


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
Department
of State
bulletin

The Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 82 / Number 2064

July 1982

**Economic
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**President Reagan's
Visit
to
Europe / 15**



Department of State bulletin

Volume 82 / Number 2064 / July 1982

The DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, published by the Office of Public Communication in the Bureau of Public Affairs, is the official record of U.S. foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide the public, the Congress, and government agencies with information on developments in U.S. foreign relations and the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIN's contents include major addresses and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State; statements made before congressional committees by the Secretary and other senior State Department officials; special features and articles on international affairs; selected press releases issued by the White House, the Department, and the U.S. Mission to the United Nations; and treaties and other agreements to which the United States is or may become a party.

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
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President Reagan Attends Economic and NATO Summits

President Reagan attended the eighth economic summit of the industrialized nations June 5-6, 1982, in Versailles, France. The other participants were French President Francois Mitterrand (chairman), Canadian Prime Minister Pierre-Elliott Trudeau, West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, Italian Prime Minister Giovanni Spadolini, Japanese Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki, and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. The European Communities was represented by Gaston Thorn, President of the Commission, and Belgian Prime Minister Wilfried Martens, President of the Council.

On June 10, President Reagan attended the North Atlantic Council summit in Bonn.

Following are statements by Secretary Haig and Treasury Secretary Donald T. Regan made at the opening of press briefings and by the President; the final communique issued at the conclusion of the economic summit; the declaration and two documents issued at the conclusion of the NATO summit; and Secretary Haig's press briefing.¹

Participants of the economic summit pose on steps of Grand Trianon, Versailles. From left to right are Gaston Thorn, President of the Economic Community Commission, Japanese Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, President Reagan, French President Francois Mitterrand (chairman), West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, Canadian Prime Minister Pierre-Elliott Trudeau, Italian Prime Minister Giovanni Spadolini, and Belgian Prime Minister Wilfried Martens.

(White House photo by Karl H. Schumacher)

ECONOMIC SUMMIT

Secretary Regan's Statement

Versailles
June 5²

As you know, we had the first session this morning. It opened a little before 10:00 a.m. The main subject for the first part, lasting through the coffee break and until about 12:30 p.m., was the subject of research, technology, employment, and growth. Each of the heads of state spoke in regard to this. President Mitterrand led off the discussion and



men later passed out copies of his paper in the subject.

The U.S. position was, as expressed by President Reagan, that we welcomed his initiative on the part of President Mitterrand, that there should be a working party that should further study the subject of technology and how to improve it.

The President cautioned, though, that this should be mainly in the private sector rather than in the public sector, pointing out that most of the innovations over the past half century or more have been in the private sector of the United States rather than through government. He gave out some figures to the effect that we are spending in the United States about \$80 billion on research and development, half of which is coming from the private sector. Of the \$40-odd billion that's in the public sector—government spending, \$5.5 billion of that is pure research, has nothing to do with applied research.

He also pointed out that a presidential study in this area that was reported to President Roosevelt in the early 1930s, as to what would be the great innovation in research and development over the next 25 years, failed to mention such things as television, plastics, space technology, jet planes, organ transplants, laser beams, "and even," he said, "such a common item," and he held up his ballpoint pen, "as a ballpoint pen." So he said, "There's no way we can predict what will be happening over the next 25 years with any degree of clarity as to what the inventions will be."

He also said that we should not fear technology because a lot of people, a lot of nations do fear that there will be higher unemployment as a result of newly introduced technology. And he used the homely illustration of the dial telephone, stating that when the dial telephone first came in, it was thought that all of the female telephone operators would be thrown out of work. He went on to say that today more than ever, there are more women employed in the United States than at any other time. And were women still on the dial—still manning the telephones—it would take every woman in the United States to

man the telephone system of the United States, if, indeed, that were possible.

He said, we shouldn't fear the results of technology but rather should welcome it. He said that it would promote growth and that it would promote more employment.

After the subject of technology had been pretty well exhausted, the summit turned to the subject of macroeconomics. President Mitterrand asked Chancellor Schmidt to lead off. Schmidt said he didn't know how he got to be a sherpa for macroeconomics, but, nevertheless, he went ahead and described his ideas of where the nations of the world stood at the current moment from an economic point of view.

Most of these facts are well-known about high unemployment in most of the nations involved in the summit—about the fact that we simultaneously have high rates of interest and a recession, which is something very unusual. He pointed out that the real rates of interest, particularly in the United States, were the highest they've ever been. He thought that this was something that all of us should work on. He said he wasn't pointing the finger at the United States, but all nations would have to get their domestic policies into effect, that there were too many transfer payments. Deficits are running too high. There's much too much public borrowing.

President Reagan then gave his intervention and in the course of it described our economy. Again, most of these facts are known to you. I'll tick them off rather quickly.

The fact that we do have high unemployment but he pointed out that the figures we received yesterday—that unemployment as a percentage is up from 9.4 to 9.5—at the same time indicated that over a million new job-seekers were in the marketplace. Of that number, 800,000 had found employment, and at the current moment, we were employing over 100 million Americans. That's the greatest number of employed Americans in our history.

He also stated that our high rates of interest were psychological in his judgment, that inflation was down. He gave the figures on inflation—a little over 6% for 12 months around, a little over 2%



(White House photo by Karl H. Schumacher)

Republicanin outside Versailles Palace.



for 6 months, less than 1% for the last 3 months; in fact, 1 month of deflation. He said that that indicated to him that interest rates would come down as soon as the fear of those who are loaning money that we could have continually high Federal deficits—those fears were allayed. And he thought that could be done by a budget process that would end in the near future with Federal deficits showing that they would be down over the next 3 months—over the next 3 years with a balanced budget in sight. And at that point, there was an adjournment for lunch.

Secretary Regan's Statement

Versailles
June 5, 1982

This afternoon the session was primarily devoted to the wrap-up of the macroeconomic statements by the heads of state. And then we get into trade, and the subjects lasted most of the day. I told you this morning earlier or early this afternoon what the President had to say about macro. When it came to trade, by that time he had left for his Saturday live radio show so I did the intervention on trade.

Our points were that we would have to come out strong for free trade and less protectionism during this summit or we might find ourselves going backwards; that the trade among free nations was the hallmark of the post-World War II era, and it was up to the summit nations to preserve what had brought prosperity to most nations over the period since that time.

The other points that we made were the need for promoting some type of rules for investment. As you know, there are rules for trade in the GATT [General Agreement in Tariffs and Trade]. There are rules for money in the IMF [International Monetary Fund], but there are no rules for international investment. And we advocated that the heads of state consider this in their communique and give instructions to the

finance ministers that they should begin discussions leading eventually toward some such rulemaking.

The other points that came up during the afternoon that might be of interest to you: There was quite an exchange among the Canadian Prime Minister, the British Prime Minister, the German Chancellor, and the President of the United States. And the subject was unemployment and inflation and whether or not there is a trade-off. If you recall the so-called Phillip's curve, that is where the more that you have inflation, the more unemployment you'll have; and the less inflation, the less unemployment.

And the President is pretty firm, sticking by his positions as to the fact that while we have a high unemployment rate in the United States, we still have, at this particular time, more employed in the United States. We have gotten our inflation rate down.

The German Chancellor's position was that interest rates and inflation actually started up way back in the time of President Lyndon Johnson and the Vietnam war. And oil prices were not the immediate cause of inflation, but they were just an additive on the road.

The other things that happened during the afternoon: There was another exchange in which the German Chancellor asked the President of the United States at what point he thought that deficits would be coming down in the United States, because he said that psychologically that was, in his judgment, keeping up interest rates. And this was having an adverse effect on the European countries, as well as the rest of the world.

The President replied that the—it's his understanding there'll be a vote in the House of Representatives next week—Wednesday probably or sometime around that—regarding at least two different budgets. He was hopeful, with the passage of one of those—a reconciliation between the House and the Senate—that the United States would have a budget with deficits trending down.

The British Prime Minister picked up on that and said that in her opinion the trend was the most important thing, not the absolute level because we all needed that.

growth of each country and a consequence of that growth. We reaffirm our commitment to strengthening the open multilateral trading system as embodied in the GATT and to maintaining its effective operation. In order to promote stability and employment through trade and growth, we will resist protectionist pressures and trade-distorting practices. We are resolved to complete the work of the Tokyo Round and to improve the capacity of the GATT to solve current and future trade problems. We will also work towards the further opening of our markets. We will cooperate with the developing countries to strengthen and improve the multilateral system and to expand trading opportunities in particular with the newly industrialized countries. We shall participate fully in the forthcoming GATT Ministerial Conference in order to take concrete steps towards these ends. We shall work for early agreement on the renewal of the OECD export credit consensus.

- We agree to pursue a prudent and diversified economic approach to the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe, consistent with our political and security interests. This includes actions in three key areas. First, following international discussions in January, our representatives will work together to improve the international system for controlling exports of strategic goods to these countries and national arrangements for the enforcement of security controls. Second, we will exchange information in the OECD on all aspects of our economic, commercial and financial relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Third, taking into account existing economic and financial considerations, we have agreed to handle cautiously financial relations with the U.S.S.R. and other Eastern European countries in such a way as to ensure that they are conducted on a sound economic basis, including also the need for commercial prudence in limiting export credits. The development of economic and financial relations will be subject to periodic ex-post review.

- The progress we have already made does not diminish the need for continuing efforts to economise on energy, particularly through the price mechanism, and to promote alternative sources, including nuclear energy and coal, in a long-term perspective. These efforts will enable us further to reduce our vulnerability to interruptions in the supply of



energy and instability of prices. Cooperation to develop new energy technologies, and to strengthen our capacity to deal with disruptions, can contribute to our common energy security. We shall also work to strengthen our cooperation with both oil-exporting and oil-importing developing countries.

- The growth of the developing countries and the deepening of a constructive relationship with them are vital for the political and economic well-being of the whole world. It is, therefore, important that a high level of financial flows and official assistance should be maintained and that their amount and their effectiveness should be increased as far as possible, with responsibilities shared broadly among all countries capable of making a contribution. The launching of global negotiations is a major political objective approved by all participants in the summit. The latest draft resolution circulated by the Group of the 77 is helpful, and the discussion at Versailles showed general acceptance of the view that it would serve as a basis for consultations with the countries concerned. We believe that there is now a good prospect for the early launching and success of the global negotiations, provided that the independence of the specialized agencies is guaranteed. At the same time, we are prepared to continue and develop practical cooperation with the developing countries through innovations within the World Bank, through our support of the work of the regional development banks, through progress in countering instability of commodity export earnings, through the encouragement of private capital flows, including international arrangements to improve the conditions for private investment, and through a further concentration of official assistance on


the poorer countries. This is why we see a need for special temporary arrangements to overcome funding problems for IDA [International Development Association] VI, and for an early start to consideration of IDA VII. We will give special encouragement to programmes or arrangements designed to increase food and energy production in developing countries which have to import these essentials, and to programmes to address the implications of population growth.

- In the field of balance of payments support, we look forward to progress at the September IMF annual meeting towards settling the increase in the size of the Fund appropriate to the coming eighth quota review.

- Revitalization and growth of the world economy will depend not only on our own efforts but also to a large extent upon cooperation among our countries and with other countries in the exploitation of scientific and technological development. We have to exploit the immense opportunities presented by the new technologies, particularly for creating new employment. We need to remove barriers to, and to promote the development of the trade in new technologies both in the public sector and in the private sector. Our countries will need to train men and women in the new technologies and to create the economic, social and cultural conditions which allow these technologies to develop and flourish. We have considered the report presented to us on these issues by the President of the French Republic. In this context we have decided to set up promptly a working group of representatives of our governments and of the European Community to develop, in consultation with the appropriate international institutions, especially the OECD, proposals to give help to attain these objectives. This group will be asked to submit its report to us by 31 December 1982. The conclusions of the report and the resulting action will be considered at the next economic summit to be held in 1983 in the United States of America.

Statement of International Monetary Undertakings

1. We accept a joint responsibility to work for greater stability of the world monetary system. We recognize that this rests primarily on convergence of policies designed to

Economic
and
NATO
SummitsSecretary Haig's
StatementVersailles
June 6, 1982³

The primary purpose of this briefing, of course, is to cover the political highlights of the just concluded summit. But I know that all of you are very concerned, as are we, about the worsening situation in Lebanon, and I thought I would say a few words about that at the outset and get it behind us and to take care of your concerns.

We have been watching this situation moment by moment as it unfolds. The President has followed it throughout the day and has shared with his colleagues during the plenary session the updates that we had as they developed to include the fact of his communication very early this morning with Prime Minister Begin and the response received later this afternoon from Mr. Begin.

That response was consistent with the decision made by the Israeli Cabinet and announced in Jerusalem which reads as follows: "The Cabinet took the following decision, first, to instruct the Israeli defense forces to place all civilian population of the Galilee beyond the range of the terrorist fire from Lebanon where they, their bases, and their headquarters are concentrated. The name of the operation is Peace for Galilee. During the operation, the Syrian Army will not be attacked unless it attacks the Israeli forces. Israel continues to aspire to the signing of the peace treaty with an independent Lebanon, its territorial integrity preserved."

That is the brief text, which you may or may not have seen from Israel.

We are, of course, extremely concerned about the escalating cycle of violence. The President, yesterday afternoon, asked Ambassador Habib [Philip C. Habib, the President's special emissary to the Middle East] to proceed here posthaste. He met with Ambassador Habib this afternoon and decided to send him directly to Israel as

his personal representative to conduct discussions on an urgent basis with Prime Minister Begin. The President also dispatched an urgent message to Prime Minister Begin, telling him of his decision to do so. I anticipate that Phil will proceed on to Rome this evening and, hopefully, will arrive in Israel early tomorrow morning.

In the last 48 hours at the President's direction, we have been engaged in an intense degree of diplomatic activity in the United Nations in New York, where we firmly supported the resolution urging an immediate cease-fire. And as you know, President Reagan joined this morning with the other members of the summit in issuing a statement urging a responsive reaction to the U.N. resolution.

We have been in touch with the Government of Israel for a prolonged period on the situation in Lebanon, always urging restraint, and always hoping, as we continue to hope, that the cease-fire can, even at this late date, be reinstated. As of now, we are informed that there are two Israeli military columns that crossed into Lebanon from Israel, one proceeding along the coast road in the direction of Tyre and the other through the upper Galilee panhandle. The penetration in the latter case has been approximately 10 kilometers, in the former case perhaps 3 or 4 kilometers.

We are extremely disturbed by the loss of innocent lives in this fighting on the Israeli-Lebanese border. It has involved, as you know, the exchange of artillery and rockets for a prolonged period preceding the Israeli ground penetration. We are concerned also that the fighting not be expanded into a broader conflict and are acutely conscious of the presence of Syrian forces in fairly close proximity to the eastern penetration. We will do our best to convey to the Government of Syria the stated intentions of the Government of Israel not to engage unless engaged by Syrian forces.

I know that Don Regan has talked to you at length about the economic

achieve lower inflation, higher employment and renewed economic growth; and thus to maintain the internal and external values of our currencies. We are determined to discharge this obligation in close collaboration with all interested countries and monetary institutions.

2. We attach major importance to the role of the IMF as a monetary authority and we will give it our full support in its efforts to foster stability.

3. We are ready to strengthen our cooperation with the IMF in its work of surveillance; and to develop this on a multilateral basis taking into account particularly the currencies constituting the SDR [special drawing rights].

4. We rule out the use of our exchange rates to gain unfair competitive advantages.

5. We are ready, if necessary, to use intervention in exchange markets to counter disorderly conditions, as provided for under Article IV of the IMF Articles of Agreement.



6. Those of us who are members of the EMS [European Monetary System] consider that these undertakings are complementary to the obligations of stability which they have already undertaken in that framework and recognize the role of the system in the further development of stability in the international monetary system.

7. We are all convinced that greater monetary stability will assist freer flows of goods, services and capital. We are determined to see that greater monetary stability and freer flows of trade and capital reinforce one another in the interest of economic growth and employment.

deliberations in the summit itself, and I'm not going to rehash them unless you have a question. But I think the general consensus of view on almost every topic was evident. I think President Reagan's interventions throughout the deliberations were extensive, impressive, and had an enormous impact on the shaping of the communique itself and the overall tone and direction of the deliberations; especially was he impressive in analyzing the various economic factors that have contributed to the inflationary spiral, declining levels of economic growth, and increased unemployment. I think it was an invaluable exchange of views between the leaders on these subjects, which admittedly, are viewed from the perspective of the internal policies and affairs of the member governments but which are all affected enormously by American policies, plans, and the progress that we are making in our own economic reforms.

On the political side, which is, of course, the essence of my concerns, in the several sessions, luncheons, evening sessions, dinners, in the margins, as well as some instances at the plenaries themselves, there was a great deal of discussion about political affairs. And I'll touch upon some of the key issues in a moment. I think, clearly, there is unanimous concern, as you would expect, that the implications of the continuing growth in Soviet military capabilities, continuing concern about the lack of progress in the continuing occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, continued repression in Poland, as well as other Soviet interventionist activities.

These issues, of course, will be addressed in even greater detail at the Bonn summit which will take place early next week. In discussing the Soviet challenge, the President argued that Moscow's economic problem and its impending succession crisis, as I told you the other day, provided a rich and important opportunity for Western nations operating in concert and employing their political, economic, and security assets to influence a greater degree of restraint and responsibility on the part of the Soviet Union. It was clear that the consensus in this direction was

broad. There are, of course, differences in where these assets can best be applied and how they best can be applied based again on a demography—the demographic aspects of the country concerned—and a particular role that they can play.

We, of course, welcome agreement on exercising prudence on handling the finances with the Soviet Union, including limits on export credits. You will note that we talked about a continuing monitorship of this. And for the first time, the seven who are not exclusively involved—the OECD is involved—all Western creditor nations, and some of the nonaligned are neutral nations—are involved. But for the first time, we developed a consensus for the need to pull together all of the facts associated with trade and credit with the East, not just the Soviet Union but Eastern Europe as well, to analyze and assess and draw conclusions from this.

You will note also that there was a reinforcement of the decision made at Ottawa to continue to broaden the controls on the transfer of sensitive technology to the Soviet Union.

The President's decision to pursue a new arms control approach, one that focused on significant reductions, was unanimously and warmly welcomed by all the participants. The President made it clear that the United States is, indeed, prepared to have a serious dialogue with the Soviet Union.

As I noted yesterday, the heads of state addressed a number of regional security issues, including the South Atlantic crisis and the Iran-Iraq war. To that was added today, of course, extensive discussion on the crisis in Lebanon, which I have already touched upon.

The margins and the luncheons provided an opportunity to discuss again the scourge of international terrorism, and the recent events associated with the Lebanon crisis drew everyone's attention to this continuing problem.

There were discussions, as I told you yesterday, on the need for youth exchanges—youth exchanges between the United States and Japan, Europe and the United States, and Japan and Europe.

Now I want to say a word about the Falklands. That clearly was a very heavily discussed aspect of this summit, especially in the informal meetings of the leaders themselves. From the U.S. point of view, I want to restate tonight very clearly that it is the President's policy that aggression must not be allowed to succeed, and if the Argentine invasion of the Falklands was allowed to stand uncontested, this would have an impact on the security of small states everywhere.

I want to say another word despite my efforts last evening to dispense with the question of the U.N. resolution; that the difference in assessment between veto and abstention should in no way be interpreted as any lessening of U.S. support for the principle involved, which Great Britain is upholding, nor has it changed in any way the levels of support and dedication to support that the United States announced earlier with respect to the conflict. We may have differences in the context of assessments of the particular U.N. resolution, as, indeed, we would expect to do from time to time. After all, the United States makes its decisions based on its own national interests.

I want to make it clear that we have not asked for a military pause, considering this is a judgment, as I have said repeatedly, for Great Britain and commanders on the ground to make and to assess.

We remain confident after the dis-





Economic and NATO Summits

ussions—the extensive discussions between the President and Mrs. Thatcher here, the discussions I've had with Foreign Minister Pym—that we share a common view with Britain; that the crisis in the South Atlantic should be solved with a minimum loss of life. And I would like to note tonight that the notion of a honorable withdrawal for Argentine forces remains still available.

NATO SUMMIT

Declaration

Ann
June 10, 1982

We, the representatives of the 16 members of the North Atlantic Alliance, reaffirm our dedication to the shared values and ideals on which our transatlantic partnership is based.

2. The accession of Spain to the North Atlantic Treaty, after its peaceful change to parliamentary democracy, bears witness to the vitality of the Alliance as a force for peace and freedom.

3. Our Alliance has preserved peace for a century. It is an association of free nations joined together to preserve their security through mutual guarantees and collective self-defence as recognized by the United Nations Charter. It remains the essential instrument for deterring aggression and means of a strong defence and strengthening peace by means of constructive dialogue. Our solidarity in no way conflicts with the right of each of our countries to choose its own policies and internal development, and laws for a high degree of diversity. Therein lies our strength. In a spirit of mutual respect, we are prepared to adjust our aims and interests at all times through free and open consultations; these are the core of everyday Allied co-operation and will be intensified appropriately. We are a partnership of equals, none dominant and none dominated.

4. The Soviet Union, for its part, requires the countries associated with it to act as a bloc, in order to preserve a rigid and imposed system. Moreover, experience shows that the Soviet Union is ultimately willing to threaten the use of force beyond its own frontiers. Afghanistan and the Soviet attitude with regard to the Polish crisis show this clearly.

The Soviet Union has devoted over the past decade a large part of its resources to a massive military build-up, far exceeding its defence needs and supporting the projection of military power on a global scale. While creating a threat of these dimensions, Warsaw Pact governments condemn Western defence efforts as aggressive. While they ban unilateral disarmament movements in their own countries, they support demands for unilateral disarmament in the West.

5. International stability and world peace require greater restraint and responsibility on the part of the Soviet Union. We, for our part, reaffirming the principles and purposes of the Alliance, set forth our Programme for Peace in Freedom:

(a) Our purpose is to prevent war and, while safeguarding democracy, to build the foundations of lasting peace. None of our weapons will ever be used except in response to attack. We respect the sovereignty, equality, independence and territorial integrity of all states. In fulfillment of our purpose, we shall maintain adequate military strength and political solidarity. On that basis, we will persevere in efforts to establish, whenever Soviet behaviour makes this possible, a more constructive East-West relationship through dialogue, negotiation and mutually advantageous co-operation.

(b) Our purpose is to preserve the security of the North Atlantic area by means of conventional and nuclear forces adequate to deter aggression and intimidation. This requires a sustained effort on the part of all the Allies to improve their defence readiness and military capabilities, without seeking military superiority. Our countries have the necessary resources to undertake this effort. The presence of North American armed forces in Europe and the United States strategic nuclear commitment to Europe remain integral to Allied security. Of equal importance are the maintenance and continued improvement of the defence capabilities of the European members of the Alliance. We will seek to achieve greater effectiveness in the application of national resources to defence, giving due attention to possibilities for developing areas of practical co-operation. In this respect the Allies concerned will urgently explore ways to take full advantage both technically and economically of emerging technologies. At the same time steps will be taken in the appropriate fora to restrict Warsaw Pact access to Western militarily relevant technology.

(c) Our purpose is to have a stable balance of forces at the lowest possible level,



thereby strengthening peace and international security. We have initiated a comprehensive series of proposals for militarily significant, equitable and verifiable agreements on the control and reduction of armaments. We fully support the efforts of the United States to negotiate with the Soviet Union for substantial reductions in the strategic nuclear weapons of the two countries, and for the establishment of strict and effective limitations on their intermediate-range nuclear weapons, starting with the total elimination of their land-based intermediate-range missiles, which are of most concern to each side. We will continue to seek substantial reductions of conventional forces on both sides in Europe, and to reach agreement on measures which will serve to build confidence and enhance security in the whole of Europe. To this end, those of us whose countries participate in the negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Vienna have agreed on a new initiative to give fresh impetus to these negotiations. We will also play an active part in wider international talks on arms control and disarmament; at the Second United Nations Special Session on Disarmament which has just opened in New York, we will work to give new momentum to these talks.

(d) Our purpose is to develop substantial and balanced East-West relations aimed at genuine detente. For this to be achieved, the sovereignty of all states, wherever situated, must be respected, human rights must not be sacrificed to state interests, the free movement of ideas must take the place of one-sided propaganda, the free movement of persons must be made possible, efforts must be made to achieve a military relationship characterised by stability and openness and in general all principles and provisions of the

Helsinki Final Act in their entirety must be applied. We, for our part, will always be ready to negotiate in this spirit and we look for tangible evidence that this attitude is reciprocated.

(e) Our purpose is to contribute to peaceful progress worldwide; we will work to remove the causes of instability such as under-development or tensions which encourage outside interference. We will continue to play our part in the struggle against hunger and poverty. Respect for genuine non-alignment is important for international stability. All of us have an interest in peace and security in other regions of the world. We will consult together as appropriate on events in these regions which may have implications for our security, taking into account our commonly identified objectives. Those of us who are in a position to do so will endeavor to respond to requests for assistance from sovereign states whose security and independence is threatened.

(f) Our purpose is to ensure economic and social stability for our countries, which will strengthen our joint capacity to safeguard our security. Sensitive to the effects of each country's policies on others, we attach the greatest importance to the curbing of inflation and a return to sustained growth and to high levels of employment.

While noting the important part which our economic relations with the Warsaw Pact countries can play in the development of a stable East-West relationship, we will approach those relations in a prudent and diversified manner consistent with our political and security interests. Economic relations should be conducted on the basis of a balanced advantage for both sides. We undertake to manage financial relations with the Warsaw Pact countries on a sound economic basis, including commercial prudence also in the granting of export credits. We agree to exchange information in the appropriate fora on all aspects of our economic, commercial and financial relations with Warsaw Pact countries.

6. Nowhere has our commitment to common basic values been demonstrated more clearly than with regard to the situation in Germany and Berlin. We remain committed to the security and freedom of Berlin and continue to support efforts to maintain the calm situation in and around the city. The continued success of efforts by the Federal Republic of Germany to improve the relationship between the two German states is important to the safeguarding of peace in Europe. We recall that the rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers relating to Berlin and

Germany as a whole remain unaffected and confirm our support for the political objective of the Federal Republic of Germany to work towards a state of peace in Europe in which the German people regains its unity through free self-determination.

7. We condemn all acts of international terrorism. They constitute flagrant violations of human dignity and rights and are a threat to the conduct of normal international relations. In accordance with our national legislation, we stress the need for the most effective co-operation possible to prevent and suppress this scourge.

8. We call upon the Soviet Union to abide by internationally accepted standards of behaviour without which there can be no prospect of stable international relations, and to join now with us in the search for constructive relations, arms reductions and world peace.



Document on Arms Control and Disarmament

Bonn
June 10, 1982

As indicated in our Declaration of today, we, the representatives of the 16 members of the North Atlantic Alliance, hereby set out our detailed positions on Arms Control and Disarmament:

Militarily significant, equitable and verifiable agreements on arms control and disarmament contribute to the strengthening

of peace and are an integral part of our security policies. Western proposals offer the possibilities of substantial reductions in United States and Soviet strategic arms and intermediate-range weapons and in conventional forces in Europe, as well as of confidence-building measures covering the whole of Europe:

- In the forthcoming Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), we call on the Soviet Union to agree on significant reductions in United States and Soviet strategic nuclear forces, focused on the most destabilizing inter-continental systems.

- In the negotiations on Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) which are conducted within the START framework and are based on the December 1979 decision on INF modernization and arms control,⁴ the United States proposal for the complete elimination of all longer-range land-based INF missiles of the United States and the Soviet Union holds promise for an equitable outcome and enhanced security for all.


- Those of us participating in the Vienna negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) will soon present a draft treaty embodying a new, comprehensive proposal designed to give renewed momentum to these negotiations and achieve the long-standing objective of enhancing stability and security in Europe. They stress that the Western treaty proposal, if accepted, will commit all participants whose forces are involved—European and North American—to participate in accordance with the principle of collectivity in substantial manpower reductions leading to equal collective ceilings for the forces of Eastern and Western participants in Central Europe, based on agreed data, with associated measures designed to strengthen confidence and enhance verification.

- In CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] the proposal for a Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe as part of a balanced outcome of the Madrid CSCE Follow-up meeting would open the way to increased transparency and enhanced stability in the whole of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.

At the same time, we are continuing our efforts to promote stable peace on a global scale:

- In the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, the Allies will actively pursue efforts to obtain equitable and verifiable agreements including a total ban on chemical weapons.

- In the Second Special Session on Disarmament of the United Nations General



Economic and NATO Summits

sembly now in progress, we trust that new
petus will be given to negotiations current
d in prospect, especially by promoting
ilitary openness and verification, that the
ed for strict observance of the principle of
unciation of force enshrined in the United
tions Charter will be reaffirmed and that
mpliance with existing agreements will be
engthened.

We appeal to all states to co-operate with
in these efforts to strengthen peace and
urity. In particular we call on the Soviet
ion to translate its professed commitment
disarmament into active steps aimed at
chieving concrete, balanced and verifiable
ults at the negotiating table.

Document on Integrated NATO Defense

Ann
June 10, 1982

indicated in the Declaration of today, we,
representatives of those members of the
North Atlantic Alliance taking part in its in-
tegrated defence structure, hereby set out
detailed positions on defence. We
welcome the intention of Spain to participate
in the integrated defence structure, and the
readiness of the President of the Spanish
Government to associate himself with this
document, while noting that the modalities of
Spanish participation have still to be worked
out.



Pursuant to the principles set out in the
Programme for Peace and Freedom, we
agree that, in accordance with current NATO
defence plans, and within the context of
NATO strategy and its triad of forces, we
will continue to strengthen NATO's defence
posture, with special regard to conventional
forces. Efforts of our nations in support of
the decisions reached at Washington in 1978
have led to improved defensive capabilities.
Notwithstanding this progress, it is clear, as
documented in the recently published com-
parison of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces,
that continuing efforts are essential to
Alliance security. Against this background,
we will:

- Fulfill to the greatest extent possible
the NATO Force Goals for the next six years,
including measures to improve the readiness
of the standing forces and the readiness and
mobilization capability of reserve forces. Note
was taken of the recently concluded agree-
ment between the United States and the
Federal Republic of Germany for wartime
host nation support.

- Continue to implement measures iden-
tified in the Long-Term Defence Programme
designed to enhance our overall defence
capabilities.

- Continue to improve NATO planning
procedures and explore other ways of achiev-
ing greater effectiveness in the application of
national resources to defence, especially in
the conventional field. In that regard, we will
continue to give due attention to fair burden-
sharing and to possibilities for developing
areas of practical co-operation from which we
can all benefit.

- Explore ways to take full advantage
both technically and economically of emerg-
ing technologies, especially to improve con-
ventional defence, and take steps necessary
to restrict the transfer of militarily relevant
technology to the Warsaw Pact.

Noting that developments beyond the
NATO area may threaten our vital interests,
we reaffirm the need to consult with a view
to sharing assessments and identifying com-
mon objectives, taking full account of the ef-
fect on NATO security and defence capabili-
ty, as well as of the national interests of
member countries. Recognising that the
policies which nations adopt in this field are a
matter for national decision, we agree to ex-
amine collectively in the appropriate NATO
bodies the requirements which may arise for
the defence of the NATO area as a result of
deployments by individual member states out-
side that area. Steps which may be taken by
individual Allies in the light of such consulta-
tions to facilitate possible military deploy-
ments beyond the NATO area can represent
an important contribution to Western
security.



Secretary Haig's Press Briefing

Bonn
June 10, 1982⁵

I would describe this as a historic day
for the NATO alliance, due primarily,
but not exclusively, to Spain's formal en-
try into NATO. It is a step of vital im-
portance to both the alliance and to
Spain. The entry of Spain is a clear
demonstration of the continuing appeal
and vitality of the alliance of some 33
years' life span.

This summit meeting and the docu-
ments that were adopted by the meeting
today also demonstrated that NATO
represents Western values at their very
best. I'm particularly pleased with the
communiqué and associated documents
that were released on arms control and
the strengthening of our conventional
defenses. They reflect a year of very
solid work within the framework of the
alliance on a number of key areas, and, I
think, it was appropriate that they
should be in all of the considerations
contained in those documents. I would
urge you to study them carefully; they
are a keen reflection of the views of the
U.S. Government, as well as a
manifestation of a solid consensus within
the framework of the alliance itself.

I think we have here a framework
for the decade of the 1980s which has

been established, which is both contemporary in its recognition of needs in the area of balanced defenses for the alliance; the need for arms control, and the integration of political, economic, and security assets of the Western world to elicit what we hope will be an era of restraint and responsibility on the part of the Soviet Union under a framework which is coordinated, integrated, and fully accepted by all member states. I think that is extremely important.

I want to say a word about the summit declaration itself which sends the strongest message in memory to the Soviet Union—certainly in recent memory. It clearly contrasted how NATO is fundamentally different from the Warsaw Pact. Our alliance is an open partnership based on consensus and democracy. Its diversity is also its strength. The Warsaw Pact is a strained association, a forced marriage dominated by a single government. It is unresponsive in many ways to the needs of the peoples that it is designed to protect. It is afraid of freedom, wary of diversity. The West has again called on the U.S.S.R. to show restraint and responsibility in its behavior, and that's a clear message and signal throughout the communique.

The statement on defense, which we consider to be especially significant and important, reaffirms NATO's strategy at a time when it has become fashionable to question something that has kept and preserved the peace in Western Europe and, indeed, in the East-West sense, for the 33-years' life span of the alliance itself. It reflects top-level agreement on the needs to improve NATO's conventional defense posture, including the rapid deployment and reserve forces. It emphasizes full employment of emerging technologies; a need to protect our Western technological advantage. You'll recall that that surfaced earlier in both Ottawa and subsequent NATO ministerial meetings.

It emphasized the importance of growing cooperation by the allies to insure security and stability in critical regions elsewhere in the world. And here again, it was anathema some years

ago to speak an alliance parlance of anything. Outside this strict geographic confines of the alliance itself, we have now developed a consensus of agreement that, like it or not, the alliance is increasingly influenced by events outside of the geographic confines of the alliance, and, therefore, those nations with essential interest must coordinate and consult together in dealing with them, not within the alliance framework but as a framework for watching briefs and continuous exchange of information.

There is also a very important statement on arms control. It makes absolutely clear that it is the Western alliance which has the ideas and the initiatives in seeking a dialogue with the East in this very important area. The document itself strongly endorses the major aspects of President Reagan's own peace program. It supports U.S. objectives in START and the U.S. approach to the Geneva negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces based on the December 1979 decision. It announces Western readiness to invigorate the Vienna negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions, now in their ninth year; through a new approach aimed at lower and more equal force levels in central Europe—700,000 per ground, 900 for the aggregate ground, sea, and air. And, it signals a strong Western interest in the possibilities for a constructive dialogue offered by the U.N. Special Session on Disarmament and other arms control fora.

As important as these Western initiatives are, the appeal that NATO has made today, once again, to the Soviet Union to match its professions of peaceful intentions with actions leading to results, I think is a very important theme in the overall deliberations. As the Danish Prime Minister said today, "the search light is now on Moscow."


I think for many of us, the highlight of the summit which was a very well prepared summit and, therefore, permitted the heads of state and government to make their own separate interventions without a great deal of what I call "heated dispute" about remaining controversies—that says something for the

quality of the preparations that were made. It was President Reagan's intervention at the conclusion this afternoon; it was an ad-libbed, if you will, or unstructured personal intervention that ran about 10 minutes, I would say, give or take—and, it clearly summarized the President's own view on East-West relations. It was both powerful as it was ex tempore; it reiterated in clear terms the President's willingness to have a genuine dialogue with the Soviets but one based on Soviet restraint.

It talked about the experience we had in the decade of the 1970s with the 1970 interpretation of detente, a formula to which we witnessed increasing Soviet interventionisms worldwide—in Africa, the Middle East, the Yemens, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, and once again in this Western Hemisphere. You will note the language in the communique refers to something different than the classic 1970 version. It refers to genuine detente. In other words, there is an abandonment of the principle of dialogue and the desire to reach agreements and the meeting of the mind with the Soviet Union, but to do so not with words but by a continuous assessment of actions with a heavy emphasis on reciprocity.

I think in the President's intervention, he referred to the situation in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. He painted clearly a picture of hope for the future by emphasizing the demographic assets available to the Western world if properly integrated and orchestrated. He referred to those in political terms, our essential democratic values; in economic terms, the vast superiority of Western industrialized societies; and, of course, the security assets of the collection of alliance members all integrated.

I think the President drew the conclusion, as many of us have, that if we abandon the self-consciousness of the recent decade, the sense of inadequacy or perhaps even inevitability, and apprise with full frankness and openness what we have going for us, and apply those assets intelligently, moderately, but with vision and steadiness of purpose, that there is, indeed, hope. The President referred to his communication with Mr.

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Summits

Brezhnev at the time that he was convalescing from his wound, how he suggested to Mr. Brezhnev that if the governments themselves could step aside and that the peoples could communicate each other's wishes, aspirations, and desires that clearly a new world structure for peace and stability would be an inevitable outcome. And he ecried the continual manipulation of the wishes and desires of the people by insensitive government.

All in all, as I would like to emphasize that I personally feel extremely pleased with the outcome of this summit meeting. I suppose it's because of my own NATO background, understandable. As I say, it reflects a year of solid positive work and progress in consensusbuilding. It confirms that the alliance itself not only alive and healthy but that it has never been better.

There were other meetings today on the margin. There were discussions about the Middle East. There was a registration of support for Great Britain's actions in the Falklands. The president has bilaterals with the Prime Minister of Spain, with the Prime Minister of Greece, and he met at the conclusion of the summit with Foreign Minister Saud of Saudi Arabia.

Q. Can you tell us anything about the communications you received from the Saudis today?

A. Yes. The foreign minister's visit as one requested about 2 or 3 days ago in the wake of the Lebanon crisis.

Q. Who requested it?

A. The Saudi Government. His highness brought an oral communication from King Khalid, which was essentially a registration of serious concerns about the continued deterioration of the situation in Lebanon and the long-term consequences of this.

Q. Did he give any examples of possible consequences as it went on?

A. No. This was an exchange of views between friendly governments—two leaders who have enjoyed an unusually cordial and frank relationship over the span of President Reagan's incumbency.

Q. What progress, if any, toward achieving a cease-fire? Has there been any progress?

A. I would be remiss were I to suggest there had been no progress. There have been detailed discussions in Damascus and in Jerusalem. Those discussions continue, but it's clear that the advance of the Israeli military forces has become extensive. They are on the outskirts of Beirut on the west and well into the Bekaa Valley in the east. There have been heavy clashes in the Bekaa Valley in the air today. The Israeli Government has mobilized its 880th Armored Division, moving it north. There are some additional indications of increased Syrian readiness, movement of missile units. Eight MiGs have been claimed today in the conflict. As you know last night the Israeli Government claimed to have knocked out all the missiles in Bekaa Valley.

Q. You sound like you're describing a movement toward a general war.

A. No, I certainly don't think that, and I don't describe it. But I do think that an operation as extensive as this, of course, always contains overtones that could result in an expansion un contemplated or unwanted.

Q. Is there any sign of Soviet resupply to Syria?

A. We have no evidence of it at this time, but their resupply of Syria has been rather steady over an extensive period. But we don't see any dramatic step-up that would be abnormal yet.

Q. What was the President's reaction prior to Prince Saud's saying he would provide whatever war materiel to Yassir Arafat needed to drive out the Israelis?

A. That did not come up in any discussions that I sat in on, and I think I heard it all. It may have been said to the press later, but it was not said to the President.

Q. Is the impatience of our government growing because Israel is unwilling to agree to a cease-fire?

A. We are concerned. I was asked this morning to visit Jerusalem, and I thought about it as I've assessed the various positions today. I think I would say that the discussions we had with the Israelis today have not evidenced sufficient flexibility to make a visit worthwhile at this time.

Q. What is your reaction to the communique of the Ten Common Market Foreign Ministers last night—very strongly worded toward Israel? And, what was the deliberation of the NATO Council with regard to the situation today?

A. Let me take your second question first. Clearly, there was a great number of expressions of concern around the table about the situation in Lebanon. As you know, it's not the role of the alliance to take a position on a crisis solely outside of its area. I talked about that a moment ago. On the other hand, the leaders did enfranchise the Secretary General to express their concern and their hope that the bloodshed would soon be brought to a conclusion. And, I would say that was the unanimous sense of concern around the table, but it was not dealt with.

The answer to the first part of your question, of course, the Ten have a right to do what they want within the confines of that fora. We are not members, and it wouldn't be appropriate for me to indulge in any value judgments.

Q. What was the nature of President Brezhnev's message to the President? What was its tone?

A. I think it was a frank expression of Soviet concern about the widening military conflict in Lebanon.

Q. Did it indicate any Soviet action?

A. I'm not going to go into any detail. I think it is very inappropriate to do that in diplomatic communications, other than to give you the general flavor.

Q. Who initiated the exchange? Who first contacted whom?

A. The Soviet Union.



(White House photo by Michael Evans)

Prior to the opening ceremony of the NATO summit, the President meets with Joseph M.A.H. Luns, Secretary General of NATO and chairman of the the North Atlantic Council.

Q. Was there an exchange, or just one letter from Brezhnev? What was the response?

A. The President always responds to the correspondence. He did.

Q. Could you clarify that? What was the response from the President—what was it all about?

A. Let's just say it was responsive to the tone of the letter that came in.

Q. Was the exchange with Brezhnev what precipitated President Reagan's message to Begin?

A. No, not at all.

Q. Has the United States been able to ascertain what the Israeli goals and objectives are in this invasion?

A. Go back to the public communication we had which was not different from the original communication from Mr. Begin to President Reagan

which talked about a zone of 40 kilometers depth in which Israel hoped to eliminate the continuing threat from rockets, katusha, artillery, and terrorist activity across or infiltrations through third countries into Israel.

Q. Do you know what their new objectives are?

A. No.

Q. When the United States voted to support the U.N. resolution to have a cease-fire along—

A. 508?

Q. Yes—along with Israeli withdrawal? My question really is, do we still support that resolution? Do we still insist on Israeli withdrawal and is that the hang-up and the reason you are not going to Jerusalem?

A. No, it's far more complex than that, and we do still support 508. We voted for it. We've continued through diplomatic channels to try to assist in its implementation.

Q. You said 2 or 3 days ago that we were reassessing the question of supplying arms to Israel based on assessing their intentions, whether or not they had gone beyond the 25-mile zone. You have now described that they are well beyond it. Where does that decision stand, first place; second

place, is the United States concerned at all, after your meeting with Prince Saud, about American interests in the Arab world and whether or not the Arab world will swing toward a more extreme position as a result of this invasion?

A. I wouldn't want to make any predictions about the direction of the Arab world, but I can certainly assure you that, from the outset, we have been concerned about the impact of the crisis in Lebanon on our relationships with moderate Arab friends, those with whom we have maintained traditional ties of friendship and coordination and cooperation. There can be no question about that. That has become somewhat more sharply edged in the last 48 hours.

Q. Who asked you to go to Jerusalem? Was it the Secretary of Labor? You said you were asked to go. Do you mean someone in their government or someone in our government?

A. I was invited by Israel.


¹Texts from press releases issued by the White House, the Department of State, the economic summit participants, and NATO. The Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of June 7 and 14, 1982, contains all material relating to the President's participation in the two summits.

²Made at L'Orangerie Press Center, Versailles.

³Press release 192 of June 16.

⁴In this connection Greece reserves its position [text in original].

⁵Press release 197 of June 16. ■

Visit
to
Europe

President Reagan Visits Europe

President Reagan made state visits to several European capitals June 2-11. The President visited Paris and Versailles to attend the eighth economic summit of the industrialized nations held June 5-6 at Versailles (see previous article); Vatican City and Rome, June 7; London and Windsor, June 7-9; and Bonn and Berlin, June 9-11 to attend the North Atlantic Council summit held in Bonn June 10 (see previous article).

Following are remarks, addresses, statements, and luncheon and dinner toasts made by the President and other heads of state, statements made by Secretary Haig at the opening of press briefings, and a joint U.S.-Italy statement.¹

FRANCE

Secretary Haig's Statement

Paris
June 3, 1982²

am going to make a very few remarks about the first series of working meetings today on the—our first day in Europe.

They took place at a working luncheon with President Mitterrand and President Reagan that lasted about 1½ hours and which covered a broad range of regional, security-related and bilateral issues between the two governments and peoples.

As you know, the summit officially begins tomorrow so both leaders were reluctant to deal, in any depth, with the subjects which should be included on the agenda when all seven leaders of the western industrialized nations, including Japan, convene at Versailles tomorrow evening.

Instead, they used this opportunity

to extend the very warm personal relationship and rapport that has developed between the two leaders—this being the fourth meeting between the two men since they both assumed their responsibilities—the last was a personal visit by President Mitterrand to Washington last March. They used it as an opportunity and, of course, because of the extensive rapport already established and the warmth of friendship, to move to issues of mutual concern in the domestic scene in both countries and to exchange insights on several important global situations of a regional character.

That included the Falklands question—its near-time consequences and its long-term consequences. It involved an exchange of views on the Middle East with a very special focus on the conflict between Iran and Iraq and the concern of both leaders that this conflict not expand, that the territorial integrity of the countries involved be preserved, and that international attention be focused on international efforts to bring this conflict to a peaceful conclusion.

With respect to the Falklands, of course, both leaders are concerned that bloodshed terminate at the earliest possible date and that the conflict be resolved within the framework of U.N. Resolution 502 which, from the outset, has enjoyed the support of both governments and which has been the fundamental premise upon which the United States has conducted its policies toward this very difficult situation in the South Atlantic.

In the exchange of domestic issues, it is clear that both leaders approach economic issues from a different philosophic base. Nevertheless, they are seeking common objectives—the reduction of excess levels of federal central government spending, and high levels of unemployment in the return to a cycle of prosperity.

President Reagan noted the success that his Administration had achieved in bringing down the very high levels of inflation that he found upon assuming office. He also expressed some disappointment that he was unable to arrive in

Europe with a budget compromise in hand—one that would have brought the projected American deficits in the period ahead down substantially and, thereby, influence more substantially the interest rates which are of such concern on both sides of the Atlantic today.

In sum, it's important to characterize these first of two series of meetings. There'll be further meetings this evening with President Mitterrand at a dinner as an extension of an unusual relationship that has developed between the two leaders; one of intimacy and mutual confidence, and one of frankness in their exchange of viewpoints.

All in all, I think it was a very successful first day of what is going to be an increasingly busy schedule of activity in Versailles and, subsequently, in Rome, in Bonn, and in Berlin.

Dinner Toasts

Paris
June 3, 1982³

President Reagan. I hope you all realize that we know, of course, France has great appreciation for fine wines and that's why we decided to treat you to some California wine tonight. [Laughter]

I speak not just for Nancy and myself but for so many of our countrymen when I express the joy that we Americans feel in returning to France and seeing again her special jewel—"Paree." I am grateful to have the opportunity to continue our dialogue and to meet with Madame Mitterrand,

President's Schedule

June 2—Depart Washington, D.C.
June 2-7—Paris and Versailles
June 7—Vatican City and Rome
June 7-9—London and Windsor
June 9-11—Bonn and Berlin
June 11—Arrive Washington, D.C.

members of your government, and so many of your fine citizens.

I've enjoyed getting to know you this past year and have benefited from your wise counsel during our several discussions. This will be our second economic summit together. You may be sure I'll work with you to help make it a success. I come to Europe and to this summit with a spirit of confidence.

Our Administration has embarked upon a program to bring inflationary government spending under control, restore personal incentives to revive economic growth, and to rebuild our defenses to insure peace through strength. This has meant a fundamental change in policies and understandably the transition has not been without difficulties.

However, I'm pleased to report that these policies are beginning to bear fruit. Inflation is down, interest rates—I'm very happy to say here—are falling, and both personal savings and spending are improving. We believe that economic recovery is imminent.

We also are moving forward to restore America's defensive strength after a decade of neglect. Our reasons for both actions are simple; a strong America and a vital unified alliance are indispensable to keeping the peace now and in the future just as they have been in the past. At the same time, we've invited the Soviet Union to meet with us to negotiate, for the first time in history, substantial, verifiable reductions in the weapons of mass destruction, and this we are committed to do.

You and your country have also been working to set a new course. While the policies you've chosen to deal with, economic problems, are not the same as ours, we recognize they're directed at a common goal: a peaceful and a more prosperous world. We understand that other nations may pursue different roads toward our common goals, but we can still come together and work together for a greater good. A challenge of our democracies is to forge a unity of purpose and mission without sacrificing the basic right of self-determination. At Versailles, I believe we can do this. I believe we will.




(White House photo by Michael Evans)

Presidents Reagan and Mitterrand meet at the Elysee Palace following a luncheon hosted by the latter. The Presidents discuss regional, security-related, and other bilateral issues.

We in the West have big problems, and we must not pretend we can solve them overnight. But we can solve them. It is we, not the foes of freedom, who enjoy the blessings of constitutional government, rule of law, political and economic liberties, and the right to worship God. It is we who trust our own people rather than fear them. These values lie at the heart of human freedom and social progress. We need only the spirit, wisdom, and will to make them work. Just as our countries have

preserved our democratic institutions, so have we maintained the world's oldest alliance.

My true friends, who may disagree from time to time, we know that we can count on each other when it really matters. I think there's no more fitting way to underscore this relationship than to recall that there are more than 60,000 young Americans, soldiers, sailors, and Marines who rest beneath the soil of France. As the anniversary of D-Day approaches, let us pay homage to all the brave men and women, French and American, who gave their lives so that we and future generations could live in

Visit
to
Europe

freedom. In their memory, let us remain vigilant to the challenges we face standing tall and firm together.

If you would allow me, there was a young American. His name was Martin Treptow who left his job in a small town barbershop in 1917 to come to France with the same "Rainbow Division" of World War I. Here on the Western front he was killed trying to carry a message between battalions under heavy artillery fire. We're told that on his body was found a diary. And on the leaflet under the heading, "My Pledge," he had written that we must win this war. He wrote, "Therefore I will work. I will save. I will sacrifice. I will endure. I will fight cheerfully and do my utmost as if the issue of the whole struggle depended upon me alone."

The challenges we face today do not require the same sacrifices that Martin Treptow and so many thousands of others were called upon to make. But they do require our best effort, our willingness to believe in each other and to believe that together, with God's help, we can and will resolve the problems confronting us. I pledge to you my best effort. Let us continue working together for the values and principles that permit all people to dream great dreams, to row tall, to live in peace, and one day to leave behind a better life for their children.

St. Exupery wrote that a rock pile ceases to be a rock pile the moment a single man contemplates it bearing within him the image of the cathedral. Let us raise our glasses to all the cathedrals yet to be built. With our friendship, courage and determination, they will be built.

Vive la France et vive l'Amerique mes amis ce soir, demain, et toujours. Would you like to translate that for the Americans. [Laughter] [Applause]

President Mitterrand [as interested]. I would like to say welcome, welcome to our country. Our country is a country which enjoys receiving a visit from friends. We're also proud that you would be here and that you should be here on the occasion of your first trip to France and, indeed, your first trip to Europe. So, during this visit, we will

keep you here with us for 3 days, and the Prime Minister and myself, we will then have the privilege of seeing you again in Bonn.

The French—who are here with me, here today, during the days when you will be here—will try to insure that this visit, which I know is a visit dedicated to work and activity, will also be a visit for—of pleasure, a pleasure that one finds among friends.

We have had several occasions already to meet and to talk together, and we will move forward toward—[inaudible]—each other. We have been able to talk of the matters which are important for our countries and, indeed, for the whole world. I have always appreciated your wise counsel, the very marked attention that you have devoted to what has been said around you, and your openmindedness. It is clear that when the fate of mankind is at stake and, also, mankind to some extent for which we are responsible—you and I—it is on those occasions that your attention is particularly dedicated.

It is not a matter of chance that we should, in fact, be the members of the oldest alliance in the world. Think of the time that has elapsed. Generations have gone by, the events that have taken place, the contradictions, perhaps, in our approaches to the things of the world—yet, despite all of these differences, when the time and need came, we were there, both of us, in order to defend the cause of liberty—the liberty for the individual citizen within each country and the liberty for all the citizens in the whole world, and the liberty, in fact, of friends.

It is not a matter of pure chance nor a matter of simply a combination of various interests which led to the presence of French soldiers when it was a question of fighting for the independence and liberty of your country. Nor was it a matter of chance out of interest merely, when many years later, American soldiers fought side by side with French soldiers for the independence and the liberty of France. It is because, perhaps, tonight really realizing [inaudible] it during those two centuries

many people reacted and reflected in the same way as the almost synonymous hairdresser, that you were mentioning earlier, who later became a soldier, in fact, felt that on their shoulders rested the weight of the whole world.

It was simply because they felt that they were responsible—as this man, alone, realized in his innermost conscience and awareness, what he decided in his intimate knowledge of himself and what was right in his eyes, would govern the way the rest of the world would think likewise.

And where else really does one learn responsibility? Surely, it is only in the political democracies where one entrusts to no one else the decisions that have to be taken by each and every individual. And who can really be fully responsible more than the person who realizes and fully appreciates that it is the force of the mind that is decisive, that it can always win the day over the forces—over the mechanical forces, however powerful they may be, even the forces of economics.

One can say that the world can be built if the world thinks right and if one wants it. And we have excellent opportunity of proving this in the next 3 days—without too much ambition—but all the same we need a lot of ambition in the positions that arise.

The least we can do, of course, is to discuss economics. If the seven countries which will be meeting with the European Economic Community are to attain the strength that they need in order to defend the ideas which they consider to be right, then it is important not to divorce the economic powers from the other resources. It is important that we should be able to guarantee peace which, after all, is based on agreement among ourselves. In order to be able to do that, it is essential that we should not fight among ourselves.

I, as you are yourself, am confident that we can control and dominate the crisis that we are living. The methods that we may employ within our countries may, indeed, be somewhat different. But the aims are the same, and

our methods can and must converge in the form of common actions that we can engage in together.

Yes, I am confident that we will win the battle of peace. Although, sometimes the methods that we would employ within our countries may be different, we will always agree on the essential goals. So it is that, for over a year now, we have, indeed, moved forward together, hand in hand, in full agreement about the goals that we were striving to achieve. By the presence of force and power, we should be able to review with equanimity and serenity the threats that may be before us. At the same time, we would only use force in order to insure the protection and the appeasement of the peace which is so necessary.

It is that force which must be there in order to first start the necessary negotiations. That is what you have just done, saying what you have said just before the opening of the very important talks concerning disarmament, talks that are to be held with the very great power that—with you and with others, such as ourselves—is responsible for the state of the world.

I hope that we will be able to extend our efforts, further, in order to help those millions of human beings who are no longer really the Third World but a sort of world which is in the process of moving toward development, a world which needs us just as we need them in order that our century should have a future.

The remarks that you were making yourself earlier have taken me somewhat far afield from the tone that should be the tone of this evening. And it is a tone, of course, of happiness, the happiness of being together, the joy of being together. So, in a moment, I will be raising my glass to your health, to the health of Mrs. Reagan. I have had the very great pleasure of having long talks with Mrs. Reagan. We started our talks in London as you will recall, and, indeed, we also talked about you—[laughter]—I also raise my glass to the people of the United States, friends, our faithful friends, just as we are their

loyal allies. It is our function to say, on all occasions, what we think just as it is our duty to, at all times, show our wholehearted solidarity. I also raise my glass to the health of the Ambassador and Mrs. Galbraith, representing the United States here in France. It is to you, Madame, that we owe these very pleasant moments.

I am honored to speak on behalf of the French guests present here tonight who represent what you might call in American terms—as far as the political scene is concerned—we call them proxies. [Laughter] But vis-a-vis the President of the United States and indeed, the world, they are representatives of the whole nation of France. It is on their behalf, on behalf of everyone present, that I would like, again, to raise my glass to your health. I would say good luck to your action and also good luck to the work that we are going to undertake in the next 2 days—the conquest of liberty and peace. [Applause]

Secretary Haig's Statement

Paris
June 4, 1982⁴

I have just left the American Embassy with the President where the President addressed our Embassy personnel. During that discussion, he commented on the particular hazards associated with diplomatic activity and stationing abroad today and the exposure to terrorism. We noted, with regret, that last night another cowardly terrorist act was perpetrated against the American school here close to Paris. I received, this morning, the official regrets and apologies of the host government from Foreign Minister Cheysson. We are, of course, grateful and impressed by the actions being taken by the French Government against this international plague. Of course, I am confident that the leaders of the seven governments meeting—starting this evening at Versailles—will continue the discussions in


this critical area that were launched at the summit at Ottawa, so that greater and more effective international cooperation can be developed to stamp out this irresponsible plague against all mankind.

We had a very busy day with several bilaterals—the first with Prime Minister Suzuki of Japan and the second with Prime Minister Thatcher of Great Britain. With respect to the Suzuki bilateral it was a very detailed and subjective and tightly programed hour of discussion between the two leaders and their representatives. The focus was on trade. In these discussions, President Reagan very much welcomed the recent announcement of the Government of Japan on the further liberalization of Japanese trade practices. The President described it as a positive step in the direction of greater liberalization.

This involved the recent decisions of the Japanese Government to liberalize tariff and nontariff restrictions and an improvement in Japanese import regulations. During these discussions, Prime Minister Suzuki pledged to support the further enhancement of free trade at the upcoming GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] conference next fall—a pledge which, of course, was welcomed by the United States as it is parallel to and consistent with U.S. objectives and intention at that upcoming meeting.

The President also welcomed the announcement made, earlier this afternoon, by the Japanese Government of the completion of an interim agreement on civil aviation between the United States and Japan. As you know, this has been under discussion for an extended period and a breakthrough was achieved largely as a result of the initiative of Prime Minister Suzuki himself.

The President, in these discussions this afternoon, warmly endorsed the recent decision of the Suzuki government to increase its level of defense spending to almost 8%—increase real term spending for the coming year, the only sector, incidentally, of the current Japanese budget to receive such an enhanced allocation of resources.

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During the discussions, Prime Minister Suzuki warmly endorsed and welcomed President Reagan's recent initiatives in arms control ranging from the November 18 speech on INF [international-range nuclear forces] and the talks at Geneva and the more recently announced on START [Strategic Arms Reduction Talks] talks which will resume on the 29th—negotiations themselves which will resume on the 29th in Geneva—the 29th of this month.

Prime Minister Suzuki, of course, welcomed the position of the United States with respect to mobile, intermediate-range missiles in our Geneva discussions, in which they are dealt with in

global terms. There would be great concern in the Far East that missiles now directed at Western Europe might be shifted to the Far East.

In conclusion, there were some detailed discussions as they wound up their meeting of the recent visit of the Premier of the People's Republic of China to Tokyo and Prime Minister Suzuki's impressions—important impressions—with respect to this visit. As the meeting broke up, the Prime Minister described the current state of U.S.-Japanese relations as never better and on the highest plain in his memory, particularly singling out the leadership of President Reagan in this difficult time

of international crisis and confusion.

The meeting with Prime Minister Suzuki was followed by an extensive one-on-one meeting between Prime Minister Thatcher and President Reagan. They met alone for 1½ hours. The main focus of which, of course, as I described yesterday, was a detailed exchange of views between the two leaders on the Falkland crisis, both in the context of the near term and the longer term. It was clear that the current situation is one which is best assessed by commanders on the ground or charged with the responsibility for the conduct of the military operations which, unfortunately, have been underway for some time.

I think with respect to the longer term aspect of the Falklands question, it was clear from the exchange of views that both leaders agreed that it was still somewhat too early to deal finitely with a number of the longer term questions associated with this crisis.

It is dynamic—at 4 p.m. this afternoon the U.N. Security Council will meet again where various resolutions have been considered over the last 48 hours. We are now, of course, complete—have completed the Paris leg of the President's journey. Based on the bilaterals the President has had—my own discussions with Foreign Minister Cheysson and Foreign Minister Pym—we proceed this evening to Versailles with a sense of confidence that the Versailles summit, itself, will be one that gives clear evidence of continued and growing solidarity between the Western industrialized nations and Japan in a host of common problems primarily of economic but also of political nature as well. In the days ahead at Versailles, a number of the questions which some of you have been writing and speculating about will be resolved in finite terms.



(White House photo by Michael Evans)

Meeting at the U.S. Ambassador's Residence, President Reagan and Japanese Prime Minister Suzuki hold detailed talks which focus on trade.

President Reagan's Remarks

Versailles
June 5, 1982⁵

I bring to France greetings and best wishes from the American people. I carry their hopes for continued Western unity to secure a prosperous and lasting peace, and I've come to express our commitment to policies that will renew economic growth.

But today touches French and American memories in a special way. It brings to mind thoughts quite apart from the pressing issues being discussed at the economic summit in Versailles. On this day, 38 years ago, our two peoples were united in an epic struggle against tyranny.

In 1944, as World War II raged, the allies were battling to regain their foothold in the continent. The French resistance fought valiantly on, disrupting communications and sabotaging supply lines. But the Nazis held Europe in a stranglehold, and Field Marshal Rommel was building his Atlantic wall along France's coast.

Late on the night of June 5th, as fog enshrouded the Normandy coastline, over 2,000 planes took off from English fields to drop soldiers by parachute behind enemy lines. By the early hours of June 6th, the massive allied armada, 5,000 ships, had begun to move across the cold and choppy water of the English Channel. D-Day had begun.

The code names, Omaha, Utah, gold, Juno, and sword, are now indelibly etched in history by the blood spilled on that 100-mile stretch of beach. More than 150,000 allied troops stormed Normandy that day, and by dusk they had established beachheads at each of the five invasion points. The toll was high. More than 10,500 of our young men were either dead, wounded, or missing.

Today, endless rows of simple white crosses mark their seacoast graves. The rusty helmets still buried in the sand, and the ships and tanks still lying off the shore are testaments to their sacrifices.

By the end of World War II, more than 60,000 Americans had been buried in France. Today, we remember them, honor them, and pray for them, but we also remember what they gave us.

D-Day was a success, and the allies had breached Hitler's seawall. They swept into Europe liberating towns and cities and countrysides until the axis powers were finally crushed. We remember D-Day because the French, British, Canadians, and Americans fought shoulder-to-shoulder for democracy and freedom, and won.

During the war, a gallant, French leader, Charles de Gaulle, inspired his countrymen organizing and leading the free French forces. He entered Paris in triumph liberating that city at the head of a column of allied troops, a victory made possible by the heroes of Normandy. "Nothing great will ever be achieved without great men, and men are great only if they're determined to be so," de Gaulle said.

Ours was a great alliance of free people determined to remain so. I believe it still is. The invasion of Normandy was the second time in this century Americans fought in France to free it from an aggressor. We're pledged to do so again if we must. The freedom we enjoy today was secured by great men and at great cost. Today, let us remember their courage and pray for the guidance and strength to do what we must so that no generation is ever asked to make so great a sacrifice again.

ITALY


President Reagan's and Pope John Paul II's Remarks

The Vatican
June 7, 1982⁶

President Reagan. This is truly a city of peace, love, and charity where the highest to the humblest among us seek to follow in the footsteps of the fishermen. As you know, Your Holiness, this is my first visit to Europe as President, and I would like to think of it as a pilgrimage for peace, a journey aimed at strengthening the forces for peace in the free West by offering new opportunities for realistic negotiations with those who may not share the values and the spirit we cherish.

This is no easy task, but I leave this audience with a renewed sense of hope and dedication. Hope, because one cannot meet a man like Your Holiness without feeling that a world that can produce such courage and vision out of adversity and oppression is capable, with God's help, of building a better future. Dedication, because one cannot enter this citadel of faith, the fountainhead of so many of the values we face in the—or that we in the free West hold dear without coming away resolved to do all in one's power to live up to them.

Certain common experiences we have shared in our different walks of life, Your Holiness, and the warm correspondence we have carried on also gave our meeting a special meaning for me. I hope that others will follow. Let me add that all Americans remember with great warmth your historic visit to our shores in 1979. We all hope that you will be back again with your timeless message: "Ours is a nation grounded on faith, faith in man's ability through God given freedom to live in tolerance and peace as faith in a Supreme Being



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guides our daily striving in this world." Our national motto, In God We Trust, reflects that faith.

Many of our earlier settlers came to America seeking a refuge where they could worship God unhindered. So our dedication to individual freedoms is wedded to religious freedom as well. Liberty has never meant license to Americans. We treasure it precisely because it protects the human and spiritual values that we hold most dear: the right to worship as we choose; the right to elect democratic leaders; the right to choose the type of education we want for our children; and freedom from fear, want, and oppression. These are God-given freedoms, not the contrivances of man.

We also believe in helping one another through our churches and charitable institutions or simply as one friend, one good Samaritan to another. The Ten Commandments and the Golden Rule are as much a part of our living heritage as the Constitution we take such pride in. And we have tried, not always successfully, but always in good conscience, to extend those same principles to our role in the world.

We know that God has blessed America with the freedom and abundance many of our less fortunate brothers and sisters around the world have been denied. Since the end of World War II, we have done our best to provide assistance to them—assistance amounting to billions of dollars worth of food, medicine, and materials. And we'll continue to do so in the years ahead.

Americans have always believed that in the words of the Scripture, "Unto whomsoever much is given, of him shall be much required." To us in a troubled world, the Holy See and your pastorate represent one of the world's greatest moral and spiritual forces.

We admire your active efforts to foster peace and promote justice, freedom, and compassion in a world that is still stalked by the forces of evil. As a

people and as a government, we seek to pursue the same goals of peace, freedom, and humanity along political and economic lines that the Church pursues in its spiritual role. So, we deeply value your counsel and support and express our solidarity with you.

Your Holiness, one of the areas of

our mutual concern is Latin America. We want to work closely with the Church in that area to help promote peace, social justice, and reform and to prevent the spread of repression and godless tyranny. We also share your concern in seeking peace and justice in troubled areas of the Middle East, such



(White House photo by Michael Evans)

Following an arrival ceremony at the Vatican, President Reagan meets with Pope John Paul II.

as Lebanon. Another special area of mutual concern is the martyred nation of Poland—your own homeland. Through centuries of adversity, Poland has been a brave bastion of faith and freedom in the hearts of her courageous people, yet, not in those who rule her.

We seek a process of reconciliation and reform that will lead to a new dawn of hope for the people of Poland. We'll continue to call for an end to martial law, for the freeing of all political prisoners, and to resume dialogue among the Polish Government, the Church, and the Solidarity movement which speaks for the vast majority of Poles.

Denying financial assistance to the oppressive Polish regime, America will continue to provide the Polish people with as much food and commodity support as possible through church and private organizations.

Today, Your Holiness, marks the beginning of the U.N. special session on disarmament. We pledge to do everything possible in these discussions, as in our individual initiatives for peace and arms reduction, to help bring a real, lasting peace throughout the world. To us, this is nothing less than a sacred trust.

Dante has written that, "The infinite goodness has such wide arms that it takes whatever turns to it." We ask your prayers, Holy Father, that God will guide us in our efforts for peace on this journey and in the years ahead, that the wide arms of faith and forgiveness can some day embrace a world at peace with justice and compassion for all mankind.

The Pope. I am particularly pleased to welcome you today to the Vatican. Although we have already had many contacts, it is the first time that we have met personally.

In you, the President of the United States of America, I greet all the people of your great land. I still remember privately the warm welcome that I was given by millions of your fellow citizens

less than 3 years ago. On that occasion, I was once more able to witness firsthand the vitality of your nation. I was able to see again how the moral and spiritual values transmitted by your Founding Fathers find their dynamic expression in the life of modern America.

The American people are, indeed, proud of their right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. They are proud of civil and social progress in American society as well as their extraordinary advances in science and technology.

As I speak to you today, it is my hope that the entire structure of American life will rest evermore securely on the strong foundation of moral and spiritual values. Without the fostering and defense of these values, all human advancement is stunted, and the dignity of the human person is endangered.

Throughout the course of their history, and especially in difficult times, the American people have repeatedly risen to challenges presented to them. They have given many proofs of unselfishness, generosity, concern for others, concern for the poor, the needy, the oppressed. They have shown confidence in that great ideal of being a united people with a mission of service to perform.

At this present moment in the history of the world, the United States is called above all to fulfill its mission in the service of world peace. The very condition of the world today calls for a far-sighted policy that will further those indispensable conditions of justice and freedom, of truth and love that are the foundations of lasting peace. My own greatest preoccupation is for the peace of the world, peace in our day.

In many parts of the world, there are centers of acute tension. This acute tension is manifested, above all, in the crisis of the South Atlantic, in the war between Iran and Iraq, and now in the grave crisis provoked by the new events in Lebanon. This grave crisis in Lebanon likewise merits the attention of the world because of the danger it contains

of further provocation in the Middle East with immense consequences for world peace.

There are, fortunately, many factors in society that today positively contribute to peace. This positive factor includes an increasing realization of the interdependence of all peoples, the growing solidarity with those in need, and a growth of conviction of the absurdity of war as a means of resolving controversies between nations.

During my recent visit to Britain, I stated, in particular, that the scale and the horror from all the warfare, whether nuclear or not, makes it totally unacceptable as a means of settling differences between nations. And for those who profess the Christian faith, I offer up, as motivation, the fact that when you are in contact with the Prince of Peace, you understand how totally opposed to His message are hatred and war.

The duty of peace calls especially upon the leaders of the world. It is up to the representatives of governments and peoples to work to free humanity not only from wars and conflicts, but from the fear that is generated by evermore sophisticated and deadly weapons. Peace is not only the absence of war; it also involves reciprocal trust between nations a trust that is manifested and proved through constructive negotiations that aim at ending the arms race and at liberating immense resources that can be used to alleviate misery and feed millions of hungry human beings.

All effective peacemaking requires foresightedness, for foresightedness is quality needed in all peacemakers. You—your own great nation is called to exercise this foresightedness as far—as all the nations of the world. This quality enables leaders to commit themselves to those concrete programs, which are essential to world peace—programs of justice and development, efforts to defend and protect human life, as well as initiatives that favor human rights.

On the contrary, anything that wounds, weakens, or dishonors human dignity, in any aspect, imperils the cause of the human person and, at the same



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time, the peace of the world. The relations between nations are greatly affected by the development issue—issue, which reserves its full relevance in this day of ours. Success in resolving questions in the North-South dialogue will continue to be the gates of peaceful relations between values, political communities, and continue to influence the peace of the world in the years ahead.

Economic and social advancement linked to financial collaboration between peoples remains an apt goal for renewed efforts of the statesmen of this world.

A truly universal concept of the common good for the human family is an incomparable instrument in building the edifice of the world today. It is my own conviction that a united and concerned America can contribute immensely to the cause of world peace through the efforts of our leaders and the commitment of all her citizens dedicated to the high ideals of her traditions. America is in a splendid position to help all humanity enjoy what it is intent upon possessing.

With faith in God and belief in universal human solidarity may America step forward in this crucial moment in history to consolidate its rightful place at the service of world peace. In this sense, I repeat today those words that I spoke when I left the United States in 1979. My final prayer is this: that God will bless America so that she may increasingly become, and truly be, and long remain one nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.

Luncheon Toasts

Rome
June 7, 1982⁷

President Reagan. It's a genuine privilege to be here today and, most especially, as the guest of President Pertini. The poet Robert Browning wrote, "Open my heart and you will see 'graved inside of it Italy.'"

As countless immigrants to my nation's shores would confirm, Italy is

engraved inside millions of American hearts. And, after your recent trip to the United States, the name Pertini also is engraved in our hearts. In my time at the White House, I don't remember as beautiful and moving a gesture as the kiss you planted on our flag that March morning. That kiss touched all the

hard but self-confident choices in recent years. The Atlantic Alliance is firm in large part because of Italian determination to assume major responsibilities within NATO for our common defense. The prospects for peace are improved because of Italy's contribution to such efforts as the Sinai multinational force.



(White House photo by Michael Evans)

citizens of my country. We were deeply honored.

I want to say, personally, how honored I feel to call you amico. The word friend certainly characterizes the relationship between Italy and the United States. We're drawn together by the blood of our people and the bonds of our Western ideals. We share a devotion to liberty and the determination to preserve that liberty for ourselves and our descendants.

We live in difficult times that test our beliefs. The independence and freedom of people the world over are threatened by the expansion of totalitarian regimes and by the brutal crimes of international terrorism. I am optimistic. The West simply needs to believe in itself and in its leadership to succeed. Italy and her people are abundant in that leadership. Italy has made

After brief remarks following his meeting with the Pope, the President meets with Italian President Alessandro Pertini.

The free world better appreciates human dignity and justice thanks to Italy's principled stand on Afghanistan and Poland. And, of course, there is Italy's integrity in the face of terrorism. Let me cite here the brilliant operation that freed General Dozier. These issues have required difficult decisions. They have required political decisiveness beyond the ordinary. So I want to say—and pay special tribute to you, President Pertini, Prime Minister Spadolini, Foreign Minister Colombo, and to the entire Italian Government for the resolution you've shown and the example that you have given.

In return, I want to assure you that the United States stands behind you in

defending the values of the West. The Atlantic Alliance is still the heart of our foreign policy, and that heart beats for peace and freedom.

The United States is fortunate to enjoy the friendship of Italy and the Italian people. We are wiser for your counsel and stronger for your partnership. Like the great Virgil, we Americans believe: "As long as rivers shall run down to the sea or shadows touch the mountain slopes or stars graze in the vaulted heavens, so long shall your honor, your name, your praises endure."

Mr. President, amico, ladies and gentlemen, may I propose a toast to Italy and to her honor, her name, and her praises. May they long endure. [Applause]

U.S.-Italy Statement

London
June 7, 1982^a

At the invitation of the President of the Italian Republic, Sandro Pertini, the President of the United States of America, Ronald Reagan, paid a visit to Rome on June 7th, 1982. The visit provided an opportunity for the two Presidents to have a productive exchange of views. Two useful meetings were held between President Reagan and the President of the Council of Ministers, Giovanni Spadolini. President Reagan took the opportunity to thank President Pertini for his recent state visit to the United States and conveyed to him the warm good wishes of the American government and the American people. President Pertini expressed to President Reagan his appreciation for the warm reception he enjoyed in the United States.

Presidents Reagan and Pertini reviewed the threat which international terrorism presents to the free world and noted with satisfaction the successes of the Italian and other Western governments in combatting this menace. The two Presidents also reviewed international trouble spots including Afghanistan, Poland, and Central and South

America; the two reaffirmed their strongest commitment to the preservation and restoration of freedom and justice for all men. They noted their shared hope for a cessation of hostilities in the South Atlantic. The two Heads of State concluded their meeting with an affirmation of the strength of U.S.-Italian bonds and a review of those common values on which the two societies have been built.

Prime Minister Spadolini and President Reagan, first between themselves and then along with Minister of Foreign Affairs Emilio Colombo and Secretary of State Alexander Haig, reviewed a number of questions facing the two countries, including the 1979 decision by NATO to place intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe, together with the offer to the Soviet Union for simultaneous negotiations on control and limitation of such weapons, and the overall Middle East situation, with special attention to the two most urgent questions in that area at the moment; the Lebanese situation where it is of the utmost urgency to bring a cessation of the fighting. On the Iran-Iraq conflict—the two sides agreed on the need for a political settlement respecting the territorial integrity of both nations.

In addition they reviewed the validity of both countries' participation in the Sinai multinational force and the prospects for the dialogue on Palestinian autonomy. They also examined East-West relations, including questions of trade and credit and issues related to economic and monetary cooperation between the two countries. The two Heads of Government reaffirmed their commitment to a policy aiming at a growing level of economic and commercial relations between the two countries in order to fight against inflation, promote growth and thereby employment.

President Reagan reviewed his proposals for the worldwide reduction of strategic nuclear weapons and for the reduction of intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe. Prime Minister Spadolini noted with approval the recent announcement that the START talks will begin in Geneva on June 29. The

two said they shared the aspirations of many of the young people who were marching for peace, took note of the institutions and policies which have kept the peace in Europe for almost 40 years, and urged the Soviet Union to respond positively to proposals which have been made by the United States.

The Prime Minister and the President viewed with pleasure the new initiative for the exchange of young students between their countries which will begin in 1982.

The two governments agreed to begin regular meetings to discuss cultural and information matters with the desire to improve cultural programs and in order to examine means of strengthening relations in these fields. The first cultural and information talk will be held in Washington in October.


The two sides concluded their talks by welcoming recent decisions to strengthen mutual consultations as an expression of the special and close relationship which Italy and the United States enjoy.

UNITED KINGDOM

President Reagan's Address

London
June 8, 1982^a

The journey of which this visit forms a part is a long one. Already it has taken me to two great cities of the West—Rome and Paris—and to the economic summit at Versailles. There, once again our sister democracies have proved that even in a time of severe economic strain free peoples can work together freely and voluntarily to address problems as serious as inflation, unemployment, trade, and economic development in a spirit of cooperation and solidarity. Other milestones lie ahead. Later this

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week in Germany, we and our NATO allies will discuss measures for our joint defense and America's latest initiatives for a more peaceful, secure world through arms reductions.

Each stop of this trip is important, but, among them all, this moment occupies a special place in my heart and the hearts of my countrymen—a moment of kinship and homecoming in these hallowed halls. Speaking for all Americans, I want to say how very much at home we feel in your house. Every American would, because this is—as we have been so eloquently told—one of democracy's shrines. Here the rights of free people and the processes of representation have been debated and refined.

It has been said that an institution is the lengthening shadow of a man. This institution is the lengthening shadow of all the men and women who have sat here and all those who have voted to send representatives here.

This is my second visit to Great Britain as President of the United States. My first opportunity to stand on British soil occurred almost a year and a half ago when your Prime Minister graciously hosted a diplomatic dinner at the British Embassy in Washington. Mrs. Thatcher said then that she hoped that I was not distressed to find staring down at me from the grand staircase a portrait of His Royal Majesty King George III. She suggested it was best to let bygones be bygones and—in view of our two countries' remarkable friendship in succeeding years—she added that most Englishmen today would agree with Thomas Jefferson that "a little rebellion now and then is a very good thing."

From here I will go on to Bonn and then Berlin, where there stands a grim symbol of power untamed. The Berlin Wall, that dreadful gray gash across the city, is in its third decade. It is the fitting signature of the regime that built it. And a few hundred kilometers behind the Berlin Wall there is another symbol. In the center of Warsaw there is a sign that notes the distances to two capitals. In one direction it points toward Moscow. In the other it points toward Brussels, headquarters of Western

Europe's tangible unity. The marker says that the distances from Warsaw to Moscow and Warsaw to Brussels are equal. The sign makes this point: Poland is not East or West. Poland is at the center of European civilization. It has contributed mightily to that civilization. It is doing so today by being magnificently unreconciled to oppression.

Poland's struggle to be Poland, and to secure the basic rights we often take for granted, demonstrates why we dare not take those rights for granted. Gladstone, defending the Reform Bill of 1866, declared: "You cannot fight against the future. Time is on our side." It was easier to believe in the march of democracy in Gladstone's day, in that high noon of Victorian optimism.

We are approaching the end of a bloody century plagued by a terrible political invention—totalitarianism. Optimism comes less easily today, not because democracy is less vigorous but because democracy's enemies have refined their instruments of repression. Yet optimism is in order because, day by day, democracy is proving itself to be a not-at-all fragile flower.

From Stettin on the Baltic to Varna on the Black Sea, the regimes planted by totalitarianism have had more than 30 years to establish their legitimacy. But none—not one regime—has yet been able to risk free elections. Regimes planted by bayonets do not take root.

The strength of the Solidarity movement in Poland demonstrates the truth told in an underground joke in the Soviet Union. It is that the Soviet Union would remain a one-party nation even if an opposition party were permitted, because everyone would join the opposition party.

America's time as a player on the stage of world history has been brief. I think understanding this fact has always made you patient with your younger cousins. Well, not always patient—I do recall that on one occasion Sir Winston Churchill said in exasperation about one of our most distinguished diplomats: "He is the only case I know of a bull who carries his china shop with him."

Threats to Freedom

Witty as Sir Winston was, he also had that special attribute of great statesmen—the gift of vision, the willingness to see the future based on the experience of the past. It is this sense of history, this understanding of the past, that I want to talk with you about today, for it is in remembering what we share of the past that our two nations can make common cause for the future.

We have not inherited an easy world. If developments like the industrial revolution, which began here in England, and the gifts of science and technology have made life much easier for us, they have also made it more dangerous. There are threats now to our freedom, indeed, to our very existence, that other generations could never even have imagined.

There is, first, the threat of global war. No president, no congress, no prime minister, no parliament can spend a day entirely free of this threat. And I don't have to tell you that in today's world, the existence of nuclear weapons could mean, if not the extinction of mankind, then surely the end of civilization as we know it.

That is why negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces now underway in Europe and the START talks—Strategic Arms Reduction Talks—which will begin later this month, are not just critical to American or Western policy; they are critical to mankind. Our commitment to early success in these negotiations is firm and unshakable and our purpose is clear: reducing the risk of war by reducing the means of waging war on both sides.

At the same time, there is a threat posed to human freedom by the enormous power of the modern state. History teaches the dangers of government that overreaches: political control taking precedence over free economic growth, secret police, mindless bureaucracy—all combining to stifle individual excellence and personal freedom.

Now I am aware that among us here and throughout Europe, there is legitimate disagreement over the extent to which the public sector should play a role in a nation's economy and life. But

on one point all of us are united: our abhorrence of dictatorship in all its forms, but most particularly totalitarianism and the terrible inhumanities it has caused in our time: the great purge, Auschwitz and Dachau, the Gulag and Cambodia.

Historians looking back at our time will note the consistent restraint and peaceful intentions of the West. They will note that it was the democracies who refused to use the threat of their nuclear monopoly in the 1940s and early 1950s for territorial or imperial gain. Had that nuclear monopoly been in the hands of the Communist world, the map of Europe—indeed, the world—would look very different today. And certainly they will note it was not the democracies that invaded Afghanistan or suppressed Polish solidarity or used chemical and toxin warfare in Afghanistan and South-east Asia.

If history teaches anything, it teaches that self-delusion in the face of unpleasant facts is folly. We see around us today the marks of our terrible dilemma—predictions of doomsday, anti-nuclear demonstrations, an arms race in which the West must for its own protection be an unwilling participant. At the same time, we see totalitarian forces in the world who seek subversion and conflict around the globe to further their barbarous assault on the human spirit.

What, then, is our course? Must civilization perish in a hail of fiery atoms? Must freedom wither in a quiet, deadening accommodation with totalitarian evil? Sir Winston Churchill refused to accept the inevitability of war or even that it was imminent. He said:

I do not believe that Soviet Russia desires war. What they desire is the fruits of war and the indefinite expansion of their power and doctrines. But what we have to consider here today, while time remains, is the permanent prevention of war and the establishment of conditions of freedom and democracy as rapidly as possible in all countries.

The Crisis of Totalitarianism

This is precisely our mission today: to preserve freedom as well as peace. It may not be easy to see, but I believe we

live now at a turning point. In an ironic sense, Karl Marx was right. We are witnessing today a great revolutionary crisis—a crisis where the demands of the economic order are conflicting directly with those of the political order. But the crisis is happening not in the free, non-Marxist West but in the home of Marxism-Leninism, the Soviet Union. It is the Soviet Union that runs against the tide of history by denying human freedom and human dignity to its citizens. It also is in deep economic difficulty. The rate of growth in the national product has been steadily declining since the 1950s and is less than half of what it was then. The dimensions of this failure are astounding; a country which employs one-fifth of its population in agriculture is unable to feed its own people. Were it not for the tiny private sector tolerated in Soviet agriculture, the country might be on the brink of famine. These private plots occupy a bare 3% of the arable land but account for nearly one-quarter of Soviet farm output and nearly one-third of meat products and vegetables.

Overcentralized, with little or no incentives, year after year the Soviet system pours its best resources into the making of instruments of destruction. The constant shrinkage of economic growth combined with the growth of military production is putting a heavy strain on the Soviet people.

What we see here is a political structure that no longer corresponds to its economic base, a society where productive forces are hampered by political ones. The decay of the Soviet experiment should come as no surprise to us. Wherever the comparisons have been made between free and closed societies—West Germany and East Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia, Malaysia and Vietnam—it is the democratic countries that are prosperous and responsive to the needs of their people. And one of the simple but overwhelming facts of our time is this: of all the millions of refugees we've seen in the modern world, their flight is always away from, not toward, the Communist world. Today on the NATO line, our military forces face East to prevent a possible invasion. On the other side of

the line, the Soviet forces also face East—to prevent their people from leaving.


The hard evidence of totalitarian rule has caused in mankind an uprising of the intellect and will. Whether it is the growth of the new schools of economics in America or England or the appearance of the so-called "new philosophers" in France, there is one unifying thread running through the intellectual work of these groups: rejection of the arbitrary power of the state, the refusal to subordinate the rights of the individual to the superstate, the realization that collectivism stifles all the best human impulses.

Struggle Against Oppression

Since the exodus from Egypt, historians have written of those who sacrificed and struggled for freedom: the stand at Thermopylae, the revolt of Spartacus, the storming of the Bastille, the Warsaw uprising in World War II. More recently, we have seen evidence of this same human impulse in one of the developing nations in Central America. For months and months the world news media covered the fighting in El Salvador. Day after day we were treated to stories and film slanted toward the brave freedom fighters battling oppressive government forces in behalf of the silent, suffering people of that tortured country.

Then one day those silent, suffering people were offered a chance to vote, to choose the kind of government they wanted. Suddenly the freedom fighters in the hills were exposed for what they really are: Cuban-backed guerrillas who want power for themselves and their backers, not democracy for the people. They threatened death to any who voted and destroyed hundreds of busses and trucks to keep people from getting to the polling places. But on election day the people of El Salvador, an unprecedented 1.4 million of them, braved ambush and gunfire and trudged miles to vote for freedom.

They stood for hours in the hot sun waiting for their turn to vote. Members of our Congress who went there as observers told me of a woman who was wounded by rifle fire who refused to

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leave the line to have her wound treated until after she had voted. A grandmother, who had been told by the guerrillas she would be killed when she returned from the polls, told the guerrillas: "You can kill me, kill my family, kill my neighbors, but you can't kill us all." The real freedom fighters of El Salvador turned out to be the people of that country—the young, the old, and the in-between. Strange, but in my own country there has been little if any news coverage of that war since the election.

Perhaps they'll say it's because there are newer struggles now—on distant islands in the South Atlantic young men are fighting for Britain. And, yes, voices have been raised protesting their sacrifices for lumps of rock and earth so far away. But those young men aren't fighting for mere real estate. They fight for a cause, for the belief that armed aggression must not be allowed to succeed and that people must participate in the decisions of government under the rule of law. If there had been firmer support for that principle some 45 years ago, perhaps our generation wouldn't have suffered the bloodletting of World War II.

In the Middle East the guns sound once more, this time in Lebanon, a country that for too long has had to endure the tragedy of civil war, terrorism, and foreign intervention and occupation. The fighting in Lebanon on the part of all parties must stop, and Israel should bring its forces home. But this is not enough. We must all work to stamp out the scourge of terrorism that in the Middle East makes war an ever-present threat.

But beyond the troublespots lies a deeper, more positive pattern. Around the world today the democratic revolution is gathering new strength. In India, a critical test has been passed with the peaceful change of governing political parties. In Africa, Nigeria is moving in remarkable and unmistakable ways to build and strengthen its democratic institutions. In the Caribbean and Central America, 16 of 24 countries have freely elected governments. And in the United Nations, 8 of the 10 developing nations which have joined the body in the past 5 years are democracies.

In the Communist world as well,

man's instinctive desire for freedom and self-determination surfaces again and again. To be sure, there are grim reminders of how brutally the police state attempts to snuff out this quest for self-rule: 1953 in East Germany, 1956 in Hungary, 1968 in Czechoslovakia, 1981 in Poland. But the struggle continues in Poland, and we know that there are even those who strive and suffer for freedom within the confines of the Soviet Union itself. How we conduct ourselves here in the Western democracies will determine whether this trend continues.

Fostering Democracy

No, democracy is not a fragile flower; still, it needs cultivating. If the rest of this century is to witness the gradual growth of freedom and democratic ideals, we must take actions to assist the campaign for democracy. Some argue that we should encourage democratic change in rightwing dictatorships but not in Communist regimes. To accept this preposterous notion—as some well-meaning people have—is to invite the argument that, once countries achieve a nuclear capability, they should be allowed an undisturbed reign of terror

ask only for a process, a direction, a basic code of decency—not for an instant transformation.

We cannot ignore the fact that even without our encouragement, there have been and will continue to be repeated explosions against repression in dictatorships. The Soviet Union itself is not immune to this reality. Any system is inherently unstable that has no peaceful means to legitimize its leaders. In such cases, the very repressiveness of the state ultimately drives people to resist it—if necessary, by force.

While we must be cautious about forcing the pace of change, we must not hesitate to declare our ultimate objectives and to take concrete actions to move toward them. We must be staunch in our conviction that freedom is not the sole prerogative of a lucky few but the inalienable and universal right of all human beings. So states the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which, among other things, guarantees free elections.

The objective I propose is quite simple to state: to foster the infrastructure of democracy—the system of a free press, unions, political parties, universities—which allows a people to choose their own way, to develop their own

The objective I propose is quite simple to state: to foster the infrastructure of democracy—the system of a free press, unions, political parties, universities—which allows a people to choose their own way, to develop their own culture, to reconcile their own differences through peaceful means.

over their own citizens. We reject this course.

As for the Soviet view, President Brezhnev repeatedly has stressed that the competition of ideas and systems must continue and that this is entirely consistent with relaxation of tensions and peace. We ask only that these systems begin by living up to their own constitutions, abiding by their own laws, and complying with the international obligations they have undertaken. We

culture, to reconcile their own differences through peaceful means.

This is not cultural imperialism; it is providing the means for genuine self-determination and protection for diversity. Democracy already flourishes in countries with very different cultures and historical experiences. It would be cultural condescension, or worse, to say that any people prefer dictatorship to

democracy. Who would voluntarily choose not to have the right to vote, decide to purchase government propaganda handouts instead of independent newspapers, prefer government to worker-controlled unions, opt for land to be owned by the state instead of those who till it, want government repression of religious liberty, a single political party instead of a free choice, a rigid cultural orthodoxy instead of democratic tolerance and diversity?

Since 1917 the Soviet Union has given covert political training and assistance to Marxist-Leninists in many countries. Of course, it also has promoted the use of violence and subversion by these same forces. Over the past several decades, West European and other social democrats, christian democrats and liberals have offered open assistance to fraternal political and social institutions to bring about peaceful and democratic progress. Appropriately, for a vigorous new democracy, the Federal Republic of Germany's political foundations have become a major force in this effort.

U.S. Proposals

We in America now intend to take additional steps, as many of our allies have already done, toward realizing this same goal. The chairmen and other leaders of the national Republican and Democratic party organizations are initiating a study with the bipartisan American Political Foundation to determine how the United States can best contribute—as a nation—to the global campaign for democracy now gathering force. They will have the cooperation of congressional leaders of both parties along with representatives of business, labor, and other major institutions in our society.

I look forward to receiving their recommendations and to working with these institutions and the Congress in the common task of strengthening democracy throughout the world. It is time that we committed ourselves as a nation—in both the public and private sectors—to assisting democratic development.

We plan to consult with leaders of

other nations as well. There is a proposal before the Council of Europe to invite parliamentarians from democratic countries to a meeting next year in Strasbourg. That prestigious gathering would consider ways to help democratic political movements.

This November in Washington there will take place an international meeting on free elections and next spring there will be a conference of world authorities on constitutionalism and self-government hosted by the Chief Justice of the United States. Authorities from a number of developing and developed countries—judges, philosophers, and politicians with practical experience—have agreed to explore how to turn principle into practice and further the rule of law.

At the same time, we invite the Soviet Union to consider with us how the competition of ideas and values—which it is committed to support—can be conducted on a peaceful and reciprocal basis. For example, I am prepared to offer President Brezhnev an opportunity to speak to the American people on our television, if he will allow me the same opportunity with the Soviet people. We also suggest that panels of our newsmen periodically appear on each other's television to discuss major events.

I do not wish to sound overly optimistic, yet the Soviet Union is not immune from the reality of what is going on in the world. It has happened in the past: a small ruling elite either mistakenly attempts to ease domestic unrest through greater repression and foreign adventure or it chooses a wiser course—it begins to allow its people a voice in their own destiny.

Even if this latter process is not realized soon, I believe the renewed strength of the democratic movement, complemented by a global campaign for freedom, will strengthen the prospects for arms control and a world at peace.

I have discussed on other occasions, including my address on May 9th, the elements of Western policies toward the Soviet Union to safeguard our interests and protect the peace. What I am describing now is a plan and a hope for the long term—the march of freedom and democracy which will leave Marxism-Leninism on the ash heap of history as it

has left other tyrannies which stifle the freedom and muzzle the self-expression of the people.

That is why we must continue our efforts to strengthen NATO even as we move forward with our zero option initiative in the negotiations on intermediate-range forces and our proposal for a one-third reduction in strategic ballistic missile warheads.

Dedication to Western Ideals


Our military strength is a prerequisite to peace, but let it be clear we maintain this strength in the hope it will never be used. For the ultimate determinant in the struggle now going on for the world will not be bombs and rockets, but a test of wills and ideas, a trial of spiritual resolve: the values we hold, the beliefs we cherish, the ideals to which we are dedicated.

The British people know that, given strong leadership, time, and a little bit of hope, the forces of good ultimately rally and triumph over evil. Here among you is the cradle of self-government, the mother of parliaments. Here is the enduring greatness of the British contribution to mankind, the great civilized ideas: individual liberty, representative government, and the rule of law under God.

I have often wondered about the shyness of some of us in the West about standing for these ideals that have done so much to ease the plight of man and the hardships of our imperfect world. This reluctance to use those vast resources at our command reminds me of the elderly lady whose home was bombed in the blitz. As the rescuers moved about they found a bottle of brandy she'd stored behind the staircase which was all that was left standing. Since she was barely conscious, one of the workers pulled the cork to give her taste of it. She came around immediately and said: "Here now, put it back, that's for emergencies."

Well, the emergency is upon us. Let us be shy no longer—let us go to our strength. Let us offer hope. Let us tell the world that a new age is not only possible but probable.

During the dark days of the Second

Visit
to
Europe

Dinner Toasts

London
June 8, 1982¹⁰

Her Majesty the Queen. I am so glad to welcome you and Mrs. Reagan to Britain. Prince Philip and I are especially delighted that you have come to be our guests at Windsor Castle, since this has been the home of the Kings and Queens of our country for over 900 years.

I greatly enjoyed our ride together this morning. And I was much impressed by the way in which you coped so professionally with a strange horse and a saddle that must have seemed even stranger. [Laughter]

We hope these will be enjoyable days for you in Britain, as enjoyable as our stays have always been in the United States. We shall never forget the warmth and hospitality of your people in 1976 as we walked through the crowds in Philadelphia, Washington, New York, and Boston to take part in the celebrations of the Bicentennial of American independence. Two hundred years before that visit one of my ancestors had played a seemingly disastrous role in your affairs. [Laughter] Yet, had King George III been able to foresee the long-term consequences of his actions, he might not have felt so grieved about the loss of his colonies. Out of the war of independence grew a great nation, the United States of America. And later, there was forged a lasting friendship between the new nation and the country to whom she owed so much of her origins. But that friendship must never be taken for granted. And your visit gives me the opportunity to reaffirm and to restate it.

Our close relationship is not just based on history, kinship, and language, strong and binding though these are. It is based on same values and same

beliefs, evolved over many years in these islands since the Magna Carta and vividly stated by the Founding Fathers of the United States.

This has meant that over the whole range of human activity, the people of the United States and the people of Britain are drawing on each other's experience and enriching each other's lives. Of course, we do not always think and act alike, but through the years our common heritage, based on the principles of common law, has prevailed over our diversity. And our toleration has moderated our arguments and misunderstandings. Above all, our commitment to a common cause has led us to fight together in two world wars and to continue to stand together today in the defense of freedom.

These past weeks have been testing ones for this country when, once again, we have had to stand up for the cause of freedom. The conflict in the Falkland Islands was thrust on us by naked aggression, and we are naturally proud of the way our fighting men are serving their country. But throughout the crisis, we have drawn comfort from the understanding of our position shown by the American people. We have admired the honesty, patience, and skill with which you have performed your dual role as ally and intermediary.

In return, we can offer an understanding of how hard it is to bear the daunting responsibilities of world power. The fact that your people have shouldered that burden for so long now—never losing the respect and affection of your friends—is proof of a brave and generous spirit.

Our respect extends beyond the bounds of statesmanship and diplomacy. We greatly admire the drive and enterprise of your commercial life. And we, therefore, welcome the confidence which your business community displays in us by your massive investment in this country's future. We also like to think we might have made some contribution to the extraordinary success story of American business.

In darker days, Winston Churchill surveyed the way in which the affairs of

World War when this island was incandescent with courage, Winston Churchill exclaimed about Britain's adversaries: "What kind of a people do they think we are?" Britain's adversaries found out what extraordinary people the British are. But all the democracies paid a terrible price for allowing the dictators to underestimate us. We dare not make that mistake again. So let us ask ourselves: What kind of people do we think we are? And let us answer: free people, worthy of freedom, and determined not only to remain so but to help others gain their freedom as well.

Sir Winston led his people to great victory in war and then lost an election just as the fruits of victory were about to be enjoyed. But he left office honorably—and, as it turned out, temporarily—knowing that the liberty of his people was more important than the fate of any single leader. History recalls his greatness in ways no dictator will ever know. And he left us a message of hope for the future, as timely now as when he first uttered it, as opposition leader in the Commons nearly 27 years ago. He said: "When we look back on all the perils through which we have passed and at the mighty foes we have laid low and all the dark and deadly designs we have frustrated, why should we fear for our future? We have," he said, "come safely through the worst."

The task I have set forth will long outlive our own generation. But together, we, too, have come through the worst. Let us now begin a major effort to secure the best—a crusade for freedom that will engage the faith and fortitude of the next generation. For the sake of peace and justice, let us move toward a world in which all people are at last free to determine their own destiny. ■

the British Empire, as it then was, and the United States would become, in his words, "somewhat mixed up." He welcomed the prospect. "I could not stop it if I wished," he said. "No one can stop it. Like the Mississippi, it just keeps rolling along. Let it roll." How right he was. There can be few nations whose destinies have been so inextricably interwoven as yours and mine. Your presence at Versailles has highlighted the increasing importance, both to Britain and to America, of cooperation among the industrial democracies. Your visit tomorrow to Bonn underlines the importance to both our countries of the continued readiness of the people of the Western Alliance to defend the ways of

life which we all share and cherish. Your stay in my country reflects not only the great traditions that hold Britain and the United States together, but above all, the personal affection the British and the Americans have for one another. This is the bedrock on which our relationship stands.

I raise my glass to you and to Mrs. Reagan, to Anglo-American friendship, and to the prosperity and happiness of the people of the United States.


President Reagan. Nancy and I are honored to be your guests at this beautiful and historic castle. It was from here that Richard the Lion Hearted rode out to the Crusades, and from here that

his brother, King John, left to sign the Magna Carta. It is a rare privilege to be even a momentary part of the rich history of Windsor Castle.

As we rode over these magnificent grounds this morning, I thought again about how our people share, as you have mentioned, a common past. We are bound by much more than just language. Many of our values, beliefs, and principles of government were nurtured on this soil. I also thought of how our future security and prosperity depend on the continued unity of Britain and America.

This place symbolizes both tradition and renewal, as generation after generation of your family makes it their home.



Visit
to
Europe

President Reagan's and Prime Minister Thatcher's Remarks

London
June 9, 1982¹¹

Prime Minister Thatcher. May we report to you on the talks we've had and the way we think that this whole visit has gone. Of course, there is always a very great welcome in Britain for a visit by our great ally and friend, the United States.

This visit has been something more than an ordinary welcome. It's been an extraordinarily warm welcome which I think we must attribute to the way in which President Reagan has appealed to the hearts and minds of our people. The reception he's had, not only from Parliament—which was a triumph—but also from the people of this country who listened to his speech before Parliament, that reception has been one of great affection and one which recognizes that here is a leader who can put to the uncommitted nations of the world the fact that we in Britain and the United States have a cause in freedom and justice that is worth striving for and worth proclaiming. We do, indeed, thank him for that and congratulate him most warmly on everything—all the speeches and everything he's done—since he has been with us for his very brief visit. It is a triumph for him as well as a great joy to have our ally and friend with us.

We have, of course, discussed matters of defense in the context of East-West relations. Once again we take a similar view. We cannot depend upon the righteousness of our cause for security; we can only depend upon our sure defense. But we recognize, at the same time, that it is important to try to get disarmament talks started so that the balance of forces and the deterrents

can be conducted at a lower level of armament. In this, again, the President has seized the initiative and given a lead, and we wish those talks very well when they start. We will all be behind him in what he is doing.

This morning we have also discussed the question of what is happening in the Middle East. We have discussed it in a very wide context. As you'd expect, we are wholly agreed on the U.N. Security Council Resolution 508 that there must be cessation of hostilities coupled with withdrawal, and the United Kingdom is wholly behind Mr. Habib in the efforts he is making to bring that about. We have discussed it also in the very much wider context of the whole difficult problems of the Middle East which we've been striving to solve for so many years now.

Finally, I would like once again to record our thanks to our American friends, to the President, and to Secretary Haig for the staunch support they've given us and continued to give us over the Falkland Islands and their realization that we must make it seem to the world over that aggression cannot pay. They have been most helpful, most staunch, and not only we but the whole of the British people thank them for it. Altogether, if I may sum up, this has been a tremendously successful visit, and one which we shall long remember both in our minds and in our hearts. [Applause]

President Reagan. I have no words to thank Prime Minister Thatcher for those very kind words that she said with regard to us. Nancy and I will be leaving here with warm hearts and great gratitude for the hospitality that has been extended to us, and the pleasure that we've had here in addition to the worthwhile meetings and the accomplishments that have already been outlined.

We did discuss a number of the trouble spots in the world—Lebanon—and found ourselves in agreement with regard to the U.N. Resolution 508, the hope for a ceasefire, and withdrawal of all the hostile forces there. We had a chance, again, to reiterate our support of the British position in the Falklands;

We in America share your excitement about the impending birth of a child to the Prince and Princess of Wales. We pray that God will continue to bless your family with health, happiness, and wisdom.

It has been said that the greatest glory of a free-born people is to transmit that freedom to their children. That is a responsibility our people share. Together, and eager for peace, we must face an unstable world where violence and terrorism, aggression, and tyranny constantly encroach on human rights. Together committed to the preservation of freedom and our way of life, we must strengthen a weakening international order and restore the world's faith in peace and the rule of law.

We, in the free world, share an abiding faith in our people and in the future of mankind. The challenge of freedom is to reject an unacceptable present for what we can cause the future to be. Together it is within our power to confront the threats to peace and freedom and to triumph over them.

Nancy and I and all of our party are very grateful for your invitation to visit great Britain and for your gracious hospitality. Our visit has been enormous—productive and has strengthened the ties that bind our peoples. I would like to propose that we raise our glasses to Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom, to the continued unity of our two nations, the preservation of our freedom for generations to come. I propose a toast to Her Majesty the Queen.

The President enjoys an early morning ride with Her Majesty the Queen at Home Park.

White House photo by Michael Evans)

that armed aggression cannot be allowed to succeed in today's world.

We had what we think were worthwhile meetings at the economic summit in Versailles, and now we go onto the NATO meeting. Our goals there we are also agreed upon: solidarity of the members of the alliance; strength, dialogue, and the urging of restraint on the Soviet Union and responsibility and our agreement on going forward with realistic arms control that means arms reduction, not just—as in the past—some efforts to limit the increase in those weapons, but to bring about a realistic, verifiable decrease and, thus, further remove the possibility of war.

This has been a most important meeting for us and a very heartwarming experience every minute that we've been here. We leave strengthened with the knowledge that the great friendship and the great alliance that has existed for so long between our two peoples—the United Kingdom and the United States—remains and is, if anything, stronger than it has ever been.

GERMANY

President Reagan's Address

Bonn
June 9, 1982¹²

I am very honored to speak to you today and thus to all the people of Germany. Next year we will jointly celebrate the 300th anniversary of the first German settlement in the American colonies. The 13 families who came to our new land were the forerunners of more than 7 million German immigrants to the United States. Today more Americans claim German ancestry than any other.

These Germans cleared and cultivated our land, built our industries, and advanced our arts and sciences. In honor of 300 years of German contributions in America, President Carstens and I have

agreed today that he will pay an official visit to the United States in October of 1983 to celebrate the occasion.

The German people have given us so much; we like to think that we've repaid some of that debt. Our American Revolution was the first revolution in modern history to be fought for the right of self-government and the guarantee of civil liberties. That spirit was contagious. In 1849 the Frankfurt Parliament's statement of basic human rights guaranteed freedom of expression, freedom of religion, and equality before the law. These principles live today in the basic law of the Federal Republic. Many peoples to the east still wait for such rights.

The United States is proud of your democracy, but we cannot take credit for it. Heinrich Heine, in speaking of those who built the awe-inspiring cathedrals of medieval times, said that "in those days people had convictions. We moderns have only opinions and it requires something more than opinions to build a Gothic cathedral." Over the past 30 years, the convictions of the German people have built a cathedral of democracy—a great and glorious testament to your ideals.

We in America genuinely admire the free society you have built in only a few decades. And we understand all the better what you have accomplished because of our own history. Americans speak with the deepest reverence of those founding fathers and first citizens who gave us the freedoms we enjoy today. And even though they lived over 200 years ago, we carry them in our hearts as well as our history books.

I believe future generations of Germans will look to you here today and to your fellow Germans with the same profound respect and appreciation. You have built a free society with an abiding faith in human dignity—the crowning ideal of Western civilization. This will not be forgotten. You will be saluted and honored by this republic's descendants over the centuries to come.

Yesterday, before the British Parliament, I spoke of the values of Western civilization and the necessity to help all peoples gain the institutions of freedom.


In many ways, in many places, our ideals are being tested today. We are meeting this afternoon between two important summits, the gathering of leading industrial democracies at Versailles and the assembling of the Atlantic alliance here in Bonn tomorrow. Critical and complex problems face us. But our dilemmas will be made easier if we remember our partnership is based on a common Western heritage and a faith in democracy.

The Search for Peace

I believe this partnership of the Atlantic alliance nations is motivated primarily by the search for peace. Inner peace for our citizens and peace among nations. Why inner peace? Because democracy allows for self-expression. It respects man's dignity and creativity. It operates by rule of law, not by terror or coercion. It is government with the consent of the governed. As a result, citizens of the Atlantic alliance enjoy an unprecedented level of material and spiritual well-being. And they are free to find their own personal peace.

We also seek peace among nations. The psalmist said: "Seek peace and pursue it." Our foreign policies are based on this principle and directed toward this end. The noblest objective of our diplomacy is the patient and difficult task of reconciling our adversaries to peace. And I know we all look forward to the day when the only industry of war will be the research of historians.

But the simple hope for peace is not enough. We must remember something Friedrich Schiller said, "The most pious man can't stay in peace if it doesn't please his evil neighbor." So there must be a method to our search, a method that recognizes the dangers and realities of the world. During Chancellor Schmidt's state visit to Washington last year, I said that your republic was "perched on a cliff of freedom." I wasn't saying anything the German people do not already know. Living as you do in the heart of a divided Europe, you can see more clearly than others that there are governments at peace neither with their own peoples nor the world.

Visit
to
Europe

I don't believe any reasonable observer can deny there is a threat to both peace and freedom today. It is as stark as a gash of a border that separates the German people. We are menaced by a power that openly condemns our values and answers our restraint with a relentless military buildup.

We cannot simply assume every nation wants the peace we so earnestly desire. The Polish people would tell us there are those who would use military force to repress others who want only basic human rights. The freedom fighters of Afghanistan would tell us as well that the threat of aggression has not receded from the world.

Strengthening Alliance Security

Without a strengthened Atlantic security, the possibility of military coercion will be very great. We must continue to improve our defenses if we are to preserve peace and freedom. This is not an impossible task; for almost 40 years, we have succeeded in deterring war. Our method has been to organize our defensive capabilities, both nuclear and conventional, so that an aggressor could have no hope of military victory. The alliance has carried its strength not as a battle flag but as a banner of peace. Deterrence has kept that peace, and we must continue to take the steps necessary to make deterrence credible.

This depends in part on a strong America. A national effort, entailing sacrifices by the American people, is now underway to make long-overdue improvements in our military posture. The American people support this effort because they understand how fundamental it is to keeping the peace they so fervently desire.

We also are resolved to maintain the presence of well-equipped and trained forces in Europe, and our strategic forces will be modernized and remain committed to the alliance. By these actions, the people of the United States are saying, "We are with you Germany. You are not alone." Our adversaries would be foolishly mistaken should they gamble that Americans would abandon their alliance responsibilities, no matter how severe the test.

Alliance security depends on a fully credible conventional defense to which all allies contribute. There is a danger that any conflict would escalate to a nuclear war. Strong conventional forces can make the danger of conventional or nuclear conflict more remote. Reasonable strength in and of itself is not bad; it is honorable when used to maintain peace or defend deeply held beliefs.

One of the first chores is to fulfill our commitments to each other by continuing to strengthen our conventional defenses. This must include improving the readiness of our standing forces and

member of the alliance, and this fundamental commitment is embodied in the North Atlantic Treaty. But it will be an empty pledge unless we insure that American forces are ready to reinforce Europe and Europe is ready to receive them. I am encouraged by the recent agreement on wartime host-nation support. This pact strengthens our ability to deter aggression in Europe and demonstrates our common determination to respond to attack.

Just as each ally shares fully in the security of the alliance, each is responsible for shouldering a fair share of the

The soil of Germany, and every other ally, is of vital concern to each member of the alliance, and this fundamental commitment is embodied in the North Atlantic Treaty.

the ability of those forces to operate as one. We must also apply the West's technological genius to improving our conventional deterrence.

There can be no doubt that we as an alliance have the means to improve our conventional defenses. Our peoples hold values of individual liberty and dignity that time and again they have proven willing to defend. Our economic energy vastly exceeds that of our adversaries. Our free system has produced technological advantages that other systems, with their stifling ideologies, cannot hope to equal. All of these resources are available to our defense.

Yes, many of our nations currently are experiencing economic difficulties. Yet we must, nevertheless, guarantee that our security does not suffer as a result. We've made strides in conventional defense over the last few years despite our economic problems, and we have disproved the pessimists who contend that our efforts are futile. The more we close the conventional gap, the less the risks of aggression or nuclear conflict.

The soil of Germany, and every other ally, is of vital concern to each

burden. Now that, of course, often leads to a difference of opinion, and criticism of our alliance is as old as the partnership itself.

But voices have been raised on both sides of the Atlantic that mistake the inevitable process of adjustment within the alliance for a dramatic divergence of interests. Some Americans think that Europeans are too little concerned for their own security; some would unilaterally reduce the number of American troops deployed in Europe. And in Europe itself, we hear the idea that the American presence, rather than contributing to peace, either has no deterrent value or actually increases the risk that our allies may be attacked.

These arguments ignore both the history and the reality of the trans-Atlantic coalition. Let me assure you that the American commitment to Europe remains steady and strong. Europe's shores are our shores. Europe's borders are our borders. And we will stand with you in defense of our heritage of liberty and dignity. The American people recognize Europe's

substantial contributions to our joint security. Nowhere is that contribution more evident than here in the Federal Republic. German citizens host the forces of six nations. German soldiers and reservists provide the backbone of NATO's conventional deterrent in the heartland of Europe. Your *Bundeswehr* is a model for the integration of defense needs with a democratic way of life. And you have not shrunk from the heavy responsibility of accepting the nuclear forces necessary for deterrence.

I ask your help in fulfilling another responsibility. Many American citizens don't believe that their counterparts in Europe—especially younger citizens—really understand the U.S. presence there. If you will work toward explaining the U.S. role to people on this side of the Atlantic, I will explain it to those on the other side.

The Threat of Nuclear War

In recent months, both in your country and mine, there has been renewed public concern about the threat of nuclear war and the arms buildup. I know it is not easy, especially for the German people, to live in the gale of intimidation that blows from the East. If I might quote Heine again, he almost foretold the fears of nuclear war when he wrote: "Wild, dark times are rumbling toward us, and the prophet who wishes to write a new apocalypse will have to invent entirely new beasts, and beasts so terrible that the ancient animal symbols . . . will seem like cooing doves and cupids in comparison."

The nuclear threat is a terrible beast. Perhaps the banner carried in one of the nuclear demonstrations here in Germany said it best. The sign read, "I am afraid." I know of no Western leader who doesn't sympathize with that earnest plea. To those who march for peace, my heart is with you. I would be at the head of your parade if I believed marching alone could bring about a more secure world. And to the 2,800 women in Filderstadt who sent a petition for peace to President Brezhnev

and myself, let me say I, myself, would sign your petition if I thought it could bring about harmony. I understand your genuine concerns.

The women of Filderstadt and I share the same goal. The question is how to proceed. We must think through the consequences of how we reduce the dangers to peace. Those who advocate that we unilaterally forego the modernization of our forces must prove that this will enhance our security and lead to moderation by the other side—in short, that it will advance, rather than undermine, the preservation of the peace. The weight of recent history does not support this notion.

Those who demand that we renounce the use of a crucial element of our deterrent strategy must show how this would decrease the likelihood of war. It is only by comparison with a nuclear war that the suffering caused by conventional war seems a lesser evil. Our goal must be to deter war of any kind.

And to those who decry the failure of arms control efforts to achieve substantial results must consider where the fault lies. I would remind them it is the United States that has proposed to ban land-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles—the missiles most threatening Europe. It is the United States that has proposed and will pursue deep cuts in strategic systems. It is the West that has long sought the detailed exchanges of information on forces and effective verification procedures. And it is dictators, not democracies, that need militarism to control their own people and impose their system on others.

Western Commitment to Arms Control


We in the West—Germans, Americans, our other allies—are deeply committed to continuing efforts to restrict the arms competition. Common sense demands that we persevere. I invite those who genuinely seek effective and lasting arms control to stand behind the far-reaching proposals that we have put forward. In return I pledge that we will sustain the closest of consultations with our allies.

On November 18th, I outlined a

broad and ambitious arms control program. One element calls for reducing land-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles to zero on each side. If carried out, it would eliminate the growing threat to Western Europe posed by the U.S.S.R.'s modern SS-20 rockets, and it would make unnecessary the NATO decision to deploy American intermediate-range systems. And, by the way, I cannot understand why, among some, there is a greater fear of weapons which NATO is to deploy than of weapons the Soviet Union already has deployed. Our proposal is fair because it imposes equal limits and obligations on both sides and it calls for significant reductions, not merely a capping of an existing high level of destructive power. As you know, we have made this proposal in Geneva, where negotiations have been underway since the end of November last year. We intend to pursue those negotiations intensively. I regard them as a significant test of the Soviets' willingness to enter into meaningful arms control agreements.

On May 9th, we proposed to the Soviet Union that Strategic Arms Reduction Talks begin this month in Geneva. The U.S.S.R. has agreed, and talks will begin on June 29th. We in the United States want to focus on the most destabilizing systems, and thus reduce the risk of war. That is why in the first phase we propose to reduce substantially the number of ballistic missile warheads and the missiles themselves. In the second phase we will seek an equal ceiling on other elements of our strategic forces, including ballistic missile throwweight, at less than current American levels. We will handle cruise missiles and bombers in an equitable fashion. We will negotiate in good faith and undertake these talks with the same seriousness of purpose that has marked our preparations over the last several months.

Another element of the program I outlined was a call for reductions in conventional forces in Europe. From the earliest postwar years, the Western democracies have faced the ominous reality that massive Soviet conventional forces would remain stationed where

Visit
to
EuropePresident Reagan's
AddressBerlin
June 11, 1982¹³

It was one of Germany's greatest sons, Goethe, who said that "There is strong shadow where there is much light." In our times, Berlin, more than any other place in the world, is such a meeting place of light and shadow, tyranny and freedom. To be here is truly to stand on freedom's edge and in the shadow of a wall that has come to symbolize all that is darkest in the world today, to sense how shining and priceless—and how much in need of constant vigilance and protection our legacy of liberty is.

This day marks a happy return for us. We paid our first visit to this great city more than 3 years ago, as private citizens. As with every other citizen to Berlin or visitor to Berlin, I came away with a vivid impression of a city that is more than a place on the map—a city that is a testament to what is both most inspiring and most troubling about the time we live in.

Thomas Mann once wrote that "A man lives not only his personal life, as an individual, but also, consciously or unconsciously, the life of his epoch. . . ." Nowhere is this more true than in Berlin where each moment of everyday life is spent against the backdrop of contending global systems and ideas. To be a Berliner is to live the great historic struggle of this age, the latest chapter in man's timeless quest for freedom.

As Americans, we understand this. Our commitment to Berlin is a lasting one. Thousands of our citizens have served here since the first small contingent of American troops arrived on July 4, 1945, the anniversary of our independence as a nation. Americans have served here ever since—not as conquerors but as guardians of the freedom of West Berlin and its brave, proud people.

Today I want to pay tribute to my fellow countrymen, military and civilian, who serve their country and the people of Berlin and, in so doing, stand as sentinals of freedom everywhere. I also

they do not belong. The muscle of Soviet forces in Central Europe far exceeds legitimate defense needs. Their presence is made more threatening still by a military doctrine that emphasizes mobility and surprise attack. And as history shows, these troops have built a legacy of intimidation and repression.

In response, the NATO allies must show they have the will and capacity to deter any conventional attack or any attempt to intimidate us. Yet we also will continue the search for responsible ways to reduce NATO and Warsaw Pact military personnel to equal levels.

In recent weeks, we in the alliance have consulted on how best to invigorate the Vienna negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions. Based on these consultations, Western representatives in the Vienna talks soon will make a proposal by which the two alliances would reduce their respective ground force personnel in verifiable stages to a total of 700,000 men and their combined ground and air force personnel to a level of 900,000 men.

While the agreement would not eliminate the threat nor spare our citizens the task of maintaining a substantial defensive force, it could constitute a major step toward a safer Europe for both East and West. It could lead to military stability at lower levels and lessen the dangers of miscalculation and of surprise attack. And it also would demonstrate the political will of the two alliances to enhance stability by limiting their forces in the central area of their military competition.

The West has established a clear set of goals. We, as an alliance, will press forward with plans to improve our own conventional forces in Europe. At the same time, we propose an arms control agreement to equalize conventional forces at a significantly lower level.

We will move ahead with our preparations to modernize our nuclear forces in Europe. But, again, we also will work unceasingly to gain acceptance

in Geneva of our proposal to ban land-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles.

In the United States, we will move forward with the plans I announced last year to modernize our strategic nuclear forces, which play so vital a role in maintaining peace by deterring war. Yet we also have proposed that Strategic Arms Reduction Talks begin, and we will pursue them determinedly.

The Need for Unity

In each of these areas our policies are based on the conviction that a stable military balance at the lowest possible level will help further the cause of peace. The other side will respond in good faith to these initiatives only if it believes we are resolved to provide for our own defense. Unless convinced that we will unite and stay united behind these arms control initiatives and modernization programs, our adversaries will seek to divide us from one another and our peoples from their leaders.

I am optimistic about our relationship with the Soviet Union if the Western nations remain true to their values and true to each other. I believe in Western civilization and in its moral power. I believe deeply in the principles the West esteems. And guided by these ideals, I believe we can find a non-sense, workable, and lasting policy that will keep the peace.

Earlier I said that the German people had built a remarkable cathedral of democracy. But we still have other work ahead. We must build a cathedral of peace, where nations are safe from war and where people need not fear for their liberties. I've heard the history of the famous cathedral at Cologne—how those beautiful soaring spires miraculously survived the destruction all around them, including part of the church itself.

Let us build a cathedral as the people of Cologne built theirs—with the deepest commitment and determination. Let us build as they did—not just for ourselves but for the generations beyond. For if we construct our peace properly, it will endure as long as the spires of Cologne.

wish to pay my personal respects to the people of this great city. My visit here today is proof that this American commitment has been worthwhile. Our freedom is indivisible.

The American commitment to Berlin is much deeper than our military presence here. In the 37 years since World War II, a succession of American presidents has made it clear that our role in Berlin is emblematic of our larger search for peace throughout Europe and the world. Ten years ago this month, that search brought into force the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin. A decade later, West Berliners live more securely, can travel more freely, and, most significantly, have more contact with friends and relatives in East Berlin and East Germany than was possible 10 years ago. These achievements reflect the realistic approach of allied negotiators who recognized that practical progress can be made even while basic differences remain between East and West.

As a result both sides have managed to handle their differences in Berlin without the clash of arms to the benefit of all mankind. The United States remains committed to the Berlin agreement. We will continue to expect strict observance and full implementation in all aspects of this accord, including those which apply to the eastern sector of Berlin. But if we are heartened by the partial progress achieved in Berlin, other developments made us aware of the growing military power and expansionism of the Soviet Union.

Challenge for Peace

Instead of working with the West to reduce tensions and erase the danger of war, the Soviet Union is engaged in the greatest military buildup in the history of the world. It has used its new-found might to ruthlessly pursue its goals around the world. As the sad case of Afghanistan proves, the Soviet Union has not always respected the precious right of national sovereignty it is committed to uphold as a signatory of the U.N. Charter. And only 1 day's auto ride from here, in the great city of Warsaw, a courageous people suffer because they dare to strive for the very fundamental

human rights which the Helsinki Final Act proclaimed.

The citizens of free Berlin appreciate better than anyone the importance of allied unity in the face of such challenges. Ten years after the Berlin agreement, the hope it engendered for lasting peace remains a hope rather than a certainty. But the hopes of free people—be they German or American—are stubborn things. We will not be lulled or bullied into fatalism, into resignation. We believe that progress for just and lasting peace can be made—that substantial areas of agreement can be reached with potential adversaries—when the forces of freedom act with firmness, unity, and a sincere willingness to negotiate.

To succeed at the negotiating table, we allies have learned that a healthy military balance is a necessity. Yesterday, the other NATO heads of government and I agreed that it is essential to preserve and strengthen such a military balance. And let there be no doubt: The United States will continue to honor its commitment to Berlin. Our forces will remain here as long as necessary to preserve the peace and protect the freedom of the people of Berlin. For us the American presence in Berlin, as long as it is needed, is not a burden. It is a sacred trust.

Ours is a defensive mission. We pose no threat to those who live on the other side of the wall. But we do extend a challenge—a new Berlin initiative to the leaders of the Soviet bloc. It is a challenge for peace. We challenge the men in the Kremlin to join with us in the quest for peace, security, and a lowering of the tensions and weaponry that could lead to future conflict.

We challenge the Soviet Union, as we proposed last year, to eliminate their SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 missiles. If President Brezhnev agrees to this, we stand ready to forego all of our ground-launched cruise missiles and Pershing II missiles.

We challenge the Soviet Union, as NATO proposed yesterday, to slash the conventional ground forces of the Warsaw Pact and NATO in Central Europe to 700,000 men each and the total ground and air forces of the two alliances to 900,000 men each. And we


challenge the Soviet Union to live up to its signature its leader placed on the Helsinki treaty so that the basic human rights of Soviet and East European people will be respected.

A positive response to these sincere and reasonable points from the Soviets, these calls for conciliation instead of confrontation, could open the door for a conference on disarmament in Europe. We Americans are optimists, but we are also realists. We're a peaceful people, but we're not a weak or gullible people. So we look with hope to the Soviet Union's response. But we expect positive actions rather than rhetoric as the first proof of Soviet good intentions. We expect that the response to my Berlin initiative for peace will demonstrate finally that the Soviet Union is serious about working to reduce tensions in other parts of the world as they have been able to do here in Berlin.

Reducing Human Barriers

Peace, it has been said, is more than the absence of armed conflict. Reducing military forces alone will not automatically guarantee the long-term prospects for peace. Several times in the 1950s and 1960s the world went to the brink of war over Berlin. Those confrontations did not come because of military forces or operations alone. They arose because the Soviet Union refused to allow the free flow of peoples and ideas between East and West. And they came because the Soviet authorities and their minions repressed millions of citizens in Eastern Germany who did not wish to live under a Communist dictatorship.

So I want to concentrate the second part of America's new Berlin initiative on ways to reduce the human barriers—barriers as bleak and brutal as the Berlin Wall itself—which divide Europe today. If I had only one message to urge on the leaders of the Soviet bloc, it would be this: think of your own coming generations. Look with me 10 years into the future when we will celebrate the 20th anniversary of the Berlin agreement. What then will be the fruits of our efforts? Do the Soviet leaders want to be remembered for a prison wall, ringed with barbed wire and armed guards whose weapons are aimed at innocent



Visit to Europe



A visit to the Berlin Wall with the governing Mayor of Berlin Richard von Weizsaecker and Chancellor Schmidt.

concrete and practical steps to help further reduce the risk of a nuclear conflict which I intend to explore with the Soviet Union.

It is time we went further to avert the risk of war through accidents or misunderstanding. We shortly will approach the Soviet Union with proposals in such areas as notification of strategic exercises, of missile launches, and expanded exchange of strategic forces data. Taken together, these steps would represent a qualitative improvement in the nuclear environment. They would help reduce the chances of misinterpretation in the case of exercises and test launches. And they would reduce the secrecy and ambiguity which surround military activity. We are considering additional measures as well.

We will be making these proposals in good faith to the Soviet Union. We hope that their response to this Berlin initiative, so appropriate to a city that is acutely conscious of the costs and risks of war, will be positive.

A united, resolute Western alliance stands ready to defend itself if necessary. But we are also ready to work with the Soviet bloc in peaceful cooperation if the leaders of the East are willing to respond in kind.

Let them remember the message of Schiller that only "He who has done his best for his own time has lived for all times." Let them join with us in our time to achieve a lasting peace and a better life for tomorrow's generations on both sides of that blighted wall. And let the Brandenburg Gate become a symbol not of two separate and hostile worlds but an open door through which ideas, free ideas, and peaceful competition flourish.

My final message is for the people of Berlin. Even before my first visit to

(White House photo by Michael Evans)

civilians—their own civilians? Do they want to conduct themselves in a way that will earn only the contempt of free peoples and the distrust of their own citizens? Or do they want to be remembered for having taken up our offer to use Berlin as a starting point for true efforts to reduce the human and political divisions which are the ultimate cause of every war.

We in the West have made our choice. America and our allies welcome peaceful competition in ideas, in economics, and in all facets of human activity. We seek no advantage. We covet no territory. And we wish to force no ideology or way of life on others.

The time has come, 10 years after the Berlin agreement, to fulfill the promise it seemed to offer at its dawn. I call on President Brezhnev to join me in a sincere effort to translate the dashed hopes of the 1970s into the reality of a safer and freer Europe in the 1980s.

I am determined to assure that our

civilization averts the catastrophe of a nuclear war. Stability depends primarily on the maintenance of a military balance which offers no temptation to an aggressor. And the arms control proposals which I have made are designed to enhance deterrence and achieve stability at substantially lower and equal force levels. At the same time, other measures might be negotiated between the United States and the Soviet Union to reinforce the peace and help reduce the possibility of a nuclear conflict. These include measures to enhance mutual confidence and to improve communication both in time of peace and in a crisis.

Past agreements have created a hot line between Moscow and Washington, established measures to reduce the danger of nuclear accidents, and provided for notification of some missile launches. We are now studying other

your city, I felt a part of you, as all free men and women around the world do. We lived through the blockade and airlift with you. We witnessed the heroic reconstruction of a devastated city and we watched the creation of your strong democratic institutions.

When I came here in 1978, I was deeply moved and proud of your success. What finer proof of what freedom can accomplish than the vibrant, prosperous island you've created in the midst of a hostile sea? Today, my reverence for your courage and accomplishment has grown even deeper.

You are a constant inspiration for us all—for our hopes and ideals and for the human qualities of courage, endurance, and faith that are the one secret weapon of the West no totalitarian regime can ever match. As long as Berlin exists, there can be no doubt about the hope for democracy.

Yes, the hated wall still stands. But taller and stronger than that bleak barrier dividing East from West, free from oppressed, stands the character of the Berliners themselves. You have endured in your splendid city on the Spree, and my return visit has convinced me, in the words of the beloved old song that "Berlin bleibt doch Berlin"—Berlin is still Berlin.

We all remember John Kennedy's stirring words when he visited Berlin. I can only add that we in America and in the West are still Berliners, too, and always will be. And I am proud to say today that it is good to be home again.

President Reagan's Remarks

Bonn
June 11, 1982¹⁴

President Reagan. Nancy and I are grateful for the warmth and the friendship that we have encountered throughout our short visits to Bonn and Berlin. In Berlin, this morning, I looked across that tragic Wall and saw the grim consequences of freedom denied. But I was deeply inspired by the courage and dedication to liberty which I saw in so many faces on the western side of that city.

The purpose of my trip to Bonn was to consult both with leaders of the German Government and our colleagues from other nations. Both aspects of the visit have been a great success. We didn't seek to avoid the problems facing the West in the coming years. We met them head-on and discovered that, as always, what unites us is much deeper and more meaningful than any differences which might exist.

We leave with renewed optimism about the future of the Western world. We also leave with a very warm feeling about the people of Bonn, Berlin, and the Federal Republic.

Diplomacy is important, but friendship leaves an even more lasting impression. Your friendship for us has been an especially moving experience. Nancy and I are personally very touched by your hospitality. We know, however, that this greeting was meant not only for us but for the entire American people.

These trips, these meetings, have been arduous, they have been long, they've been tiring to all of us. But I think they've been successful. Here, today, is an evidence of why they have to be successful—because what was at issue and what is at stake in all that we were trying to accomplish in those meetings is visible here in these young people. We must deliver to them a world

of opportunity and peace. [Applause] With that as a goal and with that as our inspiration, we cannot fail.

German-American friendship is truly one of the lasting foundations of Western cooperation and peace and freedom in the world. This visit has convinced me that ours is a friendship that cannot be shaken.

I thank you all from the bottom of my heart. Good-bye and until we meet again, auf wiedersehen.

¹Texts from press releases issued by the White House. The Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of June 7 and 14, 1982, contain all material relating to the President's participation in the two summits.

²Made following the President's meeting with President Mitterrand, the Press Center, Meridien Hotel. Press release 189 of June 11, 1982.

³Exchange of toasts made at reception and dinner hosted by U.S. Ambassador Galbraith.

⁴Made following meetings between President Reagan and Japanese Prime Minister Suzuki, and President Reagan and British Prime Minister Thatcher, press center, Meridien Hotel. Press release 191 of June 16, 1982.

⁵Taped May 31, 1982, at the White House for French television and released 12:00 p.m. Paris time and 6:00 p.m. Eastern Daylight Time.

⁶Made in the Papal Library, The Vatican.

⁷Made in the Room of Mirrors, Quirinale Palace.

⁸Released in London.

⁹Made to members of both Houses of Parliament, the Palace of Westminster.

¹⁰Made at State Dinner hosted by Her Majesty the Queen, Windsor Castle.

¹¹Made at breakfast meeting hosted by Prime Minister Thatcher at 10 Downing Street.

¹²Made to the Bundestag, The Bundeshaus, Bonn.

¹³Made to the people of Berlin, Charlottenburg Palace.

¹⁴Made upon departure from Germany, Cologne/Bonn Airport. ■

An Agenda for Peace

*President Reagan's address to the Second U.N. General Assembly's Special Session on Disarmament held in New York on June 17, 1982.*¹

I speak today as both a citizen of the United States and of the world. I come with the heartfelt wishes of my people for peace, bearing honest proposals, and looking for genuine progress.

Dag Hammarskjöld said 24 years ago this month, "We meet in a time of peace which is no peace." His words are as true today as they were then. More than 100 disputes have disturbed the peace among nations since World War II, and today the threat of nuclear disaster hangs over the lives of all our peoples. The Bible tells us there will be a time for peace, but so far this century mankind has failed to find it.

The United Nations is dedicated to world peace and its charter clearly prohibits the international use of force. Yet, the tide of belligerence continues to rise. The charter's influence has weakened even in the 4 years since the first Special Session on Disarmament. We must not only condemn aggression, we must enforce the dictates of our charter and resume the struggle for peace.

The record of history is clear: Citizens of the United States resort to force reluctantly and only when they must. Our foreign policy, as President Eisenhower once said, ". . . is not difficult to state. We are for peace, first, last, and always, for very simple reasons. We know that it is only in a peaceful atmosphere, a peace with justice, one in which we can be confident, that America can prosper as we have known prosperity in the past."

To those who challenge the truth of those words let me point out that at the end of World War II, we were the only undamaged industrial power in the world. Our military supremacy was unquestioned. We had harnessed the atom and had the ability to unleash its destructive force anywhere in the world. In short, we could have achieved world domination, but that was contrary to the character of our people.

Instead, we wrote a new chapter in the history of mankind. We used our power and wealth to rebuild the war-ravaged economies of the world, both East and West, including those nations

who had been our enemies. We took the initiative in creating such international institutions as this United Nations, where leaders of goodwill could come together to build bridges for peace and prosperity.

America has no territorial ambitions, we occupy no countries, and we have built no walls to lock our people in. Our commitment to self-determination, freedom, and peace is the very soul of America. That commitment is as strong today as it ever was.

The United States has fought four wars in my lifetime. In each we struggled to defend freedom and democracy. We were never the aggressors. America's strength and, yes, her military power have been a force for peace, not conquest; for democracy, not despotism; for freedom, not tyranny.

Watching, as I have, succeeding generations of American youth bleed their lives onto far-flung battlefields to protect our ideals and secure the rule of law, I have known how important it is to deter conflict. But since coming to the Presidency, the enormity of the responsibility of this office has made my commitment even deeper. I believe that responsibility is shared by all of us here today.

On our recent trip to Europe, my wife Nancy told me of a bronze statue, 22 feet high, that she saw on a cliff on the coast of France. The beach at the base of that cliff is called Saint Laurent, but countless American families have it written in the flyleaf of their Bibles and know it as Omaha Beach. The pastoral quiet of that French countryside is in marked contrast to the bloody violence that took place there on a June day 38 years ago when the allies stormed the Continent. At the end of just 1 day of battle, 10,500 Americans were wounded, missing, or killed in what became known as the Normandy landing.

The statue atop that cliff is called "The Spirit of American Youth Rising From the Waves." Its image of sacrifice is almost too powerful to describe. The pain of war is still vivid in our national memory. It sends me to this special session of the United Nations eager to comply with the plea of Pope Paul VI when he spoke in this chamber nearly 17 years ago. "If you want to be brothers," His Holiness said, "let the arms fall from your hands."

We Americans yearn to let them go. But we need more than mere words, more than empty promises, before we can proceed. We look around the world and see rampant conflict and aggression. There are many sources of this conflict— expansionist ambitions, local rivalries, the striving to obtain justice and security. We must all work to resolve such discords by peaceful means and to prevent them from escalation.

The Soviet Record

In the nuclear era, the major powers bear a special responsibility to ease these sources of conflict and to refrain from aggression. And that's why we're so deeply concerned by Soviet conduct. Since World War II, the record of tyranny has included Soviet violation of the Yalta agreements leading to domination of Eastern Europe, symbolized by the Berlin Wall—a grim, gray monument to repression that I visited just a week ago. It includes the takeovers of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Afghanistan and the ruthless repression of the proud people of Poland. Soviet-sponsored guerrillas and terrorists are at work in Central and South America, in Africa, the Middle East, in the Caribbean, and in Europe, violating human rights and unnerving the world with violence. Communist atrocities in Southeast Asia, Afghanistan, and elsewhere continue to shock the free world as refugees escape to tell of their horror.

The decade of so-called detente witnessed the most massive Soviet buildup of military power in history. They increased their defense spending by 40% while American defense spending actually declined in the same real terms. Soviet aggression and support for violence around the world have eroded the confidence needed for arms negotiations. While we exercised unilateral restraint, they forged ahead and, today, possess nuclear and conventional forces far in excess of an adequate deterrent capability.

Soviet oppression is not limited to the countries they invade. At the very time the Soviet Union is trying to manipulate the peace movement in the West, it is stifling a budding peace movement at home. In Moscow, banners are scuttled, buttons are snatched, and demonstrators are arrested when even a few people dare to speak about their fears.

Eleanor Roosevelt, one of our first ambassadors to this body, reminded us that the high-sounding words of tyrants

stand in bleak contradiction to their deeds. "Their promises," she said, "are in deep contrast to their performances."

U.S. Leadership in Disarmament and Arms Control Proposals

My countrymen learned a bitter lesson in this century: The scourge of tyranny cannot be stopped with words alone. So, we have embarked on an effort to renew our strength that had fallen dangerously low. We refuse to become weaker while potential adversaries remain committed to their imperialist adventures.

My people have sent me here today to speak for them as citizens of the world, which they truly are, for we Americans are drawn from every nationality represented in this chamber today. We understand that men and women of every race and creed can and must work together for peace. We stand ready to take the next steps down the road of cooperation through verifiable arms reduction. Agreements on arms control and disarmament can be useful in reinforcing peace, but they're not magic. We should not confuse the signing of agreements with the solving of problems. Simply collecting agreements

- In 1955, President Eisenhower made his "open skies" proposal, under which the United States and the Soviet Union would have exchanged blueprints of military establishments and provided for aerial reconnaissance. The Soviets rejected this plan.

- In 1963, the Limited Test Ban Treaty came into force. This treaty ended nuclear weapons testing in the atmosphere, outer space, or underwater by participating nations.

- In 1970, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons took effect. The United States played a major role in this key effort to prevent the spread of nuclear explosives and to provide for international safeguards on civil nuclear activities. My country remains deeply committed to those objectives today and to strengthening the nonproliferation framework. This is essential to international security.

- In the early 1970s, again at U.S. urging, agreements were reached between the United States and the U.S.S.R. providing for ceilings on some categories of weapons. They could have been more meaningful if Soviet actions had shown restraint and commitment to stability at lower levels of force.

reduce the risk of war. We have proposed four major points as an agenda for peace:

- Elimination of land-based intermediate-range missiles;
- A one-third reduction in strategic ballistic missile warheads;
- A substantial reduction in NATO and Warsaw Pact ground and air forces; and
- New safeguards to reduce the risk of accidental war.

We urge the Soviet Union today to join with us in this quest. We must act not for ourselves alone but for all mankind.

On November 18 of last year, I announced U.S. objectives in arms control agreements: They must be equitable and militarily significant, they must stabilize forces at lower levels, and they must be verifiable.

The United States and its allies have made specific, reasonable, and equitable proposals. In February, our negotiating team in Geneva offered the Soviet Union a draft treaty on intermediate-range nuclear forces. We offered to cancel deployment of our Pershing II ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles in exchange for Soviet elimination of their SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 missiles. This proposal would eliminate, with one stroke, those systems about which both sides have expressed the greatest concern.

The United States is also looking forward to beginning negotiations on strategic arms reductions with the Soviet Union in less than 2 weeks. We will work hard to make these talks an opportunity for real progress in our quest for peace.

On May 9, I announced a phased approach to the reduction of strategic arms. In a first phase, the number of ballistic missile warheads on each side would be reduced to about 5,000. No more than half the remaining warheads would be on land-based missiles. All ballistic missiles would be reduced to an equal level at about one-half the current U.S. number.

In the second phase, we would reduce each side's overall destructive power to equal levels, including a mutual ceiling on ballistic missile throw-weight below the current U.S. level. We are also prepared to discuss other elements of the strategic balance.

Before I returned from Europe last week, I met in Bonn with the leaders of

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will not bring peace. Agreements genuinely reinforce peace only when they are kept. Otherwise, we are building a paper castle that will be blown away by the winds of war. Let me repeat, we need deeds, not words, to convince us of Soviet sincerity should they choose to join us on this path.

Since the end of World War II, the United States has been the leader in serious disarmament and arms control proposals.

- In 1946, in what became known as the Baruch Plan, the United States submitted a proposal for control of nuclear weapons and nuclear energy by an international authority. The Soviets rejected this plan.

An Agenda for Peace

The United Nations designated the 1970s as the First Disarmament Decade, but good intentions were not enough. In reality, that 10-year period included an unprecedented buildup in military weapons and the flaring of aggression and use of force in almost every region of the world. We are now in the Second Disarmament Decade. The task at hand is to assure civilized behavior among nations, to unite behind an agenda for peace.

Over the past 7 months, the United States has put forward a broad-based comprehensive series of proposals to

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. We agreed to introduce a major new Western initiative for the Vienna negotiations on mutual balanced force reductions. Our approach calls for common collective ceilings for both NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization. After 7 years, there would be a total of 700,000 ground forces and 900,000 ground and air force personnel combined. It also includes a package of associated measures to encourage cooperation and verify compliance.

We urge the Soviet Union and members of the Warsaw Pact to view our Western proposal as a means to reach agreement in Vienna after 9 long years of inconclusive talks. We also urge them to implement the 1975 Helsinki agreement on security and cooperation in Europe.

Let me stress that for agreements to work, both sides must be able to verify compliance. The building of mutual confidence in compliance can only be achieved through greater openness. I encourage the Special Session on Disarmament to endorse the importance of these principles in arms control agreements.

I have instructed our representatives at the 40-nation Committee on Disarmament to renew emphasis on verification and compliance. Based on a U.S. proposal, a committee has been formed to examine these issues as they relate to restrictions on nuclear testing. We are also pressing the need for effective verification provisions in agreements banning chemical weapons.

The use of chemical and biological weapons has long been viewed with revulsion by civilized nations. No peace-making institution can ignore the use of these dread weapons and still live up to its mission. The need for a truly effective and verifiable chemical weapons agreement has been highlighted by recent events. The Soviet Union and their allies are violating the Geneva Protocol of 1925, related rules of international law, and the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. There is conclusive evidence that the Soviet Government has provided toxins for use in Laos and Kampuchea and are themselves using chemical weapons against freedom fighters in Afghanistan.

We have repeatedly protested to the Soviet Government, as well as the governments of Laos and Vietnam, their use of chemical and toxin weapons. We call upon them now to grant full and

free access to their countries or to territories they control so that U.N. experts can conduct an effective, independent investigation to verify cessation of these horrors.

Evidence of noncompliance with existing arms control agreements underscores the need to approach negotiation of any new agreements with care. The democracies of the West are open societies. Information on our defenses is available to our citizens, our elected officials, and the world. We do not hesitate to inform potential adversaries of our military forces and ask in return for the same information concerning theirs. The amount and type of military spending by a country are important for the world to know, as a measure of its intentions, and the threat that country may pose to its neighbors. The Soviet Union and other closed societies go to extraordinary lengths to hide their true military spending not only from other nations but from their own people. This practice contributes to distrust and fear about their intentions.

Today, the United States proposes an international conference on military expenditures to build on the work of this body in developing a common system for accounting and reporting. We urge the Soviet Union, in particular, to join this effort in good faith, to revise the universally discredited official figures it publishes, and to join with us in giving the world a true account of the resources we allocate to our armed forces.

Last Friday in Berlin, I said that I would leave no stone unturned in the effort to reinforce peace and lessen the risk of war. It's been clear to me that steps should be taken to improve mutual communication and confidence and lessen the likelihood of misinterpretation.

I have, therefore, directed the exploration of ways to increase understanding and communication between the United States and the Soviet Union in times of peace and of crisis. We will approach the Soviet Union with proposals for reciprocal exchanges in such areas as advance notification of major strategic exercises that otherwise might be misinterpreted; advance notification of ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] launches within, as well as beyond, national boundaries; and an expanded exchange of strategic forces data.

While substantial information on U.S. activities and forces in these areas already is provided, I believe that jointly and regularly sharing information would represent a qualitative improvement in the strategic nuclear environment and would help reduce the chance of misunderstandings. I call upon the Soviet Union to join the United States in exploring these possibilities to build confidence, and I ask for your support of our efforts.

Call for International Support

One of the major items before this conference is the development of a comprehensive program of disarmament. We support the effort to chart a course of realistic and effective measures in the quest for peace. I have come to this hall to call for international recommitment to the basic tenet of the U.N. Charter—that all members practice tolerance and live together in peace as good neighbors under the rule of law, forsaking armed force as a means of settling disputes between nations. America urges you to support the agenda for peace that I have outlined today. We ask you to reinforce the bilateral and multilateral arms control negotiations between members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact and to rededicate yourselves to maintaining international peace and security and removing threats to peace.

We, who have signed the U.N. Charter, have pledged to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territory or independence of any state. In these times when more and more lawless acts are going unpunished—as some members of this very body show a growing disregard for the U.N. Charter—the peace-loving nations of the world must condemn aggression and pledge again to act in a way that is worthy of the ideals that we have endorsed. Let us finally make the charter live.

In late spring, 37 years ago, representatives of 50 nations gathered on the other side of this continent, in the San Francisco Opera House. The League of Nations had crumbled and World War II still raged, but those men and nations were determined to find peace. The result was this charter for peace that is the framework of the United Nations.

President Harry Truman spoke of the revival of an old faith—the everlasting moral force of justice prompting that U.N. conference. Such a force remains strong in America and in other

News Conference of May 13 (Excerpts)

countries where speech is free and citizens have the right to gather and make their opinions known.

President Truman said, "If we should pay merely lip service to inspiring ideals, and later do violence to simple justice, we would draw down upon us the bitter wrath of generations yet unborn." Those words of Harry Truman have special meaning for us today as we live with the potential to destroy civilization.

"We must learn to live together in peace," he said. "We must build a new world—a far better world."

What a better world it would be if the guns were silent; if neighbor no longer encroached on neighbor and all peoples were free to reap the rewards of their toil and determine their own destiny and system of government—whatever their choice.

During my recent audience with His Holiness Pope John Paul II, I gave him the pledge of the American people to do everything possible for peace and arms reduction. The American people believe forging real and lasting peace to be their sacred trust.

Let us never forget that such a peace would be a terrible hoax if the world were no longer blessed with freedom and respect for human rights. The United Nations, Hammarskjöld said, was born out of the cataclysms of war. It should justify the sacrifices of all those who have died for freedom and justice. "It is our duty to the past," Hammarskjöld said, "and it is our duty to the future, so to serve both our nations and the world."

As both patriots of our nations and the hope of all the world, let those of us assembled here in the name of peace deepen our understandings, renew our commitment to the rule of law, and take new and bolder steps to calm an uneasy world. Can any delegate here deny that in so doing he would be doing what the people—the rank and file of his own country or her own country—want him or her to do?

Isn't it time for us to really represent the deepest, most heartfelt yearnings of all of our people? Let no nation abuse this common longing to be free of fear. We must not manipulate our people by playing upon their nightmares; we must serve mankind through genuine disarmament. With God's help we can secure life and freedom for generations to come.

¹Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of June 21, 1982. ■

Four times in my life, I have seen America plunged into war—twice as part of tragic global conflicts that cost the lives of millions. Living through that experience has convinced me that America's highest mission is to stand as a leader among the free nations in the cause of peace. And that's why, hand-in-hand with our efforts to restore a credible national defense, my Administration has been actively working for a reduction in nuclear and conventional forces that can help free the world from the threat of destruction.

In Geneva, the United States is now negotiating with the Soviet Union on a proposal I set forward last fall to reduce drastically the level of nuclear armament in Europe. In Vienna, we and our NATO allies are negotiating with the Warsaw Pact over ways to reduce conventional forces in Europe.

Last Sunday, I proposed a far-reaching approach to nuclear arms control—a phased reduction in strategic weapons beginning with those that are most dangerous and destabilizing—the warheads on ballistic missiles, and especially those on intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Today, the United States and the Soviet Union each have about 7,500 nuclear warheads poised on missiles that can reach their targets in a matter of minutes. In the first phase of negotiations, we want to focus on lessening this imminent threat. We seek to reduce the number of ballistic missile warheads to about 5,000—one-third less than today's levels, limit the number of warheads on land-based missiles to half that number, and cut the total number of all ballistic missiles to an equal level—about one-half that of the current U.S. level.

In the second phase, we'll seek reductions to equal levels of throw-weight—a critical indicator of overall destructive potential of missiles. To be acceptable, a new arms agreement with the Soviets must be balanced, equal, and verifiable. And most important, it must increase stability and the prospects of peace.

I have already written President Brezhnev and instructed Secretary Haig to approach the Soviet Government so that we can begin START [Strategic Arms Reduction Talks] talks at the earliest opportunity. And we hope that these negotiations can begin by the end

of June and hope to hear from President Brezhnev in the near future.

Reaching an agreement with the Soviets will not be short or easy work. We know that from the past. But I believe that the Soviet people and their leaders understand the importance of preventing war. And I believe that a firm, forthright American position on arms reductions can bring us closer to a settlement.

Tonight, I want to renew my pledge to the American people and to the people of the world that the United States will do everything we can to bring such an agreement about.

Q. If wiping out the nuclear threat is so important to the world, why do you choose to ignore 7 long years of negotiations in which two Republican Presidents played a part? I speak of SALT II. We abide by the terms the Soviet Union does; why not push for a ratification of that treaty as a first step and then go on to START?

A. I remind you that a Democratic-controlled Senate refused to ratify it. And the reason for refusing to ratify, I think, is something we can't—

Q. —Republican Senate now.

A. But we can't ignore that. The reason why it was refused ratification—SALT stands for strategic arms limitation. And the limitation in that agreement would allow, in the life of the treaty, for the Soviet Union to just about double their present nuclear capability. It would allow—and does allow us—to increase ours. In other words, it simply legitimizes an arms race.

The parts that we're observing of that have to do with the monitoring of each other's weaponry; so both sides are doing that. What we're striving for is to reduce the power, the number—and particularly those destabilizing missiles that can be touched off by the push of a button—to reduce the number of those. There just is no ratio between that and what SALT was attempting to do. I think SALT was the wrong course to follow.

Q. You may know that former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger said yesterday that your approach

might take far longer than the 7 years it took to require—to negotiate SALT II. What sort of time frame do you anticipate it would take to negotiate these limits on warheads?

A. I don't know that you could project a time frame on that, when you look back at the history all the way back to the end of World War II with the Soviet Union on the negotiations. But I do think there is one thing present now that was not present before, and that is the determination of the United States to rebuild its national defenses. The very fact that we have shown the will and are going forward on the rebuilding program is something that, I think, offers an inducement to the Soviet Union to come to that table and legitimately negotiate with us.

In the past several years, those negotiations took place with them having a superiority over us and us actually unilaterally disarming. Every time someone wanted a little more money for another program, they took it away from defense. That isn't true anymore.

Q. There have been calls in recent days for the United States to renounce the existing NATO treaty policy under which we would retaliate against the Soviets with nuclear weapons if they attack Western Europe with conventional arms. Under what conditions could we pledge that we will never be the first to introduce nuclear weapons in any conflict in Western Europe?

A. I just don't think this proposal that has been made to renounce the first use of weapons—certainly, there's none of us who want to see them—but I don't think that any useful purpose is served in making such a declaration. Our nuclear—strategic nuclear weapons, unfortunately, are the only balance or deterrent that we have to the massive buildup of conventional arms that the Soviet Union has on the Western Front—on the NATO front. This is why, in Vienna, we're trying to negotiate with them on a reduction of conventional arms, also, because they have an overpowering force there.

Q. What can you tell us about the progress or lack of progress concerning the negotiated settlement on the Falkland Islands? Could you explain a little bit what role the United States is playing, and if you could elaborate a little bit about what our situation is now with respect to other allies in Latin America and in South America, since we have so firmly come down on the side of the British?

A. I think there's a tendency on the part of many of the countries of South America to feel that their sympathies are more with Argentina than ours. I don't think there has been irreparable damage done. The negotiations continue to go on. They have been moved to the United Nations now, and the Secretary General there is very much involved in them. This morning, yesterday, in my talks with President Figueiredo of Brazil, he, too, is interested and has volunteered his good offices to try and help. And all we—those of us who want to be brokers for a peaceful settlement—can do is stand by and try to be helpful in that.

There are reports that some of the issues between the two have been agreed upon. Basically, it is down to a situation of withdrawal, of what will be the interim administration on the island itself, and what will be the period of negotiations, then, of what the ultimate settlement is supposed to be.

Up until now the intransigence had been on one side, that is, in wanting a guarantee of sovereignty before the negotiations took place—which doesn't make much sense. I understand that there's been some agreement now on awaiting negotiations on that. So we'll continue to hope and pray.

Q. Do you intend to reactivate the memorandum of understanding with Israel, and do you believe Egypt should agree to hold a meeting of the autonomy talks in Jerusalem?

A. I'm not going to comment on that last part of the question because we want to stand by and be of help there, and this is one to be worked out between them. But I do have faith that both President Mubarak and Prime Minister Begin intend to pursue the talks in the framework of Camp David—the autonomy talks—and we stand by ready to help them.

In the thing that you mentioned that has temporarily been suspended, we regretted having to do that, and we look forward to when that will be implemented again.

Q. What is the United States doing to keep the peace along the Lebanese border?

A. With some minor flurries, our ceasefire has held for 9 months now. The word we get from both sides is that they want it to continue, and I could probably answer your question better when I get an assessment—I'll be seeing Ambassador Habib this, I think, Saturday.

Q. In your arms proposals, you focus on a central intercontinental missile system to the two sides. If the Soviets were to come back and say they wanted to talk about bombers, about cruise missiles, about other weapons systems, would you be willing to include those, or are those excluded?

A. No, nothing is excluded. But one of the reasons for going at the ballistic missile—that is the one that is the most destabilizing. That one is the one that is the most frightening to most people. And let me just give you a little reasoning on that—of my own on that score.

That is the missile sitting in its silo in which there could be the possibility of miscalculation. That is the one that people know that once that button is pushed, there is no defense; there is no recall. And it's a matter of minutes, and the missiles reach the other country.

Those that are carried in bombers, those that are carried in ships of one kind or another, or submersibles—you are dealing with a conventional type of weapon or instrument, and those instruments can be intercepted. They can be recalled if there has been a miscalculation. So they don't have the same, I think, psychological effect that the presence of the others have that, once launched, they're on their way, and there's no preventing, no stopping them.

Q. There are many arms specialists, however, who say that the multiplication of cruise missiles, in particular, those that can be put on land, can be put on ships, submarines, and so forth, also have that same effect. You can't call them back once they are launched. They have a very short flight time, and there will be thousands of them.

A. They have a much longer flight time, actually, a matter of hours. They're not the speed of the ballistic missiles that go up into space and come back down again. But this doesn't mean that we ignore anything. As I said, we're negotiating now on conventional weapons.

But I think you start with first things first. You can't bite it all off in one bite. So our decision was to start with the most destabilizing and the most destructive.

Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of May 17, 1982. ■

Peace and Security in the Middle East

Secretary Haig's address before the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, Chicago, Illinois, on May 26, 1982¹

The Middle East today is a severe testing ground for constructive diplomacy. Deeply rooted rivalries and historic animosities mark its politics. The region's strategic value as a bridge linking three continents is amplified by its vast natural wealth. And in the nuclear age, the interplay of local and superpower competition takes on a special edge of danger.

As a consequence, no other region is less forgiving of political passivity than the Middle East. So many interests are at stake and so many factors are at work that the alternative to shaping events is to suffer through them. We are at such a juncture today. We must shape events in the Middle East if we are to continue to hope for a more peaceful international order, one characterized by peoples living in peace and the resolution of conflicts without resort to force.

Ever since the 1973 war, the daunting task of achieving peace between the Arabs and Israel has been among America's highest priorities. Despite the reluctance of the American people to expand their international commitments during the decade of the 1970s, the efforts of our diplomats were supported by an increasing volume of economic and military assistance. Clearly, the safeguarding of our interests in the Middle East through the peace process has merited and enjoyed both bipartisan support and popular consensus.

The efforts launched by the United States in those years have borne substantial fruit. Two American presidents and Secretary of State Kissinger laid the groundwork for progress through the disengagement agreements. The Camp David accords became the living testimony to the vision of the late President Sadat, Prime Minister Begin, and President Carter that the cycle of war and hatred could be broken. The United States will always be proud of its crucial role in this process.

By 1981, however, the challenges to American policy had multiplied far beyond the self-evident necessity to prevent another Arab-Israeli war.

- The Soviet Union and its allies increased their influence, particularly

along the sea lanes and vital approaches to the region. Local conflicts and ambitions ranging from North Africa to the Horn of Africa, the Yemens to Afghanistan, offered the context. Arms, Cuban mercenaries, and Soviet soldiers themselves in Afghanistan were the instruments. The United States seemed slow to recognize that this pattern of events was undermining the regional security of our friends, prospects for peace, and vital Western interests.

- Iran, a close American ally and a force for stability in the Persian Gulf, was convulsed by revolution as the Islamic republic rejected the diplomacy and modernizing program of the Shah. In the face of this upheaval, the United States found it difficult to pursue its interests or to achieve a constructive relationship with the new government. Meanwhile, Iraq invaded Iran. Fueled by Soviet arms to both countries, this conflict threatened ominous consequences for the future security of the area and Western interests in the flow of oil.

- The once prosperous and peaceful State of Lebanon was shattered by civil conflict and the intervention of outside forces. Continuous tension sapped the authority of the Lebanese Government, aggravated inter-Arab relations, and threatened to involve Israel and Syria in war.

- Meanwhile, the peace process itself had reached a dangerous impasse. Egypt and Israel were divided over the role and composition of the multinational force and observers, crucial to the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai and the peace treaty itself. The negotiations for Palestinian autonomy were in recess. The other Arab states, American friends in Saudi Arabia and Jordan among them, were opposed to the Camp David accords and Egypt's peace with Israel. The Palestinian Arabs themselves were still adamantly against either joining the peace process or recognizing explicitly Israel's right to live in peace.

An American Approach

These developments required an American approach to the problems of the Middle East that not only pressed the peace process forward but also enlarged the security dimension of our relations with the states of the area. Peace and security had to move in

parallel. Local leaders understood that the inevitable risk-taking for peace would be vitally affected by the strategic context of the region. Lack of confidence in the United States and fear of the Soviet Union or radical forces would paralyze the prospects for progress, not only in the Arab-Israeli conflict but other regional problems as well.

Our previous policies had to be strengthened by building on a consensus of strategic concern over Soviet and radical activities that already existed among our friends in the Middle East. It was not enough to say that we opposed Soviet intervention and Soviet proxies. We had to demonstrate our ability to protect our friends and to help them to defend themselves. We had to take initiatives on the peace process and other regional conflicts that would prevent the Soviet Union from exploiting local turmoil and troublemakers for its own strategic purposes. In short, the United States had to be receptive, useful, and reliable in helping our friends to counter threats to their security.

The President, therefore, set in motion a broad-ranging attempt to create more effective security cooperation in the Middle East.

- We established a fresh basis for cooperation with Pakistan, a traditional American friend, a key state on the northern tier of the Middle East, and, with the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, at the front line of danger.
- We have improved relations with Turkey, a staunch member of NATO and long a barrier to Soviet expansion.
- We have worked together with our friends to counter the activities of Libya in Africa and the Middle East.

In addition, the United States has sought and will continue to seek practical arrangements with such countries as Morocco, Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, Jordan, Oman, and Saudi Arabia that enhance security. We are also working with Israel, a strategic ally, to whose security and qualitative military superiority we have long been committed.

In undertaking these efforts, we recognize that for many countries formal and elaborate security structures are no longer appropriate. We have not tried to create interests where none exist. Though we shall take full account of local sensitivities, no country can be given a veto over the pursuit of our best interests or necessary cooperation with others.

The United States, working with its local friends despite their sometimes conflicting concerns, can be a responsive partner in the achievement of greater security for all. Our strong naval forces and the determination of the President and the American people to improve our defense posture, despite economic austerity, are also essential to our credibility in the Middle East.

Three Issues

Greater cooperation in the field of security will increase measurably the confidence that our local friends repose in the United States. If properly managed, such cooperation reinforces American diplomacy. And today the United States must address three issues: first, the Iraq-Iran war; second, the autonomy negotiations; and third, the crisis in Lebanon.

Each of these issues is characterized by a mixture of danger and opportunity. Moreover, they have begun already to affect each other. If we are to succeed in advancing our goals throughout the region, then we must coordinate our approaches to all of them.

First, the Iran-Iraq war. Iraq has justified its invasion and seizure of Iranian territory by referring to longstanding border claims and Iranian calls for the overthrow of its government. Iran has responded that the 1975 Algiers agreement settled such claims and accuses Iraq of deliberate aggression intended to bring down the Islamic republic. It is clear that disregard for the principle that international disputes should be settled peacefully has brought the region into great danger, with ominous implications for Western interests.

Both Iran and Iraq, though wealthy in oil, have been badly drained of vital resources. There is great risk that the conflict may spill over into neighboring states, and it has already aggravated inter-Arab relations. It may lead to unforeseen and far-reaching changes in the regional balance of power, offering the Soviet Union an opportunity to enlarge its influence in the process.

The United States does not have diplomatic relations with either Iraq or Iran. From the beginning of the war we have stressed our neutrality. We have refused and we shall continue to refuse to allow military equipment under U.S. controls to be provided to either party.

Neutrality, however, does not mean that we are indifferent to the outcome. We have friends and interests that are endangered by the continuation of

hostilities. We are committed to defending our vital interests in the area. These interests—and the interests of the world—are served by the territorial integrity and political independence of all countries in the Persian Gulf. The United States, therefore, supports constructive efforts to bring about an end to the fighting and the withdrawal of forces behind international borders under conditions that will preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both Iran and Iraq. In the weeks ahead, we shall take a more active role with other concerned members of the international community as efforts are intensified to end this tragic war.

Second, the autonomy negotiations. President Sadat of Egypt, who gave his life for peace, once described the barriers to Arab-Israeli peace as primarily psychological. He recognized that the profound antagonisms dividing Arab and Israeli were deeply reinforced by lasting suspicion. Politics—the art of

Both Iran and Iraq, though wealthy in oil, have been badly drained of vital resources. There is great risk that the conflict may spill over into neighboring states, and it has already aggravated inter-Arab relations.

the possible—could succeed only after psychology—the science of perceptions—had done its work.

Our initial task was to make sure that both the psychology and the politics of the peace process continued. While we were prepared to take the initiative on the autonomy negotiations, it soon became evident as the Sinai withdrawal date approached that the best way to sustain confidence in the peace process was to help both Egypt and Israel fulfill the terms of their peace treaty. After prolonged American diplomatic effort, the multinational force and observers (MFO) was established. It is safeguarding the peace in Sinai today. The President's decision to offer U.S. troops for the force was a tangible recognition of the interrelationship between peace and

security. Such a demonstration of our commitment to the treaty helped to secure broader participation, including units from some of our European allies. This truly multinational peacekeeping force testifies to international support for peace.

Only 1 month ago, the final arrangements were put into place. On that occasion, President Reagan spoke for all Americans when he praised the courage of both Egypt and Israel. Sinai, so often the corridor for armies on the way to war, was at last a zone of peace. But we cannot allow the peace process to end in the desert.

The signatories of the Camp David accords, of which we are the witness and full partners, wisely entitled their work, "A Framework for Peace in the Middle East." Basing their diplomacy on U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, which provide for peace between Israel and all of its neighbors, including Jordan and Syria, both Egypt and Israel were not content to establish peace only with each other. They recognized the necessity to go beyond their bilateral achievement in the search for a just, comprehensive, and durable settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. They have, therefore, been engaged for over 3 years, not only in the execution of the treaty of peace but also in negotiations aimed eventually at the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects.

These negotiations, known as the autonomy talks, have been the subject of much misunderstanding and criticism. For many Israelis the process threatens to go too far, leading toward a Palestinian state which they fear would deny Jews access to the historic areas of ancient Israel, threaten Israeli security, and offer the Soviet Union a fresh opportunity for influence. For many Arabs, including until now the Palestinians themselves, autonomy does not seem to go far enough. In their view, it is only a formula for an Israeli domination that they resist and they fear will lead to further radicalization of the entire region. Israeli settlement activities in the occupied territories have exacerbated these fears.

We must all face the reality that autonomy in and of itself cannot entirely alleviate the fears on either side. But we should also realize that autonomy is only one stage of a process: It is an opportunity, not a conclusion. The beginning of autonomy actually initiates a transitional period to last no longer than 5 years, in which a freely elected self-governing authority would replace the

Israeli military government and civilian administration. Furthermore, negotiations are to commence not later than the third year of the transitional period on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and its relationship with its neighbors. A peace treaty between Israel and Jordan is also an objective of this negotiation.

Ample opportunity is provided in every phase for the participation, in addition to the present partners in the peace process, of Jordan and the Palestinian Arabs. These arrangements are to reflect both the principle of self-government by the inhabitants and the legitimate security concerns of all the parties involved.

The Camp David process, which is based firmly on U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338, remains the only practical route toward a more comprehensive Middle East peace between Israel and all of its neighbors, including Jordan and Syria. No other plan provides for movement despite the conflicting interests and fears of the parties. No other plan

Israelis and Palestinians to work together. Public statements that fail to recognize the temporary nature of autonomy and negotiating positions that mistake autonomy for final status do nothing but hinder forward movement.

- Unilateral actions by any party that attempt to prejudice or bias the final outcome of the process serve only to raise suspicions and aggravate relationships. Truly all of our ultimate hopes for peace depend in the end upon the achievement of mutual respect and friendly relations between Arab and Israeli. A heavy responsibility will be borne by those who darken these hopes without regard for either Israel's long-term interests or legitimate Palestinian aspirations.

- Refusal to participate in the talks by those most affected by the conflict risks the loss of the best chance for the achievement of a lasting peace. Fifteen years have passed since the 1967 war and the initiation of Israel's military government over the West Bank and Gaza. Autonomy is the vital first step in

neither recognize nor negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) until it accepts U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338, and recognizes Israel's right to live in peace.

Now is the time to redouble our efforts to make the peace process under the Camp David framework continue to work. I have said that great intellectual ingenuity and political courage will be required by all parties if an autonomy agreement is to be reached. Our delegation, led by Ambassador Fairbanks [special adviser to the Secretary Richard Fairbanks], will continue to work closely with Egypt and Israel as we intensify our effort to achieve success.

The peace process has already accomplished what would have been considered a utopian fantasy only a few short years ago. But none of us should be under any illusions. The failure to negotiate an autonomy agreement, and to negotiate one soon, will squander the best chance to act in the best interests of all parties. Inevitably, such a failure will invite more dangerous alternatives.

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Third, and finally, the crisis in Lebanon. Lebanon today is a focal point of danger. All of those conditions are present in abundance that might be ignited into a war with far-reaching consequences. The lives of the people of Lebanon are at stake. The life of the state itself is at stake. And the stability of the region hangs in the balance.

The recent history of Lebanon is a grim tale. Over the last 6 years, many of the country's most striking achievements have been lost. Once stable enough to be the center of Middle Eastern finance, its economy has been wracked by internecine warfare and foreign intervention. Tragically, Lebanon, once extolled as a model in a region of suffering minorities, is now a byword for violence.

Lebanon's unique position as a marketplace for the ideas of the Arab world has given way instead to a marketplace for the violent conflicts of inter-Arab and regional rivalries. Its representative government has been endangered. The Arab deterrent force, now consisting entirely of Syrian troops with its mission to protect the integrity of Lebanon has not stabilized the situation.

The story on the Lebanese-Israeli border is no different. Once the most peaceful point of Arab-Israeli contact, southern Lebanon turned into a battleground between Israel and the PLO even as the peace process proceeded. In this part of the country as well, inter-communal relations have suffered badly.

embodies so well the necessity for progress despite the inherent imperfections of a transitional arrangement. As Churchill put it, "The maxim—nothing avails but perfection—spells paralysis."

The United States has been heartened by the public and private declarations of both President Mubarak of Egypt and Prime Minister Begin of Israel to press forward toward the early and successful conclusion of an autonomy agreement. As we proceed, it is important that we conduct ourselves with several considerations in mind.

- Autonomy is transitional, not the final word. The genius of Camp David was to provide for the possibility of progress, despite crucial, unresolved issues such as the ultimate status of Jerusalem. These, too, must be negotiated, but first we must establish a self-governing authority that will enable

the historic opportunity to change this situation and to begin the painful but necessary process of resolving the Palestinian problem. A settlement cannot be imposed, but peace can be negotiated. History will judge harshly those who miss this opportunity.

Despite all of the obstacles confronting a broader Middle East peace, there has been a change in the polemic over the Arab-Israeli conflict in recent months. Many are recognizing at last that "no war, no peace" is not good enough. Increasingly, disagreement concerns the terms of peace, not the fact that peace itself must come.

The United States long has believed that the risks and sacrifices required for settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict do not admit of any ambiguity on the basic issue that genuine peace is the objective. That is why, for example, we shall

The central government's authority has been challenged by the variety and military strength of contesting groups. The brave units of the U.N. force, faced with an enormously difficult and dangerous task, have saved many lives but have not succeeded entirely in establishing the security of daily life.

Over the past year, deteriorating conditions in Lebanon have required extraordinary efforts to avoid war. In April of 1981, Ambassador Habib [President's special emissary to the Middle East Philip C. Habib], at the President's direction, worked successfully to avoid military confrontation in Lebanon. His efforts culminated in the cessation of hostilities in the Lebanese-Israeli area. A fragile cease-fire has survived for more than 10 months. While all parties remain fundamentally interested in maintaining it, the danger is ever present that violations could escalate into major hostilities.

These measures have deterred war. But conflict cannot be managed perpetually while the problems at the root of the conflict continue to fester. The world cannot stand aside, watching in morbid fascination, as this small nation with its creative and cultured people slides further into the abyss of violence and chaos. The time has come to take concerted action in support of both Lebanon's territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders and a strong central government capable of promoting a free, open, democratic, and traditionally pluralistic society. The President has, therefore, directed Ambassador Habib to return to the Middle East soon to discuss our ideas for such action with the cooperation of concerned states.

America's Moment in the Middle East

The Middle East today is a living laboratory for the political experiments of the 20th century. A multitude of nations have emerged from the disintegration of empires, their dreams of a better future sustained by memories of a glorious past. The modern nation-state has been imposed upon traditions that transcend both secular loyalties and well-defined borders. The quest for modernization competes uneasily with religious and ethnic identities that long predate the Industrial Revolution of the West.

Clearly, the peoples of the Middle East are embarked upon the most rapid social transformations in their history.

Nonetheless, the past strongly permeates both their attitudes toward the future and the texture of their daily life. The ruins of ancient times remind them and us that the region has always played a vital part in the advance of civilization.

There are other ruins, too, that remind us of another aspect of the Middle East. Philosophers and artists, merchants and travelers, statesmen and scholars have made their impact throughout the ages. But the soldier, with his vast monuments to destruction, is perhaps overly represented in the archaeology of this region. The violence of war is all too often the point of contact

between the history of the Middle East and its contemporary struggles.

By the standards of this ancient region, the United States is a country still in its infancy. But by virtue of our power and our interests, our relationships and our objectives, we are uniquely placed to play a constructive role in helping the nations of the area in their quest for peace and security. Now is America's moment in the Middle East. As Americans, let us hope to be remembered by the peoples of the Middle East not for the monuments of war but for the works of peace.

¹Press release 177. ■

Peaceful Change in Central America

by *Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.*

Address given on behalf of Secretary Haig before the Pittsburgh World Affairs Council, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on May 27, 1982. Ambassador Stoessel is Deputy Secretary of State.¹

It is a pleasure to appear here today before the Pittsburgh World Affairs Council and to deliver, on behalf of Secretary Haig, his remarks on "Peaceful Change in Central America." I know how much the Secretary wanted to be here today himself to deliver this important statement, and yet it is the very theme of his speech—peaceful change—which necessitates his presence in Washington today to attend the Organization of American States' (OAS) special session on the Falklands.

As the fighting has grown more intense over the past few days in the Falklands, diplomatic efforts have been renewed by several parties. Today's meeting of the organ of consultation of the Organization of American States is a pivotal event in this process, at which further definition may be given to the OAS position on this crisis. Owing to the vital American interests which are involved and to the tragic cost of this crisis in terms of human life, Secretary Haig felt it necessary to personally lead the U.S. delegation to the meeting. His involvement today is, as it has been from the outset, an expression of our willingness to aid in the search for a peaceful solution to this dispute between two friends.

As we meet today to discuss our hemisphere, the war between Great Britain and Argentina can only cause Americans the greatest of anguish. We in the United States must recognize that much is at stake. Britain is a country to which we are bound by unique ties of friendship, values, and alliance. Argentina is an old friend, a country of immigrants like our own, with which we share the adventure of the new world experience.

For these relationships alone, we would have been deeply concerned about the tragic events that began so short a time ago. But there are additional and even more compelling reasons for our anguish. This hemisphere has been more than just a place to dream of a "new world": For two generations and more, it has also been the world's best haven from war. The inter-American system and the Rio treaty have contained and almost eliminated armed conflict among the states of the Americas. Our neighbors have the lowest rate of expenditure for arms of any area of the world. These unique achievements must not be lost.

When two friends are at war with each other, American policy cannot be guided simply by friendship. Nor can we be guided simply by fear that the very expression of our position will damage our long-term interests. In this critical situation, the only sure guide for American action is principle.

The President has set forth as a basic principle of American foreign policy that historic change should occur peacefully and under the rule of law. The United States favors the peaceful

settlement of international disputes without resort to force or the threat of force. Only in this way can we advance in the Western Hemisphere and elsewhere toward more free, more peaceful, and more productive societies.

Our policy toward the South Atlantic has been designed to support this central principle of our foreign policy. If we disregard it, conflict will continue, creating an opportunity for the Soviet Union and its allies to gain the influence they have long sought. At the request of both parties we have, therefore, tried hard to prevent war. We remain ready to help or to support any realistic diplomatic initiative which will bring a just peace.

The South Atlantic is not the only place in this hemisphere where the process of peaceful change has been challenged. The peoples of Central America are confronted by severe economic and social problems. They want to remain faithful to the authentic vision of the Americas—the liberty and dignity of man. But self-appointed revolutionaries supported by Nicaragua, Cuba, and the U.S.S.R. are attempting to manipulate the problems of Central America in order to impose new dictatorships by force. If they should succeed, peace and progress in the hemisphere will surely be among the victims.

Despite the efforts of such forces, the advocates of democratic reform and international cooperation have recently registered impressive advances. The March 28 constituent assembly election in El Salvador provided a decisive example. Neither the local guerrillas nor the international skeptics prevented the courageous people of El Salvador from reaffirming their faith in a democratic solution to their problems.

El Salvador was not alone. Costa Rica and Honduras, members with El Salvador in the Central American Democratic Community, were resisting successfully Cuban and Nicaraguan efforts to destabilize the region. In January, Honduras completed its own transition to democratic rule with the inauguration of an elected president and legislative assembly. At the same time, Costa Rica's 30-year-old democratic tradition withstood the double shock of hard economic times and the political and military turmoil of its neighbors.

The democratic experience also extended to the Dominican Republic and Colombia. Only 10 days ago, the presidential election in the Dominican Republic marked a new milestone in that country's inspiring progress in building democratic institutions. And despite

violence by Cuban-trained guerrillas, Colombia's voters elected a new legislature on March 14. They return to the polls this Sunday to elect a president.

These affirmations of freedom have reverberated throughout the region and the world. They demonstrate that totalitarian victory over democracy in the Caribbean Basin is far from inevitable. Quite to the contrary: 18 of the 25 states in the basin now have governments elected by the people. Recognition is growing that armed insurrection and extremism, whatever the ideology, are unwanted and unworkable. The security for every citizen that is essential to development can be provided best within the framework of democracy.

America's Responsibility

The United States, as the advocate of democratic reform and peaceful change, cannot stand aloof from the challenges of Central America. Our neighbors' fate will have far-reaching consequences for the stability of the region and our hemisphere. The world is watching to see whether we are careful enough and determined enough to meet these challenges.

We can no longer afford our historical tendency to oscillate between utter neglect of Central America and direct intervention. Instead, the United States must pursue a balanced approach, one that takes into account the realities of local conditions but that also appreciates the regional and global context. We know that the United States cannot "cure" Central America's longstanding problems by itself. Still less does our policy envisage the use of American troops, who are neither wanted nor needed. But we can promote democracy and reform, while protecting our vital interests. We can do so if we mount the sustained political, economic, and security cooperation with Central America and other friends in Latin America that is demanded by our democratic values and essential to our own security.

The time has come for Americans to work with unity and determination toward the goal of a region at peace with itself, free from outside threats, and able to devote its energies to economic progress and the development of democratic political institutions.

Threefold Commitment

What is required of America today is a threefold commitment to support

democracy, economic development, and security cooperation in Central America.

First, we must commit ourselves to the support of democracy in every country of the area. Democracy is not an abstract value but an indispensable means through which political, economic, and social issues can be addressed in a peaceful manner. Democratic institutions offer the chance to redress grievances and the flexibility to resolve problems in a rational way before dangerous pressures explode in violence. And responsible democratic institutions are the best protection against the repeated violation of individual rights.

A key part of our commitment to democracy must be the determination to use our influence to help our neighbors secure the human rights of each of their citizens. Intimidation, fear, and denial of liberty are unacceptable barriers to progress. Only the political framework of democracy strengthens lasting economic and social development.

Second, we must support sustained economic development. President Reagan's Caribbean Basin proposals—developed in concert with Mexico, Canada, Venezuela, and Colombia—will provide the opportunity for long-term prosperity to the small economies of the area. The President's program is designed to encourage future economic development by granting duty-free treatment to the region's imports, by providing tax incentives for investment in the region, and by offering assistance and training to help the private sector. Emergency financial assistance is also provided to relieve critical short-term pressures. The Caribbean Basin initiative offers hope of a different future for the region—a better future for so many who have known only destitution. We must support this program which is so much in our own national interest as well as that of our neighbors.

Third, we must offer our cooperation in security matters. Military training and supplies can help local forces to repel guerrilla violence against the political process, the economic infrastructure, and national institutions. Central American armed forces face a difficult task against experienced enemies who receive substantial and sophisticated support from abroad. Their ability to respond in an effective and discriminating manner can be increased by our assistance and training.

Our Priorities

Guided by these reaffirmations of our interest in the freedom, prosperity, and security of our neighbors, we must set our priorities for the months ahead. It is critical that we maintain the momentum of recent steps toward democracy in El Salvador. Salvadoran political parties and the constituent assembly have shown the ability to make the compromises necessary to form a government of reconciliation with a mandate to build a functioning democracy. Those opposition elements capable of accommodating to democracy should seriously consider rejoining the political process. Now that El Salvador's civilian and military leaders have faced the elections and abided by the results, other governments can also encourage steps toward national reconciliation which can rally El Salvador's fragmented society around democratic standards.

For our part, we will support the continuation of El Salvador's reforms, particularly its land reform program. Considerable confusion has arisen recently over constituent assembly legislation affecting this program. We have been assured that the purpose of the legislation is to improve agricultural efficiency while reaffirming the rights of land-reform beneficiaries. We are watching the practical effects of this change very carefully, to see that progress will continue. Salvadorans should know that we will support no less. We shall also look forward to further efforts to curb abuses of authority by the security forces, and we shall help to sustain progress toward the establishment of democratic institutions. All of these elements of change are important in fulfilling the desires expressed by the Salvadoran people so clearly in the elections.

The United States will also help efforts to facilitate the reentry of dissident Salvadoran political forces into the country's democratic life. We shall willingly enter into contacts to facilitate discussions or negotiations on how to broaden the democratic process and to provide an opportunity for those who can accept democratic rules to reenter the mainstream. But we will neither endorse nor promote negotiations over powersharing, which would give the guerrillas a special place at the bargaining table because they bear arms. This would defeat the very principle of the democratic process. It would dishonor the courage of the Salvadoran people.

Elsewhere in Central America, the newly elected governments of Costa

Rica and Honduras have embarked upon tough austerity programs to prevent economic disaster. At the same time, they are working to improve their capacity to prevent terrorist infiltration from undermining their institutions and stability. The United States will provide the economic and security assistance needed by these countries, and newly independent Belize as well, to set their economies back on the road to development and to protect their democratic institutions from attack.

For the first time in years, the outlook is also promising in Guatemala, where political development has long been paralyzed. In the wake of a military coup led by young officers, a new government has pledged to end human rights abuses, to eliminate corruption, and to institute a free and open democratic system. We hope that the steps already taken toward fulfilling these commitments will continue and that they will enable Guatemala to deal more effectively with its socioeconomic, political, and security problems. Cuba's guerrilla allies in Guatemala have been consistently unresponsive to the new government's pleas to lay down their arms and join in a process of national reconciliation. But they are unlikely to gain power by force if Guatemala continues on its new course of orderly reform. Now that Guatemala has begun to change, we must seize this opportunity to encourage the return to democracy and law through electoral reforms and safeguards for individual rights.

Our approach to Central America has focused on those societies embarked on the road to democratic reform, but we must also address the problems posed by Nicaragua. Under the Sandinistas, Nicaragua has been instrumental in the campaign to obstruct democratic progress in El Salvador. We and other countries have repeatedly expressed concern over these activities and developments in Nicaragua itself that endanger both pluralism and economic progress.

Marxist-Leninist leaders in Nicaragua would have been greatly strengthened had El Salvador collapsed this spring as they predicted. They did more than just predict it. They sought to insure it by providing arms, propaganda, and logistical support. Now, in the wake of the Salvadoran elections, we are exploring once again whether the Nicaraguan leadership is prepared to change its ways, to cease its intervention in the

affairs of its neighbor, to stop the militarization of its society, and to fulfill its promises of pluralism and genuine non-alignment.

Progress will not be possible unless the Sandinistas end their support for insurgencies in other countries. We are discussing with the Sandinista government several proposals which could address their neighbors' concerns, our concerns, and the complaints of the Sandinistas themselves. We must hope that the Nicaraguans will understand that their future and that of Central America does not lie in imitating Cuba but in democratic government with the support of the people.

Finally, a word is in order about our policy toward Cuba itself. Over two decades have passed since Fidel Castro took power. In Cuba, as in other countries, it has become clear that while Marxist-Leninist ideology may be a vehicle to seize power, it is an obstacle to progress. Today, the Cuban people see the fruits of their labor poured into armaments and adventures abroad. Their economy stagnates and a huge Soviet subsidy of \$3 billion a year has become essential for survival. Like other Communist states, Cuba has also produced a flood of refugees.

A better relationship between Cuba and the United States is both possible and desirable, but it cannot take place in the context of aggression and subversion. The Salvadorans and others have shown that they reject the latest attempt by Cuba, abetted by the U.S.S.R., to determine their destinies by force. Sooner or later, the determination of the peoples of Central America to win a democratic future must impress the Cuban leadership with the futility of their current policies.

Democracy and Peaceful Change

History, wrote Valery, is the science of events that never recur. As we enter the final decades of the 20th century, we are conscious that our relations with our neighbors in the Western Hemisphere have entered a new stage. Neither we nor they can afford benign neglect in any field. Neither they nor we can afford to ignore the principles of peaceful change and the resolution of disputes without resort to force.

U.S. relations with the nations of Central America, the Caribbean, and indeed the rest of Latin America are changing, but the democratic vocation

endures. It is democracy alone that recognizes government's responsibility to the people, thus providing the fundamental political stability necessary for both individual freedom and social progress. This stability, however, should not be confused with the *status quo*. To the contrary, the bloodless balance of social forces offered by democracy is the only sure framework for lasting and beneficial economic and social change. By adding our strength to the will of our neighbors, we can realize together a new world of opportunities for self-development in freedom.

¹Press release 180 of May 28, 1982. ■

Developing Lasting U.S.-China Relations

by *Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.*

Address given on behalf of Secretary Haig before the National Council on U.S.-China Trade, Washington, D.C., on June 1, 1982. Ambassador Stoessel is Deputy Secretary of State.

It is a great pleasure to be here today. I know that you and the other members of the National Council on U.S.-China Trade have been deeply involved in developing a strong, mutually beneficial relationship between the United States and China. I can honestly say that without your constructive approach and persistent efforts, we would not have come as far as we have in our bilateral relations.

Fostering a lasting relationship between the United States and China has been a vitally important bipartisan objective for the last four administrations. A strong U.S.-China relationship is one of the highest goals of President Reagan's foreign policy.

Strong U.S.-China relations are not only critical for our long-term security but also contribute to Asian stability and global harmony. The United States and China are both great countries, strong and vigorous, with tremendous potential for promoting world peace and prosperity. As President Reagan noted in his letter to Premier Zhao commemorating the 10th anniversary of the Shanghai

communique, "our contacts have embraced almost all areas of human endeavor."

We view China as a friendly country with which we are not allied but with which we share many common interests. Strategically, we have no fundamental conflicts of interest, and we face a common challenge from the Soviet Union. In areas such as trade, tourism, banking, and agriculture and in scientific, technological, and educational exchanges, a close, cooperative relationship has resulted in a productive flow of people and ideas between our two societies. It is for these reasons that the Reagan Administration believes it essential that we develop a strong and lasting relationship.

During the decade-long process of normalizing our relations, a number of principles upon which we base our China policy have emerged. These principles, which President Reagan has strongly endorsed, include our recognition that the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China and our acknowledgment of the Chinese position that there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China.

They also include a firm acceptance that the U.S.-China relationship, like all relationships between equal, sovereign nations, should be guided by the fundamental principles of respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity and noninterference in each other's internal affairs. The relationship should be based on a spirit of consultation, cooperation, and strong efforts to achieve mutual understanding on the wide range of issues of interest to both of our countries.

The Reagan Administration is committed to pursuing a durable relationship with China based on these principles. President Reagan values the relationship highly and believes it is important to work together to expand the benefits to both countries. As he said in a recent letter to Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping, "China and America are two great nations destined to grow stronger through cooperation, not weaker through division."

It is because of the importance that President Reagan places on the U.S.-China relationship that Vice President Bush recently visited Beijing as the President's personal emissary. We were highly pleased with the outcome of the Vice President's trip, both in terms of the reception he received and in terms of the clarity and quality of the high-level communication which it produced.

We believe that both the United States and China saw in this visit the opportunity to demonstrate the high value each places on the relationship. We also believe that good progress was made in addressing the one serious issue that threatened good relations—Taiwan arms sales.

We are continuing our discussions with the Chinese on this complex, historical issue. We believe that so long as both sides demonstrate the statesmanship, vision, and goodwill that have characterized our relationship, we will be able to overcome our difficulties. Indeed, anything other than a successful outcome would be a great misfortune for both sides. The only beneficiary would be our common adversaries.

Reagan Administration Initiatives

It is not my purpose to address the Taiwan arms sale issue today. Indeed, public attention on this issue has tended to obscure the continuing progress which this Administration has made in carrying out important China policy initiatives. These steps play an important role in removing residual impediments to a relationship based on mutual trust. They will further strengthen the foundation for a durable long-term partnership between the United States and China.

These initiatives grew out of a thorough review of all aspects of U.S.-China relations conducted during the first 5 months of the Reagan Administration. They were launched just 1 year ago, when Secretary Haig visited Beijing. During his meetings, the Secretary reaffirmed our common strategic perceptions and announced new steps aimed at deepening our bilateral relationship. The subsequent implementation of this policy focused on four main areas—technology transfer, arms transfers, legislative restrictions, and consular relations. In the 11 months since the Secretary's visit, important progress has been made on all fronts.

We have substantially liberalized our export control policy toward China. This initiative has reflected not only a desire to expand business opportunities but also our strong national interest in contributing to China's modernization. We recognize that a secure, modernizing China is important to the United States from a global and strategic perspective. We strongly believe in supporting Beijing's ambitious efforts to improve the quality of life of more than one-quarter of the world's population.

Over the past year, there has been a

dramatic rise in approvals of export licenses for China. Since July of 1981 through March of this year, 1,203 license applications were approved. This represented an increase of nearly 40% over the prior 9-month period.

A recent White House directive reaffirmed this policy of substantial liberalization, emphasizing that U.S. export policy "should support a secure, friendly, and modernizing China" and underscoring the importance of "prompt and full implementation" of the President's June 4, 1981 decision. This new directive should give additional impetus to our efforts to expand trade relations. I fully expect that as U.S.-China relations continue to advance, there will be important further progress.

Another area in which we have opened the way to future cooperation is in arms transfer policy. During his June 1981 visit to Beijing, Secretary Haig announced that we were prepared to cooperate with China in this area on the same case-by-case basis governing U.S. arms transfers to all other nations. In December 1981, we lifted the historical bars on munitions sales to China.

The Administration also recognized that the increasing flow of businessmen, tourists, and students between the United States and China made it imperative that we establish regular consular relations. Accordingly, Secretary Haig rapidly concluded negotiations on a consular convention which was ratified last fall and came into force this year. Since the differing social systems of the two countries at times lead us to take differing views on some issues involving our citizens, the convention provides important protections for Americans in China. We intend vigorously to uphold its provisions, not only in letter but in spirit.

The Administration conducted a thorough review of legislation affecting our relationship with China. The review identified three areas in which outdated laws discriminated against China in ways inconsistent with our current strategic relationship. These were: eligibility for foreign assistance, PL 480, and the importation of seven previously banned furskins.

Congressional reaction to these proposals has been positive. We have no plans to extend PL 480 and are only contemplating limited technical assistance through Chinese involvement in established programs. However, these are important symbolic gestures, which we hope will contribute to a relationship based on equality, mutual benefit, and mutual respect.

The Growing Relationship

I would now like to share with you some of my thoughts about the value of the U.S.-China relationship, both past and future. We have made tremendous strides and will seek continued progress in the years ahead.

To start with, the strategic benefits that we see now—some 10 years after the beginning of rapprochement—have been substantial. It is an obvious but often overlooked and vitally important fact that the United States and China no longer face each other as hostile adversaries and no longer need to deploy forces against one another. This has made a tremendous difference to both nations and will continue to be of critical importance to planners on both sides.

The relationship has been important to our entire global strategy. U.S. and Chinese security policies are basically compatible. The relationship has supported our alliance structure and enhanced China's ability to deal with challenges to its security. In many areas of the world our economic assistance and political relationships have been mutually reinforcing.

To turn to specific areas, our consultations with the Chinese on Kampuchea have been an important complement to our cooperation with the ASEAN [Association of South East Asian Nations] nations in attempting to turn back Vietnamese aggression. In Afghanistan and Southwest Asia, the United States and China have maintained closely parallel policies, recognizing that the entire region is threatened by a southern thrust from the Soviet Union.

Indeed, even where we disagree, the very fact that we can maintain a high-quality dialogue on international issues is an important byproduct of the relationship. In one area which we approach in different ways—the Korean Peninsula—our good relations have been an important factor fostering regional stability.

Bilaterally, of course, there have been major benefits. U.S.-China trade is of tremendous importance to our nation. Its volume has increased dramatically, and its potential for further expansion remains great. We were pleased, for example, to see Premier Zhao Ziyang receiving important American businessmen recently even at a time of difficulty elsewhere in U.S.-China relations. The Premier's reception of Mr. Phillips [Christopher H. Phillips, President, National Council of U.S.-China Trade] and Mr. Tappan [David S. Tappan, Jr., President and Chief Operating Officer,

Fluor Corporation] are strong indicators that the importance we continue to attach to building a long-term commercial relationship is reciprocated at the highest levels in China.

It is impressive to note the levels of cooperation that already exist between our two countries.

- The volume and value of bilateral trade have been increasing dramatically. China is now our 14th largest trading partner.

- U.S. agricultural sales to China were around \$2 billion in 1981. China has thus become our fifth largest market for agricultural products.

- There are currently over 8,000 Chinese students in the United States. They are now the largest group of students from another country to be studying here. Hundreds of Americans have also studied or done research in China.

- Tourism and other travels between the two countries have grown to massive dimensions. Tens of thousands of Americans visit China annually. Official delegations are already numerous and are increasing.

- At last count some 80 American companies have established permanent offices in Beijing. Many companies with representatives in Hong Kong or Tokyo are also involved in frequent business discussions with the Chinese.

- Opportunities for joint ventures are growing. The Chinese recently adopted a joint venture law that establishes a legal framework for such undertakings. Under the auspices of the U.N. Industrial Development Organization, the Chinese have announced 130 joint ventures open to foreign participation.

- Our two governments have begun to explore the possibility of a bilateral investment treaty which would further facilitate U.S. investment in China.

- We have also been conducting discussions with the Chinese on the possibility of an agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation, which would enable us to compete commercially in the development of China's nuclear power program.

- Exchanges have increased substantially in the science and technology area. During 1981 dozens of delegations were exchanged, and three new protocols were signed—bringing the total number of protocols under our bilateral science and technology agreement to 17. The benefits to both sides in this area,

which span a wide variety of fields ranging from health to earthquake studies, have proven to be even more impressive than we had foreseen.

Conclusion

In conclusion, I would like to emphasize again that the Reagan Administration values the U.S.-China relationship very highly. That relationship must be based on the principles of equality and mutual respect. We will continue to work closely with the Chinese leadership with the objective of resolving the Taiwan arms sales issue. We will seek to expand cooperation with China in areas where our interests are parallel or complementary.

American foreign policy is sometimes accused of being shortsighted and

of operating in a 4-year context. It is clear from the record of four administrations that this is not the case with China. U.S. foreign policymakers clearly recognize that it is not in our interest to perpetuate the hostility that existed between the United States and China but to look ahead to decades of close Sino-American cooperation.

I believe that the coming years will see the development of an even deeper and more extensive relationship between our two great countries. We at the State Department would welcome your thoughts on areas that remain to be explored and initiatives for the future. With your help we can forge a lasting relationship of mutual benefit to both the United States and China that will take us well into the 21st century.

withdrawal of the Argentine forces from the islands; and a political solution. I think those three essential elements are as important today as they were at the outset of the crisis.

Q. As of the moment, what you seem to be saying is that there is no foreseeable negotiating position that could be successful—that is, right now. In that case, it appears that the fighting is going to go on for a while. Do you see the Soviet Union in any way getting involved on the side of Argentina, and, particularly, do you see the danger of a superpower confrontation over this?

A. It is clear that we have made clear to the Soviets that we do not believe that this crisis should take on East-West overtones, and I am encouraged that thus far the Argentine Government has repeatedly stated that it will not accept assistance, so to speak from the Soviet Union or its proxies. I would hope that situation would prevail, but the danger of its turning the other way is, of course, a very active danger, and one that we are quite concerned about.

Secretary Interviewed on "Face the Nation"

Secretary Haig was interviewed on CBS TV's "Face the Nation" by George Herman, CBS News; Bernard Gwertzman, The New York Times; and Robert Pierpoint, CBS News, Washington, D.C., on May 23, 1982.

Q. In this morning's news, the British troops in the Falklands seem to be consolidating their hold on their bridgehead following some air strikes on Argentinian positions. Since you've been a military commander as well as a diplomat, what would you say would have to happen in the fighting in the Falklands to make new negotiations possible and profitable?

A. We, of course, would hope that there would be a renewed round of negotiations at any point, but it's clear that until some evidence of some change in the military situation is available, there may be continued stalemate.

Q. Remembering America's military experiences in Korea and in Vietnam, in which you had a role, is this situation now in the Falklands the kind of thing which is productive of good negotiations, or does it have to wait until one side or the other takes a black eye or gains some kind of a face-saving victory?

A. I don't think that one can make a real value judgment on that. There is much to be said on both sides of the

issue—for example, that frustration, stalemate, and continuing sacrifices on both sides do present auspicious opportunities for negotiation. On the other hand, the extensive efforts that have been applied by the U.S. Government, by the Peruvian Government, and more recently by the U.N. Secretary General in a period before real sacrifices—and I don't belittle those incidents that were already involved—did not seem to bring about the necessary compromise on the part of the parties. So one might be inclined to feel that today the landing of the British forces, the establishment of a strong bridgehead on the Falklands in itself constitutes a rather remarkable change in the situation. For that reason, I would hope that efforts would continue on the part of all parties to arrive at an early solution.

Q. Now that the British flag has been hoisted in the Falklands, why not support the growing pressure in the United Nations for an immediate cease-fire?

A. I think the answer to that question is very clear. The United Nations has passed a resolution, 502, which has three components. Those three components constitute a very strong endorsement of rule of law in international affairs, and that is that aggression must not be rewarded. The three components involve a cease-fire, as you suggest; the

Q. There have been reports that the Soviet Union has been giving at least intelligence information to the Argentines through Soviet satellites. Could you clarify that?

A. We've been exposed to the same assurances that the world community has from Argentina that they are not accepting assistance, so I prefer to accept their word on face value.

Q. You say you would hope there would be no East-West overtones, but already we're hearing North-South overtones. How about the U.S. position vis-a-vis not only Argentina but its increasing number of friends among those who used to be not so friendly to Argentina? Are we in trouble?

A. It goes without saying that this crisis, from the outset, endangered a number of longstanding American interests in this hemisphere and, indeed, worldwide. We, for that reason, became active from the outset foreseeing these complications, and we certainly didn't misjudge them. On the other hand, we recognize as well that the United States has been guided in this crisis by a fundamental principle, and that is that we must support those forces that support the rule of law and no first use of force. If we were to permit that to be violated there are a number of situations in the

hemisphere which could immediately explode into similarly serious crises.

Q. Are we sending an envoy down to Argentina, another General Walters [Ambassador at Large Vernon A. Walters] or is General Walters going back down there? There has been a report this morning to that effect.

A. There is only one General Walters.

Q. Is he going back?

A. There is no emissary en route to Buenos Aires at this time.

Q. On that same country, is there a fear that Argentina might go nuclear, not right now, but would this war propel Argentina or other Latin countries to step up their military spending or even to go nuclear?

A. I think on the nuclear question, the incentives for that we must recognize are longstanding worldwide. That's why we have been such avid proponents of nonproliferation. I've always made the point that insecurity, isolation, and security dangers are the key incentives for the acquisition of nuclear capabilities. We have been concerned about Argentina's activities in this area, and we've discussed it with the Argentine Government. I'm reasonably confident that will not be a direct outgrowth of this.

With respect to the conflict at large, of course, it whets the appetites for higher levels of armaments throughout the hemisphere, and we hope this incident will not have that consequence.

Q. You have indicated that you accept the Argentine assurance that they are not getting help from the Soviet Union, but the United States is giving help to Great Britain. For some reason, so far, this Administration, while admitting we're giving some help, has not been willing to say what we're doing to help Britain. Is this a kind of a pre-World War II "destroyers to Britain" on a secret basis, or can you tell us really what we are doing?

A. I think the President has been very clear on that, and that is there will be no active American military involvement in this crisis; and the President meant precisely what he said. On the other hand, we've had a longstanding military relationship with a key ally and a special relationship with Great Britain. Within the confines of that, we have provided certain levels of assistance.

They do not include direct military involvement of any kind by U.S. forces, and they will not.

Q. But what do they include?

A. I think we have pursued a policy of not providing a day-to-day checklist of such items. It serves no useful purpose, and I'm not going to depart from that policy this morning.

Q. Is there a parallel on the other side? Are any of the Latin American countries and neighbors of Argentina providing her with materiel or help?

A. Yes, there is some evidence of that.

Q. What?

A. There again, I don't think it serves any purpose to go into that.

Q. Can you tell me what countries or what kinds of aid are being given?

A. No, but Argentina has a number of historically close neighbors who have been providing assistance, of course, but I don't think at substantial levels.

Q. There is a report that President Brezhnev has replied to President Reagan's letter about the start of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). Could you tell us if that letter goes much beyond what he said in his public speech?

A. I don't think it serves a useful purpose to lay out detailed exchanges in diplomatic channels between heads of state and heads of government. I will confirm there has been a reply. I will also suggest that we anticipate through diplomatic channels—that's at State Department level—to confirm, hopefully before too long, a date for the resumption of our START negotiations.

Q. The letter did not, then, contain a date in itself?

A. Now you're dragging me into disclosures which I don't think, as a matter of practice, is good diplomacy.

Q. What about your possible meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko? Would you expect that by that time or at that time you would set a date for the start of these START talks?

A. It's too early to say, and I don't want to even suggest there has been a meeting confirmed with Foreign Minister Gromyko in New York at the disarmament conference, which I'm sure you're referring to.

Q. Yes.

A. There have been some informal discussions at diplomatic levels about the

possibility of such a meeting. We, on our part, would welcome it. But that itself has not been fixed.

Q. I'm not exactly trying to drag you into disclosure, but would like to try on another level something which I'm sure every American is concerned about, and that is, in these interchanges, do you detect some motion on the part of the Soviet Union, something that gives the United States reason to be somewhat more sanguine than in the past about arms reduction?

A. I think the response of the Soviets to the President's speech at Eureka College, the public response, Mr. Brezhnev's speech to the *Komsomol*, was basically encouraging. It was also replete with a number of self-serving posturing statements of a propagandistic character.

Q. Soviet boilerplate.

A. Yes, especially as we get into the European-American mutual interest on so-called INF [intermediate-range nuclear forces] talks.

Q. But you see some reason, some psychological movement, so to speak?

A. Yes, I think from two points of view. Mr. Brezhnev in his speech welcomed the early resumption of talks in general and also accepted the principle of substantial reductions in levels of armaments. One can only be encouraged by that.

Q. You were critical, as was the Administration as a whole, about his proposal for a freeze in strategic weapons at the time the START talks would begin. Some people have suggested that, actually, since the Soviets have a very active program right now, a freeze would not hurt the United States but, in fact, might help it hold off further Soviet programs. But you don't see the logic in that?

A. Not only don't we see the logic, why, we see the counterlogic. The simple facts are that a freeze would lock the United States into positions of inferiority in key areas. No place is that more true than in the Western European nuclear environment, where we are facing some 900 warheads on 300 new mobile systems, with the West having no counterpart whatsoever. Anyone who would suggest that entering into negotiations under such a frozen disadvantage would be an incentive for progress in the arms control I think has somewhat misplaced his logic.

Q. I don't want to get locked into

initials here, but the talks you just referred to are on medium-range missiles. As I understood Mr. Brezhnev's proposal, it was for a freeze in the strategic or longer range systems.

A. He has proposed both, as you know—for both systems. As a matter of fact, his speech seemed almost to pre-occupy itself with the European arms control question.

Q. Let me ask you something, as an amateur. I mean, these two gentlemen cover the State Department a good deal, and they are used to the language which is somewhat foreign to me. I'm a little bit puzzled—

A. Sometimes it's foreign to me, too. [Laughter]

Q. Foreign to you. Very well. On one hand, I hear you say that SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] II is dead in the water; on the other hand, I hear you say that we're observing SALT II. And I'm a little puzzled as to what it means.

A. It means simply that there are certain restraints associated with the SALT II discussions and the draft treaty which both sides continue to abide by.

Q. Not all of them?

A. Not at all. Neither side has entered into the reductions that were visualized. And I made the point in my recent Senate testimony. There is no contradiction in such a thing. Clearly, there were many good aspects of SALT II, and it's in the interest of the United States—and it has thus far been in the Soviets' interest—to maintain those restraints because it provides an international backdrop of greater confidence on which to proceed into the START negotiations.

Q. Why, then, would it not make some sense to go ahead and ratify SALT II, start from there and move on to what you want, which is reductions?

A. For the simple reason that we felt that SALT II is badly flawed, badly flawed in a number of areas. It permitted the Soviet Union unusual advantage in the heavy intercontinental missile area. Secondly, there were deficiencies in the verification aspects. Thirdly, there was no Backfire bomber restraint—in other words, it ran free for the Soviet Union.

To go through the processes of ratifying this controversial, flawed treaty would be a detriment to our ability to move on promptly and rapidly with the

START negotiations. Beyond that, it would lock in these flaws. And it's a very different thing to start a new kind of negotiation against a backdrop of unresolved issues than to have these disadvantages locked into a formal treaty and then have to work back, as SALT II would seek to do.

Q. If I understand you correctly, then you are willing to accept certain parts of SALT II as having already been negotiated, not necessarily take those in treaty form, but incorporate those parts that are acceptable to you into the START talks. Is that correct?

A. No, that's not correct. What I am saying is that there are certain constraints that were visualized and agreed to in SALT II, and that as long as the Soviet Union continues to abide by those constraints—and thus far they seem to be—we are inclined to do the same thing. But it does not mean that this is an inherent aspect of the START negotiations, which are clear and clean in their own right, and visualize, as the President said, substantial reductions on both sides.

Q. You may have noticed my abstracted expression as I listened to some news on my little earphone. Let me tell you that it is reported—Argentine radio is saying that President Galtieri has sent a letter to the Pope saying that President Galtieri agrees with the Pope that there should be a cease-fire. Can you read anything into this? Is this politeness? Is this movement? Can one guess from this brief headline what this might mean?

A. I think there has been a great deal of well-meaning and more-than-justified diplomatic activity. We've seen a great deal of it here. The Peruvian Government is attempting to launch another effort. The Pope himself, as he should be, is seriously concerned about this bloodshed.

What the position of the Argentine Government is with respect to one or more of these depends, in its character, as to what it is the Argentine Government is prepared to accept. If it's a cease-fire and that the conditions for a resumption of conflict are violations of fundamental principles that we are seeking to preserve and strengthen, then clearly it doesn't offer much hope.

Q. To go back to the discussion of our relations with the Soviet Union, you obviously have to take into account domestic problems within the Soviet Union when you are evaluating

how much they are willing to give in certain areas. Today, the *Washington Post* has a very interesting report, which I'm sure you've seen, saying that Soviet agriculture is once again, still, and yet in deep trouble, and that as a result of this, they expect some changes at the higher levels of the Kremlin during Politburo meetings that start tomorrow. What is your evaluation of this report and of the possible changes in the Soviet hierarchy?

A. This is an historic, almost organic, failure of the Marxist-Leninist system and the Soviet model. From the outset, the Soviet Union has been unable to meet the food requirements of its people—this despite the fact that they have placed greater and greater concentration on that sector of their society. They have applied more human effort and more technology, but they still, through systematic failure, have failed to “turn the corner,” so to speak.

I think that it is perfectly natural that there are always scapegoats in such failures, and periodic meetings provide an opportunity to make some changes. It's just that simple.

Q. Speaking of the hierarchy, what do you see about the impact on the Soviet Union's relations with the West if it's going to be so dependent for food on the outside world?

A. I've always made the point that the United States and the West at large if they maintain especially their unity in their dealings with the Soviet Union, have a great deal of political and economic leverage with which and through which to insist on greater restraint and responsibility on the part of the Soviet leaders.

Q. Do you think we're sending the wrong signal by agreeing or even urging the start of the strategic arms talks without any conditions attached to it—in other words, without any direct linkage?

A. No. I think we've made it very clear that linkage continues to be an active aspect of American foreign policy—indeed, it does. But the President has also made it clear that arms control is very special area of East-West relation and one in which we seek our own vital interests to be realized.

Q. You're really saying that linkage is dead.

A. Not at all. I said just the opposite. I said it is not dead; it remains a very active part and will remain an active part. It's a fact of life. It's not a

question of an option of policy. It is a fact of life that international behavior of nations that have relationships with one another affect the full range of their relationships in all—

Q. Let me adopt [the previous questioner's] rather dramatic phrase and apply it to another situation. Are parts two and three of our Camp David agreement dead—Palestinian autonomy?

A. Not at all. People are rather short of memory. Here we have just had an event of major historic significance—the return of the Sinai on the 25th of April. A year and a half ago the skepticism as to whether or not that would ever happen was growing daily. It has been the product of cooperation between the Government of Egypt and the Government of Israel—and in some very, very remarkable ways.

Now that is behind us, and the time has come to turn to the other aspects of Camp David. These are the autonomy talks. Ambassador Fairbanks [Special Adviser to the Secretary Richard Fairbanks] has just now returned from his third trip to the area, and I believe we are ready to get moving.

Q. Have you got agreement on the place?

A. No. The venue question is still open, but I'm optimistic that it lends itself to a reasonably early solution.

Q. At Camp David?

A. Not necessarily, no.

Q. Do you think that when Mr. Reagan comes to see Mr. Reagan these problems will be shoved aside, and we'll make some progress?

A. The President is very actively engaged in the whole range of our foreign policy, but especially he has shown an exceptional interest in the Middle East situation. Clearly, this and other matters will be discussed with Mr. Reagan when he comes for the disarmament conference.

Q. Do you know for sure when that is, by the way?

A. I don't have the precise date. We're still working on it. It will be about the time of the President's speech at the disarmament conference, and it might include some other discussions beyond that.

Q. That's next month, then?

A. Early next month, after returning from Europe.

Interview on "This Week With David Brinkley"

Secretary Haig was interviewed on ABC's "This Week With David Brinkley" on June 13, 1982, by Sam Donaldson; Sander Vanocur, ABC's chief diplomatic correspondent; and George Will, ABC news analyst.¹

Q. Israel says it will not withdraw immediately from Lebanon, as demanded by U.N. Resolution 508 that we voted for. So let's just say it out loud, if we mean it: Is that all right with us, or do we want an immediate withdrawal?

A. It's too early to say. I think the key aspects of the resolution you refer to are, for the moment, to get a cessation of the hostilities and the bloodshed, and the President's focus thus far has been on that. Clearly, no one would welcome a return to *status quo ante* in Lebanon with all of the instabilities that we've experienced since 1976.

Q. It's too early to say, as you put it, because you don't believe the cease-fire has been tested long enough. After a cease-fire clearly is in place, do we want an immediate Israeli withdrawal?

A. I think we are going to wait and to work to achieve adjustments in the withdrawal of all foreign elements from Lebanon. After all, this has been a country that's been wracked by internal elements not under the authority and control of the Lebanese Government, as well as a nation that's been occupied by Syrian forces for too long.

Q. You ducked the question.

A. I'm sometimes very good at that, but why don't you ask it again?

Q. I'm really trying to find out if we want to back up our vote in the U.N. Security Council.

A. Of course.

Q. Do we want an immediate Israeli withdrawal?

A. Of course. The vote that the United States stood behind and joined the other nations in putting forward was a very clear picture that ultimately there must be a withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon.

Q. To facilitate an Israeli withdrawal, to fill the vacuum that

has been their objective to create in that part of Lebanon, would you be willing to see American troops put in to a peacekeeping force?

A. I think it's still a hypothetical question. We have not given serious thought to U.S. participation in the peacekeeping in Lebanon. However, I think in the hours and days ahead, we're going to have to look very, very carefully at what will be necessary to provide a stable situation in southern Lebanon to relieve the tensions which have brought about this disaster in the first place.

Q. Might it be useful, as a precondition to having whatever settlement we come to in that area, to have a referendum in which the people of that part of Lebanon are asked if they want the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] and the Syrians back?

A. I wouldn't discount a referendum. I wouldn't discount any step that would strengthen the authority of the central government and bring about a rapprochement, if you will, of the various factions in Lebanon—that is, the Lebanese factions—toward a strengthened central government.

Q. I take it from the tenor of your remarks today and in the past week that the U.S. Government and, indeed, most of the countries involved, are not too unhappy about the developments. In other words, the dirty little secret which has existed for some time is that nobody really wants the PLO in Lebanon.

A. I wouldn't suggest there's a dirty little secret because the next question that would be asked is, "Did the United States collude, were we acquiescing in the actions?"

Nothing could be farther from the truth. We regret very much that the situation has resulted in the violence that we've witnessed. On the other hand, I think it's very clear that you must not and cannot have enclaves of separate authority in a sovereign nation and expect the seeds for stability to grow. They will not.

Q. No. I wasn't suggesting collusion, but I'm suggesting now a question that goes to the heart of what happens next. Is the United States willing to see whatever Israel is trying to do, whether it's playing the Jordanian option or a homeland for the Palestinians? How far is the United States going in symmetry in what seems to be Israeli objectives in the Middle East?

A. It's too early to say. I think our

¹Press release 176 of May 24, 1982. ■

first priority must continue to be a cessation of the hostilities, and the humanitarian aspects of this problem have got to be dealt with on a most urgent basis. We've got to work with all of the nations in the region. There are some of those in Western Europe who are concerned to seek to provide a long-term solution in which the sovereignty of Lebanon will again be established.

Q. Work with other European nations. Does that mean Camp David is dead and you're back to the Geneva conference which would include the Russians?

A. No, not at all. Camp David is not dead. As a matter of fact, I would hope that these tragic circumstances in Lebanon today would offer new opportunities for a reinvigorating of the Camp David process and to moving forward as we intend to do.

Q. When the fighting first broke out, you and the other American officials were worried that somehow the Soviets might come in, that the whole thing could escalate into that kind of a very dangerous confrontation. This morning can you say that that now has receded—that danger—that it looks like we'll have a situation where the Soviets will not in any way intervene?

A. Of course, we've been concerned about that from the outset. There have been exchanges between the President and Mr. Brezhnev—exactly two sets of exchanges during the period. I would describe the Soviet attitude thus far as being encouragingly cautious.

The holding of the cease-fire which started 2 days ago—it broke down yesterday with respect to the PLO, which we worked on all night and again this morning—it appears that the local collapse of the cease-fire in the Beirut area has again been reestablished—the cease-fire has.

I would hope that all of these circumstances would make it clear to the Soviet leadership that they have no business in intervening or becoming involved in this situation other than to urge those with whom they exercise influence to exercise restraint.

Q. I didn't realize there were two sets of exchanges. Can you describe them? When did they come? I thought Mr. Brezhnev sent a letter to President Reagan and he replied. When was the second exchange?

A. There was a subsequent communication and reply. A reply went out last night.

Q. What kind? Can you characterize it?

A. I would characterize it as essentially concerned, but cautiously concerned.

Q. Concerned but cautiously in what sense? In other words, does this second exchange mean that the Russians were telling us, and we were telling the Russians, "Okay, we've cooled it, it looks like the heat's off"?

A. No, not in the context of that question. I think it was a continuing expression of concern on the part of the Soviet leadership about the potential dangers of a spreading of the violence, and we share that concern ourselves. It doesn't mean that we accept the Soviet view as to why these conditions occurred, but thus far I would say that the situation is cautious on both sides.

Q. I'm struck by the fact that you said earlier that no one really wants the *status quo ante*. When you add to this the fact that two Soviet clients, armed by the Soviet Union and trained by the Soviet Union, have been decisively bested in battle by an American ally with American training and American arms, isn't this a tremendous thing? I mean, aren't you really pleased? How can we possibly be displeased about that?

A. No one is pleased when circumstances involve the loss of innocent lives, and there's been too much of that in Lebanon today. The longer term strategic aspects of this question remain to be seen.

Q. A little more than a year ago you went to the Middle East, pursuing—not without reason—something that was called a "strategic consensus." President Reagan sent you on that trip to establish this. Now we've had a change of the reality in the Middle East. We have a resurgent Iranian nationalism backed by the force of arms with Arab nations, at least fearing Iran as much as they proclaim to fear Israel; we have a change in leadership in Saudi Arabia with a King who is supposed to be pro-American, but is subject to a lot of pressures both within the family and in the country and in the Muslim world.

What is your sense today of this new reality in the Middle East, its opportunities, its pitfalls, and the U.S. national interest in the Middle East?

A. First, I want to make clear that

the President didn't send me to the Middle East to establish a strategic consensus but rather to recognize that a strategic consensus was emerging for precisely the reasons you just described. It involved not only the growing concern of moderate Arab states about Soviet interventionism in the wake of the collapse of Iran and the invasion of Afghanistan but also the potential exploitation of the radical Arab movement—the fundamentalist movement in Islam, especially in the Shi'ite sect.

The fact that we described the phenomena a year ago should underline the fact that we recognize these forces were underway. Now they are importantly underway. It means also, as I said in Chicago during my speech in May, we have three interrelated areas of concern with which the United States must deal and effectively cope in the months ahead—the peace process under Camp David, the situation in Lebanon which I described before recent events as highly volatile and likely to collapse in the conflict, and perhaps the even more pervasive and worrisome aspects of the fundamentalist movement emerging through Khomeini's Iran and casting a shadow of threat through the gulf state into Saudi Arabia and as far as the North African continent—Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt itself.

All of these factors must be dealt with in an integrated mosaic, which they, indeed, are. They are replete with contradictions, also.

Q. Could I just cut through and ask at this point what differences, if any, King Khalid's death makes?

A. Of course, as a friend and a collaborator, it's viewed as a loss here. On the other hand, we're encouraged that the transition has proceeded, apparently smoothly; that His Majesty King Fahd now in place. He, too, is a close friend and collaborator of the United States, so I view the situation as one of steady improvement in the relationships between the United States and Saudi Arabia.

Q. Last week on this program, Secretary Regan—the Treasury Secretary—was a very good soldier. He came on and said that the agreement at Versailles to limit credits to the East bloc really implied that credits would be cut. Is it your understanding that the Versailles communique will be violated unless credits will be cut to the East bloc by our allies?

A. Not necessarily. I don't think that seven at Versailles control the full

mechanism of credit management with the East, let alone the Soviet Union. As you know, the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] put forward some proposals recently which involve an increase in the interest rates and, in effect, on the time for repayment.

They visualize that by moving the Soviet Union into a Category I recipient, that will have the effect of raising the price of credits to the Soviet Union, and we hope that by the 15th—the time the mandate would run out for the implementation of that by the OECD—it will be implemented.

What was done at Versailles was to put together for the first time a comprehensive mechanism to begin to assess the whole range of East-West trade, credit transfer, and to do so with assessments on 6-month intervals so that we can be sure that we are not overexposed.

Q. But 2 days after the Versailles meeting ended, *The New York Times* carried a headline reporting that the Poles are now threatening us with default, that they will go into default unless they get more loans to pay the interest on their old loans. When you were on the show about 6 months ago, the question was asked, "What in the world could be done by the Poles to provoke the United States into calling their default, default?" Your answer was that, "Unless things get better, we will get tougher." Things have not gotten better, and we have not gotten tougher. Is there any likelihood that we'll call them into default?

A. It's still too early to say. I wouldn't suggest we haven't gotten tougher because the pervasive impact of the cutoff of credits to Poland has been substantial and has had a grievous effect on the economic development of Poland today, and we hear it every day.

Q. One other bit of lobbying that was done at Versailles and has gone all over this town is that the Japanese are lobbying for a waiver from the sanctions against the Soviet Union imposed after Poland so that they can sell energy technology for yet another Soviet energy project. Is the Reagan Administration going to grant this waiver?

A. We're talking about some \$2 million of energy-related equipment to his Sakhalin pipeline?

Q. Yes.

A. The President has not made a decision on this question, just as he has

not made a decision on the spare parts associated with the East-West pipeline and the extraterritoriality question on existing contracts. I would anticipate he will make this in the very near future in the wake of his assessment of—

Q. Is it a hard call? I mean, this is punching holes in sanctions that are fairly porous to begin with.

A. It is a hard call. It's a hard call because I think the President's been very, very strong in attempting to exercise leadership in Western Europe and in Japan. And, incidentally, we've had very good cooperation on the whole from Japan on this question and the question of whether or not the results of the decision really have a meaningful impact as a sanction against the Soviet Union to influence their behavior at the price of considerable sacrifice to American industry, jobs, and future markets. It's not an easy problem, and, of course, that's why it's been prolonged for so long. Easy ones are settled very easily.

Q. There are reports from London that Prime Minister Thatcher, once the Falklands have been retaken from Argentina—assuming that happens—wants to fortify them and perhaps give eventual independence to those islands. I thought our position was that there should be negotiations, including Argentina, to try to determine the ultimate future. Is that our position?

A. I think our position goes back to U.N. Resolution 502, and that resolution calls for the withdrawal of Argentine forces, the cessation of hostilities, and a diplomatic or political solution to the problem.

Q. Including Argentina? Will it have a voice?

A. Clearly, in controversies where two nations are involved, it can't be a unilateral thing. On the other hand—

Q. Yes. But when one is defeated, they very seldom have the chance to decide who rolls the next dice.

A. There's no question about that. That makes it somewhat of a different ballgame than it was before the violence began.

Q. What do you want to see? When you got off the plane on your second and last trip there—that Thursday or Friday night—the first thing you hit the Argentinians with was that you were proceeding under

U.N. Resolution 502. Are you still proceeding under Resolution 502, and is the British Government? I have doubts about Mrs. Thatcher. Is she?

A. I think it's too early to say. I think her first order of priority now—once the conflict has started—is either to have Argentina withdraw without conditions, which has not occurred and it doesn't look like it will, or to take military action to see that it does withdraw.

Following that, I think we have an open menu. There are certain things Britain has discussed that they want. They want to rehabilitate the island. They want to reestablish the conditions of self-government, if you will, of the island population. Beyond that, I think it remains to be seen.

Q. What's this going to do to NATO, keeping a force down there? How are they going to take care of the island? If they can't fly into Buenos Aires any more or any of the ports in the south, they have to fly into Montevideo. This is an untenable situation for NATO, is it not?

A. I wouldn't describe it as untenable for NATO. I would describe it as a situation which must be viewed in the context of the long-term relationships of Great Britain and the United States with the Southern Hemisphere, the need to bring about an outcome that has stability and justice. In the case of justice, that means that the views of the inhabitants on the island are considered in the ultimate outcome.

Q. About Mrs. Kirkpatrick, our U.N. Ambassador. We saw a clip earlier of her saying that the U.S. foreign policy was inept and that many people conducting it are amateurs. Why is she still in the Administration, because she's talking about this Administration apparently?

A. Too much has been said, too much has been written, and too much has been speculated on this subject.

Q. But she said it.

A. I'm not going to add to that.

Q. She said too much has been said. She said it.

A. She gave a speech which has been given several times before by her, which was, of course, because of its juxtaposition on other events propelled into great national attention by you gentlemen.

Q. No, she said it. We didn't do it.

A. And you will find that she said it earlier as well. I want you to know—

Q. She must believe it then. She must believe that amateurs run our foreign policy if she says it so often.

A. I don't think that's what she said. I think she said that our foreign policy in recent years has been somewhat amateurish, and I think someone could make an objective observation that on certain occasions that that might be true.

Q. But your bottom line is forgive and forget?

A. My bottom line is that we have important things to do and personal peccadilloes which tantalize you gentlemen so much, I understand, but I'm not going to be a part of it.

¹Press release 198 of June 16, 1982. ■

News Conference of June 19

Secretary Haig held a news conference at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations in New York on June 19, 1982.¹

We have just completed 9¼ hours of discussions with Foreign Minister Gromyko; 5 yesterday and 4¼ this morning and early this afternoon. I'll just say a few words about those discussions and then touch upon some issues related both to the discussions and the activities of this past week here in New York.

I would describe the meeting itself as full, frank, and useful. The topics ranged from the broad principles that should seek to underline East-West relations in general and U.S.-Soviet relations in particular. We went through the full range of global and regional issues of mutual importance and interest to both governments. And we also conducted discussions on a number of bilateral issues between the United States and the Soviet Union. One of the major areas of the discussions of yesterday was on the broad subject of arms control.

In that regard, I would like to make some broad observations about the activities of the past week here at the disarmament conference: the position of President Reagan on this vitally important subject.

The President's policies, as you

know, are based firmly on deeply rooted principles—and I'm talking now in the broad sense of East-West relationships and then arms control—of international conduct, in order. As a people, we Americans have always believed in rule of law, the settlement of disputes by peaceful means, and non-use of force except for self-defense. These are the principles that guide our approach to the various regional conflicts that confront us as a nation today.

It is the President's sincere desire to put the U.S.-Soviet relationship on a stable, constructive, long-term basis. We see important potential advantages for both countries in every area of our relationship, but this cannot be achieved without Soviet willingness to conduct its international affairs with responsibility and restraint.

It is clearly, squarely up to the Soviets to determine what sort of relationship they want to have with the United States in the months and years ahead. The United States, for its part, is prepared for constructive and mutually beneficial relations if the Soviet Union is prepared to join us in acting with the responsibility necessary in the nuclear age. We have made serious and realistic proposals to achieve this end. The objective of the United States remains an overriding interest in the maintenance of peace and stability.

I would like to say a word about arms control, in particular. With the negotiations on strategic arms reduction beginning later this month, the topic of arms control is clearly very high on the agenda of U.S.-Soviet relations. The full range of President Reagan's arms control initiatives are now well known. They're all on the table. They are proposals which mark the way to the first significant reductions in the arsenals of the two major superpowers.

With respect to START [Strategic Arms Reduction Talks] first. The President's proposals provide an equitable basis for real and significant reductions of strategic nuclear weapons, beginning with the most destabilizing systems.

East and West—especially the United States and the Soviet Union—have important reasons to curb weapons that threaten their retaliatory capabilities. We will consider most seriously the Soviet proposals, and the President has stated that nothing—and I repeat, nothing—is excluded from the upcoming START negotiations.

In short, our approach to START is not one-sided, but it is designed with mutual benefit and mutual stability in mind. Now is the time to get on with

serious negotiations devoid of public posturing. Similarly, on the intermediate-range missile question—the INF [intermediate-range nuclear forces] talks—the seriousness of the President's proposals for total elimination of land-based intermediate-range missiles is very clear. It is our conviction that this proposal is an equitable and realistic approach to the threat to peace created by the imbalance in such systems which now favors the Soviet Union.

Last week's discussions, and the week before in Europe, underlined the fact and confirmed that the entire NATO alliance stands four-square behind the proposals put forth and underscores the alliance's commitment to proceed with the deployment of the 1979 decision—that's for the Pershing IIs and the GLCMs [ground-launched cruise missiles]—in the absence of an arms control solution.

Finally, President Reagan's initiative to reinvigorate the long-stalled negotiations on reducing conventional forces in Europe, his proposals to reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war and to convene an international conference on arms expenditures are now on the table for prompt responsive action by the Soviet Union.

Together, all of these proposals represent a carefully thought through, integrated approach to arms control, and it is fitting that it has come together at a time of the U.N. Special Session on Disarmament. It certainly stands in sharp contrast to the various cosmetic arms control proposals such as that as the non-first-use proposal made this week. Our position on this proposal remains clear: The United States stands for the non-use of force of any form except in legitimate self-defense.

The United States, together with its allies, intends to deter all war, conventional or nuclear. As the President said in his speech on November 18th: "No NATO weapons, conventional or nuclear, will ever be used in Europe except in response to attack."

So, in sum, the President has now put forward a comprehensive agenda for arms control which is balanced and equitable and which, for the first time, offers a way to reducing the burden of armaments at every level. We hope that the Soviet Union will negotiate serious with us on the agenda now before us. We will do our part, and we look to the Soviet Union to turn from posturing to serious talks in the interest of peace. We also call upon the Soviet Union to match

ts words about arms control with concrete actions demonstrating its seriousness.

I would note, for example, that only a few days after the speech here at the United Nations given by Mr. Gromyko, with emphasis on arms control in outer space, the Soviet Union has undertaken an unusually high level of strategic activity, including an antisatellite test, two CBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] launches, an SS-20 launch, an SLBM [sea-launched ballistic missile] launch, and two AMB [antiballistic missile] interceptions. Such activity belies, by specific action, the words put forth to the world audience here in New York this week.

Q. Do you have any apparent explanation for this increased strategic activity you just talked about, and did you discuss with the foreign minister the possibility of a summit meeting between Presidents Brezhnev and Reagan?

A. I have no explanation with respect to the first part of your question other than to suggest that the best measure of the real state of relationships between East and West and the Soviet Union and the United States is the criteria of action and not words, as the President has repeated in the recent past, especially in his recent trip to ATO, Europe.

The question of summity was discussed in the meetings with Foreign Minister Gromyko, but I have nothing to put forward on that subject today.

Q. You addressed arms control which presumably occupied you yesterday. Could you take us through today in any greater detail?

A. There was some discussion today on the topic, but the bulk of today's discussions dealt with a range of regional problems and a very extensive range.

Q. The strategic activity you referred to, I understand these are in the area of tests. Are any of them prohibited by treaties or other agreements?

A. I would leave that observation until later. It's clear that they are not consistent with the words that are being used.

Q. In these strategic tests, what kind of activity does this compare to the past? We have no basis for which to say this is heavier or lighter than usual.

A. Unprecedented.

Q. You said that you discussed

regional issues. Was anything said about what is going on in Lebanon? Also, in the last talks there was said to be some stress because of the Soviets' imposing martial law in Poland. Was there any—

A. Yes. I'm very happy to tell you the topics that were touched upon. By mutual agreement with my counterpart, I will not go into the character of the substance. That is the position we have followed—this is the third of the series of the discussions we've had. Of course, the Middle East was discussed, as was the other topic you mentioned.

Q. Do you think that this strategic activity relates to any particular situation in the world, in Lebanon, for example?

A. No.

Q. Did you discuss this strategic activity with Mr. Gromyko?

A. No.

Q. Why not?

A. I think there are several reasons for it. We have had very extensive discussions on the topic of arms control. Some of the details of the activity I've described were not clear at the time I went into the discussions—they have become clear since. I believe they do underline the character of the difference sometimes between words and actions.

Q. Your discussions began with him, as you know, yesterday. Do you mean that the evidence of this strategic activity was just within the last 24 hours?

A. I mean it is very recent activity, and the integration of the various components of it have just been pulled together this morning—overnight.

Q. To clarify an earlier response, did you mean to give the impression that there is some possibility that some of these tests may have been in violation of either of—

A. No. I meant to give an indication that they run rather counter to the speech given here this week—

Q. And nothing else.

A. And repeated calls for restraint in outer space.

Q. When you say "it runs counter to what was said," what was said at the speech was that the Soviet Union would like arms control agreements, and they made a pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Could you just embroider what you mean—

why it runs counter to Gromyko's speech?

A. I prefer not to go into an extensive "Who shot John?" on this. I put this information forward because it does represent a significant first in both the scope and integration of activity and capability.

Q. Has there ever been any period of American testing that compares to this? To put this thing in further perspective, is there a way to put it in percentages?

A. No, I prefer not to do that other than to suggest that this is a first in the context of the activities by either the East or the West.

Q. Could you help us understand the way these meetings go? If you are clearly troubled by the evidence that you are presenting to us here—you tell us it came together in the middle of the night, you've been talking to them for 4¼ hours this morning—why didn't you raise it with them?

A. I think the point I just made was that it was not available to me in its entirety before I started these meetings but rather subsequent thereto. That is not to suggest I would have raised it in the meeting, in any event.

Q. Is this the kind of thing that does get raised?

A. Probably, but not necessarily.

Q. I get the feeling that your having come out of this meeting, and made this rather discouraging—from your standpoint—announcement, that the meeting itself didn't accomplish much. Is that right?

A. No. I described the meeting as useful, and I think it is always useful to conduct far-ranging discussions with my counterpart in the Soviet Union. They inevitably bring about consequences which are favorable, and I don't view this meeting as any exception.

Q. Just prior to the meeting, you had described the Soviet's approach to the Middle East in the communications you have had as cautious. On the basis of the last 2 days, would you still say that that is their general approach to the situation?

A. Concerned and cautious, yes.

Q. I'm still not quite clear on what you mean by the integration of these various strategic tests. What—

A. I think I called them "strategic activity."

Q. What relationship is there between these? For example, are the two

ABM intercepts related to the two ICBM launches?

A. Integrated.

Q. Did they involve [inaudible] or explosions?

A. I didn't hear—

Q. Can you tell us which test ranges?

A. No. No, no, I can't do that.

Q. How do you interpret this? What does it mean, this activity?

A. It shows the level of interest, skill, and technological advancement that should be of concern.

Q. Is a summit meeting between the two leaders likely by the end of the year, would you say?

A. I don't want to comment on that. I'm sure the President will comment on the subject in the months ahead. I think both sides clearly have made their position clear on summitry, and they are surprisingly convergent, and that is that summitry for summitry's sake is to be avoided; but rather summitry that has been well prepared, that will result in a positive movement forward is far preferable to an *ad hoc* kind of summitry in which expectations rise before—sometimes in the past, we have seen even euphoric expectations that were only dashed following such ill-prepared summits. I don't think either side wants to go into such [inaudible].

Q. You said that the United States favors the rule of law in the settlement of disputes except in legitimate self-defense. Would you include the Israeli actions in Lebanon this past week to be covered by that rubric?

A. Clearly, there is a great deal in support of that. A number of objective observers might question the scope of the counteraction and the character of it. We have, as a government, not made a ruling on that as yet.

Q. Would you expect to either protest or to inquire about these strategic activities once you are—

A. I would like to wait until we have had an opportunity to consider what we will do with respect to it. It might be a decision to do nothing.

Q. There is a possible further response to it?

A. Possibly.

Q. Can you run through with us what progress, if any, has been made in your effort to strengthen the cease-fire in Lebanon?

A. Phil Habib [Ambassador Philip C. Habib, the President's special emissary to the Middle East] has been intensely engaged in the whole framework of the crisis in Lebanon, both in search of a permanent and lasting cease-fire and in creating the conditions by which the sovereignty of the central Government of Lebanon will be enhanced and strengthened as a consequence of this tragedy. I think while this activity is underway, it sometimes is counterproductive to become too specific on how; but he has been in touch with all the internal parties and with the external parties involved as well. And we have been back-stopping here in Washington on an hourly basis and throughout the night.

That situation has not changed from the beginning of this crisis; especially the President has personally followed it moment by moment. I just spoke to him at Camp David, and it is clear that the United States is doing all within its power to have a situation in which the bloodshed terminates, and the conditions for a long-term settlement are enhanced.

Q. Do you find that the Soviet policy, as best you understand it now, works in the same direction as America's?

A. I would not describe it that way. On the other hand, I would not indict recent Soviet activity as particularly troublesome or counterproductive.

Q. On that strategic activity, do you regard that as an acceleration of some of the past activities that they've had, or is this, given the integrated nature as you characterized it, something that involved an entirely new effort by the Soviets?

A. I think there has been enough said on this subject. Clearly, I wanted you to have the information as quickly as it was available and releasable. We've done that, and I think I'd just like to let it drop there.

Q. Would you be kind enough, so we don't botch this up, could you run

through exactly what you said about this strategic activity?

A. All right, and I do refer to it as "activity."

Q. You didn't answer the question about the nuclear explosions.

A. I'm about to. Oh, no; no nuclear no.

I will repeat what I said on this subject. I would note, for example, that only a few days after the speech at the United Nations which touched upon outer space arms control, the Soviet Union has undertaken an unusually high level of strategic activity, including an antisatellite test, two ICBM launches, a SS-20 launch, an SLBM launch, and two ABM intercepts.

Q. You mentioned earlier that you had not taken a position on whether this Israeli activity in Lebanon is in self-defense or not. Can you say, first of all, why you have not taken a position on that? And secondly, the United States has maintained that it wants a the foreign troops out of Lebanon. Was that a similar Soviet point of view? And is the United States thinking of a particular timeframe on the withdrawal of such troops from Lebanon?

A. I don't know what the Soviet view is on the subject of foreign forces in Lebanon. The U.S. view is, of course that we would like to see ultimately all foreign forces out of Lebanon so that the central government can conduct the sovereign affairs of a sovereign government within internationally recognized borders.

With respect to the other question it is clear that there was a sequence of events that has been going on for an extended period involving actions and counter-actions, terrorist activity, across-the-border shelling and rocket attacks, and a series of air- and counter-air actions. Clearly, this recent crisis is the culmination of a long period of unacceptable instability in southern Lebanon and perhaps throughout Lebanon. I think there will have to be a very careful analysis of events associated with this recent crisis before the kind of value judgment you've asked for would be appropriate.

¹Press release 203 of June 21, 1982. ■

FY 1983 Assistance Requests

by Chester A. Crocker

Statement before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the House Appropriations Committee on March 25, 1982. Mr. Crocker is Assistant Secretary for African Affairs.¹

I appreciate this opportunity to discuss with you the integrated foreign assistance budget for Africa which the President has proposed for fiscal year 1983. We view this budget as vitally important since it represents the principal tool the U.S. Government has at its disposal for effecting its goals in the foreign policy area.

About 1 year ago, this Administration initially defined its foreign policy objectives for Africa. I would like to review those objectives for you and what we believe are our accomplishments to date, and then take a look at the unfinished agenda which remains—especially in relation to the assistance programs the President has proposed to the Congress.

U.S. Objectives and Accomplishments

From the outset we have sought to promote peace and regional security in Africa and to deny opportunities to all those who pursue contrary objectives. We promised to support proven friends and to be a reliable partner, in Africa as elsewhere. We stated our interest in maintaining access to key resources and increasing mutually advantageous trade and investment. We said that we support peaceful solutions to the problems of southern Africa, and, as you know, the search for that goal has been one of our major activities over the past year. We pledged ourselves to make a special effort on behalf of that group of nations in Africa whose development policies reduce genuine economic progress and which have working democratic institutions. And we promised to do our share in meeting Africa's humanitarian needs and in supporting basic human liberties, keeping both with American principles and American interests.

In the first year of the Reagan Administration we have made a good measure of progress. We have actively lent support to various efforts, especially those initiated by the African states themselves, designed to stop hostilities and establish the structures necessary

for peace in several parts of Africa. The Organization of African Unity (OAU), under the positive and energetic leadership of Kenya's President Daniel arap Moi, has undertaken a number of initiatives which we supported either politically or materially. In Chad we provided nonlethal equipment and supplies for the Nigerian and Zairian contingents of the OAU peacekeeping force. We continue to give full diplomatic support to the OAU peace effort in the Western Sahara.

In southern Africa our efforts as a member of the contact group have been instrumental in bringing the peace process there close to the point where phase one of the three-phase Namibia negotiations is almost complete. Good friends in Africa have had ample demonstrations throughout this year that the support and friendship of the United States is not in doubt, and we have thus made considerable progress in strengthening the resolve of a number of these states in resisting the pressures and experiments in adventurism which the Soviets and their surrogates continue.

The private sector, both in the United States and in Africa, has been engaged in a serious effort to expand our commercial links in ways which are genuinely beneficial to both parties and which we believe will ultimately strengthen African economies where the private sector is still nascent and fragile or discouraged by the negative experiences of the past two decades. The Agency for International Development (AID) has initiated new programs designed both to stimulate additional investment opportunities and to assist in a variety of ways the further development of African entrepreneurship. Our most dramatic recent initiative in this area was a high-level trade and investment mission to a number of African countries led by Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige and Secretary of Agriculture John R. Block.

In short, we have made solid progress on several fronts, not as the key player in the African drama and certainly not as either Africa's principal "angel of mercy" or as its policeman, but rather as one important member of a team of like-minded nations which have the continent's long-term interests at heart.

Of course, much remains to be done. Africa still faces a range of problems, some resulting from natural causes and others manmade. A number of African

countries have what I can only describe as dangerously troubled economies. Others live in the shadow of different threats, such as those posed by hostile neighbors. Only a few seem to be holding their own.

Assistance Proposals

The assistance programs which we are proposing are designed to address both economic and security goals, for we recognize that sooner or later peace and development are interdependent sides of the same coin. We expect that our efforts, combined with those of other Western and multilateral donors, will achieve further progress. Clearly the process will not be quick or easy, for reasons that are well known. Africa has the worst economic growth rate of any continent. It contains two-thirds of those countries certified by the United Nations as being the very poorest. It is also the only continent with declining per capita food production. Last year Africa's food import bill alone rose by 17%, or \$1 billion, an amount equivalent to our total aid program. Many African nations are caught in the merciless squeeze of high oil prices, stagnating export production, and ever-mounting debt. All too often governments have opted for economic policies which work against sustained, real economic growth. We are encouraged, however, by a growing awareness among Africans themselves that an improved economic policy climate, combined with increased trade and investment, is the real key to economic growth and that without growth, equity will remain elusive.

We are not proposing charity programs. In every case, the development and security measures which we support with our aid require resource commitments and often tough decisions by the Africans themselves. Our economic assistance programs, funded by development assistance, economic support funds (ESF), and PL 480, encourage and support the self-help efforts of the Africans and are designed to complement the much larger resource flows provided by multilateral institutions—chiefly the World Bank—as well as the economic stabilization programs of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Our security assistance programs, constituting less than one-quarter of our total request, provide a minimum level of response to those of our friends who face armed enemies. We recognize that security programs cost money which, in a perfect world, could be devoted to economic programs. We are requesting \$210 million

AFRICA

of our \$234 million foreign military sales (FMS) in direct credits so that we can ease the repayment burden by offering concessional terms. Nevertheless, in Africa, as in the United States where security needs exist, they must be addressed.

Our total proposed FY 1983 Africa assistance program is divided as follows:

Development Assistance	\$324 million
Economic Support Funds	325
PL 480, Title I & III	117
PL 480, Title II	75
Foreign Military Sales	234
International Military	9
Education and Training Program	
TOTAL	\$1,084 million

Our program is focused on regions where U.S. economic interests and security interests are greatest. For example, in FY 1981, 41% of the total budget was allocated to six key countries—Sudan, Kenya, Somalia, Zimbabwe, Liberia, and Zaire. For FY 1983, the same six account for 62%. We believe the quantitative increase I have just cited is indicative of a qualitative increase in both the country specific programs and in the African assistance program as a whole.

Sudan. Sudan is a country of great strategic importance which lives under constant threat from Libyan efforts at subversion and has a dangerously troubled economy. Its location on the Red Sea, between Libya and Ethiopia, and south of Egypt makes its importance and its major problems quite evident. Our proposed programs there include \$25 million in development assistance—focused on integrated rural development—\$100 million in FMS, \$70 million in ESF, \$30 million in PL-480 Title I and III, and \$1.5 million in IMET.

Horn of Africa and the Indian Ocean. Here we are proposing programs for five African states: Kenya, Somalia, Djibouti, Seychelles, and Mauritius. The countries of this region face unprecedented economic difficulties and must consider their security needs in the light of Soviet and Cuban military presence in Ethiopia, South Yemen, and the Indian Ocean. Kenya and Somalia also provide critical facilities for the use of U.S. forces temporarily in that area. For

	Development Assistance	ESF	PL 480 (Titles I/III)	PL 480 (Title II) ¹	FMS	IMET ²	Total ³
Angola	—	—	—	.4	—	—	.4
Benin	—	—	—	.5	—	—	.5
Botswana	—	10	—	1.1	5	.125	16.2
Burundi	5.6	—	—	2.4	—	.03	8
Cameroon	17	—	—	1	10	.150	28.2
Cape Verde	2.2	—	—	.8	—	.035	3
Central African Republic	1	—	—	—	—	—	1
Chad	—	—	—	.2	—	—	.2
Comoros	—	—	—	.3	—	—	.3
Congo	2	—	—	.3	—	.035	2.3
Djibouti	—	2	—	2.6	1.5	.100	6.2
Equatorial Guinea	1	—	—	.3	—	.05	1.4
Ethiopia	—	—	—	1.9	—	—	1.9
Gabon	—	—	—	—	3	.100	3.1
The Gambia	5.1	—	—	.9	—	—	6
Ghana	4.6	—	7	6.2	—	.45	18.3
Guinea	2	—	2.5	.3	—	.035	4.8
Guinea-Bissau	2	—	—	.4	—	.035	2.4
Ivory Coast	—	—	—	—	—	.05	.05
Kenya	28	30	15	3	35	1.5	112.5
Lesotho	10.8	—	—	8.8	—	—	19.6
Liberia	12	32	11	.4	15	.80	71.2
Madagascar	—	—	—	1	—	.02	1
Malawi	7	—	—	.6	—	.06	7.7
Mali	9.7	—	—	—	—	.125	9.8
Mauritania	6.8	—	—	4.2	—	.05	11.1
Mauritius	—	2	3.5	.7	—	—	6.2
Mozambique	—	—	—	.6	—	—	.6

these five countries our suggested program levels total:

Development Assistance	\$ 45 million
Foreign Military Sales	66.5
(of which \$21 million is concessional)	
Economic Support Funds	61
PL 480, Titles I and III	33.5
International Military	2.1
Education and Training Program	
TOTAL	\$208.1 million

West Africa. This area contains a number of states where adequate aid is essential to prevent economic instability and Libyan adventurism from damaging U.S. interests. This danger is real. Declining economic conditions in Ghana were major factors leading to last December's coup. The Libyans moved rapidly to try to take advantage of the

situation. Other potential danger spots include Cameroon, Gabon, Niger, Senegal, and Liberia. In Liberia, a country in which we have important strategic interests and substantial American investment, our aid is part of a carefully structured program aimed at promoting the economic recovery which is vital to political stability. West Africa is an area which rarely captures the headlines but is susceptible to destabilization of the type in which Libya is fast becoming an expert. The poverty of the Sahel provides Libya its main opportunity there. Our aid will help to insure continued access to important facilities and to build economically and politically self-confident states around Nigeria—our second largest source of imported oil.

AIDS FOR AFRICA

	Development Assistance	ESF	PL 480 (Titles I/III)	PL 480 (Title II) ¹	FMS	IMET ²	Total ³
Igier	15.7	5	—	.1	5	.45	26.3
igeria	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
rwanda	5.3	—	—	3.3	1.5	.075	10.4
ao Tome	—	—	—	.06	—	—	.06
enegal	16.9	10	8	8.9	5	.45	49.3
eychelles	—	2	—	.4	—	—	2.4
ierra Leone	1	—	3	1.3	—	.025	5.3
omaliala	17	25	15	3.7	30	.055	91.3
udan	25	70	30	3.4	100	1.5	229.9
waziland	6.5	—	—	.7	—	—	7.2
anzania	10.2	—	5	2.5	—	.075	17.8
ogo	2.9	—	—	1.6	—	.075	4.6
ganda	5.5	—	—	—	—	.050	5.6
pper Volta	9.8	—	—	7.7	—	.135	17.6
aire	10	15	10	2.1	20	1.3	58.4
ambia	—	20	7	—	—	.150	27.2
imbabwe	—	75	—	—	3	.150	78.2
Subtotal	242.8	298	117	74.7	234	8.7	975.5
ahel Regional	27.6	—	—	—	—	—	27.6
outhern Africa Regional	3	27	—	—	—	—	30
frica Regional	50	—	—	—	—	—	50
TOTAL	323.4	325	117	74.7	234	8.7	1,083.1

¹ Includes world food program, voluntary agency and government programs; does not include emergency feeding programs that may be necessary in 1983.

² Includes military assistance program (\$.175).

³ Does not include Peace Corps, military assistance program, or international narcotics control.

The totals for this category are as follows:

Development Assistance	\$ 62	million
Foreign Military Sales	38	
Economic Support Funds	47	
PL 480, Titles I & III	19	
Education and Training Program	1.950	
TOTAL	\$167.950	million

Southern Africa. We propose programs for seven nations—Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, Zaire, Zimbabwe, and Zambia and the southern Africa regional program. The totals are:

Development Assistance	\$ 34.3	million
Foreign Military Sales	28	

Economic Support

Funds	147
(including \$27 million for the southern Africa regional program)	
PL 480, Title I	17
International Military Education and Training Program	1.785
TOTAL	\$228.1 million

In Southern Africa our policy is designed to insure continued Western access to key strategic minerals, to promote regional stability, to reduce opportunities for Soviet and Cuban exploitation, and to seek negotiated solutions to the key problems of the region. The historic conflicts in southern Africa have provided the greatest opportunities to date for malign exploitation. We also have commitments to assist in the development of the front-line states

whose participation is essential to a successful Namibia peace agreement. I cannot stress too strongly the importance of our assistance programs in relation to our ongoing southern Africa strategy which is, as you know, a major focal point of this Administration's Africa policy. Our commitments and the overall level and thrust of these assistance programs are watched very carefully by the countries of the region as the real test of our sincerity and seriousness of purpose there. In Zaire our continuing assistance helps to promote economic and other reforms and to forestall a repetition of events like the 1978 Shaba invasion.

A substantial portion of our aid is proposed for countries which rank among the world's poorest. Some of these countries are of high strategic importance, and like Somalia and Sudan, are among those mentioned in the categories I have just described. Many, despite current problems, have great economic potential. In all cases, our assistance reflects President Reagan's pledge at Cancun to maintain a generous level of assistance to the poorer countries. Typically, our aid to these countries is provided through small, sharply focused development assistance programs, complemented where necessary by PL 480.

I know you share with me a deep and serious concern for the goals we pursue through the means of these proposed programs even though some of you may differ with us over some of the details. We live in a time when the United States and its friends and those who would be our friends find themselves assaulted on several fronts by problems of enormous scale and enemies as dangerous as they are implacable. I believe the programs outlined in this presentation help address those problems and meet the challenge those enemies present in a thoughtful, constructive, and effective manner.

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

FY 1983 Authorization Request

by Secretary Haig

Statement before the Subcommittee on State, Justice, Commerce, and the Judiciary of the Senate Appropriations Committee on May 4, 1982.¹

It is a great pleasure to be here today to begin hearings on the President's FY 1983 budget for the Department of State.

The international challenges and opportunities facing the United States today have placed the Foreign Service and the Department of State in the front-line defense of our national interests. Accurate and clear reporting are critical if we are to anticipate political and economic events. Intellectual and diplomatic creativity are essential if we are to establish and sustain the trust, friendship, and understanding of other countries. A strong and vital Foreign Service enables us to handle the multitude of foreign policy problems, including the preservation of peace.

The President recognizes that successful diplomacy rests on a solid foundation of strength and resolve. But renewed military strength serves its true purpose of preserving peace when it is accompanied by diplomatic efforts to settle disputes, strengthen alliances, promote development, and reduce the risks of war. As a soldier as well as a diplomat, I can tell you that diplomacy is an investment in deterrence itself.

The task of statesmanship is to shape events, not merely to react to them. In a world marked by many powers and interests, the President has established a transcending objective for the United States—to create an international environment hospitable to American values, especially the freedom and creativity of the individual. To accomplish this task, we have emphasized the strengthening of our traditional alliances and the nurturing of new partnerships, the promotion of peaceful progress in the developing world, and the achievement of a relationship with the Soviet Union based on restraint and reciprocity. We can influence international events if we have the knowledge and the sensitivity to appreciate regional realities and the unique circumstances of every country. This can only be done if

we have the informed reporting and the understanding of our professional Foreign Service.

The budget before you is necessary to sustain the excellence of the Foreign Service. We put it forward fully recognizing the requirements of these austere times, and we are committed to the President's program of fiscal restraint. The Department has done its full share to meet the reductions required by this program. In FY 1982 alone, the Department has reduced more than \$200 million from our March 1981 request. As a consequence, there have also been substantial reductions in the Department's activities. The 1983 budget request is, therefore, critical if we are to continue to meet U.S. foreign policy goals.

Operational funding in the 1983 budget is approximately equal in constant dollars to the 1974 appropriations. During this same period, the responsibilities of the Department have grown, and the complexities of diplomacy have increased. However, our key resource—people—has declined in numbers. The Department has also been forced to reduce expenditures for a number of major activities in order to absorb many new programs. All too frequently, we have failed to make the provisions necessary today to insure a better service tomorrow.

This dangerous trend must be reversed. The 1983 budget proposes prudent increases that constitute a long-term investment in both personnel and property. Even with these modest changes, we will have the smallest budget outlays of any cabinet-level agency. With the full support of this committee and the Congress, the Department will be able to make major cost-effective strides toward meeting its objectives.

Under Secretary Kennedy [for Management Richard T.] and other representatives of the Department will address the specifics of the budget, but allow me to mention certain items which are of particular significance.

- About 82% of our total 1983 increase is needed just to operate at current levels. Most of this increase offsets the effects of overseas wage and price increases in countries abroad where inflation is often substantially higher than in the United States. Also, burgeoning passport and consular requirements will

alone require over 100 new positions in 1983.

- The remaining 18% of our 1983 increase is for several programs of key importance. This includes resources as part of a continuing program supported by the Congress to strengthen substantive political and economic reporting and analysis in critical regions such as the Caribbean, the Middle East, and Asia.

- A lean and efficient cadre of professional officers is required to perform effectively a myriad of foreign policy responsibilities. As a step in implementing the Foreign Service Act of 1980, the 1983 budget includes a modest increment of new positions and funds to carry out a mandatory midlevel training program for career officers. This investment in education will strengthen our capacity to manage U.S. foreign policy by insuring that officers achieve high standards of professional excellence.

The budget also funds the first phase of construction for our new embassy complex in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. This project is imperative physically and politically. The upcoming shift of the Saudi diplomatic capital from Jidda to Riyadh in the fall of 1983—a distance of 800 miles—makes this project necessary. Without it, relations between the United States and our Saudi allies will be hampered as they proceed to establish formally this new diplomatic capital. In addition, further delaying construction of the chancery and embassy residences to 1984 will increase the total cost of this project by some \$7 million because of inflation and rental costs.

The 1983 budget also provides for necessary efficiencies and economies in areas throughout the Department.

- We want to enhance communications and computer capacity, particularly by updating obsolete systems. This will include continuing development of the new financial management system so policymakers in the Department can make sound decisions on resource allocations.

- Additional resources are needed for the President's program to combat waste, fraud, and mismanagement.

- Strengthened administrative capacity is required in underdeveloped countries where our workload has dramatically increased.

These efforts, while requiring relatively small investments, will more than pay for themselves through the cost-savings they will achieve. Delay on

uch matters will not only aggravate current inefficiencies but mean higher start-up costs in the future.

These additional resource requirements are necessary to maintain the Department's institutional responsibilities. But our foreign service and other employees are also facing real dangers abroad. I must reemphasize to the committee that security for our personnel remains the Department's highest priority. Indeed, because of the recent individual acts of terrorism directed against specific officers abroad, such as Charge Chapman, General Dozier, and Assistant Military Attache Ray, we are moving rapidly to blunt this growing threat to the safety of our employees. An urgent request to meet 1982 supplemental security requirements has recently been transmitted to Congress which will provide additional armored vehicles and guard services and improve public access controls and communications.

In conclusion, U.S. foreign policy must provide a broad framework to foster respect for individual liberty, to

preserve peace, to increase security, and to promote development. But if the United States is to conduct an effective policy directed toward the goals, then the State Department must have the necessary resources; we simply cannot carry out our foreign policy initiatives, including programs of military and developmental aid, unless we have an adequate infrastructure. I am confident that we will continue to receive your support for this infrastructure in the crucial times ahead.

This budget is the product of rigorous effort. It constitutes a sound program for the conduct of current operations, and, just as important, it offers an investment for the future. The American people and the foreign policy professionals who serve them so well deserve no less.

¹Press release 156. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

legitimacy and thereby may become a destabilizing factor tending to vitiate other components of our strategy to foster peace, prosperity, and stability.

The increasing strength of the Soviet Union's military forces in East Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East prompts some of our particular concerns, and the continuing threat to South Korea from North Korea and to Thailand from Vietnam are the source of special assistance efforts. In this context, a strong U.S. military presence in East Asia is essential, and unhampered use of military facilities such as those in the Philippines are an essential component of this presence. In turn, our assistance program is an integral part of our good relations with the Philippines on which effective use of these facilities depends.

Maintenance of stability on the Korean Peninsula depends upon strengthening the South Korean Armed Forces to balance the large and well-equipped forces of North Korea. The security of the entire North Pacific would be seriously impaired if the Korean balance were upset.

The strengthening of Thailand's armed forces is essential at this point considering Vietnam's continued military occupation of Kampuchea and its recent force improvements in that country. Confidence in the effectiveness of the U.S. contribution of Thailand's defense is a key factor in ASEAN [Association of South East Asian Nations] perceptions of a positive and effective U.S. policy in the area. In the wake of Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea, the ASEAN members have also wisely undertaken military modernization programs which we are supporting.

Unfortunately, U.S. interests and East Asian needs must be addressed in the context of severe economic constraints which affect both our friends and ourselves. High petroleum prices, the inflated cost of hardware, sharp limits on grant aid or concessional financing, and growing debt servicing problems are among the factors which hamper the defense procurement programs of our East Asian allies and friends.

Regional Program Overview

Conceptually, FY 1983's military and economic development assistance programs are integrated components of a single strategic package. All components are directly related to U.S. strategic interests in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, but my remarks today concern primarily

FY 1983 Assistance Requests

John H. Holdridge

Statement before the Subcommittee on Government Operations of the House Appropriations Committee on March 30, 1982. Ambassador Holdridge is Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.¹

I am pleased with the opportunity to explain our FY 1983 budget request and its relationship to U.S. interests in the Pacific and how it serves these interests by meeting the needs of regional states and institutions.

U.S. Interests

The U.S. assistance programs to East Asian and Pacific countries are designed to serve the many U.S. interests in this highly important region. It is important for us to strengthen the ties with our friends and allies in East Asia and help them maintain their independence and territorial integrity in the face of current and potential threats.

East Asia contains some of the world's most rapidly growing economies, and the economic ties of these nations to the United States are of increasing importance to our economy. In fact, for 10

consecutive years our Asian Pacific trade has surpassed that with Western Europe. We must maintain access to vital raw materials for which the region is a significant source.

Protection of key sea lanes of communications in the region and those that link East Asia to the Indian Ocean and the Middle East is crucial to U.S. security. This aspect of U.S. security warrants special attention considering the increased Soviet ability to threaten the sea lanes and thereby deny Middle Eastern petroleum to our major East Asian allies, as well as other vital trade among regional states such as exists between Japan and Australia.

Enhancing the stability of friendly governments of the area facilitates their serving as forces for peace and development in the region and permits them to act in ways that further our common global security and other interests. We also believe that stable, self-confident governments will be more inclined to undertake actions which will improve the human rights situation and the humanitarian services in their countries, thereby serving the U.S. global interests in furthering human rights. Human rights abuses undermine governmental

military assistance—the foreign military sales (FMS), international military education and training (IMET), and economic support funds (ESF) programs which we have proposed for FY 1983.

The preponderance of security assistance program resources is allocated to countries facing the greatest and most immediate military threats—Korea and Thailand—or, in the case of the Philippines, providing military facilities from which to deter or resist aggression. Thus, these three countries receive some \$416.4, or 86% of the total \$482.7 FMS, ESF, and IMET funds proposed for East Asia. Inclusion of the \$950,000 in military assistance program (MAP) funds to meet the costs of completing former MAP programs would not change the percentages since the same three countries should receive all but \$100,000 of the total funding proposed.

The largest recipients of economic assistance—development assistance and PL 480—include the Philippines and Thailand, as well as Indonesia, which occupies a key strategic location and is the poorest country in ASEAN. They receive some \$175.8, or approximately 65% of the \$270.4 proposed for the region.

The total amount of U.S. assistance proposed for East Asian countries in FY 1983—FMS, ESF, MAP, IMET, development assistance, and PL 480—is approximately \$677.7, an increase of \$93.6 million over FY 1982. Most—that is, \$87.4 of the increase, is for security assistance—FMS, ESF, and IMET. Most of this increase is for FMS credits to assist Korea and Thailand, the two most threatened countries, to cope with the combination of serious military threats and increasing defense procurement difficulties. Some additional specifics may help put the request in perspective.

- Our FMS request of \$413.5 million for the region is an increase of \$80.5 million over the final FY 1982 allocation of \$333 million. However, it exceeds our original congressional presentation document request of \$355 million by only \$58.5 million, and by less than this in real terms, of course. As I will discuss shortly, these modest increases afford minimum levels to redress risky shortfalls in two principal strategic areas—Northeast and Southeast Asia.

- Our IMET proposal of \$9.2 million is an increase of \$2.4 million over the final FY 1982 level of \$6.8 million but a much smaller increase of only \$230,000 over the original congressional presentation document request of \$8.9 million.

- Our ESF request of \$60 million represents an increase of \$4.5 million over the \$55.5 million in the final allocation for FY 1982. Actually this is an increase of \$4 million in country programs since \$500,000 of the FY 1982 program is for a one-time oceanographic project.

I should mention that straight cash sales far exceed our assistance programs. The estimated level of such sales for FY 1982 is \$4.5 billion and for FY 1983 is \$2.3 billion.

Northeast Asia

Korea. The continuation of peace and stability in Northeast Asia is very important to the security and prosperity of the United States. Deterrence of North Korean aggression against South Korea is essential to the maintenance of that peace and stability. The fact that we have had peace in the area during the past 25 years is due in no small measure to our determination to resist aggression. That resolve has also enabled the people of the Republic of Korea to devote needed efforts to development. These efforts have been rewarded by unprecedented levels of economic growth and corresponding improvements in their living standards.

Despite this record of success, the need for continued U.S. support remains. The steady buildup of military force by North Korea, which has been in progress since the late 1960s, continued unabated during the past 12 months. Because we have taken steps during that same period to improve the capabilities of our own forces and to assist the South Koreans to do the same, we have not fallen further behind the North. Nevertheless, an imbalance persists on the peninsula and is likely to persist despite our best efforts for a number of years to come. North Korea now has a decided advantage in numbers of combat divisions, tanks, artillery and armored personnel carriers, and a two-to-one numerical superiority in fighter aircraft. Moreover, it has shown an increasingly sophisticated ability to mount the sort of complex, large-scale maneuvers which would be required for an invasion of the South. In sum, North Korean capabilities have become steadily more formidable, and continuing efforts on our part are required.

During the past year, we have seen steady progress in South Korea toward a more open political system. Martial law was lifted early in 1981. The curfew in effect since the end of the Korean war was removed in January of this year. There has been increasing activity

on the part of the National Assembly in asserting a significant role for itself *vis-a-vis* the government. There have been number of amnesties during the past year, the most recent on March 2, affecting nearly 3,000 prisoners, almost 300 of whom could be termed political prisoners. As you know, President Chun in January of last year commuted Kim Dae Jung's death sentence to life imprisonment. On March 2 that sentence was reduced to 20 years. Other prisoners associated with Kim and with the events in Kwanju in May 1980 were released or had their sentences reduced.

Korea, nonetheless, remains an authoritarian society. We believe, however, that the Korean Government intends to move in the direction of further liberalization, and they know that this they would have our full support. Korean leaders are aware of our concerns about human rights in their country, as elsewhere, and we are hopeful that the situation will continue to improve.

During the past 12 months there have been several efforts on the part of President Chun to stimulate a dialogue with the North, most recently on January 22. This was the most comprehensive set of measures ever proposed by either side, addressing both the fundamental question of reunification as well as the need to take steps to reduce tension in the period before reunification could be accomplished. We believe this was a reasonable, realistic, and forward looking proposal for which we have declared our full support. The North Korean response has been disappointing if predictable. Pyongyang, in essence, has repeated its call for American withdrawal and change of government in the South as a prerequisite to any progress. President Chun's proposal deserved a more considered response and we believe the ball clearly remains in North Korea's court.

North Korea remains an enigma to the United States. As I indicated earlier there is no sign of a constructive North Korean approach to relations with the South in the short term. This may, however, change in time. Given the dramatic growth in South Korea's economic strength, its increasing international influence, and its continued domestic stability, Pyongyang may ultimately recognize that over the long term, the balance of power and influence on the peninsula will shift inexorably toward the South. This may eventually become clear on the military front as well, where North Korea's industrial

ase is increasingly strained by the burden of its military buildup, while the South Korean economic infrastructure continues to be enhanced, increasing South Korea's ability to support its own forces. Logic would suggest, therefore, that the North might one day—perhaps relatively soon—conclude that South Korea must be recognized as a viable entity with which it must deal peacefully. On the other hand, however, we have no reason to believe that Kim Il Sung, in fact, is approaching this realization. Instead, his strategy appears to remain one of waiting for an opportunity to reunite Korea on his own terms, through whatever means—including military—that may be required.

There is no sign that our assistance to South Korea has generated an anti-American backlash. We undoubtedly have seen fewer manifestations of anti-Americanism there than in any other country in which we have a large military presence. You may be aware that the U.S. International Communication Agency office in Pusan was the target of arsonists last week, who distributed anti-American leaflets as they left the scene. While this was deeply disturbing, it was, we are confident, an aberration. It promoted a heart-warming display of concern and regret among Koreans of all walks of life in Pusan and elsewhere, for whom the U.S.-Korean relationship remains, as it has been for the past 30 years, a source of reassurance.

Our proposed program of \$210 million in FMS credits for Korea—an increase of \$44 million over FY 82—is the largest dollar increase requested for any East Asian country and retains Korea's position as the largest East Asian FMS recipient. Nevertheless, it is a very modest program if one considers Korea's large military purchasing requirements and the funding shortfalls of previous years. The FMS credits proposed heretofore to support the force improvement program have consistently fallen short.

The major systems which Seoul is expected to purchase with FMS financing in order to help redress the military buildup include a further increment in the F-5E/F corporation program, a tactical air control package, an indigenous tank production program, M-88A1 tank recovery vehicles, TOW [tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided] missiles, and hawk surface-to-air missile modification equipment.

The proposed IMET program of \$1.85 million is an increase of \$450,000, or 32% and is essential to improve the interoperability of Korean with U.S.

forces and commonality of U.S.-Korea tactics and doctrine. Moreover, the Republic of Korea has urgent requirements to develop managerial expertise for its complex defense establishment. Korea also needs to improve its indigenous training capability.

China. In light of the significant progress that the United States and China have made toward establishment of a normal and mutually beneficial relationship, the President last year decided to seek legislative change to laws which link China with the Soviet bloc and which are no longer consistent with our strategic relationship.

China has not been considered to be part of the Soviet bloc since the 1960s. U.S. laws should reflect this fact and our policy which is to treat China as a friendly but nonallied country with which we share important interests. We believe it is no longer in U.S. interests to treat China as if it continued to be part of a monolithic Soviet bloc.

This year's foreign assistance bill contains two proposals that would end such past discrimination against China:

- Amendment of the Foreign Assistance Act to eliminate the blanket prohibition on assistance to China and
- Amendment to the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act to clarify that China would be eligible for PL 480.

I would emphasize that we have no plans to establish bilateral development assistance or PL 480 programs for China. Our principal interest in amending these laws is to insure that, in principle, we treat China in the same way we treat other friendly, nonallied countries. We do not plan to ask for additional funds for China as a result of these amendments.

Amendment of the Foreign Assistance Act would allow China to participate in ongoing Agency for International Development (AID) technical assistance programs, under current funding levels, in the same manner as do most other countries. For example, China could participate in ongoing agricultural research programs funded by the United States at the International Rice Research Institute in the Philippines or in fertilizer development programs at the International Fertilizer Development Center in Muscle Shoals, Alabama. We have not discussed any of these ideas with the Chinese and will not do so until the law is amended.

We would, of course, consult closely with the Congress if, in the future, we should decide that bilateral PL 480 or

development assistance programs for China were in the interest of the United States.

Southeast Asia

Because Southeast Asia is poorer and more heterogeneous than the Northeast, U.S. assistance is spread among a number of recipients, and the various kinds of aid available have to be carefully adapted to a variety of requirements.

Philippines. Our close relations with the Philippines are of long standing. They have demonstrated their durability. This is especially true in the security field. The United States and the Philippines are treaty allies and share similar views on the strategic challenges to peace and stability in Southeast Asia.

U.S. military facilities at Subic Naval Base and Clark Air Force Base are of major strategic importance to us. Their advantageous geographical position helps facilitate our military operations in two areas of the world of importance to us—the western Pacific and the Indian Ocean.

ESF and FMS levels for FY 1983 are the same as for FY 1982. They reflect President Carter's pledge to President Marcos at the time of the 1979 amendment to our Military Bases Agreement that the U.S. Administration would make its best effort to secure \$500 million in security assistance for the Philippines during the period FY 1980-84. We have honored this commitment, and we continue to appreciate the cooperation of the Congress over the past 3 years in giving currency to this pledge. We consider your support for our FY 1983 request for \$100 million in FMS and ESF to be most important.

The 1979 amendment to our Military Bases Agreement has worked well. As called for in the amendment, the United States and the Philippines will hold a formal review of the entire bases agreement in 1983-84.

In addition to military assistance, we have requested \$38.8 million in development assistance and \$14.3 million in PL 480. Any decline in economic assistance would have serious political and economic consequences for us. At the time we negotiated the 1979 bases amendment, we implicitly committed ourselves to maintain development assistance at the 1979 level through 1984.

A significant portion of the Philippine population subsists at levels below the World Bank's poverty line. Rural problems are being exploited by the Communist New People's Army. The

government is attempting to improve living standards and generate employment in rural areas. Our assistance program focuses on agricultural production, rural employment, and family planning and, thus, complements the government's efforts.

The only proposed MAP increase for the Philippines is in IMET—an increase of \$300,000 to a total of \$1.3 million. While not a part of our Military Bases Agreement with the Philippines, IMET is closely related to it. At the time of the 1979 bases amendment, Secretary Vance wrote Foreign Minister Romulo that "We will support those efforts [to achieve military self-reliance] by means of our security assistance programs, including the important training component." The Armed Forces of the Philippines have always put a premium on IMET training. Moreover, the Philippine Armed Forces face a growing challenge from the New People's Army insurgency which, if unchecked, could jeopardize our strategic military facilities at Clark and Subic. It is especially important to respond favorably to Philippine desires for increased IMET to help set the stage for the Military Bases Agreement review coming in 1983-84.

Thailand. We have requested \$50 million in direct credits and \$41 million in guaranteed credits for Thailand's FMS program. This is an increase of 36%, or \$24 million, in overall FMS levels and would increase the concessionality of the FY 1982 Thai program. However, the increases requested for FY 1983 represent a mere \$10 million over the original FY 1982 congressional presentation document levels with the same level of concessional financing as originally requested for FY 82. Although we were able to increase assistance in FY 82, we were able to provide only \$101 million of the \$132 million requested in FMS, ESF, IMET, and development assistance funds.

Thailand has long faced a military threat from larger, better armed Vietnamese forces. However, during the past year, the Vietnamese forces in Kampuchea have improved their command and control capabilities and have increased their operations in the border area against Kampuchean resistance forces. Thus, Thailand's force modernization requirements have become even more urgent, in both the military and political sense.

Militarily, the proposed FMS program will make a significant contribution toward the purchase of artillery, tanks, antitank weapons, coastal patrol

boats, transport aircraft, helicopters, air defense systems, and mortar locating radars. These are practical items that can have an immediate effect in deterring or raising the costs of encroachments into Thai territory.

The political effect of the proposed program is at least as significant as the military benefits that should accrue to Thailand. This is because Thailand's security, as our own for that matter, depends not on its Armed Forces alone but also on its international position and relationship with friends and allies. The ASEAN countries regard our support for Thailand, their front-line state, as the litmus test of our commitment to support them and to maintain our status as a Pacific power. By assisting Thailand, we are promoting our relationship with ASEAN and our overall position in the region as well. Inadequate assistance levels could undermine ASEAN unity and give the wrong signals to the countries of the area, including the Vietnamese.

Thailand is expected to incur serious debt servicing problems by 1985 unless current account adjustments are made. The Royal Thai Government has had to forego commercial borrowing for defense purposes and, instead, rely on internal revenues and government-to-government loans. Concessional financing will reinforce the sound decision to avoid commercial borrowing.

Failure to provide adequate concessional financing and sufficient overall levels of FMS to Thailand risks unacceptable military and political costs to U.S. interests. Militarily, it would force Thailand to choose between foregoing needed force modernization on one hand or impairment of the sound economy needed to cope with protracted internal and external threats. Politically, Thailand and other ASEAN states would receive the wrong signal, i.e., that the United States lacks the resolve to give adequate assistance to the country perceived by the entire region as the front-line state at a time that Hanoi is improving its forces in Kampuchea.

Our FMS concerns for Thailand focus on two factors:

- Overall levels—the importance of which I have just discussed.
- The degree of concessionality—in order to assist Thailand to cope with a short-term balance-of-payments problem while sustaining sufficient economic growth to maintain internal stability.

The requested increase of \$750,000, or 52%, in Thailand's IMET program to

a level of \$2.2 million is essential to support the crucial military modernization efforts undertaken by the Thai Government. Historically, Thailand makes full use of its IMET funds: during the first quarter of FY 1982, it has already obligated over \$1.2 million of its \$1.45 million allocation.

The \$10 million in ESF requested for Thailand equals the original congressional presentation document request for FY 1982. Thai cooperation with our refugee and Khmer relief efforts are pillars of U.S. strategy on Kampuchea. ESF monies provide an important part of the funding levels needed to induce continued Thai cooperation on refugee and Khmer relief-related issues.

The \$28 million development assistance proposed for Thailand is designed to promote growth in the private sector as well as to assist Thai Government efforts to reduce poverty and accelerate rural development in politically sensitive backward areas, particularly northeast Thailand. The Thai Government recognizes that underdevelopment and unacceptable income disparities are a threat to Thai security and accords the highest priority in its budget to development.

Thailand is a less developed country which exports raw materials and basic manufactures—rice, tapioca, rubber, and textiles—and which imports capital goods and most of its fuel. International market conditions, together with great needs for public and private investment, have resulted in growing current account deficits financed by rapidly rising public and private debt. Inflation was very high in 1979 and 1980 and only somewhat moderated to around 15% in 1981. Prudent management requires that the government takes steps to halt the growth of debt in order to avoid serious debt-service problems in the near term. Support in the form of "stand-by" arrangements with International Monetary Fund and World Bank lending and increased concessional financing of military expenditures are all essential elements in the Thai program.

Thailand's continued independence, territorial integrity, and stability, free any dominating influence by an unfriendly power, are central to the stability of Southeast Asia and to the unity of ASEAN and is a prime objective of U.S. policy in the region. U.S. leaders, including President Reagan, have restated our commitment to Thailand under the Manila pact and have made clear our continued support for Thai security needs.

Our proposed assistance program

enhances and encourages Thai cooperation with other U.S. policy objectives in Thailand, including more rapid economic and social development, narcotics control, and assistance to Indochinese refugees using Thailand as a country of first asylum.

Indonesia. We are proposing increasing our FMS and military training in Indonesia because of its strategic importance and to bolster its defenses against an increasing Soviet military presence in Southeast Asia and Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea.

Indonesia has the world's fifth largest population, a strategic location, provides 6% of U.S. petroleum imports, and generally plays a moderate and friendly role in the nonaligned movement, the Islamic Conference, and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. The Suharto Government is strongly anti-Communist, plays a key role in ASEAN's resistance to expanding Soviet and Vietnamese influence in the region, and supports the U.S. position on many global and regional issues. Indonesia's leaders view our assistance as an important indicator of the strength of our relationship. Despite its oil resources, Indonesia remains one of the poorest countries in the world, with per capita GNP of \$431 annually. The country faces difficult problems of a growing work force, very high population density on Java, and the probable end of oil exports in the 1990's. Indonesia is the key to stability in Southeast Asia, and we need to do all we can to help it continue the impressive economic progress it has achieved since Suharto took power in 1965.

The \$50 million requested in FMS credits represents an increase of \$10 million over the FY 1982 allocation but only \$5 million over the originally requested congressional presentation document level. This assistance plays a significant role in developing Indonesian capabilities to patrol and defend the strategic waterways surrounding this island nation. Moreover, this expenditure is a modest investment to make in the largest member of ASEAN.

Their FMS credits will be used to finance a small portion of Indonesia's military modernization including the purchase of M101 howitzers, MK-46 torpedoes, ship overhaul, and possible new aircraft acquisitions.

The IMET program of \$2.6 million will permit about 270 students to receive training in U.S. military schools. The training will cover a wide spectrum of professional, managerial, advanced, and

technical courses. Moreover, the Indonesians have begun placing more emphasis on in-country training through the use of mobile training teams in order to increase the number of students who benefit from the training. Thirteen teams are programmed for FY 1983, covering naval operations, resource management, and artillery operations and maintenance.

We are attempting to maintain the level of development assistance because it makes a crucial contribution to Indonesia's development and long-run political and economic stability. We have reduced PL 480 Title I substantially since FY 1980 because of budget stringencies and Indonesia's improved food situation, but a small program remains in our political and commercial interest.

Our proposed \$65 million in development assistance and \$27.3 million in PL 480 Titles I and II will help the Indonesian Government deal with a chronic food deficit and severe shortage of trained and skilled manpower and a difficult balance-of-payments situation caused by world recession and oil glut.

Malaysia. The Malaysian Armed Forces are continuing with plans to double in size within the next several years and are shifting from a counterinsurgency to a conventional warfare orientation in response to regional political developments.

Our modest FMS credit program of \$12.5 million is a recommended increase of \$2.5 million to help relieve a small portion of a much larger defense budget. FMS credits in FY 1983 will finance only a small portion of the U.S. military equipment Malaysia will buy as it expands its armed forces; the remainder will be purchased through FMS and commercial sales. Equipment scheduled for purchases includes Chaparral air defense missiles, communications equipment, ammunition, and spare parts for A-4 aircraft refurbishing. The IMET program will provide technical and professional training for an estimated 223 students. Malaysia will pay all travel costs.

The larger IMET increase is in response to a specific request from the prime minister for an increased U.S. military training. This is the most appropriate way for the United States to help nonaligned and relatively prosperous Malaysia meet its increased security needs. Thus, our proposal to increase the IMET program to \$850,000 from \$500,000 is the largest percentage increase recommended for any East Asian country.

Singapore. Singapore is a good friend and strong supporter of increased U.S. involvement in Asia. Singapore provides access to its excellent and strategically located air and seaport facilities for U.S. forces operating in the Indian Ocean. U.S. training and equipment, also purchased for cash, enhance military effectiveness and promote equipment commonality among the ASEAN countries.

A small (\$50,000) IMET program was begun by the Administration in FY 1981 as a gesture of support for Singapore and ASEAN in the face of Vietnamese hostility on the Thai border and a growing Soviet presence in the region. We anticipate that this will remain only a token program in view of Singapore's relative wealth. Most military training in the United States will continue to be purchased through FMS sales procedures. There is no other military or economic assistance for Singapore.

The \$50,000 IMET grant for Singapore will be used for professional training for the best officers from all three services. Singapore will continue to buy other professional and technical training.

Burma. Burma is gradually moving from almost total isolation into the world community, has increased contacts with the United States, and has turned away from the Soviet Union. Although we recognize Burma's commitment to strict neutrality, it is in our interest to encourage this trend.

The proposed increase in U.S. assistance to Burma should promote the continuing warming in our bilateral relations, support our broader interests, including narcotics cooperation, and respond to specific Burmese requests.

Burma is one of the world's poorest countries with a per capita income of only \$174. It has significant mineral and agricultural resources which, if properly developed, could insure increased internal prosperity and contribute to the economic strengthening of the region as a whole. Our development assistance concentrates on two of the most needy sectors—agriculture and health—where even small inputs will provide large increases in food production, incomes, and better health care countrywide.

U.S. AID and IMET programs were recommended in Burma in FY 1980 after a 16-year hiatus. The proposed increase in development assistance to \$12.5 million for FY 1983 will permit expansion of the key agricultural development program, as well as the second

phase of a public health project. The increase to \$200,000 for IMET will provide for about 32 trainees to attend U.S. military schools in FY 1983 up from an estimated 25 students in FY 1982.

ASEAN. ASEAN has developed into a major force for stability in Southeast Asia and is of central importance to U.S. interests in the region. The ASEAN states have taken a united stand in opposing Soviet-backed Vietnamese aggression in Kampuchea and are resisting expanding Soviet military presence in the region; Soviet port calls are denied by all member countries, for example. The ASEAN nations look to us for support, and our small regional economic assistance programs are important signals of our help.

ASEAN is formally an economic organization, and economic cooperation among its members is the foundation of their political cooperation. It is now our fifth largest trading partner, a moderate influence on North-South issues, and home to \$5 billion of U.S. investment. Continued cooperation, especially in the training area, benefits expanded trade and investment opportunities for the U.S. private sector, as well as reinforces ASEAN's moderate North-South stand.

The proposed \$4.05 million program funds scholarships and training in Southeast Asia studies and regional programs in agricultural planning, plant quarantine, watershed conservation, and tropical medicine.

Japan and the European Communities have recently announced increased economic support for ASEAN programs. However, our decrease from \$4.5 million in FY 1982 to our proposed \$4.05 million for FY 1983 does not indicate a reduced priority for the ASEAN program. Our original FY 1982 proposal was for \$4 million, but an additional \$500,000 became available at the last minute, after the FY 1983 proposed levels had become final.

Pacific Islands

We learned during World War II the value of the Pacific Islands to the security of the United States and our sealines of communication. We should not have to relearn this lesson. The Soviet Union continues its efforts to make inroads in the area which have been repeatedly rebuffed. This is a situation in which relatively little money goes a long way in safeguarding U.S. interests. On the other hand, any real decrease in the proposed \$5.1 million

program would be very noticeable by the countries involved.

Our proposed levels would serve as an effective counter to Soviet offers of assistance, particularly in hydrographic research, and would be much appreciated by Pacific countries whose support for our policies should be rewarded by some assistance to them.

Fiji. The \$55,000 IMET program requested for Fiji is East Asia's only new program for the fiscal year. The Government of Fiji is pro-Western and broadly supportive of U.S. policy goals in international fora. Fiji was the first government publicly to support U.S. peace initiatives in the Sinai, and Fiji's participation was instrumental in demonstrating broad international support for a multinational peacekeeping force effort. Fiji has also participated in the U.N. peacekeeping forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL) since 1978. The requested IMET program would provide a mix of professional and technical training to assist the Royal Fijian Military Forces to acquire the skills needed to operate their own defense establishment and to maintain their role in UNIFIL and the peacekeeping force in the Sinai.

Papua New Guinea. The United States has enjoyed friendly relations with Papua New Guinea before and since its independence from Australia in 1975. Papua New Guinea's strategic location, size, and resource base give it the potential to become a major actor in the South Pacific.

The proposed FY 1983 IMET program of \$20,000 will assist Papua New

Guinea in its continuing effort to upgrade its defense forces by providing technical training to two or three officers. Areas of continuing interest are expected to be U.S. naval entry-on-duty training, coastal surveillance courses, and the repair and maintenance of various kinds of equipment. Perhaps annual IMET programs will lead to Papua New Guinea sending officers to attend the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

Conclusion

In short, we have tried to balance the need for budgetary restraint with the strategic realities of increasing Soviet, Vietnamese, and North Korean pressures against our increasingly resource-constrained East Asian friends and allies. Accordingly, we have devised a military assistance package that we believe will help meet our foreign policy objectives in the Pacific. As you can see relatively small increases for FY 1983, particularly considering the cuts made in requested FY 1982 levels, are going to have to do heavy duty in shoring up our strategic position in both Northeast and Southeast Asia. We believe, however, that these levels together with the development assistance requested will maintain our defense and security interests in the Pacific.

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

FY 1983 Assistance Requests

by Charles H. Thomas

*Statement before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on April 1, 1982. Mr. Thomas is Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs.*¹

I appreciate this opportunity to appear before the subcommittee in support of the European portions of the Administration's proposals for security assistance in FY 1983.

As Secretary Haig emphasized to the full committee on March 2, 1982, today's foreign assistance programs have been redirected to specific and vitally important strategic objectives including

military threats from the Soviets. He further singled out our aid to Turkey, which strengthened a strategically vital ally who contributes decisively to Western security along NATO's southern region, and the aid to Spain involving vital base facilities. I would like to describe each of our major programs in Europe.

Spain

The reentry of Spain into the Western community of democratic states was crowned during the past year by the Spanish decision to seek entry into NATO. Spain's people, its young and healthy democratic institutions, and its strategic location will add important

strength to NATO capabilities and contribute to the security of the West. We are pleased that Spain has taken this step.

Under the terms of the 1976 treaty of friendship and cooperation, we enjoy access to several important military bases in Spain. We are currently negotiating a successor to that treaty. As always the process is complex, and progress is slower than we would like, but we hope to reach agreement before summer. Although our FY 1983 assistance proposal is not tied to the agreement, it reflects our expectation that our security cooperation with Spain will continue to be of major importance.

Our proposed assistance program for Spain of \$400 million in foreign military sales (FMS) credits will help Spain undertake major modernization projects for its armed forces, including acquisition of an air defense missile system and advanced fighter aircraft. Three million dollars in international military and education training (IMET) will help Spain to develop the expertise and systems necessary for effective management of its defense establishment, while \$12 million in economic support funds (ESF) will support a wide range of education, cultural, and scientific exchanges.

The proposed program carries with it a wide range of strategic and political benefits. It will assist Spain in its impressive effort to upgrade Spanish defenses to levels more compatible with other NATO forces. It will lend visible support to a young democracy opting to resume its Western vocation. Finally, it will strengthen the important bilateral ties between the United States and Spain.

Portugal

Portugal has come a long way in establishing a working democracy since the 1974 revolution. It has successfully made the difficult and delicate transition from an authoritarian state to one in which fundamental political liberties are respected. Prime Minister Pinto Balsemao leads the ruling coalition government with a substantial parliamentary majority.

Portugal is an important NATO ally. It shares our commitment to strengthening Western security, particularly through NATO, and has made available the strategically located airfield at Lajes in the Azores for this purpose. Both the governing coalition and the socialist-led democratic opposition agree that Portugal should participate as much as possible in NATO activities. However,

Portuguese economic resources are inadequate to support the modernization necessary to render such participation meaningful.

Portugal, therefore, looks to the United States and other NATO allies for security assistance. Providing such aid facilitates cooperation with a valued and reliable ally and reassures the Government of Portugal of our commitment to a substantive role for Portugal in NATO.

For FY 1983, we are proposing \$20 million in grant ESF assistance. The Government of Portugal will use these funds to support development programs in the mainland and in the Azores, a relatively underdeveloped part of the country. We are also proposing \$90 million in FMS credits and \$2.6 million in IMET. As we begin talks on renewal of our Lajes base agreement, this program will help meet basic needs in all three service branches and continue to aid the economically depressed region of the Azores.

Cyprus

Based on the discussion of the November 18, 1981, U.N. evaluation of the Cyprus intercommunal negotiations, the Cypriot communities are continuing their negotiating efforts. Along with defining points of coincidence between the positions of the communities, the evaluation offers ideas and concepts for bridging some of the major differences. Although there are many outstanding points of difference, we believe the U.N. evaluation, within the context of the intercommunal talks, offers an historic opportunity for progress.

As a reflection of the entrepreneurial efforts and economic energy of the Cypriot people, the island has made very significant economic strides. Recognizing this economic health, we are not recommending economic assistance for FY 1983, as Cyprus is now fully capable of sustaining economic growth through standard international financial mechanisms. An already funded scholarship program, however, will continue to bring Cypriot students to the United States for several years.

The United States fully supports the U.N. effort to secure a just, fair, and lasting settlement of the Cyprus problem. We have repeatedly emphasized our concern over this issue and reemphasize our strong commitment to assist in promoting a mutually acceptable solution to the Cyprus dilemma.

Greece

Our proposed program for Greece in FY 1983 reflects an appreciation of the key role Greece plays in NATO for the protection of the crucial southern region, especially when there are critical developments in areas bordering on the eastern Mediterranean.

Greece has been an active member of the Alliance fully participating in NATO activities since its relinking to the military structure in October 1980. As an integral part of U.S. policy toward Greece, our program provides a continuing indication of American support for a democratic Greece and is designed to enable Greece to supplement inadequate economic resources for the modernization of Greek armed forces and the fulfillment of NATO responsibilities.

Furnishing security assistance to Greece is consistent with U.S. policy to encourage the peaceful resolution of its differences with Turkey and to support the search for a solution to the Cyprus problem.

Accordingly, the Administration has requested \$280 million in FMS credits to assist Greece in purchasing spare parts and upgrading its defense capabilities, and \$1.7 million in IMET grants to improve professional and technical expertise.

Turkey

Spiraling terrorism and paralysis of civilian authority led Turkey's military leaders to take over the government on September 12, 1980. In the ensuing 18 months, the generals have restored law and order, curbed political violence, bolstered public confidence, continued the economic recovery program, and begun a process for return to stable democratic government. They retain the overwhelming support of the Turkish people. A consultative assembly was convened last October to draft a new constitution and to serve as a de facto parliament. Head of State Gen. [Kenan] Evren has announced a timetable for return to full democracy—completion of the constitution this summer, referendum on that constitution in November, and general elections in the fall of 1983—alternatively, in the spring of 1984. We are confident that the Turkish Government will meet that timetable.

Strongly committed to NATO and to western values, Turkey remains a staunch ally of the United States. The 1980 defense and economic cooperation agreement, by which the United States pledged best efforts to help Turkey with

security and economic resources, is functioning smoothly. All allies share our desire to help Turkey upgrade its armed forces to carry out essential NATO tasks more effectively. Turkey has made great progress under the economic reform program adopted in January 1980. For the past 3 years, the United States has worked with other OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] nations and international financial institutions to support that program. We believe that Turkey continues to need fast-disbursing, concessional assistance to achieve self-sustaining economic growth.

Our security assistance proposals for FY 1983 address these requirements. To make Turkey a more effective member of the vital southern flank of NATO, we propose a total military assistance program of \$468.5 million—\$465 million in (FMS) credits and \$3.5 million in IMET. Of the \$465 million FMS credits, \$300 million would be direct credit, reflecting Turkey's still severe economic constraints and debt burden. These FMS funds will enable Turkey to begin to

modernize some of its weapons systems and to acquire spares and support equipment for systems already in its inventory. Our request is extremely modest when compared to Turkey's overall needs for military support. We also propose \$350 million in ESF assistance to help Turkey consolidate the momentum toward economic recovery. Of the total ESF assistance, \$250 million would be grant and \$100 million soft-term loans.

In formulating our security assistance proposals for Greece and Turkey, we have been guided by the "Statement of Principles" contained in section 620C(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. The formal certification to this effect, required by section 620C(d) of that Act, will be contained in the formal letter transmitting the Administration's foreign assistance legislative proposals for FY 1983.

¹ The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

FY 1983 Assistance Requests

by Nicholas A. Veliotis

Statement before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the House Appropriations Committee on March 31, 1982. Ambassador Veliotis is Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.¹

I welcome this opportunity to discuss with you our policy toward the Near East-South Asian region in the context of the Administration's FY 1983 budget requests. I shall concentrate my brief opening remarks on a political overview into which our requests fit. This can serve as a framework for our subsequent discussion.

Under Secretary [for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology James L.] Buckley in his appearance before you March 11 sketched the overall foreign policy framework into which our Near East-South Asian policy fits. He spoke of the need for a safer future in which all nations can live in peace free from pressures such as that exerted by Soviet presence in Afghanistan. He has also spoken of our desire to promote peaceful solutions to regional

rivalries and hostilities. There is no question that persistent pursuit of a comprehensive and balanced U.S. policy in the Near East-South Asian region is critical to these goals. It is critical to:

- Preserving a global strategic balance which will permit free and independent societies to pursue their aspirations;
- Checking the spread of Soviet influence in this strategic region;
- Fulfilling our responsibility to assist in the resolution of conflicts which threaten international security and the well-being of the nations and peoples in the region;
- Assuring the security and welfare of Israel and other friendly nations in the region;
- Preserving free world access to the region's oil; and
- Supporting other major economic interests, such as assisting the orderly economic development of some of the needy countries in the region, cooperating with wealthier states to maintain a sound international financial order, and generally maintaining access to markets for American goods and services.

Themes in U.S. Approach

There are two central themes to our approach which can be summarized in the words "peace" and "security" for the region. Both promote our own policy and the welfare of the region's people. In this context, we are continuing to pursue vigorously a just and comprehensive Middle East peace within the framework of the Camp David agreements, which in turn derive from U.N. Security Council Resolution 242. Arrangements are nearly complete for emplacement of the multinational force and observers (MFO) and its assumption of responsibility to monitor the security provisions of the Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel. We are confident that both Egypt and Israel are committed to the continued strengthening of their relationship.

We are also continuing with negotiations on the establishment of an autonomy regime for the West Bank and Gaza. These negotiations look to achievement of an agreement which will serve as the basis for the Palestinian participation necessary for successful conclusion of arrangements to permit establishment of a transitional regime in the West Bank and Gaza.

We are continuing our support for the Government and people of Lebanon in working their way—with help from other Arab states—toward national reconciliation and greater security. We are committed to the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Lebanon and strongly support the constitutional process which calls for the election of a new president later this year. As you know, Ambassador Habib [Philip C. Habib, the President's special emissary to the Middle East] has just returned from another trip to the region, and his discussions encourage us to believe that the cease-fire agreement he worked out last July can and will continue to hold, thus winning time for the internal conciliation process in Lebanon, which offers the best prospect for a phased, orderly withdrawal of Syrian forces.

Moving to another serious conflict in the area, we support the resolution of the war between Iraq and Iran, which has already caused so many human casualties and extensive physical destruction. The continuation of this war, we believe, serves the interests of neither Iraq nor Iran. It endangers the peace and security of all nations in the gulf region. Consistent with our policy of neutrality toward this conflict, we have refused to sell or authorize the

transfer of U.S. controlled defense articles and services to either Iran or Iraq, and we have urged that others avoid actions which will have the effect of prolonging or expanding the conflict. We have welcomed responsible international efforts to bring the fighting to an end and the parties to negotiations. We consider a peaceful settlement—reaffirming independence and territorial integrity of both Iran and Iraq—to be essential to the security and well-being of the region.

We also support the return of peace to the suffering peoples of Afghanistan. It is this must be peace in the context of the withdrawal of Soviet military forces, the restoration of Afghanistan's independence and nonaligned status, the right of the Afghan people to form a government of their own choosing, and the creation of conditions which will permit the 3 million refugees to return to their homes.

This brings me to my second theme—security. Under Secretary Buckley in his own presentation spoke of the importance of Southwest Asian security and the relationship of this concern to Middle East peace. We share with friendly states their concern about threats to security throughout this region posed by factors such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the uncertainty surrounding Iran, the Soviet position in the Horn of Africa and in South Yemen, Libyan support for terrorism and pressures against neighboring states, and efforts to magnify such threats through the Libyan alliance with Ethiopia and South Yemen.

Indeed, both in our efforts to move forward with the Middle East peace process and in our efforts to encourage the return of peace with security and national sovereignty elsewhere in the region, we recognize that the necessary spirit of accommodation can grow more easily if the states concerned feel secure and confident of U.S. support.

We have taken important steps to build the confidence of key states in our commitment to their security. At a time of budgetary stringencies, we have, with considerable sacrifice, increased the national resources for our own military to develop their capability to deter threats to the region.

We have at the same time significantly increased our security and economic assistance to friendly and strategically located states in the region so that they can better provide for their own defense, resist external pressures, improve their own economies, and thus

enhance the prospects for orderly progress. I shall briefly list for you the highlights of our assistance programs for the countries in the Near East-South Asian region.

The Foreign Assistance Programs

The FY 1983 foreign assistance request will fund six major programs. These include:

- Development assistance totaling \$287.2 million for the region to seven countries, of which over \$200 million goes to the three poorer countries of South Asia—India, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka;
- PL 480 totaling \$619.5 million—\$420 million Title I and \$99.5 million Title II—provided to 13 of the 15 foreign assistance recipient countries;
- Economic support fund (ESF) of \$1,768 million, of which a substantial proportion goes to Israel and Egypt, our partners in peace;
- Foreign military sales (FMS) financing totaling \$3,660 million—\$1,030 million of it in direct concessional loans, \$500 million and \$400 million as forgiven loans for Israel and Egypt respectively;
- International military education and training (IMET) totaling \$11.1 million; and
- Peacekeeping operations totaling \$34.5 million in support of the Middle East peace process.

These programs total \$6,380.33 million for FY 1983, which the Administration believes is the minimal required to the United States to protect its interests and achieve its policy goals in this vital region.

I would now like to offer a few comments on each of our FY 83 proposals.

Israel. We are committed to Israel's security and well-being. Security support for Israel is central to our Middle Eastern policy. The \$1.7 billion in FMS that we are proposing will help Israel maintain its technological edge in overall military capability in the region. We are also requesting \$785 million in ESF to reflect U.S. support tangibly and facilitate a modest rate of economic growth.

Egypt. Egypt is key to much of what we hope to accomplish in the Middle East, in terms of both regional peace and regional security. The \$1.4 billion FMS program contributes to Egypt's ability to defend itself and help its neighbors in the face of the various threats I have mentioned. It replaces a small portion of Egypt's aging,

deteriorating military materiel. The ESF request for Egypt totals \$785 million, which is designed to provide direct support for economic stability in the near term while building the base for improved economic productivity and equity upon which long-term stability must depend. The requested PL 480 program consists of \$250 million in PL 480 Title I and \$9.9 million Title II in support of private voluntary agencies.

Pakistan. Pakistan is a key frontline state which remains steadfast in resisting great pressures from the Soviets in Afghanistan. Our FY 1983 proposal of \$275 million in FMS loans is the first FMS increment of the \$3.2 billion 5-year assistance package. This will help fund F-16 aircraft, armored vehicles, artillery, and associated equipment ordered in FY 1982, as well as follow-on orders for additional quantities of similar equipment later. Our assistance to Pakistan is in no way intended against India, good and mutually beneficial relations with which remain our high priority goal. A total of \$200 million in development assistance and ESF will be concentrated in the agricultural sector with activities also in the fields of population, health, energy, and private sector development. We are requesting \$50 million for PL 480 Title I.

Morocco. The proposal of \$100 million in FMS credits to Morocco would permit support of major U.S. combat systems which Morocco has already acquired, together with an ongoing modernization program. Concessional terms for 50% of this FMS are recommended to alleviate a heavy debt burden related to economic difficulties largely beyond Morocco's ability to control—drought and world inflation. Development assistance of \$13.5 million will fund programs in agriculture, family planning, renewable energy resource development, and low-cost housing. The requested level of PL 480 is \$25 million for Title I and \$10.5 million for Title II.

Tunisia. Tunisia, under direct threat from Libya, requires a military modernization program with heavy initial costs. Our FMS credits of \$140 million, half of which we are requesting in concessional terms, are intended to cushion the shock of such large expenditures. The FY 1983 levels would help fund the acquisition of F-5 aircraft, M60 tanks, and Chaparral missiles which the Tunisians intend to order in FY 1982. We are requesting \$10 million for PL 480 Title I and \$1.8 million for Title II.

Jordan. We propose an increase in FMS for Jordan by \$25 million to a total

of \$75 million. We seek, through our continued support, to enhance Jordan's security and ability to remain a viable, independent, and constructive actor in the region. A stable Jordan supports our objective of building peace in the region and assisting countries in acquiring the capability of resisting outside aggression and regional subversion. We are also preparing \$20 million in ESF to assist the development of critical water and waste water programs, health programs, and agricultural and irrigation projects. There is also a \$256,000 PL 480 Title II program.

Yemen. North Yemen is presently being challenged militarily by an armed, Marxist-led insurgent group backed by Soviet-sponsored South Yemen. The North Yemeni military requires essential additional training and operational assistance to utilize effectively U.S. equipment funded by Saudi Arabia. Further, it requires increased and sustained economic and military assistance if we are going to provide credible support to the central government in the face of this persistent outside threat. We are asking for an additional \$5 million in FMS to a total of \$15 million and a modest increase in IMET over FY 1982. Development assistance of \$27.5 million is requested to meet basic human needs in one of the poorest nations of the region.

Oman. The \$40 million in FMS will, in part, be applied against continuing payment for U.S. equipment acquired over the past 2 years. In light of a tightening internal budget, the remaining amount will be used to offset the cost of the continuing and essential Omani force modernization effort. Oman continues to play an important role in regional security and in the defense of the southern gulf-Indian Ocean region. And we are requesting \$15 million in ESF which will support dam construction, fisheries, and other projects identified by the U.S.-Oman Joint Commission.

Lebanon. Small increases in our proposed FMS loan program for Lebanon of \$15 million, up \$5 million from the FY 1982 level, reflect our continued desire to see the Lebanese Government develop the capability to reduce and eventually eliminate civil conflict and work for restoration of essential public services and a return to normalcy of life in that very troubled country. An ESF program of \$8 million will include support for humanitarian purposes and will assist the programs of

the Council of Redevelopment and Construction.

For the poorer countries of South Asia we are proposing development assistance of \$87 million for India, \$76 million for Bangladesh, \$40.3 million for Sri Lanka, and \$13.5 million for Nepal. In general their programs seek to increase food production and rural employment as well as health and family planning programs. As for PL 480, we are requesting \$111 million in Title II for India, \$60 million in Title I and \$20.5 million in Title II for Bangladesh, and \$2.5 million Title I and \$5.8 million Title II for Sri Lanka.

In short, both through our FMS credits and through our economic assistance to the countries of this region, we seek to strengthen security and stability, promote the peaceful solution of old or new conflicts, and assist those countries to provide a better life for their peoples. To these goals we remain committed.

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

FY 1983 Assistance Requests for Israel

by Morris Draper

*Statement before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on March 23, 1982. Mr. Draper is Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.*¹

I am here today to testify in support of our military and economic assistance programs in Israel for FY 1983. The Administration is proposing a funding level of \$1.7 billion—up \$300 million from last year—in foreign military sales (FMS) financing and \$785 million in economic support funds (ESF). If approved by the Congress, the overall level of \$2.5 billion in combined military and economic assistance for Israel would be the largest U.S. bilateral assistance program.

Military Assistance and Economic Assistance

In a fundamental sense, our proposal for \$1.7 billion in military assistance reflects our intention that Israel be assisted so as to maintain its technological edge and its qualitative military advantage in the region. We expect that Israel would use some of the \$300 million in added funds primarily to purchase U.S.-produced aircraft, although in the end Israel may make other choices. The bulk of the military assistance funding would be used to purchase artillery, missiles, tanks, antipersonnel carriers, and aircraft engines from the United States. We are proposing that \$500 million of this total financing be in the form of forgiven credits and that the remainder—\$1.2 billion—be in the form of a 30-year loan.

We are proposing for FY 1983 a level of \$785 million in ESF, which is identical to the pattern of the past few years; actual amounts programed in the past 2 years have fluctuated, owing to "borrowings" by the United States and "pay backs." The program is essentially a cash transfer program, although we are proposing a return to the traditional mix of two-thirds grants and one-third concessional loans, rather than the full grant programs of the last 2 fiscal years.

Israel's political and economic stability is important to U.S. policy. Our economic assistance program in effect provides balance-of-payments support in order to meet short term balance-of-payments requirements and to import certain civilian goods and services without undue reliance on high-cost commercial borrowing and drawdowns of essential foreign exchange reserves.

Israel's Debt Burden

Israel's growing debt repayments to the United States have been a source of concern to many Israeli officials, who naturally would prefer that the grant component of our assistance program be much larger. We carefully reviewed the debt burden before submitting the security assistance proposals to Congress. Our review also had to take into account our own budget stringencies. In reaching our conclusions, we attempted to put all factors—including needs, priorities, and resources—into sensible balance. As our separate report to the Congress should make clear, we believe Israel will be able to handle the additional debt burdens implicit in the FY 1983 funding levels.

Conceptual Approach

Let me outline briefly some of the major elements of the conceptual framework within which our assistance proposals for Israel have been formulated.

First of all, our support for Israel's security and economic well-being is a basic and unshakable tenet of American foreign policy in the Middle East. It is so a critical element in our strategy toward the region as a whole. While Israel cannot hope to keep up with its potential adversaries in quantitative military terms, with U.S. assistance at the proposed levels, it can continue to maintain its qualitative and technological superiority over any potential combination of regional forces.

Our support for Israel grows out of our longstanding moral commitment to a free and democratic nation which has been a haven and which shares many of our own social and democratic traditions. Israel has been a steady friend of the United States.

The perennial Arab-Israeli conflict and the need to achieve a broad, just, and lasting peace in the region have been at the forefront of U.S. foreign policy concerns for many years. Israel has sought peace and in the process has agreed to the Camp David understandings and signed the historic Treaty of Peace with Egypt.

Our large military and economic assistance programs for Israel tangibly support the unfinished business of the peace process and give Israel the confidence to continue. Israel is making important sacrifices for peace—including the forthcoming full withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula in the last week of April—and our materiel as well as moral and political support over the years have provided some compensation.

Our assistance programs for Israel implement the two mutually reinforcing goals of American policy in the region: first, the search for a just and lasting peace; and, second, the assurance that our friends in the region will be able to maintain their security against threats from the outside and from radical forces within the region. These programs are also consistent with the premise that economic progress and advancement of the welfare of the peoples of the region will help promote stability.

In addition a strong Israel has been a good investment as we look to the strategic picture and to potential Soviet and Soviet-supported challenges to our interests in the region. We know that we can count on Israel for cooperation and understanding.

We are, however, in the midst of an extremely tense period, affecting not only Israel but the entire region. The political and security environment in the region has changed, and mostly for the worse. The Iran-Iraq war, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the tripartite pact among Libya, South Yemen, and Ethiopia, and continued Russian mischiefmaking—directly and through proxies—present threats and challenges. Lebanon remains a powder-keg. Israel's full cooperation has been indispensable in preserving and strengthening the cease-fire in the Israeli-Lebanese arena, which has held since last July and which has seen no loss of life yet through cease-fire violations.

The presentation and examination of our foreign assistance proposals are taking place at a particularly sensitive juncture

in Israel itself. Israel is experiencing a genuine domestic crisis in the process of completing preparations for its final withdrawal from the Sinai next month. The Israeli Government has been facing tremendous pressure from many of its own citizens, yet is faithfully carrying out its commitment to bring back into Israel the settlers and squatters from the settlements in the Sinai before Israel's final withdrawal.

These tensions show why it is so important that Israel continue to have confidence in our determination, in our policies, and in the quality and credibility of our friendship.

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

FY 1983 Requests for Migration and Refugee Assistance

by *Richard D. Vine*

Statement before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the Senate Appropriations Committee on May 20, 1982. Ambassador Vine is Director of the Bureau for Refugee Programs.¹

A principal State Department policy is to favor solutions to refugee problems that minimize the number of persons resettled in this country. While we cannot deny our special concern and responsibility for refugees from certain areas, we recognize that refugee problems are an international concern and should be resolved, where at all possible, by voluntary repatriation and resettlement in countries of first asylum. Given this international responsibility, we continue to hold the view that the responsibility for refugee assistance and resettlement is to be shared by the international community as a whole through the services of international organizations, especially the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The UNHCR received the 1981 Nobel Peace Prize in recognition of its efforts to deal with international refugee problems. As a major donor, it is our responsibility to press for continued programmatic and operational improvements in this organization so that it can meet the basic needs of refugees for protection, food, shelter, and medical care while other, more

lasting solutions to their plight are being worked out.

Resettlement in the United States

The budget request before you is a concrete expression of this philosophy. Whereas, in FY 1980 over 60% of our expenditures were for resettlement in the United States, only 38% of the FY 1983 budget request is directed toward U.S. resettlement. The number of refugees to be resettled in the United States has fallen over 210,000 in FY 1980, to an FY 1982 consultations level of 140,000, and to a projected total of only 103,500 in the coming fiscal year. At the same time, we are increasing the proportion of our funding for programs which assist refugees in nations of asylum and for programs of voluntary repatriation and of resettlement in third countries which have not traditionally been engaged in resettlement.

I would like to emphasize, however, that the downward trend in admissions is being managed in a way that is consistent with the humanitarian traditions of the United States and with U.S. responsibilities for refugees of particular concern to this country. At the same time, we are continuing to provide support for the protection, care, and maintenance of refugees abroad, in accordance with the

level of need and with U.S. foreign policy interests in the particular program area.

The State Department fully understands the significant impacts that refugee resettlement have on some communities in this country. It is our intention to continue to manage refugee resettlement to this country in such a fashion that the concerns of State and local governments are fully considered. We do not accept the faulty premise that the only viable solution to refugee situations is resettlement in a third country, chiefly the United States. We will continue to pursue other alternatives which promise to help resolve refugee situations in a humanitarian manner.

The FY 1983 request for the migration and refugee assistance appropriation totals \$419 million, \$84 million less than the FY 1982 appropriation. Recently, the President has requested that FY 1982 funding for this program be reduced by \$50 million. This proposal was made because of major cost savings in our refugee resettlements program—resettlements to the United States are running lower than the FY 1982 consultations level provides and the enacted appropriation finances. The Department is requesting a supplemental for protective security improvements for American diplomats at selected overseas posts. Because that supplemental and the deferral of refugee appropriation funds coincide, the President proposed to the Congress that transfer authority language be enacted to mitigate the financing of the protective security supplemental. If that language is not enacted, the Administration will request a rescission of these funds at a later date.

Projected FY 1983 Admissions

For U.S. resettlement activities in FY 1983, we are seeking \$158,188,000 to finance the resettlement of up to 103,500 refugees, including 72,000 from Southeast Asia. I must stress that this level of refugee admissions is only a projection. The President will determine the admission ceiling after consultations with the Congress prior to the beginning of FY 1983, as required by the Refugee Act. Furthermore, due to such uncertainties as the situation in Eastern Europe, refinements of these admission projections may be required. However, it is my expectation that, unless the refugee situation in the world changes fundamentally between now and when we have our consultations in September,

the total admissions ceiling will not exceed this figure, which is 36,500 persons lower than that for the current fiscal year.

Among the 31,500 refugees other than Indochinese, we have projected admissions of 23,000 Soviets and East Europeans, 4,000 from the Near East, 2,000 from the Western Hemisphere and 2,500 from Africa. We are, of course, concerned about the current situation in Poland, and the levels of admissions which we request in September will take into account all factors relevant to this problem.

Relief Assistance

With respect to funding of relief assistance for refugees, the Department of State is seeking \$29,400,000 to support refugee relief operations in Southeast Asia. These funds will support the care and maintenance operations of the UNHCR, as well as the international efforts to care for the 200,000 Khmer who have sought sanctuary along the Thai-Kampuchean border. This funding level is \$20,435,000 less than that appropriated for FY 1982, reflecting continued reductions in the number of Indochinese refugees in Southeast Asia, as well as a reduced food program inside Kampuchea. We expect a phaseout of extensive multilateral assistance to the interior of Kampuchea by FY 1983.

Resettlement Assistance

The next activity in our budget is resettlement assistance. This program request is a concrete expression of the interest of the Department in resolving refugee problems through means other than resettlement in the United States. We are seeking \$10 million for this program in FY 1983, an increase of \$9 million above the FY 1982 appropriation. The program will finance various voluntary repatriation, local resettlement, and third country resettlement projects. We expect that programs funded under this initiative will be organized under the auspices of international organizations or private voluntary agencies.

Among the innovative activities funded will be projects involving local permanent settlement in nations of asylum, as well as initiatives to resettle refugees in certain developing nations which are willing to accept refugees for permanent resettlement, but which would be unable to do so without international financial support. These programs are intended to help reduce the

number of refugees requiring resettlement in the United States.

Israel. The Department is seeking \$12.5 million, the same amount as appropriated in FY 1982, for a contribution to the United Israel Appeal. The contribution will help finance assistance to Soviet and Eastern European refugees who resettle in Israel. Regrettably, the Soviet Union continues to reduce the rate of emigration for its Jewish citizens, but this program continues at this level in recognition of the long-term costs incurred by Israel in caring for refugees who have arrived in recent years.

Africa. For assistance to refugees in Africa, we seek \$76.9 million, which is \$30,100,000 below the FY 1982 appropriation. This decrease is accounted for by the one-time appropriation of \$30 million to the migration and refugee assistance appropriation in FY 1982 for longer term projects to aid refugees and displaced persons in Africa. It was recognized that such longer term projects are properly the responsibility of the Agency for International Development (AID). In fact, the Congress specified that the FY 1982 appropriation be administered by AID.

Within the \$76.9 million that we are requesting for the Africa program, we will continue our current policy of financing one-third of the UNHCR's program in Africa and will make a \$7.9 million contribution to the African programs of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). We will also provide up to \$8 million for a variety of bilateral and voluntary agency initiative to address those aspects of refugee problems that are not adequately dealt with by the involved international organizations.

Middle East. Refugee assistance is provided by this government for both humanitarian and political purposes. These concerns are clearly combined in the Middle East where we are confronted with the human needs of the Palestinians and the Afghans as well as the worldwide political and economic implications of those problems. In order to deal with the needs of the Palestinians, the Department is seeking \$72 million as a contribution to the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). This organization, which provides basic services to the nearly 2 million Palestinian refugees, contributes toward a political atmosphere within the Mideast which is conducive to the long-term peace process. The proposed UNRWA contribution, an

FY 1983 Security Assistance Requests

by James L. Buckley

*Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on April 14, 1982. Mr. Buckley is Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology.*¹

I am pleased to be here today to have the opportunity to present an FY 1983 foreign assistance program. The Administration is mindful that the Congress passed a 2-year authorization bill last year. But as the committee report recognized, the authorizations for 1983 were made without the benefit of the Administration's views, and it anticipated that the Administration would be submitting requests for additional funds in due course.

We wish we could stay within the amounts already authorized, but we have no responsible choice but to present the additional levels of security assistance the Administration is asking for FY 1983. They reflect the hard necessity of responding effectively to events occurring outside our borders which have the most direct impact on our ultimate safety and well-being.

Close to home and in distant lands, our nation's most important military, political, and economic interests are being challenged. Security assistance is the most cost-efficient investment we can make both to meet today's challenges and to enhance the prospects for a safer future in which all nations observe the maxim of "live and let live." At present, however, strategically located friends and allies are under growing pressure from the Soviets and their stand-ins. Afghanistan has been taken. The bid for greater freedom has been crushed in Poland. With Soviet arms and support, Vietnamese troops continue to occupy Kampuchea. In Africa and in the Caribbean Basin, Cuban troops or Cuban-supported forces pose a direct threat to our most vital interest.

Weakness attracts the predator. Hence, it is understandable that the arena of global challenge has increasingly shifted from the industrialized states

over FY 1982. We propose to provide a total of \$4.7 million to the Intergovernmental Committee for Migration in support of that organization's assessed and operational budgets. We will also provide \$3.75 million to the ICRC in support of the ordinary budget of the organization and the Political Detainee Protection and Assistance Program. In the case of the ordinary budget we will provide \$2 million, an increase of \$500,000 above the amount provided in the current year. We are seeking \$1,750,000 as a contribution to the program.

Previously, U.S. contributions to this activity were obtained through reprogramming of other funds in this appropriation. However, because of the importance of this program as an expression of concern by this Administration for political prisoners, we are including this item in our FY 1983 appropriation request. We are also seeking \$1 million, the same amount appropriated in FY 1982, to support programs of the UNHCR in areas of the world other than those dealt with in the geographic segments of this budget.

Administrative Expenses

The administrative expenses of this program are expected to increase to \$7,562,000 in 1983. This is a net increase of only \$136,000. This request will finance the salary and operating costs associated with our staff of 98 permanent employees.

This budget request does not include a request for new funding for the U.S. Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund. Unobligated carryover balances available in that fund should be sufficient to finance appropriate responses to refugee and migration emergencies during FY 1983.

As you are well aware, refugee situations frequently change between the time that this budget is developed and the new fiscal year. Should any such changes occur affecting our 1983 appropriation, we will attempt to reprogram funds to meet the higher priority needs. I wish to thank this subcommittee for its support during the past 2 years for our reprogramming efforts in order to reallocate our funds to meet new and changing requirements.

¹ The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.■

crease of \$5 million over the FY 1982 appropriation, will help UNRWA deal with the effects of inflation and a constantly increasing population.

The Afghan refugees in Pakistan comprise the largest refugee population in the world. The Government of Pakistan is currently providing asylum to well over 2 million refugees who have fled Afghanistan into Pakistan during the past 3 years. Thousands of refugees continue to flee from Afghanistan because of the ongoing fighting between Soviet forces and the Afghan resistance. Pakistan, I must add, serves as an outstanding example of a nation meeting its international responsibility to provide asylum to refugees. Pakistan has willingly granted asylum with the expectation that the international community will finance the care and maintenance of the refugees, a program expected to require approximately \$110 million in FY 1983.

The Department requests \$38 million to meet our share of this relief effort. Up to \$33 million will be provided to the UNHCR to meet 30% of the cost of its care and maintenance program. The remaining \$5 million will finance a variety of initiatives to meet essential health, relief, and transportation needs not addressed through the UNHCR's program. Medical care for persons injured in the fighting in Afghanistan provided by the ICRC is one example. The \$5 million will be used to finance grants to the ICRC, private voluntary agencies, and possibly the Pakistani Government.

Latin America. Latin America, until recently, was one of the few areas of the world not confronted with a major refugee problem. However, continuing civil disturbances in Central America are forcing increasing numbers of persons to flee across international frontiers to escape fighting and persecution. The Department is requesting \$5 million to help meet the costs of the international efforts to provide assistance to refugees in Central America. These funds are \$1 million less than the amount appropriated in FY 1982 due to nonrecurring costs in the 1982 program. However, even the volatility of the political situation in Central America, these needs are particularly difficult to project. It is clear that we must keep this problem under close review as events unfold.

International Organizations

The State Department requests \$3,450,000 in FY 1983 for contributions to various activities of international organizations, an increase of \$1 million

of Europe and Asia to the less-developed nations of Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and, closer to home, the Caribbean. A failure to achieve viable economies, credible defenses, and stable political institutions makes these less-developed nations inviting targets for subversion.

A New Approach

To meet these urgent challenges abroad and to minimize the cost to taxpayers at home, this Administration has adopted a fundamentally new approach in arriving at our security assistance program for FY 1983. We have explicitly defined our nation's vital foreign policy objectives and painstakingly allocated all foreign assistance resources against our priority goals. As many of you can appreciate, this has necessarily prolonged the process and delayed the submission of some congressional presentation materials. However, we believe the resulting program contains the minimum required resources to:

- Promote peaceful solutions to regional rivalries;
- Assure U.S. access to critical military facilities and basic raw materials;
- Confront growing military threats from, and subversive efforts by, the Soviets; and
- Reduce the economic and social degradation that breeds domestic violence and invites external intervention.

The entire program has been carefully scrutinized by the President to insure that our resources are, in fact, directed toward our most important goals. The final scrutiny, of course, will be yours. But given the care with which this request has been constructed and the pressing needs it has been designed to meet, I urge your committee and the Congress to approve it in full.

I would invite your attention to the Department's booklet, "International Security and Economic Cooperation Program, Fiscal Year 1983," which has been made available to the Congress. Since the details of our FY 1983 program are set forth in this document, I will forego a listing of all the specific levels and, instead, summarize the major regional elements.

Overall, our FY 1983 request is for \$8.7 billion in total program authority; the necessary budget authorization would come to \$4.8 billion. This represents a program increase of \$1.65 billion and a budget increase of \$1 billion over the amounts you have already authorized for FY 1983. Given our

worldwide responsibilities, and the problems with which we have to deal, the increase we seek is modest.

Foreign Policy Objectives

I would now like to review briefly the major foreign policy objectives toward which our proposed program has been tailored and explain why the requested security assistance is necessary to attain our goals. I will also summarize the few changes to the legislation which we will seek.

Middle East. Over 53% of the entire FY 1983 security assistance program will be directed in support of our Middle East objectives, namely, the search for a just and lasting peace and the urgent requirement that friends in the region be secure against external threats. These objectives are mutually reinforcing. No peace is possible unless the nations of the region are secure from outside coercion, and security will not be achieved if we fail to address the underlying sources of conflict and instability.

Our security assistance serves both of these objectives. It seeks to advance economic well-being and political stability in the region. The security and economic health of Israel and Egypt are requisite for further broadening the peace of the Middle East. U.S. assistance programs tangibly reflect our support and help give these nations the confidence to continue on the path toward peace begun at Camp David. Our assistance to Israel and Egypt, along with our aid to Jordan, Lebanon, and the regional programs, provides a security and economic base essential to ultimate stability and peace within the region.

Europe. The President is allocating 19% of the program—\$1.6 billion to support our interests in Europe. The strategic importance to NATO of Europe's southern flank has been dramatically underlined by events this past year. With neighboring regions facing a growing challenge, our efforts to assist Greece, Turkey, Spain, and Portugal have assumed increasing importance. Helping these nations, through our security assistance programs, is an important contribution to our common defense, not only against threats to Europe but against challenges to our common interests beyond the geographic bounds of the Alliance.

Turkey, for example, lies at the intersection of our NATO, Middle East, and Persian Gulf security concerns. A

militarily and economically stronger Turkey cannot only contribute significantly more to a strengthened NATO deterrent but can move more rapidly to the full return of civilian government. Spain and Portugal, the other major security assistance recipients, are important not only to our NATO posture, but to our capabilities to project military forces from the United States to Africa and the Middle East.

Southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf. Ten percent of the FY 1983 security assistance program is directed to insuring our continued access to Southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf and to their critically important resources. Almost all nations in the area stretching from Pakistan in the east to Morocco in the west face serious economic problems and potential subversion or regional threats, in many cases supported by the Soviets or their proxies. Our proposal for military modernization and economic assistance will help Pakistan to deter attacks from Afghanistan and facilitate the economic development essential to internal stability. Sudan, Morocco, and Tunisia all face, to one degree or another, threats of subversion or aggression emanating from Libya. All are important not only to our strategy for the security of the Persian Gulf but, potentially to the prospects for peace in the Middle East as well.

Latin America and the Caribbean Basin. Our plan for restoring stability and improving economic prospects in the Caribbean Basin will require \$433 million in security assistance for 1983. Here, we face a major challenge from Cuba's efforts to exploit economic, social, and military vulnerabilities. Our assistance programs are designed to address the underlying causes of socio-political instability and restore stability within the region as a whole. We must help provide the concessional resources essential to the task until increased investment, a strengthened private sector and expanded export markets enable these countries to achieve economic self-sufficiency.

Of this amount, El Salvador will need \$166 million in economic support fund (ESF) and military assistance to thwart the outright drive by insurgents to destroy the economy. Jamaica will continue to need substantial assistance in order to restore the vitality of its shattered private sector. Costa Rica's rapidly deteriorating economy will require substantial assistance while fundamental reforms are effected. Hon-

ras faces an economic decline and a political-military crisis on its borders. Deteriorating conditions in other countries in the region may well require emergency assistance during the year, hence the critical importance of at least a modest contingency fund we are proposing. The amounts allocated for military assistance represent just 16% of our total program for the Caribbean Basin.

East Asia and the Pacific. Requests in support of our important specific interests represent a modest allocation, only 6%, but nevertheless, a vital part of our FY 1983 security assistance program. This region is of major political, strategic, and economic importance to the United States. We have significant treaty relationships with Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and our ANZUS partners. We also have growing economic and commercial links in the area, with petroleum both originating and passing through the region. U.S. trade with the area now surpasses that with Western Europe.

The Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia are located astride strategic sea lanes that are vital to U.S. and Western interests. Indonesia is an important source of petroleum. The Philippines provide the United States with essential military facilities. Our security and economic assistance contributes to the stability of these nations, their economic progress and political development, and to our own defense and economic well-being.

In Northeast Asia, a strong and economically vital South Korea is essential to deter its northern neighbor from military adventures. A Soviet-supported 300,000-man Vietnamese army remains in Kampuchea and threatens Thailand's security.

The importance of our interests in the Western Pacific is beyond dispute, and the only reason our proposal is not larger, is that our partners in the Far East are somewhat better off economically, and in security terms, than are many of our friends and allies elsewhere.

Africa. To help assure stability and access in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf area, we must provide economic and military assistance to Kenya, Somalia, Djibouti, Mauritius, and the Seychelles. Most of these nations are experiencing severe economic difficulties, and several face serious threats from Ethiopia or South Yemen.

Both Kenya and Somalia require help in achieving economic self-reliance and improved defense capabilities. In

turn, both nations provide U.S. forces with access to facilities, thus contributing significantly to our ability to sustain a credible deterrent posture in the region.

Our proposed \$177 million security assistance program for Southern Africa is designed to advance the peaceful establishment of an independent Namibia, to help insure continued Western access to key strategic minerals, and to support the development process from Zaire to the Cape. We must fulfill our undertaking to assist the economic development of the frontline states of Southern Africa, whose participation is essential to the stability of a region rich in minerals essential to our economic well-being. The alternative, a new escalation of conflict, would only provide irresistible opportunities for the Cubans and Soviets.

In West Africa, modest levels of security assistance are essential to maintain economic and political resilience and to discourage further Libyan attempts to exploit the financial difficulties faced by several nations. In addition, our aid to Liberia is designed to insure continued U.S. access to key transportation and communications facilities.

In sum, the President is requesting and is committed to defending a total \$8.7 billion security assistance program for FY 1983. I reiterate that only \$4.8 billion requires budget authority; \$3.9 billion is in the form of off-budget foreign military sales (FMS) guarantees. The foreign policy objectives I have just outlined are those we strive to attain with these resources. The President's program has, as never before, been carefully structured to address only our most critical needs. For example, 87% of the entire FY 1983 FMS guarantee program is allocated to only seven countries: Egypt, Greece, Israel, Pakistan, Spain, and Turkey. Seventy-seven percent of the FY 1983 ESF program is for six vital countries: Egypt, El Salvador, Israel, Pakistan, Sudan, and Turkey. Almost 80% of the FMS direct credit program will go to Israel, Egypt, Portugal, Sudan, and Turkey.

Concessional Assistance

We again seek authority to provide concessional assistance to key countries in order to make it possible to purchase defense equipment and services that we believe it is in our interests for them to have. We are asking this because we believe that concessional rates provide us with maximum flexibility in meeting the specific needs of security assistance

recipients. Over the long term, they also lower the net cost to the U.S. taxpayer.

The two adverse trends of increasing debt burdens among recipient countries and high Federal Financing Bank interest rates have created a situation in which many countries, with particularly weak economies, are facing serious difficulties in financing their purchases through FMS guaranteed loans. Under our proposal, we will plan to offer \$950 million in the form of forgiven credits to three countries only—\$500 million for Israel, \$400 million for Egypt, and \$50 million for Sudan. In addition, we propose to furnish \$789 million of concessional credits to 19 countries—including an added \$50 million for Sudan—at an interest rate as low as 3%. The countries selected are those facing particularly difficult economic situations and those in which we have important security and foreign policy interests. For example, we are planning to provide \$300 million at concessional rates to Turkey for its modernization program. Seventy percent of the remaining \$489 million would go to six countries: Thailand, Tunisia, Sudan, Morocco, Portugal, and El Salvador.

The programs we are submitting have been carefully weighed, debated, and made to answer the question, "Is the need critical?" We have had to make trade-offs between what we—and you—would like to do and the minimum that must be done to protect our national interests. We conclude that there is simply no alternative but to seek the additional resources if we are to support our varied and important goals. Without the increases over the levels appropriated for the current year:

- We would be unable to provide sufficient FMS guaranteed financing to launch the Pakistan program we discussed in such detail last year, increase the Egypt and Israel programs, or support our negotiations for the Spanish bases;

- We would be unable to provide the concessional credit terms required to enable Egypt, Sudan, Turkey, Thailand, Morocco, Tunisia, El Salvador, and Portugal to upgrade their defenses; and

- The ESF level would fall far short of the needs of Turkey and countries in the Caribbean Basin.

Modification of Current Legislation

Let me now summarize the modifications we will seek to current legislation. Seven of them involve minor changes that will enhance the effectiveness of

our security assistance program. In addition, we seek new authority to establish an antiterrorism law enforcement assistance program.

The proposed revisions to the law are:

- An emergency peacekeeping drawdown authority for the President of \$10 million in commodities and services, if he determines that unforeseen circumstances have developed necessitating immediate assistance;
- Elimination of certain prohibitions on foreign assistance to the People's Republic of China, ending the discriminatory treatment of that country based on its past association with the Soviet bloc;
- A clarification to permit full-cost recovery of all additional expenses incurred in carrying out administrative functions under the Arms Export Control Act;
- Exemption from the present 15-day notification to the Congress on reprogramming funds up to \$50,000 for international military and education training and international narcotics control programs;
- Provision for a "one-to-one" exchange of U.S. and foreign military students at professional military schools in accordance with bilateral agreements to be negotiated with foreign countries and international organizations after enactment;
- Allowance of funds collected for administrative surcharges to be used for representation purposes; and finally,
- An allowance for the executive to

sell government-furnished equipment, including components and spares, to U.S. firms acting as prime contractors for foreign governments or international organizations for incorporation into end items.

Conclusion

I assure you that, in this most difficult year, the President would not be asking for additional security assistance if he were not absolutely convinced that these resources were essential to enhance the prospects for peace and protect essential American interests around the globe. Without them, the President would be forced to decide which objectives of our foreign policy to pursue and which to abandon or neglect. For example, he would be forced to face such damaging choices as scaling back our Spanish bases in order to finance our Caribbean initiative, or of shifting resources away from Turkey to address our needs in Sudan, Kenya, and Somalia, or abandoning our undertakings and initiatives in such important areas as Southern Africa and Southeast Asia in order to meet our commitments in the Middle East.

Unless we are willing to make these investments for peace and security today, we risk far greater costs to both our safety and national treasure tomorrow.

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

more efficient and better managed programs can produce under enhanced fiscal and budgetary discipline.

We hope the Congress will authorize and appropriate the entire amount requested as a concrete signal of sustained U.S. commitment to the United Nations and the Organization of American States and as a practical measure for facilitating the conduct of U.S. foreign policy through these multilateral agencies.

U.S. Position

Before discussing the different items included in this request, I want to explain the Administration's position regarding the United Nations and its affiliated agencies.

It has been the proud tradition of this country that in asserting our power in the modern world we have always sought the cooperation of other nations to oppose aggression, to uphold the rule of law, and to help the poor and the weak. We have persisted in the belief, and we continue to pursue the ideal that the maintenance of stable institutions of global cooperation are essential for the effective pursuit of American foreign policy goals.

As it has developed over the four decades of its existence, the U.N. system has been a source of both satisfaction and disappointment. The United Nations has grown into a versatile global conglomerate whose concerns range from keeping the peace to exchanging scientific knowledge, from the production of food to the protection of fundamental freedoms. Today, it has three times as many members as it had on its day of birth. Its expenditures have multiplied manifold, and its programs touch all countries on the Earth.

In the intervening 37 years, however, we have also learned that bigger is not necessarily better—that while the United Nations has grown it has not yet matured, and while it has become the sounding board for new and unfamiliar voices, it does not always echo the truth.

The role of the United States as one of the U.N.'s principal supporters for these years earns us the right to criticize it when warranted and defend it when deserved. We have gained the wisdom and experience to discern and distinguish between what is wrong with the United Nations and what is right, and the responsibility to right the wrongs.

Frankly, we are not happy with a number of developments at the United Nations including:

- The perennial crop of one-sided, polemical Mideast resolutions;

FY 1983 Assistance Requests

by *Nicholas Platt*

Statement before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the House Appropriations Committee on May 5, 1982. Mr. Platt is Acting Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs.¹

I appreciate this opportunity to appear before you to present the President's FY 1983 request for contributions to certain voluntarily funded programs of the United Nations and the Organization of American States (OAS).

This request is made at a time of stringently budgetary requirements and reflects the overriding need to curtail

Federal spending. We have been assessing all U.N. programs in which we participate, and this request is the result of our rigorous analysis.

We have arrived at this request under the weight of other national priorities but not unmindful of the actual and symbolic consequences that reduced U.S. contributions might have for the U.N. family of agencies and programs. Certainly, needs worldwide have not diminished; the programs we support remain important to U.S. foreign policy goals, and the benefits accruing to our country and our economy are no less welcome. We are, however, conscious of the equity and fairness of our request and of the compensating qualities that

- The adoption of propagandistic and unrealistic stands on arms control and disarmament;
- Extreme resolutions on South Africa which are also abusive of the United States; and
- The tendency of the nonaligned group in the United Nations to criticize the United States and the other industrialized democracies for the woes of the Third World, and to demand unrealistic solutions.

Major U.N. Accomplishments

But this is not the entire picture, the whole story. Permit me to highlight some of the major U.N. accomplishments in 1981-82. These included:

- Adoption of resolutions demanding an end to aggression in Kampuchea and Afghanistan by increased majorities;
- Adoption of a strong resolution by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights expressing concern over the violation of human rights in Poland;
- Strong rebuke in the International Labor Organization to Poland and the Soviet Union because of the suppression of Solidarity;
- Extension, by an increased majority, of the mandate to the special U.N. Chemical Weapons Experts Group for another year;
- Defeat of the Cuban-inspired attempt to place Puerto Rico on the agenda of the Special Committee on Decolonization;
- Adoption by the General Assembly of important resolutions on religious intolerance and on the causes of mass refugee movements;
- Formulation in UNESCO [United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization] of a moderate and practical program for the development of communications in the less developed countries with less emphasis on the radical call for a New World Information Order;
- Preservation of vital peacekeeping operations in South Lebanon, the Golan Heights, and Cyprus;
- Adoption by the Security Council of Resolution 502 on the Falkland Islands which provides the best framework for a peaceful settlement based on the U.N. Charter; and
- Continued performance by U.N. specialized agencies of a host of functions essential to the United States in many fields.

I drew this balance sheet to put into relief the paradoxical reasons why—as revealed by the most recent polls—most Americans, while critical of certain U.N. actions, are also in favor of continued U.S. participation in the many constructive activities of that world organization and its affiliated agencies.

Over the years, it has been consistent U.S. policy to moderate the excessive expenditures of international organizations and to urge the acceptance of more efficient operation methods. Over the years we have resisted simplified solutions, quick fixes, and shouldering a disproportionate share of the burden for the U.N.'s social, economic, and humanitarian undertakings. And over the years, we have maintained that the United Nations must complement, but never substitute for, the self-reliant efforts of the countries, themselves, in the path of their development.

While continuing to hold to these positions as a matter of practicality and principle, we must also weigh the limits imposed on the size of our voluntary contributions by our own budgetary restraints. More importantly, we must also reemphasize certain principles. First, expenditures of the public sector for major U.N. development programs should be designed to engender complementary efforts by the private sector where the greatest potential of expertise, capital, and technology required for the economic growth of the LDCs [less developed countries] can be found. And secondly, if we are to bring under better control an overgrown international bureaucracy that spends progressively more energy on its own maintenance and less and less on accomplishing its mission, the time has come to acknowledge that there are limits to the U.N.'s institutional capacity to attend to every problem.

In striving to maintain a proper balance between these considerations and the promotion of U.S. interests through multilateral organizations, we cannot escape the leading role we have in shaping the activities of the U.N. agencies and programs. There are overriding rationales for a continued high level of U.S. commitment and voluntary contributions to international organizations that embrace political, strategic, economic, and cultural considerations. Our voluntary contributions to the U.N. agencies and programs undeniably affect the international environment in which we pursue our goals. More specifically,

U.S. contributions to these organizations and programs

- Provide an opportunity for advancing American ideals and ideas affecting the evolution of the international system;
 - Are critical for advancing the development of all countries, especially the poorer ones;
 - Demonstrate, in specific terms, American humanitarian concerns;
 - Are often warranted because of the strategic importance of given geographic areas in which U.N. programs are active;
 - Act as catalysts for use of U.S. expertise, technologies, and supplies;
 - Sponsor foreign students to U.S. institutions of higher learning;
 - Are, in a large part, returned to the U.S. economy in the forms of rentals, salaries, services, purchases, and other expenditures;
 - Encourage the recognition that certain international responsibilities, which cannot rest on one or a few countries alone, devolve upon the entire world community;
 - Substitute for the uneconomical proliferation of bilateral agreements between the United States and other nations;
 - Permit these organizations to coordinate their activities with U.S. bilateral assistance programs and to serve in areas too sensitive for, or outside the reach of, U.S. bilateral aid; and finally,
 - Strengthen these organizations as preferred alternatives for many LDCs to entering into entangling "mutual assistance" arrangements with the Soviet Union.
- Few if any of these organizations and programs would continue at the level of activity or with the impact they now have without substantial U.S. participation. Withdrawal from these organizations would harm our diplomacy; our economy; and our own scientific, educational, cultural, and business communities.

The remainder of my statement describes briefly the activities and operations of the organizations and programs our voluntary contributions support. How, for example, the International Atomic Energy Agency promotes nuclear nonproliferation through its safeguards program; how the World Meteorological Organization doubles the data available to U.S. weather services;

or how the U.N. Environmental Program helps tackle the problem of trans-boundary air pollution.

The U.N. Development Program (UNDP)

Financed entirely through voluntary contributions from governments, UNDP is the main channel for technical cooperation in the U.N. system. It administers projects valued over \$600 million in some 150 countries covering a great diversity of fields ranging from stimulating capital investment to vocational and professional training. It has a coordinating and primary role in development efforts, particularly in the poorest of the developing countries.

The requested U.S. contribution of \$106.8 million is \$21.4 million less than the U.S. contribution for FY 1982. This major cut does not reflect, in any way, a lessened U.S. commitment to UNDP or depreciation of its achievements but is in harmony with the Administration's effort to improve our domestic economy while maintaining our leadership position overseas.

The U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF)

Since its creation in 1946, UNICEF has evolved into a major long-term humanitarian development fund aimed at improving the condition of children everywhere, particularly in the developing countries. Often, in cooperation with other multilateral and bilateral organizations, UNICEF provides both goods and services for projects that have direct bearing on the welfare of children and their immediate community.

The United States has been a leader in UNICEF and has been its largest single donor. The \$26 million requested for UNICEF for FY 1983 reflects general U.S. budgetary reductions and in no way reflects a declining interest in the program.

The Organization of American States (OAS)

The OAS is the principal hemisphere organization in which the United States seeks solutions to inter-American problems. Its importance is particularly highlighted by recent events in the Caribbean Basin, for it offers a regional mechanism to advance U.S. security and political objectives.

The OAS is especially attuned to the development needs of the region and to the promotion of technical cooperation among its members through its four

voluntary funds: the Special Multilateral Fund, the Special Projects Fund, the Special Development Assistance Fund, and the Special Cultural Fund.

The maintenance of the level of U.S. contributions in FY 1983 at the magnitude of \$15.5 million, in view of other reductions, reflects the strong commitment of the United States to regional stability and economic growth and the high stakes that are involved in resolving the present conflicts in Central America. Our participation in the OAS was essential to prevent action by this organization in the current Falkland Islands crisis to impose sanctions on the United Kingdom or to take other concrete steps adverse to our interests.

World Food Program (WFP)

The purpose of this WFP contribution is to provide administrative and other cash costs in dispensing food aid for economic and social development and for food emergencies worldwide.

The WFP uses its resources in a variety of development and rehabilitation programs. There are "food-for-work" projects where food is provided as payment to workers planting trees, digging irrigation canals, etc. WFP food is also used in hospitals, child care centers, school feeding programs, and resettlement programs for refugees. The U.S. \$1 million contribution for FY 1983 will provide administrative support needed to disburse our contribution of PL 480 foods. WFP estimated 1983 expenditures are \$608 million. Over 70% of these funds will be channeled into agricultural development projects. Low-income, food deficit countries will receive approximately 80% of the overall total.

U.N. Capital Development Fund (UNCDF)

The UNCDF provides, on a grant basis, seed money for preinvestment activities for both private and public sector projects too small for financing by multilateral banks. The fund concentrates almost entirely on the least developed countries with particular emphasis on the drought-stricken Sahelian Zone and Africa's poorest and neediest nations. Projects are executed by the U.N. specialized agencies, working with host country government, bank, private groups, and entrepreneurs. Projects concentrate on food production, village self-help initiatives, and the development of alternate sources of energy.

The U.S. annual contribution of \$2 million for FY 1981 and 1982 represents

approximately 5% of the total receipts for each of those years. The proposed million contribution for 1983 reflects a continued U.S. interest in encouraging locally run activity involving simple to intermediate-level technology. The work of the UNCDF enhances self-reliance, creates markets for American equipment and services, and promotes political stability and economic growth.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

The voluntary U.S. contribution to the IAEA demonstrates U.S. support of the IAEA and strengthens IAEA safeguards in accordance with U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy. The voluntary safeguards support program is complementary to nonproliferation and safeguards activities which are covered under the regular budget of the IAEA. The FY 1983 program will focus on the development and field-testing of instruments and the implementation of systems which have been developed through the U.S. program of technical assistance to IAEA safeguards. Work will continue on the development of techniques for verification testing of safeguards on spent fuel. U.S. assistance to the technical cooperation program will be in the form of cash contribution plus equipment, services of U.S. experts, fellowships, and training courses, including preferential programs for LDC party to the nonproliferation treaty. The U.S. contribution request for FY 1983 is \$14,500,000.

U.N. Environment Program (UNEP)

The United States has been a major participant in UNEP since its beginning in 1972, contributing 30% of its total resources for the period 1978-1981. The proposed contribution for FY 1983 is \$14.5 million, down from \$7.85 million in FY 1982.

A principal goal of UNEP's program is to stimulate monitoring and assessment of major global and regional environmental trends and to coordinate programs to improve environmental management. The organization provides a means through which the United States and other countries can stimulate action through the U.N. system on problems of global dimensions such as the building of toxic substance in rivers and oceans, the depletion of ozone in the atmosphere, and the loss of tropical forestable soil, and genetic resources of the land. UNEP's multilateral approach is the preferable means of preventing

application and managing international programs of such global dimensions.

Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES)

The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species was ratified in 1973 at U.S. congressional initiative to achieve concerted action on the conservation of endangered species of wild fauna and flora. Support of the convention is a major element of U.S. conservation policy. CITES achievements include the establishment of guidelines for safe shipping of live specimens of plants and animals; approval of a prototype identification manual for use by customs officials to identify protected species at ports of entry; adoption of a standardized universal format for information required to amend listings of endangered species; standardization of permit forms and other documentation; and tighter controls on trade in elephant ivory, rhinoceros horn, and whale products. The U.S. contribution request for FY 1983 is \$150,000, which is needed primarily to meet the U.S. share of the biennium budget and to provide a small amount for development of a CITES yearbook of international wildlife trade.

U.N. Educational and Training Program for Southern Africa (UNETPSA)

The U.N. Educational and Training Program for Southern Africa provides scholarships for secondary college level education and advanced technical and vocational training to students from Namibia and the Republic of South Africa who are denied such education and training in their own countries. The objective of this program is not only to enable these young people to play a full role in the society of their respective countries as they become independent or as majority rule is achieved, it is also to provide general support for the concept of peaceful transition in Southern Africa. Approximately 30% of scholarship holders study in the United States and another 15% study in Europe. The FY 1983 request, like the U.S. contribution appropriated for FY 1982, is \$1,000,000.

U.N. Institute for Namibia

The purpose of the U.N. Institute for Namibia located in Lusaka, Zambia, is to train young Namibians for mid-level civil service positions in preparation for the independence of Namibia so that they can lead the country through peaceful

means during its first few sovereign years. The current student enrollment numbers over 400. Some of the salient projects carried out by the Institute are in the fields of manpower, health, education, rural, and urban surveys, and in the study of the constitutional options available for an independent Namibia. The U.S. contribution request for FY 1983 is the same as that appropriated for FY 1982—\$500,000.

U.N. Voluntary Fund for the Decade for Women

The U.N. Voluntary Fund for the Decade for Women was created to improve significantly the status of and opportunities for women worldwide through greater participation in the economic and social development process. The fund's goal is to provide seed money for innovative and catalytic projects which will grow and become self-supporting or, once evaluated, will be adopted or emulated by larger developmental funds. Since its inception, the fund has financed over 220 projects with priority attention being placed on the least developed countries and on programs and projects which benefit rural women and the poorest women in urban areas. The FY 1983 request for a U.S. contribution is \$500,000.

World Meteorological Organization (WMO)/Voluntary Cooperation Program (VCP)

The WMO/Voluntary Cooperation Program assists developing countries to participate in WMO's World Health Watch which provides the United States access to important meteorological and climatic information collected on a global scale. The U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration relies on the World Weather Watch for meteorological, hydrological, and ocean-related services. Through VCP efforts, e.g., greatly improved telecommunications, there has been nearly a doubling of surface and upper air data received at the U.S. National Meteorological Center. The FY 1983 contribution request is for \$2.3 million, the same as in FY 1981 and 1982.

As you can see, there are some very practical reasons and arguments for our continued support of international organizations and programs. Our mental image of a flawed United Nations—as one huge, expensive, and overpoliticized, international bureaucracy—gets a dramatic jolt of reality if we examine, individually, the constructive work of the many constituting parts that make

up this global institution. We find that together they spell "U.S. interests," and our interests are in harmony with our ideals. At the same time, we have made every effort to assure that our reduced request for voluntary contributions is consonant with overall Administration policy to hold down Federal spending. We hope, therefore, that Congress will support in full our request.

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

FY 1983 Assistance Requests

by Thomas O. Enders

Statement before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on April 21, 1982. Ambassador Enders is Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs.¹

I am pleased to have this opportunity to discuss with the committee our request for security assistance for FY 1983 for Latin America and the Caribbean. The Administration is requesting \$326 million in economic support funds (ESF), which with \$274.6 million in development assistance and \$183 million of PL 480 from the separate AID appropriation, would bring our proposed FY 1983 economic assistance for the region to a total of \$783 million. We are also asking for \$138.6 million in funds for foreign military sales (FMS) financing and international military and education training (IMET).

The bulk of this projected assistance is for the countries of the Caribbean and Central America. These FY 1983 requests are substantially higher than those provided for in the FY 1982 budget. As such, they reflect the high priority the Administration attaches to U.S. interests in Central America and the Caribbean. They are essential elements of an integrated approach to the economic, political, and security problems of the region.

Let me summarize briefly the overall framework of U.S. interests, analysis,

and objectives within which the Administration's assistance requests should be addressed.

President Reagan, in his address at the Organization of American States on February 24, outlined the U.S. national interests in the Caribbean Basin region. As the President said, the "well being and security of our neighbors in the region are in our own vital interest."

Economic progress, peace, and security are in serious danger in the Caribbean Basin. Almost without exception, the countries of the region face economic difficulties of a potentially catastrophic nature. Their economies are, for the most part, small, fragile, and extremely vulnerable to disruption. Developments in the international economic system can seriously exacerbate longstanding internal problems. The current slowdown in the world economy is a case in point. Prices for raw materials which are the principal exports of these countries—sugar, coffee, bananas, and bauxite—have fallen sharply. Simultaneously, most of the region is still struggling with the need to adjust to increases in the costs of essential imports, particularly petroleum. High interest rates have imposed a new burden in countries needing to borrow money or refinance existing debt. Tourism, important to many, has stagnated. Certain economies of Central America, particularly in El Salvador and Guatemala, have been further damaged by guerrilla-sponsored violence and the general political instability of the area.

At the same time, Cuba and, now, Nicaragua are both seeking to exploit the regionwide economic crisis for their own political objectives. Their instruments are antidemocratic minorities predisposed to extremism, violence, and systematic armed conflict. Cuba and Nicaragua are providing political organization, guerrilla training, and other support to insurgent groups in El Salvador and Guatemala, and there are disquieting signs of their aggressive intent in several other countries.

We do not, for our part, seek to involve our neighbors in the political and military competition between East and West. And, certainly, they do not want to be involved. They are independent, and they hope their countries and the waters of the Caribbean can be free of international tension and conflict. They need our help to overcome economic difficulties, to defend themselves, and to keep alive their faith in freedom and democracy. With our assistance, they can manage their own affairs and find

their way out of their present troubles.

The complexity and urgency of the problems which I have outlined make clear that our response must be comprehensive. It must respond to both immediate and longer term needs, and it must address all aspects—economic, political, and security—in their separate individual requirements while recognizing that, in fact, these aspects are also interdependent in important ways. The overall strategy will not succeed unless we move forward in all areas.

Economic Strategy

On March 17, the President sent to the Congress a set of integrated proposals for a major new program of economic cooperation for the Caribbean Basin. As you are aware, the President's program includes three major elements:

- Authority to extend duty-free treatment in the United States for agricultural and industrial products, except textiles, from countries of the Caribbean Basin;
- Authority to extend tax incentives to U.S. investors in Basin countries; and
- Substantial increases in levels of U.S. economic assistance to countries of the region, including a requested \$350 million supplemental in ESF funds for FY 1982.

Over the medium term, the trade and investment authorities requested by the President will make a major contribution to the economic well-being of the region. Together with the self-help efforts of these countries, we can contribute to an economic climate of expanded production, new employment, and rising exports. These measures will also convey a political message. The United States is saying, in effect, that the economic well-being and political health of these countries is of such direct importance to us that we are willing to extend special treatment to them on a long-term basis. Our commitment is both serious and sustained.

The President's program also recognizes that many of these countries face major short-term problems which must be addressed if they are going to be able to benefit from the trade and investment initiatives. In some countries, including El Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica, major balance-of-payments problems threaten, immediately, their ability to import foodstuffs and critical raw materials for industry and agriculture. Jamaica will need increased assistance to sustain a still vulnerable economic recovery. Other countries, for

example, the small nations of the Eastern Caribbean, need additional assistance to develop the economic infrastructure required to capitalize on the new trade and investment opportunities.

Because of the urgency of these problems the President has requested additional \$350 million in ESF in the current fiscal year to supplement the funds already approved by the Congress. But that \$350 million, vital though it is, will not be enough to meet the needs of the next few years. Therefore, we have requested \$326 million in ESF for FY 1983. Combined with development assistance and PL 480, our economic assistance for the region would total \$783 million. This is a 47% increase over the amount budgeted for the current fiscal year. It reflects both the large and urgent needs of these countries and the high priority which the Administration attaches to our interests in the Caribbean Basin area.

A large share of our FY 1983 ESF request, \$105 million, would go to El Salvador. Its economy has been brought to the point of collapse by terrorism and economic sabotage directed against the country's transportation and power systems, businesses, and workers. Investment has dried up, and the private sector cannot even obtain the credits essential to its survival. Output declined 10% in 1980, and 10% again in 1981. With the assistance we and other donors plan for this year, this decline should be significantly reduced by the end of the year. We expect further improvement next year with the economic assistance we are requesting in FY 1983.

Other major recipients of ESF would include:

- \$55 million to Jamaica to support [Prime Minister Edward] Seaga's effort to revitalize his nation's economy;
- \$60 million for Costa Rica to help that country address one of the most severe crises in its history;
- \$25 million for Honduras to help bolster confidence and provide critical needed credits to the struggling private sector; and
- \$30 million to the Eastern Caribbean to stimulate economic activity and generate employment.

Political Strategy

The Caribbean Basin is not, as some suppose, a region of repressive, right-wing military dictatorships. Of the 24 governments in the Basin, not including the United States, 16 have democratically elected governments. Support for the

establishment and consolidation of democratic institutions is a central element of our approach. Not just because it is our own system of government but also because we believe it is the system most able to produce social justice, economic progress, and political stability in the Caribbean Basin itself.

We have been encouraged by last year's electoral success in Honduras. We are similarly heartened by February's peaceful elections in Costa Rica as the people of that country demonstrated, again, the strength of their commitment to democratic institutions. Now the Dominican Republic is preparing again for elections, extending the democratic achievements made during the last generation.

In Guatemala, the military coup last month may have ended the political paralysis which had gripped that country. It was led by junior officers apparently seeking to give the Guatemalan people a better government. General Carlos Montt, who has emerged as leader of the junta, was the presidential candidate of the Christian Democratic coalition in 1974. Since the coup, violence not directly connected to the insurgency has been brought virtually to an end. Concrete measures have been taken against corruption. All political forces have been urged to join in national reconciliation. We are watching these developments closely. We hope that the new government of Guatemala will continue to make progress in these areas and that, in turn, will be able to establish a freer, more collaborative relationship with this key country that faces both economic difficulty and an active Cuban-supported insurgency.

In El Salvador, the elections of March 28 were a fundamental first step in the democratic process, but it was only beginning. Discussions are now underway among the political parties concerning the organization of a new provisional government and the launch of the work of the newly elected Constituent Assembly. That Assembly must carry forward political reform and, importantly, establish procedures for the election of a President.

Discussions on the composition of the provisional government and the actual form of the political reforms are those which can only be made by the Salvadorans themselves. We have made clear our desire to continue to support El Salvador in their programs of economic recovery and in their battle against the guerrillas of the extreme left. We have also made clear, however, that our continued support must not be

taken for granted. In particular, we have emphasized our expectation that the new provisional government will carry forward political and economic reform, including land reform, and continue to make substantial progress in controlling violence.

On March 28, the people of El Salvador massively signaled their choice for a democratic process of elections as the method for resolving political conflict and ending the violence. They did this despite a concerted attempt by the guerrillas, first, to dissuade people from voting and, then, to intimidate them. Thus, the results of the March 28 election clearly stand as a massive political defeat for the FMLN/FDR [Farabundo Marti's People's Liberation Front/Revolutionary Democratic Front]. The guerrillas have advocated, as an alternative to these elections, direct negotiation of an overall division of political power, the results of which could later, perhaps, be submitted to a plebiscite.

In light of the March 28 results and in view of the ongoing political process in El Salvador, we hope that elements of the FMLN/FDR which can accommodate to democracy will now decide to participate peacefully in that process. Such a decision would be in the interests of El Salvador. We believe that mechanisms could be found to facilitate the entry of these groups into the democratic process. We will be prepared to assist in discussions or negotiations which might be required. However, we remain firmly and unalterably opposed to negotiations on division of political power in El Salvador outside the democratic process.

Security Assistance

Freedom and prosperity are impossible without security. The purpose of our FMS and IMET programs is quite simply to help small countries defend themselves against an immediate threat. Many of our neighbors have neither the resources nor a long-term need to develop and maintain large military establishments. Faced with a sudden threat, they need help from friends in the form of equipment and training.

We do not believe that only the strong should be secure. With appropriate help, our neighbors all have the capability and will to turn back outside threats. They do not want us to do their fighting for them. That would not serve anyone's interest and is not needed. All they ask is to be provided the training and equipment they cannot afford.

We are requesting \$125.3 million in FMS financing for FY 1983. To keep this in perspective, this is less than 2% of our global FMS program. The increases over our request last year are largely for El Salvador, Honduras, and Jamaica. We are, again, requesting a portion of the FMS—\$74 million—in direct concessional credits for those countries facing severe economic problems and where high interest guaranteed loans would further add to their heavy debt burden.

About one-half of our FMS request for the region—\$60 million—is for El Salvador. Of this amount \$50 million is being requested on concessional terms. This program is critically important to provide the resources to enable the Salvadoran Government to protect the people's right to choose their own future and carry forward the important economic, political, and social reforms underway. Our military assistance program is designed, in part, to enable the Salvadoran armed forces to employ small unit tactics, considered more effective against the guerrillas and less likely to cause casualties among noncombatants in the battle zone. The growing effectiveness of El Salvador's armed forces was evident in the exemplary way in which they turned back the guerrilla's effort to launch a major pre-election offensive. They protected voters, polling places, and election officials from guerrilla attacks and harassment last March 28.

We are also seeking an increase in our FMS program for Honduras to \$14.5 million, \$9 million of which would be on concessional terms. The democratic Government of Honduras is threatened by the illegal use of its territory by those supporting the insurgencies in El Salvador and Guatemala as well as by the unprecedented military buildup in Nicaragua. Honduras needs additional help to develop its transportation, patrol, and communications capabilities to defend itself from these threats.

Elsewhere in the Caribbean Basin, we are requesting an increase in our program in Jamaica—\$6.5 million in concessional credits—to help the democratic, pro-Western Seaga government modernize its defense force to deal with potential subversion and to protect its coastal waters from illegal traffic. We are also seeking concessional credits and training for the small democratic states of the Eastern Caribbean to improve their coast guards.

Finally, a small part of the FMS

program is for South America. We propose \$12 million for Colombia and \$6 million each for Peru and Ecuador to enable them to meet essential military needs.

Our request for \$13.3 million in IMET includes 23 country programs and our regional program for the Eastern Caribbean. We believe that training and education under the IMET program will strengthen the professional qualities of defense forces, improve our military-to-military relations, and insure continued orientation toward U.S. doctrine and security goals. We have asked for \$250,000 in IMET for Guatemala in the expectation that conditions there may improve sufficiently for us to consider a small training program.

Cooperation

The strategy I have outlined cannot rest on our efforts alone. We neither can nor should try to carry the burden by ourselves. Solutions designed exclusively in Washington are not desired and would probably not work. Our response must be in cooperation with our neighbors. We find, today, a consensus among the nations of the hemisphere over the danger of foreign intervention, the importance of democracy and free market policies, and the need to take collective responsibility. At this point I would like to make some remarks on our policies toward Nicaragua and Cuba.

Over the past several months, we have tried to establish a dialogue with Nicaragua. As members of this committee are aware, the United States is acutely concerned by several of the policies and activities being pursued by the Sandinista government. First and foremost, like countries in the region themselves, we are concerned by Nicaragua's continuing large-scale support for the guerrillas in El Salvador and its similar activities in other Central American countries. This, together with Nicaragua's extraordinary arms buildup and the large-scale presence of Cuban military advisers, is the fundamental cause of tension within the region.

On April 8, our Ambassador in Managua conveyed to the Nicaraguan Government several proposals which would address our concerns and, we believe, address the alleged concerns of the Sandinistas. On April 14, the Nicaraguan Ambassador in Washington presented to us a response. We are now evaluating that response and expect to decide soon our possible next steps.

I would stress, however, as we have stressed to the Nicaraguans that no

progress is possible in the areas of our relationship of concern and interest to them unless and until they cease their active support for insurgencies in the region.

In the case of Cuba, we continue to oppose fundamentally all efforts to export subversion and terrorism in Central America and the Caribbean. In this connection, Senator Symms [Steve Symms, R.-Idaho] has introduced a resolution reaffirming the resolution adopted in 1962 on the U.S. determination to oppose the efforts of Cuba to expand its sphere of influence. The resolution reflects the policy of six administrations, certainly, this one. As we told Senator Symms, we have always endorsed the thrust of his resolution. While we supported the tabling motion on the Senate floor, we did so only because we believed it was appropriate that the resolution be fully addressed in committee before coming to the Senate floor. After it has been given the appropriate committee consideration, we fully intend to support the Symms resolution.

We will not accept that the future of the Caribbean Basin be manipulated from Havana. Support for self-determination and democracy was evident at the OAS meeting in St. Lucia and in the hemisphere's wide support for the elections in El Salvador. It was evident in the formation this year of the Central American Democratic Community by Costa Rica, Honduras, and El

Salvador to cooperate toward the common goals of economic development, democracy, and mutual security against outside threats.

The momentum for greater cooperation is in our interest, and we will seek to strengthen and widen it. That is why we have joined Colombia and Venezuela in supporting the Central American Democratic Community. This was the spirit in which we discussed with Mexico the Mexican President's proposals aimed at reducing tensions throughout Central America.

The Caribbean Basin program is, in many ways, a model of the types of regional cooperation we seek. The overall program and the U.S. contribution to it was developed over a period of some 8 months of intensive consultation and joint analysis. The United States, Venezuela, Mexico, and Canada, later joined by Colombia, recognizing our common interest in the economic health of the region, are each undertaking major efforts under a common set of objectives. This is what we are asking the Congress to support: programs that will make cooperation possible in support of an emerging democratic consensus among our closest neighbors.

¹The complete transcript of the hearing will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

The Falkland Islands

Following are statements by Secretary Haig; Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, U.S. Representative to the U.N.; J. William Middendorf II; U.S. Permanent Representative to the OAS; the White House; and texts of the U.N. and OAS resolutions.

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, MAY 21, 1982¹

The President and this Administration have been intensely involved in the search for peace since the beginning of the dispute in the South Atlantic. Our deep concern over the threat of conflict has been evident to the international community. We have made bilateral and multilateral efforts in support of that effort. We continue today to be in contact

with those at the United Nations and elsewhere who are also striving for a peaceful solution under U.N. Security Council Resolution 502 and the U.N. Charter.

Let me emphasize, there will be no involvement whatsoever of U.S. military personnel in the conflict in the South Atlantic. As the President and Secretary Haig have said, we will meet our commitments to Great Britain. Any responses made to requests for assistance will be carefully evaluated on a case-by-case basis. We will, however, not address reports of specific requests for assistance or how we respond.

Our position throughout this dispute has been to do whatever we can to advance the chances for a peaceful resolution, and that remains our stance. Every step, every action of the President and

the U.S. Government shall be taken with the thought in mind—a peaceful solution. We stand ready to assist in any way we can.

**SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION 505,
MAY 26, 1982²**

*The Security Council,
Reaffirming its resolution 502 (1982) of April 1982,
Noting with the deepest concern that the situation in the region of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) has seriously deteriorated,
Having heard the statement made by the Secretary-General to the Security Council at its 2360th meeting on 21 May 1982, as well as the statements in the debate of the representatives of Argentina and of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
Concerned to achieve as a matter of the greatest urgency a cessation of hostilities and an end to the present conflict between the armed forces of Argentina and of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,*

1. Expresses appreciation to the Secretary-General for the efforts which he has already made to bring about an agreement between the parties, to ensure the implementation of Security Council resolution 502 (1982), and thereby to restore peace to the region;

2. Requests the Secretary-General, on the basis of the present resolution, to undertake renewed mission of good offices bearing in mind Security Council resolution 502 (1982) and the approach outlined in his statement of May 1982;

3. Urges the parties to the conflict to cooperate fully with the Secretary-General in his mission with a view to ending the present hostilities in and around the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas);

4. Requests the Secretary-General to enter into contact immediately with the parties with a view to negotiating mutually acceptable terms for a cease-fire, including, if necessary, arrangements for the dispatch of United Nations observers to monitor compliance with the terms of the cease-fire;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to submit an interim report to the Security Council as soon as possible and, in any case, not later than seven days after the adoption of the present resolution.

**EMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK,
MAY 26, 1982³**

I should like once again to express the admiration and appreciation of my Government for the skill and judgment with which you have conducted and are continuing to conduct the affairs of this Council while we are dealing with this terribly difficult problem.

The United States has already explained here that this conflict is particularly poignant and painful for us. We have already expressed our intense desire to reduce, to isolate, and to end this tragic conflict. I believe we have given evidence of the seriousness of our desire. My government, in the person of the Secretary of State, made sustained efforts to avoid the conflict and, subsequently, offered full support to the efforts of Peru's President Belaunde and, of course, to the efforts of our distinguished Secretary General, Javier Perez de Cuellar.

The United States ardently desires an end to this tragic war. We welcome this resolution and pledge our continued support for the Secretary General's efforts to find a just and enduring peace. I should like to take this opportunity to assure the distinguished representative of Panama and any other interested parties that my country has deep respect for all of our neighbors in the hemisphere, that we desire greatly to live in peace with them, that we are, ourselves, part of this hemisphere, that we desire to put an end to this conflict so that we can get on with the business of living in peace in the hemisphere.

As I said earlier this week, the quicker we put this tragic conflict behind us the quicker we can begin building our future—and there, as always, the nations of Latin America will find how deeply the United States is committed to the cause of peace and prosperity for our hemisphere.

**SECRETARY HAIG,
OAS, MAY 27, 1982⁴**

As the fighting intensifies and the cost in lives mounts in the South Atlantic, I think we all share a sense of anguish that it has not been possible to prevent this terrible conflict. It touches traditions and sympathies that run deep in our past and our national experiences. It is a loss and a failure of our generation.

We grieve over the heartbreak and the bereavement that the conflict brings to so many families in Argentina and Great Britain. We too share the emotions and pain of those families. Is there a country among us that has not counted itself a friend of both countries? Our hemisphere and the Western society of nations would be far poorer without their notable contributions to our common civilization. When friends fight, it is truly tragic.

It is from Great Britain that the United States drew the inspiration for many of its most cherished institutions.

Most of us stood at the side of Great Britain in two world wars in this century. Great Britain is a vital partner in the alliance with Europe which is the first line of defense for Western civilization against the dangers of Soviet aggression.

Argentina is an American republic, one of us. It is a nation, like the United States, founded on the republican ideal that all men are created equal. Like my country it is a nation of immigrants and settlers whose own culture and civilization have long had the respect of my countrymen and the world. President Reagan moved early in his Administration to make clear the high value we place on our relations with the Government of Argentina and the high esteem in which we hold the Argentine people.

Preserving the Inter-American System

It is not only our friendship and our ties with the two countries that are at stake. This festering dispute has suddenly become a violent conflict that poses dangers to the very institutions and principles which bring us here and that have made this hemisphere, in many ways, the envy of the world.

The war puts the inter-American system under stress. Some say that this is an "anticolonial war" because the islands were formally administered as a British colony. Some say that since this is a war that pits an American republic against an outside power, the Rio treaty requires that all its members come to the assistance of the American republic.

Others say that it is impossible to speak of colonialism when a people is not subjugated to another and, as we all know, there was no such subjugation on the island. Others say there is no way in which the inter-American system—which protects regional order based on law and the peaceful settlement of disputes—can be interpreted as sanctioning the first use of armed force to settle a dispute.

With full respect for the views of others, the U.S. position is clear: Since the first use of force did not come from outside the hemisphere, this is not a case of extracolonial aggression against which we are all committed to rally.

As we deal with this crisis, let us agree that there is far more to unite the nations of this hemisphere than to divide us. We must keep the future in mind. If we are to learn anything from the grim events of recent weeks, it is that conflict might have been averted if there had been better communication and confidence among American states. We

should take as our guide the work of the generations of statesmen who gave us an inter-American system that is both visionary and practical. Their legacy is statecraft that is calm, reasoned, and just.

The very presence in this hall of so many distinguished statesmen indicates that we do agree—all of us—that the inter-American system is important. It has served us well. For two generations and more this hemisphere has been the region in the world most free of the scourges of war. The inter-American system and the Rio treaty have constrained and almost eliminated armed conflict between states of the Americas. The countries of Latin America spend less of their national resources for arms than any other area in the world. They have suffered less from Communist infiltration or aggression than any other part of the developing world. None of that would have been possible without the inter-American system of security.

The post-World War II achievements of the Organization of American States (OAS), now in its 92d year as the world's oldest regional international body, are largely responsible for our collective record as the world's haven from war. The contributions of the OAS to regional peace and harmony are almost too numerous to mention. Let me cite a few.

- This organization helped restore peace along the borders between Nicaragua and Costa Rica on four separate occasions (1948, 1955, 1959, and 1978).
- Similar OAS efforts helped contribute to calming disputes, as between Ecuador and Peru (in 1955 and again in 1980) or Honduras and Nicaragua (1957), or to diminishing tensions, as between Bolivia and Chile (1962) and between Haiti and the Dominican Republic (1963).
- In 1971, the OAS successfully urged Ecuador and the United States to avoid widening their differences over international fishing boundary rights. As one Ecuadoran writer noted at that moment, this OAS action proved that "the inter-American system functions and that its most powerful member did not vacillate one instant in recognizing the equality of its weaker associated partner."
- By taking an early and steadfast stand against violations of diplomatic staffs and premises, the organization played a vital humanitarian role in 1980 in ending terrorist takeovers. One of

these situations was a diplomatic mission (Colombia) and the other an OAS office (El Salvador).

- During the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the legal position of the OAS had a major psychological and practical effect on the Russians.
- In another serious instance, the OAS imposed sanctions on a member state when it was proved that the intentions of that regime (Trujillo in the Dominican Republic) were aimed at assassination of the president of another OAS country (Romulo Betancourt of Venezuela).
- When riots broke out in the Panama Canal Zone in 1964, an OAS team assisted in stopping bloodshed; the organization's principled solidarity eventually helped bilateral negotiations to resolve what President Woodrow Wilson called the greatest problem dividing the United States and Latin America from each other.
- In the Dominican Republic in 1965, after the outbreak of civil war, the organization acted decisively to restore peace, setting the stage for an impressive democratic evolution.
- When fighting between Honduras and El Salvador broke out in 1969, OAS action helped put a quick stop to the bloodshed and fighting. Within 48 hours the OAS arranged a cease-fire, with contending forces withdrawing to *status quo ante bellum*.

For me the inter-American system is one of the unique forces that have helped the new world realize its special and privileged destiny, a hemisphere with almost unlimited human and material potential, yet with the means to prevent or control the conflicts that have prevented other continents from realizing their potential.

The South Atlantic conflict could put into danger the principles and institutions we have constructed so laboriously and which have served us so well. We must protect the integrity of our institutions so that they can serve us as well in future crises, which could affect any of us, as they have served us in the past.

Efforts to Resolve the Conflict

We face a conflict that involves us all, but to which the Rio treaty does not well apply. It is a dispute over competing claims of sovereignty, each with profound historical and emotional sources.

We know how deep is the Argentine commitment to recover islands Argentines believe were taken from them by illegal force. This is not some sudden

passion but a longstanding national concern that reaches back 150 years and heightened by the sense of frustration over what Argentina feels were nearly 20 years of fruitless negotiation.

We know, too, how deeply Britain in peaceful possession of the disputed territory for 150 years, has been devoted to the proposition that the rights and views of the inhabitants should be considered in any future disposition of the islands. No one can say that Britain's attitude is simply a colonial reflex to retain possession of distant islands. In the last 20 years no less than nine of the members of the Organization of American States received their independence in peace and goodwill from Great Britain.

For its part, the United States has not taken—and will not take—any position on the substance of the dispute. We are completely neutral on the question of who has sovereignty. Indeed, 35 years ago, at the 1947 signing of the final act of the Rio conference which created the Rio treaty, the U.S. delegation made this clear at the same time it set forth our position that the treaty is without effect upon outstanding territorial disputes between American and European states.

Faced with a conflict for which the inter-American system was not designed, American republics have turned instinctively to that fundamental principle of world order, the encouragement of the peaceful settlement of disputes. That was what the United States did. Our effort began even before April 2, when we offered to the two sides our good offices to help find a solution to the South Georgia incident. Argentina declined.

Then, when it became apparent that Argentina was preparing to land troops on the islands, President Reagan called President Galtieri to urge him not to proceed. We told President Galtieri in the most friendly but serious terms what consequences would be. I can hardly take any satisfaction in knowing that our predictions have proved prescient.

After April 2, both President Galtieri and Prime Minister Thatcher asked the United States to see whether it could be of assistance. At President Reagan's direction, I undertook two rounds of intense discussions in each capital.

The first meeting of the organ of consultation also promoted peaceful negotiation. Meeting in this very hall, we, the foreign ministers of the

mericas, urged that peace be maintained and that law prevail as the foundation of our international relations.

Immediately afterward, President Belaunde of Peru took the initiative to forward a peace plan, drawing also the fundamental elements of Resolution 502. We worked in close consultation with him.

Let me now report to you some of the specific elements involved in our efforts to resolve this dispute, which has proved so extraordinarily difficult to solve. On April 27, as prospects for more intense hostilities arose, the United States put forward a proposal of its own. It represented our best estimate of what the two parties could reasonably be expected to accept. It was founded primarily on Resolution 502.

That proposal called for negotiations on the removal of the islands from the control of non-self-governing territories. It specified that the definitive status of the islands must be mutually agreed, with regard for the rights of the inhabitants and for the principle of territorial integrity. And it referred both to the purposes and principles of the charter of the United Nations and to the relevant resolution of the General Assembly.

Those negotiations were to be completed by the end of the year. Pending that, an interim authority composed of Argentina, Britain, and the United States was to oversee the traditional administration, to be sure that no decision was taken contrary to the agreement. Argentine residents of the islands were to participate in the council for this purpose, in proportion to their numbers. During the interim period, travel, transportation, and movement of persons between the islands and the mainland were to be promoted and facilitated without prejudice to the rights and guarantees of the inhabitants.

The proposed interim authority of the three countries was to make proposals on how to take into account the wishes and interests of the inhabitants and on the role of the Falkland Islands Company should be. Should the negotiations not succeed in the time afforded, the United States was to be asked to engage in a formal mediation/conciliation effort in order to resolve the dispute within 6 months.

The British Government indicated that it would give the most serious consideration to acceptance of our proposal, although it presented certain real difficulties for it. However, Foreign Minister Costa Mendez informed me that the proposal was not acceptable to Argentina.

On May 5 a simplified text was forwarded by Peru to Buenos Aires at the initiative of President Belaunde. It called for:

- An immediate cease-fire;
- Concurrent withdrawal and non-introduction of forces;
- Administration of the Falkland Islands by a contact group pending definitive settlement in consultation with the elected representatives of the islands;
- Acknowledgement of conflicting claims;
- Acknowledgement of the aspirations and interests of the islanders would be included in the final settlement;
- An undertaking by the contact group to insure that the two parties reached a definitive agreement by April 30, 1983.

Britain made clear that it could seriously consider accepting the proposal. Argentina declined to consider it, asking, instead, for the U.N. Secretary General to use his good offices as, of course, it was Argentina's full privilege to do.

To promote negotiations is also what the Security Council and the U.N. Secretary General have done. We are heartened that the two parties—and the Security Council as a whole—have now been able to agree to give a new mandate to the Secretary General to find a basis for peace.

The Collective Search for Peace

What has been the approach of the international community as a whole must remain the policy of this body. We must strive to resolve the conflict, not seek to widen it. We must work to use the rule of law and the principle of non-use of force to settle the conflict, not seek to challenge these vital principles. We must search for ways in which we can all join to help bring about peace, not ask the Rio treaty mechanism to adjudicate a conflict for which it was not conceived.

It is right and proper that signatories to the Rio treaty should convoke a meeting of foreign ministers when they perceive a threat to peace in the hemisphere. It is this right which has served so well in preserving peace in this hemisphere. In times of danger we need the collective wisdom of all members of this body. This is of critical importance to the smallest among us who cannot afford large standing armies to defend their independence. It is this principle of collective security on which rests that

other principle—nonintervention—which is vital to our relations.

We here have a special responsibility to insure the peace of the hemisphere, as signatories of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, of the Charter of the Organization of American States, and of the Charter of the United Nations, and as nations of the Western Hemisphere. We should take no action and make no decisions which increase tensions without enhancing the prospects for a negotiated settlement of the struggle in the South Atlantic.

Resolution 502 embodies the principles which must govern our search for peace. We must have the strength to seek a solution, described well to us by [Brazilian] President Figueiredo, in which there is neither victor nor vanquished.

The Secretary General of the United Nations has now been given a new mandate to search for peace. The most important thing we could do here would be to give our unanimous collective support to that effort. We should reassert the validity of Resolution 502 as the indispensable framework in which a peaceful solution has been sought and will ultimately be found. And we should call on both parties to reach a peaceful negotiated solution.

As the Secretary General of the United Nations proceeds, I would hope he would give particular attention to the ideas put forward by the President of Peru 10 days ago, as well as those advanced by the Government of Brazil on May 24. Although they may require completion and adjustment, these proposals contain much that is equitable and fair; they merit careful attention.

For our part, the United States has remained in touch with both parties throughout the crisis. We have tried in countless ways to help Argentina and Britain find a peaceful solution. We are actively engaged in working with the Secretary General in support of his most recent mandate for peace.

This conflict has by now proven that the young men of Argentina and Great Britain can fight with skill and determination. They have the courage to die for the dignity of their nations. They have the strength and valor to endure in desperate struggle in a desolate climate.

Now the time has come for older heads to accept the risks of compromise and the hazards of conciliation to bring the suffering and dying to an end. Wisdom as well as struggle is a test of valor. The dignity of a nation is honored not only with sacrifices but with peace.

The South Atlantic has reverberated with the fury of war. It must now be calmed by the wisdom and courage of peace.

**AMBASSADOR MIDDENDORF,
OAS, MAY 28, 1982⁵**

I would like to explain my delegation's abstention on the resolution before us.

When we began our deliberations yesterday, Secretary of State Haig, in his address to this distinguished assembly, made clear our commitment to the inter-American system. He suggested that we search for ways in which we all can join to help bring about peace. Here, yesterday and today, my delegation has worked and cooperated in that effort.

Regretfully, my delegation does not feel that the resolution which this assembly is asked to approve serves that purpose.

We believe the resolution before us to be one-sided. It charges some; it ignores the actions of others. It ignores what the legal effects of first use of force should be. Further, there is no recognition that there must be compliance by both parties with all the elements of U.N. Security Council Resolution 502, to govern this search for peace in which we are engaged.

We are pleased, however, that the resolution carefully avoids language which would seek to force observation of its parts by the signatory states.

With respect to that section of the present resolution which calls upon the United States, we have listened very attentively to our colleagues here in this forum. The United States will lift the measures announced with regard to Argentina immediately when the provisions of Security Council Resolution 502 have been implemented.

Finally, we wish to assure all here that we will continue vigorously to pursue, in cooperation with others in this hemisphere, the search for a formula which will lead to an early, equitable, and peaceful settlement.

My delegation hopes that the two parties will find peace. We remain heartened that they have agreed in giving the Secretary General of the United Nations his new mandate for peace. We firmly support that effort.

My delegation also firmly believes, as Secretary Haig so wisely said, that there is far more to unite nations of this hemisphere than to divide us. We believe that all in this distinguished assembly, with whom we have worked so closely in

the past and with whom we will work closely in the days and years to come, share our determination to preserve what we already have in order to achieve our future potential. My delegation remains committed to that very practical and real ideal.

**OAS RESOLUTION II,
MAY 29, 1982⁶**

WHEREAS:

Resolution I of the Twentieth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, adopted on April 28, 1982, decided "to keep the Twentieth Meeting of Consultation open, especially to oversee faithful compliance with this resolution, and to take such additional measures as are deemed necessary to restore and preserve peace and settle the conflict by peaceful means";

That resolution urged the Government of the United Kingdom "immediately to cease the hostilities it is carrying on within the security region defined by Article 4 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, and also to refrain from any act that may affect inter-American peace and security," and urged the Government of the Republic of Argentina "to refrain from taking any action that may exacerbate the situation";

The same resolution urged the governments of the United Kingdom and the Argentine Republic "to call a truce that will make it possible to resume and proceed normally with the negotiation aimed at a peaceful settlement of the conflict, taking into account the rights of sovereignty of the Republic of Argentina over the Malvinas Islands and the interests of the islanders";

While the Government of the Argentine Republic informed the Organ of Consultation of its full adherence to Resolution I and acted consistently therewith, the British forces proceeded to carry out serious and repeated armed attacks against the Argentine Republic in the zone of the Malvinas Islands, within the security region defined by Article 4 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, which means that the United Kingdom has ignored the appeal made to it by the Twentieth Meeting of Consultation;

Following the adoption of Resolution I, the Government of the United States of America decided to apply coercive measures against the Argentine Republic and is giving its support, including material support, to the United Kingdom, which contravenes the spirit and the letter of Resolution I;

As a culmination of its repeated armed attacks, beginning on May 21, 1982, the British forces launched a broad-scale military attack against the Argentine Republic in the area of the Malvinas Islands which affects the peace and security of the hemisphere;

The deplorable situation raised by the application of political and economic coercive measures that are not based on present international law and are harmful to the Argentine people, carried out by the European Economic Community—with the exception of Ire-

land and Italy—and by other industrialized states, is continuing; and

The purpose of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance is to "assure peace, through adequate means, to provide for effective reciprocal assistance to meet armed attacks against any American State, and in order to deal with threats of aggression against any of them,"

THE TWENTIETH MEETING OF CONSULTATION OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, RESOLVES:

1. To condemn most vigorously the unjustified and disproportionate armed attack perpetrated by the United Kingdom, and its decision, which affects the security of the entire American hemisphere, of arbitrarily declaring an extensive area of up to 12 miles from the American coasts as a zone of hostilities, which is aggravated by the circumstances that when these actions were taken all possibilities of negotiation seeking a peaceful settlement of the conflict had not been exhausted.

2. To reiterate its firm demand upon the United Kingdom that it cease immediately its act of war against the Argentine Republic and order the immediate withdrawal of all its armed forces detailed there and the return of its task force to its usual stations.

3. To deplore the fact that the attitude of the United Kingdom has helped to frustrate the negotiations for a peaceful settlement that were conducted by Mr. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, the Secretary General of the United Nations.

4. To express its conviction that it is essential to reach with the greatest urgency peaceful and honorable settlement of the conflict, under the auspices of the United Nations, and in that connection, to recognize the praiseworthy efforts and good offices of Mr. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, the Secretary General of the United Nations, and to lend its support to the task entrusted to him by the Security Council.

5. To urge the Government of the United States of America to order the immediate lifting of the coercive measures applied against the Argentine Republic and to refrain from providing material assistance to the United Kingdom, in observance of the principle of hemispheric solidarity recognized in the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.

6. To urge the members of the European Economic Community, and the other states that have taken them, to lift immediately the coercive economic or political measures taken against the Argentine Republic.

7. To request the states parties of the Treaty to give the Argentine Republic the support that each judges appropriate to assist it in this serious situation, and to refrain from any act that might jeopardize that objective. If necessary, such support may be adopted with adequate coordination.

8. To reaffirm the basic constitutional principles of the Charter of the Organization of American States and of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, particular those that refer to peaceful settlement of disputes.

9. To keep the Organ of Consultation available to assist the parties in conflict with their peace-making efforts in any way it may support the mission entrusted to the United Nations Secretary General by the Security Council, and to instruct the President of the Organ of Consultation to keep in continuous contact with the Secretary General of the United Nations.

10. To keep the Twentieth Meeting of Consultation open to see to it that the provisions of this resolution are faithfully and immediately carried out and to take, if necessary, any additional measures that may be deemed upon to preserve inter-American solidarity and cooperation.

¹Made at the White House news briefing Deputy Press Secretary Larry Speakes at from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of May 24, 1982.

²Adopted unanimously on May 26, 1982. ³U.N. press release 38.

⁴Adopted at the 20th meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, OAS, a vote of 17-0, with 4 abstentions (U.S.). ⁵Press release 178 of May 28, 1982.

⁶Made at the 20th meeting of the Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, S. ■

Current Actions

BILATERAL

Agriculture

International agreement for the creation of an International Office for Epiphytology, with annex. Done at Paris Jan. 25, 1944. Entered into force Jan. 17, 1925; for U.S. July 29, 1975. TIAS 8141. Accession deposited: Libya, Apr. 7, 1982.

Antarctica

Antarctic Treaty. Signed at Washington Jan. 1, 1959. Entered into force June 23, 1961. TIAS 4780. Accession deposited: Spain, Mar. 31, 1982.

Recommendations relating to the furtherance of the principles and objectives of the Antarctic Treaty. Adopted at Buenos Aires Mar. 7, 1981.¹

Notification of approval: Australia, Feb. 23, 1982.

Aviation

International air services transit agreement. Signed at Chicago Dec. 7, 1944. Entered into force Feb. 8, 1945. 59 Stat. 1693.

Notification of denunciation: Sweden, Mar. 29, 1982, effective Apr. 29, 1983.

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Montreal Sept. 23, 1971. Entered into force Jan. 26, 1973. TIAS 7570.

Notification deposited: Luxembourg, May 18, 1982.

Notification of succession: Solomon Islands, Mar. 3, 1982.

Coffee

Extension of the international coffee agreement 1976. Done at London Sept. 25, 1981. Enters into force Oct. 1, 1982.

Acceptances deposited: Brazil, Apr. 22, 1982; Ethiopia, May 10, 1982; Guatemala, Apr. 28, 1982.

Collisions

Convention on the international regulations for preventing collisions at sea, 1972, with regulations. Done at London Oct. 20, 1972. Entered into force July 15, 1977. TIAS 8587.

Accessions deposited: Colombia, July 27, 1981; Gabon, Jan. 21, 1982.

Notification of succession: Solomon Islands, Mar. 12, 1982, effective July 7, 1978.

Commodities

Agreement establishing the Common Fund for Commodities, with schedules. Done at Geneva June 27, 1980.¹

Ratifications deposited: Botswana, Apr. 22, 1982; Ecuador, May 4, 1982.

Signature: Pakistan, May 4, 1982.

Conservation

Convention on international trade in endangered species of wild fauna and flora, with appendices. Done at Washington Mar. 3, 1973. TIAS 8249.

Accessions deposited: Malawi, Feb. 5, 1982; Austria, Jan. 27, 1982.

Convention on the conservation of Antarctic marine living resources, with annex for an arbitral tribunal. Done at Canberra May 20, 1980. Entered into force Apr. 7, 1982. TIAS 10204.

Ratification deposited: F.R.G., Apr. 23, 1982.²

Accession deposited: European Economic Community, Apr. 21, 1982.

Diplomatic Relations

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at Vienna Apr. 18, 1961. Entered into force Apr. 24, 1964; for the U.S. Dec. 13, 1972. TIAS 7502.

Notification of succession deposited: Kiribati, Apr. 2, 1982.

Fisheries

Convention for the conservation of salmon in the North Atlantic Ocean. Open for signature at Reykjavik Mar. 2 to Aug. 31, 1982. Enters into force on the first day of the month following the deposit of instruments of ratification, approval or accession by four parties meeting certain requirements.

Signatures: U.S., EC, Norway, Iceland, Mar. 3, 1982; Canada, Mar. 18, 1982.

Maritime Matters

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Adopted at London Nov. 14, 1975. Entered into force May 22, 1982, except for Article 51 which enters into force July 28, 1982.

Accession deposited: Malaysia, Apr. 12, 1982.

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Adopted at London Nov. 15, 1979.¹

Accession deposited: Hungary, May 3, 1982.

International convention on standards of training, certification, and watchkeeping for seafarers, 1978. Done at London July 7, 1978.¹

Accession deposited: Bulgaria, Mar. 31, 1982.

Meteorology

Convention of the World Meteorological Organization. Done at Washington Oct. 11, 1947. Entered into force Mar. 23, 1950. TIAS 2052.

Accession deposited: Belize, May 25, 1982.

North Atlantic Treaty (Protocol)—Spain

Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of Spain. Done at Brussels Dec. 10, 1981.

Acceptances deposited: France, Netherlands, Turkey, May 13, 1982; Italy, May 18, 1982; Portugal, May 28, 1982; Greece, May 29, 1982.

Entered into force: May 29, 1982.

Postal

General regulations of the Universal Postal Union, with final protocol and annex, and the universal postal convention with final protocol and detailed regulations. Done at Rio de Janeiro Oct. 26, 1979. Entered into force July 1, 1981, except for Article 124 of the General Regulations which became effective Jan. 1, 1981.

Ratifications deposited: Cyprus, Feb. 8, 1982; United Arab Emirates, Mar. 15, 1982; Yugoslavia, Mar. 23, 1982.

Approvals deposited: Hungary, Mar. 17, 1982; Lesotho, Mar. 29, 1982.

Money orders and postal travelers' checks agreement with detailed regulations and final protocol. Done at Rio de Janeiro Oct. 26, 1979. Entered into force July 1, 1981.

Ratifications deposited: Cyprus, Feb. 8, 1982; Yugoslavia, Mar. 23, 1982.

Approval deposited: Hungary, Mar. 17, 1982.

Program-Carrying Signals

Convention relating to the distribution of program-carrying signals transmitted by satellite. Done at Brussels May 21, 1974. Entered into force Aug. 25, 1979.³

Ratification deposited: Austria, May 6, 1982.

Safety at Sea

Protocol of 1978 relating to the international convention for the safety of life at sea, 1974 (TIAS 9700). Done at London Feb. 17, 1978. Entered into force May 1, 1981. TIAS 10009.

Accessions deposited: Argentina, Feb. 24, 1982; Switzerland, Apr. 1, 1982.

Sugar

International sugar agreement, 1977, with annexes. Done at Geneva Oct. 7, 1977.

Entered into force provisionally Jan. 1, 1978;

definitively Jan. 2, 1980. TIAS 9664.
Notification that it assumes the rights and obligations of a contracting party deposited: Belize, Dec. 17, 1981.

Telecommunications

Radio regulations, with appendices and final protocol. Done at Geneva Dec. 6, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1982 except for (1) Articles 25 and 66 and appendix 43 which entered into force Jan. 1, 1981 and (2) certain provisions concerning aeronautical mobile service which shall enter into force Feb. 1, 1983.

Approvals deposited: Belize, Mar. 1, 1982; F.R.G., Jan. 8, 1982.²

Trade

Protocol extending the arrangement regarding international trade in textiles of Dec. 20, 1973, as extended (TIAS 7840, 8939). Done at Geneva Dec. 22, 1981. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1982.

Acceptances: Brazil, Feb. 9, 1982⁴; Egypt, Feb. 22, 1982⁵; EEC, Mar. 15, 1982; Finland, Mar. 5, 1982⁵; Hungary, Feb. 10, 1982; India, Dec. 31, 1981; Japan, Dec. 25, 1981; Republic of Korea, Mar. 12, 1982; Mexico, Mar. 4, 1982; Pakistan, Dec. 29, 1981; Philippines, Feb. 16, 1982; Poland, Mar. 10, 1982; Sri Lanka, Dec. 29, 1981; Switzerland, Mar. 3, 1982⁵; U.K. on behalf of Hong Kong, Jan. 21, 1982.

U.N. Industrial Development Organization
Constitution of the U.N. Industrial Development Organization, with annexes. Done at Vienna Apr. 8, 1979.¹

Ratification deposited: Turkey, May 5, 1982.

Weapons

Convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects, with annexed Protocols. Done at Geneva Oct. 10, 1981.¹

Ratification and acceptances deposited: Ecuador, May 4, 1982.

Wheat

1981 protocol for the sixth extension of the wheat trade convention, 1971 (TIAS 7144). Done at Washington Mar. 24, 1981. Entered into force July 1, 1981.

Acceptance deposited: Japan, May 25, 1982.
Ratification deposited: Finland, Apr. 19, 1982.

1981 protocol for the first extension of the food aid convention, 1980. Done at Washington Mar. 24, 1981. Entered into force July 1, 1981.

Acceptance deposited: Japan, May 25, 1982.
Ratification deposited: Finland, Apr. 19, 1982.

World Health Organization

Amendments to Articles 24 and 25 of the Constitution of the World Health Organization. Adopted at Geneva May 17, 1976 by the 29th World Health Assembly.¹

Acceptances deposited: Sao Tome and Principe, Apr. 12, 1982; U.S.S.R., Apr. 1, 1982.

Amendment to Article 74 of the constitution of the World Health Organization, as amended. Adopted at Geneva May 18, 1978 by the 31st World Health Assembly.¹

Acceptance deposited: U.S.S.R., Apr. 1, 1982.

BILATERAL

Barbados

Air transport agreement, with exchange of letters. Signed at Bridgetown Apr. 8, 1982. Entered into force Apr. 8, 1982.

Supersedes understanding concerning air transport relations of Apr. 14 and 27, 1972, as amended (TIAS 7363, 7998).

Canada

Arrangement on mutual assistance in fighting forest fires. Effected by exchange of notes at Ottawa May 4 and 7, 1982. Entered into force May 7, 1982.

Egypt

Project grant agreement for the rehabilitation and modernization of the Aswan High Dam Power Station. Signed at Cairo Apr. 12, 1982. Entered into force Apr. 12, 1982.

El Salvador

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of Jan. 22, 1981. Signed at San Salvador Mar. 15, 1982. Enters into force upon notification that the legal requirements of each country have been satisfied; effective Mar. 15, 1982.

Federal Republic of Germany

Agreement concerning host nation support during crisis of war, with annexes. Signed at Bonn Apr. 15, 1982. Entered into force Apr. 15, 1982.

Haiti

Agreement relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products, with annexes. Effected by exchange of notes at Port-au-Prince Mar. 25 and Apr. 1, 1982. Entered into force Apr. 1, 1982; effective Mar. 1, 1982.

Hungary

Memorandum of understanding for scientific and technical cooperation in the earth sciences. Signed at Washington Mar. 23, 1982. Entered into force Mar. 23, 1982.

India

Agreement amending the agreement of Dec. 30, 1977, as amended (TIAS 9036, 9232), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington Mar. 31 and Apr. 7, 1982. Entered into force Apr. 7, 1982.

Indonesia

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of Dec. 2,

1980 (TIAS 10063), with agreed minutes. Signed at Jakarta Mar. 20, 1982. Entered into force Mar. 20, 1982.

Jamaica

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, with memorandum of understanding. Signed at Kingston Apr. 30, 1982. Entered into force Apr. 30, 1982.

Liberia

Agreement for the sale of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of Aug. 13, 1980 (TIAS 9841). Signed at Monrovia Apr. 6, 1982. Entered into force Apr. 6, 1982.

Mexico

Agreement extending the agreement of Feb. 16, 1979, as extended (TIAS 9444), on cooperation to improve the management of arid and semiarid lands and control desertification. Effected by exchange of notes at Mexico and Tlatelolco Apr. 15 and May 6, 1982. Entered into force May 6, 1982; effective Apr. 16, 1982.

Morocco

Agreement establishing a Binational Commission for Educational and Cultural Exchange. Signed at Marrakech Feb. 12, 1982. Entered into force: May 20, 1982.

Netherlands

Agreement establishing a television transmitter at Soesterberg Airfield. Effected by exchange of notes at The Hague Dec. 7, 1981 and Mar. 4, 1982. Entered into force Mar. 1982.

Pakistan

Agreement amending the agreement of Jan. 4 and 9, 1978, as amended (TIAS 9061, 9661, 9804, 10268), relating to trade in cotton textiles. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington Dec. 30, 1981 and Jan. 6, 1982. Entered into force Jan. 6, 1982.

Commodity import grant and loan agreement for agricultural commodities and equipment. Signed at Islamabad Apr. 13, 1982. Entered into force Apr. 13, 1982.

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of Mar. 25, 1980 (TIAS 9782). Signed at Islamabad Apr. 15, 1982. Entered into force Apr. 15, 1982.

Peru

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of Apr. 26, 1978 (TIAS 9604). Signed at Lima Apr. 5, 1982. Entered into force Apr. 5, 1982.

Agreement for cooperation concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy, with annex and agreed minute. Signed at Washington June 26, 1980.

Entered into force: Apr. 15, 1982.

U.S.S.R.

Agreement amending the agreement of

ov. 26, 1976, concerning fisheries off the coasts of the U.S. (TIAS 8528). Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Apr. 22 and 29 and May 3, 1982. Entered into force May 3, 1982.

Agreement extending the agreement of Nov. 26, 1976, as amended, concerning fisheries off the coasts of the U.S. (TIAS 8528). Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Apr. 22 and 29, 1982. Enters into force following written notification of the completion of internal procedures of both governments.

aire
Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of May 30, 1980. Signed at Kinshasa Apr. 3, 1982. Entered into force Apr. 3, 1982.

imbabwe
General agreement for economic, technical, and related assistance. Effected by exchange of notes at Salisbury Feb. 10 and Mar. 22, 1982. Entered into force Mar. 22, 1982.

Grant agreement for commodity imports. Signed at Salisbury Apr. 7, 1982. Entered into force Apr. 7, 1982.

¹Not in force.

²Applicable to Berlin (West).

³Not in force for the U.S.

⁴Ad referendum.

⁵Subject to ratification. ■

May 1982

May 1
British bombers attack airfields on the Argentine-occupied Falkland Islands—the first such attack since the Argentine invasion.

May 2
British Foreign Secretary Francis Pym meets with Secretary Haig and Secretary of Defense Weinberger to review political, military, and economic aspects of the crisis in the South Atlantic. He later visits U.N. Secretary General, Javier Perez de Cuellar, to discuss the Secretary General's offer of his good offices to resolve the dispute.

In Rome, Pope John Paul II calls on Britain and Argentina to restore peace in their dispute over the islands.

May 2-3
British sink Argentine cruiser *Gen. Balgrano*.

May 3
Argentina does not accept peace plan put forward by Peru's President Belaunde, calling proposals similar to previous U.S. proposals. Belaunde continues efforts.

May 4
Foreign Minister Mohammed Benyahia of Algeria, who played a key role in freeing the

U.S. hostages held in Iran, is killed in a plane crash on a flight to Tehran.

At Ireland's request, U.N. Security Council schedules consultations on U.K.-Argentine dispute for May 5 as Britain and Argentina consider the Secretary General's proposal.

U.S. authorizes all nonessential personnel and some dependents of officials of the mission to leave Argentina temporarily.

U.S. House of Representatives adopts, by voice vote, a resolution urging Argentina to withdraw from the Falklands and calling for "full diplomatic support" for Great Britain.

Argentina severely damages the British *HMS Sheffield*, which later sinks.

May 5
At Ireland's request, U.N. Security Council meets in an informal session to assess the situation in the South Atlantic. Ireland is seeking an immediate halt to the fighting and a negotiated settlement under U.N. auspices.

May 6
NATO Defense Planning Committee ministerial meeting is held in Brussels May 6-7. The Committee issues a final communique agreeing on the "validity of the alliance strategy of deterrence and defense, coupled with a strong commitment to arms control and disarmament."

Argentina accepts U.N. intervention and calls for a cease-fire.

May 7
Britain announces that Argentine warships or military aircraft found more than 12 miles from Argentina's coast will be regarded as hostile.

U.K. announces Peruvian peace plan is dead due to "Argentine intransigence."

May 8
U.N. Secretary General begins indirect negotiations on the South Atlantic crisis, meeting separately with Sir Anthony Parsons, head of the British mission to the U.N., and Enrique Ros, Argentina's Deputy Foreign Minister.

May 10
U.N. Special Session on the Human Environment is held in Nairobi, Kenya May 10-18 to assess progress made during the past decade in safeguarding the world's environment.

Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) ministerial meeting is held in Paris May 10-11.

Polish Government demands that two American diplomats—John Zerolis, Scientific Attache, and J. Daniel Howard, Cultural Affairs Officer—leave Poland by May 14, for allegedly "promoting destabilizing activity in Poland." The diplomats were accused by Polish security forces while visiting a Polish scientist who had been recently released from detention.

May 11
Brazilian President Joao Baptista de Oliveira Figueiredo makes official visit to Washington, D.C. May 11-13.

May 12
Secretary Haig makes official visits to Ankara, May 13-15, and Athens May 15-16 for discussions with heads of state; and Luxembourg, May 16-18, to attend the North Atlantic Council ministerial meeting. While in Luxembourg, Secretary Haig meets with British Foreign Minister Pym to discuss the crisis in the South Atlantic.

May 13
State Department releases report showing "conclusive evidence" that toxins and chemical warfare agents have been used, in recent months, in Laos and Kampuchea.

In retaliation for the expulsion of two U.S. diplomats from Poland, the U.S. tells the Polish Embassy that Andrzej Koroseik, Attache for Science and Technology, and Mariusz Wozniak, Political Officer, would have to leave the U.S. by May 17.

May 14
After 6 consecutive days of indirect negotiations conducted by the Secretary General, U.N. talks on the South Atlantic crisis are temporarily interrupted when Sir Anthony Parsons is called to London for consultations.

May 16
European Common Market fails to agree to extend economic sanctions against Argentina. The sanctions are scheduled to expire at midnight.

Yugoslav Parliament elects a woman, Milka Planinc, as the country's first female Prime Minister. Mrs. Planinc succeeds Veselin Djuranovic.

May 17
European Common Market—except Ireland and Italy—extends its sanctions against Argentina for another week.

U.N. talks resume after a 2-day break. Sir Anthony, the British delegate, returns with close to final British proposal to continue negotiations.

Paul Nitze, Chief U.S. negotiator to the Geneva negotiations on Limiting Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) departs for Geneva for resumption of talks with the Soviet Union.

North Atlantic Council ministerial meeting is held in Luxembourg May 17-18. A final communique is issued May 18:

- Welcoming the accession of Spain to NATO;
- Citing examples of Soviet actions in Poland and Afghanistan which contradict Soviet claims to peaceful intentions;
- Expressing an allied determination to maintain adequate military strength and political solidarity, perseverance in their efforts to establish a more constructive East-West relationship, including progress in arms control, and welcoming President Reagan's START proposals;
- Addressing the situation in and around Berlin, economic exchanges, the Falklands

PRESS RELEASES

situation, terrorism, and third world sovereignty and independence; and

- Agreeing to intensify their consultations.

May 18

King Hassan II of Morocco makes official working visit to Washington, D.C. May 18-21.

May 19

Secretary General Perez de Cuellar makes a personal appeal to Argentine and British leaders to consider new ideas as negotiations begin to collapse.

May 20

U.N. talks break down. Prime Minister Thatcher reports Argentina's rejection of British proposals and withdraws them. Argentina blames the U.K. U.N. Secretary General suspends his efforts.

May 22

U.S. Presidential Delegation to commemorate the Centennial of U.S.-Korean Relations participate in groundbreaking for the Centennial Memorial at Inchon, Republic of Korea. Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer (USA Ret.), heads the delegation.

At the Vatican, Pope John Paul II reiterates his calls for both countries to cease hostilities and resume negotiations.

May 23

U.N. Secretary General is urged by Security Council speakers to renew his efforts to negotiate a peaceful settlement in the South Atlantic crisis.

Argentine President Galtieri, in a reply to the Pope, says that Argentina is willing to join in a ceasefire.

May 24

All members of the European Common Market except Ireland and Italy agree to extend indefinitely economic sanctions against Argentina.

Prime Minister Thatcher rejects a ceasefire appeal by the Pope in the absence of Argentine withdrawal.

May 26

By unanimous vote, the U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 505 reaffirming Resolution 502 of April 3. The Resolution

- Expresses "appreciation to the Secretary General" for his efforts to implement Resolution 502;
- Requests the "Secretary General, on the basis of the present resolution, to undertake a renewed mission;"
- Urges both parties "to cooperate fully" with the Secretary General, and
- Requests the Secretary General "to enter into contact immediately with the parties with a view to negotiating mutually acceptable terms for a cease-fire, including, if necessary, arrangements for the dispatch of United Nations observers to monitor compliance with the terms of the cease-fire."

May 27

U.S.-Morocco formally complete an agreement which will allow U.S. military planes to use airbases in Morocco during emergencies in the Middle East and Africa. The document is initiated by Secretary Haig and Foreign Minister Mohammed Boucetta.

Twentieth meeting of Rio treaty Foreign Ministers reconvenes at the OAS.

May 29

By a vote of 17 to 0 with 4 abstentions—U.S., Chile, Colombia, and Trinidad and Tobago—the OAS adopts a resolution condemning Britain's attack on the Falkland Islands and urging the U.S. to halt its aid to the British.

May 30

Spain, depositing an instrument of ratification with the Department of State, formally becomes the 16th member of NATO.

Colombia holds presidential elections. The leading contenders are former President Alfonso Lopez Michelsen of the ruling Liberal Party and his Conservative Party opponent, Belisario Betancur Cuartas.

May 31

Belisario Betancur Cuartas, the Conservative Party candidate, is elected President of Colombia. ■

Department of State

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
155	5/3	Haig, Hunt: remarks upon signing MFO, Mar. 25.
156	5/4	Haig: statement before Subcommittee for State, Justice, Commerce, and related agencies of the Senate Appropriations Committee.
*157	5/4	Increased processing time for passports.
*158	5/7	Franklin statue dedicated.
*159	5/7	Program for the State visit of Brazilian President Joao Baptista de Oliveira Figueiredo, May 11-13.
*160	5/7	Haig: remarks at the AFSA memorial ceremony.
*161	5/10	U.S. Organization for the International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee (CCITT), study group A, May 26.
*162	5/10	Shipping Coordinating Committee (SCC), Subcommittee on Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), working group on ship design and equipment, May 26.
*163	5/10	SCC, SOLAS, working group on fire protection, May 27.
*164	5/10	SCC, SOLAS, working group on carriage of dangerous goods, June 3.
*165	5/10	Haig: special briefing, Washington, D.C.
166	5/11	Haig: statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
*167	5/17	Program for the official working visit to Washington, D.C. of King Hassan II of Morocco, May 18-21.
*168	5/17	Haig: arrival statement; Foreign Minister Ilter Turkmen: welcoming statement, Ankara, May 13.
*169	5/19	U.S., Maldives establish text visa system, Dec. 29, 1982 and Mar. 22, 1982.
170	5/18	Haig, Turkmen: remarks upon the Secretary's departure May 15.
*171	5/18	Haig: arrival statement, Athens, May 15.
172	5/19	Haig: press conference, Athens, May 16.
*173	5/19	Haig, Pym: remarks after their meeting, Luxembourg, May 16.
174	5/20	Haig: press conference, Luxembourg, May 18.
*175	5/24	Selwa Roosevelt sworn in as Chief of Protocol (biographical data).
176	5/26	Haig: interview on "Face the Nation," May 23.
177	5/26	Haig: address before Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, Chicago.
178	5/28	Haig: statement before the 20th meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Rio treaty OAS, May 27.
179	5/28	Haig: question-and-answer session following speech before Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, Chicago, May 26.
180	5/28	Stoessel: address at World Affairs Council of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, May 2

*Not printed in the BULLETIN. ■

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The BULLETIN's contents include major addresses and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State; statements made before congressional committees by the Secretary and other senior State Department officials; special features and articles on international affairs; selected press releases issued by the White House, the Department, and the U.S. Mission to the United Nations; and treaties and other agreements to which the United States is or may become a party.

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
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Combatting Terrorism: American Policy and Organization

by Ambassador Robert M. Sayre

*Address before the
Third International Civil Aviation Security Conference
Washington, D.C., July 21, 1982*



The Iraqi Embassy in Beirut was destroyed by a car bomb on December 15, 1981; 20 people were killed and another 100 were injured. (Slygma)

Political violence and terrorism are not new. They have been with us since the dawn of recorded history. What is new is the speed with which people and ideas move. You can be in Washington tonight and Paris tomorrow morning. You can sit at your television set and have a front-row seat at the world soccer matches in Madrid. An assassin can attempt to kill the President of the United States on the streets in Washington or the Pope on the streets in Rome, and the television networks will bring the event to you simultaneously and in living color. Political terrorism used to be a national event that seldom had ramifications beyond national borders. Now any attack against any prominent figure or against a commercial aircraft or against an embassy is an international media event. Our ability to travel and communicate rapidly has made it so. Terrorism is international, and, as many say, it is theater.

I would like to be able to tell you that we are doing as well on controlling political violence generally as you are doing in controlling terrorist attacks against commercial aviation. But you are, in a sense, fortunate because you can put people and baggage through a single checkpoint. You can, of course, still be and are the victim of human er-

rors and poor procedures. You have done a remarkable job, at considerable expense, to maintain your safety record.

Unfortunately this is not the case for political violence and terrorism generally. We have no way of running all terrorists through a checkpoint or x-raying their baggage. Their methods of attack are myriad, they are clandestine, and they are elusive. They frequently change the names of their organizations and their passports, recruit new faces, send old faces off to different parts of the world, and generally try to confound and confuse the police and security organizations that governments create as defensive mechanisms.

The number of actual terrorist acts increases daily. Every day that passes brings to my desk in the Department of State a new batch of reports about planned terrorist attacks or attacks actually carried out. Diplomats are once again the principal target; and American diplomats are particularly high on the list of victims or intended victims. Some 15% of the operating budget of the Department of State goes to pay for protection of our personnel and facilities overseas, and the cost is rising. So while I would like to tell you that the situation

is getting better, I must honestly and candidly tell you that it is getting worse. What are we doing about it?

In truth our problems are not that much different from yours. We have a worldwide operating network and so do the airlines. The difference may be that we are in almost every country, sometimes in several places, whereas your networks are not as extensive. That is a difference in degree and not substance.

We must have an international consensus, and cooperation on security threats to our operation, and so must you.

We must have an understanding with individual governments on how terrorist attacks against us will be handled and so must you. There must be an understanding within our organizations from the President to the security man in the field on how we will react, both in a policy and operational sense, and I am certain that is the case with the airlines.

American Policy

The first action required of the Reagan Administration was a clear and unequivocal statement of policy.

At the very beginning of this Administration, President Reagan, in welcoming the Tehran hostages home, articulated U.S. policy on terrorism. He said: "Let terrorists be aware that when the rules of international behavior are violated, our policy will be one of swift and effective retribution."

We have publicly and repeatedly noted that the United States, when faced with an act of terrorism at home or abroad, will take all possible lawful measures to resolve the incident and to bring to justice the perpetrators of the crime. This policy is based upon the conviction that to allow terrorists to succeed only leads to more terrorism; if they are successful, they will be encouraged to commit more such acts.

We firmly believe that terrorists should be denied benefits from acts such as hostage-holding or kidnapping; thus the U.S. Government does not make concessions to blackmail. We will not pay ransom or release prisoners in response to such demands.

When a terrorist incident occurs outside the United States, we look to the host government to exercise its responsibility to protect persons within its jurisdiction and to enforce the law in its territory. During such incidents, we consult closely with the responsible government, and we offer all practical support to the government concerned.

When a terrorist incident against us is sponsored or directed by a nation, as an instrument of its own policy in an attempt to intimidate or coerce us, we will take all appropriate measures—be they diplomatic, political, economic, or military—to resolve the incident and to resist this form of international blackmail. So the United States has a clearly stated policy.

But a policy is no better than the determination or will to carry it out and the organization established to do so. The problem is international, so the first question is, how effective and determined is the international community?

International Cooperation

International organizations, including the United Nations, have sponsored a number of multilateral conventions which deal with particular terrorist crimes to bring them within the criminal law. The United States has strongly supported these efforts over the years.

The most widely accepted conventions are The Hague convention against


Director, Office for Combatting Terrorism

Ambassador Robert M. Sayre became the Director of the Department of State's Office for Combatting Terrorism in May 1982. He is also chairman of the Department's policy group on security policies and programs and contingency planning.

Mr. Sayre was born in Hillsboro, Oregon, on August 18, 1924. He received a bachelor's degree from Willamette (1949), a doctorate in law from George Washington University (1956), a master's degree from Stanford (1960), and an honorary doctorate in laws from Willamette (1966).

He joined the Department in 1949 as an intern. He later held assignments as international economist in the Bureau of Economic Affairs and the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs (1950-52), international relations officer in the latter bureau (1952-56), officer in charge of inter-American security and military assistance affairs (1956-57), chief of the political section in Lima (1957-60), and financial officer in Havana (1960-61).

He returned to Washington in 1961 to become President Kennedy's executive secretary of the task force on Latin America and also assisted in efforts that put together the Alliance for Progress. Other positions Ambassador Sayre has held have been officer in charge of Mexican affairs (1961-64), senior staff member of the National Security Council (1964-65), Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs (1965-67), Acting Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Af-



fairs (1967-68), and a Foreign Service inspector (1974-75 and 1976-78).

He has held three ambassadorial posts—Uruguay (1968-69), Panama (1969-74), and Brazil (1978-82). Ambassador Sayre twice has been awarded the Department's Superior Honor Award (1964 and 1976). ■



No Concessions!

The Reagan Administration has adopted a firm policy to combat international terrorism. We will resist terrorist blackmail and pursue terrorists with the full force of the law. We will not pay ransom, nor release prisoners, and we will not bargain for the release of hostages. To make concessions to terrorist blackmail only jeopardizes the lives and freedom of additional innocent people. We encourage other governments to take a similarly strong stance. When U.S. citizens are taken hostage, we look to the host government to exercise its responsibility under international law to protect them, but at the same time we urge the government not to give in to terrorist blackmail. We are prepared to assist the host government should our aid be requested.

The basic philosophy underlying this policy is that concessions to terrorists only serve to encourage them to resort to more terror to obtain their political objectives, thereby endangering still more innocent lives. If terrorists understand that a government steadfastly refuses to give in to their demands and is prepared to live up to its international obligations to prosecute or extradite them, this will serve as a strong deterrent. We also encourage other governments to adopt a no-concessions policy since international terrorism is a phenomenon which crosses national boundaries. Our no-concessions policy is of little avail if Americans are taken hostage abroad and the host government concedes to the terrorists' demands.

The current policy in dealing with hostage incidents involving U.S. diplomats and other officials represents an evolution from the handling of the first incidents in 1969 and 1970. Although our policy was not to give in to terrorists' demands, there is a feeling by those who have analyzed those cases that the principal concern then was the safe release of the hostages, and any host government concessions to the terrorists were acceptable if they contributed to that goal.

By the time the U.S. Ambassador in Haiti was kidnapped by local terrorists in January 1973 and the U.S. Ambassador and the Deputy Chief of Mission were held hostage in Khartoum in March 1973 by Palestinian terrorists, a considerable hardening in the U.S. policy was apparent. Although the Ambassador to Haiti was released after local

authorities had made concessions to the terrorists, it is apparent that the United States had not been in favor of giving in to their demands. In connection with the Khartoum case, while it was still in progress, President Nixon said that "as far as the United States as a government giving in to blackmail demands, we cannot do so and we will not do so." He went on to say, "We will do everything that we can to get them released but we will not be blackmailed." One of the terrorist demands had been to release Sirhan Sirhan, the convicted assassin of Robert F. Kennedy.

The Ambassador, the Deputy Chief of Mission, and the Belgian Charge were killed in the Saudi Embassy in Khartoum by the terrorists. Among the terrorists' other demands had been the release of some particularly important terrorist leaders who had been captured and were being tried in Jordan. The terrorists in Khartoum repeatedly called for the release of these men, and, in the view of some analysts, the failure of the terrorists to obtain their release was the basic reason for the brutal assassination of these diplomats.

If a foreign government engages in acts of terrorism against the United States, the Administration has made it clear that the United States would respond effectively and vigorously using all appropriate resources at its disposal—diplomatic, political, economic, and military.

Because international terrorism affects most countries around the world, it is essential that all responsible governments adopt a common policy of not giving in to terrorist blackmail. This principle is already embodied in international conventions such as the widely accepted Hague convention on hijacking which establishes an obligation to either prosecute or extradite hijackers. Although there is a temptation to give in to the terrorists' demands on humanitarian grounds to avoid the possibility of violence against the hostages, such a moral compromise is fleeting since a terrorist victory only encourages more acts which endanger additional innocent lives. No responsible government can allow itself to be dictated to by ruthless, criminal acts which endanger the lives of its citizens, citizens of other countries, and which threaten its authority. Compromise will prove transitory and over the long run will be detrimental to a country's efforts to cope effectively with the problem. ■

hijacking and the Montreal convention against aircraft sabotage, which are now adhered to by over 100 states. The international community, through these conventions, has established the principle that aircraft piracy and sabotage, like maritime piracy they so closely resemble, are universally abhorred international crimes.

Other conventions dealing with additional aspects of the terrorism problem are the New York convention on crimes against internationally protected persons, the Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials. These agreements establish an obligation among states party to them to submit for prosecution or extradition those alleged to have committed particular crimes.

The United States strongly supports the principle established in these conventions that those who commit terrorist crimes should be brought to justice in accordance with the law, and we continue to urge other nations to become parties to these important agreements.

The United Nations has also considered the effectiveness of the New York convention on attacks against diplomats and other internationally protected persons. The Secretary General has invited member states to submit reports this year for consideration by the United Nations on actions they have taken to carry out the convention. We welcome this continuing focus on attacks on diplomats which now account for more than half of all terrorist attacks.

In addition to these efforts in the international organizations, the economic summit seven—the United States, Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Japan—enunciated a course of action against hijacking. In 1978 the heads of state and government of these seven nations adopted a declaration against hijacking. It was a commitment to take joint action by terminating air service to states which fail to live up to their obligations under The Hague convention on hijackers. Last year the Bonn declaration was implemented against Afghanistan for its conduct during and subsequent to the hijacking of a Pakistani aircraft in March 1981. The

United Kingdom, France, and West Germany, the countries of the summit seven with bilateral air service with Afghanistan, gave notice that air links would be terminated this November. We continue to monitor the actions of countries during hijacking incidents and will

urge such actions in future cases where it would be appropriate.

At the bilateral level, we have consulted many countries on sharing information on terrorists and their plans. Such exchanges occur systematically, but we need to do more to assure that

all members of the world community are aware of specific dangers. I wish to take this opportunity to assure you that when the United States learns that a terrorist act is being planned in any country around the world, we immediately inform the appropriate authorities of the country involved so that innocent lives may be saved. We do not and will not hold back such information. We hope that other countries will adopt a similar policy.

We have also discussed the coordination of policy responses to terrorism. We have urged other countries to adopt a policy similar to ours to deny terrorists the benefits they seek from their crime and to bring the full force of law enforcement measures to bear on them.

Consultation and coordination of policies are only part of the solution. We have recently submitted legislation to the U.S. Congress which would authorize a program of antiterrorism assistance for foreign government law enforcement personnel. The Congress now considering this proposal. If authorized, this program would enable us to offer training in antiterrorism security and management skills at our training facilities and to provide equipment, such as security screening devices for airports. Once legislation is passed, we will be contacting selected countries about the possibility of participation in this program. We consider this program as a way to assist countries that may want to learn our techniques of dealing with terrorists. But we also see it as an opportunity to learn by exchanging experiences with all countries that have been victims of terrorist attacks.

As I stated early in my remarks, a principal target of terrorists is the diplomat. Terrorists have recently turned their attention to foreign diplomats in the United States. We are therefore, strengthening the protection we provide to foreign diplomats. We have introduced new legislation which will enable the Department of State to carry out its responsibilities more effectively and efficiently in cooperation with State and local authorities. We are hopeful that the Congress will act promptly on this proposal.

Although we have a strong set of policies and laws on terrorism agreed to by the international community, the international community has not been as

Antiterrorism Cooperation Program

In April and May of 1982, Ambassador Robert M. Sayre, the Department of State's Director for Combatting Terrorism, testified before both Houses of Congress in support of a new program intended to be a major element of the President's program to combat and deter political terrorism. The proposal asks Congress to provide authority and funding for assistance to selected friendly governments by providing them with antiterrorism training, specialized equipment where appropriate, and by generally expanding the scope and type of intergovernmental cooperation. Specifically the Department asked the Congress to amend the Foreign Assistance Act to authorize antiterrorism assistance up to a level of \$5 million in FY 1983.

Both the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee responded encouragingly to this proposal and recommended to their respective bodies that the program be approved. Edward Marks, a career Foreign Service officer and formerly U.S. Ambassador to Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde and most recently of the National War College, was designated in December 1981 as the Department's Coordinator for Antiterrorism Programs.

As presently conceived, the program will begin by providing training courses in various antiterrorism skills and management techniques for the civil and police authorities of friendly developing countries subject to a terrorist threat. Training will be offered at existing U.S. Government institutions such as the FBI Academy (Quantico, Virginia), the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (Glynn, Georgia), and the Federal Aviation Administration's Transportation Safety Institute (Oklahoma City). The training will include antiterrorist policy, government crisis management organization, incident management, hostage and barricade negotiations, airport security measures, bomb disposal, and dignitary and facility protection. The training and orientation will be designated primarily for senior officials responsible for antiterrorism policy and incident management, plus senior training personnel.

In addition, the U.S. Government will provide a limited amount of appropriate antiterrorist equipment to complement specific training programs.

The antiterrorism cooperation program has a number of objectives, all revolving around the perception that political terrorism is an international phenomenon which threatens individual countries as well as international society. Thus, it must be met by an international effort much in the way in which piracy was challenged and finally eliminated. The U.S. Government has a multifaceted antiterrorism program, important parts of which are directed toward creating the necessary international consensus. The antiterrorism assistance program shares that objective but is specifically directed toward enhancing the antiterrorist operating skills of relatively inexperienced governments and to expanding cooperation among all concerned governments.

This program will serve broader U.S. policy interests:

- Strengthen bilateral ties with friendly governments by offering this concrete assistance in an area of mutual concern;
- Assist governments, by improving their capabilities, to better protect U.S. diplomatic missions and other interests, including the American tourist; and
- Increase respect for human rights and improve the climate for them by reducing the terrorist threat to innocent third parties on the one hand, while helping governments deal with the terrorist threat by means of modern, humane, and effective antiterrorist techniques on the other.

Pending final authorization and approval by Congress for FY 1983, the Office for Combatting Terrorism is preparing implementation of the new program. By the time this article appears, selected posts will have been queried about the feasibility of their host governments participating in pilot projects. That inquiry will be followed by a circular telegram to approximately 15 other posts, initiating the participating country selection process for the antiterrorism assistance program's first full year of operation (FY 1983). ■



successful in working out arrangements to give effect to these policies and laws. The countries in Europe have their own working arrangements, and there are occasional conferences such as this one. Multilateral cooperation is extreme-

ly limited. If the world community is serious about combatting terrorism, then it needs to give more attention to working arrangements that will do that. For its part, the United States stands ready to cooperate to the fullest extent.

U.S. employees in Tripoli poured motor oil on the embassy's marble staircases to delay Libyan mobs from gaining access in December 1979.



State-Supported Terrorism

Unfortunately there are states which are directly involved in carrying out international terrorist acts. There are also states which find it in their interest to provide arms, training, and logistical support to terrorist organizations. Another problem, then, is that the community of nations needs to face forthrightly the fact that some of its members are promoting terrorism and others have a certain sympathy for terrorist organizations and condone what they do because they are of the same political philosophy and consider terrorism as an effective way to undermine their adversaries.

Bonn Declaration


In 1978 at the economic summit in Bonn, the heads of state and government of the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, and Japan expressed their resolve to effectively combat international hijackings when they issued the Bonn antihijacking declaration.* In essence, the declaration states that any nation which does not prosecute or extradite hijackers in its territory will face the termination of air service by the seven nations. It does not specify what sentence a hijacker must receive but does require that he be tried under the laws of the apprehending nation (or extradited).

There is good reason to believe that the declaration has had a positive effect in reducing the number of international terrorist hijackings by its reaffirmation of the need of governments to live up to their international responsibilities to either prosecute or extradite hijackers. Obviously any multinational undertaking of this type faces differences in interpretation due to the different approaches and policies regarding terrorism. However, at the 1981 Ottawa summit, the seven governments provided a clear expression of resolve by giving Afghanistan notice that it faced sanctions due to the harboring of the hijackers of a Pakistani International Airlines aircraft.** This action will serve to place potential hijackers on notice that it will be difficult for them to find sanctuary.

*The Bonn declaration was published in the BULLETIN of Sept. 1978, p. 5.

**The Ottawa statement was published in the BULLETIN of Aug. 1981, p. 16. ■

U.S. Government Organization for Antiterrorism, Planning, Coordination, and Policy Formulation



The U.S. Government is organized in separate but parallel ways to deal with two distinct aspects of the problem of international terrorism—policy and incident management.

The principal vehicle for coordinating policy and programs is the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism, the senior executive branch organization devoted solely to the problem of terrorism. Chaired by the Department of State, it is made up of representatives of the Departments of Justice /FBI (deputy chairman), Defense /JCS, Energy, Treasury, and Transportation; Central Intelligence Agency; National Security Council; and the office of the Vice President. The group meets frequently, generally twice a month, to insure full coordination among the agencies of the Federal Government directly involved in antiterrorism programs. The State Department representative, and chairman, is the Director of the Office for Combatting Terrorism.

The executive branch's response to the management of terrorist incidents is based on the "lead agency" concept. State has the lead in overseas incidents, Justice/FBI the lead in incidents of domestic terrorism, and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) plays a key role in skyjackings of U.S. flag carriers within the United States.

When a terrorist incident occurs overseas, the State Department immediately convenes a task force under the direction of the Office for Combatting Terrorism to manage the U.S. response. The task force is physically located in the Operations Center of the State Department and is in operation 24-hours a day until the incident is resolved. It is composed of representatives from the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the State Department and from other agencies as necessary.

When Brig. Gen. James L. Dozier was kidnapped in Verona, Italy, on December 1, 1981, for example, an interagency task force was convened by the State Department within hours after the news of the abduction. In addition to the normal members of the task force, the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were represented because of Gen. Dozier's military position. That task force remained in operation until Gen. Dozier's rescue on January 28, 1982. ■



U.S. Government Organization

What is the U.S. Government doing in both its operations and organizations to carry out the strong policy enunciated by President Reagan?

First, I am sure that you would agree that a key to dealing with the terrorist threat is good intelligence. We have recently strengthened significantly our ability to collect, analyze, and use intelligence on terrorism. We have also taken steps to improve the exchange of information with our friends and allies.

It is one thing to have intelligence; it is another to get policy officers to act on it. We have made organizational changes that improve our alert system and our response capability. Certainly, on the intelligence side, we are in much better shape today than we were a year or two ago.

Second, soon after the Reagan Administration assumed office, it created an Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism—most of you would say inter-ministerial—to serve as the policy formulation and coordination body for the government. It is composed of representatives of Federal agencies with direct responsibilities for combatting international terrorism. I am the chairman of that group. Since its inception it conducted a complete review of U.S. policy and proposed several initiatives. One of the gaps that needed to be filled was a near operational arrangement to provide support to the President and other key decisionmakers during a major terrorist incident. This has been remedied, and we believe that we are now better organized to get prompt policy guidance so that we can respond swiftly and effectively to a terrorist incident.

The possible use of force to resolve an incident is another important aspect of our response capability. In the United States, most major cities have SWAT [special weapons and tactics] teams. Each district of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has its own SWAT team. The rescue missions which were conducted at Entebbe, Mogadishu, and the Iranian Embassy in London last year, as well as a number of aircraft incidents, emphasize the need for an effective assault capability. The United

States has dedicated military forces for such a purpose. Although we consider the use of force in resolving a terrorist incident a measure of last resort, it is important to have these capabilities should they be needed.

Role of the Department of State

To many of you, terrorism is a domestic problem and you may wonder why the foreign office would head the Federal Government group on terrorism. The answer is quite simple: For the United States, most of the terrorist incidents have been directed against our diplomats or American interests overseas. The Department of State is the "ministry" in the United States most directly affected and best able to respond. We do have terrorist incidents in the United States and when they occur, it is the responsibility of the Department of Justice to take the lead and respond. As all of you attending this conference know, when it is the unique case of an aircraft, it is the responsibility of our Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).

As you might expect, the Department of State has taken many steps over the years to improve our security, especially overseas. We are now engaged in major improvements to many of our embassies which will provide better protection to both personnel and physical facilities. Some 15¢ out of every \$1.00 the Department spends on operations is for security. So it is no small matter to us. And other governments which have the responsibility for protecting American Embassies are spending again collectively as much as we do. It is my responsibility to assure that we recommend security policies and programs that provide a prudent level of protection. We are doing that.

Conclusion

We believe we have in place the policies, programs, and organization to deal with terrorism, but we are fully aware that there is much more to be done.

The international community must continue and strengthen its efforts to

cooperate more fully on terrorism. The international organizations in particular—the United Nations and the regional organizations—might consider additional conventions to outlaw terrorist tactics, such as assassinations and bombings, and bring these additional tactics under the "prosecute or extradite" obligation. The international community must give special emphasis to working arrangements that will give full effect to these policies and conventions. We are hopeful that we can implement our proposed antiterrorism training program beginning in 1983 and that it will make a significant contribution to more effective working relationships among civil authorities responsible for dealing with terrorism.

Individual countries should redouble their efforts to make clear that terrorism is an unacceptable method for achieving change. No matter what one's ideological preferences, a bomb in a train station or a threat of death against a plane load of civil air passengers is not an acceptable way to bring one's causes to public attention or to overthrow a government. An adequate response requires not only a better intelligence capability so that we are warned of possible terrorist acts, but that the machinery of government is organized from top to bottom so that we act promptly when a terrorist incident occurs. I believe that we in the U.S. Government are now prepared, but it will require constant vigilance, planning, and the exercise of our organizational system to have confidence that we can deal effectively with terrorist incidents.

We must work to establish a world in which peaceful change can occur without violence and terror. We must also be vigilant in our mutual efforts to prevent terrorist attacks. You have a particularly important part to play in prevention. I know that we will continue to work together toward this goal. In that effort, you can be certain that the United States is prepared to be a full and reliable partner. ■



Patterns of International Terrorism: 1981

Overview

Both the number of international terrorist incidents and the number of casualties resulting from incidents fell in 1981 (figure 1). Deaths caused by terrorist attacks dropped dramatically from 642 in 1980 to 173 in 1981. Despite this decline in the number of casualties, the long-term trend is toward more serious threats to human life. In 1970 about half the international terrorist incidents were directed against people and half were directed against property. In 1981, 80% of such incidents were directed against people.

Attacks against U.S. citizens also declined in number with fewer casualties, but all the U.S. fatalities in 1981 (as in 1980) were killed because of their nationality. In earlier years, most were victims of indiscriminate terrorist attacks that had little or nothing to do with their citizenship.

The trend toward a broader geographic spread of international terrorism continued in 1981; incidents occurred in 91 countries, more than in any previous year. Government-sponsored international terrorist attacks were mainly directed against Middle Easterners in the Middle East.

Key Patterns in 1981


Types of Attacks. In 1981 international terrorists used a variety of methods to achieve their goals—including kidnapping, hostage taking, assassination, bombing, threats, and hoaxes (table 1). The number of serious incidents—kidnappings, major bombings, assassinations, and skyjackings—dropped. Although assassinations and assassination attempts dropped from 111 in 1980 to 70 last year, 1981 still had the second-highest total since 1968, when the United States began to record such incidents.

In the first part of 1981, the number of skyjackings was high, but after a few well-publicized failures, their incidence declined. In March a Pakistani commercial airliner was hijacked first to Afghanistan and then to Syria by the Pakistan Liberation Army (PLA). The resulting release of prisoners in Pakistan, combined with publicity and eventual freedom for the terrorists, probably encouraged other, less-successful attempts. An Indonesian plane was also seized in March and taken to Thailand where all the terrorists were killed by Indonesian forces, and the hijacking of a Turkish plane to Bulgaria was foiled by the pilot and passengers. Fewer incidents occurred during the rest of the year, apart from several attempts by East Europeans to hijack planes to the West. One dramatic exception was the simultaneous hijack-

Figure 1

International Terrorist Incidents

Number of Incidents Total Incidents: 7,425



A Jewish synagogue in Antwerp was bombed by the PFLP/SC on October 20, 1981, causing 2 deaths and 95 injuries.

(©Gamma)

ing of three planes from Venezuela via Central America to Cuba, where the hostages were released. The total number of skyjackings reported in 1981 was 32, four less than the previous year. Caution is indicated in using these figures, however, as the United States suspects far more incidents may have occurred in Eastern Europe than the United States has recorded.

Location of Attacks. Figures for 1981 confirm a clear trend toward a greater geographic spread of international terrorism.

1970	48 countries
1975	57 countries
1980	76 countries
1981	91 countries

The great majority of incidents, however, continued to occur in a few areas where conditions facilitate publicity and in some cases provide greater safety for the perpetrators—Western Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, and North America. More incidents occurred in the United States than in any other country, but Argentina, Lebanon, West Germany, France, and Italy were also sites of frequent terrorism.

Victims. In 1981 citizens of 77 countries were the victims of international terrorist incidents, more than in any previous year since January 1968. As in past years, U.S. citizens were the primary target, followed by those of the United Kingdom, U.S.S.R., France, Israel, Turkey, and Iraq. Attacks or threats against citizens of these seven countries accounted for more than 60% of the 709 incidents (including threats and hoaxes) recorded in 1981. Incidents directed against U.S. citizens or facilities totaled 258 last year.

In terms of who or what is attacked, there are several clear and ominous trends. In 1970 about half of the incidents were against people, the rest against property. Now, 80% are directed against people. Diplomats are the foremost category; the number of attacks against them rose from an average 165 per year during 1975-79 to 409 in 1980 and then dropped to 368 in 1981, when they constituted more than half of all victims. This is due in part to the rising number of attacks sponsored by

Table 1
Geographic Distribution of International Terrorist Incidents, 1981, by Category

Type of Event	North America	Latin America	Western Europe	U.S.S.R./ Eastern Europe	Sub-Saharan Africa
Kidnapping	0	10	6	0	1
Barricade-hostage	3	13	12	0	1
Bombing ^a	12	25	89	1	9
Armed attack	0	7	2	0	1
Hijacking ^b	4	9	2	8	1
Assassination ^c	2	7	30	4	3
Sabotage	0	0	1	0	0
Exotic pollution	0	1	0	0	0
Subtotal	21	72	142	13	16
Bombing (minor)	12	33	52	2	6
Threat	15	18	15	6	6
Theft, break-in	1	4	5	0	0
Hoax	34	17	18	3	1
Other ^d	5	12	17	1	3
Subtotal	67	84	107	12	16
Total	88	156	249	25	32

Type of Event	Middle East/ North Africa	Asia	Pacific	Unkown	Total
Kidnapping	5	0	0	0	22
Barricade-hostage	3	0	0	0	32
Bombing ^a	33	1	0	0	170
Armed attack	15	0	0	0	25
Hijacking ^b	3	5	0	0	32
Assassination ^c	20	3	1	0	70
Sabotage	0	0	0	0	1
Exotic pollution	0	0	0	0	1
Subtotal	79	9	1	0	353
Bombing (minor)	13	4	0	0	122
Threat	7	6	0	0	73
Theft, break-in	2	1	0	0	13
Hoax	6	5	1	0	85
Other ^d	22	2	0	1	63
Subtotal	50	18	1	1	356
Total	129	27	2	1	709

^aBombings where damage or casualties occurred, or where a group claimed responsibility

^bHijackings of air, sea, or land transport.

^cIncludes assassination or attempt to assassinate where the victim was preselected by name.

^dIncludes conspiracy and other actions such as sniping, shootout with police, and arms smuggling.

governments, which tend to single out enemy diplomats, dissidents, and prominent exiles living abroad. Businessmen, mostly U.S. citizens in Latin America,

were the victims in 12% of the incident and military personnel were involved in about 9%. Attacks against military personnel constitute one of the fastest growing categories.



Categories of Terrorist Incidents

Terrorist Groups. A total of 113 groups claimed credit for international terrorist incidents in 1981, down slightly from the high of 128 in 1980. These numbers are undoubtedly inflated: some groups create cover names to avoid responsibility for a particular action, others use them to commemorate an anniversary, and common criminals create titles to mislead investigators. The terrorists represented 86 nationalities, but, as in the past, Palestinians, Armenians, West Germans, and Central Americans were responsible for the majority of incidents.

Terrorist Events Causing Death or Injury. Only about one-fourth as many people were killed in terrorist attacks in 1981 as in the previous year—173 compared with 642. The number injured also dropped, but not as dramatically (figure 2). The patterns were, however, similar to previous years. Assassination attempts and bombings accounted for the majority of attacks that involved casualties, and most of these incidents occurred in Western Europe and the Middle East. Terrorists appear to have been more careful in selecting their targets, and more than half of such attacks resulted in harm only to the intended victim, whereas in the past innocent bystanders were much more often the victims.

Attacks that produced casualties occurred in 56 countries. The greatest number took place in Lebanon, where many of the Middle Eastern terrorist groups are headquartered and where

Kidnapping

Seizure of one or more victims, who are then moved to a hideout.

Barricade-Hostage

Seizure of a facility with whatever hostages are available; their release is made contingent on meeting terrorists' demands.

Bombing

Major bombing—use of any type of explosive or incendiary device for terrorist purposes, including those delivered through the mail, when significant damage or casualties occur or a terrorist group claims responsibility. Minor bombing—same as above except that there are no casualties and little or no damage, and no group claims responsibility.

Armed Attack

An attempt to seize or damage a facility, with no intent to hold it for negotiating purposes.

Hijacking

An attempt to seize an airplane, ship, or other vehicle, with whatever hostages may be in it, to force some action—movement to another country and/or agreement by the authorities involved to some terrorist demand.

Assassination

An attempt, whether or not successful, to kill a preselected victim, usually with small arms or bombs. Letter bombs are excluded from this category, although, in at least some cases, there probably is a specific intended victim.

Seizure

Intentional destruction of property by means other than bombing.

Exotic Pollution

Use of exotic substances—atomic, chemical, or biological—to contaminate material; for example, the introduction of mercury into oranges shipped from Israel.

Threat Hoax

The stated intent by a terrorist group to carry out an attack, or a false alert to authorities about a coming terrorist attack by a named group.

These incidents serve terrorists' purposes in that they tend to alarm and intimidate potential victims, their parent states and organizations, and often the local populace. They usually cause facilities to be evacuated, absorb the time of investigative authorities, and generally disrupt the work of the threatened group.

Well over half the recorded threats and hoaxes are directed against U.S. citizens—673 out of a total of 1,081 threats and 78 out of 143 hoaxes. This is at least partially attributable to the fact that the United States has much more information about such incidents than it does about threats or hoaxes directed against other nations' citizens. Moreover, much of the information on such incidents directed against foreigners is derived from their reports to U.S. authorities about such attacks in the United States—frequently at the United Nations.


Theft, Break-In

Illegal entry into a facility to intimidate or harass its owners.

Other

Includes sniping, shootouts with police, arms smuggling, and credible reports of plotting a terrorist attack that is subsequently foiled or aborted. In all cases a terrorist group is named. ■

Figure 2
Deaths and Injuries Due to International Terrorist Attacks



responsibility for security is fragmented. Included in the Lebanese total are a number of Iraqi and Iranian attacks on each other's diplomats.

Fifty-eight terrorist groups claimed responsibility for attacks that produced casualties in 1981, compared with 49 in 1980. The Armenian and Palestinian groups were responsible for most of these attacks. Nationalities most victimized changed little from 1980: Americans were most numerous among casualties, followed by Israelis, Britons, Iraqis, and Iranians.

Attacks Against U.S. Citizens. A total of 258 international terrorist incidents were directed against U.S. citizens or property during 1981—slightly more than in most previous years but not as many as in 1978 and 1980. There were nine kidnappings, 14 assassination attacks, and 91 bombings of U.S. property—about the same as in 1980. Threats dropped significantly from 50 to 29, but hoaxes rose from 25 to 51 (tables 2 and 3 and figure 3).

A new and ominous development is that all the Americans killed by international terrorist attacks in 1980 and 1981 were assassinated because of their nationality. In earlier years, most Americans killed in such incidents were victims of indiscriminate attacks that had little or nothing to do with their nationality. Moreover, at least one terrorist group, the Red Brigades, is known to have shifted to less well-protected U.S. officials after initially planning to attack a closely guarded target.

Seventy-two international terrorist groups took credit for attacks against Americans in 1981. The Colombian leftist group—April 19 Movement (M-19)—claimed the largest number. The Red Army Faction (RAF) and its sympathizers in West Germany and terrorist groups in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Peru also carried out a significant number of attacks against Americans.

In addition to nongovernment-sponsored terrorist attacks in 1981, the United States was confronted by Libyan leader Qadhafi's threat to assassinate President Reagan and other senior U.S. Government officials and to attack U.S. facilities abroad.

Table 2
Geographic Distribution of International Terrorist Attacks on U.S. Citizens and Property, 1981, by Category

Type of Event	North America	Latin America	Western Europe	U.S.S.R./ Eastern Europe	Sub-Saharan Africa
Kidnapping	0	8	1	0	0
Barricade-hostage	0	2	0	0	0
Bombing ^a	4	21	21	0	1
Armed attack	0	5	0	0	0
Hijacking ^b	4	6	2	4	0
Assassination ^c	0	5	3	0	0
Sabotage	0	0	1	0	0
Subtotal	8	47	28	4	1
Bombing (minor)	5	16	17	0	1
Threat	3	8	7	2	2
Theft, break-in	0	1	2	0	0
Hoax	6	15	15	3	1
Other ^d	1	8	8	1	2
Subtotal	15	48	49	6	6
Total	23	95	77	10	7

Type of Event	Middle East/ North Africa	Asia	Pacific	Unkown	Total
Kidnapping	0	0	0	0	9
Barricade-hostage	0	0	0	0	2
Bombing ^a	0	0	0	0	47
Armed attack	2	0	0	0	7
Hijacking ^b	1	4	0	0	21
Assassination ^c	5	1	0	0	14
Sabotage	0	0	0	0	1
Subtotal	8	5	0	0	101
Bombing (minor)	2	3	0	0	44
Threat	3	4	0	0	29
Theft, break-in	2	1	0	0	6
Hoax	6	4	1	0	51
Other ^d	6	1	0	0	27
Subtotal	19	13	1	0	157
Total	27	18	1	0	258

^aBombings where damage or casualties occurred, or where a group claimed responsibility.


^bHijackings of air, sea, or land transport.

^cIncludes assassination or attempt to assassinate where the victim was preselected by name.

^dIncludes conspiracy and other actions such as sniping, shootout with police, and arms smuggling.

In 1981, 17% of incidents directed against Americans resulted in at least one casualty. Six Americans were killed and 31 wounded in international terrorist attacks in 1981. These numbers

are slightly lower than in the last few years. This is partially due to good fortune; the number of attempted violent attacks has not decreased.



All six U.S. citizens killed in 1981 were assassinated in Latin America, where more than one-third of the incidents directed against Americans occurred. While the attacks were no more frequent than in 1980, the number in each year was higher than in any previous year. Five assassination attacks, eight kidnappings, 37 bombings, and four skyjackings that involved U.S. citizens were recorded in Latin America during the year.

- In El Salvador 15 incidents took place, including a series of armed attacks against the U.S. Embassy in March and April and the murder of two Americans in January.
- In Guatemala there were 14 attacks, including five kidnappings and the murder of three U.S. citizens.
- In Costa Rica a bomb destroyed a train carrying Marine guards to the U.S. Embassy, injuring three guards and their driver.
- In Colombia the M-19 carried out eight attacks on Americans during the year, including the murder of a kidnapped missionary.
- In Peru the U.S. chancery and the ambassador's residence were bombed on August 31.

A total of 30 attacks were directed against U.S. personnel and property in West Germany during 1981—more than in any other year. They were carried out by RAF members or sympathizers and included an attempt to assassinate Gen. Frederick Kroesen (commander, U.S. forces in Europe) as well as numerous bombings of U.S. facilities. The last bombing of the year, on August 31 at Ramstein AFB, damaged the headquarters building and injured 18 people, including a U.S. brigadier general.

The Broader Picture


Since the United States began recording international terrorist incidents in 1968, a number of broad patterns have emerged. Some are relatively unchanging, such as the distribution of terrorist incidents—where Western Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East continue to account for about three-fourths of all incidents (figure 4). Almost half of the incidents recorded since 1968 have occurred in only nine countries. The

Figure 3

International Terrorist Attacks on US Personnel and Facilities, 1981



Figure 4
Geographic Distribution of International Terrorist Attacks, 1968-81



greatest number were recorded in the United States (partly because information is better); other nations with a large number of incidents include Argentina, Italy, France, West Germany, Iran, Turkey, Greece, and Israel. These are convenient locations for terrorist operations, and in many cases the incident did not even involve citizens of the country in which the event occurred. Fewer than 20% of the events in France involved French terrorists, for example, and an even smaller portion of the victims were French nationals.


Over the past 14 years, more than 20% of all international terrorist incidents occurred in Latin America, and the number in that region has been increasing faster than in other parts of the world. More attacks were recorded in 1980-81 than in any other 2-year

period since 1968, primarily reflecting the spillover of increased domestic violence into the international arena. In most cases, the attacks were carried out by indigenous groups against foreigners in an attempt to discredit or undermine the local regime. In some cases the attacks were by rightwing groups against foreigners who were thought to sympathize with antigovernment forces.

From 1968 through 1981, the United States recorded 1,512 international terrorist incidents in the Middle East and North Africa. The number of attacks in the region was highest in 1978 (reflecting increased anti-American activity in Iran), remained high in 1979 and 1980, and declined somewhat in 1981. As in Latin America, much of the international terrorism is a spillover from domestic violence; Iran in 1978 is a good example. Most of the attacks in that region were carried out by Middle Eastern terrorists, and about half were directly at other Middle Eastern citizens. Responsibility was claimed by 151 different terrorist groups—mostly Palestinian.¹

While citizens of almost every country have been victimized by international terrorism, most incidents have been directed against those of only a few countries (figure 5). U.S. records show that between 1968 and 1981, citizens of 131 different countries were victimized by international terrorism; attacks against U.S., Israeli, U.K., West German, French, and U.S.S.R. nationals ac-

Figure 6
Type of Victim of International Terrorist Attacks, 1968-81



count for more than 60% of all the incidents. Americans were by far the most often targeted.² Of the 7,425 attacks recorded, 38% were directed against U.S. citizens. This reflects the wide geographic spread of American interests and the fact that U.S. citizens are regarded as symbols of Western wealth and power.

Each year, between 35% and 45% of all the international terrorist incidents are directed against U.S. personnel or property. The second-highest number of incidents against any single country has consistently been far less—about 10% of the total. Usually either Israel or the United Kingdom has been the second most victimized country. In 1979,

however, it was France and in 1980, the Soviet Union.

Diplomats have been the foremost target of terrorist incidents, accounting for nearly 40% of the total (figure 6). Businesses and businessmen are the second most frequent victims. Since 1968 almost one-fourth of the incidents were directed against business, especially U.S. business in Latin America. The number reached a high in 1978 and declined thereafter—in part because of increased security, improved operating procedures in high-risk areas, and, most importantly, a shift in focus by many terrorist groups.

Although military personnel are not as large a segment of the victim population as diplomats or businessmen, the United States has recorded 600 terrorist attacks (fewer than 10% of the total) against them. The number of attacks against the military is increasing at the greatest rate.

The pattern of terrorist events that produce casualties appears to be changing. In 1,614 such incidents (figure 7), 3,841 people were killed and 8,298 wounded. Bombings and assassinations account for more than 70% of the attacks that produced casualties. Bombings have always been the most prevalent, perhaps the most serious being the December 15, 1981, bombing of the Iraqi Embassy in Beirut, which killed at least 55 and injured another 100.


In recent years, however, assassination attempts have increased dramatically, especially from 1977 to 1980.

1968-76	20 (annual average)
1977	34
1978	54
1979	65
1980	111
1981	70

This increase is attributable to the fact that several countries—Libya, Syria, and Iran among them—have increasingly used their military and intelligence services to carry out terrorist attacks against foreign diplomats or their own exiles.

U.S. citizens have been the victims of only 20% of all attacks that produce casualties, while suffering more than 40% of all international terrorist incidents. U.S. businessmen have been the primary target of casualty-producing a

Figure 5
Nationality of Victims of International Terrorist Attacks, 1968-81






Terrorist Groups

More than 670 groups have claimed credit for at least one international attack since the United States began keeping statistics in 1968. This number is undoubtedly inflated: some of these are cover names for organizations wishing to deny responsibility for a particular action, and some have probably been used by common criminals to throw off investigators or by psychotics seeking public recognition. The list includes the names of nations that conduct international terrorism such as Libya and Syria, insurgency groups that use terrorist tactics, separatist groups such as the ETA (a Basque group), and nihilist groups such as the RAF and the Japanese Red Army. It includes leftwing groups, rightwing groups, anti-American groups, anti-Soviet groups, environmentalist groups, and even religious groups. They represent the spectrum of ideologies, classes, cultures, and races.

The annual number of groups that claim credit for attacks has increased markedly since the United States began keeping statistics. For example, 49 groups claimed credit for attacks in 1970, rising to 111 groups by 1975, and 128 groups by 1980. It dropped slightly to 113 in 1981.

While some terrorist groups have dropped out of sight during the 14-year period, a large number have persisted. They are well organized, with a dedicated core of well-trained and highly motivated terrorists. Moreover, they usually have at least some popular sup-

Figure 9
International Terrorist Attacks on US Personnel and Facilities, 1968-81




port. Although the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) is primarily a domestic terrorist group that conducts operations in Northern Ireland, U.S. records show that the PIRA and its sympathizers have conducted more international terrorism than any other group. The PIRA has launched attacks from several countries, and the attacks have involved citizens from at least 15 countries, although the majority were against British nationals.

The Black September Organization has carried out the second-largest number of attacks, most of them in Europe and the Middle East, targeted against Israelis and moderate Palestinians. Other Palestinian groups—particularly the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the PFLP-General Command, and the Black June Organization (BJO)—have conducted terrorist incidents during the past 14 years. Together, the Palestinian groups perpetrated more international attacks than any other movement. U.S. records show 9% of all terrorist attacks (almost 700) have been carried out by Palestinians.

Other significant groups that have been active in international terrorism are the Montoneros, the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), the Basque Fatherland and Liberty, the M-19, and the RAF. Among the states most active in carrying out international terrorist attacks are Libya, Iran, Syria, and Iraq.

Figure 7
International Terrorist Incidents That Caused Casualties




ports, but attacks on U.S. diplomats and military personnel have increased at a steeper rate in recent years.

Over the period 1968-81, attacks on Americans that produced casualties occurred in 69 countries, most frequently Argentina, Iran, and the Philippines. More than 155 terrorist groups claimed responsibility for one or more attacks. The Argentine Montoneros and Iranian and Palestinian groups have been the most prominent perpetrators.

In 1981, for the first time, the United States has grouped terrorist incidents into more serious and less serious categories. As shown in figure 8, the number of serious incidents—such as kidnappings, the taking of hostages, assassination attacks, and major bombings—rose rapidly in the early 1970s, remained fairly steady between 1974 and 1979, then jumped to new highs in 1980-81. Less serious incidents have occurred more widely. The peak year for relatively minor incidents, 1978, saw a drop in serious incidents. Minor bombings and threats account for more than 90% of the less serious incidents.

The trend of serious international terrorist incidents involving U.S. citizens and property has shown little variation (figure 9). It peaked in 1975, declined thereafter, only to rise somewhat in the past 2 years. Less serious incidents account for most of the year-to-year variation in total incidents involving the United States.

Figure 8
International Terrorist Incidents, 1968-81



Activities of Significant Groups in 1981

The United States recorded 113 terrorist groups that claimed credit for international attacks during 1981. The terrorists represented 86 nationalities, and, as in the past, Palestinians, Armenians, Germans, Salvadorans, and Guatemalans carried out the most attacks.

Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia. ASALA carried out more international attacks during 1981 than any other terrorist organization. Its primary targets in the past have been Turkish diplomats and diplomatic facilities, but, under cover names, ASALA has attacked Swiss interests in retaliation for the arrest of ASALA members, and, using the name Orly Organization, it has attacked French interests in retaliation for the November arrest of an Armenian carrying a false passport at Orly Airport. ASALA carried out 40 attacks in 11 countries during the year. Although most of the attacks were bombings against French and Swiss property, the most serious were attacks against Turkish diplomats. These included the September 24 seizure of the Turkish Consulate in Paris and the assassination of Turkish diplomats in Switzerland, Denmark, and France.

Palestinian Terrorists. Palestinian terrorists have not been as active in international terrorism in recent years as during the mid-1970s. In 1981 some radical Palestinian groups resumed international terrorist attacks. Palestinian terrorists carried out a total of 49 attacks during 1981; groups such as the May 15 Organization, Black June Organization, and the PFLP-SC (Special Command) were the most active. This is far more than recorded in 1979 or 1980 but about the same as during the mid-1970s. The attacks were committed in 14 countries. Most of the incidents were bombings, six were assassination attempts, five were armed attacks, and one was a rocket attack.

The May 15 Organization and the PFLP-SC were active in 1981. The former carried out attacks against Israeli targets in Europe, including bomb attacks on the embassies in Vien-

Table 3

International Terrorist Attacks on U.S. Citizens and Property, 1968-81, by Category

Type of Event	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
Kidnapping	1	3	25	19	5	22	14	23
Barricade-hostage	1	0	4	0	1	3	2	1
Bombing ^a	13	31	29	37	44	28	80	71
Armed attack	1	4	3	5	10	8	6	7
Hijacking ^b	1	5	12	4	4	0	1	2
Assassination ^c	3	3	10	2	4	4	2	8
Sabotage	0	0	0	3	3	1	0	1
Subtotal	20	46	83	70	71	66	105	113
Bombing (minor)	36	62	106	105	100	79	79	41
Threat	11	12	51	51	71	77	19	19
Theft, break-in	0	3	15	8	1	3	4	3
Hoax	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Other ^d	4	1	10	9	12	11	9	5
Subtotal	51	78	183	173	184	170	111	68
Total	71	124	266	243	255	236	216	181

Type of Event	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	Total
Kidnapping	8	7	8	8	10	9	162
Barricade-hostage	2	3	0	6	7	2	32
Bombing ^a	54	63	42	35	39	47	613
Armed attack	8	5	12	10	11	7	97
Hijacking ^b	5	4	3	15	20	21	97
Assassination ^c	15	6	7	10	18	14	106
Sabotage	1	0	0	1	0	1	11
Subtotal	93	88	72	85	105	101	1,118
Bombing (minor)	71	72	133	91	58	44	1,077
Threat	53	22	161	47	50	29	673
Theft, break-in	1	0	7	4	13	6	68
Hoax	0	0	0	1	25	51	78
Other ^d	13	13	23	28	27	27	192
Subtotal	138	107	324	171	173	157	2,088
Total	231	195	396	256	278	258	3,206

^aBombings where damage or casualties occurred, or where a group claimed responsibility

^bHijackings of air, sea, or land transport.

^cIncludes assassination or attempt to assassinate where the victim was preselected by name.

^dIncludes conspiracy and other actions such as sniping, shootout with police, and arms smuggling.

na and Athens and on El Al offices in Italy and Turkey. It also claimed credit for the bombing of a Cypriot cruise ship in Haifa, Israel. The PFLP-SC carried out a series of bombings in the Middle East and is believed responsible for the October 20 bombing of a synagogue in Belgium.

The Black June Organization (BJO) a radical Palestinian group which opposes political settlement with Israel or Palestine Liberation Organization leader Arafat's moderate policies, was also very active during 1981. It targeted moderate Palestinians, Israelis, and non-Israeli Jews. On September 23, BJO launched a hand grenade attack on the offices of a




Israeli shipping line in Cyprus. BJO killed moderate Palestinian leaders on June 1 in Brussels and on October 9 in Rome. (This is the group that attempted to assassinate the Israeli Ambassador in London on June 3, 1982, an incident that preceded the Israeli invasion of Lebanon.)

Provisional Irish Republican Army. The PIRA was more active in 1981 than in most previous years. It retaliated for the attempted assassination of Bernadette Devlin McAliskey with the murder of Sir Norman Stronge and his son.

PIRA expanded the tactic of prisoner hunger strikes. After a 66-day fast, Bobby Sands died on May 5. He was the first and most widely publicized IRA militant to die in 1981. Nine other IRA and Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) members died after unsuccessful attempts to gain prisoner-of-war status for the terrorist inmates. After the failure of the hunger strikes, the IRA intensified its campaign of violence in England. In October and November it claimed credit for bombing facilities in London, mailed several bombs to British facilities, kidnapped the son of a wealthy Irish businessman, and attempted to assassinate the Commanding General of the British Royal Marines. PIRA sympathizers destroyed British cars in West Germany, bombed a British cultural center in Greece, attacked British targets in Portugal, and threatened British facilities in Switzerland.

Red Army Faction. The RAF in 1981 launched a series of attacks against the U.S. presence in West Germany despite a series of setbacks in 1980. The RAF had been rebuilding its operational structure for some time, and in an attempt to capitalize on the controversy over NATO nuclear weapons modernization plans and "squatters' rights" in West Berlin, the RAF and its sympathizer groups carried out numerous attacks.

The RAF or its supporters claimed credit for numerous attacks during the year. It firebombed U.S. military facilities in Frankfurt and Wiesbaden. It attempted to bomb the U.S. library in West Berlin and the Dow chemical plant in Dusseldorf. On August 31, the RAF



(S. Sigma)

exploded a car bomb at the U.S. Air Force Headquarters at Ramstein. It attempted to assassinate U.S. Gen. Frederick Kroesen on September 15, firing two rocket-propelled antitank weapons at Kroesen's car; one missed, and the other hit the trunk. The car was severely damaged, but no one was seriously injured. Sympathizer groups

During 1981 Irish terrorists imprisoned in Northern Ireland carried out hunger strikes "to the death." Ten prisoners died.

Skyjacking

Since January 1968, there have been 684 attempted skyjackings, representing about 9% of all terrorist attacks since that date. According to U.S. records, those attempts have resulted in at least 50 fatalities and 400 injuries. More than one-third of the hijackers demanded passage to Cuba. Nearly 40% of the planes hijacked belonged to U.S. carriers (such as Eastern, National, and TWA).

The number of attempted skyjackings reached a high in 1969-70, declined slightly in 1971-72, then decreased by half in 1973, and has remained fairly constant since then. These decreases are easily traced to increased public awareness of and concern for this threat. The 1970 multiple skyjacking by Palestinian terrorists was the catalyst for international concern which resulted in The Hague and Montreal conventions on aerial hi-

jacking. In January 1973, the full screening of boarding passengers and luggage inspection was instituted in the United States and, to a lesser extent, at international airports in other countries; that year the number of skyjacking attempts was half that of the previous year. The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) reports that more than 20,000 firearms have been confiscated since the institution of these security measures.

Of the 684 skyjacking attempts since 1968, 108 have been designated terrorist skyjackings, meaning they were politically motivated. More than one-third of these resulted in casualties (212 dead and 186 wounded). Terrorist skyjackings originated in 43 countries and terminated in 47 countries, most of them in Latin America, Western Europe, and the Middle East. Forty-eight terrorist groups

claimed the credit, almost half of them Palestinians and Latin Americans.

Between 1973 and 1980, terrorists averaged five skyjacking attempts a year. There was a significant increase in 1981, partly attributable to the Pakistan Liberation Army's (PLA) successful skyjack in March, which probably encouraged other attempts. As of May 31, 1982, there have been four terrorist skyjackings, suggesting a decrease from the 1981 total.

Terrorists achieved logistic success in 70% of their attempts between January 1968 and June 1982. (Logistic success does not mean that ancillary demands were met; it simply notes whether the skyjacker was able to divert the plane to a destination selected by the terrorist.) ■

Terrorist Skyjackings by Region, January 1968-June 1982*





also attacked West German and U.S. targets in Germany and other European countries. The Black Block bombed two U.S. military facilities near Frankfurt and attempted to bomb the railroad line to the Rhein/Main airbase. Others bombed the U.S. Consul General's office and a military base near Frankfurt and U.S. military facilities in Kassal, Wiesbaden, and West Berlin. They also attacked a West German Consulate in Switzerland and the U.S. Embassy in Sofia.

Red Brigades. Despite some setbacks early in the year, the Red Brigades broadened their targets to include foreign nationals in 1981. The confessions of Patrizio Peci, the arrest of RB planner Mario Moretti, and increased government antiterrorist activity contributed to pressure on the RB.

The RB claimed credit for numerous attacks during the past year—the assassination of a hospital director in Milan, a prison warden in Rome, and four police officials. The RB kidnapped three individuals, murdering one and releasing the other two after holding them for lengthy periods. In retaliation for Peci's testimony, the RB kidnapped and killed his brother and shot one of his defense attorneys. During the year, the RB also wounded 12 victims, bombed four facilities, and robbed a bank in Rome.

On December 17, RB kidnapped U.S. Army Brig. Gen. James Dozier from his home in Verona, Italy. Italian authorities subsequently arrested more than 300 suspects and uncovered large amounts of weapons and supplies in the search for Dozier and subsequent counterterrorist operations. On January 28, 1982, Italian officers rescued Dozier from a safehouse in Padua.

Basque Fatherland and Liberty. In Spain, the ETA-PM (Political-Military) and the ETA-M (Military), both Marxist-Leninist-oriented Basque separatist organizations, continued their campaign of violence against the Spanish Government. They also targeted citizens from six other countries in Spain, including threats to bomb the U.S. airbase near Torrejon.

Early in January the government granted greater autonomy for the Basque region in an attempt to decrease

tension, but this did not stop the terrorists; they claimed credit for many attacks during the next few months. Near the end of January, the terrorists fired antitank weapons at government buildings in two Basque cities, kidnapped a prominent citizen in Bilbao, and kidnapped and murdered the chief nuclear engineer at the Lemoniz power plant in northern Spain. During the same month, the Spanish police rescued unharmed a prominent doctor who had been kidnapped in Madrid and was being held in northeast Spain by ETA-PM for a U.S. \$2 million ransom.

On February 20, in a coordinated operation, the ETA kidnapped the honorary consuls to Spain from Austria, El Salvador, and Uruguay. The consuls were held for a week, and the attack received widespread publicity.

On February 23, the ETA-PM announced its intention to abandon terrorism. Shortly thereafter the ETA-M increased its terrorist campaign. In February and March, it bombed facilities, attacked police patrols, and assassinated prominent members of the Spanish Government. A few months later the ETA-M carried out another series of attacks, which included assaults on police and Civil Guard facilities and bombings of the Spanish electric company.

April 19 Movement. The Colombian April 19 Movement (M-19) carried out 11 international terrorist operations in 1981, including bombings, hijackings, and one kidnapping. All of the incidents occurred in Colombia and almost all were targeted against the United States. A faction of the group kidnapped a U.S. citizen, and after weeks of negotiations and threats his body was found in an abandoned bus in Bogota.

The M-19 attempted large-scale military operations on March 8 and 11, launching amphibious attacks on three remote villages in southern Colombia. Government forces killed or captured most of the terrorists. M-19 suffered another major setback when a truckload of sophisticated weapons, including rocket grenades and machineguns, was captured by the Colombian border guard.

Marxist-Leninist Armed Propaganda Unit. In Turkey the MLAPU, a faction of the Turkish People's Liberation Party/Front, the most anti-U.S. of all the leftist groups in Turkey, was responsible for the deaths of seven Americans in 1979 and one in 1980. MLAPU killed no Americans in 1981 and had very little success in other terrorist attacks during the year.

Since imposition of martial law in September 1980, the Turkish military government has killed or arrested a number of MLAPU members, raided safehouses, and executed convicted MLAPU members. Although the group suffered setbacks during the year, it was

U.S. Business Can Call for Help

The Department of State's Threat Analysis Group can provide brief unclassified oral evaluations to U.S. business representatives on the potential terrorist threat in countries around the world. Call (202) 632-6308.

During an international terrorist incident involving U.S. interests, a State Department task force coordinates the U.S. response. Businessmen, whose operations may be affected by that crisis, may telephone the Office for Combatting Terrorism to be put in direct contact with the task force. Call (202) 632-9892. ■

able to conduct some terrorist operations, both against the U.S. presence in Turkey and against the Turkish Government. On January 22, the MLAPU attempted to assassinate two U.S. soldiers as they walked to a bus stop. On April 6, the MLAPU claimed credit for an attack on a U.S. military vehicle. Although the vehicle was hit by machinegun fire a number of times, no one was seriously injured. The terrorists who carried out this attack were arrested in a raid on a safehouse the following day.

Special Cases—Guatemala and El Salvador. In Guatemala and El Salvador, prolonged domestic strife has created fertile soil for terrorism, both domestic and international. Terrorism is a major tactic of both leftwing and rightwing groups in El Salvador. Of the

five leftwing groups forming the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN), the Popular Liberation Forces (FPL) is the strongest and largest. Groups operating under the rubric FMLN or FPL claimed responsibility for most of the attacks in 1981, including 18 attacks on U.S. personnel or facilities and 10 attacks on the embassies or private facilities of other Central American countries. Among the incidents involving U.S. citizens was a series of attacks on the U.S. Embassy during March and April. Other attacks on Americans in El Salvador included the bombing of the Exxon compound, a Hardees restaurant, and the Citibank facilities.

Rightwing terrorists were also active in El Salvador, with most attacks against other Salvadoran citizens. On January 3, the head of the agrarian reform program and two U.S. advisers were assassinated by three terrorists while at a dinner meeting at the Sheraton Hotel in San Salvador. Two men arrested in connection with this case have ties with extreme rightwing groups opposed to Salvadoran land reform.

In Guatemala terrorism figured as a major tactic of the right, the left, and the Guatemalan Government. U.S. files contain records of 27 international terrorist attacks in 1981. These include bombings, kidnappings, and four assassination attempts. While most of the international attacks were carried out by leftwing groups such as the Guerrilla Army of the Poor, two U.S. citizens were assassinated by rightwing groups. Thirteen of the attacks were directed at American personnel and property. Other victims of international terrorism in Guatemala included citizens of Japan, Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, Spain, and Honduras.

Among the most publicized assassinations were two U.S. missionaries working in Guatemala and a U.S. businessman, who had been kidnapped in December 1980 by leftwing guerrillas during an attempted rescue by the Guatemalan police. Numerous bombings of foreign facilities were recorded, including the Pan American headquarters, the Honduran airline office, the American Chamber of Commerce office, an Eastern Airlines plane on the ground, the Chevron oil depot in

Guatemala City, the British Consul's office, and a U.S.-owned hotel. Other incidents included the murders of an Italian and a Spanish priest working in the area and the kidnapping of an Australian and a U.S. citizen for ransom.

State-Sponsored International Terrorism

Nations support international terrorist groups or engage in terrorist attacks to influence policies of other countries, to establish or strengthen regional or global influence, and, in some cases, to eliminate or terrorize dissident exiles and nationals from adversary countries.

Many countries are reluctant to condemn states that support or engage in international terrorist activities when those activities are cloaked in the mantle of anti-imperialism. Other countries tolerate state-sponsored terrorist activities because they fear economic or other forms of retaliation by the sponsoring states.

U.S. records list 129 terrorist attacks conducted directly by national governments, but this figure almost certainly understates the incidence of state-sponsored terrorism. More than 80% of the 129 attacks took place in 1980 and 1981, and almost 40% were assassinations or attempted assassinations. This is roughly six times the percentage of assassinations recorded in non-state-sponsored terrorist attacks. State-sponsored attacks were more lethal than other terrorist incidents, 44% resulting in casualties—a total of 60 persons injured and 61 killed. A majority of these attacks occurred in the Middle East, were carried out by Middle East nations, and were directed against expatriates and diplomats from Middle Eastern countries.

The pattern of state-sponsored international terrorist incidents in 1981 was similar to that of 1980. The 44 attacks occurred in 20 different countries, but almost half were in Lebanon. The attacks were directed against citizens from 17 countries, half of them from the Middle East. Incidents included kidnappings, bombings, assassinations, and armed attacks against embassies or other facilities. During 1981, 21 victims were killed and 28 wounded in state-

sponsored international terrorist attacks.

Soviet Union. The Soviets provide training, arms, and other direct and indirect support to a variety of national insurgent and separatist groups. Many of these groups commit international terrorist attacks as part of their program of revolutionary violence. Moreover, some of the individuals trained and equipped by the Soviets make their way into strictly terrorist groups with little revolutionary potential.

Moscow maintains close relations with and furnishes aid to governments and organizations that directly support terrorist groups. In the Middle East, for example, the Soviets sell large quantities of arms to Libya. The Soviets also back a number of Palestinian groups that openly conduct terrorist operations. In Latin America, the Soviet Union and Cuba appear to be pursuing a long-term coordinated campaign to establish sympathetic Latin American regimes. The Cubans, and more recently the Soviets, clearly support organizations and groups in Latin America that use terrorism as a basic technique to undermine existing regimes. In other parts of the world, especially Africa, the Soviets have supported guerrilla movements and national liberation organizations that engage in terrorism.

Libya. Support of terrorist groups has been an element of Libya's foreign policy under Qadhafi since the mid-1970s. Qadhafi has been linked by overwhelming evidence to terrorist attacks and assassinations in Western Europe, the United States, and the Middle East and is known to support terrorist groups and liberation movements worldwide. After the Gulf of Sidra incident, when the United States shot down two Libyan fighters which were attacking U.S. naval forces in international waters, Qadhafi threatened to assassinate President Reagan and other senior U.S. Government officials. The 1981 records contain information on 13 attacks by Libyan assassination squads.

South Yemen. The Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen has supported international terrorism since the late 1960s. It provides camps and other training facilities for a number of leftist terrorist groups.



The Government of South Yemen has not participated directly in international terrorist attacks, however, and South Yemeni citizens have been involved in only six incidents since 1968.

Syria. As a major supporter of radical Palestinian groups, Syria has provided training, logistic support, and use of diplomatic facilities to groups that are willing to do its bidding. Syria supports Palestinian elements that engage in international terrorism, including the BJO, which targets moderate Palestinian leaders as well as Israeli interests.

Iraq. During the past 3 years, the Iraqi Government has reduced support to non-Palestinian terrorists and placed restrictions on many Palestinian groups, moving closer to its moderate Arab neighbors.

Iran. Despite its radical, anti-Western policies, its support for Islamic fundamentalists, and widespread government terrorism within Iran, the Khomeini regime provides only limited support to international terrorist groups. U.S. records list 24 international terrorist attacks carried out directly by the Iranian Government in 1980 and five in 1981. All of the attacks in 1981 occurred in Beirut and were directed primarily against Iraqi diplomats. Most Iranian-sponsored attacks on Iraqi targets in Lebanon not undertaken by the Iranian Government were carried out by Lebanese Shiite militia members.

Cuba. Havana openly supports and advocates armed revolution as the only means for leftist forces to gain power in Latin America. Cuba also supports organizations and groups in Latin America that use terrorism to undermine existing regimes. The Cubans have played an important role in facilitating the movement of men and weapons into Central and South America, providing direct support in the form of training, arms, safe havens, and advice to a wide variety of guerrilla groups.

¹These groups were more active in the early 1970s.

²The proportions are skewed by the fact that much better information exists on incidents that involve the United States. ■

U.S. Business as a Target

Types of Attacks

International terrorists have used almost every type of violence against U.S. business personnel and facilities, ranging from telephone threats to murder. The United States has recorded 645 bombings, 61 kidnappings, 29 assassination attempts, and 23 armed attacks since January 1968.

Bombing. This is a preferred terrorist method in part because explosives are relatively easy to obtain, difficult to trace, and normally involve little personal risk to the perpetrators. This common type of attack occurred in 38 countries—the greatest number in Argentina, Iran, Italy, and Mexico. While almost 70% of all incidents recorded were bombings, the majority of them did not cause significant damage.

Seizure. Since 1968 there have been 94 attacks in which U.S. business personnel were taken hostage against the satisfaction of monetary or political demands. Almost two-thirds of these seizures were kidnappings, but such incidents also included skyjackings and hostage-barricade situations. The largest annual total of kidnappings and hostage seizures was 21 in 1981, almost four times the annual average for the 1968–81 period. Almost 60% of them occurred in Latin America, with the greatest number of incidents in Argentina, Guatemala, and Colombia. Financial demands were most often made for the release of the hostages, but other ultimatums included the release of imprisoned terrorists, publicity for a political statement, and/or a safe getaway for the captors. In over 75% of the hostage takings, the terrorists were able to achieve at least some of their demands.

Assassination. Although handgun assassinations of U.S. business representatives overseas are rare, they attract media attention, require a response from the local government, and have a strong impact on local business operations. Most incidents of this type have taken place in Argentina and Guatemala.

Types of Companies Targeted

The U.S. companies that have been the targets of terrorism range from well-known giants of international business to small enterprises. They included oil companies (Chevron, Mobil, Exxon, Gulf, and Texaco), banks and financial enterprises (Chase Manhattan, Chemical Bank of New York, Bankers Trust, Citibank, Bank of America, and American Express), and companies associated in the public mind with the "American way of

life" (Coca-Cola, Pepsi-Cola, Colgate-Palmolive, Ford, Chrysler, Macy's, Sears Roebuck, and McDonald's). Slightly less popular targets were airlines (Pan American), engineering firms (Bechtel), agricultural equipment companies (John Deere), and high-technology enterprises (IBM, Burroughs, and Honeywell).

Incidents Resulting in Casualties

Attacks that cause casualties are almost always perpetrated by experienced terrorist organizations, provoke a response from the highest levels of government and corporate management, and command worldwide media attention.

The United States recorded 144 terrorist attacks on U.S. business personnel in 1968–81 that caused injuries or death. Such incidents occurred in 31 countries, mostly Argentina, Iran, the United States, the Philippines, Mexico, and Guatemala. Sixty terrorist groups claimed credit. Bombings and assassinations accounted for 75% of the attacks resulting in casualties.

Location of Incidents

Since 1968 incidents of international terrorism against U.S. business personnel and facilities have occurred in 56 countries, more than 40% of them in only six countries. The greatest number were in Argentina, primarily because the Montoneros routinely targeted U.S. business interests during the early and mid-1970s. In the United States and Italy, the attacks were usually carried out by foreign terrorists, while in Argentina, Iran, Mexico, and Guatemala, the incidents were almost always the work of indigenous groups. Terrorist groups in Latin America carried out attacks as symbolic action against U.S. power, wealth, and influence in the region or in an attempt to undermine the local regime.

As with all terrorist attacks, incidents involving U.S. business are often carried out where they will receive the most publicity, and the large urban areas of Western Europe provide the perfect setting.

International Terrorist Groups

A total of 98 terrorist groups have claimed credit for attacks against U.S. businesses during the past 14 years. The Montoneros have claimed more responsibility than any other group.


The People's Revolutionary Army (Argentina) also conducted numerous attacks during the mid-1970s, but this group has not carried out an attack against U.S. business since 1976. ■



Terrorist Target: The Diplomat

by Frank H. Perez

*Address before the
conference on terrorism sponsored
by the Instituto de Cuestiones Internacionales,
Madrid, Spain, June 10, 1982*



These cars, belonging to U.S. employees, were burned inside the embassy compound in Islamabad, Pakistan, when mobs overran that facility in November 1979.

(Department of State)

The worldwide terrorism phenomenon of the past decade and a half has impacted most severely on our Western democratic societies. The brutal tactics of terrorist groups, whether from the far left or right, have served to erode democratic institutions and civil liberties in many parts of the world. Democracies have found it difficult to cope with the tactics of terrorism and in some cases have been tempted to respond by a turn to authoritarian political structures. Terrorism also has adversely impacted diplomatic relations between nations—even friendly ones.

Attacks on the Rise

In Beirut the French Ambassador is gunned down by terrorists. Several months later, a French employee of the embassy and his pregnant wife are found shot to death in their apartment. A car bomb explodes in the French Embassy compound killing 12 and injuring 25. Turkish officials are killed in Los Angeles and Boston and another is wounded in Ottawa. The Turkish Consulate in Paris is seized. The U.S. Charge in Paris narrowly escapes assassination.

An Israeli attache is assassinated in Paris only 3 months after an American military attache is shot to death while on his way to the embassy. In London the Israeli Ambassador lies critically wounded in the hospital after being shot through the head by a terrorist. In Guatemala the Brazilian Embassy is seized. These are only some of the more recent examples of growing terrorist attacks against diplomats.

The dramatic worldwide increase in both the number and seriousness of terrorist attacks against diplomatic personnel and facilities during the past decade has adversely affected the conduct of diplomacy. In 1970 there were 213 attacks on diplomats from 31 countries. By 1980 this number had risen to 409 attacks on diplomats from 60 countries—an increase of almost 100%. The number of attacks on diplomats as a percentage of total terrorist attacks has also increased from 30% in 1975 to 54% in 1980. Unfortunately this trend exhibits no sign of abating.

World attention has focused on the fact that diplomacy has become a high-risk profession. Some 20 ambassadors from 12 countries have been assassinated (including five U.S. Ambassadors—more than the number of U.S. generals killed in the Vietnam war). Between 1968 and mid-1981 there were 370 international terrorist attacks which

caused death or personal injury. During 1980 alone, there were 50 such incidents, more than in any previous year. All together, 381 diplomats have been killed and 824 wounded between 1968 and 1982. Even more ominously, assassination attempts, which have been increasing steadily over the past 10 years, reached an alltime high in 1980. The number of kidnappings and hostage barricade situations has also increased. Bombings are still the most frequent form of attack, however, since they involve little risk of capture to the terrorist, and explosives can be acquired fairly easily.

The number of groups carrying out terrorist attacks has also grown almost every year. Since 1968 a total of 102 terrorist groups have claimed responsibility for terrorist attacks. In all, diplomats from 108 countries have been victims of attacks, and the embassies of 38 countries have been seized by terrorists. The level of violence of attacks has also increased.

During the early years of the 1970s the terrorist threat to diplomats was primarily from low-level, small-scale violence. In recent years we have also witnessed an increase in mob violence. Between 1970 and 1980 there were some 70 forcible incursions into diplomatic facilities. However, more than

50% of these occurred after the takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, which suggests that the success achieved there created a model for other terrorist groups to emulate. The potential dangers of such acts were borne out when 39 people, including several Spanish diplomats, were killed when the Spanish Embassy in Guatemala was seized in 1980.

Why the Diplomat?

All terrorist attacks involve the use of violence for purposes of political extortion, coercion, and publicity for a political cause. The terrorist uses his victims as tools to achieve these goals, regardless of the fact that those targeted are rarely directly associated with the area of political conflict. Although some may argue that attacks against diplomats are senseless, in the mind of the terrorist it is a calculated act with deliberate political goals and objectives.

Diplomats are highly visible and desirable targets for several reasons, including their symbolic value and the psychological impact created. Attacks against diplomats evoke a response from the highest levels of two governments—

that of the diplomat attacked and that of the host country. Terrorists are also able to command worldwide media attention for the duration of the incident. Terrorist groups single out diplomats perhaps because they perceive that in order to obtain the publicity they seek, they must strike at these increasingly more visible and symbolic targets.

Terrorist attacks on diplomats almost always are perpetrated by well-trained and experienced terrorist organizations. These groups are well organized and are seeking specific political goals. For example, two Armenian terrorist groups have conducted a campaign of terror directed against Turkish diplomats in revenge for alleged atrocities which were committed over 60 years ago. Some 20 Turkish diplomats and members of their families have been killed in recent years by Armenian terrorists in numerous countries, for example in Spain, where in 1978 the Turkish Ambassador's wife, her brother, and their chauffeur were killed. We in the United States have not been immune to the violence perpetrated by Armenian terrorist organizations. In January of this year the Turkish Consul General in Los Angeles was gunned down and the honorary Turkish Consul in Boston was murdered in a similar fashion in early May. Earlier a car bomb was detonated in front of the Turkish U.N. mission injuring several people.

Deputy Director, Office for Combatting Terrorism

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His most recent overseas service was in Brussels as the Political Adviser to the U.S. Mission to NATO and in Geneva as the State Department member of the SALT II delegation with the rank of minister. Earlier he served as a member of the Department of State's Policy Planning Staff and as an office director in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. He was in the National War College class of 1966. Mr. Perez retired from the U.S. Air Force Reserve in 1968 with the rank of Lt. Col. ■



An Increasing Toll

Terrorism unfortunately has taken its toll on state-to-state relations. Relations between countries can be adversely affected if one country believes that another is failing to provide adequate protection to its diplomats or to live up to its responsibilities. For example, Franco-Turkish and Franco-Spanish relations have suffered because of a perceived laxity in French prosecution and extradition of terrorists. The Dominican Republic Embassy seizure in Bogota in 1980 by the April 19th Movement (M-19), in which 15 senior diplomats were held for 61 days, caused considerable strains in relations between the Government of Colombia and some of the countries whose ambassadors




were held hostage. The recent slayings of Turkish officials in the United States interject strain in an otherwise close U.S.-Turkish relationship.

Also, sponsorship of terrorist acts by one country against another can seriously disrupt diplomatic intercourse and normal relations. Last year, for example, Colombia suspended diplomatic relations with Cuba because of its training in Cuba of Colombian M-19 terrorists. One of the principal reasons for expelling Libyan representatives from Washington was the continuing support by the Qadhafi regime to international terrorist activities, including those directed against U.S. officials. U.S. relations with other countries and groups have been adversely affected by their sponsorship of acts of international terrorism, such as the Letelier assassination in Washington carried out by Chilean agents and the continued resort to international terrorism by various elements of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The disastrous effects of the seizure of American diplomats on U.S.-Iranian relations need no further elaboration.

Countries whose diplomats have been victimized represent a wide range of ideologies, geographic locations, sizes, and wealth. However, all attacks on diplomats have one element in common: All terrorist attacks are acts of political violence. The terrorist is seeking to redress a political grievance, overthrow a political system, or publicize a political point of view. I was a firsthand witness to the events in Bogota which occurred when the M-19 held diplomats from 15 countries hostage in the Embassy of the Dominican Republic for 61 days, demanding publicity for their cause, freedom for imprisoned members of their organization, and ransom. Although the Government of Colombia did not accede to the major terrorist demands, the terrorists did obtain widespread publicity for their cause. A relatively obscure terrorist organization was suddenly catapulted into the international spotlight and thereby increased greatly its prominence within Colombia and internationally.

It is the symbolism of the individual terrorist act, and not necessarily the act itself, which gives it significance. The terrorist uses the act to make a political statement to the target (which is not the

ROCKET ATTACK ON U.S. AMBASSADOR'S MOTORCADE BEIRUT, LEBANON - 1940 Hrs., AUGUST 27, 1980



(SY/Threat Analysis Group)

victim) and to the world at large. Thus, U.S. diplomats who were held in Tehran for 444 days were used as pawns to advance political objectives internally of the group that held them as well as to achieve objectives with regard to the U.S. Government and to the rest of the world.

While the functions of representation, negotiation, and intelligence gathering continue, embassies are now conducting diplomacy in the face of an increasingly violent environment under conditions never before experienced. The level of security surrounding diplomatic personnel and facilities has been increased to unprecedented levels in an attempt to deter terrorist attacks. As embassy security has become more stringent, it has become more difficult to conduct diplomatic business in a normal fashion. Many embassies now resemble military installations, surrounded by high walls and barbed wire. Buildings are equipped with automatic tear gas dispensers, ballistic glass, and closed-circuit TV. Visitors are searched and made to pass through metal detectors under the scrutiny of armed guards. Embassy personnel are often transported in armored vehicles.

The cost of protecting diplomats abroad has also soared. The Department of State now spends annually about 14% (around \$140 million) of its entire budget on security, and this figure has been rising steadily. This is in addition to protection provided to U.S. diplomatic facilities and personnel overseas by host governments which would cost us an additional \$200 million annually if the U.S. Government had to provide it.

While precautions are certainly necessary, the effect has been a reduction in access and a corresponding reduction in the level of communications between diplomats and the host country, in particular, the people of the country. Diplomats are finding it increasingly difficult to function well in this environment.

Enhanced Security Measures

In 1980, for the first time since 1968 when the U.S. Government first began keeping statistics on terrorism, U.S. diplomats surpassed U.S. businessmen

Security Enhancement Program

A dimension has been added to the problem of securing U.S. Embassies in the 1980s—the need to cope with the threat of mob violence. The Department of State's security enhancement program must be aimed at preventing U.S. Embassies from being destroyed, personnel taken hostage or killed, and national security information compromised. Security planning must take into account the possibility that the host government will not provide meaningful protection before the attack or send timely relief during the attack but may even encourage, support, or sponsor the hostile action. Public access controls alone are not sufficient to deny rapid mob penetration into buildings.

In addition to the threat of overt action, U.S. diplomatic installations must be recognized as prime targets of espionage activity by hostile intelligence services. Surreptitious entry into a mission is a constant threat, as is the danger of the placement of electronic surveillance equipment.

The main thrust of the security enhancement program is to establish, at those posts considered most threatened, an environment that will provide the greatest possible degree of safety and security—control barriers; guards and receptionists; bullet-resistant materials, electronically operated locks,

alarms, and communications equipment; package inspection equipment, defensive equipment, and closed circuit TV; perimeter protection in the form of fences, walls, and gates; lighting; reinforcement of entrances, windows, walls, and other exterior features of the building; internal controls; tear gas systems; safe havens which are fire resistant and resist forced penetrations; fire safety equipment; and emergency power and destruction equipment.

Initially proposed as a 5-year program which would cost approximately \$200 million, the Congress appropriated a total of \$42 million for FY 1980 and 1981. Additional appropriations have been requested of \$25 million each for FY 1982 and 1983. Improvements at several posts have already been completed. Major security improvements are to be made at a total of 70 of the most threatened U.S. diplomatic missions and significant steps are being taken on security at another 55 posts. ■

The U.S. Embassy in San Salvador is heavily fortified—a bunker is on the roof, steel plates reinforce the balconies, a high wall surrounds the building, and armed guards patrol the area. Another high wall circles the entire compound.



(Donna Gighiotti, STATE Magazine)



Terrorism and the Foreign Service

In 1981 more than 13,000 people took the written examination for entry into the Foreign Service—about 1,000 more than in 1980. The number of applicants for the 1982 exam, to be given in December, indicates that the numbers will continue to increase. Despite the fact that the U.S. diplomat is a prime target of international terrorists, thousands of talented and able young Americans have not been deterred from seeking a career in the Foreign Service.

Terrorism is, however, a fact of life for those in the service. Families may not accompany employees to some diplomatic posts because of the danger of terrorism. It may be too dangerous to travel in certain areas of other countries because of the threat of ter-

rorism. Obviously assignments to such posts are not always desired—but the posts are staffed.

Foreign Service personnel understand that they are members of a disciplined service and agree that they will serve where they are needed. In addition efforts are made to compensate them for the dangers. They may receive as much as 25% additional pay for assignments to designated high-risk areas. They also benefit from the protection of the Department's security program.

The Department of State recognizes its obligation to provide the most effective representation abroad of the interests of the United States, regardless of terrorism or any other obstacle. ■

“Coping With Violence Abroad”

Most U.S. Government civilian employees serving abroad share one common experience—attendance at the Department of State's seminar on “Coping With Violence Abroad.” Presented by the Department's Foreign Service Institute 37 times annually, it attracted more than 3,000 persons in 1981; attendance in 1982 certainly will be higher.

The seminar represents a program which has been in effect since the early 1970s. At that time, when terrorism was first recognized as a problem for U.S. Government operations abroad, the State Department sent mobile training teams to a number of diplomatic posts to brief employees on techniques to minimize the risk of becoming a victim of terrorist acts. The Department then developed a 1-day program in Washington, “The Terrorism Course,” for its employees going overseas. That program evolved into a 2-day seminar on “Coping With Violence Abroad” in January 1981.

Early in 1982 it was determined that the seminar could be presented more effectively by splitting it into two parts. One day (in Washington) addresses problems of general concern, such as government policy with regard to terrorism, the effect of terrorism on families, surveillance recognition, hostage

survival, and explosive devices. The second segment, to be in operation by October 1982, will be taken at the employee's post and will deal with more specific problems in the particular area using video cassette training aids prepared by the Foreign Service Institute. This new approach is designed to give new arrivals (all U.S. Government employees and their adult families, regardless of parent agency) at the 253 Foreign Service posts useful information directly related to circumstances where they live and work.

In its various forms, the seminar has been taken by more than 5,000 people. Their comments and reactions have been a major impetus to the continuing reappraisal of the seminar from the point of view of both form and content. A number of persons who took the course and later found themselves in a terrorist situation have stated that they found the information they received in the seminar to have been particularly helpful. Those of the hostages held in Tehran who had taken some version of the earlier course reported that they remembered vividly hostage survival techniques and stated that the information was beneficial to them during their captivity. ■

Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, commonly referred to as the New York convention. Adhering states must either extradite or prosecute persons alleged to have committed violations of the convention. The conven-

tion's effectiveness, however, has been hampered by the fact that only 53 nations have ratified it.

Recognition of the problem has continued with the adoption of the 1979 U.N. Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, which now has been ratified

as the most frequent victims of terrorist attacks overseas, in spite of the fact that U.S. businessmen greatly outnumber U.S. diplomats. To deal with this problem, the United States has undertaken a rigorous campaign to enhance the security of our personnel and facilities overseas. Primarily we are attempting to reduce the vulnerability of our diplomatic missions by constructing perimeter defenses, building secure safe-havens to which staff can retreat in the event of an attack, improving access controls, and installing nonlethal entry denial systems. Other protective measures involve added guards, armored cars, and the like. All State Department employees are also required to attend a seminar on “Coping with Violence Abroad” in order to make them aware of security problems and educate them on how to reduce their vulnerability. Intelligence collection and analysis on terrorist groups has been accorded a much higher priority and has paid off in terms of alerting us to possible attacks against our diplomatic personnel and facilities.

Need for International Cooperation

If we are to deal more effectively with this problem over the long run, better international cooperation will be required. While diplomats from the United States, Israel, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, Cuba, and Turkey have been the most frequent targets, terrorism is a complex and universal problem shared by all nations of the world. Virtually no state has been left unaffected by terrorism. Nations must work together to take steps to deter and prevent terrorist violence from escalating. Such necessary steps include a greater exchange of information on terrorists and their movements, tighter controls on the movement of weapons and explosives, and more efficient extradition procedures for accused terrorists.

The international community must also develop a consensus that acts of terrorism should be outlawed and that those who commit them should be brought to justice. The international community took a major step in this regard in 1973 when it adopted the U.N. Convention on the Prevention and

by 17 nations; 22 ratifications are required before the convention enters into force. In 1980 the General Assembly adopted a Resolution on Measures to Enhance the Protection, Security and Safety of Diplomatic and Consular Missions and Representatives, which was reaffirmed last year.

The New York convention and other international agreements relating to the protection of diplomatic personnel and premises are steps in the right direction of establishing an international consensus and body of law outlawing crimes against diplomats. However, they must be strengthened and built on to establish norms of behavior by seeking to discourage nations who would condone and support terrorists and terrorism and to encourage nations to take more seriously their obligations to protect diplomats.

Obligation of Nations

All nations have an obligation to provide protection for diplomats accredited to them. The universally accepted Vienna convention requires states to "take all appropriate steps to prevent attack" on the "person, freedom or dignity" of foreign diplomatic and consular personnel. A violation of this obligation, regardless of the cause, is always disturbing. Of particular concern, however, is state complicity or acquiescence in acts of terrorism directed against diplomatic personnel and facilities. State-sponsored and -supported terrorism, whatever the target, is the most egregious form of terrorism. But when the target is the representative of another country, the act takes on an entirely new dimension and we see an erosion of the principle of diplomatic inviolability.

The Libyan Government is one which has engaged in targeting for violence the diplomats of other countries, specifically the United States. For example, the Government of Libya was behind the sacking of the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli. Last November, Sudanese authorities successfully thwarted a Libyan plot to plant explosive devices in the American Club in Khartoum. The bombs, consisting of two stereo speakers each packed with 20 kilograms of plastic explosives, were intended to explode on a weekend evening when the club would be filled with the families of U.S. Em-

Department of State Security Program

The operational arm of the Department of State against terrorism is the Office of Security. Its primary function is to provide protective security for the personnel and facilities of the agency and the Foreign Service in the United States and abroad and for the protection of certain high-level foreign dignitaries. (Protection of visiting chiefs of state and heads of government is the responsibility of the Secret Service.)

The Office of Security is headed by a Deputy Assistant Secretary, assisted in Washington by a deputy director and four assistant directors. The Deputy Assistant Secretary is assisted abroad by associate directors in specific geographical regions.

Domestic Concerns

Domestic Operations Division plans and administers security programs designed to protect the property and personnel of the Department of State. It conducts security surveys on buildings (guards, alarm systems, access control systems, and closed circuit TV systems); makes arrangements for high-level diplomatic functions, conferences, news events, and high-level visits to the Department of State; oversees preparation of contingency plans; conducts surveys of foreign diplomatic missions, as requested, and at the residences of certain high-ranking State Department officials; and investigates any threats or incidents that occur within the Department or Foreign Service buildings.

Marine Corps guards are vital elements to the security of U.S. diplomatic missions.



(International Communication Agency)

Secretary's Detail is responsible for the protection of the Secretary of State anywhere in the world. It is also responsible for the protection of his residence(s) and family, as required.

Dignitary Protection Division provides protection to foreign dignitaries (other than chiefs of state or heads of government) and their families while they are visiting the United States. It also protects selected U.S. officials traveling or assigned abroad, including certain ambassadors in high-threat areas. (The protection of foreign consular personnel in the United States would become an added duty of this division under legislation now pending before the Congress. The legislation would authorize the Department to reimburse State or local police when they are requested to provide extraordinary protection to foreign consular personnel. The Secret Service now provides protection for foreign diplomats stationed in Washington, D.C., and, under an arrangement between the Secret Service and the New York City Police Department, the latter provides protection to diplomatic missions in New York City on a reimbursable basis.)

Command Center has two functional sections which provide a 24-hour, 7-day-a-week emergency operations center, communications to and from protective details, a worldwide security communications network and threat assessment capability. (1) The *Watch Officer Group* disseminates in-



telligence information concerning potential terrorist activities or other threats directed against U.S. Government employees or installations, coordinates protective detail movements throughout the Washington, D.C., area, and provides details with threat-related intelligence concerning the people under protection. (2) The *Threat Analysis Group* researches and analyzes intelligence produced by the U.S. intelligence and counterintelligence communities and monitors terrorist activities and related security problems. It also provides intelligence assessments for security planning, selection of preventive and protective measures, and overall security decisionmaking.

Protective Liaison maintains liaison with local, State, and Federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies and the foreign diplomatic and consular corps. It also conducts physical security surveys of foreign diplomatic facilities, when requested, and protective security briefings for foreign dignitaries and security personnel; notifies the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the U.S. Customs Service of the travel of foreign dignitaries, particularly if they are accompanied by armed security personnel; and arranges for the special security needs of foreign diplomatic missions arising from threats, incidents, or official diplomatic functions.

Overseas Operations

Foreign Operations Division develops and implements security programs for the protection of personnel, property, and classified and controlled information at U.S. Foreign Service posts. This includes coordinating post security programs; serving as the point of contact for the regional security officers; reviewing and critiquing emergency planning documents, security surveys, and serious incident reports; and preparing briefings for ambassadors and other senior U.S. Government personnel. It also supervises the U.S. Navy Seabees and the Marine security guards.

Regional Security Officers formulate contingency plans to cope with bomb threats, acts of terrorism, riots and demonstrations, and internal defense; conducts security surveys of official office buildings and residences; provides protective services for potential targets of terrorist organizations, maintaining liaison with local and U.S. law enforcement and intelligence authorities; conducts counterterrorist training and indoctrination programs; and provides operational supervision of the Marine security guards.

Marine Security Guards are enlisted members of the U.S. Marine Corps who are specifically selected and trained for duty at



(International Communication Agency)

U.S. diplomatic posts. There are presently 119 Marine security guards detachments located throughout the world. Their primary function is the protection of personnel, property, and classified material. They are also responsible for controlling access by the public to those diplomatic or consular establishments, often using sophisticated technical equipment; for serving as key members of a post's internal defense team; and for maintaining control of emergency communications networks, particularly after normal office hours.

Seabees (U.S. Navy Construction Personnel) are assigned to the Department of State to perform surveillance over construction work and for performing maintenance and construction in sensitive areas.

Technical Services Division plans and administers programs related to the technical defense of Foreign Service establishments against electronic penetration, surreptitious entry, and terrorist attack (utilizing security equipment such as alarms, closed circuit TV systems, locking hardware and remote-controlled locking systems, bullet-resistant materials, intercom systems, metal detectors, package inspection, document destruction equipment, tear gas dispensing systems, and other special protective equipment). It also provides the expertise to formulate policy for technical and physical security, weapons, and personnel protective measures.

Armed Department of State security agents accompany U.S. Ambassador Deane Hinton in El Salvador.

Security Enhancement Group provides continuity for all physical security improvements to be made under the security enhancement program. In general it provides trained and experienced personnel for the survey teams that determine what is needed and make recommendations for improvement, develops and tests improved physical security materials and equipment, establishes physical security standards, and coordinates with other offices of the Department concerning these projects.

Education and Training Staff conducts counterterrorism courses for security professionals and other U.S. Government employees, including terrorism, hostage negotiations, and hostage rescue operations; the senior officers counterterrorism briefing; firearms training; counterterrorism, security enhancement, investigations, and guard forces; dignitary protection; and instruction for foreign national guard forces, chauffeurs, and police escorts on dignitary protection, firearms, explosives recognition and emergency response, and emergency driving techniques. It also provides professional training to new special agents of the Office of Security, regional security officers, Marine security guards, and Seabees and is a major contributor to the Department's seminar on "Coping With Violence Abroad." ■

bassy staff and other Americans. Bombs of this size could have completely destroyed the club, killing or maiming scores of people, including third-country diplomats who use the club. We know that these devices were prepared by Libyan intelligence officers assigned to a Libyan People's Bureau in a neighboring country and that a Libyan intelligence officer personally insured that the bombs were loaded on a flight to Khartoum.

Outlook

This is a bleak picture of the current situation regarding diplomats and terrorism. What can be done to alleviate this problem? The problem is one of increasing intensity and the future, unfortunately, does not look any brighter. Attacks on diplomats have proven to be extremely cost effective for the amount of worldwide attention they generate and for that reason they are likely to continue.

Obviously, we will have to continue to do more of what we have been doing (e.g., more and better intelligence and more effective security measures and procedures), although one eventually reaches the point of diminishing returns. At the same time, like-minded nations must intensify ways of improving cooperation among themselves with a view to reducing the disruption caused by terrorism to international relations and stability, particularly with regard to the protection of diplomatic premises and staff.

Governments which sponsor or condone acts of terrorism against diplomats must be made to understand that such conduct will not be tolerated by the international community. Likewise, everything possible must be done to bring to justice swiftly those perpetrators of heinous crimes against the civilized world. The challenge of preventing attacks against diplomats and the disruption of diplomatic intercourse must be a topic high on the agenda of the world community. ■

Guidelines for U.S. Government Employees Taken Hostage

U.S. Government personnel serving abroad are expected to be mature, responsible, and patriotic individuals for whom the concept of service has a real and personal meaning.

Individuals who are taken hostage should be aware that their captors may seek to exploit them. Their captors may be seeking information to be used to the detriment of the United States or of their fellow hostages, and are likely to use information obtained from one captive when interrogating another. Individuals should consequently be guided by the knowledge that whatever they say may be used to mislead or punish their colleagues and that their actions may result in reprisals.

Captured individuals should not discuss sensitive aspects of the work of their fellow hostages. They should not divulge classified

or sensitive information. They should not sign or make statements or take actions which they believe might bring discredit to the United States.

The decision to attempt escape rests with the individual concerned. However, the decision should be consistent with the considerations set above.

Hard and fast rules are not always helpful, and the U.S. Government recognizes that the ability of individuals to resist extreme pressure differs. But to the extent possible one must help one's colleagues and avoid exploitation. Sound judgment is essential.

Approved June 24, 1982
by the Secretary of State ■



Armenian Terrorism: A Profile

by Andrew Corsun
Threat Analysis Group
Office of Security



(Gamma)

September 24, 1981, Paris. Four Armenian terrorists seized the Turkish Consulate and threatened to kill more than 20 hostages. A Turkish security guard was killed and three others were wounded (one of the terrorists, a Turkish Vice Consul, and a French security guard). The terrorists, who claimed to be members of the Yeghia Keshishian Commando of ASALA, demanded that all Armenian political prisoners be released from Turkish jails within 12 hours. As the deadline passed and the terrorists realized that the Turkish Government would not negotiate, the terrorists decided to accept a French Government offer of political asylum. Once in custody, however, the French Government stated that their offer was a ploy and that the terrorists would be treated as criminals. During a news conference in Beirut following this incident, ASALA leaders stated that their commandos were willfully deceived and that the promise made by the French Government must be kept or "there is no doubt that there will be a confrontation between them and us." (As of this publication date, the political/criminal status of the terrorists remains undetermined.) This was the first incident of Armenian terrorists seizing a diplomatic mission.

Introduction

Since the advent of modern Armenian terrorism in 1975, the world has witnessed a terrorist campaign that has resulted in at least 170 attacks directed primarily against Turkish installations and diplomatic personnel outside of Turkey's borders.

Enraged over the alleged massacre of 1.5 million Armenians by Turkey during World War I, and the loss of their homeland, Armenians unlike Jews tried and failed as propagandists to focus the world's attention on their grievances.¹ By resorting to terrorism, Armenian extremists were able to accomplish in 7 years what legitimate Armenian organizations have been trying to do for almost 70 years—internationalize the Armenian cause.

Terrorism may not be able to ease the pain of past agonies, but it is an effective tactic in evoking international sympathy for a previously unknown (or forgotten) cause. How many people had heard of the Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) or their cause before they bombed the headquarters of the World Council of Churches in Beirut on January 20, 1975? The same can be said for the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (JcAG) who gained "prominence" on October 22, 1975, with the assassination of the Turkish Ambassador to Vienna, Dennis Tunaligil. Since then, Armenian extremists have waged a successful campaign against Turkish interests that in recent years has expanded to include Western targets as well.

The Seeds of Conflict

According to historians, Armenia is believed to be not only the oldest of the

civilized races of Western Asia (dating to pre-1200 B.C.), but eventually grew to become one of the strongest kingdoms in that region. Geographically, Armenia was straddling the crossroads of the world and thus became the victim of many invasions. With the fall of Constantinople in 1453, the Turks finally ruled all the lands that once belonged to Armenians and held them for 465 years.

Since we are interested in the cause-and-effect relationship history has played regarding the recent outbreak of Armenian terrorist activities against Turkish diplomats and establishments, we will jump ahead in time to the Ottoman Empire of the late 19th century.

With the rise of nationalism throughout Europe, the Armenian struggle for autonomy and modernization took on new vigor in the 1880s, and the Armenians began to form political organizations for self-protection and as a vehicle to voice their desire for a free Armenia. One such organization was the Dashnaksutiun (Armenian Revolutionary Federation) which was founded in 1890 in Tiflis, Georgia.

In a multiethnic state, such as the Ottoman Empire, nationalism was viewed by the Turks as a serious internal threat. The result was harsher repression by the Ottoman government which led to thousands of Armenian deaths in 1895. With the rise of the Young Turks in 1908, its policy of pan-Turanism led to even harsher measures in suppressing Armenian nationalism. On April 17 and 24, 1909, over 30,000 Armenians were massacred in Adana and other villages along the Cilician plains in order to suppress the national ambitions of the Armenian people.

With the advent of World War I, the stage was set for what was later alleged to be called the first "genocide" of the

20th century. Turkey entered the war on the side of Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire on October 31, 1914, and offered autonomy to the Armenians if they would foment dissension behind the Russian lines. Partly out of distrust of the Young Turks, and encouraged by the principle of self-determination, they refused.

Turkey viewed this attitude as treasonous, especially in light of the fact that it (Turkey) was suffering heavy military reversals. Minister of Interior Taalat Bey ordered "the elimination of the Armenian element, which had been trying for centuries to undermine the foundation of the state." By 1915 the Turks ordered a mass deportation of Armenians from Turkish Armenia to Syria and Iraq. It was later alleged that 1.5 million people (approximately 60% of the Turkish Armenian population) were killed or died on the journey.

With the conclusion of the war, the Western Powers established the Independent Republic of Armenia on May 28, 1918, which was later guaranteed by the treaty of Sevres, and signed on August 10, 1920, by Turkey, the Allied Powers, and Armenia. But due to the pressures exerted by the Turks and Communists, the new republic collapsed, and by December 2, 1920, Armenia was Sovietized and its territories to the west were awarded to Turkey.

The basis for their grievances, as perceived by the Armenians, is not only the restoration of their homeland but to seek justice for the alleged mass murders (1894-96, 1909, 1915) of more than 1.5 million people. It is these issues that have fostered the armed struggle by Armenian extremists against Turkish diplomats and establishments around the world.

During the diaspora of 1915, many Armenians fled to Lebanon which has long been regarded as a refuge for dispossessed minorities. Although the Armenian community (approximately 200,000) in Lebanon had flourished and played a vital role in Lebanese life, by the 1970s they became caught-up in the internecine fighting that had overtaken Lebanon. When the Phalangists (Catholic Christian rightists) decided to use the Armenian section of east Beirut, known as Bourj Hammoud, to launch their attacks against the adjacent Muslim section called Naba'a, a split

resulted within the Armenian community. Some Armenians felt that they had a duty to take up arms on behalf of their Christian brothers, while others, mainly left-wing Armenian youth through their close contact (via the universities and the proximity of their neighborhoods) with their Palestinian counterparts, realized they shared a similar situation—they had lost their land, had a large diaspora community, and the use of legal methods to bring their cause to world attention had failed. The left-wing Armenian youth began to form their own groups (e.g., ASALA) with the aid of the Palestinians, and links between the two were formed. Many of these youths also moved to the Palestinian section of west Beirut. With the political success that the Palestinians have achieved through terrorism, it is not surprising that these left-wing Armenian youths would choose the same path. The growing sympathy and support that these youths have gained within the worldwide Armenian community had forced the right-wing Armenians to set up their own group (JCAG), but for different goals and objectives.

Terrorist Activities

Terrorism is certainly not a new tactic for Armenian extremists. At the end of World War I, the Dashnag decided it would carry out its own executions of those Ottoman leaders they believed were responsible for the "genocide" of the Armenian people. As a result, a network called Nemesis was established to track down and execute those Ottoman leaders.

On March 15, 1921, the former Ottoman Minister of Interior Taalat Bey—who was living in Berlin under the pseudonym Ali Sayi Bey—was shot and killed at point-blank range after being under surveillance for 2 weeks by Soghoman Tehlirian. Others who met the same fate at the hands of Nemesis were the Ottoman Foreign Minister Said Halim, who was assassinated in Rome in December 1921, and Behaeddin Shakir and Djimal Azmi, two Ottoman officials who were killed a year later in Berlin. It is unknown what became of Nemesis following the incidents of the early 1920s. Yet one must wonder why Armenian extremists have waited over 60

years to carry out their armed struggle. Were they perhaps fulfilling the prophecy of Taalat who in 1915 said, "There will be no Armenian question for 50 years," or (a more plausible explanation) are the times such that terrorism has become an acceptable vehicle for protest?

Whatever the reason, since returning to the scene in 1975, Armenian terrorists have claimed responsibility for over 170 incidents which includes the assassination of 21 Turkish diplomats and/or family members, and 10 attempted assassinations of Turkish diplomats. Although the tactic of assassination has been used repeatedly, the majority of their operations have been bombings which are simple in construction and design. Unlike the Irish Republican Army [IRA], which favors remote-control devices, Armenian terrorists have been partial to a Czechoslovakian-manufactured plastic called Semtex-H. In the overwhelming majority of cases, this device is set at such an hour to cause property damage and not cost lives.

Operationally Armenian terrorists must be viewed as unsophisticated in comparison with other groups since they have never shown the inclination or ability to hit a hard target. The only exceptions were the seizure of the Turkish Consulate in Paris on September 24, 1981, and the attempted assassination of the Turkish Consul General in Rotterdam on July 21, 1982, both of which failed. In the seizure of the consulate, the four terrorists eventually surrendered without any of their demands being met. In Rotterdam the consul general, who was traveling to work in an armored car and escorted by two police vehicles, was attacked by four terrorists. The assailants opened fire with automatic weapons—which proved ineffective against the armored car—and as they attempted to flee the area, one of the attackers was shot and captured. Their bombings and assassinations required the minimum of logistical planning.

While no one can dispute their success, nevertheless, it is such spectacular operations as airport attacks, kidnappings, and assassinations of well-protected political officials that generate maximum publicity and impact which is so important to the terrorists *raison d'etre*.



Of the 21 Turkish diplomats / family members slain between 1975-July 1982, 14 were killed while in their car which was stopped at a light, slowing before entering a busy intersection, or parked. And of the 10 attempted assassinations of Turkish diplomats, 8 took place while the diplomat was in his vehicle. These vehicle attacks were carried out by assassination teams armed primarily with 9mm automatic weapons. The teams varied in size from a lone gunman used in eight attacks to two assailants with a third member in a waiting car. With the exception of the July 21 attack in Rotterdam, the diplomatic vehicles that were involved in these attacks were not armored, and the only protective security (if any) was a driver/bodyguard.


JCAG and ASALA

While Armenian extremists have carried attacks under 19 operational names, the main terrorists groups are the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (JCAG) and the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA).² On the surface these two groups appear to be united by a common goal. However, a closer look at their communiques, and targeting, reveals that their methods and objectives are quite different.

Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide. Unlike ASALA, which is Marxist oriented and adheres to the philosophy of Scientific Socialism, JCAG appears more closely aligned with the policies of the right-wing Dashnag party. The goals of the Dashnag are to reclaim their lost homeland, as specified in the treaty of Sevres, and to seek reparations and recognition of the crimes committed against their people by Turkey; and they seek a solution similar to Germany's admission of guilt and reparations to Israel after World War II. JCAG, in its communiques, appears to strive for these same goals. Following the assassination of the Turkish Ambassadors to Vienna and Paris in October and December of 1975 respectively, JCAG, in a follow-up communique entitled "To all the Peoples and Governments" wrote:

Let the world realize that we will lay down our arms only when the Turkish Government officially denounces the genocide perpetrated

ARMENIAN TERRORISM: INCIDENTS, BY YEAR



AREAS OF OPERATIONS: NUMBER OF INCIDENTS, 1973 - JULY 26, 1982



by Turkey in 1915 against the Armenian people and agrees to negotiate with Armenian representatives in order to reinstate justice.

And following the bombings in New York City and Los Angeles on October 12, 1980, JCAG stated:

We make clear that our struggle today against the Turkish Government is not to be regarded as revenge for the 1915 genocide in which 1.5 million Armenian men, women, and children were massacred. Our struggle today is directed to have the Turkish Government to admit to its responsibility for that murderous act, as well as to return to the Armenian people the lands taken forcefully and today occupied by the imperialist Turkish Government since the genocide. We demand once again that the Turkish Government admit its responsibility for the genocide of 1915 and make appropriate territorial and financial reparations to the long-suffering Armenian people.

This theme remains constant in all their communiques to February 1982 with the assassination of the honorary Turkish Consul to Boston, Orhan Gunduz. In Paris JCAG said that:

The shooting was to reaffirm the permanence of our demands. The Turkish Government must recognize the responsibility of its predecessors in 1915 in the execution and genocide perpetrated against the Armenian people, and it must clearly condemn it. Secondly, the Turkish Government must recognize the right of the Armenian people to constitute a free and independent state of Armenian land which Turkey illegally occupies.

Because ideology affects the operational strategy of a terrorist group, JCAG concentrated its operation solely on Turkish interests. The one possible exception was the January 1980 triple bombing of the offices of Swiss Air, TWA, and British Airlines in Madrid. At first JCAG claimed credit for the bombing, but in a later phone call to the local press, the caller said that JCAG was not responsible for the bombing and, in fact, condemned it.

As the group name implies, of the 22 operations carried out by JCAG, 10 of the operations were assassinations (resulting in 12 deaths), 6 were attempted assassinations, and 6 were bombings.

Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia. Whereas JCAG's stance on the Armenian question appears compatible with traditional Armenian political beliefs, ASALA,

whose communiques are replete with Marxist-Leninist rhetoric, considers the Armenian question part of the international revolutionary movement, and they seek closer ties with Soviet Armenia.

For the first 4½ years of its existence, ASALA concentrated its attacks (the sole exception being the bombing of the headquarters of the World Council of Churches in Beirut in January 1975) on Turkish installations and diplomatic personnel. During this period, ASALA was in the process of enlarging its organization and base of operations in



preparation for entering its second and current phase.

Our second step was only possible due to the successful completion of our first step which had politicized the Armenian youth enough to gain their support in the second step. This second step contains four new developments: (1) heavy assault on imperialist and Zionist and reactionary forces; (2) a much greater frequency of attacks; (3) direct communication with the Armenian masses and international opinion; and (4) strong ties with other revolutionary organizations including operational ties with the Kurdish Workers Party [of Turkey].³

No doubt this "second step," which began on November 13, 1979, in Paris with the triple bombing of the airline offices of KLM, Lufthansa, and Turkish Airlines, was influenced by ASALA's close cooperation with the Palestinians, most notably the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). In a follow-up com-

munique to this attack, ASALA set the theme for future operations.

Let imperialism and its collaborators all over the world know that their institutions are targets for our heroes and will be destroyed. We will kill and destroy because that is the only language understood by imperialism.

While ASALA has done its share of assassinating Turkish officials (nine), nevertheless, half of their bombings are directed against Western targets. The group, operating under various ad hoc commando names, has taken it upon itself to carry out "military operations" against any country which attempts to jail or try one of its commandos. Examples of this can be seen with the arrest on October 3, 1980, in Geneva of two Armenian extremists—Suzy Mahseredjian and Alex Yenikomechian—who were arrested after a bomb they were making accidentally exploded in their hotel room. Until their eventual release on January 12, 1981, and February 9, 1981, respectively, ASALA—using the name October 3 Organization—in a 4-month period carried out 18 bombings against Swiss interests worldwide in an effort to force the Swiss to release their comrades. The two extremists received 18-month suspended sentences and were barred from Switzerland for 15 years.

On June 9, 1981, Mardiros Jamgotchian was caught in the act of assassinating a Turkish diplomat—Mehmet-Savas Yorguz—outside the Turkish Consulate in Geneva. From the time of his arrest on June 9 to his trial on December 19 (he was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment), ASALA, using the name June 9 Organization, perpetrated 15 bombings against Swiss targets worldwide. After Jamgotchian's trial, ASALA, again using the name Swiss Armenian Group 15, has, to date, carried out five bombings against Swiss targets.

Switzerland is not the only country that has been targeted by ASALA; Italy, France, and most recently Canada have been victims of ASALA's wrath. On May 31, 1982, three alleged ASALA members were arrested for attempting to bomb the Air Canada cargo building at Los Angeles International Airport. It is suspected that this bombing was in retaliation for the May 18 and 20 arrests



of four alleged ASALA members / sympathizers by the Toronto police for extortion.

It is interesting to note that JCAG has two alleged members in jail in the United States, and they have never launched any terrorist campaign against the United States. The two alleged members are Harout Sassounian, who was arrested and found guilty of the October 1980 firebombing of the home of the Turkish Consul to Los Angeles, Kemal Arikan, and Harout's brother Harry, who was arrested and charged as being one of the assailants in the assassination of Kemal Arikan on January 28, 1982. At this writing, he is awaiting trial.

No terrorist group is monotheistic, and neither are the Armenians. Both groups share a common bond, yet they are quite different when it comes to achieving their goals. This difference is also mentioned in their communiques. Following the assassination of the Turkish Consul General by JCAG in Sydney, Australia, on December 17, 1980, a woman called the local Australian press to emphasize that her group had no connection with the so-called Armenian Secret Army (aka ASALA) and that the group's attacks were aimed at Turkish diplomats and Turkish institutions. On April 4, 1981, *Le Reveil*, Beirut's Rightist Christian daily, received a phone call from an alleged JCAG member who claimed that his group was not connected with ASALA and that JCAG's attacks are "reprisal measures for the injustice committed against the Armenians; our targets are the Turks, and Turkish institutions."

Even ASALA has made reference to this difference. Hagop Hagopian (the ASALA spokesman) in an interview for *Panorama* magazine said:

The Dashnag party is trying to imitate us [ASALA] in order to regain lost ground. The April 18, 1980, operation in Rome against the Turkish Ambassador to the Vatican was organized by the Dashnags who use the name of a revolutionary group, the Avenger Commandos of the Armenian Genocide.

As for international connections with other groups, it appears that only ASALA, through its relationship with the PFLP and the DFLP, has benefited from any training and logistical support

that the Palestinians can provide. When asked if Palestinians used to train Turkish terrorists in their camps, Mr. Abu Firas, the chief Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) representative in Turkey replied:

In our camps, we train them to be terrorists in their countries but to fight against Israel. For this reason, we cannot be held responsible for training them. Since Armenians are citizens of Lebanon, we also train them to fight for the liberation of Palestine.

Although there have been reports of links between Armenian terrorists and Greek Cypriots, Greeks, and even the Soviets, outside of the assistance that ASALA has received from the Palestinians, there is no proof that Armenian terrorists are plugged into any international terrorist network.

Conclusion

While Armenian terrorism has evoked a greater interest in and awareness of the Armenian question throughout the world, the chances of Armenians attaining their major objectives through terrorism are nebulous at best. This has been exemplified by the PLO, IRA, Croats, etc. A viable solution to the Armenian question will only come about through political means (e.g., United Nations, lobbyist groups, etc.) and / or compromise on both sides. Yet, until such a path is followed—if ever—the issues will be kept fresh in the public's mind through acts of terrorism.

Although ASALA is based in west Beirut and JCAG in east Beirut, on the surface it would appear that the recent Israeli invasion of Lebanon has not affected the operational capabilities of Armenian terrorists as witnessed by the July 20 and 24 bombings of two Paris cafes by the Orly Organization and the July 21 attempted assassination of the Turkish Consul General in Rotterdam by the Armenian Red Army.

Yet on closer examination, the bombings of the two cafes are the types of low-level operations that can be carried out by indigenous cells independent of instructions from Beirut. While an attempted assassination of an individual traveling in an armored car with a police escort requires detailed planning, the attack against the consul general appeared

hastily organized and very amateurish in its execution. One possible explanation for its failure was that Beirut was unable to provide the hit team with proper guidance and logistical coordination.

Although ASALA's attack on Ankara's airport on August 7, 1982, was the first airport attack by Armenian extremists, this suicide operation was designed to obtain maximum publicity and did not require elaborate planning or execution.

JCAG has emerged virtually unscathed from the invasion, and it is only a matter of time before ASALA can regroup in another country. France, with its large Armenian population and geostrategic location in Western Europe, has been mentioned as a possible base of operation for ASALA. Wherever they find a "home," what remains to be seen is the type of strategy and tactics they pursue once they are able to fully renew their operations.

NOTE

Because the historical record of the 1915 events in Asia Minor is ambiguous, the Department of State does not endorse allegations that the Turkish Government committed a genocide against the Armenian people. Armenian terrorists use this allegation to justify in part their continuing attacks on Turkish diplomats and installations.

¹The number of Armenians killed in 1915 is a central issue in the dispute between Armenians and Turkey. The Armenian community contends that those killed in 1915 were part of a genocide against Armenians orchestrated by the Turkish Government. Turkey on the other hand states that, at most, 200,000 Armenians died, and their deaths were not the result of a planned massacre but rather the tragedies of war in which many Turks also lost their lives. It is for this reason that Turkey refuses to acknowledge any guilt or make any sort of restitution / compensation to descendants or survivors, as Germany did for Israel after World War II.

²By operating under many different names, the terrorists hope to give the impression of the existence of numerous groups, implying a broader base of support within the worldwide Armenian community.

³The Kurds, who were pressed into military service under the Ottoman Empire, played an important role in the liquidation and massacre of Armenians through World War I. ■

News Conference of June 30 (Excerpts)

Q. There are some who say that by failing to condemn the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and refusing to cut off arms to the invading armies, U.S. and Israeli policies and goals have become identical. If there is a difference, what is it? Also, is there a difference between the Soviet slaughter of Afghans, which the United States has condemned so often, and the killing of Lebanese and the displaced people of Palestine? If so, what's the difference?

A. You've asked several questions that I have to walk a very narrow line in answering. There's no question but that we had hoped for a diplomatic settlement and believed there could have been a diplomatic settlement in the Middle East, in that situation. We were not warned or notified of the invasion that was going to take place.

On the other hand, there had been a breaking of the cease-fire, which had held for about 11 months in that area.

I think there are differences between some of these things that are going on and things like just the outright invasion of Afghanistan by a foreign power determined to impose its will on another country. We have a situation in Lebanon in which there was a force—the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization]—literally a government within a government and with its own army. And they had pursued aggression themselves across a border by way of rocket firing and artillery barrages.

But the situation is so complicated and the goals that we would like to pursue are what are dictating our conduct right now. We want the bloodshed to end, there's no question about that. We didn't want it to start. But we've seen Lebanon for 7 years now divided into several factions, each faction with its own militia, not a government in control. We have seen, as I've said, this PLO and we've seen the invasion of other forces—the presence of the Syrians as well in Lebanon.

Right now, our goals are—as for the first time in 7 years the Lebanese seem to be trying to get together, and their factions have come together seeking a way to have a central government and have control of their own country and to have a single Lebanese Army. That is one of the goals we would like to see.

The other goal would be the guaranteeing of the southern border with Israel, that there would be no longer a force in Lebanon that could, when it chose, create acts of terror across that border.

And the third goal is to get all the foreign forces—Syrians, Israelis, and the armed PLO—out of Lebanon. And we're—

Q. People have been displaced in Palestine.

A. Yes, and I signed a bill this morning for \$50 million in aid for Lebanon there, where several hundred thousand of those Palestinians are. I don't think they were all displaced from one area, and they have been refugees now into ongoing generations.

I think, when I say PLO, one has to differentiate between the PLO and the Palestinians. And out of this, also we have another goal, and it's been our goal for quite some time. And that is to, once and for all—when these other things are accomplished—to deal with the problem of the Palestinians and settle that problem within the proposals and the suggestions that were made in the Camp David accords.

Q. By all accounts Secretary of State Haig offered to resign several times. Why did you accept his offer this time? And what are you going to be doing to make sure that the sort of problems that led to his resignation don't occur again?

A. Once again you ask a question upon which, when I accepted his resignation, I made a statement that I would have no further comments on that or take no questions on it. He only once offered to, or came in with a resignation and submitted his resignation to me. Whatever else has been heard was never—that was never in any conversation between us. And he presented his resignation and I, with great regret and sorrow—and that's not just a platitude; I really mean it—accepted that resignation.

I must say at the same time I also stated, and I will state again, his service to his country and his service to our Administration has been all that could be desired. And I have profited and benefited by his wisdom and his suggestions, and he made his letter of resigna-

tion plain. And to save further time from any of you, as I said the first day, I will comment no further on that.

Q. Looking to the future, there were some problems in the foreign policy area. Can you say if there are going to be any changes or if anything will be done differently so that the sort of problems that led to his resignation won't reoccur?

A. There's going to be no change in policy. Foreign policy comes from the Oval Office and with the help of a fine Secretary of State. And I've had that fine Secretary of State. And I must say, fortunately for the country, for the Administration, as Secretary Haig leaves, his replacement is a man with great experience and a man of unquestioned integrity, and I think we're all fortunate that we have been able to have such a replacement [George P. Shultz].

My system has been one, and always has been one, not having a synthesis presented to me of where there are conflicting ideas and then it's boiled down and I get a single option to approve or disapprove. I prefer debate and discussion. I debate all those who have an interest in a certain issue and a reason for that interest, to have their say, not sit around as "yes" men. And then I make my decision based on what I have heard in that discussion, and that will be the procedure we'll follow.

Q. What I wanted to ask you is whether you felt—even though you won't discuss the reasons for Secretary Haig's resignation or why you accepted it—whether you feel that coming at the time of this crisis in the Middle East, that you should have accepted his resignation. What could have propelled you to accept the resignation in the middle of such a crisis, and do you think it has undermined our ability to conduct foreign policy with confidence abroad?

A. No, I don't believe it has, and I think part of this is because the continuity that anyone can see with the replacement by—or nominee, George Shultz. I just have to say that there is no easy time for a Secretary of State to resign. I don't know of a time that we've been here in which there has not been some crisis, something of that kind going on, and there are several hot spots in the world other than these that we've touched upon. So there just is no easy time for that to happen.

Q. How do you reply to those who say that there is confusion in your foreign policy?

A. I would respond by saying that I think that we've been pursuing a foreign policy that is sound, that we've had some great successes in a number of areas with this. Granted, we have some problems in the world that we would like to be helpful in and we've not secured—or been the help that we would like to have been. But when we came here, our own national defenses were in disarray. We have started the rebuilding of those defenses.

There was great question, with the terrible tragedy in Egypt, that the Camp David first-call for the return of the Sinai might not be carried out. It was carried out. We have just had 11 months of cease-fire, thanks to the herculean efforts of Phil Habib [Ambassador Philip C. Habib, the President's special emissary to the Middle East] who has been there and performing yeoman service keeping the lid on that situation. We offered our help and, again, Secretary Haig did a superhuman job in trying to prevent bloodshed in the South Atlantic situation regarding the Falklands. We were unable to succeed in that to persuade the aggressive party to leave the islands and then have a peaceful solution to the problem. But I wouldn't refuse to do it again in a like situation. I thought we had a proper place in trying to solve that.

But in the southern part of Africa, the independence of Namibia—this was dead in the water—we have made great progress there, and we are very optimistic about what might take place. I think there was disarray with our European allies. I think that has been largely eliminated, and they have confidence in us once again. So I think we're progressing very well with what it is we're trying to accomplish.

Q. What steps are you prepared to take if Israel resumes fighting in Lebanon, moves in on the PLO and West Beirut? And what is the United States prepared to do for the Palestinians whose legal rights you apparently told President Mubarak of Egypt the United States supports?

A. This is a question, again, where I have to beg your tolerance—with the delicacy of the negotiations that are trying to achieve those three major points that I mentioned. There's just no way that I could comment on or speculate about what might happen because I don't want anything that might in any

way affect those negotiations, all of which involve the very things that you're asking about, and I just have to remain silent on those.

Q. In 1976, when another Secretary of State left under another President, you were critical of the explanations given and called for a fuller explanation. With all due respect, don't you think that the American people deserve to know more of the reasons that led to the departure of Secretary Haig?

A. If I thought that there was something involved in this that the American people needed to know, with regard to their own welfare, then I would be frank with the American people and tell them. And I think if we're recalling the same previous resignation, I think there were some things that indicated that maybe there was something where there—there were sides in which the American people needed to know for their own judgment.

Q. Then you think that the entire explanation has been given as far as is necessary?

A. Yes, I don't think there's anything that in any way would benefit the people to know or that will in any way effect their good judgment.

Q. Many Arab states are saying that if Israel invades Beirut—west Beirut—it can only be because you have given Israel a green light to do so. Have you done so? Will you? And what will be your attitude if Israel goes into west Beirut?

A. Again this is the type of question in which, with the negotiations at the point they are, that I can't answer. I would like to say this: No, I've given no green light whatsoever. And an impression that I know some of the neighboring states there have had from the beginning is that somehow we were aware of this and we gave permission or something. No, we were caught as much by surprise as anyone, and we wanted a diplomatic solution and believe there could have been one.

Q. But, if I may, last week your deputy press secretary said that when Prime Minister Begin was here, he promised you that Israel would go no further into Beirut.

A. I think also—his not having heard the conversation between Prime Minister Begin and myself, that what he

called a promise actually was in a discussion in which, to be more accurate, the Prime Minister had said to me that they didn't want to and that they had not wanted to from the beginning.

Q. So it was not a promise not to do it?

A. No.

Q. The British Government today took steps to enable British companies to get around the U.S. embargo on the sale of gas pipeline equipment to the Soviet Union. Some of your advisers, including Mr. Haig, have argued all along that this embargo is going to be counterproductive and is going to be damaging to U.S. interests in Europe. I'm wondering if you have any second thoughts about the U.S. embargo or if you intend to take any additional steps to force our European allies to go along with this.

A. There aren't any additional steps. We were well aware that there might be legalities concerned with the contracts of the licensing of foreign countries. This is simply a matter of principle. We proposed that embargo back at the time when the trouble began in Poland, as we believe firmly that the Soviet Union is the supporter of the trouble in Poland and is the one to deal with on that. We said that these sanctions were imposed until—and we specified some things that we felt should be done to relax the oppression that is going on of the people of Poland by their military government.

If that is done, we'll lift those sanctions. But I don't see any way that, in principle, we could back away from that simply because the Soviet Union has sat there and done nothing. And this is the reason for it. I understand that it's a hardship. We tried to persuade our allies not to go forward with the pipeline for two reasons. One, we think there is a risk that they become industrially dependent on the Soviet Union for energy, and all the valves are on the Soviet side of the border, that the Soviet Union can engage in a kind of blackmail when that happens.

The second thing is, the Soviet Union is very hard pressed financially and economically today. They have put their people literally on a starvation diet with regard to consumer items while they poured all their resources into the most massive military buildup the world has ever seen. And that buildup is obviously aimed at the nations in the alliance. They—the Soviet Union—now hard-pressed for cash because of its own

actions, can perceive anywhere from \$10-\$12 billion a year in hard cash payments in return for that energy when the pipeline is completed which, I assume, if they continue the present policies, would be used to arm further against the rest of us and against our allies and thus force more cost for armaments for the rest of the world.

And for these two reasons we tried to persuade our allies not to go forward. In some instances they claim that the Administrations before them—see, there are others that have had Administrations before them—had made contracts which they felt were binding on their countries and so forth. We offered to help them with a source of energy closer to home—Norway and the Netherlands and gas fields that apparently have a potential that could meet their needs. We weren't able to get that agreement. We did have some success with regard to credits where the Soviet Union is concerned.

But this—our sanctions—as I say, have to do with actions taken by the Soviet Union and our response to those actions.

Q. Do you intend to keep or in the near future remove the sanctions you imposed on Argentina in the Falklands crisis?

A. I can't give you an answer on that, what is going on right now. We did our best, as I said before, to try to bring about a peaceful settlement. It didn't happen. And there was armed conflict, and there has been a victor and a vanquished, and now it's hardly the place for us to intervene in that. We'll stand by ready to help if our help is asked for. We just haven't had a discussion on that matter as yet.

Q. I don't know if I'll succeed where others have failed before. I understand your reluctance to discuss the Haig resignation. But two specific questions have seemed to arise from that resignation. Do you think that there were mixed signals sent to the Middle East which resulted in the PLO getting one impression—that you were pressing the Israelis to withdraw—while the rest of the Administration was trying to maintain pressure on the PLO to evacuate and disarm?

And the second one is, did you sort of blind-side your own State Department when you suddenly made the decision to take your most severe

option on the pipeline, leaving the State Department dangling to explain to Western Europe?

A. No, there was no blind-siding on that; that was fully discussed and has been several times in the Cabinet. There were differences of opinion about the extent to which we would do it or whether we would do it at all. And I had to come down, as I did at the first, on the side of what I thought was principle.

As to conflicting signals, no. I know there have been rumors about that. No, we have been in constant communication through the State Department with Phil Habib and taking much of our lead from his reporting of what's going on there and what we can or can't do that might be helpful. And, naturally there are times such as I've had conversations with ambassadors. But everything that is discussed is then related to whoever was not present—National Security Council, the National Security Adviser, State Department—so that at all times and there has never been any dual track or confusion with regard to our communications.

Q. Some Israeli officials have acknowledged in recent days the use of cluster bombs in the war in Lebanon. How much does this concern you?

A. It concerns me very much, as the whole thing does. We have a review going now, as we must by law, of the use of weapons and whether American weapons sold there were used offensively and not defensively, and that situation is very ambiguous. The only statement that we have heard so far with regard to the cluster bomb was that one military official—Israeli military official—has apparently made that statement publicly, and we know no more about it than what we ourselves have read in the press. But the review is going forward and the review that would lead to what the law requires—that we must inform the Congress as to whether we believe there was a question of this being an offensive attack or whether it was in self-defense.

When I said ambiguous you must recall that prior to this attack, Soviet-built rockets and 180-millimeter cannons were shelling villages across the border in Israel and causing civilian casualties.

Text from White House press release. ■

Vice President Bush Visits East Asia and the Pacific

Vice President Bush departed Washington, D.C., April 22, 1982, to visit Japan (April 23-25), Korea (April 25-27), Singapore (April 27-29), Australia (April 29-May 3), New Zealand (May 3-5), and China (May 5-9). He returned to the United States on May 9.

Following are the Vice President's remarks before the Foreign Correspondents' Club of Japan in Tokyo and the National Assembly in Seoul, his dinner toasts in Singapore and Melbourne, his arrival statement in Wellington, and his departure statement in Beijing.¹

REMARKS BEFORE THE FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS' CLUB OF JAPAN, TOKYO, APR. 24, 1982

I've come to Japan in the interests of harmony, friendship, and peace. I've come to learn, and I've come to listen. The day is past when America seeks to dominate the agenda of the countries of the free world.

The free world will survive, as a concept and reality, only if the partnerships that make it up remain intact and vibrant. As we enter the 1980s and approach the millennium, America will guard its old friendships carefully, even as it seeks new partners in the free world.

If I come in the interests of harmony, it is a time when the affairs of the world are increasingly disharmonious. The Soviet Union's appetite for the freedom of other peoples is as rapacious as ever. Lech Walesa languishes in confinement as his countrymen contend with martial law, having only the fleeting encouragement of the broadcast of Radio Solidarity.

An army of occupation continues its ruthless campaign against the Afghan people—continues to kill innocent men, women, and children with chemicals outlawed by all decent societies. Soviet leaders have given homilies on their desire for nuclear disarmament as SS-20 missiles sprouted overnight like fields of asparagus. Old wounds persist in the Middle East, though tomorrow will witness a decisive, historic, and courageous step for peace when Israel completes its withdrawal from the Sinai.

We are reminded every day that liberty is on trial and that darkness has descended over many parts of the world. In Eastern Asia, it has descended on North Korea, Vietnam, Laos, Soviet Asia, and Kampuchea. One of the most enduring symbols of the injustices of the 20th century may be those people who have braved the dangers of the sea in open boats. There is much to mourn. But there is also much to celebrate, which brings me to my visit.

In the next 3 weeks, Japan and the United States will observe two important anniversaries—April 28th, just a few days from now, will mark the 30th anniversary of the San Francisco peace treaty and the end of postwar occupation. The last 30 years have seen the historically unprecedented boom of postwar Japan. Not surprisingly is this known as "the miracle of Japan." No Eastern bloc countries will be celebrating such anniversaries this year—or next year or the year after. That is a sad fact, and the heart of the

Vice President and Mrs. Bush ring a temple bell at the Zojoji temple in Tokyo.



(White House photo by Cynthia Johnson)

West goes out to those millions of people who will continue to live under the threat of Soviet armies and under the blight of Marxist mismanagement.

On May 15th, Japan and the United States will observe the 10th anniversary of the reversion of the Island of Okinawa. Many brave men fought and died there. The soil that absorbed their blood is now a shrine to their memory. I hope Okinawa will now be remembered not so much as a battleground but as a symbol of how our two nations worked together to heal the wounds of war.

It's true that these two anniversaries come at a time of some bilateral problems between our two countries. But I haven't come here to emphasize them or to dramatize them. If my presence here today dramatizes anything, it's what joins us, not what separates us.

Obviously, problems exist. They are no secret, and they are important problems for us both, but just as obviously, we're all anxious to work out solutions—together. Partners consult; they don't dictate to each other. We've got a vigorous dialogue going, and there's no need to suspect it will grow any less vigorous over the years.

Our Japanese friends can expect from us what all our friends can expect from us—open lines of communication, a determination to overcome obstacles, and consistency. To them I would say: There will be no unpleasant surprises in your relations with us.

Japan now enjoys an unquestioned prominence among the nations of the world. It has a global role to play in the affairs of the 20th century—a role that will expand in the 21st. As it assumes a greater role, its responsibilities will grow in proportion. There are clear indications the Japanese people have a growing awareness of their country's new global role and of the obligation and responsibilities that accompany great economic strength.

To paraphrase penetrating analysis by the present Chief Cabinet Secretary, Kiichi Miyazawa, the Japanese were not ready in the 1970s to assume their full share of global responsibility; even though Japan, as Mr. Miyazawa pointed out, "became increasingly conscious of the need to play a large role in the international economy and made considerable efforts to do so." Japan's performance should be measured in its context as the second largest economic power among the industrialized democracies. Today, its political role is growing—as it should. As a pillar of the industrialized democracies, Japan cannot avoid that

role, and I for one can think of no nation more qualified to assume it.

Japan, meanwhile, has been demonstrating that it is willing to cooperate with its Western friends in all areas, including matters of defense and trade. Prime Minister Suzuki's statements on behalf of increased defense goals, along with recent increases in Japan's defense budget, attest to Japan's good faith. We are conscious, too, that the question of Japan's defense spending is much more complex than the black-and-white terms in which it is too often discussed. Let me say that the United States is grateful for the progress so far on the defense issue.

We would, of course, be grateful for continued progress, knowing as we do that Japan will make its own decisions. We have confidence in the wisdom and global perspective of Japan's leaders and its people, just as we have confidence that we will continue to cooperate in this crucial area. At the same time, we recognize the contributions of Japan's foreign aid program, much of which goes to critical parts of the world, where both our countries are working toward the same goals.

There is no question that some friction exists between the United States and Japan in the matter of trade. Many visitors from Japan, as well as my and Japan's great friend, former Ambassador Robert Ingersoll, have recently remarked on the danger of protectionism and the extent to which sentiment has been aroused in all quarters on trade issues. My own sense is that we both want to achieve the same goals—free trade and fair trade. But here I want to make a point that I cannot emphasize enough, namely, that we cannot allow trade disagreements to dominate our dialogue. Some newspapers have drawn the conclusion that our two countries are moving toward a "head-on collision" on trade. I disagree. I think, happily, that we're moving toward some head-on decisions on trade.

Long before the dilemmas of the postmodern age, Simon Bolivar said that "... the majority of men hold as a truth the humiliating principle that it is harder to maintain the balance of liberty than to endure the weight of tyranny." However vexatious our disagreements may be, we live at a time when we ought never to take for granted the special comfort of our friendship.

The difficulties abound, but we have the will and the wherewithal to overcome them. The historical imperative demands that we do. It is, for instance,

no secret that the United States has had difficulties pursuing our relations with the People's Republic of China. But we are absolutely resolved to strengthen our relationship with the People's Republic and in cooperating in its development. We thoroughly appreciate the importance of that relationship to all Asia. Strengthening it will, of course, require the efforts on both sides. But I am greatly confident of a successful outcome.

There are many other challenges facing the United States. President Reagan is deeply committed to arms reduction. He is willing to explore all reasonable—and verifiable—approaches to the question of how to reduce the world's arsenal of nuclear weapons. His zero-option proposal of last November was the single most sincere and dramatic overture to the Soviet Union in a long, long while. He's been earnest and aggressive in pursuing talks with the Soviets. But there has been a great deal of confusion and misunderstanding on the matter.

No one is more interested in maintaining peace between the Soviet Union and the United States than Ronald Reagan. He seeks no confrontation there. He seeks to reduce tensions—tensions caused in no small part by the Soviet Union's international behavior. President Reagan will do everything he can to convince the Soviet Union to cooperate with the United States in agreeing to arms reduction. And he will keep America strong. To pursue new policies does not mean old ones will be abandoned. Make no mistake: He will maintain our deterrence.

Our secret weapon in the protracted conflict against totalitarianism lies not in underground silos but in our free marketplaces. I say secret because the leaders of the totalitarian regimes cannot afford to impart the knowledge of the triumph of capitalism to their people. What Russian worker, fully informed of the status, condition, and rights of his counterpart in the United States or Japan or in any of the other industrialized democracies, would not run to the nearest Aeroflot office and get himself and his family on the next flight out? But alas, *Pravda* does not print the whole story; Aeroflot does not accept reservations from just anyone.

Irving Kristol once addressed the question of why democracies live and die. For over 2,000 years, he said, political philosophers rejected democracy because they believed that it inevitably degenerated into chaos and dictatorship.

Foreign Relations Machinery

This section describes the organization and facilities of the executive branch for the conduct of U.S. foreign relations. It is intended as background for the other sections of the atlas which deal with special issues—international organizations, the world economy, trade and investment, development assistance, and national security.

The President is the central figure in U.S. foreign relations. Under the Constitution the President has the authority to make treaties and appoint diplomatic and consular officials (with the advice and consent of the Senate). He is authorized to receive foreign emissaries and may exercise other authorities granted in various statutes. To assist the President in these duties, Congress in 1789 created the Department of State, successor to the Department of Foreign Affairs established in 1781. The Secretary of State is, by tradition, the first-ranking Cabinet member. He or she is the President's prin-

cipal adviser on foreign policy and is chiefly responsible for U.S. representation in foreign countries. The consular and diplomatic systems, originally separate, were united in the Foreign Service of the United States in 1924.

The present system for conducting foreign relations evolved after World War II. For more than a century after independence, the United States played a limited role in world political affairs. Not until 1893 did the Republic begin to exchange ambassadors (rather than minister-plenipotentiaries—a lower rank) with the European Great Powers. After taking a leading role in the 1919 peace conferences ending World War I, the United States reduced its involvement in world affairs—only to be thrust into an unambiguous position of world leadership by World War II. To counter the threat of Soviet expansion, the United States entered into permanent military alliances with Atlantic and Pacific countries and, to help the world economy develop and prosper, embarked upon a program of

foreign aid and international economic cooperation.

Global responsibilities required a more complicated foreign policy machinery. Department of State personnel rose from 6,000 in 1940 to 13,000 in 1960. The Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, and the Treasury assumed new responsibilities in international economic and monetary affairs and the Department of Defense in military assistance and cooperation. Congress created new agencies to work under the overall direction of the Secretary of State—the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (1961), Agency for International Development (1961, succeeding other agencies responsible for major foreign aid programs), the International Development Cooperation Agency (1979, to coordinate all foreign aid), and the International Communication Agency (1978, combining existing foreign information services with cultural exchange programs). In 1963 Congress created the Office of the United States Trade Representative to

conduct negotiations with other nations seeking to reduce world trade barriers.

To help the President reach decisions on foreign policy, which had become increasingly complex, and to coordinate the work of the many agencies involved, Congress passed the National Security Act of 1947 creating the National Security Council (NSC). Chaired by the President, the NSC includes the Vice President and the Secretaries of State and Defense as regular members. This act also created the national defense establishment, uniting the separate branches of the Armed Forces, and the Central Intelligence Agency, which was to operate under NSC direction.

This atlas is compiled and written in the Bureau of Public Affairs by Harry F. Young and edited by Colleen Sussman.

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Administration of U.S. Foreign Affairs

Foreign Affairs Branch

Political Affairs

(general foreign policy and conduct of relations with foreign countries)

Politico-Military Affairs

(mutual defense, strategic policy, arms control)

International Commercial and Economic Affairs

(trade, investment, monetary affairs, foreign aid)

Information and Educational and Cultural Exchange

(contact with foreign audiences through government media; promotion of people-to-people relations)

Intelligence

(collection and analysis of information bearing on the conduct of foreign relations)

Departments and Agencies Involved

Department of Defense, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Energy, Labor, Treasury; Export-Import Bank; International Trade Commission; Overseas Private Investment Corporation; U.S. Trade Representative, International Development and Cooperation Agency; Agency for International Development

International Communication Agency

Intelligence Community

Department of State

Responsibilities in all foreign affairs branches

Interagency Policy Coordination

National Security Council

Flexible system of interagency committees at various levels and of varying composition depending on subject matter

Constitutional Responsibility

President

Head of Government/Head of State






Responsibilities in the Department of State

Duties

Leadership and overall direction	Policy development and coordination	Development of policy toward and conduct of relations with foreign countries and international organizations	Policy development and conduct of relations in special fields	Policy development in and conduct of consular affairs (passports, visas, citizens' services overseas)	Specialized support	Congressional, media, and public liaison	Management of the Department
Responsible Officers							
Secretary of State	Under Secretaries for Political Affairs, Economic Affairs, and Security Assistance and Technology	Assistant Secretaries for (heads of bureaus of) African Affairs, Inter-American Affairs, East Asian and Pacific Affairs, European Affairs, Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, and International Organizations	Assistant Secretaries for (head of bureaus of) Economic and Business Affairs, Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, International Narcotics Matters, and Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs	Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs	Legal Adviser	Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations	Under Secretary for Management
Deputy Secretary of State	Counselor of Department				Director of Intelligence and Research	Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs and Spokesman of the Department	Inspector General
	Director of Policy Planning Staff				Chief of Protocol		Assistant Secretary for Administration
							Director General of the Foreign Service and Director of Personnel
							Comptroller of the Department
							Director of Management Operations

Areas Covered by State Department Geographic Bureaus

To facilitate the conduct of business, the Department of State groups the countries of the world into regions, assigning each to the responsibility of a geographic bureau. This division is based on geographical proximity. Canada, for example, comes under the Bureau of European Affairs because of its historic ties to the United Kingdom and Western Europe.

-  Bureau of African Affairs
-  Bureau of Inter-American Affairs
-  Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
-  Bureau of European Affairs
-  Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs



Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative.

Diplomatic and Consular Representation

The United States accredits an ambassador (or a chief of mission of lesser rank) to each of the countries with which the United States has diplomatic relations. The number of such countries in July 1982 was 150.

Establishing diplomatic relations means that two governments wish to maintain regular official exchange under the rules of international law. This step does not necessarily imply approval of one another's governmental or social system.

The United States has no diplomatic relations with, and no representation in, Albania, Angola, Iran, Kampuchea,

Mongolia, North Korea, Vietnam, and Yemen (Aden). Although the United States also has no diplomatic relations with Cuba and Iraq, it does have a form of representation known as an interests section in each country.

Consular posts provide various services for Americans sojourning in foreign countries and issue visas to foreigners for travel and immigration to the United States. Each embassy has a consular section, and there are separate consular facilities in many port cities or other commercial or tourist centers.

Other Permanent U.S. Foreign Service Posts

- U.S. Mission to the United Nations New York
- U.S. Mission to the United Nations and other International Organizations (Geneva)
- Permanent U.S. Mission to the Organization of American States (Washington, D.C.)
- U.S. Mission to Berlin
- U.S. Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Brussels)
- U.S. Mission to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (Paris)
- U.S. Mission to European Communities (Brussels)
- U.S. Mission to the International Atomic Energy Agency (Vienna)
- U.S. Mission to the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (Vienna)
- U.S. Mission to the International Civil Aviation Organization (Montreal)



- ▲ Interests section
- Consular facility outside embassy
- Countries with which United States has:
 - Diplomatic relations
 - No diplomatic relations

A U.S. Mission in a Foreign Country — Venezuela

A U.S. mission in a foreign country is classified as an embassy if the permanent chief of mission has the rank of ambassador. U.S. embassies usually consist of political, economic, consular, and administrative sections staffed by members of the Foreign Service and the Department of State and, depending on need, of specialized sections employing personnel from other departments and agencies. The Foreign Commercial Service of the Department of Commerce is

responsible for commercial program activity in 66 countries, and the Foreign Agricultural Service of the Department of Agriculture has officers posted at embassies in nearly 40 countries.

The ambassador is the personal representative of the President. He or she must represent U.S. policy to the host government and coordinate and integrate the activities of all U.S. personnel in the host country (with the exception of military personnel under area command). The ambassador is assisted in these duties by the country team com-

prising the heads of the various embassy elements. The ambassador reports to the President and receives instructions through the Secretary of State.

There are 98 Americans employed in the Embassy and other offices in Caracas, Venezuela, and the consulate in Maracaibo. By comparison, the U.S. staff at the Embassy in London numbers 274; in Brazzaville, People's Republic of the Congo, the figure is 8. Most of the Americans at the mission in Venezuela are members of the Foreign Service, in-

cluding staff of the International Communication Agency (USICA). As of June 1982, there were about 15 civilian and military employees of the Department of Defense. The Federal Aviation Administration, represented by five persons, is present temporarily under a special arrangement to provide technical assistance on a reimbursable basis in civil aviation.

Chief of Mission

Ambassador

Personal Representative of the President

Deputy Chief of Mission

Minister-Counselor

COUNTRY TEAM

Mission Unit	Agricultural Trade Office	Agricultural Counselor	Public Affairs Counselor	Commercial Counselor	Political Counselor	Economic Counselor	Administrative Counselor	Consul General	Defense Attache	Head, Military Group (advisory)	Other Agencies Present:	U.S. Consulate in Maracaibo, U.S. staff:
											Drug Enforcement Agency	3 State
			USICA	Commerce		Department of State			Defense	Defense	Federal Aviation Administration	1 USICA
Home Agency	Agriculture	Agriculture									Inter-American Geodetic Survey	
											Internal Revenue Service	



Trade Promotion Offices Abroad

At many embassies and consulates, trade promotion and other commercial activities are performed by members of the Department of Commerce's Foreign Commercial Service, while agricultural attaches or counselors from the Department of Agriculture's Foreign Agricultural Service.

Commerce also maintains several special facilities overseas. These include Export Development Offices and similar facilities in Eastern Europe to promote the sale of U.S. manufactured goods and

services; the East-West Trade Development Support Office in Vienna, Austria; and U.S. Travel Service Offices to attract foreign tourists to the United States.

The Department of Agriculture maintains Agricultural Trade Offices as separate facilities overseas to promote agricultural sales.



Region of country beneath rule indicates office's area of responsibility.

Information and Cultural Exchange Centers

The International Communication Agency (USICA) is responsible for cultural and educational exchange programs and the dissemination in foreign countries of news and information about the United States. USICA activities at U.S. missions are directed by the Public Affairs Officer.

This map shows the location of two different kinds of facilities (for which USICA is responsible) designed to promote exchange of ideas and better understanding of American life. An American Center is a permanent U.S.

Government facility providing (in many cases) a library as well as space for exhibits, lectures, and other activities. At some posts where there is no center, USICA maintains reading rooms. A Binational Center is a private institution administered by a local committee, in some cases with the help of a USICA officer serving as director. English instruction is often the primary source of income.



The United States has not recognized the incorporation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into the U.S.S.R. Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative.



American Centers
Countries with Binational Centers

USICA Periodicals Distributed Abroad

International Distribution

Dialogue. Illustrated intellectual quarterly with articles from U.S. publications; 230,000 in 16 languages.


Economic Impact. Quarterly on U.S. economy; 45,000 in English; 18,000 in Spanish.

Problems of Communism. Bi-monthly, scholarly; 21,000 in English. Congress authorizes additional 6,000 copies for U.S. distribution.

English-Teaching Forum. Quarterly journal on teaching English as a foreign language. 80,000 copies distributed overseas. Congress authorizes U.S. distribution.

Distribution in Specific Country or Region

Periodical	Country/Region	Style/Content	Circulation/Languages	Topic	U.S. life, U.S. policy and aid for Africa	Circulation/Languages
Amerika	U.S.S.R.	Illustrated articles on U.S. life	62,000 (Russian)	Sub-Saharan Africa	U.S. life, U.S. policy and aid for Africa	34,000 (English); 17,000 (French)
Al Majal	Arab countries	International subjects, economic, Mideast, U.S. life	19,000 (Arabic)	Trade USA	Trade opportunities	17,000 (English)
Span	India	Articles and reprints on U.S. life, U.S.-Indian relations	78,000 (English)	Vocero Comercial	Same as Trade USA	22,000 (Spanish and Portuguese)
				Trends	U.S.-Japanese relations, culture	16,000 (Japanese)



- Amerika
- Al Majal
- Span
- Topic
- Trade USA
- Vocero Comercial
- Trends

U.S. Government International Broadcasting

Since World War I, when governments first began to use the radio to speak directly to the people of a foreign country, international broadcasting has become a standard supplement to conventional diplomacy. In 1981, 16 governments had external radio services broadcasting more than 300 hours a week.

The three largest international broadcasters are the U.S.S.R. (2,100 hours a week in 80 languages), the United States (1,924 hours in 46 languages), and the People's Republic of China (1,304 hours in 43 languages). The following are U.S. broadcasting facilities:

Voice of America (VOA), the official voice of the U.S. Government, sending news, cultural, and entertainment programs to every part of the world (with emphasis on the U.S.S.R.). USICA estimates that over 104 million adults listen to VOA at least once a week, including over 32 million Soviet citizens;

Radio Liberty broadcasting from West Germany to the U.S.S.R.;

Radio Free Europe broadcasting from West Germany to Eastern Europe; and

RIAS (Radio im amerikanischen Sektor), broadcasting in German from West Berlin.

Languages Used by U.S. Broadcasting Services

Worldwide: VOA has a worldwide English service as well as special English programs for sub-Saharan Africa.

Sub-Saharan Africa: English, French, Hausa, Portuguese, Swahili.

Arab Countries: Arabic.

East Asia: Burmese, Indonesian, Khmer, Korean, Lao, Thai, Vietnamese.


South Asia: Bengali, Dari, Farsi, Hindi, Urdu.

China: Mandarin.

Eastern Europe: Albanian, Bulgarian, Czech, Estonian, German, Hungarian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Polish, Rumanian, Serbian, Croatian, Slovak, Slovene.

Southern Europe: Greek, Turkish, Portuguese.

Latin America: Portuguese, Spanish.
U.S.S.R.: Armenian, Azeri, Georgian, Kazakh, Kirghiz, Russian, Tadzhik, Tatar, Bashkir, Turkmen, Ukrainian, Uzbek.



Figures under rule indicate number of weekly hours broadcast (excluding English broadcasts)

Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative

Foreign Affairs Costs and Personnel

Outlays FY 1981 (\$ billions)	
Total Federal Government	657.0
Total Foreign Affairs ¹	11.1
Foreign Aid	7.3
Foreign Affairs Administration ²	1.3
Foreign Information and Exchange	0.5
International Financial Programs	2.0



¹ This approximate figure includes total outlays of the Department of State, Agency for International Development (AID), Export-Import Bank (Eximbank), International Communication Agency (USICA), International Development and Cooperation Agency (IDCA), International Trade Commission (ITC), National Security Council (NSC), Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), and Peace Corps, plus outlays for foreign affairs-related activities for the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Energy, Labor, and Treasury

² Expenses of Department of State and Foreign Service and contributions to international organizations and conferences.

Source: Budget of the United States Government, FY 1983

Personnel FY 1981 (number of persons)	
Total Federal Government	2 million
Civilian Employment	36,000 (less than 2% of total)

¹ U.S. citizens only—all State, AID, Eximbank, USICA, IDCA, ITC, NSC, OPIC, Peace Corps staff, and USTR employees, plus foreign affairs-related positions in Agriculture, Commerce, Energy, Labor, and Treasury, as calculated from data received from these departments by the Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State.



But, "what changed the attitude of political philosophers," wrote Kristol, "was the emergence of modern capitalism, with its promise of economic growth—of an economic system in which everyone could improve his condition without having to do so at someone else's expense. It is the expectation of tomorrow's bigger pie, from which everyone will receive a larger slice, that prevents people from fighting to the bitter end over the division of today's pie."

Japan and the United States need each other to grow. We depend on each other to grow. Our combined national products account for one-third of the world's output. That is a formidable weapon against the adversaries of freedom. We owe it to ourselves, to our friends in the free world, and moreover to those who may someday be free to resolve our differences, so that, together, we can build on a past that promises great things to come.

ADDRESS BEFORE THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, SEOUL, APR. 26, 1982

This is my first visit to Korea. I hope it will not be my last. On arriving I was struck by two things. The first was how close we are here to the DMZ [demilitarized zone] and the realization of how much a part of everyday life in Seoul that proximity is. The second was how amazed and touched I was by the warmth of the public reception. I have always heard about Korean hospitality and graciousness. Yesterday, what had only been general knowledge became a first-hand experience. Please thank the people you represent. They made me feel very welcome, just as you have by inviting me to speak to you today.

We celebrate this year a century of friendship between the government and peoples of the United States and Korea—100 years. That is not such a long time, perhaps, in the march of human history; but a hundred years is one-half of the U.S. life as a nation. That we have been friends so long, in a world that, in those 100 years has seen enough conflict and hatred to last a millennium, is cause for great joy.

I carry with me the greetings and the friendship of the people of the United States and of President Reagan. What I have to say here today I say on their behalf. I am glad to be able to give my message to you, representing as you do the Korean people. I am honored that



(White House photo by Cynthia Johnson)

you called this body into special session in order to hear it.

Legislative bodies such as this National Assembly are where the people's business should be conducted. I myself am well enough acquainted with legislative branches to know that they are not always tranquil. Indeed, sometimes they are rather noisy.

Long ago, Simon Bolivar, one of the great liberators of the Western Hemisphere, said that "... the majority of men hold as a truth the humiliating principle that it is harder to maintain the balance of liberty than to endure the weight of tyranny." This is ever true of our own times. Our own Congress is sometimes full of noise. But we would have it no other way.

In the North, there is no truly representative Congress. Instead only a great silence—the silence of despotism and one-man rule. This silence is broken by the occasional sounds of violence, as it

Near the demilitarized zone in Korea, Vice President Bush received a briefing from Gen. John A. Wickham, Jr., commander in chief of the U.N. command, U.S. forces in Korea, and the combined forces command.

was last week when four who sought freedom were killed by their own countrymen as they made their way to freer soil.

The occasion of 100 years of relations is a fitting time to emphasize the continuity of our friendship. We will remain a faithful ally. We will remain a reliable ally. We are partners in the non-Communist world. That especially makes our bond a sacred one. If America once lectured its friends and apologized to its adversaries, that day is over.

During the height of the Vietnam war, a message was passed to President Nixon. It was from Henry Kissinger, then a professor at Harvard. The message said, "The word is going out that it may be dangerous to be

America's enemy, but it is fatal to be its friend." As long as Ronald Reagan sits in the Oval Office of the White House, no one will be able to say this about the United States.

We live in a world full of tension—tensions which complicate our search for a lasting peace. The United States is a Pacific power, and Korea is one of our most vital allies. The purpose of America's presence in Korea is to protect and preserve the peace which both our countries fought so hard to bring about. The United States will remain a power in Korea only as long as we are welcome. It is not our desire to dominate the non-Communist world, only to be a vital partner in it and to be a friend upon whom our friends can rely.

The United States is proud to have as its friend and ally a country such as Korea, where economic miracles occur. Twenty years ago, this was a poor country. Political scientists study South Korea as a model for economic development. Kim Kyung Won has explained part of the Korean success this way. "It is," he said, "the culture of discipline and postponing immediate satisfaction for the future—even for posterity."

According to an international labor organization study, South Koreans work longer hours than any other people on Earth. This industriousness has given you one of the most dynamic economies of the 20th century. Between 1970 and 1980, the volume of trade between our two countries has increased hugely: from \$531 million to \$10 billion.

The United States is, of course, a vital market for Korean goods, and vice versa. President Reagan has made it clear that he will do all he can to keep the U.S. market open. There are few other advocates of free trade as ardent as he. And naturally his job in persuading those who regulate the market to keep it open will be made easier if our trading partners are prepared to make the same pledge. Korea is our ninth largest trading partner, and we expect it will become even more important in the years ahead. Because, among other things, your economy is expanding so rapidly. Your growth rate last year was 14%. By sharp contrast, the North has one-fourth the output of the South. One-half of the North's work force is required to feed its people; in the South, little more than one-third are needed to fulfill that task. Your hard work and determination to bring about these economic successes have validated, in

the eyes of the world community, the U.S. decision to help you sustain your freedom.

Against this background of extraordinary economic achievement, the opportunities for pluralism are strong. President Chun, the first head of state President Reagan received at the White House, spoke of a new era in the Republic of Korea, an era of "renewal of the spirit of national harmony, replacing the old chronic and internecine battles between those who take rigid and extreme positions." He spoke of an era of "dialogue" and "consensus building." He spoke of a "freer, more abundant, and democratic society in our midst." We support this philosophy with all our heart. And we look to President Chun and to this assembly to build on such a commitment, the foundation stones of which have already been laid.

In a democracy, legislatures are the only true means of determining the will of the people. Democracy, as President Abraham Lincoln defined it for us long ago, consists of "... government of the people, by the people, for the people." To be sure, the people speak with many voices; but in free countries, as someone once observed, every man is entitled to express his opinions, and every man is entitled not to listen.

Some countries have a fear of pluralism, and only the preordained few control the destinies of the many. One country in our own hemisphere—Nicaragua—overthrew an autocratic, repressive regime, promising that the new order would be pluralistic and democratic, promising that all Nicaraguans would have a voice in their new government. Unfortunately, the rulers of that new Nicaragua subsequently found one excuse after another for postponing elections, closing down the newspapers, and jailing the opposition. The United States regrets this, just as it regrets the suppression of democratic practices in all countries, friend or foe. We see political diversity as a source of strength not weakness.

There is an ancient Chinese curse that says, "May you live in interesting times." We live today in interesting times—though I think that is more a challenge than a curse. The most important task facing us as partners is preserving peace. The very close cooperation between the United States and Korea is a matter of record. The United States will try to build on new relations, such as the one we have with the People's Republic of China, but not

at the expense of our longstanding friendships.

A great American poet once wrote, "Most of the change we think we see in life is due to truths being in and out of favor." The policy of deterrence has served us well in the past; why should it not continue to serve us well in the future? I sympathize with those intellectual quarters who devote themselves to the search for new solutions. But that does not mean the old solutions are no longer valuable. The essence of deterrence is that where there is balance, there is safety. This policy has kept the peace in Korea since 1954. The world has seen a great many wars in our time. Since NATO was founded in 1948, for instance, about 150 wars have broken out. In this troubled century, 28 years of peace on this peninsula amounts to a proud legacy.

The quest for lasting peace involves more than merely maintaining the *status quo*. This is why President Reagan has been trying hard to encourage the Soviet Union to work with the United States in finding a way to bring about real and verifiable nuclear arms reduction. And that is also why the United States so strongly supports the bold and imaginative initiative of President Chun toward a reunification of the two Koreas.

I would take this opportunity to urge Kim Il-song to respond to President Chun in the same spirit. The United States will be glad to discuss new ideas with the North, in conjunction with the South. We have no intentions of talking to the North alone.

Here let me make an important point about the foreign policy of Ronald Reagan. He is anxious to pursue all avenues toward dialogue, believing as he does that the best way to bring about dialogue is to seek it from a position of strength. It is a truism of foreign policy that an adversary is more likely to negotiate if it is to his advantage to negotiate. If, for instance, the United States were to remove its military forces from all over the world, what incentive for restraint in international behavior would remain for the Soviets? Thus, until the day comes when the Soviet Union, and other Communist nations such as Vietnam, decide to respect international law and to reduce international tension, the United States has little choice but to remain strong. And so we shall.

Kim Il-song, to judge from his rather lengthy speeches—lengthier, even, than my own—is adamant on the

subject of withdrawal of the United States peacekeeping forces from Korea. I should like to take this opportunity to admonish him to redirect his rhetorical energies elsewhere. Too many men and women—Korean and American—have already given their lives protecting this land from his troops. He desires reunification, but as we saw all too recently in Vietnam, reunification, in Communist terms, means the horrors of new wars, “reeducation,” camps, and hundreds of thousands of people driven to the sea in open boats. The United States has no intention of stepping aside in Korea so Kim Il-song can launch another invasion and set the clock back 32 years.

It is our earnest hope that he eventually will see the logic of negotiations. But we in the United States as you in the Republic of Korea are prepared to wait for that day patiently and to prosper in the meantime as we begin our second 100 years of friendship.

**DINNER TOAST,
SINGAPORE,
APR. 27, 1982**

I'm very honored to be here this evening. It's been too long since my last visit to Singapore in the mid-1970s. You've undergone remarkable changes, undertaken remarkable achievements. In the midst of an uncertain world, you've created a society that has excited the admiration and respect of many nations. This is obviously a source of great pride for those who have taken part in the Singapore adventure.

The Vice President and Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew offer toasts.

The world looks to Singapore, and especially to your leadership, Mr. Prime Minister [Lee Kuan Yew]. Your vision, your ingenuity, your range of accomplishments are known throughout the world. You have shown boldness, that quality so valued by Disraeli, who told us that “success is the child of audacity.”

We are good friends, Singapore and the United States. We share the same view on many matters. We both believe in free enterprise as a stabilizing influence. We are not allies in a formal sense, but we both believe in the need for the United States to maintain a strong and steady influence in the Pacific region. The United States, as I have told audiences in all the East Asian countries I've visited on this trip, has no desire to dominate; only to be a good and faithful friend and a dependable ally.

We live, as the traditional Chinese curse has it, in the interesting times. Soviet aggression is on the loose in many parts of the world. Here, their proxy, Vietnam, continues its war against Kampuchea. Its occupation of that country is a profoundly destabilizing influence in Southeast Asia, filling refugee camps of Thailand, just as the rulers of the new Vietnam have filled the sea with hundreds and thousands of homeless souls.

We deplore these tragedies. We are both anxious for withdrawal from beleaguered Kampuchea. We are both anxious for increased respect for international law. ASEAN [Association of South East Nations] plays an enormously important role as a stabilizing and progressive influence in this region. And we recognize the crucial role that

Singapore plays in that organization.

I look forward most to eagerly to my meeting with you tomorrow, Mr. Prime Minister, to hearing first-hand your perspective on questions pertaining to Southeast Asia and the world. I also look forward to hearing your views on world affairs, inasmuch as you are, by virtue of your leadership of this internationally minded country, a man of the world. I'll be ready to address the issues you have so forthrightly expressed in your remarks.

**DINNER REMARKS,
MELBOURNE,
MAY 1, 1982**

Barbara and I have been the recipients of so many kindnesses since we arrived here 2 days ago. The hospitality seems to go on and on; seems to be as endless as the great stretches of territory we flew over since our first stop in Darwin and here. Once again, so many thanks.

I want to tell you how pleased Barbara and I are to have had the chance to visit Melbourne, your city, Mr. Prime Minister [Malcolm Fraser]. I see why it is called Australia's “Garden City.” On our visit here we've seen one beautiful city after another. I must say, I think John Batman knew a bargain when he saw one—if he bought all this for 200 pounds of trinkets. When your great past Prime Minister and fellow Victorian, Robert Menzies, visited us in the United States back in 1950, he said that except in the jaundiced eye of the law, Americans are not regarded as foreigners in Australia. I have managed on my visit to keep out of the way of your law. You've made us feel wonderfully at home.

Our two countries have passed so many tests in this century. We fought together in four wars—World Wars I and II, Korea, and Vietnam. If, as Hazlitt said, prosperity is a great teacher, but adversity is a greater one, then we've learned much, both from our hardships and from the way we shared them.

For the past 30 years, our ANZUS [Australia, New Zealand, United States] mutual defense treaty has helped to keep the peace. That treaty is the cornerstone of our security in the Southwest Pacific and the foundation for our search for peaceful resolutions to heated conflict worldwide.

Thirty years later, it has endured in a way far beyond the vision of those



White House photo by Cynthia Johnson



In Sydney, Vice President Bush reviews the honor guard.

White House photo by Cynthia Johnson

who put their signatures to that document. The cooperation of Australian and U.S. forces in contributing to the Sinai peace force shows how far our collaboration has taken us. In a world in which there are too few peace processes, our standing together in that part of the world, far from our own shores, should give us great satisfaction. In these perilous times, President Reagan is determined to do all he can to maintain the intimacy between our countries on which ANZUS thrives.

It was Sir Percy Spencer, the Australian statesman, who once told our House of Representatives that, "So far as it is possible, it is our objective to build up with the United States somewhat the same relationship that exists within the British Commonwealth. That is to say, we desire a full exchange of information and experience on all matters of mutual interest."

Our discussions of the past 2 days can only be described as very friendly and productive. Yesterday in Canberra, we had a long and straightforward session around the cabinet table with the Prime Minister and members of his cabinet. Many subjects were raised with so few disagreements. It's not the stuff that banner headlines are made of, but that's the way it is with friends. That's the way it must be in this dangerous world. And for the free nations of the world, that's big news.

Our talks ranged around the entire world—Japan, China, the Falklands, the Soviet Union, the ASEAN nations, the nations that comprise the Caribbean. We discussed President Reagan's deep and abiding desire to reduce nuclear weapons throughout the world. And as the Prime Minister said in the meeting, we saved to the last the sweetest subject of all—sugar.

There is very little going on in our world today that is not of mutual interest to both our countries. As partners in the free world, we have done and will continue to do our all to insure that those who have given everything they had in the defense of freedom shall not have done so in vain and that those who come after us will be able to say that we worked for peace on their behalf.

ARRIVAL STATEMENT, WELLINGTON, MAY 3, 1982

It's very good, finally, to be in New Zealand, Mr Prime Minister [Robert Muldoon], and I want to thank you for your kind invitation. Barbara and I have been looking forward very much to this part of our journey for a long, long time. I've never been here before, but back home the beauty of New Zealand is well known, as is the innate and legendary graciousness of New Zealanders. I'm looking forward enormously to our talks

and to those with other members of your government.

I've come to New Zealand to reaffirm the friendship between our two countries. Just a few days ago, we marked the 30th anniversary of the entry into force of the ANZUS treaty, which marked the beginning of our formal, postwar alliance. The spirit of ANZUS is strong—stronger even than the vision of those who put their signatures to the document in 1951. As the world has evolved, so has our friendship. The United States has learned that as Emerson put it long ago, "the best way to have a friend is to be one."

Ours is much more than a security alliance. Our ties are cultural and economic and grounded in the conviction that democracy has given us the means and the power to attain our prosperity—and our peace.

Our friendship goes back long before ANZUS. I've come not only to celebrate our past but, I hope, to inaugurate our future. In America we place great value on the comradeship and the self-sacrifice that characterized the origins of our partnership. And we place equally great value on a friend who continues to stand for those values that sustain and nourish the free world.

Lest I overstay my welcome within only minutes of my landing here in Wellington, let me conclude by simply saying, thank you for this warm welcome. Thank you for having us here, Mr. Prime Minister.

Vice President Bush lays a wreath at New Zealand's National War Memorial in Wellington; he is accompanied by Lt. Col. Michael Fry, a member of the Vice President's staff.



White House photo by Cynthia Johnson

President Reagan's Letters

**TO VICE CHAIRMAN
DENG XIAOPING,
APR. 5, 1982**

Dear Mr. Vice Chairman:

The establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China was an historic event which improved the prospects for peace and served the interests of both our peoples. Yet we now find ourselves at a difficult juncture in those relations.

I am writing to you because it is important for the leadership of both our countries to resume the broad advance to which you have contributed so much. This is particularly important today, as we face a growing threat from the Soviet Union and its satellite nations throughout the world. Though our interests and thus our policies are not identical, in Afghanistan and Iran, in Southeast Asia, in my own hemisphere, and in the field of nuclear weaponry, your nation and mine face clear and present dangers, and these should impel us toward finding a firm basis for cooperation.

We have come far together in a very short time. I strongly support the continuation of this progress. We must work together to expand the benefits to both our countries. My Administration had taken a number of initiatives to further this process, and we intend to do more.

Clearly, the Taiwan issue has been a most difficult problem between our governments. Nonetheless, vision and statesmanship have enabled us in the past to reduce our differences over this issue while we have built a framework of long-term friendship and cooperation.

The United States firmly adheres to the positions agreed upon in the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the United States and China. There is only one China. We will not permit the unofficial relations between the American people and the people of Taiwan to weaken our commitment to this principle.

I fully understand and respect the position of your government with regard to the question of arms sales to Taiwan. As you know, our position on this matter was stated in the process of normalization: the United States has an abiding interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question.

We fully recognize the significance of the nine-point proposal of September 30, 1979. The decisions and the principles conveyed on my instructions to your government on January 11, 1982 reflect our appreciation of the new situation created by these developments.

In this spirit, we wish to continue our efforts to resolve our differences and to create a cooperative and enduring bilateral and strategic relationship. China and America are two great nations destined to grow stronger

through cooperation, not weaker through division.

In the spirit of deepening the understanding between our two countries, I would like to call your attention to the fact that Vice President Bush will be traveling to East Asia toward the end of April. The Vice President knows and admires you. He is also fully aware of my thinking about the importance of developing stronger relations between our two countries. If it would be helpful, I would be delighted to have the Vice President pay a visit to Beijing, as part of his Asian trip, so that these matters can be discussed directly and personally with you and other key leaders of the People's Republic of China.

Sincerely,

RONALD REAGAN

**TO PREMIER ZHAO ZIYANG,
APR. 5, 1982**

Dear Mr. Premier:

The present state of relations between our two countries deeply concerns me. We believe significant deterioration in those relations would serve the interests of neither the United States of America nor the People's Republic of China.

As the late Premier Zhou Enlai said in welcoming President Nixon to China in 1972, "The Chinese people are a great people, and the American people are a great people." We are strong, sovereign nations sharing many common interests. We both face a common threat of expanding Soviet power and hegemonism. History has placed upon us a joint responsibility to deal with this danger.

The differences between us are rooted in the long-standing friendship between the American people and the Chinese people who live on Taiwan. We will welcome and support peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question. In this connection, we appreciate the policies which your government has followed to provide a peaceful settlement.

As I told Vice Premier Huang in Washington, we welcome your nine-point initiative.

As I also told the Vice Premier, we expect that in the context of progress toward a peaceful solution, there would naturally be a decrease in the need for arms by Taiwan. Our positions over the past two months have reflected this view. We are prepared, indeed welcome, further exchanges of view in the months to come. I hope you share my conviction that the United States and China should work together to strengthen the prospects for a peaceful international order. While our interests, and thus our policies, will not always be identical, they are complementary and thus should form a firm basis for cooperation.

In my letter to Vice Chairman Deng, I have suggested that a visit to Beijing by Vice

President Bush at the end of April could be a useful step in deepening the understanding between our two countries. The Vice President will be traveling in Asia at the time, and could visit Beijing if you feel it would be useful.

Sincerely,

RONALD REAGAN

**TO CHAIRMAN HU YAOBANG,
MAY 3, 1982**

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The visit of Vice President Bush to China affords a welcome opportunity to convey my regards to you.

As sovereign nations, our two countries share a common responsibility to promote world peace. We face a grave challenge from the Soviet Union which directly threatens our peoples and complicates the resolution of problems throughout the globe. It is vital that our relations advance and our cooperation be strengthened.

Vice President Bush is visiting China as my personal emissary. He is prepared to discuss a wide range of issues of mutual concern. My sincere hope is that we can achieve, through discussions, enhanced mutual understanding, at the highest levels of our governments.

Among the issues the Vice President will address is the question of United States arms sales to Taiwan. This remains an area of residual disagreement, as our governments acknowledged at the time of US-China normalization. I believe, so long as we exercise the statesmanship and vision which have characterized our approach to differences over the past decade, we will be able to make progress toward the removal of this issue as a point of bilateral contention.

In the meantime, as stated in my recent letters to Vice Chairman Deng and Premier Zhao, the United States will continue to adhere firmly to the positions agreed upon in the joint communiqué on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China. Our policy will continue to be based on the principle that there is but one China. We will not permit the unofficial relations between the American people and the Chinese people on Taiwan to weaken our commitment to this principle.

On this basis, and with good faith on both sides, we are confident that a means can be found to resolve current differences and deepen our bilateral and strategic cooperation. It is my hope that you and I will have an opportunity to meet soon. Please accept my best wishes in your efforts to build a secure and modernizing China.

Sincerely,

RONALD REAGAN ■

DEPARTURE STATEMENT, BEIJING, MAY 9, 1982

During the past 3 days, in private discussions and public statements, I have stated again and again that my visit to China is a symbol of the Reagan Administration's good faith in seeking to build upon the strength of our friendship and the strength of our important strategic relationship.

I have attempted to impress upon the leaders of China the depth of President Reagan's commitment to building an enduring relationship—a relationship based on mutual trust and understanding. Frankly, I feel good about the discussions I have had during the past days. I feel that some progress has been made, and I believe that recent personal correspondence by the President to the Chinese leaders has done much to help advance the process.

Differences between us remain, to be sure. But as we seek to resolve them we must be certain that the positive elements in our relationship are reinforced and that the problems do not determine the course of our relationship.

We have a clarification of thinking on both sides on the Taiwan issue and other bilateral and global concerns. And we have agreed that U.S. and Chinese representatives will continue to hold talks on the main question before us. I am also pleased by the positive way in which the Chinese leaders have presented my visit and the talks to the Chinese people. These are good signs.

When I came to China, I came with the purpose of conveying and explaining in detail the President's position on bilateral, regional, and global issues. I believe that has been accomplished. I am confident that in the weeks and months ahead, the friendship and relations between our governments will grow. I know that the President, and those officials of the United States who work constantly to enhance our relationship, will do everything to insure that.

¹Texts from the Vice President's Office of the Press Secretary. ■



(White House photo by Cynthia Johnson)

Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping met with Vice President Bush in Beijing.

The Origins of the ANZUS Treaty and Council

by Edward C. Keefer
Office of the Historian

The foreign ministers who made up the council created by the ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, United States) Security Treaty met for their first session on August 4, 1952, at Kaneohe Marine Corps Air Station in Hawaii. This initial gathering was evidence of a significant shift in the security relations of the three countries, a change which began with the signing of the ANZUS Security Treaty on September 1, 1951, and which was completed on April 29, 1952, when the agreement came into force.

For Australia and New Zealand, the ANZUS treaty was the first time those Commonwealth nations had entered into a major international agreement which did not also include the United Kingdom, and, henceforth, they would look east to the United States to fulfill the role of protecting superpower rather than west to the United Kingdom. Canberra and Wellington saw this formal security pact as a guarantee against a possible threat from a resurgent Japan as well as other potential adversaries.

For the United States, the ANZUS pact was an integral part of a series of new American security arrangements in the Pacific which also included bilateral security treaties with the Philippines and Japan.

The ANZUS treaty reflected important changes in the international environment in the area—the reduction of British power, the fear of isolation by Australia and New Zealand from decisions which would affect their security, the growing threat from the Soviet Union, conflicts in Korea and Southeast Asia, the emergence of the People's Republic of China, and the potential role of a rearméd Japan.

ANZUS was also the product of the persistence and efforts of two men—Sir Percy Spender, former Foreign Minister of Australia, and John Foster Dulles, former Special Consultant to the Department of State. As Canberra's Ambassador to the United States, Sir Percy was a member of the delegation to the first ANZUS Council meeting. John Foster Dulles was not associated with the Department of State at that time but, instead, actively involved in the presidential campaign of Dwight D.

Eisenhower. While Spender and Dulles played a primary role in creating ANZUS, they did so for different reasons.

The Proponents

Sir Percy Spender was a tireless promoter of the idea of a Pacific pact modeled organizationally along the lines of the North Atlantic Treaty. In 1950, in Australia and during his visit to the United States, he argued forcefully for a security pact which would include Australia, New Zealand, the United States, and possibly the United Kingdom. One historian characterized Spender's role in the shaping of a Pacific pact as "a political obsession."

In speeches before the Australian parliament and public groups and in confidential discussions with President Truman and his advisers and leading members of the U.S. Congress, Spender preached one sermon: the security of Australia now depended on American power. Since the United States was making the important decisions on international developments in Asia, Australia should have a formal say in those decisions which affected its security. A Pacific pact with consultative machinery and collective planning was Sir Percy's remedy.

While the Truman Administration was aware of Australia's security needs, it had been unenthusiastic for some time about a Pacific alliance, especially one on the model of NATO. Truman and his advisers gave Spender a sympathetic hearing but made no commitments. One member of the Administration, however, came to favor the concept of a Pacific pact, but on his own terms and for his own reasons. John Foster Dulles interpreted the rise of the Soviet Union as a Pacific power, alignment of the People's Republic of China with the Soviet Union, the Korean conflict, and the war in Indochina as part of a "comprehensive plan" by the Communists to eliminate all Western influence on the Asian mainland and the islands of Japan, Formosa, the Philippines, and Indonesia. Dulles saw a Pacific Ocean pact, including Australia and New Zealand—in his view the most "dependable countries" in the area—as the best response to this perceived threat to non-Communist Asia. Dulles' proposal also complemented his principal foreign policy task—a Japanese peace treaty flexible enough to allow Japan to defend itself.

In January 1951, President Truman asked Dulles to negotiate a peace treaty

with Japan and to explore "other potential defense arrangements in the Pacific." With the President's blessing, Dulles traveled to the Far East to test the waters for his idea of a defensive chain starting with the Aleutians, proceeding through Japan, the Ryukyus,

tives by other means. Dulles was open to suggestions but was now considering a series of separate security arrangements which, in effect, would replace his grand scheme. A tripartite agreement among Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, with the possible inclusion of the Philippines, was one possibility.

While prospective security arrangements were a principal concern at Canberra, the proposed Japanese peace treaty was a related topic. Spender and New Zealand's Foreign Minister, F.W. Doidge, informed Dulles that their governments were unwilling to accept a peace treaty with Japan which did not limit Japanese rearmament unless there was "an accompanying arrangement" on security among the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. While it is an over-simplification to say that Dulles paid for Canberra's and Wellington's acceptance of a so-called soft peace with Japan by American acceptance of ANZUS, U.S. records of the meetings give clear evidence that a bargain was struck. While Doidge and Spender feared Japanese rearmament, Dulles worried about the consequences if Japan was not allowed to maintain adequate armed forces. Thus, the ANZUS pact allowed Australia and New Zealand to accept the American view of peace with Japan and still insure their security.

The draft treaty which emerged from the Canberra discussions was in most provisions the same treaty signed later in 1951 and ratified in 1952. Dulles, Doidge, and Spender worked out the details of the agreement, but by all accounts, Dulles was the master draftsman who wrote with an eye toward Senate confirmation. The language in Article II of the draft was carefully drawn from the Vandenburg resolution passed by the Senate in June 1948 calling for the development of regional and individual collective security based on self-help and mutual aid. Article IV, which Dulles characterized to General Douglas MacArthur "as the meat of the treaty," drew its inspiration for the phraseology from the Monroe Doctrine. Article IV reads in part: "Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes." Dulles clearly had in mind the problems encountered in securing Senate acceptance in 1949 of Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty. As he told MacArthur, the



(Australian News and Information Bureau)

Sir Percy Spender

the Philippines, and Indonesia, and ending in Australia and New Zealand. It was to be "composed of links so interconnected that an attack on one link would jeopardize the entire chain." The British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, however, was unalterably opposed to this concept—it would send the wrong signals to Moscow and Beijing about British intentions to defend Hong Kong and Malaya and about the West's determination to support the French in Indochina and non-Communist governments in Thailand and Burma. At the onset of his trip, the British told Dulles of their fears and the Special Consultant abandoned the idea of a single Pacific Ocean pact.

Negotiating the Treaty

When Dulles arrived in Canberra in mid-February 1951 for discussions with the Australian and New Zealand Foreign Ministers, he knew that British opposition to the island chain concept meant that he would have to achieve his objec-

treaty was also flexible: "While it [Article IV of the ANZUS Treaty] commits each party to take action—presumably to go to war—it does not commit any nation to action in any particular part of the world. In other words, the United States can discharge its obligations by action against a common enemy in any way and in any area that it sees fit." Article VII had provisions for the creation of a council of the signatories' foreign ministers. By the terms of Article VIII, the council was authorized to maintain a "consultative relationship" with other states, regional organizations, and associations in the Pacific.

The language in Article VIII of the draft treaty reflected the longstanding desire of Australia, and to some extent New Zealand, to be included in global military planning, which Australia was convinced was centered in the Pentagon. Secretary of State Dean Acheson later recalled that the Joint Chiefs of Staff "broke into a sustained tantrum of negation" over the bureaucratic and organizational responsibilities involved in this proposal. Truman and Acheson had specifically enjoined Dulles to inform the Australians and New Zealanders of American unwillingness to establish a direct and permanent link between their military staffs and the Joint Chiefs of Staff or with NATO. Acheson believed that in letting them down too easily at Canberra, Dulles gave the Australians and New Zealanders the impression that an informal relationship with the Joint Chiefs might still be possible.

The question of just what was implied in the provisions for consultation in Article VIII was the principal issue in Washington's interagency deliberations over the agreement, which was made public in July 1951. The idea of creating a Pacific NATO on even a limited or informal scale occasioned formal protests from the Joint Chiefs and the Department of Defense during the summer. It was not so much the language of Article VIII that was the concern but the implication behind the words. Having made their protest and received assurances that the consultative provisions would not grow into a formalized planning link, the military was satisfied but still wary.

On September 1, 1951, the three countries signed the Security Treaty in San Francisco. Just 1 week before, the United States and the Philippines had signed a treaty of mutual defense. A week later Japan and the United States signed a security treaty. All three agreements were made in conjunction with the conclusion of the Japanese

peace treaty that same week, and together they provided a framework for American security in the Pacific which, while not as comprehensive as Dulles' original concept for a single Pacific Islands pact, accomplished virtually the same objectives. The ANZUS treaty proceeded smoothly through the Senate, due in no small part to Dulles' careful drafting, and President Truman ratified it on April 15, 1952. It came into force 2 weeks later.

The First Council Meeting

The first council meeting of ANZUS was scheduled for Hawaii in August 1952, in order that the anniversary of the signing of the treaty should not predate the first session of foreign ministers. In those hectic summer months of 1952, ANZUS did not loom large on the list of difficulties and crises faced by the Truman Administration. Acheson predicted that there would be no problems requiring "soul searching" at the council and that there would be certainly "no spectacular results." He promised to guard against giving Australia and New Zealand the

Lord Casey



(Australian Information Service)

impression that the treaty could lead to a future NATO in the Pacific or of giving Asians the view that the treaty organization was in any way a private club among Canberra, Wellington, and Washington.

The flight to Hawaii by the U.S. delegation almost proved more difficult than any of the issues raised at the council session. Mechanical trouble grounded the delegation's plane at an Air Force base in Denver. Acheson and his colleagues spent the night in the base hospital, which alarmed President Truman until he was informed the delegates were there as guests, not patients. The American party arrived at Kaneohe after 3 days of difficult travel, stoically endured the formal landing ceremonies, and then, according to Acheson, headed for the bar!

Acheson met with Australian Foreign Minister Richard Casey to discuss informally two problems facing all the delegates—a British request for observer status at the council and a lingering Australian desire for joint military planning. Acheson told Casey frankly that the British could not be given observer status without encouraging other interested nations also to apply. Such a state of affairs would seriously complicate the ANZUS Council machinery in which simplicity and intimacy were the key elements. Casey agreed and offered to enlist the support of New Zealand Foreign Minister T. Clifton Webb to inform London that its request was denied.

Acheson also informed Casey that the Department of State, not the Pentagon, was the best point of contact for Australia and New Zealand with the U.S. Government on issues of mutual concern in the Pacific. Though no closer contact with the Pentagon was possible, Acheson suggested that Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Commander in Chief Pacific (CINCPAC), and his staff at Honolulu would be the appropriate channel for discussing military planning. Acheson identified CINCPAC as an organization responsible for the formulation as well as implementation of regional strategic policy.

When the formal sessions began the participants officially approved the term "ANZUS" as the acronym for the treaty organization, mainly because they felt the use of "Pacific" implied a broader outlook than was warranted. Acheson correctly sensed that the desire of the Australia and New Zealand representatives for joint military planning and

Secretary-Designate Shultz Appears Before Senate Committee

Secretary-designate George P. Shultz's statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on July 13, 1982. He was confirmed by the Senate on July 15 and sworn in as the 60th Secretary of State on July 16.¹

President Reagan honors me by his nomination to be the Secretary of State for the United States of America. I regard service in this post as a high privilege and a grave duty. If I am confirmed by the Senate and have the opportunity to serve, I will muster whatever energy, intelligence, and dedication I have and pour all of it into the performance of this job. I recognize and accept the responsibilities that will be placed upon me. But I say this too: I will need and I will expect help and cooperation all around; and, judging from the many assurances already extended voluntarily to me, I will get it. I look especially to members of this committee and your counterparts in the House of Representatives. But my appeal reaches much farther, to every corner of our land and to our friends throughout the world.

President Reagan has expressed his confidence in me by making this nomination; I will strive mightily to merit that confidence. I will do so fully conscious that the conduct of our foreign policy is, in accordance with the Constitution, a presidential duty to be performed in collaboration with the Congress. My job is to help the President formulate and execute his policies. I shall be ever faithful to that trust.

I have appeared before a Senate committee for confirmation to a Cabinet post on two previous occasions. Thirteen years ago I was the nominee to be Secretary of Labor before the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. Both Senators Cranston and Pell, who sit before me today, sat on that panel and voted favorably on that nomination. I was accompanied to that hearing by a friend of long standing and Senator from my then home state of Illinois,

Senator Percy. His wise and informed counsel, in government and out, has always been available and most helpful to me. I deeply appreciate his assurance that I will continue to have that counsel.

The biographical material available to you shows that I brought to my government service two decades of experience in university activities, teaching, and doing research and administration at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the University of Chicago. After serving as the Secretary of Labor, I went on to be Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and then Secretary of the Treasury. For the last 8 years, I have been with Bechtel, most recently as President of Bechtel Group, Inc. Bechtel is a truly remarkable organization, astonishing in the range of its capabilities and impressive in the quality of its people, who bring integrity, intelligence, enthusiasm, and drive to their work. I feel privileged to have played a part in Bechtel's activities. During this period, I have also served part time on the faculty of Stanford University, from which I plan to be on leave in the period of my government service.

During the last few days, a number of Senators have asked me to address myself to the question of my relationship to Bechtel should I become Secretary of State. To those questions, I see only one possible answer: none. If I am confirmed, agreements already executed by me will result in my resignation from my officerships in all Bechtel entities. I will retire as an employee, retaining only vested rights to medical and insurance benefits and to assets already accumulated under Bechtel trust and thrift plans. I will sell, at a price determined by an established process, all my Bechtel-related investments. Although I understand that these steps leave me with no legal conflict of interest, I will, if I become Secretary of State, execute a statement removing myself from any "particular matter" involving Bechtel. In the words of my counsel, concurred in by the Office of Government Ethics, these steps "will assure your full compliance, while serving as Secretary of State, with the terms of" the Federal conflict of interest laws.

global strategy sessions with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and with NATO stemmed in part from their feelings of geographical isolation. As Acheson reported to Truman at the end of the Council meetings, "both countries suffered from the knowledge that they had little knowledge of what was going on and our attitude toward the appraisal of current situations. They felt remote and worried by the unknown." Acheson and Radford decided that "rather than to starve the Australians and New Zealanders, we would give them indigestion." For 2 days, Acheson and Radford gave their ANZUS colleagues a thorough and frank assessment of every major issue and situation in the world affecting American national security. Acheson informed Truman that the Australian and New Zealand delegates seemed satisfied with these briefings, were convinced that Admiral Radford could provide liaison to American strategic planners, and were reconciled to the idea that ANZUS could not be linked with other military treaty organizations.

The first ANZUS Council meeting concluded with mutual agreement on the Council's basic organization and functions, an understanding which has influenced the workings of the security arrangement during its many years of operation. The vitality and importance of ANZUS are evident in the fact that the Council met in Canberra, June 21-22, 1982, in its 31st session. This account of the origins of the pact commemorates those Americans, Australians, and New Zealanders responsible for the creation of the ANZUS Security Treaty. ■

U.S. Global Involvement

For those of us who have spent the better part of our lives watching America's deepening involvement in the world around us, it is easy to forget that the United States has, throughout most of its history, only episodically been concerned with foreign affairs. The world of 40 or so years ago seems almost nostalgically simple in comparison to the complexities we confront today. In the decades that have passed, scores of new nations—many with frustrated aspirations—have achieved independence. The international economy is no longer managed from a few world capitals but has developed into a global network of mutually dependent partners. Extensive trade in goods and services, the international flow of critical raw materials, the emergence of new technologies, and the revolution in communications have created a world in which no nation is immune from the influence of the international economy.

Forty years ago we could not even glimpse the enormous dangers of nuclear weapons or the complexities we would face today in our efforts to control them. And 40 years ago few could foresee that the collapse of the old order would bring with it the spread of increasingly sophisticated military arms to new and contending nations, so that today regional conflicts carry with them the constant threat of escalation. General Douglas MacArthur saw these broad interrelationships and put the point succinctly and eloquently in 1951: "The issues are global and so interlocked that to consider the problems of one sector, oblivious to those of another, is but to court disaster for the whole."

Today most Americans recognize that the nature and strength of our diplomacy and our strategic posture are linked to, and heavily dependent on, our performance at home. Our economy is fundamentally strong and will strengthen further as economic policies now in place and in prospect take hold. A strong and productive America makes us a strong trading partner and a resourceful ally, giving to our friends a confidence that strengthens their will to resist those who would deprive us of our freedoms.

Today most Americans are uncomfortable with the fact that we must spend so much of our substance on defense—and rightly so. Yet most Americans also recognize that we must deal with reality as we find it. And that reality, in its simplest terms, is an uncertain world in which peace and security can be

assured only if we have the strength and will to preserve them. We have passed through a decade during which the Soviet Union expanded its military capability at a steady and rapid rate while we stood still. President Reagan has given us the leadership to turn that situation around—and just in time.

The past decade taught us once again an important lesson about the U.S.-Soviet relationship. In brief, it is that diminished American strength and resolve are an open invitation for Soviet expansion into areas of critical interest to the West and provide no incentive for moderation in the Soviet military buildup. Thus it is critical to the overall success of our foreign policy that we persevere in the restoration of our strength. But it is also true that the willingness to negotiate from that strength is a fundamental element of strength itself.

The President has put forward arms control proposals in the strategic, theater, and conventional arms areas that are genuinely bold and that will, if accepted, reduce the burdens and the dangers of armaments. Let no one doubt the seriousness of our purpose. But let no one believe that we will seek agreement for its own sake, without a balanced and constructive outcome.

We recognize that an approach to the Soviet Union limited to the military dimension will not satisfy the American people. Our efforts in the area of arms reduction are inevitably linked to restraint in many dimensions of Soviet behavior. And as we enter a potentially critical period of transition in Soviet leadership, we must also make it clear that we are prepared to establish mutually beneficial and safer relationships on the basis of reciprocity.

Today most Americans recognize that a steady and coherent involvement by the United States in the affairs of the world is a necessary condition for peace and prosperity. Over and over again since the close of the Second World War, the United States has been the global power to which others have turned for help, whether it be to assist in the process of economic development or in finding peaceful solutions to conflicts. Our help continues as, in President Reagan's Caribbean Basin initiative, an example of America's commitment to a more prosperous world. It must be an example, as well, of the key role in economic development of private markets and private enterprise. As the President said in his address in Cancun:


History demonstrates that time and again, in place after place, economic growth and human progress make their greatest strides in countries that encourage economic freedom. . . . Individual farmers, laborers, owners, traders, and managers—they are the heart and soul of development. Trust them. Because whenever they are allowed to create and build, wherever they are given a personal stake in deciding economic policies in benefiting from their success, then societies become more dynamic, prosperous, progressive, and free.

In our international endeavors, we are strengthened by a structure of alliances that is of central importance. Ours is not a hegemonic world but a diverse and pluralistic one, reflecting the complexity of the free, independent, and democratic societies with which we are associated. Just as we expect others to act in partnership with us, so we must conduct ourselves as responsible partners. Friction and differences are inevitable among allies, and we can never assume complacently that they will automatically disappear. Tolerance of the needs and perspectives of others is essential. So is candid recognition of our difficulties and challenges. Above all, there has to be a commitment to the common values and interests on which the truly unique multilateral institutions of the last three and a half decades have been based. Our commitment is firm—as President Reagan made clear during his recent European trip. I am confident that the same is true of our allies.

If we are strong, we buttress our allies and friends and leave our adversaries in no doubt about the consequences of aggression. If we provide assistance to help others to be strong, our own strength can be husbanded and brought to bear more effectively. If we are confident, we give confidence to those who seek to resolve disputes peacefully. If we are engaged, we give hope to those who would otherwise have no hope. If we live by our ideals, we can argue their merit to others with confidence and conviction.

Middle East

During my individual visits with members of this committee, many expressed a strong interest in my views on problems and opportunities in the Middle East, particularly as related to the conflict between Israel and the Arabs. Responsive to this interest, but even more to the importance of developments in this area, I will conclude my statement today by a brief discussion of my views.



George P. Shultz was sworn in as Secretary of State by Attorney General William French Smith as President Reagan watched; Mrs. Shultz held the Bible.

I start with the terrible human tragedy now taking place in Lebanon. Violence on a large scale has come once again to a region whose strategic importance inevitably guarantees that any local conflict will receive global attention—with all the dangers for world peace that implies.

In late 1974 I visited Beirut, at the time a beautiful and thriving city, even then marked by the presence of Palestinian refugees. But since then Lebanon has been racked by destruction, enduring the presence of the armed and assertive Palestine Liberation Organization and other forces.

Coherent life and government are impossible under those conditions and inevitably Lebanon became a state in disrepair. The Lebanese deserve a chance to govern themselves, free from the presence of the armed forces of any other country or group. The authority of the Government of Lebanon must extend to all its territory.

The agony of Lebanon is on the minds and in the hearts of us all. But in a larger sense Lebanon is but the latest chapter in a history of accumulated grief stretching back through decades of conflict. We are talking here about a part of the globe that has had little genuine peace for generations. A region with thousands of victims—Arab, Israeli, and other families torn apart as a consequence of war and terror. What is going on now in Lebanon must mark the end

George P. Shultz

George P. Shultz was sworn in on July 16, 1982, as the 60th U.S. Secretary of State. He was nominated by President Reagan on July 1 and confirmed by the Senate on July 15.

Mr. Shultz graduated from Princeton University in 1942, receiving a B.A. degree in economics. That year he joined the U.S. Marine Corps and served until 1945. In 1949 Mr. Shultz earned a Ph.D. degree in industrial economics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He taught at M.I.T. from 1948 to 1957, taking a year's leave of absence in 1955 to serve as a senior staff economist on the President's Council of Economic Advisers during the Administration of President Eisenhower.

In 1957 Mr. Shultz was appointed Professor of Industrial Relations at the University of Chicago Graduate School of Business. He was named Dean of the Graduate School of Business in 1962. From 1968 to 1969 Mr. Shultz was a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford.

Mr. Shultz served in the Administration of President Nixon as Secretary of Labor for 18 months, from 1969 to June 1970, at which time he was appointed the Director to the Office of Management and Budget. He became Secretary of the Treasury in May 1972, serving until 1974. During that period Mr. Shultz served also as Chairman of the Council on Economic Policy. As Chairman of the East-West Trade Policy Committee, Mr. Shultz traveled to Moscow in 1972 and negotiated a series of trade protocols with the Soviet

Union. He also represented the United States at the Tokyo meeting of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

In 1974 Mr. Shultz joined the Bechtel Corporation. Until his appointment as Secretary of State, Mr. Shultz was President and a director of Bechtel Group, Inc. During this period he also served part-time on the faculty of Stanford University.

Prior to his appointment, Mr. Shultz was Chairman of President Reagan's Economic Policy Advisory Board. At President Reagan's request, Mr. Shultz met with leaders in Europe, Japan, and Canada in May 1982 to assist in preparations for the Versailles economic summit.

Secretary Shultz's publications include *Economic Policy Beyond the Headlines* (1978), *Workers and Wages in the Urban Labor Market* (1970), *Guidelines, Informal Controls, and the Market Place* (1966), *Strategies for the Displaced Worker* (1966), *Management Organization and the Computer* (1960), *Labor Problems: Cases and Readings* (1953), *The Dynamics of a Labor Market* (1951), and *Pressures on Wage Decisions* (1950). He holds honorary degrees from Notre Dame, Loyola, Pennsylvania, Rochester, Princeton, Carnegie-Mellon, and Baruch College, New York.

Mr. Shultz was born in New York City on December 13, 1920, and spent his childhood in Englewood, New Jersey. He is married to the former Helena M. O'Brien of Nashua, New Hampshire. They have five children.

Press release 232 of July 30, 1982. ■

Secretary Haig Resigns

of this cycle of terror rather than simply the latest in a continuing series of senseless and violent acts.

We cannot accept the loss of life brought home to us every day, even at this great distance, on our television screens; but at the same time we can, as Americans, be proud that once again it is the United States, working most prominently through President Reagan's emissary, Ambassador Philip Habib, that is attempting to still the guns, achieve an equitable outcome, and alleviate the suffering.

The crisis in Lebanon makes painfully and totally clear a central reality of the Middle East: The legitimate needs and problems of the Palestinian people must be addressed and resolved—urgently and in all their dimensions. Beyond the suffering of the Palestinian people lies a complex of political problems which must be addressed if the Middle East is to know peace. The Camp David framework calls as a first step for temporary arrangements which will provide full autonomy for the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza. That same framework then speaks eloquently and significantly of a solution that “must also recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.”

The challenge of the negotiations, in which the United States is, and during my tenure will remain, a full partner, is to transform that hope into reality. For these talks to succeed, representatives of the Palestinians themselves must participate in the negotiating process. The basis must also be found for other countries in the region, in addition to Israel and Egypt, to join in the peace process.

Our determined effort to stop the killing in Lebanon, resolve the conflict, and make the Government of Lebanon once again sovereign throughout its territory underscores the degree to which our nation has vital interests throughout the Arab world. Our friendly relations with the great majority of Arab states have served those interests and, I believe, assisted our efforts to deal with the current Lebanon crisis.

But beyond the issues of the moment, the importance to our own security of wide and ever-strengthening ties with the Arabs is manifest. It is from them that the West gets much of its oil; it is with them that we share an interest and must cooperate in resisting Soviet imperialism; it is with them, as well as Israel, that we will be able to bring peace to the Middle East. The brilliant

Following is the exchange of letters between Secretary Haig and President Reagan of June 25, 1982.¹

Dear Mr. President:
Your accession to office on January 20, 1981, brought an opportunity for a new and forward looking foreign policy resting on the cornerstones of strength and compassion. I believe that we shared a view of America's role in the world as the leader of free men and an inspiration for all. We agreed that consistency, clarity and steadiness of purpose were essential to success. It was in this spirit that I undertook to serve you as Secretary of State.

In recent months, it has become clear to me that the foreign policy on which we embarked together was shifting from that careful course which we had laid out. Under these circumstances, I feel it necessary to request that you accept my resignation. I shall always treasure the confidence which you reposed in me. It has been a great honor to serve in your Administration, I wish you every success in the future.

Sincerely,

ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.

Dear Al:
It is with the most profound regret that I accept your letter of resignation. Almost forty

years ago you committed yourself to the service of your country. Since that time your career has been marked by a succession of assignments demanding the highest level of personal sacrifice, courage and leadership. As a soldier and statesman facing challenges of enormous complexity and danger, you have established a standard of excellence and achievement seldom equalled in our history. On each occasion you have reflected a quality of wisdom which has been critical to the resolution of the most anguishing problems we have faced during the past generation—the conclusion of the Vietnam war, the transfer of executive authority at a time of national trauma and most recently, advancing the cause of peace among nations.

The nation is deeply in your debt. As you leave I want you to know of my deep personal appreciation, and in behalf of the American people I express my gratitude and respect. You have been kind enough to offer your continued counsel and you may be confident that I will call upon you in the years ahead. Nancy joins me in extending our warmest personal wishes to you and Pat.

Sincerely,

RONALD REAGAN

Arab heritage of science, culture, and thought has a fresh dynamism. Working together with us, our Arab friends can contribute much, not only to our bilateral interests and those of the region, but to the global future and the world economy as well. I will do all in my power to sustain these relationships and to further them.

Finally, and most important, the Lebanese situation is intimately linked to the vital question of Israel's security. Israel, our closest friend in the Middle East, still harbors a deep feeling of insecurity. In a region where hostility is endemic, and where so much of it is directed against Israel, the rightness of its preoccupation with matters of security cannot be disputed. Nor should anyone dispute the depth and durability of America's commitment to the security of Israel or our readiness to assure that Israel has the necessary means to defend itself. I share in this deep and enduring commitment—and more. I recognize that democratic Israel shares with us a deep commitment to the security of the West.

Beyond that, however, we owe it to Israel, in the context of our special relationship, to work with it to bring about a comprehensive peace—acceptable to all the parties involved—which is the only sure guarantee of true and durable security.

America has many often competing concerns and interests in the Middle East. It is no secret that they present us with dilemmas and difficult decisions. Yet we must, using all the wit and compassion we possess, reconcile those interests and erase those contradictions, for it is, in the last analysis, peace we are seeking to create and nurture.

Today's violence should not cause us to forget that the Middle East is a land of deep spirituality where three great religions of our time were born and come together even today. Some have suggested that it was only natural, in a land of such vast, harsh, and open space, that men should be drawn toward the heavens and toward a larger sense of life's meaning. Whatever the reasons, the force of religion in this region is as powerful today as ever, and our plans

¹Texts from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of June 28, 1982. ■

for peace will be profoundly incomplete if they ignore this reality.

Let me close by recalling to you President Reagan's definition of America's duty to this region: "Our diplomacy," he said, "must be sensitive to the legitimate concerns of all in the area. Before a negotiated peace can ever hope to command the loyalty of the whole region, it must be acceptable to Israelis and Arabs alike."

I pledge to you and this committee that if I am confirmed as Secretary of State I will do my best to help the President carry out the task so clearly defined in his statement. We must dare to hope that, with effort and imagination, we can arrive at an agreement that will satisfy the vital security interests of Israel and the political aspirations of the Palestinians, meet the concerns of the other parties directly involved, and win the endorsement of the international community.

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

NATO Allies Table Draft MBFR Treaty

Following is a statement by Eugene V. Rostow, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), of July 8, 1982.

President Reagan, in his speech to the *Bundestag* in Bonn on June 9, stated that the alliance had agreed on a new proposal designed to give new life to the Vienna negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) in central Europe. At their recent summit meeting, NATO leaders announced that the Western participants in MBFR "will soon present a draft treaty embodying a new, comprehensive proposal designed to give renewed momentum to these negotiations and achieve the long-standing objective of enhancing stability and security in Europe."

This morning in Vienna's Hofburg Palace, where the MBFR plenary sessions take place, the West formally tabled its draft treaty. This new initiative is the result of an effort by this

Administration to develop an arms control approach on the question of conventional forces in central Europe which calls for substantial reductions—reductions which, if implemented, could reduce the risk of war in central Europe. The U.S. delegation in Vienna is headed by Ambassador Richard Staar.

As the President stressed in his speech to the *Bundestag*, this new Western proposal on conventional force reductions is an important complement to previous U.S. initiatives taken in the talks on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) and in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), both of which are now in session in Geneva. Thus, the comprehensive arms control program launched by President Reagan in his November 18th speech of last year has now culminated in three specific proposals in the categories he listed. The proposals all meet the criteria set forth in that speech; namely, that there must be substantial, militarily-significant reductions in forces, equal ceilings for similar types of forces, and adequate provisions for verification.

The primary Western objective in MBFR continues to be the establishment of parity at significantly lower levels of forces in central Europe.

Currently, the Warsaw Pact has some 170,000 more ground forces in central Europe than the West. This disparity is one of the most destabilizing factors in the military situation in Europe. Its elimination, through the establishment of parity, could reduce the capability for sudden aggression and thereby lessen the risk of war, including nuclear war, in Europe.

The new initiative differs from previous Western proposals in that it provides for one comprehensive agreement in which all direct participants would undertake, from the outset, a legally binding commitment to take the reductions required for each side to decrease to the common collective ceiling of 700,000 ground force personnel for each side. This reduction would take place in stages and would be completed within 7 years. Each stage of reductions would have to be fully verified. Under this new approach, the West will be making stronger reduction commitments than we have ever proposed before.

There is no change in the Western position that the sides must agree on the number of troops present in the area and subject to reduction before signature of any treaty. Without agreement on the size of the forces to be

reduced and limited, an MBFR treaty would be neither verifiable nor enforceable. In the draft treaty, starting force levels for each side would be identified at time of signature.

The Western draft treaty incorporates the package of confidence-building and verification measures proposed by the West in 1979. These measures are designed to help verify reductions and limitations and to enhance security and stability by reducing the risks of miscalculation and misperception.

In sum, the draft treaty tabled by the West in Vienna takes into account Eastern arguments and interests while meeting this Administration's requirement that arms control agreements result in real reductions to equal levels. It offers the opportunity of achieving concrete results in the negotiations in furtherance of the agreed objectives of enhancing stability and security in Europe and complements our efforts in other arms reduction negotiations.

This is the first time that a Western proposal in the MBFR negotiations has been tabled in the form of a draft treaty. Doing so underscores Western seriousness in the negotiations and readiness to bring about substantial reductions. ■

START Negotiations

**WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT,
MAY 18, 1982¹**

We welcome President Brezhnev's announced willingness to begin negotiations on substantial reductions in strategic nuclear arms. We will study Brezhnev's statement in detail, which we have not yet had a chance to do.

With regard to President Brezhnev's proposal to freeze strategic arms as soon as the talks begin, as we have said before, a freeze now would codify existing Soviet military advantages and remove Soviet incentives to agree to the substantial reductions which President Reagan has identified as our primary objective in START [Strategic Arms Reduction Talks].

With regard to Brezhnev's proposal to limit additional deployments of intermediate-range missiles, this appears to be little more than a reiteration of an earlier Soviet proposal to freeze the current nuclear imbalance in Europe. As

such, it falls far short of President Reagan's proposal for the total elimination of longer range land-based INF [intermediate-range nuclear forces] missiles on both sides.

**PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT,
JUNE 25, 1982²**

This afternoon we held the latest in a series of National Security Council meetings focused on arms control. At the conclusion of the meeting, I gave final approval to the instructions the American negotiating team will carry to Geneva, where negotiations will begin next Tuesday, June 29, on Strategic Arms Reduction Talks.

Our team will be headed by Ambassador Edward L. Rowny, an outstanding soldier-diplomat, who has participated actively in developing the far-reaching START proposals we have made, and in which the entire world is placing so much hope.

An historic opportunity exists to reverse the massive buildup of nuclear arsenals that occurred during the last decade. We must do all we possibly can to achieve substantial *reductions* in the numbers and the destructive potential of the nuclear forces. As our proposals emphasize, we must seek especially to reduce the most destabilizing elements of the strategic arsenals. We must insure reductions that are verifiable, that go to equal levels, and that enhance stability and deterrence and thereby reduce the risk of nuclear war.

I do not underestimate the formidable nature of this task. But I believe it is in the interest of the peoples of the United States, the Soviet Union, and the entire world to engage fully in this effort. I have the highest confidence that Ed Rowny and his team will work faithfully and tirelessly toward this goal.

¹Made by Larry Speakes, Principal Deputy Press Secretary to the President (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of May 24, 1982).

²Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of June 28, 1982. ■

Alaska Gas Pipeline

Following is an exchange of letters between Secretary Haig and Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs Mark MacGuigan regarding financing for the Alaska natural gas transportation system.¹

**SECRETARY MacGUIGAN'S LETTER,
APR. 23, 1982**

Dear Al,
I have been alerted to what could become a critical impasse in the discussions on financing of the Alaskan segment of the Alaska Natural Gas Transportation System.

As you well know, in addition to the bilateral agreement of 1977, our two Governments have jointly invested substantial efforts in support of this pipeline, which we have agreed is in the long-term security and energy interests of both our countries. The Canadian Government remains committed to the early completion of the project, based on private financing, but I am concerned that the various parties involved in the financing negotiations may fail to appreciate fully the implications of any significant delay on the willingness or ability of the Canadian Government and the Canadian companies involved to proceed with it at some later date.

The Canadian Northern Pipeline Commissioner, the Honourable Mitchell Sharp, is planning to convene a meeting of the producers and the sponsors of the Alaska portion next week in order to apprise them of the views and concerns of the Canadian Government. I am sure that a reiteration by you of the USA Government's support of the project, preferably in a public statement, would have a positive influence.

I am prepared to release this letter as a clear statement for the public record of our Government's position.

Yours sincerely,

MARK MacGUIGAN

**SECRETARY HAIG'S LETTER,
APR. 27, 1982**

Dear Mark:
Thank you for your letter of April 23 regarding the financing of the Alaska Natural Gas Transportation System (ANGTS).

We shared the Government of Canada's concerns about recent developments which could delay significantly completion of the pipeline. The United States Government remains fully committed to the Alaska Natural Gas Transportation System based upon private financing, and believes it would be unfortunate if its construction were subject to another, perhaps indefinite postponement.

As you know, this Administration has taken an active role in reducing legal and regulatory impediments that have complicated efforts in the private sector to arrange the necessary financing. Upon submission of the waiver of law to Congress October 15, 1981, President Reagan reaffirmed this government's basic commitment to ANGTS when he stated,

"My Administration supports the completion of this project through private financing, and it is our hope that this action will clear the way to moving ahead with it. I believe that this project is important not only in terms of its contribution to the energy security of North America. It is also a symbol of U.S.-Canadian ability to work together cooperatively in the energy area for the benefit of both countries and peoples."

Through the cooperative efforts of the Administration and Congress, the waiver was approved December 15, 1981.

We continue to believe ANGTS offers Americans the most realistic option to obtain secure and reliable access to some 13 percent of America's natural gas reserves which is currently inaccessible. Once in operation, the project promises to provide the energy equivalent to some 400,000 barrels of oil a day which will help Americans lessen their energy dependence on uncertain foreign sources. Moreover, the pipeline's early completion would be an important step toward further reduction of our energy vulnerability.

Sincerely,

ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.

¹Released jointly by the U.S. and Canadian Governments. ■

Allied Responses to the Soviet Challenge in East Asia and the Pacific

by *Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.*

Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 10, 1982. Ambassador Stoessel is Deputy Secretary of State.¹

I am delighted with your invitation to discuss allied responses to the Soviet threat in East Asia and the Pacific. My remarks will focus, as the chairman's [Senator Charles A. Percy] letter requested, primarily on the Japanese, Australian, and New Zealand contributions to the region's defense with some remarks about the role of South Korea in stabilizing the Korean Peninsula and how we see China's future role. I will also share some of our thoughts about the nature of the Soviet threat in the Pacific.

Security Interests and Assets in the Area

The contributions of East Asia and Pacific nations to the vitality and strength of the free world have grown enormously over the last 10 years. All evidence indicates that they will continue to do so over the next decade.

The dramatic rise of the Japanese and South Korean economies from the ruins of war is, of course, among the world's best known success stories. Less well known perhaps is the role these two nations and the quite different, but similarly impressive, role the Australian and New Zealand economies have played in stimulating growth in other parts of Asia and the Pacific by transferring resources and technology through assistance programs, investment, and trade. The largest and longest sustained growth rates for both advanced and less developed countries are now found in Asia.

Asian and Pacific nations are in turn playing an increasingly important role in strengthening more distant parts of the free world. Japanese aid programs are now directed not only to East Asia but to far away Middle East and African nations. Korean construction companies are carrying badly needed skills and assets to the Middle East and Southwest Asia, and Korea has begun a modest aid

program. Australia and New Zealand have continued to assume critical international economic, political, and peace-keeping responsibilities.

The economic success stories of Pacific, Northeast Asian, and most recently Southeast Asian nations are based to great extent, I believe, on the fact that each nation has been free to carve out its own place in the world's market economy without sacrificing values and traditions important to the identity of their societies. Together they comprise a highly cooperative, also competitive, and, therefore, efficient central element of what we have come to call the free market system.

In attempting to describe in broad terms the extremely valuable free world assets which must be defended in East Asia and the Pacific, I hope I have also pointed to some of its intrinsic defense strengths. The stark contrast between the thriving, dynamic, free economies of the Republic of Korea and the ASEAN [Association of South East Asian Nations] states with the stagnant, rigidly controlled, and highly unproductive systems of the neighboring North Korean and Indochinese Communist states has not gone unnoticed. The pragmatic cooperative approach China is now taking in charting its own course toward modernization, a change which has immense strategic implications, undoubtedly stems in part from observation of these differences. The export market for revolution among lesser developed countries in the region has virtually collapsed.

Unfortunately, the Soviet Union and some of its friends have taken to a more direct and blatant course to their objectives. The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the Soviet-supported Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea are clear examples. The strength of the Vietnamese and North Korean armed forces, which greatly exceed defensive needs, and the marked buildup of Soviet power in the Pacific raise the threat of further actions of this sort.

Soviet Threat

The Soviet objective in East Asia, as in other regions, is to seek positions of

maximum geopolitical strength from which to project power and influence. As is implicit in the Soviet force buildup to be summarized today by the Department of Defense, the Soviets put a premium on military force as an instrument of geopolitical strength. The Soviet force buildup—globally and in the Pacific—far exceeds any legitimate defense requirements.

Soviet objectives which directly affect the countries on which our discussion is focused today include:

Neutralizing Japan in any conflict, weakening existing defense ties, and ultimately isolating Japan. Incidentally, during the past 3 years the Soviets have increased their forces in the Kuril Islands they occupy north of Hokkaido to approximately 10,000 personnel. Moreover, Soviet strong points in the islands overlook strategic sea lanes linking the seas of Japan and Okhotsk with the northern Pacific. In time of war,

The Soviet objective in East Asia . . . is to seek positions of maximum geopolitical strength from which to project power and influence.

Soviet forces could stage from the islands for attacks on Hokkaido to secure these vital sea lanes and prevent the Soviet fleet from being bottled up in Vladivostok.

Threatening the security of the sea lanes, thereby putting themselves in a position to interdict Middle Eastern petroleum to our major allies during a period of international crisis. This would also permit the Soviets to threaten vital trade among regional states, such as exists between Japan and Australia. In a crisis the Soviets might also seek to deny East Asian routes of

access to the Indian Ocean to the United States or anyone else for that matter. As is apparent from the Defense Department's description of the Soviet naval forces in the Far East, much of the increased threat to sea lanes of communications derives from the following Soviet naval trends:

- Diversity and improvement in warship, aircraft, and weapons capability;
- Large increases in at-sea and distant-deployment operations and commitments by the Soviets to strive for naval superiority; and
- Increased awareness by the Soviet leadership of the leverage which accrues to a nation with sizeable and strong maritime resources, especially a large, modern navy.

Soviet objectives which represent a significant longer term but less direct threat to Northeast Asia include:

Increasing and maintaining access to Vietnamese air and naval facilities as a means of projecting Soviet military power and political influence throughout the region, especially among ASEAN countries. Access to these facilities greatly extends the Soviet military reach in the Pacific. From airfields in Vietnam, Soviet bombers could attack much of southern China now out of range of aircraft based in the Soviet Far East (with the exception of the Backfire bomber). Access to Vietnamese facilities increases the threat to the Philippines, which currently have the only U.S. bases near mainland Asia which are not vulnerable to combined Soviet air and naval attack from existing bases in the Soviet Far East.

Reduction of ASEAN's links with the West. The establishment of ties to ASEAN states is a long-term Soviet objective. As one means of loosening U.S.-ASEAN ties, as well as ties among ASEAN states, the U.S.S.R. seeks to undermine resolution of the Kampuchean problem based on the declaration of the U.N.-sponsored international conference on Kampuchea, which called for Vietnamese withdrawal and Khmer self-determination.

Limit external assistance to China's modernization efforts by exploiting trade links to discourage Western Europe and Japan from close economic and defense ties with China. The Soviets are also employing diplomatic overtures to draw the Chinese away from Western relationships.

In short, the increasingly formidable Soviet military capabilities in East Asia combined with objectives inimical to U.S. and allied interests present a challenge.

The East Asian and Pacific states are adapting their defenses to respond to these changes in the security environment. Some may not proceed at times with the dispatch that we desire but most are doing much more with less assistance from us than has ever been the case in the past. While our increased foreign military sales (FMS) credits to Korea, for example, are highly important in a real as well as a symbolic sense, they do not, in fact, cover yearly payments on past debts to us and the Republic of Korea is dipping deep into its own resources to finance its military modernization. In working out with our friends and allies our separate contributions to the area's defense, it is important that we do not inadvertently neglect our greatest source of strength, which is the cooperative, competitive, and highly productive system we have built up among our societies over the past two decades.

I will now turn to some of the efforts being taken by some important treaty allies of the United States to cope with the Soviet threat.

Japan

The Soviet military buildup in East Asia and the significant strengthening in the past 2 or 3 years of Soviet military forces in the Japanese islands north of Hokkaido have reinforced the traditional suspicion with which most Japanese regard the Soviets. Aggressive use of power over the past decade by the U.S.S.R. has increased Japanese awareness of the danger that Soviet actions pose for their interests. While few Japanese believe Japan should respond in kind to the growth of Soviet military power, responsible Japanese in and out of government recognize the need for closer cooperation with the West. A consensus has grown for steady improvements in Japan's self-defense forces while at the same time the nation continues to rely on the U.S.-Japan security treaty and the nuclear umbrella associated with it. There is growing recognition that the defense responsibilities assumed by the United States in areas such as the Middle East serve Japan's security as well, thereby arguing for enhanced Japanese defense efforts.

Recent Japanese governments, including that of Prime Minister Suzuki, have maintained that Japan can most

usefully contribute to stability and peace in the Asia-Pacific region through a combination of political, economic, and defense measures designed to strengthen Japan's security posture at home and improve its cooperation with both the industrial democracies and the Third World. This approach has come to be labeled "comprehensive security." Rather than emphasizing percentages of gross national product and other contentious—and often misleading—measures of defense performance, our security dialogue with Japan has, in turn, stressed a more rational and appropriate division of labor to meet our common strategic concerns. This concept of burdensharing is evident in the following areas:

Strengthened self-defense force capabilities that will allow Japan to assume primary responsibilities for its local defense as well as protect the sea lanes in the northwest Pacific upon which its economic security depends. I should emphasize our view that such capabilities remain within Japan's well-known constitutional constraints on the projection overseas of offensive military power, are consistent with the provisions of our Mutual Security Treaty with the Japanese, and should not cause undue concern among Japan's neighbors. There have already been substantial improvements in the self-defense forces, but the Japanese Government itself acknowledges that there are still significant shortcomings in such essential areas as air defense, antisubmarine warfare, logistics, and communications. Both Secretaries Haig and Weinberger have urged their Japanese counterparts to accelerate their government's efforts to rectify these weaknesses.

More effective cooperation between U.S. and Japanese forces. Under the Mutual Security Treaty, Japan provides the U.S. bases that are all but indispensable to our strategy of forward deployment in the Asia-Pacific region. Japan has made increasing contributions to the maintenance and improvement of these facilities—their direct and indirect support of U.S. forces this year will exceed \$1 billion. In recent years this support, which increased 25% in the current budget, has embraced new areas such as partial assumption of our local labor costs and the construction of new operational facilities.

Joint planning. Since the adoption of the "U.S.-Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation" in 1978, U.S. and Japanese military staffs have worked to-

gether in formulating specific plans for not only the defense of Japan but, recently, for Japanese facilitative assistance to our forces in meeting emergencies elsewhere in the Far East.

Joint exercises. Joint exercises involving all three services have grown in frequency and scope each year. Naval forces, for example, participate with us in the annual multinational RIMPAC exercises.

Technological cooperation. We have been working closely with the Japanese in regard to weapons development in meetings of the systems and technology forum and look forward to Japan's adoption of a policy that will permit a full two-way flow of defense technology.

Efforts in related areas of common interest. Japan's positions on such international issues as Afghanistan, Poland, refugees, and arms control have been close to our own. In undertaking a more assertive foreign policy, Japan has made increasingly clear its identification with Western interests. We are, of course, interested in Japan's expanding foreign aid programs, particularly to such countries of strategic importance as Thailand, Pakistan, Turkey, Sudan, Egypt, and the Persian Gulf states. Recently Japan has voiced support for the Caribbean Basin initiative. Japan is committed to doubling its overseas aid level between 1979 and 1984.

Japan's commitment to greater security efforts is evident in the increase of its 1982 defense budget (\$11.8 billion) by 7.75%, a decision made in the face of severe budgetary pressures which resulted in cutbacks of most domestic programs of the Japanese Government. We give due credit to this and other steps the Japanese have taken to strengthen their defense posture, but we have pointed out—most recently during Secretary Weinberger's visit to Tokyo last month—that the United States and its other allies also face serious domestic problems in taking necessary defense measures. We will continue to urge that Japan accelerate its security efforts so that we can cooperate effectively in coping with the Soviet challenge.

Australia and New Zealand

Australia and New Zealand anchor the southern end of the Western line of defense in East Asia and the Pacific. They also stand guard over a secure, if lengthy, line of communication between the Pacific and Indian Oceans which was of great value in World War II and

would be today in the event of war. Both are old allies that have fought in every war involving the United States in this century, from World War I to Vietnam. Since 1951 we have been formally linked with them through the ANZUS [Australia, New Zealand, United States pact] mutual defense treaty and the Manila pact.

Both countries continue contributions to peace, security, and economic development of contiguous regions that have been vital to the free world. Through the five power defense arrangement, the two ANZUS allies are linked with Malaysia, Singapore, and Great Britain. Australia currently maintains air force units in Malaysia, while New Zealand has an infantry battalion at Singapore. Joint exercises, training, and consultations are undertaken.

Both countries also maintain close economic and security assistance links with the other three members of the ASEAN countries—Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines. Finally, New Zealand and Australia have played important roles in assisting the new island nations of the southwest Pacific to develop peacefully and, through the Commonwealth, have played a constructive role in countries like Zimbabwe and, most recently, Uganda.

From the defense standpoint, Australia, with a larger population and a more prosperous economy than New Zealand, makes a quantitatively greater contribution to both security and economic development in contiguous regions. Australia's defense budget is projected at U.S.\$4.4 billion in 1982-83 or about 2.9% of gross domestic product. Moreover, in 1980 a 5-year defense modernization and buildup was adopted calling for an increase of 7% in defense expenditures in real terms and procurement of over U.S.\$500 million annually, mainly from the United States.

When this expansion is completed, Australia will have 75 F-18 aircraft to supplement and then replace its aging Mirage IIIs; it is purchasing 10 new P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft to replace an earlier model, giving it a total of about 20 such aircraft; and it is modernizing its RF/F-111C strike and reconnaissance squadron. The Royal Australian Navy has agreed to purchase the British aircraft carrier *Invincible* to replace its aging H.M.A.S. *Melbourne* and has ordered a fourth FFG guided missile frigate from the United States. With its six Oberon class submarines and River class destroyer escorts, it will soon have one of the most

potent naval forces in its region. These air and sea forces, backed by a small but well-trained and -equipped army, make Australia's contribution to the alliance an important one, both in terms of defending its island continent and of maintaining peace in the region.

New Zealand's forces are proportionally smaller than Australia's—roughly 12,640 regulars compared to 71,000 Australians—but they, too, are exceptionally well-trained and effective. In addition to the contribution of helicopters, pilots, and ground crew that the New Zealand Government has contributed with Australia to the Sinai peace-keeping force and its role in Singapore and Malaysia, New Zealand plays an important civic action role among the small nations of the southwest Pacific such as the Kingdom of Tonga, Fiji, and Western Samoa. Most recently, New Zealand and Australian forces rendered critical aid to Tonga following a devastating hurricane. New Zealand has also provided military and civilian advisers and equipment to the armed forces of these countries. With a military budget of about \$400 million and facing difficult economic circumstances, there has been little opportunity for the New Zealand Government to undertake an ambitious program of defense modernization. The government is doing all it can; it will, for example, purchase two Leander class frigates to replace the two oldest of the four in its navy.

South Korea

The maintenance of a credible deterrent to North Korean aggression against the south is a key element in preserving peace and security in Northeast Asia. It is this objective to which our assistance to the Republic of Korea (R.O.K.)—as well as that country's own very substantial efforts—has been devoted. Our own contribution to that shared objective has frequently been reviewed by this and other committees of the Congress. It is substantial. We maintain as you know some 39,000 military personnel in the R.O.K., including the 2d Infantry Division just south of the demilitarized zone. We have recently taken steps to improve the capability of those forces by providing them with more modern weapons and aircraft. We have also maintained a high level of military assistance, in the form of FMS credits, to the R.O.K. Although Congress has appropriated \$166 million in FMS credits for fiscal year (FY) 1982, we recently forwarded a request for a \$29 million supplemental.

We have proposed a \$210 million program for FY 1983. These levels of assistance are in our view essential in view of the persisting military imbalance on the peninsula and the steady and continuing buildup of North Korean forces.

Our assistance is also justified when placed in the context of South Korea's own efforts to meet the threat from the north. The R.O.K. maintains an armed force of more than 600,000 with a ready reserve several times that number. To support this level of military preparedness, it spends some 6% of its gross national product on defense. While Korea has achieved remarkable economic progress over the past 20 years, it nonetheless remains a developing country, whose domestic economic requirements remain, in many respects, unfulfilled. The burden imposed by its military expenditures has been especially heavy during the past 2 years of economic recession and gradual recovery. Nevertheless, the R.O.K. has not faltered in its commitment to redress gradually the unfavorable balance with the north and to deter aggression.

Our alliance with the Republic of Korea and both Korean and U.S. efforts to strengthen the military forces at the disposal of that alliance are directed only toward deterring an attack upon the south by the north and repelling such an attack if it should ever come. Nevertheless, while this is a narrowly defined geographic objective, its importance extends far beyond the peninsula and is, as I have suggested, vital to the peace and security of the entire region. In this important sense, R.O.K. defense efforts and our support of them figure prominently in our broader objectives vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in East Asia.

China

China is a friendly, nonallied country with which we share important strategic interests, including a common perception of threatening Soviet ambitions worldwide. In the Pacific area specifically, the People's Republic of China plays a significant international role by maintaining consistent pressure on the Vietnamese to withdraw from Kampuchea and Laos and on the Soviets to leave Afghanistan. China's opposition to Soviet and Soviet-proxy aggression, which results in the tying down of nearly 500,000 Soviet and 250,000 Vietnamese troops on Chinese borders, is an important factor in maintaining regional and global peace and stability.

Beijing, moreover, strongly supports our security ties with Japan and the concept of strengthening Japanese defensive rearmament. China also supports the presence of U.S. bases in Asia and a strong U.S. naval presence in the Pacific as a counter to further Soviet moves into the area. For the same reason, China shares our interest in maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula and has parallel security commitments to such U.S. friends as Thailand and Pakistan.

Our friends and allies in Asia attach great importance to development of a healthy Sino-U.S. relationship. Close U.S. ties with China are considered a key element in China's economic development and thus to China's continuing progress as a responsible participant in the Asian and world economic order. U.S. relations with China are also seen by our Asian friends as a positive influence on the future direction of China's foreign policy and as a stimulus to regional cooperation and development.

We believe that continued good U.S. relations with China greatly enhance security and stability in East Asia. U.S.-China relations are currently at a sensitive juncture due to the Taiwan arms sales issue. We are attempting to resolve this problem through continuing dialogue with Beijing. The recent visit of Vice President Bush to China demon-

strated this Administration's desire to bridge our differences and preserve and strengthen the important relations and cooperation between the United States and China. The Chinese welcomed Mr. Bush and showed a spirit of willingness to work toward resolution of our differences. The visit last week by Senate Majority Leader Baker further contributed to this spirit and certainly enhanced Chinese understanding of congressional views on this sensitive issue.

Conclusion

In summary, while our defense burdens are heavy and we continue by necessity to make the largest single contribution of any country, our allies and friends are continuing to assume an ever-increasing share of the burden. Given the increasing Soviet threat to our common interests, it is essential that we, our allies, and our friends transmit an unremitting signal of resolve to protect these interests for so long as they continue to be threatened.

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Southeast Asia and U.S. Policy

by John H. Holdridge

*Statement before the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 8, 1982. Ambassador Holdridge is Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.*¹

I greatly welcome your invitation to speak on U.S. policy toward Southeast Asia. This hearing is timely as Deputy Secretary Stoessel and I will next week be meeting with the ASEAN [Association of South East Asian Nations] Foreign Ministers in Singapore, where many of the issues I will mention today will undoubtedly be addressed.

Favorable Trends

Few would have thought 20 years or even 10 years ago that Southeast Asia would be described this year in the

financial section of the *New York Times* as "the most upbeat area of the world." Although I have not measured Southeast Asia's claims to this distinction against those of other parts of the globe, several important developments in my view justify an overall positive assessment both of developments in the region and of our relationships there.

Particularly encouraging is the successful manner in which many Southeast Asian nations have carved out for themselves increasingly important roles in the world's free market. The economic growth of most of our Southeast Asian friends, to which I drew attention in my appearance before this subcommittee last summer, has continued despite a less than favorable international environment, particularly as regards demand for their principal export commodities. The ASEAN states in particular have both drawn strength from—and lent strength to—the world market economy.

Another positive feature is the effectiveness with which ASEAN countries continue to rally international support for resolution of the Kampuchean problem. They have met continued Vietnamese intransigence with resolution and resourcefulness. ASEAN's success has been reflected in another decisive vote on Kampuchea in the U.N. General Assembly last fall, equally broad support for its approach to a political solution to the Kampuchea problem spelled out in the declaration of last July's international conference on Kampuchea, and broad cooperation in applying strong economic pressure on Vietnam to help persuade it to negotiate a comprehensive political solution in Kampuchea as outlined by ASEAN in the international conference.

We can also point to favorable trends in popular political participation paralleling the emphasis that a market-economy approach places on freeing individual initiative. Three of the five ASEAN states held national elections this year, and the other two held important byelections, adding to the foundation of democratic development. While progress in this area may be regarded by some as uneven, the trend is encouraging when viewed over the long term. Certainly prospects are bright when contrasted with conditions in Indochina, which possesses the region's principal alternative governing system.

Current Challenges

When we meet with ASEAN Foreign Ministers in Singapore later this month, the focus will be less on past accomplishments, of course, than on challenges that lie before us—and there are many.

The ASEAN governments are particularly concerned about the current state of the world economy, which has placed strains on them and on their relationship with us. As we are all aware, economic growth such as many ASEAN countries have experienced often increases popular expectations faster than actual incomes, and the depressed market for certain export commodities has had a widespread effect within their domestic economies. Some governments are under pressure to withdraw from competition through restrictive and thus ultimately self-defeating trade arrangements. There is a widespread fear that the United States itself might turn to protectionism. We will stress our commitment to get our own economy in-

to order, to resolve trade and investment problems in a manner which will deepen attachments to the market economy, and to contribute to balanced growth through investment, trade, and development assistance programs.

Improving the global economic climate will also be important in this respect, and I think that we will soon be able to point to some positive movement arising from the Versailles summit. We will ask in return for ASEAN's continued cooperation in assuring that the world market, from which we all have drawn our strength, remains competitive and thus efficient.

Continued Vietnamese intransigence on Kampuchea and the threat Vietnamese forces pose to our good friend, Thailand, are also matters of immediate and great concern to ASEAN and the United States alike. The repressive measures used by the Indochinese regimes to control their own people, including the use of lethal chemical agents against civilian populations, is an additional disturbing element. Pressing for a political solution to the Kampuchea problem while strengthening the military forces of Thailand and its friends in the area are parallel, complementary measures to meet this challenge. We will reassure the ASEAN states that they can rely on our firm support for their efforts to promote a Kampuchean settlement based on the declaration of the international conference on Kampuchea. We believe ASEAN governments should continue to take the lead on this issue because of their demonstrated success in marshaling international support and because of their sound approach to the problems involved. At the same time, we will stress the reliability of the United States as a treaty ally to Thailand, as a counterweight to the growing Soviet military presence in Indochina, and as a reliable supplier of credit, equipment, and training for the modest military modernization programs of friendly Southeast Asian countries.

While Indochinese refugee flows have fortunately diminished markedly in past months, they remain a problem for the first-asylum countries. It is important that the residual refugee population in Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia continue to decrease, and we will work with other resettlement countries toward this end.

The lack of a complete accounting for U.S. servicemen missing in action in Vietnam and Laos is a bilateral problem to which we assign highest priority. We will continue strenuous efforts to obtain

the cooperation of the Governments of Vietnam and Laos on this matter, as a humanitarian issue to be handled expeditiously and separately from other concerns.

Conclusions

Southeast Asia has for many years been known as the home of some of the world's most intractable and dangerous problems. Many of them are still with us. Today, however, Southeast Asia is also the home of some of the world's more effective problem-solving governments—and this has made a difference.

I think we might sum up the sources of favorable developments in Southeast Asia by singling out three characteristics of our friends there.

- They have strived hard to compete in the world market economy. Their overall growth rates, which are far above the world average, testify to the efficiency and strength they have gained from such competition.
- They have sought to cooperate in preserving the economic system which gives them this growth. ASEAN, which found common economic goals for countries whose economies are not complementary and which has now become a potent constructive force in world political councils, is proof of their success in this field.
- They have recognized and demonstrated that local initiative is the basic buildingblock for economic development, social progress, and security.

The United States has great interest in assuring that this competitive spirit, cooperative attitude, and local initiative continue to thrive. Our objectives, therefore, remain much as I described them to you in last year's hearing. In cooperation with our ASEAN friends, we will seek to curb the security threat posed by Vietnamese aggression and the Soviet military presence and to alleviate the economic pressures caused by the current world slump and imbalances within our system. The progress and stability of our friends and allies in ASEAN are the heart of our policy since they form the foundation for the favorable trends we have thus far witnessed in Southeast Asia.

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Secretary Visits Turkey, Greece; Attends North Atlantic Council

Secretary Haig departed Washington, D.C., May 12 to visit Turkey (May 13-15), Athens (May 15-16), and Luxembourg (May 16-18), where he attended the regular semiannual session of the North Atlantic Council ministerial meeting (May 17-18). He returned to the United States on May 18.

Following are the Secretary's remarks and news conferences in Ankara, Athens, and Luxembourg and the North Atlantic Council final communique.

REMARKS BY SECRETARY HAIG AND FOREIGN MINISTER TURKMEN, ANKARA, MAY 15, 1982¹

Foreign Minister Turkmen. I wish to speak very briefly and leave the floor as soon as possible to the Secretary of State.

May I say, first of all, that we are extremely pleased with the visit of Mr. Haig to our country. I think that the talks we have had here have shown that there is a complete mutual understanding and mutual trust between Turkey and the United States. Secretary Haig also visited our Prime Minister, an old friend, again. He visited the President of the Consultative Assembly, Mr. Irmak, and we had extensive talks on many subjects with the Secretary. The Secretary of State had the opportunity to meet and to talk with the members of the National Security Council; he had a chance to talk to Deputy Prime Minister Ozal, Minister of State Aztrak, and Defense Minister Bayulken.

We have, of course, taken up with priority the bilateral relations between Turkey and the United States. We have dealt extensively with the defense and economic cooperation between the two countries. I think we agree that the high-level committee on defense and cooperation is a very useful and effective instrument for promoting our defense cooperation. We have explored the possibilities of furthering our economic, commercial, technological, and scientific cooperation.

We have had a large exchange of views on international problems, particularly on the sources of tension today.

I think that we are in full agreement on the broad principles and the main approaches toward these problems. We have reiterated together our strong support for NATO solidarity. We discussed the problem of international terrorism, and there is an agreement between us that there should be an effective fight against this evil. We reviewed the situation in the Middle East with particular emphasis on the Arab-Israeli conflict and the war between Iraq and Iran.

We have, naturally, discussed the relations between Turkey and Greece and the Cyprus problem. On Turkish-Greek relations we have explained our point of view to the Secretary. We have emphasized that we are always ready to negotiate our differences with Greece but that, of course, we are equally opposed to any *fait accomplis* or unilateral acts. On the Cyprus problem we have reiterated our strong support for the intercommunal talks, and we have underlined to the Secretary that we were ready to deploy all efforts in order to facilitate and promote these talks. I think on the whole we can say, as the Secretary pointed out yesterday, that the relations between Turkey and the United States are excellent, that we have reached in our relationship the age of maturity and that we are looking forward to increased cooperation and partnership between Turkey and the United States.

Secretary Haig. I want to reiterate and underline the great sense of enthusiasm and satisfaction that I feel as a result of this all-too-brief visit here in Turkey. This is the first time I've had an opportunity to return to Turkey since my days as Supreme Commander in the spring of 1979, and I was especially gratified that it could be in the year of the centennial of the great Ataturk who is the founder of modern Turkey and whose influence is so pervasive today in all that is Turkish.

I think I was able to use the opportunity of this visit to underline once again the great sense of dedication that the United States feels to its relationship with Turkey and its recognition that Turkey is the vital anchor of the southeastern flank of the alliance. Turkey also plays an indispensable role

in the stability of the eastern Mediterranean region and, indeed, Southwest Asia as well. This visit afforded me an opportunity to convey to General Evren, an old friend, President Reagan's determination to continue the level of economic and military assistance to Turkey and to build and strengthen our ties in the months and years ahead.

As Foreign Minister Turkmen mentioned, during the visit we had an opportunity to exchange views on the blight of international terrorism, and I, of course, used the opportunity to convey the deep sense of regret and sorrow that every American feels for the recent tragedies in our own country as a result of terrorist—vile terrorist—acts against Turkish officials. In this sense we are working now at the Federal, state, and local levels to deal with this situation, to bring prompt and firm justice to perpetrators of these acts. One of the most encouraging aspects of the visit for me was to see the changes that have occurred here in Turkey since my last visit. I speak of the return to law and order, the suppression of terrorist activity that Turkey was plagued by in the late 1970s, and early 1980s, which I had an opportunity to witness firsthand as the Supreme Allied Commander. To see the elimination of that kind of activity is very encouraging to me.

And it goes without saying I was also able to witness firsthand, through the briefings and information that were provided to me and my party, the high level of improvement that has occurred as a result of Turkey's economic reform program, both in the area of internal economic inflation, where the reductions have been very encouraging, and in the increase in exports that Turkey is realizing as a result of the disciplined and effective and visionary planning of the Evren regime. We, of course, had an opportunity to discuss the timetable for the return to representative democracy here in Turkey, and I was able to reassure General Evren that the United States has full, total, and unquestioning confidence in the adherence to the schedule which we support and believe is wholly reasonable and practicable.

We did not have an opportunity also to discuss Greek-Turkish relationships, the Cyprus question, and problems in

the Aegean. As you know, it is U.S. policy to favor a peaceful solution of whatever disputes occur by the parties. And I will go on to Athens where I am sure there will be further discussions about these subjects.

All in all, I want to emphasize and reiterate the deep sense of satisfaction I had with this visit. It is especially so because I have known and respected Turkey so well over the years. To see the kind of progress that is so evident today, and to a visitor who has been away for some time, I think this progress is even more sharply evident.

Again, I want to thank you, Mr. Minister, General Evren, Prime Minister Ulusu, and the general staff, with whom I've worked in the past, as well as the other officials of the government, for the hospitality and great benefit that this visit afforded me and my colleagues.

Q. It is reported that you advised the Turkish Government to improve its somewhat strained ties with the European countries. In your opinion, what could and should Turkey do to improve them?

Secretary Haig. As a matter of fact, I did not advise my Turkish hosts to improve their ties. I have encouraged our European friends to continue their high level of support and cooperation with Turkey. I don't think it is the role of a friend and ally to be pedantic in the context of your question. I have no question that the overwhelming membership of the alliance is fully cognizant of the vital role and indispensable role that Turkey plays today, and they will continue their high level of cooperation with Turkey.

Q. In 1976 the Greek Government's demand for a guarantee against Turkey was answered by a letter signed by Mr. Kissinger. Today the present Greek Government seems to be asking for the same type of a letter from the American side. I wonder whether you consider this Kissinger letter still valid, and whether you will make a reference to it when asked.

Secretary Haig. I think that U.S. policy on this subject is well-known and longstanding. It involves our interest in seeing disputes in the Aegean between Greece and Turkey solved through peaceful means through communication among the parties. That has been and remains American policy, and I am confident that these two valuable members of the NATO alliance have willingly joined the alliance to meet their own

securities through that partnership and the participation in the alliance.

Q. Are you still committed to the Rogers plan for the allocation of defense responsibilities in the Aegean?

Secretary Haig. As you know, I have a certain degree of my own energies and activities involved in the Rogers plan, if that's what the proper term is these days. We, of course, feel that it is vitally important to be full, total participants in the alliance, full members. Whatever the vehicle that's employed to achieve that in the light of recent history is something that would have our support.

Q. How does your Administration interpret these European misconceptions about Turkey, and how valid are these perceptions in Europe and the United States toward Turkey?

Secretary Haig. I think that it's not for me to be the official observer of these things. I can speak for my own government and reemphasize again our full confidence in the leadership here in Turkey and the great admiration we have for what this leadership has accomplished. I sometimes regret that memories are too short. All of which has happened is a source of satisfaction to me, and I am fully confident and I have no reservation about the return of Turkey to representative democracy under the time schedule announced by the Evren government last year. I would hope that our European partners would share that sense of confidence.

Q. Can you please bring us up to date on the situation around the Falkland Islands and the efforts of the United Nations to bring about a settlement?

Secretary Haig. No, I think the Secretary General had a very detailed statement on this subject last night. As you know, the British Government has recalled its Ambassador from the United Nations and its representative from Washington, Ambassador Henderson, for a high-level review of the situation in London over the weekend. I will be seeing British Foreign Minister Pym in Luxembourg and look forward to detailed talks on the situation. As you know, President Reagan commented in his press conference day before yesterday expressing some slight degree of optimism that some progress had been made, and I think that parallels the observation of the Secretary General. The United States stands prepared to do all that it can in what the Secretary

General has described as the critical hours, which we now find ourselves in, in this very difficult issue.

Q. It seems like the Greek Government's policies are against NATO principles—asking for guarantees against another NATO ally and putting reservations in the joint declarations. Do you think that Greece is causing a crack in NATO right now?

Secretary Haig. I would not. I don't think it's appropriate for me to make any observations along these lines. As you know, I will be moving from here this morning to Athens, and I'm sure there will be further discussions there. I have outlined for you the general policy of the United States on this subject. I am aware that there is a letter of the kind referred to in the files, and that's where it is.

Q. Turkey is ready to start negotiations again. Do you believe that you will be able to convince the Greek Prime Minister to start the negotiations between Turkey and Greece?

Secretary Haig. I understand there is some discussion already underway in a sporadic sense on some of the narrower issues. There is some underway on the question of territorial waters. We, of course, think these are matters to be discussed and resolved either bilaterally or under international agreement.

Q. In light of Deputy Prime Minister Mr. Turgut Ozal's statement on Thursday that political parties in Turkey will be allowed to start functioning as from the middle or end of 1983, are you still confident that the regime can stick to its timetable of holding elections in late 1983 or early 1984?

Secretary Haig. My discussions here convinced me that the timetable established by the government is satisfactory, is on schedule, and is proceeding as anticipated. I have no basis for questioning that. I have no doubt that it will be pursued as outlined.

Q. Did you discuss specifically the case of Mr. Ecevit? There is a lot of opinion in Europe that he should be released from prison.

Secretary Haig. It's not my role nor would it be appropriate for me to make any public comment on an internal matter which is being pursued in accordance with existing Turkish law, and I'm not going to do that this morning.

Q. Did you discuss the question of Mr. Ecevit with the Turkish authorities?

Secretary Haig. I didn't discuss it, but it was discussed with me by Turkish officials.

Q. Is the Kissinger-Bitsios letter valid or not?

Secretary Haig. Almost in dental fashion, you have tried to extract everything you can on the subject. I said it's a letter that's in the files. I told you what our policy is in the Administration today. That is that these are matters to be worked out peacefully by the governments concerned, and I'm talking about tensions in the Aegean. Only last week somebody said I feel like a lemon in service to 20 martinis.

Q. Are you satisfied with the explanation you received concerning Turkey's close ties with Libya?

Secretary Haig. I certainly understand clearly the Turkish-Libyan relationship. It is somewhat different than that between the United States and Libya. The great strength of this alliance is that we are all different and we pursue sovereign policies of the member states, and that's as it should be. We are not a Warsaw Pact where all march in tandem—most of the time.

**SECRETARY HAIG,
NEWS CONFERENCE,
ATHENS, MAY 16, 1982²**

I think at the outset I want to express a *sas epharisto* to President Karamanlis, Prime Minister Papandreu, and to my counterpart, the distinguished Foreign Minister of Greece.

I think in reflecting back on what has been a very busy although a very compressed schedule that I would describe our visit here in Greece as being a very good one marked by cordiality, constructive, and far-reaching discussions, all of which set a very positive tone and framework for which to deal with a number of longstanding and difficult questions.

Yesterday was a very busy one. We started out with 3½ hours of discussion—in the first hour with the Prime Minister alone followed by 2½ hours with our respective teams, concluded by a 3-hour dinner last night in which substantive discussions continued. Of course, a very special privilege for me was a 1-hour meeting with President Karamanlis, an individual I have known over many years and who is rapidly

Eighth Report on Cyprus

**MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS,
MAY 25, 1982¹**

In accordance with the provisions of Public Law 95-384, I am submitting the following report on progress made during the past 60 days toward reaching a negotiated settlement of the Cyprus problem.

In the course of continuing discussion of the United Nations "evaluation" of the intercommunal negotiations, the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot negotiators met on April 14, 21, and 30 and May 4, 6, 11, 13, and 18. The negotiators have continued to focus their discussion on elements of the United Nations "evaluation" of the intercommunal negotiations. Having completed their initial review of many of the "points of coincidence," the communities are now beginning examination of "points of equidistance" including such issues as the freedoms of movement, settlement and property ownership in any future agreement. The negotiating sessions continue to be useful and constructive discussions with good relations between the participants.

United Nations Secretary General Perez de Cuellar met in Rome on April 4 with Cypriot President Kyprianou and in Geneva on April 9 with Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash. These meetings provided a thorough review of the status of the negotia-

tions and both sides agreed to accelerate the pace of the talks and hold two meetings per week. The negotiating parties also agreed to meet again with the Secretary General in New York in June for a further review of the negotiating process.

We believe that the intercommunal negotiations are firmly established as a strong and effective tool to promote progress toward resolving the Cyprus problem. I wish to congratulate both the United Nations Secretary General and his Special Representative on Cyprus, Ambassador Hugo Gobbi, for their commitment to bringing the Cyprus problem to a just and lasting settlement. They have my full support for their efforts. We hope that the negotiators will seize the opportunities offered by the United Nations "evaluations" to make progress toward resolving outstanding differences between the communities.

Sincerely,

RONALD REAGAN

¹Identical letters addressed to Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of Representatives, and Charles H. Percy, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of May 31, 1982). ■

becoming the elder statesman of Europe, based both on his vast experience, his adherence to the democratic values of the Western world, and his unusual contributions over many, many years.

I think the trip itself underscores President Reagan's and his Administration's attachment to the importance of our relationships with the Government and the people of Greece. These relationships of over a century standing involve a deep mutual respect and are built on the shared values, the historic Greek perception of the role of the individual, his dignity, his creativity, and the need to preserve the freedom of the citizens within the state. These shared perceptions and values have always generated mutual benefits for the American and Greek peoples as manifested by a continuing alliance in two conflicts in this century and understanding relationships in peace as well.

I think in summary the visit itself, while not focused on making specific decisions on particular questions, did establish a very positive framework for the improvement of our bilateral relationships, including the defense sector.

They underlie Greece's vital role in assuring peace and stability in the southern region of the Atlantic alliance. Specific topics included a number of global issues, East-West issues, the topic of arms control, and the recent initiative taken by President Reagan to achieve for the first time substantial reductions in nuclear armament.

We had an opportunity to discuss the ongoing and continuing crisis in Poland, the Falklands crisis, and, of course, the question of Cyprus. I emphasized the support for the continuation of the intercommunal talks under the auspices of the U.N. Secretary General. We discussed the Greek-Turkish question, and this was particularly valuable because I have, as you know, just proceeded from Ankara where similar discussions were held, and, as always, I encouraged a resolution of these questions on a bilateral basis.

We also discussed what the Prime Minister referred to as the triangular question—Greece, Turkey, and NATO related issues. Here, of course, these are appropriately dealt with in NATO itself, but as a member of the alliance and as a

good friend to both Greece and Turkey, we have always some constructive contributions to make.

We, of course, focused on Greek-American bilateral relationships to include our defense relationships and the issue of U.S. facilities in Greece. Again, not to seek to make decision but I think we arrived at a consensus of view on how to deal with this issue in the period ahead. So all in all, the visit was very positive, and I think its results justify optimism. There will be progress in the days ahead on a number of longstanding and difficult questions in the areas that I touched upon.

Q. What is your line on Mr. Papandreou's request for a guarantee for the eastern frontier of Greece?

A. The question was how was the topic of a guarantee to Greece, a longstanding question, dealt with in our discussions, and I think it suffices to say that this question arose in both capitals. We are sensitive to the issue. We believe, regardless of the future treatment of this question, that its fundamental character is best assured by a full participation of the member states in the alliance of a resolution of longstanding questions among member states on a bilateral basis.

I know yesterday the question came up on certain letters that have been exchanged in the past between both President Carter and the Government of Greece and the Foreign Ministers of the United States and Greece in an earlier period. We recognize those letters are in the file, and the task ahead now is to get on to resolve the issues which create understandable concerns. We intend to work as actively as we can to be a catalyst in that effort.

Q. You have stressed the need for peaceful resolutions between the two parties—Greece and Turkey—on the Aegean question. Would the United States actively and unequivocally oppose military action by either side in resolving that dispute?

A. I think it goes without saying that the U.S. view is no different than it is in the Falklands question. We reject and oppose, first, use of force to resolve disputes, no matter what their nature, except the reaffirmation of U.N. Charter Article 51 which provides for the right of self-defense. This is a matter of principle, and just as the United States has subscribed to that principle in the Falklands crisis—although, we have and seek to maintain good relationships with, of course, Great Britain and

Argentina—we cannot recoil from stating unequivocally our adherence to the rule of law and peaceful change in the resolution of political disputes.

Q. Since the United States requested departure from the Falkland Islands of the Argentine troops, why do they not ask the departure of the Turkish troops from the island of Cyprus where they have been for 8 years?

A. It has been the U.S. position—continues to be the U.S. position—that the best way to deal with the non-Cypriot forces on the Island of Cyprus is—with active movement on the side of the two communities—to arrive at a settlement through the intercommunal talks. We believe that progress in that area will necessarily include progress in dealing with the subject of non-Cypriot forces. I am very pleased that the discussions I had in both Ankara and Athens suggest that both parties are willing to subscribe to progress under the auspices of the U.N. Secretary General shortly after my return to Washington this week.

Q. In your discussion here you said you have arrived at a consensus of view dealing with the question of U.S. facilities and bases in Greece. What do you mean by that?

A. I think the consensus was on how to deal with this subject in the period ahead, primarily with respect to timing and initial discussions. I don't want to go beyond that because it would suggest that we actually got into the substance of these discussions. We did not. We merely discussed how to treat them in the period ahead.

Q. Concerning Greece's participation in the military wing of NATO, Mr. Papandreou said recently "for the time being we are neither in nor out." I would like to know your opinion today after the talks with Papandreou.

A. I am not a novice on this subject. But there is danger, because I am not a novice, of portraying myself as an active official in the resolution of the remaining questions on the command structure here in the Aegean. I am not. This is a NATO question. It should be dealt with within the NATO framework. We did, however, have a very good exchange of views on the subject, and as the Prime Minister pointed out yesterday, this is not an area in which I have a lack of background. I know specifically what the remaining questions are. I believe they are resolvable within the NATO

framework and am optimistic they will be resolved in the period ahead. This is going to take some careful work as in the past it has as well, but I think enough said.

Q. Can you say after your visit to Ankara and Athens now whether or not as a result of your visit, the tensions between Greece and Turkey have somewhat been ameliorated?

A. I think it would be wrong to make such a suggestion as a result of a brief visit of the kind we have just had, and I wouldn't even presume to draw such a conclusion. However, I think I leave the visits in both capitals with an enhanced sense of optimism. In the period ahead these questions can be positively resolved.

Q. You have stated that the United States believes that the only solution for the Cyprus issue is the dialogue that will take in the withdrawal of the Turkish military forces. But at the present time it has been accepted that the dialogue is between Nicosia and Ankara. In case the dialogue between the two is not successful, what do you see as being the alternative to this?

A. I think it serves no useful purpose to indulge in speculations about failure on a political effort that should be undertaken with increased vigor. It is still underway, as you know. There has been the U.N. assessment of the situation. There was some movement some months ago. I think it is very important that we do not indulge in speculation which visualizes failure because sometimes it contributes to failure. What we are after is a successful outcome that will meet the interests of the communities not only in a contemporary sense but in the future as well. And this is an important and delicate issue as it has been for a number of years.

What is important is to establish a broad political framework and to get progress within that framework. When one becomes too preoccupied with contemporary aspects—and incidentally, the Falklands question is much the same, and it isn't quite as simple as the question that was posed to me earlier. We are not just talking about the withdrawal of forces from the Falkland Islands. We are not just talking about the withdrawal of non-Cypriot forces from the island, as desirable as that is. We are talking about a broad framework which will meet the fundamental interests of the peoples on Cyprus and their children, and this is going to take, as it always does in such difficult questions, patience and care.

Situation in Poland

Q. I wonder if you could make some general observations about the kind of welcome the Greek Communist Party had prepared for you, particularly at a time when the President has called for an initiative on nuclear affairs and you are about to proceed into discussions with your NATO colleagues.

A. I think that since I had not been exposed to the demonstration and only had access to the Greek press on that, I prefer to take my lead from them. I think their descriptions of the situation covering a broad spectrum of political views give a very adequate reply to you, and I would not presume to.

Q. Could you tell us what dates the talks about the bases will start and whether there will be a special meeting between Papandreu and President Reagan in Bonn?

A. With respect to the first question, I would prefer to let events unfold on that. I think we have a general commonality of view on how to approach these questions on timing and venue. But I think it is preferable to let that unfold.

With respect to the upcoming summit in Bonn, of course, I think there is only one set of bilaterals discussed that are now scheduled between President Reagan and the Chancellor of West Germany as the host government for the summit. This does not preclude whatever discussions will occur on the margins and during the frequent opportunities that occur during breaks and social events which I am quite confident will afford an opportunity for discussion.

**SECRETARY HAIG,
NEWS CONFERENCE,
LUXEMBOURG, MAY 18, 1982³**

I think I want to underline some of the basic themes and conclusions that emerged from this ministerial meeting here in Luxembourg.

It is very clear to all of us that the meeting once again demonstrated Western resolve to deal with the challenges of this decade, and I can state unequivocally that there was substantial agreement on the full range of substance that was discussed during this meeting. As a first example, the free choice of democratic Spain to join the alliance should be cited. Spanish entry has been welcomed heartily by all the allies, and it is the clearest evidence of the continued vitality and attraction of the North Atlantic alliance today.

**PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT,
MAY 1, 1982¹**

May 1 is celebrated as Labor Day in many parts of the world. Although this celebration originated in the United States, recently the Communist world has paid it special attention. This takes on ironic significance in the wake of the brutal actions by Polish authorities to crush Solidarity, the only free trade union in a Communist country.

Poland is no longer on the front pages every day, but we must not allow its people to be forgotten. We must continue to honor the unbroken spirit of the Polish people and to call upon Poland's leaders to recognize their commitments. The Polish leaders must take positive action if there is to be hope for either economic recovery or a healing of the hatred and bitterness that the political repression has generated.

On December 23, we imposed a broad range of economic sanctions against Warsaw in response to the government's declaration of martial law. We made it clear that these sanctions are reversible if and when Polish authorities restore the internationally recognized human rights of the Polish people. When that happens, we stand ready to provide assistance to help in Poland's economic recovery.

The actions taken earlier this week by the Polish Government are a welcome step in the right direction but are not enough. By their own count, over 2,000 citizens, including Lech Walesa, are still imprisoned. I would like to lift our sanctions and help Poland, but not until the Polish Government has ended martial law, released the detainees, and reopened a genuine dialogue with Solidarity, led by Lech Walesa.

So on this day, Law Day in the United States, when we commemorate our principles of liberty and individual rights, we reflect upon the Polish people's lack of such freedoms and upon their struggle to gain them.

Secondly, the meeting very vigorously reaffirmed the alliance's strong determination to do all that is necessary to maintain a strong and credible defense. The communique which you will be receiving shortly recognizes that peace can be preserved only if the alliance has

**PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT,
JUNE 13, 1982²**

Six months ago today, darkness descended on Poland as the Warsaw Government declared a "state of war" on its own people. Today the Polish people's spirit remains unbroken, and as the widespread popular demonstrations in early May indicate, the gap between the Polish people and their leaders has widened since December 13, 1981.

The broad range of economic sanctions which we introduced against the Warsaw government last December has had a strong impact on the Polish economy, a fact which is acknowledged by Polish officials. With each passing day, the impact of these sanctions grows, particularly in light of the unwillingness of Warsaw's allies to provide substantial assistance. We made it clear when we introduced these sanctions that they were reversible if and when Polish authorities restored the internationally recognized human rights of the Polish people. In addition, we stated that the U.S. Government stands ready to provide assistance to such a Poland to help its economic recovery. But the United States cannot and will not take these steps until the Polish Government has ended martial law, released all political prisoners, and reopened a genuine dialogue with the church and Solidarity.

Our hearts go out to the brave Polish people who have suffered so much through the years. The United States will continue to help provide humanitarian assistance to the Polish people through such organizations as Catholic Relief Services, CARE, and Project HOPE. Let us hope that the authorities in Warsaw will move to bring about a genuine process of reconciliation in Poland before the gap between the authorities and the people becomes even more threatening.

¹Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of May 10, 1982.

²Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of June 21. ■

the ability to defend itself at any and every level. It notes that this requires a wide range of conventional and nuclear forces. We also agreed that it is essential to insist on restraint and responsibility on the part of the Soviet Union in all parts of the world as the necessary

condition for a more constructive East-West relationship. We agreed that it is necessary to take account of security considerations in East-West economic dealings, particularly export credits, and the danger in transferring militarily relevant technologies to the Warsaw Pact is clearly understood by all member states. The meeting condemned the continuing and increasing Soviet aggression against the people of Afghanistan and called for a political solution based on total Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.

We also agreed that the ongoing repression of the Polish people violates the principles of the U.N. Charter and the Helsinki Final Act, and we reaffirmed the three Western criteria for a restoration of normal relations—the lifting of martial law; the release of political prisoners; and the restoration of a genuine dialogue with the church and the trade unions. It is clear that there is a firm and continuing consensus by the alliance and a recognition that Poland continues to cast a dark shadow over East-West relations today. The alliance concern remains unified and undiminished on this important question. The allies remain concerned about the threat to security interests outside the NATO treaty area. We have reaffirmed the need to consult on security issues outside of the area.

We also condemned the Argentine aggression against the Falkland Islands and called for a continued effort to achieve a negotiated settlement in accordance with U.N. Resolution 502. We agreed that it is essential to uphold the fundamental principle that the use of force to resolve international disputes is unacceptable.

There was enthusiastic support both in the formal discussions and along the margins for the U.S. position put forth by President Reagan in his speech in Eureka on May 9. I had an opportunity to explain the elements of our proposals in considerable detail, and I am very confident that we now have a solid basis of allied understanding and support for a goal of achieving significant reductions in strategic forces all designed to enhance stability and security for all nations.

There was also a very strong reaffirmation of the validity of the U.S. negotiating position in the Geneva talks on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) and a consensus that these proposals offer a change for a fair and effective agreement. Both our INF and START [Strategic Arms Reduction

Talks] initiatives confirm beyond the point of speculation that it is the United States and the West that have put forth specific meaningful proposals for reductions in levels of nuclear armament, and we sincerely hope—and I know there has been a speech made today by Chairman Brezhnev—that the Soviet Union will respond positively to these approaches and others associated with the question of worldwide armaments.

In our discussions, I also explained the long-term U.S. objective in relations with the Soviet Union. We have, as I have stated before, for some time been maintaining a high-level dialogue with the Soviet Union on a very broad range of subjects, not just confined to arms control.

We hope in the days ahead to develop and expand that dialogue. President Reagan is, as he has stated repeatedly, prepared to meet with President Brezhnev, but it remains our considered view—and I believe that of the Soviet leadership as well—that such a meeting must be justified by the overall state of our relations, and there would have to be reasonable prospects for positive results from such a meeting. As I have indicated, the discussions and conclusions of this ministerial are of great importance in their own right; first and foremost, as a living demonstration of the continuing vitality and unity of the alliance. Moreover, I believe that the deliberations here have paved the way for what we can anticipate will be an extremely successful and productive outcome at the NATO summit meeting next month in Bonn. It will, indeed, be this meeting that will set the tone for the security of free societies for the decade to come.

Q. Do you have any early observations on the statement made today by Soviet leader Brezhnev on his reaction to what the President said at Eureka?

A. First, I want to emphasize that I have not had the chance to study the full text of Chairman Brezhnev's remarks, and I am always cautious about making observations on abbreviated, simplified news reporting which is all we have available at the moment.

We do know that the question of a freeze—a freeze at current levels of nuclear armament—was again raised. It has been our conviction, a very strongly held conviction, that nuclear freezes do not promote effective arms control. In the first place, merely to freeze at existing levels of forces would codify existing Soviet advantages, especially in

the nuclear threat facing our allies here in Western Europe, but also among certain elements of the strategic equation. It would leave the United States and the West at a disadvantage to the Soviet Union to join in such proposal.

Secondly, were we to accept this approach—to agree to their freeze—it is clear that the Soviet Union would then be relieved of any incentive to make rapid progress for substantial reductions, and it is reductions that constitute the main objective of President Reagan's arms control policy. Such a freeze proposal would affect immediately our negotiations in Geneva on INF and would have equally deleterious impact on the START proposals that the President just made at Eureka. I think that President Reagan has outlined an effective approach calling for significant reductions to equal levels on both sides. This is our goal in arms control. As we have said, a freeze is not sound arms control, because it results in unequal levels at the starting point as you seek to achieve and provide incentive for reductions.

Q. [Inaudible] up to the day that he was ready to reopen talks, that this was a correct step?

A. Absolutely. I am merely singling out one aspect of the reported content of Mr. Brezhnev's talk. I understand there were also discussions of the objective on the Soviet side of the achievement of reductions—that we welcome—that coincides with our position. There was reference to respecting the security needs of each side and clearly that is not incompatible with a balanced approach to arms control. There was reference to the fact that the upcoming negotiations should keep all the positive elements achieved in the previous Soviet-American agreements. We are, as we have stated repeatedly, prepared to retain parts of previous accords—definitions, mutually accepted data, and a host of other approaches. You know the President, in his first phase, has talked about reductions in warheads and launchers; that in itself is a reflection of compatibility with work that has taken place under SALT I, Vladivostock, and the now discarded SALT II.

Q. As your spokesman said yesterday, the United States is also ready to make proposals for equitable levels of bombers and cruise missiles and, of course, Brezhnev in his speech referred to what he called the unilateralism of the U.S. approach only dealing with, I guess, what he meant was warheads and missiles. Can you

clarify? Is the United States prepared in the first phase to also discuss reductions in bombers and missiles or is that in the U.S. proposal for the second phase?

A. I think it is important to recognize as a result of your question and observations made that we not conduct arms control negotiations from propaganda platform or from a public relations point of view. It always lends itself to distortion and misunderstanding. We have felt that the details of the U.S. proposal are best reserved for exchange at the conference table outside the glare of publicity and public posturing.

To answer your question, we are, as the President stated in his recent press conference, prepared to put everything on the table; that includes negotiations leading toward equitable levels in bombers and cruise missiles. Beyond that it is not appropriate for me to go into a public dissertation on the finite proposals that have been approved by President Reagan as our going-in position which will involve give-and-take in negotiations with the Soviet Union.

Q. Is it right to assume that the support which the U.S. Government has given to the United Kingdom in the Falklands crisis so far will be maintained if Mrs. Thatcher's government decides that, reluctantly, there is no option but to invade the islands since the Argentine junta refuses to accept 502?

A. I think the United States had made its position clear on this issue and that involves both the judgment we made at the time the U.S. peace effort and the formal efforts that we had been making to exercise good offices were abandoned. It was at that time that insufficient flexibility had been demonstrated in Buenos Aires and that we were going to support Great Britain in its efforts. We intend to abide fully by the commitments made.

Q. I know that you condemn Argentine aggression; was there any condemnation or any criticism at all of the British military action in the South Atlantic?

A. No, there was not. I believe that the member states recognize the rights of governments under Article 50 of the U.N. charter to utilize whatever means are necessary to protect their sovereign interests. The United States, as you know, has never taken a position on the juridical question of sovereignty. We have not done that, but it is very clear

that we have taken one in opposition to first use of force in this instance. We continue to maintain that position. I refer you to the language of the communique, because it is very precise, and you can answer your own question by reading it when it is in your hands. There was no criticism whatsoever of Great Britain.

Q. As the central figure in the negotiating process over the Falklands crisis, I wonder if you could give us your assessment now of what impact the EEC [European Economic Community] decision to extend sanctions only for 1 week will have on the diplomatic atmosphere; whether it adds or detracts from the possibilities for a settlement.

A. I think it would be highly inappropriate for me to engage in value judgments on the actions of the Ten. These actions are based on the sovereign viewpoints of the member nations of the Ten. I think it is significant that a substantial majority remain fully united behind the steps taken in support of the British position. Whether that has an effect on the negotiations that are underway by the Secretary General, and which he described as being at a critical stage, is a subjective judgment. I would avoid making such a judgment on my part publicly.

Q. Would you judge that in a few days rather than weeks, it is inevitable that the United Kingdom would have to invade the Falklands?

A. I would not presume to speculate. Our concerns are that U.N. Resolution 502 be implemented as quickly as possible. This involved not only withdrawal of Argentine forces from the Falklands but also a political solution.

Q. I wonder whether you could give us your views on the state of war between Iran and Iraq, and the impact that it is having on the states in the gulf area.

A. There was considerable discussion of the subject in the ministerial meeting as there should be because this is a very important situation that could affect an already unstable Middle Eastern situation. I think all are very concerned that the territorial integrity of the nations involved be preserved. There is a growing sense of concern among many of the moderate Arab states in the gulf and beyond the peninsula to northern Africa. I think this is an extremely sensitive subject on which we have consulted fully among the members

of the alliance. In the days and weeks ahead we will have to give this minute-by-minute our most serious attention.

**Q. Is it possible that the United States will change its policy of—
A. Impartiality?**

Q. Yes, and no arms to either side?

A. That has been and continues to be the position of the U.S. Government as it is the position of many of our allied governments in the NATO family. Clearly, this is a position which serves the best prospects for negotiating a settlement of this conflict and which we hope will be achieved in the very near future.

Q. Why are you not going to Madrid this afternoon as expected?

A. No, it was not as expected. We had a contingency plan that if the ongoing base negotiations were completed before my scheduled return to Washington, then I would have stopped off in Madrid and hopefully would have initiated the agreement. It is no surprise to me that there are still details to be worked out. But I would not want that to be interpreted as an indication of any serious problems. These are difficult and complex discussions, and they are continuing at a rapid pace—a great deal of progress has been made—but there are still a few details to be worked out.

Q. Are you trying to say that you are going to meet Perez-Llorca before next Saturday?

A. That is our anticipation, and we are working toward that objective. Were it not to happen, it would be a matter of a very, very brief period of time, I believe, to complete the talks.

Q. Will you sign the agreement with Perez-Llorca or will your Ambassador in Madrid?

A. I don't want to prejudge that question yet until we complete the talks. In coordination with my counterpart, Minister Perez-Llorca, we'll decide the best way to do it. It is not a matter of substantive difference between us.

Q. What is your reaction to an accusation made inside the European Parliament Strasbourg Chamber last week that had the United States gotten off the fence earlier in the Falklands crisis—imposed economic sanctions against Argentina immediately after invasion—lives could have been saved and a peaceful solution could have been achieved earlier? This accusation was made by Mrs. Barbara Castle, leader of the British Labor Party in Europe.

A. First, I don't make it a habit of commenting substantively on third-hand reported or second-hand reported observations by public officials identified or unidentified. That does not cause me to recoil from responding to the substance of your question. But I would not want it portrayed as a response to one or another individual that I don't even know and didn't even have the benefit of hearing first-hand, but I think anyone that reviews the U.S. position on the Falklands crisis knows well, as did the British Government, that we were asked to portray a good office's role at the highest levels in the British Government, as well as at the highest levels in the Argentinian Government. Our ability to do so clearly involved certain restraints in value judgments with respect to the conflict day-to-day.

There was no question on where the United States stood on U.N. Resolution 502 where we cast an affirmative and supportive vote. That already moots the question.

Secondly, were there any validity to such an allegation, it should have long since been dispelled as we see the Secretary General anguishing with the same issues that we anguished with during the period when the United States was involved—and even having enjoyed the benefits of what we were able to accomplish in that effort. Let me assure you that the British Government was fully aware of the supportive position taken by the United States, or my communications with my counterpart and the Prime Minister are befogged with sophistry.

Q. Could you comment on the fact that the Portuguese Government has not allowed some American planes to land on the Lajes Base in the Azores recently?

A. I don't want to comment on that too lavishly because on every occasion that Portuguese sovereign territory has been put at the disposal of U.S. forces, it involves prior consultation and coordination. There is nothing unusual or unprecedented about recent events. I make no bones about the dissatisfaction in Portugal with the level of American military and economic support this past year and that programmed for FY 1983. This is a matter of utmost concern to the U.S. Government. It is especially difficult at a time of very, very serious economic difficulties in the United States.

Those concerns which are felt by a longstanding and close friend and ally of the United States will be resolved in the

months ahead, but no one will ever be fully satisfied when it comes to levels of support. We understand that. It doesn't mean we are not sympathetic with the need because we are. We are vitally interested in Portugal's economic development and growth and, above all, in security terms, in alliance terms in their enhancement of their security capabilities. We have participated in that in the past, and we will continue to in the future to the highest level that we are capable of doing it and having it approved by the American Congress.

Q. Do you think the attitude of the Irish Government, in particular, in pulling back from the EEC trade sanctions against Argentina and in its situation as a temporary member of the Security Council has been helpful or unhelpful in the search for a peaceful solution to the Falklands crisis?

A. I wouldn't presume to label the sovereign judgments of anyone of the Ten. It would be inappropriate for me to do it, especially since I am half Irish myself.

FINAL COMMUNIQUE, MAY 18, 1982

The North Atlantic Council met in Ministerial session in Luxembourg on 17th and 18th May 1982 and agreed as follows:

1. The Allies welcome the impending accession of Spain to the North Atlantic Treaty, which offers fresh evidence of the enduring vitality of the Alliance—a community of free countries inspired by the shared values of pluralistic democracy, individual liberty, human dignity, self-determination and the rule of law in conformity with the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter.

2. The Allies are determined to maintain adequate military strength and political solidarity in order to assure a balance of forces and to deter aggression and other forms of pressure. On this base, in the interest of peace and international stability, the Allies will persevere in their efforts to establish a more constructive East-West relationship aiming at genuine detente through dialogue and negotiation and mutually advantageous exchanges. Arms control and disarmament, together with deterrence and defense, are integral parts of Alliance security policy.

Substantial improvements in East-West relations depend, however, on the readiness of the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact countries to exercise restraint and responsibility in deeds as well as in words. The continued build-up of Soviet forces across the full spectrum of military capability, the Soviet Union's aggression against the

people of Afghanistan, its encouragement and support for martial law in Poland and its destabilizing activities elsewhere in the world contradict Soviet claims to peaceful intentions and weigh heavily on East-West relations.

3. The continued oppression of the Polish people violates the United Nations Charter and the Helsinki Final Act. The Allies recall their declaration of 11th January 1982 and again urge the Polish authorities to end of the state of martial law, release all those detained and restore genuine dialogue with the church and Solidarity. Hopes for progress in this direction were disappointed when recent limited relaxation of certain measures taken under martial law was followed so quickly by new repressive measures. The Polish authorities should refrain from forcing Polish citizens into exile.

4. The increasing Soviet aggression against Afghanistan is meeting growing resistance by the Afghan people. The toll of death and destruction is mounting, more than three million Afghans are refugees and the stability of the region is endangered; this Soviet behavior is unacceptable. The Allies again emphasize their support for the proposals, put forward by the United Nations and other international bodies and repeatedly ignored by the Soviet Union, for a political solution based on the total withdrawal of Soviet troops and respect for the independence, sovereignty and non-alignment of Afghanistan. They express the hope that the mission of the United Nations Secretary General's Personal Representative for Afghanistan will help to find a solution in accordance with these principles.

5. Soviet policies confirm the need for the Allies to make all necessary efforts to maintain a strong and credible defense. The Allies can preserve peace only if they have the capability and the will to defend themselves at any level in any region of the North Atlantic Treaty area. This requires a wide range of conventional and nuclear forces designed to persuade any potential aggressor that an attack would be repulsed and would expose him to risks out of all proportion of any advantages he might hope to gain. Deterrence has kept the peace in Europe for over thirty years, and this policy is still valid today. Moreover this policy is essential to bring the Soviet Union to negotiate seriously on the reduction and control of armaments.

6. Members of the Alliance have put forward a broad series of proposals aimed at achieving concrete and far-reaching progress in a number of arms control and disarmament negotiations:

- In the context of CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe], to seek confidence and security-building measures covering the whole of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals;

- In the framework of MBFR [mutual and balanced force reductions], to establish equal collective ceilings to be achieved by manpower reductions on the basis of agreed data;

- As regards negotiations on nuclear arms, to eliminate totally United States and Soviet intermediate-range land-based missiles and to make substantial reductions in their intercontinental strategic nuclear systems.

The Allies urge the Soviet Union to respond without further delay, in a positive way to these proposals which are designed to improve security and achieve a military balance at the lowest possible level of forces.

7. The Allies welcome President Reagan's proposal to President Brezhnev to begin the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) by the end of June and urge the Soviet Union to respond positively. The United States intention to seek significant reductions in the strategic armaments of the two countries, particularly in the most destabilizing systems, is a far-reaching but realistic offer that would lead to a significant increase in strategic stability and thereby strengthen peace and international security. Within the START framework, and pursuant to the December 1979 decision on intermediate-range nuclear forces modernization and arms control,⁴ the United States is continuing to negotiate with the Soviet Union in Geneva on the basis of an imaginative proposal for the limitation of their respective intermediate-range systems.

The United States negotiating approach offers the chance for fair and effective agreements. The Allies, who remain in close consultation with the United States, support its efforts to reach such agreements.

8. The Allies participating in the Vienna talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions reaffirm their determination to work for an agreement that strengthens security and peace in Europe through force reductions to equal collective manpower levels in the area of reductions. For negotiations to succeed, it will be necessary for the East to cooperate in reaching agreement on existing force levels, and on adequate associated measures to enhance stability and to verify compliance.

9. The Allies remain committed to developing and strengthening the CSCE process but recognize the severe obstacles posed by persistent Eastern violations of the principles and provisions of the Helsinki Final Act, most recently and flagrantly in Poland.

They hope that by the time the Madrid CSCE follow-up meeting reconvenes in November, faith will have been restored in the implementation of the Final Act and that it will be possible to adopt a substantive and balanced concluding document covering all areas of the Final Act, including human rights, human contacts and information. They reaffirm their support for a Conference on Security and Disarmament in Europe and for adoption at the Madrid meeting of a precise mandate for negotiations in an initial phase of confidence and security-building measures that are militarily significant, binding, verifiable and applicable throughout the whole of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.

10. The Allies intend to play a constructive part at the forthcoming Second United Nations Special Session on Disarmament.

They hope that discussion there will take full account of the need for openness and adequate verification provisions of all areas of arms control and disarmament. In the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, the Allies will continue to work for concrete and verifiable agreements, including a total ban on all chemical weapons.

11. The maintenance of the stable situation in and around Berlin remains for the Allies an essential factor in East-West relations.

The Allies recall their statement in the Rome Communique of 5th May 1981 and express the hope that the continuation of the dialogue between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic will lead to increased direct benefits for Berlin and for the people in the two German States.

12. Economic exchanges have an important role in the development of a stable East-West relationship. The Allies reaffirm their intention which they expressed in their Declaration of 11th January 1982⁴ to review East-West economic relations, bearing in mind the need for such relations to be mutually advantageous and to take full account of security considerations, particularly in the technological, economic and financial areas, including export credits. In particular, they acknowledge the dangers involved in transfer of militarily relevant technology to the Warsaw Pact countries.

13. The recovery of the economic health of Allied countries is essential and integral to their defense effort. Allied Governments will work together both bilaterally and through competent organizations to further the prosperity of their peoples and the world economy. The Allies recognize the need for continued support for programmes intended to benefit the economies of the less favored Allied partners in keeping with Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

14. In view of the fundamental importance which they attach to the principle that the use of force to resolve international disputes should be resolutely opposed by the international community, the Allies condemn Argentina for its aggression against the Falkland Islands and dependencies and deplore the fact that after more than six weeks has still not withdrawn her forces in compliance with mandatory Resolution 502 of the Security Council. They call for a continuation of the efforts to achieve a satisfactory negotiated settlement in accordance with this resolution in its entirety.

15. The Allies are profoundly concerned over the acts of terrorism which recur in several of their countries. They strongly condemn all such acts and solemnly appeal to all governments to wage an effective struggle against this scourge and to intensify their effort to this end.

16. The Allies recognize that certain developments outside the treaty area can have consequences for their common interests. They will consult together as appropriate, taking into account their commonly identified objectives. Member countries of the

Alliance, in a position to do so, are ready to help other sovereign nations to resist threats to their security and independence.

17. The Allies will work together with others to strengthen and maintain the sovereignty and independence of countries in the Third World. They respect genuine non-alignment and support economic and social development in the Third World which contributes to world stability and can help to provide protection against outside interference. The Allied countries will continue to struggle against hunger, poverty and under-development.

18. Ministers agreed to intensify their consultations. They will hold an informal meeting in autumn 1982, taking advantage of their presence in North America on the occasion of the next regular session of the United Nations General Assembly. In this connection, they noted with pleasure the invitation of the Canadian Government to hold that meeting in Canada.

19. The next regular meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Ministerial session will be held in Brussels in December 1982. Ministers accepted with pleasure the invitation of the Government of France for the spring 1983 ministerial council meeting to take place in Paris.

¹Press release 170 of May 18, 1982.

²Press release 172 of May 19.

³Press release 174 of May 20.

⁴In this connection, Greece reserved its position and expressed its views which were recorded in the minutes [text in original]. ■

North Atlantic Council Meets in Brussels

Secretary Haig departed Washington, D.C., December 8, 1981, to attend the regular semiannual session of the North Atlantic Council ministerial meeting (December 10-11).

Following are the texts of the North Atlantic Council final communique and the declaration on intermediate-range nuclear force modernization and arms control.

FINAL COMMUNIQUE, DEC. 11, 1981

The North Atlantic Council met in Ministerial session in Brussels on 10th and 11th December 1981. On this occasion Ministers signed the Protocol of Accession of Spain to the North Atlantic Treaty which will now be submitted for ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures in their respective countries. They welcomed the decision of

Spain to seek entry into the Alliance and thereby to play its part in Allied collective security in accordance with the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty. This decision offers new evidence of the enduring vitality of the Alliance.

Resolved to pursue peace and security through a stable balance of forces, reduced tensions and more constructive East-West relations, Ministers agreed on the following:

1. The Alliance is committed to safeguarding the peace and thus allowing the peoples of its member countries to preserve the values and way of life they share. In the interest of lasting peace the Allies will continue to work unremittingly to establish through a constructive dialogue the essential climate of confidence and mutual restraint in East-West relations with the aim of achieving genuine detente and substantial progress in arms control and disarmament. But in the light of the Soviet Union's continued military build-up and as long as a solid foundation of trust has not been established, the Allies have no choice but to dissuade any potential aggressor by making it clear that they have the strength and the will to resist. The peace that Europe has enjoyed for the last 36 years is a measure of the success of the Alliance and its policy of deterrence and defense. An adequate deterrent does not jeopardize peace, it makes it safer. The unity and strength of the Alliance provide the best guarantee that its peoples can remain free from the fear of war.

The role of nuclear weapons has attracted great attention in the Western political debate, in particular among the younger generation. The fact is, however, that nuclear weapons have thus far been an essential element in preventing war, in the face of the Warsaw Pact's massive conventional and nuclear forces. The Alliance has to maintain a nuclear capability, since disarmament has not reached a satisfactory level. The Alliance could not reduce the risk of war by divesting itself unilaterally of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union has greatly increased its forces throughout the period of detente. Unilateral nuclear disarmament would give the Soviet Union, which could not be relied upon to follow suit, an overwhelming military advantage. The only sure way of preventing intimidation and war is to ensure a stable balance of forces between East and West. This should be done at the lowest possible level.

2. Restraint and responsibility are essential for the conduct of international relations. But Soviet destabilising activities of all kinds persist in various parts of the world and cast doubt on their readiness to work for a real reduction of tension. While invoking exaggerated security requirements to justify its huge armaments development and production programme, the Soviet Union condemns as unwarranted the defensive measures taken by the Western countries. At the same time, it tries to exploit for its own purposes genuine concerns often expressed in the West, while prohibiting any free debate of this kind among its own people.

The Soviet Union also seems to further its own interests by the use of force. The occupation of Afghanistan continues, against the increasing resistance of the Afghan people and in the face of repeated international demands for Soviet withdrawal. Soviet refusal to respond to these demands constitutes a menace to the stability of the region, endangers international peace and security and seriously impedes improvements in East-West relations.

3. In these circumstances the Alliance is resolved to strengthen—without seeking military superiority—its capacity to deter aggression and defend peace. Improvements in Allied defense readiness and military capabilities contribute to this end. Ministers expressed their support for the determination of the United States to ensure the deterrent capabilities of its strategic forces. An effective defense is also the essential basis for fruitful negotiations on arms control and disarmament.

4. The Allies remain committed to vigorous efforts in all appropriate fora to achieve substantial, balanced and verifiable arms limitations and reductions. Recalling President Reagan's historic speech of 18th November 1981 they registered their full support for his far-reaching and constructive programme for the achievement of a stable peace. They share the United States' resolve to work for the establishment of a military balance at lower levels of forces, and welcomed the four-point agenda which President Reagan conveyed to President Brezhnev.

On this basis as well as on the basis of restraint and responsibility, the Allies offer the Soviet Union comprehensive negotiation with the aim of effective arms control and disarmament. Soviet acceptance of this offer would benefit the peoples in East and West and in the Third World and promote peace and security worldwide.

The US-Soviet Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START), which the United States has proposed to begin as early as possible in 1982, will constitute an important new step towards reinforcing security and peace. These negotiations should lead to significant reductions in the US and Soviet strategic arsenals. The Allies also welcomed negotiations on US and Soviet intermediate-range nuclear forces which opened in Geneva on 30th November 1981 at the initiative of the United States; they expressed the hope that these negotiations will lead to a positive result in the START framework. The Allies look forward to continued close consultations with the United States in the Council on these matters.

Those Allies participating in the mutual and balanced force reductions talks in Vienna continue to seek genuine manpower parity, in the form of a common collective ceiling based on agreed data and adequate verification measures. They again call upon Eastern participating states to contribute constructively to clarifying these problems.

5. The establishment of relations based on trust and co-operation in Europe depends on the full compliance by all the signatories

with the provisions and principles of the 1974 Helsinki Final Act. These principles, to which the Allies are firmly committed, are of the utmost importance with respect to Poland; the Polish people must be free to solve their problems without outside interference or pressure of any kind. The Allies remain deeply attached to the human dimension of detente and thus to the tangible benefits which it must offer to the individual.

The Allies will continue their efforts to achieve a balanced and substantive result at the Madrid CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] follow-up meeting, in the form of progress in all areas covered by the Final Act, including human rights, human contacts and information. They call upon the Soviet Union to live up to the Final Act and urge it to join in establishing a Conference on Disarmament in Europe and to agree now on a precise mandate for negotiations on confidence-building measures applicable to the whole of Europe.

6. Those Allies who are members of the Committee on Disarmament will contribute to work in that forum for the adoption of balanced and verifiable agreements on specific issues. The Allies reaffirm the importance they attach to the Second Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on Disarmament to be held in 1982 in which they will play an active part.

7. The Quadripartite Agreement of 3rd September 1971 has made a decisive contribution to stabilizing the Berlin situation during the 10 years since its signature. The Allies stress the continuing importance they attach to the maintenance of the calm situation in and around the city.

The Allies note with satisfaction the forthcoming meeting between the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Chairman of the Council of State of the German Democratic Republic. They recall their statement in the Rome communique of 5th May 1981, and expressed their hope that this meeting will contribute to the further development of relations between the two German States.

8. Bearing in mind the close relationship between their defense and economic posture the Allies will continue to give full support to the programmes to strengthen the economies of the less favored partners in the spirit of Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

9. International stability is vital to Western interests. Political settlements must be found to crises or conflicts. Genuine non-alignment can make an important contribution towards these goals. The Allies will continue to consult among themselves and work together with others to encourage the maintenance of stability and the independence of sovereign nations, to which they attach great importance, and to reduce the risks of crisis in the Third World. They will take the necessary political and economic measures to support efforts by such nations to defend their sovereignty and territorial integrity and to enhance stability worldwide. In their consultations, Allies will seek to identify common objectives, taking full account of the political,

economic and military situation in the area concerned. Those Allies in a position to do so will be ready to take steps outside the treaty area to deter aggression and to respond to requests by sovereign nations for help in resisting threats to their security or independence.

10. Peace and economic and social development are increasingly becoming interdependent. The Allies will work together with other nations to assist countries who fight against hunger, poverty and underdevelopment.

11. The next meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Ministerial session will be held in Luxembourg on the 17th and 18th May 1982.

DECLARATION, DEC. 11, 1981

Ministerial Declaration on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Modernization and Arms Control

The Allies who participated in the December 1979 decisions on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) modernization and arms control welcomed the opening of the United States-Soviet negotiations on INF arms control in the strategic arms control framework on 30th November. They expressed their conviction that a positive outcome of these negotiations would contribute to greater East-West stability and progress in other East-West arms control negotiations. They fully support the US negotiating approach, which was developed in the course of intensive consultations among them.

The decision of December 1979 was taken against the background of a growing threat to Alliance security posed by Soviet long-range INF missiles, in particular the SS-20, each with three independently targetable warheads. Since that time the number of Soviet long-range missiles has grown rapidly. Deployments of SS-20 missiles continue. The Soviet Union now possesses some 1,100 warheads on long-range INF missiles which threaten the Alliance.

The dual-track decision of December 1979 opened the way to reducing the threat through arms control negotiations. Based on that decision, and with the full support of its Allies, the US has made a far-reaching proposal to eliminate all US and Soviet long-range land-based INF missiles. It has offered to cancel its deployment of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles if the Soviets will dismantle their SS-20 missiles, and retire their SS-4 and SS-5 missiles. This historic offer is straightforward and equitable, and would eliminate the systems of greatest concern to both sides. If the Soviet Union shows a similar willingness to secure far-reaching measures of disarmament, elimination of these long-range missiles on both sides can be a reality. Reductions in other US and Soviet nuclear systems could be sought in subsequent phases.

Determination in implementing both tracks of the December 1979 decision has been a key factor in convincing the Soviet Union to negotiate without preconditions, thus creating the opportunity to achieve genuine arms control. This same resolve will remain essential in reaching concrete results in the negotiations. Implementation of the modernization program is continuing and can be altered only by a fair and effective arms control agreement.

The Allies welcomed the US commitment to make every effort to bring the negotiations to a successful conclusion within the shortest possible time. They also noted that the US intends to negotiate in good faith, and will listen to and consider Soviet proposals, with the objective of reaching an equitable,

effective and verifiable agreement that will enhance the security of the Alliance, and thus contribute to a more stable military relationship between East and West. The achievement of such an agreement requires a similarly constructive approach on the part of the Soviet Union.

US consultations with its Allies in the Special Consultative Group on INF arms control contributed significantly to the preparations for the negotiations and will continue as the negotiations progress. These consultations are an expression of Alliance solidarity and reflect the US commitment to take Allied views into account as well as the close association of the Allies with the US negotiating effort. ■

Visit of Moroccan King Hassan II

His Majesty King Hassan II of the Kingdom of Morocco made an official working visit to Washington, D.C., May 18-22, 1982, to meet with President Reagan and other government officials. Following is a Department statement of May 21.¹

The discussions with His Majesty King Hassan II have been most satisfying and thorough, covering a broad range of subjects. Perhaps the most important outcome of the visit was the opportunity for the President and King Hassan to have face-to-face discussions on the major issues of common concern and our respective positions on them. Secretary Haig and Foreign Minister Boucetta, in the presence of the King, exchanged the instruments of ratification of the agreement establishing a binational cultural and educational commission on May 20. Secretary Haig signed the agreement in Marrakech in February, and the rapidity with which the whole process was completed testifies to its importance to both countries.

We also had a chance to review economic issues of common interest. In order to promote U.S. investment in Morocco, an investment working group in the U.S.-Moroccan Economic Commission will be established, to begin operations soon, and we have held discussions on the possibility of negotiating on a bilateral investment treaty. We also discussed a cooperative venture in dryland agricultural development. It is our hope to be able to provide around \$200 million in assistance over the next 5 years for this effort, which could cushion Morocco against the effects of another devastating drought.

We reviewed the important security aspects of our relationship. Morocco and the United States have had a long tradition of close cooperation on security issues, which has been strengthened recently with an expanded strategic dialogue. The Joint Military Commission is an important vehicle for continuing discussions between our respective military establishments.

Both sides also stressed the importance of our security assistance relationship. We are proceeding with negotiations in which Morocco will grant U.S. forces access to Moroccan transit facilities in special contingencies of concern to both countries. A detailed arrangement will now be worked out, and we expect agreement on a text before His Majesty departs the United States.

We discussed the implications of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) actions taken toward the Western Sahara. The King's initiative taken at Nairobi last year, calling for a cease-fire and referendum, continues to be the basis of our policy. After the excellent beginnings of the implementation committee this year, we hope that the OAU will persist in its activities.

Finally, we had a productive exchange on the Middle East situation. We very much value the views of King Hassan and the constructive approach that he has traditionally taken toward this issue. We reiterated U.S. determination to press forward with autonomy talks. We look forward to a continuing dialogue with Morocco on this vital matter.

¹Read to news correspondents by Department Spokesman Dean Fischer. ■

U.S. Votes Against Law of the Sea Treaty

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT,
JULY 9, 1982¹

The United States has long recognized how critical the world's oceans are to mankind and how important international agreements are to the use of those oceans. For over a decade, the United States has been working with more than 150 countries at the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea to develop a comprehensive treaty.

On January 29, 1982, I reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to the multilateral process for reaching such a treaty and announced that we would return to the negotiations to seek to correct unacceptable elements in the deep seabed mining part of the draft convention. I also announced that my Administration would support ratification of a convention meeting six basic objectives.

On April 30, the conference adopted a convention that does not satisfy the objectives sought by the United States. It was adopted by a vote of 130 in favor, with four against (including the United States), and 17 abstentions. Those voting "no" or abstaining appear small in number but represent countries which produce more than 60% of the world's gross national product and provide more than 60% of the contributions to the United Nations.

We have now completed a review of that convention and recognize that it contains many positive and very significant accomplishments. Those extensive parts dealing with navigation and overflight and most other provisions of the convention are consistent with U.S. interests and, in our view, serve well the interests of all nations. That is an important achievement and signifies the benefits of working together and effectively balancing numerous interests. The United States also appreciates the efforts of the many countries that have worked with us toward an acceptable agreement, including efforts by friends and allies at the session that concluded on April 30.

Our review recognizes, however, that the deep seabed mining part of the convention does not meet U.S. objectives. For this reason, I am announcing today that the United States will not sign the convention as adopted by the conference, and our participation in the

remaining conference process will be at the technical level and will involve only those provisions that serve U.S. interests.

These decisions reflect the deep conviction that the United States cannot support a deep seabed mining regime with such major problems. In our view, those problems include:

- Provisions that would actually deter future development of deep seabed mineral resources, when such development should serve the interest of all countries;
- A decisionmaking process that would not give the United States or others a role that fairly reflects and protects their interests;
- Provisions that would allow amendments to enter into force for the United States without its approval; this

is clearly incompatible with the U.S. approach to such treaties;

- Stipulations relating to mandatory transfer of private technology and the possibility of national liberation movements sharing in benefits; and
- The absence of assured access for future qualified deep seabed miners to promote the development of these resources.

We recognize that world demand and markets currently do not justify commercial development of deep seabed mineral resources, and it is not clear when such development will be justified. When such factors become favorable, however, the deep seabed represents a potentially important source of strategic and other minerals. The aim of the United States in this regard has been to establish with other nations an order that would allow exploration and development under reasonable terms and conditions.

¹Text from White House press release. ■

Control of Technology Transfers to the Soviet Union

by James L. Buckley

*Statement before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigation of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee on May 6, 1982. Mr. Buckley is Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology.*¹

I am delighted at this opportunity to respond to your invitation to testify on the role of the State Department in controlling the transfer of militarily critical technology to the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc. Whatever the record of prior Administrations—Republican as well as Democratic—it is clear that this Administration has placed a very high priority on improving the effectiveness of the executive branch in enforcing export controls. It has launched important initiatives which we believe will greatly improve their overall effectiveness while sharpening the focus on those elements of advanced technology and process know-how which are of the most critical importance to the Soviet bloc. We freely acknowledge that much more needs to be done; and we are actively working with other agencies to improve coordina-

tion over a range of issues. It will take time, however, for all these efforts to take hold in particular areas, especially because of the large amount of new data that has had to be gathered by various agencies and the analytical work that has to be done.

National security export controls are a basic element in overall U.S. policy toward the Warsaw Pact countries. To put it bluntly, these controls are a recognition of the fact that the global objectives of the Soviet bloc are inimical to our own and threaten every value for which our nation stands. Therefore, it is simply harmful for us to provide those nations with Western, militarily useful technologies to be turned against us.

The Role of COCOM

As most of these sensitive technologies are not within the sole control of the United States, it has been essential from the outset to achieve among the major Western industrialized powers fundamental agreement as to what technologies are militarily critical and how their transfer to the Soviet bloc should be controlled.

The instrument that has been developed for this purpose is the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Security Export Controls (COCOM) to which Japan and all NATO countries, with the exception of Iceland, belong. COCOM was created in 1949 by informal agreement among its members and has thus been in existence for more than three decades.

COCOM has three major functions.

The first is to establish and update the lists of embargoed products and technologies. Although COCOM lists are not published, they become the basis for the national control lists administered by each member government. The member governments are now preparing for a major review of these embargo lists, which will begin in October.

Second, COCOM acts as the clearinghouse for requests submitted by the member governments to ship specific items to specified end-users in the proscribed countries. The COCOM-proscribed countries are the Soviet Union, the other Warsaw Pact countries, China, and the other Communist countries in Asia.

Third, COCOM serves as a means of coordinating the administration and enforcement activities of the member governments.

The COCOM lists set up fairly specific limits on the technical characteristics above which member governments agree that they will prohibit exports to proscribed countries, unless COCOM itself approves exceptions.

In agreeing to a national request to export items on one of the control lists, COCOM works on the principle of unanimity. No application, in short, is approved if any member state objects. One of the evolved strengths of COCOM is that in over 30 years of operation, there have been very few cases in which a government has exercised its sovereign right to go ahead with exports over COCOM objections. This is all the more remarkable given the absence of any treaty or executive agreement undergirding the organization.

Over those decades, COCOM has generally been successful in inhibiting the overt flow of strategic technology to our adversaries. During the 1970s, however, in the honeymoon days of detente, the United States and the West relaxed controls over a number of embargoed commodities. It was believed that wideranging trade would somehow alter the international behavior of the Soviets and moderate their military in-

vestment. During this period, the United States went from being the least to the most frequent seeker of exceptions to multilateral controls. COCOM itself came to reflect such attitudes, and exceptions to the embargo were allowed to thrive. We now know this was a

[National security export] controls are a recognition . . . that the global objectives of the Soviet bloc are inimical to our own and threaten every value for which our nation stands.

mistake. During the period of detente, the world stood witness to the greatest military buildup in history, along with the increased Soviet adventurism that grew out of an increased self-confidence.

Stemming the Flow of Technology

The Reagan Administration came into office 15 months ago determined to stem the flow of the technology that the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies were using to improve their already vast warmaking capabilities. It was clear that the West's crucial qualitative edge in military systems was being undermined by the Soviet's increasingly aggressive efforts to buy or steal our militarily relevant technologies and equipment.

More precisely, we saw this well-orchestrated acquisition program giving the Soviets:

- A very significant savings in time and money in their military research and development programs;
- Rapid modernization of their defense industrial infrastructure;
- The opportunity to accelerate the closing of gaps between our weapons systems and theirs; and
- The chance to develop, with alarming speed, neutralizing countermeasures to our own technological innovations.

As a consequence, the Administration has initiated efforts to fill in gaps in the multilateral export control system. At the Ottawa summit meeting in July 1981, President Reagan raised the problem of Western technology transfer to the Soviet Union. An agreement at Ottawa to consult on this issue culminated in a high-level meeting in Paris during January, the first ministerial level COCOM meeting since the late 1950s. The other COCOM governments have asked that the results of that meeting be kept confidential, as, indeed, are all COCOM proceedings. I chaired the U.S. delegation to that meeting, however, and I can say that there was a concrete consensus that the member government should renew their efforts to improve COCOM effectiveness. We have been encouraged by what appears to be a new and more constructive attitude of other COCOM governments and feel that this meeting forms a basis for a revitalization of the COCOM system.

Such a revitalization will take much hard work, and it will take time, among other reasons because COCOM depends on the national administration of controls by 15 individual governments. But some specific steps are underway. Effectiveness, for example, requires precise definitions of many complex technologies. We have made progress toward agreement on a number of specific, technical proposals in this area to tighten the embargo.

The United States is now working on proposals that will expand COCOM control lists into previously uncovered priority industries. These include gas turbine engines, large floating drydocks certain metallurgical processes, electronic grade silicon, printed circuit board technology, space launch vehicles and spacecraft, robotics, ceramic materials for engines, certain advanced composites, and communications switching and computer hardware and software technology and know-how. This process will continue into the triennial COCOM list review, which will take place this October, when a general reappraisal of everything on the control lists will take place.

We have developed workable proposals for harmonizing the expert licensing procedures of the 15 member states so as to make COCOM decisionmaking more efficient. What we are seeking are ways to bring national enforcement practices to a level of equal effectiveness. These two questions will be addressed at a special COCOM meeting which will convene in Paris later this

spring—and the fact that all partners have agreed to that special meeting is testament to our shared goals.

Illegal diversion activities are a problem overseas as well as at home. We have been cooperating with our COCOM allies to improve enforcement and investigative capabilities in this area. The State Department, working closely with our intelligence and investigative agencies, has been channeling appropriate information to other governments to alert them to potentially illegal activities within their borders. We have also encouraged them to increase the investigative resources and the sanctions available for export control enforcement. The Department of Commerce, and in turn the U.S. Customs Service, have detailed officers to the Department of State to support this overseas compliance effort.

COCOM has thus, we believe, made measurable progress toward strengthening strategic export controls since this Administration came into office. But it is also clear that the continuing revitalization process will be long and hard. In attempting to strengthen strategic export controls on exports to the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact countries, we are faced with the perennial problem of securing agreement with all the other COCOM allies on just where to establish the technical cutoffs for commodities and technologies under embargo. Determining in many scores of different technical areas what is sufficiently strategic to warrant control is not an easy task. We do not always agree on what are militarily critical technologies, yet the purpose of the organization is limited to such technologies. Members exercise considerable care to avoid controls whose principal impact would be economic rather than military, and each has its own views and perspective. West European and Japanese economies would, generally speaking, be affected more than the U.S. economy by sweeping controls on manufactured products. But such differences between ourselves and our COCOM allies should not be overemphasized. We should remember that our allies have cooperated with us for over 30 years to control significant amounts of equipment, material, and technologies through COCOM. That is, first and foremost, because we share a common belief that such controls constitute an important element in our mutual defense.

As you know, the State Department is also responsible for administering munitions export controls which cover

defense articles and services. Munitions are not approved for export to Warsaw Pact countries. Accordingly, the main issue in administering these controls relates to security concerns and our foreign relations with other countries.

Your letter of invitation mentions that, in an executive branch more effectively organized to shape and enforce export control policy, you envisage a principal and expanded role for the Department of State. We, too, envisage such a role for the Department.

Upon taking office, this Administration undertook a full review of our policy concerning the transfer of strategic technology to the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact countries. The State Department was a major participant in this review, which culminated in the COCOM high-level meeting. The State Department led our delegation to

that meeting. Since then, on a number of occasions, senior officials at State have discussed with our allies security concerns related to technology transfers. We are persuaded that improved allied cooperation on sensitive technology transfer issues is a realistic objective. There will, of course, continue to be some differences on the details of controls and their application to individual cases. But, with hard work to identify clearly and to justify persuasively what needs to be controlled and how controls should be enforced and administered, such differences, we believe, will be the exception rather than the rule.

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Cuban Support for Terrorism and Insurgency in the Western Hemisphere

by Thomas O. Enders

Statement before the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the Senate Judiciary Committee on March 12, 1982. Ambassador Enders is Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs.¹

The Administration shares your concern about the growth of terrorism and violence in today's world. I welcome this opportunity to address the issue of Cuban terrorism and promotion of violent revolution in Latin America and the Caribbean.

For some 10 years following the death of Che Guevara on an Andean hillside, Cuba attempted to portray itself as a member of the international community not unlike others, carrying on state-to-state relations through embassies, and emphasizing trade and cultural contacts.

Cuba, however, never stopped glorifying violent revolution. During an entire generation, Cuba carefully nurtured agents and contacts with groups committed to violence, often providing ideological and military training to several groups in the same country. Then, in 1978, almost without notice, Castro began to implement a strategy of uniting the left in the countries of the hemisphere, with the purpose of using it as a tool for the violent overthrow of existing governments and the establish-

ment of more Marxist-Leninist regimes in this hemisphere.

In 1978, Cuba helped unite three Sandinista factions, then committed itself militarily to the rebellion in Nicaragua. At first it was not apparent to many that a new Cuban strategy was in operation, for Nicaragua seemed like a unique case. But then Cuba began to try the same thing in El Salvador, in Guatemala, in Colombia; now it is repeating the pattern in Honduras. Even Costa Rica is now exposed to the threat of externally backed terrorism.

Cuban intervention is, of course, not the only source of terrorism in the hemisphere. Violent conflict in Latin America has many origins, including historical social and economic inequities which have generated frustrations. Especially in the Caribbean Basin, economic crisis has recently subjected fragile institutions to additional stresses, increasing their vulnerability to radicalism as well as violence.

Clearly, however, Cuba's readiness to foment violence to exploit such situations imposes serious obstacles to economic progress, democratic development, and self-determination. On December 14, I delivered to the Congress a special report on Cuban covert activities in key countries [see Special Report No. 90—"Cuba's Renewed Support for Violence in Latin America"]. I

would like to take this opportunity to review and update some specific cases of Cuban export of violence.

South America

The immediate danger, it is evident, is in Central America. But the pattern is present in South America as well. In Chile, Cuban training of MIR [Movement of the Revolutionary Left] guerrillas has increased substantially in the past 18 months. In January, the Chilean Communist Party leadership met in Havana. A handful of senior Cuban officials attended and pressed hard for unity of all opposition forces in Chile and intensification of all forms of struggle, including violence.

The most prominent South American case, however, is Colombia. In February 1980, Colombian M-19 terrorists seized the Dominican Embassy, holding 18 diplomats—including the American, Mexican, and Venezuelan ambassadors and the Papal Nuncio—hostage for 61 days. As part of the negotiated settlement, the terrorists were flown to Cuba and given asylum. That summer, Cuban intelligence officers arranged a meeting among M-19 members with representatives of two other Colombian extremist organizations, the ELN [Army of National Liberation] and the FARC [Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia]. Full unification was not achieved but practical cooperation increased.

In November 1980, the M-19 sent 100-200 activists to Cuba for military training. This group was joined by M-19 terrorists already in Cuba, including Rosenberg Pabon Pabon, the leader of the Dominican Embassy takeover. The Colombians were trained by Cuban instructors in explosives, automatic weapons, hand-to-hand combat, communications, and rural guerrilla tactics. In February 1981, their Cuban training completed, these guerrillas infiltrated into Colombia by boat along the Pacific coast. The attempt of these urban terrorists at an armed uprising in the countryside failed. Pabon himself was captured. Cuba denied involvement in the arming and landing of the M-19 guerrillas but not in training them.

The clear evidence of Cuba's role led Colombia to suspend relations with Cuba on March 23. President Turbay commented in an August 13 *New York Times* interview:

... when we found that Cuba, a country with which we had diplomatic relations, was using those relations to prepare a group of guerrillas, it was a kind of Pearl Harbor for us. It was like sending ministers to Washington at the same time you are about to bomb ships in Hawaii.

In an interview published in September 1981, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, the Cuban Vice President, told the German news magazine *Der Spiegel*, "we did not deny" that we trained the M-19 guerrillas. This, he said, "holds true for the Salvadorans as well."

Neither the anger of President Turbay nor the M-19's failure has deterred Cuba. A new and sizeable group of M-19 guerrillas are today in Cuba receiving military training. We don't know that they will go back to Colombia to attempt new acts of terrorism, perhaps directed against the presidential elections this coming May, but such a pattern seems a reasonable speculation. The M-19 has already gone on record—in a declaration distributed to the media in January—condemning the elections and claiming that "civil resistance, popular combat, and armed warfare are the only roads left open to the people. . . ." This document, which was distributed under the signatures of the M-19's national directorate, pledged that the M-19 would oppose the elections "with all our force." This statement was repeated in late February when M-19 leaders rejected the government's latest amnesty proposal.

For the first time, we now also have detailed and reliable information linking Cuba to traffic in narcotics as well as arms. Since 1980, the Castro regime has been using a Colombian narcotics ring to funnel arms as well as funds to Colombian M-19 guerrillas. This narcotics ring was led by Jaime Guillot Lara, a Colombian drug trafficker now in custody in Mexico. He has admitted to working for Havana in purchasing arms for the M-19. We have information that Guillot traveled twice to Cuba since October 1981 and that on the second visit he received \$700,000 from the Cuban Government to purchase arms for the M-19 guerrillas. Last October he played a principal role in transferring the arms he purchased from a ship to a Colombian plane hijacked by the M-19. In addition to arms, Guillot reportedly also transferred funds to the guerrillas through an employee of a Panamanian bank. He maintained contact with the Cuban diplomatic mission in Bogota, including the ambassador, until that mission was closed.

In return for Guillot's services, the Cubans facilitated the ring's trafficking by permitting mother ships carrying marijuana to take sanctuary in Cuban waters while awaiting feeder boats from the Bahamas and Florida. According to a relative of Guillot, one such mother ship detained by Cuban authorities was released when Guillot protested to the Cuban ambassador in Bogota.

Guillot himself has also admitted that a future shipment of arms was to be sent to an unspecified group in Bolivia. These arms, according to Guillot, were to be supplied by an individual in Miami named Johnny. Johnny has been identified as Johnny Crump, a narcotics and arms trafficker now detained in Miami on narcotics charges.

We will continue to follow this case with extreme interest since it is the first firm information we have which implicates Cuba in narcotics trafficking. It also confirms through an independent source what we have suspected, that despite Cuban denials, Cuba has provided arms to the Colombian M-19 guerrillas in addition to training them.

Central America

In Central America, the pattern we know well from Nicaragua and El Salvador can be seen now from Guatemala to Honduras and Costa Rica.

Guatemala exemplifies Cuba's systematic efforts to unify, assist, and advise Marxist-Leninist guerrillas. In the fall of 1980, the four major Guatemalan guerrilla groups met in Managua to negotiate a unity agreement. Cuban and Sandinista officials attended the signing ceremony. We have obtained copies of the actual secret agreements which make clear that the four guerrilla groups consider themselves a revolutionary vanguard, and believe that Marxism-Leninism establishes the ideological parameters of the Guatemalan revolution. The secret agreements emphasize the importance of creating a national front, whose leadership would be approved by the self-proclaimed revolutionary vanguard, and the necessity of building international solidarity for the Guatemalan revolution. They spell out the intention of the guerrillas to control decisive political and military power, and fundamental economic power, should the Guatemalan Government be overthrown.

Later last fall, the leadership of the four Guatemalan guerrilla organizations were called to Havana to work further on developing effective unity. In January

1982, they issued a public statement to the people of Guatemala and world opinion, calling for a broad national patriotic front. They laid out a deceptively moderate program for a new revolutionary government which would be organized, guarantee freedom of expression, and respect the people's right to elect their own representatives. But on the front, they made clear, would be under their leadership as the revolutionary vanguard.

The Marxist-Leninist parameters of the Guatemalan revolution laid out in the secret accords are not mentioned in his declaration. Nor is the intention of the revolutionary vanguard to control decisive political and military power. It does not take a great deal of imagination to see why the class struggle and Marxist-Leninist ideas so prominent in the secret agreements were deleted from the public declaration.

A similar process appears underway in Honduras. The Cubans currently are using Honduran leftists to transport arms and provide support to insurgents in El Salvador and Guatemala. Nevertheless, the Cubans are looking to the day when guerrilla warfare can be initiated in Honduras itself. Honduran authorities raided several guerrilla safe-houses in late November 1981. Captured documents and declarations from detained guerrillas, including several Nicaraguans, revealed that the group was formed in Nicaragua at the instigation of high-level Sandinista leaders, its chief of operations resided in Managua, and members of the group had received military training in Nicaragua and Cuba. Among the captured documents were classroom notebooks from a 1-year training course held in Cuba in 1980. The documents also revealed that one of the three guerrilla bases discovered was responsible for transporting arms and munitions from Esteli, Nicaragua, into Honduras. We can expect to see the familiar ritual repeated in an effort to bring down the new democratic government which was inaugurated barely 2 months ago.

In Costa Rica, terrorism had been virtually unknown until March 1981 when a vehicle bearing three U.S. Embassy guards was blown apart. In June three Costa Rican policemen were shot down. This year an investigation by the police uncovered at least 20 terrorist cells of the Central American Party of Revolutionary Workers, one of which was involved in an attempted kidnapping in January of the Salvadoran businessman Roberto Palomo. Also un-

covered was a "people's prison" well supplied with arms, food, and other stores. According to documents found during the investigation, the purpose of the terrorists was to undermine Costa Rica's democratic institutions. Two Salvadorans and one Costa Rican were arrested; they told police they had been given extensive training in Nicaragua and false identity documents.

New Cuban Approach

Cuba's covert strategy for exporting armed revolution and terrorism is more sophisticated than Cuban efforts in the 1960s. The new Cuban approach no longer centers support solely on armed *focos* but combines support for revolutionary groups with propaganda, youth training courses, scholarships, and bilateral economic/technical assistance. Despite some flexibility in tactics, the mainspring of Cuba's policy remains the development of strong paramilitary forces in target countries like Colombia to provide the muscle for revolutionary groups regardless of the path to power they choose.

And now Nicaragua is collaborating in the attempt to impose new Cuban-style regimes in Central America. Such regimes are so incompetent economically and so repressive of individual liberties that their citizens will see their only hope in flight, often to the United States. The rapidly growing number of Indian refugees—now more than 12,000—who have fled Nicaragua to Honduras are just the most recent manifestation of the despair which moves people to abandon their communities for safety elsewhere.

We know the human tragedy of refugee movements. We also know the enormous social and economic burdens they place on the societies which receive them. We, ourselves, have seen the crime, the skyjackings, the huge welfare costs, and social tensions the Mariel migration brought to the communities of this country. For small countries in Central America or even Mexico the consequences could be too much to accommodate. The pressures can easily destabilize the weak, creating the chaos that gives revolutionaries new opportunities. Whether or not it is part of the design to export revolution, it at least serves that purpose.

Cuba's investment of energy, money, and agents would not be possible without Soviet help. Soviet assistance, now totaling well over \$3 billion a year, equivalent to a quarter of Cuba's GNP,

enables Cuba to maintain the second largest and the best equipped military force in Latin America and to channel significant resources to insurgencies and terrorism abroad. Cuba's new offensive since 1978 has been accompanied by ever-increasing Soviet arms buildup in Cuba including MiG-23/Floggers and 66,000 tons of supplies in 1981 alone. Having such a sophisticated military establishment enhances Cuba's ability to foster and export revolution.

Conclusion

We must be clear about Cuba. It is a Soviet surrogate. But it is not simply a Soviet surrogate. Its support for subversion derives from its own deeply based ideological conviction. It is a fundamental tenet of the Cuban revolution.

The Cuban leadership today is made up largely of the veterans who 23 years ago came to power through violent revolution. They have developed "armed struggle" into an ideological precept and way of life. Promoting "armed struggle" is not just a tactic of foreign policy, it is what reassures them that they are still revolutionaries.

This deep-seated drive to recreate their own guerrilla experience elsewhere is strengthened by hopes of creating allies and keeping Washington's attention focused away from Havana. Hoping that the United States will be domestically and internationally hamstrung on El Salvador, Cuba seeks to compound our problems by creating new ones—for example, in Guatemala or Colombia. This drive, however, makes Cuba increasingly prone to rash decisions and tactical mistakes and more willing to sacrifice the lives and resources of foreign guerrilla groups in operations that may prove disastrous to the guerrillas but advantageous to Havana.

Make no mistake: The Castro regime has made a business of violent revolution. Our response is also clear. We will not accept, we do not believe the countries of the region will accept, that the future of the Caribbean Basin be manipulated from Havana. It must be determined by the countries themselves.

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Commitment to Democracy in Central America

by Thomas O. Enders

Statement before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on April 21, 1982. Ambassador Enders is Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs.¹

Whatever else it settled, the election in El Salvador destroyed the myth that Central America is moving inexorably leftward. After Somoza fell to a vast, Marxist-led coalition, many had believed that the only question was how soon and how far Central American politics would go toward Marxism-Leninism. The massive turnout in El Salvador irrefutably repudiated the claim of the violent left that it has the people behind it. Even if you attribute all of the spoiled and null ballots to left opposition, you have a total of only 11% of the vote. And remember that this happened after massive turnouts in elections in Honduras and Costa Rica in the last 6 months gave leftwing parties infinitesimally small votes.

Why is this important? It's important because policy recommendations have often been based on the explicit or implicit assumption that what happened in Nicaragua was inevitably going to happen elsewhere. Some of our best friends in the area—and some of your witnesses here—have repeatedly and sincerely told us that we should find concessions to make to the left or it would radicalize even further and move to Stalinist extremism. Some of the proposals for negotiations in El Salvador or for reconciliation with Nicaragua presented before this committee seem to stem from that premise. The argument was: coopt the left before it's too late.

If that analysis has been invalidated, another has proven right. That is, that if only given the opportunity to choose, Central Americans will choose democracy over authoritarianism and reform over revolution. Without the political and land reforms pursued by two U.S. Administrations with broad support from the Congress, El Salvador might today be where Somoza's Nicaragua was 3 years ago, on the verge of collapse. If we have learned anything from the March 28 elections, it is that we must not waver in our support for

reforms in El Salvador. The fact that a prominent leader of the original Sandinista movement has now challenged Managua—charging that the Sandinistas' original commitment to pluralism has been betrayed—underscores the point.

There's another lesson to learn from the last months. We have spent a lot of time debating whether the United States was getting into another Vietnam, escalating from military assistance to military trainers to military advisers to the introduction of American troops—right into another "quagmire." The debate was inevitable, given our history, and probably a good thing. It has helped to make clear to the public that such an escalation is unlikely, that American troops are not wanted, needed, or appropriate to the struggles going on in Central America.

Yet, I'm not sure that we've come to terms with another—and maybe more relevant—reference point: our traditional approach to the area. Usually we have neglected Central America only—when the going got rough—to send in the Marines. What we have to do now is to find a way out of that dilemma and mount the kind of sustained political, economic, and military cooperation that our strategic interests and our simple proximity require.

The basic policies required are these:

- A relatively tight but indispensable program of military assistance. We are requesting \$125.3 million in foreign military sales (FMS) financing for fiscal year (FY) 1983 for Latin America and the Caribbean. Of this amount, which is less than 2% of our global FMS program, \$75 million is for direct concessional credits for those countries with severe economic problems and heavy debt burdens. In addition, we are requesting \$13.3 million for military training and education under the international military education program (IMET) program. We are getting good value for these military assistance efforts, as the professional performance of the Salvadoran Army in defeating the insurgents' offensive against the election shows. I expect further improvement when the 1,500 Salvadorans now undergoing training in the United States

return to their country over the next month.

- A substantial program of economic assistance. The total we are requesting for Latin America and the Caribbean—including economic support fund (ESF), PL-480, and development assistance—is \$783 million. This is somewhat less in what we hope will be the improving economic climate of FY 1983 than in this emergency year, but is still large and vital to the success of our neighbors.

- A new proposal for long-term trade and investment measures, developed in concert with other regional powers, to provide the opportunity for long-term prosperity to the small economies of the area.

- A commitment to democracy in every country of the area, not as an abstract value to pay lip service to, but as an indispensable element in resolving the political problems of the area.

- The determination to use the influence our military and economic assistance gives us to help our neighbors overcome human rights abuses.

Three new opportunities may now be open to us:

- In El Salvador, the constitution-writing and electoral processes now underway will provide numerous opportunities for national reconciliation. We remain firmly and unalterably opposed to negotiations on the division of political power in El Salvador outside the democratic process. But we will be prepared to be of assistance in discussions or negotiations which might be required to facilitate the peaceful reintegration into national life of those elements of the FMLM/FDR [Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front/Democratic Revolutionary Front] which can accommodate to democracy.

- In Nicaragua we are probing, for the second time, to see whether there can be a negotiated settlement to the threat the Nicaraguan arms buildup and heavy Cuban/Communist military presence poses to neighbors. Progress will not be possible unless and until they cease their active support for insurgencies in the region. Even so, our Ambassador in Managua has conveyed to the Nicaraguan Government several proposals which would address both our concerns and, we believe, those the Sandinistas allege. We are now evaluating response given to us by the Nicaraguan Ambassador in Washington.

- In Guatemala, which faces both economic difficulties and an active Cuban-supported insurgency, a prom-

ing evolution may have begun. Since st month's coup led by junior officers, olence not directly connected to the in-rgency has been brought virtually to n end. Concrete measures have been ken against corruption. All political rces have been called to join in na-onal reconciliation. We hope that the ew government of Guatemala will con-ue to make progress in these areas ad that we in turn will be able to tablish a closer, more collaborative lationship with this key country.

We would not, of course, have these ortunities without the commitment e have made to the underlying policies. Guatemala we carefully refrained om backing a regime with a record of rious rights violations; otherwise, we ight never have had a government that roposed to do something about it. I on't know whether or not Nicaragua is ady to negotiate our differences. But I o know that if El Salvador hadn't eld—politically and militarily—this ring, the Sandinistas would surely not ve been prepared to talk. And without onomic and military assistance, the rters in El Salvador would never have d a chance to express their will. So I pe we can sustain the effort. It's ginning to work.

¹The complete transcript of the hearings l be published by the committee and will vailable from the Superintendent of uments, U.S. Government Printing Of- e, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

urrent Actions

ULTILATERAL

- Antarctica**
Recommendations relating to the furtherance the principles and objectives of the Antarc- Treaty (TIAS 4780). Adopted at London t. 7, 1977.¹
Notification of approval: Norway, May 25, 82.
- Recommendations relating to furtherance of e principles and objectives of the Antarctic eaty (TIAS 4780). Adopted at Washington t. 5, 1979.¹
Notification of approval: Norway, May 25, 82.
- Recommendations relating to the furtherance the principles and objectives of the Antarc- Treaty (TIAS 4780). Adopted at Buenos res July 7, 1981.¹
Notification of approval: New Zealand, ay 28, 1982; Norway, May 25, 1982.

Arbitration
Convention on the recognition and enforce- ment of foreign arbitral awards. Done at New York June 10, 1958. Entered into force June 7, 1959; for the U.S. Dec. 29, 1970. TIAS 6997.
Ratification deposited: Monaco, June 2, 1982.

Biological Weapons
Convention on the prohibition of the develop- ment, production, and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow Apr. 10, 1972. Entered into force Mar. 26, 1975. TIAS 8062.
Ratification deposited: Japan, June 8, 1982.

Coffee
Extension of the international coffee agree- ment 1976. Done at London Sept. 25, 1981. Enters into force Oct. 1, 1982.¹
Acceptances deposited: Colombia, June 14, 1982; Rwanda, May 13, 1982; Spain, June 2, 1982.

Commodities
Agreement establishing the Common Fund for Commodities, with schedules. Done at Geneva June 27, 1980.¹
Ratifications deposited: Burundi, June 1, 1982; Egypt, Tanzania, June 11, 1982.
Signature: United Arab Emirates, June 8, 1982.

Conservation
Convention on the conservation of Antarctic marine living resources, with annex for an ar- bitral tribunal. Done at Canberra May 20, 1980. Entered into force Apr. 7, 1982.
Ratification deposited: Argentina, Apr. 28, 1982.²

Consular Relations
Vienna convention on consular relations. Entered into force Mar. 19, 1967; for the U.S. Dec. 24, 1969. TIAS 6820.
Accession deposited: Indonesia, June 4, 1982.

Containers
Customs convention on containers, 1972, with annexes and protocol. Done at Geneva Dec. 2, 1972. Entered into force Dec. 6, 1975.³
Ratification deposited: Poland, Apr. 29, 1982.

Copyright
Universal copyright convention, as revised, and additional protocols I and II. Done at Paris July 24, 1971. Entered into force July 10, 1974. TIAS 7868.
Accession deposited: Austria, May 14, 1982.

Cotton
Articles of agreement of International Cotton Institute. Done at Washington Jan. 17, 1966. Entered into force Feb. 23, 1966. TIAS 5964.
Notification of withdrawal: Argentina, June 18, 1982; effective Dec. 31, 1982.

Customs
Customs convention on the international transport of goods under cover of TIR carnets, with annexes. Done at Geneva Nov. 14, 1975. Entered into force Mar. 20, 1978; for the U.S. Mar. 18, 1982.
Accession deposited: U.S.S.R. June 8, 1982.

Diplomatic Relations
Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at Vienna Apr. 18, 1961. Entered into force Apr. 24, 1964; for the U.S. Dec. 13, 1972. TIAS 7502.
Accession deposited: Indonesia, June 4, 1982.

Environmental Modification
Convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques, with annex. Done at Geneva May 18, 1977. Entered into force Oct. 5, 1978; for the U.S. Jan. 17, 1980. TIAS 9614.
Accession deposited: Japan, June 9, 1982.

Finance
Agreement establishing the International Fund for Agricultural Development. Done at Rome June 13, 1976. Entered into force Nov. 30, 1977. TIAS 8765.
Accession deposited: Tonga, Apr. 12, 1982.

Judicial Procedure
Additional protocol to the inter-American convention on letters rogatory, with annex. Done at Montevideo May 8, 1979. Entered in- to force June 14, 1980.³
Ratification deposited: Ecuador, May 18, 1982.

Law
Statute of the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law. Done at Rome Mar. 15, 1940. Entered into force Apr. 21, 1940; for the U.S. Mar. 13, 1964. TIAS 5743.
Accession deposited: Chile, May 12, 1982.

Maritime Matters
Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 1948, as amended, on the International Maritime Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Adopted at London Nov. 15, 1979.¹
Acceptance deposited: Djibouti, June 1, 1982.

Narcotic Drugs
Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at Vienna Feb. 21, 1971. Entered into force Aug. 16, 1976; for the U.S. July 15, 1980. TIAS 9725.
Ratification deposited: Australia, May 19, 1982.

North Atlantic Treaty
North Atlantic Treaty. Signed at Washington Apr. 4, 1949. Entered into force Aug. 24, 1949. TIAS 1964.
Accession deposited: Spain, May 30, 1982.

Nuclear Material—Physical Protection
Convention on the physical protection of nuclear material, with annexes. Done at Vienna Oct. 26, 1979.¹
Ratifications deposited: Czechoslovakia, Apr. 23, 1982;² Korea, Apr. 7, 1982.⁴

Phonograms

Convention for the protection of producers of phonograms against unauthorized duplication of their phonograms. Done at Geneva Oct. 29, 1971. Entered into force Apr. 18, 1973; for the U.S. Mar. 10, 1974. TIAS 7808.
Notification of ratification: Austria, May 21, 1982.

Pollution

Protocol of 1978 relating to the international convention for the prevention of pollution from ships, 1973. Done at London Feb. 17, 1978.¹

Ratification deposited: Federal Republic of Germany, Jan. 21, 1982.⁵
Accession deposited: Colombia, July 27, 1982.
Approval deposited: France, Sept. 25, 1981.²

Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by dumping of wastes and other matter, with annexes. Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, and Washington Dec. 29, 1972. Entered into force Aug. 30, 1975. TIAS 8165.

Ratification deposited: Ireland, Feb. 17, 1982.
Accession deposited: Gabon, Feb. 5, 1982.
Notification of succession: Kiribati, June 3, 1982.

Convention on long-range transboundary air pollution. Done at Geneva Nov. 13, 1979.¹
Ratifications deposited: German Democratic Republic, June 7, 1982; Spain, June 15, 1982.

Property-Industrial-Classification

Nice agreement concerning the international classification of goods and services for the purposes of the registration of marks of June 15, 1957, as revised (TIAS 7419). Done at Geneva May 13, 1977. Entered into force Feb. 6, 1979.³
Notification of ratifications: Austria, May 21, 1982; Hungary, May 21, 1982; Portugal, Apr. 30, 1982.

Property-Intellectual

Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. Entered into force Apr. 26, 1970; for the U.S., Aug. 25, 1970. TIAS 6932.
Accession deposited: Mali, May 14, 1982.

Safety at Sea

Amendments to the international convention for the safety of life at sea, 1974 (TIAS 9700). Adopted at London Nov. 20, 1981. Enters into force Sept. 1, 1984, unless, prior to Mar. 1, 1984, more than one-third of the parties to the convention, or parties meeting certain requirements, have notified their objections to the amendments.

Amendments to the protocol of 1978 (TIAS 10009) relating to the international convention for the safety of life at sea, 1974 (TIAS 9700). Adopted at London Nov. 20, 1981. Enters into force Sept. 1, 1984, unless, prior to Mar. 1, 1984, more than one-third of the parties to the protocol, or parties meeting certain requirements, have notified their objections to the amendments.

Telecommunications

Final Acts of the World Administrative Radio Conference for the planning of the broadcasting-satellite service in frequency bands 11.7–12.2 GHz (in regions 2 and 3) and 11.7–12.5 GHz (in region 1), with annexes. Done at Geneva Feb. 13, 1977. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1979.³
Approval deposited: German Democratic Republic, Mar. 29, 1982.

Trade

Agreement on interpretation and application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the GATT (subsidies and countervailing duties). Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9619.
Acceptance: Spain, Apr. 14, 1982.⁴

International dairy arrangement. Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9623.
Acceptance: Poland, Apr. 23, 1982.

Agreement on implementation of article VI of the GATT (antidumping code). Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9650.
Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, Mar. 25, 1982.

Arrangement regarding bovine meat. Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9701.
Ratifications deposited: Argentina, June 1, 1982; Yugoslavia, Mar. 25, 1982.

Agreement on import licensing procedures. Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9788.
Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, Mar. 25, 1982.

Agreement on implementation of article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (customs valuation). Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1981.
Acceptance: New Zealand, June 1, 1982.⁶

Protocol to the agreement on implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (customs valuation). Done at Geneva Nov. 1, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1981.
Acceptance: New Zealand, June 1, 1982.⁶

Protocol extending the arrangement regarding international trade in textiles of Dec. 20, 1973, as extended (TIAS 7840, 8939). Done at Geneva Dec. 22, 1981. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1982. TIAS 10323.

Acceptances: Argentina, Apr. 27, 1982;⁷ Austria, Mar. 25, 1982;⁷ Colombia, Apr. 27, 1982; Indonesia, May 19, 1982; Malaysia, Apr. 28, 1982; Portugal, on behalf of Macao, June 9, 1982; Singapore, Apr. 20, 1982; Thailand, Apr. 15, 1982; Turkey, Apr. 5, 1982.

Proces-verbal of rectification to third certification of changes to schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of Oct. 23, 1974 (TIAS 8214). Signed at Geneva Apr. 20, 1982. Entered into force Apr. 20, 1982.

U.N Industrial Development Organization
Constitution of the U.N. Industrial Development Organization, with annexes. Adopted at Vienna Apr. 8, 1979.¹
Signature: Dominica, June 8, 1982.
Ratification deposited: Dominica, June 8, 1982.

Weapons

Convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects, with annexed protocols. Done at Geneva Oct. 10, 1980.¹
Ratifications and acceptances deposited: Japan, June 9, 1982; Hungary, June 14, 1982; Mongolia, June 8, 1982.

Wheat

Food aid convention, 1980 (part of the International Wheat Agreement, 1971, as extended (TIAS 7144)). Done at Washington Mar. 11, 1980. Entered into force July 1, 1980. TIAS 10015.
Ratifications deposited: Argentina, June 10, 1982; Italy, June 30, 1982.

World Health Organization

Amendments to Articles 24 and 25 of the Constitution of the World Health Organization. Adopted at Geneva May 17, 1976 by the 29th World Health Assembly.¹
Acceptances deposited: Bhutan, Mar. 8, 1982; China, May 20, 1982; Gabon, May 11, 1982; Mauritania, Apr. 28, 1982.

Amendment to Article 74 of the Constitution of the World Health Organization, as amended. Adopted at Geneva May 18, 1978 by the 31st World Health Assembly.¹
Acceptances deposited: Bahrain, May 19, 1982; Bhutan, Mar. 8, 1982.

World Heritage

Convention concerning the protection of the world cultural and natural heritage. Done at Paris Nov. 23, 1972. Entered into force Dec. 17, 1975. TIAS 8226.
Acceptance deposited: Spain, May 4, 1982.
Ratification deposited: Burundi, May 19, 1982.

World Meteorological Organization

Convention of the World Meteorological Organization. Done at Washington Oct. 11,

947. Entered into force Mar. 23, 1950.
IAS 2052.
cession deposited: Vanuatu, June 24, 1982.

BILATERAL

Antigua and Barbuda

Arrangement relating to radio communications between amateur stations on behalf of bird parties. Effected by exchange of notes at St. John's Apr. 30 and May 24, 1982. Entered into force June 23, 1982.

Australia

Arrangement relating to radio communications between amateur stations on behalf of bird parties. Effected by exchange of notes at Canberra May 21 and 26, 1982. Entered into force June 25, 1982.

Austria

Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on estates, inheritances, gifts, and generation-skipping transfers. Signed at Vienna June 21, 1982. Enters into force on the first day of the third month following that month in which the instruments of ratification have been exchanged.

Barbados

Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace Corps program in Barbados. Effected by exchange of notes at Bridgetown and Hastings May 10 and June 8, 1982. Entered into force June 8, 1982.

Supersedes agreement of July 15 and Aug. 9, 1965 (TIAS 5887).

Belgium

Agreement concerning provision of mutual logistic support, with annexes. Signed at Brussels and Stuttgart May 6 and 11, 1982. Entered into force May 11, 1982.

Brazil

Agreement amending and extending the agreement of Nov. 14, 1978, and Jan. 24, 1979 (TIAS 9403), concerning atmospheric search sounding rockets and balloon operation. Effected by exchange of notes at Brasilia May 7, 1982. Entered into force May 7, 1982; effective Jan. 24, 1981.

Colombia

Agreement amending the air transport agreement of Oct. 24, 1956, as amended (TIAS 1338, 6593). Effected by exchange of notes at Bogota Oct. 16 and 22, 1981, and Apr. 21, 1982. Entered into force Apr. 21, 1982.

Denmark

Mutual support agreement, with annex. Signed June 1 and 4, 1982. Entered into force June 4, 1982.

Dominican Republic

Agreement for the sale of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of Sept. 28, 1977 (TIAS 8944), with memorandum

of understanding. Signed at Santo Domingo May 21, 1982. Entered into force May 21, 1982.

Egypt

Agreement to transfer title of the U.S. Sinai Field Mission base camp at Umm Khusheib from the U.S. Sinai Support Mission to the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt. Signed at Umm Khusheib Apr. 22, 1982. Entered into force Apr. 22, 1982.

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of Mar. 20, 1979 (TIAS 9683). Effected by exchange of notes at Cairo May 24, 1982. Entered into force May 24, 1982.

Guinea

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of Apr. 21, 1976 (TIAS 8378), with memorandum of understanding. Signed at Conakry June 7, 1982. Entered into force June 7, 1982.

India

Agreement extending the memorandum of understanding of Jan. 3, 1978 (TIAS 9074), concerning access by an Indian ground station to NASA's LANDSAT satellites and availability to NASA and others of data acquired. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington and Andhra Pradesh Apr. 6 and 19, 1982. Entered into force Apr. 19, 1982; effective Jan. 3, 1982.

Japan

Arrangement implementing the agreement of May 2, 1979 (TIAS 9463), on cooperation in research and development in energy and related fields. Signed at Tokyo May 7, 1982. Entered into force May 7, 1982.

Amendment to memorandum of understanding of Aug. 5, 1980, on participation and cooperation of Japan in the international phase of ocean drilling of the deep sea drilling project (TIAS 9925). Signed at Washington May 21, 1982. Entered into force May 21, 1982.

Mexico

Agreement relating to assignments and usage of television broadcasting channels in the frequency range 470-806 MHz (channels 14-69) along the U.S.-Mexico border. Signed at Mexico June 18, 1982. Enters into force upon receipt by the U.S. of notification from Mexico that the formalities required by national legislation have been completed.

Agreement concerning land mobile service in the bands 470-512 MHz and 806-890 MHz along the common U.S.-Mexico border. Signed at Mexico June 18, 1982. Enters into force upon receipt by the U.S. of notification from Mexico that the formalities required by the national legislation have been completed.

Morocco

Agreement concerning mapping, charting, and geodesy cooperation. Signed at Rabat Apr. 29, 1982. Entered into force Apr. 29, 1982.

Agreement concerning the use of certain facilities in Morocco by the U.S. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington May 27, 1982. Entered into force May 27, 1982.

Panama

Agreement extending and modifying the agreement of Sept. 7, 1977 (TIAS 10033), relating to use of commissary and post exchange facilities. Effected by exchange of notes at Panama Mar. 1 and 24, 1982. Entered into force Mar. 24, 1982.

Saudi Arabia

Agreement extending the agreement of May 24 and June 5, 1965, as extended (TIAS 5830, 9590), relating to the construction of certain military facilities in Saudi Arabia. Effected by exchange of notes at Jidda Nov. 25, 1981 and May 10, 1982. Entered into force May 10, 1982.

Sierra Leone

Agreement concerning the provision of training related to defense articles under the U.S. international military education and training (IMET) program. Effected by exchange of notes at Freetown Apr. 1 and May 26, 1982. Entered into force May 26, 1982.

Singapore

Agreement amending the agreement of Aug. 21, 1981, as amended, relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of letters at Singapore May 17 and 20, 1982. Entered into force May 20, 1982.

South Africa

Agreement for the establishment and operation of an OMEGA navigation system monitoring facility. Signed at Pretoria and Washington May 17 and June 4, 1982. Entered into force June 4, 1982.

South Pacific Commission

Agreement relating to a procedure for U.S. income tax reimbursement. Effected by exchange of notes at Suva and Noumea Dec. 21, 1981, and Apr. 28, 1982. Entered into force Apr. 28, 1982; effective Jan. 1, 1982. Supersedes agreement of Mar. 31 and Apr. 15, 1980 (TIAS 9752).

Sri Lanka

Agreement amending the agreement of July 7, 1980, as amended (TIAS 9869, 10168), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of notes at Colombo Apr. 20 and 29, 1982. Entered into force Apr. 29, 1982.

Agreement extending the agreement of May 12 and 14, 1951, as amended and extended (TIAS 2259, 4436, 5037), relating to the facilities of Radio Ceylon. Effected by exchange of notes at Colombo Apr. 21 and May 10, 1982. Entered into force May 10, 1982.

Sudan

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of Dec. 22, 1979. Effected by exchange of notes at Khartoum Apr. 29, 1982. Entered into force Apr. 29, 1982.

Tanzania

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, with minutes of negotiation. Signed at Dar es Salaam June 8, 1982. Entered into force June 8, 1982.

Tunisia

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of June 7, 1976 (TIAS 8506), with minutes of negotiation. Signed at Tunis May 17, 1982. Entered into force May 17, 1982.

U.S.S.R.

Agreement on cooperation in the field of energy, as amended and extended (TIAS 7899, 9648). Signed at Moscow June 28, 1974. Entered into force June 28, 1974. Terminated: June 28, 1982.

United Kingdom

Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income. Signed at Washington Apr. 16, 1945, as amended (TIAS 1546, 3165, 4124, 6089). Notification by the United States of termination of extension to the British Virgin Islands: June 30, 1982; effective Jan. 1, 1983.

¹Not in force.

²With declaration.

³Not in force for the U.S.

⁴With reservation.

⁵Applies to Berlin (West).

⁶With statement.

⁷Subject to ratification. ■

June 1982

June 1

The State Department announces that the United States has begun talks with China about possible trade cooperation that would enable American companies to develop China's nuclear power industry.

June 2

President Reagan makes official state visits to several European capitals June 2-11. The President visited Paris and Versailles to attend the eighth economic summit of industrialized nations; Vatican City and Rome, June 7; London and Windsor, June 7-9; Bonn (to attend the North Atlantic Council summit) and Berlin, June 9-11.

June 4

By a vote of 9-2 (U.S. and U.K.) with 4 abstentions, the U.N. Security Council calls for an immediate cease-fire in the Falkland Islands. Reporting a delay in communication,

Ambassador Kirkpatrick discloses that the American position actually favored abstention.

June 5

Eighth economic summit of the industrialized nations is held in Versailles, France, June 5-6.

By unanimous vote (15-0) the U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 508 aimed at ending the conflict in Lebanon.

June 6

By unanimous vote the U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 509 aimed at ending the fighting in Lebanon.

June 7

The U.N. General Assembly's Second Special Session on Disarmament opens in New York. President Reagan, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of West Germany, and Prime Ministers Margaret Thatcher of the U.K. and Zenko Suzuki of Japan are among the 14 world leaders scheduled to address the 5-week conference.

At the direction of the President, Ambassador Philip C. Habib, special emissary to the Middle East, travels to Israel to begin discussions aimed at bringing an end to the hostilities in Lebanon.

June 9

President Reagan announces that the U.S. will provide immediate humanitarian assistance to those suffering as a result of the conflict in Lebanon.

Ambassador Habib arrives in Damascus for talks with Syrian leaders on the Lebanon crisis.

June 10

By a vote of 219-206, the U.S. House of Representatives approves a Republican budget which provides the largest peace-time increase in military spending.

June 11

Commerce Department announces plans to levy stiff penalties on steel imports from nine countries, including seven European Common Market members.

June 13

King Khalid of Saudi Arabia dies in Taif. His half-brother, Crown Prince Fahd, succeeds him.

June 14

White House announces that Vice President Bush will head the official U.S. delegation to Saudi Arabia to represent the President at a memorial service held for King Khalid.

Ambassador Habib arrives in Beirut to begin talks with Lebanese leaders.

June 15

Argentine forces surrender at Stanley and reach a cease-fire with the U.K.

June 17

Leopoldo Galtieri resigns as Argentine President and Commander in Chief of the Army. The Cabinet also resigns, and Maj. Gen. Alfredo Oscar Saint Jean is temporarily named President.

Speaking in New York, President Reagan presents the U.S. position at the U.N. General Assembly's Second Special Session on Disarmament.

June 18

By a vote of 13 to 0 with 2 abstentions (Poland and Soviet Union), the U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 511 extending the present mandate of the U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) until August 19, 1982.

June 19

By unanimous vote the U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 512 expressing deep concern at "the sufferings of the Lebanese and Palestinian civilian populations."

June 20

European Common Market members lift the trade embargo against Argentina.

Israeli Prime Minister Begin makes an official working visit to Washington, D.C., June 20-22.

June 21

President Luis Alberto Monge of Costa Rica makes an official working visit to Washington, D.C., June 21-24. During his stay, he meets with President Reagan and other Administrative officials.

June 22

Gen. Reynaldo Benito Antonia Bignone is appointed President of Argentina.

June 25

Secretary of State Haig resigns. George P. Shultz accepts the President's nomination as the new Secretary-designate.

The following newly appointed Ambassadors present their credentials to President Reagan: Juan Arguereia Ewing of Honduras; Edmund O.Z. Chipamaunga of Zimbabwe; Mircea Malita of Romania; Abdourahmane Dia of Senegal; Lancelot Raymond Adams-Schneider of New Zealand and Aquilino E. Boyd of Panama.

June 26

By a vote of 14-1 (U.S. veto) the U.N. Security Council rejects a resolution demanding steps toward "complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon, and the simultaneous withdrawal of the Palestinian armed forces from Beirut."

June 29

The Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) between the U.S. and the Soviet Union open in Geneva. Ambassador Edward Rowney heads the U.S. delegation, which includes Ambassador James Goodby, Michael Mobbs of the Department of Defense, Rear Admiral William A. Williams III representing

PRESS RELEASES

ne Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Jack W. Mendelsohn and Donald C. Tice of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. ■

Department of State

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
181	6/1	Versailles economic summit.
182		Not issued.
183	6/1	Appointment of Gweneth Gayman to the Board of Governors of the East-West Center.
184	6/4	Appointment of Gregory J. Newell as Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs (biographic data).
185	6/7	International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR) and the International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee (CCITT), joint working party, June 23.
186	6/7	Shipping Coordinating Committee (SCC), Subcommittee on Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), working group on radiocommunications, July 14
87	6/7	CCIR, study group 7, July 7.
88	6/11	INTELSAT, Department of State sign lease, June 8.
89	6/11	Haig: press briefing, Paris, June 3.
90	6/15	Department of State celebrates the 200th anniversary of the Great Seal of the United States of America, June 20.
91	6/14	Haig: press briefing, Paris, June 4.
92	6/16	Haig: press briefing, Versailles, June 6.
93	6/16	Haig: press briefing, aboard Air Force One between Rome and London, June 7.
94	6/16	Haig: news conference, London, June 8.
95	6/16	Haig: press briefing aboard Air Force One between London and Bonn, June 9.
96	6/16	Haig: press briefing, Bonn, June 9.
97	6/16	Haig: press briefing, Bonn, June 10.
97A	6/18	Haig: press briefing between Bonn and West Berlin, June 11.
97B	6/11	Haig: press briefing between West Berlin and Bonn.
98	6/16	Haig: interview on "This Week With David Brinkley," June 13.
99	6/16	Robert Anderson sworn in as Ambassador to the

		Dominican Republic (biographic data).
*200	6/18	Haig: interview on the "Today Show."
*201	6/21	Program for the working visit of Israeli Prime Minister Begin, June 20-22.
*202	6/21	Program for the official visit of Costa Rican President Luis Alberto Monge, June 21-24.
203	6/21	Haig: news conference, USUN, June 19.
*204	6/23	CCIR, study group 6, July 29.
*205	6/23	CCITT, modern working party of study group D, July 14 and 15.
*206	6/25	Blair House closed for repairs.
*207	6/28	Advisory Committee on the Law of the Sea, July 14 and 15 (partially closed).

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Press releases may be obtained from the Public Affairs Office, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, 799 United Nations Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10017.

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*1	1/20	Kirkpatrick: Golan Heights, Security Council.
*2	1/28	Lichenstein: Golan Heights, Security Council.
*3	2/5	Kirkpatrick: Golan Heights, General Assembly.
*4	2/11	Sorzano: Khmer relief, ECOSOC.
*5	2/25	Kirkpatrick: UNIFIL, Security Council.
*6	3/1	Kirkpatrick: human rights in Nicaragua, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, Washington, D.C.
*7	3/11	Ratiner: LOS draft convention, Committee I of the LOS Conference.
*8	3/24	Helman: outer space, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.
*9	3/25	Kirkpatrick: Nicaragua Security Council.
*10	3/26	Kirkpatrick: Central America, Security Council.
*11	4/2	Kirkpatrick: Nicaragua, Security Council.
*12	3/31	Dewey: Kampuchean relief, donors' meeting.
*13	4/1	Announcement of Malone remarks.
*14	4/1	Malone: LOS treaty, LOS Conference.
*15	4/2	Lichenstein: Nicaragua, Security Council.
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*17	4/3	Lichenstein: South Atlantic, Security Council.
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*19	4/13	LOS Conference.
*20	4/20	Kirkpatrick: Dome of the Rock incident, Security Council.
*21	4/22	Reynolds: U.N. Decade for Women, ECOSOC.
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*47	6/24	Lichenstein: information, U.N. Committee on Information.
48	6/26	Lichenstein: Middle East, Security Council.
49	6/26	Lichenstein: question of Palestine, seventh emergency special session of the General Assembly.

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Department of State

Free, single copies of the following Department of State publications are available from the Public Information Service, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

President Reagan

Agenda for Peace, Second Special Session on Disarmament, U.N. General Assembly, June 17, 1982 (Current Policy #405).

Preserving Freedom, Berlin, June 11, 1982 (Current Policy #404).

Alliance Security and Arms Control, *Bundestag*, Bonn, June 9, 1982 (Current Policy #400).

Promoting Democracy and Peace, Parliament, London, June 8, 1982 (Current Policy #399).

Arms control and the Future of East-West Relations, Eureka College, Peoria, Ill., May 9, 1982 (Current Policy #387).

Secretary Haig

Peace and Security in the Middle East, Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, Chicago, Ill., May 26, 1982 (Current Policy #395).

Interview on "Face the Nation," May 23, 1982 (Current Policy #394).

The Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, May 11, 1982 (Current Policy #389).

Africa

Background Notes on Madagascar, May 1982.
Southern Africa (GIST, June 1982).

East Asia

Developing Lasting U.S.-China Relations, Deputy Secretary Stoessel, National Council on U.S.-China Trade, June 1, 1982 (Current Policy #398).

Allied Responses to the Soviet Challenge in East Asia and the Pacific, Deputy Secretary Stoessel, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 10, 1982 (Current Policy #403).

Economics

Elements of the World Economy, Atlas of U.S. Foreign Relations, July 1982 (*Bulletin* Reprint).

Environment

International Environmental Issues, Under Secretary Buckley, International Environment/Development lecture series sponsored by the International Institute for Environment and Development, Washington, D.C., May 3, 1982 (Current Policy #391).

Europe

Background Notes on the Federal Republic of Germany (May 1982).

General

International Organizations, Atlas of U.S. Foreign Relations, June 1982 (*Bulletin* Reprint).

Background Notes Index, May 1982.

Human Rights

Human Rights and the Refugee Crisis, Assistant Secretary Abrams, Tiger Bay Club, Miami, June 2, 1982 (Current Policy #401).

Middle East

U.S. Policy Toward the Persian Gulf, Assistant Secretary Veliotis, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Joint Economic Committee, May 10, 1982 (Current Policy #390).

Background Notes on Morocco, May 1982.

Background Notes on Egypt (June 1982).

Terrorism

Terrorist Target: The Diplomat, Deputy Director Perez, conference on terrorism sponsored by the Instituto de Cuestiones Internacionales, Madrid, June 10, 1982 (Current Policy #402).

Western Hemisphere

Prospects for Peace in the South Atlantic, Secretary Haig, 20th meeting of foreign ministers of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio treaty), May 27, 1982 (Current Policy #397).

Peaceful Change in Central America, Deputy Secretary Stoessel, Pittsburgh World Affairs Council, May 27, 1982 (Current Policy #396).

Maintaining Momentum Toward an Open World Economy, Assistant Secretary Enders, Chamber of Commerce and Brazil-U.S. Business Council, Washington, D.C., May 13, 1982 (Current Policy #393).

Radio Marti and Cuban Interference, Assistant Secretary Enders, Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance, House Committee on Energy and Commerce, May 10, 1982 (Current Policy #392).

El Salvador (GIST, June 1982).

U.S. Interests in the Caribbean Basin (GIST, May 1982).

Background Notes on Belize (May 1982).

Background Notes on Honduras (May 1982). ■

Foreign Relations Volume Released

The Department of State released on February 18, 1982, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, vol. III, "Western European Security and the German Question,"* in two parts. This is the fourth volume to be released of

seven volumes scheduled for the year 1951. The *Foreign Relations* series has been published continuously since 1861 as the official record of U.S. foreign policy.

This volume presents 2,029 pages of previously classified high-level documentation on the questions of European security and Germany. Part 1 (pages 1-1,316) documents the U.S. participation in NATO, including the accession of Greece and Turkey, the development of the NATO command structure, and the seventh and eighth sessions of the North Atlantic Council. In addition to NATO developments, this volume presents documentation on the U.S. attitude toward the Conference for the Organization of a European Defense Community and the participation of the United States in quadripartite talks at Bonn to consider a German contribution to Western defense. Part 1 closes with documentation on the preparation for a Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in the spring and the meetings of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France in September and November.

Part 2 (pages 1,317-2,029) presents documentation on the German question. Following materials on general policy toward Germany, the volume documents Western efforts to resolve several problems arising from the wartime settlements. Documentation on the work of the intergovernmental study group on Germany and on the attempt to establish a contractual relationship between the Federal Republic of Germany and the three Western allies comprises this section. The volume also documents U.S. concern over the economic situation in Germany, U.S. policy toward reunification, and U.S. participation in the tripartite group on Germany. The volume concludes with sections on Berlin, the Saar and the Soviet Zone of Germany.

Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. III, was prepared in the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State. Listed as Department of State Publications 8982 (Part 1 and 9113 (Part 2), this volume may be obtained for \$19.00 (Part 1) and \$15.00 (Part 2). The index to both parts is contained in Part 2. Checks or money orders should be made payable to the Superintendent of Documents and sent to the U.S. Government Book Store, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520. ■

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Department of State bulletin

Volume 82 / Number 2066 / September 1982

Cover:

President Reagan meets with Ambassador Philip C. Habib at Versailles Palace prior to Ambassador Habib's departure to the Middle East. The President appointed Ambassador Habib as his special emissary to explore ways to reduce tensions produced by developments surrounding the situation in Lebanon.

(White House photo by Michael Evans)

The DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, published by the Office of Public Communication in the Bureau of Public Affairs, is the official record of U.S. foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide the public, the Congress, and government agencies with information on developments in U.S. foreign relations and the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIN'S contents include major addresses and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State; statements made before congressional committees by the Secretary and other senior State Department officials; special features and articles on international affairs; selected press releases issued by the White House, the Department, and the U.S. Mission to the United Nations; and treaties and other agreements to which the United States is or may become a party.

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EDITOR'S NOTE

The article, "Armenian Terrorism: A Profile," which appeared in the feature on terrorism in the August 1982 issue of the *Bulletin*, does not necessarily reflect an official position of the Department of State, and the interpretive comments in the article are solely those of the author.



LEBANON

Plan for the PLO Evacuation From West Beirut

On August 20, 1982, President Reagan announced the agreement by the Governments of Lebanon, the United States, France, Italy, and Israel and by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to a plan for the departure from Lebanon of PLO leaders, offices, and combatants in Beirut.

Following are the President's statement, text of the departure plan, fact sheets concerning details of the agreed upon arrangements, a White House statement, and President Reagan's letters to the U.N. Secretary General and the Congress.

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, AUG. 20, 1982¹

Thank you all and let me just say in advance I'll be taking no questions because Secretary Shultz, a little later in the day, will be having a full press conference, so you can take everything up with him.

Ambassador Habib [Philip C. Habib, President's special emissary to the Middle East] has informed me that a plan to resolve the west Beirut crisis has been agreed upon by all the parties involved. As part of this plan, the Government of Lebanon has requested, and I have approved, the deployment of U.S. forces to Beirut as part of a multinational force (MNF). The negotiations to develop this plan have been extremely complex and have been conducted in the most arduous circumstances. At times it was

difficult to imagine how agreement could be reached and yet it has been reached. The statesmanship and the courage of President Sarkis and his colleagues in the Lebanese Government deserve special recognition as does the magnificent work of Ambassador Habib. Phil never lost hope and, in the end, his spirit and determination carried the day. We all owe him a debt of gratitude.

The parties who made this plan possible have a special responsibility for insuring its successful completion, or implementation. I expect its terms to be carried out in good faith and in accordance with the agreed timetable. This will require meticulous adherence to the cease-fire. Violations by any party would imperil the plan and bring renewed bloodshed and tragedy to the people of Beirut, and under no circumstances must that be allowed to happen. As you know, my agreement to include U.S. forces in a multinational force was essential for our success. In the days ahead, they and forces from France and Italy will be playing an important but carefully limited noncombatant role. The parties to the plan have agreed to this role and have provided assurances on the safety of our forces.

Our purpose will be to assist the Lebanese Armed Forces in carrying out their responsibility for insuring the departure of PLO leaders, offices, and combatants in Beirut from Lebanese territory under safe and orderly conditions. The presence of U.S. forces also will facilitate the restoration of the



The first group consisting of PLO leaders, offices, and combatants begin their departure from Lebanon, destined for Iraq and Jordan, at the port of Sol Georgios.

(UPI photo)

sovereignty and authority of the Lebanese Government over the Beirut area. In no case will our troops stay longer than 30 days. The participation of France and Italy in this effort is further evidence of the sense of responsibility of these good friends of the United States.

Successful resolution of the west Beirut crisis by responsible implementation of the plan now agreed will set the stage for the urgent international action required to restore Lebanon's full sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity; obtain the rapid withdrawal of all foreign forces from that country; and help insure the security of northern Israel. We must also move quickly in the context of Camp David to resolve the Palestinian issue in all its aspects, as well as the other unresolved problems in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Only when all these steps are accomplished can true and lasting peace and security be achieved in the Middle East.

DEPARTURE PLAN²

PLAN FOR THE DEPARTURE FROM LEBANON OF THE PLO LEADERSHIP, OFFICES, AND COMBATANTS IN BEIRUT

1. Basic Concept. All the PLO leadership, offices, and combatants in Beirut will leave Lebanon peacefully for pre-arranged destinations in other countries, in accord with the departure schedules and arrangements set out in this plan. The basic concept in this plan is consistent with the objective of the Government of Lebanon that all foreign military forces withdraw from Lebanon.

2. Cease-fire. A cease-fire in place will be scrupulously observed by all in Lebanon.

3. U.N. Observers. The U.N. Observer Group stationed in the Beirut area will continue its functioning in that area.

4. Safeguards. Military forces present in Lebanon—whether Lebanese, Israeli, Syrian, Palestinian, or any other—will in no way interfere with the safe, secure, and timely departure of the PLO leadership, offices, and combatants. Law-abiding Palestinian noncombatants left behind in Beirut, including the families of those who have departed, will

be subject to Lebanese laws and regulations. The Governments of Lebanon and the United States will provide appropriate guarantees of safety in the following ways.

- The Lebanese Government will provide its guarantees on the basis of having secured assurances from armed groups with which it has been in touch.
- The United States will provide its guarantees on the basis of assurances received from the Government of Israel and from the leadership of certain Lebanese groups with which it has been in touch.

5. "Departure Day" is defined as the day on which advance elements of the multinational force (MNF) deploy in the Beirut area, in accordance with arrangements worked out in advance among all concerned, and on which the initial group or groups of PLO personnel commence departure from Beirut in accord with the planned schedule (see page 9).

6. The Multinational Force. A temporary multinational force, composed of units from France, Italy, and the United States, will have been formed—at the request of the Lebanese Government—to assist the Lebanese Armed Forces in carrying out their responsibilities in this operation. The Lebanese Armed Forces will assure the departure from Lebanon of the PLO leadership, offices, and combatants, from whatever organization in Beirut, in a manner which will:

- (A) Assure the safety of such departing PLO personnel;
- (B) Assure the safety of other persons in the Beirut area; and
- (C) Further the restoration of the sovereignty and authority of the Government of Lebanon over the Beirut area.

7. Schedule of Departures and Other Arrangements. The attached schedule of departures is subject to revision as may be necessary because of logistical requirements and because of any necessary shift in the setting of Departure Day. Details concerning the schedule will be forwarded to the Israeli Defense Forces through the Liaison and Coordination Committee. Places of assembly for the departing personnel will be identified by agreement between the Government of Lebanon and the

PLO. The PLO will be in touch with governments receiving personnel to coordinate arrival and other arrangements there. If assistance is required the PLO should notify the Government of Lebanon.

8. MNF Mandate. In the event that the departure from Lebanon of the PLO personnel referred to above does not take place in accord with the agreed and predetermined schedule, the mandate of the MNF will terminate immediately and all MNF personnel will leave Lebanon forthwith.

9. Duration of MNF. It will be mutually agreed between the Lebanese Government and the governments contributing forces to the MNF that the forces of the MNF will depart Lebanon not later than 30 days after arrival, or sooner at the request of the Government of Lebanon or at the direction of the individual government concerned, or in accord with the termination of the mandate of the MNF provided for above.

10. The PLO leadership will be responsible for the organization and management of the assembly and the final departure of PLO personnel, from beginning to end, at which time the leaders also will all be gone. Departure arrangements will be coordinated so that departures from Beirut take place at a steady pace, day by day.

11. Lebanese Armed Forces Contribution. The Lebanese Army will contribute between seven and eight army battalions to the operation, consisting of between 2,500–3,500 men. In addition, the internal security force will contribute men and assistance as needed.

12. ICRC. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) will be able to assist the Government of Lebanon and Lebanese Armed Forces in various ways, including in the organization and management of the evacuation of wounded and ill Palestinian and Syrian personnel to appropriate destinations, and in assisting in the chartering and movement of commercial vessels for use in departure by sea to other countries. The Liaison and Coordination Committee will insure that there will be proper coordination with any ICRC activities in this respect.

13. Departure by Air. While preser



Schedule of Departures

August 21, 1982—Departure Day

The advance elements of the MNF (approximately 350 men) land at the port of Beirut at about 0500 and deploy to the Beirut port area in preparation for the initial departures of PLO groups by sea.

Meanwhile, the Lebanese Armed Forces deploy to previously agreed positions in the Beirut area, primarily in the area called demarcation line area, to assist in the departure of PLO personnel. The Lebanese Armed Forces will take over positions occupied by the PLO.

The PLO will insure that National Liberation Forces [collection of Lebanese militias] which had occupied these positions jointly with the PLO will also withdraw.

As the day proceeds, the Lebanese Armed Forces will take up such other positions as necessary to assist in the departure of PLO personnel.

Meanwhile, the initial group of PLO personnel assemble in preparation for departure by sea later in the day (or on August 22). The vessel or vessels to be used for this purpose will arrive at pier on August 21.

The initial groups could include the wounded and ill, who would be transported in accordance with agreed arrangements—by sea or land, or both—to their destinations in other countries.

The initial group or groups of PLO personnel destined for Jordan and Iraq would move from their assembly point to the waiting commercial vessel or vessels for onward transport by sea.

August 22

All groups destined for Jordan or Iraq will have boarded ship and will have sailed from Beirut.

Duplicating the model followed on August 21, PLO groups destined for Tunisia assemble and move to the Port of Beirut for departure by sea.

August 23

All PLO personnel destined for Tunisia complete their assembly and embark on commercial vessel for Tunisia.

PLO personnel destined for South Yemen assemble and move to a vessel for departure then or on August 24.

August 24-25

Assembly and departure by sea of PLO personnel destined for North Yemen.

August 25

Provided that satisfactory logistical arrangements have been completed, the initial groups of PLO personnel destined for Syria assemble and move overland via the Beirut-Damascus highway to Syria.

The advance French elements of the MNF already in the port area will have taken up such other agreed positions on the land route in the Beirut area as necessary to assist in the overland departure of the PLO personnel for Syria.

The Lebanese Armed Forces join with the French in occupying such positions.

(If it should be agreed that these initial groups should go by sea to Syria rather than by land, this departure schedule also is subject to amendment to assure that logistical requirements are met.)

August 26-28 (Approximately)

The remaining forces of the MNF

(from the United States, France, and Italy) arrive in the Beirut area and deploy to agreed locations as determined through the Liaison and Coordinating Committee. This movement may be accompanied by the transfer of the advance French elements previously in the port area and elsewhere to other locations in the Beirut area.

August 26-27-28

PLO groups destined for Syria continue to move—by land or sea—to Syria.

August 22-September 4

Turnover to the Lebanese Armed Forces of PLO weaponry, military equipment, and ammunition in a continuing and orderly fashion.

August 29-30-31

Redeployment out of Beirut of the Syrian elements of the ADF.

September 1-4

Completion of the departure to Syria—by land or sea—of all PLO or Palestine Liberation Army personnel destined for Syria.

September 2-3

Assembly and departure by sea of all PLO personnel destined for the Sudan.

Assembly and movement by sea of all PLO personnel destined for Algeria.

September 4-21

The MNF assists the Lebanese Armed Forces in arrangements, as may be agreed between governments concerned, to insure good and lasting security throughout the area of operation.

September 21-26

Departure of MNF.

ns call for departure by sea and land, departures by air are not foreclosed.

14. Liaison and Coordination:

• The Lebanese Armed Forces will be the primary point of contact for liaison with the PLO as well as with other armed groups and will provide necessary information.

• The Lebanese Armed Forces and MNF will have formed prior to Departure Day a Liaison and Coordination Committee, composed of representatives of the MNF participating governments and the Lebanese Armed Forces. The committee will carry out close and effective liaison with, and provide continuous

and detailed information to, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). On behalf of the committee, the Lebanese Armed Forces will continue to carry out close and effective liaison with the PLO and other armed groups in the Beirut area. For

Exchange of Notes

Lebanese Note Requesting U.S. Contribution to MNF

Beirut
August the 18th, 1982

Ambassador Robert S. Dillon
U.S. Embassy, Beirut

Your Excellency,

I have the honor to refer to the many conversations between their Excellencies the President of the Republic of Lebanon, the Prime Minister and myself on the one hand, and with Ambassador Philip C. Habib, Special Emissary to the President of the United States of America, on the other hand, as well as to the resolution of the Council of Ministers passed today. I have the honor to refer to the schedule set up by the Government of Lebanon, after consultations with interested parties, in order to assure the withdrawal from Lebanese territory of the Palestinian leaders, offices and combatants related to any organization now in the Beirut area, in a manner which will:

- (1) assure the safety of such departing persons;
- (2) assure the safety of the persons in the area; and
- (3) further the restoration of the sovereignty and authority of the Government of Lebanon over the Beirut area.

In this context, the Government of Lebanon is proposing to several nations that they contribute forces to serve as a temporary Multinational Force (MNF) in Beirut. The mandate of the MNF will be to provide appropriate assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) as they carry out the foregoing responsibilities, in accordance with the annexed schedule. The MNF may undertake other functions only by mutual agreement. It is understood that, in the event that the withdrawal of the Palestinian personnel referred to above does not take place in accord with the predetermined schedule, the mandate of the MNF will terminate immediately and all MNF personnel will leave Lebanon forthwith.

In the foregoing context, I have the honor to propose that the United States of America deploy a force of approximately 800 personnel to Beirut, subject to the following terms and conditions:

- The American military force shall carry out appropriate activities consistent with the mandate of the MNF.

- Command authority over the American force will be exercised exclusively by the United States Government through existing American military channels.

- The American force will operate in close coordination with the LAF. To assure effective coordination with the LAF, the American force will assign liaison officers to the LAF and the Government of Lebanon will assign liaison officers to the American force. The LAF liaison officers to the American force will, *inter alia*, perform liaison with the civilian population and manifest the authority of the Lebanese Government in all appropriate situations.

- In carrying out its mission, the American force will not engage in combat. It may, however, exercise the right of self-defense.

- The American force will depart Lebanon not later than thirty days after its arrival, or sooner at the request of the President of Lebanon or at the direction of the United States Government, or according to the termination of the mandate provided for above.

- The Government of Lebanon and the LAF will take all measures necessary to ensure the protection of the American force's personnel, to include securing the assurances from all armed elements not now under the authority of the Lebanese Government that they will comply with the cease-fire and cessation of hostilities.

- The American force will enjoy both the degree of freedom of movement and the right to undertake those activities deemed necessary for the performance of its mission or for the support of its personnel. Accordingly, it shall enjoy all facilities necessary for the accomplishment of these purposes. Personnel in the American force shall enjoy the privileges and immunities accorded the administrative and technical staff of the American Embassy in Beirut, and shall be exempt from immigration and customs requirements, and restrictions on entering or departing Lebanon. Personnel, property and equipment of the American force introduced into

Lebanon shall be exempt from any form of tax, duty, charge or levy.

I have the further honor to propose, if the foregoing is acceptable to your Excellency's government, that your Excellency's reply to that effect, together with this note, shall constitute an agreement between our two governments, to enter into force on the date of your Excellency's reply.

Please accept, your Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

FUAD BOUTROS
Deputy Prime Minister/
Minister of Foreign Affairs

U.S. Reply to Lebanese Note Requesting U.S. Contribution to MNF

August 20, 1982

I have the honor to refer to your Excellency's note of 18 August 1982 requesting the deployment of an American force to Beirut. I am pleased to inform you on behalf of my government that the United States is prepared to deploy temporarily a force of approximately 800 personnel as part of a Multinational Force (MNF) to provide appropriate assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) as they carry out their responsibilities concerning the withdrawal of Palestinian personnel in Beirut from Lebanese territory under safe and orderly conditions, in accordance with the schedule annexed to your Excellency's note. It is understood that the presence of such an American force will in this way facilitate the restoration of Lebanese Government sovereignty and authority over the Beirut area, an objective which is fully shared by my government.

I have the further honor to inform you that my government accepts the terms and conditions concerning the presence of the American force in the Beirut area as set forth in your note, and that your Excellency's note and this reply accordingly constitute an agreement between our two governments.

ROBERT S. DILLON
Ambassador of the
United States of America



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venience, the Liaison and Coordination Committee will have two essential components:

- (A) Supervisory liaison; and
- (B) Military and technical liaison and coordination.

The Liaison and Coordination Committee will act collectively; however, it may designate one or more of its members as primary liaison contact who would of course act on behalf of all.

- Liaison arrangements and consultations will be conducted in such a way as to minimize misunderstandings and to forestall difficulties. Appropriate means of communications between the committee and other groups will be developed for this purpose.

- The Liaison and Coordination Committee will continually monitor and keep all concerned currently informed regarding the implementation of the plan, including any revisions to the departure schedule as may be necessary because of logistical requirements.

15. Duration of Departure. The departure period shall be as short as possible and, in any event, no longer than 2 weeks.

16. Transit Through Lebanon. As part of any departure arrangement, all movements of convoys carrying PLO personnel must be conducted in daylight hours. When moving overland from Beirut to Syria, the convoys should cross the border into Syria with no stops en route. In those instances when convoys of departing PLO personnel pass through positions of the Israeli Defense Forces, whether in the Beirut area or elsewhere in Lebanon, the Israeli Defense Forces will clear the route for a temporary period in which the convoy is running. Similar steps will be taken by other armed groups located in the area of the route the convoy will take.

17. Arms Carried by PLO Personnel. On their departure, PLO personnel will be allowed to carry with them one individual side weapon (pistol, rifle, or submachine gun) and ammunition.

18. Heavy and Spare Weaponry and Munitions. The PLO will turn over to the Lebanese Armed Forces as gifts

all remaining weaponry in their possession, including heavy, crew-served, and spare weaponry and equipment, along with all munitions left behind in the Beirut area. The Lebanese Armed Forces may seek the assistance of elements of the MNF in securing and disposing of the military equipment. The PLO will assist the Lebanese Armed Forces by providing, prior to their departure, full and detailed information as to the location of this military equipment.

19. Mines and Booby Traps. The PLO and the Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) will provide to the Lebanese Armed Forces and the MNF (through the Lebanese Armed Forces) full and detailed information on the location of mines and booby traps.

20. Movement of PLO Leadership. Arrangements will be made so that departing PLO personnel will be accompanied by a proportionate share of the military and political leadership throughout all stages of the departure operation.

21. Turnover of Prisoners and Remains. The PLO will, through the ICRC, turn over to the Israeli Defense Forces, all Israeli nationals whom they have taken in custody, and the remains, or full and detailed information about the location of the remains, of all Israeli soldiers who have fallen. The PLO will also turn over to the Lebanese Armed Forces all other prisoners whom they have taken in custody and the remains, or full and detailed information about the location of the remains, of all other soldiers who have fallen. All arrangements for such turnovers shall be worked out with the ICRC as required prior to Departure Day.

22. Syrian Military Forces. It is noted that arrangements have been made between the Governments of Lebanon and Syria for the deployment of all military personnel of the Arab Deterrent Force from Beirut during the departure period. These forces will be allowed to take their equipment with them, except for that—under mutual agreement between the two governments—which is turned over to the Lebanese Armed Forces. All elements of the Palestinian Liberation Army,

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, AUG. 19, 1982¹

We are, of course, extremely gratified by the Israeli Cabinet's approval of the plan, which is a tribute to the remarkable diplomatic achievement of the President's personal emissary, Ambassador Philip Habib. It sets the stage for implementation of the plan, which we expect to start as early as this weekend. We urge the parties to make every effort to clear up the remaining matters so that implementation can go forward as soon as possible.

¹Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Aug. 23, 1982. ■

whether or not they now or in the past have been attached to the Arab Deterrent Force, will withdraw from Lebanon.

FACT SHEETS ON THE DEPARTURE³

Plan for the Departure of the PLO

A plan for the departure from Lebanon of the PLO leaders, offices, and combatants in Beirut has been accepted by the Governments of Lebanon, the troop-contributing countries, and Israel and by the PLO. That plan includes a schedule of departures which is also attached to the bilateral notes exchanged between the Government of Lebanon and the troop-contributing countries.

The PLO will go to various countries in the region including Jordan, Iraq, Tunisia, North Yemen, South Yemen, Syria, Sudan, and Algeria.

Departing PLO personnel will be accompanied by a proportionate share of the military and political leadership throughout all stages of the departure arrangements.

The PLO will turn over to the Lebanese Armed Forces their heavy and

crew-served weapons, spare weaponry and equipment along with all munitions left behind in the Beirut area. They and the Arab Deterrent Force will also provide detailed information on the location of mines and booby traps to the Lebanese Armed Forces. On departure, PLO personnel may carry with them an individual side weapon and ammunition.

The Arab Deterrent Force (i.e., the Syrians) and those forces attached to the Arab Deterrent Force will also redeploy from Beirut during the period of the PLO departure. The Syrian military forces will take their equipment with them except for that which, by mutual agreement, is turned over to the Lebanese Armed Forces.

MNF Composition, Area of Operations, and Mission

Force Composition. The multinational force, which will be deployed to the Beirut area at the request of the Government of Lebanon, will be comprised of approximately 400 Italian, 800 French, and 800 U.S. military personnel. The U.S. portion of the MNF will be comprised of Marines of the 32d Marine Amphibious Unit presently serving with elements of the Sixth Fleet on duty in the eastern Mediterranean.

Area of Operations. The MNF will operate in and around the Beirut area. It will take up positions and operate from locations determined by mutual agreement between the various national contingents and the Lebanese Armed Forces through the mechanism of a Liaison and Coordination Committee.

Mission. The multinational force will assist the Lebanese Armed Forces in carrying out its responsibilities for insuring the safe and orderly departure from Lebanon of the PLO leaders, offices, and combatants in a manner which will insure the safety of other persons in the area, and which will further the restoration of the sovereignty and authority of the Government of Lebanon over the Beirut area.

Duration of the MNF Mandate. It has been mutually agreed between the Government of Lebanon and those governments contributing forces to the MNF that these forces will depart Lebanon not later than 30 days after arrival, or sooner at the request of the

Government of Lebanon or at the direction of the individual government concerned. There is also provision for the immediate termination of the mandate of the MNF and for its withdrawal from Beirut in the event that the departure from Lebanon of PLO personnel does not take place in accord with the predetermined schedule.

Role and Mission of U.S. Forces in Beirut

U.S. forces will be deployed to Beirut as part of the multinational force based on an agreement between the U.S. Government and the Government of Lebanon.

The U.S. contingent of the multinational force will provide appropriate assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces as they carry out their responsibilities concerning the withdrawal of PLO personnel in Beirut from Lebanese territory under safe and orderly conditions. The presence of U.S. forces also will facilitate the restoration of Lebanese Government sovereignty and authority over the Beirut area.

U.S. forces will enter Beirut after the evacuation is well underway (probably 5 or 6 days thereafter) in concert with the Italian MNF contingent and the remainder of the French force. Approximately 800 Marines from Sixth Fleet units will be deployed. Command authority for the Marines will be exercised by the National Command Authority (NCA) through normal American military channels (EUCOM). These forces will not engage in combat but may exercise the right of self-defense. They will have freedom of movement and the right to undertake actions necessary to perform their mission or to support their personnel. U.S. personnel will be armed with usual infantry weapons.

Close coordination will be maintained with the Lebanese Armed Forces. There will be an exchange of liaison officers among the elements of the MNF and the Lebanese Armed Forces. A Liaison and Coordination Committee composed of representatives from the U.S., French, Italian, and Lebanese armed forces will assist this process. The Government of Lebanon and the Lebanese Armed Forces are taking

measures necessary to insure the protection of U.S. forces including having secured assurances from armed elements that they will comply with the cease-fire and cessation of hostilities.

The U.S. contingent will be in Beirut for no more than 30 days.

War Powers Resolution

The War Powers Resolution requires a report to Congress within 48 hours after the introduction of U.S. Armed Forces: (1) into foreign territory while equipped for combat; or (2) into hostilities or situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances.

There is no intention or expectation that U.S. forces will become involved in hostilities in Beirut. They will be in Lebanon at the formal request of the Government of Lebanon; we will have assurances regarding the safety and security of the multinational force. Although we cannot rule out isolated acts of violence, all appropriate precautions will be taken to assure the safety of U.S. military personnel during their brief assignment to Lebanon.

These matters will, in any event, be kept under constant review, and the President will report to Congress consistent with the reporting requirements of the War Powers Resolution.

Agreements and Assurances

U.S. forces will participate in the multinational force in Beirut pursuant to an agreement between the U.S. Government and the Government of Lebanon. That agreement is in the form of an exchange of notes signed by Ambassador Dillon on behalf of the U.S. Government and Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Boutros on behalf of the Lebanese Government.

The agreement describes the missions of the Lebanese Armed Forces, the MNF, and the U.S. forces participating in the MNF. It contains provisions concerning command authority for U.S. forces, coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces and immunity of U.S. personnel. Annexed to the agreement is the schedule for the PLO departure from Beirut.



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In accordance with the agreement, the Government of Lebanon has secured assurances from all armed elements not to act under the authority of the Lebanese Government that they will comply with the cease-fire and cessation of hostilities. The Government of Israel has provided appropriate assurances.

Role of the ICRC in Moving the PLO from West Beirut

The role envisaged for the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in moving the PLO from west Beirut is being finalized on the basis of discussions in Geneva and Beirut.

In accordance with its charter, the ICRC will be expected to care for the sick and wounded combatants while in transit. Initially, the ICRC will arrange transport and provide medical care for the sick and wounded PLO personnel being moved to Greece.

Financing the Departure of the PLO from West Beirut

The cost of chartering transport of the PLO combatants to receiving countries will be funded through international organizations. The United States is prepared to provide initial funding from State Department funds.

Estimates regarding the cost of evacuating PLO forces from west Beirut currently range from \$2 to \$4 million. This figure could be increased, however, if the number of people to be transported and their ultimate destinations are finalized.

PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO THE U.S. SECRETARY GENERAL, AUG. 20, 1982⁴

Letter dated August 20, 1982, from the Charge d'Affaires a.i. of the U.S. Permanent Mission to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary General

I have the honour to transmit the following message from the President of the United States:

"Dear Mr. Secretary-General:

"As you know, the Government of the Republic of Lebanon has requested the deployment of a multinational force in Beirut to assist the Lebanese armed forces as they carry out the orderly and safe departure of Palestinian personnel now in the Beirut area in a manner which will further the restoration of the sovereignty and authority of the Government of Lebanon over the Beirut area. The Lebanese Government has asked for the participation of United States military personnel in this force, together with military personnel from France and Italy.

"I wish to inform you that the United States Government has agreed, in response to this request from the Lebanese Government, to deploy a force of about 800 personnel to Beirut for a period not exceeding 30 days. It is my firm intention and belief that these troops will not be involved in hostilities during the course of this operation.

"The deployment of this United States force is consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations as set forth in Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter. It furthers the goals of Security Council resolutions 508 (1982) and 509 (1982) adopted in June at the beginning of the Lebanese conflict. The force will plan to work closely with the United Nations observer group stationed in the Beirut area.

"This agreement will support the objective of helping to restore the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon. It is part of the continuing efforts of the United States Government to bring lasting peace to that troubled country, which has too long endured the trials of civil strife and armed conflict.

RONALD REAGAN⁵

I have the honour to request that the present letter be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under item 34 of the provisional agenda, and of the Security Council.

KENNETH L. ADELMAN
Ambassador

PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO THE CONGRESS, AUG. 24, 1982⁵

On August 18, 1982, the Government of Lebanon established a plan for the departure from Lebanon of the Palestine Liberation Organization leadership, offices, and combatants in Beirut. This plan has been accepted by the Government of Israel. The Palestine Liberation Organization has informed the Government of Lebanon that it

also has accepted the plan. A key element of this plan is the need for a multinational force, including a United States component, to assist the Government of Lebanon in carrying out its responsibilities concerning the withdrawal of these personnel under safe and orderly conditions. This will facilitate the restoration of Lebanese Government sovereignty and authority over the Beirut area.

In response to the formal request of the Government of Lebanon, and in view of the requirement for such a force in order to secure the acceptance by concerned parties of the departure plan, I have authorized the Armed Forces of the United States to participate on a limited and temporary basis. In accordance with my desire that the Congress be fully informed on this matter, and consistent with the War Powers Resolution, I am hereby providing a report on the deployment and mission of these members of the United States Armed Forces.

On August 21, in accordance with the departure plan, approximately 350 French military personnel—the advance elements of the multinational force—were deployed in Beirut together with elements of the Lebanese Armed Forces, and the departure of Palestinian personnel began. To date, Palestinian personnel have departed Lebanon in accordance with the terms of the plan.

On August 25, approximately 800 Marines began to arrive in Beirut. These troops are equipped with weapons consistent with their non-combat mission, including usual infantry weapons.

Under our agreement with the Government of Lebanon, these U.S. military personnel will assist the Government of Lebanon in carrying out its responsibilities concerning the withdrawal of Palestinian personnel under safe and orderly conditions. The presence of our forces will in this way facilitate the restoration of Lebanese Government sovereignty and authority in the Beirut area. Our forces will operate in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces, which will have 2,500–3,500 personnel assigned to this operation, as well as with a total of approximately 800 French and 400 Italian military personnel in the multinational force. Transportation of the personnel departing is being carried out by commercial air and sea transport, and by land. According to our agreement with the Government of Lebanon, the United States military personnel will be withdrawn from Lebanon within thirty days.

I want to emphasize that there is no intention or expectation that U.S. Armed Forces will become involved in hostilities. They are in Lebanon at the formal request of

the Government of Lebanon. Our agreement with the Government of Lebanon expressly rules out any combat responsibilities for the U.S. forces. All armed elements in the area have given assurances that they will take no action to interfere with the implementation of the departure plan or the activities of the multinational force. (The departure has been underway for some days now, and thus far these assurances have been fulfilled.) Finally, the departure plan makes it clear that in the event of a breakdown in its implementation, the multinational force will be withdrawn. Although we cannot rule out isolated acts of violence, all appropriate precautions have thus been taken to assure the safety of U.S. military personnel during their brief assignment to Lebanon.

This deployment of the United States Armed Forces to Lebanon is being undertaken pursuant to the President's constitutional authority with respect to the conduct of foreign relations and as Commander-in-Chief of the United States Armed Forces.

This step will not, by itself, resolve the situation in Lebanon, let alone the problems which have plagued the region for more than thirty years. But I believe that it will improve the prospects for realizing our objectives in Lebanon:

- a permanent cessation of hostilities;
- establishment of a strong, representative central government;
- withdrawal of all foreign forces;
- restoration of control by the Lebanese Government throughout the country; and
- establishment of conditions under which Lebanon no longer can be used as a launching point for attacks against Israel.

I also believe that progress on the Lebanon problem will contribute to an atmosphere in the region necessary for progress towards the establishment of a comprehensive peace in the region under Camp David, based firmly on U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

Sincerely,

RONALD REAGAN

¹Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Aug. 23, 1982.

²Made available to news correspondents by Acting Department spokesman Alan Romberg.

³Made available to news correspondents by Acting Department spokesman Alan Romberg.

⁴Circulated as a document of the U.N. General Assembly and Security Council (A/37/393-S/15371, Aug. 21, 1982).

⁵Identical letters addressed to Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of Representatives, and Strom Thurmond, President Pro Tempore of the Senate. ■

Secretary Shultz's News Conference of August 20 (Excerpts)

Following are excerpts from a news conference given by Secretary Shultz shortly after President Reagan's statement on the PLO departure plan.¹

The President today announced that a plan to resolve the crisis in west Beirut has been agreed upon by all the parties, and that in connection with that plan the Government of Lebanon has asked the United States, and the President has agreed, to the deployment of U.S. forces as part of a multinational force to help the Government of Lebanon to implement the plan.

He also expressed his admiration and his thanks to Phil Habib, and I would like to take this occasion to add my thanks to Phil, a truly great American.

The President also said that I would answer the questions, so here I am.

Q. Have American-Israeli relations suffered because of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, and on a broader scale, how do you judge the impact of the fighting on American-Arab relations?

A. The Israeli-U.S. relationship remains a strong one. We are completely committed to the support of the security of Israel. Certainly, there have been some strains during this period. The United States opposed the entry of Israeli troops into Lebanon. There were some occasions when it seemed to us that the Israeli military actions were excessive, and we said so. So those times presented great strains. But underneath it all the relationship between the United States and Israel remains a strong one.

There's no question about the fact—turning to the second part of your question—that our relationships with our friends in the Arab world have been strained, and understandably so, as they have seen the suffering in Lebanon and the great destruction in Beirut. We seek

to resolve those issues. I think the constructive role that the United States has played in the development of this plan, and Phil Habib's actions, show the fundamental commitment of the United States to peaceful solutions and the ability of the United States to be a constructive force in the region.

Q. Following withdrawal of Palestinian forces from west Beirut, do we expect the Israelis to attack other Palestinian and Syrian forces in the country, and what, if anything, are we trying to do to prevent that from happening?

A. What we expect and what we hope for is that as this process unfolds the Government of Lebanon will be able to take control, first in Beirut, then increasingly throughout the country. And that the forces of Israel, the forces of Syria, the forces of other armed groups in the country will withdraw or lay down their arms and Lebanon will become a country free of foreign forces.

I might note that in the plan, if you look at the first section, which is labeled "Basic Concept," you'll see that this notion is explicitly stated as being consistent with the objectives of the plan.

Q. I wonder if you could amplify what the President said. He said that if American forces were shot at, there would be a recall of U.S. forces. In that sort of violent environment, it is possible for stray bullets to be flying. Would a single shot result in an American call-back?

A. The President was not referring to some stray shot by some kook that might be fired. We're talking about a situation in which all the parties have agreed to a cease-fire and have agreed to establish the conditions under which the departure of the PLO can take place with safety. We are there to help in that process, help the Government of Lebanon in that process. We will stay there as long as that process is going



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forward and as long as the basic conditions envisaged for our forces remain in effect.

Q. We've heard a lot about Ambassador Habib's role in all of this. What do you envision as his role in the next phase which is the evacuation of all foreign troops from Lebanon?

A. He's a very skillful man. He's been over there since early June, and I think he deserves a good night's sleep. But he's very skillful and very capable, and he told me on one occasion that he never says no to a President. So I imagine his talents will be called upon from time to time in the future.

Q. Has the Government of Israel given you any assurances that they intend to withdraw from Lebanon in the near future?

A. When Foreign Minister Shamir was here, I asked him that question directly. He told me that Israel does not want one inch of Lebanese territory and plans to withdraw from Lebanese territory. I looked at him and I said, "We will take you at your word."

Q. On the previous question on Mr. Habib—is it contemplated that Mr. Habib will conduct the next round of negotiations on the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon, and do you have any time frame in mind, and the venue, on how and when these talks should begin?

A. I think that it is important to be working strongly not only for the withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon, but for that to happen in such a manner that the Government of Lebanon has strength and the security concerns of Israel and its northern border are adequately safeguarded.

Beyond that, I think, we must recognize that there has been a tremendous amount of destruction and displacement in Lebanon. The extent of it varies widely in peoples' estimates, but even the most modest estimates show that it's considerable. We and others around the world need to address ourselves to those problems and start thinking in constructive terms about what needs to be done to help the people of Lebanon reconstruct their land and bring it back to the conditions that it once enjoyed.

Q. Will Mr. Habib actually do the negotiating for the United States?

A. Phil's precise role has not been determined. As I said, he has been at it for a couple of months of very tiring work, and it's time for him to get a good night's sleep. We do plan to have a Lebanon task force in the government and Morris Draper, who has been Phil's assistant, will head that up; Peter McPherson, the head of the Agency for International Development, is going to take on the special concern of the reconstruction and development aspects of this plan. Some other people are being put in place to work on this. I don't say that Phil will have no role in it. He's a very constructive and able person, but I do think at this point that he'll obviously want to see the departure go on in a good way. But at some stage of the game, as I say, we have to give him a good night's sleep.

Q. It's not clear to me, in the way you answered some of the earlier questions, whether you expect further negotiations to take place to obtain the withdrawal of the Syrians and the Israelis or whether you expect them to do that voluntarily, without any further diplomatic activity. Could you clarify that a little bit?

A. I'm sure that the Syrians must feel that they, having been invited in by the Government of Lebanon, would expect to hear from the Government of Lebanon about its wishes. Again, I was told by the Syrian Foreign Minister that they were there at the request of the Government of Lebanon and when the Government of Lebanon requested them to leave, they would do so.

So I think what we are looking at here is a process in which the Government of Lebanon increasingly takes control; and as that happens and as security arrangements on Israel's northern border can be adequately developed, we should expect to see these forces withdraw. I can't tell you that all that can take place in an easy, uncomplicated way. There's no doubt about the fact that it will be complicated and difficult.

Q. How long do you think it will take?

A. I can't tell you.

Q. There is talk of an Israeli-Lebanese peace treaty as the next step after withdrawal. Will the United States actively support such a peace treaty?

A. I think it is constructive to have peace in that part of the world. With the emergence of a strong and legitimate Government of Lebanon, that is certainly something we would hope they would consider very strongly.

Q. But will we actively support it?

A. Sure.

Q. What is the possibility of the use of American troops in some type of multinational force such as is going into Beirut now to facilitate the withdrawal of Israeli and Syrian troops from Lebanon itself?

A. We don't have any plan for that at all.

Q. Will this be used as a precedent, do you think?

A. No, I don't think so.

Q. Do you foresee the formation of a Palestinian state at some point? If so, when, and what are you going to do with all these Palestinians that you are splitting up and sending to all these various countries, just leave them there?

A. The Palestinians who are departing from west Beirut probably number in the range of 6,000-7,000, and that is a number that can be assimilated. Where they go eventually, of course, remains to be seen. I do think, and have emphasized before—and practically everybody who talks about the subject emphasizes—the importance of turning to the problems of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, working at that, and negotiating about that.

My own observation is that the language of Camp David is quite worth reading in that regard. So we would expect to be moving on that front, as I'm sure others will too, because it represents an underlying issue of great importance and is one that is at the center of all this.

Q. Since you brought up Camp David, could you give us, as best you can foresee it now, the startup again of the autonomy talks, the timetable,

including whether or not you are going to appoint a new special negotiator at any time in the near future?

A. I can't really comment with any clarity on those questions. Obviously, the parties to those talks are heavily engaged in their thinking in the west Beirut problem. It will take some time and a lot of effort to construct a suitable negotiating situation, and I don't want to put down some sort of marker on it.

Q. Ambassador Habib is quoted as telling Prime Minister Begin that he thought it was Israel's military pressure which brought the PLO to agree finally to leave Beirut. Do you agree with that assessment?

A. I'm not going to try to analyze what may or may not have brought the PLO to agree to leave west Beirut. Fairly early on, they had made a statement in principle that they would withdraw. We went through a long period of trying to identify where they would go, and during that period there were many doubts expressed about whether in the end they would go. We felt that they had said they would, and we would take them at their word and expect that they would.

Q. But the greatest progress was made in the negotiations, wasn't it, after August 1 when the heaviest Israeli bombings took place?

A. The discussions that gave more and more assurance as to where they would go materialized obviously as these negotiations went on. It was quite a struggle at first and became more definite.

Q. How do you intend to try to blend, or what is your own sense of priorities about resolving the rest of the issues in Lebanon, getting the foreign forces out, etc., and dealing with the Palestinian problem on the West Bank and Gaza?

A. Both issues are important. There is, obviously, some connection between them, but they are also separate issues. I think we, obviously, have to work—it's my opinion anyway—on both. It is difficult to lay down a timetable, but both are matters of urgency. I think that this moment in time—with the bloodshed and the damage done in

Lebanon freshly in peoples' minds—is a time to work hard on this, because people must be able to see that the alternative to a reasonably peaceful situation in the Middle East is not a pleasant thing to contemplate at all. So, perhaps, it is a moment when people can turn their eyes from the problems of war to the problems of peace—at least I hope so—and that is going to be our effort.

Q. Specifically, what steps is the United States prepared to take to get the autonomy talks moving again?

A. We are working on that, thinking about it, and trying to develop our own thinking, as I'm sure others are. When we have gotten our thoughts properly constructed, we will be able to tell you what they are. I have been thinking about that myself, before I came into the government and ever since I've been here at the President's direction. I've had several meetings with the President about it. At his instruction, I've been meeting with Members of the Congress; we have had people come in from outside, and we've had lots of discussion about this as various ministers from Israel and Arab countries have visited here. So we are actively thinking about it. And we expect to be moving on it.

Q. Along those lines, the biggest and most dramatic impact of all this, at least for the moment, is the breaking up of the PLO into composite groups moving into different parts of the Middle East. What effect do you think this is going to have on the peace prospects in the region? And do you agree with those who feel that makes it less urgent for the Palestinian issue to be addressed?

A. I think that it makes it more urgent because to the extent the armed and, I think, disruptive presence of the PLO and their impact on Israel and perhaps on some of the problems in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is less, then perhaps the opportunities are more. Rather than feel—if that particular pressure is off—you should relax, my attitude would be exactly the opposite: If the opportunity is greater, you should move in harder and faster and try to take advantage of it.


Q. What is your position on Jewish settlements, either new settlements or the expansion of the existing ones in the occupied territories?

A. The President has said to me recently, when a question arose about their legality, the question isn't whether they are legal or illegal; the question is are they constructive in the effort to arrange a situation that may, in the end, be a peaceful one and be one in which the people of the region can live in a manner that they prefer. His answer to that is no, expansion of those settlements is not a constructive move. I agree with the President. I really do agree with it. I'm not just following his lead.

Q. Next month is the deadline within the Lebanese constitutional framework for a presidential election. Security is one of the reasons cited why the election was put off until next week and might be put off again. Obviously, in general, the United States has a lot of influence in a situation like this right now. It has gained more influence; it's having forces coming in there which will help provide security. What are your views on the holding of the Lebanese presidential election? Should it be in the next month, as originally planned?

A. I think, basically, the conduct of an election in a country, the development of its own governmental processes and the identification of the president and other officials of the country are matters for that country. The role of the United States is, as we are, to be helpful to the Government of Lebanon, at their request, as they seek to take control of Beirut and the country generally. Beyond that, I think the issue of the election of a new president and other related matters are essentially a matter for the Government of Lebanon, not for us.

Q. In the wake of what Menahem Begin calls a great victory, what would make you believe that Israel would become more flexible in terms of dealing with the Palestinian problem? And has the Government of Israel given us any assurances that they would be willing to discuss this more amenably?



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A. What the outcome of discussions will be and how much flexibility will be shown by various parties to it remains to be seen. I think that the prospect of peace, particularly in the light of the conflict in Lebanon that we've seen recently—and for that matter, the conflict in Lebanon that has been going on since 1975—should convince people that if there is any genuine prospect of peace, it should be seized. Perhaps that will be an incentive for everyone to give and take and try to construct something that might work.

Q. Do you believe that the PLO has any role to play in the negotiations process, or do you think that it does not represent the Palestinian people and is better not involved?

A. As far as the United States is concerned, the President has set out well-known conditions for any contacts between the United States and the PLO directly, and we stand by those conditions. If the PLO meets those conditions, obviously, the United States would be willing to talk with them. Whether others would be willing to talk with them, those others will have to say for themselves.

I think it is quite clear that, if there is to be a negotiation, that has as one of its center objectives meeting the legitimate concerns of the Palestinian people, there have to be representatives of the Palestinian people involved in those negotiations. No one accepts a result that they didn't have any part in. Who that should be remains to be seen. I don't know the answer to that question, but I know that an answer to it needs to be found.

Q. Could you give us an idea of how much U.S. funding is going to be involved in the evacuation and whether or not we will be reimbursed?

A. I don't think that what funding we supply we will be reimbursed for. We have, I think, committed around \$2 million by now for the chartering of ships and things of that kind, and perhaps we will spend a little bit more money on that sort of thing. Others will also bear some expense as they receive the PLO contingents that come to their countries, so it will be a shared expense.

That is the order of magnitude, and I don't see where any reimbursement would come from.

Q. Your fact sheet states U.S. troops will go in probably 5 or 6 days after the evacuation begins.

A. That's right.

Q. Is there a trigger mechanism for that to happen? Is there some condition to be met before those U.S. troops go in?

A. Just that we observe that the conditions precedent to the whole operation are in force, the departures are taking place as scheduled, and there is a basically nonhostile environment.

. . . .

Q. You have had talks with the Danish Foreign Minister these days, and he has invited you to go to Brussels, primarily, I understand, to assess the trouble about the pipeline. Are you intending to go to Brussels pretty soon? And what will be the next steps of the Administration in case European countries start delivery of pipeline technology very soon?

A. I don't have any immediate travel plans. I looked the other day at the little statement that is hanging up in my office now that says when the Senate voted my confirmation—that was July 15. It seems like about 10 years ago. But I am trying to assemble my thoughts and haven't made any plans to travel. There is a NATO meeting, I think, in early December, so presumably, I would go to that. At that time, other consultations could take place. Of course, I've seen many people from European governments during the month or so that I have been in office. But I don't have any immediate plan to go to Brussels.

As far as the pipeline is concerned, the President's position is firm. We don't see that anything that has happened in Poland recently meets the conditions that have been set out, not only by ourselves but by our allies. So there is no intention to change but, rather, to push ahead with the sanctions as they have been put in place.

Q. [Inaudible] what you said to us just now? If the deliveries start, would the Administration then come up with measures against the allies?

A. Not measures against the allies—these are not measures against the allies. They are measures taken to demonstrate to the Polish Government and the Soviet Union that the behavior that we see—explicitly in Poland, but also in other countries—is behavior that we deplore, and to the degree that we are willing to take steps that are hard to take.

I think it should be noted that these sanctions, while I believe they are causing problems in the construction of that pipeline—and the problems they are causing for our allies abroad are heavily publicized—they also cause problems for firms here in the United States. We know that. But to an extent, I suppose, it shows the depth of the President's conviction that the behavior that we see in Poland and elsewhere has to be noted, and a response to it needs to be put in place and kept in place.

Q. The remarks that you made today on opportunities for negotiating a broader settlement in the Middle East echo those made last night on national television by Dr. Henry Kissinger. Tomorrow you're meeting with a number of so-called foreign policy experts, most of whom at some point or another have worked as assistants to Dr. Kissinger. You've met with him personally several times over the last few weeks. The Executive Intelligence Review has reported that Dr. Kissinger is, in fact, becoming the primary foreign policy adviser of this Administration. To what extent is that true?

A. As I understand it, according to the National Security Council directives, the Secretary of State is the principal foreign policy adviser. And it's easy enough to be Secretary of State—you have to get the President to nominate you and the Senate to confirm you. So that's me.

Dr. Kissinger is a wonderful person and a great friend, a person who has tremendous knowledge and comprehension of what is going on. I have enjoyed the benefit of his friendship and his ideas over many years, and I expect to

continue to have that. One of the first visitors to me after I became Secretary of State was Dr. Kissinger, along with Irving Shapiro and Larry Silberman, to talk about the Middle East, and I'll continue to benefit from his advice. But it's my job to be the principal adviser to the President.

Q. Dr. Kissinger has been named in a number of criminal investigations in Italy and—

A. Oh, come on; come on.

Q. What is going to happen now to Yasser Arafat and other PLO leaders, and have you received any assurances from the PLO indirectly that there will not be any further terrorist attacks on Israel, either through Jordan or perhaps through Syria? What assurances?

A. I think, by this time, perhaps people can see that what terrorism evokes is not so much fear but abhorrence from the world community. It is unfortunate that there is such an amount of terrorism. But I think, by this time, people are pretty well convinced that it's something bad all around, and very strong measures increasingly are being taken against it. I would imagine that any capable analytical person would be able to see that.

Q. During this news conference I've been informed that President Carter has charged that—

A. I think it's a little tough on me—

Q. I know.

A. —that you get some information—

Q. —I apologize that it's only happened—

A. —that comes in while I'm here that I don't have access to it. It's like sitting in front of the Senate for confirmation. All those fellows are going in and out—and ladies—all the time, and I'm just sitting there. I don't know what has happened.

Q. I will explain to you what has happened, as far as I know—

A. You're blind siding me.

Q. —and I don't think you'll be totally blind sided because it's not the first time we've heard this charge, but

I've been told that President Carter—and I cannot vouch for the truth of whether he actually said it or not—has charged that Washington gave the go-ahead to Israel for the invasion of Lebanon. I'm sure that I'm not blind siding you because that you've heard from other sources before. Can you answer that charge?

A. It is not correct.

Q. Did not Secretary of State Haig, your predecessor, know in advance that Israel was going to strike into Lebanon?

A. My understanding is that the U.S. Government was not informed, and the U.S. Government was and is on the record as having opposed that invasion. Whether somebody came through here and talked about it as a possibility, I don't know. People talk about all kinds of possibilities.

Q. Who goes in first? Who's the advance element that's spoken of, if it's not American forces?

A. You mean in the Beirut situation?

Q. In Beirut, right.

A. I think that's in all the fact material. The first element of the multinational force is the French with about 350. Let me correct that. It basically is the responsibility of the Government of Lebanon and their armed forces to provide for the safety of these departures and, of course, to take control of the city and their country. The multinational force is there to assist the Government of Lebanon.

The first contingent is the French contingent of about 350 who will be stationed, I think, in the immediate port area in the beginning. The U.S. troops, the balance of the French, and the Italian will enter about 5 days after the departures start.

Q. You just talked about the necessity of addressing the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people in the next phase after Beirut. Are you willing to tell us whether those legitimate rights include the rights for self-determination and independence? In other words, what's your definition of these legitimate rights for the Palestinians?

A. Precisely what that will wind up meaning will have to emerge from a negotiation, I'm sure. The words "self-determination" seem to have taken on terms of art. But I would say, as I've indicated earlier, if people are going to accept some solution, they have to have a part in forming it. Certainly one would expect, as the language of Camp David makes clear, that the Palestinians should have a role in determining the conditions under which they will be governed.

Q. In going through the agreement, I don't see anything mentioned about verifying that the PLO has, in fact, left Beirut. Maybe I just passed over it, but I wondered if you could address that problem?

A. Arrangements have been made to, in effect, check off people as they leave so that there is a verification of how many people have left and so on, and where they have gone. That process will be undertaken, and I believe that is basically a responsibility of the Government of Lebanon to do.

Q. You just mentioned in one of your answers that Arab-American relations are now strained. It doesn't seem to have passed on to some of those Arab governments that when the United States made clear to Israel what the United States wanted, Israel did stop the bombing. Looking to the future, do you intend again to make clear to Israel to really pursue a negotiated solution which will be acceptable to all parties in the Middle East?

A. My hope is that everyone will look at what has happened in the last few weeks and feel that it means that we must all concentrate on creating a just peace. This shining objective will be the principal motivating force for everyone.

Q. Can I just come back to Camp David? You've talked a lot about peace and rights of Palestinians, and you also talked about Camp David. Before the Lebanon crisis erupted, Secretary Haig was about to launch into an intensified effort to revive the talks between Egypt and Israel on the ground rules for the self-governing authority as it's called, as well as other leftover points that hadn't been negotiated.



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Are you looking for ways beyond this, or are you willing to continue that negotiating track which has been on and off for the last several years as a first step toward this interim solution which is called for in Camp David? I'm not sure whether you want to stay with Camp David or not.

A. The language of Camp David, as I read it, has lots of room for ideas as to how the situation might be arranged. I have been listening to many people. You mentioned Dr. Kissinger and others—Sol Linowitz, Irving Shapiro, Larry Silberman, Members of Congress—talking with the President. We're trying to form our ideas about what we think in a general way should be a reasonable outcome and what kind of process will get us there. As I said at the beginning of this statement, there is a lot of room within the Camp David language, and I think when you see a situation like that it's worthwhile to preserve that.

Q. A lot of room for what?

A. A lot of room for many different interpretations as to what that language means, but it's just the kind of language that is generally used, and I recognize that different people put different meanings on it.

Q. Your fact sheet that your department handed out about the sending of these forces suggests strongly that you plan to report to Congress under the War Powers Act under a provision which is not binding in the sense that the troops are not required to be out after 60 days. As you know, the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Mr. Zablocki, and of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Mr. Percy, argue that it should be under the more binding provision because of both the situation and the precedent involved. In that view is it correct that you're planning, as this suggests, but doesn't exactly say, to go under the nonbinding provision and, if so, why?

A. The President will make a decision about what section of the War Powers Act to use at the time of the introduction of American forces. I believe, under the law, he's required to make

that statement within 48 hours of their deployment, and I'm sure that he will do so. He'll have to decide at the time what is the right section.

I would say this: that, first of all, the President has stated explicitly that we have a 30-day time limit here, and that is right in the plan, rather than 60 days as your question suggested. Second, if we have a basically peaceful departure situation in west Beirut and this government announces that its forces are going in under what it considers conditions of imminent hostility, I wonder what the message is?

I think we have to be cognizant of what the real facts are on the ground and suit our determination to that. I believe the President will certainly be doing that, and I don't want to prejudge what decision he will make. But I think the basis for the decision should be the conditions on the ground rather than some notion about the number of days or something of that kind. The President has already specified the limit on the number of days.

Q. Would you just finish up the Camp David questions that have been brought up? What evidence is there today that President Mubarak is as anxious to proceed along the framework of Camp David, no matter how you work within this large framework, as was his predecessor? There's some evidence he is not that keen, is there not?

A. I think that, as we noted earlier, people throughout the Arab world are very upset about the events in Lebanon,

and it has had a profound effect on their attitudes. I know that. That will represent a problem that we'll have to contend with. As we go along here we certainly expect to work with President Mubarak and the Egyptians. They have been an essential part of this whole peace process, and I would have every expectation that in the end they will still want to be a part of the peace process.

¹Press release 257. ■

U.N. Adopts Resolutions on Lebanon Situation

Following are texts of Security Council and General Assembly resolutions and draft resolutions and statements by Ambassadors Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, and Charles M. Lichenstein, Alternate U.S. Representative to the United Nations for Special Political Affairs.

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 508, JUNE 5, 1982¹

The Security Council,

Recalling Security Council resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and the ensuing resolutions, and more particularly, Security Council resolution 501 (1982),

Taking note of the letters of the Permanent Representatives of Lebanon dated 4 June 1982 (S/15161 and S/15162),

Deeply concerned at the deterioration of the present situation in Lebanon and in the Lebanese-Israeli border area, and its consequences for peace and security in the region,

Gravely concerned at the violation of the territorial integrity, independence, and sovereignty of Lebanon,

Reaffirming and supporting the statement made by the President and the members of the Security Council on 4 June 1982 (S/15163), as well as the urgent appeal issued by the Secretary-General on 4 June 1982,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General,

1. *Calls upon* all the parties to the conflict to cease immediately and simultaneously all military activities within Lebanon and across the Lebanese-Israeli border and no later than 0600 hours local time on Sunday, 6 June 1982.

2. *Requests* all Member States which are in a position to do so to bring their influence to bear upon those concerned so that the cessation of hostilities declared by Security Council resolution 490 (1981) can be respected;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to undertake all possible efforts to ensure the implementation of and compliance with this

resolution and to report to the Security Council as early as possible and not later than forty-eight hours after the adoption of this resolution.

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 509, JUNE 6, 1982¹

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978) of 19 March 1978 and 503 (1982) of 5 June 1982,

Gravely concerned at the situation as described by the Secretary-General in his report to the Council,

Reaffirming the need for strict respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries,

1. *Demands* that Israel withdraw all its military forces forthwith and unconditionally to the internationally recognized boundaries of Lebanon;

2. *Demands* that all parties observe strictly the terms of paragraph 1 of resolution 508 (1982) which called on them to cease immediately and simultaneously all military activities within Lebanon and across the Lebanese-Israeli border;

3. *Calls* on all parties to communicate to the Secretary-General their acceptance of the present resolution within 24 hours;

4. *Decides* to remain seized of the question.

AMBASSADOR LICHENSTEIN'S STATEMENT, SECURITY COUNCIL, JUNE 6, 1982

This resolution focuses on two elements as a means of ending the present military confrontation in Lebanon—a cessation of hostilities by all of the parties and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon.

Operative paragraphs 1 and 2 of this resolution seek to accomplish these two interrelated objectives. We wish to emphasize that these two objectives are, in fact, inextricably linked and that their

implementation must be simultaneous. This, in our view, is the clear, logical, and necessary meaning of the resolution.

I need only add that it is the fervent hope of my government, which has devoted so much effort to the resolution of this conflict—and which even at this very moment is carrying forward its commitment to the task—that the bloodshed be ended immediately and that the conditions be established for a just and enduring peace in the region.

SECURITY COUNCIL DRAFT RESOLUTION (S/15185), JUNE 8, 1982²

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 508 (1982) and 509 (1982),

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General (S/15178) of 7 June 1982,

Also taking note of the two positive replies to the Secretary-General of the Government of Lebanon and the Palestine Liberation Organization contained in document S/15178.

1. *Condemns* the non-compliance with resolutions 508 (1982) and 509 (1982) by Israel;

2. *Urges* the parties to comply strictly with the regulations attached to the Hague Convention of 1907;

3. *Reiterates its demand* that Israel withdraw all its military forces forthwith and unconditionally to the internationally recognized boundaries of Lebanon;

4. *Reiterates also its demand* that all parties observe strictly the terms of paragraph of resolution 508 (1982) which called on them to cease immediately and simultaneously all military activities within Lebanon and across the Lebanese-Israeli border;

5. *Demands* that within six hours all hostilities must be stopped in compliance with Security Council resolutions 508 (1982) and 509 (1982) and decides, in the event of non-compliance, to meet again to consider practical ways and means in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.



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AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK'S STATEMENT, SECURITY COUNCIL, JUNE 8, 1982³

I desire to offer an explanation of vote on behalf of my government. The objective of my government is to end the bloodshed and the cycle of violence in Lebanon and to restore full respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of that troubled land.

Two previous resolutions of this Council—Resolutions 508 and 509—contained balancing language that took account of the fact that the conflict in Lebanon and across the Lebanese-Israeli border is complex in its origins and that its resolution will require compliance in deed as well as in word with the resolutions of the Security Council.

Unfortunately, the resolution now before us is not sufficiently balanced to accomplish the objectives of ending the cycle of violence and establishing the conditions for a just and lasting peace in Lebanon. For that reason, Mr. President, the United States voted against this resolution.

My government is now currently engaged in every possible effort to bring the violence to an end. We shall continue those efforts.

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 511, JUNE 18, 1982⁴

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 427 (1978), 434 (1978), 444 (1979), 450 (1979), 459 (1979), 467 (1980), 483 (1980), 488 (1981), 490 (1981), 498 (1981), and 501 (1982),

Reaffirming its resolutions 508 (1982) and 509 (1982),

Having studied the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (S/15194 and Add.1 and 2) and taking note of the conclusions and recommendations expressed therein,

Bearing in mind the need to avoid any developments which could further aggravate the situation and the need, pending an examination of the situation by the Council in all its aspects, to preserve in place the capacity of the United Nations to assist in the restoration of the peace,

Lebanon—A Profile

Geography

Area: 10,400 sq. km. (4,015 sq. mi.); about the size of Connecticut. **Capital:** Beirut (pop. 1.1 million). **Other Cities:** Tripoli (240,000), Zahlah (55,000), Sidon (110,000), and Tyre (60,000). **Terrain:** Narrow coastal plain backed by high Lebanese Mountains, the fertile Bekaa Valley, and the Anti-Lebanon Mountains extending to the Syrian border. **Land—**64% urban, desert, or waste; 27% agricultural; 9% forested. **Climate:** Typically Mediterranean, resembling that of southern California. Temperatures rarely exceed 30°C (85°F) during the summer, but humidity is high.

People

Population (1981 est.): 3 million. **Annual Growth Rate:** 2.6%. **Ethnic Groups:** 93% Arab, 6% Armenian. **Religions:** Christian (Maronite, Greek Orthodox and Catholic, Roman Catholic, Protestant), Muslim (Sunni and Shi'a), Druze. **Languages:** Arabic (official), Armenian, French, English. **Education:** Years compulsory—5. **Attendance:** 93%. **Literacy—**75%. **Health:** Infant mortality rate—45/1,000 (1980). **Life expectancy—**65 yrs.

Government

Type: Parliamentary Republic. **Constitution:** May 26, 1926 (amended). **Date of Independence:** 1943. **Branches:** *Executive*—president (chief of state, elected by simple majority of Parliament for 6-yr. term), Cabinet of Ministers (appointed). *Legislative*—unicameral Parliament (99-member Chamber of Deputies elected for 4-yr. terms).

Judicial—secular and religious courts; combination of Ottoman, civil, and canon law; no judicial review of legislative acts. **Administrative Subdivisions:** 5 provinces, each headed by a governor: Beirut, North Lebanon, South Lebanon, Mount Lebanon, and Bekaa. **Political Parties:** Organized

along sectarian lines around individuals whose followers are motivated by religious, clan, and ethnic considerations. **Suffrage:** Males over 21, females over 21 with elementary educations. **Central Government Budget (1981):** \$1.3 billion. **Defense (1981):** \$250.3 million or 19% of government budget. **Deficit—**\$328.4 million or 25% of budget.

Economy

GDP (1977): \$2.6 billion. **Annual Growth Rate:** Varies with security situation but thought to be negligible over the 1974-81 period. **Per Capita Income:** \$884. **Avg. Inflation Rate (1981):** 20%—25% est. **Natural Resources:** Limestone. Agriculture (8.5% of GDP): *Products*—citrus fruit, produce. **Land—**400,000 hectares under cultivation. Industry (13% of GDP): cement production, light industry, refining. **Trade (1979): Exports—**\$664 million: chemicals, \$113 million; metal products, \$100 million; agricultural products, \$93 million; textiles, \$73 million. **Major markets—**Arab states 88%; non-Arab, 12%. **Imports—**\$2.1 billion: commodity breakdown not available. **Major suppliers—**Western Europe, U.S. **Official Exchange Rate (Oct. 31, 1981):** 4,597 Lebanese pounds = U.S.\$1.

Membership in International Organizations

U.N. and several of its specialized agencies, Arab League, Organization of the Islamic Conference, Nonaligned Movement, Group of 77, INTELSAT.

The information on this country is taken from the July 1982 Background Notes, one of a series of Notes on about 165 countries of the world, edited by Joanne Reppert Reams of the Bureau of Public Affairs.

A 1-year subscription (about 60 Notes) is available for \$18 a year (domestic); \$22.50 (foreign) from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

1. *Decides* as an interim measure, to extend the present mandate of the Force for a period of two months, that is, until 19 August 1982;

2. *Authorizes* the Force during that period, to carry out, in addition, the interim tasks referred to in paragraph 17 of the Secretary-General's report (S/15194/Add.2);

3. *Calls on* all concerned to extend full co-operation to the Force in the discharge of its tasks;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council regularly informed of the implementation of resolutions 508 (1982) and 509 (1982) and the present resolution.

**AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK'S
STATEMENT,
SECURITY COUNCIL,
JUNE 18, 1982⁵**

The United States is pleased that this Council is extending the mandate of UNIFIL [U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon] for a period of 2 months. We are likewise pleased and grateful that the troop-contributing countries are prepared to continue to so materially assist this organization in carrying out its responsibilities. Obviously, the situation in Lebanon is fraught with uncertainty, as well as with pain and turmoil.

The United States has voted today to extend this mandate without any extension of responsibilities, functions, or territorial scope because we believe that this course will contribute most directly and clearly to the restoration of peace and well-being of the area and to the restoration of the authority and the sovereignty of the Government of Lebanon. The mandate has been extended for 2 months. During that period, while the situation stabilizes, we in the Council will have the opportunity to collectively study what best serves the common good of the people of Lebanon and the peace of the region.

**AMBASSADOR LICHENSTEIN'S
STATEMENT,
SECURITY COUNCIL,
JUNE 19, 1982⁶**

My government, in consultation with the governments of Lebanon and Israel and with U.N. authorities, wholly supports the positive efforts now going forward in the field to provide humanitarian services to the people of Lebanon. Each day this humanitarian effort is more effective, reaching more of those needing special services. We believe that such progress will continue.

As an earnest of our commitment, President Reagan has appointed the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development as his personal representative to coordinate all U.S. efforts to assist in this process. Fifteen

million dollars have already been committed to the effort. We anticipate the authorization of an additional \$20 million.

Our principal concern remains the restoration of full Lebanese sovereignty and authority throughout its territory. As I have said, we are wholly committed to serving the human needs of the people of Lebanon. We hope, and we trust, that no party and no government will exploit these fundamental humanitarian concerns for narrow, political purposes.

In the context of these considerations and reflections, my delegation has supported the draft resolution.

**SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION 512,
JUNE 19, 1982¹**

The Security Council,

Deeply concerned at the sufferings of the Lebanese and Palestinian civilian populations,

Referring to the humanitarian principles of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and to the obligations arising from the regulations annexed to the Hague Convention of 1907,

Reaffirming its resolutions 508 (1982) and 509 (1982),

1. *Calls upon* all the parties to the conflict to respect the rights of the civilian populations, to refrain from all acts of violence against those populations and to take all appropriate measures to alleviate the suffering caused by the conflict, in particular, by facilitating the dispatch and distribution of aid provided by United Nations agencies and by non-governmental organizations, in particular, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC);

2. *Appeals* to Member States to continue to provide the most extensive humanitarian aid possible;

3. *Stresses* the particular humanitarian responsibilities of the United Nations and its agencies, including the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), towards civilian populations and calls upon the parties to the conflict not to hamper the exercise of those responsibilities and to assist in humanitarian efforts;

4. *Takes note* of the measures taken by the Secretary-General to co-ordinate the activities of the international agencies in this field and requests him to make every effort

to ensure the implementation of and compliance with this resolution and to report on these efforts to the Council as soon as possible.

**SECURITY COUNCIL
DRAFT RESOLUTION
(S/15255/Rev.2),
JUNE 25, 1982²**

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 508 (1982) and 509 (1982),

Reaffirming also its resolution 512 (1982) which, *inter alia*, calls upon all the parties to the conflict to respect the rights of the civilian populations,

Seriously concerned at the constant deterioration of the situation in Lebanon, resulting from the violation of the sovereignty, integrity, independence and unity of that country,

Profoundly apprehensive of the dangers of extension of the fighting within Beirut, its capital,

1. *Demands* that all the parties observe an immediate cessation of hostilities throughout Lebanon;

2. *Demands* the immediate withdrawal of the Israeli forces engaged round Beirut, to a distance of 10 kilometres from the periphery of that city, as a first step towards the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon, and the simultaneous withdrawal of the Palestinian armed forces from Beirut, which shall retire to the existing camps;

3. *Supports* all efforts by the Government of Lebanon to ensure Lebanese sovereignty throughout the territory and the integrity and independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized frontier;

4. *Calls upon* all armed elements in the Beirut area to respect and abide by the exclusive authority of the Government of Lebanon;

5. *Supports* the Government of Lebanon in its will to regain exclusive control of its capital and, to that end, to install its armed forces which shall take up positions within Beirut and interpose themselves on its periphery;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General, as an immediate measure, to station United Nations military observers, by agreement with the Government of Lebanon, with instructions to supervise the cease-fire and disengagement in and round Beirut;

7. *Further requests* the Secretary-General to study any request by the Government of Lebanon for the installation of a United Nations force which could, within the



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Philip C. Habib—The President's special emissary to the Middle East

Philip Charles Habib was born on February 25, 1920, in Brooklyn, New York. He graduated from the University of Idaho in 1942 and in 1952 received a Ph.D. in agricultural economics from the University of California (Berkeley).

In 1947, following service in the U.S. Army during the Second World War, Ambassador Habib became a teaching research assistant at the University of California. In 1949, he was appointed a Foreign Service officer and was assigned to the American Embassy in Ottawa as an economic officer. He then served in Wellington (1951-54) and in the Department (1955-57). He subsequently became political officer at Port-of-Spain, Trinidad and Tobago and the Department's officer-in-charge of underdeveloped areas in the office of the Under Secretary's Special Assistant for Communist Economic Affairs (1960-61).

Ambassador Habib was Counselor for Political Affairs in Seoul (1962-65) where he served as political officer (with the personal rank of minister) in Saigon (1965-67). He served as Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (1967-69) and was senior



(Associated Press)

President Reagan presents Ambassador Habib with the Presidential Medal of Freedom, the nation's highest civilian award.

adviser to the U.S. delegation in Paris at the peace negotiations on Vietnam (1968-71).

He was Ambassador to Korea (1971-74), Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (1974-76), and Under Secretary for Political Affairs (1976-78); beginning in June 1979 he became a senior adviser to the Secretary.

Ambassador Habib retired from the Foreign Service on February 29, 1980. He was appointed the President's special emissary to the Middle East on May 5, 1981. ■

AMBASSADOR LICHENSTEIN'S STATEMENT, SECURITY COUNCIL, JUNE 26, 1982⁷

The fundamental basis of the policy of the United States is now and has consistently been to contribute to the restoration of the Government of Lebanon's full authority throughout its land and its sovereignty and territorial integrity. My government is deeply moved by the suffering of the Lebanese people in the present crisis.

We had hoped that the draft resolution before the Security Council tonight would have reflected this basic concern. Unfortunately, the draft resolution,

while containing many elements we support, fails to call for the essential requisite for the restoration of the authority of the Government of Lebanon—that is, the elimination from Beirut and elsewhere of the presence of armed Palestinian elements who neither submit to nor respect the sovereign authority of the Lebanese Government. The omission of this requisite, in our view, thus, is inconsistent with the essential goal of restoration of Lebanese sovereignty. This, we believe, is a fatal flaw.

The resolution does contain many elements that we support—namely, a call for an immediate cease-fire, a call for simultaneous withdrawal of Israeli and Palestinian forces from the area of Beirut, and the proposal that U.N. observers, upon the request of the Government of Lebanon, monitor the cease-fire.

The members of this Council are well aware of the threat which armed foreign elements pose to the authority of the Government of Lebanon and to stability throughout the region. We deeply regret that this essential factor was not accorded the weight we believed it must have in the draft resolution before us.

AMBASSADOR LICHENSTEIN'S STATEMENT, GENERAL ASSEMBLY, JUNE 26, 1982⁸

The United States wishes to stress once again its deep and abiding commitment to the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity, and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries. We are also deeply—and, at this very moment, actively—committed to helping bring the tragic conflict now taking place in Lebanon to a just and lasting end as rapidly as possible.

The United States fully recognizes that the resolution before us reflects the profound emotional anguish felt by everyone of goodwill at the continuing loss of life and human suffering in Lebanon. Nonetheless, the resolution regretfully is an unhelpful gesture at this most delicate stage. The United

framework of the implementation of the preceding paragraphs, take up positions besides the Lebanese interposition forces, or for the use of the forces available to the United Nations in the region;

8. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Council on an urgent and sustained basis not later than 1 July 1982 on the status of implementation of the present resolution and of resolution 508 (1982), 509 (1982) and 512 (1982);

9. *Requests* all Member States to cooperate fully with the United Nations in the implementation of the present resolution;

10. *Decides* to remain seized of the question.

States cannot be a party to an unbalanced statement which may well have the effect of heightening the underlying animosities in Lebanon and actually increasing the danger of a wider conflict. A just and lasting settlement cannot be achieved by issuing declarations and ultimata—motivated sometimes by vindictiveness, even by hatred—but requires an urgent effort by all nations committed to the principles of the U.N. Charter to lessen the tensions and find a path to peace.

The humanitarian task of aiding the victims of the conflict in Lebanon is surely no less urgent than the goal of bringing the conflict to an end. The concern of the U.S. Government was demonstrated by President Reagan when he made an immediate initial allocation of \$15 million for humanitarian aid in Lebanon and also requested from the U.S. Congress an additional appropriation of \$20 million. The Congress, reflecting the deep human concern of the entire American people, not only approved the President's request but indicated its wish to provide yet an additional \$20 million of assistance. The United States, of course, stands ready to provide further assistance as and where needed.

**GENERAL ASSEMBLY
RESOLUTION A/ES-7/5,
JUNE 26, 1982^a**

The General Assembly,

Having considered the question of Palestine at its resumed seventh emergency special session,

Having heard the statement of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people,

Alarmed by the worsening situation in the Middle East as a result of Israel's acts of aggression against the sovereignty of Lebanon and the Palestinian people in Lebanon,

Recalling Security Council resolutions 508 (1982) of 5 June 1982, 509 (1982) of 6 June 1982 and 512 (1982) of 19 June 1982,

Taking note of the reports of the Secretary-General relevant to this situation, particularly his report of 7 June 1982,

Taking note of the two positive replies to the Secretary-General by the Government of Lebanon and the Palestine Liberation Organization,

*by James E. Miller
General and European Division
Office of the Historian
Bureau of Public Affairs*

On the evening of March 14, 1978, Israeli Armed Forces invaded southern Lebanon after terrorist attacks on March 11 along the Tel-Aviv and Haifa road had left 34 Israelis and one U.S. citizen dead. The Government of Israel announced that its military action was aimed at destroying the bases used by Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) terrorists for the March 11 and previous raids.

On March 15, Israeli Prime Minister [Menahem] Begin announced that his forces would halt after they had established a 6-mile security zone and would withdraw as soon as Israel had guarantees that southern Lebanon would no longer serve as a base for PLO attacks on Israel. However, as a result of continuing Palestinian resistance, the Israeli army advanced beyond the 6-mile limit in an effort to destroy the PLO's military capacity.

The U.S. Government expressed its horror at the attacks on Israeli citizens but opposed the use of military force by Israel. On March 16, in conjunction with its European allies, the United States called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon. Two days later, it introduced a resolution at a special meeting of the U.N. Security Council calling for the establishment of a U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) which would permit the rapid withdrawal of Israeli forces and the reestablishment of the authority of the Government of Lebanon in the southern part of that nation. The U.S. draft pro-

posal was approved as U.N. Resolution 425 (78) on March 19 by a vote of 12-0 with 2 abstentions (Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union).

After hearing a report by the U.N. Secretary General on the terms under which UNIFIL could operate in southern Lebanon, the Security Council adopted this report as U.N. Resolution 426 (78) by an identical vote, thus establishing UNIFIL for a period of 6 months. The costs of this peacekeeping force were to be apportioned among U.N. member states. Major General Emmanuel S. Erskine of Ghana, Chief of Staff of the U.N. Troop Supervision Organization, was given command of UNIFIL. The new peacekeeping force was composed of troops assigned to the Troop Supervision Organization together with Iranian, Canadian, and Swedish personnel detached from U.N. forces stationed on the Golan Heights and the Sinai and contingents supplied by Norway, Nepal, and France. The United Kingdom, Nigeria, and Senegal also offered to supply contingents to UNIFIL.

A special session of the U.N. General Assembly subsequently approved a credit of \$54 million for the maintenance of a 4,000-man peacekeeping force in southern Lebanon—April 21, 1978—and has assigned the major share of the cost of UNIFIL to the five permanent members of the Security Council: the United Kingdom, France, the People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union, and the United States.

Meanwhile, on March 21, Israeli forces declared a unilateral cease-fire after reaching a line along the Litani River. The first contingents of UNIFIL troops arrived in the war zone on March 22 and attempted to take up posi-

Noting with regret that the Security Council has, so far, failed to take effective and practical measures, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, to ensure implementation of its resolutions 508 (1982) and 509 (1982),

Referring to the humanitarian principles

of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, and to the obligations arising from the regulations annexed to the Hague Conventions of 1907,

Deeply concerned at the sufferings of the Palestinian and Lebanese civilian populations
Reaffirming once again its conviction tha



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U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon

ons between the Israeli Army and the LO forces. However, elements of the LO rejected the Israeli cease-fire and continued to carry out attacks on Israeli positions. The Palestinians refused to recognize UNIFIL's mandate, and the peacekeeping forces came under fire from both PLO troops and from members of Lebanese Christian militia formations who opposed the Palestinian's presence in Lebanon. Israel informed the Secretary General that its withdrawal from southern Lebanon could depend on the size of the U.N. force and its ability to keep PLO guerrillas out of the area south of the Litani river.

On May 3, in response to the demands of the Israeli Government, the Security Council approved an increase in the size of UNIFIL to 6,000 men in resolution 427 (78) by a vote of 12-0 with Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union again abstaining. Israel announced on May 21 that it would withdraw from Lebanon by June 28. Three days later, PLO Chairman Yassir Arafat agreed to cooperate with UNIFIL in the establishment of their control in southern Lebanon and to quell attacks on Israel. However, Arafat was unable to enforce compliance within the LO. Palestinian infiltration into southern Lebanon and attacks on UNIFIL troops continued. As a result, withdrawing Israeli forces turned over control of a buffer zone along the Lebanon-Israel border to a Christian Lebanese militia as they retired behind their borders on June 13, 1978.

UNIFIL now began serving as a peacekeeping force between the PLO and the Christian Lebanese as well as between Palestinian forces and Israel. In

view of the instability of the southern Lebanon region, the Security Council, on September 19, 1978, extended the life of UNIFIL for 4 additional months.

The period between January 1979 and the spring of 1981 was marked by a series of military operations interrupted by short-lived truces between Palestinians, Christians, and Israelis. UNIFIL forces attempted to carry out their peacekeeping role and were involved in a series of clashes with PLO and Christian militia forces as well as a number of ambushes in which soldiers of the forces were killed. The Security Council, noting the continuing instability in southern Lebanon, regularly renewed UNIFIL's mission at 6-month intervals, but the composition of the peacekeeping forces changed. U.N. troops who had originally been assigned to UNIFIL from other peacekeeping missions were withdrawn. Iranian soldiers who had comprised a large portion of UNIFIL troops were withdrawn after the 1979 revolution in that nation. Other nations provided troops to fill in the gaps, and by late 1980, UNIFIL numbered 7,000 men and was composed of national contingents from Fiji, France, Ireland, Italy, Nepal, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, and Senegal. In addition, small contingents of the Army of the Republic of Lebanon were attached to UNIFIL forces as part of the effort to reestablish the control of the Government of Lebanon in the south. On February 5, 1981, Major General William Callaghan of the Republic of Ireland succeeded Major Gen. Erskine as commander of UNIFIL.

UNIFIL was unable to fulfill its mission of ending the warfare in southern Lebanon. In addition to continuing Palestinian infiltration and clashes be-

tween UNIFIL troops and the PLO and Lebanese Christian militia, Israeli impatience with the inability of the peacekeeping forces to prevent PLO infiltration grew.

Israeli officials charged that some UNIFIL troops collaborated with PLO terrorists. By early 1981, Israel had adopted a policy of preventive raids against Palestinian positions in Lebanon. At the same time, Syrian forces in Lebanon aided by the PLO were attempting to reduce the power of the Christian Lebanese forces.

In order to prevent a widening of the hostilities in Lebanon and the Middle East, President Reagan appointed Ambassador Philip C. Habib as his special emissary to the Middle East on May 5, 1981. As a part of the settlement which Habib negotiated over the ensuing summer, the PLO agreed to cease using southern Lebanon as a base for raids into Israel while Israel agreed to a ceasefire. Despite occasional breaches, this ceasefire held until June 1982.

On June 6, 1982, Israeli forces again crossed into Lebanon following the attempted assassination of the Israeli Ambassador in the United Kingdom. Once again, Israeli leaders stated that the purpose of the operation was to clean out terrorist bases in southern Lebanon. The commander of UNIFIL ordered his men not to resist the invasion. After the Israeli advance pushed north of the Litani River, UNIFIL forces remained in position. On June 19, the Security Council decided on another extension of UNIFIL's mandate through August 19, 1982. On August 17, the UNIFIL mandate was renewed for another 2 months, until October 18. ■

the question of Palestine is the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict and that no comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the region will be achieved without the full exercise by the Palestinian people of its inalienable national rights,

Reaffirming further that a just and comprehensive settlement of the situation in the

Middle East cannot be achieved without the participation on an equal footing of all the parties to the conflict, including the Palestine Liberation Organization as the representative of the Palestinian people,

1. *Reaffirms* the fundamental principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force;

2. *Demands* from all Member States and other parties to observe strict respect for Lebanon's sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence within its internationally recognized boundaries;

3. *Decides* to support fully the provisions in Security Council resolutions 508 (1982) and

509 (1982) with, *inter alia*, demand that:

(a) Israel withdraw all its military forces forthwith and unconditionally to the internationally recognized boundaries of Lebanon;

(b) All parties to the conflict cease immediately and simultaneously all military activities within Lebanon and across the Lebanese-Israeli borders;

4. *Condemns* Israel for its non-compliance with resolutions 508 (1982) and 509 (1982);

5. *Demands* that Israel comply with all the above provisions no later than 0600 hours, Beirut time, on Sunday 27 June 1982;

6. *Calls upon* the Security Council to authorize the Secretary-General to undertake necessary endeavours and practical steps to implement the provisions of resolutions 508 (1982), 509 (1982) and 512 (1982);

7. *Urges* the Security Council, in the event of continued failure by Israel to comply with the demands contained in resolutions 508 (1982) and 509 (1982), to meet in order to consider practical ways and means in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;

8. *Calls upon* all States and international agencies and organizations to continue to provide the most extensive humanitarian aid possible to the victims of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon;

9. *Requests* the Secretary-General to delegate a high-level commission to investigate and assess the extent of loss of human life and material damage and to report, as soon as possible, on the result of this investigation to the General Assembly and the Security Council;

10. *Decides* to adjourn the seventh emergency special session temporarily and to authorize the President of the latest regular session of the General Assembly to resume its meetings upon request from Member States.

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 513, JULY 4, 1982¹

The Security Council

Alarmed by the continued sufferings of the Lebanese and Palestinian civilian populations in South Lebanon and in West Beirut,

Referring to the humanitarian principles of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and to the obligations arising from the Regulations annexed to the Hague Convention of 1907,

Reaffirming its resolutions 508 (1982), 509 (1982) and 512 (1982),

1. *Calls* for respect for the rights of the

civilian populations without any discrimination and repudiates all acts of violence against those populations;

2. *Calls further* for the restoration of the normal supply of vital facilities such as water, electricity, food and medical provisions, particularly in Beirut;

3. *Commends* the efforts of the Secretary-General and the action of international agencies to alleviate the sufferings of the civilian population and requests them to continue their efforts to ensure their success.

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 515, JULY 29, 1982¹⁰

The Security Council,

Deeply concerned at the situation of the civilian population of Beirut,

Referring to the humanitarian principles of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and to the obligations arising from the regulations annexed to the Hague Convention of 1907,

Recalling its resolutions 512 (1982) and 513 (1982),

1. *Demands* that the Government of Israel lift immediately the blockade of the city of Beirut in order to permit the dispatch of supplies to meet the urgent needs of the civilian population and allow the distribution of aid provided by United Nations agencies and by non-governmental organizations, particularly the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC);

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit the text of this resolution to the Government of Israel and keep the Security Council informed of its implementation.

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK'S STATEMENT, SECURITY COUNCIL, JULY 29, 1982¹¹

The United States is never indifferent to the sufferings, insecurity, or deprivations of human beings caught in war, occupation, or natural disasters. Certainly, we have been deeply concerned with the hardships visited on the people of Lebanon during the current conflict. The Lebanese people, we know, have too long suffered violence at the hands of unwanted intruders, unwelcomed invaders, and occupiers. The concern of my government for the people of Lebanon has been, and is being actively

expressed in the large contributions for emergency humanitarian aid made by my government, and by the appointment of a special administrator for aid, and by implementation of extensive, humanitarian aid programs in the region.

President Reagan has asked the Congress to provide a total of some \$65 million in humanitarian emergency aid for the people of Lebanon. The President's special envoy, Ambassador Philip Habib, has worked indefatigably in his efforts to restore peace to Lebanon and a degree of territorial integrity and sovereignty that the government has not enjoyed for too many years.

There is no room for doubt among reasonable men and women, I believe, about the commitment of the U.S. Government to the peace, independence, and sovereignty of Lebanon; indeed, for our commitment to peace, national independence, and sovereignty of all nations. Yet, we see serious problems with the resolution proposed by my friend and distinguished colleague, the representative of the Government of Spain, for the following reasons:

First, because of inadequate time either to gather or confirm the facts about the situation in Beirut and the problems of access;

Second, because of an inadequate opportunity to consult with our government; and

Third, because this resolution, we believe, is lacking in a certain, serious balance which would give it greater weight.

It is surely, in the first instance, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) that imposes itself on the civilian population of Beirut. But, the resolution proposed by my distinguished colleague from Spain does not ask that that armed force abandon its occupation of Beirut or desist in its military activities. It calls only on Israel. Yet, everyone understands that Israel seeks to affect supplies to the PLO forces, not to the civilian population of Beirut.

The United States welcomes the concern of the Security Council and of the humanitarian agencies of the United Nations for the suffering in Lebanon, as w



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welcome the concern of this body for an end to human suffering everywhere. But we feel that a one-sided appeal in a two-sided conflict suggests purposes that are political as well as humanitarian, and we cannot support these. Certainly, we cannot support them on the basis of inadequate notice and inadequate information. We call, therefore, upon the Council to take the time necessary for more careful, balanced consideration of this most serious, wrenching problem. I ask the suspension of this session to permit consideration and consultation with our governments.

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 516, AUG. 1, 1982¹²

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 508 (1982), 509 (1982), 511 (1982), 512 (1982) and 513 (1982),

Recalling its resolution 515 (1982) of 29 July 1982,

Alarmed by the continuation and intensification of military activities in and around Beirut,

Taking note of the latest massive violations of the cease-fire in and around Beirut,

1. *Confirms* its previous resolutions and demands an immediate cease-fire, and a cessation of all military activities within Lebanon and across the Lebanese-Israeli border;

2. *Authorizes* the Secretary-General to deploy immediately on the request of the Government of Lebanon, United Nations observers to monitor the situation in and around Beirut;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report back to the Council on compliance with this resolution as soon as possible and not later than four hours from now.

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 517, AUG. 4, 1982¹³

The Security Council,

Deeply shocked and alarmed by the deplorable consequences of the Israeli invasion of Beirut on 3 August 1982,

1. *Reconfirms* its resolutions 508 (1982), 509 (1982), 512 (1982), 513 (1982), 515 (1982) and 516 (1982);

2. *Confirms once again* its demand for an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon;

3. *Censures* Israel for its failure to comply with the above resolutions;

4. *Calls* for the prompt return of Israeli troops which have moved forward subsequent to 1325 hours EDT on 1 August 1982;

5. *Takes note* of the decision of the Palestine Liberation Organization to move the Palestinian armed forces from Beirut;

6. *Expresses* its appreciation for the efforts and steps taken by the Secretary-General to implement the provisions of Security Council resolution 516 (1982), and authorizes him, as an immediate step, to increase the number of United Nations observers in and around Beirut;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the implementation of the present resolution as soon as possible and not later than 1000 hours EDT on 5 August 1982;

8. *Decides* to meet at that time if necessary in order to consider the report of the Secretary-General and, in case of failure to comply by any of the parties to the conflict, to consider adopting effective ways and means in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 518, AUG. 12, 1982¹⁴

The Security Council,

Recalling its Resolutions 508 (1982), 509 (1982), 511 (1982), 512 (1982), 513 (1982), 515 (1982), 516 (1982), 517 (1982),

Expressing its most serious concerns about Israel's continued military activities in Lebanon and particularly in and around Beirut,

1. *Demands* that Israel and all parties to the conflict observe strictly the terms of Security Council resolutions relevant to the immediate cessation of all military activities within Lebanon and particularly in and around Beirut;

2. *Demands* the immediate lifting of all restrictions on the city of Beirut in order to permit the free entry of supplies to meet the urgent needs of the civilian population in Beirut;

3. *Requests* the United Nations observers in and in the vicinity of Beirut to report on the situation;

4. *Demands* that Israel cooperate fully in the effort to secure effective deployment of the United Nations observers as requested by the Government of Lebanon and in such a manner as to insure their safety;

5. *Requests* the Secretary General to report soonest on the implementation of the present resolution to the Security Council;

6. *Decides* to meet if necessary in order to consider the situation upon receipt of the report of the Secretary General.

¹Adopted unanimously.

²U.S. vetoed; therefore the draft resolution was not adopted.

³USUN press release 43.

⁴Adopted by a vote of 13 for (U.S.), with 2 abstentions.

⁵USUN press release 45.

⁶USUN press release 46.

⁷USUN press release 48.

⁸USUN press release 49.

⁹Adopted by a vote of 127 for and 2 against (U.S.).

¹⁰Adopted by a vote of 14 to 0. The U.S. did not participate.

¹¹USUN press release 59.

¹²Adopted unanimously.

¹³Adopted by a vote of 14 to 0 with 1 abstention (U.S.).

¹⁴Adopted unanimously. ■

Maintaining a Cease-Fire in Lebanon

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, AUG. 2, 1982¹

The President met with Israeli Foreign Minister Shamir this morning. The focus of the discussion was Lebanon. The President reaffirmed his support for Ambassador Habib and his mission, which is based on the policies, expectations, and hopes of the Government of Lebanon. The President emphasized that an early diplomatic settlement of the current problem of west Beirut is the essential first step in ending the trauma of Lebanon, beginning the process for a better future for this ravaged country, and moving on to the broader peace process. The President stressed the need for a complete end by all parties to the hostilities in and around Beirut as a prerequisite to allow Ambassador Habib to pursue his urgent work. The world can no longer accept a situation of constantly escalating violence. The President highlighted the humanitarian needs of the large civilian population of west Beirut, with emphasis on the need to maintain essential services and to assure adequate supplies of food and medicines.

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, AUG. 4, 1982²

Last night, Israeli forces moved forward on several fronts from their ceasefire lines around Beirut. These movements were accompanied by heavy Israeli shelling and came only a day after I had made clear to the Israeli Government, in my meeting with Foreign Minister [Yitzhak] Shamir, that the United States placed great importance on the sustained maintenance of a ceasefire in place—to avoid further civilian casualties and to secure the prompt withdrawal of the PLO forces in Beirut.

This is a necessary first step toward our goal of restoring the authority of the Government of Lebanon, a goal Ambassador Habib [Philip C. Habib, the President's special emissary to the Middle East] is earnestly working toward with full cooperation of the Lebanese Government.

Through governments which have direct contact with the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization], I have expressed my strong conviction that the PLO must not delay further its withdrawal from Lebanon. At the same time, I have expressed to the Israel Government the absolute necessity of reestablishing and maintaining a strict ceasefire in place so that this matter can be promptly resolved.

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, AUG. 10, 1982³

We welcome the Israeli assessment as an essential element in getting the problem solved in Beirut. We are encouraged that the momentum of the peace process continues to build. Ambassador Habib is in Israel, having left Beirut early this morning, where he will discuss with Israeli officials the several amendments that the Israeli Government has suggested as a result of their Cabinet meeting, as well as other issues in the peace process.

We remain cautiously optimistic that the outstanding issues can be worked out. We are hopeful that there can be rapid movement toward the implementation of the full peace plan. It is our belief that negotiations can best move forward when a cease-fire is carefully observed by all parties.

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, AUG. 12, 1982⁴

The President was shocked this morning when he learned of the new heavy Israeli bombardment of west Beirut. As a result, the President telephoned Prime Minister Begin concerning the most recent bombing and shelling in Beirut.

The President expressed his outrage over this latest round of massive military action. He emphasized that Israel's action halted Ambassador Habib's negotiations for the peaceful resolution of the Beirut crisis when they were at the point of success. The result has been more needless destruction and bloodshed.

The President made it clear that it is imperative that the cease-fire in place be observed absolutely in order for negotiations to proceed. We understand the Israeli cabinet has approved a new cease-fire, which is in effect. It must hold.

¹Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Aug. 9, 1982.

²Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Aug. 9, 1982.

³Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Aug. 16, 1982.

⁴Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Aug. 16, 1982. ■

A New Opportunity for Peace in the Middle East

Following is President Reagan's address to the nation, broadcast from Burbank, California, on September 1, 1982.¹

My fellow Americans, today has been a day that should make us proud. It marked the end of the successful evacuation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) from Beirut, Lebanon. This peaceful step could never have been taken without the good offices of the United States and, especially, the truly heroic work of a great American diplomat, Ambassador Philip Habib [President's special emissary to the Middle East]. Thanks to his efforts, I am happy to announce that the U.S. Marine contingent helping to supervise the evacuation has accomplished its mission. Our young men should be out of Lebanon within 2 weeks. They, too, have served the cause of peace with distinction, and we can all be very proud of them.

But the situation in Lebanon is only part of the overall problem of conflict in the Middle East. So, over the past 2 weeks, while events in Beirut dominated the front page, America was engaged in a quiet, behind-the-scenes effort to lay the groundwork for a broader peace in the region. For once, there were no premature leaks as U.S. diplomatic missions traveled to Mid-East capitals, and I met here at home with a wide range of experts to map out an American peace initiative for the long-suffering peoples of the Middle East, Arab and Israeli alike.

It seemed to me that, with the agreement in Lebanon, we had an opportunity for a more far-reaching peace effort in the region, and I was determined to seize that moment. In the words of the scripture, the time had come to "follow after the things which make for peace."

U.S. Involvement

Tonight, I want to report to you on the steps we have taken and the prospects they can open up for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. America has

long been committed to bringing peace to this troubled region. For more than a generation, successive U.S. administrations have endeavored to develop a fair and workable process that could lead to a true and lasting Arab-Israeli peace. Our involvement in the search for Middle East peace is not a matter of preference, it is a moral imperative. The strategic importance of the region to the United States is well known.

But our policy is motivated by more than strategic interests. We also have an irreversible commitment to the survival and territorial integrity of friendly states. Nor can we ignore the fact that the well-being of much of the world's economy is tied to stability in the strife-torn Middle East. Finally, our traditional humanitarian concerns dictate a continuing effort to peacefully resolve conflicts.

When our Administration assumed office in January 1981, I decided that the general framework for our Middle East policy should follow the broad guidelines laid down by my predecessors. There were two basic issues we had to address. First, there was the strategic threat to the region posed by the Soviet Union and its surrogates, best demonstrated by the brutal war in Afghanistan; and, second, the peace process between Israel and its Arab neighbors. With regard to the Soviet threat, we have strengthened our efforts to develop with our friends and allies a joint policy to deter the Soviets and their surrogates from further expansion in the region and, if necessary, to defend against it. With respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict, we have embraced the Camp David framework as the only way to proceed. We have also recognized, however, that solving the Arab-Israeli conflict, in and of itself, cannot assure peace throughout a region as vast and troubled as the Middle East.

Our first objective under the Camp David process was to insure the successful fulfillment of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. This was achieved with the peaceful return of the Sinai to Egypt

in April 1982. To accomplish this, we worked hard with our Egyptian and Israeli friends, and eventually with other friendly countries, to create the multinational force which now operates in the Sinai.

Throughout this period of difficult and time-consuming negotiations, we never lost sight of the next step of Camp David: autonomy talks to pave the way for permitting the Palestinian people to exercise their legitimate rights. However, owing to the tragic assassination of President Sadat and other crises in the area, it was not until January 1982 that we were able to make a major effort to renew these talks. Secretary of State Haig and Ambassador Fairbanks [Richard Fairbanks, Special Negotiator for the Middle East Peace Process] made three visits to Israel and Egypt early this year to pursue the autonomy talks. Considerable progress was made in developing the basic outline of an American approach which was to be presented to Egypt and Israel after April.

The successful completion of Israel's withdrawal from Sinai and the courage shown on this occasion by Prime Minister Begin and President Mubarak in living up to their agreements convinced me the time had come for a new American policy to try to bridge the remaining differences between Egypt and Israel on the autonomy process. So, in May, I called for specific measures and a timetable for consultations with the Governments of Egypt and Israel on the next steps in the peace process. However, before this effort could be launched, the conflict in Lebanon preempted our efforts. The autonomy talks were basically put on hold while we sought to untangle the parties in Lebanon and still the guns of war.

The Lebanon war, tragic as it was, has left us with a new opportunity for Middle East peace. We must seize it now and bring peace to this troubled area so vital to world stability while there is still time. It was with this strong conviction that over a month ago, before the present negotiations in Beirut had been completed, I directed Secretary of State Shultz to again review our policy and to consult a wide range of

outstanding Americans on the best ways to strengthen chances for peace in the Middle East. We have consulted with many of the officials who were historically involved in the process, with Members of the Congress, and with individuals from the private sector; and I have held extensive consultations with my own advisers on the principles I will outline to you tonight.

The evacuation of the PLO from Beirut is now complete. And we can now help the Lebanese to rebuild their war-torn country. We owe it to ourselves, and to posterity, to move quickly to build upon this achievement. A stable and revived Lebanon is essential to all our hopes for peace in the region. The people of Lebanon deserve the best efforts of the international community to turn the nightmares of the past several years into a new dawn of hope.

Resolving the Root Causes of Conflict

But the opportunities for peace in the Middle East do not begin and end in Lebanon. As we help Lebanon rebuild, we must also move to resolve the root causes of conflict between Arabs and Israelis. The war in Lebanon has demonstrated many things, but two consequences are key to the peace process:

First, the military losses of the PLO have not diminished the yearning of the Palestinian people for a just solution of their claims; and

Second, while Israel's military successes in Lebanon have demonstrated that its armed forces are second to none in the region, they alone cannot bring just and lasting peace to Israel and her neighbors.

The question now is how to reconcile Israel's legitimate security concerns with the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. And that answer can only come at the negotiating table. Each party must recognize that the outcome must be acceptable to all and that true peace will require compromises by all.

So, tonight I am calling for a fresh start. This is the moment for all those directly concerned to get involved—or lend their support—to a workable basis for peace. The Camp David agreement

remains the foundation of our policy. Its language provides all parties with the leeway they need for successful negotiations.

- I call on Israel to make clear that the security for which she yearns can only be achieved through genuine peace, a peace requiring magnanimity, vision, and courage.

- I call on the Palestinian people to recognize that their own political aspirations are inextricably bound to recognition of Israel's right to a secure future.

- And I call on the Arab states to accept the reality of Israel and the reality that peace and justice are to be gained only through hard, fair, direct negotiation.

In making these calls upon others, I recognize that the United States has a special responsibility. No other nation is in a position to deal with the key parties to the conflict on the basis of trust and reliability.

The time has come for a new realism on the part of all the peoples of the Middle East. The State of Israel is an accomplished fact; it deserves unchallenged legitimacy within the community of nations. But Israel's legitimacy has thus far been recognized by too few countries and has been denied by every Arab state except Egypt. Israel exists; it has a right to exist in peace behind secure and defensible borders; and it has a right to demand of its neighbors that they recognize those facts.

I have personally followed and supported Israel's heroic struggle for survival ever since the founding of the State of Israel 34 years ago. In the pre-1967 borders, Israel was barely 10 miles wide at its narrowest point. The bulk of Israel's population lived within artillery range of hostile Arab armies. I am not about to ask Israel to live that way again.

The war in Lebanon has demonstrated another reality in the region. The departure of the Palestinians from Beirut dramatizes more than ever the homelessness of the Palestinian people. Palestinians feel strongly that their cause is more than a question of refugees. I agree. The Camp David agreement recognized that fact when it spoke of the legitimate rights of the

Palestinian people and their just requirements. For peace to endure, it must involve all those who have been most deeply affected by the conflict. Only through broader participation in the peace process—most immediately by Jordan and by the Palestinians—will Israel be able to rest confident in the knowledge that its security and integrity will be respected by its neighbors. Only through the process of negotiation can all the nations of the Middle East achieve a secure peace.

New Proposals

These then are our general goals. What are the specific new American positions, and why are we taking them?

In the Camp David talks thus far, both Israel and Egypt have felt free to express openly their views as to what the outcome should be. Understandably, their views have differed on many points.

The United States has thus far sought to play the role of mediator; we have avoided public comment on the key issues. We have always recognized—and continue to recognize—that only the voluntary agreement of those parties most directly involved in the conflict can provide an enduring solution. But it has become evident to me that some clearer sense of America's position on the key issues is necessary to encourage wider support for the peace process.

First, as outlined in the Camp David accords, there must be a period of time during which the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza will have full autonomy over their own affairs. Due consideration must be given to the principle of self-government by the inhabitants of the territories and to the legitimate security concerns of the parties involved.

The purpose of the 5-year period of transition, which would begin after free elections for a self-governing Palestinian authority, is to prove to the Palestinians that they can run their own affairs and that such Palestinian autonomy poses no threat to Israel's security.

The United States will not support the use of any additional land for the purpose of settlements during the transition period. Indeed, the immediate adoption of a settlement freeze by Israel,

more than any other action, could create the confidence needed for wider participation in these talks. Further settlement activity is in no way necessary for the security of Israel and only diminishes the confidence of the Arabs that a final outcome can be freely and fairly negotiated.

I want to make the American position well understood: The purpose of this transition period is the peaceful and orderly transfer of authority from Israel to the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. At the same time, such a transfer must not interfere with Israel's security requirements.

Beyond the transition period, as we look to the future of the West Bank and Gaza, it is clear to me that peace cannot be achieved by the formation of an independent Palestinian state in those territories. Nor is it achievable on the basis of Israeli sovereignty or permanent control over the West Bank and Gaza.

So the United States will not support the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, and we will not support annexation or permanent control by Israel.

There is, however, another way to peace. The final status of these lands must, of course, be reached through the give-and-take of negotiations. But it is the firm view of the United States that self-government by the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza in association with Jordan offers the best chance for a durable, just and lasting peace.

We base our approach squarely on the principle that the Arab-Israeli conflict should be resolved through negotiations involving an exchange of territory for peace. This exchange is enshrined in U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which is, in turn, incorporated in all its parts in the Camp David agreements. U.N. Resolution 242 remains wholly valid as the foundation stone of America's Middle East peace effort.

It is the United States' position that—in return for peace—the withdrawal provision of Resolution 242 applies to all fronts, including the West Bank and Gaza.

When the border is negotiated between Jordan and Israel, our view on the extent to which Israel should be asked to give up territory will be heavily affected by the extent of true peace and normalization and the security arrangements offered in return.

Finally, we remain convinced that Jerusalem must remain undivided, but its final status should be decided through negotiations.

In the course of the negotiations to come, the United States will support positions that seem to us fair and reasonable compromises and likely to promote a sound agreement. We will also put forward our own detailed proposals when we believe they can be helpful. And, make no mistake, the United States will oppose any proposal—from any party and at any point in the negotiating process—that threatens the security of Israel. America's commitment to the security of Israel is ironclad. And, I might add, so is mine.

U.S. Commitment to Peace

During the past few days, our ambassadors in Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia have presented to their host governments the proposals in full detail that I have outlined here today. Now I am convinced that these proposals can bring justice, bring security, and bring durability to an Arab-Israeli peace. The United States will stand by these principles with total dedication. They are fully consistent with Israel's security requirements and the aspirations of the Palestinians. We will work hard to broaden participation at the peace table as envisaged by the Camp David accords. And I fervently hope that the Palestinians and Jordan, with the support of their Arab colleagues, will accept this opportunity.

Tragic turmoil in the Middle East runs back to the dawn of history. In our modern day, conflict after conflict has taken its brutal toll there. In an age of nuclear challenge and economic interdependence, such conflicts are a threat to all the people of the world, not just the Middle East itself. It is time for us all—in the Middle East and around the world—to call a halt to conflict, hatred, and prejudice; it is time for us all to launch a common effort for reconstruction, peace, and progress.

It has often been said—and regrettably too often been true—that the story of the search for peace and justice in the Middle East is a tragedy of opportunities missed. In the aftermath of the settlement in Lebanon we now face an opportunity for a broader peace. This time we must not let it slip from our grasp. We must look beyond the difficulties and obstacles of the present and move with fairness and resolve toward a brighter future. We owe it to ourselves—and to posterity—to do no less. For if we miss this chance to make a fresh start, we may look back on this moment from some later vantage point and realize how much that failure cost us all.

These, then, are the principles upon which American policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict will be based. I have made a personal commitment to see that they endure and, God willing, that they will come to be seen by all reasonable, compassionate people as fair, achievable, and in the interests of all who wish to see peace in the Middle East.

Tonight, on the eve of what can be a dawning of new hope for the people of the troubled Middle East—and for all the world's people who dream of a just and peaceful future—I ask you, my fellow Americans, for your support and your prayers in this great undertaking.

¹Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Sept. 6, 1982. ■

News Conference of July 28 (Excerpts)

Q. Chancellor Schmidt [German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt] says that the allies—Western allies—are united against your ban on equipment for the Siberian pipeline, and they're going ahead with it anyway. Since you seem to be about to make a new deal with the Soviets on grain and want to continue that, what do you think is happening to the allied relationship, and do you have any second thoughts about the pipeline?

A. No, no second thoughts. I know that we—we discussed this at great length in both the [economic] summit and NATO meetings when I was in Europe with them. We know their position. We know that several of their—or some of their governments insist that contracts had been made before the Polish situation and that, therefore, they felt obligated to go forward with them.

In December, we announced that, from our standpoint, this would be one of the steps that we would take because of what we think is Soviet pressure causing this repressive government in Poland and the actions that have taken place there.

We have made it clear that there are things that if the military government should soften and go away, if the military government should release all of the people, including Lech Walesa, if they should reopen conversations with Solidarity, we'd be very happy to review our position with regard to the pipeline.

You mentioned grain in connection with that. Let me point out that there are a couple of very important differences in the two situations. We refused to enter into negotiations for the renewal of a long-term grain compact with the Soviet Union because of the Polish situation. We continued simply on a year-to-year basis selling it. But the differences that I mentioned are that, first the technology for the pipeline is mainly only obtainable from the United States. Grain, the Soviet Union can get in other places, if they want it. So, we wouldn't be achieving very much if we had used that as it was used back a couple of years ago by the previous administration with regard to the Afghanistan invasion. It didn't hurt the Soviet Union, but it was a terrible economic blow to our farmers. The other element is that grain will result in the Soviet Union hav-

ing to pay out hard cash, and they're not too flush with that right now.

The pipeline, when finished, will result in the Soviet Union getting hard cash, which it does not now have and which it can then use to further build up its military might. Now, we think that these are two very important differences with regard to both of these, and we will very shortly be announcing our position with regard to grain, in case that might be—

Q. What about the allies' relationship, though?

A. Yes. Let me say also that that same Helmut Schmidt has made a remark even on his visit back here that indicates that—just what I feel. When I say we have a better relationship, we do. This is kind of like a fight inside a family, but the family is still a family. We know that we're bound together in a great many ways. And in these—the recent European trip—we solidified agreements having to do with protectionism, having to do with curbing low-interest loans to the Soviet Union that were literally subsidizing their ability to continue their military buildup, and so forth. No, I feel that we do have a fine relationship. We know, and we came home knowing, that there was disagreement on this particular thing.

Q. I would like to stay with foreign policy but turn to the Middle East. I wondered what effect you believe the constant, day-after-day bombing by the Israelis and shelling by the Israelis in Beirut is having on your efforts and your special envoy Mr. Habib's [Ambassador Philip C. Habib, the President's special emissary to the Middle East] efforts to try to bring some kind of a settlement? And, secondly, Mr. Habib has been there nearly 7 weeks. Can you give us some idea what progress, if any, he is making?

A. There is nothing we would like more than to see an end to the bloodshed and the shelling. But I must remind you it has also been two-way. The PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] has been, and in some instances, has been the first to break the cease-fire. That we would like to see ended, of course. And we still stay with our original purpose—that we want the exodus of the armed PLO out of Beirut

and out of Lebanon. Mr. Habib has been making a tour of countries to see if we can get some help in temporary staging areas for those people. We want the central government of Lebanon to once again—after several years of almost dissolution—to once again be the authority with a military force, not several militias belonging to various factions in Lebanon. Then we want the foreign forces, Israeli and Syrian both, out of Lebanon.

Ambassador Habib has been doing a magnificent job. I don't comment on specifics because I know how sensitive these negotiations are, and sometimes you lose some ground that you think you gained; sometimes you gain again. I still remain optimistic that the solution is going to be found.

As I say, he has returned from that trip to other countries, some of the other Arab states and to Tel Aviv. Contrary to some reports or rumors today, there are no deadlines that have been set of any kind. There is an unsubstantiated report now that another cease-fire has gone into effect. Let's hope it will hold. He continues to believe it is worthwhile to continue the negotiations, and I think he's entitled to our support.

Q. You said that you wanted the bombing stopped, if I understood you correctly. Have you conveyed your feelings to Prime Minister [Menahem] Begin?

A. What I should say is: We want the bloodshed and the conflict to stop. I hesitate to say anything further about where we are in those on who might be providing the stumbling block, now, to the steps that I just outlined that are necessary to bring peace there. So I can't go beyond that except to say that unless and until Ambassador Habib tells me that there is nothing more to be negotiated and that he can't solve it, I'm going to continue to be optimistic.

Q. A question concerning a member of your Cabinet, Secretary [of the Interior James] Watt. You recently had to disavow some comments by him when he suggested that U.S. support for Israel might be curtailed if American Jews do not support your energy policy. Mr. Watt, in a letter to Congress, suggests that American troops might have to fight in the Middle East if there is any interference with the vast new offshore oil drilling. Is Secretary Watt reflecting your views? Is he reflecting the foreign policy of the Administration? Or, as Senator [Daniel P. of New York]

Moynihn suggests, has he embarrassed your Administration and is someone who should be fired?

A. No, he should not be fired. As I say, the whole context of his letter and the opening statement you made from that letter, or paraphrasing of it, was the result of a conversation with Ambassador Arens, a lengthy discussion of this subject at a social gathering the night before. As many of us do, you go home and you think of a couple of points you haven't made, and he made them. What he was suggesting, with regard to the danger to Israel, was our vulnerability as long as we are dependent on oil energy from insecure sources; that if there should be, as we once had, an embargo, we should find ourselves without the energy needed to turn the wheels in this country, the wheels of industry. We wouldn't be much of an ally to our friends, and that would certainly include Israel. He was making it very plain that we are morally obligated to the support of Israel.

Today, he made a speech to a group in New York; I believe it was B'nai B'rith. I understand that in outlining his whole position and where he stands, that this audience was most enthusiastic and supportive of what he had to say. His letter to the Congressmen—I think he was only trying to make the example that some of those who had been the most outspoken up there have also been the—had the most objections to us trying to improve our energy situation. What he was pointing out is—where would the Western world be if someday our source of supply was purely there in the Persian Gulf and it was denied to us. So, this was his dramatic statement about the other. But I think he's also expressed the wish that he had second thoughts.

Q. What role do you envision for mainland China in American strategic planning in East Asia and along the Soviet border, and what are your plans for arms sales to Taiwan?

A. We want to continue developing the relationship that was started some years ago by President [Richard] Nixon with the People's Republic of China. But at the same time, they know very well our position, and it has not changed. We are not going to abandon our long time friends and allies on Taiwan, and I'm going to carry out the terms of the Taiwan Relations Act. This has been made clear. We have no secret agreements of any other kind or anything that should cause the government or the people of Taiwan to have any concern about that. It is a moral obligation that we'll keep.

Q. Earlier this year there was a good deal of discussion about a possible summit with Mr. [Leonid] Brezhnev. On one occasion you said it was, "in the works." Now, this issue seems to have faded, and I wondered what you anticipate in the way of a summit this year?

A. I don't know whether it's going to be this year or next or at all. That's going to depend on—it takes two to tango. I had suggested—with the belief that he was possibly coming to the U.N. meeting, as you know—that while he was here that we have a meeting just as I had with some of the other Heads of State who were here. It developed he wasn't coming. And this led to the talk of a possible summit.

A summit isn't the answer or the cure for everything that's wrong in the world. But it has to be carefully planned. An agenda has to be set and that begins with foreign ministers meeting. When I say that it's in the works, I can only tell you that our State Department has been communicating with the Soviet Union with regard to this. There have been no positive replies or steps. Indication of interest is all. We continue, and if at such time we know that there is an agenda—and there is a real purpose in having this—we'll have a summit.

Q. As you've said before and as your spokesmen have been saying, the PLO Chief [Yasir] Arafat has not yet met the conditions that the U.S. Government has set for direct talks with you. However, do you think that Mr. Arafat is moving in that direction? And would you welcome such a development?

A. I think it would be a step forward in progress if the PLO would change the position it has had; that is, that Israel must be destroyed or that it has no right to exist as a nation. What that would require is agreeing to abide by U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338, agreeing that Israel is a nation and does have a right to exist. Then I would feel that the United States could enter into discussions with the PLO. I'm not speaking for Israel. That's up to them, and we could not speak for them. But we're there as an intermediary offering our services to try and help bring about peace in the Middle East.

Q. Would you also, then, support an independent Palestinian state, which is what the PLO wants?

A. That, again, I think is up to the negotiators. We wouldn't impose anything on them, but Egypt and Israel—under the Camp David agreement—are supposed to enter into now an area of talking of autonomy for the Palestinians. That, again, is something that has been delayed because of this tragedy in Lebanon. I think that is up to them as to how that autonomy develops and what they see as a proper solution to the Palestinian problem.

Q. Critics have said that there is no progress on human rights in El Salvador nor progress on land reform. The government there has yet to cooperate in the investigation of the four American missionaries who were killed there. Can you explain why you decided to go ahead with the certification, the approval for continued military aid to El Salvador, and why people should not think you're sending the wrong message to the right-wing forces there?

A. The State Department issued the certification, and in the next few days, they will be having witnesses, observers, who will be testifying as to why they certified that the Salvadoran Government is making progress in improving the human rights situation there.

I grant you that things—I'm quite sure that there are unfortunate things that are going on and that are happening. The idea is, are they legitimately and in good faith making progress in trying to solve that—resolve that? That's what the testimony will be, that they are.

With regard to land reform, yes, there was a flurry when the new government first took over. But I, again, would like to call your attention to the great turnaround and the exposure of what has been disinformation and outright false propaganda for so long about El Salvador and the fight down there. That was exposed in the turnout of people, who in the face of guerrilla ambushes, guerrilla threats against their lives, went to the polls to vote for order in government. I said there was a flurry about land reform. I understand that that has turned around, that there are thousands of people who have been given the deeds to their plots of land now, and that there are several hundred pending.

U.S. Approach to Problems in the Caribbean Basin

Secretary Shultz's statement before the Senate Finance Committee on August 2, 1982.¹

We all know we live in a troubled world. We also know that the United States as a great nation must face up to these troubles and do its part to try to resolve them. I am here to testify today about an innovative and creative program which this Administration is proposing to address the problems of our immediate neighbors to the south—the Caribbean Basin.

The security and well-being of the countries of the Caribbean and Central America are vital to the United States and to the Western Hemisphere as a whole. Their crisis today is many sided and involves both emergency and long-term problems. Our response is comprehensive and integrated with regard to the problems and needs of individual countries and also with regard to the contributions they and their other neighbors—Canada, Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela—can make to resolve their problems. The President's Caribbean Basin initiative is an outstanding example of the steadiness and seriousness with which we view our relations with the other countries of the Americas.

Urgent Need for the Initiative

When I learned of the President's initiative, I was in the private sector. At the time, I thought it was the right medicine. Since then I have seen that the problems are even more severe than I imagined. The program is not just good medicine; it is vital.

We are talking about an area which is of crucial and immediate concern to our own self-interest. You need only glance at a map to see that it is indeed our third border. If this area should be dominated by regimes hostile to us or if it becomes the scene of prolonged social upheavals, the impact on our own economy and society would, indeed, be of major proportions. Let me give just a few examples of how closely we are linked with the basin countries.

First, the sea lanes of the Caribbean are a lifeline of our trade—one-half of all our imports and exports pass through this region, including three-quarters of our oil imports.

Second, many of our people have

roots in the area. One out of five people alive today who were born in Barbados live in the United States; the same is true for one out of six Jamaicans, and one out of ten Salvadorans.

Third, given proximity and existing ties, the United States is a natural safehaven for those fleeing social and economic pressures in the basin. These pressures create illegal immigration, itself a great problem for us. The basin area is now the second largest place of origin of illegal immigration.

Fourth, the Caribbean is now a \$7 billion market.

Clearly then, we have an enormous stake in helping our neighbors achieve economic and political stability.

When President Reagan announced this program on February 24 before the Organization of American States, and when he transmitted this legislation to the Congress on March 17, he stressed that there is an economic crisis in the Caribbean Basin that threatened our own well-being and the peace and prosperity of the whole hemisphere. That crisis has not gone away. In fact, it has deepened. These small countries to our south are acutely vulnerable to developments in the world economy. Over the last few years they have seen dramatic reversals in their terms of trade, as their oil and other imports have increased in price and their traditional exports have fallen in price. The worldwide slowdown in economic growth has choked off opportunities for developing new types of exports to the world market, as well as cut into tourism which has been an important source of foreign exchange for them.

As a result they are not able to earn enough foreign exchange to pay for the imports they need. The productive base in these countries, already inadequate to provide the jobs and products which their populations need, is being eroded by acute shortages of spare parts and by the lack of raw materials and agricultural inputs. The result is a rise in unemployment and underemployment which is of truly major proportions—25% to 40% in many countries. Added to the evils of inflation, spiraling foreign debt, and major balance-of-payments problems, it amounts to an almost classic recipe for social discontent and loss of confidence in the future.

This is the kind of environment upon

which the extreme and violent minorities on both sides of the political spectrum can feed and produce major political and social upheavals. It is an extraordinary tribute to the strength of democratic and humane traditions in the region that the vast majority of countries in the area are governed by democratically elected governments. In the last 5 months, since the time that the President announced the program on February 24, elections have been held and new democratic governments chosen in six countries. Many of the countries in this region have strong new leadership which is committed to adjusting the structure of their economies to reflect the hard new economic realities which they face. The Caribbean Basin initiative is aimed at helping these countries to implement the painful but unavoidable reforms which can reverse the deterioration and lead to self-sustaining growth. Its purpose is to help restore the faith of their peoples in their countries' ability to provide them with a better future.

Integration of Economic Programs

The program which the Administration has proposed to the Congress for the Caribbean Basin addresses the enormous economic problems in the area in a comprehensive way. It is an innovative program in several ways.

First, it integrates three types of economic programs—trade opportunities, investment incentives, and aid. Each of these elements provides significant benefits. Even more importantly, each element reinforces the other. The emergency financial assistance will help countries cope with their short-term balance-of-payments and liquidity problems. The one-way free trade area and the investment tax credit will give long-term incentives for new investment to promote self-sustaining growth. The program as a whole is greater than the sum of its parts. We need to maintain the integrity of each element to insure the effectiveness of the program as a whole.

Second, this program is part of a major multilateral effort, particularly by Canada, Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela. These four countries have already implemented improved programs of financial and technical assistance, as well as expanded new trade opportunities to the countries of this region. Their effort is impressive. It is particularly impressive since three of these countries are still developing countries themselves. Their effort is based on the perception—which we all share—

that we cannot ignore the events in our neighborhood and that—to insure our own long-term prosperity and stability—we must assist our neighbors to achieve the same goals themselves.

Third, this program was developed out of a continuing process of consultations with the countries in the region. It reflects their own priorities and assessments of their particular needs, as well as their own efforts and programs. It is thus very much a cooperative program and not a unilateral plan imposed by Washington.

The program was also developed in close cooperation with Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands and includes important features to assure that the territories share fully in the renewed economic growth in the region. For this reason I am deeply concerned about the potential impact on the territories of the curtailment of tax benefits recently adopted by this committee.

Trade and Investment Provisions

Let me spend just a few minutes on the trade and investment provisions in the legislation since these aspects are of particular interest to the committee. We already provide liberal entry into our market for much of the trade from basin countries. But there are several important limitations. First, some of the duties which remain in place are in sectors of special interest to the basin countries. And in other cases the duties which remain in place limit expansion into new and nontraditional export products. Second, a large part of the basin's present duty-free entry into our market comes from the generalized system of preferences (GSP). However, the GSP has ceilings on duty-free benefits, as well as product exclusions; these were established in the program largely for global reasons that are not relevant to the Caribbean Basin. These limitations, and the whole complex structure of the GSP, limits the ability of small and relatively inexperienced traders—which is often the case for the Caribbean Basin—to take advantage of the GSP opportunities.

The Administration's proposal asks for duty-free treatment for all products from the basin except textiles and apparel. The proposal includes safeguards to provide relief to any U.S. industry seriously injured by increased basin imports. There are also provisions to protect the U.S. domestic sugar price support program where necessary. The proposal also includes a requirement for minimum local content to insure that the free trade area does not encourage mere

"pass-through" operations involving little value added in the basin countries.

This proposal is a carefully balanced package which provides major benefits to the Caribbean Basin countries but also safeguards essential U.S. economic interests. It is dramatic and simple. While the economic benefits of the free-trade area are long term, the offer of an unimpeded U.S. market to those small nations is a major political commitment with immediate impact. It will strongly encourage sound internal economic policies in order to take full advantage of this offer. This proposal relies on the market and not on artificial incentives. It eliminates duty barriers to our market, and thus it allows the enormous size of the U.S. market in itself to provide enormous and continuing incentives for investment, innovation, and risk taking in the Caribbean Basin.

The Administration is also proposing extension of the domestic tax credit to the Caribbean Basin. U.S. investors would receive a credit up to 10% of the amount of new fixed asset investment in the basin countries. The system would operate in much the same fashion as does the credit granted domestically. We would grant this benefit for a 5-year period to countries which enter into executive agreements with the United States for tax administration purposes.

This incentive, particularly when combined with the free-trade proposal, should have an important impact on U.S. investors' perceptions about the Caribbean Basin. In some cases the risks of investment in the basin have been perceived as high, especially when coupled with the startup costs of developing new markets and marketing channels, training new local employees and managers, and overcoming transportation bottlenecks. The tax incentive promises a better return to U.S. business which undertakes investment in the basin and thus should increase investment there.

I know that there is some concern that these proposals will damage production and employment opportunities in the United States. I can understand that concern, particularly given the period of slow economic growth and budget austerity through which we are passing at present. But I believe these concerns are exaggerated. First, we are such a big economy compared to those of the Caribbean Basin that what looms large in the basin will still have a small impact here. The combined gross national product (GNP) of all of the Caribbean Basin countries amounts to less than 2% of our GNP. Our imports from the Caribbean Basin account for less than 4% of

our total imports worldwide. The imports that would be affected by our free-trade proposal are at present less than one-half of 1% of our total imports—or two-hundredths of 1% (.0002) of our GNP. I really do not expect that this region will have a serious negative impact on our producers and workers even if imports from that region should grow at explosive rates. Nevertheless, as I noted before, we have proposed in the legislation certain safeguard provisions to deal with those cases where serious injury might occur or might be threatened.

Second, I also want to emphasize that the long-term benefits of this initiative are far greater than the short-term costs. The region already buys nearly \$7 billion of goods from the United States. A stable, democratic, and prosperous Caribbean Basin means a much larger and growing market for our exports and consequently significantly greater job opportunities for our workers.

Conclusion

I appreciate that the legislation we have proposed is complex and controversial. I appreciate that the legislative process on such a bill is necessarily time consuming and complicated. I also appreciate that the Congress is carrying a heavy burden of important, indeed urgent, legislative work. Nevertheless, I urge that this piece of legislation be given priority attention. The needs of the Caribbean Basin are urgent. The United States has an opportunity to play a constructive role in helping these countries shape a better future. That opportunity is there now, but it will not be there forever. We cannot afford to wait. We have already waited too long.

Our security and our credibility are at stake. The tragic war in the South Atlantic has led some hemispheric friends—mistakenly I believe—to challenge our commitment to them as a partner. We must show them this is not so. We must do our part. If we do not, the problems will escalate, not only in the Caribbean Basin but elsewhere in the hemisphere as well.

I ask for your own strong leadership, as well as the leadership and commitment of all the distinguished members of this committee, to insure rapid passage of this program.

¹Press release 234. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

U.S. Approach to East-West Economic Relations

by Charles Meissner

Statement before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the House Appropriations Committee on July 21, 1982. Ambassador Meissner is Special Negotiator for Economic Matters for the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs.¹

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before your committee to discuss our approach to East-West economic relations and help put these in the broader context of overall U.S. foreign policy objectives toward the Warsaw Pact countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

Many of the Warsaw Pact countries are experiencing major economic difficulties that are not likely to be resolved over the short-term: sharply reduced growth rates, mounting production and administrative bottlenecks, falling exports, rising inflation, and declining standards of living. Some of the problems are the result of government mismanagement and poor investment choices, as in Poland. Others can be traced to recession in the major Western markets and rising commodity prices, particularly oil. The economic difficulties were masked for a while by the increasing flow of Western private bank and government-backed credits into the region which permitted Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union to maintain crucial import levels and public consumption. The Polish financial crisis and subsequent private bank retrenchment have removed this source of support, leaving a number of Eastern European countries, dependent like many debtors on new borrowing to pay off old debts, with acute debt service problems. These countries now have no choice but to undertake necessary economic adjustment measures to help bolster hard currency earning power and bring debt levels under control. The speed and effectiveness of their reform efforts is of major importance to the West as principal creditor.

Current Policy

While the Warsaw Pact countries belong to a common alliance and are, thus, frequently viewed as a monolithic bloc, it is important to point out that there are

great differences of history, language, culture, natural endowment, and economic development distinguishing first, the Soviet Union from Eastern Europe, and secondly, the Eastern European countries themselves.

For more than 20 years, our foreign policy has reflected this diversity. The Soviet military presence in many of the countries, the close economic links, and the longstanding ties between the Soviet Communist Party and the Eastern European parties put the Soviet Union in a unique position. But the United States has sought to encourage Eastern European countries to pursue their own national identities and more liberal economic, political, and social policies independent of the Soviet Union. We believe the U.S. Government can have an important impact on the region provided it tailors its political and economic policies to individual country circumstances and deals with each country on its own merits. Our experience shows that U.S. and allied security interests are best served by a prudent overall approach to East-West relations.

On the economic front, the U.S. discriminates against all the Warsaw Pact countries in comparison with the trade and economic benefits accorded other nations. However, we grant more favorable treatment to those Eastern European countries which either demonstrate independence *vis-a-vis* the Soviets in their foreign policies—Romania, or in domestic policies—Hungary.

Based on these two criteria, it is our policy to grant certain economic benefits like most-favored-nation (MFN) tariff treatment, export licensing, and the extension of official Export-Import Bank and Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) credits to encourage more liberal policies, and deny preferential treatment and/or impose specific economic sanctions on countries which either pose a threat to U.S. security interests or whose policies are repugnant to us.

This Administration came into office believing—and it continues to believe—that East-West relations must be a two-way street. Neither the Soviet Union nor any of its Eastern European allies can expect to continue business-as-usual with us in the economic realm if they attempt to solve political problems in other sovereign countries by force or encourage violations of human rights in

disregard of their obligations as signatories of the Helsinki Final Act.

We have sought wherever possible to coordinate our foreign economic policies toward the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe with those of our European and Japanese allies, whose economic ties with the East are more extensive than our own. This has not always been easy, but without coordinated economic policies that are perceived to serve Western interests as a whole, U.S. action will probably not prove effective. The Versailles summit constituted a significant, positive step forward in better allied management of East-West economic relations. The summit countries agreed to "pursue a prudent and diversified economic approach to the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe, consistent with our political and security interests," and to "handle cautiously financial relations with the U.S.S.R. and other East European countries in such a way as to ensure that they are conducted on a sound economic basis . . ." We and our allies pledged specifically to:

- Improve—within COCOM [Coordinating Committee for East-West Trade Policy]—the international system for controlling exports of strategic goods to Warsaw Pact countries and national arrangements for the enforcement of security controls;
- Strengthen the exchange of information in the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] on all aspects of allied economic, commercial, and financial relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe; and
- Review periodically developments in Western economic and financial relations with the East.

Of course, much work remains to be done to strengthen Western cooperation on economic issues, reduce self-defeating competition for Eastern markets, and protect Western economic-financial interests in the face of the severe economic crisis now afflicting the Warsaw Pact countries. We are heartened, however, by the progress that has already been made.

Polish Sanctions

I would like to turn briefly to a review of recent U.S. foreign policy measures involving Poland, which, more than any other country, illustrates our approach to East-West economic relations. Until the Polish Government's declaration of martial law December 1981, Poland had received the great preponderance of

U.S. assistance to the Warsaw Pact countries, including access to substantial CCC and Exim direct credits and guarantees. This assistance was based on our longstanding close and friendly relations with the Polish nation and was considered vital in support of the reform and renewal process spearheaded by Solidarity, but it was halted December 30 when the President imposed economic sanctions against the Polish military government and the Soviet Union following the martial law crackdown. Our NATO allies subsequently joined the United States in imposing sanctions on both countries. Among measures taken multilaterally against Poland were cessation of new official credits and suspension of consideration of 1982 debt rescheduling negotiations.

We and our allies have continued humanitarian assistance to the Polish people, however, and the President has made it clear from the outset that we are ready to end our sanctions and provide substantial new economic and financial assistance to Poland if the regime satisfies the three NATO conditions: releasing the political detainees, ending martial law, and reopening a meaningful dialogue with the church and Solidarity. Unfortunately, we have seen little indication thus far that the government is prepared to make meaningful steps either toward reconciliation or toward reinvigorating the faltering economy.

Polish Debt

Meanwhile, allied sanctions toward Poland have been highly effective in maintaining economic pressure on both the Polish Government and the Soviet leadership. With no new Western credits going to Poland, and with Poland being pressed to repay its debt, there is a new financial flow from Poland to the West, and the Soviets have been obliged to transfer significant amounts of real resources to Poland to prevent further economic deterioration.

With hard currency debt service obligations to Western governments and private banks amounting to some \$11.0 billion in 1982, or 160% of Poland's expected foreign exchange earnings in 1982, Poland is in dire need of both new Western credits and debt relief if it is to avoid either further sharp cutbacks in crucial imports and an accelerated decline in economic growth, or a substantial accumulation of debt arrearages. It is, thus, clearly in Poland's economic interest to take steps to satisfy Western political demands.

Some have suggested that we could exert even more pressure on Poland and the Soviet Union by declaring official Polish debts in default. While this option remains in reserve, a declaration of default against Poland, at this time, is clearly contrary to both our economic and foreign policy interests:

- Poland could view a declaration of default as a political act to be countered with a politically motivated repudiation of its debt to those creditors which had called default. Accordingly, declaring default would take economic pressure off the Polish Government. Moreover, a declaration of default would have no impact on the flow of private or government credits to Poland since leaders have already shut off the loan tap.

- Our NATO allies strongly agree with our rationale for not declaring Poland in default at the present time. Should the United States unilaterally declare Poland in default, it is highly unlikely that the Europeans would follow suit. The result would be another fissure in allied unity at a time when the alliance is wrestling to resolve several contentious financial and trade issues.

- A U.S. declaration of default could also increase the U.S. budget deficit and have an adverse impact on the sales of U.S. agricultural commodities abroad at a time of record U.S. surpluses. U.S. banks, for example, could request immediate payment from the CCC on all government-guaranteed loans and would probably also write off their nonguaranteed Polish loans, thus reducing their Federal tax liabilities. In addition, banks might become increasingly reluctant to participate in the CCC export program at a time when our major agricultural competitors are pursuing highly aggressive marketing strategies.

Extension of Sanctions Toward Soviet Union

In order to increase indirectly the pressure on Poland and advance our objective of reconciliation, the President announced June 18 his decision to extend the December sanctions imposed on the export of oil and gas equipment to the Soviet Union to include equipment produced by subsidiaries of U.S. companies abroad as well as equipment produced abroad under licenses issued by U.S. companies. The Soviet Union bears a heavy responsibility for the repressive

policies of the Polish regime, and we hope by this action to put further pressure on the Soviets to restore the reform and renewal process in Poland.

While the extension of U.S. sanctions has been unpopular in Western Europe and Japan, we hope our allies will come to view this action as a concrete demonstration of our resolve to take a firm position with respect to our economic relations with the Soviets as long as there is no improvement in the situation in Poland. We have assured our allies that the United States does not desire to promote economic warfare against either the Soviet Union or other Warsaw Pact countries. But we do believe that because of shared political and security objectives, neither the U.S. foreign economic policy nor that of our allies should treat Warsaw Pact nations on a business-as-usual basis.

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Export Sanctions on Gas and Oil Equipment

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, JUNE 18, 1982¹

I have reviewed the sanctions on the export of oil and gas equipment to the Soviet Union imposed on December 30, 1981, and have decided to extend these sanctions through adoption of new regulations to include equipment produced by subsidiaries of U.S. companies abroad, as well as equipment produced abroad under licenses issued by U.S. companies.

The objective of the United States in imposing the sanctions has been and continues to be to advance reconciliation in Poland. Since December 30, 1981, little has changed concerning the situation in Poland; there has been no movement that would enable us to undertake positive, reciprocal measures.

The decision taken today will, we believe, advance our objective of reconciliation in Poland.

¹Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of June 21, 1982. ■

Preserving Nuclear Peace in the 1980s

by Paul Wolfowitz

Address at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, on June 22, 1982. Mr. Wolfowitz is Director of the Policy Planning Staff.

I have been asked to talk today about prospects for the 1980s. Talking about the future, however, is a hazardous business. Imagine, for example, a similar discussion here at the Naval War College 40 years ago in 1942. The speaker no doubt discussed our prospects in the war we had just entered. He perhaps speculated on the world order that would follow the hoped-for Allied victory. If he were particularly prescient, he might even have foreseen that the great fact of the postwar era would be the U.S.-Soviet rivalry.

But there is no way that he could have foretold how decisions that were being made almost as he spoke would transform the history of the 1940s and of every decade thereafter, including our own. Forty years ago last Thursday, on June 17, 1942, President Roosevelt received a report from Vannevar Bush describing the possibilities of producing a nuclear weapon that could be employed decisively in combat. Under any of four possible methods, Bush told the President, such a weapon might be produced in time to influence the outcome of the ongoing war. The next day, President Roosevelt approved Bush's report and the Army Engineer Corps was directed to create a new unit that has become familiar in history as the Manhattan Project.

Neither Roosevelt nor Bush could have foreseen just how the project they undertook that day would alter the way the world would think of war—and the way it would think of peace. It was the source of a concern that has become most urgent today, a concern that will affect the rest of human history. It is the question that I would like to address today: What are the prospects of preserving the nuclear peace?

That question is not only a matter of intense current debate; it is also as important as any other question we can ask about the future. And it is a much broader question than might be immediately apparent. In fact, if there is one thought that I would like to leave

you with today, it is this: The prospects for preventing nuclear war depend on far more than just what we do about nuclear weapons themselves. They depend also on what we do to reduce the many local sources of conflict in the world and on what we do to promote possibilities of peaceful change. And they depend on what we do to restrain the Soviet use of force to exploit these sources of conflict.

The Problems of a Nuclear Freeze

Recently it has become almost commonplace to contemplate the horror of the nuclear threat. And the reaction has been, appropriately enough, a strong expression of revulsion and dread. But along with that reaction there is often a corollary suspicion, a suspicion that those who attempt to analyze nuclear policies—who deal in such abstractions as “balance,” “vulnerability,” and “survivability”—must be somehow blind to the awful reality of nuclear war. The idea seems to be that the solution is clear and simple. It does not require painstaking analysis of the complexities of nuclear deterrence or the hard lessons of the old problem of war and peace.

The deep yearning for simple solutions is understandable, but it is dangerous. Concern about nuclear war is not what divides us, and concern alone is not a license to ignore the complexities of nuclear deterrence or the realities of international relations. For example, the current call for negotiating a freeze on the production, testing, and deployment of nuclear weapons (and their delivery systems) is an appealingly simple idea but, unfortunately, one which dangerously fails to answer the complexities of our situation. What divides the opponents of a nuclear freeze from the proponents is not disagreement about the danger of nuclear war but disagreement about how best to avert that danger. The question to ask about a nuclear freeze, as about any other proposal, is: Will it make us safer, or will it actually increase the danger?

Proponents of the freeze often tend to assume that the situation is growing more dangerous with each passing day. Therefore, the reasoning goes, a freeze will at least keep things from getting worse.

The hostility to new military technology is understandable. After all, it is technology that brought us nuclear weapons. But not all technological developments have increased our peril. Technological changes have actually made nuclear weapons less prone to accident, less vulnerable to terrorists, and less susceptible to unauthorized use. By making nuclear delivery systems less vulnerable, new technology can reduce the danger of hair-trigger responses or surprise attack, as nuclear propulsion for submarines has done in the past and as advanced aircraft technology may do in the future.

Is the purpose of the freeze to stop nuclear forces from becoming ever more destructive? In fact, changes in our nuclear forces have made it possible to reduce the total megatonnage of our strategic nuclear forces by almost 30% in the last 10 years and by roughly 60% from the peak levels of 1960.

Is the purpose of negotiating a freeze to stop those changes that could make our deterrent forces more vulnerable? Our land-based missiles are already vulnerable, and a nuclear freeze would do nothing to stop improvements in Soviet conventional air defense or anti-submarine warfare capabilities that could threaten our bombers and submarines. But a freeze would prevent us from replacing those forces that are already vulnerable, or those that might become vulnerable in the future, with different, more secure ones.

In sum, the hard and complex question is whether a freeze would increase or decrease the chances of war. Just as there can be stabilizing as well as destabilizing weapons, so there can be both stabilizing and destabilizing arms control proposals.

What Could Cause a Nuclear War?

The desire for a simple solution to the danger of nuclear war, however, produces not only an overly simple version of arms control but perhaps the greatest oversimplification of all—the preoccupation with nuclear weapons themselves. Nuclear weapons have transformed

human history by transforming the nature and consequences of war. But they have changed the basic causes of war very little, if at all. Nuclear weapons have raised the possibility that war might start because of an accidental use of weapons, something that has no parallel in history. And nuclear weapons have made the age-old problem of surprise attack far more dangerous than in previous periods of history. Making these weapons safer and less vulnerable is, therefore, of the greatest importance.

But if we concentrate too much on the weapons themselves, we may neglect what I believe is an even greater danger. The danger that a conventional war between the Soviet Union and the United States, perhaps one very local in its origins, might escalate into a nuclear catastrophe. Even complete, verifiable nuclear disarmament could not remove the knowledge that nuclear weapons can be built. Global conventional war, therefore, will always raise the nuclear danger. The genie is out of the bottle. It may, we hope, be tamed and controlled, but it can never be put back in.

What we do to prevent war of any kind between the superpowers is, therefore, as important as what we do about nuclear weapons themselves. In fact, decisions about nuclear weapons—both our own military planning and in arms control negotiations—should be judged as much by how they affect the likelihood of such a conventional war as by any other standard.

There is, unfortunately, plenty of historical evidence about how conventional wars begin and how they escalate.

- The train of events that led from the terrorist incident at Sarajevo to the conflagration called World War I shows that small wars between minor countries can become much bigger ones when outside powers have a stake in the outcome.

- Misunderstandings also lead to war, whether by communicating exaggerated threats or by conveying inadequate warnings (as in the British failure to make clear their determination to fight in 1914).

- The examples of Korea and Afghanistan, to name just two cases, are reminders that military weakness can create opportunities for expansionist powers to commit aggression.

- And the disastrous history of the 1930s—strewn with broken commitments from the Rhineland to Austria

to Munich—provides tragic evidence that failure to maintain commitments can both mislead adversaries into confrontation and force potential allies to make dangerous accommodations.

The evidence from the past about how wars are started or prevented is not rendered obsolete by the nuclear threat. Indeed, it is made more urgent.

Models of East-West Relations

The past decade has seen increasing Soviet use of force, both directly and by proxy. Constructing effective restraints on that use of force is the central task we face as we work to preserve peace in the 1980s. For that reason, let me concentrate today on the problem of East-West relations. This Administration has been criticized both for paying too much attention to East-West relations and for paying too little attention to preventing nuclear war. But the successful management of East-West relations is the key to preventing nuclear war.

Over the past 40 years Americans have sought to structure East-West relations around a number of different abstract models, starting with our initial disappointed expectations about Soviet participation in an international order based on the United Nations.

Spheres of Influence. At the end of World War II, many thought that a stable division of the world into spheres of influence might be possible, in which conflict would be avoided because interests would not overlap. But dividing the world into spheres of influence cannot end the competition because the dividing line itself would become the crucial point of contention.

In particular, the countries of Europe and Asia are not mere pieces of territory but are themselves crucial factors in the global balance. We recognize this when we say that one of our greatest strengths is the strength of our allies. For reasons that are Russian as well as Communist, defensive as well as offensive, the Soviets regard the independence of these countries as a threat and domination over them as essential to security.

This quest for absolute security leads the Soviets to exploit Western talk of spheres of influence only when it gives them something they do not have already. It is as if they say: "What's in my sphere is mine; what's in yours is up for grabs."

More fundamentally, the notion of spheres of influence fails to recognize that the competition is not only about

territory or material interests but about political principles as well. Soviet principles are meant to be universal, and, despite the dreary record of Communist performance, they still attract those who seek the violent transformation of society. Western principles too are universal. For instance, Poland shows the universal attractiveness of democratic ideals.

Indeed, the greatest failing of the spheres-of-influence approach is that it assumes the right and ability of superpowers to control the fate of others. The stability it seems to offer is illusory not only because the superpowers cannot agree on how to divide the world but because the peoples of the world cannot be bound by any such agreement. Curiously, no one in the West would claim for

What divides the opponents of a nuclear freeze from the proponents is not disagreement about the danger of nuclear war but disagreement about how best to avert that danger.

his country the right to deprive others of their independence, but we are often too willing to concede that right to the Soviet Union. No one in the West would give up his country's right to self-government, but we are often too willing to concede that right for the people of Eastern Europe or the Third World.

It has usually taken Soviet actions—in Korea, in Hungary, or in Afghanistan—to remind us that such a division does not produce a natural self-enforcing equilibrium among nations. But our own principles should remind us as well, for the notion of spheres of influence violates the very principle of self-government for which the West stands. And the examples of Yugoslavia, Romania, and Austria demonstrate, each in different ways, that pressure on the Soviets to accommodate to that principle, even within areas they dominate, can contribute to global stability.

Containment. The second major concept that influenced American policy toward the Soviet Union was contain-

ment. It did not make the mistake of thinking that an agreed self-enforcing division of the world could be stable. On the contrary, it claimed that the Soviet Union would move to fill every vacuum and required us to meet every such move with "unalterable counterforce." North Korea's invasion of the south lent a note of prophecy to these predictions and prescriptions which gave the doctrine of containment added force.

Nor did containment ignore the potential international consequences of domestic changes. In fact, it counted on Soviet economic and ideological weakness and the looming post-Stalin succession struggle to change the Soviet Union overnight from one of the strongest to one of the weakest and most pitiable of national societies.

Perhaps being too sanguine about internal developments within the Soviet Union led to a short-term perspective that underestimated the importance of internal developments within other countries that might create opportunities for Soviet expansion. Still less did it reckon that the Soviets might acquire radical allies far from their borders whose ideological enthusiasm and zeal for spreading violent revolution might far exceed their own.

Perhaps because containment underestimated the staying power of the

Technological changes have actually made nuclear weapons less prone to accident, less vulnerable to terrorists, and less susceptible to unauthorized use.

Soviet Union, it tended to take our own for granted. Assuming a favorable balance and practically unlimited resources made it possible to contemplate meeting every Soviet attempt at expansion with unalterable counterforce. But such an assumption is not suitable to a long-term competition in which costs must be proportionate to the stakes at risk and in which we must exploit areas of our strength or of Soviet weakness.

Detente. The third major concept that governed U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union was that of detente. It is perhaps not surprising that the exhaustion produced by the Vietnam experience led to exaggerated hopes that the nature of the U.S.-Soviet relationship could be transformed from one of competition to one of cooperation. Unlike containment, detente did not look to a transformation of the Soviet system in order to achieve this change. Detente considered internal change in Soviet society a secondary concern, though it held out the hope that such changes could best go forward in an environment of decreasing international tensions.

Instead, detente concentrated on the prospect that Soviet internal problems and desire for Western trade and technology to cope with them could be the basis for a network of relationships and vested interests that would give the Soviets a stake in restraint and cooperation. Soviet foreign policy would be transformed because the economic problems of the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe would lead them to acknowledge an economic interdependence that would add an element of stability to the political equation. It was thought that positive economic incentives for restraint could powerfully complement resistance to expansion. It was even hoped that the advent of military parity would temper Soviet militancy rather than tempt Moscow to use its increasing military capability to expand.

Detente failed for several basic reasons. We could not reshape the Soviet leaders' fundamental views of their interests simply through negotiations. Nor could we reach agreement with them on an operative code of conduct, given the deep differences between democratic and Soviet views of international morality, popular consent, and governmental legitimacy. As a prominent Soviet analyst of foreign affairs recently wrote, the "elaboration of certain more specific rules of conduct stands little practical chance of success in view of the objective factors leading to revolutionary changes in the Third World, and in light of the conflicting evaluations given to these phenomena by the capitalist and socialist countries."

Nor could we produce restraint in Soviet conduct by creating networks of relationships or webs of interdependency. The positive incentives we have to offer are not of sufficient weight to substitute for negative constraints on Soviet expansion. It is hardly surprising that this should be so with a regime as

autarchic and as revolutionary in its international aims as the Soviet Union, when we recall that the much more extensive trading relationships among the European nations failed to prevent two devastating wars. Nor do the Soviets have such a need for external legitimation that the mere fact of negotiations themselves can exert effective leverage on Soviet conduct.

Moreover, the positive aspects of East-West relations are not simply levers that we can control. Trade creates dependencies on our side as well as theirs and is something the West can regulate less easily than can the totalitarian East. Negotiations serve our interests as well as theirs.

Most importantly, however, detente failed because it undercut the negative constraints on Soviet expansion by encouraging the very hope that helped give rise to detente, the hope that the United States could retreat from the rigors and responsibilities of leadership.

The Reality of East-West Relations

Beneath the shifting theories and slogans, the reality of East-West relations has changed much less. As one commentator jokingly put it, detente often seemed to be merely the pursuit of cold war by other means—and even the means were often the same. Even at the height of the cold war, constructive and enduring agreements were made. Austria today is an independent and united country, free of Soviet occupying forces, because of the 1955 treaty. Successful arms control agreements, such as the Limited Test Ban Treaty, were achieved without the benefit of an "era of negotiations." Even at the height of detente, crises have been resolved not by codes of conduct, webs of interdependence, or Soviet desires for trade and cultural exchanges, but rather by communications and negotiations, the basic tools of diplomacy, backed up by the common desire to avoid war and by effective credible deterrence. That basic incentive for cooperation has been with us since the advent of nuclear weapons.

For all of their differences, each of those three models of U.S.-Soviet relations reflected a hope that the competition could be definitively ended, that we could stop shouldering the terrible burdens of world leadership, that we could stop depending on the terrible

great of nuclear weapons. But the reality is that neither the U.S.-Soviet competition nor nuclear weapons can be wished away.

The wish for a less competitive relationship with the Soviet Union is more understandable. But wishing will not make it so. To the contrary, unrealistic hopes can make the competition more dangerous. To think that Soviet arms may change in the near future leads us to neglect those actions necessary to maintain favorable balances and compete effectively over the long haul. To think that we can harmonize Soviet objectives with our own—whether by agreements and negotiations or by a sudden weakening of Soviet power and resolve—leads us to neglect both the fundamental differences that underlie the competition and the balances that underlie agreements.

The reality is that the competition is fundamental; it is long-term and dynamic, not short-term and static; and it is governed by the facts of the balance of power rather than regulated by agreed norms. There is, first of all, the central fact of our time—nuclear weapons. A stable nuclear balance gives both sides a vital interest in avoiding direct confrontation and seeking safer modes of competition. Other important facts that shape how the competition is waged include global and regional balances of conventional military forces.

But the balance of power, or what the Soviets call "the correlation of forces," is not just military. It includes the strengths and strains in each side's alliances, the openings and barriers to either side's influence in specific countries and regions, each side's economic needs and resources, and the domestic political support or opposition for their policies. It is these facts, often even more than military advantages, that determine which side makes decisive gains. Great changes have occurred without armies crossing borders: the triumph of communism in Cuba; the Sino-Soviet split; the expulsion of the Soviets from Egypt; the fall of the Shah of Iran.

It is these facts of the balance of power that constrain the competition, even in the absence of agreements, that are essential for successful negotiations, and that make agreements endure. Both the high side gains in the competition and how safely it is conducted are determined by the constantly shifting facts of the balance of power. Agreements can be reached to make the competition safer so long as they are based on the

facts, and they will be kept so long as the facts are maintained that make it in the interest of both sides to do so.

A recognition that the U.S.-Soviet competition is fundamentally constrained by facts rather than regulated by agreed norms enables us to adopt a businesslike and productive tone in communications

achieve safer and more favorable balances, we must address two crucial adverse trends of the past decade:

First, increased instability in the developing world, particularly in areas on which we have become dependent for energy, strategic raw materials, and

... the balance of power ... includes the strengths and strains of each side's alliances, the openings and barriers of either side's influence in specific countries and regions, each side's economic needs and resources, and the domestic political support or opposition for their policies.

with the Soviets. As the President said on Memorial Day, "We must strive to speak of them not belligerently but firmly and frankly. And that's why we must never fail to note, as frequently as necessary, the true, the wide gulf between our codes of morality." At the same time as we strive to alert world opinion to the moral character of Soviet conduct, in our dealings with the Soviets we must bear in mind that what we consider episodes of their misconduct occur not from sudden impulses of immorality but from our failure to maintain or establish conditions that effectively constrain their conduct. We will persuade them not through denunciations or appeals to shared norms but through appeal to our common interest in survival and through establishing secure military balances and regional situations as well as other effective factual constraints. As Secretary Haig has said:

The renewal of our economic and military strength, the reinvigoration of our traditional alliances, and the promotion of peaceful progress and new friendships will help to make restraint and reciprocity the most realistic options for Moscow.

Recent Trends in the East-West Balance

The fundamental reality of the East-West relationship—as a long-term dynamic competition governed by the facts of the balance of power—has not changed. But specific facts of the balance have shifted over the past decade in ways both adverse to the West and dangerous to world peace. To

vital sea routes; and

Second, two decades of steadily increasing Soviet military investment that have permitted the Soviets not only to eliminate and, in some cases, reverse U.S. strategic advantages but also:

- To increase their previous conventional superiority in Europe and Asia; and
- To develop their capability to project power far beyond their borders, especially through exploiting the radical allies they have acquired in Cuba, Libya, Vietnam, and elsewhere.

Either one of these two trends—Western dependence on unstable areas and the growth in Soviet military power—would be dangerous by itself. But the interaction of the two has produced the most dangerous phenomenon of the past decade: the increasing Soviet tendency not merely to accumulate military force but to use it, directly and by proxy, in unstable regions of the world where the West has vital interests. The Soviets supported the use of force by their allies in Angola, Ethiopia, Kampuchea, Chad, and Central America. Most disturbingly of all, they themselves invaded and occupied Afghanistan when their clients there proved unable to prevail over the opposition of the vast majority of the population.

Meeting the Challenge

If we are serious about preventing nuclear war, nothing is more important than reversing this trend toward the use of force by the Soviet Union and its proxies. That challenge requires a three-fold effort.

First, we must work to reduce the underlying causes of instability in the developing world. This requires a multiplicity of wide-ranging efforts, efforts to which we would be committed even were there no East-West competition:

- Diplomatic efforts to achieve peaceful settlements of disputes, as in the Middle East and southern Africa;
- Economic programs such as the Caribbean Basin initiative to encourage free economic development and to reduce the poverty and injustice that help to cause instability; and
- Political programs to encourage free political development and build the "infrastructure of democracy" that the President called for in his London speech.

Second, we must strengthen the restraints against Soviet use of force. For even with the greatest possible success in reducing the sources of instability, they will continue to offer the Soviets opportunities over the next decade. Success in promoting peaceful development depends on our ability to provide security against Soviet intervention.

To do so, we must first of all improve and preserve the credibility of our nuclear deterrent. But we must also urgently remedy the conventional deficiencies that we tolerated for too long—and even allowed to get worse—under the shield of a vanishing nuclear superiority. The recent fighting between

on building new partnerships with developing countries that share our interest in restraining Soviet use of force. To do so requires the global strengthening of our own conventional forces. It also requires the ability to project force in support of threatened allies, for no ally can relish the prospect of enduring an attack while being "defended" somewhere else.

It requires security assistance to countries that are the potential targets of Soviet or proxy aggression, and it requires strategic cooperation to permit our forces to operate effectively with others. Above all, it requires the restoration of confidence in American consistency and American reliability. That is why the President thought it so important to make good on our warnings over Poland by imposing sanctions.

We must also strengthen restraints against Soviet indirect use of force. The network of Soviet proxies enables the Soviets to strike at Western interests with much less cost, blame, or risk than if they acted directly. Western policy in the 1980s, therefore, must raise the costs for these regimes at as many points as possible to counteract the advantages that they possess as a network. In the long run we can work to create conditions that will make it in the interests of these regimes to adopt more independent policies, since we generally have less fundamental divergence of interests and more leverage with them than we do with the Soviets.

The third element in our response, besides reducing sources of instability and strengthening restraints on Soviet use of force, must be to seek agreements that make the competition safer. We can't end the competition and should not promise to do so. But through agreements (like the one on incidents at sea [Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas]), we can make it safer. Through arms control, we can strengthen some of the inhibitions on the use of force. Through agreements like the Austrian treaty and the Berlin agreement, we can reduce some of the specific sources of conflict. Unfortunately, intervention by the Soviet Union and its clients in recent years has added to the agenda of international concerns a large number of new regional issues: Afghanistan, Kampuchea, Angola, Central America, and the Horn of Africa. Efforts to resolve such problems are as important as arms control for preventing nuclear war.

We should treat negotiations neither as a favor to the Soviets nor as a means of fundamentally altering the nature of

their regime or their relationship with us but as an opportunity for making agreements in our interest. We cannot expect arms control negotiations and agreements in themselves to stop the Soviet Union from continuing to pursue and exploit a favorable military balance. But we can and must use them to constrain the military competition in specific ways that make both sides safer and lessen the possibility of the use of force and threats. Similarly, we cannot expect either the denial or the expansion of East-West trade to work a radical change in Soviet objectives or Soviet society. But we can make economic arrangements that are in both sides' interests, and we can avoid arrangements that expand their capacity to wage a military competition or that constrain the capacity of the West to compete effectively.

In the coming decade, we may face some exceptional opportunities to make progress on these difficult issues. A generational change in leadership may lead to greater flexibility in Soviet policy. Soviet economic problems may constrain their ability to compete and increase the weight of some of our levers if we can succeed in getting them under control.

In considering these opportunities, however, there is also a need for caution. Although it is almost un-American not to be optimistic, we need to recognize that the possibility of change in the Soviet Union in the 1980s presents us with a mixture of dangers as well as opportunities. As in the past, change in the Soviet Union need not be for the better. New leadership may be more flexible and moderate, but it could instead be bolder, more sophisticated, and more dangerous. Internal problems may cause the Soviets to relent in their military efforts, as people have predicted they will do for decades. Or they could produce attempts to compensate through military advantages. Moreover, as we saw so clearly with Khrushchev, there is no necessary connection between internal reform and moderation in Soviet foreign policy.

Despite its problems, the Soviet Union may today be even harder to reform than in the past. Ten or fifteen years ago, many observers thought that the increasingly bureaucratic evolution of the Soviet Union would make change easier. But this trend seems instead to have made it harder to reform a deeply entrenched and institutionalized system in which important centers of power can oppose initiatives from the top. We

If we are serious about preventing nuclear war, nothing is more important than reversing [the] trend toward the use of force by the Soviet Union and its proxies.

Britain and Argentina shows most clearly that even complete nuclear superiority is not a substitute for conventional forces tailored for and clearly committed to crucial missions.

Conventional deterrence also depends critically on strengthening traditional alliances in Europe and Asia and

should not base our policies on the expectation of near-term change.

A new Soviet leadership might prove more flexible in negotiations, and we should be prepared to build on such flexibility if it appears. But we should not think that we can use negotiations to manipulate the succession struggle to our advantage. Whether we view the Soviet leadership at a particular time as reputed hawks with room to maneuver, or as supposed moderates under pressure from hardliners, we must always be willing to make any agreement that would leave us safer and never be willing to accept one that would leave us—and world peace—less secure. We should not believe that we can turn what may be a Soviet "tactical maneuver" into a "lasting transformation" or we will find ourselves unprepared for and inviting a tactical shift back from accommodation to aggression. There is a great deal of difference between expecting to establish a permanently different pattern of conduct and simply creating and maintaining conditions which make the use of force unattractive for the Soviets.

Without fundamentally and permanently changing the objectives and attitudes of the Soviet regime, we can nevertheless produce an improvement in their conduct by policies that make such an improvement in their interest. That improvement will last only so long as our policies continue to maintain conditions conducive to it in an inevitably changing world. Policies of Western weakness that establish an environment or balance more favorable to Soviet aggression are likely to undo such improvement.

We owe it to ourselves, however, as well as to our principles to work for change within the Soviet empire. For the competition will end only when there is a transformation of the Soviet regime that secures the rights of its citizens. Not only our own dedication to freedom but also solemn international obligations, undertaken by the Soviets themselves, oblige us to do all we can for the cause of human rights within the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Ultimately the cause of peace demands as much. As Andrei Sakharov has said, human rights are "part and parcel of international security—the most important conditions for international trust and security are the openness of society, the observation of the civil and political rights of man."

But while we must work for such change, we cannot expect it soon to transform the nature of East-West relations. And we cannot base our policies on the expectation that it will do so.

Conclusion

Here then is what I believe: We can do more to build a just world and a safer world:

- If we are strong, than if we are weak;
- If we are respected, than if we are dismissed; and
- If we proceed with reason and courage, than if we hang back until forced to act.

Thus, the path I believe we must follow, is an arduous—and dangerous—one. But then few routes are quicker, and none are safer. I have not offered

any shortcuts, because I do not believe that any exist.

The choice before us is not between peace and freedom. We do not choose freedom at the expense of peace. By promoting freedom we build what is ultimately the most secure foundation for peace as well. Nor can we choose peace at the expense of freedom. Even surrender would not prevent wars between the totalitarian powers that would inherit the Earth. Peace and freedom are inseparable. As President Reagan said last November:

The American concept of peace goes well beyond the absence of war. We foresee a flowering of economic growth and individual liberty in a world at peace.

And only in such a world can mankind live at peace with its terrible nuclear secret. ■

The Case for Sanctions Against the Soviet Union

by James L. Buckley

*Statement before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on July 30, 1982. Mr. Buckley is Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology.*¹

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the President's decision of June 18 to expand sanctions to prevent the export of oil and gas equipment and technology to the Soviet Union. I intend to address the basis of the President's decision, the effect of the decision, and the reaction of our Western European allies.

Basis of the President's Decision

On December 29, 1981, the President imposed selected economic sanctions against the Soviet Union because of its role in the imposition of martial law and suppression of human rights in Poland. Those sanctions included the expansion of export controls on the sale of U.S. origin oil and gas equipment and technology and the suspension of all licensing of controlled exports to the Soviet Union. At that time, the President made it clear that if the repression in Poland continued, the United States would take further concrete economic and political

actions affecting our relationship. Now, some 7 months later, martial law remains in effect, political detainees continue to be held, and the free trade union movement is still suppressed.

As a consequence, the President decided on June 18 to take the further concrete steps he had warned the Soviets about last December. Therefore, he expanded the December sanctions covering oil and gas equipment and technology to foreign subsidiaries and licensees of American firms. This is an area of crucial importance to the economy of the Soviet Union because of its dependence on exports of petroleum and natural gas for hard currency earnings, as well as the significance it places on development of a vastly expanded internal gas delivery system.

The June 18 decision to expand controls to U.S. foreign subsidiaries and licensees was based on the authority granted the President, under the Export Administration Act of 1979, to prohibit exports where necessary to further, significantly, U.S. foreign policy. The act gives the President the power to prohibit exports of goods or technology that are subject to U.S. jurisdiction or exported by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.

We have taken note of the subsequent announcement of a slight relaxation of repression in Poland, as announced last week by the Polish regime. This does not meet our minimum requirements. We are, however, consulting with our allies on the implications of the Polish announcement.

Effect of the June 18 Decision

The actions taken last December had immediate effect on manufacturers and

amounts of critical Western technology for the modernization of the industrial base on which its military power depends, as well as continue to engage in foreign adventurism. It will roughly double European gas dependence on the Soviet Union, and gas is a particularly difficult fuel to replace on short notice.

As you know, the Administration, over the last year, has encouraged the allies to develop alternatives to Soviet gas to avoid any undue dependence which could make them vulnerable to

allies have voiced their concerns individually and through the commission of the European Community. The gist of their complaints has centered around their contention that our sanctions will not produce desired changes in Poland, that our actions exceed our legal jurisdiction, and that we have failed to consult with them on the sanctions.

Our allies, of course, attach greater significance to trade with the Soviet Union than we do. In addition, all of Europe has felt the pinch of the current recession. Jobs and investment related to the pipeline project were expected to provide a significant boost for hard-hit, heavy industry firms.

The President took those considerations into account in coming to his decision. He clearly recognized the effect of the economic sanctions both in Europe and in the United States. Nevertheless, the President decided that, in the face of the continuing Soviet support of the repression of the Polish people, the costs of U.S. inaction simply outweighed the sacrifices that we would have to make to bring home to the Soviets our serious-

... let me emphasize that this impact on the Soviet economy was not . . . our primary goal. We are not engaged in economic warfare with the Soviet Union . . . we seek an end to the repression of the Polish people.

workers in the United States. U.S. firms have lost at least \$800 million worth of potential business with the Soviet Union—the impact being spread across a variety of industries supplying parts for the Yamal pipeline, as well as heavy machinery and technology for other construction projects.

However, by only reaching U.S.-manufactured equipment, the December controls left open an important loophole which allowed the Soviet Union to obtain U.S.-designed equipment from foreign subsidiaries and licensees of American companies which were subject to the December sanctions. Thus, the recent expansion of those sanctions not only makes them more effective but more equitable as well.

The obvious focus of the expanded sanctions has been on exports destined for the pipeline project. Clearly, the U.S. export control actions of December 29 and June 18 have had a major impact on equipment and the construction timetable for the Siberian gas pipeline to Europe. The U.S. position on the project is well known: We believe European participation in this project is ill-advised and potentially harmful to our joint security interests.

Upon completion, the pipeline will allow the Soviets to earn, through gas sales, some \$8-\$10 billion a year in hard currency. Such earnings will allow the Soviets to continue purchasing large

Soviet pressures. The President's decision will clearly impede the construction of the pipeline, which is already behind schedule, and it will increase its cost, as well as delay the Soviet Union's plans for a dramatic expansion of its internal gas distribution system.

But let me emphasize that this impact on the Soviet economy was not, in and of itself, our primary goal. We are not engaged in economic warfare with the Soviet Union.

Above all, we seek an end to the repression of the Polish people. The sanctions imposed against the sale of oil and gas equipment increase the internal costs to the Soviet Union of the project and cause an additional strain on already thinly stretched Soviet resources. The President wants to make clear that the Soviets will bear those costs until there is real progress toward a restoration of basic human rights in Poland.

Reaction of Our Western Allies

The extension of the sanctions obviously concerns our allies and affects our relationships with them. When the President made his decision to expand the controls, it was clear that it would not be welcomed by key allied governments. Since their expansion, our European

Situation in Poland

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, JULY 21, 1982¹

We have taken note of the steps recently announced by the Polish authorities. We have not yet had an opportunity to evaluate these moves.

We note, however, that in their declaration of January 11, 1982, the foreign ministers of the Atlantic alliance called upon the Polish leadership to reestablish civil liberties and the process of reform. Specifically they urged:

- An end to the state of martial law;
- The release of those arrested; and
- Restoration of a dialogue with the church and Solidarity.

Our response to the most recent actions of the Polish authorities will require our common evaluation, together with our partners in the Atlantic alliance, of the relationship between the measures announced and the goals cited above.

¹Read to news correspondents by Department spokesman Dean Fischer. ■

ess of purpose. The President had clearly stated that he would be forced to take additional measures if the situation in Poland did not improve. It did not, and he kept his word.

Our allies have questioned the legal basis of our actions. We believe, however, that our sanctions are proper under international law. We believe that the United States can properly prescribe and enforce controls over exports and re-exports of U.S. goods and technology and over the actions of foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms. The provisions in private licensing contracts regarding compliance with U.S. controls demonstrate that these controls are a familiar and accepted part of international commerce.

With respect to our relations with our allies, many have cited the pipeline decision as the proverbial straw that will break the camel's back and lead to a damaging policy of retaliation through higher tariffs or other measures. We disagree and believe that our differences with our allies can be resolved through continued constructive consultations. We intend to work hard toward that end. I would also stress that, despite our much publicized differences, we still share a community of interests much more substantial than the issues which are in dispute at the moment. We certainly share the common goals of helping Poland achieve an end to martial law, the release of all detainees, and a re-establishment of the dialogue among the government, Solidarity, and the church.

Conclusion

I hope this overview has provided some useful background regarding the context and effect of the President's decision to expand the sanctions against the Soviet Union for their role in the repression of the Polish people. I would also like to make a few observations. There was nothing capricious about the imposition of sanctions against the Soviet Union. They were a deliberate and measured response to Soviet actions that violate the most basic norms of international behavior. Therefore, any totaling up of

economic gains and losses misses a major point, and that is the political importance of dramatizing, in a tangible way, the depth of Western disapproval and condemnation of Soviet behavior in invading, tyrannizing, and subverting other societies. In my own view, this factor alone would justify sanctions even if, in pure economic terms, the dollar costs to the West outweighed those to the Soviets.

Nor should we be surprised that our European allies have a different perspective on the utility of the sanctions we have announced. Their security concerns center on Europe and have a narrower focus than ours. We hope that the costs imposed on the Soviet Union will influence that country's attitude toward

Poland; but whether they do or not, they represent a severity of response that can help discourage Soviet adventurism elsewhere in the world, a point of great interest to the United States in view of our broader responsibilities for Western security interests.

Finally, if we are not willing to utilize timely and effective economic measures to punish aggression and thereby deter future adventurism, the ultimate cost in defense spending may be infinitely larger than the losses we are discussing today.

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Ninth Report on Cyprus

MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, JULY 21, 1982¹

In accordance with the provisions of Public Law 95-384, I am submitting the following report on progress made during the past 60 days toward reaching a negotiation settlement of the Cyprus problem.

In the course of continuing discussion of the United Nations "evaluation" of the intercommunal negotiations, the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot negotiators met on May 18, 25 and 27, June 1, 3, 24 and 29 and July 1, 6 and 8. The negotiations are now in recess with the next session scheduled for early August. Throughout recent discussions, the negotiators have carefully reviewed elements of the United Nations "evaluation" dealing with *inter alia* the possible organization of the executive structure of a federal system and the organs and powers of a federal government. The intercommunal negotiations are continuing in a serious and constructive manner.

United Nations Secretary General Perez de Cuellar met in New York on June 8 and 10 with Cypriot President Kyprianou and on June 9 with Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash. These meetings provided a further opportunity for useful discussion of the status of and developments in the intercommunal talks.

The United Nations continues to pay close attention to the Cyprus problem. In his June 1, 1982 report to the Security Council on Cyprus, a copy of which is attached, the Secretary General reviewed recent develop-

ments and emphasized that "the intercommunal talks continue to represent the best available method for pursuing a concrete and effective negotiating process." He noted that negotiations are proceeding at "a deliberate but reasonable pace" and while major substantial problems are still to be resolved, "they are being systematically reconsidered, reformulated and reduced." The Secretary General also noted the prospective need for devising solutions to unresolved constitutional and territorial issues and urged the communities to give "earnest thought" to the requirements for an agreement. We fully endorse the efforts and observations of the Secretary General and his Special Representative on Cyprus, Ambassador Hugo Gobbi.

I also note with pleasure that on June 15, 1982, the Security Council unanimously passed a resolution extending the mandate of the UN Peace-keeping Force on Cyprus (UNFICYP) to December 15, 1982. We share with other Security Council members the judgment that the continued presence of UNFICYP adds a valuable dimension of security and stability conducive to productive intercommunal negotiations.

Sincerely,

RONALD REAGAN

¹Identical letters addressed to Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of Representatives, and Charles H. Percy, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of July 26, 1982. ■

Introduction

Potential Beneficiaries of the Caribbean Basin Initiative:

- Anguilla
- Antigua and Barbuda
- The Bahamas
- Barbados
- Belize
- British Virgin Islands
- Cayman Islands
- Costa Rica
- Dominica
- Dominican Republic
- El Salvador
- Grenada
- Guatemala
- Guyana
- Haiti
- Honduras
- Jamaica
- Montserrat
- Netherlands Antilles
- Nicaragua
- Panama
- St. Christopher-Nevis
- St. Lucia
- St. Vincent and the Grenadines
- Suriname
- Trinidad and Tobago
- Turks and Caicos Islands

The following maps and charts illustrate important strategic and economic features of the Caribbean Basin. This is the term for the region comprising the shores of the Caribbean Sea as well as the islands within it. From east to west the basin extends some 2,000 miles—from the island of Barbados facing the Atlantic to Guatemala's coast on the Pacific—and from north to south some 1,200 miles—from The Bahamas to the Venezuelan and Colombian coasts. Because of geographic proximity, economic ties, migration and tourism, and shipping lanes that carry nearly half of U.S. foreign trade, the Caribbean Basin is often said to be America's third border.

The displays are limited to the countries included in the Caribbean Basin Initiative. This is the set of proposals presented by the Administration in the spring of 1982 to promote regional development and security. The initiative extends to the South American nations of Guyana and Suriname, which have strong ties and similarities

with the island countries, but does not include Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela, larger countries of the region which are also giving economic assistance to their smaller neighbors. Cuba figures in the atlas only in the maps on the military balance, political and economic alignments, and agricultural productivity.

The Caribbean Basin Initiative is based on the principles of political and economic solidarity in the Charter of the Organization of American States signed in 1948. The world economic recession of the 1970s struck the Central American and Caribbean nations with particular force. At the same time, the area came under renewed threat of Soviet-Cuban intervention. To help these nations recover and to promote world economic progress, the Administration in the Caribbean Basin Initiative (outlined in detail in the Department of State's Special Report No. 97, Background on the Caribbean Basin Initiative) proposes duty-free access to U.S. markets (with some exceptions), technical assistance, and tax incentives to encourage U.S. investment. These proposals reflect the experience of

the past 20 years, which has demonstrated the importance of an efficient economic base, international trade, and private investment for the development of poorer and smaller nations.

Trade calculations presented here are based on United Nations, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics (1979 and 1980); Inter-American Development Bank, *direction of trade statistics based on International Monetary Fund data (tape date: May 1982)*; U.S. Department of Commerce, *EM 450/455 (U.S. exports—domestic merchandise) and IM 150/155 (U.S. general imports) (December 1981)*; and *Data Resources Inc., International Trade Information Service: OECD Trade Series C, customized extraction.*

This atlas was compiled and written in the Bureau of Public Affairs by Harry F. Young and edited by Colleen Sussman.

This atlas is offered for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402

In 1945, at the end of World War II, the basin's only independent countries were Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama. As partners in the inter-American system with the United States and other hemispheric republics, these countries became charter members of the Organization of American States (OAS) founded in 1948. Most of the English-speaking basin

countries joined the OAS when they became independent.

In January 1982, Costa Rica, Honduras, and El Salvador founded the Central American Democratic Community (CADC) to promote democratic principles, free elections, social reform, and human rights, and to combat terrorism and external aggression threatening regional peace and stability. Other countries may join.

The Nonaligned Movement, a formal association of nearly 100 developing countries, professes neutrality in the East-West conflict and advocates posi-

tive measures to advance the interests of developing and dependent areas. Members vary greatly in their political and economic systems. Cuba, though allied to the U.S.S.R., has come to play a leading role in the movement.

All English-speaking basin countries belong to the Commonwealth, a voluntary association of the United Kingdom and former units of the British Empire with a program of economic and cultural cooperation and of support for Third World interests.

Independent Caribbean Basin Countries*

(dates of independence)

Before 1945

Costa Rica
Cuba
Dominican Republic
El Salvador
Guatemala
Haiti
Honduras
Nicaragua
Panama

1960-65

Jamaica (U.K.)
Trinidad and Tobago (U.K.)

1965-70

Guyana (U.K.)
Barbados (U.K.)

1970-75





The Bahamas (U.K.)
Grenada (U.K.)


1975-81

Suriname (Netherlands)
Dominica (U.K.)
St. Lucia (U.K.)
St. Vincent and the Grenadines (U.K.)
Belize (U.K.)
Antigua and Barbuda (U.K.)

* Countries in parentheses are the former colonial powers

Members of the:

-  Organization of American States
-  Central American Democratic Community
-  Commonwealth
-  Nonaligned Movement



Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative

Military Balance

The countries of the Caribbean Basin have the world's smallest military establishments relative to their size. Cuba is the exception. With a population less than one-sixth as large as Mexico's, it expends two-and-one-half times as much money for its armed forces. Hundreds of

thousands of Cubans are enrolled in paramilitary organizations. And new Soviet equipment acquired since 1975 has greatly enhanced Cuban striking power.

Soviet-bloc Military Presence*

Soviet combat troops	Country	Number
Cuban military and security technicians	Cuba	2,600
Cuban military and security technicians	Nicaragua	2,000
	Grenada	30
Soviet and East European technicians	Cuba	2,000
	Nicaragua	**

* Excludes 6,000-8,000 Soviet civilian advisers in Cuba.
 ** 70 officers in addition to other ranks.


Relative Military Strength*

Caribbean Basin:	Population (thousands)	Armed Forces (thousands)	Number of Jet Fighters
Barbados	252	0.3	0
Cuba	9,800	227.0	200
Dominican Republic	5,835	22.5	0
El Salvador	4,617	15.0	0
Jamaica	2,295	4.0	0
Guatemala	7,200	15.1	0
Haiti	6,054	8.0	0
Honduras	3,900	11.2	12
Nicaragua	2,643	25.0	0
Panama	2,011	5.0	0

Other regional:

Colombia	27,310	70.0	0
Mexico	69,000	119.5	12
Venezuela	16,459	40.8	35

* Other Caribbean Basin countries not appearing in table do not maintain armed forces.



- Airfields for Soviet-bloc use
- Anchorages for Soviet ships
- Cuban-supported insurgencies
- Cuban/Soviet-bloc military and internal security assistance
- U.S. bases
- U.S. permanent naval presence
- U.S. military assistance (including international military)

To overcome the disadvantages of small size and dependence on one or a few export commodities, Caribbean Basin countries have formed economic unions among themselves and joined in common endeavors with developing countries in other areas. All basin countries are members of the Group of 77, the economic association comprising virtually all developing countries, and the Latin American Economic System (SELA), a

loose caucus organized to promote Latin American interests at international economic negotiations.

The Central American Common Market (CACM) was founded in 1960 to establish a regional free-trade zone. It was the first Latin American effort at economic integration.

The Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) was established in 1973 to promote broad cooperation among the English-speaking Caribbean countries.


Some Caribbean countries belong to the African, Caribbean and Pacific

(ACP) Group of States established by the 1975 Lome Convention signed by 46 developing countries with the European Economic Community (EEC). ACP manufactured goods and some agricultural products have free entry into the EEC.

The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) was founded in 1949 to promote international economic planning in the Soviet bloc. Cuba was admitted in 1972.

Seven of the least developed CARICOM members—Antigua and Bar-

buda, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Christopher-Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines—have formed the East Caribbean Common Market, which was incorporated into the Organization of East Caribbean States founded in 1981.




Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative

Agricultural Growth

While all basin countries—with the exception of Trinidad and Tobago, The Bahamas, and the Netherlands Antilles—are exporters of agricultural products, all of them are dependent on imports to meet food needs. Cereals, especially wheat, are the chief food imports for both Central America and the island countries. Although per capita food consumption increased in the 1970s, per capita food production de-

creased in all countries of the area except in the Dominican Republic. In many places the agricultural difficulties of the 1970s were due to inefficient land management and market planning as well as to drought and hurricanes.


Source: FAO, *The State of Food and Agriculture* (1978). No data for Belize, Cayman Islands, Netherlands Antilles, Suriname, Turks and Caicos Islands, and the East Caribbean islands except Barbados.



Agricultural Exports

Most Caribbean Basin countries are dependent on the export of primary commodities (unprocessed or semi-processed agricultural or mineral products) or petroleum products refined from imported crude oil. Primary commodities characteristically are subject to severe price fluctuations as well as competition from synthetic products (corn sweeteners for sugar) or substitutes (other

beverages for coffee). Efforts to stabilize prices and markets through international commodity agreements generally have had little success over the longer term. The prices of principal Caribbean Basin agricultural export commodities fluctuated widely in the 1970s.



Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative

Manufacturing, Refining, and Mining Exports

Mining and minerals refining are the chief nonagricultural export industries in the Caribbean Basin. In almost all countries where these sectors generate more than 40% of total export earnings, exports are dominated by a single commodity—which makes the national economy vulnerable to fluctuating prices. World demand for metals and nonfuel minerals produced in the basin decreased in the mid-1970s. But in the mid-1980s demand is expected to rise

heavily and toward the end of the century to rise spectacularly. This will create a large demand for investment capital.

Approximately 40% of the bauxite produced in the region is processed into alumina. Only in Suriname is there further processing into aluminum. Estimates are that between 1977 and the year 2000 over \$5 billion will be needed to create the required additional capacity for bauxite production in developing countries.

The manufacturing share of the gross domestic product increased in all

basin countries between 1960 and 1980. But in the 1970s the growth rate declined, and in the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Jamaica, and Panama the share in 1980 was lower than in 1970.

The Caribbean Basin accounted for 53% of the value of world exports of bauxite in 1978 and for 33% of alumina (aluminum oxide) and 11% of petroleum products in 1979.

Country	Mineral
Costa Rica	Gold
Dominican Republic	Gold, ferronickel
El Salvador	Gold
Guatemala	Antimony, barite, cadmium
Guyana	Diamond, gold
Honduras	Cadmium, gold, iron ore, lead, silver, zinc
Nicaragua	Gold, silver
Panama	Cadmium
Suriname	Diamond, gold



Recoverable minerals (see table)

Manufactured products or mining commodities accounting for more than 40% of export earnings

Bauxite

Petroleum products

Light manufacturing (electrical machinery and textiles)

Export Markets

Caribbean Basin countries depend heavily on exports to developing market economies. As developing countries, they receive preferential tariff rates from the United States and European countries for many products. In the 1970s the United States was the chief foreign market for 11 basin countries and the second largest market for almost all others. The European Economic Community (EEC) absorbs about 15% of the basin's exports, chiefly


petroleum products, coffee, and bananas. While Belize's largest export market is Mexico, the United States and the EEC together absorb more than 50% of Belize's exports. Antigua and Barbuda trades mostly with other East Caribbean islands; the British Virgin Islands have extensive trade with the U.S. Virgin Islands.

Chief U.S. Imports From Caribbean Basin Countries

(order of importance based on average value, 1978-80)

Petroleum products

- Coffee
- Sugar
- Bauxite and alumina
- Bananas
- Beef



Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative.

Import Sources


The United States is the chief supplier of agricultural and manufactured goods to the Caribbean Basin. During the 1970s the U.S. share of total basin imports (excluding crude oil imported from members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries [OPEC] refined or reexported by The Bahamas, Netherlands Antilles, and Trinidad and Tobago) grew from 33% to about 39%,

while the share of the European Economic Community (EEC) remained at 17%. Crude oil for refineries in Trinidad and Tobago comes mainly from Saudi Arabia, in The Bahamas from Nigeria, and in the Netherlands Antilles from Venezuela. All three countries are heavy importers of U.S. foodstuffs and manufactured goods.

Major Caribbean Basin Imports from the United States

(order of importance based on average value, 1978-80)

- Textiles and apparel
- Electrical machinery
- Paper and paperboard
- Cars and buses
- Wheat
- Synthetic resins
- Construction and mining machinery



Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative

Energy


Oil is an important element in the Caribbean economy. Three countries export large amounts of petroleum products refined from crude oil shipped from Middle Eastern and African producers. Most basin countries are dependent on imported oil for energy. The steep rise in international oil prices since 1973 struck them with particular force, as it coincided with falling prices for many Caribbean export commodities. To ease this

plight, Mexico and Venezuela in 1980 initiated a program of guaranteeing oil shipments to certain Caribbean countries and to finance these with long-term, low-interest loans. Trinidad and Tobago (the only basin country that has major oil fields) offers a similar facility to CARICOM countries.


Projects to develop new sources of energy have been supported by the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Organization of American States, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the Latin American Energy Organiza-

tion, and other international bodies. While petroleum exploration is included, the effort concentrates on hydroelectric power and nonconventional sources of energy available in the area, such as agricultural wastes, the sun, and the wind.

Oil Imports as Percentage of Total Exports Value, 1979



Source: Inter-American Development Bank, *Investment and Financing Requirements for Energy and Minerals in Latin America*, June 1981. No data available for other Caribbean Basin countries.




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Access to Potable Water


Access to safe drinking water is a necessity for public health and economic improvement. Over 20 years ago the Alliance for Progress launched an effort to provide adequate water supplies and sewage disposal systems throughout Latin America. The need was especially great in Central America and in Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Sanitation programs were sponsored by the U.S. Agency for International Development, the World Bank, the Inter-American

Development Bank, the Pan American Health Organization, and other international bodies. Although urban sprawl, due to a heavy increase in migration from rural areas, posed new obstacles, most Caribbean Basin countries are now able to supply safe water for a much larger percentage of—and in some cases for virtually the entire—population.

Access to Potable Water (% of population)







Source: Pan American Health Organization, Doc. No. ES 5 (June 1969); Proposed Program and Budget (April 1981). Data for 1968 given only for these countries.



Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative

Illiteracy, which has seriously impeded economic progress in many developing regions, is less prevalent in the Caribbean Basin. In 1960, at the beginning of the First U.N. Development Decade, all of the East Caribbean islands, Jamaica, The Bahamas, Belize, Costa Rica, Guyana, Panama, and Suriname were literate countries (that is, at least 75% of the population could read and write a simple sentence). With the help of U.S. and international aid programs, most of the other countries have substantially reduced the number of illiterates. In many places, however, primary and secondary education are deficient.

-  Literate in 1960
-  Literate by 1976
-  50%-70% literacy in 1976
-  Less than 50% literacy in 1976



Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative

Immigration to the United States

Each year over 200,000 inhabitants of the Caribbean Basin migrate to the United States. This outward flow is due primarily to low wages and limited economic opportunities. Nearly two-thirds of the total comes from the Caribbean islands—Haiti and the Dominican Republic as well as English-speaking nations. About 130,000 migrants, over two-thirds of the total, arrive in the United States illegally—crossing the border by stealth or entering with

forged papers or nonresident visas, the terms of which are then disregarded. While immigration has reduced the rate of population growth and the pressure of unemployment in basin countries, it also has drained off professionals and skilled workers badly needed for economic development.


Estimates of Population and Yearly Number of Illegal Migrants to the United States from Chief Sources of Migration, 1977

	Population (thousands)	Migrants (thousands)
Barbados	240	4
Dominican Republic	5,400	35
El Salvador	4,500	25
Guatemala	7,200	15
Guyana	800	7
Haiti	5,010	11
Jamaica	2,900	29
Trinidad and Tobago	1,000	15

Population of Caribbean Basin Initiative Countries and Cuba, estimates mid-1982

	Population (thousands)
Anguilla	77
Antigua and Barbuda	237
The Bahamas	252
Barbados	150
Belize	13
British Virgin Islands	18
Cayman Islands	2,396
Costa Rica	9,800
Cuba	80
Dominica	5,835
Dominican Republic	4,617
El Salvador	109
Grenada	7,200
Guatemala	870
Guyana	6,054
Haiti	3,900
Honduras	2,295
Jamaica	12
Montserrat	247
Netherlands Antilles	2,643
Nicaragua	2,011
Panama	52
St. Christopher-Nevis	119
St. Lucia	121
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	356
Suriname	1,203
Trinidad and Tobago	7
Turks and Caicos Islands	7

*Included in figure for St. Christopher-Nevis.



□ Main sources of immigration to the United States.

Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative

Human Rights Conditions in El Salvador

by Elliott Abrams

Statement submitted to the House Foreign Affairs Committee on July 29, 1982. Mr. Abrams is Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs.¹

When I last appeared before the Congress to discuss the human rights situation in El Salvador, I mentioned that our annual *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* documented the good and bad conduct of a beleaguered government, that human rights violations of a very serious nature had occurred, and that innocent civilians have been murdered by forces contesting this most bitter of civil conflicts. I deeply wish that I could state that these violations had ceased, that murder and violence in El Salvador are not common occurrences, and that tremendous progress had been made in restoring peace and prosperity to that unfortunate nation. I cannot make these claims, however. Violations of human rights continue, people are murdered or abducted or otherwise abused by terrorists of rightwing and leftwing groups or common criminals, and, at times, by members of El Salvador's security and military forces.

The new government, like the previous government of President Duarte, remains under siege. Salvadoran society is gravely ill. The country's judicial system, generally ineffective since the 1970s, now—burdened by threats and intimidation—barely functions. El Salvador's promising industrial plants have reduced their activity, and land lies fallow because the agricultural population fears to work the soil. Concerted attacks by Marxist-Leninist insurgents have destroyed large parts of the country's public utilities and transportation systems. Unemployment and economic distress afflict the Salvadoran people. Two hundred thousand people are internally displaced and survive only through the efforts of the government, which tries, despite great obstacles, to provide for their precarious welfare. Tens of thousands have fled to neighboring countries.

This is an extremely bleak picture, but it is not the complete picture. To understand where things stand today in El Salvador, we must also examine where El Salvador has been and where it is going. Three years ago, El Salvador had a government that came to power through probable fraud, that did not represent the will of the Salvadoran people, and from which the majority of the population was alienated. There is now a government in El Salvador that has come into power as a result of a fair, honest, national election, in which the overwhelming majority of the electorate freely participated. Three years ago, the government of El Salvador served an oligarchy that controlled the vast majority of productive agricultural land as well as the means of finance and credit. Now, almost 20% of El Salvador's arable land has been distributed to its tillers, and the banking system has been nationalized.

While violence has been endemic in El Salvador's history, 2 years ago political killings may have been at an all-time high. Political violence is always difficult to quantify, but a decline seems to have occurred over the past year. During the last 6 months, this trend has continued. As the certification states, a significant number of security force personnel have been disciplined for abuses. Five suspected killers of the four American churchwomen have been officially charged with murder. The case against these individuals continues, and we fully expect they will be brought to trial. Of course, we have not seen all the progress we would like to have seen concerning control of violence, but the signs have been positive. Not only do embassy reports show this trend, but other monitoring groups, regardless of political orientation, show a similar trend.

The National Elections

Moreover, and more importantly, on March 28 the Salvadoran people went to the polls and experienced an historical event unique in their troubled and violent history. They participated in a free and honest election that brought them the government they collectively desired. Almost 1.5 million people voted,

probably more than 80% of the eligible electorate.

The people frequently voted under tremendously difficult conditions. The leadership of the Marxist guerrillas decided to conduct a concerted and bloody campaign to prevent the exercise of the popular will. Guerrillas blew up scores of buses during the 2 weeks before the election, sought to prevent distribution of gasoline to the eastern part of the country, and threatened to kill any bus or truck drivers who were so bold as to carry voters to the polls. The guerrillas attacked polling places and the Electoral Commission's headquarters and increased bombings of electrical power installations. Guerrilla radio stations ordered voters to stay home and threatened, through letters, printed propaganda, and wall slogans, to kill or mutilate any voter who exercised his rights on election day. Guerrillas controlled the streets of the departmental capital of Usulután and prevented voting in that city. Still, despite all obstacles, the Salvadoran people went to the polls in numbers that surprised the experts. Because of guerrilla violence, voters often walked miles to safer polling places or waited in line under fire for the chance to make their choice for El Salvador's future.

This popular reaction constituted a rejection of the guerrilla attempt to prevent the election. Of the 1.5 million Salvadorans who voted, more than 88% cast their ballots for one of the six participating parties. Everyone now knows that the Christian Democratic Party received the largest single percentage—40%—of the vote, with the five parties to its right receiving the collective majority. As a result of agreement between El Salvador's political parties, a Government of National Unity was formed, and the Constituent Assembly chose as provisional president the independent and highly respected banking expert, Alvaro Magana. Three provisional vice presidents, representing the three largest parties, were also chosen. It is President Magana's freely elected government that must now face the threat of violent overthrow by well-armed, externally supported Marxist guerrillas.

The election has been attacked. Given the highly charged political atmosphere in El Salvador and persistent misperceptions about events in that country, criticism was to be expected. Such criticism that has arisen, however, with charges of massive fraud and inflated voting, is entirely unfounded and recognized as such by serious observers

of the situation in El Salvador. Jose Napoleon Duarte, who did not retain office as a result of the vote, has stated that these allegations are part of a campaign to denigrate the elections and are false. International observers were invited to monitor the campaign and election. More than 200 observers from more than 40 countries were present and more than 700 journalists served as de facto observers as well. These observers uniformly found that the electoral process was orderly and, except for the guerrilla attacks I mentioned previously, peaceful. While charges of government pressure have been made, Msgr. Rivera y Damas, acting Archbishop, remarked of the voting that, "If there was any pressure, it was not from the government but from those who did not want the elections." While there were technical difficulties, as might have been expected, there was absolutely no indication of fraud. When we would like to see free elections in so many countries that do not have them, it is unfortunate to see the first free election denigrated or minimized for political reasons.

The results of the election are significant in many ways. They show that the vast majority of the Salvadoran people desperately want peace and reject the violent alternatives offered by the Marxist-Leninist insurgents. The election also shows that the Salvadoran people have taken the first step to integrate themselves into a political system in which they have not previously had a chance to participate significantly. The results of the election indicate that the vast majority of the Salvadoran people believe that an elected government offers the best possible hope for greater respect for basic human rights.

U.S. Support for Human Rights

Respect for human rights has been at the core of our policy toward El Salvador for some time, and intensely so during the past 6 months. Our concerns for human rights have been repeatedly stressed to Salvadoran officials, both military and civilian. Our policy toward El Salvador has been formulated in such a way as to seek tangible, positive changes in human rights practices in El Salvador. We are working for meaningful structural changes, not simply cosmetic rearrangement or resolution of individual cases. Respect for human rights and proper conduct toward the civilian population has been a principal part of

our training of Salvadoran military personnel. Salvadoran leaders have been receptive to our concerns and agree with our basic objectives.

One can justifiably ask why progress has been so slow and why things have not more markedly improved in El Salvador over the last 6 months, if a major power like the United States has brought all its efforts to bear, and if the leadership of El Salvador has been so receptive to our concerns. I believe I was able to discover the answer during my recent trip to that country. I am frankly surprised, after my visit, not that progress has been so slow, but that the Salvadorans have moved as far as they have.

Obstacles to Improvement

El Salvador is desperately poor. The gross national product has declined by at least 25% in the last 2 years, due to the insurgency. Population growth is 3.5% per year in an already overpopulated land. There is no way of financing any number of necessary projects. Land reform is resisted, in part because owners have not received compensation for their losses. Statistical information is unreliable or unavailable. Road travel is extremely hazardous. The judicial system, never strong, has broken down. Judges and legal officials are regularly intimidated. Very few of us would have the courage to stand up to the threats that have been made against the safety of judicial officials and their families.

Communications within the country are extremely poor. A typical National Guard post, for example, consists of 10-15 men, under the command of a poorly educated corporal or subsergeant, stationed in a village somewhere in rural El Salvador. There is no telephone communication with national headquarters, sometimes no radio contact with even the commander of the department in which they are stationed. If their non-commissioned officer (NONCOM) is conscientious, they will patrol on foot, with no support from any other unit, and beyond any kind of control or regulation except that of their unit leader. If the NONCOM is a decent man, perhaps his men will enjoy good relations with the people of the area they patrol. But in an atmosphere of guerrilla threats and violence, abuses occur. Adequate means of redress for the victims are virtually nonexistent, since the unit is effectively a power unto itself. This is the kind of situation we are trying to change on the government side.

There has been no tradition of taking prisoners during the fighting in El

Salvador. The government has several hundred prisoners captured off the battlefield and the guerrillas have about 40. Both sides have killed opposing combatants and quarter is rarely given or expected. As might be expected, the prisoner issue remains one of our most important areas of concern on the government side.

All in all, given El Salvador's violent tradition and bitter internal divisions, conditions for seeking human rights improvements could hardly be worse.

The Human Rights Outlook

Accordingly, the struggle to achieve progress in El Salvador's human rights situation has been an uphill one for both the previous government and the current administration under President Magana, which is definitely committed to respect human rights. Progress has been measured in inches, not miles; and more importantly, in the lives and physical integrity of individuals who, in the past, would have suffered but for the decision by responsible Salvadoran officials to work for a change in the way the security and military forces treat the civilian population. We have seen no similar effort on the part of the guerrillas.

I must return to one of the points I made when I testified before the Congress last winter: How can the United States effectively work for lasting improvements in respect to democracy, human rights, and reform in El Salvador? Were the Congress to terminate our security assistance to this beleaguered government, we would greatly reduce our ability to work to restrain those narrow and often brutal elements who want to see not even a return to the status quo ante, but further retrogression into repression and violence. A vacuum left by our termination of security assistance would lead to acceleration of the insurgency and consequent violent backlash. It is certainly possible that after such a prolonged bloodbath, those forces that want to impose a totalitarian, Marxist-Leninist system would, after further struggle, take power. Let us make no mistake about the nature of the insurgents in El Salvador. They are as violent a group of men and women as any we have seen in the Western Hemisphere. It is bad enough that they see as their means to victory the destruction of factories, power systems, bridges, roads, and buses—that is, the creation of economic hardship for

the people of El Salvador. It is worse that they destroy lives, nurturing violence and assassinating those who would oppose them. Their hostility to the efforts of the people of El Salvador to exercise their right to vote is a matter of record.

The leaders of the FMLN [Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front] do not offer a viable alternative in El Salvador. Their assumption of power by force in El Salvador would only lead to dictatorship and increased misery and death. The vast majority of the Salvadoran people reject this possibility. What they have now is a government freely elected, committed to democratic reform, including further free elections, and attempting, under incredible provocations, to make significant improvements in the human rights situation in their country. President Magana has stated that the goals of his government are pacification, democratization, restoration of confidence and security, economic recuperation, and respect for human rights. In the midst of a cruel civil conflict and within a short time span since the elections, he has moved his government in those directions.

On April 15, 1982, I visited Fort Benning to observe the training of Salvadoran Army cadets, young men who now are fighting and dying for their country's freedom. We had undertaken to train almost 500 of these cadets for an army that is critically short of trained officers. The number of trainees was almost 10 times the number of men who would graduate from El Salvador's military academy this year. They were young, bright, eager, and receptive to their American instructors' emphasis on the need to respect and protect the civilian population—as their brothers in arms had done over 2 weeks earlier, defending the voters and the electoral process against insurgent attacks. We hope they will have a tremendously positive impact on their army's performance, not only in battle, but also in their response to the needs of the civilian population. If we refuse in the future to undertake such efforts, we will be committing a blunder of immense proportions. We must assist the Government of El Salvador to continue those steps it has taken to broaden popular support and eliminate abuses. If we do not, we will not only imperil our own national security over the long term, but we will help to condemn the Salvadoran people to a nightmare more frightening than the one they are now experiencing—and from which it will be hard to awake.

I said at the outset of this statement that to understand where El Salvador is today, we must consider where it has been and where it is going. I think that, thanks in large part to the beginning made by the March 28 elections, El Salvador is moving ahead toward a democratic system of accountable government, which will create the conditions necessary for increasing respect for human rights, including free elections, a functioning judiciary, due process, improved discipline, and greater professionalism in the military. These efforts are supported by the Salvadoran

Armed Forces, who are playing a very constructive role in encouraging and protecting a very new democratic system. Democracy is the central issue in El Salvador. Its strengthening will lead to a further reduction of human rights violations. The current government in El Salvador must be given the opportunity to complete what it has begun.

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Human Rights and the Refugee Crisis

by Elliott Abrams

Address before the Tiger Bay Club in Miami, Florida, on June 2, 1982. Mr. Abrams is Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs.

As you know, I am in charge of the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. As you may not know, in that capacity I am charged with overseeing for the State Department the granting of asylum to people from all around the world who seek asylum in the United States. Both responsibilities—human rights and the asylum aspect of U.S. immigration policy—obviously give me a great deal to do with Latin America and the Caribbean. What I want to do today is talk about our human rights policy and our foreign policy, and, I hope, help explain our views on a number of problems which face south Florida.

Our human rights policy is, basically, easy to explain: We try to improve the respect for human rights in countries around the world, so that we can improve the lives of the people who live there and so that we continue to make clear America's historic commitment to the cause of liberty. Of course, this is easier said than done, for the problem of human rights violations around the world is profoundly complex. The causes of human rights problems vary from race (as in South Africa) to religion (the Ba'hai in Iran), to factional strife (as between Christians and Muslims in Lebanon), to a wide variety of usually military dictatorships. And the kinds of

human rights violations vary from denial of free elections to elimination of the free press or freedom of religion, to arbitrary arrests, to torture and murder.

Needless to say, each situation calls for different tactics for an American effort in the area of human rights. Furthermore, our tactics will vary depending on our relationship with the country in question: whether it is a friend or a foe, whether there exists between us distant relations or a dense network of ties. The tools we use range, of course, from straight diplomatic discussions, to public denunciations, to U.N. votes, to denial of economic or military assistance, and so on.

Often this Administration is accused of doing too little for human rights or of "coddling" friendly regimes while we attack enemies. In fact this accusation is false. We use whatever we think will be the most effective tactic. Where we have good diplomatic ties, common sense tells us to use them. Where we do not have friendly relations, but a regime is very sensitive to its public reputation, we find that public discussions and criticisms are most effective, and we use them—as in the case of the Soviet Union. Our goal, in every case, is to be effective, not to give good speeches but to have a good effect in the real world.

If we are to achieve our human rights goals, it is clear that American power and influence are essential. Few governments around the world are greatly moved by preaching from the United States or anyone else. They change their behavior when American power, American assistance, American commitments, persuade them that it is in their interest to do so. Above all, the intangible force of the American exam-

ple as a successful example inevitably affects the willingness of other countries to pay attention to our concerns on human rights. The Reagan Administration has, it is correctly noted, improved relations between our country and such countries as South Africa and South Korea. It is our view that isolating these countries, driving them away from us, would do nothing but decrease our influence there. Our ability to obtain our goals, including our human rights goals, is sufficient only when America is understood to be an important force.

Role of Communism and Soviet Power

Thrown into the many complexities I have mentioned is another major one—the role of communism and Soviet power. Why do I single out communism and the Soviet bloc countries, among all the world's dictatorships?

First, because once a Communist government is established, the Soviets make sure that it endures permanently. No efforts by the people of that country will be allowed to win them freedom, as we have just seen in Poland. Unlike Greece or Spain or Portugal, which were dictatorships but are now free, today Communist countries are not permitted to leave the grasp of the Soviet Union and seek freedom.

Second, Communist dictatorships are aggressive. Compare Paraguay and Nicaragua, or Haiti and Cuba, or North Vietnam with the now disappeared South Vietnam. Communist countries not only destroy the human rights of their own population but threaten to export repression to their neighbors and around the world. Most recently we have seen this in Afghanistan, and even now Cuba and Nicaragua are engaged in a massive supply of arms to fuel subversion in Central America.

Third, Communist regimes are incredibly brutal. Let me take but one example. The French group, Doctors Without Frontiers, has sent doctors to Afghanistan to help injured Afghans. They have reported, and these items have been published in several of the leading journals in Paris, that the Soviets drop small mines from planes. They don't explode on landing, but only when picked up by a passerby. They are made to look like matchboxes, and some to look like children's toys. The French doctors report that much of their work in hospitals on the border of Pakistan is surgery performed on children who have lost limbs. And of course, even now the

Soviet Union is providing chemical and biological weapons to its proxies and allies in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia—the infamous yellow rain which is outlawed by international treaty and by any sense of human decency.

Obviously, we must take care in our human rights policy to make situations better and not worse. South Vietnam under General Thieu, or South Korea today, present serious human rights problems, but they are as nothing compared to their Communist alternatives. We want to be very sure that in a situation such as that in El Salvador, we do not trade the serious but solvable human rights problems of today for a permanent Communist dictatorship. Resisting the expansion of communism is a key human rights goal.

And here again, American influence in the world is essential to our goals. A strong, confident, vigorous America will be able to help countries resist Soviet subversion. And it will provide a powerful alternative model of a successful, confident people whose freedom leads to prosperity and unity. Needless to say, economic and military strength are essential elements in this picture, which is why President Reagan is determined to restore both.

Relevance to Refugee Flows

Now the relevance of all this to the refugee flows you have seen here in south Florida, and to the greater ones you may fear is, I think, clear. People do not flee free, prosperous countries. The largest refugee flows of recent years have come from Indochina and Afghanistan, where, quite simply, people are fleeing communism. The same is true of Cuba. Perhaps the greatest source of refugees throughout history has been, not natural disasters, but misgovernment. When governments have destroyed people's rights and freedoms, and have destroyed the economy, people have voted with their feet.

Our response to the refugee problem of today and the potential problems of tomorrow is necessarily complex. Neither we nor any other wealthy country can accept all of the refugees and immigrants who come to our borders. Neither can we accept immigrants who will constitute a servile class, a class of permanently unequal people such as exists in many countries around the world. Yet our response must have in it a substantial amount of humanitarianism, and we are bound (by international

treaty and our own law) to grant asylum to genuine refugees who reach our shores.

But humanitarianism alone will not enable us to deal with a ruler such as Fidel Castro, who with unbelievable cynicism uses his own people as a weapon against foreign countries. He shoots streams of refugees at nearby countries in the way a cannonball is shot out of a cannon. Think of the cynicism, think of the viciousness, of a ruler who would take mentally retarded people and drag them off and shove them into boats to be sent away from their home country. Our foreign policy must make it clear that such behavior is simply unacceptable to us and will not ever again be tolerated.

It is obvious, of course, that this country has many immigration problems that have nothing to do with communism, such as the problem of Haitian migrants you face here in south Florida. But our experience has shown that the most serious refugee problems have political causes and—even more important—that these refugee problems develop much more suddenly than those that have their origin in poverty. Compare the steady flow of migrants from Haiti to the sudden waves from Cuba. Thus they present us with a challenge that the international community has trouble preparing for ahead of time.

In fact, it is Communist rule that has caused the greatest refugee flows of recent years. We can, therefore, have a very firm notion of what the expansion of communism to El Salvador and Guatemala would mean. It has the potential to create a Southeast Asian refugee crisis right here on our doorsteps. Indeed, we have every reason to think that the expansion of communism in Central America would create this kind of incredible problem. I am always amazed when people come to me to voice their concern about refugees from El Salvador, yet who oppose the Administration's effort to avoid enlargement of that refugee problem by giving El Salvador the aid it needs to defeat Communist-led guerrillas.

Addressing the Problem

Obviously, the problem of migration and refugee flows is enormously complex, and we must address it in a number of ways. One way is economic assistance. I will help in cases such as Haiti, where poverty leads people to leave home, and it will help in the long run to reduce the opportunities that those seeking political disorder can exploit.

Another way is military assistance. Such aid is essential, for the Soviet Union, through Cuba and now Nicaragua, is deeply engaged in promoting and arming subversion in our hemisphere. If we do not help those who wish to fight and defend themselves, then chances of success are greatly diminished. And if they fail, we can predict that many of their countrymen will flee to our shores.

A third way is our human rights policy, where we seek, by the pressure of America's military and economic power and its reputation in the world, to advance the cause of liberty. We seek to bring about political reforms within many friendly countries, and it is an essential part of this policy to oppose the expansion of communism. In a world of democracies, where human rights were respected, refugee flows would virtually disappear.

A fourth way is our effort to stop the illegal flow of aliens to this country. This involves an improvement in our own enforcement mechanisms, including most recently the interdiction program now in effect with regard to Haiti.

Finally, our laws do not, and none of us would wish them to, exclude all aliens. We have been accepting 800,000 immigrants a year, and we have an active asylum program. When someone who is truly fleeing persecution comes to us, we do not want to send him or her back to the land where the persecution occurred. We cooperate through the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, the Red Cross, and other international organizations to help the international community deal with refugee flows. And, of course, we do our share in taking care of the world's refugees. We do so financially, and obviously, as in the case of Indochinese and Cubans, we meet our responsibilities and take a leadership role in the international community.

There is one thing that ties all of these efforts together. There is one thing that will help our human rights policy succeed, help friendly governments resist subversion, help create a safer international climate, and help avoid the creation of new refugee flows. It is, quite simply, American influence. There was a time after the Vietnam war when some Americans came to believe that American power was a force for ill in the world, not for good. I believe most Americans have now come to realize this is a false and dangerous view. Anyone who is seeking to promote and defend freedom, anyone who is wondering whether the future will bring

Visit of Israeli Prime Minister Begin

Prime Minister Menahem Begin of Israel made an official working visit to Washington, D.C., June 20-21, 1982. Following are remarks made by President Reagan and Prime Minister Begin after their meeting on June 21.¹

PRESIDENT REAGAN

It's been worthwhile to have Prime Minister Begin at the White House again.

All of us share a common understanding of the need to bring peace and security to the Middle East. Today, we've had an opportunity to exchange views on how this cause can be advanced. On Lebanon, it's clear that we and Israel both seek an end to the violence there and a sovereign, independent Lebanon under the authority of a strong central government.

We agree that Israel must not be subjected to violence from the north, and the United States will continue to work to achieve these goals and to secure the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon.

PRIME MINISTER BEGIN

I'm deeply grateful to my friend, the President of the United States, for his invitation to come to visit with him again—after my first visit in September

economic and political progress in the Caribbean Basin or will bring more subversion, more violence, more poverty, and more refugee flows, will surely understand that American strength is the essential ingredient. A panacea? No, of course, for the world is not that simple. But let us not be deluded by false complexities. This country remains the greatest friend of freedom in the world, and wherever we go—as with Germany and Japan after the Second World War—we attempt to instill democratic values. An expansion of Communist influence in the Caribbean Basin will inevitably create greater refugee flows. As we know, communism combines political repression with economic failure. It is the perfect recipe for the creation of

1981, in the White House—and hold a discussion, a very fruitful discussion with the President and his advisers.

Everyone knows that we face now a situation in the Middle East which calls for activity, great attention, and understanding. I have read in some newspapers in this great country that Israel invaded Lebanon. This is a misnomer. Israel did not invade any country. You do invade a land when you want to conquer it or to annex it or, at least, to conquer part of it. We don't covet even 1 inch of Lebanese territory. And, willingly, we will withdraw our troops, all of our troops, and bring them back home as soon as possible. "As soon as possible" means as soon as arrangements are made that never again will our citizens—men, women, and children—be attacked, maimed, and killed by armed bands operating from Lebanon, armed and supported by the Soviet Union and its satellites.

There is hope to believe that such arrangements will be made and that all foreign forces, without exception, will be withdrawn from Lebanon; there will be an independent, free Lebanon based on its territorial integrity. The day is near that such a Lebanon and Israel will sign a peace treaty and live in peace forever.

¹Made on the South Grounds of the White House (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of June 28, 1982). ■

refugees, and we have only to look at the world around us to see that that recipe has worked only too well.

So for you here in south Florida concerned about the potential refugees of the 1980s and 1990s, for those dealing with human rights issues and concerned about how to promote democratic values and procedures abroad, for those concerned about the fate of liberty in the world at large, let us recall again the common thread that links these issues together: a prosperous and strong America, an America willing to maintain its military strength and willing to make clear to friendly nations and to foes the strength of our values and our commitment to defend them. ■

U.S. Policy on International Narcotics Control

by *Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.*

Statement submitted to the House Foreign Affairs Committee on May 3, 1982. Ambassador Stoessel is Deputy Secretary of State.¹

As requested by the committee, I will address policy issues related to international narcotics control. This testimony will complete the review of Department of State activities begun April 21, when Assistant Secretary [for International Narcotics Matters, Dominick] DiCarlo discussed the programs and strategies conducted by the Bureau of International Narcotics Matters. At that time, Ambassador [to Colombia, Thomas D.] Boyatt discussed specific policies and programs with respect to Colombia, and Administrator Mullen discussed the diverse assistance rendered by the Drug Enforcement Administration.

The committee also took testimony from officials of the Department of Justice, the Treasury, Health and Human Services, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the White House Drug Abuse Policy Office—who provided information on domestic consumption, trafficking, enforcement and prosecution efforts, and other international policy aspects. I will, therefore, confine my remarks to the responsibilities and policies of the Department of State, although I will note our numerous collaborations with these other U.S. Agencies.

Last September, President Reagan said he would establish "a foreign policy that vigorously seeks to interdict and eradicate illicit drugs, wherever cultivated, processed or transported."

The authority for our efforts, which Secretary Haig has affirmed as a high priority for the Department, is section 481 of the Foreign Assistance Act, which established an international narcotics control function under the direction of the President and the Department of State, on the basis that effective international cooperation is required to eliminate illicit production, trafficking in, and consumption of dangerous drugs.

International Control

No nation can cope with drug abuse by relying only on treatment, prevention, and domestic enforcement. The supply

of heroin, cocaine, marijuana, and other drugs is so great that we simply must reduce production before we can substantially reduce availability. We must break the grower-to-user chains which stretch across five continents. To do this, we must have a comprehensive program of international control.

The international control function was conferred upon the President and has been delegated through the Secretary of State to the Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics Matters. I note that the Department of State is the only foreign ministry in which narcotics control has been elevated to the level of a senior policy branch. This function was assigned to the Department because the United States believes that other governments should understand that we regard drug abuse as not just a health problem, or an enforcement issue, but as a matter properly integrated into our foreign policy as an issue of government responsibility under international treaties—that should be dealt with as a matter of international obligation and concern.

U.S. Policy

Accordingly, as the first tenet of its international narcotics control policy, the Department has stressed, through diplomatic and program channels, that each country has the responsibility for demand and supply reduction within its borders.

By virtue of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and the Convention on Psychotropic Substances, signatory nations are required to establish control limiting the production, manufacture, and distribution of scheduled drugs to recognize, legitimate purposes. The Single Convention requires each signatory nation to declare and enforce prohibitions on the cultivation, production, and distribution of opium, cocaine, cannabis, and their derivatives. All of the major producer nations are signatories to the Single Convention.

This Administration rejects the contention that drug abuse is particularly an American problem, or a problem of Western civilization, and rejects the contention that the United States has the

primary responsibility for solving this problem.

We recognize that, because of political and economic considerations, some countries cannot do the job alone, and the second tenet of our narcotics policy is that the international community has an obligation to assist those nations which require help.

As a concerned member of the world community, and as a severely impacted nation, the U.S. Government supports a program of bilateral and multilateral assistance for crop control, interdiction, and demand reduction programs, and we encourage other governments, especially the governments of other industrialized nations, to participate fully in these international control efforts.

As the third tenet of our international control policy, the Bureau is applying more emphasis on crop control at the source in both our bilateral programs and in programs conducted by international organizations which we fund. Current production capability and stockpiles of heroin, cocaine, and marijuana or their base materials well exceed known consumption. Interdiction through various law enforcement activities is simply not sufficient by itself to reduce availability, given current levels of production.

The fourth tenet is that narcotics-related economic assistance, whether rendered by the U.S. Government or an international organization, should be conditions on concurrent agreements on control of narcotics production.

Strategic Consideration

There are a number of strategic considerations which link our principal policy positions and our program strategy.

- While there have been notable achievements in control efforts, success in recent years has been marginal in terms of reducing worldwide availability of heroin, cocaine, and marijuana.

- Interdiction efforts are not adequate in terms of worldwide effort, given current levels of production and profitability.

- Comprehensive control programs are not now politically negotiable or operationally feasible in every producer country.

- Both producer and transit nations are increasingly impacted by domestic drug abuse problems, as are the major industrialized, consumer nations—factors which present improved opportunities for both control agreements and increased international support.

We believe our four fundamental policies—acceptance by governments of producer and transit countries of their national responsibilities under treaties; the need for international assistance from more of the wealthy and industrialized nations; the increased emphasis on crop control; and the insistence on linkage between narcotics-related economic assistance and agreements on reducing production—respond correctly to these strategic considerations.

Our ultimate objective is that production be controlled in all geographic areas, simultaneously. Our first priority, for both our direct assistance programs and for the projects of international agencies which we fund, is on reducing cultivation and production. Trafficking or interdiction is our second priority, because we are convinced that crop control at the source is the most effective and economical method of reducing supply.

As U.S. enforcement agencies can confirm, the problems of interdicting drugs in transit are such that only a small fraction is interrupted. Production facilities, financial assets, and drug products are highly mobile and cross many national frontiers. Experience has shown that when production declines in one area, drugs from other areas are moved into the market—as has happened with both heroin and marijuana.

However, reductions in cultivation and production through crop control—which can take the form of government bans on cultivation, as in Turkey, or manual destruction as carried out in Peru, or chemical eradication as conducted by the Mexican Government—are very difficult propositions, country to country, and present different degrees of complexity.

While there have been notable successes in crop control—like in Turkey and Mexico, and there are promising control efforts in Peru, Pakistan, and Burma, which we are assisting—the first-hand reality is that worldwide crop control is a long-term objective. The conditions which are considered ideal for mounting and sustaining an effective crop control program include:

- an awareness of and acceptance by the central government of the national and international impacts of their domestic cultivation and production;
- a strong central government which has the political will to enforce control;

- the capability to achieve control of the growing areas; and
- adequate resources.

With their own material inputs and our resource assistance, Turkey and Mexico met these conditions. But one or more limitations have to be overcome in other countries. For example, major opium producers like Iran, Afghanistan, and Laos are currently inaccessible politically to the United States. In other instances, like Burma and Pakistan, the central governments do not now have complete control over all the key growing areas.

In certain countries, considerations of local economic and political impacts of crop control are such that alternative financial incentives, or control disincentives that create risk for the growers, producers, and traffickers, or both, must be offered before an effective control program can be negotiated or implemented.

Therefore, while the Department believes that crop control should be the end objective sought in all negotiations with producer countries—and we actively seek to assist them in overcoming these limitations, directly or through multilateral assistance, such as U.N. projects—the second reality is that we must have a balanced program of crop control and interdiction.

The third reality that must be considered in any assessment of our effort is that the international narcotics control program of the United States—whether the focus be on crop control or interdiction—can only be as effective and comprehensive as are the programs of the governments with whom we negotiate.

The fourth reality is that we face a variety of problems which must be overcome before the problem can be brought under control. I have already mentioned such problems as the political inaccessibility of certain producer nations; the lack of central government control over growing areas; the political and economic problems encountered by producer and transit nations attempting to exercise control over production and trafficking; and the difficulties inherent in interdiction. Let me add to our problem list.

First, market profiles change. In just a decade, Turkey, Mexico, and Pakistan have been the major sources, in succession, for heroin entering the United States. While agreements must be negotiated country by country, the control effort must be truly international in scope.

Second, we encounter in dealing with some foreign governments not only a reluctance to accept responsibility for production and trafficking, but we are also challenged by statements that drug abuse is an American problem.

Third, this “American responsibility” syndrome is reflected in international support. It is disturbing to read the list of contributors to the U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC) and realize that some industrialized and wealthy nations contribute little or nothing to the support of the multilateral international projects sponsored by UNFDAC in critical producer and transit nations.

Fourth, the economics of drug abuse currently favor illicit drug cultivation and production and present us with some of the most challenging problems. Not only do the profits from the drug trade provide incentives to growers, producers, and traffickers, but they impact heavily on local economies in producer and transit nations, as well as the United States, such as in south Florida.

Program Strategy

With those realities and problems in mind, I will explain how our principal policies translate into program strategies.

Our diplomatic challenge is to raise international consciousness of the illicit narcotics issue to a level where heightened acceptance of national responsibility becomes an international reality, seen in increased action by affected governments—producer nations, transit nations, and consumer nations.

President Reagan, Vice President Bush, Secretary Haig, the senior officers of the Department, and our Ambassadors are pressing the narcotics issue. They have communicated to the leaders and ministries of key nations the genuine intention of this Administration to reduce drug abuse impacts upon the American people. This activity takes many forms—the personal communications by Ambassador [John G.] Dean to the King and Prime Minister of Thailand; the private talks between Vice President Bush and President [Julio Cesar] Turbay of Colombia; the discussions between Ambassador [Edwin G.] Corr and Bolivian President [Maj. Gen. Celso] Torrelío, the talks Ambassador

Boyatt has described with the Colombian Government, and the very recent discussions between the Deputy Secretary and the Jamaican Government. At another level, there are activities such as the recent meetings inaugurated by our Deputy Chief of Mission in Pakistan with key Ambassadors accredited to Pakistan to share information and develop cooperation with the Government of Pakistan on narcotics control.

Assistant Secretary DiCarlo maintains an active continuing dialogue with the leadership of key producer and transit countries. In March, Mr. DiCarlo and Ambassador Coor obtained a commitment from President Torrelío for a coca leaf eradication project in Bolivia which is being developed now. Earlier this year, Mr. DiCarlo met with major donors to UNFDAC to discuss funding priorities and to make explicit the U.S. position that economic assistance to narcotics producers should be linked to crop reductions. And the Assistant Secretary and other U.S. officials this year communicated to the members of the U.N. Commission on Narcotic Drugs that we have every intention of urging governments to live up to their commitments, both for their domestic production and trafficking responsibilities and for their support of the international program. There are indications that foreign impacts of drug abuse—human, economic, and political—are improving the climate for increased responsiveness by certain governments on both counts.

Because of the diversity of the problems we face, the international effort which the Department coordinates is a program of many parts. Through our Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, the Department is responsible for coordinating international narcotics activities of the U.S. Government; for coordinating the Government's international with its domestic activities; for negotiating international agreements; and for insuring cooperation with the activities of international organizations and foreign governments.

As Dominick DiCarlo and Peter McPherson explained, the Bureau collaborates with the Agency for International Development on economic development projects in such producer nations as Peru, Pakistan, and Thailand. The Bureau works quite closely with the Drug Enforcement Administration on technical assistance and training of foreign professionals—a function in which Customs [U.S. Customs Service] also participates. The Bureau cooperates with our Bureau of International Organization Affairs in dealings with U.N. drug control agencies and other international organizations. And, still within the Department, our Bureau's programs are integrated in country policies through close collaboration with our regional bureaus and with the narcotics coordinators in U.S. embassies.

Secretary Haig is a member of the Cabinet Council on Legal Policy which is addressing the objectives of drug supply reduction. The Secretary is also a member of the South Florida Task Force, chaired by Vice President Bush, which is focused on reducing problems caused by Latin American production and trafficking in cocaine and marijuana.

The Departments of State and Justice work together on obtaining bilateral agreements on the gathering of information and evidence and rendering it admissible in courts of law in other nations. These two departments are also negotiating treaties with the Federal Republic of Germany, France, and Italy, similar to the extradition and mutual legal assistance treaties with Colombia and the Netherlands, which the Senate ratified in December. And agreements have been negotiated permitting flag vessels of other nations to be searched if these ships are suspected of transporting drugs to the United States.

Obviously, this diversity of program activity requires close policy coordination. The Department interacts on narcotics policy development with Justice, Treasury, Commerce, Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and other Departments through standing and *ad hoc* committees.

Similarly, it meets regularly with the Oversight Working Group assembled by the White House Drug Abuse Policy Of-

fice; these meetings are designed to coordinate the activities of State, Treasury, Commerce, Justice, the National Institute on Drug Abuse, and other agencies involved in both international and domestic drug programs.

Conclusion

We have a policy, and we have a strategy, with both short- and long-range programs. It is a policy that is designed to insure that the United States is focusing upon all aspects of the problem internationally—the cultivation, production, and distribution of drugs, the flow of profits, the impacts upon other countries as well as our own, and the development of broad-based, multinationally supported control programs.

Recent events in several countries, including both new agreements, reductions in crops, and major interdictions, give reason to be optimistic—not that we are solving or eliminating drug abuse—but that we are making significant progress in our more realistic objective of establishing the base for potential control of the production and distribution of major illicit substances. I choose these words carefully; we do not have control, but we have improved the possibility that the world community can gain control.

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

The Challenge of Nuclear Technology

by Harry R. Marshall, Jr.

Remarks before the Science Policy Foundation in London on April 29, 1982. Mr. Marshall is Acting Assistant Secretary for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs.

Exactly 100 years ago, there appeared an article in *Scientific American* which considered the possibility that flying machines would be invented one day and then put to use in warfare. The article discussed the revolutionary consequences of such a development in quite surprisingly accurate detail more than 30 years before aircraft first began to make their presence felt in battle. But what is even more striking from a contemporary point of view is that the author of the article, foreseeing the potentially destructive impact of the airplane, called upon inventors, "as their solemn duty," not to employ their time and talents by inventing flying machines out to turn their energies in other directions.

I think you would agree that, despite his prescience, the writer could no more delay the advent of the airplane by exhortation than he could cancel the laws of physics. But this is not to suggest a fatalism in the face of the challenges that inevitably accompany technological progress. I do, however, want to suggest in the course of my remarks today that our responses to such challenges can only be effective if they are realistic.

Now the specter of nuclear conflagration has periodically stirred the emotions of citizens on both sides of the Atlantic. Whatever the particular causes of the current outbreak of public unease, the desolation that would accompany a full-scale nuclear exchange between the weapons powers is a prospect that should continually evoke nothing but profound apprehension on all sides. For policymakers in the NATO countries, and evidently for their counterparts in Moscow as well, the question of nuclear war has remained the central point of reference in the calculus of the strategic competition between East and West. The nuclear arsenals, especially of the two superpowers, have represented not only the preeminent politico-military fact of this competition but also a constant threat to the physical survival of the nations involved. It is, therefore, only

proper and sane that a decent respect for our own well-being and that of our neighbors should fix the attention of governments and public alike on the danger latent in nuclear stockpiles, particularly those of the United States and the Soviet Union.

While we have struggled for more than three decades to avoid a nuclear showdown between ourselves and the Soviets, a new threat has arisen that could increase geometrically the risk of nuclear disaster—the possibility that nuclear weapons could now spread to nations in some of the most unstable areas in the world.

To cope with these fundamentally linked dangers—the fragility of the nuclear balance between the major powers and the possibility of further nuclear weapons proliferation—various simple, straightforward but unrealistic proposals have been put forward. Faced with the prospect of developments that could so clearly be life-threatening, it is understandable that recourse has been sought to remedies that promise low-cost relief of our tensions. Whether the nostrum be a unilateral banning of the bomb or nuclear freeze or a proscription of all nuclear commerce or a halt to development of advanced nuclear technology, history does not condone the impulse to substitute wishful thinking or a drastic quick fix for painstaking, step-by-step labor to alleviate our ills in a realistic manner.

In this light I would like to discuss with you today that part of the nuclear weapons problem with which I am directly involved—nuclear proliferation and its relationship to peaceful nuclear development and international trade.

Nuclear Development and Trade

Since the beginning of the Atomic Age, a central concern of successive American Governments has been to minimize the danger that nuclear weapons would ever be used again. As part of that effort, and recognizing that nuclear knowledge would spread in any event, the United States long ago decided to exchange its technological know-how in the commercial uses of nuclear energy for the opportunity to assist in guiding

this development toward exclusively peaceful ends. Consistent with this goal, we have developed a very careful and strict nuclear export policy, particularly with regard to countries of proliferation concern. Like our pursuit of nuclear peace through deterrence, our policy of preventing nuclear weapons spread while fostering commercial relations with countries that share our concerns has traditionally enjoyed strong support from all sectors of responsible American opinion.

However, from time to time, there have been minority views that have variously urged the United States to set an example by banning nuclear exports altogether or by proclaiming a slowdown in the arrival of new nuclear technologies. One may sympathize with this impulse to banish our troubles by fiat. But what is less acceptable is when those who favor these utopian methods try to identify proponents of a more practical approach as enemies of arms control and nonproliferation. In their view, those who do not share their orientation must be headed straight to the opposite pole and perdition.

It is certainly easier to sit on the sidelines and establish unassailable credentials as a supporter of nonproliferation by proclaiming an absolutist position. If, however, the objective is to obtain the best possible international nonproliferation situation, then you have to engage yourself on behalf of initiatives that realistically fit the needs and intentions of the dozens of other sovereign nations which are also important factors in these matters.

Although the credit must be shared—especially with countries like yours—it is, nevertheless, true that the United States played a key role in the creation of the existing international nonproliferation system—the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with its safeguards procedures—a system which constitutes a significant and wide-ranging compromise of national sovereignty in the cause of nonproliferation. Whatever the system's shortcomings—real or imagined—it gives one pause to consider where we would be without it. But the point I want to make right now is that a major factor enabling the United States to make a decisive contribution to the erection of a world nonproliferation regime was not only, or even primarily, that we

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and others perceived a need for such a system, but rather that, as a leading participant in nuclear trade and repository of nuclear energy technology, we were able to bring significant influence to bear on this issue. To the extent in recent years that we withdrew from world commerce in this area, we risked the progressive erosion, not just of our industry's competitiveness but, more to the point, of our ability to secure sympathetic attention for our views.

So while we maintain a restrictive policy with regard to transfer of nuclear materials, equipment, and technology, both to insure that U.S. exports are not

... as a matter of policy as well as a requirement of our law, we would not consider nuclear trade with a country that did not provide satisfactory nonproliferation assurances.

turned to nonpeaceful purposes and as an inducement to encourage adherence to reasonable nonproliferation principles on the part of our trading partners, we now have a full awareness of the limits of unilaterally imposed requirements. As with any policy instrument, effective utilization of our export restrictions requires careful recognition of their limits. In particular, we now recognize that nations are unlikely to agree to comprehensive nonproliferation commitments solely for the sake of American nuclear exports. There must be other factors at work which serve to enhance the national interest calculations of nuclear suppliers and potential customers alike. Among those factors I would stress the following.

- Nations must feel that their legitimate needs in the area of peaceful nuclear energy are assured.

- They must have a significant degree of confidence that neighboring countries and rivals are not clandestinely developing nuclear weapons under cover of a nuclear energy or research program.

- Perhaps most importantly, regional security situations must not be allowed to deteriorate to a point where a country might feel compelled to seek a nuclear deterrent to preserve its integrity.

With regard to that first point, a failure among the nuclear supplier nations to reach substantial agreement, in their trade with one another and with less technologically developed nations, on the conditions under which they will export nuclear technology, can serve to undermine the cause of nonproliferation. In particular, it can lead to a situation where the less responsible are encouraged to undercut nonproliferation considerations in an unseemly competition for reactor contracts. At the same time, driven by an alarmed public opinion, other nations may be moved to impose conditions that jeopardize even the most legitimate uses of nuclear energy. Both tendencies work to discredit the nonproliferation endeavor and destabilize the consensus on which it depends. For the question is not whether nuclear energy will develop but how.

More specifically, when the Reagan Administration took office, the question before us was whether international nuclear commerce was going to proceed with or without a significant American presence. As this Administration has repeatedly stressed we are determined to restore the competitiveness of U.S. firms in nuclear trade.

In pursuit of this goal, we will distinguish among the countries of the world according to their nonproliferation merit just as, in our exports of military equipment, for example, we differentiate among potential recipients according to similar assessments of how they are likely to use these items of U.S. supply. It should go without saying that, as a matter of policy as well as a requirement of our law, we would not consider nuclear trade with a country that did not provide satisfactory nonproliferation assurances.

For our traditional allies and nuclear trading partners, we have already signaled a sharp break from some of the policies of the last Administration—which often seemed to treat all nations with equal suspicion on nuclear matters—and a return to a more traditional and common sense approach.

For other countries with the requisite credentials on the proliferation

question, our task has been to demonstrate with concrete commitments that the United States will be a reliable source of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes in projects that will stretch out to the end of this decade and beyond. To that end we have opened an extensive dialogue with a number of nations which are contemplating initiation or expansion of peaceful nuclear power projects. For example, with the encouragement and participation of the U.S. Government, American nuclear vendors have been actively involved in discussions with the Government of Mexico on its extensive plans for the long-range development of nuclear power. While no decisions have yet been made by the Mexican authorities, the talks have proceeded in an increasingly positive vein on both sides and have been an important indication to us that we are on the right track.

China is another country in the process of making decisions on possible foreign involvement in projects under consideration for the commercial production of nuclear energy. Although its plans for economic development are in a process of evolution, China clearly has significant potential to expand its involvement in world nuclear commerce both as an exporter of nuclear materials and an importer of modern reactor technology. In our discussions with the Chinese Government over the past year, we have declared our willingness to make appropriate American technology available if suitable arrangements can be worked out. Over time, China has the potential to be a major participant in nuclear trade, and its support of the international nonproliferation regime could be correspondingly important. Therefore, one of our primary purposes in our dialogue is to encourage the Chinese Government in this direction.

The nuclear cooperation agreement which the United States and Egypt signed last year is a striking example of how a concern for proliferation can be accommodated in arrangements that provide a nuclear power development. With the electrical utilities in Korea and Taiwan, also, our traditional association with the safe development of nuclear power has been reaffirmed in recent months. In all of these cases, and a number of others as well, we are encouraged that, although its implementation is still incomplete, the Reagan Administration's new approach to nuclear cooperation is beginning to bear visible fruit.

Mechanisms of the Nonproliferation Consensus

My second point concerns the mechanisms of the nonproliferation consensus I mentioned a moment ago—the NPT, its Latin American analogue (the Treaty of Tlatelolco), the IAEA, and the agreements of the members of the nuclear suppliers group.

A great deal of public attention has recently been focused on the adequacy of the IAEA to monitor effectively nuclear operations in the countries where its safeguards inspections are in force. At one extreme of this issue, there are those who are content to state that, if IAEA safeguards are being applied in a given situation, all must, by definition, be in perfect order and that nothing further need be said. At the opposite extreme are critics of the IAEA system who reason that, since there are undeniable flaws at least in some parts of the apparatus, we should reject it entirely or, at best, we should halt nuclear commerce across the board until the U.S. Government has dictated the necessary corrections to the rest of the world.

Our approach is to be realistic and practical. While we must squarely face the real problems of the IAEA, we are not going to let our awareness of its shortcomings displace our recognition of the vital role it successfully accomplishes in scores of nations. The fact that legitimate questions might be raised about safeguards at particular facilities in countries of serious proliferation concern does not, in fact, call into question the whole safeguards undertaking. Any security monitoring system is theoretically liable to subversion and could, in practice, be defeated at some level of probability. But the confidence placed by well over 100 nations in the ability of this inspections system to warn of a nuclear materials diversion has turned out to have been justified by experience. The objective, of course, is to deter an attempt at diversion by posing a significantly high risk of detection. These procedures have been proven effective, and this has been of immeasurable importance in assuring countries that their security is not being threatened by unseen developments of nuclear weapons at these facilities. For these reasons the current American Administration, in word and deed, has been at pains to assure the international community of our continued full support for the IAEA.

As many of you are aware, the process of selecting a new IAEA Director General last fall was a long and laborious one. The diplomatic efforts expended by my government and by others who share our commitment to the effectiveness of this agency were successful and are indicative of the importance of the objective. Director General Blix [Hans Blix of Sweden] is continuing the agency's tradition of impartial devotion to the cause of nonproliferation and has our firm support.

Beyond the scope of the IAEA and its associated international nonproliferation treaties, the agreements among the nuclear suppliers group also have a key role in our efforts to contain the spread of nuclear weapons. In keeping with the Administration's preference for quiet diplomacy, we have been consulting on a bilateral basis with other nuclear exporters on the full range of nuclear supply topics. It should come as no surprise to those who watch these matters closely that this approach gives greater promise of success than U.S. attempts to prescribe unilaterally the shape and content of the group's nuclear commerce.

Similarly, past U.S. efforts to deter international reprocessing and use of plutonium in advanced reactors by prohibiting or delaying such use in the United States and other advanced nuclear power states has been abandoned. But that is not at all to say that we encourage all conceivable developments along this line. Rather, we fully recognize that plutonium is extremely sensitive material because it can be used to make explosives and that its use, therefore, should be carefully controlled and monitored. As long as countries are concerned about their energy security and independence, we will have to face the likelihood that these nations will proceed to seek to develop plutonium fuels.

As in other questions of nuclear cooperation, just as in every other area of foreign policy, this Administration will base its decisions on an evaluation of the concrete facts in each circumstance. In other words, we will decide the issue on the basis of the nonproliferation merits of the country involved. With regard to plutonium use, this means restricting use of U.S.-origin materials to countries with advanced nuclear programs where it does not pose a proliferation danger. A safe regime for plutonium use, like other nonproliferation measures, is not one that can be imposed by the United States on an otherwise unwilling world but rather one that

would require a consensus composed of multiple decisions by individual sovereign nations.

Factors that figure prominently in our deliberations on this sensitive issue are the following.

- What is the country's overall record on nonproliferation? This is obviously the key indicator.
- Is such use justified economically? If this is not the case, a serious question may be raised about other ends the activity may be intended to serve.
- It may be desirable to confine plutonium fuel cycle facilities to as few locations as possible. With this in view, the United States remains seriously interested in exploring cooperative arrangements for the establishment of multilateral facilities where the economic need might exist.
- Plutonium use is needed for breeder development and may become a valuable energy source for some countries. In our relations with these countries, we must be able to provide a large measure of predictability about how we intend to exercise our consent rights regarding plutonium produced from U3 material.
- Reprocessing, besides its need for breeder reactors, may be a useful waste management tool. In any event, reprocessing for waste management should be considered an option only where it does not pose a proliferation risk.

In accordance with the instructions contained in President Reagan's July 16

As long as countries are concerned about their energy security and independence, we will have to face the likelihood that these nations will proceed to seek to develop plutonium fuels.

statement on nuclear cooperation and nonproliferation, the agencies of the U.S. Government are conducting a study to develop a policy for considering the exercise of consent rights for reprocessing and plutonium use on a more long-

term and predictable basis. We started this review in the United States last summer. Our initial consideration revealed a number of complex factors, and much more time and energy was necessary for completion of this task than originally envisaged. The work, for the most part, has been completed now, and this policy should be forthcoming very soon. This approach will recognize that countries with large programs require long-term confidence and predictability in their supply arrangements. We are aiming at developing policies which will facilitate long-term planning by our cooperating partners. In the interim, we have been promptly approving, subject to statutory requirements, requests for retransfer of spent fuel to the United Kingdom and France and will consider requests for plutonium use on a case-by-case basis.

Related to this question of foreign reprocessing and use of U.S.-origin material is the issue of military use by the United States of the plutonium in spent commercial reactor fuel. While this question was examined as part of the new Administration's overall review, the decision has been to continue the traditional American policy, we have no plans to employ nuclear material generated in the civil nuclear sector in the U.S. military program. Given the importance of maintaining a clear distinction between the peaceful and the military uses of nuclear energy, as well as the serious domestic international and nonproliferation implications of such a step, we would consider military use of U.S. material in civil use only if absolutely essential for our national security and that of our allies—which is precisely where American policy has stood for decades. Such a decision would require a decision at the highest level of the U.S. Government and consultations with the U.S. Congress. When the United States imports nuclear material under a peaceful use assurance, such material must remain dedicated for civilian applications only. It could be removed from this category only with the agreement of the supplier nation.

Security Concerns

After everything has been said about safeguarding nuclear facilities, supplier guidelines, controlling plutonium use and so forth, the fact remains that the problem of nuclear weapons is, in the final analysis, an international political problem, a problem of national security. As

Reprocessing and Plutonium Use

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, JUNE 9, 1982¹

You will recall that the presidential policy statement on nuclear cooperation and nonproliferation of July 16, 1981, directed the Secretary of State, in cooperation with other responsible agencies, to give priority attention to efforts to reduce proliferation risks, to enhance the international nonproliferation regime, and, consistent with U.S. security interests, to reestablish a leadership role for the United States in international nuclear affairs. Under this mandate, one of the follow-on reviews has focused on approaches for a more predictable policy for exercising U.S. rights to approve reprocessing and use of plutonium subject to U.S. control under our peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements.

That review has now been completed, and the President has decided that in certain cases, the United States will offer to work out predictable, programmatic arrangements for reprocessing and plutonium use for civilian power

and research needs, in the context of seeking new or amended agreements as required by law. These agreements would involve only countries with effective commitments to nonproliferation, where there are advanced nuclear power programs, and where such activities do not constitute a proliferation risk and are under effective safeguards and controls.

U.S. approval will be given only if U.S. statutory criteria are met and will be valid only as long as these criteria and other conditions in the agreements continue to apply.

It should be noted that the United States has been approving reprocessing requests on an *ad hoc*, case-by-case basis under existing agreements for many years. What the President has now approved is a new approach to granting long-term approvals in certain cases for the life of specific, carefully defined programs, as long as the conditions I have described are met.

¹Read to news correspondents by acting Department spokesman Alan Romberg. ■

important as all the measures being discussed are to delaying, deterring, or discouraging the spread of nuclear weapons over the near term, there are simply too many nations that, given the political will, can hardly be prevented from acquiring the necessary technical and industrial wherewithal to build nuclear arms in the long run. This brings me to my final point—the need to address the security concerns that may often motivate a government to seek a nuclear explosives option in the first place.

In this connection, the case of Pakistan is illustrative. In 1979 the United States terminated all assistance—military and economic—to this longtime ally as a result of its nuclear program intended to put Pakistan in position to make nuclear explosives. However, our aid cutoff did not have the intended result of dissuading Pakistan from its pursuit of this nuclear weapons option.

But for the unprovoked Soviet aggression in Afghanistan, matters might have continued as they were, with Pakistan proceeding toward the testing

of a nuclear device and our two countries fundamentally estranged over the issue. However, just over 2 years ago at the time of the Soviet invasion, the Carter Administration recognized that the situation had been fundamentally altered. It became necessary to attempt to address Pakistan's legitimate and urgent security concerns, most directly by assisting it to improve its conventional military capabilities.

Although the Carter Administration's efforts in this direction were not successful, the Reagan Administration moved decisively last year to work out an assistance package with the Government of Pakistan. We believe that this assistance—which is in the strategic interest of the United States—will make a significant contribution to the well-being and security of Pakistan and that it will be recognized as such by that government. We also believe that, for this reason, it offers the best prospect of deterring the Pakistanis from proceeding to the testing or acquisition of nuclear explosives, for we have left the

akistanis in no doubt that such a move in their part would necessarily and fundamentally alter the premises of our new security relationship with them.

The task of addressing all the regional security concerns which are the ground in which the impulse to seek nuclear armaments can germinate is one that not only goes beyond the scope of my remarks here today but also one that requires the active involvement of a large body of nations. In particular, I have in mind the members of NATO and the other nations of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The friendly cooperation that exists among this group is already a promising example to the rest of the world, but a great deal more remains to be done.

In recent weeks and months, some of you may have seen articles from the American press criticizing, in tones of considerable alarm, the new directions laid out by the Reagan Administration in nuclear cooperation and nonproliferation policy.

First, it has once again been suggested, for example, that the United States should ban all commercial use of plutonium fuel and prohibit the use abroad of such fuel from American sources. Not surprisingly, the writer wishes to demonstrate how an American wish can be transformed into a universal reality any more than an order to ground all U.S. airlines and close down the Boeing Corporation would bring the life of the airplane to an end. Clearly the United States and the other advanced nuclear power nations have a need to develop and utilize plutonium for energy production.

Second, we are told we should prohibit the export of highly enriched uranium for research reactors, forgetting that such U.S. exports go only to countries with excellent nonproliferation credentials, including some of our closest allies and trading partners. Such a move would only punish the most responsible governments while leaving the rest less-so unaffected. It seems to me that the fallacy in the thinking of those who advocate these self-defeating courses of action is that they imagine the world to be a small New England town where everyone can be treated equally before the law and can, therefore, logically demand full benefit of any precedent. In the real world, this is manifestly not the case. The especially close relationship between the United

States and the United Kingdom in nuclear, as well as in other, matters does not logically set a precedent on how we or other countries should act in basically different circumstances, nor should it.

Third, among the proposals for settling international issues like nuclear proliferation, there is always a suggestion that we call an international conference—in this case reconvening the nuclear suppliers group. Such conferences have their uses—and we have had no lack of them in recent years—but at the moment the clear preference of the nuclear suppliers is for quiet diplomacy. We, therefore, feel that such a multilateral meeting of the suppliers would be counterproductive.

Fourth, it is likewise easy to prescribe remedies for the IAEA. We have been told, for example, that there should be more numerous and unannounced inspections and that inspection reports should be published. All of this, and much more, would be fine in another world than the one that exists. The fact is that the IAEA is an entirely voluntary association of sovereign nations.

Unannounced inspections already are a component of the IAEA system but, because of the complexity of the facilities to be visited, they cannot serve as the primary means of inspection. Inspections are carried out pursuant to an agreed arrangement—something called a facility attachment. What nation, including Britain or the United States, would confer an open license to an international inspector to simply wander through any private or government facility he happened upon? Finally, nations make much information available to the IAEA for one reason—because it is to be kept confidential. This is for valid proprietary and national security reasons. Publishing IAEA inspection reports would obviously destroy this confidence.

The inspection system of that agency already involves a unique delegation of sovereignty achieved after long effort. A move to extend dramatically this delegation of sovereignty by relying entirely on unannounced inspections, giving inspectors authority to roam around the countryside, or publishing reports on what countries consider proprietary and national security matters is simply unrealistic.

Fifth, a perennial component of recipes for addressing a difficult problem seems to be that we should turn the

matter over to an independent agency. In the current case, we have heard that we should consolidate all U.S. nuclear export and retransfer authority in the independent Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). While such bodies can have a useful role in government—and, indeed, in the United States the NRC has an established statutory responsibility—issuance of nuclear export actions are largely foreign policy matters. In recent years much has been done in the executive branch to insure the proper review of requested export action. Considerable effort is extended before favorable action is taken. Vesting such authority in a largely technical, domestic agency would have the effect of divorcing foreign policy from the decisionmaking.

Sixth, we have been criticized for not living up to our NPT obligations to pursue immediate strategic arms reductions with the Soviet Union. For over a decade, the two superpowers have engaged in this pursuit. There have been some achievements and some disappointments, but we certainly will not agree to measures which do not reflect balanced reductions or which cannot be adequately verified. Nevertheless, as the President and the Secretary of State have clearly said, we remain ready to proceed in good faith toward the objective of arms control and reduction.

After everything has been said about safeguarding nuclear facilities . . . the fact remains that the problem of nuclear weapons is . . . a problem of national security.

While I very much sympathize with the motives of those who offer these criticisms of our policy and I entirely share their goal of a more secure world, I must, nevertheless suggest that this kind of exaggerated and unbalanced approach is not a positive contribution to an intelligent dialogue on this vital subject.

The Administration welcomes and encourages public discussion of nuclear nonproliferation issues. In a democracy such as ours, policies related to national security matters, as well as success in negotiating effective agreements to control the spread of nuclear weapons, depend upon popular support. Over the past several months, these vital questions have become the subjects of renewed interest and examination. We are certain that as public discussion proceeds, and as the Administration's policies in this area become more widely understood, they will win broad support at home and abroad.

In conclusion, I hope that, in my talk here today, I have been able to indicate that the government in Washington fully shares the concerns on this nuclear issue that naturally worry any reflective person and that some of these criticisms we have seen are based on a fundamental misconception of our policy. I hope, also, that I have made plain my belief that, while there is little cause for complacency on the matter of nonproliferation, there are, by the same token, strong grounds for rejecting extreme and impractical solutions that could only be counterproductive. ■

strongest, most sacred ties of all—the practice of democratic freedoms denied to many peoples by their governments.

My devout hope is that, during this visit, we can weave together all these threads of common interest into a new and better understanding between our two countries.

Prime Minister Gandhi

Mr. President and Mrs. Reagan, to me every journey is an adventure; I can say that this one is an adventure in search of understanding and friendship.

It is difficult to imagine two nations more different than ours. As history goes, your country is a young one. Over the years, it has held unparalleled attraction for the adventurous and daring for the talented as well as for the persecuted. It has stood for opportunity and freedom. The endeavors of the early pioneers, the struggle for human values the coming together of different races have enabled it to retain its elan and dynamism of youth. With leadership and high ideals, it has grown into a great power. Today, its role in world affairs is unmatched. Every word and action of the President is watched and weighed and has global repercussions.

India is an ancient country, and history weighs heavily on us. The character of its people is formed by the palimpsest of its varied experiences. The circumstances of its present development are shadowed by its years of colonialism and exploitation. Yet, our ancient philosophy has withstood all onslaughts, absorbing newcomers, adapting ideas and cultures. We have developed endurance and resilience.

In India, our preoccupation is with building and development. Our problem is not to influence others but to consolidate our political and economic independence. We believe in freedom with a passion that only those who have been denied it can understand. We believe in equality, because many in our country were so long deprived of it. We believe in the worth of the human being, for that is the foundation of our democracy and our work for development. That is the framework of our national programs.

We have no global interests, but we are deeply interested in the world and its affairs. Yet, we cannot get involved in power groupings. That would be neither to our advantage, nor would it foster world peace. Our hand of friend-

Visit of Indian Prime Minister Gandhi

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of India made an official visit to the United States July 28–August 4, 1982. While in Washington, D.C., July 28–31, she met with President Reagan and other government officials.

Following are remarks made at the welcoming ceremony, toasts made at the state dinner, and Department statements.

WELCOMING CEREMONY, JULY 29, 1982¹

President Reagan

Prime Minister Gandhi, Nancy and I are delighted to welcome you to the White House. Let me add a personal note. It is good to see you here again as leader of the great Indian democracy, which provides a unique opportunity for us to broaden and deepen the dialog we began last autumn in Mexico. Through our talks, we can help to reach a renewed recognition of the mutual importance of strong, constructive ties between India and the United States.

In searching for words to describe the focus of your visit to Washington this week, I came upon a statement that you had made in Delhi when Roy Jenkins visited in 1980. At that time, you said, "The great need in the world today is to so define national interest that it makes for greater harmony, greater equality and justice, and greater stability in the world." That is more than an eloquent description of enlightened national interest. It can also serve to

describe the foundation of the relationship between the United States and India, a relationship we seek to reaffirm this week. A strengthening of that relationship, based on better understanding, is particularly important at this time.

Your father once said that the basic fact of today is the tremendous pace of change in human life. The conflicts and the tensions of the 1980's pose new challenges to our countries and to all nations which seek, as India and the United States do, freedom in a more stable, secure, and prosperous world. As leaders of the world's two largest democracies, sharing common ideals and values, we can learn much from one another in discussing concerns and exploring national purposes. From this understanding can come greater confidence in one another's roles on the world's stage and a rediscovery of how important we are to one another.

We recognize that there have been differences between our countries, but these should not obscure all that we have in common, for we are both strong, proud, and independent nations guided by our own perceptions of our national interests. We both desire the peace and stability of the Indian Ocean area and the early end of the occupation of Afghanistan. We both seek an equitable peace in the Middle East and an honorable settlement of the Iran-Iraq conflict.

We both seek a constructive approach to international economic cooperation, building on the strong links even today being forged between the economies of the United States and India. Beyond that, India and the United States are bound together by the

ship is stretched out to all. One friendship does not come in the way of another. This is not a new stand; that has been my policy since I became Prime Minister in 1966.

No two countries can have the same angle of vision, but each can try to appreciate the points of view of the others. Our effort should be to find a common area, howsoever small, on which to build and to enhance cooperation. I take this opportunity to say how much we in India value the help we have received from the United States in our stupendous tasks.

I look forward to my talks with you and getting to know the charming Mrs. Reagan. I thank you for your kind invitation, for your welcome, and your gracious words. I bring to you, to the First Lady, and to the great American people the sincere greetings and good wishes of the government and people of India.

EXCHANGE OF TOASTS, JULY 29, 1982²

President Reagan

It has been a personal pleasure for me to welcome Prime Minister Gandhi back to this city and to this house today.

The Prime Minister and I and Secretary Shultz and other members of our Government have had a long and meaningful discussion on a wide range of subjects. Often, we came at these subjects from different perspectives born of different national experiences and roles in the world. But throughout, I have been struck by the strength, the intelligence, and the determination of the Prime Minister, not only in explaining her views but in seeking a clear understanding of ours. The dialog of discovery that we began at Cancún matured in our discussions today and will, I trust, bear important fruit in the days and years ahead.

During our recent visit to Europe I had the honor of addressing a joint session of the British Parliament. It seemed fitting to build my speech around the concept of democracy which that Mother of Parliaments represents. We sought to articulate the deep and abiding faith of the American people placed in our democratic institutions and the idea that an immutable bond draws democratic countries together.

One of the nations I singled out was India. I chose India in that speech for two reasons. India's experience since independence exemplifies the gathering strength of the democratic revolution. And India stands in eloquent refutation of all those who argue that democratic institutions are not equal to the task of dealing with today's problems, or are irrelevant to the needs of today's developing nations. For these reasons, India serves as a beacon not only to developing nations which seek to emulate its experience but to all of us who seek renewal of our faith in democracy.

You can understand why we are honored to have you here. It is not only because you're the leader of a great nation—one whose history, civilization, size, and influence on the world command our attention and respect—but also because you're the representative of a family which has been, in so many ways, the architect of that nation.

The contributions which your family has made to India most closely parallel, in our history, the Adams family. They came from Massachusetts, not Kashmir. They came—by coincidence they were often referred to as Boston Brahmins. [Laughter] And theirs, too, was a tradition of scholarship, sacrifice, and public service. Successive generations of Adamses contributed to our national development—first, by struggling for independence and articulating our national ideals, then through years of selfless effort toward their attainment. So you, your father, and each of your sons have served India.

Lord Bolingbroke's description of the Adams family is equally appropriate for your family's contribution to India. "They are the guardian angels of the country they inhabit, studious to avert the most distant evil and to procure peace, plenty, and the greatest of human blessings, liberty."

The recent summit at Versailles proved once again, as I told the British Parliament, that even in times of severe economic strain, free peoples can work together freely and voluntarily to address problems as serious as inflation, unemployment, trade, and economic development in a spirit of cooperation and solidarity. In our bilateral relationship as well, democratic principles are the foundation on which we can build the framework of a lasting and durable friendship. The day-to-day reality of our close ties, whether in the fields of education, the arts, science, or commerce, all

flow from the same basic understanding that although our countries may travel separate paths from time to time, our destination remains the same.

For my part, our talks today were particularly useful in reaffirming the inherent strength of our relationship. Our frank discussions have contributed greatly to the stripping away of stereotypes which have sometimes surrounded our relations. We look forward now to a renewal of cooperation based on the shared understanding of our common values and our common aspirations.

In this spirit, I raise my glass to you as the distinguished leader of a great sister democracy and to the friendship between our two proud, free peoples.

Prime Minister Gandhi

Entering the White House, one cannot but think of the men of vision and energy and the women of character and grace who have lived here, who have influenced people's minds and the course of world events. Awesome, indeed, are the responsibilities of the United States and its President. In far-off India, at a time when communications were not as satisfactory, our own freedom struggle drew inspiration from the makers of your nation. How farseeing and wise they were, and how well they built.

The first President, who chose this site had a simple wish, and I quote: "I hope ever to see America amongst the foremost nations in examples of justice and liberality." Since those words were uttered, the United States has become the world's foremost country in wealth, in technology, and in vigor of intellect. The combination of these qualities is, indeed, something of which you can be justifiably proud.

America has grown through challenge, not conformism. To quote a historian: "America was born of revolt, flourished in dissent, and became great through experimentation."

Our challenges in India have not been less. We have charted our own course, fortunate in leaders who took sustenance from our timeless philosophy, as well as modern concepts, putting them to work as instruments of action.

Our national movement reinforced the age-old unity which had held our country together through the ups and downs of history, across the shifting

India—A Profile

Geography

Area: 3,287,590 sq. km. (1,269,340 sq. mi.); about twice the size of Alaska. **Capital:** New Delhi (pop. 5.2 million). **Other Major Cities:** Calcutta (9 million), Bombay (8 million), Madras (4 million), Bangalore (3 million), Hyderabad (2.6 million), Ahmedabad (2.5 million). **Terrain:** Varies from Himalaya mountains to flat Gangetic Plain. **Climate:** Temperate to subtropical monsoon.

People

Population: 684 million; urban 21.5% (1981 census). **Annual Growth Rate:** 2.24%. **Density:** 221/sq. km. (572/sq. mi.). **Ethnic Groups:** 72% Indo-Aryan, 25% Dravidian, 2% Mongoloid, others. **Religions:** Hindu 83%, Muslim 11%, Christian 2.6%, Sikh, Jain, Buddhist, Parsi. **Languages:** Hindi, English, and 14 other official languages. **Education:** Years compulsory—9 (to age 14). **Literacy—36%.** **Health:** Infant mortality rate (1978 est.)—139/1,000. **Life expectancy—54 yrs.**

Government

Type: Federal Republic. **Date of Independence:** August 15, 1947. **Constitution:** January 26, 1950. **Branches:** *Executive*—president (chief of state), prime minister (head of government), Council of Ministers (cabinet). *Legislative*—bicameral Parliament (*Rajya Sabha* or Council of States and *Lok Sabha* or House of the People). *Judicial*—Supreme Court. **Political Parties:** Congress (I), Congress (S), Lok Dal, Bharatiya Party, Janata Party, Communist Parties (CPI and CPM). **Suffrage:** Universal over 21. **Political Subdivisions:** 22 states, 9 union territories. **Central Government Budget (1981-82 est.):** \$21.85 billion. **Defense Expenditures (1972-80 est.):** 3.1% of GNP.

Economy*

GNP: \$167 billion. **Real Growth Rate:** 4%. **Per Capita GNP:** \$245. **Real Per Capita GNP Growth Rate:** 2%. **Annual Inflation Rate 1981:** 10%. **Natural Resources:** Coal, iron ore, manganese, mica, bauxite, chromite, limestone, barite. **Agriculture** (43% of GNP): *Products*—textiles, jute, processed food, steel, machinery, transport equipment, cement, aluminum, fertilizers. **Trade:** *Exports*—\$9.1 billion: engineering goods, cotton apparel and fabrics, precious stones, handicrafts, tea. *Imports*—\$16.1 billion: petroleum, edible oils, machinery and transport equip-



ment, fertilizer. **Major partners**—U.S., U.S.S.R., Japan, U.K., Iraq, Iran. **Currency:** Rupee, divided into 100 paise. **Official Exchange Rate (1981-82):** 8.8 rupees = U.S.\$1. **Economic Aid (1947-80): Total**—\$35.1 billion: multinational lending agencies and OECD, Communist, and OPEC countries. **U.S. aid**—\$11.7 billion, of which AID \$4 billion, PL 480 \$6.1 billion, Exim Bank loans \$614 million, wheat loans \$244 million.

Membership in International Organizations

U.N., Nonaligned Movement, Commonwealth, Colombo Plan, Asian Development Bank



(ADB), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, INTELSAT.

*All figures are 1981-82 estimates. ■

borders of hundreds of kingdoms, and bridging succeeding dynasties. After independence it was our task to usher in a more egalitarian society which would insure social and economic justice to all regardless of religion, caste, language, or sex. For us economic progress means not only material well-being but moving nearly 500 million from one age to another, with the minimum dislocation or alienation from their roots.

Few things are good or bad in themselves. Their effect and importance lies in what one makes of them. Tradition, especially ours, which has been a factor for unity, for tolerance, and harmony, and for our people's cultural literacy, can be used as a tool, paradoxical though it may sound, for change and modernity. Life for a person or a country is a series of choices, not between the correct and the incorrect, which a computer can make, but in terms of opting for a course which will be consistent with our ethos and individuality, our past history and future aspirations.

Our struggle for independence was nonviolent. We chose democracy based on the British system but with some modifications, and the American Constitution influenced the shaping of our own constitution. Our planning is not for regimentation but to help us to take rational decisions and meet the competing demands of different sections of society and regions.

In India, as in the U.S.A., we have a private sector as well as a public sector. I see no conflict between the two. We have persevered in the face of criticism, of aggression, of different types of interferences. We are not satisfied with our success; we could have done better. Yet, notwithstanding the tremendous odds, we have moved forward.

There has been significant progress in agriculture and industry, in science and technology, and in the social services. The very fact that life expectancy has gone up by 20 years indicates improvement in living and working conditions. We aim at self-reliance. So, it is befitting that 90% of the resources needed for this gigantic endeavor of modernizing the country have come from our own people, impoverished though they are thought to be. But the remaining 10% or so is important, for that represents the inflow of modern technology.

In this, we have been helped by the United States, by countries of Western



(White House photo by Jack Kightlinger)

Prime Minister Gandhi attends dinner in her honor hosted by the President and Mrs. Reagan.

and Eastern Europe, and several international institutions. We particularly appreciate American technical assistance. In consonance with our independent stand, we take cooperation in science, trade, or defense requirements from wherever it suits our national interest.

If India were considered in economic or military terms, it would not count. Yet, our voice is heard, because in spite of our poverty and economic backwardness and often looking beyond our immediate interests, we have fearlessly spoken up for the rights of the underprivileged and the threatened and have championed the cause of peace and freedom. We have always viewed our problems in the much larger perspective of global problems.

Our foreign policy is one of friendship for all, hence our nonalignment. We are against the involvement of foreign troops or any other interference in the internal affairs of other countries. We believe in negotiations rather than the use of arms in settling disputes.

India is a large area of stability in South Asia. Undoubtedly, its strengthening will help to stabilize and strengthen the entire region.

It is good that meetings between heads of state and government, individually and at conferences, are taking place more often. They do take us away from urgent tasks at home, but national and international problems are increasingly interlinked. Cancún dealt with various global issues, Versailles with the economic and other problems of the North, touching also on North-South questions. At the New Delhi Meeting of Developing Countries, the focus was on cooperation between themselves.

On earlier occasions I have pointed out that the future of advanced and developing countries is so closely intertwined that cooperation would benefit both. This is not merely a question of social justice and equity. My own view is that developing countries can contribute significantly to the emerging world economic order. Theirs are the potentially large markets which would help developed countries like the United States to maintain higher profitability on their investment, higher rates of growth, and to generate more employment.

To our minds there are three main causes of the present disturbing situation: the growth of armaments; the increasing disparity between the rich and the poor—both between and within nations; and the thoughtless wounding of our Earth.

The world is one, yet we treat it as many, giving different names to the segments. As they are politically used, the words, East and West, North and South, are not even geographically apt. More than 3,000 years ago, when the world was greener, the sages of my country wrote an ode to the Earth. It is so pertinent today that I should like to share some lines with you.

“Do not push me from the west or from the east, or from the north or the south;
Be gracious to us, O Earth; let not those find us who waylay people on the road;
Take deadly weapons far away from us.”

May I say how much I appreciate your invitation to me. In a world where crises so swiftly follow one another, it is important to keep in touch and exchange views even if one cannot agree on all points.

We have had, as you have just told us, discussions which have been important and useful to us and, I think, which have created better understanding. I thank you once again, and Mrs. Reagan, for your gracious hospitality, for this delightful evening in such elegant and impressive surroundings.

May I now ask you all, ladies and gentlemen, to join me in a toast to the health of the President and the gracious First Lady, to the well-being of the American people, and to friendship between our two countries.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, JULY 29, 1982³

In the context of Prime Minister Gandhi's visit this week the Governments of India and the United States have significantly enhanced the friendly relations between the two countries by agreeing to resolve the matter of supply of low enriched uranium to India's Tarapur atomic power station.

The two governments, after consulting with the Government of France, have reached a solution which envisages the use of French-supplied low enriched

uranium at Tarapur while keeping the 1963 agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation in effect in all other respects, including provision for IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] safeguards. This solution will serve non-proliferation interests and meet India's need for nuclear fuel for the Tarapur station.

An exchange of notes formalizing this solution will take place during the forthcoming visit to the United States of Dr. H. N. Sethna, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission of India.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, JULY 30, 1982⁴

As a result of Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's meetings with President Reagan and other Administration officials, the Indian and the American sides have agreed upon additional initiatives that will supplement the extensive ongoing activities linking our two nations. Among these is the establishment of a Blue Ribbon panel of eminent scientists from both countries to determine priorities for expanded collaboration in agricultural research, biomass energy, and health.

They also agreed that 1984 and 1987 would be designated a period of special focus to intensify and highlight cultural and educational exchange. In addition they have decided to:

- Reconstitute annual official-level talks between the Department of State and the Ministry of External Affairs;
- Promote commercial relations through trade missions and an OPIC [Overseas Private Investment Corporation] mission in early 1983 to study opportunities for joint business ventures; and
- Consult closely to insure the success of the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] Ministerial to be held in November 1982.

¹Made on the South Lawn of the White House (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Aug. 2, 1982).

²Made at the dinner in the State Dining Room (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Aug. 2, 1982).

³Made to news correspondents by Assistant Secretary Velioles.

⁴Made to news correspondents by acting Department spokesman Alan Romberg. ■

Iran-Iraq War

Following are Department and White House statements, the text of the Security Council resolution, and a statement by Ambassador William C. Sherman, U.S. Deputy Representative to the Security Council.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, JULY 9, 1982¹

U.S. policy with regard to the Iran-Iraq war has been clear and consistent since the outbreak of hostilities 20 months ago. The policy enunciated when Iraqi forces entered Iran remains our policy today.

The United States supports the independence and territorial integrity of both Iran and Iraq, as well as the other states in the region. In keeping with our policy worldwide, we oppose the seizure of territory by force.

We see the continuation of the war, as we have repeatedly said, as a danger to the peace and security of all nations in the Gulf region, and we have, therefore, consistently supported an immediate cease fire and a negotiated settlement.

We have maintained a firm policy of not approving the sale or transfer of American military equipment and supplies to either belligerent.

We have welcomed constructive international efforts to bring an end to the war on the basis of each state's respect for the territorial integrity of its neighbors and each state's freedom from external coercion.

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, JULY 14, 1982²

The U.S. Government has remained neutral from the beginning, and will remain neutral in the war between Iran and Iraq. We remain deeply concerned, however, about the continuation of this conflict and the attendant loss of life and destruction. The United States supports the independence and territorial integrity of both Iran and Iraq, as well as that of other states in the region. In keeping with our policy worldwide, we oppose the seizure of territory by force.

We urge an immediate end to hostilities and a negotiated settlement.

We support constructive international efforts for a peaceful solution to the conflict on the basis of each state's respect for the territorial integrity of its neighbors and each state's freedom from external coercion. In keeping with this policy we have joined with other members of the U.N. Security Council in 1980 and on July 12 of this year in resolutions calling for an end to the conflict.

Our support for the security of friendly states in the region which might feel threatened by the conflict is well known, and the United States is prepared to consult with these states on appropriate steps to support their security.

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 514, JULY 12, 1982³

The Security Council,

Having considered again the question entitled "The situation between Iran and Iraq",

Deeply concerned about the prolongation of the conflict between the two countries, resulting in heavy losses of human lives and considerable material damage, and endangering peace and security,

Recalling the provisions of Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations, and that the establishment of peace and security in the region requires strict adherence to these provisions,

Recalling that by virtue of Article 24 of the Charter the Security Council has the primary responsibility for maintenance of international peace and security,

Recalling its resolution 479 (1980), adopted unanimously on 28 September 1980, as well as the statement of its President of 5 November 1980 (S/14244),

Taking note of the efforts of mediation pursued notably by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and his representative, as well as by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and the Organization of the Islamic Conference,

1. *Calls* for a cease-fire and an immediate end to all military operations;
2. *Calls further* for a withdrawal of forces to internationally recognized boundaries;
3. *Decides* to dispatch a team of United Nations observers to verify, confirm and supervise the cease-fire and withdrawal, and requests the Secretary-General to submit to the Council a report on the arrangements required for that purpose;

4. *Urges* that the mediation efforts be continued in a co-ordinated manner through the Secretary-General with a view to achieving a comprehensive, just and honourable settlement acceptable to both sides of all the outstanding issues, on the basis of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, including respect for sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of States;

5. *Requests* all other States to abstain from all actions which could contribute to the continuation of the conflict and to facilitate the implementation of the present resolution;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council within three months on the implementation of this resolution.

AMBASSADOR SHERMAN'S STATEMENT, SECURITY COUNCIL, JULY 12, 1982⁴

Since the beginning of this unhappy conflict the United States has held the position that a solution must be found which preserves the independence and territorial integrity of both Iraq and Iran. We have, therefore, been prepared to support any constructive and equitable action by the Council which works toward that end.

The present text meets that test. It is a balanced resolution and calls for a comprehensive, just, and honorable settlement. It seeks negotiation of all outstanding issues between the two countries, and it does not prejudice. In supporting it, the United States hopes that both sides will agree on mutually acceptable means for working toward a settlement and will cooperate fully with the ceasefire and withdrawal arrangements to be established, and the continuing mediation efforts to be coordinated through the Secretary General, as called for by this resolution.

¹Read to news correspondents by Department spokesman Dean Fischer.

²Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of July 19, 1982.

³Adopted unanimously.

⁴USUN press release 57. ■

Certification of Progress in El Salvador

by Thomas O. Enders

Statement submitted to the House Foreign Affairs Committee on July 29, 1982. Ambassador Enders is Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs.¹

I appreciate the opportunity to review with your committee the certification required pursuant to Section 728 (b) and (d) of the International Security and Cooperation Act of 1981.

Two successive U.S. administrations have pursued a three-pronged strategy in El Salvador:

- Active support for democracy as the only practical means of building peace, reconciling internal divisions, and protecting human rights;
- Economic assistance to relieve human suffering and promote equitable development, including land reform; and
- Military assistance to counter the violence of guerrillas who are supported by Cuba and Nicaragua and attempting to seize power by force.

The essential elements of this policy are bipartisan. It has been implemented in close consultation with the Congress. It is important that we also recognize, however, that this continuity of U.S. policy toward El Salvador, including its original adoption, was made possible by internal changes in El Salvador. Though besieged by violent forces of extreme left and extreme right, the governments that have held office there since October 1979 have consistently sought to advance democratic objectives.

In the midst of explosive conditions of instability and injustice, and not a little international skepticism, the Salvadoran people have launched a new beginning. The spring of 1980 marked the start of an ambitious program of agrarian reform that has, so far, redistributed more than 20% of El Salvador's farmlands to the *campesinos* who work them. In the spring of 1981, after guerrilla forces backed by Nicaragua and Cuba had attempted to impose a military solution and failed, President Duarte invited all political parties and groups to renounce violence and prepare for elections. This past spring, on March 28, nationwide Constituent Assembly elections were held. More than 1.5 million Salvadorans voted. In doing so, they rejected

political violence and demonstrated that nonparticipatory politics have no place in El Salvador's future.

Perhaps the most striking measure of change—and it is a change that goes far to explain why social and human rights progress in El Salvador is taking place despite unremitting, externally supported guerrilla warfare—is the political reorientation of the armed forces. The military has been transformed from an institution tied to the oligarchy and dedicated to a continuation of the status quo to an institution supportive of land reform and constitutional order.

The Secretary of State, acting on authority delegated to him by the President, has certified that, despite continuing concerns about the human rights situation and parts of the reform program, we believe that progress has been made in each of the areas specified by law. Let me, therefore, cover each element of the certification in the order specified in the law.

Human Rights

The law requires us to certify whether the Government of El Salvador is making "a concerted and significant effort to comply with internationally recognized human rights." In addition, the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs has asked that we specify in this testimony how many people had been killed during the past 6 months as compared to the previous 6 months and the last year.

This question addresses the ultimate violation of human rights, the deprivation of life. All available estimates—from our embassy in El Salvador and from four different Salvadoran organizations, including groups sympathetic toward the guerrillas—suggest a rough but unmistakable downward trend in the monthly total of deaths attributable to political causes. For the period of this certification, February–June 1982, reported deaths range from between a low of 1,500 and a high of 2,600 (July figures are not yet available). For the period of the original certification, August 1981–January 1982, the range is from 2,000 to 6,000. If the period meant by "the last year" is August 1981–June 1982, the

range reported by any one organization is from 3,500 to 8,000. If the period meant is February 1981–January 1982, the date of the original certification, the range would be higher still, from 5,000 to 15,000.

Keeping in mind that we are talking about a small country, and that the figures I have just cited claim to address only politically motivated deaths, there is no question that serious violations of basic human rights are taking place. The decline suggests progress is being made, but there is a long way to go.

From this standpoint, the transition from a civilian-military governing junta to a representative civilian governing system rooted in the popular vote may be the most important development of the past 6 months. The continued evolution of democratic order and accountability in El Salvador is ultimately the best guarantee of human rights improvements. That lesson has not been lost on the Constituent Assembly or the new government of national unity. Alvaro Magana, the new President of El Salvador, committed his government in a June address to the nation to a program of democratization, confidence, security, economic recovery, reform, and respect for human rights. With regard to this last objective, the government is developing an amnesty program that will seek to return dissident elements in to the political process and guarantee their safety and security.

But problems obviously remain. Although violence has decreased, it is still unacceptably high. In April and May, a newly elected ARENA [National Republican Alliance] deputy and 14 Christian Democratic Party members were assassinated. Unlike many previous murders, these killings were formally and publicly condemned by the armed forces. They were condemned as well by a unanimous vote of the Constituent Assembly. Arrests were made in two of these cases. In March, the National Police arrested 12 civil defense force members accused of murdering 24 civilians in Cuscatlan Department. In an earlier case, the National Police on January 28 arrested a former army major, Guillermo Roeder. Roeder had developed a private security business which was suspected of being little more than a cover for criminal activities. With six associates, he was formally charged

with kidnapping. Despite his wealth and connections, Roeder is today in custody, awaiting trial.

In contrast to the progress evidenced by elections, however, El Salvador's judicial system has been unable to rise above the country's unsettled state. The conditions that existed at the last certification—including intimidation of judges, witnesses, and officials—continue largely unchanged. The selection of a new Supreme Court by the Constituent Assembly was an important first step, but the institutionalization of a more viable system of day-to-day justice remains a fundamental task. Addressing judicial reforms will clearly be a major test of the new constitution.

In sum, progress on human rights has not been as great as we would have liked. Serious violations of human rights continue. As I have indicated before this committee in the past, the U.S. embassy investigates every report it receives of violence to the best of its ability. There is evidence of a reduction in overall levels of violence, and we can report that the government is making a concerted and significant effort to comply with internationally recognized human rights.

Control of the Armed Forces

That the Salvadoran Government has made progress in "achieving substantial control over all elements of its own armed forces, so as to bring to an end the indiscriminate torture and murder of Salvadoran citizens by these forces"—the language of the law—was evident in the professionalism and restraint shown by all elements of El Salvador's forces in protecting voters under guerrilla attack. Higher standards are evident daily in most military and security units.

Preventing human rights abuses by government forces is a major government priority. In March, enforcing an earlier code of conduct decree, Minister of Defense Garcia issued orders to field commanders that they will be held accountable for the violations of human rights by their subordinates. In an action unprecedented in Salvadoran history, Garcia then publicly disclosed the names of military and security personnel arrested, disciplined, or dismissed for human rights violations. One hundred nine members of the armed forces have been disciplined during this certification period for abuses of authority, as have at least 20 members of the civil defense forces.

This observation leads directly to the additional question in the invitation to testify, namely, whether the nature of government control over various branches of the military and security services differs, and if so, how. There are, in fact, major differences in the degree of central control over the various branches of the military and security forces. These differences reflect differences in training, mission, communications, and personnel.

- The army has the strongest tradition of central control and greatest autonomy from local authorities. The Treasury Police, National Police, and National Guard are all widely dispersed throughout the country. The National Police's mission in major cities and highways means it is somewhat less dispersed than the other two services. The Treasury Police have traditionally specialized in customs and border control missions, and the National Guard has traditionally served as a rural constabulary. The missions and location of all three services have become blurred due to the civil strife.

- Civil defense forces and *patrulleros* occupy a level further removed from a central control entity. These elements are loosely subordinated to municipal or departmental guard authorities, rather than directly to the capital. All are ill-equipped and ill-trained, and their salaries are derived from local contributions. While some are professional and effective, others are less so, and the exigencies of civil strife require that they be used to provide security for rural localities, freeing up regular forces for combat against organized guerrilla units.

- The Armed Forces General Staff is convinced that stronger central command and control of individual units is essential to curbing human rights violations by isolated units of the police and security forces. Military leaders have made a concerted effort to make it clear to remote rural security force contingents that abuses must be stopped.

We agree with this diagnosis, and although U.S. law prohibits U.S. training of police personnel, U.S. training of El Salvador military personnel has become essential to our joint strategy for overcoming abuses of the civilian population. The 477 officers and 957 enlisted personnel who trained in the United States during the last 6 months received

39 hours of instruction in handling prisoners and protecting noncombatants. Human rights themes were injected into informal as well as formal instruction.

We conclude that the Government of El Salvador is slowly but unmistakably achieving substantial control over all elements of its armed forces so as to bring to an end abuses of civilians. We are convinced that their program and our training complement each other in this vital area.

Reforms

The law requires that we certify whether the Government of El Salvador "is making continued progress in implementing essential economic and political reforms, including the land reform program." The invitation to testify also asks that we measure progress in the banking, export, labor, and judicial sectors.

Almost 20% of all Salvadoran farmland has now been redistributed through the agrarian reform. Events after the elections placed the land-reform program in center stage, both in El Salvador and in this country. Phase I of the agrarian reform—the transfer of the country's largest estates to their workers—has remained in place throughout the certification period, but a

... it is in the interest of the United States to remain involved in the resolution of El Salvador's problems. El Salvador is our neighbor. We cannot ignore its turmoil.

major attack was mounted on Phase III, the Land-to-the-Tiller Program, under which renters can claim ownership of up to 7 hectares of land they rent and work.

Opponents of Phase III launched their attack in the Constituent.

Assembly, exploiting the widespread view that land had been lying fallow and that improving agricultural productivity in a country whose economy has been battered by falling commodity prices and guerrilla warfare was essential to restoring the economic system. The assembly's Decree 6 did not abrogate Phase III but did allow rental of unoccupied lands. In the countryside, a wave of evictions by emboldened landowners took place. Title applications stopped.

The government, caught between the need to put unproductive land to work to restore the economy and its commitment to make land reform work, chose to insure that, whatever the modifications, present and potential Phase III beneficiaries would have their rights protected. The armed forces supported continuing the reform and backed reinstatement of evicted peasant claimants.

Deputy Defense Minister Castillo, originally reported lost in Perquin military action, was, in fact, shot down while returning from a ceremony to distribute land-reform titles. His loss is stark evidence of the key role of the Salvadoran Armed Forces in reaffirming Phase III.

Identifying the number of illegal evictions is difficult. While some organizations estimate higher numbers, the land-reform implementing agency FINATA had received a total of 3,822 complaints of illegal evictions as of July 1. The government has advertised widely in an effort to bring forth all complaints of illegal eviction. Since June 1, 1982, 1,995 Phase III beneficiaries have been restored to their

erties has been deferred since its conception, both by the Duarte government and by the current government, because of the ongoing economic crisis in El Salvador. In the Phase III Land-to-the-Tiller Program, more than 32,000 provisional titles have been issued, including almost 5,000 since the March election. Even more important, since the elections, the first final titles have been issued.

President Magana and members of his cabinet have personally participated in title ceremonies. Almost 3,400 titles were given out in May, June, and July. The President has also appointed a government committee composed of peasant, government, military, and private-sector representatives to make recommendations to improve the framework and implementation of the program.

The slow pace of compensation in Phase III has been a major cause of landowner resistance in the program. Their resistance is understandable. Many former Phase III landowners are small farmers themselves. The government is moving to correct this situation by making available \$32 million from a very tight budget for cash payments in 1982, but that by itself will not do the job. I am delighted that the House Foreign Affairs Committee has authorized up to \$20 million in counterpart funds for compensation. Once this additional cash becomes available, final titling—which is contingent on compensation to the former owner—can be accelerated.

Carrying out a land-reform program

- To mount a vigorous drive to get the remaining likely claimants to apply;
- To keep on restoring those that have been evicted;
- To prevent further evictions on any significant scale; and
- To accelerate all the other operations—the provisional titles, the definitive titles, the compensation—so that the Land-to-the-Tiller Program can be completed before the end of 1983.

To this end we will propose to the Salvadoran Government that it develop a specific plan, including perhaps a special focus on three or four departments. For El Salvador, such a plan would help the government organize the final push. For us, it would provide a framework in which to consider the next certification.

With regard to the banking and export reforms, there is little to report since the last certification. The nationalizations of banking and export marketing were complementary to the agrarian reform. They were meant to reduce concentration of power previously in the hands of a few privileged individuals and make credit more widely available. Both reforms remain in place.

During 1980 and 1981, three drafts of a proposed new labor code were circulated. None was adopted. Since being reconfirmed as Minister of Labor in the present government, Julio Samayoa—who previously served as Minister of Labor under President Duarte and is now also Secretary General of the Christian Democratic Party—has indicated that he will submit new proposals after consulting with both management and labor. On June 28, the Constituent Assembly unanimously extended both price and wage controls.

As noted earlier, the most important change affecting the judicial system was the designation of a new Supreme Court by the Constituent Assembly. The Salvadoran Government, recognizing the urgent need to improve the judicial system so that it can function better in time of civil strife, acted to improve the standing and integrity of the judicial process by moving several major cases into the civilian judicial system, including that of civil defense and security force members in the murders of Christian Democratic mayors; the Roeder case mentioned earlier; and the case of the four U.S. churchwomen, in which five members of the National Guard were dismissed from the service and remanded to civilian judicial authorities for prosecution.

. . . the transition from a civilian-military governing junta to a representative civilian governing system rooted in the popular vote may be the most important development of the past 6 months.

land. Our conclusion is that despite the serious challenge to Phase III, the agrarian reform process is today back on track.

Phase I land distribution is nearly completed: 287 peasant cooperatives have evolved out of former large estates, and \$46.5 million in production and investment credits is available to the cooperatives in the current crop year. The Phase II reform of middle-size prop-

under present conditions in El Salvador is at best a difficult task, requiring a long-term commitment by the Government of El Salvador and by the various affected private groups, such as the *campesino* organizations. I think we can and should expect the Salvadoran Government in the next 6 months:

Elections

We are required to certify whether the Government of El Salvador

is committed to the holding of free elections at an early date and to that end has demonstrated its good faith efforts to begin discussions with all major political factions in El Salvador which have declared their willingness to find and implement an equitable political solution to the conflict, with such solution to involve a commitment to:

- (A) a renouncement of further military or paramilitary activity; and
- (B) the electoral process with internationally recognized observers.

I have been asked in addition whether the next presidential elections are "still planned for 1983." Constituent assembly elections were held March 28, 1982. The campaign and the voting were supervised by an independent Central Elections Commission and monitored by over 200 observers from over 40 countries and the Organization of American States (OAS) as well as an international press corps of well over 700.

Prior to the March 28 elections, leaders of political parties belonging to the Revolutionary Democratic Front (DR) were repeatedly invited by President Duarte and other government officials, as well as by independent Central Elections Commission President Bustamante, to participate in the elections. Other candidates ran for office at great personal risk with no security guarantees. But the representatives of the guerrillas refused even to discuss—either directly or through the good offices of others—ways in which they might participate. Instead, they tried to disrupt the election by attempting to intimidate voters and politicians, calling for a boycott, and conducting armed attacks on election day itself.

The guerrillas' efforts were rejected by over 1.5 million Salvadorans who went to the polls in a courageous outpouring of support for peace and democracy. Six parties contested the election; four won seats in the Constituent Assembly. Since no party received a majority, a period of difficult negotiations ensued, resulting in the formation of a provisional government of national unity, headed by the independent Alvaro Magana and consisting of cabinet members from the three largest parties in the assembly as well as independents.

The government of national unity will govern until presidential elections are held in late 1983 or early 1984. The

Constituent Assembly will draft a new constitution, establish the timing and ground rules for the presidential election, and function as an interim legislative body.

The elections, the peaceful replacement of a civilian-military junta with a representative civilian governing system, and constitution making are all steps in the beginning of the democratic process in El Salvador. President Magana and other government officials are working on an amnesty program. The constitution and the presidential elections will provide additional opportunities for those elements associated with the guerrillas who can accommodate to democracy to join in the democratic process and influence the future of their country through the ballot box rather than through force of arms. We hope they will.

Murders and Disappearance of American Citizens

Section 728 (e) of the International Security and Cooperation Act required that last January's certification contain a determination that the Government of El Salvador was then making "good faith efforts" to investigate the murders of the four American churchwomen and the two American labor advisers and to bring those responsible to justice. We address these cases in this certification because we remain concerned that those accused of these reprehensible crimes have not yet been tried. We are also concerned about the case of Mr. John J. Sullivan, an American freelance journalist who disappeared while on assignment in San Salvador in December 1980.

In the case of the four churchwomen, five former members of the National Guard have been charged with aggravated homicide. In accordance with Salvadoran law, they have been dismissed from military service and remanded to the custody of a civilian judge. In June, the judge stated to members of the press that he feels sufficient evidence now exists to order the case to trial and that he will set a trial date in the near future.

The investigation into the murder of the American labor advisers has made less progress. The Salvadoran Court of Appeals upheld the suspension of the case against two suspects on grounds of

insufficient evidence. In April, the Salvadoran Government established an investigative working group to seek evidence sufficient to reopen the case. The investigative group, following procedures similar to those used to break the churchwomen's case, has independently confirmed a number of points uncovered earlier. Preliminary results are encouraging.

The case of Mr. Sullivan remains unsolved. During the certification period, a number of leads were followed without developing any credible information. Acting on one such lead, the Government of El Salvador exhumed a body which had been identified by anonymous tips as possibly that of Mr. Sullivan. It proved not to be. Then two Salvadorans associated with the guerrillas claimed to have information on the case, but our contacts with them failed to turn up any evidence. We are satisfied that we have been accorded the cooperation of the Salvadoran authorities in this case. We will continue to pursue every lead.

Conclusion

Even though the record of the Government of El Salvador during the past 2½ years has not been all any one of us might wish it to be, it is our firm belief that El Salvador meets the standards for continued U.S. assistance. Progress toward a more democratic, more equitable, and more humane society has been substantial—even remarkable in light of the circumstances.

This is ultimately why it is in the interest of the United States to remain involved in the resolution of El Salvador's problems. El Salvador is our neighbor. We cannot ignore its turmoil. We know from recent developments in Nicaragua that a guerrilla force dominated by Marxist-Leninists does not create a democratic future for its people but spawns a state apparatus that is internally repressive and internationally aggressive. And we know from ample documentation the degree to which Nicaragua is interfering in the affairs of El Salvador and Guatemala under the banner of "revolutionary internationalism." Nicaraguan Junta Coordinator Daniel Ortega stated in a July 15 Madrid newspaper interview that Nicaragua is even supporting guerrillas in democratic Honduras.

If we do not help those in Central America who are committed to democratic institutions, we risk abandoning

them to the designs of violent minorities trained and armed by Cuba and Nicaragua. The Central American Democratic Community has cited the military danger which Nicaragua poses for them and has endorsed Honduras' proposal to hold discussions on ways to halt both the regional arms race and illegal arms movements in the region through international supervision of ports, airports, borders, and strategic sectors. The United States favors peaceful solutions to Central America's problems and opposes the military solution which Nicaragua and Cuba are promoting.

Our policies have strongly and consistently supported a political solution to problems in El Salvador. Military preparedness must be sufficient to protect the people and their sources of livelihood from attack. The economy must be capable of rebounding from sabotage and providing reasonable returns to

labor and management. But if El Salvador needs our economic and military assistance, to overcome what a recent Radio Venceremos broadcast boasted were 207 guerrilla actions in July alone "to destabilize the regime economically," the fundamental problem in El Salvador is political—the need to establish democratic institutions representative of all citizens. We believe that an impressive start has been made. But it is not enough to have surprised the far left with the degree of popular support for peace and democracy. What is needed now is the consolidation of aspirations into reality. That is what our policy is all about.

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Cuban Armed Forces and the Soviet Military Presence

Any formulation of U.S. foreign policy, to be complete, would have to devote special attention to the challenge Cuba presents to U.S. interests, especially in the Third World. Cuba has developed an extraordinary capacity to influence events in such diverse regions as sub-Saharan Africa and Central America in spite of serious economic problems at home. Its ability to project power far out of proportion to its size is directly related to its association with the Soviet Union and the Soviet support for the development of its military machine.

This study is being issued in the interests of contributing to better public understanding of the nature of Cuba's massive military buildup and how it contributes to Castro's ability to challenge orderly political and economic development in this hemisphere and elsewhere.

Summary

Cuba has by far the most formidable and largest military force in the Caribbean Basin with the exception of the United States. In all of Latin America, only Brazil—with a population more than 12 times that of Cuba—has a larger military establishment. Increasing Soviet-Cuban military ties and the improve-

ment of the Cuban Armed Forces have enabled Cuba to assume a far more influential world role than its size and resources would otherwise dictate.

Since 1975, the U.S.S.R. has undertaken a major modernization of all branches of the Cuban military, transforming it from a home defense force into the best equipped military establishment in Latin America and one possessing significant offensive capabilities. Equipment delivered to the ground forces has enhanced both their mobility and firepower. The Air Force, with some 200 Soviet-supplied MiG jet fighters, now is probably the best equipped in Latin America. The Navy has acquired two torpedo attack submarines and a Koni-class frigate, which will be able to sustain operations throughout the Caribbean Basin and will enable Castro to project power well beyond Cuba's shores.

As a result of this modernization program and Cuba's combat experience in Angola and Ethiopia, the Castro regime possesses a substantial regional intervention capability. Havana has increased its airborne-trained forces to a level of some 3,000–4,000 troops and also has improved its airlift and sealift capability. Although modest by Western standards, this capability is impressive in the Central American and Caribbean context. It would be employed most

effectively in aiding a regional ally against an external invasion or in suppressing internal conflict.

Cuba does not have the ability to conduct an outright invasion of another country in the region except for the Caribbean microstates. Nor does Havana possess sufficient amphibious assault landing craft or aircraft capable of transporting heavy equipment.

On occasion Cuba has been reckless in using its capabilities. The most recent example occurred on May 10, 1980, when Cuban Air Force fighters, in broad daylight, attacked and sank a clearly marked Bahamian patrol vessel inside Bahamian territorial waters, killing four crewmembers. The following day, Cuban MiGs buzzed a populated island belonging to The Bahamas, and a Cuban helicopter carrying Cuban troops landed on the island in pursuit of the surviving crewmembers.

The Cuban Military

Since the mid-1970s, when Cuba intervened in Angola on a large scale and the Soviet Union began to modernize Cuba's Armed Forces, the Cuban military has evolved from a predominantly home defense force into a formidable power relative to its Latin American neighbors. The cost of Soviet arms delivered to Castro since 1960 exceeds \$2.5 billion. These arms deliveries, plus the annual \$3 billion economic subsidy, are tied to Cuba's ongoing military and political role abroad in support of Soviet objectives. The recent deliveries of Soviet military equipment to Cuba are the latest in a surge of deliveries over the past year. Since January 1981, Soviet merchant ships have delivered some 66,000 tons of military equipment, compared with the previous 10-year annual average of 15,000 tons. These weapons represent the most significant Soviet military supply effort to Cuba since a record 250,000 tons was shipped in 1962. There are several reasons for this increase:

- The beginning of a new 5-year upgrading and replacement cycle;
- Additional arms to equip the new territorial militia, which Cuba now claims to be 500,000 strong but which it expects to reach 1 million;
- Increasing stockpiles, much of which is passed to regional supporters; and
- A convincing demonstration of Moscow's continuing support for the Havana regime.

In addition to major weapons systems, large quantities of ammunition, small arms, spares, and support equipment probably were delivered.

Cuba's Armed Forces total more than 225,000 personnel—200,000 Army, 5,000 Air Force and Air Defense, and 20,000 Navy—including those on active duty either in Cuba or overseas and those belonging to the ready reserves, which are subject to immediate mobilization. With a population of just under 10 million, Cuba has the largest military force in the Caribbean Basin and the second largest in Latin America after Brazil, with a population of more than 20 million. More than 2% of the Cuban population belongs to the active-duty military and ready reserves, compared with an average of less than 0.4% in other countries in the Caribbean Basin.

In addition, Cuba's large paramilitary organizations and reserves would be available to provide internal support to the military.

The quantitative and qualitative upgrading of the armed forces and their recent combat experience in Africa give the Cuban military definite advantages over its Latin American neighbors. Cuba is the only country in Latin America to have undertaken a major overseas military effort since World War II, giving both Army and Air Force personnel recent combat experience in operating many of the weapons in their inventories. About 70% of Cuban troops who have served in Africa have been reservists. Reservists generally spend about 45 days per year on active duty and can be integrated quickly into the armed forces. Cuba's civilian enterprises, such as


Cubana Airlines and the merchant marine, have been used effectively in support of military operations. Havana has dedicated significant resources to modernize and professionalize its armed forces and to maintain a well-prepared reserve. Cuba has demonstrated that, when supported logistically by the Soviet Union, it has both the capability and the will to deploy large numbers of troops and can be expected to do so whenever the Castro government believes it to be in Cuba's best interest.

Equipment delivered to the Army since the mid-1970s, including T-62 tanks, BMP infantry combat vehicles, BRDM armored reconnaissance vehicles, antitank guns, towed field guns, BM-21 multiple rocket launchers, and ZSU-23-4 self-propelled anti-aircraft guns, have begun to alleviate earlier deficiencies in Cuba's mechanized capability and to provide increased firepower. In addition to its qualitative advantage, the Cuban Army has an overwhelming numerical superiority in weapons over its Latin American neighbors.

The Cuban Air Force is one of the largest and probably the best equipped in Latin America. Its inventory includes some 200 Soviet-supplied MiG jet fighters, with two squadrons of FLOGGERS (the exact model of the second squadron recently delivered is not yet determined). The MiG-23s have the range to reach portions of the southeastern United States, most of Central America, and most Caribbean nations. On a round-trip mission, however, Cuban-based aircraft would be capable of conducting only limited air engagements in Central America. If based on Central American soil—a feasible option given the closeness of Cuban-Nicaraguan relations—Cuba's fighter aircraft could be effectively employed in either a ground-attack or air-superiority role. A similar arrangement would be possible in Grenada once Cuban workers complete the construction of an airfield with a 9,000-foot runway there. If the MiG-23s were to stage from Nicaragua and Grenada, their combat radius would be expanded to include all of Central America, including the northern tier of South America.

Cuban defenses have been strengthened by the additions of mobile SA-6 launchers and related radars for air defense, SA-2 transporters, SA-2 missile canisters, new early warning and height-finding radar stations, and electronic warfare vans.


U.S.S.R. Seaborne Military Deliveries to Cuba



*Approximate figure

Relative Military Strength

For Selected Caribbean Countries



For Selected Latin American Countries

Country	Population (thousands)	People in Military (thousands)	% of Population in Military
Cuba	9,800	227.0	2.32
Argentina	28,000	185.5	.66
Bolivia	5,500	26.6	.48
Brazil	124,780	272.6	.22
Chile	11,180	92.0	.82
Colombia	27,310	70.0	.26
Ecuador	8,250	38.8	.47
Paraguay	3,270	16.0	.49
Peru	18,075	130.0	.72
Uruguay	2,945	29.7	1.01
Venezuela	16,459	40.8	.25
Dominican Republic	5,835	22.5	.39
Guatemala	7,200	15.1	.21
Honduras	3,900	11.2	.29
Mexico	69,000	119.5	.17

Source: *Military Balance, 1981-1982.*

The Cuban Navy, with a strength of about 10,000 personnel, remains essentially a defensive force. However, its two recently acquired Foxtrot-class submarines and single Koni-class frigate, once fully integrated into the operational force, will be able to sustain operations through the Caribbean Basin, the Gulf of Mexico and, to a limited extent, the Atlantic Ocean.¹ The primary vessels for carrying out the Navy's defensive missions are Osa- and Komar-class missile attack boats, whose range can extend well into the Caribbean. They are armed with SS-N-2 STYX ship-to-ship missiles. Cuba has received, in addition, Turya-class hydrofoil torpedo boats, Yevgenya-class inshore minesweepers, and a Sonya-class minesweeper. Although not equipped for sustained operations away from its main bases, the Cuban Navy could conduct limited interdiction missions in the Caribbean. Cuba also has a 3,000-man coast guard organization.

By Western standards, Cuba's capability to intervene in a hostile environment using its indigenous transport equipment is modest, but it is considerably more formidable in the Central American context. As in 1975, when a single battalion of Cuban airborne troops airlifted to Luanda, Angola, at a critical moment and played a role far out of proportion to its size, a battle-tested Cuban force interjected quickly into a combat situation in Central America could prove to be decisive. Moreover, since the Angolan experience, Havana has increased the training of airborne forces, which now consist of a special troops contingent and a landing and assault brigade, and has improved its air and sealift capacity. Introduction of sophisticated Soviet weapons geared toward mobility and offensive missions has improved Cuban ability to conduct military operations off the island.

Cuba still lacks sufficient transport

aircraft capable of supporting long-range, large-scale troop movements and would have to turn to the Soviets to achieve such a capability. Cuba is able to transport large numbers of troops and supplies within the Caribbean, however, using its military and civilian aircraft. Since 1975, the Cuban commercial air fleet has acquired seven IL-62 long-range jet transport aircraft and some TU-154 medium-to-long-range transport aircraft, each capable of carrying 150-200 combat-equipped troops. By comparison, Cuba conducted the 1975 airlift to Luanda with only five medium-range aircraft, each having a maximum capacity of 100 troops.

Cuba has recently acquired the AN-26 short-range transport. The most effective use of this aircraft from Cuban bases would be in transporting troops or supplies to a friendly country, but it is capable, with full payload, of airdropping troops on portions of Florida and Belize; Jamaica, Haiti, and The

Bahamas; and most of the Dominican Republic. If based in Nicaragua, the AN-26s could reach virtually all of Central America in either a transport or air-rop role. In addition, more than 30 smaller military and civilian transport planes, including those used in Angola, could be used to fly troops and munitions to Central America.

The Soviet military deliveries also could improve Cuban ability to conduct military operations abroad. In Angola, for example, the mobile SA-6 surface-to-air missile system operated by the Cubans could provide a valuable complement to other less effective air defense systems. The new equipment would enable Havana to continue assistance to Nicaragua. The MiG-23 and MiG-21 fighters probably would be most effective in aiding the Sandinista regime. Deployment of a few dozen MiGs would not seriously reduce Cuba's defenses, and Cuban-piloted MiGs would enable Nicaragua to counter virtually any threat from within the region.

In early 1982 Cuba also received some Mi-24 HIND-D helicopters, the first assault helicopters in Cuba's inventory which also includes the Mi-8 HIP. The Mi-24—armed with a 57mm cannon, minigun, and rocket pods and carrying a combat squad—will provide

Cuba with improved offensive capability.

Cuba's ability to mount an amphibious assault is constrained both by the small number of naval infantry and by a dearth of suitable landing craft. Cuba would, however, be capable of transporting large numbers of troops and supplies—using ships belonging to the merchant marine and the navy—to ports secured by friendly forces, if the United States did not become involved.

Cuba's Paramilitary Organizations

Cuba's several paramilitary organizations involve hundreds of thousands of civilian personnel during peacetime and would be available to support the military during times of crisis. Although these groups would be far less combat capable than any segment of the military, they do provide the civilian population with at least rudimentary military training and discipline. Their primary orientation is internal security and local defense.

The extent to which the military is involved in the civilian sector is further indicated by its activity within the economic sphere. In addition to uniformed personnel, the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (MINFAR)

employs more than 30,000 civilian workers in factories and repair facilities in Cuba and in building roads and airfields in Africa. Many of them are employees of MINFAR's Central Directorate for Housing and Construction which, in addition to military construction, builds housing and apartment complexes for military and civilian personnel of both MINFAR and the Ministry of the Interior. The Youth Labor Army also contributes to economic development by engaging in agricultural, industrial, construction, transportation, and other projects.

The Soviet Presence

The Soviet military presence in Cuba includes a ground forces brigade of about 2,600 men, a military advisory group of 2,000, and an intelligence-collection facility. There also are 6,000-8,000 Soviet civilian advisers in Cuba. Military deployments to Cuba consist of periodic visits by Soviet naval reconnaissance aircraft and task groups.

Soviet ground forces have been in Cuba since shortly before the 1962 missile crisis. Located near Havana, the ground forces brigade consists of one tank and three motorized rifle battalions as well as various combat and support units. Likely missions include providing a small symbolic Soviet commitment to Castro—implying a readiness to defend Cuba—and probably providing security for Soviet personnel and key Soviet facilities, particularly for the Soviets' large intelligence-collection facility. The brigade almost certainly would not have a role as an intervention force, although it is capable of tactical defense and offensive operations in Cuba. Unlike units such as airborne divisions, it is not structured for rapid deployment, and no transport aircraft able to carry its armed vehicles and heavy equipment are stationed in Cuba.

The Soviet military advisory group provides technical advice in support of weapons such as the MiGs, surface-to-air missiles, and the FOXTROT submarines; some also are attached to Cuban ground units. The Soviets' intelligence-collection facility—their largest outside the U.S.S.R.—monitors U.S. military and civilian communications.

Since the naval ship visit program began in 1969, 21 Soviet naval task groups have deployed to the Caribbean, virtually all of them visiting Cuban ports. The most recent visit occurred in

Strength and Missions of Cuba's Paramilitary Organizations

Organization	Subordination	Strength	Mission
Youth Labor Army	MINFAR (Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces)	100,000	Civic action force, receiving little military training in peacetime. One wartime mission would be to operate and protect the railroads.
Civil Defense Force	MINFAR	100,000	"Military" units would assist in providing local defense; non-military would provide first aid and disaster relief.
Territorial Troop Militia	MINFAR	More than 500,000 at present; still forming	Regional security/local defense.
Border Guard Troops	MININT (Ministry of the Interior)	3,000 full-time, plus unknown number of civilian auxiliaries	Help guard Cuban coastline.
National Revolutionary Police	MININT	10,000, plus 52,000 civilian auxiliaries	Responsible for public order in peacetime; could help provide rear area security during wartime.
Department of State Security	MININT	10,000-15,000	Counterintelligence and prevention of counter-revolutionary activities.

April and May 1981 and included the first by a Kara-class cruiser—the largest Soviet combatant ever to have visited the island. Soviet intelligence-collection ships operating off the east coast of the United States regularly call at Cuba, as do hydrographic research and space-support ships operating in the region. In addition, the Soviet Navy maintains a salvage and rescue ship in Havana for emergency operations.

Since 1975, Soviet TU-95 Bear D reconnaissance aircraft have deployed periodically to Cuba. Typically, these aircraft are deployed in pairs and stay in Cuba for several weeks at a time. The flights traditionally have been associated with U.S., NATO, and Soviet exercises; the transit of U.S. ships to and from the Mediterranean; and periods of increased international tension.

The Soviets apparently sent a considerable number of pilots to augment

Cuban Advisers

Nation	Total Number (Estimated)	
	Military	Civilian
Angola	20,000–25,000	6,000
Ethiopia	11,000–13,000	600
Nicaragua	2,000	4,000
South Yemen	200–300	100
Grenada	30	300

Cuba's air defense during two periods—early 1976 and during 1978—when Cuban pilots were sent to Angola and Ethiopia. They filled in for the Cuban pilots deployed abroad and provided the Cuban Air Force with sufficient personnel to perform its primary mission of air defense of the island.

Threat to Hemispheric Strategic Defense

Cuban military ties with the Soviet Union, the Soviet presence in Cuba, a large Soviet intelligence-collection facility, and the periodic Soviet air and naval presence pose not inconsiderable military threats to U.S. security interests in the hemisphere. Because of Cuba's proximity to vital sea lanes, the Soviets or Cubans in wartime could attempt to interdict the movement of troops, supplies, and raw materials in the Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean Sea and could strike key facilities in the area.

¹The Koni has an operating range of 2,000 nautical miles without refueling or replenishment. The Foxtrots have a range of 9,000 nautical miles at 7 knots per hour and a patrol duration of 70 days. ■

Radio Broadcasting to Cuba

by *Thomas O. Enders*

*Statement before the Subcommittee on State, Justice, Commerce, the Judiciary of the Senate Appropriations Committee on May 4, 1982. Ambassador Enders is Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs.*¹

I appreciate the opportunity to present to you our FY 1982 and 1983 budget request for radio broadcasting to Cuba, a new program to provide to the Cuban people an alternate, reliable source of news and commentary about events taking place in their homeland. But before I get into the details of this request, perhaps I should begin with Cuban society itself.

The Cuban Society

There is nothing quite like it. The economy, organized in the familiar Soviet command model, has registered a general failure. Despite growing Soviet assistance in oil sales at low prices and sugar purchases at high prices—the whole Soviet aid effort is now equivalent to one-quarter of Cuba's GNP—per capita income in Cuba has been stagnant and steadily falling relative to much of Latin America.

Yet, Cuba projects power in the world. The Soviet Union subsidizes Cuba

with over \$3 billion in economic aid annually. In addition, Cuba's armed forces—augmented by 66,000 tons of Soviet military deliveries in 1981 alone—are stronger than any in the Western Hemisphere other than the United States. It maintains 40,000 soldiers in Africa, dominating two countries, and doing for the Soviet Union what the Gurkha mercenaries did for 19th century England. In Central America, Cuba is attempting to unite the left in search of the violent overthrow of established government and maintains no less than 1,800–2,000 military and security personnel in Nicaragua.

In other words, a would-be foreign policy giant is allied to an economic pygmy, whose peoples have had to sacrifice all hope for a rising standard of living in order to gain advantages in foreign affairs.

Most countries cannot overcommit to state interests in this manner, because the people force them to address their concerns. But Cubans lack the means to hold their government accountable.

Radio Broadcasting to Cuba, Inc.

The proposal we discuss today—Radio Broadcasting to Cuba, Inc.—is intended

to supply what the Cuban public is missing: reliable news about Cuban life, features, sports, and entertainment alternatives to the distorted, censored news that is being offered by a government that rules not for the people but for itself.

No, this is not a project to tell the Cuban people about the United States. The Voice of America—whose charter is international news and American features and culture—already does that. It can be heard in Spanish. So, also, can Florida radio stations broadcasting in Spanish to Cuban-Americans. These stations can tell Cubans much about us, but they are not an adequate source of information about what is going on in Cuba itself.

Nor is it a project to incite Cubans to revolt against their own society. There is provocation enough in the redistributed poverty, in the depressing austerity, in the unemployment and underemployment of educated Cubans, in the rigid regimentation and in Castro's speeches that only further sacrifice lies ahead. But it would be immoral and irresponsible to set a people against a government that monopolizes the means of coercion.

This radio is a proposal to give Cubans the means they now lack to know what kind of a society has been

posed on them, to furnish them with a source of news and entertainment that is not manipulated by the state, to let them find out what is really happening in their country, to inform them why so many have gone off to foreign military duty not always to return, and to learn what the state really does with the wealth of the Cuban people.

The radio—like Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty before it—is intended gradually to earn its audience through its special sensitivity to needs the state ignores. It will speak to young people of the sports and music they love. It will speak to adults of the great Cuban and Hispanic-American heritage they admire, which so often the state denigrates. And it will give news on the truth of which the listeners can rely.

We know that in Eastern Europe it took years for Radio Free Europe to earn an audience. Little by little that audience expanded. Radio Free Europe now has perhaps 70% of the Polish radio audience. Is there any doubt that the changes of the last decade could have occurred without that honest, trustworthy, humane, outside contact?

Our proposal is, thus, to begin a sustained effort, over many years, to help the Cubans know more about their country and, thus, to hold their government accountable in ways it is not now.

J.S. Diplomatic Efforts

People say: Wouldn't it be better to negotiate with the Cubans, or it isn't like us to engage in propaganda, or Cuban countermeasures will hurt us too much. We have tried to talk with Cuba in the past, and it would be wrong to rule out trying again. But the record is daunting.

In 1977, we started talking seriously to the Cubans, saying we wanted to create conditions in which the legacy of the past—the embargo and the political tension—could be overcome. We suggested a gradual withdrawal of the more than 20,000 Cuban troops from Angola. After all, the civil war was over. While we talked, Cuba went into Ethiopia.

Conversations continued. In mid-1978, Cuba launched upon a new aggressive strategy in Central America, uniting the left parties of first,

Nicaragua, then El Salvador, then Guatemala—committing them to the destruction of their established government.

Talks went on. In 1980, Castro turned the desire of many of his countrymen to flee Cuba into a hostile act against the United States—the Mariel boatlift. It is not wrong to talk to adversaries. Often it is only prudent. But what counts is not the medium, but the message. Talks cannot be a complete Cuban policy, any more than diplomatic exchanges are a complete Soviet or Polish policy. Diplomacy enables us to talk to the government. We must also talk to the people.

Others ask: Should we be associated with "propaganda?" No, we should not. We will not succeed in attracting an audience in Cuba if we offer them propaganda. If there are false reports, the listeners will soon realize the reports are false—if false reports continue, they will turn off. Only by respecting its audience can a project like this succeed.

So it must be the creature of no political tendency, of no action group, of no vested interest. We have acquired experience—in Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty—of how to do that, even though the beginnings were difficult.

To assist the Administration in formulating its plan for broadcasting to Cuba, a Presidential commission was established last September. The members of the commission were appointed in mid-January. They include F. Clifton White, its chairman, as well as former Senator from Florida, Richard Stone, and Jorge L. Mas, among others.

As a result of its first two meetings, the commission has strongly endorsed the concept of radio broadcasting to Cuba as well as much of the preparatory work already undertaken by various agencies of this Administration.

Specifically, the commission has recommended that broadcasting to Cuba be undertaken by an independent, non-profit entity, Radio Broadcasting to Cuba, Inc., which will operate Radio Marti in much the same manner that RFE/RL, Inc. now operates Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. RBC, Inc., has already been incorporated as a preliminary step. The bill, as approved by the House Foreign Affairs Committee, amends the board for International

Broadcasting Act (BIB) of 1973 to authorize BIB to further "the open communication of information and ideas to the people of Cuba." Accordingly, RBC, Inc. is available if BIB wishes to use it.

In order to establish Radio Marti, we are requesting \$10 million for FY 1982. Of this amount, \$4.2 million will be devoted to the construction of transmission facilities and \$7.2 million will be used for operating expenses to cover programming, engineering, and administrative costs. For FY 1983, we require \$7.7 million, a reduction of \$2.3 million from the 1982 request. This decrease is a result of nonrecurring construction and administrative costs.

Conclusion

Radio Marti is designed to respond to a basic human need—the need to have access to information on events and policies that affect the lives of individuals. Freedom of information is what we are talking about here—fundamental freedom recognized by every responsible individual and government in the world. This right, this freedom, has been consistently denied to the Cuban people since Castro came to power in 1959. Radio Marti will help fill this long-standing information gap.

Those of us who have lived in a Communist state will know just how much Radio Marti can affect the lives of Cubans. For those of us who have not, it is an opportunity to offer the Cuban people hope and the means to make informed judgments on the actions of their own government. For a people bottled up in a system of oppression which they did not seek and cannot remove, that can be precious.

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Radio Marti and Cuban Interference

by Thomas O. Enders

Statement before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce on May 10, 1982. Ambassador Enders is Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs. Radio Marti is a U.S. Government proposal to establish radio broadcasting to Cuba.¹

I would like to set the record straight concerning Cuban interference with American broadcasting. The serious problem of Cuban interference with the radio broadcasting of its neighbors, including the United States, is separate and distinct from the Radio Marti question. Serious Cuban interference has been going on for over a decade, long before Radio Marti was even an idea. More recently, 2 years and one administration before Radio Marti was announced, Cuba made known plans for stations that would cause much added interference. Today Cuba is continuing its interference, and Radio Marti is not even on the air. In fact, Cuba's broadcasting plans that will result in increased interference for American broadcasters will probably be implemented with or without Radio Marti as a scapegoat. And if Cuba did not have Radio Marti it would find another pretext.

Radio Marti

Radio Marti is intended to provide the Cuban people with an alternate, reliable source of news and commentary about events taking place in their homeland. It is intended to supply what the Cuban public is missing—reliable news about Cuban life, features, sports and entertainment; alternatives to the distorted, censored news and programming that is being offered by a government that rules not for the people but for itself.

Radio Marti is a proposal to give Cubans the means they now lack to know what kind of a society has been imposed on them, to furnish them with a source of news and entertainment that is not manipulated by the state, to let

them find out what is really happening in their country, to inform them why so many have gone off to foreign military duty not always to return, and to learn what the state really does with the wealth of the Cuban people.

Cuban Radio Interference

But long before Radio Marti, in the mid-1960s the Castro government embarked on a program to redesign its domestic AM broadcasting system and to initiate broadcasting directed toward the United States and other neighboring countries. Most of the new stations were in direct violation of its treaty obligations under the North American regional broadcasting agreement and resulted in harmful interference to long-established stations in the United States, Mexico, and other countries in the Caribbean.

From the mid-1960s through 1979, the level of interference caused to AM stations in the United States by Cuban stations steadily increased. This interference primarily affected AM stations in Florida and along the gulf coast. Since 1967, WQBA, a Spanish-language station in Miami, has been and still is being intentionally jammed by Cuba, using tones offset from the carrier frequency of WQBA. This jamming has also adversely affected WRVA, a co-channel station in Richmond, Virginia.

In late 1979, in preparation for the regional broadcasting conference, Cuba submitted an inventory of radio station requirements to the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) which, if implemented, would greatly increase the level of interference which would be caused to AM broadcasting stations in the United States and most other countries within the region. Included in this inventory were two 500 kilowatt (kw) stations—10 times the amount of power authorized in the United States and elsewhere in North America—plus a number of other moderate and high-power stations also capable of causing considerable interference in the United States. The Cubans have never explained why they wanted such enormous power, but the reason is obvious—since 1979 they have planned to increase their ability to propagandize their neighbors.

Beginning in 1980, more and more complaints of harmful interference were received from AM stations in the United States as Cuba began implementing this inventory. Stations as far north as New England and as far west as Indiana were recording serious interference from Cuban stations. Part of this interference resulted from Cuban rebroad-

casting of Radio Moscow in English using transmitter powers of up to 150 kw.

Prior to the second session of the regional AM broadcasting conference in Rio de Janeiro last fall, the United States held three rounds of technical-level discussions with the Government of Cuba in an attempt to explore means to reduce our mutual interference problems. While it appeared that some of the problems could be resolved, throughout the discussions it was very clear that both countries had stations in their inventory that were not negotiable. For the United States this was our existing Voice of America (VOA) station in Marathon, Florida, and for Cuba it was their two planned 500 kw stations. At the last of these three meetings, in Washington, D.C., in August of 1981, Cuba remained firm in its intention to implement these 500 kw stations and further informed us that they would be shifting the frequencies of these stations to 1040 and 1160 kilohertz (kHz). This preceded announcement of Radio Marti on September 23 and formal identification on October 29 of 1040 kHz as the best frequency for Radio Marti.

While we were aware of Cuban interest in 1040, accepting Cuba's plan would have meant accepting destruction of WHO Des Moines by a 500 kw superstation. Our own plans were carefully crafted to cause no such damage. We, therefore, took our case to the relevant international forum, the regional conference, where we were vindicated.

During that conference in Rio we held discussions with the Cubans and reached an agreement on a procedure in which the engineers on our respective delegations would get together to begin working out the resolution of specific interference problems. However, the Cubans refused to follow through with bilateral meetings, paralleling the conference approach, a procedure which all other delegations were using to resolve incompatibilities between stations.

Instead, Cuba submitted to the planning committee of the conference, on a "take it or leave it basis," 48 frequency changes which, while resolving some of the incompatibilities between Cuban stations and those of some of its neighbors, shifted the remaining incompatibilities onto frequencies occupied by U.S. stations, resulting in an increased level of interference to U.S. stations. Two important U.S. stations affected would be KSL in Salt Lake City, Utah, on 1160 kHz and WHO in Des Moines, Iowa, on

1040 kHz. The U.S. delegation was successful in getting the Rio conference to reject this proposal but the Cuban delegation refused to accept the conference's decisions and withdrew.

Later, Cuba notified the ITU that it would ignore the assignment plan adopted by the conference and the decisions made there which rejected their 48 frequency changes. Cuba said it would implement its 48 changes regardless of its international obligations.

Cuba has, in fact, implemented important parts of its plan. Cuba's second superstation on 1160 kHz has been on the air using at least 100 kw of its planned 500 kw power and has severely reduced KSL Salt Lake's secondary nighttime service area from 750 to 50-60 miles. WHO, on 1040, has thus far been spared, perhaps in hope that this Cuban threat would incite an active campaign by interested parties to kill Radio Marti.

We are seriously concerned about Cuban damage to all U.S. stations and, indeed, when Cuba threatens any U.S. interest. But we cannot allow Cuban threats of outlaw behavior to dictate our foreign policy.

The Federal Communications Commission can comment on the effect the Cuban inventory of stations as modified by their 48 frequency changes would have on U.S. domestic broadcasting.

The National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) has done its own analysis of these 48 frequency changes and has found that AM radio stations in 32 states plus the District of Columbia will experience interference and reduced listening areas should Cuba implement in full its proposed inventory. Altogether, over 200 U.S. stations will be affected. The NAB study shows that 10 clear channel radio stations will lose their nighttime coverage, 37 clear channel stations would lose large portions of their wide area coverage, and only 6 clear channel stations would continue to provide interference-free service.

Some people say that the threat from Cuba is too great; Radio Marti will invite massive Cuban jamming, interference, retaliation. They say, change frequencies and hurt someone else, not me, or they suggest using another system—FM, short wave, TV, out-of-band AM, anything. Some even seem to imply we should abandon our plans out of fear.

Cuban interference is a problem, a serious problem, because international

radio broadcasting is based on cooperation. But Cuban interference is not a new problem because Cuba long ago chose to act as an outlaw. Cuba's lawlessness predates Radio Marti and will continue to exist in the future—with or without this new station.

The truth is that we do not know for certain what Cuba will do to interfere further with U.S. radio. Cuban plans to put a high-powered station on 1040 kHz would seriously interfere with WHO Des Moines and even more with any Radio Marti broadcasts on that frequency. However, this would also cause major problems for broadcasters in other countries in the region and could cause the Cuban station itself to lose effectiveness because of mutual interference with WHO and Radio Marti.

The Cuban delegation to the Region II medium frequency broadcasting conference acknowledged that inclusion of

authoritative statement was by Fidel Castro himself to the Union of Young Communists in Cuba on April 4. Speaking of Radio Marti, Castro said he hopes it won't go on the air but "... if in the end there is to be a dialectic confrontation between them and us, they with their subversive station and we with our [arguments in] response... we are prepared to give a suitable response..." This suggests that Castro himself is threatening a stepped-up campaign of broadcasting to the United States.

Thus, while we cannot say for certain just what Cuba will, in fact, do, the stage seems set for counterbroadcasting rather than jamming. And we have no fear of anything Castro might say. That is the major difference between communism and democracy. Democracy thrives in the light of controversy; communism panics at the sound of truth.

Quite apart from the question of

We are seriously concerned about Cuban damage to all U.S. stations and, indeed, when Cuba threatens any U.S. interest. But we cannot allow Cuban threats of outlaw behavior to dictate our foreign policy.

1040 kHz for Radio Marti in list B as a U.S. station granted it international recognition and legitimacy. The operation of Radio Marti and WHO can be technically compatible. I don't believe that there is any argument on this point.

It is possible that the Castro regime might attempt to jam Radio Marti with low-powered stations situated in the main cities and towns of Cuba. This would badly interfere with reception of Radio Marti, but might have a minimal effect on WHO. It is also possible that Cuba may do nothing. The VOA has been directing broadcasts to Cuba for more than 21 years, and Castro has rarely seriously tried to jam these broadcasts.

While some American observers may have doubts as to the possible effectiveness of Radio Marti, Cuban authorities have none. They fully recognize the potential impact of Radio Marti and take it very seriously, indeed.

Cuba can mount a jamming effort. Many reports indicate preparation of stations, including a so-called Radio Lincoln, which could either jam or counterbroadcast. But the most recent and most

Radio Marti, we need to study the much broader problem posed by outlaw Cuban interference with U.S. radio. We support a proposal that has been made to assign a task force to study this problem and recommend what we might do in response. Deliberate, Cuban-caused damage to U.S. broadcasting in violation of international agreements should be considered an unfriendly act to which we should respond. The technical means exist to do that.

Those of us who have lived in a Communist state will know just how much Radio Marti can affect the lives of Cubans. For those of us who have not, it is an opportunity to offer the Cuban people hope and the means to make informed judgments on the actions of their own government. For a people bottled up in a system of oppression which they did not seek and cannot remove, that can be precious.

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

U.S.-Latin American Relations

by Thomas O. Enders

Address before the Council of the Americas in Washington, D.C., on June 21, 1982. Ambassador Enders is Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs.

We were shocked—all of us—when war broke out in the South Atlantic; in part because we knew that brave men on both sides would risk and lose their lives; in part because the two countries in conflict were both bound in friendship to us. But the shock also came because war between states has been virtually unknown in the Americas in our time.

True, Honduras and El Salvador fought each other in the so-called soccer war of 1969. Peru and Ecuador have clashed over their Amazonian frontier. Costa Rica and Nicaragua skirmished in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. But war in the Western Hemisphere has been on a small scale compared to elsewhere. Since the Second World War, some 4 million persons have lost their lives in armed action between states. Counting action in the South Atlantic, fewer than 4,000 have died in the Western Hemisphere. Military expenditures in the developing countries of the hemisphere come to only 1.4% of gross national product—a quarter of the average in the Third World as a whole.

Freed thus from the threat of war among its members, the inter-American system has been able to concentrate on three great tasks. One is the fostering of democratic institutions. For all the failures and setbacks, there is no more powerful political idea in the hemisphere than democracy. In the New World there is no enduring legitimacy for governments outside of democracy. Repeatedly the peoples of the Americas come back to it as the only valid solution.

A second is the struggle for economic development. We have always been aware that the New World contains much of the globe's potential for the creation of wealth—yet this has but dramatized how far its nations must still go to overcome poverty. Repeatedly efforts have been made—the Alliance for Progress, the Inter-American Development Bank, various common markets, the Latin American economic system—to mobilize the strength of several states or many to achieve faster growth.

A third is security from outside intervention. For if state-to-state wars are rare, there have been wars of subversion in abundance, internal struggles aided or launched from outside. How to respond to them has been a recurring theme in the inter-American system. There have been terrorist movements, insurgencies, or revolutions in Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, and Chile. On countless occasions, the states of the Americas have cooperated to keep or restore the peace, prevent intervention, and support freedom.

I have no doubt that these three tasks—democracy, economic development, and security—will go on being the central focus of policy for the Americas. Certainly they will be for the United States. But the South Atlantic war suggests that we must now add a fourth—how to keep the peace among states in the hemisphere. We must review the lessons of the tragic war between Argentina and the United Kingdom. We must draw the conclusions for the future conduct of relations among American states.

Democracy

First let me report on democracy in the hemisphere. It has made gains in the last year. In many places it is strikingly well. Last month we saw Colombians go to the polls in a massive turnout and vote the opposition party into power. Earlier in the month, 74% of the voters in a country that was once a model of authoritarianism—the Dominican Republic—took part in an impressive demonstration of civic maturity. Prior to that, St. Lucia, Costa Rica (despite a brutal economic crisis), El Salvador, and Honduras all held elections with overwhelming turnouts.

All told, 20 of the 30 members of the Organization of American States now have governments chosen through open, competitive elections—a gain of 2 since last year. And in those still short of full democracy there is progress to report. Uruguay is moving to restore full democracy. In Brazil, which is virtually a universe itself, the process of *abertura* continues to move forward, with state and city elections scheduled for later this year.

I am aware that in the past there have been long cycles in the Americas away from democracy as well as toward it. It would be rash to project indefinitely today's positive trend. But the current now flowing is deep as well as broad. The task for the United States and for other democracies in the hemisphere is to encourage it by every means that is effective.

Clearly, for all its recent success, democracy in the hemisphere has a lot of enemies—political absolutists and militarist factions, *guerrilleros* of the left, and death squads of the right—that seek democracy's destruction and ridicule. Part of the role of the United States is to make sure that they do not believe that we will condone, or easily accommodate, the destruction of representative institutions—a role we must play without arrogance, yet true to ourselves.

El Salvador is a particularly poignant case. Who was not moved to see the long, long lines of determined citizens waiting to vote, often at much personal danger? If ever a people gave a mandate to create representative institutions, it was in El Salvador on March 28.

Yet El Salvador has no experience with the practice of representative institutions. Each party still dreams of ruling alone, and the skills of negotiation and compromise, the need for comity, are all to be learned.

This nascent Salvadoran democracy is now facing two searching tests.

Land Reform. The first big test is land reform. All parties say they support land reform, but each doubts the other's intentions. Immediately after the election there came what is perhaps best characterized as an attack on land reform: ambiguous legislation was passed, titling suspended, and a political signal sent through the country that the reform was dead. Although we don't know how many there were, evictions surged. Then came a counterattack: the resumption of provisional titling, distribution of the first definitive titles, and the start of compensation. Orders are now being issued to the departmental commanders to restore evicted tenants in each department.

For the United States, it is vital to carry the agrarian reform through. *Campesinos* who have become landowners will be a strong bulwark against the *guerrilleros*.

Much more has been done since the election than is widely known here—4,700 provisional titles have been given

out in 2 months, as against 27,000 the previous 24 months. The first definitive titles have been granted; the first compensation paid.

Compensation is a particularly serious issue. It is not surprising that owners resist when they are not paid. The original plan gave it little attention. Indeed, U.S. law rules out assistance for compensation. Maybe we should look at this again as we debate our aid effort.

I want to make this clear: In July the President will certify El Salvador for continued military assistance only if there are strong month-by-month indications of progress in land reform: titles, protection against eviction, and compensation.

Reconciliation. The second big test for Salvadoran democracy will be reconciliation. With that huge mandate behind them, democratic parties can afford to reach out to adversaries. Assembly President D'Aubuisson has called for a dialogue with left factions affiliated with the *guerrilleros*. ARENA [National Republican Alliance] and other parties are working on an amnesty. These are all very positive signs. The important thing is to do them seriously. The amnesty must offer genuine security, with the participation of the church and international organizations. The dialogue must involve listening as well as talking, giving an opportunity to adversaries to explain how they could participate in the new democratic institutions. The United States very much hopes the new government will act with speed and imagination in this area.

It would be wrong to expect El Salvador's leaders to acquire overnight the ability to work together that has for generations eluded their predecessors. They will make mistakes. But we know too from Venezuela's example in the early 1960s that a history of dictatorship and Cuban subversion can be overcome by skilled leaders willing to practice democracy. And we can help by our presence and support—by keeping our faith in democracy as the political system most suited to the reconciliation of divided societies.

Economic Development

Second, economic development—this year the focus is on the small, fragile countries of the Caribbean and Central America, not because they are the only

ones to suffer in the current sharp recession but because they are so overwhelmingly dependent on the outside world. Without help they really have no chance of generating the domestic growth or making the internal corrections that will pull them out of the slump.

President Reagan joined with the leaders of Mexico, Venezuela, Canada, and Colombia to propose for these countries a comprehensive program of assistance and new economic opportunity, the Caribbean Basin initiative.

The contributions of others are significant. In spite of serious economic difficulties at home, Mexico and Venezuela are maintaining their oil facility, which sells petroleum partly for medium- and long-term credit, worth \$700 million last year. Canada is doubling its aid program. Colombia—itsself a developing country—is making available trade credits and preferences and central bank deposits.

Our own contribution is before the Congress. It consists of a major new economic opportunity—duty-free access to the U.S. market for 12 years, buttressed by incentives to U.S. investment—along with a one-time emergency appropriation of \$350 million to help the countries of the area get started again.

When we drew up this proposal, we never doubted that it would be difficult to pass in a recession year, a budget-cutting year, and an election year: But it seemed to us that the United States had already delayed too long doing something serious, long-term, and truly helpful about economic distress in our closest neighbors.

A great many members of Congress share that view. Yet many of the countries of the area are beginning to wonder whether our contribution to the Caribbean Basin initiative will ever come forth. Clearly if it were not to carry, the deep concerns these countries now have about their future would turn to despair. So it is now up to the United States to deliver, just as Mexico, Venezuela, Canada, and Colombia have delivered. I am confident that we will, but to do so will take a massive effort over the next 2 months.

While we seek an innovative solution to the problems of the small countries immediately to our south, we must also pay attention to what is happening to the big ones. Each of the major economies of the Western Hemisphere is in a slump: Mexico, Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, as well as the United States.

The problems vary: In some countries a very sharp correction is still necessary. Each depends heavily on international trade and on access to international financial markets. But the South Atlantic crisis has crystallized doubts about all borrowers in the area. There is a risk that normal access to markets may be interrupted.

This is, then, a particularly sensitive moment in the management of economic relations in the hemisphere. Two-way communication—both about the need to maintain access to markets and about necessary corrective steps—is more important than ever. The Americas are basically very credit worthy; the important thing is to keep them that way and to make sure that perceptions track reality.

Internal Security

Third, internal security—there are some incipient signs of progress in Central America. The myth that the revolution begun in Nicaragua 3 years ago was going to sweep the isthmus has now been shattered. The once broad coalition supporting the Sandinistas has now shrunk to a narrow elite. A Djilas-like “new class” has emerged. To offset their failing popularity, the Sandinistas are relying ever more heavily on foreign military advisers—some 2,000 Cubans among others—and developing the biggest army in Central America. But their leadership has split. And the economy is floundering. Perhaps as a result, Nicaragua now says it wants to take up our offer of negotiations on normalizing our relationship. We are probing to see whether it is serious.

The *guerrilleros* in El Salvador—Nicaraguan leader Daniel Ortega once told me that they were to be the “shield” of the revolution—retain military punch, as the heavy action in Morazan Province these last days shows. They continue to receive large amounts of supplies from Nicaragua, and their headquarters and training grounds are located there. But they are not gaining. They must now face a Salvadoran Army that still has many deficiencies but is now better trained and equipped. The result could well be gains this year for the Salvadoran Government and for the legally maintained order that democratic progress requires.

In Guatemala there is also a new opportunity. The new government has immediately set about to end urban death

squad activity, to campaign against corruption, and to organize rural self-defense forces. The *guerrilleros* are reacting by increasing the violence. They are massacring in some cases whole villages, perhaps in an effort to provoke the government into a new policy of repression. This new government has a long way to go, but its openness has struck a responsive chord among Guatemalans, and we will start to work with it, prudently but supportively.

In Honduras the new democratic government of President Suazo Cordoba is dealing vigorously with its financial problems, with incipient terrorist problems, and with the security problems posed by the conflict in El Salvador and the military buildup in Nicaragua. But it will need more resources, military and economic, if it is to continue.

So the isthmus isn't going Communist. Indeed 1982 could prove a turning point for Central America. The turn will not materialize, however, unless we sustain the effort we have been making. We will need to keep up the resource flows for 2 or 3 years more. We will have to maintain our political involvement to complete the democratic transformation and reforms. And we must keep searching for a way in which Nicaragua can live with its neighbors without threatening them.

It used to be that the United States either neglected Central America or, when things went wrong, sent in the troops. U.S. troops are not needed, wanted, or appropriate to Central America now. But neither is neglect. We need to keep up the effort long enough to help the countries there emerge as secure, democratic neighbors.

Peace Among States

Finally, let me say a word or two about the lessons of the Falklands/Malvinas war. We all know the roots of the conflict. The United Kingdom, in peaceful possession of the islands for 150 years, has always been concerned that the wishes of the islanders be paramount in their future disposition. Argentina, believing that the islands had been taken from it by unlawful force and frustrated by years of fruitless negotiation, has a deep national commitment to their recovery.

Perhaps the friends of the two countries should have put themselves at their disposition much earlier to assist the search for a solution. The point is more than historical. The hemisphere is laced with territorial conflicts. The United

States and other countries of the area have at one time or another been involved in calming or negotiating most of them. But perhaps this branch of hemispheric diplomacy should receive even more attention, if it can be managed without conveying an impression of interfering or busybodying.

A second lesson has to do with avoiding miscalculation. Repeated efforts were made by us and by others—before the landing on the islands, again when the British fleet was approaching, and again when the U.S. and Peruvian and U.N. peace plans were advanced—to explain to Argentine leaders what would happen if they did what they proposed to do. Although they consistently proved accurate, the predictions were not believed. Communication failed utterly.

Of course, it takes two to communicate. But I ask myself whether the lack of close ties with Argentina—not only by us but by most other American states—and the effects of the long period of self-isolation and isolation by others did not also play a role. It is difficult to have credibility in a country unless one has strong links to it.

A third lesson concerns the correct anticipation of future contingencies. The contingency of the Falklands/Malvinas was not envisaged when our peacekeeping machinery was designed. To be sure, the Rio treaty calls for common action when an American state is attacked, notably by a non-American power. But the treaty manifestly didn't envisage that its protection would extend to the case when an American state starts the conflict. Most Rio treaty members seem to accept this fundamental point implicitly, for they resisted calls to invoke the treaty's sanctions.

We should not conclude from this case that the Rio treaty or the inter-America system won't work. What we have to be sure of is that we have correctly anticipated possible future conflicts and that our institutions and diplomacy are ready to deal with them.

In the aftermath of the South Atlantic war, it is already apparent that military expenditures in South America will accelerate. Governments will look for advanced weapons, for greater self-sufficiency in defense industries, and for bigger stocks of weapons. Budgets will, of course, constrain purchases, but it would be vain to expect modern arms purchases to be deferred as has so often happened in the past.

The interest of American states is clearly to avoid arms races. Even where competitive procurement cannot be avoided altogether, they will want to see that existing disputes are not needlessly exacerbated. For many years the United States has applied restraints on our arms exports to South America that were in practice tighter than to any other part of the world. In the past decade, our share of arms sales to South America has fallen from 25% to 7%. It is important now that the United States use the full authorities of current arms export guidelines to join others in maintaining the balance of power throughout South America.

A fourth lesson is that we must be vigilant to prevent regional conflicts from having strategic consequences, changing the East-West balance. Cuba (and Nicaragua) rushed forward to exploit the crisis. In Argentina some talked of playing the Cuban card. But it would be unwise to believe Argentina will turn to the country that in its capital harbors the extremely violent Argentine terrorist organization—the Montoneros.

But all American states should be aware of the costs we might face should the U.S.S.R. gain access to the strategic southern cone. Cape Horn is a main shipping route, the alternate route for Middle Eastern oil, the link for big ships between the two coasts of the United States.

The point is that we all share a compelling interest in an Argentina that is true to hemispheric traditions and free of Communist influence. We all should be prepared to help Argentina maintain conditions in which its people can realize their free-world vocation.

A fifth lesson has to do with sensibilities. When forced to choose, when our possibilities of mediation had been exhausted, we came down squarely on the side of the principle of non-first-use of force, self-defense, and the rule of law. Many in Latin America agreed with us. But a great many were wounded by what they saw as a choice of East-West over North-South loyalties, of Anglos over Latinos, of Europeans over Americans. Resentments against the United States that may have existed anyway welled up. Ironically the sharpest reactions came from two friendly democracies: Venezuela and Peru.

It would be wrong to conclude from this reaction that the United States should not have chosen as it did. There can be no position for the United States other than to oppose the use of force to

ettle disputes. It is not surprising that pursuit of principle can have real costs. We would only compound these costs were we to try to have it both ways by trying now to buy friendship or support.

But it would equally be wrong to conclude that the pursuit of our unique relationships with the other American states is no longer realistic or desirable. For the underlying bonds remain: We are all immigrant societies, countries of the frontier, where personal equality and personal freedom are the ideal. We are all countries of believers, countries committed to the rule of law. We are all countries determined to prevent Communist inroads in our societies. We are all free-enterprise countries. And our trade and financial markets depend vitally on each other.

Perhaps indeed what this crisis tells us is not so much something about our current decisions but about what we have done in the past. Perhaps all too often we North Americans have been unwilling to make a sustained commitment to the hemisphere, pursuing instead an *a la carte* approach, ignoring our friends when it suited us, yet demanding their help or acquiescence when it served our interest.

I see this as a time for steadiness of purpose rather than for grandiose gestures, commissions, statements, or proposals.

Maintaining Momentum Toward an Open World Economy

by Thomas O. Enders

Address before the Chamber of Commerce and Brazil-U.S. Business Council, Washington, D.C., on May 13, 1982. Ambassador Enders is Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs.

For much of the postwar period the great engines of growth in the world economy have been international trade and international investment. I am not saying that there was no impulse to growth in individual domestic economies. Brazilians and Americans—above all others—know how much there was.

And yet, even in the case of our two great continental economies, international trade regularly outperformed domestic trade. In the period 1963-73, U.S. international trade grew twice as

- We have started to achieve with Mexico a relationship that reflects its exceptional importance to the United States and its role in world affairs. Now comes the harshest test of that new relationship, as the economic slowdown in both countries threatens to aggravate all our joint accounts: trade, finance, immigration.

- We have made a commitment to help the countries of the Caribbean Basin protect themselves against outside intervention, strengthen or develop democratic institutions, and overcome economic disasters. Now we must deliver.

- We were beginning to respond to the new realities in South America, building close bilateral relations with each country for the first time in a decade, when the shadow of the South Atlantic crisis fell across our efforts. Now we must relaunch those efforts, notably joining others in helping to maintain the networks of constructive relationships that are essential to peace.

After all, when a fight in distant islands can cause such a ripple effect, the fundamental lesson is not how little we need each other but how closely interlinked we are. The task now is to make our interdependence work, not against us, but for us. ■

fast as domestic trade. If you include services as well as goods, the share of U.S. gross national product (GNP) entering international exchange more than doubled in the last generation, rising to fully 12% or roughly the same proportion as in that great exporting champion, Japan. In dynamic Brazil, international trade has recently followed the same trajectory. It rose one-and-a-half times faster than domestic trade in the 1970s. By 1980 some 10% of all goods and services produced in Brazil were traded abroad.

Yet in the past 2 years, the stimulus to growth from international trade has flagged. In 1981 world trade stagnated in volume, as compared with a 1% growth for GNP. In 1982 first returns are even less encouraging.

As far as we can decipher the statistics, it's the same story with investment flows, that other great engine of growth. Up to the early 1970s there was a rapid development of direct foreign investment relative to the growth of trade, domestic investment, and GNP. The average annual growth rate of total outward international direct investment from the 13 largest OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] countries was over 12% a year. Most of this investment was channeled to developed countries which accounted for some 70% of the total.

Since then foreign investment has flagged. The average annual increase in direct foreign investment from the 13 OECD countries was roughly the same in nominal terms (12.6%). But considering the markedly higher rates of inflation, there has been a sharp deceleration in real terms. The United States provides much less of the outgoing flow and has become a strong competitor for the incoming flows.

If statistics were available for 1981 and 1982—which they are not—the story would be even more depressing. Moreover, sharp differences have recently developed in the ability of developing nations to attract investment. Although the flow of investment capital to developing countries has increased over the last few years in current and real terms, this investment has been concentrated heavily in a few economies—in particular Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Brazil. Direct investment in other developing economies has tended to stagnate.

To date the oil-importing countries of the developing world have been able to maintain their growth rates fairly well, in spite of the stagnation of international trade and investment. The annual rate of increase in their combined gross domestic product declined only slightly from 5.5% on average per year between 1963 and 1973 to about 5% between 1973 and 1980. The comparable figures for the industrial countries are 5% and 2.5% respectively. This generally encouraging performance was possible because these countries channeled the burden created by the deterioration in their terms of trade and slowdown in industrial countries' growth into increased foreign indebtedness and a sharp slowdown in the growth of per capita consumption.

It is uncertain whether developing countries will be able to continue financing the growth of investment at past rates. Rising debt and higher interest rates have substantially raised debt-

service ratios, making new borrowing more difficult. As a result, there is a growing uncertainty about the ability of the oil-importing developing countries to maintain, let alone improve, their 1973-80 performance.

I would hesitate to extrapolate these trends through the decade. That is what used to be known as the Brookings paradigm—find a trend in three consecutive quarters of economic data and claim to have discovered a new law. And yet it is not obvious to me—I wonder whether it is obvious to you—how these trends are to be reversed. No one can find the advance signs of new booms led by domestic trade. And as export growth slows down, the danger is that too many countries will succumb to the temptation to adjust imports to fit current earnings and thus accelerate the downward trend.

The jeopardies in the field of capital are different but no less deadly. Heavily indebted countries may impose new capital controls—in an effort to retain the funds they have—or fail to meet payments and thus put all flows at risk. At a time when world competition for capital is intensifying, either can be disabling. In a capital-short world, the open economies will attract a disproportionate share of available funds.

What this means is that the old problems of protectionism and barriers to investment have acquired a new urgency. When international trade and investment were growing explosively, we could afford some lapses from rational economic practice. Now that they are stagnating, we can afford much less—but risk many more.

U.S. Commitment to an Open International Economy

This Administration will not join the trend for restriction. For a long time the United States has been in the lead of the struggle for an open international economy. Our average tariffs have come down to 7% from their high point in 1930 of 35%. More than half (53%) of all U.S. imports from Brazil entered free of duty. On the remainder, the actual duty paid was 8%. I will confess that on some occasions in the past, we have attempted to channel foreign investment flows. But we did not persist, nor were we successful. President Reagan is deeply and personally committed to open trading and investment policies.

There has been a lot of talk about protectionism and, indeed, the pressures to take protectionist actions have been strong, as they always are, particularly

during periods of slow growth. But the record of this Administration in avoiding trade-restrictive actions has in practice been a good one. With the exception of sugar, this Administration has imposed no new restraints on trade. Indeed, even in as politically sensitive an area as footwear, the President decided to remove those restraints which existed prior to his assumption of office. He did so also with the steel trigger price mechanism, when countervailing duty petitions were filed.

Another indicator of this Administration's commitment to increased trade opportunities is the Caribbean Basin initiative. The fact that the region to which it applies is economically small sometimes obscures the startling sweep of the concepts which it embodies—elimination of all U.S. duties (with the single exception of the textile sector) combined with an investment tax credit and balance-of-payments support. The fundamental focus of the initiative is to enhance the productivity and dynamism of the private sector in these economies. We expect that the U.S. portion of the initiative—the trade, investment, and aid measures I've just alluded to—will be matched by basin countries' own efforts to reduce internal constraints to economic growth. In addition, U.S. efforts are being complemented by major contributions from Canada, Mexico, Venezuela, and Colombia, which have all significantly expanded trade and financial assistance to the basin region.

I know that some Latin American leaders, and probably some of you in the audience, are troubled by the preferential aspect of the Caribbean Basin initiative. We recognize that this is a departure from our traditional nondiscriminatory trade policy. But I want to emphasize that this is not a reversal of that policy. The initiative was designed to deal with a crisis situation, and one so grave and so important that unprecedented actions were called for. However, the initiative is not a permanent program but is limited to a specific 12-year period. It seeks to help countries achieve self-sustaining growth so that they need not depend on preferences indefinitely.

A moment ago I mentioned sugar, and many among you undoubtedly are troubled by our recent actions in this area. This has, indeed, been one of my own serious preoccupations in the economic area. But I want to make several points. First, our recent imposition of quotas on U.S. sugar imports was an action taken only as a measure of last

resort in defense of the domestic support program passed by the Congress last fall. Quotas were forced upon us by the declining world price for sugar. The situation was further aggravated by unusually low U.S. demand for sugar in 1982, due in part to higher than average imports last year. We expect that our demand for imported sugar will revert to a more normal level in 1983. At that time we would expect country quota levels to reflect more fully traditional levels of sugar exports to the United States.

Secondly, there will be some positive impact on exporters' revenues derived from the imposition of quotas. Because the U.S. support program will no longer have to be protected solely by duties and fees, imported sugar will get a price closer to the internal U.S. price than it had. The higher price will help to offset the reduced quantities allowed into the U.S. market. Export earnings will, therefore, be higher for many, if not all, foreign suppliers than under the fee-based system.

Finally, the U.S. action is not an isolated incident but part of a pattern of worldwide and deeply rooted imbalances in the international sugar economy—imbalances which have had serious results for both developing-country and U.S. producers. U.S. sugar policy has been aimed at addressing some of the fundamental conditions which account for these imbalances. We have been working to make the International Sugar Agreement function effectively so as to dampen the violent supply and price fluctuations which have long characterized the so-called "free" sugar market. The cooperation of the European Community in those efforts was crucial to their success. I regret that we were unable to persuade the Community to reduce or end its subsidized sugar exports nor to cooperate effectively with the sugar agreement. However, we will continue to work with the Community and with other major sugar producers to try to devise a workable international system for sugar.

I think I should say a few words at this juncture about our GSP "graduation" policy, because I understand that it is sometimes improperly characterized as a protectionist measure. First, the generalized system of preferences (GSP) authorizes a country to grant duty-free treatment to products of developing countries on the assumption that developing countries need a temporary preferential advantage to get a firm foothold in the international market place for

their nontraditional products. The "competitive need" feature in the U.S. GSP accurately reflects that philosophy. If a product exported by a country reaches a certain dollar value or percentage share of U.S. imports, it is assumed that particular export no longer needs the special privilege of duty-free treatment. I think those of you who are in business either in Brazil or in the United States would agree that those are reasonable criteria. They assure that preferential trade opportunities for any particular product are not dominated by those developing countries which have already gained a firm foothold in the U.S. market.

There has been some controversy over certain cases where GSP treatment was not restored for products which first exceeded the competitive need criteria and subsequently fell below those limits. But two striking aspects of this issue are often overlooked. First, the number of products involved is a minuscule part of the GSP program—this year only two items in the case of Brazil, for total exports to the United States of \$27.8 million. Secondly, this policy helps to preserve preferential advantages where they are needed to promote further export diversification rather than preserve preferential advantages to industries clearly beyond the infant stage.

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

But it is not enough to resist imposing restrictions—however important that is. The powerful and yet delicate machine which is the international economic system needs constantly to be serviced and repaired even in the best of times but especially now when its power appears to be diminishing. This is a time for fresh thinking and forward-looking approaches. We in the United States have some ideas. But the international economic system also needs the creative participation of other countries of this hemisphere. Brazil has long played a constructive role in international economic institutions. I hope that it will exercise a strong and positive leadership role in preserving and strengthening the international trade and investment system for the future.

The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is the crucial part of the international machine when it comes to trade and many aspects of investment. At a time when the world trading

system is under severe strain, it is well to recall the benefits the GATT has brought to the international economy. The GATT has provided the underpinning for an unparalleled expansion of trade and international investment. The GATT has achieved a major success in promoting a dramatic reduction in tariffs, to the point that in most sectors these are now of minimal importance as a barrier to trade. Yet, as tariffs have been lowered, more complex and troublesome obstacles have become prominent.

Given the complex problems before us and our economic stake in a healthy trade system, the 1982 GATT ministerial takes on a special importance. The lack of a consensus on many issues within and among developed countries, or between developed and developing countries, means that this meeting is the essential beginning of a necessary process.

Of particular importance is a recognition that the current safeguards system is not working and that a prompt acceleration of efforts to reach agreement is necessary. The increasing lack of discipline on safeguard actions taken to restrict imports is a serious threat to the GATT.

Services are particularly important to the U.S. economy but also to the economies of our trading partners. Services encompass a broad range of categories from banking to insurance, to data processing and construction. Some service issues concern the right of establishment; others involve the flow of information or people across borders. We need to work within the GATT to establish principles and rules governing specific types of services, including the possible amendment of some existing codes to apply to services.

The importance of trade in high technology requires that trade in this sector remain open and fair. There is a tendency toward national aids to support promising industries. These tend to distort trade and often shield firms from the competition which has so often been the inducement to innovation. The ministerial should agree on GATT studies for procedures to avoid domestic distortions in high-technology trade, particularly in the areas of government procurement, transborder data flows, and subsidies.

Finally, we hope the GATT will also address, quickly and effectively, an area which the United States has already proposed for GATT action—trade-related performance requirements and minimum

export quotas which can seriously distort trade and investment flows. It is time to develop better multilateral understandings on investment so as to limit the potential for distortion caused by government intervention in private investment decisions. Broad international acceptance of the principle of national treatment, greater discipline over the use of incentives, and agreement to limit, or better yet eliminate, the use of performance requirements would promote more efficient allocation of resources and economic growth. In the short run, narrowly nationalistic actions can be very tempting. In the long run, we all benefit from an open, well-functioning international economy.

Foreign Investment Climate in the Western Hemisphere

The leaders of many developing countries who met at Cancun recognized that increased foreign direct investment will be vital to their prosperity in the 1980s, particularly as the prospects for increased aid appear less promising. Their success will depend largely on the steps they take to insure favorable investment climates. As President Reagan stated in his speech at Philadelphia on October 15th, improving the climate for private capital flows is critically important, for investment—both domestic and foreign—is the lifeblood of development. Clear and consistent investment laws and regulations, in conformity with the principles of international law, will be determining factors in the decisions of many investors. Such practices attract new investment and inhibit the outflow of domestic funds which now plague many developing countries.

In this connection, I am heartened by what I believe is an increased sophistication and realism with regard to foreign investment in this hemisphere. We have all learned from experience. Multinational corporations today are far more sensitive to the development programs and needs of their host countries and take seriously their responsibility to be good citizens of their host countries. For their part, Latin American economic leaders and governments are beginning to see through the old shibboleths about the inevitability of exploitation by foreign investors and the automatic superiority of government decisions over private decisions.

The result has been a rather remarkable absence in recent years of the acrimonious and politically charged invest-

ment disputes which seemed to dominate U.S.-Latin American relations in the 1960s and early 1970s. In the first half of the 1970s, we had about 80 new expropriations in Latin America involving U.S. companies. In the second half of the decade, the number of such cases dropped almost by half to 45. Moreover, there is a growing realization in the region of the value of international mechanisms for resolving these types of cases, as well as other types of investment disputes. For example, in 1981, three countries in the hemisphere (Barbados, Costa Rica, and Paraguay) joined the World Bank's International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, thereby doubling the number of hemispheric members. There are now 16 members of the Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration.

Moreover, a number of governments are reexamining their existing legislation and practices with a view to increasing the incentives for investment. Several countries in the Caribbean Basin, for example, are exploring the possibility of negotiating bilateral investment treaties with the United States. An even more striking example is the interest of several countries, Peru among them, to increase incentives to attract foreign capital and technology for petroleum exploration.

U.S., Mexico Implement Visa Agreement for Businessmen

Thirty-one billion dollars commands a lot of corporate attention, and well it should. This figure represents the volume of trade between the United States and Mexico in 1981. Mexico has become our third largest international trading partner—behind Canada and Japan—as the Mexican Government, engaged in ambitious national development plans, scours world markets for materials and technical expertise.

Fortunately for corporate America, U.S. industry remains the primary contact of choice for Mexican firms. In 1981, 53% of Mexican exports were destined for the United States, while 64% of Mexican imports, representing over \$17 billion in sales for American firms, originated in the United States.

The Governments of the United States and Mexico have long recognized

The Need for Close Cooperation

The concept of an open world economy was not discovered by accident. We learned in the 1930s the terrible consequences—not only economic but political and most horribly of all military—that restrictionism could have. The vision of the destructiveness of the prewar decade sustained makers of policy for a generation after the war. Other things, not planned or even anticipated, added enormously to the growth of international transactions. Transportation costs fell drastically; communications improved radically; trade but, above all, capital benefited from less regulated and more profitable free international markets. The result was the greatest period of economic growth the world has known.

We will not come easily by such success again. We're going to have to work a lot harder for it than in the past. More than ever before, our future prosperity in the United States, in Brazil, in Europe, depends on our ability to maintain momentum toward an open international economy. No country has a bigger stake in such an economy than the United States or Brazil. So the closest cooperation in trade and investment policy—always desirable between our two countries—is now indispensable. ■

that our histories, cultures, and economies are intricately linked. Acknowledging the importance of our growing volume of trade, the United States and Mexico agreed in March 1982 to simplify visa procedures for businessmen traveling between the two nations. The result is that no competitor from any other country has the quick and easy access to his Mexican counterparts that the U.S. businessman now enjoys. Although of mutual benefit to both trading nations, the agreement is viewed by U.S. negotiators as the most recent example of the Department of State's ongoing effort to give vigorous support to the U.S. business community by facilitating U.S. sales abroad.

The new business visa policy is the indirect result of negotiations launched

by Presidents Reagan and Lopez Portillo in 1981. The two leaders agreed last year to establish several working groups to analyze specific problems and arrive at mutually agreeable courses of action. One is the consular and immigration action group, chaired on the U.S. side by Diego Asencio, former Ambassador to Colombia and currently Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs. His group tackles the wide-ranging and highly diverse questions of travel facilitation; the new visa policy is one of several successfully concluded agreements in recent months designed to strengthen economic ties and improve relations. The new agreement was implemented in the remarkable time of 5 weeks—a testament to its popularity in both countries.

Travel Distinctions Eliminated

The Mexican Government previously distinguished between the U.S. traveler entering Mexico for tourism and the traveler entering for business purposes. The tourist found entry procedures extremely simple—obtaining a tourist card (the Mexican Government's form FMT) upon entry to Mexico with proof of U.S. citizenship, such as a birth certificate or a passport. The business traveler, however, had to obtain a business visa in advance through a Mexican Consulate. This procedure was normally time-consuming, difficult, and costly—the U.S. businessman paid \$42 for the visa.

On April 5, 1982, the Mexican Government eliminated, for the most part, the distinction between the tourist and business traveler. Now the majority of U.S. citizens entering Mexico for business purposes (exceptions are noted below) will simply obtain a form FMT upon entry to Mexico, using the same procedure as the tourist. The FMT issued by Mexican immigration authorities will be valid for 180 days and allow multiple entries on the same form free of charge to the traveler. Although U.S. businessmen will obviously benefit from the streamlined application procedure, the greatest commercial advantage of the new system may well be the businessman's ability to travel to Mexico for meetings and consultations on short notice, with no advance visa application necessary. This will provide a distinct competitive edge.

The U.S. Government, in a reciprocal move, acted to allow the freer travel of Mexican businessmen to the United States by extending the validity of business visas issued to Mexican citizens. As of April 15, 1982, business

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Agriculture

Revised text of the international plant protection convention of Dec. 6, 1951 (TIAS 7465). Adopted at Rome Nov. 28, 1979. Enters into force on the 30th day after acceptance by two-thirds of the contracting parties.¹ Acceptance deposited: U.S., June 11, 1982.

Antarctica

Recommendations relating to the furtherance of the principles and objectives of the Antarctic Treaty (TIAS 4780). Adopted at Buenos Aires July 7, 1981.¹ Notification of approval: Belgium, July 15, 1982.

Aviation

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Montreal Sept. 23, 1971. Entered into force Jan. 26, 1973. TIAS 7570. Accession deposited: Uganda, July 19, 1982.

Bills of Lading

International convention for the unification of certain rules relating to bills of lading and protocol of signature. Done at Brussels Aug. 25, 1924. Entered into force June 2, 1931; for the U.S. Dec. 29, 1937. 51 Stat. 233.

Adherence deposited: Bolivia, May 28, 1982.

Denunciation deposited: Netherlands, Apr. 26, 1982; effective Apr. 26, 1983.

Protocol to amend the international convention for the unification of certain rules of law relating to bills of lading (51 Stat. 233). Done at Brussels Feb. 23, 1968. Entered into force June 23, 1977.²

Ratification deposited: Netherlands, Apr. 26, 1982.

Consular

Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at Vienna Apr. 24, 1963. Entered into force Mar. 19, 1967; for the U.S. Dec. 24, 1969. TIAS 6820.

Notification of succession: Kiribati, Apr. 2, 1982.

Customs

Convention concerning the international union for the publication of customs tariffs. Signed at Brussels July 5, 1890. Entered into force Apr. 1, 1981. 26 Stat. 1518.

Withdrawal: Australia, Mar. 31, 1977; effective Mar. 31, 1982.

Education—UNESCO

Convention on the recognition of studies, diplomas, and degrees concerning higher education in the states belonging to the Europe region. Done at Paris, Dec. 21, 1979. Entered into force Feb. 19, 1982.² Ratification deposited: Holy See, June 10, 1982.

visas issued to Mexican businessmen can be valid indefinitely instead of limited to the 5-year maximum which previously existed. This means that the Mexican businessman, once documented with an indefinite business visa, need never again apply for such a visa, because he will be documented to travel to the United States on business for the rest of his life.

Visa Restrictions

Although the Mexican Government's new regulations regarding business visas have made U.S. business travel to Mexico considerably easier, there are two important restrictions. Only U.S. citizens can enter Mexico on the form FMT to conduct business; resident aliens living in the United States must still apply through a Mexican Consulate for the standard business visa. Of more general interest, U.S. businessmen cannot sign contracts while in Mexico on the form FMT. Entry into Mexico to engage in activities requiring prior authorization from the Mexican Government (i.e., the signing of contracts) must comply with certain formalities set forth in laws applying to foreign citizens in Mexico. The U.S. businessman traveling to Mexico to sign contracts must do so on the standard business visa in order to avoid delays and legal complications.

Activities Permitted

Aside from these restrictions, the Mexican Government permits the U.S. businessman in Mexico on the form FMT to perform a wide range of activities. Listed below are permitted activities as specifically cited in the official order modifying visa procedures:

- Conduct business talks with Mexican citizens or legal aliens resident in Mexico;
- Participate with Mexican citizens in the discussion and development of plans regarding the economic, technical, financial, marketing, or engineering feasibility of investments in Mexico;
- Participate in preliminary proceedings connected with the formation of new enterprises or the expansion of existing ones, if the U.S. businessmen are going to provide capital or form part of the administrative bodies of such companies;

- Participate in the discussion and drafting of proposed contracts involving financing, consultation, or technical assistance for present or future business entities;

- Perform tasks inherent in the transfer, delivery, installation, or operation of machinery and equipment on behalf of foreign business entities, in fulfillment of contracts entered into for that purpose;

- Engage in intermittent activities involving visits or administrative, accounting, technical, operating, sales, or other supervision in enterprises in which the businessmen have an investment or in representation of the foreign business entity that owns stock in such enterprises;

- Participate in activities related to the managerial and executive bodies of such enterprises in representation of foreign business entities holding capital therein;

- Participate in activities connected with the management, administration, operation, and supervision of enterprises established under the regime covering the inbound assembly industry in Mexico;

- Attend meetings of the executive bodies of inbound assembly firms if the latter do not have independent legal status as Mexican companies but are affiliates, branches, etc., of a foreign firm, and the foreigner is a member or representative of the executive or administrative bodies of the United States parent firm; and

- Attend and participate in non-profit events of an economic, scientific, technological, educational, cultural, social welfare, sports, etc., nature.

In sum, the activities permitted the U.S. businessman in Mexico on the form FMT encompass the normal range of business contact and negotiation, except the signing of contracts. Questions regarding the new visa procedures, as they relate to a specific trip to Mexico or intended activity, should be directed to the Mexican Embassy in Washington, D.C., (telephone 202-293-1710) or any of the 39 consulates or 17 travel offices the Mexican Government maintains throughout the United States.

Press release 235 of Aug. 3, 1982. ■

TREATIES

Finance

Articles of agreement of the International Monetary Fund, formulated at Bretton Woods Conference July 1-22, 1944. Entered into force Dec. 27, 1945. TIAS 1501.
Signature and Acceptance: Hungary, May 6, 1982.

Articles of agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development formulated at the Bretton Woods Conference July 1-22, 1944. Entered into force Dec. 27, 1945. TIAS 1502.
Signature and Acceptance: Hungary, July 7, 1982.

Judicial Procedure

Convention on the taking of evidence abroad in civil or commercial matters. Done at The Hague Mar. 18, 1970. Entered into force Oct. 7, 1972. TIAS 7444.
Ratification deposited: Italy, June 22, 1982.^{3,4}

Maritime Matters

Amendments to the Convention of Mar. 6, 1948, as amended, on the International Maritime Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Adopted at London Nov. 15, 1979.¹
Acceptance deposited: Oman, May 24, 1982.

North Atlantic Treaty

Agreement to amend the protocol of signature to the agreement of Aug. 3, 1959, to supplement the agreement between the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the status of their forces with respect to foreign forces stationed in the F.R.G. as amended by the agreement of Oct. 21, 1971 (TIAS 5351, 7759). Signed at Bonn May 18, 1981.
Ratification deposited: F.R.G., July 9, 1982.
Entered into force: Aug. 8, 1982.

Nuclear Weapons—Nonproliferation

Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968. Entered into force March 5, 1970. TIAS 6839.
Accession deposited: Vietnam, June 14, 1982.

Pollution

Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by dumping of wastes and other matter, with annexes. Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, and Washington Dec. 29, 1972. Entered into force Aug. 30, 1975. TIAS 8165.
Accession deposited: Brazil, July 26, 1982.

Convention on long-range transboundary air pollution. Done at Geneva Nov. 13, 1979.¹
Ratification deposited: Denmark, June 18, 1982.

Weapons

Convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects, with annexed Protocols.¹

Ratifications and acceptances deposited:

Byelorussian Soviet Soc. Rep., Ukrainian Soviet Soc. Rep., June 23, 1982; Denmark, Sweden, July 7, 1982.

Whaling

International whaling convention and schedule of whaling regulations, as amended by 1956 protocol. Done at Washington Dec. 2, 1946. Entered into force Nov. 10, 1948. TIAS 1849, 4228.
Notification of adherence deposited: Belize, July 15, 1982; F.R.G., July 2, 1982;⁵ Senegal, July 15, 1982.
Notification of withdrawal: Dominica, July 6, 1982; effective June 30, 1983.

World Health Organization

Amendments to Articles 24 and 25 of the Constitution of the World Health Organization. Adopted at Geneva May 17, 1976 by the 29th World Health Assembly.¹
Acceptance deposited: Liberia, May 25, 1982; Libya, June 16, 1982; Yemen (Aden), May 3, 1982.

Amendment to Article 74 of the Constitution of the World Health Organization, as amended. Adopted at Geneva May 18, 1978 by the 31st World Health Assembly.¹
Acceptance deposited: Mauritania, May 27, 1982.

BILATERAL

Australia

Agreement relating to cooperation on antitrust matters. Signed at Washington June 29, 1982. Entered into force June 29, 1982.

Bangladesh

Agreement for cooperation concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy, with annex and agreed minute. Signed at Dacca Sept. 17, 1981.
Entry into force: June 24, 1982.

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of Mar. 8, 1982. Effected by exchange of letters at Dacca July 9 and 13, 1982. Entered into force July 13, 1982.

Brazil

Agreement extending the agreement of Dec. 1, 1971 (TIAS 7221), as amended and extended, relating to a program of scientific and technological cooperation. Effected by exchange of notes at Brasilia May 19 and June 1, 1982. Entered into force June 1, 1982.

Agreement for use of the geostationary operational environmental satellite in the Brazilian national plan for data collection platforms. Signed at Brasilia June 14, 1982. Entered into force June 14, 1982.

Interim agreement on air transport services. Effected by exchange of notes at Brasilia June 23, 1982. Entered into force June 23, 1982.

1982 Edition of Treaties in Force Released

The Department of State has released *Treaties in Force: A List of Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States in Force on January 1, 1982*.

This publication reflects the bilateral relations of the United States with 225 countries or other political entities and the multilateral relations of the United States with other contracting parties to more than 600 treaties and agreements.

The bilateral treaties and other agreements are arranged by country or other political entity; the multilateral treaties and agreements are arranged by subject with a listing of the parties to the agreements. Citations to the text, as well as information on dates of signature and entry into force for the United States, are given for each agreement.

Information on current treaty actions, supplementing the information contained in *Treaties in Force* is published monthly in the *Department of State Bulletin*.

The 1982 edition of *Treaties in Force* (324 pp.) is Department of State publication 9285. It is for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 for \$9.00. ■

European Space Agency

Agreement extending the memorandum of understanding of Oct. 7, 1978, concerning use of European Space Agency's EARTHNET system to receive and process National Aeronautics and Space Administration's Landsat data. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington and Paris June 17, 1982. Entered into force June 17, 1982.

Greece

Agreement relating to jurisdiction over vessels utilizing the Louisiana Offshore Oil Port. Effected by exchange of notes at Athens May 7 and 12, 1982. Entered into force May 12, 1982.

Honduras

Agreement relating to the military assistance agreement of May 20, 1954 (TIAS 2975), concerning the use of certain facilities in Honduras by the U.S., with annex. Effected by exchange of notes at Tegucigalpa May 6 and 7, 1982. Entered into force May 7, 1982.

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, with annexes. Signed at Tegucigalpa June 11, 1982. Entered into force June 11, 1982.

CHRONOLOGY

Hong Kong

Agreement relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products, with annexes. Effected by exchange of notes at Hong Kong June 23, 1982. Entered into force June 23, 1982; effective Jan. 1, 1982.

Iran

Joint determination for reprocessing of special nuclear material of U.S. origin, with related note. Signed at Washington July 23, 1982. Entered into force July 23, 1982.

Ireland

Agreement extending the agreement of Jan. 4, 1977, concerning fisheries off the coasts of the U.S. (TIAS 8526). Effected by exchange of notes at Washington June 30, 1982. Entered into force June 30, 1982.

Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts of the U.S., with annexes and agreed minutes. Signed at Washington July 26, 1982. Enters into force on a date to be agreed upon by exchange of notes, following the completion of internal procedures of both governments.

Italy

Agreement with respect to taxes on income, as amended, with related exchange of notes. Signed at Valletta March 21, 1980. Ratifications exchanged: May 18, 1982⁵. Entered into force: May 18, 1982

Luxembourg

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of May 27, 1981 (IAS 10221). Effected by exchange of notes at Port Louis June 25, 1981. Entered into force June 25, 1981.

New Zealand

Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income, with protocol. Signed at Wellington July 23, 1982. Enters into force upon the exchange of instruments of ratification.

Singapore

Agreement amending the agreement of Aug. 21, 1981, as amended, relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of notes at Singapore May 17 and June 14, 1982. Entered into force June 14, 1982.

Somalia

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of March 20, 1978 (TIAS 9222). Signed at Mogadishu June 17, 1982. Entered into force June 17, 1982.

Spain

Agreement extending the agreement of Feb. 16, 1977, concerning fisheries off the coasts of the U.S. (TIAS 8523). Effected by exchange of notes at Washington June 30 and July 2, 1982. Entered into force July 2, 1982; effective June 30, 1982.

Agreement on friendship, defense, and cooperation, with complementary agreements, and exchanges of notes. Signed at Madrid July 2, 1982. Enters into force upon written communication between the parties that they have satisfied their respective constitutional requirements.

Sri Lanka

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of March 25, 1975 (TIAS 8107), with agreed minutes. Signed at Colombo June 30, 1982. Entered into force June 30, 1982.

Sweden

Convention supplementary to the extradition convention of Oct. 24, 1961 (TIAS 5496). Signed at Stockholm June 22, 1982. Enters into force upon exchange of ratifications.

Switzerland

Agreement establishing rights, privileges, and immunities of the delegation to the negotiations concerning limitation and reduction of strategic arms (START). Effected by exchange of letters at Bern June 9, 1982. Entered into force June 9, 1982.

Uganda

Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of certain debts owed to, guaranteed or insured by the U.S. Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Kampala May 10, 1982. Entered into force June 21, 1982.

Zambia

Agreement for the sale of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of Aug. 4, 1978, with minutes of negotiation. Signed at Lusaka June 20, 1982. Entered into force June 20, 1982.

¹Not in force.

²Not in force for the U.S.

³With declaration.

⁴With designation.

⁵Applicable to Berlin (West).

⁶With understanding. ■

July 1982

July 1

Dominican Republic President Antonio Guzman, after his pistol discharges, dies from a gunshot wound in the head. Vice President Jacobo Majluta Azar is sworn into office as President.

Voters elect Institutional Revolutionary Party candidate Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado as the new President of Mexico.

July 6

Reversing its policy, the State Department proposes that Ethiopian exiles remain in the U.S. and not face deportation hearings.

President Reagan announces that he agrees "in principle to contribute a small contingent" of U.S. troops as part of a multinational force for "temporary peacekeeping" in Beirut.

July 12

The U.S. lifts economic sanctions imposed April 30 on Argentina at the outbreak of the Falkland Islands war.

July 14

By unanimous vote (17-0) the Senate Foreign Relations Committee approves George Pratt Shultz as Secretary of State.

President Roberto Suazo Cordova of Honduras makes an official working visit to Washington, D.C., July 13-15. During his stay President Suazo discusses military aid with President Reagan.

July 15

By unanimous vote (97-0) the Senate confirms George Shultz as Secretary of State.

Voters elect Zail Singh as the new President of India.

July 16

George Shultz is sworn in as the 60th Secretary of State by Attorney General William French Smith.

The Reagan Administration announces suspension of shipments of cluster artillery shells to Israel pending a review of Israeli use of cluster bombs (CBUs) in Lebanon in possible violation of U.S.-Israeli arms agreements.

July 18

Israel officially acknowledges to the U.S. its use of American-made cluster bomb weapons in its Lebanon invasion.

July 19

An Arab League Delegation composed of Foreign Ministers Abdel Halim Khaddam of Syria and Prince Saud al-Faisal of Saudi Arabia visit Washington, D.C., July 19-20 to present Arab League views on the fighting in Lebanon.

July 22

The French Government rejects the U.S. ban on the sale of American-licensed technology for a Soviet pipeline. Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy instructs French companies to fulfill their contracts supplying Western Europe with Soviet natural gas.

July 24

The State Department confirms that the U.S. is airlifting military equipment and weapons to Somalia to help that nation repel Ethiopian attacks across its border.

The Italian Foreign Ministry announces that "signed contracts will be honored" to supply equipment for a Soviet natural gas pipeline, defying the U.S. ban on the use of American-developed technology in the project.

July 25
President Ahmadou Ahidjou of Cameroon makes an official working visit to Washington, D.C., July 25-28. During his stay President Ahidjou meets with President Reagan and other Administration officials.

July 27
President Reagan certifies to Congress that despite "severe civil strife," the Salvadoran Government is making "tangible signs of progress" on human rights. The Administration is requesting \$61.3 million in military aid for El Salvador next year.

July 28
Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi begins an official visit to the U.S. During her 8-day trip, Prime Minister Gandhi meets with President Reagan, Secretary Shultz, and other Administration and congressional officials.

July 29
The following newly appointed Ambassadors present their credentials to President Reagan: Jaroslav Zantovsky of Czechoslovakia; Benjamin Razafintseheno of Madagascar; Bernardus Fourie of South Africa; Soto Harrison of Costa Rica; Jorge Luis Zelaya Coronado of Guatemala; and Humayun Rasheed Choudhury of Bangladesh.

July 30
President Aristedes Royo of Panama resigns, 2 years before his term ends. Vice President Ricardo de la Espriella succeeds him. ■

Department of State

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
*208	7/1	Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Deputy Secretary of State (biographic data).
*209	7/1	U.S. Organization for the International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee (CCITT), study group A and B, July 20.
*210	7/1	CCITT, group A, July 28.
*211	7/1	Elliott Abrams sworn in as Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Dec. 10, 1981 (biographic data).
*212	7/1	Program for the official working visit of Honduran President Roberto Suazo Cordova, July 13-15.
*213	7/14	Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations (biographic data).

*214	7/14	Peter H. Dailey sworn in as Ambassador to Ireland (biographic data).
*215	7/14	John L. Loeb, Jr., sworn in as Ambassador to Denmark (biographic data).
*216	7/14	Marshall Brement sworn in as Ambassador to Iceland (biographic data).
*217	7/14	David Anderson sworn in as Ambassador to Yugoslavia (biographic data).
*218	7/14	Mark Evens Austad sworn in as Ambassador to Norway (biographic data).
*219	7/14	David Funderbunk sworn in as Ambassador to Romania (biographic data).
*220	7/16	Shultz: remarks at swearing in ceremony, White House Rose Garden.
*221	7/19	Lawrence S. Eagleburger sworn in as Under Secretary for Political Affairs (biographic data).
*222	7/20	U.S., Singapore amend textile agreement, June 11 and 22.
*223	7/20	U.S., Hong Kong sign bilateral textile agreement, June 23.
*224	7/20	Stoessel, Shultz: remarks before State Department employees at Secretary's official arrival, July 19.
*225	7/22	Program for the official working visit of Cameroon President Ahmadou Ahidjo, July 25-28.
*226	7/26	Program for the official visit of Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, July 28-August 4.
*227	7/26	Raymond G. H. Seitz—Executive Assistant to the Secretary (biographic data).
*228	7/26	U.S., Korea sign new fisheries agreement.
*229	7/26	U.S., China amend bilateral textile agreement, July 16 and 19.
*230	7/30	Nicholas Platt sworn in as Ambassador to Zambia (biographic data).
*231	7/29	U.S., Spain sign new fisheries agreement.
232	7/30	George P. Shultz sworn in as the 60th Secretary of State, July 16 (biographic data).

*Not printed in the BULLETIN. ■

Department of State

Free, single copies of the following Department of State publications are available from the Public Information Service, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Secretary-Designate Shultz
Statement at Senate Confirmation Hearings
Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
July 13, 1982 (Current Policy #408).

Africa
Background Notes on Benin (May 1982),
Djibouti (June 1982), Guinea-Bissau (July 1982), Zambia (May 1982).

Arms Control
Arms Control and NATO INF Modernization (GIST, July 1982).
US Arms Control Policy (GIST, July 1982).
START Proposal (GIST, July 1982).

Europe
Preserving Nuclear Peace in the 1980s,
Director of the Policy Planning Staff
Wolfowitz, U.S. Naval War College,
Newport, R.I., June 22, 1982 (Current
Policy #406).
Soviet Active Measures: An Update, July
1982 (Special Report #101).
Background Notes on Finland (May 1982).

Middle East
Background Notes on Iran (May 1982),
Lebanon (July 1982).

Military Affairs
Chemical Weapons: Arms Control and
Deterrence, Director of the Bureau of
Politico-Military Affairs Howe, Subcommit-
tee on International Security and Scientific
Affairs, House Foreign Affairs Committee
July 13, 1982 (Current Policy #409).

Security Assistance
Conventional Arms Transfers in the Third
World, 1972-81, released by Under
Secretary Buckley, August 1982 (Special
Report #102).

South Asia
Background Notes on India (June 1982),
Nepal (April 1982).

United Nations
UNISPACE '82 (GIST, July 1982).
UN Special Session on Disarmament (GIST,
June 1982).

Western Hemisphere
U.S.-Latin American Relations, Assistant
Secretary Enders, Council of the Americas
June 21, 1982 (Current Policy #407).
Cuban Armed Forces and the Soviet Military
Presence, August 1982 (Special Report
#103).
El Salvador (GIST, June 1982).
El Salvador: Certification Process (GIST,
August 1982).
Background Notes on Suriname (June
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