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
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Volume 80 / Number 2040 / July 1980

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Secretary Muskie

Richard M. Moose

Warren Christopher

Richard N. Cooper

Myles R. R. Frechette

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The BULLETIN's contents include major addresses and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State; statements made before congressional committees by the Secretary and other senior State Department officials; special features and articles on international affairs; selected press releases issued by the White House, the Department, and the U.S. Mission to the United Nations; and treaties and other agreements to which the United States is or may become a party.

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THE PRESIDENT



Face the Nation" Interview

Following are excerpts from President Carter's interview on June 1, 1980. George Herman, CBS News anchor; Lesley Stahl, CBS News; Walter Mears, Associated Press.

... you keep emphasizing social programs lately, and you fought against a proposal in Congress to increase the military budget. You did that even though your Joint Chiefs of Staff took an unusual step of going public in opposition. How can you defend your argument on the defense increases that kind of opposition? And how do you tolerate the Joint Chiefs insisting so much insubordination?

A. It's not an unprecedented thing, it's completely compatible with the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. When they are asked the question, if you use more money for defense, they said yes. If you had called in the programs responsible for housing, for transportation or education or welfare and said you can use more money for those programs, they would probably have said yes. The best thing is to look at the record. During the 8 years of the Republican administration before I became president, we had a net reduction in dollars of 30% expenditures for defense, 30% cut over an 8-year period. I've only been in office now a little over 18 months, and we have had a very good record—there's been a strong growth in our commitment to defense. In the past 18 months, we have made the Defense Department much more efficient. We've cut out literally billions of dollars of waste in the Defense Department under leadership with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, agreeing, and also under the leadership of Harold Brown. So to make the Defense Department more efficient and carefully attuned to our needs to maintain security is an important responsibility of mine. It can't be done by massive spending one year and a sharp reduction because of an overreaction the following year. We've committed not only to sus-

tain the growth that we've already initiated in the past 3 years for the next 5 years, but I believe the Congress will see the advisability of this, and the future Presidents will also, and will keep that sustained upward growth intact regardless of what the inflation rate is—to give our nation this first priority—that is, an adequate defense to give us security.

Q. But if we save money on the defense budget, considering the way our allies have been cooperating or not cooperating with us, could we save some money on the defense budget by bringing some more troops home from Europe, cutting down our share of the NATO force?

A. No, I would not advocate that. We've got about 300,000 American servicepeople in the Europe area to maintain the defense of our allies and also directly to maintain the defense of our own country against Communist aggression from the Warsaw Pact. I would not advocate the cutting of those troops at all.

What we've done since I've been in office is to set forth a 15-year commitment by the NATO allies for a well-planned improvement in defense expenditures. In accordance with that, we and Germany, Great Britain, and others have agreed to a 3% annual growth, at least, in the defense appropriations and expenditures. Our commitment in this country, in accordance with the balanced budget that I submitted, and the 5-year plan is to have a 4% real growth, above and beyond the inflation rate, in appropriations for defense. This gives us a strong commitment to defense, predictability, good planning, and this defense budget, by the way, was developed by and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, and myself.

Q. Could you tell us how the tide is being turned in the case of the American hostages in Tehran?

A. We haven't made adequate progress there. What we've done since the very beginning is to try to protect the lives and safety of those hostages from the original threats—that they

would be tried and executed—to build up, on a worldwide basis, support for our position: condemnation of Iran and the calling on the Iranian Government to protect those hostages and to release them and to have an adequate commitment in our own nation's military strength, and otherwise—other strength—to protect those hostages and to expedite their release.

If you remember, early we were fearful about their lives because those threats to their safety and to their lives were made open and publicly. We're facing a horrible example of international terrorism—the holding of innocent people as kidnap victims supported by and condoned by the Government of Iran. And not only have our country and our allies condemned this action and are now imposing multilateral economic sanctions against Iran, but the Muslim countries themselves, of whom Iran is a member, have recently called upon Iran to release the hostages and to resolve this crisis.

Q. And, yet, the Iranian Parliament is now saying that it may be late July before they even discuss the fate of the hostages.

A. My hope and my prayer is that they will be released very soon. But I cannot predict that.

Q. Do you still consider it a crisis? I notice, looking through transcripts, that some months ago, everytime you had visitors at the White House, you mentioned the subject and brought it up yourself. Now, it seems to me, you mention it somewhat less or volunteer the subject somewhat less. Is it still a crisis? Should we still be saying on the air every day 100 and 200, or whatever it is?

A. Yes.

Q. Should we still be flying flags at halfmast, tying yellow ribbons? Is it still a crisis, in other words?

A. It's still a crisis.

Q. Why don't you talk about it?

A. There is never anytime in my day's work that I am not aware of the fact that 53 American hostages are

The President

being held as an act of international terrorism by the people, government, and terrorists in Iran.

We have mounted a military force placement, primarily naval forces, in the Indian Ocean and in the Persian Gulf region. We have made a rescue attempt which unfortunately was not successful, hopefully, to get the hostages out. But in its failure even, it showed the determination that we have to protect those 53 hostages. And, in addition to our own nation's unilateral actions and economic sanctions, we have now induced our allies to impose economic sanctions as well.

I don't believe anyone who's in a responsible position in Iran doesn't agree that Iran is suffering economically and politically and diplomatically by the holding of these hostages. Those pressures, although they have not yet been successful, must be maintained. And one of the ways to maintain that pressure is to let the world be reminded everyday that hostages are being held.

Q. But, haven't you kind of changed the signal yourself by coming out of the White House and starting to campaign after saying, for so long, that you couldn't because of Iran?

A. To some degree the circumstances have changed, and to some degree the emphasis must—the emphasis must be changed. After the unsuccessful rescue operation, it became then better for us to concentrate on a broad-based international economic pressure to be exerted against Iran. As a result of that effort, the European allies have now imposed economic sanctions against Iran.

While I would rather they be much more severe, in their minds they are adequate. We can't control those allies. They're independent nations. But they have taken a major step in additional economic sanctions against Iran above and beyond what Iran has had to experience in the past. We hope that all these efforts, collectively, will be successful in protecting the lives of our hostages and, at the earliest possible moment, I pray that they'll be released, but I cannot predict the date.

Q. Yet they continue to talk of placing the hostages on trial. Will the Administration tolerate those people being put on trial in Iran?

A. The third week in November—I think it was the 20th—we issued a statement that still prevails, in effect, prescribing what actions our nation would reserve as options if the hostages are tried or abused in any way. Those actions would be very severe against Iran. We have not closed any option for our nation to exercise. But for me to spell it in detail what we would do, I think, would be inappropriate.

Q. The Europeans seem to be moving off in a new direction on the Middle East to propose something—perhaps in the United Nations—for Palestinian self-determination. Obviously, we are opposed to that, is that correct?

A. Yes. We're making progress on the Mideast peace if you look at it in a long-term perspective. Two years ago no one would have thought that Israel and Egypt—a major Arab country and Israel—would be engaged in negotiations to resolve the differences between them. No one would have dreamed that the borders would be opened, that diplomatic recognition would have been extended, ambassadors would be exchanged, and the tourists would be flying back and forth between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem on the one side, and Cairo and Alexandria on the other.

At this time, we are still working very closely with the Israelis and Egyptians to resume the formal talks. The basis for these talks and future progress has got to be U.N. Resolution 242 and the Camp David accord document, which is almost like a Bible now. Any attempt that might be made by the European allies to circumvent or to replace this Camp David process would be a mistake in my opinion. And any attempt made to fragment or to change U.N. Resolution 242 would be a very serious mistake. We would not permit it. And, if necessary, I would take action within the U.N. Security Council to prevent any damage to U.N. Resolution 242.

Obviously, we can't expect an easy resolution of an important and difficult

and ancient division as exists between the Arab countries and Israel. But we've now focused upon the few remaining issues which are very serious but which are clearly defined, affording the self-governing authority within the West Bank-Gaza area—land rights, water rights, these kinds of things. And the Israelis know what they are. The Egyptians know what they are. We know what they are. And others around the world who are interested know what they are. We would try to encourage the European allies from projecting themselves into this process as long as we are still engaged in negotiations which might lead to success.

EDITOR'S NOTE

As the BULLETIN goes to press, President Carter is in Europe to meet with various officials and to attend the economic summit in Venice with the leaders of Canada, West Germany, France, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom as well as the President of the European Economic Community. The following is a tentative schedule:

June 19-20—Rome
June 21—Vatican
June 22-23—Venice
June 24-25—Belgrade
June 25-26—Madrid
June 26—Lisbon

Documentation on this trip will be published in the August issue. ■

The Middle East: Outlook for Peace

Address before the Washington Press Club in Washington, D.C., on June 9, 1980.¹

Want to speak today about the outlook for peace in the Middle East. For 30 years, peace in the Middle East was only a prayer—rejected four times by those who chose war, rejected again in recent weeks by deliberate and random acts of violence on the West Bank and revolting both the recent attack on Jewish citizens in Hebron and the maiming of two West Bank mayors last week. And again, alternating explosions of violence and humanity remind us of the agonizing struggles which frustrate that prayer, which surely must be shared by all those who are so bitterly divided there.

It is against that background that we evaluate the Camp David process, which brought us closer to a settlement than at any time in the past. No aspect of our foreign policy has commanded more diligent work, more patient effort. We must not let it fail. Why?

First, because endless conflict destroys precious lives. It squanders resources—resources that could be used to improve life for all people in the Middle East. A comprehensive peace could put the vast wealth of the Middle East to constructive use—building—not destroying. It could restore borders and close the refugee camps where thousands live in desperation. Peace is a cherished dream and a vital interest for Israel. Through three decades, the United States has been unambiguously committed to Israel's security. We played a proud role in the creation of the State of Israel. We have backed that commitment with generous investments in Israel's security and prosperity. President Carter alone has requested from the Congress more than \$10 billion in aid to Israel.

Today, he stands where six American presidents have stood before him—on the threshold of support for a strong, secure Israel. The experience of four wars has convinced that Israel's security can best be assured by a just and lasting peace between Israel and all its neighbors. Peace is equally important for the United States and for our relations with the world. For reasons of geography, history, and global interdependence, we have

vital common interests with the Arab nations. The moderate Arab states are a key to stability in the region. Their stability and independence are extremely important to us. Many of them look to us to buttress their security.

A just and genuine peace is also essential to the Palestinian people. Their legitimate interests can be realized only

The parties have come face-to-face with the central issues. Real progress has been made, and the progress possible in the future justifies persistence. Serious negotiations must continue.

through an end to conflict, not through war or violence. A process that resolves the Palestinian problem in all of its aspects can give the Palestinian people a secure future of purpose and dignity.

And peace is important for reasons that far transcend the region. Continued strife in the Middle East could erupt, by accident or by escalation, into wider conflict—conflict that could be disastrous. The Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973 brought us dangerously close to such a point.

This whole broad region of the globe—the Middle East and Southwest Asia—is a strategic crossroads at which the interests of many nations are vitally engaged. The future of the United States and of our key friends and allies around the globe is now bound up with its fate.

With turmoil in Iran and Soviet aggression in Afghanistan, the strategic concerns of the United States and its allies in that region are more seriously threatened than ever before. If hostile forces should gain control of the Persian Gulf region or if it should lapse into anarchy, the entire world economy would be undermined, and the world strategic balance would be dangerously altered.

Let me emphasize that in this new strategic situation, it is not only the vital interests of the United States, its European allies, and Japan that are at stake. So are the future security and well-being of Israel and the Arab states. If a credi-

ble deterrent balance in the area cannot be maintained, the independence of all states in the area will be at risk.

Achieving a Middle East peace would make a vital contribution to the ability of the United States to help provide security and stability in the entire region. Soviet ability to enlarge its influence and to deflect attention from its invasion of Afghanistan would be reduced. All our friends in the region would benefit, and the entire world would be more likely to remain secure and at peace.

For all these reasons, President Carter has given peace in the Middle East a major share of his time and concern. And for all these reasons, I count it high among my priorities as Secretary of State.

Historic Steps

In the long history of the Middle East conflict, we have heard a recurring complaint: that progress is stalled, that peace efforts have run aground. So frequent have been the headlines and forecasts of failure that it is easy to forget the historic steps we have taken. Those who doubt that progress, however, need only contrast where we are in 1980 with where we were in 1977.

In 1977, U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, with its formula of peace for the return of occupied territory, stood as a foundation to build upon. Three limited interim agreements had been signed.

Then in 1977, following President Carter's efforts to breathe new life into the peace process, came a truly historic breakthrough. President Sadat made his momentous trip to Jerusalem. Prime Minister Begin responded with high statesmanship. Negotiations began. And in September 1978, President Carter invited the two leaders to meet at Camp David.

At Camp David, the parties designed a framework for a comprehensive peace. They agreed to begin with a treaty of peace between Egypt and Israel. They agreed next, as a further step toward comprehensive peace in the Middle East, to launch serious negotiations—negotiations aimed at providing full autonomy for the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. There would be a withdrawal and redeployment of Israeli

The Secretary

forces to specified locations while assuring Israel's security. And they established final objectives: resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects and, ultimately, peace treaties between Israel and each of its other neighbors—Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon.

That is the vision of Camp David. How far have we come toward realizing it?

The treaty between Israel and Egypt was signed a year ago last March—an event of truly historic importance. In re-

come as no surprise, therefore, that the negotiations have been slow and frustrating, punctuated by pauses and disappointments.

A year ago, President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin, in a joint letter to President Carter, set the end of May as a goal for completing the negotiations. That goal was not met: The agreement we all hope to achieve has not yet been attained. Of course this is a disappointment. But it is no cause for despair. And it is no cause to abandon a process which

If hostile forces should gain control of the Persian Gulf region or if it should lapse into anarchy, the entire world economy would be undermined, and the world strategic balance would be dangerously altered.

cent months, we have been working toward the next objective of the Camp David accords. With the United States as full partner, the two parties to Camp David have been engaged in negotiations—the first negotiations in 30 years in which the concerns of the Palestinian people, along with the security of Israel, are at the top of the agenda. The goal of the first stage of these negotiations is full autonomy for the people in the West Bank and Gaza, under a freely elected self-governing authority which will serve for a transitional period of not more than 5 years.

The Camp David accords recognize that nations and peoples do not easily abandon hostile attitudes built up over more than a generation. Trust and understanding cannot be dictated. They can only come through patient effort, through face-to-face meetings, through time and experience.

The current negotiations are not, therefore, designed to define the permanent status of the West Bank and Gaza, nor are they meant to address the eventual status of Jerusalem. The final status of the West Bank and Gaza is reserved for the second stage of negotiations—to begin as soon as possible but not later than 3 years after the self-governing authority is inaugurated. Those negotiations would include elected Palestinian representatives from the West Bank and Gaza.

The issues at stake in the current negotiations are critical to the future shape of life in these territories—and they are highly complicated. It should

have achieved so much. We remain firmly committed, therefore, to the Camp David process.

The parties have come face-to-face with the central issues. Real progress has been made, and the progress possible in the future justifies persistence. Serious negotiations must continue.

And so today, on behalf of the President, I call upon Israel and Egypt to resume the negotiations as soon as possible. The issues both sides want resolved can only be resolved through active negotiations. And with the resumption of negotiations, I also call on each side to do its utmost to create a political climate that will give the negotiations a maximum opportunity to succeed. They cannot succeed if either side persists with unilateral actions that prejudice the final status of the territories, nor can they succeed if one side is insensitive to the concerns of the other.

We believe, furthermore, that the talks must continue to be solidly based on Resolution 242 and the Camp David framework. It would be a mistake to change either of those essential building blocks. Indeed, the United States will not allow that to happen.

We do not object to new initiatives that would further the Camp David process. But we will strongly oppose any efforts that would derail that process.

We take this position for two reasons: First, to alter drastically or to abandon the process would threaten the progress we have already made. And second, it would mean abandoning the most realistic hope yet for real peace.

Consider these concrete achievements of the process—achievements surely worth preserving.

- Peace now exists between Israel and its most powerful Arab neighbor. The danger of war in the Middle East has been reduced. Every Israeli is more secure; every Egyptian has new hope for a better life; every American can take confidence that the dangers to our country and our world have been diminished.

- Peace between Egypt and Israel, moreover, has borne visible fruit. Israel has turned over to Egypt, on or ahead of schedule, much of the Egyptian territory it occupied in 1967, including the major portion of the Sinai and rich oilfields. Egypt and Israel have exchanged ambassadors and begun to normalize relations.

- This peace agreement has created a center of stability in a region of turmoil. Extending that center of stability to include the West Bank and Gaza through the Camp David process will have even greater benefits.

- The two parties remain committed, despite the obstacles, to practical negotiations for a broader peace—ultimately encompassing all the parties in the region.

- Finally, the Camp David process has established the power of negotiations to settle issues once thought to be intractable. Today more people than ever before, in the Middle East and elsewhere, believe that peaceful negotiations can resolve the conflict. In itself, this change of attitude is historic and a basis for further progress.

These accomplishments are significant but fragile. To abandon the current process would be to risk losing these gains. It would also undermine the prospect of further progress toward a wider peace. For the current negotiations, however slow and difficult, hold out real hope of success for the future.

Critical Issues

The negotiators have begun to discuss critical issues—issues which constitute a hard agenda but the right agenda.

Let me describe those issues briefly. First and most critical is security. Israel must be secure. But to be durable, any agreement must also enable the people in the West Bank and Gaza to provide for their security. The Israel

nse force must be able to protect Israel from external attack, whether by conventional armed forces or by terrorist coups. At the same time, the "strong national police force" under the self-governing authority—called for at Camp David—must be able to assume its fair share of the burden for internal security and public order.

The second key issue is land. The agreement must assure the sanctity of private property in the West Bank and Gaza. It must also guarantee that the public land is used during the transitional period will not prejudice future negotiations on the final status of these territories.

Third is water—which truly represents life. In the American West, where water is scarce, conflicts over water rights have raged for years between individuals, localities, and even between states. So we can appreciate the situation in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza, where scarce water must be shared. This is a strong incentive for cooperation between Israel and the self-governing authority.

A fourth major issue involves the powers of the self-governing authority. Having agreed at Camp David that there would be a self-governing authority for a year transitional period, the negotiators have worked to define its powers. The important principle has already been agreed—that most matters touching the daily lives of the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza will be under Palestinian control when the self-governing authority is established. Now the negotiators are dealing with the final details of how to implement this principle.

Finally, there is the issue of how elections for the self-governing authority will be conducted. Here, agreement is nearly complete. But one major issue remains—the question of participation in the election by Arabs who live in the part of Jerusalem captured by Israeli forces in 1967.

These five issues constitute a formidable agenda. But if peace is to result, these are the issues that must be settled within the framework of a secure Israel and recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to participate in the determination of their own future.

To launch some alternative process will not make these issues go away. Another road will only bring us back, after

dangerous delay, to these same central questions. The Camp David process is confronting those questions; it should continue.

Let me make several final points about the negotiations themselves.

First, working within the framework of the Camp David accord and U.N. Resolution 242, the United States is determined that an agreement will be reached as soon as possible. It is incumbent upon Israel and Egypt to continue this process without interruption.

Second, if negotiations are to succeed, no party should take steps on its own that prejudge the outcome. Thus, for Israel unilaterally to place settlements in the West Bank and Gaza while negotiations are in progress runs counter to the very purpose of the negotiations—to achieve an agreement all parties can support.

Third, we support future negotiations on the final status of Jerusalem. We also support the view that the city should remain undivided, with free access to the holy places for people of all faiths.

Fourth, if negotiations are to suc-

ceed, all participants must accept the same objectives. Those objectives are expressed in Resolution 242 and in the Camp David accord. Palestinians are urged to join the peace talks. We will, however, stand by a commitment we first made 5 years ago: We will not recognize or negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Organization—unless the PLO accepts Resolution 242 and the right of Israel to exist.

To those who oppose the process because they oppose peace itself, I say: Let us put history at long last on the side of peace. The disputes have been moved from the battlefield to the bargaining table.

One final point about these negotiations—the most important point of all. The negotiations look toward a certain kind of future for Israelis and Palestinians, a future of peace and mutual cooperation. An alternative vision of the future was laid before us all last week. Two elected Palestinian officials were maimed by acts of violence as cowardly as they were reprehensible, and that violence followed the savage murder from ambush of several Jewish religious students a month ago. Now is the time for Israelis and Palestinians alike to choose which future they prefer—for they will surely either harvest the promise of peace together or reap a whirlwind of destruction.

It may be tempting, given the slow and frustrating pace of complicated negotiations, to lose patience, to reject what does not yield instant success as an utter failure, to advocate uncertain new departures instead of relying on patient diplomacy. But we must not lose patience; we must hold to our course.

To those who oppose the process because they oppose peace itself, I say: Let us put history at long last on the side of

peace. The disputes have been moved from the battlefield to the bargaining table. And to those who oppose the Camp David process out of frustration and skepticism, I say: Let us persist. Let us not undermine the most hopeful avenue yet found toward peace. Remember that this process had already altered the course of history. Having come so far, let us not turn aside from what we have begun.

Fifth, the current negotiations, as I have said, are designed to establish transitional arrangements for a 5-year period. The final status of the West Bank and Gaza will be taken up in future negotiations. The United States, therefore, will oppose any effort to use the current talks to lay the foundation for an independent Palestinian state or to tie the hands of future negotiations in some other way.

¹ Press release 144. ■

Secretary Attends NATO Meeting in Brussels and Visits Vienna

Secretary Muskie was in Brussels May 13-15, 1980, to attend a joint session of the NATO Defense Planning Committee attended by Foreign and Defense Ministers. He then visited Vienna May 15-16 to represent the United States at the 25th anniversary of the signing of the Austrian state treaty. While in Vienna, he also met with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. Following are various remarks he made during the trip and the texts of the NATO communique and declaration issued on May 14.¹

NEWS CONFERENCE, EN ROUTE TO BRUSSELS, MAY 13, 1980²

Q. Do you have any three or four main points you are trying to get across to the allies or to the Russians in these couple of days you have?

A. I think the first point that is very important to make is the continuity of our policy. I expect that we might have at least two questions as to whether or not Secretary Vance's resignation and my selection might represent a change of policy, at least with respect of the central questions that I am sure are on their minds about Iran and Afghanistan. So that's my first objective.

Secondly is to confirm allied support and unity behind our policy in Iran and Afghanistan and what we have asked them to do to be supportive.

Thirdly, although, of course, a principal responsibility of Defense Ministers is to insure that as the United States moves to strengthen our defense posture in the Persian Gulf area, our NATO defense posture is not weakened in any way. This requires consultation and coordination of policy and support. This ought not suggest that there is any weakening of our NATO support under consideration whatsoever. They ought to recognize the fact that as we put resources into the Persian Gulf area, given the need for budget austerity and so on, our resources could be strained in other areas.

So we would like them to understand that and be supportive. I'd say, of

course, we would like to get out of this meeting a strong statement of support—continuing support—for our policies.

Q. When you say "strong statement of support," with respect to what—that strong statement of support? And also, can we expect you to try to get a commitment from the nine to live up to the April 22d pledge to impose an almost across-the-board ban—economic/diplomatic—against Iran if there is not decisive progress by May 17?

A. Yes, I think we have a right to expect a commitment, an understanding, that there may be some problems of precise compatibility between what they are able to do in the way of sanctions and what we are able to do; but, nevertheless, a strong commitment to go forward with the same sense of urgency and commitment to the objective—the objective, of course, being to maintain pressure on Iran while we explore by whatever means are available to us, diplomatic and otherwise, the problem of dealing with the hostage problem.

Q. Do you expect to get them to live up to April 22, not that they are going to say, "We support you but we are going to drastically dilute April 22"? I mean an across-the-board ban, which is what they promised.

A. As I understand, their promise was to implement the sanctions resolution which the Russians vetoed. That is what I understand it was meant to be. That is my objective—to get confirmation of that.

Q. Do you expect to have time to get into the question of the Middle East—to urge the Europeans to hold off their separate initiative to bring the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] into the process or seek to revise [U.N. Resolution] 242?

A. I would expect at least in the bilaterals, if not in the meeting tomorrow morning, that this question will arise. I expect it to arise, and I expect to urge them—and I think it is important to urge them—not to take any step that would divert attention from the Camp David process that might have

the effect of relaxing the pressures on the Egyptians and the Israelis to continue to press for the Camp David process.

For the first time, really, under Ambassador Linowitz [Sol M. Linowitz, Personal Representative of the President for the Middle East Peace Negotiations], the parties are coming to grips with the six "hard-knot" problems standing in the way of an autonomy agreement. I can't conceive of any other process that could get us close to those central issues than this one. Any other process which was to undercut Camp David and start us down another road would involve delay in getting those central issues—issues like land and settlements, issues like security issues like the authority of the self-governing authority, issues like war, and so on. These are central to any autonomy definition. And we're there—we're pounding at them. Both parties—both Egypt and Israel—want to continue pounding at them in this process, and I would hope that our European friends would not take a step that would have the effect of relaxing that pressure and undercutting that process. I am going to make the case as persuasively as I can.

Q. How much time—the May deadline has already slipped—but how far into the summer is this likely to go? At some point they are going to have to discern their interest.

A. They will have to determine what their interest is—the successful conclusion of this process, which would have a stabilizing effect and if successful gradually move the Middle East that direction. That is going to be tough, of course. Or to start all over again. It's taken quite some time to get this far with this process. But where does their interest lie? I understand of course, their concern about their oil sources, their concern for stability in the Middle East is more immediately significant to them perhaps than to us in those terms, but stability surely is their objective.

That's why I would expect to have a very vigorous discussion on this issue because I understand the pressures that play on them to take an initiative

their own. I had a brief discussion with [British Foreign Minister] Lord Carrington about it—I expect to have more. I think that would be a very key issue in this discussion, not on the ATO agenda as such, but in terms of common interest in the Middle East.

Q. As you may know, Khomeini has said the hostages are not going to be released until the Parliament is convened and the issue debated and I presume the allies are going to say to you: "Well, the imposition of harsh sanctions really is academic because they are not going to be released until the Parliament debates in any event, why should we do it in that connection?" I mean, what are you going to say to them in that regard, and have you completed your review of Iran policy, and how do you see this crisis working itself out?

A. My review of Iran policy is ongoing. I want to get much deeper into it.

Q. I meant the Administration.

A. Yes, there are two reviews—we have to get caught up to speed and the Administration's in terms of the aftermath of the rescue action. So we're looking at it from a slightly different perspective, but with the same objectives in mind.

My feeling about this is that, on the basis of what I have learned to date, the Iranians are truly concerned about European sanctions. If they are, it can only mean that if applied, the sanctions would have an impact. There are a lot of pressures to which the Iranians are subject: questions of internal instability, struggle for power, economic deterioration, the threats on their borders, the postrevolutionary world in which it is going to have to live and provide for its people. There are international pressures in Iran upon which we ought to build and economic pressures when their economic problems are not going to be effective pressures. I don't know what a religion preaches about the willingness of human beings to accept austerity as a way of life, people still have to eat; they still have to provide their essential needs. And when their opportunities to do so are squeezed, their government must respond.

Indeed, the revolution itself is evidence of the truth of what I've just

said. The revolution was initiated and succeeded because people were not satisfied with the kind of life they were getting under the Shah. Now a government—the new authority—which has taken over as a result of that popular unrest, cannot be insensitive to the economic problems that face Iran. So I think that this kind of pressure is essential. It will not, by itself perhaps, bring Iran around to our objectives of releasing the hostages, but it surely ought to improve the climate for doing so.

The second point, which I am really not ready to, or even in a position to, define is the posthostage relationship between the United States and Iran and the Western world. I would expect that at least the rational forces in Iran would be worried about that, concerned about it, and I think that to the extent that we could contribute to the development of our policy to a clarification of their role in the posthostage world, we might contribute then to the release of the hostages.

Now, the main roadblock here that I see is that the militants, who presumably still hold the hostages, have power internally only because they have the hostages. That is going to be a very critical point to get over, so it seems to me that a lot is going to depend upon the regular government authority taking over control of the hostages. You get that, and then you can begin to move into the areas of legitimate governmental concern—what we do about the future of our country, what do we do about the future of our own people, what do we do about our economic conditions? What do we do about our relations with the outside world? And any government which has the specific responsibility of being concerned with those things is a government subject to pressures from its own people.

Q. Now that you have reviewed the history, I guess, of the Iran crisis, is there anything that you would have done differently if you would have been on the job?

A. At the moment, I have really been learning—learning how to deal with you fellows, among other things. No, I have been reviewing policy, reviewing my thinking, consulting with the President, his foreign policy advisers, shaping my thoughts. More specifically, I have been addressing myself to these meetings this week and in the next 30 days which I must attend.

Q. Do you think there was a mistake at the onset to give the issue so much prominence since, as you just said, the value of the hostages is the *raison d'être* of the militants?

A. The heart of the situation has sort of generated its own visibility, with the help of the media, of course. The fact that Walter Cronkite [of CBS Evening News] every night adds another day to the period—and that's his prerogative—of the number of days of imprisonment, keeps the issue before the American public constantly. And, of course, the President kept its visibility high by tying it to his own campaign plans. If there were a way of deescalating or reducing the visibility without reducing our efforts, that would be a useful thing. But you can't unscramble the history of the last 6 months.

Q. What is your expectation of your meeting with Mr. Gromyko?

A. I look forward to it. I had one long meeting with him almost 10 years ago. When I was running for a higher office, I went to Moscow and had a 4-hour meeting with Kosygin and a 3-hour meeting with Gromyko, so I had some exposure to the ways in which he conducted a dialogue at that time, and I know it requires a lot of patience, alertness, willingness, and ability to respond in a knowledgeable way. It requires a lot of preparation. He is a tough guy—a smart guy—staunch defender, without blinking, of all Soviet policies.

So I would expect that we're going to get a very interesting comparison of notes on who created the present stalemate in U.S.-Soviet relations, and why and what faults the other side has to overcome to improve relationships. That's an exercise you inevitably have to go through. But, I would hope that in that process of feeling each other out, there may be some indication on his part of priority Soviet concerns that we can build on to persuade him to change Soviet policy.

The point that I am going to emphasize with him over and over again is that the invasion of Afghanistan created a sea change, not only in the Administration's view of Soviet intentions but in the view of the American people and of the Congress.

With respect to SALT, there was no way that the Congress would consider ratification of SALT following that invasion. The Senate, indeed, had

cleared its schedule last fall for the debate to begin in January. As a matter of fact, we planned it so thoroughly that we haven't had much domestic legislation to consider in the early months of this year, because we had reserved that time. So this Soviet complaint that we did not really make an effort to ratify SALT is completely without foundation. There is, of course, opposition to SALT.

It would have been a tough fight to win at best. We all know that, and you all know that. But we were ready to go, and we thought—Senator Byrd's a pretty good nose counter—we had a fighting chance that if we could have begun the debate in January, we would have gotten the SALT ratification. I think it is important to make that point, and maybe as a Member of the Senate at that time, I could have been more persuasive with Mr. Gromyko on that point than the Administration had been up to that point.

Q. From his viewpoint, there was a sea change when we decided to convince the allies to put in missiles that can hit the Soviet Union—those 572 missiles that can reach the Soviet Union. What can you offer him in a way of allaying what, after all, he considers as a major departure, and, secondly, do you see any real chance that this meeting or even a future meeting will revive the long-shelved Administration emphasis on arms control—specifically, the SALT Treaty and other things that are totally gone by the board as we take this tough line?

A. What he has got to understand if he doesn't—we are not really sure what he understands and what he doesn't understand; he is a pretty sharp guy—what he has got to understand is that a steady Soviet buildup in nuclear arms and in conventional arms over a period of 15 years has finally generated a reaction all of its own, independent of Afghanistan. And coupled with Afghanistan, it has just intensified prodefense attitudes of this country, our people, and the Congress. He has got to expect that given the continued buildup by the Soviets—and it still continues—that the United States and our NATO allies are going to protect our interests.

With respect to theater nuclear forces (TNF), after all, they began the thing with the SS-20. The SS-20 generated alarm throughout Europe and it certainly did with us, and neither the

SS-20 aimed at Europe nor the TNF is covered by the SALT II Treaty. We have offered to make those issues part of the negotiations moving toward SALT III. SALT II is not the end of the line. We have never included theater nuclear weapons in the SALT discussions up to this point, by mutual agreement. But so long as they continue to modernize their theater nuclear weapons, we surely have the option to do the same.

But that's a fact of life, and that ought to push both of us toward SALT III. We can't get to SALT III unless we ratify SALT II, and Afghanistan stands right in the way.

Q. You feel you can't have a SALT III unless you ratify SALT II? I mean, that's a judgment that you have decided that you can't put aside SALT II and start on SALT III right away?

A. I think that has to be the emphasis on this point. We've got to keep the pressure on the Russians. We've got to keep the pressure on the possibility for ratifying SALT II so long as the calendar makes it relevant. The calendar itself creates problems down the road, but I am not interested in looking that far away.

Q. But it seems that Afghanistan at this moment is the pivot. In other words, you've described another 1940s; you've described the cold war. Are they going to pull out of Afghanistan or are we going to blink or are we going to do something nice or what? I mean there's no end to this, is there?

A. I think they've got to get out of Afghanistan. I think they've got to move toward a neutralized Afghanistan, and they've got to recognize this fact. When I say that SALT II is tied to Afghanistan, I say it irrespective of the Senate vote count.

I just don't see any way that you can get through this in the Senate—to ratify SALT II—unless something is done to reassure the American people about Afghanistan. And I can see nothing short of withdrawal of troops that would that at this point, and I think he must understand that. I don't expect any substantive achievement, as I've already said, out of this meeting with Gromyko. But I will hope that we can have a forthcoming discussion of where we are and how each of us sees our present posture, so that there can be no doubt about the realities of the

critical situation in our respective countries.

Whether or not there is a follow-up meeting is the question I leave up in the air. I would think that—I would hope—that I might present our point of view, and especially from the perspective of a recent Senator, in such a way as to give him some food for thought about the depth of the American feeling about what the Russians have done, about the breadth of it across our whole political spectrum, and about our desire not to move our whole political spectrum, and about our desire not to move into a cold war situation, but our desire to resume the process which produced the SALT II and which created hope that we might slowly build up a peaceful world.

I hold that out not just as a carrot but as a very real, genuinely-held objective of this Administration and the American people—that we can get to that kind of post-Afghanistan world, put us both on the same track, moving in the same direction, towards goals that assure a peaceful resolution of issues rather than a violent one.

Q. I wonder whether I can take you back to the subject of sanctions again. Is it your understanding that for them to comply with their commitment, it would have to involve the cutting off of all existing contracts as well future ones, or is there some gray area there?

A. I would rather not prejudge the question at this point. I think I owe them an obligation to hear what they have to say.

Q. Has there been any slippage in there any slippage on the subject of the Olympic boycott? There are reports that the French and the Germans are now leaning away from it

A. The most recent vote we had was that of the German Olympic Executive Committee—which, we're told, is not binding—which was 12-7 for a boycott. Chancellor Schmidt has told me personally that, once it's clear that the American position is solidly behind the boycott that West Germany will follow. That was, of course, when he was here in the United States. I have no evidence that he has changed his view about that.

The French vote, which I think takes place today, would be important. We have just got to wait for the vote. We talked to Mr. Poncet [Foreign Minister

n Francois-Poncet] about it yesterday, and we will just have to wait and watch the vote is. If we can get both those, then I think we've won the ticket.

Q. You mentioned the Soviet proposals. I guess there also have been proposals for the neutralization of Afghanistan made by the British—Lord Carrington when he was in London. Can those go anywhere? Are you going to discuss those with Gromyko? I may be a little bit off on this, but my understanding is that Secretary Vance was prepared to discuss them with the Russians, provided there would be simultaneous Soviet troop withdrawal over an extended period. Does the Carrington idea of neutralization make sense to you? Can it go anywhere?

A. It's an initiative which I think would be useful if the Russians respond to it and they think they should respond to it.

The Russians like to be in a position to knock down a proposal after you come up with the one you want. What I'm looking for is a proposal which forces both to focus on it. No proposal in its first stages is going to settle this issue, but if an initiative is offered that we each use as the basis for building an agreement, then I'd be interested in it. I'm not going to agree in advance by agreeing in advance put the Russians in a position to reject it.

Q. Earlier you sounded a little bit against the idea that has been proposed which might have been by George Ball—but the idea of a combination of incentives and penalties which the Iranians might make some sense to you. Is that something you are going to discuss with the Europeans—the idea of perhaps suggesting to the Iranians that if they release the hostages there might be unfreezing of assets within a certain amount of time? If they don't, there would be additional sanctions?

A. You know I think the question of incentives generally, including the economic measures we took against the Iranians, are a proper subject for consideration if the Iranians are willing to go to the point of discussing [inaudible]. We can't dilute the issue; but, I think that as we communicate through diplomatic avenues that are available to us, and there are such, that there are these kinds of things that can be worked out to us and to the Iranians as

possibly useful in coming to a decision to release the hostages. I think it has to be done through third parties to try to identify the stakes that the Iranians have in the posthostage period that might be useful.

Q. You spoke about trying to persuade Mr. Gromyko to change Soviet policies. Do you think it is that simple, or does it require a structural change in their form of government of a new generation of leaders?

A. If we wait for those two events, we won't have any agreements. I think that we may not have any anyway. I will say to you in all frankness, I found the Afghanistan invasion so unexpected—not that I haven't always been alert to the dangers which the Soviet Union posed for us, but I found it such a sharp diversion from the policy that they have been practicing and following for a decade that it raised real doubts in my mind as to whether it made any sense to go forward with some of these other efforts to find areas of agreement. And as you all know, there are Soviet scholars who disagree with each other about the long-term significance of what they've done. So I think we have to be very alert, very careful to try to read that significance, and we have to read any proposal to resolve our present differences in that context. It's not going to be an easy task, and I find myself in a new role in respect to that, and I'm going to be a little cautious about it.

Q. What kind of neutralization plan for Afghanistan do you think would induce the Senate to take a more serious look at SALT? Do you have a bottom line on that? Anything short of a complete withdrawal—would that be acceptable?

A. I don't think you can get the Senate at this point to even react to a neutralization plan. It's too hypothetical, and the Senate is sensitive as a whole, as I am, to trying to answer problems related to the Soviet Union in terms of hypotheticals. Hypotheticals give them something to play with, and I am against it. I am for getting some pretty solid feel of their response to any proposal before endorsing one in advance.

Q. Would anything short of complete withdrawal—

A. Again you are trying by a series of questions, and I am not going to re-

duce the options. Any reduction of options simply would lead them to bring pressure on one area or another, and I'm not about to let them do that.

Q. I got the impression that if you're going to hold SALT as a carrot you're going to suggest that there could be action on SALT if they are forthcoming in Afghanistan. Is that what you're saying? That was my understanding, basically. That's oversimplified.

A. SALT is just one illustration of the issues. I brought SALT up because they have accused us of having been less than enthusiastic about SALT ratification. They've used SALT as a partial explanation for why they went ahead in Afghanistan. But there are other issues—an improvement in the whole range—on grain, on high technology—the whole range of areas in which we were broadening contacts, exchanges—commercial, agriculture, or otherwise—all of those promising initiatives which were gaining momentum are at stake here, not just SALT, but the whole range. I don't hold any of them as a carrot, but what I'm holding out is the challenge of normalizing relations between the Russians and ourselves, and I am saying to them the burden is on you to demonstrate to us that real normalization is truly our objective and Afghanistan, which you created, is the test.

Q. What is your attitude—and what do you sense—after this week or so of consultations with the President and other members of the Administration toward the possible trial of the hostages in Tehran if this were seen as the way by which they could resolve the matter within their processes?

A. I'm not under the impression at this point that that is an idea that is being actively or vigorously pursued in Iran, so it is not a contingency which we have been addressing this week.

Q. Some of those who recently been in Iran think it is—

A. It's hard to know how to use your time the first week, and that's something that has concerned me very much, but I've been reading the intelligence briefings. At this point, even though it's been talked about in the press—

Q. You talked about the tough guy Mr. Gromyko is. What kind of guy do you want NATO and our NATO allies to think you are?

A. I've always found it useful for people to think of me as an intimidating sort of fellow. Dick Stewart once said that I would intimidate Mount Rushmore.

Q. Is that how you're going to operate?

A. I'm going to operate being myself, but looking at myself through the media is like looking at one of those rippled mirrors in an amusement park—you recognize yourself, but it doesn't look like the image you see in your morning mirror.

Q. Can I go back to something you said about Iran? You said it would be helpful for the whole crisis, particularly the hostages, if they could become less visible. Assuming that were so, how then can you go about [inaudible]? What would you be able to do if the American popular pressure were off the Administration? What then could you do that you cannot do now?

A. I think it isn't a question of what we could do then that we cannot do now. As the pressures arouse public opinion to do something fast—that's part of the problem. And a lot of initiatives that have to be taken here are not going to be visible to the public, and so it is conceivable in one way or another through the press—the public perception—the Administration may be perceived as sitting on its hands and not making an effort, and in a political year, that is a dangerous perception for the Administration to be subjected to. So that I would hope—I know the word "patience" has been used to the point that people say, "Well, patience isn't a policy." I think one of the candidates said: "Patience is an excuse for lack of a policy." I am determined to press whatever initiatives I finally conclude should be pressed, but they may not be as visible as other kinds of options might be.

Q. I was left with the impression that you made a hint at the possibility of reducing the frozen assets in advance of any commitment to release the hostages.

A. No, I'm not suggesting timing with respect to any of these things because the issue is the release of the hostages. It's the primary issue, and beyond that I don't want to talk about it.

Q. And you're not talking about the President making [inaudible] visi-

bility of the hostages. You don't mean that the President has contributed to the high visibility of the hostages which you are unhappy about?

A. I think all of us have contributed to it. I am not really interested in rewriting the history of the last 6 months or evaluating it or assessing it. If I were to get into that, I would make my views about something that happened 6 weeks ago or 6 months ago the issue rather than what I propose to do now, so I'm not going to indulge in backward looking.

Q. Are you going to tell Mr. Gromyko what you just told us?

A. If I can remember it all.

ARRIVAL STATEMENT, BRUSSELS, MAY 13, 1980³

May I say, first of all, that it is a pleasure to be back in Brussels. I come here on my first visit to Europe as Secretary of State recognizing that this is the capital of the continent and also the center of the Atlantic community. And I come here to reconfirm strong ties with the community which is the bedrock of American foreign policy.

I come here at the same time to represent the continuity of American foreign policy, and I suspect there may be some questions as to whether my selection represents a change in foreign policy. It does not in any respect with respect to the issues which are most visible and most current in our relationship.

I look forward to the discussions tomorrow involving not only the Defense Ministers but for the first time in a long time, a [joint] meeting with the Foreign Ministers of the alliance as well. This was done at President Carter's initiative in order to indicate the very great importance of the coordination of defense and foreign policy in dealing with such events as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the problems associated with Iran.

The strength of the alliance, I think, is terribly important as our problems with the Soviet Union and insuring the stability of the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, as well as the jurisdictional limits of the NATO alliance.

I look forward to meeting with my counterparts, the Foreign Ministers of the alliance, meeting with Mr. Gromyko in Vienna later this week, and hopefully, with some optimism, recognizing

the serious current problems which confront the alliance, that together—as we have for 31 years—we can deal with and surmount.

Q. Will you be asking the alliance to live up to their pledge to impose sweeping economic/diplomatic sanctions against Iran? And, what will be the posture you will take in your talks with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko?

A. With respect to the alliance come here in a positive sense to commend the support which the alliance has already offered with respect to both Iran and Afghanistan—to confirm that support and to develop policies following on that support. I look to the future, not to the past, and I trust these commitments in that respect.

With respect to Mr. Gromyko, I would like to make it clear that understanding as I do from my own personal contacts in the past, the nature of diplomacy with the Soviet Union, I do not expect any significant, if any, substantive achievements. What is important, I think, is the continuation of communications and, indeed, since the Afghanistan event, the opening of communications which I think are vital, if we are to avoid developments and accidents which arise out of misperceptions of each other's objectives and intentions. Whether or not this dialogue will lead to anything substantive, we'll have to wait and see. I would expect that both sides will take the opportunity to relate a litany of developments since last December as perceived by each side triggering a reaction on the other side. When the litanies are complete, each of us will be looking for possible openings in the other side that could lead to a more positive relationship.

Q. The French Government made a decision today of going to the Olympics in Moscow. What do you think about this? Do you agree with it?

A. I am disappointed in that decision. I think it is very important that the West, that the alliance, that NATO indicate to the Soviet Union in the most positive terms that adventurism—which may be more serious than that—as represented by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is unacceptable to the West and an indication of a turn in Soviet foreign policy that must be deterred. I know that in France the word detente is a popular word. Detente will not

ork unless there is deterrence. The
o words go together and if that is,
deed, the vote, I am disappointed in

**NEWS CONFERENCE BY
SECRETARIES MUSKIE
AND BROWN, BRUSSELS,
MAY 14, 1980⁴**

Can you tell us to what degree you
are able to get the commitment of
the allies to live up to their April 22
commitment on the imposition of
actions against Iran?

Secretary Muskie. This was not a
meeting nor the forum to consider sanc-
tions. These involve the European
community which is not involved in
these meetings. This was a meeting of
the NATO Defense Ministers to con-
sider what actions they would take with
respect to Iran, specifically the meeting
agreed to a side statement on Iran
strongly condemning again the taking
of the hostages and demanding their
mediate and safe release. That side
statement was developed last night and
was agreed to without any difficulty.

Q. Can you give us some sense of
the general allied view is now on
Afghanistan and, in particular,
whether there is any kind of a con-
sensus that emerged that you should
discuss with Soviet Foreign Minister
Gromyko on Friday? Any Soviet or
Afghani ideas or British proposals for
neutrality?

Secretary Muskie. My sense of the
discussions this morning was that the
Secretaries—and they all spoke—shared our
concern about the implications and the
seriousness of the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, and, indeed, this meeting
of the Defense Ministers was focused
largely on that threat as it impacted
on the resources available to the de-
fense of NATO as well as the defense of
NATO interests outside NATO terri-
tory. So the subject and the purpose of
the meeting, to begin with, was related
to your question.

With respect to the meeting with
Gromyko, there was, I think,
satisfaction that the meeting was going
to be held for the purpose of opening
channels, hopefully, continuing communi-
cations. There was really no discussion
beyond that, so whether that fact in and
of itself was sufficient, I am not clear. I
could doubt that anyone looking at that
meeting would have high expectations
of any substantive achievements at this

first meeting. But, I think there is
widespread satisfaction that the meet-
ing is taking place and that they will be
briefed on the results of that meeting.

Q. In your private bilateral
meetings, did you form the view that
you and your allies had an identity of
view about the nature of the sanctions
to be applied to Iran? And secondly,
do you have an identity of view on the
next way of proceeding with the Mid-
dle East problem—the Palestinian
negotiations?

Secretary Muskie. I regret to re-
port that because of the length of the
meeting this morning, my bilateral
meetings haven't started. But, I would
hope to have an answer to that ques-
tion, at least to my satisfaction if not
yours, before I return.

Q. The Soviets in the past have
turned down NATO overtures to
negotiate on TNF modernization. In
your meeting with Mr. Gromyko this
week are you going to make a new ap-
proach on this subject?

Secretary Muskie. I would expect
that initially both sides in that meeting
will undertake to review the events of
the last 6 months from its own perspec-
tive, from the posture of being the in-
jured party, and we would have to go
through that exercise before we get any
feeling for why each is meeting the
other. Whether or not it would be pos-
sible to give any clues as to the Soviet
responsiveness to our demand that
Soviet troops be withdrawn from Af-
ghanistan, that will be our question.

And I would suspect that on the
Soviet side, since they were interested
in the meeting, at least as interested as
we were, I suppose they will be probing
to see any soft spots in that line be-
cause of their interest in the advan-
tages of detente. Obviously detente
wouldn't have been engaged in the first
instance if both sides did not see advan-
tage in it; and, it's a question of
whether or not that mutual advantage
is now sufficient to overcome the prob-
lem of Afghanistan, overcome the feel-
ing on our side that Afghanistan rep-
resents such an apparent change in our
relationship as to undermine our per-
ception of any advantage in the detente
process.

So it's going to be, I think, a fen-
cing exercise initially. If it goes beyond
that, it may be some source of satisfac-
tion, but I think it would be a mistake
to raise expectations and I certainly

would not want to raise expectations to
the point where there is any doubt in
their minds on our determination to
pursue the goal of withdrawal of Soviet
troops from Afghanistan and neu-
tralization of that country.

Q. On sharing the burden, should
the United States have to commit
forces to the Persian Gulf area, how,
for example, would you expect to
make up the lack of an aircraft car-
rier or the lack of forces which are
uniquely American?

Secretary Brown. We do not plan
to shift our peacetime ground and air
forces from Europe in order to fulfill
the need for greater U.S. military
presence in the Indian Ocean, South-
west Asia, Persian Gulf area. We do not
need to be able to move forces into that
Persian Gulf area and surrounding area
quickly, so it does not affect reinforce-
ment plans for Europe.

In the specific case of the carrier
battle groups that we now deploy in the
Arabian Sea, one happens to come from
the Mediterranean, one comes from the
Pacific. We have not determined what
our long-range level of naval forces will
be. It is quite possible that there will
be some draw-down on the average of
our naval forces in the Mediterranean.
To some degree, that can be replaced or
substituted for by land-based air, either
U.S. or European.

What's important I think—and I
think that our European partners un-
derstand this and will take action to
implement it—is that the Europeans
speed up, to the extent they can, and
certainly carry out the commitments
they have made to strengthen their own
military capability in Europe—land and
air and, to an extent, also at sea. I be-
lieve mention was made by Secretary
Luns [NATO Secretary General Joseph
Luns] of the proposal to study addi-
tional European task forces. Those
won't replace carriers in their power
projection role; they can substitute to
some degree in a sea control role.

Q. President Carter originally
called Afghanistan the most serious
crisis since World War II, and I think
the Europeans generally did not share
that assessment. And I wonder now if
what's going on here is merely an ac-
celeration of things they would have
done anyway, designed to paper over
the differences in evaluation while
they do not go along with us in such
things as economic sanctions and

Olympic boycotts against Afghanistan. In short, do you feel that they are now with us in terms of the seriousness of the situation?

Secretary Muskie. Yes, as long as you don't become preoccupied with adjectives and look at the substance of concern, I have no doubt from my exposure to this meeting this morning and the advance briefings I had on the attitudes of the members of the alliance that they recognize the invasion of Afghanistan as a significant and serious change in the direction of Soviet policy. The crossing of an international border with Soviet troops directly for the first time, they perceive as a threat to their own oil lifeline in the Persian Gulf. I could detect nothing, in speech after speech this morning, but the highest order of concern about that challenge and a recognition of the additional burden it imposes upon the United States and a willingness to consider options for sharing that burden. It was all positive. It was not complaining in any sense whatsoever, not even critical.

Secretary Brown. I would add to that, that I too was struck by the degree to which the allies share the view that the Soviet move into Afghanistan does cast a new light on Soviet willingness to use military force. Moreover, the Europeans also made it clear that they understand, as well as we, that access to Persian Gulf oil is of overwhelming importance to them. It's even more important to them than it is to us. A large part of the reason it's important to us is that it's important to them. They, I think also, recognize that they have to build up their military capability, at least as fast as they had planned. They do not want to abandon, nor does the United States want to abandon, the other part of our policy with respect to the Soviet Union; that is an attempt to reach agreements on arms control and in other areas where there is a community of interest and recognized willingness on the Soviet side to restrain their actions. There was no disagreement on that either among us.

Q. Were you satisfied with the responses, apart from the rhetorical response, the "action responses"?

Secretary Brown. At this stage, we are dealing with two phases. Phase I of the response, in terms of improving military capabilities, including a carrying out and, to the extent possible, an acceleration of some of the items that are already in the Long-Term Defense Plan which was carefully enough

thought out so that it turns out that the items in it are the ones that need to be emphasized—things like increasing war reserve stocks, reinforcement capabilities, electronic warfare, and so on. And they have agreed that they will implement the so-called phase I.

Phase II is in another category because it requires an examination of what else needs to be done in the middle and long term. In other words, you always start with rhetoric and then you take the steps. We have had the rhetoric and it has been good. We've had the beginning of the concrete steps and the signs are that the longer term steps will also be forthcoming, but it's too early to tell for sure.

Q. Don't you think that Afghanistan, Iran, and the Middle East are three related subjects and that the Camp David accords are now at an impasse? What will be the consequences of this failure?

Secretary Muskie. Of course, we are in a world in which every part is connected to every other part. Just like that old description of the human anatomy: The thigh bone is connected to the ankle bone—or not the ankle bone but the hip bone—I don't know my human anatomy as well as I should. But you can't really solve all of these problems at once, and they do impact upon each other, especially those problems which are clustered around the Middle East. To try to wrap them all up in a single solution would be impossible.

With respect to the Middle East, the question gives me the opportunity to make this point—especially here in Europe—and that is for the first time Egypt and Israel are coming to grips, have been forced to come to grips, with the six really hard central questions that stand in the way of achieving an autonomy agreement. I don't know of any other process that can get us to that point any faster. I read about all these suggestions for other avenues and other approaches, but if the settlement of the Palestinian question requires an agreement of autonomy for them, at least as a beginning step, then I don't know of any process that will get us to the hard questions any faster. And it's really in a relatively recent period that they have been forced to go through the hard, slogging negotiations and interchange that's necessary to consider those issues. Both sides, both Israel and Egypt, see this as the process which ought to be continued, notwithstanding the discouraging setbacks

that they encounter and experience. My impression of the process is that it's very much alive at the time when it needs to be alive. And I would hope that action is taken that would undercut or so dilute the concentrated effort that's being applied to it that that effort becomes less effective. And that's a reading of the situation that I've taken for my own use as Secretary of State when I take office.

Q. While asking for allied support on Iran, did you exclude here in the NATO meeting the resort to military action or initiatives from the United States in the near future?

Secretary Muskie. We did not go into that kind of discussion. In my opening statement to the meeting I simply indicated our concern with Iran and hoped that we would get support from the meeting. I have said elsewhere that my view of the way to approach the resolution of the Iranian hostage question is to explore all the nonmilitary avenues that are available and they are considerable, as well as use our ingenuity and the ingenuity of our friends and contacts with the Iranian

It seems to me that it's important to build on the pressures that are building on the Iranians themselves. They are confronted with a deteriorating economic situation which results in their being able to launch a successful revolution which cannot be ignored by any government in place there. They are faced with a fragmented and hostile confrontation of their internal political situation with which they must deal. They are confronted with pressures on their borders that could erupt into an unacceptable kind of challenge for them. The holding of hostages isn't helping them solve any of those problems.

So it seems to me that we ought to treat the hostage situation as static from the Iranian point of view and dynamic only from ours. There are pressures working on them, and I think that we need to apply our ingenuity and some further patience. Patience is not an old-fashioned way yet for pursuing those avenues to a resolution of the conflict. I don't dismiss options, because I don't think it's useful when we are in the kind of posture we are in with the Iranians and give them the luxury of excluding options; but I tried to indicate where I think the answer lies, and I intend to pursue that avenue.

Q. Would the Administration

appointed if the European Economic Community does not decide on July 17 to impose as tough sanctions they agreed upon as Europeans at the United Nations?

Secretary Muskie. The Administration would be disappointed if the Community does not put in place a sanctions policy that matches the commitment that was made. There are some technicalities involved with respect to old contracts and new contracts, services, and industrial products, but so on that I understand are under discussion, and I would certainly like involvement to be as constructive as possible. We need a sanctions policy that is meaningful, that will hurt the Russians, that will make them see that they have got to pay a price for their energy policy. That's our objective.

Q. Chancellor Schmidt has suggested, I think a number of times in public appearances, that he believes life in times as dangerous as those we live prior to World War I. I wonder whether you share that view?

Secretary Muskie. Before I took the job I would not have agreed, but I'm not so sure. [Laughter]

Secretary Brown. I would offer another analogy for your consideration, that is the analogy with the 1930s. These also were very dangerous times, they went from danger into war through lack of resolve and lack of willingness to face up to a threat.

Secretary Muskie. I'd agree with you. I think of Lord Gray's statement about World War I, and I think of other occasions more recently when I suspect miscalculations as to the consequences of an action has led to more wars than almost any other single factor. There is so much opportunity for miscalculation that I resolved when I took this office that I would be just as careful as I could be as to my perception of consequences, the price to be paid by the world and of the results that might be avoidable. I think that it's the kind of attitude that I developed as a legislator. One of the toughest jobs as a legislator was to try to project the consequences of language that you put down on paper in terms of its impact on human behavior, and it's just as important when you consider policymaking at the executive level, it seems to me. It's all too easy to react to the immediate idea, to the pressures of an immediate crisis without thinking it

through. Thinking it through is a quality that people in this modern world are rapidly losing.

FINAL COMMUNIQUE, MAY 11, 1980

1. The Defence Planning Committee of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization met in Ministerial session in Brussels on 13th and 14th May 1980. Foreign Ministers of countries participating in the integrated military structure of the Alliance took part in the session of 14th May. In appreciation of the important contribution made by the Federal Republic of Germany to Allied defence and cooperation, Ministers drew attention to the 25th anniversary of its accession to NATO on 6th May 1955.

2. Ministers carried out their discussions against a background of the major strategic issues facing the Alliance in the light of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the implications of that action for stability in South West Asia. Foreign Ministers looked forward to a full discussion of the political aspects of these developments at the forthcoming Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Ankara.

3. Ministers expressed their concern that for the first time in the post-war era the Soviet Union had used military force to impose its will on a non-aligned country of the Third World and in a way which affected the overall strategic situation. Ministers denounced this use of force which jeopardizes international peace and stability and strikes at the principles of the United Nations' Charter, and called for the total and immediate withdrawal of all Soviet forces from Afghanistan. The people of Afghanistan must be free to shape their future without outside interference.

4. Ministers expressed the hope that the Soviet Union would re-establish the conditions for more positive and productive East-West relations. They stressed their readiness to continue to search for progress in the field of arms control and disarmament on the basis of realistic balanced and verifiable measures. They reaffirmed their support for the SALT II Treaty as a major contribution to detente and to security and looked forward to its early ratification. Ministers recalled the wide range of initiatives particularly in the field of confidence building and arms control contained in the communique of 12th and 14th December 1979 and designed to improve mutual security and cooperation in Europe. They appealed to the members of the Warsaw Pact to make their contribution towards this goal and to respond positively to these Western proposals. At the same time, in the present circumstances, Ministers underlined the continuing need to maintain and strengthen the Alliance's defence posture in the interests of deterrence.

5. Ministers further agreed that the stability of regions outside NATO bound-

aries, particularly in the South West Asia area, and the secure supply of essential commodities from this area are of crucial importance. Therefore, the current situation has serious implications for the security of member countries. The altered strategic situation in South West Asia warrants full solidarity and the strengthening of Allied cohesion as a response to the new challenges. Ministers recognized that maintenance of the special relationships of Allies with the regional countries are in the interests of the West as well as of the countries of the region.

6. It is in the interests of members of the Alliance that countries which are in a position to do so should use their best efforts to help achieve peace and stability in South West Asia, taking into consideration the interests of the regional countries and the value of their political cooperation. The burden, particularly in so far as defence measures are concerned, falls largely upon the United States, which has already taken steps to enhance its effectiveness. Ministers noted that this commitment, which in certain circumstances might substantially increase, could place additional responsibilities on all Allies for maintaining levels and standards of forces necessary for defence and deterrence in the NATO area. Ministers agreed on the need for ensuring that at the same time as the United States carries out the efforts to strengthen defence capabilities for South West Asia described above, Allied capabilities to deter aggression and to defend NATO Europe are also maintained and strengthened.

7. In discussing the effect of recent events on the NATO area, Ministers agreed that there was no sign of any relaxation in the efforts being undertaken by the Warsaw Pact and, in particular, the Soviet Union to increase substantially the quality and readiness of their forces. Despite a slowdown in economic growth and increasing difficulties in the energy sector, Soviet defence expenditure still amounted to 11 to 13 percent of its GDP, and continued to receive top priority despite the needs of the civil economy.

8. Ministers pledged themselves to increase their efforts to improve the capabilities of the full spectrum of forces committed to the Alliance. They received the assurance of the United States Secretaries of State and Defence that the security of the NATO area remains central to United States policy, and they noted that the United States has no plans to withdraw any United States forces permanently stationed in Europe for use in South West Asia. Ministers of other countries agreed to do their utmost to meet additional burdens for NATO security which could result from the increased United States responsibilities in South West Asia.

9. As an expression of their willingness to respond to the needs of the present situation, Ministers agreed upon a number of

The Secretary

near-term defence measures to be undertaken by individual countries. Action would represent earlier or augmented implementation of urgently required defence measures designed to improve force capabilities in the NATO area. These measures are derived largely from existing national plans and based on comprehensive Alliance defence planning.

10. Ministers also called for a report, for the December 1980 Defence Planning Committee meeting, establishing again on a country-by-country basis further specific measures for prompt or accelerated implementation. In the main, these would also be selected from current defence programmes; they would take account of the evolution of the international situation in general and of the situation in South West Asia in particular, and of the possible effects of this situation on the reinforcements available for the defence of the NATO area. Areas suitable for consideration would include readiness, reserve mobilization, war reserve munitions and materiel, maritime defence, airlift enhancement, support by nations of reinforcing forces, military assistance to Portugal and Turkey and the NATO infrastructure programme.

11. Ministers agreed that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and its implications for international stability including in South West Asia made it more than ever necessary to maintain solidarity, cohesion and undiminished strength throughout the Alliance. These developments also brought more sharply into focus the strategic importance of the Mediterranean area and the pressing need for strengthening the economic and defence postures of member countries on the southern flank.

12. Ministers also discussed a number of issues related principally to the continuation and implementation of current NATO defence plans designed to maintain the credibility of the Alliance's deterrence and defence posture.

13. They discussed the status of the Long-Term Defence Programme and approved recommendations designed to ensure steady progress in a number of key areas. These areas included certain readiness and reserve mobilization measures, a number of maritime equipment projects, the provision of electronic warfare units and war reserve stocks.

14. Ministers once more reviewed the serious economic difficulties of Portugal and Turkey. Their effect on the defence capabilities of both nations, but in particular of Turkey, continues to give grave concern. Problems and possible remedies were identified and highlighted. Noting that satisfactory progress has not been made up to now, Ministers agreed that Allied military assistance needs to be intensified and accelerated to meet the critical requirements in a timely way. In this respect they welcomed the decision of Germany further to increase its already substantial aid programme for Turkey. To strengthen the Alliance's maritime posture, particularly in the field of anti-

submarine warfare, Ministers also supported the Portuguese Government in its plans to acquire three modern frigates and agreed to consider the best ways to provide assistance for them.

15. Ministers welcomed the evidence of closer collaboration amongst member nations in defence equipment matters as reported by the Conference of National Armaments Directors. They noted with satisfaction that the NATO armaments planning review is already providing a useful means of identifying opportunities for a cooperative development and production of equipment and for improving interoperability, and that the trial of the periodic armaments planning system is proceeding well. They welcomed the progress being made towards ammunition interchangeability and the establishment of several new project groups for future equipment, including air-delivered missiles and a frigate replacement.

16. Ministers noted with interest the greater emphasis being placed on transatlantic cooperation in the development of families of weapons. In this respect they welcomed the progress being made in the field of third generation anti-tank weapons and air-to-air missiles and the prospects for a family of maritime mines. They encouraged the search for greater use of new technology, including that now available in the commercial sphere for application to systems which will enhance the effectiveness of NATO defence including that of members of the Alliance which are less industrialized. To safeguard the military advantages accruing to NATO from the application of advanced technology, Ministers considered that close attention should be given to the implementation of trade control provisions, so that Soviet forces cannot benefit from the transfer of any technology which would enable them to modernize their forces more quickly and at lower cost.

17. Ministers received a statement by Dr. Hans Apel, German Defence Minister and Chairman of the Eurogroup. They reaffirmed their support for the continuing work of the Eurogroup aimed at strengthening the cohesion of the Alliance and at making the European contributions to collective security as effective as possible. They welcomed the determination of Eurogroup members to continue steady and sustained force modernization; and to ensure that resources available for defence are used to maximum advantage through cooperation and collaboration in practical fields of activity. In this connection they noted the continuing progress in the fields of logistics, training, communications, equipment cooperation, force structures and medical cooperation.

18. Ministers noted that the NATO military commanders had presented a case for an augmentation and acceleration of the current five-year 1980-1984 NATO infrastructure programme and agreed to consider a more substantive report at their December 1980 meeting.

19. Ministers endorsed a new procedure to extend NATO's defence planning progressively into a longer timeframe, with the goal of achieving closer coordination at the national and international level in setting Alliance objectives and in allocating resources for defence.

20. Ministers recalled their decision of 12th December 1979 to pursue the two parallel and complementary approaches of long-range theatre nuclear force (TNF) modernization and on arms control involving TNF, and took note of the progress reported on the proceedings of the special consultative group on arms control involving TNF. Ministers expressed support for the repeated efforts of the United States to engage the Soviet Union in serious negotiations aimed at achieving verifiable limitations on Soviet and United States long-range TNF consistent with the principle of equality between the sides. An offer was first made following the December TNF decision and was repeated by the United States Secretary of State on 4th April 1980. Ministers regretted that the Soviet Union has in response reiterated its rejection of the offer to conduct serious negotiations and is instead advancing conditions which would perpetuate inequality. The Soviet Union has until now posed unacceptable pre-conditions for negotiations and is continuing the process of deploying SS-20 missiles at a rapid pace. Ministers therefore called on the Soviet Union to respond positively and to accept without delay the United States' offer to negotiate.

21. Ministers expressed their concern about the Soviet superiority in long-range TNF systems. They recognized that the continuing deployment of new Soviet long-range TNF systems, particularly of the SS-20 missile, further increased the already existing disparity in long-range TNF in favour of the Soviet Union. They noted that the Alliance's long-range TNF modernization programme, in which an initial operational capability for modern long-range TNF in Europe is anticipated towards the end of 1983, is deliberately restrained one compared with the qualitative and quantitative growth in Soviet nuclear capabilities facing the Alliance which has already taken place and is continuing. The Soviet Union is already in the process of deploying for its SS-20s alone more warheads than will be involved in the entire Alliance modernization programme. Ministers reiterated that the scale of NATO's long-range TNF requirements will be examined in the light of concrete results achieved through negotiations.

22. Ministers recalled that it was decided at the December 1979 meeting that 1,000 United States nuclear warheads should be withdrawn from Europe as an integral part of the decision to modernize without increasing NATO's reliance on nuclear weapons, and to pursue arms control involving TNF. They noted that this withdrawal has begun, as has implementation of other parts of the December decision.

23. Ministers took note of the present state of negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions. They urged Eastern participants to make a positive response to the recent Western proposals for an interim phase 1 agreement, and for a package of associated measures which forms an integral part of the interim agreement proposal.

24. Ministers concluded their meeting endorsing NATO force goals for the period 1981-1986 established on their behalf by the Defence Planning Committee in permanent session. There was full recognition that in view of the current imbalance between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces, implementation of these force goals would present a major factor in the maintenance of adequate Alliance defence.

25. Accordingly Ministers pledged themselves to preserve and strengthen the military capabilities of the Alliance. They affirmed the importance of member countries achieving and sustaining the aim, endorsed by Heads of State and Government, of increases in annual defence expenditures of real terms in the region of 3 percent. They expressed their confidence that those countries who have not yet been able to meet this goal will make every effort to do

**DECLARATION,
MAY 14, 1980**

Ministers and representatives of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, United Kingdom and the United States meeting in Brussels on May 14 expressed their continued deep concern over the illegal detention of U.S. diplomatic personnel and captivity in Iran in flagrant violation of international law. They also noted that this is further exacerbating instability in the South West Asia region.

The Ministers and representatives therefore called upon the Iranian authorities to release immediately and unharmed the American hostages.

**STATEMENT FOLLOWING
MEETING WITH EEC
PRESIDENT JENKINS,
BRUSSELS, MAY 14, 1980⁵**

had a very useful visit. We touched a lot of bases and I've got a lot of impressions. To try to summarize them all and to write a lead paragraph in your evening paper or your morning papers, it is that, in short, I find our friends in the NATO alliance very supportive, very understanding, and very willing to discuss the complexities and many of the problems with which we are confronted, including the Olympic boycott.

I'd like to take this opportunity to emphasize my own view that the Olympic boycott is a significant, an important, and an indispensable message to the Soviet Union if we are to divert the Soviet Union from its present course.

Now I would hope, secondly, that that message will contribute to a forthcoming dialogue in Vienna with Mr. Gromyko which would enable us to proceed in some fashion, as yet undetermined, to a healthier relationship between the Soviet Union and the West and the United States.

Thirdly, I think an important contribution to this result is the Community's implementation of its commitment to sanctions, and my impression is that every effort will be made to follow through on that commitment. Speaking generally and summarily I have a feeling that we have friends here in Europe—friends who are willing and determined to be supportive—and the problem that lies ahead of us is the question of agreeing on the definition of the problem. The definition of the approach to those problems will have the effect first, of unifying the West and NATO alliance; secondly, of making an impression upon policies and objectives of the Soviet Union. So, on the whole, as a rookie Secretary of State I've had a day which has been educational, useful, and, on the whole I think, very solid and productive.

Q. What are the definitional differences that you see may be problems?

A. The question of definition covers a lot of problems. The question of sanctions, the question of the Olympic boycott, the question of defense posture and policies which include the contribution of our NATO allies toward its new dimension, a challenge to the United States and to Europe and to NATO—so there are a lot of definitions which in congressional legislation usually the last pages of a 100-page bill.

Q. Are you satisfied with the level of sanctions as you see them coming up, and do you believe that they are going to come into operation on May 17?

A. On the level of sanctions, as a definition of sanctions, I think it is still very fluid and in the definitional stage. I've tried to communicate with Mr. Jenkins my view of what is required in terms of the commitment that was made. He understood that. We did not

get into any disagreement about it, but I think we developed an understanding of some of the practical, pragmatic problems that are involved. At this point I would say that we are in the developmental state with respect to that issue.

Q. Do you think that it will be clarified by Sunday, May 17, in Naples? Will there be a common view at that point? Is there a danger that the Europeans will pursue a different policy than the one you would like to see?

A. I think that your question [inaudible] it is impossible to say that when working those problems out is an objective, and not having yet concluded that it is not possible of achievement I would not like to suggest danger.

Q. Do you feel that you have been able to dissuade the Europeans in any way from undertaking a Middle Eastern initiative at this time?

A. As to that I think we have begun the dialogue at a new level—a different level—based upon my appreciation of the value of the Camp David process and the options to it that I would hope they would find use for. We have just begun that dialogue, and I think it will be pretty immature to draw conclusions about the reaction of our European friends or the impact that might have on the process. I would like to say at this point that with respect to the United States and Israel and Egypt that we do not regard May 26 as an obstacle—simply as a target. This is not as important as the quality of the negotiations that may be still under way on the morning of May 27 and the evening of May 26.

Q. Do you agree with the widely held view here that sanctions cannot work?

A. With respect to what?

Q. Iran.

A. If that is a widely held view—and I've heard it expressed as a view but not as a widely held view—let me say this; my own view is that there are pressures building in Iran, on its border, within the country that obviously must be having an effect which may or may not be acknowledged on their own perception of the value of the hostage policy to their own future. I think we ought to be willing to take the time to

try to understand what that impression may be.

Secondly, with respect to our own attitude, pain is a highly motivating force in our private lives, the lives of the nations, and the lives of countries, and it seems to me that sanctions are a very specific way of communicating to Iran the shape of the economic future with which they must deal. And I don't know how you can find a way to more directly influence their conception of that fact than the sanction rules. I would hope that our European friends would understand that and, on the other hand, if sanctions were rejected—I have not evidence they will be—the effect that would have upon Iranian intransigence in dealing with the central problem with which each of our governments is concerned, including in our future relationships, the role of Iran toward the Western world and the rest of the world. These are central questions.

The hostage question is peripheral; central to the families of the hostages, central of our own concerns, but there are other issues that we ought to move to deal with as rapidly as possible. And I would hope that we would find a way as directly, indirectly through all the diplomatic channels that are available to us, through all the ingenious ways of communications that we can devise. Both Iran and the United States will be better off once the hostage situation is behind us.

Q. How much time do you think the President has?

A. I think of the problem not in terms of time the President has but in terms of the time that we have to resolve the problem before events overwhelm us and move toward confrontation that would be nonproductive, unproductive for both Iran and the United States.

Q. In the light of recent diplomatic moves and contacts, have you any indications at all from the Russian side of any intention to withdraw from Afghanistan?

A. I would doubt that. If they had any such communication to make, they would make it before my meeting with Mr. Gromyko. Even then, I am not sure they would choose that time to [inaudible].

Q. Are you concerned that after the French Olympic vote that other European countries would now follow

suit and the whole boycott movement is being [inaudible]?

A. I'm happy to have this question, and it is an opportunity to express my deep concern.

The failure of the Olympic boycott movement could undermine all of the slow, agonizing effort we've been making to make clear to the Russians that the course upon which they embarked when they invaded Afghanistan is a nonproductive course. I find it incomprehensible that the citizens of democratic societies—whether Olympic athletes or otherwise—could fail to understand this fact. For us to march into the stadium in Moscow, representatives of free nations, with our young people embracing Moscow under the guidelines which the Soviets themselves have described in their Olympic document as a confirmation of the rightness of their foreign policy, I find it incomprehensible that free people—whether Europeans or Americans, whether athletes or nonathletes—could contemplate allowing the Soviet Union to convert that act of participation in the Olympics as a confirmation of their system, their policy, and their aggression in Afghanistan. I am speaking not so much as a Secretary of State, but as a citizen of the United States whose father was born in Russian-occupied Poland in the last century.

ARRIVAL STATEMENT, VIENNA, MAY 15, 1980⁶

Mr. Chancellor, may I, first of all, express my personal joy at being here in Vienna and in Austria. I came within 50 miles of Austria once years ago and was called back to the United States and have been looking forward to it ever since. And, I'd like first of all, because this is principally a festive and ceremonial occasion in the context of which we now have arranged for some serious business, to bring President Carter's warm greetings on this 25th anniversary celebration, as well as my own.

He has the closest and warmest feelings for Austria and the greatest respect for your own leadership and the quality of your leadership not only in your country but with respect to issues that cut across national lines which concern us all. You have spoken out on that from a position of neutrality, but neutrality does not mean to you an absence of responsibility to speak out on issues

as you see them. And for that I pay you my personal compliments as well as those of President Carter.

I think it is appropriate to say of an occasion which is the celebration of Austria's independence 25 years ago that the issues involving independence of peoples are still with us and still require, I think, that we pay close attention to the threats to independence of peoples, and we are faced with difficult problems now in resolving conflicting national interests that threaten the interests of independent peoples. It is appropriate, I think, that on this occasion of celebration of your independence that we should be engaging in the next day or two in discussions with other countries with respect to the problems created by tensions today similar to those circumstances in which Austria was born as a free and independent state. May I congratulate you and express my great pleasure to be here, indeed.

Q. Will you comment on the latest suggestions on Afghanistan about the willingness to discuss the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan?

A. With respect to the latest Afghan proposal of which I have probably only a sketchy outline, I think it's significant more for its timing and its obvious purpose to affect the Islamabad conference than as a serious response to our demand for the withdrawal of Soviet troops. The withdrawal issue touched upon in the proposal as I have seen it only in the very most ambiguous terms, and it seems to be conditioned upon a recognition of the Babrak regime—a legitimization of the invasion by the Soviet Union. So I regard it as cosmetic and not a meaningful proposal at this point. Nevertheless, the fact that Russia feels the pressure of international condemnation to the point that for the first time reference to withdrawal is included in the proposal is an interesting development.

Q. What effect do you think the less than enthusiastic reaction to the new proposal on Afghanistan will have in your negotiations tomorrow with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko?

A. I suspect it will be matched by less than enthusiastic reception on his part of what I have to say to him.

Q. But how do you think it will affect your talks, in any way, if at all?

A. I would expect these talks to begin, as I said yesterday, with sort of diplomatic minuet as we each recite our reactions to the other's actions over the past 6 to 8 months. It will be a probing on each side for what possibilities there may be to meet the minimal requirements of the other side. I do not expect a substantive achievement tomorrow.

I think it will be a mistake to raise expectations on that possibility, but I think it is useful that the talks are being held and that a dialogue has begun after an absence of 6 to 8 months. Beyond that, given the Soviet reaction to our response to the Afghan situation over 8 months, I am not optimistic that the talks will reflect any marked or significant change in the Soviet defense of its intervention in Afghanistan, its justification, or its criticism of the actions taken by the United States. I think it would be unrealistic to expect that kind of a change in Soviet attitudes to take place tomorrow, and that's certainly no mystery given the nature of negotiations with the Soviet Union over the last quarter of a century or more.

So the probing may or may not lead to substantive discussions upon which further talks can be held. I make no predictions of that but, obviously, both sides are meeting in some expectation that the dialogue will continue and that it might eventually reach a constructive result.

STATEMENT MADE AT THE AUSTRIA STATE TREATY CEREMONY, VIENNA, MAY 16, 1980⁷

I am honored and delighted to carry the warm wishes of the American people to the people of Austria on this proud day. I bring with me as well, on this historic anniversary, a message of admiration and friendship from President Carter.

I am pleased that my first journey abroad as a neophyte U.S. Secretary of State should bring me to Europe and to this celebration. For today is an important milestone for Austria and its people. And for all of us, this occasion expresses the promise of peace. We celebrate today a great success. Twenty-five years ago, the four powers ended the agreement which ended the occupation of Austria. The national independence and integrity of this great nation were restored. And through the



(UPI photo)

Secretary Muskie and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko

strength, the determination, and the imagination of Austria's leaders and people since that time, that covenant has been translated into a vibrant reality.

Austria today is a successful democracy. It is a prosperous and dynamic society—beyond the expectations 25 years ago of all but the most visionary. And over this period, Austria's role as a constructive force in the world has grown. It is truly a crossroads—common ground for all nations.

You have pursued the policy of active neutrality—the policy that underlies this treaty and that is embodied in your constitution—not narrowly and timidly but with vision and courage. The United States deeply respects Austria's perpetual neutrality, and we shall continue to support its independence.

The Austrian State Treaty was signed against the background of a troubled world. Tensions between nations were high, especially between the Western and Eastern victors in World War II. In a similar sense, today's celebration stands in contrast to the atmosphere that prevails over much of the world. A number of crises threaten international stability. Our economies—industrial and developing—face serious problems. We confront the specter of international terrorism—acts of inhumanity in disregard of the most basic principles of a civilized world. We see a world in considerable ferment—as nations and people assert themselves with growing fervor. All of these crises challenge the imagination of the inter-

national community as it has seldom been challenged before. And we must soberly face another reality. The principles of neutrality, of independence, and territorial integrity, so respected in the case of Austria, are today being violated.

Today, we are faced again with a vital lesson from the past: that an act of aggression anywhere threatens security everywhere. Today, no less than in the past, my country and others will oppose such actions—through the firmness and clarity of our response, through a strong defense and strong alliances. Our purpose is to preserve the balance and to reinforce the restraint on which peace rests for us and for others.

We shall continue to convey the costs of aggression so long as it continues for we are committed to building peace by creating an international environment in which national independence is respected. And we shall continue to work in other ways to build a more stable peace.

We seek to preserve the framework of East-West relations. We will continue to seek balanced control and reduction of armaments on the basis of equality. We remain committed to ratification of the SALT II Treaty, and we will abide by its terms so long as that practice is mutual. In accordance with the NATO decision of last December, we continue to favor an early negotiation to limit long-range nuclear weapons in the European theater, and we will continue to pursue the negotiations here in Vienna for a mutual and

Coup d'Etat in Liberia

by William C. Harrop

*Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on April 29, 1980. Mr. Harrop is Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs.*¹

I want to thank the committee for this opportunity to share with you information on the recent coup d'etat in Liberia and the executions which have followed it. As requested by the chairman, I will provide a chronology of events following the coup and leading up to the executions as these events relate to our asylum and refuge policy.

U.S.-Liberian Ties

The United States has always enjoyed a particularly close and special relationship with Liberia, a nation that was established in the middle of the 19th century largely by freed slaves from America. Historically, Liberia has been one of the most stable nations in Africa and, having never been a colony, escaped the trauma that accompanied and came after independence in much of the continent.

A ruling oligarchy, often referred to as the "Americo-Liberians" or "settler class"—constituting only 3% of Liberia's 1.8 million people—has dominated the political and economic life of the country since independence in 1847. An irony of the recent coup is that President [William R.] Tolbert had begun to make some progress in increasing the participation of indigenous people in the mainstream of Liberian political and economic life. Thus, the rising expectations of the indigenous people, in addition to their accumulated frustration at the lopsided distribution of benefits, contributed to Tolbert's downfall.

Roots of the Coup

The coup of April 12 was foreshadowed by the rice riots of April 1979 and the growing support for political groups opposed to the ruling True Whig Party. The roots of the coup lay in the indigenous people's resentment of the Americo-Liberians and the resentment of the "have-nots" for the "haves." This resentment was aggravated by the os-

tentatious wealth of the Tolbert family and the corruption of the privileged class in an era of pressing economic difficulties for Liberia as well as most other developing countries.

We have no evidence of external involvement in the coup. It appears there have been a spur-of-the-moment action although a vague plan may have been the back of Sergeant [Samuel K.] Dorn for some time.

The executions of the past week have been particularly unsettling since we had been led to hope that the military tribunal would not result in capital sentences. None of the officials who were executed had requested asylum extended from the United States. In the specific case of Foreign Minister [C. Cecil] Dennis, he, his brother, and their families did take shelter at the home of one of the Embassy officers immediately after the coup, but he voluntarily surrendered later the same day to representatives of the new government. Neither those former Liberian officials, who willingly surrendered to the new government, nor our Embassy could predict the harsh violence which was to follow.

Chronology of Events

On April 12, about 2 a.m., gunfire broke out in Monrovia around President Tolbert's Executive Mansion and quickly spread so that it became extremely dangerous to go anywhere that morning. Chargé [Julius W.] Walker and the other officials who were able to get to the Embassy immediately advised all Americans to stay at home and "keep their heads low."

It was during these early morning hours that Embassy personnel who had remained at home received calls or visits from four government officials. In the confusion of the gunfire in the streets and sporadic telephone service the Embassy was unclear about what the four officials had sought.

As it turned out, in reconstructing the events of that night with the Americans who were contacted by these officials, the government officials did not request asylum either immediately or later on. The officials were

balanced reduction of forces in Europe. We look forward to the forthcoming meeting in Madrid of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe as an opportunity for a balanced discussion of developments since the conference in Belgrade. And the path to broader cooperation, to a lessening of tensions in Europe and elsewhere, is open when the policies of others allow. We are committed to a realistic search for common ground, but we must all recognize that detente can thrive only in an atmosphere of restraint, on a foundation of fidelity to the basic tenets of international law.

We remain hopeful that progress can be made, and this occasion strengthens our hope for the treaty we commemorate today is an enduring reminder. It is a reminder that even in the most difficult time, it is possible—indeed, all the more important—to work for a stable and peaceful world. So this celebration is not only a proud look backward, it is a reason for hope.

I am grateful for the opportunity to share this day with you and to confirm, once again, the friendship, respect, and support of the American people.

STATEMENT MADE FOLLOWING MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO, VIENNA, MAY 16, 1980²

Mr. Gromyko and I had an obviously long and serious discussion about a number of practical problems, and the discussion fully justified my belief that it was necessary to hold this talk. I will not discuss any of the details. I think my duty is to report to the President and I shall do so. And I would hope that the meeting might lead to further discussions and that at some point along the way they may lead to a resolution of the differences that exist.

¹ Not printed here are the President's and Secretary's remarks before the latter's departure on May 13 (Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of May 19) and the Secretary's departure remarks in Brussels on May 15 (press release 120 of May 21).

² Press release 117 of May 14.

³ Press release 118 of May 13.

⁴ Made at the conclusion of the NATO ministerial meeting (press release 119 of May 16).

⁵ Press release 123 of May 19.

⁶ Press release 121 of May 19.

⁷ Press release 126 of May 20.

⁸ Press release 125 of May 19. ■

reign Affairs Minister Dennis; Justice Minister Joseph Chesson; Deputy Minister of National Security Will Clark; and Head of the National Security Agency Spencer Edriss. Chesson and Clark first called for information on the situation; Chesson apparently was not heard from again, but Clark later said by word that he wanted the Embassy to intercede with the new government in his behalf.

The Embassy response had been to hold meetings with Chairman Doe and the reign Minister [Gabriel Baccus] Matthews and to urge due process of law and respect for individuals' rights. The Embassy has emphasized these points on only many times since the coup but has not intervened on behalf of any particular individual.

Spencer, Edriss, and Dennis were taken in refuge in the homes of Embassy personnel. Edriss told the Embassy officer that he would not be able to return to the United States. He said this as he was leaving to turn himself in and added that he would be in touch again when he was released.

Dennis and his brother, James, were contacted by an Embassy officer in the early morning hours of the coup. He told them what was going on. Cecil was not at home, but James later located him. Both Dennis families were taken in refuge in the Embassy officer's residence. They had free access to the radio and were fed during this time. Around noon Dennis spoke of giving himself up. He then called the Embassy and spoke with the Chargé who expressed concern for both Dennis families.

Cecil Dennis did not at any point in these conversations ask for asylum or extended refuge. From the officer's residence he telephoned several other embassies to ask for a car to take him to the Barclay Training Camp. He did not ask for American assistance from the American Embassy official or anyone in the Embassy. Gunfire would have prevented a car from driving through town—where the Embassy is located—at that time, and Dennis was presumably aware of this fact. Later that afternoon, Cecil's young cousin worked at the Executive Mansion to get to the residence. After being requested by Cecil to drive him to the stockade, the young cousin returned with two soldiers on foot. They went

Liberia—A Profile

People

Population: 1,733,000 (Jan. 1978).

Annual Growth Rate: 3.3%.

Ethnic Groups: 5% descendants of immigrant Negroes, 95% indigenous tribes, the largest of which are Kpelle, Bassa, Gio, Kru, Grebo, and Mano.

Religions: Tribal religions, 75%, Muslim 15%, Christian 10%.

Languages: English (official); over 20 local languages and dialects of the Niger-Congo language group.

Literacy: 24%

Life Expectancy: 46 yrs.

Geography

Area: 111,370 sq.km. (43,000 sq. mi.).

Capital: Monrovia (pop. 210,000).

Government

Type: Military Council.

Date of Independence: 1847.

Constitution: July 26, 1874 (suspended in April 1980).

Branches: People's Redemption Council combines executive, legislative, and judicial functions. Chairman is head of state; cabinet of heads of ministries conducts administration.

Political Parties: None.

Suffrage: Elections suspended under military rule.

Administrative Subdivisions: 9 Counties.

Central Government Budget: \$315 million (1979-80 FY).

Economy

GDP: \$744 million (1978).

Annual Growth Rate: 5.3%.

away in the young cousin's car to the stockade. The cousin returned to the Embassy residence later to say that Cecil had had no problems enroute and had been received in an orderly fashion at the stockade. Cecil's wife and the James Dennis family spent that night at the officer's residence.

The security situation in Liberia,



Per Capita Income: \$433.

Avg. Rate of Inflation 1970-76: 10.3% per year.

Natural Resources: Iron ore, rubber, timber, diamonds.

Agriculture: *Products*—rubber, rice, oil palm, cassava, coffee, cocoa.

Industry: *Types*—iron and diamond mining, rubber processing, food processing, lumber milling.

Trade (1978); Exports—\$486.4 million. *Imports*—\$480.9 million.

Official Exchange Rate: Liberia uses U.S. dollars.

Economic Aid Received: *Total*—\$44.4 million from international agencies (FY 78), \$23.3 million from other bilateral donors (CY 77). *U.S. aid*—\$6.4 million (1978).

For more detailed information on Liberia, see the Liberia Background Notes (April 1979).

where some 4,000 American citizens are located, is now improved, but the atmosphere remains very tense.

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

U.S. Policy Toward South Africa

by Richard M. Moose

Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on April 30, 1980. Mr. Moose is Assistant Secretary for African Affairs.¹

I am pleased to appear before this subcommittee today to discuss U.S. policy toward South Africa. It is without any question the single most difficult issue we face in the African Bureau—so I welcome your concern and interest, as manifested by the hearings, and shall look forward to your contribution to the policy process as we move into what could be a decisive decade.

It is a fact of history and geography that how the South African Government conducts itself in coming months and years will, to an unknown but important degree, affect the destiny of the whole southern tier of the continent. The South African Government has a choice: to follow the difficult and courageous course of seeking cooperation with the forces for change, both internally and within the region, or to face the prospect of conflict, disintegration, and violence. How South Africa moves along its chosen path will bear directly on our interests. They are:

- Preserving our national consensus on foreign policy goals relating to human rights and human dignity;
- Assuring long-term access to strategic minerals in South Africa and surrounding countries both for our own and our allies' economies and defense; and
- Foreclosing opportunities for expanded Soviet influence that come with protracted violent conflict.

We simply cannot pursue these interests selectively. Without political change, our humanitarian objectives cannot be fulfilled, the risk of violent conflicts grows, and the possibilities for Soviet meddling increase.

As those who have visited it know, South Africa is a magnificent country, endowed with gifted people of all races and unmatched mineral wealth. South Africa's technologically advanced economy is unusually self-sufficient. It has modern transportation, industrial, and communications sectors, and strong, well trained armed forces ready for any conventional threat. In terms of wealth and power it dwarfs other African countries.

One group controls this country. It is skilled, generally cohesive, and white. Among whites, the Afrikaners hold a virtual monopoly of political power. They staff a bureaucracy that rules the 85% of the people who are not white. In this land of wealth and promise, the distribution of status, opportunity, and benefits reflects this concentration of political power.

The African, colored, and Asian South Africans, who live in concentrations of urban deprivation and expanses of rural poverty, are increasingly an integral—but not integrated—part of the society and economy. They depend on modern industry and agriculture for jobs. The mines and factories need their labor. Their contributions to South Africa are essential, but still they are denied equal access to housing, education, and social services; they are subject to mass deportations; they are involuntarily stripped of their citizenship; and, the constitution, backed by stern laws, gives them inferior political status. Nevertheless, their numbers alone insure that their desire for change will be equally critical in determining South Africa's future.

Future of Apartheid

We have no doubt that eventually all South Africans must and will share fully in their country—socially, economically, culturally, politically. Whatever we believe, however, is probably less important than the doubts which white South Africans express about apartheid's future. Although they retain confidence in their culture and values, the politically knowledgeable element of the white population is experiencing a rising level of anxiety about the future. With increasing frequency and often with more clarity than outside observers, Afrikaners are analyzing their problems and prescribing solutions. For example, *Die Beeld*, a leading Afrikaans newspaper, said it this way:

For the umpteenth time, we must say: South Africa's whites must face the unpleasant fact that ours is a besieged land and that it will become even more so unless we work out a political dispensation with Blacks who are ready to talk but who are going to make great demands in any negotiations. We will have to relinquish policy directions which are unacceptable to Blacks. Laws on racial relations, the question of "Bantu" education, the consequences of the homelands, the question of

passes and influx and citizenship will all have to be scrutinized closely.

Whites will have to realize those interlocutors around the table cannot be only homeland leaders. Place will have to be made for the Motlanas and the Thozamile Bothas of the Labor fame from Port Elizabeth. They are just agitators and instigators per se. They are fighting for their rights just as heroic Afrikaners once fought and struggled for our rights against foreign and unsympathetic governments and administrations. Bannings and detentions cannot in the long run further our great political solution; they can only retard it.

The mood among blacks encompasses both hope and frustration. Depending on personal circumstances forced upon them by apartheid, an urban laborer, a student, a rural trader, an unemployed farmworker, or a homeland leader might differ on tactics, but they also share common views. They dismiss present changes as inadequate; they hope for a moderate, open society not stratified by racial lines; they want equality before the law and full participation in all aspects of one South Africa. Despite, or perhaps because of, repression, blacks daily become more politicized.

The divergent thinking of black and white South Africans about their situations is mirrored in their differing reactions to external events. For instance, South Africans see different lessons in the events in Zimbabwe. Some whites conclude from Robert Mugabe's [Prime Minister of Zimbabwe] election that a change is dangerous and uncontrollable and that the status quo must be maintained at all costs. Others, however, have concluded that constructive, negotiated change is possible—and the sooner it begins the more moderate and cooperative it is likely to be. Blacks claim that the lesson to be learned is that political change must be a fundamental part of other reforms.

By several criteria, white South Africans should be at the height of their confidence.

- Gold price rises have brought a unparalleled bonanza, transforming an economy dependent on external finance into an exporter of capital.
- Low reliance on petroleum for energy and technological leadership in conversion of coal to oil enabled South Africa to weather the loss of petroleum supplies from its major source, Iran.
- South Africa has beaten the U.S. arms embargo by building the world's 10th largest arms industry, and other governments rightly or wrongly believe

at South Africa has nuclear weapons.

- Events in Iran and Afghanistan are seen as justification by white South Africans for their view that the West needs to cooperate with South Africa on its own terms. Finally, the apparent trend toward conservatism in the West also reinforces their world view.

Thus, this is a moment when the South African Government should have the confidence and strength to embark fully on the process of reform. Other countries, including the United States, are ready to recognize such an effort, as are many South Africans.

Neither South Africans nor Americans find it easy to agree on how the United States does, and should, relate to South Africa. In approaching this relationship, several questions pose a dilemma for U.S. policy. For example:

- How can we combine a clear stand in principle with practical approaches to encourage change?
- How can we maintain credibility with all parties in a segregated society?
- And how can we communicate approval of individual steps while still calling for other steps as yet untaken?

In attempting to judge the significance of current developments in South Africa, we realize that there are no easy tests to apply, no individual reforms that one will guarantee a broad process of change. But the following ideas are central in our thinking.

- Even now, a process of peaceful change is still possible because of the extra margin provided by South Africa's man and economic resources.
- Change is a process, not a solution. Continuing refusal to seek peaceful change only makes more likely an eventual tragedy.
- Although we are ready to recognize substantive individual changes as they occur, the process itself must also be comprehensive, eventually including an end to racial discrimination, equal social services for all South Africans, freedom for blacks to participate in all sectors of the economy, and essential steps toward reforms to bring all South Africans into full participation in the political life of the nation.
- White South Africans must recognize that the process of change must go beyond reforming apartheid. Simply "reforming" the status quo will not receive the probation of the United States nor will it be accepted by the world community

or the overwhelming majority of South Africans.

Just as we may find it hard to understand South Africa, so South Africans often find it easy to misunderstand our own position. Even those who would promote the most positive view of the actions of the South African Government must recognize that it is contrary to the nature of this society to have any sympathy for such actions as:

- Depriving leading church leaders, like Bishop Tutu, of their passports;
- Forcibly deporting whole, living communities, such as the Batlokwa, to strange, uninhabited areas of the country;
- Banning effective spokesmen, such as David Russell, for opposite points of view;
- Suppressing legitimate constructive black leaders, such as Botha of Port Elizabeth, who are attempting to reform the system and improve the lot of the black people;
- Perpetuating inferior education and housing for blacks by being stingy with government expenditures at a time when the coffers are full; and
- Using the judicial process to prevent legitimate political activity.

In conclusion, I want to make several points about U.S. policy toward South Africa.

First, no U.S. administration can permit itself to follow the policy of neglect that characterized our actions 10 years ago. Such a retreat will be prevented by a growing awareness in this country of what apartheid represents. And I can assure you that this Administration will not retreat from the commitment that Vice President Mondale made 3 years ago in Vienna to the pursuit of change in southern Africa.

Second, the main thrust of our policy must continue to encourage peaceful—but rapid—change. One of the main assets here is the openness of our society and the relevance of our values and experience. We do have a unique opportunity—indeed, obligation—to speak to all South Africans and to help them see the possibilities for a different future. U.S. International Communication Agency programs, by providing for a dialogue and an exchange of persons between our countries, can make a substantial contribution to the ways South Africans view themselves. In his work with U.S. corpo-

rations, the Reverend Leon Sullivan has shown a way in which American corporations can have an impact on South African society. Other opportunities may lie in encouraging expanded educational exchange programs and relating in new ways to South Africa's rural population.

Third, and this is sometimes difficult for Americans to accept, our ability to influence events is limited. The future of South Africa will be determined by its own people, as it should be. We cannot afford to let our desire to help obscure other facts—that the South African economy is unusually self-sufficient; that dependencies between Western economies and South Africa's are mutual; and that no amount of political action from overseas can overshadow the solution to be worked out by South Africa's own people. Over the next few years the greatest external influence on political change in South Africa may well be the developments in Zimbabwe and in Namibia, and it is essential that we continue to make our own full contribution to the independent nation of Zimbabwe and to the negotiations for elections and independence in Namibia. It is deeply in our interest to demonstrate that in South Africa, as in Zimbabwe, the West will support peaceful change which protects the rights of all individuals.

Finally, despite the difficulties that lie ahead, it is crucial that we and other Western countries work together to play our part in encouraging South Africa to avoid the tragedy of self-destruction. And it is crucial that we demonstrate to the South African black majority that they have Western support for their aspirations for equal rights and full political participation in the life of their country. Somewhere between self-righteous or indifferent abstention and hubristic intervention, the United States has a role that it can, must, and shall play.

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Kampuchean Relief

by Warren Christopher

Statement at the conference on Kampuchean relief in Geneva, Switzerland, May 26, 1980. Mr. Christopher is Deputy Secretary of State.

We are grateful to the nations of ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) and the members of ECOSOC (U.N. Economic and Social Council) for initiating the call for this meeting and to the Secretary General for convening it. For the urgent needs of the Kampuchean people continue to require our attention, our commitment, and our resources.

We convened last fall, summoned by a human tragedy of quickly mounting proportions. We saw widening starvation. We saw a rising flood of Kampucheans moving across the country in desperate search of food and safety. We saw survivors too weak even to cry. We saw the future of an entire people imperiled.

The international community responded, through governments and private citizens, individually and through the joint effort of U.N. agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and private voluntary organizations. The work of these groups, and particularly the relief workers on the ground, has been truly heroic. This international relief effort has given sustenance—indeed life itself—to hundreds of thousands of Kampucheans.

This massive program would have been vastly more difficult had the Government of Thailand not provided refuge to the masses of Kampucheans fleeing war and famine. For this compassionate and farsighted policy, the Government and people of Thailand have the profound respect and strong support of my government and, I am certain, of the world community.

A potential human tragedy summons us again. The long, dark night has not ended for the people of Kampuchea.

- The recent harvest, small as it was, is virtually exhausted.
- Death from starvation is mounting again; disease is rampant.
- Growing numbers of Khmer are fleeing to the border.
- The rice planting season for the year-end harvest has begun with limited seed and, therefore, with limited promise.
- The monsoons will soon arrive, bringing with them severe new problems.

For the Kampuchean people, the margin of survival is once again shrink-

ing. If renewed famine is to be avoided, it is clear that a continued heavy flow of supplies—both food and seed—is essential, now and throughout 1980.

We must rededicate ourselves here to new levels of humanitarian support and assistance. And we must address here as well the obstacles that have prevented the international relief effort from being as effective as was intended—as effective as is necessary.

To date, the U.S. Government has committed over \$85 million to the Kampuchean relief efforts. In an impressive outpouring of support, the American private sector has contributed more than \$40 million.

I am here today on behalf of the President of the United States to place substantial further resources behind this essential humanitarian effort. We are prepared to provide an additional \$29.6 million in food and financial resources for the next 4 months, to help meet the urgent needs of the Kampuchean people.

The international community must not turn its back on the plight of a people desperately in need of food, of medical care, of the seed which can bring the Kampuchean harvest back to life. We urge all donors to increase, significantly, their commitment to meeting one of the greatest moral challenges of our lifetime.

There has been some discussion here in Geneva of the possibility of a special fund for Khmer relief, to be administered by the Secretary General and his Special Representative. Such a fund would enable the Secretary General to respond flexibly to emergency relief needs, needs which cannot be predicted in long-term planning.

We fully support this suggestion. We will allocate a portion of our pledges to this special fund if it is established.

Surely no nation on Earth has suffered more in recent years than Kampuchea—ravaged by war, devastated by the unspeakable horrors of the Pol Pot regime, victimized by foreign invasion and occupation, and now tragically short of the necessities for life. Yet the solution is available, if those in control will place human life above political advantage.

I am gravely concerned that unless we overcome the present obstacles to effective relief distribution inside Kampuchea, further widespread suffering and starvation are inevitable despite our efforts. For the fact is that food and supplies are not getting to those who need it most.

The problems inherent in such a

massive relief effort are substantial. After long years of civil strife, Kampuchea's infrastructure is largely destroyed. The Khmer people no longer have the strength, the trained personnel, the equipment or facilities to distribute the food and rebuild their agricultural economy without outside assistance.

For many months, the international community has stood ready to help overcome these obstacles. But the relief effort has been hobbled by restrictions on access and movement imposed on the international relief workers.

Let me be clear on this point. The obstacles have made it impossible to reach all Kampucheans in need. Only when these obstacles are removed can we hope to break the cycle of famine, disease, and renewed mass migration that threatens the very existence of a people and a nation.

Essential Steps

Specifically, a number of steps are essential.

First, the authorities in Phnom Penh and the Vietnamese must permit the provincial airports to be opened for international and domestic flights carrying relief supplies. These airports are now being used for military purposes. Let them serve to help bring food to the starving.

Second, international relief flight must be allowed to fly into Phnom Penh along more direct routes less wasteful of precious time and fuel—routes which would permit additional food and medical supplies to be carried on each flight.

Third, those in control must allow greater numbers of international relief workers into Kampuchea. There must be sufficient personnel to help transport, administer, and monitor a broad-scale relief effort.

Fourth, there is a desperate shortage of doctors and other medical personnel in Kampuchea, yet the authorities in Phnom Penh and the Vietnamese have permitted only 29 medical personnel to enter the country. That is one for almost 200,000 people. Hundreds of doctors and other medical personnel stand ready and willing to enter Kampuchea, individually or under the auspices of international relief organizations. They must be permitted to do so.

Fifth, the authorities in Phnom Penh and the Vietnamese must permit relief supplies to move by truck and rail across the Thai-Kampuchean border. That alone would permit a massive expansion of the amount of relief reaching needy Khmer.

Finally, we appeal to the Soviet Union to join in helping resolve the barriers to an effective relief effort. The United States, as part of its contribution, is prepared to provide funds for trucks and other equipment to transport supplies. We urge the Soviet Union to undertake the helicopter or other airlift supplies which could overcome the transport problems posed by the coming rainy season.

Without an early breakthrough, Kampuchea could suffer another wave of mass starvation and disease within months, if not weeks.

As, in good faith, we increase our levels of commitment, we appeal again to the authorities in Phnom Penh, the Government of Vietnam, to the supporters of Vietnam: Do not preside over the death of a nation and a people; commit an effective relief effort to go forward.

Ultimately, the plight of the Kampuchean people cannot be divorced from political causes. For the tragedy of Kampuchea will not end until there is an end to the military occupation and a government truly representative of the Kampuchean people, nonaligned and free of foreign interference.

This is not the forum for addressing in detail those critical issues. But let me say this: It is regrettable that some of those who bear such a heavy responsibility for this human crisis have not joined here as full participants to help fashion the most effective humanitarian response.

Indeed, as we look across the international landscape, we have witnessed in recent months an enormous new flood of humanity—people driven from their homes, from their nations, by aggression in Afghanistan, by externally fueled conflict in the Horn of Africa, by the harsh reality of life in Cuba. The human toll is appalling; the strains on neighboring countries are staggering; the humanitarian demands on the international community are heavy and growing.

The community of nations cannot turn its back on the plight of those in desperate need of help. But neither can we be blind to the fact that the policies of some are creating suffering for so many mounting costs for us all.

We cannot escape this broader reality. But the need that calls us here, the plight of the Kampuchean people, is unambiguous. For the future of the Kampuchean people, of their entire culture, hangs in the balance. If conditions there do not

International Contributions for Khmer Relief—U.S. Status

The U.S. Government, as of May 8, 1980, has spent or obligated for Khmer relief \$93,876,000. This figure does not include \$1,425,000 the U.S. Government spent for the same objective during the previous fiscal year. Grants break down as follows. Figures are rounded to the nearest hundred dollars.

UNICEF

Amount	Reason/Date
\$ 2,500,000	Startup costs for Khmer relief program (10/79)
2,000,000	Rice purchases in Thailand for distribution in Kampuchea (11/79)
448,000	(in kind) Airlift of cranes from Japan to Singapore for onward shipment to Kampuchea (11/79)
44,600	(in kind) Incremental air transport cost of Archer, Daniels, Midland donated food (12/79)
6,500,000	Relief of cash shortage (12/79)
2,500,000	Cash for ongoing relief program (5/80)
\$13,992,600	

International Committee of the Red Cross

\$ 2,500,000	Startup costs for Khmer relief program (10/79)
27,000	(in kind) Two field labs (11/79)
20,000	(in kind) Medical survey team for contingency planning (11/79)
2,500,000	Relief of cash shortage (12/79)
952,400	(in kind) 40-day lease of Hercules for shuttle flights to Phnom Penh (12/79, 1/80)
5,550	(in kind) Airlift of a field hospital donated by SAWS (1/80)
810,000	(in kind) Lease of Hercules for shuttle flights to Phnom Penh (4/80)
1,690,000	Cash for ongoing relief program (5/80)
\$ 8,504,900	

World Food Program

\$37,634,000	Food for Peace commodities including shipping costs (\$28.756 million directly to
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	Kampuchea; \$8.878 million in and through Thailand (11/79, 3/80, 5/80)
290,000	Lease of trucks in Thailand (11/79)
150,000	(in kind) Airlift and commodity cost of instant corn soy milk (11/79)
1,026,000	Food processing in Thailand and Singapore (11, 12/79)
891,600	Food management in Thailand (12/79)
3,000,000	Rice purchases in Thailand for border and holding center feeding (12/79)
8,800	(in kind) Air transport cost for soy fortified bulgur (2/80)
4,000,000	Cash for cross border seed rice program (3, 5/80)
\$47,000,400	

Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees

\$ 450,000	(in kind) Airlift and commodity cost of 800 tents and tent flies (10/79)
9,000,000	Care and maintenance of Khmer in holding centers and center construction (11/79)
5,550,000	Care and maintenance of Khmer in holding centers and center construction (balance of USG pledge to UNHCR) (1/80)
3,000	(in kind) Four hand pumps (5/80)
\$15,003,000	

Food and Agriculture Organization

\$ 3,000,000	Agricultural rehabilitation program in Kampuchea (3/80)
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Thai Red Cross

\$ 100,000	Mrs. Carter's presentation for Khmer relief (11/79)
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National Council for International Health

\$ 87,200	Medical assistance clearing house (12/79, 5/80)
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(continued)

change, there will be little left of Kampuchea—its people dispersed, its land inhabited by others.

With sufficient resources, with full cooperation from all the parties con-

cerned, with sustained effort, we can see the Kampuchean people turn the corner away from endless want toward a future of hope and promise. ■

Cambodia Crisis Center

\$ 80,900 Startup costs for informational clearing house (1/80)

Church World Service

\$ 1,250,000 Emergency delivery of medicines, relief supplies, and seeds for agricultural rehabilitation in Kampuchea (1/80)

World Vision Relief Organization

\$ 3,103,300 Rehabilitation of rice culture, small animal breeding, orphanages, and a youth hostel in Kampuchea (3/80)

CARE

\$ 55,800 Ocean freight reimbursement for baby food and relief supplies (3/80)

100,000 Cash for cross border seed rice program (3/80)

\$ 155,800

American Friends Service Committee

\$ 558,300 Agricultural rehabilitation in Kampuchea (3/80)

15,900 Ocean freight reimbursement for medical supplies and vegetable seeds (4/80)

\$ 574,200

Office of the U.N. Secretary General's Special Representative for Kampuchean Humanitarian Relief

\$ 150,000 Startup costs of coordinating office (3/80)

Embassy Bangkok

\$ 127,500 Emergency funds for Khmer relief at Ambassador's discretion (11/79)

Task Force 80 (Thai Supreme Command)

\$ 10,700 Office supplies for Thai coordinator (3/80)

Unattributed

\$ 384,000 Special airlift of medical and other relief supplies in response to the President's 11/13 decision (11/79)

351,500 Travel and administrative expenses of staffing Khmer relief program in Thailand (10/79-9/80)

\$ 735,500

\$93,876,000 (Grand Total)

Visit of Japanese Prime Minister Ohira

Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira of Japan visited Washington, D.C., April 30-May 1, 1980, for meetings with President Carter and other government officials and to sign the U.S.-Japan science and technology agreement. Following are the President's and Prime Minister's remarks at the signing ceremony on May 1, and text of a White House fact sheet issued following the ceremony.¹

REMARKS AT SIGNING CEREMONY²

President Carter

A year ago, the Prime Minister of Japan, Mr. Ohira, and I met here to agree to a productive partnership for the 1980s. It was a commitment with far-reaching impact and very difficult to achieve. We understood that. But in this last 12 months, both our nations have made remarkable progress toward reaching these very important goals.

Also, in addition to those mutual commitments which we made one to another, the world has been afflicted with fast-changing and very difficult events which have caused the Japanese Government, under Prime Minister Ohira, to have to face decisions which were, again, very difficult. The decisions made in Japan have been the right ones. They have been of major significance and benefit to our own country and the rest of the world, and they have required great exhibitions of courage and leadership.

The people of my nation deeply appreciate this common approach to very difficult problems and the resolve, which we share, to face international terrorism—exemplified in Iran—and aggression—exemplified in Afghanistan—with a mutuality of purpose, with a common commitment, and with national and individual courage. The bonds which bind together the people of Japan and the United States provide the very cornerstone of our policy in Asia, and they also provide the central core of the global policy of the United States of America.

On behalf of all our people, again, I want to express to Prime Minister

Ohira and to his distinguished colleagues a heartfelt welcome as they come to our country and our deepest appreciation for their friendship and their support, for their advice and for their counsel and partnership as we face these difficult issues together.

Prime Minister Ohira

Let me first express my thanks to you for having invited me to Washington for a brief but thorough and very constructive discussion on matters of our mutual concern. I feel a special sense of importance that I have come to talk with you at a very difficult and trying time for the people in the world. Freedom, democracy, justice, and peace, which we so dearly share among us, can be seriously harmed for long years to come if we now fail to stand together.

All Japanese understand your deep emotion over the fate of the 50 fellow Americans held still captive in Iran. I join in the fervent prayer of our people for their safety. I also admire your patience and restraint, Mr. President, which can be demonstrated only by brave. The situation is too serious.

I shall not list usual words of sympathy or support today. But let me just assure you that Japan stands ready to demonstrate its solidarity with the United States and will do its utmost, in concert with other friends, to bring about peacefully the earliest release of the hostages.

The same degree of seriousness prevailed in our discussion over the military intervention of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and the continuing challenge to world peace. The President and I agreed that we must remain very firm in meeting the challenge posed by this Soviet aggression and that we should lend a helping hand to countries in the Middle East and in Asia for the peace and stability. In this context, I told the President my government's position that the participation in the Moscow Olympic games under the present circumstances is not desirable.

We also talked about our bilateral relationship. I'm very much satisfied with the solid friendship now existing between our two countries. Never before has such a close and strong bond existed between two nations with differences in culture, history, and language, as between us.

I should once again like to thank you for warmly receiving me today. As true friends should, we will each air what is on our minds without fear of

...making the unique bond that exists between us; for in times of need, in times of crisis, we will not fail to extend the help needed by the other. We, the Japanese, may not be the most eloquent, but we remain a determined and one of the most dependable friends of our country. We know you are there in the same way for us.

[At this point, the President and the Prime Minister signed the agreement.]

Prime Minister Ohira

It is my great pleasure and honor to have signed with you the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America on Cooperation in Research and Development in Science and Technology.

Japan and the United States already are actively cooperating together in the field of energy, under the energy agreement concluded last year. Now with the signing of the new agreement, which we owe very much to the initiative of the President, our two countries are to start cooperating in non-energy fields as well.

By concluding these two agreements, our two countries have established a solid framework for cooperation covering all fields of science and technology. In this sense the new agreement is indeed significant, and Japan will endeavor to strengthen further the cooperative relations with the United States within the aforementioned framework.

I honestly hope that the cooperation under the agreement will make a steady progress and that Japan and the United States will contribute a great deal to the welfare and prosperity of not only our two peoples but also of the entire mankind.

In closing, I wish to express my sincere respect for the insight of the President, who has continuously made tremendous effort for the realization of the agreement.

President Carter

It is obvious that Prime Minister Ohira has already expressed very clearly the significance not only of the energy, scientific, and technology agreement which we signed last year but also this new one, which relates to matters in addition to energy; matters concerning transportation, matters concerning



(White House photo by Jack Kightlinger)

President Carter and Prime Minister Ohira

health, environmental quality, the control of disease, space, and many other elements which are now important to American and Japanese people and those of the world, but which will be increasingly important in the future.

This agreement is particularly significant because it is between two nations which individually have led the world in scientific study, research, development, and technology. We will still be competitors in trade and in the development and the production and the distribution and sale of new ideas, new equipment, new services to mankind. But at the same time now, we can combine our efforts and benefit mutually from the exchange of ideas and concepts, particularly in the basic sciences, which are so important to us, and among our studies and the teaching of young and old Japanese, who can make such a tremendous contribution in the future.

It is with a great deal of pleasure and gratitude that I recognize the leadership of Prime Minister Ohira and the tremendous untapped potential that still exists within our two great nations

for the service of our own people and a better life for all human beings who live on Earth.

Thank you very much, Mr. Prime Minister, the people of Japan. I believe this is a great day for both our countries.

WHITE HOUSE FACT SHEET³

President Carter and Japanese Prime Minister Ohira today signed an Agreement on Cooperation in Research and Development in Science and Technology.

The agreement provides the United States and Japan—two of the world's most technologically advanced nations—a framework for jointly conducting research and development programs in a variety of national priority areas. Under the umbrella of the agreement the two countries will pursue research and development programs which rank high in the national priorities of each country. This agreement represents a relatively new mechanism for developed countries to

work together on solving globally important research and development problems. It allows advanced nations to pool resources rather than duplicate efforts in a variety of areas.

This agreement results from a December 1978 initiative by President Carter to the Japanese Government. At that time, the President proposed that the two countries cooperate on large-scale, expensive research activities in non-energy fields. This American initiative was a natural complement to ongoing cooperative research and development in energy-related fields resulting from a 1978 initiative to the U.S. Government by then-Prime Minister Fukuda. Top-level science officials began the process of developing a new type of meaningful science and technology program at a September 1979 meeting in Tokyo. Some specific agreements were reached at a follow-on meeting in Washington in February 1980. Today's signing of the "umbrella" agreement represents further progress in the process.

The science and technology agreement provides:

- A framework for undertaking significant joint research in non-energy areas which rank high among the national priorities of both countries;
- A "home" for conducting high-level consultations between the two countries on science and technology policies; such consultations are becoming increasingly important in the face of our need for more basic research and innovation in order to sustain the momentum of scientific and technological advances; and
- A mechanism for making more effective the broad range of ongoing scientific and technological cooperation between our two countries.

The most important objective of the science and technology agreement is the promotion of significant joint research in the non-energy area. Policy-level officials on both sides have initiated the identification and, in some cases, the implementation of joint undertakings above and beyond those carried out for some two decades between agencies of the two governments. These undertakings are characterized by one or more of the following.

- They are high technology, high-risk projects. Examples include re-

search related to space, such as geodynamics, the origin of plasmas in Earth's neighborhood program, the comet rendezvous mission, the Saturn orbiter and dual probe mission, and others, such as research on recombinant DNA and the development of antivirals.

- They are projects in high-risk basic research, such as neutron scattering with advanced instrumentation and accelerator research.

- They meet urgent global needs, such as research on alcoholism, cardiovascular disease, environmental diseases, salmonella control, pest control, and the supply of animals including primates for biomedical research.

- They address problems affecting all advanced industrial nations. These projects, which often involve broadscale testing, can be accomplished expeditiously only through the pooling of resources. They include the national toxicology plan (testing of thousands of toxic compounds), resource conservation (including recycling) technology, detoxification and disposal of hazardous materials, study of the effects of carbon dioxide and diesel particulates, and nitrogen oxide control.

As a result of two recent joint meetings of top-level science officials—in Tokyo in September 1979 and in Washington last February—both sides have identified some 40 initial projects, including all of those mentioned above, for implementation under the new program. Most of these projects, because of their complexity, require extensive program definition and project planning work. Contact points on each side have been named for all of the proposed projects, and consultations are currently underway.

Illustrative of the work entailed are the 17 space-related projects on which we have agreed in principle to collaborate. On nine of these on which we have made the most progress, we have signed project agreements. Consultations in the form of exchange of information, visitors, and correspondence are underway—looking toward the conduct of joint and complementary operations, the development of compatible instruments and complementary science payloads, and training of scientists and technicians.

In the areas of high-energy physics and environmental protection research, there have been exchanges of informa-

tion and numerous visits by scientists to the national laboratories, and we are now in various stages of finalizing agreements on specific projects. Two important joint meetings are scheduled for later this year: in June between the U.S. Department of Energy and counterpart Japanese agencies and in October between [the Environmental Protection Agency and counterpart agencies].

In health and agriculture areas, exchanges of visits by experts have already taken place or will soon take place on virtually all of the projects. The two sides will hold a workshop in Japan this fall on "quality control of laboratory animals."

New projects will be added to the already broad program of science and technology cooperation, as mutually agreed. Both countries expect that the summit meeting between President Carter and Prime Minister Ohira will accelerate the progress on specific joint projects.

¹Prior to the signing ceremony, the President and the Prime Minister held a working luncheon in the Cabinet Room.

²Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of May 5, 1980.

³White House press release. ■

Energy in a Global Perspective: Putting to Rest Three Myths

Richard N. Cooper

Mr. Cooper is Under Secretary for Economic Affairs.

There are three myths which have become widespread in the wake of the energy crisis of the last several years.

- The first myth concerns the role of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in generating and sustaining turbulence in the world oil market.

- The second myth concerns the perception, especially abroad, that Americans have great scope for energy conservation but have done little to conserve.

- The third myth concerns the perception, mainly in the United States, that only the United States is acting to strain demand for oil and that other countries have undertaken little effort in this regard, relying instead on the United States to bail them out of a situation which admittedly affects them deeply.

OPEC Myth

The first myth is that all of our difficulties are due to OPEC. This is simply not so. Moreover, it is an enervating illusion to seek and find in OPEC a scapegoat for difficulties which are more fundamental in their origin.

It is true that in December 1973 the OPEC countries, led by the Shah of Iran, raised crude oil prices by a factor of four. It will be debated for a long time whether that conscious act was simply willed by the major supplying countries or whether it was the result of the market conditions for oil prevailing at that time, including a sharp inflation in the prices of most other commodities that had already taken place by the end of 1973.

There can be little debate, however, that in 1979 OPEC, far from initiating the doubling of crude oil prices that took place during the year, scrambled to catch up in a turbulent and rising market. Those events were stimulated by the revolution in Iran and a consequent drop in Iranian production—from roughly 5½ million barrels per day to 3½ million barrels per day in

late 1978 and to virtually nothing in early 1979—combined with the perception that Iranian production, once it recovered to 3–4 million barrels per day, could drop further at any time.

In these alarming and unforeseen circumstances, many OPEC countries increased their oil production, so that by the spring of 1979 OPEC production actually exceeded what it had been a year earlier by 1 million barrels per day. Unfortunately, the precautionary

inventories rose as a result of this change in marketing practices. over 80% in 1973 to less than 45% in 1979—found themselves short of crude oil as more oil was directed into government-to-government transactions, and as a consequence they had to prorate their customers around the world. This process aroused anxiety about the security of future supplies of oil—even when total supplies were sufficient—and many countries scrambled to assure adequate supplies for themselves. Thus the “normal” level of

The fundamental underlying problem is that prospective demand for oil exceeds prospective supply. Under these circumstances, the oil market will continue to be under pressure.

demand for oil increased even more. As the petroleum market continued under pressure and prices in the spot, or secondary, market for crude oil rose far above the prices posted by producers, several oil-exporting countries (most notably Iran) exploited the turbulent situation by raising their own export prices. OPEC as an organization made several attempts—in March, June, and December—to unify and stabilize the prices for oil, but each of these proved abortive.

Primary oil stocks in the industrialized countries actually rose by about 7% during the course of 1979, far more than would have been justified by normal economic growth. Stocks in Europe grew by 9%, and in individual countries they grew as much as 30%. This precautionary demand for oil was created by fear of further disruption in oil supplies, especially in Iran, reinforced by a change in the marketing practices with respect to world oil supplies.

A relatively small number of major firms have traditionally produced, shipped, refined, and distributed petroleum products in most countries of the world. Government-to-government sales of oil have gradually eroded the dominant position of the major oil firms, and this process accelerated in 1979. The major oil firms—whose share of world shipments of crude oil fell from

inventories rose as a result of this change in marketing practices.

Augmenting these anxieties was the constant threat of a cut in oil production by individual OPEC countries. OPEC as an organization was not involved in these prospective cuts, and in fact they have not to date materialized. But the possibility of such cuts was a further source of uncertainty in 1979.

The fundamental underlying problem is that prospective demand for oil exceeds prospective supply. Under these circumstances, the oil market will continue to be under pressure. OPEC countries contribute to this prospective imbalance by not investing as much as they could to increase supply, although many OPEC countries are, in fact, investing extensively both to maintain production from existing fields and to develop new fields. Each country pursues its conception of its national economic interest in this regard, and we have not yet reached the point in coordination of world economic policy that countries are obliged to make investments for the purpose of satisfying growing demand in other countries. We in the United States, for example, control, in the name of national policy, production of enriched uranium and the harvesting of our forests, to name only two products.

The vital task for us in preventing further turbulence in the oil market is

to reduce our demand for imported oil through conservation of energy, through substitution of other energy sources for oil, and through development of our own oil resources.

U.S. Nonconservation Myth

This brings me to the second myth: Americans are uncontrolled consumers of energy—gas guzzlers for short—with much room for easy conservation; and we have not done anything about it.

The last proposition is clearly not so. Whether measured in actions or in results, much has already been accomplished. Take actions first. Several steps were taken before the current Administration to conserve on oil, of which the most important were mandatory speed limits and mandatory mileage requirements on new automobiles. The International Energy Agency (IEA) was also created, and the U.S. Government committed itself to a strategic petroleum reserve.

The Carter Administration has had three phases to its energy program. Phase I was introduced in April 1977 and finally passed the Congress in October 1978. Its main elements were phased decontrol of natural gas prices, measures to increase greatly the use of coal by industry and electric utilities, loan and tax incentives to encourage energy conservation, and increased government support for energy research and development.

Phase II of the Administration's energy program was announced in April 1979. Its principal element was the phased decontrol of oil prices, combined with a request for an "excess profits" tax, the latter really being a tax on what economists would call the economic rents involved in production of a natural resource—such as oil—whose price has risen rapidly.

Phase III was announced in July 1979 and involved a commitment to impose an annual ceiling of 8.5 million barrels per day on U.S. imports of oil. The Administration also requested Congress to create an Energy Security Corporation to develop commercial scale facilities for producing synthetic liquid fuels and unconventional natural gas and an Energy Mobilization Board to speed the regulatory process governing new investments in oil-saving activities.

Taken all together, these actions

involve a combination of market incentives (through higher prices for oil and gas), government stimulants to reinforce market incentives (through loans and tax credits for energy saving activities), and government mandated actions to conserve oil (such as mileage requirements on automobiles and limitations on use of oil by electric utilities). The program has not relied on any single cure-all to the energy problem. Instead, it has recognized that an appropriate solution requires action on a variety of fronts, involving (1) energy conservation, (2) development of such alternative energy sources as coal, nuclear power, and solar and renewable energy, and (3) domestic production of oil and gas. Moreover, the measures range in impact from immediate to long term. Some actions, such as encouragement of the use of gas as a boiler fuel, are clearly not desirable in the long run but have been helpful in reducing immediate pressures in the oil market.

Actions are important only insofar as they lead to results. Results in the energy sector are more difficult to achieve than they are in many other sectors of the economy. Energy consumption is a pervasive feature of our economy, not easily avoidable or set aside even in the short run. Large investments are typically involved in each "energy system," including investments by individuals and households. For both reasons it is not easy to reduce our demand for oil rapidly. But 6 years have gone by since the large

For the economy as a whole, energy use has grown about one-third as rapidly as real GNP since 1973, compared with a one-to-one relationship during the preceding two decades.

OPEC price increase of December 1973, and we can observe substantial responses over this period of time.

The most notable response has been a 20% decline between 1973 and 1978 in the use of energy per unit of industrial output. Thus, the "energy productivity" of American industrial output has increased substantially. This increase perhaps offers a partial explanation for the decline in growth of labor

productivity, as business expenditure was diverted from the traditional labor-saving investment to energy-saving investment. To the extent this switch has taken place, it should be a cause of joy rather than alarm; but it is another reminder that so long as we import substantial amounts of oil whose price is rising, we must trim increases in our standards of living.

For the economy as a whole, energy use has grown about one-third as rapidly as real GNP since 1973, compared with a one-to-one relationship during the preceding two decades. This represents a remarkable shift in behavior toward energy conservation.

Gasoline consumption in 1979 was 4% lower than it was in 1978. By December 1979, when gasoline was not constrained by shortages, consumption was over 9% below its level for the same period in 1978. Seven percent of homeowners have shifted away from oil for space heating, mainly to gas and wood. Distillate oil sales (mostly heating oil) dropped 10% between December 1978 and December 1979, even though the winter through the end of December was only about 5% less cold than in 1978. (Heating oil sales dropped even more sharply—15%—in early 1980).

Further response is ahead of us. Investments in oil conservation in both the private and public sector continue apace. Moreover, retail prices of petroleum products rose over 50% in 1979, a more rapid increase than in any other major industrial country. Further conservation can be expected as a result. One consequence is already starkly evident: The demand for automobiles has shifted dramatically from large to small cars, such that by early 1980, 63% of all new automobile sales in the United States were small cars, compared with 48% in 1978, which was itself higher than in previous years.

These results will perhaps not be impressive for those who believe that Americans guzzle oil incontinently. It is true, as often pointed out, that Americans have the highest per capita consumption of oil, apart from Canada. It is also true that Americans have the highest real per capita income of any major industrialized country. Our consumption of many goods and services not merely oil, is higher than that observed elsewhere—telephones, ice cream, pianos, higher education, etc.

more appropriate comparison would focus on total energy consumption per unit of GNP. The United States is high on this scale as well, though not at the top, and the comparison is not so bad when allowance is made both for the substantial variations in temperature and for the vast distances involved in the United States compared with most other industrialized countries.

It is possible that the high mobility of Americans was encouraged by cheap energy as well as by a continental-sized country, although it should be noted that this high American mobility was already evident in the early 19th century, long before oil and coal came to be used for transportation. (Travel over long distances was presupposed even at the inception of the United States. Legislative representatives were based in geographical constituencies, and congressmen from Georgia had to travel 600 miles to Philadelphia, the first capital. The distance between Edinburgh and London, by comparison, is about half that. Today, some Congressmen must travel 5,000 miles between their constituencies and Washington.)

The high mobility has become so deeply ingrained in our social and economic structure that it is difficult to reverse. We may now regret the layout of the typical American city, with its hundreds of thousands of single family residences stretching for miles in all directions from the center. Such basic locational dispersion can be altered only over many decades. In most of the country, these millions of buildings must be heated in winter. The system of transportation that serves this system may require a lot of gasoline, but the gasoline is not wantonly wasted as is sometimes portrayed in Europe. Moreover, urban mass transportation can go only part way in substituting for the automobile or small bus because of the great dispersion of residences. Gasoline can be conserved mainly through the use of smaller, more energy-efficient cars, and, as noted above, the American public is moving strongly in that direction. But, again, we must keep in mind the existing capital stock. There are over 135 million motor vehicles in the United States, and it will take about a decade to change the entire stock.

With higher oil prices, all countries have a relative scope for conservation relative to

their previous condition. The American experience since 1973 suggests there is substantial scope for energy conservation even in industry, which is the main user of energy in most countries. (It should be noted here that detailed comparisons of particular industries in various countries suggest that U.S. manufacturing is not notably more prodigal in its use of energy than are corresponding industries in other leading countries.)

"Other Countries" Nonconservation Myth

The third myth, most prevalent in the United States, is that other countries are not doing their share and the United States is bearing the major burden of adjustment to imbalance in the world oil market. In fact, we have had extensive collaboration among the industrialized countries on energy policy and the need for collective action. The Tokyo economic summit was devoted mainly to energy. The 20-nation IEA, in addition to its emergency sharing plan, focuses on the need for action by all members to bring oil demand into balance with supply, both in the short run and by 1985. In March 1979, propelled by the turbulent oil market, the IEA set targets for each of its member countries to reduce imports of oil by 5% of projected oil consumption by the end of the year. True, some countries did not meet their target, but most countries took serious steps to cut back on oil imports, and the oil market would have been considerably tighter if these steps had not been taken.

In recent years France and Japan have raised excise taxes on their already highly taxed sales of gasoline, for example. In countries where gasoline prices are controlled, these controls have been relaxed. Many countries—including Canada, France, Germany, and Japan—have taken steps to encourage electricity generation by coal and to discourage the use of oil as boiler fuel. Many countries have raised insulation standards and have provided financial incentives for improved insulation. And, like the United States and sometimes in collaboration with the United States, several countries have increased sharply their research and development expenditures devoted to the energy field. As in the United States,

the growth of energy consumption relative to overall economic growth in the last few years is well below historical trends, although the decline has not always been as dramatic as it has been in the United States.

The Difficult Challenge Ahead

Restoring and maintaining balance in the world oil market is an arena where no one country can solve the problem alone. Actions are economically painful, politically difficult, and involve changes in traditional ways of doing things. Oil price increases provide an incentive for all oil consumers to conserve on oil, and thus, are a necessary element of the solution to the energy problem.

But sharp increases in oil prices are part of the problem as well as being part of the solution. They aggravate inflation, reduce economic growth, and enlarge deficits in international payments.

The publics and officials of most nations can persuade themselves that they are too insignificant to influence events in the world oil market. Due to their size, larger nations have some incentive to act, but even their willingness to take action will be blunted if others do not join in. Hence, there is a strong need for international cooperation and even collective action to reduce the demand for oil during the next decade. If we do not do so, the decade will be plagued by continual oil-price-induced impetus to inflation and by sluggish or even negligible economic growth forced on us by the need to balance demand for oil with available supplies.

It is important that both we Americans and other industrialized countries get on with the pursuit of an active energy policy to head off these threats to our economic welfare and to political stability around the world. ■

Moscow Summer Olympic Games

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT,
MAY 15, 1980¹

We welcome the courageous decision of the West German Olympic Committee to refuse to participate in the Moscow Olympic Games. The committee, the West German Government, and the people of West Germany deserve the admiration of all those throughout the world who believe in peace and freedom and who recognize that the achievement of these goals sometimes requires painful sacrifices.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is a serious blow to peace and freedom. We hope that the other Olympic committees of Western Europe will follow the advice of their own governments and join with the West German Olympic Committee in demonstrating their opposition to Soviet aggression.

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT,
MAY 16, 1980¹

The President today met with Lord Killanin, the president of the International Olympic Committee, and Mme. Monique Berlioux, its director, at their request. The President reaffirmed that the position of the United States in opposition to sending a team to the 22d Olympic Games in Moscow results solely from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and our belief that it was not appropriate to attend the games in a host nation that was invading its neighbor.

The President made clear that this position does not detract in any way from our support of the international Olympic movement, and that we will welcome athletes from any eligible Olympic nation at the 23d Olympic games in Los Angeles in 1984.

The President reaffirmed that the United States will continue to urge other governments and Olympic committees to oppose participation in the Olympic Games in Moscow this summer. He noted that more than 40 national Olympic committees, including those of the United States, West Germany, Canada, China, Norway, Kenya, Argentina, and numerous Muslim nations, have already decided not to attend the Olympic Games in Moscow. More major national committees are

expected to take the same position during the next 2 weeks.

DEPARTMENT ANALYSIS,
MAY 24, 1980²

The Department of State today issued the following analysis of the success achieved by the boycott of the Moscow Olympics.

Of the national Olympic committees outside the Soviet bloc which have made their decisions, one-half (58 out of 116) have decided not to send teams to Moscow. The decisions of 17 additional committees are not yet known.

A number of the committees which decided to send teams to Moscow had been urged by their governments that it would be inappropriate to do so because of the continuing Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. However, numerous sports federations in these nations did follow the recommendations of their governments and have decided not to participate in such sports as equestrian events, fencing, yachting, shooting, gymnastics, cycling, boxing, field hockey, and pentathlon.

Those national teams and sports federations not participating in Moscow won 73% (58 out of 80) of all the gold medals won at Montreal in 1976 by athletes from nations outside the Soviet bloc. For all medals—gold, silver, and bronze—the comparable percentage is 71%.

Those national teams and sports federations not participating at Moscow counted for approximately 50% of the athletes from nations outside the Soviet bloc who participated in the 1976 games at Montreal.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
MAY 24, 1980²

We are most pleased by the decision this morning of the Japanese Olympic Committee not to send a team to the summer games in Moscow. Both the committee and the Government of Japan deserve to be congratulated by those who cherish freedom and who understand its obligation.

The decision by Japan was not an easy one, because it involved real sacrifice on the part of large numbers of highly qualified athletes. It is particularly noteworthy, therefore, that the decision was taken by such an overwhelming majority of the members of the Japanese Olympic Committee.

This is the last day that national Olympic committees have to respond to invitations from the Moscow Olympic Organizing Committee. There are still more than a dozen Olympic committees that have not yet taken a formal vote. We naturally hope that all of them will join in a boycott effort that has become an international display of solidarity against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Whatever happens today, we are most pleased that a majority of the nations and Olympic committees outside the Soviet bloc have decided to keep their teams home this summer. Some Olympic committees have already reached this decision. They are joined by the governments of 15 countries, who lack formal Olympic committees but which indicated they support the boycott. There are 11 other governments, which publicly support the boycott even though their national Olympic committees have chosen to send teams to Moscow. This makes a total, so far, of 84 governments around the world that support a boycott.

¹Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of May 19, 1980
²Made available to news correspondents by acting Department spokesman Tom Reston. ■

Defense Cooperation With Turkey

Foreign Relations Outline¹

For over three decades, the United States and Turkey have cooperated in measures for the common defense. A valued and strategically located ally, Turkey forms part of NATO's southeastern flank, helps guard access to the Mediterranean from the Black Sea, and faces the Soviet Union across the longest common land border of any NATO nation. Although Turkey has always been important to U.S. and NATO security, this importance has been emphasized most recently by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the unsettled conditions in the Middle East.

Our relationship with Turkey is based on bilateral agreements, our common membership in the North Atlantic alliance, our shared dedication

democratic forms of government, and the interests of our two peoples in freedom and independence. The United States and Turkey further strengthened their relationship on March 29, 1980, by concluding the agreement for Cooperation on Defense and Economy.

Purpose of Agreement

In the preamble to the agreement, both nations state their desire to enhance economic, defense, and related scientific and technological cooperation—laterally and as members of NATO. The preamble also stresses that the U.S.-Turkish bilateral relationship rests on our adherence to the principles of democracy, human rights, justice, and social progress. The agreement is marked by the following general characteristics.

- It is a 5-year agreement renewed annually thereafter.
- It is a bilateral implementation of the North Atlantic Treaty.
- It is an executive agreement containing no pledge of specific economic or military assistance.
- It has a broad focus covering cooperation in the interrelated economic, military, and defense production areas.
- It provides for the continuation of U.S. military activities in Turkey.

U.S. Assistance

The agreement recognizes the interrelationship between a strong economy and a strong defense, and it is consistent with ongoing efforts by the United States and other nations to help the Government of Turkey stabilize its troubled economy.

Under the agreement, the United States pledges to exert its best efforts to provide mutually agreed financial and technical assistance to Turkey. The agreement specifies that military assistance to Turkey shall be subject to the annual authorization and appropriations contained in U.S. security assistance legislation.

A joint Turkish-U.S. commission, established by the agreement, will implement the existing relationship between the Turkish General Staff and the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Ankara and will assist in determining

how to maximize the usefulness of our military assistance to Turkey. Each year the Government of Turkey, based on its assigned NATO missions, will develop a 5-year projection of its force goals. Using estimates of contributions that will be forthcoming from Turkey's own resources and other sources, the commission will make recommendations on how best to realize those goals.

Defense Industrial Cooperation

It is a long-term U.S. policy to encourage our NATO allies to develop and maintain the industrial and technological capability critical to a nation's security. The agreement emphasizes enhanced U.S.-Turkish cooperation in the production of defense material. To facilitate cooperation in defense procurement, the United States and Turkey waive those "buy national" regulations not covered by law, as is the case with other NATO allies.

Military Installations

The agreement authorizes the United States to maintain forces and carry out military activities at specified installations in Turkey. These facilities include a major air force base regularly hosting NATO-committed U.S. aircraft, three intelligence-gathering installations, a long-range navigation station, elements of the U.S. defense communications system, and other important support and logistics units. The following are key provisions of this part of the agreement.

- The installations are designated as Turkish, with a Turkish commander, although the U.S. commander at each installation has full command and control over all U.S. personnel, equipment, and missions.
- The U.S. flag will be flown at the headquarters of the U.S. commander.
- Arrangements for joint use and joint technical operations are specified.
- Each nation pays for the salaries of its personnel and for the maintenance of those facilities provided for their exclusive use.
- The NATO status of forces agreement is applied to all U.S. personnel.
- All ongoing U.S. military ac-

tivities and missions in Turkey are authorized by the Government of Turkey to continue.

- The extent of defense cooperation under the agreement is limited to obligations arising out of the North Atlantic Treaty.

NATO Support

Other NATO nations are increasingly aware of Turkey's importance. Most of them participated in the April 15, 1980, pledge by the 16 members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development to provide \$1.16 billion in new economic assistance to Turkey in the year ahead. The Federal Republic of Germany will be increasing the amount of its military aid to Turkey this year, and there are efforts within NATO forums to identify equipment not needed by alliance members for transfer to Turkey.

For our part, the new agreement, along with the Administration's FY 1981 request for \$452 million in economic and military assistance for Turkey, represents the U.S. response to the manifest needs of our longtime ally and friend.

¹Taken from a Department of State publication in the GIST series, released in May 1980. This outline is designed to be a quick reference aid on U.S. foreign relations. It is not intended as a comprehensive U.S. foreign policy statement. The outline was based on a statement by Matthew Nimetz, Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology, before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on May 7, 1980. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

18th Report on Cyprus

MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS,
MAR. 27, 1980¹

In accordance with the provisions of Public Law 95-384, I am submitting the following report on progress made during the past 60

Role of the President's National Security Affairs Assistant

by Warren Christopher

Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on April 17, 1980. Mr. Christopher is Deputy Secretary of State.¹

I have brought with me a number of documents which I offer for your hearing record. They include Presidential Directives NSC-1 and NSC-2 of January 20, 1977, concerning the National Security Council (NSC) system; a brief description of the council, its membership, and its operations; an organizational chart of the National Security Council staff; and a June 4, 1979, letter from President Carter to Senator [Frank] Church regarding the [Senator Edward] Zorinsky amendment.

As part of these hearings, I understand that the committee is once again considering whether the positions of Assistant and Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs should be subject to the advice and consent of the Senate.

Let me state our position at the outset. As the President indicated in his letter to Senator Church last year, the Administration opposes this proposal. We believe it would intrude upon the authority of the President in international affairs and complicate the conduct of our foreign relations. It would do so without significant compensating value to the Congress.

National Security Adviser, NSC Relationship

As members of the committee know, the National Security Council was created in 1947 as an element of the sweeping National Security Act, which redefined the entire national security and foreign policy apparatus. The purpose underlying the creation of the NSC was to coordinate the many strands of national policy set by various departments, all of which bore upon our global posture.

The act specified statutory members of the National Security Council, including the President and the Secretaries of State and Defense, and it provided for a civilian staff headed by an

executive secretary. There was no mention of an Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. That position was created by a Presidential statement in 1953.

I do not propose to trace the intervening history in any depth. From it however, some broad observations emerge.

First, the function of the NSC as its staff has varied widely, depending primarily on the needs and preference of the President in office. During the Eisenhower Administration, for example, the council structure was highly developed and extensively used. President Kennedy, by contrast, preferred less formal approach.

Second, the requirement which inspired the creation of the National Security Council—for interdepartmental coordination on foreign affairs—remains its most important role. Indeed, the breadth of today's foreign policy concerns—reaching from such traditional areas as defense and trade to newer concerns such as communications and energy—could not have been foreseen 30 years ago.

Third, the search for effective ways to coordinate and integrate America's wide-ranging international interests is a ceaseless process and an endless challenge. It has been the subject of a series of careful studies—the Hoover Commission, the Government Operations Committee studies in 1967, the Murphy Commission, and most recently, the Odeen report, which dealt with the security aspect of the council work. The need for efficient decision-making is paramount. The means of coordination, in the White House and directly between the Departments and Agencies, are indispensable.

Current Role of the NSC

The current role of the National Security Council and that of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs were set forth on January 20, 1977, when President Carter issued Presidential Directives NSC-1 and NSC-2 providing for the reorganization of the National Security Council sys-

days toward the conclusion of a negotiated solution of the Cyprus problem.

Unfortunately, the intercommunal talks remain in recess. I am, however, hopeful that the recent intensive effort of the Secretary General of the United Nations will bring both parties on Cyprus back to the negotiating table. Through his representatives on Cyprus, Secretary General Waldheim has suggested a specific format under which both sides might be able to resume talks. While there has not yet been agreement on the suggested format, I believe the Secretary General has proposed a reasonable program that will enable the two sides to begin to discuss their concerns and to face the issues of substance that divide the island.

The Foreign Minister of Cyprus was in Washington February 5-7 for meetings with Secretary Vance and other State Department officials. In these discussions, we made clear our continuing support for Secretary General Waldheim's efforts to resume the intercommunal talks. We told the Foreign Minister that we believe both sides to the Cyprus dispute should concentrate on issues where there is some measure of agreement and begin to build a settlement on that common ground.

For years, the people of Cyprus have been unable to reach a political accommodation that satisfies both communities. The Secretary General of the United Nations is offering them a way to sit down together and search for understanding. Achieving a settlement at the negotiating table will not be easy. But achieving a settlement will be impossible unless both sides are willing to engage in meaningful discussions. The United States is firmly committed to the early resumption of the intercommunal talks and will continue to support the Secretary General's efforts. We are convinced that only face-to-face negotiations between the communities will lead to a just and lasting peace.

Sincerely,

JIMMY CARTER

¹Identical letters addressed to Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of Representatives, and Frank Church, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Mar. 31, 1980). ■

m. The intent, in the President's words, was to:

... place more responsibility in the departments and Agencies while insuring that the NSC, with my Assistant for National Security Affairs, continues to integrate and facilitate foreign and defense policy decisions.

These directives provided that the work of the NSC system would be carried out by two subordinate committees.

The **Policy Review Committee** develops policies for the President in areas where the basic responsibilities lie within one Department but where the decision will have important implications for other Departments. It is usually chaired by the Secretary of State. Interdepartmental groups are formed and operate under the direction of the committee.

The **Special Coordination Committee** deals with issues that require interdepartmental coordination. Examples include arms control and intelligence activities. As defined in Presidential Directive 2, the committee has also been used to develop the U.S. response to crises. It is chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

Within the NSC system, the National Security Adviser has a dual responsibility. First, at the President's request, he provides advice on foreign and defense policy. He also directs the NSC system in order to bring options to the President's attention and to assure that the President's decisions are appropriately followed.

Finally, like all Presidential advisers, the National Security Adviser performs additional duties, such as conducting factfinding missions, on behalf of the President and at his direction.

Zorinsky Proposal

Against this background, I would like now to turn to Senator Zorinsky's proposal. There is, I believe, general agreement on three propositions.

First, there is complete agreement on the principle that the Congress has a vital role in American foreign policy, both in helping to guide its direction and in monitoring its implementation. Those responsibilities have

taken on new meaning in recent years as we have worked to build a post-Vietnam consensus on our international priorities. The Administration recognizes that the United States can have an effective and durable foreign policy only if the Congress is fully informed and involved.

Second, a proposition which I take to be common ground is that, except for the President himself, the principal executive authority for American foreign policy must reside in one person—the Secretary of State. The self-evident nature of this proposition is reflected in congressional enactments which have conferred upon the Secretary of State the responsibility for implementing our international policy and for assuring that American interests are properly represented in the world.

Third, we also believe there is agreement that the President of the United States requires a personal and confidential staff of his own choosing. He must be able to draw upon advisers who, within the law, answer only to him. He must be able to hear a wide range of views and consider all possible options when he makes his decisions. The availability of the unfettered advice of persons the President trusts serves not just the convenience of the President, but the interests of the country as well.

In outlining the agreement on these three central propositions, I have defined the three interests that are most directly touched by the proposal before this committee: the oversight interest of the Congress; the national interest in a sound structure for conducting our international relations; and the Presidential interest in managing his own office and responsibilities.

In our judgment, the proposed legislation is not necessary for achieving the first of these interests, and it would tend to be inconsistent with the other two.

As I believe this committee recognizes, the Carter Administration has demonstrated a sustained commitment to a fully informed Congress. Administration witnesses from the Secretary of State on down are routinely available to discuss every aspect of our international policy.

The recent events in Iran and Afghanistan offer apt examples. Secretary Vance and I have provided regular briefings to both the Senate and House leadership—sometimes daily, regularly

twice weekly—and we have provided many briefings to the committee and to all the members.

On these and on a wide range of other issues, State Department officials have been readily available for formal testimony and have conducted countless informal briefings and consultations. You hear regularly from the Secretary as well as from me, from the Under Secretaries, from the Assistant Secretaries and their deputies, from the directors of offices and the administrators of Agencies, and from our ambassadorial nominees.

This access reaches two of the four statutory members of the National Security Council—the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense—and all its statutory advisers and their principal assistants.

These are the officials with direct responsibility for our policy and our programs in the world. Either through designation by statute, or through delegation from the President or Secretary of State, they have the direct authority to shape and implement our policy and the specific obligation to account for public funds.

By contrast, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs does not administer statutory programs. He does not expend public funds. Rather, the principal roles of the National Security Adviser are to provide confidential advice to the President and to coordinate foreign policy. His appearance to testify on the Hill would impinge upon the President's right to obtain confidential advice from individuals responsible only to him.

Opposition to the Proposal

Thus, the Zorinsky proposal would provide the Congress with, at most, a redundant source of information. At the same time, the proposal would compromise crucial interests by hindering the capacity of the executive branch to represent effectively the Nation's interests in the world.

First, the proposal would inevitably, if unintentionally, diminish the authority of the Secretary of State. If our own Congress were to look explicitly to another source for authoritative descriptions of American policy, then governments elsewhere would be inspired to do the same. This

alteration in our foreign policy structure would confuse foreign governments and complicate our foreign relations.

The simple truth is that the focus of American foreign policy, under the President's direction, must reside in one person—the Secretary of State. As chief officer of the Department which implements foreign policy, he is uniquely situated to comprehend all the interests that must be weighed when national policy is formed.

Nearly 20 years ago similar issues were raised in the exhaustive Senate study of national policy machinery conducted by the Jackson subcommittee of the Government Operations Committee. Faced with the deepening complexity and expanding reach of international issues, the subcommittee noted the belief of some:

... That the remedy lies in some radical organizational change (for example) a super Cabinet First Secretary, or a "super staff" agency in the White House. The appeal of a quick solution is understandable, if one could be found. But such novel additions to the policy process, far from reducing the President's burdens, would in all likelihood increase them. The President's best hope lies along another path—strengthening the traditional means of executive power.

That reasoning remains valid today. I hope the Congress will not mandate that we move the opposite way.

Let me turn now to the final and most compelling reason for opposing Senator Zorinsky's proposal. It would directly impinge upon the Office of the President by limiting his necessary flexibility in foreign policy.

The Constitution confers upon the President broad powers and discretion in the field of foreign policy. The Supreme Court has described the Presidency as the "sole organ of the Federal Government in the field of international relations." It has declared that the President must be afforded:

A degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved (*United States v. Curtiss-Wright*) Export Corp., 299 U.S. 301.

In the post-Vietnam period, the involvement of the Congress in foreign policy decisions has, of course, increased through such steps as the War Powers Act, notifications on executive

agreements and intelligence activities, review of confidential arms sales, and others. These initiatives, however, have been designed to help the Congress to perform better its own constitutional duties.

Now, in my view, we are presented with something quite different: a step that bears no strong legislative purpose, but which would inhibit the President in the performance of functions that are clearly assigned to him.

As the Chief Executive of the country, the President should have an opportunity to arrange the flow of information and executive decisions according to his personal preference. The Government Operations Committee put it this way in 1960:

Each President will have his own style of doing business—the product of his nature and experience. Each President, therefore, needs great freedom to adapt his office and procedures to suit the peculiarities of his style.

As the chief architect of American foreign policy, the President must be able to choose his personal and confidential advisers without the searching inquiry that confirmation hearings entail. It is inappropriate for the Senate to pass on the qualifications of intimate Presidential advisers, for only the President is in a position to adjudge the needs of his immediate office and to decide what, if any, advice he requires and who, if anyone, will provide it. Just as it is unthinkable that the selection of personal aides of Senators would be subject to outside scrutiny, it is equally unthinkable that the appointment of the President's personal advisers should be subject to the advice and consent of the Senate.

Paradoxically, the legislation that Senator Zorinsky submitted last year appears to recognize the importance of Presidential discretion in the appointment of his personal staff. By leaving it to the President to determine what, if any, duties shall be assigned to the National Security Adviser, the proposal recognizes that the President must have the freedom to organize his office as he sees fit. It would seem inconsistent to require confirmation of an individual to whom no duties are legislatively assigned.

Moreover, as the nation's chief diplomat, the President should have flexibility to decide the level and for-

mality of our contacts with other countries, including the use of personal emissaries when he deems it appropriate. So long as the Congress is informed and the Administration is answerable for the results, the prerogatives of the Congress are in no way impaired.

Our system provides ample opportunity to question and challenge the President's decisions. But if our government is to operate effectively, it must accord the President breathing space. Some Presidents will organize their office in a highly structured way others will feel more comfortable with less formal arrangements. The proposal under consideration is an unwarranted intrusion by the Congress that will needlessly hamper future Presidents

Conclusion

I believe that the Zorinsky proposal an unwise incursion into an area that has traditionally—and appropriately—been within the President's exclusive control. We oppose the legislation because we wish to deny Congress information it needs. The relationship that this Administration has had with Capitol Hill belies that notion. Rather we oppose it because it would deny the President the flexibility he needs to formulate and execute foreign policy and would compromise the confident advice of trusted advisers.

Under the President's direction, the current arrangements for the conduct of foreign policy are satisfactory. The Secretary of State and the National Security Adviser have maintained a sound working relationship that allows the President, with congressional consultation, to direct our foreign policy. The present arrangements serve the President well and, I believe, they serve the country well.

¹ The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Reported Use of Lethal Chemical Weapons in Afghanistan and Indochina

Statements by Jerome J. Shestack, U.S. Representative to the U.N. Human Rights Commission, before the 36th U.N. Human Rights Commission meeting in Geneva on March 10, 1980, and Matthew Nimetz, Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology, before the Subcommittees on Asian and Pacific and International Security and Scientific Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on April 24, 1980.¹

AMBASSADOR SHESTACK

The 36th U.N. Human Rights Commission cannot conclude its work without recognizing the repeated and disturbing reports of the use of lethal chemical agents by Communist military forces against both civilians and soldiers in Afghanistan, Laos, and Kampuchea.

My delegation already has addressed this topic during this body's consideration of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Commission is aware of refugee accounts and circumstantial evidence that Soviet or cooperating Afghan forces may have used lethal chemical agents in their efforts to suppress continued Afghan nationalist resistance. Some of these accounts describe such effects as including blindness, paralysis, and death. There is additional, clearcut evidence that Soviet troops have brought chemical decontamination equipment to Afghanistan and that Soviet or cooperating Afghan airstrikes have taken place in areas of that country where lethal chemical agents reportedly have been used.

While the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has understandably commanded the world's attention—and this Commission's solemn condemnation—we should not ignore the conflict in human rights deprivations experienced by the people of Indochina. In addition to general human rights abuses which this body already has expressed concern, there are specific reports that lethal chemical agents are

being used against both soldiers and noncombatants in Laos and Kampuchea.

Many of the members of the Hmong (Meo) hilltribes minority arriving in Thailand as refugees from Laos have reported lethal chemical attacks by Viet-

If these reports are true, a line has been crossed in the nature of modern warfare, into a realm previously considered "out of bounds" under treaty and international law.

namese and Lao forces there. In some cases, they have stated that they were the actual victims of such attacks. Typical is the testimony of a 12-year-old girl, Xe Xiong, who lost both parents and sustained severe injuries associated with chemical warfare when a plane launched rockets on her small village of 50 people.

There also is a growing number of reports from Kampuchea that chemical warfare is being practiced there by Vietnamese forces, not only in isolated areas in the interior but also in areas along the Khmer-Thai border, not far from huge concentrations of already suffering refugees.

It is in the nature of the conflicts in Afghanistan and Indochina that the world presently does not yet possess conclusive physical evidence of the use of lethal chemical agents. At the same time the insistent accumulation of this increasingly persuasive evidence must cause all civilized nations profound concern. If these reports are true, a line has been crossed in the nature of modern warfare, into a realm previously considered "out of bounds" under treaty and international law. We can only condemn any use of such lethal weapons as outrageous and inhumane and call for its immediate cessation.

We must not turn our eyes from such reports. The members of this Commission have a right—and a

duty—to investigate and determine the facts. This would be accomplished most effectively by an independent investigative committee, established by this Commission, and empowered to receive testimony from refugees and to examine the sites of alleged chemical attacks and other relevant evidence.

The United States favors the establishment of such an investigative committee in the interest of getting at the facts. To deter future use of these agents, this Commission needs to make it very clear that the world is watching and monitoring closely the reports of the use of lethal chemical weapons in Afghanistan and Indochina. As the distinguished American jurist, Louis Brandeis, expressed it some 50 years ago in combatting human rights abuses in the United States: "The best disinfectant is sunlight." We intend to keep the full glare of world opinion directed on this issue.

UNDER SECRETARY NIMETZ

I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss two matters of serious concern to the U.S. Government—reports of the use of lethal, incapacitating, and irritant chemicals in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia and an outbreak of illness last April in the Soviet city of Sverdlovsk which may have been connected with a biological warfare agent.

Beginning with the issue of the use of chemical weapons, let me give you a brief description of the information at our disposal, the actions we have taken to date both to increase our knowledge and to bring any such use to a stop, and the strategy we now plan to follow.

These reports of possible chemical weapons use are naturally of considerable concern to the United States for a number of reasons.

First, such use of lethal or incapacitating chemical weapons would contradict the civilized practices of all nations.

Second, it would violate the basic and long-established rule of international law prohibiting the first use in war of lethal or incapacitating chemical weapons.

Human Rights

Third, these reports indicate the possibility that in some cases chemical weapons may have been used against defenseless civilian populations in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia. This would be even more inhumane and in itself a violation of the basic international law prohibiting attacks or acts of violence directed against civilians who take no part in hostilities.

Finally, these reports must be viewed seriously by the United States and our allies in terms of what they indicate about Soviet capabilities, doctrine, and intentions in chemical warfare.

I want to emphasize at the same time that we are not in a position either to confirm or disprove, conclusively, reports of the use of chemical weapons in remote areas where the U.S. Government has no presence. But this is not a trial. We are not prosecutors who must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the issue is sufficiently serious and the reports of sufficient significance and credibility to warrant a thorough, impartial international investigation. And it is essential that we maintain relentless international pressure to deter any future use of such weapons.

Reported Use of Chemical Weapons

Evidence at Hand. Let me make some brief comments about the use of chemical weapons in Laos and Kampuchea. We have previously testified before this committee on this subject and have shared with you what information we had available at that time. After discussing with you our most recent information on Southeast Asia, I will go into more detail on reported chemical weapons' use in Afghanistan, where the reports are more recent and on which we have not yet had an opportunity to brief you.

Laos. In the hearing before this committee on December 12, 1979, Deputy Assistant Secretary [for East Asian and Pacific Affairs] Evelyn Colbert informed you that the result of U.S. Government investigations supported the conclusion that some chemical agent or agents had been used against the Hmong people of Laos as part of the Lao Government's efforts to bring the

Hmong under its control. She outlined how, beginning in 1974, and with increasing frequency in 1976 and 1977, there were reports of the use of chemical agents delivered by air, causing illness or death among the Hmong tribesmen. She also informed you that, based on our investigations and on refugee reports and other evidence of such chemical weapons' use, we had raised this issue with the Governments of Laos, Vietnam, and the Soviet Union, as well as other governments, and had made several statements in international fora on this issue in Southeast Asia.

Since Ms. Colbert's testimony, there have been additional reports of gas attacks in Laos. A refugee claimed that there had been gas attacks on June 25 and 26, 1979, in Luang Prabang Province and told of an incident in November in which civilians were reportedly killed by chemical agents in Houa Phan Province. Another Hmong said he had talked to an eyewitness of an attack in October 1979 in Ban Pha Koi, Luang Prabang Province.

In late December, a U.S. Army Medical Corps doctor, on a field trip to northern Thailand, interviewed four refugees in Chiang Khan district who claimed to have undergone attacks at various times in Laos. One of the four claimed to have witnessed an attack in September 1979 in Luang Prabang Province. The doctor noted, however, that physicians questioned at the large Ban Vinai camp for Hmong refugees "did not report seeing any patients with signs or symptoms suggesting the use of chemical agents."

Cables in January 1980 from our diplomatic posts in the area noted five reports of chemical weapons attacks in Laos after May 1979. One of the sources claimed to have actually witnessed the attacks; the others were secondhand reports. All but one of the sources were described as present or former resistance members.

The information at our disposal, both from the earlier period and the more recent reports, supports the conclusion that Vietnamese and Lao forces have used chemical agents against the Hmong tribesmen for several years. Our estimates, based on interviews of Hmong refugees, are that approximately 700-1,000 persons may have died as a result of the use of chemical agents and that many times this

number may have been made ill.

Various physical symptoms have reportedly resulted from contact with the delivered agents. Symptoms described range from skin pallor, puffy eyes and face, bloodshot eyes, headaches, and poor coordination to severe coughing, uncontrollable vomiting, hemorrhaging from the nose and mouth, blindness, convulsions, and death.

The characteristics of the agents and the physical symptoms described suggest to the U.S. intelligence community that at least three types of chemical warfare agents may have been used. One of these may be a nerve agent; an irritant agent may also have been used. However, U.S. analysis of a few samples of residue from material reportedly used in the aerial attacks was inconclusive.

With regard to the Soviet role in Laos, I would note that the Soviet Union provides substantial military assistance and military advisers to the Vietnamese and Laotian forces. Therefore, they would presumably be in a position at least to be aware that chemical agents had been used. Moreover, since we know of no lethal or incapacitating agents being produced in Southeast Asia, it is also possible that the Soviet Union is supplying any chemical agents, weapons, and training involved. There is a possibility as well, however, that the irritants involved come from captured U.S. stocks.

Kampuchea. The evidence is less substantial in Kampuchea, although there is a possibility that Vietnamese and Heng Samrin forces are using irritant agents against both Pol Pot and Khmer Serei forces, especially along the Thai-Kampuchean border.

Democratic Kampuchean forces are centrally controlled and engage in intensive propaganda campaigns. As a result, we have carefully evaluated refugee reports on this subject. We have been cautious in evaluating their broadcasts and press releases concerning alleged chemical weapons use in Kampuchea. However, there is enough circumstantial evidence to warrant serious concern and a careful investigation and analysis of the possible use of lethal agents.

Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, we regard it as highly likely that the Soviet invasion forces have used irritant

gents in their efforts to suppress the Afghan resistance. And there are a number of refugee reports, which we have not been able to confirm or disprove so far, that the Soviets have also employed lethal and incapacitating chemical agents² as well.

These reports from Afghan refugees in Pakistan and nationalist leaders have led us to conclude the chances are about even that lethal agents have or have not been used by Soviet forces in trying to suppress the Afghan resistance.

The Soviets have deployed chemical defense battalions, standard in all Soviet divisions, with three of the operational divisions in Afghanistan. Soviet troops in the Kabul area have been seen carrying what appear to be gas masks in canvas cases. The Soviets may also have established decontamination stations in northeast Afghanistan. The presence of these chemical and defense battalions and stations—which, I said, are standard features of Soviet military operations—clearly does not confirm the actual use of toxic chemicals. However, such units would be essential for ground force operations in terrain contaminated with toxic agents.

There were unconfirmed reports at Soviet aircraft dropped chemical bombs on resistance strongholds in the eastern provinces even before the invasion. The earliest reports of air attacks were in August and September 1979, in which chemical agents were said to have been used in the Panjshir valley area—northeast of Kabul—against nationalist forces who were attempting to interdict the Salang highway.

Since the invasion, Afghan nationalist forces and refugees have reported the Soviet use of chemical bombs against their strongholds in Badakhshan and Konarha Provinces and near Feyzabad and Jalalabad. In particular, on December 27, 1979, Soviet MiG-type aircraft reportedly dropped chemical bombs. The location of this attack was not given, but the same report mentioned other chemical attacks in Badakhshan Province.

Another report speaks of chemical bomb attacks during the third week of January against nationalist forces near Feyzabad and Jalalabad, in the Hazarajat area of Bamian Province and Takhar Province, all in eastern Af-



ghanistan. In the latter case, the bombs reportedly exploded in midair, dispersing a "vapor" that those affected by it said felt damp on the skin. Inhalation of the vapor is said to have caused difficulty in breathing, nasal excretions, vomiting, blindness, paralysis, and death.

Most recently, several Afghan refugees claim to have witnessed air attacks in which gas canisters were used against resistance forces and villages. These attacks, in Badakhshan Province between late January and early February, allegedly caused eyes to tear, coughing, loss of motor control, "senselessness," and, in many in-

stances, death. Earlier attacks in Wardak Province reportedly caused similar effects but no deaths.

Further Evidence Gathered

Laos and Kampuchea. Since late 1978, we have actively sought to bring these reports to the attention of competent authorities and develop information on the continuing reports of poison gas use against the Hmong. In October 1978, we called to the attention of the Lao Charge d'Affaires, in Washington, the first reports we had received alleging use of poison gas in Laos. Later that month, Assistant Secretary [for East Asian and Pacific Affairs] Richard Hol-



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of Foreign Affairs later in January, expressing the hope that Laos would "find no difficulty in acceding to it, as have many other nations in the world." In addition to formal demarches, we have regularly raised the issue on an informal basis with the Lao.

The subject has been discussed with the Vietnamese most recently in a March 26 meeting between Mr. Negroponte and Vietnamese Ambassador to the U.N., Ha Van Lau.

Afghanistan. When we began to receive reports of possible use of lethal chemical weapons in Afghanistan, we intensified all of our efforts on this issue.

On January 24 and March 5 of this year, the Department spokesman [Hodding Carter III] expressed our deep concern. He stated that while we were not able to establish conclusively that lethal chemical agents had been used, if these reports were true, we would regard such use as outrageous and inhumane.

On March 10, at the 36th U.N. Human Rights Commission meeting in Geneva, the U.S. Representative [Jerome J. Shestack] made a strong statement expressing our alarm at mounting reports of the use of chemical weapons by Communist military forces in Afghanistan, Kampuchea, and Laos. Our statement condemned the use of such weapons and urged establishment by the Commission of an independent investigative committee empowered to receive testimony from refugees and examine the sites of alleged chemical attacks and other relevant data.

While other Commission members were not yet ready to adopt a decision on the subject at the March meeting, the U.S. statement in Geneva served notice of our determination to pursue this issue vigorously and to focus world opinion on it. We believe it important that, to deter further employment of such chemical agents, the Human Rights Commission and other appropriate international organizations must demonstrate strong international concern over reports of their use.

Last month, the head of the U.S. Mission in Geneva briefed a member of the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) about the use of chemical weapons in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan and asked to be briefed on any relevant reports by officials of the UNHCR particularly those

brooke traveled to Vientiane and discussed our concern about Hmong human rights and related issues with Lao leaders.

In January 1979, the Department of State again informed the Lao Embassy of its concern about reports that chemical weapons were being used in Laos, coupling this with a similar demarche in Vientiane. The Lao denied the validity of the reports.

We pursued this matter in international fora as well, when in March 1979, the U.S. Representative to the 35th session of the U.N. Human Rights Commission [Jerome J. Shestack] expressed the concern of the United States about the plight of the Hmong, specifically raising the issue of chemical weapons¹ use.

As part of our efforts to obtain more information, a State Department representative went to refugee camps in Thailand in May 1979 to interview Hmong claiming to be eyewitnesses and/or victims of chemical warfare attacks in Laos. He also visited Vientiane where he discussed the problem with various diplomatic missions and the senior U.N. representative in Laos. During the visit he raised this issue directly with the Lao Foreign Ministry.

In September 1979, a Department

of Defense medical team was dispatched to Thailand to interview Hmong who claimed to have knowledge of gas attacks in Laos. The team compiled a report on their findings which is reflected in the assessment I presented earlier.

In late 1979, we raised the issue in demarches to the Vietnam and the Soviet Union Governments requesting that they, too, look into reports that chemical weapons were being used in Indochina and, should the reports prove valid, put an end to the practice. As had the Government of Laos, both governments categorically denied the validity of the reports.

Deputy Assistant Secretary [for Oceans and Fisheries Affairs, John D.] Negroponte raised the reports that chemical weapons were being used, during a call on Lao Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials in Vientiane in January 1980. After exchanging views on the reports, Mr. Negroponte asked if the Lao People's Democratic Republic adhered to the 1925 Geneva protocol. The Lao replied that they were not bound by agreements France signed during that period. They did, however, agree to study the question of adherence. The U.S. Embassy in Vientiane then sent the text of the 1925 protocol by diplomatic note to the Lao Ministry

operating in the field. We have also met with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to stress our concern and urge the ICRC to share any information they may develop. The ICRC issued a statement on March 18, 1980, condemning the use of lethal chemicals by any state, whether or not party to the 1925 Geneva protocol, as contrary to customary international law.

On March 18, at the 40-nation committee on Disarmament meeting in Geneva, our Ambassador made a strong statement pointing out that any use of chemical weapons could threaten the stability of the Geneva protocol and the ongoing efforts to negotiate a complete prohibition of chemical weapons. The following week, after Soviet rebuttal, we renewed the statement.

And this week in Geneva we responded to a totally unfounded charge by the regime installed in Afghanistan that the United States had supplied chemical weapons to the nationalist forces. This report apparently relates to the alleged capture in Afghanistan of a few canisters of U.S.-manufactured tear gas of a type commonly supplied to and used by police forces around the world. We stated that the United States has not supplied chemical weapons of any type to the resistance forces in Afghanistan and that this was an obvious attempt to cover up reports of use by the Soviets and Afghanistan military forces.

Strategy for the Future

The problem raised by these reports is a major concern for the world community as a whole—one which cannot and must not be ignored. Recognizing this, we have developed a strategy for pursuing this problem further, which includes action in a number of specific areas.

- We will be continuing and intensifying our efforts to ascertain the facts and, particularly, to collect further evidence and documentation. We are continuing to interview refugees in both Pakistan and Thailand who may have evidence of such activities or may have witnessed them.

- We are intensifying consultations with other countries. We are approaching our allies and key nonaligned governments to reiterate our concern

over these reports, to provide the information we have which leads to our concern, to indicate how we intend to deal with the problem and to urge them to join in publicly expressing concern and in making demarches to the countries involved, and to encourage their support for further investigation into the reports.

- We are consulting with interested states parties to the 1925 Geneva protocol and others about the possibility of convening a meeting in order to look into these reports. It should be noted, however, that Kampuchea, Laos, and Afghanistan are not parties to the protocol and that the Soviet Union adhered with a reservation that would not be bound with regard to states which are not parties. It is clear, though, that the Soviet Union would be prohibited by well-established customary international law from making first use of chemical weapons in war.

- We are pursuing this matter in multilateral fora and are considering whether it will be useful to raise this issue in the U.N. General Assembly session this fall. We will also continue to draw attention to this issue in the U.N. Human Rights Commission, the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, and other appropriate international bodies, encouraging other countries to make statements there as well. We will be careful, of course, not to let our statements exceed the evidence we have at hand.

- We will continue to stay in close touch with the Congress to keep you informed of the steps we are taking to meet this problem. And, needless to say, we will be seeking your continued support for the important work which I have outlined to you.

Biological Weapons

The Biological Weapons Convention, which entered into force in 1975 and to which the United States, the U.S.S.R., and 85 other states are party, provides for consultation and cooperation among the parties for the purpose of solving problems that may arise. As you know, the United States has recently initiated consultations with the Soviet Union as provided for under article V of the convention.

Information which became available to us in February this year about a disease outbreak in Sverdlovsk in the spring of 1979 raises questions as to

whether biological agents were present in quantities greater than those permitted by the convention for peaceful purposes. The Soviets responded to our demarche. After studying their response, we have gone back to request further information and consultations. I cannot go further into the nature of our intelligence in open session, however, but I understand that you have access to such material from the intelligence community.

At the Biological Weapons Convention review conference last month, we made a statement noting that this problem had arisen and that we were pursuing it with the Soviet Union under the terms of the convention. With our support, the concluding document of that conference called for the cooperation of all states in resolving any problems which arise and noted the right of any state party to request that a consultative meeting open to all states parties be convened at expert level to address any such problem. In addition, the Biological Weapons Convention itself states that such matters can be brought before the U.N. Security Council for resolution. Thus, the United States has yet a number of multilateral steps that can be taken in pursuit of this matter.

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

²There is a qualitative difference between incapacitants and what are commonly called riot control agents. Agents CS and CN are irritants commonly used as riot control agents by the police. Their effects wear off quickly once exposure to the agent ceases. Incapacitants tend to have effects that last for hours or days. These effects may be mental, physical, or both. ■

International Refugee Assistance Programs

by Victor H. Palmieri

*Statement before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on February 21, 1980. Ambassador Palmieri is U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs.*¹

As you know, over the past year or so there have been great increases in numbers of refugees worldwide, in the cost of providing relief for their care, and in the cost of resettling them or, where possible, repatriating them to the country from which they came. In Africa, for instance, a veritable explosion of refugees has forced the international community to increase greatly the refugee assistance it provides. Estimates of refugees and displaced persons on the African continent range from 2½ to 4 million. Given the continuing political and military conflicts, the numbers and needs of African refugees are not expected to decline in the foreseeable future. The international community must continue to be prepared to respond both to emergency and long-term situations on that continent, particularly in the light of the poverty of most of the countries providing asylum there.

In Southeast Asia, the number of refugees and displaced persons is over 1 million. There are several hundred thousand displaced Khmer on the Thai-Kampuchean border. We hope that most of them will be able to return to their homeland eventually. There are still 270,000 other Khmer, Vietnamese, Lao, and Hmong in camps throughout Southeast Asia, awaiting resettlement outside the region.

Thanks to a remarkable international effort, particularly since the U.N. meeting in Geneva last July, more than 190,000 Indochinese were resettled in 1979. As a result of accelerated departures and reduced arrivals, first-asylum countries are no longer pushing refugees out to sea or back across national borders. The outflow of refugees from Vietnam has subsided substantially because of Vietnam's agreement at the Geneva meeting to a moratorium on organized expulsion of ethnic Chinese and others whom the Vietnamese consider to be undesirable.

There is no way to accurately predict how long the moratorium will last and what the outflow will be in the future.

At the same time, the dimensions of the problem continue to grow in other areas of the world.

- In Pakistan there are more than 500,000 Afghan refugees, and that number may rise dramatically in the spring.

- In Latin America, thousands have been added to the refugee rolls as a result of civil strife in Central America.

- The number of Soviet Jews and others fleeing Eastern Europe exceeded 50,000 last year.

- In the Near East, some 1.8 million Palestine refugees are registered with the U.N. Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA).

These are some of the major highlights of a long litany of refugee problems.

In response to the growth of the worldwide refugee problem, the United States has considerably increased the level of U.S. funding for refugee programs. The Administration has requested \$552,298,000 for its FY 1981 international refugee programs, of which \$216 million, excluding funds provided to the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) for transportation services related to refugee resettlement in the United States, will be contributed to international organizations. This is tangible evidence of our conviction that, for the most part, multilateral efforts are the best approach to refugee assistance. We prefer international assistance for the following reasons.

- It insures that the international community shares both in the financial and moral responsibility for assisting refugees throughout the world.

- It helps reduce potential political problems inherent in funding, implementing, and monitoring refugee assistance.

- It recognizes that no one nation is capable of resolving refugee problems as large and complex as those we face today.

Yet it is the very scope and complexity of current programs that behoove us to maintain a critical watch on

their management and the level of our own contributions. Let me review the Administration's proposed voluntary contributions to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNRWA, ICEM, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

UNHCR

The principal organization, both in terms of its mandate and the dollar volume of its assistance program, is the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. For the past 30 years, the UNHCR has been the international community's principal instrument to protect the rights of refugees and others displaced as a result of military conflict and civil strife, in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention on the Status of Refugees. The UNHCR has also been the main international vehicle to provide the material assistance to ensure the physical survival of refugees as well as to arrange for their repatriation or permanent settlement in countries of first asylum or elsewhere.

In recent years, UNHCR's material assistance programs have grown dramatically in response to the exponential growth in the size of the worldwide refugee problem. In the last 4 years (1976-79), the dollar volume UNHCR assistance programs, as measured by contributions received, grew by 320%, to an alltime high of \$322 million. In 1980, it is estimated that level may reach \$495 million, representing a 544% increase over a 5-year period.

It is fairly obvious that organizations which undergo such massive expansion, whether they are public or private enterprises, are apt to suffer growing pains. Restructuring and improving the administration of organizations to accommodate larger program volume is difficult at best when confronted with the day-to-day need to respond quickly to emerging refugee situations.

Let me illustrate these difficulties in the context of the UNHCR's 1980 program. Last fall, the UNHCR estimated its material assistance program needs to be \$234 million. Within 3 months, new demands raised that original estimate by \$261 million. This increase reflects the following developments.

• The breakthrough in the Zimbabwe/Rhodesia talks permitted agreement to return some 250,000 refugees from Botswana, Zambia, and Mozambique. UNHCR has issued a \$22 million special appeal for that purpose, 9 million of which are new requirements.

• The number of refugees in Somalia rapidly reached crisis proportions late last year (currently estimated to be 570,000). The UNHCR estimates will require an additional \$35 million to meet those needs.

• 500,000 Afghan refugees have already fled into Pakistan as a result of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The UNHCR has requested an additional \$9 million to provide emergency care and maintenance for them. These numbers may increase to a million this spring.

• The number of Khmer fleeing the ravages of war and starvation increased significantly as a result of continued Vietnamese offensives. Several hundred thousand Khmer are dependent on international relief, and many more may move toward the border in coming months after the present harvest is exhausted. After a preliminary review, the UNHCR estimates that they may need an additional \$92 million for longer relief.

• An additional \$40 million is needed to continue the expansion of the refugee processing centers in the Philippines and Indonesia. These centers are important since they help accelerate the movement of refugees out of the temporary camps in the first-column countries of Southeast Asia and provide an opportunity for better orientation and training of refugees prior to their resettlement in the United States and other countries.

• Lastly, an additional \$26 million will be needed, according to the UNHCR estimates, to meet new or special requirements to finance refugee education programs and other relief programs, including Nicaragua and Uganda.

These kinds of requirements are difficult to predict or budget. But, given the rapidly growing UNHCR budget and the importance the United States and other nations attach to the UNHCR effort, we have begun discussions with other governments on

ways to help UNHCR to improve its planning, budgeting, and operations. The High Commissioner has welcomed this initiative and has indicated his willingness to begin a series of reviews and discussions with an informal group of major donor countries to begin the effort. For our own part, the United States will be reviewing its own programs to arrive at the best possible use of our resources to be helpful to the High Commissioner in the coming weeks and months.

To sum up this review of the UNHCR, I would like to point out that it has been quite successful in spreading the financial burden of refugee programs more equitably among other nations. That success has allowed the United States to reduce its share from 46.7% to 28.2% of total contributions over the 4-year period ending in 1979, even though the UNHCR budget has increased 320% during that period. This is laudable progress. We will continue to encourage UNHCR in its efforts to spread the burden-sharing as broadly as possible. In the final analysis, the problem of refugees is a world problem, and the financial and moral responsibility must be shared by the world community of nations.

UNRWA

In the Near East, there are equally serious and potentially explosive problems. It continues to be in the interest of the United States and the international community to contribute to the stabilization of the region through the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine refugees. The fact that UNRWA is still caring for Palestine refugees 30 years after its creation is a sad commentary on the inability of the world community to resolve the pressing problem of the Palestinians. Until a just and comprehensive solution is reached, UNRWA's humanitarian work for the refugees is essential—as is our continued strong support for UNRWA's efforts.

UNRWA plays the vital role of providing services to the Palestine refugee population that now numbers 1.8 million (up from 750,000 in 1950). They are concentrated in five areas: the Gaza Strip, the West Bank of the Jordan River, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria.

UNRWA provides virtually all of its services directly to the refugees

rather than through the governments controlling their areas. UNRWA has its own school system, clinics, and health units to provide the educational and health services that would normally be provided by national ministries of education, health, and welfare. It is an efficiently run organization that is able to provide services at remarkably low costs: Education costs run about \$250 per pupil per year; medical services cost about \$12 per patient per year; and total UNRWA assistance averages about \$162 per eligible refugee per year.

UNRWA's budget for 1980, as presented in the Commissioner General's report to the General Assembly in September 1979, is \$185.3 million. But in February 1980 that figure was revised upward to \$210.5 million. For 1981 the budget will be approximately \$232 million.

UNRWA's budget increases are based upon three factors: the cost of providing the growing registered refugee population with education, health, and supplemental relief services if necessary; the rate of inflation in the region—over 100% in the occupied territories, 20% in Jordan; and the declining value of the U.S. dollar, on which UNRWA's accounts are based.

For 3 years the United States has virtually straightlined its contribution: We pledged \$51.5 million in 1978 and \$52 million in both 1979 and 1980. During this period the UNRWA budget has grown from \$148 million in 1978 to \$151.8 million in 1979 and \$210.5 million for 1980. As a result, while the UNRWA budgets were increasing, the U.S. contribution as a percentage of the announced budget was decreasing. The State Department has budgeted \$62 million for the 1981 U.S. contribution to UNRWA.

The United States has made it clear that we view the support of UNRWA to be the responsibility of the world community. Only last August the U.S. chairman of the UNRWA Advisory Commission stated in his opening remarks to that 10-nation body: "UNRWA is the responsibility of the world community, which should support the organization to the degree that it will be able to maintain services to the refugees at the required levels."

I am pleased to report that Arab

Human Rights

members of the United Nations are beginning to share this view. Heretofore they maintained that since the United States and other Western states created the Palestine refugee problem they should be solely responsible for the financial costs of UNRWA. But that attitude is changing. At the last U.N. General Assembly, Arab representatives spoke of world community and their responsibility toward UNRWA. More important, Arab countries have begun to increase their contributions.

ICEM

Next, I would like to discuss our contributions to the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration. ICEM plays a major role in the moving of refugees for permanent resettlement throughout the world. Since 1952, some 2.6 million refugees and migrants have been relocated under their auspices. Last year, ICEM moved 248,000 persons, of whom 160,000 were Indochinese refugees and 59,000 were Eastern Europeans and Soviet Jews. ICEM estimates that it will move 263,000 people in 1980. This is not only a remarkable logistical achievement but a humanitarian undertaking which deserves our support.

Of the estimated 263,000 to be moved in 1980, 168,000 will be Indochinese refugees coming to the United States. ICEM will arrange for documentation, medical screening, transportation and, if necessary, care in transit facilities at the decommissioned Hamilton Air Force Base near San Francisco for refugees awaiting onward movement. These costs will total \$121.8 million. An additional \$11.25 million will be provided to ICEM for transportation services for Soviet, Eastern European, and other refugees.

Our proposed contribution to ICEM for its overall operations in 1981 is \$5 million of which \$2.58 million is for the administrative budget and \$2.42 million for the operational budget.

ICEM's administrative budget is financed by mandatory contributions from member governments in accordance with the scale of assessment adopted by the ICEM council and agreed to by each member government. Our assessed contribution for 1981 is \$2.58 million, or one-third of the administrative budget of \$7.2 million. This is an increase of \$214,000 over our

1980 assessment. The administrative budget provides for the basic administrative staff in Geneva headquarters to supervise ICEM's operational program, including 30 field offices.

In 1981, we propose to make a voluntary contribution of \$2.42 million to the operational budget, which represents 25% of ICEM's estimated budget and an increase of \$666,000 over our voluntary contributions last year. These funds support ICEM's migration program for Latin America, Europe, the Middle East, and Africa.

ICEM also plays an important role in encouraging the migration, either from Europe to Latin America or within Latin America, of skilled workers and professionals requested by Latin American governments. We are exploring the possibility that ICEM could apply its experience and contacts in Latin America to play an even greater role in the resettlement of Indochinese refugees.

At present, ICEM has two special appeals outstanding—for Nicaragua and Uganda. After the civil war ended, the Government of Nicaragua asked ICEM to assist in the return of its skilled workers, technicians, and experts who had fled the country for political or other reasons. Some people have already been assisted in returning. Several hundred others already registered with ICEM will be similarly assisted. In addition, the Government of Nicaragua requested ICEM to recruit technicians from the industrialized countries to fill vacant posts in the country. Denmark, Germany, and Italy have contributed a total of \$420,000 to the program.

ICRC

Finally, let me comment on our contributions to the International Committee of the Red Cross. Although it is not specifically a refugee organization, it is unique in that it can act decisively to provide relief to victims of armed conflict or internal strife. It is not restricted by political considerations as are other international organizations.

The United States proposes to continue to support the ICRC in its humanitarian task by again contributing \$1 million to the general budget in 1981.

We will also continue to provide special contributions for ICRC programs in specific areas.

To date in FY 1980, we have made contributions to the ICRC of \$2.5 million for Kampuchean relief programs. These funds were made available primarily to provide food for those in need and to recruit doctors and medical teams to assist refugees on the Thai-Kampuchean border.

For ICRC's African programs, we propose to contribute \$5 million for 1980 and \$7 million for 1981. These programs will provide food, shelter, and medical care to 13 African nations. The major programs are in the Horn and southern Africa.

We are confronted by a refugee problem for which financial and moral responsibility must be shared by the international community. To this end, the United States this year and next year will continue to provide the maximum support to international refugee organizations consistent with our fair share of the burden.

In summary, it is vital to U.S. interests that we continue to approach refugee problems through international organizations wherever possible. By doing so, we demonstrate our commitment to resolve refugee problems collectively. Our continued participation in these international organizations enhances our influence in solving global problems. It permits us to achieve through international cooperation what we cannot achieve alone.

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Secretary Muskie's News Conference of June 13

as been agreed that the meeting of Ambassador Linowitz [Sol M. Linowitz, Personal Representative of the President for the Middle East Peace Negotiations] will hold with the Israeli and Egyptian heads of delegations, Dr. Yehonatan Burg and Foreign Minister Yehonatan Ali, will take place in Washington on July 2 and 3. I am very pleased at this further development in joint efforts to pursue the armistice talks, and, hopefully, we will build some momentum in moving forward.

The second subject I would like to turn upon, with a sense of realism, is the FY 1980 foreign assistance appropriations bill. I would hope I might be able to make a case sufficiently here that it gets the kind of attention which the Congress might give.

We have been operating in this fiscal year—nearly two-thirds over—on a continuing resolution. This is the only appropriations bill which has been cleared for 1980, and the provisions of the continuing resolution were that we must operate at the lower level of the 1979 figures or the 1980 estimates, which leaves us about one-third over our program estimates and under.

And the result of this jam is that we have to find room under the third continuing resolution for 1980 to do the things that the Congress itself has said are very important, but the supplemental appropriations bill, reported by the House committee this week, would use up all that room, leaving no room for such items as these.

• Nicaragua aid, which the House last week approved for FY 1981, and an authorization bill with a margin of 74 votes. The case has been made that that is an important foreign policy priority, and there is no room for that \$75 million in the 1980 continuing resolution, and we are on the threshold of a foreign policy failure in a very sensitive area because of the failure of the Congress to provide the resources.

• Cambodia refugee assistance—\$100 million. The Congress has evidenced strong support for this objective for this program and for this policy, and now when it comes to providing the money to follow through, there is a possibility that we will not have it.

• Disaster relief—we are entirely

out of disaster relief funds for FY 1980.

• The Congress has indicated strong support for \$20 million of assistance in connection with the Caribbean hurricane, and the \$20 million isn't available.

• The World Bank—our contributions to the World Bank risk being defaulted, and as a result, we could lose our veto and, indeed, lose our right to choose an American successor to Mr. McNamara, as president of the World Bank.

• The African Development Bank—we could lose our right to participate in that important foreign policy objective.

I really don't urge a different posture with respect to these programs than I have for 22 years as a Senator. I find it ironic that it is so easy to make the case for greater defense spending on the Hill, and those numbers have risen by tens of billions of dollars in the last year. Yet, in these situations around the globe, which the Soviet Union regards as doors of opportunity to spread their influence and to have their way, we somehow can't find our way to produce the relatively few dollars, compared to defense spending, to take advantage of those doors of opportunity ourselves.

I think we are tremendously short-sighted in not recognizing the importance of those kinds of investments. Each day, as Secretary of State, I hear of situations here, there, or elsewhere around this planet where a little assistance—often a few hundred thousand dollars or a couple of million dollars—could be very visible evidence that the United States of America cares about dealing with these problems which create instability—thrusters for change which can be exploited around the planet.

And so, I take this opportunity to convey this sense of urgency to the Congress. I have talked to Members of the Congress, in both Houses, and they all point to the parliamentary difficulties which they face. I have faced those for 22 years, and I found that there is a way to pierce and to penetrate them, get around them, if there is a will to do so, so I don't buy that as an unavoidable excuse.

Q. Perhaps someone will return to one or both of those questions or issues, but I would like to ask you

about a third thing, which is of some urgency. The European allies have just approved a resolution saying the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] will have to be associated—that's their word "associated"—with peace negotiations, with any negotiations. They also support self-determination, which is a phrase we've heard before, for the Palestinians.

"Associated" is what I would like to concentrate on. It is ambiguous and perhaps a word of some compromise. Did the United States have anything to do with the selection of that word or that approach which seems to be a moderation of calling for participation right now in the peace process?

Secondly, from a U.S. viewpoint, does the United States—can it imagine the Palestinians, the Arab Palestinians, agreeing to a settlement without approval of the PLO?

A. With respect to your first question, the U.S. Government was not involved in the shaping of this European Community statement. We were not consulted about—and did not wish to be consulted about—what we regarded as a European effort to be helpful in the Middle East situation, so whatever words were chosen were words chosen by them.

They may or may not have been influenced by the discussions that I have had with the various members of the NATO governments as to the importance of not undercutting the Camp David process, supporting it—not diverting it. So to the extent they felt a sense of restraint, that might have produced some of the language—and I agree with you that it is interesting—that is found in the text.

I don't want to comment upon the text. The rough draft of the text came in only a few moments ago, and I would not want to try to definitively analyze it. But I was particularly pleased with the statement of Mr. Cossiga [Prime Minister of Italy] at the press conference in which he emphasized that it is the intent of the European Community not to undermine the Camp David process but to support it. And that is the signal that we have been getting, of course, for the last week.

Q. Now on the second part, to an extent—I don't think we do it completely—the United States tries to dissociate the PLO from its efforts, sometimes you are at the fringes of that. You invite mayors here, you

give them audiences, you offer them medical help, and they are, in some ways, related to the PLO; but you are trying to keep the PLO, *per se*, out.

What I'm asking is if you can expect to have your Camp David process succeed with Palestinian support without the Palestinians themselves getting a green light from the PLO. Wouldn't you expect the PLO has to say yes or no at some point, anyhow?

A. I think that one point ought to be very clear: We are not trying to keep the PLO out; but we are trying to make clear to the PLO that until it changes its posture with respect to Resolution 242, which it has never supported, and its recognition of Israel's right to exist, we will not deal with it on these questions. I think that has been a clear-cut, longstanding, and unchanged American position.

With respect to the broader negotiating base, which must include not only representatives of the Palestinian peoples—and we have urged the Palestinian peoples to join the negotiations but also Jordan, Syria, and other countries in the region—that is going to be a very tough problem when we get to that stage of the negotiations.

Obviously, a comprehensive peace in the Middle East cannot be achieved by negotiations which are forever limited to Israel, Egypt, and the United States. The negotiating base must be broadened at the right time, and even when we get to the right time, it is not going to be easy.

Q. In summary, then, do you think the fact of the European statement is going to have positive or negative effects on your process of negotiations, on the process of negotiations which is now underway?

A. I can really answer that question better after I have the benefit of some of the reactions that we unavoidably get to it and after I have had an opportunity to further study the text. The European Community has made clear its purpose, which is to be helpful in moving to a comprehensive peace.

I do not see anything on its face which directly challenges the Camp David process or seeks to divert the effort of the parties to the Camp David process from their work. And that being the case, I see no reason why we should not be able to proceed with the Camp David process.

Q. Could I put it slightly differently? Could it not be that this statement will, in fact, have a beneficial

effect on the negotiations by placing some pressure on the Israelis that the United States is either not willing or able to place itself?

A. I think its impacts could be better characterized by those who framed it than by me, especially since I haven't had an opportunity fully to study it. As I indicated following my own speech on Monday [June 9 before the Washington Press Club], in response to questions, you can never be sure when a speech on the Mideast, any aspect of it, will encounter negativism; and it wasn't until 24 hours later that I began to feel that maybe I had made a constructive and positive contribution to the discussion. So for me to make that kind of a judgment without a similar timeframe to this statement, I think would be to assume a capability for omniscience that I don't have.

Q. The King of Jordan is coming here next week. Do you see that as in any way related to the broader Middle East peace efforts? What do you hope to achieve on this visit that might contribute—you just mentioned trying to get Jordan into these talks?

A. I think it is important from time to time—and the President hasn't seen King Hussein since sometime in 1978—for the United States and Jordan to have general discussions about overall interests. I would be surprised if the Middle East questions didn't enter into those discussions, but there is no agenda for dealing specifically with Jordan's participation in the Camp David talks; King Hussein has made his position very clear here.

But at some point, Jordan is going to be impacted by the results—hopefully, the results of Camp David—and ought to be part of the negotiating base for whatever follows on. I think it is important, therefore, to continue a dialogue with King Hussein and the representatives of Jordan with respect to any subjects of mutual interest.

Q. You said you regard the European Community's statement as an effort to be helpful. Yet, the European statement talks about—

A. Could I correct that? I said that they had said it is an effort to be helpful.

Q. "They have said it is an effort to be helpful" because I have my note saying we regard it as a European effort to be helpful. I would like, nevertheless, to say with that single question—

A. I was speaking to their moti-

Q. Yes. They are saying that the PLO would have to be associated with the Middle East negotiations, flat out, without conditions—no 242 and no recognition of Israel.

I wonder if you could address yourself to that specific and highly delicate question.

A. Would you frame it a little more sharply?

Q. That is to say, the European Community is talking about the fact that the PLO would have to be associated without setting forth conditions for PLO association. Do you share that view or not?

A. I think the Palestinian people will have to be. Whether or not we would acquiesce in PLO participation—long as they continue on the record to be opposed to Israel's survival—is another question.

The European Community does have to be as concerned with that question as we have to be, because we are involved in specific negotiations; they are not. They are talking about a broad framework of policy considerations toward which they would hope the parties would move. And it is much easier to generalize that kind of objective than it is to pass judgment upon the eligibility for specific parties to be involved in specific negotiations.

I mean the ball is in the PLO's court. How do you expect a country like Israel's position to negotiate and reach an agreement with a group which is bent on its destruction and which repeats over and over again that that is its objective, as it did recently, it is not firm in effect that longstanding objective?

I think that until the PLO backs off from that long-repeated stand, that is not, in our judgment, eligible to participate in specific negotiations.

Q. That puts you in a direct clash—that is to say, the United States—with the position taken by the European Community on this question of PLO association.

A. That may be a newsman's way of discussing it. We are involved in a difference of opinion with respect to that but you have got to put that in a timeframe.

What the Europeans are trying to put together is a statement of direction in which they hope that not only Israel, the United States, and Egypt will ne-

the Arab countries generally, representatives of the Palestinian peoples, and so on.

In that kind of framework, pointing the middle term or longer term, however long it may take, what they are saying is that hopefully at some point the PLO having—and this may be implicit—they don't have to address the question specifically—hopefully with the PLO having abandoned some of its policies, ought to be represented.

That is a point of view with respect to the long term that is one thing. But when we, who are asked to exert our influence to bring the parties together to reach an agreement, have to consider the viability of what is proposed, we have to consider what the parties' position is, and the PLO's position is that it is not interested in a negotiated agreement with Israel. It is interested only in Israel's extinction.

That being the case, how do you invite them to join a negotiation aimed at ensuring Israel's survival? Before we can negotiate with them, they have to abandon that point of view.

Q. If I can narrow that down just a little bit, then do you find it helpful that the European Community has now called for the PLO to be associated with the peace process, and do you find it helpful in sustaining the Camp David process?

A. Again, the answer to that is going to depend upon the reaction of the parties to it.

As I said on Monday, the parties are toe-to-toe on tough issues. There is every human inclination, I suspect, to fall back from that kind of hard negotiation, if there is any reason to do so. And if they see this as a sufficient diversion so that they ought to step back from the negotiations to look at it more carefully, then the effect would be negative.

On the other hand, if they see it as simply an expression of European Community concern about the problem and European suggestions as to ways it might be dealt with that does not interfere with the continuation of the Camp David talks, then it is not negative.

The attitude of the parties is so much a part of the piece here that you can't make judgments anticipating those attitudes as to what its final effect would be.

Q. One of the reasons for this European initiative was their impatience with the slow pace of the Camp David negotiations. You have just

now announced the resumption of contacts on July 2d and 3rd. I wonder how long, in your view, this Israeli/Egyptian/American dialogue can or should or will go on.

A. I once conducted a fund-raising drive for a hospital that was about to go out of business, and the question was how much money did we need to raise, and I finally decided on this slogan: "Give enough to save the hospital."

I don't know how you define a timeframe for this sort of thing. Hopefully sooner would be better than later, and there are problems ahead that are obvious to all of us.

We are in an election year here. Both President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin have internal problems of their own. You have this impatience on the sidelines, which is understandable, both in Europe and among Arab nations; the possibility always of initiatives in the United Nations and the Security Council. We are walking through very crowded waters here, and very unsettled waters, and it is difficult to move in a straight line toward the ultimate objective.

What was put into motion was a process, and a few days may seem a long time, a few weeks may seem a long time, but as I think back to the late 1940s and the fact that over most of that time there were no negotiations at all, nothing but escalating violence and tension and division, then the timeframe within which we have been operating on the Camp David process seems much more reasonable.

Q. Should it then be open-ended?

A. It is open-ended in the sense that nobody is in a position to set a date for final conclusion, and, indeed, there is always the risk that we will not get through to the end. I think the parties ought to recognize that.

Q. You expressed hope recently to obtain the ratification of the SALT II Treaty in the Senate in that year or before the election after rather negative statements of your former colleague, Senator Byrd. I just wonder whether you still hope to obtain that goal of ratification in this year.

A. The fact is, there aren't the votes in the Senate at this point, for understandable reasons. Nevertheless, the objective is still a high priority objective of both the Soviet Union and the United States—arms control, for all of the reasons that have emerged over the years of the debate over arms control. We simply have to restate that commitment from time to time to make sure

that we don't lose it. This is a very delicate time with respect to the preservation of the SALT process and movement toward arms control and made so, of course, by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

My impression is that they still place high value on the importance of arms control, from their point of view, and so do we. If we can find a way to move together toward that objective while we resolve the Afghanistan issue, to which there seems to be no present answer, is the challenge that confronts both of us at the present time.

Q. If I could return to the Middle East for a moment, a State Department official yesterday, in talking about the Europeans, said: "Let's find two roads that can intersect rather than two roads that go apart." Then he went on to say: "Let's work on a process that gives the legitimate rights of the Palestinians practical political expression."

My questions is: Is the granting of some of the things you are trying to achieve in the autonomy talks, such as the turning over to the Palestinians the administration of justice, control over health and education facilities, will that give the Palestinians political opportunities that they have not had in the past?

A. A lot of those functions of government with respect to the transfer to the self-governing authority have already been agreed to by the negotiators, conditioned, of course, upon achieving a final agreement.

The five remaining functions—or the five remaining issues, which involve functions of government, are the tough ones: law and order; security—that is tough; land and settlements—that is tough; water—that is tough; voting. These are all rather central and fundamental issues when one considers the structure of a new political entity, which is what the self-governing authority is envisioned as becoming.

That is what it is all about: How far we can move in the direction of creating political rights for the Palestinian people, and what those rights ought to be.

Q. We are hearing a lot these days, but it is hard to make out what it means, from Iran. Both Bani-Sadr and the Ayatollah have talked about difficulties within the country. We have, on the other hand, Mr. Kreisky [Chancellor of Austria] and Mr. Palme [chairman, Social Democratic

Party of Sweden) now talking about the possible plans for getting the hostages out in the near future.

Could you give us an assessment of where we are right now in Iran and your analysis of the internal situation there?

A. These various initiatives—some made wholly independent of us, others made after advising us of the initiative and of the objective of the parties involved—continue and do not seem to diminish. The results are not entirely clear in part because one can't be sure that what people say publicly, especially in Iran, is what they say privately; whether or not what they say publicly is intended to influence the political situation in Iran or to signal an improvement in the situation for the hostages. You get both signals from them, depending upon where they are.

Mr. Ghotbzadeh has been in Oslo and the other countries represented there, or the other parties represented there, are all interested in resolving the hostage issue, and he went there. Now, what signal do you get from that?

He says that he went there in order to make clear to them the nature and the justification for the Iranian grievances. So the two are always linked. The fact is, of course, that authority is not yet concentrated in Iran in such a way as to give anybody, or any group, control over the final decision, except maybe Khomeini himself.

But there seems to be—with the caveats that I have made—a growing awareness and appreciation of the fact that continuing to hold the hostages is more of a problem for Iran than an opportunity.

Secondly, the holding of the hostages seems to be more related to the struggle for power in Iran than anything else.

If we can get to the point where political authority begins to be concentrated in Iran and to the point where Iran begins to perceive that it has other overriding priorities which it ought to be concentrating on and pursuing, I think we may reach the time when appropriate help from appropriate quarters could bring us to our goal.

Q. To go back to the question of the PLO, supposing the question of the European suggestion that they be associated, supposing the Egyptians asked the PLO to sit as advisers to their delegation, how would the United States react to that?

A. With respect to that, I think that we, as you—you are a pretty

sharp press in this conference—will be examining words like that and trying to reach conclusions about them and determine whether or not they might be helpful. I am not in a position to say that now.

I sometimes kill time by philosophizing, but I remember when I was in law school, and the professor was giving us some practical advice on how to behave when we became lawyers, and he said: "Assume that a client climbs up your stairs after weeks when nobody comes and presents a set of facts to you and asks you for a legal opinion. Now, having just graduated from law school, you, of course, will have an instant answer but don't yield to the impulse. Tell him to go home and to come back in a couple of days, and you run that set of facts through your law books again and determine whether or not your judgment is good. Then when he comes back, you give him the best advice that you possibly can.

"Now, as soon as he leaves, another client walks in with what seems to be the identical set of facts and asks for your opinion. Don't yield to impulse then either."

Q. I don't want to get you to yield to impulse, but if I am hearing you correctly, you are not really ruling out the possibility that the United States could accept the PLO as sitting as advisers.

A. The difficulty with affirming that kind of a conclusion is that it quickly becomes transformed from not ruling out to ruling in.

Q. But there is a transcript, and there is a specific response you gave that may reflect some of that legal training.

You ruled out their specific participation until they changed their stand on Israel. You did not rule out their association in some way without changing their stand on Israel. Those adjectives, those modifiers, are awfully important around this building.

You said "specific participation." Are you ruling out any participation by the PLO, associated or otherwise?

A. I am not passing any judgment on the word "associated." I am saying our position is still unchanged; that the PLO must support 242 and must abandon its long-held commitment to the extinction of Israel before we would be involved in talks with them. That is clear.

With respect to the word "association," any piece of paper that comes

before me that affects any issue or policy, obviously I study it carefully. Maybe I shouldn't speak too openly about the nature of the process, but that certainly is no secret to you. But do not intend to signal simply because have said that of course we would study any word, that, therefore, I rule something in or out. That simply is an erroneous conclusion.

Q. On that point, do you mean just a verbal abandonment of their policy? If they verbally say they would abandon their policy to destroy Israel, but if terrorist acts continue would the United States then consider talking with the PLO?

A. It is always important to evaluate words in the context of action if you want to get the real meaning of what people say.

Q. After Iran and Nicaragua, it is said that Korea is your own first international crisis. What is your view on Korea on a short-term and long-term basis? Do you think that the Soviet Union will try to fish in these troubled waters of Korea by supporting North Korea politically or militarily?

A. I think my first foreign policy crisis was accepting the appointment as Secretary of State. But in any case, with respect to Korea, the latest—I think over the period of this last month I have expressed my concern with developments in Korea and the consequences of not moving toward political development and democratic processes.

In a calmer period there, I would hope and have been urging the Government of South Korea to resume what was at best a very slow movement, uncertain movement, toward political development.

There was an announcement today of a constitutional referendum in October, of elections, and then of a new administration by next June.

It is good to have that kind of verbalization of the government's objectives, but I think that we will not really be in a position to judge until we see what happens, because we have had that sort of formulation before.

I would take this opportunity, in answer to your question, to urge the Government of Korea to go beyond the articulation of its political objectives with firm and clear progress and final action of the kind they have described. It is only that that I think will move them into a healthy political future.

World Court Renders Final Judgment on U.S. Case Against Iran

Following are: text of the judgment of the Court in the case concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, the summary of the final judgment released by the Registry of the International Court of Justice, and the Department of State's statement in reaction to the Court's judgment on May 24, 1980.

FINAL JUDGMENT, MAY 24, 1980

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

YEAR 1980
24 MAY 1980

CASE CONCERNING UNITED STATES
DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR STAFF IN
TEHRAN
(UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
IRAN)

Article 53 of the Statute—Proof of facts—Admissibility of Proceedings—Existence of wider political dispute no bar to legal proceedings—Security Council proceedings—restriction on functioning of the Court—Fact-finding commission established by Secretary-General.

Jurisdiction of the Court—Optional protocols to Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 1963 on Diplomatic and Consular Relations—1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights (USA/Iran)—Provision for recourse to Court unless parties agree to "settlement by some other pacific means"—Right to unilateral Application—Whether counter-measures a bar to invoking Treaty of Amity.

State responsibility for violations of Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 1963 on Diplomatic and Consular Relations—Action by persons not acting on behalf of State—Non-imputability thereof to State—Breach by State of obligation of protection—Subsequent decision to maintain situation so created on behalf of State—Use of situation as means of coercion.

Question of special circumstances as possible justification of conduct of

State—Remedies provided for by diplomatic law for abuses.

Cumulative effect of successive breaches of international obligations—Fundamental character of international diplomatic and consular law.

JUDGMENT

Present: President Sir Humphrey WALDOCK; Vice-President ELIAS; Judges FORSTER, GROS, LACHS, MOROZOV, NAGENDRA, SINGH, RUDA, MOSLER, TARAZI, ODA, AGO, EL-ERIAN, SETTE-CAMARA, BAXTER; Registrar AQUARONE

In the case concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran,

between

the United States of America,
represented by

The Honorable Roberts B. Owen,
Legal Adviser, Department of State, as Agent;

H.E. Mrs. Geri Joseph, Ambassador of the United States of America to the Netherlands, as Deputy Agent;

Mr. Stephen M. Schwebel, Deputy Legal Adviser, Department of State, as Deputy Agent and Counsel;

Mr. Thomas J. Dunnigan,
Counsellor, Embassy of the United States of America, as Deputy Agent;

assisted by

Mr. David H. Small, Assistant Legal Adviser, Department of State,

Mr. Ted. L. Stein, Attorney-Adviser, Department of State,

Mr. Hugh V. Simon, Jr., Second Secretary, Embassy of the United States of America,

as Advisers,

and

the Islamic Republic of Iran,

THE COURT,

composed as above,

delivers the following Judgment:

1. On 29 November 1979, the Legal Adviser of the Department of State of the United States of America handed to the Registrar an Application instituting

proceedings against the Islamic Republic of Iran in respect of a dispute concerning the seizure and holding as hostages of members of the United States diplomatic and consular staff and certain other United States nationals.

2. Pursuant to Article 40, paragraph 2, of the Statute and Article 38, paragraph 4, of the Rules of Court, the Application was at once communicated to the Government of Iran. In accordance with Article 40, paragraph 3, of the Statute and Article 42 of the Rules of Court, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Members of the United Nations, and other States entitled to appear before the Court were notified of the Application.

3. On 29 November 1979, the same day as the Application was filed, the Government of the United States filed in the Registry of the Court a request for the indication of provisional measures under Article 41 of the Statute and Article 73 of the Rules of Court. By an Order dated 15 December 1979, and adopted unanimously, the Court indicated provisional measures in the case.

4. By an Order made by the President of the Court dated 24 December 1979, 15 January 1980 was fixed as the time-limit for the filing of the Memorial of the United States, and 18 February 1980 as the time-limit for the Counter-Memorial of Iran, with liberty for Iran, if it appointed an Agent for the purpose of appearing before the Court and presenting its observations on the case, to apply for reconsideration of such time-limit. The Memorial of the United States was filed on 15 January 1980, within the time-limit prescribed, and was communicated to the Government of Iran; no Counter-Memorial was filed by the Government of Iran, nor was any agent appointed or any application made for reconsideration of the time-limit.

5. The case thus became ready for hearing on 19 February 1980, the day following the expiration of the time-limit fixed for the Counter-Memorial of Iran. In circumstances explained in paragraphs 41-42 below, and after due notice to the Parties, 18 March 1980 was fixed as the date for the opening of the oral proceedings; on 18, 19 and 20 March 1980, public hearings were held,

in the course of which the Court heard the oral argument of the Agent and Counsel of the United States; the Government of Iran was not represented at the hearings. Questions were addressed to the Agent of the United States by Members of the Court both during the course of the hearings and subsequently, and replies were given

ICI MEMBERS

President

Sir Humphrey Waldock (U.K.)

Vice President

Taslim Olawale Elias (Nigeria)

Judges

Manfred Lachs (Poland)

Isaac Forster (Senegal)

Andre Gros (France)

Richard R. Baxter (U.S.)

P. D. Morozov (U.S.S.R.)

Jose Sette-Camara (Brazil)

Jose Maria Ruda (Argentina)

Nagendra Singh (India)

Abdullah Ali El-Erian (Egypt)

Hermann Mosler (F.R.G.)

Shigeru Oda (Japan)

Salah El Dine Tarazi (Syria)

Robert Ago (Italy) ■

either orally at the hearings or in writing, in accordance with Article 61, paragraph 4, of the Rules of Court.

6. On 6 December 1979, the Registrar addressed the notifications provided for in Article 63 of the Statute of the Court to the States which according to information supplied by the Secretary-General of the United Nations as depositary were parties to one or more of the following Conventions and Protocols:

(a) the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961;

(b) the Optional Protocol to that Convention concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes;

(c) the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963;

(d) the Optional Protocol to that Convention concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes;

(e) the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, of 1973.

7. The Court, after ascertaining the views of the Government of the United States on the matter, and affording the Government of Iran the opportunity of making its views known, decided pursuant to Article 53, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court that copies of the pleadings and documents annexed should be made accessible to the public with effect from 25 March 1980.

8. In the course of the written proceedings the following submissions were presented on behalf of the Government of the United States of America:

in the Application:

"The United States requests the Court to adjudge and declare as follows:

(a) That the Government of Iran, in tolerating, encouraging, and failing to prevent and punish the conduct described in the preceding Statement of Facts, violated its international legal obligations to the United States as provided by

- Articles 22, 24, 25, 27, 29, 31, 37 and 47 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,

- Articles 28, 31, 33, 34, 36 and 40 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations,

- Articles 4 and 7 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, and

- Articles II (4), XIII, XVIII and XIX of the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights between the United States and Iran, and

- Articles 2 (3), 2 (4) and 33 of the Charter of the United Nations

(b) That pursuant to the foregoing international legal obligations, the Government of Iran is under a particular obligation immediately to secure the release of all United States nationals currently being detained within the premises of the United States Embassy in Tehran and to assure that all such persons and all other United States nationals in Tehran are allowed to leave Iran safely;

(c) That the Government of Iran shall pay to the United States, in its own right and in the exercise of its right of diplomatic protection of its nationals, reparation for the foregoing violations of Iran's international legal obligations to the United States, in a sum to be determined by the Court; and

(d) That the Government of Iran submit to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution those persons responsible for the crimes committed against the premises and staff of the United States Embassy and against the premises of its Consulates";

in the Memorial:

"The Government of the United States respectfully requests that the Court adjudge and declare as follows:

(a) that the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in permitting, tolerating, encouraging, adopting, and endeavouring to exploit, as well as in failing to prevent and punish, the conduct described in the Statement of the Facts, violated its international legal obligations to the United States as provided by:

- Articles 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 31, 44 and 47 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations;

- Articles 5, 27, 28, 31, 33, 34, 35, 40 and 72 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations;

- Article II (4), XIII, XVIII and XI of the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights between the United States of America and Iran; and

- Articles 2, 4 and 7 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents;

(b) that, pursuant to the foregoing international legal obligations:

(i) the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran shall immediately ensure that the premises at the United States Embassy, Chancery and Consulates are restored to the possession of the United States authorities under their exclusive control, shall ensure their inviolability and effective protection as provided for by the treaties in force between the two States, and by general international law;

(ii) the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran shall ensure the immediate release, without any exception, of all persons of United States nationality who are or have been held in the Embassy of the United States of America or in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tehran, or who are or have been held as hostages elsewhere, and afford full protection to all such persons, in accordance with the treaties in force between the two States, and with general international law;

(iii) the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran shall, as from that moment, afford to all the diplomatic and consular personnel of the United States the protection, privileges and immunities to which they are entitled under the treaties in force between the two States, and under general international law, including immunity from any form of criminal jurisdiction and freedom of movement and facilities to leave the territory of Iran;

(iv) the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran shall, in affording the diplomatic and consular personnel of the United States the protection, privileges and immunities to which they are entitled, including immunity from any form of criminal jurisdiction, ensure that no such personnel shall be obliged to appear on trial or as a witness, deponent, source of information, in any other role, at any proceedings, whether formal or informal, initiated by or with the acquiescence of the Iranian Government, whether such proceedings be

nominated a 'trial', 'grand jury', 'international commission' or otherwise;

(v) the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran shall submit to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, or extradite to the United States, those persons responsible for the crimes committed against personnel and premises of the United States Embassy and Consulates in Iran;

(c) that the United States of America is entitled to the payment to it, in its own right and in the exercise of its right of diplomatic protection of its nationals held hostage, of reparation by the Islamic Republic of Iran for violations of the above international legal obligations which it owes to the United States, in a sum to be determined by the Court at a subsequent stage of the proceedings."

9. At the close of the oral proceedings, written submissions were filed in the Registry of the Court on behalf of the Government of the United States of America in accordance with Article 60, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court; a copy thereof was transmitted to the Government of Iran. Those submissions were identical with the submissions presented in the Memorial of the United States.

10. No pleadings were filed by the Government of Iran, which also was not presented at the oral proceedings, and no submissions were therefore presented on its behalf. The position of that Government was, however, defined in its communications addressed to the Court by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran; the first of these was a letter dated 9 December 1979 and transmitted by telegram the same day (the text of which was set out in full in the Court's Order of 15 December 1979, *I.C.J. Reports 1979*, pages 10-11); the second was a letter transmitted by telex dated 16 March 1980 and received on 17 March 1980, the text of which followed closely that of the letter of 9 December 1979 and reads as follows:

(translation from French)

"I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of the telegram concerning the meeting of the International Court of Justice held on 17 March 1980 at the request of the Government of the United States of America, and to set forth for you below, once again, the position of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran in that respect:

The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran wishes to express its respect for the International Court of Justice, and to its distinguished Members, for what they have achieved in the quest for a just and equitable solution to legal conflicts between States, and respectfully draws the attention of the Court to the deep-rootedness and the essential character of the Islamic Revolution

of Iran, a revolution of a whole oppressed nation against its oppressors and their masters, the examination of whose numerous repercussions is essentially and directly a matter within the national sovereignty of Iran.

The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran considers that the Court cannot and should not take cognizance of the case which the Government of the United States of America has submitted to it, and in the most significant fashion, a case confined to what is called the question of the 'hostages of the American Embassy in Tehran'.

For this question only represents a marginal and secondary aspect of an overall problem, one such that it cannot be studied separately, and which involves, *inter alia*, more than 25 years of continual interference by the United States in the internal affairs of Iran, the shameless exploitation of our country, and numerous crimes perpetrated against the Iranian people, contrary to and in conflict with all international and humanitarian norms.

The problem involved in the conflict between Iran and the United States is thus not one of the interpretation and the application of the treaties upon which the American Application is based, but results from an overall situation containing much more fundamental and more complex elements. Consequently, the Court cannot examine the American Application divorced from its proper context, namely the whole political dossier of the relations between Iran and the United States over the last 25 years.

With regard to the request for provisional measures, as formulated by the United States, it in fact implies that the Court should have passed judgment on the actual substance of the case submitted to it, which the Court cannot do without breach of the norms governing its jurisdiction. Furthermore, since provisional measures are by definition intended to protect the interest of the parties, they cannot be unilateral, as they are in the request submitted by the American Government."

The matters raised in those two communications are considered later in this Judgment (paragraphs 33-38 and 81-82).

11. The position taken up by the Iranian Government in regard to the present proceedings brings into operation Article 53 of the Statute, under which the Court is required *inter alia* to satisfy itself that the claims of the Applicant are well founded in fact. As to this article the Court pointed out in the *Corfu Channel* case that this requirement is to be understood as applying within certain limits:

"While Article 53 thus obliges the Court to consider the submissions of the Party which appears, it does not compel the

Court to examine their accuracy in all their details; for this might in certain unopposed cases prove impossible in practice. It is sufficient for the Court to convince itself by such methods as it considers suitable that the submissions are well founded." (*I.C.J. Reports 1949*, p. 248.)

In the present case, the United States has explained that, owing to the events in Iran of which it complains, it has been unable since then to have access to its diplomatic and consular representatives, premises and archives in Iran; and that in consequence it has been unable to furnish detailed factual evidence on some matters occurring after 4 November 1979. It mentioned in particular the lack of any factual evidence concerning the treatment and conditions of the persons held hostage in Tehran. On this point, however, without giving the names of the persons concerned, it has submitted copies of declarations sworn by six of the 13 hostages who had been released after two weeks of detention and returned to the United States in November 1979.

12. The essential facts of the present case are, for the most part, matters of public knowledge which have received extensive coverage in the world press and in radio and television broadcasts from Iran and other countries. They have been presented to the Court by the United States in its Memorial, in statements of its Agent and Counsel during the oral proceedings, and in written replies to questions put by Members of the Court. Annexed or appended to the Memorial are numerous extracts of statements made by Iranian and United States officials, either at press conferences or on radio or television, and submitted to the Court in support of the request for provisional measures and as a means of demonstrating the truth of the account of the facts stated in the Memorial. Included also in the Memorial is a "Statement of Verification" made by a high official of the United States Department of State having "overall responsibility within the Department for matters relating to the crisis in Iran". While emphasizing that in the circumstances of the case the United States has had to rely on newspaper, radio and television reports for a number of the facts stated in the Memorial, the high official concerned certifies that to the best of his knowledge and belief the facts there stated are true. In addition, after the filing of the Memorial, and by leave of the Court, a large quantity of further documents of a similar kind to those

already presented were submitted by the United States for the purpose of bringing up to date the Court's information concerning the continuing situation in regard to the occupation of the Embassy and detention of the hostages.

13. The result is that the Court has available to it a massive body of information from various sources concerning the facts and circumstances of the present case, including numerous official statements of both Iranian and United States authorities. So far as newspaper, radio and television reports emanating from Iran are concerned, the Court has necessarily in some cases relied on translations into English supplied by the Applicant. The information available, however, is wholly consistent and concordant as to the main facts and circumstances of the case. This information, as well as the United States Memorial and the records of the oral proceedings, has all been communicated by the Court to the Iranian Government without having evoked from that Government any denial or questioning of the facts alleged before the Court by the United States. Accordingly, the Court is satisfied that, within the meaning of Article 53 of the Statute, the allegations of fact on which the United States bases its claims in the present case are well founded.

14. Before examining the events of 4 November 1979, directly complained of by the Government of the United States, it is appropriate to mention certain other incidents which occurred before that date. At about 10:45 a.m. on 14 February 1979, during the unrest in Iran following the fall of the Government of Dr. Bakhtiar, the last Prime Minister appointed by the Shah, an armed group attacked and seized the United States Embassy in Tehran, taking prisoner the 70 persons they found there, including the Ambassador. Two persons associated with the Embassy staff were killed; serious damage was caused to the Embassy and there were some acts of pillaging of the Ambassador's residence. On this occasion, while the Iranian authorities had not been able to prevent the incursion, they acted promptly in response to the urgent appeal for assistance made by the Embassy during the attack. At about 12 noon, Mr. Yazdi, then a Deputy Prime Minister, arrived at the Embassy accompanied by a member of the national police, at least one official and a con-

tingent of Revolutionary Guards; they quelled the disturbance and returned control of the compound to American diplomatic officials. On 11 March 1979 the United States Ambassador received a letter dated 1 March from the Prime Minister, Dr. Bazargan, expressing regrets for the attack on the Embassy, stating that arrangements had been made to prevent any repetition of such incidents, and indicating readiness to make reparation for the damage. Attacks were also made during the same period on the United States Consulates in Tabriz and Shiraz.

15. In October 1979, the Government of the United States was contemplating permitting the former Shah of Iran, who was then in Mexico, to enter the United States for medical treatment. Officials of the United States Government feared that, in the political climate prevailing in Iran, the admission of the former Shah might increase the tension already existing between the two States, and *inter alia* result in renewed violence against the United States Embassy in Tehran, and it was decided for this reason to request assurances from the Government of Iran that adequate protection would be provided. On 21 October 1979, at a meeting at which were present the Iranian Prime Minister, Dr. Bazargan, the Iranian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Yazdi, and the United States Chargé d' affaires in Tehran, the Government of Iran was informed of the decision to admit the former Shah to the United States, and of the concern felt by the United States Government about the possible public reaction in Tehran. When the United States Chargé d' affaires requested assurances that the Embassy and its personnel would be adequately protected, assurances were given by the Foreign Minister that the Government of Iran would fulfill its international obligation to protect the Embassy. The request for such assurances was repeated at a further meeting the following day, 22 October, and the Foreign Minister renewed his assurances that protection would be provided. The former Shah arrived in the United States on 22 October. On 30 October, the Government of Iran, which had repeatedly expressed its serious opposition to the admission of the former Shah to the United States, and had asked the United States to permit two Iranian physicians to verify the reality and the nature of his illness, requested the United States to bring about his return to Iran. Nevertheless, on 31 October,

the Security Officer of the United States Embassy was told by the Commander of the Iranian National Police that the police had been instructed to provide protection for the personnel of the Embassy.

16. On 1 November 1979, while very large demonstrations were being held elsewhere in Tehran, large numbers of demonstrators marched to and from the front of the United States Embassy. Under the then existing security arrangements the Iranian authorities normally maintained 10 to 15 uniformed policemen outside the Embassy compound and a contingent of Revolutionary Guards nearby; on this occasion the normal complement of police was stationed outside the compound and the Embassy reported to the State Department that it felt confident that it could get more protection if needed. The Chief of Police came to the Embassy personally and met the Chargé d' affaires, who informed Washington that the Chief was "taking his job of protecting the Embassy very seriously". It was announced on the radio, and by the prayer leader, that a main demonstration in another part of the city, that people should not go to the Embassy. During the day a large number of demonstrators at the Embassy was around 5,000, but protection was maintained by Iranian security forces. That evening, as the crowd dispersed, both the Iranian Chief of Police and the Chief of Police expressed relief to the Chargé d' affaires that everything had gone well.

17. At approximately 10:30 a.m. on 4 November 1979, during the course of a demonstration of approximately 3,000 persons, the United States Embassy compound in Tehran was overrun by a strong armed group of several hundred people. The Iranian security personnel are reported to have simply disappeared from the scene; at all events it is established that they made no apparent effort to deter or prevent the demonstrators from seizing the Embassy's premises. The invading group (who subsequently described themselves as "Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Policy", and who will hereafter be referred to as "the militants") gained access by force to the compound and to the ground floor of the Chancery building. Over two hours after the beginning of the attack, and after the militants had attempted to set fire to the Chancery building and to cut through the upstairs steel doors with a torch, they gained entry to the upper floor. An hour later they gained control of the

in vault. The militants also seized the other buildings, including the various residences, on the Embassy compound. In the course of the attack, all the diplomatic and consular personnel and other persons present in the premises were seized as hostages, and detained in the Embassy compound; subsequently other United States personnel and one United States private citizen seized elsewhere in Tehran were brought to the compound and added to the number of hostages.

18. During the three hours or more of the assault, repeated calls for help were made from the Embassy to the Iranian Foreign Ministry, and repeated requests to secure help from the Iranian authorities were also made through direct discussions by the United States Chargé d'affaires, who was at the Iranian Ministry at the time, together with two other members of the mission. When there he made contact with the Iranian Minister's Office and with Foreign Ministry officials. A request was also made to the Iranian Chargé d'affaires in Washington for assistance in putting an end to the seizure of the Embassy. Despite these repeated requests, no Iranian security forces were sent in time to provide relief and protection to the Embassy. In fact when Revolutionary Guards ultimately arrived on the scene, they were dispatched by the Government "to prevent clashes", they considered that their duty was merely to "protect the safety of the hostages and the students", according to statements subsequently made by the Iranian Government's spokesman, and by the operations commander of the Guards. No attempt was made by the Iranian Government to enter the Embassy premises, to rescue persons held hostage, or to persuade the militants to terminate their action against the Embassy.

19. During the morning of 5 November, only hours after the seizure of the Embassy, the United States Consulates in Tabriz and Shiraz were also seized; again the Iranian Government took no protective action. The operation at these consulates had been suspended after the attack in February 1979 (paragraph 14 above), and therefore no United States personnel were seized on these premises.

20. The United States' diplomatic mission and consular posts in Iran were the only ones whose premises were subjected to demonstrations during the revolutionary period in Iran. On 5 November 1979, a group invaded the British Embassy in Tehran but was

ejected after a brief occupation. On 6 November 1979 a brief occupation of the Consulate of Iraq at Kermanshah occurred but was brought to an end on instructions of the Ayatollah Khomeini; no damage was done to the Consulate or its contents. On 1 January 1980 an attack was made on the Embassy in Tehran of the USSR by a large mob, but as a result of the protection given by the Iranian authorities to the Embassy, no serious damage was done.

21. The premises of the United States Embassy in Tehran have remained in the hands of militants; and the same appears to be the case with the consulates at Tabriz and Shiraz. Of the total number of United States citizens seized and held as hostages, 13 were released on 18-20 November 1979, but the remainder have continued to be held up to the present time. The release of the 13 hostages was effected pursuant to a decree by the Ayatollah Khomeini addressed to the militants, dated 17 November 1979, in which he called upon the militants to "hand over the blacks and the women, if it is proven they did not spy, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs so that they may be immediately expelled from Iran".

22. The persons still held hostage in Iran include, according to the information furnished to the Court by the United States, at least 28 persons having the status, duly recognized by the Government of Iran, of "member of the diplomatic staff" within the meaning of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961; at least 20 persons having the status, similarly recognized, of "member of the administrative and technical staff" within the meaning of that Convention; and two other persons of United States nationality not possessing either diplomatic or consular status. Of the persons with the status of member of the diplomatic staff, four are members of the Consular Section of the Mission.

23. Allegations have been made by the Government of the United States of inhumane treatment of hostages; the militants and Iranian authorities have asserted that the hostages have been well treated, and have allowed special visits to the hostages by religious personalities and by representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross. The specific allegations of ill-treatment have not however been refuted. Examples of such allegations, which are mentioned in some of the sworn declarations of hostages released

in November 1979, are as follows: at the outset of the occupation of the Embassy some were paraded bound and blindfolded before hostile and chanting crowds; at least during the initial period of their captivity, hostages were kept bound, and frequently blindfolded, denied mail or any communication with their government or with each other, subjected to interrogation, threatened with weapons.

24. Those archives and documents of the United States Embassy which were not destroyed by the staff during the attack on 4 November have been ransacked by the militants. Documents purporting to come from this source have been disseminated by the militants and by the Government-controlled media.

25. The United States Chargé d'affaires in Tehran and the two other members of the diplomatic staff of the Embassy who were in the premises of the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the time of the attack have not left the Ministry since; their exact situation there has been the subject of conflicting statements. On 7 November 1979, it was stated in an announcement by the Iranian Foreign Ministry that "as the protection of foreign nationals is the duty of the Iranian Government", the Chargé d'affaires was "staying in" the Ministry. On 1 December 1979, Mr. Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, who had become Foreign Minister, stated that

"... it has been announced that, if the U.S. Embassy's chargé d'affaires and his two companions, who have sought asylum in the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, should leave this ministry, the ministry would not accept any responsibility for them".

According to a press report of 4 December, the Foreign Minister amplified this statement by saying that as long as they remained in the ministry he was personally responsible for ensuring that nothing happened to them, but that

"... as soon as they leave the ministry precincts they will fall back into the hands of justice, and then I will be the first to demand that they be arrested and tried".

The militants made it clear that they regarded the Chargé and his two colleagues as hostages also. When in March 1980 the Public Prosecutor of the Islamic Revolution of Iran called for one of the three diplomats to be handed over to him, it was announced by the Foreign Minister that

"Regarding the fate of the three

Americans in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the decision rests first with the imam of the nation [i.e., the Ayatollah Khomeini]; in case there is no clear decision by the imam of the nation, the Revolution Council will make a decision on this matter."

26. From the outset of the attack upon its Embassy in Tehran, the United States protested to the Government of Iran both at the attack and at the seizure and detention of the hostages. On 7 November a former Attorney-General of the United States, Mr. Ramsey Clark, was instructed to go with an assistant to Iran to deliver a message from the President of the United States to the Ayatollah Khomeini. The text of that message has not been made available to the Court by the Applicant, but the United States Government has informed the Court that it thereby protested at the conduct of the Government of Iran and called for release of the hostages, and that Mr. Clark was also authorized to discuss all avenues for resolution of the crisis. While he was en route, Tehran radio broadcast a message from the Ayatollah Khomeini dated 7 November, solemnly forbidding members of the Revolutionary Council and all the responsible officials to meet the United States representatives. In that message it was asserted that "the U.S. Embassy in Iran is our enemies' centre of espionage against our sacred Islamic movement", and the message continued:

"Should the United States hand over to Iran the deposed shah . . . and give up espionage against our movement, the way to talks would be opened on the issue of certain relations which are in the interest of the nation".

Subsequently, despite the efforts of the United States Government to open negotiations, it became clear that the Iranian authorities would have no direct contact with representatives of the United States Government concerning the holding of the hostages.

27. During the period which has elapsed since the seizure of the Embassy a number of statements have been made by various governmental authorities in Iran which are relevant to the Court's examination of the responsibility attributed to the Government of Iran in the submissions of the United States. These statements will be examined by the Court in considering these submissions (paragraphs 59 and 70-74 below).

28. On 9 November, 1979, the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations addressed

a letter to the President of the Security Council, requesting urgent consideration of what might be done to secure the release of the hostages and to restore the "sanctity of diplomatic personnel and establishments". The same day, the President of the Security Council made a public statement urging the release of the hostages, and the President of the General Assembly announced that he was sending a personal message to the Ayatollah Khomeini appealing for their release. On 25 November 1979, the Secretary-General of the United Nations addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council referring to the seizure of the United States Embassy in Tehran and the detention of its diplomatic personnel, and requesting an urgent meeting of the Security Council "in an effort to seek a peaceful solution to the problem". The Security Council met on 27 November and 4 December 1979; on the latter occasion, no representative of Iran was present, but the Council took note of a letter of 13 November 1979 from the Supervisor of the Iranian Foreign Ministry to the Secretary-General. The Security Council then adopted resolution 457 (1979), calling on Iran to release the personnel of the Embassy immediately, to provide them with protection and to allow them to leave the country. The resolution also called on the two Governments to take steps to resolve peacefully the remaining issues between them, and requested the Secretary-General to lend his good offices for the immediate implementation of the resolution, and to take all appropriate measures to that end. It further stated that the Council would "remain actively seized of the matter" and requested the Secretary-General to report to it urgently on any developments with regard to his efforts.

29. On 31 December 1979, the Security Council met again and adopted resolution 461 (1979), in which it reiterated both its calls to the Iranian Government and its request to the Secretary-General to lend his good offices for achieving the object of the Council's resolution. The Secretary-General visited Tehran on 1-3 January 1980, and reported to the Security Council on 6 January. On 20 February 1980, the Secretary-General announced the setting up of a commission to undertake a fact-finding mission to Iran. The Court will revert to the terms of reference of this commission and the progress of its work in connection with

a question of admissibility of the proceedings (paragraphs 39-40 below).

30. Prior to the institution of the present proceedings, in addition to the approach made by the Government of the United States to the United Nations Security Council, that Government also took certain unilateral action in respect to the actions for which it holds the Government of Iran responsible. On 1 November 1979, steps were taken to identify all Iranian students in the United States who were not in compliance with the terms of their entry visas, and to commence deportation proceedings against those who were in violation of applicable immigration laws and regulations. On 12 November 1979 the President of the United States ordered the discontinuation of all oil purchases from Iran for delivery to the United States. Believing that the Government of Iran was about to withdraw all Iranian funds from United States banks and to refuse to accept payment in dollars for oil, and to repudiate obligations owed to the United States and to United States nationals, the President on 14 November 1979 acted to block the very large official Iranian assets in the United States or in United States control, including deposits both in banks in the United States and in foreign branches and subsidiaries of United States banks. On 12 December 1979, after the institution of the present proceedings, the United States informed the Iranian Chargé d'affaires in Washington that the number of personnel assigned to the Iranian Embassy and consular posts in the United States was to be restricted.

31. Subsequently to the indication by the Court of provisional measures and during the present proceedings, the United States Government took other action. A draft resolution was introduced into the United Nations Security Council calling for economic sanction against Iran. When it was put to the vote on 13 January 1980, the result was 10 votes in favour, 2 against, and 2 abstentions (one member not having participated in the voting); as a permanent member of the Council cast a negative vote, the draft resolution was not adopted. On 7 April 1980 the United States Government broke off diplomatic relations with the Government of Iran. At the same time, the United States Government prohibited exports from the United States to Iran—one of the sanctions previously proposed by it to the

curity Council. Steps were taken to prepare an inventory of the assets of the Government of Iran frozen on 14 November 1979, and to make a census of outstanding claims of American nationals against the Government of Iran, with a view to "designing a program against Iran for the hostages, the hostage families and other U.S. claimants" involving the preparation of legislation "to facilitate processing and reviving of these claims" and all visas issued to Iranian citizens for future entry into the United States were cancelled. On 17 April 1980, the United States Government announced further economic measures directed against Iran, prohibited travel there by United States citizens, and made further plans for reparations to be paid to the hostages and their families out of frozen Iranian assets.

32. During the night of 24-25 April 1980 the President of the United States in motion, and subsequently terminated for technical reasons, an operation within Iranian territory designed to effect the rescue of the hostages by United States military units. In an announcement made on 25 April, President Carter explained that the operation had been planned over a long period as a humanitarian mission to rescue the hostages, and had finally been set in motion by him in the belief that the situation in Iran posed mounting dangers to the safety of the hostages and that their early release was highly unlikely. He stated that the operation had been underway in Iran when equipment failure compelled its termination; and that in the course of the withdrawal of the rescue forces two United States aircraft had collided in a remote desert location in Iran. He further stated that preparations for the rescue operations had been ordered for humanitarian reasons, to protect the national interests of the United States, and to alleviate international tensions. At the same time, he emphasized that the operation had not been motivated by hostility towards Iran or the Iranian people. The texts of President Carter's announcement and of certain other official documents relating to the operation have been transmitted to the Court by the United States Agent in response to a request made by the President of the Court on 25 April. Amongst these documents is the text of a report made by the United States to the Security Council on 25 April, "pursuant to Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations". In that report, the United States maintained that the mission had been carried out by it "in exer-

cise of its inherent right of self-defence with the aim of extricating American nationals who have been and remain the victims of the Iranian armed attack on our Embassy". The Court will refer further to this operation later in the present Judgment (paragraphs 93 and 94 below).

33. It is to be regretted that the Iranian Government has not appeared before the Court in order to put forward its arguments on the questions of law and of fact which arise in the present case; and that, in consequence, the Court has not had the assistance it might have derived from such arguments or from any evidence adduced in support of them. Nevertheless, in accordance with its settled jurisprudence, the Court, in applying Article 53 of its Statute, must first take up, *proprio motu*, any preliminary question, whether of admissibility or of jurisdiction, that appears from the information before it to arise in the case and the decision of which might constitute a bar to any further examination of the merits of the Applicant's case. The Court will, therefore, first address itself to the considerations put forward by the Iranian Government in its letters of 9 December 1979 and 16 March 1980, on the basis of which it maintains that the Court ought not to take cognizance of the present case.

34. The Iranian Government in its letter of 9 December 1979 drew attention to what it referred to as the "deep-rootedness and the essential character of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, a revolution of a whole oppressed nation against its oppressors and their masters". The examination of the "numerous repercussions" of the revolution, it added, is "a matter essentially and directly within the national sovereignty of Iran". However, as the Court pointed out in its Order of 15 December 1979,

"... a dispute which concerns diplomatic and consular premises and the detention of internationally protected persons, and involves the interpretation or application of multilateral conventions codifying the international law governing diplomatic and consular relations, is one which by its very nature falls within international jurisdiction" (*I.C.J. Reports 1979*, page 16, paragraph 25).

In its later letter of 16 March 1980 the Government of Iran confined itself to repeating the observations on this point which it had made in its letter of 9 December 1979, without putting forward

any additional arguments or explanations. In these circumstances, the Court finds it sufficient here to recall and confirm its previous statement on the matter in its Order of 15 December 1979.

35. In its letter of 9 December 1979 the Government of Iran maintained that the Court could not and should not take cognizance of the present case for another reason, namely that the case submitted to the Court by the United States, is "confined to what is called the question of the 'hostages of the American Embassy in Tehran'". It then went on to explain why it considered this to preclude the Court from taking cognizance of the case:

"For this question only represents a marginal and secondary aspect of an overall problem, one such that it cannot be studied separately, and which involves, *inter alia*, more than 25 years of continual interference by the United States in the internal affairs of Iran, the shameless exploitation of our country, and numerous crimes perpetrated against the Iranian people, contrary to and in conflict with all international and humanitarian norms.

The problem involved in the conflict between Iran and the United States is thus not one of the interpretation and the application of the treaties upon which the American Application is based, but results from an overall situation containing much more fundamental and more complex elements. Consequently, the Court cannot examine the American Application divorced from its proper context, namely the whole political dossier of the relations between Iran and the United States over the last 25 years. This dossier includes, *inter alia*, all the crimes perpetrated in Iran by the American Government, in particular the *coup d'état* of 1953 stirred up and carried out by the CIA, the overthrow of the lawful national government of Dr. Mossadegh, the restoration of the Shah and of his régime which was under the control of American interests, and all the social, economic, cultural and political consequences of the direct interventions in our internal affairs, as well as grave, flagrant and continuous violations of all international norms, committed by the United States in Iran."

36. The Court, however, in its Order of 15 December 1979, made it clear that the seizure of the United States Embassy and Consulates and the detention of internationally protected persons as hostages cannot be considered as something "secondary" or "marginal", having regard to the importance of the legal principles involved. It also referred to a statement of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and to Security Council resolution 457 (1979), as evidencing the importance attached by the international community as a whole to the

observance of those principles in the present case as well as its concern at the dangerous level of tension between Iran and the United States. The Court, at the same time, pointed out that no provision of the Statute or Rules contemplates that the Court should decline to take cognizance of one aspect of a dispute merely because that dispute has other aspects, however important. It further underlined that, if the Iranian Government considered the alleged activities of the United States in Iran legally to have a close connection with the subject-matter of the United States' Application, it was open to that Government to present its own arguments regarding those activities to the Court either by way of defence in a Counter-Memorial or by way of a counter-claim.

37. The Iranian Government, notwithstanding the terms of the Court's Order, did not file any pleadings and did not appear before the Court. By its own choice, therefore, it has foregone the opportunities offered to it under the Statute and Rules of Court to submit evidence and arguments in support of its contention in regard to the "overall problem". Even in its later letter of 16 March 1980, the Government of Iran confined itself to repeating what it had said in its letter of 9 December 1979, without offering any explanations in regard to the points to which the Court had drawn attention in its Order of 15 December 1979. It has provided no explanation of the reasons why it considers that the violations of diplomatic and consular law alleged in the United States' Application cannot be examined by the Court separately from what it describes as the "overall problem" involving "more than 25 years of continual interference by the United States in the internal affairs of Iran". Nor has it made any attempt to explain, still less define, what connection, legal or factual, there may be between the "overall problem" of its general grievances against the United States and the particular events that gave rise to the United States' claims in the present case which, in its view, precludes the separate examination of those claims by the Court. This was the more necessary because legal disputes between sovereign States by their very nature are likely to occur in political contexts, and often form only one element in a wider and long-standing political dispute between the States concerned. Yet never has the view been put forward before that, because a legal dispute submitted to the Court is only

one aspect of a political dispute, the Court should decline to resolve for the parties the legal questions at issue between them. Nor can any basis for such a view of the Court's functions or jurisdiction be found in the Charter or the Statute of the Court; if the Court were, contrary to its settled jurisprudence, to adopt such a view, it would impose a far-reaching and unwarranted restriction upon the role of the Court in the peaceful solution of international disputes.

38. It follows that the considerations and arguments put forward in the Iranian Government's letters of 9 December 1979 and 16 March 1980 do not, in the opinion of the Court, disclose any ground on which it should conclude that it cannot or ought not to take cognizance of the present case.

39. The Court, however, has also thought it right to examine, *ex officio*, whether its competence to decide the present case, or the admissibility of the present proceedings, might possibly have been affected by the setting up of the Commission announced by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 20 February 1980. As already indicated, the occupation of the Embassy and detention of its diplomatic and consular staff as hostages was referred to the United Nations Security Council by the United States on 9 November 1979 and by the Secretary-General on 25 November. Four days later, while the matter was still before the Security Council, the United States submitted the present Application to the Court together with a request for the indication of provisional measures. On 4 December, the Security Council adopted resolution 457 (1979) (the terms of which have already been indicated in paragraph 28 above), whereby the Council would "remain actively seized of the matter" and the Secretary-General was requested to report to it urgently on developments regarding the efforts he was to make pursuant to the resolution. In announcing the setting up of the Commission on 20 February 1980, the Secretary-General stated its terms of reference to be "to undertake a fact-finding mission to Iran to hear Iran's grievances and to allow for an early solution of the crisis between Iran and the United States"; and he further stated that it was to complete its work as soon as possible and submit its report

to him. Subsequently, in a message cabled to the President of the Court on March 1980, the Secretary-General confirmed the mandate of the Commission to be as stated in his announcement of 20 February, adding that the Governments of Iran and the United States had "agreed to the establishment of the Commission on that basis". In this message, the Secretary-General also informed the Court of the decision of the Commission to suspend its activities in Tehran and to return to New York on 11 March 1980 "to confer with the Secretary-General with a view to pursuing its tasks which it regards as indivisible". The message stated that while, in the circumstances, the Commission was not in a position to submit its report, it was prepared to return to Tehran, in accordance with its mandate and the instructions of the Secretary-General, when the situation required. The message further stated that the Secretary-General would continue his efforts, as requested by the Security Council, to search for a peaceful solution of the crisis, and would remain in contact with the parties and the Commission regarding the resumption of its work.

40. Consequently, there can be no doubt at all that the Security Council was "actively seized of the matter" and that the Secretary-General was under express mandate from the Council to use his good offices in the matter when on 15 December, the Court decided unanimously that it was competent to entertain the United States' request for an indication of provisional measures, and proceeded to indicate such measures. As already mentioned the Council met again on 31 December 1979 and adopted resolution 461 (1979). In the preamble to this second resolution the Security Council expressly took into account the Court's Order of 15 December 1979 indicating provisional measures; and it does not seem to have occurred to any member of the Council that there was or could be anything irregular in the simultaneous exercise of their respective functions by the Court and the Security Council. Nor is there this any cause for surprise. Whereas Article 12 of the Charter expressly forbids the General Assembly to make any recommendation with regard to a dispute or situation while the Security Council is exercising its functions in respect of that dispute or situation, no such restriction is placed on the functioning of the Court by any provision either the Charter or the Statute of the

court. The reasons are clear. It is for the Court, the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, to resolve any legal questions that may be in issue between parties to a dispute; and the resolution of such legal questions by the Court may be an important, and sometimes decisive, factor in promoting the peaceful settlement of the dispute. This is indeed recognized by Article 36 of the Charter, paragraph 3 of which specifically provides that:

"In making recommendations under this article the Security Council should also take into consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court."

41. In the present instance the proceedings before the Court continued in accordance with the Statute and Rules of the Court and, on 15 January 1980, the United States filed its Memorial. The time-limit fixed for delivery of Iran's Counter-Memorial then expired on 18 February 1980 without Iran's having filed a Counter-Memorial or having made a request for the extension of the time-limit. Consequently, on the following day the case became ready for hearing; and, pursuant to Article 31 of the Rules, the views of the Applicant State are requested regarding the date for the opening of the oral proceedings. On 19 February 1980 the Court was informed by the United States Agent that, owing to the delicate stage of negotiations bearing upon the release of the hostages in the United States Embassy, the United States would be grateful if the Court for the time being would defer setting a date for the opening of the oral proceedings. On the very next day, 20 February, the Secretary-General announced the establishment of the above-mentioned Commission, which commenced its work in Tehran on 23 February. Asked on 27 February to clarify the position of the United States in regard to the future procedure, the Agent stated that the Commission would not address itself to the claims submitted by the United States to the Court. The United States, he said, continued to be anxious to secure an early judgment on the merits, and he suggested 17 March as a convenient date for the opening of the oral proceedings. At the same time, however, he added that consideration of the well-being of the hostages might lead the United States to suggest a later date. The Iranian Government was then

asked, in a telex message of 28 February, for any views it might wish to express as to the date for the opening of the hearings, mention being made of 17 March as one possible date. No reply had been received from the Iranian Government when, on 10 March, the Commission, unable to complete its mission, decided to suspend its activities in Tehran and to return to New York.

42. On 11 March, that is immediately upon the departure of the Commission from Tehran, the United States notified the Court of its readiness to proceed with the hearings, suggesting that they should begin on 17 March. A further telex was accordingly sent to the Iranian Government on 12 March informing it of the United States' request and stating that the Court would meet on 17 March to determine the subsequent procedure. The Iran Government's reply was contained in the letter of 16 March to which the Court has already referred (paragraph 10 above). In that letter, while making no mention of the proposed oral proceedings, the Iranian Government reiterated the reasons advanced in its previous letter of 9 December 1979 for considering that the Court ought not to take cognizance of the case. The letter contained no reference to the Commission, and still less any suggestion that the continuance of the proceedings before the Court might be affected by the existence of the Commission or the mandate given to the Secretary-General by the Security Council. Having regard to the circumstances which the Court has described, it can find no trace of any understanding on the part of either the United States or Iran that the establishment of the Commission might involve a postponement of all proceedings before the Court until the conclusion of the work of the Commission and of the Security Council's consideration of the matter.

43. The Commission, as previously observed, was established to undertake a "fact-finding mission to Iran to hear Iran's grievances and to allow for an early solution of the crisis between Iran and the United States" (emphasis added). It was not set up by the Secretary-General as a tribunal empowered to decide the matters of fact or of law in dispute between Iran and the United States; nor was its setting up accepted by them on any such basis. On the contrary, he created the Commission rather as an organ or instrument for mediation, conciliation or negotiation to provide a means of easing the situation of crisis existing between the two coun-

tries; and this, clearly, was the basis on which Iran and the United States agreed to its being set up. The establishment of the Commission by the Secretary-General with the agreement of the two States cannot, therefore, be considered in itself as in any way incompatible with the continuance of parallel proceedings before the Court. Negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and judicial settlement are enumerated together in Article 33 of the Charter as means for the peaceful settlement of disputes. As was pointed out in the *Aegean Sea Continental Shelf* case, the jurisprudence of the Court provides various examples of cases in which negotiations and recourse to judicial settlement by the Court have been pursued *pari passu*. In that case, in which also the dispute had been referred to the Security Council, the Court held expressly that "the fact that negotiations are being actively pursued during the present proceedings is not, legally, any obstacle to the exercise by the Court of its judicial function" (*I.C.J. Reports 1978*, page 12).

44. It follows that neither the mandate given by the Security Council to the Secretary-General in resolutions 457 and 461 of 1979, nor the setting up of the Commission by the Secretary-General, can be considered as constituting any obstacle to the exercise of the Court's jurisdiction in the present case. It further follows that the Court must now proceed, in accordance with Article 53, paragraph 2, of the Statute, to determine whether it has jurisdiction to decide the present case and whether the United States' claims are well founded in fact and in law.

45. Article 53 of the Statute requires the Court, before deciding in favour of an Applicant's claim, to satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction, in accordance with Articles 36 and 37, empowering it to do so. In the present case the principal claims of the United States relate essentially to alleged violations by Iran of its obligations to the United States under the Vienna Conventions of 1961 on Diplomatic Relations and of 1963 on Consular Relations. With regard to these claims the United States has invoked as the basis for the Court's jurisdiction Article I of the Optional Protocols concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes which accompany these Conventions. The United Nations publication *Multilateral Treaties in*

respect of which the Secretary-General Performs Depositary Functions lists both Iran and the United States as parties to the Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 1963, as also to their accompanying Protocols concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, and in each case without any reservation to the instrument in question. The Vienna Conventions, which codify the law of diplomatic and consular relations, state principles and rules essential for the maintenance of peaceful relations between States and accepted throughout the world by nations of all creeds, cultures and political complexions. Moreover, the Iranian Government has not maintained in its communications to the Court that the two Vienna Conventions and Protocols are not in force as between Iran and the United States. Accordingly, as indicated in the Court's Order of 15 December 1979, the Optional Protocols manifestly provide a possible basis for the Court's jurisdiction, with respect to the United States' claims under the Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 1963. It only remains, therefore, to consider whether the present dispute in fact falls within the scope of their provisions.

46. The terms of Article I, which are the same in the two Protocols, provide:

"Disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the Convention shall lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and may accordingly be brought before the Court by an application made by any party to the dispute being a Party to the present Protocol.

The United States' claims here in question concern alleged violations by Iran of its obligations under several Articles of the Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 1963 with respect to the privileges and immunities of the personnel, the inviolability of the premises and archives, and the provision of facilities for the performance of the functions of the United States Embassy and Consulates in Iran. In so far as its claims relate to two private individuals held hostage in the Embassy, the situation of these individuals falls under the provisions of the Vienna Convention of 1961 guaranteeing the inviolability of the premises of embassies, and of Article 5 of the 1963 Convention concerning the consular functions of assisting nationals and protecting and safeguarding their interests. By their very nature all these claims concern the interpretation or application of one or other of the two Vienna Conventions.

47. The occupation of the United States Embassy by militants on 4 November 1979 and the detention of its personnel as hostages was an event of a kind to provoke an immediate protest from any government, as it did from the United States Government, which despatched a special emissary to Iran to deliver a formal protest. Although the special emissary, denied all contact with Iranian officials, never entered Iran, the Iranian Government was left in no doubt as to the reaction of the United States to the taking over of its Embassy and detention of its diplomatic and consular staff as hostages. Indeed, the Court was informed that the United States was meanwhile making its views known to the Iranian Government through its Chargé d'affaires, who has been kept since 4 November 1979 in the Iranian Foreign Ministry itself, where he happened to be with two other members of his mission during the attack on the Embassy. In any event, by a letter of 9 November 1979, the United States brought the situation in regard to its Embassy before the Security Council. The Iranian Government did not take any part in the debates on the matter in the Council, and it was still refusing to enter into any discussions on the subject when, on 29 November 1979, the United States filed the present Application submitting its claims to the Court. It is clear that on that date there existed a dispute arising out of the interpretation or application of the Vienna Conventions and thus one falling within the scope of Article I of the Protocols.

48. Articles II and III of the Protocols, it is true, provide that within a period of two months after one party has notified its opinion to the other that a dispute exists, the parties may agree either: (a) "to resort not to the International Court of Justice but to an arbitral tribunal", or (b) "to adopt a conciliation procedure before resorting to the International Court of Justice". The terms of Articles II and III however, when read in conjunction with those of Article I and with the Preamble to the Protocols, make it crystal clear that they are not to be understood as laying down a precondition of the applicability of the precise and categorical provision contained in Article I establishing the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in respect of disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the Vienna Convention in question. Articles II and III provide only that, as a substitute for recourse to the Court, the parties *may* agree upon resort either to arbitration or

to conciliation. It follows, first, that Articles II and III have no application unless recourse to arbitration or conciliation has been proposed by one of the parties to the dispute and the other has expressed its readiness to consider the proposal. Secondly, it follows that only then may the provisions in those Articles regarding a two months' period come into play, and function as a time limit upon the conclusion of the agreement as to the organization of the alternative procedure.

49. In the present instance, neither of the parties to the dispute proposed recourse to either of the two alternatives, before the filing of the Application or at any time afterwards. On the contrary, the Iranian authorities refused to enter into any discussion of the matter with the United States, and this could only be understood by the United States as ruling out, *in limine*, any question of arriving at an agreement resort to arbitration or conciliation under Article II or Article III of the Protocols, instead of recourse to the Court. Accordingly, when the United States filed its Application on 29 November 1979, it was unquestionably free to have recourse to Article I of the Protocols, and to invoke it as a basis for establishing the Court's jurisdiction with respect to its claims under the Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 1963.

50. However, the United States presents claims in respect of alleged violations by Iran of Articles II, paragraph 4, XIII, XVIII and XIX of the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights of 1955 between the United States and Iran, which entered into force on 16 June 1957. With regard to these claims the United States has invoked paragraph 2 of Article XXI of the Treaty as the basis for the Court's jurisdiction. The claims of the United States under this Treaty overlap in considerable measure with claims under the two Vienna Conventions and more especially the Convention of 1963. In this respect, therefore, the dispute between the United States and Iran regarding those claims is at the same time a dispute arising out of the interpretation or application of the Vienna Conventions which falls within Article I of their Protocols. It was for this reason that in its Order of 15 December 1979 indicating provisional measures the Court did not find it necessary to enter into the question whether Article XXI, paragraph 2, of the 1955 Treaty might also have provided a basis for the exercise of its jurisdiction in the present

e. But taking into account that Article II, paragraph 4, of the 1955 Treaty provides that "Nationals of either High Contracting Party shall receive the most constant protection and security within territories of the other High Contracting Party. . .", the Court considers that at the present stage of the proceedings that Treaty has importance in regard to the claims of the United States in respect of the two private individuals said to be held hostage in Iran. Accordingly, the Court will now consider whether a basis for the exercise of its jurisdiction with respect to the alleged violations of the 1955 Treaty may be found in Article XXI, paragraph 2, of that Treaty.

51. Paragraph 2 of that Article reads:

"Any dispute between the High Contracting Parties as to the interpretation or application of the present Treaty, not satisfactorily adjusted by diplomacy, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice, unless the High Contracting Parties agree to settlement by some other pacific means."

As previously pointed out, when the United States filed its Application on 29 November 1979, its attempts to negotiate with Iran in regard to the overrunning of its Embassy and detention of its nationals as hostages had reached a deadlock, owing to the refusal of the Iranian Government to enter into discussion of the matter. In consequence, there existed at that date not a dispute but, beyond any doubt, a dispute . . . not satisfactorily adjusted by diplomacy" within the meaning of Article XXI, paragraph 2, of the 1955 Treaty; and this dispute comprised, *inter alia*, the matters that are the subject of the United States' claims under that Treaty.

52. The provision made in the 1955 Treaty for disputes as to its interpretation or application to be referred to the Court is similar to the system adopted in the Optional Protocols to the Vienna Conventions which the Court has already explained. Article XXI, paragraph 2, of the Treaty establishes the jurisdiction of the Court as compulsory for such disputes, unless the parties agree to settlement by some other means. In the present instance, as in the case of the Optional Protocols, the immediate and total refusal of the Iranian authorities to enter into any negotiations with the United States excluded *in limine* any question of an agreement to have recourse to "some other pacific means" for the settlement

of the dispute. Consequently, under the terms of Article XXI, paragraph 2, the United States was free on 29 November 1979 to invoke its provisions for the purpose of referring its claims against Iran under the 1955 Treaty to the Court.

While that Article does not provide in express terms that either party may bring a case to the Court by unilateral application, it is evident, as the United States contended in its Memorial, that this is what the parties intended. Provisions drawn in similar terms are very common in bilateral treaties of amity or of establishment, and the intention of the parties in accepting such clauses is clearly to provide for such a right of unilateral recourse to the Court, in the absence of agreement to employ some other pacific means of settlement.

53. The point has also been raised whether, having regard to certain counter-measures taken by the United States vis-à-vis Iran, it is open to the United States to rely on the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights in the present proceedings. However, all the measures in question were taken by the United States after the seizure of its Embassy by an armed group and subsequent detention of its diplomatic and consular staff as hostages. They were measures taken in response to what the United States believed to be grave and manifest violations of international law by Iran, including violations of the 1955 Treaty itself. In any event, any alleged violation of the Treaty by either party could not have the effect of precluding that party from invoking the provisions of the Treaty concerning pacific settlement of disputes.

54. No suggestion has been made by Iran that the 1955 Treaty was not in force on 4 November 1979 when the United States Embassy was overrun and its nationals taken hostage, or on 29 November when the United States submitted the dispute to the Court. The very purpose of a treaty of amity, and indeed of a treaty of establishment, is to promote friendly relations between the two countries concerned, and between their two peoples, more especially by mutual undertakings to ensure the protection and security of their nationals in each other's territory. It is precisely when difficulties arise that the treaty assumes its greatest importance, and the whole object of Article XXI, paragraph 2, of the 1955 Treaty was to establish the means for arriving at a friendly settlement of such difficulties by

the Court or by other peaceful means. It would, therefore, be incompatible with the whole purpose of the 1955 Treaty if recourse to the Court under Article XXI, paragraph 2, were now to be found not to be open to the parties precisely at the moment when such recourse was most needed. Furthermore, although the machinery for the effective operation of the 1955 Treaty has, no doubt, now been impaired by reason of diplomatic relations between the two countries having been broken off by the United States, its provisions remain part of the corpus of law applicable between the United States and Iran.

55. The United States has further invoked Article 13 of the Convention of 1973 on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, as a basis for the exercise of the Court's jurisdiction with respect to its claims under that Convention. The Court does not, however, find it necessary in the present Judgment to enter into the question whether, in the particular circumstances of the case, Article 13 of that Convention provides a basis for the exercise of the Court's jurisdiction with respect to those claims.

56. The principal facts material for the Court's decision on the merits of the present case have been set out earlier in this Judgment. Those facts have to be looked at by the Court from two points of view. First, it must determine how far, legally, the acts in question may be regarded as imputable to the Iranian State. Secondly, it must consider their compatibility or incompatibility with the obligations of Iran under treaties in force or under any other rules of international law that may be applicable. The events which are the subject of the United States' claims fall into two phases which it will be convenient to examine separately.

57. The first of these phases covers the armed attack on the United States Embassy by militants on 4 November 1979, the overrunning of its premises, the seizure of its inmates as hostages, the appropriation of its property and archives and the conduct of the Iranian authorities in the face of those occurrences. The attack and the subsequent overrunning, bit by bit, of the whole Embassy premises, was an operation which continued over a period of some three hours without any body of police, any military unit or any Iranian official intervening to try to stop or impede it

from being carried through to its completion. The result of the attack was considerable damage to the Embassy premises and property, the forcible opening and seizure of its archives, the confiscation of the archives and other documents found in the Embassy and, most grave of all, the seizure by force of its diplomatic and consular personnel as hostages, together with two United States nationals.

58. No suggestion has been made that the militants, when they executed their attack on the Embassy, had any form of official status as recognized "agents" or organs of the Iranian State. Their conduct in mounting the attack, overrunning the Embassy and seizing its inmates as hostages cannot, therefore, be regarded as imputable to that State on that basis. Their conduct might be considered as itself directly imputable to the Iranian State only if it were established that, in fact, on the occasion in question the militants acted on behalf of the State, having been charged by some competent organ of the Iranian State to carry out a specific operation. The information before the Court does not, however, suffice to establish with the requisite certainty the existence at that time of such a link between the militants and any competent organ of the State.

59. Previously, it is true, the religious leader of the country, the Ayatollah Khomeini, had made several public declarations inveighing against the United States as responsible for all his country's problems. In so doing, it would appear, the Ayatollah Khomeini was giving utterance to the general resentment felt by supporters of the revolution at the admission of the former Shah to the United States. The information before the Court also indicates that a spokesman for the militants, in explaining their action afterwards, did expressly refer to a message issued by the Ayatollah Khomeini, on 1 November 1979. In that message the Ayatollah Khomeini had declared that it was "up to the dear pupils, students and theological students to expand with all their might their attacks against the United States and Israel, so they may force the United States to return the deposed and criminal shah, and to condemn this great plot" (that is, a plot to stir up dissension between the main streams of Islamic thought). In the view of the Court, however, it would be going too far to interpret such general declarations of the Ayatollah Khomeini to the people or students of Iran as amounting to an

authorization from the State to undertake the specific operation of invading and seizing the United States Embassy. To do so would, indeed, conflict with the assertions of the militants themselves who are reported to have claimed credit for having devised and carried out the plan to occupy the Embassy. Again, congratulations after the event, such as those reportedly telephoned to the militants by the Ayatollah Khomeini on the actual evening of the attack, and other subsequent statements of official approval, though highly significant in another context shortly to be considered, do not alter the initially independent and unofficial character of the militants' attack on the Embassy.

60. The first phase, here under examination, of the events complained of also includes the attacks on the United States Consulates at Tabriz and Shiraz. Like the attack on the Embassy, they appear to have been executed by militants not having an official character, and successful because of lack of sufficient protection.

61. The conclusion just reached by the Court, that the initiation of the attack on the United States Embassy on 4 November 1979, and of the attacks on the Consulates at Tabriz and Shiraz the following day, cannot be considered as in itself imputable to the Iranian State does not mean that Iran is, in consequence, free of any responsibility in regard to those attacks; for its own conduct was in conflict with its international obligations. By a number of provisions of the Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 1963, Iran was placed under the most categorical obligations, as a receiving State, to take appropriate steps to ensure the protection of the United States Embassy and Consulates, their staffs, their archives, their means of communication and the freedom of movement of the members of their staffs.

62. Thus, after solemnly proclaiming the inviolability of the premises of a diplomatic mission, Article 22 of the 1961 Convention continues in paragraph 2:

"The receiving State is under a special duty to take all appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity." [Emphasis added.]

So, too, after proclaiming that the person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable, and that he shall not be liable to any form of arrest or detention, Article 29 provides:

"The receiving State shall treat him with due respect and shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on his person, freedom or dignity." [Emphasis added.]

The obligation of a receiving State to protect the inviolability of the archives and documents of a diplomatic mission laid down in Article 24, which specifically provides that they are to be "inviolable at any time and wherever they may be". Under Article 25 it is required to "accord full facilities for the performance of the functions of the mission" under Article 26 to "ensure to all members of the mission freedom of movement and travel in its territory and under Article 27 to "permit and protect free communication on the part of the mission for all official purposes". Analogous provisions are to be found in the 1963 Convention regarding the privileges and immunities of consular missions and their staffs (Article 31, paragraph 3, Article 40, 33, 28, 34 and 35). In the view of the Court, the obligations of the Iranian Government here in question are not merely contractual obligations established by the Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 1963, but also obligations under general international law.

63. The facts set out in paragraphs 14 to 27 above establish to the satisfaction of the Court that on 4 November 1979 the Iranian Government failed altogether to take any "appropriate steps" to protect the premises, staff and archives of the United States' mission against attack by the militants, and take any steps either to prevent this attack or to stop it before it reached its completion. They also show that on 4 November 1979 the Iranian Government similarly failed to take appropriate steps for the protection of the United States Consulates at Tabriz and Shiraz. In addition they show, in the opinion of the Court, that the failure of the Iranian Government to take such steps was due to more than mere negligence or lack of appropriate means.

64. The total inaction of the Iranian authorities on that date in face of urgent and repeated requests for help contrasts very sharply with its conduct on several other occasions of a similar kind. Some eight months earlier, on 14 February 1979, the United States Embassy in Tehran had itself been subjected to an armed attack mentioned above (paragraph 14), in the course of which the attackers had taken the Ambassador and his staff prisoner. On that occasion, however, a detachment of Revolutionary Guards, sent by the Government, had ar-

ed promptly, together with a Deputy
me Minister, and had quickly succeed-
in freeing the Ambassador and his
ff and restoring the Embassy to him.
1 March 1979, moreover, the Prime
xister of Iran had sent a letter ex-
sisting deep regret at the incident, giv-
an assurance that appropriate argu-
gements had been made to prevent
repetition of such incidents, and in-
tating the willingness of his Govern-
nt to indemnify the United States for
damage. On 1 November 1979, only
ee days before the events which gave
to the present case, the Iranian
ce intervened quickly and effectively
protect the United States Embassy
en a large crowd of demonstrators
nt several hours marching up and
n outside it. Furthermore, on other
asions in November 1979 and
uary 1980, invasions or attempted in-
ions of other foreign embassies in
ran were frustrated or speedily ter-
ated.

65. A similar pattern of facts ap-
rs in relation to consulates. In
bruary 1979, at about the same time
he first attack on the United States
bassy, attacks were made by
onstrators on its Consulates in
rizz and Shiraz; but the Iranian
orities then took the necessary steps
lear them of the demonstrators. On
other hand, the Iranian authorities
ok no action to prevent the attack of 5
November 1979, or to restore the Con-
sulates to the possession of the United
States. In contrast, when on the next
1 militants invaded the Iraqi Con-
sulate in Kermanshah, prompt steps
were taken by the Iranian authorities to
secure their withdrawal from the Con-
sulate. Thus in this case, the Iranian
authorities and police took the necessary
steps to prevent and check the attempt-
invasion or return the premises to
their rightful owners.

66. As to the actual conduct of the
Iranian authorities when faced with the
events of 4 November 1979, the infor-
mation before the Court establishes that,
in spite of assurances previously given by
Iran to the United States Government
and despite repeated and urgent calls
for help, they took no apparent steps
either to prevent the militants from in-
vading the Embassy or to persuade or to
compel them to withdraw. Furthermore,
when the militants had forced an entry
into the premises of the Embassy, the
Iranian authorities made no effort to
compel or even to persuade them to
withdraw from the Embassy and to free
the diplomatic and consular staff whom
they had made prisoner.

67. This inaction of the Iranian
Government by itself constituted clear
and serious violation of Iran's obligations
to the United States under the provi-
sions of Article 22, paragraph 2, and Ar-
ticles 24, 25, 26, 27 and 29 of the 1961
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Rela-
tions, and Articles 5 and 36 of the 1963
Vienna Convention on Consular Rela-
tions. Similarly, with respect to the at-
tacks on the Consulates at Tabriz and
Shiraz, the inaction of the Iranian
authorities entailed clear and serious
breaches of its obligations under the pro-
visions of several further articles of the
1963 Convention on Consular Relations.
So far as concerns the two private
United States nationals seized as
hostages by the invading militants, that
inaction entailed, albeit incidentally, a
breach of its obligations under Article
II, paragraph 4, of the 1955 Treaty of
Amity, Economic Relations, and Con-
sular Rights which, in addition to the
obligations of Iran existing under
general international law, requires the
parties to ensure "the most constant
protection and security" to each other's
nationals in their respective territories.

68. The Court is therefore led in-
evitably to conclude, in regard to the
first phase of the events which has so
far been considered, that on 4 November
1979 the Iranian authorities:

(a) were fully aware of their
obligations under the conventions in
force to take appropriate steps to pro-
tect the premises of the United States
Embassy and its diplomatic and consular
staff from any attack and from any in-
fringement of their inviolability, and to
ensure the security of such other per-
sons as might be present on the said
premises;

(b) were fully aware, as a result of
the appeals for help made by the United
States Embassy, of the urgent need for
action on their part;

(c) had the means at their disposal
to perform their obligations;

(d) completely failed to comply
with these obligations.

Similarly, the Court is led to conclude
that the Iranian authorities were equally
aware of their obligations to protect the
United States Consulates at Tabriz and
Shiraz, and of the need for action on
their part, and similarly failed to use the
means which were at their disposal to
comply with their obligations.

69. The second phase of the events
which are the subject of the United

States' claims comprises the whole series
of facts which occurred following the
completion of the occupation of the
United States Embassy by the militants,
and the seizure of the Consulates at
Tabriz and Shiraz. The occupation hav-
ing taken place and the diplomatic and
consular personnel of the United States'
mission having been taken hostage, the
action required of the Iranian Govern-
ment by the Vienna Conventions and by
general international law was manifest.
Its plain duty was at once to make every
effort, and to take every appropriate
step, to bring these flagrant in-
fringements of the inviolability of the
premises, archives and diplomatic and
consular staff of the United States Em-
bassy to a speedy end, to restore the
Consulates at Tabriz and Shiraz to
United States control, and in general to
re-establish the status quo and to offer
reparation for the damage.

70. No such step was, however,
taken by the Iranian authorities. At a
press conference on 5 November the
Foreign Minister, Mr. Yazdi, conceded
that "according to international regula-
tions the Iranian Government is duty-
bound to safeguard the life and property
of foreign nationals". But he made no
mention of Iran's obligation to safeguard
the inviolability of foreign embassies and
diplomats; and he ended by announcing
that the action of the students "enjoys
the endorsement and support of the
government, because America herself is
responsible for this incident". As to the
Prime Minister, Mr. Bazargan, he does
not appear to have made any statement
on the matter before resigning his office
on 5 November.

71. In any event expressions of ap-
proval of the take-over of the Embassy,
and indeed also of the Consulates at
Tabriz and Shiraz, by militants came im-
mediately from numerous Iranian
authorities, including religious, judicial,
executive, police and broadcasting
authorities. Above all, the Ayatollah
Khomeini himself made crystal clear the
endorsement by the State both of the
take-over of the Embassy and Con-
sulates and of the detention of the Em-
bassy staff as hostages. At a reception
in Qom on 5 November, the Ayatollah
Khomeini left his audience in no doubt
as to his approval of the action of the
militants in occupying the Embassy, to
which he said they had resorted
"because they saw that the shah was
allowed in America". Saying that he had
been informed that the "centre occupied

by our young men . . . has been a lair of espionage and plotting", he asked how the young people could be expected "simply to remain idle and witness all these things". Furthermore he expressly stigmatized as "rotten roots" those in Iran who were "hoping we would mediate and tell the young people to leave this place". The Ayatollah's refusal to order "the young people" to put an end to their occupation of the Embassy, or the militants in Tabriz and Shiraz to evacuate the United States Consulates there, must have appeared the more significant when, on 6 November, he instructed "the young people" who had occupied the Iraqi Consulate in Kermanshah that they should leave it as soon as possible. The true significance of this was only reinforced when, next day, he expressly forbade members of the Revolutionary Council and all responsible officials to meet the special representatives sent by President Carter to try and obtain the release of the hostages and evacuation of the Embassy.

72. At any rate, thus fortified in their action, the militants at the Embassy at once went one step further. On 6 November they proclaimed that the Embassy, which they too referred to as "the U.S. centre of plots and espionage", would remain under their occupation, and that they were watching "most closely" the members of the diplomatic staff taken hostage whom they called "U.S. mercenaries and spies".

73. The seal of official governmental approval was finally set on this situation by a decree issued on 17 November 1979 by the Ayatollah Khomeini. His decree began with the assertion that the American Embassy was "a centre of espionage and conspiracy" and that "those people who hatched plots against our Islamic movement in that place do not enjoy international diplomatic respect". He went on expressly to declare that the premises of the Embassy and the hostages would remain as they were until the United States had handed over the former Shah for trial and returned his property to Iran. This statement of policy the Ayatollah qualified only to the extent of requesting the militants holding the hostages to "hand over the blacks and the women, if it is proven that they did not spy, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs so that they may be immediately expelled from Iran". As to the rest of the hostages, he made the Iranian Government's intentions all too clear:

"The noble Iranian nation will not give permission for the release of the rest of

them. Therefore, the rest of them will be under arrest until the American Government acts according to the wish of the nation."

74. The policy thus announced by the Ayatollah Khomeini, of maintaining the occupation of the Embassy and the detention of its inmates as hostages for the purpose of exerting pressure on the United States Government was complied with by other Iranian authorities and endorsed by them repeatedly in statements made in various contexts. The result of that policy was fundamentally to transform the legal nature of the situation created by the occupation of the Embassy and the detention of its diplomatic and consular staff as hostages. The approval given to these facts by the Ayatollah Khomeini and other organs of the Iranian State, and the decision to perpetuate them, translated the continuing occupation of the Embassy and detention of the hostages into acts of that State. The militants, authors of the invasion and jailors of the hostages, had now become agents of the Iranian State for whose acts the State itself was internationally responsible. On 6 May 1980, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Ghotbzadeh, is reported to have said in a television interview that the occupation of the United States Embassy had been "done by our nation". Moreover, in the prevailing circumstances the situation of the hostages was aggravated by the fact that their detention by the militants did not even offer the normal guarantees which might have been afforded by policy and security forces subject to the discipline and the control of official superiors.

75. During the six months which have elapsed since the situation just described was created by the decree of the Ayatollah Khomeini, it has undergone no material change. The Court's Order of 15 December 1979 indicating provisional measures, which called for the immediate restoration of the Embassy to the United States and the release of the hostages, was publicly rejected by the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the following day and has been ignored by all Iranian authorities. On two occasions, namely on 23 February and on 7 April 1980, the Ayatollah Khomeini laid it down that the hostages should remain at the United States Embassy under the control of the militants until the new Iranian parliament should have assembled and taken a decision as to their fate. His adherence to that policy also made it impossible to

obtain his consent to the transfer of the hostages from the control of the militants to that of the Government of the Council of the Revolution. In any event, while highly desirable from the humanitarian and safety points of view, such a transfer would not have resulted in any material change in the legal situation, for its sponsors themselves emphasized that it must not be understood as signifying the release of the hostages.

76. The Iranian authorities' decision to continue the subjection of the premises of the United States Embassy to occupation by militants and of the Embassy staff to detention as hostages, clearly gave rise to repeated and multiple breaches of the applicable provisions of the Vienna Conventions even more serious than those which arose from their failure to take any steps to prevent the attacks on the inviolability of the premises and staff.

77. In the first place, these facts constituted breaches additional to those already committed of paragraph 2 of Article 22 of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations which requires Iran to protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent and disturbance of its peace or impairment of its dignity. Paragraphs 1 and 3 of that Article have also been infringed, and continue to be infringed, since they forbid agents of a receiving State to enter the premises of a mission without consent or to undertake any search, requisition, attachment or like measure on the premises. Secondly, they constitute continuing breaches of Article 29 of the same Convention which forbids any arrest or detention of a diplomatic agent and any attack on his person, freedom or dignity. Thirdly, the Iranian authorities are without doubt in continuing breach of the provisions of Articles 25, 26 and 27 of the 1961 Vienna Convention and pertinent provisions of the 1963 Vienna Convention concerning facilities for the performance of functions, freedom of movement and communications for diplomatic and consular staff, as well as of Article 24 of the former Convention and Article 33 of the latter, which provide for the absolute inviolability of the archives and documents of diplomatic missions and consulates. This particular violation has been made manifest to the world by repeated statements by the militants occupying the Embassy, who claim to be in possession of documents from the archives, and by various

ernment authorities, purporting to certify the contents thereof. Finally, the continued detention as hostages of the private individuals of United States nationality entails a renewed breach of obligations of Iran under Article II, paragraph 4, of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights.

78. Inevitably, in considering the compatibility or otherwise of the conduct of the Iranian authorities with the requirements of the Vienna Conventions, the Court has focussed its attention primarily on the occupation of the Embassy and the treatment of the United States diplomatic and consular personnel within the Embassy. It is however evident that the question of the compatibility of their conduct with the Vienna Conventions also arises in connection with the treatment of the United States Chargé d'affaires and two members of staff in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 4 November 1979 and since that date. The facts of this case establish to the satisfaction of the Court on 4 November 1979 and thereafter that Iranian authorities have withheld from the Chargé d'affaires and the two members of his staff the necessary protection and facilities to permit them to leave the Ministry in safety. Accordingly it appears to the Court that with respect to these three members of the United States' mission the Iranian authorities have committed a continuing breach of their obligations under Articles 26 and 27 of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. It further appears to the Court that the continuation of this situation over a long period has, in the circumstances, amounted to detention in the Ministry.

79. The Court moreover cannot conceal its observations on the series of threats which it has found to be imputable to the Iranian State and to be patently inconsistent with its international obligations under the Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 1963 without mention also of another fact. This is that judicial authorities of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Minister for Foreign Affairs have frequently voiced or associated themselves with, a threat announced by the militants, of killing some of the hostages submitted to trial before a court or some other authority. These threats may at present merely be acts in contemplation. But the Court considers it necessary here and now to stress that, if the intention to submit the hostages to any form of

criminal trial or investigation were to be put into effect, that would constitute a grave breach by Iran of its obligations under Article 31, paragraph 1, of the 1961 Vienna Convention. This paragraph states in the most express terms:

"A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State." Again, if there were an attempt to compel the hostages to bear witness, a suggestion renewed at the time of the visit to Iran of the Secretary-General's Commission, Iran would without question be violating paragraph 2 of that same Article of the 1961 Vienna Convention which provides that "A diplomatic agent is not obliged to give evidence as a witness".

80. The facts of the present case, viewed in the light of the applicable rules of law, thus speak loudly and clearly of successive and still continuing breaches by Iran of its obligations to the United States under the Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 1963, as well as under the Treaty of 1955. Before drawing from this finding the conclusions which flow from it, in terms of the international responsibility of the Iranian State vis-à-vis the United States of America, the Court considers that it should examine one further point. The Court cannot overlook the fact that on the Iranian side, in often imprecise terms, the idea has been put forward that the conduct of the Iranian Government, at the time of the events of 4 November 1979 and subsequently, might be justified by the existence of special circumstances.

81. In his letters of 9 December 1979 and 16 March 1980, as previously recalled, Iran's Minister for Foreign Affairs referred to the present case as only "a marginal and secondary aspect of an overall problem". This problem, he maintained, "involves, *inter alia*, more than 25 years of continual interference by the United States in the internal affairs of Iran, the shameless exploitation of our country, and numerous crimes perpetrated against the Iranian people, contrary to and in conflict with all international and humanitarian norms". In the first of the two letters he indeed singled out amongst the "crimes" which he attributed to the United States an alleged complicity on the part of the Central Intelligence Agency in the coup d'état of 1953 and in the restoration of the Shah to the throne of Iran. Invoking these alleged crimes of the United States, the Iranian Foreign Minister took the position that the United States' Application could not be examined by the Court divorced from its proper con-

text, which he insisted was "the whole political dossier of the relations between Iran and the United States over the last 25 years".

82. The Court must however observe, first of all, that the matters alleged in the Iranian Foreign Minister's letters of 9 December 1979 and 16 March 1980 are of a kind which, if invoked in legal proceedings, must clearly be established to the satisfaction of the tribunal with all the requisite proof. The Court, in its Order of 15 December 1979, pointed out that if the Iranian Government considered the alleged activities of the United States in Iran legally to have a close connection with the subject-matter of the Application it was open to Iran to present its own case regarding those activities to the Court by way of defence to the United States' claims. The Iranian Government, however, did not appear before the Court. Moreover, even in his letter of 16 March 1980, transmitted to the Court some three months after the issue of that Order, the Iranian Foreign Minister did not furnish the Court with any further information regarding the alleged criminal activities of the United States in Iran, or explain on what legal basis he considered these allegations to constitute a relevant answer to the United States' claims. The large body of information submitted by the United States itself to the Court includes, it is true, some statements emanating from Iranian authorities or from the militants in which reference is made to alleged espionage and interference in Iran by the United States centred upon its Embassy in Tehran. These statements are, however, of the same general character as the assertions of alleged criminal activities of the United States contained in the Foreign Minister's letters, and are unsupported by evidence furnished by Iran before the Court. Hence they do not provide a basis on which the Court could form a judicial opinion on the truth or otherwise of the matters there alleged.

83. In any case, even if the alleged criminal activities of the United States in Iran could be considered as having been established, the question would remain whether they could be regarded by the Court as constituting a justification of Iran's conduct and thus a defence to the United States' claims in the present case. The Court, however, is unable to accept that they can be so regarded. This is because diplomatic law itself provides the necessary means of defence against, and sanction for, illicit activities

by members of diplomatic or consular missions.

84. The Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 1963 contain express provisions to meet the case when members of an embassy staff, under the cover of diplomatic privileges and immunities, engage in such abuses of their functions as espionage or interference in the internal affairs of the receiving State. It is precisely with the possibility of such abuses in contemplation that Article 41, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, and Article 55, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, provide

"Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities, it is the duty of all persons enjoying such privileges and immunities to respect the laws and regulations of the receiving State. They also have a duty not to interfere in the internal affairs of that State."

Paragraph 3 of Article 41 of the 1961 Convention further states "The premises of the mission must not be used in any manner incompatible with the functions of the mission. . ."; an analogous provision, with respect to consular premises is to be found in Article 55, paragraph 2 of the 1963 Convention.

85. Thus, it is for the very purpose of providing a remedy for such possible abuses of diplomatic functions that Article 9 of the 1961 Convention on Diplomatic Relations stipulates:

"1. The receiving State may at any time and without having to explain its decision, notify the sending State that the head of the mission or any member of the diplomatic staff of the mission is *persona non grata* or that any other member of the staff of the mission is not acceptable. In any such case, the sending State shall, as appropriate, either recall the person concerned or terminate his functions with the mission. A person may be declared *non grata* or not acceptable before arriving in the territory of the receiving State.

2. If the sending State refuses or fails within a reasonable period to carry out its obligations under paragraph 1 of this Article, the receiving State may refuse to recognize the person concerned as a member of the mission."

The 1963 Convention contains, in Article 23, paragraphs 1 and 4, analogous provisions in respect of consular officers and consular staff. Paragraph 1 of Article 9 of the 1961 Conventions, and paragraph 4 of Article 23 of the 1963 Convention, take account of the difficulty that may be experienced in practice of proving such abuses in every case or, indeed, of determining exactly when exercise of the diplomatic function, expressly

recognized in Article 3 (1) (d) of the 1961 Convention, of "ascertaining by all lawful means conditions and developments in the receiving State" may be considered as involving such acts as "espionage" or "interference in internal affairs". The way in which Article 9, paragraph 1, takes account of any such difficulty is by providing expressly in its opening sentence that the receiving State may "at any time and without having to explain its decision" notify the sending State that any particular member of its diplomatic mission is "*persona non grata*" or "not acceptable" (and similarly Article 23, paragraph 4, of the 1963 Convention provides that "the receiving State is not obliged to give to the sending State reasons for its decision"). Beyond that remedy for dealing with abuses of the diplomatic function by individual members of a mission, a receiving State has in its hands a more radical remedy if abuses of their functions by members of a mission reach serious proportions. This is the power which every receiving State has, at its own discretion, to break off diplomatic relations with a sending State and to call for the immediate closure of the offending mission.

86. The rules of diplomatic law, in short, constitute a self-contained régime which, on the one hand, lays down the receiving State's obligations regarding the facilities, privileges and immunities to be accorded to diplomatic missions and, on the other, foresees their possible abuse by members of the mission and specifies the means at the disposal of the receiving State to counter any such abuse. These means are, by their nature, entirely efficacious, for unless the sending State recalls the member of the mission objected to forthwith, the prospect of the almost immediate loss of his privileges and immunities, because of the withdrawal by the receiving State of his recognition as a member of the mission, will in practice compel that person, in his own interest, to depart at once. But the principle of the inviolability of the persons of diplomatic agents and the premises of diplomatic missions is one of the very foundations of this long-established régime, to the evolution of which the traditions of Islam made a substantial contribution. The fundamental character of the principle of inviolability is, moreover, strongly underlined by the provisions of Articles 44 and 45 of the Convention of 1961 (cf. also Articles 26 and 27 of the Convention of 1963). Even in the case of armed conflict or in the case of a breach in diplomatic relations those provisions re-

quire that both the inviolability of the members of a diplomatic mission and the premises, property and archives of the mission must be respected by the receiving State. Naturally, the observance of this principle does not mean—and this the Applicant Government expressly acknowledges—that a diplomatic agent caught in the act of committing an assault or other offence may not, on occasion, be briefly arrested by the police of the receiving State in order to prevent the commission of the particular crime. But such eventualities bear no relation at all to what occurred in the present case.

87. In the present case, the Iranian Government did not break off diplomatic relations with the United States; and in response to a question put to him by a Member of the Court, the United States Agent informed the Court that at no time before the events of 4 November 1979 had the Iranian Government declared, or indicated any intention to declare, any member of the United States diplomatic or consular staff in Tehran *persona non grata*. The Iranian Government did not, therefore, employ the remedies placed at its disposal by diplomatic law specifically for dealing with activities of the kind of which it now complains. Instead, it allowed a group of militants to attack and occupy the United States Embassy by force and to seize the diplomatic and consular staff as hostages; instead, it has endorsed that action of those militants and has deliberately maintained their occupation of the Embassy and detention of its staff as a means of coercing the sending State. It has, at the same time, refused altogether to discuss this situation with representatives of the United States. The Court, therefore, can only conclude that Iran did not have recourse to the normal and efficacious means at its disposal, but resorted to coercive action against the United States Embassy and its staff.

88. In an address given on 5 November 1979, the Ayatollah Khomeini traced the origin of the operation carried out by the Islamic militants of the previous day to the news of the arrival of the former Shah of Iran in the United States. That fact may no doubt have been the ultimate catalyst of the resentment felt in certain circles in Iran and among the Iranian population against the former Shah for his alleged misdeeds, and also against the United States Government which was being publicly accused of having restored him to the throne, of having supported him for many years and of planning to go on doing so. But whatever be the truth

ard to those matters, they could
ly be considered as having provided
stification for the attack on the
ted States Embassy and its
omatic mission. Whatever extenua-
of the responsibility to be attached
he conduct of the Iranian authorities
be found in the offence felt by them
use of the admission of the Shah to
United States, that feeling of offence
d not affect the imperative character
ne legal obligations incumbent upon
Iranian Government which is not
red by a state of diplomatic tension
even the two countries. Still less
d a mere refusal or failure on the
of the United States to extradite
Shah to Iran be considered to
nify the obligations of the Iranian
orities, quite apart from any legal
ulties, in internal or international
there might be in acceding to such
quest for extradition.

39. Accordingly, the Court finds
n no circumstances exist in the pres-
case which are capable of negating
fundamentally unlawful character of
conduct pursued by the Iranian
te on 4 November 1979 and
n after. This finding does not
ever exclude the possibility that
e of the circumstances alleged, if
established, may later be found to
some relevance in determining the
quences of the responsibility incur-
by the Iranian State with respect to
h conduct, although they could not be
sidered to alter its unlawful
hacter.

40. On the basis of the foregoing
leiled examination of the merits of the
a, the Court finds that Iran, by com-
ning successive and continuing
rches of the obligations laid upon it
the Vienna Conventions of 1961 and
93 on Diplomatic and Consular Rela-
ics, the Treaty of Amity, Economic
ations, and Consular Rights of 1955,
r the applicable rules of general inter-
onal law, has incurred responsibility
ards the United States. As to the
quences of this finding, it clearly
tils an obligation on the part of the
ian State to make reparation for the
ry thereby caused to the United
tes. Since however Iran's breaches of
bligations are still continuing, the
n and amount of such reparation
not be determined at the present
e.

41. At the same time the Court
is itself obliged to stress the
ulative effect of Iran's breaches of

its obligations when taken together. A
marked escalation of these breaches can
be seen to have occurred in the transi-
tion from the failure on the part of the
Iranian authorities to oppose the armed
attack by the militants on 4 November
1979 and their seizure of the Embassy
premises and staff, to the almost im-
mediate endorsement by those
authorities of the situation thus created,
and then to their maintaining deliber-
ately for many months the occupation of
the Embassy and detention of its staff
by a group of armed militants acting on
behalf of the State for the purpose of
forcing the United States to bow to cer-
tain demands. Wrongfully to deprive
human beings of their freedom and to
subject them to physical constraint in
conditions of hardship is in itself
manifestly incompatible with the prin-
ciples of the Charter of the United Na-
tions, as well as with the fundamental
principles enunciated in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. But what
has above all to be emphasized is the ex-
tent and seriousness of the conflict be-
tween the conduct of the Iranian State
and its obligations under the whole cor-
pus of the international rules of which
diplomatic and consular law is com-
prised, rules of fundamental character of
which the Court must here again strong-
ly affirm. In its Order of 15 December
1979, the Court made a point of stress-
ing that the obligations laid on States by
the two Vienna Conventions are of car-
dinal importance for the maintenance of
good relations between States in the in-
terdependent world of today. "There is
no more fundamental prerequisite for
the conduct of relations between
States", the Court there said, "than the
inviolability of diplomatic envoys and
embassies, so that throughout history
nations of all creeds and cultures have
observed reciprocal obligations for that
purpose". The institution of diplomacy,
the Court continued, has proved to be
"an instrument essential for effective co-
operation in the international communi-
ty, and for enabling States, irrespective
of their differing constitutional and
social systems, to achieve mutual under-
standing and to resolve their differences
by peaceful means" (*I.C.J. Reports 1979*,
page 19).

42. It is a matter of deep regret
that the situation which occasioned those
observations has not been rectified since
they were made. Having regard to their
importance the Court considers it essen-
tial to reiterate them in the present
Judgment. The frequency with which at

the present time the principles of inter-
national law governing diplomatic and
consular relations are set at naught by
individuals or groups of individuals is
already deplorable. But this case is
unique and of very particular gravity
because here it is not only private in-
dividuals or groups of individuals that
have disregarded and set at naught the
inviolability of a foreign embassy, but
the government of the receiving State
itself. Therefore in recalling yet again
the extreme importance of the principles
of law which it is called upon to apply in
the present case, the Court considers it
to be its duty to draw the attention of
the entire international community, of
which Iran itself has been a member
since time immemorial, to the ir-
reparable harm that may be caused by
events of the kind now before the Court.
Such events cannot fail to undermine
the edifice of law carefully constructed
by mankind over a period of centuries,
the maintenance of which is vital for the
security and well-being of the complex
international community of the present
day, to which it is more essential than
ever that the rules developed to ensure
the ordered progress of relations be-
tween its members should be constantly
and scrupulously respected.

43. Before drawing the appropriate
conclusions from its findings on the
merits in this case, the Court considers
that it cannot let pass without comment
the incursion into the territory of Iran
made by United States military units on
24-25 April 1980, an account of which
has been given earlier in this Judgment
(paragraph 32). No doubt the United
States Government may have had
understandable preoccupations with
respect to the well-being of its nationals
held hostage in its Embassy for over five
months. No doubt also the United States
Government may have had understand-
able feelings of frustration at Iran's
long-continued detention of the
hostages, notwithstanding two resolu-
tions of the Security Council as well as
the Court's own Order of 15 December
1979 calling expressly for their im-
mediate release. Nevertheless, in the cir-
cumstances of the present proceedings,
the Court cannot fail to express its con-
cern in regard to the United States' in-
cursion into Iran. When, as previously
recalled, this case had become ready for
hearing on 19 February 1980, the
United States Agent requested the
Court, owing to the delicate stage of
certain negotiations, to defer setting a

date for the hearings. Subsequently, on 11 March, the Agent informed the Court of the United States Government's anxiety to obtain an early judgment on the merits of the case. The hearings were accordingly held on 18, 19 and 20 March, and the Court was in course of preparing the present judgment adjudicating upon the claims of the United States against Iran when the operation of 24 April 1980 took place. The Court therefore feels bound to observe that an operation undertaken in those circumstances, from whatever motive, is of a kind calculated to undermine respect for the judicial process in international relations; and to recall that in paragraph 47 1.B. of its Order of 15 December 1979 the Court had indicated that no action was to be taken by either party which might aggravate the tension between the two countries.

94. At the same time, however, the Court must point out that neither the question of the legality of the operation of 24 April 1980, under the Charter of the United Nations and under general international law, nor any possible question of responsibility flowing from it, is before the Court. It must also point out that this question can have no bearing on the evaluation of the conduct of the Iranian Government over six months earlier, on 4 November 1979, which is the subject-matter of the United States' Application. It follows that the findings reached by the Court in this Judgment are not affected by that operation.

95. For these reasons,

THE COURT,

1. By thirteen votes¹ to two²,

Decides that the Islamic Republic of Iran, by the conduct which the Court has set out in this Judgment, has violated in several respects, and is still violating, obligations owed by it to the United States of America under international conventions in force between the two countries, as well as under long-established rules of general international law;

2. By thirteen votes¹ to two²,

Decides that the violations of these obligations engage the responsibility of the Islamic Republic of Iran towards the United States of America under international law;

3. Unanimously,

Decides that the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran must immediately take all steps to redress the

situation resulting from the events of 4 November 1979 and what followed from these events, and to that end:

(a) must immediately terminate the unlawful detention of the United States Chargé d' affaires and other diplomatic and consular staff and other United States nationals now held hostage in Iran, and must immediately release each and every one and entrust them to the protecting Power (Article 45 of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations);

(b) must ensure that all the said persons have the necessary means of leaving Iranian territory, including means of transport;

(c) must immediately place in the hands of the protecting Power the premises, property, archives and documents of the United States Embassy in Tehran and of its Consulates in Iran;

4. Unanimously,

Decides that no member of the United States diplomatic or consular staff may be kept in Iran to be subjected to any form of judicial proceedings or to participate in them as a witness;

5. By twelve votes³ to three⁴,

Decides that the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran is under an obligation to make reparation to the Government of the United States of America for the injury caused to the latter by the events of 4 November 1979 and what followed from these events;

6. By fourteen votes⁵ to one⁶,

Decides that the form and amount of such reparation, failing agreement between the Parties, shall be settled by the Court, and reserves for this purpose the subsequent procedure in the case.

Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative, at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this twenty-fourth day of May one thousand nine hundred and eighty, in three copies, one of which will be placed in the archives of the Court, and the others transmitted to the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, respectively.

(Signed) Humphrey WALDOCK
President

(Signed) S. AQUARONE
Registrar.

Judge LACHS appends a separate opinion to the Judgment of the Court.

Judges MOROZOV and TARAZI ap-

pend dissenting opinions to the Judgment of the Court.

(Initialled) H.W.

(Initialled) S.A.

SEPARATE OPINION OF
JUDGE LACHS

I wish to make some comments regarding the Judgment and the solution of the outstanding issues between the two States concerned. First I wish to express some preoccupation over the inclusion of the decision recorded in subparagraph 5 of the operative part.

It is not that there can be any doubt as to the principle involved, for that breach of an undertaking, resulting in injury, entails an obligation to make reparation is a point which international courts have made on several occasions. Indeed, the point is implicit, it can go without saying. "Reparation", said the Permanent Court of International Justice, "is the indispensable complement of a failure to apply a convention and there is no necessity for this to be stated in the convention itself" (*P.C.I.J. Series A, No. 9, p. 21*). This dictum cannot, as it happens, refer to a judicial decision but to a convention. But the Court's Judgment of 9 April 1949 in the *Corfu Channel* case illustrates the point in a decision of the Court, which then in the operative paragraph, did not make any statement on the obligation to make reparation.

There was thus no necessity for an operative paragraph of the present Judgment to decide the obligation, with the responsibility from which it might be deduced had been clearly spelled out both in the reasoning and in subparagraph 2. I accordingly felt subparagraph 5 to be redundant. In the circumstances of the case it would, to my mind, have been sound judicial economy to confine the *res judicata* to the first four subparagraphs and to conclude with the reservation for further decision, pending agreement between the Parties, of any subsequent procedure necessitated in respect of a claim to reparation.

By so proceeding the Court would in my opinion have left the ground clear for such subsequent procedure, without depriving the Applicant of a sufficient response to its present claim under the head.

I wish now to emphasize the value which the present Judgment possesses in my eyes. I consider it to constitute

only a decision of the instant case an important confirmation of a body of law which is one of the main pillars of international community. This body of law has been specifically enshrined in the Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 1963, which in my view constitute, together with the rules of general international law, the basis of the present legal system. The principles and rules of diplomatic privileges and immunities are ancient and this cannot be over-estimated – the invention or devise of one group of nations, of one continent or one culture, but have been established over centuries and are shared by nations of all races and all civilizations. Characteristically, the preamble of the 1961 Convention "Recall[s] that peoples of nations from ancient times have recognized the status of diplomatic privileges" and concludes with the words: "Recognizing that the rules of customary international law should continue to govern questions not expressly regulated by the provisions of the present Convention. Moreover, by 31 December 1978 the Vienna Convention of 1961 on Diplomatic Relations had been ratified or acceded to by 132 States, including 61 in Africa and Asia. In the case of the Convention on Consular Relations, the figures at the same date were 81, 45 from those two continents. It is clear that these Conventions reflect the law as approved by all regions of the world, and by peoples belonging to both the North and South, East and West alike. The same laws in question are the common property of the international community and have been confirmed in the interest of all.

It is a matter of particular concern, however, that the Court has again had to make its pronouncements without the assistance of the respondent's defence, and from the general arguments contained in two letters addressed to it. The Court took note of the claims of the Islamic Republic of Iran against the United States of America and kept the door open for their substantiation before the Court, unfortunately, Iran chose to waive itself of the available means for opposing its contentions. While arguing its obligations under Article 36 of its Statute, the Court could not rely on any claim of the Iranian Government, for no such claim was submitted; thus the responsibility for not appearing so cannot be laid at the door of the Court. In this context I am anxious to recall that the Court was called into being by

the Charter of the United Nations as "the principal judicial organ of the United Nations" (Article 92), and is intended to serve all the international community in order to "decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it" (Statute, Article 38, paragraph 1). But to be able to perform this task, the Court needs the assistance of the States concerned. Governments remain, of course, free to act as they wish in this matter, but I think that, having called it into existence, they owe it to the Court to appear before it when so notified – to admit, defend or counter-claim – whichever role they wish to assume. On the other hand, the Applicant, having instituted proceedings, is precluded from taking unilateral action, military or otherwise, as if no case is pending.

The Court having given its ruling on the issues of law placed before it, one should consider whether one can usefully point the way towards the practical solution of the problems between the parties. Here it would not be realistic to ignore the fact that the mandate given by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to his special commission linked the grievances of either side.

The efforts of that commission thus brought the problem into a field of diplomatic negotiation where its solution should have been greatly facilitated. Unfortunately, those efforts failed, while further events contributed to an aggravation of the tension. Nevertheless, now that the Judgment has, with force of law, determined one of the major issues in question, it should in my opinion be possible for negotiations to be resumed with a view to seeking a peaceful solution to the dispute. I can only repeat the deep-rooted conviction I have expressed on other occasions, that, while the Court is not entitled to oblige parties to enter into negotiations, its Judgment should where appropriate encourage them to do so, in consonance with its role as an institution devoted to the cause of peaceful settlement.

Accordingly, both countries, as parties to the Charter and members of the international community, should now engage in negotiations with a view to terminating their disagreement, which with other factors is sustaining the cloud of tension and misunderstanding that now hangs over that part of the world. By taking such account of the grievances of Iran against the United States as it had been enabled to do, the Court gave its attention not only to the

immediate question of responsibility for specific acts placed before it, but also to the wider disagreement that has perturbed relations between the two countries. In view of the fact that the Islamic Republic of Iran has radically severed its ties with the recent past under the former ruler, it is necessary to adopt a renewed approach to the solution of these problems, and while both parties are not on speaking terms I believe recourse should be had to a third-party initiative. The States concerned must be encouraged to seek a solution in order to avoid a further deterioration of the situation between them. To close the apparent abyss, to dispel the tension and the mistrust, only patient and wise action – mediation, conciliation or good offices – should be resorted to. The role of the Secretary-General of the United Nations may here be the key.

I append these words to the Judgment because I am hopeful that its pronouncements may mark a step towards the resolution of the grave differences which remain in the relations between the two States concerned. The peaceful means which I have enumerated may still appear difficult of application, but our age has shown that, with their aid, progress can be made towards the solution of even more complex problems, while perilous methods tend to render them even more intractable. Past efforts have failed for a variety of reasons, many of them deriving precisely from the lack of direct communication, and the situation being dominated by factors unrelated to the specific nature of the dispute. Against this background, the crucial element of timing went awry.

It will be necessary to seize the propitious moment when a procedure acceptable to both sides can be devised. But the uses of diplomacy which are corroborated on the present occasion will, I am confident, be vindicated in the event.

(Signed) Manfred LACHS

DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE MOROZOV

I vote against paragraphs 1, 2, 5 and 6 and in favour of paragraphs 3 and 4 of the operative part of the Judgment. Furthermore, there were some points in the reasoning which I could not accept, and I would like to explain the reasons for this.

1. I consider that the long-established rules of general international law relating to the privileges, immunities and immunities of diplomatic

and consular personnel are among those which are particularly important for the implementation of such basic principles of contemporary international law as the peaceful coexistence of countries with different political, social and economic structures. These rules are reflected in the Vienna Convention of 18 April 1961 on Diplomatic Relations and the Vienna Convention of 24 April 1963 on Consular Relations.

The obligations laid on the parties to the Conventions should be strictly observed and any violation of their provisions by any country should be immediately terminated.

2. But the Court will be competent to deal with the question of such violations at the request of one party to the dispute only if the *other* party in one or another of the forms provided by Articles 36 or 37 of the Statute has expressed its agreement to refer the case to the Court. For the purposes of this dispute, which has been referred to the Court only by *one* party, it is necessary to notice that the two Optional Protocols to the two Vienna Conventions provide in Article I that:

"Disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the Convention shall lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and may accordingly be brought before the Court *by an application made by any party to the dispute being a Party to the present Protocol.*" [Emphasis added.]

The Optional Protocols were duly ratified by the United States and Iran.

3. It would therefore not have been necessary to undertake any further examination of the question of jurisdiction if the Court in operative paragraph 1 had limited itself to recognition of the fact that the Islamic Republic of Iran had violated several obligations owed by it *under the Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 1963.*

Instead, the Court qualified the actions of Iran as violations of its obligations "*under international conventions in force between the two countries.*" [Emphasis added.]

The formula adopted by the Court, read in combination with paragraphs 50, 51, 52, 53 and 54 of the Judgment, signifies recognition that the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights between the United States and Iran of 1955 is an additional source for jurisdiction of the Court in the current case.

If one compares the text of Article I of the two Optional Protocols to the Vienna Conventions with the text of Ar-

ticle XXI (2) of the Treaty of 1955, one finds without difficulty that the latter text (unlike the Optional Protocols) does not provide for unconditional jurisdiction of the Court at the request of *only one party to the dispute.*

In its Memorial (page 41) the Applicant concedes: "It is, of course, true that the text of Article XXI (2) does not provide in express terms that either party to a dispute may bring the case to the Court by unilateral application."

Following passages of the Memorial contain references to the understanding allegedly reached between the United States of America and other countries on some bilateral treaties of the same type. According to the Agent of the United States of America, a number of countries understand that a formula analogous to Article XXI (2) of the Treaty gives to any party the right to submit a dispute to the Court by unilateral application.

But as is correctly said on page 42 of the same Memorial: "Iran is not, of course, bound by any understanding between the United States and third countries." Thus the Applicant itself recognized that, legally speaking, the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights of 1955 could not be used as a source of the Court's jurisdiction.

In the light of the actions taken by the Government of the United States of America in November 1979 and further during the period from December 1979 to April 1980—military invasion of the territory of Iran, a series of economic sanctions and other coercive measures which are, to say the least, incompatible with such notions as amity—it is clear that the United States of America, according to commonly recognized principles of international law, has now deprived itself of any right to refer to the Treaty of 1955 in its relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran.

In an endeavour to show that provisions of the Treaty of 1955 may be considered as a source of jurisdiction in this case, the Court, in some of its reasoning, goes so far as to consider the actions of the United States of America as some kind of normal counter-measures, and overlooks the fact that they are incompatible not only with the Treaty of 1955 but with the provisions of general international law, including the Charter of the United Nations.

4. On the other hand, the formula used by the Court in paragraph 4 of the operative part of the Judgment, read in combination with paragraph 55 of the

reasoning and operative paragraphs 5 and 6, implies that the Court *only in present Judgment* has decided not to enter into the question whether, in the particular circumstances of the case, Article 13 of the Convention of 1973 on Prevention and Punishment of Crime against Internationally Protected Persons including Diplomatic Agents "provides a basis for the exercise of the Court's jurisdiction with respect" to the claims of the United States of America.

Taking into account the fact that operative paragraph 6 the Court provides for a possible continuation of the case on a question of reparation, this implies that the Court does not exclude the possibility that the claim of the United States of America to found jurisdiction on the 1973 Convention might in future be re-examined. Therefore I am obliged to observe that the Convention of 1973 does not provide for the *unconditional* right of *one* party to a dispute to present an application to the Court. This right arises, according to Article 13 of the Convention, only if the other party in the course of six months has not accepted a request to organize an arbitration. The Memorial of the United States, as well as additional explanations given by Counsel for the United States at a public meeting of the Court on 20 March 1980, provide evidence that the United States Government never suggested to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran the organization of any arbitration as provided for by the Convention of 1973.

It is also necessary to take note that the 1973 Convention is not a substitute for either of the Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 1963; it was drawn up for the purpose of ensuring co-operation among States in their efforts to fight international terrorism.

The formula employed by the Court in operative paragraph 1, when read in combination with paragraph 91, serves also to level at Iran the unfounded allegation that it has violated the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

5. Paragraphs 2, 5 and 6 of the operative part of the Judgment relate to the question of the responsibility of the Islamic Republic of Iran towards the United States of America and the obligation of Iran to make reparation to the United States.

It is well known that, in accordance with the provisions of general international law, some violations of freely accepted international obligations may

wed by a duty to make compensation for the resultant damage. But taking into account the extraordinary circumstances which occurred during the period of judicial deliberation in this case, when the Applicant itself committed many actions which caused enormous damage to the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Applicant has forfeited the legal right as well as the moral right to expect the Court to hold any claim for reparation. *The situation in which the Court has acted on its judicial deliberations in the present case has no precedent in the history of the administration of international justice either before this Court, or before any international judicial institution.*

While declaring its intention to settle the dispute between the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran exclusively by peaceful means, and presenting its Application to the Court, the Applicant in fact simultaneously acted contrary to its own obligation, and committed a series of violations of the provisions of general international law and the Charter of the United Nations. Pending the Judgment of the Court these violations included unilateral economic sanctions and many other coercive measures against Iran, and culminated in a military attack on the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

One element of these violations was the decision to freeze Iranian assets in the United States, which, according to news and broadcast reports, amount to over 12 billion dollars. On 7 April 1980 these measures were taken by the President of the United States with the intention of the disposal of the frozen assets by American authorities in view. In the statement from the Deputy Agent of the United States of 15 April 1980, these actions of the President were explained particularly by the necessity to make an inventory and by the idea that the freezing of assets might "well be useful in future proceedings before the Court as to the amount of reparations owed by Iran". But in this letter the Deputy Agent failed to comment on the crucial nature of the statement of the President of the United States on 7 April 1980, which undoubtedly shows that the real purpose of his order relating to Iranian assets is to use them in accordance with decisions which would be made in a domestic framework by the United States itself. In the statement of the President of

the United States of 7 April 1980 we read:

"3. The Secretary of the Treasury will make a formal inventory of the assets of the Iranian Government which were frozen by my previous order and also make a census or inventory of the outstanding claims of American citizens and corporations against the Government of Iran. *This accounting of claims will aid in designing a program against Iran for the hostages, the hostage families and other US claimants. We are now preparing legislation which will be introduced in the Congress to facilitate processing and paying of these claims.*" [Emphasis added.]

In the context of the statement, this implies that the United States is acting as a "judge" in its own cause. It should be noted that, according to a communication published in the *International Herald Tribune* on 19-20 April 1980, the above-mentioned request to the United States Congress included a provision to "reimburse the United States for military costs because of the hostage crisis." [Emphasis added.]

6. Furthermore, despite the fact that the Security Council did not adopt the suggestion of the United States to order sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Government of the United States decided not only to undertake unilaterally all these sanctions but also to take some additional coercive measures.

In these completely unusual circumstances, it is not possible to include in the Judgment any provisions establishing the responsibility of the Islamic Republic of Iran towards the United States of America and a duty to make reparation, as is done in paragraphs 2, 5 and 6 of the operative part of the Judgment. The Court has disregarded the unlawfulness of the above-mentioned actions of the United States of America and has consequently said nothing about the Applicant's responsibility for those actions to the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Operative paragraph 6 of the Judgment, which provides that the "form and amount of such reparation, failing agreement between the Parties, shall be settled by the Court" and "reserves for this purpose the subsequent procedure in the case", does not affect my objection. Even if these provisions are detached from operative paragraph 5, and read only with operative paragraph 2, it is still apparent that the Court has recognized an imperative duty on the part of Iran to make reparation to the United States.

It has been mentioned that the absence of Iran from the judicial pro-

ceedings allegedly created an obstacle to considering its possible counter-claims against the United States of America. But the wholly unilateral actions committed by the United States of America against Iran simultaneously with the judicial proceedings were clearly proved by documents presented at the request of the Court by the Applicant itself, and there was no legal obstacle to the Court's taking this evidence into account *proprio motu* under Article 53 of the Statute, at least when considering the question of responsibility.

7. Some parts of the reasoning of the Judgment described the circumstances of the case in what I find to be an incorrect or one-sided way.

It is not my intention to refer to all those paragraphs in the reasoning which I could not accept. Accordingly, I confine myself to the inclusion in this opinion of the points which, it seems to me, are the most important.

8. I was unable to accept paragraphs 32, 93 and 94. The language used by the Court in those paragraphs does not give a full and correct description of the actions of the United States which took place on the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran on 24-25 April 1980. Some of the wording used by the Court for its description of the events follows uncritically the terminology used in the statement made by the President of the United States on 25 April 1980, in which various attempts were made to justify, from the point of view of international law, the so-called rescue operation. But even when the President's statement is quoted, some parts thereof, which are important for a correct assessment of those events, are omitted.

What happened in reality? During the night of 24-25 April 1980 armed units of the military forces of the United States committed an invasion of the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In accordance with the statement of the President of the United States of 25 April 1980, the planning of this invasion "began shortly after our Embassy was seized . . . this complex operation had to be the product of intensive training and repeated rehearsal." [Emphasis added.] This means, first, that almost simultaneously with its filing of the Application with a view to settling the dispute by peaceful means, the United States started preparing for settlement of the dispute by the use of armed force, and, secondly, that it proceeded to carry out its plan while the Judgment of the Court was still pending.

It is a well-known fact that in the

course of the period preceding the military invasion, the United States concentrated naval forces near the shore of Iran, including an aircraft-carrier, the *Nimitz*. And in the statement of the United States Secretary of Defense on 25 April 1980 we read: "*The second helicopter [which participated in the invasion] had difficulties, reversed course, and landed aboard the carrier Nimitz in the Arabian Sea.*" [Emphasis added.]

The Court requested the United States Agent to present documents related to the events of 24-25 April, and they were officially transmitted to it. Among them is the text of a report made by the United States to the Security Council on 25 April "pursuant to Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations." In that report the United States maintained that the "mission" had been carried out "in exercise of its inherent right of self-defense".

The question of a military invasion committed by one Member of the United Nations against another should of course be considered on every occasion by the Security Council of the United Nations, in accordance with its exclusive competence as provided by the Charter of the United Nations.

But, as has been observed, the invasion of the territory of Iran was committed by the United States in a period of judicial deliberation, and was directed (at least according to the explanation given by the United States) not towards the settlement of the dispute in a peaceful way, for example, by negotiations or similar means (which could take place in parallel with judicial proceedings), but *by force*.

In my view, the Court should not, in this completely unusual situation, have limited itself to stating that "an operation undertaken in those circumstances, from whatever motive, is of a kind calculated to undermine respect for the judicial process in international relations" and to "recall[ing] that in paragraph 47 I.B. of its Order of 15 December 1979 the Court had indicated that no action was to be taken by either party which might aggravate the tension between the two countries" (paragraph 93). At the same time the Court said that "the question of the legality of the operation of 24 April 1980, under the Charter of the United Nations and under general international law", is not "before the Court" and that "It follows that the findings reached by the Court in this Judgment are not affected by that operation" (paragraph 94).

I consider that, without any prejudice to the above-mentioned exclusive competence of the Security Council, the Court, from a purely legal point of view, could have drawn attention to the undeniable legal fact that Article 51 of the Charter, establishing the right of self-defence, may be invoked only "if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations". It should have added that in the documentation officially presented by the United States to the Court in response to its request relating to the events of 24-25 April 1980 there is no evidence that any armed attack had occurred against the United States.

Furthermore, some indication should have been included in the Judgment that the Court considers that settlement of the dispute between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran should be reached exclusively by peaceful means.

9. Among the paragraphs of the reasoning which I described in point 7 above as incorrect or one-sided is paragraph 88, which deals with the authorization extended to the former Shah to come to New York. This authorization extended to him even though the United States Government was well aware that he was considered by the Government and people of the Islamic Republic of Iran as a person whom the United States has restored to the throne after overthrowing the legitimate government of Dr. Mossadegh, and as a man who had committed the gravest crimes, having been responsible for the torture and execution of thousands of Iranians. His admission to the United States, and the subsequent refusal to extradite him, were thus real provocations and not, as the Judgment suggests, merely ordinary acts which just happened to give rise to a "feeling of offence".

(Signed) P. MOROZOV

DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE TARAZI

[Translation]

Having perused the Application instituting proceedings which the Government of the United States of America filed on 29 November 1979, read the Memorial filed by it on 15 January 1980 and listened to the oral arguments during the hearing of 18, 19 and 20 March 1980, the Court had before it a series of facts, historical developments and legal arguments which were to lead to its delivering a Judgment of, in my view,

cardinal importance. I concurred in the findings of the Judgment concerning the necessity of compliance by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran with the obligations incumbent upon it under the Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 1963 on, respectively, Diplomatic and Consular Relations. I nevertheless found some difficulty, arising on the one hand from the situation which has developed in Iran since the overthrow of the régime of which the former Shah was the symbol, and on the other hand from the conduct of the applicant State both before and after the events of 4 November 1979, in deciding and declaring only that the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran was responsible vis-à-vis that of the United States of America while neglecting to point out at the same time that the latter had also incurred responsibility, to an extent remaining to be determined, vis-à-vis the Government of Iran.

My intention here is to indicate, in as brief explanations as possible, the reasons for my attitude and position. To that end I will have to consider the following points:

1. The principle of the inviolability of diplomatic and consular missions and of the immunity enjoyed by their members,

2. The factors which enter into the assessment in principle of the responsibility incurred by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran;

3. The actions undertaken by the United States Government both before and after the seisin of the Court which were capable of affecting the course of the proceedings.

1. The inviolability of diplomatic and consular missions and the immunity enjoyed by their members

I entirely concurred in the reasoning of the Judgment on this point. I was pleased to note that the Judgment to particular account of the traditions of Islam, which contributed along with others to the elaboration of the rules of contemporary public international law on diplomatic and consular inviolability and immunity.

In a course of lectures which he gave in 1937 at the Hague Academy of International Law on the subject of "Islam and *jus gentium*", Professor Ahmed Rechid of the Istanbul law faculty gave the following account of the inviolability of the envoy in Muslim law

"In Arabia, the person of the ambassador had always been regarded as sacred. Muham-

consecrated this inviolability. Never ambassadors to Muhammad or to his messengers molested. One day, the envoy of a foreign nation, at an audience granted to him by the Prophet, was so bold as to use insulting language. Muhammad said to him: 'If you were not an envoy I would have you put to death.' The author of the 'Siyer' which describes this incident draws from it the conclusion that there is an obligation to respect the person of ambassadors."

Reehid adds further on:

"The Prophet always treated the envoys of foreign nations with consideration and respect. He used to shower gifts upon them and recommended his companions to follow his example, saying: 'Do the same as I do.'"

In a work entitled *International Law*, published by the Institute of State and Law of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, the following is to be read on conduct in the Middle Ages of the Moslems, the bearers of the Islamic faith:

"The Arab States, which played an important part in international relations in the Middle Ages (from the 7th century) had well-developed conceptions regarding the Law of Nations, closely linked with religious precepts.

"The Arabs recognized the inviolability of ambassadors and the need for the fulfilment of treaty obligations. They resorted to arbitration to settle international disputes and considered the observance of definite rules of international law necessary in time of war ('the blood of the innocent, children and old men shall not be the price of your victory')."

Factors which enter into the assessment of the principle of the responsibility incurred by the Iranian Government

The deductions made by the Court from the fact that the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran had violated binding international obligations to the United States of America with regard to diplomatic inviolability and immunity have led it to declare the former responsible by reason of acts of both commission and commission.

I find this approach inadequate. It is not right to proclaim the responsibility of the Iranian Government unless its exoneration is first preceded by an appropriate study of the historical facts surrounding the seizure by Islamic elements of the United States Embassy in Tehran on 4 November 1979. In that respect, it is a matter for deep regret that the Iranian Government refused to appear before the Court. Nevertheless, it emerges from the two identical communications addressed to the Court by the Iranian Minister for Foreign Affairs on 10 November 1979 and 16 March 1980

that the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran considers that the present proceedings are only a marginal aspect of a wider dispute dividing Iran and the United States since the Shah was in 1953 restored to the throne thanks to the intrigues of the CIA and the United States Government continued to meddle in Iran's internal affairs.

In spite, and perhaps because, of the absence of the Government of Iran from the proceedings, it behoved the Court to elucidate this particular point before pronouncing on the responsibility of the Iranian State. That responsibility ought to have been qualified as relative and not absolute.

I recognize that the Court made a laudable effort in that direction. This, however, remained insufficient. It has been argued that more would mean examining deeds of a political nature which lay outside the framework of the Court's powers. But is it possible to ignore historical developments which have direct repercussions on legal conflicts? The Permanent Court of International Justice well clarified this point when in its Judgment of 7 June 1932 (*Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex*), it stated:

"The era of the Napoleonic Wars preceding the Hundred Days was brought to an end by the treaties concluded at Paris on May 30th, 1814, between France, on the one hand, and Austria, Great Britain, Prussia and Russia respectively, on the other." (*P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 46, p. 115.*)

One could therefore have devoted some attention to the events of 1953 with a view to gauging to what extent the assertion of the Iranian Minister for Foreign Affairs was plausible. On this essential question, I have been able to glean some impression from a source that does not look with any favourable eye upon the Islamic Revolution of Iran. In his work entitled *The Fall of the Shah*, Mr. Fereydoun Hoveyda, the brother of the ex-sovereign's former Prime Minister, Mr. Abbas Amir Hoveyda, who was condemned to death and executed after the ex-sovereign left Iran, says:

"Some Iranian observers were sceptical, considering that foreign interests were pulling the strings: top-ranking non-British companies on the world market were pushing for a break of the contract with the AIOC [Anglo-Iranian Oil Company]. Be that as it may, when the nationalist uproar grew, the Iranian ruling class and various foreign powers got the wind up and turned to the Shah again. It was then that the CIA floated the idea of a coup d'état, and in 1953 Kermit Roosevelt visited Tehran to examine the possibilities and find a likely candidate. He

found his man in General Zahedi, and the plotters staged the departure of the Shah after having him sign a decree naming Zahedi prime minister. He used CIA money to buy the services of Shaban-bi-mokh (literally Shaban the Scatterbrain), the master of a famous 'Zurkane' (a traditional gymnastics club), in order to recruit a commando squad of 'civilians' to act in concert with the army. The operation begun in August 1953 did not take more than a day, and then the Shah made a triumphal return. And the very people who had followed Mossadeq right up to the eleventh hour scurried to the airport and prostrated themselves before the sovereign to kiss his boots!

In spite of the facts, which have been disclosed by the Americans themselves, the Shah was pleased to consider the 1953 coup as a 'popular revolution' which gave him the mandate of the people. And apparently he ended up by believing his own propaganda. Already the sovereign was showing a tendency to bend the truth, it was to intensify to the point of cutting him right off from the realities of the country⁸.

Thus, in the eyes of the present Iranian leaders, the power of the Shah had lacked all legitimacy or legality ever since the overthrow of Dr. Mossadeq in 1953. This point should have been examined carefully, because these same leaders say that they are firmly convinced that the Shah would not have been able to maintain himself upon the throne without the backing given him by the Government of the United States of America.

This opinion concords with the reflections of Dr. Henry Kissinger, the former Secretary of State of the United States of America. In his work entitled *The White House Years*, Dr. Kissinger states that:

"Under the Shah's leadership, the land bridge between Asia and Europe, so often the hinge of world history, was pro-American and pro-West beyond any challenge. Alone among the countries of the region—Israel aside—Iran made friendship with the United States the starting point of its foreign policy. That it was based on a cold-eyed assessment that a threat to Iran would most likely come from the Soviet Union, in combination with radical Arab states, is only another way of saying that the Shah's view of the realities of world politics paralleled our own. Iran's influence was always on our side; its resources reinforced ours even in some distant enterprises—in aiding South Vietnam at the time of the 1973 Paris Agreement, helping Western Europe in its economic crisis in the 1970s, supporting moderates in Africa against Soviet-Cuban encroachment . . . In the 1973 Middle East war, for example, Iran was the only country bordering the Soviet Union not to permit the Soviets use of its air space—in contrast to several NATO allies. The Shah . . . refueled our fleets without

question. He never used his control of oil to bring political pressure; he never joined any oil embargo against the West or Israel. Iran under the Shah, in short, was one of America's best, most important, and most loyal friends in the world. The least we owe him is not retrospectively to vilify the actions that eight American Presidents—including the present incumbent—gratefully welcomed⁹."

It is in these words that Dr. Kissinger himself describes the links which existed between the presence of the Shah at the head of the Iranian State and the exigencies of American worldwide and Middle East strategy. These links do not in any way justify the occupation of the Embassy. But they should be placed in the balance when the responsibility incurred by the Iranian Government falls to be weighed.

Furthermore, the ex-Shah, when in Mexico, was authorized to enter United States territory. The United States authorities were perfectly aware that this authorization might have untoward consequences. They nevertheless granted it, thus committing a serious fault which the Court could have taken into consideration. In what has become a classic work, entitled *Traité théorique et pratique de la responsabilité civile délictuelle et contractuelle*, the brothers Henri, Léon and Jean Mazeaud write:

"If the sole cause of the injury is an act of the complainant, the defendant should always be absolved, for it was not his fault if harm was done. He is thus entitled to rely on the complainant's act, whatever it be. Here it should be pointed out that the question whether the complainant's act contained an element of fault does not even arise. The defendant is absolved because it was not *his* act which was held to be the cause of the injury. In reality, he relies on the complainant's act solely in order to establish the absence of any causal connection between his own act and the harm done¹⁰."

Similarly, before reaching the point of declaring the Iranian State responsible, one should take into consideration the circumstances in which the facts complained of occurred. In doing so, one must bear in mind the essential point that Iran is at present traversing a period of revolution. It is no longer valid to assess the obligations of the Iranian State in accordance with the criteria which were current before the departure of the Shah. This corresponds to the essence of the theory recognized in French administrative law with regard to the influence of war on the obligations of the State and public bodies. In its Judgment of 30 March 1916 (*Compagnie du gaz de Bordeaux*) the French Conseil d'Etat confirmed the principle of the collapse of the economy of contracts on account of war¹¹. This principle was endorsed by the great French jurist Maurice Hauriou, in his theory of the unforeseen¹².

With this essential factor added to those already mentioned, the responsibility of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran ought to have been envisaged in the context of the revolution which took place in that country and brought about, as it were, a break with a past condemned as oppressive. Thus it would in my view be unjust to lay all the facts complained of at the door of the Iranian Government without subjecting the circumstances in which those acts took place to the least preliminary examination.

3. *The actions undertaken before and after the seisin of the Court which were capable of affecting the course of the proceedings*

The Government of the United States of America referred its dispute with Iran to the Court on 29 November 1979. It is certain that the Court's jurisdiction is not automatic. The Court possesses only such jurisdiction as is conferred upon it. Two essential consequences flow from this:

(a) any State is free to ignore the possibility of the judicial solution of a dispute, either by omitting to refer it to the International Court of Justice, or by refusing to submit to the Court's jurisdiction, to the extent that the circumstances of the case enable it so to refuse;

(b) however, once a State presents itself before the Court as an applicant and requests it to direct the respondent State to submit to the law, the option it possessed before the institution of proceedings disappears. The whole dossier of the dispute at issue is taken in hand by the Court. The applicant State must refrain from taking any decisions on the planes of either domestic or international law which could have the effect of impeding the proper administration of justice.

Yet, even before turning to the Court, the Government of the United States of America had already decided to freeze the Iranian assets in United States dollars lodged in United States banks or their branches abroad.

Subsequently, just when the Court was embarking upon its deliberation prior to the Judgment it was to adopt, the President of the United States of America, on 7 April 1980, announced a series of measures he had decided to take which were closely connected with the case before the Court. Having regard to the normal exercise of the

Court's powers, the most important of these measures was unquestionably the third, whereby he ordered the Secretary of the Treasury to:

"make a formal inventory of the assets of the Iranian Government which were frozen by my previous order and also make a census or inventory of the outstanding claims of American citizens and corporations against the Government of Iran. This accounting claim will aid in designing a program against Iran for the hostages, the hostage families and other United States claimants."

The President added: "We are now preparing legislation which will be introduced in the Congress to facilitate processing and paying of these claims."

This, in my view, constituted an encroachment on the functions of the Court, for until the Court has ruled upon the principle of reparation the applicant State is not entitled to consider that its submissions, or part of them, have already been accepted and recognized as well founded. What is more, the decision of the United States President to propose the adoption by Congress of legislation granting victims the possibility of receiving compensation out of the Iranian assets frozen in the United States, when the action before the Court has not yet been exhausted, raises the problem of a conflict between the rules of municipal law and those of international law. Were the legislation contemplated to be passed, the conflict would be settled to the detriment of the latter.

However, it was the military operation of 24 April 1980 which was the gravest encroachment upon the Court's exercise of its power to declare the law in respect of the dispute laid before it. This operation was called off by the President of the United States for technical reasons. It is not my intention to characterize that operation or to make any legal value-judgment in its respect, but only to allude to it in connection with the case before the Court. I must say that it was not conducive to facilitating the judicial settlement of the dispute.

In his report to the Security Council of 25 April 1980, Mr. Donald McHenry, the Permanent Representative of the United States of America, stated that the military operation of 24 April 1980 had been undertaken pursuant to Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. Yet Article 51 provides for the eventuality of that kind of operation only if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations". One can only wonder, therefore, whether an

ed attack attributable to the Iranian
ernment has been committed against
territory of the United States, apart
its Embassy and Consulates in

To sum up my position, I would like
ention the following points:

(a) I consider that the Court has
diction to decide the present case
under the provisions of the Vienna
ventions of 1961 and 1963 on,
ectively, Diplomatic and Consular
tions. Any direct or indirect
erence to the 1955 Treaty between
United States and Iran or to the
Convention is, from my point of
c, unacceptable.

(b) I consider that the Iranian
ernment has violated its obligations
r the two Vienna Conventions men-
ed above. I concur in those parts of
operative paragraph which deal with
question.

(c) On the other hand, I could not
ort the idea that the Iranian
ernment should be declared responsi-
less the Court also found:

(i) that the responsibility in ques-
is relative and not absolute, that it
straightway be qualified in accord-
with the criteria which I have put
and others which may be en-
red;

(ii) that the Government of the
red States of America, by reason of
s conduct both before and after the in-
tion of proceedings, has equally in-
ed responsibility.

(Signed) S. TARAZI ■

COURT'S SUMMARY

17 24, 1980

cy, 24 May 1980, the International
ct of Justice delivered its judgment
e case concerning U.S. diplomatic
n consular staff in Tehran. The Court
ealed:

- 1) That Iran has violated and is still
ting obligations owed by it to the
ed States;
- 2) That these violations engage
s responsibility;
- 3) That the Government of Iran
t immediately release the U.S. na-
als held as hostages and place the
ises of the Embassy in the hands of
protecting power;
- 4) That no member of the U.S.
omatic or consular staff may be kept
an to be subjected to any form of

judicial proceedings or to participate in
them as a witness;

(5) That Iran is under an obligation
to make reparation for the injury caused
to the United States; and

(6) That the form and amount of
such reparation, failing agreement be-
tween the parties, shall be settled by the
Court.

These decisions were adopted by
large majorities: (1) and (2)—13 votes to
2; (3) and (4)—unanimously; (5)—12 votes
to 3; (6)—14 votes to 1.

A separate opinion has been ap-
pended to the judgment by Judge Lachs,
who voted against operative paragraph
5. Dissenting opinions have been ap-
pended by Judge Morozov, who voted
against paragraphs 1, 2, 5, and 6, and
by Judge Tarazi, who voted against
paragraphs 1, 2, and 5.

Analysis of the Judgment

Procedure before the Court. In its
judgment, the Court recalls that on 29
November 1979 the United States of
America had instituted proceedings
against Iran in a case arising out of the
situation at its Embassy in Tehran and
consulates at Tabriz and Shiraz, and the
seizure and detention as hostages of its
diplomatic and consular staff in Tehran
and two more citizens of the United
States. The United States having at the
same time requested the indication of
provisional measures, the Court, by a
unanimous order of 15 December 1979,
indicated, pending final judgment, that
the Embassy should immediately be
given back and the hostages released.

The procedure then continued in ac-
cordance with the statute and rules of
court. The United States filed a
memorial, and on 18, 19, and 20 March
1980 the Court held a public hearing at
the close of which the United States, in
its final submissions, requested it to ad-
judge and declare, *inter alia*, that the
Iranian Government had violated its in-
ternational legal obligations to the
United States and must:

- Insure the immediate release of
the hostages;
- Afford the U.S. diplomatic and
consular personnel the protection and
immunities to which they were entitled
(including immunity from criminal
jurisdiction) and provide them with
facilities to leave Iran;
- Submit the persons responsible for
the crimes committed to the competent
Iranian authorities for prosecution or ex-
tradite them to the United States; and

- Pay the United States reparation,
in a sum to be subsequently determined
by the Court.

Iran took no part in the proceedings.
It neither filed pleadings nor was
represented at the hearing, and no sub-
missions were therefore presented on its
behalf. Its position was however defined
in two letters addressed to the Court by
its Minister for Foreign Affairs on 9
December 1979 and 16 March 1980
respectively. In these the Minister main-
tained *inter alia* that the Court could
not and should not take cognizance of
the case.

The Facts. The Court expresses
regret that Iran did not appear before it
to put forward its arguments. The
absence of Iran from the proceedings
brought into operation article 53 of the
statute, under which the Court is re-
quired, before finding in the applicant's
favor, to satisfy itself that the allega-
tions of fact on which the claim is based
are well founded.

In that respect the Court observes
that it has had available to it, in the
documents presented by the United
States, a massive body of information
from various sources, including
numerous official statements of both Ira-
nian and U.S. authorities. This informa-
tion, the Court notes, is wholly concord-
ant as to the main facts and has all been
communicated to Iran without evoking
any denial. The Court is accordingly
satisfied that the allegations of fact on
which the United States based its claim
were well founded.

Admissibility. Under the settled
jurisprudence of the Court, it is bound,
in applying article 53 of its statute, to
investigate, on its own initiative, any
preliminary question of admissibility or
jurisdiction that may arise.

On the subject of admissibility, the
Court, after examining the considera-
tions put forward in the two letters
from Iran, finds that they do not
disclose any ground for concluding that
it could not or should not deal with the
case. Neither does it find any incom-
patibility with the continuance of judicial
proceedings before the Court in the
establishment by the Secretary General
of the United Nations, with the agree-
ment of both states, of a commission
given a mandate to undertake a fact-
finding mission to Iran, hear Iran's
grievances, and facilitate the solution of
the crisis between the two countries.

Jurisdiction. Four instruments
having been cited by the United States

as bases for the Court's jurisdiction to deal with its claims, the Court finds that three, namely the optional protocols to the two Vienna conventions of 1961 and 1963 on, respectively, diplomatic and consular relations, and the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights Between the United States and Iran, do in fact provide such foundations.

The Court, however, does not find it necessary in the present judgment to enter into the question whether article 13 of the fourth instrument so cited, namely the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons Including Diplomatic Agents, provides a basis for the exercise of its jurisdiction with respect to the U.S. claims thereunder.

Merits—Attributability to the Iranian State of the Acts Complained of, and Violation by Iran of Certain Obligations.

The Court has also, under article 53 of its statute, to satisfy itself that the claims of the applicant are well founded in law. To this end, it considers the acts complained of in order to determine how far, legally, they may be attributed to the Iranian state (as distinct from the occupiers of the Embassy) and whether they are compatible or incompatible with Iran's obligations under treaties in force or other applicable rules of international law.

The Events of 4 November 1979. The first phase of the events underlying the applicant's claims covers the armed attack on the U.S. Embassy carried out on 4 November 1979 by Muslim student followers of the Imam's policy (further referred to as "the militants" in the judgment), the overrunning of its premises, the seizure of its inmates as hostages, the appropriation of its property and archives, and the conduct of the Iranian authorities in the face of these occurrences.

The Court points out that the conduct of the militants on that occasion could be directly attributed to the Iranian state only if it were established that they were in fact acting on its behalf. The information before the Court did not suffice to establish this with due certainty. However, the Iranian state—which, as the state to which the mission was accredited, was under obligation to take appropriate steps to protect the U.S. Embassy—did nothing to prevent the attack, stop it before it reached its completion, or oblige the militants to withdraw from the premises

and release the hostages. This inaction was in contrast with the conduct of the Iranian authorities on several similar occasions at the same period, when they had taken appropriate steps. It constituted, the Court finds, a clear and serious violation of Iran's obligations to the United States under articles 22 (2), 24, 25, 26, 27, and 29 of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations; of Articles 5 and 36 of the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations; of article 11 (4) of the 1955 treaty. Further breaches of the 1963 convention have been involved in failure to protect the consulates at Tabriz and Shiraz.

The Court is therefore led to conclude that on 4 November 1979 the Iranian authorities were fully aware of their obligations under the conventions in force and also of the urgent need for action on their part, that they had the means at their disposal to perform their obligations, but that they completely failed to do so.

Events Since 4 November 1979. The second phase of the events underlying the U.S. claims comprises the whole series of facts which occurred following the occupation of the Embassy by the militants. Though it was the duty of the Iranian Government to take every appropriate step to end the infringement of the inviolability of the Embassy premises and staff and to offer reparation for the damage, it did nothing of the kind. Instead, expressions of approval were immediately heard from numerous Iranian authorities. Ayatollah Khomeini himself proclaimed the Iranian state's endorsement of both the seizure of the premises and the detention of the hostages. He described the Embassy as a "center of espionage," declared that the hostages would (with some exceptions) remain "under arrest" until the United States had returned the former Shah and his property to Iran, and forbade all negotiations with the United States on the subject.

Once organs of the Iranian state had thus given approval to the acts complained of and decided to perpetuate them as a means of pressure on the United States, those acts were transformed into acts of the Iranian state: The militants became agents of that state, which itself became internationally responsible for their acts. During the 6 months which ensued, the situation underwent no material change; the Court's order of 15 December 1979 was publicly rejected by Iran, while the Ayatollah declared that the detention of the hostages would continue until the

new Iranian Parliament had taken a decision as to their fate.

The Iranian authorities' decision to continue the subjectation of the Embassy to occupation, and of its staff to detention as hostages, gave rise to repeated and multiple breaches of Iran's treaty obligations, additional to those already committed at the time of the seizure of the Embassy (1961 convention: articles 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, and 29; 1963 convention: *inter alia*, article 33; 1955 treaty: article 11 (4)).

With regard to the Chargé d'Affaires and the two other members of the U.S. mission who have been in the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs since 4 November 1979, the Court finds that the Iranian authorities have withheld from them the protection and facilities necessary to allow them to leave the Ministry in safety. Accordingly, it appears to the Court that in their respect there have been breaches of articles 22 and 29 of the 1961 Vienna convention.

Taking note, furthermore, that various Iranian authorities have threatened to have some of the hostages submitted to trial before a court, or compel them to bear witness, the Court considers that, if put into effect, that intention would constitute a breach of article 31 of the same convention.

Possible Existence of Special Circumstances. The Court considers that it should examine the question whether the conduct of the Iranian Government might be justified by the existence of special circumstances, for the Iranian Minister for Foreign Affairs had alleged in his two letters to the Court that the United States had carried out criminal activities in Iran. The Court considers that, even if these alleged activities could be considered as proven, they would not constitute a defense to the U.S. claims, since diplomatic law provides the possibility of breaking off diplomatic relations or of declaring *persona non grata* members of diplomatic or consular missions who may be carrying on illicit activities. The Court concludes that the Government of Iran had recourse to coercion against the U.S. Embassy and its staff instead of making use of the normal means at its disposal.

International Responsibility. The Court finds that Iran, by committing successive and continuing breaches of the obligations laid upon it by the Vienna conventions of 1961 and 1963, the 1955 treaty, and the applicable rules of general international law, has incurred responsibility toward the United States.

a consequence, there is an obligation on the part of the Iranian state to make reparation for the injury caused to the United States. Since, however, the breaches are still continuing, the form and amount of such reparation cannot be determined.

At the same time the Court considers it essential to reiterate the observations made in its order of 15 December 1979 on the importance of the principles of international law governing diplomatic and consular relations. After stressing the particular gravity of the events, arising out of the fact that it is not private individuals or groups that are set at naught the inviolability of an Embassy, but the very government of the state to which the mission is accredited, the Court draws the attention of the entire international community to irreparable harm that may be caused by events of the kind before the Court. Such events cannot fail to undermine a carefully constructed edifice of law, the maintenance of which is vital for the security and well-being of the international community.

U.S. Operation in Iran of 24-25 April 1980. With regard to the operation undertaken in Iran by the U.S. military forces on 24-25 April 1980, the Court states that it cannot fail to express its concern. It feels bound to observe that the operation undertaken in those circumstances, from whatever motive, is of a kind calculated to undermine respect for the judicial process in international relations. Nevertheless, the question of the legality of that operation can have no bearing on the evaluation of Iran's conduct on 4 November 1979. The findings reached by the Court are therefore not affected by that operation.

Operative Part of Judgment

The Court by 13 votes to 2, decides that the Islamic Republic of Iran, by the conduct which the Court has set out in this judgment, has violated in several respects, and is still violating, obligations owed by it to the United States of America under international conventions for the maintenance of friendly relations and for the promotion of good will and cooperation between the two countries, as well as under long-established rules of general international law:

By 13 votes to 2, decides that the obligations of these obligations engage the responsibility of the Islamic Republic of Iran toward the United States of America under international law;

Unanimously, decides that the

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, MAY 24, 1980

We are deeply gratified by the favorable decision of the International Court of Justice in our case against Iran. It is particularly striking that all 15 judges of the Court have agreed that Iran has plainly violated international law (including two specific treaties) in its seizure and detention of the hostages. The Court has therefore unanimously held that the hostages must be immediately released and allowed to leave Iran, that none of them may be subjected to any kind of trial, and that the Embassy must be immediately turned over to the Swiss Government, which now represents our interests in Iran.

The Court's judgment confirms that Iran's conduct with respect to the hostages and the Embassy is totally inadmissible in a civilized international order and cannot be excused or justified by past grievances, whether real or imagined. In its summary of its opinion the Court has said,

... the Court draws the attention of the entire international community to the irreparable harm that may be caused by events of the kind before the Court. Such events cannot fail to undermine a carefully constructed edifice of law, the maintenance of which is vital for the security and well-being of the international community.

Under the U.N. Charter, Iran is bound to obey the Court's judgment, and the United States urges it to do so, in order that Iran will then be free to pursue its international interests as a law-abiding member of the international community, entitled to the respect and cooperation of other nations.

*Made available to news correspondents by acting Department spokesman Tom Reston. ■

Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran must immediately take all steps to redress the situation resulting from the events of 4 November 1979 and what followed from these events, and to that end:

- Must immediately terminate the unlawful detention of the U.S. Chargé d' Affaires and other diplomatic and consular staff and other U.S. nationals now held hostage in Iran, and must immediately release each and every one and entrust them to the protecting power (Article 45 of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations);

- Must insure that all the said persons have the necessary means of leaving Iranian territory, including means of transport;

- Must immediately place in the hands of the protecting power the premises, property, archives, and documents of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and of its consulates in Iran;

Unanimously, decides that no member of the U.S. diplomatic or consular staff may be kept in Iran to be subjected to any form of judicial proceedings or to participate in them as a witness;

By 12 votes to 3, decides that the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran is under an obligation to make reparation to the Government of the United States of America for the injury caused to the latter by the events of 4 November 1979 and what followed from these events;

By 14 votes to 1, decides that the form and amount of such reparation, failing agreement between the parties, shall be settled by the Court, and reserves for this purpose the subsequent procedure in the case.

Summary of Opinions Appended to the Judgment

Judge Lachs. Judge Lachs indicated that he voted against the first part of operative paragraph 5, as he found it redundant. The responsibility having been established, the whole question of reparations should have been left to the subsequent procedure, including the question of form and amount as provided by the judgment.

The opinion stresses the importance of the judgment for diplomatic law, and the major part of it is devoted to the question of the practical solution by diplomatic means of the dispute between the parties. Once the legal issues have been clarified by the judgment, the parties should take speedy action and make maximum efforts to dispel tension and mistrust, and in this a third-party initiative may be important. Judge Lachs visualizes a particular role for the Secretary General of the United Nations in this respect and the work of a special commission or mediating body. In view of the gravity of the situation, the need for a resolution is urgent.

Judge Morozov. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Morozov indicates that operative paragraph 1 of the judgment is drafted in such a way that it is not

limited to the question of the violation of the Vienna conventions of 1961 and 1963, but also covers, if read with some paragraphs of the reasoning, the question of alleged violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights Between Iran and the United States; this treaty, he believes, does not provide the parties with an unconditional right to invoke the

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Request for Interim Measures of Protection, p. 40.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 457 of Dec. 4, 1979, p. 51.
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- Oral argument before the ICJ by Attorney General Civiletti and Department of State Legal Adviser Owen on Dec. 10, 1979, p. 41.
Text of the Court order of Dec. 15, 1979, p. 49.
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- Announcement of January 15, 1980, that the United States had filed its Memorial with the ICJ, p. 60.
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- White House statement of February 20, 1980, concerning the establishment of the U.N. commission of inquiry, p. 47.
Iran Chronology, February 1980, p. 47.

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- Oral arguments before the ICJ by Department of State Legal Adviser Owen on March 18, 19, and 20, 1980, p. 36.
White House statement of March 10, 1980, concerning the suspension of the U.N. commission of inquiry, p. 60.
Iran Chronology, March 1980, p. 60.

June 1980 Bulletin

- Iran Chronology, April 1980, p. 51. ■

compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, and in the circumstances, the Court has in fact no competence to consider the alleged violations.

Furthermore, Judge Morozov observes, the United States committed during the period of the judicial deliberations, many unlawful actions, culminating in the military invasion of the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and has, therefore, lost the legal right to refer to the treaty in its relations with Iran.

Judge Morozov voted against operative paragraphs 2, 5, and 6 because he had noted that a series of actions was undertaken by the United States of America against Iran in the course of the judicial deliberations, in particular, the freezing by the United States of very considerable Iranian assets, combined with the intention, clearly expressed in a statement made by the President of the United States on 7 April 1980, to make use of these assets, if need be, in accordance with decisions that would be taken in the domestic framework of the United States; that meant that the United States was acting as a "judge" in its own cause.

In Judge Morozov's view, the situation, created by actions of the United States, in which the Court carried on its judicial deliberations in the case had no precedent in the whole history of the administration of international justice either before the Court or before any other international judicial institution. The United States, having caused severe damage to Iran, had lost the legal as well as the moral right to reparations from Iran, as mentioned in operative paragraphs 2, 5, and 6.

Judge Morozov also finds that some paragraphs of the reasoning part of the judgment describe the circumstances of the case in an incorrect or one-sided way. He considers that, without any prejudice to the exclusive competence of the Security Council, the Court, from a purely legal point of view, could have drawn attention to the undeniable fact that Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, establishing the right of self-defense to which the United States of America referred in connection with the events of 24-25 April, may be invoked only "if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations," and that there is no evidence of any armed attack having occurred against the United States.

Judge Morozov also stresses that some indication should have been included in the judgment to the effect that the Court considered that settlement of

the dispute between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran should be reached exclusively by peaceful means.

Judge Tarazi. Judge Tarazi voted in favor of operative paragraphs 3 and 4 of the judgment, because he considered that the seizure of the Embassy, and detention as hostages of those present, constituted an act in breach of the provisions of the 1961 and 1963 Vienna conventions on diplomatic and consular relations.

On the other hand Judge Tarazi felt impelled to vote against operative paragraph 1, because he considered that only the 1961 and 1963 Vienna conventions conferred jurisdiction on the Court in the present case.

He also voted against paragraphs 2 and 5, because, in his view, the Court at the present stage of the proceedings, considering the concomitant circumstances, could not make any ruling as to the responsibility of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

On the other hand, Judge Tarazi voted in favor of paragraph 6, because he considered that, in the event of any reparations being owed, they should be determined and assessed by the International Court of Justice; it was not admissible for them to be the subject of proceedings in courts of domestic jurisdiction.

¹President Sir Humphrey Waldock Vice-President Elias; Judges Forster, Gros, Lachs, Nagendra Singh, Ruda, Mosler, Oda, Ago, El-Erian, Sette-Camara and Baxter.

²Judges Morozov and Tarazi.

³President Sir Humphrey Waldock Vice-President Elias; Judges Forster, Gros, Nagendra Singh, Ruda, Mosler, Oda, Ago, El-Erian, Sette-Camara and Baxter.

⁴Judges Lachs, Morozov and Tarazi.

⁵President Sir Humphrey Waldock Vice-President Elias; Judges Forster, Gros, Lachs, Nagendra Singh, Ruda, Mosler, Tarazi, Oda, Ago, El-Erian, Sette-Camara and Baxter.

⁶Judge Morozov.

⁷Ahmed Rehid, "L'Islam et le droit des gens", 60 *Recueil des Cours ADI*, 1937-II, pp. 421 f.

⁸Fereydoun Hoveyda (trans. Roger Liddell), *The Fall of the Shah*, London 1979, pp. 92 f.

⁹H. Kissinger, *The White House Years*, London 1979, p. 1262.

¹⁰H., L. and J. Mazeaud, *Traite theorique et pratique de la responsabilite civile delictuelle et contractuelle*, Tome 6th ed., Paris 1970, p. 552.

¹¹Council d'Etat, 30 March 1916, *Recueil Sirey*, 1916, Part III, p. 17 ff.

¹²Maurice Hauriou, note to Judgment in question (*ibid.*). ■

S. Measures to Isolate Iran

Peter Constable

Statement before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy, Trade and on Europe and the Middle East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on May 8, 1980. Mr.

Constable is Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.¹

... welcome this opportunity to discuss to you the measures we have taken under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. Let me begin by setting the crisis—and our efforts to resolve it—into perspective.

As you know, on November 4, 1979, a mob overran our Embassy compound in Tehran. Militant students occupied the compound and announced that our personnel would be held until we returned the hostages to Iran. We had early assurances from officials of Prime Minister Bazaar-gan that the hostages would be released. But Ayatollah Khomeini and prominent clerical leaders announced shortly thereafter their support for the student militants. Our Charge in Tehran, Bruce Laingen, who was at the Foreign Ministry when the takeover occurred, was not permitted to discuss the release of our people with Prime Minister Bazaar-gan. Then, on November 6, Bazaar-gan himself resigned—apparently in protest against the militants' actions.

A presidential mission headed by our Attorney General Ramsey Clark was sent to Iran, but before the delegation could reach Tehran, Ayatollah Khomeini forbade any Iranian contact with it. The newly appointed "overseer" at the Iranian Foreign Ministry, Abdol Karim Sadr, announced on November 12 that before the hostages could be released in the United States would have to:

- Admit that the property and the person of the Shah were stolen;
- Promise to refrain from further intervention in Iranian affairs; and
- Extradite the Shah to Iran for trial.

Our early developments in the crisis—Khomeini's support for the terrorism of the militant students, the collapse of the supposedly moderate Bazaar-gan government, the unacceptable conditions announced by Bani-Sadr, and Khomeini's

orders against any Iranian contact with the U.S. Government—provided convincing evidence that the Iranian authorities had, in effect, assumed responsibility for the seizure of the Embassy and the hostages and were unwilling or unable to bring about their immediate release.

In view of these conclusions the President undertook a series of actions to demonstrate that the Iranian actions were unacceptable and that we were determined to press Iran for the early release of the hostages. A number of these steps involved diplomatic initiatives worldwide through bilateral contacts with other governments and multilaterally in the United Nations. The President also ordered a series of unilateral economic actions which are detailed below.

On November 12 the President directed a ban on U.S. purchases of Iranian oil under provisions of the Trade Expansion Act. He did so to make clear that our energy needs would not influence our response to the hostage crisis and that the United States would not be blackmailed on the basis of our oil import requirements. The United States then learned that Iran was about to order all Iranian funds moved out of the United States. This jeopardized billions of dollars in potential U.S. claims—both public and private—against those assets and threatened disruption of the international financial system.

The President moved quickly to respond to Iran's violation of international law and to protect the interests of U.S. citizens by preventing the movement of the Iranian funds. In order to do so, the President invoked the provisions of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. His decision reflected a finding that the situation in Iran then—as now—constitutes "an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States." The act permits the President under certain circumstances to:

... investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest.

By Executive order 12170 of

November 14, 1979, which declared a national emergency with respect to Iran, the President ordered the blocking of Iranian Government assets, and delegated the power to implement the order to the Secretary of the Treasury. This order blocked in excess of \$8 billion in this country and abroad.

These presidential actions under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act—and others that followed—have been implemented by the Department of the Treasury through the adoption and amendment of Iranian assets control regu-

We will continue to hold the Iranian authorities fully responsible for the safety and well-being of our people. If our people have indeed been dispersed from the Embassy compound, the responsibility the Iranian authorities have assumed for their safety becomes all the more important.

ulations. Treasury adopted the initial Iranian assets control regulations on November 14, 1979, to implement Executive order 12170 by blocking Iranian assets, and it has amended those regulations from time to time since then.

Our intent was to impress on the Iranians that by continuing to hold the hostages they risked increasing international pressure and increasing direct costs to Iran. At the same time, we continued to pursue every peaceful means available to us to bring this ordeal to an honorable conclusion. Through our efforts in the United Nations, the International Court of Justice, and elsewhere, we aimed at underscoring the growing isolation Iran faces in the international community by its continued gross violation of international law and conduct between civilized nations.

As you will recall, the U.N. Security Council on December 4 called unanimously for the release of the hostages, and on January 13 ten members approved economic sanctions against Iran in a resolution which was vetoed by the Soviet Union. The International Court of Justice

also ruled unanimously that Iran must release the hostages and declared the inviolability of diplomatic envoys a fundamental basis of relations between states.

Despite our approaches and those of other nations, divisions within Iran prevented any real progress at this time toward a resolution of the crisis or indeed any dialogue with Iranian authorities.

Later, however, after Bani-Sadr was elected President on January 28—though not permitted to form a government pending election of a new parliament—opportunities appeared to open for diplomacy. We pursued them seriously through the U.N. Secretary General and a variety of intermediaries. We held back temporarily our efforts to press for further international sanctions to give these prospects every opportunity to succeed. But these efforts finally broke down because differences between secular and clerical factions in Iran prevented the Iranian authorities from honoring their promises. The President then moved promptly on April 7 to impose new measures to increase the price the Iranians will pay so long as they deny our people their freedom. Additional unilateral sanctions were also announced on April 17.

- Executive order 12205 of April 7, 1980, prohibited most exports to Iran and imposed prohibitions on financial dealings with Iran.

- Executive order 12211 of April 17, 1980, imposed additional prohibitions on financial transfers to persons or entities in Iran, imports from Iran, and transactions relating to travel to Iran. It also ordered restrictions on travel to Iran under the Immigration and Nationality Act.

As we consider the present situation in Iran, we should have no illusions about the difficulties ahead. We are dealing with a government in Iran that has few of the attributes we expect of national authorities. Iran is a country torn apart by continuing revolutionary turmoil. Our people are hostage not only to the militants but to internal power struggles and rivalries. And we are dealing with a nation that faces not only the threat of internal disintegration but external threats to its independence and territorial integrity from nations on its borders.

We will continue to take such steps as may be necessary and feasible to secure the safe release of the hostages. We will continue to move forward with strong and collective economic and political sanctions to convince the Iranians that it is in their own self-interest to bring an end to

the hostage situation. The nine members of the European Community, and other friends and allies, have reaffirmed their support for severe sanctions against Iran. The sanctions contemplated accord, in most cases, with the U.N. Security Council resolution of January 13. Some governments are now seeking legislation to enable them to join this effort. I am confident that the measures they have agreed to as necessary—political steps followed by economic sanctions—will be put into effect as promised.

However, these measures will take time to have an effect. We must have patience as well as determination. It was and is a reality that these pressures are not likely to produce a quick result. Nonetheless, strong, clear, effective international pressures are more important now than ever before to drive home to the Iranians that their present course can only bring growing hardship for their people and continuing damage to their hopes to consolidate their revolution by building a strong, stable, unified, and independent Iran.

We will continue to hold the Iranian authorities fully responsible for the safety and well-being of our people. If our people have indeed been dispersed from the Embassy compound, the responsibility the Iranian authorities have assumed for their safety becomes all the more important.

We will also make every effort to bring home to the Iranian people that the threat to their revolution does not come from the United States; it comes from this crisis. We would like to see a stable and prosperous Iran. If this matter is resolved shortly and without harm to our people, the way will be open to develop a relationship that serves our mutual interests. Clearly, it is not possible to do so as long as our people are endangered and imprisoned illegally.

The measures we have taken under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act were clearly necessary to respond to an "unusual and extraordinary threat." Any decisions which the President may take on additional steps in the months ahead will also be made in conformity with the authority granted by this act.

¹ The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Iran Chronology, May 1980

May 5

In London, British commandos and policemen storm the Iranian Embassy and rescue 19 of the hostages who had been held for 5½ days.

Cynthia B. Dwyer, an American freelance writer, is taken into custody by Iranian authorities and accused of being a CIA agent.

May 6

Bodies of the eight U.S. servicemen who died in the attempted rescue mission arrive in the U.S. President Carter proclaims 3 days of mourning.

May 7

Iran dampens British hopes that its freeing of the hostages held in Iran's Embassy in London might help gain freedom for the 53 U.S. hostages held in Iran.

Tehran *Times* reports total crude production drop from 2.7 million barrels a day to 2.0 million a day.

May 8

An Iranian woman, Farrokhrou Panahi, who served as Education Minister under the Shah's regime, is executed.

May 9

In an effort to gain control over Iran's divided political scene, Bani-Sadr wins Khomeini's support by listing the following three demands:

- Appointment of a Prime Minister to be ratified by the Imam;
- Placing the armed forces under the control of the President; and
- Assurance that the state radio and television would serve the Islamic Republic.

Second round of balloting for the new Parliament is held.

May 12

Bani-Sadr's latest efforts to gain control of the government is blocked when the Revolutionary Council fails to name a Prime Minister.

May 13

Voting in parliamentary elections runoff was reported as follows: 229 of 247 seats were filled, and, of the 247 seats, the Islamic Republican Party won 118.

May 14

Ministers of the NATO nations, except France and Greece, condemn Iran and urge it "to release immediately unharmed" the U.S. hostages.

Political Feuding in Afghanistan: A Dilemma for the Soviets

by Eliza Van Hollen

The following report was released by the Department of State in June 1980. Mrs. Van Hollen is the analyst for Afghanistan in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

Intensifying infighting between the Khalq and Parcham factions of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) is significantly complicating efforts to legitimize and popularize the Soviet puppet Babrak Karmal regime. The struggle has its roots in early personal and ideological differences, greatly exacerbated by the events of the 2 years since the April 1978 coup, which brought the PDPA to power in Afghanistan. Should the present uneasy truce continue to erode, there could be another major upheaval in the Afghan political scene. Already, reports abound that each group is plotting to unseat the other.

The situation presents the Soviets with a dilemma. The continuing feud is paralyzing government operations and strengthening the ranks of the countrywide resistance. But if the Soviets should espouse the cause of one faction to the exclusion of the other, they could further undermine their own base of support. While neither faction could remain in power without Soviet backing, keeping the peace between them may prove to be a goal beyond the Soviet reach.

Importance of a United PDPA

The government installed by the Soviets after their December 27 invasion signaled a reuniting of Khalqis and Parchamis under the leadership of long-time Parcham head, now President, Prime Minister, and Secretary General of the PDPA, Babrak Karmal. The government is a carefully contrived mix of Khalqis and Parchamis. There are two Deputy Prime Ministers—one a Khalqi, Assadullah Sarwari, and the other a Parchami, Sultan Ali Keshtmand. The dominant Parcham faction outnumbers the Khalq in all the government and party organizations—but only by a margin of four to three in the important politiburo.

Collaboration between the two groups, functioning as a united PDPA, is important from the Soviet viewpoint for two reasons. First, it confers legitimacy on Babrak Karmal, the Soviet puppet, as a natural successor to the previous Khalq regimes of Nur Mohammad Taraki and Hafizullah Amin and supports the claim that this is merely a new phase in the natural evolution of the Saur (April) revolution. Second, it helps establish as broad-based a political appeal as possible. The Soviet Union gambled that Babrak would appear more politically attractive than his predecessors and that it could effect a reconciliation between the estranged Khalqis and Parchamis which would provide a base on which to build a broader national front. The building of such a front is considered essential for overcoming the present widespread hostility to the succession of Marxist governments.

The Soviets also apparently believed that the 85,000 troops they brought into Afghanistan to support Babrak would quickly discourage the countrywide opposition to the government, thus giving it time and breathing space to become established and to win support with conciliatory programs. To date, most of the Soviets' original judgments appear to have been in error. The overwhelming popular resistance, which has grown appreciably since the December invasion and is now directed primarily against the Soviets themselves, makes a mockery of any claim to legitimacy. Likewise, the deep-seated hostility between the Parcham and Khalq factions is proving to be irreconcilable.

Early Stages of Rivalry

The rivalry between the Khalqis and the Parchamis has its roots in an early split in the Communist-styled People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan when Babrak led a splinter group out of the party in 1967, 2 years after it was founded by Taraki. The present organization was then known popularly as the Khalq party after the name of its short-lived publication *Kalq* ("The Masses" or "The People") and the Babrak group became known as the Parcham ("Banner") party from the name of its paper.

The reasons for the original split

16
Bani-Sadr urges Foreign Ministers of
Common Market countries meet-
Naples, to withhold sanctions until
newly elected Parliament convenes.

18
Common Market Foreign Ministers
they will impose limited sanctions
st Iran on May 22. Rather than halt
all sales except for food and medical
ies, the Ministers decide to ban only
covered by contracts signed since
mber 4, when the U.S. Embassy was
id.

20
British Government softens trade
ions against Iran when it fails to win
upport of Parliament.
ustralian Cabinet announces its deci-
o introduce an embargo on trade with
a which would include all items, com-
ies, and products except food,
ine, and supplies intended for strictly
al purposes.

21
West German and French Cabinets ap-
trade sanctions against Iran.
ansoor Farhang, Iran's U.N. Amba-
was quoted in Tehran as stating it is
t his country's best interest to con-
holding the hostages.

22
apan freezes all exports, except food
medicine, to Iran.

24
International Court of Justice rules
Iran must immediately release all U.S.
ages; that none of them may be sub-
ct to any kind of trial; that the Em-
s must be immediately turned over to
e Swiss Government now representing
interests in Iran; and that Iran is ob-
re to make reparations to the U.S., and
e reparations would be established by the
ut if the two countries did not come to
reement.

25
n an effort to resolve the hostage
ts, three European Socialist leaders
g a fact-finding mission in Iran. Aus-
Chancellor Kreisky leads the party
accompanied by Olof Palme, Chairman,
Democratic Party of Sweden, and
Gonzales, leader of the Spanish
ist Party.

28
New Parliament convenes.

29
Britain imposes limited economic sanc-
against Iran forbidding the signing of
rade contracts from May 30. ■

appear to have been more personal than ideological as both groups were dedicated to the principles of Marxism-Leninism. However, certain philosophical and policy differences separated them from the beginning and are important factors in the current struggle. The Parchamis have always been considered closer to Moscow than the more independent Khalqis. This is currently symbolized by the Parchamis' blatant status as a Soviet puppet. Also, the Parchamis have consistently been more pragmatic and have favored temporary alliances with progressive movements as an intermediate step on the path to socialism, whereas the Khalqis have favored class struggle and a hard line. This approach led the Parchamis to team up with Mohammad Daoud for the coup against his cousin, King Zahir, in July 1973 and for the early stages of his presidency. Currently, it means that the Parchamis are advocating a gradual approach to political, social, and economic change in order to appease the inflamed populace. This policy appears to have the full support of the Soviets.

Recruitment and organization patterns also differed from the beginning of the Afghan leftist movement and are important factors in the present conflict. The Parchamis, although more in the public eye because of the dynamism of Babrak, were a relatively small and loosely organized group. They were intellectuals drawing their support from the urban middle class, professionals, and students and have been described as Afghanistan's "Communist aristocracy."

The Khalq group stayed more in the background but eventually came to be much larger and much better organized than the Parchamis. It recruited primarily among the civil service, the military establishment, and in the countryside. It was also considered to be more Pushtun-dominated than the Parcham party, which, although smaller, reputedly had a broader ethnic base. One member of the Khalq inner circle who was a particularly effective organizer and had special responsibility for recruiting in the military was Amin.

No official current membership figures are available. According to a recent Reuter article from Kabul, there are an estimated 25,000-50,000 Khalqis, while it is believed there were fewer than 10,000 Parchamis at the time of the December coup. These figures give a sense of relative size. They may have been valid for an earlier

period, but in light of overwhelming current alienation, they are probably highly inflated.

Feuding Intensified After Successful 1978 Coup

The predominant cause for the current hostility lies in the events of the past 2 years after the Khalq and Parcham groups, having reunited in 1977 following 10 years of estrangement, jointly overthrew President Mohammad Daoud in April 1978.

The unity which brought them to power proved to be short-lived. The Khalqis quickly outmaneuvered the Parcham group and forced Babrak and his closest associates first into diplomatic exile as ambassadors in July 1978 and later into real exile, when they were dismissed from their posts. Other high-ranking Parchamis suffered an even more disagreeable fate in the summer of 1978 when they were accused of plotting against the government, imprisoned, and tortured. During the course of the Taraki and Amin regimes, most of the Parcham leadership and hundreds of lower-ranking members were imprisoned.

When the Soviets invaded in December 1979 and overthrew Amin, who had won out in a power struggle with the subsequently murdered Taraki, they brought the exiled Parcham leadership group with them and reinstated it as the dominant element in the new government. All other Parchamis were subsequently released from imprisonment.

Against this background, it is understandable that the current attempts to reconcile past differences are not succeeding. Parchamis who suffered torture from their current Khalq colleagues cannot forget and forgive. One of the most hated figures is Khalqi Deputy Prime Minister Assadullah Sarwari, who was head of the secret police during the Taraki presidency and who is held personally responsible for the torture of some of the Parcham political prisoners, including the other Deputy Prime Minister, Sultan Ali Keshmand.

Current reports indicate a good deal of maneuvering by each group to discredit and hopefully eliminate the other. The differences are now becoming so acute that they are breaking out into the open and are being reported in the press with increasing frequency.

Recently a prominent Parchami newspaper editor, who is a younger brother of Parchami Deputy Prime Minister Keshmand, was arrested after his paper ran an article and a cartoon critical of former President Taraki. While former President Amin is now treated as an aberrant and responsible for the mistakes and suppression of the past 2 years, Taraki is still honored by the Khalqis in the present government and is loyal to him.

The Khalq faction is apparently opposed to the current Parcham policy which emphasizes moderation and respect for Islam designed to placate the hostile populace. The Khalqis reportedly were particularly opposed to issuing the new, less inflammatory flag.

Most important of all, it has been reported by the Press Trust of India correspondent in Kabul that the recently signed Afghan-Soviet treaty covering the status of Soviet troops in Afghanistan has caused sharp divisions within the government and the Parcham Khalqis are now said to be increasingly opposed to the continued presence of Soviet troops.

On the surface it might appear to be in the Soviets' interests to disperse with the Khalq faction altogether and rely solely on the more amenable and beholden Parchamis. However, Babrak Karmal has failed to win popular support and strongman Khalqi Assadullah Sarwari is said to be a Soviet favorite. Even more important, the superior numerical strength of the Khalq group, and particularly its strength in the military, makes this a less appealing option. If the Khalqis were to go over to the resistance *en masse*, it would reverse the Soviets' job of pacification even more difficult than it already is.

Some lower-ranking Khalqis may already be joining the resistance ranks, however, and it certainly appears that the Soviets will find it increasingly difficult to keep the lid on the explosive feuding. ■

S. Antiterrorism Program

Anthony C. E. Quintou

Statement before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Judiciary Committee held in Newark, New Jersey, on May 19, 1980. Ambassador Quintou is Director of Office for Combatting Terrorism.¹

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before your committee concerning the continuing threat of international terrorism. I am pleased to be able to discuss the U.S. Government's antiterrorism program as it has developed over the last year.

Let me first give you some idea of the seriousness of the worldwide threat of terrorism. Over the last 12 years we have recorded over 3,300 acts of international terrorism. Approximately 100 innocent people have been injured; 2,700 have been killed. The victims have been Prime Ministers and Ambassadors, school children and teachers, businessmen and farmers. No continent has been immune; no continent has been untouched; no country has been unscathed. Terrorism has undermined and threatened the international order built on a common commitment to peace, security, and the rule of law. Terrorism is a major issue for the United States. There were 293 acts of terrorism last year—77 directed against Americans. Over the last 18 months one U.S. Ambassador has been killed in Afghanistan, another taken hostage in Colombia; our diplomats were held in Tehran, a Peace Corps Volunteer held captive in El Salvador, U.S.

businessmen kidnapped in Honduras and El Salvador; seven U.S. soldiers murdered in Turkey. Terrorist violence has become a part of our daily lives.

Internationally we have been working to build upon the widespread agreement that terrorist acts are inadmissible irrespective of the causes in which they are used. Adherences to the key antiterrorist conventions continue to increase. There are now 108 parties to The Hague convention against aircraft piracy, 105 to the Montreal convention against aircraft sabotage, and 44 to the New York convention on the protection of diplomats. Last December the United Nations, by consensus, opened for signature a convention outlawing the taking of hostages under all circumstances. We were among the first to sign this convention and are actively urging others to do the same.

Here in the United States since 1972 we have had an active program of counterterrorism. Because we have been so frequently the target of terrorist violence, we have had to respond. We have not stood silently by while terrorists have attempted to disrupt economic and social activity. We have not complacently allowed terrorists to sow the seeds of distrust and fear. We have had a program of action which has concentrated on prevention and deterrence as well as effective crisis management. We have defined a policy which makes clear our opposition to terrorism and our determination to combat it.

At the heart of our policy is the commitment to oppose terrorist blackmail. We will not pay ransom. We

care, of course, about the lives which are at stake in a particular incident. But we also must care about the risk to others in the future.

Were the United States to pay ransom, thousands of other Americans around the globe would be at risk. We have conveyed to other governments our hope that they will adopt similar policy stances. Only when all governments come to this same conclusion will the terrorists know that they cannot hope to gain from their violent acts. Unfortunately in the last decade, more often than not the terrorist has won; each victory has provided a new incentive for future acts.

It is not, however, sufficient to have a vigorous policy. It must be backed up by concrete actions. We must have good intelligence; we must have sound physical security; we must have the ability to respond quickly and effectively in a crisis.

A critical element of any counterterrorist program is intelligence. If we can be forewarned of terrorist plans, we can take measures to thwart those plans. When a terrorist act takes place, we need to know as much as possible about his *modus operandi*, his personality, his propensity to kill. With that knowledge we can begin to resolve the incident. We are giving high priority to the intelligence needs of our counterterrorist program. However, we will never have all the information we would like, for terrorist groups are hard to penetrate, and our resources are limited.

Because we will not always know

International Terrorist Attacks on US Citizens or Property,

1968-79, by Category of Target

Category of Target	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	Total ¹
Diplomatic officials or property	12	17	52	51	22	19	12	12	12	21	22	21	273 (20.3)
Consular officials or property	4	2	38	36	11	12	12	9	33	40	30	7	204 (15.1)
Other Government officials or property	26	32	57	21	20	10	16	14	2	7	2	10	217 (16.1)
Business facilities or executives	6	35	24	40	44	51	86	42	52	33	47	27	487 (36.2)
Private citizens	3	7	17	5	12	10	13	27	26	13	21	12	166 (12.3)
Total	51	93	188	153	109	102	139	104	125	84	122	77	1,347

¹Figures in parentheses are percentages of the total accounted for by each category of target.

Terrorism

International Terrorist Attack on US Citizens or Property, 1968-79, by Category of Attack

	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	Total ¹
Kidnaping	1	2	17	9	2	20	8	20	7	4	5	5	100 (7.4)
Barricade-hostage	0	0	3	0	1	2	2	1	1	3	0	3	16 (1.2)
Letter bombing	2	1	2	0	3	0	1	0	2	1	0	0	12 (0.9)
Incendiary bombing	12	18	40	26	13	19	25	4	36	24	49	39	275 (20.4)
Explosive bombing	30	58	77	93	73	52	90	63	44	35	40	38	693 (51.4)
Armed attack	1	4	3	4	6	6	5	3	8	3	11	7	61 (4.5)
Hijacking ²	0	4	12	3	4	0	0	2	5	4	0	1	35 (2.6)
Assassination	3	2	9	2	2	3	2	7	13	5	6	9	63 (4.7)
Theft, break-in	0	3	15	8	0	0	3	3	1	0	8	0	41 (3.0)
Sniping	2	1	5	2	2	0	3	1	5	4	3	3	31 (2.3)
Other actions ³	0	0	5	6	3	0	0	0	3	1	1	2	21 (1.6)
Total	51	93	188	153	109	102	139	104	125	84	123	77	1,348

¹ Figures in parentheses are percentages of the total accounted for by each category of attack.

² Includes hijackings by means of air, sea, or land transport, but excludes numerous nonterrorist hijackings, many of which involved US aircraft

³ Includes occupation of facilities without hostage seizure, shootouts with police, and sabotage.

when a terrorist will strike, we have also had to take defensive measures. We are all accustomed to the screening required before boarding an aircraft. The purpose is to deter and to apprehend potential hijackers. In very large part we have succeeded. In the last 6 years, we have seized over 19,000 weapons at U.S. airports. Perhaps a hundred hijackings have been averted.

Similarly, we have improved security at our embassies abroad. Bullet-proof glass, closed circuit television, and armored vehicles have become standard. It is not easy for terrorists to seize one of our missions. Obviously, a mob of thousands as in Tehran or Islamahad can overcome an embassy. But not since 1976 has a small terrorist group taken one of our missions.

Other countries are only just coming to realize that they too must take the same measures. Since the beginning of this year in Latin America alone, eight embassies have been seized or assaulted in six different countries. None of those embassies was American. Our security has paid off.

We have learned not to be complacent. Even with good intelligence and solid security, the terrorists will sometimes succeed. We must be ready when they do. Effective contingency planning

and crisis management are essential.

To maximize the U.S. Government's response to terrorism, the State Department's Office for Combatting Terrorism has become the focal point for coordinating the interagency structures established in September 1977 to cope with the problem of both domestic and international terrorism. During the last 3 years the Working Group on Terrorism—composed of 28 Federal Government agencies, the National Governor's Association, the National League of Cities, and the Washington Metropolitan Police—and the Executive Committee on Terrorism composed of 10 key agencies have made tremendous progress. In August 1978, the Working Group on Terrorism established several subcommittees to focus attention on the major issues relating to terrorist activity. Most of the working group's activities are now carried out at the committee level, while the working group as a whole meets periodically to coordinate progress. Individual committees have active work programs. They have assessed physical security at U.S. Government installations both at home and abroad and have updated contingency plans. They have also evaluated and proposed new international initiatives, reviewed proposals

for research and development, and developed guidelines for a coordinated public affairs response by Federal and local agencies during a terrorist incident.

During 1979, the Executive Committee concentrated its attention on interagency policy issues and the Federal Government's crisis management capabilities. It has, for example, initiated Federal antiterrorism training capabilities and is studying broader policy questions relating to the provision of such training. It has reviewed the U.S. Government's handling of specific terrorist incidents in the last year, including several hijackings. It has taken an active role in the security preparations for the Pan American Games and the Lake Placid Olympics.

We have also taken an interest in the broader questions of vulnerability. A joint FBI/Coast Guard study is now looking at the vulnerability of the maritime environment to terrorist attack. Other agencies are assessing threats to energy-related installations. The threat credibility assessment system for handling nuclear extortion has been refined.

In sum we are not merely content to deal with the conventional terrorism of the past—hijackings, kidnappings

Cuban-Soviet Impact on the Western Hemisphere

by Myles R. R. Frechette

Statement submitted to the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on April 17, 1980. Mr. Frechette is Director of the Office of Cuban Affairs.¹

I welcome this opportunity to review with you the impact of Cuban-Soviet ties on the Western Hemisphere. When my predecessor, Wayne Smith, testified before this subcommittee in April 1978, he concluded:

- That while Cuba's hands were not altogether clean in the hemisphere, its clandestine activities within neighboring states had declined markedly since the 1960s;

- That both Cuba and the Soviet Union seemed content to play a waiting game in the hemisphere; but

- That we could not be complacent about Cuba's future role, because, should significant opportunities present themselves, Cuba could move back toward a more aggressive posture.

Since that testimony 2 years ago, there have been several noteworthy developments, some favorable to U.S. interests, others unfavorable. I would like to review these briefly before responding to any questions you might have.

Two years ago our major concern with respect to Cuba was the presence of Cuban expeditionary forces in Angola and Ethiopia. That concern has not diminished; Cuba still has about 20,000 troops in Angola and 12,000-15,000 in Ethiopia. To this have been added two concerns closer to home: growing Cuban willingness to become involved

in the Caribbean and Central America and Cuba's increasingly close relationship with the Soviet Union. The Sandinista victory in Nicaragua and the New JEWEL (Joint Endeavor for Welfare, Education, and Liberation) Movement coup in Grenada have brought into power in the Caribbean basin two new governments favorably disposed toward Cuba.

It is doubtful that the Cubans anticipated the speed with which these changes took place. But there are signs that Cuba has been reassessing the prospects for revolutionary change elsewhere in the hemisphere and that, after several years of Cuban preoccupation with Africa, we are seeing a resurgence of interest in Latin America. Cuba has also grown increasingly dependent on the Soviet Union for economic and military assistance; there has been no significant divergence of interests between the two.

At the same time, the Cuban economy has experienced severe setbacks, calling more sharply into question Cuba's viability as a development model for the rest of the Third World and stimulating increased emigration from Cuba to the West. Cuba's drive for Third World leadership and bid for a seat on the U.N. Security Council have been sidetracked by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. While there has been some limited progress in our bilateral relations, Cuba's aggressive foreign policy has prevented any significant progress toward normalization.

Involvement in the Caribbean and Central America

Since the failure of its attempts to export revolution in the 1960s, Cuba has

to the principle that the Federal, State, and local governments must work together. The ultimate objective in this cooperative effort between Federal and local agencies is a partnership based on better understanding of each other's problems and a mutual respect for each other's capabilities.

In sum while the problem of dealing with terror remains a serious and difficult one, antiterrorism initiatives are being taken by law enforcement and operational agencies at all levels of

government. We are working to bring about an even greater capability to predict, prevent, deter, and respond to any terrorist attack. We have made progress using the existing coordinating structures. We intend to continue to refine them and to seek new ways to combat terrorism.

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

ostage barricade incidents—we
so looking to the future to insure
we are prepared should the ter-
change his tactics or his targets.
When we are faced with an actual
ist incident, it is obviously not
ole for 31 agencies to manage the
ct of events. Neither the working
nor the Executive Committee is
ed with the management of spe-
errorist incidents. Instead there
ree lead agencies with special
nsibilities—the Department of
for foreign incidents, including in-
ional hijackings; the Department
tice for domestic incidents; and
ederal Aviation Administration
A) for hijacking incidents taking
e in American jurisdiction. When
s decisions are needed, the Special
ination Committee (SCC) of the
nal Security Council is convened.
e designated group in the execu-
ranch to which the President has
e the responsibility for dealing with
s situations, including the man-
nt of terrorist incidents. While
gencies carry out operational re-
nents, the coordination of policy
ions is handled by the SCC.
ere in America typical terrorist
s have been bombings, hijackings,
tortion. In major incidents of a
ist nature the FBI is always in-
volved. The FBI routinely deploys spe-
eapons and tactics teams and
e special capabilities. The same is
e in hijackings. Our experience has
e positive. The FBI and the FAA
e demonstrated on numerous occa-
sions their ability to manage incidents
e quickly, quietly, and effectively. More
e terrorists than ever before are behind
e investigations are continuing in
e other cases.

otwithstanding the existing coop-
e in law enforcement agencies at
e federal level, we need and are
e seeking closer liaison and exchange of
e information between Federal and local
e governments. The participation of the
e National League of Cities and the Na-
e Governors Association on the
e Planning Group on Terrorism demon-
e strates their interest and concern about
e emergency response capabilities of
e cities and states. At the present
e time 14 states are reviewing the vul-
e nerabilities of key economic facilities,
e such as pipelines, transformers, and
e power generator plants. A manual on
e chemical terrorism has been prepared
e by the National Governors Association.
e In Washington we are committed

followed a two-pronged approach toward Latin America. It has shifted emphasis to strengthening its relations with nonrightist governments, attempting to push them leftward, while still maintaining ties to leftist revolutionaries in those countries with governments it considers to be reactionary. During the 1970s, Cuba's approach has been cautious, flexible, and sophisticated. The Cubans now demonstrate a capacity to tailor their activities to local political realities and to make allowances for national and regional differences. This approach has paid some dividends for Cuba in the Caribbean basin, where many states have entered a difficult period of economic and political transition.

In Nicaragua, the Cubans had long maintained ties with the Sandinista movement, but until the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) offensive of last year, they had generally limited their support to training, asylum, and money. During 1979, however, as the Sandinistas' prospects for success brightened, Cuba stepped up its support by clandestinely sending arms. Despite this support, the Sandinista movement was and is basically an indigenous movement with historical roots in Nicaragua. While Cuban support was important to the FSLN, it was but one element in the equation which produced Somoza's downfall.

Since the Sandinista victory, Cuba has moved quickly to assist the new Nicaraguan Government, building on existing ties to key Sandinista leaders. The total Cuban presence in Nicaragua is now at least 2,000 and includes:

- About 200 military and security advisers;
- At least 1,200 teachers, who began arriving in late October 1979; and
- Several hundred medical specialists, construction personnel, and advisers on agrarian reform, the media, labor, and cultural instruments.

In addition, some 600 Nicaraguan students are studying at a Cuban secondary school at the Isle of Pines.

In Grenada, the Cubans may well have had foreknowledge of the coup that brought Maurice Bishop and the New JEWEL Movement to power, but there is no evidence they engineered it. After the coup, however, the Cubans moved quickly to offer assistance, which the Bishop government has been all too eager to accept. Cuba has provided arms and sent military advisers—most of whom have since

departed—to train the new Grenadian Army. It has also sent a few civilian technicians. Recently 250 Cuban construction workers began arriving to build a new airport, for which Cuba will provide much of the material. Havana may well have in mind making Grenada a showcase of Cuban-aided development in the region, but it is doubtful the Cubans have the wherewithal to succeed alone in this effort.

Elsewhere in the region, the Cubans probably see El Salvador as the most promising target for further revolutionary gains. They have counseled the Salvadoran leftists to seek unity before provoking a direct confrontation with the junta. It appears, however, that the leftists have not followed this advice. Cuba's principal contribution so far has been training and advice.

Cuba also maintains ties to leftists in Guatemala and Honduras but apparently believes the prospects for radical change there are less promising.

Cuba still has good relations with the two countries which until last year were its closest friends in the Caribbean basin—Jamaica and Guyana. Since 1975 Cuba has provided Jamaica with assistance in improving Kingston's water supply, constructing housing and schools, and modernizing agricultural and fisheries techniques. Cuba has sent doctors and other medical personnel to staff Jamaican hospitals and has trained several hundred Jamaican youths in Cuba to become construction workers. There are also reports that Cuba is providing training to some Jamaican security officials.

Cuban assistance to Guyana has been of a similar nature, although smaller in scale. However, Cuba's relations with the Burnham government are complicated by its desire to maintain influence with the major opposition to Burnham, Cheddi Jagan's People's Progressive Party. In late 1979, Cuba and Guyana terminated their fisheries agreement, reportedly because the Guyanese believed Cuba had failed to live up to its end of the agreement.

In the eastern Caribbean, Cuba has balanced low-key encouragement of legitimate leftist groups with open cooperation with established governments. There is little doubt that the political climate offers opportunities. Havana may be able to exploit to increase its influence at the expense of the United States. However, Cuba's official presence in the eastern Caribbean—excluding Grenada—is still limited to several *Prensa Latina* and

Cubana airline representatives.

The Soviets have also increased their involvement in this hemisphere, expanding their trade, technical assistance, and diplomatic presence. The Soviets have been particularly interested in South America, although they have recently added Embassies in Nicaragua and Grenada. Both Jamaica and Nicaragua have expressed interest in receiving Soviet economic and technical assistance. So far the Soviets have provided little, although there is a possibility the recent Nicaraguan mission to Moscow may change this.

Soviet-Cuban Relationship

Cuba's relationship with the Soviet Union has several facets. Havana depends on Moscow for about two-thirds of its total trade. Soviet economic support to Cuba exceeded \$3 billion in 1979, a two-fold increase from 2 years ago. The bulk of this assistance consists of subsidies on sugar, petroleum, and nickel. As President Castro explained in an unusually candid speech to the National People's Assembly on December 27, 1979, the price paid by the Soviets for Cuban sugar is on a sliding scale. In 1979 they bought Cuban sugar at the equivalent of 44¢, as compared to the world market price of about 10¢.

Similarly, the Soviets sell Cuban petroleum at about half the market price. Since Cuba exports 3-4 million tons of sugar to the Soviet Union each year, it receives nearly all its petroleum from the Soviets, these price differentials are crucial to the Cuban economy. The need to maintain this enormous subsidy, without which Cuba would be forced to reduce sharply its already austere standard of living, remains a constant concern to the Castro regime.

For the past several years, the Soviet Union has been helping upgrade the Cuban Armed Forces by delivering modern military equipment to Cuba. Unlike other Soviet military clients, Cuba pays nothing for this equipment. This armed forces modernization program strikes a tender nerve in the United States, even though most of the types of equipment Cuba has received so far were provided earlier to other Soviet clients. Given the experience of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, we monitor arms deliveries to Cuba closely to insure that they represent no threat to the United States.

Several developments have aroused particular interest. In 1979

s delivered MiG-23s, more sophisticated aircraft than Cuba had previously received. Since certain versions of the MiG-23 are configured to carry nuclear weapons, we carefully studied the aircraft's characteristics and discussed the transfer directly with the Soviets before concluding that they do not constitute an offensive threat to the United States.

Similarly, we have been monitoring the time the construction of a new facility at Cienfuegos consisting of deep-water piers and naval support buildings. We have no evidence that the Soviets are involved in the construction or will be ultimately operating the facility. So far it has been used by conventional, non-nuclear submarines delivered by the Soviets to Cuba. It would not be surprising, however, for the Soviets to use the facility for naval vessels to make a port call at the new facility during future deployments to the Caribbean.

Another facet of the Soviet-Cuban relationship is the presence in Cuba of a Soviet combat brigade. The unit, which consists of 2,600-3,000 men, may have been in Cuba for some time, but we are unable to confirm its presence at this time. Here again we were concerned with something which, while not a security threat to the United States, was a cause of serious concern. More recently, the costs to Cuba of its dependence on the Soviet Union have become an increasingly sharper focus. Castro has attempted to use Cuba's 3-year term as president of the nonaligned movement to present himself as leader of the Third World. Havana spent lavishly in preparation for the September 1979 nonaligned summit. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan not only ended Cuba's hopes for a seat on the U.N. Security Council but also has undermined Cuba's ability to exert influence within the nonaligned movement. Cuba was placed in an uncomfortable position by the intervention that when Cuba's Ambassador to the United Nations finally spoke out on the subject, he was careful to couch his support for the Soviets not in defense of the invasion but as an expression of the United States and "imperialism."

Economic Problems

Cuba's deepening economic problems have shown the Cuban people and the world that the Cuban economic model, which resembles some aspects of the Soviet model, offers few solutions to the problems of underdevelopment. The

Soviet economic subsidy to Cuba exceeds U.S. assistance to all of Latin America, while Cuba's population is less than one-twentieth of Latin America's. Despite this huge subsidy, the Cuban standard of living, as mentioned before, is austere and deteriorating.

Massive infusions of Soviet aid have kept the economy afloat, but just barely. Sugarcane rust has hurt the 1979-80 sugar crop. The tobacco industry has been severely damaged by blue mold. Castro admitted in his December 27 speech that the Soviets delivered only 28% of the lumber they had agreed to supply to Cuba in 1979. This has brought construction to a standstill, exacerbating the already extremely tight housing situation. Virtually all basic consumer necessities are strictly rationed, and rations for some items were cut back in 1979. The thousands of Cubans who have crowded into the Peruvian Embassy in Havana in a desperate attempt to leave the island provide a graphic illustration of popular discontent with the dismal failure of the Cuban economy.

In light of Cuba's current economic difficulties, the Castro government will probably go to great lengths to maintain Soviet assistance at least at the present level. Beyond this, the Cubans are beginning to introduce material incentives in an attempt to increase labor productivity and are continuing to seek increased trade with the West. The Castro regime's prospects for earning hard currency to finance purchases from the West are extremely limited, however. This is one reason the Cubans continue to be interested in improving relations with the United States. They see a lifting of the trade embargo as one means of easing their economic squeeze. It also explains their interest in more tourism from the United States, even at the risk of increased domestic discontent arising from greater exposure to the West.

Still, Cuba has proven unwilling to sacrifice its aggressive foreign policy to improve relations with us. It wants better relations but apparently not at the cost of abandoning its position at the forefront of those seeking revolutionary change.

U.S.-Cuban Relations

Over the past 3 years, we have taken a number of steps to open constructive lines of communication between Cuba

and the United States. We negotiated the opening of Interests Sections in Washington and Havana and have lifted the ban on U.S. travel to Cuba, granted visas to selected Cuban citizens to visit the United States, and permitted the resumption of charter flights between the two countries. We have also signed fishing rights and provisional maritime boundary agreements and held two rounds of Coast Guard talks in Havana and Washington.

The Cubans, for their part, have taken some encouraging steps, particularly in the human rights field. But this has not been matched by any change in Cuba's foreign policy. As a result, we have emphasized to the Cubans that there can be no significant progress toward normalization until we see convincing evidence of a Cuban turnaround in Africa, including troop reductions. At the same time, we have also taken steps to protect our security interests closer to home.

This does not mean that our policy of seeking to open constructive lines of communication was mistaken. On the contrary, we continue to believe that there is no possibility of resolving our differences unless we are at least willing to talk.

Our dialogue with Cuba has cost us little and has yielded some significant benefits. For example, the Cubans are cooperating with us in search-and-rescue operations and drug traffic interdiction in the heavily traveled waters between Cuba and Florida. We have had greater success in securing the release of American small craft and their crews that stray into Cuban waters. (Between November 1979 and March 1980, 46 American citizens inadvertently entered Cuban territory without authorization—32 were released fairly promptly after questioning; 14 were arrested.)

Our consular officers at the U.S. Interests Section are able to provide assistance to Americans in Cuban jails. This has become increasingly important, because there are now more than 40 Americans in Cuban jails. The Cuban Government has permitted all single-source Americans and dual nationals to depart Cuba with all members of their households, even those of Cuban citizenship. The Cubans have also released most American political prisoners. Indeed, one of the members of this subcommittee, Congressman Ben Gilman, contributed a great deal of time and effort toward securing the release

of four American political prisoners last fall.

The Cuban Government has taken other unilateral steps which probably would have been impossible before we opened lines of communication to Cuba. In late 1979, President Castro announced that he would release almost all Cuban political prisoners and allow them to leave the island with their families. So far about 3,900 political prisoners have been released. And for the first time since the early 1960s, the Castro government now allows Cuban-Americans to return to the island for family visits. Tens of thousands of Americans of Cuban extraction have benefited from these steps.

Meeting the Challenge

The past 2 years have shown that the Cubans and the Soviets remain ready to exploit targets of opportunity in this hemisphere. They see any erosion of U.S. influence as a net gain for themselves. So far, however, they have avoided taking too many risks, probably out of fear of provoking a strong U.S. reaction. The Soviets have traditionally focused their attention on South America. The Cubans, however, see the Caribbean basin as an area ripe with opportunities for extending their influence. They are becoming more active in the region now that their African involvement has leveled off.

Cuba's success in exploiting any emerging opportunities will depend in large measure on our response and that of others in the hemisphere. Our most effective response to Cuba's attempts to extend its influence in the Caribbean basin would be to increase our own efforts of assistance. Most countries in the region badly need economic and technical assistance of one form or another. We have the capability to meet at least some of their needs. Cuba, by contrast, has very little to give. It is worthwhile to keep in mind that even those states which are friendliest to Cuba—Jamaica, Nicaragua, and Guyana—have carefully kept the door open to the West. They may admire certain aspects of the Cuban model but pragmatism and nationalism dictate against replicating it.

Our policies are designed to address critical short-range economic problems in the region. We are encouraging greater cooperation and interdependence among the island-states of the Caribbean. In Central

America, we recognize that change is inevitable where traditional patterns are, in many respects, both unjust and unsuitable. We are adapting our policies and using our many links to these societies to help the processes of change already underway take less violent and more democratic forms than they would otherwise.

In addition, we have made clear to all parties that we take our security interests in the Caribbean basin most seriously. The President has already announced concrete steps in this regard, including increased surveillance of Cuba, expanded military maneuvers in the region, and the establishment of a full-time Caribbean joint task force headquarters at Key West.

Cuba has shown it can move quickly to take advantage of targets of opportunity. Nevertheless, the United States has the resources and the determination to meet the challenge. The poignant picture of thousands of Cubans jammed shoulder-to-shoulder inside the Peruvian Embassy in a desperate attempt to flee their homeland is a vivid reminder that the future does not belong to Castro's Cuba.

¹ The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Exodus From Cuba

Foreign Relations Outline¹

Since 1959 over 800,000 Cubans have fled to the United States. The current massive defection from Cuba is rooted in several years of deepening economic and political frustration. Severe problems in sugar and tobacco production—Cuba's two major agricultural industries—have contributed to the difficulties of providing adequate economic and educational opportunities for a young and rapidly growing labor force. The result is a rising tide of restlessness and disaffection, particularly among those Cubans with relatives in the United States.

Recent Developments

Since 1979 many Cubans have sought political asylum at the Peruvian and Venezuelan Embassies in Havana; some have used trucks or buses to crash into the Embassy grounds. On April 4, 1980,

Cuban guards posted outside the Peruvian Embassy were withdrawn in reaction to the death of a Cuban guard during an attempt by Cubans to crash into the Embassy compound. The Cuban Government then announced that all those who wished to seek Peruvian visas would be free to leave Cuba.

Within days over 10,000 people were camped within the Peruvian Embassy compound and surrounding lots. On April 14 President Carter signed an authorization to admit up to 3,500 Cuban refugees from the Peruvian Embassy. Our policy was based on the fact that we would be cooperating in an international effort with adequate opportunity for prescreening to insure compliance with U.S. immigration laws.

From April 14 to April 18, flights from Havana to Costa Rica carried some 1,000 refugees, about half of whom subsequently were taken to Peru. On April 18, Castro suspended the airlift, declaring that henceforth only refugee flights to countries of destination would be permitted. Costa Rica offered to accept all the remaining refugees in the Peruvian Embassy compound, after receiving U.S. Government assurance that we would continue to use our best efforts to seek additional resettlement offers from other countries. The Castro regime then announced, on April 20, that Cubans wishing to emigrate to the United States were free to board ships at the port of Mariel, 20 miles from Havana.

Boat Exodus

Within 24 hours of Castro's announcement, flotillas of small boats moved from the United States to pick up relatives of Cuban-Americans as well as others at Mariel. From the start, it was evident that the Cuban authorities were following a deliberate policy of forcing acceptance of several nonrelatives as well as relatives on each boat. These nonrelatives included persons released from a variety of institutions, many with criminal records, and individuals claiming to have taken refuge in the Peruvian Embassy. The number of U.S. arrivals climbed steadily to more than 80,000 by the end of May.

Federal Actions

The U.S. Coast Guard was quickly deployed to provide search and rescue, surveillance missions, and safety inspection and has since been involved

600 search-and-rescue operations. On April 27 the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) established a coordinating team in Miami to deal with the crisis. Processing centers were established with capacity for 10,000 Cubans at Eglin Air Base, Florida; for 20,000 persons at Port Chaffee, Arkansas; for 20,000 at Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania; and for 15,000 at Fort McCoy, Wisconsin.

President Carter declared a state of emergency for south Florida on May 6 and approved the use of \$10 million in emergency funds to reimburse voluntary organizations for their overhead expenses at the processing centers and for costs of transporting the Cubans from the centers to their final destinations.

Processing Procedures

Documented Cubans arriving at Key West are given preliminary screening by an interagency group, representing Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the FBI, and other agencies, in accordance with requirements of the Immigration and Nationality Act. If information is obtained indicating that a person was convicted of a serious nonpolitical crime or may be a detriment to the community, he is detained pending a more thorough investigation. After initial screening, persons and their relatives in the Miami area are transferred to Miami for final processing and placement. Others are transferred to one of the other processing centers for additional processing and placement. Those with relatives or sponsors are then released on their own recognizance until inspection is completed by the INS and their claims for asylum are reviewed by the Department of State and Justice. During this period they are authorized to work but with only limited access to Federal benefits, mainly food stamps. All arrivals are medically screened as required by law under the general jurisdiction of the Public Health Service. Those found to have a medical condition requiring treatment are provided that treatment. If needed, hospitalization is arranged.

Future

The United States will continue to welcome Cubans seeking freedom, in accordance with our laws. However, law

enforcement agencies will take steps as necessary to discourage the unlawful and dangerous boat traffic to Cuba.

We have made clear to the Cuban Government our desire to negotiate a legal and orderly process for those wishing to leave Cuba. Under such a process, all people would have to be screened before departure from Cuba. Priority for acceptance to the United States will be given to close relatives of U.S. permanent residents, political prisoners, and persons who sought freedom in the Peruvian Embassy or in our Interests Section.

On May 15 a family registration office was established to receive the names of close Cuban relatives of U.S. citizens and permanent residents. We are prepared to start an immediate airlift or sealift as soon as President Castro accepts this offer. We have called for other governments to honor their previous pledges to resettle Cuban refugees and to take into account the larger international problem that has now developed.

¹ Taken from a Department of State publication in the GIST series, released May 1980. This outline is designed to be a quick reference aid on U.S. foreign relations. It is not intended as a comprehensive U.S. foreign policy statement. ■

El Salvador

*Foreign Relations Outline*¹

Background

For decades, El Salvador's people suffered under the dictatorship of a tiny oligarchy that monopolized land, credit, and trade. On October 15, 1979, a watershed date in Salvadoran history, young military officers broke with the old repressive order and joined with moderate civilian leaders to undertake a peaceful and democratic revolution. The young officers and their new revolutionary junta of government immediately amnestied political prisoners and committed themselves to a platform of far-reaching social and economic reforms, respect for human rights, and democratic elections.

Reform Program

Since January 1980, when the Christian Democratic Party joined the government, the revolutionary junta has begun implementing a series of structural reforms.

- An agrarian reform decree issued March 6 authorizes expropriation of some 2 million acres of El Salvador's best farmland. The reform initially affects estates larger than 1,250 acres but in time is to extend to all holdings of prime land over 250 acres and of secondary land over 375 acres. These properties will be given to landless peasants as small private farms or larger cooperatives. The government estimates that two-thirds of the rural population will benefit. Compensation will be primarily in interest-bearing government bonds and will include up to 25% in cash for smaller holdings.

- Financial reforms announced March 7 give the government 51% of the stock of local banks and savings and loan institutions and require that remaining shares be sold within 1 year to bank employees and to the public, with no individual or family allowed to hold more than 1% of the total. These reforms end the monopoly power of the oligarchy and facilitate the allocation of credit to the new producers created by the agrarian reform.

Obstacles to Reform

Implementation of the reforms has gone remarkably well. Nevertheless, serious problems remain.

- The agrarian reform and other structural changes are technically complex and would be difficult to implement even under ideal circumstances. The suspicions and hatreds engendered by years of repression and violence add greatly to the difficulties.

- Extremists at both left and right are attempting to bring down the government. Rightist groups opposed to all reforms are engaging in indiscriminate assassinations and hope to instigate a reactionary counter-coup. Leftist *cadres* see power slipping from their grasp and are provoking confrontations in hopes of stimulating a violent revolution.

- To proceed with the reforms in the face of these special interests, the government has been forced to institute a limited state of siege, suspending

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temporarily certain constitutional guarantees.

U.S. Policy

We welcome and support the government's efforts. We believe that its October 15 program offers the best chance for evolutionary reform, political liberalization, and respect for human rights in El Salvador. We are supporting the reform process through the following measures:

- Diplomatic cooperation with democratic governments in Latin America and Europe in support of the revolutionary junta;
- Economic assistance of about \$50 million for FY 1980 to support the agrarian reform and other programs of direct benefit to the poor; and
- Military assistance of \$5.7 million in FY 1980 foreign military sales credits to enable the Salvadoran Armed Forces to purchase communication and transportation equipment, which will help them protect implementation of the reform program against violence from both right and left.

We would promptly reassess our policy if there were evidence that our assistance was not being used to enhance human rights in El Salvador. As former Secretary of State Vance stated in response to a letter from Salvadoran Archbishop Romero to President Carter: "The advancement of human rights . . . underlies every aspect of U.S. policy toward El Salvador."

¹Taken from the Department of State publication in the GIST series, released Mar. 1980. This outline is designed to be a quick reference aid on U.S. foreign relations. It is not intended as a comprehensive U.S. foreign policy statement. ■

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure of aircraft. Done at The Hague Dec. 16, 1970. Entered into force Oct. 14, 1971. TIAS 7192.
Applied to Greenland: May 7, 1980, effective June 1, 1980.

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Montreal Sept. 23, 1971. Entered into force Jan. 26, 1973. TIAS 7570.
Applied to Greenland: May 7, 1980, effective June 1, 1980.

Judicial Procedure

Convention on the taking of evidence abroad in civil or commercial matters. Done at The Hague Mar. 18, 1970. Entered into force Oct. 7, 1972. TIAS 7444.
Extended to: The Isle of Man, Apr. 16, 1980.¹

Maritime Matters

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Signed at Geneva Mar. 6, 1948. Entered into force Mar. 17, 1958. TIAS 4044.
Acceptance deposited: Guyana, May 13, 1980.

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 1948, as amended, (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 8606) on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Done at London Nov. 14, 1975.²
Acceptances deposited: Bahrain, Apr. 25, 1980; Cape Verde, Apr. 23, 1980; Guyana, May 13, 1980.

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 1948, as amended, (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 8606) on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Done at London Nov. 17, 1977.²
Acceptances deposited: Bahrain, Apr. 25, 1980; Cape Verde, Apr. 23, 1980; Guyana, May 13, 1980.

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 1948, as amended, (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 8606) on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Done at London Nov. 15, 1979.²
Acceptances deposited: Bahrain, Apr. 25, 1980; India, May 5, 1980; Jamaica, Apr. 30, 1980.

Narcotic Drugs

Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at Vienna Feb. 21, 1971. Entered into force Aug. 16, 1976; for the U.S. July 15, 1980.
Accession deposited: Grenada, Apr. 25, 1980.

Protocol amending the single convention on

narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva 12/25, 1972. Entered into force Aug. 8, 1979. TIAS 8118.
Accession deposited: Bangladesh, May 1980.

Patents

Patent cooperation treaty, with regulations. Done at Washington June 19, 1970. Entered into force Jan. 24, 1978; except chapter II. Chapter II entered into force Mar. 29, 1978.³ TIAS 8733.
Accession deposited: Korea, Apr. 8, 1980.

Pollution

International convention for the prevention of pollution from ships, 1973, with protocols and annexes. Done at London Nov. 2, 1973.²
Accession deposited: Peru, Apr. 25, 1980.

Protocol relating to intervention on the high seas in cases of pollution by substances other than oil. Done at London Nov. 2, 1973.²
Ratification deposited: U.K., Nov. 5, 1979.
Accession deposited: Mexico, Apr. 14, 1980.

Property—Industrial

Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial property of Mar. 20, 1883, as revised. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. Article I-12 entered into force May 19, 1970; for the U.S. Aug. 25, 1973. Article I3-30 entered into force Apr. 26, 1970; for the U.S. Sept. 5, 1970. TIAS 6923.
Notification from World Intellectual Property Organization that ratification deposited: Philippines, Apr. 16, 1980.⁴

Property—Intellectual

Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. Entered into force Apr. 26, 1970; for the U.S. Aug. 25, 1973. TIAS 6932.
Ratification deposited: Philippines, Apr. 14, 1980.

Refugees

Protocol relating to the status of refugees. Done at New York Jan. 31, 1967. Entered into force Oct. 4, 1967; for the U.S. No. 10, 1968. TIAS 6577.
Accessions deposited: Bolivia, May 5, 1980; Seychelles, Apr. 23, 1980.

Rubber

International natural rubber agreement of 1979. Done at Geneva Oct. 6, 1979.²
Signature: Denmark, May 12, 1980.

Safety at Sea

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1974, with annex. Done at London Nov. 1, 1974. Entered into force May 25, 1980. TIAS 9700.
Ratification deposited: Chile, Mar. 28, 1980.

ession deposited: Dominican Republic, 10, 1980.

Protocol of 1978 relating to the international convention for the safety of life at sea, 1974 (TIAS 9700). Done at London 17, 1978.²

Ratification deposited: Sweden, Dec. 21,

Approval deposited: France, Dec. 21, 1979.

Accession deposited: Spain, Apr. 30, 1980.

White Communications System

Agreement relating to the International Communications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), with annexes. Done at Washington Aug. 20, 1971. Entered into force Feb. 12, 1973. TIAS 7532.

Accession deposited: Honduras, May 6,

Agreement relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), with annex. Done at Washington Aug. 20, 1971. Entered into force Feb. 12, 1973. TIAS 7532.

Signature: Empresa Hondurena de Telecomunicaciones HONDUTEL, for Honduras, May 6, 1980.

Communications

Final revision of the radio regulations, Geneva, 1959, as amended, to establish a frequency allotment plan for high-frequency radiotelephone coast stations, with annexes and final protocol. Done at Geneva June 8, 1974. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1976; for the U.S. Apr. 21, 1976. TIAS 8599.

Approval deposited: Greece, Mar. 3, 1980.

Final revision of the radio regulations, Geneva, 1959, as revised, relating to the nautical mobile (R) service, with annexes and final protocol. Done at Geneva 5, 1978. Entered into force Sept. 1, 1979, except for the frequency allotment for the aeronautical mobile (R) service which shall come into force on Feb. 1,

Approval deposited: Ireland, Feb. 28, 1980.

Crimes

Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents. Adopted at New York Dec. 14, 1948. Entered into force Feb. 20, 1977. TIAS 8532.

Accession deposited: Mexico, Apr. 22,

Ratification deposited: Norway, Apr. 28,

International convention against the taking of hostages. Adopted at New York Dec. 17,

Signatures: Guatemala, Apr. 30, 1980; Philippines, May 2, 1980.

Tonnage Measurement

International convention on tonnage meas-

urement of ships, 1969, with annexes. Done at London June 23, 1969.²

Accession deposited: China, Apr. 8, 1980.

U.N. Industrial Development Organization

Constitution of the U.N. Industrial Development Organization, with annexes. Adopted at Vienna Apr. 8, 1979.² Signatures: Guinea-Bissau, May 1, 1980; Saint-Lucia, May 8, 1980; Tanzania, May 12, 1980; Uruguay, May 5, 1980.

Ratification deposited: Trinidad and Tobago, May 2, 1980.

World Health Organization

Constitution of the World Health Organization. Done at New York July 22, 1946. Entered into force Apr. 7, 1948; for the U.S. June 21, 1948. TIAS 1808.

Acceptances deposited: Equatorial Guinea, May 5, 1980; San Marino, May 12, 1980; Zimbabwe, May 16, 1980.

World Heritage

Convention concerning the protection of the world cultural and natural heritage. Done at Paris Nov. 23, 1972. Entered into force Dec. 17, 1975. TIAS 8226.

Ratification deposited: Chile, Feb. 20, 1980.

BILATERAL

Barbados

Agreement concerning the provision of training related to defense articles under the U.S. International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program. Effected by exchange of notes at Bridgetown Mar. 6 and Apr. 3, 1980. Entered into force Apr. 3, 1980.

Botswana

Agreement concerning the provision of training related to defense articles under the U.S. International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program. Effected by exchange of notes at Gaborone Feb. 26 and Mar. 21, 1980. Entered into force Mar. 21, 1980.

Bulgaria

Agreement extending the agreement of June 13, 1977 (TIAS 9020) on exchanges and cooperation in cultural, scientific, educational, technological, and other fields. Effected by exchange of notes at Sofia Mar. 21 and Apr. 9, 1980. Entered into force Apr. 9, 1980.

Canada

Protocol amending the agreement of June 15, 1955, as amended and supplemented (TIAS 3304, 3771, 4518, 5102, 6649, 8287, 8782), concerning civil uses of atomic energy, with agreed minute. Signed at Ottawa Apr. 23, 1980. Enters into force on the date upon which the parties exchange

diplomatic notes informing each other that they have complied with all applicable requirements for its entry into force.

Agreement extending the agreement of May 8, 1975, (TIAS 8085) relating to the organization and operation of the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD). Effected by exchange of notes at Washington May 12, 1980. Entered into force May 12, 1980.

Federal Republic of Germany

Agreement for application to Land Berlin of agreement of Mar. 12 and May 31, 1974, relating to the reciprocal acceptance of airworthiness certifications (TIAS 7965). Effected by exchange of notes at Bonn and Bonn-Bad Godesberg Nov. 3, 1976 and Mar. 18, 1980. Entered into force Mar. 18, 1980.

Ghana

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, with related letter and agreed minutes. Signed at Accra Apr. 14, 1980. Entered into force Apr. 14, 1980.

Greece

Agreement for cooperation in the economic scientific and technological, and educational and cultural fields. Signed at Athen Apr. 22, 1980. Entered into force Apr. 22, 1980.

Guyana

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of Jan. 27, 1978 (TIAS 9145). Signed at Georgetown Apr. 23, 1980. Entered into force Apr. 23, 1980.

Honduras

Agreement establishing a cooperative program for the operation and maintenance of the meteorological observation and telecommunications facility on the Swan Islands, with annexes. Effected by exchange of notes at Tegucigalpa Nov. 22, 1971. Entered into force Sept. 1, 1972. TIAS 7454. Notice of termination: U.S., Jan. 29, 1980 effective Mar. 29, 1980.

Agreement relating to the making available of electric power to the radio air navigational facility and dock and landing strip lighting systems on the Swan Islands. Effected by exchange of notes at Tegucigalpa Nov. 22, 1971. Entered into force Sept. 1, 1972. TIAS 7455.

Notice of termination: U.S. Jan. 29, 1980; effective Mar. 29, 1980.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

Agreement amending the agreement of May 11, 1959, as amended and extended (TIAS 4291, 7852), for cooperation in the civil uses of atomic energy, with annex. Signed at Vienna Jan. 14, 1980. Entered into force: May 6, 1980.

International Coffee Organization

Agreement relating to a procedure for U.S. income tax reimbursement. Effected by exchange of letters at London Mar. 20 and 25, 1980. Entered into force Mar. 31, 1980; effective Jan. 1, 1980.

Japan

Agreement on cooperation in research and development in science and technology. Signed at Washington May 1, 1980. Entered into force May 1, 1980.

Malawi

Agreement concerning the provision of training related to defense articles under the U.S. International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program. Effected by exchange of notes at Lilongwe Mar. 20 and May 1, 1980. Entered into force May 1, 1980.

Mexico

Agreement amending the agreement of Apr. 18, 1962, as amended (TIAS 5043, 8185, 9641), relating to the assignment and use of television channels along the U.S.-Mexican border. Effected by exchange of notes at Mexico and Tlateloleo Jan. 22 and Apr. 7, 1980. Entered into force Apr. 7, 1980.

Agreement relating to additional cooperative arrangements to curb the illegal traffic in narcotics. Effected by exchange of letters at Mexico Apr. 7, 1980. Entered into force Apr. 7, 1980.

Agreement amending the agreement of June 2, 1977, (TIAS 8952), as amended (TIAS 9251, 9637, 9695), relating to additional cooperative arrangements to curb the illegal traffic in narcotics. Effected by exchange of letters at Mexico Apr. 11, 1980. Entered into force Apr. 11, 1980.

Netherlands

Agreement relating to cooperation between the U.S. and the Netherlands Antilles regarding a hurricane monitoring and forecasting program for the Caribbean, with memorandum of arrangement. Effected by exchange of notes at The Hague July 26, 1979. Entered into force: May 8, 1980.

Panama

Agreement concerning air traffic control and related services, with annexes. Signed at Panama Jan. 8, 1979. Entered into force: Apr. 23, 1980.

Interim agreement relating to continued use of lands and installations for purposes of air traffic control and related services, with related note. Effected by exchange of notes at Panama Oct. 1, 1979. Entered into force Oct. 1, 1979.

Terminated: Apr. 23, 1980.

Agreement relating to jurisdiction over

vessels utilizing the Louisiana offshore oil port. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Mar. 21 and 24, 1980. Entered into force Mar. 24, 1980.

Rwanda

Agreement concerning the provision of training related to defense articles under the U.S. International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program. Effected by exchange of notes at Kigali Mar. 6 and 11, 1980. Entered into force Mar. 11, 1980.

Togo

Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of certain debts owed to, guaranteed, or insured by the U.S. Government and the Export-Import Bank of the U.S., with annexes. Signed at Lome Mar. 28, 1980. Entered into force: May 2, 1980.

Tunisia

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of June 7, 1976, (TIAS 8506), with minutes of negotiation. Signed at Tunis Apr. 17, 1980. Entered into force Apr. 17, 1980.

Turkey

Implementing agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of certain debts owed to the Agency for International Development. Signed at Ankara Apr. 22, 1980. Enters into force upon receipt by Turkey of written notice that domestic U.S. laws and regulations covering debt rescheduling concerning the Dec. 11, 1979, rescheduling agreement have been complied with.

Tuvalu

Agreement relating to treaty obligations assumed by Tuvalu upon its independence. Effected by exchange of notes at Suva and Funafuti Jan. 29 and Apr. 25, 1980. Entered into force Apr. 25, 1980.

United Kingdom

Agreement amending the agreement of July 23, 1977, as amended, (TIAS 8641, 8811, 8965) concerning air services. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Dec. 27, 1979. Entered into force Dec. 27, 1979.

Yugoslavia

Agreement on scientific and technical cooperation. Signed at Belgrade Apr. 2, 1980. Enters into force upon notification to the Government of the U.S. by the Government of Yugoslavia that it has fulfilled all necessary legal requirements for concluding this agreement.

¹With reservation, designations, and declarations.

²Not in force.

³Chapter II not in force for the U.S.

⁴For articles 13 through 30.

⁵Not in force for the U.S. ■

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Events pertaining to Iran may be found on page 72.

May 1

U.S.-Japan sign 5-year agreement of cooperation in scientific and technologic research and development.

May 2

U.S. declares four Libyan diplomats "not acceptable" for conduct inconsistent with the normal role of a diplomat and gives them 72 hours to leave the U.S. State Department instructs its two diplomats Tripoli to leave Libya temporarily.

May 3

To save the Moscow summer games Olympic committees of most West European countries issue the following eight point proposal to eliminate politics from Olympics:

- Athletes would not march in the opening parade; each national delegation would be represented by a flag bearer and a name board;
- Instead of its nation's flag, each team would use the Olympic flag;
- Olympic hymn would replace the national anthems;
- Olympic flag and hymn would be used at the opening and closing ceremonies as well as at the presentations of medals;
- Athletes' clothes would display only the badge of their national Olympic committee and an identification badge;
- Political speeches would be barred from opening ceremony;
- Each delegation would confine its activities to sporting events; and
- National committees would not participate in the international youth camp organized by the Russians in connection with the Olympics.

May 4

Yugoslav President Tito dies. NATO Secretary General Joseph L. G. DeLoach makes official visit to Washington, D.C. May 4-6.

May 5

Four Libyan diplomats fail to depart the U.S. in compliance with the May 2 order and take refuge in the Libyan People's Bureau (embassy).

Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis is elected President of Greece.

U.S. suspends immigrant visa and refugee program for Cubans at the Interests Section in Havana until the Cuban Government guarantees the safety of people who come to the Interests Section to conduct normal business.

6 President Carter announces his intention to appoint Griffin Bell, former Attorney General, and Max M. Kampelman, Washington Attorney and Chairman of the Andrew Wilson International Center for Scholars, to serve as Chairman and Chairman, respectively, of the U.S. Delegation to the review meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to be held in Madrid in November 1991.

7 By a vote of 94 to 2, the Senate confirms the appointment of Senator Edmond Muskie as Secretary of State. The White House announces that Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, will be used as an additional temporary site to house Cuban refugees awaiting resettlement. Fort Chaffee was used in 1975 as a temporary housing facility for Indochina refugees.

8 Senator Muskie is sworn in as Secretary of State. By a vote of 14-0, with 1 abstention (U.S.), the U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 468 which calls on Israel to recall the "illegal" deportation of three West Bank Arab leaders. President Sadat calls for a postponement of the Palestinian autonomy talks so that he can review their status with his advisers. A conference on the humanitarian aspects of the Cuban refugee problem is held in San Jose. The following countries participate: Brazil, Belgium, Dominican Republic, France, Australia, U.K., Chile, Ecuador, Peru, Argentina, Italy, Uruguay, Venezuela, Colombia, Spain, the Netherlands, Canada, F.R.G., Switzerland, Costa Rica, and the United States. U.S. delegation is headed by Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, William G. Bowdler, and Ambassador Frank E. Loy, Deputy Coordinator of Refugee Programs. Other participants include the Vatican, U.S., ICEM, representatives from the Office of the UNHCR, Inter-American Human Rights Commission, Inter-American Human Rights Court, EEC, and ICRC.

Conference representatives agree on major objectives:

- Recognition of the international character of the problem;
- Need for all governments, including those not represented in San Jose, to establish a program for resettlement for those wishing to leave Cuba and for financial relief. The UNHCR and the ICEM are urged to make an emergency plea for an increase in assistance;
- Prompt commitment by a number of countries, at the conference itself, of resettlement and financial resources;

- Formation of a group of countries, including the U.S., which will jointly and individually seek the Cuban Government's cooperation in finding a mutually satisfactory solution to this urgent problem; and
- Agreement to maintain awareness of the problem and to meet, in the near future, to review progress made and to consider any additional measures which could bring about a solution.

Official U.S. delegation to Tito's funeral, headed by Vice President Mondale, arrives in Belgrade.

May 9
Libyan Government agrees to recall four diplomats who had taken refuge in the People's Bureau.

May 10
Secretary Muskie recalls U.S. Ambassadors to Egypt and Israel to review with them and Ambassador Linowitz the Palestinian autonomy talks.

May 11
Four Libyan diplomats depart U.S.

May 12
U.S.-Canada agree to extend the current North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) agreement for 1 year.

May 13
Secretary Muskie makes official visit to Brussels to attend a joint ministerial session (Defense and Foreign Ministers) of the NATO Defense Planning Committee, May 13-15. He also visits Vienna, May 15-16, to represent the U.S. at the 25th anniversary of the signing of the Austrian State Treaty. While in Vienna, he confers with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, the first meeting of high-level officials of the Soviet Union and the U.S. in 8 months.

May 14
Members of NATO's Defense Planning Committee rebuke Moscow for its invasion of Afghanistan and agree on military measures to strengthen Western defenses because of that action.

Saudi Arabian Government increases its crude oil prices by \$2 a barrel, to \$28, retroactive to April 1.

Yugoslav Cvijetin Mijatovic is elected President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, continuing the system of rotation planned by Tito.

President Sadat, in a speech to his National Assembly on reorganization of his government, says that he is ready to resume the autonomy negotiations at President Carter's request.

May 15
President Sadat states through Boutros Ghali, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, that Egypt's plans to resume the

autonomy negotiations are again in abeyance due to Egypt's understanding that the Israeli Knesset has passed a bill giving Israel sovereignty over Jerusalem. Despite clarification, i.e., that no such bill was passed although draft legislation proposed on the issue by opposition members was referred to the committee, the negotiations remain in suspension.

May 16
Governing Liberal Democratic Party of Japanese Prime Minister Ohira gets a vote of "no confidence" in Parliament.

May 17
Eleventh Islamic Foreign Ministers conference convenes in Pakistan for a 5-day session. Thirty-nine delegations, including 27 foreign ministers attend. Of the countries expected to attend, only Chad's representative does not arrive. Egypt and Afghanistan are suspended from the group.

May 18
After 12 years of military rule, Peruvians vote for a President and a Congress. Rudolf Kirchschlager is re-elected to a second 6-year term as President of Austria.

May 20
By a vote of 14-0, with 1 abstention (U.S.), U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 469 which "strongly deplors" Israel's failure to abide by Resolution 468, approved on May 8.

May 22
Eleventh Islamic conference ends, having discussed Soviet intervention into Afghanistan, Iran, the Middle East, and Indian Ocean issues.

May 25
Chinese Vice Premier Geng Biao makes official visit to U.S., May 25-June 5.

May 26
Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher heads U.S. delegation to the U.N. Geneva Conference on Kampuchean Relief, May 26-27.

Goal passes for completing the negotiations for West Bank/Gaza autonomy with the talks not in session, but with all three parties stating their intentions to continue them through to success.

May 28
Thailand Foreign Minister Siddhi Savelsila makes official visit to Washington, D.C., May 28-June 4.

May 29
Senior business executives of the U.S.-ASEAN Business Council meet in Washington, D.C. ■

Department of State

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No.	Date	Subject
*108	5/5	Public session discussion of U.S. policy toward the Helsinki agreement, Pittsburgh, May 14.
*109	5/5	Public session discussion of U.S. policy toward the Helsinki agreement, New York, May 13.
*110	5/6	Advisory Committee on International Investment, Technology, and Development, May 30.
111	5/8	Status of U.S. contribution to international efforts for Khmer relief.
*112	5/9	Overseas Schools Advisory Council, June 17.
*113	5/9	Fine Arts Committee, June 9.
*114	5/9	Muskie: statement before Department of State employees.
*115	5/9	Muskie: conference before Department of State employees.
*116	5/12	U.S.-Canada extend NORAD agreement.
117	5/14	Muskie: press briefing en route to Brussels, May 13.
118	5/13	Muskie: arrival statement, Brussels.
119	5/16	Muskie, Brown: news conference, Brussels, May 14.
*120	5/21	Muskie: departure statement, Brussels, May 15.
*121	5/16	U.S. Organization for the International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR), study group 8, June 17.
*122	5/16	Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs Advisory Committee, June 2.
123	5/19	Muskie: statement following meeting with EEC President Jenkins, Brussels, May 14.
124	5/19	Muskie: arrival statement, Vienna, May 15.
125	5/19	Muskie: statement following meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, Vienna, May 16.
126	5/20	Muskie: statement at the 25th anniversary ceremony of the Austrian State Treaty, Vienna, May 16.

*127	5/18	Muskie: statement at the Hubert H. Humphrey memorial ceremony, Worcester, Mass., May 18.
128	5/15	Biographic data on Secretary Muskie.
129	5/20	Muskie: News conference.
*130	5/20	Shipping Coordinating Committee, Committee on Ocean Dumping, June 12.
*131	5/20	Advisory Committee on the Law of the Sea, June 30 (closed), July 1 (open and closed).
*132	5/27	Public session discussion of U.S. policy toward the Helsinki agreement, Detroit, June 25.
*133	5/27	Public session discussion of U.S. policy toward the Helsinki agreement, Chicago, June 26.
*134	5/27	Gordon R. Beyer sworn in as Ambassador to Uganda (biographic data).
*135	5/29	Robert V. Keeley sworn in as Ambassador to Zimbabwe (biographic data).

*Not printed in the BULLETIN. ■

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
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Volume 80 / Number 2041 / August 1980

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Honor guard at the Quirinale Palace, Rome.
(White House photo by Jack Kightlinger)

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The BULLETIN's contents include major addresses and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State; statements made before congressional committees by the Secretary and other senior State Department officials; special features and articles on international affairs; selected press releases issued by the White House, the Department, and the U.S. Mission to the United Nations; and treaties and other agreements to which the United States is or may become a party.

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(White House photo by Karl Schumacher)



2

(White House photo by Karl Schumacher)



3



(White House photo by Karl Schumacher)

President Carter Attends Economic Summit in Venice

President Carter departed Washington, D.C., June 19, 1980, for a trip to Italy, the Vatican, Yugoslavia, Spain, and Portugal. He returned to the United States on June 26. After state visits to Italy (see page 12) and the Vatican (see page 17), he participated in an economic summit meeting in Venice June 22-23 with the leaders of Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom and the President of the European Commission. After the Venice summit, President Carter went to Yugoslavia (see page 19), Spain (see page 20) and Portugal (see page 26).

Following are the concluding statements of the eight summit participants; the communique issued at the conclusion of the summit; and statements released to the press on Afghanistan, the taking of diplomatic hostages, refugees, and hijacking.¹

CONCLUDING STATEMENTS, JUNE 23, 1980²

Prime Minister Cossiga

I thank, on behalf of all the heads of government—I thank all of you not only for being here but also for your collaboration in this summit through the information that you, the press, and I have provided. This is the final press conference we have after a summit, and it is a pleasure to me as chairman, president of the summit of the seven industrialized countries of the West.

The message, I think, emerging from this Venice summit, at the beginning of the 1980s—the beginning of a difficult decade—is a message of unity, harmony, and cooperation.

You have before you the text of the communique, or if not, it will be distributed to you. And yesterday you received the text on consultation that is taking place on the political issues. The problems that we've had to deal with in these 2 days, as you all very understand, were numerous and no means easy and nobody, I think, could have maintained that we could have an immediate response or reply or a reply, because, of course, this is the reality, either in history or in politics.

The truth emerging from this summit is that the seven major industrialized countries are agreed on the strategy which should guide us in facing the challenges that we have before us. We also agree that our unity and solidarity is not enough in a world which is increasingly interdependent. We are all responsible for the fate of this

world—industrialized countries and developing countries, oil-producing countries and oil-consuming countries. In the communique, I think you will find an appeal to this general sense of a joint responsibility.

As you already know, the central problem that we discussed was that of energy, and we have set out a strategy which involves specific actions to save oil but also an accelerated or speedy effort to produce alternative sources of energy—alternative to oil—including nuclear energy, whose contribution is essential for a better balance between supply and demand in the energy field. We've decided on the general lines for the decade and how we are to monitor the execution of this program.

We have decided on the need to fight inflation, but we've also agreed that we will help investment to create more jobs, improving the economic structures in our countries. In particular, in the energy field, there will be new investments which can create new jobs, which is very important to solve what is a human, social, political problem: one of the most important, that of youth.

We also discussed in depth the problems of the less rich countries. And it is our intention to confirm our commitment, but at the same time, we wish to make aware of this commitment—what should be a general opinion, a general commitment, a general responsibility—the other industrialized countries, all of them, including the Communist industrialized countries and the oil-producer countries.

The increasing cost of oil doesn't only harm the industrialized countries but creates situations which sometimes are unbearable, especially in developing

countries. And the problem cannot be solved merely through the recycling undertaken by private banks. In the final communique, you will find what other measures we intend to adopt in this field.

Venice has been the host in the past 10 days of two summit meetings, two important meetings at the highest political level. In the first, that of the nine heads of state, heads of government of the European Community, we found, in spite of the fears of many, the confirmation of the real vital unity of the Community. In this second meeting at the highest political level, which is drawing to an end today, we've taken economic and political decisions and indicated lines of action to reinforce international cooperation in the decade which is only now opened.

From Venice, then, we leave with a new spirit. We thank this marvelous city for its hospitality, with a spirit and a sense of openness to the world which has characterized the history of this beautiful city.

President Giscard d'Estaing

This meeting of the seven major industrialized nations here in Venice, of the summit—there are three things that I shall particularly bear in mind.

First of all, this summit has enabled us to issue joint statements on subjects as important as Afghanistan, the attitude to be adopted with regard to refugees throughout the world, and the problem of the holding of hostages. Also, this summit has clearly shown that there is agreement, converging views, with regard to not just the analysis, which is important, but particularly the measures that should be taken in order to resolve the economic difficulties with which we are currently faced.

And the third point is that this summit has been chaired so excellently by Italy, and we have enjoyed the finest Italian hospitality. And, Mr. President, Mr. Chairman, we thank you for both.

In the very short time available to us, there are two things to which I would like to refer: energy and development aid.

Last year in Tokyo our decisions aimed at establishing a ceiling and at reducing our oil imports. These were decisions that it was necessary for us to take but which were of a defensive, negative nature.

In Venice we have taken a different decision, and I invite you to understand the importance of this. It's expressed by a sentence in our communique, and it is our decision to break the link between oil imports and economic growth. We have set ourselves a limit of 10 years in which to break this link and, in particular, in order to efface in public opinion the feeling of anxiety, the feeling of uncertainty about the economic growth of our countries, given a high level of oil imports.

We could have confined ourselves to expressing this in very general terms. And our communique, which I think will be distributed to you shortly, contains, in fact, quite specific indications with regard to energy savings. We have decided that we shall build no new generating stations which are oil fired. We have taken measures with regard to savings to be made in the heating of dwellings and public buildings, with regard to the consumption of petrol by automobiles and other motor vehicles.

We have also taken decisions with regard to the development of alternative energy sources. As you know, there are three main sources: coal, nuclear electricity, and new energy sources. And here the target that we have set ourselves is to effect a saving by 1990 of between 15 and 20 million barrels a day of oil by using these new energy sources.

The Latin countries, that are more familiar with units expressed in millions of tons of petrol—this means that by 1990 our seven countries will, together, be producing the equivalent of 1 billion tons of oil in all equivalents—1 billion tons.

This means that between 1980 and 1990 we shall be doubling our coal production. It means that we shall be carrying forward our efforts to develop nuclear powerplants. As you know, France is making a major effort in this respect, and we shall maintain these efforts. And lastly, it means that we shall develop alternative energy sources: biomass, geothermal energy, and solar energy. And lastly, we shall be lending assistance to new producer countries, developing countries that could develop new oil resources.

If we manage to achieve all of this, we shall, in fact, reduce the link that exists between oil imports and economic growth to the following extent. Up until the 1974 crisis, when we underwent the economic growth of 100, oil imports went up by 100. At the present time, subsequent to our initial efforts, when economic growth goes up by 100, our oil imports go up by 90 or even 80. And in 1990, when our economic growth goes up by 100, our oil imports will be going up by only 60. Thus, we shall have broken the link that exists between economic growth and oil imports.

We shall be reducing our oil share, that's currently at 53% of our imports down to 40% by 1990. And as far as France is concerned, this figure will be substantially less. The goal we set ourselves is to bring the oil share in our energy consumption down to a figure of between 28% and 33% by 1990; in other words, far beyond the common goals that we have set ourselves.

A second point is aid to development.

We've said, first of all, that aid to development in the world is a responsibility that we all must share, a responsibility that is shared by all countries. And we have decided to devote thought to the mechanisms which are appropriate to the development of states in the decade 1980 to 1990. And the conclusions of the thinking that we have devoted to this, indeed, will be at the forefront of our next summit, that is to say in 1981.

And then lastly, we have emphasized that fact that we shall be making an active contribution to the very necessary dialogue that must be established between North and South.

Here you have the main features of what I have noted from our work. And now, as I'm here with Helmut Schmidt and we are two of the founding fathers of these summit meetings, because we participated at the first in Rambouillet and each summit since, I would just like to say, by way of conclusion, that the Venice summit represents a very marked progress in this institution in the way in which it functions and in its usefulness.

And then, last of all, if you would allow me, I would like to say that I shall leave Venice in a short time with great regret, and it is with great joy and pleasure that one day I shall return.

President Carter

Our meeting is ending in a spirit of gratifying concord and mutual confidence. We have joined in unity to prepare an agenda for both individual and common action.

From the history of this beautiful city, we have drawn an important lesson, that even the most secure powers must act in time in order to shape great changes. The republic Venice left us with incomparable beauty, which we have observed to great pleasure. Yet in the end, its leaders failed to meet the threats of change pressing in from the east and failed to seize the opportunities for change which were opening then in the west. We are determined not to repeat the same errors.

All of us who served in positions of leadership recognize that the decade of the 1970s was a period of great difficulty and great challenge, of struggle against unpredictable and uncontrollable change. Yet we all recognize that the 1980s might very well be much more difficult, much more challenging, and much more unpredictable.

Free peoples face hard choices. The freedoms that make our nations strong are at risk in the decade of the 1980s. And we have pledged ourselves here during this Venice conference, to secure those freedoms for the 1990s, even to the end of this century. The challenges are both political and economic in nature.

We've committed our combined strength and our influence and our voices against a ruthless power's invasion of its nearby defenseless neighbor, which threatens the stability of a crucial area of the world for us all. The Soviet aggression in Afghanistan is a profound assault against the laws of nations and a grave threat to the stability of that vital region.

We've pledged to oppose this Soviet invasion with the means at our disposal, and do this because it is a moral imperative and also a strategic imperative. We also know that by resisting Soviet militarism and aggression in the present that we can reopen paths of peace, detente, accommodation in the future.

We've demonstrated our almost unique unity in our opposition to terrorism, hijacking, to the attacks on innocent diplomatic personnel, and toward the alleviation of the suffering of many millions of refugees around the world.

We are also committed to the unity of purpose in overcoming our

mon economic challenges. We come to battle the inflationary forces that poison the confidence on which our economic systems are built. That battle, as we all know too well, is far from easy. It compels us to a greater common effort.

Our own nation has been effective, by the convention of this summit in Venice, in reducing oil imports, reversing a longstanding upward trend. I just received the figures today that the first three months of this year our nation's oil imports are down 13.4% below the same three months last year, an indication not particularly of our own achievement but of the results of these summits, which have been felt so tangibly on the lives of our people in the past.

We are resolved, as the President has said, to break the link between our economic growth and our oil consumption. We have set ambitious goals for alternative energy sources to replace oil with coal, shale, energy derived from the Sun, energy reduced by growing crops and trees, equivalent to between 15 and 20 million barrels of oil per day by the end of this decade. And we've agreed on concrete, immediate actions with which to achieve our goal. It is a figure not idly given to the public. We feel this commitment binding on all of us.

Here, both in oil consumption and in the exploration and development of alternative energy sources, including enormous coal reserves—six or seven times greater than all the known reserves in the world—is an adventure, an exciting opportunity for us, of imagination and of our skill.

And finally, another challenge confronts us in the poor nations of the world, those nations which have been especially crippled by the unwarranted excessive increases in the price of oil set by the OPEC nations [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries]. Here, again, we must match our words with concrete action, for without such action, we will face an accelerating cycle of alienation and decline and disorder. We will study this question of aid, assistance, trade in great depth between now and next year. This summit conference is conducted again.

We share responsibility with each other and with those developing nations to achieve a better life for all. We know the hunger that afflicts many of our people is not only for food, which our nation, thank God, has in abundance, but it's a hunger also for mutual



(White House photo by Jack Kiehlinger)

The participants in the Venice economic summit (left to right): Japanese Foreign Minister Okita, Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau, West German Chancellor Schmidt, French President Giscard d'Estaing, Italian Prime Minister Cossiga, President Carter, British Prime Minister Thatcher, and EC Commission President Jenkins.

respect, for mutual understanding, and for mutual support, which we are dedicated freely to give to one another. We recognize that hunger for equality of treatment and concern, and we've resolved to do everything we can do to alleviate it with dignity and with equal treatment.

What we do in facing these dangers and opportunities is a measure of our will to survive as free societies. There's no longer much real distinction that can be drawn between domestic affairs and foreign affairs, between military strength and energy or economic strength, between economic health and political vitality. These factors and the characteristics of a life in a nation are intimately entwined and inseparable. All these elements must be fused together to provide the basis for genuine security—security for the future as well as for the present.

Here in Venice, we have confronted this broad range of challenges together, and together we have fashioned our responses. Our hosts, by

their gift of hospitality, have opened this path and opportunity of harmony and tangible cooperation to us.

We owe our thanks to the authorities of the Italian Republic for preparing and coordinating our work, and particularly for our chairman—Prime Minister Cossiga—for the people of Venice who have made our stay here so pleasant. We leave this meeting thankful for their help, inspired by their example in solving problems for themselves, and committed to show in our common work how much we honor the sacrifices they have made for our own convenience.

We will now return to our own countries to ask more sacrifices of ourselves. There will undoubtedly be some who will oppose the pledges of action we've taken and given each other here. Some will seek to delay the implementation of our action. But I'm confident that our democratic societies will assume these burdens of freedom in freedom, rather than subsequently, if we

fail, to have more crushing burdens imposed on us from outside.

We've reached our conclusions freely as befits an association of free peoples. We've agreed on the ways to insure the security of our free world, now and urgently. We shall show that we can employ the tools of democracy in order to build a future of freedom.

This has been a very gratifying experience for me and one of great profit to our nation. The association with these other leaders, representing their great countries, is indeed an important element in the future development of the lives of the people of the United States of America. I'm indebted to them and, particularly, Mr. Chairman, to you and the people of Italy and the people of this beautiful community.

Chancellor Schmidt

First of all, I would like to support the excellent appreciation of President Giscard d'Estaing on this year's summit meeting. I think it is in the very nature of a meeting such as this with the press that we can't go over all the ground that the previous speakers have covered. But I would expressly like to support everything that has been said by the three previous speakers about the nature of our discussions.

And for me, there is another point, which is particularly relevant, in what President Carter said—the very great value we place upon our exchange of views.

Obviously, with regard to a series—given the current range of problems—the international links, the international political links played a perhaps greater role than in the past, took up a very great deal of our time, rather more than has been the case in earlier meetings. And in this respect, I have had an opportunity, after lengthy consultation with our Minister of Foreign Affairs, our diplomats, I have been able to report on the forthcoming visit of the Foreign Minister and myself to Moscow, the points that we shall be discussing.

We didn't ask for any mandate. We shall be speaking for our own country, but we have proceeded to a far-reaching consultation on all the areas that we wish to discuss, and we shall certainly inform ourselves in our discussions. These discussions will be informed by the points that we have covered with our colleagues. And we would like to thank our colleagues for their support.

There is one point in the comments made by President Giscard d'Estaing that I would like to highlight—indeed, this was also raised by President Carter—this is our determination, our joint determination, to break the link between economic growth on the one hand and growth in oil imports on the other hand. It's a very ambitious goal that we have set ourselves, but I am quite convinced it's a very realistic goal. And my country, like France, like the United States of America, like Italy, will be making the utmost efforts to achieve this goal, and we think that we have very good chances of achieving the goals we have set ourselves for 1990.

Energy problems, oil problems, oil price problems perhaps are of particular importance in the world at the present time. The balance of payments of oil-exporting countries and non-oil-producing countries, the industrialized countries, price rises, inflation. We have emphasized the necessity of carrying forward an anti-inflationary policy. This is very much in keeping with the policies that we pursue in my own country.

We have never before, at such a meeting, gone in such detail into the possibilities of economic relations with the developing countries, and we have set ourselves a target of doing this even more exhaustively next year. And I would very much like to emphasize the fact that we are convinced, as we have said in the communique, that the oil-exporting countries that currently have very high surpluses must directly participate in aid programs, in transfers to the non-oil-producing, developing countries.

Here, too, I would like to say that we looked at the possibility of a North-South summit with limited participation. And I'd like to say here what I said in our discussions. I certainly would intend to participate at such a meeting and would expect the oil-producing, exporting countries to do likewise.

Now, if I'm going to confine myself to the 5 minutes allowed to me, I must bring my remarks to a close. But I would very much like to thank our colleague, Francesco Cossiga. He has chaired brilliantly and most successfully two very important international meetings here in Venice within 10 days. And at this meeting—the meeting of the seven most important democratic, industrialized states in the world—we have had an extremely positive atmos-

phere, one of collaboration and cooperation. I am most grateful and appreciative of this.

And I would like to say to the ladies and gentlemen of the press, to the mass media that, of course, only part of the things that we have discussed have been able to go into the communique, but I certainly feel greatly enriched by the far-ranging discussions we have been able to have among ourselves.

I'd also like to express my thanks for the warm hospitality of Venice. Those of us who aren't Italians are very, very much impressed by the 10 days we've had the opportunity of spending here in Venice, in this remarkable city which is of importance to the culture of the whole world.

Prime Minister Thatcher

[Inaudible] I'd like to undertake four points. The first one is this: If you go back to Tokyo last year and think what has happened there, you'll see that the events since that time illustrate very vividly the kind of problems that we have to tackle. Those of you [inaudible] Tokyo will remember that we were then discussing the oil problem, which [inaudible]. Then the price of a barrel of oil was \$20; now it's \$30 a barrel. We were worried then; we're much, much more worried now. That illustrates the continuing problems which we had to tackle.³

Another one of these is the taking of hostages in Iran, a new one which came upon us suddenly and which we are doing all we can to assist President Carter to secure their release.

The one continuing problem, or new one, and the third one, which is also discussed—for the invasion of Afghanistan, which many of us would see as a continuing manifestation of an old problem and the fundamental division between East, West, and their political philosophies.

I mention these things as my first point to illustrate that in politics we are constantly having to deal both with short-term and long-term problems. We try to deal with the short-term ones in a way that will contribute to the solution of the longer term problems. We've discussed them all at this conference.

The second point will take up one of the first ones. How are we going to continue to deal with the oil problem? You've heard my colleagues give details of some of the things which we have agreed. Really, they all have this i-

mon: From whatever countries we
e, we're trying to reduce our de-
pendence on oil and, therefore, make
elves less vulnerable to the oil-
ducing countries being able to sud-
y reduce their production and leave
our economies and our politics
ly vulnerable.

Everything we're doing is trying to
ce the dependence of our countries
d and leave us less vulnerable to
ects of others. You will find them
etailed, but by and large, they boil
to that simple proposition. That
as, of course, that we have to find
r sources of energy. It means that
der to find the resources for de-
ing other sources of energy, we
have to let the price rise of the
ogy we're using now, and we shall
to have massive investment into
native supplies, such as nuclear,
ng other things, and such as open-
p new coal fields.

Now the third point I want to make
is: If we in the Western indus-
alized countries have found it dif-
to rise to the problems of the in-
creasing price of oil and if it's reduced
ability to help others, then the
poor countries have had the worst
blem of the lot. We talk about re-
ing; we talk about aid. The fact is
some of the poorer countries just
can't afford the oil they're having
port now. And if you look at the
relationship of aid to the increasing
ris of oil that they've had put upon
e, you'll find the astonishing thing
at the aid that we all give them to-
eter from the whole of the Western
l is not sufficient to match the in-
creasing price of oil since 1978.

Everything we can do in aid isn't
ough to meet their very real prob-
m. And that is why I think, instead
st talking about North-South
ague, I think most of us are very
icious that as well as involving the
ountries of the North in solving the
blems of the countries of the South,
also have to involve the oil-rich
ountries, the oil-producing countries,
euse we really feel that it's not only
estion of recycling money, it's also
estion of giving new sources of aid
ose poor countries.

And the fourth point is this: We
great ambitions; we have great
ies to help others, though we're
able to do so if each of us puts our
economies really in order.

For many of us, we have a very
siderable inflation problem. Indeed,
nk over the past 2 years, inflation
been a very much larger part of the

problems, economical problems of
Western societies. Indeed, some 2
years ago, the average of OECD [Or-
ganization for Economic Cooperation
and Development] inflation was 8%;
now it's some 14%. And we're not going
to be able to help other countries, let
alone ourselves, as much as we would
wish unless we tackle that problem.

You will find quite a considerable
portion of the communique taken up
with the old recipes for tackling infla-
tion. They are the old ones; there aren't
any new ones. It's just sometimes that
the old ones haven't been tried for long
enough to produce sound money and a
basis for stable growth, except perhaps
in the economy of Germany, which we
all admire for its tenacity in holding to
sound financial principles. We recognize

Economic Summits

The Venice summit was the sixth in a
series of such meetings of the leaders of the
major industrialized democracies.

The summits have addressed the inter-
related problems of the world economy—
abrupt increases in the price of oil, persist-
ent inflation, slow economic growth, and
imbalances in international payments. They
underscore the interdependence of our
economies and the need to find mutually
reinforcing solutions to our common prob-
lems.

The principal result of the Bonn sum-
mit, for example, was an agreement on the
coordination of macroeconomic policies,
which achieved a balance between meas-
ures to fight inflation and those to stimu-
late growth. The principal outcome of the
Tokyo summit was an agreement on targets
for oil imports and consumption as part of a
shared response to a tight oil market and
sharply rising prices.

Nov. 15-17, 1975 Rambouillet, France	France, F.R.G., Italy, Japan, U.K., U.S.
June 27-28, 1976 Puerto Rico	Canada, France, F.R.G., Italy, Japan, U.K., U.S.
May 7-8, 1977 London, England	France, F.R.G., U.K., U.S.
July 16-17, 1978 Bonn, Germany	Canada, France, F.R.G., Italy, Japan, U.K., U.S.
June 28-29, 1979 Toyko, Japan	Canada, France, F.R.G., Italy, Japan, U.K., U.S.
June 22-23, 1980 Venice, Italy	Canada, France, F.R.G., Italy, Japan, U.K., U.S.

that we will have to do that if we really
intend to be in a position to help others.

I think that our success in tackling
the problems of the coming year will
depend upon whether in our own coun-
tries we can raise our economic effi-
ciency sufficiently to match the level of
our international ideals. That will be
the test that we have to undergo during
the coming year, and doubtless you'll be
keeping us up to it as to how well we're
doing.

I would like to join my colleagues
in saying thank you. We've had a won-
derful Chairman, who's presided over
our proceedings with very, very great
ability. We've been visitors in a most
beautiful city, and we've had a valuable
and very rewarding conference.

We, all of us, talked about difficul-
ties. I wouldn't like the message to go
out of this conference just to be one of
difficulties and problems. I think the
result is that we believe the Western
free societies can cope with those dif-
ficulties and that we'll all be back next
year—perhaps with a new set of prob-
lems, perhaps with the same—but we
believe we'll have made some progress
in meeting them. And I'm sure we'll all
meet together, I believe, next year in
Canada. We look forward to it.

Prime Minister Trudeau

In facts and figures and conclusions,
there is very little I can add, if any-
thing, to the forceful and lucid state-
ments which my colleagues have just
made, indeed add to the very detailed
communique which you will have before
you. I thought, for those few of you
who might be interested in mood
pieces, that I would say a word about
the mood of cautious optimism which, in
my judgment, seems to have been pres-
ent among us.

I notice that Prime Minister
Thatcher just used words to that effect
by saying that there is a belief that we
can cope with our problems. And that
seemed to me to be the mood which
prevails here today—not a mood of wild
enthusiasm or of great self-
congratulation but feeling that the in-
dustrialized democracies, challenged as
they have been over the years with
what seemed at each summit an in-
tractable problem, has begun to find a
way toward a solution.

One year it was the problem of re-
cycling petrodollars, and that seems to
have been solved, at least until now,
and we see the great danger for the fu-
ture. There was also, another year, the
discussion of the impending trade wars

and protectionism to defend ourselves from each other, and that, too, seems to have been satisfactorily overcome, or at least held in abeyance. And I remember also we talked on one occasion of our slow growth and the danger that might create cynicism and perhaps a measure of revolt amongst, particularly, of the young in our populations, and that, too, seems to have been averted for the time being.

And I think we must say that to the worries that might have existed as to the possibility for industrialized democracies to come to grips with these very intractable problems, that worry is somewhat in abeyance in the sense that we have managed, not to overcome all the crises, but we have managed to manage them in a certain sense. We have remained in a reasonable measure of control of our domestic economic environment.

There is one problem which was intractable and which for the time being remains so; that is the problem of North-South relations. And we did discuss that again at this summit. I suppose it's fair to say that that is one problem that is not, of course, wholly within our control, since we must seek a measure of agreement with those countries of the Third World. I believe there were new steps taken at this summit toward a solution of those problems. Some of us, certainly myself, indicated an interest, if invited, in participating in the Brandt minisummit.

We, as my colleagues have indicated, have called upon the oil-rich countries to help solve this problem with us, and we've called upon, also, the Soviet bloc to do something to bear a part of this burden, which it certainly is not doing now. But perhaps more important, we discussed among ourselves the fact that we hadn't really broken the back of this problem, and we were determined—you will see some words in the communique to that effect—to make sure that at next year's summit we would expend every effort to come to grips with that problem, hopefully with a beginning of success.

I would not wish to finish without making some reference to the political dimensions of our discussions, to which reference has indeed already been made. We mentioned the four communique of a political nature, or semipolitical nature, of the refugees, hijacking, the taking of hostages, and above all, on Afghanistan.

I think it is important to underline that our summits are, first of all and above all, of an economic nature and

should remain such. But we have had to become aware of this reality that the industrialized democracies, those represented at the summit, could not avoid realizing that in the political field, where there's been rather more disarray, rather less unity than in the economic field, and the political crises still seem to be somewhat more intractable, rather more insoluble than the economic crises or the economic challenges we've had to face. But there, too, a climate of moderate optimism is justified.

On Afghanistan, we made a declaration saying that as to the essentials we share the same view on the basis, the foundation of the problem, the main positions to be taken for the future. I think we shall also have to face these responsibilities. But as far as I'm concerned, I realize that we must do it marginally to the economic discussions, which are essential to the summit. We merely envisage the possibility of translating in the political domain this sort of political unity or this democratic approach which we've achieved in the economic field.

We could hope that this may pass over into the political field. This remains to be seen, and this no doubt remains to be seen at the Canadian summit next year, since we have agreed at this summit in Venice to meet next year in 1981 at the Canadian summit.

I must say, indeed I must warn my colleagues and those of you who will be there that we shall not be able to compete with the splendor of Venice and the hospitality of the Italian people, nor even the excellence of the masterly way in which our chairman has conducted the proceedings during the past 2 days. But I can tell you that you will all be welcome. And we think, all together, we shall be able to contribute further to the solutions of some of our serious problems.

Foreign Minister Okita

On behalf of the Government and people of Japan, I wish to take this opportunity to express our deep sense of gratitude and appreciation to the condolence expressed to the sudden demise of our late Prime Minister, Mr. Ohira, by the heads of government and state.

Prime Minister Ohira had a particularly high valuation of the role of the summit in these difficult times of the world, and he had great expectations upon his participation. I truly regret that and miss his presence, but Prime Minister Cossiga and heads of state and govern-

ment have given very kind and courteous attention to us so that the Japanese delegation has been able to participate in the meeting very productively.

Yesterday, by the way, we had general elections in Japan. The result have come to be known to us by now. The party of which Prime Minister Ohira was representative enjoyed a landslide victory, increasing the number of seats of the Liberal Democratic Party from 258 to 284. I might take this opportunity to report that you.

This summit in Venice I believe accomplished a result that truly belies the first such summit in this decade—the eighties.

First, on the political question: initially the summits were for economic discussions, but as other heads of government and state have commented on these new, changing environments have discussed political points, matters particularly with regard to our position as regards Afghanistan. You all heard Prime Minister Cossiga yesterday in his press briefing.

The Government of Japan, since the outset of the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan—the Government of Japan has persistently taken the view that Japan cannot tolerate such military intervention in that nation, and Japan shall continue to maintain this same attitude. I am gratified and find it very significant that among the heads of state and government in Venice, a common perception has been confirmed about this question.

As regards economic questions Japan came to Venice looking forward to fruitful and substantive discussions on inflation and energy and the so-called North-South situation, including the question of recycling of oil money. We are satisfied that we have seen long-term strategic discussion. First next year's Canada summit, further discussions we look forward to take place on North-South relations. We strongly support this forthcoming agenda item.

On energy, our view is that among the seven nations here, on the supply side—in other words, not only on the demand side, on the supply side—our efforts must be further redoubled. That the question that affects the oil-market economies. We must demonstrate our resiliency and strength of market economies to the rest of the world. That end, through investment, productivity must be increased, and through savings, inflation must be curtailed.

In other matters, that may involve political difficulties domestically, but as industrialized nations to overcome the difficulty of paying such expenses would be an essential condition for strengthening our democracies.

Summit Statements June 22, 1980*

Afghanistan

Seeking here in Venice to define a global economic strategy and to show our united determination to make it a reality, we are consciously accepting the responsibility that falls to the three great industrialized areas of the world—North America, Western Europe, and Japan—to help create the conditions for harmonious and sustained economic growth. But we cannot do this alone; others too have a part to play.

However, present circumstances oblige us to emphasize that our efforts will only bear fruit if we can at the same time preserve a world in which the rule of law is universally obeyed, national independence respected, and world peace is kept. We urge on all countries to join us in working towards such a world and we welcome the readiness of nonaligned countries and regional groups to accept the responsibilities which this involves.

We, therefore, reaffirm hereby that the Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan is unacceptable now and that we are determined not to accept it in the future. It is incompatible with the will of the Afghan people for national independence, as demonstrated by their courageous resistance, and with the security of the states of the region. It is also incompatible with the principles of the U.N. Charter and with our efforts to maintain genuine detente. It undermines the very foundations of peace, both in the region and in the world at large.

We fully endorse in this respect the views already expressed by the overwhelming majority of the international community, as set out by the U.N. General Assembly in Resolution No. ES-6/2 of 14th January 1980 and by the Islamic conference at both its recent sessions.

Afghanistan should be enabled to retain the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence, and nonaligned character it once enjoyed. We, therefore, call for the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops and for the Afghan people to be left again to determine their own future.

We have taken note of today's announcement of the withdrawal of some Soviet troops from Afghanistan. In order to make a useful contribution to the solution of the Afghan crisis, this withdrawal, if confirmed, will have to be permanent and continue until the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops. Only thus will it be possible to reestablish a situation compatible

This summit meeting has dealt with such a long-term question fully and squarely, and we find it very significant that we have done so.

Next, on the matter of relations with the developing nations, our pres-

ent summit has paid greater attention than before to that matter; in this, it has been very meaningful. At the present, because of the sharp rise of the prices of oil, many non-oil-producing developing nations have met difficul-

ties with peace and the rule of law and thereby with the interests of all nations. We are resolved to do everything in our power to achieve this objective. We are also ready to support any initiative to this end, such as that of the Islamic conference. And we shall support every effort designed to contribute to the political independence and to the security of the states of the region.

Those governments represented at this meeting which have taken a position against attendance at the Olympic Games vigorously reaffirm their positions.

Taking of Diplomatic Hostages

Gravely concerned by recent incidents of terrorism involving the taking of hostages and attacks on diplomatic and consular premises and personnel, the heads of state and government reaffirm their determination to deter and combat such acts. They note the completion of work on the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages and call on all states to consider becoming parties to it as well as to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons of 1973.

The heads of state and government vigorously condemn the taking of hostages and the seizure of diplomatic and consular premises and personnel in contravention of the basic norms of international law and practice. The heads of state and government consider necessary that all governments should adopt policies which will contribute to the attainment of this goal and to take appropriate measures to deny terrorists any benefits from such criminal acts. They also resolve to provide to one another's diplomatic and consular missions support and assistance in situations involving the seizure of diplomatic and consular establishments or personnel.

The heads of state and government recall that every state has the duty under international law to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting, or participating in terrorist acts in another state or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed toward the commission of such acts and deplore in the strongest terms any breach of this duty.

Refugees

The heads of state and government are deeply concerned at the plight of the ever-increasing number of refugees throughout the world. Hundreds of

thousands have already left the Indo-Chinese Peninsula and Cuba, many of them taking the risk of fleeing across the open seas. Pakistan and Iran have received almost 1 million refugees from Afghanistan. In Africa refugees number several millions.

The heads of state and government note with great regret that the refugee population continues to grow and that, despite major international relief efforts, their suffering continues. They pay tribute to the generosity and forbearance with which countries in the regions affected have received refugees. For their part, the countries represented at this summit have already responded substantially to appeals for assistance to and resettlement of refugees. They will continue to do so, but their resources are not unlimited. They appeal to others to join with them in helping to relieve this suffering.

But however great the effort of the international community, it will be difficult to sustain it indefinitely. The problem of refugees has to be attacked at its root. The heads of state and government, therefore, make a vigorous appeal to the Governments responsible for it to remove the causes of this widespread human tragedy and not to pursue policies which drive large numbers of their people from their own countries.

The heads of state and government expressed their satisfaction at the broad support of the international community for the principles set out in the Bonn declaration of July 1978 as well as in the international conventions dealing with unlawful interference with civil aviation. The increasing adherence to these conventions and the responsible attitude taken by states with respect to air-hijacking reflect the fact that these principles are being accepted by the international community as a whole.

The heads of state and government emphasize that hijacking remains a threat to international civil aviation and that there can be no relaxation of efforts to combat this threat. To this end they look forward to continuing cooperation with all other governments.

Hijacking

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* Prime Minister Cossiga of Italy, chairman of the conference, issued these statements to the press on behalf of the conference participants. As printed here, they follow the text of the English translation made available by the White House; they were not issued as White House press releases.

ties, and we must, of course, step up our cooperation with these nations.

In our relationship with the developing nations, we need long-term basic strategy; that is, we in the West need it. For Japan, we have, for some time, been emphasizing increased food production and building of better human resources for improving human skills and also development of energy resources in developing nations. On these matters, too, I'm glad we have had good discussions in the present summit.

For some time to come, in all of our respective nations, we will, I expect, continue to have difficult domestic economic situations, particularly on unemployment and recession respects. Nevertheless, we must resist any protectionist pressure resolutely and squarely. And on that, too, we have seen convergence of opinion and consensus. Not only for this present generation but for our future generations, we must prove that our free democratic economies are, indeed, viable and strong. We must make every effort to demonstrate that, I believe.

Finally, may I say that we are very favorably impressed by this city of Venice. We regret our stay has been too short—only for 2 days—and too full of meetings, leaving us very little time to enjoy the beautiful sights of Venice. We think we have to come back in a more leisurely way if possible. I personally hope to bring my wife to Venice.

To the government of Italy and the municipal authorities of Venice and to all the citizens of Venice and to the en-

tire population, friendly people of Italy, and to the host government which has been most courteous, warm, and considerate for successful management of the meeting, and to the most smooth chairmanship of Prime Minister Cossiga, I would like to express our deep appreciation.

Finally, for the end of my statement, I would like to say that at the beginning of yesterday's session, I mentioned that our seven nations are fellow passengers in the same gondola, we are riding in the same gondola. And this is the feeling that I have, once again, most strongly as I leave here.

President Jenkins

The central message of this summit meeting, in my view, has been that the stability of the world economy depends on all countries recognizing their mutual needs and accepting their mutual responsibilities.

The problem faced by the seven major industrial countries and the European Community, as such, cannot be separated from those of the world as a whole. For this reason, I greatly welcome the way in which at this summit we looked beyond the frontiers of the industrial countries and our own difficulties to the problems which concern the greater part of mankind.

No outside industrial country is so closely linked to the developing world as is the European Community. Our interest is closely joined to theirs. The disequilibrium between rich and poor is tolerable to neither; both are deeply

vulnerable. The devastating impact of oil price rises on developing countries without oil of their own causes deficits which could not only deepen and prolong the existing recession but could touch the very vitals of our economic and monetary system.

On trade, the Tokyo Round has been a battle won, but not the war. We still face a protectionist threat which could cause major and lasting damage to the trading system on which our jobs and our standard of living depend.

Here at Venice we have looked realistically at these problems. We tried to see our way forward into the somber decade of the 1980s. We isolated some of the policies which should guide us and looked, as has been rightly said by Prime Minister Trudeau, with cautious optimism at the major changes which will be necessary. Above all, we recognized the common dangers and common interests which should bind the world together.

Mr. President of the Council, I thank you for your outstanding chairmanship, and I thank the Italian Government and the people of Venice for their unforgettable hospitality.

DECLARATION, JUNE 23, 1980

I. Introduction

1. In this, our first meeting of the 1980s, the economic issues that have dominated our thoughts are the price and supply of energy and the implications for inflation and the level of economic activity in our own countries and for the world as a whole. Unless we can deal with the problems of energy, we cannot cope with other problems.

2. Successive large increases in the price of oil, bearing no relation to market conditions and culminating in the recent decisions by some members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) at Algiers, have produced the possibility of even higher inflation and the imminent threat of severe recession and unemployment in the industrialized countries. At the same time they have undermined and in some cases virtually destroyed the prospects for growth in the developing countries. We believe that these consequences are increasingly coming to be appreciated by some of the oil exporting countries. The fact is that the industrialized countries of the free world, the producing countries, and the non-oil developing countries depend upon each other for the realization of their potential for economic development and prosperity. Each can overcome the obstacles to its

Energy Consumption Trends

Energy consumption (thousand b/d oil equivalent)	1970-73	1974-75	1976	1977	1978	1979
United States	34,291	34,970	36,323	37,240	38,098	38,034
Japan	6,340	7,029	7,080	7,205	7,300	7,754
West Germany	5,028	5,092	5,329	5,295	5,533	5,860
France	3,363	3,550	3,645	3,677	3,690	3,790
United Kingdom	4,417	4,211	4,200	4,286	4,334	4,500
Italy	2,601	2,728	2,840	2,875	2,858	NA
Canada	3,496	3,867	3,930	4,067	4,196	4,315
Energy consumption per capita (gallons per year oil equivalent)						
United States	2,530	2,520	2,588	2,633	2,674	2,647
Japan	913	972	962	970	974	1,025
West Germany	1,255	1,260	1,328	1,322	1,383	1,468
France	1,002	1,034	1,056	1,062	1,062	1,086
United Kingdom	1,216	1,155	1,152	1,176	1,189	1,236
Italy	735	752	775	781	773	NA
Canada	2,469	2,627	2,619	2,678	2,737	2,789

NA—not available.

development, but only if all work together, with the interests of all in mind.

3. In this spirit we have discussed the problems that confront us in the coming decade. We are confident in the ability of our democratic societies, based on individual freedom and social solidarity, to meet these challenges. There are no quick, easy solutions; sustained efforts are needed to achieve a better future.

Inflation

The reduction of inflation is our immediate top priority and will benefit all nations. Inflation retards growth and harms all sectors of our societies. Determined fiscal and monetary restraint is required to break inflationary expectations. Continuous dialogue among the social partners is needed for this purpose. We must reach effective international coordination to carry out this policy of restraint, and also guard against the threat of growing unemployment and worldwide recession.

5. We are also committed to encouraging investment and innovation, so as to increase productivity, to fostering the movement of resources from declining into expanding sectors so as to provide new job opportunities, and to promoting the most effective use of resources within and among countries. This will require shifting resources from government spending to the private sector and from consumption to investment, and avoiding or carefully limiting actions that shelter particular industries or sectors from the rigors of adjustment. Measures of this kind may be economically and politically difficult in the short term, but they are essential to sustained non-inflationary growth and to increasing employment which is our major goal.

6. In shaping economic policy, we need a better understanding of the long-term effects of global population growth, industrial expansion and economic development generally. A study of trends in these areas is in hand, and our representatives will keep these matters under review.

Energy

7. We must break the existing link between economic growth and consumption of oil, if we mean to do so in this decade. This strategy requires conserving oil and substantially increasing production and use of alternative energy sources. To this end, maximum reliance should be placed on the price mechanism, and domestic prices for oil should take into account representative world prices. Market forces should be supplemented, where appropriate, by effective fiscal incentives and administrative measures. Energy investment will contribute substantially to economic growth and employment.

8. We welcome the recent decisions of the European Community (EC), the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and

Selected Domestic Economic Trends

	1970-73	1974-75	1976	1977	1978	1979
Real GNP growth (average annual rate, %)						
United States	3.5	-1.4	5.9	5.3	4.4	2.3
Japan	9.1	0.6	6.5	5.4	6.0	5.9
West Germany	4.4	-0.7	5.3	2.6	3.5	4.4
France	4.8	1.8	5.2	2.8	3.6	3.2
United Kingdom	3.7	-1.2	3.6	0.9	3.1	0.6
Italy	4.1	0.5	5.9	2.0	2.6	5.0
Canada	5.7	2.4	5.4	2.4	3.4	2.9
Industrial production growth (average annual rate, %)						
United States	4.0	-4.6	10.7	5.9	5.8	4.1
Japan	9.5	-7.6	11.1	4.1	6.3	8.3
West Germany	4.5	-4.2	7.3	2.6	2.7	5.3
France	5.8	-2.0	8.0	1.9	0.9	4.5
United Kingdom	2.4	-4.4	2.2	3.8	3.7	2.7
Italy	5.0	-2.6	12.4	1.1	2.0	6.5
Canada	5.9	-1.4	5.6	3.3	5.7	4.2
Consumer price inflation (average annual rate, %)						
United States	4.9	10.1	5.7	6.5	7.7	11.3
Japan	6.9	16.1	8.4	7.3	4.2	3.2
West Germany	5.3	6.5	4.5	3.7	2.7	4.1
France	6.1	12.6	9.6	9.5	9.3	10.8
United Kingdom	8.0	20.0	16.6	15.8	8.3	13.4
Italy	6.5	18.1	16.7	18.4	12.1	15.7
Canada	4.6	10.8	7.5	8.0	8.9	9.2
Unemployment rate (annual average % of labor force)						
United States	5.3	7.0	7.7	7.0	6.0	5.8
Japan	1.3	1.6	2.0	2.0	2.2	2.1
West Germany	0.8	3.2	4.0	4.0	3.8	3.3
France	1.6	3.0	4.2	4.7	5.2	6.0
United Kingdom	2.8	3.0	4.9	5.3	5.2	5.0
Italy	4.8	4.5	5.1	7.2	7.2	7.7
Canada	5.9	6.1	7.1	8.1	8.4	7.5

Development (OECD) regarding the need for long term structural changes to reduce oil consumption, continuing procedures to monitor progress, the possible use of oil ceilings to deal with tight market conditions and coordination of stock policies to mitigate the effect of market disruption. We note that the member countries of the IEA have agreed that their energy policies should result in their collective 1985 net oil imports being substantially less than their existing 1985 group objective, and that they will quantify the reduction as part of their continuing monitoring efforts. The potential for reduction has been estimated by the IEA Secretariat, given existing uncertainties, at around 4 million barrels a day (MBD).

9. To conserve oil in our countries:

- We are agreed that no new base-load, oil-fired generating capacity should be constructed, save in exceptional circumstances, and that the conversion of oil-fired capacity to other fuels should be accelerated.

- We will increase efforts, including fiscal incentives where necessary, to accelerate the substitution of oil in industry.

- We will encourage oil saving investments in residential and commercial buildings, where necessary by financial incentives and by establishing insulation standards. We look to the public sector to set an example.

- In transportation, our objective is the introduction of increasingly fuel efficient vehicles. The demand of consumers and competition among manufacturers are already leading in this direction. We will accelerate this progress, where appropriate, by arrangements or standards for improved automobile fuel efficiency, by gasoline pricing and taxation decisions, by research and development and by making public transport more attractive.

10. We must rely on fuels other than oil to meet the energy needs of future economic growth. This will require early, resolute, and wide-ranging actions. Our potential to increase the supply and use of energy sources other than oil over the next

ten years is estimated at the equivalent of 15-20 MBD of oil. We intend to make a coordinated and vigorous effort to realise this potential. To this end, we will seek a large increase in the use of coal and enhanced use of nuclear power in the medium-term, and a substantial increase in production of synthetic fuels, in solar energy and other sources of renewable energy over the longer term.

11. We shall encourage the exploration and development of our indigenous hydrocarbon resources in order to secure maximum production on a long term basis.

12. Together we intend to double coal production and use by early 1990. We will encourage long term commitments by coal producers and consumers. It will be necessary to improve infrastructures in both exporting and importing countries, as far as is economically justified, to ensure the required supply and use of coal. We look forward to the recommendations of the International Coal Industry Advisory Board. They will be considered promptly. We are conscious of the environmental risks associated with increased coal production and combustion. We will do everything in our power to ensure that increased use of fossil fuels, especially coal, does not damage the environment.

13. We underline the vital contribution of nuclear power to a more secure energy supply. The role of nuclear energy has to be increased if world energy needs are to be met. We shall therefore have to expand our nuclear generating capacity. We will continue to give the highest priority to ensuring the health and safety of the public and to perfecting methods for dealing with spent fuels and disposal of nuclear waste. We reaffirm the importance of ensuring the reliable supply of nuclear fuel and minimizing the risk of nuclear proliferation.

14. The studies made by the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation Group, launched at the London Summit in 1977, are a significant contribution to the use of nuclear energy. We welcome their findings with respect to: increasing predictable supplies; the most effective utilization of uranium sources, including the development of advanced technologies; and the minimization of proliferation risks, including support of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. We urge all countries to take these findings into account when developing policies and programmes for the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

15. We will actively support the recommendations of the International Energy Technology Group, proposed at the Tokyo Summit last year, for bringing new energy technologies into commercial use at the earliest feasible time. As far as national programmes are concerned, we will by mid-1981 adopt a two-phased approach; first, listing the numbers and types of commercial scale plants to be constructed in each of our countries by the mid-1980s, and, second, indicating quantitative projections for expanding production by 1990,

1995 and 2000, as a basis for future actions. As far as international programmes are concerned, we will join others in creating an international team to promote collaboration among interested nations on specific projects.

16. A high level group of representatives of our countries and of the EEC Commission will review periodically the results achieved in these fields.

17. Our comprehensive energy strategy is designed to meet the requirements of the coming decade. We are convinced that it can reduce the demand for energy, particularly oil, without hampering economic growth. By carrying out this strategy we expect that, over the coming decade, the ratio between increases in collective energy consumption and economic growth of our countries will be reduced to about 0.6, that the share of oil in our total energy demand will be reduced from 53 percent now to about 40 percent by 1990, and that our collective consumption of oil in 1990 will be significantly below present levels so as to permit a balance between supply and demand at tolerable prices.

18. We continue to believe that international cooperation in energy is essential. All countries have a vital interest in a stable equilibrium between energy supply and

demand. We would welcome a constructive dialogue on energy and related issues between energy producers and consumers in order to improve the coherence of their policies.

IV. Relations With Developing Countries

19. We are deeply concerned about the impact of the oil price increases on the developing countries that have to import. The increase in oil prices in the last two years has more than doubled the oil bill these countries, which now amounts to over \$50 billion. This will drive them to ever increasing indebtedness, and put at risk the whole basis of their economic growth and social progress, unless something can be done to help them.

20. We approach in a positive spirit the prospect of global negotiations in the framework of the United Nations and the formulation of a new International Development Strategy. In particular, our object is to cooperate with the developing countries in energy conservation and development, expansion of exports, enhancement of human skills and the tackling of underlying food and population problems.

Oil Import Trends

	1970-73	1974-75	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
Net oil imports (thousand b/d)							
United States	4,351	5,857	7,072	8,565	8,002	7,939	8,199
Japan	4,763	5,190	5,229	5,446	5,331	5,625	5,919
West Germany	2,707	2,488	2,675	2,639	2,724	2,837	2,919
France	2,241	2,284	2,349	2,219	2,206	2,410	2,499
United Kingdom	2,108	2,015	1,660	1,093	872	436	NA
Italy	2,147	1,962	1,963	1,936	1,980	2,014	2,014
Canada	(³)	(³)	110	188	199	224	224
Net oil imports (billion U.S. \$)							
United States ⁴	4.5	24.9	32.2	42.4	39.5	56.7	61.7
Japan	4.4	20.8	23.2	25.7	25.5	38.0	41.9
West Germany	3.2	11.0	12.9	13.6	14.7	24.5	27.5
France	2.4	9.5	11.2	11.2	11.5	16.2	18.2
United Kingdom	2.5	8.4	7.8	5.4	4.4	2.3	NA
Italy	1.8	7.7	8.0	8.4	8.7	11.9	11.9
Canada	(³)	(³)	1.0	1.4	1.6	1.9	1.9
Net oil imports as a share of energy consumption (%)							
United States	12.7	16.7	19.5	23.0	21.0	20.9	20.9
Japan	75.1	73.8	73.6	75.0	73.0	72.5	72.5
West Germany	53.8	48.9	50.2	49.8	49.2	48.4	48.4
France	66.6	64.3	64.4	60.3	58.0	61.7	61.7
United Kingdom	47.7	47.9	39.5	25.5	20.3	9.7	NA
Italy	82.5	71.9	69.1	67.3	66.8	NA	NA
Canada	(³)	(³)	2.8	4.6	4.7	5.2	5.2

NA—not available.

¹ Net oil import target pledge.

² Includes territories.

³ Net exporter.

⁴ Gross oil import bill.

21. A major international effort to help the countries increase their energy production is required. We believe that this is gaining ground among oil-exporting countries. We ask the World Bank to examine the adequacy of the resources and mechanisms now in place for the exploration, development and production of conventional and renewable energy sources in oil importing developing countries, to consider means, including the possibility of establishing a new affiliate or facility by which it might improve and increase its financing programmes for energy assistance, to explore its findings with both oil-exporting and industrial countries.

22. We are deeply conscious that extreme poverty and chronic malnutrition affect hundreds of millions of people of developing countries. The first requirement for these countries is to improve their ability to feed themselves and reduce their dependence on food imports. We are ready to work with them and the International Agency concerned in their comprehensive long-term strategies to increase food production and to help improve national as well as international research services. We will support and, where appropriate, supplement initiatives of the World Bank and of the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and to improve grain storage and handling facilities. We underline the importance of wider membership of the Food Aid Convention so as to secure at least 10 million tons of food aid annually and an equitable replenishment of the International Fund for Agricultural Development.

23. High priority should be given to efforts to cope with population growth and existing United Nations and other programmes for supporting these efforts.

24. We strongly support the general increase of the World Bank, increases in the funding of the regional development banks, and the sixth replenishment of the International Development Association. We would welcome an increase in the rate of lending of these institutions, within the limits of their present replenishments, as needed to fulfill the programmes described above. It is essential that all members, especially the major donors, provide their full contributions on the agreed schedule.

25. We welcome the report of the Brundt Commission. We shall carefully consider its recommendations.

26. The democratic industrialised countries cannot alone carry the responsibility of aid and other different contributions to developing countries: it must be equitably shared by the oil-exporting countries and the industrialised Communist countries. The Personal Representatives are instructed to review aid policies and procedures and other contributions to developing countries and to report back their conclusions to the next Summit.

V. Monetary Problems

27. The situation created by large oil-generated payments imbalances, in particular those of oil-importing developing countries, requires a combination of determined actions by all countries to promote external adjustment and effective mechanisms for balance of payments financing. We look to the international capital market to continue to play the primary role in rechanneling the substantial oil surplus funds on the basis of sound lending standards. We support the work in progress by our monetary authorities and the Bank for International Settlements designed to improve the supervision and security of the international banking system. The private banks could usefully supplement these efforts.

28. Private lending will need to be supplemented by an expanded role for international institutions, especially the International Monetary Fund (IMF). We are committed to implementing the agreed increase in the IMF quotas, and to supporting appropriate borrowing by the Fund, if needed to meet financing requirements of its members. We encourage the IMF to seek ways in which it could, within its guidelines on conditionality, make it more attractive for countries with financing problems to use its resources. In particular, we support the IMF's examination of possible ways to reduce charges on credits to low-income developing countries. The IMF and the World Bank should work closely together in responding to these problems. We welcome the Bank's innovative lending scheme for structural adjustment. We urge oil-exporting countries to increase their direct lending to countries with financial problems thus reducing the strain on other recycling mechanisms.

29. We reaffirm our commitment to stability in the foreign exchange markets. We note that the European Monetary System (EMS) has contributed to this end. We will continue close cooperation in exchange market policies so as to avoid disorderly exchange rate fluctuations. We will also cooperate with the IMF to achieve more effective surveillance. We support continuing examination by the IMF of arrangements to provide for a more balanced evolution of the world reserve system.

VI. Trade

30. We are resolved further to strengthen the open world trading system. We will resist pressures for protectionist actions, which can only be self-defeating and aggravate inflation.

31. We endorse the positive conclusion of the multilateral trade negotiations, and commit ourselves to early and effective implementation. We welcome the participation of some of our developing partners in the new non-tariff codes and call upon others to participate. We also call for the full participation of as many countries as possible in strengthening the system of the

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. We urge the more advanced of our developing partners gradually to open their markets over the coming decade.

32. We reaffirm our determination to avoid a harmful export credit race. To this end we shall work with the other participants to strengthen the International Arrangement on Export Credits, with a view to reaching a mutually acceptable solution covering all aspects of the Arrangement by 1 December 1980. In particular, we shall seek to bring its terms closer to current market conditions and reduce distortions in export competition, recognising the differentiated treatment of developing countries in the Arrangement.

33. As a further step in strengthening the international trading system, we commit our governments to work in the United Nations toward an agreement to prohibit illicit payments to foreign government officials in international business transactions. If that effort falters, we will seek to conclude an agreement among our countries, but open to all, with the same objective.

VII. Conclusions

34. The economic message from this Venice Summit is clear. The key to success in resolving the major economic challenges which the world faces is to achieve and maintain a balance between energy supply and demand at reasonable levels and at tolerable prices. The stability of the world economy, on which the prosperity of every individual country relies, depends upon all of the countries concerned, recognising their mutual needs and accepting their mutual responsibilities. Those among us whose countries are members of the European Community intend to make their efforts within this framework. We, who represent seven large industrialised countries of the free world, are ready to tackle our own problems with determination and to work with others to meet the challenges of the coming decade, to our own advantage and to the benefit of the whole world.

¹Texts from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of June 30, 1980, which also includes the President's and Chancellor Schmidt's exchange with reporters in Venice on June 21, the President's exchange with reporters following the first two summit sessions on June 22, and the President's interview with reporters at the conclusion of the summit on June 23. The text of President Carter's remarks on departure from the United States on June 19 are printed in the Weekly Compilation of June 23.

²Made at the Sala Degli Arazzi at the Cini Foundation. Prime Minister Cossiga, President Giscard d'Estaing, Chancellor Schmidt, and Foreign Minister Okita spoke in their native languages, and their remarks were translated by interpreters. The other participants spoke in English.

³Due to a failure in transmission, this transcript does not include the first portion of Prime Minister Thatcher's statement. ■

Visit to Rome

President Carter left Washington, D.C., June 19, 1980, for a state visit to Rome June 19-21, before participating in the seven-nation economic summit meeting in Venice (see page 1).

Following are the toasts exchanged at a state dinner and the text of the joint press statement.¹

DINNER TOASTS, JUNE 20, 1980²

President Pertini

I am particularly happy to welcome you, Mrs. Carter, and your entourage on your first visit to Italy, which falls at a particularly delicate and difficult moment in international affairs and on the eve of the Venice summit. Public opinion in our countries looks to this opportunity for obtaining an unambiguous and reassuring answer to the problems and uncertainties which lie before us.

Although at many similar occasions and meetings in the past we have sought to emphasize how numerous and how close are the traditional ties which unite our two peoples and nations, permit me to once again recall our substantial convergence of views.

The ties of friendship between Italy and the United States are deep-rooted and immutable and extend back through history to one of my fellow countrymen who opened up the frontier with the New World. This long history tells of the irresistible passage of men and ideas across the vastness of the ocean.

I am thinking now of the influence that the American Revolution had on movements for Italian unification and independence, the political and cultural interaction between Italy and the United States in the first half of the 19th century, which witnessed the first mass emigration of Italian labor to the United States, particularly from the most depressed areas of the Italian south. From that emigration a whole group of your countrymen originated, those of Italian extraction who made their mark through their hard work, tenacity, patience, and affection, both for their country of adoption and their distant motherland in the Old World.

Nor can we Italians forget that at the darkest hour in our national history—and not ours alone—there came from the United States the deci-

sive intervention against fascism and nazism, the moral support and the economic aid which permitted our ravaged and exhausted country to rebuild and regain its place within the international community.

Casting my mind back to our struggle, I am bound to recall that noble message which Franklin Delano Roosevelt delivered to the U.S. Congress in the wartime winter of 1944. His conception of liberty was the same for which we were fighting—we Italian patriots in the mountains, towns, and cities—and it was for this same liberty that the European resistance and the Allies fought. It was a total political and social conception of liberty which remains today the fundamental value for which we and our two countries are still fighting today.

I want now to take two quotations from that Roosevelt speech on which we all should meditate.

This Republic had its beginning, and grew to its present strength, under the protection of certain inalienable political rights—among them the right of free speech, free press, free worship, trial by jury, freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. They were our rights to life and liberty.

This great President then finalized this idea with these words.

We have come to a clear realization of the fact that true individual freedom cannot exist without economic security and independence. Necessitous men are not free men. People who are hungry and out of a job are the stuff of which dictatorships are made. In our day these economic truths have become accepted as self-evident. We have accepted, so to speak, a second Bill of Rights under which a new basis of security and prosperity can be established for all—regardless of station, race or creed.

This conception of liberty should be championed and consistently safeguarded in the international order also, in relations between all peoples, with the developing countries and with the Third World, which has so great a need for help from the industrialized nations to resolve the frequently life-and-death alternatives which encroach on all sides.

While I speak, millions of human beings are fighting against hunger. In 1979, 18 million children in the world died of malnutrition. This slaughter of the innocents is a condemnation which weighs heavily on the consciences of every statesman—and I am no exception. To resolve these agonizing problems means to strengthen that liberty

proclaimed in the noble words of President Roosevelt.

To defend this liberty intact and indivisible, the United States has two set foot on the old continent; these two memorable landings I myself lived through during the First and Second World Wars. And the gravestones recalling those American soldiers who laid down their lives that Europe might be free remain an everlasting monument to the defense of liberty.

These men, indeed, died for Europe's freedom, since the United States was not drawn to Europe by desire for conquest but only the firm resolution to stem the rising tide of authoritarian regimes. These men—I repeat—came to defend our liberty.

Italy is committed to a policy of dialogue and detente in its awareness the need for contacts which foster an understanding of the stances adopted by others and make its own position understood; this in the conviction that detente is the only possible way forward if a dangerous and complex spirit is to be avoided in international relations. Only an overall climate able to contribute to the maintenance of relations of friendship and confidence can effectively place relations between states in a framework within which elements of opposition and controversy can be settled and their causes progressively reduced.

This is the spirit which inspires participation in the Atlantic alliance, just as this is also the spirit which guides our staunch commitment to the creation of a politically unified Europe. Both these undertakings seem the surest means of removing the threats to peace, reducing tension, and achieving all those essential conditions for the peaceful and harmonious development of our peoples.

It is, nevertheless, necessary, particularly at a time when the future is overshadowed with uncertainties, to succeed in expressing that Western solidarity to which we refer. This solidarity must, therefore, be translated into concerted and united positions on the major problems which confront us. If, indeed, a lesson can be learned from the analysis of the present political situation and outlook, it is surely the need—or urgency, rather—to strengthen ties, to create new forms of consultation and cooperation, in common recognition of the commitment which makes all of us equally indispensable to collective security.

It is for these reasons that we feel profound solidarity and sympathy with the feelings of the people of the United States and for the stand taken by the Government over the distressing case of the Tehran hostages. I personally understand the agony of your thoughts: to be forced to adopt ambivalent caution to avoid a global conflict. I have often asked myself what would have happened if the hostages had been of some other nationality. I am proud to have been the first to express full solidarity with you and to dispatch a firm message to the Tehran authorities.

Our support of a friendly nation is at this time inspired above all by concern for what is needed to resolve as quickly as possible a situation of emergency which has been so brutally thrown. These events risk involvement in that overall climate of international tensions in the overthrow of rules which traditionally govern relations between states, when it is that climate which is the cornerstone of the very existence of states founded on the rule of law.

For these same reasons, Italy is opposed to any departure from the principle of constantly striving to safeguard the peace. In particular, Italy deploras the most serious departure currently witnessed in Afghanistan. This, in itself, jeopardizes not only local equilibrium but also the general principles governing coexistence between peoples.

Yet again, therefore, we voice our protest against the brutal invasion of that country. With our own memories of the struggle against foreign powers which occupied and oppressed our country, we send out from this place, which is today honored by your presence, a message of brotherly solidarity to the Afghan patriots who heroically pursuing their struggle against the invader. It would be cowardice to resign ourselves to the criminal act which has been committed, and cowardice is the main enemy not of peace but also of democracy.

The task of defending peace and democracy in the world must be a common task. Europe must take its own responsibility for this onerous task if it is to survive; this responsibility can valuably be undertaken by Europe to the degree to which the continent can succeed in achieving its unity. But this unity will never be obtained unless we learn to put aside our egotism and individual interests and permit the admission of nations such as Spain and Portugal to the European Community.



(White House photo by Karl Schumacher)

President and Mrs. Carter with President Pertini in the Sala D'Ercole in Quirinale Palace in Rome. The interpreter is between the two Presidents.

I still vividly recall my recent visit to Spain. This nation, which has without bloodshed made the transition from a long dictatorship to democracy, is today totally committed to its social and economic rebirth under the guidance of a young and wise sovereign.

A truly united Europe will never come into being while we continue to create restricted "executive boards," or worse, even more limited bodies. The nations of democratic Europe—all nations, without discriminations of any sort—must take their place with equal rights and equal obligations. Italy has shown that it can fulfill its obligation, but it intends to see its rights and, above all, its national dignity, properly safeguarded.

You are familiar with discriminations which have been practiced or attempted toward Italy. The United States has supported us, and for this we are grateful. Yet permit me, nevertheless, as a representative of Italy—this country to which I have dedicated my whole life—to lodge my protest.

These discriminations are senseless, because they do not take into consideration the strategic importance derived from the nation's geographical position. Italy is a democratic bridge uniting Europe with Africa and the Middle East, and in the alarming event that this bridge should be destroyed, not only would the Mediterranean area be destabilized but world peace itself placed in jeopardy. Moreover, the terrorism in our country is probably aimed at just this objective.

With equal rights and equal obligations for each member and without these absurd discriminations, European unity can be truly created. Then, and only then, Europe, which has been a battlefield for centuries, can become through its human, cultural, technological, and industrial potential a land of solidarity. A Europe on these lines could truly contribute to the strengthening and defense of world peace.

With these intentions and these remarks, I propose this toast to ever closer ties between Italy and the United States, to your own personal well-being and that of Mrs. Carter and all those present.

President Carter

It's a great honor for me to be here on a trip of great economic importance to our nation and also one of political and diplomatic significance to our two nations and also to the world.

My entire family has been here before me, and I have to admit that the best diplomat is not the one speaking to you. I remember when my mother arrived in Italy without any instructions from the diplomatic corps, she made three statements: First of all, she said she had always, through her entire life, wanted to meet the Pope; secondly, she congratulated Italy on choosing such a young President; and third she says, "I have never met an ugly Italian man." [Laughter.]

I learn a lot from these visits. One piece of advice that I've gotten from the President is that when I go to Spain, I

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should not go to bed too early but be sure to see the flamenco dancers, and I intend to take your advice, Mr. President.

You have a text before you, but I would like to say these words to you, because they are so important to us. We have a lot in common. In each of our lands, a democracy has been born. Each has struggled to achieve the balance of unity and liberty that lead free societies to the highest form of human government—self-government.

Freedom and human rights have no firmer friend in thought and action than President Pertini. For personal liberty and democracy in this country—his country—he paid the price through years of cruel imprisonment. In fact, I understand that in 1940 he was not released from prison as he legally had a right to be, because he was considered especially dangerous. And so he remains today: dangerous to anyone who would threaten to destroy or to diminish the liberty of an individual, the rights of a group, or the life or livelihood of free people.

As chief of state, he was foremost in his appeal to Iranian authorities—the

first of all—to release our diplomatic personnel from terrorists, and it gives me great pleasure on this personal occasion to express the gratitude which the American people and I feel for his unswerving support.

This morning, President Pertini and I discussed some of the central issues that are troubling world peace. Later I was able to discuss these questions with Prime Minister Cossiga, whose visit to Washington in January and whose presidency of the European Community have so deeply impressed us all.

Three basic ideas ran through our discussions today. The first is that the best possible policy for our countries, as we face a time of danger, change, and testing in the 1980s, is a policy that seeks both strong defense of national security and lasting world peace, for the plain truth is that the one is necessary to the other.

In decades past the West successfully resisted Soviet expansionism, both eastward and westward. Today we see the Soviet Union thrusting southward directly into Afghanistan and indirectly

through Vietnam and Cambodia. This represents a strategic challenge to the vital interests of the West and to the industrial democracies. We must face together. If we are firm in our resolve we will define a position from which we can encourage detente. If we fail, we will have allowed the strategic, political, and economic balance to be gravely altered in favor of totalitarianism.

A second belief we share is that we cannot defend our common heritage of freedom by arms alone. Our future—the future of our way of life—is equal dependent upon our ability to provide economic opportunity and social justice for all our citizens and to create a decent world environment in which freedom can survive and prosper. We must be careful thinkers and practical politicians in our approach to energy independence, inflation, developing nations, arms control, and peace in troubled regions, such as the Middle East.

The third basic idea that ran through our discussions today is that national security and world peace can only be achieved by maintaining a strong and united Atlantic alliance. Just as the best form of government is self-government, so the strongest cement of any alliance is free will. Our strength as an alliance of independent democracies is drawn both from our common traditions and our individual differences.

Let us not be afraid to confront directly and in full public view the most fundamental challenges of our alliance today. We've heard a great deal recently about the differences and the disagreements among the Western democracies. Some voices in my country and in Europe talk about disarray. Some pessimists view the debate among democratic nations as a signal of fatal weakness. They predict the decline of Western civilization, spreading pessimism, materialism, softness of will and diminishing confidence in ourselves and in our institutions.

Our experience and reality itself shows clearly that these self-styled realists are wrong. Our open and unrelenting grappling with economic and social problems cannot obscure the extraordinary achievements of our society as a whole. The democratic nations are magnets for young students from all over the world. The democratic world is a center of intellectual and technological invention. It's a great focus of cultural creativity. It's undergoing a major resurgence of religious belief, and our political institutions establish and exhibit a resilience unmatched by any society in the totalitarian world.

Italy—A Profile

Geography

Area: 116,303 sq. mi. (about the size of Georgia and Florida). **Capital:** Rome (pop. 2.6 million). **Other Cities:** Milan, Naples, Florence.

People

Population: 56.9 million (1979). **Annual Growth Rate:** 0.5% (1979). **Ethnic Groups:** Primarily Italian but small groups of German-, French-, Slovene-, and Albanian-Italians. **Religion:** Roman Catholic. **Language:** Italian. **Literacy:** 93%. **Life Expectancy:** 70 yrs.

Government

Official Name: Italian Republic. **Type:** Republic. **Independence:** June 2, 1946. **Date of Constitution:** Jan. 1, 1948. **Branches:** *Executive*—President (Chief of State), Council of Ministers (Cabinet) headed by the President of the Council (Prime Minister). *Legislative*—bicameral Parliament (630-member Chamber of Deputies and 322-member Senate). *Judicial*—Constitutional Court. **Political Parties:** Christian Democratic, Italian Communist, Italian Socialist, Italian Social Movement, Social Democratic, Republican, Liberal, Radical. **Suffrage:** Universal over 18. **Subdivisions:** 93 Provinces, 20 regions.

Economy

GDP: \$266 billion (1978). **Annual Growth Rate:** 2.6%. **Per Capita GNP:** \$5,620 (1979). **Inflation Rate Last 4 Yrs.:** 15.3%. **Natural Resources:** Fish, dwindling natural gas reserves. **Agriculture:** *Products*—wheat, rice, grapes, olives, citrus fruits. **Work Force**—15%. **Industries:** Automobiles, machinery, chemicals, textiles, shoes. **Trade:** *Exports*—\$72.2 billion (1979); machinery and transport equipment, textiles, foodstuffs, chemicals, footwear. *Imports*—\$47.6 billion (1977); machinery and transport equipment, foodstuffs, ferrous and nonferrous metals, wool, cotton, petroleum. **Partners**—F.R.G. (20%), France (16%), U.K. (5%), Benelux countries (7%), U.S. (7%), U.S.S.R. (3%). **Official Exchange Rate:** 830 lire = US\$1.00 (June 1980).

Membership in

International Organizations

U.N. and its specialized agencies, NATO, OECD, EC, Western European Union, Council of Europe, INTELSAT.

Principal Government Officials

Italy: President—Alessandro PERTINI, Prime Minister—Francesco COSSIGA, Minister of Foreign Affairs—Emilio COLOMBO, Ambassador to the U.S.—Paolo PANSA CEDRONIO, Ambassador to the U.N.—Umberto LA ROCCA. **United States:** Ambassador to Italy—Richard N. Gardner.

It is not from democracy that millions of refugees have fled since 1945. It is not to escape democracy that people have risked their lives in small boats in the high seas during recent weeks. It is not from democracy that nearly 10% of the people of an entire Asian nation have left their ancient homeland. And it is certainly not from democracy, but from foreign oppression, that hundreds of thousands—almost a million—of men, women, and children have now fled Afghanistan. These votes of fleet-footed millions are being cast—as the voices of millions more are being heard—for the deeply rooted faith that democracy is its unique dynamism: an underlying belief in the inalienable rights and dignity of human beings. Material accomplishments and cultural vitality alone cannot express the power of our spiritual heritage. Nor is the spirit of our society found simply in enterprise, the skills, or success of a people. The fundamental desire for democracy rises from the very center of the human heart and the human soul. That is why the echo of the unsilenced call for liberty is heard throughout the world. That call finds its voice in the negotiations assembling in Venice tomorrow.

Our faith in human rights—the freedom, the dignity, and the value of every individual—is the most compelling, revolutionary concept of our times. It has produced a level of economic progress and intellectual creativity unmatched by any other political philosophy or idea. We have no reason to fear change, new ideas, or new problems. We do not rely on military invasions by our belated friendly neighbors, much less terrorism, to sustain the idea of liberty. It stands on its own merit.

The search for freedom and democracy has spread throughout recent decades—in Spain, in Portugal, in Greece, in Africa, in Latin America. It is the genuine human voice of democracy that rings far more clearly than the shouting loudspeakers of authoritarian regimes.

But while liberty need not be imposed by force, we know all too well that once won, it must be defended. To quote from your statement, Mr. President: "... cowardice is the main enemy not only of peace but also of democracy." The search for peace demands strength, not weakness; firmness, not capitulation; pride, not arrogance. We do not seek to remake the world on the model of America or the West. We want the peoples of the world to decide their own destiny and to make their own

choices. We are confident, because history is on the side of freedom. Let there be no mistake about this: The West is not motivated by relentless hostility nor by a desire for indiscriminate confrontation nor a return to the cold war.

But for the Western alliance simply to accept foreign occupation and domination of Afghanistan as an accomplished fact would be a cynical signal to the world that could only encourage further aggression, further tension, and further danger to world peace. It is our responsibility to register in concrete terms our condemnation of the Soviet invasion for as long as that invasion continues.

We cannot know with certainty the motivations of the latest Soviet move, whether Afghanistan is the purpose or the prelude, but there can be no doubt that this invasion poses an increased threat to the independence of nations in the region and to the world's access to vital resources and to vital searoutes. The fact is that our democracies are dependent on oil supplies from a volatile region whose own security from internal divisions and from external threat is now in question. Unresolved, that security problem could change the way we live. Already it does touch directly or drastically the lives of all.

President Carter reads the bronze plaque commemorating former Italian Prime Minister Moro at the location in Rome where the Prime Minister's body was found in 1978 after he was assassinated.



(White House photo by Karl Schumacher)

But our interest in peace and stability in the region goes far beyond economics. In this ever more interdependent world, to assume that aggression need be met only when it occurs at one's own doorstep is to tempt new and very serious adventures.

Detente with the Soviets remains our goal, but detente must be built on a firm foundation of deterring aggression. The Soviets must understand that they cannot recklessly threaten world peace or still enjoy the benefits of cooperation while pursuing a policy of armed intervention. Above all, everyone must know that efforts cannot succeed to divide our alliance nor to lull us into a false belief that somehow America or Europe can be an island of detente while aggression is carried out elsewhere.

We recognize that our policy toward those who might threaten peace must be clear, it must be consistent, it must be comprehensible. There must be no room for any miscalculation. But let me be equally clear that the way to improved relations is open, and that is the path we prefer.

I'm confident that just as the American people want to sustain strong policies against Soviet aggression, they also want our strong efforts to continue at arms control. We know that the SALT II agreement can contribute directly to the security not only of the United States but of Europe and, indeed, of the entire world. It can help to restrain future arms competition, continue the historically important direction of nuclear arms limitation, and keep our faith that even the most dangerous differences can be resolved in a framework of cooperation. Especially now in this time of tension, observing the mutual constraints imposed by the treaty is in the best interest of every nation on Earth.

Therefore, I intend to honor the object and purpose of the treaty as long as the Soviet Union, as observed by us, does the same. I will remain in close consultation with our Congress with the goal of seeking the ratification of SALT II at the earliest opportune time.

Further, if the decade of the 1980s is not to become the decade of violence, we must work with our friends on renewed efforts to stabilize all aspects of arms competition and to widen the scope of arms control agreements.

In sum, I do not accept forecasts of weakness or failure for democracy in the world. Our societies, our values, our freedoms will decline only if we allow them to do so; only if we surren-

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der to uncertainty about where we stand and in what we believe; only if we forget that each nation and each individual share a responsibility to pull together and defend those common beliefs which unite us—and I am convinced that none of us will ever surrender nor forget.

Just as within each democracy we must work to nourish the spirit of community which alone can make the whole of a nation larger than the sum of its parts, so within the alliance of free nations it is equally true that unless we work together we shall surely be vulnerable separately.

I pledge America's own unswerving commitment to our common interest of security and peace, and we depend on our European friends and allies to join us in that effort. Together we can and will defend the values and interests of our society. Historical experience counsels such a course. Present circumstances compel it.

It is in this spirit of alliance and partnership that I ask you to join me in a toast. If you would please rise. To President Pertini, to the traditions of two great nations that are at once parallel and intertwined, and to the unbreakable spirit of freedom, friendship, and the love of human life that will forever join our countries and our people.

JOINT PRESS STATEMENT, JUNE 20, 1980

At the invitation of the President of the Italian Republic Sandro Pertini, the President of the United States of America, Jimmy Carter, paid a state visit to Rome June 19-21. The visit provided an opportunity for the two Presidents to have a productive exchange of views. Constructive meetings were also held between President Carter and the President of the Council of Ministers, Francesco Cossiga. The meetings were also attended by Minister of Foreign Affairs Emilio Colombo and Secretary of State Edmund Muskie.

The two sides noted with satisfaction the extremely close relations between the United States and Italy which are based on longstanding ties of friendship and kinship, a common commitment to democratic values, and on ties which derive from the membership of the two countries in the Atlantic alliance. In the course of the discussions, an exchange of views was held on key international issues of particular con-

cern to both governments; these included the crisis in Afghanistan, the Middle East situation, the grave problem of the illegal detention of the hostages in Iran, and U.S.-Italian cooperation for the promotion of security and peace. President Carter expressed appreciation for the constructive role played by Prime Minister Cossiga, in his capacity as President of the European Community for the current term.

The international situation created by the Soviet Union's armed intervention and continuing occupation of Afghanistan was examined in depth. It was agreed that this Soviet action, taken in flagrant violation of the U.N. Charter, constitutes a threat to peace, poses a grave challenge to the West and to its interests in Southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf, and that it has created a serious obstacle to the continuation of the process of detente.

As a result of this assessment, both sides view as indispensable a comprehensive Western political strategy designed to make clear to the Soviet Union by the application of tangible measures the necessity of a prompt and complete withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan.

In line with that view, the two sides welcomed the concerted steps which NATO is now pursuing in order to strengthen the common defense in response to the strategic challenge faced by all the Western allies. The two governments confirmed their commitment to the earliest possible fulfillment of the goals embodied in NATO's Long-Term Defense Program. Both sides recognized that increased European attention to security requirements within the NATO treaty area assumes even greater urgency because of U.S. commitment of resources toward building a security framework in the region of Southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf.

President Carter and Prime Minister Cossiga expressed their satisfaction with the NATO decision to pursue the complementary objectives of arms control and the deployment of theater nuclear forces. President Carter reiterated his admiration for Prime Minister Cossiga's leadership in this effort. Prime Minister Cossiga reaffirmed Italy's active support to implement the NATO offer of December 12, 1979, inviting the Soviet Union to begin negotiations on the limitation of long-range theater nuclear weapons systems.

President Carter expressed his own appreciation and that of the entire American people for Italy's support of

the international effort to secure the release of the American hostages held by Iran in violation of international and universally accepted standards of decency. It was stressed that the principle of the rule of law, vital to the health and stability of the world community, is at stake in this crisis. The conviction was also expressed that the release of the hostages constitutes a precondition for reestablishing the international prestige of Iran and for the resumption of mutually beneficial relations with its government, including the revocation of economic sanctions.

Turning to other questions of common interest, President Carter reiterated the U.S. commitment for a comprehensive peace in the Middle East including the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. He reaffirmed his belief that the Camp David accords continue to provide the soundest framework for building on significant progress which has already been achieved toward ending the decades of bitterness and conflict in the Middle East.

President Cossiga expressed Italy's full agreement with the objective of a comprehensive and durable peace with justice for all, for Israel as well as for the Arab countries and for the Palestinian people. This objective is shared by the United States. It is also endorsed by the countries of the European Community and was reaffirmed in the June 13 declaration of the European Council in Venice.

In the context of the efforts designed to achieve this objective he expressed the hope that significant progress could be made in the implementation of all aspects of the agreement reached at Camp David, thanks to the personal and courageous commitment of President Carter.

Both sides reaffirmed their commitment to work toward detente, based on principles of reciprocity and mutual restraint. They agreed that detente can be achieved only on condition that its comprehensive and indivisible character is acknowledged as indispensable.

An exchange of views on the agenda of the Venice summit to be held June 22-23 followed. President Carter expressed his appreciation for the extensive preparations which Italy, as host, has made on behalf of the several industrialized democracies which will participate in the summit.

The two sides agreed on the need for closer consultations among the industrialized democracies to formulate a comprehensive strategy based on

Meeting With His Holiness, Pope John Paul II

While in Rome President Carter paid a courtesy call on His Holiness, Pope John Paul II, at the Vatican on June 21, 1980. Following is an exchange of remarks they made on that occasion.¹

EXCHANGE OF REMARKS, JUNE 21, 1980²

President Carter

Your Holiness, as happy as I was to welcome you as the first Pope to visit in the White House, I'm equally happy today to be welcomed by you to your ancient and holy city.

Like millions before me, I'm moved by the beautiful works of Michelangelo, of Raphael, or Bernini, and many other great artists. They've left us proof that when our energies are expended away from destruction and toward creation, that we are able to do the work of the

divine in the service of mankind. Today, as perhaps never before, heads of nations and leaders of religious faith as well stand in need of a shared commitment to serve humanity.

In the midst of a trip which I'm presently taking, whose objective is to promote peace and cooperation and common purpose with the close partners of my country, it has been a privilege today to meet with a man passionately dedicated to these same ideals.

I'm gratified that we share a belief that the struggle to enhance the dignity and decency of individual human lives gives meaning to history; that through our actions our beliefs are given life; that the role of a state is not to crush, but to free the spirit of its people; and that it is the duty of leaders to join together with all who would walk in the ways of peace.

Our common pilgrimage is more urgent than ever before. The world's

The President with His Holiness, Pope John Paul II, in the Clementine Room at the Vatican.



White House photo by Mary Anne Fackelman

mutual security to meet the challenges of the 1980s, the crises, the instability and conflicts in the world frequently caused by poverty, underdevelopment, and injustice.

To further the close bilateral relations between Italy and the United States it was agreed to intensify mutually advantageous cooperation in a variety of fields. The two governments announced their decision to cooperate in the design of the world's largest installation for the direct conversion of sunlight into electricity; a one megawatt photovoltaic plant to be located in Puglia. They agreed to carry forward other projects for research and information exchange in the solar field and in coal technologies, geothermal energy, nuclear safety, and energy conservation.

In the social sector, it was agreed to continue cooperation to combat unemployment, particularly among the young. Satisfaction was also expressed for the positive impact of the Social Security Agreement. The two governments will continue to cooperate on both a bilateral and multilateral basis for the suppression of international narcotics traffic, together with the prevention and treatment of drug abuse.

Expanding knowledge of the languages of the two countries was considered. Having noted with satisfaction the results of the memorandum of agreement signed in Rome on May 4, 1978, both sides agreed to work together to produce television programs for the teaching of their respective languages. The Italian Government announced its intention to increase its financial contribution to the Fulbright program to match the U.S. contribution in the next years.

The decision recently announced by the Cini Foundation in Venice and by the Guggenheim Foundation in New York to collaborate on the establishment of a major cultural center in Venice was cited with satisfaction as a concrete and valid example of the contribution which the private sector offers to the development of bilateral relations between the United States and Italy.

¹ Texts from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of June 30, 1980, which also includes the President's remarks to U.S. Embassy employees and members of the American community in Rome on June 21.

² Made in the Salon delle Feste at the Quirinale Palace. President Pertini spoke in Italian, and the translation of his remarks follows the White House press release. ■

The President

resources, meant by God for the use of all, are diverted on a grand scale to finance means of destruction. Homeless people by the millions, often driven from their lands by violence and subjected to hunger and disease, wander the world in search of elemental dignity which has been denied to them.

We all share the responsibility for bringing these tragedies to an end. In the current world situation, we know it is fraught with conflicting interests that threaten bloodshed. It is also alive with possibilities for reconciliation, and we must seize these initiatives and use them.

Nations can begin by heeding a universal moral and political imperative that the protection of the human rights of each person is the premise and the purpose of governments. They can also respect as sacrosanct the sovereignty of other nations.

America's settlers were drawn to our own shores by the promise of freedom and of a better life. Over our long history, now more than 200 years, America has been guided by the traditions of that continuing quest, not only for ourselves but for all peoples. That's why the pursuit of individual freedom, the security of nations, and the peace of the world are basic principles of American foreign policy. And that is why Americans feel such deep admiration and so much love for Pope John Paul II.

Americans of all faiths rejoiced in his visit to our country last year. It was one of the most remarkable events in

the history of our nation. And we have watched with respect and with gratitude as he's touched millions of lives in his further travels. His moral and spiritual leadership has focused the attention of the world upon those suffering from hunger, from poverty and disease; upon refugees in every corner of the Earth; and upon those laboring under political repression.

The United States shares these concerns of His Holiness. They are our unfinished tasks as well. America has responded generously to the men, women, and children of Kampuchea, and we are acting with justice and with charity toward those people escaping from intolerable conditions in the Caribbean. And we work with the international relief agencies, such as the Catholic Relief Services, in providing food and shelter for those who are displaced by warfare in Indochina, the Horn of Africa, and Afghanistan.

In addition, the United States is trying to provide new leadership toward a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. We are pleased to champion the cause of democracy and human development in Latin America, and we will continue to make the United States more worthy as a nation committed to social justice, to economic opportunity, and to religious freedom.

One thing more, and this is deeply important to me. On behalf of the American people, Your Holiness, I would like personally to thank you for your efforts toward the release of the 53 American hostages being held in Iran, victims of terrorism who are being held in continued defiance of international law and universally accepted standards of decency.

We do have many unfinished tasks, but we have many resources—of courage, patience, faith, strength, and love. We've renewed these sources in our meeting today. Together we are working toward a day when human beings shall not make others go homeless and hungry, when all people will have a voice in deciding their own destiny, when we will at last lift the terrible fear of nuclear destruction from our children and from their children, when the values and ideals of freedom are respected by all governments, and when humility and the service of the human spirit and the human condition is the high honor of every human state.

Your Holiness, it's been an honor and a pleasure for me to be with you, and I go with the hope that your prayers will be with me.

His Holiness, Pope John Paul II

Mr. President, it is a great pleasure for me to welcome you today. I am very happy to be able to reciprocate the warm welcome I received from you in Washington. The memories of my visit to the White House and of all my other contacts with the people of the United States are stored in my heart. They are recalled with joy and are frequently expressed in my prayers for America.

Your visit today to the Vatican as President of the United States is greatly appreciated. I am pleased to see in it an indication of your country's profound respect and esteem for ethical and religious values, a respect and esteem which are so characteristic of millions and millions of Americans of different faiths.

During my visit last October, I was a personal witness to the way these spiritual values find expression in the lives of your people, how they form the moral fabric of your nation, how they constitute the strength of the civil state which does not forget that it was founded on sound moral principles and which wishes to preserve its heritage one nation under God.

All fields of human endeavor are enriched by true ethical values. During my pastoral journey I had occasion to speak of these values and to profess my own profound esteem for all who embrace them in national life. There is a sphere of activity that does not benefit when religious values are actively pursued. The political, social, and economic domains are authenticated and reinforced by the application of those moral standards that must be irrevocably incorporated into the tradition of every state.

The same principles that guide the internal destinies of a people should direct their relationships with other nations. I desire to express my esteem for all those who, at the national and international level, have exemplified the values of compassion and justice, of personal concern for others, and fraternal sharing in an effort to promote ever greater freedom, ever more authentic equality, and an ever more stable peace for a world craving for truth, unity, and love.

At the center of all sublime spiritual values is the worth of every human person worthy of respect, from the first moment of existence, endowed with dignity and rights, and called to share responsibility for every brother and sister in need. In the cause of dignity and human rights the church is

Vatican City—A Profile

Area: 109 acres.

Population: 1,000.

Ethnic Groups: Italian, Swiss.

Languages: Italian, Latin.

Literacy: 100%

Official Name: State of the Vatican City.

Type: Papacy; administrative and spiritual capital of the Roman Catholic Church.

Independence: Lateran Agreements regulating independence and sovereignty of the Holy See signed with Italy on Feb. 11, 1929.

Suffrage: College of Cardinals elects Pope for life.

Membership in International Organizations: UPU, ITU, and permanent observer status at the U.N., FAO, UNESCO, OAS.

Officials: Pope John Paul II; Secretary of State—Agostino Cardinal CASAROLI. President Carter's Envoy to the Vatican is Robert F. Wagner.

Visit to Belgrade

At the conclusion of the seven-nation economic summit in Venice, Italy, President Carter made an official visit to Belgrade June 24-25, 1980.

Following are President Carter's remarks upon arrival, his toast at a state dinner, and the text of a joint statement issued at the conclusion of the visit.¹

ARRIVAL REMARKS, JUNE 24, 1980²

I've looked forward to this day since March of 1978, when President Tito invited me to come to Yugoslavia. I'm very grateful to the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for renewing that invitation.

My pleasure in visiting this proud and beautiful land is tempered by the sorrow we all feel at the passing of President Tito. He was a great man, one of the greatest of the 20th century. He was one of a small handful of statesmen who can truly be said to have shaped the modern world and one of an even smaller handful who have shaped it for the better.

He was a man of extraordinary courage—physical, moral, and political courage. He was also a man of imagination and of a rare kind of practical vision, the kind of vision that sees not only what a better world might be like but also how the imperfect tools that we have can be used to help build a better world. President Tito's contribution to the development of a strong, independent, and nonaligned Yugoslavia was, of course, unparalleled, but his contribution to international peace and stability was no less important.

It was my privilege to have worked with President Tito. I've greatly valued his counsel, which was the product of so much wisdom and experience. He shared this wisdom with me very generously, both face-to-face and through the many letters that we exchanged.

I share your grief at his passing and your admiration for what he accomplished. President Tito left a precious legacy—a strong, independent, and nonaligned Yugoslavia. I have come to Belgrade to assure you of the friendship and support of the United States as you build on that legacy.

President Tito devoted a great deal of effort to forging good relations be-

spite human limitations, governments of good will must continue to work for peace and for international understanding in the control and reduction of armaments, in the promotion of the North-South dialogue, and in furthering advancement of developing nations.

Just recently, on my visit to Africa, I was able to perceive personally the importance of that continent and the contribution it is called to make to the good of the world. But all this, in turn, requires the interests, support, and fraternal assistance of other peoples so that African stability, independence, and rightful autonomy will be safeguarded and reinforced.

The question of human dignity is particularly linked with efforts on behalf of justice. Any violation of justice anywhere is an affront to human dignity, and all effective contributions to justice are truly worthy of the greatest praise.

The purification of structures in the political, social, and economic fields cannot help but yield salutary results. I know of the interest of the United States in the situation in Central America, especially at this time. Persevering efforts are required and must be sustained until every brother and sister in that part of the world and elsewhere is secure in his or her dignity and free from manipulation by any power, overt or subtle, anywhere on Earth.

I hope that the United States will lend its powerful support to efforts which effectively uplift the human level of peoples in need.

As I mentioned, my contacts with the people of the United States are vivid in my memory. Enthusiasm and generosity, the will not to fall into enslaving materialism, in the pursuit of the common good at home and in the international field, and for Christians, the need to communicate justice and the peace of Christ—these are the forces that the Holy See encourages for the benefit of humanity.

My words today are meant to be an expression of appreciation for what has been done, an echo of the persistent needs of the world, a challenge of hope and confidence to the American people, whom I have known and loved so much. May God sustain you and bless the nation which you represent.

¹Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of June 30, 1980, which also includes their exchange of remarks to Americans attending the ceremony on the beatification of Kateri Takakwitha, an American Mohawk Indian.

²Made in the Papal Study at the Vatican. ■

ent on offering to the world the contribution of the Gospel of Christ, proclaiming that man is created in the image and likeness of God and destined for life everlasting.

Although, as the Second Vatican Council emphasizes, the church is not a political entity, she still serves together with the political community, but by a separate title, the personal and social vocation of the same human beings. And, while distinct from the socioeconomic realm, the church is called to serve it by proclaiming that man is the source and center and purpose of all socioeconomic life.

In this area, as in so many others, the church is happy to speak out in favor of the human person and for everything that is advantageous to humanity. Moreover, she gives the assurance of her support for all that is done for the good of mankind according to the distinctive contribution of each one. In this sense, church and state are called to collaborate in the cause of mankind in the promotion of sacred human dignity.

This collaboration is eminently useful, and it corresponds to the truth about man. Through the ethical formation of true citizens who work side by side with their fellow citizens, the church fulfills another aspect of her collaboration with the political community.

And today, in this context, I wish to assure you of my deep interest in every effort aimed at the betterment of humanity and devoted to world peace, and particularly the Middle East and neighboring regions occupy our common attention because of the immense importance they hold for international well-being. I offer my prayers that all worthy endeavors at reconciliation and cooperation may be crowned with success.

The question of Jerusalem, which during these very days attracts the attention of the world in a special way, is vital to a just peace in those parts of the world, since this holy city embodies interests and aspirations that are shared by different peoples in different ways. It is my hope that a common monotheistic tradition of faith will help to promote harmony among all those who call upon God. I would renew my earnest plea that just attention be given to the issues affecting Lebanon and the whole Palestinian problem.

The Holy See is aware of the worldwide aspect of the responsibility that falls to the United States. It is likewise conscious of the risks involved in facing this responsibility. But despite all inconveniences and problems, de-

tween our two countries. Today the foundation of those relations is firm and durable. In the past 3 years, moreover, the bonds between our two countries have grown visibly stronger, and I am eager to work with you to make them stronger still.

In this connection, I want to reaffirm to you today the basic continuity of American policy toward Yugoslavia. The United States supports and will continue to support the independence, territorial integrity, and the unity of Yugoslavia. The United States wishes to see an economically prosperous and politically strong Yugoslavia. The United States respects Yugoslavia's nonalignment and admires Yugoslavia's constructive international role.

We stand ready to work closely with you to insure the continued development of an independent Yugoslavia. But we know that your independence is a creation not of any outside force but of the courage and sacrifice of the people of Yugoslavia. And we also know that the greatest bulwark of your independence is your own fierce determination to defend it. That determination is perhaps the key to the special role Yugoslavia plays in the world.

Yugoslavia was a pioneer of nonalignment and a founder of the nonaligned movement. Yugoslavia remains an important leader of that movement today—militarily, economically, and politically. Yugoslavia has pursued a policy of authentic nonalignment that has won the respect of the entire world. Especially now, at a time when the principles of equality, noninterference, and territorial inviolability are threatened, Yugoslavia's steadfast defense of the principles of the United Nations and of the nonaligned movement takes on new importance.

We know that Yugoslavia can make a significant contribution to the solution of international problems and to the further development of detente between East and West. The United States also wants to strengthen detente, and we will work hard toward that end. But detente must be based on reciprocity. It must be based on mutual restraint. It must be based on respect for the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and noninterference in the affairs of other nations. These are the principles of international life for which Yugoslavia has always struggled.

At the same time, the United States strongly believes that efforts to reduce the chances of nuclear war must continue; so must the efforts to build an

international system that helps to reduce tensions and to foster peace, security, freedom, and economic well-being.

Despite the crises that beset the world today, the United States remains committed to preserving the framework of detente and to maintaining a dialogue between the nations of the world. Specifically, we support arms control and disarmament talks and negotiations wherever they can contribute to mutual security and to international stability. We also support the Madrid review conference of the Helsinki Final Act, which we feel can contribute to the full and frank review of progress to date and to balanced steps forward in all areas of the Final Act.

I'm looking forward to our discussions on these and other matters. We are eager to hear your ideas for ways in which Yugoslavia and the nonaligned movement can contribute to solving the many difficult problems the world faces. Our time here is short and we have much to discuss, but we will be building on a foundation of mutual purpose. I'm very pleased to be here. I bring to you and to all the people of Yugoslavia the warmest good wishes of the people of the United States.

PRESIDENT CARTER'S DINNER TOAST, JUNE 24, 1980³

Although this is my first visit to your great country, Yugoslavia, the special relationship between our two countries has involved seven American Presidents, beginning with President Harry Truman. I'm here to confirm the continuity of that relationship. I'm here to reiterate our firm support of Yugoslavia's independence, territorial integrity, and unity and our respect for Yugoslavia's nonaligned position.

These are the principles which President Tito and I emphasized during his visit to the United States a little more than 2 years ago. I want you to know that they are just as central to American policy now as they were then, when our country was honored by the presence of this great leader.

It is with great sadness that I pay here tonight a personal tribute to President Tito. I regarded him as a friend, as well as a statesman of uncommon vision. I valued his counsel, his wisdom, and his perspective. I gained many insights from our personal correspondence, which continued even during the final months of his illness.

Great men of history sometimes leave the nations they have led ill-equipped to face the world without them. What has impressed me in my brief visit here is how smoothly you have met the challenge of transition. That is a great tribute not only to the foresight of President Tito but also to the dedication and the patriotism of his political heirs.

A man like President Tito cannot be replaced. It is the nature of such men to be irreplaceable, but the courage and the creativity of the Yugoslav people guarantee that President Tito's life's work of building a strong, independent Yugoslavia will go forward in the years ahead.

Yugoslavia's unswerving defense of the principles of true nonalignment and nonintervention in the internal affairs of foreign states is particularly important in today's unstable and troubled world. The United States respects such a policy.

It has always been my hope as President that we could move on in many areas of the world from conflict to peace. I did look forward to significant contributions in arms control when the SALT II Treaty was signed. Ratification of this treaty has been temporarily frustrated but not abandoned.

We are deeply concerned that an unjustifiable act of armed aggression continues in Afghanistan, a founding member with you of the nonaligned movement, a small country, which, as you well know, constituted no threat to anyone. The vast majority of the countries of the world, in an extraordinary vote by the General Assembly of the United Nations, have called for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all foreign troops from Afghanistan. We want to see the restoration of an independent and nonaligned Afghanistan, which can live in peace with all its neighbors and contribute to the stability of the region.

With the withdrawal of all Soviet forces from Afghanistan, we would be prepared to join in assurances and arrangements to establish a truly independent, a truly nonaligned Afghanistan with a government acceptable to the Afghan people. We would be prepared to explore a transitional arrangement, to be implemented along with the prompt withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Afghanistan, for the purpose of restoring peace and tranquility in that suffering country.

Our talks today have also touched on the grave consequences of politically motivated terrorism. I speak for ever,

American citizen when I say how much I appreciate Yugoslavia's forthright support for the release of the American diplomatic personnel who at this moment are held hostage in Iran, in violation of every tenet not only of international law but of simple decency.

For my part, I want to reiterate that my government will not tolerate terrorist acts against Yugoslav officials and establishments in the United States and that we strongly oppose political efforts aimed at undermining Yugoslavia's unity and territorial integrity.

Our talks today have confirmed my view that Yugoslavia's concept of nonalignment is not a passive or quietist thing but a bold, creative, imaginative approach to the problems of the world, particularly the problems of the developing nations. And our talks have reaffirmed something else—that both Yugoslavia and the United States want to strengthen the bilateral relationships that exist between us and that we want to do so on the basis of independence, equality, and mutual respect.

I would like to thank you, on behalf of my family and my colleagues, for your generous hospitality and friendship. I look forward to a continuing exchange with you on international issues, on which we share so many compatible views, and also on bilateral issues, on which we've made such great progress in recent years.

I would like to ask everyone to join me as I raise my glass in a toast: To the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and to its President, his Excellency President Mijatovic; to a strong and prosperous Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; to the peoples of Yugoslavia, whose love of independence we admire and support; and to the furthering, strengthening of American-Yugoslav friendship in the cause of peace and stability throughout the world.

**JOINT STATEMENT,
JUNE 25, 1980**

At the invitation of the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, President of the United States Jimmy Carter and Mrs. Carter paid an official visit to Yugoslavia June 24-25, 1980. During the visit, President Carter and President of the Presidency of the SFRY, Cvijetin Mijatovic, held cordial and constructive talks in an atmosphere of mutual respect, understanding, and friendship.⁴

White House photo by Bill Fitz-Patriek



President Carter and President Mijatovic exchange toasts in the Federal Hall at the Palace of the Federation.

President Carter expressed the profound sorrow of the American people at the death of President Tito, who was greatly admired and respected in the United States. President and Mrs. Carter on this occasion again expressed regret at the loss of a great statesman who, as one of the most prominent leaders of the nonaligned movement, devoted his entire life's work to building a strong and independent Yugoslavia and to securing peace and progress in the world.

President Carter and the Presidency of Yugoslavia noted with satisfaction the very successful development of relations and cooperation between Yugoslavia and the United States. They agreed that the meeting held in Washington in March 1978 between Presidents Carter and Tito and the document signed on that occasion represents a durable and stable basis for further strengthening of the cooperation between the two countries. Based firmly on the positions and principles set forth in that document, as well as the documents signed by the Presidents of the two countries in 1971 and 1975, the United States and Yugoslavia have made great progress in recent years in broadening and deepening their relations in all areas.

Both sides affirmed that in recent years significant expansion of the dialogue and consultations between the two countries has occurred, in which a special role was played by the regular exchange of letters between Presidents Tito and Carter. There have also been frequent exchanges of visits at all levels, including productive contacts between members of the U.S. Congress

and of the Federal Assembly of the SFRY as well as other mutually useful visits and exchanges. The United States and Yugoslavia affirmed their readiness to continue this useful practice, which has proven to be in the interests of both countries and of greater international understanding generally.

The two sides noted the importance of historical and cultural ties between the two peoples and the special role in strengthening the bonds of friendship and understanding played by Americans of Yugoslav descent. They also confirmed their mutual interest in facilitating the free flow of information and people between the two countries, endorsed governmental and non-governmental exchanges in the fields of science and technology, culture, and information, and agreed that even more can be done in these areas.

Turning to the increasingly important economic relations between the United States and Yugoslavia, President Carter and the Presidency of the SFRY noted with satisfaction the growth in trade and economic cooperation between Yugoslav and American enterprises and financial institutions. They stressed their mutual interest in further expansion of economic relations and agreed to intensify efforts to increase trade, while recognizing that the growth of Yugoslavia's exports will be an important factor in the satisfactory development of two-way trade. They also agreed that more should be done to promote other forms of economic cooperation including joint ventures and long-term cooperation. The American side expressed understanding for and a

readiness to support the efforts of Yugoslavia toward stabilization and further development of its economy. Appreciation was expressed for the contribution already being made to strengthening U.S.-Yugoslav economic relations by the U.S.-Yugoslav Economic Council, the Yugoslav Chamber for Promotion of Economic Cooperation with the U.S., and the U.S.-Yugoslav economic working groups.

The two sides favorably noted the measures taken to prevent acts of violence against Yugoslavia and its diplomatic, consular, and other representatives in the United States and in prosecuting the perpetrators. President Carter reiterated the commitment of the U.S. Government not to tolerate such terrorist activities, which are against the interests of the United States and are also against the good relations between the two countries.

President Carter and the President of the SFRY Presidency expressed great concern over the serious deterioration in the international situation which represents a threat to world peace. With the objective of halting the current dangerous trend in international relations, and of renewing the disrupted process of detente, they affirmed the need for strict respect for the spirit and principles of the U.N. Charter, especially those which refer to the inadmissibility of the application of force, of intervention and interference in the affairs of other countries, of the imposition of alien will on sovereign states, whatever the form or justification, and of the blocking of their independent internal development.

On these bases the two sides emphasized the importance of broadening the process of negotiations and cooperation in the world, as well as the need for a comprehensive process of detente which should include the largest possible number of countries, and be based on strict respect for the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of all states. This was judged to be all the more significant as the world is undergoing great change requiring reciprocal restraint on the part of all countries from actions which disrupt world peace and stability. They reaffirmed the role of the United Nations as an essential instrument for preserving peace, for the peaceful settlement of disputes, and for strengthening cooperation in the world.

The discussion also encompassed general questions of security and cooperation in Europe. Both sides affirmed the obligation to implement all provi-

sions of the Helsinki Final Act and stressed their determination to strengthen the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] process and to work for balanced progress in all areas at the Madrid meeting, in the conviction that doing so would improve security and cooperation among all signatories of the Final Act, and would have broader significance.

The two sides exchanged views on the consequences of further arms competition from the standpoint of preserving peace and security, the current worsening international situation, and the need for general economic development. They agreed on the need resolutely to pursue effective, equitable, and verifiable arms limitation, arms reduction, and disarmament agreements based on the principles of undiminished security of all states. The objective should be gradual reduction of armaments to the lowest possible level con-

sistent with the security and stability of all nations, with the ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The two sides took note of the significance of the U.S.-Soviet Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. They also agreed upon the urgent need for further progress through negotiations, both bilateral and multilateral, toward the limitation and reduction of nuclear and conventional armaments.

Special attention was devoted in the discussions to the worsening situation of developing countries and of the international economic situation as a whole. Proceeding from the growing interdependence of all nations, it was mutually affirmed that there is an urgent need to seek solutions to unresolved questions and to seek the equitable harmonization of the economic interests of all countries. The two sides agreed on the far-reaching political in-

Yugoslavia—A Profile

Geography

Area: 99,000 sq. mi. (about two-thirds the size of California). **Capital:** Belgrade (pop. 1.3 million). **Other Cities:** Zagreb (700,000), Skopje (440,000), Sarajevo (400,000), Ljubljana (300,000).

People

Population: 22 million (1980 est.). **Density:** 20 per sq. mi. **Annual Growth Rate:** 1%. **Ethnic Groups:** 40% Serbs, 22% Croats, 8% Slovenes, 8% Bosnian Muslims, 6% Macedonians, 6% Albanians, 2% Montenegrin Serbs, 2% Hungarians, 1% Turks. **Religions:** Eastern Orthodox (Serbian and Macedonian), Roman Catholic, Islam. **Languages:** Serbo-Croatian, Slovene, Macedonian, Albanian, Hungarian. **Literacy:** 85%. **Life Expectancy:** 68 yrs.

Government

Official Name: Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). **Type:** Federal Republic. **Independence:** Dec. 1, 1918. **Date of Constitution:** February 1974. **Branches:** *Executive*—Presidency of the SFRY (Chief of State, President of the SFRY, 1-yr. term), Prime Minister (Head of Government and President of the Federal Executive Council), Cabinet (Federal Executive Council). *Legislative*—bicameral SFRY Assembly (Federal Council of 220 delegates and Council of the Republics and Provinces of 58 delegates). *Judicial*—Constitutional Court. **Political Party:** League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY). **Suffrage:** Universal over 18. **Subdivisions:** 6 Republics, 2 autonomous provinces.

Economy

GNP: \$69 billion (1979 est.). **Annual Growth Rate:** 7.5%. **Per Capita GNP:** \$3,109. **Natural Resources:** Bauxite, timber, antimony, chromium, lead, zinc, asbestos, mercury, cadmium. **Agriculture:** Land—33% arable. *Products*—cotton, wheat, tobacco, sugarbeets. *Work force*—48%. **Industries:** Wood, processed food, nonferrous metals, machinery, tiles. **Trade (1979):** *Exports*—\$6.5 billion; nonferrous metals, machinery and metal products, wood products, textiles, food, tobacco. *Imports*—\$12.9 billion; machinery and metal products, fuels, chemicals, iron and steel, food products. **Partner:** F.R.G., U.S.S.R., Italy, U.S. **Official Exchange Rate:** 27.3 dinars = US\$1.00. **Economic Assistance:** \$2.9 billion (1951-67), including \$700 million in grant military assistance (1951-59). U.S. economic development ceased Jan. 1, 1967; \$1 billion in earthquake reconstruction assistance in 1979.

Membership in International Organizations

U.N. and its specialized agencies, GATT, IBRD, IMF, IAEA, CEMA (observer status), OECD, INTELSAT.

Principal Government Officials

Yugoslavia: President of the SFRY—Cvijetin Mijatovic (until May 1981); President of the Federal Executive Council (Prime Minister)—Veselin Djuranovic (until May 1982); Josip Vrhovc, Secretary for Foreign Affairs—Josip Vrhovc, Ambassador to the U.S.—Budimir Loncar, Ambassador to the U.N.—Milica Komatina. **United States:** Ambassador to Yugoslavia—Lawrence S. Eagleburger.

importance of the continuation of a constructive dialogue between industrial and developing countries and on the strengthening of international economic cooperation on a more stable and just basis. They especially emphasized the importance of greater support of the industrially developed countries for the more rapid development of developing countries and of the importance of the global negotiations on these questions. They expressed the hope that these negotiations will achieve productive results for the benefit of all, and particularly for developing countries, which could be in the interest of the more efficient functioning of the entire world economy.

Considering the various aspects of human rights, the two sides also agreed that efforts to enhance respect for human rights in all countries should proceed in accord with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the Helsinki Final Act.

Agreeing upon the need to invest decisive effort toward the equitable solution of both previously existing and new crises in the world, the U.S. and the Yugoslav sides assessed current developments in the Near East, South Africa, Southwest and Southeast Asia, and other areas.

The two sides expressed their special concern about the situation in the Middle East, which remains a source of great tension in international affairs. They agreed on the urgent need to find comprehensive, just, and lasting solutions to the problems of the Middle East and explained in detail their respective views on the current situation.

Turning to southern Africa, the American and Yugoslav sides condemned racism in all forms and the South African system of apartheid. They expressed their support for efforts directed at the achievement of majority rule and national independence in Namibia. They welcomed recent developments in Zimbabwe.

Both sides emphasized the need to respect the right of Iran to independence and to nonalignment, as well as its right to determine its own internal development and orientation in international affairs without outside interference and pressure. They agreed that the release of the U.S. diplomats held hostage in Iran and the peaceful resolution by the U.S. and Iran of the issues between them, on the basis of principles of the U.N. Charter, would greatly contribute to peace and stability in this region.

The two sides called for an end to military intervention and all other forms of interference in the internal affairs of independent countries. Both sides emphasized the need for the foreign troops involved to be withdrawn and an end put to all causes of suffering and sacrifice in such countries. They also called for further humanitarian efforts by the international community to resolve the problems of refugees.

In this connection, each side elaborated its viewpoint on ways to resolve the situations which have arisen in Afghanistan and Kampuchea, emphasizing the need to respect the rights of all peoples to determine their own destiny.

President Carter and the President of the Presidency of SFRY emphasized the significance of nonalignment as an independent factor in international affairs. President Carter affirmed that the United States respects the desire of the nonaligned states to determine their own internal development and orientation in international affairs.

President Carter reiterated the continuing respect and support of the United States for the independence, territorial integrity, and unity of Yugoslavia. The United States considers an independent and nonaligned Yugoslavia an important factor for balance, peace, and stability in Europe and the world.

The two sides emphasized their determination to further expand and to enrich qualitatively the current successful development of friendly relations between the SFRY and the U.S.A., on the basis of equality and with full mutual respect for the differences in each other's social system and international position.

President Carter extended an invitation to the President of the Presidency of the SFRY to visit the United States and the invitation was accepted with pleasure.

¹Texts from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of June, 30, 1980, which also includes a White House statement and the President's exchange with reporters during a tour of Kalemegdan Park on June 24 and the President's departure statement on June 25.

²Made at the welcoming ceremony at Surcin Airport.

³Made in response to a toast by President Mijatovic in the Federal Hall of the Palace of the Federation.

⁴The list of participants in the talks is not printed here. ■

Visit to Madrid

From Belgrade President Carter traveled to Madrid for an official visit June 25-26, 1980.

Following are President Carter's toast at a state luncheon and the text of a press statement issued at the conclusion of the visit.¹

PRESIDENT CARTER'S LUNCHEON TOAST, JUNE 25, 1980²

This is a great moment for me to be here and to bring you and your people the warm good wishes of the Government and people of the United States of America. It is a special pleasure, because of my great personal interest in your language and culture.

Four hundred years ago, Spain was the superpower of the Western World, and the Spanish of that day left a legend of vision and courage that has never been forgotten. During that golden age, painters like El Greco and Velasquez and writers like Cervantes and Lope de Vega taught the world new ways to see and to feel. The Spanish explorers were the astronauts of their day, bravely probing new worlds with unforeseen dangers and difficulties. All of us have benefited from this greatness of Spain.

My own State of Georgia began as a very small outpost of the Spanish Empire. The first European to set foot there was Hernando de Soto in 1540. Georgia was a Spanish colony for a much longer time than it was an English colony.

I speak of the historic influence of Spain because it is so obvious that Spain's courage and greatness prevail today. In little more than 4 years, you have created a vigorous, thriving democracy, with respect for human rights, individual liberties, and freedom of expression. The task has not been easy. You have had to contend with worldwide recession, with enormous increases in energy costs, and with ancient and sometimes divisive internal challenges. Yet you have succeeded brilliantly in rebuilding old institutions and creating new ones.

The growth of Spanish democracy has been a tonic for the entire Western World. Spain refutes the false contention that the sweep of history is invari-

The President

ably toward authoritarianism. Spain is a source of hope and inspiration to democrats everywhere. Spain's experience holds lessons about resolution, moderation, and self-control—lessons for other democracies and for new countries in the Third World which have found freedom and now are searching for models to follow in shaping their own societies.

In the past 4 years, Spain has also moved toward a new place of leadership in the world. Your ministers have repeatedly made it clear that Spain stands side-by-side with the other Western democracies, as a full member-to-be of the European and Atlantic Communities. We are pleased that you have begun negotiations for entry into the European Communities, because we believe that Spain's accession will strengthen the Community, just as the Community strengthens Europe.

Similarly, we hope that Spain will see its own interests served by participating in the collective defense of the West. However, we fully recognize that this is a decision to be taken solely and exclusively by Spain, in its own time and in its own way. Our nation will give full support to your decision once it has been made.

In addition, our two countries share a bilateral security partnership based on important common interests. We will begin a review this year of the security relationship that has well served the interests of both our countries and that will continue to serve our joint interests for many years to come.

Our significant economic relationship also links our peoples. American business leaders have demonstrated their faith in Spain's future by their high level of investments here in recent years. Exporters in each country have looked to the other as an important market for their products. What is absolutely clear is that the growing economic relationship is of very great benefit to both countries.

Spain's concern about energy supplies is fully shared in the United States. As you know, I took office as President at a time when the American people still largely believed that oil was an infinite resource. The central drama of American public life during the last 4 years has been the struggle to change that attitude and then to build a viable energy policy. The struggle goes on, but the foundations for such an energy policy are now nearly complete. This is crucial not only to the future of my own

(White House photo by Jack Kightlinger)



King Juan Carlos I accompanies President Carter on an inspection of the honor guard at Barajas Airport.

country but to the broader web of relationships of which both our countries are a part.

Our two countries also share a strong interest in democratic evolution and respect for human rights in other parts of the world. In Latin America we both have special ties. I appreciate the support and wise counsel we have often received from Spain with respect to difficult, frequently critical situations in Latin America and the Caribbean. We also appreciate the close consultations we have had and the assistance you have given us on the hostage crisis in Iran and other aspects of that delicate situation. In the Middle East and parts of Africa, we can look forward to further cooperation, especially valuable because of your historical knowledge of the Muslim world.

The United States has special reason to applaud Spain's emergence as a major partner in the unfinished tasks of peace. Its cultural and historical ties in so many areas of the world enable it to be a bridge between the Third World and the West. This is especially relevant as we take up the problems of the new decade, which in many ways will be more difficult and dangerous than any we have surmounted before.

Today the West confronts a strategic challenge of historic magnitude. From 1945 through the mid-1950s, we successfully resisted Soviet expansionary power westward and eastward. Today the Soviet Union is thrusting southward directly in Afghanistan, indirectly through Vietnam

and Cambodia, and elsewhere by means of foreign proxies. The challenge is clear, and so is the question it poses for our democratic institutions: Do we permit aggression to proceed with impunity, or do we resist encroachment which affects our common vital interests? There is no doubt in my mind where both our countries stand on this issue.

The gratifying resurgence of Spanish influence throughout the world is an important source of confidence with which the West can approach the difficult decade of the 1980s. That confidence is fully justified. The vitality I have witnessed here attests to Spain's own sure sense of its future and the direction it has freely taken toward democracy, diversity, and the unfettered exercise of the human spirit.

Your Majesty, I would like to raise my glass: To you, to your lovely queen, to your President and all the leaders of the government and of the democratic opposition who have helped build Spanish democracy, and above all to the Spanish people, to whose spirit goes the bulk of the credit for the successes of the past several years. *Viva España.*

PRESS STATEMENT, JUNE 26, 1980³

At the invitation of His Majesty King Juan Carlos, the President of the United States Jimmy Carter paid an official visit to Spain on June 25-26.

During the visit the President of the United States held conversations with His Majesty the King. President Carter also had meetings with the President of the Government, Mr. Suarez, and with members of the Spanish Government.

President Carter's visit is the first by a President of the United States to democratic Spain. Accepting the Spanish King's invitation, the President is returning visits to his country by His Majesty and by the President of the Spanish Government.

During the conversations between President Carter and His Majesty, the excellent level of the close and friendly relations between the two countries was noted with satisfaction as were the harmonious points of view on various foreign policy subjects.

The two chiefs of state expressed their concern with regard to the tensions existing in various parts of the world and set forth their desire and their intention to contribute in all ap-

appropriate ways to the reestablishment of peace and stability in those regions. President Carter congratulated His Majesty on the favorable evolution of the Spanish democratic process which has earned the sincere support of the entire free world and for Spain's return to its proper place in the concert of nations. For its part the Spanish side expressed its appreciation for the work carried out by the United States in support of human rights and the cause of peace.


The international scene, with particular reference to the crises in Iran and Afghanistan and the situation in the Middle East, and bilateral relations were examined in President Carter's meeting with the President of the Spanish Government, Mr. Suarez. During these conversations, which were held within the framework of the consultations and contacts taking place among Western leaders, it became evident once again that Western solidarity constitutes one of the main principles of democratic Spain's foreign policy and

that Spain will join its efforts with those of the other Western countries in the pursuit of peace and stability for all peoples.

In these contacts President Carter said he was pleased at progress toward Spain's entry into the European Community, which will reinforce Western solidarity and will complete the construction of a stronger and more united Europe.

Both leaders expressed the hope that the balanced development of the Madrid conference would permit the creation of a climate favorable to dialogue and cooperation, that it would favor the reestablishment of mutual confidence and make it possible to advance on the road toward detente and peace.

President Carter expressed his satisfaction for the important work that Spain is carrying out as host to the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] meeting in Madrid.



White House photo by Jack Kightlinger

The President with Prime Minister Suarez.

Both statesmen examined ways to strengthen Western solidarity in the face of the serious threat represented by Soviet aggression in Afghanistan. They examined the significance of the Soviet announcement of the withdrawal of some forces from Afghanistan and reaffirmed that only the total withdrawal of Soviet troops and guarantees for nonalignment and respect for the freedom of the Afghan people to express their political desires constitute the necessary elements for a definitive solution to the conflict.

President Carter expressed his understanding of Spain's role in its relations with the Arab world and of President Suarez' efforts in his international contacts and his trips to the Middle East. The two leaders expressed their common desire to contribute to a just and peaceful solution to the problems of the region.

President Carter expressed his appreciation and that of all the American people for Spain's support and activities on behalf of the prompt liberation of the American hostages being illegally held in Iran.

The President of the Spanish Government stated that Spain will continue its actions to support the international effort for the favorable solution of the problem.

The two Presidents agreed that respect for international law is indispensable for the proper conduct of international relations and for the solution of the present crisis.

President Carter described the results achieved in the recent Venice summit. In view of the concern shared by both governments regarding the world energy crisis and its negative economic and social effects, President Carter showed his willingness that Spain cooperate in and benefit from research and development into alternate energy sources in which the United States is making an important effort.

Spain—A Profile

Geography

Area: 195,988 sq. mi., including the Balearic and Canary Islands (about the size of Arizona and Utah). **Capital:** Madrid (pop. 3.5 million). **Other Cities:** Barcelona (1 million), Valencia (700,000), Seville (600,000), Zaragoza (500,000), Bilbao (500,000), Malaga (400,000).

People

Population: 37.8 million (1979). **Annual Growth Rate:** 1.2%. **Density:** 193 per sq. mi. **Ethnic Group:** Mediterranean and Nordic composite. **Religion:** Roman Catholic. **Languages:** Spanish (official), Catalan, Basque. **Literacy:** 97%.

Government

Official Name: Spanish State. **Type:** Monarchy. **Branches:** *Executive*—Prime Minister. *Legislative*—bicameral Cortes (50-member Congress of Deputies and 18-member Senate). *Judicial*—Supreme Court. **Political Parties:** Union of the Democratic Center, Socialist Workers Party, Popular Alliance, Communist Party, Regional parties. **Suffrage:** Universal over 18. **Subdivisions:** 50 metropolitan Provinces, 2 presidios, 3 enclaves.

Economy

GDP: \$201 billion (1979). **Annual Growth Rate:** 1.5%. **Per Capita GDP:** \$5,300 (1979).

Natural Resources: Coal, lignite, iron ore, uranium, mercury, pyrites, fluorspar, gypsum, zinc, lead, tungsten, copper, kaolin, hydroelectric power. **Agriculture:** *Products*—cereals and feedgrains, vegetables, citrus fruits, wine, olives and olive oil, livestock. *Work force*—19%. **Industries:** Processed foods, textiles, footwear, petrochemicals, steel, automobiles, consumer goods, ships. **Trade:** *Exports*—\$18.2 billion (1979): fresh and canned fruits, automobiles, iron and steel products, footwear, textiles. *Partners*—EC (46%), U.S. (9%). *Imports*—\$18.7 billion (1978): oil seeds, grains, oil, machinery and transportation equipment. *Partners*—EC (35%), U.S. (13%). **Official Exchange Rate:** 69 pesetas=US\$1.00.

Membership in International Organizations

U.N. and its specialized agencies, OECD, IEA, INTELSAT, IAEA, World Tourism Organization.

Principal Government Officials

Spain: Chief of State, Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces—King Juan Carlos I, Prime Minister—Adolfo SUAREZ Gonzalez, Minister of Foreign Affairs—Marcelino OREJA Aguirre, Ambassador to the U.S.—Jose LLADO, Ambassador to the U.N.—Jaime de PINIES. **United States:** Ambassador to Spain—Terence A. Todman.

The two statesmen agreed in the opinion on the threat which terrorism constitutes for the peace, stability, and progress of today's world.

In the field of bilateral matters the two Presidents expressed pleasure at the state of our relations and set forth their satisfaction at the favorable attitude of both parties toward the search for a contractual framework for future relations between both countries, which will take account of Spain's new political circumstances.

The two sides examined the state of economic relations between the two countries and expressed their intention to maintain this trend, while, at the same time, striving to end the present imbalance in their commercial exchanges.

¹Texts from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of June 30, 1980, which also includes a White House statement of June 25 and the President's remarks to U.S. Embassy employees and members of the American community in Madrid on June 26.

²Made in response to a toast by King Juan Carlos I in the State Dining Room of the Royal Palace. President Carter delivered his response in Spanish, and the text here follows the advance release issued by the White House.

³As printed here, this item follows the text of the Spanish press statement as translated by the U.S. International Communication Agency. The statement was agreed to by the U.S. Government but was not issued as a White House press release. ■

Visit to Lisbon

President Carter's last stop on his European trip was in Lisbon June 26, 1980.

Following are the President's toast at a state luncheon and the text of a joint statement issued at the conclusion of the visit.¹

PRESIDENT CARTER'S LUNCHEON TOAST, JUNE 26, 1980²

Mr. President, let me thank you and Mrs. Eanes for this lovely luncheon in this most magnificent setting. Rosalynn and I have long looked forward to a chance to visit Portugal. The excitement of the visit started even before our plane landed as we came in over

Lisbon and the Tagus River. As I looked down on this beautiful city and its monuments, I was vividly reminded of Portugal's rich history.

Just a few hours ago, I had a chance to visit the monastery which honors two of Portugal's greatest heroes—the poet Camoes and the explorer Vasco da Gama. These men and others, like Ferdinand Magellan, are properly honored in our country as well as yours. Their courage and their vision paved a way for the extension of a great cultural heritage across the seas to other continents.

Portugal has reason for pride in these men. Now, 500 years later, we may have run out of seas never before navigated, as Camoes said, but I have seen that Portugal continues to be served by dedicated men. While their task is different from that of the discoverers, it is no less difficult. It's to build a strong and a new permanent democracy.

Portugal's democratic leaders had the courage of the explorers in the years after the 1974 revolution. Your nation's perseverance and your capacity have been severely tested by the stresses of the last 6 years—economic crises, the resettlement of hundreds of thousands of refugees, forging new ties with your former colonies, and challenges to democracy itself. But you have prevailed. You've built healthy and vigorous democratic parties. You've defended freedom to debate and to differ one from another, and you've conducted fair and free elections.

Many of you in this room have helped lay the foundations of a lasting democracy in Portugal. You, the democratic leaders, have personally borne the burdens of office. You've played the role of responsible opposition. You've organized, inspired, and led your people. Because of your personal involvement in creating democracy, you know better than most how precious it is. It's no wonder that Portugal was among the first of the world's nations to recognize and to respond to the threat which was posed to democratic societies everywhere by aggression in Afghanistan and official terrorism in Iran.

Your actions and your words demonstrated that people who value freedom cannot stand idly by while others' rights are ruthlessly suppressed and while a system of international order so dearly won and so delicately maintained is so callously attacked. It is at times such as these that friends and allies must stand together.

The alliance has served us well, but it's now being tested by new challenges—a challenge to its most vital economic interests and a challenge to the principle that free people in independent nations should have the right to decide their future without outside interference. Will we be able to meet such threats? Do we have the will, the capacity, the resolve to make a common stand? I am confident that we can, and my confidence has been bolstered by the talks that I have had here today.

Consultations such as these and others that I've had with other nations on this trip are essential for us to maintain the strength and unity of our associations, for we are members of a voluntary association—the association of democratic nations. It's a source of great satisfaction to me and to my fellow Americans to know that democracy is succeeding in Portugal and that Portugal is a steadfast member of the Atlantic alliance.

Mr. President, I ask everyone to join me as I raise my glass to you and Portugal's democratic leaders of all parties. You've set an example in your achievements at home and in your leadership abroad. I thank you for your hospitality. I wish you every success, and I look forward to our continued and close collaboration. Mr. President, to you, to your lovely wife, and to the brave and courageous people of Portugal.

JOINT STATEMENT, JUNE 26, 1980

President Jimmy Carter of the United States visited Lisbon on June 26 at the invitation of the President of Portugal Antonio Ramalho Eanes. The visit provided an opportunity for meetings between the two Presidents and between President Carter and Prime Minister Francisco Sa Carneiro.

President Carter and his hosts noted with satisfaction the close relations between the United States and Portugal, based on longstanding ties of friendship, common commitment to democratic values, and partnership in the NATO alliance. They discussed international issues, including the situation in Afghanistan, in Iran, and in the Middle East; new forms of coordination and consultation among the Western countries; and U.S.-Portuguese cooperation in enhancing Western security, including development and conservation of energy resources.

In emphasizing Portugal's very positive contributions to the Western alliance, President Carter congratulated both the President and the Prime Minister for their vigorous leadership in the evolution of Portuguese democracy. He expressed particular appreciation for the prompt response of the Portuguese Government to the Soviet-armed invasion and occupation of Afghanistan. The leaders agreed that this Soviet action, in flagrant violation of the U.N. Charter, seriously threatens international peace and poses a major strategic challenge affecting vital Western interests in Southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf region.

In accord with that shared strategic assessment, the leaders view as indispensable the application of concrete political, economic, and commercial measures to impress upon the Soviet Union the necessity of a prompt and complete withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan.

In line with that view, the leaders welcomed the concerted steps which

NATO is now pursuing in order to strengthen the common defense in response to the strategic challenge faced by all the Western allies, and they pledged their commitment to the earliest possible fulfillment of the goals embodied in NATO's long-term defense program. Bearing in mind the U.S. commitment of resources toward building a security framework in the region of Southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf, they further recognized the usefulness of adequate consultation among the Western allies regarding security requirements within the NATO area.

President Carter also reiterated his appreciation and that of the entire American people for the forthright support given by Portugal to the international effort to secure release of American hostages held by Iran in defiance of international law and universally accepted standards of decency. The leaders stressed that the principle of the rule of law, vital to the health and stability of the world community, is at

(White House photo by Karl Schumacher)



President Carter and President Eanes exchange toasts at Ajuda Palace.

stake in this crisis. They agreed that continued detention of the hostages will further undermine Iran's international standing, and they concurred in the necessity of maintaining economic sanctions on Iran as well as the efforts being pursued by international bodies as a way of convincing the Iranian authorities to release all the hostages unharmed.

Turning to other aspects of mutual interest, both sides recognized the importance of achieving a comprehensive and lasting peace in the Middle East which takes into consideration the interests of all the parties involved.

President Carter welcomed the constructive insights and suggestions which President Eanes and Prime Minister Sa Carneiro offered regarding critical issues affecting East-West and North-South relationships. In particular, President Carter praised Portugal's efforts to strengthen ties with Africa, and especially with the Lusophone African states. They agreed that it would be useful to intensify U.S.-Portuguese consultations on ways in which both countries can work for greater peace, freedom, and prosperity.

¹Texts from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of June 30, 1980, which also includes remarks made by Presidents Eanes and Carter at the arrival ceremony, a White House statement, and the President's remarks made on his return to the United States on June 26.

²Made in response to a toast by President Eanes in the State Dining Room of the Ajuda Palace. ■

Portugal—A Profile

Geography

Area: 93,000 sq. mi., including the Azores and Madeira Islands. **Capital:** Lisbon (pop. 1 million). **Other Cities:** Oporto (350,000).

People

Population: 9.8 million. **Ethnic Make-Up:** homogeneous Mediterranean stock with small black African minority. **Religion:** 97% Roman Catholic. **Language:** Portuguese. **Literacy:** 70%. **Life Expectancy:** 69 yrs.

Government

Official Name: Republic of Portugal. **Type:** Parliamentary democracy. **Constitution:** April 25, 1976. **Branches:** *Executive*—President (Chief of State), Council of the Revolution (advisory body), Prime Minister (head of Government), Cabinet. *Legislative*—unicameral Assembly of the Republic (263 members). *Judicial*—Supreme Court. **Political Parties:** Socialist, Center Democratic, Social Democratic, Communist, 10 minor parties. **Suffrage:** universal over 18. **Subdivisions:** 18 Provinces, 2 autonomous administrative districts (Azores, Madeira), 2 dependencies (East Timor, Macao).

Economy

GDP: \$16.6 billion (1977). **Annual Growth Rate:** 5.6% (1977 at constant prices). Per

Capita GNP: \$2,010 (1979). **Inflation Rate:** 23% (1976-78). **Natural Resources:** Fish, cork, tungsten ore. **Agriculture:**

Products—grains, potatoes, olives, wine-grapes, rice, tomatoes. *Work force*—33%. **Industries:** Textiles and clothing, footwear, wood and pulp, paper, cork, metalworking, ore processing, chemicals, fish canning, wine. **Trade:** *Exports*—\$3.5 billion (1979): textiles and clothing, wood and wood products, cork and cork products, electrical machinery, wine. *Imports*—\$4.5 billion (1977): petroleum, cotton, agricultural products, industrial machinery, iron and steel, chemicals. **Major trading partners**—EC (36%), EFTA (12%), U.S. (8%). **Official Exchange Rate:** 49 escudos=US\$1.00. **U.S. Economic Assistance:** \$442 million (FY 1975-78).

Membership in International Organizations

U.N., Council of Europe, EFTA, GATT, NATO, OECD.

Principal Government Officials

Portugal: President—Antonio dos Santos Ramalho EANES, Prime Minister—Francisco SA CARNEIRO, Minister for Foreign Affairs—Diogo FREITAS DO AMARAL, Ambassador to the U.S.—Joao Hall THEMIDO, Ambassador to the U.N.—M. Vasco FUTSCHER PEREIRA. **United States:** Ambassador to Portugal—Richard J. Bloomfield.

The Costs of Leadership

Address by Secretary Muskie before the Foreign Policy Association in New York on July 7, 1980.¹

I welcome this opportunity to address the Foreign Policy Association and to raise with you an issue of fundamental and long-term importance to our nation. It is a matter that cuts across all aspects of our foreign policy. It will decide whether the United States can have an effective, affirmative foreign policy in the years ahead—or be left simply to wring our hands and react to crises.

The issue is this: Are we willing to commit sufficient resources to the defense of our interests and the promotion of our ideals abroad? The issue was raised again by the decision last week on Capitol Hill to lop off still more of the funds we budget to help other countries bolster their security, develop their economies, and help their people to survive. In less than 90 days, FY 1980 will be over. We've gone all this time with no aid appropriation for 1980. We've limped along at last year's spending levels. The practical effect has been deep cuts in critical programs and projects. Now we have a supplemental appropriation. It belatedly funds a few of the most urgent activities—but then excludes all the others. This is not a solution. It has simply prolonged much of the problem.

Consider just a few examples of what we are forced to neglect because of the delay and the deletions I have mentioned.

- There is currently a serious shortage in Export-Import Bank lending authority, a vehicle to promote American trade. That means fewer American jobs and reduced American profits.

- Foreign military credit sales are curtailed—credits that could have been used in areas of the world important to our security. Can anyone look at Soviet activism in the world and conclude that this is the time to neglect the security needs of our friends?

- The international military education and training program—a program that increases the professionalism of military officers in developing countries—has been cut by 25%.

- We are funding international narcotics control efforts at 20% below the amount approved earlier by a conference of the House and Senate. This is not a large program, but it serves our interests

by attacking the drug problem that costs the American people billions each year in crime, in lost health, and in ravaged lives.

- We have to absorb serious cuts in the Agency for International Development's (AID) programs to promote food production, rural development, and nutrition. Projects in the Caribbean, in Kenya, and in North Yemen are among those in jeopardy.

- The multilateral programs are especially hard hit. Only 16% of what we owe the World Bank has been approved. Funding for the African Development Fund would drop 40% from the budgeted amount—inviting interpretations that America's concern for this important African institution is waning and reversing the steady improvement in our relations with Africa under President Carter. There is also a serious deficiency in funds for the Asian Development Bank.

When we fall short in our contributions to these banks, development—and people—suffer. Our influence in the banks suffers. Our ability to get others to contribute suffers. Ultimately, our diplomacy suffers. Our contributions to the banks are not simply invented by the

. . . if we are to continue to lead, then we must be prepared to pay the costs that leadership requires.

Administration; they are negotiated. The Carter Administration has been scrupulous about consulting the Congress at every stage of those negotiations. When the funds are then cut, developing countries lose help they desperately need. And in the process, other contributors—our allies and friends—lose confidence in America's word.

I am not here simply to mourn the fate of a single aid bill, though in these times that would be cause enough for concern. What concerns me even more is a pattern. There is no lack of rhetoric calling for more American leadership in the world—leadership we must continue to provide. But if we are to continue to lead, then we must be prepared to pay the costs that leadership requires.

Humanitarian Concerns

If this declining trend in foreign assistance persists, we will contribute to a human tragedy of massive proportions. For we should always keep in mind that these programs work to help people. Let me cite just a few examples.

- Between 1966 and 1972, AID helped design 250 clean water systems in rural villages in Thailand. The program was successful and continued by the Thai Government. Now 800 villages are served. As a result, water-borne disease—a major Third World killer—has declined. At the same time, incomes have climbed and village life is more stable.

- In another case, AID started a credit system in Colombia enabling small farmers to take advantage of land reform. In a 15-year span, almost 35,000 small farms in Colombia have been financed. AID has sponsored similar programs throughout the Third World.

- An AID program in rural Guatemala has stressed improved teacher training and better school equipment. Through this program, the dropout rate in participating rural schools has been cut by over 30%.

Viewed from a distance no single project is dramatic. But for the people helped, even small projects are transforming lives. And the cumulative global impact is profound.

Impact on U.S. Interests

Let me emphasize that these programs involve far more than our humanitarian instincts. They bear strongly on our national interests. For the fact is that we have a deep and growing stake in developing countries. We cannot get along without them—as trading partners and markets; as sources of essential materials; as necessary partners in efforts to address pollution and population, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and countless other issues touching all of our lives. We want them to progress because we care about people. We also want them to succeed because our own economic health is bound up with theirs.

Our economic support funds—a central element in our security assistance—have been essential to our efforts to help strengthen the economies of such friends as Israel, Egypt, and Turkey. These funds also have provided major support for our effort to help bring stability and peaceful change to southern Africa.

There is nothing mysterious about the purpose of our international programs. It is an approach that makes sense in the world just as it does in our

businesses, our families, or in any other aspect of our lives. Anticipating a problem and dealing with it is invariably safer and cheaper than waiting for crisis to erupt.

It is in our interest to do all we can now to counter the conditions that are likely to drive people to desperation later. It costs less to invest now in clean water systems than to work later at curing the diseases caused by foul water. It is prudent to help people toward agricultural self-sufficiency, instead of offering later emergency programs needed to sustain life against drought and famine. We could rather send technicians abroad to help grow crops than send soldiers to fight the wars that can result when people are hungry and susceptible to exploitation by others. So let there be no mistake. By slashing these international programs we are not saving money. We are merely postponing and dramatically increasing the costs that one day will come due.

These programs are important for another reason. With them, we have an opportunity to influence events in crucial areas of the world. Without them, our power to shape events is drastically diminished. All of us are concerned—and rightly so—that we not slip into military weakness. We are steadily modernizing our military posture. Yet cutting back our other international programs contributes to another kind of weakness, every bit as dangerous. It cuts back our arsenal of influence. Our support for liberty in the world—our defense of American and Western interests—cannot be mounted with military weapons alone. The battle for American influence in the world requires more than rockets, certainly more than rhetoric. It requires the resources that make our diplomacy effective.

Consequences

What are the likely consequences for America if we lack those resources? The first consequence is American isolation. We need healthy trading partners. We need access to facilities and resources. We need the support of others in helping to achieve peaceful alternatives to regional conflicts. We need political support—whether it be in resisting terrorism in Iran or aggression in Afghanistan. But we cannot expect the cooperation and support of others on issues of importance to us if we are unprepared to offer concrete support on matters of importance to them—particularly their own economic development and social progress.

Isolation would be only one consequence. Declining American aid, and declining American influence, would also help the Soviets exploit internal instability—in Nicaragua, in El Salvador, and in many other places where the Soviets are prepared to exploit tensions to expand their power and to limit Western influence. Nothing that I know of the American people suggests to me that they want to give the Soviets this kind of free ride. I believe the American people want their nation to resist Soviet expansionism—not

All of us are concerned—and rightly so—that we not slip into military weakness. . . . Yet cutting back our other international programs contributes to another kind of weakness, every bit as dangerous. It cuts back our arsenal of influence.

only militarily but by helping other nations defend their freedom and feed their people. I believe the American people want their nation to be actively involved in the world.

Finally, the decline of American aid and influence would hamper our efforts to settle dangerous disputes and build peaceful, democratic solutions.

Let me give you an example. Over the past 3 years, many in the Congress fought bitterly against President Carter's Rhodesian policy. President Carter—courageously and almost alone—insisted that the United States actively support Britain's effort to bring a democratically elected government to Rhodesia. Fortunately President Carter prevailed against bitter opposition. In fact, his refusal to compromise prematurely on Rhodesia helped bring to an end a bloody civil war in that country. The result has been good for the people of Zimbabwe and bad for the Soviets, who sought to exploit turmoil there.

Consider another case. We have been trying for a year and more to strengthen the center in Nicaragua to help moderate there resist extremist solutions. Every time we tried to appropriate the funds necessary to support our efforts in Nicaragua, the effort was defeated. Finally, Congress has acted to make possible \$75 million needed to fulfill our commitment. But in the delay, we suffered a loss of credibility. The willingness of the United States to work for democracy was called into question throughout the region.

The point is this: Those most concerned about Soviet and Cuban activism in the world should be the strongest supporters of our efforts to support the moderate transition from repressive tyranny to democratic development. For by failing to support the alternatives to radicalism, we help radicalism to breed.

This continuing assault on foreign assistance is not only short sighted; it is dangerous to American interests. For it threatens the capacity of the United States to play a positive role in the world,

to compete effectively with the Soviets, to encourage emerging—and threatened—democracies. It threatens to strip America of all its instruments except the instruments of destruction.

I believe that the American people, if they have the facts, will understand what is at stake. I believe they will understand that a generous investment in security assistance and economic development abroad is necessary to a strong America.

I am not new to this issue. Twenty-two years ago I made my support for international assistance a centerpiece of my first Senate campaign. And I am fully prepared to press the message until it gets through.

I think it is time for a healthy national debate on this subject. And I invite you, as citizens vitally concerned with America's role in the world, to contribute to that debate. The price of silence could be growing isolation and even irrelevance for America. That is a price no American should want us to pay.

¹Press release 175 (opening paragraphs omitted). ■

Question-and-Answer Session Following Foreign Policy Association Address

At the conclusion of the Secretary's address before the Foreign Policy Association on July 7, 1980 (see previous article), he answered the following questions which had been earlier given to a moderator to ask at this time.¹

Q. To what extent do you favor American aid being channeled through multinational organizations, thereby diffusing or obscuring our specific contributions?

And secondly, what is your position on aiding countries whose regimes either on the right or on the left fail to meet our particular standards of human rights or decent policies?

A. With respect to the first question, I think that a mixture of multinational aid/bilateral aid is probably the most realistic approach to the aid problem. I have seen a number of instances in which bilateral aid is the only realistic alternative—both because of the size of the program that is involved and because of the nature of our relationship with the client country.

But I must say this about the multinational programs: When those developed—and I've been in the Senate long enough to remember that early birth and development—they were regarded as possibly an easy way for Members of Congress to support aid programs and also divorce them from the political maneuvering that it was always assumed took place between us and the recipient countries. Well, it hasn't worked that way.

As I have observed, these multinational programs in the congressional budget process, because they are sort of depersonalized, disassociated from the recipient countries—disassociated on the record from the positive benefits that our money is desired to achieve—they tend to have less support rather than more. I gave you the figures on the World Bank—it's down to 16%. We're way behind on our contributions and our commitments.

I would hope that we can somehow—maybe not beginning with this speech, the inadequacy of which I'm only too aware—you know, I'd like to get out on the stump and speak as a politician about these aid programs. I

think that the people at the grassroots of America don't understand them. The multinational programs are important, I think, as a way of combining the resources of all of the member countries to do a more effective job, but I don't think they are a complete substitute for the obligation of each country, with the wealth and the resources available to it, of undertaking an additional share of the burden.

[As to your second question] it is not always easy to make a judgment as to whether the right or the left is in control in a particular country—and, indeed, the situation may be a slippery one, as in the case of Central America at the present time.

One needs only to read the transcripts of the debates in the Senate to get the impression that from one group of Senators, opposition to the AID [Agency for International Development] program will have the effect of undermining and undercutting democratic impulses in the country, and on the other side you'll get the opposite argument.

When you have countries like Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala undertaking to struggle from the present into the future and you have pressures from both the right and the left, it is never clear at any given moment which may be in the ascendancy. And what I'm pleading for here, really, in those kinds of situations is the authority and the resources necessary to try to influence situations of that kind so that the result will be a moderate, hopefully increasingly democratic and open, society. But it won't come overnight, and we've got to be willing to make the investment—and we're going to lose some and we're going to win some; but if we're not in the game, we're going to lose them all.

Q. Do you foresee any possibility that arms limitations talks with the Soviet Union could be resumed while Soviet troops remain in Afghanistan?

And do you foresee a particular formula for a compromise on that issue; for example, in return for a U.S.-Chinese commitment not to supply arms to rebels, would the Soviets be willing, in your view, to at least begin moving out seriously from Afghanistan?

A. As to the first question, I don't like to use the word "linkage" or the word "connection," but there is, obviously, a relationship between the two national objectives; one to achieve a reversal of Soviet policy in Afghanistan, and two, to achieve arms control—hopefully, the ratification of SALT II, but the calendar is running out on us there.

The simple fact is that the votes for ratification are not present in the Senate at the present time. I think we had a fighting chance of getting ratification before the invasion of Afghanistan, but that chance disappeared, and it is not existent at the moment, so that I can't conceive of being able to rally the necessary support of the Senate to achieve ratification of SALT II unless there is a significant change in Soviet behavior. Even then, one would need time in order to feel the impact of that development politically.

Does that mean then that we should abandon the SALT process in arms control? Not at all. I think we need to press for that goal, which is even more important given the invasion of Afghanistan, in a sense, than it was before. The Soviets revealed that inclination to cross borders directly with their own troops.

The effect of Afghanistan, of course, is to escalate the possibility of confrontation between our two countries, and in that kind of an environment, the limitation of arms, especially nuclear arms, is an important objective for each country. The difficulty is, how do we achieve it? While we are butting heads on the Afghanistan issue, how do we achieve, at the same time, a viable and credible negotiating posture on SALT? No one, to my knowledge, has come up with a solution to that problem. But I think we need to press and continually make clear that both are important national objectives and that one does not yield to the other at this point.

Whether or not there is in process politics at the international level is a dynamic force just as it is at the domestic level, and there are just the slightest kinds of signs that there may be movement. Whether the movement will occur within any particular time-frame, I don't think can be said. But there is dialogue going on; it's very tentative at the present time.

Mr. Schmidt [Chancellor Schmidt of West Germany] brought back a Soviet reaction on theater nuclear weapons connected to the SALT process that we are studying—and these are

complex questions. The SALT process is a complex process; but nevertheless, the Soviets changed their position, which was that the West must agree to reverse its decision to deploy the Pershing missile before they would consider talks. Now they have dropped that precondition, and who knows?

We may have something underway, but I do not mean—and would not want—to raise expectations about that possibility with this answer. It's simply that there has been a change. What its forecasts is very difficult at the moment to judge.

Q. There is much disillusionment, as you know of course, with the current grain embargo—it doesn't seem to be doing much good. Would you foresee an early lifting of that embargo, and in general, how do you feel, as a matter of principle and philosophy, about using trade as a weapon in our relations with the Soviets?

A. Trade is less lethal than other options that might be available to us.

With respect to the effectiveness of the embargo, it was effective in the current harvest year, which is about to end. I think we denied the Soviets at least 10 million metric tons of grain that they otherwise would have used to improve their peoples' diets and also to let the meat cycle geared up in order to increase the meat share of the Soviet diet. We deprived them of 10 million metric tons.

Obviously, the effectiveness of an embargo can be influenced by the harvest. We have very good ways of measuring the projected harvests worldwide, and we will continue to monitor. I think it would not be useful to try to prejudge what the final answer would be.

Our view is that the policy ought to be retained. Its effectiveness would be affected by the harvest, but the policy, as a demonstration of our disapproval of Soviet policy in Afghanistan, I think, is an important part of the total. Whether or not it will yield under the pressures of the farmers of the Midwest—if the harvest proved, as suggested, would not be effective—I'm not prepared to answer at the present time.

With respect to the appropriateness of particular responses to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, obviously, given the geography of the situation and the gravity of the problem, the logistical problems that are posed, the options are not all that many. The grain embargo happened to

be a very useful and available weapon, or tool, because the Soviet harvest last year was about 178 million metric tons compared to their need for about 210, so it was, obviously, a very useful instrument for us to express our disapproval and make the Soviets pay some price for their action.

The Olympic boycott I thought, and still think, was a very useful way for the West to indicate to the Soviets that their behavior was unacceptable. But the Olympics will come and go and we'll forget about that in a couple of months.

The other areas in which we can impose a cost upon the Soviets are, one, technology transfers—and that to me is very important and it is an area in which there will be disagreement probably among our alliance associates, but nevertheless, we've held the line pretty well with them up to now, and I hope we can continue to do so—and secondly, the alliance—both our NATO allies in Europe and ourselves—is “beefing up” our defenses in response to Afghanistan. That surely must impact on the Soviets and their planning.

They don't have an economy as large as ours. They are having economic problems, as we are. And the prospect of an arms race—if that is, indeed, what is triggered by the present situation—can't be too welcome in Soviet leadership circles.

In addition to that, they have run into some very sticky problems in trying to pacify Afghanistan, so they are paying some costs, and very serious and heavy costs. There is some indication that they are looking for a way to relieve the burden of those costs and at the same time perhaps back off from their policy, while at the same time saving face. And again, I don't raise expectations about that.

Q. Having recently been in Venice, I wonder whether you could give us your view of the current situation, current condition, of the alliance, specifically whether you feel that the unity, or at least the appearance of unity, that was achieved in Venice would require us to give a bit more than the Europeans.

A. With respect to NATO issues as such—and by that I mean the purposes for which NATO was created, the defense of Western Europe and the Atlantic community—the alliance, I think, has rarely, if ever, been stronger, and there is very little disagreement.

It is with respect to issues that lie outside the NATO territory that one begins to find differences of opinion—

Iran, Afghanistan, Persian Gulf policy, and so on. These are the issues that create differences of opinion, but I don't think necessarily that they are destructive of unity.

One sees differences of agreement. I have met several times now in 60 days with the four Foreign Ministers. Germany, France, Britain, and the United States have met with the other three at the summit. I met with the 16 at the NATO Foreign Ministers meeting at Ankara; I met with the ASEAN [Association of South East Asian Nations] Foreign Ministers at Kuala Lumpur. And of course, there are differences of opinion, differences of perspective.

I like it when the discussions are healthy and vigorous, not when they are meekly submissive. I find that that is the inclination on the part of others as well. I know of two or three instances in which our allies have backed off positions about which they felt strongly in order to support our position.

That doesn't happen for any reason but that the feeling that this was a time for the alliance to be solid, to be united whenever possible, and they are all, of course, very much concerned to deal with this image of alliance disarray that one reads about in the press all the time. I don't find that kind of disarray. I mean, I come from the Senate, of course, which sets benchmarks of disarray. [Laughter]

And there is nothing in the alliance which measures up to disarray in the U.S. Senate, so if I have a gentler view about this picture of alliance disarray, you may understand. But even the Senate agrees from time to time: They agree to adjourn [laughter] and they agree to come back again after the conventions.

You know, there are a lot of tough questions that you can agree about. It's the easy ones that create disarray.

Q. You are about to go to Japan—and, of course, the occasion is purely ceremonial. Nonetheless, it has happened in the past that a certain amount of business will be discussed at funerals or after funerals. Do you intend to raise any substantive matters with the Japanese, especially I would ask you in relation to the automobile trade issue?

A. There are ongoing discussions with respect to issues such as that, and they should continue. I would be hesitant to make the ceremonial occasion a special focus on specific issues of that kind, especially with the Japanese.

The Secretary

I believe strongly that the President should go to Japan for this occasion. Japan is a very strong ally—one of our strongest—and it is disposed to be cooperative. It is for the purpose of indicating his appreciation for Mr. Ohira's cooperation as an ally and indicating our friendship toward the Japanese people and our desire to reach common ground wherever we can that the President has done this.

His strongest impulse was one of friendship. Mr. Ohira had struck up a very close personal friendship, and these other plusses, reasons for making the trip are secondary. But I would not consider it a time to get involved in—a matter of fact, there won't be the time. We'll be there 1 day. There will be several meetings connected with the funeral, and then we're going to meet with the Chinese Premier, and then we have to get back home.

Q. Turning for a moment to the Middle East, has anything changed in the situation since the visit of King Hussein to Washington? And are we any closer to recognizing, or feeling the need to recognize, the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization]?

A. What we must do at some point, of course, is to broaden the negotiating base to include representatives of the Palestinian people and the other countries in the area. For the moment, that broadening doesn't seem to be possible.

We continue to have dialogue, of course, with countries such as Jordan, and we find that useful so that we can, from time to time, make clear to each other precisely what our attitudes and perceptions of the moment may be. I thought his visit here was useful in that respect. It did not produce a formula for broadening negotiations or for reaching the final agreement in the Camp David process.

These meetings also are useful to us, I think, in making it clear, not only to Israel, Egypt, and the American public but to other countries—those in the area and so on—that we are going to persist in the Camp David process.

One point that strikes me about it all more than anything else is that this is the only time in the whole history of the Middle East that Palestinian rights and Israeli security have been on the agenda of the negotiating process. I hear all these complaints from Arab countries, from the left to the right, from European friends, and from others that we're not getting anywhere. This is the only process that has gotten anywhere.

We are now head-to-head on the toughest issues—those dealing with autonomy—and any diversionary tactics that tend to pull the parties back from that confrontation sets back the time of the possibility of reaching agreement. Not that it is going to be easy to reach decisions with respect to

autonomy, the rights of Palestinians, and the security of the Israelis, but that process has got to continue. And at some point, if the parties manage to press that process to an agreement, then the challenge will be to broaden the negotiating base to bring in others. You can't really settle Palestinian rights altogether in a negotiating process which does not include them—although I hasten to add that they have been invited, and the Camp David process certainly provides for their inclusion.

But I think we are going to have to achieve something more by way of agreement—especially with respect to autonomy—before we can have any prospect of broadening the base. And it is for the purpose of improving the possibilities of broadening the base at some point that it is important that we meet with King Hussein and others in the area from time to time.

It is a very tough, frustrating experience, but when I think of all that has happened since President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, all the progress that has been made, I find it difficult to understand why all that should be thrown away for some ambiguous, unstructured alternative that is usually offered for the purpose of diverting attention from the process, rather than supporting its objectives.

¹Press release 175A. ■

The 58th Secretary

In the July BULLETIN, we published a brief biographic sketch of Secretary Muskie which stated that he was the 57th Secretary of State. That was an error—Secretary Muskie is the 58th Secretary. We neglected to count James G. Blaine twice; he served two nonconsecutive terms. ■

Secretary Attends NATO Meeting in Turkey; Consults With ASEAN in Malaysia

After accompanying President Carter on his state visit to Italy and the economic summit in Venice, Secretary Muskie attended the regular semi-annual session of the North Atlantic Council in Ankara June 25-26, 1980. From Ankara he traveled to Kuala Lumpur to consult with the members of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) June 27-29 before returning to Washington on June 29.

Following are the Secretary's arrival statement in Ankara, a briefing for American press, a statement at the opening of the North Atlantic Council meeting, a statement at a meeting with ASEAN Foreign Ministers, and the questions the Secretary answered at a joint ASEAN news conference, as well as the North Atlantic Council final communiqué and NATO Foreign Ministers' declaration of June 26.¹

ARRIVAL STATEMENT, ANKARA, JUNE 24, 1980

As I say that I am delighted to be here in Ankara for the spring meeting of the North Atlantic Council, and I am particularly pleased to be in Turkey, a longtime ally and a valued friend whose dedication to democracy and courage in dealing with the real challenge has commanded the admiration and support of us all.

NATO is an alliance of democratic nations with common values and shared purposes, and we find ourselves working together at a time when East-West relations are under severe strain. The unified declaration yesterday, out of the Venice summit, with respect to Afghanistan—the restatement of the complete unacceptability of that invasion and the requirement that there be complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan before normal relations with the Soviet Union can be continued—I think is a significant demonstration of allied unity and solidarity with respect to that issue. We will, of course, discuss the NATO response to that invasion in the course of these discussions here in Ankara.

In addition to that, we will discuss the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] meeting in Madrid, which involves the Soviet Union as well as ourselves, demonstrating our commitment to continuing the basic

framework of our relationships with the Soviet Union, in dealing with areas in which we have a common interest.

In addition to that, here in Ankara, we will discuss the prospects for arms control which, of course, have been diminished by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. So I look forward to these meetings with my colleagues in the North Atlantic Council, as well as to bilateral meetings with several of them on subjects of mutual interest.

BRIEFING FOR AMERICAN PRESS, ANKARA, JUNE 24, 1980²

With respect to the Turkish bilateral, as you know both Prime Minister Demirel and Foreign Minister Erkmén participated. Among other things, I got an interesting look at Turkish politics and votes of censure and a Turkish form of filibuster. Anyway we thought the vote was going to take place this afternoon at 3 o'clock—it's going to take place in 2 or 3 days after Demirel is reasonably assured that he has got the votes, and I got the feeling that he probably already has them.

We covered the usual issues including the state of the NATO alliance, and especially after the eastern flank, got into the question of Greek reintegration into the military structure of NATO which both Greece and Turkey now support. A few details have to be worked out on the military side which are Gen. Rogers' [Gen. Bernard Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe] responsibility. I would expect, therefore, that there will be an intensified effort to resolve those issues in order to promote reintegration. That, of course, will also involve a new agreement with Greece on our bases in Greece. We have already negotiated a defense and economic agreement with Turkey which Mr. Demirel told me the Turkish Parliament is certain to ratify, so we are all set on that end. The reintegration of Greece is not without its problems. But both sides seem to be very positive and completely supportive of the goal of reintegration as essential to reordering and strengthening the eastern flank of the NATO defense structure. So I thought that was very useful and constructive.

With respect to Turkey, of course, there are other problems—the Turkish economy—and I think you are all familiar with the effort being made by the European allies, under the leadership of Chancellor Schmidt, to put together an economic package of grants and loans and credits of one kind or another on the order of \$1.1 billion I think the first year, \$1.1 billion the second year, and I think the third year and fourth year about half a billion apiece. It is a rather substantial package. It has been carefully integrated. It also includes International Monetary Fund standards that Turkey is asked to meet with respect to its economic plan. As the Prime Minister told me, their objective is to create a strong Turkey—strong economically and strong militarily—as the eastern flank of NATO. Of course, in the light of developments in Afghanistan, that's an important goal and an objective which we thoroughly share.

I raised the Cyprus question with the Prime Minister. I share the frustration of others that the communal talks, which were initiated under Waldheim's direction in the United Nations, do not seem to be moving. You can drop the "seem;" they are not moving. I was interested in getting the perspectives of both Turkey and Greece on why they are not meeting, and they are doing what so often happens—arguing about not literally the shape of the table but the agenda and how they get to the agenda and whether agreeing to the agenda prejudices their positions on substance. It's one of those frustrating games that I've played for so many years in House/Senate conferences.

I thought it was a good discussion in each case and maybe we opened up some possibilities for movement that will be productive, but I don't like to raise expectations in that connection. It was a good opportunity for me to get a good feel for the difficulties that are involved in getting these two countries to talk about almost any subject. At least we do have that NATO reintegration about which they are in agreement, and perhaps if we can make progress on that in the reasonably near future that might open the prospects of dealing with other problems.

On the hostage situation in Iran, I discussed that with the Prime Minister. As a matter of fact, I think he raised that subject first. He expressed his concern, number one, at the gross violation of international law, and they have been as outspoken as any country on that point, though they are in a difficult position to get involved in sanctions. But I think that, nevertheless, the hostage situation inhibits the relationships of all countries with Iran in this area and in Europe, and that is bound to have a negative effect on Iran's prospects for using its relationship with potential or actual trading partners to improve the lot of its people. That really is what we're trying to focus on, and I suggested to the Prime Minister that he might find an opportunity, given the fact that Turkey is a neighbor of Iran, to use his influence in a way that would be helpful in achieving our goal.

With respect to the bilateral with the Greek Foreign Minister, we spent, I think, all of our time on the three subjects I've already mentioned. It was a good talk, very positive talk, on reintegration, on Cyprus, and on the American bases in Greece. Incidentally, on that agreement—on the new base agreement—although obviously that subject is tied to reintegration, they are agreeable to moving forward on both lines, so that hopefully both could be concluded at the same time and go into effect at the same time.

Q. How do you expect the question of reintegration to come up here in NATO in the next couple of days? Will you simply discuss it? Will you give us some plans [inaudible]?

A. I think it is important to discuss it, but I think that really, although it has political overtones it is better to emphasize the military nature of the problems in order to minimize others.

Q. It's a technical point, but do the differences really come down to what degree of control Greece and Turkey would have over the Aegean Sea area?

A. I don't like to answer any questions like that. It's not altogether control. I don't like to characterize it at all. But obviously NATO defense forces have to move through the air space and in the Aegean and defense forces involve forces of each of these two countries. It gets to be a sticky matter to try to identify the areas in a way which avoids political implications—if I make myself reasonably unclear.

Q. What can NATO, as an alliance or even the NATO countries as individuals, do about Afghanistan that they are not already doing?

A. The defense buildup, which certainly isn't completed—it's a commitment at 3% real growth. In addition, in phase II of the agreement that was worked out in Brussels in May, there will be identified additional initiatives that the alliance can take to make, in effect, the American response to any additional, any other Soviet move, more flexible—in other words a shifting of resources.

Q. I was going to ask you about where we stood on the military facilities in that area. We announced a tentative agreement with Oman. I gather with Kenya we never really had any real problem, but what's going to happen with Somalia? The last I heard was that they were asking for a lot of military aid without giving any guarantees it wouldn't be used against Ethiopia. Are we going to drop that one?

A. In the first place, we never set a target with three bases.

Q. Three? The President made—

A. No. If I may state it as I understand it, I was not involved in that. There are three countries with which we explored the possibilities of using three bases. I don't think the strategic judgment was made in advance that we needed three bases or these three bases nor was there any judgment as to how many we might be able to negotiate. What was undertaken was the talks with all three. We've signed an agreement with Oman, we've signed the one with Kenya, so now there is the question of whether or not we need a third, and whether or not, if we do, the terms that are under discussion with Somalia—and there is not agreement on them—are adequate. Third, there is, of course, the political situation in the area which is something less than trouble free.

All those questions are being examined. [After the press briefing the following clarification was issued: It should be stressed that negotiations with Somalia are continuing. As to Kenya we have made good progress, but a formal agreement has not yet been concluded.]

Q. The President said yesterday that he wouldn't be going to east Jerusalem if Mr. Begin moves his offices there. Will the American Am-

bassador be permitted to call on the Prime Minister in east Jerusalem?

A. It's a very hypothetical question that you're asking.

Q. If they move, it's not hypothetical; it's very real.

A. I know, but isn't the word "if" hypothetical?

Q. Not from what they're saying

A. I haven't seen anything in any of the cable traffic. I can't even characterize it. I haven't seen a statement in the cable traffic which quotes Mr. Begin as saying: "I'm going to move my offices to east Jerusalem next week." I haven't seen anything like that.

Q. Have you asked him if he is going to?

A. He hasn't been on the trip. No. I made the speech in Washington—how long ago is it, 6 months?—that unilateral acts on the part of either party are not useful. I would hope that both sides have taken note of that. Sometimes you find Mr. Begin restating some goal which he has stated in the past in a way which makes it sound like a new one but which necessarily isn't accompanied by action. So I like to be perfectly clear what he has said—and if it suggests a question and precisely what action and when—before I comment. If I prejudge him on something that's less than that then I get telephone calls. I like to be very careful and precise in my reactions to these things.

Q. Should we take this as an indication that you have some indication that perhaps this is not going to happen or just that you want to wait and see?

A. We simply see nothing in the cable traffic that confirms or explains or describes what is reported to have been said by Mr. Begin. I have been trying to find out. We just haven't found anything.

Q. Actually the stories don't quote Begin on this subject. It just says that he has gone ahead with the building, and it might be completed about 3 months.

A. I'd have to have more facts. It's just not useful to comment or characterize these things until I have the facts.

Q. Just so we can triangulate backward, if he were, that would be a unilateral act as defined in your speech?

A. You guys are pretty good with interpretations.

Q. Now that you've had a few days to mull it over and get the Venice matters all over, and you start gain with NATO, do you have any more of an assessment as to what the impact is going to be of this Russian partial withdrawal, or announced partial withdrawal, from Afghanistan? How is he going to play it from here?

A. I think, first of all, you have to get the facts as to whether or not there has been a net reduction of troops, and want to shift your attention away from the word "withdrawal." There's evidence that there was a troop buildup. It's not hard evidence yet—within the last 2 weeks—and now the announcement by the Russians of a withdrawal is really the movement of something less than the number that they're talking about—according to our best estimate—just across the border, where there have been 40,000 Russian troops all along, that could be moved in any time. So that the question is not whether or not there's been this movement but whether this movement represents a net reduction in Russian forces in the area. We don't have any evidence to suggest that there is. I don't want to discourage the possibility, I said this morning, because if that's the way their thinking is tending I wouldn't want to throw cold water on it, but I just don't think you've got very much to go on as yet. What I said in what I thought was a guarded moment but don't believe what you don't see [laughter].

Q. What would be your reasoning here? Why would you judge the Soviets went through the routine this week with Giscard [President Giscard d'Estaing of France], if they did not intend to do [inaudible]?

A. It would have been a good time for them if they could make it credible, influence the attendance at the Olympic Games, which aren't too far off. It might be a good time to throw the allies into confusion at the Venice summit. It may be the best card they had to play. Their instincts would be to try to throw a curve ball into the summit or to improve attendance at the Olympics. I'd have no real way of reading what was on their minds. It may be that they've tried to characterize a routine movement of troops, that didn't seem to be relevant to the

kind of fighting that they're doing in Afghanistan, into a withdrawal that would tend to promote divisiveness among the allies. It didn't have that effect, even for a moment, so if that's what they meant to do, that's one thing.

But the second question really is, whatever the facts are as to troop reduction rather than troop movement or withdrawal, what would really be significant is whether this was followed by something further by way of troop reduction. And assume that this were a reduction of 5,000 men, if that's what it was, or 10,000, if that's it, and the remaining numbers—which would then be about 120,000 troops—remained in the area, it wouldn't have much significance.

Q. You said something else at the airport this morning. You said that there's no prospects of further disarmament—I'm paraphrasing but I think it's accurate—agreements as long as the Soviet troops are in Afghanistan. Does that mean there is now a de facto freeze on MBFR [mutual and balanced force reductions] and the Geneva talks and all the rest of it?

A. Then that was a slip of the tongue. Did I say that?

Q. I'm going to go look. [Laughter] I thought the words you used were set back or slow or delay.

A. Whatever I may have said—check that—diminished.

Q. That's a fair difference between them going to end.

A. Yes, obviously they have diminished.

Q. Does it mean, in effect, that there is no real chance of any advance?

A. That's hard to say. I'd have to say as of the situation at the moment, because if arms control agreements depend on ratification of SALT II, the simple fact is that at this moment the votes aren't there in the Senate.

Q. How do you see it as a politician and as a presidential issue? I mean, will it be in Carter's interest to campaign on a ratification issue, saying, if he were reelected, he would push for it after the election?

A. I know he believes very deeply about pursuing it.

Q. What do you think the votes are on it?

A. I don't recall the last poll I saw on arms control but I think there continues to be a strong impulse for moving in that direction that could be developed and built up into support of arms control. My own personal view is that it should be.

That doesn't necessarily mean that by the time you generate the public support necessary to put the votes together in the Senate that SALT II would necessarily be relevant. You all are familiar with the time constraints that press on SALT II. If you couldn't get ratification by next spring then the calendar would be close to having run out on SALT II. And so it would be a question of whether you renegotiate SALT II or whether you proceed to SALT III, taking into account the failure to ratify SALT II. Whether you could persuade the Russians to do that is a very iffy question, so you get off into a wildly speculative area. I would say that it is important and in the public interest to underline and to emphasize the importance of achieving arms control agreements with the Soviet Union. I think that that point should be made independently of how it's to be implemented, strongly enough so that people don't lose sight of the importance of the goal.

On a parallel track, obviously you've got to talk about the SALT II agreement, the SALT process, the SALT III, but you ought not to get so confused that if the calendar runs out on you with respect to SALT II that people throw up their hands on arms control. I just think arms control is critical, especially when we find ourselves in a posture of confrontation with the Soviet Union, uncertain as to what their ultimate intentions are, uncertain as to where they're likely to go next. It's in the interest of both countries. After all, we reached an arms control agreement with the Soviet Union when we were up to our necks in Vietnam and having just mined Haiphong Harbor. Mr. Nixon was welcomed in Moscow in order to pursue arms control in the interest of both sides. If we're going to fight each other, we ought to do so with something less than nuclear weapons.

That's oversimplifying the thing, but nevertheless I think the President believes this deeply about it, and I'd be surprised if the issue doesn't emerge in the campaign, but maybe in two forms—one, the importance of arms control, two, what you do about SALT II as the immediate item on the agenda.

Q. On that second point, what about a lame duck session of Congress—post-November?

A. It all depends on whether public opinion, public support, for an arms control agreement has intensified sufficiently to influence Members of the Senate, and also the environment as between us and the Soviet Union, what it then is. I think we've got to keep looking for an opening, keep searching for it, keep probing for it, keep selling the idea, keep promoting it, and we just can't stop where we are.

Q. How active would you become if this becomes a presidential issue between Mr. Carter and Mr. Reagan? How much of your duties and time would be devoted to making speeches in favor of SALT, possibly addressing a Democratic convention on that issue?

A. I have no political calendar. I think that it's important for me to talk about SALT and these other issues. That, as you all know, is one of the reasons that the President selected me to discuss foreign policy as Secretary of State, not as a campaigner.

Q. One parallel with the arms control thing, would we be prepared to enter into discussions on a neutralization formula for Afghanistan before withdrawal or as a withdrawal precondition?

A. I think that withdrawal is a precondition to any political settlement. Otherwise—to use the Afghan proposal as a specific example—there the Russian proposal is that we reach a political settlement and then talk about withdrawal, which puts withdrawal entirely in the hands of the Russians, as it is now. Whether or not there is some way of accommodating the two so that both objectives can be achieved at the same time is a legitimate question. I don't have any formula in mind for that. I think you have to stress the importance of withdrawal—total withdrawal—as essential to any resolution of the problem.

Q. Nothing emerges yet of the Giscard or anybody else's two-way track discussions leading to withdrawal and the settlement?

A. No evidence of that. Giscard's discussions with Brezhnev by and large were an opportunity for him, which he asserted, to indicate to Brezhnev that the invasion of Afghanistan was com-

pletely unacceptable to the French and that relationships between the two would be impacted until it was reversed.

Q. Do you expect the French to be pushing for some sort of endorsement of their proposal for a security conference in Europe? What kind of a reaction would you give that?

A. I don't know whether they put it on the table for the Madrid meeting or not, but we expect it to be discussed in Madrid. I mean, the invasion of Afghanistan took place after that, so just what the relationship of the two may be, we may get some clues as to that at this meeting.

Q. You don't know whether they're still pressing that actively?

A. They have not withdrawn it, but they expect to take it up, I think, at Madrid and in that sense, they may be pressing it actively. But it has not been raised in any discussion I've had with the French Foreign Minister.

Q. Would the United States be willing to favor that?

A. We've got it under consideration, and we have not turned it down. We have some reservations about creating another security forum. On the other hand, we like to be forthcoming with our allies. There is nothing more divisive than to totally reject the viability of a difference of opinion in NATO relations.

Q. Are you expecting any specific problems with the allies at this meeting, such as second thoughts on stationing nuclear missiles in certain countries?

A. I expect problems wherever I go as Secretary of State, but nothing special.

Q. The President and the Chancellor [Schmidt of West Germany] told us vigorously on Sunday night [in Venice] that they had identical views now on theater nuclear forces, but it is not entirely clear to me what the identical view is. I wonder if you could [inaudible]?

A. We are all committed to the decision of last December to deploy the Pershing missile in accordance with the schedule agreed upon at that time—the construction to begin or the selection of sites to begin as soon thereafter as possible. Now this is what I understand to be the agreement last December, and it is still the agreement.

Q. Does that exclude feeling out some sort of—

A. You remember that as part of that same announcement, the allies suggested the possibility of negotiations on theater nuclear weapons, and that's still on the table and the Russians have rejected it.

Q. The site selection and site construction, is that part of deployment? Is that including deployment?

A. No, that's where the whole idea of a freeze gets caught up. It's easy to monitor construction. It's not easy to monitor deployment. In other words, if the sites have already been built, it's not easy to monitor the placing of missiles in them. So that what you have is the possibility of an asymmetrical result which puts us at a disadvantage. That's what that talk of a freeze was all about, unless the talk was about a unilateral freeze by the Soviets.

What do we freeze, if we freeze something? The question obviously arises that the Russians would do something, I suppose. But you might be put in the position of talking about freezing construction. We'd have to wait 3 years before we could begin site selection construction, and this is where the confusion arose. Now if the Russians would freeze deployment of their missiles—and one problem there is that if they did so in response to a request by us, that would have the effect of placing an imprimatur on the number they've already got, and that would put us in an asymmetrical disadvantage. It was a very confusing kind of dialogue that went on there that is now, as I understand it, clarified and straightened out.

STATEMENT BEFORE THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, ANKARA, JUNE 25, 1980³

I am privileged as honorary President of the North Atlantic Council to open our discussions with some remarks. It is a privilege that, notwithstanding my Senate background, I will not abuse with a long speech.

Let me first express our deep gratitude to the Government and people of Turkey for so graciously hosting these discussions. Turkey is a vital ally. It is a valued friend. It is confronting its serious economic and social challenges with courage and a devotion to democracy. For this it has not

only the admiration but the willing cooperation and strong support of its NATO allies.

These meetings continue the process of charting the long-term course for our alliance. The challenges we face today are demanding, as they have been repeatedly since the beginning of this great partnership. There will be differences among us, as there have always been. But let no one mistake our essential unity. We shall meet new challenges together as we have for more than 30 years.

The rapid growth of Soviet military forces for well over a decade and their demonstrated willingness to violate the sovereignty and assault the independence of another nation require an effective allied response—a concerted and sustained allied response.

- We must preserve the military balance in Europe, through full implementation of the defense decisions we have made.
- We must make unmistakably clear that aggression will be firmly opposed.
- We must continue our individual efforts to strengthen stability in the vital region of the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia and to support the independence of nations in the region.
- And together we must continue to reinforce the strength of one another so that every member can play its full role and make its own strong contributions to our collective security.

Our purpose is not confrontation; it is to diminish the danger of a global conflict. Our purpose is to strengthen the only basis on which detente can be sustained—deterrence of aggression and mutual restraint.

- With the prompt withdrawal of all Soviet forces, we are prepared to support a truly independent and unaligned Afghanistan, administered by a government acceptable to the Afghan people.
- The West is prepared to seek continued progress in limiting the deadly arsenals on both sides, through arms control based on equality. The United States will seek ratification of the SALT II Treaty when that objective is achievable, and we will abide by its terms so long as that practice is mutual. The Western side remains committed to progress in the mutual and balanced force reduction negotiations in Vienna. And the allies are ready to negotiate equal limits on long-range theater nuclear forces as we

proceed with the modernization steps we embarked upon in December. We cannot, however, accept the proposition that negotiations are possible only if NATO countries reverse their commitment to achieve a safer and more secure balance of these forces.

• Moreover, the allies are prepared to pursue a balanced and forthright dialogue at the CSCE meeting in Madrid. Madrid offers an important opportunity to review how well all of the 35 participating states have done in fulfilling commitments freely made in Helsinki 5 years ago. It offers an opportunity to consider new proposals for advancing the entire range of CSCE goals and to expand and strengthen confidence-building measures that are militarily significant, verifiable, and cover all of the European continent. Ultimately our efforts in Madrid must be measured by their tangible meaning for the daily lives of people throughout Europe—on their security, their freedom, and their ability to work with one another.

• And finally, let me reaffirm that the path to broader cooperation with the Soviet Union, to a lessening of tensions in Europe and elsewhere, is open when Soviet actions allow. The West is committed to a realistic search for common ground. But we all recognize that cooperation can be sustained only in an atmosphere of restraint, on a foundation of respect for the sovereignty and independence of others. We shall keep open our channels of communication with the Soviet Union—to make our own resolve absolutely clear and to pursue efforts that can genuinely contribute to stability.

This is a time of new testing of our alliance, as the West is confronted by new challenges to our security beyond our alliance boundaries, by new pressures on our political cohesion, by the continuing imperative of developing our defenses and maintaining the military balance.

For 30 years the history of our alliance has been a history of progress—progress in adjusting our thinking and our actions to meeting new challenges to our security. We have successfully reconciled the requirements of security and cohesion; for we are all democracies. Within our alliances, no less than within our nations, we are strengthened by free discussion in a framework of shared values and unshakeable trust. Today, as in previous meetings of this Council, we celebrate those values and that trust as we draw the benefits of our consultations.

**NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
FINAL COMMUNIQUE,
JUNE 26, 1980**

I.

1. The North Atlantic Council met in Ministerial session at Ankara on the 25th and 26th June 1980.

2. In reviewing the international situation, Ministers noted with concern that the past six months have been overshadowed by developments which challenge the foundations of stability in the world. The rules which govern relations between states are defined in the United Nations Charter: the violations of these rules have led to tensions which are prejudicial to the understanding and trust which ought to govern relations between states. Ministers underlined the opposition of their governments to threat or use of force and they reaffirmed their commitment to the peaceful settlement of international disputes. They considered it particularly important in present circumstances to reaffirm their determination to work together for the achievement of the fundamental ideals and aims of the Atlantic Alliance; national independence, security, human rights, democracy and the rule of law. In this connection they underlined the importance of close political consultation within the Alliance.

3. Ministers expressed their deep concern at the continued occupation of Afghanistan by Soviet armed forces. This occupation of a traditionally neutral and non-aligned country of the Third World has aroused the resistance of the Afghan people, led to the flight of about a million refugees and has been condemned by the overwhelming majority of the international community in resolutions of the UN General Assembly, the UN Human Rights Commission, the Islamic Conference and other bodies. They regard as unacceptable this armed intervention and the attempt to crush the national resistance of the Afghan people by massive military force, and they note that the arguments used by the Soviet Government to justify its actions are totally unconvincing. Reaffirming the words of the UN General Assembly Resolution of 14th January 1980, adopted by 104 votes, Ministers stressed the need for "immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan" and urged the Soviet Government to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of that country and the rights of the Afghan people freely to determine their future.

Ministers noted that the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan carried with it very serious implications for the general strategic situation. By using its own military forces directly to impose its will, this time on a non-aligned country, the Soviet Government has clearly demonstrated its readiness to exploit opportunities to shift the balance of forces in its favour. It has thus given rise to grave concerns about its

future intentions and is threatening the security of a region which is vital for world peace and stability. While recognizing that the security of the region is primarily the concern of the countries there, Ministers welcomed the fact that members of the Alliance are, by reason of their relations with those countries, in a position to make a contribution to peace and stability in the region.

Ministers agreed that the international crisis caused by the Soviet intervention calls for a resolute, constant and concerted response on the part of the Allies. It is vital that the Soviet Government should be left in no doubt as to the extremely grave view which the Allies take of this situation which jeopardizes world peace. Ministers reaffirmed that there could be no question of accepting a *fait accompli* resulting from the use of force. Afghanistan should be neither a pawn nor a threat for anyone. They stressed the need for a political settlement which must necessarily provide for the total and immediate withdrawal of Soviet forces so as to enable the Afghan people to decide on its future peacefully with complete freedom and without any outside pressure. The recent announcement that some Soviet troops are being withdrawn from Afghanistan would only be of interest if it were the beginning of a total withdrawal. Ministers welcomed the important role which the Islamic Conference and the Non-Aligned Movement have assumed in the search for a political solution. Ministers noted that while there had been various proposals formulated or inspired by the Soviet Union, including the ideals advanced in the Declaration of the Warsaw Pact states of 15th May 1980, none of them had addressed the basic issues and all would subject the national independence and right of self-determination of the Afghan people to restrictions unacceptable in international law.

Ministers noted that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had done serious damage to detente, to which they reaffirmed their attachment. They restated their willingness to work for the improvement of East-West relations and their wish to keep open the channels of communication between the countries of East and West, so as to make their views clear, to prevent misunderstandings, to facilitate a resolution of the present crisis and to foster constructive co-operation, as circumstances permit. They reaffirmed, however, that detente cannot be pursued in one region of the world regardless of developments in another.

Moreover, they agreed that restoration of a co-operative relationship must be based on a foundation of mutual confidence, and this has been shaken by recent Soviet actions. It will need to be rebuilt by positive action on the part of the Soviet Government to live up to the peaceful intentions which it professes.

4. In addition to the concern created by the invasion of Afghanistan, Ministers noted that, despite Warsaw Pact state-

ments that they did not seek military superiority, there was no sign of any slackening of the substantial rate of growth in the quality, readiness and strength of Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces which threaten to increase the present military disparities, particularly in Europe. Ministers, therefore, re-emphasized their governments' resolve to take all necessary steps individually or collectively to maintain an adequate level of deterrence and defence across the full spectrum.

They reaffirmed that more effective use of resources through co-operative equipment programmes and increased standardization and interoperability of weapons systems was a key element in conventional force modernization and they noted with satisfaction further progress in this respect. They reaffirmed too that they would continue to work through the transatlantic dialogue toward more balanced relations among the European and North American Allies in armaments development and production and toward heightened availability and quality of new defence equipment. In this connection Ministers welcomed the work of the Conference of National Armaments Directors. They also commented on the importance of the work of the independent European programme group and the progress they expected of it.

They re-emphasized the need to bear in mind the interests of the less industrialized members of the Alliance in the course of improving armaments co-operation. Ministers also stressed the significance of maintaining the technological advantages which NATO Members possess.

5. In parallel with the efforts of their governments to maintain and strengthen their defence capabilities, Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to the pursuit of effective, balanced and verifiable measures of disarmament and arms control. They nonetheless noted that the prospects for success will depend on the restoration of international confidence and stability. Ministers emphasised that their governments wished to avoid a competitive arms race. But the substantial reductions in the level of forces which they seek will only be possible if negotiations are based on a genuine willingness to achieve undiminished security for all participants and if the Warsaw Pact countries are convinced of the determination of the Allies to maintain an adequate level of defence capabilities. They devoted particular attention to the various initiatives of members of the Alliance in the area of arms control. They noted that these proposals had not met with a positive response. Ministers reaffirmed the determination of their governments to play their full part in the current disarmament work of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva as well as of the United Nations Disarmament Commission and other United Nations bodies. They underlined the importance they attach to the frequent and active consultations which take place on arms control and disarmament questions within the context of the permanent machinery of the Alliance.

6. Ministers reaffirmed their support for the SALT II Treaty which represents a significant contribution towards curbing the arms race and to ensuring the security of the Alliance and the stability of East-West relations. They expressed regret that the current international crisis had delayed until now the process of ratification of the Treaty. Ministers expressed the hope that circumstances would make possible its ratification by both sides at the earliest opportunity. They hoped that the continuation of the SALT process on the basis of further close consultations within the Alliance would make possible further reductions and qualitative limitations in the nuclear field between the United States and the USSR and create a favourable climate for progress in other fields of arms control.

7. The Ministers of the countries participating in the negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions affirmed the continued importance of progress in those negotiations as a means of achieving a more stable force relationship in Central Europe on the basis of genuine parity in military manpower in the form of a common collective ceiling on ground force manpower and a combined common collective ceiling on ground and air force manpower for each side. The determination of Western participants in those talks to achieve progress and to come to early results was demonstrated by their presentation in Vienna in December 1979 of important new proposals for an interim Phase I agreement and associated measures as part of the programme of arms control initiatives approved by those Ministers earlier in December 1979. These proposals, which thus far remain unanswered by the East, are the most recent substantive proposals advanced in the Vienna talks. They provide realistic framework for achieving a first negotiated result, including the reduction and limitation of United States and Soviet ground force manpower in the area on the basis of agreed data on these personnel, and associated measures which would aid verification of reductions and limitations, increase military stability, enhance mutual understanding of the military posture and activities of the other side and diminish the risk of misunderstanding and miscalculation.

These Ministers noted the expression in the recent Declaration of the Warsaw Pact states, of a desire for more rapid progress in the Vienna talks. They called on the Warsaw Pact states to give concrete expression to this statement through practical movement on the data issue and through an early, constructive and substantive Eastern response to the Western proposals of December 1979.

8. Turning to the process initiated by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Ministers noted that in this field also, the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan had seriously affected the confidence necessary for progress. They recalled that in the CSCE Final Act, the participating states had declared

their intention to conduct their relations with all other states in the spirit of the principles guiding relations between themselves. It was therefore a matter of particular concern that the Soviet Union had acted and was still acting in Afghanistan in a manner violating the principles to which it had committed itself at Helsinki at the highest level. Ministers also deplored the increased suppression in certain countries of human rights and fundamental freedoms and the harassment, imprisonment, internal exile and banishment of those who strive for implementation of the Final Act. They expressed their concern that despite some positive developments, implementation in the field of human contacts remained uneven. They also noted with regret the lack of progress towards the freer flow of information.

Against this background Ministers considered the approach to the forthcoming CSCE follow-up meeting at Madrid. They stressed the importance of maintaining the integrity of the Final Act. They agreed that the emphasis must be placed on full implementation of its principles and provisions. Therefore, Allied representatives at Madrid will engage in a thorough, frank and measured review of implementation with a view to stimulating improvement.

Ministers noted that the prospects for progress at Madrid, and in particular for the consideration of new proposals, would be influenced by the course of this review and would depend on the international situation at that time. With this in mind, and recognizing the importance of the CSCE process for promoting contacts and negotiations between participating states, Ministers agreed to continue to develop a balanced group of proposals and remain prepared to discuss and to take account of concrete proposals for balanced and significant progress in all fields of the Final Act which may be advanced by other participants.

Ministers reviewed the various proposals that have been developed so far in the field of CBMs [confidence-building measures] and of certain aspects of security and disarmament. In this connection, Ministers recalled their agreement at the North Atlantic Council meeting of December 1979, to work towards the adoption during the Madrid CSCE meeting, as part of a balanced outcome, of a mandate for further negotiations under the aegis of the CSCE, as proposed by the Government of France, on militarily significant and verifiable CBMs, applicable to the entire continent of Europe, this means including the whole of the European part of the Soviet Union. They expressed the hope that circumstances noted above would permit concrete results in this regard at the Madrid meeting. They noted that work was continuing in the Alliance on CBMs related to military activities which would accord with these prerequisites. They agreed to continue their common efforts in this area, while recognizing that present circumstances required the Council in permanent session to evaluate developments on a constant basis.

9. Ministers examined developments with regard to Berlin and Germany as a whole since their last meeting in December 1979. They expressed satisfaction with the working of the Quadripartite Agreement of 3rd September 1971 and agreed that the situation in and around Berlin has continued relatively quiet. They underlined the fundamental importance of an undisturbed climate in Berlin and on the access routes for the maintenance of security and stability in Europe.

Ministers noted with satisfaction the conclusion of the agreements and arrangements between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic on 30th April 1980. They welcomed the favourable effects which these will have, particularly for Berlin.

In connection with the 25th anniversary of the entry into force of the Bonn and Paris Conventions, Ministers recalled that these Conventions enabled the Federal Republic of Germany to become an equal member of the North Atlantic Alliance, laid the foundations for its close co-operation, based on mutual trust, with the partners in the Alliance and contributed thereby to the strength of the Alliance and to the preservation of peace and security in Europe. They took this opportunity to recall also the importance for the improvement of the situation in Europe of the treaties of the Federal Republic of Germany with the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia as well as with the German Democratic Republic. Recalling that these treaties did not

affect the rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers relating to Berlin and Germany as a whole, they reaffirmed their support for the political objective of the Federal Republic of Germany to work towards a state of peace in Europe in which the German people regains its unity through free self-determination.

10. Ministers noted the report on the situation in the Mediterranean prepared on their instructions and underlined again the necessity of maintaining the balance of forces in the whole area. They requested the Council in permanent session to continue its consultations on this subject and report to them at their next meeting.

Ministers noted that the recent developments in South-West Asia have brought even more sharply into focus the great strategic importance of the South-Eastern flank for the security of the Alliance and for the overall balance of power in the region, the maintenance of which is essential for international stability. Ministers therefore stated that the urgency of strengthening the economic and defence postures of these member countries has further increased. In addition Ministers stressed, in the interests of the Alliance's collective defence, the importance of the initiatives undertaken to strengthen the cohesion of the South-Eastern flank. In this connection, Ministers also stressed that in the interests of the Alliance's collective defence, the restoration of full and undiminished solidarity between the member countries concerned takes on a special significance.

11. The Ministers welcomed the continuation of the dialogue between Greece and Turkey and expressed the hope that they would pursue their joint efforts for a peaceful solution to the differences between the two countries.

12. Ministers reviewed the particular problems faced by the economically less advanced member countries in the light of a report by the Secretary-General. Noting that in the present circumstances the need for a clear demonstration of Allied solidarity is even more important, Ministers reaffirmed their attachment to the spirit of Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty and their continued political support for the process of enhancing the economies of those countries. In this context they reiterated the urgent need for an increase in financial assistance and economic co-operation from the Allies which are in a position to do so, through the appropriate bilateral and multilateral channels. They welcomed the efforts being made to find a solution to Turkey's economic problems, recognizing time was necessary for the current efforts to become fully effective and that they would need to continue over a number of years.

13. Ministers recalled the welcome they gave at their spring session in 1979 to the intensified consideration being given by the Science Committee to the possibilities of reducing scientific and technological disparities between member countries

NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS' DECLARATION, JUNE 26, 1980

Gravely concerned by incidents of terrorism involving the taking of hostages and attacks on the personnel of diplomatic missions and their premises, the Foreign Ministers and representatives of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America, reaffirm their determination to deter and combat such acts. They consider it necessary that all governments should adopt policies which will deny terrorists any benefits from such criminal acts. They vigorously condemn the attacks against the lives of the personnel of diplomatic and consular missions, the seizure of diplomatic and consular premises and personnel and the taking and holding of hostages and property in contravention of fundamental human rights and of international law.

With particular reference to Iran, they expressed their continued deep concern over the flagrantly illegal holding of United States diplomatic personnel and property and reiterated their call upon the Iranian authorities to release immediately and unharmed the American hostages.

through co-operative activities. They endorsed the establishment of a special five-year programme, "Science for Stability," proposed by the Science Committee, to strengthen the scientific and technological capabilities of Greece, Portugal and Turkey by means of co-operation with scientific institutions in other countries of the Alliance and thereby contribute to the economic development of these three countries. The modalities of implementation of this programme will be decided by the Council in permanent session.

14. With respect to the Middle East, Ministers reaffirmed the importance of a just, lasting and comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. They reviewed the situation in the area including the progress achieved by Egypt and Israel in developing their mutual relations. Ministers believed that such a settlement should ensure the right of all states in the area, including Israel, to live within secure, recognized and guaranteed boundaries, as well as the achievement of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. Ministers affirmed that all the parties concerned, including representatives of the Palestinian people, should participate in a negotiated settlement. Ministers considered that Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, together with the principles stated above, should form the framework for such a settlement. They deemed it essential that this framework should be accepted by all the parties concerned.

15. Within the context of their discussion of the need for enhancing global stability and security, Ministers called upon all countries to assume their share of the responsibility for seeking solutions to world economic problems and for contributing to the economic and social progress of the developing countries in order to bring about a more equitable international economic system. They observed that positive results from the proposed global round of negotiations within the United Nations concerning raw materials, energy, trade, development and monetary and financial questions would serve the interests of developing as well as developed countries.

II.

16. Ministers of countries who participated in the decision of 12th December 1979 to pursue the two parallel and complementary approaches on long-range theatre nuclear forces (LRTNF) modernization and on arms control involving TNF (theatre nuclear forces), having received a report on progress on TNF arms control discussions, welcomed the repeated efforts of the United States, based on full consultations among the Allies concerned, to engage the Soviet Union in serious negotiations in the SALT III framework aimed at achieving verifiable limitations on Soviet and United States land-based LRTNF consistent with the principle of equality between the sides. In particular, these Ministers supported the United States readiness

to engage in preliminary exchanges on such limitations without precondition or delay, as a useful starting point for negotiating on TNF in the SALT III framework. These Ministers regretted that the Soviet responses do not contain anything which would constitute practical measures designed to restore a balanced situation. Neither has the Soviet Union so far shown any willingness to enter into serious negotiations or even to engage in preliminary exchanges. They noted that although there have been some indications that the Soviet Union recognizes that SALT III could be the appropriate forum for negotiations involving TNF, the Soviet Union continues to repeat, most recently in the Warsaw Pact Declaration, unrealistic and unacceptable preconditions which would perpetuate inequality.

These Ministers therefore once again called on the Soviet Union to respond promptly and positively to the United States offers to negotiate and to enter into preliminary exchanges without any preconditions before the ratification of the SALT II Treaty.

These Ministers expressed their concern about Soviet preponderance in LRTNF systems deployed to date, and noted that the systems deployed have already reached a dangerously high level. In addition to its existing force of 450 SS-4 and SS-5 LRTNF, the Soviet Union has at present deployed approximately 450 warheads on 150 SS-20 launchers. The SS-20 deployments are continuing at a rapid pace. The Soviet Union is in the process of deploying for its SS-20 force alone more warheads than are planned for the entire modernization programme agreed to in December 1979. By contrast, deployments in Allied countries will not begin until late in 1983.

These Ministers pointed out that it was the need to preserve the Alliance's deterrent capability against the background of existing disparity in LRTNF in favour of the Soviet Union which gave rise to the decision of their governments to modernize LRTNF, and that the continuing Soviet deployments of new SS-20 missiles will further increase that disparity.

These Ministers further noted that the modernization programme was deliberately restrained as compared with the qualitative and quantitative growth in Soviet nuclear capabilities. In this regard, they also noted that the withdrawal of 1,000 United States nuclear warheads from Europe as an integral part of the LRTNF modernization and arms control decision has begun; they recalled that the new LRTNF warheads decided upon on 12th December, 1979, would be accommodated within the reduced level.

These Ministers recalled their statement of 12th December, 1979, that arms control, by constraining the Soviet build-up, can enhance Alliance security, modify the scale of NATO's long-range TNF requirements and promote stability and detente in Europe in consonance with NATO's basic policy of deterrence, defence

and detente. Ministers reiterated that the scale of NATO's long-range TNF requirements will be examined in the light of concrete results achieved through negotiations.

NEWS CONFERENCE, ANKARA, JUNE 26, 1980⁴

It has been a pleasure and a privilege to be here at my first North Atlantic Council meeting. I thought the discussions were very comprehensive, very relevant, and, I think, very successful. The communique, I think, reflected very well the discussions which took place yesterday and this morning; covered subjects which I am sure were no surprise to any of us, ranging from Afghanistan to Iran to the Middle East, East-West subjects, CSCE, arms control. On the whole I thought it was a very strong communique especially as it dealt with Afghanistan and the response to the Russian invasion—the unanimity on the requirements for the complete withdrawal of forces, the failure to be seduced by the announced or alleged withdrawal of Russian forces. On the whole I thought it was a communique which reflects a basic solidarity and, indeed, continuity of NATO policy in the areas which I've mentioned and others. It's a pleasure to be here; it's been a successful conference. I think there is a greater feeling of unity and solidarity than appeared publicly 2 or 3 weeks ago. For that I'm gratified and pleased.

Q. Was anything discussed about giving specific aid—backing up the words in the communique—or any other sort of support for the Afghan rebels who are actually fighting the Soviets?

A. It was not discussed at the conference, in the corridors, at the bilaterals, trilaterals, nor did I hear any rumors or speculation on that subject.

Q. Why did you object to the reference to Palestinian self-determination in the final communique, and is it, indeed, true that you were alone in objecting to a wording which made such a reference?

A. It was interesting that a closed session is so quickly open, but I'll be glad to state my position which has been stated publicly many times.

The question of the legitimate rights of Palestinians appears in the communique, and we supported that fully. It appears in the Camp David ac

ords, and it appears there fully. The issue of self-determination will be a subject for negotiation in the Camp David process, and there are differing views as to how self-determination ought to be defined or what the final result ought to be. I did not think it appropriate to put in words—which were subject to differing interpretations, differing definitions, and which were included in the process in which my country is already involved with a commitment to negotiate self-determination—to include it in a communique which was in that context ambiguous on the issue. And may I say I was not alone on my position.

Q. Can you tell us what your expectations are on the talks which are to be held between the Foreign Ministers of Turkey and Greece on Saturday?

A. I think the fact that they are meeting is a source of great satisfaction to me. Secondly, it is clear to me from bilateral talks I've had with each of them that they probably will discuss issues which are quite evident—the question of Greek reintegration into the NATO military structure and other questions. I would not try to presume to suggest an agenda for them; I would assume they will discuss matters of mutual interest, and we all know what they are, don't we.

Q. Did you discuss here a plan for some transitional arrangements regarding Afghanistan as has been mentioned publicly by the President in Belgrade and, I guess, elsewhere? And could you explain how it ties in with what NATO is trying to do with its attitude toward the Soviet invasion there?

A. There was no discussion here of any transitional plans and, indeed, the phrase is as old as the Presidential press conference in February of this year, and the phrase has been repeated on occasion since. Obviously it is a phrase that needs definition, and if there is a response to our policy objectives including that phrase, then I would assume the process of definition would take place. Obviously with a situation in which probably 120,000 troops are involved and the question of the legitimacy and the stability of the government in place in question, that to move from the present situation to a more satisfactory one from the present time would take more than 5 minutes—it would take some time—

and the assumption is that some arrangements to move through the transition period would have to be made. But, that pragmatic fact ought not to obscure the central point of our objective and our policy; that is, the total and complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

Q. Six months have gone by since the Russian invasion of Afghanistan. There have been many analyses, many statements, in fact, the Olympic Games boycott has divided the West. The grain embargo and the technological embargo at COCOM [Coordinating Committee for East-West Trade Policy] has largely failed. You're not discussing any military aid or other sort of aid to the Afghan peoples. What forms of pressure do you propose in any field on Russia to bring about the total withdrawal of Russian troops?

A. I'd be glad to review the policies and pressures we've undertaken to put in place. I'm sure you are familiar with them but I'll be glad to repeat them. They are still in place, still working, I would assume.

First of all, I would think the Soviets would be sensitive to the fact that the entire West has responded in military terms; that is, in the sense of strengthening their defense establishments, increasing defense expenditures, and in the United States, as measured over a 5-year timeframe which is our present projection in the Congress, it amounts to hundreds of billions of dollars.

In addition to that, the United States has been moving to establish a military presence in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean areas at a cost of some billion dollars. In order to maintain that presence, we are undertaking to negotiate facilities' rights in the area. So all of this certainly should mean to a Soviet Union, which has been interested in arms control in order to reduce the burden of arms on themselves and on mankind, that what they've triggered is the possibility of enormously increased defense expenditure by those potentially threatened by their action.

In addition to this, they have succeeded—again stressing the military—in persuading the NATO allies to increase their defense expenditures beyond what had already been planned and to identify areas and ways in which NATO defenses can be coordinated with American needs to respond to additional threats in the Persian Gulf

area. That decision was taken in Brussels in May. This surely must impact upon the thinking of Russian planners. If the Russians are really intent upon triggering another arms race, they have got to take into account that their economy is smaller than ours, that if we really are convinced that that is the road we must travel, that it would be costly to the Soviet Union, costly to us also.

But when they undertake to establish a strategic threat, represented by the geography of Afghanistan, they've got to expect that the West will respond, and the West has responded and is responding.

Now with respect to other kinds of pressures, we have committed ourselves to limiting the transfer of high technology to the Soviet Union, and the acquisition of Western technology has been a high priority of Soviet planning over the last few decades and continues to be. We are going to continue to limit that transfer, and that's repeated in this communique. So that as opportunities to isolate the Soviet Union because of this action, to bring economic pressures, bring political pressures on them appear, we will do so. They certainly are not insensitive to the fact that they've been condemned by the Islamic nations where they had placed very high importance on establishing their credibility and their leadership. They've been roundly condemned twice by the Islamic conference. So there are all sorts of ways which we have taken to apply pressure, to isolate them, to make them realize that there is a cost to what they've done.

How long that might take to result in a reversal of their policy in Afghanistan, one can't say, but at the very least I would hope that the cost has been one that will discourage them from trying to repeat the exercise. An additional cost is, of course, the trouble they are running into in Afghanistan. They have run into a very considerable military problem that has tied down 120,000 troops, and there has been evidence in the last few weeks of an increase as compared with the alleged withdrawal to which they've been speaking in the last few days.

Q. Greek Government officials during the last 4 or 5 years have been referring to a concept of power in the area. When Washington refers to the concept of balance of power in the area, do you mean the overall balance of power between NATO and Warsaw Pact or between Greece and Turkey?

And are there any agreements that call for aid to Greece and Turkey on a proportional basis?

A. In this communique? No.

Q. No, Greek Government officials have been demanding aid on a 10-7 basis to Greece and Turkey. Did Washington and Athens ever sign any kind of agreement whatsoever? Where do these proportions come from?

A. We have not begun the negotiation or the renegotiation of the defense agreement with Greece. We've signed one with Turkey, I think on March 29th which I'm told is before the Parliament, expected to be ratified, so I don't think there is any basis for making a mathematical calculation of the kind you suggest. We did not discuss the issue in the bilaterals I held with either the Greek Minister or the Turkish Minister. We're hoping that before the end of this year, we will have defense agreements with both countries and that, of course, will be in the context of the NATO alliance. The NATO alliance is the structure for NATO defense and that means the entire NATO territory.

Q. I would like to return to the question of Afghanistan. Whereas quite a number of the NATO allies call those people who are fighting against the Soviet Union—Soviet invasion—"freedom fighters," the United States seems to choose the word "rebels" instead. Does this have a special connotation?

A. I don't call them rebels; I call them freedom fighters. Either that or a national liberation force. That's the way I regard them. I don't see how people who are fighting for their own country can be considered rebels. They're fighting for their freedom and liberation.

Q. I understand you made the observation that declarations do not really achieve the sort of purpose of Palestinian aspirations. What makes you think that the declaration on Afghanistan will achieve anything more, particularly when I understand [British Foreign Secretary] Lord Carrington said that the Soviet Union cannot appear to be wilting under the international condemnation of their action?

A. I don't know what you mean by "wiling." If I wanted to be legalistic I'd ask you to define that so I could answer your question.

But isn't it interesting that they moved the date for acceptance of invitations to the Olympics? They must have done so, it seems to me, because they felt that our effort to boycott the Olympics had been sufficiently successful to tarnish their Olympic Games. So now they've opened it without, I think, a deadline. Why do you suppose they throw up these red herrings in advance of summits, in advance of talks in Vienna, if they weren't feeling the pressure?

They are constantly undertaking to initiate diplomatic efforts and other efforts to divide the allies, to raise doubts about our interpretation of their action. I think they're feeling the pressure, and it's obvious that on the ground they are now hunkering down for perhaps a 2- or 3-year stay in their effort to pacify the country. I don't know if the word "wilting" is the one that applies to all this but that they are feeling the impact and the cost I think is evident.

Our grain embargo denied them at least 10 million metric tons of grain this year. That has forced them to revise their meat-growing program. It has forced them to revise the targets for supplying their consumers. That certainly is impacting. Now if by wilting you mean what happens to an orchid in midday on a hot Turkish afternoon, well, I guess they haven't wilted to that extent.

Q. If the Soviets are, as you say, hunkering down for a 2-3 year stay in Afghanistan, what does that really say about the possibility for any SALT agreement or any other kind of arms control arrangement that would require Senate confirmation? Do you think it's possible the Senate would vote in favor of any arms control measure after the election while the Soviets are still in Afghanistan?

A. The fact that the Soviet Union is building permanent structures in Afghanistan, which suggests that they are preparing for a long haul, doesn't necessarily mean that they may not be persuaded, for other reasons, to change their behavior, to shorten their timetable, or even to reverse their decision. The fact that bridges are in place of a permanent nature across streams to accommodate their military plans, however long they may have to stay there, doesn't make the diplomatic judgments that presumably they'll be making parallel with their military judgments. So they prepare for the long haul but that doesn't mean they may necessarily stay there.

With respect to the prospects of arms control, we've got to assume, and I do assume, that arms control is an important Soviet objective as well as an important objective for us. They know as well as we know that if SALT II is not ratified by next spring that the calendar will have run against some of the provisions in the SALT II Treaty, necessitating some accommodation by negotiation or otherwise or moving into the next step in the SALT process or some other alternative that may develop. If that is as important to them as it is to us, they may consider altering their behavior in Afghanistan so that we can both move the SALT process along. It is a dynamic situation, hopefully in which they can be influenced by events, by the cost of what they're doing within Afghanistan and outside, and, hopefully, we will get back on track.

But there is no way of guaranteeing a timetable or guaranteeing a final result.

Q. You said earlier this morning that the subject of aid to the freedom fighters in Afghanistan had not been the subject of the conference, it had not been discussed as rumors, it had not been discussed in the corridors. I'm wondering why it was not discussed. Is it because it is already in place and doesn't have to be discussed or it's because the United States does not think it's a worthy cause?

A. It was not discussed because it was not raised.

Q. Let me pursue it in a different way then. Why does the United States not believe that it would be a policy at least worth exploring?

A. A subject of that kind is not a subject that can be discussed in all of its aspects in a public meeting at this time, and it was certainly not raised in this conference. I'm not in a position to say anything more.

Q. Yesterday you urged your NATO allies that we must continue our individual effort to strengthen its stability in the vital region of the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia and to support the independence of nations in the region. Do you have a definite plan to strengthen position in the Persian Gulf and to support the independence of nations of the region as a whole?

A. Let me say, first of all, that Southwest Asia nor any other similarly remote area of the globe can be brought

under our defense umbrella [inaudible] to deter expansion on the part of the Soviet Union. Detente and deterrence are two sides of the same coin, and that's what we are undertaking to do.

Q. In your opinion, do the developments in the region—in the Middle East, in the Indian Ocean, and in the gulf area—call for a reorientation of NATO military planning?

A. I don't believe it does, except to the extent that NATO recognizes that there are threats in the Persian Gulf region and the Middle East region, which could require the deployment of U.S. forces, that they would be willing to move into whatever gap was left in NATO defenses in Europe. That's all that's involved. To the extent that that's involved, that requires some planning which is going to take place in the next 6 months to identify steps that must be taken which will be considered in December. That decision was taken in Brussels in May.

Q. As you're leaving for Kuala Lumpur, how serious does this Vietnam-Cambodian situation appear to be?

A. In and of itself it's serious in that it involves—I can't quantify but my impression is that it involves serious military forces that did considerable damage. Whether it is serious in terms of their ultimate objective I don't think has yet been determined. There's been a national outcry against it. The ASEAN nations are meeting in Kuala Lumpur, and they have denounced the situation. I have directly [see page 53]. Lord Carrington has this morning. I think there is rather a worldwide reaction to the possibility that this is the first step in aggression against Thailand. It is timely from my point of view that I'm going to Kuala Lumpur, and I hope to have better perspective on it when I get there.

Q. You said you predicted that by the end of this year both Turkey and Greece will have signed a defense agreement with the United States. Could you tell me what/where do you see this prediction? Have you, for instance, seen Gen. Rogers' new suggestions or gotten assurances from the Turkish Government that they will observe the law—the international law—governing the Aegean status.

A. No, it was none of those things. I used the word "hope"—I hoped that

it would be [inaudible] the willingness of the parties to begin talking about it. That's all.

Q. [Inaudible]

A. They obviously have a serious problem, part of which is the fact that it has been difficult for Greece and Turkey to talk directly to each other. They're now beginning that process, and they both agree on the objective—the reintegration of Greece into the military structure of NATO. Given those two facts that gives me hope that they will reach an agreement. There's nothing else in my mind on the subject.

Q. [Inaudible]

A. If they were willing to do anything, the first people they ought to inform should be Greece, not the U.S. Secretary of State.

STATEMENT AT MEETING WITH ASEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS, KUALA LUMPUR, JUNE 28, 1980⁵

I am delighted that my first visit to Asia as U.S. Secretary of State brings me to this meeting of ASEAN ministers. This is the third leg of a journey of some 25,000 miles. It began with a highly productive meeting among the leaders of the industrial democracies in Venice. It continued in Ankara with consultations among the NATO Foreign Ministers. It concludes with this opportunity to meet and talk with our ASEAN friends in Kuala Lumpur.

The 11-year history of ASEAN has been a remarkable demonstration of the strength that comes from unity in the pursuit of common purposes. As like-minded countries oriented toward democracy and free market economies, ASEAN has contributed to the rapid growth of its member states and to the tangible progress of their people. As an association of countries dedicated to the principle that nations should define their destinies free from outside interference and dominations, ASEAN has been an important force for stability and peace—in this region and throughout the world. With clarity of purpose and a strong, unified political will, ASEAN has drawn the respect and admiration of all who seek a more peaceful and equitable world order.

Let me take this occasion to reaffirm, clearly and unequivocally, that the United States deeply values its growing ties to ASEAN, that it is a

fundamental goal of American foreign policy to broaden those ties, and that we shall continue to shape our policies and actions in this region in full consultation with our ASEAN colleagues and with full regard for your interests and concerns.

We meet at a time of stern challenges to the stability of this region and to peace.

- We have seen new assaults on the territorial integrity of Thailand by a government in Vietnam that has demonstrated again disregard for the most basic tenet of international life—respect for the sovereignty of other nations.

- The Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea continues, denying the long-suffering Khmer people an opportunity to escape the dark shadow of national annihilation.

- Strife and conflict in Indochina have a human face of haunting and dangerous proportions. Thousands, perhaps millions, of Kampucheans once again face starvation. New waves of the desperately hungry are making their way across the Kampuchean countryside in search of food and safety, placing new demands on neighboring nations.

- And the aggression of the Soviet Union against the people of Afghanistan continues, adding a serious new threat to peace and stability—in Asia and in the world.

These challenges confront us all. We must meet them together. This is a time that requires clarity in our intentions and unity in our actions. Let me make the position of my government clear.

First, we stand behind the independence, security, and territorial integrity of Thailand. That support is based upon our historic friendship and our conviction that a secure Thailand is a force for regional peace and cohesion. Over the past year, we have increased our security assistance in Thailand. We have accelerated the delivery of equipment urgently needed to deal with the volatile situation Thailand faces on its border. Let me assure you today that in light of the recent developments on the Thai-Kampuchea border, we intend to step up our assistance to Thailand. We will further accelerate the immediate delivery of urgently needed military equipment. We will help Thailand reduce the economic burden of its military requirements through additional credits and

The Secretary

more generous terms. And we will provide immediate assistance to the Government of Thailand to help relieve the suffering of those who have been victims of the recent fighting. We are hopeful that others will join in support for the independence and security of Thailand.

Second, we strongly support the ASEAN resolution adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in November calling for withdrawal of foreign troops from Kampuchea and the establishment of a representative and neutral government. We shall continue to pursue a political settlement, together with our ASEAN colleagues, that would restore the sovereignty of Kampuchea and bring peace and hope to its beleaguered people.

Third, the United States is committed to the resettlement of Indochinese who seek refuge from conflict and deprivation. The nations of first asylum, and those in the immediate area who have opened processing centers, command the admiration and respect of the entire world community. But we all recognize that the refugee dilemma is an international problem. It requires an international commitment. Over the past several years, the United States has opened its doors to more than 360,000 Indochinese refugees. I can assure you today that our commitment is undiminished. President Carter has requested from our Congress funds to finance resettlement of 168,000 Indochinese refugees over the next fiscal year. And we shall continue to press others in the international community to do their full and fair share in the resettlement effort.

Fourth, we shall continue to participate fully in the international effort to provide desperately needed food and seed to the people of Kampuchea. To date, the United States has committed some \$160 million in public and private funds for this pressing international humanitarian enterprise. What the world confronts in Kampuchea is the chilling prospect of an entire people destroyed by a cruel combination of natural and political forces. The international lifeline to the Kampuchean people must be continued. The Vietnamese and the authorities in Phnom Penh must permit those supplies to reach all Kampuchean in need. History will judge harshly those who fail to respond to this staggering human tragedy.

Fifth, we shall persist in our resolute opposition to the violation of national independence and self-determination taking place in Afghanistan. The demonstrated willingness of the Soviet Union to use brute military force to impose its will on a sovereign nation has strained international peace. It has posed new risks to stability in that vital region. It has damaged the fabric of East-West relations. A firm international response—a sustained international response—is required to register our condemnation of this attack on the Afghan people so long as it continues and to deter further adventures that could create new crises. The ASEAN nations have demonstrated, again here in Kuala Lumpur, their own firm response. The enhanced strategic position of the United States in East Asia is vital to our ability to respond in the Indian Ocean and Southwest Asia. In turn, our strengthened presence there has served the interest of our Pacific allies and friends, for we share an interest in peace and stability in that critical region of the world.

As we address common challenges to peace, we are also determined to expand the range of our economic, cultural, and educational cooperation.

The progress we have made over the past year in concluding multilateral trade negotiations agreements with all of the nations of ASEAN has contributed to a 30% increase in our two-way trade. American businessmen are increasingly recognizing the importance of the ASEAN nations in their export and investment decisions. We shall continue to support and encourage this growth.

A second area of economic cooperation is commodities. We are delighted with the news from Geneva that there has been agreement on the common fund. This achievement, which was given particular impetus by the 1978 U.S.-ASEAN meeting and has been advanced by strong ASEAN leadership, will serve our shared interests in stability and growth in raw material markets.

The U.S.-ASEAN dialogue also contributed importantly to the successful negotiation of a rubber price stabilization agreement. I am pleased to announce today the United States will support ASEAN's position that Kuala Lumpur should be the site for the new international rubber agreement headquarters.

We were not able to conclude negotiations of the international tin

agreement during the recent tin conference. However, we remain committed to working with the producer nations to shape a tin agreement that serves our common interest in a healthy tin market.

Finally, we hope to expand our cooperation in the critical area of energy. The leaders at the Venice summit committed themselves to a far-reaching effort to expand the production and use of alternative energy sources. In particular, they called upon the World Bank to reexamine the adequacy of existing resources for assisting developing countries in their energy production and to consider the advisability of a new lending facility for this purpose. As part of this expanded international effort, we hope to increase our energy cooperation with ASEAN. We hope that the recent tour of the United States by ASEAN energy experts will generate new projects for cooperation, particularly in the area of nonconventional energy sources.

As we confront the challenges we face together, as we seize the opportunities we share together, our individual judgments will be enriched by our continuing dialogue. I have learned a good deal about this area in the past several days. I hope I have contributed to your understanding of American intentions and purposes—in this region and the world. I look forward to continuing those discussions this afternoon, in the spirit of trust and cooperation that has come to characterize this relationship of growing importance to us all.

**PRESS BRIEFING,
KUALA LUMPUR,
JUNE 28, 1980***

Q. In his opening remarks at the la session, Mr. Tomamantino spoke very strongly about the need to recognize Democratic Kampuchea at the United Nations. In your remarks, you endorsed the ASEAN position Cambodia quite fully but you said nothing on that issue. Would you be good enough to comment on that?

A. We discussed that issue very thoroughly this afternoon, and the ASEAN Foreign Ministers understand that it's a decision that's under consideration in the United States, that I came here to listen to the issues as they understood it, and I will report back to my government.

Q. Chancellor Schmidt is going to Moscow next week. Do you expect that he should have talks on the Vietnamese aggression to Thailand, because as I understand from your delegation, we feel that the pressure has to be put on the Soviet Union in order to get Hanoi to its senses?

A. I would not presume from this instance to offer advice to Chancellor Schmidt as to what he should discuss in Moscow. I think that's for him to say. He outlined to us pretty thoroughly in advance what he expected to say to the Chancellor [sic] with respect to Afghanistan and NATO issues. Whether or not he has in mind discussing this one too, especially in light of this latest incident on that Thai border which has occurred since I last saw him, I have no way of knowing. It could be an appropriate thing for him to say.

I intend to communicate to my South Vietnamese government and to those of my allies among the Foreign Ministries of Europe my deep concern about the situation on the Thai border, the incident there, and the possible implications for the future, as well as the possibility that in the next few days a problem of feeding people may escalate dramatically and even in dangerous ways. We fully support the ASEAN ministers in their call for U.S. action and for the full weight, influence, and resources of the United Nations in dealing with this problem and avoiding a disruption of what are already inadequate means for distributing food, not only on the Thai border but within Cambodia itself. I think it is a potentially explosive situation, and I would not doubt that Chancellor Schmidt or others were to get the same impression of the situation that we've gotten here that they would speak out on it.

Q. I understand there has been some discussion as to whether the situation in Kampuchea and the Thai border is now worthy of the same attention by the world that has been given to Afghanistan. Has agreement been reached on that issue and, if not, what is the nature of the disagreement?

A. This dog is just about to be bitten to death I think, but I would like to draw attention to President Carter's speech throughout his 8 days in Europe last past week when he started out with his toast—which proved to be more of a speech than a toast—in

Rome in which he identified these two aggressions as being strategically connected and strategically related and that they should be of concern to the entire world.

Russian expansionism can best be fully evaluated and its implications understood if one looks at the total, and these two are the two thrusts that confront the world both in the East and in the West with the problem of deterring and the resisting and defeating of Soviet expansionism.

Q. While we welcome your assurance and support for Kuala Lumpur as the rubber headquarters, we would like to know if there is any change in the U.S. attitude on the tin agreement negotiations, particularly with regard to the export control which the producing countries would like to maintain and also U.S. insistence that the stockpile should be doubled. Is there any chance that you will be prepared to consider or review the objections that the U.S. delegations have been making all this time in the Geneva meeting?

A. I did not conduct the negotiations of the administration of the rubber agreement. We participated in the development of the agreement, and I think we were the first country to rectify it. We are a consuming country, and we have agreed to the location of the headquarters here in Kuala Lumpur. That doesn't mean that there won't be different points of view between producing states and consuming states as the agreement is implemented. I did not regard it as my function here today to discuss or negotiate those issues.

Q. How do you interpret the constant call from Phnom Penh for talks with Thailand?

A. I can make a generalized observation that politicians always find it difficult to sustain taxpayers interest in particular projects, whether domestic or foreign. So to try to answer a question about patience is a difficult one to answer.

What the central question that's involved here was that the refugee problem is the question for providing for the feeding, the resettlement, and humanitarian needs of people who have been driven out of their homelands by conditions politically who are fleeing oppression. That sort of problem has always, I think, attracted the compas-

sion of the American people and, indeed, the peoples in the free world everywhere.

The interesting thing about the refugee movements that plague the planet at the present time is that they involve millions of people who are walking away from the Soviet Union and Soviet-sponsored regimes, and they're walking toward the free democratic societies. That's a very clear message that ought to have great appeal for the free peoples of this planet who are concerned about the expansionism and aggression of the closed totalitarian society. I think that beyond the humanitarian appeal these refugees generate in so many countries that are supporting them, including these ASEAN countries, beyond that is that central question which it seems to me would appeal to people in terms of justifying the political systems in which they are free to live.

¹ Press releases issued concerning the Secretary's visit to Ankara and Kuala Lumpur but which are not printed here are 165, 167, and 171 of June 30, 1980, and 193 of July 17.

² Press release 166 of June 30.

³ Press release 168 of June 30.

⁴ Press release 169 of June 30.

⁵ Press release 181 of July 8.

⁶ Press release 178 of July 8. ■

U.S. Policy Toward Zaire

by Lannon Walker

*Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on March 5, 1980. Ambassador Walker is Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs.*¹

I welcome the opportunity to appear before this subcommittee to discuss with you the Administration's policy toward Zaire. I recently returned from a visit to Kinshasa where I had the chance to meet with President Mobutu, Prime Minister Bo-Boliko, Foreign Minister Nguza, and other Zairian leaders, as well as to consult in detail with members of the U.S. Mission.

Before reviewing with you the ways in which the political, economic, and security situation in Zaire has evolved over the past year, I want to outline the strategic, political, and economic realities that underpin our policy toward Zaire.

First, let there be no mistake that our interests in Zaire are long term in nature. As Assistant Secretary [for African Affairs Richard M.] Moose stated before this subcommittee last year: "Zaire's geopolitical and economic weight in African scales of power is significant." With its population of 27 million, it is the third largest sub-Saharan African state. In terms of land area, it ranks second in size and it borders on nine other states in central and southern Africa. It is a fact that Zaire's sheer size and economic potential make it critical to regional stability. And it is a fact that Zaire's moderate foreign policy orientation and close relations with the West stand in marked contrast to several countries in the area which favor more radical policies and have turned to the U.S.S.R., East Germany, and Cuba for military and economic support.

Zaire is also the world's leading producer of both cobalt and industrial diamonds and the seventh largest producer of copper. It has consistently supplied Western markets over the past two decades and intends to continue this policy in the future. The United States imports over 60% of its cobalt from Zaire. The mining sector in Zaire, in turn, is an important market for U.S. equipment and technology. U.S. interest in the hotel industry, tire and battery manufacturing, flour milling, and vehicle assembly plant and

other U.S. investments are all commercially important in this, black Africa's third largest market.

Furthermore, Zaire's political support continues to be important to our interests in Africa and elsewhere. Zaire is pro-Western in its foreign policy and in the positions it takes in international organizations. It has been a consistent voice of reason in the councils of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the nonaligned movement, and the United Nations. Zaire has strongly encouraged efforts to find peaceful solutions to regional disputes, including support for the Camp David accords. It has opposed efforts by radicals such as Cuba and Vietnam to dominate the nonaligned movement, instead aligning itself with other moderates such as Yugoslavia, Egypt, Bangladesh, and Singapore.

President Mobutu was among the first to call for the immediate release of the American hostages in Iran and has steadfastly supported us on this issue in the United Nations and other public fora. Zaire condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and supported the U.N. General Assembly resolution calling for immediate Soviet withdrawal. Zaire was the first African state to announce that it would not participate in the Moscow Olympic Games. In regional affairs, Zaire—though not one of the frontline states—has consistently and actively supported combined Western and African efforts to find peaceful solutions in Namibia and Rhodesia.

In sum, I submit that Zaire has historically been a good friend of the United States; that its minerals production is vital to us and the West; and that its stability and economic potential are important to a region of the world that has become a major focus of U.S. and Western attention and efforts over the past 3 years of this Administration. In addition, given the serious crisis which has persisted in Zaire for the last 5 years, and the consequent negative effects on the standard of living and the health of the Zairian people, we have a major humanitarian interest in this important country.

The facts that the United States has significant interest in Zaire, that Zaire has been a friend, and that the friend is now in trouble do not mean

that this Administration's policy is one of blind or massive support. As Assistant Secretary Moose told this subcommittee on February 7, our position is that, together with our allies and the international financial institutions, we shall continue to assist Zaire's efforts to correct these problems as long as sustained progress is also made by the Government of Zaire in these same areas. We have explicitly and publicly stated that if our interests and the interests of the Zairian people are to be protected and prosper, major reforms must take place in the political, economic, and military systems of Zaire, and there must be a significant improvement in the overall human rights situation in that country.

These reform goals have been spelled out in detail by President Mobutu and endorsed by the major Western powers, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank. The Western assistance programs to Zaire are linked in various degrees to achievement of these goals, with the United States taking the lead. These combined efforts are finally beginning to show progress, although it has been a slow and painful process for all concerned, and it is far from being over.

It was in recognition of the failure of the government to implement adequately the reform program that President Mobutu and Prime Minister Bo-Boliko drastically changed the membership of the cabinet [Executive Council] and the directors of state enterprises in January; that President Mobutu ordered the new cabinet at its first meeting to concentrate upon efficient, honest administration of their departments, or else; and that the new cabinet worked very hard during the month of February under the leadership of the Prime Minister to produce precise programs for each department to execute during 1980. The Prime Minister explained these programs for 4 hours February 25 on nationwide TV, responding to questions from the press and the public. He, too, stressed the necessity for good management in order to start Zaire again on the upward path. And he expressed his and the President's determination to apply sanctions against those who fail to follow the new approach.

Let me, in this context, review with you progress in major areas of reform over the past year. I will not address myself specifically to U.S. economic assistance programs for Zaire, a subject covered by AID [Agency for In-

International Development] Deputy Assistant Administrator Haven North in his February 28 statement.

Human Rights

Last year at this time, only 10 months had gone by since the traumatic attack on Kolwezi by the ex-Katangan gendarmes. The attitude of the central government was defensive, and there was a real question as to whether there could be reconciliation between Shaba and Kinshasa. Nevertheless, President Mobutu had announced an amnesty program designed to welcome back into Zaire the exiles who had left Shaba after the 1977 and 1978 invasions. By early 1979, thousands of exiles had returned, and a number of political prisoners had been released. Some said these actions were purely cosmetic and easily reversed.

The fact of the matter is that, up to now, some 150,000 returnees, mainly from Angola, have been resettled in Zaire. Though the massive influx appears to have ended, Zaire continues to work with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees to receive and help resettle former exiles from Angola, Congo, and Sudan who continue to return, albeit in smaller numbers. Although the amnesty officially expired in mid-1979, the Zairian Government continues to honor its terms and to actively seek the return of other expatriated Zairians, some of them formerly prominent in the political and economic life of the country, and some active political opponents of the Mobutu government.

At the same time, Zaire continues to play host to some 650-700,000 refugees, primarily Angolans but also including some 50,000 Ugandans, 33,000 Burundians and Rwandans, and 40,000 Cambodians forced from their homes by the recent upheaval. Zaire, Somalia, Thailand, and Thailand support the largest refugee populations in the world, except for the United States.

Zaire also now affords to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) access to most prisons as part of the committee's efforts to help improve the lot of individual prisoners and monitor prison conditions in Shaba, Kinshasa, and other regions of Zaire.

Most recently, President Mobutu dissolved the Judicial Council which had extended tight control over the courts, the courts, and almost all aspects of the judicial system, replacing it with an independent bar and courts and curbing such abuses by security agen-

cies as arbitrary arrest. Measures are also underway to reduce the size, increase the discipline, and generally bring under control the gendarmes, including creation of a separate civilian police force. This reform, a return to an earlier system, was in response to criticism and advice from within and without. It is acknowledgment of a mistake.

I submit that these actions represent real progress toward respect for the rights of the individual.

Political Reform

In the area of political reform, progress—while not spectacular—is being sustained. Last year we told you that we perceived the beginnings of decentralization of political authority and responsibility and that the Legislative Council was showing encouraging signs of activity. I continue to be impressed by the candor and the skill exhibited by members of the Legislative Council in taking advantage—as they did again just last December—of the budgetary process to question government policies, suggest alternatives, and to interpellate individual cabinet members.

I am equally encouraged by the new responsibility being accorded to Prime Minister Bo-Boliko and his cabinet. The January 1980 cabinet reshuffle brings into the government a number of persons formerly considered as critics of the regime and outspoken advocates for honest, effective administration. Among the ministers, secretaries of state, and heads of state enterprises replaced—not simply shifted to other positions—were those most criticized by the legislature for gross mismanagement and abuse of the public trust. Some of them are under investigation, charged with misappropriating large amounts of government funds. The interaction among the Legislative Council, the Executive Council, and the President has increased encouragingly in the past year.

I might also point out that in a February 25 TV interview, Prime Minister Bo-Boliko stated that the regional economic and social councils nominated late last year will soon begin operating.

Military Reform

Last year, we told you it was too early to say when Zairian armed forces would replace the foreign troops in Shaba. Today, I can state that substantial progress is being made in the area of

reforming and retraining those key elements of the Zairian armed forces charged with maintaining security in Shaba, the mining region vital to Zaire's economic recovery. The 2,500-man inter-African force that maintained security in Shaba for more than a year following the 1978 invasion was withdrawn over a period of some 6 weeks during the summer of 1979. It was replaced by newly trained Zairian troops of the 3,000-man 21st Infantry Brigade. The Belgian Army advisers who trained this unit remain with the troops in Shaba and are now beginning a battalion-by-battalion retraining of the Kamanyola division.

Relations between the Shaban civilian population and these units continue to be much improved over relations before Shaba II, and the security situation remains calm. Discipline and *esprit de corps* have been maintained. And, the new units—though still hampered by long and badly organized supply lines—are at last being regularly paid, properly fed, adequately housed, and well led. French advisers are training the 31st Parachute Brigade, while the P.R.C. is training a commando brigade. Other units, such as the Kamanyola division and the gendarmerie, will take time to reach similar levels of discipline and performance, but programs to bring this about have begun.

Peace and security in Shaba bodes well both for Zaire's economic health and for renewed confidence among foreign lenders and investors. The recent World Bank-organized consortium loan to Zaire's state-owned mining firm—GECAMINES—is one evidence of renewed confidence. Another is the return of the expatriate technicians and managers still vital to the operation of the copper and cobalt mines and processing facilities. Contrary to recent published reports, expatriate employees of GECAMINES now number some 750, as opposed to some 200 only a year ago.

Our foreign military sales (FMS) credit and international military and education training (IMET) programs continue to make an important contribution, I believe, to the international effort to assist Zaire in reforming and reequipping its armed forces. The recent General Accounting Office (GAO) audit of our FMS programs underlined the need for basic improvements in the logistical management of Zaire's Army (FAZ), a task that is even now being undertaken by our Belgian allies. Sixteen Belgian officers are assuming key

positions in the logistics system at FAZ headquarters and in the field. There is an immense task to be accomplished in this area. But, once again, effective action has begun and promises to continue.

The success of the programs begun to improve the Zairian military performance depends in large measure upon a close working relationship among the various foreign advisers, and between them and the FAZ. I can say confidently that this has been the case to date. Success also depends upon a coordinated approach to meeting the material needs, including the kinds of transport and communications equipment, spare parts, small arms and ammunition, uniforms, etc., that our FMS program has made available to Zaire during recent years. While there have been some difficulties with this program, the GAO report concludes that there was no evidence of systematic diversions of equipment supplied through FMS, and the improved logistics system should remedy the problems discussed in the GAO report. Thus, there is every reason for the United States to continue to play its part in a cooperative effort to improve Zaire's armed forces.

Reconciliation

Also important to Zaire's security and to its economic recovery are relations with its closest neighbors, particularly Angola, Zambia, and the Congo. Since 1978 President Mobutu has worked hard and effectively to secure his frontiers through reconciliation and establishment of normal diplomatic relations with Angola. The 1979 mutual nonaggression pact signed by the Presidents of Zaire, Angola, and Zambia, coupled with their efforts to increase trade and economic cooperation, is an important psychological and political milestone for Zaire and the region.

Economic Reforms

Though military reform and secure frontiers are important, the key to Zaire's future stability and the welfare of its people is continued progress on economic reforms. Central to this has been the effort to apply rational economic criteria to the control and allocation of Zaire's foreign exchange receipts. This is being undertaken with assistance from the IMF and the U.N. Development Program, whose experts in the Central Bank and the Ministry of

Finance are for the most part now in place. The new team at the Ministry of Finance was chosen particularly for its reputation of toughness in insuring that the budget is respected and taxes are collected. Improvements in customs collection and accounting procedures under the aegis of a recently reorganized customs office staffed by a 35-member Belgian team should further tighten financial management and improve the recapture of government revenues. The road back is long, but the journey has begun and there are solid grounds to believe it will continue.

I would also underline the importance of recent major agreements on rescheduling of debts owed by Zaire to foreign banks and governments. These were difficult negotiations, but with good will on the part of all, they resulted in agreements which should provide Zaire with the breathing space necessary to reestablish its credit worthiness with both private and public lenders. The successful conclusion of these negotiations is one more indication that Zaire's creditors, including the U.S. Government and major American banks, recognize that the economic reforms now underway are having a positive impact. It also speaks for the determination of the Zairian leadership to come to grips with past commitments despite the heavy financial burden and sacrifice these agreements entail for the people of Zaire.

What Remains to be Done?

Though we continue to be encouraged by progress across the board toward achieving basic reform in Zaire, it is obvious that there remains much to be done by way of implementing the program outlined by President Mobutu in 1977 and 1978. President Mobutu and Prime Minister Bo-Boliko both made this point forcefully during television appearances in February. For example, there is a continuing concern about Zaire's ability to keep on the course of budgetary retrenchment and economic reform it has charted with its friends.

As you know, the key element in Zaire's economic recovery program and in its efforts to regain investor and lender confidence is the IMF stabilization program agreed to in August 1979. At the moment, the agreement between the IMF and the Government of Zaire is being renegotiated. This has not been a particularly easy set of negotiations, and Zaire's performance under the first 4 months of the program was less than satisfactory. We do not have a formal

report from the IMF at this time and, therefore, I will not be able to go into detail on precisely what the Zairians have and have not done. But, let me make it clear that we have already conveyed our concerns in this regard to President Mobutu and other ranking Zairian officials.

When I was in Kinshasa last month, we stressed that the crucial question is the economic reform effort and that the linchpin of all other reform efforts is the issue of budgetary discipline. I also emphasized that the test of Zaire's willingness and ability in this regard will be the results of the current negotiations with the IMF and Zaire's performance in the next 6 months. If Zaire does not pass this test, then we and others will find our ability to aid Zaire blocked and our desire to do so severely reduced.

We and Zaire's other friends will also be watching for further moves on judicial and legal reforms and a thoroughgoing overhaul of the law enforcement agencies, most particularly the gendarmes, as promised by President Mobutu on February 4. In addition, we will be looking for indications that continued collaboration with the ICRC is resulting in improved conditions of confinement for both convicts and those awaiting trial. In terms of military reform, we expect to see steady progress toward retraining the Kamanyola division and other units of a leaner, more professional armed forces whose discipline, pay, housing, and logistical support are assured. Finally, on the political side, we look forward to continued progress toward decentralization as represented by a strong and responsive cabinet, unfettered debate in a representative Legislative Council, and the creation of regional consultative bodies.

¹ The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

China and the United States: Into the 1980s

by Richard C. Holbrooke

Address before the National Council for U.S.-China Trade on June 1, 1980. Mr. Holbrooke is Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

Less than a decade ago, after 20 years of doubt, hesitation, and often savage debate in this country, we began to move toward "normalizing" relations with the People's Republic of China. A little more than 500 days ago, we reached that historic goal.

It is difficult today to recall the controversy that surrounded the normalization process. The latest national polls show that two-thirds of Americans have favorable impressions of China, a stunning reversal of similar polls taken as recently as 1977. There is clearly a national consensus to continue to develop the close, friendly, and cooperative relationships we have already established with the Chinese people and their government.

The speed with which we have been able to develop our bilateral relations with China since January 1, 1979, has astonished the world. There is no need for me to detail the remarkable pace of developments in U.S.-China relations for its knowledgeable audience. In every area, we have established or are on the verge of establishing much the same framework for our relations that might have developed had recognition not been delayed for 30 years.

The fears and doubts that were expressed by opponents at the time of normalization have proven ill-founded. The high hopes that we held have been realized or surpassed. Let me briefly review for you what we have hoped to achieve by "normalization" and measure what has occurred against these objectives.

Objectives and Achievements

Recall the China we observed in the 1960s—a nation in self-inflicted chaos, promising its hope to extend revolutionary turmoil throughout the globe, actively supporting insurgencies in many areas, armed with primitive nuclear weapons, vulnerable to outside intervention, isolated and enraged by international denial of its legitimacy. It seemed then that

China's inevitable entry onto the world stage could only be profoundly disruptive of world peace and threatening to our security and that of our friends and allies.

The objectives of this Administration have been clear from the outset, although they must have seemed to many to be overly ambitious. We wished:

- To facilitate China's full entry into the international community in a way that would contribute to world peace and stability, not threaten it;
- To acknowledge our national interest in the development of a strong, secure, prosperous, and friendly China that could play a legitimate and constructive role in the Asia-Pacific region and ultimately in the world;
- To defuse contentious issues dividing ourselves from China, such as the Taiwan issue, and eliminate the danger of possibly catastrophic miscalculation by an emerging nuclear and major regional power; and
- To develop constructive patterns of consultation with the Chinese on international issues and build the friendly and cooperative economic, commercial, cultural, and other relationships with the Chinese necessary to sustain these ends.

These objectives have been or are being achieved under this Administration.

As for China itself, that nation is now beginning to enjoy the international status that long eluded it. The 1 billion people of China have begun to play a role in the maintenance of global peace and stability. The arc from Korea through Taiwan and the Philippines, at the very center of great power rivalry and instability for much of this century, is less subject to these strains today than at any time in well over 40 years. Longstanding tensions between China, Japan, and the United States have been replaced with true dialogue and consultation. For the first time in a century, our three countries enjoy close and cooperative relations and share an interest in the independence, peace, and stability of the Korean Peninsula.

On the Southeast Asian mainland, the focus of bitter mutual hostility less than a decade ago, we now share many objectives in common with China, even though we sometimes still differ on the appropriate means by which they should be pursued. In Southwest Asia, we stand

together in demanding Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and a halt to Soviet southward expansion. We each place emphasis on bolstering the security of Pakistan and other neighboring states, while seeking to improve our respective relations with India.

Our own relations with China are good and steadily improving. Widespread fears about the implications of "normalization" for Taiwan and our flourishing private relationships with the people of that island have proven groundless. Although we no longer recognize the Taiwan authorities or maintain official relations with the island, nongovernmental relationships with Taiwan's dynamic society and people continue to prosper, as does Taiwan itself, despite some internal difficulties. Beijing's threats to "liberate" the island by force have been replaced with moderate policies that respect current realities in Taiwan. Beijing now seeks the reestablishment of economic, cultural, and other links between Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Tensions in the area are demonstrably at an historic 30-year low.

Our bilateral relations with the Chinese have been rapidly consolidated and—most important in our system of government—institutionalized so that they are no longer dependent on a few individuals operating in secrecy, as was the case until the beginning of last year. Broad American interests are engaged; it would be difficult for any future Administration to reverse the trend.

By the end of this year we will have completed the construction of the basic legal and institutional framework within which economic, cultural, scientific, and technological relationships between the American and Chinese peoples can develop their full potential. That potential is already being realized. As many as 100 Chinese delegations now visit our shores each month. More than 60,000 Americans will visit China this year. Our trade—which doubled last year over the previous year, reaching \$2.3 billion—is continuing its rapid growth and should exceed \$3 billion this year. This first joint ventures are being concluded between American and Chinese businessmen.

Finally—and of vital importance to the prospects for world peace and stability—we have established a pattern of frequent and extremely useful consultation between our highest leaders and diplomats. A serious dialogue on international security matters is now taking place in an atmosphere of friendship and candor. This pattern was set in last year's historic visits of Vice Premier Deng

Xiaoping and Vice President Mondale, whose personal direction and prodding of our respective bureaucracies have played such an essential role in the extraordinary growth in our relations. It was advanced with Secretary of Defense Brown's trip to China in January, in last week's visit to Washington by Vice Premier Geng Biao, and in the regular cycle of diplomatic consultation initiated with the visit of Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Wenjin in March. Several of my colleagues and I will visit Beijing this summer to continue the dialogue.

The agenda for this period of reconstruction that is now nearing completion has been simple, virtually self-evident. We had to sweep aside the misunderstandings and debris of the past and to fill in the gaps in our relationships caused by the 30-year absence of normal ties. We are doing so to our mutual satisfaction.

The Future

But what of the future? Having laid in the 1970s the groundwork for a normal relationship, we now must ask ourselves what our hopes and objectives should be in the 1980s. We have only just begun to address this momentous issue. Let me share with you today some of our preliminary thinking.

Over the 80 years of this century there has been endless speculation about China's future. But virtually every prediction has been confounded by events, thus suggesting extreme caution to anyone making predictions even 5—still less 20—years ahead. Nevertheless, most of the best China experts I have consulted in the past year feel that China's leaders have some reason to be hopeful about their country's future.

It does not appear impossible that Chinese growth rates through the rest of this century will continue at 6% or perhaps even 7% annually. China's GNP is now about the size of ours as it was in the 1920s. Should growth continue at recent rates, by the year 2000 China's GNP will—in real terms—approach the size of U.S. GNP in the late 1970s. Given China's enormous population, this would, of course, translate into a standard of living more like America's in the early 20th century. Even so, this would be an impressive achievement.

Moreover, national power and influence are determined not by per capita GNP comparisons but by industrial, scientific, and technological prowess in the aggregate. A China with a GNP in the area of \$1.5–2 trillion will have a weight

and presence in world affairs far beyond that at present. And, if China can overcome the bureaucratic inertia and difficulties inherent in managing the destinies of a billion or more people—admittedly a very big “if”—it will have achieved a degree of security and capacity for independent action that it lacks today.

The United States, our allies, and China's neighbors all have a vital interest in how China may choose to use its regained power and influence. For over a century, the world has speculated—sometimes hopefully, sometimes fearfully—about what the achievement of Chinese potential might portend. For over a century, the questions have been the same.

- Will the Chinese be comfortable with a world of independent, sovereign, equal nation-states, or will they revert to the view that others should bow to their centrality and superiority in a hierarchy of nations?
- Will China prove able to absorb the foreign ideas and techniques essential to its modernization without relapsing into xenophobia?
- And, will a wealthy and powerful China direct its immense energies within itself, or will it prove expansionist?

We cannot predict with certainty the answers to these difficult questions, any more than we can predict with certainty the outcome of the great effort now underway in China to make up for lost time. Some of the answers China's current leaders give are encouraging. China, they say, is devoted to a world of independent nation-states coexisting peacefully on terms of sovereign equality. China, they say, will modernize both by drawing on its own traditions and on foreign ideas. It will deal with foreigners—and with its neighbors—on the basis of friendship, equality, and mutual benefit.

Such policies would obviously be in our national interest as well as China's. It is important that we encourage those trends that deepen China's involvement with the West and Japan. In short, our policies should seek to insure that China's answers to these questions continue to coincide with our own interests, preferences, and practices and with those of our friends and allies.

U.S. Principles

The principles that will govern our China policy for the decades to come are therefore already clear.

First. We will develop our relations with China on their own merits. It is the business of diplomacy not only to gauge the reactions of our potential adversaries but also to measure policy with respect to the interests of our allies. We will enhance our nation's prosperity and security and that of our allies by developing our relations with China in a way that takes full and adequate account of all the external factors that are affected by them. While strategic factors remain a central consideration in our relations, the famous triangular diplomacy of the early 1970s is no longer an adequate conceptual framework in which to view relations with China. Broad American interests engaged, as are those of allies and friends in a world of increasingly complex interplay among power centers such as Japan, the Association of South East Asian Nations, India, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, and Western Europe.

We welcome the emergence of China on the world scene as an active participant in global and regional affairs, thus ending China's long isolation and relative noninvolvement in the international arena and multilateral diplomacy. China is beginning to play an important role in major and more issues—many completely unrelated to security and strategic considerations.

In short, relations with China are not a simple function of our relations with the Soviet Union, although the pace of their advance has been and will continue to be influenced by changes in the international environment. As Chairman Mao told us privately as early as 1973, the United States must not attempt to stand on China's shoulders to strike at the Soviet Union. His statement is true notwithstanding the fact that for China, as for ourselves, the question of how to deal with growing Soviet power and assertiveness in the world is, and will remain a central issue of foreign policy. Each of us has other interests and is concerned with other issues as well. Our perspectives and our policies may be parallel from time to time; but they will rarely be identical. Our societies rest on quite different philosophic assumptions and our values and institutions diverge in many ways. In the absence of frontal assaults on our common interests, we will remain—as at present—friends, rather than allies.

Second. Our new friendship with China need not and will not be pursued at the expense of our relationships with others. On the contrary, the effectiveness

Our China policy depends in part upon the enhancement of our role in the Asia-Pacific region, and that role is in turn strengthened by our growing, constructive ties with China.

Our recognition of China's importance in the Asia-Pacific region does not mean that we intend to default on our own role or to entrust it to the Chinese. There will be no "division of labor" with China in Southeast Asia or elsewhere. Each of us has our own interests, as do Japan and other countries of the region. Our relations with China are founded on respect for this fact.

The United States will remain a major Pacific power, vitally interested in the stability of the western Pacific, of Southeast and South Asia, and of other areas on the rim of China. We will maintain and enhance our already strong military, political, economic, and cultural presence in the area. Doing so is important to our Asian friends and allies and would be welcome to the Chinese as evidence of our intention neither to pursue hegemony nor to permit others to pursue it in the Asia-Pacific region.

Third. We will continue to recognize our national interest in a friendly and successfully modernizing China. Our policies on technology transfer are evolving to reflect this interest.

China and the United States are both continental societies whose foreign policies are decisively influenced by our domestic political and economic situations. Should China relapse into economic stagnation, xenophobia, or ideological frenzy borne of frustration, the consequences for world order would be profound. Should China be unable to maintain peaceful relationships of equality and mutual benefit with the nations of the region, its domestic aspirations could prove unattainable. Should China fall still further behind its more advanced neighbors, its role in the maintenance of global balance would be eroded, to the profound disadvantage not only of China but of the United States and our allies as well. An economic or political vacuum in China has not served the interests of stability in the world in the past; it would not do so in the future.

More positively, we—and the world—have much to gain from a revitalized China, not only in terms of trade and economic exchange but also in terms of scientific and technological interchange. The Chinese are a talented people who, in the broad sweep of world history, have often in the past led the advance in human knowledge and the quality of life and can do so again.

The very size of China makes its experiment in modernization unique and gives us all a special interest in the character of its success. To illustrate: Imagine the consequences for the quality of the environment in the northern hemisphere if a billion or more Chinese were to fail to learn from our mistakes and to industrialize to our levels without imposing pollution controls. Imagine the consequences for world energy supplies should a modernized China be forced to turn to massive imports to sustain its agriculture, industry, and commerce. Clearly, we have a stake not only in China's successful modernization but also in how it modernizes. Our rapidly developing scientific and technological exchanges with the Chinese reflect this interest. It should be a source of some satisfaction that China, in pursuing modernization, has asked us to play such an important supporting role.

Fourth. We will continue to pursue our interest in a strong, peaceful, and secure China. A China confident in its ability to defend its borders against foreign aggression enhances stability in the Pacific and on the Eurasian landmass and, therefore, contributes to our own security and that of our allies.

We do not sell arms to China or engage in joint military planning arrangements with the Chinese. The current international situation does not justify our doing so. Neither we nor the Chinese seek such an alliance relationship. Nevertheless, we can and will assist China's drive to improve its security by permitting appropriate technology transfer, including the sale of carefully selected items of dual use technology and defensive military support equipment. We have begun to do so.

We will continue to consider such transactions individually on their merits as they arise, taking into account our own security interests and those of others in the region. Vice Premier Geng Biao's visit to the United States this week and last has marked another step forward in this policy. His discussions with Defense Secretary Brown, with the President, the Vice President, and the Secretary of State have played a key role in defining what is now desirable and possible in terms of a modest American contribution to China's massive modernization needs.

Secretary Brown's and Vice Premier Geng's visits have also initiated a process of regular contact and dialogue between our respective defense establishments. We expect these useful exchanges to broaden and grow in the years to come.

Fifth. we will continue to adhere scrupulously to our normalization understandings with respect to Taiwan. The past 18 months have shown that the full range of private American relationships with the people of Taiwan can prosper in the absence of any official U.S. relations with the island. The Taiwan Relations Act provides a firm grounding in our domestic law under which such unofficial relationships continue to flourish.

The act also establishes our concern for the continued peace and security of the Taiwan area. Our policy will remain consistent with the act and with our abiding interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue by the parties directly concerned.

Within this context, the nature and form of Taiwan's ultimate relationships with the mainland of China are for the Chinese on both sides of the strait to determine. It would be presumptuous for Americans to attempt to do so. Nor would we impede the process of their reconciliation.

Sixth. We will actively pursue our efforts to enlist the energies and talents of the Chinese people in global efforts to address the common problems of humankind. It is obvious that no such problem—whether of the environment, of food and population, of global energy and resource management, of economic development, technology transfer or arms control—can be successfully addressed without the positive participation and contribution of China. We are encouraged by Chinese interest and cooperation with us on these vital issues in this initial period. We hope to work closely with the Chinese Government and people in the United Nations and in other international organizations and fora to insure continued progress toward a better quality of life for all on this planet.

In sum, the 1980s begin with Sino-American relations entering the stage of maturity. They are firmly grounded on both sides in enlightened self-interest and mutual respect. Sino-American normalization has worked. Its immense promise is now being realized. ■

Review of Relations With Taiwan

by Richard C. Holbrooke

Statement before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on June 11, 1980. Mr. Holbrooke is Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.¹

I appreciate your inviting me today to review the state of relations with Taiwan 1 year after enactment of the Taiwan Relations Act. In establishing American relations with the people on Taiwan on an unofficial basis last year, those of us who were concerned with Taiwan, both in the Administration and in the Congress, knew that we were breaking entirely new ground—that we were establishing a unique relationship in response to the requirements of our foreign policy as it relates to China. We could not be certain, of course, exactly how it would turn out—indeed, the purpose of these hearings is to address that very question.

We can look back with considerable pride and satisfaction at the developments of the past year as have such detached observers as the General Accounting Office staff team, which agreed that the unofficial system through which relations have been maintained with the people of Taiwan is working very well. We successfully accomplished the important policy objective of transferring our diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing—a step clearly in our interest and long overdue—without jeopardizing the security and well-being of the people on Taiwan. Even the Taiwan authorities have acknowledged that in the months since derecognition, substantive relationships between the United States and the people on Taiwan have not suffered.

There is abundant evidence that this policy has worked effectively.

- Taiwan's overall foreign trade last year increased by 31% over 1978 levels, while U.S. investment and two-way U.S. trade increased by 15% and 23% respectively.

- Tensions are markedly down in the Taiwan Strait area.

- Travel to the United States from Taiwan increased nearly 60% during 1979.

- Five agreements have been negotiated and concluded between the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) and the

Coordination Council for North American Affairs (CCNAA).

Now I would like to address myself to the four major areas of interest indicated by the subcommittee.

Security

The security of the people on Taiwan continues to be of concern to the United States. The Administration has affirmed this on many occasions. So, too, has the Congress—most notably in the Taiwan Relations Act. I can report to you today that a variety of political and military factors continues to render unlikely any P.R.C. [People's Republic of China] action against Taiwan.

- Chinese military action against Taiwan would severely damage or destroy prospects for cooperation with the United States in pursuit of our larger common interests.

- The P.R.C.'s concerns with military challenges on its northern and southern borders continue to exert priority claims on its limited defense resources.

- The Chinese do not have the capability to mount a successful amphibious invasion of Taiwan.

- Beijing now talks in terms of peaceful reunification.

- Foreign investment and trade are now being encouraged in Fujian Province (opposite Taiwan), previously closed to foreign visitors.

- We continue to provide Taiwan access to selected defensive weapons and follow-on support.

In short, tensions in the Taiwan Strait area are at a 30-year low. We believe that much of the impetus for this comes from our recognition of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China. As our relations with China continue to improve, the likelihood of conflict in the Taiwan Strait area should continue to recede. Nevertheless, we shall continue to monitor closely the situation with regard to current capabilities and intentions on both sides of the strait, as well as projected future capabilities.

Arms Sales. During 1979 we continued to honor previous commitments by delivering to Taiwan military equipment in the pipeline as well as spare parts and follow-on support for items previously supplied. These items included additional

F-5E interceptors with improved weaponry such as precision-guided munitions and Maverick missiles. Total U.S. arms sales to Taiwan in 1979—foreign military sales (FMS) and commercial—were valued at approximately \$800 million.

In light of our normalization understanding that there would be a moratorium on new arms sales commitments to Taiwan during 1979, we deferred consideration of new arms requests. In anticipating resumption of sales in 1980, however, discussions were held under the auspices of AIT and CCNAA toward the end of last year to review Taiwan's priority defense equipment needs. Taiwan's requests predictably focused on air and sea defense, particularly the need for a follow-on aircraft to the F-5.

On January 2, we sent prenotifications to Congress for several major items in the package. The equipment approved, worth about \$280 million, included:

- An additional battalion of I-Hawk anti-aircraft missiles;

- An improved version of the Sea Chaparral ship anti-aircraft missile;

- TOW anti-tank missiles;

- A shipboard weapons-fire control system along with 76 mm rapid-firing guns; and

- An improved electronic identification system to safeguard fighter aircraft against friendly anti-aircraft fire.

With the exception of certain high-performance aircraft, which were disapproved on the grounds of the President's arms transfer policy, none of the remaining items on the list was rejected. Taiwan has been informed that we expect to address all other items on the list during this calendar year and that decisions on them will be announced as they are made. (Beijing has registered continuing objections to this aspect of our relationship with Taiwan, but despite our disagreement on this point, we have been able to continue to normalize U.S.-P.R.C. relations.)

As you are aware, on January 4, 1980, the President decided that in certain cases the sale to foreign countries of intermediate fighter aircraft developed or modified for export would serve the national interest and would be consistent with the objectives of the arms transfer policy. Interested companies were authorized to proceed with the development of such aircraft, on the understanding that they would receive no U.S. Government funding for their development, but that the U.S. Government would not disapprove their sale or

ounds that they were developed or modified solely for export. All other arms transfer policy criteria were to be applied on a case-by-case basis to proposed sales in order to insure consistency with our foreign policy, national security, and arms control interests.

Two companies subsequently submitted munitions control requests to be discussing an FX fighter with various potential customers, including Taiwan. Decisions on those requests were deferred, however, pending completion of the Defense Department of an analysis of the effect of the FX program on U.S. military procurement plans.

We expect very soon to reach a decision, in concert with Defense and NSC [National Security Council] staff, concerning preliminary discussions on FX aircraft between the contractors and potential foreign customers including Taiwan.

P.R.C.-Taiwan Relations. The nature and form of Taiwan's ultimate relationships with the mainland of China are for the Chinese on both sides of the strait to determine. It would be preposterous for Americans to attempt to do so. Nor would we impede the process of their reconciliation.

P.R.C. leaders have made several statements about resolving the Taiwan question peacefully. They have reiterated—most explicitly in an interview by Deng Xiaoping gave to a Japanese journalist October 18, 1979—that if Taiwan were to be reunited with the P.R.C. it could maintain virtual autonomy, keep its own currency and commercial institutions, its own armed forces, and its own provincial government. P.R.C. statements in recent months have been consistent with this approach.

The P.R.C. has also removed barriers to trade and communications between Taiwan and the mainland and proposed that such ties be developed to bring about reconciliation. The Taiwan authorities have rejected these proposals, which they characterize as merely a tactical ploy. Nevertheless, there is, in fact, a rapidly growing indirect trade between Taiwan and the mainland, mostly through middlemen in Hong Kong and Japan, and some travel is also taking place via circuitous routes. Taiwan's de facto policy toward trade with the mainland has not been clear but in general has been increasingly permissive. Other direct contacts take place occasionally at international conferences, sports events, and between Taiwan and P.R.C. students at American universities. Annual meetings abroad of Chinese from

Taiwan and the P.R.C. are increasingly frequent, whereas a few years ago they would have been avoided.

The Economy: Performance Since Normalization

Taiwan's gross national product advanced 20.3% in current prices in 1979 to \$32 billion. Total trade with 120 partners increased 31% to nearly \$31 billion, and U.S. and other foreign investment reached a record \$329 million as compared to \$213 million in 1978.

In the first quarter of this year the total value of Taiwan's imports increased 44% to \$4.5 billion, of which 21%—nearly \$1 billion—was crude oil. Imports from the United States during the quarter—mainly farm products, fertilizer, and machinery—were up 65% over the same period in 1979 to \$1.1 billion.

The value of Taiwan's exports in the first quarter reached almost \$4.5 billion, an increase of 34% over January-March 1979. The United States absorbed \$1.5 billion of the total, mainly textiles, footwear, and electronic items and electrical machinery. Globally, Taiwan had a trade deficit (rare for Taiwan) of about \$64 million in the first quarter. It is now too

early to predict whether or not the traditional trade surplus will emerge by year's end.

Special Factors Underpinning the Economy. Taiwan's broad-based economic development rests on a strong private sector and enlightened economic policies hospitable to foreign as well as domestic private investment and designed to foster high levels of savings, employment, and vital public services. The services include universal education designed to meet the needs of the economy. Budget surpluses and favorable trade balances are the rule rather than the exception in Taiwan. As a result, over the last two decades Taiwan has become a stable industrial economy. Per capita income has grown from subsistence level in the 1950s to nearly \$1,900 in 1980.

Taiwan's Role in the World Economy. Taiwan's economy is heavily export oriented and is overly dependent on the U.S. and Japanese markets, which together absorb about 50% of Taiwan's exports. The United States took 39% of Taiwan's exports in 1970 and 35% in 1979, but the value rose in 9 years to \$5.65 billion from \$567 million. The U.S. trade deficit was \$2.3 billion in 1979,

Vietnamese Attack Into Thailand

SECRETARY MUSKIE,
JUNE 25, 1980¹

The United States strongly condemns Vietnam's military attack on Thai territory beginning June 23. The attack produced a significant number of civilian casualties. Vietnam's actions severely disrupted humanitarian operations undertaken by the United Nations and other international relief agencies along the Thai-Khmer border aimed at alleviating the tragedy imposed on the Khmer people.

Vietnam's violation of Thai territorial integrity, despite its repeated pledges to the contrary, also threatens the peace, security, and stability in the entire region. As we did on January 26 of this year, we call upon Vietnam to refrain from any further aggressive actions threatening Thailand's security and integrity or endangering the well-being and safety of the noncombatants in the refugee concentrations along the border. We call upon the Soviet Union, without whose support these actions

would not be possible, to use its influence to bring an end to the present conflict. Moreover, we urge them to join in efforts to reach a peaceful solution on the basis of the U.N. General Assembly resolution of November 1979 which called for the withdrawal of all foreign troops and the creation of a genuinely independent and representative Khmer government.

The United States firmly supports the international effort to minister to the desperate needs of the Khmer people and applauds the cooperation of the Thai Government in this effort. I call upon all parties to the conflict to respect these international humanitarian efforts.

The United States is in close consultation with the Thai Government. As I told Thai Foreign Minister Sitthi during his recent visit to Washington, we will stand by our commitments to Thailand.

¹ Read to news correspondents on the Secretary's behalf by Department spokesman Hodding Carter III and issued as press release 164 of June 30, 1980. ■

slightly less than the \$2.6 billion in 1978. The implications of a downturn in the world economy can be seen in the worldwide recession in 1974-75: Taiwan's real growth plunged to 1.1% in 1974 from 13% in 1973, and reached only 3.1% in 1975.

Taiwan's GNP grew at an annual rate of 6.2% in real terms in the first quarter of 1980, low by Taiwan standards but remarkable by world standards. It reflects mainly soaring costs of the 380,000 barrels of oil imported each day. At present prices the year's oil bill will total \$3.8 billion—74% higher than in 1979. Taiwan's growth, however, is based not only on a vibrant export sector but also on strong consumer demand; booming housing and industrial construction; and progress on a number of railway, harbor, highway, nuclear power, and other infrastructure projects. Inflation in 1980 will be about 15%. Wages will probably increase an average of 20%.

Prospects. Despite worldwide stagnation at present, the long-term prospects for Taiwan's economy are excellent. Exports and markets are being expanded and diversified, and economic policies remain conducive to investment and development.

Domestic Politics

Although there has been some intermarriage since 1949, the population of Taiwan can be roughly described as 85% Taiwanese—the descendants of pre-1949 Chinese inhabitants of the island. The other 15% are mainlanders who crossed over to Taiwan in 1949 and their descendants. Chiang Ching-kuo appears to perceive a need to bring more Taiwanese into the political process. In the past several years, he has implemented policies designed to increase Taiwanese representation in the central elective bodies and has appointed Taiwanese to major cabinet positions.

Most of the membership of the Kuomintang (KMT)—the ruling nationalist party—is now Taiwanese, and roughly 70% of the local-level party organization is Taiwanese. One-third of the members of the KMT Central Standing Committee are also Taiwanese. Nevertheless, party leadership remains heavily dominated by mainlanders, and there is no indication that they are giving serious thought to relinquishing control. This appears to have frustrated some of the party's Taiwanese membership.

Defections from the KMT of a number of promising young Taiwanese members who later formed the core of the in-

dependent opposition have highlighted the need for party reform, and such reform has been seriously debated during the past year. Indeed, party modernization was named as one of the major policies of the KMT during the 11th plenum of the KMT Central Committee in December 1979. However, previous efforts to reform and modernize the party have met with the stiff opposition of old-line party stalwarts.

Trends toward general political liberalization have been set back, at least temporarily, by the December 10, 1979, Kaohsiung incident—a demonstration organized by political oppositionists which erupted in violence resulting in several police injuries and the subsequent arrests and trials. The demonstration had been billed as a human rights rally. However, a number of the rally organizers were charged during the subsequent trial with having promoted the idea of "Taiwan independence" and with seeking to overthrow the authorities by illegal means. Several of the defendants responded that what they had advocated was really "Republic of China independence," which they said would simply be acknowledgment of the separation of the "Republic of China on Taiwan" from the mainland for over 30 years.

Given the unshakable position that theirs is the legitimate government of all of China, including Taiwan, the idea of a Taiwan separate from the mainland (*de jure* as well as *de facto*) is totally unacceptable to the KMT leadership. Eight of the demonstration organizers (all Taiwanese) were tried and convicted of sedition and given prison terms ranging from 12 years to life. Thirty-two others have been tried and convicted of lesser charges stemming from their involvement in the demonstration.

In a separate development, Kao Chun-ming, Secretary General of the Taiwan Presbyterian Church, and nine others were arrested on charges of harboring or failing to report one of the rally's organizers who temporarily eluded arrest. The military court, which conducted a public trial last month, sentenced Kao to 7-years imprisonment. Four received suspended sentences and the other sentences ranged from 2 to 7 years. Although the authorities have stated that Kao's was purely a legal matter, concerns have been voiced in the United States and in Taiwan that his arrest and trial may have been prompted by a desire of the authorities to tighten control over the Presbyterian Church.

We have watched these developments closely, and have been mindful of the human rights interests embodied in

the Taiwan Relations Act. AIT has kept CCNAA informed of our views, and how seriously these developments have disturbed church and other groups in the United States.

Looking ahead, it should be noted that the KMT Central Standing Committee presided over by Chiang Ching-kuo, as well as the Executive Yuan, decided on June 5 to hold by the end of this year the supplemental central parliamentary elections suspended in December 1978. High officials have recently stated in public that the number of seats to be contested in these elections—seats in the Legislative Yuan, Control Yuan, and National Assembly—will be increased, and a decision on the size of the increase is expected to be announced soon.

Over the long term, stability on Taiwan will depend on several interrelated factors: the strength of the economy at its growth rate, confidence in the new relationship with the United States, Taiwan's overall defense posture, and the level of tension in the Taiwan Strait area. We believe that, in spite of occasional setbacks, the long-term trend continues to be toward broader and more genuine participation of all elements of Taiwan society in the political process, and we see this as a healthy development.

The AIT-CCNAA Relationship

The formula for nongovernmental relations with the people of Taiwan, established in the Taiwan Relations Act, has afforded us the flexibility to deal with problems cooperatively and imaginatively. The American Institute in Taiwan has proved its effectiveness over this past year. Through AIT:

- Americans and the people of Taiwan continue to enjoy access to travel services which allow them to travel between the United States and Taiwan to conduct business, pursue academic work and engage in other fields of mutually beneficial cooperation;

- Businessmen of both sides continue to receive assistance, advice, and facilitation;

- Americans are able to maintain mutually beneficial relations with Taiwan on an unofficial basis in such fields as nuclear energy development, scientific cooperation, and air transport;

- Sales of defensive equipment are arranged; and

- Our views and concerns on human rights, as well as those of Members of Congress and the American public, are transmitted to the authorities on Taiwan.

OECD Ministerial Meeting Held in Paris

Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher represented the Secretary of State in Paris June 3-4, 1980, at the meeting of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Council at ministerial level. Following is his statement made before the Council on June 3.

I am pleased to participate once again in the annual meeting of the OECD ministerial council. I bring you the greetings and best wishes of our Secretary of State, who very much regrets that the press of new responsibilities prevents his attendance. Secretary Muskie is keenly aware of the urgency of economic issues in current international relations—issues which directly affect the lives of all our peoples. He strongly supports the efforts of the OECD to develop a coordinated response to our common economic problems.

sponded in November and again, with a new draft, in April of this year. AIT proposed slight modifications in a meeting with CCNAA on May 22. CCNAA has not yet responded to the latest proposals. If any differences remain, they should be very minor; we believe that agreement will be reached soon. In the meantime, the two sides have extended functional privileges to allow for effective operation of the two organizations.

All of those who have been concerned with our relations with Taiwan—including both members of this subcommittee and people in the Administration—can, I believe, derive much satisfaction from the experience of the first year of the new relationship. The first year should also provide reassurance to the people on Taiwan that they will not suffer from the new arrangements. This is a most successful beginning to an important new chapter in our overall China policy; we can all be justifiably proud. I appreciate the interest this subcommittee has shown in Taiwan affairs this past year, and I look forward to working with you on this and other subjects over the coming year.

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Although the OECD has always served a helpful role in the exchange of information and the coordination of policy, its importance in recent years has grown enormously. For events of the last few years have shown beyond all doubt that the economic problems we all face defy parochial, national solutions. It is only through cooperation that we can avoid destructive, beggar-thy-neighbor policies and sustain the economic policies that have so handsomely rewarded our nations.

Interdependence of Problems

Economic theory stresses the interdependence of the problems we face and the absolute necessity of dealing with them in a coherent, mutually consistent manner. I think it is important, however, to stress two different kinds of interdependence. One is quite obvious and has become virtually a cliché: the interdependence of our national economies. Although obvious, it is important to emphasize this fact. The apparent intractability of such problems as energy, inflation, and unemployment has encouraged us to search for cooperative solutions. International cooperation can yield especially large benefits now, paradoxically, when there is increased pressure to adopt actions that would inevitably prove to be mutually destructive.

Unprecedented changes have taken place recently in key economic variables. Consequently, we find it particularly difficult to chart the future impact of those changes and their implications for our economic policies. Cooperation through the OECD will, at a minimum, allow us when making policy to share a mutually consistent view of the world.

Moreover, in all our economies we face an enormous task of adjusting to higher energy prices—not only in the energy sector but throughout the economy. In making this adjustment there will be steps we can take together that will have much greater benefit than actions any of us could take singly and in an uncoordinated way. These steps will include the sharing of burdens and moving toward common goals. Cooperation can insure that actions we take to strengthen our own domestic economies are not at the expense of the economic performance of other countries.

It is essential, in terms of our overall China policy, that we protect the basic understanding which made normalization possible. To that end, we have striven to maintain both the fact and the appearance of unofficiality in U.S.-Taiwan relations. This had led to restrictions on travel and access to officials and administrative procedures which some find cumbersome and inefficient. I would prefer to describe our attitude on such matters as pragmatic; we look at each case on its merits.

When we normalized relations with the People's Republic of China, we believed it essential that our existing agreements with Taiwan continue to be respected in Taiwan and to have validity under the law of the United States, despite the withdrawal of recognition. Therefore, as you know, a presidential memorandum was issued on December 15, 1978, which stated that: "Existing international agreements and arrangements in force between the United States and Taiwan shall continue in effect. . . ." The Administration welcomed the addition of Section 4(c) of the Taiwan Relations Act, which approved the continuation in force of such agreements "unless and until terminated in accordance with law," because that provision further removed any doubt about their continuing validity. This treatment of existing agreements by the Administration and Congress stands in contrast to that of most other nations, which considered all their agreements with Taiwan to have lapsed upon recognizing the P.R.C.

Nonetheless, our relationship with Taiwan is not static. As Assistant Secretary [for Congressional Relations] Atwood said to Chairman [of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs] Zablocki in his letter of October 30, 1979, some of our agreements with Taiwan will expire, perhaps calling for replacement with new agreements; some will require changes or updating; and others, having completed their purposes, will become obsolete. As circumstances change, new agreements on subjects not now covered by existing agreements may be required. I want to emphasize that we do not have a policy to replace or terminate all of the treaties and agreements we maintain with Taiwan. Each agreement, as the circumstances require, will be considered on its own merits, on a case-by-case basis.

As to the question of privileges and immunities, AIT gave CCNAA a draft agreement in September last year, and the subject has been under consideration by the two sides since then. CCNAA re-

The second kind of interdependence I would stress is the relationship among all the major economic problems we face. High energy prices, inflation, slow economic growth, protectionism, and recycling are all interrelated. We can deal sensibly with none of them in isolation.

For example, energy is a problem in its own right. But the price and supply of energy over the next decade will strongly influence all aspects of our macroeconomic performance—inflation, productivity, and unemployment. At the same time, the dramatic change this year in the current account positions of the less developed countries (LDCs), caused by the increase in the price of energy, will create difficulties for these countries. Our macroeconomic performance, in turn, will determine whether the LDCs are able to sustain their growth and avoid aggravating problems of indebtedness. Finally, all these problems will influence our trade and international financial relationships.

World Environment Day

SECRETARY MUSKIE,
JUNE 5, 1980¹

Earlier this year concerned citizens across America marked the 10th anniversary of Earth Day. We used that anniversary to measure our progress as a society toward the bold environmental goals we set. As we gather on World Environment Day, I hope each of us is looking forward to making the next decade of the environmental movement a global revolution.

A growing world population, increasing pressure on the world's natural resource base, and the spread of environmental pollution must become a fundamental concern of the world community. In my new position as Secretary of State, I intend to continue my commitment to improving and protecting the environment. I will do everything I can consistent with overall U.S. policies and priorities to pursue U.S. environmental interests and responsibilities. I view those interests as an important and necessary aspect of U.S. foreign policy.

The 4 billion people on this planet need food, energy, shelter, and living

space. As our economies face large, oil-induced balance-of-payments deficits and slower real economic growth, pressures for protectionism will certainly rise.

The OECD provides us with a long record of useful cooperation on these problems of interdependence, and its present work continues to offer a full agenda. Let me review briefly what I think are the main points on that agenda.

Areas for Cooperation

Energy. This is the area in which the scope for cooperation is greatest and perhaps most vital. We stand to gain not only by avoiding a destructive scramble for scarce supplies in periods of temporary shortfall but also by a joint effort of adjustment to higher energy prices. Two weeks ago at the International Energy Agency (IEA) ministerial meeting, our colleagues addressed themselves to improving our coordination on these crucial issues. I

urge all governments represented here today to support the conclusions of the meeting and to use the appropriate policy measures to reduce our dependence on imported oil and to develop alternative sources of energy.

space. They all seek improvements in their quality of life and greater social opportunity. Competition for the world's limited resources of the air, water, and land is inevitable. The community of nations must find ways to manage these resources which will allow us to meet people's needs as well as protect the environment.

Deterioration of the global resource base—air, water, forests, arable lands—threatens to undercut international development goals and objectives and sow the seeds for increased social, economic, and political instability. When one considers traditional U.S. foreign policy objectives, such as economic growth, political stability, sustained supply of raw materials at acceptable prices, and meeting basic human needs, it should be apparent why the issues associated with resources, environment, and population are being referred to as the "new dimension of national security."

Recognizing the importance of these concerns, I will support efforts in the United Nations and elsewhere to deal with them. World Environment Day provides us with an opportunity to redouble our efforts to improve the quality of life for people all over the world.

Inflation. The most important task we face in running our macroeconomic policies is to come to grips with inflation. To do so will not be easy. But we cannot expect to return to high and sustained growth until we bring inflation under control. I would emphasize an important aspect of the OECD's role this. The restrained policies that are necessary to deal with inflation pose their own risks as we enter a slow-down in world economic growth. Since no country's economic growth is independent of its trade with others, the regular cooperation within the OECD in discussing and analyzing macroeconomic policies will become even more important to insure that the downturn in economic activity does not become more severe than we now anticipate.

Developing Countries. Joint action will also assist in our relationship with developing countries. Higher energy costs and the slower growth our economies will reduce economic growth in the developing nations. We can and must respond to their problems in a number of ways.

- We must assist in their adjustment to higher oil costs. We should encourage energy conservation, energy efficiency, and the development of conventional and alternative sources of energy. We must also assure the LDC that, despite our own slower growth our markets will remain open to their exports.

- We must assist the LDCs in their balance-of-payments financing during the period of adjustment. Here our responsibility lies in supporting the reforms of the international financial institutions now underway, which are designed to insure that sufficient financing under reasonable terms will be available in the medium term.

- We must recognize that aid as well as financing will be required for the poorest of the developing countries. We must avoid the temptation to use our own economic problems as an excuse for lower levels of assistance to developing nations. The oil-exporting countries and centrally planned economies also have a responsibility in this area. We would hope that the major surplus countries would play a significant role, both through aid flows and through financing arrangements, insuring the recycling of their surplus to developing countries in deficit.

¹ Press release 147 of June 10, 1980. ■

U.S. Policy and Eastern Europe

by Robert L. Barry

Address before the World Affairs Council of Cleveland on April 22, 1980. Mr. Barry is Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs.

Trade. Although cooperation through the OECD will assist us in dealing with the energy shortage and with the problems of developing nations, it is in the area of trade that the temptation for us to go our separate, national ways is strongest. There are, of course, always pressures to solve our domestic economic problems by protecting industries that are vulnerable to imports. These pressures will intensify during the period of slow growth that faces us. However, we must be aware that the solution of increased protection is an illusion. As a group we can become only worse off, not better off, by trade restrictions. While this has always been true, open trading is taking on more importance as the need to resist inflation has increased.

We must also resist the temptation to compete through the subsidization of export credits, which distorts market prices. To that end we must bring our agreement on export credits into line with current credit market realities.

The variety and complexity of economic issues that confront us require us to establish priorities, to concentrate our attention. I have outlined the four issues that, to the United States, appear most urgent. Nevertheless, the OECD and its Secretariat have provided invaluable assistance on other policies that will engage our longrun attention.

Other Topics for Attention

For example, we must be concerned about the increase in the use of narcotic drugs. Heroin addiction has spread alarmingly throughout Europe and is increasing in the United States. For the first time, the Development Assistance Committee in several informal meetings has considered the impact of bilateral aid programs on illicit narcotics production, the source of our heroin problem. The OECD has also undertaken the development of statistically comparable data bases on drug abuse so that member nations can share information on drug abuse more effectively.

The OECD has also shown itself highly responsive to changing conditions and changing requirements in other "nontraditional" areas of growing importance to member countries. The personal role of the Secretary General in organizing assistance for Turkey to which our members responded is indicative of the OECD's ability to act quickly to meet serious problems.

When I heard from Coby Swank last fall that the Cleveland Council planned a session on Eastern Europe and that I would have an opportunity to speak, I was delighted. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the chance to say something about our policy toward Eastern Europe is all the more welcome. Many legitimate questions and doubts have been raised since last December as to whether we can—or should—continue our present policies toward Moscow's Warsaw Pact allies in the wake of Soviet aggression against Afghanistan. I will try to deal with that question this evening and also to analyze the trends which we expect will affect Eastern Europe in the 1980s.

I would also like to say something about the future of Yugoslavia, a country of central importance to the United States and Western Europe. Although this independent and nonaligned country has little in common with Moscow's Eastern European allies, Belgrade's policies impact importantly on Warsaw Pact capitals and vice versa.

Finally, I intend to say a word about Albania, another "special case" country on the margins of the region.

The high-level conference on the Employment of Women last April, much as the similar 1978 meeting on youth unemployment, contributed substantially to our understanding of changes in our domestic labor markets and to our governments' ability to deal with them.

The new OECD Steel Committee has provided an invaluable mechanism to help member nations cope with sectoral and trade problems that transcend national frontiers.

Similar examples can be cited in the fields of toxic chemicals, transborder data flows, urban problems, and environmental protection.

This impressive record of adaptability, relevance, and vigor is largely due to the creative leadership of our Secretary General. I want to express

I will not focus on the three Baltic States in these remarks. I want to emphasize, however, that our policy of not recognizing the forcible and illegal incorporation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into the Soviet Union in 1940 remains unchanged.

Before I begin to speak in generalities, let me warn you against them. Even in the early days of the cold war and regimes freshly imported from Moscow, Eastern Europe was not a monolith. It is far less so today. Each country has its own historic personality, its own religious, historical, cultural, and political traditions. Even within each country there are important national and regional differences of continuing—and sometimes growing—importance. The last decade has seen nationalism play an increasingly important role worldwide, from Quebec to southern Africa. During the 1980s we expect—and welcome—growing diversity in Eastern Europe as governments are forced to cope with the differing historical and economic factors at play in each country.

We made steady progress in our relations with most of the countries of Eastern Europe in the 1970s, particularly during the latter half of the decade. As we enter the 1980s our policy remains, as Secretary Vance said on March 3 in Chicago, one of continuing to "build stronger relations with the nations of Eastern Europe."

my Government's sincere appreciation for Mr. Van Lennep's personal contributions to this Organization and, through it, to the countries we represent.

Meetings such as this demonstrate that there is a large core of common understanding and agreement on the economic problems that vex us. Economic theory shows us that narrow, national solutions provide only a temporary respite from the economic problems that we all share; that only through international cooperation can long-term relief be assured. The OECD has proven its value as a forum for us to exchange information, to share our national problems and experiences, and to coordinate our efforts at resolution. It is up to us to muster the political will to turn our common economic understandings into political policy. ■

U.S. Interests

U.S. interests in Eastern Europe remain consistent and constant, and they provide a framework for our policies in the decade ahead.

- We have a strong and legitimate security interest in a region which was the birthplace of two World Wars. A prosperous and diverse Eastern Europe which plays an independent and constructive role in the world can only be a factor for international stability.

- As the homeland of so many millions of Americans, we have a special humanitarian interest in the peoples of the area. American Presidents from Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt to Jimmy Carter have paid particular attention to the aspirations of Eastern European peoples, and American Presidents in the decade ahead will surely do the same.

- We have an interest in expanding economic ties with these countries which are becoming increasingly important trading partners. Since 1970, our trade with the region has increased eightfold and we had a favorable trade balance of \$1 billion in 1979.

- While trade will not be a predominant U.S. interest in the area in the 1980s, we favor its expansion because of the direct benefit it brings to the American economy and because of its political contribution to diversity in the region.

Economic Factors

Economic factors are virtually certain to reinforce the trend toward diversity in Eastern Europe in the decade ahead. The troubled economies of the countries are a challenge to the ability of the regimes of the region to govern. Rising energy prices, declining productivity, falling growth rates, imported inflation, poor agricultural performance, and rising hard currency indebtedness add up to a picture which is gloomy, even in today's terms.

These problems will probably get worse. Given the prospect of declining Soviet oil production, Moscow may be forced to supply a smaller percentage of Eastern Europe's energy needs in the next decade. In any event, Eastern European countries will probably be paying OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] prices for their Soviet oil within a couple of years, and nuclear power will not be a significant substitute until at least the 1990s. The energy crunch alone, on top of the endemic inefficiencies of the Soviet-

model command economies of the region, will lead to marginal and even negative growth rates in some of the countries of the region in the 1980s.

At the same time, Soviet demands for Warsaw Pact military expenditures continue to grow, and there is increasing evidence of consumer discontent. In Poland, for example, there are indications that consumer dissatisfaction over shortages of meat and certain other food products is a major source of government concern. This could be an explosive mixture, especially since economic growth is the leading "success indicator" for the political elites of Eastern Europe.

The same factors, of course, are a stimulus to reform and diversification of economic and financial ties. Moscow's answer—increased integration of the economies of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance—is unlikely to make much headway without the cement of energy dependence and hidden subsidies to hold it together.

The economic challenge of the 1980s demands new responses in Eastern Europe, responses which should contribute to decentralization and political trends we would welcome. Hungary has already taken a series of additional measures aimed at further rationalization of its economy.

Following its recent party congress and a series of top-level changes in government, Poland appears to be starting slowly down the path of reform. The Polish Government, for example, is instituting a new wage incentive system in some enterprises. The new system is aimed at stimulating exports through higher productivity and better quality control.

Czechoslovakia, too, has embarked, albeit cautiously, on a limited economic reform program. Bulgaria has just announced a new law permitting mixed-capital joint ventures with the West for the first time. Romania has been a member of the International Monetary Fund since 1973, and other Eastern European countries are interested in following suit. All the countries of the region want to strengthen their trade and financial ties with the West. While protecting both our strategic and financial interests, this is a trend we want to encourage.

Political Change

There is also some political change afoot. In an increasingly multipolar world, most Eastern European governments want to carve out a role of

their own rather than be perceived as Moscow's shadow. Romania, for example, is strengthening its ties with the nonaligned as an extension of its independent foreign policy. Poland would like to use its unique historical and geographical position to assume a role as a "bridge" between East and West. Hungary seeks a similar economic role for itself. Bulgaria seeks improved bilateral relations with the United States and other Western countries as the catalyst for enhanced economic ties. These are trends we welcome, and to the degree that the countries involve are prepared to take our concerns into account and truly act as sovereign entities on the international scene, we are fully prepared to expand our relations with them.

Finally, in the past few years there has been movement, albeit often hesitant, toward recognition of the fact that human rights has a legitimate place on the bilateral agenda. We shall continue to point out to the governments of the region that human rights is an important subject to us, that it goes considerably beyond divided family or visa questions, and that it is a matter which they should take increasingly into account if they wish to create favorable conditions for mutually beneficial cooperation.

The 35 governments which signed the Helsinki Final Act committed themselves to be guided in their relations by the principle of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. They promised progress in a number of areas, including the specific basket 3 matters of family reunification; freer international travel; greater access to printed, broadcast, and film information; and increased education and cultural exchanges.

As we prepare for the Madrid followup meeting this fall, we have been holding bilateral consultations with Eastern European countries on implementation of the Helsinki Final Act and prospects for further cooperation. These consultations have dealt with the full range of human rights questions as well as military security and economic subjects. While results have been disappointing when weighed against the commitments made by governments at Helsinki 5 years ago, some progress has been made.

The situation varies from country to country. In general there is more willingness to permit divided families to be reunited and to allow greater movement of people. Some governments, such as Poland's, recognize the need

spect the role played by religion in the society and have a higher relative degree of toleration for intellectual diversity. The Romanians have been prepared to discuss bilaterally issues they consider highly sensitive, including treatment of Romania's ethnic Hungarians.

Many of the promises made at Helsinki have not been kept—particularly by the Governments of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and the German Democratic Republic—but this should not cause us to lose hope or abandon our efforts.

U.S. Relations

In the last 3 years, this Administration has achieved a great deal in our bilateral relations with Eastern Europe.

- The return of the crown of St. Stephen to the Hungarian people and reciprocal granting of most-favored-nation (MFN) tariff treatment in 1978 contributed to a much improved political and economic relationship. More importantly, the crown, as the most important symbol of Hungarian national identity, is on public display in Budapest where it has been viewed by thousands of Hungarians.

- President Carter's 1977 visit to Warsaw improved our political, economic, and cultural relationship with Poland, a critically important country in Eastern Europe with which so many Americans have personal ties.

- President Ceausescu's visit to the United States in 1978 gave new impetus to U.S.-Romanian relations, which are important to both countries because of Romania's independent stance on a range of important international issues. The granting of MFN status to Romania in 1975 has strengthened the economic dimension of this relationship, with bilateral trade more than doubling in the past 5 years.

- With the German Democratic Republic we have signed a landmark consular agreement which deals satisfactorily with the troublesome issue of "German" nationality in a way which meets our concerns, and we are negotiating a cultural and scientific exchange agreement which will give our professors, scientists, artists, and sportsmen greater access to East German society.

We have welcomed Bulgarian interest in improved political and economic ties, as well as the modest but important moves to reunite divided families

19th Report on Cyprus

MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS,
MAY 20, 1980¹

In accordance with the provisions of Public Law 95-384, I am submitting the following report on progress made during the past 60 days toward the conclusion of a negotiated solution of the Cyprus problem.

The intercommunal talks have not yet resumed. In order to circumvent the difficulties that caused the breakdown of the talks last June, Secretary General Waldheim suggested to the two Cypriot communities a formula under which both sides might return to the intercommunal table and begin concrete negotiations on the substantive aspects of the Cyprus problem. Neither community was able to accept all elements of the Secretary General's proposals. Despite intensive efforts, the Secretary General and his representative have, so far, been unable to achieve agreement on a compromise formula.

However, in a report to the General Assembly on the Cyprus question dated April 2, 1980, Mr. Waldheim states that he continues "to hold to the opinion that the intercommunal talks, if properly used, represent the best available method for negotiating a just and lasting political settlement of the Cyprus problem based on the legitimate rights of the two communities." A copy of the Secretary General's report is attached.

and to settle claims of American holders of Kingdom of Bulgaria dollar bonds.

We have made less progress with Czechoslovakia, partially in reaction to the Czechoslovak Government's harsh repressive measures against human rights activists. But we are prepared to negotiate a fair settlement of the longstanding issues of compensation of U.S. claims for nationalized property and the return of Czechoslovak gold held by the tripartite U.S.-French-British commission since the end of World War II. Such a settlement could pave the way to improved economic and cultural relations provided that the climate of our relations is not again worsened by new acts of repression in Czechoslovakia.

That we and the countries of Eastern Europe have made progress in our dealings with one another is not really in question. The question is whether this progress can be maintained following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the consequent worsening of relations between the West and Moscow. It is clear that Eastern European

Both communities on Cyprus have welcomed the news that the Secretary General plans to continue his efforts, and both have reaffirmed their belief that the intercommunal talks are the best means of negotiating a fair and permanent solution to the Cyprus problem. I, too, am pleased that the Secretary General plans to continue his search for a Cyprus settlement. The United States fully supports his pursuit of a solution.

While Secretary General Waldheim's proposal for resuming the talks has not yet met with success, his proposal contains a sound basis for achieving a resumption of negotiations. Both communities must make renewed and sincere efforts to cooperate with the Secretary General as he endeavors to bridge the remaining differences.

During the past 60 days, there have been a number of informal contacts between various groups of Greek and Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus. It is heartening that some lines of communication are being re-established between the two communities; these may help establish an atmosphere more conducive to reaching a permanent solution to the island's problems.

Sincerely,

JIMMY CARTER

¹Identical letters addressed to Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of Representatives, and Frank Church, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of May 26, 1980). ■

countries are freer to pursue their own interests with the West in a period of detente. It is also evident that Soviet pressure on Eastern Europe for foreign policy unity and domestic orthodoxy has heightened in the face of the international outcry against Soviet aggression in Afghanistan. What remains to be seen is whether U.S. relations with Eastern Europe are doomed to decline in step with U.S.-Soviet relations.

From our perspective, the answer is clearly "no." Moscow's Warsaw Pact allies neither participated in the invasion of Afghanistan nor apparently were consulted about it in advance. Some, at least, were not even advised of the Soviet rationale until well after we were. The initial responses of Eastern European governments to the event were varied—from Romania's implicit public condemnation of the act to the prompt endorsement of the East German leadership, with a wide range in between. Although Moscow has since enforced a degree of public support—with the continuing exception of Romania—we continue to hear convincing private disclaimers.

We are determined that the Soviets must pay a real and lasting cost for their brutal aggression in Afghanistan, and since we see no sign of their withdrawal, the prospects for U.S.-Soviet relations are poor for the foreseeable future. But it would make little sense for us to apply the same measures to the countries of Eastern Europe, as this would give them no incentive to conduct policies reflecting their own national interests. Indeed, in the wake of Afghanistan we should—and will—try harder to maintain and build on the progress we have made with the countries of the region, confident that this is in our best interest and theirs.

We, of course, expect the nations of Eastern Europe to recognize that our relations must be built on reciprocity. We expect them to take our concerns into account, despite the limitations Soviet military and political power place on their freedom of maneuver. Diversion of U.S. grain or controlled technology to the U.S.S.R., should it occur through Eastern Europe, would inevitably make it impossible for us to differentiate between Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in our trade controls. Direct participation in the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan would certainly cause us to reevaluate our policies. Overt pressure on Yugoslavia would cause us great concern. Domestic repression, as always, would affect the climate of our relations. But such steps would also be contrary to the interests of the governments concerned, and it is our devout hope that this—rather than the threat of a U.S. reaction—will be the deciding factor.

Yugoslavia

Our efforts to improve relations with Moscow's Eastern European allies will continue to be important to us in the decade ahead. But Yugoslavia will be much more central to our foreign policy. Events in post-Tito Yugoslavia will have a major impact on both Eastern and Western Europe and, indeed, the entire international system. An independent, united, and nonaligned Yugoslavia is crucial to the stability of Europe and the world, and support for that country's territorial integrity, independence, and unity is central to U.S. policy.

Much is being said and written these days about the potential challenges to a Yugoslavia without Tito at the helm. As someone whose exposure to Yugoslavia began 17 years ago with my first Foreign Service assignment, I

confess to skepticism when I hear predictions of radical change in Yugoslavia's position in the world.

In 1963, the conventional wisdom in this country was that Tito was about to lead Yugoslavia into the Warsaw Pact, or that he had never really been apart from it at heart. The U.S. Congress had just acted to end all assistance to Yugoslavia and to withdraw normal trade privileges—MFN treatment. Wisely, we never actually withdrew MFN. We underestimated Yugoslavia's determination and ability to defend its independence then, and many in the United States and elsewhere are making the same mistake today.

Yugoslavia, indeed, faces difficult problems in the decade ahead. Historically rooted animosities among Yugoslavia's peoples have not been entirely overcome, although considerable progress has been made. Yugoslavia's economy is overheated and the economic decentralization of the past decade has made it more difficult for the central government to deal with pressing problems of inflation and balance of payments. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea challenge the principle of nonintervention with Yugoslavia and the other members of the nonaligned movement regard as fundamental. Recent public attacks on Yugoslav policies by the Soviet Union, some of its Warsaw Pact allies, and Vietnam seem to promise further pressure on Belgrade's independent line. A few anti-Yugoslav emigre organizations abroad—including, regrettably, in the United States—harbor individuals who advocate and employ violence in pursuit of their political goals.

Yet Yugoslavia without Tito is already working, and working well. During the 3 months of the President's illness, the country has drawn together behind a collective leadership selected in accordance with procedures established before Tito's illness. A stringent austerity program is already having its effect on the economy. Yugoslavia's able diplomatic corps and principled opposition to Soviet efforts to manipulate the nonaligned movement should assure it a continued leadership role there. And the country's territorial defense force, which is capable of mobilizing 3 million men and women in short order, and the Yugoslavs' tradition of determined resistance to outside intervention indicate that any attempt to use military force against Yugoslavia would face very formidable opposition.

But what is the United States prepared to do to assist a Yugoslav Government facing challenges from within or without?

We have no security commitment to Yugoslavia nor does Yugoslavia want one. An overeager embrace from the United States and its allies would discomfort Tito's successors more than it would reassure them. As President Carter has said, we are prepared to consider seriously doing whatever the Yugoslavs may ask us to do. This obviously includes diplomatic and economic support and continuation of the military supply relationship we have maintained for many years.

For the past 3 years we have been strengthening our relations with Yugoslavia across the board in preparation for Tito's inevitable departure from the scene. Our bilateral relations have never been better. President Carter expects to carry on the same high-level dialogue with Tito's successors as he did with Tito himself. We strongly encourage the continued interest of U.S. companies in doing business in Yugoslavia. The new agreement between the European Economic Community and Yugoslavia should give a further boost to Yugoslav exports, increasing Western confidence in the long-term prospects for the Yugoslav economy.

To Moscow and its allies, it should be clear that attempts to undermine Yugoslavia's unity, territorial integrity, and independence would be a matter of grave concern to the United States and the nations of Western Europe. It should also be clear to emigre groups which favor the break of Yugoslavia that their aims totally contradict U.S. policy and that we will not tolerate illegal or terrorist acts against the Yugoslav Government on U.S. soil. Federal and local law enforcement authorities are alert to the possibility of an outbreak of illegal actions following President Tito's death and will prosecute crimes to the full extent of the law.

I believe, then, that we can look Yugoslavia's future with confidence at a prosperous and independent state fully capable of managing its own internal affairs and defending itself against outside aggression. We will do what we can to contribute to this end.

Albania

In closing, let me say a word about Albania with which we have not had diplomatic relations since World War II. Concerned about its political and eco-

omic isolation, the Albanian Government has moved hesitantly of late to improve its economic and political ties with Greece, Yugoslavia, and Western Europe. We welcome this trend in the belief that it will contribute to stability and peaceful progress in the Balkans and Europe as a whole. The Albanian leadership has made it plain in its public statements that it does not presently seek such an improvement in relations with the United States. However, I would like to reiterate the statement by Deputy Secretary of State Rush in an address at the Naval Academy in April 1978: "If and when Albania wishes to resume relations with us, it will find us prepared to respond." ■

100th Anniversary of U.S.-Romania Relations

On June 13, 1980, the United States and Romania celebrated the 100th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. On that occasion President Carter and President Ceausescu exchanged the following messages.¹

Dear Mr. President:

It is a pleasure to extend to you, and through you to the people of Romania, the best wishes of the American people on the 100th anniversary of diplomatic relations between our countries.

During the first century of Romanian-American relations, the American people came to experience firsthand—and to admire—Romania's contributions to civilization. More recently, as a result of our cultural, scientific and educational exchange programs, interaction between Romania and the United States has intensified, and our citizens have learned more about each other's achievements. Many Americans have visited Romania and have returned with a deepened awareness of her rich cultural traditions and modern development.

Although 100 years old, U.S.-Romanian relations have never been more intense than in the past 15 years. The importance which the U.S. attaches to its ties with Romania is underscored by the fact that Romania was the first Eastern European country to be visited by an American President. Since then, Presidential visits—including our meeting in 1978—have become a permanent part of the

U.S.-Romanian dialogue, and high-level exchanges have become a normal aspect of our relationship. U.S.-Romanian trade has become increasingly dynamic, providing a strong underpinning for our cultural and political relations. These achievements illustrate convincingly the high degree of mutually beneficial cooperation we have attained.

I look forward to continuing to work closely with you and your government to find ways to reduce the tension in the present international environment and to foster stability and cooperation in Europe and other areas of the world.

I trust that our second century of diplomatic relations will further strengthen cooperation between our countries and peoples.

Sincerely,

JIMMY CARTER

Dear Mr. President:

The celebration of the centennial of the diplomatic relations between Romania and the United States of America offers me the pleasant opportunity to convey to you and to the American people, on behalf of the Romanian people and of my own, cordial greetings and warmest congratulations.

The establishment of diplomatic relations—as a result and on the basis of the United States' recognition of Romania's state independence—marked an important step, which has contributed to the development of the Romanian-American relations, as our peoples cooperated under many particular circumstances.

I would like to particularly emphasize that during the last 15 years a fruitful dialogue at the highest level has been initiated and developed, that, generally, the Romanian-American contacts and meetings have been intensified, the economic exchanges, cooperation in various fields of mutual interest have been expanded and the overall relations between the Socialist Republic of Romania and the United States of America have witnessed a strong development based upon equality of rights, observance of national independence and sovereignty, non-interference in domestic affairs.

The meetings and discussions we had together during the visit I paid to the United States of America in April, 1978, and the Joint Declaration signed on that occasion, have given a new impetus to the relations between our peoples, to the cooperation of our two states in international life, to the benefit of peace and cooperation among nations.

Celebrating the centennial of the diplomatic relations, may I express my conviction that we would continue to act jointly with a view to giving a new impetus and new dimensions to the relations between Romania and the United States, for the intensification of our contacts, for the growth

of the commercial exchanges and economic industrial cooperation, for the expansion of the exchanges in the fields of science, technology, education, culture as well as in other fields of mutual interest.

At the same time, I would like to express my hope that our countries would cooperate in order to arrest the present trend towards the worsening of the international situation, for the resumption of the policy of peace, detente and independence, for the settlement of disputes among states, of the states of tension and conflict existing in different areas of the world exclusively by political means, through negotiations, with a view to strengthening the international security, the cooperation and understanding among all peoples.

May I wish you good health and personal happiness, prosperity and peace to the American people.

With friendly sentiments,

NICOLAE CEAUȘESCU,
President of the Socialist
Republic of Romania

¹ Press release 185 of July 11, 1980. ■

U.S.-Persian Gulf Relationship

by David D. Newsom

Address at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C., on April 11, 1980. Ambassador Newsom is Under Secretary for Political Affairs.

If the world were a flat circle and one were looking for its center, a good argument could be made that it would lie in the gulf—Arabian or Persian, depending on your perspective. Nowhere in the world today is there quite such a convergence of global interests. No area is quite as central to the continued economic health and stability of the world.

The question is not only one of energy. The area embraces the center of the Islamic world. Its influences, both cultural and financial, extend westward to Morocco and eastward to Indonesia. The border of the Soviet Union lies only a few hundred miles away. The presence of peoples from the Levant, from Palestine, from Egypt, from Pakistan and India means that what happens in the region affects those nations as well, and vice versa. Laborers and contractors came from as far away as Korea, the Philippines, and Indonesia.

Europe receives more than two-thirds of its energy from the gulf region. Exports to the region are significant to the health of the European economies. Britain, once the custodian of the gulf, still retains important links with the nations and the peoples there. France's interest has recently been demonstrated by President Giscard d'Estaing's visit to the region. The European Community, as a whole, continues to discuss a possible dialogue with the states of the area.

To Japan, the region is equally vital. Three-fourths of Japan's energy comes from this area. Japan, too, is an active and aggressive exporter. Last year, the Japanese Prime Minister visited the gulf. Recently, the former Foreign Minister, Mr. Sonoda, made a trip through the area.

The presence of Mecca symbolizes the centrality of this region to the Islamic world. Kerbela and Najaf, just to the north of the gulf, in Iraq, have a special significance to the Shi'a.

The region has become a financial power, able to influence the world's economy and the trends and policies of a wide region. Direct financial help

from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait benefits other Arab and Muslim states less well endowed. We count on the willingness of states of the area to help other nations as a parallel effort to our own. In some cases, as in Yemen, it has become an indispensable part of a joint effort. Remittances from the area generated by the employment of large numbers of expatriate workers have become major sources of revenue for Egypt, Pakistan, India, and other nations.

One must assume a strong Soviet interest in the region. No one outside the Politburo really knows why the Soviet Union made the decision to invade Afghanistan. The real reason is, perhaps, not as important as the fact that they are there. Traditionally, since imperial times, the Russians have spoken of their need and desire for an outlet to the Indian Ocean. The thrust into Afghanistan brings them nearer to that goal than ever before.

The present Soviet posture is one of recognizing European interests in the gulf and holding out the hope of Soviet cooperation in insuring access for the Europeans. On February 29, TASS spoke of the possibility of a conference on the security of the oil of the Persian Gulf area. The Soviet Union's interest is also manifested by its strong presence in Aden in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. That presence remains a clear and immediate threat to North Yemen with the obvious additional consequences it would have for the stability of the peninsula as a whole. The Soviet fleet presence in the Indian Ocean is also formidable. Today it consists of some 30 ships.

If your conference here today has run true to form in discussing American policy in the gulf, at least three issues were covered.

- What is the attitude of the United States toward the nations of this region?
- What are the intentions of the United States strategically?
- Does the United States recognize the importance of the issue of Palestine in this area?

U.S. Interests

The interest and relationship of the United States in this area goes back to the early part of the 19th century when

in 1832 we signed a treaty of commerce and navigation with the Sultan of Muscat and Oman.

The modern relationship began in 1932 when Americans began the exploration for petroleum in the island of Bahrain. Those who went out at that time looked across at salt domes in Saudi Arabia and concluded that even greater resources lay in that country. The Arabian-American Oil Company (ARAMCO) was born and through wise cooperation with the Saudis has become one of the great producers of world energy. That phase of America's relationship will end shortly when the Saudi Arabian Government assumes full ownership of ARAMCO. They will continue, however, the relationship with the Americans through consulting and operating contracts.

The centerpiece of American interest is, of course, Saudi Arabia. In the aftermath of the revolution in Iran there has been a tendency to predict similar developments in other states, including Saudi Arabia. We feel such dire predictions are unwarranted. While Saudi Arabia faces many of the same problems of adapting modernization to a traditional society, its leadership is firmly based in the family which helped create the country. One might also note: Saudi Arabia, with only one-tenth the population of Iran has many times the wealth and resources of Iran. The two situations are vastly different. The U.S. Government is confident that Saudi leadership will be able to meet satisfactorily challenges which currently face it.

In each of the states of the gulf—Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman—U.S. citizens have played important roles in the development of their resources.

Iraq, at the north end of the gulf presents a special problem. Long among the most militant of the Arab states on the subject of Israel, Iraq broke diplomatic relations with the United States following the 1967 war. It is the only state which broke at that time which has not resumed relations. Interests sections under foreign flags take care of our bilateral relationship.

The United States is prepared, on our part, to resume diplomatic relations with Iraq at any time. With the growing role of our country in the area, we feel it is important that we have normal relations with every country. Our approaches to Iraq, however, have not met with success.

There are other important economic elements present in our relations with all of these states. Not only do we look to them for continued access to their resources but they look to us for policies which will reduce our dependence upon their resources. It may seem strange that these nations which have helped create the energy problem as keenly interested in sound energy policies as we are. They recognize that their resources are not infinite. They recognize also that the continued strength and health of the Western economies is essential to the health of their own.

The relationship between these countries and the United States will continue to be based heavily on their access to our technical know-how and to our citizens who can assist them in their strong desire to rapidly modernize their societies and their countries. The 35,000 American citizens in Saudi Arabia testify to the extent of this relationship.

Two events in the last years have shaken this area: the revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Iranian revolution introduced into this area both the turmoil of a troubled country and the impact of politicized, militant Islam. In Afghanistan the Soviet actions to suppress a popular Islamic uprising belie Soviet pretensions to pose as the friend of the Muslim world.

Both events had an impact on the Gulf. The Iranian military umbrella had disappeared. The Afghan invasion added to concerns already present about the long-range intentions of the Soviet Union. The apparent willingness of the Soviets to ignore opinion in the Muslim and Third World countries in order to pursue its own ends was not expected by most in the Gulf.

Except in Iran and Iraq, the United States has maintained close relations with all the nations of the Gulf. These events, however, have raised questions about future attitudes of the United States. Some wondered whether the Iranian situation said anything about the ability of the United States to protect and preserve its friends. Still others expressed apprehension at what might appear to be the beginning of the lead of militant Islamic and anti-Western movements.

Whatever our presence in a country, our ability to stem the tide of a genuinely popular revolution is limited. This is a case in point. We do not believe this fact should carry any suggestion of a lessening of American willing-

Iran Chronology, June 1980

June 2

Despite President Carter's ban on travel to Iran, former Attorney General Ramsey Clark leads a 10-member group to an Iranian sponsored conference on U.S. "intervention in Iran." The purpose of the 4-day international meeting, called by Bani-Sadr, was to air Iran's grievances against the U.S. role in Iran in recent years.

June 3

As a possible solution to end the crisis, Clark offers to exchange places with any of the hostages.

June 4

Clark agrees to a request by President Bani-Sadr that he form a commission in the United States to investigate U.S. involvement in Iran during the deposed Shah's reign.

June 5

Four-day conference ends with a 12-point declaration denouncing the U.S. for its continued 27-year interference in Iran and the Soviet Union's intervention in Af-

ghanistan. No mention is made of the hostages.

June 7

Five members of the Clark party meet with militants holding hostages, three return to U.S., and one flies to London because of illness. Clark remains in Iran.

June 10

Khomeini warns that Iran is in a state of "chaos" and tells Bani-Sadr and the majority party in Parliament to mend their differences to avoid destruction of the Islamic Republic.

June 16

Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh states the only way the hostage crisis can be solved would be a "comprehensive settlement of Iran-U.S. problems." He also states that U.N. efforts to solve the crisis would be unsuccessful.

June 23

Ghotbzadeh states that the hostage crisis could be settled within 4 or 5 weeks after a new government and prime minister are installed by the Parliament.

June 28

Shah's condition worsens, and he is readmitted to an Egyptian military hospital. ■

ness and a capacity to help those nations in the area which are clearly prepared to help themselves maintain stability and growth.

Given the strength of the traditional societies of the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula, we do not see that the happenings in Iran need be a precursor to similar events elsewhere in the region. The Iranian revolution has focused new attention on the Islamic movement, but differences in the nature of Islam give us mixed signals in predicting any wider Islamic revolution in this region. The Afghan events have also had their effect in reducing complacency about the ultimate intentions of the U.S.S.R. in the area.

U.S. Role

All of this has posed anew the question of the role of the United States in the Gulf region. We have two immediate issues: Iran and Afghanistan.

Our ability to renew normal relationships with Iran rests on a solution to the hostage question. We cannot consider normal relations with that country until the cruel and illegal holding of the hostages is ended. We accept Iran's revolution as a fact; we do not question the right of the Iranian people

to determine their own future; we do not reject Iran's desire to bring its grievances to the attention of the world. But Iran must first live up to its fundamental responsibilities for the safety, well-being, and release of the hostages.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan demonstrated that the Soviets, despite world opprobrium, are prepared to use their military forces against an independent nonaligned country if they believe their interests are at stake. The invasion also brings Soviet forces closer than ever before to the Gulf region.

The United States cannot afford to ignore either fact. Our vital interests are involved. As President Carter said in his State of the Union address:

Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.

Our readiness to support those interests raises the question of the relationship of the Gulf states to our own readiness. These recently independent states have made it clear that they do not wish to see the return of outside military forces to the area. They sup-

port the nonaligned positions against bases. Any suggestion of outside military intervention against their wishes brings strong and instant negative reaction.

At the same time, many of their leaders recognize that they cannot defend their region without the support of the Western powers, including the United States. They want that support to be, first, in the form of the provision of military equipment for their own forces. Beyond that, so long as the Soviet Union represents a potential threat, they are not averse to having the forces of the United States "over the horizon." That force must be there for the global balance essential to maintaining a broader peace in the world.

Today that "over the horizon" force has been increased and discussions are under way with one of the gulf states, Oman, for possible cooperation in the use of shore facilities. The use of such facilities would make easier the supply and communication with the fleet and the support of the reconnaissance essential to the fleet's role.

The U.S. military response to the new situation in the area has been gradual but progressive. We have had, since 1949, a small naval presence consisting of three ships in the gulf. In September 1979, President Carter announced a small addition—of two ships customarily in the Indian Ocean—to the strength of that unit, as well as more frequent deployment of larger battle groups in the Indian Ocean. An increase in the facilities at Diego Garcia was authorized to support this increased deployment. Today, the U.S. naval presence in the western Indian Ocean area consists of two carrier battle groups and four ships carrying a Marine amphibious unit.

Let me say a few words about that presence. It is there to provide a prudent deterrent against any efforts to interfere with the independence of the states of the region or restrict the free access of others to this vital region. It is not there to intervene in the affairs of the states of the region.

Our presence there is in full recognition that the resources of the area are not "ours." They belong to the independent states of the area. Our presence is part of a general effort, in which our allies will also play a part. The area is as important to them as it is to us, perhaps more so. Our diplomacy will continue to urge a meaningful joint response to regional security.

The security relationship of the United States to the area must be

based on a relationship between sovereign, independent nations. The day of the client state has gone. Such cooperation will, therefore, inevitably be affected by issues in which differences exist between the United States and the nations of the area.

Palestinian Issue

Foremost among such issues is that of our approach to ending the 30-year-old Arab-Israeli conflict. We all recognize that at the core of that conflict is the issue of the Palestinians. All who deal with this area are aware of the significance of this issue. The Palestinian yearning for political expression is supported by all Arab states and has also captured the imagination of many non-Arab Islamic and Third World countries. There are also large numbers of Palestinians who occupy important positions in the states of the gulf and the peninsula.

Among the Arab and Muslim states of the area, the Palestinian cause and the related question of Jerusalem are seen both as political and religious issues. The moderate states feel the pressures of the more militant countries, pressures embodied in the results of the Baghdad summit of November 2, 1978.

The tragedy of the issue is that so much of the criticism of the United States is based on unrealistic premises. No nation, however strong, can "pressure" another, sensitive to its security, into making politically unacceptable sacrifices. Conferences and resolutions can set the path to solutions; the solutions themselves can only come through difficult, prolonged, and serious negotiations. If such negotiations are to succeed, they must be carried forward in a negotiating format in which both sides—let me emphasize, both sides—have confidence.

All of the gains toward an ultimate comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli issue have come through that process. So it was that Ralph Bunche brought about the armistice agreements at Rhodes in February 1949. So it was that the Golan Heights and Sinai disengagements were arranged in May 1974 and September 1975, respectively.

The Camp David process has chosen that path. No clear alternative has been proposed that would lead in the same direction—to a genuine settlement. We are convinced that it provides a sound negotiating format that can steadily make progress toward the twin objective of providing security for Israel and giving the Palestinians a real

means of self-expression and of control over their own affairs.

Many now, among our allies and among our friends in the area, are skeptical that the Camp David process can achieve results. We believe it can. We are seeking peace, not just rhetorical positions that will lessen the pressures on us.

Success in the autonomy negotiations now taking place is essential if the parties are to remain engaged in the negotiations, and a way is to be opened for participation by the Palestinians in the subsequent stages of the negotiation. We are deeply conscious of the fact that the Palestinians must ultimately speak and negotiate for themselves.

Ambassador Linowitz [Personal Representative of the President for the Middle East Peace Negotiations], who has just returned from the area, has worked hard and ably to focus and accelerate the talks. The discussions have now begun to center on the substantive issues which lie at the very heart of the negotiations—issues like security, water, and land. There are no illusions about the complexity and sensitivity of the problems that remain; there is, equally, no doubt that they must be tackled. Both sides are determined to do their best to reach agreement by May 26.

President Sadat has been in Washington this week [April 7–10] for further discussions of the peace process. Prime Minister Begin will be here next week [April 14–17]. They both know, as we do, that this process provides the best opportunity to take the next step forward toward a comprehensive peace which can ultimately bring the security of peace to the Middle East.

It is difficult to see any other process by which we can resolve the issue which continues to be of such paramount importance to the nations of the gulf region. Peace in the Middle East area is not only important for the stability of the world. It is also important in order to continue to assure sufficient stability in the gulf area to permit our overall relationships to continue. Political wisdom must continue to accompany economic access.

We have a significant and complex relationship with the nations of the gulf region. As long as we need the energy resources, as long as the nations of the area need our technology, as long as those nations face Soviet-backed threats to their independence, that relationship will continue to be a central preoccupation of U.S. foreign policy.

Secretary Meets With Australian Foreign Minister

*Australian Foreign Minister Andrew Peacock met with Secretary Muskie at the Department of State on June 11, 1980. Following is the text of a question-and-answer session they held with reporters after their meeting.*¹

Secretary Muskie. It's a pleasure to welcome to our country the Foreign Minister of Australia, Andrew Peacock, representing a country with whom we have had longstanding ties of friendship and mutual support, going back even to the days of my youth, which is a long time—almost ancient history.

But in more recent times, we have appreciated the support that Australia has given us in connection with our problems in Iran, our response to the Russian invasion of Afghanistan, and, especially important, the role that Australia is playing in Southeast Asia, the ASEAN [Association of South East Asian Nations] conference, and in the development of mutual interests by the countries of that fastest growing area of the planet.

I look forward to meeting him again in Kuala Lumpur—that poetic sounding city on the other side of the planet—but in the meantime to welcome him here in much less glamorous circumstances.

Foreign Minister Peacock. I found our meeting very successful indeed. I am very grateful to the Secretary of State. We have a complementary set of interests in the world, as you know. We are part of an alliance, which has worked particularly effectively, not simply as a military alliance but in forging our close political links. Our part of the world, Southeast Asia, is undergoing rapid transformation as it moves into a fast-growing economy, and the need for coordination of policies between a great power, such as the United States, and an influential power, but smaller, such as Australia, which, of course, is a great influence to us.

We discussed today matters alluded to by the Secretary of State, and I am extremely grateful for this exchange of views. And I look forward, as you said, to seeing him in a couple of weeks' time in Malaysia when we and the Foreign Ministers of a number of other countries meet with the Foreign Ministers of ASEAN.

Q. Despite recent trends, do you ever foresee a time that the entire Australian Olympic Committee would reverse itself on attending the Moscow boycott? [sic] And do you ever see a time when Australia would ever cut its huge exports of food to Iran?

Foreign Minister Peacock. On the first question, that's a question not for the entire federation but for the executive of the federation. And the President [of the Australian Olympic Federation] has indicated that whilst he thought it unlikely that the executive would reconsider the matter, this, nevertheless, remains possible. There are an increasing number of people associated with the Olympic Games in Australia—like individual athletes, sporting federations, and those officials in management—who are withdrawing from the games. So it may well be that the federation will agree with the government, which is strongly and emphatically in favor of a boycott, and I would certainly hope that reconsideration would occur.

On public opinion—the Secretary of State rightly alludes to public opinion in Australia. The last Gallup poll has it at approximately 60% in support of a boycott, 30% opposed to a boycott, and 10% undecided, which is an extraordinarily high figure. As I said to Mr. Muskie, I would like a return of 60/30 if I were advocating any position.

The second question I was asked, I will do it as succinctly as possible. We have implemented, as requested, the U.N. resolution. It has been very costly to do so, but we have been prepared to do so as a strong ally of the United States. As far as Iran is concerned, the U.N. resolution did not name a particular date for the ending of contracts, but we have placed an embargo on all contracts, excepting food and medicine, because the U.N. resolution itself excludes food and medicine. U.N. resolutions traditionally do in the sanctions area. So I think we are probably the only country that has implemented the full spirit and letter of the resolution.

Q. Could I ask you a question about the speech yesterday by former Secretary Vance? He proposed that the SALT II process go forward this year. Do you think there is any prospect of that happening?

Secretary Muskie. The President,

as you know, is committed to the SALT process, and we have under active consideration, and do on an almost constant basis, strategies for pursuing that objective, which remains his objective and that of this Administration.

It is not easy to devise the strategies, given the fluid situation in the Senate, with which I think you are all familiar, and also the importance of highlighting our objection to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. But we have the question under review and, in due course, hope to develop a strategy.

Q. As long as the Soviet troops are in Afghanistan, is there any prospect that the SALT Treaty would go forward?

Secretary Muskie. I think the two issues are separable. As a matter of fact, the fact that we are engaged in this kind of confrontation in Afghanistan to me elevates the question of arms control as an important security issue. If we were in total peace with the Soviet Union, arms control would not be as important a national security issue. It is because we understand that, and that's our view of it, that we are considering strategies for dealing with both objectives.

Q. Is the Administration planning to press charges against Ramsey Clark and his colleagues when they return?

Secretary Muskie. That is a question that is under consideration in the Justice Department. I am not on top of their investigation.

Q. It is believed that Secretary Vance feels that it would be important enough to call a special session of Congress after the election to try to deal with SALT. Do you think that the political climate at that time might be such that people would not have to worry about getting elected, that you might be able to move then when you couldn't now?

Secretary Muskie. I think there are a number of options of that kind that we have under consideration. If I were in Mr. Vance's position at the present time—which I am not anxious to at this time—I would be in a better position to have made a personal decision. At the moment, I think the question of timing, the question of separability of the issues from the public perception, as well as the perception of others who are influenced by our policies, I think all of those have to be carefully evaluated and balanced, and we are undertaking to try to do so.

Q. It looks as though the Europeans are again going to press their pro-PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] initiative in the United Nations despite President Carter's warnings. Do you think that they can be dissuaded from that?

Secretary Muskie. I don't read their position as being that clear-cut or definite. I don't read their position as having been set in concrete as yet. They are still talking about an initiative. My impression is that they have not yet agreed on form or the approach or the shape of that initiative. And I know that they are sensitive to our view that any initiative that had the effect of undermining the Camp David process would be negative in its impact at the present time.

Q. Speaking of the Olympics, is Australia thinking about providing any of the sites for the alternate games or subsequent games being organized in countries which boycott the Olympics?

Foreign Minister Peacock. A number of discussions have been held between officials on this question, and there has been no resolution at this juncture. There are sites available. In certain circumstances, some teams I know would have wished to have held competitions and, in fact, have only recently done so on a worldwide or a very large scale. But the matter is still under review.

Q. On this New Hebrides situation, how deeply is Australia likely to become involved?

Foreign Minister Peacock. That's a question for the administering authorities at the present moment. There has been a secessionist movement on one island. I have already discussed with the French authorities—I came from France yesterday—the fact that the administering authorities—mainly Britain and France—must exert their authority to restore law and order. The two ministers met on Monday of this week and agreed on a joint approach of restoring law and order, and as long as those moves continue, and we have a smooth and orderly transition to independence, then together with the negotiations commencing between the duly elected government and the alleged secessionists, then I would be satisfied with that movement.

Q. Could they use bases or facilities in Australia if they need them?

President Approves Export of Nuclear Material to India

Following are the President's message to the Congress and a Department of State fact sheet of June 19, 1980, and a statement by Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher before the House Foreign Affairs Committee of June 26.

MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, JUNE 19, 1980¹

I am transmitting with this message, pursuant to Section 126b. (2) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, an Executive Order [12218] authorizing the export of 39,718 kgs. of low-enriched uranium to India for use in fueling its Tarapur Atomic Power Station and authorizing the export of replacement parts for this station.

Two applications for licenses to export the fuel were submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in September 1978 and August 1979, respectively. After a careful review of these applications, and the applications for replacement parts for the Tarapur reactors, the Executive Branch concluded that the proposed exports would not be inimical to the common defense and security, that they met all applicable statutory criteria under the Atomic Energy Act, and that the licenses should be issued. The Commission was notified of these Executive Branch findings and recommendations on March 28, 1979, and on May 7, 1980.

On May 16, 1980, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission decided that it could not

find that the criteria for issuing the licenses had been met. Pursuant to the law the Commission then referred these applications to me.

In reaching its decision, the Commission argued that the full-scope safeguard export criterion of Section 128a of the Atomic Energy Act applies to these applications because they do not fall within the grace period provided in the law. The Department of State, on the other hand, concludes that this statutory criterion does apply to these two applications because they were submitted before September 1979, the cutoff date specified in the law because the first shipment under each was reasonably planned to occur before March 10, 1980, and because there is no reason to believe that the applications were filed early as a way of circumventing the September 10, 1979, deadline.

In any event, the license criteria specified by statute, of which Section 128a (1) one, are not the same as the export criteria on the basis of which I must determine whether to issue an Executive Order. As the Commission noted, its inability to issue the licenses "should not be read as a recommendation one way or the other on the proposed exports." As the Commission noted further, in such cases the law provides that the President may authorize such exports by Executive Order if he determines that withholding them would seriously prejudicial to the achievement of the United States non-proliferation objectives or would otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security.

I have determined that to withhold these exports would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of United States non-proliferation objectives and would otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security. I have made this determination for the policy reasons discussed here. However, I want to make it clear that in fact regard these export applications having fallen within the statutory grace period before the full-scope safeguards requirement of action 128a takes effect. Thus, my authorization of these exports does not constitute a precedent for an exception to the full-scope safeguards criterion. Further, this action in no way creates a change in the high priority I attach to preventing the spread of nuclear explosives. On the contrary, this action reflects my judgment that non-proliferation will be set back, not advanced, by withholding these exports, and that our failure to supply this fuel could seriously jeopardize other important U.S. interests.

India's failure to accept international safeguards on all its peaceful nuclear activities and its failure to commit itself to conduct further nuclear explosions is a serious concern to me. These exports

Foreign Minister Peacock. That's totally speculative. I mean, if the British and the French are prepared to restore law and order, then, there's no need to even bring that into question.

Q. In the future, if Iran does not move, are you prepared to end food and medicine? I understand you are a very large supplier of food to Iran.

Foreign Minister Peacock. As you would be aware, any foreign minister who speculated on something that has not even occurred would be a most delinquent one. When the question arises, we will give every consideration to it, because we have met the concerns of the United States on their requests to date. It is not before us now, so I don't need to walk down that path just yet.

¹Press release 150. ■

us to maintain a dialogue with India in which we try to narrow our differences on these issues.

The exports will avoid the risk of a veto by India that the United States has taken an existing agreement between the two governments and has thereby relieved India of its obligation to refrain from reprocessing the fuel previously supplied by the United States.

Supply of this fuel will also ensure the continuation of safeguards and other U.S. controls on disposition of U.S.-origin fuel that has been supplied to India.

Approval of these exports will help strengthen ties with a key South Asian democracy at a time when it is particularly important for us to do so. Insecurity in South and Southwest Asia has been greatly heightened by the crisis in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. We must do all we reasonably can to promote stability in the area and to bolster our relations with those there, particularly those that can play a role in checking Soviet expansionism.

When I signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, I expressed reservations about the constitutionality of provisions of law which purport to allow Congress to overturn my decisions by means not subject to my veto power. In submitting this Executive Order, I also want to make it clear that I am not departing from those reservations.

JIMMY CARTER

WHITE DEPARTMENT
STATE SHEET, JUNE 19, 1980

Summary

The President has approved the export of certain nuclear fuel and components to India. To withhold these exports would jeopardize U.S. interests in the region and would be harmful to U.S. nonproliferation objectives there. This order provides background on the issue and addresses questions which may arise.

Nonproliferation Considerations. A fundamental nonproliferation policy objective, consistent with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA), is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and sensitive nuclear facilities which could contribute to nuclear explosive capabilities. Approval of the proposed exports for the Tarapur reprocessors supports these nonproliferation policy objectives.

To withhold these exports would adversely affect several key nonproliferation policies.

- India has indicated that the refusal of the United States to provide fuel needed for the Tarapur facility will relieve it of its corresponding obligations under the relevant agreements. In that event,

- (1) India might reprocess U.S.-supplied spent fuel for recycle of plutonium in the reactors—a step which would undercut our worldwide effort to hold back reprocessing and discourage such use of plutonium in present day reactors;

- (2) It might also remove the Tarapur facility from its present coverage under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)—a precedential step with ominous implications for the entire structure of IAEA safeguards; this would be the first case anywhere in which IAEA safeguards were withdrawn;

- (3) India might also decide to end the present U.S. veto over any use of material already supplied other than to fuel Tarapur, e.g., our veto over use of this material for nuclear explosions. It also could end the present U.S. veto over any retransfer to another country of this material. It could terminate the present U.S. right to buy any derived plutonium in excess of India's civil needs as well as end the present Indian commitment not to use Tarapur to irradiate any non-U.S. fuel.

- A cut-off will make a continuing nonproliferation dialogue with India impossible at a time when we need more than ever to sustain our discussions on this concern in the subcontinent and when India itself is becoming a nuclear supplier. A cut-off of U.S.-supplied fuel for Tarapur at this time would deprive the United States of the opportunity to discuss its differences with India on nuclear issues in an atmosphere conducive to progress. Constructive talks would not be likely after a cut-off.

- A cut-off will not advance the objectives of the NNPA and our nonproliferation interests in India; it would simply result in the Indians obtaining fuel from other sources and/or recycling plutonium.

- While some may view continued Tarapur supply as a weakening of U.S. nonproliferation policy, there is a greater risk that a cut-off could reinforce the perceptions of many countries of the unilateralism of U.S. nonproliferation policy and that the United States cannot be counted on as a reliable supplier.

- A cut-off will only encourage those in India and in other countries who argue the need for a full fuel cycle independent of outside suppliers and international safeguards.

Other Foreign Policy Considerations. The crisis in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan have profoundly affected U.S. security interests in South and Southwest Asia. We consider it vitally important to support stability and systematically bolster our relations with this region.

- We have sought in this context to maintain and strengthen constructive relations with India. It is the largest, strongest, and one of the most stable countries in the area. The policies it adopts on such issues of concern to the United States as relations with Pakistan and China, Afghanistan, Kampuchean recognition, U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean, and international economic affairs are important and influential.

- Indo-U.S. relations have not always been smooth. Our policy perceptions and interests do not always coincide. We believe, however, that the best way to influence India to adopt policies beneficial to U.S. interests is to try to build a reliable and mature bilateral relationship.

- Tarapur has become a crucial indicator to the Indians of the seriousness with which we view our relationship with them. A positive decision on Tarapur will help allay apprehensions about U.S. constancy and U.S. policies on issues sensitive to India, such as our relations with China and Pakistan.

- A break in our fuel supply would damage our broader relationship with India without any commensurate gains—and with potential losses—on the nonproliferation side. Moreover, the Soviets would seek to take further political advantage by supplying India with any needed fuel. We have just seen in the \$1.6 billion arms deal the use they make of their resources to influence India. We can't afford at this critical time to deal ourselves out of the game by reducing our links with this key South Asian player.

Background

The Tarapur Agreement and the NNPA. Under a 1963 agreement with India, the United States agreed to supply India, in accordance with the terms of a supply contract which was subsequently concluded, with all of the en-

riched uranium needed to operate two U.S.-supplied nuclear power reactors located at Tarapur during their 30-year life span. In return India agreed, among other things, to use only U.S.-supplied fuel, to allow the application of IAEA safeguards to this material, not to use it for any nuclear weapons or other military purpose, and not to re-transfer or reprocess the fuel without U.S. consent.

In 1974 India exploded a nuclear device using plutonium produced from a Canadian-supplied research reactor and most likely some U.S.-supplied heavy water. Both were supplied without safeguards arrangements but with the understanding that they would be used only for peaceful purposes. The Indians claimed that their explosion did not violate this understanding since it was a "peaceful nuclear explosion." As a result, the United States sought and obtained clarification from India concerning the Tarapur agreement that U.S.-supplied fuel would be used only at the Tarapur nuclear power station and thus not for any nuclear explosive device.

In 1978 the Congress passed and the President signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act. Among its provisions is a requirement that a non-nuclear-weapons state such as India have all of its nuclear facilities under international safeguards (full-scope safeguards) in order to receive U.S. nuclear fuel unless the President, subject to congressional veto, waives this requirement. The NNPA, however, delays the application of this criterion. Specifically, the law provides that the full-scope safeguard provision in the law (Section 128 of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended) will not apply to export applications filed prior to September 10, 1979, for exports which "would" begin prior to March 10, 1980.

Although India has accepted international safeguards on the U.S. material supplied to Tarapur and other material supplied from abroad, it also has a number of indigenously developed nuclear facilities which are not subject to safeguards. Over the last 2 years we have urged India to agree to place these facilities under safeguards, but it has refused.

There are two pending applications for nuclear fuel for Tarapur, both of which were filed before the relevant deadline in the law. The executive branch recommended to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in March 1979 that the first license be issued.

Subsequently the executive branch in May 1980 recommended to the NRC that the two fuel licenses, as well as licenses for replacement parts for the reactors, be issued. In its recommendations the executive branch stated that the statutory export criteria had been met, that the full-scope safeguard requirement did not apply to these licenses, and that withholding the exports would not be supportive of U.S. nonproliferation objectives and would jeopardize broader U.S. interests in the region.

On May 16, 1980, the NRC decided that it was unable to determine that these export licenses, as well as the licenses for replacement parts for the Tarapur reactors, meet the statutory export criteria. The NRC, therefore, referred all of these applications to the President for decision pursuant to Section 126(b)(2) of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended.

The NRC maintained that the full-scope safeguard criterion does apply to the two fuel licenses since, in the view of the NRC, this requirement is absolute with respect to any export made after March 10, 1980, irrespective of the date of the license application, the scheduled export date, or any other considerations.

The NRC noted, however, that its inability to issue these licenses should not be read as a recommendation one way or the other on the proposed exports and that the President may in such cases authorize the export by Executive order if he finds "that withholding the proposed export would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of United States non-proliferation objectives or would otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security."

In making a decision to move forward with the exports, the executive branch has taken the following factors into consideration.

Nonproliferation Aspects. The continuation of U.S. supply of nuclear fuel to India has been interpreted by some in the United States and abroad as an indication that the United States is backing away from its commitment to nonproliferation. This is not the case. The Administration remains firmly committed to preventing the spread of nuclear explosives and to the universal acceptance of safeguards on all peaceful nuclear activities.

Terminating nuclear supply to India at this time would *not* promote achievement of these objectives, and there would be substantial nonproliferation costs involved. India has stated

its view that the end of U.S. supply under the 1963 agreement would constitute grounds for India to renounce its obligations under this agreement. Continuation of controls on the U.S.-supplied fuel now in India would, therefore, be placed in jeopardy. In such an eventuality, the Indians would almost certainly reprocess the U.S.-origin spent fuel in India and use the plutonium as further fuel for the Tarapur reactors. Such a consequence of a cut-off would be damaging to our worldwide efforts to hold back reprocessing and prevent recycling. If the existing safeguards on the Tarapur reactors and fuel are lost, it would be the first such instance and a serious blow to the international safeguards regime.

In addition, the end of nuclear supply would make a dialogue with India on nonproliferation issues impossible and eliminate whatever influence we have on India's nuclear program. The continuation of this dialogue does no of course, promise that we will be successful in reconciling our differences but an end to these discussions would insure that no progress would be made.

It is also important that the United States meet nuclear supply commitments that are consistent with U.S. law and policy in order to avoid damage to our reputation as a reliable supplier. As noted above, the executive branch believes that these exports are not affected by the full scope safeguard criterion and meet the other U.S. nuclear export criteria; their approval would enhance our reputation in this regard.

India is one of the "second generation" supplier countries and will have the capability to become a significant exporter of nuclear technology and components during the next 10-15 years. So far the Indians have taken a thoroughly responsible stance in international nuclear commerce. India's continuing association with us and other supplier countries in a cooperative atmosphere will affect the future climate in which Indian supplier policies evolve.

Regional Political Considerations. The virtual collapse of Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan have profoundly affected U.S. security interests in South and Southwest Asia. We consider it vitally important to promote stability and systematically bolster our relations with this region particularly with those countries which can play a role in checking any future Soviet expansion.

Constructive and useful relations with any country depend on a web of ties which taken together form the fabric of a total relationship. Particularly at this time of crisis in the region, it is not in U.S. interests to deal ourselves out of the game by reducing our links to important countries. We risk being viewed as irrelevant to the needs and concerns of the region.

The maintenance and strengthening of good, cooperative relations between the United States and India is clearly in our interest. India is the largest, strongest, and one of the most stable countries in the South Asian area. It shares with us important democratic values. It is a leader of the moderate group in the nonaligned movement and plays a significant role in international forums. The policies it adopts on issues of concern to the United States, such as relations with Pakistan and China, Afghanistan, Sino-Soviet recognition, U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean, and international economic affairs, can be important and influential.

Indo-U.S. relations have not always been smooth. Our policy perceptions and interests do not always coincide. There have been many times when we would have preferred that India take positions closer to ours. At the same time, we should recognize that in pursuing its independent role, Prime Minister Gandhi's government has taken positions on several important matters which we can welcome and has signaled to us that it wants a constructive relationship. It has moved from a pro-Soviet view of Afghanistan to oppose the Soviet invasion and call for prompt Soviet withdrawal. Mrs. Gandhi has personally spoken out against criticism of the Iran rescue operation. In sharp contrast to earlier negative Indian positions, her government has had little comment on the U.S. buildup in the Indian Ocean. Despite campaign pledges, it has not yet recognized the Vietnamese-installed regime in Kampuchea.

We believe that the best way to influence India to adopt policies most beneficial to U.S. interests is to build a credible and multifaceted bilateral relationship. The Tarapur issue is highly important in this regard. Affecting the supply of electricity to the industrialized area of western India, it has been on perhaps exaggerated significance in Indo-U.S. relations. Many in India see it as a litmus test of U.S. interest in maintaining good relations and of our recognition of the importance

of constructive Indo-U.S. ties to our broader foreign policy concerns in South and Southwest Asia.

A positive decision on Tarapur will help to encourage India to act in ways favorable to us in the longer run as it faces up to the new situation posed for South Asia by the likelihood of a long-term Soviet presence in Afghanistan. It will also help allay Indian apprehensions about U.S. policies in areas sensitive to India. For example, Indian perceptions of our relations with China and Pakistan are likely to be influenced by the conclusions the Indians draw regarding our interests in India, as demonstrated by our handling of the Tarapur issue.

A cut-off of nuclear fuel would have the reverse impact. Moreover, the setback to U.S. interests which disapproval of the exports would bring about will be made more serious by the probability that the Soviet Union will move promptly to reap benefits from our negative action. They have already offered to supply the Indians with enriched uranium for Tarapur if we fail to do so. We have just seen in the \$1.6 billion cut-rate arms deal the use they make of their resources to influence India. We can't afford to deal ourselves out of India just as the Soviets are demonstrating the importance they attach to this key South Asian player.

Considerations Related to the Applicability of the Full-Scope Safeguard Provision. The President's decision to authorize these exports is based on his determination that withholding these exports "would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of United States nonproliferation objectives and would otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security." This action does not require a determination that the full-scope safeguard criterion of Section 128 of the Atomic Energy Act or other requirements of that act or the NNPA are met. Nevertheless, the executive branch disagrees with the NRC's view that the full-scope safeguard criterion of the law applied to the two fuel applications and that, in effect, a waiver of Section 128 is, therefore, involved in approving these exports. In the view of the executive branch, the legislative history of this section of the NNPA supports the view that the September 10, 1979, deadline in the law concerning filing of export license applications is the date certain for application of the Section 128 criterion and is not meant to apply to applications under which the first shipment was reasonably planned to

occur prior to March 10, 1980, absent some indication of circumvention of the September 10, 1979, filing deadline. In these cases, the exports in question were reasonably planned to occur before March 10, 1980, and the failure of the shipments to be made in this time period was due to delays on the processing of these applications within the U.S. Government.

**DEPUTY SECRETARY
CHRISTOPHER,
JUNE 26, 1980²**

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this committee to discuss the proposed export of fuel to India for the Tarapur atomic power station. The President's decision to approve the two fuel shipments has generated some differences of opinion, as I found in my two prior appearances before Congress on this issue. It is obvious from the questions that I have received and from the public discussion of this issue that there are some fundamental misunderstandings on the issues involved.

I believe, therefore, that after briefly recounting the history of our nuclear relationship with India, it would be useful if I devoted the bulk of my remarks to responding to some of the questions that have arisen on this subject.

In 1963 the United States and India entered into an agreement for nuclear cooperation. Under this agreement, the United States agreed to supply all of the enriched uranium needed to fuel the reactors at the Tarapur atomic power station during their estimated 30-year lifetime. In return India agreed that it would use only U.S. supplied fuel at Tarapur, that safeguards would be maintained on the fuel, that it would not be reprocessed without U.S. agreement, and that the supplied material and equipment would be used only for peaceful purposes and not for "atomic weapons or for any other military purpose." In 1974 the United States obtained from India an explicit commitment that U.S. fuel supplied to Tarapur would be used at Tarapur for the needs of the power station and, thus, not for any nuclear explosive device.

Thus far, the United States has supplied under the agreement more than 200 tons of low enriched uranium to fuel the Tarapur reactors. The fuel is under safeguards and has not been reprocessed; and India has met all of its other obligations under the 1963 agreement.

As you all know, in 1978 Congress enacted the NNPA which provides that, after a grace period, a recipient of U.S. nuclear exports must have all of its nuclear activities under international safeguards as a condition of continued export. India has accepted safeguards on Tarapur and other facilities that contain material supplied from abroad, but it has a number of indigenously developed facilities that are not under international safeguards. India takes the position that it will accept safeguards on all of its nuclear facilities only when all other states, including the nuclear-weapon states, do the same.

During the grace period provided in the 1978 act, two shipments of enriched uranium have been made to India. Two additional export license applications were filed during the grace period: one in September 1978 and one in August 1979. The shipments requested in those applications are the ones that are, in effect, before this committee today.

The new Indian Government under Mrs. Gandhi came into office early this year. Based on a series of discussions, we have concluded that the Indian Government will not go beyond Mrs. Gandhi's statement that India intends to use nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes. This formulation does not exclude the possibility of so-called peaceful nuclear experiments. India has reiterated that so long as the United States meets its supply obligations under the Tarapur agreement, India will consider itself bound to the reciprocal obligations under the 1963 agreement.

We must now decide whether to terminate our nuclear supply relationship with India or to approve these exports for Tarapur. Both geopolitical and nonproliferation concerns have led the Administration to conclude that the exports should be approved.

It is simply not true, as some have stated, that the President's decision represents an abandoning of our nonproliferation goals in favor of improving our relations with India. The President's decision will not weaken our nonproliferation policy. To the contrary, the best way that we can advance that policy is to continue our supply relationship. Those who, in the name of nonproliferation, oppose these shipments have failed, in my view, to contemplate the possible repercussions should their view prevail.

If we disapprove these shipments, India is very likely to consider itself

free of its obligations under the 1963 agreement. In that event, India might reprocess the U.S.-origin fuel in India and use the plutonium in the Tarapur reactors. This would be an unfortunate precedent, because it would be seen by some as a demonstration that thermal recycle is a practical alternative, at least as an interim measure, to avoid dependence on external supply.

If we disapprove these shipments, India might also withdraw the U.S.-supplied nuclear fuel from safeguards. This would be the first time this has occurred and could seriously undermine the whole nonproliferation regime. In addition, India might decide to disregard our veto over any other use of the material already supplied beyond its use as fuel for Tarapur. It also could end the present U.S. veto over any retransfer to another country of this material.

On the other hand, if these shipments are approved, we will have preserved India's obligations under the existing agreements. It is in our interest to be able to hold India to these commitments.

I am persuaded that opponents have failed to come to grips with the geopolitical implications of the decline in Indo-U.S. relations that termination of the supply agreement would inevitably cause. India is the largest democracy in the world. Its government, like ours, rests on the consent of the governed, expressed again in January in the most massive popular election the world has ever seen. We share with India a faith in human rights, a belief in the rule of law, and a pride in strong democratic institutions.

The turmoil in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan have heightened U.S. security concerns in South and Southwest Asia. We consider it vital to bolster our relations with this region, particularly with those countries, such as India, which can promote security and stability in South Asia.

U.S.-India relations have not always been smooth. Our policy perceptions and interests do not always coincide. At the same time, we should recognize that in pursuing its independent course, Mrs. Gandhi's government has taken positions on several important matters which we welcome and has signaled to us that it wants a constructive relationship.

• India has moved from an uncritical view of recent events in Afghanistan to one opposing the Soviet invasion and calling for prompt withdrawal.

• India has sought to improve relations with Pakistan and has sent two high level emissaries to Islamabad to discuss regional problems with the Pakistan Government.

• It has continued to play a moderate role in the nonaligned movement.

• India has signaled that it wants to develop a closer relationship with the U.S. Clark Clifford and Averell Harriman have had candid and useful sessions with Mrs. Gandhi, and, as you know, she has warmly welcomed several of your congressional colleagues to India.

We believe that the best way to encourage India to pursue policies harmonious with U.S. interests is to build a framework of constructive bilateral relations which underscores U.S. constancy and reliability. The Tarapur issue is highly important in this regard. Many in India see it as an index of U.S. interest in maintaining good relations and of our recognition of the importance of constructive U.S.-India ties to our broader foreign policy concerns in South and Southwest Asia. A positive decision on Tarapur now will encourage India in the long term to act in ways consistent with our interests as it faces up to the new situation posed for South Asia by the prospect of a prolonged Soviet presence in Afghanistan.

On the other hand, the Soviets would undoubtedly exploit a refusal by us to supply fuel to India, and they may very well supplant us as the source of Tarapur fuel. We have just seen, in the generous terms of the \$1.6 billion arms deal, the use the Soviets make of their resources to influence India. We simply cannot afford to complicate our relations with India just as the Soviets are demonstrating the importance they attach to this key South Asian nation.

Some opponents of the President's decision have expressed the view that the Administration is "caving in" to unreasonable demands by India. This contention is not justified by the facts. The short of it is that the United States and India entered into a fuel supply agreement in 1963. India, to the best of our knowledge, has abided by its obligations under the Tarapur agreement.

We would like, of course, to see India accept full-scope safeguards on all of its nuclear facilities. Nevertheless, the conditions that the United States would like to see India accept were imposed by U.S. law in 1978—15 years after our international obligation was entered into. If we were to cut off our fuel shipments, India could plausibly ask whether the United States is a nation that abides by its commitments.

When Congress passed the NNPA in 1978, it recognized that by effectively changing the ground rules of our nuclear supply policy, the act would create problems for some countries. That is why the legislation has a grace period to allow time to negotiate with countries, such as India, to which we supplied nuclear fuel, but which had not accepted a full-scope safeguards regime. Thus, the legislative underpinning of our nonproliferation policy itself recognizes that there is no contradiction between nonproliferation and the shipment of these exports to India.

Some critics have charged that, whatever the merits of the fuel shipments, they violate the spirit of the NNPA, because the proposed shipments do not fall within the grace period of the act. This assertion, we believe, is incorrect.

The two current applications filed in India were for fuel that it needs for the efficient operation of the Tarapur power station. No one claims that India failed to file the two applications well before the September 10, 1979, deadline. Delay by the U.S. Government, to which India can hardly be held responsible, is the only reason that the fuel was not shipped before March 10, 1980.

The administration, therefore, believes the two license applications in this case fall within that grace period. In any event, I can assure you that the Administration will regard these two shipments as within the grace period and not as a precedent for any other license applications. Therefore, approval of these exports will not prejudice the future application of the full-scope safeguards requirements.

In conclusion, the Administration recognizes that there are plausible arguments on both sides of this issue. But I am convinced that, upon close examination, the weight of these arguments lies decisively on the side of going forward.

If we do not proceed, we could close the door on any opportunity for influencing India's future nuclear activities. We would risk losing our veto over India's use of spent fuel from the reactors we have provided. We would jeopardize the prospects for strengthening our relations with India—an influential democracy in a critical region at a crucial time. If we do not go forward, it would benefit not ourselves but those who would move to the breach. We hope we will have your support on this matter of real importance to American interests.

¹Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of June 23, 1980.

²The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Afghanistan Briefing

by Secretary Muskie

The following are excerpts from a briefing by Secretary Muskie before the National Association of Broadcasters at the White House on June 5, 1980.

I'd like to take this opportunity to raise with you who represent an important segment of communications media in our country a topic of profound global importance and insufficient global attention, and I refer to the continuing brutal Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

The challenges that that grim enterprise pose to governments are obvious. It also poses challenges to you in your continuing efforts to keep the trivial from overwhelming the fundamental and in your endless quest for access to important news.

In other wars of our time—in Nigeria, in Vietnam, in Bangladesh, in Nicaragua, in the Middle East, in Zimbabwe—American and other Western media have usually had extensive access. The nature of those struggles and the magnitude of the suffering have been witnessed and understood around the world. Diplomacy, inevitably, has been affected.

Afghanistan is different. This is a Soviet war. Censorship is rigidly imposed. Only a few non-Communist correspondents are still allowed in Afghanistan, and they stay in Kabul. Events within the mountains, the valleys, cliffs, and deserts of Afghanistan's 700,000 square miles are almost never viewed or recorded by any objective outside observer.

But we should not let this matter slip from the world's consciousness. The wretched reality of what the Soviets are doing needs continuous exposure. It cannot be censored out of existence, and it must never be excused by inattention.

As we meet here, a major war of national independence is under way in Afghanistan—a war of global strategic significance. The cities and other major towns are armed camps. Demonstrations,

merchant strikes, besieged government buildings, and guerrilla attacks on Soviet personnel are commonplace. Soviet army and air force units try every conceivable means to root out the nationalist insurgents. As these Soviet tactics destroy entire villages and kill and wound people by the thousands, great streams of refugees—now approaching a total of 1 million—pour across the borders to safety in Pakistan and Iran.

This is a large-scale conflict. Soviet armed forces inside Afghanistan number over 85,000 men. As many as 40,000 more in the Soviet Union just across the border are committed to the operation—many poised on the border, others launching bombing sorties from Soviet airfields. This heavy Soviet effort is supplemented by perhaps 15,000 remaining effective troops of the Afghan puppet regime from an army that once numbered 90,000. On the other side, maybe hundreds of thousands of irregular forces are fighting the invaders in small, separate guerrilla bands.

On paper it seems an unequal struggle, but on the ground the resistance is growing. Since Christmas, when Moscow sent in its troops, the situation has worsened for the Communist side. They occupy Kabul in sufficient force to maintain the facade of the Babrak Karmal regime. But outside of it, the Afghan Government and its Soviet backers are encountering fierce opposition.

In rural areas, Soviet military convoys are still regularly blown up. Most of the country is out of government control. Almost everywhere public administration has come to a halt. Many schools are closed. Fields are left unplowed. Food production is sinking.

The conflict has grave implications outside of Afghanistan. It is the first direct intrusion of Soviet forces into combat outside of the countries Soviet forces occupied when World War II ended. It poses a threat in a region of vital importance and thus a threat to the wider balance. It sets a precedent we cannot accept.

In response, our position is clear. We have taken a series of steps—on grain sales, on technology, on fishing rights, on exchanges, on the Olympics—to demonstrate that aggression bears a price and to deter any further adventures in the region or elsewhere. President Carter has declared that any assault on our vital interests in the Persian Gulf area will be met by any means necessary—and our capacity to respond is growing.

Over the period since the invasion, our allies have come to a similar perception of Soviet behavior as a serious threat

to our common interests. At the NATO meeting in Brussels last month, Secretary [of Defense Harold] Brown and I underscored the importance of a coordinated allied response. This month, President Carter will bring a similar message to the seven-nation summit in Vienna.

Our first mutual obligation is one of understanding. Americans must understand the particular economic and political vulnerability of our allies. At the same time, our allies must understand that burdens must be shared equitably. Detente cannot be sustained unless there is also effective deterrence.

Let me concentrate briefly on one specific aspect of the American response—the boycott of the Moscow games which are scheduled to begin in July. President Carter's original decision to oppose American participation in the Moscow Olympics was founded upon a simple fundamental principle that we could not join in Olympic Games—a festival of peace—in a country that was making this kind of aggressive war.

Even if the United States were the only country to withdraw, that would have been the proper decision. You don't abandon your principles just because not everyone will join you in upholding them. And the impact of our initial decision has been multiplied many times over by the similar judgment of other countries' Olympic committees and individual sports federations.

Some 60 countries, including almost the entire Far East and half of the Near East, Latin America, and Africa, will not be represented in Moscow. More than 50% of the athletes from outside the Soviet bloc will not attend. And in cases where national Olympic committees did not go along with the boycott, more than 30 individual sports federations have decided not to send teams against the decision of their parent Olympic committees. In total, these decisions represent a stinging international rebuke to the Soviets.

The British publication, *The Economist*, has correctly observed that the contests in Moscow will be called, but will not be, Olympics. In the absence of the countries which will not be there, a gold medal surely will not be a symbol of global superiority over all conceivable competition.

It is fundamentally important to recognize that neither this nor any other element of our response has been based on a desire to dismantle the framework for the potential for cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union. On the contrary, we do have legally binding agreements with the Soviets, and we have held to our obligations under the

law. The suspension of progress has been dictated not by American preference but by Soviet behavior.

I can only hope that the Soviet stake in detente will not fall victim to Soviet censorship. That can be the result if they believe their own interpretations—if they mislead themselves into a conviction that by restricting the flow of news, they can somehow dispel the effects of their deeds. We must not let that happen.

Beyond that, I am concerned that if the Soviet struggle in Afghanistan continues for the 2-3 year period for which they now seem to be preparing their people, and with as little attention paid in our media for the reasons that I have outlined, the public perception of the significance, gravity, and importance of the Soviet invasion will fade here, in Europe, and elsewhere around the globe, and our efforts to continue pressure on the Soviets—to continue to exact a price from them—may well begin to fade because of the lack of will.

I could wish that the conflict were more visible on our television screens. I

Afghanistan Relief Week

A PROCLAMATION¹

From the beginning, the United States has been a shining symbol of hope to the oppressed and the destitute of the world. The lamp held high by the Statue of Liberty still sheds its light into the darkness of tyranny, poverty and war.

In the years since World War II, America has given substance to that symbol time after time. Our country has provided food, clothing, shelter and medicine to millions of people from Greece, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Kampuchea, Bangladesh, Chile, Guatemala and many other places.

Last December, the non-aligned Moslem nation of Afghanistan was suddenly and brutally invaded by almost a hundred thousand Soviet troops. Because of this act of aggression, which has earned the condemnation of the world, hundreds of thousands of Afghans have been forced to flee their country.

They have fled because their homes have been bombed, their crops and flocks have been destroyed and their villages have been attacked with rockets, napalm and other modern weaponry. Facing starvation, shelterless against the bitter cold of the mountain winter, some one million men, women and children have crossed the high passes to seek shelter in Pakistan, or have fled to Iran. Children and the old

don't know what the answer to it is. Surely, the print media could do more to tell the story of what is going on in Afghanistan from the human rights point of view, the human values point of view, from a compassionate point of view—also from the point of view of the difficulties that the Soviet military machine is having with respect to a conflict on their own borders, which they obviously regard as of overriding national significance for them. It is one thing to be bogged down in Vietnam, 10,000 miles away from home; the Soviets, at this time, are bogged down next door.

That story ought to be told. It ought to be understood that the Soviets are feeling the pinch of world disapproval. You may have noted that in the Tehran conference yesterday, convened for the purpose of putting the United States in the dock, the Soviet spokesman, undertaking to explain his country's action in Afghanistan, was heckled and jeered—there are these kinds of pressures that ought to be brought to the Soviet Union.

often die on the way. But despite the hardships, thousands more arrive each week.

The Afghans now constitute one of the largest concentrations of refugees in the world today. Most of them are destitute. They have been able to bring with them only their proud, resilient spirit of independence. They desperately need shelter. And they need clothing, blankets, fuel, urgent medical care, especially for the women and children.

Americans can help—and Americans must help. I call upon all Americans to help the Afghan refugees through contributions to agencies involved in the relief efforts: both the UN High Commission for Refugees and the dedicated private voluntary agencies.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, JIMMY CARTER, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim the week of July 21 through July 27, 1980, as Afghanistan Relief Week and urge my fellow citizens to join voluntary international relief agencies in assisting and helping the Afghan refugees in their struggle for survival.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this nineteenth day of June, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and eighty, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and fourth.

JIMMY CARTER

¹No. 4765 of June 23, 1980 (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of June 23). ■

Cuban Refugees

Following is a statement by Victor Palmieri, U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of the House Judiciary Committee, a statement by President Carter, and a statement issued by the White House.

**AMBASSADOR PALMIERI,
MAY 4, 1980¹**

I appreciate the opportunity to bring you up to date on the processing and settlement of recently arrived Cubans. The sudden influx of these exiles presents us with unprecedented humanitarian, political, budgetary, and legal challenges. The Administration is committed to keeping the Congress informed on the evolution of the situation and ways to resolve it.

On May 13, I presented to the full Judiciary Committee three principles which we have based our response to the sudden influx of Cubans.

- We are offering temporary asylum to arriving Cubans while we consider their claims for permanent asylum.
- We are seeking ways to make the flow from Cuba safe, orderly, and in accordance with our own immigration laws.
- We are contacting other nations and international agencies and encouraging their participation in the solution of this problem.

These principles remain the basis of our approach today, although the magnitude of the exodus has changed considerably.

Total Number of Arrivals

Yesterday the cumulative total of Cuban arrivals in the United States since April 14 reached 103,238. This includes 6,258 passengers who arrived on vessels yesterday at Key West. Almost 800 vessels have been seized by U.S. Customs Service.

Of the total Cuban arrivals, 48,914 have already been resettled, leaving 54,324 in the processing pipeline. Over 8,000 remain at Fort Chaffee, almost 9,000 at Indiantown Gap, some 6,300 at Eglin Air Force Base, about 6,000 at McCoy, and 1,525 in Miami.

At Eglin Air Force Base last Sunday, over 100 of the 430 who were released for resettlement were "walkouts," i.e., arrivals who were screened and immediately released to relatives. This new "walkout" program appears to be working well and is being used to hasten early release to relatives.

Resettlement Problems

Undocumented Cubans who arrive at Key West are given preliminary screening by an interagency group which includes representatives from the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and other agencies in accordance with the requirements of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

All arrivals are medically screened, as required by law, under the general direction of the Public Health Service. Medical treatment or hospitalization is available for those who need it. Arrivals found to have been convicted of a serious nonpolitical crime or who otherwise constitute a threat to the community have been detained in Federal facilities. A total of 681 persons, or 1%, are currently being detained by INS for convictions of serious crimes.

I returned from Fort Chaffee late Monday where a small group of recently arrived Cubans had caused considerable property damage. We are mounting a strong effort to convince the Cubans of the advantages of law and order in camps until orderly resettlement can be provided. Thirty-six of the participants have been arrested and placed in the post stockade. The trouble was started by a small but tough, hardcore group who took this opportunity to demonstrate their strength and ability to dominate others in the camp. They constitute a small number of approximately 19,000 arrivals at Fort Chaffee. An interesting sidelight to this event is that a number of Cubans at Fort Chaffee wore white arm bands during the melee in an attempt to identify themselves with those who wanted to stop the demonstration.

The recent Cuban influx and resettlement efforts on their behalf present a different set of circumstances from that of the Indochinese program in 1975. At that time, the wide sympathy and acceptance of the refugees translated into appropriations of over \$400 million. The caseload consisted largely of families and individuals of special

concern. There was no question about their status as political refugees. Full reimbursement was provided to the States for all costs associated with the program. The voluntary resettlement agencies received \$500 per person in reception and placement grants. With these advantages, some 125,000 persons were resettled from the camps in 8 months with a peak rate of about 25,000 per month. The average resettlement time was 3 months.

The present situation is quite different from 1975.

First, we are dealing with a different kind of population. Of those remaining in the processing centers, a large percentage consists of single males and others who may be more difficult to resettle than families.

Second, there are significant, well-established Cuban communities in the United States.

Third, the resettlement structures of the voluntary agencies are much stronger and better organized than they were at the onset of the 1975 crisis.

Resettlement Resources

Our major resettlement resources are the voluntary resettlement agencies. While we are considering other ways to tap into the resettlement potential of the American community, we are supporting the voluntary agencies and helping them to get into high gear. Their task is a difficult one, and although their major concern is to arrange for sponsorship, they have contributed greatly in assisting in out-processing procedures.

The pressures for rapid resettlement continue to exist, however, and in addition to humanitarian and financial considerations, include the urgent need to reduce in-camp tensions by showing substantial out-movement.

Since to date the Cubans and Haitians have not been determined to be refugees as a group, they are, therefore, not eligible for the full range of benefits authorized by the Refugee Act of 1980.

With respect to the second principle I mentioned earlier, we have taken measures to make the flow from Cuba safe, orderly, and in accordance with our own immigration laws.

Since the President's announcement on May 14, the INS, Coast Guard, and Customs have collaborated to halt the flow of boats to Cuba. The Coast Guard has successfully persuaded vessels heading south to return to Florida.

The estimate of southbound vessels has dwindled to a trickle of three or four a day, from an average of 70 before May 14. The INS has issued over 1,500 notices of intent to issue fines, and hundreds of vessels have been seized and are awaiting further legal action. All seized vessels are prohibited from leaving Florida and are subject to criminal action and fines up to \$50,000 if they are apprehended transporting illegal aliens.

In accordance with principle three, we are continuing to work toward internationalization of the Cuban exile problem. As I testified before the Senate on May 13, we participated at a high level in the international conference called by President Carazo of Costa Rica, held in San Jose on May 8 and 9. At the conclusion of the conference, which was attended by representatives of 22 nations, the Holy See and several international organizations, the Government of Costa Rica issued a final communique stating the "need . . . for all governments and international relief organizations to join their efforts in an international program for resettlement of those wishing to leave Cuba and to offer material and financial support for the effort, including resettlement opportunities, commensurate with their resources."

The various representatives outlined the contributions their nations could make, including offers of resettlement for Cubans who had sought refuge in the Peruvian Embassy.

As a result of this conference, a trilateral group composed of the United States, Great Britain, and Costa Rica agreed to negotiate with Cuba an orderly program for the departure of the Cubans who wish to leave Cuba. The group presented a diplomatic note to the Cuban Government requesting opening discussions on this matter. Although the Cuban Government did not accept the proposal set forth in the note, we do not believe that the concept of an orderly departure has been rejected. In consultation with Great Britain and Costa Rica, we will continue our efforts to establish a productive dialogue with Cuba. Whether or not Cuba is willing to meet with us in a constructive manner is for them to decide. But given that all governments are influenced by international opinion, we intend to pursue these efforts even though they may be rebuffed initially.

In the event that an orderly departure program can be negotiated with Castro, a list of persons eligible for consideration to come into the United

States will be drawn in part from among those who have filed immigrant visa petitions or registered with the Family Registration Center in Miami. The center has received numerous applications, which the Department of Health and Human Services will be processing in the near future.

In addition, we are continuing our efforts to internationalize the resettlement of Cubans who have sought asylum in the United States. Argentina has sent a representative to Eglin Air Force Base to select Cubans for resettlement. Australia plans to send an immigration officer to the centers shortly to recruit up to 200 Cubans. These are important initiatives that we hope will be duplicated by other countries.

We have already consulted with the Governments of Ecuador, Spain, Peru, the Netherlands, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, Canada, Italy, Austria, Venezuela, Brazil, France, and Costa Rica. We have asked these nations to confirm to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) or to the Inter-governmental Commission for European Migration (ICEM) their pledges made at the San Jose conference to accept Cubans. And we have asked UNHCR and ICEM to arrange for the screening and transportation of the Cubans willing to resettle elsewhere. Furthermore, last week in Geneva, I met with the ICEM and UNHCR executive committees, and they have agreed to our requests to seek additional offers of resettlement for Cubans.

Voluntary Repatriation

Regarding the matter of voluntary repatriation to Cuba, there are at least seven persons who have requested to return. Four of them are detained at the Federal correctional institute in Talladega, Alabama. The other three are located at Eglin Air Force Base. Because of the nature of the exodus from Mariel—where many Cubans were crammed on departing vessels, possibly not all of them willingly—we expect there will be more people expressing a desire to return to Cuba. As part of our agreement with the UNHCR, that organization will negotiate with the Cuban Government on arrangements for their voluntary repatriation, including appropriate guarantees for their safety and well-being in Cuba.

Caribbean Nations

I would like to conclude my testimony this afternoon by sharing with you some of my concerns about conditions in the Caribbean and their implications for our refugee programs in the future.

As you well know, political, social and economic crises have been brewing in the Caribbean for decades. Political systems range from various kinds of representative democracy to authoritarian governments of the left and of the right. Throughout the region, economic pressures for emigration are intense. The stark contrast between economic prospects at home and those in the United States is an important factor motivating emigration to this country. The resulting brain drain deprives developing Caribbean nations not only professional people but of artisans and technicians without whom there can be no meaningful development program.

At the same time, this situation presents the United States with the dilemma of trying to allocate admissions numbers among the literally millions of people who would like to come to this country.

We will continue to work with the Congress to find solutions to this problem and, specifically, to resolve the remaining issues with regard to the current influx of Cubans.

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT JUNE 5, 1980²

On Tuesday, June 3, a freighter of 100 percent Panamanian registry landed at Key West, Florida, with 731 Cuban refugees on board. This boat was chartered by Cuban Americans apparent in direct violation of my order that private boat flotilla from Cuba cease.

Any person who attempts to circumvent this order will be prosecuted to the full extent of the law.

Any shipowner, captain, or crew member agreeing to travel from U.S. foreign ports to Cuba to take refugees to the United States in violation of American immigration law will face most severe penalties under the law. Ships engaged in such efforts will be seized regardless of the nation of registry. Ship captains will face criminal prosecutions and maximum civil fines. Those who charter boats for these purposes will also face criminal prosecution.

The penalties for aiding and abetting a conspiracy to smuggle aliens into the United States include prison sen-

Haitian Migration to the U.S.

*Statements before the Subcommittee on Immigration of the House Judiciary Committee on June 17, 1980, by John A. Bushnell, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, and Stephen E. Palmer, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs.*¹

MR. BUSHNELL

I am pleased to exchange ideas on some aspects of one of the major concerns in our hemisphere—the migration of people. Today we are focusing on Haitian migration; but that is only one part of a much larger issue.

Haitian migration, not only to the United States, but throughout the Caribbean, is now receiving a great deal of attention and is a matter of concern in several countries. In the United States, there is particular concern about the Haitian "boat people" in Florida, especially in

torney General to take the following actions.

First, Cubans identified as having committed serious crimes in Cuba are to be securely confined. Exclusion proceedings will be expedited to the maximum extent consistent with constitutional requirements for due process of law.

Second, exclusion proceedings will also be started against those who have violated American law while waiting to be reprocessed or relocated. The Justice Department will investigate all serious violations of the law, and the Justice Department will bring prosecutions where justified. Those responsible for the disturbances at Fort Chaffee are confined and will be confined until fair decisions can be made on criminal prosecution or exclusion from this country or both. Similar measures will be taken in the event of any future disturbances.

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

²Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of June 9, 1980.

³Read to news correspondents by White House press secretary Jody Powell. A question-and-answer session followed the statement and is included in the press release (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of June 16, 1980). ■

the context of the recent wave of uncontrolled and undocumented immigration from Cuba. There are important distinctions between the Haitian and Cuban cases, however: I would like to put the phenomenon of Haitian migration into some perspective.

The island of Hispaniola, shared by Haiti and the Dominican Republic, is the most populous in the Caribbean with over 11 million people. Haiti's 6 million are crowded into the poorest third of the island. Only about one-seventh of Haiti's land surface is flat or sloped at less than 10° and thus suitable for intense cultivation with the primitive farming techniques traditional in the country. Average rural per capita income is around \$100 per year. Nowhere in this hemisphere are economic and demographic pressures so intense. Survival is a struggle. There is often little hope or expectation that one's condition will improve; and many expect the lives of their children to be even more difficult than their own. The stark contrast between living conditions and economic prospects in Haiti and the United States is the principal factor motivating emigration to this country.

Aside from Mexico, with its much larger population and its common border with the United States, this island of Hispaniola probably has been the source of most illegal immigration into the United States over a period of several decades. Informed estimates place the number of Haitians in the United States at between 300,000 and 400,000, a large proportion illegally.

Haitians have been the migrants of the Caribbean basin throughout this century. They traditionally have migrated to the Dominican Republic, the Bahamas, Canada, the French West Indies, and Cuba. Cuba ceased to be an attractive destination after Castro came to power. The Bahamas, since independence in the early 1970s, have been more sensitive to illegal immigration.

Unlike Cuba, the Haitian Government has permitted emigration—documented or not—to proceed freely. Haitians travel back and forth from neighboring countries and islands. Emigration has reduced somewhat the population pressure on Haiti's limited resources, but the population continues to grow at 2% per year—perhaps a million people in the last decade. Emigration is also a foreign exchange earner as many Haitians remit wages earned abroad to their families in Haiti.

ces of up to 5 years and fines up to \$1000 per alien brought to the United States.

The captain of the freighter, the *Diamond*, and those responsible for chartering her services have been charged under these statutes. I have directed the Justice Department to prosecute these cases vigorously.

There should be no misunderstanding of my intention. Illegal traffic in refugees is unacceptable to the United States. It will be stopped. Those who attempt to evade this order will pay very severe penalties under the laws.

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT JUNE 7, 1980³

Among the tens of thousands of people being oppressed in Cuba and seeking to reunite with their families and to seek freedom in the United States, Fidel Castro has very cynically thrown several hundred hardened criminals in Cuban jails. These criminals will not be resettled or relocated in American communities under any circumstances. The administration will take all legal and necessary steps to make sure that this will not happen.

There is evidence that the Cuban Government exported these undesirable elements to the United States in a calculated effort to disguise the fact that the vast majority of those Cubans who have come to this country were not law-abiding citizens whose only purpose was to seek freedom and to reunite with their families.

This action by the Cuban Government, in addition to its cynical and inhumane characteristics, is a direct and serious violation of international law. It would be an equally serious violation if the Cuban Government should refuse to perform its obligations under international law to accept the return of these criminals. The President has directed the Secretary of State to press this issue urgently through diplomatic channels and in the appropriate international forum.

Unfortunately, a few of those who come to the United States seeking the right to live here in this country, to join a democratic and law-abiding society, have created disturbances and have violated the laws of the country in which they seek to live. These individuals will be dealt with in strict accordance with those laws.

The President has directed the At-

Migration Pattern

The traditional route into the United States for undocumented Haitian immigrants has been through Canada, which has no nonimmigrant visa requirement. This pattern has been supplemented in recent years, however, as entry into southern Florida has become relatively easy and attractive. A primary factor has been the knowledge, now widespread in Haiti, that Haitians entering the United States illegally and applying for asylum will not be excluded or deported. This has been the case for several years as restraining orders in connection with a series of class action suits against the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) have prevented such repatriation for most of the period since 1976. This changes the economics of emigration, since even the poorest of Haitians can borrow money from families and friends with a future job in the United States as excellent collateral. Whereas travel in small boats between Haiti and the Bahamas has been common for decades, for many Florida has now become the ultimate destination, and a smuggling industry has emerged to meet that demand.

We possess little data on which projections of the volume of potential emigration to the United States from Haiti could be based. The chief variable affecting the emigration rate, in our view, is the Haitian emigrant's assessment of his or her chances of being able to stay in the United States and find work here. In the absence of some natural catastrophe, it is not so much conditions in Haiti that determine the flow over the short term, but rather the emigrant's expectations of the prospects for success. If it were widely known that Haitians were expeditiously returned without being permitted to hold jobs, illegal immigration from Haiti would not cease, but the traffic in small boats would be greatly diminished.

Illegal immigration from other Caribbean countries, mainly the Dominican Republic and Jamaica, follows a somewhat different pattern. Although large numbers of Dominicans also have entered the United States—that is, Puerto Rico—by small boat, entry with documentation—a passport and visa—is the rule rather than undocumented entry. Many of the 200,000 or more illegal Dominicans in the United States entered legally but remained in violation of their nonimmigrant status.

The same is true of large numbers of Jamaicans and nationals of other English-speaking Caribbean entities. Approximately 40,000 nonimmigrant visas per year are issued to citizens of the

Dominican Republic, a significant number of whom remain illegally in the United States. Only approximately 17,000 nonimmigrant visas are issued annually to Haitians. This difference reflects both the relative ease with which illegal entry can be accomplished, as well as the difficulty in qualifying for nonimmigrant visas for most poor Haitians. Cuba carefully controls travel and very few nonimmigrant visas have been issued to Cubans in recent years, except for official travel.

The population of the Caribbean, including Cuba, approaches 25 million. Despite the so-called middle income status of most of these countries, meaning per capita incomes are little more than one-tenth of U.S. levels, the great majority of these people are poor, a significant portion of them desperately so. Most of them are potential emigrants to the United States, especially if there is a reasonable expectation of remaining and making a livelihood in this country.

The Need for National Development

Let me turn to another aspect. Clearly we all sympathize with the plight of the millions of poor in Haiti. The long-term, fundamental response to this situation is to sustain a process of economic development which will improve the conditions of life and the prospects for the future of the millions who now have little to look forward to. This is an international responsibility, requiring the cooperation of the international financial institutions and a number of bilateral donors.

The Agency for International Development's (AID) bilateral development assistance program—\$5.8 million this year and \$7.2 million contemplated for 1981—is designed to address the most fundamental problems of the rural poor. Since Haiti is starting from such a low base, assistance must be substantial enough and must be carried out for a sufficiently long duration to have a meaningful impact. AID strategy is to focus on such problems of the rural poor as low-income levels, malnutrition, inadequate health services, primitive agricultural technology, soil erosion, and poor farm-to-market roads. These are the types of problems which impinge directly on the lives of potential immigrants and are factors in shaping their decision on remaining in Haiti or migrating elsewhere.

In addition to the long-term strategy of development, food assistance under the PL-480 program is necessary to address acute and immediate needs. Title II commodities—\$9.4 million this year—are distributed on a grant basis, largely by private voluntary organizations. Title I

commodities—\$9 million in 1980—are sent through the usual commercial channels, and the proceeds used to augment public sector financial resources for development activities. We are currently projecting a PL-480 program in 1981 of a total of \$30 million, which would include title II and a title III program in place of the usual title I. Title III would be based on a series of fiscal and administrative reforms which would provide increased domestic revenues for development and improve Haiti's institutional capability management activities.

The conduct of U.S. relations with Haiti has been based on the pursuit of certain basic goals: economic and institutional development and promotion of the process of peaceful, positive social and political change which will foster human rights safeguards.

Haiti did not inherit the institutions which benefit most other Caribbean territories which achieved independence much later and under more peaceful circumstances. There is no tradition of democracy or history of peaceful and constitutional transfers of power in Haiti. Very little except the population size change from independence in 1804 until well in this century. Once a rich colony of France, since independence it probably has always been the poorest country in the Americas. It has a primitive economy, little infrastructure, and few natural resources.

Institutional development under such circumstances is necessarily a long-term effort. Haiti will be poor, and Haitians continue to emigrate for a long time to come. We believe that the conditions which exist now in Haiti are favorable to an acceleration in the rate of development, however, and our policies are designed to pursue that objective.

MR. PALMER

I am pleased to be here to discuss the questions raised by the arrival of Haitian asylum applicants in this country. The issue has been a prominent one and has attracted the attention of the media and of a great many of our citizens. The debate to date, however, has often generated far more heat than light. This country has needed a careful and systematic review of the kind that your committee today is undertaking, and we welcome your efforts.

I want to do two things today: first, to focus on current human rights conditions in Haiti; second, to discuss what has been done by the Department of State in reviewing Haitian asylum applications

key point must be emphasized: My subjects are separate matters. Obviously they are related—one must be informed about human rights conditions in a country to pass judgment on a particular asylum application. But there is no one-to-one relationship between human rights conditions and asylum determinations.

The Department of State is keenly aware of the abysmal series of human rights abuses that Haiti has known practically throughout its 180-year history. We know the depths to which Haiti sank under Francois Duvalier, and we are aware of the halting and checkered progress made since those days. We know how Haiti falls short of observance of internationally accepted human rights standards, and we have labored hard to establish the limited footholds a country like Haiti affords—and they are quite limited—press for human rights progress.

The determination of a particular asylum claim, however, is not a general referendum on human rights in the home country. We are not asked, in passing on an application, to state whether we agree in general of human rights practice of the home government. We are not asked whether we know of instances where individuals have been persecuted in that country. We are not asked whether prison conditions are bad, whether free speech exists, whether people are ever beaten or tortured.

Instead, we must apply a narrow and carefully focused standard established by treaty and by U.S. statutes. The question in passing on an asylum application is: "Does this particular individual have a well-founded fear of persecution" based on race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, if he or she were to return to the home country. In applying this standard to Haitians, we have found relatively few who qualify for asylum. This finding does not diminish any respect we might feel for people who have thrown themselves to cross 800 miles of ocean in order to better their lives. It does not diminish our concern about the general human rights climate in which they would return to Haiti. It does not mean that their cases are utterly without humanitarian appeal. It does reduce, rather, our efforts to apply conscientiously the narrow and precise standard the Congress has established for asylum in cases of this sort.

I can understand many of the concerns voiced by the critics of our denials of Haitian asylum claims, for they spring from the same concerns we share about the pervasiveness of human rights in that coun-

try. But I believe that in most instances their real quarrel is not with our application, but with the asylum standard itself.

If that standard is to be changed—to include, for example, a wider range of persons who suffer economic deprivation—that change will have to be accomplished by congressional action. It should only be done, moreover, if there is full awareness—and acceptance—of the broad range of consequences that such a change would bring in its wake.

Human Rights Conditions

The year 1979 saw many discouraging developments with regard to human rights in Haiti. There had been some genuine progress in 1977 and 1978. When Ambassador Andrew Young and others from the Department of State visited Haiti in August 1977, discussions of human rights conditions formed a prominent part of their conversations with government officials. Not long thereafter all of the remaining political prisoners known by the U.S. Government to be incarcerated in Haiti were released. Haiti signed the American Convention on Human Rights and invited the Inter-American Human Rights Commission to send a mission to visit the country. That mission arrived in August 1978.

However, 1979 brought several setbacks. Long-awaited elections for the National Assembly held in February proved to be closely controlled with many credible allegations of vote rigging. Although one independent candidate was elected, two candidates who had sought to run, Joseph Maxi and Sylvio Claude, were arrested shortly after the elections. Claude was exiled to Colombia but returned in July and resumed his political activities.

In May the government decreed censorship of plays and films. Human rights supporters took some heart, however, from the strong response, both from the international community and from Haitian authors and artists, against this measure.

In late August there was a new series of widespread arrests, most notably of Sylvio Claude and Gerard Resil, a radio operator who had permitted Claude the use of his radio facilities to broadcast a fiery political statement. A presidential speech in September boosted the prominence of the Volunteers for National Security (VSN), the relatively undisciplined militia who are the successors to the Tonton Macoutes, reversing a decline in their prestige in recent years. A new press law was decreed in September, with a broad range of repressive provisions. Finally, a

large meeting of the Haitian Human Rights League on November 9 was violently disrupted by thugs who were most probably government agents.

Throughout the period, prison conditions remained poor, and prison regimen was marked by frequent beatings. Corruption persisted. Prisoners often were held for lengthy periods—many exceeding a year's duration—without ever being brought to trial. Sometimes this simply reflected the extreme understaffing of Haiti's judicial system; sometimes it apparently reflected governmental reluctance to proceed with a trial where the apparent offense had political overtones. The latter group includes persons arrested near St. Marc in February 1979 for alleged involvement in a plot against the government. The U.S. Government regularly made known its concern on these matters.

In the last few months, we have seen some changes, moderating to some degree the negative trends of 1979, and marking a return in large measure to the old pattern of human rights problems checkered by some reform steps. The September press law, widely criticized within Haiti and internationally, was never implemented. Instead, a panel including some of the September law's staunchest critics was established to suggest changes, and a new law was promulgated in April. It is less restrictive in some respects than its predecessor, but there is no doubt that it leaves in place substantial potential for controls on the Haitian press.

Sylvio Claude, a subject of considerable international attention, was released in May and has resumed some of his political activity. A ranking member of the VSN, Antoine Khoury, who had killed a civilian, was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment in December 1979. The Haitian Government has taken steps designed to include most of the national revenue in the governmental budget. If these economic reforms, which have been strongly advocated by the International Monetary Fund and by the United States, were to be fully implemented—and on the basis of experience this is doubtful—they would reduce many existing opportunities for diversion of the national wealth to certain private coffers.

The positive steps I have just outlined, of course, have not fully dispelled the chilling effect of many of the 1979 actions—especially the August arrests and the November disruption of the Human Rights League meeting. Nonetheless they are a welcome relief to the negative trends of 1979, and we hope that they

presage further progress. Our diplomatic efforts continue to encourage such progress.

As our 1980 human rights report indicated, Haiti remains vulnerable—and will for many years—to the kind of seesaw trends we have seen over the past 2 years because it lacks solid institutions to preserve human rights gains which are made. In the long run, solid reform must be based on firm establishment of the rule of law, with independent institutions strong enough to check abuses. We have supported efforts to foster such institution building, for example, with an AID-sponsored legal aid program now beginning to be implemented in Port-au-Prince. Institution building, however, is inevitably a lengthy process. There is much that is needed on many fronts and relatively little to build on.

The Inter-American Human Rights Commission report on Haiti, issued last April, stressed a similar point. It urged that "all resources available be used to improve social and economic conditions [in Haiti] in order to lessen the inequalities which are an obstacle to observation of human rights." The commission made a "special appeal to international organizations to give Haiti the aid it urgently needs to improve living conditions among the population." We agree with this basic precept: Institutional deficiencies are a principal limiting factor in human rights progress in Haiti. Our policies, aside from assuring that the Haitian Government and public are acutely aware of our human rights concerns, must better address these deficiencies if we are to hope for sustained progress.

Asylum Policy

Let me turn now to our asylum policy. In a perhaps perverse way, one side benefit of the recent Cuban problem has been substantially greater attention to and understanding of the asylum provisions of our immigration law. Previously, those provisions had received little systematic attention.

Our immigration laws have long provided discretion to the Attorney General to withhold deportation of persons who would be subject to persecution in their homeland. In 1968 this country made that commitment more concrete when the Senate approved ratification of the U.N. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. In ratifying that treaty, we committed ourselves to the international law doctrine of *nonrefoulement*—the obligation not to send persons to countries where their life or freedom would be

threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. The Refugee Act of 1980 formally codified the protocol standards into U.S. statutory law. Also, the Refugee Act improved some of the proceedings involved in the asylum process—especially by creating for the first time an "asylum" status for persons whose applications are approved.

The asylum provisions are unique elements in our immigration laws. Virtually all other portions of those laws, including the new refugee provisions, provide for screening of individuals overseas before they come here. Our immigration laws usually provide explicit numerical limits, or provisions for setting those limits in advance, by category, on the number of people allowed to immigrate. The asylum privilege, however, is potentially open to any person who reaches our shores on his own. It permits those who qualify to stay no matter how they entered—legally or illegally. Few of the usual eligibility qualifications set forth in Section 212 (a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act apply in asylum cases. There is no numerical ceiling on the number of people who may be granted asylum and no way to set such a ceiling without abrogating our obligations under the U.N. protocol which we have accepted in law. Persons in asylum status may be sent to a third country, but third-country offers of resettlement are rare and generally cannot be obtained without substantial diplomatic effort.

Our asylum commitment is fully consistent with the strong humanitarian tradition of this nation. It would be totally unacceptable to return people to countries where we know they would be persecuted. The Administration is strongly committed to honoring our protocol commitment.

Nevertheless, the asylum provision could become an enormous loophole in our immigration laws if it is not carefully and expeditiously applied to sort out valid claimants from those not entitled to asylum. As I indicated earlier, the protocol standard is narrow. One does not qualify for asylum merely by showing that serious human rights abuses exist in the home country. The applicant must instead show, in essence, that he is likely to be singled out as a victim of such abuses.

Our policy regarding Haitian asylum applicants has been and remains to review carefully their individual cases and to grant meritorious applications. We do not hesitate to grant valid claims. The allegation sometimes made that we routinely deny Haitian applications in

order to foster better relations with the Government of Haiti is false. In fact, the State Department has recommended favorably in approximately 250 Haitian boat people cases.

Most of the applications we receive from Haitian nationals base the asylum claim solely on the fact that the applicants have departed from Haiti illegally. They assert that mere departure and seeking of refuge in the United States will be treated as a political act by the Government of Haiti and that that government will persecute them if they are returned. Most applications contain no allegation that the applicants or their families suffered persecution before the left or that other factors in their background would make them suspect politically in Haiti. We do not believe that such applications support a finding of a well-founded fear of persecution, and in such cases we recommend denial of the application.

There are, of course, cases in which the applicant does speak of past episode of mistreatment or threats to the individual applicant or to his family or friends. Cases of this type must be carefully evaluated on their own merits. They require both a judgment of the credibility of the individual's story and a determination of whether the episode is sufficiently well-founded. Where appropriate, we pursue additional information from our Embassy in Port-au-Prince.

As an added measure to assure the accuracy of our asylum determinations, we made special arrangements with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 1977 to secure UNHCR review of all Haitian applications filed in Florida. To date the final State Department determinations in all Haitian cases have been in complete accord with the view of the UNHCR. At present we are refining the procedures we use to obtain UNHCR advice in asylum cases. UNHCR is currently sending staff to Washington to advise us on asylum applications on a continuing basis. We are expanding UNHCR involvement to include review of those applications by Cuban nationals whose claims are not sustained on our initial review.

Under international law, the individual who is applying for asylum has the burden of proving that he or she is entitled to asylum status. Our obligation is to assess whether that burden has been met and to do so on the basis of information which the individual applicant brings forward.

Cuban-Haitian Refugees

Following are a statement at a State Department briefing by Victor H. Palmieri, U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, and a White House fact sheet of June 20, 1980.

AMBASSADOR PALMIERI

For more than two decades south Florida has been providing a haven for Cubans fleeing from Castro's repressive policies and Cuba's failing economy. In recent years, it has also become an entry point for thousands of Haitian "boat people." In the last 2 months, more than 114,000 Cubans have entered south Florida by boat.

The sudden and disorderly arrival of these Cubans on our shores without proper documentation has presented this country with an unprecedented political and humanitarian challenge. Under international law, we have an obligation to provide temporary refuge to arrivals claiming a well-founded fear of persecution in their homeland. Under previous U.S. law, we did, in fact, provide a permanent haven to almost 800,000 Cubans fleeing communism under Castro. Several factors, however, have determined the way we have responded to this extraordinary emergency and the strains it has created in south Florida.

First, those Cubans admitted in past years arrived under an orderly departure program that involved interviews and reviews of documentation before departure from Cuba. This allowed a careful screening process in accordance with U.S. immigration laws. This has not occurred with the current Cuban or Haitian entrants.

Second, our refugee and asylum provisions are now governed by new legislation, the Refugee Act of 1980, which came into effect on April 1 of this year. The Refugee Act established a framework for selecting groups of refugees overseas for admission to the United States, as well as for granting asylum to individuals already in this country who can demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution if they were to return to their country of origin. But this legislation did not contemplate the kind of situation we face now, with a sudden massive influx, without overseas processing and valid documentation. The procedures for dealing with asylum seekers in this country require lengthy

We also, however, in many cases seek additional information on our own. Sometimes this involves sending a query to the Embassy in Port-au-Prince. On occasion, it means that we send cases back to the INS requesting that they develop more information through an interview with the applicant.

Moreover, in May of 1979 we sent a team to Haiti to develop additional information of use to our consideration of Haitian asylum applications. Their specific mission was to check on the treatment of those Haitians who had been returned to their home country from the United States. Such a step was not a required part of our obligation in reviewing asylum applications. But this extra step had been suggested by groups that have supported Haitian asylum applicants. We were persuaded to send a mission especially because of the persistence of allegations that virtually all returnees were systematically persecuted. Our knowledge of conditions in Haiti and regular Embassy reporting did not support that allegation. But we had been frequently reminded by Haitian asylum support groups that the Embassy's contact with returnees took place largely in Port-au-Prince. The team was developed to see what information could be developed on returnees on rural areas.

While in Haiti, the team covered both the northern and southern peninsulas. It interviewed 86 returnees and family members of 11 others. The team members also spent considerable time with other observers of the Haitian situation, especially U.S. citizens who had spent many years in Haiti working with the efforts of voluntary agencies. The statements of these persons corroborated the results of the individual interviews: there is no pattern or policy of mistreatment of those returned from the United States. On their return, they have generally been ignored, resettling in their home areas, usually to the difficult life of poverty that is the lot of most Haitians.

That conclusion is decidedly different, however, from saying that there is no persecution in Haiti. Instead, the team reported carefully on the indications it received, some from remarkably candid conversations with government officials, and some of those returned—especially those who had been politically active—would indeed be in some jeopardy. The team's fundamental conclusion was that a case-by-case review must be maintained to insure that valid claimants continue to be afforded asylum.

There has been a measure of controversy about the findings of this team. Many of the criticisms I have seen are

based on exaggerated misstatements of what the team did or what it found. I think a reading of its report confirms the care of its efforts and its scrupulous attempt not to draw broader conclusions than the modest ones possible in this kind of inquiry.

As this committee knows, return to Haiti of most of the unsuccessful asylum applicants has been blocked by a series of Federal court injunctions. I will not go into the specifics of those cases, except to say that the government has vigorously contested them. There is no doubt, however, that one effect of these injunctions has been to encourage additional illegal migration from Haiti, as the perception has spread there that no persons who reach the United States will be sent back.

The recent and massive Cuban influx has also had a major effect on our response to this problem. As has been made clear in earlier hearings before this subcommittee, we are committed to even-handed treatment of Cuban and Haitian asylum applicants. We will be working with the Congress to solve this emergency—as respects both Cubans and Haitians—in a way that restores our ability to deal fairly but expeditiously with groups of asylum applicants. Restoration of a well-functioning, equitable asylum review must be a key part of our long-run strategy, if we are to be able to cope reasonably with migration pressures from Haiti, the rest of the Caribbean, and Central America. And a key part of that must be restoration of our ability to reach finality in the asylum determination promptly. No one's interest is served by prolonging the limbo of asylum applicant status.

In the meantime, it is vital to maintain vigorous human rights diplomacy as regards Haiti, other Caribbean countries, and indeed all of the globe. Asylum can never be a major avenue for solving the problem of human rights abuses in the country of origin. If we pretend that it is, I fear we would soon suffer a backlash in this country that might sweep away all possibility of asylum even for people unmistakably in danger of severe persecution. The ultimate response to human rights abuses is not relocation of large populations. The response must be a resolute continuation of our efforts to support an end to those abuses in the home countries.

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Western Hemisphere

examinations on a case-by-case basis that would leave many arrivals in limbo status for long periods, without eligibility for federally funded assistance. And the strict standards for asylum would prevent many of the Cubans and Haitians from qualifying for admission under that category.

This is clearly an intolerable situation for the Cuban and Haitian entrants as well as for the States that are receiving and resettling them, particularly the State of Florida. To date, the Cuban-American community and the voluntary resettlement agencies have generously assisted these exiles. But they can no longer bear this burden alone, especially since those being released from the processing centers are increasingly persons without relatives in this country. The size of this special population and the difficulty of returning them to their homelands or resettling them in other countries make it all the more important to clarify their status and eligibility for some forms of federally funded assistance.

In order to redress this extraordinary situation, yet maintain the integrity of our refugee laws for those applying for admission in the prescribed manner, the President has decided to seek special legislation regularizing the status of Cuban-Haitian entrants. This legislation will allow them to remain in the United States and will make them eligible for certain benefits, but it will not provide the status or benefits accorded to those admitted as refugees or granted political asylum.

U.S. Steps

Until this legislation is enacted, we will take the following steps to deal with the special needs of the communities in which the Cuban-Haitian entrants relocate and to prevent the occurrence of such crises in the future.

- Cubans who have arrived in the United States during the period April 21-June 19, 1980, and who are in Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) proceedings as of June 19, 1980, and all Haitians who are in INS proceedings as of June 19, 1980, will have their parole into the country renewed for a 6-month period as "Cuban-Haitian entrants (status pending)."

- Under this 6-month parole, these Cubans and Haitians will be eligible, if they otherwise qualify, for supplemental security income (SSI—for the elderly and handicapped), Medicaid, aid to families with dependent children

(AFDC), and emergency assistance under the rules of the States in which they are residing and with normal Federal-State matching of funds. In order to qualify, Cuban-Haitian entrants must first report to the INS for their new parole documents. Procedures for applying for these benefits will be announced by INS and the Department of Health and Human Services next Friday, June 27.

- Minor children in camps without close relatives in this country will be provided English-language training, health services, counseling, and individualized planning for permanent placement.

- Per capita grants will be provided to private resettlement agencies for all persons leaving processing centers after June 19, 1980, and for Cuban-Haitian entrants being relocated out of the south Florida area after that date. In addition, funds will be provided to the resettlement agencies to provide employment counseling and referral services to all Cuban-Haitian entrants already released from camps or resettled directly into the Miami area.

- The President has already sought funding totaling \$385 million to finance reception, processing, care and maintenance, transportation, initial relocation, health services, and educational costs as part of the FY 1980 supplemental appropriation. The Administration will seek necessary funding for the continuation of this program in FY 1981.

- Special legislation will be submitted to the Congress as soon as possible to:

- Establish a "Cuban-Haitian entrant" status for recently arrived Cubans and Haitians;

- Define services and benefits for these arrivals for 1 year after release from processing centers;

- Provide SSI, Medicaid, AFDC, and emergency assistance under the rules of the States in which they are residing and with normal Federal-State matching of funds; and authorize retroactive reimbursement to States and localities for 75% of the total cost of other general assistance, medical assistance, special educational programs, and social services for 1 year;

- Provide for conversion to permanent resident alien status after 2 years;

- Improve future asylum processing, both to expedite case-by-case review, including exclusion and deportation, and to reduce the likelihood of future problems of this nature;

- Provide minor children without close relatives in this country English-language training, health services, coun-

seling, and individualized planning for permanent placement. States will be reimbursed for 100% of the costs of maintenance and services provided to such unaccompanied minors until they reach the age of majority; and

- Seek a method to identify and extend "Cuban-Haitian entrant status" to those other Haitian "boat people" who have arrived in Florida prior to June 19, 1980, but who are not in INS proceedings.

- Criminals continue to be subject to detention and exclusion or deportation from the United States.

- Processing of applications for asylum will continue. Those who are granted asylum status will be eligible to adjust to permanent resident alien status after 1 year.

- U.S. Government enforcement agencies will continue to interdict boats bringing undocumented aliens into the United States. Enforcement will be maintained to prevent future illegal arrivals and violators will be subject to civil or criminal prosecution in accordance with the President's declaration of May 14, 1980. Persons who arrive illegally after June 19, 1980, will not be eligible for the program and will be subject to exclusion or deportation in accordance with U.S. immigration laws.

All of these steps are consonant with the policy that the President outlined May 14. Throughout this emergency, our objectives have been to uphold our international obligations and protect the integrity of our immigration and refugee laws. We have, therefore, sought to treat the arriving Cubans and Haitians in an equitable way by providing them temporary safehaven until their status can be resolved in this country or until they are offered resettlement in other countries.

In the case of the Cubans, we have also tried to limit both the inhumane and hazardous conditions of their journey and their impact on communities in Florida by deterring the Cuban-American community from illegally bringing in any more undocumented Cubans. At the same time, we have pursued international efforts to negotiate with Castro to establish an orderly departure program to allow the humane and manageable departure of Cubans who qualify for admission to the United States under the Refugee Act of 1980.

To date, our efforts have virtually stopped the boat flotilla from Cuba. We hope that our enforcement measures will discourage others from undertaking the long and dangerous journey by boat in violation of our laws. The problem of

umented aliens in the United States is
 uly broader than the current Cuban-
 aian entrants, and it will have to be
 subject of future policy decisions
 e in consultation with the Congress.
 epect that the Select Commission on
 igration and Refugee Policy will be
 ressing the situation of Haitians who
 ot covered by the President's deci-
 s: I have announced today, as well as
 r documented aliens in this country.

Summary

In summary, the current Cuban-Haitian
 is but a symptom of a worldwide
 el toward greater dislocation and mi-
 on. In the past, the American people
 r responded generously to the plight
 e uprooted. And our laws provide for
 e acceptance of large numbers of immi-
 grants and refugees. In fact, we will be
 tting over 600,000 this year.

However, there are millions more
 h would like to begin new lives in this
 ountry than we can accept. Our laws,
 efore, establish numerical limits and
 e careful selection and processing
 i to admission. Many applicants for
 ssion have waited for years, and on
 r al they have managed with little or
 ssistance from the Federal Govern-

in the case of Cuba, we have long
 e the country of preferred asylum. We
 ot stand by in silent witness to the
 ise and uncontrolled exodus from
 i, yet our laws do not allow us to ac-
 p for permanent resettlement any
 n or Haitian who arrives here in this
 aier. While we work for the eventual
 n of those who are found inadmissa-
 nder our laws, particularly crimi-
 l we must now find ways to resettle
 o whom common decency compels us
 eive.

WHITE HOUSE FACT SHEET¹

ate about 114,000 Cubans and more
 15,000 Haitians have entered
 n Florida as "boat people," requir-
 n emergency response from the
 Government and from the States,
 cities, and private voluntary organi-
 ns involved. More than 65,000 Cu-
 have been resettled with families
 other sponsors, a remarkable feat
 ng this 2-month period. The Cubans
 e heterogeneous group of people of
 age range and with a wide range
 asons for coming to the United
 es. Some were political prisoners,
 y seek reunification with their
 ies here, and many seek the

greater economic opportunities and
 personal freedoms of our country.

On May 14 President Carter pub-
 licly offered Castro a means for orderly
 and safe movement of Cubans to this
 country. That offer has not been ac-
 cepted. In addition, the President or-
 dered many actions to stop the unsafe
 movement of boats from Florida to
 Cuba to seek additional emigres. Those
 actions were successful.

Haitian entrants tend to be a more
 homogeneous group seeking greater
 economic opportunities, but many claim
 to be fleeing political repression.

After exhaustive review of the
 Refugee Act of 1980, the Immigration
 and Naturalization Act, and other au-
 thorities and after extensive consulta-
 tion with Members of Congress, af-
 fected State and local officials, and in-
 terested groups in the communities, the
 President has determined to pursue the
 following course of action to resettle
 the recent Cuban-Haitian entrants and
 to assist state and local governments,
 as well as private voluntary organiza-
 tions.

- Cubans who have arrived in the
 United States during the period April
 21--June 19, 1980, and who are in INS
 [Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
 vice] proceedings as of June 19, 1980,
 and all Haitians who are in INS pro-
 ceedings as of June 19, 1980, will have
 their parole into the country renewed
 for a 6-month period as "Cuban/Haitian
 Entrants (Status Pending)."

- Under this 6-month parole, these
 Cubans and Haitians will be eligible, if
 they otherwise qualify, for SSI [sup-
 plemental security income], Medicaid,
 AFDC [aid to families with dependent
 children], and emergency assistance
 under the rules of the States in which
 they are residing and with normal
 Federal/State matching. In order to
 qualify, Cuban-Haitian entrants must
 first report to the INS for their new
 parole documents. Procedures for ap-
 plying for these benefits will be an-
 nounced by INS and HHS [Department
 of Health and Human Services] on June
 27.

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 vided to private resettlement agencies
 for all persons leaving processing cen-
 ters after June 19, 1980, and for
 Cuban-Haitian entrants being relocated
 out of the south Florida area after that
 date. In addition, funds will be pro-
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 provide employment counseling and
 referral services to all Cuban-Haitian
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 reception, processing, care and mainte-
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 health services, and educational costs
 as part of the fiscal year 1980 supple-
 mental appropriation. The Administra-
 tion will seek necessary funding for the
 continuation of this program in fiscal
 year 1981.

- Special legislation will be sub-
 mitted to the Congress as soon as pos-
 sible to:

- Establish a "Cuban-Haitian en-
 trant" status for recently arrived Cu-
 bans and Haitians;

- Define services and benefits for
 these arrivals for 1 year after release
 from processing centers;

- Provide SSI, Medicaid, AFDC,
 and emergency assistance under the
 rules of the States in which they are re-
 siding and with normal Federal/State
 matching of funds and authorize retro-
 active reimbursement to States and
 localities for 75% of the total cost of
 other general assistance, medical as-
 sistance, special educational programs,
 and social services for one year;

- Provide for conversion to per-
 manent resident alien status after 2
 years;

- Improve future asylum process-
 ing, both to expedite case-by-case re-
 view, including exclusion and deporta-
 tion, and to reduce the likelihood of fu-
 ture problems of this nature;

- Provide minor children without
 close relatives in this country
 English-language training, health
 services, counseling, individualized
 planning for permanent placement.
 States will be reimbursed for 100% of
 the costs of maintenance and services
 provided to such unaccompanied minors
 until they reach the age of majority;

- Seek a method to identify and
 extend "Cuban-Haitian entrant status"
 to those other Haitian "boat people"
 who have arrived in Florida prior to
 June 19, 1980, but who are not in INS
 proceedings.

- Criminals continue to be subject
 to detention and exclusion or deporta-
 tion from the United States.

- Processing of applications for
 asylum will continue. Those who are
 granted asylum status will be eligible to
 adjust to permanent resident alien
 status after a year.

- U.S. Government enforcement
 agencies will continue to interdict boats
 bringing undocumented aliens into the
 United States. Enforcement will be
 maintained to prevent future illegal ar-
 rivals, and violators will be subject to

TREATIES

civil or criminal prosecution in accordance with the President's declaration of May 14, 1980. Persons who arrive illegally after June 19, 1980, will not be eligible for the program and will be subject to exclusion or deportation in accordance with U.S. immigration laws.

¹Text from White House press release. ■

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Agriculture

Convention on the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture. Done at Washington Mar. 6, 1979.¹

Ratifications deposited: Guatemala, May 8, 1980; Jamaica, May 13, 1980; Paraguay, May 12, 1980.

Conservation

Amendment to the convention of Mar. 3, 1973 on international trade in endangered species of wild fauna and flora (TIAS 8249). Adopted at Bonn June 22, 1979.¹

Acceptances deposited: Canada, Jan. 30, 1980; India, Feb. 5, 1980; Norway, Dec. 18, 1979; Sweden, Feb. 25, 1980.

Containers

International convention for safe containers (CSC), with annexes. Done at Geneva Dec. 2, 1972. Entered into force Sept. 6, 1977; for the U.S. Jan. 3, 1979. TIAS 9037.

Accession deposited: Chile, Mar. 28, 1980.²

Customs

Customs convention on the international transport of goods under cover of TIR carnets, with annexes. Done at Geneva Nov. 14, 1975. Entered into force Mar. 20, 1978.³

Ratification deposited: Greece, May 15, 1980.

Finance

Articles of agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) formulated at the Bretton Woods conference July 1-22, 1944. Open for signature at Washington Dec. 27, 1945. Entered into force Dec. 27, 1945. TIAS 1502.

Signature and acceptance: St. Lucia, June 27, 1980.

Human Rights

International covenant on civil and political rights. Adopted at New York Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force Mar. 23, 1976.³

Accession deposited: Sri Lanka, June 11, 1980.

International covenant on economic, social, and cultural rights. Adopted at New York Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force Jan. 3, 1976.³

Accession deposited: Sri Lanka, June 11, 1980.

Maritime Matters

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization.

Signed at Geneva Mar. 6, 1948. Entered into force Mar. 17, 1958. TIAS 4044.

Acceptance deposited: Yemen (Aden), June 2, 1980.

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 1948, as amended, (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 8606) on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Done at London Nov. 14, 1975.¹

Acceptance deposited: Australia, June 10, 1980.

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 1948, as amended, (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 8606) on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Done at London Nov. 17, 1977.¹

Acceptance deposited: Australia, June 10, 1980.

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 1948, as amended, (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 8606) on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Done at London Nov. 15, 1979.¹

Acceptances deposited: Bahamas and Canada, May 23, 1980; German Democratic Republic, June 10, 1980; Suriname, May 28, 1980.

Narcotic Drugs

Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at Vienna Feb. 21, 1971. Entered into force Aug. 16, 1976; for the U.S. July 15, 1980.

Proclaimed by the President: May 12, 1980.

Patents, Microorganisms

Budapest treaty on the international recognition of the deposit of microorganisms for the purposes of patent procedure, with regulations. Done at Budapest Apr. 28, 1977.

Accession deposited: Japan, May 19, 1980. Enters into force: Aug. 19, 1980.

Pollution

International convention for the prevention of pollution from ships, 1973, with protocols and annexes. Done at London Nov. 2, 1973.¹

Ratification deposited: U.K., May 22, 1980.⁴

Protocol of 1978 relating to the international convention for the prevention of pollution from ships, 1973. Done at London Feb. 17, 1978.¹

Ratification deposited: U.K., May 22, 1980.⁴

Accession deposited: Peru, Apr. 25, 1980.

Convention on long-range transboundary air pollution. Done at Geneva Nov. 13, 1979.¹

Ratifications deposited: Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, June 5, 1980; Union Soviet Socialist Republics, May 22, 1980.

Property, Intellectual

Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. Entered into force Apr. 26, 1970; for the U.S. Aug. 25, 1979. TIAS 6932.

Ratification deposited: Peru, June 4, 1980.

Red Cross

Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (protocol I), with annexes.

Adopted at Geneva June 8, 1977. Entered into force Dec. 7, 1978.³

Accessions deposited: Bahamas, Apr. 1, 1980; Gabon, Apr. 8, 1980; Mauritania, Mar. 14, 1980.

Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and relating to the protection of victims of noninternational armed conflicts (protocol II). Adopted Geneva June 8, 1977. Entered into force Dec. 7, 1978.³

Accessions deposited: Bahamas, Apr. 1, 1980; Gabon, Apr. 8, 1980; Mauritania, Mar. 14, 1980.

Rubber

International natural rubber agreement 1979. Done at Geneva Oct. 6, 1979.¹

Senate advice and consent to ratification: May 22, 1980.

Instrument of ratification signed by the President: June 6, 1980.

Signature: European Economic Community, May 30, 1980.

Safety at Sea

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1974, with annex. Done at London Nov. 1, 1974. Entered into force May 25, 1980. TIAS 9700.

Acceptance deposited: Greece, May 12, 1980.

Accessions deposited: Brazil, May 22, 1980; Japan, May 15, 1980; South Africa, May 15, 1980.

Terrorism

Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents. Adopted at New York Dec. 14, 1973. Entered into force Feb. 20, 1977. TIAS 8532.

Accession deposited: Seychelles, May 1, 1980.

International convention against the taking of hostages. Adopted at New York Dec. 17, 1979.¹

Signatures: El Salvador, June 10, 1980; Honduras, June 11, 1980; Senegal, June 11, 1980.

Agreement regarding bovine meat. Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9701.

Notification deposited: Finland, Mar. 13, 1980.

Notification of provisional application deposited: Tunisia, Feb. 18, 1980.

Agreement on trade in civil aircraft. Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9620.

Notification deposited: Austria, Mar. 17, 1980.⁵ Notification deposited: U.K., Feb. 19, 1980. Notification deposited: Switzerland, Apr. 14, 1980.

International dairy arrangement. Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9623.

Notification deposited: Finland, Mar. 13, 1980.

Agreement on technical barriers to trade. Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9616.

Notification deposited: U.K., Feb. 19, 1980. Notification deposited: Finland, Mar. 13, 1980.

Geneva (1979) protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva June 30, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9629.

Notification deposited: Finland, Mar. 13, 1980. Notification deposited: Yugoslavia, Mar. 19, 1980.⁶

Notification deposited: U.K., Feb. 19, 1980.

Convention on contracts for the international sale of goods. Done at Vienna Apr. 11, 1980. Enters into force on the first day of the month following the expiration of six months after the date of deposit of the instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession, subject to the provisions relating to denunciation of the 1964 Geneva Convention on the International Sale of Goods Convention.

Protocol amending the convention on the limitation period in the international sale of goods. Done at Vienna Apr. 11, 1980. Enters into force on the first day of the sixth month following the deposit of the second instrument of accession, provided that on that date (a) the 1974 limitation convention is in force; and (b) the 1980 sales convention is also in force.

Transportation

Agreement on the international carriage of dangerous goods, in particular, of radioactive material, and on the special provisions to be used for such carriage by air, with annexes. Done at Geneva Apr. 1, 1970. Entered into force Nov. 21, 1972.

Notification deposited: Finland, May 15, 1980.

Industrial Development Organization Convention for the promotion and development of the U.N. Industrial Development Organization, with annexes. Done at Vienna Apr. 8, 1979.¹

Notification deposited: Barbados, May 30, 1980; Mali, May 30, 1980.

Ratifications deposited: Barbados, Malawi, May 30, 1980; Laos, June 3, 1980.

Acceptance deposited: Japan, June 3, 1980.

Whaling

International whaling convention and schedule of whaling regulations. Done at Washington Dec. 2, 1946. Entered into force Nov. 10, 1948. TIAS 1849.

Notification of adherence: Switzerland, May 29, 1980.

Wheat

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement), 1971 (TIAS 7144). Done at Washington Apr. 25, 1979. Entered into force June 23, 1979, with respect to certain provisions, July 1, 1979, with respect to other provisions.

Accession deposited: Algeria, June 6, 1980.

World Heritage

Convention concerning the protection of the world cultural and natural heritage. Done at Paris Nov. 23, 1972. Entered into force Dec. 17, 1975. TIAS 8226.

Acceptance deposited: Seychelles, Apr. 9, 1980.

BILATERAL

Algeria

Agreement for mutual assistance in connection with the investigation of activities of International Systems and Controls Corporation and International Telephone and Telegraph Company, their affiliates and subsidiaries. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington May 22, 1980. Entered into force May 22, 1980.

Bolivia

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of May 31, 1978 (TIAS 9518). Effected by exchange of notes at La Paz May 19, 1980. Entered into force May 19, 1980.

Burma

Agreement concerning the provision of training related to defense articles under the U.S. International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program. Effected by exchange of notes at Rangoon Apr. 8 and May 27, 1980. Entered into force May 27, 1980.

Canada

Arrangement relating to the employment of dependents of government employees. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington June 4 and 12, 1980. Entered into force June 12, 1980.

Denmark

Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income, with exchange of notes. Signed at Washington June 17, 1980.

Enters into force upon receipt of the latter notification by one contracting state from the other that the constitutional requirements for entry into force of the convention have been satisfied.

Dominican Republic

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of Jan. 3, 1980 (TIAS 9730). Effected by exchange of notes at Santo Domingo Apr. 9 and 11, 1980. Entered into force Apr. 11, 1980.

Egypt

Project grant agreement relating to educational assistance for graduate level fellowships at U.S. institutions of higher education. Signed at Cairo May 13, 1980. Entered into force May 13, 1980.

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of Oct. 4, 1979. Effected by exchange of notes at Cairo May 22, 1980. Entered into force May 22, 1980.

Finland

Protocol relating to the air transport agreement of Mar. 29, 1949 (TIAS 1945). Signed at Washington May 12, 1980. Enters into force on the 30th day following the exchange of notes through diplomatic channels confirming that the constitutional requirements for the entry into force have been complied with.

Federal Republic of Germany

Memorandum of understanding for cooperation within the area of army tactical data systems for the purpose of standardization and interoperability. Signed at Washington and Bonn Jan. 6 and Apr. 14, 1980. Entered into force Apr. 14, 1980.

Guinea

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of Apr. 21, 1976 (TIAS 8378), with memorandum of understanding. Signed at Conakry May 22, 1980. Entered into force May 22, 1980.

India

Agreement amending the agreement of Dec. 30, 1977, as amended (TIAS 9036, 9232, 9578, 9663), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington June 6, 1980. Entered into force June 6, 1980.

Israel

Protocol amending the convention with respect to taxes on income signed at Washington on Nov. 20, 1975, with exchanges of notes. Signed at Washington May 30, 1980. Enters into force immediately after the expiration of 30 days following the date on which the instruments of ratification are exchanged and shall thereupon have effect in accordance with article 31 of the convention.

Treaties

Jamaica

Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income, with exchange of notes. Signed at Kingston May 21, 1980. Enters into force upon the exchange of instruments of ratification.

Japan

Agreement amending and extending the agreement of Feb. 23, 1976, (TIAS 8246) on research participation and technical exchange in the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission LOFT research program, with memorandum of understanding. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington and Tokyo Mar. 18 and 21, 1980. Entered into force Mar. 21, 1980; effective Feb. 23, 1980.

Agreement amending and extending the agreement of Mar. 9, 1976, (TIAS 8616) on research participation and technical exchange in U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission power burst facility (PBF) research and Japanese Atomic Energy Research Institute nuclear safety research reactor (NSRR) program. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington and Tokyo Mar. 18 and 25, 1980. Entered into force Mar. 25, 1980; effective Mar. 9, 1980.

Agreement extending the agreement of May 2, 1975, as extended (TIAS 8088, 8399, 8874, 9204), concerning an international observer scheme for whaling operations from land stations in the North Pacific Ocean. Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo May 27, 1980. Entered into force May 27, 1980.

Jordan

Agreement relating to the provision of technical assistance and services to the Civil Aviation Department of Jordan. Signed at Amman and Washington Mar. 5 and Apr. 1, 1980. Entered into force June 1, 1980.

Air transport agreement. Effected by exchange of notes at Amman Apr. 8 and June 8, 1980. Entered into force June 8, 1980.

Republic of Korea

Agreement amending the agreement of Dec. 23, 1977, as amended (TIAS 9039, 9350, 9566), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Apr. 14 and May 20, 1980. Entered into force May 20, 1980.

Mexico

Agreement amending the agreement of Dec. 3, 1979 (TIAS 9696) relating to additional cooperative arrangements to curb the illegal traffic in narcotics. Effected by exchange of letters at Mexico Apr. 25, 1980. Entered into force Apr. 25, 1980.

Morocco

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of May 17, 1976 (TIAS 8309). Signed at Rabat May 21, 1980. Entered into force May 21, 1980.

Agreement for cooperation concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy, with annex and agreed minute. Signed at Washington May 30, 1980. Enters into force on the date on which the parties notify each other by exchange of notes that they have satisfied their legal requirements.

Nicaragua

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of Aug. 31, 1979. Effected by exchange of notes at Managua Mar. 20 and 25, 1980. Entered into force Mar. 25, 1980.

Panama

Agreement relating to payment to be made by Panama to the Panama Canal Company and the Canal Zone Government for goods and services, with agreed minute. Effected by exchange of notes at Panama Mar. 25, 1980. Entered into force Mar. 25, 1980.

Agreement relating to payments to be made by the Panama Canal Commission to Panama pursuant to Articles III(5) and XIII(4) of the Panama Canal Treaty, with agreed minute. Effected by exchange of notes at Panama Mar. 25, 1980. Entered into force Mar. 25, 1980.

Poland

Agreement amending the agreement of Jan. 9 and 12, 1978, as amended (TIAS 9064, 9213, 9640), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington May 5 and June 3, 1980. Entered into force June 3, 1980.

Philippines

Arrangement for the exchange of technical information and cooperation in nuclear safety matters, with addenda. Signed at Bethesda and Manila Mar. 28 and Apr. 28, 1980. Entered into force Apr. 28, 1980.

Senegal

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, with annexes and memorandum of understanding. Signed at Dakar May 16, 1980. Entered into force May 16, 1980.

Singapore

Agreement amending the agreement of Sept. 21 and 22, 1978, as amended (TIAS 9214, 9610, 9719), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington May 27 and June 2, 1980. Entered into force June 2, 1980.

South Pacific Commission

Agreement relating to a procedure for U.S. income tax reimbursement. Effected by exchange of letters at Suva and Noumea Mar. 31 and Apr. 15, 1980. Entered into force Apr. 15, 1980; effective Jan. 1, 1980.

Sri Lanka

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of Mar. 1980, (TIAS 9737) with related letter. Effected by exchange of notes at Colombo May 21, 1980. Entered into force May 21, 1980.

Sudan

Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of certain debts owed to, guaranteed, or insured by the U.S. and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Khartoum May 17, 1980. Enters into force for 1979 debt, upon receipt by Sudan of written notice that domestic U.S. laws and regulations covering debt rescheduling concern this agreement have been complied with; 1980/81 debt, upon receipt by Sudan of written notice from the U.S. Government that the U.S. considers Sudan in compliance with the condition stated in article III, paragraph 1, of the agreement.

Tanzania

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of Mar. 1980. Effected by exchange of notes at Dar es Salaam June 9, 1980. Entered into force June 9, 1980.

¹ Not in force.

² With reservation.

³ Not in force for the U.S.

⁴ With reservation and declaration.

⁵ Subject to ratification and with a declaration.

⁶ Subject to approval. ■

June 1980

Events pertaining to Iran may be found on p. 63.

June 5
By a vote of 14-0 with 1 abstention (U.S.), the U.N. Security Council adopts a resolution "rebuking" Israel for failing to protect Arab lives in the occupied West Bank.

June 6
The following newly appointed Ambassadors present their credentials to President Carter: Sherif Fawaz Sharaf of Jordan, Jorge Pacheco Areco of Uruguay, Apati Willie Star of Nauru, and Jacques Mande-Makombo of the Central African Republic.

June 11
Japanese Prime Minister Ohira dies.

June 12
The 40-nation Disarmament Conference begins the second half of its 1980 session in Geneva.

June 13
European Common Market leaders, meeting in Venice, unanimously adopt a declaration supporting full self-determination for the Palestinian people, stating that the PLO "will have to be associated with" negotiations for a Middle East peace settlement, calling for an end to Israeli "territorial occupation" of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, denouncing the settlements as "a serious obstacle to the peace process," and calling the expropriation of Israeli-owned land "illegal under international law."

June 16
Jordanian King Hussein I makes official visit to Washington, D.C., June 16-21.

June 19
President Carter makes official visit to Europe June 19-26 with stops in Rome and the Vatican, June 19-21; Venice to attend the Sixth Economic Summit, June 22-23; Yugoslavia, June 24-25; Spain, June 26-27; and Portugal, June 28. Secretary of State Muskie accompanies the President through the Venice portion of the trip.

June 20
Eighth semiannual report on implementation of the Helsinki Final Act—November 1, 1979 through May 31, 1980—is submitted to Chairman Dante Caprio of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

June 22
Japan holds parliamentary elections. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party wins 267 votes in the lower chamber of the House of Representatives and 135 votes in the House of Councilors.

June 25-26
Secretary Muskie attends NATO's 1980 spring North Atlantic Council Ministerial meeting in Turkey.

June 27
Secretary Muskie arrives in Kuala Lumpur for consultations with ASEAN members, June 27-29.

June 30
A 2-day followup international conference on humanitarian aspects of the Cuban exodus begins in San Jose. U.S. delegation is headed by Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, William G. Bowdler and the Deputy Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, Ambassador Frank E. Loy.

By a vote of 14-0 with 1 abstention (U.S.), the U.N. Security Council adopts a resolution deploring Israel's persistence in "changing the physical character, demographic composition, institutional structure, and status" of Jerusalem. ■

Department of State

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

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			*161	[Not issued]
			*162	6/24
			*163	6/26
			164	6/30

Muskie: address before Washington Press Club.
Muskie: question-and-answer session following address before Washington Press Club, June 9.
Copenhagen '80: The Washington Conference for Women; Dept. of State conference, June 12-13.
U.S., Singapore amend textile agreement, May 27 and June 2.
Muskie: statement for World Environment Day, June 5.
Muskie: news conference.
Reallocation of fishery resources withheld from the U.S.S.R.
Muskie, Australian Foreign Minister Peacock: press statements.
Program for the official visit of King Hussein I of Jordan to Washington, June 16-21.
U.S. delegation to the World Conference of the U.N. Decade for Women (biographic data).
Advisory Committee on International Investment, Technology, and Development, July 9.
SCC, SOLAS, working group on standards of training and watch-keeping, July 9.
U.S., Korea amend textile agreement, Apr. 14 and May 20.
U.S., India amend textile agreement, June 6.
National Foreign Policy Conference for Educators, Dept. of State, June 26-27.
John H. Trattner named Dept. of State spokesman (biographic data).
Muskie: statement reaffirming his determination to affirmative action and employment at the Dept. of State.
William C. Harrop sworn in as Ambassador to Kenya (biographic data).
U.S., Jordan air transport comes into force, June 8.
Marvin Weissman sworn in as Ambassador to Bolivia, Mar. 19 (biographic data).
Muskie: statement on Vietnam's military attack on Thai territory, June 23.

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- *165 6/30 Muskie: statement at the U.S. Embassy, Ankara, June 24.
- 166 6/30 Muskie: press briefing, Ankara, June 24.
- *167 6/30 Muskie: statement at Ankara airport, June 26.
- 168 6/30 Muskie: statement at the opening of the North Atlantic Council, Ankara, June 25.
- 169 6/30 Muskie: news conference, Ankara, June 26.

* Not printed in the BULLETIN. ■

1951 Foreign Relations Volume Released

The Department of State in March released *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, vol. I, "National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy."* The *Foreign Relations* series has been published continuously since 1861 as the official record of U.S. foreign policy. This is the third of seven volumes covering 1951.

This volume of 1,774 pages presents high-level documentation (nearly all of which is newly declassified) on general U.S. national security policy, foreign assistance, the regulation of armaments, the foreign policy aspects of atomic energy, and U.S. foreign economic policy. Papers presented in this volume were selected mainly from the files of the Department of State, but also include material from the Truman Library and the files of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. I, was prepared by the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State. Listed as Department of State Publication 8975, this volume may be obtained for \$22.00. Checks or money orders should be made out to the Superintendent of Documents and should be sent to the U.S. Government Printing Office Bookstore, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Press Release 74 of Mar. 31, 1980. ■

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September 1980



Great Seal of the United States

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Volume 80 / Number 2042 / September 1980

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The DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, published by the Office of Public Communication in the Bureau of Public Affairs, is the official record of U.S. foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide the public, the Congress, and government agencies with information on developments in U.S. foreign relations and the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service.

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OCT 14 1980

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Mr. Jefferson, be a committee,
to bring in a device for a seal
for the United States of America.

The Great Seal of the United States

Before it adjourned on July 4, 1776, the Continental Congress of the newly independent United States passed a resolution appointing a committee of three of the five men who had drafted the Declaration of Independence "to bring in a device for a seal for the United States of America."

The revolutionaries needed an emblem and national coat of arms to give visible evidence of a sovereign nation and a free people with high aspirations and grand hopes for the future. The task proved far more difficult than anticipated; it took 6 years, two more committees, and the combined efforts of 14 men before the Great Seal of the United States became a reality on June 20, 1782.

This year marks the 198th anniversary of the first use of the Great Seal on a document giving full power to General Washington to negotiate and sign with the British an agreement for the exchange, subsistence, and better treatment of prisoners of war.

Following is a reprint of a publication on the history of the Seal prepared by Harriet P. Culley, senior writer/leditor in the Department of State's Bureau of Public Affairs.

DESIGNING A SEAL

The First Committee

The challenge facing the committee was to translate intangible principles and ideas into graphic symbols. Three of the great minds of the Age of Enlightenment—Benjamin Franklin, Adams, and Jefferson—struggled unsuccessfully with Biblical and classical themes, including the Children of Israel in the Wilderness and the Judgment of Hercules. Finally they sought the aid of a talented "drawer" and portrait artist, Pierre Eugene du Simitiere. To the post of consultant, Du Simitiere brought some knowledge of heraldry—his expert of describing coats of arms—and his experience in designing seals.

Four features recommended by the committee and its consultant were adopted in the final seal: the Eye of Providence and the date of independence (1776), both of which appeared on the final reverse side of the seal, and the shield and Latin motto, *E Pluribus Unum* (Out of many, one), on the obverse.

The first committee submitted its report on August 20, 1776, but the Congress ordered the report "to lie on the table," indicating lack of approval.




Portrait artist Du Simitiere's design for Franklin, Adams, and Jefferson suggested shield, Eye of Providence in radiant triangle, and motto, *E Pluribus Unum*, all used in final design. Drawn from original in Thomas Jefferson papers.

Great Seal Origins


Great seals have their origins in the royal seals of the 7th, 8th, and 9th centuries, but the first seal to be called "great" was that of England's King John (1199–1216). The King's Chamber acquired a smaller seal of its own, called the "privy seal," for use in the sovereign's private business, and thereafter the King's seal became known as the "Great Seal." Our seal is called "Great Seal" although no "lesser" seal exists.

The Second Committee


In March 1780 the Congress turned the design and final report of the first committee over to a new committee, composed of James Lovell, John Morin Scott, and William Churchill Houston. They asked Francis Hopkinson, the gifted Philadelphian who had designed the American flag and the great seal of the State of New Jersey, to serve as their consultant. They too failed to create an acceptable seal, but, influenced by the flag adopted in 1777, they contributed to the final design 13 red and white stripes, the constellation of 13 six-pointed stars, and the olive branch, a symbol of peace.



Second committee's consultant, Francis Hopkinson, contributed red, white, and blue colors to shield, an arrow and olive branch, and radiant constellation of 13 stars.



Lawyer William Barton's design for third committee combined white eagle, flag, and reverse side with 13-step pyramid and first committee's Eye of Providence.



The Third Committee

In May 1782 the Congress appointed a third committee. The three members, John Rutledge, Arthur Middleton, and Elias Boudinot, did little or no serious work themselves, relying on the service of William Barton of Philadelphia. A young lawyer with artistic skill and well-versed in heraldry, he became a central figure in the seal's refinement.

Barton's chief contribution at this stage was the eagle, not the American bald eagle, but a small crested white eagle "displayed" (with its wings spread). He combined it with a small flag and a design for the reverse which contained a 13-step unfinished pyramid and the first committee's Eye of Providence. He quickly drew up two designs and their technical explanations and the committee turned in its report 5 days after it was appointed.

Charles Thomson's Proposal

The Congress still was not satisfied. On June 13, 1782, it presented the collective work and recommendations of the three committees to Charles Thomson, Secretary of Congress. Thomson was not a

ist, but he was a practical man with the ability to get things done and he was not what was needed at this moment. He selected what he believed to be the best features of all the previous designs, assigning prominence to the eagle. Feeling that the new nation's symbol should be strictly American, however, Thomson rejected Barton's crested Imperial eagle with the native American bald eagle, wings extending downward as though in flight. He placed in the left talon a bundle of arrows and in the right, the olive branch.

Thomson's modified crest (a device placed above the shield) was a constellation of 13 stars surrounded by clouds. The shield, borne on the eagle's breast, was a chevron design with alternating red and white stripes. Adopting the motto *E Pluribus Unum* from the first committee's report, Thomson included it on a scroll clenched in the eagle's beak. His was the first proposal in which the final design of the obverse can be seen.

In his design of the seal's reverse, Thomson retained the pyramid with the Eye of Providence in a triangle at the zenith and, as products of his Latin scholarship, introduced the mottos *Annuit Cœptis* (He [God] has favored our undertakings) over the eye and *Novus Ordo Sæclorum* (A new order of the ages) beneath the pyramid. He gave his rough sketches and reports to Barton, depending on him to polish the designs.



Secretary of Congress Charles Thomson rejected earlier suggestions, gave them a fresh and novel arrangement, pleasing in its simplicity and lack of clutter. His design was first to foreshadow one Congress adopted.

Remarks and Explanation

by Charles Thomson*

"The Escutcheon is composed of the chief [upper part of shield] & pale [perpendicular band], the two most honorable ordinaries [figures of heraldry]. The Pieces, paly [alternating pales], represent the several states all joined in one solid compact entire, supporting a Chief, which unites the whole & represents Congress. The Motto alludes to this union. The pales in the arms are kept closely united by the chief and the Chief depends on that union & the strength resulting from it for its support, to denote the Confederacy of the United States of America & the preservation of their union through Congress.

"The colours of the pales are those used in the flag of the United States of America; White signifies purity and innocence, Red, hardiness & valour, and Blue, the colour of the Chief signifies vigilance, perseverance & justice. The Olive branch and arrows denote the power of peace & war which is exclusively vested in Congress. The Constellation denotes a new State taking its place and rank among other sovereign powers. The Escutcheon is born on the breast of an American Eagle without any other supporters [figures represented as holding up the shield] to denote that the United States of America ought to rely on their own Virtue.

"Reverse. The pyramid signifies Strength and Duration: The Eye over it & the Motto allude to the many signal interpositions of providence in favour of the American cause. The date underneath is that of the Declaration of Independence and the words under it signify the beginning of the New American Æra, which commences from that date."

* Adopted by the Continental Congress, June 20, 1782.

The Final Device

Barton portrayed the eagle with its wings displayed, but with wing tips upward, and simplified Thomson's chevron arrangement of stripes on the shield. He arranged 13 vertical stripes, alternately white and red, below a rectangular blue

"chief" (upper part of the shield). And he specified that the arrows in the eagle's left talon should number 13.

The designs were returned to Thomson on June 19, 1782. He made a few alterations and overnight produced the "blazon" (written description) with accompanying "Remarks and Explanation" and presented them to the Continental Congress on June 20. The Congress acted the same day to adopt the report, which did not contain a drawing of either design.

Thus, nearly 6 years after establishment of the first committee, Charles Thomson and William Barton "brought in a device." The Great Seal of the United States was unique—simple and uncluttered, yet bold—the composite product of many minds.

MEANING OF THE SEAL

Symbolically, the seal reflects the beliefs and values the Founding Fathers attached to the new nation and wished to pass on to their descendants. The report which Thomson submitted to the Congress explained the obverse this way: The red and white stripes of the shield "represent the several states . . . supporting a [blue] Chief which unites the whole and represents Congress." The colors are adopted from the American flag: "White signifies purity and innocence, Red, hardiness & valour, and Blue, the colour of the Chief, signifies vigilance, perseverance & justice." The shield, or escutcheon, is "born on the breast of an American Eagle without any other supporters to denote that the United States of America ought to rely on their own Virtue."

The number 13, denoting the 13 original States, is represented in the bundle of arrows, the stripes of the shield, and the stars of the constellation. The olive branch and the arrows "denote the power of peace & war." The constellation of stars symbolizes a new

nation taking its place among other sovereign states. The motto *E Pluribus Unum*, emblazoned across the scroll and clenched in the eagle's beak, expresses the union of the 13 States. Recent scholarship has pointed out the probable source of this motto. *Gentleman's Magazine*, published in London from 1732 to 1922, was widely read by the educated in the American Colonies. Its title page carried that same motto and it is quite possible that it influenced the creators of the seal.

The reverse, sometimes referred to as the spiritual side of the seal, contains the 13-step pyramid with the year 1776 in Roman numerals on the base. At the summit of the pyramid is the Eye of Providence in a triangle surrounded by a Glory (rays of light) and above it appears the motto *Annuuit Coepit*. Along the lower circumference of the design appear the words *Novus Ordo Seclorum*, heralding the beginning of the new American era in 1776.

THE DIE IS CUT

1782

The first die was cut from brass in 1782 by an engraver who has not been positively identified (possibly Robert Scot of Philadelphia). It is thought that Charles Thomson, since he was to have custody of the seal as Secretary of the Continental Congress, took it upon himself to find an engraver and someone to supply a suitable press. If Thomson provided a drawing to the engraver, it has disappeared and no drawing made by the engraver has been found. In any case, the seal and its press came into existence sometime between June and September 1782. They were placed in the State House in Philadelphia and on September 16, Thomson used them for the first time. That first sealed document was a full power authorizing General Washington to negotiate and sign with the British an agreement for the exchange, subsistence, and better treatment of prisoners of war. It was signed by the President of the Continental Congress John Hanson and countersigned by Secretary Thomson. Thomson continued as keeper of the seal until the Congress handed over power to the new government in 1789 and custody of the seal passed to the Secretary of State.

The Masi Treaty-Seal Die of 1825

European custom in the late 18th century called for the use of pendant seals on certain state documents, such as treaties. These seals consisted of impressions of the die on red or white wax discs which were then placed in silver or silver gilt boxes called skippetts. The seal and skippet were suspended from the document being sealed by heavy ornamental cords that bound the pages together, passed through the seal and its box, and ended in tassels.

The United States did not begin to use pendant seals until 1815 (on the instrument of ratification of the Treaty of Ghent), and then it used the die of the 1782 seal to make the wax impressions. But its small size compared unfavorably with the impressive European pendants and Seraphim Masi of Washington, D.C., was asked to design a special treaty seal. He responded with an elegant and graceful design, quite in contrast to the 1782 seal, and 4 1/16 inches in diameter. He didn't follow the official description of 1782 closely, but produced a realistic, uncrested eagle turned slightly to one side, as though resting on the branch of an olive tree. He clearly defined 13 arrows, made the shield narrower and more pointed and altered its crest, and centered the motto *E Pluribus Unum* over the eagle's head. This

beautiful seal was used for treaties until 1871, when the government ceased using pendant seals and retired the die. It is available for viewing in the National Archives.



Masi Treaty-Seal Die of 1825, used for pendant seals impressed in wax and enclosed in gold or silver boxes, then fastened with ornamental cords and tassel to treaties.

The 1782 seal, now on public display in the National Archives, is rather archaic in appearance. It measures 2 5/16 inches in diameter and carries a relatively crude rendering of a crested eagle, thin-legged and awkward, its head protruding into the constellation of six-pointed stars. The bundle of 13 arrows and the olive branch, bare of fruit, are pressed against the border of modified acanthus leaves.

1841

By 1841 the original die of 1782 had become worn and a new steel die was cut John Peter Van Ness Throop of Washington, D.C. This die has been called "the



First Great Seal, possibly engraved by Robert Scot of Philadelphia in 1782. Brass die of seal was in use almost 60 years.

legal seal" because of its faulty design. Whereas the law called for 13 arrows in the left talon, Throop gave his eagle only 6. (It is assumed that he didn't work from the text of the resolution of 1782 but rather from an impression made by the worn, original die, which would have shown a bundle of arrows but perhaps not the precise number. This may also account for the fact that he engraved five-pointed stars,² instead of the heraldic six-pointed stars of the original. However, these departures from the official design didn't affect the legality of the documents on which this seal was affixed.

The Throop die is of steel, 2½ inches in diameter, about the same size as the original. In fact, it is thought that the same press was used for both. But the differences in style are marked: The border is without acanthus leaves; the whole design has been crowded upward; the eagle is more vigorous and uncrested; two lines, instead of a straight line, form the top of the shield; and the olive branch lacks fruit, i.e., four olives.

In early 1866 a crude counter-die of the die was cut for the first time and put into use. It was a duplicate cut in relief, apparently in bronze. Its purpose was to improve the impression from the die when a document was pressed between them. However, the impressions grew less distinct and the die was retired after some 36 years of use.



Great Seal of 1841, engraved in steel by John Peter Van Ness Throop of Washington, D.C. It departed from 1782 design by showing only six arrows in eagle's claw and by giving stars five, rather than six, points. It also added fruit to olive branch.

1877

With the celebration of the Centennial in 1876, Americans were reminded of their heritage and interest was aroused in the origins and forms of the Great Seal. An article appeared in the press about this time revealing that there were "irregularities" in the 1841 die of the seal's obverse and that the reverse, although created by law in 1782 had never been cut.³ The Department of State seemed unaware of any public criticism and the irregularities in the obverse were not corrected when the Throop die began to wear and a new die was cut during 1877. The engraver was Herman Baumgarten of Washington, D.C., who followed the design of the 1841 die very closely, including the errors. The seal was the same size as its two predecessors, but Baumgarten enlarged the stars and the lettering on the motto. It is considered the poorest of all the Great Seal dies and, ironically, it was the one in use for the Great Seal's own centennial in 1882.

1885

By early 1881 the Department of State was beginning to listen to comments from the public and the press about the errors and omissions and bids were asked for engraving a reverse and a new obverse that would correct them. The firm selected was Tiffany & Co. in New York, and its head designer, James Horton Whitehouse, was asked to submit sketches. Whitehouse was a seal engraver, jewel cutter, and art designer of exceptional skill, taste, and artistic judgment. A great deal of research went into these two designs, going back to the original written description adopted in 1782. The Tiffany die of the obverse differs radically from all earlier dies. It is formal and heraldic, rather than realistic, and it served as the pattern for the die in use today. Its 3-inch diameter makes it larger than its predecessors and the eagle once again carries 13 arrows. The olive branch has 13 leaves and 13 olives on it and for the first time the cloud of the crest is in the form of a complete circle.

But it is the eagle itself that has undergone the greatest change. Gone are the thin-kneed eagles with L-shaped legs, replaced by a muscular and unmistakable American bald eagle. More of the body appears above the shield, and the engraving is so skillfully done that the break between the white feathers of the head and neck and the dark feathers of the body is visible in both the die and the impressions. In another departure, the eagle grasps the olive branch and arrows in large, strong claws from behind, not from the front, as previously drawn.

Although a die for the reverse was ordered from Tiffany & Co. and funds were appropriated, the die was not cut. With the passing of pendant seals in 1871 there was no practical use for it.



1901

After only 17 years of use, the steel Tiffany die of 1885 was no longer producing a sharp impression, probably due to a worn counter-die. Whatever the reason, the Department ordered a new die in 1902 and funds were appropriated. Although there was some debate about changing the design, the instructions that went to the Philadelphia firm of Baily Banks & Biddle were to "furnish a fac-simile" of the design of the Tiffany die "not later than June 15, 1903."⁴ The new die was engraved in hardened steel by Max Zeitler, and impressions from it are so nearly identical that it is hard to tell them from those of the 1877 die. There are differences, however. Impressions from the Zeitler die are sharper and clearer, particularly in the feathering of the eagle and in the 19 clouds of the crest. The eagle's feathers are more pointed and its talons have shorter joints. Zeitler also corrected two heraldic errors which had been called to the Department's attention. But it takes close inspection to see any of these changes.

The Zeitler die of the Great Seal was first used on January 27, 1904, and has been in use ever since, some 16 years longer than any of its predecessors.

Great Seal of 1904 by Bailey Banks & Biddle, in Philadelphia. The engraver, Max Zeitler, was instructed to reproduce 1885 die as exactly as possible. The engraving was deeper, however, and impressions are still sharp and clear after 76 years of use.

Designs of the Reverse

Although drawings of the obverse side of the Great Seal were done immediately upon adoption of the design in 1782, the first reverse was not drawn until 4 years later. A Philadelphia engraver, James Trenchard, working from the written description, produced a full page engraving of the reverse for the October 1786 issue of *Columbian Magazine*. He followed the law closely and produced an elongated, 13-step unfinished pyramid, with the two mottoes, the date in Roman numerals, and the Eye of Providence in a blaze of glory.

The second drawing of the reverse was probably done by the artist and historian, Benson J. Lossing, to accompany an article he wrote on the Great Seal for the July 1856 issue of *Harper's New Monthly Magazine*. Lossing gave his rather square pyramid a deep perspective and filled the ground around it with flowers and grass. He also changed Trenchard's right Eye of Providence to a left eye, which it has been ever since. This drawing has influenced all later realizations of the written description of 1782, with the exception of the Great Seal Centennial Medal struck in 1882. The back of this medal, which followed closely Trenchard's design, was the first realization of the reverse to be issued officially by the U.S. Government.

The design for the reverse was made available by the Continental Congress in case it was desired to impress the back surfaces of wax pendant seals. The United States used pendant seals for treaties from 1815 to 1871, but the backs were never impressed. Enthusiasm for cutting a die of the reverse has diminished, and to this day one has not been cut. The current official design of the reverse of the Great Seal follows almost exactly the Lossing drawing, and can be seen on the \$1 bill.



USES OF THE SEAL AND THE COAT OF ARMS

The Great Seal is used to seal documents 2,000 to 3,000 times a year. Although custody of the first seal had been assigned to the Secretary of the Continental Congress Charles Thomson in 1782, the new government in 1789 assigned it to the Secretary of State. Mr. Thomson hand-carried the seal and press to President Washington, delivered his resignation with genuine regret, and surrendered the books, papers, and records of the late Congress. Thomas Jefferson thus became the first of a long line of Secretaries of State to have custody of the Great Seal.

The actual sealing is done by an officer from the Department's Presidential Appointments Staff. At present it is impressed on the following types of documents, after they have been signed by the President and countersigned by the Secretary of State:

- Instruments of ratification of treaties and other international agreements;
- Proclamations of treaties and other international instruments;
- Appointment commissions of Ambassadors, Foreign Service officers, Cabinet officers, and all other civil officers appointed by the President whose commissions are not required by law to issue under another seal; and
- Assignment commissions for consular officers.

The seal is also affixed to the envelopes that contain letters accrediting and recalling our ambassadors and other ceremonial communications from the President to heads of foreign governments.

The design of the obverse of the Great Seal, which is the coat of arms of the United States, is used by the government in many ways. It has been shown in some form on coins, postage stamps, stationery, publications, flags, military uniforms, public monuments, public buildings, passports, and other



Reverse side of Great Seal. Although description was adopted in 1782, no die has ever been cut.

ems the U.S. Government has issued, ens, or uses. In full color it is displayed above the doors to all U.S. embassies, consulates general, and consulates throughout the world. It may also appear in black and white, and it may be printed, engraved, embossed, shown in relief, etched, carved, stamped, painted, lithographed, stitched, or reproduced by any other process appropriate to the materials being used. One of the more unusual uses of the coat of arms is in a stained glass window of the Prayer Room at the U.S. Capitol.

We see the seal design almost every day, both the obverse and the little-noticed reverse, as it passes through our hands on the \$1 bill. In 1935, the Department of the Treasury sent President Roosevelt a new design for the bill, incorporating the obverse and reverse of the Great Seal. After approving it rather routinely, the President changed his mind, scratched out his signature, and made in several significant changes. He switched the obverse and reverse and added "The Great Seal" under a rough outline of the pyramid and "of the United States" under an even rougher sketch of the eagle, and initialed the whole "FDR." Upon receipt, Treasury's Bureau of Engraving and Printing duly noted "Received by the Engraving Division June 10, 1935," and revised the model.

All of these uses of the Great Seal and the design, or coat of arms, are official. Often private, nonofficial requests to use one or the other come to the Department of State. It is the position of the Department that the Great Seal can be affixed only as provided by law and that impressions of the seal cannot be made for display purpose or in response to requests for souvenirs or samples. This position has been applied not only to impressions made from the present die but also to impressions from earlier dies still in existence.

As for the coat of arms, the Department has expressed concern in the past over the increasing tendency to use it in



Model of back of 1935 dollar bill submitted to President Franklin Roosevelt for approval. The President changed his mind after approving it, reversed placement of obverse and reverse and added legend "The Great Seal of the United States" in two parts under his roughly sketched pyramid and eagle.


commercial enterprises and in ways that give the impression of U.S. Government sponsorship or involvement. However, it is the current practice not to give opinions as to the suitability of proposed uses, leaving that to the taste of the user. The

matter of legality is left to the Department of Justice. Title 18 of the U.S. Code as revised in January 1971 prohibits use of the likeness of the Great Seal or any facsimile in "any advertisement, circular, book, pamphlet, or other publication, play, motion picture, telecast, or other production" for the purpose of conveying a false impression of sponsorship or approval by the U.S. Government under threat of a fine of not more than \$250 or imprisonment of not more than 6 months, or both.

GREAT SEAL TODAY

Sealing of Documents

In the Department of State the term "Great Seal" has come to include not just the die, but the counter-die, the press, and the cover, or cabinet in which it is housed, as well. These stand in the Exhibit Hall of the Department, inside a wood and glass enclosure which is kept locked at all times, even during the sealing of a document. The mahogany cabinet's doors are also kept locked and the press is bolted and padlocked in position except when in use.⁵ When there are documents ready for sealing, one of the officers carries them to the enclosure where the Great Seal is kept and prepares them for impressing. First, a 3¼-inch, scalloped, blank paper wafer of off-white linen stock is glued in the space provided for it to the left of the document's dating clause. If ribbons are used in binding the document, they are run under the paper wafer and glued fast. Second, the document is inserted between the counter-die and the die, with the wafer carefully lined up between them. Third, the document is held in place with the left hand and the weighted arm of the press is pulled sharply forward with the right hand, from right to left. This drives the die down onto the wafer, document, and counter-die, which impresses the seal in relief. The die is then raised, releasing the document and allowing for its removal. When an envelope containing letters of credence or recall is to be sealed, the wafer is impressed first, and then glued to the sealed envelope, leaving the envelope itself unmarked.



Great Seal of 1904 and its press in mahogany cabinet are located in Exhibit Hall of Department of State. Seal is engraved on steel die, cost \$600 with press, cabinet, and two copper counter-dies.

The Great Seal is no longer portable as it was in Charles Thomson's day. Although the five Great Seals have had many homes and have been in the custody of 56 Secretaries of State since Thomas Jefferson first took the responsibility, only the 1904 seal seems to have found more or less permanent quarters.

In 1955, it was put on public display for the first time during a ceremony in the Department of State lobby opening an exhibit on the history of the Great Seal, after which it was returned to the mezzanine where the public could view it.

On September 16, 1957, the 175th anniversary of the earliest known use of the seal, another public ceremony took place and four documents were sealed by the then Acting Secretary of State, before television and movie cameras.

It was not until March 1961 that the Great Seal was placed in what everyone considered its first appropriate location—the Exhibit Hall of the Department. This hall is on the first floor, centered between the north and south open-air courts which

lie straight ahead of the diplomatic entrance at 2201 C Street, Northwest. There the Great Seal, the press, and the cabinet are on display today.

¹The eagle on the Great Seal has always faced to its own right. The eagle that faced to its own left (toward the arrows) was in the Presidential seal and this was the design President Truman altered in 1945 when he ordered the eagle's head turned toward the olive branch.

²This innovation has been carried from die to die through the one now in use.

³Charles Thomson's written description, as adopted by the Continental Congress, provided for the reverse in case it was decided to impress the back of pendant seals. It was never intended that it be used apart from the obverse. A design was drawn in 1786, another in 1856, but no die was produced and pendant seals carried only the obverse of the seal.

⁴Actual delivery was delayed until January 1904, although the press is engraved "June 15, 1903." The die has been referred to as the die of 1903 because of this, but the 1904 date is more customary.

⁵Only three people are authorized to affix the Seal: Mrs. Bernice Renn, Chief of the Presidential Appointments Staff, and her two assistants, Sandra Sheskin and Josephine Weare. ■

Copies of The Great Seal of the United States may be purchased for \$2.00 from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Visit to Tokyo

President Carter was in Tokyo July 9-10, 1980, to attend a memorial service for former Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira at the Budokan on July 9. Following the service, he met with Emperor Hirohito at the Imperial Palace and, later, with Acting Prime Minister Masayoshi Ito at the Akasaka Place. On July 10 the President met with Chinese Premier Hua Guofeng at the Okura Hotel.

Following are President Carter's remarks upon arrival in Tokyo and the text of an interview he held with Japanese reporters.¹

ARRIVAL REMARKS, TOKYO, JULY 9, 1980²

As President of the United States, I am both honored and saddened to return to Japan on this solemn occasion. Prime Minister Ohira was a good friend and a wise counselor. I valued his advice, and I admired his statesmanship. All Americans deeply appreciated his cooperation, and particularly in recent months as we have worked together to meet difficult challenges to world stability and peace.

I have come to Japan to convey my personal condolences to Mrs. Ohira and her family, to the Prime Minister's friends and colleagues, and to the people of Japan. I hope that my visit will also be understood as an expression of the deep friendship and respect felt by the American people for your great nation.

Prime Minister Ohira and I always believed that our personal friendship was a symbol of the firm bonds between two nations. We worked together to strengthen our peoples' enduring ties of mutual respect, common interests throughout the world, and of shared values of democracy and freedom for individuals and for nations. Prime Minister Ohira's leadership will be sorely missed, but because of his many contributions, the relationship between the United States and Japan will continue to grow.

When Prime Minister Ohira visited the United States last year [April 30-May 6, 1979] he said, and I quote his words, "I am eager to work to make the American-Japanese partnership a more powerful and productive force for the progress of the world community toward a more stable peace and a more



White House photo by Karl Schumacher

Memorial Service for former Prime Minister Ohira.

widely shared prosperity for all." With these words, he spoke for both of us and for both our peoples.

In this spirit, I bring to Japan today my personal condolences and the sincere respect of the United States of America.

INTERVIEW, TOKYO, JULY 10, 1980³

Q. Let me begin by asking your impressions of the memorial service for the late Prime Minister Ohira yesterday. What were the thoughts which came across your mind while attending the service?

A. The most profound thoughts that I had were of my personal friendship with Prime Minister Ohira and the closeness that had developed between my family and his. We had been together often in some historic moments.

And I thought the funeral service—the commemorative service—was very impressive, very

solemn, but it expressed the genuine outpouring of respect that was felt for Prime Minister Ohira from throughout the world. Someone told me that 108 nations were represented there at the services. And this is not only a sign of respect for him and his leadership during troubled times but also a respect for the greatness of Japan and its growing leadership throughout the world, not only economically but also politically and diplomatically.

And finally, I was reminded of the closeness of our two countries, which I think is unprecedented and which was exemplified by my closeness to him personally.

Q. In a relationship so broad and complex like the relationship between Japan and the United States, there are bound to be some problems from time to time. How do you see the United States dealing with current issues, including trade and defense?

A. All nations in this modern world have problems, and particularly those that are in the role of a leader, as is the case with both Japan and the United States. With the skyrocketing price of



President Carter and Chinese Premier Hua Guofeng with Chinese interpreter (center).

White House photo by Jack Kiehlinger

the past and that we can solve these problems together with gratification to the people of both nations.

Q. Now you are about to have talks with Premier Hua Guofeng of the People's Republic of China. Can you tell us at this time what you expect out of this meeting and, also, how the closer relations between the United States and China would affect Japan and the rest of the world, specifically the Soviet Union?

A. I don't think it would be appropriate to outline all of the subjects that we're going to discuss with Premier Hua, but I'll be seeing him in just a few minutes, as you know, across the street.

In the first place, this last 18 months since I decided to normalize relations between our country and the People's Republic of China has been one of exciting progress between our two great nations, and, of course, this is a similar experience to what has been the case between Japan and the People's Republic of China.

We believe that this new development is conducive to peace and stability and progress throughout the Asian region of the world. We also see it as a means by which we can share our long-range strategic concerns to minimize the threat of the Soviet military buildup, which is exemplified most vividly by their unwarranted invasion of Afghanistan and their support of the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea.

We believe that this new relationship, however, should not be used by either our country or Japan, with China, against the Soviet Union. We should not combine our efforts against another nation, but we should combine our efforts to maintain peace and the freedom of each country to make its own decisions free of outside interference and certainly free of an invasion.

I believe in every respect the new peaceful relationship between our two countries on the one hand and China on the other is better for us all, in the matter of peace and trade and an improved better life for our people. My guess is that 50 or 100 years from now, as historians look back on this last few years, the turning of China outward to friendship with Japan and the United States will be a major development in the lives of all people.

¹ Texts from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of July 21, 1980.

² Made at Haneda International Airport.

³ Held in the Okura Hotel and broadcast live on Japanese television. ■

energy, economic problems are a responsibility for all leaders now, but the thing to remember is not those problems but the resolution that we have to resolve the problems, working together.

We have so much in common in the challenges and the approach to them that these common approaches and common commitments far outweigh any differences that might exist between us. We both represent dynamic, aggressive societies where people are very confident about the future, where we set the pace for other nations, and where we have never feared the meeting of a challenge with courage and conviction.

Economically, in trade, we have unprecedented benefits to both our nations from the rapidly growing volume of trade. And of course, on defense our mutual security treaty is a foundation for our own ability and commitment in the western Pacific to maintain stability and to maintain peace for all people.

We believe that this good relationship between our two countries in a competitive spirit is going to grow and that the 1980s will show even greater progress than we've seen in the 1970s because of the common purpose of our countries, in progress and also in freedom, and our commitment to democracy and to peace. We believe, finally, that the good relationship between our two countries is very beneficial to other nations and that we have set an example of the kind of growth that can benefit both peoples in a rapidly changing technological world if those peoples share those common commitments, which I've already mentioned.

Q. What kind of contribution would you like to have from the Japanese side to strengthen the tie of both countries?

A. I don't have any fear of Japan pursuing its own goals and the United States pursuing its independent goals, because we have so much in common that this pursuit is mutually supportive and not contradictory. We want stability and peace throughout Asia, and our commitment to a strong defense, at some sacrifice to us, is supportive of the Japanese commitment to defend your own area and your own people. There is no problem between us in that respect.

Similarly, in the development of technology, science, research, development, education, dealing with the energy problem, meeting the challenges of Soviet aggression in Afghanistan, international terrorism exemplified by the holding of American hostages in Iran, the growth of the strength of the ASEAN group [Association of South East Asian Nations], which is a very encouraging development, the opening up of China, a vast country very important to us both, with new opportunities for trade and exchange of ideas and a common purpose, the sharing of strategic matters—all of these elements of the life of Americans is identical with the importance in the life of Japanese.

As we pursue our own individual goals, sharing all these problems and all these opportunities for the future, I have great confidence that the relationship between our people will be better, even, in the future than it has been in

Visit to West Africa

Vice President Mondale visited Senegal July 17-19, 1980, Niger July 19-20, Nigeria July 20-23, and Sao Tome Verde July 23. Following are the Vice President's address at a dinner in Lagos, Nigeria, hosted by Vice President Alex I. Ekwueme on July 22 and the text of a joint U.S.-Nigeria communiqué of July 23.¹

ADDRESS

I am told that the best-selling book in Nigeria today is the Nigerian constitution—and that proves something that I've always believed. Freedom may be a burden—but it is a glorious burden, and there are no people on Earth who would refuse to shoulder it. Democracy may be noisy, but it is the sound of the human spirit, and there is no nation on Earth which would suffer from its liberation. Development may be difficult, but it is a human goal, and there is no society on Earth where human rights would not hasten it.

And so let me begin by saluting Nigeria's transition to democracy and the triumph of all Nigerians who achieved it. Let me celebrate not only your return to a government but also the process by which you achieved it.

Our joy in Nigeria's new democracy underscores the fundamental change in America's relations with Africa. When President Carter and I were inaugurated in early 1977, we were determined to establish a new foreign policy on the foundation of American democratic values.

We value justice. And so we commit our nation to an Africa free from racism and oppression.

We value personal dignity. And so we committed our nation to an Africa free from want and suffering.

We value peace. And so we committed our nation to an Africa free from war and from foreign domination.

These three goals—human rights, economic progress, and peace—were outlined by President Carter here in Lagos 2 years ago, in the first state visit by any American President to Africa.

When he did, he was greeted by friends both friendly and direct. "The Nigerian public," he was told, "has learned to measure policy pronouncements by results—and not expectations." It was an appropriate point. And tonight is an appropriate moment to assess the results and to survey the work ahead.

Human Rights

First, human rights. For the United States, the question is not whether we should work to advance justice in Africa but rather how to do so.

Tonight, as your Vice President pointed out, we celebrate a historic step forward—majority rule and independence for the people of Zimbabwe. It was an achievement of which Nigeria can be proud—most African governments, the British Government, and especially all Zimbabweans should be proud. And I am proud that my own country stood firm with yours and with others, for today, the people of Zimbabwe control their own future, free from outside interference, whether from their neighbors or from other continents.

Throughout the years of effort to find a solution, the United States held to a policy of support for free and fair elections, open to all parties; for a democratic and fair constitution; and for a negotiated settlement based on these principles.

The President insisted on maintaining American sanctions against Rhodesia until an impartial election process had begun. There was intense pressure to abandon this course—to drop our principles and take a short-sighted view of our interests. But our President and our Congress refused.

We know that it is in our national interest to support further progress for Zimbabwe. We have pledged substantial assistance to Zimbabwe—because we believe that its future will help decide the future of southern Africa.

One of our partners in the search for peace in Zimbabwe was President Khama of Botswana. He was a gifted, gentle leader of modern Africa—the father of a state both nonracial and democratic, in a turbulent region that has known too little of either quality. And we will all mourn his passing.

But we also celebrate a cause that he nurtured—democratic government in Africa. We welcome the return to civilian rule in Nigeria, Ghana, and Upper Volta, and the movement toward democracy in other nations in this region. We applaud the heightened emphasis on human rights in many African nations and in OAU (Organization of African Unity) councils. We offer our support for the future of Zimbabwe. But we also address those areas where human rights are trampled.

Injustice based on racial discrimination is abhorrent to men and women

everywhere. That is why the problems of southern Africa have been of special concern.

We believe that an agreement on a plan for peace and justice in Namibia, based on fair and open elections, is within reach. The plan proposed by the U.N. Secretary General has received strong African support and the agreement of the South West Africa People's Organization. South Africa has accepted the plan but does not yet agree on how to carry it out.

Now is the time for South Africa to put its faith in the plan it has accepted. If it does not, if instead it insists on its own formulas and carries the conflict further afield into neighboring states, the opportunity for peace could be lost, and the conflict will continue. We urge South Africa to build on the experience of Zimbabwe and to move forward—not backward—on the issue of Namibia, while there is still time.

Events within South Africa concern us as well. In May of 1977, I met in Vienna with the then Prime Minister Vorster. I impressed upon him, in the clearest terms, that relations between our two countries would depend upon progress toward full human rights and full political participation for all the people of his country. I expressed our strong hope that the South African Government would meet soon with representative leaders from across South African society to determine that country's future.

And I repeat that appeal that again tonight—for the clock is ticking in South Africa.

We advocate no simple formula. We know there is no simple answer. We see the need to solve a problem. And we believe that only blacks and whites, talking and reasoning together, can find its solution.

A great African poet once wrote: "Who would bring life's memory back to the men of gutted hopes?" We believe there is still hope for the men and women of South Africa. And there is still time—for reconciliation, for progress, for reason. But time is running out.

Economic Progress

Our second goal in Africa is economic progress; freedom from want and suffering.

Since we've come to office, American

The Vice President

economic assistance to Africa has doubled—to more than a billion dollars each year.

We have focused that aid on people—people who need clean water and food; who need decent health care, housing, and education. We support special efforts to help those who are forced to flee their homes by drought or war. And we have encouraged regional economic cooperation, such as ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States).

Much of our assistance is in agriculture. Hunger not only inflicts suffering on millions, it also makes a people vulnerable to political manipulation. A strong agricultural economy not only brings decency to millions, it also strengthens their freedom. All human rights are linked—and freedom from want bolsters freedom from oppression.

The agricultural agreements we will sign tomorrow will advance Nigeria's "green revolution." And they will mean cooperation not only between our governments but also our business leaders and technical experts.

For aid alone cannot supply the resources and technology needed to meet Africa's massive development needs. Today, even Marxist African leaders are openly seeking strengthened trade and investment ties with industrialized democracies. We welcome this pragmatism, and we are encouraging American businesses to respond—so that American capital, technology, and markets can play a role in the development process.

Perhaps more important to development—ultimately even more important than the transfer of goods and capital—is the sharing of ideas. That is why, in our discussions here and in our programs, we have emphasized exchanges of technical experts and other joint educational ventures.

For of all the values Americans share with Nigerians, none defines our national characters more vividly than our common belief in education. The trained mind, in my country and in yours, is our greatest resource. As the United Negro College Fund says in its motto: "A mind is a horrible thing to waste." Today more than 20,000 Nigerians are studying in America—the second largest body of foreign students in our country. They enrich us; they enrich you; and they prove that knowledge is a treasure that grows when it is shared.

Peace

America's third goal for Africa is peace: freedom from the waste of war, freedom

from outside domination and military intervention.

I have spoken about our active support for peaceful settlements in Zimbabwe and Namibia.

Let me say also the United States supports your efforts, and those of the other nations in the OAU, to find negotiated settlements to conflicts in this continent—in Chad, in the Western Sahara, and elsewhere.

We respect the independence and nonaligned status of states in this region. We oppose outside military intervention in Africa.

In the Horn of Africa and elsewhere, we have seen that foreign military intervention aggravates tensions. It prolongs conflicts. It denies local peoples the right to find their own solutions. It threatens the right of Africans to be free.

For all these reasons, the United States has not only undededdeddraken to help nations in Africa build their societies and strengthen their institutions; we have also pledged to help friendly nations strengthen themselves against outside interference. And we stand ready to honor that pledge.

We have obviously far to go before together we reach our goals. But as President Franklin Roosevelt once said: "Democratic government has an innate capacity to protect its people against dis-

asters once considered inevitable; to solve problems once considered unsolvable."

And so tonight I would say this about our efforts as Americans and Nigerians, as Americans and Africans: Your democracies will grow stronger—not I cause we express dissent but because we cherish it. We will grow more rich—not because we crush personal liberty but because we respect it. We will grow more just—not because we deny our inequities but because we confront them.

Dissent may sometimes make us fractious nations—but we prize the spirit more than the silence. Liberty may sometimes make us impatient nations—but we value an open society more than an oppressed one. Acknowledging our injustices may sometimes make us impatient nations—but we would rather admit our yearnings than turn our back on work undone.

Other nations may be deflected to a different course. They consolidate their strength—by oppressing their people's liberty. They increase their wealth—by diminishing their people's dignity. They trumpet their achievements—by muffling their people's discontent.

But we believe—as we see in Zimbabwe—that democracy is a means toward peace. We believe—as in Niger—that democracy is a means toward economic development. And we believe—



White House photo by Bob Burgess

Vice President Mondale and Nigerian Vice President Ekwueme signing Joint Communiqué.

Africa, in the United States, and throughout the world—that democracy, more than any other weapon, is the best general of national security.

Those of us who enjoy democracy are blessed. And those who are not yet free must not lose hope. "Hold fast to your dreams," said Langston Hughes, one of our great black poets, "for if dreams die, you are a broken-winged bird that cannot fly."

Those dreams will not die—neither in Nigeria nor anywhere across this continent, which is so rich and so beautiful and so full of promise for humanity.

MEMORANDUM OF INTENT COMMUNIQUE²

The U.S. delegation emphasized its willingness to consult with the Nigerian Government as developments emerge, to expedite an early decision on this important project.

Both sides held discussions on possible areas of cooperation in the field of science and technology. The U.S. delegation prepared a number of proposals for cooperation in the areas of agriculture, energy, demography, environment, housing, industrial technology, technical training, and transportation. It also submitted a draft Agreement as a proposed framework for scientific and technological cooperation between the U.S. and Nigeria.

On its part, the Nigerian delegation indicated its main areas of immediate concern and interest, in particular, the development of Nigerian scientific and technological capability for undertaking a number of priority programmes, including research and development in agriculture, oil and building construction, engineering and energy as well as development programmes in housing and the environment.

Both sides took note of these submissions and expressed the hope that progress could be made at the talks to take place in August 1980 leading to the conclusion of an Agreement on Science and Technology Cooperation during the visit to Nigeria of the U.S. Presidential Adviser on Science and Technology later in the year. In trade and investment, the U.S. side agreed to improve its efforts to provide information and opportunities for increased United States investment in Nigeria as well as increased trade between the two countries. In this connection, it was noted that Nigeria intends to set up Trade and Investment Centres in the United States. The United States Government will facilitate the effort and work with the Federal Government of Nigeria to identify ways in which Nigeria can take greater advantage of existing United States Government facilities to provide information and advice on trade and investment opportunities in Nigeria, including the organization of high level joint seminars.

The United States side will assist Nigeria to derive maximum benefit from the Overseas Private Investment Corporation. To this end, the Federal Government of Nigeria will provide a list of specific projects, which OPIC will consider. OPIC will lead an investment mission to Nigeria at the invitation of the Federal Ministry of Industries in consultation with the Nigerian Association of Chambers of Commerce, Industries, Mines and Agriculture.

On trade, it was agreed that the United States Government and the Federal Government of Nigeria will begin negotiations of a bilateral trade agreement within one month.

The United States delegation noted Nigeria's continuing interest in becoming eligible to benefit from the United States Generalized System of Preferences. It stated that congressional authorization would be needed prior to Nigeria's being designated for GSP eligibility, and that it would support such legislation.

Both sides noted the progress made in the last round of negotiations for a bilateral tax treaty and agreed to meet in February, 1981 in Lagos to resolve the outstanding issues.

The United States delegation noted the positive steps taken by the Federal Government of Nigeria to improve the country's investment climate and access to its market. The Nigerian delegation will examine other suggestions made by the United States delegation for further improvement. In order to facilitate trade and investment relations between them, each side will designate a senior official to be in frequent contact with one another so as to resolve problems which inhibit expansion of such relations.

The two Governments welcomed the initiative of the Chambers of Commerce of both countries to create a Joint Business Council and will encourage this effort. A high-level United States delegation led by Mr. Walter Mondale, Vice President of the United States of America, visited Nigeria from 20th to 23rd July, 1980. The delegation visited Kano and later held discussions in Lagos with its Nigerian counterparts led by Dr. Alex I. Ekwueme, Vice President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, as part of ongoing bilateral economic talks between the two countries which started in 1977.

While in Lagos, Vice President Mondale was received by Alhaji Shehu Shagari, President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, to whom he conveyed a message of goodwill from Mr. Jimmy Carter, President of the United States of America. The two leaders agreed on the need to take necessary measures to achieve more concrete results from their bilateral talks particularly in the fields of agriculture and energy.

The two delegations discussed cooperation in the areas of agriculture, energy, science and technology, trade and investment, and education.

In agriculture, the two Vice Presidents signed a Memorandum of Understanding designed to facilitate, on a continuing basis, the development of projects of mutual interest in the agricultural sector.

Under the Memorandum, a government-to-government working group will be formed to provide a forum for the planning and implementation of specific projects. The working group will hold its first meeting in September.

The two governments also agreed to form a Joint Agricultural Consultative Committee, made up of representatives from the public and private sectors, to promote contacts between Nigerian and American businessmen in the field of Agriculture.

The first project to be considered under the memorandum will be technical assistance for the comprehensive soil survey of Nigeria, on a reimbursable basis, with the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Other areas which the parties agreed to consider included technical assistance and training in various fields of agricultural production, processing, marketing, water resources development, and management as well as agricultural research and extension.

In energy, the Vice Presidents signed a Memorandum of Intent concerning Energy Cooperation. Within this framework, the two Governments agreed to identify areas of cooperation and specific projects, where appropriate, in the following fields:

- Technologies to protect the environment from the effects of energy exploration, production, transportation, and utilization;
- Secondary and tertiary oil recovery methods;
- Exploration and production of hydrocarbons from deep onshore formations, and in deep waters;
- Training in management and operations of drilling rigs;
- Facilitation of joint ventures and other appropriate vehicles for manufacturing equipment and material to support oil industry operations in Nigeria;
- Development of Nigeria's coal, including an appraisal of reserves and exchange of information on combustion and conversion technologies;
- Establishment of solar energy research capability in Nigeria with a supporting demonstration project;
- Training in petroleum refinery management and operations;
- Exchange of information on hydroelectric projects.

It was agreed that these proposed activities ought to be pursued expeditiously. To that end, the Nigerian Government will send an official delegation to the United States to discuss in detail the implementation of specific projects and areas for further cooperation.

The two sides also discussed extensively the Bonny LNG [liquefied natural gas] project, particularly in the context of the outlook for U.S. gas supplies and recognized the overall importance of this project and the long term commitment it would represent. The U.S. delegation expressed its support for the development of the project, but noted that the project can move

forward from its standpoint only within the framework of competitive conditions in the U.S. market.

The Nigerian side presented a proposal to the United States delegation for an agreement on Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation. The United States Delegation undertook to consider promptly its contents and formally respond to this initiative in September, 1980.

On education, Nigeria and the United States agreed to encourage increased cooperation between particular universities in faculty exchange and enrichment, collaborative research and joint degree programmes. In these endeavors, both the Fulbright Programme and other suitable institutional arrangements will be utilized.

As a means of enhancing Technical Teacher Education and manpower development in Nigeria, both sides intend to sign an agreement which will involve Technical Teacher Training in both the United States and Nigeria. This agreement will be concluded within the next month.

It was agreed that the further establishment of linkages between Nigerian and American institutions of higher education is of great mutual advantage. Means of funding such linkages was then discussed extensively. At the end of the discussion, the Nigerian side asked the American side to review all possible means of such funding, including Title XII of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 so amended. The U.S. side agreed to initiate such a review.

In the area of recruitment of faculty for higher education, the two sides agreed to work together to facilitate and to improve selection of U.S. professors to teach in Nigeria. It was agreed that further Fulbright awards in broad scientific fields would be added through funds from the N.U.C. supplementation budget.

The U.S. side welcomes the Nigerian intention to send education attaches to the Nigerian consulates in the USA to strengthen the educational services provided by those consulates, thereby improving educational cooperation between the two countries. The American side will explore ways to strengthen its official representation in Nigeria with persons who are more knowledgeable about higher education in the United States and in Nigeria.

Finally, the two sides agreed to explore ways of ensuring that recipients of Nigerian government scholarships return to Nigeria at the completion of their studies.

The two delegations noted that the discussions had taken place in a cordial atmosphere and renewed their confidence that these consultations would lead to better understanding and fruitful cooperation between their two countries.

Finally, it was decided that the next round of talks will take place in Washington in 1981 at a date to be agreed upon.

¹Texts from the Vice President's press secretary.

²Lists of the U.S. and Nigerian delegations not printed here. ■

America's Strength: Ideals and Military Power

by Secretary Muskie

Address before the G.I. Forum in Los Angeles on August 7, 1980.¹

I'm glad to be here. And I want to begin by saluting some remarkable Americans: first, Dr. Hector Garcia, one of democracy's freedom fighters, who not only founded this organization but forged it into a powerful, creative, insistent voice for a better America; second, Lupe Saldana, a Marine Captain in Vietnam, chairman of the G.I. Forum, and a leader of Hispanic Americans whose counsel is sought—and heeded—in the White House; and third, the entire membership of this remarkable organization. You have always believed that America was good enough to be better. And you have helped assure Hispanic Americans that their cause will have powerful support—in the armed services, in veterans affairs, in government, and in the making of foreign policy.

One of my goals as Secretary of State is to attract more young people to careers in the Foreign Service from groups that are underrepresented there: Hispanic- and Asian-Americans, black people and women, and others to whom opportunities in the past have too often been closed.

I want to do this not as a favor to them but as a favor to our country. I believe that such people—the son of a Polish tailor, the grandson of a slave, the granddaughter of a migrant worker—can help enrich our foreign policy and improve our standing in the world, for they bring with them some special qualities: closeness to other cultures, sensitivity to the pain of poverty and injustice, and a special enthusiasm for the power of democracy to unlock human potential and improve human life. And so my goal is to make affirmative action in the U.S. Department of State an accomplished reality—and I invite you to help me meet that goal.

For a few minutes today, I want to talk about America's strength, for I cannot think of any group that better understands how this strength is twofold. It is found in America's military power. And it is found in the strength of the ideas America stands for—in our commitment to justice and human rights.

I have a strong sense, as I stand here, that this audience itself says more about that subject than any speech of

mine can express. For the story of this G.I. Forum is a story of military valor war—and of devotion, in peace and war to America's best values. You have demanded that America fulfill the dream you have fought for. You have championed the cause of an America that is both strong and decent, and you have believed that America could be both.

I share that belief. And today, as we enter a season of intense debate about America's purpose in the world, I want to talk about what will be required if we are to keep America strong in its defense and steadfast in its pursuit of decent purposes in the world.

National Defense

First—and fundamental—is a strong military defense. Let no one whose purpose is political advantage tell you that America is weak or growing weaker—that is not true.

It is true that over the past 20 years our chief potential adversary, the Soviet Union, has been building its military forces massively and relentlessly, in every category from nuclear missiles to naval forces, and at tremendous economic cost.

It is true that the Soviet Union has shown itself, over the past few years, eager to assert itself as a global power and all too willing to disturb the peace with Cuban proxy forces in Africa and with Soviet tanks in Afghanistan. But it is not true that President Carter and his Administration have neglected our side of the military balance.

Let's look at the record.

When this Administration took office, we inherited a military posture and a defense budget that simply had not kept pace. In the 8 years preceding President Carter's inauguration, real defense spending, after inflation, had declined more than 35%. In particular, our spending on strategic nuclear weapons had declined by 20%.

It was soon clear to President Carter that only by changing course could we prevent the growing Soviet military capability from surpassing our own; or by increasing our efforts could we pre-

ent a dangerous Soviet military superiority in the future.

So this Administration, since taking office, has increased real defense spending every year. Already this has resulted in an overall increase of 10%. And under our 5-year defense plan, real defense spending will have increased more than 7% by 1985. That is not a story of declining strength; it is a story of growing strength.

And President Carter has devoted this Administration to increasing our strength in every category.

- To improve the nation's strategic nuclear arsenal, we are developing the MX missile on land, the Trident II system at sea, and the cruise missile for our bomber fleet.
- To improve our conventional capabilities, we are developing the rapid deployment force and arranging new basing privileges around the world.
- And to improve the capabilities of our NATO alliance, we have led our partners to develop a long-term defense plan, to increase real defense spending by at least 3% a year, and to modernize NATO's long-range nuclear missiles in the European theater.

Does this sound like a winding down of America's defense capabilities? Of course not. It is, in fact, a buildup—a buildup of funding and equipment, a buildup of strength. It is a buildup aimed at improving quality, not piling up mere quantity. And President Carter has accomplished this buildup without sacrificing this nation's commitment to look after its own people—to help the poor, to heal the sick, to educate our young people, and to care for our old people in retirement. I think this is a record to be proud of.

And while he has worked to build up our strength, President Carter has also pursued, in the name of increased security for America, a process pursued by presidents Johnson, Nixon, and Ford: negotiations aimed at prudent, balanced arms control. The SALT II Treaty is in America's interest. It will serve our security interests by preventing an uncontrolled arms race. It deserves your support. And it deserves to be ratified by the U.S. Senate.

So that is the record of our efforts to protect America's security. It is a record that is clear, consistent, prudent, and practical.

It stands in contrast to the rhetoric of those who sow panic about American defenses in order to reap political profit. They ask for a blank check for massive

military spending but call at the same time for a massive tax cut. They say that they are for arms control but against SALT II. Well, I say they can't have it both ways. I have been in public life for nearly 30 years, and I know partisan doubletalk when I hear it.

I prefer—and I believe you prefer—a record of achievement to the rhetoric of a campaign. I believe the record I have outlined deserves your confidence.

And you have a basis for confidence beyond our record in building America's military strength, for this Administration has moved to assure that the might of our arms is matched by the power of our ideals; that our arsenals are maintained not simply to buttress America's power but to defend values which resound all over the world.

We are defending our values in our strong response to aggression against Afghanistan. We are defending our values when we promote peace among nations and the human rights of individuals. Without our strength, our values might be in danger. But without these values, our strength would be empty.

Let me tell you what I mean when I speak of a foreign policy based on values.

American Values and Foreign Policy

To begin with, this Administration believes in dealing with other nations on a basis of mutual respect.

Several years ago, the G.I. Forum gave its support to a vital reflection of this principle—the new Panama Canal Treaty. That treaty, which acknowledged Panama's right to operate the Panama Canal, came under fierce attack. There were many in this country who thought it folly to deal with tiny Panama on terms of equality and respect. Some might even try to reverse this step if they were given half a chance.

But President Carter and his Administration stood up for the agreement; he saw it through to ratification. He did it not only because the treaty was important to our future access to the canal and to our relations with Panama; not just to calm a dispute that threatened the canal's security. He did it because that treaty said something to the rest of the world about America. It said that America was willing to make and abide by a fair agreement with Panama that benefited both nations. It said that America was

prepared to establish a relationship based on bargaining, not on bullying.

In today's world, we are well served by that message—in our relations in this hemisphere and in our ability to work with other nations toward goals we share. And today, our treatment of a smaller neighbor stands in stark contrast to the continuing Soviet assault on the free people of Afghanistan.

Another value we uphold is peace. And so this Administration has worked tenaciously to build peace in troubled regions of the world.

In the Middle East our efforts still have great obstacles to overcome. But we have come a long way. There is peace between Egypt and Israel—an historic accomplishment. And the Camp David accords between Israel and Egypt also represent an historic beginning. We must not waver there, in patience or in persistence.

In southern Africa, patience and persistence have also been rewarded. The people of Rhodesia—now the new nation of Zimbabwe—today enjoy peace, a government based on majority rule, and an authentic chance for a stable future. All this is possible, in part, because the United States worked hard to support a negotiated solution to Rhodesia's racial war. Here again, President Carter did not bend his support for a real settlement—and the results vindicate his policy.

Another value the United States stands for in the world is economic and social progress for the world's poor nations and the world's poor people.

It is a stark fact of our time that millions of people are sick and hungry—in Africa, in Asia, and close to home in Latin America.

Our economic aid programs—in the face of these overwhelming human needs and spiraling energy costs—are at best modest. They deserve your support, for they work. They are essential if we want a foreign policy that is active and effective. How ironic it is that some of the loudest demands for wider American influence in the world come from the same people who consistently vote against American involvement in the world, who vote against programs to help nations and people break the shackles of poverty.

We will continue to resist those who vote against these programs, and we need your help, for this Administration believes that the real way to build our influence and to stave off violence in the world is to help people meet their basic human needs: energy, food and agriculture, education and health. We intend to

be on the side of helping ordinary people build self-sufficient lives. In the process we will serve our own interest in building a more stable world.

We believe, quite simply, that even in a turbulent world, we must be loyal to our values—at home and abroad. We must stand for democracy and human dignity, for free speech and free institutions.

Human Rights

American human rights policy does not displace our other international interests. Indeed, it serves those interests. It underscores the contrast between us and our adversaries. It encourages our friends to build stronger, freer societies. And it aligns the United States with the tide in favor of human rights which is running in the world.

In our own hemisphere, we have seen that tide surge in Ecuador and Peru, in the new human rights emphasis of the Organization of American States and the Andean pact nations. We have seen tragic setbacks, as in Bolivia last month. But we believe that the broad trend is in favor of human freedom, and the United States should be on the leading edge of that trend.

Perhaps most important of all, our human rights policy reflects the character of the American nation and the best qualities of the American people.

As the agenda of your meeting here makes clear, we have a great deal left to do. We have a long way to go before all Americans enjoy a fair stake in our economy and our political life.

We intend to make the State Department a part of that process. My predecessor as Secretary of State, Cy Vance, launched a number of wise and hopeful precedents. He called for stepped-up recruitment of Hispanics; he held meetings with Hispanic-American leaders to seek their counsel. The Department held its first Hispanic conference last October. I intend to continue and build on these efforts. And I urge you to give me your insights, your participation, and your advice, for by living up to our best values at home can we strengthen our position abroad.

For years, you have been helping your government do just that. The evidence lies in one of the truly great stories of America's battle against discrimination.

When a funeral home in Texas refused to give Private Felix Longoria a military burial in an "Anglo" cemetery, Dr. Hector Garcia and the G.I. Forum

The U.S. and Its Allies: New Patterns of Cooperation

*Address before the Commonwealth Club of California and the World Affairs Council of Northern California in San Francisco, August 8, 1980, and a question-and-answer session following the address.*¹

When the President asked me to become the new Secretary of State, he assured me that there wouldn't be too much traveling. Since then I've been to Brussels and Vienna; to Venice, Ankara, and Kuala Lumpur; and to Japan—twice.

The traveling is not bad, actually. There's a similarity, I've found, between foreign travel and the seniority system in the Senate: They're both tastes that grow on you.

Partly by circumstance, but in larger part by choice, I have spent a fair portion of my time over the past 2½ months—both in these travels and at home—on the relationship between the United States and its major allies. I have done so because I deeply believe, as I have throughout my public career, that the strength and cohesion of our alliances are vital to our well-being as Americans.

This morning, I want to share some thoughts with you about our basic alliances—their condition today and their direction for the future.

My own public career began when our postwar security alliances—particularly NATO and our alliance with Japan—were being formed. From that time to this, there has scarcely been a moment when the strength of these partnerships was not being questioned.

Journalistic and other building inspectors regularly have examined our alliances and found them endangered—by "hairline cracks," sometimes by "gaping holes." They describe these problems with words like "disarray." Those same assertions are with us now.

It might be possible to base a re-

became the champions of this dead soldier's rights. They took their cause to Washington. And on January 11, 1949, Senator Lyndon B. Johnson sent a telegram to Dr. Garcia that included these words: "This injustice and prejudice is deplorable. I am happy to have a part in seeing that this hero is laid to rest with the honor and dignity his service deserves." Soon afterward, Private Felix Longoria was buried, with full military honors, on a hillside in Arlington National

response solely on the very real and broad agreement that was evident at the Venice summit and the meeting of NATO Ministers in Ankara. But I don't want to indulge in the rhetoric of blanket reassurance. The fact is that there are differences among us.

Nor do I offer the rhetoric of re-elimination. From time to time, tension among free allies is understandable. We and our allies are now confronting new challenges as well as the old—challenges to our interests outside our alliance boundaries and others that arise from our growing economic interdependence.

Our common goals are enduring. We are joined to preserve our democratic way of life, by deterring war and also by working to lessen tensions between ourselves and our adversaries. But as we pursue those abiding central objectives, our patterns of cooperation must be broadened.

Beyond our collective defense, it has always been desirable for us and our allies to coordinate our actions elsewhere in the world. Today, however, that broader cooperation is not only desirable; it is indispensable. For we have reached a new era. We live in a time when central interests of the industrial democracies are touched not only by threatening military power on adjacent borders but by the reality of more distant aggression. It is an era when economic policy as well as military strategy profoundly affect our security interests, when we must concern ourselves with both the direct threat of armed attack and the conditions which breed turbulence in the developing world. And it is an era in which the defense of common Western interests increasingly requires a concerted Western response.

The challenges of this new era must be met. The industrial democracies must fashion a coordinated response to challenging events beyond our alliance areas.

Cemetery with his brother heroes.

For several decades now, in that spirit, you have championed respect and fair treatment for your fellow citizens— young and old, the living and the dead. You have stood for an America that is powerful but whose power always serves decent ends. What you stand for is what we stand for. So let us work together, now and in the future.

¹ Press release 212 of Aug. 8, 1980. ■

we do not, the consequences can be severe. In all our nations, confidence in our alliances and in each other can erode. And if we were to let short-term national concerns divert us from meeting shared strategic challenges—as in Afghanistan—we would risk our future security.

There have been tensions, in recent months, as we and our allies put together our responses to aggression in Afghanistan and terrorism in Tehran. But the differences we have had should not obscure a central fact. In the actions we are fashioning, we are also creating new patterns of cooperation. This process has generated considerable noise. But, in large measure, the sounds we hear are the sounds of construction.

Let us first be clear about the basic strength that is at the hard core of these relationships.

Our alliances are succeeding in their fundamental purpose—the collective defense of their collective territory. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has endured more than 30 years of peace. Because it could defeat aggression against Western Europe, NATO has deterred that aggression. In the process NATO has shown remarkable resilience and growth.

- We have successfully managed far-reaching adjustments in strategic doctrine, from the era of massive retaliation to a more realistic strategy—one of flexible response to the full range of dangers in our face.

- In June 1978, NATO adopted the Long-Term Defense Program to remedy weaknesses in our defense and build for the future.

- The NATO allies have committed themselves to a goal of 3% real growth in defense spending each year.

- NATO is responding effectively to the presence of new Soviet nuclear weapons in the European theater with new systems of our own and with an offer to negotiate truly equal limits on these weapons with the Soviets.

These are the efforts of a defense alliance vigorously meeting its basic purpose—strong and stalwart defenses.

The same is true in the Pacific. Our strategic relationship with Japan is growing. And our ANZUS relationship with Australia and New Zealand is strong.

So we begin with the fact that our major peacekeeping relationships, on both sides of the world, are working. They are solid. They are progressing. They are doing what they were created to do—detering aggression.

New Realities

Nevertheless, it would be folly to ignore the new realities which now press us to shape new patterns of cooperation. One of those new realities is exemplified by the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan.

In recent years, the military reach of the Soviet Union has extended to the Third World. Afghanistan is the most recent, and the most dramatic, evidence of growing Soviet military activism in the developing world.

By proximity and by precedent, the Soviet invasion has escalated the threat to energy supplies and trade routes vital to the United States and its allies. And it clearly demonstrates that there are new challenges to Western interests beyond immediate alliance boundaries.

A second new reality is the improved economic and political stature of our allies. The United States still holds the strategic umbrella. But gathered beneath that umbrella is a group of increasingly prosperous and powerful nations. The problems this development creates are a little like the tax problems of a multimillionaire—they are difficult, but they are the sort of problems you wouldn't mind having.

Strong partners deserve serious consultation; there will be no automatic acquiescence in American decisions. That fact may be unsettling to those who long for the days when America might dominate our allies. But the change is a fact nonetheless.

That decisions are now debated with vigor is not a sign of an alliance grown weak; it is a sign of allies grown stronger.

It is also a reality that our economic and political interests are not always identical. To many Americans, for example, detente may be an abstraction—a commonsense policy, but one that is remote from daily life. To the people of West Germany, on the other hand, the degree of tension between East and West has a direct bearing on everyday concerns. The opportunity to visit loved ones, the chance for Germans in the East to emigrate, the daily conditions in Berlin—all of these are at stake.

And there are other differences. For example, the dependence of the nations of Europe and Japan on outside energy sources is heavier than ours. Such differences in perspective must be accommodated as common positions are reached.

We in the United States need to be sensitive to the special concerns and vulnerabilities of our allies. At the same time, our allies must accept the growing responsibility that comes with growing

strength. They must be prepared to bear their share of our common burdens.

The beginning of wisdom is to recognize these realities frankly and to use them as the basis for new patterns of cooperation.

Let me briefly describe how I see those patterns evolving.

Managing East-West Relations

The first area is our common strategy for managing East-West relations. The foundation of that strategy, today as in the past, must be an unquestioned military deterrent. For deterrence continues to be the cornerstone of the peace we intend to preserve.

The contribution our NATO partners make to our collective defense is not sufficiently recognized here at home. Our partners provide nearly half of NATO defense spending, almost 60% of its armed forces, about 75% of its tanks, more than 90% of its armored divisions.

But in the face of steady growth in Soviet military power, we and our allies are compelled to muster even greater defense efforts. These new burdens must be shared fairly and equitably.

As we in the United States significantly increase our own defense spending, we will expect our allies to fulfill their pledge to increase their own spending by 3% annually. And as the United States takes the lead to protect shared allied interests in the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia, our allies will shoulder a greater share of NATO's strength in Europe. In short, as we do what is needed to maintain a military balance, we will continue to call upon our allies to assume defense burdens commensurate with their prosperity, influence, and strength.

A common strategy toward East-West relations also requires a concerted political response to Soviet actions around the world.

The industrial democracies must make it unmistakably clear to the Soviet leaders that adventures such as that in Afghanistan carry genuine costs in our direct relations. As the President said in Venice, Europe cannot be an "island of detente" while aggression is carried out elsewhere. For that would simply invite new adventures and new crises, in Europe or elsewhere.

We must be prepared to hold to our course on Afghanistan for as long as that assault on national freedom continues. If allied nations or their business firms step in where the United States and American

The Secretary

corporations have stood aside, that breach of confidence and cooperation will undermine here the public support on which a strong alliance is based.

Sustained as well as strong allied actions are necessary to gain Soviet restraint. And that restraint is necessary to progress in East-West relations. Thus, detente and deterrence are inseparable parts of the same parcel.

For that reason, progress on another front is also critically important to allied cohesion. Along with sustained firmness, a common allied strategy toward the Soviet Union depends upon our genuine willingness to seek concrete agreements that serve Western interests—particularly sensible restraints on the arms race.

If we—and here I speak primarily of the United States—turn away from our commitment to steady arms control progress, the strength and unity of our alliances genuinely will be shaken. Indeed, it is hard to conceive of a more serious blow.

Let us have no illusions: The key to future arms control is ratification of the SALT II Treaty.

Under that treaty all of the strategic programs we have planned can go forward. But without it, by 1985 we could face 700-800 more Soviet missiles and bombers than we would if the treaty were in force.

Without it, there would be nothing to stop the Soviets from placing 20 or 30 more nuclear warheads on each of their heavy missiles instead of 10 under the treaty.

Without it, the Soviets would be free to conceal their strategic programs from observation by our satellites and other monitoring devices. We would know less about the future threats we might face.

Of course, we would do whatever was necessary to meet an increased threat. But the arms race will not stand still during more prolonged talks to control it. It never has and never will. And anyone who claims we can negotiate a better agreement without first nailing down SALT II is selling a bill of goods.

Afghanistan unquestionably has made the task of ratification harder. It has not made it one iota less important to our national interests, not one iota less crucial to maintaining a common strategy of East-West relations with our allies.

Economic Issues

A second and related area in which U.S.-allied cooperation must grow is in our overall approach to the developing world.

I am not suggesting some conspiracy of industrial nations where the strong impose their will upon the rest of the world. Those days are over. They shouldn't be mourned. But it is in our common interest to work together to address the root causes of instability and conflict before they explode.

It is in our interest to help Third World governments fight poverty and disease and hopelessness before frustrations build to the boiling point. It is in our interest to provide sensible levels of security assistance where that will help them to defend their independence from outside threats. And it is in our interest to work in harmony as we seek practical, negotiated solutions to disputes in troubled regions of the world such as the Middle East.

Finally, our relationship with our allies will increasingly be shaped by economic issues. For the economic currents that shape our daily lives flow throughout the industrial world.

On energy, will we act as cutthroat competitors for scarce oil—or will we act together, as fellow consumers, to reduce our dependence and foster stability and restraint in the market?

On trading, will we slide into a new protectionist spiral—or will we continue to build patterns of trade that are both free and fair?

On economic policy, will each of us simply pursue temporary advantage—or will we coordinate our domestic economic actions to serve our overall, long-term interests?

The future of allied relationships will be determined as much by how these questions are answered—by the degree of our economic cooperation—as by the shape of our military cooperation.

That we need to do all these things is clear; that we will do them, however, is by no means ordained.

It could be that the industrial democracies will allow our divergent interests and our individual problems to drive us apart. Or we can build on the new patterns of cooperation that are taking shape.

- To a greater extent than before, the industrial nations are coordinating their domestic as well as their international energy and economic policies.

- The NATO allies have stood firm against extraordinary Soviet pressure to reverse our course on theater nuclear modernization.

- Over the past few years, the

Western democracies have shown an unprecedented degree of cooperation toward resolving dangerous regional disputes, in Rhodesia and Namibia.

- The industrial democracies have joined together in a massive aid program for Turkey.

- While we sought broader measures, the fact is that our allies have joined us in imposing economic sanctions on Iran for holding Americans hostage.

- And the Venice summit and the NATO meeting in Ankara demonstrated the essential unity of the allies in insisting on a total—not cosmetic—Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. The Soviets should not mistake that resolve.

New allied patterns of cooperation are still emerging. More—much more—clearly must be done. We must avoid backsliding on the gains we have made in recent months.

I have no doubt that there will continue to be differences and disagreement among us in the months and years ahead. The United States will vigorously pursue its point of view at such times. But we should bring to such moments a sense of the larger progress to be made.

Those who doubt that this progress is possible should contrast the present with past moments—moments when the noise the world heard was not the noise of construction underway but the gears of allied cooperation grinding to a halt. Consider the Suez Crisis of 1956, when the United States found itself in opposition to its principal allies, Britain and France—or the Vietnam period.

We should also recall some fundamental realities.

The great industrial nations, for all their economic problems, are the well-springs of the world's prosperity. They are the source of the ideas, the technical genius, and the organizing ability that not only provide much of the world's goods but also hold the greatest hope for humanity's progress.

And with all their imperfections, our nations are the principal guardians of the democratic heritage. Ours are systems which believe in and seek to promote the dignity of the individual, the independence of nations, and the consent of the governed.

Possessing such assets and such values, we and our allies need fear neither our current differences, nor for our common future.

Q. Begin's hard line with regard to Jerusalem threatens to scuttle the Camp David talks and to alienate the United States from Arab friends on which we are critically dependent. Why isn't the United States more effectively use its considerable economic leverage over Israel to temper Begin's demands and force resolution of this issue?

A. The course of action suggested by the question would undoubtedly abort the Camp David process. There is a tendency, when countries are divided by deeply national issues as Egypt and Israel obviously are, to act unilaterally, to speak unilaterally, to respond to the emotional pressures of their constituencies, and to complicate the environment in which direct negotiations are being conducted. I think that dealing with a complicated negotiating process of this kind is something like playing golf: You've got to keep your head down, concentrate on the ball and slow down your backswing. I think there are no golfers in the audience. [Laughter] And perhaps it's not an analogy.

There is a temptation, not only with respect to this international problem but others, that because the United States is a superpower, it can, by the application of its power in one form or another, impose settlements, solutions, or policies upon those who are less strong or who are dependent upon us in one way or another. That would not work. There are all sorts of efforts to divert the world's attention from the Camp David process and the autonomy negotiations that are under way in accordance with that process.

I regret the unilateral actions that have been taken by both sides as these negotiations go forward, and the United States has indicated its concern when such unilateral actions are taken, whether on the Egyptian side or the Israeli side. In recent days, the increasing escalation of such actions creates danger for the process—and we've said that to both sides privately, and we've said it publicly.

I'm also asked from time to time, "Why doesn't the United States, in the negotiations, develop its own plan and impose it on the parties?" Well, there are a number of problems with that—in the first place, summoning up the wisdom to know what that plan should be. In considering that, considering the associated questions, how can we be sure that our plan, however wisely perceived and with whatever clarity our crystal ball gives us, will be acceptable not only by the two parties immediately involved in the negotiations but others who must, at some point, be

brought into the negotiations because their rights are also the subject of the negotiation?

I think the problems associated with that approach are obvious. So, what we have tried to do with this negotiating process is to develop the process to the point where the parties are forced to consider the fundamental and difficult issues that must be resolved if an agreement on Palestinian autonomy is to be reached. They are at that point. They have discussed all of the other authorities that a self-governing authority, as it is referred to in the Camp David process, would have to have in dealing with the day-to-day lives of those who are subject to its writ.

With respect to the issues—such as the nature of the self-governing authority; its powers; the question of how internal as well as external security in the area is to be handled and how the responsibility for it is to be divided; how the relatively scarce water resources of the area are to be shared; what will be the franchise of Arabs living in East Jerusalem, which Arabs regard as being part of the West Bank, and Israelis regard, as is obvious from recent events, as an integral part of the territory of Israel; what is the political status of Arabs living in East Jerusalem—these very difficult questions, these and one or two others, are the questions that are being considered.

When the talks resumed following the last pause, which you will remember was triggered by Israeli actions bearing upon the status of Jerusalem, both parties returned to the talks with a very constructive and positive attitude. There was great hope on the part of Ambassador Linowitz, [Personal Representative of the President to the Middle East Peace Negotiations] who is conducting the negotiations on our side—great hope that, finally, progress was being made.

Whether or not there will be another pause, and if so, how long it may continue, and what the impact upon the viability of the Camp David process may be are all appropriate subjects for speculation. And I don't have the answers for that.

But if the talks should collapse, if these negotiations should collapse, then what will we turn to? There is the pre-Sadat Jerusalem visit, with unpredictable impacts upon the treaty already signed by Egypt and Israel, with unpredictable questions about the relationships between Egypt and Israel as well as the rest of the Arab world.

Can one expect that if the Camp

David talks collapse the level of violence on the West Bank will be reduced or enhanced? Will mischiefmaking with respect to the security rights of Israel and the rights of Palestinians be enhanced in the United Nations?

Is it likely that another formula designed in such a way that it will implement itself without negotiations can be devised? Or isn't it a fact, whether or not these negotiations succeed, that negotiations at some point will be essential to resolve the questions raised by this age-old enmity?

We think our best chance is these autonomy talks, and we don't think they can succeed if we use them as a way to impose our notion of what the settlement ought to be. That we ought to contribute to the development of ideas that are considered in the negotiating talks I think goes without saying, and that has happened. But it is not in the form of an imposition of an American view or plan upon the negotiating parties.

Q. Is the locating of medium-range ballistic missiles in NATO countries mute confirmation that the United States is no longer committed to respond to a Soviet conventional assault in Europe with its nuclear ICBMs?

A. No, I would not think that is the case. We always, in our defense arrangements with our NATO allies, included tactical nuclear weapons of one kind or another, theater nuclear weapons of one kind or another. But the Soviets have been in the process now of deploying a modern and very effective theater nuclear weapon aimed at Europe, the SS-20, and that program of deployment is well on its way and will be completed in late 1982 if present trends continue. So the question that confronted NATO was whether or not, in the absence of an agreement on the limitation of such theater nuclear weapons, to modernize its own theater nuclear resources.

The allies concluded in December of last year that that was essential, that the growth of the Soviet threat to them, the nuclear threat in that theater, required—and common sense required—that we modernize. That decision was taken, but it was in two parts: first, the decision to deploy; and second, the offer to negotiate with the Russians controls on such theater nuclear weapons in order to stabilize the nuclear side of the East-West military confrontation in Europe.

The Russians' insistence that the European decision to deploy such weapons must be reversed before they would

be willing to engage in talks has been dropped, and we are on the verge of beginning preliminary exchanges with the Russians on talks dealing with theater nuclear weapons which may conceivably broaden in the other areas.

Q. In Los Angeles yesterday you stated that we won't get into an arms race but we will have a defensive capability second to none. Isn't the commitment to the MX missile a new step in the arms race?

A. As I said in my comments today, the buildup of arms continues even in the course of talks designed to stabilize the arms race, and that has been the history of the last 10 years or more during which the SALT process has been under way. Until we reach agreements, neither side has been willing to suspend the development of its own technology to put in place in the event the talks should fail. So the momentum that is generated by that ongoing arms competition is a serious block because, as the technology race proceeds, the technology of nuclear weapons becomes more complicated and more difficult to reach agreement for stabilizing.

I can remember, for example, in my Senate career, the debate over whether or not we ought to MIRV our missiles. As you know, MIRVing added multiple, independently targetable warheads on single missiles. That was a breakthrough, and with our decision to deploy it—which I opposed at the time because I thought that once we deployed it, the Russians would find it necessary then to develop their own MIRVs, which of course they have done—the arms race escalated, as a result, to a higher level to which we now have to seek stabilization before we can even talk about reduction. So the time it takes to reach agreement and the events which delay implementation of agreements provide time for a continuation of the arms competition.

The arms race I referred to yesterday was that this arms competition—and I've used that word today—that is ongoing now will be escalated into an all-out arms race if the objective of each side is to achieve nuclear superiority over the other—because obviously neither of the superpowers is going to be willing to be frozen into a position of nuclear inferiority in some SALT treaty of the future.

Only an agreement that is based upon essential equivalence has any chance of being agreed to by both parties, and only such agreement will avoid the prospect of the kind of unrestrained arms race to which I was referring yesterday.

Q. How are you and Dr. Brzezinski [Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs] getting along? [Laughter]

A. Well, as someone said earlier in our relationship, we have a fine bipolar relationship. [Laughter] We have no difficulties. I have none, and I'm not aware that he does. Foreign policy making is not a one-person process in this or any other Administration. There are other agencies which impact upon our relationships with other nations, the Department of Defense more than any of them. The press and public don't focus on that very much. But we have ongoing discussions between the defense ministries of the West that have obvious implications for foreign policy in ways that may not be anticipated when discussions are going on at the defense ministerial level.

The Department of Commerce, the Department of Energy, our Trade Representative—there are a number of agencies and persons who are involved in affecting foreign policy in one way or another, and I think we need to better coordinate all of that. I have that as a very strong impression after 90 days.

My concern with coordinating foreign policy and identifying the principal figures responsible for it has broadened far beyond Dr. Brzezinski and the National Security Council. We've had no confrontations up to this point. It is conceivable that we might because we are both strong-minded individuals; we both have definite ideas; we both seek access to the President; and it's my job to make sure that the Secretary of State doesn't take second place, that's all. It's that simple.

Q. Now that you are viewing the process from the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue, do you believe that intense congressional scrutiny is a constructive factor in the development of foreign policy? [Laughter]

A. I think it can be if their constituents are intensely scrutinizing their decisions on foreign policy. That is one of the reasons that I have engaged on this nationwide campaign to discuss foreign policy with constituents. Not that I want to end-run Congress, but because I think, as in the case of domestic policy, our policy is more likely to be wise, perceptive, and supported by our people if our people understand it. If you understand it, I'm sure from my 22 years of experience in the Senate, Congressmen will find a way to understand it.

¹ Press releases 213 and 213A. ■

Review of Discussions Abroad

Secretary Muskie's statement before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on July 30, 1980.¹

I find myself coming before you with the chronic complaint of a Secretary of State a great deal of territory to cover in a very short time. In fact, that has been the story of my life over the past 2½ months. Today I want to bring you up to date on my activities—particularly my recent discussions abroad.

Before I turn to those travels, however, let me say a few words about three matters which shaped those discussions: the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan; the holding of American hostages in Iran; and the negotiating process in the Middle East.

Afghanistan

First, Afghanistan. I need not dwell on the history. The President and others have made our view clear: The Soviet invasion is not only an assault on the people of Afghanistan; it also assaults fundamental principles of international order and decency. It raises serious potential threats to world peace and to vital Western interests in the Persian Gulf area.

For all these reasons, the United States has reacted firmly. We imposed restrictions on grain, high technology, and phosphate exports to the Soviet Union. We boycotted the Moscow Olympics and helped persuade 59 other countries do likewise. We have encouraged and joined the widespread condemnation of the Soviet invasion by the international community. We have called for a complete withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan and for a political solution to the crisis.

What should be the elements of such a political settlement? In our view, four are essential:

- A prompt and complete withdrawal of all Soviet forces;
- Nonintervention in Afghan internal affairs by any outside state;
- A government acceptable to the Afghan people; and finally,
- An independent and nonaligned Afghanistan.

We are prepared to explore transitional arrangements aimed at restoring

place to Afghanistan. Such arrangements could be implemented along with the prompt withdrawal of Soviet troops.

But we see no indication that the Soviet Union is interested in anything other than imposing its military grip upon that country. Our judgment is that the "withdrawal" announced last month is only a partial redeployment of troops—mostly of units not suitable to this kind of war. The Soviet announcement has not been followed by any steps which indicate that the Soviets are prepared to discuss a political solution. Indeed, if anything, the fighting appears to have intensified in recent days. The resistance of the Afghan people continues to grow.

So we believe it is essential to keep up the pressure; to maintain the sanctions; to impose continuing costs upon the Soviet Union for its aggression. We will continue to urge other nations to stand with us. And we will continue to draw attention and seek support for the plight of more than 1 million Afghan refugees now homeless in Pakistan and Iran.

Iran the continued holding of American hostages and continuing revolutionary chaos contribute further to instability in the region and prolong the crisis between our two countries. Iran's leadership is diverted by this manufactured crisis from dealing with the real threats to its independence and security.

At this point, we simply cannot say what, if any, effect the recent death of the Shah might have on the situation. Key Iranian leaders, however, say that this will have no impact on their decision to release the hostages. We continue to press, through every avenue open to us, for an early release of the hostages. And we continue to impose economic sanctions designed to impress upon Iran's leaders the costs of the crisis to their own interests. Most of Iran's major trading partners have broadly supported a policy of isolating Iran.

At the same time, we have made it clear that once our hostages are free, we and the world stand ready to deal with Iran on a basis of mutual respect. It is the holding of hostages that keeps Iran from enjoying better relations in the world.

The new Iranian Parliament is organizing. We can have some hope that if the internal power struggle within Iran can be resolved somewhat, the outlook for release of the hostages will improve. In the days and in the weeks ahead, we will use

every diplomatic source to urge Iranian leaders to end the crisis.

I wish I could report that the recent release of Richard Queen has hopeful implications for the other 52 hostages. In fact, however, we simply can't speculate. We are encouraged that the Iranian authorities looked with compassion on the plight of one hostage; we hope that they will see the fundamental human dimension of the entire situation and move quickly to release the remaining 52.

Iranian leaders have said they have no quarrel with the *people* of America. But they must realize that as long as the hostages are held, it is the people of America who demand their release. It is people like Richard Queen and his family who have suffered and who will rejoice when the crisis has ended.

Middle East

A third area of continuing concern is the Middle East. The Camp David accords of 1978 represent an historic step toward peace. The treaty between Egypt and Israel continues to bear fruit; it has diminished the danger of war in the Middle East.

As we expected, the negotiations concerning autonomy for the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza have proved difficult and complex. But there are hopeful signs. Our negotiating team has been in the region, engaged with the Israelis and the Egyptians in intensive discussions of legal, economic, and security issues as well as the broad outlines of an agreement. In these talks, both sides have demonstrated a new seriousness of purpose and a willingness to consider fresh approaches to the difficult issues that remain.

If the talks continue in this positive way, we expect that the heads of delegation will meet again with Ambassador Linowitz [Personal Representative of the President for the Middle East Peace Negotiations] toward the middle of August. We will continue to do all in our power in the months ahead to bring about an agreement on autonomy for the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza: an agreement which must take full account of Israel's security concerns and which must also lead to a significant and genuine change in the situation of the Palestinians.

In seeking to advance real negotiating opportunities, we will be firm in our stand against one-sided resolutions on the Middle East at the United Nations, such as the one just put forward at the special session of the General Assembly. That resolution was totally unbalanced. It did

not acknowledge Resolution 242 as the basis for a peace settlement. It did not recognize Israel's right to exist. We voted against it and were pleased that a substantial number of other members felt they could not support the resolution. Such efforts will not bring us any closer to peace.

Another principle clearly applies to our negotiating effort. It is this: While negotiations are being pursued, all of the parties must avoid unilateral actions designed to prejudice the outcome of the negotiations or that would have the effect of worsening the atmosphere for successful negotiations. No negotiations can succeed if one of the parties at the table attempts simultaneously to gain unilateral advantage on the ground.

If the parties should fail, or if the Camp David process should be derailed by misguided interventions, the consequences could be serious, indeed, for the interests of the entire world are deeply engaged in the Middle East. Continuing conflict in the region threatens those interests; threatens the future of our friends in the region; threatens intervention by outside powers—and threatens the peace of the world.

Recent Discussions

I begin by mentioning these three serious situations because they have formed the backdrop for many of my recent foreign policy discussions—and those of the President—here and abroad.

Venice. Afghanistan, for example, was clearly the most urgent political topic on the agenda at the recent summit meeting in Venice. I want to report briefly on the Venice meeting and on subsequent discussions in Ankara, where the NATO ministers gathered; in Kuala Lumpur, where I met with the foreign ministers of the Association of South East Asian Nations; and in Tokyo, where President Carter paid his respects to the late Prime Minister Ohira and met with Premier Hua Guofeng of China.

The most publicized results of the Venice summit were the joint economic and energy declarations made by the chiefs of state; indeed, economic and energy issues took up two of the three summit discussion periods. Energy, in fact, occupied more than 75% of the economic agenda. The result of the discussion was a strong, forthright, unambiguous agreement by the major industrial nations to pursue certain goals individually and in concert. The chiefs of state

agreed to work toward significant reductions within this decade in their dependence on foreign oil; to press major energy conservation efforts; and to use energy sources other than oil where possible—coal, nuclear, synthetic, and renewable energy sources.

The Venice discussions covered other economic topics also, principally inflation, the foreign exchange market, and the serious economic problems of the less developed countries.

I will not attempt to repeat what has already been said in the communiqués. Let me simply underscore what we see as the major achievement of these economic discussions. First, they represent a new departure—a concerted effort by the industrial nations to analyze their economic problems together and to set joint goals for solving them. Second, the communiqués are consistent with, and indeed reinforce, our own energy and economic policies.

The political discussions at Venice were marked by similar unity. On the eve of the summit, the Soviets announced their intended troop withdrawal. The Western response was prompt and firm. The leaders challenged the Soviet Union to undertake a complete, not cosmetic, withdrawal if it wished to heal the breach caused by the Afghanistan invasion.

Let me mention briefly another aspect of the Venice summit which was of great concern to the United States: the initiative of the European Community on the Middle East. The United States—before, during, and after the Venice meetings—has worked hard to make one point clear: that we welcome initiatives which support the Camp David process, and we strenuously discourage initiatives which might undermine that process.

Having made these points clear, I welcomed the statement of Italian Prime Minister Cossiga that the European Community wants to support the Camp David process. Last week, the nine European foreign ministers decided to ask Luxembourg Foreign Minister Thorn to undertake an exploratory mission to the Middle East. We understand that this is a fact-finding mission to enable the European Community to obtain a clearer picture of thinking in the Middle East on the peace process.

As that exploration goes forward, the position of the United States remains clear and firm: We believe the effort of the Europeans will be most constructive if it builds on the ongoing negotiations. We would welcome broader participation in those negotiations. But we believe it

would be a profound mistake to encourage a solution which cannot be negotiated or to ignore the central fact that the complex political realities are already being addressed in the autonomy negotiations.

Ankara. Immediately after the Venice summit, I flew to Ankara for the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council, the first such meeting in Turkey since 1960. In Ankara, I outlined as forcefully as I could the importance of the actions of our allies to our shared goal of deterring further Soviet aggression. After an extremely candid discussion, the ministers agreed on a tough, Afghanistan-focused communique which built on the Venice declaration.

I also took advantage of being in Ankara to meet with Turkish Prime Minister Demirel and Greek Foreign Minister Mitsotakis. I stressed to both the importance of strengthening NATO's southeastern wing; that to accomplish this, it is urgent that Greece resume active participation in NATO and that Greece and Turkey continue working to resolve their differences. They in turn affirmed their commitment to work toward these goals and, after the NATO ministerial meetings, the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers held lengthy discussions which I understand were quite positive.

Kuala Lumpur. Upon leaving Ankara, I traveled halfway around the world to Kuala Lumpur. There I met with the foreign ministers of the ASEAN nations: Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines, together with several other nations which support the dialogue with ASEAN—Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and Japan.

Those discussions took place in the wake of the Vietnamese attack across the Thai border, an attack we strongly condemned. I announced in Kuala Lumpur a series of concrete steps to bolster Thailand's defense. These included \$2 million in immediate economic aid, speedy delivery of tanks and other weapons, and improved credit terms to Thailand.

The 10 foreign ministers in Kuala Lumpur also issued a joint appeal to Secretary General Waldheim to use the prestige of his office to restore feeding operations to help thousands of desperate Kampuchean refugees on the Thai border. I reaffirmed our intention, subject to consultations with the Congress, to accept 168,000 refugees from Southeast Asia in FY 1981 to help relieve the enormous burden of first asylum borne by the ASEAN countries.

The Kuala Lumpur visit achieved

several purposes. It demonstrated the importance we attach to our relations in Asia. It solidified our growing relationship with ASEAN. And it demonstrated to Hanoi and Moscow our continued support for the independence and integrity of non-Communist Southeast Asia.

Tokyo. I returned home from Kuala Lumpur on June 29th. One July 9 I returned to the Pacific, to accompany President Carter to Tokyo for the funeral of President Ohira. In deference to Japan's official mourning, we scheduled no substantive talks with the Japanese. But I believe that the President's vivid demonstration of our respect for Prime Minister Ohira and for our Japanese friendship created enormous good will in our relations.

President Carter met in Tokyo, for the first time, with Premier Hua Guofeng of the People's Republic of China. That meeting was strikingly relaxed and cordial. It confirmed that the strategic view of our two countries converge at several important points. We agree, for example on the importance of support for nations pressured by aggression on their borders such as Thailand and Pakistan. And we agree that Chinese-American relations are making good progress.

Summary. The meetings I have described differed in many respects. But in summarizing them I believe we can find some common denominators.

First, while there unquestionably are differences between us and our friends and allies about how to respond, I have found striking agreement on both sides the world on one point: that the Soviet Union has set in motion forces and events which threaten world stability, which threaten the interests and the security free and independent nations, and which must be resisted. I believe I was able to impress upon my colleagues our intention to meet our responsibilities and the importance of their doing their part.

Second, I have found on both sides the world impressive support for the views and positions of the United States. The era of lockstep unity between the United States and its allies, to be sure, has passed. The strengthened economic and political power of the other industrial nations, and their perception of their own interests, made this inevitable. But to cast the current situation as "disarray" or "disunity" would be to misread profoundly the true state of our relations. The sum total of Venice and Ankara, and the other encounters I have described, mutual respect and cooperation. There should be no mistake about this.

Conclusion

Let me conclude by pulling the focus back from specific issues and events to discuss to more general subjects: the state of U.S.-Soviet relations and the state of our most important cooperative structure—the NATO alliance.

U.S.-Soviet Relations. That relations between the United States and the Soviet Union are severely strained is undeniable. And that this strain is largely created by Soviet behavior is also undeniable.

What does this recent tension mean for the future? Let me make several points very briefly. The relationship between the two great powers is the most decisive single influence on peace in the world. And so a stable, balanced relationship between our country and the Soviet Union remains our goal.

We remain interested in lessening tension and broadening cooperation with the Soviet Union. But as the President said in Philadelphia last spring, "... detente must be built on a firm foundation of deterrence." The Soviets must understand they cannot recklessly threaten world peace—that they cannot commit aggression—and still enjoy the benefits of cooperation with the United States and the West. They must understand the invasion of Afghanistan has had a profound adverse effect on world opinion, including here in America.

Having said that, let me make it clear that the way to better relations is open if the Soviets alter their conduct. That is clearly the path we prefer. We are prepared to accept the Soviet Union as a great world power with its own legitimate interests. We have no interest in an in placeable cold-war approach which holds the Soviet Union responsible for all the world's instabilities; we know the world is too complicated for such simple-minded notions. But we will insist that Moscow respect the legitimate interests of other nations, and that it not pursue its own advantage in ways that threaten the fabric of peace.

In short, we seek negotiations and better relations with the Soviet Union. But we have no intention of sacrificing our interests, our good sense, and our long-time prospects for peace in the name of detente.

NATO Alliance. This attitude is expressed clearly in our approach to a current issue between East and West: the issue of theater nuclear missile systems in Europe.

Last December, as you know, the

NATO allies decided on a two-track approach to the military imbalance in Europe threatened by the Soviet Union's buildup of SS-20 missiles and Backfire bombers. The first track was a decision to add Pershing II missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles to NATO's forces—a decision which is going forward. The second track was to seek negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, in the context of SALT III talks, to limit land-based, long-range missiles.

Last month the Soviets dropped their demand that such talks not be held unless NATO halted or abandoned its modernization plans. We and our allies regard this as a success for our dual commitment to seek a stable military balance while pursuing arms limitations.

We are now preparing for these preliminary exchanges. We will be consulting closely with our allies before meeting with the Soviets. Once SALT II has been ratified—a goal to which we remain firmly committed—these preliminary exchanges can lead to formal negotiations and, we hope, meaningful limits on theater nuclear forces in the SALT III framework.

We believe that the wisdom of our policy—a policy of firmness and willingness to pursue cooperative arrangements—has been confirmed by events. It is important to understand that it is also the basic approach of our allies. The Soviet Union will make a great mistake to think that it can separate us from our allies on fundamental issues. The results of Venice and Ankara make this point clear, and Chancellor Schmidt's statements on his visit to Moscow reinforce the point.

Let me be candid. We and our allies did undergo a difficult period several months ago. We encountered difficulty because we encountered a situation that was unprecedented. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a challenge to our common interests although not to our collective territory. As we searched for ways to make a coherent response to that new challenge, there were differences among us.

We have emerged from that difficulty. In Venice and Ankara, the allies showed themselves capable of moving—and speaking—together. We signaled the Soviets that we are serious about Afghanistan and about the larger issue of fidelity to the rules of international conduct.

Today the allies stand together on issues of interest that lie beyond the alliance area. And certainly we stand together when it comes to the defense of

that area. NATO's commitments of recent years are ample evidence of this: the Long-Term Defense Program, the joint commitment to increase real defense spending by 3% each year, the decision last December to redress the theater nuclear balance in Europe by deploying new missiles and by seeking negotiations to limit missile forces.

It will remain a central problem to prevent the Soviets from dividing our alliance—and to head off the tempting but dangerous illusion that Europe can remain a stable island of detente while the Soviets create dangerous situations elsewhere. Dealing with this problem will require vigorous and subtle diplomacy; it will call for patience and wisdom from the American people. But we are on the right path.

This government is committed to a foreign policy that is at once strong and generous. We are pursuing the most ambitious military program in two decades. But we will resist becoming locked into a cycle of renewed arms competition—for a new unbridled arms race would threaten America domestically while not increasing our security.

We are working with our allies in an atmosphere of mutual concern and support. But we reject the illusion that we can—or should—return to the kind of domination we enjoyed when our allies were still recuperating from World War II.

We are firmly opposing Soviet adventurism. But we have no interest in a policy of knee-jerk hostility which sees a Russian under every Third World stone.

Finally, we are working to build peace and stability—in Africa, in the Middle East, in Central America, and other troubled regions.

In each of these areas, we have received the understanding and cooperation of this committee and your support for the resources necessary for success. I welcome that continued support, for I am convinced that these are the best policies for today and for the decade to come. And I am convinced they reflect the opinion and the will, the realism and good sense, of the great majority of the American people.

¹ Press release 207. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

The North-South Dialogue

Statements by Richard N. Cooper, Under Secretary for Economic Affairs; Thomas Ehrlich, Director of the International Development Cooperation Agency (IDCA); Joan Spero, U.S. Representative to the U.N. Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC); and C. Fred Bergsten, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs, before the Subcommittees on International Economic Policy and Trade and International Organizations of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on May 15, 1980.¹

MR. COOPER

I appreciate the opportunity to talk with you about the North-South dialogue, its importance to the United States, and the directions we see it taking in the months ahead. This subject is particularly timely, as late this summer we will attend the 11th Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly, which will bring together two major themes for the first time—the launching of a round of global negotiations on major international economic issues, including energy, and the formulation of an international development strategy for the 1980s.

The North-South dialogue can be looked at on two levels. Most generally, it can be defined as the whole range of discussions and negotiations between industrial and developing countries—bilateral, regional, and international. More specifically, however, the dialogue can be defined as a discussion in multilateral fora of the international economic system which has evolved since 1945. The developing countries use this dialogue to press for fundamental restructuring of the system in ways they believe would benefit them. Industrial countries attempt to strike a balance between promoting mutually beneficial change and preserving the fundamentals of a system which they believe has generally served well not only their interests but those of all countries.

It is this latter concept of a dialogue we are discussing today. Yet, at the outset, I should note the interrelationship between the two concepts. Clearly, our bilateral relationships with developing countries and our actions in such specialized economic organizations as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the development banks,

and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), all have a strong impact on international political-level discussions. And conversely, the tone set in the international dialogue provides a backdrop on which more concrete bilateral and multilateral relations occur.

The North-South dialogue grew out of the experience of the developing countries in the 1950s and 1960s, when they discovered that in the U.N. General Assembly they could command world attention. Unlike the Bretton Woods institutions, in which voting is weighted heavily in favor of industrial countries and meetings are closed to the public, in the U.N. institutions each country has an equal vote. Developing countries are able to make their demands heard and constitute majority votes in those fora, particularly when they act in unison. They first used this power to demand an end to colonialism, but by the 1960s, as the curtain rang down on the colonial empires, developing countries increasingly turned their attention to the international economic system in the U.N. fora.

The decade of the 1970s marked an intense period of North-South dialogue. Debate turned highly confrontational in the U.N. Sixth Special Session in the spring of 1974, in which the developing countries demanded a new international economic order. A more constructive tone was set in 1975 with the Seventh Special Session of the United Nations and the launching of the Conference on International Economic Cooperation in Paris, and in the spring of 1976 with UNCTAD [U.N. Conference on Trade and Development] IV in Nairobi. In 1979 the combination of a deteriorating world economic climate and dissension among the developing countries over their priorities and over the question of energy, led the developing countries to call for an inclusive, high-level round of global negotiations, to be launched by the 11th Special Session.

As we prepare for this major undertaking, it is appropriate that we review the importance to the United States of the North-South dialogue, the issues debated, and the factors which encourage or impede progress in the dialogue.

Importance to U.S.

For the United States, the developing countries are increasingly important

both economically and politically. They are major suppliers of raw materials, including, of course, oil, and our most rapidly growing export markets. For example, from 1970 to 1978 U.S. exports of capital goods to developing countries quadrupled from under \$5 billion to over \$22 billion. In fact, taken as a group, developing countries now account for more U.S. exports than the European Common Market and Japan combined. During the recessionary period of 1974-76, while exports to industrial countries stagnated or declined, exports to developing (including oil-exporting) countries continued to expand. Without that demand for U.S. goods, our unemployment and production would have been even worse. About 24% of our \$170 billion in overseas direct investments are in developing countries,

For the United States, the developing countries are increasingly important both economically and politically.

as well as around 31% of the \$190 billion in U.S. bank claims on foreigners. Profits and interest from these investments and loans play an important role in helping to offset the merchandise of trade deficits we have run in recent years.

The cooperation of the developing countries is becoming increasingly essential if we are to use the world's resources efficiently. We need to work with them if we are to continue effective use of the world's electromagnetic spectrum and to mine the floor of the sea and harvest its fish. Policies in developing countries which result in deforestation or desertification affect not only their own futures but the future availability of food and timber and even the nature of weather patterns for the world community. Their attitudes toward pollution as they spur economic growth affect not only their own rivers and air but the world's oceans and atmosphere.

It is also in our strong security interest to see that most of these countries find that we and our allies are receptive to their desires for improved economic growth. It is true that so long as we maintain a strong national

defense, the direct threat of developing countries to the physical security of the United States is negligible. But the internal upheavals and regional disputes endanger individual Americans and risk confrontation between the superpowers. Moreover, events of the past few years have demonstrated anew that an overwhelming force of arms cannot assure the United States of sure friends or the achievement of security objectives in the Third World. If the developing countries believe we are uninterested in their economic and political welfare, no amount of arms will win their respect or their cooperation on matters of importance to our security and well-being.

Perhaps even more important than these current considerations is the fact that the kind of world our children inherit will be heavily determined by the choices developing countries make as to their social and economic systems. The developing countries, after all, account for about three-quarters of the world population, and their share is increasing. The degree to which they identify or oppose the Western system of economic, social, and moral values will have an influence, perhaps even a determining influence, on whether our descendants live in a world which is hospitable to their values and welfare or whether they live under a psychological state of siege.

Developing Country Concerns

Thus, it is not only out of humanitarian concern but also for hardheaded economic and security reasons that the United States should listen carefully to the concerns enunciated by the developing countries in the North-South dialogue. These demands tend to revolve around three themes—obtaining needed foreign exchange, assuring availability of technology for development, and increasing the decisionmaking power of developing countries in the economic system.

The most important means of obtaining foreign exchange for most developing countries is through export of raw materials or processed goods to the world community. Much of the North-South dialogue has, therefore, revolved around developing countries' desire for higher and more stable prices for raw materials and improved market access for their manufactured goods.

Many developing countries, particularly the poorest, depend heavily on official development assistance to obtain their foreign exchange. They demand

larger, more automatic transfers of resources on concessional terms with a minimum of political and economic strings attached.

Finally, developing countries, particularly the more advanced, can also open their doors to foreign investment or obtain loans from private capital markets. They obtain resources in the present in return for promising to allow payment of profit, interest, and principal in the future. The terms and conditions under which international investment and capital borrowing take place, and what happens when disputes arise, are therefore another important area of debate involving resource flows.

Developing countries also want to assure that increased resource flows will be used productively. To this end, they want to see increased the amount of scientific and technological research which will be of benefit to the developing world. They would like to improve the terms under which technology is transferred through private and public means to the developing world. Finally, they want to increase their own capacity to develop, select, adapt, and apply technology to their specific requirements. These themes were highlighted in the U.N. Conference on Science and Technology for Development (UNCSTD) held in Vienna last year and run through the negotiations on an international code of conduct on technology transfer being conducted under UNCTAD auspices.

The developing countries have also sought through the North-South dialogue to increase their role in international economic decisionmaking. The dialogue itself, by highlighting the economic concerns of the developing countries, partly accomplishes this goal. In addition, the developing countries have pressed for increased voting power in institutions such as the IMF, have sought to move debate on particular issues to fora they find politically more hospitable (e.g., UNCTAD for trade), and have proposed new institutions in which they have a greater role at the outset. The establishment of the International Fund for Agricultural Development, in which developing countries have two-thirds of the vote, and the voting structure being negotiated for a Common Fund, both reflect this pattern.

In sum, the goal of the developing countries in the North-South dialogue is to restructure the international economic system—to create a new international economic order—which has as primary objectives the promotion of

their development and what they consider a more equitable distribution of the world's wealth.

U.S. Concerns

We understand and sympathize with the aspirations of the developing countries. However, we also have an enormous stake in the continuing smooth functioning of the international economic system. We are the world's largest exporter and importer of both raw materials and manufactured goods, the largest overseas investor, and the largest international debtor as well as the largest creditor. Major changes in the system can thus have important implications for our own welfare.

As we look back over the past three decades, we believe that the system has responded flexibly, if not always smoothly, to major changes in the world, including the growing economic and political importance of the developing countries. We favor continued evolution of the system to meet new situations. But suggested changes must have a high probability of improving the system for everyone—if this is not the case, it makes no sense to disrupt a system which works reasonably well.

We naturally have additional criteria with which we evaluate suggestions for changes in the system. We want a system which provides the stability and predictability that promotes trade and facilitates financial transactions—transactions which are increasingly long term in nature. This does not imply a system which resists change but rather recognizes that national social and economic structures can only absorb change at a reasonable pace. Sudden changes in the rules of the game for investment and financial transactions or massive shifts in trade patterns tend to inhibit overall economic activity. Thus, we favor needed change at a rate which can be absorbed without undue dislocations.

Second, we want an international system which promotes efficient use of the world's resources. As the current energy situation has made us painfully aware, we cannot afford to waste the world's resources—be they capital, raw materials, or human beings. We have thus pursued an international system of basically open trade and free capital flows. We are convinced that such a system will result in countries benefiting from their comparative advantage and increased global efficiency.

Additionally, as we are all well

aware, industrial countries are faced with domestic budgetary constraints, particularly in these times of stagflation. This is a major reason that we find it difficult to accept some of the developing countries' most pressing and legitimate claims, such as those for more official assistance and greater access to our markets. These are claims which do not jeopardize the world economic system but do require increased expenditures on aid and adjustment programs for workers and industries affected by increased imports.

Progress in Global Negotiations

In a sense, then, the North-South dialogue involves weighing a variety of politically, economically, and socially desirable goals—development, growth, efficiency, equity, and stability—in evaluating specific policy proposals. This is not dissimilar to the same kind of evaluation which the executive branch and the Congress must make in determining domestic policies. In both cases, it is a complicated process, but one in which progress is possible and imperative.

And progress has been made in the North-South dialogue. Measures have been taken which benefit both developed and developing countries and which have brought developing countries more fully into the international economic system. Without going into great detail, a few examples can be mentioned.

- In commodities, new agreements on rubber and sugar were negotiated, and the United States joined the tin agreement. Negotiations are well along on a Common Fund with a final package hopefully to be concluded in June. Liberalizations of the IMF's Compensatory Finance Facility in 1975 and 1979 are particularly useful to raw materials exporters.

- In the Tokyo Round the industrial countries agreed to cut tariffs by about one-third and impose greater discipline on nontariff trade barriers. In addition, the United States signed 27 bilateral agreements with developing countries. Further, all the industrial countries had previously implemented preferential tariff systems to help less developed countries.

- In finance, new facilities established in the IMF and enlarged quotas can make resources available to meet a variety of developing-country adjustment problems in larger amounts and on more flexible terms. Two weeks ago

agreement in UNCTAD was reached on a restrictive business practices code.

- Regarding development assistance, in the past 4 years replenishments involving over \$100 billion have been negotiated for multi-lateral development banks and funds. This includes \$40 billion for the World Bank's general capital increase, which will guarantee its ability to operate well into the 1980s. The International Fund for Agricultural Development was established in Rome. Individual industrial and OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] countries have expanded their own assistance programs.

- Special attention has been given to the poorest developing countries. Official development assistance to them has risen from a level equal to about 4.1% of their combined GDP in 1971 to approximately 10.3% in 1978.

- In technology, we agreed at UNCTAD to the establishment of an interim fund for science and technology for development. Earlier, at the Tokyo summit, we agreed to double the resources of the international agricultural research centers, which focus on developing country agricultural problems.

If we wish to continue to make progress in the North-South arena, we should consider what factors have contributed to successful outcomes in the past. Two points are worth emphasizing. First, the dialogue has been most productive when it has been focused on specific issues and on realistic proposals. UNCTAD II dealt with trade preferences and UNCTAD IV on commodity agreements and the Common Fund. Developing countries continued to press these themes at subsequent international meetings, and positive accomplishments were eventually forthcoming.

Second, progress is most likely when there are clearly mutual interests involved, rather than one side asking the others to make concessions without getting anything in return. Regarding commodity policy, for example, the United States responded in the belief that stable commodity prices and production benefit consuming as well as producing countries. Unduly low prices discourage producers and can lead to subsequent shortfalls and high prices, and sharply rising prices have an inflationary impact on consumer economies. Similarly, liberalizing the Compensatory Finance Facility not only helped raw material producers to offset temporary shortfalls in their export earnings but enabled them to maintain their demand for manufactured

goods at a more constant level, thus having a beneficial countercyclical impact on producers of capital goods.

Factors Impeding Progress

These conditions have sometimes been lacking. Last year at UNCTAD V in Manila, for example, the developing countries produced a long list of demands but with no particular focus. The conference was hence an unstructured affair which produced limited results. Developing countries prepared their positions for UNIDO [U.N. Industrial Development Organization] III in the highly political atmosphere of Havana and not only produced another long list of demands with little focus or attention to the interests of industrial countries but also put forth a totally unrealistic proposal for a \$300 billion North-South fund for the promotion of the industrialization of developing countries. Once again progress proved impossible.

One reason it is so difficult for developing countries to limit their attention to a few priority items is the wide diversity of interests among them. The poorest countries need increased official development assistance, middle-income countries want balance-of-payments support and improved conditions for commodity trade, and the wealthier developing countries are most concerned about access to markets for industrial products, to private capital markets, and to technology. Oil-importing countries want stable oil prices and help to pay for the oil; oil-exporting countries worry about industrial-country inflation and security of their financial assets. Policies which might help one group of developing countries are of limited value or even detrimental to others. This results in formulating a list of demands based on maximum common denominator, which satisfies their collective political needs but limits their political effectiveness in dealing with industrial countries, and greatly complicates the overall dialogue.

Future Approaches

As we prepare for global negotiations, we have carefully reviewed our experience in North-South discussions and examined the critical problems we see ahead. We know we are moving into a period of high oil prices, relatively low economic growth rates, and major financial imbalances. Slow growth and trade deficits will tempt many parties to urge protectionist trade measures. Further,

number of developing countries will face increased food shortages by the mid-1980s.

In the next few years we must find ways to use energy more efficiently and locate new energy sources. We must find ways to assure that the enormous OPEC surpluses are recycled to allow reasonable growth levels to continue. We need to resist protectionist pressures and to assure growth in food production.

In the longer run, we must be certain that all countries can and do increase their production of conventional and nonconventional energy, as we move away from economies based on petroleum to ones based on a broader mix of energy sources. We need to encourage all countries to take positive measures which will encourage their economies to adjust to changing conditions, and we must help developing countries increase their food production.

These are major tasks, which must be pursued on many levels and in many fora. Some may be too urgent to await attention in the global negotiations. For example, the IMF and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) already are examining new ways in which they can respond more effectively to the financial problems caused in large part by the recent rise in oil prices. But the global negotiations provide one mechanism which could help address these problems. The United States has accordingly devoted considerable attention to examining ways in which the international community might take maximum advantage of the global negotiations.

We suggested, at the outset, that we could try to focus the global negotiations on a limited number of subjects of interest to all participants where there was a realistic possibility of achieving tangible results. When the developing countries nonetheless presented a lengthy agenda including almost all topics covered in North-South discussions over the years, we urged that, at a minimum, the participating countries agree to focus immediately on an early action program which would address critical problems.

Specifically, we proposed that the global negotiations immediately turn its attention to four topics:

- A worldwide trade pledge to resist protectionist pressures and to promote positive adjustment;
- Assistance for exploration and

development of energy resources in energy deficient countries;

- Improved world food security by fulfilling national targets of the food aid convention, backing these commitments with food aid reserves, and improving food storage and distribution in developing countries; and

- Suitable steps to facilitate the recycling of payments surpluses.

We are certainly open to other suggestions. But we emphasize that in such an early action program, we should select critical issues on which early agreement is possible. The global negotiations could identify these key issues and provide the political impetus needed for negotiating specific agreements in specialized fora, where they exist, or in the global negotiations themselves when there are no other appropriate fora. Once an early action program has been launched, the global negotiations could turn to longer term problems, such as food production, population and health, and structural adjustment.

We are pressing this approach in the preparatory work for global negotiations and in the special session itself, if agreement on an agenda for global negotiations has not been reached by that time. It should perhaps be reiterated that global negotiations are but one forum to address these problems. And it should also be pointed out that global negotiations, even if successful, will not solve all of the problems of the less developed countries. The negotiations and the North-South dialogue in general must be kept in perspective. Genuine economic development depends on a complex variety of factors. The institutions and the rules of the international economic system are of course important. But at least as important are the policies of the major industrialized countries with respect to inflation, growth, and trade, which together set the tone of the world economic environment. And, of course, the most critical variables are the developing countries' own policies, which influence either positively or negatively the millions of economic decisions by households, entrepreneurs, and firms which must provide the core of economic development. After all, we have examples of economic success stories and economic disasters among the developing countries—both occurring within the existing international economic system.

Unfortunately, overall development policy—as opposed to specific

demands—is seldom addressed in North-South fora. The negotiation of an international development strategy for the 1980s is an exception, where greater attention is paid to the contributions both industrial and developing countries ought to make to development.

Like its predecessor of the 1970s, the new international development strategy is intended to set down a more systematic and more rational approach to economic and social development. It should provide a basis for meaningful coordination of national and international programs. By supporting provisions for reviewing development progress, we hope to make the strategy a document of continuing relevance through the decade.

Negotiations, however, have been contentious and the Group of 77 (G-77) and the industrialized countries still have major differences on the content of the new strategy. The developing countries are pushing for growth targets to be accepted as commitments, rather than as indications of what we hope can be accomplished. They also have included in their suggestion for policy measures a series of proposals for special development funds and other transfer mechanisms to which the industrialized countries cannot agree. There is one more regular negotiating session before the special session on which occasion the strategy is scheduled to go into effect to guide the United Nation's Third Development Decade.

The 11th Special Session, then, provides a unique opportunity both to launch a process of global negotiations which focuses on improvements in the international economic system which might benefit us all and to address questions of development strategy and goals which might better define how both industrial and developing countries can accelerate economic development. This is an important opportunity which we cannot afford to waste.

MR. EHRLICH

The last decade has been marked by periods of tension between developing countries of the South and industrial nations of the North. At times each group has been deeply suspicious of the other's motives and has expressed widely differing perceptions of global needs and priorities. This pattern may well persist; relations between developed and developing countries may periodically be abrasive far into the future, particularly in multilateral settings. But this reality

in no way diminishes the need for the governments of all nations to meet on common problems of global concern. Indeed, over the course of the last decade, significant progress of mutual benefit to both developed and developing countries has been achieved in areas of trade, monetary and financial affairs, commodities, and food and agricultural development. In the decade ahead it will remain in our interest to continue to work with developing countries on problems of common concern. Global negotiations provide one—among many—occasions for partnership.

Last December, when the United States agreed with other U.N.-member states to prepare a new round of global negotiations, we said they could make useful contributions to resolving international economic problems if they focused on a limited number of specific issues. We also said that the negotiations should give momentum to ongoing efforts in other international organizations. From a development perspective, the need to set priorities and not to disrupt or duplicate ongoing activities is still a key requirement.

We are now working with other countries to establish the agenda and procedures for global negotiations. This may be a difficult and trying process. The United Nations is a highly visible, political forum. Discussions take place among more than 150 countries with widely disparate needs, capabilities, and interests.

Before discussing the issues that those and other aspects of our relations with developing countries might usefully address in the year or two ahead, I want to underscore deep concern about one legislative problem. If not corrected, it could cripple our efforts to strengthen ties with nations of the South as well as bring to a halt vital support for development throughout the Third World.

Several weeks ago the House refused to approve the conference report on legislation to authorize our participation in several of the regional multilateral development banks. I emphasize at the outset, however, its importance for our development policy concerns, for our continued leadership in North-South relations, and for the credibility of our position in preparation for the global negotiations. We have stressed that on monetary and financial issues the fora for negotiations are the IMF and the multilateral development banks.

My comments this afternoon will emphasize four main points.

- It is in our interest to focus

serious attention on the problems of development and on economic negotiations with developing countries, and it is in our interest to be perceived as serious.

- Among the priority development issues for the 1980s are food, energy, population, and economic adjustment. These concerns are important to us as well as to developing countries. And they correspond to our priorities in development assistance.

- Those four issues are substantively interrelated; prospects for mutually acceptable progress on each of them would be enhanced by attention to the interrelations.

- Global negotiations can contribute to progress on these issues. Those negotiations are not the only context in which we are discussing food, energy, population, and economic adjustment; we are also addressing these and other

Americans. Later this year the International Development Cooperation Agency will report to the President on the results of an interagency review of the commission's recommendations. The central theme of the Brandt Commission report is the common interest of nations within both the North and the South in meeting the challenge of development and in responding to specific global economic problems. For us, this common interest relates not only to the humanitarian concerns of our people but also to our political, economic, and strategic future.

Political. We have important political interests in helping to promote development among Third World countries. And we have political interests in maintaining an international economic order in ways that benefit all nations. We seek a world at peace—in which

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concerns in negotiations with developing countries on a new international development strategy and elsewhere as well. But the global negotiations do offer a prime opportunity for progress. It would be misleading to be enormously optimistic; a significant dose of healthy skepticism is essential about any prospective international undertaking, particularly when the agenda is, quite literally, global. But it would be equally wrong to be only pessimistic, for we believe that real gains for all nations are possible through the global negotiations.

U.S. Interests

Against that background, I begin with the profound importance to the United States of helping to promote development and working with developing countries to solve problems of mutual concern. Earlier this year, a distinguished international commission [Independent Commission on International Economic Issues or Brandt Commission] issued its report on North-South relations. It was headed by former West German Chancellor Willy Brandt and included leaders from developed and developing countries, including two eminent

each nation honors the others' national independence, in which the people of each nation participate in its political process, in which each nation respects the human rights of its citizens, in which each nation strives to meet equitably the economic aspirations of its people.

Development is often destabilizing. Pressures to redistribute economic and political power can be unsettling. But the resulting changes are not as threatening to peace and international stability as the dangers of pent-up rage from injustice and hunger. The question is not whether change from development should occur, but whether change will be channeled in constructive directions. Development, with our help, is the best hope for a world in which human and political liberties flourish. The road to this goal may be rough, but our interests are clearly served by conducting relations in a way that promotes development.

Economic. The growing economic basis for our interests in developing countries is also striking.

- More than one-third of U.S. exports are shipped to developing nations.
- 800,000 American jobs in manufacturing alone depend on exports to developing countries.

• We export 50% of our cotton, 5% of our wheat, and 70% of our rice to the developing world.

• To a growing extent we must rely on developing countries for vital materials. For example, the United States imports 100% of our tin requirements, 90% of the bauxite used for aluminum, and all of our natural rubber needs from developing countries. Most important, 41% of the petroleum we use comes from developing countries and roughly half of that from nations outside the Middle East.

• And as of 1978, American firms have invested over \$40 billion in developing countries, nearly one-quarter of our total foreign direct investment.

These are a few examples of our deepening economic involvement with the Third World.

Strategic. The United States has a critical stake in relations with the countries of the South. Developing nations are vital to the resolution of a wide range of global problems that concern the American people directly—from the peaceful resolution of disputes in Africa to the protection of our Earth's environment. Wasteful use of the Earth's resources, pollution of the Earth's atmosphere, international terrorism, nuclear proliferation, unchecked arms competition, and the pressures of rapid population growth, all threaten the well-being and safety of the human race. None can be solved without the involvement and cooperation of developing nations.

Humanitarian. Finally, overwhelming humanitarian needs require us to work with Third World governments to help poor people in their countries. Almost one billion of those people live in absolute poverty. They lack safe drinking water, access to basic health care, and other essentials. Fifteen million children die each year from malnutrition and infection.

Our political, economic, strategic, and humanitarian interests can be served by U.S. support for development and by progress in North-South negotiations. The North-South dialogue and development efforts are intricately interrelated, although they are by no means synonymous. Development is one goal of North-South economic negotiations. It is explicitly the focus of concern of negotiations on an international development strategy for the decade of the 1980s. That strategy, thus far the subject of considerable disagreement between developed and developing countries, aims to set long-run objectives for

development cooperation. Goals for actions by developing as well as developed countries are the subject of the negotiation strategy. But, clearly, there is much we can do to support development that is outside this and other North-South negotiations. And there is much that developing countries need to do within their own societies, quite apart from the efforts of other nations to help them.

Conversely, North-South negotiations are about more than promoting development. They are about the rules, principles, and procedures governing international economic relations. Of particular importance, they are about the role and responsibility of both developing and developed states in the management of the international economic system. The challenge for us as well as for all other countries is to deal with North-South issues in a way that is conducive to meeting both development concerns and other global economic goals.

For all these reasons, we should be—and be viewed as—serious about engaging in substantive negotiations with developing countries on issues of mutual concern. This means that neither the United States nor other countries should approach the North-South dialogue as a discussion of what the rich can give the poor but rather as one of several means by which nations can work together to meet global economic problems for their mutual benefit.

Taking the North-South dialogue seriously also means that we cannot begin with unalterable positions. We cannot dictate unilateral solutions. Nor can other countries. We are talking about a negotiating process. As in any negotiation, there must be real give and real take.

We need now to arrive at an agreement with developing countries on an agenda of priority issues on which both sides are prepared to enter active negotiations. We have urged this problem-solving approach concerning the global negotiations and in the key international financial institutions. That approach is antithetical to putting every possible demand on an agenda. Sharp focus on key problems is the only way that the dialogue between North and South has made—and can continue to make—progress on critical problems that affect both prospects for development and the health of the global economy.

Key Issues

The main point I want to emphasize today can be simply stated. The most

pressing development goals we believe the world community has for the 1980s are economic adjustment, food, energy, and population. Those issues are important to the Third World prospects for development. They are issues on which sufficient international consensus can be generated to enable agreement on specific actions. And their resolution would be consistent with U.S. interests. Let me describe, briefly, the central features of each issue, beginning with adjustment.

Adjustment. By adjustment, I mean the necessary process within all societies of accommodating to changing world economic conditions, including the higher costs of energy and the payments imbalances they engender. For many developing countries the need to adjust to structural imbalances has become the major medium-term challenge to achieving sustainable economic development.

In the past, in dealing with problems of developing country deficits and adjustment, adjustment has been synonymous with austerity. In the 1960s and early 1970s, many developing countries sought short-term balance-of-payments support to help in difficult years when imports exceeded exports. In response, they were generally told to tighten their belts. Now we are considering adjustment in a broader dimension. We are considering adjustment to structural changes in the global economy, and this is going to have to entail the reallocation of investment in developing countries geared to increasing their exports and reducing their imports of goods they can produce efficiently at home. This includes—of particular importance—developing alternative energy resources and making greater strides to achieve food self-sufficiency when economically feasible.

Without the changes, those countries will be overwhelmed by financial and political strains. To help promote the changes, suitable steps to facilitate the recycling of payments surpluses will be needed and adequate levels of development assistance provided for the poorest countries.

The rise in oil prices, as you well know, has led to enormous OPEC surpluses. The oil price increases have also led—directly and indirectly—to sizable increases in current-account deficits of Third World countries already much in debt. Although the situation is manageable in 1980, looking at 1981 and beyond, there is cause for concern and careful attention. Crippling financial

difficulties may well arise in some countries, if, as we expect, the real price of oil remains high and there is a significant slowdown of exports from developing countries to developed nations.

Third World nations that import oil will face current-account deficits this year of \$50 billion compared to \$14 billion just 3 years ago. The deficits in 1981 are likely to be even larger. More than half of these deficits are concentrated in countries that have borrowed heavily, mostly from private banks. The scale of further commercial bank lending to help these countries in 1981 and beyond is uncertain. For the poorest countries, almost wholly dependent on concessional assistance, prospects for continuing growth and development will be bleak without increased flows of development assistance.

The United States and other members of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank are now considering ways to help developing countries adjust. A crucial factor in providing assistance—a central element of adjustment on a global scale—will be successful recycling of oil revenues that have accumulated in some OPEC countries.

Adjustment on a global scale will also require all states to resist the temptation to retreat into protectionism. It is tempting to use trade restrictions to export economic difficulties. But this path, which may seem helpful in the short run, invites retaliation and breakdown of the international system in ways we all can remember.

Hunger. A second problem that the international community must address seriously is the elimination of hunger. Both the Presidential Commission on World Hunger and the Brandt Commission urge attention to this problem as a matter of priority. Recent events in Southeast Asia, Somalia, and elsewhere have heightened international awareness of the precarious food situation in many of the poorest developing countries. The number of undernourished people in these countries is continuing to expand. Furthermore, poor people in low-income countries are increasingly vulnerable to periods of acute food shortages.

To overcome the fundamental causes of hunger, developing countries need to increase their food production, raise the incomes of their people to enable them to buy food, and develop efficient internal food storage and distribution networks. For countries willing to take these necessary steps, adequate international assistance ought to be made

available by all countries with the financial capacity to provide it. Furthermore, the international community ought to help to insure that poor countries have the means to meet their food import needs, and that community should continue to seek ways to enhance the stability of the international grain market.

Energy Production. Increased energy production in developing countries is a third common concern: World economic prospects depend critically on the ability of all societies to reduce the link between imported oil supplies and economic growth. The problem is particularly acute for non-OPEC developing countries. They are less and less able to bear the financial burdens those imports entail.

Continued economic growth of developing countries will probably mean that their share of world oil demand will increase from 6% to 25% of total demand within the next decade, further straining the world oil market.

One of the promising approaches to today's energy problem—in addition to rigorous conservation efforts—is to increase energy exploration and development within non-OPEC developing countries. As much as 40% of the oil yet to be found may be in those countries. And renewable energy sources in Third World nations must be pursued with equal vigor.

Population Explosion. Finally, we and others should recognize that today's population explosion is as serious and as central a problem as adjustment, food, and energy. Rapid growth in population limits development everywhere. In the poorer nations, it frustrates efforts to end the poverty, malnutrition, and degradation that are the lot of one-quarter of the world's people. In many countries of Africa, for example, though food production is expanding, population is increasing faster. The result is a growing number of starving people and increasing pressure on the world's resources.

We now face the prospect of a population increase in the final quarter century that will equal the entire growth of the world's population in the last 2,000 years. If current trends persist, the world's population of 4.5 billion people will more than double before stabilizing in the 21st century.

Too few developing countries are now paying enough attention to population, and too few industrial nations are

providing significant support in this area. Population aid currently accounts for only 2% of total development assistance worldwide. The United States has been the leader in this field—in terms of both emphasis and volume of aid. The United States will give \$195 million this year for family planning assistance. We are also urging other donors to do more. An increasing number of developing countries share our concern. Thailand, Indonesia, and Colombia, for example, have given much attention to population over the last decade; their declining birth rates testify to the success of their efforts.

A Framework

Given the importance of these four issues, how can they best be considered? Analysis shows, I think, that food and energy have several similar characteristics, and that these and the other two issues—adjustment and population—are substantively interrelated problems. In regard to both food and energy, international action is needed to promote: security of supply; increased production in developing countries; and financing required by poor countries to pay for increased production and imports.

The adjustment issue relates to both the demand side and the supply side of the food and energy problems. On a national scale, adjustment in many developing countries includes the production of more food and energy. As part of the adjustment process, but on the global scale, there is a need for avoiding protectionism and for increasing financial flows—or recycling—to developing countries to support their adjustment efforts. If one asks the question "recycling for what?", one is immediately led back around to the need in many developing countries for increasing production and financing imports of food and energy. Population is a critical companion issue because of the long-term pressures that high birth rates place on critical resources.

Progress on any or all of these issues will benefit every nation. Progress on the issues also calls for action by every nation.

- All countries must be prepared to reduce long-term demands on the world's limited resources. This includes making real strides in energy conservation. For developing countries, it also means making a greater effort to increase agricultural production and to reduce population growth rates.

• At the same time, we in the United States should recognize that—just as we seek energy security—those who depend on food imports seek food security through increased production and an adequate system of grain reserves.

• OPEC countries, for their part, should recognize their greater official responsibility for recycling the surplus capital that results from higher oil prices. Since 1973, Western countries have assumed most of the financial risk of recycling, largely through private commercial banks. In the future the surplus countries should assume more of that risk.

We are now in the process of preparing an agenda for global negotiations with other countries. We cannot guarantee the final outcome of those discussions. But we will continue in the next several months to urge particular focus on a short list of key concerns. And we will continue to direct attention to the central issues I have been discussing in this context and in the context of other North-South negotiations and consultations.

S. SPERO

Much of the North-South economic dialogue takes place in New York at the United Nations, and our mission to the United Nations heads the U.S. representation in these talks. Thus, I am here today to talk to you about the process of the North-South economic discussions in New York, the dynamics of the North-South negotiations themselves, and the political environment within which discussions are conducted.

At the United Nations, economic issues are among the principal concerns of developing countries. Problems associated with poverty and the quest for economic development in Third World nations are enormous. With world inflation, recession, and the oil crisis the problems are becoming increasingly serious. In the view of the less developed countries (LDCs), the developed world and many of the existing international economic institutions pay insufficient attention to their economic plight and to their development needs. What the LDCs want is to create a new international economic order which will promote their development and which will thereby lead to a more equitable distribution of the world's wealth.

In order to draw attention to their

problems and to achieve this new order, the developing nations feel they need a forum that commands maximum visibility, insures high-level participation by developed states, and offers procedures which make possible participation by all governments. The U.N. General Assembly and the subsidiary economic bodies it has created meet these requirements. They are highly visible. Their debates receive high-level attention in the capitals of the industrialized world. And all nations participate in their deliberations on an equal basis regardless of size, wealth, or strength.

Hence, the United Nations has been the focal point for the conduct of North-South negotiations. Indeed, during the last decade all high-level North-South meetings, except for Conference on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC), were conducted under U.N. auspices—some in New York and some elsewhere. The United Nations in New York—particularly the General Assembly—will continue to be a central forum for North-South issues. The procedures, practices, and organization of the U.N. system, therefore, will continue to be important features in shaping the North-South dialogue.

We in New York are now engaged in the most recent phase of the North-South dialogue: preparations for the special session of the U.N. General Assembly which will be held in late August and early September of this year. Two central topics for discussion, and we hope agreement, at the special session will be the U.N. international development strategy for the 1980s and the global round of negotiations. We at the U.S. mission are now engaged in intensive preparatory negotiations for the special session.

Dynamics of the Negotiations

Before describing those negotiations, it may be useful to review the context of North-South negotiations and specifically the dynamics of the interaction among the principal economic working groups at the U.N.

The less developed countries cooperate closely on economic issues in the United Nations through the G-77. The G-77 emerged as less developed countries sought to mobilize and maximize the bargaining advantages which derived from their growing numbers and voting strength in the General Assembly. The Group was initially created in the early 1960s by the united action of 77 countries at UNCTAD, the

U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, and has evolved as the principal vehicle for developing country cooperation on economic issues at the United Nations.

Let me clarify a few points about the G-77. The G-77 is not the same as the nonaligned movement, although the membership of the two groups overlaps substantially. The 119 members of the G-77 represent virtually every developing country, including some that are aligned with one or the other of the major blocs. In contrast to the nonaligned movement, the G-77 focuses its attention almost exclusively on economic issues. It is a highly decentralized, though cohesive, body with annual revolving chairmanships. The G-77 places great stress on, and has succeeded, in achieving a large measure of group solidarity. There exist, however, considerable economic and political differences among developing countries, which reflect the various levels of development they have attained, the approaches they prefer to take toward development, and their access to resources, particularly oil.

In addition to the G-77, there are two working groups in New York. There is no formal industrialized country group but instead a loosely coordinated, informal working group, whose members represent governments which belong to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). These delegations participate actively in the North-South dialogue. The group of Eastern bloc Socialist states, remains on the sidelines for the most part, on the pretext that, Western nations, as former colonial powers and as dominant forces in an exploitative international market, are solely responsible for the Third World's economic problems.

There are advantages and disadvantages to conducting North-South negotiations against the backdrop of these working groups. The G-77 can be an extremely rigid negotiating body. Because of its size, it is cumbersome and slow moving. The need to present a united front encourages the G-77 to adopt a "lowest common denominator" approach that simply adds up individual claims and concerns of the members and reflects the tremendous diversity of national interests among the Group's members.

The need to present a united front and the lowest common denominator approach inhibit the setting of priorities and also make the Group rigid in negotiations. Having carried out intense internal negotiations to develop a group

119 Members of the Group of 77

Afghanistan	Guinea-Bissau	Papua New Guinea
Algeria	Guyana	Paraguay
Angola	Haiti	Peru
Argentina	Honduras	Philippines
Bahamas	India	Qatar
Bahrain	Indonesia	Romania
Bangladesh	Iran	Rwanda
Barbados	Iraq	Sao Tome-Principe
Benin	Ivory Coast	Saudi Arabia
Bhutan	Jamaica	Senegal
Bolivia	Jordan	Seychelles
Botswana	Kampuchea	Sierra Leone
Brazil	Kenya	Singapore
Burma	Korea, North	Solomon Islands
Burundi	Korea, South	Somalia
Cameroon	Kuwait	Sri Lanka
Cape Verde	Laos	Sudan
Central African Republic	Lebanon	Suriname
Chad	Lesotho	Swaziland
Chile	Liberia	Syria
Colombia	Libya	Tanzania
Comoros	Madagascar	Thailand
Congo	Maldives	Trinidad-Tobago
Costa Rica	Malawi	Togo
Cuba	Malaysia	Tonga
Cyprus	Mali	Tunisia
Djibouti	Malta	Uganda
Dominican Republic	Mauritania	United Arab Emirates
Ecuador	Mauritius	Upper Volta
Egypt	Mexico	Uruguay
El Salvador	Mongolia	Venezuela
Equatorial Guinea	Morocco	Vietnam
Ethiopia	Mozambique	Western Samoa
Fiji	Nepal	Yemen (Aden)
Gabon	Nicaragua	Yemen (Sana)
The Gambia	Niger	Yugoslavia
Ghana	Nigeria	Zaire
Grenada	Oman	Zambia
Guatemala	Pakistan	
Guinea	Palestine Liberation Organization	
	Panama	

NOTE: The G-77 consisted originally of one of the formal membership groups (groups A and C) of UNCTAD. Subsequently, the G-77 has excluded Israel and South Africa and admitted Mongolia, Romania, and the PLO.

position, it is difficult for the G-77 to be flexible in altering its demands and positions in the process of negotiation beyond the Group. Finally, such a large group of 119 nations must rely on strong leadership by a few, often self-selected, activist nations and individuals. If the G-77 activists are radical, as they have been at times in the past, they are able to exert a disproportionate influence on the Group's positions. All these factors create a strong tendency for the G-77, as an institution, to polarize North-South negotiations.

There are, however, positive aspects to the existence of a group of developing countries. The existence of the Group has enabled us to focus on the valid

needs of developing countries and provided us with a necessary interlocutor both in formal and informal consultations. The G-77's insistence on consensus can also lead to moderation. Under responsible leaders, like that of the present Indian chairman, the G-77 can reach effective compromises that take into account the interests of both industrialized and developing states. These more moderate leaders can inject an element of realism in the Group and help it achieve greater flexibility and thereby aid us all to achieve agreement on issues of common concern. These negotiating dynamics have great importance for the series of North-South negotiations on

which we are now embarked. The key conference will be the General Assembly special session on development, scheduled to be held just before the regular General Assembly this September. The special session was originally scheduled over 2 years ago, for the purpose of approving the international development strategy and thus launching the United Nation's Third Development Decade, but its mandate was expanded last year also to include responsibility for launching the global negotiations. It is now likely that the special session will itself become a major negotiating forum. The negotiations for a new international development strategy have been going on for more than a year. Progress has been limited, and there will be only one more 3-week preparatory session in June before the special session.

The new international development strategy will be a complex document, intended to provide a long-term blueprint for efforts on the part of governments and international institutions to promote economic and social development in the 1980s. It attempts to establish economic and social goals, objectives, and specific targets to be achieved over the course of the decade, to accelerate the development of Third World countries as well as to sustain global development. The strategy will also contain specific policy measures to implement its objectives and targets.

The G-77 has been attempting to include in the strategy commitments by developed countries to increase official development assistance as well as to provide financial resource transfers and reforms in the international monetary system. For our part, the United States and other developed countries have attempted to introduce the concept of necessary reforms within developing countries to facilitate their development, particularly in the area of social development. We would also like to see the strategy provide for a system of review and appraisal which would evaluate all countries' performance.

Global Negotiations

In conception, global negotiations are to be a new departure for the United Nations. The intent of all parties is to engage in truly meaningful negotiations about difficult economic issues. The United States is anxious to avoid the pit falls of some past U.N. negotiations. In particular, we want to avoid getting bogged down in the negotiation of omnibus "declarations" in which real

agreements are papered over with acceptable, but ultimately meaningless, language. We mean to achieve real, not merely rhetorical, results.

To that end, the resolution of the General Assembly for global negotiations authorized its Committee of the Whole to act as a preparatory committee for the global round. The Committee of the Whole is charged with making agreed recommendations on an agenda, procedures, and a timeframe for completing the negotiations. The Committee of the Whole is currently holding a third preparatory meeting and will convene once more in June prior to presenting its results to the special session. The committee has not yet reached consensus on the difficult issues it faces, but it has grappled with all of them. Let me review for you the results of the committee's early sessions on agenda and procedures.

A very long agenda has been produced by the G-77. It constitutes a virtual compendium or "shopping list" of all recent economic proposals by members of the Group in various international fora. Some proposals address serious issues of mutual concern while others reflect more narrow interests less appropriate for global negotiations.

Although we understand the group dynamics leading to such an omnibus proposal, we feel that, unless it is subjected to rigorous priorities, the G-77 agenda would likely lead to only superficial discussion—and meager results—in the timeframe of less than 90 days (January to September 1981).

Originally envisaged for the negotiations. For our part, the United States believes that priority attention and action negotiations should focus on a few issues of paramount urgency which also reflect the possibility of early, concrete results. With other OECD countries, we have suggested food, energy, and protectionism as agenda items. The United States has proposed the four-point early action program, including a trade regime, further development of energy resources in energy-deficient countries, improved world food security, and facilitating recycling of payments resources.

In the Committee of the Whole, the European Community and Switzerland have made rather detailed proposals on an agenda which are compatible with our approach. As yet, however, there is no coming of minds on agenda, but we expect the last preparatory session, in June, will bring us close to a workable compromise.

Both the United States and the G-77 have already indicated their preferences for procedures to govern the global negotiations. We and the other OECD countries favor decentralizing the negotiations. Multilateral fora such as the IMF, IBRD, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) exist for discussing many of the most pressing international economic issues. We would prefer to take up these issues in the fora which have made the mandates and the expertise to conduct such negotiations. Where no global forum currently exists, as is the case with energy issues, we might expect global negotiations to lead to the formation of some mechanism within which continuing discussion can take place. We have also emphasized that we do not wish to interfere with ongoing negotiations in whatever U.N. fora.

Under our proposals, the central forum in New York would by consensus agree on general objectives for negotiation in specialized fora. After the specialized fora have completed negotiations, the central body would review their results.

The G-77 has a different view of the way in which the negotiations should be conducted. They would prefer that a single global forum be set up to negotiate all issues, regardless of the existing mandate and competence of specialized agencies.

U.S. Objectives

Global negotiations are high on the list of priorities of the U.S. Mission to the United Nations. Mission staff has been very actively involved in the work of the Committee of the Whole, seeking the sort of focused agenda and procedures which will facilitate realistic negotiations toward achievable ends.

In this enterprise, we, of course, work closely with our Washington colleagues. To the extent the U.S. mission can play a special role in the global negotiation process, it arises out of our intimate knowledge of the United Nations and our constant contact with the G-77 and with the delegations of developed countries in New York. In the coming months, our special objectives include:

- Improving the coordination of our strategy with other developed countries;
- Working with the G-77 to assure an acceptable and realistic agenda for the negotiations;
- Achieving decentralization, so that

we can respect the mandate and take advantage of the expertise in existing U.N. fora; and

- Finding ways to increase informed and serious consideration of the substance of issues.

We anticipate that global negotiations will be a long and arduous process with no quick and easy results in sight. But our approach need not and should not be confrontational in order to protect our own national interests while contributing to the larger common good of the international community. There is some give and take on every good-faith negotiation and we have high hopes that satisfactory progress will be made in global negotiations to improve the international economic environment for both developing and industrialized countries.

MR. BERGSTEN

There has been a great deal of progress in North-South economic relations during the past 4 years. Significant results with mutual benefit to all sides have occurred on trade, monetary, commodity, food, energy, and resource-transfer issues. There is, to be sure, much more that can be accomplished. But the key to further success is twofold: a realistic recognition of both the achievements of the past and the needs of all nations, developed and developing, and a commitment to pursue the common interests of all rather than to seek benefits for one group at the expense of another.

Some observers have suggested that North-South relations could be headed for extremely rocky times over the next 4 years. It is certainly true that the crippling effect of higher oil prices, coupled with the dual problems of inflation and recession in the developed countries, may continue to cause serious problems for some developing countries. These and other key economic issues can, however, be addressed constructively through existing international institutions which have served the global community well in the past such as the International Monetary Fund, the multilateral development banks, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. We must continue to use these functionally specific fora to consolidate the progress already made; they hold the expertise, the experience, and the basic commitment of governments which are essential for further progress.

The capability of the United States to reach agreements of mutual benefit

and to avoid acrimonious political debate, however, is severely handicapped when the credibility of our negotiating posture is weakened by perceptions of our inability to deliver. I refer specifically to the current need for congressional action with regard to authorization and appropriation legislation for multilateral development banks, which I will address in more detail later.

My comments today will focus on two key issues: first, the progress achieved in recent years; and second, the critical need for Congress to support the international financial institutions and the U.S. position therein, given the particular importance of these institutions in the current economic environment.

Recent Progress

The Administration's comprehensive approach to North-South economic relations has led to significant progress on a number of fronts.

Trade. The United States reinvigorated the deadlocked multilateral trade negotiations (MTN) and brought them to a successful conclusion. As a result of the negotiations, the major industrialized countries will reduce their industrial tariffs by 33% on a weighted average basis. A 25% cut in developed-country tariffs will be made on items of traditional export interest to LDCs. U.S. tariff cuts on LDC products, excluding textiles and apparel, average about 35%.

New non-tariff codes on subsidies, government procurement, standards, import licensing, and customs valuation will provide a much more open and stable environment for future trade growth for all nations. The procurement code alone will open over \$30 billion of trade to eligible countries. The agreements also provide a permanent legal basis for special and more favorable treatment of developing countries, accompanied by more liberal rules on trade measures taken by LDCs for development purposes. Since opportunities for trade expansion are probably the single most important feature of the world economy for most developing nations, the MTN agreements mark an enormous step forward in North-South economic relations.

Trade is also probably the most important area of U.S. economic relations with developing countries and provides the clearest example of mutual benefits for industrialized and developing countries alike. Exports are an important

generator of U.S. investment, production, employment, and income. The non-oil LDCs are by far the fastest growing market for U.S. exports, where our sales have tripled from \$16 billion in 1973 to \$48 billion in 1979.

Imports help dampen inflation and encourage competition and, hence, productivity. Despite the fact that the United States accounts for about 40% of the combined GNP of the industrial countries, in 1978 the United States took more than 52% of developing country manufactured exports to all industrial countries. Nearly 22% of all our manufactured imports in 1978 came from developing countries; the corresponding figure for all other industrial countries was less than 5%. U.S. economic growth since the global recession of 1975 has been particularly beneficial to the non-oil LDCs, whose exports grew much faster to the U.S.

The primary task before us now is to consolidate and make full use of those international economic instruments which have recently been put in place or improved

market than to either Japan or the European Community.

Energy. With strong support from the United States, the World Bank plans to support oil and gas projects which, combined with private and government financing, will total more than \$33 billion over the next 5 years. This should ultimately provide an additional 2.5 million barrels of oil equivalent a day to the world market. Our own Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) has established political risk insurance for oil exploration, production, and development in developing countries, with significant results already. These multilateral and bilateral efforts will help reduce the dependence of developing countries on expensive oil imports and, at the same time, improve the world energy balance—a clear example of mutual benefit to industrialized and developing countries alike.

Commodities. The United States supports the negotiation of stabilization agreements to reduce commodity price

volatility, to lessen inflation in the consuming countries, and stabilize resource availability for investment and growth in producing countries. The International Sugar Agreement was finalized in September 1977; the President signed the necessary authorizing legislation in April. The framework of an agreement for the Common Fund has been negotiated, and the full treaty is scheduled for completion in June. The Natural Rubber Agreement, completed in October 1979, is now receiving congressional consideration. The United States participated actively in the recent renegotiation of the International Tin Agreement and has offered to make a stockpile contribution to the current agreement.

In short, the previous U.S. policy of "rejecting commodity agreements on a case-by-case basis" has been replaced by a positive, constructive approach—because we believe such agreements are of mutual benefit to ourselves and the developing countries alike.

Food. The Administration has continually sought to improve world food security. It supported the creation of a \$1 billion International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), which is helping the developing countries increase their food production. We have pledged 4.5 million tons of food aid annually under the international Food Aid Convention, nearly half of its 10 million ton target. U.S. farmers, acting on government incentives, placed 35 million tons of grain in reserve during 1977-78; the value of this reserve was demonstrated last year when 14 million tons were released into the market in response to rising world demand. By ending the set-aside program in agriculture, we have helped provide more food for the world and more markets for our farmers. We have proposed the creation of a special domestic food aid security reserve of 4 million tons of grain, which will guarantee our ability to meet our food aid commitments even under tight market conditions. Indeed, the U.S. Government has already purchased the 4 million ton of wheat destined for this reserve.

The United States has been in the forefront in urging the multilateral development banks to help develop effective food strategies; in particular, we strongly support the World Bank's program to improve food distribution and storage infrastructure in developing countries. The World Bank is far and away the largest single source of external funding for agricultural and food

duction, providing over 40% of all special commitments to agriculture. Over the 5 years just ended, total lending commitments equaled \$11.6 billion, representing 33% of total lending. The World Bank expects to finance projects which will contribute approximately one-fifth of the increase in annual food production in its developing member countries in the 1980s.

Strengthening the Monetary System

As the world's central monetary institution, the IMF provides the basic framework for international monetary cooperation. Its resources are made available to all members, developed and developing, to help them implement economic adjustment programs to correct balance-of-payments problems. In the wake of the latest oil price increases, the IMF has expanded its financing activities and, in the early months of this year, has provided resources and made commitments amounting to \$2.8 billion—all for developing countries and more than it lent in all of 1979.

The IMF has increased substantially its resources available for its lending, through establishment in 1978 of both a \$10 billion Supplementary Financing Facility and its sixth quota increase (of which about a quarter goes to developing countries). These countries receive a similar share of Special Drawing Rights (SDR) allocations, which will total \$4 billion annually during 1979-81. The Fund will receive a further injection of resources from the seventh quota increase, scheduled to take effect this fall. Also, in light of the size of current payments imbalances and the attendant adjustment and financing requirements, the IMF will be conducting discussions with potential lenders on the terms and conditions on which the Fund could borrow additional resources, if and when the need arises.

The Fund has also greatly expanded access to its resources through the Supplementary Financing Facility, the substantial liberalization of the Compensatory Financing Facility, and the quota increases. As a result of these steps, member countries can in some cases obtain financing which exceeds 600% of their quota.

In view of the difficult adjustments which countries must make to the changed economic situation and new energy balance, the period of adjustment repayment associated with IMF financing has been increased. For example, economic adjustment programs can

30 Developed Countries

OECD Members

Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany, West
Greece
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Luxembourg
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
U.K.
U.S.

Centrally Planned Economies

Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia
Germany, East
Hungary
Poland
U.S.S.R.

now be implemented over a 3-year period compared with the 1-year programs normally required in the past. The maturities on IMF loans have been increased to 10 years on Extended Fund Facility drawings and 7 years on Supplementary Financing loans, compared with the 3-5 year repayment periods on regular IMF financing.

Finally, the IMF is examining further steps that might be taken to improve its ability to meet members' balance-of-payments requirements, including actions to reduce the interest cost on Supplementary Financing drawings and the possibility of using part of the Trust Fund repayments to ameliorate the conditions of loans to low-income developing countries.

Multilateral Development Banks

The multilateral development banks are a cost-effective and efficient means by which the United States can help developing countries help themselves. Because these institutions are at the heart of international efforts to address the fundamental concerns of the

developing countries, the Administration has been unwavering in its support of the banks.

For 1979 the Congress voted a record level of appropriations of \$2.5 billion for the multilateral development banks, up from \$700 million voted for FY 1977 before this Administration took office. We have supported a capital increase for the World Bank of \$40 billion and a replenishment of almost \$10 billion for the Inter-American Development Bank. We participated in a new replenishment of over \$2 billion for the Asian Development Fund and an expansion of membership that will increase the capital of the African Development Bank by \$4.5 billion. For International Development Association (IDA), the largest concessional assistance program in the world, we have completed our contribution of 31% to the fifth replenishment of \$7.6 billion and have pledged 27% to the sixth replenishment of \$12 billion for 1980-82.

The Need for Congressional Action

Implementation of many of these initiatives now requires congressional action. Several pieces of commodity legislation are still pending. Early floor action is needed on the latest IMF quota increase, already reported out by the Senate Foreign Relations and House Banking Committees.

Most urgent, however, is passage of the necessary authorization and appropriations legislation for the multilateral development banks. The failure of Congress to do so has already resulted in a suspension of lending from the Inter-American Development Bank and the Asian Development Fund. This can have severe economic and political consequences for developing countries throughout the world. It also weakens U.S. influence in these institutions, and in overall North-South relations, and leads other donor countries to doubt our pledges across a wide range of negotiations. This is an untenable position for the United States.

Such congressional inactions seriously damage the moral, political, and economic leadership role of the United States. At the recent meeting of the IMF Interim Committee and IMF/IBRD Development Committee in Hamburg, criticism of U.S. delays concerning the multilateral development banks was a major topic. Many developed and developing countries expressed their acute concern, both formally during the

meetings and informally in the corridors. Many countries drew attention to the fact that any cessation of multilateral-development-bank lending caused by U.S. inaction would adversely affect development prospects in a large number of countries at a time of greatly growing need.

Countries were also troubled that the current problems concerning the regional development banks might spill over into the whole range of multilateral-development-bank issues, including the IDA sixth replenishment and the IBRD General Capital Increase. These concerns were expressed explicitly in the recent development committee communique, where legislative difficulties were singled out as threatening a hiatus in the commitment authority of the banks.

U.S. failure to meet its pledges to the multilateral development banks is rapidly becoming a major issue in U.S. relations with the developing world. The concerns expressed in Hamburg will almost certainly be echoed in other North-South fora unless we move quickly to repair the situation.

The IMF and the World Bank provide complementary sources of external capital. In the narrow sense, they have distinctly different functions and objectives. Yet both aim fundamentally at a strong global economy. The energy situation has brought to the surface the widespread need for structural adjustment in all oil-importing countries—developed and developing countries alike.

By cooperating closely, the Fund and World Bank can enable countries to undertake the needed medium-term structural adjustments, while simultaneously meeting the shorter term external financing needs. Fund policies aimed at eliminating internal and external imbalances can be reinforced with structural adjustment programs supported by the Bank. However, without strong and unwavering support from the United States for these two institutions, as well as the regional development banks, the international financial institutions will be unable to demonstrate the flexibility and strength necessary to meet the economic challenge before us.

Conclusion

There has been considerable progress during the past few years in North-South relations. In the process of attaining this progress, we have sought to insure that the policies adopted will provide benefits for the United States as

well as for the developing countries. Indeed, this is the only politically viable way in which such progress can be made.

The primary task before us now is to consolidate and make full use of those international economic instruments which have recently been put in place or improved, most of which I have discussed today. Once we have implemented the new agreements and given them a chance to work, we can determine what further steps need to be taken.

At home, this requires timely and faithful implementation—including by the Congress—of the various steps which have been worked out internationally. Abroad, it requires patience and perseverance in effectively utilizing the agreements of the late 1970s. By building on the progress made on specific issues in functionally specific fora over the past few years, we can hope to evolve a more stable and equitable world economy in the 1980s and beyond.

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

GLOSSARY

Brandt Commission. An independent commission on international economic issues headed by former West German Chancellor Willy Brandt and created in September 1977 at the suggestion of World Bank President Robert McNamara. It gathered information and proposed solutions to North-South problems. The commission issued its report on North-South relations in February 1980.

Common Fund. A fund to finance commodity buffer stocks as proposed in the 1976 Nairobi UNCTAD IV integrated program for commodities.

Compensatory Financing Facility. An IMF program established in 1963 to finance temporary export shortfalls, as in coffee, sugar, or other cyclically prone export items, for reasons beyond the member's control; member must cooperate with the IMF to find appropriate solutions (100% of quota; repayment in 3-5 years).

Conference on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC). A conference of 8 industrial nations, 7 oil-producing nations, and 12 developing countries held in several sessions between December 1975

and June 1977. The CIEC was sometimes referred to as the North-South dialogue.

Developed Countries. Countries with relatively high per capita GNP, education, levels of industrial development and production, health and welfare, and agricultural productivity. International agencies differ in their classification of countries but, in general, the developed countries are considered to be the 24 OECD members and six centrally planned economy countries of Eastern Europe, including the U.S.S.R.

Developing Countries. The remaining countries of the world. They are largely poor and lack significant industry and efficient agriculture, although there is no uniform definition in terms of wealth or economic structure. The OPEC members, for example, are considered developing nations.

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). A multilateral trade treaty negotiated and signed in 1947. The original 23 signatory nations had been appointed by ECOSOC to draft a charter for a proposed international trade organization. Since the charter was never ratified, GATT, intended to be an interim agreement, remains the only code of conduct for international trade accepted by the countries responsible for most of the world's trade. GATT has 83 members plus 23 developing countries participating under special arrangements.

Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). A system approved by GATT in 1971 which authorizes developed countries to give preferential tariff treatment to developing countries. The United States adopted the system in 1976.

Global Negotiations. The 34th U.N. General Assembly in the fall of 1979 adopted a resolution calling for a special session in August-September 1980 to decide on launching a new round of international economic negotiations. These negotiations—to include issues of raw materials, energy, trade, development, money, and finance—have come to be called "global negotiations."

Group of 77. A majority of developing countries that has its origins in the "caucus of 75" developing countries preparatory to UNCTAD I in Geneva in 1964. By the time UNCTAD I had completed its deliberations the group had expanded by two members and issued a "Joint Declaration of the 77 Developing Countries" appraising the work of the conference. The numerical designation for the group has persisted, although in 1980 the membership is 119.

The G-77 has continued to function as a caucus for the developing countries on economic matters in UNCTAD and many other fora of the U.N. system. Although regional differences, level of development, trade relationships, and resource endowment have continued to provide areas of potential and actual cleavage within the group, it remains politically cohesive. The group includes

PEC countries with per capita incomes higher than any developed country as well as the world's poorest nations.

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, or World Bank). Created as a companion organization to the International Monetary Fund as a result of the 1944 Bretton Woods conference, the IBRD began its operations in 1946. Its purpose, after initially emphasizing the reconstruction of Europe after World War II, has been to lend funds at commercial rates and to provide technical assistance in order to facilitate economic development in its poorer member countries. The Bank works closely with other international organizations in preparing and identifying development projects in such areas as agriculture, education, electric power, transportation, and family planning.

IBRD funds are derived from members' subscriptions, sales of its own securities and profits of its own loans, repayments, and net earnings. Membership in the IMF is a prerequisite to membership in the IBRD.

International Development Association (IDA). The IDA was established in 1959 as an affiliate of the World Bank group. It lends money to developing countries at no interest and for a long repayment period (soft loans), because many developing countries cannot afford development loans at ordinary rates of interest and in the time span of conventional loans. IDA's funds are furnished by regular "replenishments" from member countries and by loans from the IBRD.

International Monetary Fund (IMF). An independent international organization created in 1945 as a result of the 1944 Bretton Woods conference, the IMF's chief purpose is the maintenance of international monetary stability. Members are assessed a membership quota to create the monetary fund; the standard rule is that 25% of the member's quota must be paid in gold and 75% in the member's own currency. The IMF's resources are used as a revolving fund that does not need to be replenished; whenever the Fund sells an amount in one currency to a member state, it obtains an equivalent amount in another currency.

Nonaligned Movement. A grouping of nations that have deliberately chosen not to be politically or militarily associated with either the West or the Communist bloc. Although this movement has its roots in a 1955 meeting of the leaders of 25 Asian and African countries at Bandung, Indonesia, it began formal meetings using the name "nonaligned countries" in Belgrade in 1961. At a Cairo meeting preparatory to the Belgrade conference, the countries adopted a definition of nonalignment which states that a nonaligned country must: "1) pursue an independent policy based on peaceful coexistence; 2) not participate in any multilateral

military alliance . . . 3) support liberation and independence movements; and 4) not participate in bilateral military alliances with the Great Powers."

Six nonaligned summit meetings have been held—Belgrade (1961), Cairo (1964), Lusaka (1970), Algiers (1973), Colombo (1976), and Havana (1979). Interim leadership of the nonaligned countries rests with the country that last hosted a summit meeting. (A list of the 95 members of the nonaligned movement was printed in the February 1980 BULLETIN, p. 35.)

North-South Dialogue. Refers to economic discussions between the North (the industrialized developed countries generally located in the Northern Hemisphere) and the South (the developing countries located mainly in the Southern Hemisphere). Although the term "North-South dialogue" is used as a synonym for the CIEC, North-South issues are discussed at a number of international forums. The Soviet Union and its allies generally remain aloof from the North-South dialogue and only occasionally actively participate in North-South discussions. The Communist countries respond to the growing pressures to be more forthcoming toward LDC demands with the argument that LDC problems are the result of past colonialism and capitalism and, therefore, are the sole responsibility of the West.

Official Development Assistance. This is defined by the OECD's Development Assistance Committee as:

"Those flows to developing countries and multilateral institutions provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies, each transaction of which meets the following tests: a) it is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective and b) it is concessional in character and contains a grant element of at least 25 percent."

Official development assistance may be in the form of soft loans, bilateral grants, or multilateral flows of various types.

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The OECD was created in 1961 with 22 members—the industrialized market economies of North America, Europe, and the Far East. Its objectives are to promote economic growth among member nations, to contribute to the economic development of both member and nonmember nations, and to further world trade. A prominent organ of the OECD is the Development Assistance Committee, which coordinates and tabulates the official development assistance given by OECD members to developing countries. The membership is currently 24.

Supplementary Financing Facility. This IMF facility provides larger amounts and for longer periods in order to support economic programs under standby arrangements reaching into the upper credit

tranches or under extended arrangements. Members are subject to relevant policies on conditionality, phasing, and performance criteria (102.5–140%) of quota; repayment in 3.5–7 years.

Third World. Refers to those countries with underdeveloped but growing economies, often with colonial pasts and low per capita incomes. "Third World" is often used interchangeably with the terms "less developed countries," "developing countries," or "the South." In the 1970s a "Fourth World" has been distinguished from the Third World to include those developing countries with little economic growth, few natural resources, lack of financial reserves, and with annual per capita incomes below \$200. Two main branches of Third World institutions are the nonaligned movement (which acts primarily as the political caucus of the Third World) and the Group of 77 (which functions as the economic voice of the Third World).

U.N. Development Decades. A term used by the United Nations to refer to its 10-year plans for international development strategy in achieving eventual economic self-sufficiency in developing countries. The First Development Decade, proclaimed by President Kennedy in an address to the U.N. General Assembly on September 25, 1961, set as its goal a minimum rate of growth in national income of 5% in developing countries by the end of the decade. Developed countries were asked to provide 1% of their national incomes as financial aid to developing countries.

The Second Development Decade, adopted at the 25th General Assembly in 1970, called for an annual growth rate of at least 6% in the GNP of developing countries, an annual growth rate of 3.5% in per capita income in these countries, and resource transfers of at least 1% (of which 0.7% should be official development assistance) of GNP from developed countries.

Negotiations are now underway for a development strategy for the Third Development Decade—the 1980s. ■

The Global 2000 Report

Following are the President's and the Secretary's statements of July 24, 1980, on The Global 2000 Report to the President: Entering the Twenty-First Century, together with the major findings and conclusions taken from volume 1 of that report.

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT¹

Shortly after assuming office in 1977, I directed the Council on Environmental Quality, the Department of State, and other government agencies to study the profound changes that may take place in our world's population, natural resources, and environment through the end of the century.

Never before had our government or any government attempted to take such a comprehensive, long-range look at interrelated global issues such as world population, agriculture, water resources, forest resources, energy needs, and the overall environmental quality of the Earth we live on.

The *Global 2000* study is now complete. Its report projects global conditions which could develop by the end of this century, assuming that present trends and patterns around the world continue. Many of the report's findings must be of great concern to all of us. These findings point to developments related to the world's peoples and resources that our prompt attention can begin to alleviate. We will make use of the information from the *Global 2000* report in carrying out public policy wherever possible. In addition, we must continue to analyze the serious issues it raises.

It is important to understand that the conditions the report projects are by no means inevitable. In fact, its projections can and should be timely warnings which will alert the nations of the world to the need for vigorous, determined action, at both the national and international levels.

The United States is not alone in responding to global population, natural resources, and environmental issues. The recent Venice summit declaration committed the Western industrial nations to cooperate with developing countries in addressing global food, energy, and population problems. The summit nations agreed on the need for a

better understanding of the implications of resource availability and population growth for economic development. In the United Nations many of the key issues raised in the *Global 2000* report are being included in the formulation of a new international development strategy.

A number of U.S. and international responses to critical global issues are already underway. For example, since the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment in 1972, our government has contributed actively to a series of world conferences on these issues and to followup actions.

Nonetheless, given the importance, scope, and complexity of the challenges set forth in the report, I believe America must provide special leadership in addressing global conditions. I am, therefore, today appointing a Presidential Task Force on Global Resources and the Environment, to be chaired by the Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality, and to include the Secretary of State, the Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs and Policy, the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. The task force will report to me as soon as possible with recommendations for action in problem areas needing priority attention. I am directing other Federal agencies to cooperate with and support the task force's efforts.

I am also directing the State Department to raise the issues and problems identified in the *Global 2000* report in all appropriate international meetings, and I myself will raise them as well. For example, in my second environmental message last August, I expressed my concern about the loss of tropical forests. For immediate action on this critical problem, I am directing all relevant Federal agencies to respond within 60 days to the Interagency Task Force Report on Tropical Forests, which was submitted to me last month. In their responses, agencies will detail the steps they will take to carry out the report's recommendations. In receiving these reports, the Interagency Task Force on Tropical Forests will operate as an arm of the

Presidential Task Force on Global Resources and the Environment. Finally, I am requesting the Commission of the Eighties to give careful attention to these global issues.

There are less than 20 years left in our 20th century. The time to look forward to the world we want to have in the year 2000 and leave to succeeding generations is now. It is my firm belief that we can build a future in which all people lead full, decent lives in harmony with a healthy and habitable planet. And I believe that the skills, experience, vision, and courage of the American people today make the United States a natural leader in charting and guiding humanity's course toward a better world tomorrow.

SECRETARY'S STATEMENT²

World population growth, the degradation of the Earth's natural resource base, and the spread of environmental pollution collectively threaten the welfare of mankind. If these challenges are ignored, they will overwhelm our efforts to improve the quality of life and social opportunities for the world's people, including our own. If they are met and successfully overcome, we will face the 21st century with renewed hope and security. This is the essential message of *Global 2000*.

Global 2000 is not a prediction. It is merely one vision of the consequences of present trends. Even with a decline in the rate of population growth, world population is expected to exceed 6 billion by the turn of the century. Even with major advances, it will be an enormous challenge to feed these billions, house them in our cities, and provide even modest social and economic opportunity.

This social challenge is matched by the challenge to our resources, particularly our supplies of fuel. Pressure will increase on our forests; our coal, oil, and natural gas; our stores of basic metals; and our supply of the most fundamental of all resources—air, water, and land.

The world community will have difficulty coping with these challenges. Many reflect longstanding social, cultural, and economic preferences and life styles, including our own. In addition,

financial and technological resources available to governments to find remedies are limited, here as well as elsewhere. But the *Global 2000* report is not a fatal prophecy merely waiting to be played out. Prompt action can change the pace and direction of present trends.

Our own record is frankly mixed. We remain, in overall dollar terms, the largest contributor to international programs on family planning, food production, environmental protection, disaster relief, health services, and others. Even our contribution is pitifully small when measured against the need. And even this modest commitment to the world's future comes under regular attack, and opponents have succeeded too often in recent years. This is because we do not have a foreign aid bill at all. We are operating at 30% below target. Our commitment ought to be a national embarrassment, whatever the name of the opponents. *Global 2000* demonstrates, I think, just how important our investment in the welfare of our neighbors can be and just how great are the human costs of shortsighted policies.

The study concludes that, if present trends continue, the world in 2000 will be more crowded, more polluted, less stable ecologically, and more vulnerable to disruptions than the world today. Barring revolutionary advances in technology, life for most people on earth will be more precarious in 2000 than it is now—unless the nations of the world act decisively to alter current trends. To avoid such a world, people, through their governments, must re dedicate themselves to the fight against the fundamental enemies: overpopulation, hunger, and the supply of energy.

First and foremost, we must come to grips with the tremendous growth in world population. With a projected 55% increase in world population by the end of the century—90% of it in developing countries—the prospects for increased disorder and social disruption are high. When the United States are the largest contributor, by far, to international programs to address it. We now contribute about \$200 million a year to family planning in the developing countries. If we doubled that contribution in 1985—and if others joined us—we could have 3 billion fewer people on earth when population finally stabilizes. And stability might come 20

years sooner. That would be quite a return on our investment.

A second major target illuminated by *Global 2000* is world food supply. Despite significant increases in production, the food supply will be unchanged or worse for the poorest of the world's people in large regions of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The United States has been a world leader in this area. We have shared our knowledge—as well as our food aid—freely and effectively. Where we have been generous, we can point to startling success. India, for example, is now able to meet its own food needs in no small part due to U.S. assistance in the 1950s and 1960s.

Yet even if we keep up with population growth and maintain current dietary levels to the year 2000, there will still be an estimated 800 million people with not enough to eat. Clearly the cost to meet their needs does not exceed our resources. It must not exceed our will.

Energy has been a dominant concern here at home. People in other parts of the world, particularly in the developing nations, have also faced severe difficulties as energy prices have risen. And the *Global 2000* prognosis for the poorest two-thirds of humanity is bleak. The introduction of small, low-cost energy alternatives has become a high priority need not only in the United States but for all mankind. We have begun this work. We must do more.

The issues of global resources and environmental protection have been a fundamental concern of mine as long as I have been in public life. They are a fundamental concern of the Carter Administration as well. President Carter asked for *Global 2000* in one of his first directives. Under his leadership, policies and programs are changing. But he needs the support of the Congress. He needs the support of the American people. After all, food programs make sense to our own farmers as well as to hungry people around the world. Energy alternatives are just as valuable to us as to our neighbors. Our stake in these programs is fundamental. It ought to be obvious as well.

A great deal more needs to be done, and the United States has a special role to play. We ought to acknowledge our responsibilities and commit ourselves to carry our full share of the international burden. We ought to ask other nations to join us.

What we *cannot* do is back away

from the conclusions of *Global 2000*. The stakes are too high—for the United States and for mankind.

These are not problems which will yield to simplistic response. They cannot be ignored despite our very real problems here at home. But they are problems which will yield to the best efforts of mankind. Since the days of Malthus, those who predicted doom for humanity have been wrong. They have been wrong because they discounted the vision of nations and the willingness of the Earth's people to respond to the need for change.

If we begin our work now, we will say in 20 years that the *Global 2000* was also wrong. And we will congratulate ourselves for having the foresight to build a better future.

MAJOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

If present trends continue, the world in 2000 will be more crowded, more polluted, less stable ecologically, and more vulnerable to disruption than the world we live in now. Serious stresses involving population, resources, and environment are clearly visible ahead. Despite greater material output, the world's people will be poorer in many ways than they are today.

For hundreds of millions of the desperately poor, the outlook for food and other necessities of life will be no better. For many it will be worse. Barring revolutionary advances in technology, life for most people on earth will be more precarious in 2000 than it is now—unless the nations of the world act decisively to alter current trends.

This, in essence, is the picture emerging from the U.S. Government's projections of probable changes in world population, resources, and environment by the end of the century, as presented in the *Global 2000* Study. They do not predict what will occur. Rather, they depict conditions that are likely to develop if there are no changes in public policies, institutions, or rates of technological advance, and if there are no wars or other major disruptions. A keener awareness of the nature of the current trends, however, may induce changes that will alter these trends and the projected outcome.

Principal Findings

Rapid growth in world population will hardly have altered by 2000. The

world's population will grow from 4 billion in 1975 to 6.35 billion in 2000, an increase of more than 50 percent. The rate of growth will slow only marginally, from 1.8 percent a year to 1.7 percent. In terms of sheer numbers, population will be growing faster in 2000 than it is today, with 100 million people added each year compared with 75 million in 1975. Ninety percent of this growth will occur in the poorest countries.

While the economies of the less developed countries (LDCs) are expected to grow at faster rates than those of the industrialized nations, the gross national product per capita in most LDCs remains low. The average gross national product per capita is projected to rise substantially in some LDCs (especially in Latin America), but in the great populous nations of South Asia it remains below \$200 a year (in 1975 dollars). The large existing gap between the rich and poor nations widens.

World food production is projected to increase 90 percent over the 30 years from 1970 to 2000. This translates into a global per capita increase of less than 15 percent over the same period. The bulk of that increase goes to countries that already have relatively high per capita food consumption. Meanwhile per capita consumption in South Asia, the Middle East, and the LDCs of Africa will scarcely improve or will actually decline below present inadequate levels. At the same time, real prices for food are expected to double.

Arable land will increase only 4 percent by 2000, so that most of the increased output of food will have to come from higher yields. Most of the elements that now contribute to higher yields—fertilizer, pesticides, power for irrigation, and fuel for machinery—depend heavily on oil and gas.

During the 1990s world oil production will approach geological estimates of maximum production capacity, even with rapidly increasing petroleum prices. The Study projects that the richer industrialized nations will be able to command enough oil and other commercial energy supplies to meet rising demands through 1990. With the expected price increases, many less developed countries will have increasing difficulties meeting energy needs. For the one-quarter of humankind that depends primarily on wood for fuel, the outlook is bleak. Needs for fuelwood will exceed available supplies by about 25 percent before the turn of the century.

While the world's finite fuel resources—coal, oil, gas, oil shale, tar sands, and uranium—are theoretically sufficient for centuries, they are not evenly distributed; they pose difficult economic and environmental problems; and they vary greatly in their amenability to exploitation and use.

Nonfuel mineral resources generally appear sufficient to meet projected demands through 2000, but further discoveries and investments will be needed to maintain reserves. In addition, production costs will increase with energy prices and may make some nonfuel mineral resources uneconomic. The quarter of the world's population that inhabits industrial countries will continue to absorb three-fourths of the world's mineral production.

Regional water shortages will become more severe. In the 1970–2000 period population growth alone will cause requirements for water to double in nearly half the world. Still greater increases would be needed to improve standards of living. In many LDCs, water supplies will become increasingly erratic by 2000 as a result of extensive deforestation. Development of new water supplies will become more costly virtually everywhere.

Significant losses of world forests will continue over the next 20 years as demand for forest products and fuelwood increases. Growing stocks of commercial-size timber are projected to decline 50 percent per capita. The world's forests are now disappearing at the rate of 18–20 million hectares a year (an area half the size of California), with most of the loss occurring in the humid tropical forests of Africa, Asia, and South America. The projections indicate that by 2000 some 40 percent of the remaining forest cover in LDCs will be gone.

Serious deterioration of agricultural soils will occur worldwide, due to erosion, loss of organic matter, desertification, salinization, alkalization, and water logging. Already, an area of cropland and grassland approximately the size of Maine is becoming barren wasteland each year, and the spread of desert-like conditions is likely to accelerate.

Atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide and ozone-depleting chemicals are expected to increase at rates that could alter the world's climate and upper atmosphere significantly by 2050. Acid rain from increased combustion of

fossil fuels (especially coal) threatens damage to lakes, soils, and crops. Radioactive and other hazardous materials present health and safety problems in increasing numbers of countries.

Extinctions of plant and animal species will increase dramatically. Hundreds of thousands of species—perhaps as many as 20 percent of all species on earth—will be irretrievably lost as their habitats vanish, especially in tropical forests.

The future depicted by the U.S. Government projections, briefly outlined above, may actually understate the impending problems. The methods available for carrying out the Study to certain gaps and inconsistencies tend to impart an optimistic bias. For example, most of the individual projections for the various sectors studied—food, minerals, energy, and so on—assume that sufficient capital, energy, water, and land will be available in each of these sectors to meet their needs, regardless of the competing needs of the other sectors. More consistent, better integrated projections would produce a still more emphatic picture of intensifying stresses, as the world enters the twenty-first century.

Conclusions

At present and projected growth rates the world's population would reach 6 billion by 2030 and would approach 7 billion by the end of the twenty-first century. These levels correspond closely to estimates by the U.S. National Academy of Sciences of the maximum carrying capacity of the entire earth. Already the populations of sub-Saharan Africa and in the Himalayan hills of Asia have exceeded the carrying capacity of the immediate area, triggering an erosion of the land capacity to support life. The resulting poverty and ill health have further complicated efforts to reduce fertility. Unless this circle of interlinked problems is broken soon, population growth in such areas will unfortunately be slowed for reasons other than declining birth rates. Hunger and disease will claim more babies and young children and more of those surviving will be mentally and physically handicapped children malnourished.

Indeed, the problems of preserving the carrying capacity of the earth and sustaining the possibility of a decent life for the human beings that inhabi

Human Freedom: America's Vision

Secretary Muskie

Address before the United Steelworkers of America in Los Angeles on August 7, 1980.¹

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stand for human freedom. It is what makes us as a people. It is what distinguishes us from our adversaries. It is our compass in the world to defend our freedoms at home and to advance human freedom around the world.

There are those who suggest that the freedom of other people is none of our business, that with enough military muscle our freedom can be secure while the freedom of others is stifled, that our purpose in the world is to preserve the status quo.

I say, and I believe you say, that is an invitation to trouble. It is a narrow vision of ourselves and of the world. It would be a foreign policy of reaction.

We must, of course, equip ourselves with the arms to defend our vital interests. But that's not enough. We must also equip ourselves with the conviction that our values have increasing power in today's world.

For if America is not the companion of human progress in the world, if we do not work to shape events in progressive directions, the world will pass us by. If we do not promote freedom in the world, we will be less free in the future of Americans.

Today, let me describe to you the values of freedom we must promote and the tools we need to promote it.

First is the freedom of nations: the freedom of nations, including our own, to be independent, to be free of outside domination. That has been and is the enduring goal of U.S. foreign policy. But it cannot be our only goal, for America's national interest, America's national values, require that we support other values of freedom in the world.

This Administration is committed to a second kind of freedom: the political freedom of people within nations.

And we are committed to a third kind of freedom from poverty and human misery, conditions that destroy human lives and create unrest in the world.

A narrower approach, an approach

which ignores the hopes and needs of people within nations, cannot succeed. For it would ignore the political stirring of humanity, the current of human freedom that is gaining strength in the world. And when peaceful change is frustrated, violent and radical change can explode in a storm that damages America's interests and creates opportunities for our adversaries.

So when Soviet troops seek to crush the freedom of an independent nation, we will oppose it.

When an adversary threatens our vital interest in the Persian Gulf, in Europe, in the Caribbean, in Asia or elsewhere, we will oppose them.

When foreign governments allow the seizure of American citizens, as in Iran, we will not give up until they are home safe and free.

And when governments anywhere suppress the freedoms of their own people, when malaria or malnutrition degrade human lives, we will oppose that as well.

We believe, in short, that America can flourish best in a world in which freedom is growing—freedom in all its aspects: national independence, political liberty, and freedom from hunger, poverty, and disease.

To promote these freedoms, we need to maintain a foreign policy that rests on four pillars.

- The first is an unwavering commitment to our security through a strong defense, solid alliances, and unyielding opposition to aggression.

- The second is an unrelenting effort to help resolve the regional disputes that threaten peace.

- The third is our foreign assistance programs which support the security and progress of other nations around the world, while providing us with the influence we need to advance our interests.

- The fourth is our support for human rights and human dignity.

In each of these four areas, this Administration has been active, and it has achieved results. The world is an unruly place. The headlines will always reflect new crises and new challenges. But I'm

tired of hearing the fear merchants who overstate the dangers and undersell America for their own political profit. Let's listen to the facts and not their fears.

Military Modernization

First, this Administration is devoted heart and soul and sinew to a strong national defense. We have undertaken the most sweeping military modernization program in nearly 20 years.

In the 8 years before President Carter took office, real defense spending after inflation had declined by more than 35%.

Since taking office, this Administration has increased real defense spending every year by 10% overall.

We are modernizing every element of our strategic nuclear forces, with the new MX missile on land, with a new Trident submarine and missile at sea, and with new cruise missiles in the air. We are building a new rapid deployment force and obtaining new basing rights abroad to strengthen our hand in emergencies. We have led our NATO allies in several major initiatives: a new long-term modernization of NATO's conventional forces, real increases in allied defense spending, and deployment of new missiles in the European theater to meet the Soviet buildup.

Let us be clear. This military modernization program has, and will continue to involve, heavy costs. Our 5-year defense program will put defense spending in fiscal 1985 at a level more than 25% higher than in fiscal 1978. This is a price we must pay to preserve our strength.

In recent weeks, you and I have heard this effort described as inadequate. We have heard the call for a military buying binge. And we have heard demands that we radically alter our fundamental national security objective from a stable military balance to a quest for across-the-board military superiority.

Let there be no mistake. That is a prescription for a dramatic new arms race. For having achieved a position of equivalence, the Soviet Union will not accept military inferiority anymore than we will—no matter what the price to the people of the Soviet Union.

The costs of a new arms race would

be staggering. We would have to cut back significantly on vital human services. And most importantly, we would increase the risk of a nuclear nightmare.

The consequence of a new arms race would not be greater security. It would be greater insecurity at home and abroad.

And there is a further point. In this effort to achieve military superiority, we would destroy the future of arms control. For arms control can only move forward on the basis of genuine equivalence. That is the basis of the preliminary agreement reached with the Soviets by President Ford in Vladivostok in 1974. It is the basis of the SALT II Treaty. It is the basis on which we have agreed with our allies to pursue further arms control, including limits in Europe.

Let us have no illusions. If we abandon the quest for arms control now, if we cast aside the treaty negotiated by three Presidents—two Republicans and one Democrat—the threats we face will be greater. Our knowledge about Soviet military plans will be less certain. Our own defense will be more difficult.

Today America is strong, and we are growing stronger. We have already reversed more than a decade of inattention to our national defense. We are prepared as a nation to spend whatever is needed.

But we must be as hard on over-spending on the military as we are on waste in our domestic programs. And we should reject outmoded military doctrines that add danger to an already dangerous world.

Our commitment to the freedom of nations also means that we must be prepared to oppose aggression against the freedom of others.

Every day Afghan people are dying in defense of freedom. Every day the Soviet Union is paying a price for their aggression. Every day the free nations of the world must demonstrate their opposition to this assault on freedom.

Measures like our grain embargo and the Olympic boycott express not only our disapproval; they express the readiness of the American people to sacrifice in the cause of freedom. These sacrifices were necessary. And they have been felt in the Soviet Union.

I am proud of our athletes who did not go to Moscow, and I know you are, too. I am proud of our farmers and our businessmen and workers who have given up exports to send the Soviets a message. And I know you are, too. For the

message has been received in an Olympics that was a sham, in declining meat supplies on Soviet shelves, and in the stinging rebuke of world opinion.

The rhetoric of the past few weeks calls for us to be firmer on Soviet aggression but to reverse the grain embargo, to write off the Olympic boycott, to conduct business as usual.

There is a short answer. We cannot fight Soviet aggression more by doing less.

We know, and the American people know, that we cannot oppose aggression abroad without exerting ourselves at home. We know, and the American people know, that security cannot be bought without sacrifice. To suggest otherwise in the hope of gaining partisan advantage is not leadership but expediency.

Achieving Peace

A second element of a foreign policy of freedom is to build peace: to help achieve peaceful, negotiated settlements to dangerous disputes in the world.

You know of President Carter's patient efforts to bring forth an agreement between Israel and Egypt at Camp David. That agreement was a beginning, not an end. It was the beginning of a long and difficult process that is not yet over. Camp David was one of the finest achievements of this or any other Administration. It has already produced peace between Israel and Egypt. And it provides the only practical process yet devised that can lead to a comprehensive peace.

In a similar fashion, the Panama Canal Treaty, which ended 14 long years of negotiations, healed festering resentments in Latin America and laid the groundwork for sounder relations between the United States and our neighbors in this hemisphere.

To build peace and buttress our strategic position, we have normalized relations with the People's Republic of China.

President Carter's unswerving support for a negotiated settlement in Rhodesia helped end a bitter and bloody civil war. It helped bring forth a new nation, Zimbabwe, based on majority rule and minority rights. It helped calm a dispute that could have become a broader conflict in Africa. By working toward a settlement, by refusing to lift sanctions against Rhodesia until a fair settlement

was insured, we emphasized not only our commitment to peace but our willingness to support abroad the principles of democracy and freedom we espouse at home.

Lloyd McBride and the steelworker stood by the President in that difficult moment. You supported continuing the sanctions until a fair, free election could be held. You can be proud that this union has contributed in an important way to a solution that fostered peace.

There is a lesson in this experience. The same people who call now for a narrow vision of our foreign policies were bitterly opposed to our approach in southern Africa. Had they prevailed, there would not have been a settlement in Rhodesia. The fighting would have raged on. This would have been bad for the people of Zimbabwe, bad for the region, bad for our allies, bad for us, and good only for the Soviets who stood to profit from conflict.

Foreign Assistance

A third element of a foreign policy of freedom is helping developing nations defend their independence, expand their economies, and dispel poverty.

For a good many years, this union and its members have understood an important fact—that a generous foreign assistance program is not a giveaway but a gateway: a gateway to new markets and new influence for the United States and gateway to greater world stability.

That fact needs to be better understood by the American people.

American foreign assistance dollars are investments we make in others and ourselves. These U.S. investments mean security aid to nations whose independence is threatened by outside intervention. These investments mean economic development for poorer nations. They help developing countries buy American equipment to build highways and dams, help hire American experts to strengthen their institutions, help them produce the food and the jobs that increase living standards for their people. And these investments directly benefit our own people.

Seventy cents of every dollar we commit for country-to-country development programs are spent here in the United States. They purchase American goods and American services, from farm

ment to technical training. Those purchases amounted to nearly \$2 billion a year alone. Our Agency for International Development has spent over \$650 million for goods and services just in California over the past 10 years. Well over a billion dollars last year went to American farmers for grain and other agricultural commodities.

The economic return to the American people goes beyond what is spent here, our investments in development had create new markets for U.S. goods. Every dollar we pay into institutions like the World Bank, for example, generates between \$2 and \$3 of new growth in our own economy. The activities of these development banks mean 100-100,000 new American jobs each year.

In such transactions everyone gains. The United States gains jobs and markets and the capacity to help shape events in constructive ways. Small, struggling nations gain strength against aggression and subversion; they gain economic and social progress. Millions of people gain the beginnings of a better life. And the cause of freedom also gains. So I would urge you to continue to fund these programs and help defeat strikes and cuts recently suffered in the progress. Together, we must convince the American people that the defense of freedom requires not only a strong military fist but also an extended hand.

Human Rights

Finally, let me emphasize a fourth element of a foreign policy of freedom: support for human rights.

Throughout a long history of struggle for success, the trade union movement in general, and the steelworkers in particular, have supported that cause.

Today, as hundreds of thousands of refugees flee from assaults on human rights around the world, the steelworkers once again are showing their concern. Your effort on behalf of the AFL-CIO and the bodia Crisis Campaign, which Lloyd Bentsen unveiled this week, is a dramatic testament to the power of this great union for good. And it is an eloquent expression of your support for human rights.

Human rights has been a special concern of this Administration.

We stand for the right of people to be free of torture and repression, to choose their leaders, to participate in the decisions that affect their daily lives, to speak and write and travel freely.

There are limits on our capacity to influence affairs in other countries. And we must seek a practical approach that builds the long-term strength of our friends. But the fact that there are obstacles and risks should not keep us from holding up the banner of human rights—and it will not.

Ultimately, our firm support for human rights, for human freedom, will help build a more stable world. It will help remove the causes of violent and convulsive change.

There is, in various places in the world, a strong tide for human rights. We see the evidence for this in Spain, in Greece, in Portugal, in Ghana, in Nigeria, in Ecuador and in Peru, in other nations which have recently embraced and strengthened democracy. America cannot claim sole credit for these developments. But we can take pride that we have encouraged abroad the freedoms we enjoy at home, for they run hand in hand.

I have sketched the outlines of the foreign policy of freedom: a strong emphasis on security, a vigorous quest for peace, concrete development for nations and peoples, and practical support for human rights. This has been our policy for the past 4 years. And despite the difficulties, despite limits to our influence, it is working.

We must not succumb to the voices which say we should now turn back. These voices are pessimistic about the possibilities of freedom in the world. They see change abroad, for the most part, as dangerous for America. They are hostile to it. We see in change not only threats to be met but opportunities to be seized.

Their voices sound a note of fear, rather than hope, when they speak about the world. They have cried out against our efforts to strengthen the center in Nicaragua and to pursue prudent arms limitation agreements.

Above all, these voices suggest that our defense of freedom should be concentrated almost exclusively in arms.

We do need to revitalize our military. And we are. America can and will do all that is necessary to maintain its military position, to counter aggression, and to deter war.

America is and will remain a global power, second to none. But I believe the American people understand that a foreign policy premised on a renewed arms race is a foreign policy of folly, not wisdom; of weakness, not strength.

I believe the American people will rightly refuse to write a blank check for belligerence. America's purpose is not a new cold war but a realistic peace based on a solid foundation of deterrence.

We must seek security not only in arms but also in a diplomacy that is generous, that is willing to cope with inevitable change, that is faithful to decent human values. If we do that, we can be in the 1980s not only as strong as steel but as resilient and enduring. We can be not only a fortress of arms but a fortress of hope and freedom as well.

¹ Press release 210 (opening paragraphs omitted). ■

News Conference of August 7 (Excerpts)

Following are excerpts from a news conference Secretary Muskie held after his address to the United Steelworkers of America in Los Angeles on August 7.¹

Q. At the end of your speech just a few moments ago, you asked for the steelworkers to lend their support to you in a broader political arena. Were you confining it to your role as the Secretary of State or perhaps to a broader role like the Presidential campaign, or as the President?

A. A very good question. My purpose is simply to enlist their support in responsibilities I now have as Secretary of State into a much broader arena—the whole world—and Americans have an influence on that world, which is very similar to the influence they are able to bring to bear upon their domestic problems and domestic issues. I was simply trying to drive that point home.

Q. Since taking over the State Department, have there been any fundamental changes in the operation of the Department and/or in the making of foreign policy?

A. If by “fundamental changes” you mean has there been any restructuring of the institutions of government to deal with foreign policy, the answer is no. I think it would be premature to walk in as a very unexpected Secretary of State with a handmade blueprint of how the structure ought to be adapted to my needs.

For this year, which obviously has its own pressures because it is an election year, I am working with the structure as I find it, undertaking to familiarize myself with it, and in terms of change, at some point in the future, with some developing perceptions of how the policymaking process works, so that when the right time comes I can make recommendations.

Q. What impact do you see the continuing holding of the hostages in Iran having on the American political process?

A. Obviously, it's a negative factor from the point of view of the President, and I would suspect it is a frustrating issue from the point of view of all the candidates. Finding a magic, simple answer for that problem is not the easiest thing in the world, as I've found over the last 90 days. If there were some way for us to find and touch a responsive chord among those who have authority in Iran and achieve their release, that fact would have a political impact in this country, I would assume.

Q. There is a story out of the Middle East today that four nations—I believe Switzerland, Austria, an Arab country, and the United States—are trying to work out a deal on the hostages that might see a breakthrough in the third week of August. Are you aware of any major effort under way at this time to achieve that end in that time?

A. If that is the standard of the word “major,” there have been a number of such initiatives in the last 90 days. None of them, obviously, were yet successful involving other nations, involving other individuals. We continue to pursue them, and there have been recent developments that give us some reason to believe that we ought to try not to raise our expectations too high. But there is the fact of Richard Queen's release, which indicated at least two things: one, that somebody had the authority to make that decision and do it quickly—there was some doubt on that point prior to his release; and secondly, that it was done apparently on compassionate grounds, if not compassionate motives.

Then you have the Ramadan holy season which ends on August 12, which might release some wellsprings of compassion and humanity that might influence the leaders. And they seem to be trying to distinguish between the Government of the United States in the person of President Carter and any other officials and the people of the United States. They made that distinction quite clear in connection with Mr. Queen's release, so that's something.

And finally, there is the slow emergence of the political institutions of Iran. The Parliament is meeting, has

elected a speaker, and they seem to be on the verge of agreeing on a prime minister, so that authority is being put in place—authority, presumably, with some ability and capacity to make decisions that will be held accountable not only for the condition of the hostages but for the welfare of the people of Iran, which is being undermined by the hostage crisis.

It has inhibited normal relations with their natural trading partners; it has reduced the flow of goods into Iran; it has cut down on their oil production and their ability to sell their oil. Economic conditions within the country, political fragmentation within their country, the rising tide of violence in Kurdistan in northwestern Iran, the pressures on their border as they may perceive them from the Soviets, and the Afghanistan invasion—all of the pressures are working on the decision makers within Iran.

They are going to be held accountable for the failure or success in dealing with these problems. And their ability to deal with those problems, we believe, is being affected unfavorably by their preoccupation with the hostage crisis. This point is being made by friends, by interested countries on a constant basis in the hope that we can influence the environment there.

Q. There has been a confluence of seemingly favorable developments in the past, and they have been disappointing. Is there a special reason to believe that there may be genuine cause for optimism, some kind of breakthrough, in the near future?

A. I would not be optimistic unless I saw the 52 gathered in front of me.

Q. How would you characterize the efforts of the United States in this affair? Are we merely sitting back and waiting for Iran to crack in its demands and to come to us and say: “All right, we're ready to talk and negotiate on a reasonable level”?

A. I guess I haven't succeeded in the last 5 minutes. I don't think what I said is a description of inactivity, of

ing back, or of indifference or lack of effort. This involves an enormous amount of effort. We have a special watch in the State Department. It operates on a 24-hour basis with volunteers from hostage families and from others constantly watching developments.

The first report I get every morning delivered to my door is the one- or two-page report on the current status of the current talks, the current contacts that are being followed, the channels of communication, the reports back we are getting. We are constantly sending messages to send back, ways to influence them to influence the people with whom they are in contact. It's an intensive, full-court press on the diplomatic front that we continue, and we are constantly searching ways to expand it, messages that might be an appeal—and that's why I mentioned some of the recent developments that we think may enable us to reshape our messages.

The treatment that we gave to the Iranian student demonstrators is a way of contrasting the way they treat hostages and the way we treated people who have violated our laws. We are every crumb of an idea that we can come up to impress the leadership. We are considering others.

Q. You talked a few moments ago about the Iranians who were being detained in New York—they have not, most of them, been released. We occasionally hear from the public and suggestions as to why don't we let their people until they return to us. Can you give us your thoughts on that type of thinking; whether it's useful or not and whether that's part of the tactics or not?

A. You can speculate all over the place. I'm not sure that those people want to go back there. Our hostages do want to come back here, so whether or not there is a *quid pro quo* in the making is a question.

Number two, whether or not these demonstrations are somehow orchestrated from Iran is a legitimate question to which I don't have any evidence on which to base an answer. I thought it ought to be made clear to the Iranian students that if they really dislike this country, they are

perfectly free to return to Iran and that we'll help them in the process. If that is the message you suggest conveying, I will convey it, and it will be in the most persuasive ways I can find.

Q. I was wondering if the use of, in effect, hostages on this side of the ocean to put pressure on for the release of the hostages on that side of the ocean, if that had ever been considered as part of the overall—

A. We think about it—we think about options of that kind. In the first place, these students were arrested for disorderly conduct. The time they spent in jail was the maximum that would normally be imposed in cases like that, so that when 5 days passed, holding them on that charge any longer would have been, in a way, going beyond what our own laws would have required.

Secondly, the other issue involved was their unwillingness to identify themselves under the immigration laws that made them subject to deportation. So that was the pressure that we were positioned then to apply.

We shifted them to a facility in New York which was much less like a prison—much less like the D.C. prison, among other things. In the new environment, they would be with lawyers, they would have lawyers by that time—American lawyers, American Civil Liberty lawyers, and so on—and they began to change their minds and identified themselves. Once they identified themselves, we were able to establish the legality of their status here in the United States, and there was no basis for holding them. So that we couldn't, really, if we were going to enforce our own laws, on some arbitrary charge, hold them as hostages. I mean, we would in effect be justifying, in effect, what the Iranians are doing.

Q. But you did say you considered the possibility of holding Iranians perhaps to make some kind of—

A. No. I suggested the possibility of generously inviting them to go over to Iran at our own expense, if that's where they really wanted to be. That's just a little different approach to the same problem.

Q. He did ask you directly if you had considered the possibility of holding so-called hostages, to make some sort of exchange?

A. Whenever you reporters use the word "consider," we have to be very careful about what we answer. "Consider" to some reporters means to seriously consider; to me the word "consider" means that this is among the list of things that someone or other suggested. It doesn't mean we seriously consider it. So if you would drop the word "consider" from your questions, my answers can be more precise.

Q. Do you think that the foreign policy record of this Administration would be a help or a drag on Carter's reelection?

A. It depends on how well and how accurately it is presented and what the contrast is. You know, you have a foreign policy on the other side.

Q. Do you think the American people understand your viewpoint?

A. I hope they will by the time we get to November 4. There is no guarantee of that. Having been involved in elections, I'm sure of that.

Answering your question seriously, I would think that the foreign policy issues, as well as the economic issues, would be the centerpieces of this campaign to date. And as far as I'm concerned, I find the President very knowledgeable about all of his policies in detail, well equipped to debate his policies, good in debate, cool under pressure, and tough.

I've not found him the kind of indecisive person that he is often described as being. I find that when he makes a decision in which I have an input, he has no patience with anybody who comes back asking him to reconsider it, whatever it is. He tends to be tough-minded, cool under pressure, knowledgeable, and I would think he'd hold up well in debate, so that if debating these issues has an effect on the final result, then I think President Carter is in a good position to hold his own.

Q. Are you planning on campaigning for the President at all?

A. The Secretary of State is non-political.

Q. I've heard from a couple of sources that Iran is slipping into the

hands of the Soviet Union. Within the next 6 months this is supposed to happen. Have you heard anything about this? And also what are you doing to strengthen our position in the Middle East now? What is currently being done?

A. By the "Middle East," what do you mean?

Q. Iran, Turkey, Yemen—to prevent Soviet control of that area and of the oil sources.

A. We're doing a number of things to deter further Soviet expansion, all of which have a bearing on it.

With respect to Soviet intentions vis-a-vis Iran, I think that is an uncertainty that ought to trouble Iran, as well as us and other countries. There is no way of determining Soviet intentions with certainty, but the fact that they have troops on the Iranian border and indulge in military exercises on the border, as well as getting involved in infiltration as they do in any country which they border, we know that creates an air of uncertainty that ought to be of concern.

The fact that our relations with Iran are at such an unfavorable level minimizes or makes impossible any influence on our part with respect to the Iranian interests.

On the other hand, we are in a position to be of assistance to Turkey, which adjoins Iran, which is having its own economic problems; and we are involved in a consortium led by Chancellor Schmidt of West Germany and the other NATO allies in putting together an economic package to help Turkey pull out of the economic doldrums in which it finds itself at the present time, and that, I think will be of significant assistance. We are doing the same thing with Pakistan in a consortium with other countries.

On the military side, we are building the rapid deployment force, to which I referred in my speech, and getting access rights to bases in that area which gives us more flexibility in emergencies. The NATO defense alliance is being strengthened in such a way as to give us flexibility to deploy forces outside the NATO area, if necessary. So along the defense line, we are doing a great deal to create a threshold across which the Soviets might be deterred from crossing, with the experience they have had with the world's reaction to Afghanistan.

Q. Recently the Canadian Government had some discussion with regard to the prebuilt pipeline running from Alberta into the United States, and there was some question here that they should not go ahead with the prebuilt lines unless the American Government was prepared to give some guarantees that the full Alaska-U.S. pipeline would be built. Can you say that these guarantees are forthcoming to the Canadian Government?

A. I know that as a result of our talks directed at that very point, Congress adopted a resolution—it doesn't have the force of law, but it gives the support of the Congress to the project—and my impression is that that assurance on the part of Congress may be enough for the Canadians to go forward.

We are also undertaking to press on the fisheries treaty affecting the eastern Provinces and our Northeastern States—another issue which I think affects Canadian perceptions of our commitment to this gas pipeline. So we are working on both and trying to get both.

Then there was another issue which troubled the Canadians, and that was the question of acid rain from our Midwest. And I just signed an interim agreement with Ambassador Towe, of Canada and [Environment] Minister Roberts of Canada committing ourselves to a program which, one, commits us to enforce our present laws, but secondly, to put together a program directed specifically at transboundary pollutants, of which acid rain is the most troublesome and most visible at the present time.

We are very concerned about our relations with Canada. Those are three issues that could become very divisive, and it is our intention and our determination to work on all three so that our generally good relations are not disturbed.

Q. Just to clarify one answer you gave earlier regarding the hostages: Would it be fair to say that you are ruling out the possibility that they might be released in the coming weeks, and that you know of no such plan?

A. No, I wouldn't rule out anything, nor would I raise expectations. You have to be very realistic and pragmatic. Release might be the result of what, on its face, is not a logical act—it might be the result of painful, carefully negotiated arrangements, or anything in between. And to try to predict in advance—

Who predicted Queen's release? An hour before he was released, he didn't even know it was being considered. I said he was given the word: "One hour from now you're being put on a plane to the United States," and so nobody anticipated that.

Q. I think what we're trying to get at is, besides the normal contact which the State Department and the government have with Iran through third countries, is there something special that is happening regarding the arrangements that you mention just a minute ago?

A. Anything that works would be something special.

¹ Press release 211 of Aug. 11, 1980.

Hostages' Families

While in San Francisco, Secretary of State Alexander Haig met with families of the hostages held in Iran. Following are excerpts from a question-and-answer session held at the Hilton Inn Airport during a luncheon with the families on August 8, 1980.¹

The purpose of coming here is because you're a member of a hostage family, you've got to understand that they are scattered across the country—many of them a distance from Washington, they're lonely—and it's important that you have the sense, from time to time, to have direct contact with their government, especially with that department or agency which has a large part of the responsibility for solving their problem. I've undertaken to come here for that purpose, so they could take a look at me, listen to me, and get some feeling for whether or not there is reason to have some confidence that I am involved in a real effort, a genuine effort, a meaningful effort to help bring the loved ones back to them.

With respect to the means that we use, those of you who are close to the State Department in your day-to-day work understand that a great deal of effort takes the form of quiet diplomacy, involving channels of communication available to us or to friends and colleagues around the globe—channels of communication which, if revealed, could be used. So it's not possible for me to answer your questions such as the ones that have been raised here so publicly and in such detail. You would know much about it as those of us who have some responsibility for it.

We seek to take advantage of the dynamism of the situation, which is relative to forces operating within Iran and at the borders of Iran. It is affecting Iran's economy, their potential for lack of safety, their political institutions, the development of government institutions with the authority to deal with this issue, to make decisions about it, as well as other decisions that the Government of Iran will eventually have to make as they are held accountable for the welfare of their own people,

as well as for the welfare of the hostages. This is about as detailed a characterization as I can make of my conversations with the hostage families.

In addition to that, I undertook to listen to each one of them, and listen to their own frustrations, their own suggestions about how our policy ought to be applied to the problem—and that was a very moving experience. I mean the toughest question to answer is: "Why can't my boy come home tomorrow?" or "Why was he held there in the first place?" Questions like that aren't easily answered. But the fact that they had an opportunity to ask it of the Secretary of State and to challenge the Secretary of State to answer it gives them some escape and some relief from the frustrations that they face in their day-to-day lives.

This is why I came here. I didn't come here to make hard news or to unveil a magic new formula for dealing with the problem. I came out here to listen to the hostage families in a way that is helpful and meaningful to them and useful to me, and that's what it's all about. I have no hard news to give to any of your questions.

Q. Did any of the families advocate taking advantage of the current situation with the Iranian students, to use them as trading material or at least a psychological break in the hostage crisis?

A. No, I don't recall that any of them did. Some of them expressed frustration that these demonstrations might have an undesirable and unfavorable impact upon the hostages in Iran.

Q. About the families' morale, how is it holding up after all this time?

A. It's about what you would expect. Frustrations grow. There were a lot of tears in there, and that is bound to continue.

Q. Do you hold out any more hope now than might have been held out back in November? Has there been any improvement at all, as far as any release at any time in the foreseeable future?

A. Obviously, what I said just a little while ago. There is a dynamism to this situation which is changing the political situation internally, which is

changing the economic situation internally, which is changing the leadership situation internally—and all those changes may well, after the fact, be seen as improvements in the prospects for resolving the problem. But I think it is difficult to reach such a conclusion at this point. It's like looking at the latest polls bearing upon our own election campaign and asking the question: "Well, does this poll mean that the President is worse off or better off?" We'll know the answer to that on November 5.

Q. Did they have a lot of criticism for the State Department? There was a lot of frustration. Was it directed toward the Department?

A. I told them to make me their target. I mean, frustration has got to have a target if you want them to be relieved, but I don't sense that there was specific criticism directed at the State Department as an institution.

There were differences of opinion among the hostage families as to whether a hard line, a diplomatic line, or some other line ought to be used; but this comes, I think, out of the frustrations. So I don't think they gathered in some concerted effort to shoot at us.

Q. Did they make any comments regarding the rescue attempt?

A. There were a number who expressed the hope that there would not be another one, but there were others who seemed more receptive to another try. There were differences of opinion.

Q. Do you know where all the hostages are?

A. I don't think I had better answer that question.

Q. Did any of the families discuss any desire to go to Iran at all, ask your permission?

A. I think the accurate answer to that is no, but that ought not to be taken as a reflection of what their response might be if they were directly asked that question.

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Q. What is your reading today of the pro-Khomeini demonstrations in

Washington, New York, and London? Has your assessment of them changed?

A. We have examined the suggestion that appeared in the press that it was being orchestrated in some fashion. We have not yet identified any evidence on that point. It's easy to speculate that that may be the case, but we simply haven't got any evidence.

Q. Have you discounted the possibility?

A. No, I wouldn't discount it, but in saying that, I can see the headline, "Muskie doesn't discount the possibility" of that [laughter], so whenever I give that kind of an answer, I'm a little leery.

Q. Some of the families feel that the authorities in Washington are being kinder to the protesters because of our hostages in Iran. Do you feel that that is so?

A. I think it is obvious that we are giving these protesters the benefit of due process of law—it isn't a question of kindness—and that our hostages are not being given the advantages of due process of law, which they should, independent of any feelings of kindness or compassion that they have. I don't think it is a matter of kindness; it is a

matter of what is right and what is just.

We are dealing with these people on the basis of what our laws require us to do in respecting the rights of people, whoever they are. That doesn't spring from kindness, which is an *ad hominem* kind of virtue that not all people share. But we hope that by our example of recognizing the due process rights of these people, the Iranians might be persuaded to give our people the same kind of consideration.

In addition, if they can find it in their hearts to be kind, I would not reject that.

Q. There have been reports in the press that the Iranian Government—the Khomeini government—has been financing demonstrations in the United States. Does that reflect the dynamics of the situation at the moment?

A. I said, in response to an earlier question, that I have seen the speculation to that effect, but we, as far as I know, have no evidence to that effect, as yet.

Q. Is there an indication that the militants in Tehran might be losing some of their authority or hold on the government? Do you see any of that?

A. My impression is that their hold on the hostages is the only authority they've got, and it is a question of

another authority taking its place in Iran which is able to assert itself and take over possession of the hostages.

Q. Is the parliament going into the vacuum, at this point?

A. The parliament is organizing; has elected a speaker; a prime minister seems about to be designated; and increasingly various factions are pointing to the parliament as the place where authority to deal with the hostage question will eventually occur.

Whether that is the case, we've been building toward that possibility because if, in fact, a decisive debate takes place there, we would hope, in whatever way we can, to influence the shape of that debate, which could be critical.

¹Press release 214 of Aug. 13, 1980.

are enormous and close upon us. Yet there is reason for hope. It must be emphasized that the *Global 2000* Study's projections are based on the assumption that national policies regarding population stabilization, resource conservation, and environmental protection will remain essentially unchanged through the end of the century. But in fact, policies are beginning to change. In some areas, forests are being replanted after cutting. Some nations are taking steps to reduce soil losses and desertification. Interest in energy conservation is growing, and large sums are being invested in exploring alternatives to petroleum dependence. The need for family planning is slowly becoming better understood. Water supplies are being improved and waste treatment systems built. High-yield seeds are widely available and seed banks are being expanded. Some wildlands with their genetic resources are being protected. Natural predators and selective pesticides are being substituted for persistent and destructive esticides.

Encouraging as these developments are, they are far from adequate to meet the global challenges projected in this Study. Vigorous, determined new initiatives are needed if worsening poverty and human suffering, environmental degradation, and international tension and conflicts are to be prevented. There are no quick fixes. The only solutions to the problems of population, resources, and environment are complex and long term. These problems are inextricably linked to some of the most perplexing and persistent problems in the world—poverty, injustice, and social conflict. New and imaginative ideas—and a willingness to act on them—are essential.

The needed changes go far beyond the capability of responsibility of this or any other single nation. An era of unprecedented cooperation and commitment is essential. Yet there are opportunities—and a strong rationale—for the United States to provide leadership among nations. A high priority for this Nation must be a thorough assessment of its foreign and domestic policies relating to population, resources, and environment. The United States, possessing the world's largest economy, can expect its policies to have a significant influence on global trends. An equally important priority

Copies of Global 2000

The Global 2000 Report to the President: Entering the Twenty-First Century was made available to the public on July 24, 1980, in three volumes. Copies may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. Remittance, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany order.

Volume 1—The Summary Report (041-011-00037-8) \$3.50.

Volume 2—The Technical Report (041-011-00038-6) \$13.00.

Volume 3—The Government's Global Model (041-011-00051-3) \$8.00.

for the United States is to cooperate generously and justly with other nations—particularly in the areas of trade, investment, and assistance—in seeking solutions to the many problems that extend beyond our national boundaries. There are many unfulfilled opportunities to cooperate with other nations in efforts to relieve poverty and hunger, stabilize population, and enhance economic and environmental productivity. Further cooperation among nations is also needed to strengthen international mechanisms for protecting and utilizing the "global commons"—the oceans and atmosphere.

To meet the challenges described in this Study, the United States must improve its ability to identify emerging problems and assess alternative responses. In using and evaluating the Government's present capability for long-term global analysis, the Study found serious inconsistencies in the methods and assumptions employed by the various agencies in making their projections. The Study itself made a start toward resolving these inadequacies. It represents the Government's first attempt to produce an interrelated set of population, resource, and environmental projections, and it has brought forth the most consistent set of global projections yet achieved by U.S. agencies. Nevertheless, the projections still contain serious gaps and contradictions that must be corrected if the Government's analytic capability is to be improved. It must be

acknowledged that at present the Federal agencies are not always capable of providing projections of the quality needed for long-term policy decisions.

While limited resources may be a contributing factor in some instances, the primary problem is lack of coordination. The U.S. Government needs a mechanism for continuous review of the assumptions and methods the Federal agencies use in their projection models and for assurance that the agencies' models are sound, consistent, and well documented. The improved analyses that could result would provide not only a clearer sense of emerging problems and opportunities, but also a better means for evaluating alternative responses, and a better basis for decisions of worldwide significance that the President, the Congress, and the Federal Government as a whole must make.

With its limitations and rough approximations, the *Global 2000* Study may be seen as no more than a reconnaissance of the future; nonetheless its conclusions are reinforced by similar findings of other recent global studies that were examined in the course of the *Global 2000* Study. All these studies are in general agreement on the nature of the problems and on the threats they pose to the future welfare of humankind. The available evidence leaves no doubt that the world—including this nation—faces enormous, urgent, and complex problems in the decades immediately ahead. Prompt and vigorous changes in public policy around the world are needed to avoid or minimize these problems before they become unmanageable. Long lead times are required for effective action. If decisions are delayed until the problems become worse, options for effective action will be severely reduced.

¹ Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of July 28, 1980.

² Press release 202. ■

Tropical Deforestation

*Statement by R. Max Peterson, Chief of the Forest Service at the Department of Agriculture, and Bill L. Long, Director of the Office of Food and Natural Resources in the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, on May 7, 1980, before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.*¹

MR. PETERSON

We appreciate the opportunity to appear before this subcommittee to discuss tropical deforestation and the activities of the U.S. Interagency Task Force on Tropical Forests. The subject of this series of hearings is important and exceptionally timely, both for the United States and for the world community of nations. We would like to note that the testimony relates to the task force report and should not be construed as necessarily reflecting the position of the Administration.

In June 1978 a national conference on tropical deforestation was convened in Washington by the State Department and the Agency for International Development. The purpose was to assess the discussions and implications of the tropical-forest loss problem and to examine U.S. interests and responsibilities. One-hundred twenty invited experts attended, representing U.S. Government agencies, universities, industry, the environmental community, and several international organizations. The principal conclusion of this meeting was that:

The world is being confronted by an extremely serious problem with immediate and long-range socio-economic consequences as the result of the accelerating loss of forest and vegetative cover in the humid and semi-arid lands within or near the tropical latitudes. Further, the community of nations must quickly launch an accelerated and coordinated attack on the problem if these greatly undervalued and probably irreplaceable resources are to be protected from virtual destruction by the early part of the next century.

This conclusion and perspective served to energize a broad-based response by the U.S. Government, working in close cooperation with the

non-Federal sector. We would like to report on this response today and in so doing present what is emerging as a government-wide consensus on the nature and implications of the problem, U.S. interests involved, this nation's influences on the situation, the type of policy and program this country should undertake, and unresolved issues and needs.

This month a Federal Interagency Task Force on Tropical Forests will submit to the President a report recommending a comprehensive U.S. policy, strategy, and program on tropical forests. The report is a direct outgrowth of the 1978 national conference cited earlier. We will be drawing on the findings of this forthcoming report to the President for the purpose of this testimony, along with the results of an international meeting on tropical forests convened in Nairobi 2 months ago by the U.N. Environment Program (UNEP).

Tropical Forests: Extent and Distribution

Tropical forests constitute a major world resource, totaling 1.9 billion hectares [1 hectare=2.5 acres]. They cover 42% of all tropical lands. Of this 42%, 18% is "open" forest—woodland and semiarid shrubland such as the African Sahel—and 24% is "closed"—a continuous forest canopy such as the Amazon rain forest.

Africa has about 64% of all tropical open forest, while more than 50% of the closed forest is in South and Central America and 30% in Asia/Australia/Oceania. The U.S. tropical forests represent less than 1% of the world's total and are found mainly in southern Florida and Texas, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa.

Forest Values

Forest environments are vital to human existence in the tropics. They provide food, fiber, fodder, fuel, building materials, and medicines. Forests also provide habitat for wildlife, as well as for indigenous human populations, and perform important protective functions by regulating water flow and by minimizing soil erosion. In addition, since tropical forests provide commodities important in international trade and regulate or influence critical environmental processes that occur on regional and, possibly, global scales, people far removed from tropical forest

ecosystems are affected by the integrity of this resource. The following is a brief summary of major forest values.

- An enduring use of forests by tropical communities is a source of wood. One-third of the wood removed from the world's forests for human use comes from the tropics—more than 1 billion cubic meters per year. Some 30% of tropical wood is used for fuel, mainly to meet household cooking needs of a large majority of the populations of most tropical countries.

- The food supplies that sustain nearly 2 billion people who live in the tropics are produced on soils that generally owe both their existence and productive qualities to former forests. Tropical forests accelerate soil formation, retard erosion and silting, regulate streamflow, create favorable soil structure, and store nutrients useful for food crop production.

- Reliable supplies of fresh water in the tropics, whether from rivers or wells, depend in most instances on forested lands. By stabilizing soils, maximizing their receptivity to rainwater, and retaining available minerals, tropical forests help regulate both the quantity and quality of usable water. The production of paddy rice and other irrigated crops in the tropics is especially dependent on forest-regulated water supplies. And this relationship is the basis for a new U.S.-Panama cooperative program to protect the forested watersheds that regulate water inflow into the Panama Canal.

- Tropical forests contain the greatest diversity of life on Earth—probably more than 3 million species of plants and animals. In addition thousands of migratory species seasonally inhabit these forests. This diversity is the source of an increasing number of valuable products for both local and worldwide use.

- Human populations in many tropical areas depend on wild animals and fish for protein. And both aquatic and terrestrial animals are dependent on healthy forest ecosystems.

- The integrity of forested watersheds is also critical to the functioning of downstream estuaries, mangrove swamps, and nearshore coral reefs—the principal nursery areas for many commercially important fish and shellfish.

- Besides supplying products used locally, forests provide many tropical countries with significant income from

ported wood products. The aggregate value is about \$4.7 billion annually. Currently, more than 70% of the tropical wood exports is from Asia and the Pacific and the rest primarily from Africa. The chief products are sawlogs and veneer logs, shipped mostly from Southeast Asia to Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea for processing, or from Africa to Europe, and sawed wood shipped from Southeast Asia to various temperate zone countries, from Africa to Europe, and from Brazil to North America.

- Other products derived directly or indirectly from tropical forests contribute significantly to export trade. Their aggregate value is unknown, but a wide variety, including latexes, gums, essential oils, medicines, nuts, and ornamentals, is included. Prospects for an expanding demand for such products are favorable. The U.S. National Academy of Sciences has screened 400 underexploited tropical plants and identified 36 with special economic promise.

- To these values must be added certain exported agricultural products, most of which are, in one way or another, dependent on forest-generated seeds and water or the clearing of forests for cropland. The aggregate value of exported agricultural products now about \$36 billion per year, apparently the largest single source of outside revenue for tropical developing countries from products generated locally.

- On the worldwide scale, the forests of the tropics have unequalled scientific and educational value. The complexity of tropical forests has for years attracted scientists and students in search of answers to basic questions about life processes. No other region on Earth offers so much material for study.

- Forest cover influences ground temperature, soil moisture, and rainfall on a local scale; weather patterns on a regional scale; and also may be an important factor in regulating global carbon dioxide levels and, hence, global climate.

Deforestation Rates

The amount of permanent forest cover being lost is difficult to establish. Historical records are poor, our ability to monitor deforestation is limited, and changes in cover occur rapidly. It is estimated, however, that closed tropical forests have already been reduced by human activities by more than 40%.

Distribution of Tropical Forests



Adapted from:
1. FAO State of Knowledge of Resource Potential
PO PAP/DST/71/13/4

2. Udvardy, M.D.F. 1975 World Biogeographical Provinces (Map)
3. Odum, E.P. 1971 Fundamentals of Ecology
W. B. Saunders Co

The current annual rate of decrease is 10-20 million hectares a year, according to the best available estimates. This decline means that 1-2% of the world's closed tropical forests is being cleared each year.

Causes of Loss

The principal direct causes of tropical forest loss are: (1) conversion and use for agriculture, (2) fuelwood gathering, and (3) poorly managed industrial logging. But behind these direct causes are more fundamental problems—rapidly increasing population, great inequalities of land tenure, absence of advancement in agricultural technology, and lack of opportunities for employment on proven agricultural land or outside the agricultural sector. With changing world conditions and rapid loss of forests, the quantitative importance of the various causes of deforestation may be shifting, but the conversion and use of tropical forests to support agriculture is still considered to be a major contributor.

Agriculture. It is widely believed that shifting agriculture is the single most important contributor to the destruction of tropical forests worldwide. While this approach to food production has been used for centuries in a manner which also sustained the forests, the sheer numbers of poor people now seeking land to cultivate is overwhelming the forest resource. "Slash

and burn" farmers generally work upland soils that cannot maintain fertility with continuous cropping and can support crops for only a few seasons before they must be left fallow. The system is ecologically sound if the fallow period is long enough and the cleared area relatively small. In many places, however, the length of the fallow period is too short to restore the fertility of the site. The most common reason for inadequate fallows is population pressure.

Typically, rapid and widespread deforestation occurs where roads are constructed into formerly inaccessible areas. The clearing of land thus made accessible usually is done by landless people who must concentrate their main efforts on the current season's crops. As a result, little labor or capital may be left for investment in land maintenance necessary for sustained agriculture. The farmers must work whatever accessible site is not claimed by someone else. They have no alternative investment for their labor, and while they may be well aware of the poverty and impermanence of the soils they use, they have no choices.

Often the users of the land are illegal squatters who seldom get agricultural advice or aid from government sources. On other occasions, they are colonists who are encouraged by their governments to settle in forested areas. Furthermore, new agricultural techniques that might let settlers prolong

the use of their sites are often unfamiliar or risky, and there is little incentive or margin to assume extra risks.

To get to the fundamental causes of deforestation, it is necessary to understand why so many people are without job opportunities and why so many seek marginal land to cultivate. In many countries, the traditional agricultural lands simply cannot absorb the rapidly growing population. Intensified production, which might increase both yields and employment opportunities on land already cleared, often depends on the availability of technical assistance and material inputs, such as irrigation water, fertilizer, and credit, that are beyond the reach of most farmers. In some areas land ownership systems keep productive agricultural land from absorbing as many workers as it profitably could; in others, farm workers are displaced by modernization that substitutes capital for labor, by construction of reservoirs, or by other nonagricultural land uses. With urban labor already in surplus, many of the displaced people must move to the forests. Others who move are refugees from war or from political oppression.

The most optimistic estimate of annual loss is 7.3 million hectares. The most frequently cited estimate is 12 million hectares a year. Recent analyses of deforestation in specific countries suggest a current rate of 20 million hectares or higher; and a report by the U.S. National Academy of Sciences released last month cites the annual worldwide loss as 24.5 million hectares—a particularly high estimate. Due to limitations in the data base, assessments of forest loss are best given in terms of worst-case and best-case scenarios.

In the worst-case scenario, the closed forest area is projected to decline by one-half, to about 580 million hectares, by the year 2000, i.e., under the assumption that forest loss in 1979 is 20 million hectares and that the rate of forest conversion will thereafter increase at the expected rate of population growth in the tropics. In this case, most tropical countries will have little economically accessible forest remaining at the end of the century. Millions of people will be without wood for fuel, shelter, or fiber. Watersheds of the major agricultural areas largely will be denuded, and reservoirs needed for flood control, irrigation, and hydropower will be filling rapidly with silt. Hundreds of thousands of plant and animal species will vanish, and much of

the potential for remedying agricultural, ecological, and medical problems will vanish with them. Although this case is possible, most analysts think it is not likely to occur over the next 20 years.

The best-case scenario also is plausible but equally unlikely to happen over the next 20 years unless significant changes in policies and practices are made to insure improved forest management.

If the current rate of deforestation is only 10 million hectares, and if all forestry plans and goals of tropical countries are fully successful over the next 20 years, then the deforestation rate may drop to less than 5 million hectares a year by 2000. Under these assumptions, the projections indicate that wood will still be abundant in some countries of Africa, South America, and Southeast Asia. Wood for fuel and for construction material will still be available for people living near the remaining forests and for relatively wealthy people elsewhere. Whether wood will be available for subsistence farmers away from the edges of forests and for the urban poor depends on whether plantations of fast-growing trees can be established in the next few years.

No comparable estimates are available on the rates at which open forests in the tropics are being denuded. The process of converting open forests is more subtle than that in closed forests and thus is seldom accurately measured. Destruction of the trees in open forests is believed to be a causal factor in desertification, a process that is claiming an estimated 5 million hectares worldwide each year, according to UNEP.

The very high deforestation rates cited from the few available studies cannot be extrapolated to the entire tropical forest resource. These studies, however, indicate some alarming national and regional problems, and even the best-case projection is cause for concern.

Shifting cultivation is not the only agricultural practice that leads to deforestation. The processing of agricultural products, such as grain drying, food preservation, tobacco curing, and rubber preparation, require large amounts of fuelwood.

Fire also contributes significantly to deforestation in the tropics. It is not only a widespread problem but reportedly is increasing at an accelerating

rate. In most instances it is man-caused. Fire is a primary tool of primitive and shifting agriculture to dispose of felled trees and is also used to "renew" pastures and to prevent invasion of shrubs and trees. In terms of forest destruction, fires are of greatest significance in the dry forest areas, having converted millions of hectares into derived savannas where chronic burning makes reinvasion of trees virtually impossible. Except as employed by man in certain cases, fire is not an important cause of destruction of rain forests which are generally not readily flammable.

The production of beef has become increasingly important worldwide, particularly in the more humid tropics. In some cases, the conversion of forests to grazing land is not sustainable, but the international demand for beef is strong enough and the price high enough that it has become profitable to convert to pasture even on poor soils that deteriorate rapidly and must be abandoned after a few years. Although the acreage converted from tropical forest to permanent or temporary pasture are not available on a worldwide even regional basis, the large increase in beef exports from forested tropical countries, particularly in Central and South America, suggests the scope of the changes in land use.

Fuelwood-Gathering. Cutting wood for fuel is another important cause of deforestation and in some places is the major cause. More than billion cubic meters of wood are harvested each year in the tropics, and the rate is increasing. At least four-fifths of the wood harvested annually in tropical countries—some 825 million cubic meters—is used for firewood and charcoal; the rest for building materials and for export.

Industrial Logging. Industrial wood—wood for construction materials, fiber, and manufactured products—accounts for one-fifth of the total volume removed from tropical forests. Only about 6% of total removals is exported each year. The relationships between deforestation and the removal of industrial wood are complex. Most tropical logging is highly selective as to species and tree size. The use of heavy equipment for timber extraction, however, cause substantial secondary loss. The immediate result of logging operations is thus more likely to be degraded forest than conversion to nonforest. But the roads and clearings made by the loggers are common

ed by farmers who complete the process of deforestation. Industrial logging often depletes or destroys valuable resources of people living in or near the forest, with most or all of the benefits going to distant companies, governments, or foreign consumers.

New techniques of logging and wood use, including whole-tree harvesting and on-site chipping, are making clearcutting—the removal of all trees—more common in the tropics. On some clearcut sites, the forest will not regenerate naturally. Thus, the new harvesting techniques may lead to greater resource loss if the sites are not replanted immediately with appropriate species. Replanting after industrial logging, even after clearcutting, is uncommon, however.

The reasons for the lack of reforestation in the tropics are a complex array of economic, political, cultural, and environmental factors that vary from place to place. Some partners in multinational logging firms are unwilling to invest profits in efforts that will have no immediate payoff. Insecure tenure is a major constraint on reforestation investments, both for large companies and small farmers, and this is often more a political than an economic issue. Concessionaires commonly are unable to protect reforested areas from people seeking land to cultivate. Site-specific cultural factors may inhibit tree planting, as in Papua New Guinea where local people object to tree planting by timber companies because planting, unlike cutting, implies permanent ownership of the land. Depredations by domesticated, feral, and wild animals cause some reforestation efforts to fail.

Consequences of Forest Loss

Although many consequences have been alluded to above, it is useful to summarize by indicating that the impacts of uncontrolled loss of tropical forests are many and serious. They include rising prices and shortages of wood in tropical countries, as well as a diversity of ecological problems. Floods of unprecedented severity, with large losses of life and property, have been reported recently by Asian nations and attributed largely to the loss of vegetation on upland watersheds. Lakes, reservoirs, and irrigation systems are adversely affected by siltation.

In the semiarid regions of Africa and Asia, woody vegetation used for fuel by up to 90% of the rural population is receding ever farther from human settlements. Fuelwood prices, the family time taken to collect wood, and the suffering from doing with less continue to increase. With no other substitutes available, people are burning dung and crop residues which previously were used to maintain soil fertility. The process of "desertification," triggered by removal of vegetative cover and overgrazing in semiarid regions, now threatens the productive capacity of the resource base over large areas of the tropics.

Consequences of forest loss also include the extinction of indigenous plant and animal species which is occurring at a rate never before experienced during the history of this planet. According to a recent National Academy of Sciences report, fully one-third of all tropical organisms—almost a million species—may become extinct by the end of the century as a result of deforestation. As an additional source of concern, recent investigations of the carbon cycle have suggested that continuing tropical forest losses on the current scale may contribute to destabilization of the Earth's climate in the 21st century.

Development and Environment Relationships


The underlying cause of deforestation in the tropics is the unremitting pressure for food, fuel, shelter, and capital in the developing countries of the world. These pressures tend to relegate environmental concerns and values to a secondary role, with development being primary.

In some cases, the forests were regarded, and may still be regarded, as obstacles to development, with minimal regard for their present environmental values or their future economic and environmental benefits.

The challenge is to provide for these human needs in ways that are more in harmony with nature. A purely protectionist approach will not suffice; neither will all-out exploitation. Both protection and rational exploitation must somehow be provided for in development.

Strategies for improved management of tropical forests must also recognize the sovereign rights that nations have to use and manage their resources as they see fit. National programs to meet perceived national needs should be the cornerstone of such strategies. However, international, bilateral, and multilateral arrangements can do much to assist nations as they develop pro-

Areal Extent of Closed and Open Tropical Forests (mid-1970)



Note: Graphs depict approximate extent of forest cover based on best estimates

Sources: Persson, 1974, UNESCO/UNEP/FAO, 1978. Myers, private communications, 1980

grams to both use and protect their tropical forest resource. Many kinds of potential assistance have been identified by the U.S. Interagency Task Force on Tropical Forests, by international meetings of experts, and by the developing countries themselves.

There are encouraging signs that governments are giving increased attention and priority to tropical forests. At the recent UNEP meeting in Nairobi, Kenya, participants indicated that national policies for the management of tropical forests were being developed in many countries where such forests occur. Most of these policies emphasize (1) economic utilization of the resource, (2) conservation of the resource according to the principles of wise use, (3) protection of important water catchments and the environment in general, and (4) protection of indigenous forests and the wildlife they contain by means of parks and preserves.

These actions indicate high-level government concern and should help provide a sound basis for more effective international cooperation.

MR. LONG

U.S. Influences

The United States affects tropical forests both positively and negatively through a variety of public and private sector policies and practices. Major influences include: (1) U.S. consumer demand for wood and beef, the latter associated with conversion of forested land to pasture, particularly in Central and South America, (2) U.S. tariff policies and quotas on wood and meat imports, (3) domestic environmental policies that restrict cutting of temperate forests, regulate international trade in endangered species, and require environmental assessments of certain types of U.S. overseas activities that might impact tropical forests, (4) U.S. development assistance projects in tropical countries which may modify, restore, or protect forests, (5) commercial forestry activities, with some 30 U.S. firms currently involved, mostly in Southeast Asia, and (6) private investment in cattle-ranching operations in other countries.

In many cases, the precise nature and magnitude of U.S. influences have not been adequately described or quantified, as is the case of beef and wood imports, but studies are about to be undertaken to help fill these knowledge gaps.

As pointed out above, only 6% of total wood removals in the tropics is exported. Harvesting of wood for in-country use and large-scale conversion of forest land to other uses, mainly agriculture, are by far the principal sources of tropical forest loss.

Further, although U.S. imports of tropical hardwood and hardwood products are substantial in terms of value, in terms of *volume* they amount to only 1-2% of the total softwoods and hardwoods used in this country. Tropical wood imports are used mainly for decorative purposes and thus are not limiting in terms of strategic applications of wood.

U.S. Interests

Why should the United States be concerned about tropical forests when it exercises sovereignty over less than 1% of the world's total resource? The answer involves a combination of political, humanitarian, economic, developmental, environmental, educational, and scientific considerations—each with proponents within the diverse U.S. public and private sectors.

- U.S. commitments to world peace, economic and social stability, and the maintenance of the Earth's basic life support system all require concern about the productivity of the natural resource base, including forests.

- The United States is party to international agreements which call for sound resource management and environmental protection.

- Economic and social progress in less-developed countries, a basic U.S. foreign policy goal, is influenced by the integrity and use of indigenous forest resources.

- The influence of tropical forests on global physical, biological, and geochemical processes—including the stability of world climate—is poorly understood.

- One-third of the U.S. export market is with non-oil-producing developing countries, and their purchasing power is affected by the health of their natural resource base. Further, the United States earned more than \$16 billion from direct investments in the developing world in 1978 alone.

- U.S. economic growth is aided by a sustained supply of wood and other tropical forest products at reasonable prices. Imports of tropical wood aver-

aged \$430 million annually from 1974 to 1978.

- Closed tropical forests contain large numbers of uninvestigated plant and animal species, many of which are likely to have important uses as food, medicinal, or industrial products. The United States already imports medicinal plants valued at \$25 million annually, as well as primates used for medical research and various natural products such as rubber and gum arabic.

- The United States shares with tropical countries hundreds of animal species including migratory birds, mammals, insects, and turtles whose survival depends, to varying degrees, on tropical forests.

- Unique tropical flora and fauna provide outstanding scientific and educational opportunities.

- U.S. assistance to the international community for improved forest management is increasingly in demand.

In sum, although the U.S. share of the world's tropical forests is small, our overall stake in their sustained productivity is substantial.

U.S. Response

We would now like to turn to the paramount matter of the U.S. response to the situation we have just described. Two types of responses are in fact involved—domestic and international.

At the domestic level the efforts the Federal task force have been designed to accomplish the following objectives: (1) raise public awareness of the tropical deforestation situation, (2) establish "tropical forest management" as a focal point for attention by the public and private sectors, (3) insure improved coordination of U.S. Federal activities related to this subject, and (4) develop a rationale, justification, and program proposals for an expanded U.S. effort to be carried out within a emerging international tropical forest management program.

Following the 1978 national strategy conference on tropical deforestation, the State Department established an Interagency Task Force on Tropical Forests which is cochaired by State and the Forest Service. It is this body that prepared the report to the President, and it will assume responsibility for coordinating the followup activities the government undertakes pursuant to the President's direction.

The Federal task force also serves as a point of contact with environmen-

groups, universities, private industry, and other private sector interests. During preparation of the report to the President, the task force worked closely and productively with a counterpart nongovernmental task force chaired by Mr. Robert Blake and also with the National Forest Products Association. We intend to continue our close interaction with these groups in the future. One of the successes to date has been the high degree of interest at the U.S. Government and the various non-Federal interests share in pursuing improved management of the tropical forest resource base to meet a wide range of needs and values.

International cooperation is, however, essential for achieving sound stewardship of the world's tropical forests. Over 99% of such forests exist outside the United States in countries which exercise sovereignty over the development and management of their resources, including forests.

The U.S. strategy has, therefore, been to raise worldwide awareness of the scope, origins, and consequences of tropical forest loss problems and to promote development of a coordinated international program on tropical forests which would attract support from governments and international organizations.

Consequently, the United States has raised the tropical forest loss problem at the last two U.N. General Assembly sessions, calling upon the nations of the world to join together in efforts to preserve this valuable resource for use by current and future generations. As a follow-up, the U.S. delegation to the 7th session of the governing council of UNEP, in May 1979, introduced a resolution calling for an international meeting on tropical forests to begin development of an integrated "global plan of action." The resolution drew broad support and led to the convening of an experts meeting in Nairobi from February 25 to March 1, 1980. In opening the meeting, UNEP Executive Director Mostafa Tolba referred to the world's tropical forests as "one of the great development challenges of the 1980's" and emphasized the importance of addressing the situation through creation of "a comprehensive detailed program of activities, coordinated among governments and international agencies, in conjunction with those nongovernmental organizations that possess specialist skills in this field." This echoed one made by President Carter in his environmental message of

1979 in which he identified the loss of tropical forests as one of the major global problems which will confront mankind in the years immediately ahead.

As the United States had hoped, the international experts meeting in Nairobi reached agreement on a series of program recommendations to improve tropical forest management. These recommendations were presented in the report of the meeting as an "important first step" toward development of an internationally coordinated global plan of action. We are pleased to note that last week the UNEP governing council approved the report of the experts group and—most important—a procedure which guarantees that the existing program framework and recommendations will be further elaborated and developed over the next year.

In the coming months it will be necessary to insure that the momentum for this emerging international program is sustained. It will also be essential for the United States to determine exactly what and how it will contribute to the international program.

In our efforts to define an appropriate and meaningful U.S. program on tropical forests, the Federal task force confronted the important issue of program goals. Specifically, we addressed the questions: What conditions do we wish to see reached with respect to the world's tropical forests within the next 5 years (by 1985)? Over the subsequent 10 years (by 1995)? And by the year 2000 and beyond? It is especially significant that the answers to these questions—developed by the task force in the form of "short-term," "medium-term," and "long-term" goals—were presented by the U.S. delegation at the February international experts meeting, and they drew strong support. The U.S. goals will be further examined internationally, but we believe that they will ultimately be adopted, with some modification, as proper goals for the *overall* international plan of action.

Goals for the Future

The following are the goals that we believe the United States and other nations can realistically achieve within the next 5 years:

- Policy commitments by virtually all nations to the concept of improved forest management;
- Initiation of an internationally coordinated action program, involving

research, monitoring, training and education, information exchange, technical assistance, and management demonstration;

- Doubling of the current annual rate of reforestation and afforestation worldwide;
- Completion of a comprehensive worldwide analysis of the causes and rates of tropical forest loss;
- Substantial increases in international research and development in tropical forest management, ecosystem dynamics, and commercial forestry operations;
- Launching of a major international effort to develop and introduce alternative low cost energy and food production systems into rural areas;
- Initiation of an international program to inventory and catalog unique forest, plant and animal types; and
- Expansion of national parks, wildlife refuges, ecological and biosphere reserves, and similar protected areas by at least one-third.


By 1990 the Federal task force believes that the following can be achieved internationally:

- Significant reduction in the present rate of tropical deforestation, with any large-scale forest clearing the result of deliberate, enlightened decisions by governments and local communities;
- Availability in virtually all tropical forest countries of revised policies and laws and improved management capabilities, dedicated to sound forest management;
- Additional commitment and programs by nations for the preservation and study of representative and unique forests, protection of forest peoples, and continued expansion of biosphere reserves and protected areas;
- Increased flow of wood and wood products, with expansion provided increasingly from plantation forestry; and
- Adequate understanding of forest-carbon dioxide-climate relationships on which to assess the impact of additional forest loss and reforestation on global climate.

And, by the year 2000 and beyond, the following goals have been recommended by the task force:

- A stabilized global situation in which a broad mix of forest types and values are maintained, and where reforestation and afforestation efforts offset cutting;
- Adequate knowledge of biological and soil characteristics, ecosystem dynamics, and land-use effects on which

Exports of Tropical Woods, 1966-77
(millions of Cubic Meters)



Interpretation:
Vertical axes of histograms indicate millions of cubic meters of wood exported. Exports of plywood, lumber, etc., are converted to roundwood equivalents.
Note the very different scales used on the vertical axes of the histograms.

Note downward trend of Latin American exports over period, in contrast to relatively stable situation in Africa and the rapid increase and recent leveling off of Asian exports.

(Source: FAO, 1979c.)

to conduct sound forest management; and

- Success by the international community in relieving pressures on the tropical forests by providing food and energy for the poor and by slowing population growth and regulating land-use patterns and practices.

Clearly there are difficult obstacles to achieving the goals. The most formidable lies in the fact that the greatest pressures on the forests come from the quest of poor people for land, food, and energy. In this regard the solutions will, in large part, depend upon efforts undertaken outside the forest sector—actions involving increased food production on existing lands, development of energy alternatives for rural areas, and family planning programs.

A related challenge involves the problem of increasing the economic return from the forests and on a sustained basis, while at the same time protecting and preserving wildlife, ecological, and other noncommercial values. While international discussions reveal a willingness by tropical countries to consider and introduce measures to improve forest management, their representatives say that this must not be at the expense of sacrificing the economic return. Indeed, some developing country spokesmen are suggesting that if the

tropical forests are a resource of global importance, then the rich countries must share the cost of protecting and maintaining them.

This, in turn, leads us to a third area wherein both problems and opportunities exist: namely the role and responsibilities of the commercial sector, including U.S. overseas industry. With the demand for wood and wood products for domestic and international markets projected to increase significantly, governments of tropical countries will be seeking to expand commercial cutting of timber. They indicate that their objectives include both obtaining increased prices per unit of wood harvested and requiring concessionaires to exercise improved harvesting and processing techniques to eliminate waste and to protect adjacent forest areas. This means that U.S. and other foreign firms may face different "rules of the road" governing their overseas operations dictated by host governments.

There is, consequently, a need to insure that commercial forestry in the tropical countries moves forward in a fashion that maintains wood production while affording greater protection to

the forest environment. There is, in particular, the need to move vigorously toward plantation forestry that will enable other forest areas to be reserved for nontimber uses. To achieve this, the international community must press for an investment climate that provides incentives for corporations to pursue sound, long-term management without damaging their competitive position vis-a-vis other firms.

Finally, there is the difficult problem of gaining international agreement on the priority, funding, and coordination of a tropical forest program involving a multitude of governments, international and regional institutions, and nongovernmental organizations. On the basis of the international experts meeting in Nairobi, and subsequent supportive action by the UNEP governing council, there is a rapidly emerging worldwide consensus that the loss of tropical forests demands high priority attention. However, the matter of mobilizing the necessary financial resources during a period of inflation and tight budgets is yet to be faced, as are the issues of overall program leadership and coordination. Still to be worked out are the appropriate roles of the array of international and regional bodies with relevant tropical forest mandates and interests.

We are pleased to see that the subcommittee plans to devote the second in its series of hearings on this subject specifically to international organizational issues. In the view of our Federal task force, one of the key needs is to encourage and assist the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization to strengthen and expand its tropical forest activities and to assume the central coordination function for the international program we are working toward. Significant contributions from the U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, UNEP, the World Bank, the Organization of American States, and a host of other organizations will also be required if a effective program is to be launched.

As noted earlier, the United States has broad-based and vital interests in insuring that the viability of the tropical forest resource is sustained—this despite the small amount of tropical forest this country possesses. We have to date, managed to play a lead role internationally in raising awareness of the tropical forest loss problem and the range of values being sacrificed. We

Continuing the CSCE Process

Following are remarks by President Carter at a White House ceremony commemorating the 5th anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act and remarks by Secretary Muskie before a foreign policy conference on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) at the State Department on July 29, 1980.

PRESIDENT CARTER¹

This event which will take place in Madrid is one of the most important of 1980. I'm very pleased that all of you could come to Washington today to meet with the leaders of the delegation. Our public members, about 30 of you, are here in the audience and you've had a chance to review both the purpose of the Helsinki accords and what we hope to accomplish working with the other nations in November of 1980. We will have to rely on you very heavily, not only to represent our nation and the principles on which it's founded but also in an evocative way, a clear way, to present our beliefs and our commitments, our principles and our ideals to the rest of the world.

There is opposition abroad, as you well know, to the pursuit of the principles espoused by the 35 nations at Helsinki. And there is some skepticism here at home from others who don't understand the fundamental truth that peace on the one hand and the pursuit of human rights on the other are irrevocably interrelated. Peace and the pursuit of human rights cannot be strengthened one without the other. They cannot be successfully advanced independently of one another. That belief which we all share is above party as the history of the Helsinki process proves. A Republican administration signed the accords and now a Democratic administration is deeply committed to carrying out those agreements.

The accords embody goals and values in which Americans believe as human beings who are struggling to build a more decent and a more humane world. The pledges given by the 35 signatories at Helsinki 5 years ago were not lightly undertaken, and they cannot be lightly abandoned or ignored. The document that was signed there, even though it was called the final act, was not the end of our

work. It was just a fresh start on work that commenced in this nation more than 200 years ago.

The Madrid meeting this year [beginning November 11, 1980] is designed to assess what progress has been made and, if possible, to speed its pace and to widen the scope of that progress. Like the Belgrade meeting in 1977, attended by some of you, Madrid is an opportunity to look carefully backward and also to permit us to push forward vigorously.

Some have said that we should stay away from Madrid, that we ought to drop out of the Helsinki process. Such ideas spring from ignorance of the meaning of Madrid. Some have even compared the meeting in Madrid to the Moscow Olympics, suggesting that since American athletes chose not to go to Moscow, that American diplomats and citizens should not go to Madrid. This reasoning is, of course, very confused. As host to the Olympics, the Soviet Union sought to enjoy both the fruits of aggression in Afghanistan and the prestige and the propaganda value of being the host of the Olympics at the same time. American athletes and those of 50 other nations rejected that equation as indecent and unacceptable. I commend them. They stayed at home, at great sacrifice to themselves, and without them the Moscow spectacular has become a pathetic spectacle. But Madrid will not be an aggressor's propaganda festival. The Spanish are the hosts, not the Soviets. The Soviet Union will be there as the other 34 states will be there.

To give an account of the manner in which the commitments at Helsinki have been fulfilled or not fulfilled is the undertaking of the meeting at Madrid. It would certainly please those who are most guilty of violation of the principles of Helsinki, including human rights, to be freed of their obligation to account for their actions before world opinion, which will be focused upon the meeting in Madrid. There will be no medals awarded in Madrid. It's not a wrestling match or a gymnastic tournament among diplomats. What it will test is the progress made on the international agenda of security and cooperation and the firmness of the principles by which the 35 participants agreed to be bound.

In pursuing the cause of human

we also participated actively in the initiation of an international program designed to achieve the goal of conservation of the world's tropical forests to meet man's long-term needs. Domestically, a variety of Federal agencies have already taken steps to strengthen and expand their tropical forest activities, and U.S. Federal and non-Federal sector institutions have demonstrated a desire and ability to join forces to develop an effective U.S. response to international needs. We believe it important that we be alert to opportunities to contribute to alleviating these problems.

The task force has developed a number of specific recommendations. We expect to carefully review these recommendations in terms of specific programs, resource commitments, and their impact on other policies and interests.

¹ The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Copies of Tropical Forests Report

World's Tropical Forests: A Policy Strategy, and Program for the United States was published in May 1980 by the U.S. Interagency Task Force on Tropical Forests. Copies of this 53-page report are available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402, for \$3.50 each. Remittance, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany order.

rights through the Helsinki accords, there are no shortcuts. The road that we're on is the right one. As the Belgrade meeting was ending, Dante Fascell, who was our congressional chairman at the time, said, and I quote from him: "Advocacy of human rights is not a quick fix. It holds no promise of easy victories." We know that all too well. But this advocacy of human rights, no matter how difficult it might be at times and how much it is scorned at times, must be pursued. And at Madrid it will be pursued, aggressively, persistently, and with the full focus on it of world opinion.

When I became President, as a matter of fact even in my acceptance speech, almost exactly 4 years ago, I emphasized our commitment as a nation to human rights as a fundamental tenet on which our foreign policy was based. That commitment of mine is as deep and as important to me today as it was then. It's as central to America's interests now as when our nation was first born. Then as now, our commitment to human rights persists in our own country and also worldwide. Beyond Europe, we've sought in Africa, Asia, Latin America, to stand behind basic principles of respect for each individual person, for fair trials, for political liberty, and for economic and social justice.

We've made it clear that the United States believes that torture cannot be tolerated under any circumstances and that officially sanctioned so-called "disappearances" are abhorrent in any society as we've insisted on the right of free movement everywhere. So we've worked hard to give aid to the world's refugees, compelled to flee from oppression and hardship.

As we have maintained these policies as a government, sometimes they have not had the full support of American citizens. I have often had people come to me and say: "Drop this human rights posture; it's damaging our relationship with such-and-such a dictatorship, where people are being imprisoned and where they are being hidden or where they are being killed." We have maintained our opposition and will continue to do so. We pursue these policies because we recognize that both our country and our world are more secure when basic human rights are respected internationally. In pursuing our values, we enhance our own security. Let

no one doubt that our words and actions have left their mark on the rest of the world.

Many governments have released their political prisoners. Others have lifted states of siege, curtailed indiscriminate arrests, and reduced the use of torture. We've seen several dictatorships, some of them in this hemisphere, change into democracies, where their present leaders were freely elected by people who did not fear any further political persecution because they expressed themselves as human beings. And because of our leadership, the defense of human rights now has its rightful place on the world agenda for everyone to see. I doubt that there is a leader on Earth who is frequently not reminded of the human rights of the citizens of that particular country and of the human rights performance of that country's neighbors or others associated with it in other parts of the world.

Those who seek to deny individual rights must now answer for their actions. At least among these 35 nations, those brave men and women struggling for liberty, often against great odds, are no longer alone. In the past, because our nation turned its head away, they were frequently alone.

In working with the 35 Helsinki states, in North America and in Eastern Europe and in Western Europe, we pursue the same values with great vigor. The Helsinki accords commit the signatories to ease military threats and to ease international tensions, to promote progress and to respect human rights, fundamental freedoms, and the self-determination of peoples. We have never expected an uninterrupted record of progress. The behavior of the Soviet Union, in particular, has dishonored the principles of the Helsinki accords, both inside and outside its own borders.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the increasingly brutal occupation of that once free nation can no more be reconciled with the Helsinki pledges than it can be reconciled with the Charter of the United Nations. For invading a neighbor, the Soviet Union already stands condemned before the world. One hundred and four members of the United Nations condemned the Soviet Union and demanded the immediate withdrawal of its occupying troops. If they are still there at

the time of the Madrid conference, we will continue the pressure for the withdrawal of those Soviet troops.

As many of you know vividly, because of the experiences of your own family and those people whom you love, Soviet authorities have also intensified at home their repression of the freedoms which they pledged at Helsinki—to promote the banishment into internal exile. Andrey Sakharov, a great scientist and great humanist, is the best known, but sadly not the only instance of such violations of the Helsinki commitment made by the Soviet Union. More than 40 courageous men and women are now in prison or in exile just because they worked in private groups to promote the Helsinki agreement and to encourage the Soviet Union to live up to its pledges. Now they are silenced. But in Madrid, no one can silence their cause, and we will make sure.

Although I do have importunities from some of our own citizens to lessen our commitment and our public posture concerning human rights, I have had from those who are in exile or who are persecuted in foreign countries unanimous messages, sometimes of a highly secret nature—"Mr. President, do not abandon us, do not abandon the commitment of the United States to protect our rights."

Madrid will be a sober meeting. Talk will be frank and straightforward, but we hope without polemics. We will seek progress, not propaganda. There is some progress, of course, which we welcome, and we will be glad to do so. Some confidence-building measures have been implemented. The Helsinki accords have given some impetus to the long-term process of breaking down East-West relations and easing the flow of people and the flow of ideas across frontiers that were once almost completely closed.

For example, thousands of people immigrated to the West last year from East European countries in accord with the Helsinki undertakings. There have been recent efforts by a number of states to resolve outstanding family reunification problems with us, and we welcome those also. The Helsinki provisions have also helped Soviet Jews to emigrate, although the encouraging record level set in 1979 is being reduced this year. At Madrid, we will seek an explanation for that decline and a commitment by the Soviet Union to reverse it.

I might say now, as I approach the end of my remarks to you, that on all these issues at Madrid we can count on the support of the great majority of participants. This is not always the U.S. position in international fora. The others are the basic philosophy of international relations that underlie the Helsinki accords. Indeed, the effort to negotiate accords originally and now to assure their implementation has made Western Europe and the United States recognize all the more vividly how much we share political and moral values and interests in the when there is so much glib talk, and of it ill-advised and erroneous about Western disharmony.

The Madrid meeting can give a clear expression to our unity on fundamental issues and on fundamental goals. And with that support, we can continue at Madrid to pursue the aims to which we committed ourselves at Helsinki. We want to encourage progress in human rights performance by the Soviet Union and its allies, and we have no hesitation about submitting our own record to examination by others at Madrid. We are imperfect. We don't claim that the United States is perfect. But we're making a strong and continuing effort to improve because preserving and extending human rights is the heart and soul of our political system in this country.

At Madrid, we will use the CSCE process to break down even more the barriers to human contacts between the East and the West, to help with the reunification of families, to help with the movement of people and ideas and the resolution of immigration issues. We'll try to get as part of a balanced result to achieve practical progress in the military security field.

The Helsinki session should not become primarily an arms control forum at Madrid. But the United States is prepared to test the possibility of achieving significant, verifiable, and comprehensive confidence-building measures relating directly or indirectly to weaponry, which will help to enhance mutual security desired in East and West Europe.

Madrid gives us an important opportunity to restate both our genuine desire for a better East-West relations and our firm belief that the principles of reciprocity and mutual restraint are there on which workable ties can be built. There will be sharp differences at Madrid between the values we espouse and those

which the Communist nations will seek to advance, but we will not go to Madrid looking for conflict.

We approach that meeting, instead, eager for progress, determined not to abandon our principles in any instance, determined to put our views forward in the most forceful possible manner, and committed to only one contest—the struggle to advance freedom and through freedom, mutual security.

The Helsinki accords to us hold the promise of a freer, more humane, and thus a more secure Europe, based not just on superpower accommodation but on the fundamental principles of international conduct. These principles require that states earn the respect of their neighbors by treating their citizens with full respect for their rights and dignity as persons.

My own faith in the ultimate outcome of this struggle is undimmed. Our nation's

The Helsinki accords to us hold the promise of a freer, more humane, and thus a more secure Europe, based not just on superpower accommodation but on the fundamental principles of international conduct. These principles require that states earn the respect of their neighbors by treating their citizens with full respect for their rights and dignity as persons.

role must never be in doubt. One of the best ways to express this commitment, I'd like to say in closing, is to quote from the words of Archibald MacLeish: "There are those who will say that the liberation of humanity, the freedom of man and mind, is nothing but a dream. They are right. It is. It's the American dream."

SECRETARY MUSKIE

First of all I would like to take this opportunity to welcome all of you to this conference on CSCE. I would like to assure you that I do so from the perspective of a job that I like more every day, and I hope that I have that job for perhaps 4 years more. But I didn't come here today to campaign even for that job.

Five years ago in Helsinki, 35 nations gathered to sign the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. It is a landmark document for it embodies essential principles of East-West relations and human rights.

It pledges the European states, the United States, and Canada:

- To refrain from the threat of use of force;
- To respect the territorial integrity of each participating state;
- To respect human rights and fundamental freedoms; and
- To respect the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination.

Three years ago the Helsinki signatories met in Belgrade to review how those and other obligations were being carried out. This November they will meet again for the same purpose. We are fortunate to have with us today Arthur Goldberg, who served with distinction as chief of our delegation at Belgrade, and Griffin Bell and Max Kampelman, who will lead our delegation to Madrid. And I would like to convey my

personal appreciation and gratitude to all three of them for having assumed or assuming this heavy responsibility.

Formal review conferences such as Madrid are only a part of what can fairly be called the "Helsinki process." This meeting, too, is part of that process. More than 100 ethnic, religious, and human rights organizations are here today to help us fashion an effective approach to the Madrid meeting.

Through the persistence of our efforts and the weight of international opinion, we hope one day there will be open and frank meetings like this not only in Western countries but throughout Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, as well.

I would like to take a few minutes this morning to discuss the place of CSCE in our foreign policy. The importance of CSCE is growing, and I believe it is important to understand why.

It is clear that in 1975 few understood the power of the Helsinki idea:

- That the Helsinki accords would become a manifesto for the oppressed,

giving them new courage and hope;

- That groups would arise spontaneously in many countries, including this one, to hold their governments accountable for the way they fulfill their obligations under the accords; and

- That CSCE would become a standard against which the actions of all signatory states would be judged on a continuing basis.

The Helsinki accords today are a dynamic force in the world. They are a recognized benchmark for human rights performance. And they have improved day-to-day life for thousands of Europeans, enhancing opportunities to visit loved ones, offering the chance for many to emigrate.

The impact of CSCE had not been limited to human rights. The process has fostered increased contacts in many areas: economic, scientific, and environmental. And it has provided a forum for useful discussions on security, discussions which we hope to advance at the Madrid meeting.

Unfortunately, it is also clear that there are dark corners where Helsinki obligations are forgotten. Andrey Sakharov has been banished to exile. More than 40 other individuals—men and women who took seriously the Soviet Union's commitments at Helsinki—have been arrested. Their only "crime" was to monitor Soviet compliance with the accords.

The Madrid meeting takes place at a time of heightened tensions between East and West—tension caused by the brutal Soviet effort to destroy the freedom of the people of Afghanistan. The Soviet invasion and continued occupation seek to crush the right of self-determination of the Afghan nation. The invasion is totally contrary to the Helsinki accords.

We remain open to a cooperative relationship with the Soviet Union. We are prepared to maintain the framework of East-West relations.

But the Soviet Union cannot expect that East-West relations will not be affected by what Soviet troops are doing beyond its borders and by what Soviet police are doing within them. Nor can the CSCE process—or the Madrid meeting itself—be insulated from the overall state of those relations.

The Soviets have argued that détente is divisible. It is not; Soviet aggression in one part of the world inevitably has consequences elsewhere. They have

argued that an emphasis on human rights mars the prospect for peace. It does not; on the contrary, the two are inextricably linked. The Soviet leaders must come to understand that the prospects for a peaceful and cooperative relationship with the West cannot be divorced from how they treat their neighbors and their own citizens.

In current international circumstances, it has been suggested that the Madrid meeting is a gift bestowed on the Soviet Union and its allies and that the United States should boycott it. We reject such a course, for continuation of the CSCE process serves the interests of the United States. So the United States will go to Madrid, and we will advance these objectives:

First, we will press for progress on human rights. Our approach will be forthright but not polemical as we assess the record of compliance by the participants. And we will certainly take positive account at Madrid of any significant progress on human rights that is made before the review meeting begins.

Second, we will work at Madrid for an increase in contacts between ordinary people in Eastern Europe and in the West. We will seek specific progress, for example, in reunifying families and in resolving emigration problems.

Third, in the security field, we will explore the possibility of further military confidence-building measures. But we are not interested in cosmetic measures or talks which go nowhere. And we will not permit discussions of security at Madrid to overshadow or in any way diminish the attention paid to human rights.

It is essential that these objectives be pursued in ways which reenforce the unity of the NATO alliance. There will be efforts at Madrid to divide the Western allies. We must insure that such efforts do not succeed.

And the CSCE process can also help strengthen our ties with the neutral and nonaligned countries of Europe. The states which signed the Helsinki accords did so in their sovereign capacities, not as members of a political or military alignment. We are also mindful of the opportunities CSCE provides to further our relations with the countries of Eastern Europe on a basis of mutual benefit and reciprocity.

Progress at Madrid and afterward will come slowly. But I firmly believe the

CSCE process can contribute to a more humane and more secure Europe. That shall be our overriding objective in Madrid.

May I also confess at this point some envy that you all will have this opportunity. It is an opportunity to contribute to a moderation of the tensions between East and West on the only basis which makes any sense whatsoever in the term of the prospects for peace—true peace and true accommodation in the world. The Soviets and those who are like-minded must be made and persuaded to appreciate the fact that only by accommodating their system and their goals and objectives to the rights created and endorsed by the Helsinki accords can true peace come.

So I congratulate you upon your interest. I pledge you my wholehearted support, and I hope with the leadership you will be following that we can somehow find our way through the minefield created by those who would like to convert this process to their own purposes purposes which are at odds to the real objective of the Helsinki accords.

¹ Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Aug. 4, 1980

² Press release 205. ■

Refugees: A Global Issue

Warren Christopher

Statement before the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States on July 23, 1980. Mr. Christopher is Deputy Secretary of State.

Earlier this month, the Secretary General of the Organization referred to the OAS as a forum for dialogue on important global and hemispheric issues. I appreciate this opportunity to join that dialogue on an issue of growing concern to all.

I refer to the global issue of refugees and the problems that follow the abrupt, massive, induced displacement of persons. Such migrations may result from wars, natural disasters, persecution, or other local conditions. Whatever the causes, they raise deep legal and humanitarian issues. And these issues are of great concern for the international community and this Organization.

Our governments will shortly begin intensive consultations on this problem. Today, therefore, I will outline the challenges we face as a backdrop for actions at this forum, or others, may consider in the future.

The problem of refugees and displaced persons is serious, widespread, and—I regret to say—growing. More than 15 million inhabitants of our planet have fled their homes in recent years because of wars, civil disturbances, persecution, or hostile government policies. They include more than 7 million Asians, 3 million Africans, 3 million from the Middle East, and 300,000 Europeans. Perhaps most pointedly for the people in the room, they include 1.2 million people from our hemisphere.

In a few cases, fortunately, these displacements have proved temporary. The settlement of the Zimbabwe conflict enabled nearly 200,000 men, women, and children to return to their homes. In our hemisphere, a similar number of Nicaraguans, who had fled to neighboring countries, returned home once the civil war ended in that country.

Sadly, however, such happy endings are relatively rare. The past year alone has witnessed the flight of more than 1.2 million Afghans, 1 million Somalis, and hundreds of thousands of Kampuchean and other who remain homeless and vulnerable. Ours is becoming an epoch of refugees.

Today, as a consequence, few countries can be confident that they will not

suddenly face refugee problems originating outside their borders. And no one country, however well-intentioned, can deal by itself with large-scale flights of refugees. As this problem transcends national boundaries, so should the solution transcend single nations.

Since 1975, the United States has welcomed over 600,000 refugees for permanent resettlement. In the past 10 months alone, we have taken in 230,000 refugees, and this total does not include the 150,000 Cubans and Haitians now in the United States, seeking to settle here. We are doing everything we can to assist refugees from around the world who look to us for help. But we need help if we are to help them.

Cuban Refugees

A new and critical dimension of this problem developed for the United States in April of this year. At that time, the first of what are now more than 115,000 Cubans began arriving on our shores. The salient facts are these:

- In April, more than 10,000 Cubans seeking asylum crowded into the Peruvian Embassy in Havana. An airlift was organized by Costa Rica and several international agencies, but Cuba abruptly ended the airlift before it could be completed.

- As a consequence, many of the refugees from the Peruvian Embassy, and thousands more, were induced to depart in small and dangerously overloaded boats. Few of those boats met even minimum safety standards. The ensuing boatlift brought great suffering; a number of lives were lost at sea.

- The Cuban refugees who did reach our shores included many who do not qualify for admission under our immigration laws. At least 1,000 among them are known to have committed serious criminal acts. Many of them were released from jail on the specific condition that they would leave for the United States.

- Cuba has rejected repeated efforts to work out safe, orderly, legal procedures so that Cubans may emigrate to countries willing to receive them. These include bilateral representations by the United States and other nations, multilateral contacts through responsible international agencies, and the effort of a tripartite group formed at the international conference in San Jose last May. All have been rebuffed.

- Last month, the United States

formally sought to repatriate 65 Cubans who had asked to return to their country. That effort, too, was rebuffed.

- In May, several hundred Cubans seeking to come to the United States in full conformity with our immigration laws were set upon and beaten in front of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana. More than 300 of them sought temporary sanctuary inside, and to this day, most of them remain in our Interests Section.

- Finally, as you are aware, the cha-

... no one country, however well-intentioned, can deal by itself with large-scale flights of refugees. As this problem transcends national boundaries, so should the solution transcend single nations.

otic flow of Cubans into the United States has dropped off sharply in recent weeks. This has been primarily due to vigorous preventive efforts by my government. Yet the fundamental problems remain: thousands of people eager to leave that country; the refusal of Cuba to cooperate in devising orderly, legal arrangements for dealing with this migration; and the massive burdens that are imposed when thousands of people migrate under such adverse conditions.

Role of the Inter-American Community

I should like to suggest that in this deeply affecting situation, the entire inter-American community has an important role to play. One challenge is to resettle those Cubans who have come to the United States but who do not have strong ties with this country. For example, at least 800 Cubans now in refugee centers here have made clear their interest in settling in other countries. We will continue to look to the hemisphere to play a role in their resettlement.

Another challenge—and one of even greater long-term significance—is to develop and reinforce legal instruments which more adequately spell out the rights and obligations of states in dealing with refugee problems.

There are some grounds for optimism. The generous hospitality of Honduras, Costa Rica, and other Central American countries during the recent Nicaraguan civil war enabled almost 200,000 people to find refuge. Assistance

from international and regional organizations and neighboring countries helped the Central American nations deal with this crisis until the end of hostilities enabled the refugees to return to Nicaragua.

Similarly, many nations in the hemisphere have made generous contributions toward resolving the problems posed by the exodus from Cuba. Argentina, Peru, Ecuador, Costa Rica, and Venezuela, among others, have received or offered to receive Cuban migrants. Costa Rica made a generous offer to receive Cubans for onward resettlement. Costa Rica also played a leading role in establishing the unfortunately short-lived "air bridge" and called two international meetings to discuss means of regularizing the Cuban exodus.

The two San Jose conferences constitute an unprecedented international effort to give effect to certain basic precepts of international law—precepts designed to protect the rights of individuals as well as the rights of states. It is, for example, a fundamental principle of customary international law—incorporated in many international conventions—that persons may not be transported in disregard of the immigration laws of the receiving state. No government has the right to select emigrants for permanent resettlement in another country. This right to establish and enforce national immigration laws is grounded in the principles of mutual respect and equality of states which are the foundation of all international law. Needless to say, the intentional export of convicted criminals is a particularly egregious violation of this elementary principle.

Moreover, each nation has a corresponding duty to receive its own citizens who have been expelled by another state. This obligation is clearly spelled out in modern treaties for the protection of human rights.

Nations must also, of course, observe the basic safety requirements set forth in the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea. But as we have already noted in the Maritime Safety Committee of the Inter-governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, the vessels which formed the Mariel sealift were deliberately overloaded; they did not meet convention safety standards. The U.S. Coast Guard, in fact, rescued a large number of those who left Cuba via Mariel.

Need for a Worldwide Response

The challenges I have outlined—and others arising from refugee migrations—require a concerted response in this

hemisphere and in the world community. In the past, the Organization has set precedents that other regional bodies and the United Nations have later adopted. Today, the inter-American system is again well-situated to make a similar contribution.

In the past few years, movements of people fleeing their homelands have touched all our countries. Such mass movements of people are likely to continue with potentially serious repercussions for each of our societies. To date, however, we have developed no mechanism to cope with massive waves of displaced people or with countries which induce such displacements in violation of basic international norms.

A global and humanitarian problem of such sweep requires our best collective efforts. On behalf of my government, I would suggest four principles that might well guide our collective search for a solution.

First. Large-scale displacements of persons should be discouraged in the name of humanity and international order. I can imagine no justification—political, social, racial, or religious—for a government to induce large numbers of its citizens to flee their homeland.

Second. Persons displaced from their homelands should be repatriated, as promptly as conditions permit. Permanent resettlement should not be accepted as the inevitable result of crisis, for such permanent displacement may serve neither the welfare of the individuals or the nations concerned. The repatriation of persons following the end of the fighting in Zimbabwe and Nicaragua demonstrates that there are effective and humane alternatives to permanent resettlement.

Third. International procedures must be devised to solve the problems which arise when permanent resettlement becomes necessary. In such situations, the task of resettlement should be shared on an equitable basis so that no single nation or group of nations is faced with the entire refugee burden. Any system for resettlement must take into account that displaced persons are truly an international problem requiring an international solution.

Fourth. Our efforts must be focused on the fundamental human issues involved. These issues are too serious to be made the subject of partisan or ideological polemics.

In developing the elements of such an international solution, we might well begin by reaffirming the principle of

mutual respect for immigration laws. A concrete way of doing this would be to develop cooperative machinery to prevent the misuse of vessels and aircraft in refugee migrations. We should also reaffirm the absolute obligation of states to permit the return of their citizens.

We should, in addition, consider ways in which the inter-American system can help international relief organizations, private voluntary organizations, and other agencies in their efforts to deal with future crises.

The OAS can work closely with international agencies like the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and the Inter-governmental Committee for European Migration to develop procedures for coping with these complex and highly sensitive problems. The OAS might, for example, provide the institutional framework for insuring that appropriate legal obligations are carried out and that member nations get the help they need to meet their responsibilities to displaced people. Our efforts to develop regional procedures to control dangerous and chaotic refugee flows could set a precedent for larger international efforts to deal with this global problem.

Conclusion

In conclusion, I would like to suggest that we of the Americas can take the lead in responding to this grave humanitarian problem. And I should like to suggest that in the weeks ahead, we focus our efforts in two directions.

First. Toward the immediate problem: What role can the OAS play to assist the permanent resettlement of persons now in countries of first asylum? We should specifically consult on whether a OAS Permanent Council meeting should address this problem.

Second. Toward the long-term issue: What norms and mechanisms can be established to deal with future problems of this nature? Our consultations should focus, in particular, on how to involve the OAS General Assembly in efforts to develop such norms and mechanisms.

The United States looks forward to the day when all peoples can live happily and peacefully, and productively in their own countries—a day which unfortunately is not yet in sight. Meanwhile the community of nations, of which the OAS is a vital institution, must develop remedies that will protect the rights of people and of nations and serve the cause to which all of us are dedicated—the cause of peace, stability, and cooperation among the nations of the world. ■

Deposed Shah Dies in Cairo

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
JULY 27, 1980¹

have been informed that the former Shah has died in Cairo.

The President and Mrs. Carter are offering their personal condolences to the Shah's family. At this time of great personal grief for the members of the Shah's family, they deserve sympathy in an atmosphere of tranquility. Ambassador [to Egypt Alfred] Atherton has been asked to deliver the Carters' condolences.

The Shah was the leader of Iran for an exceptionally long period of 38 years. History will record that he led his country at a time when profound changes were taking place. His death marks the end of an era in Iran, which all hope will be followed by peace and stability.

Read to news correspondents by acting department spokesman David G. ...

Visit of Jordanian King Hussein

His Majesty King Hussein I of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan made an official visit to Washington, D.C., June 16-21, 1980, to meet with President Carter and other government officials. Following are the dinner toasts arranged at a state dinner at the White House on June 17.¹

President Carter

... of people have accused me of inviting Their Majesties to Washington so we could have Queen Noor visit the White House. [Laughter] That's not totally accurate, because there are many reasons why we should want His Majesty, King Hussein, to come back to us, as well as his beautiful wife and the new mother of his new child, to come with her parents and her brothers and sisters and to be with us every evening. It's a delightful experience for us, and her presence vividly demonstrates the close relationship and

the unbreakable ties between our two countries.

The first time that King Hussein came to visit a President of the United States was in 1960, when President Eisenhower lived in this home. And he's been here many times since, a great leader, one who represents accurately the courage and the dynamism and the commitment and the progress of the people of Jordan.

He has led his nation over more than a quarter of a century, in good times and in dangerous times, in successful times and in disappointing times, but always with a deep commitment to what's best for his own people and the preservation of stability and peace and the honoring of human rights not only in Jordan but throughout the Middle East.

He's indeed been an inspiration to many people who have served as the leaders of other nations. This is a troubled time in the history of the world, and to have a leader like him, still young, but with deep experience, reaching out his hand of friendship and peace to those neighbors of Jordan who look to him with confidence and with admiration, is reassuring to us all.

We share a great deal in common—a commitment to the integrity of international boundaries; a commitment to the unity of nations in the Middle East, to the preservation of peace, to the security of all, and to the enhancement of those principles which guide human beings and which never change. But, at the same time, he has exhibited to a remarkable degree an ability to insure economic progress and utilization of modern science and technology to give his people a better life.

King Hussein is a good counselor and adviser for other leaders of nations who meet with him. And although sometimes our two nations do disagree on the technique for achieving a goal, we share completely a common commitment to the same goals—to the realization of the full rights of the Palestinian people, to the security of Israel and all the nations in the Middle East, to the honoring of deep religious feelings, and to the knowledge that people of good will ultimately with courage and with perseverance, sometimes with patience, can triumph.

We have had good discussions so far today—much better than would



White House photo by Jack Kightlinger
President and Mrs. Carter with King Hussein I and Queen Noor.

have been expected—because of his frankness and because of his generosity, his eagerness to understand different points of view without yielding at all on the deep principles which have guided his life and which he holds so dear. We have expressed our concern about aggression demonstrated by the Soviets' invasion of Afghanistan. We've expressed our concern about international terrorism, exhibited in Iran with the unwarranted holding of innocent Americans hostage for many months, and we've expressed our commitment to stability in the Persian Gulf region and to peace in the Middle East.

I would like to say in closing that because of his own leadership and because of geographical circumstances of his own nation, Jordan will indeed play a central role in the realization of the hopes and dreams of all who want peace and stability and freedom and security in the Middle East.

At this time, I would like to propose a toast, if you will stand and join me. To Their Majesties, King Hussein and Queen Noor, to the friendship which binds our two nations and our two people together, and to the commitment to peace and the enhancement of human rights and a better life for all those of faith and good will everywhere throughout the world.

King Hussein

I'd like to thank you for your kind and warm words of friendship toward both Noor and I, toward a friendship that I value, toward the ties and relations that have grown between our two nations over many years, and through good and difficult times, the ties that we treasure, for the fact that there are links of people who uphold the same ideals and principles and are dedicated toward fulfilling the same objectives for a better tomorrow which, hopefully, will bring a preservation of dignity to human beings, peace, justice, and a better life.

It's true I have had the privilege of visiting the United States over many years. I'm a firm believer and have always been dedicated to the cause of friendship between our people, a better understanding, and I'm proud to have been able to serve this objective and will continue to do so to the end of my days.

Throughout these many years and many occasions, I've had the privilege of meeting with leaders of this great nation. I said it today, and I've said it often: Throughout all these meetings, none gave me more of his time to discuss the problems of our part of the world and indicated as much of an interest in the problems that we face in the area from which I came and the determination to contribute toward solutions to those problems as have your good selves.

It is true that we may have differences in approach, but we respect your dedication to the cause of peace in our part of the world. It's a dedication that we share. We look into the future with hope, with determination, to contribute our full share for the establishment of a just and durable peace in the Middle East which will affect not only those who live there but future generations there and elsewhere in the world.

We thank you for the opportunity to be with you, to have this opportunity to discuss our problems, to discuss all matters as friends, as brethren, and I'm convinced that this opportunity will enable us to address ourselves more adequately to the challenge in the times to come. We have been overwhelmed by the kindness and warmth with which we have been received once again, almost at home and amongst friends.

Thank you very much from both

Noor, myself, and all who accompanied me from Jordan on this visit to the United States. May God bless you; may your efforts always meet with success in the times to come. Thank you, Mr. Carter.

Ladies and gentlemen, please, I call upon you to rise and join me in drinking a toast to the President and Mrs. Carter, to the United States, to friendship and fruitful cooperation in serving our mutual and common objectives, to peace and a better future.

¹ Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of June 23, 1980, which also contains remarks made at the welcoming ceremony and a statement by the White House press secretary of June 17 and the President's and King's remarks and a statement by the White House press secretary of June 18. ■

Iran Chronology, July 1980

July 10

Khomeini orders the release of one of the hostages, Vice Consul Richard I. Queen, because of illness.

July 11

Queen arrives in Zurich, Switzerland, and is hospitalized for observation of what is said to be a neurological disorder.

Iranian Government smashes plot to overthrow the government. The plot, reported to involve plans to bomb Khomeini's home and other targets in Tehran and Qom, is linked to Shahpur Bakhtiar, former Prime Minister of Iran.

July 12

Reports state that many Iranians are arrested and seven are killed in connection with the alleged coup attempt.

Queen is transferred from a Zurich hospital to a U.S. Air Force hospital in West Germany.

July 15

After 4 days of examinations, U.S. doctors diagnose Queen's illness as "multiple sclerosis."

July 18

Richard Queen arrives in Washington, D.C.

In Paris, four men identified as Palestinians, attempt to assassinate Bakhtiar.

July 20

Iranian Parliament takes over legislative power from the Revolutionary Council.

July 22

Ali Akbar Tabatabai, who served as press attache during the deposed Shah's reign, is assassinated in Washington, D.C.

Bani-Sadr is formally sworn in as President of Iran.

July 23

Iran's U.N. delegate, Mansour Farhang, resigns.

July 26

President Bani-Sadr nominates national police chief, Mostafa Mir-Salim as prime minister.

July 27

Deposed Shah of Iran dies in Cairo. A spokesman for President Bani-Sadr states that the Shah's death will not affect U.S.-Iranian relations nor change the status of the hostages.

In Washington, D.C., on hearing of the Shah's death, Khomeini supporters and opponents stage demonstrations throughout the city. Violence breaks out between the pro-Khomeini groups and American protesters leading to the arrest of between 160 to 175 people.

July 29

Deposed Shah is buried in Cairo with full military honors. U.S. is represented at the funeral ceremony by U.S. Ambassador to Egypt Alfred Atherton.

July 31

Twenty-four men, including 11 who implicated in the alleged coup against the Khomeini regime, are executed. ■

U.S. International Population Policy

Richard Elliot Benedick

Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on April 29, 1980. Ambassador Benedick is Coordinator of Population Affairs.¹

Demographic Setting

It is encouraging to note that the world's population growth rate gradually slowed during the 1970s, reflecting fertility declines in many developing as well as industrialized countries. However, tomorrow's parents are already here. Even if they should decide to have fewer children themselves, there is built-in demographic momentum, which will keep the youthful age structure in the Third World, which will probably carry the world's population from the current 4 billion to over 6 billion by the end of the century. This prospective 20-year growth is almost as much as the entire world population as recently as 1930. It is the equivalent of adding more than 20 new countries of the current size of Bangladesh. Ninety percent of the growth will occur in the low income countries. The proportion of industrialized countries' population in the world total will probably decline, from 40% in 1950 to only 20% by the year 2000. Because of the expanding base, more people will be added to the world's total in the year 2000 than this year, even though the overall growth rate may decline.

The World Bank currently projects a possible stabilization of total population around 10 billion late in the next century, but this number could be affected, up or down, by acceleration—or deceleration—in attaining lowered fertility levels. The issue of further, and faster, reduction of fertility is far from academic: In a world which is already characterized by growing scarcities, technological uncertainty, and strains on political and environmental systems, the consequences of these dimensions have portentous implications.

Impacts of Modern Population Growth

It is difficult to overemphasize the fundamental effects of high population growth on the development process. There is ample data that population expansion in many less developed countries substantially offsets development

efforts, as well as foreign aid. Rapid growth in the number of consumers, under conditions of relative scarcity of domestic resources, means that a significant portion of capital and labor has to be devoted merely to preventing deterioration of already low consumption levels—and is thereby diverted from needed investment for the future.

During the 1970s, much of the economic gains of the Third World were, in fact, canceled out by the steady rise in population. For hundreds of millions of people, the United Nations' "Second Decade of Development" was a decade of virtual stagnation. In Africa, average annual per capita growth of GDP was 0.2%. On a per capita basis, the gap in income levels between rich and poor nations has not narrowed.

Food production is not keeping pace with population growth in most parts of the world. From 1970 through 1977, per capita food output in market-economy developing countries rose at an annual rate of only 0.2%, and their dependence on food imports increased significantly. Moreover, rising food demand must now compete with increasingly higher priced energy imports. Norman Borlaug, pioneer of the "green revolution," has cautioned that innovations in agricultural technology can only buy limited time with which to control population growth.

The toll in maternal and child deaths resulting from consequences of excessive fertility and unwanted pregnancies is staggering. WHO [World Health Organization] studies indicate that the health of women and children is demonstrably undermined by pregnancies during teenage and late in life, by close spacing of children, and by high orders of birth. It has been estimated that, for every five births in the world today, there are probably two induced abortions; the consequences of pregnancy and abortion are a major cause of death among young women in many developing countries. And, according to UNICEF, even now, millions of children die each year from malnutrition and related causes.

UNESCO estimates that the number of illiterates are growing, from the current 800 million to approximately 1 billion by the year 2000; efforts to provide schooling are simply being overwhelmed by the tide of children. The proportion of illiterates who

are women has actually increased, from 58% in 1960 to an estimated 60% currently.

ILO [International Labor Organization] estimates that, in the next two decades, approximately 700 million more people will enter the labor pool of developing countries—this is more than the total current labor force of the industrially advanced countries. The amount of investment required to put these numbers of people to work is astronomical. And this comes on top of unemployment/underemployment already reaching 40% in many areas. Pressures to migrate continue, especially in southern and West Africa and to the Middle East and the United States. Because of the sheer numbers involved, as well as social and political frictions associated with foreign workers, emigration cannot solve the growing problem of surplus labor in less developed countries (LDCs).

A recent Worldwatch Institute study estimated that the number of rural people who are effectively landless would approach 1 billion over the next two decades and predicted that "conflict rooted in inequality of land ownership is apt to become more acute in country after country." Already the estimated proportion of rural families who are landless, or nearly so, is over 80% in such countries as El Salvador and Guatemala and between 70% and 80% in Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, Bangladesh, and the Philippines.

As rural population growth increases the fractionalization of landholdings, as croplands are depleted due to overintensive farming, and as job opportunities in the countryside diminish, migration to the cities is producing a virtual urban explosion in the Third World. The United Nations estimates that, in only 20 years, some 40 LDC cities may contain over 5 million inhabitants each; half of these may have over 10 million, including Mexico City at 32 million; Sao Paulo, 26 million; Calcutta, 20 million; Bombay, 19 million; Karachi, 16 million. By the year 2000, three-fourths of the Latin American population will be living in cities. Provision of jobs, housing, and social services to numbers of this magnitude, over such a short period of time, will present difficulties hitherto unimagined by town planners and governments.

Some recent studies suggest that

Population

the contemporary phenomenon of worldwide inflation is being influenced by rising demand associated with the vast increases in population. Commodities become more costly as supplies dwindle or fail to keep pace with rising demand, or as they become more expensive to obtain. Population growth has also been linked with pressure on energy and raw material supplies. A recent Worldwatch study concludes that, "everywhere one turns, limits are being encountered and the effects are being compounded It seems clear that the world is entering a new period of scarcity." Problems of water pollution, soil erosion, and deforestation are becoming major international issues as a consequence of overintensive farming, overgrazing, encroachment of cities, and uncontrolled industrialization.

President Carter, in a message to Congress in May 1977, stated that: ". . . without controlling the growth of population, the prospects for enough food, shelter, and other basic needs for all the world's people are dim." It is worth underscoring the fact that there are no food, energy, or resource problems *per se*, but only in relation to numbers of people and their consumption levels. If the world does not address the underlying causes, our efforts will continually lag behind growing imbalances and strains.

National Security

For many countries, the prospects for at least the next two decades are not promising: food scarcities and probable expansion of malnutrition, diversion of potential investment resources to maintain an expanding population, increasing underemployment and unemployment, growing numbers of landless poor people, and a tremendous growth in urban proletariat—all exacerbated by such global factors as inflation, higher priced energy, and environmental degradation. Rapid population growth is a major contributing element to all of these conditions and, in addition, itself creates a large proportion of youth in the population. Recent experience, in Iran and other countries, shows that this younger age group—frequently unemployed and crowded into urban slums—is particularly susceptible to extremism, terrorism, and violence as outlets for frustration.

On balance, these factors add up to an increasing potential for social unrest, economic and political instability,

mass migrations, and possible international conflicts over control of land and resources.

It is admittedly difficult to be analytically precise in pinpointing exact causes of a given historical breakdown in domestic or international order. Nevertheless, there is, in my opinion, a clear connection between such instability and the frustrations caused by absolute and relative poverty, reinforced by unprecedented demographic pressures. The examples of warfare in recent memory involving India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, El Salvador, Honduras, and Ethiopia and the potential for increased instability in such places as Turkey, the Philippines, Central America, Iran, and Pakistan surely justify the question being raised as to the contributing role of population factors.

Many developing countries of particular importance to U.S. security are currently experiencing some combination of fast population growth, high and growing population density relative to arable land, massive rural-urban migration, and high underemployment and unemployment—particularly among urban youth. Our interests in many of these countries include—in addition to our traditional concern for human welfare and dignity—such geopolitical factors as strategic location, provision of military bases or support, and supply of oil or other critical raw materials.

In the Middle East, the four most populous nations—Turkey, Egypt, Iran, and Pakistan—are experiencing in varying degrees the complex effects of rapid population growth. In Egypt, for example, where the ratio of population to arable land is among the highest in the world, almost 10% of GNP is devoted to food subsidies; attempts to lower these subsidies 3 years ago led to rioting in Cairo and other cities. In each of these countries, unemployment is already a serious concern, and the labor pool is growing at an alarming pace. The possible spread of political instability through this so-called arc of crisis could imperil vital U.S. interests in oil-producing countries, as well as weaken the southern flank of NATO.

Other countries affected by demographic pressures include such key suppliers—or potential suppliers—of U.S. petroleum imports as Indonesia, Mexico, Venezuela, and Nigeria—already heavily populated countries with high growth rates. They also include countries like Bolivia, Brazil, Morocco, the Philippines, Zimbabwe,

and Thailand, which supply essential U.S. imports of tin, antimony, tungsten, manganese, chromite, and rare ores used for production of jet engines and similar purposes. The U.S. Department of the Interior estimates that, by the year 2000, the United States will be dependent on imports of 12 out of 13 critical minerals required by U.S. industry.

The near certainty of at least a doubling of the populations of most developing countries within the next two to three decades has particular significance for the United States, which has been the goal of so many of the world emigrants and refugees. Problems of unemployment and income distribution aggravated by high population growth contribute to pressures for migration from the United States from Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean.

In sum, the potentially destabilizing effects of excessive population growth in the years ahead must be taken seriously. Disorders abroad can affect our military and strategic situation, as well as our own unemployment rate, the prices and availability of critical industrial raw materials and markets for our exports.

U.S. International Population Policy

Both the Secretary of State and the President's National Security Advisors have emphasized the fundamental linkage between population development, foreign policy, and national security. [Former] Secretary of State Vance, in a letter to all U.S. Ambassadors in December 1978, noted that excessive population growth in many areas of the world complicates and makes more difficult U.S. and international efforts to address a broad range of global issues, including economic development, political stability, unemployment, poverty and malnutrition, migration, inflation, the environment, and energy and resource scarcities.

The fact that this modern phenomenon of rapid population growth—both on a global scale and in particular key countries—is not merely another economic development issue is reflected in the U.S. Government's approach to this subject. In recognition of the special problems posed by population issues for U.S. foreign policy, President has assigned to the Department of State, through an NSC [National Security Council] interagency

network, "the responsibility to develop and develop policy in the population field and to coordinate its implementation." The NSC Ad Hoc Group on Population Policy, comprising 18 Departments and agencies, is headed by the Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs; the Department's Coordinator of Population Affairs acts for the Assistant Secretary in working sessions of the group. Each year, the group produces an annual report to the President which is a basic national policy document on the subject.

U.S. international population policy fully supports the expression at the 1991 World Population Conference in Bucharest of the basic human right of individuals to decide on the number and spacing of their children and the corollary responsibility of governments to provide the information, education, and means to do so. The United States has accepted a leadership role in global efforts to limit population growth and to implement the various actions ratified in Bucharest under the "World Population Plan of Action." In exercising this role, however, the U.S. objective is to work closely with other nations and organizations, rather than seeking to impose our views.

It has been U.S. policy during recent Administrations to respond promptly and fully to requests from developing countries for assistance in dealing with their population growth problems. U.S. policy emphasizes encouraging leaders of developing countries to establish and actively promote, in cooperation with multilateral institutions and other donors, national programs to reduce fertility levels. We believe that such programs, to be more effective, should be fully integrated into a country's development strategy. Finally, we hold that both donors and recipient countries should emphasize programs, in the context of development, which enhance motivation for small families, as well as provide a full range of family planning information services.

U.S. international population policy is reflected in a range of activities, including diplomatic and other high-level contacts and statements, positions at international conferences, assistance to governments in establishing and implementing population programs, training, provision of commodities, and medical and social sciences research. U.S. foreign assistance is provided by

the Agency for International Development (AID), operating under the policy and budgetary guidance of the new International Development Cooperation Agency (IDCA). U.S. aid is given bilaterally directly to foreign governments, as well as through multilateral organizations—primarily the UN Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA)—and nongovernmental intermediaries. In addition, the Center for Population Research at the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development, Department of Health and Human Services, is primarily responsible for administering U.S. Government research in population sciences, much of which has important implications on the international scene.

U.S. international population policy is predicated on the fact that the demographic situation is obviously serious, but it is not hopeless. A growing body of evidence demonstrates that population trends can be influenced by determined public and private sector programs. Data developed during 1979 reinforced earlier evidence of significant fertility declines in a number of populous countries, notably China, but also including Indonesia, Thailand, Colombia, and most recently, Mexico. Impressive results have been achieved in many areas among poor, illiterate, and rural populations of varying ethnic and religious backgrounds. The keys to success generally include commitment of government leadership, effective delivery of family planning information and services, local community involvement, and an enhanced status of women, including education and employment opportunities. Improvements in health and economic conditions and hope for future progress appear to be important factors in motivating couples to desire smaller families. In a growing number of countries—for example, China, Singapore, and Thailand—economic incentives and disincentives have contributed to dramatic declines in fertility.

Some observers believe, however, that these successes represent the easy phase. Reducing fertility to replacement levels will require considerably more intensive, and expensive, efforts in terms of education, motivation, and expansion of services. Over one-half, and perhaps as many as two-thirds, of Third World couples (outside of China) do not currently have access to family planning information and services. The major countries of South Asia—India, Pakistan, Bangladesh—are making

limited progress at best in slowing population growth; the same is true of Egypt, Jordan, Iran, and Turkey in the Middle East; and of many smaller, but nonetheless, densely populated Latin American countries. Much of Africa has not yet recognized the need for action in the face of high-population growth rates.

The constraints impeding effective population programs continue to present formidable problems. These include uneven commitment of political leadership, limited administrative capacity, logistical difficulties, religious conservatism, fatalism, apathy, and personal attitudes toward family size. There is also a great need for improved contraceptive methods, more effective rural delivery systems, and enhanced efforts toward motivation.

Yet there are signs of growing realization of the problem and of growing potential demand for family planning services. Population is no longer a North-South confrontational issue, and many LDC leaders have spoken forcefully and publicly on the need to reduce fertility in order to achieve the development aspirations of their peoples. In most of the 18 developing countries studied by the World Fertility Survey, substantial proportions of married women indicated they desired no more children. A recent poll in India revealed a strong consensus on the urgency of controlling population growth, with a majority favoring use of incentives to limit family size.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The above paragraphs summarize the context for U.S. international population policy. It is evident that, as [former] Secretary of State Vance has said: ". . . it would be difficult to overemphasize the importance of this problem." Current demographic projections convey a clear message that the future consequences of complacency and delay in reaching replacement fertility levels will be billions of individuals added to an overpopulated and overstrained future world. But strenuous efforts will be required to reach the two-child norm. It has been estimated that, in order to reach replacement level of fertility, two-thirds of couples must practice family planning; currently, however, only about one-quarter to one-third of couples in developing countries (apart from China) are estimated to do so. And, many more women are entering the reproductive age each year than

Population

are leaving, which means that more people must be reached just to stand still in terms of birth rates.

Yet, despite these considerations, population policy is not a dominant theme, with very few exceptions, in the affairs of nations or at international meetings. The population growth rate seems glacial in comparison with changes in other areas that attract the attention of decisionmakers. As one observer recently noted: "Population growth assumes the character of background noise"—while political leaders, in the Third World as well as in developed countries, focus on such seemingly more immediate issues as energy, food shortages, terrorism, unemployment, and political crises.

By the world's actions, by its relative budget priorities, and by its silences, it would seem that, even now, many would prefer not to agree with World Bank President Robert McNamara that "... short of nuclear war itself, population growth is the gravest issue that the world faces over the decades immediately ahead." Public attitudes toward population lack a sense of urgency, even though the gradual and accumulating effects of population growth threaten to undermine efforts to solve a broad range of other problems.

Against this background, U.S. international population policy now needs increasingly to focus on the extension of family planning information and services to all peoples as rapidly as possible, combined with programs to increase motivation for smaller families. By virtue of experience and resources, the U.S. cannot relinquish the leadership role in this area.

Unfortunately, there are no quick and easy solutions. Many things must be done simultaneously. For purposes of simplicity, I would divide my policy recommendations into three categories: diplomacy, assistance, and biomedical research.

Diplomacy. Understanding and awareness of the problem are essential preconditions for action. There is a continuing need for educating new policymakers—and their constituencies.

Building on the World Population Plan of Action and the Colombo declaration of international parliamentarians, the United States should seek to keep the population problem at the forefront of the world's agendas, as a

matter of urgent global priority. The objective is a strong and sustained international consensus which can support—and influence—national leaders in their approach to population issues.

- The major themes of these efforts should be the inescapable relationship between fertility reduction and the potential for meaningful economic development and the need for coordinated and expanded population assistance and research by industrialized countries in support of Third World efforts.

- The United States should seek opportunities for public statements by senior U.S. officials and for diplomatic contacts with national leaders on these subjects.

- The United States should promote meaningful resolutions on population in the United Nations and other international forums, including the international development strategy for the Third Development Decade and the North-South global negotiations.

- The United States should consult with other donor governments at highest policy levels, e.g., the economic summit meetings.

- To reinforce these efforts, it would be desirable to assign or designate a population officer in the staffing of every embassy where population factors are important.

Assistance. Measured against the magnitude of the problem, current levels of global population assistance are derisory, amounting to only about 2% of total aid flows, and they are declining in real terms. In constant dollars, U.S. assistance in FY 1979 was lower than in FY 1972; severe budget constraints are holding FY 1980 to no increase, even in current dollars. Even so, the United States remains by far the world's leader in international population assistance, providing more than half of total governmental aid flows. After a 19% increase in 1978, aid from other donors grew by less than 5% in 1979.

Many observers, including the Brandt Commission, have noted a flagging of donor support at precisely the time when the need is most urgent and when LDCs are becoming more receptive. The International Conference of Parliamentarians at Colombo last fall called for urgent world attention to the

population growth problem and proposed an increase in international assistance from current levels of approximately \$450 million to \$1 billion in 1984.

IDCA has initiated a population assistance study and priorities with the collaboration of AID and the Department of State, which should serve to sharpen our focus and provide analytical underpinning for a renewed U.S. leadership role as we enter the 1980s. Such a role could hopefully serve also stimulate other donor governments.

I am certainly aware of the very tight current budgetary situation, but nevertheless feel obligated to renew the National Security Council's recommendation of 1975 for a "major expansion" of U.S. funding for both bilateral and multilateral population programs—an expansion I believe essential to reflect the priority of the population growth issue. Both AID's bilateral assistance program and the UNFPA have significantly more requests for help than they can handle with current budgetary resources.

If more funds were available, a worldwide effort could be launched, consistent with recommendations of Alma Ata and Bellagio conferences, extend primary health care services all peoples by the end of this century. By linking family planning services with basic maternal and child health and nutrition, a combined package of benefits, at not unreasonable cost, could produce hope and change attitudes in previously unreached areas. Such an effort would involve coordination among UNFPA, World Bank, WHO, UNICEF, other agencies, and donor governments. I recommend that it be further explored in the context of North-South negotiations.

Because of the security implications of population growth factors and their effects in undermining the benefits of general development assistance, serious consideration should be given to expanding our population assistance selected cases by allocations from the economic support fund.

Biomedical Research. Existing methods of regulating fertility suffer from serious drawbacks in terms of safety, convenience, acceptability, or effectiveness. Numerous observers agree that it is imperative to increase research funding in order to expand

Security Council Meets on West Bank Situation

Following is a statement made by Donald F. McHenry, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, in the Security Council on June 5, 1980, and the resolution adopted by the Council on June 5.

**AMBASSADOR MCHENRY,
JUNE 5, 1980¹**

A brutal crime has been perpetrated on the West Bank. On June 2 the official spokesman of the Department of State expressed the distress of the American people and their Government in these words:

We are deeply saddened by these terrible acts. Our profound sympathy goes out to Mayor Shakah, Mayor Khalaf, those who have been injured in Hebron, and their families. I would note there has been at least one Israeli injury as well. Nothing can justify such senseless violence. We condemn those responsible and hope they will be brought swiftly to justice. In the interest of the welfare of the peoples of the area, we urge everyone to exercise maximum restraint.

Today we have convened to consider a resolution which focuses on these cowardly attacks, the latest in a spiral of acts which has brought more distress to the West Bank than at any time since the occupation began. This sad situation and the equally sad murder of Israeli citizens at Hebron, are, of course, part of a broader tragedy—the continuing Arab-Israeli conflict. The Council has the responsibility to keep in mind, in its actions, the range of these events and other factors bearing on the dispute; a fact which, regrettably, is not the case in the present resolution. For our own part we continue to believe that Resolution 242, a change in which we would oppose, provides the basis for a just settlement of the conflict. And it is on the basis of Resolution 242, which is not modified in any way by the resolution which is before us, that the United States has pursued a peaceful settlement through the Camp David accords.

An accelerating cycle of violence, of actions and counteractions born of fear and insecurity, erodes the shared vision of an equitable peace from which

any negotiation must draw its sustenance. Instead of a steady advance toward mutually beneficial resolution of problems, more grievances are created which require redress, and historic suspicions are reinforced. Solutions become more complicated as belief in the very possibility of a prosperous and secure coexistence is perceived to recede.

Further, as violence proliferates, many may conclude violence is inevitable, and brave men dedicated to bridging gaps of mutual suspicion in the delicate early stage of a search for peace will find their reasoned appeals are no longer heard. Fear radicalizes by undermining the sense of the possible and the willingness for compromise and compassion. At a minimum, the law must be upheld.

There must be absolute certainty in every mind that criminals will be brought to justice and the law scrupulously observed. If, instead, the law—which on the West Bank includes the provisions of the fourth Geneva convention—is flouted or perceived to be flouted, the voices of moderation, of reflection and good will, may be stifled. The fear of ever-increasing violence will come to dominate every life. Many will conclude active self-defense must be their first priority, with a concomitant loss of interest in understanding the fears of the other side.

The historic result of this kind of radicalization is tragically clear. The emotion and, ultimately, intolerance of immoderate minorities not only wins adherents but a controlling hand in a deteriorating atmosphere where one violent act is assumed to guarantee another. A distorted sense of self-preservation by individuals and groups will give false credence to those who preach force and will insidiously discredit those who argue for a conscious effort first to understand and then to work to allay the concerns of the other side.

On behalf of my government and the people of the United States, I appeal most earnestly to those with influence and authority to exercise leadership and restraint. No provocation

ions, follow up on currently promis-
heads, adapt existing methods to the
icular physiological and social cir-
stances of LDCs, and attract high-
quality scientific talent to the field.

Yet, although improved methods of
controlling fertility would bring far-
reaching health and economic benefits
to mankind, only about 1-2% of global
medical research funding goes to-
ward research in reproductive physi-
ology and contraceptive development.
Research is not a current global
priority in comparison with disease-
related research affecting far fewer
people. WHO was forced to abandon
several activities in 1979 due to flag-
ging donor interest. Private industry
cannot be expected to fill the gap be-
cause of the unprofitability of an "ideal
contraceptive."

In the United States, most re-
search is carried out by the NIH [Na-
tional Institutes of Health] Center for
Population Research, in well conceived
programs of basic and applied research.
In addition, AID's applied research, al-
though modest in size, has produced
impressive practical results.

I agree with the conclusion last
year of the House of Representatives
Select Committee on Population that
there are few areas in which a
strong commitment of American sci-
entific expertise and resources could con-
tribute more to overall health and wel-
fare both in the United States and the
world as a whole."

Unless the United States, and
others, join in urgent and concerted
efforts along the various lines discussed
above, I believe that the consequences
of population growth will increasingly
affect international economic and politi-
cal stability. Time is not on our side: 1
billion people are currently added to
the Earth's population every 5 days,
and the time needed to add the next
billion continues to grow shorter.

The complete transcript of the hear-
ing will be published by the committee and
will be available from the Superintendent
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

can justify terror, intolerance, or disrespect for the law. There must be an end to the fear engendered by the horrors of recent events so that the people of the area can turn constructively and creatively to the urgent task of building a peaceful and equitable framework in which to live their daily lives. Where wrongs can be righted, those in authority should act to that end. Where a wrong cannot be reversed, we hope the perpetrators can be promptly discovered and delivered to the appropriate courts of justice.

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 471²

The Security Council,
Recalling once again the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (1949), and in particular article 27 which, *inter alia* reads:

"Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their persons . . . They shall at all times be humanely treated, and shall be protected especially against all acts of violence or threats thereof;"

Reaffirming the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (1949) to the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem,

Recalling also its resolutions 468 (1980) and 469 (1980) of 8 and 20 May 1980,

Reaffirming its resolution 465 (1980), by which the Council determined "that all measures taken by Israel to change the physical character, demographic composition, institutional structure or status of the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, or any part thereof, have no legal validity and that Israel's policy and practices of settling parts of its population and new immigrants in those territories constitute a flagrant violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War and also constitute a serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East" and strongly deplored the "continuation and persistence of Israel in pursuing those policies and practices",

Shocked by the assassination attempts on the lives of the mayors of Nablus, Ramallah and Al Bireh,

Deeply concerned that the Jewish settlers in the occupied Arab territories are allowed to carry arms thus enabling them to perpetrate crimes against the civilian Arab population,

1. *Condemns* the assassination attempts on the lives of the mayors of Nablus, Ramallah and Al Bireh and calls for the immediate apprehension and prosecution of the perpetrators of these crimes;

2. *Expresses deep concern* that Israel, as occupying Power, has failed to provide adequate protection to the civilian population in the occupied territories in conformity with the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (1949);

3. *Calls upon* the Government of Israel to provide the victims with adequate compensation for the damages suffered as a result of these crimes;

4. *Calls again upon* the Government of Israel to respect and to comply with the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, as well as with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council;

5. *Calls once again upon* all States not to provide Israel with any assistance to be used specifically in connexion with settlements in the occupied territories;

6. *Reaffirms* the overriding necessity to end the prolonged occupation of Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report on the implementation of the present resolution.

¹USUN press release 63.

²Adopted on June 5 by a vote of 14 to 0 with 1 abstention (U.S.). ■

Security Council Meets on South African Situation

Following is a statement made by Donald F. McHenry, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, in the Security Council on June 13, 1980, and the resolution unanimously adopted by the Council that day.

AMBASSADOR McHENRY¹

The problem of institutionalized racial domination in the Republic of South Africa, and related questions throughout southern Africa, have been priority items on the agenda of this Council and for many years have been of concern to the nations located in southern Africa and throughout that continent. These issues have been the cause of violence,

upheaval, and dislocation. They have impeded progress toward needed development in southern Africa.

They have also been the cause for hope as, one by one, all of these questions, except those of South Africa and Namibia, have been resolved in favor of full political participation of all citizens in governing themselves. And the Namibian situation is, we all hope, on the brink of a resolution that will transfer political power to all the residents of that land without further violence. This would leave the troubling question posed by South Africa's policies of apartheid.

South Africa faces a time for critical choices. It must choose one of two paths to deal with the legitimate aspirations of the majority of its population for the full civil, political, and human rights that are the birthright of all men.

It can choose the path of peaceful settlement of the dispute between the white minority and the nonwhite majority. South Africa can recognize that its people will not be denied what they ask and what is in fact already theirs and make the courageous decision to join them in a historic enterprise—the search for the best, at least disruptive, the most meaningful way to bring about the inevitable changes in its national way of life.

No one can pretend that it will be easy for such a society to bridge the gulf between apartheid and full political participation. Yet we know that men of good will can build such a bridge through negotiation and compromise. We know that in other difficult situations it has been possible to hammer out that measure of political consensus which provides the basis of acceptable government for all. We have only to look at the example of Zimbabwe. Despite the bitterness born of bigotry and racial injustice, the bloody heritage of civil war, and the understandable fear of both blacks and whites about the possibilities for peaceful coexistence, a new country was born in peace in Zimbabwe. While we have not yet reached a final settlement in Namibia, that situation too, demonstrates the advantage of peaceful to violent settlement.

Or there is the other course—the course of resisting change by the South African Government.

We know all too well what happens on this path. The oppressed, who are effectively disenfranchised and with no peaceful means of redress, lash out in frustration in the only way open to them—violence. Violence in turn breeds repression on the part of the authorities. Repression leads to more and greater violence, in a cycle from which it seems to be no escape.

We have seen this phenomenon in South Africa time and time again—in Johannesburg, in the exile and imprisoning of moderate popular leaders, in Soweto, in the senseless death of Stephen Biko. Last week, we see it in the protests of school children and the officially sanctioned response to their protests. We see it in the bombing of the SASOL refinery.

Such acts of violence or repression do not only harm the prospects for a peaceful settlement and can only disfigure the moderate leaders and elements who seek to promote peaceful change.

The course adopted by the South African Government during the coming months and years will have consequences, not only for that country but for the future of all of southern Africa. Southern Africa has much to contribute to the region if it and its neighbors can manage to put behind them the animosity that separates them because of the policy of apartheid. Long obsessed with throwing off their own colonial yokes, the southern African states are now joining a cooperative effort to address the tremendous economic and social problems they face. As a developed country with a relatively advanced economy, South Africa could make a significant contribution to that effort. In the process, South Africa could make progress toward resolving its own anxieties and fears about the process of change, since development and prosperity would doubtless enhance the prospect of peace and stability in the entire region.

If, on the other hand, South Africa rejects change, and if friction and violence increase, the other states in the region will suffer additional economic setbacks; and their path to development and stability will be impeded. Continued instability will not enhance South Africa's willingness to come to some accommodation with its majority.

South Africa is not deaf to the plea for change in its country. Nor are many

of its people ignorant of the inevitability that change will occur. There is considerable debate within the government, and among the majority of whites in South Africa, about what changes should be made and how to make them. Governmental commissions have studied the country's economic and social problems and recommended changes. The government has instituted some reforms during the past year.

We do not wish to denigrate the importance of those reforms. But, similarly, we cannot delude ourselves. Because these reforms have not gone to the heart of the matter, they will never be sufficient. South Africa's majority is not wrong or unreasonable to ask for more fundamental changes so that they are full political participants in a government of a society that is not stratified along racial lines. They seek the recognition of their rights as human beings. They will be satisfied with nothing less. And unless South Africa is immune from the historical forces that have triumphed in every other corner of the world, the majority in South Africa will, in the end, obtain what it seeks. We cannot predict the time when this will happen, but we know that it will.

The pursuit of peaceful change, were that the course chosen, would be a long process; one beset with difficulties. There would, no doubt, be setbacks, which could tempt the South African Government to swerve from a progressive course and could tempt some to resort to violence in order to speed up the painful process of negotiation. But we know from the example of Zimbabwe's 14-year-long armed struggle that intransigence will not hasten peace. It will hasten violence. Only negotiation holds out the prospect of finding the best way to achieve change.

Now is the time for South Africa to move toward fundamental social and political change—change that will come about because of, or in spite of, the course it chooses. At this moment, the Government of South Africa, with its strong economy and formidable defenses, should have the confidence and strength to commit itself to make necessary reforms.

Those of us who are not citizens of South Africa cannot dictate the form that a final resolution of this dilemma will take—as the front-line states declared in the Lusaka manifesto—all of

us stand ready to extend whatever assistance the South African Government and people need or desire if the goal of a full participatory government can be agreed upon. But we know that no progress will be made until all South Africans—black, white, and colored—come together and find a level of accommodation that will provide the basis for a just and representative government.

This means that South Africa must avail itself of the talents of all its people. Instead of harassing a Desmond Tutu, South Africa must call upon him. Instead of imprisoning political leaders on Robben Island, South Africa must call upon them to represent their people in the process of negotiation. Meaningful discussions are seriously jeopardized as long as those whom the people themselves would choose as their representatives are forcibly prevented from participating.

We call upon South Africa to make a gesture of good faith by freeing, recalling, and dealing with those whose participation is essential to the country's peaceful and stable future. Such a gesture would warrant an equivalent response, in the form of cooperation instead of violent resistance. Taken together, these two gestures would help create an atmosphere in which serious negotiations between majority and minority could begin.

And now let me say a word about the role and responsibility of this Council at this moment in this longstanding dispute. We, too, are at a crossroads. We can demonstrate a helpful attitude by offering our good offices, and those of the Secretary General, as mediators and facilitators of a solution. Or we can be content to add to the long litany of resolutions, immoderate in tone, which do not materially advance the chances for settlement and may affect them adversely. We can be as much a prisoner of our history as South Africa has thus far been to its past. I suggest that the former course would be more propitious at this crucial time.

Many members are aware of a point of view I have advanced throughout the extensive consultations on the resolution to be voted on by the Security Council. I have argued that much of the language of this resolution repeats earlier pronouncements of the Security Council and urged that the Council

should move away from what has become a debasement of language, including name calling, and should adopt a new approach. I want also to note that the Chapter VI Resolution on which the Council is voting this afternoon contains, for example, in operative 7(b), particular wording that is not appropriately drawn.

In order to make clear our view as to the direction that Security Council action on the question of South Africa should take, I am today sending the President of the Council a letter containing the text of the kind of resolution we have in mind. We hope that the ideas and expression of this draft may prove useful to members in the future.

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 473²

The Security Council,

Taking note of the letter dated 29 May 1980 from the Charge d'Affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Morocco to the United Nations contained in document S/13969,

Gravely concerned over the aggravation of the situation in South Africa, in particular the repression and the killings of schoolchildren protesting against apartheid, as well as the repression against churchmen and workers,

Noting also with grave concern that the racist regime has intensified further a series of arbitrary trials under its racist and repressive laws providing for death sentences,

Convinced that this situation has been brought about by the continued imposition by the South African racist regime of apartheid in defiance of resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions on the question of South Africa, in particular resolutions 392 (1976) of 19 June 1976, 417 (1977) of 31 October 1977 and 418 (1977) of 4 November 1977,

Recalling further resolutions 454 (1979) of 2 November 1979 and 466 (1980) of 11 April 1980, in which South Africa was condemned for the flagrant violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of neighbouring African States,

Reaffirming its recognition of the legitimacy of the struggle of the South African people for the elimination of apartheid and the establishment of a democratic society in accordance with their inalienable human and political rights as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

Taking note of the extensive demands

within and outside South Africa for the release of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners,

Gravely concerned over reports of supply of arms and military equipment to South Africa in contravention of resolution 418 (1977),

Taking note of the letter dated 27 March 1980 by the Chairman of the Special Committee against apartheid concerning an oil embargo against South Africa (S/13869),

Mindful of its responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security,

1. *Strongly condemns* the racist regime of South Africa for further aggravating the situation and its massive repression against all opponents of apartheid, for killings of peaceful demonstrators and political detainees, and for its defiance of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, in particular resolution 417 (1977);

2. *Expresses* its profound sympathy with the victims of this violence;

3. *Reaffirms* that the policy of apartheid is a crime against the conscience and dignity of mankind and is incompatible with the rights and dignity of man, the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and seriously disturbs international peace and security;

4. *Recognizes* the legitimacy of the struggle of the South African people for the elimination of apartheid and for the establishment of a democratic society in which all the people of South Africa as a whole, irrespective of race, colour or creed, will enjoy equal and full political and other rights and participate freely in the determination of their destiny;

5. *Calls upon* the South African Government urgently to end violence against the African people and to take urgent measures to eliminate apartheid;

6. *Expresses* its hope that the inevitable change in south Africa's racial policies can be attained through peaceful means, and declares, however, that the violence and repression by the South African racist regime and its continuing denial of equal human and political rights to the great majority of the South African people greatly aggravate the situation in South Africa and will certainly lead to violent conflict and racial conflagration with serious international repercussions and the further isolation and estrangement of South Africa;

7. *Calls upon* the South African regime to take measures immediately to eliminate the policy of apartheid and grant to all South African citizens equal rights, including equal political rights, and a full and free voice in the determination of their destiny. These measures should include:

(a) Granting of an unconditional amnesty to all persons imprisoned, restricted

or exiled for their opposition to apartheid;

(b) Cessation forthwith of its indiscriminate violence against peaceful demonstrators against apartheid, murders in detention and torture of political prisoners;

(c) Abrogation of the bans of political parties and organizations and the news media opposed to apartheid;

(d) Termination of all political trials;

(e) Provision of equal education opportunities to all South Africans;

8. *Urgently calls upon* the South African regime to release all political prisoners including Nelson Mandela and all other black leaders with whom it must deal in a meaningful discussion of the future of the country;

9. *Demands* that the South Africanist regime refrain from committing further military acts and subversion against independent African States;

10. *Calls* on all States strictly and scrupulously to implement resolution 41 (1977) and enact, as appropriate, effective national legislation for that purpose;

11. *Requests* the Security Council Committee established under resolution 421 (1977) in pursuance of resolution 41 (1977) on the question of South Africa to redouble its efforts to secure full implementation of the arms embargo against South Africa by recommending by 15 September 1980 measures to close all loopholes in the arms embargo, reinforce and make more comprehensive;

12. *Requests* the Secretary-General report by 15 September 1980 on the implementation of the present resolution;

13. *Decides* to remain seized of the question and to consider the situation again not later than 30 September 1980.

¹ USUN press release 66.

² Adopted unanimously June 13, 1980.

Security Council Votes on Status of Jerusalem

Following is a statement made by Donald F. McHenry, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, in the Security Council, the text of the resolution, and a statement made by Secretary Musgrave at the White House all on June 30, 1980.

**AMBASSADOR MCHENRY,
JUNE 30, 1980¹**

The United States is deeply committed to making practical progress toward just and lasting peace in the Middle

which would permit people of all faiths to live in peace in an undivided Jerusalem.

We strongly believe that Jerusalem should become a city of peace—undivided with free access to people of all faiths. We also believe that its status should be determined in the negotiations for a comprehensive peace.

The process of achieving a durable peace requires negotiations among the parties. Only in the give-and-take of negotiations can solutions be worked out with which all parties to an agreement can live in dignity and at peace with each other.

In recent weeks and months we have faced, in this Council, a series of debates on issues related to the Middle East. These debates and the unilateral actions of the parties have the effect, if not the intention, of undercutting the one process of negotiation currently in progress. Progress in any negotiation will be more difficult so long as we are expending our energy in the treadmill of accusations and reactions in the Security Council rather than devoting those energies to a realistic process of negotiations.

The United States, Israel, and Jordan are currently engaged in a process of negotiations designed to provide self-determination to the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. These negotiations, under the Camp David accords, are designed to resolve the Palestinian problem in all of its aspects, while fully protecting the security of Israel. This is the first effort in 30 years aimed at resolving some of the most intractable problems that stand in the way of a just and lasting peace. We do not believe that actions which undermine the negotiating process are consistent with the search for a peaceful settlement to which this Council and its members are committed.

The resolution before us contains a number of deficiencies in its formulation. It does not, for instance, root out consideration of the Jerusalem issue in the context of the negotiated peace envisioned in Resolution 242, but rather deals selectively from that resolution. It contains a provision which affirms the need for Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in 1967 without any reference to the other central provision of Resolution 242—Israel's right to secure and recognized boundaries in a

just and lasting peace. Resolution 242, in all its parts, remains the basis for a comprehensive peace.

What is really needed in a resolution on Jerusalem is a practical method for bringing peace to the people of that city. We must establish the basis for a negotiation to resolve the final status of Jerusalem in the context of peace. We must find a way to assure in clear and unequivocal terms that the city is not again divided and that people of all faiths have free access to the holy places.

The real challenge to those who seek peace in this holy city is to develop the basis for such a negotiation. In such a negotiation, the issues must be addressed in a more realistic manner than the present resolution's impractical call for rescinding past actions.

At the same time I must note that this resolution contains much which is consistent with the policy of my government because it deplores unilateral acts which have sought to change the character of the city outside a negotiated settlement. The significance of those acts is they are inconsistent not only with international law but, indeed, with the very nature of negotiation, which is essential to peace.

The position of the United States on Jerusalem has been stated consistently by successive American Administrations and remains as stated in this Council by Ambassador Goldberg on July 14, 1967, and by Ambassador Yost on July 1, 1969. Beyond that, the policy of the United States is reflected in "A Framework for Peace in the Middle East Agreed at Camp David." It remains the view of the United States that the comprehensive peace envisioned there can only come about when an agreement has been negotiated on the final status of Jerusalem.

We do not intend to be diverted from our course of negotiation by a series of actions and reactions resulting in resolutions in this Council which do not contribute to a negotiated peace. The clearest way for us to indicate that determination is for us to abstain in the vote on the resolution before the Council.

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 476²

The Security Council,

Having considered the letter of 28 May 1980 from the representative of Pakistan, the current Chairman of the Organization of

the Islamic Conference, as contained in document S/13966 of 28 May 1980,

Reaffirming that acquisition of territory by force is inadmissible,

Bearing in mind the specific status of Jerusalem and, in particular, the need for protection and preservation of the unique spiritual and religious dimension of the Holy Places in the city,

Reaffirming its resolutions relevant to the character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem, in particular resolutions 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968, 267 (1969) of 3 July 1969, 271 (1969) of 15 September 1969, 298 (1971) of 25 September 1971 and 465 (1980) of 1 March 1980,

Recalling the Fourth Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,

Deploping the persistence of Israel, in changing the physical character, demographic composition, institutional structure and the status of the Holy City of Jerusalem,

Gravely concerned over the legislative steps initiated in the Israeli Knesset with the aim of changing the character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem,

1. *Reaffirms* the overriding necessity to end the prolonged occupation of Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem;

2. *Strongly deplores* the continued refusal of Israel, the occupying Power, to comply with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly;

3. *Reconfirms* that all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel, the occupying Power, which purport to alter the character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem have no legal validity and constitute a flagrant violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War and also constitute a serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East;

4. *Reiterates* that all such measures which have altered the geographic, demographic and historical character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem are null and void and must be rescinded in compliance with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council;

5. *Urgently calls* on Israel, the occupying Power, to abide by this and previous Security Council resolutions and to desist forthwith from persisting in the policy and measures affecting the character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem;

6. *Reaffirms* its determination in the event of non-compliance by Israel with this resolution, to examine practical ways and means in accordance with relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations to secure the full implementation of this resolution.

SECRETARY MUSKIE,
JUNE 30, 1980³

I thought I'd like to make a statement on the vote at the United Nations today on the Jerusalem resolution. The issue was discussed very thoroughly this morning with the President and his other advisers, and our conclusion is this: that we are being faced now constantly with resolutions from the United Nations whose purpose it is, whether intentionally or not, to undermine the negotiations going on in the Camp David process.

They are not constructive in the sense that they do not substitute for a process. They divert attention from it; they undertake to prejudge some of the issues which will be negotiated or which are scheduled to be negotiated in the Camp David process. They have had the same effect as unilateral actions by the parties themselves.

The process is difficult enough to keep moving. The problems facing the parties are challenging enough and complex enough that the process ought not to be undermined, whether intentionally or unintentionally, by these kinds of resolutions or by unilateral action. The only way that we can indicate clearly our commitment to the negotiations now going on, in the hope that by concentrating on them and by keeping the parties that are actively pursuing them so we can finally resolve the issues that stand between the present situation of almost constant possibilities of violence, is to transfer them into a peaceful arrangement in the Middle East.

The only way we can do it is by abstaining from these votes, and so our abstention is not a negative act; it is a positive act designed to indicate our commitment to the negotiations, our commitment to the Camp David process, and our determination to pursue it and to resolve such issues as Jerusalem, the settlement question, the economy. We are in direct confrontation on the autonomy questions, and I think that we ought not to be diverted from them. I think these resolutions have the effect of creating such diversion.

Q. Do you think a unilateral move on the part of Israel to make Jerusalem its capital is also diversionary and hurts Camp David?

A. I've indicated that all unilateral actions—and I don't exclude any—have that effect.

Q. Why is it so impossible for the United States of America not to be able to say to the world that Israel is a democratic country, the only one in the Middle East we've supported. They want this capital and we recognize that. Why is it so impossible?

A. I'm sure that is impossible. I think we've said that many times. I've said it many times. This Administration has said it many times. The question assumes a condition that doesn't exist.

One of the problems of these resolutions is that we are asked to repeat rhetoric over and over again. But what we're trying to do is to get away from the rhetoric that does nothing but create sometimes emotional responses, divisiveness, diversionary actions. What we're trying to do is to get down to the nitty-gritty of the issues that stand between us and peace in the Middle East.

Now you can embroider it with all the rhetoric that you want, but the issue and the problem has been surrounded by rhetoric for almost 40 years now, and the only real effort to get down to nitty-gritty has been the Camp David process. We've negotiated, we've achieved results—important results. We want to continue that process. There are those, of course, who would like to undermine the Camp David process. There are those who would like to see it fail because they would like then to play in the chaos that would follow such a failure. What we're trying to do is to keep our eye and our focus and our effort and our energy on this process, and you cannot do it by a succession of resolutions in the United Nations which consume energy, which confuse issues, which ask us to prejudge issues that are going to be negotiated. That's my point, and abstention is the only way that we can make that point clearly. I wish there was some other way.

What I'm saying is, that in my judgment, abstention in this context is a positive act in the direction of resolving these problems and these issues.

¹USUN press release 76 of June 30, 1980.

²Adopted on June 30 by a vote of 14 to 0 with 1 abstention (U.S.).

³Department press release 172 of July 1, 1980. ■

Question of Palestine

Following are two statements by William J. vanden Heuvel, Acting U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, in an emergency special session of the U.N. General Assembly on July 24, 1980, and July 29 and the texts of two resolutions adopted by the Assembly on July 29.

JULY 24, 1980¹

The procedure under which this session of the General Assembly has been called was set up by the resolution known as "Uniting for Peace." The surely no issue on which the international community stands more in need of unifying for peace than the conflict in the Middle East.

Today, the need for peace is greater than ever, the quest more urgent. The confrontation that has continued for more than 30 years has prevented every nation in the Middle East from achieving the stability and prosperity that their peoples need and deserve. It has caused profound dislocation for many of those people and has caused them to live their daily lives under enormous stress. It continues to cause untold human suffering in terms of lost families bereaved, grievous wounds inflicted. It has made each a time of fear and tension for Arab and Israeli alike.

The international community gathered here today once again to consider this tragic conflict. My government would like nothing better than to see this body make a genuine contribution toward building a lasting peace. But the record of the past does not provide encouragement. Innumerable resolutions have been passed, but we are no closer to peace as a result of them. The reason is simple and apparent to all: Resolutions that do not take into account the legitimate rights and concerns of both sides will not be accepted by both sides and, therefore, cannot be the basis for negotiations. And without negotiations, we cannot move toward peace.

We do not pretend that the course of negotiations opened up by Camp David is more than a start. There is a long way to go before a just and lasting peace is assured. But we do believe a major step has been taken—and it

country should begrudge or attack a resolution that moves the world closer to peace. What better alternative to the negotiating process of Camp David do you who oppose it suggest? Neither the endless sessions of the Security Council nor the deliberations of the Assembly on the problems of the Middle East has produced an answer to that question.

Proposals circulated by the proponents of this emergency session of the General Assembly do not offer a realistic alternative. They are totally one-sided and, as such, totally unrealistic. They are not founded on the one agreed basis on which a settlement in the Middle East could be conducted—Resolution 242.

They make no attempt to understand, much less accept, Israel's concern for its security. Nor do they make an attempt to understand, much less respect, a realistic procedure for moving toward peace through concrete agreements. When was a negotiation for peace ever achieved or encouraged by intervention so careless of the real concerns of the parties involved?

Nor can this tragic conflict be resolved by one-sided rhetoric of the sort which characterizes the proposals which have been advanced. There are two sides to the Arab-Israeli conflict, and each has legitimate interests, aspirations, and concerns. Any nation that attempts to contribute to bringing peace to the Middle East must understand those interests, aspirations, and concerns. To serve the interests of only one side does no service to the peoples who have suffered most from the conflict and who yearn most for a change in the status quo.

The United States has considered the provisions of the draft resolution being discussed, as it has all others, on the complicated problems of the Middle East on its merits. We will continue to vote, as a minimum of any resolution on which we must vote, whether it will help or hinder the process of negotiating a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace settlement within the framework of Security Council Resolution 242.

Today it is possible to say that as a result of the negotiations launched at Camp David, an important start has been made toward the objective which is of us share—the achievement of a just, lasting, comprehensive peace in the Middle East.

For the first time in more than 30 years, two major warring powers of the region—Egypt and Israel—are at peace with a commitment to continue their

efforts to achieve a comprehensive peace.

For the first time also in 30 years, the Palestinian question is inscribed on the agenda of a continuing negotiation in which important elements of the Palestinian question related to the West Bank and Gaza are being addressed concretely and in ways that can produce specific tangible benefits for the Palestinians.

My government intends to persevere in the effort to make progress in the negotiations. As we do so, we are guided by a number of principles with respect to the Palestinian question. I welcome the opportunity to restate those principles.

- The search for peace must be based on the principles of Security Council Resolution 242, which is the only internationally accepted foundation for a resolution of the Middle East conflict.

- The United States is committed to help the parties to the conflict achieve a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace settlement. We will not be satisfied with partial solutions; as the Camp David framework acknowledges, a real peace will not come to the area until all aspects of the conflict are resolved.

- Peace cannot be imposed on the parties. A lasting peace can only come about through negotiations among the parties in which detailed accommodation on the complex issues is worked out. There can be no shortcut to this requirement. On the other hand, history has amply demonstrated the efficacy of the negotiating procedure. Faced with real and practical choices, negotiating parties have changed their perspectives on issues in a manner that has made agreement possible.

- We have made it clear that any concerned party may participate in the search for peace if it accepts Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, including recognition of Israel's right to exist within secure and recognized borders.

- We recognize that no peace will be just or lasting unless the independence and territorial integrity of all the states in the Middle East, including Israel, is explicitly acknowledged by all parties to the conflict. Let me repeat the phrase, "including Israel." There cannot be peace and there will not be a negotiated settlement that brings an end to this conflict unless all parties recognize that one of the significant elements in the recognition of Israel's

right to exist and to exist with assurances of its security in the context of the military, terrorist, economic, and political assaults that threaten it.

- We recognize as another fundamental principle that peace will not be comprehensive unless the Palestinian problem is resolved in all its aspects. The Camp David framework recognizes that there are dimensions to the Palestinian question beyond the refugee problem that must be addressed. We believe that the Palestinian people should have the opportunity to secure for themselves and their future generations—through negotiations—the right to live in dignity and freedom; the right to economic, social, and cultural fulfillment; and the right to responsible political expression. The Camp David framework establishes a course of negotiations envisaging Palestinian participation to achieve these rights in the context of arrangements that will insure Israel's security and fulfill Israel's own deep desire for peace with its neighbors.

- It is a self-evident historical truth that the political rights of any people can only be given expression in the context of the maintenance of the rights of neighboring peoples. Surely no one would deny the Palestinians their fundamental human rights. Surely also no one would deny that the unique conditions that govern the Arab-Israeli problem—the tightly confined geography, the legacy of suspicions, emotions, and unresolved issues resulting from 30 years of conflict—make the working out of these rights in practical and real ways exceptionally complicated. Yet we are convinced they can be worked out through the negotiating process, if the two sides bring determination, patience, and good will to the task.

- We further believe that the Palestinian people must be able to participate through negotiations in the determination of their future. As [former] Secretary Vance said in his remarks in May 1979 at the opening of the autonomy negotiations, the United States believes deeply in the principle that "... governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed."

- We also recognize that the full spectrum of issues involved in the Palestinian problem is far too complex to be resolved all at once but that the problem should be resolved in all its aspects. The only realistic approach to such a constellation of issues is to establish a transitional period during which the decisions that need to be

made can be dealt with in a measured and logical way.

• And, finally, we know that all parties in the conflict must renounce the use of force and violence against each other if peace is to be secured.

We believe these principles are the essential underpinnings of a successful negotiation. We call on other members of the Assembly to work responsibly with us and with the parties to expand on these principles in a manner which retains the parties' confidence and adherence to them.

The United States is not merely committed to the objective of peace but determined to work toward it in concrete and realistic ways. In the process, we seek a resolution of all aspects of the Palestinian question; a peace that will make refugee camps and violence of all kinds no more than a memory; a peace that will make it unnecessary for the Palestinian question to be inscribed on the agenda of the General Assembly as it has been annually since the founding of this Organization; a peace that will assure the security of Israel and of all its neighbors.

That peace will not come without efforts by men of good will, and of courage, on all sides. The participation of the Palestinian people, as well as other Arabs, and of Israel is an essential prerequisite to full success. My government is committed to this effort. This is the route we have chosen and which we will follow. We cannot and will not abandon it for the declarations that offer only the illusion of progress but which contribute nothing toward achieving the just and lasting peace to which the peoples of the Middle East and the world aspire.

The United States calls on those who would foster peace, as a sign of good will, not to indulge in inflammatory rhetoric without even a pretense of a balanced approach.

We call on those who would foster peace to refrain from prejudging the results of negotiations between the parties and do everything possible to encourage the achievement of meaningful results.

We call on those who would foster peace to take no steps that would undermine, or be perceived as undermining, the prospect of achieving a negotiated settlement. This admonition applies equally to Israel, the Palestinians, the Arab countries—indeed, to all of us represented here.

We call on those who would foster peace to sense that there is a real opportunity for that peace, that the time

is at hand to grasp that opportunity and encourage it, that this world and its people are weary of conflict and pray that those nations which live in the cradle that produced mankind's noblest dreams and ideals would now find the will and the leadership to move courageously toward peace.

RESOLUTION A/RES/ES-7/2²

The General Assembly,

Having considered the question of Palestine at an emergency special session, *Convinced* that the failure to solve this question poses a grave threat to international peace and security,

Noting with regret and concern that the Security Council, at its 2220th meeting on 30 April 1980, failed to take a decision, as a result of the negative vote of the United States of America, on the recommendations of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolutions 31/20 of 24 November 1976, 32/40A of 2 December 1977, 33/28A of 7 December 1978 and 34/65A of 29 November 1979,

Having considered the letter dated 1 July 1980 of the Permanent Representative of Senegal, Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People [U.N. document A/ES-7/1, annex],

Having heard the statement by the Observer of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people [U.N. document A/ES-7/PV.1],

1. *Recalls and reaffirms* its resolutions 3236 (XXIX) and 3237 (XXIX) of 22 November 1974 and all other relevant United Nations resolutions pertinent to the question of Palestine;

2. *Reaffirms*, in particular, that a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East cannot be established, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant United Nations resolutions, without the withdrawal of Israel from all the occupied Palestinian and other Arab territories including Jerusalem, and without the achievement of a just solution of the problem of Palestine on the basis of the attainment of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people in Palestine;

3. *Reaffirms* the inalienable right of the Palestinians to return to their homes and property, in Palestine, from which they have been displaced and uprooted, and calls for their return;

4. *Reaffirms also* the inalienable rights in Palestine of the Palestinian people, including:

- (a) The right to self-determination without external interference, and to national independence and sovereignty;
- (b) The right to establish its own independent sovereign State;

5. *Reaffirms* the right of the Palestine

Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people, to participate on an equal footing in all efforts, deliberation and conferences on the question of Palestine and the situation in the Middle East with the framework of the United Nations;

6. *Reaffirms* the fundamental principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force;

7. *Calls upon* Israel to withdraw completely and unconditionally from all the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since June 1967, including Jerusalem, with all property and services intact, and urges that such withdrawal from all the occupied territories should start before 15 November 1980;

8. *Demands* that Israel should fully comply with the provisions of resolution (1980) adopted unanimously by the Security Council on 1 March 1980;

9. *Further demands* that Israel should fully comply with all United Nations resolutions relevant to the historic character of the Holy City of Jerusalem, in particular Security Council resolution 476 (1980) of 30 June 1980;

10. *Expresses* its opposition to all policies and plans aimed at the resettlement of the Palestinians outside their homeland;

11. *Requests and authorizes* the Secretary-General, in consultation, as appropriate, with the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, to take the necessary measures towards the implementation of the recommendations contained in paragraphs 5-72 of the report of the Committee to the General Assembly at its thirty-first session [U.N. document A/31/35] as a basis for a solution of the question of Palestine;

12. *Requests* the Secretary-General report to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session of the implementation of the present resolution;

13. *Requests* the Security Council, in the event of non-compliance by Israel with the present resolution, to convene in order to consider the situation and the adoptive effective measures under Chapter VII of the Charter;

14. *Decides* to adjourn the seventh emergency special session temporarily and to authorize the President of the latest regular session of the General Assembly to resume its meetings upon request from Member States.

RESOLUTION A/RES/ES-7/3³

The General Assembly,

Having heard the statements by the Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People [U.N. document A/ES-7/PV.1] and by the Rapporteur of the Committee [U.N. document A/ES-7/PV.1],

1. *Commends* the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the

...astinian People for its efforts to discharge its duties;

2. *Expresses great appreciation* for the studies on the various aspects of the question of Palestine published by the Special Representative on Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat under the guidance of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People and requests the Committee to study thoroughly the reasons for the refusal of Israel to comply with the relevant United Nations resolutions, particularly resolution 31/20 of 24 November 1976, which the General Assembly endorsed in its recommendations of the Committee contained in its report to the Assembly at its thirty-first session [U.N. document A/31/5] and the numerous resolutions demanding the withdrawal of Israel from the occupied Palestinian and other Arab territories, including Jerusalem, and to submit a study to the Assembly;

3. *Requests* the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People to report on the progress of its study to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session.

JULY 29, 1980¹

...set forth in my statement to this Assembly on July 24, the U.S. Government believes the resolution just adopted fails to take into account the legitimate rights and security concerns of all parties in the Middle East. Whether it is founded upon U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, the one agreed basis for a comprehensive settlement. The resolution ignores one of the basic principles of Resolution 242, which is that establishment of a just and lasting peace should include the termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area. . . ."

By calling on Israel to withdraw "unconditionally" from territories occupied since 1967, this resolution contradicts and seeks to undermine Resolution 242, one of whose essential principles is the right of Israel and its neighbors to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries. In addition, I wish to note specifically that the recommendations in paragraphs 17-22 of the report to the 31st General Assembly of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, which are cited in the present resolution are as unrealistic and impractical as the resolution in its entirety.

In brief the resolution cannot serve as a basis for negotiations which can

advance just, comprehensive, and durable arrangements for peace. Resolutions that do not take into account the legitimate rights and the concerns of both sides will not be accepted by both sides, and, therefore, cannot be the basis for negotiations. And without negotiations, we cannot advance toward peace.

My delegation has therefore voted against Resolution A/RES/ES-7/2. In view of our opposition to the work of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, we have also voted against Resolution A/RES/ES-7/3.

¹USUN press release 81.

²Adopted on July 29, 1980, by a vote of 112 to 7 (U.S.), with 24 abstentions.

³Adopted on July 29 by a vote of 112 to 5 (U.S.), with 26 abstentions.

⁴USUN press release 83. ■

U.S. Participation in the U.N., 1978

MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, JULY 3, 1980¹

I am pleased to transmit to the Congress this report of the activities of the United States Government in the United Nations and its affiliated agencies during calendar year 1978.

This 33rd annual report covers the second year of my Administration, and I believe it confirms our conviction that the United Nations is of vital and growing importance to the conduct of U.S. foreign relations.

The year 1978 revealed some of the strengths of the UN system. Among the actions taken during 1978 by the United Nations that best exemplify its strength were the rapid establishment of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and the development of a UN plan to ensure the early independence of Namibia through free and fair elections. The UN plan for Namibia includes the authorized establishment of a United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) to assist the Secretary General's Special Representative for Namibia. Formation of UNTAG still awaits final agreement on the implementation of a Namibia settlement.

The establishment of UNIFIL was particularly important for the development of the UN's peacekeeping operations. UNIFIL is a test of the UN's ability to

gain the cooperation of the parties concerned because, unlike other peacekeeping operations, it operates without a precise agreement between opposing parties. In an area where there has been little or no exercise of legitimate civil authority, the Force is attempting to maintain peace within the territory of a sovereign country where there are indigenous, rebellious armed groups supported from outside. The technique of peacekeeping is among the most innovative activities of the United Nations, and one of the most successful.

The year 1978 also witnessed small but growing third world interest in UN human rights initiatives, and the Special Session on Disarmament, which set forth goals and priorities for disarmament negotiations. The United Nations also began to become closely involved in efforts to alleviate the human tragedy in Kampuchea.

The continuing difficulties of the United Nations in dealing with general economic issues were demonstrated by the year-long impasse over the mandate of the Committee of the Whole. In contrast, the decision to convene a Conference on New and Renewable Sources of Energy, which we strongly support, and the reconvening of the negotiating conference on the Common Fund for Commodities, which has since made substantial progress, are solid evidence of the UN's growing ability to deal effectively with specific international economic problems.

The United States remains deeply concerned about the budgetary growth in the UN system, and in 1978 voted against the UN budget for the first time because it failed to exercise the necessary financial restraint. We are continuing to monitor closely UN expenditures, programs, and personnel practices.

It is my hope that this report will contribute to knowledge of and support for the UN as an institution, and to continued active and constructive U.S. participation.

JIMMY CARTER

¹Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of July 7, 1980. Copies of the 309-page report, entitled "United States Participation in the UN—Report by the President to the Congress for the year 1978," are available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402, for \$6.00 each. Remittance must accompany order. ■

Bolivian Coup d'Etat

Following is a Department statement of July 23, 1980, a statement made by Ambassador Gale McGee, U.S. Permanent Representative to the Organization of American States (OAS), on July 24 in the Permanent Council, text of the resolution adopted by the Council, and a statement by Secretary Muskie, both on July 25.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, JULY 23, 1980¹

The Department remains seriously concerned over the July 17 coup and subsequent developments in Bolivia. We are particularly disturbed over the reports we have been receiving from a number of reliable sources of widespread, even savage, violations of human rights reportedly being conducted by the Bolivian Armed Forces at their center of joint operations in the Miraflores barracks in La Paz. Repeated and severe beatings, torture, and denial of needed medical attention are said to be common. We have reports that hundreds of people are being held under detention in various places throughout the country. These reports concern us deeply. We strongly urge that the rights of all Bolivians be respected and that the leaders of the Bolivian military insure that these violations of human rights cease whenever and wherever they may be occurring.

We are continuing our consultations with a number of concerned governments on the Bolivian situation. We have stressed that we deplore this coup by the Bolivian military, the interruption of the democratic process, and the accompanying violence. The Andean nations have called for a meeting of the OAS Permanent Council, which has been scheduled for tomorrow (July 24), to review the human rights situation in Bolivia. We support this initiative and will participate fully in the deliberations in that meeting.

As we announced, we have suspended security assistance, suspended any new economic assistance commitments, and recalled Ambassador [to Bolivia Marvin] Weissman for consultations. We are now engaged in complete review of all ongoing U.S. programs in Bolivia, which may well lead to significant reductions in these programs, with the exception of humanitarian programs carried out through CARE and other

private voluntary agencies. This review of U.S. programs is underway, and we would expect to have results to announce within the next week or so.

AMBASSADOR MCGEE, JULY 24, 1980²

The United States deeply deplores the brutal events that have convulsed Bolivia during the past week. Constitutional authorities have been arrested; their whereabouts kept secret. Many political leaders have been detained; some may have been tortured and murdered. The offices of newspapers and radio stations have been attacked. A climate of repression and fear prevails.

Archbishop Manrique of La Paz, the principal representative of the Bolivian church, spoke for all of us Sunday when he condemned the violations of human rights and the interruption of the democratic process.

Just as last November, when a military officer claimed to be able to interpret the popular will better than freely elected representatives, a handful of officers have embarked upon a course that defies basic principles of constitutional order, human rights, and the self-determination of peoples.

The U.S. delegation considers these tragic events especially reprehensible because they come on the heels of the election of June 29, which provided a clear popular mandate to consolidate the progress Bolivia had made toward the restoration of constitutional and democratic government after almost 15 uninterrupted years of military regimes.

In July 1979 Bolivians went to the polls to cast ballots in what all observers agreed were free and honest elections. Absent a majority, the Bolivian Congress, in accordance with the constitution, then chose Walter Guevara Arze to serve as an interim President for a period of 1 year.

The Guevara government had barely begun to address the country's problems when it was deposed in a bloody coup that cost more than 200 lives.

Many of us here today were in La Paz when it happened. The coup came only hours after the closing session of the OAS General Assembly, held in La

Paz, during which all of us had witnessed the progress democracy had made in Bolivia.

In fact, that progress was such that the united opposition of the Bolivian people to that coup last November led to the restoration of democratic government, this time under the leadership of President Lydia Gueiler.

A few politicians and military officers, however, speciously charged that the Gueiler government was not governing that the country had been infiltrated by international Communists, and that there was anarchy and chaos.

These charges were false then, they are false now. President Gueiler governed wisely and well for 9 months. Her government began a needed economic stabilization program. It guaranteed respect for constitutional rights and it conducted free and honest elections which clearly mandated the orderly transfer of power that has now been arbitrarily interrupted.

There can be no question that the international condemnation of last November's coup provided crucial support for the efforts of the Bolivian people to determine their own destiny. That same international condemnation must make itself felt here today.

There must be a stop to torture, murder, illegal imprisonment, and the flagrant dishonoring of constitutional norms in Bolivia. There must be a prompt restoration of a legally constituted government in which all Bolivians can strengthen freedom and foster national development under the law.

The United States believes that civilized opinion and international opinion require us to support democracy in Bolivia. We should instruct the Inter-American Human Rights Commission to follow the situation closely and keep our governments fully informed of developments in Bolivia. We should support humanitarian agencies like the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), in providing assistance to the victims of repression. And we should make the views of this country unmistakably clear in these regards.

OAS RESOLUTION 308 (432/80) JULY 25, 1980³

The Permanent Council Of The Organization Of American States, Considering:

The principles established in the Charter of the Organization, especially those

Maritime Boundary Treaties

by Mark B. Feldman

*Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 30, 1980. Mr. Feldman is Deputy Legal Adviser.*¹

I welcome the opportunity to testify today in support of three significant treaties that establish maritime boundaries between the United States and Mexico, between the United States and Cuba, and between the United States and Venezuela off the coasts of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands.

These treaties are necessary to delimit the U.S. Continental Shelf in these areas and to resolve overlapping claims of jurisdiction arising out of the establishment of a 200-nautical mile fishery conservation zone off the coasts of the United States in accordance with the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 and the establishment of 200-nautical-mile zones by neighboring countries.

The U.S. fishery conservation zone, created by act of Congress as of March 1, 1977, encompasses approximately 2.8 million square nautical miles of waters. Together with reciprocal actions by other states, this act created more than 30 new boundaries between areas of U.S. fisheries jurisdiction and those of other nations. Such boundary questions arise with neighboring states adjacent to the United States and with opposite states wherever the coasts of the two countries are less than 400 nautical miles apart.

Thus, the 200-mile zone off the coasts of the continental United States abuts that of Canada in the Atlantic Ocean, in the Beaufort Sea, and in two places on the Pacific coast. It abuts the 200-mile zone of the Soviet Union in the Bering and Chukchi Seas, the North Pacific Ocean, where the maritime boundary is determined by the 1867 convention with Russia in connection with the purchase of Alaska, and it borders the Mexican 200-mile zone in the Pacific Ocean and in the Gulf of Mexico. It also borders on the 200-mile zone of Cuba and the Bahamas off the coasts of the southeastern United States.

Similar boundary situations arise in the Caribbean between Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands and the Dominican Republic, Venezuela, and a

For our part we have taken several steps to emphasize our concern over developments in Bolivia. We have terminated military assistance. We have ceased new commitments of economic assistance. We have recalled our Ambassador for consultations. We have made the decision today to withdraw our military group from Bolivia and substantially reduce embassy personnel.

In addition, we have been reviewing our present economic assistance programs with an eye toward substantial reductions. I have ordered today the termination of all economic assistance projects where there is a basis to do so under existing agreements. The only exception will be those programs which support humanitarian assistance such as food programs carried out by private voluntary agencies.

These actions are designed to demonstrate the depth of our concern over the situation in Bolivia. The United States cannot support this attempt to thwart the will of the people of Bolivia. Their journey toward stable democratic rule had not been an easy one. But the people had demonstrated their eagerness to follow that path. We condemn this attempt to force them to turn back.

¹Read to news correspondents by Department spokesman John Trattner.

²Delivered during the first session of the special meeting of the OAS Permanent Council on Bolivia.

³Adopted on July 25 by a vote of 16 to 3 with 4 abstentions.

⁴Press release 204. ■

sed in Article 3, paragraphs d) and

e American Declaration of the
and Duties of Man; and
The Declaration of La Paz, adopted by
esus at the ninth regular session of
General Assembly; and
Big In Mind:

That each state has the right to de-
pts cultural, political, and economic
ely and spontaneously and that in
the development, the state shall re-
the rights of the individual and the
cles of universal morality, as set
in Article 16 of the Charter of the Or-
zation;

That this precept has been violated by
ilitary coup that has taken place in
v in disregard of the elections re-
held in that country; and
Vth strict respect for the principle of
intervention.

1 To deplore the military coup, which
itely suspends the process of demo-
stitutionalization that was cul-
ing in the sister Republic of Bolivia.

2 To express its deepest concern over
of human life and the serious viola-
s of the human rights of the Bolivian
as a direct consequence of the coup

3 To request that, in the shortest time
ble, the Inter-American Commission
Human Rights examine the situation of
rights in Bolivia.

4 To express its solidarity with the
vian people and its confidence that they
will find the most suitable means to main-
tain the viability of their democratic in-
stitutions and their freedoms.

DIETARY MUSKIE, 125, 1980¹

a: deeply concerned over the coup
ovia and subsequent developments
e Bolivia's democratic process has
n thwarted. The will of the Bolivian
ol, freely expressed in recent elec-
s has been flagrantly violated. We
oe these actions. We believe the
oatic process should be resumed
te desires of the Bolivian people
eted. We also deplore violation of
rights of hundreds of political, reli-
and labor leaders being held by
nw regime.

We have been in consultation with
ountries. Our views are widely
re both in this hemisphere and
were in the world. Most notably,
Adean group has taken the initia-
t bring the Bolivian situation be-
te OAS. We strongly support that
ave.

number of islands, including the British Virgin Islands. In the Pacific, our 200-mile zone off American Samoa, Guam, and other island territories creates maritime boundaries with Tonga, Western Samoa, the Cook Islands, the Trust Territory, and several other islands including the new country of Kiribati.

Most of these boundaries remain to be established by agreement. Although the United States has exercised sovereign rights over the resources of the Continental Shelf since the Truman proclamation of 1945, the need to define the boundaries of our Continental Shelf with other nations has only recently become a matter of practical concern as the technical ability to exploit the hydrocarbon resources of the Continental Shelf has developed.

The problem of maritime boundary delimitation became urgent, however, with the extension of fisheries jurisdiction out to 200 miles. Precise limits are needed for purposes of fisheries management and law enforcement, and that need forced the issue of international maritime boundaries to the fore.

In anticipation of legislative action, the State Department established, in 1975, an interagency group to develop a U.S. maritime boundary position. I chaired that group for the Department's Legal Adviser, and it included representatives of other interested bureaus in the Department and representatives of the Departments of the Interior, Commerce, Defense, Energy, and Transportation (Coast Guard). This group's task was to identify in each situation the maritime boundary that would maximize U.S. resource and security interests consistent with international law and friendly relations with our neighbors.

Recognizing that it would not be possible to conclude boundary agreements with most of our neighbors before establishment of the fishery conservation zone on March 1, 1977, the United States published the provisional limits of that zone on March 7, 1977, "pending the establishment of permanent maritime boundaries by mutual agreement."

Subsequently, we have pursued negotiations with several nations and have concluded the three treaties before the committee today; the treaty with Canada, submitting the maritime boundary in the Gulf of Maine area to international adjudication, which the committee has under review, and a treaty with the Cook Islands which was signed on June 11 and which will be

transmitted to the Senate in due course for advice and consent to ratification. Other boundary negotiations are being undertaken, and we intend to work to achieve agreements on all U.S. maritime boundaries as soon as possible.

With this background, I would like to turn to the three pending treaties with our Latin American neighbors. These are the first treaties establishing Continental Shelf and 200-nautical-mile fisheries boundaries to be signed by the United States and submitted to the Senate. They are important treaties that demonstrate that the United States can reach peaceful agreements with our neighbors on sensitive issues of sovereign rights and jurisdiction. We hope this committee will report them favorably and that the Senate will advise and consent to their ratification at an early date. [The Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported favorably on the three treaties on July 24, 1980.]

Mexico

I would like to consider, first, the Treaty on Maritime Boundaries Between the United States of America and the United Mexican States, signed at Mexico City, May 4, 1978. The United States and Mexico first agreed upon maritime boundaries in 1970 in the Treaty to Resolve Pending Boundary Differences and Maintain the Rio Grande and the Colorado River as the International Boundary Between the United States of America and the United Mexican States. The 1970 treaty, in addition to dealing with the land frontier, established a maritime boundary in the Pacific Ocean and the Gulf of Mexico to a distance of 12 nautical miles from the coast. The establishment of 200-nautical-mile zones by our two countries made it necessary to reach agreement on the seaward extension of those boundaries out to 200 nautical miles. The two governments concluded an exchange of notes establishing provisional maritime boundaries on November 24, 1976, and that line was confirmed in the treaty signed on May 4, 1978.

The 200-mile zones established from the coasts of the United States and Mexico overlap in three areas: off the Pacific Coast and in the western Gulf of Mexico where the U.S. and Mexican coasts are adjacent and in the eastern Gulf of Mexico where Mexico's 200-mile zone developed from certain

islands off the Yucatan Peninsula off the Louisiana coast overlaps the U.S. 200-mile zone.

In the central Gulf of Mexico there is a reach of waters approximately nautical miles in length where there is no fisheries boundary between the countries. In this area the coasts of two countries opposite each other are more than 400 nautical miles apart. Our fisheries zones do not overlap. We have not drawn a continental shelf boundary in this area for the time being because the limit of the outer edge of the continental margin is presently a matter under active negotiation at the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea. In respect of this process in view of the fact that water depths in this area do not readily admit of exploitation at the present time, it was decided that there is no immediate need to determine a boundary in this area. We intend to keep this matter under active review and, at such time as may be appropriate, establish a maritime boundary with Mexico in this area.

I am aware that one scholar has questioned the use of islands as basepoints for the boundary line in the Gulf of Mexico. This practice follows the precedent of the 1970 treaty, but the argument is made that the agreement gives Mexico more area in the deep waters of the east central Gulf than should be the case. In considering this issue, the committee should note that the use of islands as basepoints gives the United States substantial areas in the Pacific off the coast of California. These Pacific areas have hydrocarbon potential and are also of considerable interest to U.S. fishermen. There may also be hydrocarbons in the seabed under the waters of the east central Gulf, but these areas are under deep waters and will not be exploited for some years. There are significant fisheries in that area.

I can assure you that before reaching this agreement the Department of State solicited the best available advice including scientists at the U.S. Geological Survey, the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute, and the fishing industry. We contacted interested Members of Congress at an early stage, and the agreement was supported by all interested agencies of the U.S. Government.

Moreover, the approach followed in the treaty with Mexico is consistent with the general U.S. interest in giving full effect to islands off the U.S. coast. The boundary agreement with Cuba

Response to Congressional Inquiry on Letelier-Moffitt Case

by Malcolm R. Barnebey

Statement before the Subcommittee on Government Activities and Transportation of the House Committee on Government Operations on May 9, 1980. Mr. Barnebey is Director of the Office of Andean Affairs in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs.¹

I am here this morning to testify about the response of the U.S. Government to the assassination of Orlando Letelier and Ronni Moffitt.²

time, both governments see advantage in concluding a permanent understanding as to our maritime boundary. Ratification of this treaty will remove a potential problem in U.S. relations with Cuba and will, therefore, contribute to the maintenance of peace and security in the area.

Venezuela

The Maritime Boundary Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Venezuela, signed at Caracas on March 28, 1978, establishes the maritime boundary off the coasts of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands in the Caribbean Sea. This line is based on the same general principles as the agreements with Mexico and Cuba and follows the line published by the United States when the U.S. fishery conservation zone was established in 1977. The Caribbean Regional Fishery Management Council and the authorities in the U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico were consulted prior to the establishment of the U.S. boundary position in this area and concurred in this line.

The three treaties I have discussed this morning all follow a similar format. Each contains the geographic coordinates of the boundary and technical information concerning the establishment of the boundary. Each contains an article which describes the legal effect of the boundary: that neither country shall claim nor exercise, for any purpose, sovereign rights or jurisdiction over the waters or seabed and subsoil on the other country's side of the boundary line. Each treaty also provides that establishment of the boundary does not affect or prejudice either

Subsequent to the 1978 indictments by a U.S. Federal grand jury in Washington of three officers of the Chilean intelligence service, the U.S. Government requested that the Government of Chile order the extradition of the three officers. This request was reviewed by the President of the Chilean Supreme Court but was denied in May 1979. The U.S. Government appealed this decision to a special review panel made up of five Justices of the Chilean Supreme Court. In elaborating U.S. arguments for extradition before the courts, a

country's position concerning the maritime jurisdiction that may be claimed by the other country. This disclaimer was deemed necessary as many of these countries assert claims of jurisdiction over the high seas not recognized by the United States.

As I noted previously, the U.S. position in the negotiation of these treaties was adopted after a full inter-agency review of legal questions and resource considerations and consultation with interested constituents and Members of Congress. We believe all three treaties are advantageous to the United States and fair to the other party. Ratification of these treaties will resolve issues with neighboring states which could become contentious and difficult if they are left unresolved.

Before I conclude my remarks, I would like to note that much of the work required to establish our boundary position, in general and in these cases, was carried through by Dr. Robert D. Hodgson who passed away last December. Dr. Hodgson was Geographer of the Department of State for 10 years and a world renowned expert in this field. He was a dedicated American, respected everywhere for his professional integrity as well as his expertise. The United States owes Dr. Hodgson a considerable debt of gratitude for his contribution to the law of the sea. The new frontiers we are creating are in significant measure a memorial to his work.

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

ample, gives full effect to the Keys. The United States has important island interests in the Alexander Archipelago in eastern Alaska which affects the boundary with Canada in and of Dixon Entrance.

ally, this agreement is a further of United States' and Mexico's to work together as equals to problems on the basis of mutual et. Ratification of the agreement strengthen relations between the States and Mexico by settling which could become content-left unresolved.

Maritime Boundary Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of Cuba signed at Washington December 16, 1977, establishes the boundary in the Straits of Florida and the eastern Gulf of Mexico. The line runs from the west at a point 200 miles from each coast and continues through the eastern gulf and north of Florida to a potential trijunction with the Bahamas. At its southern point the boundary is approximately 38 nautical miles from the U.S.

In the spring of 1977 the United States resumed direct, formal discussions with the Cuban Government for the first time in many years. The maritime boundary agreement was one of the first items on the agenda for talks because both countries recognize the need to avoid incidents over the sea. At that time discussions were held in New York and Havana, and on April 27, 1977, the parties concluded a *modus vivendi* establishing a temporary boundary for the purpose of allowing further negotiations in the maritime boundary treaty was signed in Washington on December 16, 1977.

The agreement provided for prompt application of the boundary line for 20 years from January 1, 1978. When the period expired on January 1, 1980, the parties, by exchange of notes dated December 27 and 28, 1979, extended the temporary application of the boundary for another 24 months. The establishment of the boundary with Cuba is to be a complex technical task because of the difference in charts utilized by the two countries and other technicalities, but the negotiations were conducted on a businesslike basis that serves as a model for how relations between two countries can be conducted. Although relations with Cuba have been seriously strained at the present

strong case was made, as is well known both to those Americans who have followed the case closely as well as to large numbers of Chileans who followed the extensive coverage of the trial in the Chilean press. On October 1, 1979, the review panel of the Chilean Supreme Court issued its findings, denying our appeal and upholding the initial denial of extradition.

Concurrent with our request for extradition, a Chilean investigation was underway of the possible fraudulent use of Chilean passports and other matters related to the assassination. By October 1979, this investigation had proceeded for over 20 months without any indication that it would be pursued vigorously. The decision of the review panel gave no indication that this situation would change.

U.S. Measures

As a result of the failure of the Government of Chile to investigate seriously or to prosecute these crimes, the President decided on a series of actions which were announced on November 30, 1979. These measures were taken to make clear both to the Government of Chile and to others throughout the world that any such act of terrorism as that committed against Orlando Letelier and Ronni Moffitt on the streets of Washington, D.C., cannot be tolerated.

- We reduced the number of U.S. Government personnel in Chile. This reduction is complete except for a few individuals, and they will depart from Santiago before mid-July. The reduction involves 25% of mission personnel and has significantly lowered the profile of U.S. Government activities in Chile.

- On January 1, 1980, the foreign military sales pipeline to Chile was terminated, and thus all deliveries of military equipment and spare parts to the Government of Chile by the United States has been ended.

- Concerning the military group stationed at our Embassy in Santiago, the measures announced November 30 prescribed that the military group would be phased down as the foreign military sales pipeline was reduced and that in 1980 an assessment would be made as to whether the military group should be eliminated. This assessment has been made, and the decision was to eliminate the military group.

- Pursuant to the Export-Import Bank Act and to authority delegated by the President, the Secretary of State

determined that suspension of Export-Import Bank financing in Chile would "clearly and importantly advance United States policy" in combatting international terrorism. The Export-Import Bank has, therefore, suspended its limited remaining financing operations in Chile. In addition, the Federal Credit Insurance Agency, a private organization closely associated with the Export-Import Bank, is no longer providing export insurance.

- The Overseas Private Investment Corporation will not approve further investment guarantees or undertake new activities in Chile.

We have continued to make clear to the Government of Chile our grave concern over its failure to investigate seriously the Letelier/Moffitt assassinations. For example, we recently voted in the World Bank against a proposed water supply project loan in Chile. In our contacts with the Government of Chile, we have continued to stress the adverse impact of this case on our bilateral relations.

We believe that the measures which have been taken constitute clear and strong indications of the U.S. Government's abhorrence of terrorist killings and our determination to take significant and appropriate steps against those who, by their actions or failure to act, condone such crimes.

Civil Aviation

You have also asked what is the U.S. Government's policy with respect to international terrorism in the civil aviation context. The statutory guidelines in the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended, which deal with illegal seizure of aircraft (i.e., hijacking) obviously do not apply in this case.

Our 1948 aviation agreement with Chile contains a provision for revoking the permit of a Chilean airline that fails to comply with U.S. laws and regulations pertaining to: (a) the admission to or departure from U.S. territory of the airline's aircraft; (b) the operation and navigation of the aircraft within U.S. territory; and (c) the admission to or departure from U.S. territory of passengers, crew, or cargo (i.e., regulation on entry, clearance, immigration, passport, customs, and quarantine). Unless there is an established use of aviation for an illegal act, therefore, we would not terminate operations. The determination of whether or not a violation of U.S. law or regulation actually occurs must be made by the agency responsible for enforcing the particular

law or regulation in question. Once determination is made that an airline has violated U.S. laws or regulations, the responsible U.S. agency must determine what punitive action should be taken against that airline.

We have never unilaterally abrogated an aviation agreement. Even where there has been mutual agreement to suspend services, we have the basic agreement in place for use. However, and with particular reference to the Chilean airline, LAN Chile, the U.S. Government in the present political context has not agreed to the request for additional authorization which that airline made in July 1979 and which, if approved, would have permitted LAN-Chile to fly to Los Angeles. We also decided not to enter at this time into negotiation of a bilateral air transport agreement with the Chilean Government.

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the commission and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

²Orlando Letelier was Chilean ambassador to the U.S. during the Allende period. He and his coworker, Ronni Moffitt (a U.S. citizen), were killed in Washington, D.C., in Sept. 1976 by a bomb attached to their car. ■

U.S.-Mexican Relations

by Robert Krueger

Statement before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the Foreign Affairs Committee on 1980. Ambassador at Large, U.S. Coordinator for Mexican Affairs

Since Mexico and the United States are intricately entwined by a host of problems and interrelationships, the developments of one country often have a significant impact on the other. Mexico presents a particular challenge to the U.S. Government because the issues have both foreign and domestic implications. A plethora of domestic interest group government agencies are affected.

President Carter marked the importance he attaches to U.S.-Mexican relations by inviting the Mexican President to make the first state visit under

Administration. During this February 1977 visit the two Presidents agreed to establish the U.S.-Mexico Consultative Mechanism to better manage the relationship through cooperation and consultation on a broad range of issues. At a meeting in February 1979 the mechanism directed that the Consultative Mechanism be reorganized and renamed and that it focus on energy, finance, industry, tourism, migratory cooperation, and law enforcement.

The President subsequently named the U.S. Coordinator for Mexican Affairs and Executive Director of the Consultative Mechanism. Under the leadership of the Secretary of State, U.S. participation in the Consultative Mechanism and work closely with the Ambassador to Mexico, Dr. Nava.

Several sharp differences over the Iranian crisis gave rise in 1979 to a public perception of deterioration in U.S.-Mexican relations. In negotiations with Mexico under the Consultative Mechanism have been positive in recent months with a natural gas agreement and a third presidential visit last September in 1980 with a natural gas agreement; a major sale to Mexico of agricultural commodities formerly reserved for the Soviet Union; agreement on a joint marine pollution control plan and the final capping of the Ixtoc I oil well; progress on borderation agreements; progress on a treaty on the return of stolen vehicles; expanded air routes and increased civil aviation agreement; and increased close cooperation on narcotics

main issues in our relationship—trade, energy, migration, and narcotics. I would like to describe the current status of those issues and also something about tourism, narcotics, and the problem of stolen vehicles. Mexico's more active role in Central and regional questions, particularly in Central America.

With Mexico, our fifth trading partner, is assuming increasing economic and political significance. According to the latest Commerce statistics, total trade with Mexico in 1979 reached a record \$8.7 billion—an increase of 46% over 1978. Since the United States is

Mexico's largest source of imports and its major export market, our trade policy actions have a heavy impact on the Mexican economy.

Our trade relations with Mexico are in a state of uncertainty, resulting from the recent Mexican decision not to join the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). This decision nullified the agreement on tariff concessions which we concluded with Mexico last December under the multilateral trade negotiations (MTN) after 5 years of tough negotiations. Mexico's nonadherence to the code of conduct on subsidies/countervailing duties will encourage countervailing duty petitions by U.S. industry. The bilateralization of our trade with Mexico will doubtless require protracted trade negotiations.

We look forward to continued expansion in trade with Mexico, but it appears that the growth may be slower than what might have been expected with GATT adherence and the MTN agreement. While we would have preferred to deal with our important trade with Mexico in a multilateral and technical context through the GATT, we await Mexican

proposals for bilateral trade negotiations with much interest.

Energy

Mexico's large oil and gas reserves—50 billion barrels proven and 200 billion potential—are its most important and readily exploitable resource. Given our geographic proximity, the United States is the logical market for Mexican hydrocarbons, and last year we imported over 80% of Mexico's oil exports. However, in response to domestic concerns that Mexico is becoming overly dependent on the United States, the Mexican Government is seeking to diversify its energy customers. While our percentage will decrease in the future, planned Mexican production increases should result in somewhat greater oil imports to the United States this year and next (up to 730,000 barrels per day).

In September 1979 the United States and Mexico finally reached agreement on a natural gas deal for which negotiations began in 1977. Shipments amounting to 300 million cubic feet per day began in early 1980.

We understand Mexico's objectives of

MEXICO—A PROFILE

Geography

Area: 764,000 sq. mi.
Capital: Mexico City (Mexico, DF)—pop. 8.6 million, 1978 est.)

People

Population: 69 million (1979 est.).
Ethnic Groups: Indian-Spanish (*mestizo*) 60%, American Indian 30%, Caucasian 9%.
Education: Years compulsory—9, percentage attendance—65%, literacy—75%.
Health: Infant mortality rate—73 per 1,000 (US=17/1,000), life expectancy—62 yrs.

Government

Type: Federal republic.
Independence: First proclaimed September 16, 1810; Republic established 1822.
Date of Constitution: February 5, 1917.
Branches: *Executive*—President (Chief of State and Head of Government).
Legislative—bicameral. *Judicial*—Supreme Court, local and Federal systems.
Political Parties: Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), National Action Party (PAN), Popular Socialist Party (PPS), Authentic Party of the Revolution (PARM), Socialist Workers Party (PST), Mexican Democratic Party (PDM), and Mexican Communist Party (CPM).

Principal Government Officials

Mexico: President—Jose Lopez Portillo; Minister of Government (Interior)—Enrique Olivares Santana; Minister of Foreign Relations—Jorge Castaneda; Ambassador to the United States—Hugo B. Margain.
United States: Ambassador to Mexico—Julian Nava; U.S. Coordinator for Mexican Affairs—Ambassador at Large Robert Krueger.

Economy

GDP: \$120 billion (1979 est.).
Annual Growth Rate: 8% (1979 est.).
Per Capita GDP: \$1,800 (1979 est.).
Agriculture: *Products*—corn, coffee, sugarcane, vegetables.
Industry: *Types*—food processing, chemical, basic metal and metal product, petroleum.
Trade: *Exports of goods*—\$8.9 billion (1979): manufactured goods, petroleum, and agricultural products (coffee, cotton, fruits and vegetables). *Partners*—U.S. (69%), the European Community, and Japan.
Imports of goods—\$12.1 billion: machinery, equipment, industrial vehicles, intermediate goods. *Partners*: United States (63%), the European Community, and Japan.
Average Exchange Rate: 22.5 pesos=U.S. \$1.00 (1980).

using its energy resources at a rate which will promote that country's economic and social development. We want to be a good customer, paying a fair price for the oil and gas Mexico chooses to export. We understand the economic and political reasons for diversification and believe that new, expanded contacts can contribute to the recognition of Mexico's place in the world community and improve its relationships with the United States.

Migration

The complex issue of Mexican migration is being dealt with by the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy—consisting of representatives from the Administration, Congress, and the public; by the two governments through the Consultative Mechanism; and by the Administration as a whole in protecting the human and civil rights of undocumented workers. All of these efforts are complementary.

Instead of enacting the Administration's comprehensive 1977 legislative proposals, Congress established the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy which is scheduled to report its findings along with policy, administrative, and legislative proposals early in 1981.

In February 1979 Presidents Carter and Lopez Portillo agreed for the first time to cooperate closely to find a realistic and long-term solution, one which would respect the dignity and human rights of undocumented workers and which would take account of the many social, economic, and development issues involved.

In both the February and September 1979 presidential meetings, President Lopez Portillo expressed Mexican concerns over mistreatment of Mexican undocumented aliens in the United States. President Carter has emphasized his responsibility to enforce our nation's immigration laws but committed himself to safeguard the constitutionally guaranteed rights of all persons in our territory. The Administration has taken a number of steps to guard against abuse of these rights.

The Migration Working Group of the Consultative Mechanism has agreed on the following work program now underway: joint training sessions for U.S. and Mexican immigration officials, exchange of information and research including joint review of methodology of a major Mexican migration study, cooperation against undocumented alien smugglers, and improving channels of communication to insure high human rights standards in the treatment of undocumented workers.

Border Relations

The uproar over the so-called "tortilla curtain," which was more a symbolic than substantive issue, has largely abated. According to the scaled-down plan, work on short stretches of existing and replacement fences began in June 1979 and is expected to be completed this year. There continue to be periodic disturbances, especially in the Tijuana-San Ysidro sector, but cooperation between local authorities is generally good.

Opening new border stations and bridges and, in particular, environmental issues have predominated in recent bilateral meetings on border questions. Significant progress was made on these questions at a January 1980 meeting of the Border Working Group in Mexico City.

The two governments propose to open an urgently needed border inspection station at Otay Mesa to relieve existing facilities for San Diego-Tijuana 8 miles to the west and to serve new development in the area.

We have concluded an agreement with the Mexicans on disaster assistance in border areas. Progress is being made on agreements for the return of stolen vehicles and aircraft and procedures for confrontation of witnesses in Mexico whose testimony may be admitted in U.S. criminal trials.

The International Boundary and Water Commission, a model of border cooperation, has been assigned responsibility for planning and monitoring works to correct five problem areas where Mexican sanitation wastes are polluting waters entering the United States. The commission expects to reach agreement for two areas this year, and meanwhile, the Mexican Government has taken interim steps at each location to reduce hazards while permanent solutions are being devised and agreed upon. The commission is also studying means to avert controversy over competing exploitation of border underground water basins and overutilization of three streams crossing the Arizona boundary and not yet allocated between the two countries.

U.S. and Mexican environmental experts recently met in El Paso, Texas, under the 2-year-old cooperative agreement concluded between our Environmental Protection Agency and its Mexican counterpart. Important understandings were reached on subjects such as air pollution and the transportation and disposal of hazardous wastes.

The Border Working Group held its third plenary session 3 weeks ago. The

two sides reviewed the full range of oral cooperation programs along the border, which also include activities by Department of Health and Human Services and its counterpart Mexican ministry in cooperation with the Pan American Health Organization and the Border Health Association, educational and cultural exchanges, and exchanges of information and experiences by the U.S. Mexican agencies concerned with health and urban development. A new program relating to applications, studies, and approval for border crossings and international bridges was discussed.

Near agreement has now been reached on a joint marine pollution contingency plan, which would provide coordinated responses by our two governments for future incidents, such as last year's Ixtoc I oil well blowout.

Also at the June 1980 meeting, coordinator for the Mexican Commission for the Development of the Border and the U.S. Federal cochairman of Southwest Border Regional Commission explained to other working group members the functions, goals, and objectives of their respective economic development plans.

Tourism

Tourism is an important issue in U.S. Mexican relations not only because tourist money is important to both countries but because the experience of tourists influences mutual perceptions. Revenues from tourism have provided almost 10% of Mexico's total export earnings with U.S. visitors accounting between 60% and 70% of that amount. While tourist income is only 5% of U.S. export earnings, approximately 25% of U.S. tourism earnings come from Mexican tourists whose expenditures are especially important in U.S. ski resort border areas as well as in areas with growing Hispanic populations.

The Tourism Working Group under the U.S.-Mexico Consultative Mechanism met in San Francisco in June 1979 with the following recommendations:

- Established working parties to exchange statistics, training, development of tourism to third countries, and tourism facilitation;
- Recommended the creation of a new subgroup within the U.S.-Mexico Quadripartite Commission to deal with border tourism;
- Requested that airlines consider

ing regime for flights between countries; and called for the development by 1982 of a day Mesa border crossing.

The 1978 air transport agreement Mexico has led to an increase in service to the United States and to some increase in fares. The main problem in negotiating the agreement has been Mexican fear of low U.S. fares and elimination of the routes.

Other tourism controversies include the balance of trade in tourism and the Tax Reform Act of 1976. Although the United States insists the balance of trade in tourism favors Mexico, the Mexicans disagree, but without statistics to support their claims. Mexicans resent the passage of the 1976 U.S. Tax Reform Act restricting U.S. travelers to two tax-free overseas conferences each year. The Mexicans, along with the tourists, have pushed for an exception for these countries or for the Western Hemisphere.

Drugs Control

The U.S.-Mexico cooperative antinarcotics program has stressed two approaches. The most extensive has been the effort to eradicate illicit opium poppy fields. A parallel and complementary approach has been bilateral law enforcement cooperation to neutralize narcotics trafficking syndicates on both sides of the border through exchange of intelligence, joint investigation, extradition, and prosecution. This is primarily a Mexican effort, involving an estimated \$40 million annually that country's financial resources. The assistance funds provided by the State Department, approximately \$10 million since 1973, help the Government of Mexico purchase and maintain surveillance and spray aircraft for the Attorney General's office. Purchase of surveillance aircraft and other operational costs are borne by Mexico. In the early days of the eradication effort, U.S. technical assistance, including both State Department and Drug Enforcement Administration personnel, was also necessary. Today, however, Mexican expertise is such that U.S. experts also learn through partnership.

Opium poppy eradication campaigns have been a great success. Three or four years ago, poppy fields in Mexico's border areas were often a quarter acre or less in size, and an estimated 6 tons of opium annually crossed the border into

the United States. During the past 2 years, however, poppy fields have been fewer, more widely dispersed, and considerably smaller, with one-tenth of an acre plots considered large. There has been a decrease in the amount of Mexican heroin entering the United States. We estimate that some 1.5 tons of Mexican heroin entered the United States last year.

The cooperative U.S.-Mexico law enforcement program is conducted primarily through exchange of intelligence and joint investigations by the Drug Enforcement Administration and its Mexican counterparts. U.S. officials do not participate in actual arrests or other direct Mexican law enforcement activities.

This joint Mexican-U.S. cooperation has resulted in the immobilization of many major international narcotics traffickers. In 1979 Mexican police seized 5 heroin laboratories and 102 kilograms of heroin and opium. Since drug enforcement efforts have not been relaxed, these lab and drug seizures—only 25% of comparable seizures the previous year—demonstrate the diminished supply of Mexican narcotics.

A major element of U.S.-Mexico law enforcement cooperation has been the Janus program. Initiated in 1976 by the two governments, Janus is a system whereby violators in one country can be prosecuted on the basis of court evidence from the other. To date, at the request of the U.S. Department of Justice, the Government of Mexico has pursued 68 Janus cases. As a result, 36 traffickers are presently imprisoned with 17 fugitive warrants outstanding. The remaining cases are currently under Mexican judicial process.

In 1978-79, heroin from Mexico is estimated by DEA to have comprised less than 45% the total entering the United States, compared to 90% in 1975. Present indications point to a continuation of this favorable trend.

Stolen Vehicles

An estimated 10,000-20,000 stolen U.S. vehicles (automobiles, aircraft, etc.) are transported to Mexico each year. It is likely that many of them enter the Mexican domestic market in violation of tax and duty requirements. In 1978, 120 vehicles were recovered from Mexico through the 1936 convention governing their return and through administrative releases authorized by Attorney General Flores. Continued and expanded cooperative efforts between the United States and Mexico are required if the flow of stolen vehicles is to be reduced. To this end, the

Legal Affairs Working Group has been developing a new treaty governing the return of stolen vehicles and aircraft. Both sides are now very close to an agreed text. We have been assured that Mexican approval can be expected momentarily.

Multilateral and Regional Issues

On multilateral and regional issues, Mexico and the United States sometimes take different positions. Mexico's election to the U.N. Security Council last year amounts to recognition of Mexico's increasing importance on the world scene. Again, we differ on some international issues in the United Nations but, by and large, enjoy a good deal of cooperation in areas such as U.N. reform and disarmament.

Mexico traditionally has felt constrained from playing a predominant role in the Caribbean and Central America due to her policy of nonintervention. This is changing somewhat, particularly in Central America where Mexico broke relations with Somoza before he was overthrown by the Sandinistas.

In general, Mexico shares with the United States the goal of a stable, healthy, nonextremist Central America. Through the Organization of American States and the United Nations, Mexico has generally pursued a policy similar to ours toward Nicaragua. The Mexican Government has maintained a "wait and see" attitude toward El Salvador, preferring not to grant the same degree of support to the revolutionary junta as we have.

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure of aircraft. Done at The Hague Dec. 16, 1970. Entered into force Oct. 14, 1971. TIAS 7192.

Accession deposited: Syrian Arab Republic, July 10, 1980.¹

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation.

Done at Montreal Sept. 23, 1971. Entered into force Jan. 26, 1973. TIAS 7570.

Accession deposited: Syrian Arab Republic, July 10, 1980.¹

Conservation

Convention on the conservation of Antarctic marine living resources, with annex for an arbitral tribunal. Done at Canberra May 20, 1980. Enters into force on the 30th day following the date of deposit of the eighth instrument of ratification, acceptance, or approval by states participating in the conference which adopted the convention.

Consular

Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at Vienna Apr. 24, 1963. Entered into force Mar. 19, 1967; for the U.S. Dec. 24, 1969. TIAS 6820.

Ratification deposited: Finland, July 2, 1980.

Optional protocol to the Vienna convention on consular relations concerning the compulsory settlement of disputes. Done at Vienna Apr. 24, 1963. Entered into force Mar. 19, 1967; for the U.S. Dec. 24, 1969. TIAS 6820.

Ratification deposited: Finland, July 2, 1980.

Containers

International convention for safe containers (CSC), with annexes. Done at Geneva Dec. 2, 1972. Entered into force Sept. 6, 1977; for the U.S. Jan. 3, 1979. TIAS 9037.

Accession deposited: Sweden, June 9, 1980.

Copyright

Universal copyright convention, as revised. Done at Paris July 24, 1971. Entered into force July 10, 1974. TIAS 7868.

Accession deposited: Panama, June 3, 1980.

Customs Cooperation Council

Agreement relating to a procedure for U.S. income tax reimbursements. Effected by exchange of letters at Brussels May 30 and June 23, 1980. Entered into force June 23, 1980; effective Jan. 1, 1980.

Load Lines

Amendments to the international convention on load lines, 1966, relating to amendments to the convention. Adopted at London Nov. 12, 1975.²

Senate advice and consent to acceptance: July 2, 1980.

Instrument of acceptance signed by the President: July 22, 1980.

Maritime Matters

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Adopted at London Nov. 14, 1975.²

Senate advice and consent to acceptance: July 2, 1980.

Instrument of acceptance signed by the President: July 22, 1980.

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Adopted at London Nov. 17, 1977.²

Senate advice and consent to acceptance: July 2, 1980.

Instrument of acceptance signed by the President: July 22, 1980.

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Adopted at London Nov. 15, 1979.²

Acceptance deposited: F.R.G., June 23, 1980.³

International convention on maritime search and rescue, 1979, with annex. Done at Hamburg Apr. 27, 1979.²

Senate advice and consent to ratification: July 2, 1980.

Instrument of ratification signed by the President: July 22, 1980.

Narcotic Drugs

Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at Vienna Feb. 21, 1971. Entered into force Aug. 16, 1976; for the U.S. July 15, 1980. TIAS 9725.

Accession deposited: Ethiopia, June 23, 1980.

Patents

Patent cooperation treaty, with regulations. Done at Washington June 19, 1970. Entered into force Jan. 24, 1978; except for chapter II. Chapter II entered into force Mar. 29, 1978.⁴ TIAS 8733.

Ratification deposited: Finland, July 1, 1980.

Pollution

International convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, with annexes. Done at London May 12, 1954. Entered into force July 26, 1958; for the U.S. Dec. 8, 1961. TIAS 4900.

Acceptance deposited: Cyprus, June 10, 1980.

Amendments to the international convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954 (TIAS 4900). Done at London Apr. 11, 1962. Entered into force May 18, 1967 except for art. XIV which entered into force June 28, 1967. TIAS 61

Acceptance deposited: Cyprus, June 10, 1980.

Amendments to the international convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted at London Oct. 21, 1962. Entered into force Jan. 20, 1978. TIAS 8505.

Acceptance deposited: Cyprus, June 10, 1980.

Protocol of 1978 relating to the international convention for the prevention of pollution from ships, 1973. Done at London Feb. 17, 1978.²

Senate advice and consent to ratification: July 2, 1980.

Instrument of ratification signed by the President: July 22, 1980.

Ratification deposited: Sweden, June 9, 1980.

Convention on long-range transboundary air pollution. Done at Geneva Nov. 13, 1979.²

Ratification deposited: Byelorussian Socialist Republic, June 13, 1980.

Property—Industrial

Convention of Paris for the protection industrial property of Mar. 20, 1883, as revised. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. Articles 1-12 entered into force May 1, 1970; for the U.S. Aug. 25, 1973. Articles 13-30 entered into force Apr. 26, 1970 for the U.S. Sept. 5, 1970. TIAS 6923.

Notification from World Intellectual Property Organization of deposit of accession: Argentina, July 8, 1980.⁵

Property—Intellectual

Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization. Done at Stockholm, July 14, 1967. Entered into force Apr. 26, 1970; for the U.S. Aug. 25, 1970. TIAS 6932.

Accession deposited: Argentina, July 8, 1980.

Rubber

International natural rubber agreement 1979. Done at Geneva Oct. 6, 1979.² Signatures: China, June 17, 1980; Finland, June 16, 1980; Ireland, Mexico, June 2, 1980; Norway, June 16, 1980; Papua New Guinea, June 25, 1980; Sweden, June 1, 1980.

Acceptance deposited: Japan, June 13, 1980.

Safety at Sea

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1974, with annex. Done at London Nov. 1, 1974. Entered into force May 25, 1980. TIAS 9700.

cession deposited: Italy, June 11, 1980.

Protocol of 1978 relating to the international convention for the safety of life at sea, 1974 (TIAS 9700). Done at London Oct. 17, 1978.²

Request for advice and consent to ratification deposited: July 2, 1980.

Instrument of ratification signed by the President: July 22, 1980.

Accession deposited: F.R.G., June 6, 1980.

Accession deposited: Japan, May 15, 1980.

Intersatellite Communications System

Agreement relating to the International Intersatellite Communications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), with annexes. Done at Washington Aug. 20, 1971. Entered into force Feb. 12, 1973. TIAS 7532.

Accession deposited: Guinea, July 14, 1980.

Agreement relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), with annex. Done at Washington Aug. 20, 1971. Entered into force Feb. 12, 1973. TIAS 7532.

Accession deposited: Guinea, July 14, 1980.

Supplementary convention on the abolition of slavery, the slave trade, and institutions and practices similar to slavery. Done at Geneva Sept. 7, 1956. Entered into force Dec. 30, 1957; for the U.S. Dec. 6, 1967. TIAS 6418.

Accession deposited: Togo, July 8, 1980.

International sugar agreement, 1977, with annexes. Done at Geneva Oct. 7, 1977. Entered into force provisionally, Jan. 1, 1978; definitively, Jan. 2, 1980. TIAS 9664.

Accession deposited: Paraguay, July 8, 1980.

Radio Communications

Protocol revision of the radio regulations (Geneva, 1959), as revised, relating to the international mobile (R) service, with annex and final protocol. Done at Geneva Oct. 7, 1977. Entered into force Sept. 1, 1979, except for the frequency allotment for the aeronautical mobile (R) service which shall come into force on Feb. 1, 1983. Accession deposited: F.R.G., Apr. 14, 1980.

Crimes

International convention against the taking of hostages. Adopted at New York Dec. 17, 1978.

Accession deposited: Togo, July 8, 1980; Zaire, July 8, 1980.

Industrial Development Organization

Convention of the U.N. Industrial Development Organization, with annexes. Done at Vienna Apr. 8, 1979.²

Accession deposited: Cameroon, July 8, 1980.

Whaling

International whaling convention and schedule of whaling regulations. Done at Washington Dec. 2, 1946. Entered into force Nov. 10, 1948. TIAS 1849.

Adherence deposited: Oman, July 15, 1980.

Wheat

Protocol modifying and further extending the food aid convention (part of the international wheat agreement), 1971 (TIAS 7144). Done at Washington Apr. 25, 1979. Entered into force June 23, 1979, with respect to certain provisions, July 1, 1979, with respect to other provisions.

Accession deposited: Luxembourg, June 30, 1980.

Terminated: July 1, 1980.

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144). Done at Washington Apr. 25, 1979. Entered into force June 23, 1979, with respect to certain provisions, July 1, 1979, with respect to other provisions.

Ratifications deposited: Portugal, July 23, 1980; Tunisia, July 8, 1980.

Accession deposited: Luxembourg, June 30, 1980.

Food aid convention, 1980 (part of the international wheat agreement, 1971, as extended) (TIAS 7144). Done at Washington Mar. 11, 1980. Entered into force July 1, 1980.

Ratifications deposited: Australia, June 5, 1980; Denmark, Ireland, Netherlands, June 30, 1980; Norway, June 13, 1980; Sweden, June 16, 1980; Switzerland, June 2, 1980.

Declarations of provisional application deposited: Argentina, June 24, 1980; Belgium, France, F.R.G., Italy, Luxembourg, U.K., European Economic Community, June 30, 1980; Finland, Japan,¹ June 17, 1980; Spain, July 21, 1980; U.S., June 27, 1980.

Women

Convention on the political rights of women. Done at New York Mar. 31, 1953. Entered into force July 7, 1954; for the U.S. July 7, 1976. TIAS 8289.

Signature: Nigeria, July 11, 1980.

Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women. Adopted at New York Dec. 18, 1979. Enters into force on the 30th day after the date of deposit with the Secretary General of the U.N. of the 20th instrument of ratification or accession.

Signatures: Bolivia, May 30, 1980; Cuba, Mar. 6, 1980; Ethiopia, July 8, 1980; G.D.R., June 25, 1980; Honduras, June 11, 1980; Hungary, June 6, 1980; Poland, May 29, 1980; Portugal, Apr. 24, 1980; Rwanda, May 1, 1980; Sweden, Mar. 7, 1980; U.S., July 17, 1980.¹

Ratifications deposited: G.D.R., July 9, 1980; Sweden, July 2, 1980.

Accession deposited: Guinea, Mar. 14, 1980.

BILATERAL

Australia

Agreement providing for the continuation of a cooperative program facilitating space flight operations. Effected by exchange of notes at Canberra May 29, 1980. Entered into force May 29, 1980; effective Feb. 26, 1980.

Belgium

Memorandum of understanding for the development of a cooperative program in the sciences, with annex. Signed at Brussels June 2, 1980. Entered into force June 2, 1980.

Botswana

Agreement relating to the reciprocal granting of authorizations to permit licensed amateur radio operators of either country to operate their stations in the other country. Effected by exchange of notes at Gaborone Nov. 7, 1978 and Sept. 26, 1979. Entered into force Sept. 26, 1979.

Canada

Protocol amending the agreement of June 15, 1955, as amended and supplemented (TIAS 3304, 3771, 4518, 5102, 6649, 8287, 8782), concerning civil uses of atomic energy, with agreed minute. Signed at Ottawa Apr. 23, 1980. Entered into force: July 9, 1980.

Colombia

Agreement extending the agreement of Apr. 22, 1976 (TIAS 8244), concerning procedures for mutual assistance in the administration of justice in connection with the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation matter, to Textron, Inc. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington July 7 and 15, 1980. Entered into force July 15, 1980.

Cook Islands

Treaty on friendship and delimitation of the maritime boundary between the United States of America and the Cook Islands. Signed at Rarotonga June 11, 1980. Enters into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

Egypt

Grant agreement relating to commodity imports. Signed at Cairo June 30, 1980. Entered into force June 30, 1980.

Loan agreement relating to commodity imports. Signed at Cairo June 30, 1980. Entered into force June 30, 1980.

Loan agreement relating to commodity imports. Signed at Cairo June 30, 1980. Entered into force June 30, 1980.

Federal Republic of Germany

Extradition treaty. Signed at Berlin

Treaties

*182	7/9	Hume A. Horan sworn in as Ambassador to Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea (biographic data).	201	7/24	Muskie, Shahi: remarks following meeting, July 23.	12	2/8	U.S. perspective of the 34th UNGA.
			202	7/24	Muskie: statement on public release of <i>Global 2000</i> report to the President.	*13	2/11	McHenry: address at Oberlin College, Feb.
*183	7/10	Herbert Stuart Okun sworn in as Ambassador to the German Democratic Republic (biographic data).	*203	7/25	Meeting to commemorate 5th anniversary of signing of Helsinki accords, July 29.	*14	2/19	Petree: membership application of St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Security Council.
*184	7/9	U.S., Poland amend textile agreement, May 5 and June 3.	204	7/25	Muskie: statement on coup in Bolivia.	*15	2/19	Announcement of the arrival of Prince Sihanouk.
185	7/11	Presidential messages on the 100th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Romania.	205	7/29	Muskie: statement before foreign policy on CSCE.	16	3/1	McHenry: Israeli settlements, Security Council.
			*206	7/30	Shipping Coordinating Committee, Committee on Ocean Dumping, Sept. 4.	17	3/3	McHenry: address before the Women's National Democratic Club, Washington.
*186	7/14	William Bodde, Jr., sworn in as Ambassador to Fiji, Tonga, and Tuvalu (biographic data).	207	7/30	Muskie: statement before House Foreign Affairs Committee.	18	3/3	Vance: Rhodesian elections, Mar. 2.
*187	7/17	U.S., Singapore amend textile agreement, May 27 and June 2.	*208	7/31	Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs Advisory Committee, Antarctic Section, Sept. 25 (partially closed).	*19	3/19	Sorenson: food, FAO Conference for Asia the Pacific, New De Mar. 12.
*188	7/17	U.S., Romania amend textile agreement, June 6 and 11.				*20	3/26	Vanden Heuvel: Kampuchean relief, Kampuchean relief donors' meeting.
*189	7/17	U.S., Malaysia amend textile agreement, July 13 and 27.	*Not printed in the BULLETIN. ■			*21	4/2	McHenry: address at Spelman College, Atlanta.
*190	7/17	U.S., India amend textile agreement, May 22.	U.S.U.N.			*22	4/9	Spero: statement following swearing in ceremony, USUN.
*191	7/17	U.S., Pakistan amend textile agreement, June 25 and July 1.	Press releases may be obtained from the Public Affairs Office, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, 799 United Nations Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10017.			*23	4/10	McHenry: global negotiations, Committee of Whole.
*192	7/17	John J. Crowley, Jr., sworn in as Ambassador to Suriname (biographic data).	No.	Date	Subject	*24	4/10	Horbal: World Conference on Women, preparatory committee, Apr. 8.
*193	7/17	Muskie: arrival remarks, Kuala Lumpur, June 27.	1	1/6	McHenry: Afghanistan, Security Council.	*25	3/3	McCall: host country relations, Host Country Relations Committee Apr. 10.
*194	7/17	Muskie: statement before the national foreign policy conference for State and local officials, July 15.	*2	1/13	McCall: keynote address at the Martin Luther King day convocation.	*26	4/11	McHenry: South African incursion into Zamb Security Council.
*195	7/18	Muskie: interview by Barry Schweid and George Gedda of AP, Jim Anderson of UPI, and Roy Gutman and Robert Horton of Reuters, July 16.	*3	1/11	McHenry: Iran, Security Council.	*27	4/15	Horbal: effects of apartheid on women in southern Africa, preparatory committee the World Conference on Women, Apr. 14.
			*4	[Not issued.]		*28	4/15	Ambassador McCall attends Zimbabwe independence celebration.
*196	7/18	Muskie, Queen: arrival of U.S. hostage Queen from Iran.	5	1/12	McHenry: Afghanistan, UNGA.	*29	4/18	Horbal: Palestinian women, preparatory committee for the World Conference on Women Apr. 15.
*197	7/18	U.S., India amend textile agreement, July 1 and 3.	6	1/13	McHenry: Iran, Security Council.			
*198	7/18	U.S., Pakistan amend textile agreement, July 3 and 8.	7	1/13	McHenry: Iran, Security Council.			
*199	7/18	U.S., Mexico amend textile agreement, May 21 and 28.	*8	1/17	Meissner: global negotiations, Committee of the Whole.	*30	4/18	Horbal: Palestinian women, preparatory committee for the World Conference on Women Apr. 16.
*200	7/23	U.S., Pakistan amend textile agreement, June 20 and 25.	*9	1/30	McCall: Third World, Nigerian-American Friendship Society, New York.	*31	4/18	Good: women refugee preparatory committee for the World Conference on Women, Apr. 17.
			*10	2/1	Announcement that Ambassador McHenry will visit the Middle East and North Africa for 2 weeks.			
			*11	2/2	McHenry: Rhodesia, Security Council.			

*Not printed in the BULLETIN. ■

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