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
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The BULLETIN's contents include major addresses and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State; statements made before congressional committees by the Secretary and other senior State Department officials; special features and articles on international affairs; selected press releases issued by the White House, the Department, and the U.S. Mission to the United Nations; and treaties and other agreements to which the United States is or may become a party.

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EDMUND S. MUSKIE
Secretary of State

WILLIAM J. DYESS
Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs

PAUL E. AUERSWALD
Director,
Office of Public Communication

JOHN CLARK KIMBALL
Chief, Editorial Division

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG
Editor

JUANITA ADAMS
Assistant Editor

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DEPOSITORY

Persian Gulf: Common Interests, Different Views

Following are excerpts from a statement by Assistant Secretary Harold H. Saunders before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on September 3, 1980. The full text will be available as a committee print.

Nine years ago, the British withdrew from the [Persian] Gulf. There was much concern and uncertainty about the area because of internal, regional, and external pressures As events evolved, these states have enjoyed a period of relative security and impressive national progress, thanks to their own efforts and a helpful regional environment.

Now in the past 2 years that regional environment has changed dramatically, and these states, having successfully met the challenges of the 1970s face new ones in the 1980s. While their domestic development goes on, developments such as the Iranian revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Soviet activism in the Horn of Africa and South Yemen, the still unresolved Arab-Israeli conflict, and Iraq's search for a new role in the area have changed the regional political and strategic environment.

The people in this area have their own view of the security threat they face, and this view is not widely understood. They are as concerned as anyone in the area about potential Soviet efforts to achieve a predominance there which would curb their independence. They recognize that they themselves do not have the capacity to meet that threat militarily, but they do believe that a strong Arab nationalism and vigorous Islamic faith can be important bulwarks against Soviet efforts to move toward predominance in individual states.

But they also see security issues of two other kinds. They see the opportunity for external aggression or for subversion, either with Soviet support or stemming from regional conflicts. The modernization process itself brings strains to traditional societies. The large influx of foreign workers, including many Palestinians and other Arabs so necessary to implement their national development programs, has given most Gulf states a work force more foreign than indi-

genous. The leadership in these countries has shown concern for human development in the use of wealth, but they are likely to be faced in the years ahead with continuing internal pressures to assuage various elements of society—particularly the unusually large percentage of young people—a fair and meaningful role. Having made progress in establishing government institutions, these states face the challenge of maintaining sensitive contact with the peoples and of developing institutions which will carry their traditional social harmony over into the modern era. Since the Iranian revolution, the attitude of minority Shia'a communities in many of the Gulf societies has been of concern because propaganda from Tehran has urged Shia'a residents to oppose the monarchical Gulf regimes and their Western ties.

On a different plane, the governments of the Gulf states also consistently assert that the absence of Arab-Israeli peace is a primary threat to security and stability in the Gulf region. They regard the Arab-Israeli conflict as providing a main opportunity to enhance Soviet influence in the region, as an instrument for revolutionaries and those who would spread radical political influence, and as the primary obstacle to the firm relationship with the United States which their national interests otherwise demand for.

We continue to share many common goals and interests with the states of the Gulf: We all want to maintain a global strategic balance which protects their independence. We all want to achieve a comprehensive Middle East peace. We all want to maintain orderly energy and financial markets. We want to expand economic cooperation.

Today, some aspects of our earlier approach remain valid; others must be adjusted to take into consideration conditions in Iran and neighboring Afghanistan. My comments here today are designed to present to you our sense both of the continuity of a more permanent elements of U.S. policy toward the region and an explanation of why and how we are making the adjustments necessary in response to changed local and regional circumstances. ■

U.S. Relations With the Persian Gulf States

Harold H. Saunders

Statement submitted to the House Foreign Affairs Committee on September 3, 1980. Mr. Saunders is Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.¹

Each of the past 2 years at this time, I have been asked by this subcommittee to present an overview of the developments in the Middle East and Southwestern Asia. Although today's hearing is not intended as that presentation, it is appropriate in that context to discuss with the committee the evolving U.S. relationship with the Arabian Peninsula states on the Persian Gulf—Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.), and Oman. Developments in the surrounding region and the importance of the Gulf itself warrant our ongoing made this area the centerpiece of a significant policy review.

My purposes in this statement are to:

- Outline our interests in these states as they have intensified in the last several years;
- Present our perception of the dynamics of this area, how it has developed in the past decade, and the challenges ahead; and
- Discuss how our policies toward this area fit our expanding interests and changing circumstances there.

U.S. Interests

Our interests in the region are longstanding, major, and interrelated. They take the following form:

The area's strategic location and its significance to maintaining a global strategic balance;

The significance we place on the sovereignty and independence of these states as part of a more stable world;

The world's vital need for the region's oil; and

The importance of these states in the international finance and development markets for our goods and technology.

In the last decade our interests in the region have changed little in nature but have grown in importance.

We then spoke of the vital flow of Gulf oil to our NATO allies and our friends east of Suez. Now we ourselves have become excessively dependent upon Gulf oil.

As the Gulf countries have grown prosperous, they have assumed a much more prominent role in both regional and world affairs.

Our commerce with the area has expanded enormously, as has the presence of Americans there.

Our cultural relations have greatly increased, including the education in American universities of large numbers of students from the region.

Events in surrounding countries have sharply increased concern about Soviet pressure on this sensitive region.

In the last decade, our relationships with these six Gulf states have been solidly developed on a foundation that includes:

- The strategic importance of the area to the Western world and the importance the Gulf states attach to our ability to maintain a global strategic balance which discourages outside intervention in the area;

- The priority these states attach to a just and lasting resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and their recognition that among outside powers the United States is unique in its ability to play an effective role in the search for a comprehensive Middle East peace;

- A general recognition of the common responsibility of major oil producers and consumers to maintain orderly markets conducive to international economic welfare;

- An expanding mutual interest in economic cooperation including: the growth of commerce, the transfer of technology for sound economic develop-

Bahrain—A Profile

Geography

Area: 260 sq. mi. (four times the size of Washington, D.C.; it is an archipelago of islands of which six are inhabited). **Capital:** Manama (pop. 90,000).

People

Population: 343,000 (1979 est.). **Annual Growth Rate:** 3.4%. **Ethnic Groups:** Arab (80%), Iranian (12%), Pakistani, Indian. **Religions:** Shia'a Muslim (60%), Sunni Muslim (40%). **Languages:** Arabic (official), English, Farsi, Urdu.

Government

Type: Traditional Emirate (Cabinet-Executive system). **Date of Independence:** Aug. 15, 1971. **Constitution:** May 26, 1973. **Branches:** *Executive*—Amir (Chief of State), Prime Minister (Head of Government), Council of Ministers (cabinet). *Legislative*—suspended. *Judicial*—independent judiciary with right of judicial review. **Political Parties:** None. **Suffrage:** Not applicable.

Economy

GDP: \$1.7 billion (1979 est.). **Annual Growth Rate:** 6% (est.). **Per Capita Income:** \$4,967 (1979 est.). **Inflation Rate:** 15%. **Natural Resources:** Oil, associated and nonassociated natural gas, fish. **Agricultural Products:** Eggs, vegetables, dates. **Industries:** Oil, aluminum, ship repair, natural gas, fish. **Trade (1978):** *Exports*—\$1.9 billion: oil, aluminum, fish. *Partners*—Japan, Saudi Arabia, U.K., U.S. *Imports*—\$2 billion: machinery, industrial equipment, motor vehicles, foodstuffs, clothing. *Partners*—Japan, U.K., U.S. **Official Exchange Rate:** .384 Bahrain dinars=US\$1.00.

Membership in International Organizations

U.N. and most of its specialized agencies, Arab League, OAPEC.

Principal Government Officials

Bahrain: Amir—Shaikh Isa bin Salman Al Khalifa; Crown Prince—Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa; Prime Minister—Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa; Minister of Foreign Affairs—Mohammad bin Mubarak Al Khalifa; Ambassador to the U.S.—Abdulaziz Buali. **United States:** Ambassador to Bahrain—Peter Sutherland.

ment of the Gulf states, maintaining international financial order, and facilitating the development of poorer countries; and

- The desire of these states for U.S. assistance in developing an appropriate defense capability and our willingness to join our allies in fulfilling this need.

A Decade of Progress

Eight years ago the Department testified before this subcommittee on U.S. policy toward the Persian Gulf, following an intensive, prolonged review of U.S. policy toward that region in light of the ending of the United Kingdom's historic protective treaty relationships with the smaller states on the Arab side of the Gulf. Then we looked forward to developing formal relations with three states achieving full independence, while retaining an historic relationship with Oman and building on well-established relations with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

But the international community contemplated the British withdrawal from the Gulf with understandable concern.

Revolutionary ideologies had long attacked the Gulf's ruling order.

Territorial disputes complicated the quest for regional cooperation.

Communist-supported insurgency in Oman's Dhofar Province demonstrated the destabilizing effect of outside intervention.

The world wondered if states so small and thinly manned could develop the institutions and national character required to stand on their own in a troubled world.

As it turned out, the smaller states of the Gulf were helped in their progress toward nationbuilding by a relatively tranquil environment. Their larger neighbor, Saudi Arabia, was and remains in a period of great national progress. The concept of close cooperation among the Arabian Peninsula states on the Gulf progressed steadily. The harmonious relationship that the two largest Middle East countries, Iran and Egypt, developed with one another and with Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states provided an atmosphere conducive to orderly development.

In this environment, progress on the Arab side of the Gulf was impressive.

The seven so-called Trucial States came together to form the United Arab Emirates. Bahrain and Qatar firmly established their national identities. All the lower Gulf states developed a strong foundation of cooperation across a broad

range of economic, political, and security issues among themselves, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia.

Many of the sensitive boundary disputes in the Gulf were resolved.

The insurgency in Oman's Dhofar Province, supported by the radical South Yemen regime, collapsed when faced with Oman's spirited resistance and progress toward national unity. Oman was aided by significant support from its neighbors.

Saudi Arabia and its Gulf neighbors made progress in developing institutions of public administration, accommodating traditional social structures to the needs of modern government. In the U.A.E. the federal assembly has developed as a constructive expression of public sentiment. Kuwait and Bahrain have experimented with popularly elected national assemblies and in the process have gained valuable experience in how to engage public opinion constructively in the formulation of national policy. Kuwait's ruler has just issued a decree calling for the reconvening of an elected national assembly before the end of February. Saudi Arabia has announced that it will soon establish a consultative council.

Without exception these six governments have made important strides in using the benefits of oil wealth to better the lives of their peoples by meeting basic human needs and developing human potential while building the material attributes of modern societies.

The Surrounding Environment

Presently, however, and as we look ahead, the reassuring record of progress in these six Gulf states must be weighed against events in surrounding countries which impact heavily on these states.

The revolution and the decline of central authority in Iran have radically altered the strategic environment of other Gulf countries.

The Soviet invasion of nonaligned Afghanistan threatens the security of all of Southwest Asia.

In this regional atmosphere, Soviet, Cuban, and East German presence in the Horn of Africa and South Yemen reinforces longstanding concern about Soviet pressure through support of radical forces.

There is, furthermore, an atmosphere of marked instability within the wider region. Rejection of long-cherished traditions of civility is becoming more notable. Specific examples are:

Kuwait—A Profile

Geography

Area: 7,780 sq. mi. (slightly smaller than New Jersey). **Capital:** Kuwait (pop. 1.0 million).

People

Population: 1.2 million (1979 est.). **Annual Growth Rate:** 6% (1977 est. which includes immigration). **Ethnic Groups:** Arab, Iranian, Indian, Pakistani. **Religion:** Muslim. **Languages:** Arabic (official), English widely spoken.

Government

Type: Constitutional monarchy, governed by an Amir chosen by consensus of the ruling al-Sabah family from its own members. **Independence:** June 19, 1961. **Constitution:** Suspended temporarily. **Political Parties:** None. **Suffrage:** Males over 21.

Economy

GDP: \$23.8 billion (1979 est.). **Per Capita GDP:** \$19,817 (1979 est.). **Inflation Rate:** 5.2%. **Agricultural Products:** None. **Industries:** Crude and refined oil, fertilizers, chemicals, building materials, shrimp. **Trade (1979): Exports—\$18.3 billion:** crude and refined petroleum, shrimp. **Imports—\$4.9 billion:** foodstuffs, automobiles, building materials, machine textiles. **Partners—Japan, U.S., U.K. F.R.G. Official Exchange Rate:** 1 Kuwaiti dinar=\$3.68 (1980). **Economic Aid Received:** None. **Economic Aid Sent:** \$2.5 billion (1975-79).

Membership in International Organizations

U.N., Arab League, OPEC, OIAPEC, IBRD.

Principal Government Officials

Kuwait: Amir—Jabir al-Ahmad al-Sabah; Crown Prince and Prime Minister—Salem al-Abdullah al-Sabah; Minister of Foreign Affairs—Sabah al-Ahmad al-Sabah; Ambassador to the U.S.—Khalid M. Jaffar. **United States:** Ambassador to Kuwait—Francois M. Dickman.

- The violation of international law and standards of civilized conduct among nations in the continued holding of diplomatic hostages in Iran;

- The unprecedented campaign of terrorism by Libyan leaders against their own people abroad;

- The violence in Lebanon and the difficulty of rebuilding civil order; and

- The legacy of Iraq's support for radical groups engaged in terrorism.

The complexity of Iraq's search for national personality, its future relationship with Gulf neighbors, and its international role as a wealthy member of a world under economic pressure all impact significantly on the region.

Historic progress in achieving peace between Egypt and Israel has in its current state created tension between Egypt and other Arabs. The current isolation of Egypt from the Arab world has inhibited Egypt's role as a force for stability elsewhere in the Middle East.

At the same time, our commitment deal with all aspects of the Palestinian problem while sustaining Israel's security wishes hopes for the tranquility which peace can bring throughout the area. But the quest challenges leaders in the Gulf elsewhere in the Middle East to rise to a new level of vision and courage required to proceed on the path to a lasting peace.

Present and Future Gulf

The Gulf states perceive themselves and the world perceives the Gulf region with a remarkable mixture of anxiety and tension. Tensions in surrounding areas have increased concern about the Gulf's security while the very progress in the region has brought internal stresses. The vast resources of the region and the demonstrated willingness of its leaders to meet these challenges at home and abroad suggest that these states have the capability to keep their own houses in order while playing an ever more constructive and important role in regional and world affairs.

We can pursue our interests in the region in harmony with the aspirations and concerns of its people. To do so we must constantly bear in mind how our various interests and their various needs relate. There is, for instance, an obvious relationship between the security of the region and its reliability as an oil supplier. The growth of our economic relationships will have an impact on the pace and quality of development in the Gulf states, and in turn will influence the prospects for stability.

Our ability to be supportive of the security of the region will be influenced by both international economic and regional political factors, and regional security will in turn enhance the prospects for orderly development and stability. The progress which we can make toward a comprehensive Middle East peace not only will heavily influence the quality of our relationship with these states but also will have profound impact on their prospects for orderly progress.

Security and Orderly Progress

Given our deep interest in the security of the region and the alertness of the Gulf states to external and internal pressures on their stability, we might define possible threats to the region as a framework for discussing part of the U.S. policy response, making clear that our posture is one of defense, finely tuned to the sensitivity and sovereignty of the states in the area.

Saudi Arabia—A Profile

Geography

Area: About 873,000 sq. mi. (one-third the size of the U.S.; boundaries are undefined and disputed). **Capital:** Riyadh (pop. 750,000 est.). **Other Cities:** Jidda (615,000; site of the Foreign Ministry and the foreign diplomatic representatives), Mecca (250,000), Medina (150,000), Taif (100,000), Damman (100,000).

People

Population: 7.1 million (1979 est.). **Annual Growth Rate:** 3.1% (1979). **Ethnic Groups:** Arab tribes with admixture of peoples from other Arab and Muslim countries. **Religion:** Muslim. **Language:** Arabic.

Government

Type: Monarchy. **Date of Unification:** Sept. 23, 1952. **Constitution:** None. **Branches:** *Executive*—King (Chief of State and Head of Government). *Legislative*—none. *Judicial*—Islamic Courts of First Instance and Appeals. **Political Parties:** None. **Suffrage:** None.

Economy

GDP: \$78 billion (1979 est.). **Annual Growth Rate:** 24.9% (1979). **Per Capita**

Direct Soviet Aggression. In the light of historic Russian objectives and expansionism into Central Asia, the Gulf states have good reason to be apprehensive about the possibility of direct Soviet military intervention. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan gives a tangible quality to this longstanding concern. The turbulence in revolutionary Iran suggests a further immediate possibility for the Soviets which could give them a direct opening into the Persian Gulf and its oil and a further lever with which to upset domestic stability in the Gulf region. The thinly populated Gulf states realize they have no prospect for developing a military capability to meet these threats. They look to us to check them, but they prefer that we do so by actions outside the region and in a way that minimizes their involvement. They greatly fear that the area will become an arena of superpower confrontation.

Our response to the Soviet threat must, therefore, involve a complex of

Income: \$11,500 (1979 est.). **Inflation Rate:** 10%. **Natural Resources:** Petroleum, natural gas. **Agricultural Products:** Dates, grains, vegetables, livestock. **Industries:** Petroleum and petroleum products, fertilizer, cement. **Trade (1979):** *Exports*—\$46.5 billion: petroleum. *Partners*—EEC (50%), U.S. (16%), Japan (15%), LDCs (19%). *Imports*—\$217 billion: transportation equipment, machinery, foodstuffs. *Partners*—EEC and Japan (62%), U.S. (25%), LDCs (12%), other (1%). **Official Exchange Rate:** 3.34 Saudi riyals=US\$1.00. **Economic Aid Received:** None. **Economic Aid Sent (1974-78):** Approximately \$15 billion.

Membership in International Organizations

U.N. and its specialized agencies, OPEC, OAPEC, INTELSAT.

Principal Government Officials

Saudi Arabia: King and Prime Minister—Khalid bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud; First Deputy Prime Minister and Crown Prince—Fahd bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud; Minister of Foreign Affairs—Sa'ud bin Faisal bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud; Ambassador to the U.S.—Faisal Alhagelan. **United States:** Ambassador to Saudi Arabia—John C. West.

military, economic, and political actions, and working in close cooperation with our allies, our friends in the Gulf, and key states in the broader region.

Economic and political measures we and our allies have taken to bring home to the Soviets the cost of intervention in Afghanistan are part of this response. The Gulf countries, in their own Islamic context, have led international efforts to obtain Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Other industrial democracies have joined us in intensified efforts to support two key neighboring states which are deeply concerned about Soviet intentions in the region—Turkey and Pakistan. Gulf governments have indicated their desire to assist and cooperate with these countries. We are also seeking to provide the states of the region with an improved defense capability of their own.

We have made significant sacrifices to transfer scarce resources into a strengthened global military capability and continue to work with our allies in the common task of maintaining a military balance which will deter Soviet intervention in the Gulf or elsewhere. We and our NATO allies are proceeding with actions in Europe to buttress Western strength vis-a-vis the Soviets, while we also direct resources and military capabilities toward the Persian Gulf to establish the capacity to deter there as well.

Because of its strategic location and its critical resources, the Gulf is inescapably a factor in the global balance. Our ability to maintain that balance requires a capability to project effective force toward the region for the purpose of confronting aggressors and safeguarding the integrity of its nations. We are determined that the Gulf will be secure against outside interference. In his State of the Union address the President made this point clearly when he said:

An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.

The logistics of maintaining this deterrent capability requires cooperation from friendly states in the region. For one-third of a century we have maintained a military presence in the Gulf and our deployed forces have had access to logistic support facilities. Our continued ability to contribute to the security of the region greatly depends upon such access.

In order to carry out this policy in the region, we have undertaken several

United Arab Emirates— A Profile

Geography

Area: About 32,000 sq. mi. (about the size of Maine). **Capital:** Abu Dhabi (pop. 300,000). **Other Cities:** Dubai, Sharjah.

People

Population: 900,000 (1979 est.). **Annual Growth Rate:** 8% (1979). **Ethnic Groups:** Arab, Iranian, Pakistani, Indian (less than 25% of the population are U. A. E. citizens). **Religions:** Muslim (90%), Hindu, Christian. **Languages:** Arabic (official); Farsi and English widely spoken.

Government

Type: Federation of Emirates. **Date of Independence:** Dec. 2, 1971. **Date of Provisional Constitution:** Dec. 2, 1971. **Branches:** *Executive*—7-member Supreme Council of Rulers which elects President and Vice President. *Legislative*—40-member National Consultative Council. *Judicial*—secular legal codes being introduced; Islamic law influential. **Political Parties:** None. **Suffrage:** None.

initiatives. In response to the destabilizing situation and Soviet pressures in the general region, we have significantly increased our naval presence in the Indian Ocean. Further, we are improving our capability to surge forces into the area by organizing the rapid deployment force (RDF) and by improving our airlift and sealift forces to move the RDF more quickly. In addition, we have sought and are seeking selective and limited access to air and naval facilities in the area, such as Oman, Kenya, and Somalia. We are also upgrading facilities in the area, such as Diego Garcia.

These facilities are to support our peacetime presence, periodic exercises and deployments, and to allow us to move more significant forces into the area if necessary. We seek no bases. Our cooperative arrangements fully respect the sovereignty of the cooperating states, and of their neighbors. Such cooperation reflects the realism and strategic grasp of

Economy

GDP: \$16 billion (1979). **Annual Growth Rate:** 5% (1979 est.). **Per Capita Income:** \$16,000 (1979 est.). **Inflation Rate:** 15% **Natural Resource:** Oil. **Agricultural Products:** Vegetables, dates, limes. **Industries:** Light manufactures, petroleum. **Trade (1979): Exports**—\$55.5 billion: petroleum. **Imports**—\$13.1 billion: machinery, consumer goods, food. **Partners**—Western Europe, Japan, U.S. **Official Exchange Rate:** 1 dirham=US\$0.26. **Economic Aid Received:** None. **Economic Aid Sent:** \$3.5 billion (1974-78).

Membership in International Organizations

U.N., Arab League, OPEC, OAPEC.

Principal Government Officials

United Arab Emirates: President and Ruler of Abu Dhabi—Shaikh Zayid bin Sultan al Nuhayan; Vice President, Prime Minister, and Ruler of Dubai—Shaikh Rashid bin Said al-Maktum; Minister of Foreign Affairs—Ahmad Khalifa al-Suwaidi; Ambassador to the U.S.—Vacant. **United States:** Ambassador to U. A. E.—William D. Wolle.

governments determined to preserve their own independence and to foster a secure regional environment.

Soviet-Supported Aggression. Over the years, Gulf governments have been concerned about Soviet military support for and political influence in radical neighboring states with aggressive policies. In the last decade the Marxist regime in South Yemen, strongly backed and heavily armed by the Soviets, fomented border actions against Saudi Arabia, supported the insurgency in Oman's Dhofar Province, and last year invaded North Yemen. The Soviet position in Ethiopia, combined with a prominent Soviet role in South Yemen, increases the vulnerability of the Bab-al-Mandab/Red Sea access and intensifies the concern of the Gulf countries. Cubans and East Germans are actively engaged in supporting Soviet efforts in the area.

All six Arabian Peninsula countries on the Gulf seek harmonious relations

with all their neighbors. Their basic policy has been to foster a sense of common purpose among Arab and Islamic nations which finds no room for Soviet intervention.

This policy is supportive of our own desire to see the Gulf peoples preserve peace and tranquility. We are encouraged by signs that Iraq has developed a greater harmony with Arab neighbors on the Gulf. We have noted the emergence of a new leadership in South Yemen and will watch carefully for tangible indications it might come to live in peace and perhaps in cooperation with its neighbors.

As elsewhere in the Middle East, we stand ready to work with others in the region to ease tensions where our help is beneficial. Our political and military support efforts and deployments in response to last year's Yemen war manifested this intent.

But if Saudi Arabia and its Gulf neighbors are to be secure from Soviet-backed military threat or the political pressure such threat can bring to bear, they must have a modern defense capability. Our security assistance to these countries is a significant factor in providing this capability and a key element in our overall relationship with them. Our peacetime military presence in the region is an additional element in assuring the security of the area.

Over the years we have had an important role in assisting Saudi Arabia to develop a modern defense capability. Over the last decade we have played a significant part in Kuwait's defense program. In recent years we have demonstrated our willingness to be supportive of the defense requirements of the other Gulf states.

Our arms policy toward the region is consistent with our worldwide approach to providing military equipment and training. Our arms sales to all six states are designed not to seek short-range political or commercial gains by loading them with unsuitable or excessive equipment, but rather to help provide them with an appropriate and effective national defense. In this effort we do not wish an excessive role and welcome the contribution of our industrialized allies and of governments in the region, such as Jordan, which can assist in various ways.

Regional Conflict. The atmosphere in which the Gulf states seek their future is influenced by rivalries, tensions, and strife in the wider region—in the Arab-Israeli dispute, in Lebanon, in parts of Africa, and, closer to home, in the current tension between Iraq and Iran and

South Yemeni pressures on neighbors. The Gulf states recognize clearly the need to defuse these tensions. Our own policy remains dedicated to this objective. In some cases we can play a significant role, at times working together with Gulf countries. In other situations, such as the tension between Iraq and Iran, our concern exceeds our ability to influence events. We welcome whatever influence the Gulf states can bring to bear in removing the source of regional tension.

Externally Supported Subversion and Internal Threats. No catalogue of possible threats to the Gulf states would be complete without acknowledging that there is widely publicized concern about threats from within. That outside forces seek to subvert these states is a matter of public record. The Gulf states face a number of challenges, some resulting from the very progress they have made.

The modernization process itself brings change to traditional societies.

The large influx of foreign workers—so necessary to implement their national development programs—has given most Gulf states a work force more foreign than "native." This raises the long-term problem of the claims of foreign residents on the society.

The leadership in these countries has shown wisdom and concern for human development in the use of oil wealth. In the years ahead, however, they are likely to be faced with continuing internal pressures to assure various elements of society a fair share and a meaningful role. Insuring a meaningful role for the unusually large percentage of young people in these societies, all of them with access to education, is a special challenge.

Having made progress in establishing government institutions, these states face the challenge of maintaining sensitive contact with their peoples and of developing institutions which will carry their traditional social harmony over into the modern era.

Since the Iranian revolution the attitude of minority Shi'a communities in many of the Gulf societies has been of concern. Propaganda from Tehran urges Shi'a residents to oppose the monarchial Gulf regimes and their Western ties. The Gulf states wish to maintain decent relations with Tehran. They desire a reduction of tensions between the United States and Iran as a means of fostering regional tranquility.

We will not interfere in the internal affairs of any country. We have, however, through both official and private channels,

Oman—A Profile

Geography

Area: 115,800 sq. mi. (about the size of Kansas). **Capital:** Muscat (pop. NA).

People

Population: 860,000 (1979 est.). **Annual Growth Rate:** NA. **Ethnic Groups:** Arab, Baluchi, East African, Indian, Pakistani. **Religions:** Muslim, some Hindus. **Languages:** Arabic (official), English, Farsi, Urdu, Indian dialects.

Government

Type: Absolute monarchy; sultan rules through ministries and other government agencies. **Constitution:** None. **Branches:** *Executive*—Sultan. *Legislative*—None. *Judicial*—Traditional Islamic judges and a nascent civil court system. **Political Parties:** None. **Suffrage:** None.

Economy

GDP: \$3.4 billion (1979 est.). **Per Capita GDP:** \$3,934 (1978 est.). **Inflation Rate:** 8% (1979 est.). **Natural Resources:** Oil, some copper, asbestos, marble, limestone. **Agricultural Products:** Dates, alfalfa, wheat, bananas, coconuts. **Industries:** Petroleum, fish, construction. **Trade** (1979 est.): *Exports*—\$2.3 billion; oil. *Imports*—\$1.4 billion; machinery and transportation equipment, food and live animals, mineral fuels, tobacco. **Partners**—Japan, U.K., U.A.E., West Germany, U.S., Netherlands. **Official Exchange Rate:** Omani rial=US\$2.90. **Economic Aid Received:** Total—NA. *U.S.*—as of 1979, U.S. aid consisted of a small Peace Corps program and a small reimbursed Federal Aviation Administration program.

Membership in International Organizations

U.N. and several of its specialized agencies, Arab League, INTELSAT.

Principal Government Officials

Oman: Sultan, Prime Minister, Minister of Defense and Finance—Qaboos Bin Said; Minister of State for Foreign Affairs—Qais Abdul-Munim Al-Zawawi; **Ambassador to the U.S.**—Sadek Jawad Sulaiman; **United States:** Ambassador to Oman—Marshall W. Wiley.

had an important role in the region's economic and social development, and we are eager to continue this contribution wherever it is welcome. We share the view of these governments that their economic and social development must be sound and wisely paced.

The Gulf governments are aware that we welcome their efforts to devise political institutions which will respond effectively to the desire of their people to participate in the shaping of national policy in a period of rapid economic and social change. These governments understand we advocate no particular doctrine or political system for them but that we support their interest in developing viable institutions of government, which assist in providing protection for basic human rights.

Middle East Peace. The Palestinian issue weighs heavily on all the Gulf governments and on our relations with them. These governments seek a comprehensive Middle East peace on the basis of Security Council Resolution 242. They all strongly assert the need to fulfill the rights of the Palestinian people in any peace arrangements, and Saudi Arabia in particular feels a special responsibility toward the future status of Jerusalem.

Consistently these governments assert that absence of peace in the Middle East is the primary threat to Middle East security, including the stability of the Gulf region. They regard tensions and alienations created by one-third of a century of conflict between Arabs and Israelis as the main source of Soviet influence in the region, as a leading contributor to revolution and radical political currents throughout the Middle East, and as the primary obstacle to developing the sort of firm relationships with the United States which their national interests otherwise call for.

In the last 2 years the Gulf states, except Oman, have rejected the approach we have taken toward the peace negotiations. Even Oman has recently stated publicly that continued negotiations on Palestinian autonomy should be "discarded" if Israel refuses to end its efforts to consolidate control over East Jerusalem occupied in June 1967. The Gulf states generally are skeptical that the negotiations under the Camp David agreement will lead to a comprehensive peace. Our differences on this question have caused strains in our relations. We intend to continue to stay in close touch with them. We seek their understanding that the course we are pursuing is the only practical approach to a lasting peace.

These states all understand the commitment of the United States to a determined pursuit of the peace process and our unique ability among outside powers to influence events.

The Arab-Israeli problem is the most striking example of the interrelationship of concern and hope in the Gulf states. Our own responsibility to seek peace in the Middle East flows from national objectives much broader than our interests in the Gulf. But if we can successfully pursue the path to peace at some early point with the cooperation of the Gulf states, we can proceed to turn a danger into an opportunity, for progress toward peace will enhance the security and domestic tranquility of the Gulf. It will strengthen the quality of our overall relations with the region. And it can unleash enormous additional Gulf resources to enhance the international effort to improve the lives of all the peoples of the Middle East and areas beyond. As a final point, I would stress that while a solution to the Arab-Israeli problem will not solve all the problems of the Persian Gulf, visible progress in pursuit of such a solution would contribute significantly to our pursuing a Gulf policy in active harmony with the states of the region.

The Economic Issues

Our policy and our relations address the total context of these countries, which play and will continue to play an important role in some of the most pressing economic issues facing the world community.

Energy. These six states currently provide almost half of the free world's imports. Because their absorptive capacity is, at least in the short run, limited relative to their enormous oil reserves they have considerable flexibility in production policies. Because oil is overwhelmingly the mainstay of their national economies, they face growing domestic pressure to conserve this national patrimony. These countries have generally been on the moderate side in OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] price debates, and they have tended to produce more than their domestic revenue needs require in order to help meet international demand. Saudi Arabia, by far the largest producer, has, of course, been noteworthy in the responsibility toward the international economy it has demonstrated both price and production policy.

A key issue for the United States and the world generally in this decade

Qatar—A Profile

Geography

Area: 4,000 sq. mi. (about the size of Connecticut and Rhode Island). **Capital:** Doha (pop. 150,000).

People

Population: 250,000 (1979 est.). **Annual Growth Rate:** 11%. **Ethnic Groups:** Arab (40%), Iranian (17%), Pakistani (7%). **Religion:** Muslim. **Languages:** Arabic (official), English, and Farsi.

Government

Type: Traditional Emirate. **Date of Independence:** Sept. 3, 1971. **Constitution:** None; however a 1970 "Basic Law" serves as a constitution. **Branches:** *Executive*—Council of Ministers (cabinet). *Legislative*—Advisory Council (has assumed only limited responsibility to date). *Judicial*—independent. **Political Parties:** None. **Suffrage:** None.

Economy

GNP: \$4.5 billion (1979 est.). **Annual Growth Rate:** NA. **Per Capita Income:** \$18,000. **Natural Resources:** Petroleum, fish. **Agricultural Products:** Fruits, vegetables. **Industries:** Oil production and refining, fishing, cement, desalting plants. **Trade (1978):** *Exports*—\$2.5 billion; *Imports*—\$1.2 billion; industrial and consumer goods. **Partners**—U.K., Western Europe, Japan, U.S. **Official Exchange Rate:** 1 riyal=US\$0.27. **Economic Aid received:** None. **Economic Aid Sent:** \$1.1 billion (1974-78).

Membership in International Organizations

U.N., Arab League, OPEC, OAU.

Principal Government Officials

Qatar: Amir; Acting Prime Minister—Khalifa bin Hamad Al-Thani; Minister of Foreign Affairs—Suhaim bin Hamad Al-Thani; Ambassador to the U.S.—Abdel Qader Bareek al-Amari. **United States:** Ambassador to Qatar—Charles Marthin sen.

how narrowly or how broadly these oil producers define their economic interests approaching production and price decisions. As we face the tight energy supply situation anticipated in this decade, there may be a continuing need to find means to encourage these producers to maintain their production. We have pursued a sustained exchange with them in recent years on energy issues and their relationship to the world economy.

We seek to intensify this dialogue to develop a stronger sense of the common responsibility of key producers and consumers toward an orderly transition to a world less dependent upon oil as an energy source. As this dialogue has developed in the last year, it is noteworthy that the Gulf producers have strongly welcomed the efforts we are making to reduce our dependence on imported oil and have urged us to do considerably more.

International Finance. The official foreign assets of these Gulf states now total over \$140 billion and are increasing rapidly as these states produce more oil than they currently need to meet domestic expenses. The Gulf states have acted responsibly in their investment of these surplus assets, but such huge amounts pose a number of problems for the international economy:

The difficulty of sustaining world economic growth with financial stability in the face of the massive transfer of resources from industrial democracies and the developing world to the producer states;

The need to maintain adequate opportunities for investment by Gulf states in U.S. and other economies;

The requirement for stability in the international financial system and to maintain confidence on the part of investors;

The problem of coping with the needs of those developing countries which are increasingly strapped to pay their oil bills.

We consult in a variety of fora with the Gulf countries on these problems and the financial issues. They have become important and constructive members of the international financial community. We seek to encourage their further participation, including greater recognition of the need for the wealthy oil producers to bear their share of the task of helping poorer countries to finance their large balance-of-payments deficits through concessional aid and direct lending.

International Development. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar have collectively committed over \$20 billion in economic assistance to developing countries in the Arab world and beyond, including some \$5 billion in support of a variety of regional, OPEC, and international lending institutions. They devote some 5% of their GNP to economic development lending. We seek to work closely with them in a common effort to assist third countries. In the decade ahead there is great scope for even closer cooperation, in some cases combining U.S. and other Western technology with the financial power of the Gulf states to pursue constructive development projects in needy nations, including helping them develop energy resources.

Commerce. U.S. exports to these six Gulf countries now exceed \$7 billion a year, representing about one-half of our sales to the Middle East. Our sales to these countries provide employment for some one-quarter million Americans. Yet because of our dependence on Gulf oil and the rapid increase in oil prices, we ran a \$4-billion trade deficit with these countries last year and expect that gap to increase this year.

U.S. exporters currently hold over one-sixth of the market in these countries and an even higher one-fifth share in Saudi Arabia. But we continue to face extremely tough competition from other industrial democracies and some developing countries in our efforts to maintain and expand our sales. There are a number of important policy issues under the general heading of "export disincentives" which both the Administration and the Congress must continue to address if we are effectively to pursue our national interest in expanding commercial ties with this region.

Transfer of Technology. We can take satisfaction in the role of private Americans in the development of the Gulf oil industry, which has provided the wherewithal for the remarkable improvement in the living conditions of the people of the Gulf. American technology continues to contribute in a wide range of development activity. Today there are some 30,000 private Americans working in Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states contributing to the orderly development of these societies. It is in our interest, consistent with other national policies, to encourage greater U.S. participation.

There has long been official American involvement in the development of Saudi Arabia through the activities of the U.S. Geological Survey and the U.S.

Corps of Engineers. In recent years we have significantly expanded our official participation under the U.S.-Saudi Joint Economic Commission, which provides expertise to the Saudi Government on a fully reimbursable basis. There are currently 20 Joint Commission projects in such areas as water resource planning, solar energy, vocational training, highway management, water desalinization, data processing, and financial information services.

We have recently established a U.S.-Omani Joint Economic Commission which also will focus on technical assistance for development projects. The United States intends to contribute, along with Oman, in financing the activities of the commission, which we regard as the centerpiece of expanding economic cooperation.

For some years our Peace Corps has been active in Oman, as it was until recently in Bahrain. There we have also provided a number of Agency for International Development experts on a cost-sharing basis. In the other Gulf states through a variety of mechanisms we have provided U.S. Government experts at host government request. In recent years, the trade and development program of the International Development Cooperation Agency has been an effective mechanism for facilitating this transfer of technology.

It is our policy to be helpful, wherever host governments desire, in making official U.S. expertise available to their development programs. We fully recognize, however, that in the future as in the past our private sector will play the leading American role in helping the Gulf societies meet their development aspirations.

Educational and Cultural Ties. In the last decade both the official and private American cultural and educational links with the Gulf countries have grown enormously. Today there are over 15,000 students from the Arabian Peninsula in U.S. institutions of higher learning. The exchange of visits by public and private officials in educational and cultural fields has grown significantly. In our policy toward the Gulf region we fully recognize the need to continue to nurture these relationships. Our ongoing effort to develop stronger relations with the Gulf states will greatly benefit from the understanding and ties which are being created by the experience of students from these countries in our universities. The importance of this region to the United States today and in the future requires

that in our society there be a better understanding of the culture and aspirations of the peoples of the Gulf.

The Evolving Relationship

As we seek to build our relations with Saudi Arabia and its Arab neighbors on the Gulf, in a mutually beneficial way, we are sensitive to the fact that the pursuit of each of our interests—security, peace, energy, economic development, financial cooperation, commerce, and culture—impacts on the prospects for our other interests. We will continue to seek a balance in our relationships which reflects the totality of our own interests and the total personality of the Gulf states.

We do not underestimate, nor do our friends in the Gulf states, the problems that lie ahead and the difficulty of the issues which our expanding relationships must address. On the contrary, we recognize that we are striving for security and stability in the midst of complex and crosscutting issues in a region whose continued independence and orderly progress are in our deep interest. On the basis of the progress made to date, however, we believe that we can continue to build firm and close relations with each of these countries in a way which will increasingly serve the interests of both our peoples and, indeed, of the world community generally.

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

National Security Policy

President Carter's address before the annual convention of the American Legion in Boston on August 21, 1980.¹

This morning, as Commander in Chief, I want to talk to you very briefly and very frankly about some of the problems that we face, some of the achievements that we've had, some of the uncertainties about the future, and how you can help. As Commander in Chief of America's Armed Forces, working with the Congress, I have the final responsibility for making those difficult choices. They are critical choices. They are far from simple. I need your support and your understanding based on experience in the Armed Forces in understanding the real choices that we face in defense and in the broader realm of national security policy.

Our goals are simple but profound: security, honor, and peace. Those are the victories we seek for ourselves, for our children, and for our children's children. These victories can be won but not by nostalgic nor wishful thinking and not by bravado. They cannot be won by a futile effort either to run the world or to run away from the world. Both of these are dangerous myths that cannot be the foundation for any responsible national policy.

Objectives

American requires the authority and the strength—and the moral force—to protect ourselves, to provide for the defense of our friends, and to promote the values of human dignity and well-being that have made our own nation strong at home and respected abroad. To this end, our national security policy has four specific objectives:

- First, to prevent war, through the assurance of our nation's strength and our nation's will—in this we will not fail;
- Second, to share with our friends and allies the protection of industrial democracies of Europe and Asia—in this we will not fail;
- Third, to safeguard and to strengthen our vital links to the nations and the resources of the Middle East—in this we will not fail; and
- Fourth, to defend America's vital interests if they are threatened anywhere in the world—and in this we will not fail.

All of these objectives require America's great military strength. But arms alone cannot provide the security within which our values and our interests can flourish. Our foreign policy must be directed toward greater international stability, without which there is no real prospect for a lasting peace. Thus, our strength in arms—very important—must be matched by creative, responsible, and courageous diplomacy.

We have as a nation that strength and that courage now to present clearly to potential adversaries as well as to our allies. We must continue to build wisely for a future when our patience and persistence will be taxed by challenges perhaps even more diverse and even more dangerous than those that we've seen in recent years. In planning for that future we must have the foresight to accept the reality of change. Americans have never feared change. We must prepare for what we cannot completely predict—there is no way for any nation or any person to know what might happen next—and to know with certainty the objectives that we intend to reach and to hold.

For the sake of all humanity, we must prevent nuclear war. To do so requires the most modern strategic forces based on America's superior technology. Our country has always been in the forefront of new developments, new ideas, new technology, new systems for defense. The decisions that we make today—some of them highly secret—will affect the risks of nuclear war well into the next century.

Like our weapons, our diplomacy must also be aimed at enhancing strategic stability. Thus far in my Administration we've strengthened every single element of our strategic deterrent, and we have also worked to enhance strategic stability through world peace and through negotiation of mutual and balanced limits on strategic arms. And I'm thankful to the American Legion for your support of that effort to control nuclear weapons.

Strategic Forces

We could have spent more money on our strategic forces, but we would not have spent it as wisely. We could have placed our chips on the B-1 bomber, which would have been in service quickly and obsolete almost as quickly. In order to

apitalize on advanced American technology and to deal with predictable improvements in Soviet air-defense capabilities, I decided instead, after close consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to accelerate the development of cruise missiles.

Four years ago there was no program for long-range air-launched cruise missiles. This year, in a very quick period of time, we will actually begin production of those kinds of missiles. Because of their accuracy and because of their ability to penetrate Soviet air-defense systems, they represent a far more effective deterrent than would have the B-1 bomber. We needed the right answer for the long run, and Soviet air-defense capabilities, as known today, and U.S. technological developments, as known today, have proven this answer to be the right one.

Similarly, we could have decided, and some still propose, to resume production of land-based intercontinental missiles and simply build more vertical slots to house them. But that solution would not have increased our strategic strength, because the new missiles in fixed silos would have been just as vulnerable as the old ones to the predictable improvement in the accuracy of Soviet missile systems. Instead, we conducted a searching evaluation of our real and responsible choices, and I chose to go forward with the MX missile program.

Four years ago, there was no known solution to the increasing vulnerability of fixed silos. Today, we've devised a mobile system for basing these missiles that will really shelter them from attack. The MX will be ready to strengthen our strategic defenses just when we need it added strength. And I might point out to you that the total area covered by the MX system—from which civilians, women, and others, would be excluded—only would comprise 25-square miles, a block of land in our whole country just 5 miles on a side. And the total cost of the MX mobile missile system, in constant dollars, would be less than the 52 bomber system, less than the Nuteman missile system, and less than the combined cost of the Poseidon and the Polaris submarine-launched missile systems.

At sea, as well, we've altered the upward course that we were steering in 1977. We've put the Trident missile system and the Trident submarine programs back on track. The U.S.S. *Ohio*, the first Trident submarine, is about to

begin sea trials. Its sister ship, the U.S.S. *Michigan*, is ready to be launched, and five more Tridents are under construction.

And finally, in this combined system, let me mention that we've made steady progress in a less visible and less dramatic but crucially important area of our strategic forces, and that is the system of command and control to insure that they and the communications associated with them can survive a crisis, a peremptory, unexpected attack or a major conflict. This has been an area of our defense system which has been too long overlooked and neglected in the past.

All these steps add up to a prudent and a forward-looking program for enhancing our strategic forces and the credibility of our deterrent. In order to keep those forces adequate for the future, we continue to work on new aircraft and on new technology and weapons of all kinds that will be equal to any threats that may arise in the next decade or beyond.

Our strategy, now modernized to take advantage of Soviet planning and Soviet attitudes, must leave them no room for the illusion that they can obtain any advantage over the United States of America by the use of their force. And we will keep our forces that strong and that clearly dominant.

Recently there's been a great deal of press and public attention paid to a Presidential Directive that I have issued, known as PD-59. As a new President charged with great responsibilities for the defense of this nation, I decided that our nation must have flexibility in responding to a possible nuclear attack—in responding to a possible nuclear attack. Beginning very early in my term, working with the Secretaries of State and Defense and with my own national security advisers, we have been evolving such an improved capability. It's been recently revealed to the public in outline form by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown. It's a carefully considered, logical, and evolutionary improvement in our nation's defense capability and will contribute to the prevention of a nuclear conflict.

No potential enemy of the United States should anticipate for one moment a successful use of military power against our vital interest. This decision will make that prohibition and that cautionary message even more clear. In order to insure that no adversary is even tempted, however, we must have a range of responses to potential threats or crises and an integrated plan for their use.

Arms Control

Equally vital for our strategic purposes is the pursuit of nuclear arms control and balanced reduction of nuclear arsenals in the world. Just as we build strategic forces equal to our needs, we seek through negotiated agreements to keep unnecessary competition from carrying us into a purposeless and dangerous nuclear arms race to the detriment of our nation's security and to the detriment of the adequate strength of our conventional and other forces. We will continue to make every responsible effort to bring our forces and those of any potential foe under strict, balanced, and verifiable controls, both in the quantity of strategic arms and in their quality.

I want to make clear that if an unlimited nuclear arms race should be forced upon us, we will compete and compete successfully. Let no one doubt that for a moment. But to initiate such a dangerous and costly race, abandoning our efforts for nuclear-weapons control, would be totally irresponsible on our part.

The destructive power of the world's nuclear arsenals is already adequate for total devastation. It does no good to increase that destructive power in search of a temporary edge or in pursuit of an illusion of absolute nuclear superiority. To limit strategic nuclear weapons, as the SALT Treaties do, is not to reduce our strength but to reduce the danger that misunderstanding and miscalculation could lead to a global catastrophe. This is a course that has been pursued by the last six Presidents, both Democratic and Republican. To go beyond the reductions that were outlined in the SALT II Treaty, as I firmly intend to do, is to advance the stability on which genuine peace can be built.

Strategic Stability

Stability in the strategic area, however, leaves us still to meet serious challenges now and in the future in Europe, in the Far East, the Middle East, and in Southwest Asia. We must understand those challenges in order to deal with them prudently and responsibly. We do not need massive standing armies in place everywhere in the world to defend our friends and our interests. But we do need and we and our allies are acquiring the skilled, modernized, specially equipped conventional forces that can respond fast and effectively to crises and threats before they engulf us in larger conflicts.

Europe. With NATO in Europe, for example, we do not need overwhelming tank forces. We and our allies do not plan to start a war on the European Continent. What we do need and what we will maintain are the weapons that repulse any force that seeks or threatens the domination of Europe. After years of neglect during the Vietnam war, we have led NATO's commitment to the deterrent levels of strength it actually needs. The Long-Term Defense Program to which we are now all committed—a 15-year program—will add \$85 billion to NATO's fighting strength over the next decade or so and will permit the alliance to meet any real threat to Europe's security and to our own. This is a major step forward in the closer coordination among ourselves and our allies and a restoration of the spirit of NATO that is crucial to the defense of Europe and to the security of our own country. It must be continued, and it will be continued.

Reversing a long, downward trend in real defense expenditures, above and beyond inflation, we have had real growth for the last 4 years, and we will continue this commitment during the years ahead. That is a promise that I make to you, and that is a promise that the Congress of the United States has also confirmed. We will not permit us to take a downward trend, as was the case during the 8 years before I became President.

A very significant development was the NATO decision last December to modernize theater nuclear forces in Europe, a direct response to the Warsaw Pact buildup of the last 10 years with their SS-20 medium-range missile and others similar to it. This is a vital part of our commitment. It was very difficult politically for some of the European nations to agree to take this major step. The Soviets used every possible propaganda that they could marshal. But our efforts and those of our allies were successful.

Pacific and East Asia. In the Pacific and in East Asia, our alliances and our military strengths are firm and they're adequate. We have the military presence on land and at sea to insure that no would-be aggressor can profit at the expense of ourselves or our friends from any upheaval in that region. Sustained, normal relations with China are very important and improve the prospects for a stable and a peaceful future in Asia.

You of the American Legion have pledged at this convention to the cause

of Kampuchean relief. It's important that we Americans show the world the strength of American compassion and concern. I applaud your decision to alleviate human suffering and to help the cause of peace in Southeast Asia.

Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia. In the most volatile and vital area to our security—the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia—we're taking additional steps to protect our vital interests. The security of the region and the crucial energy that it supplies to us and other nations are both now exposed to the new threat of Soviet forces in Afghanistan, which have turned that country from its former status as a buffer state into a wedge pointed at the sealanes of the Persian Gulf and to the rich oil deposits. To deter any further encroachment of Soviet power in this region, we must help to strengthen the resolve and the defenses of the countries there.

We are continuing to build up our own forces in the Indian Ocean and in the adjacent areas and to arrange to use facilities on land which we might need to aid our friends in the region in case of conflict and primarily to prevent the need for conflict. We've speeded up formation of a mobile force of up to 100,000 personnel that could be rapidly deployed to any area where sudden trouble loomed and needed to be met. We've arranged to put supplies and equipment for such a force in place ahead of time so they will be there when and if they're needed.

Most of all, in the Middle East, we've pursued the arduous, difficult, frustrating but absolutely essential cause of peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors. The real security of that crucial area of the world depends heavily on the force with which we promote stability and political compromise to avoid the outbreak of conflict. It's crucial that our nation use all its influence to prevent a fifth Middle East war. The Camp David accords and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaties that followed them were two extraordinary steps on a long road that until 1978 no one had been able to travel.

In the real world we know that we cannot expect miracles on the Middle East peace negotiations. The issues are too emotional. The difficulties are too great. The obstacles sometimes appear to be insurmountable. But I'm convinced that Israel wants peace, and I'm convinced that the Egyptians want peace, and I'm equally as convinced that those who live in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and the Palestinians all want peace. We

know that our own future peace make this work very important, and it's work that must be continued.

Other Concerns

At home, over intense opposition, as you know, but with great help from the American Legion, we have won the fight for peacetime draft registration. We need the ability to mobilize quickly and effectively, and we have shown our resolve to both friend and foe alike.

It should be clear to everyone who studies national security or defense that our work to keep America the strongest nation in the world is not finished. There are no laurels on which to rest. There are no victories which are final. There are no challenges which have disappeared magically. But we've resumed a firm and steady course of diplomacy and defense preparedness to lead our allies and our friends and ourselves with confidence toward the challenges facing the world of today and the world of tomorrow.

The interdependence, the security, at the development of the countries of the Third World—the small nations, the nations, the developing nations, the nonaligned nations—are also very important to our national security. Violence and radical revolution thrive in an atmosphere of political repression, economic want, massive unemployment and hunger. Our interest is served when the countries of the developing world are able to meet the needs and aspirations of their people peacefully, democratically, and through cooperation with the United States of America and the other Western nations.

In helping them to achieve these objectives, we are encouraging democracy, but we are also strengthening our ability to compete effectively with the Soviet Union. Those who are most concerned about Soviet activism in the world should be the strongest supporters of our foreign aid programs designed to help the moderate transition from repressive tyranny to democratic development and to bolster the strength and independence of our friends.

We've revived in this Administration the policy that gives added purpose to our nation's strength: our wholehearted national commitment to promote the universal standards of human rights. Freedom for ourselves is not enough. Americans want to see other people enjoy freedom also. It's an unswerving commitment of our nation, and as long as I'm in the White House, it'll be a major part of our international policy.

News Conference of August 4 (Excerpts)

We do not maintain our power in order to seize power from others. Our goal is to strengthen our own freedom and the freedom of others, to advance the dignity of the individual and the right of all people to justice, to a good life, and to future secure from tyranny. In choosing our course in the world, America's strength must be used to preserve America's values.

The choices ahead are every bit as demanding as the ones we've already made. Facing them takes a clear understanding of where we are and where we want to go as a nation. Responding to dangers that might menace our future security also will ensure America's common sense and courage, just as previous history has ensured America's common sense and courage.

I've known America's courage by being it tested. I've seen it in the men who went to Iran to attempt so valiantly in an isolated desert to rescue their fellow Americans, who are still held captive there. I saw it in the families of women who died in that effort, and I've seen it in the families—with whom I've been as frequently as possible—of the men who are still held captive in Iran. What a nation we are to produce such men and women. All Americans are thankful to them.

And finally let me say that our country so has the courage to reject the illusions of something for nothing, the fantasy goals of strength without sacrifice, the irresponsible advocacy of a quick-cut economics and quick-fix defense solution. There are no magic answers, and solutions are very difficult to find. Courage, sometimes quiet courage, unpublicized courage, is the most to be appreciated.

I see this kind of courage in you, as do I see in the men who have served and sacrificed bravely, but who still work continuously for the sake of service, not for recognition or reward. Your example reinforces my faith in our nation and the future of our nation. With your confidence and your courage and with your common sense, I know America will continue to be a nation of unmatched strength, a nation that faces the world as it is today and works with determination to bring to the world the freedom, peace, and justice.

(Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Aug. 25, 1980 (certain paragraphs omitted).)

There are few governments in the world with which we have more sharp and frequent policy disagreements. Libya has steadfastly opposed our efforts to reach and to carry out the Camp David accords to bring peace to the Middle East. Our two governments have strongly different opinions and attitudes toward the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] and toward international terrorism. Within OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries], Libya has promoted sharply higher prices of oil and, on occasion, has advocated the interruption of oil supplies to the United States and to other Western nations.

On the other hand, we have substantial trade with Libya. Libya is one of our major oil suppliers, and its high-quality crude oil is important to our east coast refineries. Libya has publicly and privately opposed Iran's seizure and holding of our hostages, and for a time, Libya joined with other Muslim countries in opposing the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

So for many years, our policies and actions toward Libya have, therefore, been mixed firmness with caution.

And now I'd like to say a word about my brother's relations with Libya. As all of you know by now, Billy is a colorful personality. We are personally close. I love him, and he loves me. Billy is extremely independent. On occasion he has said: "I don't tell Jimmy how to run the country, and he doesn't tell me how to run my life." When I was elected President, Billy was thrust into the public limelight. Media attention made him an instant celebrity. He was asked to make a number of television and other speaking engagements, and he even put his name on a new brand of beer.

And in the summer of 1978, Billy was invited to visit Libya with a group of businessmen and State officials from Georgia. This highly publicized trip occurred late in September 1978. I was not aware that he was planning the trip until after he had left the United States and shortly before he arrived in Libya. When I heard about it, I was deeply concerned that there might be some serious or unpleasant incident while he was there.

Shortly after he returned from Libya, in October 1978, I saw a message from our charge in Tripoli reporting on the positive nature of the visit. I was greatly relieved, and I sent a copy of that message to Billy. This message contained no sensitive information, was never encoded, and, in fact, more than a year ago it was made publicly available by the State Department to a news columnist.

Early in 1979 a Libyan trade mission came to the United States, visited several localities in our country. Billy visited with the Libyans and made a number of controversial statements, which were roundly criticized both by the press and also by the American public. I publicly deplored, in a news conference, some of those comments myself.

As a result of Billy's remarks and his new association with the Libyans, almost all of his scheduled television and other appearances were canceled. His income from these public appearances almost totally disappeared, while his financial obligations continued to mount.

I shared the general concern about Billy's relationship with Libya, and the members of our family were also concerned about some of his personal problems. During this period, Billy entered the hospital for medical treatment. On one occasion while he was hospitalized, he discussed with me the possibility of another trip to Libya, and I urged him not to go, partly because of his health and partly because of the adverse effect it could have on our Middle East negotiations, which were at a critical stage at that time.

By the late summer of 1979, Billy had successfully completed his medical treatment, and despite my advice he made a second trip to Libya. There was relatively little publicity about this trip.

I am not aware of any effort by Billy to affect this government's policies or actions concerning Libya. I am certain that he made no such effort with me. The only occasion on which Billy was involved, to my knowledge, in any matter between Libya and the United States was his participation, with my full approval, in our efforts to seek Libyan help for the return of our

hostages from Iran. Let me discuss this incident briefly.

On November the 4th, 1979, our hostages were seized in Tehran. In the weeks that followed, we explored every possible avenue to bring about their release. We increased our military presence in the Persian Gulf, we stopped all oil imports from Iran, and we seized the assets of that country. We appealed to the U.N. Security Council and to the World Court. We asked other governments, and particularly Muslim governments, including Libya, to support our position. As is still the case, we explored every official and unofficial avenue of contact we could find to encourage the Iranians to release the American hostages.

Public statements coming out of Libya at that time were not supportive and indicated that our diplomatic efforts to secure their assistance had not been successful. During the third week in November, it occurred to us that Billy might be able to get the Libyans to help to induce the Iranians to release the American hostages. As requested, he talked to the Libyans about our hostages and arranged a meeting with a Libyan diplomat at the White House. I did not attend that meeting, and so far as I'm aware, Billy played no further role in these discussions with the Libyans.

As matters turned out, the Libyan foreign office announced that the hostages should be released, and the leader of Libya, Col. Qadhafi, also made the direct private appeal to Ayatollah Khomeini that we requested. At least in this respect, the approach to the Libyans was successful; whether it would have been successful if Billy had not participated is a question that no one can answer with certainty.

I made this decision in good faith, with the best interests of the hostages and our nation in mind. Billy merely responded to our request for assistance, and I believe his only motive in this effort was to seek release of the American hostages from Iran.

Q. But don't you think that by using your brother, Billy Carter, at least as an emissary to make contact with a foreign government—don't you feel that perhaps it might have been better judgment to have used a trained diplomat in that capacity?

A. No, not in that particular instance concerning the hostages. We were using trained diplomats. Im-

mediately after the hostages were seized, this became an absolute, total obsession of mine, to get those hostages released. We inventoried every possibility of influence on the Iranians to induce them to release our hostages, safely and immediately. We sent messages—and had our diplomats in those countries and contacted their diplomats in Washington—to almost every nation on Earth, every one that we thought might have the slightest semblance of influence with Iran. We especially thought that the Muslim countries, believing in the Koran, having the same religion as the Ayatollah Khomeini, might have a special influence.

We had tried through diplomatic means to get Libya to give us some support in condemning the Iranian action and calling for the release of the hostages. Up through the 18th of November, the public statements coming out of Libya—and these are documented in Dr. Brzezinski's [Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs] report—had been negative, against our position, in effect supporting the holding of the hostages. Some private comments from Libyan diplomats to our diplomats in the United Nations, for instance, had said, "We would like to help you," but the public comments, which were the important ones, were contrary to that.

Under those circumstances, I decided to use Billy to see if he could have some special influence to get the Libyans to help. I had no reticence about it.

That was the same day that the religious fanatics attacked the mosque in Saudi Arabia. It was the same day, I believe, that Khomeini announced that the hostages—American hostages—would be tried and, if convicted, Khomeini said, "Jimmy Carter knows what's going to happen to them." We thought that the hostages' lives were directly in danger.

I saw then and see now nothing wrong with asking Billy and other private citizens to try to help if it's appropriate and legal. The only thing Billy did was to contact the Libyans, whom he knew personally—he does not know Qadhafi, but he did know the charge in Washington—and say, "We would like very much to have your help in having the hostages released. Will you meet with Dr. Brzezinski at the White House," a week from then, which was the 27th day of November.

Billy then met a week later with Dr. Brzezinski and the charge, and we believe that some progress was made.

As I said in my opening statement, cannot say for sure that Billy had anything in the world to do with the press that was made. But 2 days after Billy contacted the charge, they made public announcement for the first time—Libya did—calling for the release of the hostages. After that meeting, Col. Qadhafi himself sent a personal emissary to Khomeini, asking Khomeini for the first time to release our hostages, and then he sent me word that he had done so.

I'm not trying to claim great things from that small involvement of Billy. But Billy came up to Washington, so as I know, at his own expense on two occasions. He went back to Plains. I never told anybody publicly that he had done it. He never bragged about it. And I have enough judgment to know that that may have enhanced Billy's stature in the minds of the Libyans. That's the only down side to it that I can understand. And that may have been bad judgment, but I was the one that made the judgment. I did what I thought was best for our country and best for the hostages, and I believe that that's exactly what Billy was doing.

Q. You said that you were obsessed with the hostages and that's why you called your brother in. Do you have any new ideas for freeing the hostages now?

A. No, we are pursuing the same kind of degree of effort that we were then.

I think I tried to point out, as best I could remember, a couple of things that were happening at the time—the threat by Khomeini that the hostage might be killed and the fact that the Grand Mosque in Jidda was—in Medina I think—was attacked by radical believers in the Muslim faith. Those were the kind of things that were causing great concern.

The approach to Libya, although now it has taken on great significance here, 9 or 10 months later, was one of a broad pattern of things that I was doing, the National Security Council was doing, everyone in the State Department assigned to this task was doing, and many private citizens were doing. And there was nothing extraordinary about it. It was just one of a broad gamut of things that we were trying to do in every possible way to get word to Khomeini that it was best for Iran to release those hostages.

Interview by the French Media

While he was in New York on August 13, 1980, Secretary Muskie was interviewed by Dominique Bromberger for French television and Christian Ballard for French radio. Following are excerpts from those two interviews.

TELEVISION¹

Apparently there is a new U.S. nuclear strategy contained in a document known as Presidential Directive 59. Could you give us an update on this?

A. I am hardly the man to give you an update, since I was not involved in developing it. But as I understand it, it is not a new doctrine. PD 59 has been described to me as a codification of a doctrine that has been in the process of evolution since 1977 when PD 18 directed a study following on the Schlesinger doctrine of 1974 to evaluate what our policy ought to be. And as it has evolved, I am told that it has been stated in the Secretary of Defense's public statement of January and February of 1979, and especially that one of 1979.

Having said that, I ought to make a few points about it, as I understand it. First, that it does not abandon assured destruction as a deterrent policy. It is designed to add flexibility to that policy in order to make deterrence a more effective policy. It is based, in part, on the fact that the Russians,

Q. Your spokesman, Mr. Powell, has said, in defending your use of your brother as an intermediary — and you have alluded to this as well — that we'd be very surprised one day when we hear of some of the unorthodox emissaries you've used as channels to other countries to try and secure the release of the hostages. Can you surprise us a little and tell us who they are, who some of them might be? And might we be embarrassed by the revelations of any of their names?

A. No, you wouldn't be embarrassed, but I think maybe the surprise might come later.

given our evaluation of their policy, see nuclear war as possibly a prolonged exchange of weapons. We've always conceived of nuclear war as being of rather short duration given the devastation that would follow.

And so this new policy is not new but a policy which has evolved over these several years and which Secretary [of Defense Harold] Brown refers to as countervailing strategy and involves mixing our response so as to preserve the assured deterrence aspect which is aimed at the urban industrial complex but adding selected military targets as well.

Q. Nevertheless, do you think it is a priority to being able to strike at military targets in the Soviet Union other than cities? Doesn't that make war more thinkable because it leaves the aggressor less possibilities of total destruction?

A. I don't believe so and neither does Secretary Brown, because I don't think a limited nuclear war is conceivable. I think that as soon as there is an exchange of nuclear weapons, the war would rapidly escalate to an all out nuclear war. I can't imagine that anything less than that would happen.

Secondly, neither side has a first-strike capability. So there is no way that either side could eliminate the other side's ability to retaliate given the present posture of both parties. That being so, it would seem to me that the deterrent value is still there. But if the Russians, for any reason, consider a limited nuclear war possible, the purpose of the countervailing strategy is to discourage them from that notion.

Q. In Europe it is difficult to hold a clear distinction between the deterrence, which is war avoidance, and defense, which is a damaging addition, because we feel that if there is a limited war it could be limited from an American point of view and yet in Europe — Do you rule out completely this possibility?

A. I am not sure the human mind can comprehend all of the hypothetical possibilities. My own view may be an oversimplistic one, but, as I said earlier, I think nuclear war in any form is unthinkable because I cannot conceive of a limited one. Nevertheless, the argument that we must have an ability to strike selected military targets as well as the urban industrial complex as well

as military related industrial targets as well as command and control targets, I think is a possible deterrent, a more sophisticated deterrent added to that one of assured destruction. Our capacity to destroy cities is formidable, and, I think, one in analyzing the countervailing strategy ought not to overlook that. We are not abandoning our policy at all; we are simply refining it, as I understand it.

Q. You have indicated at the beginning of this interview that you were not consulted in the process of elaborating the evolution of this strategy. How could this be possible?

A. First of all let me make clear that I raised the question not in a personal sense but in an institutional sense. And what I have been examining — and I have been examining the records since the question first arose last week, and I didn't raise it, it was raised in a *New York Times* article based upon a leak from some agency — that the State Department did not participate, and I have been examining that record. And that comes pretty close to being true. There was some State Department participation a little over a year ago which then terminated. I think this is institutionally wrong, and I have said so, and the President and the Secretary of Defense have agreed with me at this point. So it remains to be seen whether or not this institutional problem will be corrected. Now how long that institutional problem existed, I have not yet determined. It has gone back at least to 1977.

Q. This last example seems to confirm what is the common feeling in Europe that there is some difficulty in managing the foreign policy in this country among the White House, the National Security Council, the State Department, and other government agencies. What is your feeling about that?

A. One ought not to overblow it. Just as I think the question of consultation between the allies and differences between the allies has been escalated this year and, indeed, since I have been Secretary of State under a widespread conception of disarray in the alliance which I think was overblown, now that I have examined it closely. So this can be overblown. The President, after all, is the supreme foreign policymaking authority. The Constitution of the United States makes him so. And he has not been excluded from this policy. He has made it. PD 59 means Presidential Directive 59 and it is for him to organize,

¹For full text, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Aug. 11,

so organize his agencies as to enable him to make foreign policy in a way which he finds useful, convenient, and comfortable. One ought not to think of foreign policy being made by anyone but the President of the United States. And how he organizes his assistants is for him to decide, and each President will do it in a different way. Nevertheless, even within those limits it seems to me the President would be wise to include in the formulation of doctrines like this, advice from the State Department because of its foreign policy implications which your questions obviously suggest.

Q. Let's stay for awhile in the strategic field. The Republican Party and Reagan called for military and nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union. What do you think of that?

A. I think it is unthinkable. I think it is totally inconsistent with the notion of arms control because if we were to achieve nuclear superiority and then seek an arms control treaty, it is inconceivable to me that the Russians would sign a treaty that froze them into a position of nuclear inferiority. That proposition seems so obvious on its face that it must have been obvious when that Republican plank was written.

And the reverse is also true. We would not sign a treaty which froze us into nuclear inferiority. So that that prescription of nuclear superiority is a prescription for an uncontrolled escalating arms race with enormous costs in terms of greater insecurity for the superpowers and others and also enormous costs for the tax payers of both countries.

I might add incidentally that this concern of mine—it is obvious to me that our NATO allies place a high value on arms control not only with respect to central systems but theater nuclear systems as well. So it seems to me that that policy on the part of the Republican platform raises an issue of serious concern to the alliance that could weaken our alliance ties.

Q. Since you are talking of the allies, President Carter pointed to the unity of the Atlantic alliance Sunday and quite frankly many observers here or in Europe think also of the why and what kind of basis can you claim unity to the point that it was claimed by President Carter.

A. Let me turn your question around a little bit. The United States is 50 States and 220 million people. Now by unity, you mean unanimity? Oh-

viously, in a free society this is not unanimity. Within your own country there is more than one political party, and you pursue unity in terms of national goals but there is not unanimity, not at least from my perception of France. And even within Europe, excluding the United States, there are differences of opinion and yet you strive for unity in the European Community and in other fora. So unity ought not to be overplayed. I mean unity of purpose is an important thing but disagreements as to the ways for achieving those purposes may be a healthy thing.

Now with respect to NATO's primary objective, which is the defense of NATO territory, I think the alliance has never been in a stronger position. When one looks back to the days of the Mansfield amendment, when I was then a Member of the Senate, and Senator Mansfield failed by less than a handful of votes in getting the Senate to adopt that proposition which would have involved the total withdrawal of American forces from Europe to the present time when the alliance is committed, among other things, to 3% real growth each year, in real terms, to modernization of theater nuclear weapons, to a more flexible NATO defense which will enable the United States to deploy its forces outside the NATO territory if our common interests were jeopardized outside that territory. Now these are, I think, significant improvements in NATO defense and significant commitments to NATO defense.

So within that alliance territory perspective there has been, I think, better performance on the part of all countries, including the United States and France and so on, than previously.

With respect to issues that arise outside the NATO territory, one positive development that has taken place is a growing appreciation of the need to find some way to consult on such issues more effectively. I have heard that idea expressed by Francois-Poncet, by Genscher, by myself, by other Foreign Ministers, by the Japanese Foreign Minister, and so on, and it is important to do so. Afghanistan is such an issue.

Q. Have you any idea at this point how this kind of consultation could work?

A. I think to suggest a framework at this point might destroy the suggestion. I think that at the present time, we do it not as effectively as some would like through the NATO structure, to some extent through the

United Nations where there are opportunities for meetings on bilateral and multilateral bases independent of the United Nations. So we have ad hoc possibilities for consultation that many of us would like to see institutionalized, but no one yet has come up with a suggestion.

Q. Are you still frustrated, as you said during your first press conference, by the independent voice of France?

A. There are frustrations with the job, and I have heard other foreign ministers express them. But I say that overall I think that the opportunity to deal with the diverse world on a global basis and to discuss its problems and approaches to it with men of the capabilities that I have encountered in NATO and elsewhere is an intellectually stimulating exercise; frustrations from time to time, challenges from time to time.

Each country has its own interests to protect, and I think I have a slightly different perspective on how to take that pursuit of national interests in the context of establishing a common point of view, and struggling with that I think is a stimulating challenge, and enjoy it on the whole. I like my colleagues in the NATO alliance; I have enjoyed working with them, and my instinct is that on the whole they seek positive solutions.

Q. Fifty-two Americans have been held hostage in Iran for more than 9 months now. Can this situation last until the election day, for example? Do you plan any new initiative?

A. We continue to pursue the option of quiet diplomacy through all of the channels that are made available us by our friends, by our allies, by non-governmental sources. We have been undertaking, in these indirect ways, to persuade the emerging powers in Iran that it is in Iran's self-interest to get the hostage situation behind it. We have been waiting for the emergence of effective governmental authority in Iran without which the decision to release the hostages or even to create a dialogue of negotiation has been very difficult. With the appointment of a new Prime Minister, perhaps we are close to that second objective.

With respect to the first, there has been a growing appreciation of the need to get the decision behind us, and, increasingly, various elements in Iran have identified the Parliament as the

place where the decision will be made. And once the Parliament is fully constituted with a Prime Minister and a Cabinet as well as a President, then it seems to me we'll know how soon we can begin to get to grips with the problem finally.

RADIO²

Q. Recently you complained about the fact that you learned through the press the change of nuclear policy of President Carter. So you got the impression that there was a lack of coordination at the White House at the same time that many Europeans complain about the lack of consensus, the lack of leadership of President Carter. Are you very satisfied with the Administration you work for?

A. You have implied a lot of questions. As I perceive Europe I see differences of opinion. I don't see the alliance countries always agreeing with each other or each other's policies, and the alliance is strong and it is strong in part because of confidence demonstrated in President Carter's leadership. It was President Carter's leadership which led to the decision to increase NATO defense spending in terms by 3% a year. It was his leadership that led to the decision to deploy modernized theater nuclear weapons, at the same time asking for a limitation on theater nuclear weapons for the Russians. It was his leadership which prompted the NATO Defense Ministers to begin planning for a more flexible defense of Europe which would enable the United States to deploy its forces elsewhere in the area if needed. These surely are not signs of a lack of confidence in President Carter's leadership.

With respect to the decision here on a clear strategy, it is a fact that the State Department's participation in the development of that strategy has been minimal. That's a fact that I have noted since last week, and I think it should be comprehensive, for the foreign policy implications are obvious and evident in the fact that you asked the question. And yet our European friends ought not to overlook the fact that after all, it is the President who is constitutionally the foreign policymaker. And he was not excluded from policymaking. The State Department apparently was to an extent that it shouldn't have been. The question

that was raised really is not a complaint on my part, it's not personal on my part. I just think that the President's ability to deal with that sort of policy would be enhanced if the State Department as well as the Defense Department and the National Security Council were involved. I suspect from now on it may be.

Q. Last May, a few days after your trip to Vienna, you harshly complained about the Europeans and especially about the French political initiatives toward the Soviet Union. How would you qualify today the French foreign policy and its relationship to the United States?

A. I think that my complaint was very limited and had to do more with consultation than with the fact of the meeting. And I raised the question of consultation somewhat with tongue in cheek because I had been pretty severely lectured in Europe about the lack of American consultation of allies only to learn on my return here that we had not been consulted on that. So we both have something to learn about the importance of consultation, and I thought I made the point relatively gently but I think it stuck and I expect that we'll have better consultation in the future.

Q. But how would you qualify the Franco-American relationship today and the exchange of views?

A. I think that you French are in a better position to qualify that. I think there is a lot of residual goodwill for the French people here going back to the Revolution and our historic ties. In my own State, about 25% of our people are of French extraction—French Canadian mostly. And so there is that.

The special French trait of seeking an independent position for the sake of being independent is sometimes frustrating to us, but on the other hand there have been evidences of French cooperation that are important. So, the French have captured the knack of getting special attention by acting in a specially different way, and I suppose all countries seek to find that way. The United States, being a superpower, gets attention by virtue of that fact which I suspect is frustrating to our European friends at the same time that they understand and support the value of our collaboration.

Q. How do you view the attitude of Mr. Brezhnev using France, and especially President Giscard d'Estaing, very often as a sort of mediator

between the Eastern and the Western world? Does it hurt you quite a lot?

A. It all depends upon what the French response is. I think looking at it one way, if as a result of those contacts Mr. Brezhnev comes away impressed with the fact of alliance unity on a particular issue, then to get it from two or three different countries is a useful kind of thing.

If, however, as a result he succeeds in dividing the alliance on an important issue then the result is negative. I don't think we should prejudge such contacts as being either negative or positive but seek rather by consultation to insure to the maximum extent possible that we are moving in a common direction.

Q. Do you really believe that during the Venice Summit that the Soviets were withdrawing the 10,000 troops when everybody knows that for 3 weeks before they sent 10,000 more?

A. We tried to take it at face value because we knew that our friends wanted to show that we weren't totally negative on it. But we really did not find that there was anything more than some redeployment of about 5,000 troops from within Afghanistan to the Afghanistan border, and it involved units that were not particularly valuable to the kind of fighting that was going on.

Q. Let's come back to the U.S. hostages in Iran. How do the negotiations go now between Washington and Tehran, and do you have any hope to have the hostages freed before next November, especially after the nomination of a new Prime Minister, Mr. Mohammad Ali Rajai?

A. There is no way of setting a date, and if one were to do so it could prove very unfortunate in raising expectations. Nevertheless, the development to which you refer—the election of a Prime Minister and a gradual emergence of the formal government in Iran—at least moves us closer to the day when there will be somebody in authority—somebody with the authority. Khomeini himself has said that the Parliament will settle this issue. The hardliners have said that the Parliament will settle this issue. And others have said that the Parliament will settle this issue. So once the Parliament is constituted, it is our hope and we'll try to build on that hope through all the diplomatic channels made available to us by our allies and others in order to shape the decision and the terms which will eventually resolve in the release of the hostages.

Q. So you are still very hopeful in spite of the confusion in this Iranian administration?

A. That makes it particularly frustrating. We have never been in that particular kind of a situation before, but one can recall the hostages that were seized by North Korea in connection with the *Pueblo* in 1964. Those hostages were held 11 months before they were released and they were finally released. That was a frustrating period and 11 months is an awfully long time. And there have been other instances.

So that patience, especially in a situation such as this where events from time to time escalate emotions there—after all, the economy is in bad shape, there is factionalism, there are those who seek to dethrone the Khomeini and his revolutionary government. So in that kind of a situation it's easy to whip up popular emotions and use the hostages as sort of a scapegoat, the bargaining chip for getting some kinds of political power. They really are a source of political power now more than anything else.

Q. How do you view the situation in Afghanistan right now? The Russians are still there. What are your plans to make them leave?

A. There are two objectives that are important. I don't think that we really entertained any hope that the Russians would leave very soon or that they would withdraw or reverse their policy in response to the pressures that we tried to bring upon them. But nevertheless, we hope to influence that and influence the level of fighting there; but in addition, to deter the Russians from further expansionism beyond Pakistan.

So it is important, I think, to maintain the pressure that we sought to impose. The grain embargo which did not involve Europe very much, because Europe is not a big grain growing area, but with the help of other countries I think we did exact an important price. The Russians did not recapture what they lost in American exports. As a result they were not able to increase their meat supplies, which was one of their objectives. In addition they had to draw down their grain reserves, and it is very doubtful that their crop this year will enable them to restore those reserves or build up their meat supplies. So there has been a price they have had to pay.

COMECON [Council for Mutual Economic Assistance] is very important. It is very important that the industrial countries hold the line. This involves high technology related, of course, to military uses. And up to now, I think, the allies have held pretty steady on that policy to build up our defenses, I think, is a fact that the Russians cannot ignore and over time promises to increase their own defense levels with the resulting impact upon their peoples' standard of living and so on. So all of these pressures, I think, are important.

I think also the disapproval of the Islamic conference—a conference within which the Soviet Union had made great headway prior to the Afghanistan invasion—is an important deterrent to the Russians. They have run into more difficulty in Afghanistan than they anticipated which makes it difficult for them to pull out and save face. But I think if we hold steady that eventually that problem will perhaps be worked out.

Q. In the next coming days the President of the European Council, Mr. Gaston Thorn, is going to the Middle East to try to promote the European initiatives and the negotiation in the Middle East. How do you view that?

A. It is not a very encouraging time. In all of these actions—unilateral actions taken by the parties to the negotiations, these resolutions in the United Nations, the special session of the United Nations related to Palestinian rights—all of these things so exacerbate the emotional climate in both Egypt and Israel as to be counterproductive. I understand the objective of the European initiative. It seeks to play the role of middleman, and at some point it may be of help in broadening the negotiative base so that we can include all parties who will be affected. But in the meantime the principal engine—the negotiations—have stalled again because of these outside diversions which have prompted the parties to pull back from the talks.

¹ Press release 220 of Aug. 15, 1980.

² Press release 221 of Aug. 15, 1980. ■

Interview for "U.S. News & World Report"

Following is the text of an interview Secretary Muskie held with the editors of U.S. News & World Report and which appeared in the August 1 1980, issue.

Q. There is a great deal of criticism that the Carter Administration has bungled foreign policy—that after years we are in trouble with allies, adversaries, and the Third World. What do you say to it?

A. I've heard the same criticism made of just about every Administration I've been involved with as a senator. I don't know that there is a general, succinct rebuttal to a sweeping criticism of that kind. It would be more useful to deal with particular situations—the North Atlantic Treaty alliance, for example.

I can recall when the state of the alliance was such that Senator Mike Mansfield almost persuaded the Congress to vote to withdraw all our troops from Europe. And I remember the complaints that our European friends and allies didn't seem to be sufficiently concerned about the threat and about adequately supporting NATO. Sure that must have been a low point—a it did not occur in this Administration.

Q. What about all the talk of a array in the alliance that critics attribute to Administration policies?

A. The fact is that NATO, in terms of the defense of Europe, is in better shape than it has been in a long time thanks to President Carter's leadership as well as the impact of events such as the invasion of Afghanistan.

Even before Afghanistan, NATO committed itself to a 3% annual real growth in defense spending, and, by and large, that commitment is being honored. Furthermore, the allies agreed in May to give us greater flexibility in deploying our forces outside the NATO area. Finally, there is the decision to modernize theater nuclear weapons.

So, in terms of the original purpose of NATO—the defense of the territory covered by the treaty—the alliance is strong and supportive of U.S. leadership. Really, I don't think there is any basis for complaint.

Q. Have the allies been dragging their feet when it comes to helping us counter the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and protect Persian Gulf oil?

A. Outside the NATO territory there have been differences of opinion—not over the strategic significance of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan but over the means for implementing our concern.

With respect to the grain embargo, although the Europeans are not big suppliers, they did support us.

With respect to technology transfers to the Soviets since the Afghan invasion, our NATO allies and Japan have been cooperating with us in OCOM [Coordinating Committee for East-West Trade Policy], the organization which regulates exports to Russia that have potential strategic value.

With respect to the Olympics, there was disagreement—but not so much among the governments as among the Olympic committees. It's interesting, too, that the Olympics emerged as they said they would—sort of an East Germany-Russia bilateral track meet.

In addition to that West Germany has led the effort to form a consortium to help Turkey economically; Britain has been helpful in allowing us to expand our facilities on Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean.

The performance among the allies has been mixed, but there's been performance.

Still, it's true that there's an inclination on their part to continue the benefits of detente in terms of trade and economic benefits and, in the case of West Germany, in terms of human contacts. And they want to see arms control continue; that's a very high priority with them.

When we disagree, it does not mean that they necessarily are challenging American leadership so much as pursuing their own interests to the extent that they can while still cooperating with us. You're not going to get a monolithic line—unquestioning support for every initiative that we take or every policy that we seek to put in place.

Q. Do you share the concern of other Administration officials who see the future danger of what they call self-Finlandization of Western Europe—a drift to neutralism?

A. No. I think that's a theoretical argument. I suspect it may be a Soviet objective down the line. But in terms of day-to-day relationship of Western

Europe and the Soviet Union and our perceptions of our alliance with Western Europe, I don't see any impulse toward neutralism.

It's directly the contrary: There is a vigorous determination to restrain Soviet behavior and to demonstrate that it's unacceptable, not only in NATO but elsewhere. The allies understand that their independence and their freedom can be inhibited and restrained without war if we don't maintain a strategic balance, if the NATO defense is allowed to flag, if we don't establish common policies and common views with respect to common areas.

The European allies would like to be independent of us, but they'd like even more to be independent of the Soviet Union. They don't want to be too independent of us, but they'd like to be perceived as able to be independent whenever they're in a position to assert themselves. That is natural.

Nevertheless, when you get through all the angry rhetoric that occasionally erupts and you sit around the table with the foreign ministers and you've had your arguments and your disagreements, then you come to understand there's a basic agreement that the alliance is important to us all. It's important for all of us to sustain it, to support it, to work at it, and to minimize the perception that it's in disarray.

Q. Looking at another specific area of American foreign policy that is widely viewed as the Administration's outstanding achievement: Isn't the Camp David agreement on Middle East peace showing signs of unraveling? Is there danger that Egypt might pull out of the negotiations?

A. There is that danger. There is a problem with mutual reaction—the tendency by one side to take unilateral actions that create political difficulties for the other side and produce reactions that in turn tend to put the other side on the defensive.

The settlements question and the Jerusalem issue have been the most difficult. The parties get diverted by unilateral actions, their concentration is disturbed, and they tend to cause the other side to walk away from the talks.

The actions now taken and being considered in Israel on Jerusalem cannot finally settle the status of Jerusalem. At some point it will be discussed as an issue. If agreement eventually is reached concerning the status of Jerusalem, then presumably both the Israeli and Egyptian Governments will support it notwithstanding any prior

position either government may have taken. I've tried to make that point to both sides.

I regret the actions that Israel is now taking because the risk is that they will lead to interruption of the talks. At the same time, I make the point to the Egyptians that the issue of Jerusalem really is still there to be discussed, and they ought to bear that in mind in their reactions to such things.

Q. How do you answer our European allies and others who maintain that events have demonstrated that the Camp David process can't work and that it's necessary now to move to a comprehensive negotiating framework to include the Palestinians and Jordanians?

A. The conclusion that the Camp David process can't work applies even more to any other approach to this problem than one can conceive.

Nothing else has worked for more than 30 years in the Middle East. There have been four wars. There have been U.N. resolutions before. Nothing else has ever produced anything. If one uses pessimism based upon 30 years of frustration as the test of this or any other process, one can conclude that it won't work.

My answer to that is that the Camp David process has worked remarkably up to this point and that it can work the rest of the way if we don't adopt that defeatist attitude. It's like Winston Churchill's description of democracy: The worst form of government—until you consider the alternatives. When I consider the alternatives for dealing with this issue, all I can see in the future is a growth of violence, an exacerbation of tensions, and maybe a destruction of what has been accomplished under Camp David.

Q. Do you contemplate some new American initiative to get the talks back on the tracks again?

A. What I see developing is something like this: As the talks go forward, from time to time the parties ask the United States: "Do you have any advice? Do you have any suggestions on how to handle this next point?"

I think that we can be a positive force in the context of ongoing talks in which U.S. influence, innovation, and creativity can be one of the ingredients that all of the parties can take advantage of. It is a leadership role that must be played. But I think the idea of using the State Department bureaucracy to build a plan and then take it over there and present it is the least effective way to exercise leadership.

Q. Do you see any prospect of breaking the stalemate and making major progress in the Camp David negotiations before the American elections?

A. I think there is that possibility if the parties would concentrate. They might not complete the job by election day. But before the talks were suspended in May, they were moving from point to point.

What strikes me about the talks is that the attitudes of the Egyptian and Israeli negotiators and their delegations are constructive; they're positive. There's no sign of foot-dragging.

Q. Turning to relations with the Soviets: What are the prospects of improving relations with Russia while its army remains in Afghanistan?

A. There certainly will not be any business-as-usual relationship with the Soviet Union so long as their troops are in Afghanistan. We should continue our policies that are designed to impose a cost on them. We don't, however, totally destroy the framework of East-West relations within which there are contacts.

For example, the meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in Madrid to review compliance with the Helsinki Final Act is going forward. This is a way for us, among other things, to raise the Afghanistan issue and to challenge the Soviets' performance and all participating countries' performance in the human rights area.

We must not forget, also, that the CSCE framework is a way for the Eastern European countries to relieve the repressive nature of their relationships with the Soviet Union—to establish more contacts with the West. So you would not want to destroy the CSCE or postpone it or suspend it. In that sense, we continue our relationships with the Soviet Union.

With respect to arms control, we're preparing for preliminary exchanges on controlling theater nuclear forces in Europe that we agreed to begin with the Soviet Union. It's important to our security interests as well as theirs that we begin to establish a system of restraint for nuclear arms in Europe. I expect we will meet the Soviets on this before too long.

Q. And SALT?

A. Yes, we need to pursue that. But it's very difficult to do. At the moment, the prospects of getting the necessary votes in the Senate are pretty remote.

But time is running out on us with respect to the deadline for the dismantling of missiles that SALT II requires of the Soviet Union. Thus far, the Soviets are honoring the SALT II Treaty—or at least not violating it. Neither are we. There's no explicit agreement on this, but there's a very clear understanding.

With respect to trade relations, the grain embargo, technology transfers, and other contacts, we will insist upon continuation of our current policies designed to impose a cost on the Soviet Union.

The Soviets, of course, are having a very difficult time in Afghanistan. Right now, there's no progress at all on Afghanistan, except the fact that we're communicating.

Q. Are you considering other sanctions against the Soviets to exact a higher cost for their invasion of Afghanistan?

A. No. I think what we've got in place really covers the options that are available: grain embargo, technology transfers controlled under the COCOM list, the buildup of Western defenses, and defense budgets. That imposes a heavy pressure on the Soviet Union.

Q. Have those measures had any practical effect on the Soviets as far as forcing them to rethink their Afghanistan policy is concerned?

A. They are obviously uncomfortable, at the very least, and seriously concerned that world reaction has been what it has been. They would like to restore their relationships with Europe, the West, and the United States. There's no doubt in my mind they're seeking to do that. Of course, they may hope to have their cake and eat it, too. But I think it's been made very clear to them up to now that they cannot.

They're having difficulty pacifying Afghanistan—and yet they have refrained from any troop buildup beyond what it has been for several months. Now that the Olympics are over, it will be interesting to see whether their policy changes, whether they begin to put in more forces in an effort to bring the situation in Afghanistan under control. I suspect they will not do that immediately, because they will want to continue their diplomatic efforts—Madrid, talks on theater nuclear forces, and so on.

The pressure we have applied on the Soviets has had its effect. But whether it's had enough to cause them to actually reverse their policy in Afghanistan is certainly not clear.

Q. If not an all-out offensive to crush the insurgents, what do you expect the Soviets to do?

A. They're in sort of a dilemma as to which course to pursue in Afghanistan. I suspect they're going to build their pressure on the Pakistani border in order to stop the flow of materiel, arms and food to the insurgents.

Q. What is the United States doing to deter the Russians from pressuring Pakistan or to respond if they actually move troops across the border?

A. We are in communication with the Pakistanis. Maybe I could just put it this way:

The Pakistanis see increased pressure and occasional hot pursuit across the border, but not a major invasion this point. They need economic assistance. But at the moment, the situation seems controllable.

Even though we've not been able to reverse Soviet policy, there's a high probability that the international reaction to Afghanistan has had a deterrent effect upon any thought that the Soviets may have of extending their expansion beyond Afghanistan. I think they'd be very careful about that.

Q. Does the Administration intend to help the Afghan insurgents continue their resistance against the Soviet army of occupation?

A. Do you mean go to war?

Q. No. Provide the insurgents with arms—

A. If that were a question under serious consideration, it isn't one I could discuss.

Q. Has the death of the Shah somehow cleared the way toward a resolution of the crisis and the release of the hostages?

A. Not in any way that we've been able to perceive at this point. Nevertheless, we place it in rank with other developments that have taken place which might warrant new initiatives by us.

The death of the Shah was one such development. Another was the return of Richard Queen, which indicated at the very least that somebody was in a position to make the decision and had the authority to do so very quickly. Also, Ramadan—the holy season—expires on August 12 in Iran. And finally there is the slow but gradual emergence of political institutions—the Parliament, in particular—which might

Access Agreement With Somalia

Following are a Department announcement of August 22, 1980, and a statement by Richard M. Moose, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on August 26.

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT, AUG. 22, 1980¹

On August 22, 1980, the United States and the Somalia Democratic Republic exchanged diplomatic notes providing for expanded cooperation between Somalia and the United States in both the civil and military spheres. The implementation of this agreement will be a matter of mutual and continuing consultation between the two governments as we work together toward an expanded relationship across a broad range of mutual interests, including the development of programs of security assistance and economic cooperation.

This exchange of notes allows the United States increased access to Somalia's air and port facilities. The provisions of this agreement are defensive in nature and are aimed at the promotion of stability in the general area; they are not directed against any particular nation or group of nations.

eventually concentrate authority that's accountable and responsive. Now all of these are coming together.

You will remember that when the UN commission went to Iran early this year, there was no follow-through on its plan because there was nobody with the authority to implement it. We've been waiting for this authority to develop and to emerge. The situation has reached a point where perhaps shortly it will have emerged.

Q. What kinds of new initiatives do you have in mind? Can you elaborate on that?

A. I cannot, because I would deny them if I were to do so. But basically what it involves is contacts that we've developed over these agonizing months—diplomatic, nondiplomatic, various countries, through our allies.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOOSE, AUG. 26, 1980²

On August 22 we exchanged notes with officials of the Somali Democratic Republic which incorporated an agreement to allow our military forces increased access to the port and air facilities in Somalia.

We will shortly be sending copies of this agreement to the appropriate House and Senate committees as required under the Case act. At that time you will see that they are unremarkable and differ only in minor ways with other agreements which we have negotiated.

As you know, the agreement with Somalia is one of three which we have sought for the purpose of increasing our ability to project our military strength in the Southwest Asian area. We have felt that access to the facilities in Somalia would round out our military capabilities in this region. I want to emphasize that we have undertaken these negotiations and this agreement in furtherance of a global strategic objective.

We have had a series of discussions with countries in the Southwest Asian and Indian Ocean littoral area and have found general acceptance of our desire to enhance our ability to counter potential threats in the Indian Ocean region.

These enable us to establish indirect contact with people of importance in Iran. We're considering expanding the effort.

Q. Would you say you're more hopeful now about the release of the hostages?

A. I'd rather not use words like that in connection with the hostages.

I think eventually a decision is going to be made. Increasingly there's a perception in Iran that holding the hostages is against Iran's self-interest. Once that perception coincides with our desire to have the hostages returned, I think something's going to happen.

Q. In 1 month, 6 months, or when?

A. Don't put out a bulletin on it. ■

To date, we have had little reaction from African nations to our efforts to acquire access to additional facilities along the Indian Ocean. We have made clear on numerous occasions that these efforts do not represent any basic change in the policy established by this Administration toward Africa. We continue to believe that conflicts on the African Continent should be resolved peacefully and that economic development remains the primary task with which we should associate ourselves. I feel that an undue amount of attention has been paid to the military assistance aspects of our agreements with both Kenya and Somalia. In point of fact, in both cases we have placed considerable emphasis on responding to economic needs within the framework of our new relationship.

Negotiations on the agreement with Somalia have taken considerable time and have been the occasion for frank discussions between the Somalis and ourselves on bilateral problems—past, present, and future. In particular, they have given us the opportunity to discuss problems which could arise from the continuing dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia over the Ogaden region.

We believe that we have made abundantly clear to the Somalis the limitations imposed by our laws on the use of materiel which might be supplied in the future under foreign military sales agreements and the possible consequences of their violation of these provisions. We are confident that the Somalis understand our views on the activities in the Ogaden.

In this connection, we have again expressed our view that the problems of the Horn cannot be solved by military means, and we believe the Somalis agree that their only long-term solutions lie in the political realm. This latter view is supported by most of the states of Africa, and we continue to hope that the OAU [Organization of African Unity] Good Offices Committee on Settlement of the Dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia, which met again in Lagos last week, will eventually be able to bring the two parties to some sort of agreement on a solution to the Ogaden which is acceptable to all.

¹Read to news correspondents by acting Department spokesman David Passage.

²The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

U.S.-Canada Relations

by Sharon E. Ahmad

Statement before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on June 17, 1980. Mrs. Ahmad is Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs.¹

I welcome the opportunity to appear before you today to review with you the nature and current state of U.S. relations with Canada. The involvement of the United States with Canada over a broad range of areas—political, economic, cultural, commercial, and defense, etc.—is greater than with any other foreign country.

In the political area, our governments work closely and harmoniously, both bilaterally and in international fora. As friends and allies we share the same goals of peace, freedom, and the betterment of mankind's existence on the planet.

We are deeply involved with each other economically, as our people produce and exchange goods and services for our mutual benefit. More than one-fifth of our exports go to Canada, nearly twice that which goes to Japan, our next largest customer. U.S. exports to Canada are greater than our exports to all the countries of the European Economic Community combined. A quarter of all U.S. foreign investment is located in Canada, while the net flow of equity investment has now shifted and is now directed toward the United States from Canada.

We are allies in NATO, but our defense relations go well beyond those with other NATO allies, involving the 40-year-old Permanent Joint Board on Defense. Also, we have a unique military joint command—the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD)—and longstanding defense procurement relations.

Our people know each other well and share a common outlook on the world. Over 70 million people cross the U.S.-Canada border annually. In addition to business and government travel, we vacation in the areas of each other's country that we find attractive. Our students attend each other's educational institutions in large numbers. We see many of the same films and television shows and read many of the same publications.

We share a common interest in a large part of our environment—land, air, and water—and are both increasingly concerned about the maintenance and improvement of the quality of life and the effects of our actions on each other's environment.

All of this involvement leads frequently to the need for cooperation, consultation, and negotiation at many levels of Federal, provincial, and local government. The success or failure of this cooperation has a significant impact on our bilateral relations.

I think it is also useful to discuss some of the factors which affect how the relations between the two countries are perceived from each other's perspective. The difference in size, on the order of 10 to 1 in terms of both population and economic strength, is a central fact. In addition, the distribution of the Canadian population should be noted. Canadians are concentrated along the U.S. border, with 80% of Canadians living within 100 miles of the United States.

As a result, Canadians are far more conscious of the relationship than are Americans, and our bilateral issues are usually national issues in Canada, while they more often are regional issues in the United States. Furthermore, there is an ambiguity in Canadian attitudes toward the United States. While Canadians are attracted to many elements of our culture and society and welcome their relationship with us, at the same time they are determined to maintain their own separate identity and not be overwhelmed by us.

Situation in Canada

With these general factors in mind, I would now like to say a few words about the current situation in Canada and the state of our relations. As you know, the Liberal Party of Prime Minister Trudeau currently governs Canada, having won a majority of 12 in the House of Commons in elections last February. With this majority, the Liberals will probably be in power for the next 4 to 5 years.

More recently, the most important event on the domestic political scene in Canada has been the May 20 referendum in Quebec. Canada has a heritage of two distinct founding cultures which has no parallel here. For many years there has been substantial attention

given to what the relation between the two cultures should be. The referendum was on a proposal by Quebec Premier Rene Levesque to negotiate with Ottawa a new relationship termed "sovereignty-association." That proposal was defeated by a vote of nearly 60%. Levesque was opposed by the provincial Liberal Party, headed by Claude Ryan.

With the decision in Quebec, the people of Canada now are turning their renewed efforts to resolving their constitutional differences. Canadian provinces already have far more autonomy than do our States. Nevertheless, and for different reasons, the provinces are also interested in constitutional change. Prime Minister Trudeau met with the 10 provincial premiers on June 9 and agreed to an intensive series of constitutional negotiations over the summer, culminating in a federal-provincial formal meeting September 8-12 to revise the country's federal structure. Trudeau has said that failure to reach substantial agreement in the September talks would be "a disaster" for Canada.

Recognizing that the national unity issue is vital to the future of Canada, the United States has followed with interest the events taking place to the north. However, we recognize that while we hope Canada will remain united and strong, these questions are internal issues which Canadians must decide without outside interference.

Canada has emerged as the world's seventh-ranking industrial power. With regard to the current state of the Canadian economy, it is expected to grow in 1980 at less than 1%. Inflation will be held to about 10%, in part because Canada, as a net energy exporter, is insulated from increases in the costs of imported oil. Export industries will suffer as a result of an expected decrease in demand in the United States. Unemployment should increase slightly to about 8.5%. However, a deep recession in the United States could change this outlook substantially for the worse.

Bilateral Relations

Current U.S.-Canadian relations are now in excellent shape. The differences which prevailed during the Vietnam era have been put aside, and our relationship can properly be characterized as warm and cordial. As I mentioned earlier, the United States and Canada share a broad range of global interests and are active in cooperating in pursuit of those interests throughout the world.

Canada has been strongly supportive of the United States on a wide variety of global issues. Canada gave strong support on Iran and Afghanistan from the beginning of the crisis in Southwest Asia and took the lead in the boycott of the Moscow Olympics. Canada agreed in January to support the U.S. partial grain embargo against the Soviet Union and not to replace U.S. grain withheld from the U.S.S.R. Canada has held to 8 million tons the amount of grain to be delivered to the Soviet Union during this Canadian crop year, which ends July 31.

Americans will not forget the bravery of the Canadians who protected and aided in the escape of our six Americans from Tehran in January. Also, Canada implemented from the start informal financial restrictions on trade with Iran in concert with our major European allies and Japan. Canada attaches great importance to allied unity and concerted action and favors close consultation with the United States and its other allies on the developing events in Southwest Asia.

As I indicated earlier, our joint inhibition of this continent also involves a wide range of bilateral matters. Let me turn now to some of the current specific issues involved in U.S.-Canadian relations, an area where the potential for unsettling our relations is greater and, therefore, bears close watching.

East Coast Maritime Boundary and Fisheries Treaties. Last year the United States and Canada signed two treaties concerning the disputed boundary between the two countries in the Gulf of Maine and related issues involving mineral resources and fisheries. Current U.S.-Canadian east coast maritime boundary differences have as their origin the extension of fisheries jurisdictions to 200 miles by both countries in 1977. The fisheries treaty covers fish stocks of mutual interest on the Atlantic coast, including those in the disputed area. It would establish a U.S.-Canada east coast fisheries commission for the management of many of the fish stocks and would assign percentage shares to each country for each stock covered. In addition, the treaty provides for conciliation of disagreements and for ways of settling disputes through an arbitrator. The boundary treaty provides for settlement of the boundary dispute by referral to a special member of the International Court of Justice.

There has been substantial opposition in the Senate to approval of the treaties. Opponents have been critical of

the permanent nature of the treaty, of the division of shares of some fish species, and of the treaty's provision for Canadian access to certain stocks off the U.S. coast.

Recognizing that the treaties have encountered very substantial opposition, we are in touch with the Senate, with representatives of fishery interests, and with Canada in an effort to work out an early and acceptable resolution of this important matter. Failure to do so would have a serious adverse effect on our bilateral relations.

Alaska Gas Pipeline. In 1977 the United States and Canada agreed to foster the construction of a pipeline to

bring Prudhoe Bay gas through Canada to the U.S. market. Most of the regulatory procedures have been completed, and early agreement on financing this \$23 billion project has become critical to continued progress.

The U.S. builder envisaged financing the southern legs of the pipeline (from Alberta to California and from Alberta to the Midwest) through the advance construction or "prebuild" of facilities to carry increased Canadian gas exports. It was planned that transmission revenues would cover the construction costs.

From the outset Canada was concerned that financing the technically complex Alaska segment might prove difficult, leaving Canada in the position

U.S., Canada Sign Memo on Air Pollution

The United States and Canada took an important step on August 5, 1980, toward dealing with acid rain and other forms of air pollution crossing the U.S.-Canada border. They agreed to set in motion a bilateral process to deal more effectively with these problems. The action took the form of a Memorandum of Intent signed for the United States by Secretary Muskie and Environmental Protection Agency Administrator Costle and for Canada by Ambassador Towe and Environment Minister Roberts.¹

In signing the memorandum, Secretary Muskie stated that this action confirms the mutual goal of the United States and Canada to take concrete, cooperative steps to combat the problem of transboundary air pollution and to negotiate a bilateral agreement as soon as possible. The Secretary noted that the memorandum responds to the 1978 congressional resolution calling for U.S.-Canadian negotiations to preserve and protect mutual air resources.²

The Canadian Government welcomed the Memorandum of Intent as a step forward in efforts to develop cooperative measures with the United States to combat transboundary air pollution. This includes the already serious problem of acid rain which affects the environment of both countries. Ontario Environment Minister Harry Parrott also attended the Washington signing ceremony.

The Memorandum of Intent establishes five work groups to prepare for

future negotiation of an agreement on air pollution. The work groups will undertake the necessary technical preparations for the negotiations. The United States and Canada are moving ahead to name experts and technicians to these work groups.

The Memorandum of Intent also creates a U.S.-Canada coordinating committee to oversee the activities of the work groups and provides that the work groups submit work plans to the coordinating committee at an early date. Preparatory U.S.-Canadian discussions on transboundary air pollution will continue, and formal negotiations will commence as soon as possible.

The Memorandum of Intent also calls upon both governments to take important interim actions, under current authority, to combat transboundary air pollution, pending conclusion of the agreement. The interim measures include mutual commitments for development of domestic air pollution control policies, vigorous enforcement of existing laws, increased advance notification of proposed actions involving risk of transboundary air pollution and further development of exchanges of scientific studies, cooperative monitoring programs, and research on pollution control technologies.

Press release 209 of Aug. 5, 1980.

¹For text of the Memorandum of Intent, see press release 209A of Aug. 6.

²The statements by the participants in the signing are printed in press release 209B of Aug. 6. ■

of having authorized increased exports of Canadian gas to the United States to facilitate a pipeline for Alaskan gas that might never be built. Accordingly, Canada seeks assurances that the entire line will be built before it will authorize additional gas exports and the construction of the "prebuild" facilities.

We are working with Canada to find a formula for the assurances Canada seeks. We are optimistic that the remaining issues can be resolved in the near future and that it will be possible to move ahead on authorizing construction of the "prebuild" facilities within a short time.

Bilateral Air Quality Agreement.

Following a request by Congress in October 1978, the United States and Canada began consultations on the negotiation of an air quality agreement. We have met several times and have agreed on principles which would be included in an agreement. At this juncture we are considering the next steps to be taken to accomplish the important objectives we share in this area.

One of the major concerns prompting U.S. interest in an air quality agreement is the desire to control Canadian sources of air pollution near the U.S. border. Examples include the Poplar River plant just north of the Montana line, Atikokan near the Minnesota boundary waters canoe area, and Nanticoke across Lake Erie from Cleveland. Air quality in Canada is under provincial rather than federal control, and Canadian provincial pollution controls are generally less stringent than U.S. controls. There are, for example, no scrubbers required on coal-fired power plants or smelters in Canada.

On the Canadian side, a major motivation for concluding an air quality agreement with the United States is to reduce acid rain. Also the United States is itself interested in combating acid rain. (Acid rain is caused by a combination of sulfur dioxide with oxygen and water vapor, producing a mild sulfuric acid which returns to the Earth in rain.) Although a recent study indicates that Canada generates at least half its own acid rain, it is a fact that the United States produces five times as much sulfur dioxide as Canada, much of which originates in the Middle Western and Northeastern States, which are generally upwind from eastern Canada. Also, some of the acid rain falling in the United States originates in Canada. The geological makeup of eastern Canada and parts of the United States are particularly vulnerable to acid rain pollu-

tion, which in certain cases kills aquatic life and may be harmful to crops and trees.

We share Canada's concern about transboundary air pollution and acid rain, issues of vital importance to the people concerned in both countries. We wish to move ahead to develop an air quality agreement and have under consideration mechanisms to aid both countries in arriving at a workable agreement on this important problem.

U.S.-Canadian Automotive Agree-

ment. Until recent years the North American auto industry was unique. It was dominated by three manufacturers of large cars to meet demand in North America. In Europe and Japan, production was principally of smaller cars to satisfy demand in Europe and elsewhere. In recognition of Canada's interest in the North America auto industry—particularly in the areas of trade, investment, and employment—in 1965 the United States and Canada concluded an agreement in this area. The agreement provides for duty-free trade in finished vehicles and original-equipment parts in commerce between both countries. Two-way trade has increased from \$700 million in 1964 to about \$22 billion in 1979. This has resulted in substantial advantages for both countries in terms of investment, employment, and economies of scale.

For several years Canada has suffered a persistent deficit in its automotive trade with the United States. Last year's deficit came to \$2.5 billion, a record high. This has caused some Canadians to question whether Canada is receiving a "fair share" of the benefits under the agreement. There is also concern in Canada that it may not benefit sufficiently from investment and research and development expenditures made by auto manufacturers to meet the increased demand for smaller cars.

In 1978 the Canadian Federal Government and the Province of Ontario provided the Ford Motor Company a \$68 million incentive to encourage the company to locate a \$500 million plant in Ontario rather than Ohio. This brought a U.S. effort to reach agreement with Canada on the use of investment incentives in the North American automotive sector. The U.S. and Canadian Governments have consulted several times on mutual restraint on investment incentives. Canada has also expressed the desire to consult on the state of the auto industry, including operation of the auto pact. We expect

that within the next few weeks the first of these formal consultations will take place.

Defense Issues. The United States and Canada have few differences in the defense field. The North American Air Defense Command agreement remains key element in the U.S.-Canadian defense relationship. Earlier this year we agreed to extend for 1 year the NORA agreement, to allow time for the Standing Committee on External Affairs and Defence of the House of Commons to consider issues involved in the NORAD agreement. There is every reason to believe that the forthcoming negotiations will result in a new agreement for an extended period and a continuation of this longstanding close defense relationship.

The Canadian Government announced on April 10 its decision to purchase the McDonnell Douglas F-18A as Canada's new fighter aircraft to replace the existing fleet of obsolescent fighter. The number of aircraft to be purchased will be between 129 and 137 depending on arrangements now under discussion concerning the possible waiver of certain costs incurred by the U.S. Government. Delivery of the aircraft is scheduled to begin in the second half of 1982 and will continue until 1989.

Conclusion

The questions I have described are illustrative of the many issues which are involved today in U.S.-Canadian bilateral relations. There are many more, and I would be happy to try to provide any additional details which members of this subcommittee may wish.

As I have noted, U.S.-Canadian relations are close and friendly. I see no reason to expect that our shared view of global issues will alter significantly in the foreseeable future. Bilaterally the same priorities will continue to apply: energy, transborder pollution control, maritime boundaries and fisheries, and trade and investment. The close interdependence which exists between our two countries will inevitably bring clashes of interests. We must vigorously seek ways to resolve these issues to the mutual satisfaction of both countries.

While success or failure in dealing with individual problems is bound to have some broader impact on other issues, we must recognize that in a relationship as extensive and complex as exists between the United States and Canada, there are real risks in drawing specific linkages between unrelated issues. Such a practice can give rise to a trade-

off mentality that could greatly complicate our efforts to resolve individual issues, and would not serve us well in the long run. Further, our two nations clearly have the capacity to help or hurt one another, and this fact dictates caution and restraint in our relations. Our tradition of consultation, of prior notification on issues of importance to the other country and of genuine consideration of each other's concerns is of great value to us. In most cases we are able to resolve our differences by meeting them head on, but when we are unable to do so it is strongly in our interest to isolate and minimize the area of conflict involved.

U.S.-Canadian relations are carried on in an atmosphere of mutual confidence. Given the broad range of our two nations' interests, it is understandable that we are challenged by individual differences, particularly in the bilateral area. We must remain vigilant to insure that our differences are managed in the perspective of our broader relationship. This is significant not only for the two countries involved, but it sets an important example for the world of how two free, dynamic, and complex societies can create a productive and cooperative relationship on the basis of mutual respect and consideration.

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Canada Approves Segment of Alaska Gas Pipeline

Following are President Carter's letter to Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau and his statement of July 18, 1980.¹

LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Since you last wrote to me in March, the United States Government has taken a number of major steps to insure that the Alaska Natural Gas Transportation System is completed expeditiously.

Most significantly, the Department of Energy has acted to expedite the Alaskan project. The North Slope Producers and Alaskan segment sponsors have signed a joint statement of intention on financing and a cooperative agreement to manage and fund continued design and engineering of the pipeline and conditioning plant. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission recently has certified the Eastern and Western legs of the System.

The United States also stands ready to take appropriate additional steps necessary for completion of the ANGTS. For example, I recognize the reasonable concern of Canadian project sponsors that they be assured recovery of their investment in a timely manner if, once project construction is commenced, they proceed in good faith with completion of the Canadian portions of the project and the Alaskan segment is delayed. In this respect, they have asked that they be given confidence that they will be able to recover their cost from U.S. shippers once Canadian regulatory certification that the entire pipeline in Canada is prepared to commence service is secured. I accept the view of your government that such assurances are materially important to insure the financing of the Canadian portion of the system.

Existing U.S. law and regulatory practices may cast doubt on this matter. For this reason, and because I remain steadfastly of the view that the expeditious construction of the project remains in the mutual interests of both our countries, I would be prepared at the appropriate time to initiate action before the U.S. Congress to remove any impediment as may exist under present law to providing that desired confidence for the Canadian portion of the line.

Our government also appreciates the timely way in which you and Canada have taken steps to advance your side of this vital energy project. In view of this progress, I can assure you that the U.S. Gov-

ernment not only remains committed to the project; I am able to state with confidence that the U.S. Government now is satisfied that the entire Alaska Natural Gas Transportation System will be completed. The United States' energy requirements and the current unacceptable level of dependence on oil imports require that the project be completed without delay. Accordingly, I will take appropriate action directed at meeting the objective of completing the project by the end of 1985. I trust these recent actions on our part provide your government with the assurances you need from us to enable you to complete the procedures in Canada that are required before commencement of construction on the prebuilt sections of the pipeline.

In this time of growing uncertainty over energy supplies, the U.S. must tap its substantial Alaska gas reserves as soon as possible. The 26 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in Prudhoe Bay represent more than ten percent of the United States total proven reserves of natural gas. Our governments agreed in 1977 that the Alaska Natural Gas Transportation System was the most environmentally sound and mutually beneficial means for moving this resource to market. Access to gas from the Arctic regions of both countries is even more critical today as a means of reducing our dependence on imported petroleum.

Successful completion of this project will underscore once again the special character of cooperation on a broad range of issues that highlights the U.S./Canadian relationship.

I look forward to continuing to work with you to make this vital energy system a reality.

Sincerely,

JIMMY CARTER

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT

My Administration's energy policy has always recognized that the energy problem is not unique to our country. The energy burden of the 1980s is shared by all the industrialized nations and by the lesser developed nations as well. Just as the energy burden is shared by all nations, so must the solution be borne by all in a cooperative spirit.

Just last month in Venice, I met with the heads of six other leading nations of the industrialized world to establish specific goals and a series of comprehensive commitments to conservation and the development of new energy supplies. At the time, we pledged increased international cooperation among ourselves and with other countries to help achieve these objectives.

When I met with Prime Minister Trudeau of Canada in Venice, we agreed that one of the potential cooperative projects—one that could be most meaningful to both our countries—was the Alaska natural gas transportation system. I am very pleased that today the Canadian Government has announced its willingness to move forward on this vast project by approving the construction of the first major segment of what is intended eventually to be a 4,800-mile pipeline from Prudhoe Bay in Alaska through British Columbia and Alberta to the heartland of the United States.

This first segment, approved today by the Canadian Government, will enable U.S. consumers in 33 States to begin receiving additional natural gas from Canada by 1981, replacing 200,000 barrels a day of crude oil, even before the Alaskan and northern Canadian portions of the pipeline are completed. Eventually, too, Canadian natural gas from the north will be able to flow to consumers in Canada.

The entire project, which I approved in 1977, is intended to be completed in 1985 and will bring about 2.4 billion cubic feet of Alaskan natural gas to U.S. consumers each day, replacing more than 400,000 barrels of foreign oil. Prudhoe Bay natural gas represents 10% of our nation's reserves.

I have today sent a letter to Prime Minister Trudeau expressing our confidence that this project will be carried forward to completion and become an example to the world of how international cooperation can serve the common energy needs of both partners. Both Houses of Congress have recently passed resolutions of support for the Alaska pipeline, and I have been able to provide several specific assurances to Prime Minister Trudeau on our commitment as a nation to this joint project.

The pipeline is one of the most complex and demanding energy ventures ever undertaken. When completed, it will be a major element in our transition to a more diversified and secure energy economy.

¹Texts from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of July 21, 1980. ■

Thai-Cambodian Border Situation

by Morton I. Abramowitz

*Statement before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on July 29, 1980. Mr. Abramowitz is U.S. Ambassador to Thailand.*¹

I am pleased to be here today and to have this opportunity to talk with you on the situation along the Thai-Cambodian border and in Cambodia. I have welcomed this committee twice in Bangkok and genuinely hope to see it again in Bangkok at an early time. It is important for our own interests that we understand what is happening in Indochina; it is important that Thailand and the other members of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) know that we are deeply interested and concerned about what is going on in the region and are prepared to play a constructive role there. Our continued involvement in Khmer relief remains a life or death matter for the Khmer people.

Let me briefly review the principal elements of the present situation.

Present Situation

The Vietnamese in December 1978—3 weeks after creating their Heng Samrin puppet authority—invaded Cambodia, quickly took Phnom Penh, and drove on to the Thai border. In the process, the country's population was dislocated and the 1979 harvest doomed, with consequences starkly seen in subsequent months of hunger and refugee wanderings. The Vietnamese forces, however, have failed to destroy the Khmer Rouge and other small resistance efforts, such as Son Sann's Cambodian nationalist movement.

The Vietnamese Army has garrisoned Cambodia with about 180,000 troops and perhaps 20,000 more support personnel. They impose authority in the name of Heng Samrin on all the key cities and along the main roads. Insecurity and conflict are most prevalent in the stretch of Cambodian territory along the Thai border. There Khmer Rouge and Son Sann units carry out their struggle against Vietnamese forces, taking advantage of rugged ter-

ritory and a porous, often poorly marked border that is unsealable by either side.

We have little good information on the composition of the Democratic Kampuchean or Pol Pot forces. We do not know their strength but realistic estimates range from 20,000 to 40,000. Their forces, badly decimated in 1979 have recovered. They are a cohesive, disciplined fighting force with strong organization and good communication. They are concentrated along the border on the Cambodian side but with some strength far into the interior of Cambodia. Given the bloody history of the short rule in Cambodia it is questionable whether they can recruit more forces. They hope to capitalize on Khmer nationalism and the strong anti-Vietnamese sentiments of the Khmer people. The Son Sann forces total about 5,000 and have focused more on political proselytizing than fighting.

The Thai-Cambodian border is roughly divisible into four segments of military activity.

- The most active combat is taking place in Khmer Rouge-dominated areas south of the Thai border town of Aranyaprathet anchored on Phnom Melai on the north and extending into the Cardamon Mountains in the south.

- The southwestern corner, where the Thai border meets the sea, is also an area of Khmer Rouge operations and presents considerable security problems for the Vietnamese, who have not extended strong control over Koh Kor Province and the shoreline.

- The northern border of Cambodia is a sparsely populated area with the border formed by mountains sharply dropping to the Cambodian plain. Its rugged territory provides protection for both Khmer Rouge and small Son Sann units.

- The less-rugged land north of Aranyaprathet has received most of the news coverage. Here are intermingled over 100,000 refugees with small numbers of petty Khmer Serei warlords (mostly a collection of ragtag anti-Vietnamese units who have spent more time fighting each other than the Vietnamese and profiteering on the relief effort), one substantial Khmer Rouge area (Phnom Chat), and the bases of Son Sann's forces. The Vietnamese have sought with limited success to

rike at military opportunities here and, until the Mak Mun incursion, exercised considerable restraint with respect to the civilian concentrations which are no military threat.

Recent Incursion

The most dramatic recent event has been the Vietnamese incursion into Thailand June 23. Our best reconstruction of that event is as follows. Early that day the Vietnamese sent several hundred troops into the Thai village of Non Mak Mun, enveloping the perhaps 20,000-person refugee concentration, Camp 204, on the border east of that Thai village. Elements of three Vietnamese regiments were involved in the full operation—one in a blocking position just north of the attack point; the other just south, while the third, in the center, provided most of the troops which moved against the refugees and the Thai village.

A newly dug antitank trench, located between the border and the Thai village, was crossed by the Vietnamese, who thus could have no question about the location. The nearest Thai Army unit responded quickly, but the platoon was ambushed on the road to the village with heavy casualties. By midmorning the Thai moved against the Vietnamese positions using artillery support and air force helicopters and planes. The Vietnamese withdrew from the village that afternoon, and some fighting continued in the area until the 24th. Thereafter, the two sides disengaged but exchanged mortar and artillery fire for another day.

Intelligence indicates that Vietnamese commanders told their troops they would be going into Thailand, that they would stay for a well-defined if short space of time, and that they would contest, if necessary, Thai army efforts to move into the area they occupied. It seems, therefore, that the operation was planned in advance and not a result of vague demarcation of the border, hot pursuit, or local initiative.

I would emphasize that this was not a major military action. It did not extend over a large area, the number of Vietnamese involved was limited, and they employed no armor or air. In fact, it was an incursion not an invasion.

Nevertheless, an armed incursion is not a trifling matter. Consider if such an incident had happened along the demilitarized zone in Korea with the casualties involved—22 for the Thais and 36 Vietnamese killed and one cap-

tured, according to the Thais. The greatest sufferers were actually the Khmer refugees caught in the artillery crossfire. It appears that some hundred were killed, several hundred wounded, and thousands forced from the camp into the interior. Overall, the major significance of the event lies in its demonstration of Vietnamese disregard for Thai sovereignty and its disruption of refugee congregations.

The U.S. response to the Vietnamese incursion was swift and welcomed by the Thai. Secretary Muskie's condemnation of Vietnamese action and support for Thailand was unambiguous. I myself called on the Vietnamese Foreign Minister visiting in Bangkok and underlined our deep concern and our ties to Thailand. We also made strong representations to the Soviet Union. Simultaneously we accelerated delivery of arms purchased by the Thais to defend their borders, providing a timely airlift of howitzers and other items direct to Bangkok. We are continuing close consultation with the Thais on political and military measures appropriate to deter further Vietnamese aggression and strengthen Thailand's defenses. I might note that the question of sending U.S. troops is not at issue, by Thai desires as well as our own assessment of the situation.

Vietnamese leadership appears to have miscalculated the impact of their incursion on ASEAN. Whereas, Hanoi strategy has attempted to sow division among ASEAN, the incursion in June on the eve of the ASEAN ministerial conference in Kuala Lumpur united the ASEAN allies firmly in support of Thailand. That support was reflected in the ASEAN communique which strongly condemned the Vietnamese incursion. The fact that Vietnamese Foreign Minister Thach in Jakarta denied that any incursion had occurred underscored the cost to Hanoi's credibility caused by the crossing of Vietnamese Army troops of the second international frontier—for the first time in history—despite repeated promises to the contrary.

While a Vietnamese invasion of deep incursion into Thailand is unlikely, the situation remains very serious. The Vietnamese have mounted in this rainy season a concerted campaign all along the Thai-Cambodian border. Seven Vietnamese divisions—some 60,000 troops—are involved in the effort. They appear to be intent on destroying the Khmer Rouge along the border and at a minimum depriving them of any military initiative during this rainy season. Their efforts raise again the possi-

bility of further incursions into Thailand and action against the restored refugee concentrations. The Foreign Minister of Vietnam swore both publicly and privately in Bangkok in late June that the Vietnamese would not transgress Thai territory. We hope his credibility will not be impaired again.

Plight of Khmer People

Let me now turn to the plight of the Khmer people. Their sufferings and the holocaust visited on them since Pol Pot's rise to power in 1975 are well known to all of you. From your trips to Thailand, many of you are personally familiar with the starvation and disease that wracked the Khmer people in the wake of the Vietnamese invasion. The situation has improved, if far too slowly, since the massive international relief began last November, and we can take pride in our role in that humanitarian endeavor. The United States has been the catalyst and prime contributor to an effort which I believe has thus far saved large numbers of Khmer people. The support of the American people and Congress has been gratifying.

Nevertheless, the situation is still tenuous. The first question remains whether a good portion of the Khmer people will have enough food to eat until the coming harvest some 4 months away. Our interviews over several months of hundreds of Khmer farmers appearing at the Thai border produce a depressingly unanimous response: Rice supplies from the previous harvest—nature conspired with invasion to produce an extremely poor one—have been exhausted.

Relief Efforts

The subject of international assistance is a difficult one to assess. There have been different perceptions of how effectively the programs have been carried out. There have been limitations on both the channels through the Heng Samrin administration in Phnom Penh and across the border. Given the enormity of the requirements and the limited means for achieving delivery, we have sought to maximize the infusions of aid through all channels.

Assistance through Phnom Penh has had myriad problems: the devastation of the infrastructure during the Pol Pot years; lack of vehicles, cargo landing facilities, destroyed bridges, a road net left untended for years; and near total lack of personnel with either the

technical or administrative expertise to manage an assistance program. These problems were compounded by the earlier general debilitation of the Khmer people and new deprivations following the Vietnamese invasion. Moreover, at least until recently the priorities of the Vietnamese/Heng Samrin administration essentially ignored the rural Khmer, most of whom at best received a kilogram or less of food per person per month from the Phnom Penh administration since relief efforts began in the late fall. Finally the Vietnamese held the relief effort hostage to their political purposes.

The cross-border feeding operation from Thailand obviously also has had serious limitations. The arduous and long trek across Cambodia and back for sustenance is a terribly inefficient means of achieving relief for the already weakened Khmers. It has also hampered agricultural activity, but without food or seed for the farmers, most of which came from the border, agriculture is seriously inhibited. Moreover, transients who come to the border have been subjected to harassment, robbery, and physical jeopardy by a variety of both Khmer and Vietnamese. Despite these hazards, prior to the Vietnamese attack on the refugee camps June 23, an estimated 60,000 Khmers a week turned up for food distribution at the main food point at Nong Chan. These figures are rough, but we estimate that 500,000-1 million people, principally in western Cambodia, benefited from this cross-border feeding operation.

Despite the difficulties and vagaries of both aspects of the program, we estimate that roughly 100,000 tons of relief, including 22,000 tons of rice seed, were distributed across the border. Some 100,000 tons of food and some 20,000 tons of rice seed have been sent via the Phnom Penh administration.

I would be remiss if I did not express my appreciation to the Thai Government and people for their cooperation in this and all other aspects of the relief and refugee programs for the people of Cambodia and all of Indochina. Thailand has had up to a million people running in and out of its borders since 1975. It has the burden of granting asylum to almost 300,000 Indochinese refugees at this point. It has received over 10% of the population of Laos. Thai support for the whole relief operation has been essential in keeping alive a goodly portion of the people of Cambodia and Indochina.

As I have indicated, despite faults and controversies, the first phase of the effort has been a success in saving countless lives from starvation and disease. A limited crop is now in the process of being planted. Our knowledge of its extent and prospects are limited. In any event the acreage will certainly be short of the need. Nevertheless, a corner toward self-sufficiency will have been turned. Relief agencies and donors must also start to plan now for the 1981 planting season.

The short- and long-term problems faced by the international relief agencies are complex and very difficult. I have alluded several times to the restrictions placed on operations within Cambodia. We all welcome the recent news from the international organiza-

Military Equipment to Thailand

WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT,
JULY 1, 1980¹

President Carter today approved an immediate U.S. airlift of military equipment to Thailand, involving the shipment of small arms and artillery on U.S. military aircraft from Army arsenals in the United States directly to Bangkok. The President's determination, about which the appropriate committees of the Congress have been informed, was taken under section 506(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act.

The decision was made in the wake of last week's Vietnamese attack across the Thai/Kampuchean border on refugee concentrations and Thai villages. The airlift responds to urgent Thai requests for accelerated delivery of equipment items purchased by Thailand under the foreign military sales (FMS) program. The airlift, which is expected to cost roughly \$1 million, will transport M-16 rifles, 106mm recoilless rifles, and 105mm howitzers.

The United States will also begin expediting surface shipments to Thailand of needed small arms and artillery ammunition and is making arrangements to accelerate the delivery by sea of 35 M48-A5 tanks, following completion of the required 30-day congressional review period on July 23, 1980.

¹Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of July 7, 1980. ■

tions of relaxations of restrictions and successful effort to clear Cambodian ports of relief commodities. But given past history it seems wise to see what they mean in practical terms of feeding the rural Khmer. We cannot rest until comprehensive system permitting broad, reasonably monitored distribution to the countryside is achieved. Controversy continues as to the best means to do this—the keys are obviously in Hanoi and Moscow. The excuse of noninterference in the internal affairs of the Heng Samrin government does not wash in the face of the urgent needs of the Khmer people and Hanoi's massive influence in all other aspects of Cambodian life. Conceivably recent reports of improvement reflect a Vietnamese perception that there are more political benefits to be gained from cooperation with the international relief effort rather than from obstructionism.

On the border, the international relief effort has also faced multiple frustrations. Most discouraging perhaps has been the repeated outbreak of fighting between the so-called Khmer Serei groups, whose disreputable leaders seek to maintain their positions of personal power and the undoubtedly lucrative cut from diversion and sales of relief supplies. There is a simple solution, but the Thai Government and international organizations are working within their limitations to overcome the problems by both separating out armed elements and trying to develop direct distributions which would make black market profiteering more difficult.

The second major border dilemma is assuring that relief supplies go to the needy civilians in Khmer Rouge controlled area; not to soldiers. Their numbers are uncertain: Some put it as low as 20,000, some as high as 55,000. Insecurity makes monitoring here nonexistent. International relief supplies to this area have been recently suspended. This issue is under the urgent consideration of the Thai Government and international organizations. Understand from recent reports that direct distributions to civilians in these areas as well is being considered.

The dilemmas of the relief effort both on the border and through Phnom Penh have been caught up in the political objectives of the countries involved. This has been principally reflected in the debate about relative priorities to be given to the Phnom Penh vs. border program. But it must not be forgotten that cross-border feeding and large concentrations of Khmer refugees at

the border developed because of the absence of an adequate food distribution program within Cambodia. Once that is in place, the border operation should be rather away in any event. Until then both avenues of relief have to be pursued as vigorously as possible. We simply cannot risk the cessation of cross-border feeding which puts food into the hands of those who need it, notwithstanding the associated uncertainties, on the basis of hopes out of Phnom Penh.

Since the Vietnamese invasion a month ago, the refugee and relief situation north of Aranyaprathet has changed significantly. The number of refugees at the border is down and is now very crudely estimated at from 10,000 to 150,000. The armed Khmer elements of all stripes in the area are a small fraction of this amount—some 10,000–10,000. The bulk of the refugees are at the two camps of Nong Samet and Nong Chan being cared for by international and voluntary agencies. There are, of course, another 150,000 Khmer in refugee camps within Thailand.

The cross-border feeding situation remains seriously disrupted. Only small amounts of food have been distributed in recent weeks at two border points by international agencies. The international agencies are trying but have not yet reestablished the previous major mechanism of cross-border feeding that was in place at Nong Chan. Most significant only very small numbers of people are appearing at the border to seek food, although in the past few days numbers coming to the border on foot have increased. Some of this reduction may be due to the present absorption in planting in Cambodia, but the main factor seems to be that the Vietnamese are stopping at least some and perhaps many Khmer from going to the border. Khmer may also simply fear going to the border for fear of hostilities. The possible impact of all this can be catastrophic. In the months of April and May some 12,000–16,000 tons of food were going into western Cambodia. That supply has been cut off for over a month, and there is no evidence that rice distributions from Phnom Penh have made up that deficiency.

Finally, we must frankly recognize that while the world has saved millions of Khmer, the end of the Khmer relief problem and some serious reconstruction in Cambodia can derive only from a political resolution of the struggle for control in Cambodia. The resolution passed by the last U.N. General As-

sembly provides a solid basis to pursue a settlement of the Cambodian problem. But nothing has so far been achieved, and the prospects for a political solution are hardly promising.

Thus far, the Vietnamese have shown no flexibility on their part over substantive issues involved in the Cambodian problem. Vietnamese insistence on keeping its troops in Cambodia indefinitely and on the outside world's acceptance of the Heng Samrin regime remain the nub of the problem. Their recent statement on the subject—the Indochinese ministerial statement of July 18—artfully seems to indicate some flexibility but in effect offers us again only the Heng Samrin government and Vietnamese occupation. We cannot achieve peace in Cambodia if the Vietnamese insist on a peace exclusively on their own terms. Without some flexibility, there can be no hope for resolution of the problem.

In addition to the Vietnamese attitude, other major uncertainties remain. The situation inside Cambodia is still ambiguous. Democratic Kampuchea capabilities to harass the Vietnamese are unclear. The border situation continues to be tense and dangerous. Thai security remains a major concern of ours. Amidst all this uncertainty, we cannot lose sight of the near total dependence of the Khmer people on outside sources for their very lives.

I would conclude by saying that despite the ambiguities and difficulties, the United States has no choice but to continue its vigorous relief efforts to save Cambodia and the Khmer people from extinction while at the same time remaining vigilant for possibilities of a satisfactory negotiated outcome—however remote it appears at this time.

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Khmer Relief Efforts

STATUS OF U.S. CONTRIBUTIONS¹

The U.S. Government, as of July 1, 1980, has spent or obligated for Khmer relief \$108,810,500. This figure does not include \$1,425,000 the U.S. Government spent for the same objective during the previous fiscal year. Grants break down as follows. Figures are rounded to the nearest hundred dollars.

| UNICEF Amount | Reason/Date |
|---------------|--|
| \$2,500,000 | Startup costs for Khmer relief program (10/79) |
| 2,000,000 | Rice purchases in Thailand for distribution in Kampuchea (11/79) |
| 448,000 | (in kind) Airlift of cranes from Japan to Singapore for onward shipment to Kampuchea (11/79) |
| 44,600 | (in kind) Incremental air transport cost of Archer, Daniels, Midland-donated food (12/79) |
| 6,500,000 | Relief of cash shortage (12/79) |
| 2,500,000 | Cash for ongoing relief program (5/80) |
| 2,000,000 | Cash for rice purchases for World Food Program (6/80) |
| <hr/> | |
| \$15,992,600 | |

International Committee of the Red Cross

| | |
|-------------|--|
| \$2,500,000 | Startup costs for Khmer relief program (10/79) |
| 27,000 | (in kind) Two field labs (11/79) |
| 20,000 | (in kind) Medical survey team for contingency planning (11/79) |
| 2,500,000 | Relief of cash shortage (12/79) |
| 1,012,900 | (in kind) 40-day lease of Hercules for shuttle flights to Phnom Penh (12/79, 1/80) |
| 5,500 | (in kind) Airlift of a field hospital donated by SAWS (1/80) |
| 714,400 | (in kind) Lease of Hercules for shuttle flights to Phnom Penh (4/80) |
| 1,785,600 | Cash for ongoing relief program (5/80) |
| <hr/> | |
| \$8,565,400 | |

World Food Program

| | |
|--------------|---|
| \$43,108,000 | Food for Peace commodities including shipping costs (\$34.23 million directly to Kampuchea; \$8.878 million in and through Thailand, 11/79, 3/80, 5/80) |
| 290,000 | Lease of trucks in Thailand (11/79) |
| 150,000 | (in kind) Airlift and commodity cost of instant corn soy milk (11/79) |

| | | | |
|--------------|--|------------|---|
| 1,026,000 | Food processing in Thailand and Singapore (11, 12/79) | 100,000 | Cash for cross border seed rice program (3/80) |
| 891,600 | Food management in Thailand (12/79) | \$ 155,800 | |
| 3,000,000 | Rice purchases in Thailand for border and holding center feeding (12/79) | | American Friends Service Committee |
| 8,800 | (in kind) Air transport cost for soy fortified bulgur (2/80) | \$ 558,300 | Agricultural rehabilitation in Kampuchea (3/80) |
| 4,000,000 | Cash for cross border seed rice programs (3, 5/80) | 15,900 | Ocean freight reimbursement for medical supplies and vegetable seeds (4/80) |
| \$52,474,400 | | \$ 574,200 | |

Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees

| | |
|--------------|--|
| \$ 381,200 | (in kind) Airlift and commodity cost of 800 tents and tent flies (10/79) |
| 9,000,000 | Care and maintenance of Khmer in holding centers and center construction (11/79) |
| 5,618,800 | Care and maintenance of Khmer in holding centers and center construction (balance of U.S. Government pledge to UNHCR, (1/80) |
| 3,000 | (in kind) Four hand pumps (5/80) |
| 6,400,000 | Care and maintenance of Khmer in holding centers (6/80) |
| \$21,403,000 | |

Food and Agriculture Organization

| | |
|--------------|---|
| \$ 3,000,000 | Agricultural rehabilitation program in Kampuchea (3/80) |
|--------------|---|

National Council for International Health

| | |
|-----------|--|
| \$ 87,200 | Medical assistance clearinghouse (12/79, 5/80) |
|-----------|--|

Cambodia Crisis Center

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|-----------|--|
| \$ 80,900 | Startup costs for informational clearinghouse (1/80) |
|-----------|--|

Church World Service

| | |
|--------------|---|
| \$ 1,250,000 | Emergency delivery of medicines, relief supplies, and seeds for agricultural rehabilitation in Kampuchea (1/80) |
|--------------|---|

World Vision Relief Organization

| | |
|--------------|---|
| \$ 3,103,300 | Rehabilitation of rice culture, small animal breeding, orphanages, and a youth hostel in Kampuchea (3/80) |
|--------------|---|

Care

| | |
|-----------|--|
| \$ 55,800 | Ocean freight reimbursement for baby food and relief supplies (3/80) |
|-----------|--|

World Relief

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|--------------|---|
| \$ 1,000,000 | Subsistence agricultural packages (tools, 6/80) |
|--------------|---|

Office of the U.N. Secretary General's Special Representative for Kampuchean Humanitarian Relief

| | |
|------------|---|
| \$ 150,000 | Startup costs of coordinating office (3/80) |
|------------|---|

Embassy Bangkok

| | |
|------------|--|
| \$ 102,500 | Emergency funds for Khmer relief at Ambassador's discretion (some for communications equipment, 11/79) |
|------------|--|

Thai Red Cross

| | |
|------------|---|
| \$ 100,000 | Mrs. Carter's presentation for Khmer relief (11/79) |
|------------|---|

Task Force 80 (Thai Supreme Command)

| | |
|----------|---|
| \$10,700 | Office supplies for Thai coordinator (3/80) |
|----------|---|

Royal Thai Government

| | |
|-----------|---|
| \$ 25,000 | Assistance to Thai victims of Vietnamese incursion (6/80) |
|-----------|---|

Unattributed

| | |
|------------|--|
| \$ 384,000 | Special airlift of medical and other relief supplies in response to the President's 11/13 decision (11/79) |
| 351,500 | Travel and administrative expenses of staffing Khmer relief program in Thailand (10/79-9/80) |
| \$ 735,500 | |

\$108,810,500 (Grand Total)

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, JULY 9, 1980²

The United States is deeply concerned by the continuing disruption of relief efforts to the Khmer people along the Thai/Kampuchean border and inside Kampuchea, which was cut off as a result of the Vietnamese attacks on sev-

eral refugee concentrations in Thailand 2 weeks ago. Food, rice seed, and other relief supplies distributed to the Khmer who came to the Thai border prior to the Vietnamese attack comprised a vital element of the international community's relief effort and sustained hundreds of thousands of Khmer inside Kampuchea who had no other source of sustenance and who were attempting to plant a new rice crop there.

The United States believes it is essential that relief supplies continue to be distributed to all needy Khmer wherever they are via the border as well as through Phnom Penh and Kampong Som. We believe urgent steps must be taken to provide adequate care for the refugees from the camps disrupted by the fighting. We also urge the Vietnamese and Phnom Penh authorities concerned to facilitate distribution of food and relief supplies throughout Kampuchea. At the same time, we call on the international organizations, voluntary agencies, and the governments concerned in this critical humanitarian effort, with the support of the donor nations, to take all measures necessary to restore these urgent feeding operations to insure survival of the Kampuchean people.

¹ Press release 170 of July 1, 1980.

² Read to news correspondents by Department spokesman John Trattner. ■

Accounting for MIAs: A Status Report

by Michael A. Armacost

Submitted to the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on June 27, 1980. Mr. Armacost is Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.¹

As you will recall, Assistant Secretary [for East Asian and Pacific Affairs] Richard Holbrooke appeared before your subcommittee last October with a full update on developments up to that time. From time to time since then there have been informal briefings and discussions. I propose to touch briefly on some background, and then to deal in more detail with events since last October.

From the beginning this Administration and the Department of State have followed a policy of obtaining the fullest possible accounting of our missing personnel. In one of his earliest foreign policy initiatives, President Carter sent a Presidential commission to Indochina—the Woodcock Commission—to explore directly with the Vietnamese and Lao how such an accounting might be obtained. On March 12, 1977, the President referred to the Woodcock Commission, saying he was “. . . hopeful that this step we are taking will meet with a positive response and put in motion a process that will obtain the fullest possible accounting for our men who sacrificed so much for their country. At the same time, we recognize that information may never be available on many of them.”

The commission's report stated: “The highlight of the Commission's findings in Hanoi was the SRV's formal undertaking to give the U.S. all available information on our missing men as it is found and to return remains as they are recovered and exhumed.” The report also noted that Vietnam “. . . promised to set up permanent study mechanism by which the U.S. Government can provide information that we have about the potential whereabouts or identity of servicemen who were lost, and the Vietnamese have promised to cooperate in pursuing the evidence we might present in the future.”

The United States met with the S.R.V. [Socialist Republic of Vietnam] on three occasions in 1977 to discuss

prospects for normalizing relations between our countries. In those meetings we stressed Vietnamese willingness to follow policies supportive of peace and stability in the region and continued Vietnamese efforts to provide us with the fullest possible accounting of our missing personnel as factors which would affect progress toward normalization of relations.

We also stressed that we rejected any effort to link the accounting issue to the question of aid, or any idea that the return of remains or information could be traded for diplomatic relations. We stressed then, as we do now, that Hanoi has a humanitarian obligation to provide this information irrespective of U.S. recognition or a commitment for aid.

During 1978 the S.R.V. showed signs of flexibility in its position on U.S. aid, and by the fall Hanoi had stopped demanding U.S. aid as a *quid pro quo* for normalization or for progress on accounting for the missing. As you know, however, progress toward normalization was halted due to the emergence in October and November 1978 of new Vietnamese policies which were destabilizing to the region—closer ties with the Soviet Union, the massive flow of refugees, and sharp clashes with Kampuchea, culminating in Vietnam's invasion and occupation of Kampuchea in December 1978 and January 1979.

Although under the circumstances there is no question of any movement toward normalization of relations with Vietnam at this time, we have continued our efforts to obtain a full accounting on MIAs [missing-in-action]. As Assistant Secretary Holbrooke told you last fall, this has been underscored in all high-level contacts between our governments. You will recall, we acted on a number of suggestions made by your subcommittee: contacting the Soviets for their assistance, using U.N. channels, and following up on statements the Vietnamese made to you during your August 1979 visit to Hanoi about new information and about the visit of JCRC [Joint Casualty Resolution Center] experts. As you are aware, however, the Vietnamese have provided no new information and have not allowed visits by JCRC experts as

they suggested to you last August they would. Nor have they returned any remains since August 1978.

Assistant Secretary Holbrooke also reviewed efforts we had made with the Lao Government, including his talks with the acting Lao Foreign Minister, contacts by State Department officials and Members of Congress with the Lao Chargé here, and efforts by our Chargé in Vientiane, Leo J. Moser, to underline the importance of the issue. We have consistently pressed the Lao and Vietnamese authorities on this issue. There is no doubt that they understand its importance to us. We will continue our efforts to obtain the fullest possible accounting for our missing personnel.

Vietnam

In November 1979, we learned that a refugee from Vietnam stated he knew that the Vietnamese were holding the remains of over 400 Americans. Many of you were intimately involved in the events that followed. The refugee was exhaustively debriefed and was found to be a credible source. He met with some of you, and during your January trip to Hanoi, you and other members raised the information he provided with the S.R.V. authorities.

In order to follow up on the matter, [former] Secretary of State Vance sent a letter February 7 to the Vietnamese Ambassador to the United Nations, Ha Van Lau. In the letter he referred to the report of remains and to your efforts to raise the matter with S.R.V. officials and noted that, without full inquiry and investigation, serious questions about the report would remain unanswered. He suggested that U.S. experts go to Hanoi to discuss the matter with Vietnamese officials and also asked that Ambassador Lau meet with Deputy Assistant Secretary [for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, John D.] Negroponte.

The letter was hand delivered to the Vietnamese Mission in New York on February 8. The State Department officer carrying the letter referred to the Secretary's personal interest in continuing progress on MIAs. The officer also noted the long time that had passed since the Vietnamese had shown any progress on the matter, which was puzzling in light of the “new information” they had said in the summer of 1979 might soon be available. He also noted the continuing congressional and public interest in the matter.

Ambassador Lau replied in a letter dated February 20 that the S.R.V.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs had authorized him to reply that the report of the 400 remains "was completely untrue, spread with ill-intention, and aimed at creating further complications to the relations between our two countries and to the search itself for the Americans MIA." He added: ". . . it was a tendentious fabrication, and even opinion among American political circles was also skeptical about the single source of spreading speculation. I therefore believe there is no sound justification for a serious concern in the United States as it was said in your letter." Ambassador Lau recalled the earlier return of remains of 73 Americans and stated that the Vietnamese ". . . continue the search although the American side has not only failed to respond to that gesture of goodwill on the part of the Vietnamese side but also pursued a policy of overt hostility against Vietnam. . . ." He concluded by noting that the Vietnamese were still considering the subject of allowing American experts to travel to Hanoi and would advise us at a convenient time.

On March 27, Deputy Assistant Secretary Negroponte, accompanied by Brig. Gen. T.C. Pinckney of DOD/ISA [International Security Affairs], raised the report of 400 remains again during a call on Ambassador Lau. It was raised during a lengthy discussion of the entire issue of accounting for missing Americans. Gen. Pinckney also discussed four specific cases with Ambassador Lau and left with him materials, including photographs, press stories, and other identifying data on each case. Ambassador Lau said that his government would review the material, and he would reply at a later date.

In mid-March we were advised of the results of an earlier effort on the MIA question. The text of House Concurrent Resolution 10, sponsored by this committee and adopted by the House of Representatives on July 9, 1979, called for the Secretary of State to seek the good offices of the Secretary General of the United Nations for the purpose of establishing a special investigatory commission charged with the responsibility of securing a full accounting of Americans listed as missing in Southeast Asia. Through our U.N. mission, the Secretary promptly transmitted the text of the resolution to the Secretary General, who in turn transmitted the resolution to the Vietnamese mission at the United Nations. In addition, the Secretary General instructed one of his special representatives to

discuss the matter directly with the Vietnamese during a visit to Hanoi.

The special representative raised the subject with senior officials of the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They responded by stating that the Government of Vietnam had done all that was needed to trace the missing Americans, that the U.S. Government was fully aware of the Vietnamese position, that they were, nevertheless, continuing their efforts, and that they would not fail to inform the U.S. Government if new evidence were found. The representative raised the idea of establishing a special investigatory commission with responsibility for securing a full accounting of Americans listed as missing. The Vietnamese did not accept this proposal. Nonetheless, we continue to use the U.N. channel, and in early April, for instance, we sent background information on the report of the 400 remains to the Secretary General for his use in making further inquiries into the matter.

Laos

I would like now to turn to the MIA situation in Laos. All of you are aware, I believe, that the United States has consistently pressed the Lao Government for further information on Americans missing in Laos. The Woodcock Commission visited Laos in March 1977 as well as Vietnam. A number of congressional delegations have visited Laos since then and have also stressed to senior Lao officials the deep concern of the American people. In October 1978, Assistant Secretary Holbrooke traveled to Vientiane and met with Lao President Souphanouvong and other officials to restate the importance which we attach to obtaining full Lao cooperation relating to the provision of information on missing U.S. personnel in Laos. Assistant Secretary Holbrooke also met with acting Foreign Minister Khamphai Boupha last October 4 in New York, as he mentioned in his testimony last year, and emphasized the importance of this issue to the American people, the Congress, and the Administration.

When he met with you last October, Assistant Secretary Holbrooke also noted that our new Chargé in Laos, Leo J. Moser, was talking with Lao officials about this matter during his initial calls in Vientiane and would continue to do so throughout his assignment there.

Over the past 9 months the Chargé has been very active on this issue. Not only did he raise it during his initial round of calls, he has vigorously pursued the matter throughout his time there. He has reported on his efforts a some length, and we have tried to keep you posted on major developments. The Embassy staff has been able to travel recent months somewhat more than has been possible for a number of years; this was helpful in getting a feel for conditions outside of Vientiane.

In January 1980, Deputy Assistant Secretary Negroponte visited Laos together with JCRC liaison officer Lt. Col. Paul Mather. While they were there, they raised the subject with Lao Foreign Ministry Deputy Secretary General Soukthavone Keola and specifically requested that periodic meeting be held to exchange MIA information. The Embassy and other visiting officials have continued to raise the matter at every appropriate opportunity.

In the course of the discussions Moser and other members of his staff have had with Lao officials at all levels we have stressed the continuing importance of obtaining the fullest possible accounting for Americans killed or missing in Laos. The Lao have generally replied that they hope for an improvement in U.S.-Lao relations. They have reviewed the past efforts of the government, including the return of nine American prisoners from Laos in 1973 and the recovery and return of four sets of remains in August 1978. They have discussed the difficulties encountered in searching for remains and their limited resources for the task. They have expressed their experience that it is difficult to motivate people to search for remains but have also said that they would continue to look for remains.

In February our Embassy initiated an exchange of notes with the Lao Foreign Ministry. I would like to quote for the record, the substantive parts of the Lao response:

"The LPDR [Lao People's Democratic Republic] has returned all American prisoners of war, and at present, to the knowledge of the Laotian Government, there are no longer any Americans in Laos under the category of 'deserters,' such as criminal prisoners, 'former Americans who have opted for Laotian nationality,' or under any other such category."

As our Embassy noted, the Lao statement considerably amplifies previous assertions on Americans in Laos

and covers such categories as "deserters." The Embassy also noted that they would energetically pursue any indication that POWs may, in fact, remain in Laos.

I will not go into great detail on all of the Embassy's efforts on this matter. I do want you to be aware of the great energy that the Embassy staff and Chargé Moser have brought to this effort.

There is one particular subject that has recently engaged a great deal of the Embassy's attention that I would like to mention specifically. The Embassy has been aware of the possibility that the Military Museum in Vientiane might have information on Americans that would help advance the accounting process. The museum, however, is normally closed to foreigners and diplomats. The Embassy staff initiated a series of requests to visit the museum, which were repeatedly denied. At the same time, the Embassy asked visiting news media representatives, who sometimes could get permission to enter the museum, to be on the lookout for possible information on MIAs. Several have done so, and it appears that the museum may, indeed, have some significant information.

In light of this indication that the museum contains information which might help account for Americans lost in Laos, the Embassy has repeatedly renewed its request to visit the museum.

Deputy Assistant Secretary Ne-groponte raised the matter with the Lao Chargé here on May 14. We also instructed our Embassy to again approach Lao authorities for permission to visit the museum, reviewing our past efforts to seek further information, and asking Lao Government assurances that it was acting in good faith in providing to the United States all information in its possession on Americans missing in Laos. We also noted that failure of the Lao Government to provide information in its possession and failure to permit U.S. Embassy inspection of this information despite U.S. requests does not reflect the earlier assurances of the Lao Government. We repeated our longstanding request that appropriate U.S. and Lao officials meet to discuss all information which might be available or obtainable which would help in the accounting and renewed the standing invitation for a Lao delegation to visit the Joint Casualty Resolution Center/Casualty Identification Laboratory

(JCRC/CIL) in Hawaii. There has been no immediate reply on any of the points raised.

We are also preparing to request access to specific crash sites in Laos. We view our request for such access, along with our request for access to the information in the Military Museum, as a new opportunity to test Lao cooperation on MIAs and to seek a better awareness among Lao officials on the seriousness with which we regard the MIA issue and their handling of it.

We have consistently addressed the MIA accounting issue in our contacts with the Vietnamese and Lao authorities. There is no doubt that they understand that the issue is important to us. We will continue to work toward eliciting from the Vietnamese and Lao forthcoming and satisfactory cooperation in obtaining the fullest possible accounting for our missing personnel.

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

U.S.-Indonesia Nuclear Energy Agreement

MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS,
JULY 2, 1980¹

I am pleased to transmit to the Congress, pursuant to Section 123d of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2153(d)), the text of the proposed Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy with accompanying agreed minute; my written approval, authorization, and determination concerning the agreement; and the memorandum of the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency with the Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement concerning the agreement. The joint memorandum submitted to me by the Secretaries of State and Energy, which includes a summary analysis of the provisions of the agreement, and the views of the Members of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency are also enclosed.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, which I signed into law on March 10,

1978, calls upon me to renegotiate existing peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements in order to obtain the new provisions set forth in that Act. In my judgment, the proposed agreement for cooperation between the United States and Indonesia, together with its agreed minute, meets all statutory requirements.

I am particularly pleased to note in this connection that Indonesia deposited its instrument of accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on July 12, 1979, thereby becoming the 109th Party to that landmark treaty and cornerstone of international nonproliferation efforts. This action reflected Indonesia's commitment to international nonproliferation efforts, and marks a notable step toward the ultimate goal of universal acceptance of the objectives of the NPT.

The proposed bilateral agreement between us reflects the desire of the Government of the United States and the Government of Indonesia to update the framework for peaceful nuclear cooperation between our two countries in a manner that recognizes both the shared nonproliferation objectives and the close relationship between the United States and Indonesia. The proposed agreement will, in my view, further the non-proliferation and other foreign policy interests of the United States.

I have considered the views and recommendations of the interested agencies in reviewing the proposed agreement and have determined that its performance will promote, and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to, the common defense and security. Accordingly, I have approved the agreement and authorized its execution, and urge that the Congress give it favorable consideration.

JIMMY CARTER

¹Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of July 7, 1980. ■

Economics and National Security in the 1980s

by Richard N. Cooper

Address at Brown University in Providence, Rhode Island, on March 7, 1980. Mr. Cooper is Under Secretary for Economic Affairs.

Our topic today is economics and national security in the 1980s. I will begin my remarks with a few words on what I mean by national security and then go on to discuss the relation of economics to it.

It is conventional to consider national security as the prevention of physical attack on the United States and its people. Apart from pin pricks, the only country which now, and in the foreseeable future, threatens U.S. physical security is the Soviet Union. It is worth remarking in this connection, however, that many of our potential or actual adversaries in the past—Britain, France, Germany, Japan—are technically capable, if they had a will to do so, of imparting great damage to the United States. It is a measure of the success of our foreign policy over the past 30 years that neither we nor they even conceive of such an eventuality.

The conventional response to our concerns about our physical security is to maintain a strong defense establishment—primarily for deterrence but if necessary to fight for our protection—backstopped by a vigorous and productive national economy. I will return to this response later on.

We should also, however, consider broader conceptions of our national security; for example, security in our enjoyment of our high level of economic well-being. Threats to our security in this sense were brought home to the average American by gasoline shortages last year. With those came the realization that we are vulnerable to interruptions in remote parts of the globe to supplies that are crucial to our welfare. This sense of vulnerability is new to Americans. It is much older for Europeans and Japanese. It is worth recalling that one of the reasons the Japanese bombed the U.S. fleet at Pearl Harbor was to remove what they conceived to be the major threat to their oil lifeline to the then Dutch East Indies.

There is a third dimension to national security, and that concerns security in the pursuit of our moral values, i.e., a perception that the world is following, or is

at least compatible with, our deepest feelings about society and humanity. This factor is not normally considered a "security" issue at all. Yet it continually thrusts us into foreign affairs, as when we offer substantial help to political refugees in the far corners of the Earth. It represents a secular reflection of the still strong missionary tradition in the United States.

I was struck by a recent article in *Harvard Magazine*, in which seven professors, ranging in field from divinity to engineering, were asked to identify the most important issue facing the United States (and the world) in the decade of the 1980s. Five of the seven chose topics involving international affairs, and only one of those focused on the prevention of nuclear war. Four of the seven dealt with different aspects of what would now be called North-South relations, focusing on the pervasiveness and growth of world hunger, the maldistribution of world wealth and income, the tensions and turmoil created by the growing pressure of population on limited resources, and the increasing loss of biological species (which takes place overwhelmingly in the tropics).

The reasons why these issues should be of concern to Americans are not typically spelled out. They could lie in the ultimate threat of these developments to our economic security, as resources are used by others, or even to our physical security. (Disaffection in Third World countries can perhaps not literally threaten the United States, but it can lead to physical harm to American diplomats and travelers.)

But I suspect that the authors simply take for granted that these issues should be of concern to Americans, without having to spell out tangible ways we may feel the tensions. The threat is thus in the psychological or moral realm rather than in the physical realm. Here lies perhaps the most serious threat to our security, which rests fundamentally on our shared values and our cohesion as a nation and as a society. Some argue that it will not be politically sustainable within the United States for Americans to go on enjoying our growing affluence when there are daily reminders through our media of death and destitution elsewhere in the world.

Let me turn now to economics and the relationship that that bears to each of these three broad aspects of security. I will take them up in reverse order.

Pursuing Moral Values

The relationship of economics to security in the enjoyment of our moral values is the most difficult to define. If we are honest with ourselves, we must recognize that we may not be able to provide enough resources effectively to assure that the evils of hunger and poverty and the social and political consequences that flow from them will be diminished in any finite period of time. This is for the simple reason that we cannot control what goes on elsewhere in the world.

The best we can do is to provide a positive influence to the overall environment in which national economies can prosper, supplemented by specific guidance, technological assistance, and financial resources to help alleviate poverty. We cannot assure world prosperity, and we cannot assure that prosperity will lead to the adoption of our values and our standards of a civilized life. But we can be confident that without some technical and financial assistance from us, these aims will become immeasurably more difficult to achieve.

To be true to our own values, we must do what we can. We should provide technical and financial assistance to poor nations where it can be used effectively. And we should gear our own macroeconomic and trade policies to the maintenance of a vigorous world economy where poor countries can trade those goods they produce for the goods and services they need from us. Our own economic policies thus have a vitally important influence in creating the possibility for the eventual elimination of poverty and destitution.

Threat to Economic Well-being

It is the second notion of security—secure enjoyment of our economic well-being—that has become a matter of widespread public concern during the past decade. This issue was brought home by the dramatic increase of the prices of most commodities in 1972–73. For the general public most notable were the six-fold increase in the price of sugar and the four-fold increase in the price of oil. Sugar prices have since receded, but oil prices

have gone on to new highs; to make matters worse, we have had periods of physical shortage.

A world in which 60% of a crucial commodity comes from 14 nations, with the supply heavily concentrated in a politically unstable area, is not a comfortable one. And the medium-run outlook promises to be worse rather than better, with prospective demand outrunning prospective supply.

This outlook has several implications. The first is slower world economic growth, with possibly devastating implications for developing nations. The second is more inflation, with its corrosive effect on our own institutions. The third is that it will give rise to divisive competition among oil-consuming nations for the limited supplies of oil, with a corrosive effect on political harmony among allies. Finally, it suggests a dangerous vulnerability to interruptions in supply which may come about as a consequence of political turmoil or by military action, e.g., a Soviet move into the Persian Gulf.

I want to emphasize that our current uncomfortable condition is not due to the organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). OPEC, led by the Shah of Iran, took advantage of the situation in December 1973 and raised prices sharply by decree. But the basic problem is that demand for oil is growing more rapidly than supply. The recent sharp price increases were not decreed by OPEC. Rather, market prices rose sharply, and OPEC scrambled to catch up. The loss of substantial Iranian production in early 1979, combined with anxieties about further interruption in supply and a changing structure in world marketing of oil, led in 1979 to substantial increases in precautionary demand and stockpiling.

We face two conceptually different but factually related problems. The first is unanticipated interruptions in supply of oil, and the second is a prospect of future demand for oil increasingly outrunning available supply.

Interruptions in Oil Supply. Our response to the first of these problems has been a three-fold one. We have decided to create a strategic reserve of petroleum, approximately 1 billion barrels. We have so far achieved about 9% of this ultimate goal, and we hope to resume purchases for the reserve when market conditions permit it. Beyond that, through the Paris-based International Energy Agency (IEA), we have agreed with other major industrial nations to keep commercial stocks of no less than 90 days supply of

Second, we have created in the IEA an emergency sharing mechanism. If oil supplies fall by 7% or more, we will be able to allocate oil on an agreed basis among the 20 member countries of the IEA, thus inhibiting a catch-as-catch-can scramble for oil under circumstances of shortage.

Third, we try to maintain cooperative relationships with the leading oil-producing nations, so that in an emergency they will be well disposed toward increasing their production as much as they can. It is noteworthy that in early 1979 several OPEC countries increased their production sharply in order to compensate for the shortfall in Iranian production.

Imbalance in Oil Supply and Demand. The second problem is the long-run imbalance between prospective demand and supply. Here the task before us is clear: to take all those sensible actions which help reduce our future demand for imported oil. I will not rehearse here all of the elements of the Administration's energy policy, but they include incentives for conservation, stimulus for switching from oil to other forms of energy, and incentives for increased domestic oil production. Moreover, through the IEA and through the various economic summit meetings we have engaged other leading countries in this vital effort. Collectively we have had considerable success, in that the relationship of energy use to total production of goods and services is substantially below pre-1974 relationships. However, much more remains to be done.

Of one thing we can be sure: We cannot consume more oil than is available. The question is not where the extra oil will come from but rather what mechanism of adjustment will be used to cut demand for oil back to available supplies. It can be done through much lower growth, even economic recession, in the oil-consuming countries. It can be done through much higher oil prices, which in addition to discouraging oil consumption will also aggravate inflation and reduce economic growth. Or it can be done through conscious policies designed to conserve oil and thus protect our growth possibilities and inhibit inflation. It is strongly in our interest to take the last course.

Supply of Other Commodities. This discussion of oil raises the question of whether we are equally vulnerable with respect to other commodities that we import from the rest of the world. We rely heavily on imports for our consumption of tin, chromium, cobalt, and a host of other

materials. But none of these has the crucial importance for the economy that oil does. Moreover, the likelihood of interruption is generally less.

The potential for producer cartels and for serious disruption of supply depends on several factors: limited supply relative to demand, limited sources of production, few substitutes (at least in the short run), and essential importance to the industrialized world. All four conditions must be met. Stability of such a cartel depends also on the strength of the producer countries: They must be willing to forego immediate gains, if necessary, in order to take the product off the market and so maintain or raise prices. Many Third World nations, typically dependent on exports of a few primary products, could not long afford to deny themselves crucial foreign exchange.

What we find is that no other commodity besides oil currently has all the attributes just described. Bauxite is both essential and localized in its production, but plentiful, with ample scope for extensive recycling that would become increasingly economic as price increases. Further, many of the exporting countries would find it difficult to forego for even a short time needed foreign exchange earnings. Copper is in both tight supply and essential but production is too diffuse to offer easy cartelization. Tin is both limited in supply and mined in only a few countries but lacks much strategic or industrial importance.

Put somewhat differently, we should have a healthy regard for the power of the market. If commodities become scarce, the resulting increase in price generates investment in mines previously uneconomic, encourages substitution, and leads to greater recycling—the last option does not obtain for oil, a product that is literally consumed in use.

In an effort to guide the market, the United States has supported, where practical, the formation of consumer-producer commodity agreements. These agreements, now in place for tin, sugar, and soon rubber, represent an international effort to reduce risk by moderating price fluctuations and so spur investment in increased supplies. Such agreements should reduce the threat of supply disruption.

Turning from the likelihood of supply disruption, let us consider our vulnerability if one were to occur. Here we find the United States is particularly fortunate relative to most other industrialized nations. Although our import dependence on 12 critical industrial materials, other than fuel, has increased since 1974, it re-

mains modest—less than 20% of consumption. Further, our sources of supply are concentrated in developed countries, with Canada alone supplying one-half our needs. None of these critical materials could have the economic impact that oil has had on our economy. U.S. petroleum imports were \$45 billion in 1977, or 30% of total U.S. imports, as compared to \$1 billion for iron ore, the highest value of any industrial raw material outside the energy field.

We are not wholly insulated from the possibility of supply disruptions, particularly in cobalt and chromium. The disruption in the Zairian province of Shaba illustrated the short-term world dependence on that source of cobalt. However, unexploited cobalt reserves are plentiful in many other nations. Also, within this century, we can look forward to a considerable quantity of cobalt mined from the ocean floor. Chromium is likely to be a longer lasting problem, since over time we are likely to become increasingly dependent on South Africa, Zimbabwe, and the U.S.S.R. Fortunately, however, chromium is not that crucial to U.S. interests, and, further, between our strategic stockpiles and private supplies, we have a 5-year reserve. More generally, our ample strategic stockpiles protect us against supply disruption in the event of a national security emergency.

Looking ahead, we will have to increase the level of investment in minerals worldwide in order to insure adequate supply in the next century. This may become a major problem, as it currently appears we are underinvesting significantly, and we may, therefore, have to adjust to the higher prices that may be required for the needed investment to be undertaken. However, for the foreseeable future, we in the United States need not fear supply disruption that could severely affect our balance of payments or economic growth.

Europe and Japan are far more dependent than we for their raw materials; Europeans import 75% of their critical commodities and the Japanese 90%. This does not mean that our allies will suffer from supply disruption more frequently than we. As I mentioned before, there are major reasons on the production side that mitigate the likelihood of such disruptions. However, we should not underestimate the psychological impact of such overwhelming reliance on imported raw materials. The fear of supply disruption and of producer cartels is significant enough to influence the foreign and economic policies of our allies.

U.S. Trade Policy

by Harry Kopp

*Statement before the Subcommittee on Trade of the House Ways and Means Committee on June 26, 1980. Mr. Kopp is Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs.*¹

We have been operating now for several months in the new environment that was created by the conclusion of the MTN [multilateral trade negotiations], the 1979 Trade Agreements Act, and trade reorganization. It is entirely appropriate that we should take stock to see how we are doing. I hope that from these hearings we can get the kind of support and constructive criticism that we need from the Congress to do our job effectively.

The State Department attaches high priority to trade and commodity policies. We play an active role at all levels of the decisionmaking process here in Washington, and our ambassadors, deputy chiefs of mission, and economic officers are regularly involved in trade and commodity policy issues overseas. We give trade this much attention because of its importance in our foreign relations. It is important in three ways.

Maintaining a Strong Defense

Finally, let me return to the question of national security in the conventional sense—security from physical attack. Our key line of defense here is the vigor of our own economy, including its capacity for technical change, combined with the share of resources we are willing to spend on defense. During the past decade the Soviet Union has spent considerably more on its military forces than has the United States. It is paradoxical that as we become richer, we seem to find greater, not less, difficulty in financing traditional government expenditures, such as national defense. The share of national defense expenditures in our 1979 gross national product was 4.5%, less than one-half of the 9.3% share 20 years ago in 1959, which itself was not an exceptional year in this regard.

More alarming, national defense expenditures in real terms actually fell (after rising in the late 1960s for the Vietnam war) between 1959 and 1979. (It is worth noting here that the other major

Trade and the U.S. Economy

First, trade is increasingly important in the U.S. economy. Exports now represent about 8% of our GNP, as compared with 4% 15 years ago. If we exclude services from GNP, they account for more than 20%. That is a remarkable statistic. One-fifth of the goods that we produce are exported. As for imports, I need not elaborate here on the importance of foreign oil and other raw materials to our economy.

While trade with other countries is increasingly important to us, trade with the United States is even more important for other countries. U.S. trade accounts for about 19% of total world trade. For 42 other countries, the United States is the most important export market. These include not only our neighbors—Canada, Mexico, a number of Central American and Caribbean countries—but also major developed and developing countries in other parts of the world—Japan, the U.K., Korea, Israel, India, Singapore, and the Philippines. Because trade with us is so important for these countries, our trade policies are bound to have a strong effect on our overall political—and even security—relations.

component of what might be called foreign affairs expenditures—foreign economic assistance—also fell in real terms, by about 7%, between 1959 and 1979.) I find it extraordinary that an economy that has doubled in size during this period finds itself unable or unwilling to spend a bit more on its own security or to help friendly developing countries.

More important in today's world than the quantity of goods and services purchased for national defense is their quality, which above all depends on continual scientific and technical advances. Weapons systems, reconnaissance, communications, etc., are all greatly enhanced by improvements in technology. We must continue to provide adequately for basic research in our universities and research institutions. It is this research which lays the foundation both for improved national security and for technological progress in the civilian economy in future years. Our national security in all of the senses I have described depends heavily on it. ■

For many developing countries, trade in raw materials is the principal economic activity and accounts for the bulk of foreign exchange earnings. The United States is both a major producer and consumer of raw materials, and we are dependent on foreign sources for supplies of many critical commodities. As a result of this convergence of resource interests, commodity issues are a dominant element—if not the dominant element—in our relations with certain developing countries—Bolivia, for example, a major tin producer; or Malaysia, the leading rubber and tin producer; and the Ivory Coast, the biggest producer of cocoa.

In the multilateral setting of the United Nations, moreover, developing countries have made commodity issues a major topic on the agenda of the North-South dialogue. In these discussions, the U.S. objective has been to seek international measures, where possible, to improve the functioning of commodity markets for the benefit of producers and consumers alike. The International Rubber Agreement, which the Congress recently approved, is a good example of these efforts. This agreement is intended not to manage the rubber market but to help create more stable conditions under which to undertake investment and assure adequate supply. In short, commodity issues can offer opportunities for international cooperation to improve the open market trading system.

When I stress the importance of trade in our foreign relations, I am not advocating that we make unilateral trade concessions for the sake of political harmony. What I do mean is that as a result of the explosion of trade and investment over the past 35 years, the economic links are often the major element in our bilateral relations. The way in which we deal with problems arising from those economic links can significantly affect the overall relationship.

The world trading system works best when each country promotes and defends its interests in a healthy and vigorous way—but does so in accordance with established rules. Differences are normal. When we meet with our major trading partners for periodic bilateral consultations, the agendas are big, and many of the problems are difficult. As long as we deal with the problems responsibly, recognizing the rights, obligations, and vital interests of all parties, no serious damage will be done to our relations. Sudden measures that do not follow the rules of the game, on the other hand, even when they do

not provoke retaliation, can have a severely negative impact on our broader relations.

Multilateral Trading System

It was 46 years ago this month that Congress adopted a trade agreements act that marked the beginning of this country's commitment to freer trade. Since the end of World War II and the establishment of the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade], every Administration has worked hard to strengthen an open world trading system on a multilateral basis. That system has promoted economic efficiency and growth throughout the world. Trade is now the most dynamic sector of the world economy, growing faster than production.

The multilateral trading system—strengthened by the new codes of conduct negotiated in the MTN—is now under enormous pressure because of developments in the world economy. The oil shock of 1979–80 is proving to be at least as severe as the shock of 1973–74. World payments problems are becoming more intractable. The OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] surplus could be as high as \$120 billion this year. Even countries like West Germany and Japan are facing trade deficits. Our own deficit could be an all-time high. Governments of industrialized countries are mounting export drives to cover their oil bills. At the same time, they are being urged by domestic constituencies to resort to protectionism to protect sectors where imports are a symptom, not a cause, of economic distress. We cannot afford to succumb to a new wave of protectionism. Neither can Europe, Canada, and Japan. The costs—economic and political—would be incalculable.

Rising energy costs and slow growth in the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] are also causing serious problems—perhaps more serious than our own—in developing countries. The oil-importing less developed countries (LDC) as a group are expected to run combined current account deficits on the order of \$60 billion in 1980 and comparable amounts in the years immediately thereafter. They face a major challenge in financing these deficits and servicing their debt. Exports are crucial to the ability of these countries to manage their economic problems without reducing economic growth to socially unacceptable levels. Because of the increasing importance of these

countries to U.S. trade—they are the most rapidly growing markets for U.S. exports—we have an economic, as well as a political, interest in helping them avoid a downward spiral.

Developing Countries

Our objectives toward developing countries are twofold.

- We want to encourage them, particularly the advanced ones, to rationalize and open up their trade regimes. This is good for our exporters and also for their development. What we are seeking is not only more liberal trading structures but also more stable and predictable ones. A more active and constructive participation by these countries in the GATT system of mutual rights and obligations would also serve our own and their interests.

- Recognizing that trade is necessarily a two-way street, we will need to maintain access to our market and continue to give developing countries the opportunity to earn foreign exchange. Obviously, given our own economic slowdown, as well as the substantial MTN liberalization now being implemented, we will not be able to offer substantial new trade benefits over the next few years. Generally speaking, however, access by LDCs to our market is already very good, although some of the products of greatest interest to developing countries are also those of greatest domestic sensitivity for us—for example, textiles and footwear.

These and related questions in the trade area are some of the most important and controversial issues being discussed internationally in various inter-governmental fora, covered by the shorthand term "North-South dialogue." At a time of growing economic difficulties, we can expect LDCs to express their frustrations vocally and to press strongly for changes in the international economic system to their benefit. Where we can, and where it is in our interest to do so, we will respond positively to the concerns of developing countries; at the same time, however, we recognize that some of the proposals advanced by the Group of 77 would, if adopted, undermine the effective functioning of the international trading system. We will continue to insist on an international trading system in which all countries undertake obligations that are consistent with their economic capabilities and needs.

Trade Reorganization

The impact of Reorganization Plan No. 3 on the Department of State has been greatest in the handling of export-promotion activities abroad. The establishment of the Foreign Commercial Service of the United States under the Department of Commerce, and the transfer of positions and responsibilities from State to Commerce in more than 60 overseas posts, has proceeded more smoothly and cooperatively than most observers expected.

The officers and foreign service national employees of the Foreign Commercial Service are responsible for trade promotion and other commercial support activity and share with the officer and foreign service national employees of the Department of State responsibility for monitoring foreign compliance with MTN agreements. The delineation of responsibilities is described in two messages (State 92661 of April 9, 1980, and State 110972 of April 27, 1980) that I am submitting with this statement for the record.

East-West Trade

In the area of East-West trade, the U.S. Trade Representative and the Trade Policy Committee have assumed the functions formerly carried out by the East-West Foreign Trade Board under Section 411 of the Trade Act of 1974. That board had been chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury. The Department of State participates in interagency discussions of East-West trade issues in the Trade Policy Committee system in much the same way it did under the East-West Foreign Trade Board and its working group. With respect to national security controls under the Export Administration Act on the export of militarily significant goods and technology to the Soviet Union, the Department of State participates in the committee, chaired by Commerce, that advises the Secretary of Commerce on the administration of those controls. The Department of State has primary responsibility under the Export Administration Act for U.S. participation in COCOM [Coordinating Committee for East-West Trade Policy], the Coordinating Committee of NATO countries (except Iceland) and Japan that develops and administers multilateral controls on strategic trade with Communist countries.

In the area of investment policy, trade reorganization has brought new responsibilities to the U.S. Trade Representative. The delineation of respon-

Oil-Supply Prospects and U.S. International Energy Policy

Statements by Gerald A. Rosen, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs, and Joseph W. Twinam, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on July 1, 1980.¹

ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROSEN

Oil-supply prospects and U.S. international energy policy are critical subjects. Even though the oil market has eased over the past few months, the long-term outlook gives cause for serious concern. Oil exports from the members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) are unlikely to increase beyond today's level, and competition for that oil is likely to increase. The total amount of imported oil available to the industrial democracies is likely to decline significantly over the next decade. Furthermore, these diminishing supplies could be subject to sudden interruptions or price increases.

Superimposed on all of these potential difficulties is a substantially altered structure in the world oil market. Since 1973 the influence of the major oil companies has declined as their share of

sibilities between the Department of State and the Trade Representative is set forth in a memorandum of October 19, which I submit for the record as an attachment to this statement.

The reorganization also transferred lead responsibility on commodity matters from the State Department to the Trade Representative. As noted earlier, commodity issues form an important element of U.S. relations with developing countries. Consequently, the State Department continues to be heavily engaged in the interagency policy process, as well as in the negotiating phase. The Economic and Business Affairs Bureau of State remains a major source of government expertise on commodity markets and issues.

Finally, I want to reaffirm that my Department has a major stake in trade

OPEC exports has gone from over 90% to about 45%. Oil-producing countries now market directly, in channels outside the majors, almost 13 million barrels per day (mm b/d) compared to only 2.4 million barrels in 1973. Some important implications of these developments are:

- During a period of market tightness, prices are bid up as potential buyers, formerly supplied by the majors as third-party customers, compete against each other for oil now sold directly by producers;
- Some crude-short majors also are forced into the spot market;
- Oil sales may become increasingly politicized as government-to-government deals become more common; and
- The industrialized oil consumers are becoming lower priority customers of OPEC as OPEC's own consumption needs and LDC [less developed countries] oil requirements, frequently met through direct government deals, take precedence over OPEC sales to major oil companies.

To attempt to deal effectively and systematically with these and other troublesome aspects of the energy situation, which confront all nations of the world, the Administration has developed three closely interconnected elements of its international energy policy:

- To cooperate with other industrialized democracies to control oil

policy. We will continue to cooperate with other agencies and with the Congress in defending our interests in the open multilateral trading system. At the same time, our officials at home and overseas will continue to work closely with the business community and with the Department of Commerce to promote American exports. In my view expanding the stake that American industry, labor, and agriculture have in world markets is the key to maintaining the American commitment to an open world trading system—the commitment on which our prosperity, and that of much of the world, depends.

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

consumption, promote development of alternative energy sources, and prepare a common approach to possible oil supply shortfalls or disruptions;

- To work with the OPEC countries to insure that their oil production and pricing policies take account of the world's need for an adequate supply of oil at reasonable prices; and

- To promote the development of energy sources in developing countries to increase global energy supplies and to ease the energy constraint upon these nations' economic growth.

To be successful, our international energy activities must be based on a strong domestic energy policy. Other industrial nations look to the United States for leadership in developing effective domestic policies since they recognize that acting alone they can have no decisive effect on global energy balances. The major oil-producing nations have emphasized that our conservation efforts make it easier for them to contribute to stabilizing energy markets through their price and production policies. Developing nations will be more responsive to our international policies if they see that we are making a maximum effort to develop our own energy resources and to use energy wisely.

I would like to concentrate on the following elements of our policy:

- The production and pricing policies of some of the major oil producers outside the Middle East;
- U.S. international energy policy, with particular emphasis on recent accomplishments at the annual economic summit meetings and in the International Energy Agency; and
- The energy recommendations of the Brandt Commission.

C-Supply Outlook

Last month in Algiers, the OPEC ministers decided to set a price ceiling for "marker" or benchmark crude at \$32 per barrel. They also agreed that surcharges or value differentials of up to \$5 per barrel could be added to reflect differences in quality or location. We do not know how this decision will affect other premiums, such as premiums for new buyers, for incremental volumes, or for exploration rights. The Saudis have indicated they may increase oil prices in the next few months but probably not to the \$32 ceiling, at least initially.

According to press reports, the OPEC long-term strategy committee at

its meeting in May recommended that over the long term, prices should approximate the cost of alternative fuels. To insure advancement toward that target, the committee proposed a price floor adjustment mechanism. This mechanism would adjust oil prices to account for inflation, exchange rate changes, and OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] real growth rates. To sustain these price changes OPEC countries would adjust production as necessary.

Moreover, as OPEC's own oil consumption grows, with production likely to be essentially steady or declining, OPEC oil available for export will necessarily decline. At the same time, the non-OPEC developing nations and the Communist nations are likely to increase their demand for OPEC oil. This means that developed country access to OPEC oil will be reduced. It is, in our view, crucial that this expected decline in oil availability be matched by a reduction in developed countries' demand brought about by our own efforts to conserve energy and switch to alternatives.

If we are unprepared to cope with reduced oil supplies, the result would be a rapid bidding up of world oil prices which would impose tremendous economic costs on us. Any interruption of these reduced supplies—whether by accident or political design—would impose still more serious costs.

I believe it would be useful to indicate why we believe OPEC's exports are unlikely to increase beyond today's level. The Persian Gulf oil producers are the most important in this regard because these are the countries which have the physical capacity to increase oil production substantially. I will, however, defer to Mr. Twinam for an analysis of the oil policies of the Persian Gulf and North African producers and will instead discuss briefly other important oil producers, their likely output levels, their policies, and our influence.

Other Producers

Oil consumers have begun to look with increased interest toward oil producers in other areas of the world because of recent events in the Middle East. I do not propose to cover in detail all of these producers but would like to provide some information on four groups of countries: major non-Middle East OPEC countries, oil-exporting LDCs, the North Sea producers, and China and the Soviet bloc countries.

Non-Middle East OPEC. The largest producers in this group are Indonesia, Nigeria, and Venezuela. Each has limited resources of conventional oil and faces potential production declines. Since these countries have relatively large developing economies which can make good use of oil revenues as a tool for economic growth, they will probably continue oil production at maximum capacity.

Indonesia has recently increased exploration expenditures, reversing the trend of the past few years. Additional oil will no doubt be found (reserves are now 9.5 billion barrels), but the discovery of large fields is unlikely, based on the geology of the country. If there are no major new finds, rapidly increasing domestic demand for oil (12-15% annually) may result in Indonesia becoming a net oil importer by 1990.

In many ways, Nigeria is similar to Indonesia. Output is static at about 2 mm b/d, while proved and probable reserves are only 20-26 billion barrels. While it is likely that more oil can be found, the Nigerian Government has not emphasized exploration and appears to be focusing on the exploitation of other energy sources. One project being considered is to export some 1,500 million cubic feet per day of liquefied natural gas.

Venezuela is another example of a large oil producer facing declining production. Output has declined from 3.7 mm b/d in 1970 to 2.1 mm b/d projected for 1980. Official reserves are less than Nigeria's, requiring Venezuela to intensify its exploration activities or exploit its nonconventional petroleum if it is to sustain output at current levels.

Venezuela has a major source of nonconventional oil in the Orinoco heavy oil belt. Estimates vary widely, but oil-in-place is probably in the range of 750 billion to 3 trillion barrels. Since the recoverability factor could be anywhere from 10% to 25% of oil-in-place, ultimate potential production from these reserves is highly uncertain, ranging from as little as 75 billion barrels to as much as 750 billion barrels (compared to Saudi Arabian reserves of 166 billion). Venezuela has decided on a phased plan for exploration of its heavy oil in order to test out alternative technical processes in commercial-scale pilot projects before deciding what processes to use for subsequent expansion of heavy oil production. The present plan calls for 1 mm b/d output of heavy oil by the year 2000. Limiting factors are Venezuela's

sensitivity to including foreign multinationals, which could help with the technology required and the need for refinery modifications to process the heavy oil.

While the United States has good relations with these countries, our ability to influence their oil production decisions is limited. The primary action we can and have taken is to urge provision of adequate incentives for new exploration.

Oil-Exporting LDCs. The more important of these countries are Mexico, Malaysia, Egypt, and Angola. With the possible exception of Mexico, these countries are likely to continue to produce at full capacity because petroleum revenues are critically important to finance their economic development.

The case of Mexico is somewhat more complicated. Mexican oil production is continuing to grow, and reserves could support a very high level of production. President Lopez Portillo has stated, however, that Mexico will limit its production to domestic needs plus an export level which will provide revenues needed for balanced growth. Mexico is finding that it can absorb a greater quantity of imports than initially anticipated, and if the Mexican Government expands social programs, it would imply an increase in petroleum exports beyond projected levels. There are some in the country, however, who argue that production should be restrained, either to manage resources more conservatively or because they fear ambitious development programs would lead to disastrous inflation. In any event, it is unlikely that long-term production decisions will be made in the next 2 years, before the 1982 presidential election.

The United States, Mexico's largest customer, is receiving about 590,000 b/d of current Mexican exports of 820,000 b/d. Because of the economics of transportation, the United States will continue as Mexico's largest customer, but many countries are vying for Mexican oil, and the Mexican Government has indicated a desire to diversify its sales. Nonetheless, even though the U.S. share is declining, Mexico's accelerating production may lead to an increase in the absolute level of exports to the United States.

The North Sea Producers. Based on current estimates of proven reserves, U.K. oil production should peak at about 2.5 mm b/d in 1985. Production is then expected to decline steadily and could reach about 1 mm b/d by the early 1990s. This suggests that the United Kingdom could

become self-sufficient in oil within the next year and be a net exporter into the late 1980s. These estimates, however, do not take into account future discoveries or development of fields not judged commercial at mid-1979 prices.

Because North Sea crudes are light and sweet, they command top prices along with North African and some Nigerian crudes. Thus far, the United Kingdom has followed prices of comparable OPEC crudes.

There are indications that the U.K. Government is considering restricting depletion rates to stretch out the period of net self-sufficiency. No official announcement has been made, but U.K. Energy Secretary David Howell has publicly indicated that a new policy is being considered, and Labor Party shadow Secretary for Energy David Owen has called for a long-range production policy aimed at self-sufficiency.

Should such a policy evolve, it could mean that the United Kingdom will be producing in the mid-1980s at about 300,000-500,000 b/d less than has been officially projected based on technical consideration. We have urged the United Kingdom to consider allowing production to continue at the maximum efficient rate.

Norway's proven oil and gas reserves as of mid-1979 were estimated at about 11.5 billion barrels of oil equivalent, divided about equally between oil and gas. The Norwegian Government recently reaffirmed its longrun oil and gas production goal of 1.8 mm b/d which could be reached by the mid-1980s. Currently, Norway produces about 600,000 b/d of oil and a slightly smaller amount of gas. Following an export-oriented production policy, Norway exports almost all of its gas as well as 400,000 b/d of oil.

The Norwegian Government is undergoing a comprehensive review of its North Sea production policy in the wake of the recent disaster in which the offshore structure, *Alexander Keilland*, capsized with the loss of 123 lives. Indications are that Norway's longrun oil policies will remain unchanged, but its offshore operations will be more carefully scrutinized. The result is likely to lead to slower exploration, especially north of the 62d parallel, as more stringent safety requirements are imposed on offshore structures and personnel. This northern region, yet unexplored, encompasses 85% of the Norwegian Continental Shelf,

and substantial discoveries could enhance Norway's production possibilities significantly. Although this area appears promising, development will be very costly. Even if commercial discoveries were made, 5-8 years would be required before production could begin.

Norway has not been an oil price leader but has been quick to follow other producers of sweet, light crudes to post top prices. This has evoked criticism from some of Norway's neighbors.

China and the Soviet Bloc. Substantial uncertainty surrounds the petroleum situation in China. Large-scale exploration is just getting underway, and it will be a few years before we have a reasonably accurate picture of China's potential. Present production is about 2 mm b/d. While China may have as much as 80 billion barrels of recoverable oil, the rate of annual increases in output is declining. Growth in output in 1979 was 1.9%, and China is now turning to Western firms for the sophisticated technology needed for offshore exploration and development.

China looks toward petroleum to finance the import of technology and capital goods needed for modernization. It is difficult, however, to judge how much revenue will be needed to support planned growth rates. In any case, sizable increases in exports are not likely before 1985, when results can be expected from activities recently initiated by foreign firms.

The Soviet Union's energy situation is characterized by declining or stagnant oil production, along with an abundance of oil, gas, and coal resources and nuclear energy capability. Their production problems result mainly from managerial and technological difficulties compounded by reserves being located in extremely hostile environments at long distances from energy consumers.

One problem which complicates our assessment of likely Soviet oil production and policies is lack of hard data on Soviet oil reserve estimates and on projected Soviet oil production. The uncertainties are substantial, but it appears that the Soviet bloc might soon shift to a net importer position from its traditional role as an exporter of oil.

Cooperation with Industrial Consumers

Excessive dependence on imported oil clearly threatens the economic health of the industrial nations. In 1979 a relative-

small and temporary interruption of supplies caused a more than doubling of oil prices. Today the United States is receiving about a million barrels a day less oil than a year ago, but U.S. payments for imported oil in 1980 are expected to reach \$90 billion. This import bill will make it harder to master inflation and overcome the current recession.

These problems are likely to grow ever more serious over the coming decade as supplies tighten further. We recognize that the economic strains of the energy crisis have the potential to weaken the mutually reinforcing economic, political, security, and cultural ties which we have built up since World War II with the democracies of Western Europe, Japan, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Many of these nations are more dependent on imported oil than we are. Their vulnerability increases our own vulnerability. We cannot let our energy problems tear down relationships which have taken us years to build. Either, we are determined to find cooperative solutions to our mutual energy problems and by so doing to turn energy into a force which will unify, not divide, us.

Our urgent tasks are to reduce our vulnerability to sudden supply interruptions and price increases and to make an orderly transition to a world economy less dependent on oil. We have been making some progress on these issues in the International Energy Agency (IEA) and at the annual economic summit meetings.

Since 1974, the IEA nations have had an emergency oil-sharing system for us in the event of major disruptions. In 1979, however, we learned that even a relatively small shortfall could, under conditions of uncertainty, lead to sharp increases in the world price of oil, with painful effects on our economies. Since the onset of the Iranian crisis, we have developed a flexible system for responding to oil-market disturbances which are not large enough to trigger the IEA emergency sharing system. In March 1980 the IEA nations agreed to reduce the collective demand for oil on the world market by 2 mm b/d. Although a reduction did not take place fast enough to cool off a steaming oil market right away, our restraint was helpful in slowing down the pace of oil price increases throughout the first half of this year and in encouraging moderate oil producers to maintain responsible production

levels. Without the IEA action, prices would probably have increased even more.

To replace the creative but improvised response to the oil crisis of 1979, the May 1980 IEA meeting at ministerial level established an ongoing system of oil-import yardsticks and ceilings designed to improve our ability to deal with tight oil markets. Under this system, the IEA nations will establish national oil-import "yardsticks" each year. These yardsticks will be based largely on projections of oil requirements. In normal circumstances these yardsticks will be used to monitor each nation's performance in reducing oil imports. If the oil market tightens, the IEA nations will consider converting the yardsticks into politically binding oil-import ceilings. Nations would be expected to use effective energy policy measures to restrain demand for oil to levels compatible with their national ceilings.

The United States and its allies have also made progress toward the longrun goal of reducing imports and thus facilitating the transition of the world economy away from its heavy dependence on oil. At the Tokyo summit last June, we pushed for strong commitments on limiting medium-term oil imports and achieved the following results.

- The United States adopted as a goal 1985 imports not to exceed the 1977 level of 8.5 mm b/d.
- Japan agreed to limit 1985 imports to between 6.3 and 6.9 mm b/d.
- Canada agreed to limit 1985 imports to 0.6 mm b/d or less.
- France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom agreed to limit 1985 imports to the 1978 figure.

At the December 1979 IEA ministerial meeting, all IEA nations adopted national oil import goals for 1985. At the May 1980 IEA ministerial meeting, IEA nations agreed that it would be necessary to undershoot substantially these 1985 goals. The United States and the IEA Secretariat believe that a reduction of 4 mm b/d for the IEA as a group is both necessary and achievable.

At the May 1980 IEA ministerial, IEA nations for the first time established energy objectives for 1990. They agreed to take action to limit the ratio between energy growth and economic growth to 0.6. (Before the oil crisis the ratio had been about 1.0). They also

World Crude Oil Production

(excluding natural gas liquids)

| | 1978 | 1979 |
|--------------------------------|---------------|---------------|
| WORLD | 60,190 | 62,400 |
| Non-Communist countries | 46,425 | 48,370 |
| Developed countries | 12,170 | 12,745 |
| United States | 8,700 | 8,535 |
| Canada | 1,315 | 1,495 |
| United Kingdom | 1,080 | 1,570 |
| Norway | 355 | 405 |
| Other | 720 | 740 |
| Non-OPEC LDCs | 4,455 | 4,915 |
| Mexico | 1,215 | 1,460 |
| Egypt | 485 | 525 |
| Other | 2,755 | 2,930 |
| OPEC | 29,800 | 30,710 |
| Algeria | 1,160 | 1,135 |
| Ecuador | 200 | 215 |
| Gabon | 210 | 205 |
| Indonesia | 1,635 | 1,590 |
| Iran | 5,240 | 3,035 |
| Iraq | 2,560 | 3,435 |
| Kuwait ¹ | 1,895 | 2,215 |
| Libya | 1,985 | 2,065 |
| Neutral Zone ² | 475 | 565 |
| Nigeria | 1,895 | 2,305 |
| Qatar | 485 | 505 |
| Saudi Arabia ¹ | 8,065 | 9,250 |
| United Arab Emirates | 1,830 | 1,835 |
| Abu Dhabi | 1,445 | 1,465 |
| Dubai | 365 | 355 |
| Sharjah | 20 | 15 |
| Venezuela | 2,165 | 2,355 |
| Communist countries | 13,765 | 14,030 |
| U.S.S.R. | 11,215 | 11,470 |
| China | 2,080 | 2,120 |
| Other | 470 | 440 |

¹ Excluding Neutral Zone production, which is shown separately.

² Production is shared equally between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

agreed to reduce the share of total energy requirements supplied by oil from 52% now to 40% by 1990.

These commitments will be strongly reinforced by actions taken at the Venice economic summit meeting. At Venice, the heads of state agreed on specific policy measures that each nation should undertake to insure a substantial reduction in oil use over the decade. They also pledged to make a coordinated and vigorous effort to increase the availability of alternative fuels by the equivalent of 15-20 mm b/d of oil over the next decade. This will require greatly expanded production of coal, nuclear, gas, synthetic fuels, and renewables. The United States intends to do its share. We have made great progress in these areas in recent years; our allies acknowledge and appreciate this. We have reduced our import levels from 8.5 mm b/d in 1977 to less than 7 mm b/d during the first half of this year. Our recent energy policy initiatives will encourage a continuation of this progress in the future.

Several problem areas remain; each nation has room to make some improvement in energy policy. At recent summit and IEA meetings, we have criticized some aspects of the energy policies of our allies; they, in turn, have pointed out areas where they feel we could make improvements. Among the most important areas in which our allies see room for improvement in U.S. policy are gasoline taxes, oil use in electricity generation, and coal exports. Our allies, most of whom impose taxes of \$1-2 per gallon on gasoline, were disappointed by the defeat of the President's gasoline conservation fee. They also attach importance to the Administration proposals to encourage conversion of power plants from oil to coal and to remove obstacles to increased exports of coal.

Our efforts to establish tough objectives and to take steps to achieve them are also valued by oil producers. Many of the Persian Gulf producers are concerned about stretching the productive life of their one significant economic resource and have linked responsible price and production policies to strong efforts in conservation by the industrial nations. The developing nations also support our efforts. They fear that without restraint, our appetite for energy could crowd them out of the world oil market.

Brandt Commission Report

Finally, I would like to take up the ideas on energy proposed in February of this

year by the Brandt Commission report, *North-South: A Program for Survival*. In the report, energy is part of the emergency program for the next 5 years together with the problems of resource transfers, food, and reforms of the international economic system. In fact, the emergency program calls for a major global agreement on these issues, including "an international energy strategy" that would insure "regular supplies of oil, more rigorous conservation, more predictable changes of prices, and more positive measures to develop alternative sources of energy."

The report argues that there is a strong case for an understanding between all producers and consumers, citing the particular impact of sudden rises in petroleum prices on developing countries and the fact that "no country can escape serious disruption if its supplies of oil are drastically reduced." The report calls for an agreement on energy to include: production assurances, special arrangements to insure that poorer developing countries receive adequate supplies of oil, demand restraint commitments, indexed price increases at levels which give incentives for production, guarantees of accessibility and value of financial assets, major investment in energy resource development in developing nations, increased funding for energy research, and broad international access to the fruits of that research.

The United States is interested, in principle, in undertaking constructive discussions between producers and consumers on the future of the oil market. We have made clear our interest in pursuing such talks as recently as the Venice summit, when the summit nations agreed to "welcome a constructive dialogue on energy and related issues between energy producers and consumers in order to improve the coherence of their policies."

Topics mentioned for discussion by industrialized nations or by producing nations include those listed above as well as spare oil production capacity for emergency use and cooperation in industrialization of OPEC countries. Some of these subjects would present formidable legal, political, and economic challenges. In any case, to date, the main producers have declined to enter discussions about oil price and supply and are willing to discuss other aspects of energy only when linked to other development-related international economic issues. Efforts in the United

Nations to initiate discussions solely on energy, such as Mexican President Lopez Portillo's proposal last fall, have not been successful, largely because of the opposition of OPEC countries.

A comprehensive producer-consumer agreement, even if achieved, would be difficult to enforce. To hold down prices in the event of an interruption would require a buffer stock or excess capacity. But a buffer stock of adequate size would be extremely expensive and difficult to build and maintain. Excess capacity, though cheaper than holding stocks, is also very expensive to install and maintain. We could offer to help finance excess capacity, but control of this capacity would effectively rest in the hands of producers. Internal political pressure would make it difficult for OPEC nations to use this capacity to hold down prices if a serious interruption drove spot prices up rapidly. And a producer-consumer agreement would not prevent interruptions arising from political instability, such as in Iran. Any agreement on prices could, therefore, turn out to guarantee a floor price but not prevent excessive price increases. Notwithstanding these potential difficulties, we can endorse the idea of producer-consumer negotiations. We are confident that at least some progress can be made.

We are moving rapidly ahead in some areas which the Brandt Commission highlights. The report makes a strong case for major financial and technical assistance for oil and gas development in non-OPEC Third World countries, estimating that additional capital of roughly \$14 billion annually is needed in the 1980s for these purposes, including \$3.3 billion in official multilateral loans. We are now actively seeking ways to assist in expanding oil and gas production from non-OPEC developing countries. We have made increased assistance for energy development in energy-deficient countries a high priority item in our approach to the upcoming U.N. global negotiations and expect to receive broad support. Furthermore, the Venice summit requested the World Bank to examine the adequacy of the resources and mechanisms now in place for increased conventional and nonconventional energy development in oil-importing developing countries, to investigate ways to improve and expand its lending programs in this area, and to discuss its findings with both industrialized and oil-exporting countries.

The Brandt Commission also stresses industrialized consumer countries' responsibility in energy conservation and calls for "more ambitious targets than those agreed in 1979 at the Tokyo Summit and by the twenty members of the International Energy Agency." We have been moving in this direction. Our recent commitments at the summit and the IEA ministerial indicate that the industrial nations recognize their responsibility and are taking concrete steps to achieve unprecedented reductions in energy consumption within this decade.

Emphasis is also placed on hydroelectric development and on solar energy. We are actively engaged in preparing for the upcoming 1981 U.N. Conference on New and Renewable Sources of Energy which will promote use of both of these resources as well as biomass, wind energy, ocean, geothermal, oil shale and tar sands, peat, and geothermal power.

While the report is clear on the issues of development of oil and gas in developing countries and renewable energy sources, it devotes less attention to coal and nuclear energy. We would emphasize that to the extent that industrialized countries shift to coal and nuclear energy sources, there will be more leeway in international oil markets which would also benefit the oil-importing developing countries. Measures to increase production, trade, and use of coal are receiving high priority both domestically and internationally in the IEA and at recent economic summit meetings.

The Brandt report proposes the establishment of a global energy research center under U.N. auspices to coordinate information and projections and to support research on new energy sources. It is certainly to everyone's advantage to increase international cooperation on energy research. Useful mechanisms for that cooperation exist now in the IEA and in other bilateral and multilateral agreements, and we will give serious attention to other possible means to encourage research which are broadly supported within the international community.

AMBASSADOR TWINAM

I welcome the opportunity to appear before this subcommittee to discuss an issue of profound importance to U.S. strategic and economic interests—the oil

policies of the members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in the Middle East and North Africa and U.S. policies for dealing with our interest in the region's oil resources.

The importance to our country and our allies of a secure flow of Middle East and North African oil at sustainable prices is longstanding, has increased sharply in recent years, and will continue for the foreseeable future. I cannot overemphasize the need to restrain our own dependence upon this faraway resource, and it is significant that the OPEC producers of the region support the Administration's effort to make the United States less dependent upon their oil.

It is clearly in the interest of oil consumers to have good relations with producers. Our relations with the diversity of governments in the North African and Middle Eastern oil states cover the spectrum from excellent to virtually nonexistent. The Western oil industry's loss of control to producer governments, the Arab oil embargo in 1973, and the pressures brought on world oil markets by the Iranian revolution leave no doubt that political factors can profoundly influence the availability of the region's oil and attitudes with which producing governments approach pricing and other energy issues. The quality of our overall relationships with producing governments, involving a range of political and security considerations, determine to a large extent the environment in which we seek their cooperation on energy questions. Relations among the oil producers, including the political dynamics in OPEC, also affect pricing and production decisions. Political considerations will remain an important determinant of the availability of the region's oil, as will, of course, the security of the region.

Increasingly, however, as the region's producers in the last decade have gained full control of their national oil policies, economic considerations have come to play a more complex role in price and production policies. A critical concern in this decade is that the demand for the region's oil is likely to keep pressing against the limits of the producers' willingness to provide it. The issue focuses on OPEC's leading producer, Saudi Arabia, and its gulf neighbors. The demand for their oil exceeds their demand for oil income. As a result, there are strong and intensifying pressures in these countries to conserve the principal source of national wealth.

These governments, however, have strong ties to and interests in both the industrial and the developing worlds. Hence the issue is joined on how narrowly or how broadly they define their economic interests as they make decisions on how to respond to market forces in their oil production and pricing policies.

A central task for our diplomacy in this decade will be to seek a stronger base of common economic purpose with these producers. The task involves a variety of issues:

- Conservation of energy in the United States and other industrial countries;
- Development of alternate energy resources in both the industrial and developing worlds;
- Control of inflation and stability of the dollar;
- The quest for greater international financial cooperation and more effective international economic development; and
- The transfer of technology.

Given reasonably propitious political and security environments for U.S. interests in the Middle East and North Africa, our success in dealing with these economic issues will increasingly help determine the quality of our relations with key producers, our own security and prosperity, and that of the world generally.

Political Factors

The political environment in each of the producer nations and their attitudes toward the United States and other industrial countries clearly have an impact on how each government approaches oil production and price decisions. Over the last quarter century, revolutionary regimes in the region—particularly new ones—have exhibited considerable hostility to Western oil interests, have tended to be confrontational rather than cooperative on economic issues, and generally have been "price hawks."

By contrast, Saudi Arabia and the three gulf emirates in OPEC have maintained close relationships with the United States and the United Kingdom, and our political relations with these monarchies have, except in periods of intense Arab-Israeli hostilities, generally been conducive to a cooperative approach in economic matters, including oil.

A variety of political influences, including a common attachment to preserving the strength of OPEC as a mechanism for setting a price floor, work on the producers as they formulate production and pricing policies and seek OPEC price decisions.

All of the region's producers are influenced by an attachment to Third World causes, although the breadth and degree of commitment varies. The Iraqis increasingly seek a leadership role in this regard and have gone further than other producers in pushing the idea of a two-tier price system for industrial and developing countries. Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Abu Dhabi are leaders in development lending.

Security considerations obviously lie at the heart of the politics and foreign policy of the producers. They produce complex and sometimes contradictory forces. All of the producers feel vulnerable to some degree to outside powers, to Middle East rivals, and to the tensions of domestic change.

This complexity prevents our drawing simple conclusions on how the gulf producers relate political and security concerns to their oil policy. Clearly, however, a strong U.S. global military posture, including an ability to project deterrent strength, is important to a long-term constructive relationship with producers. So is the perception that the United States is alert and firm in checking Soviet designs in the area and is dynamic in its role in a Western alliance with great interests in the Middle East and North Africa. The complexities and contradictions of the security situation and the basic fragility of the region require that the U.S. security role be played out with steadiness of purpose, nuance, and sensitivity to the political environment.

All of the Arab producers have indicated to some degree that in the longer term their attitudes on oil will be affected by their perception of how the international community deals with the Palestinian cause. Revolutionary rhetoric on punitive use of the "Arab oil weapon" is unabated. Among the monarchies there is a growing tendency to use a "carrot" approach, by suggesting more favorable consideration in oil supply in return for greater political support for the Palestinian cause. We cannot rule out that this trend will intensify over time if the Arab producers become increasingly disillusioned with the rate of progress toward Middle East peace. The recent trend toward state-to-state oil ar-

rangements enhances the ability of the Middle East and North African producers to mix politics and oil and lessens the ability of the major oil companies to manage dislocations resulting from destination restrictions.

Political Dynamics of OPEC

Although economic considerations primarily determine producer policies, the impact of political factors on an organization such as OPEC, composed of nation states, is inevitable. Political relations among the diverse members of the organization play some role, as does the motivation to exert leadership within OPEC councils. Thus within the range of options which the market offers, OPEC as an organization is liable to political responses. The perception that consumer nations are banding together in confrontational posture to "break" the cartel tends to elicit a political and more confrontational response from OPEC. The perception that the industrial world is seeking to work with the OPEC countries to expand common economic interests tends to elicit a more cooperative OPEC response toward consumers.

Iran

In the context of this appearance I believe it is not necessary to lay out for the committee the recent state of our relations with Iran, on which there is an extensive public record. For the present the hostage situation prevents normal development of economic and other relations.

With regard to energy, Iran in the past was the one OPEC member that had both large oil reserves and production capacity and also a large appetite for revenues. The intent of the Islamic Republic to reshape Iran's economy toward less dependence on oil, combined with labor and technical difficulties in the oil fields, had resulted in much lower production even before Iran's attempt to charge exceptionally high prices brought its production to present low levels—currently about 1.5 mm b/d. Given the Iranians' recent willingness to forgo exports rather than reduce their high asking price, we must assume that Iran will continue to stress maximizing prices rather than seeking increased revenues through higher export volume.

Algeria

Our relations with Algeria were fully restored in November 1974 and have in

general shown gradual improvement. Political differences on the Middle East peace process and on the Western Sahara have not prevented the development of a cooperative approach on bilateral matters involving mutual economic interests. Currently, however, we and certain European nations are involved in bilateral negotiations with Algeria over the price of Algerian liquefied natural gas. Shipments under the El Paso contract have been suspended pending resolution of this problem.

Our Embassy has had ready access to appropriate Algerian officials, but over the years we have had little influence on Algerian attitudes on oil pricing. Algeria, of course, has been a net borrower, whose development expenditures have regularly exceeded its income. It has maintained oil production at a high percentage of reserves and is currently attempting to increase exploration activity (e.g., through its \$3 per barrel exploration fee), though on terms many companies find onerous.

Libya

Since the Libyan revolution, relations between the United States and Libya have been at best strained. In the aftermath of the attack on our Embassy in December of 1979 and allegations of a worldwide Libyan Government-sponsored intimidation campaign, relations are at a low ebb, and the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli remains temporarily closed. Nonetheless, the United States continues to emphasize the mutual benefits in our economic relations. The United States receives approximately 8% of its imported oil supply from Libya, and U.S. companies and personnel provide much of the vital expertise, manpower, and facilities for the production and distribution of Libyan oil. We have not been able to carry on a meaningful dialogue on energy issues with the Libyan Government.

In spite of its small population, Libya, though maintaining some financial reserves, has generally managed to spend the bulk of its considerable revenues on development, arms, and support for its foreign policy. It has consistently argued for keeping upward pressure on price through adjustment of production. Libya itself has used this method to some extent but has generally produced near its practicable capacity in recent years, desiring to maximize

Secretary Muskie Interviewed on "Face the Nation"

Secretary Muskie was interviewed CBS's "Face the Nation" on September 7, 1980, by George Herman, *S News* (moderator); Robert Pierant, *CBS News*; and Don Oberdorfer, *Washington Post*.¹

Q. Is the new Government of Poland a step toward some kind of civilian suppression of the workers' gains in Poland?

A. Not if one is to take the first elements of the new First Secretary, [Stanislaw] Kania. He has said that he will honor those commitments to the workers. And he, of course, has gotten a very generous endorsement from Mr. Brezhnev so that on the whole, I think the description I read in either the *Times* or the *Post* this morning, describing Kania as a conservative but a pragmatist, suggests that he may give comfort to the Soviets but, at the same time, determine to keep the commitments that he made [Edward Gierak, former First Secretary and Politburo Member of the Polish Communist Party] Gierak made to the workers.

Q. If you think the new Government of Poland is likely to continue to agree to the gains won by the workers in their strikes why bother to change it? Why get rid of Mr. Gierak? In his name disappeared from the streets in the Soviet Union 3 or 4 days before he had the "heart attack." Why get rid of it if you're only going to have someone else who is going to continue with this policy?

A. Of course, in any system of government there comes a time when leaders outwear their welcome or their usefulness. I would suspect that Mr. Gierak had expended a great deal of his political capital not only *vis a vis* the Soviets but also internally, and at that point, maybe his health was such as to preclude a rational explanation for his absence in leadership. I don't have any information to suggest otherwise.

Q. You and others in the Administration were very cautious in what

you said about the Polish strikes while they were going on. And we understand that you privately pointed out to the head of the AFL-CIO, Lane Kirkland, the possible dangers of broad-scale and open American labor movement contributions to the workers. Now, the labor federation has gone ahead. Do you think this is going to complicate the situation over there?

A. That depends, I think, on how it's perceived by the Poles and the Russians and upon its nature. Mr. Fraser [Douglas Fraser, President of the United Automobile Workers] has described it as a humanitarian effort to assist the families of the strikers, and he, in the same breath, indicated that we have to be careful that the problem—basic problem—is left to the Poles and their government. So it's a sensitive and delicate kind of situation. Up to this point, it has not been, yet, a destabilizing factor in the relationships between the Poles and the Russians. I think that if, with this new leadership, both sides within Poland develop a healthy understanding of their new relationship that it will probably last. It's not over by any means.

Q. You are aware, of course, that there was a delegation of Polish bankers and financial experts here this past week asking for agricultural credits. I think that the total they asked for was \$670 million. This is not anything new. They have done it for the past several years, but this is a larger amount of money than they have ever asked for before. And some of our allies reportedly are suggesting that we wait a while before granting those credits and see whether the new Polish Government is going to live up to its promises to the workers. What is the attitude of the Carter Administration about that loan? Are they going to grant it?

A. It's been under consideration in roughly that magnitude before the recent events in Poland. I think we had been considering seriously about \$550

million. The \$650 or \$670 million is somewhat more, but we've had that program with the Poles now for, I think, at least 3 years, and we understand the economic difficulties of Poland.

We've had a long-time economic relationship with Poland, and I think we ought not to indicate that that is doubtful at this point. They are going through a very difficult period, and their economic situation would impose strains upon these new arrangements that they have worked out with their workers; I think that's basically the attitude of our allies as well. I don't think there's been any formal request that we suspend any particular decisions. I think they also understand that there may be need for strengthening the economic ties between ourselves and Poland.

Q. So you're indicating, if I read you correctly, that we are going to go ahead and grant that \$670 million loan.

A. We've not made that decision yet. The other factor in it is that those resources are limited. There are other demands upon them, and it is in that context that we will make the decision.

Q. Is it too early—have you assessed what the meaning of the workers' gains—the licensing, in the sense of free trade unions—whether this means the beginning of a really fundamental change in the satellite countries around the Soviet Union?

A. It could well be. On the other hand, it may be that Poland will be a different sort of arrangement within the Soviet bloc than others. The Poles have had—

Q. Do you think it will be isolated in Poland?

A. The Poles have had a greater degree of religious freedom, for example. They've had greater freedom in dealing with their agricultural problems. One of their problems there is that the average farming unit, for

example, is under 10 acres which makes it inefficient. But nevertheless, there has been very careful treatment of that problem of enlarging those units in order to make the agriculture more efficient.

So there have been a number of ways in which the Poles have been allowed—perhaps because of their history, because of what they are—a greater measure of liberalization than some of the other Eastern bloc countries. That, obviously, has triggered some dissatisfaction—not very visible, I don't think—on their part, but it may, at some point, trigger greater dissatisfaction and lead to pressures for similar liberalizations within their own countries. That is clearly possible.

Q. We have a new government now appointed by the Prime Minister or Premier in Iran being submitted to the Parliament. Do you see signs that this is going, in any immediate future, to forward the question of the hostages and their release?

A. There are signs that they are beginning to think of actually debating the hostage issue. There are signs of increasing awareness on the part of leaders in various factions that the hostage issue ought to be settled in Iran's interests. There are, of course, signs that there will be responses to initiatives taken on our side from Members of Congress, my own letter to the Prime Minister.

Perhaps in other ways, there are signs that also they are listening to urgings—from other sources, other countries—to settle the hostage issue in their own interest. So it may be that as governmental authorities put together that they will begin to debate the issue, consider the terms on which they are willing to resolve it, and we may find ourselves engaged in a debate or dialogue with them on those terms.

Q. One of the initiatives which you referred to a minute ago was the letter from 187 Members of Congress. They are drafting a reply and as published, at least in the Iranian press, the draft reply suggests a kind of congressional inquiry into the past history of Iranian-American relations and into the question of Iran's legitimate claims, as they put it, for redress on the financial side. Some time

ago, you remember, the congressional inquiry was discussed when Congressman [George (Idaho)] Hansen was out there. The Administration, at that time, was very negative about it. Do you have a view now as to whether such a congressional inquiry could be useful in this process?

A. I think it would depend upon its timing and nature as related to the timing for the release of the hostages and other possible terms that might be raised. I think, standing by itself, its value might be lost. I think that when this hostage crisis is over that there will be congressional hearings whether as part of an agreement with the Iranians or not. I can't imagine Congress being insensitive to the usefulness of such an inquiry when it's behind us, but its timing within the timeframe when the question of the release of the hostages is involved has to be very carefully identified.

Q. If the Iranian Parliament, as is now indicated, suggests this to the U.S. Congress as a means of paving the way for the settlement of the hostage problem, do you think it would be a good idea or a bad idea?

A. I think it would depend upon what else is part of that initiative.

Q. You wrote a letter, as you mentioned, to the new Iranian Prime Minister. There have been rumors that in that letter you proposed that you might meet with some representative of their government. Did you, in fact, do that? And what can you tell us about that letter?

A. The letter was consistent with positions that we had taken previously and which were known publicly. That particular subject was not in it. I refer to that only to make it clear that it was not in the letter. But I am not inclined to otherwise characterize the contents of the letter because I think I want to maximize the possibility that the Iranians will respond to that letter on its merits and perhaps initiate a dialogue. It's conceivable that if I were to release the text or characterize it—even though I don't think there are many surprises, if any, in it—that they would regard that as being an affront, and I see no point in risking that.

Q. The last time you were sitting in this chair as a Senator, I think, before you were even invited to become Secretary of State, you said that in the case of American relations with Iran, you would see nothing wrong with admitting things that America had done to Iran because that was part of history, and we might as well admit it; there would be no problem. You were not saying we should take blame or say *mea culpa* but that you saw nothing wrong with admitting American actions to Iran which were part of past history. Is that still your attitude now that you are Secretary of State or—

A. I'm not sure that you have correctly and accurately characterized what I said then, but I remember it quite clearly, and I see nothing wrong with it as I remember it.

Q. You would still be willing to put on the record America's past actions—

A. I think they were part of history.

Q. There have been reports that in order to get the Palestinian autonomy talks going, Prime Minister Begin is willing to forego the move of his office into East Jerusalem. May also release some Palestinian prisoners. Are those reports accurate?

A. I've read the transcript of M. Linowitz' [Ambassador Sol M. Linowitz, Personal Representative of the President for the Middle East Peace Negotiations] press conference yesterday, and his statement is consistent with my own understanding that what he did was discuss all those issues with both Mr. Begin and Mr. Sadat. Out of his conversations with Mr. Begin and members of the Israeli Parliament—the Knesset—he got very strong impressions which he conveyed to Mr. Sadat and also to Mr. Begin about issues that troubled Mr. Sadat. And on that basis and on the basis of the apprehension of both of those statesmen that the situation might be slipping into a time of great threat to peace in the Middle East, they were prompted to move forward. I am not under the impression that there were specific *quid pro quos* discussed.

Q. There were not?

A. Not. There were very strong impressions conveyed to both sides.

Q. Why then would Mr. Sadat have changed his mind and put himself further out on the limb *vis-a-vis* his Arab brethren by agreeing to return to the talks when, in fact, he had said he would not do so unless some of these things did take place?

A. Mr. Linowitz made this point out as clearly as anyone could. First of all, both Mr. Sadat and Mr. Begin took the opportunity in the statement which they jointly agreed to as a commitment to the Camp David process as the only viable road to peace. That's a very strong statement for each of them to make at this point, and especially for Mr. Sadat, given some of the positions that have been raised as a result of the frustrating events of recent weeks and months, but they made it. And the second point they made was that if the process could not continue effectively unless there was an atmosphere of trust and confidence slowly developed between the two countries.

Q. Reports that there have been American and middle European troops during the attempt to subdue the rebellion in Afghanistan, do you know of any confirmation or do you believe in these reports?

A. I recall only the vaguest of rumors with respect to Cuban involvement, and that's not been verified by any information that's come to my attention.

Q. And middle European forces besides the Russians?

A. I've not even heard rumors to that effect.

Q. You're going up to the U.N. General Assembly meeting this fall, and we understand that you're going to meet with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko on, I believe, it is the 25th of this month.

There have been reports that you are going to discuss with Mr. Gromyko the subject that they—the Soviets—are very anxious to discuss and that we have avoided in the recent past; the reduction of nuclear forces in Europe, the theater nuclear forces issue. Is it true? Does that mean that we have decided to go ahead with detente and arms control despite the Soviet presence in Afghanistan?

A. From the beginning we have indicated a desire to discuss theater nuclear weapons limitations with the Russians, and that was the second part of a two-part decision that NATO made last December. NATO decided to deploy the Pershing II missile but, at the very same time, offered to discuss limitations with the Russians.

The Russians delayed for 6 months by imposing a precondition upon discussion, and that is a reversal of the decision to deploy. It was when the Russians dropped that precondition that we agreed to go forward, and they know we have agreed to go forward. It's a question of agreeing on the time and the character of the initial talks which have to be certainly technical and preparatory, and I expect to discuss that with Mr. Gromyko in New York. That may be the only positive development that comes out of that meeting, but is this inconsistent with our policy on Afghanistan? I think not.

I think that both pursuit of arms control and our policies in Afghanistan are designed to impose restraint upon Soviet aggressive intentions. And so they are consistent.

Q. Are you ready to suggest a time as suggested by some news reports for going ahead with these technical preparatory talks, and will it be before November as these reports suggest?

A. I think that's possible. I don't like to try to preempt the question of time from the Soviets, and I don't know what would be convenient for them, but we're willing to go forward as early as possible.

¹ Press release 247. ■

Secretary Muskie's News Conference of September 14

The Senate is considering the Foreign Service Act this afternoon, and I take this opportunity to urge my former colleagues to enact it.

The bill is a response to the mandate of Congress in 1976 for a comprehensive review of the personnel system of the Foreign Service. It is designed to simplify the system and to link advancement more closely with performance. It is also designed to establish a more equitable relationship between the Civil Service and the Foreign Service.

Our diplomatic service is the best in the world. The men and women who run it are capable and dedicated. Increasingly, they serve under difficult or dangerous conditions abroad. The Foreign Service Act is designed to recognize their work and their working conditions and to codify their treatment. It deserves enactment, which I hope it will receive.

The Congress will soon be voting on the President's decision to supply fuel and equipment for India's Tarapur reactors. I have reviewed the arguments carefully on both sides of this issue. I approached that review from the perspective of a committed advocate of nuclear nonproliferation. Our nonproliferation policy is one I helped shape as a Senator and one I support without reservation. I understand and share the seriousness with which the Senate and House view this policy. I am convinced our interests are served by going ahead with the Tarapur shipments.

Indeed, the President based his decision on his own deep commitment to nuclear nonproliferation. We have a responsibility to make our nonproliferation policy work in the real world, to obtain tangible progress, and to gain the cooperation of other nations to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. The heart of the issue is how best to accomplish these objectives.

In 1963 we agreed to provide all the nuclear fuel for the Tarapur reactors. In return, India agreed to use only U.S. fuel in these reactors.

India also agreed to accept international safeguards on the Tarapur fuel and to obtain U.S. consent before transferring the spent fuel to third parties or reprocessing the spent fuel to extract its plutonium.

If the Congress blocks our decision, India might well claim that we have breached the 1963 agreement and that India is, therefore, no longer bound by its nonproliferation commitments. Fuel for Tarapur is available elsewhere. Indeed, in the longer run, the Indians may reprocess the spent fuel and use the resulting plutonium for fuel. I need not remind you that plutonium is a weapons-usable material. The spent fuel is being stored at Tarapur. If it is removed from the agreed upon international safeguards, inspection would be impossible, and a precedent would be set that would strike at the very heart of our efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons.

Other nations which support strong nuclear safeguards have told us they understand the President's decision and our desire to maintain a dialogue with India on this critical issue. And they understand the importance of living up to an existing commitment.

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Act permits the supply of fuel to India. These two shipments fall under a grace period designed to assure that lines of communication remain open with countries which have not yet accepted full-scope safeguards. The Administration's proposal does not contravene the law; it is intended to maintain nonproliferation controls over the Tarapur facility while we seek broader application of the goals of our policy.

Q. On Iran: Do you see any signs of any hope that the hostage crisis is closer to resolution today than last week?

A. I think it is very important to be cautious in our reaction to statements coming out of Iran. We have read them

before. As a matter of fact, we have been reading them over a period of weeks or months. I think it would be a mistake to raise expectations based upon any specific statements which are now the subject of speculation in the press.

Q. The public statement attributed to Ayatollah Khomeini the other day—has that been reflected in any other direct or indirect communications with the United States? In other words, the dropping, apparently, of a condition—for an apology?

A. Different statements coming out of Iran over a period of several weeks have focused upon some combination of the totality of ideas that have been advanced by Iranian spokesmen of one kind or another.

Q. The Saudi Report reports that the Administration authorized a study by the Rand Corporation of security implications of Israel's giving up the West Bank and that it concluded Israel's security would not be hurt if it yielded the West Bank. I'm not even aware of such a report, so if there is one, I wonder if you would tell about and tell us about your feelings?

A. And, while you are at it, U.S. officials over the last several weeks have been quoted as saying that they thought the internationalization of Jerusalem might not be a bad idea, and I wondered if you thought it was a good idea or a bad idea?

A. With respect to the first part of your question, I'm not aware of the report—that doesn't mean it doesn't exist. Secondly, it has been our policy to characterize the ultimate decision with respect to Jerusalem beyond saying that our position is supportive of an undivided Jerusalem, open to all religions. And for us to go beyond that formulation, at this point, I think, would have the effect of being perceived as having the effect of undertaking to prejudice the outcome of the negotiations.

Q. Against the background of your opening remark warning against raising expectations, I wonder how you can reconcile that with what President Carter has said today, "statements by Iranian authorities"—if I am quoting it precisely—"might very well lead to a resolution of the hostage question in the future." And another report says "in the near future."

How do you reconcile what the President has said against your own warning about building expectations? And, secondly, what can you tell us about whatever negotiations, or whatever the President is hinting at, to avert the possibility that what the President has said will be seen by many as Presidential politicking?

A. I have no reason to conclude that the President is hinting at anything. I think his statement is perfectly consistent with statements I've made, pointing out that we have been looking to as many channels of communication as we could find—private and governmental—over the last several months, with the view to ultimately establishing official contact that might lead to negotiations. It is our constant hope that one or more of these channels might hold promise for the kind of result that the President suggested this morning.

Q. Shortly after you took office, you spoke about the possibility of economic incentives to encourage Iran to release the hostages. Would the United States, if there is a satisfactory conclusion of the hostage crisis and they come home safely, be willing to consider economic aid to Iran to address what you have described many times as "the real problems that confront the nation"?

A. What I have had reference to in the past is the fact that in my judgment—and I think this is borne out by the events in Iran in the last 4 months—it is in Iran's economic self-interest, as well as in our political self-interest and in the interest of the normalization of relations with its normal trading partners, to get the hostage problem behind it.

In that sense it has an economic dimension. Precisely what may be the ultimate

basis for the release of the hostages is something I don't think could be advanced by public discussion.

Q. Would you be willing, for example, to consider either a partial lifting of the sanctions against Iran or unfreezing of some of the Iranian assets prior to the actual release of all the hostages?

A. To answer your question would be to appear to be opening a negotiation process publicly. I don't think that's the way to advance the objective.

Q. You're not ruling it out?

A. I'm not ruling it out or ruling it in.

Q. A week ago you made public the text of a letter to the new Iranian Prime Minister asking for the opening of direct channels of communication. Have you received any reply from him, either directly or indirectly?

A. I have received the oral reply in the sense that he read the letter to an audience in Iran. I look forward to a written reply, although I have had no clear signal on that.

Q. There is a report today that the State Department has been negotiating for the last 3 months on some document with former Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh. This creates the impression that there have been some very active negotiations going on. Is that accurate?

A. That story is inaccurate.

Q. On Poland: Can you tell us whether you believe that the recent labor troubles and the drive for freedom in that country is over and the Soviet Union has decided not to intervene, or whether this infectious disease of freedom is liable to spread further and be a continuing problem for the Soviet Union?

A. Obviously, the questions you've raised are questions we all speculate about, without really knowing the hard answers. I think that the Soviet attitude toward developments in Poland will emerge over time. The fact that they've received Polish representatives since

those agreements were concluded and that the result has been some step up in Soviet economic assistance suggests that the Soviets are going to be supportive with respect to the economic problems that may have been generated.

Beyond that we can only speculate. I would like to believe that the workers in Poland have achieved an important gain to themselves and that it will prove to be a constructive contribution to their national life.

Q. Ronald Reagan said over the weekend that he felt we should accept three of the Ayatollah's demands—unfreezing the assets, dropping claims, and promising not to intervene. Can you go that far?

A. It was useful to have that guidance. [Laughter.]

Q. Do you endorse his guidance? Do you agree with his guidance?

A. Again, they are questions the answer to which would imply that we are in some kind of negotiating posture, which I think would be premature. I think it may represent an overreaction to the news coming out of Iran, and I just found it useful in these past few months to be as cautious in public reaction to developments in Iran as possible.

Q. Could you say whether it is helpful or not helpful for statements such as this to be made by a person who is seeking the Presidency in a few weeks?

A. Well, I don't find it unhelpful.

Q. Did you meet with the liaison board of hostages' wives when they met here about a week or 10 days ago, and did they show their letter to you before they sent it?

A. Yes. We've been in touch.

Q. Did you promise them, at that time, any part of the assets of Iran for the hostages or their families?

A. No. That question was not discussed.

Q. Last week the President announced commodities aid to Poland. Is any other aid possible under the existing laws should the Poles request it?

Are you studying the matter? Do you have any thoughts on what else the United States could provide?

A. Resources, as I think those of you who attend these conferences regularly know, are very limited at the present time because of the failure of Congress to enact a foreign aid appropriations bill in fiscal year 1980 and the generally negative climate on Capitol Hill to such programs. If the Poles decide to place their problem before us and to seek our assistance, we certainly will consider their request. But I must say at the moment our resources are limited except for the CCC [Commodity Credit Corporation] grants that we approved. And, incidentally, those were approved at a higher level than we've ever approved before.

Q. There seems to be a slight difference in the mood, at least, of what you have said here and what President Carter said earlier today. Let me ask the question in a slightly different way. The President was quoted as saying: "They are making statements"—meaning people in Iran—"that might very well lead to the resolution of this problem in the near future." Do you agree with that statement by the President?

A. I could, I think, if my memory were precise enough, identify maybe a half dozen statements that have been made by one Iranian leader or another over the last month which might very well lead. But that isn't, I don't think, phraseology to suggest either optimism or pessimism. It's a rather obvious conclusion. It might, but the reverse is also true: It might not.

Q. Would you recommend a trilateral meeting among the Egyptians, the Israelis, and Americans while Ali [Egyptian Foreign Minister Kamal Hassan Ali] and Shamir [Israeli Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir] are in Washington this week?

A. Would I recommend what?

Q. Trilateral talks among the Americans, the Israelis, and the Egyptians this week in Washington. And what, in your opinion, can be the outcome of such talks?

A. We would hope that the bilateral talks, with which the present initiative will begin, will lead to trilateral talks and

then to the formal reopening of negotiations somewhat later. The pace of that movement, I think, will depend upon the first talks, then the second talks, and then the third. I don't think it would be particularly helpful for me to identify which talks ought to then lead to the trilaterals. That's part of the objective.

Q. At the World Energy Conference meeting in Munich that just concluded, European and Third World leaders were extremely critical of Administration policy toward nuclear energy, saying that it had foreign policy implications, that the Carter Administration's explicit stand against aggressive nuclear energy development in this country and around the world had implications that went very far. The people who made these statements included Chancellor Schmidt.

Are they wrong to see the Administration's policy toward nuclear energy as reflecting a broader antigrowth policy of this Administration? That is, do you disagree with their charges, or will you try to convince Europe of your policies?

And, secondly, because the Third World leaders made a very direct connection between the antigrowth policies of this Administration and the deterioration of the situation in the Third World, I'd like to ask you, at this point, what the United States is going to recommend or what we will vote on in terms of the seating of Pol Pot at the United Nations?

A. Number one, with respect to the Nonproliferation Treaty and the meeting which is just concluded, may I point out the positive side of that. The meeting concluded with all parties in support of the Nonproliferation Treaty and its objectives, including the United States.

When you referred to our antigrowth policy, I'm not sure whether you were referring to anti-nonproliferation policy or anti-economic growth policy. Economic growth was not involved in negotiations on the Nonproliferation Treaty.

With respect to some of the issues that were discussed in the treaty—and there were a number of them—some of them were raised for the purpose of advancing the cause of nonproliferation; some of them I would describe as being

more political in motivation. But, in any case, it was not possible, after an extensive effort, to reach agreement. Opposition did not stem only from the United States; there were opponents to some of the specific proposals from other sources. I regret that more was not done. We made an effort, and we made a last-minute effort, to try to move the conference toward a declaration which all nations could join.

With respect to the concern of the non-nuclear states that the major powers had not moved as they committed themselves to move in the Nonproliferation Treaty toward a comprehensive test ban and toward the reduction of nuclear arms, I sympathize altogether with their concern that we haven't moved in those directions. We know that, in our country, the SALT II Treaty has not been advanced and is awaiting ratification suggests that we, perhaps, are not as committed as we ought to be to the objective of the Nonproliferation Treaty. I can only assure those who are interested in knowing that that is this Administration's commitment as soon as it is feasible.

I'm not sure what you meant with your nongrowth question, so maybe you'll get another chance.

Q. Is the United States now in the early stages of a negotiation with Iran to seek the release of the hostages?

A. No.

Q. We're not yet there? Because for so many months, it had been stated here that you were looking for the formation of an Iranian Government with which you could then negotiate.

A. Let me say this: After the fact, one is able to identify the roots of a negotiating process which may have been laid, say, 2 months ago prior to this date. I have not yet recognized it as such. I mean, when we have a number of channels opened and are trying to communicate messages of one kind or another, one never knows when one of those suggestions takes root and blossoms out into the kind of contact that results in negotiations. But that link has not yet been made.

The question that was raised earlier about a 3-month negotiation having been underway seems to have originated in one of those indirect channels that, from

somebody's perception, looked like a negotiation. Well, it was not.

Q. The Speaker of the Iranian Parliament is quoted as saying that it is now America's turn, "... if it has the good will vis-a-vis the hostages, to prove its sincerity in action." Does the United States now believe that there is any action that it could take to advance the cause of getting the hostages released?

A. I think action to get the hostages released involves mutuality. Unilateral action is not likely to do it. We learned something of that earlier this year.

Q. I have several questions that flow from your opening statement with regard to the Indian reactor Tarapur. Before I get to those, though, the question that was left on the table back here was about Pol Pot, whether you have made up your mind yet what to do about that? I'd like to just pose that to you.

A. And regarding the Indian matter, give the Indians told the United States that they will take any of the actions that you suggest they might take if the United States does not ship the fuel—that is to say, abandon the safeguards previously agreed to, reprocess the fuel which is available, and so on? Does your statement that they might do so tend to legitimize the possibility that they could take some action if Congress does not agree to ship the fuel? And what would the U.S. position be if Congress refuses to do as you and the President suggest, and the Indians then think about abandoning the agreement they made in 1963?

A. First, "if they abandon the treaty," your question presupposes that they would have abandoned it first, so the word "abandonment," with respect to India's response to such abandonment on our part, I don't think is a very fair definition of the proposition.

With respect to what the Indians might do, they have not uttered any threats, but the Indian options which the 1963 agreement foreclosed are clear. And if the agreement is no longer binding on them, it is surely a fair assumption that they might consider it no longer binding on them. And if it is no longer binding on them, then the specific provisions to

which my statement refers could well be aborted; we ought to assume that.

The opponents of the shipments make speculative arguments about Indian behavior or performance, but the argument I make is not a speculative one. I'm making an argument based on a very simple proposition: If one party to an agreement abandons it, the other party surely is free not to feel bound by it.

With respect to the Kampuchean credentials question, anticipating that I might just conceivably be asked this question, I have the following statement to make.

In the event that the credentials of the Democratic Kampuchean regime are challenged at the U.N. General Assembly, the United States will again vote to support the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) position in favor of the continued seating of that regime.

Our decision on this question was reached after careful consultation with our friends and allies, particularly those Southeast Asian countries most concerned about the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. We support the ASEAN position on the grounds that the Democratic Kampuchean regime has been seated by all General Assemblies since 1975, and there still is no superior claimant for the seat.

The seating of the current regime in Phnom Penh, the Heng Samrin administration, which was installed and is maintained by 200,000 Vietnamese troops, would indicate international acceptance of a government imposed by foreign aggression in violation of the U.N. Charter.

This decision is also based on our conclusion, based on careful diplomatic soundings, that Vietnam has not shown a willingness to negotiate concerning the central issues of the Kampuchean question—the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea—and self-determination for the Khmer as called for by the U.N. General Assembly last year.

Our position on the U.N. credentials issue is consistent with our objective of working actively with the ASEAN nations and with all U.N. member states to seek a permanent settlement in Cambodia which satisfies the aspirations of the Khmer people as well as the interests of all countries in the region.

This position, on the technical question of U.N. credentials, in no way im-

plies any support or recognition of the Democratic Kampuchean regime. We abhor and condemn the regime's human rights record and would never support its return to power in Phnom Penh. Our policy is to work for the termination of all forms of foreign intervention in Cambodia and for the emergence of a genuinely neutral government in Phnom Penh.

Our position on this issue cannot and will not restore the Democratic Kampuchean regime to power, but our vote can prevent legitimization of a government installed by aggression and maintained by the presence of an invading army.

Q. On Vietnam: Is it correct to assume that, in the light of the latest statement as well as other pronouncements earlier, a precondition for any progress in normalization or negotiations with Vietnam is withdrawal from Kampuchea, or is there any other linked issue which would first have to be resolved before you can progress in the normalization process with Vietnam which was begun sometime ago?

A. We think the objective, consistent with the position of the ASEAN countries, is a political settlement in Kampuchea; the terms of that settlement, obviously, must emerge out of negotiations which the Vietnamese have been unwilling to undertake.

Q. We probably will not see you before you see Foreign Minister Gromyko. Could you tell us what you expect to accomplish out of that meeting? And is there a disagreement now with the Soviet Union over whether forward-based systems are a fit agenda item in TNF [theater nuclear forces] negotiations, and what are the prospects for those negotiations getting started, either before or after November?

A. It's a short timeframe, at best. It seems longer to some than to others.

With respect to my meeting with Mr. Gromyko on the TNF issue, I would expect that we would reach agreement on the time for beginning the talks on that subject, a place, the date—and my staff urge me not to use this word, but I will just to indicate that I'm slowly becoming a diplomat—the modalities of the meeting. So I would expect that we will reach agreement on those points.

With respect to what each side would be free to discuss in those talks, I think it is premature to anticipate what that may be. And the difference of view that you expressed in your question, I presume, would be a part of that discussion.

Q. Can you conceive of any basis for improving relations with the Soviet Union without negotiations beginning with the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan?

A. I think that is critical, as it has been from the beginning and will continue to be.

Q. Do you have any reason to believe that Foreign Minister Gromyko will bring any willingness to begin such negotiations to New York?

A. If I had a positive response to that, I would be standing here with much greater enthusiasm than I am.

Q. You're not saying that we're unwilling to talk to the Soviets in face-to-face negotiations about theater nuclear forces in Europe until their troops are out of Afghanistan, are you?

A. No. I was talking about Afghanistan.

Q. But he was saying can you envision improved relations with the Soviets unless they make some progress—beyond TNF, can you envisage—

A. One never knows when one is in a trap. [Laughter.] Number one, we did not, in our Afghanistan policy, undertake—and you've heard this phraseology before—to dismantle the framework of East-West relations which includes arms control, arms control talks, and arms control agreements. We've made it clear that we are still going to press for ratification of SALT II when it is feasible, and that's still our commitment.

With respect to TNF, we and our NATO allies last December linked two things: one, the deployment of Pershing II missiles in Europe; and two, the beginning of talks on theater nuclear weapons. When the Soviets dropped their precondition about a reversal of the decision on deployment of the weapons and indicated a willingness to talk without that precondition, we responded, and we are willing to go forward with those talks.

We don't think that is inconsistent with our policy toward the Soviet Union's unacceptable action in Afghanistan. Indeed, the objective of our policy there as well as the objective of our arms control policy is Soviet restraint, and both policies work to that end.

Q. You mentioned earlier that you thought SALT should be ratified when it's feasible. I think the question is when it would ever be feasible so long as the Soviets are in Afghanistan. A group, including former Ambassador [George] Kennan, have published documents and letters urging that the Administration take up, or push for, the SALT Treaty even as early as the special session in November. Others have said the first thing next year.

Do you think it would be helpful, feeling the way toward feasibility, if President Carter, in this campaign, made SALT a major issue so that you could, in effect, have a plebiscite of the popular will on this question?

A. That's exactly our objective.

Q. What?

A. To develop the issue in this campaign in such a way that the American people can come to grips with the issues and, hopefully, create a constituency for SALT II ratification. There are a couple of points involved: number one, the one you very appropriately raised—the question that this is a Presidential campaign and it's highly appropriate that an issue of this magnitude be discussed in it.

Mr. Reagan's position is opposed to SALT II. The President's is clearly supportive of SALT II, and debate between the two conceivably could help bring that issue to the fore and give the public the benefit of both points of view.

Secondly, there is, among the military and I suspect among thoughtful citizens, a growing apprehension about the prospect of a SALT-free world, or a SALT-less world, and what that can mean in terms of our security interests, in terms of budgetary burdens, the cost of an arms race. And as those perceptions grow, I would expect the constituency for SALT II may grow.

What the odds are that that would happen is a question that one may legitimately raise. But I am simply indicating that so far as I'm concerned—and I have the full support of the President with respect to my role in this debate—I hope to press it and hope to change the climate of public opinion with respect to SALT.

Q. Is it possible to have a vote this November, do you think?

A. There are problems not necessarily associated with the SALT II issues. I gather that the postelection scenario for the Congress is likely to be limited to about 30 days—November 15 to December 15. I don't know whether that is fixed or are just dates that I've heard tossed around. That timeframe is going to be pretty much filled with budgetary issues and appropriations bills, and the time that may be necessary to really debate SALT II would not be available in that period. I would not exclude anything at this point; it just doesn't seem likely at this point.

Q. Could we close this off with a footnote question? What is the significance of that yellow ribbon in your lapel?

A. It says "Free the Hostages."

Q. Can we draw anything from that?

A. This is a very useful reminder that was prepared by the committee representing the hostage families and presented to me just this last week with a kiss on both cheeks as a reminder to me. I wear it every day, and it is a daily reminder to me that this is the first order of business.

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revenue through both volume and price. Even recent cutbacks appear influenced by technical factors, as new discoveries have lagged and reserves are declining.

Iraq

Iraq broke diplomatic relations with the United States during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Since 1972, when Interests Sections were opened in Baghdad and Washington, we have maintained sustained but limited contact with the Iraqi Government. Over the past several years, the United States has made known on a number of occasions its willingness to normalize relations. Although Iraq has not precluded this possibility sometime in the future, it has indicated it does not believe the present is the appropriate time. Thus the United States is limited in its ability to carry on an economic dialogue with Baghdad at present, but the U.S. private sector is playing an increasing role in Iraq's economic development.

With the sharp price increases of 1979-80, Iraq has become a new member of the surplus-revenue club. Iraq has carefully kept development spending within limits of absorptive capacity and is expected to continue to do so. Nevertheless, spending on development and arms has been high and until recently has not lagged far behind revenues. Since early 1979, however, Iraq's foreign exchange reserves have grown rapidly and are now believed to stand at well over \$20 billion. Spending will continue to grow but not so rapidly as revenue unless the market permits Iraq to trim production without setting off further price increases. Iraq has generally produced near capacity and has plans to continue increasing capacity and exploring for new reserves. It is increasing bilateral assistance to developing countries, in part to further its desire for a leadership role in the nonaligned movement. Recently Iraq has taken a more moderate attitude toward prices.

Saudi Arabia

For over a third of a century, the United States has maintained a deep interest in the territorial integrity and security of Saudi Arabia and has worked to develop broad, strong ties with that country. This Administration has worked intensely to further this longstanding policy. Our relationship with Saudi Arabia has weathered periods of great tensions in U.S.-Arab relations and has progressed steadily.

The contribution that we make to Saudi and regional security is one of the important elements in this relationship. The Saudis look to us to be a dependable supplier of military equipment and training to enhance the Kingdom's own defense capability, and they recognize the key importance of U.S. global power in maintaining a strategic balance which deters outside intervention in the region.

As Saudi wealth and influence have grown, we have increasingly worked closely with the Saudi Government in efforts to bolster other countries in Africa and Asia where our two governments perceive a common interest in security and orderly development and a need to help reduce regional tensions.

Another major element in our relationship has been the ability of the United States, as a power with influence in both Israel and the Arab world, to make a unique contribution in the long quest for a just, comprehensive, and durable peace in the Middle East. The Saudis have come to share our basic objectives in this regard. They have not supported the Camp David approach, and disagreement on how best to pursue the negotiations has caused some strain in our relations. Nevertheless, we remain in close consultation. The Saudis have continued to urge more rapid progress in the peace process, while we seek Saudi understanding of our negotiating effort and eventual Saudi support for it.

In recent years our economic ties with Saudi Arabia have expanded significantly. The U.S.-Saudi Joint Economic Commission has become an effective vehicle for the transfer of American technology to assist Saudi development, while our private sector continues to play a leading role in this regard. This year about 37% of our total exports to the Middle East and North Africa are going to Saudi Arabia. As Saudi Arabia has become an international financial power, its role as investor and development lender has expanded tremendously as has the need for close consultations between our two governments on international financial and development issues.

In this Administration our sustained diplomatic exchanges on the wide range of issues of common interest with Saudi Arabia have been reinforced by a process of frequent presidential and Cabinet-level communications and contacts. Crown Prince Fahd's Washington visit in the spring of 1977, the President's visit to Saudi Arabia in January 1978, and King Khalid's visit to the White House in November 1978 have been

highlights of a sustained exchange, which on the economic side has included exchanges of visits between the Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of Energy, and the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs and their Saudi counterparts.

Saudi Arabia has, in recent years, maintained oil production at levels providing income well in excess of its domestic development needs. Since last summer Saudi Arabia has produced 9.5 mm b/d of oil (9.8 mm b/d counting its share of production from the partitioned zone between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait), a million barrels daily above its preferred production level.

Saudi oil reserves would permit expansion of sustainable production capacity significantly above present levels, but many Saudis question whether there is sufficient economic incentive to make the investment required to increase production. The Saudi Government has, in recent years, embarked on ambitious economic and social development programs. Much of the physical infrastructure of a modern society is now in place, and the absorptive limits of the economy have been revealed. Industrial prospects, except in the petrochemical area, are limited. There are strong social pressures for slower development, which in view of recent price increases suggests slower growth in expenditures and even more rapid accumulation of financial surpluses than in the past. Some Saudi officials argue that oil in the ground is a better investment than financial assets acquired with surplus revenue. It has become increasingly difficult for policymakers to justify, in terms of narrowly defined economic self-interest, continued production well in excess of domestic income requirements.

The growing conservationist trend in Saudi Arabia has been balanced by concern for the welfare of the international economy. In addition to its significant role as a lender to poorer countries, Saudi Arabia has an increasing stake in the international economy and financial system. There is no question that the government approaches oil production and price decisions with concern for the impact of its decisions on the stability of financial markets, the state of the dollar, and the impact on inflation and growth rates in the industrial countries—from which most of their imports come—and in developing countries. The importance Saudi Arabia attaches to these broader economic interests and concerns, involv-

ing the health of the international economy, is evidenced by the choices it has made in its own production and pricing policy and the role it has played in OPEC in working for a more orderly evolution of oil prices. Saudi Arabia's legitimate and continuing concern with balancing its narrower and broader economic interests will continue to play a central role in its choices on oil production and prices.

Gulf Emirates

The gulf states were important to U.S. economic interests and private American presence was significant there well before Kuwait achieved full independence in 1961 and before the independence of Qatar and the formation of the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) in 1971. In the era of full independence, it has been U.S. policy to develop close relations with these three states and their gulf neighbors and to pursue the expansion of mutual interests across a range of issues, while remaining in close consultations with the United Kingdom, which has long shared our basic interests in this region. Our general policy approach toward the gulf states, and the general course of our relationships, has been consistent with our longstanding and more developed relationship with Saudi Arabia, and we welcome and seek to encourage the commitment of Saudi Arabia and its gulf neighbors to close cooperation in the interest of the region's security and sound development.

The Iranian revolution and the intensified Soviet pressure against the region, manifested in the invasion of Afghanistan and the close Soviet relationship with South Yemen, have, of course, prompted careful and sustained review of our policy toward the gulf states and of how we best can contribute to the region's security and progress. We seek to strengthen our relations with the gulf states across the economic, political, cultural, and security spectrums. We have increased U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean and are in the process of developing an improved capability to project deterrent force toward the region.

Over a number of years we have developed security assistance relationships with Kuwait and the other emirates and continue to make appropriate U.S. military equipment and training available to help these small states develop a reasonable defense

capability. We remain in close diplomatic contact with them on a variety of political issues of importance to the region, particularly our quest for a comprehensive Middle East peace. Kuwait, Qatar, and the U.A.E. share our goal of a peaceful settlement although they do not support the Camp David approach.

On the economic side we maintain important commercial ties with Kuwait, the U.A.E., and Qatar and have supplemented, when requested, the substantial exchange of private sector technology with U.S. Government experts in areas of interest to these countries' development programs. We keep in close diplomatic contact on energy and economic issues, including the significant role these states play as constructive international investors and generous development lenders. In this Administration this dialogue has been supported by visits of former Secretary of the Treasury [W. Michael] Blumenthal, Secretary of the Treasury [G. William] Miller, and Under Secretary of State [Richard N.] Cooper to both Kuwait and the U.A.E.

The oil policies of these three states differ notably. Qatar is a relatively minor producer of oil (500,000-550,000 b/d). Although it has vast reserves of non-oil-associated natural gas, which it is now making plans to exploit, its oil reserves are limited, and production is expected to decline slightly over the decade. Qatar's production has tended to move up to capacity as the market tightens and to fall off slightly as the market eases.

The U.A.E.'s production and pricing policy involves essentially the same considerations as that of Saudi Arabia. On one hand there is concern for conserving its primary resource and avoiding too great a surplus in revenues and a broader concern, reflecting its stake in the international economy, for helping to maintain the health of that economy by contributing to orderly oil markets. The U.A.E. has generally supported Saudi positions on price restraint, although in recent months its price has been above the Saudi level. The U.A.E., too, has been a substantial lender and investor. The U.A.E. has also contributed to world energy supplies and domestic economic development through fostering exports of liquefied petroleum gas and liquefied natural gas.

Recent nuances in the oil policy of Kuwait may be a guide to future tendencies in other producing countries. Kuwait's new production level of 1.5 mm b/d (1.8 mm b/d counting its share of the

partitioned zone) represents a long-heralded decision to cut back production in response to conservationist pressure, and hence this level may remain firm for some time to come. This level of production provides sufficient associated natural gas and natural gas liquids to supply Kuwait's liquefied petroleum gas plant at the desired level and to meet domestic needs. It also provides oil revenues more than sufficient to finance Kuwait's domestic development, welfare and security needs; its foreign aid; and its extensive and sophisticated investment programs. If it maintains a fixed production policy, Kuwait will, in effect, have opted out of any ongoing efforts to influence prices through production policy. In the past Kuwait has at times asserted that oil policy is a "commercial" rather than "political" issue, and its new approach seems to reflect a more aggressive commercial thrust to marketing. Kuwait's oil policymakers reportedly are focusing attention downstream and overseas—on controlling the destinations of their crude and using access to their fixed supply as an instrument to gain access to promising investments abroad in exploration, refining, and petrochemicals.

Conclusion

The implications of the foregoing discussions are clear and unsurprising. The OPEC countries that desire greater revenues have little or no flexibility to raise production. Those that have this flexibility in production capacity, and sufficient reserves to expand capacity, currently receive a surfeit of oil revenues. Thus, as noted at the beginning of this statement, the issue focuses on OPEC's leading producer, Saudi Arabia, and its gulf neighbors: Kuwait, the U.A.E., and, increasingly, Iraq. These countries can easily support or raise oil prices by trimming production. They can ease upward price pressure by producing more, though their ability to restrain prices in this manner is limited, as the past year shows. In a tight market, they can increase their revenues by producing less oil, and as prices increase so do surplus revenues and pressures for lower production.

In the case of the three monarchical states, these facts, plus their concerns for and stake in the international economy, add up to conflicting economic interests. In each of them many argue that oil production should be reduced to maximize unit revenue and to stretch

Export Restrictions on the U.S.S.R.

by Richard N. Cooper

*Statement before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs on August 20, 1980. Mr. Cooper is Under Secretary for Economic Affairs.*¹

I am happy to have the opportunity to appear before this committee. As you have requested, I will review Soviet actions in Afghanistan and the responses that the United States and its allies have taken to this aggression. I would like to begin with a brief status report on the current level of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan.

Almost 8 months have passed since Soviet forces invaded the nonaligned nation of Afghanistan in December 1979. Since that time the U.S.S.R. has increased the level of its occupation forces in an effort to quell the nationwide resistance of the Afghan people. The Soviet aggression has caused great suffering for the people of Afghanistan. It has resulted in over 1 million Afghans—about 7% of the total population—seeking refuge outside their country. Fierce resistance to the Soviet occupation continues. The U.S.S.R. has failed in its efforts to establish effective control over the country. Its attempts to obtain recognition for the puppet regime headed by Babrak Karmal have been rebuffed by the overwhelming majority of the international community.

production levels. The continuing willingness of surplus-revenue producers to commit substantial amounts of their oil income to foreign aid will also be an important factor, and the ability of the industrial nations to draw them more closely into the development assistance community will influence this. Perhaps more critical will be the perception of the surplus producers of the benefits or lack thereof of investment of their surplus earnings in the industrial world. This involves not only questions of freedom and security of investment but also the issues of inflation, stability of financial markets, and particularly the strength of the dollar.

In the perception of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the U.A.E., a stable market

The United States continues to regard the Soviet action as a blatant violation of the rules of international conduct and a serious threat to world peace. The presence of Soviet forces in Afghanistan continues to pose a threat to other countries of Southwest Asia and to our own interests in the region.

The United States had to respond vigorously to this provocative Soviet step. Failure on our part to react would only encourage new adventures and risk miscalculation. Also, failure to react would have baffled and distressed many countries in the area and would have undermined our position there and elsewhere. Our policy has been to take a number of firm and highly visible steps which express our feelings to the Soviets in the clearest possible manner. We intend to continue to do what we can to convince the U.S.S.R. to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan and to reduce the possibility that they will be tempted to undertake similar adventures in the future.

I would now like to describe the actions we have taken.

Militarily we have accelerated our efforts to increase our strategic capabilities, including plans for the establishment of a rapid deployment force sufficiently large and mobile to deter possible Soviet aggression in critical areas such as the Middle East. We have increased our naval presence in the In-

for Middle East oil in the industrial world is preferable to ever-increasing demand. They fear that future gaps between supply and demand can lead to dangerous international tensions. The heart of this way of looking at things is that consumers' excessive dependence on Persian Gulf oil endangers both sides. In this situation the producer's responsibility is to make possible a reasonably smooth transition to less dependence; the consumer's is to achieve that transition as quickly as possible.

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

dian Ocean and are rapidly proceeding with plans to expand our facilities in Diego Garcia.

We have concluded agreements with friendly governments in the area which will increase their capacity to resist Soviet pressure. Some of these agreements will provide us access to facilities that will significantly improve our ability to respond quickly and effectively to provocative actions.

Our response has not occurred in a vacuum. On the diplomatic front we have worked closely with our allies and with other nations concerned by the invasion. No action by a major power has been more quickly or universally condemned, as votes in the United Nations, the European Community, the Islamic conference, and numerous other international bodies testify. Any hopes Moscow may have had that the international community would shrug off the invasion have been shattered.

We boycotted the Moscow Olympics and helped to persuade 59 other

countries to take similar action. Countries joining in the boycott included major sports powers such as West Germany, Japan, Canada, and the People's Republic of China. Many participating teams were diluted by individual and federation decisions not to attend. The sweep of medals by the Warsaw Pact countries illustrates the extent to which outstanding Olympic teams from all continents supported the boycott.

Economically we took a number of measures in areas intended to result in substantial costs and disruptions for the U.S.S.R. These included restrictions on exports of grain and other agricultural commodities, phosphates, goods for the Olympics, and high technology items. It is, of course, obvious that any interference with trade would involve costs for the exporting country as well as for the importing country. But under the circumstances it was inappropriate to maintain business as usual.

Some of our actions were clearly

punitive in character and intention—designed to get the Soviets to take notice of the strong negative reaction of the United States and other countries. Other actions were a longer term response to a new situation. The Soviet invasion makes it most important that the United States and its allies bolster the countries of Southwest Asia, especially Turkey and Pakistan, and increase the capability of our military forces in the region. We must also reassess the strategic significance of our exports to the U.S.S.R. In this context we have proposed tightening the application of COCOM [Coordinating Committee for East-West Trade Policy] procedures and suggested that COCOM consult on all major process know-how sales of potential military significance.

We believe that our actions have demonstrated to the Soviets that they cannot engage in aggressive actions with impunity. The United States has shown that it is willing to assume a leadership role among our allies and make sacrifices when we are provoked. This demonstration of our readiness to react will help deter future Soviet aggression.

In formulating our response we chose specific measures such as the restrictions on the export of grain and high technology which would impose tangible costs upon the Soviets. We have deliberately avoided sweeping measures such as a total trade embargo. We do not seek a return to the cold war. We wish to leave the door open for rebuilding our economic relations if the Soviet Union withdraws from Afghanistan.

Grain

The partial grain embargo announced by President Carter on January 4 stopped 17 million tons in U.S. grain shipments to the Soviet Union. This action limited exports during the fourth year of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. grains agreement (October 1979-September 1980) to the 8 million tons to which we were committed by that agreement. To compensate for a disastrous harvest, the Soviets had expected to import about 36 million tons, including 25 million tons from the United States. The President also prohibited sales of soybeans and of other agricultural commodities which would contribute to the Soviet livestock sector.

We estimate that, because of our action, grain imports by the Soviets

Secretary Meets With German Foreign Minister

JOINT PRESS STATEMENT,
AUG. 26, 1980

Secretary of State Muskie and Foreign Minister Genscher of the Federal Republic of Germany met on August 26 to continue consultations on matters of importance to their two countries. They agreed that these consultations are particularly useful and necessary at the present time.

Developments in Poland occupied an important part of their talks. They agreed that the issues there are for the Polish people and the Polish Government to settle and that all outside parties should exercise the greatest restraint. Minister Genscher informed the American Government about the considerations which have led the Federal Government to adjourn the meeting between the German Federal Chancellor and the President of the State Council of the G.D.R. [German Democratic Republic], although the will to develop relations with the G.D.R. continues.

Secretary of State Muskie and Minister Genscher reiterated their condemnation of the Soviet aggression in Afghanistan and called once again for withdrawal of Soviet troops. With respect to this objective, they consider it

necessary to continue to pursue coordinated policies of their countries within the framework of the Atlantic alliance.

They exchanged views on the current state of disarmament negotiations. They underscored the importance of the alliance decision of December 1979 on theater nuclear forces (TNF) and discussed the preparations for preliminary exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union on TNF which, in their view, are expected to occur at an early date.

They discussed the prospects for the Madrid Review Conference of CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] and agreed on the importance of thorough preparations and constructive work to insure a balanced outcome which contributes to East-West cooperation.

The present status of the North-South dialogue and the situation at the 11th U.N. special General Assembly were also discussed.

In conclusion the Secretary of State and the Minister agreed that they should take every possible opportunity to continue these consultations which both countries believe are of great value to them and to the purposes of the NATO alliance. ■

will be about 8-9 million metric tons less than they had planned for the year ending September 30. This means that by October the Soviets will have made only about half of the 17 million metric tons we stopped from the United States. Our actions have forced the Soviets to rely on an unpredictable variety of feed grains and substitutes arriving on an irregular schedule. As a result of our restrictions, and their poor harvest, we expect Soviet meat production in 1980 to drop by 200,000-300,000 tons or 1%-2% below the 1979 level. By January 1981 livestock inventories may be down 2%-3%. Even though the Soviets will have an improved grain crop this year—we now estimate an average harvest of between 200-225 million tons—the continuation of the embargo will curtail Soviet ability to rebuild depleted grain stocks and will make its impact felt on the livestock sector for several years to come. The availability of meat is a very sensitive internal issue in the U.S.S.R. and is considered by Soviet consumers to be one of the most important measuring sticks in gauging improvements in their standard of living. Despite Soviet Government promises of a steady increase, per capita consumption has not risen during the past 5 years. Our partial grains embargo has made it still more difficult for the Soviet leadership to fulfill promises of significant increases in meat availability to Soviet consumers. Reports have been growing of severe meat and dairy product shortages. News reports attributed work stoppages in May at auto and truck plants in the Soviet Union to food shortages.

In addition to its effects on the Soviet economy, the partial grains embargo has proved to be a successful example of allied cooperation in response to the invasion of Afghanistan. Canada, Australia, and the European Community all imposed restraints on their sales to the U.S.S.R., despite serious opposition by some segments of their populations. Australia and the European Community recently agreed to hold 1980-81 grain sales to the U.S.S.R. to the 1979-80 level, while Canada will limit sales to "normal and conditional" levels. Argentina's exports increased to 5.1 million metric tons in 1979-80, as compared to 1.3 million tons in 1978-79. Argentina has agreed to supply the Soviets with 4.5 million metric tons of coarse grains and soybeans under the terms of a recently concluded 5-year agreement. But Argentine sales have not been large

enough to offset restraints imposed by the United States and other exporters.

Phosphates

In February we blocked exports to the U.S.S.R. of U.S. origin phosphates, whether in the form of rock, acid, or fertilizer. The phosphate embargo stopped annual U.S. shipments to the U.S.S.R. of about 1 million tons of superphosphoric acid as part of a major 20-year trade agreement. Inability to obtain this phosphoric acid will delay and disrupt Soviet plans to produce a complex liquid fertilizer, since there is no alternative supply for this quantity of superphosphoric acid. Utilization of lower grades of phosphoric acid or conventional phosphatic fertilizers, either from Soviet or foreign sources, could reduce the impact of our embargo. It is too early to see what effect this restriction will have on future Soviet grain output.

High Technology

In January, in the area of high technology, we suspended issuance of new licenses and shipments to the Soviet Union under old licenses, pending the development of a new licensing policy. The most important element of the new policy, which was announced on March 19, is generally to approve no exceptions from agreed COCOM controls on exports to the U.S.S.R. The result of our virtually no-exceptions policy is to cut off U.S. high technology exports to the U.S.S.R. which, for 1979, were valued at \$50 million, in large part related to computers. We also increased controls on computers, polycrystalline silicon, lasers, and fiber optics and stopped shipments of spare parts for a computer and of a diesel engine assembly line for the Kama River truck plant.

We tabled proposals in COCOM in March to multilateralize tighter controls on high technology. COCOM review of these proposals has not yet been completed.

The actions we have taken in the area of high-technology transfer have had their impact on the Soviets. They will disrupt Soviet programs. They have also introduced serious uncertainties into the Soviet planning process at a time when the next 5-year plan is in the final stages of elaboration.

Fish

An additional economic measure we have taken has been to withhold from the Soviets the allocation of approximately 300 million tons of fish in the U.S. fishery zone during 1980. This amounts to roughly 5% of the Soviet annual catch, which will be difficult to replace because of worldwide scarcities.

Essential Elements

Where do we go from here? We believe it is essential that we and our allies maintain pressure on the Soviets to let them know they cannot selectively carry out a policy of reduced tensions in one sphere, beneficial to them, while they commit naked acts of aggression in another. We will continue to insist upon a satisfactory political resolution of the crisis which the Soviets have created through their intervention in Afghanistan. As Secretary Muskie noted last month, we believe that a political settlement must contain four essential elements:

- A prompt and complete withdrawal of all Soviet forces;
- Nonintervention in Afghan affairs by any outside state;
- A government acceptable to the Afghan people; and
- An independent and nonaligned Afghanistan.

Until the Soviets make it clear that they are prepared to move in this direction we cannot relax our efforts.

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Trident I Missile Sale to the U.K.

Following are an exchange of letters between British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and President Carter and a White House statement.¹

EXCHANGE OF LETTERS²

10 July 1980

Dear Mr. President,

As you are aware the United Kingdom Government attaches great importance to the maintenance of a nuclear deterrent capability. It will be necessary to replace the present Polaris force in the early 1990s, and having reviewed the options, the Government has concluded that the Trident I weapon system best meets the need to maintain a viable nuclear deterrent capability into the 21st century. I write therefore to ask you whether the United States Government would be prepared, in continuation of the cooperation which has existed between our Governments in this field since the Polaris Sales Agreement of 6 April 1963, to supply on a continuing basis, Trident I missiles, equipment and supporting services, in a manner generally similar to that in which Polaris was supplied.

The United Kingdom Government would wish to purchase sufficient missiles, complete with multiple independently targettable re-entry vehicles and less only the warheads themselves, together with equipment and supporting services, on a continuing basis to introduce and maintain a force of 4 British submarines (or 5 if the United Kingdom Government so prefer), close coordination being maintained between the Executive Agencies of the two Governments in order to assure compatibility of equipment.

The successor to the Polaris force will be assigned to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, like the Polaris force; and except where the United Kingdom Government may decide that supreme national interests are at stake, the successor force will be used for the purposes of international defence of the Western alliance in all circumstances. It is my understanding that cooperation in the modernisation of the United Kingdom nuclear deterrent in this way would be consistent with the present and prospective international obligations of both parties.

In particular, I would like to assure you that the United Kingdom Government continues to give whole-hearted support to the NATO Long-Term Defence Programme

and to other strengthening of conventional forces. The United Kingdom Government has substantially increased its defence spending, in accordance with NATO's collective policy, and plans to make further such increases in the future in order to improve the effectiveness of its all-round contribution to Allied deterrence and defence. In this regard the objective of the United Kingdom Government is to take advantage of the economies made possible by the cooperation of the United States in making the Trident I missile system available in order to reinforce its efforts to upgrade its conventional forces.

If the United States Government is prepared to meet this request, I hope that as the next step the United States Government will be prepared to receive technical and financial missions to pursue these matters, using the framework of the Polaris Sales Agreement where appropriate.

Yours sincerely

MARGARET THATCHER

July 14, 1980

Dear Madame Prime Minister:

In reply to your letter of July 10, 1980, I am pleased to confirm that the United States attaches significant importance to the nuclear deterrent capability of the United Kingdom and to close cooperation between our two Governments in maintaining and modernizing that capability. To further that objective, the United States is prepared to supply the United Kingdom TRIDENT I missiles, equipment and supporting services, as you propose in your letter, subject to and in accordance with applicable United States laws and procedures.

I view as important your statements that the POLARIS successor force will be assigned to NATO and that your objective is to take advantage of the economies made possible by our nuclear cooperation to reinforce your efforts to upgrade the United Kingdom's conventional forces. As you know, I regard the strengthening of NATO's conventional and nuclear forces as of highest priority for Western security.

I agree that as the next step in implementing these agreed arrangements, our two Governments should initiate the technical and financial negotiations which you propose.

Sincerely,

JIMMY CARTER

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, JULY 15, 1980

Today in London, the British Government is informing the House of Commons of its decision to modernize the British strategic nuclear deterrent force. In this connection, the British Government has requested that the United States sell the United Kingdom U.S. Trident I missiles. The Trident I missiles would be carried in new submarines built in Britain and would replace the existing British Polaris sea-based strategic missile force in the early 1990s. This request was formally conveyed in a letter from Prime Minister Thatcher to the President on July 10, 1980. In a letter sent to the Prime Minister yesterday, the President agreed that the United States will sell Trident I missiles to the United Kingdom.

Since the Second World War, the United States has cooperated intimately with the United Kingdom on nuclear matters. In President Roosevelt's Administration, American and British scientists began working together on the development of nuclear weapons. In 1962 at Nassau, President Kennedy agreed to assist the British in the development of their strategic nuclear forces by selling Polaris missiles to the United Kingdom.

Today's announcement of Anglo-American cooperation on a modernized British Trident missile force signals a continuation of this longstanding cooperation, which is a central element in the close cooperation between the United States and the United Kingdom. This cooperation is, of course, not limited to the nuclear field and includes a strong U.K. conventional commitment to NATO, which Britain also intends to strengthen.

The Administration believes the independent British strategic nuclear force which is assigned to NATO makes an important contribution to the ability of the North Atlantic alliance to deter Soviet aggression. For this reason, the President decided to assist the United Kingdom in the maintenance of a modernized, independent British deterrent force into the 21st century.

This joint step by the United States and United Kingdom is part of

he broader pattern of efforts by this Administration and our allies in Europe to strengthen NATO defense capabilities—3% real growth in defense budgets, the NATO Long-Term Defense Program, and the NATO decision to modernize theater nuclear forces. It is a sign of our determination to strengthen close cooperation with our allies on sensitive security matters.

¹Texts from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of July 21, 1980.

²Texts of the letters were released by the White House on July 15. ■

10th Report on Cyprus

MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, JULY 22, 1980¹

In accordance with the provisions of Public Law 95-384, I am submitting the following report on progress made during the past 60 days toward conclusion of a negotiated solution of the Cyprus problem.

The intercommunal talks remain recessed despite persistent efforts by UN Secretary General Waldheim and his staff to bring the two parties back to the conference table. Ambassador Hugo Cobbi, the new Special Representative of the Secretary General, arrived in Cyprus in May and immediately began working with the two sides in an effort to overcome the remaining difficulties. As the UN efforts intensified, the Secretary General also dispatched Under Secretary General Perez de Cuellar to Cyprus. Mr. Perez de Cuellar presented the two parties with a compromise formula under which they might resume the intercommunal talks. Early on June 7, the Greek Cypriots informed the Under Secretary General that they would accept the proposal. Later that day, the Turkish Cypriots told Mr. Perez de Cuellar that they had given the UN formula serious consideration but felt unable to accept it.

It is encouraging to note, however, that the Perez de Cuellar mission succeeded in narrowing somewhat the gap between the positions of the two parties, and Ambassador Cobbi is continuing to consult with the two sides in an attempt to reach a compromise. The Secretary General's June 13 statement to the Security Council on Mr. Perez de Cuellar's mission is attached.

I am pleased to report that the United Nations Security Council voted on June 13 to extend the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP) for another six months. The calm that prevails on the island today is due to the professionalism and dedication of the men of UNFICYP. Without the stability provided by the peacekeeping troops, there would be little hope for eventually achieving a negotiated Cyprus settlement. (The Secretary General's report to the Security Council on UNFICYP is also attached.)

Secretary of State Muskie recently returned from Ankara where he discussed the Cyprus problem with Turkish Prime Minister Demirel. In a productive exchange of views, Secretary Muskie stressed the continuing interest of the United States in seeing the Cyprus dispute resolved. During his meeting with the Turkish Prime Minister as well as in his discussions with Greek Foreign Minister Mitsotakis, the Secretary of State reaffirmed our faith in Secretary General Waldheim's efforts as the best hope for achieving an early resumption of the intercommunal talks.

Other members of the Executive Branch have also been active in support of the Secretary General's efforts. On June 23, for example, while in Athens, Under Secretary of State Nimetz took the opportunity offered by the presence of Cyprus Foreign Minister Rolandis to arrange an informal but useful meeting on the Cyprus problem.

The United States Government will continue to use every opportunity to emphasize to all concerned parties that cooperation with the efforts of UN Secretary General Waldheim offers the best chance for a resumption of the intercommunal talks. The Secretary General has pledged to persevere in his mission, and the two parties on Cyprus have renewed their commitment to reach a negotiated settlement. The roots of the Cyprus problem are deep, and a solution will not easily be found. I am convinced, however, that if the two communities on Cyprus are seriously committed to resolve their differences, a settlement will eventually be achieved. I urge both sides to return to the negotiating table and begin the process of searching for a just and lasting solution that will meet the needs of all people of Cyprus.

Sincerely,

JIMMY CARTER

¹Identical letters addressed to Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of Representatives, and Frank Church, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of July 28, 1980). ■

Poland

SECRETARY'S STATEMENT, AUG. 22, 1980¹

We are concerned about the situation in Poland. It is a key European country with which we have had good relations for a number of years. It is also a country to which 12 million Americans are linked by family ties. We have stressed repeatedly our view that internal problems in Poland are for the Polish people and the Polish authorities to resolve.

We are watching developments closely. We are concerned to hear of the arrest of a number of Polish dissidents, and we hope they will be released soon. We continue to hope that a solution will be found to the current problems in Poland which meets the wishes and interests of the Polish people.

¹Read to news correspondents, on the Secretary's behalf, by acting Department spokesman David Passage. ■

Granting Political Asylum Abroad

by William T. Lake

Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on April 29, 1980. Mr. Lake is Deputy Legal Adviser.¹

I am pleased to appear on behalf of the Department of State this morning to discuss the U.S. policy with respect to granting asylum in U.S. diplomatic premises abroad. I will summarize that policy briefly and then explain the considerations, both legal and practical, that underlie it. Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, William C. Harrop will then describe the events following the recent coup in Liberia that led up to the executions of a number of former Liberian Government officials [July 1980 BULLETIN, p. 18].

U.S. policy in this area is set forth in regulations in the Department of State's Foreign Affairs Manual and was published in full in the *Federal Register* in 1972. We have provided those documents to the committee.

Chief Elements of the Policy

First, the United States does not grant asylum at its embassies or at other installations within the territorial jurisdiction of a foreign state. Likewise, diplomatic and consular affairs officers are not authorized to extend asylum to persons who are not members of the officers' official or personal households. Any request for asylum that is received in the field must be reported immediately to Washington, but the policy is not to grant such requests.

At the same time, U.S. embassies are authorized to grant temporary refuge for humanitarian reasons in extreme or exceptional circumstances when the life or safety of a person is put in immediate danger, such as pursuit by a mob.

Any decision to grant temporary refuge must be made by the senior U.S. official present at the embassy, who must take into consideration the possibility that that decision may pose a danger to the safety of U.S. personnel. When the period of active danger to the individual has ended, temporary refuge is to be terminated after the embassy obtains authorization from the Department.

It is important to add that if a violent coup or similar event disrupts the normal processes of the host govern-

ment and creates a danger that it may deal unfairly and summarily with some of its citizens, we do bring to bear all possible diplomatic and consular resources to try to assure that those individuals receive due process. The chief weapon on which an embassy must rely in such a situation is the power of persuasion.

The policy I have just outlined was reexamined and reaffirmed in 1977 following a study prepared for the National Security Council on the Latin American practice of granting diplomatic asylum. A year later, in 1978, the policy was again carefully reviewed, following incidents with a group of dissidents at our embassy in Bucharest and with the Pentecostals in Moscow. It was concluded that the present policy is the proper one.

The United States has adhered to its policy of not granting asylum throughout the many violent coups and changes of government of the past decade. To the best of my knowledge, the case of Cardinal Mindszenty,² dating from 1956 to 1971, and the continuing accommodation of the Pentecostals in Moscow, a situation in no way involving a change of government, are the only arguably contrary examples in recent history. I cannot provide you with statistics on past instances in which diplomatic asylum was actually requested and refused. This is next to impossible because of limitations on the storage of records at the State Department plus the difficulty in actual practice of distinguishing between an alien's inquiry into the possibility of territorial asylum, that is, asylum within the United States, and an inquiry about potential diplomatic asylum in the embassy. The chief of our asylum unit estimates, however, that each year our posts abroad receive up to 150 requests for asylum, either territorial or diplomatic.

U.S. policy in this area comports with the practice of most other states. Other states generally do not follow a practice, or assert a right, to use their diplomatic premises in this country or elsewhere as places of asylum. The most notable exception is the somewhat erratic practice of Latin American countries in allowing their embassies in other Latin American countries to provide asylum to political refugees. Even in Latin America the practice of granting diplomatic asylum has not been consistent over the years or from country

to country, and the practice has not gained acceptance outside Latin America.

Reasons for Declining Asylum

The reasons for the U.S. practice of declining to grant diplomatic asylum are both legal and practical.

- On the legal side, our embassies abroad exist to perform diplomatic functions, and they receive special protections from international law to allow them to perform those functions. The granting of asylum is not recognized as a diplomatic function under customary international law or the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, to which both the United States and Liberia are parties.

To use our embassies as havens for asylum of nationals of the host country might invite charges that we are violating article 41 of the Vienna convention, which prohibits diplomatic personnel from interfering in the internal affairs of the host country and from using embassy premises in any way that's incompatible with the functions of the embassy.

- There are also compelling practical considerations. First, if we were to grant diplomatic asylum and the host country refused to permit safe conduct of the persons out of the country, the embassy would be faced with the dilemma of either accommodating the persons within the embassy for an indefinite period of time or else turning them over to the authorities.

The publicized example of Cardinal Mindszenty illustrates the dangers in this area.

Second, the residence within an embassy of persons hostile to the government of the host country would constitute a continual source of friction and controversy and would be extremely detrimental to our normal diplomatic relations. In fact, the possibility that mobs—either with or without government approval—would, however unlawfully, storm the embassy to capture such persons cannot be discounted, particularly, in light of recent events in Tehran, Tripoli, and Islamabad.

Third, since diplomatic asylum could never be granted in more than a few cases, the United States would be placed in the difficult position not only of having to deny most requests for asylum but also of having to justify granting asylum in some cases and denying it in others.

Review of Human Rights in Latin America

by Patricia M. Derian

Address prepared for presentation to the Center for Inter-American Relations in New York on April 24, 1980. Ms. Derian is Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs.

I am glad that you have chosen to discuss human rights in the Latin American context. It is both relevant and important. A popular theme we often hear in these first few months of 1980 is how some objective, product, or issue relates to the decade of the 1980s. This theme is particularly appropriate to describe concern for human rights, which I can firmly state has come of age and will continue to be a priority issue as we move through this period, not only in our country but worldwide.

Concern for the individual's right to enjoy civil, political, and economic freedoms are fundamental principles which we hold in common with many governments in this hemisphere. More importantly, they are principles with which the peoples of the Americas identify.

President Carter reaffirmed this government's deep commitment to

In recent years, we have, on a number of occasions, explained to Members of the Congress our policy against diplomatic asylum. In just the last 2 years, letters on the subject were sent to Senator [Edward] Kennedy, to Congressman [J. Kennedy] Robinson, to Congressman [Andrew] Maguire, and to Congressman [Dante] Fascell. And we, of course, welcome this occasion to discuss the policy with the members of this committee. We continue to believe that our policy is the proper one, that it conforms with our obligations under international law, and that it serves the long-term interests of the United States.

¹ The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

² Jozsef Mindszenty, Hungarian prelate and Cardinal of the Roman Catholic Church who spent 15 years living in the U.S. Embassy in Budapest. ■

human rights and to meeting human needs in his State of the Union address on January 23 when he stated that it "... is in our own national interest as well as part of our own national character." Secretary Vance, in a statement to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on March 27, noted that "... we pursue our human rights objectives not only because they are right but because we have a stake in the stability that comes when people can express their hopes and find their futures freely. Our ideals and our interests coincide."

Is it compatible with national security interests? Of course. It has always been understood that human rights policy operates in tandem with our pursuit of other interests. Secretary Vance addressed this point in the same statement mentioned earlier. He said that:

We must constantly weigh how best to encourage the advancement of human rights while maintaining our ability to conduct essential business with governments—even unpopular ones—in countries where we have important security interests.

But the fact remains that over the longer term, our pursuit of human rights is not only generally compatible with our national security, it contributes to that security.

There is much evidence to support the emergence of human rights as a major priority in our hemisphere. We have seen substantial progress regarding both personal and political rights, significant actions by both governments and international bodies, and more precise attention given to serious problems which still need alleviating.

In 1979 Ecuador and Bolivia installed civilian governments; Bolivia averted renewed efforts to install a military government. Peru adopted a new Constitution. Brazil maintained a steady course of liberalization. There was a decline in violations of the integrity of the person in countries where abuses have been most serious. Fewer disappearances occurred in Argentina. Cases of prolonged arbitrary detention were down in Chile. The Uruguayan Armed Forces adopted apparently effective internal measures to stop the use of torture. Cuba released about 3,900 political prisoners. But, as we have recently seen in the sad situation of thousands of Cubans seeking asylum

There is reason to believe that if the United States began a policy of granting diplomatic asylum, our embassies abroad could quickly become the preferred sanctuaries. In any country, the U.S. embassy generally has a special prominence which would attract persons seeking refuge. The claims of asylum would force us to distinguish among an almost limitless variety of factual situations—persons seeking asylum primarily as a means of acquiring U.S. visas, persons seeking to avoid ordinary criminal charges, and persons with various types of real political grievances.

We would need procedures and facilities for dealing with possibly large numbers of cases, particularly in the event of major, violent change in a government. The need to decide who is entitled to diplomatic asylum would thrust the United States directly into political judgments concerning events in the country involved.

Thus, a policy of allowing diplomatic asylum would expose us to charges of interference in internal affairs and would complicate greatly our emerging relations with new regimes—whether left, right, or center.

A final and important consideration is how the United States would respond if the situation were reversed—that is, if a foreign embassy in this country sought to give diplomatic asylum to persons sought by U.S. authorities. We might, for example, be faced with a situation in which a foreign embassy offered diplomatic asylum to political exiles. We do not believe that the U.S. Government—or the American people—would tolerate such action by a foreign government.

Conclusion

Finally, I would like to stress again the important function that a U.S. embassy can play in a country, such as Liberia, which is going through violent change. The role that our embassies are expected to play is to provide a calming and steadying influence on a new government, to remind it as often and as carefully as necessary that it has obligations to its citizens and to the international community and that the world is watching to see that it respects those obligations. That diplomatic role can be extremely important at such critical moments, and we should be loath to take steps that, although intended to protect human rights, might actually diminish the role our diplomats can play in protecting those rights.

in the Peruvian Embassy in Havana, people are still voting with their feet to flee from the Cuban model of life. Honduras has just held its first national election in almost a decade.

The American Convention on Human Rights, which entered into force in 1978, established an Inter-American Court on Human Rights. The Court has begun to meet at its permanent site in San Jose, Costa Rica. The American convention strengthened the role of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IAHRC), and the General Assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS) in its October 1979 meeting approved new statutes for both bodies. The IAHRC has undertaken five on-site investigations during the past 2 years, including a landmark visit to Argentina in 1979. The IAHRC has just released a report on human rights in Argentina, based, in part, on its on-site observations. The report confirms the findings of many human rights organizations that systematic and massive violations of human rights have occurred during the past 5 years, notes that the scale of abuses has declined in recent months, and makes numerous constructive recommendations to the Argentine Government for needed improvements.

The October 1979 OAS General Assembly devoted much attention to human rights issues. It approved resolutions urging reforms in Paraguay, Uruguay, and Chile and emphasized the need to deal with the problem of disappearances.

The U.N. Human Rights Commission (UNHRC), which met for 6 weeks in Geneva in February and March, achieved very positive results, which we hope will have lasting beneficial impact. The United States strongly supported efforts to insure that the United Nations acts evenhandedly in applying human rights criteria to all countries. Among the actions taken by the UNHRC were the following:

- Condemned the U.S.S.R. invasion of Afghanistan;
- Condemned the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea as well as human rights abuses within that country;
- Extensively debated the suppression of dissidents in the Soviet Union and maintained the Andrei Sakharov case on the agenda as a priority item;
- Took public action on South Africa, Equatorial Guinea, Malawi, Israeli-occupied territories, Chile, and Guatemala; and

• Discussed in detail specific abuses in 11 countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America in closed sessions.

Perhaps the most far-reaching achievement of the UNHRC was the establishment of a five-member working group to investigate reports of disappearances. The group, composed of independent experts acting in their own capacity, will deal worldwide with the thousands of cases of missing persons. The group is empowered to seek and receive information from governments, intergovernmental organizations, humanitarian organizations, and other reliable sources. This is the first time in its history that the UNHRC has adopted a procedure for possible immediate action on human rights cases. The need for this type of action is particularly appropriate to the situation in Argentina, where thousands of persons have been abducted by security forces in recent years.

There should be little doubt that concern for human rights has now become universal. Our representative to the U.N. Human Rights Commission, Jerry Shestack, wrote eloquently that "human rights is far from a passing fad; on the contrary it has an increasingly wide appeal." He reported that the significance of the recent overthrow of repressive rulers in Uganda, the former Central African Empire, Equatorial Guinea, Nicaragua, and, I might add, El Salvador was not lost on the nations represented at the commission.

The positive accomplishments are encouraging. Government officials and oppositionists alike in this hemisphere have acknowledged that the steady application of U.S. human rights policies has been an important stimulant in maintaining an improving trend. This is good news, but we cannot take credit; no improvement in human rights can be sustained unless it emanates from the will of the people and their governments. Our objective is to encourage governments to take necessary action to fulfill their obligation to their own people, to their international commitments, for the sake of improving their relations with us and achieving respect in the international community.

It is our hope that the gathering momentum of human rights awareness can be brought to bear on the many serious problems that remain. In this connection I will focus my remarks on Argentina, Chile, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, Grenada, Haiti, Cuba, and El Salvador.

Argentina

A distinguished recent resident of Argentina has said:

... it is up to the Argentine military government to prove that it does, as it claims, wish to return to a "stable pluralistic democracy" by ending all violations of law and by accounting for those who have disappeared. The military has long argued that their aims are respectable and that the methods employed were forced upon them by a ruthless enemy. . . . It is time that the so-called moderates in the Argentine Government showed the resolution needed to account for the past and to ensure that the atrocities committed by extremists on the left and the right are not allowed to happen again. . . . It is important to get the truth out into the open and demand that if the Argentine Government wishes to have a respectable place in the estimation of the democratic world, it must act swiftly and promptly to return to the rule of law.

The message that we are getting from groups in Argentina is an expression of hope that the U.S. Government and private sectors will not ease the human rights pressure on the Argentine Government because of geopolitical contingencies. I can tell you today that we have not. One of the objectives of recent visits by U.S. Ambassador at Large Gerard Smith and Gen. Andrew Goodpaster to Argentina was to exchange views and achieve a better understanding of our respective positions regarding human rights.

Some areas of our continuing concern are the following.

Disappearances. As we noted in our report to Congress, the most carefully recorded and documented list of unexplained disappearances in Argentina, compiled by the Permanent Assembly for Human Rights in Buenos Aires, contains about 6,500 cases for the period 1976-79. Some estimates run considerably higher. Our records contain 44 cases of disappearances for 1979, compared to over 500 in 1978 and many more in earlier years. We are aware of three cases thus far in 1980. The Argentine Government has taken no meaningful action to provide to families or other interested parties an accounting of the many thousands who have disappeared during the past 4 years.

Executive Detention Prisoners. There are approximately 1,300 persons being held in this category. Most have never been charged with any offense. I should note, however, that there has

en a gradual reduction in the number of executive prisoners. There has also been some improvement in prison conditions.

Torture. There are credible allegations that torture of new detainees during interrogation continues. We are aware of no measures taken by authorities to halt this practice.

"Right of Option" Program.

Although the Government of Argentina frustrated a constitutional provision permitting executive detainees to choose self-exile, and the U.S. Government established a special parole program to accept qualified applicants, almost two-thirds of our requests for interviews have been denied and the Government of Argentina has refused a large number of option requests submitted by detainees to whom we have issued certificates of eligibility.

With respect to bilateral relations, U.S. military assistance and sales remain prohibited by law. At the multinational level, since January 1977 and through January 31, 1980, the U.S. Government has opposed 18 and supported 2 out of a total of 20 loan applications submitted by Argentina to the International Development Bank. At the same time, since September 1978, we have been approving financing of U.S. exports to Argentina through the Export-Import Bank in large amounts.

Chile

Serious problems remain although there have been some improvements in the human rights situation in Chile during the past 2 years. Our bilateral relations continue to be affected by that government's disposition of the Orlando Letelier and Ronni Moffitt assassination case. The Chilean Government has failed to fully investigate or prosecute the former security officers indicted in the United States for complicity in the 1976 assassinations.

In October 1979, the Chilean Supreme Court denied a U.S. Government extradition request for the three officers. A domestic investigation of the case in Chile has dragged on for nearly 2 years without a full and diligent effort. Following the October 1979 decision of the Chilean Supreme Court, President Carter took a number of actions:

- Reduced the size of our mission in Santiago;
- Terminated the foreign military sales (FMS) pipeline of military equipment;
- Removed the U.S. military group;
- Suspended all Eximbank financing in Chile; and
- Terminated new Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) business.

Despite the Letelier case, there are some encouraging signs in Chile. There have been no disappearances since 1977. There is relative freedom to speak out and to criticize the government. Although institutionalized or legal guarantees against violations of the integrity of the person are weak, there are some indications that the courts and the press are taking more interest in defending human rights.

We continue to have concern in some areas.

- The IAHRIC reported in October 1979 that the rights to a fair trial and to due process were subject to significant limitations, principally because of the active role of the military courts in judicial proceedings and the reluctance of the civil courts actively to investigate human rights violations.

- While fewer than in past years, in 1979 there were one dozen allegations of torture by credible sources.

- Political parties remain formally dissolved.

- While having pledged eventual restoration of an elected government, the Pinochet regime has not set a timetable for relinquishing control.

- On March 7, 1980, the Chilean Supreme Court upheld internal banishment for those who participated in the proscribed women's day activities. A total of 17 have been affected.

- The Chilean courts continue to side with the government in prohibiting the return of exiles the Government of Chile doesn't want.

The status of bilateral relations, in addition to the actions taken in the Letelier case, is that all new military assistance and sales remain terminated since 1976. New economic development assistance is also terminated. In the multinational development banks, the U.S. Government has voted "no" on all loans since 1977. At the United Nations

and the OAS, we have supported resolutions criticizing Chilean human rights abuses and those establishing international procedures to work toward improvements. In recent U.N. meetings on this subject, we have issued statements taking note of the improvements mentioned earlier.

Guatemala

Guatemala is a country where human rights are in jeopardy and where the government is doing little or nothing to bring violence under control. Many human rights groups have focused concern on the level of violence. Amnesty International began a worldwide campaign in September 1979 and estimated in December that more than 2,000 persons had been killed for political reasons in the last 18 months. The International Commission of Jurists in a September 1979 report stated that the Lucas government had "embarked on a systematic campaign to suppress dissent which has, in fact, generated a widespread climate of fear, demoralization, and the growth of clandestine opposition."

Numerous other groups have spoken out against the violence, and two international unions have organized boycotts to protest specific violations. Our own estimation of political and death squad murders for 1979 is between 800 and 900. Since our report was written, violence has increased both from the right and left. Perhaps the most graphic incident was the burning of the Spanish Embassy, when government security forces broke into it in an attempt to dislodge a group of occupiers. Thirty-nine persons, the majority of whom were Guatemalan *campesinos*, died in the fire. The Spanish Embassy broke diplomatic relations as a result, and the U.S. Government expressed shock and called it deplorable because it could have been avoided.

The Guatemalan Government has invited the IAHRIC to make an inspection visit, which should take place later this year. The UNHRC, in a resolution approved March 11, 1980, concerning the assassination of Dr. Alberto Fuentes Mohr, expressed profound concern at the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Guatemala.

In our bilateral relations, Guatemala has not received security assistance since FY 1978. We have con-

tinued to give economic development assistance for projects which meet basic human needs criteria. In the multinational development banks, the United States abstained on a tourism and industrial development loan in 1979, the only application to be considered.

We recognize the instability of Central America and the threat of terrorism which exists. Nevertheless, ways must be found to strengthen the democratic processes; vital reforms are essential and acknowledged to be necessary by influential sectors of the Guatemalan society. Violence must be investigated and the instigators brought under control in order to avoid a serious radicalization of that country.

Nicaragua

There can be no doubt that the overthrow of the Somoza government in July 1979 reflected the will of the majority of the people of Nicaragua. The victory of the Sandinista forces ended a repressive family dynasty of more than 40 years' duration. The civil war that resulted in the violent change of government cost an estimated 30,000-50,000 lives and left the country in economic shambles. Nine months after the event, there is still little discernible evidence of significant economic recovery. Another legacy of the war was over 7,500 political prisoners held by the Sandinistas for association with the former Somoza National Guard or for some other relationship with that government.

The U.S. Government is making a sincere effort to have good relations and assist the revolutionary government. We worked hard to obtain a \$75 million supplemental appropriation from the Congress to assist the economic recovery efforts.

The Nicaraguan revolution did not, however, bring an end to human rights concerns. A number of summary executions have occurred. Allegations of torture continue, particularly with respect to political prisoners. The Nicaraguan Permanent Commission on Human Rights, a private organization which has courageously documented abuses both under this government and under Somoza, on March 27 presented a specific case of torture to the Nicaraguan Supreme Court. Other disturbing developments include efforts to intimidate the free press, the resignations this week of the two prominent moderate members of the ruling junta and the

moderate Central Bank president, the slow pace of the special tribunals conducting the trials of the political prisoners, and concern that proper judicial safeguards are not being applied. This latter concern motivated a mission of the International Commission of Jurists to visit Nicaragua to observe the trial process.

These and other developments portend a consolidation of control by the Sandinistas and lead to serious speculation about the future of pluralism in that society. Thus, we believe the scheduled visit of the IAHR to Nicaragua this summer, at the invitation of that government, is of particular importance, and we look forward to its findings.

Panama

Panama is another country in the hemisphere where important segments of the public are not satisfied with the pace of the transition to free elections. In September 1979, there was a major teachers strike dedicated to the repeal of a controversial educational reform plan. On October 9 there was an extraordinary series of protest marches throughout Panama wherein the teachers attracted widespread support for their opposition to the reform plan.

Within human rights and opposition circles in the country and elsewhere, there is criticism of the lack of independent judicial and legislative branches of government, certain penal and judicial practices, such as interrogation techniques, the "night courts," limitations on freedom of expression, and restrictions on political party formation.

Our annual report commented on the lack of freedom of expression, noting that the Panama Government's point of view dominates the media. It cited a law implemented in 1979, requiring the licensing of journalists, which was subject to criticism by many newsmen as a threat to freedom of expression and as a guarantee of self-censorship. This concern was well founded. On March 3, 1980, the licenses of four radio commentators were canceled. They were charged with distorting facts with the intention of disrupting public order and jeopardizing security and attacking the reputation of President Royo.

Opposition and human rights groups in Panama have called these sanctions a violation of human rights. I

would mention that one of those sanctioned, Julio Ortega, is currently in the United States on a travel grant under our USICA [U.S. International Communication Agency] education and cultural exchange program. I understand that a suit has been filed with Panamanian courts on behalf of all four commentators asking for immediate suspension of the cancellation orders.

Grenada

The government of Prime Minister Gairy was overthrown by a coup d'etat in March 1979 by leaders of a former opposition party, the New JEWEL Movement. Our annual report documents human rights violations by the former Gairy government. There were also charges of corruption, rigging of the 1976 elections, and intimidation of the opposition by violent means. The new People's Revolutionary Government, which came into being, had the advantage of replacing a dictatorial and unpopular regime. It has maintained a reputation for honesty and begun some necessary economic programs, particularly in the agricultural field.

However, the revolutionary nature of the coup has led to the replacement of one set of human rights concerns by others equally serious. The constitution has been suspended, opponents have been detained indefinitely and without legal representation, freedom of assembly and private enterprise have been limited or abridged, and the independent press has been abolished. The Church has been a target for pressure. A publication called the *Catholic Focus* published only its initial issue before it was suspended, allegedly at the instigation of the new government. On a positive note, some 13 prisoners were released on March 25. We believe there are in excess of 50 persons still detained.

Grenada continues to send mixed signals in the international arena concerning its human rights stance. It has participated actively in human rights issues in the OAS forum but voted against the U.N. General Assembly resolution condemning Soviet aggression in Afghanistan.

Haiti

Haiti continues to be the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, and it continues to function under authoritar-

n rule. In 1979 the first independent political parties in recent history merged, but negative developments outweighed the positive. A restrictive law press law was enacted; the political opposition was further intimidated by the militia and the executive. Objective observers characterized our report on the 1979 human rights situation in Haiti as an accurate representation.

Last week the IAHRIC issued a report on its August 1978 inspection visit to Haiti. Prior to its release, the report was updated to December 1979. The report concluded, among other things, that the right to life was violated, particularly in the mid-1970s, by means of summary executions, prison terms, and lack of medical care, but there has been improvement in this regard since. However, numerous persons continue to be detained without benefit of legal procedure or access to an attorney.

Freedom of inquiry, speech, and dissemination of thought do not exist, although freedom of religion does. Freedom of association is extremely limited. There have been violations of the right to residence, movement, and nationality. Numerous civil and political rights and certain prerogatives of the judiciary have been suspended. The OS report makes a series of specific recommendations for amelioration of its findings and makes a special appeal to international organizations to give Haiti aid to improve living conditions in order that the country can establish respect for the rights currently being violated. For development, we understand that the Haitian Government has modified the 1979 press law in response to criticism, but details are lacking.

The case of Haitian "boat people" is a topic of serious concern. The plight of these people involves disputed matters of human rights as well as issues of refugee policy. Since 1972 thousands have arrived illegally in Florida, in small boats and, therefore, at considerable risk. Many request political asylum. There are over 9,000 such cases pending in Florida. The U.S. Government is committed to the careful case-by-case evaluation of all claims for political asylum, according to our law which refers to the U.N. Protocol on Refugees. Last week President-for-Life Duvalier issued a statement on the "boat people," reiterating that Haitians deported from Florida "have not been and not be harassed."

The Administration is urgently reassessing the situation of the Haitian "boat people." Meanwhile, none are being deported.

Cuba

Returning to the question of Cuba, I noted earlier that 3,900 prisoners had been released in 1979. According to Huber Matos, the prominent political prisoner released last October, there are about 1,100 still being held. We do not know if this number had been increased in the last 2 weeks. This situation is now complicated by the immediate problem of the 10,000 Cubans who sought refuge in the Peruvian Embassy in Havana. The Cuban Government does not permit free emigration and arbitrarily determines who may leave the country through issuance of exit permits. It has, furthermore, not held to its earlier agreement to permit those who were in the Peruvian Embassy to proceed to any country willing to receive them.

We are lending our efforts to break the impasse by cooperating with governments in this hemisphere and elsewhere to facilitate their departure. The United States has agreed to take 3,500 who meet our immigration, refugee, or asylum criteria. We believe that the boat owners and captains from the country who are taking people out of Cuba and trying to land them in the United States are playing into the hands of the Cuban authorities.

El Salvador

Those who subscribe to the domino theory in Central America view what is happening in El Salvador as the next target of international marxism after Nicaragua. Those who study El Salvador know that the problem is home grown and has been building to the present crisis level for many years. Solutions to the problems of that beleaguered country are not handy, and the current U.S. Government policy is highly controversial, particularly with U.S. religious groups. What is incontrovertible is that urgent reforms are absolutely essential to the survival of the revolutionary junta now governing the country.

In early March 1980, the Salvadoran Government bit the bullet and instituted both agrarian and financial reforms, after the original junta, installed by the military coup in October 1979, failed to act before it expired at the beginning of 1980. The junta's reforms have been violently opposed by both extremes of the right and the left. It is clear that reforms must be made. The agrarian reform, if fully im-

plemented, could be one of the most profound and far-reaching social experiments in the modern history of Central America.

I know that the U.S. Government's decision to provide security assistance to the junta is controversial. The volume of mail on this subject received in Washington in recent weeks is near the level of correspondence regarding the Iranian question. One widespread misconception that I wish to clarify is that this security assistance consists of arms; it does not. It is restricted to credits to enable the Salvadoran Armed Forces to purchase communications and transportation equipment to improve its ability to control the violence. We remain deeply concerned at the level of violence now prevalent in El Salvador, some of it the responsibility of undisciplined security forces in the countryside. Most of it, we believe, comes from rightist groups opposed to all reforms who are engaging in indiscriminate assassinations.

Before his tragic death, Archbishop Oscar Romero was given written assurance by Secretary Vance that "the advancement of human rights . . . underlies every aspect of U.S. policy toward El Salvador."

There is much that has been written about the brutal assassination of Archbishop Romero, and much that I could say. Perhaps I should merely conclude my remarks by saying that his death is a noble symbol of the human rights struggle we all are facing and that many have given their lives defending.

I returned to the United States from a month-long visit to the Near East and South Asia the day before the beautiful Requiem Mass given for Archbishop Romero at Georgetown University on March 29. I would like to quote from the eulogy given by Reverend Timothy Healy, which I profoundly believe best expresses what human rights is all about.

His message was the simplest teaching of modern theology and he couched it in the words of the Second Vatican Council. Again and again he raised his voice, in his Cathedral, in his radio station (until it was bombed out from under him), and with everyone he met, to remind his countrymen, oppressors and oppressed, the hunters and the hunted, that no man can reach his full religious being unless he enjoys some dignity, some freedom, some self-determination in his daily life; unless he has some hope of something better for his children. ■

Human Rights in South Africa

by Patricia M. Derian

Statement before the Subcommittees on Africa and International Organizations of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on May 13, 1980.

*Ms. Derian is Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs.*¹

The status of human rights in South Africa is a crucial and timely subject for the following reasons:

First, in recent weeks, tens of thousands of colored (mixed racial origin) students have been engaging in a massive school boycott. They are protesting against the inferior education system given them under the white-dominated apartheid system. Several hundred have been detained. The system for the South African black student is even worse.²

Second, South Africa's policy of institutionalized and legalized racism is one of the cruelest forms of human rights abuse in the world today. Under the apartheid system, the black, colored, and Asian South African majority suffers pervasive discrimination in all areas of life. Protest against this discriminatory racial system is punishable by law.

Third, apartheid remains among the most persistent human rights abuses before the world community. The United Nations has focused on this issue almost from its inception. Although considerable achievements in combating racial discrimination have taken place in many nations, including our own, there has been rooted resistance to change in South Africa.

Fourth, time is running out for the prospects of peaceful change in that country. Dissatisfaction and resentment on the part of black South Africans have never been more widespread than they are today. As a result of the suppression of the Soweto demonstrations in 1976, several hundred black South Africans died; others fled to neighboring countries in search of military training; others were sentenced to prison terms.

Today's hearings, significantly, focus on the perilous human rights situation in South Africa. I hope that the

recommendations resulting from these hearings will contribute to the rapid development of racial equality and respect for all human rights in that country.

LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND PROCEDURES

The subcommittee has addressed several questions to me. The first asks that I identify the South African laws, regulations, and procedures which result in the greatest and most serious violations of human rights in that country.

Apartheid is a system of legalized racism. It is a web of discriminatory laws and practices by which 16% of the population dominate 84% of the population. The Constitution entrenches a white monopoly of political power in a parliament whose membership is all white and elected by whites only. The parliament is the supreme lawmaking authority. Thus, the Constitution itself denies to more than 19 million black as well as colored and Asian South Africans the right to participate in the political process which ultimately governs them.

"Homeland" Policy

The government's "homeland" policy is perhaps the most explosive single issue in South Africa today; the homelands legislation is serving to forcibly relocate substantial numbers of the black population and divest all black South Africans of their citizenship. Black South Africans comprise 72% of the population. The government has designated 13% of the land area as "independent" homelands for this 72% of the population. The 13% of the land designated is generally the less arable and removed in large part from advanced centers of commerce and industry.

In the homelands, there is often neither space nor water to conduct agriculture. There is often no industrial development to provide jobs. Under the law, once a homeland gains "independence," its members lose their South African citizenship. To date, three homelands have reached independence, and the black people assigned to them have been divested of citizenship. When the

government grants independence to all the homelands, South Africa will no longer have any black citizens. Thus, black men, women, and children, who have lived all of their lives in South Africa—people whose families before them have lived in South Africa—suddenly find themselves stripped of their citizenship and dumped into resettlement areas where they cannot find jobs and where they do not necessarily want to reside.

The photographs on the board in front of me show the tragic human consequences of this policy. They were recently taken by an officer in the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. These are pictures of a destroyed village of the Makgato people. Since most of the Makgato resisted moving from their longstanding home in the northern Transvaal to a desolate and arid resettlement area in Kromhoek, government forces entered the community in September 1979, destroyed buildings, and removed their belongings. Thus, a community of 500 families, who had developed substantial homes, a school, and prosperous farms have been forced to leave their property, their homes, their community because they are black and because they were located in areas designated as white by the South African Government.

Similarly, this government remain intent upon forcibly removing a neighboring and much larger community—the Batlokwa people—to the same arid resettlement area. They number 50,000-80,000. They, too, have substantial homes, schools, and agricultural productivity in the northern Transvaal. Their lives are also to suffer dismantling and the destruction of their communities as a result of the homelands policy.

Black laborers who cannot subsist in the homelands and must seek work in white urban areas have no political or economic rights in these areas. They are relegated to the status of migrant workers in their own country. Their families are not allowed to live with them; they must remain in the homelands, often great distances away. The human suffering involved in these forcible family separations is one of many cruel consequences of the homelands legislation.

Group Areas Act

To rigidly maintain racial separation in urban areas, the Group Areas Act de-

nes separate residential places for all black, colored, and Asian South Africans. As a result, tens of thousands of human beings have been moved into specially designated urban areas because they are not white. In 1979 alone, 317 colored families and 819 Indian families were moved out of their homes; there were nine white families who found themselves forced to leave their homes to satisfy the apartheid policy. Most of the black South Africans at Crossroads had been moved more than once before they created that threatened community.

A highly reputable private source, Frank Sash, reported in February 1980 that as a result of the Group Areas Act, the homelands policy and the pass laws, over 2 million people had been forcibly uprooted by 1978. At least 1 million people were still to be removed, and during 1979, these removals continued apace.

Flux and Pass Laws

Flux and pass laws are used to enforce racial separation. Under these laws, known as one of the most despised requirements of the apartheid system, black people over age 16 are required to carry reference books at all times. They must produce them to demonstrate that they are entitled to be in any urban area. Arrests for pass law offenses totaled 272,887 in 1978 and 119,869 in 1979. They have resulted in the removal of large numbers of black people from urban areas, although they entered such areas looking for economic opportunities otherwise denied them.

POLITICAL OPPOSITION

They also asked about the treatment of black activists who are seeking to promote change in South Africa. South African laws do not only racially segregate black people, restrict economic opportunities—including the use of alcohol—and bar participation in the political process, South African legislation also curtails the ability of everyone to express their views or opposition to the political and economic system imposed upon them. Restrictions are placed on their right to publish, to assemble, to form organizations, and to lobby; in sum, to peacefully affect the white political process.

Banning

A variety of laws ban organizations on loosely defined political grounds. The basic ones are the Internal Security Act (1976), previously called the Suppression of Communism Act, and the Unlawful Organizations Act (1960). Under the latter act, the two most influential black political organizations were banned—the African National Congress and the Pan African Congress. As a result, their members and supporters became liable for imprisonment, and many hundreds were arrested for furthering the organizations' aims, for attending meetings, for distributing pamphlets.

The Internal Security Act further enables the government to ban individuals for activities loosely defined as a danger to state security or public order. Banned individuals are restricted in their freedom of expression, association, and movement. They are prohibited from publishing or making public statements. They are restricted to a particular area. They are forbidden to meet with others. They must periodically report to the police. In

law, the Minister is not required to give any grounds for his banning decision, and there is no judicial review.

Arbitrary Detention

In addition to the banning laws which have served to stifle and silence black African opinion, the government is empowered to arbitrarily and preventively detain its critics. A variety of security laws provide the state with extraordinary powers to detain persons without charge, in some cases indefinitely. Section 6 of the 1967 Terrorism Act authorizes the government to detain individuals and hold them incommunicado, indefinitely. No court may intervene by writ of *habeas corpus*. Visits to the detainee by family, lawyers, clergy, doctors, or the press are prohibited.

Arbitrary detention is authorized by other South African laws as well, among these the Internal Security Act and the Sabotage (General Law Administration) Act.

At present, there are about 500 men and women serving prison sentences under these main security laws; other political prisoners have been con-

... Apartheid is a system of legalized racism. It is a web of discriminatory laws and practices by which 16% of the population dominate 84% of the population.

some instances, they have been prohibited from carrying on their occupation. For example, black leader Thomazile Botha of Port Elizabeth, released from detention to banning, was forced to peddle goods in the street. Mrs. Winnie Mandela and Dr. Mamphela Ramphele have been moved to remote areas, tantamount to internal exile.

Banning is no ordinary human rights abuse. As recently described by our Representative to the U.N. Human Rights Commission, Jerome J. Sheshtack, banning negates human worth in its entirety. It seeks to make a person disappear by making his human personality disappear. A banned person cannot even be quoted. There are currently 146 banned men and women in South Africa.

Generally, banning orders are imposed for a 2- or 5-year period arbitrarily by the Minister of Justice. Frequently, they are renewed. Under the

victed under criminal laws; still others are detained. From January to November 1979, a total of 334 people were placed in detention. At least 64 of the persons detained during 1979 were known to the Institute of Race Relations to have been students. The Minister of Justice places at 48 the number of persons under 18 that were detained in 1979. Six were females.

The incommunicado interrogation of detainees has resulted in reports of systematic abuse and torture of detainees by the police. Since 1963, at least 52 persons died while detained under security laws, including 24 between March 1976 and mid-July 1978. Tortures applied have included severe beatings; electric shocks; extracting teeth with pliers; depriving detainees of food, water, and sleep; forcing them to run on stones; and long periods of interrogation and solitary confinement. Partly in response to the strong domestic and international reaction to the death in detention of student leader

Steve Biko, there have been no known deaths of security detainees since mid-July 1978. However, this does not mean that torture and mistreatment have come to an end. The laws giving rise to such abuses and the security apparatus enforcing them remain in effect.

Thus, the incidence of torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment remains an exceedingly serious problem. The government, itself, does not completely deny the use of torture. The government, in fact, has paid claims arising out of assaults on detainees. It paid \$214,000 for 78 claims in 1978. In 1979, the government paid R65,000 to the family of Steve Biko. Thirty-two similar cases are pending. Its attitude perhaps is reflected in the statement by Justice Minister Kruger in response to the Biko case: "I am not sorry about Mr. Biko. He leaves me cold."

The result of this governmental determination to repress black activists is that black leaders who have standing in the black community and probably could influence events in a moderate and lawful direction continue to be detained, banned, or imprisoned. Such policies surely serve to heighten anger and bitterness and drive black South Africans to violence in their struggle for their legitimate rights. This repressive treatment for peaceful change has led many black activists to leave South Africa to seek military training.

GOVERNMENT POLICIES

The third question in your letter was whether Prime Minister Botha's policies have resulted in any improvement in human rights of South Africans. The answer unfortunately is, no; there have been no significant changes. Reliable reporting attests that it is the overwhelming opinion of black South Africans that changes effected so far have been inconsequential adjustments in an unacceptable system.

The Botha government has allowed a relaxation of certain segregation measures, including an easing of restrictions against multiracial sports; the removal of "whites only" signs from some public places; and the opening of certain hotels, theatres, and municipal buildings. Small numbers of black students have been admitted to white universities. The changes, thus, have been limited to opening up institutions and privileges reserved exclusively for

whites to limited numbers of blacks. They have not taken the form of change in the basic laws; they are merely exemptions, often on an *ad hoc* basis.

The Prime Minister has promised to review discriminatory legislation, for example, laws limiting the amount of land available for Africans, as well as the Immorality Act and the Mixed Marriages Act which prohibit sexual relations between white and black. The government, also, has indicated willingness to engage in dialogue with black, colored, and Asian leaders. In 1979, a government commission recommended major changes in labor laws affecting blacks. However, few results have emerged. New labor legislation perpetuates ultimate government control of black labor organizations. With regard to the Immorality Act, I would note that during 1979, 299 persons were prosecuted under this act, and 222 convicted; 46 await trial.

In sum, for black South Africans, there has been little or no change in existing patterns of discrimination. None of the measures have made any real change in the overall pattern of apartheid. Black South Africans remain excluded from the political process and continue to be denied their basic human rights.

Certainly, we hope that meaningful steps will be taken and that the considerable debate in the white community on the apartheid system will lead to concrete actions to end discrimination and afford participation for all black citizens in the political life of the nation. Otherwise, the deepening frustration at the lack of substantial change will increase an already polarized political situation and increase the prospect for violent convulsion.

U.S. RESPONSE

Your final question was what specifically the United States has done to protest human rights violations in South Africa.

The U.S. Government has continued to underscore our opposition to the apartheid system in South Africa.

Private and Public Diplomacy

At the diplomatic level, the United States has repeatedly protested human rights violations to the South African Government at the highest levels. In these exchanges, we have raised the

practice of banning, arbitrary detention, torture, the pass laws, the forcible removal of black communities, the systematic denial of South African citizenship to blacks, the denial of meaningful participation by all South Africans in the political process, and the lack of justice in the judicial system.

The United States also has publicly protested the egregious abuses in South Africa. Our Ambassadors at the United Nations have delivered forceful public statements on apartheid's abhorrent nature. On October 4, 1979, speaking before Ambassadors and Ministers of the Organization of African Unity [OAU], former Secretary Vance reaffirmed that unless a system of government evolved in which all South Africans could participate equitably, our relations with South Africa would inevitably deteriorate. Vice President Mondale has affirmed this same point publicly.

Arms Embargo

In addition to private and public diplomacy, the United States imposed a voluntary arms embargo against South Africa, beginning in 1962. In 1977, the Carter Administration supported the U.N. mandatory arms embargo on South Africa. In 1978, we imposed a ban on all exports to the South African military and police and have made sometimes effective representations to other governments to do likewise. We shall continue to do so. There have been no sales to South Africa under the U.S. foreign military sales program since 1973. We, further, have tightened procedures on the commercial sale of civilian aircraft to South Africa to help assure that they will not be used for military, police, or paramilitary purposes.

There also have been no exports of nuclear supplies or materials to South Africa since 1975. We have made it clear that resumption of peaceful nuclear cooperation would depend on South Africa's agreement on the Non-proliferation Treaty and safeguards issues.

Economic Endeavors

In the economic sphere, legislation was passed in 1978 to confine Export-Import Bank support to those private firms implementing fair employment practices. In consequence of this restriction, there have been no new authorizations for Exim financing for ex-

ts to South Africa since September 1978. Prior to these restrictions, the United States had halted Eximbank financing to the South African government.

In 1979 and 1980, CCC [Commodity Credit Corporation, U.S.A.] credits have not been made available to South Africa.

In the area of private investment, we have urged U.S. firms operating in South Africa to follow fair employment practices for black employees in accordance with the Sullivan code. The Sullivan principles set reasonable standards for corporate conduct in South Africa. They have sought to improve the business community in promoting economic opportunities for blacks. The Sullivan principles call for improvements in wages, working conditions, fringe benefits, and advancement opportunities for black workers.

They also support recognition of representative black trade unions. To date, more than 130 companies have subscribed to the Sullivan principles, representing 75% of the work force on high payrolls of U.S. corporations doing business in South Africa. Certainly, the American firms which have not implemented the Sullivan code are not acting in accordance with the thrust of U.S. policy. It is noteworthy that as a result of the Sullivan initiative, similar codes of conduct have emerged from other nations and some South African corporations, too, have agreed to implement these principles.

SUMMARY

Politically and legally, the United States has refused to recognize the independent homelands, proclaimed by the South African Government.

At the United Nations, we have supported resolutions condemning the establishment of these independent homelands. We also have supported resolutions on South Africa's ill-treatment of political prisoners and endorsed continuation of U.N. trust funds for South Africans. I would like that we have been unable to support resolutions that encourage violence or call for economic sanctions against South Africa.

We have sought to maintain ties with many elements of the black South

African community, including human rights organizations and banned individuals. We have dispatched embassy observers to political trials.

We have contributed generously to U.N. funds providing educational assistance and training to black South Africans. We also have contributed funds for legal aid to prisoners, relief for their families, and assistance to black South African refugees in neighboring states.

Through the visitors program of the International Communications Agency (USICA), we have brought approximately 50 South Africans annually to the United States. Twenty-five Americans, in turn, have visited South Africa. By means of this program, we

Banning is no ordinary human rights abuse. It seeks to make a person disappear by making his human personality disappear.

have demonstrated our support for black South Africans seeking change; we have encouraged white South Africans to recognize the need for change. The program's effectiveness is perhaps evidenced by the South African Government's refusal on occasion to grant passports to some of the black grantees. We have vigorously protested these actions.

In sum, the United States has undertaken a variety of measures to influence and persuade South Africa to change its policies. There is still a great deal to do.

For example, many private groups in the United States today are calling for stronger measures to combat apartheid in South Africa. They have urged broadening of the Sullivan principles and strengthening their implementation. It would be useful for this subcommittee, in its hearings on the role of U.S. corporations, to examine this proposal. Private groups also have called upon the U.S. Government to disassociate itself more clearly from the South African Government through our trade and investment policies. Specifically, they have urged the U.S. Government to curtail or halt private trade and investment to South Africa. They have called upon corporations to withdraw from South Africa. In at least two cases, corporations have done so. It might be useful for this subcommittee

to review these recommendations too. Private groups also have urged the United States to consider if there are any circumstances whereby it could support economic sanctions against South Africa in the United Nations. To date, the United States has limited its support of sanctions to our expanded arms embargo.

Our policies must encourage rapid, peaceful, and significant change in South Africa. It is incumbent upon the United States, consistent with its obligations under the U.N. Charter, to continue to seek respect for the rights of all South Africans to participate in the political process of South Africa without distinction based on race. The Government of South Africa will remain in violation of its human rights obligations under the charter as long as this participation is denied. We, further, must persist vigorously to seek an end to the use of violence and force by the Government of South Africa to maintain apartheid. Such practices could, in turn, lead to violence by the victims of apartheid. We look forward to a South Africa in which race, creed, or color form no basis for distinction and in which fundamental human rights and freedoms are guaranteed to all.

¹ The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

² In 1976-77, the average expenditure per black South African student was R49 (\$73.50); per white student, R654 (\$981). ■

U.S.-Libyan Relations Since 1969

by David D. Newsom

Statement before the Subcommittee to Investigate Individuals Representing Interests of Foreign Governments of the Senate Judiciary Committee on August 4, 1980. Ambassador Newsom is Under Secretary for Political Affairs.¹

I am here to respond to the subcommittee's request for a review of the relations of the United States with Libya since Col. Qadhafi came into power in September 1969. The Department of State wishes to cooperate fully with the subcommittee in its inquiry, and I am here in that spirit.

My own connection with Libya goes back to 1962, when I became Director of the Office of North African Affairs in the Department. I subsequently served as Ambassador to Libya from 1964 until the summer of 1969, leaving Libya just 3 months before the revolution which brought Col. Qadhafi to power. But I was not to leave association with Libya, because I then became Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, and at that time the responsibility for Libya was in that bureau. In my present position, I have dealt closely with many of the recent aspects of our relationship with Libya.

This afternoon I would like to begin with a short sketch of Libya and then discuss in more detail and in response to the subcommittee's request our interests in Libya, the main features of the current U.S.-Libyan relationship, and the principal problems that we encounter in that relationship.

Libya: Past and Present

This sparsely populated desert country, which is almost three times the size of Texas with 2.5 million people, today has many of the relics of its mixed and turbulent history: as an extension of ancient Carthage, as a major outpost of the Roman Empire, as the invasion path of tribes from the Arabian Peninsula, as the site of some of the pirates who preyed on the commerce of the young United States. As an Italian colony, it was part of Mussolini's dream of a Mediterranean empire, and the charred tanks and unspent explosives which litter the Libyan desert today are reminders of the battles between Rommel and Montgomery.

In 1951, under U.N. auspices, Libya became independent. A king, Idris, was chosen, who was at the same time head of an Islamic religious order, the Senussis. A poor country until commercial oil production began in 1962, Libya lived at that time with the help of substantial aid from the United States and Britain. Each country had, during that period, as part of that cooperation an air base in Libya.

Even in the period of King Idris, certain attitudes were present in Libya which today have become more pronounced: a bitter resentment against the establishment of the State of Israel, strong support for the Arab cause, a fervent attachment to Islam, and a degree of xenophobia.

When Col. Qadhafi and his young fellow officers overthrew the King in September 1969, these attitudes intensified and became integral elements of Libyan policy. The young officers believed that the influence of the United States and Britain had prevented Libya from playing its rightful role in the struggle against Israel, and particularly in the 1967 war. They vowed to change that by closing the British and American bases in Libya, by acquiring large quantities of arms, and by supporting anti-Israel and revolutionary causes everywhere.

The Libyan leaders saw in their oil wells the opportunity to support not only Palestinian and Islamic movements everywhere but many revolutionary movements and particularly any cause which they believed would weaken traditional Arab kingdoms or would be directed at Britain or the United States. What we call terrorism, they call revolution.

On the Palestinian question, Libya under Qadhafi has taken an extreme position. Qadhafi has, in recent months, publicly called upon Palestinian groups to attack Egyptian, Israeli, and American targets in the Middle East. In addition to helping Palestinian groups, the Libyans have provided money, training, and, in some cases, arms to virtually any group around the world which asserts revolutionary credentials, including the Moro insurgents in the southern Philippines, the provisional wing of the Irish Republican Army, the Japanese Red Army, and certain African organizations. In the immediate area of Libya, activities have included support for various factions in the

Chadian civil war and for the Polisario in its struggle against Morocco in the Western Sahara.

Qadhafi has also sought to develop a whole new theory of government; namely, that government is unnecessary and that the people could rule. People's committees are taking the place of traditional organs of government. Diplomats are a relic of the past to him; he has recently established, instead, People's Bureaus which represent the Libyan people to many countries, including the United States.

U.S. Interests in Libya

But despite the many problems which exist in our relations with Libya, the United States has important reasons for seeking to find a basis for satisfactory relations, and our policy choices are not easy ones. We cannot remain indifferent to the activities and orientation of a nation which is strategically situated on the southern shore of the Mediterranean, located between two nations—Egypt and Tunisia—with which we have close and particularly friendly relations.

There is an American community of between 2,000 and 2,500 people resident in Libya, connected both with oil production and other projects important to Libya's economic and social well-being and to the trade between the two countries. There is a mutuality of interest in the continuation and security of that community.

We have important energy interests in Libya. The United States receives approximately 10.8% of its imported oil supplies from Libya. This equals about 700,000 barrels a day and makes Libya our third largest supplier, after Saudi Arabia and Nigeria. The United States is Libya's largest single customer, and our purchases account for almost 40% of Libya's total production each year. It is low sulphur, light density oil of high value for gasoline production.

The Libyan economy is almost totally dependent upon oil revenues for its income. It relies heavily upon American and other Western companies for the production and the distribution of that oil.

There are currently over 50 American companies in Libya, the majority of them in oil or in oil-related fields. Over half of Libya's total oil production is in the hands of American companies, and all

Libya's liquefied natural gas production is accounted for by one American company, Exxon.

In addition to the United States, Libya supplies oil to West Germany (14% production), Italy (13%), France (3%), and a small but growing amount to the Soviet Union. The United States receives liquefied natural gas from Libya, but still relies upon Libya for 80% of its liquefied natural gas and Italy for 40% of its supply.

In price deliberations in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Libya has been a hawk. Its current \$37 per barrel price is at the upper limit of official OPEC prices. Libya has also been a strong advocate of production cuts as a means to husband a limited resource and to maintain price levels.

Statements have been attributed to Col. Qadhafi from time to time that because of political differences Libya might embargo oil sales to the United States. We cannot dismiss totally this possibility. In the past, however, Libya has seen the oil relationship as mutually beneficial.

We also have important general economic interests in Libya. Given the high volume of U.S. oil purchases from Libya, which may surpass \$9 billion in 1980, we can be running a bilateral balance-of-payments deficit of around \$8.5 billion this year. In 1979 Libya purchased \$468 million from the United States, and 1980 figures are likely to show little, if any, improvement. With its high oil revenues for its major development programs, Libya represents a valuable potential market for American products and services, but both strong European competition and Libyan official attitudes are currently obstacles to an increase in trade.

Major Features of the U.S.-Libyan Relationship

Birth of Revolution. As I said at the outset, immediately following the 1969 revolution, the leaders of the new Libyan Government closely identified the United States with the deposed Idris monarchy and with support for the Government of Israel. Libyan attitudes toward any government which had enjoyed a privileged position in that country before the revolution were marked by great suspicion and even hostility. The new government in the first year expelled almost all of the last members of the old Libyan colonial community and closed down the British military base at Tobruk. Then, on June 11, 1970, the U.S. Air Force Base at Wheelus.

In the early days of the revolution, our then Ambassador to Libya, Joseph Palmer, had some brief talks with Col. Qadhafi and his deputy, Maj. Jallud. After the closure of Wheelus, these contacts ceased, and Ambassador Palmer found over the next 2 years that it was virtually impossible to communicate directly with the senior levels of the Libyan Government. This difficulty has generally continued until the present time.

Terrorism. During this period, Libyan criticism of U.S. Middle East policy grew increasingly vocal and strident. Libyan support for revolutionary movements and for groups carrying on international terrorism grew, exemplified by the sanctuary which Libyans gave to the perpetrators of the terrorist attack on Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics in 1972.

In consequence of these and other similar problems in our relations with Libya, we decided in early 1973 that we would not appoint a successor to Ambassador Palmer, who had, meanwhile, returned to the United States. From that point until our Embassy in Tripoli was temporarily closed on May 2, 1980, U.S.-Libyan relations in Tripoli have been conducted at the level of charge d'affaires.

Military Equipment. Because of Libya's support for international terrorism and subversive activities and its interference in the internal affairs of other countries, we also decided in 1973 to disapprove the sale to Libya of military weaponry and certain other equipment and products which could add significantly to Libya's military capability.

That policy was the basis for our decision to block the export of eight C-130s to Libya in 1973, despite the fact that Libya had paid for them. I should say that Libya already had eight other C-130s which were acquired through contracts signed by the prerevolutionary regime. It remains our policy to the present not to sell military equipment to Libya.

Nationalization. A further complication in U.S.-Libya relations was the Libyan decision, starting in 1973, partially to nationalize American and other Western oil companies operating in Libya on the basis that the contracts negotiated by the previous regime had been too favorable to the foreign companies. Non-American, as well as American, companies were involved. This process was a turbulent one, and several companies closed their Libyan operations.

By the late 1970s, however, most claims had been settled, and the American companies there had largely come to an acceptable working relationship with the Libyans.

Peace Process. Libya's relations with Egypt deteriorated after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, as Egypt moved closer to the United States. In July 1977 the two countries were involved in a brief but intense military conflict. President Sadat's 1977 visit to Jerusalem produced vitriolic Libyan criticism, and Libya has pursued a policy firmly rejecting all that has flowed out of our Middle East peace negotiations. It promotes and finances opposition to the Camp David agreements and the Egyptian-Israel Peace Treaty, as well as Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, which form the basis of the Camp David accords. On several occasions, Col. Qadhafi has called for a solution involving "the expulsion from Palestine of all Jews who arrived after 1947." We can and we do have differences with other Arab states on the peace process. But with Libya, the differences are more profound and involve active and often violent opposition to the process of peace.

Aircraft Sales. Commercial aircraft sales, largely for Libya's scheduled international air routes, have been a prominent element in our relationship. Starting in the early 1970s, we allowed the export of civilian commercial aircraft, such as Boeing 727s and 707s.

We made a distinction between commercial aircraft and military aircraft, such as the C-130s, which we had refused to license. In March 1978, however, in a signal intended to underline our opposition to certain of Libya's policies and certain of its activities, the Department of State recommended to the Department of Commerce that licenses not be issued for two Boeing 727s, which were then on order for the Libyan Arab Airlines.

Decisions on matters of this kind are always difficult. Significant U.S. commercial interests are involved, not only in the particular sale but in the maintenance of a market against increasingly strong European competition in commercial aircraft. Also market conditions and the growth and route structure of Libyan Arab Airlines made it clear that use of these aircraft was justified economically.

In June 1978, recommendations from within the Department that the Department's earlier decision be reviewed and reconsidered were sent to Secretary Vance. The Department of Commerce supported reconsideration on the basis of

its own economic analysis. During the summer, Libya indicated it was ready to accede to The Hague convention on hijacking—the most important of the three international antihijacking conventions—and it did so formally in October 1978. Meanwhile Libya agreed to provide in writing assurances that the aircraft involved in the sale would not be used for military purposes. This injunction was made an actual part of the licenses.

It was finally decided on November 2, 1978, by both the Departments of State and Commerce, following congressional consultations, to go forward with this sale. In early 1979, consistent with the 727 decision, the Department of State also recommended the sale of three 747s to Libya, on condition that similarly strict assurances were obtained regarding their nonmilitary use.

We entertained hopes that these decisions would not only be commercially advantageous but would also open opportunities for a more constructive dialogue with Libya on issues which have divided us. We had candid talks with senior Libyan officials in Tripoli in late 1978. I met in October 1978 in Washington with Libyan Foreign Secretary Turayki to discuss our relations. However, a new development occurred.

Libyan Troops. In February 1979, Libyan troops were detected in Uganda, supporting Idi Amin's army in its fight against the Tanzanians and anti-Idi Amin forces. As the Ugandan Army fell back, Libya rushed in more troops and supplies. Both soldiers, possibly as many as 1,500, and military supplies were flown to Entebbe on C-130s (those which Libya had acquired before the revolution) and Boeing 727s. There is no evidence that the two 727s sold in 1978, which carried the specific prohibitions on military use, were employed, but others from the Libyan Arab Airlines fleet were used. These planes were also used in evacuating some of the 400–500 Libyan troops who were wounded in the fighting.

When these reports were confirmed, it left the State Department with no alternative but to regard the 747s for Libya, then being manufactured, as having a "potential significant military application," and in May 1979 the Department of State recommended that the Department of Commerce not allow their export. These three planes were never exported.

Bilateral Discussions. The Libyan attitude toward the United States had, throughout this period, been ambivalent. Col. Qadhafi had, as I have stated, pursued policies clearly contrary to our interests. But at the same time, he had reiterated to private Americans and to foreigners, including high foreign officials, his desire for better relations with the United States. Given our interests in the country, we believed that we had a responsibility to continue to explore whether any basis could be found for improved relations.

In 1979, and in 1978 to a lesser degree, we had serious talks at a level higher than any that had been agreed to since the early days of the revolution. In January 1979, Ambassador Quainton, who is the Director of our Office for Combating Terrorism, held talks with the Libyan Foreign Secretary and other officials in Tripoli and emphasized to them that improvement in our bilateral relations would depend on changed Libyan policies as regards terrorism. On June 17, 1979, I met in Tripoli with Maj. Jallud, who is Col. Qadhafi's deputy. Secretary Vance met with Libyan Foreign Secretary Turayki on October 3, 1979, at the U.N. General Assembly for discussions of U.S.-Libyan relations.

All these talks confirmed that wide differences still divided our two governments but also suggested that Libya wanted to find a way to contain those differences and to "agree to disagree." It was agreed as a result of the conversations between Secretary Vance and Foreign Secretary Turayki that discussions would be continued at my level. Accordingly on October 18, Foreign Secretary Turayki designated the Libyan Ambassador to the United Nations, Monsieur Kikhya, as their point of contact. During the last week of October, I arranged to meet with him on November 8 in New York.

Diplomatic Missions. In this same period, however, changes were taking place within the Libyan foreign policy establishment. I mentioned earlier Qadhafi's philosophy which said that there should not be a government, that rules should be in the hands of the people; so he began creating a people's liaison office under their National People's Congress. The foreign policy aspect of that was the creation of Libyan People's Bureaus in Washington and other major capitals in September 1979, replacing regular embassies as the authority for dealing with the United States. Authority was increas-

ingly shifted from Dr. Turayki's Foreign Ministry to the Foreign Liaison Office, headed by Ahmed Shahati. Ali El-Houderi, who came to Washington to open and to head the People's Bureau in September, reports directly to Ahmed Shahati in Tripoli. By the end of the year it was apparent that the shift was complete and that the Foreign Liaison Office was to be solely responsible for all dealings with countries where People's Bureaus has been established.

Hostages in Iran. In my November 8, 1979, meeting with Libya's U.N. Ambassador Kikhya, which occurred just 4 days after the Tehran hostage crisis had begun, I urged that Libya, along with many other countries, take a stand against the seizure of the hostages. My urging was part of our global effort to mobilize international opinion and pressure.

While Ambassador Kikhya showed understanding and a helpful attitude, other official Libyan statements, including a public call at the Arab Foreign Ministers' meeting in Tunis by the Libyan Foreign Secretary for a concerted Arab boycott action against the United States following our freezing of Iranian assets, prompted us to weigh in strongly with Libyan officials to make the point that Libya could not have it both ways. Their public attacks on us and their call for a boycott were clearly inconsistent with their private and unpublicized criticism of the hostage taking. I informed Ambassador Kikhya on November 16 that because of the position which Libya had taken on this issue, we would have to postpone the planned talks on our bilateral relations. Two days later our charge in Tripoli made similar representations to high officials in both the Foreign Ministry and the Foreign Liaison Office.

On November 22 Libya issued a formal statement in which the section on hostages was helpful, and Col. Qadhafi sent a message to President Carter on November 29 which indicated that he was against the seizure of the hostages and would try to be helpful in securing their release.

Attack on U.S. Embassy. The attack on our Embassy in Tripoli on December 2, 1979, turned a new page in our relationship. The Libyan mob which attacked our Embassy and burned it as our people withdrew to safety ostensibly was demonstrating in support of the Iranian revolution. This event took place, however, against a backdrop of other developments which had caused the temperature to rise

parts of the Islamic world. These included not only the hostage crisis and criticism over our freezing of Iranian assets but also the takeover temporarily of the Grand Mosque at Mecca and the burning of our Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan, by mobs which had been incited to blame the United States for involvement in the desecration of this Islamic shrine.

Immediately after the December 2 attack on our Embassy, our efforts concentrated on getting the Libyans to do certain things: first, to accept responsibility for failing to provide adequate security for the Embassy; second, to agree to compensation for damages; and, most important, to give assurances about the security of official and nonofficial U.S. citizens in Libya.

We had received high-level assurances regarding the safety of Americans in Libya just prior to the attack on our Embassy. After the attack, we received no assurances, but we did not consider them satisfactory in the absence of Col. Qadhafi's willingness to receive our charge and to establish clear responsibility in the Libyan Government for commitments in the case of threats. Our charge returned to Tripoli on December 31, 1979, to seek those assurances from Col. Qadhafi, but he was still awaiting a meeting when other events unfolded.

Regional Dispute. In late January 1980, a commando attack was mounted against the Tunisian city of Gafsa. Ever since an abortive effort to forge a union between Tunisia and Libya in 1974, Col. Qadhafi had made clear his opposition to the regime of President Bourguiba and had offered training and sanctuary to Tunisian dissidents. Tunisia publicly accused Libya of planning and supporting the raid. Both the United States and France rushed military equipment to Tunisia. In consequence, on February 4, the French Embassy in Tripoli and the French Consulate General in Benghazi were attacked and badly damaged by Libyan mobs protesting the alleged presence of French troops in Tunisia. We told our charge to return to Washington, and we left Libya on February 8, 1980.

Intimidation Campaign. Shortly thereafter a series of assassinations of Libyan citizens in Europe commenced, in what appeared to be an effort to stifle opposition to the regime by Libyan exiles. Libyan public statements carefully offered strong evidence that these were officially sanctioned.

Here in the United States, as in Europe, an intimidation campaign was

Iran Chronology, August 1980

August 2

172 of the Iranian protesters arrested on July 27 in Washington, D.C., are transferred to a Federal prison in Otisville, New York.

August 3

Khomeini charges that the protesters are being brutally mistreated by U.S. authorities. U.S. authorities deny charge.

August 4

In retaliation for the alleged mistreatment of the protesters, Iranian Parliament announces it will delay debate on hostage issue.

August 5

Federal authorities release 171 of the protesters.

August 9

President Bani-Sadr announces Mohamad Ali Rajai, a former mathematics teacher, as Prime Minister designate.

August 14

Heads of nine embassies—Australia, Austria, Finland, Greece, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland—appeal to Iran's Parliament to end the hostage crisis.

Iran's internal security chief, Gen. Hossein Fardoust, is reported seen in the U.S. shortly before the shooting on July 22 of Ali Akbar Tabatabai, an Iranian exile.

mounted against Libyan citizens and students resident in this country suspected by the regime in Tripoli of being dissidents or of avoiding service to the state. We took strong steps to stop this campaign. We expelled a total of six members of the Libyan People's Bureau from the United States and insisted that the Libyan mission observe accepted diplomatic norms of conduct.

Assuming, under these circumstances, that we could not safely keep our own officials in Libya, we withdrew the last two American diplomats from Tripoli on May 2, 1980, and temporarily closed our Embassy. This does not constitute a formal break in relations with Libya, and their mission in Washington—the People's Bureau—remains open. We decided, in light of these experiences and the apparent unwillingness of Qadhafi to receive our charge in Tripoli, that the relationship should not be put back on a more usual basis while present circumstances prevail.

U.S. officials state that it appears that his mission was to boost activities in support of Khomeini and against his critics.

August 17

Because of growing tension in Iran, Britain announces temporary closing of its embassy.

Heads of the European Common Market appeal to Iranian Parliament to release hostages.

August 18

Speaker of Iran's Parliament rebuffs appeal from diplomats representing four U.S. allies—Japan, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands—to let an international mission visit the hostages.

August 29

300th day of captivity for U.S. hostages in Iran.

August 30

Eleven Iranians are executed for their alleged roles in plotting a coup aimed at restoring power to Shahpur Bakhtiar, last Prime Minister under the Shah. Ninety-two have been shot for their part in the conspiracy and 300 arrested on charges of involvement.

After 2 weeks of disagreements, the Islamic Republic Party and Bani-Sadr confer to break deadlock over the composition of a cabinet.

August 31

Iranian Cabinet is announced by Prime Minister Rajai but Bani-Sadr disapproves of several nominees. ■

Meanwhile, as our Embassy remains closed, we seek ways to assist and protect the private American community in Libya. We are in close and continuing touch with the American companies which have American citizens living in that country.

The intimidation campaign, meanwhile, remains an issue. Col. Qadhafi publicly indicated in June 1980 that the campaign was over but seemed to exempt the United States and supporters of Israel. There have been no assassinations of Libyans in Europe since June 11, and, fortunately, no serious incident has yet to occur in the United States. But we continue to monitor the situation closely.

Libya's Attitude. The attitude of Qadhafi and his followers toward the United States has been ambivalent and often self-contradictory. They have seen the value of cooperation with American companies in the production and marketing of their oil and have recognized the

role American citizens have played in keeping production high. At the same time, in Qadhafi's revolutionary philosophy, the American Government and all it stands for is, to quote one of his statements, "the embodiment of evil." Particularly in international policies, our differences are deep.

It is both in this latter connection and consistent with Qadhafi's general political theory that government and people can be separated, that Libya has made efforts over the past 2 years to improve its ties with nonofficial Americans. For example, in October 1978, the Libyans sponsored an "Arab-American dialogue," which took the form of bringing to Libya a large group of private Americans for meetings and discussions with senior Libyan officials. Ahmed Shahati, head of the Foreign Liaison Office, came to this country with a goodwill delegation in January 1979 and visited several American cities, including Washington, Atlanta, Miami, New Orleans, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Detroit, and Moscow (Idaho). A Libyan women's delegation in March 1979 made a goodwill visit to the United States, meeting with Americans in Washington, New York, and on the west coast. We have to assume that such Libyan efforts will be a continuing feature of Libya's foreign relations under Qadhafi.

For the Future

As the subcommittee can see, Libya is a country where the combination of our important interests and the policies of the Libyan Government present us continually with difficult choices.

We obviously cannot have satisfactory relations in the face of Libyan-supported terrorism practiced against us and our friends. While we don't see eye-to-eye on how Middle East peace can be achieved, in the absence of terrorist actions and subversion directed against other parties involved, it should be possible for our two countries to accept that we have differences and proceed on that basis—as is the case with other Arab countries in the region.

We cannot reopen our mission in Tripoli until we have credible and acceptable assurances for the safety of our personnel. But at the same time we believe it is in our interest to keep the channels of communication open with Libya, through the People's Bureau in Washington and through other channels which may be available, such as third country embassies in Tripoli.

If the atmosphere can improve, we do not exclude the eventual return of our American staff to Tripoli, the resumption of a dialogue over the differences which divide us, and possibly a lessening of our restrictions on trade.

In present circumstances, however, our broad interests require that we continue efforts to communicate with the Libyan authorities wherever possible, at the same time making clear in our specific actions and policies our concern over many of the attitudes and activities of the Libyan regime. ■

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Tank Sale to Jordan

by Harold H. Saunders

*Statement before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on July 29, 1980. Mr. Saunders is Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.*¹

What I would propose to do this afternoon is to recall briefly my testimony of a year ago when a possible sale of tanks to Jordan was an issue and then to bring you up to date on developments since that time. I then would like to summarize the importance of this sale for U.S. national security interests and for our relations with Jordan.

Situation Last Summer

Last summer when I testified on this issue, my starting point was the study the United States did in the summer of 1973 to assist Jordan to design a force modernization plan, dropping from five motorized divisions to four, more modern, mechanized and armored divisions. In the context of these four divisions, we discussed a maximum of 18 armored battalions each with a strength up to 54 tanks, i.e., a structure identical to a U.S. tank battalion. For their own reasons, the Jordanians settled on an eventual structure of 44 tanks per battalion. Implementation of the plan was slowed by funding constraints, and the Jordanians limited themselves to 16

battalions—rather than 18—with 35 tanks per battalion—instead of even 44—in the interim.

The Jordanian tank fleet consists a large number of aging tanks, including U.S. M48A1s and British Centurions. These are tanks of Korean war vintage and, after periods of service as long as 20 years, the Jordanians wish to replace or upgrade these vehicles. They decided to rebuild the Centurions. The M48s were to have been rebuilt/upgraded in an Iranian facility at Iranian expense, and we had concurred in this plan in 1976. This would have made the M48 a close match for the M60s not being offered. The collapse of the Iranian Government foreclosed this option.

Before the Iranian collapse, the Jordanians had also begun to consider alternative options for completing the tank modernization program—rebuild in Jordan, or new U.S. tanks and/or foreign-source tanks. They engaged in an extended cost and effectiveness study. As an input into the study, the United States was asked whether it would supply up to 300 new M60A3 tanks. We agreed to consult with the Congress on that proposal, subject to the provision that the older M48 tank in the Jordanian inventory be retired on an essentially one-for-one basis. The Jordanians at the same time explored mix of U.S. and foreign-source procurement.

This was the situation when we discussed the subject of tanks a year ago with the Congress. At that time, we briefed on the then current Jordanian plans to finish equipping the existing 16 battalions, i.e., to raise the strength of each battalion from 35 to 44 tanks in the process of modernizing the inventory. We also said that we were not prepared to sell the tank thermal sight at that time.

Present Situation

What has changed since last summer? The Jordanians have made two decisions. One was to buy 274 British Chieftain tanks. The other was to return to the 18-battalion structure originally proposed in our 1973 discussions. They will mechanize their last two infantry brigades, which would require the armoring of two battalions. The four-division structure remains unchanged. The Jordanians still intend to dispose of the aging M48s.

At the April 1980 meeting of the U.S.-Jordanian Joint Military Commission, we informed Jordan that we were

prepared to sell 100 M60A3s, subject to Congressional concurrence, and to continue to work with the Congress about the sale of an additional 100 tanks. We also agreed to offer the tank thermal sight, which, since our negative decision about Jordan's request a year ago, has been reserved to Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Korea. At that meeting, Jordan rejected an earlier request for U.S. assistance in finding purchasers for the M60A3 tanks and reiterated their intent to remove these tanks from their inventory. In May the Jordanians requested 100 M60A3s to complete their force modernization plans.

U.S. Interests

With this factual background, I would not like to turn to the significant policy issues underlying this decision. These issues seem to me to be three. How are U.S. interests served by this sale? What will be the effect of the sale on the regional military balance? What would be the effect on our interests of a refusal to make the sale?

We believe this sale is fully consistent with America's interests in the region. U.S. cooperation with moderate regimes in preserving the integrity and security of their own nations is an important part of the role the United States is expected by its friends to play. A strong American position of this kind in the area serves the interests of all who depend on us for their ultimate security.

Jordan has a longstanding policy of keeping Jordanian territory to potential terrorists. Maintenance of this policy, along with other sensible Jordanian policies, is reinforced by U.S. cooperation and understanding for Jordan's legitimate defensive needs and goals.

Jordan works actively for the stability and security of the states of the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula. This Jordanian policy conforms to our own interests in the region's stability and in promoting a policy of regional responsiveness in resisting outside aggression. In 1961 Jordan sent troops to Kuwait to ward off a threatened Iraqi invasion. Jordan cooperated in the defense of Oman against the 1965-75 communist-supported rebellion in Oman. Over 1,000 Jordanian military advisers are actively serving in the peninsula states, and more than 10,000 military personnel from this area have been trained in Jordanian facilities.

During his recent visit to Washington, King Hussein reaffirmed his willingness

to respond, if called on for help by the peninsula states. The effectiveness of Jordan's assistance, which closely supports our interests, is directly related to both Jordan's own military strength and the close military relationship which Jordan is perceived as having with the United States.

We disagree with Jordan about the merits of the Camp David process. The recent meetings between the President and King Hussein, however, reaffirmed the fact that Jordan supports Resolution 242 and wants a comprehensive peace with Israel. Jordan's attitude will be critically important to bringing about a West Bank settlement which we would find acceptable. As we work toward the goal of a comprehensive peace, it is essential that we preserve and protect our relations of trust and cooperation with Jordan—something which we will have greater difficulty doing if we do not continue our longstanding cooperation with them in maintaining their legitimate defensive strength.

We have examined carefully the question of the military balance, both between Jordan and Israel and in the broader regional context. Let me briefly take you through the numbers.

- The present Jordanian tank force numbers 673 tanks, including 283 M48 tanks, 308 British Centurions, and 82 M60Als.

- The Jordanians have on order 274 British Chieftains. If the Chieftains were added to the existing inventory, the total would be 947 tanks, i.e., more than the Jordanians want.

- They are, however, planning to dispose of the M48s.

- If they add the 100 tanks which you are considering today and dispose of the M48s, they will have an inventory of 749 tanks, consisting of 293 upgraded Centurions (15 Centurion tanks will be used in the upgrading process), 274 Chieftains, 82 M60Als, and 100 M60A3s. That is 76 more tanks than they have right now and fewer than they actually have on hand and on order combined. It is also fewer than the 972 envisioned in the 1973 study.

- If we go forward with the sale of the second 100 tanks, a decision which is still under review, the total impact of both sales would be 150 more tanks than Jordan presently has on the ground. This is not, nor can it be, a significant threat to Israel; it is, nonetheless, a substantial contribution to Jordan's defense capability and to regional stability.

Iraq and Syria have both qualitatively and quantitatively increased their tank forces. In fact, this has been a primary reason for Jordan's continued modernization. Furthermore, even when Jordan's tank forces are added to those of other Arab countries, one must realize that Israel has also expanded and modernized its tank forces since 1973 and continues to enjoy an overwhelming superiority against all likely adversaries. Equally important is our judgment that Jordan has no offensive intentions, that it is a small country outnumbered by all its major neighbors, and that its forces modernization plan, long under way, is both prudent and reasonable.

In considering this sale, you must also contemplate the effects of our refusal or your rejection. In that context, it should be remembered that the British Chieftain tank, purchased by Jordan last year and which Jordan could again purchase, is at least a comparable vehicle to the M60A3 and has features, such as gun size and engine power, superior to the M60A3. The policy question we have to address is not whether Jordan will obtain more modern tanks but who will supply them and under what conditions. Consider the following.

- A U.S. sale to Jordan bolsters a key bilateral relationship and carries with it restraints (on transfer to third countries, for example), while acquisition of tanks from another country would carry few or no restraints.

- In the context of the M60 sale, Jordan has agreed to replace its M48s on a one-for-one basis and intends, in fact, to phase out virtually all its M48s. Working with the Jordanians we have already identified three friendly countries whose combined requests for tanks exceed Jordan's M48 inventory. Several other purchasers are also possible.

An effort to "punish" Jordan by withholding our consent to this sale will not prevent the acquisition of tanks, but it will do serious damage to a key bilateral relationship and to our efforts to work with Jordan for regional security and stability.

In summary, the sale is a clear demonstration that we are capable of recognizing and supporting our interests in the stability and security of the region as a whole and supporting these interests. Jordan performs a critically important security role in cooperation with key states of the Persian Gulf re-

gion, thus serving U.S. interests directly and indirectly. The United States must maintain a close working relationship with Jordan in the present and future interest of peace. This can only be done if we are prepared to respond in a reasonable way to reasonable Jordanian requests for cooperation in areas vital to Jordan's own security.

We have not provided all that Jordan has requested; however, close Jordanian-U.S. working relationships have reinforced the inclination of the Jordanian Armed Forces to look to the West, and the United States particularly, for advice, training, and military orientation. For the United States to turn away from this relationship would clearly diminish our capacity to influence Jordan's future policies, political and military, and to serve our broad, enduring national interests in an important region of the world.

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

U.S.-Jordan Relationship

by *Morris Draper*

*Statement before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on August 27, 1980. Mr. Draper is Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.*¹

I welcome the opportunity to testify before this subcommittee on the historically close U.S.-Jordanian relationship as well as on the important role the United States expects Jordan to play in the region in the years ahead. To begin with, I would like to review briefly U.S. policies toward Jordan and U.S. interests in a moderate, stable government which remains ready to make peace on the basis of Security Council Resolution 242, Jordan's attitude toward peacemaking, and how our policies toward Jordan fit into the tumultuous period in which King Hussein has led his country, along with our expanding interests in the region and the changing circumstances there.

U.S. Interests in and Policies Toward Jordan

A succession of American Administrations has believed that we should work particularly closely with moderate and like-minded governments such as Jordan to preserve their integrity, to strengthen their abilities to pursue independent policies, and to expand their capacity to respond constructively to inevitable change. Our friends in turn expect us to respond positively and fairly to their legitimate concerns and interests, as well as to some of their honest grievances. We believe that the success of moderate policies will affect the political nature of the region in a useful way and will reinforce the concept of resolving problems—both internal and international—through negotiation and compromise rather than through conflict and confrontation.

American policy toward Jordan, particularly in the last decade, therefore, has been centered on the following major elements.

- We intend to assist Jordan in maintaining its independence, its integrity, and its freedom to make decisions of its own, despite influences and pressures exerted by other states.

- In return we will want a reasonable degree of Jordanian cooperation in seeking to realize our long-term policy goals of peace, stability, and security for the area.

- We will do what we can to reinforce Jordan's willingness and ability to join in a negotiated, comprehensive Middle East peace settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

- At the present stage, we will try to set the stage for Jordan's possibly more active involvement in the peace process at an early future moment. Such an opportunity could arise following a satisfactory completion of negotiations for a self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza.

- We will continue to encourage Jordan's determination to preserve peace along the long border with Israel and the occupied territories.

- We will encourage Jordan in its useful role of helping to preserve stability in the gulf region, including Yemen, through its current programs involving the training of gulf military personnel and the seconding to certain gulf states of Jordanian military and security advisers. In this connection we have noted King Hussein's willingness to provide Jordanian forces on a limited scale for deterrent or defensive

purposes—if called upon for help—in periods of challenge and tension.

- We will want to manage our economic and military assistance program in such a way as to make it clear to Jordan it need not depend—to a possibly unacceptable degree—upon the assistance of states which might want to exact politically difficult demands.

- We will want to continue—through the military assistance program, training programs, and the Joint Military Commission—a relationship with Jordan's military establishment, based on mutual trust and confidence which will reinforce and preserve Jordan's present major dependence on the United States and the West for weaponry, for training, and for military doctrine and orientation. It is reasonable to assist Jordan in satisfying its legitimate defensive needs.

- We will want to maintain a constructive economic assistance program which will advance the day when Jordan will be self-supporting and which meanwhile, will contribute to the strengthening of Jordan's institutions and stability.

- We will encourage Jordan to maintain good cooperative relationships with the other moderate government and to pursue foreign and domestic policies aimed at enhancing stability in the region.

- We will continue to acknowledge in appropriate ways the contribution Jordan has been making in providing opportunity—political and economic—to the Palestinian element of its total population.

- We intend to work constructively with Jordan for the fair and efficient use of vital water resources in the area.

Jordan's Attitudes Toward Peacemaking

King Hussein is a member of a small handful of Arab statesmen who have persistently applied real and serious thought to ways of securing a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace on honorable terms. President Sadat of Egypt and President Bourguiba of Tunisia are others. All—Hussein included—have suffered bitter and unfair criticism, as well as political ostracism, for their courage and convictions. All have been ready to accept the reality of Israel and to recognize Israel's genuine security needs.

Following the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, Jordan adhered to Security Council

Arms Coproduction

by Matthew Nimetz

Address before the American Defense Preparedness Association in Arlington, Virginia, on July 15, 1980. Mr. Nimetz is Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology.

I want to talk to you this morning about an evolution in one aspect of our security assistance relationship with other countries around the world, and that is the trend toward coproduction. I will emphasize at the outset that this trend is driven not only by military considerations but also by political and economic realities. Policies have not created the trends but are of necessity responding to them.

With our NATO allies we face the specific task of achieving the most effective combat forces possible, given limited resources and a relentlessly growing Soviet military power. The goals of rationalization, standardization, and interoperability (RSI) have been imposed to achieve the most effective mobilization of our Western defense assets, which on the battlefield may mean survival or destruction. So the overriding justification of RSI, with its cooperative development and production

programs within NATO, is essentially military.

In the context of history, the trend toward coproduction is an evolution that has developed with the economies of our Western allies. It has been a long time now since we provided our ravaged friends Marshall plan economic aid and surplus military equipment from our World War II stocks. As you know, that grant program was followed by the development of foreign military sales (FMS) commercial and government-to-government transactions on either a cash or loan basis, with the gradual phasing out of the military assistance program (MAP). The war-torn economies we once bolstered have now become major competitors with us in the arms industry.

For U.S. manufacturers, the growth of European industry translates into a loss of assured markets and, especially in the aerospace industry, competition with international consortia of companies backed by European governments. This trend to consortia-produced systems reflects the high costs and technological complexity involved, among other factors.

Faced with the political and economic realities of modern Europe, we must conclude that we have two choices:

What Kind of Jordan Do We Want?

It would be short-sighted and irresponsible of us to play down the potential role of Jordan in contributing to area peace and stability.

Jordan will be an indispensable partner to a comprehensive peace and to an accommodation to Israel's critical security requirements. Active Jordanian cooperation will be essential in dealing with the Palestinian problem, including its political and refugee dimensions, among others.

We want Jordan to continue its useful advisory and training activities in the gulf region and to continue to act as a responsive and responsible ally of moderate Arab leaders.

Broad American interests will be served well through a continuing, close partnership of the kind that has existed for most of the years of King Hussein's stewardship. This requires, however, that we continue our sound relationship

in the military field and consult regularly and systematically about Jordan's legitimate defensive requirements. We cannot expect them to take decisions which they believe would compromise their national security, but we can work with them for prudent programs which will not upset the basic military balance.

In the conduct of our relationship, we should not try to force proven friends of the past into adopting our preferred tactics of the moment. This might be worth trying if we had fundamental differences over our ultimate goal, but the goal of a just and full peace is common to both Jordan and the United States. Our relationship must revolve about our common interests and our common, long-term objectives.

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Resolution 242 as the basis for a settlement and has stuck to that position ever since; it cooperated with U.N. Ambassador Jarring's mediatory efforts under that resolution; and it accepted the thrust of the so-called Rogers plan. In 1972 Jordan floated a proposal for a "United Arab Kingdom" encompassing the West and East Banks. While it met strong opposition, the concept would have to be viewed by any objective observer as a serious effort to resolve one of the more sensitive problems in an overall Arab-Israeli peace settlement.

Following the 1973 war, Jordan reported the initial, limited disengagement agreements in the Sinai and Golan Heights; however, it made clear its reservations about the potentially divisive implications—in the Arab world—of the second Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement. Jordan appeared ready, in principle, to explore a Palestinian-Israeli disengagement, but nothing materialized.

In 1978 Jordan decided it could not accept the invitation to join the process envisaged in the Camp David accords; in part it was worried about "partial and incomplete" settlements. We, of course, agree with Jordan about the merits of the Camp David approach. But there is no misunderstanding between us on the fact that Jordan still wants a fair and just peace based on the principles of Security Council Resolution 242.

King Hussein has made clear to us—as he has in his recent talks in Washington—in his address to the National Press Club—that he will remain skeptical about the Camp David process but open-minded about unfolding developments. Under certain circumstances, he will consider involving Jordan more actively in peacemaking efforts.

Consistently since Camp David, King Hussein has advised his fellow Arabs not to be bound by ideological arguments. He has, instead, urged them to develop an alternative to the Camp David route which, however, would be peaceful, pragmatic, and acceptable to all parties. He has stressed that the Arab states must exhibit an attitude of reasonableness in lieu of rigid activism if an honorable end to the Arab-Israeli conflict is to be achieved.

We believe it is important to sustain this pragmatic and open-minded attitude until developments in the peace negotiations turn what we hope will be a new and fresh page and offer opportunities for accelerated progress.

Either we cooperate in some way, through licensing, shared research and development, and coproduction, or we try to go it alone on both sides of the Atlantic. The days of wholesale acceptance of American finished products, utilizing advanced and unmatched technology, have just about ended in Europe and even elsewhere around the world. Everyone wants a piece of the pie and will strike the deal that gives him the biggest slice. But I would remind you that the pie is a large and expanding one—the NATO market accounts for over 60% of the free world total of military expenditures.

Allied Cooperation

Within a NATO context our recognition of the need for military effectiveness, along with these politico-economic realities, is incorporated in our cooperative arms projects, which range from licensing, through cooperative research and development to the projected “families of weapons” for the late 1980s and 1990s.

Have our cooperative projects been successful thus far? The answer to that is a qualified yes. RSI has not achieved the savings it might in an ideal world where all duplicative research and development would be eliminated, along with all duplicative production; nor has it achieved the complete rationalization of allied logistics. But coproduction has achieved improved battlefield compatibility and savings in both cost and development time. An example is the ROLAND air-to-air missile system, developed through Franco-German cooperation and bought by the U.S. Army in 1975. By agreeing to coproduce the ROLAND, the United States acknowledged that it would not spend the money to develop a comparable state-of-the-art weapons system when it had the capability to do so, but which perhaps would not have been within the desired timeframe.

From a general comparison of estimates, it would appear that the United States saved at least \$500 million in development costs and several years in drawing board to production time, and these are conservative estimates. We have achieved general equipment commonality, which means interoperability and standardization on the battlefield. Euromissile, the Franco-German developer, received an infusion of licensing fees, and we received a share of the jobs

and the profits. The families of weapons, the air-to-air missile systems, and the antitank guided weaponry now under development for the late 1980s are to use the best technology available in the alliance but will be coproduced on both sides of the Atlantic.

This means that U.S. industry will compete; we will not make all of the profits, but we will share in the profits as will our European partners. So our cooperative projects are very much a part of our planning for the future. In pursuing them we are conscious of the need to work with U.S. industry to insure fair procedures, good opportunities for investment and sales, and a better feel for the international competitive situation.

One reality of NATO arms cooperation is the Europeans' desire for third-country sales. For reasons which are familiar to you, such as the need for a large enough production run to justify initial investment and to maintain a viable industry, the Europeans believe they need to be able to sell coproduced weapons to non-NATO markets. In recognition of this, our effort is to channel, in full cooperation with the governments of NATO, those third-country sales into areas and to countries that will be consistent with our worldwide interests and those of our NATO allies.

We are conscious of our global responsibilities to restrain the arms trade and to maintain stability in troubled regions. On this issue, we and the Europeans differ somewhat in approach: Generally the Europeans desire to maximize third-country sales, while it is U.S. Government policy to temper the export drive with foreign policy-motivated restraint. It is not inconceivable that without cooperative projects the Europeans would go off entirely on their own. While they have this right, we believe that all our interests are better served through cooperation.

Another reality is that with cooperative development there may be less research and development to go around, certainly less for any one type of weapon system. We hope the research and development will be better, by virtue of focusing the dollars and talent on the priority areas—not diffused and poorly utilized. But because there may be less to go around, industry will have to do even better than in the past. We will assuredly see more coproduction, more licensed production, more cooperation with our allies and friends, even more offsets, which are all part of the growing competitiveness of the international production and sale of weapons today. We

must all, government officials and industrialists alike, think as broadly and flexibly as is possible to meet the challenge of the decade ahead.

Impact on Developing Countries

I have spoken briefly about the problems and benefits of coproduction with our allies, which include Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and other special friends. Within these countries, economic and political pressures may work to create an overly large industrial capacity for the production of certain items, leading in turn to the inevitable pressure to find export markets. But the issue of coproduction has a new dimension when we examine its effects on lesser developed countries. We are now seeing our European friends and the United States, as even the Soviet Union, sharing technology and coproducing weapons with the less developed countries (LDCs).

Very simply, there is a worldwide trend of increased production of weapons by an increasing number of countries. Over 30 nations are now producing arms for their use, and the number is growing each year. This trend is not confined just to Western European and Warsaw Pact states and China but is spreading to middle-tier and lesser developed countries. Major combat systems are now being produced by Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, India, Israel, North Korea, South Korea, Pakistan, Singapore, South Africa, Taiwan, and Yugoslavia. Arms production by all LDCs is about 5% of the world's yearly total; it has grown from \$1 billion in 1969 to a present figure of more than \$5 billion. This is not a small sum, especially considering the demands for development resources.

Some of the industrialization in the lesser developed countries has been in high-technology civilian sectors, but for weapons they have mainly produced simple, rugged, reliable, and practically designed systems. Some of the weapons production, though, has become quite complex, reflecting a substantial infusion of advanced technology. Less developed countries are now building destroyers and frigates, jet fighters, antitank missiles, submarines, and main battle tanks. And some will soon be in the missile business.

Indigenous weapons production is considered important by some developing nations for a number of reasons. Among these are:

- Increasing their international prestige;

- Enhancing their security;
- Saving foreign exchange;
- Training workers for other industrial skills;
- Reversing the "brain drain";
- Moving from buying to assembling or producing to selling;
- Exerting a regional influence; and
- Ending their dependence on others.

Let me cite a couple of examples. India after its independence, procured most of its weapons from abroad (the United Kingdom and the United States originally, then the Soviet Union) but soon joined the trend toward coproduction, primarily with the United Kingdom and France. In the late 1970s, the Soviets, in spite of their secretiveness, entered the coproduction scheme by way of competitive bidding against Western governments and industry. Recently, India signed a very large arms purchase agreement with the Soviet Union, which will probably lead to coproduction of some very sophisticated weapons. Incidentally, India's construction of a space launch vehicle is a good example of the use of civilian technology which has applications for military systems.

Brazil is another good example. The Brazilians have improved their capability to the point where, from totally internal sources, Brazil was able to produce and sell armored combat vehicles to several lesser developed countries.

The point I want to make here is that the so-called lesser developed countries are modernizing fast, and the combined growth of their defense industries and the accompanying growth of their infrastructure make it possible for many of them now to produce for export.

In looking at 10 major arms producers from among the LDCs which have received technological assistance, licenses, or coproduction agreements, we find that of 40 major weapons systems being produced by those 10 countries, 26 were accomplished with help from the developed industrial states.

The suppliers to these 26 projects were: four from the United States, six from the United Kingdom, five from France, four from West Germany, and ten from the Soviet Union. Interestingly, in a couple of cases one LDC needed another. In 10 cases the LDCs produced the major weapons systems themselves from internal resources, capabilities, and manpower.

You can see from this that a little assistance can go a long way—be it primary coproduction or dual-use civilian technology. And major suppliers tend to

at least seek to maintain their relationships by continuing to supply still more advanced technology and improvement packages to the LDCs.

In this competitive world we see this trend continuing—licensing and coproduction are a way to protect an exporting nation's economic interests, as well as the interests of a particular company. We must recognize that in many cases, unless one is willing to consider these types of arrangements, someone else will; or the LDCs will do it themselves.

The problem for the LDC in all this is to find a balance between civilian and military needs, and within the defense sector, between buying weapons and producing its own. This is not an easy decision when you consider:

- What are the LDCs' other societal and industrial needs? Will building an arms industry unnecessarily upset the precarious balance among economic sectors?
- Will an arms industry drain valuable cash and assets (people and raw materials) away from other priorities?
- Will an arms industry upset neighboring countries and contribute to regional instability?
- Will an internal arms industry really give a country prestige, regional dominance, and enhanced security? Might it not make for vulnerability instead?
- Will an arms industry create new pressures for exports in a highly competitive field? Is this not a competition in which the LDC is likely to fare badly, leaving the government the embarrassing and expensive choice between abandoning or subsidizing a failing domestic arms industry?

It is also clear that in weighing these factors, the country that opts for coproduction will not always make the most economically feasible choice between buying and coproducing. In fact, even a highly developed nation might pay twice as much per copy of a major item to gain the industrial development benefits from coproduction.

U.S. Concerns

In my view, we need to think about the policy issues we will all face because of the proliferation of conventional arms production. When we speak about "proliferation," we commonly refer to nuclear matters. But we must also be concerned about the security and destabilizing risks of conventional arms proliferation. This should be particularly on

our agenda because we advanced countries supply the technology, the licenses, the turnkey factories, the education, and training that provides the lesser developed countries with the ability to go into large-scale arms production. But of the major suppliers only the United States has a comprehensive arms transfer policy.

We are most concerned that weapons and weapons-production proliferation could lead to increasingly unstable regions. While we support economic development and technology transfer generally, we take a somewhat more cautious approach to the flow of new or advanced technology with military applications except to allied countries; and we scrutinize carefully arrangements that significantly expand arms industry capabilities of others. We in government recognize these responsibilities and take the most sophisticated approach we can toward our arms transfer restrictions, to insure that their application fully accounts for the changing realities.

Another implication of the politically motivated decision by more and more countries to establish their own arms industries is that arms manufacturing capacity is likely to become excessive to real needs, leading in turn to untrammelled efforts to export, which will upset regional balances and affect our own security and foreign policy.

Another of our major concerns is the risk to U.S. or allied forces during military operations worldwide. We have heard of the problems of protecting the oil-shipping lanes from fast patrol boats armed with surface-to-surface missiles, but we must recognize that our carrier task forces could also be faced with threats from smaller countries and even terrorists, utilizing advanced weapon systems, possibly nuclear weapons. The growth of missile technology in these countries is also alarming. Earlier this year, China tested the intercontinental capabilities of its ballistic missile, and others no doubt will soon have this capacity. When the yearning and capacity to develop advanced delivery systems is added to the nuclear proliferation problem, we see real grounds for concern ahead.

This is a very complicated area. We have many friends around the world who have a legitimate security need for coproduction and a stable economic and political base on which to build. We want to accommodate them whenever possible, within reason. We also understand that some sales will be made anyway, and that coproduction is a requirement of the acquiring country. We

Ocean Development in the 1980s

by Thomas R. Pickering

Address before the National Ocean Industries Association in Washington, D.C., on March 11, 1980. Mr. Pickering is Assistant Secretary for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs.

It is a pleasure to be with you at your Eighth Annual Meeting. Your theme, "The 1980s: Decade for Ocean Development," is timely and places you in good company. As you know, last year 53 Members of the Congress broached the concept of the 1980s as a decade of ocean resource use and management in a letter to the President. The idea is now under study by the Administration and by the presidentially appointed National Advisory Committee on Oceans and Atmosphere.

By whatever name we give to these endeavors—whether it be the decade of

ocean development, the decade of ocean resource use and management, or a name yet to be coined—I believe we all striving to attain a common goal. That goal is the development of marine resources, through the encouragement of private enterprise, in a manner that protects the marine environment and equitably accommodates the often competing demands on ocean space.

Certainly, that is a principal goal of the bureau which I head in the Department of State—the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs. We are charged with handling a wide variety of international oceans issues pertinent to your theme. These include fisheries negotiations and ocean management matters concerned with marine scientific research, marine mammals, marine pollution, and polar affairs. We also have responsibilities with regard to the third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, which is

But our task is to take into account the realities of the trends in coproduction and adjust and channel our energies to the reality of what is happening in the world. We want to assure greater predictability to industry and cooperating governments. We have, therefore, in certain cases, established sales territories to allow sales to all NATO countries; this builds in stability and predictability which helps industry to plan. Additionally, where and when possible we are approving sales territories for sales to countries outside NATO.

In reaching our decisions we focus not on abstractions but on the sensitivity of technology that needs to be controlled. Does it make sense for us to control the sale of a tank because it has U.S. paint or even tank treads? We are considering waiving export reviews of items containing low-level technology. Similarly, we expect European governments to waive their restrictions on U.S. coproduced items containing European technology. We are more and more concerned about the economics of major arms sales, including the impact of offset arrangements on our balance-of-payments position.

With these trends in mind, it is up to both government and industry to

adapt to the changing nature of global arms sales. Even with our NATO allies we must be aware of the problems involved in the difficult partnership ahead. And with regard to the less developed countries, we must keep in mind the host of new problems, as well as benefits, that arms coproduction brings. Given the trends in the world today, it is our task to work together in this country, government and industry, to channel these trends into productive endeavors to the United States and for the other countries concerned.

That is why we are attempting to fine-tune our arms transfer restraint policy, and why we are working with others in cooperative projects. We are looking not to short-term maximization but to the long-term health of our defense industry and American economic, political, and security interests. In fact, it is one of the accomplishments of this Administration that we have made such progress in developing cooperative weapons projects, as well as maintaining a responsible restraint policy. So I urge you to work with us in the coming decade to maintain the superiority of our industry, both qualitative and quantitative, in the context of a more competitive world and a period of heightened risks for our country. ■

also recognize that there is a difference between limited coassembly, partial coproduction, and wholesale transfer of sensitive technology.

We do not take a doctrinaire approach to this problem. Exceptions to our general policy against coproduction are possible. Each such arrangement is, of course, considered on its merits and for its contribution to the national interest. And national interest must be seen in the long as well as in the short term. We have found that some flexibility in our sales policy can work to our advantage. We are looking carefully at the goals we seek and balancing them against our policy of restraint.

The President alone can make exceptions and will do so if such an exception is in the national interest. In January he decided to make an exception to allow U.S. firms to develop a fighter solely for export—a quite major exception to Presidential Determination 13. In coproduction, he has made some 13 exceptions to our policy of no coproduction.

An important baseline to recall here is that the arms transfer limitations of our policy do not apply in any manner to NATO states, Japan, Australia, or New Zealand (a market encompassing close to 70% of non-Communist military expenditures); there are no dollar ceilings and no prohibitions on coproduction. The one limit that remains is that to which I have alluded earlier—third-country transfers. Just as with U.S. firms, if U.S.-origin technology goes into a weapons system, then the U.S. Government, for policy reasons and because of a congressional mandate, must carefully review proposed transfers. Some U.S. firms have argued that for the government to allow coproduction puts them at a competitive disadvantage, as the Europeans can more easily market, but I disagree. It is not our policy to permit European sales to countries to which we would not at the same time permit U.S. firms to sell. In other words, if one competes, we want everyone to compete on an equal basis.

Conclusion

Where, then, does this leave us? First, on the NATO side, we can see some trends. Rationalization, standardization, and interoperability (RSI) has a solid foothold, and I believe has solid public, congressional, and industry support. The family of weapons concept has taken hold, as have codevelopment, coproduction, and industrial teaming.

presently meeting at the United Nations in New York. At the conclusion of the Law of the Sea Conference, my Bureau will be responsible for the foreign policy followup and implementation.

During the past year we have been engaged in an analysis of likely trends and related national objectives in ocean affairs during the 1980s. I would like to share with you some of our thoughts on these matters, particularly as they relate to the development and management of ocean resources. I look forward to your comments on our analysis in the discussion period after these remarks.

We see that, whether or not a draft of the sea treaty is concluded, principles are evolving that will be applicable to the development and management of ocean resources. Chief among these is the growing trend toward coastal state control over exploration, exploiting, conserving, and managing both the living and nonliving resources of the seabed, subsoil, and adjacent waters out to 200 nautical miles from the coast. Coastal state control over other activities such as the production of energy from the water and winds would also be asserted. Because most of the presently exploitable resources of the oceans are found within 200 nautical miles of the coast, during the 1980s the majority of ocean resource activities will be carried out under the regulation and control of national governments, although we in the State Department will necessarily be involved because of the potential for dispute and conflict which these activities could engender.

Fisheries

Ocean resource activity with which the Department of State has had the most association is fishing. Since the 1950s the Department has been concerned with the development and management of the living resources of the oceans as an important world source of protein. Looking ahead to the decade of the 1980s, we foresee a declining per capita world fisheries harvest. Despite a marked increase in investment in fishing fleets since 1970, the annual world catch has increased little beyond 80 million tons. At the same time the world's population continues to grow rapidly.

During the 1980s maximum sustainable yields will have been reached or surpassed in many regions unless more sophisticated management

schemes are instituted to rebuild stocks. Better management might actually reduce world catch over the short run as overfishing in some regions is cut, but the end result should be a higher sustained catch over the longer term as depleted stocks recover. An increase in the world catch to 80 million tons by the year 2000 is a possibility. We also see a trend through the 1980s away from long-distance fishing fleets, as coastal states extend their control. Increased emphasis will be placed on new coastal fishing vessels and domestic shore-based or offshore processing operations.

We expect U.S. fisheries policy to continue to be set by the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, which established our 200-nautical-mile fishery conservation zone. Under the terms of that act, regional fishery management councils initiate the calculation of the optimum yield from each fishery and determine how much U.S. vessels are capable of harvesting. The Department of State allocates the balance to other nations with which we have governing international fishery agreements. In the past, the primary factor in the Department's determination of allocations has been the traditional or historical levels of foreign fishing.

However, sentiment also is growing in Congress, industry, and the regional councils to use U.S. fish allocations as devices or bargaining chips to open foreign markets to U.S. fisheries exports and to gain other economic benefits in the fisheries arena. We share this interest. As an example, we are now carrying on consultations with Congress, the Commerce Department, and industry prior to reallocating some 350,000 tons of fish we withheld from the Soviet Union in our reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. These consultations will establish the basis for reallocation of this resource, including how we can use it to promote the exports of our own fish.

The Fishery Conservation and Management Act has encouraged significant new investment in the U.S. harvesting and processing capacity. During the 1980s we expect to see a continuing decline in the level of foreign fishing off our coasts. This will reduce the occasions to negotiate additional governing international fishery agreements except in cases where there are opportunities for either reciprocal access by U.S. vessels or where there is a potential for increased economic benefit

in the U.S. fisheries sector, such as establishing new joint ventures and increased foreign trade. During the 1980s we will also be giving priority to negotiating arrangements with other countries to help maintain U.S. access to important distant water fisheries such as tuna and shrimp.

Mineral Resources

Turning from fish to mineral resources, during the past decade exploration for petroleum and natural gas from ocean areas has increased dramatically. The search for hydrocarbons on the Continental Shelf has accelerated at a pace that has exceeded all expectations. However, management of the increased recovery of petroleum from the Continental Shelf should not prove to be as difficult as the management of fisheries. Unless the seaward extension of a boundary between two countries happens to cross an oil pool, cooperative international management arrangements for the production of petroleum should not be necessary. Where the problem of a common pool occurs, a bilateral or multilateral agreement will have to be reached if it is to be exploited efficiently. In certain areas, cooperative arrangements concerning the landing or shipment of oil and gas may be desirable.

The increased exploitation of offshore petroleum in the 1980s will bring greater possibilities of blowouts and other pollution incidents. Of particular interest to my Department are the possible transboundary environmental impacts arising from offshore hydrocarbon development. The massive blowout and oil spill of the Ixtoc well in the Bay of Campeche is an example of the effect upon our nation of the activities on the Continental Shelf of another. The mutual vulnerability of coastal nations bordering the same body of water points to a clear need to harmonize safety and antipollution measures, including provisions for blowout prevention, control, and liability.

Working in close cooperation with other agencies such as the Coast Guard, the Department of Energy, and the Department of the Interior, we expect during the 1980s to negotiate with our neighboring nations new and additional contingency planning and other environmental agreements concerning offshore hydrocarbon development. Such initial agreements may well also

serve as a precedent for the negotiation of minimum safety and environmental standards within a broader international context. Our long-term goal will be the development of an internationally agreed upon policy for offshore resource activities which have possible transboundary impacts.

Antarctic Resources

Interest in ocean resources have directed man's attention to the farthest frontiers of our planet. The ongoing discussions within the Antarctic Treaty system to develop regimes for the management of the living resources in Antarctic waters and of Antarctica's mineral resources—primarily offshore hydrocarbons—testify to this interest. The United States has taken the lead in seeking solutions to these resource issues. Our objectives for this decade involve:

- Maintaining the Antarctic Treaty system which has successfully reserved Antarctica for peaceful purposes as an arena of free scientific research for the past two decades;
- Instituting an effective system of managing and harvesting its living resources so that the renewability of these resources and the health of the marine ecosystem of which they are a part will be insured; and
- Developing an international regime to determine the acceptability of possible mineral resource activities in Antarctica and to govern any such activities carried out there.

To achieve these objectives we must find imaginative solutions to differences of view over sovereignty in Antarctica and imaginative approaches to resource management. We are very close now to an agreement on a convention for the conservation of Antarctic marine living resources and have made a good start toward dealing with mineral resources. If we persevere on the basis of experience and in the spirit of the Antarctic Treaty system, I believe that we will achieve our goals in both of these important resource areas.

Renewable Energy Resources

Toward the end of the decade of the 1980s, renewable ocean energy sources, such as ocean thermal energy conversion, will become commercially attractive. By the middle 1980s the Department of Energy intends to inaugurate a power plant for ocean thermal energy

conversion of about 10 megawatts for experimental and demonstration purposes. Successful demonstrations, combined with ever-increasing oil prices, could make this type of energy conversion a very interesting energy option during the 1990s for countries in a suitable geographic environment, especially if they must import oil for base-load electricity generation. We expect demonstration projects during the 1980s to receive a great deal of attention, especially with respect to their possible environmental impacts and with respect to the international legal regime under which ocean thermal energy conversion is to operate.

Environmental Concerns

In addition to possible injury from offshore energy production, the environmental health of the ocean in the 1980s may be threatened by greater pressures to use the oceans for dumping. Increasing environmental and political objections to the land-based disposal of highly toxic chemical wastes are making at-sea incineration of such wastes more attractive. During 1979, the ocean dumping convention was amended to take account of this emerging technology. Interim technical guidelines were endorsed by the parties at their fourth consultative meeting.

Disposal of nuclear wastes at sea is also likely to become a more visible issue in the 1980s. Quantities of low-level radioactive wastes being dumped at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's North Atlantic site have been increasing yearly, and the United States, while not a dumping country, has advocated proper monitoring and assessment of the site. The possible emplacement of high-level nuclear wastes in the deep seabed is also receiving increased attention. The United States is studying this concept as a backup option to our primary plans for land-based geological disposal of such wastes. But for countries having serious demographic, geographic, geologic, or hydrologic restrictions, the deep seabed option may be the only alternative short of shipping wastes to other nations. As further experimentation and development occur on the concept during the 1980s, international legal and policy issues are certain to arise.

The Department of State will also continue to be involved in the more traditional ocean pollution issues. Repeated accidents involving large super-

tankers will require us to be concerned with the development of standards which meet the needs of the international community. Because of our strategic interests in the freedom of navigation, the United States wishes to move the international community away from the concept of absolute coastal state control for pollution purposes in the 200-mile zone. We are instead in favor of other means of handling offshore pollution, such as agreements for joint pollution enforcement contingency plans for containment and cleanup, information exchange regarding shipping, and port entry regulation.

Solving pollution problems resulting from ocean-based activities is, however, only part of the issue. At present land-based activities are responsible for the bulk of ocean pollution through river runoffs and atmospheric transfers. With the continued growth of coastal populations and increased agricultural and industrial activity, the pressures on the oceans' absorptive capacities from land-based activities will increase.

The Department of State is working with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) to develop methods for comparing strategies for dealing with coastal zone pollution on an international basis. It is essential that monitoring of the marine environment and scientific research to increase our understanding of marine pollution processes be carried out. The National Ocean Pollution Research and Development and Monitoring Planning Act of 1978 designates the NOAA as the lead agency for developing a comprehensive 5-year plan for Federal ocean pollution research and development and monitoring programs. This plan is to be revised and updated at 2-year intervals. In the coming years we expect also to work closely with NOAA and the other Federal agencies in determining how our national marine pollution monitoring, research, and regulation programs might complement similar activities of international organizations.

Rights of Navigation

While coastal nations are consolidating their control over resources within 200 nautical miles of their coasts, these same ocean areas will be used by other nations for navigation. The need to accommodate national and international rights and duties within 200-mile zones

will be one of the more difficult tasks facing us in this decade. My Department will work with other Federal agencies in developing national and international regulations safeguarding navigation in areas of resource activity. The negotiating text presently under consideration within the Law of the Sea Conference treats this subject to the satisfaction of the United States.

Another navigation issue which appears to be emerging as a major problem involves the safety of navigation in congested areas, such as international straits or entrances to harbors. These issues may well have to be addressed in international organizations such as the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization.

Conference on Law of the Sea

As you know, the third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea resumed its fifth session in New York on February 22. My bureau, along with Ambassador Richardson [Special Representative of the President for the Law of the Sea Conference] and his interagency team, have worked long and arduously to develop a realistic negotiating posture in the hope of obtaining substantial progress, as we perceive it, in revision I of the Informal Composite Negotiating Text. As many of you are aware, we have tried to draw upon all the varied interests in the United States who will be affected by a comprehensive law of the sea treaty, including, most certainly, the industries represented by your organization.

At this time, while our representatives are deep in intensive negotiation of a terribly lengthy and intricate text, I cannot predict exactly what improvements we can anticipate at the conclusion of this session. Certainly our negotiators have serious concerns with the present text as it applies to the transfer of technology, a subject with which your organization has been so interested. We are hopeful that a number of changes will be accepted by the conference in the area of technology transfer with regard to seabed mining as well as in the related provisions pertaining to voting rights, assured access, financial arrangements, and other issues.

It would be less than candid if I left you with the impression that the United States negotiating team will obtain an agreement from the conference on the positions that we are proposing to protect the economic interests of the

United States. We will do our utmost. Our goal is to obtain a treaty that, on balance, will be acceptable to the United States, including the firms represented by the National Oceans Industries Association.

The Senate has already enacted a bill on deep seabed mining and the House has a similar bill before it. Generally, we continue to believe that the legislation should:

- Be transitional or interim, pending international agreement on a regime for the deep seabed;
- Proceed on the legal basis that, notwithstanding future agreement on an international regulatory regime, deep seabed mining is a freedom of the high seas;
- Not contain investment guarantees against financial losses as a consequence of U.S. ratification of an international treaty;
- Provide for effective environmental protection, sound resource management, the safety of life and property at sea, and effective law enforcement;
- Establish an international revenue-sharing fund to be used for the benefit of developing countries;
- Encourage other deep-seabed-mining legislation patterned on our example through the mechanism of reciprocating state recognition of rights;
- Not require that vessels used in the recovery, processing, or transport of hard minerals from the seabed be exclusively constructed in or documented under the laws of the United States;
- Not require processing plants to be located in the United States; and
- Not issue licenses or permits for specific mine sites in a manner that could be misinterpreted as assertion of sovereignty over high seas areas on the seabed.

We believe that these elements are not only consistent with the establishment of an effective domestic seabed-mining regime, but also are fully compatible with the goals and position we have espoused in the law of the sea negotiations. ■

Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT,
JULY 3, 1980¹

The Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, signed by the President on June 28, 1980, reaffirms this nation's commitment to both a law of the sea treaty and orderly development of a U.S. ocean mining capability. Our nation needs assured access to the nickel, copper, cobalt, and manganese—metals important in steelmaking, high performance alloys, and many other industrial uses—found in seabed nodules. This legislation will further these domestic and international aims. The act establishes an interim regulatory procedure for ocean mining activities conducted by U.S. nationals that will be superseded when a law of the sea treaty enters into force for the United States.

Since 1974 many nations have been working through the U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea to design rules governing the entire range of uses of the oceans. Arrangements for mining deep ocean minerals have constituted the greatest challenge to the conference. Both developed and developing nations see the opportunities for exploring new avenues of international cooperation and decisionmaking. The International Seabed [Resource] Authority being considered could become the first international organization with authority to manage a major natural resource.

The U.S. Government has been working with other nations at the conference to fashion a treaty acceptable to the world community and serving the best interests of the United States. We hope that substantive negotiations on the treaty can be concluded this year.

The Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act will serve as a steppingstone to this broader, long-term international goal. It will fill the gap created by the pace of technological development and our need for minerals on the one hand and the slow, deliberate process of international lawmaking on the other. Without the national ocean mining legislation that we are enacting, the deep seabed provisions of the law of the sea treaty would be hollow, since private industry would not be able to deliver benefits to this nation and the world for many years.

In enacting this legislation, the Congress displayed the bipartisan cooperation necessary to strike a judicious balance between American domestic and international interest. This legislation has been continuously revised and improved since its original introduction in 1971. During the past 18 months, it was considered and reported by four House and six Senate committees and numerous subcommittees and was unanimously passed by both Houses. The chairmen and members of those various committees and subcommittees deserve praise for their patient leadership in shepherding this complex legislation to its final enactment. The cooperation and support of the mining industry and labor unions were instrumental in reaching this valuable result.

This act will serve three purposes. First, it will insure that when a law of the sea treaty is implemented, there will, in fact, be a viable ocean mining industry. Second, it will subject ocean mining operations conducted in the interim to stringent domestic regulation to insure protection of the marine environment, safety of life and property at sea, prevention of unreasonable interference with other uses of the high seas, and conservation of mineral resources. Third, it will encourage nations that embark on ocean mining ventures before the treaty is in force to manage the activities of their nationals in a similar fashion and to respect licenses and permits issued under this and other national legislation.

Moreover, the act is drafted to be compatible with the work of the Law of the Sea Conference. It recognizes that the resources of the seabed are a common heritage of mankind. It requires that revenues from commercial production be set aside for developing countries. No sovereign jurisdiction is asserted over areas of the international seabed. No license will be issued for exploration to be conducted before July 1, 1981, and more importantly, no permit for commercial recovery will be effective sooner than January 1, 1988.

Under this timetable, the Law of the Sea Conference will have ample time to complete its work and to prepare for implementation of the treaty before commercial recovery under American law would actually take place. At the same time, potential ocean miners are assured that they may continue the orderly progress of their work without fear that delays in the international process will cause unanticipated and costly interruptions in their development programs.

Secretary Meets With Pakistani Foreign Minister

Following are remarks by Secretary Muskie and Pakistani Foreign Minister Agha Shahi following their meeting in the Department of State on July 23, 1980.¹

Secretary Muskie. I have had the pleasure this afternoon of welcoming the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Shahi, to our country. This is his first visit to Washington since he became Foreign Minister, so in a sense we are going through the same experience of a new job in the same field. The Foreign Minister has been kind enough to give me a report on his activities as a member of the Islamic Committee of the Three which was created by the Islamic conference to deal with the Afghanistan problem. So we have spent the last hour or more discussing the Afghanistan issue—our perception of its significance and a report on his efforts to pursue a political solution. I am delighted to present the Foreign Minister at this time.

Foreign Minister Shahi. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your kind words. I came here in response to Secretary Muskie's invitation to exchange views on the developments in connection with the Afghanistan situa-

The act authorizes reciprocal agreements with any foreign nation that regulates the conduct of its citizens in a manner compatible with this legislation; recognizes the licenses, permits, and priorities of right granted under it; and provides an interim framework for ocean mining that respects other nations' freedom of the high seas. Responsible cooperation among the early ocean mining nations can set the stage for successful implementation of a law of the sea treaty.

Ocean mining holds great promise for meeting the strategic mineral needs of this nation. With the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, we can look forward to an era in which ocean resources benefit all mankind and the institutions overseeing these resources set a new standard for international cooperation.

¹As enacted H.R. 2759 is Public Law 96-283, approved June 28, 1980 (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of July 7). ■

tion. As you might be aware, I have had talks with the European leaders last month. I thought I should complete this round of consultations by informing the U.S. Government of the efforts made by the Standing Committee of the Three to explore the possibilities of a political solution of the Afghanistan crisis.

Q. Can you tell us what prospects do you see for a political solution at this time?

Foreign Minister Shahi. The standing committee has made a beginning in meeting the leaders of the Mujaheddin whose cooperation is essential if there is to be a cease-fire in Afghanistan. That is the first step toward any political solution. We have expressed our readiness to hold talks with the representatives of the Babrak Karmal regime, in their capacity as members of the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan, to exchange views on how to advance the prospect of a political settlement. We have had to adopt this course of dealing only with the representatives of the ruling political party because we are under the injunction of the Islamic conference not to compromise the principle of non-recognition in the consultations that we undertake.

Q. Have you gotten any responses at all from this political leadership in Afghanistan?

Foreign Minister Shahi. As I have said, we have had no clear indication one way or the other whether they would be prepared to talk to us. Of course, in the past, they have indicated that they would like to hold talks with the Foreign Ministers of Pakistan and Iran on a bilateral basis, on a government-to-government basis, but we have indicated the position that we have taken and our readiness to meet with the representatives of the ruling political party as a standing committee.

Q. What about your contacts with the Soviets? Have they gotten anywhere?

Foreign Minister Shahi. The President of Pakistan is in communication with the Soviet leadership, and exchanges of views have taken place. We have explained to the Soviet leadership our approach to a political solution. The

ets take their stand on the May 14 proposals. There are common elements, there are important differences. So dialogue is continuing.

Q. Have you come to the conclusion that it might be time to begin support for the nationalist forces in Afghanistan, or do you still maintain a hands-off attitude?

Secretary Muskie. I would not call a hands-off attitude in the sense of ignoring the problem. It obviously is a very important policy objective to have the withdrawal of Soviet troops in conjunction with a political settlement. Our objective politically is the same as that of the Islamic conference which independently arrived at; that is, an independent Afghanistan, elected by the Afghan people, representatives of their desires, nonaligned, and the withdrawal of troops. So our objectives are the same; we have not abandoned them. What your question is aimed at is whether or not we are about to become involved as a combatant, no.

Q. Not as a combatant but as a supplier of weapons or of support, or any sort of assistance?

Secretary Muskie. Our assistance to the Pakistan Government at this time takes the form of debt-rescheduling which we have under consideration and are willing to be responsive to Pakistan's needs for economic assistance and support. That is the extent of which we are asked to be involved at this time.

Q. What is your government's view of the possibility of assistance being supplied to the nationalist forces fighting from Pakistani territory?

Foreign Minister Shahi. We have issued a policy statement that we cannot allow ourselves to become a conduit for the flow of arms to the Mujaheddin. We are extending humanitarian assistance to Afghan refugees, and they now number nearly a million. That is about the extent of our assistance.

Hostage Convention

MESSAGE TO THE SENATE,
AUG. 4, 1980¹

With a view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, I transmit herewith a copy of the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 17, 1979 and signed on behalf of the United States of America on December 21, 1979. The report of the Department of State with respect to the Convention is also transmitted for the information of the Senate.

In recent years, we have witnessed an unprecedented and intolerable increase in acts of terrorism involving the taking of hostages in various parts of the world. Events have clearly demonstrated that no country or region is exempt from the human tragedy and immense costs which almost invariably result from such criminal acts. Consequently, the urgent need to take positive action against these manifestations of international terrorism has become readily apparent. Although the penal codes of most States contain provisions proscribing assault, extortion, kidnapping, and other serious crimes inherent in hostage-taking incidents, an international framework for cooperation among States directed toward prevention of such incidents and ensuring punishment of offenders, wherever found, has not previously existed.

The Convention creates a legal mechanism whereby persons alleged to have committed offenses under the Convention will be prosecuted or extradited if apprehended within the jurisdiction of a State

Party, wherever the offense was committed. In essence, the Convention imposes binding legal obligations upon States Parties either to submit for prosecution or to extradite any person within their jurisdiction who commits an act of hostage-taking (as defined in Article 1), attempts to commit such an act, or participates as an accomplice of anyone who commits or attempts to commit such an act. A State Party is subject to these obligations without regard to the place where the alleged act covered by Article 1 was committed.

Article 1 of the Convention declares that the act or offense of taking of hostages is committed by any person who seizes or detains and threatens to kill, injure, or continue to detain another person (the "hostage") in order to compel a third party (a State, an international intergovernmental organization, a natural or juridical person, or a group of persons) to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the hostage. States Parties to the Convention will also be obligated to cooperate in preventing hostage-taking offenses by means of internal preventive measures, exchange of information, and coordination of enforcement activities.

This convention is a vitally important new element in the campaign against the scourge of international terrorism in general and the heinous crime of hostage-taking in particular. I hope that all States will become Parties to this Convention, and that it will be applied universally. I recommend, therefore, that the Senate give early and favorable consideration to this Convention.

JIMMY CARTER

¹Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Aug. 11, 1980. ■

Securing the World's Common Future

by Secretary Muskie

Statement before the 11th special session of the U.N. General Assembly on August 25, 1980.¹

I welcome this opportunity to address the U.N. special session on economic development. I intend to speak frankly. And I will suggest some specific obligations of the world's nations—including my own—to secure our common future on a fragile planet.

We meet because we are in the midst of a world economic crisis. We cannot escape it. We must respond to it. Millions of our fellow humans are starving, and millions more are malnourished, on what can be a bountiful planet. Soaring oil prices have crippled the developing world; even the strongest industrial economies are struggling. Infectious recession and inflation touch us all. Nations in desperate need of growth and development instead face worsening trade deficits, deeper debt, and diminishing prospects for meeting the needs of their people.

The work ahead is substantial. The time is short. But if we take an ambitious view, seasoned with realism, we can accomplish our main purposes at this special session. We can adopt a realistic international development strategy that will help improve development prospects. And we can agree on procedures and an agenda for a new round of global economic negotiations—serious work aimed at concrete progress where the need is urgent and consensus appears within reach. My country will participate constructively in these proceedings. Progress is essential for the world's interest and also our own.

We are encouraged that progress is possible because progress has been made. The fact is that over the past decade many people in developing nations have attained better lives. Per capita income in the Third World has risen by some 3% per year. Exports have increased by 8.7% annually. Manufacturing output is higher. Life expectancies and literacy rates have improved. Infant mortality rates have declined. Striking progress has been made, much of it recently, in adjusting the system to improve Third World prospects.

- The flow of aid to poorer nations has steadily increased. More than \$100 billion in replenishments for the multilateral development banks and their affiliates have been agreed.

- Access to International Monetary Fund resources has been sharply increased. Terms are more flexible. New facilities are in operation. A major quota increase is in process. The World Bank has also launched an innovative program of lending for structural adjustment.

- The common fund negotiations have been completed. We have moved ahead on individual commodity agreements.

- On trade, last year's multilateral trade agreement will mean an average cut of 25% in tariffs on principal developing-country exports. Preferential tariff systems have been adopted by all Western industrial countries.

- Use by developing countries of world capital markets has increased fourfold—from \$11 billion in 1970 to \$44 billion in 1978.

- The effort to increase world food supplies has been advanced through the International Fund for Agricultural Development and through the concentration of World Bank resources. In the past 5 years the World Bank committed some \$11.6 billion to agricultural projects.

- And in another urgent priority area—energy—the World Bank will be lending well over \$10 billion for energy projects between now and 1985.

This partial listing is not the record of a world community frozen in short-sighted self-interest, rigidly divided by ideology or stalemated on methods. Those tendencies do afflict us. Yet in recent years we have also found the common sense and good will to move forward.

But our accomplishments are still far short of our needs. My government has just completed a major study of the world's population, resources, and environmental prospects for the year 2000—just 20 years away. Its conclusions remind us again why these debates must move from rhetoric to reality. Our "Global 2000" study begins with a harsh truth. In the year 2000, the world population will be more than half again higher than in 1975. Over the last quarter of this century, more than 2 billion people will be

added—2 billion more mouths to feed, bodies to clothe, individual hopes to be fulfilled.

Given this fact, the study tells us what could happen if nations fail to act time and with reason. Based on current trends, food production should nearly double. Still, the number of people going hungry will rise by millions. Many nations already hungry see their croplands and grasslands drying to desert—a loss each year equal to the size of my home State of Maine.

On energy, from the vantage of a precarious present, we could face a pushing future. Unless trends are changing, oil supplies will be insufficient and, for many, unaffordable. Wood, the main household fuel for over 1 billion people, will be found only at ever greater distances and in dwindling amounts.

We have become accustomed to warnings about the need to conserve, nonrenewable resources such as oil. But the "Global 2000" study also points up serious stresses on renewable resources—croplands and forests, fisheries, air, water, and land—resources we have taken for granted as endless.

Another central observation of the study is that protecting the environment and succeeding in economic development are not competing goals but complementary paths. Poverty worsens the most acute environmental dangers, such as the loss of forests and soil. Thus we will not save the environment unless we also solve the problems of the poor and move the global economy forward.

"Global 2000" is not a forecast. It is a projection of present trends. But it is another chilling reminder that our common future depends on our common success, here and throughout the complex of relations known as the North-South dialogue. We must work together to raise food production, to diversify energy sources and to use energy and other resources more efficiently, to protect our common environment, to restrain population growth, to deal effectively and equitably with mounting deficits, and to keep an open system of trade.

It falls to us to rewrite the future. It is within our power to do so. But it will require a change not only in the quantity but in the character of our effort. For as fast as we have run in recent years, the challenges still outpace us. Too often, as

Brandt Commission reminds us, we are engaged in a "dialogue of the deaf," which "we judge ourselves by our good points and the other side by their failings. The result is frustration and deadlock."

Global Responsibilities

The deadlock must be broken. The needs of our common future require it. They compel a new inquiry. We must ask not only what individual nations can take of the global system but what each nation must bring to it. Without exception, we must recognize that assigning responsibility for the future to others is not an answer but an abdication. Such excuses do not feed, nor clothe, nor heal, nor support our successors if we fail. And fail we will, unless all nations are fully engaged.

Industrial Countries. I do not by any means exclude my own country from the prescription. In suggesting what different societies, differently situated, could offer, let me begin with the industrial countries.

• First, we must reduce the rate of domestic inflation. Spiraling prices stunt growth and make the world economy more vulnerable and less fair.

• Second, we should keep our markets open, particularly to products from developing countries.

• Third, the industrial nations must use energy more efficiently, increase domestic production, spur the development of new energy sources, and cut our reliance on imported oil.

• Fourth, despite the need for a certain restraint to control inflation, we should increase our aid to the developing nations. This Administration has said that aid is three times the American Congress says. The American people that our present level of assistance to lower income countries is not enough. I intend to keep it that way in all in my power to change that condition.

• Fifth, developed countries should continue to accept an increasing role for developing countries in international economic decisionmaking—a role commensurate with their growing importance in the world economy and their willingness to accept international obligations.

• Sixth, we must increase the capacity of developing countries to apply scientific and technological development. We must accelerate the transfer of information technology, pollution-control strategies, and other skills.

Most of these steps will entail short-term sacrifice for the sake of long-term returns. I believe the American people will support those investments. But as a former practicing politician, let me speak frankly. The American people will insist that their contributions have an effect—that people's lives must actually be changed for the better. And we can assure that only if other nations are also prepared to do their part.

Oil-Exporting Nations. The oil-exporting nations have a unique responsibility. In recent years rising oil prices

The vision we share is a vision of opportunity and of peace. It is within our capacity to alter the future to fit that vision.

have been a ponderous drag on development and growth and a major cause of inflation. This year the oil-importing developing countries will have to spend—for that single commodity—almost double the amount they will receive from all sources in aid. Thus steps such as these by oil-exporting nations will be vital to our common goals:

• First, they must adopt stable price and supply policies to avoid further trauma to the international economy.

• Second, the oil-exporting countries must increase their aid and recycle more of their surpluses directly to developing countries.

• Third, oil-exporting countries should join with consuming nations in working for rational global energy arrangements.

Developing Countries. Whatever the level, external assistance will always be a secondary factor. The major determinants are internal—the ability to use resources effectively, to encourage innovation, and to share broadly the benefits of growth. Thus, there are responsibilities that developing countries must shoulder:

• First, domestic and external resources must be used efficiently and fairly, with concentration on such priority areas as energy and food.

• Second, serious family-planning efforts are vital. Nine-tenths of the world's population increase in the next 20 years will be in developing countries. No other single factor does more to darken their future.

• Third, as their economic strength grows, individual developing nations should accept more responsibility for the common management of international economic problems.

• Fourth, as their development proceeds, they must open their own economies to free flows of world trade.

Centrally Planned Countries. The market economy countries have received dominant attention in the North-South dialogue. But the centrally planned countries have global responsibilities as well. Empty bellies will not be filled by polemics. No nation or group of nations has grounds to remain aloof from this struggle. World opinion looks to the centrally planned countries:

• First, to increase their assistance to developing countries;

• Second, to increase their unconditional purchases of LDC [less developed country] products; and

• Third, to cooperate in international efforts to stabilize commodity markets.

Proposals

For all of us, the principles I have outlined must be the basis for practical action. For our part the United States is prepared to join with others to meet the global challenge.

Our most urgent task is to confront the specter of imminent famine haunting Africa. This summer alone the United States has provided an additional 235,000 tons for emergency African food relief. We strongly urge that all nations able to contribute foodstuffs or funds join under the leadership of the Food and Agriculture Organization to coordinate relief to drought-afflicted regions. I am happy to note that the Director General will convene a meeting of concerned governments and international organizations in the coming weeks.

Targets have been set for annual food assistance in the new Food Aid Convention and for emergency food aid through the international emergency food reserve. We encourage others to join us in the effort to reach those targets, to guarantee that food will be available to those in need. Further, we should develop reserves that are adequate to back up donor commitments and assure that food emergencies can be met. My government is working toward a 4-million-ton reserve of wheat to assure our food aid commitments.

Despite efforts to produce more food, many poor developing countries will still

have to import substantial quantities over the next decade. We should consider new arrangements to assist those developing countries that are improving their own food production.

We should explore ways to channel more international funds, both concessional and nonconcessional, into food production. We, therefore, support rapid agreement on an equitable replenishment of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). We would also consider further measures to strengthen IFAD.

To help developing countries adjust to oil-driven balance-of-payments deficits, we favor continued improvements in International Monetary Fund facilities, including subsidizing the Supplementary Financing Facility. Such arrangements should receive strong support from those who prosper as oil prices climb. Private capital flows also will continue to play a critical role. We look forward to the Development Committee's report on proposals for increasing nonconcessional flows to developing countries.

We are committed to the stimulation of energy production worldwide and to the increased use of renewable fuels. The United States strongly supports an expansion of World Bank energy programs, to permit Bank participation in multinational risk-sharing ventures to discover and develop new energy sources. Here, too, as we agreed at the Venice summit, we are open to new institutional and financial arrangements. We will participate positively in the U.N. Conference on New and Renewable Energy Sources. We urge the U.N. Secretariat and member nations to make every effort to insure its success.

Coal is an attractive alternative to high-priced oil. We will expand our capacity to produce and ship coal, and we are ready to help developing countries establish coal-burning facilities and increase their use of coal.

We support discussions between oil-exporting and oil-importing nations on ways to insure orderly market conditions and on further assistance for non-oil developing countries.

Requests for population program assistance have outpaced the international community's ability to respond. We are ready to join an international commitment to double, in this decade, the availability and use of family-planning and related health services.

On trade, my country would support a pledge by all countries to restrain protectionism and ease adjustment. Such a commitment would provide more assured

Jerusalem and the Peace Negotiations

Following are Secretary Muskie's statement before the U.N. Security Council on August 20, 1980, and the text of Security Council Resolution 478 adopted that day.

SECRETARY'S STATEMENT¹

I come here today out of my deep respect for the United Nations and all it has represented for 35 years. It is a force for peace and reason in the world. It is a forum where nations may air their differences and seek out the common ground. We should all be grateful that this institution has worked so well, on so many issues, in its relatively short span of time.

Therefore, I also come here today with a feeling of sorrow, for I believe that in its work on the Middle East over the past 5 months the United Nations has been the focus of attempts not to advance the cause of peace but to restrain it, contrary to the ideals and purposes of this institution.

The succession of resolutions before this Council and the emergency special session of the General Assembly has neither aided the Camp David process

market access to developing countries. Also, beyond the sharp reductions in tariffs already agreed, we are prepared to increase the benefits of our generalized system of preferences for poorer developing countries.

These proposals reflect the positive approach we believe our common problems demand and this special session deserves.

Let me conclude with this observation. I am persuaded, to the depth of my being, that the challenges ahead are not beyond us. The "Global 2000" report has been described as a reconnaissance of the future. It describes the possibility. I believe it will not be the reality. The vision we share is a vision of opportunity and of peace. It is within our capacity to alter the future to fit that vision. The resources do exist. The solutions can be found. Together we can summon the will. Knowing what is at stake, we must not fail.

¹Press release 230 and USUN press release 92. ■

nor offered a single alternative with the slightest chance of success. Eight times in these 5 months resolutions on the Middle East have come before us. For our part, the United States has joined the debate and the voting. We have done that because we respect this institution and we honor those who have labored hard for a positive approach.

But eight times, those resolutions have failed the critical tests of reason, balance, of accounting for the concerns both sides, of genuinely serving the objective of peace. The resolution before today is illustrative of a preoccupation which has produced this series of unbalanced and unrealistic resolutions on Middle East issues. It fails to serve the goal of all faiths that look to Jerusalem holy.

We must share a common vision of this ancient city's future—an undivided Jerusalem, with free access to the holy places for people of all faiths. But how can that vision be realized? Certainly it cannot be realized by unilateral action; nor by narrow resolutions in this forum. Rather the question of Jerusalem must be addressed in the context of negotiation for a comprehensive, just, and lasting Middle East peace.

That is the position of my government. But it is more. The status of Jerusalem cannot simply be declared; it must be agreed to by the parties. That is a practical reality. It will remain so despite this resolution or 100 more like it. We have encouraged all parties to refrain from unilateral actions which seek to change the character or status of Jerusalem. In line with this position we will not vote against the resolution as presently written.

So there can be no mistake, let me note that we will continue firmly and forcefully to resist any attempt to impose sanctions against Israel under Chapter VII [of the U.N. Charter]. That step is contained in a draft resolution to be presented here but not to be voted upon. We are unalterably opposed to it. We will vote against any such resolution.

But if we do not vote against the version before us today, neither can we find cause to support it. For the resolution is still fundamentally flawed. It fails even to reaffirm Resolution 242 as the basis for a comprehensive peace. Israel, for example, is to be censured—yet there is no censure, indeed no mention at all,

ence against Israel or of efforts that undermine Israel's legitimate security needs. Further, the resolution before us is upon those states that have established diplomatic missions in Jerusalem to withdraw them from the holy city. In our agreement this provision is not binding. It is without force. And we reject it as a coercive attempt to dictate to other nations. It does nothing to promote a resolution of the difficult problems facing Israel and its neighbors. It does nothing to address the cause of peace. On these basic grounds, we abstain on the resolution.

And on broader grounds, we ask that the United Nations return to first principles in addressing the Middle East. Let us resist useless pronouncements and return to the practical search for results—on Jerusalem and on all other issues.

There are few problems in the world as much in need of resolution—and as patient, constructive effort to achieve our cruel wars in 30 years—and the pain and suffering that remain—understand the urgency of this task. And it is underscored again by recent fighting in Lebanon, renewing that violent cycle. In all those 30 years there was no peace. Plans were tried and abandoned. Mutual solutions came apart. Modest, stabilizing steps were the very most to be achieved; and they were all too fragile.

When in November 1977, President Anwar of Egypt took the courageous step of going to Jerusalem in an inspired act of statesmanship to break the deadlock. In that equal statesmanship the Israeli government responded. At Camp David the next September, for 13 days, President Sadat, Prime Minister Begin, and President Carter joined to create a framework for peace in the Middle East. It was born the first real chance to bring the goals of Resolution 242 into being. Then, following President Carter's mediation in the Middle East in February 1979, a peace between Israel and Egypt—the first real peace—was achieved.

Even so, it was only a beginning. At Camp David was designed not just for a final settlement between Israel and its neighbors but as a framework for a truly comprehensive and final peace bringing all parties to the conflict. A year later, in May, the second stage of the Camp David process began—negotiations between Egypt and Israel, with the United States as full partner, to provide autonomy for the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. This is to be a transitional arrangement of 5 years. Not later than the third year after the start of that process, negotiations to settle the final status of the territories would begin.

This may be an imperfect process. But let me remind you of this. It is also the first time the twin issues of Palestinian rights and Israeli security—issues at the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict—have been at the top of the agenda together. It is the first time there has been real hope—not a mirage or a wish—that a comprehensive settlement could be attained.

My government has stated many times in the past, and I will restate it again today: We are absolutely and firmly committed to the success of the process begun at Camp David and its ultimate goal of a just and lasting peace throughout the region. There is no issue on which President Carter has spent more time and effort than this great cause. And that will continue to be the case until the job is done.

This is difficult and painstaking work. It is precisely the kind of effort that inspired the creation of the United Nations. It is precisely the work to which the United Nations should now rededicate itself. We desire to work closely with the Islamic states in order that their legitimate goals set out in Resolution 242 may be attained in peace and honor.

It is vital that a political climate be preserved within which the hard work of peace can succeed. That is why we have urged all the parties not to take unilateral steps that could prejudice the outcome of the negotiations. That is why we have counseled patience and sought wider support for our efforts. And it is why events here in the last several months have been so profoundly disturbing. We do not expect everyone to support the Camp David process. We do, however, seek an end to efforts that work in the contrary direction—not just to undermine the Camp David process but to disrupt the search for peace itself.

Let me, therefore, repeat our belief that this constant recourse to debates and resolutions that are not germane to the peace process—and even harmful to it—should stop. Elsewhere in Southwest Asia and in Southeast Asia warfare is a present reality. The aggressor nations make no effort to find peace. Yet this Council is continuously drawn to the Middle East, where authentic work for peace is under way.

The United States will not be deterred from this historic enterprise. Indeed, I would like to reiterate our firm determination to finish what has so well begun. At Camp David, as a result of statesmanship and courage, the two parties with the help of the United States designed a framework for comprehensive peace. They agreed to start with a treaty

of peace between Egypt and Israel. This was a goal which many thought to be utterly unattainable but which was achieved through negotiation and on the basis of Resolution 242.

As a further step toward a comprehensive peace, the parties agreed to launch serious negotiations aimed at providing autonomy for the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza for a transitional period. The final objective is clear: resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects and, ultimately, peace treaties between Israel and all of its other neighbors—Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon.

We intend to persevere in this effort regardless of all distractions, diversions, and difficulties.

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 178²

The Security Council.

Recalling its resolution 476 (1980) of 30 June 1980,

Reaffirming again that the acquisition of territory by force is inadmissible,

Deeply concerned over the enactment of a "basic law" in the Israeli Knesset proclaiming a change in the character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem, with its implications for peace and security,

Noting that Israel has not complied with Security Council resolution 476 (1980),

Reaffirming its determination to examine practical ways and means, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, to secure the full implementation of its resolution 476 (1980), in the event of non-compliance by Israel,

1. *Censures* in the strongest terms the enactment by Israel of the "basic law" on Jerusalem, and the refusal to comply with relevant Security Council resolutions;

2. *Affirms* that the enactment of the "basic law" by Israel constitutes a violation of international law and does not affect the continued application of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War in the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since June 1967, including Jerusalem;

3. *Determines* that all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel, the occupying Power, which have altered or purport to alter the character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem, and, in particular, the recent "basic law" on Jerusalem, are null and void and must be rescinded forthwith;

4. *Affirms also* that this action constitutes a serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East;

5. *Decides* not to recognize the "basic law" and such other actions by Israel that, as a result of this law, seek to alter the character and status of Jerusalem and calls upon all Members of the United Nations:

U.S. Relationship With the U.N.

by Donald F. McHenry

*Address at the 35th Convocation of the U.S. United Nations Association on April 19, 1980. Ambassador McHenry is U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations.*¹

I am very pleased to be here with you today on this important anniversary. In fact, there is no group of people with whom I would rather celebrate the founding of the United Nations than the members of the U.N. Association. You perform a valuable service for both the United Nations and the United States.

I wish there were more of you, that more Americans understood the role of the United Nations in the world and of the United States in the United Nations. The United Nations has never been more important than it is today. Multilateral initiatives and global cooperation are a crucial complement to our own efforts to resolve the pressing international problems that have such a profound effect on our economy and lifestyle here at home—energy, hunger, pollution, depletion of nonrenewable resources, protectionism, global economic affairs—these are all matters which only a generation ago we thought of as domestic affairs.

U.S. Attitude Toward the U.N. Since 1945

Yet American public support for the United Nations is muted today. The United Nations is a frequent target of attack—in some places where it counts—on Capitol Hill. A small but vocal group of legislators, who are critical of the Third World's occasional use of the forum to criticize or rebuff the United States, tends to hamstring our attempts to expand American par-

ticipation in the U.N. system. These legislators have, obviously, tapped a wellspring of anti-U.N. sentiment among the American people; one based on several disquieting factors:

- Lack of understanding about the United Nations;
- Preoccupation with domestic concerns at the expense of foreign policy;
- Failure to understand the increasing interrelationships between domestic and foreign policy;
- Vain hope that complex problems can be resolved simply and quickly, and finally;
- What anthropologists would call an "ethnocentric" view of the world, in which everything that is not done the American way is automatically suspect.

At the core of the love-hate relationship our country has carried on with the United Nations since 1945 are some fundamental misperceptions and outmoded ideas. We must correct those wrong impressions and change American attitudes about the United Nations if we are to play the leadership role we wish and ought to play in the world organization.

American views about the United Nations are grounded in the Wilsonian idealism we brought to the organization at its founding. The U.N. Charter reflects an essentially American vision—a dream that the world could transcend political differences and, for some purposes at least, become the kind of melting pot our nation has turned out to be.

Almost from the beginning, the United Nations was less than we had hoped. In American eyes, its shortcomings stemmed from the intransigence of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies, against whom we and our more numerous political friends were arrayed on most issues.

The United Nations did not transcend—it could not—cold war politics. It became a forum where confrontational scenarios between the world's two major blocs were acted out peacefully. Since the tally of pro-American votes outnumbered the opposition through the 1950s, we were on the winning side of most questions.

The United Nations thus vindicated our belief in the fundamental rectitude of American ideals and foreign policy. That the Russians could only make their presence felt by repeatedly

exercising their veto simply reinforced our belief in Communist obstructionism. I grew up as a boy believing there was something viciously wrong with casting a veto. Every evening I heard Mr. Gabriel Heatter keep count of number of vetoes the United States cast. I didn't know then that the id was essentially American.

Ironically, it was the ultimate triumph of American ideals in the United Nations, and the fulfillment of one of the main objectives of the U.N. Charter, that fundamentally altered the organization and set it on a course many Americans disliked. I am speaking of the decolonization of Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean and the ability of those nations to express fundamental disagreements with our policy on the three most contentious issues facing the organization: the Middle East, southern Africa, and the North-South dialogue.

Third World Nations

Beginning in about 1960, the world underwent a transformation unlike anything other in recorded history. In the last two decades almost a hundred new nations have emerged from colonial status to become full members of the world community and of the United Nations. Their presence changed what had been an essentially homogenous body, dominated by industrialized northern hemispheric states, into a pluralistic forum that reflects many different interests and ideologies.

On the whole, these new nations imbued with a strong sense of nationalism, have little use for the tactics of superpower confrontation. The United Nations is the one forum where they can speak out on what they see as an "equal footing" with older nations, and deal with the issues that are important to them: an end to colonialism and racism, economic development, the reallocation of world financial resources, and noninterference by established powers in their internal affairs. Furthermore, they approach these issues from a radically different perspective than we do.

Unlike the United States, the Third World nations do not have to deal with broad, strategic considerations when they consider the merits of particular issues. Their interests are far narrower than ours. Their needs are great; their goals, immediate. They take support from whomever offers it. They are aware of John Kennedy's warning that he who rides on the tiger's back may end up in the tiger's stomach. They hope, however, that knowledge

(a) to accept this decision;

(b) and upon those States that have established diplomatic Missions in Jerusalem to withdraw such Missions from the Holy City.

6. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the implementation of this resolution before 15 November 1980;

7. Decides to remain seized of this serious situation.

¹ Press release 227 and USUN press release 89.

² Adopted by a vote of 14 to 0 with 1 abstention (U.S.). ■

tiger's proclivities will enable them avoid being maimed or devoured.

The United States, however, can ignore broad, strategic concerns in defining its position on foreign policy issues. As a world leader that seeks to lead on the basis of shared principles and interests, rather than by military intimidation, we must balance a number of factors every time we take a position on any issue. These include the wishes and sensitivities of our allies, economic considerations that arise from our free enterprise system, public opinion in democratic societies, and our overall strategic responsibility in the Western world. We also have honest differences of opinion about how the Third World can best achieve goals like economic development and fiscal responsibility and social and political equality.

Thus, even though we support the principles that the sponsors of many Third World resolutions seek to vindicate, the United States has been on the losing side of many U.N. votes.

The Soviets are not constrained by responsibilities like ours. They can support many one-sided initiatives that we must oppose because the positions we take mean nothing to them and have no consequences for them in their world society.

Many Americans have thus come to feel that the United Nations is now anti-American, if not pro-Soviet, or at least in contrast to its former pro-American stance. The public seems concerned that American interests are threatened by the changing forces at a United Nations dominated by a Third World-Soviet bloc. Public support for the organization has fallen in the United States to alarming levels. The consolation I have in my job is that the United Nations is still thought more highly of than the U.S. Congress.

U.S. Views Today

Public support reached its nadir in the mid-1970s. Too often the United States and confrontation politics at the United Nations. After he left, one of our permanent representatives called the organization "a very dangerous snake" and belittled its abilities and objectives. As our national disenchantment with the United Nations grew, our influence and national prestige at the United Nations declined further.

I believe that beginning with Governor [William W., (Mar. 1976-Jan.

7) Scranton's tenure, we have seen a resurgence of American prestige and influence at the United Nations. At the

root of this shift has been acknowledgment of Third World nationalism as an ideology independent of international communism.

We no longer view every issue and every vote through the lenses of East-West politics. We recognize that the developing countries can take positions that do not mirror ours without being either anti-American or pro-Soviet. Simply according the Third World nations fundamental respect for their independent interests, motives, and points of view has aided our image at the United Nations.

Furthermore, we have become more secure in dealing with the United Nations as the myth of Third World-Soviet solidarity has been exploded.

During the past few years, the developing nations and the United States have been on the same side of a number of politically sensitive U.N. votes. The Third World views any interference with national autonomy as intolerable, so it condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Soviet-backed Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea. The Third World supported the United States during the Iranian hostage crisis, even to the point of voting in favor of the imposition of sanctions against a state with whose revolutionary goals they are fundamentally in sympathy. This underscores its commitment to legal and moral principles that America has long espoused.

The developing countries also rebuffed a Cuban-inspired move to proclaim the Soviet Union as the natural ally of the nonaligned movement. And the ringing condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that came after the Islamabad conference demonstrated to the Soviets the political costs of their interference in Third World affairs.

The difference between America's view of the United Nations today and 5 years ago is simply summed up: Our government has reappraised what the United Nations was founded to accomplish and what the organization can accomplish in today's world. We have set our policy goals at the United Nations accordingly. And our position in the world forum has slowly but surely improved. The time has now come for the American people to bring their views of the United Nations into line with reality.

U.N. Role

The American people must understand that, for all the lofty ideals set forth in the U.N. Charter, the United Nations can do no more than its 152 [Zimbabwe

became the 153rd member on August 25, 1980] sovereign members permit it to do.

The U.N. Charter may read like a supernational constitution, but the United Nations is not a supernational government. If we expect the United Nations to exercise governmental powers or prerogatives—and too many Americans do though they would object strenuously if they did—we will be sorely disappointed in what the organization is able to accomplish.

Yet despite the limitations that sovereignty inevitably imposes, U.N. members have conceded certain prerogatives to the organization and placed powerful tools in its hands.

The United Nations is the vehicle through which the collective weight of international political pressure can be imposed on states whose actions violate the tenets of law and comity enshrined in the U.N. Charter. Political censure can lead to real political costs by isolating countries that violate their charter obligations from the rest of the world community. Political censure can have indirect consequences as well, as Cuba learned to its sorrow when its failure to condemn the Afghan invasion cost it a seat on the Security Council and created such tensions within the nonaligned movement that Cuba has been greatly handicapped in its effort to use the platform of the nonaligned movement to pursue its political goals.

The United Nations also imposes moral pressure. It focuses the world's attention on crises that have political roots but human consequences—the plight of refugees, the seemingly insoluble problem of worldwide hunger, the repression of human rights.

The United Nations' most familiar role is that of mediator: The neutral third party that attempts to defuse volatile situations and find acceptable grounds for solving problems. We have become so accustomed to the United Nations in this role that we no longer think it unusual. Yet what a marvel it is that the world has fashioned an internationally accepted honest broker, to which resort in times of crisis is almost automatic.

The United Nations' record as a mediator in places like Cyprus, Lebanon, and the Middle East, and currently in Namibia or Iran, is alone a testament to the organization's importance. So is the performance of U.N. forces patrolling cease-fires in mediation areas. The United Nations seems even to have breached some of the hostility that Iran initially displayed toward it and is doing everything possible

to bring an end to the holding of American diplomatic hostages. Of course, the United Nations possesses no magic that would enable it to circumnavigate those obstacles that impede the resolution of international dilemmas. Despite its best efforts, the United Nations has not yet solved the Iran conundrum. The factors that have thus far frustrated U.N. attempts to find a solution are the same factors that have prevented our government from ending the crisis:

- A revolution that is not yet complete;
- A political scene presided over by a fanatic; and
- A struggle for power among the various factions that hope to inherit the Ayatollah's mantle of power.

But the United Nations has, through patient effort, demonstrated that a neutral party can command an audience in Iran that we cannot yet command. When the impasse in Tehran breaks, the United Nations will have played a leading role.

We also take for granted United Nations' coordination of international initiatives across a spectrum of activities. Global efforts to eradicate disease, poverty, hunger, and pollution commence frequently at the United Nations. The international monetary and trade system and much of the world's development funding is administered through U.N. agencies. Science and technology, arms control and disarmament, education and research are among the fields that U.N. agencies fund and coordinate.

I believe the United Nations performs one more important function which we should not belittle. It provides a place where the nations of the world can blow off steam. Much of the rhetoric and invective that receives so much publicity in the American press, and causes Americans to denounce the United Nations, is just that—blowing off steam.

Those who are critical of this facet of life at the United Nations view the organization as no more than a debating society.

Yet each of us has found it useful, in family life or business dealings, to explode verbally from time to time. It serves an equally useful purpose for nations grappling with tense issues. Indeed, strident speeches are often face-saving gestures that allow nations to compromise or soften their positions.

It seems apparent that, if the U.N. system did not exist, we would have to invent it. The interdependent world of

1980 simply could not exist without a global body to provide coordination, conciliation, and counsel on all fronts.

Given the importance of the United Nations, it is equally apparent that the United States ought to find it politically advantageous to play as much of a role in the U.N. system as we can. We ought to commit ourselves to enhancing America's image at the United Nations and to laying the political groundwork that helps build consensus in favor of our positions.

U.S. Support

Our efforts to bolster the American image at the United Nations are undermined by the United Nations' detractors in this country. Already, budget cuts and congressional opposition have forced us to withdraw budgetary support entirely from several innovative U.N. programs and to restrict our participation in others.

Yet the United States was assessed only \$143 million by the United Nations last year. That amounts to about 65¢ per man, woman, and child in the United States—less than the cost of a package of cigarettes or an ice cream cone.

Ours is the largest single assessment in the \$600 million U.N. budget. But when we take both assessed and voluntary contributions into account, our share is miniscule compared to the contribution of smaller nations. Norway's contribution per citizen is eight times ours; so is Kuwait's. Even tiny New Zealand pays more to the United Nations than we do on a per capita basis.

Obviously, cutting back on our contributions to the United Nations is not the way to win friends and influence there. It short-circuits the world body's ability to reach constructive solutions and reinforces a widespread belief that the United States can give short shrift to the rest of the world's needs or interests as long as we take care of ourselves.

Congress also has shown no reluctance to attach riders to our U.N. appropriations—a practice, heretofore, more typical of the Soviet Union. These special conditions bar the use of American contributions for particular projects. Obviously, such conditions exacerbate the United Nations' precarious financial position. They also impair our credibility and good will, particularly in the eyes of nations that do not withhold payment for programs or activities adopted by the majority of the membership, even though they oppose them.

Withholding American support for particular programs certainly calls question our commitment to the democratic principles we espouse in our domestic affairs. And it has another unfortunate twist. It gives a congressional stamp of approval to the Soviet tactic of deliberately withholding funds from selected U.N. activities—a practice we have long opposed but which are increasingly adopting.

Those of us who believe in the U.N. system must defend the organization and American participation in it loudly and vehemently. It is time for Congress and the American public to broaden their perspective on why the United Nations exists and how it can be used to advance our country's interests.

Of course, there will always be those who believe that U.S. support for the United Nations ought to be a function of U.N. support for the views and policies of the United States.

I believe this position has the elements of the function reversed. Our recent experiences in the United Nations indicate that there is plenty of support at the United Nations for American positions that are principled and consistent with our national ideals.

Support for American leadership at the United Nations will depend on the role America chooses to play at the United Nations and the attitude we display toward the organization. If we are supportive and cooperative, rather than abusive and confrontational, I believe we will see a strong impetus from Third World nations, as well as from our allies, for the United States to resume the preeminence that has recently eluded us at the United Nations.

And if Americans make an effort to understand and respect the motives of the many diverse members of the United Nations, I believe we can expect better understanding, at home and abroad, for the principles and positions that the United States espouses in its foreign relations.

¹USUN press release 36 of Apr. 22 1980. ■

Current Actions

BILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Supply agreement for the transfer of enriched uranium for a research reactor to Yugoslavia, with annex and exchange of notes. Signed at Vienna Jan. 16, 1980. Entered into force: July 14, 1980.

Agreement for the exchange of fuel elements, relating to the agreements of Dec. 1963, and Oct. 4, 1972, for the transfer of enriched uranium for a research reactor to Mexico. Effected by exchange of notes at Vienna Mar. 6, 1980. Entered into force: June 16, 1980.

Signatures: IAEA, Mexico, U.S. Mar. 6, 1980.

Agreement on research participation and technical exchange in a coordinated analytical and experimental study of the thermohydraulic behavior of emergency core coolant during the refill and reflood phase of a loss-of-coolant accident in the pressurized water reactor. Signed at Washington, and Tokyo Jan. 25, Mar. 20, and Apr. 8, 1980. Entered into force Apr. 18, 1980.

Signatures: F.R.G., Mar. 20, 1980; Japan, Apr. 8, 1980; U.S., Jan. 25, 1980.

Convention of International Convention on the High Seas. Done at Washington Jan. 17, 1966. Entered into force Feb. 23, 1966. TIAS 5964.

Declaration of intent to seek approval of agreement deposited: Argentina, June 11, 1980.

Agreement on an international energy program. Done at Paris Nov. 18, 1974. Entered into force provisionally Nov. 18, 1974. Definitively, Jan. 19, 1976. TIAS 8232.

Provisional accession deposited: Portugal, July 19, 1980.

Agreement establishing the International Center for Agricultural Development. Done at Rome June 13, 1976. Entered into force July 30, 1977. TIAS 8765.

Accession deposited: Grenada, July 25, 1980.

Human Rights

International covenant on civil and political rights. Adopted at New York Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force Mar. 23, 1976.¹ Ratification deposited: Australia, Aug. 13, 1980.

Shipping Lines

Amendments to the international convention on load lines, 1966, relating to amendments to the convention (TIAS 6331). Done at London Nov. 12, 1975.²

Acceptances deposited: U.S., Aug. 12, 1980; Yugoslavia, July 25, 1980.

Maritime Matters

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Adopted at London Nov. 14, 1975.²

Acceptances deposited: Iceland, July 28, 1980; Morocco, July 25, 1980; Yugoslavia, Aug. 4, 1980.

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Adopted at London Nov. 17, 1977.²

Acceptances deposited: Iceland, July 28, 1980; Morocco, July 25, 1980.

International convention on maritime search and rescue, 1979, with annex. Done at Hamburg Apr. 27, 1979.²

Signatures: France, Apr. 9, 1980;³ U.K., May 22, 1980.^{3,4,5}

Ratification deposited: U.S., Aug. 12, 1980.

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Adopted at London Nov. 15, 1979.²

Acceptances deposited: Iceland, July 28, 1980; Morocco, July 25, 1980.

Nuclear Material—Physical Protection

Convention on the physical protection of nuclear material, with annexes. Adopted at Vienna Oct. 26, 1979.²

Signatures: Austria, Greece, Mar. 3, 1980; Belgium, Denmark, European Atomic Energy Community,⁴ France,⁶ F.R.G., Ireland, Italy,⁶ Luxembourg, Netherlands, U.K., June 13, 1980; German Democratic Republic,⁶ Paraguay, May 21, 1980; Guatemala, Mar. 12, 1980; Haiti, Apr. 10, 1980; Hungary,⁶ June 17, 1980; Panama, Mar. 18, 1980; Philippines, May 19, 1980; Sweden, July 2, 1980; U.S.S.R.,⁶ May 22, 1980; Yugoslavia, July 15, 1980.

Pollution

Protocol of 1978 relating to the international convention for the prevention of pollution from ships, 1973. Done at London Feb. 17, 1978.²

Ratification deposited: U.S., Aug. 12, 1980.

Postal

Constitution of the Universal Postal Union, with final protocol. Done at Vienna, July 10, 1964. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1966. TIAS 5881.

Accession deposited: Saint Lucia, May 16, 1980.

Additional protocol to the constitution of the Universal Postal Union with final protocol signed at Vienna July 10, 1964. Done at Tokyo Nov. 14, 1969. Entered into force July 1, 1971, except for article V of the additional protocol which entered into force Jan. 1, 1971. TIAS 7150.

Accession deposited: Saint Lucia, May 16, 1980.

Second additional protocol to the constitution of the Universal Postal Union of July 10, 1964, general regulations with final protocol and annex, and the universal postal convention with final protocol and detailed regulations. Done at Lausanne July 5, 1974. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1976. TIAS 8231.

Accession deposited: Saint Lucia, May 16, 1980.⁶

Ratification deposited: Mexico, Apr. 16, 1980.

Money orders and postal travelers' checks agreement, with detailed regulations. Done at Lausanne July 5, 1974. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1976. TIAS 8232.

Ratification deposited: Mexico, Apr. 16, 1980.

Publications

Convention concerning the exchange of official publications and government documents between States. Adopted at Paris Dec. 3, 1958. Entered into force May 30, 1961; for the U.S. June 9, 1968. TIAS 6439. Acceptance deposited: Sweden, June 10, 1980.

Convention concerning the international exchange of publications. Adopted at Paris Dec. 3, 1958. Entered into force Nov. 23, 1961; for the U.S. June 9, 1968. TIAS 6438. Acceptance deposited: Sweden, June 10, 1980.

Refugees

Protocol relating to the status of refugees. Done at New York Jan. 31, 1967. Entered into force Oct. 4, 1967; for the U.S. Nov. 1, 1968. TIAS 6577.

Accession deposited: Upper Volta, June 18, 1980.

Rubber

International natural rubber agreement, 1979. Done at Geneva Oct. 6, 1979.² Signatures: Australia, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Italy, Liberia, Peru, Philippines, June 30, 1980; Belgium, F.R.G., Luxembourg, U.S.S.R., U.K., June 27, 1980; Morocco, Netherlands, June 26, 1980.

Telecommunications

Partial revision of the radio regulations (Geneva, 1959), as revised, relating to the aeronautical mobile (R) service, with annexes and final protocol. Done at Geneva Mar. 5, 1978. Entered into force Sept. 1, 1979, except for the frequency allotment plan for the aeronautical mobile (R) service which shall come into force on Feb. 1, 1983.¹

Approvals deposited: Argentina (with statement) May 16, 1980; Zambia, May 20, 1980.

Safety at Sea

Protocol of 1978 relating to the international convention for the safety of life at sea, 1974 (TIAS 9700). Done at London Feb. 17, 1978.²

Ratification deposited: U.S., Aug. 12, 1980.

Approval deposited: Netherlands, July 8, 1980.⁷

Terrorism

Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents. Adopted at New York Dec. 14, 1973. Entered into force Feb. 20, 1977. TIAS 8532.

Accessions deposited: Israel, July 31, 1980; Panama, June 17, 1980.

International convention against the taking of hostages. Adopted at New York Dec. 17, 1979.²

Signatures: Dominican Republic, Aug. 12, 1980; Mauritius, June 18, 1980; Portugal, June 16, 1980; Suriname, July 30, 1980; Switzerland, July 18, 1980.

Treaties

Vienna convention on the law of treaties, with annex. Done at Vienna May 23, 1969. Entered into force Jan. 27, 1980.¹

Accession deposited: Panama, July 28, 1980.

United Nations

Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice.

Signed at San Francisco June 26, 1945. Entered into force Oct. 24, 1945. TS 993.

Admission to membership: Zimbabwe, Aug. 25, 1980.

UNIDO

Constitution of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization, with annexes. Adopted at Vienna Apr. 8, 1979.²

Signature: Morocco, July 25, 1980.

Ratifications deposited: Guinea, June 23, 1980; Malaysia, Sweden, July 28, 1980; Panama, July 23, 1980.

Wheat

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement), 1971 (TIAS 7144). Done at Washington Apr. 26, 1978. Entered into force June 24, 1978, with respect to certain provisions, July 1, 1978, with respect to other provisions. TIAS 9459.

Ratification deposited: Italy, Aug. 20, 1980.

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement), 1971 (TIAS 7144). Done at Washington Apr. 25, 1979. Entered into force June 23, 1979, with respect to certain provisions, July 1, 1979, with respect to other provisions.

Ratification deposited: Iran, Aug. 14, 1980.

Protocol modifying and further extending the food aid convention (part of the international wheat agreement), 1971 (TIAS 7144). Done at Washington Apr. 26, 1978. Entered into force June 24, 1978, with re-

spect to certain provisions, July 1, 1978, with respect to other provisions. TIAS 9459.

Ratification deposited: Italy, Aug. 20, 1980.

Food aid convention, 1980 (part of the International Wheat Agreement, 1971, as extended (TIAS 7144)). Done at Washington Mar. 11, 1980. Entered into force July 1, 1980.

Ratification deposited: Austria, Aug. 14, 1980.

Women

Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women. Adopted at New York Dec. 18, 1979.²

Signatures: Afghanistan, Aug. 14, 1980; Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bhutan, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Finland, France, Gabon, F.R.G., Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Laos, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mexico, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Spain, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, U.S.S.R., Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, July 17, 1980; Barbados, Iceland, Tunisia, July 24, 1980; Congo, Gambia, Indonesia, Senegal, Vietnam, July 29, 1980; Egypt, July 16, 1980; India, Uganda, July 30, 1980; Panama, June 26, 1980; Philippines, July 15, 1980.

Ratifications deposited: Cuba, Guyana, July 17, 1980; Poland, Portugal, July 30, 1980.

BILATERAL

ASEAN

Agreement regarding the establishment of an ASEAN Agricultural Development and Planning Center. Effected by exchange of notes at Kuala Lumpur June 28, 1980. Entered into force June 28, 1980.

Australia

Agreement providing for the continuation of a cooperative program facilitating space flight operations for the advancement and application of mutual scientific knowledge. Effected by exchange of notes at Canberra Mar. 25, 1970. Entered into force Mar. 25, 1970; effective Feb. 26, 1970. TIAS 6866. Terminated: Feb. 26, 1980.

Agreement amending the agreement of Mar. 25, 1970 (TIAS 6866), providing for the continuation of a cooperative program facilitating space flight operations for the advancement and application of mutual scientific knowledge. Effected by exchange of notes at Canberra Mar. 3 and June 27, 1978. Entered into force June 27, 1978. TIAS 9270.

Terminated: Feb. 26, 1980.

Canada

Memorandum of intent concerning transboundary air pollution, with annex. Signed at Washington Aug. 5, 1980. Entered into force Aug. 5, 1980.

Colombia

Mutual legal assistance treaty, with exchange of notes. Signed at Washington Aug. 20, 1980. Entered into force on the date of the exchange of the instrument ratification.

Dominican Republic

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of June 22, 1980 (TIAS 9730). Effected by exchange of notes at Santo Domingo June 13 and July 22, 1980. Entered into force July 22, 1980.

Egypt

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of March 20, 1979 (TIAS 9683). Effected by exchange of notes at Cairo June 30, 1980. Entered into force June 30, 1980.

Agreement extending privileges and immunities to U.S. military personnel in Egypt in connection with joint Egyptian-U.S. Air Force training exercises. Effected by exchange of notes at Cairo June 25 and July 15, 1980. Entered into force July 15, 1980.

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of October 1979. Effected by exchange of notes at Cairo July 31, 1980. Entered into force July 31, 1980.

France

Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on estates, inheritances, and gifts. Signed at Washington Nov. 24, 1978.

Instruments of ratification exchanged: Aug. 7, 1980.

Enters into force: Oct. 1, 1980.

Federal Republic of Germany

Treaty concerning extradition, with protocol. Signed at Bonn June 20, 1978. Entered into force Aug. 29, 1980.

Proclaimed by the President: Aug. 9, 1980.

Guyana

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of February 23, 1980 (TIAS 9755). Effected by exchange of notes at Georgetown July 12 and July 14, 1980. Entered into force July 14, 1980.

Honduras

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of February 27, 1979 (TIAS 9521). Effected by exchange of notes at Tegucigalpa July 18, 1980. Entered into force July 18, 1980.

International Atomic Energy Agency

Agreement for the application of safeguards in the U.S., with protocol. Signed at Vienna Nov. 18, 1977.²

ment of ratification signed by the
ent: July 31, 1980 (with understand-

International Sugar Organization

ment relating to a procedure for U.S.
 e tax reimbursement. Effected by ex-
 e of letters at London July 10, 1980.
 ed into force July 10, 1980; effective
 , 1980.

ment for financing certain educa-
 exchange programs. Signed at Rome
 8, 1948, as amended (TIAS 1864,
 3278, 4254, 6179, 6408). Entered into
 Dec. 18, 1948.
ated: July 28, 1980.

ment extending the agreement of
 e 9, 1967, as extended (TIAS 6280,
 53199) for a cooperative program in
 n. Effected by exchange of notes at
 June 19, 1980. Entered into force
 e 9, 1980.

ment for exchanges in the fields of
 on and culture. Signed at Rome
 5, 1975.
ed into force: July 28, 1980.

ment amending and extending the
 ent of Aug. 5, 1975, on cooperation
 h field of environmental protection
 A 3172). Effected by exchange of notes
 o Aug. 5, 1980. Entered into force
 1980.

cheduled air service agreement, with
 es, as amended (TIAS 7954, 8553,
 5) signed at Amman Sept. 21, 1974.
 el into force Sept. 21, 1974.
ated: June 8, 1980.

erational express mail agreement, with
 ill regulations. Signed at Seoul and
 hton Dec. 27, 1979 and Jan. 14,

ment of ratification signed by the
ent: July 31, 1980.

ment of cooperation regarding pollu-
 o the marine environment by dis-
 g of hydrocarbons and other hazard-
 stances, with annexes. Signed at
 ic City July 24, 1980. Entered into
 eily 24, 1980, provisionally. Defini-
 ly upon exchange of notes informing
 hty that the other party has com-
 eents necessary internal procedures.

ment relating to additional coopera-
 arrangements to curb the illegal traffic
 otics. Effected by exchange of let-
 a Mexico July 25, 1980. Entered into
 uly 25, 1980.

Zimbabwe

ment amending the agreement for
 agricultural commodities of June
 19). Effected by exchange of notes at

Maputo July 24, 1980. Entered into force
 July 24, 1980.

Nigeria

Memorandum of understanding on coopera-
 tion in the field of agriculture. Signed at
 Lagos July 23, 1980. Entered into force
 July 23, 1980.

Oman

Agreement concerning the use of certain
 facilities in Oman by the U.S. Effected by
 exchange of notes at Muscat June 4, 1980.
 Entered into force June 4, 1980.

Panama

Treaty on the execution of penal sentences.
 Signed at Panama Jan. 11, 1979. Entered
 into force June 27, 1980.
Proclaimed by the President: Aug. 5, 1980.

Peru

Treaty on the execution of penal sentences.
 Signed at Washington July 6, 1979. En-
 tered into force July 21, 1980.
Proclaimed by the President: Aug. 9, 1980.

Sierra Leone

Agreement for sales of agricultural com-
 modities, relating to the agreement of Aug.
 31, 1978 (TIAS 9210), with memorandum of
 negotiations. Signed at Freetown Aug. 8,
 1980. Entered into force Aug. 8, 1980.

Spain

Master data exchange agreement for the
 mutual development of weapons systems.
 Signed at Washington June 19, 1980. En-
 tered into force June 19, 1980.

Cover agreement on the Territorial Com-
 mand Net, with annexes. Signed at Madrid
 July 24, 1980. Entered into force July 24,
 1980.

Sri Lanka

Agreement relating to trade in cotton, wool,
 and manmade fiber textiles and textile
 products, with annexes. Effected by ex-
 change of notes at Colombo July 7, 1980.
 Entered into force July 7, 1980; effective
 May 1, 1980.

Turkey

Agreement regarding the consolidation and
 rescheduling of certain debts owed to,
 guaranteed, or insured by the U.S. Gov-
 ernment and its agencies, with annexes.
 Signed at Ankara Dec. 11, 1979.
Entered into force: Jan. 14, 1980.

Implementing agreement regarding the con-
 solidation and rescheduling of certain debts
 owed to the Agency for International De-
 velopment. Signed at Ankara Apr. 22, 1980.
Entered into force: Apr. 22, 1980; effective
Jan. 14, 1980.

Zaire

Agreement for sales of agricultural com-
 modities, with memorandum of understand-
 ing. Signed at Kinshasa May 30, 1980.
 Entered into force May 30, 1980.

¹ Not in force for the U.S.

² Not in force.

³ Signature definitive.

⁴ With declaration(s).

⁵ Applicable to The Bailiwick of Jersey,
 The Bailiwick of Guernsey, Isle of Man, St.
 Christopher-Nevis-Anguilla, Belize, Ber-
 muda, British Virgin Islands, Gibraltar,
 Hong Kong.

⁶ With reservation(s).

⁷ Applicable to Netherlands Antilles. ■

August 1980

Events pertaining to Iran may be
 found on page 63.

August 5

U.S.-Canada sign memorandum of in-
 tent on transboundary air pollution.

August 6

Secretary Muskie visits Los Angeles
 and San Francisco Aug. 6-8.

August 11

Nonproliferation Treaty Review Con-
 ference opens in Geneva. Ambassador
 Charles N. Van Dorn heads U.S. delega-
 tion.

August 19

U.S.-Colombia sign agreement on
 mutual legal assistance in criminal matters.
 U.S.-Oman sign agreement establish-
 ing a Joint Commission for Economic and
 Technical Cooperation.

August 20

By a vote of 14-0 with 1 abstention
 (U.S.), the U.N. Security Council censures
 the action of the Israeli Parliament in ap-
 proving a law which asserts Israeli
 sovereignty over Jerusalem and calls upon
 those states that have diplomatic missions
 in Jerusalem to withdraw them.

August 21

Zimbabwean Prime Minister Robert
 Mugabe makes official visit to U.S., Aug.
 21-26.

August 22

The following newly appointed Amba-
 sadors presented their credentials to
 President Carter: Don Carmelo NVONO
 NCA Menene Oluy of Equatorial Guinea,
 Abdelkadir Braik Al-Ameri of Qatar,
 PROK Amaranand of Thailand, Juan Jose
 Amado III of Panama, Aboubacar Bokoko
 of Gabon, and Jose Luis Fernandes Lopes
 of Cape Verde.

U.S.-Somalia exchange notes providing
 for expanded cooperation in the develop-
 ment of security assistance and economic
 cooperation programs.

August 25

Zimbabwe becomes the 153rd member of the U.N.
 Eleventh U.N. General Assembly special session on North-South economic issues is held Aug. 25-Sept. 5.
 Objectives of the special session are:

- To begin a series of global negotiations with attention on North-South issues;
- To adopt an international development system for the third development decade; and
- To receive reports from the Secretary General on economic progress.

August 26

The following newly appointed Ambassadors presented their credentials to President Carter: Filipe Nagera Bole of Fiji, Dr. Mohamed Warsame Ali of Somalia, Dr. Bhekh Bahadur Thapa of Nepal, Frank Gill, C.B.E., D.S.O. of New Zealand, Jan Hendrik Lubbers of the Netherlands, Anton Hegner of Switzerland, Dr. Joseph Kingsley Baffour-Senkyire of Ghana, and Dr. Elleck K. Mashingaidze of Zimbabwe.

August 27

Ambassador to Lebanon, John Gunther Dean, is target of an assassination attempt in Beirut.

August 29

Ambassador Sol M. Linowitz, Personal Representative of the President for the Middle East Peace Negotiations, visits Israel and Egypt to discuss the current status of the Palestinian autonomy negotiations Aug. 29-Sept. 5. ■

Department of State

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

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|-------|------|---|
| 209 | 8/5 | U.S., Canada sign memorandum of intent on transboundary air pollution. |
| *209A | 8/6 | Memorandum of Intent Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Canada Concerning Transboundary Air Pollution. |
| *209B | 8/6 | Muskie, Towe, Roberts, Costle: statements at the signing ceremony for the U.S., Canada memorandum of intent on transboundary air pollution, Aug. 5. |

| | | | | | |
|------|------|---|----------------------------------|------|---|
| 210 | 8/7 | Muskie: address before the United Steelworkers of America, Los Angeles. | *228 | 8/22 | U.S. Organization for International Teleg and Telephone Con tative Committee (CCITT), Sept. 16. |
| 211 | 8/11 | Muskie: news conference following address in Los Angeles, Aug. 7. | *229 | 8/22 | U.S., Canada agree o interim arrangermer albacore fishing. |
| 212 | 8/8 | Muskie: address before the G.I. Forum, Los Angeles, Aug. 7. | 230 | 8/25 | Muskie: statement be the 11th special ses of the U.N. Genera ssembly. |
| 213 | 8/11 | Muskie: address before the Commonwealth Club and the World Affairs Council of Northern California, San Francisco, Aug. 8. | *231 | 8/26 | Hume Alexander Hor sworn in as Ambassa to Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea (biographic data). |
| 213A | 8/12 | Muskie: question-and-answer session follow- ing address in San Francisco, Aug. 8. | *232 | 8/28 | U.S., Philippines ame textile agreement, Sept. 4 and 12, 1979. |
| 214 | 8/13 | Muskie: news conference following luncheon with hostages' families, San Francisco, Aug. 8. | *233 | 8/28 | U.S., China establish tile visa system, Ju and 25. |
| *215 | 8/13 | Muskie: interview on NBC's "Today" Show, New York. | *234 | 8/28 | U.S., Singapore ame textile agreement, 14 and 18. |
| *216 | 8/13 | Advisory Committee on International Invest- ment, Technology, and Development, Sept. 3. | *235 | 8/28 | U.S., Mexico amend t tile agreement, July and Aug. 6. |
| *217 | 8/14 | Muskie: interview on ABC's "Good Morning, America," New York, Aug. 13. | *236 | 8/28 | U.S., Malaysia amenc textile agreement, 23 and Aug. 8. |
| *218 | 8/14 | Muskie: interview for ABC News, New York, Aug. 13. | *237 | 8/28 | U.S., Sri Lanka sign tile agreement, July |
| *219 | 8/14 | Muskie: interview for CBS News, New York, Aug. 13. | *238 | 8/29 | Theresa Ann Healy s in as Ambassador to Sierra Leone (bio- graphic data). |
| 220 | 8/15 | Muskie: interview for French television, New York, Aug. 13. | * Not printed in the BULLETIN. ■ | | |
| 221 | 8/15 | Muskie: interview for French radio, New York, Aug. 13. | | | |
| *222 | 8/19 | U.S., Colombia sign treaty on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters. | | | |
| *223 | 8/21 | Frances D. Cook sworn in as Ambassador to Burundi (biographic data). | | | |
| *224 | 8/21 | Shipping Coordinating Committee (SCC), Subcommittee on Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), panel on bulk cargoes, Sept. 9. | | | |
| *225 | 8/21 | SCC, SOLAS, working group on subdivision, stability, and load lines, Sept. 10. | | | |
| *226 | 8/21 | SCC, SOLAS, working group on standards of training and watch- keeping, Sept. 24. | | | |
| 227 | 8/20 | Muskie: statement in the U.N. Security Council on the question of Jerusalem. | | | |

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
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Jimmy Carter

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
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高波





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- Dealing With the World's Realities (*Secretary Muskie*)
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Seated: President Carter and Chinese Vice Premier Bo Yiho sign U.S.-China agreements. Standing from left to right: Yang Xuziang, Head of Chancery, P.R.C. Embassy; Vice President Mondale; Secretary Muskie; Chai Zemin, Ambassador to the U.S. from China; Myron Klutznick, U.S. Secretary of Commerce; and Arthur Rovine, Assistant Legal Adviser for Treaty Affairs, Department of State.

(White House photo by Bill Fitz-Patrick)

U.S.-China Agreements

In a ceremony at the White House September 17, 1980, President Carter and Vice Premier Bo Yibo of the People's Republic of China signed four agreements—civil air transport, textile, maritime transport, and consular.

Following are remarks made by the president and the Vice Premier on that occasion, texts of the agreements, a White House fact sheet on significant points leading to the agreements, and summaries of the four agreements.

REMARKS AT SIGNING CEREMONY¹

President Carter

I am here today to share some good news with each other. With the four agreements that we are about to sign, the normalization of relations between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China is at last complete.

That relationship is a new and vital force for peace and stability in the international scene. In addition, it holds a promise of ever-increasing benefits in trade and other exchanges for both the United States and for the People's Republic of China. I am personally committed to the proposition that our relationship will not be undermined but will be strengthened. Both the United States and China have made firm and written commitments which form the basis of this relationship. These commitments have the support of the people of my country and of your country, and, therefore, they will be honored.

What we have accomplished together at the beginning of diplomatic relations between our countries has been extraordinary. But as I said to Vice Premier Bo Yibo and Xiaoping when he was here in January 1979, our aim is to make these exchanges not extraordinary but ordinary—to make the benefits of this new relationship a routine part of the everyday lives of the citizens of this country and of the People's Republic of China. This is exactly what these four agreements will do. Let me say a brief word about each of them.

First, the civil aviation agreement: this agreement will mean regularly scheduled, direct flights between the United States and China, beginning in the very near future. I have instructed

the Civil Aeronautics Board to move quickly to name the first of the two U.S. airlines which, along with the Chinese carriers, will fly the new routes. At the airports in New York or Los Angeles or San Francisco or Honolulu a few months from today, we will hear flights announced for Shanghai and for Beijing, as well as London and Paris.

Second, the maritime agreement: For the first time in more than 30 years, all U.S. ports will be open to Chinese merchant ships, and American ships will have access to all Chinese ports of call. This will mean a stronger American maritime industry. It will mean revenue for U.S. shippers from the growing Chinese market for American goods, and growing trade and commerce will benefit the people of both China and the United States.

Third, the textile agreement: By permitting orderly marketing in this country of Chinese textile products, this agreement will benefit American retailers and consumers without damaging our own textile industry, which was fully represented in these negotiations.

The fourth agreement is the consular convention. It spells out the duties of consular officers in providing services to citizens of both our countries. One immediate benefit is to insure the protection of the rights and interests of American citizens in China. We have two Consulates in China already, and now we will open three more. These offices will promote trade, travel, and cultural and educational exchange. They will serve the needs of hundreds of thousands of Americans who will be visiting China in the next few years.

On this side of the Pacific Ocean, China now has two Consulates in the United States—one in San Francisco and one in Houston. Soon, thanks to this agreement, there will be new Chinese Consulates in New York, Chicago, and Honolulu as well.

These agreements, as you well know, are the fruit of some very hard work. A year ago, when Vice President Mondale visited China, both nations pledged an effort to complete the political and legal framework of normalization by the end of 1980. We have met that goal with 3½ months to spare. The negotiators on both sides deserve the thanks and the appreciation of us all.

I'm privileged to lead my great nation in taking this step. I consider it one of the most important achievements of my Administration—but it's an achievement with a bipartisan history. President Nixon concluded the Shanghai communique of 1972, and President Ford accepted and supported the principles of that communique. My Administration, working closely with the Congress, has taken the decisive steps which made that goal a reality.

One result has been the activity by private and public organizations on both sides to build human contacts between our peoples after 30 years of near-total mutual isolation. Another was the establishment of the Joint Economic Committee, which is meeting here this week under the chairmanship of Vice Premier Bo and Secretary [of the Treasury G. William] Miller. Our economic ties, like our cooperation in science and technology, grow broader and closer every day. Trade between the United States and China this year will be nearly four times what it was 2 years ago. China will buy some \$3 billion worth of American goods. That means jobs for American workers and opportunities for American businesses. And it means help for China's efforts to modernize and to develop its economy.

Almost 700,000 American citizens trace their roots to China. There are strong bonds of blood kinship and history between the United States and China. Yet both countries have acted not out of sentiment but out of mutual interest.

In a few moments, normalization between our two countries will be a fact. We are building something together—a broadly based consultative relationship that will enable us to expand our cooperation as the years go by.

Both of us will gain from this relationship; so, I firmly believe, will the peace of the world. America and China, so recently at odds, will have shown the world something about the possibilities of peace and friendship. In a world that badly needs a good deal of both, this is an achievement of which we can all be proud.

Vice Premier Bo Yibo *[as translated]*

Today, in the field of Sino-U.S. economic cooperation, President Carter and I have completed a task of major significance.

Starting from today, the economic relations between our two countries will have moved from ordinary exchanges to institutionalization. Just as President Carter pointed out in his very warm message to the Chinese Trade Exhibition which opened in San Francisco a few days ago, the cornerstone of our relationship is the communique on the establishment of diplomatic relations between our two countries which was solemnly declared to the whole world by the heads of government of our two countries on December 15, 1978.

Since that time, the relations between our two countries in various fields have developed rapidly on the basis of both sides abiding by the obligations undertaken in the communique. It is our firm opinion that these friendly relations should continue to develop forward. Here, it is my pleasure to declare that with the signing of the Consular Convention, we'll be setting up three more Consulates General in your country. This will give a further impetus to the friendly contacts and trade and economic cooperation between our two peoples. Facts have proven and will continue to prove that such relations are not only beneficial to the two peoples but also to the peace and stability of the world.

Not long ago, we held the third session of the fifth National People's Congress. Our newly elected Premier Zhao Ziyang explicitly pointed out that we will continue to carry out unswervingly the domestic and foreign policies which we have set forth in recent years. Through this session of the People's Congress, the whole series of the effective new policies which we have been carrying out have been or will shortly be fully legalized and institutionalized.

All our people are, with full confidence, working hard to build our country into a highly democratic and civilized modern nation. For this purpose, we need peace, we need stability, we need friendship, we need cooperation. It is my conviction that the American people too need peace, need stability, need friendship, need cooperation. Let our two great nations and two great peoples on both sides of the Pacific advance hand-in-hand and make common efforts for world peace and stability and for the prosperity and strength of our two peoples.

TEXTS OF AGREEMENTS¹

Civil Air Transport Agreement

AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
RELATING TO CIVIL AIR TRANSPORT

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of China,

Desiring to develop mutual relations between their countries, to enhance friendship between their peoples, and to facilitate international air transport;

Acting in the spirit of the Joint Communique of December 15, 1978 on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China;

Observing the principles of mutual respect for independence and sovereignty, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and friendly cooperation;

Recognizing the importance of reasonable balance of rights and benefits between both Parties under this Agreement;

Being Parties to the Convention on International Civil Aviation opened for signature at Chicago on December 7, 1944;

Have agreed on the establishment and operation of air transportation involving their respective territories as follows:

ARTICLE 1
Definitions

For the purpose of this Agreement, the term:

(a) "Aeronautical authorities" means, in the case of the United States of America, the Civil Aeronautics Board or the Department of Transportation, whichever has jurisdiction, and in the case of the People's Republic of China, the General Administration of Civil Aviation of China, or in either case any other authority or agency empowered to perform the functions now exercised by the said authorities;

(b) "Agreement" means this Agreement, its annexes, and any amendments thereto;

(c) "Convention" means the Convention on International Civil Aviation, opened for signature at Chicago on December 7, 1944, including

- any amendment which has entered into force under Article 94 (a) of the Convention and has been ratified by both Parties, and

- any annex or any amendment thereto adopted under Article 90 of the Convention, insofar as such annex or amendment is effective for both Parties;

(d) "Airline" means any air transport enterprise offering or operating international air services;

(e) "Designated airline" means an airline

designated and authorized in accordance with Article 3 of this Agreement;

(f) "Air service" means scheduled air service performed by aircraft for the public transport of passengers, baggage, cargo (mail, separately or in combination, for re-creation or hire);

(g) "International air service" means air service which passes through the air space over the territory of more than one State;

(h) "Stop for non-traffic purposes" means a landing for any purpose other than taking or discharging passengers, baggage, cargo or mail.

ARTICLE 2

Grant of Rights

(1) Each Party grants to the other Party the rights specified in this Agreement to enable its designated airline(s) to establish and operate scheduled air services on the route(s) specified in Annex 1 to this Agreement. Such route(s) and services shall hereinafter be referred to as "the specified route(s)" and "the agreed services" respectively.

(2) Subject to the provisions of the Agreement, the designated airline(s) of each Party, while operating the agreed service on the specified route(s), shall enjoy the following rights:

(a) to make stops at points on the specified route(s) in the territory of the other Party for the purpose of taking on board or discharging international traffic in passengers, baggage, cargo and mail; and

(b) subject to the approval of the competent nautical authorities of the other Party, to make stops for non-traffic purposes at points on the specified route(s) in the territory of the other Party.

(3) Nothing in paragraph (2)(a) of this article shall be deemed to confer on the designated airline(s) of one Party the right of transit on at one point in the territory of the other Party traffic in passengers, baggage, cargo or mail destined for another point in the territory of the other Party (stopover and cabotage traffic), except the non-revenue traffic in personnel of such airline(s), their families, baggage and household effects, articles used by the representative offices of such airline(s) and craft stores and spare parts of such airline for use in the operation of the agreed service. Any exchange of rights between the Parties to allow the designated airline(s) of either Party to carry on-line stopover traffic between two points on the specified route(s) in the territory of the other Party shall be subject to consultations at an appropriate time in the future.

(4) The operation of the agreed service by the designated airline(s) on routes over third countries shall be conducted on routes available to the airlines of both Parties, unless otherwise agreed.

(5) Charter air transportation shall be governed by the provisions of Annex 11.

ARTICLE 3

Designation and Authorization

(1) Each Party shall have the right to designate in writing through diplomatic channels the other Party two airlines to operate the agreed services on the specified route(s), and to withdraw or alter such designations. In the operation of the agreed services, the designated airlines may operate combination or all-gate service or both.

(2) Substantial ownership and effective control of an airline designated by a Party shall be vested in such Party or its nationals.

(3) The aeronautical authorities of the other Party may require an airline designated by the first Party to satisfy them that it is qualified to fulfill the conditions prescribed by the laws and regulations normally applied to the operation of international air services by the said authorities.

(4) On receipt of such designation the other Party shall, subject to the provisions of paragraphs (2) and (3) of this Article and of Article 7, grant to the airline so designated the appropriate authorizations with minimum procedural delay.

(5) When an airline has been so designated and authorized it may commence operation on or after the date(s) specified in the appropriate authorizations.

ARTICLE 4

Revocation of Authorizations

(1) Each Party shall have the right to revoke, suspend, or to impose such conditions as may be deemed necessary on the appropriate authorizations granted to a designated airline of the other Party where:

(a) it is not satisfied that substantial ownership and effective control of that airline is vested in the Party designating the airline or its nationals; or

(b) that airline fails to comply with the laws and regulations of the Party granting the authorizations specified in Article 2 of this Agreement;

(c) that other Party or that airline otherwise fails to comply with the conditions set forth under this Agreement.

(2) Unless immediate revocation, suspension or imposition of the conditions mentioned in paragraph (1) of this Article is essential to prevent further non-compliance with subparagraphs 1(b) or (c) of this Article, such rights shall be exercised only after consultations with the other Party.

ARTICLE 5

Application of Laws

(1) The laws and regulations of each Party relating to the admission to, operation within and departure from its territory of aircraft engaged in the operation of international air services shall be complied with by the designated airline(s) of the other Party, while entering, operating, and departing from the territory of the other Party.

(2) The laws and regulations of each Party relating to the admission to, presence within, and departure from its territory of passengers, crew, baggage, cargo and mail shall be applicable to the designated airline(s) of the other Party, and the passengers, crew, baggage, cargo and mail carried by such airline(s), while entering, within and departing from the territory of the first Party.

(3) Each Party shall promptly supply to the other Party at the latter's request the texts of the laws and regulations referred to in paragraphs (1) and (2) of this Article.

ARTICLE 6

Technical Services and Charges

(1) Each Party shall designate in its territory regular airports and alternate airports to be used by the designated airline(s) of the other Party for the operation of the agreed services, and shall provide the latter with such communications, navigational, meteorological and other auxiliary services in its territory as are required for the operation of the agreed services, as set forth in Annex III to this Agreement.

(2) The designated airline(s) of each Party shall be charged for the use of airports, equipment and technical services of the other Party at fair and reasonable rates. Neither Party shall impose on the designated airline(s) of the other Party rates higher than those imposed on any other foreign airline operating international air service.

(3) All charges referred to in paragraph (2) of this Article imposed on the designated airline(s) of the other Party may reflect, but shall not exceed, an equitable portion of the full economic cost of providing the facilities or services in question. Facilities and services for which charges are levied shall be provided on an efficient and economic basis. Reasonable notice shall be given prior to changes in charges. Each Party shall encourage consultations between the competent charging authorities in its territory and the airline(s) using the services and facilities, and shall encourage the competent charging authorities and the airline(s) to exchange such information as may be necessary to permit an accurate review of the reasonableness of the charges.

ARTICLE 7

Safety

(1) Mutually acceptable aeronautical facilities and services shall be provided by each Party for the operation of the agreed services, which facilities and services shall at least equal the minimum standards which may be established pursuant to the Convention, to the extent that such minimum standards are applicable.

(2) Each Party shall recognize as valid, for the purpose of operating the agreed services, certificates of airworthiness, certificates of competency, and licenses issued or rendered valid by the other Party and still in force, provided that the requirements for such certificates or licenses at least equal the minimum standards which may be established pursuant to the Convention. Each Party may, however,

refuse to recognize as valid, for the purpose of flight above its own territory, certificates of competency and licenses granted to or rendered valid for its own nationals by the other Party.

(3) Each Party may request consultations concerning the safety and security standards maintained by the other Party relating to aeronautical facilities and services, crew, aircraft and operations of the designated airlines. If, following such consultations, one Party is of the view that the other Party does not effectively maintain and administer safety and security standards and requirements in these areas that at least equal the minimum standards which may be established pursuant to the Convention, to the extent that they are applicable, the other Party shall be informed of such views together with suggestions for appropriate action. Each Party reserves its rights under Article 4 of this Agreement.

ARTICLE 8

Aviation Security

The Parties reaffirm their grave concern about acts or threats against the security of aircraft, which jeopardize the safety of persons or property, adversely affect the operation of air services and undermine public confidence in the safety of civil aviation. The Parties agree to implement appropriate aviation security measures and to provide necessary aid to each other with a view to preventing hijackings and sabotage to aircraft, airports and air navigation facilities and threats to aviation security. When incidents or threats of hijackings or sabotage against aircraft, airports or air navigation facilities occur, the Parties shall assist each other by facilitating communications intended to terminate such incidents rapidly and safely. Each Party shall give sympathetic consideration to any request from the other Party for special security measures for its aircraft or passengers to meet a particular threat.

ARTICLE 9

Representative Offices

(1) For the operation of the agreed services on the specified route(s), the designated airline(s) of each Party shall have the right to set up representative offices at the points on the specified route(s) within the territory of the other Party. The staff of the representative offices referred to in this paragraph shall be subject to the laws and regulations in force in the country where such offices are located.

(2) Each Party shall to the maximum extent practicable ensure the safety of the representative offices and their staff members of the designated airline(s) of the other Party, as well as safeguard their aircraft, stores, and other properties in its territory for use in the operation of the agreed services.

(3) Each Party shall extend assistance and facilities to the representative offices and their staff members of the designated airline(s) of the other Party as necessary for the efficient operation of the agreed services.

(4) The designated airline(s) of each Party shall have the right to convert and remit to its country at any time on demand local revenues in excess of sums locally disbursed. Conversion and remittance shall be effected without restrictions at the prevailing rate of exchange in effect for current transactions and remittance and shall be exempt from taxation on the basis of reciprocity. Wherever the payments system between the Parties is governed by a special agreement, that special agreement shall apply.

ARTICLE 10

Personnel

(1) The crew members of the designated airline(s) of either Party on flights into and out of the territory of the other Party shall be nationals of the Party designating such airline(s). If a designated airline of either Party desires to employ crew members of any other nationality on flights into and out of the territory of the other Party, prior approval shall be obtained from that other Party.

(2) The staff of the representative offices of the designated airline(s) of each party in the territory of the other Party shall be nationals of either Party, unless otherwise agreed. The number of such staff shall be subject to the approval of the competent authorities of both Parties. Each designated airline shall be permitted such number of staff as is adequate to perform the functions described in this Agreement associated with the provision of the agreed services, and in no event shall be less than that permitted to any foreign airline performing comparable services. Each Party shall by diplomatic note notify the other Party of the authorities which shall be considered the competent authorities for purposes of this paragraph.

ARTICLE 11

Market Access

(1) Matters relating to ground handling pertaining to the operation of the agreed services may be agreed upon between the airlines of both Parties, subject to the approval of the aeronautical authorities of both Parties.

(2) The sale, in the territory of each Party, of air transportation on the agreed services of the designated airline(s) of the other Party shall be effected through a general sales agent(s). The designated airline(s) of each Party shall serve as general sales agent(s) for the designated airline(s) of the other Party unless such airline(s) is offered and declines such agency. The terms and conditions of each general sales agency agreement shall be subject to the approval of the aeronautical authorities of both Parties. The Parties shall ensure that, if either Party designates a second airline for provision of the agreed services, both designated airlines shall be given the opportunity to act as general sales agents for the designated airline(s) of the other Party on the same terms and conditions.

(3) Notwithstanding paragraph (2) of this

Significant Events Leading to the Agreements

WHITE HOUSE FACT SHEET²

In the almost 2 years since normalization, several significant events have given impetus to the process of rapprochement between the United States and China.

- Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping visited Washington, D.C., in January 1979 to begin the process of building a long-term structure for the relationship. All of the accords which have been and are being signed now result from initiatives taken at that time by the President and Deng. In particular, the Joint Economic Commission (JEC), which is holding its first regular meeting this week in Washington, was the result of the Carter-Deng talks.

- Secretaries [former Secretary of the Treasury, W. Michael] Blumenthal and [former Secretary of Commerce, Juanita] Kreps, [former] Special Trade Representative [Robert] Strauss, and others visited China in the spring of 1979 to broaden contacts on economic issues and to begin addressing, in detail, some of those matters which have now come to successful conclusion. Some of their Chinese counterparts, including Vice Premier Fang Yi, Trade Minister Li Qiang, Finance Minister Jiang Jingfu, and others have visited the US.

- Vice President Mondale's visit to China in August 1979 gave added impetus to the negotiations, particularly on civil

aviation. The Vice President also formally opened the first U.S. Consulate in China nearly 30 years when he cut the ribbon Guangzhou (Canton) on August 31, 1979. Since that time, we have also opened in Shanghai and the Chinese have opened San Francisco and Houston. The new Consular Convention spells out, in detail, the functions which consular officers may perform. Its signing will prepare the way for China to open three more consulates in the United States—in New York, Chicago, Honolulu—and for the United States to open three more in China.

- Defense Secretary [Harold] Brown traveled to China in January of this year and his Chinese counterpart, Vice Premier Geng Biao, came to the United States in May and June. The purpose of these visits was to establish a normal range of contact between our respective defense establishments, corresponding to contacts in other fields. In March the Department of State published guidelines permitting the export to China of selected items of military support equipment. Many U.S. companies have sought and received licenses to make sales presentations to the Chinese, and number of deals may be concluded in the coming months. The purpose of the current visit by Deputy Secretary of Defense [William J.] Perry and his delegation to China is to learn more about Chinese capabilities and needs. However, the United States does not sell arms to China.

Article, the designated airline(s) of each Party, in its representative office(s) in the territory of the other Party, may sell air transportation on the agreed services and on all of its other services, directly or through the agents of its own appointment. Any person shall be free to purchase such transportation in the currency of that territory or, in accordance with applicable law, in foreign exchange certificates or freely convertible currencies. In addition the representative office(s) may be used for management, informational, and operational activities of the designated airline(s).

(4) The general sales agent for a designated airline appointed in accordance with paragraph (2) of this Article shall be responsive to the preferences expressed by the traveling and shipping public regarding airline selection, class of services and other related matters.

ARTICLE 12

Capacity and Carriage of Traffic

(1) The designated airlines of both Parties shall be permitted to provide capacity in operating the agreed services as agreed by the Parties and set forth in Annex V of the Agreement. Within two and one-half years after the commencement of any agreed service

under this Agreement, the Parties shall consult with a view to reaching a new agreement which shall apply to the provision of capacity.

(2) In keeping with the principles set forth in the Preamble to this Agreement, each Party shall take all appropriate action to ensure that there exist fair and equal rights for the designated airlines of both Parties to operate the agreed services on the specified routes so as to achieve equality of opportunity, reasonable balance and mutual benefit.

(3) The agreed services to be operated under the designated airlines of the Parties shall have as their primary objective the provision of capacity adequate to meet the traffic requirements between the territories of the two Parties. The right to embark on or disembark from such services international traffic destined for or coming from points in third countries shall be subject to the general principle that capacity shall be related to:

- (a) traffic requirements to and from the territory of the Party which has designated the airline and traffic requirements to and from the territory of the other Party;

- (b) the requirements of through airline operation; and

- (c) the traffic requirements of the area through which the airline passes after taking account of local and regional services.

(4) Each Party and its designated air-
s) shall take into consideration the inter-
of the other Party and its designated air-
s) so as not to affect unduly the services
in the latter provides.

(5) If, after a reasonable period of opera-
either Party believes that a service by a
designated airline of the other Party is not
compliant with any provision of this Article,
Parties shall consult promptly to settle the
matter in a spirit of friendly cooperation and
mutual understanding.

(6) If, at any time, either Party is of the
view that traffic is not reasonably balanced,
the Party may request consultations with the
other Party for the purpose of remedying the
imbalanced situation in a spirit of friendly
cooperation and equality and mutual benefit.

ARTICLE 13

Pricing

(1) Each Party may require the filing with
the aeronautical authorities of fares to be
used for transportation of passengers to
and from its territory. Such filing shall be
made sixty (60) days prior to the date on which
the fares are proposed to go into effect. In ad-
dition, the aeronautical authorities of both
Parties agree to give prompt and sympathetic
consideration to short-notice filings. If the
competent authorities of a Party are dissatisfied
with a fare, they shall notify the compe-
tent authorities of the other Party as soon as
possible, and in no event more than thirty (30)
days after the date of receipt of the filing in
question. The competent authorities of either
Party may then request consultations which
shall be held as soon as possible, and in no
event more than thirty (30) days after the date
of receipt of the request by the competent au-
thorities of the other Party. If agreement is
reached during consultations, the competent
authorities of each Party shall ensure that no
fare inconsistent with such agreement is put
into effect. If agreement is not reached during
consultations, the fare in question shall not go
into effect, and the fare previously in force
shall remain effective until a new fare is
established.

(2) If the competent authorities do not
reach a satisfactory solution within thirty (30) days
after the date of receipt of the filing of a fare
in accordance with paragraph (1) above,
the fare shall be considered as approved.

(3) Notwithstanding paragraph (1) above,
each Party shall permit any designated airline
to file and institute promptly, using short-
notice procedures, if necessary, a fare for
scheduled passenger services between a point
in the United States of America and
one or more points in the People's Republic of
China provided that:

(a) the fare is subject to terms and con-
ditions agreed in Annex IV to this Agree-
ment and such fare would not be less than 70
percent of the lowest normal economy fare ap-
plied for sale by any designated airline for
services between the same point or points in the
United States of America and the same point
or points in the People's Republic of China; or

(b) the fare on the specified route(s)
(hereinafter, the matching fare) represents a
reduction of an approved fare but is not below
any approved fare or any combination of fares,
whether or not approved, for the provision of
international air service between the United
States of America and the People's Republic of
China (hereinafter, the matched fare), and is
subject to similar terms and conditions as the
matched fare, except those conditions relating
to routing, connections, or aircraft type, pro-
vided that:

(i) if the matched fare is for services
provided in whole or in part by a designated
airline over the specified route(s), the desig-
nated airline(s) of the other Party shall be
permitted to institute a matching fare over the
specified route(s);

(ii) if the matched fare is for services
provided in whole or in part by a designated
airline over a route(s) other than the specified
route(s), the designated airline(s) of the other
Party shall be permitted to institute a match-
ing fare over the specified route(s) which is not
less than 70 percent of the lowest comparable
approved fare, excluding discount fares;

(iii) if the matched fare is offered solely
by a non-designated airline(s) over the
specified route(s), a designated airline shall be
permitted to institute a matching fare over the
specified route(s) which is not less than 70 per-
cent of the lowest comparable approved fare,
excluding discount fares; and,

(iv) if the matched fare is offered solely
by a non-designated airline(s) over a route
other than the specified route(s), a designated
airline shall be permitted to institute a match-
ing fare over the specified route(s) which is not
less than 80 percent of the lowest comparable
approved fare, excluding discount fares.

The Parties shall review the practice of
matching of fares before the end of three years
after commencement of any agreed service.

Each Party also agrees to apply subpara-
graph (b), *mutatis mutandis*, to fares of the
designated airline(s) of the other Party for the
provision of international air service between
the territory of the first Party and a third
country.

If, under the terms of subparagraph (b), a
designated airline institutes a lower normal
economy fare than the fare, or fares, put into
effect pursuant to paragraph (1) of this Article,
the normal economy fare for the purpose of es-
tablishing the 30 percent zone of pricing flexi-
bility set forth in subparagraph (a) shall re-
main unchanged absent mutual agreement of
both Parties.

Nothing in subparagraph (a) or (b) shall be
construed as requiring a designated airline to
institute any specific fare.

(4) (a) Each Party may require the filing
with its aeronautical authorities of rates to be
charged for transportation of cargo to and from
its territory by the designated airline(s) of the
other Party. Such filing shall be made forty-
five (45) days prior to the date on which the
rates are proposed to go into effect. In addi-
tion, the aeronautical authorities of both Par-
ties agree to give prompt and sympathetic
consideration to short-notice filings of the
designated airlines.

(b) The competent authorities of each
Party shall have the right to disapprove cargo
rates. Notices of disapproval shall be given
within twenty-five (25) days after receipt of
the filing. A rate which has been disapproved
shall not go into effect, and the rate previously
in force shall remain effective until a new rate
is established.

(c) A Party shall not require the desig-
nated airline(s) of the other Party to charge
rates different from those it authorizes for its
own airline(s) or those of other countries.

(5) Notwithstanding the provisions of this
Article, each Party shall permit any desig-
nated airline to file and institute promptly,
using short-notice procedures, if necessary, a
fare or rate identical to that offered by any
other designated airline in accordance with the
provisions of this Article for transportation be-
tween the same points and subject to compar-
able terms and conditions.

(6) Each Party shall by diplomatic note
notify the other Party of the authorities which
shall be considered the competent authorities
for purposes of this Article.

ARTICLE 14

Customs Duties and Taxes

(1) Aircraft of the designated airline(s) of
either Party engaged in the operation of the
agreed services, as well as their regular
equipment, spare parts, fuel, oils (including
hydraulic fluids), lubricants, aircraft stores
(including food, beverages, liquor, tobacco and
other products for sale to or use by passengers
in limited quantities during the flight) and
other items intended for or used solely in con-
nection with the operation or servicing of the
aircraft, which are retained on board such air-
craft shall be exempt on the basis of reciprocity
from all customs duties, inspection fees and
other national charges on arrival in and depart-
ure from the territory of the other Party.

(2) The following shall also be exempt on
the basis of reciprocity from all customs duties,
inspection fees and other national charges,
with the exception of charges based on the
actual cost of the service provided:

(a) aircraft stores introduced into or
supplied in the territory of a Party and taken
on board, within reasonable limits, for use on
aircraft of a designated airline of the other
Party engaged in the operation of the agreed
services, even when these stores are to be
used on a part of the journey performed over
the territory of the Party in which they are
taken on board;

(b) ground equipment and spare parts
including engines introduced into the territory
of a Party for the servicing, maintenance or
repair of aircraft of a designated airline of the
other Party used in the operation of the agreed
services; and

(c) fuel, lubricants and consumable
technical supplies introduced into or supplied
in the territory of a Party for use in an aircraft
of a designated airline of the other Party en-
gaged in the operation of the agreed services,
even when these supplies are to be used on a

part of the journey performed over the territory of the Party in which they are taken on board.

(3) Aircraft stores, equipment and supplies referred to in paragraph (1) of this Article retained on board the aircraft of the designated airline(s) of either Party engaged in the operation of the agreed services may be unloaded in the territory of the other Party with the approval of the customs authorities of that other Party. The aircraft stores, equipment and supplies unloaded, as well as aircraft stores, equipment and supplies introduced into the territory of the other Party referred to in paragraph (2) of this Article, shall be subject to the supervision or control of the said authorities, and if required to fair and reasonable storage charges, up to such time as they are re-exported or otherwise disposed of in accordance with the regulations of such authorities.

(4) The exemptions provided for by this Article shall also be available where a designated airline of one Party has contracted with another airline, which similarly enjoys such exemptions from the other Party, for the loan in the territory of the other Party of the items specified in paragraphs (1) and (2) of this Article. The treatment by a Party of a sale of any such item within its territory shall be determined by agreement of the Parties.

(5) Each Party shall use its best efforts to secure for the designated airline(s) of the other Party, on the basis of reciprocity, an exemption from taxes, charges and fees imposed by state or provincial, regional and local authorities on the items specified in paragraphs (1) and (2) of this Article, as well as an exemption from fuel through-put charges, in the circumstances designated in this Article, with the exception of charges based on the actual cost of the services provided.

ARTICLE 15

Provision of Statistics

The aeronautical authorities of both Parties will consult from time to time concerning, and will provide, as agreed, statistics of traffic carried on the agreed services between the two countries.

ARTICLE 16

Consultations

(1) The Parties shall ensure the correct implementation of, and satisfactory compliance with, the provisions of this Agreement in a spirit of close cooperation and mutual support. To this end, the aeronautical authorities of the Parties shall consult each other from time to time.

(2) Either Party may, at any time, request consultations relating to this Agreement. Such consultations shall begin at the earliest possible date, in no event later than sixty (60) days from the date the other Party receives the request unless otherwise agreed.

(3) If any dispute arises between the Parties relating to the interpretation or application of this Agreement, the Parties shall, in a

Civil Aviation Agreement—A Summary

Designations

Each side may designate one airline to operate on the agreed route. A second airline may be designated by either party 2 years after airline service begins.

Routes

The designated airlines may operate on a route to and from New York, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Honolulu, Tokyo, or another point in Japan, Shanghai, Beijing. A second route between China and the United States will be discussed during the first 2 years after the commencement of service by either side. If a second route is not agreed upon, a second designated airline may operate on the first route.

Capacity and Carriage of Traffic

The first designated airlines of each side may operate two round-trip frequencies a week on the agreed route. The second designated airline may operate two frequencies; or, if either side does not designate a second carrier, then its first carrier may operate an additional two flights a week. Both sides agree that there shall be a reasonable balance of traffic carried by the airlines of both sides.

Pricing

Both parties must agree on the initial fares for airline service. The designated airlines of either party may introduce lower fares without either government's approval if the new level is not less than 70% of the lowest normal economy fare approved for sale.

Charters

Charter flights may be operated by airlines of either party with prior approval on the basis of comity and reciprocity.

Entry into Force and Termination

The agreement enters into force upon signature and remains in force for 3 years. After the third year, the agreement may be terminated by either party giving 12 months written notice of intention to terminate.

spirit of friendly cooperation and mutual understanding, settle it by negotiation or, if the parties so agree, by mediation, conciliation, or arbitration.

ARTICLE 17

Modification or Amendment

(1) If either of the Parties considers it desirable to modify or amend any provision of this Agreement or its annexes, it may at any time request consultations with the other Party, and such consultations shall begin within a period of ninety (90) days from the date of receipt of the request by the other Party unless both Parties agree to an extension of this period.

(2) Any modification or amendment to this Agreement or its annexes agreed upon as a result of the consultations referred to in paragraph (1) of this Article shall come into force when it has been confirmed by an exchange of notes through diplomatic channels.

ARTICLE 18

Entry into Force and Termination

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of its signature and shall remain in force for three years. Thereafter, it shall continue in force but may be terminated by either Party by giving twelve months' written notice to the other Party of its intention to terminate.

DONE at Washington, this seventeenth day of September 1980 in duplicate, each copy in the English and Chinese languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

JIMMY CARTER

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA:

BO YIBO

ANNEX I

I. First Route

A. For the United States of America:

The first airline designated by the United States of America shall be entitled to operate the agreed services on the following route, in both directions:

New York, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Honolulu, Tokyo or another point in Japan, Shanghai, Beijing.

B. For the People's Republic of China:

The first airline designated by the People's Republic of China shall be entitled to operate the agreed services on the following route, in both directions:

Beijing, Shanghai, Tokyo or another point in Japan, Honolulu, Los Angeles, San Francisco, New York. Anchorage may be utilized as a technical stop in both directions on this route.

Second Route

The Parties shall consult during the first years following the commencement of any scheduled service to decide on a route for operation by the second designated airline of each Party. If the Parties have been unable to agree on a second route by the end of the second year, the second designated airline of each Party shall be entitled to commence operation on the agreed services on the first route in both directions, and to operate such services thereuntil the Parties agree upon a second route. In such circumstances, the Parties shall continue to consult and to exercise their maximum effort to reach agreement upon a second route, it being understood that the establishment of a second route is a mutually shared objective of both Parties. In the meantime, the Parties shall take overall review of the established routes.

Extra Section

In case any of the designated airline(s) of either Party desires to operate additional sections on its specified route(s), it shall submit an application to the aeronautical authorities of either Party three (3) days in advance of the commencement of operation, and the additional sections can be commenced only after approvals have been obtained therefrom.

(1) On or after the effective date of this Agreement, each Party is entitled to designate an airline for operation of the agreed service. Beginning two years after the commencement of any agreed service, a second designated airline of each Party may also commence the operation of the agreed service. If either Party does not designate a second airline, or if its second designated airline does not commence or ceases to operate any route, that Party may authorize its first designated airline to operate the agreed services in all respects as if it were also designated as a second airline.

(2) Each designated airline may at its option permit any point or points on the above routes on any or all flights in either or both directions, provided, however, that the agreed route it operates begins or terminates at a point on the specified route in the territory of the Party designating the airline.

(3) Before operation of service through any other point in Japan, referred to in Section I of this Annex, that point shall be agreed upon by the Parties. If a designated airline of either Party desires to change the point served in Japan, that airline shall furnish six (6) months' notice to the aeronautical authorities of the other Party. Such change shall be subject to the concurrence of that other Party.

(4) Subject to the provisions of Annex V, the designated airline(s) of each Party may effect a change of gauge in the territory of the other Party or at an intermediate point or point on the specified route(s) provided that:

(a) operation beyond the point of

change of gauge shall be performed by an aircraft having capacity less, for outbound services, or more, for inbound services, than that of the arriving aircraft.

(b) aircraft for such operations shall be scheduled in coincidence with the outbound or inbound aircraft, as the case may be, and may have the same flight number; and

(c) if a flight is delayed by operational or mechanical problems, the onward flight may operate without regard to the conditions in subparagraph (b) of this paragraph.

ANNEX II

Charter Air Transportation

(1) In addition to the operation of the agreed services by the designated airlines of the two Parties, any airline(s) of one Party may request permission to operate passenger and/or cargo (separately or in combination) charter flights between the territories of the Parties as well as between a third country and the territory of the Party to which the requests are addressed. Each Party may provide to the other Party by diplomatic note a list of airlines qualified under the laws of the first Party to provide charter air transportation.

(2) The application for charter flight(s) shall be filed with the aeronautical authorities of the other Party at least fifteen (15) days before the anticipated flight(s). The flight(s) can be operated only after permission has been obtained. Permission shall be granted without undue delay in the spirit of equality of opportunity for the airlines of both Parties to operate international charter air transportation, mutual benefit and friendly cooperation.

(3) The aeronautical authorities of each Party shall minimize the filing requirements and other administrative burdens applicable to charterers and airlines of the other Party. In this connection, the charterers and airline of a Party shall not be required by the other Party to submit more than the following information in support of a request for permission to operate a charter flight or series of flights:

- (a) Purpose of flight;
- (b) Nationality of registration, owner and operator of aircraft;
- (c) Type of aircraft;
- (d) Either (i) identification marks and call signs of the aircraft, or (ii) flight number;
- (e) Name of captain and number of crew members;
- (f) The proposed flight plan (the air route, date, hours and destination);
- (g) The identity of the charterer or charterers;
- (h) The number of passengers, and/or the weight of cargo, on board; and
- (i) The price charged by the airline to each charterer.

The information contained in the application for charter flight(s) and required by subparagraphs (d), (e) and (h) may be changed, subject to notification prior to each flight. Such changes shall be contained in the flight plan.

(4) In the event that either Party should have reasons to disapprove a particular charter flight or series of charter flights, it shall,

under normal circumstances, give timely notification of the reasons therefor, and the applicant may, where appropriate, resubmit an application for approval of the requested flight or flights.

(5) Neither Party shall require the filing by airlines of the other Party of prices charged to the public for charter transportation originating in the territory of the other Party, or a third country.

(6) The provisions of Articles 2(4), 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9(2) and (4), 10, 11(1), and 14 and Annex III of this Agreement shall apply, *mutatis mutandis*, to charter air transportation.

ANNEX III

Technical Services

I. Airports for Scheduled Service

(1) In accordance with Article 6, paragraph (1) of this Agreement, airlines designated by the Government of the People's Republic of China are assigned the following regular and alternate airports in the United States:

Regular Airports

New York, New York:
JFK International Airport
Los Angeles, California:
Los Angeles International Airport
San Francisco, California:
San Francisco International Airport
Honolulu, Hawaii:
Honolulu International Airport
Anchorage, Alaska:
Anchorage International Airport

Alternate Airports

Baltimore, Maryland:
Baltimore-Washington International Airport
Boston, Massachusetts:
Logan International Airport
Newark, New Jersey:
Newark International Airport
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania:
Philadelphia International Airport
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania:
Greater Pittsburgh Airport
Moses Lake, Washington:
Grant County Airport
Oakland, California:
Metropolitan Oakland International Airport
Ontario, California:
Ontario International Airport
Stockton, California:
Stockton Metropolitan Airport
Hilo, Hawaii:
Hilo International/General Lyman Airport
Seattle, Washington:
Sea-Tac International Airport
Kansas City, Kansas:
Kansas City International Airport
Fairbanks, Alaska:
Fairbanks International Airport
Washington, D.C.:
Dulles International Airport

(2) In accordance with Article 6, paragraph (1) of this Agreement, airlines designated by the Government of the United States

of America are assigned the following regular and alternate airports in China:

Regular Airports

Beijing:
Capital Airport
Shanghai:
Hongqiao Airport

Alternate Airports

Guangzhou:
Baiyun Airport
Hangzhou:
Jianqiao Airport
Tianjin:
Zhangguizhuang Airport

II. Airports for Charter Air Transportation

Aircraft of the airline(s) of each Party engaged in the operation of charter air transportation approved by the aeronautical authorities of the other Party may utilize airports appropriately identified in the Aeronautical Information Publication of that other Party as available for international flights, and such other airports as may be approved by such aeronautical authorities.

III. Air Routes

All flight operations by aircraft of the designated airline(s) of one Party operated in the airspace of the other Party shall be over established airways/prescribed routes or as cleared by the appropriate air traffic control service. Each Party will make reasonable efforts to ensure that air routes entering and within their sovereign airspace are as direct as practicable in the interest of economy, efficiency and fuel conservation, including the establishment of arrangements with controlling authorities of adjacent airspace as appropriate.

IV. Aeronautical Information

(1) The aeronautical authorities of both Parties shall provide each other with their Aeronautical Information Publication.

(2) Amendments and additions to the Aeronautical Information Publication shall be sent promptly to the aeronautical authorities of the other Party.

(3) The International NOTAM Code shall be used in the transmission of Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs). When the NOTAM code is not suitable, plain English shall be used. Urgent NOTAMs shall be transmitted by the quickest available means to the aeronautical authorities of the other Party.

(4) Aeronautical information and NOTAMs shall be made available in the English language.

V. Meteorological Services

Mutually acceptable meteorological service shall be provided in accordance with standards and recommended practices, to the extent to which they are applicable, developed pursuant to the Convention of the World Meteorological Organization and International Civil Aviation Organization.

VI. Radio Navigation and Communication

(1) For the operation of agreed services on the specified routes, the Parties recognize the requirement for the establishment of point-to-point aeronautical communications between the two countries. The Parties shall hold consultations as to the measures and procedures for the establishment of such communications.

(2) The English language and internationally accepted codes and procedures in force shall be applied in air-ground and point-to-point communications.

ANNEX IV

Conditions of Discount Fares

Discount fares within the zone of pricing flexibility described in paragraph (3) of Article 13 of this Agreement shall be subject to conditions of the type generally applicable to same or similar fares in other international air transportation markets. Such discount fares shall be subject to conditions in not less than four of the following categories:

- Round trip requirements;
- Advance-purchase requirements;
- Minimum-Maximum length of stay requirements;
- Stopover restrictions;
- Stopover charges;
- Transfer limitations;
- Cancellation refund penalties;
- Group size restrictions;
- Return travel conditions;
- Ground package requirements.

ANNEX V

Capacity and Carriage of Traffic

(1) The Parties agree that each designated airline shall have the right to operate two frequencies per week. If a Party does not designate a second airline, its first designated airline shall, upon the commencement of service by the second airline of the other Party or upon the passage of two years from the commencement of any agreed service, whichever is earlier, be entitled to add to its operation two frequencies per week. For purposes of this Agreement a frequency is: one (1) round trip flight of an aircraft having a maximum certificated take-off gross weight not less than 710,000 pounds but not more than 800,000 pounds; one and one-half (1½) round trip flights of an aircraft having a maximum certificated take-off gross weight equal to or greater than 430,000 pounds but less than 710,000 pounds; and two (2) round trip flights of an aircraft having a maximum certificated take-off gross weight less than 430,000 pounds. If a designated airline uses only aircraft having a maximum certificated take-off gross weight of less than 710,000 pounds, it shall be entitled to one additional round trip flight of an all-freight configured aircraft having a maximum certificated take-off gross weight of less than 430,000 pounds for every two frequencies. All unused frequencies may be accumulated by a designated airline and used at its discretion at any

time. Any increase in frequencies during the first three years after commencement of an agreed service in excess of the frequencies mentioned above shall be subject to prior consultation and agreement between the Parties.

(2) With a view to realizing the object set forth in Article 12, paragraph (2), the Parties agree that there should be a reasonable balance of the traffic carried by their respective designated airline(s) on the specified route(s) in terms of number of passengers and tons of cargo taken up and put down in the territory of the other Party.

The consultations referred to in Article 12, paragraph (6) shall take place as soon as possible, and in no event later than thirty (30) days following the date of receipt of the request by the latter Party. The Parties shall undertake to reach agreement within thirty (30) days to effective measures for remedying the imbalanced situation and fully implement such agreed measures. In considering the measures to be undertaken, the Parties shall take into account all relevant factors, including commercial decisions of the designated airlines, local factors and actions of third parties. In case agreed measures fail to remedy the imbalance within three months after their implementation, the Parties shall meet together to look into the cause of such failure and agree upon measures for remedying the imbalanced situation. In case the Parties fail to reach agreement on effective remedial measures, they shall look into the cause of the imbalance and consider amendments to this Agreement which may be required to eliminate such cause.

(3) The provision of paragraph (2) of this Annex is valid for three years from the date of commencement of any service under this Agreement. Not later than six months prior to the end of this three-year period, the Parties shall consult with a view to agreeing to the means to achieve reasonable balance of traffic referred to in paragraph (2) of this Annex.

ACCOMPANYING LETTERS

Beijing
September 8, 1980

Mr. Lin Zheng
Leader
Civil Aviation Delegation
of the Government of China

Dear Mr. Lin:

I have the honor to refer to the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of China relating to Civil Aviation Transport initiated today by our two governments. During the course of negotiations leading to the initialing of the Agreement, both sides discussed questions relating to the conduct of business in the territory of the other Party and other operational matters of the designated airlines. I understand that agreement was reached that the designated airline(s) of each Party shall have, in the territory of the other Party, the rights and privileges as set forth below:

1. With respect to the representative office(s) referred to in Article 11, paragraph (3) of the Agreement, the designated airline(s) of each Party shall have:

(a) the right to issue, reissue, reconfirm or exchange tickets for transportation on the agreed services, for connecting air services, for transportation over any other route or routes outside of the agreed services which are operated by such airline(s); and

(b) the right to make, reconfirm, or change reservations for passengers wishing to travel over the routes of such airline(s) whether or not such reservations are for transportation on the agreed services.

2. The designated airline(s) of each Party shall also have the right to import, maintain, store, and distribute informational materials (including, but not limited to, time tables, schedules, brochures, sales and tour literature, calendars, displays, etc.) and to advertise in the same manner and through the same or similar media as the designated airline(s) of the other Party.

3. With respect to operational matters, the designated airline(s) of each Party shall have:

(a) the right to import, install, and operate telex, computer, VHF radio, and handheld radio sets (walkie talkie) and related equipment for reservations, load planning and management, and for other operational purposes, subject to the approval of the appropriate authorities, where necessary;

(b) the right to supervise load planning and actual loading and unloading of its aircraft through its own employees or representatives;

(c) the right to import company-owned vehicles and to operate such vehicles on airport roadways and aircraft servicing ramps, subject to the approval of the appropriate authorities, where necessary;

(d) the right to inspect fuel storage and fuel pumping equipment on a quarterly basis and to take samples at each source for export and subsequent laboratory analysis; and

(e) the right to film, under whatever supervision is necessary, the aircraft approach view to the runways of all regular airports and alternate airports contemplated for the operation of the agreed services, for purposes of pilot training, subject to the approval of the appropriate authorities.

4. Each Party grants to the other Party the assurance that the following authorizations, permits, and information will be provided, on the basis of reciprocity, in a timely fashion to each airline designated to operate on the agreed services:

(a) airport security permits for assigned foreign and locally employed company staff authorizing them to move freely beyond airport customs and immigration screens into the terminal loading areas and onto the airport ramp areas;

(b) written information on the procedures to be employed by the airport authorities at each regular airport and alternate airport contemplated for the operation of the agreed services in the event of an emergency

such as a crash, a hijacking, or a bomb threat, establishing the order of action in a given situation for units responsible for tower control, firefighting, medical assistance and transportation, perimeter security and other emergency and security functions in effect; and

(c) written information on aeronautical laws, including the rules and regulations thereunder and amendments thereto, each designated airline is expected to follow.

5. The appropriate authorities of each Party shall use their best efforts to assist the designated airline(s) of the other Party to receive housing for the staff of such airline(s) comparable in cost and quality to the best obtained by or provided to other foreign airlines.

6. The designated airline(s) of each Party shall have the right to train the personnel of any appointed agent in the procedures of that airline for passenger, cargo, and aircraft handling and in procedures relating to reservations, ticketing, marketing, management, and sales promotion, subject to prior agreement.

This letter will be effective on the date the Civil Air Transport Agreement is signed.

I would be grateful for your confirmation that this is also your understanding of the agreement we have reached.

Sincerely,

B. BOYD HIGHT
Chairman
Civil Aviation Delegation
of the Government
of the United States

Attachment: Initialed Translation

Beijing
September 8, 1980

Mr. B. Boyd Hight
Chairman
Civil Aviation Delegation of
the Government of the United States

Dear Mr. Hight:

I have the honor to refer to the Civil Air Transport Agreement initialed today by our two governments and to your letter of today's date which reads as follows:

"I have the honor to refer to the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of China relating to Civil Air Transport initialed today by our two governments. During the course of negotiations leading to the initialing of the Agreement, both sides discussed questions relating to the conduct of business in the territory of the other Party and other operational matters of the designated airlines. I understand that agreement was reached that the designated airline(s) of each Party shall have, in the territory of the other Party, the rights and privileges as set forth below:

1. With respect to the representative office(s) referred to in Article 11, paragraph (3) of the Agreement, the designated airline(s) of each Party shall have:

(a) the right to issue, reissue, reconfirm

and exchange tickets for transportation on the agreed services, for connecting air services, and for transportation over any other route or routes outside of the agreed services which are operated by such airline(s); and

(b) the right to make, reconfirm, or change reservations for passengers wishing to travel over the routes of such airline(s) whether or not such reservations are for transportation on the agreed services.

2. The designated airline(s) of each Party shall also have the right to import, maintain, store, and distribute informational materials (including, but not limited to, time tables, schedules, brochures, sales and tour literature, calendars, displays, etc.) and to advertise in the same manner and through the same or similar media as the designated airline(s) of the other Party.

3. With respect to operational matters, the designated airline(s) of each Party shall have:

(a) the right to import, install, and operate telex, computer, VHF radio, and handheld radio sets (walkie talkie) and related equipment for reservations, load planning and management, and for other operational purposes, subject to the approval of the appropriate authorities, where necessary;

(b) the right to supervise load planning and actual loading and unloading of its aircraft through its own employees or representatives;

(c) the right to import company-owned vehicles and to operate such vehicles on airport roadways and aircraft servicing ramps, subject to the approval of the appropriate authorities, where necessary;

(d) the right to inspect fuel storage and fuel pumping equipment on a quarterly basis and to take samples at each source for export and subsequent laboratory analysis; and

(e) the right to film, under whatever supervision is necessary, the aircraft approach view to the runways of all regular airports and alternate airports contemplated for the operation of the agreed services, for purposes of pilot training, subject to the approval of the appropriate authorities.

4. Each Party grants to the other Party the assurance that the following authorizations, permits, and information will be provided, on the basis of reciprocity, in a timely fashion to each airline designated to operate on the agreed services:

(a) airport security permits for assigned foreign and locally employed company staff authorizing them to move freely beyond airport customs and immigration screens into the terminal loading areas and onto the airport ramp areas;

(b) written information on the procedures to be employed by the airport authorities at each regular airport and alternate airport contemplated for the operation of the agreed services in the event of an emergency such as a crash, a hijacking, or a bomb threat, establishing the order of action in a given situation for units responsible for tower control, firefighting, medical assistance and transportation, perimeter security and other

emergency and security functions in effect; and (c) written information on aeronautical laws, including the rules and regulations thereunder and amendments thereto, each designated airline is expected to follow.

5. The appropriate authorities of each Party shall use their best efforts to assist the designated airline(s) of the other Party to receive housing for the staff of such airline(s) comparable in cost and quality to the best obtained by or provided to other foreign airlines.

6. The designated airline(s) of each Party shall have the right to train the personnel of any appointed agent in the procedures of that airline for passenger, cargo, and aircraft handling and in procedures relating to reservations, ticketing, marketing, management, and sales promotion, subject to prior agreement.

This letter will be effective on the date the Civil Air Transport Agreement is signed.

I would be grateful for your confirmation that this is also your understanding of the agreement we have reached."

I have the honor to confirm that the above constitutes an agreed understanding between our two governments concerning the rights of the designated airline(s) of each Party in the territory of the other Party.

This letter will be effective on the date the Civil Air Transport Agreement is signed.

Sincerely,
LIN ZHENG
Leader
Civil Aviation Delegation
of the Government
of China

Beijing
September 8, 1980

Mr. B. Boyd Hight
Chairman
Civil Aviation Delegation
of the Government of the United States

Dear Mr. Hight:

I have the honor to refer to the Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the United States of America Relating to Civil Air Transport, initialed today by our two governments. During the course of negotiations leading to the initialing of the Agreement, both sides discussed questions relating to the utilization of full traffic rights at a point or points in Japan in the operation of the agreed services. It is my understanding that agreement was reached that the utilization of full traffic rights at Japan by the designated airlines of both sides shall be governed by the following terms:

(1) The first designated airline of each Party, unless otherwise agreed, shall be permitted to operate two frequencies¹ with full traffic rights at Japan immediately upon the commencement of the agreed services. Two years following the commencement of any agreed service, the second designated airline of each Party, unless otherwise agreed, shall be permitted to operate two frequencies with

full traffic rights at Japan. These rights shall continue until otherwise agreed by the Parties.

(2) If, two years after the commencement of any agreed service, the United States does not designate a second airline, or if one of the United States' two designated airlines does not operate all of the Japan frequencies authorized by paragraph (1) above, the Parties shall consult with a view to agreeing on the utilization of the unused Japan frequencies by the United States.

(3) The designated airline(s) of the People's Republic of China shall operate more than two Japan frequencies only if, and to the same extent that, the designated airline(s) of the United States are operating singly or in combination more than two Japan frequencies.

(4) Not later than two and one-half years following the commencement of any agreed service, the Parties shall review their respective utilization of Japan frequencies. If, upon such review, the number of Japan frequencies operated by the U.S. designated airline(s) exceeds the number of Japan frequencies which the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Japan have agreed upon for the Chinese designated airline(s), the Parties shall consult with a view to agreeing upon an alternative opportunity or opportunities for the Chinese designated airline(s).

(5) If, by 90 days prior to the end of the third year following the commencement of any agreed service, the Parties have not agreed upon an alternative opportunity or opportunities, the People's Republic of China shall be entitled to select point services² for operation in the fourth year and thereafter equal to the difference between the number of Japan frequencies operated by the U.S. designated airline(s) and the number of Japan frequencies authorized for the Chinese designated airline(s). The Chinese designated airline(s) shall be entitled to operate such point services at one or more intermediate and/or beyond points selected at the sole discretion of the People's Republic of China. A list of intermediate and/or beyond points so selected shall be furnished to the Government of the United States through diplomatic channels not later than 60 days prior to the commencement of operations. The number of point services operated by the Chinese designated airline(s) shall be reduced by one for each new Japan frequency which the Chinese designated airline(s) is authorized to operate subsequent to the selection of point services.

This letter will be effective on the date the Civil Air Transport Agreement is signed.

Sincerely,
LIN ZHENG
Leader
Civil Aviation Delegation
of the Government
of China

Beijing
September 8, 1980

Mr. Lin Zheng
Leader
Civil Aviation Delegation
of the Government of China

Dear Mr. Lin:

I am in receipt of your letter of today's date relating to the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of China Relating to Civil Air Transport initialed today by our two governments, and more particularly relating to the utilization of full traffic rights at a point or points in Japan in the operation of the agreed services. Your letter reads as follows:

"I have the honor to refer to the Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the United States of America Relating to Civil Air Transport, initialed today by our two governments. During the course of negotiations leading to the initialing of the Agreement, both sides discussed questions relating to the utilization of full traffic rights at a point or points in Japan in the operation of the agreed services. It is my understanding that agreement was reached that the utilization of full traffic rights at Japan by the designated airlines of both sides shall be governed by the following terms:

(1) The first designated airline of each Party, unless otherwise agreed, shall be permitted to operate two frequencies¹ with full traffic rights at Japan immediately upon the commencement of the agreed services. Two years following the commencement of any agreed service, the second designated airline of each Party, unless otherwise agreed, shall be permitted to operate two frequencies with full traffic rights at Japan. These rights shall continue until otherwise agreed by the Parties.

(2) If, two years after the commencement of any agreed service, the United States does not designate a second airline, or if one of the United States' two designated airlines does not operate all of the Japan frequencies authorized by paragraph (1) above, the Parties shall consult with a view to agreeing on the utilization of the unused Japan frequencies by the United States.

(3) The designated airline(s) of the People's Republic of China shall operate more than two Japan frequencies only if, and to the same extent that, the designated airline(s) of the United States are operating singly or in combination more than two Japan frequencies.

(4) Not later than two and one-half years following the commencement of any agreed service, the Parties shall review their respective utilization of Japan frequencies. If, upon such review, the number of Japan frequencies operated by the U.S. designated airline(s) exceeds the number of Japan frequencies which the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Japan have agreed upon for the Chinese designated airline(s), the Parties shall consult with a view to agreeing upon an alternative opportunity or opportunities for the Chinese designated airline(s).

(5) If, by 90 days prior to the end of the first year following the commencement of any scheduled service, the Parties have not agreed upon an alternative opportunity or opportunity for the People's Republic of China shall be entitled to select point services² for operation during the fourth year and thereafter equal to the difference between the number of Japan frequencies operated by the U.S. designated airlines and the number of Japan frequencies authorized for the Chinese designated airlines. The Chinese designated airline(s) shall be entitled to operate such point services at one or more intermediate and/or beyond points selected at the sole discretion of the People's Republic of China. A list of intermediate and/or beyond points so selected shall be furnished to the Government of the United States through diplomatic channels not later than 60 days prior to the commencement of operations. The number of point services operated by these designated airline(s) shall be reduced by one for each new Japan frequency which the Chinese designated airline(s) is authorized to operate subsequent to the selection of point services.

This letter will be effective on the date the Civil Air Transport Agreement is signed."

I have the honor to confirm that the above constitutes an agreed understanding. This letter will be effective on the date the Civil Air Transport Agreement is signed.

Sincerely,

B. BOYD HIGHT
Chairman
Civil Aviation Delegation
of the Government
of the United States

Attachment: Initialed Translation

Beijing
September 8, 1980

Mr. Lin Zheng

Chairman
Civil Aviation Delegation
of the Government of China

Dear Mr. Lin:

I have the honor to refer to the Civil Air Transport Agreement initialed today by our two governments. With respect to paragraph (1) of Annex V to the Agreement, it is my understanding that in case the first designated airline of the People's Republic of China does not operate more than two B-747SP aircraft per week during the period of one year following the commencement of the agreed services, for the same period the designated airline of the United States of America will limit its available capacity to an average of 120 tons of payload per week, measured quarterly. Payload will be measured by the actual total tons of passenger, cargo and mail traffic, embarked or disembarked in the People's Republic of China quarterly.

This letter will be effective on the date the Civil Air Transport Agreement is signed.

Sincerely,

B. BOYD HIGHT
Chairman
Civil Aviation Delegation
of the Government
of the United States

Attachment: Initialed Translation

Beijing
September 8, 1980

Mr. B. Boyd Hight
Chairman
Civil Aviation Delegation of
the Government of the United States

Déar Mr. Hight:

I am in receipt of your letter of today's date relating to the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of China relating to Civil Air Transport initialed today by our two governments, and more particularly relating to Annex V (1) setting forth a capacity regime to govern the operations of the designated airline of each Party during the first year following the commencement of the agreed services by the first designated airline of the People's Republic of China. Your letter reads as follows:

"I have the honor to refer to the Civil Air Transport Agreement initialed today by our two governments. With respect to paragraph (1) of Annex V to the Agreement, it is my understanding that in case the first designated airline of the People's Republic of China does not operate more than two B-747SP aircraft per week during the period of one year following its commencement of the agreed services, for the same period the designated airline of the United States of America will limit its available capacity to an average of 120 tons of payload per week, measured quarterly. Payload will be measured by the actual total tons of passenger, cargo and mail traffic, embarked or disembarked in the People's Republic of China quarterly.

This letter will be effective on the date the Civil Air Transport Agreement is signed."

I have the honor to confirm that the above constitutes an agreed understanding.

This letter will be effective on the date the Civil Air Transport Agreement is signed.

Sincerely,
LIN ZHENG
Leader
Civil Aviation Delegation
of the Government
of China

Beijing
September 8, 1980

Mr. B. Boyd Hight
Chairman
Civil Aviation Delegation of
The Government of the United States

Dear Mr. Hight:

With reference to Annex V, paragraph (2) of the Agreement between the Government of

the People's Republic of China and the Government of the United States of America relating to Civil Air Transport initialed today, I have the honor to confirm, on behalf of my Government, the following discussion between the civil aviation delegations of our two countries in the course of their negotiations.

In the operation of the agreed services on the specified routes by the designated airlines of the Parties, it is deemed that traffic will no longer be reasonably balanced whenever, on a semi-annual basis, the traffic carried by the designated airline(s) of one Party shall exceed 56.25 percent of the total traffic carried by the designated airlines of the two Parties.

This letter will be effective on the date the Civil Air Transport Agreement is signed.

Sincerely,

LIN ZHENG
Leader
Civil Aviation Delegation
of the Government
of China

Beijing
September 8, 1980

Mr. Lin Zheng
Leader
Civil Aviation Delegation
of the Government of China

Dear Mr. Lin:

I am in receipt of your letter of today's date with respect to Annex V, paragraph (2) of the Civil Air Transport Agreement initialed today by our two governments, and acknowledge the contents therein.

This letter will be effective on the date the Civil Air Transport Agreement is signed.

Sincerely,

B. BOYD HIGHT
Chairman
Civil Aviation Delegation
of the Government
of the United States

Attachment: Initialed Translation

September 17, 1980

Mr. Lin Zheng
Leader
Civil Aviation Delegation
of the Government of China

Dear Mr. Lin:

I have the honor to confirm that the Government of the United States of America is prepared, within its authority, to make clear in its official publications and statements that "China Airlines" is an airline from Taiwan and is not the national flag carrier of China.

Sincerely,
B. BOYD HIGHT
Chairman
Civil Aviation Delegation
of the Government
of the United States

Textile Agreement²

AGREEMENT RELATING TO
TRADE IN COTTON, WOOL, AND
MAN-MADE FIBER TEXTILES AND
TEXTILE PRODUCTS BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of China, as a result of discussions concerning exports to the United States of America of cotton, wool, and man-made fiber textiles and textile products manufactured in the People's Republic of China, agree to enter into the following Agreement relating to trade in cotton, wool, and man-made fiber textiles and textile products between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as "the Agreement"):

1. The two Governments reaffirm their commitments under the Agreement on Trade Relations between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China as the basis of their trade and economic relations.

2. The term of the Agreement shall be the three-year period from January 1, 1980 through December 31, 1982. Each "Agreement Year" shall be a calendar year.

3. (a) The system of categories and the rates of conversion into square yards equivalent listed in Annex A shall apply in implementing the Agreement.

(b) For purposes of the Agreement, categories 347, 348 and 645, 646 are merged and treated as single categories 347/348 and 645/646 respectively.

4. (a) Commencing with the first Agreement Year, and during the subsequent term of the Agreement, the Government of the People's Republic of China shall limit annual exports from China to the United States of America of cotton, wool, and man-made fiber textiles and textile products to the specific limits set out in Annex B, as such limits may be adjusted in accordance with paragraphs 5 and 7. The limits in Annex B include growth. Exports shall be charged to limits for the year in which exported. The limits set out in Annex B do not include any of the adjustments permitted under paragraphs 5 and 7.

(b) With respect to Category 340, 200,000 dozens of the quantity exported in 1979 shall be charged against the Specific Limit for that Category for the first Agreement Year.

(c) With respect to Category 645/646, 48,000 dozens of the quantity exported in 1980 will be entered without charge.

5. (a) Any specific limit may be exceeded in any Agreement Year by not more than the following percentage of its square yards equivalent total listed in Annex B, provided that the amount of the increase is compensated for by an equivalent SYE decrease in one or more other specific limits for that Agreement Year.

| Category | Percentage |
|----------|------------|
| 331 | 6 |
| 339 | 5 |
| 340 | 5 |
| 341 | 5 |
| 347/348 | 5 |
| 645/646 | 6 |

(b) No limit may be decreased pursuant to sub-paragraph 5 (a) to a level which is below the level of exports charged against that category limit for that Agreement Year.

(c) When informing the United States of adjustments under the provisions of this paragraph, the Government of the People's Republic of China shall indicate the category or categories to be increased and the category or categories to be decreased by commensurate quantities in square yards equivalent.

6. The Government of the People's Republic of China shall use its best efforts to space exports from China to the United States within each category evenly throughout each Agreement Year, taking into consideration normal seasonal factors. Exports from China in excess of authorized levels for each Agreement Year will, if allowed entry into the United States, be charged to the applicable level for the succeeding Agreement Year.

7. (a) In any Agreement Year, exports may exceed by a maximum of 11 percent any limit set out in Annex B by allocating to such limit for that Agreement Year an unused portion of the corresponding limit for the previous Agreement Year ("carryover") or a portion of the corresponding limit for the succeeding Agreement Year ("carryforward") subject to the following conditions:

(1) Carryover may be utilized as available up to 11 percent of the receiving Agreement Year's limits provided, however, that no carryover shall be available for application during the first Agreement Year;

(2) Carryforward may be utilized up to seven percent of the receiving Agreement Year's applicable limits and shall be charged against the immediately following Agreement Year's corresponding limits;

(3) The combination of carryover and carryforward shall not exceed 11 percent of the receiving Agreement Year's applicable limit in any Agreement Year;

(4) Carryover of shortfall (as defined in sub-paragraph 7 (b)) shall not be applied to any limits until the Governments of the United States of America and the People's Republic of China have agreed upon the amounts of shortfall involved.

(b) For purposes of the Agreement, a shortfall occurs when exports of textiles or textile products from China to the United States of America during an Agreement Year are below any specific limit as set out in Annex B, (or, in the case of any limit decreased pursuant to paragraph 5, when such exports are below the limit as so decreased). In the Agreement Year following the shortfall, such exports from China to the United States of America may be permitted to exceed the applicable limits, subject to conditions of sub-paragraph 7 (a), by carryover of shortfalls in the following manner:

(1) The carryover shall not exceed the amount of shortfall in any applicable limit;

(2) The shortfall shall be used in the category in which the shortfall occurred.

(c) The total adjustment permissible under paragraph 7 for the first Agreement Year shall be seven percent consisting solely of carryforward.

8. (a) In the event that the Government of the United States believes that imports from the People's Republic of China classified in any category or categories not covered by Specific Limits are, due to market disruptions threatening to impede the orderly development of trade between the two countries, the Government of the United States may request consultations with the Government of the People's Republic of China with a view to avoiding such market disruption. The Government of the United States of America shall provide the Government of the People's Republic of China at the time of the request with a detailed factual statement of the reasons for its request for consultation with current data, which in the view of the Government of the United States of America shows

1) the existence or threat of market disruption, and

2) the contribution of exports from the People's Republic of China to that disruption.

(b) The Government of the People's Republic of China agrees to consult with the Government of the United States within 30 days of receipt of a request for consultations. Both sides agree to make every effort to reach agreement on a mutually satisfactory resolution of the issue within 90 days of the receipt of the request, unless this period is extended by mutual agreement.

(c) During the 90 day period, the Government of the People's Republic of China agrees to hold its exports to the United States of America in the category or categories subject to this consultation to a level no greater than 35 percent of the amount entered in the latest twelve month period for which data is available.

(d) If no mutually satisfactory solution is reached during these consultations, the People's Republic of China will limit its exports in the category or categories under this consultation for the succeeding twelve months to a level of 20 percent for man-made fiber cotton product categories (and of 6 percent wool product categories) above the level of exports entered during the first twelve of the most recent fourteen months preceding the date of the request for consultations.

9. To prevent inadvertent or fraudulent circumvention of the Agreement, to ensure accurate record keeping, and to facilitate proper entry into the United States of the products covered by the Agreement, a Visa System shall be established as soon as practicable as an administrative arrangement under the Agreement.

10. The Government of the United States of America shall promptly supply the Government of the People's Republic of China with monthly data on imports of textiles from China, and the Government of the People's Republic of China shall promptly supply the Government of the United States of America with quarterly data on exports of China's textiles to the United States in categories for which levels have been established. Each Government agrees to supply promptly any other pertinent and readily available statistical data requested by the other Government.

11. (a) Tops, yarns, piece goods, made-up articles, garments, and other textile manufactured products (being products which define their chief characteristics from their textile components) of cotton, wool, man-made fibers, or blends thereof, in which any or all of these fibers in combination represent either in chief value of the fibers or 50 percent or more by weight (or 17 percent or more by weight of wool) of the product, are subject to this Agreement.

(b) For purposes of the Agreement, textiles and textile products shall be classified as cotton, wool or man-made fiber textiles if wholly or in chief value of either of these fibers.

(c) Any product covered by subparagraph 11 (a) but not in chief value of cotton, wool, or man-made fiber shall be classified as (I) cotton textiles if containing 50 percent or more by weight of cotton or if the cotton component exceeds by weight the wool and the man-made fiber components; (II) wool textiles if cotton and the wool equals or exceeds 17 percent by weight of all component fibers; (III) man-made fiber textiles if neither of the foregoing applies.

12. The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of China agree to consult on any question arising in the implementation of this Agreement.

13. Mutually satisfactory administrative arrangements or adjustments may be made to resolve minor problems arising in the implementation of this Agreement, including differences in points of procedure or operation.

14. If the Government of the People's Republic of China considers that, as a result of a violation specified in this Agreement, China is being placed in an inequitable position vis-a-vis a third country or party, the Government of the People's Republic of China may request consultations with the Government of the United States of America with a view to taking appropriate remedial action such as reasonable modification of this Agreement and the Government of the United States of America shall agree to hold such consultations.

15. At the request of either Government, the two Governments will undertake a major review of the Agreement at the end of the second Agreement Year.

16. Each Government will take such measures as may be necessary to ensure that the specific Limits established for any category under this Agreement are not exceeded. Consultations will be based on the date of export from the People's Republic of China.

Neither Government shall act to restrain the trade in textile products covered by the Agreement except in accordance with the terms of the Agreement.

17. Either Government may terminate the Agreement effective at the end of any Agreement Year by written notice to the other Government to be given at least 90 days prior to the end of such Agreement Year. Either Government may at any time propose revisions in the terms of the Agreement.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the authorized representatives of the Contracting Parties have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Washington, in duplicate, in the English and Chinese languages, both texts being equally authentic, this seventeenth day of September, 1980.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

JIMMY CARTER

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA:

Bo YIBO

ANNEX A

M and B = Men's and Boys'
W, G, and I = Women's, Girls', and Infants
n.k. = not Knit

| Category | Description | Conversion Factor | Unit of Measure |
|-----------------------|---------------------|-------------------|-----------------|
| YARN | | | |
| Cotton | | | |
| 300 | Carded | 4.6 | Lb. |
| 301 | Combed | 4.6 | Lb. |
| Wool | | | |
| 400 | Tops and Yarns | 2.0 | Lb. |
| Man-made Fiber | | | |
| 600 | Textured | 3.5 | Lb. |
| 601 | Cont. cellulosic | 5.2 | Lb. |
| 602 | Cont. noncellulosic | 11.6 | Lb. |
| 603 | Spun cellulosic | 3.4 | Lb. |
| 604 | Spun noncellulosic | 4.1 | Lb. |
| 605 | Other yarns | 3.5 | Lb. |
| FABRIC | | | |
| Cotton | | | |
| 310 | Ginghams | 1.0 | SYD |
| 311 | Velveteens | 1.0 | SYD |
| 312 | Corduroy | 1.0 | SYD |
| 313 | Sheeting | 1.0 | SYD |
| 314 | Broadcloth | 1.0 | SYD |
| 315 | Printcloths | 1.0 | SYD |
| 316 | Shirtings | 1.0 | SYD |
| 317 | Twills and Sateens | 1.0 | SYD |
| 318 | Yarn-dyed | 1.0 | SYD |

EDITOR'S NOTE:

DPR = dozen pair
SFT = square feet
SYD = square yards
SYE = square yards equivalent

Textile Agreement—
A Summary

This agreement provides a framework for insuring the orderly development of textile trade between the United States and China in a manner consistent with the interests of both nations. It assures China secure market access while protecting the United States from the disruptive market conditions that could be caused by sharply rising or fluctuating trade levels.

The agreement applies to textile products exported from China during the period January 1, 1980, through December 31, 1982. It establishes agreed levels of trade for six textile products. It provides for some flexibility in the transfer of unused quota between categories and between years. The agreement also sets out a consultation mechanism for categories of textile products which are not subject to specific ceilings and for which levels may be established later upon agreement between the two governments.

This agreement supersedes the seven unilaterally imposed quotas now in effect. Details on this transition will be announced in the *Federal Register*.

China is now the number five supplier of textile products to the United States—accounting for 8% by volume of U.S. textile imports—and the number two supplier of cotton textile products to the United States—12% of U.S. imports.

| | | | |
|-----------------------|--|-----|-----|
| 319 | Duck | 1.0 | SYD |
| 320 | Other Fabrics, n.k. | 1.0 | SYD |
| Wool | | | |
| 410 | Woolen and worsted | 1.0 | SYD |
| 411 | Tapestries and upholstery | 1.0 | SYD |
| 425 | Knit | 2.0 | Lb. |
| 429 | Other Fabrics | 1.0 | SYD |
| Man-Made fiber | | | |
| 610 | Cont. cellulosic, n.k. | 1.0 | SYD |
| 611 | Spun cellulosic, n.k. | 1.0 | SYD |
| 612 | Cont. noncellulosic, n.k. | 1.0 | |
| 613 | Spun noncellulosic, n.k. Other fabrics, n.k. | 1.0 | SYD |
| 614 | Knit | | Lb. |
| 625 | Pile and tufted | 1.0 | SYD |
| 626 | Specialty | 7.8 | Lb. |
| 627 | | 1.0 | SYD |
| | | 7.8 | Lb. |

APPAREL

| | | | |
|---------------|--------------------------|------|-----|
| Cotton | | | |
| 330 | Handkerchiefs | 1.7 | Dz. |
| 331 | Gloves | 3.5 | DPR |
| 332 | Hosiery | 4.6 | DPR |
| 333 | Suit-type coats, M and B | 36.2 | Dz. |

Feature

| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----------------------|--|-------|------|-----|--|------|------|-----|--|------------------------------|------|----|
| 334 | Other coats, M and B | 41.3 | Dz. | 631 | Gloves | 3.5 | DPR. | 650 | Dressing gowns, incl. bath and beach robes | 51.0 | D | |
| 335 | Coats, W, G, and I | 41.3 | Dz. | 632 | Hosiery | 4.6 | DPR. | | | | | |
| 336 | Dresses (incl. uniforms) | 45.3 | Dz. | 633 | Suit-type Coats, M and B | 36.2 | Dz. | | | | | |
| 337 | Playsuits, Sun- suits, Washsuits, Creep- ers | 25.0 | Dz. | 634 | Other Coats, M and B | 41.3 | Dz. | | 651 | Pajamas and other nightwear | 52.0 | D |
| 338 | Knit shirts, (incl. T- Shirts, other sweatshirts) M and B | 7.2 | Dz. | 635 | Coats, W, G and I | 41.3 | Dz. | | 652 | Underwear | 16.0 | D |
| 339 | Knit shirts and blouses (incl. T-Shirts, other sweatshirts) W, G and I | 7.2 | Dz. | 636 | Dresses | 45.3 | Dz. | | 659 | Other Apparel | 7.8 | L |
| 340 | Shirts, n.k. | 24.0 | Dz. | 637 | Playsuits, Sun- suits, Washsuits, etc. | 21.3 | Dz. | | MADE-UPS AND MISC. | | | |
| 341 | Blouses, n.k. | 14.5 | Dz. | 638 | Knit Shirts (Incl. T-Shirts), M and B | 18.0 | Dz. | | Cotton | | | |
| 342 | Skirts | 17.8 | Dz. | 639 | Knit Shirts and blouses (Incl. T-Shirts), W, G and I | 15.0 | Dz. | | 360 | Pillowcases | 1.1 | N |
| 345 | Sweaters | 36.8 | Dz. | 640 | Shirts, n.k. | 24.0 | Dz. | | 361 | Sheets | 6.2 | N |
| 347 | Trousers, slacks, and shorts (outer) M and B | 17.8 | Dz. | 641 | Blouses, n.k. | 14.5 | Dz. | | 362 | Bedspreads and Quilts | 6.2 | N |
| 348 | Trousers, slacks and shorts (outer) W, G and I | 17.8 | Dz. | 642 | Skirts | 17.8 | Dz. | | 363 | Terry and other pile towels | 0.5 | N |
| 349 | Brassieres, etc. | 4.8 | Dz. | 643 | Suits, M and B | 54.0 | Dz. | | 369 | Other Cotton manu- facturers | 4.6 | L |
| 350 | Dressing gowns, incl. bathrobes, and beach house coats, and dusters | 51.0 | Dz. | 644 | Suits, W, G and I | 54.0 | Dz. | | Wool | | | |
| 351 | Pajamas and other nightwear | 52.0 | Dz. | 645 | Sweaters, M and B | 36.8 | Dz. | | 464 | Blankets and auto robes | 1.3 | L |
| 352 | Underwear (incl. union suits) | 11.0 | Dz. | 646 | Sweaters, W, G and I | 36.8 | Dz. | | 465 | Floor Covering | 0.1 | S. |
| 359 | Other apparel | 4.6 | Lbs. | 647 | Trousers, slacks and shorts (outer), M and B | 17.8 | Dz. | | 469 | Other Wool man- ufactures | 2.0 | L |
| Wool | | | | 648 | Trousers, slacks and shorts (outer), W, G and I | 17.8 | Dz. | | Man-made Fiber | | | |
| 431 | Gloves | 2.1 | DPR | 649 | Brassieres, etc. | 4.8 | Dz. | | 665 | Floor Coverings | 0.1 | S. |
| 432 | Hosiery | 2.8 | DPR | | | | | | 666 | Other Furnishings | 7.8 | L |
| 433 | Suit-Type coats, M and B | 36.0 | Dz. | | | | | | 669 | Other man-made manufactures | 7.8 | L |
| 434 | Other Coats, M and B | 54.0 | Dz. | | | | | | | | | |
| 435 | Coats, W, G and I | 54.0 | Dz. | | | | | | | | | |
| 436 | Dresses | 49.2 | Dz. | | | | | | | | | |
| 438 | Knit Shirts and Blouses, n.k. | 15.0 | Dz. | | | | | | | | | |
| 440 | Shirts and Blouses, n.k. | 24.0 | Dz. | | | | | | | | | |
| 442 | Skirts | 18.0 | Dz. | | | | | | | | | |
| 443 | Suits, M and B | 54.0 | Dz. | | | | | | | | | |
| 444 | Suits, W, G and I | 54.0 | Dz. | | | | | | | | | |
| 445 | Sweaters, M and B | 14.88 | Dz. | | | | | | | | | |
| 446 | Sweaters, W, G and I | 14.88 | Dz. | | | | | | | | | |
| 447 | Trousers, slacks and shorts (outer) M and B | 18.0 | Dz. | | | | | | | | | |
| 448 | Trousers, slacks and shorts (outer) W, G and I | 18.0 | Dz. | | | | | | | | | |
| 459 | Other Wool Apparel | 2.0 | Lb. | | | | | | | | | |
| Man-made Fiber | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 630 | Handkerchiefs | 1.7 | Dz. | | | | | | | | | |

ANNEX B SPECIFIC LIMITS

| Category | Brief Description | First Agreement Year | Second Agreement Year | Third Agree- ment Year |
|----------|---------------------------------|--|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| 331 | Cotton Gloves | 3,213,600 dozen pair 11,247,600 SYE | 3,310,008 dozen 11,585,028 SYE | 3,409,308 doz 11,932,578 SY |
| 339 | Knit Shirts & Blouses W, G, & I | 720,000 dozen 5,184,000 SYE | 912,000 dozen 6,566,400 SYE | 865,280 doz 6,230,016 SY |
| 340 | Shirts, M & B, not knit | 540,000 dozen 12,960,000 SYE | 561,600 dozen 13,478,400 SYE | 584,064 doz 14,017,536 SY |
| 341 | Blouses, W, G, & I not knit | 381,300 dozen 5,528,850 SYE | 455,100 dozen 6,598,950 SYE | 443,456 doz 6,430,112 SY |
| 347/348 | Trousers | 1,440,000 dozen 25,632,000 SYE | 1,824,000 dozen 32,467,200 SYE | 1,730,560 doz 30,803,968 SY |
| 645/646 | Sweaters | 550,000 dozen 20,240,000 SYE | 566,500 dozen 20,847,200 SYE | 583,495 doz 21,472,616 SY |

Maritime Transport Agreement

AGREEMENT ON
MARITIME TRANSPORT
BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of China

In conformity with the spirit of the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China of December 15, 1978; and

Recognizing the importance of maritime relations for both countries; and

In consideration of the significance of maritime transport in the development and facilitation of trade between both countries;

For the purpose of strengthening their cooperation in the field of maritime transport;

In accordance with the principle of equality and mutual benefit

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

For purposes of this Agreement:

a. The term "vessel" shall mean any merchant ship engaged in commercial maritime shipping or merchant marine training. The term "vessel" shall not include warships; vessels carrying out any form of state function except for those mentioned in the preceding sentence; or fishing vessels; fishery research vessels or fishery support vessels.

b. The term "vessel of a Party" shall mean a vessel flying the national flag of and registered in the United States of America or the People's Republic of China respectively.

c. The term "member of the crew" shall mean a person working on board a vessel of a Party who actually performs duties or services connected with the operation or maintenance of the vessel, holding appropriate identity documents issued by the authorities of that Party as provided in Article 5, and whose name is included on the crew list of the vessel.

ARTICLE 2

a. The Parties agree that when vessels of either Party, for the purpose of transportation of passengers and cargo, enter into or depart from the ports, mooring places and waters of the other Party, the latter shall adopt all appropriate measures to provide favorable treatment to such vessels with regard to serving of vessels, port operations, the simplification and expedition of administrative, customs and all required formalities. The conditions under which vessels of one Party may enter the ports of the other Party are set forth in letters, exchanged between the competent authorities, which accompany this Agreement.

b. Each Party undertakes to ensure that tonnage duties upon vessels of the other Party

will be as favorable as the charges imposed in like situations with respect to vessels of any other country.

ARTICLE 3

This Agreement shall not apply to the vessels of one Party in the transportation of passengers and cargo between the ports of the other Party. However, the right of vessels of either Party to engage in commercial passenger and cargo services in accordance with Article 2 shall include the right to pick up or discharge passengers and cargo at more than one port of the other Party if such passengers and cargo are destined for or are proceeding from another country on the same vessel.

ARTICLE 4

a. Each Party shall recognize the nationality of the vessels which fly the national flag of the other Party and hold certificates of their nationality issued according to the laws and regulations of the other Party.

b. Each Party shall recognize the tonnage certificates and other ship's documents issued by the competent authorities of the other Party to the extent permitted by applicable laws and regulations.

c. Each Party shall inform the other Party of any changes in its system of tonnage measurements.

ARTICLE 5

a. Each Party shall recognize the identity documents of crew members issued by the competent authorities of the other Party. Those issued by the United States of America shall be the "U.S. Merchant Mariner's Document", while those issued by the People's Republic of China shall be the "Seaman's Book". Should any change in the identity document of a Party occur, such change shall be communicated to the other Party.

ARTICLE 6

a. Members of the crew of vessels of either Party shall be permitted to go ashore during the stay of their vessel in the ports of the other Party, in accordance with its applicable laws and regulations.

b. Each Party may deny entry into its territory of a member of the crew of a vessel of the other Party in accordance with its applicable laws and regulations.

c. Members of the crew of vessels of either Party requiring hospitalization shall be permitted to enter into and remain in the territory of the other Party for the period of time necessary for medical treatment, in accordance with applicable laws and regulations of that Party.

d. Members of the crew of vessels of either Party holding documents as stipulated in Article 5 of this Agreement may enter the territory or travel through the territory of the other Party for the purpose of joining national vessels, for repatriation or for any other reason acceptable to the competent authorities of

the other Party, after complying with the applicable laws and regulations of that Party.

ARTICLE 7

a. Should a vessel of either Party be involved in a maritime accident or encounter any other danger in the ports, mooring places and waters of the other Party, the latter shall give friendly treatment and all possible assistance to the passengers, crew members, cargo and vessel.

b. When a vessel of one Party is involved in a maritime accident or encounters any other danger and its cargo and other property is removed therefrom and landed in the territory of the other Party, such cargo and other property shall not be subject to any customs duties by that Party, unless it enters into its domestic consumption. Storage charges incurred shall be just, reasonable and non-discriminatory.

c. Each Party shall promptly notify the consular officials, or in their absence the diplomatic representatives, of the other Party when one of its vessels is in distress, and inform them of measures taken for the rescue and protection of the crew members, passengers, vessel, cargo and stores.

ARTICLE 8

a. Each Party recognizes the interest of the other Party in carrying a substantial part of its foreign trade in vessels of its own flag and both Parties intend that their national flag vessels will each carry equal and substantial shares of the bilateral trade between the two nations.

b. Each Party, where it directs the selection of the carrier of its export or import cargoes, shall provide to vessels under the flag of the other Party a general cargo share and a bulk share equal in each category to those vessels under its flag, and consistent with the intention of the Parties that their national flag vessels will carry not less than one-third of bilateral cargoes.

c. Whenever vessels under the flag of one Party are not available to carry cargo offered for carriage between ports served by such vessels with reasonable notice and upon reasonable terms and conditions of carriage, the offering Party shall be free to direct such cargo to its national flag or third flag vessels.

d. When bulk cargo is carried between the United States and the People's Republic of China such cargo shall be carried at a mutually acceptable rate. Each Party, where it has the power to select the carrier, shall offer such cargo to vessels of the other Party at rates, terms and conditions of carriage which are fair and reasonable for such vessels.

ARTICLE 9

Each Party recognizes the interest of the other, through domestic legislation or policy, in regulating the conduct of cross-traders in their respective foreign ocean commerce and agrees to respect each other's laws and policies in this regard.

Maritime Agreement— A Summary

The agreement's most important provisions deal with port access and cargo sharing. It also provides for facilitation of crew list visa procedures, assistance to vessels in distress, conversion and remittance of locally earned revenues, technical and information exchanges, and for an annual review of how the agreement is being implemented. The agreement will go into effect when signed and will run for 3 years.

Cargo Sharing

Article 8 of the agreement provides that the parties intend that their national-flag vessels shall each carry a substantial share—at least one-third—of bilateral cargo. In instances where one party carries more than one-third, the other party is entitled to carry an equal amount of such cargo, subject to the availability of ships. When national-flag vessels of one party are not available to carry cargo which is fairly offered, such cargo may be directed to the vessels of the other party or third-flag vessels. Carriage of bulk cargoes shall be at mutually acceptable rates.

Port Access

Article 2 and the accompanying exchange of letters set forth the following arrangements with respect to port access:

- For Chinese-flag vessels—access to 55 specified U.S. ports on a 4-day notice basis; entry into all other U.S. ports will ordinarily be granted upon submission of 7-day advance information to U.S. authorities and

- For U.S.-flag vessels—7-day notice access to 20 specified Chinese ports. The two parties will review both port lists periodically with a view to expanding them.

We expect that the agreement will officially foster expanded U.S. and Chinese shipping services linking the two countries and that it will provide further momentum to the growth of Sino-American trade.

Two-way trade between the People's Republic of China and the United States totaled \$2.3 billion in 1979 and is expected to reach about \$4 billion this year. By 1985 annual U.S.-China trade should reach at least \$10 billion.

The United States has been exporting to the People's Republic of China about three times as much as it imports, according to Commerce Department figures.

ARTICLE 10

Payments for transportation services under this Agreement shall either be effected in freely convertible currencies mutually accepted by firms, companies and corporations

and trading organizations of the two countries, or made otherwise in accordance with agreements signed by and between the two parties to the transaction. Parties to such transactions may convert and remit to their country, on demand, local revenues in excess of sums locally disbursed. Conversion and remittance shall be permitted promptly without restrictions in respect thereof at the rate of exchange applicable to current transactions and remittances. Neither Party may impose restrictions on such payments except in time of declared national emergency.

ARTICLE 11

The Parties agree to enter into such technical personnel and information exchanges necessary to facilitate and accelerate the movement of cargo at sea and in ports and to promote cooperation between their respective merchant marines.

ARTICLE 12

a. For the implementation of this Agreement the competent authority of the United States of America shall be the Department of Commerce while that of the People's Republic of China shall be the Ministry of Communications. Each Party shall authorize its competent authority to take action under its laws and procedures, and in consultations with the competent authority of the other Party, to implement this Agreement.

b. The Parties agree that representatives of the competent authorities will meet annually for a comprehensive view of matters related to the Agreement as may be desirable. Such meetings will be held at a time and place agreeable to both Parties. The Parties also agree to engage in such consultations, exchange such information, and take such action as may be necessary to ensure effective operation of this Agreement.

ARTICLE 13

This Agreement shall be in force for three years from the date of signing and shall expire on September 17, 1983. This Agreement may be extended, subject to negotiations between the Parties prior to the expiration date. The Agreement may also be terminated by either Party on 90 days written notice.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Washington, this seventeenth day of September 1980 in duplicate, each copy in the English and Chinese languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

JIMMY CARTER

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA:

Bo YIBO

ACCOMPANYING LETTERS

September 17, 1980

Mr. Dong Huamin
Director
Bureau of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Communications
Beijing, People's Republic of China

Dear Mr. Dong:

In connection with the Agreement on Maritime Transport concluded on this date between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of China, and, in particular, Article 1 of that Agreement, I have the honor to confirm that the following conditions apply to the entry of vessels of each Party into the ports of the other Party:

1. Vessels flying the flag of the United States of America may enter all ports of the People's Republic of China which are open to international merchant shipping listed in Annex A to this letter subject to seven days' advance notice of such entry to the appropriate authorities of the People's Republic of China in accordance with regulations concerning entry by foreign vessels to China.

2. Vessels flying the flag of the People's Republic of China may enter ports of the United States of America in accordance with regulations concerning entry by foreign vessels. Entry into ports listed in Annex B to this letter will be subject to four days' advance notice of such entry to the appropriate authorities of the United States of America. Regarding ports not included in this Annex B, appropriate authorities of the United States of America will be informed not less than seven working days prior to an intended entry into such ports. It is understood that entry into these ports will ordinarily be granted, but that authorities of the United States may deny such entry for reasons of national security.

3. It is further understood that, in view of the expectation of both our governments that the relations between our countries will continue to grow, the list of ports contained in the Annexes to this letter will be reviewed periodically during the term of the Agreement with a view toward increasing the number of ports on these lists.

I request that you confirm these proposed conditions.

Respectfully,

SAMUEL B. NEMIROW
Assistant Secretary
United States Department
of Commerce

ANNEX A

List of Chinese Ports

1. Dalian
2. Qinhuangdao
3. Tianjin
4. Yantai
5. Qingdao

Consular Convention— A Summary

The U.S.-P.R.C. Consular Convention is the first treaty concluded between our two governments. It establishes a comprehensive framework for our consular relations.

The 42 articles of the convention spell out the rights and duties of consular officers and expand consular protections and services for citizens of both nations. The convention is a major step in fully normalizing relations between the United States and China.

The convention amplifies and clarifies the general principles contained in the U.S.-China agreement on consular relations signed in Washington on January 31, 1979. These include the mutual obligation to notify consular officers of the arrest of one of their nationals, the right of consular officers to communicate with their nationals, and to attend trials and other legal procedures.

There are now American Consulates General at Guangzhou (Canton) and Shanghai and Chinese Consulates General at San Francisco and Houston. With the signing of the convention, the United States and China are each free to open three additional consulates general. These new offices will provide more convenient and accessible service to both peoples and further promote the development of bilateral trade.

The significance of the new convention lies not only in the specifics of the text but also in the placing of a keystone in the edifice of fully mature and normal relations between the United States and China.

-
- 46. Long Beach, California
 - 47. Honolulu, Hawaii
 - 48. Erie, Pennsylvania
 - 49. Cleveland, Ohio
 - 50. Toledo, Ohio
 - 51. Bay City, Michigan
 - 52. Chicago, Illinois
 - 53. Kenosha, Wisconsin
 - 54. Milwaukee, Wisconsin
 - 55. Duluth, Minnesota/Superior, Wisconsin

September 17, 1980

Mr. Samuel B. Nemirow
Assistant Secretary
United States Department of Commerce

Dear Mr. Nemirow:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated today, the contents of which follow:

"In connection with the Agreement on Maritime Transport concluded on this date between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of China, and, in particular, Article 2 of that Agreement, I have the honor to confirm that the following conditions apply to the

entry of vessels of each Party into the ports of the other Party.

1. Vessels flying the flag of the United States of America may enter all ports of the People's Republic of China which are open to international merchant shipping listed in Annex A to this letter subject to seven days' advance notice of such entry to the appropriate authorities of the People's Republic of China in accordance with regulations concerning entry by foreign vessels to China.

2. Vessels flying the flags of the People's Republic of China may enter ports of the United States of America in accordance with regulations concerning entry by foreign vessels. Entry into ports listed in Annex B to this letter will be subject to four days' advance notice of such entry to the appropriate authorities of the United States of America. Regarding ports not included in this Annex B, appropriate authorities of the United States of America will be informed not less than seven working days prior to an intended entry into such ports. It is understood that entry into these ports will ordinarily be granted, but that authorities of the United States may deny such entry for reasons of national security.

3. It is further understood that, in view of the expectation of both our governments that the relations between our countries will continue to grow, the list of ports contained in the Annexes to this letter will be reviewed periodically during the term of the Agreement with a view toward increasing the number of ports on these lists.

I request that you confirm these proposed conditions."

I confirm the above contents of your letter as correct.

With my highest considerations,

Respectfully,

DONG HUAMIN
Director
Bureau of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Communica-
tions
People's Republic of China

Consular Convention

CONSULAR CONVENTION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of China,

Desiring to regulate and strengthen their consular relations, in order to promote the development of friendly and cooperative relations between the two countries, and thus to facilitate the protection of their national interests and the protection of the rights and interests of their nationals,

Have decided to conclude this Consular Convention and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries the following:

For the United States of America:
Jimmy Carter, President

Lianyungang
Wenzhou
Shanghai
Ningbo
Fuzhou
Xiamen
Shantou
Shanwei
Huangpu
Guangzhou
Zhanjiang
Beihai
Haikou
Basuo
Shijiusuo (under construction)

ANNEX B

List of United States Ports

Portland, Maine
Boston, Massachusetts
Fall River, Massachusetts
New York (New York and New Jersey
ports of the Port of New York
Authority), New York
Albany, New York
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (including
Camden, New Jersey)
Wilmington, Delaware
Baltimore, Maryland
Richmond, Virginia
Florehead City, North Carolina
Wilmington, North Carolina
Georgetown, South Carolina
Savannah, Georgia
Tampa Grande, Florida
Port Everglades, Florida
Miami, Puerto Rico
Tampa, Florida
Mobile, Alabama
Gulfport, Mississippi
New Orleans, Louisiana
Bourbonside, Louisiana
Baton Rouge, Louisiana
Dallas, Texas
Fort Worth, Texas
Port Arthur, Texas
Galveston, Texas
Houston, Texas
Corpus Christi, Texas
Brownsville, Texas
Anchorage, Alaska
Kagway, Alaska
Bethel, Alaska
Seattle, Washington
Bellingham, Washington
Longview, Washington
Everett, Washington
Tacoma, Washington
Portland (including Vancouver, Washing-
ton), Oregon
Astoria, Oregon
Coos Bay (including North Bend), Oregon
Eureka, California
Stockton, California
San Francisco (including Alameda, Oak-
land, Berkeley, Richmond), California
Sacramento, California
Los Angeles (including San Pedro, Wil-
mington, Terminal Island), California

For the People's Republic of China:
Bo Yibo, Vice Premier

Who, having examined and exchanged their respective full powers, which were found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

Definitions

For the purpose of the present Convention, the terms listed below shall have the following meanings:

1. "Consulate" means a consulate general, consulate, vice consulate, or consular agency;

2. "Consular district" means the area assigned to a consulate for the exercise of consular functions;

3. "Head of a consulate" means the consul general, consul, vice consul or consular agent who is charged by the sending State to head a consulate;

4. "Consular officer" means any person, including the head of a consulate, who is charged by the sending State with the performance of consular functions;

5. "Consular employee" means any person who performs administrative, technical, or service functions at a consulate;

6. "Member of a consulate" means any consular officer or consular employee;

7. "Members of the family" means the spouse, minor children and other relatives of a member of a consulate who form a part of his household;

8. "Consular premises" means buildings or parts of buildings, as well as the grounds ancillary thereto, used exclusively for the purposes of a consulate, regardless of ownership;

9. "Consular archives" means all correspondence, codes and ciphers, documents, records, files, tapes and books of a consulate, as well as any article of furniture intended for their storage or safekeeping;

10. "Vessel of the sending State" means any vessel sailing under the flag of the sending State, in accordance with the law of the sending State, excluding military vessels;

11. "Aircraft of the sending State" means any aircraft flying under the nationality and registration marks of the sending State, in accordance with the law of the sending State, excluding military aircraft;

12. "Law" means

- for the People's Republic of China, all national, provincial, municipal, autonomous region and local laws, ordinances, regulations and decisions having the force and effect of law;

- for the United States of America, all federal, state or local laws, ordinances, regulations and decisions having the force and effect of law.

ARTICLE 2

Opening of Consulates

1. A consulate may be established only through agreement between the sending and receiving States.

2. The determination of the seat of the consulate, its classification, and its consular

district, as well as any changes pertaining thereto, shall be through agreement between the sending and receiving States.

ARTICLE 3

Appointment of the Head of a Consulate

1. The sending State shall forward to the receiving State through diplomatic channels a written notification of the appointment of the head of the consulate. This notification shall contain the full name, nationality, sex and rank of the head of the consulate, a brief biography, the date on which he will begin to exercise his functions, the classification and seat of the consulate, and the consular district.

2. Upon receiving notification of the appointment of the head of the consulate, the receiving State shall, if there is no objection, confirm it in writing without delay. The head of the consulate may enter upon the performance of his functions only after the receiving State has provided such confirmation.

3. The receiving State may permit the head of a consulate to exercise his functions on a provisional basis prior to his confirmation by the receiving State.

4. The receiving State shall, immediately after granting recognition, including provisional recognition, take all measures necessary to enable the head of the consulate to exercise his functions and to enjoy the rights, facilities, privileges and immunities granted under this Convention and under the law of the receiving State.

5. If for any reason the head of a consulate is unable to exercise his functions, or if the position of the head of consulate is vacant, the sending State may place its consulate under the temporary charge of a consular officer of the same or of another consulate in the receiving State or a member of the diplomatic staff of the diplomatic mission of the sending State in the receiving State. The sending State shall notify the receiving State in advance of the full name of the person appointed as acting head of a consulate.

6. A person appointed as acting head of a consulate shall enjoy the same rights, facilities, privileges and immunities enjoyed by a head of a consulate under this Convention.

7. Entrusting a member of the diplomatic staff of the diplomatic mission of the sending State with the functions of head of a consulate does not limit the privileges and immunities to which such person is entitled by virtue of diplomatic status, subject to the provisions of Article 33, paragraph 4 of this Convention.

ARTICLE 4

Appointment of Members of a Consulate

1. The sending State may staff its consulate with the number of members of a consulate it considers necessary. The receiving State may, however, require that the number of such members of a consulate be kept within the limits which it considers to be reasonable, having regard to existing circumstances and conditions in the consular district and the needs of a particular consulate.

2. Consular officers shall be nationals of the sending State only, and shall not be permanent residents of the receiving State.

3. The sending State shall communicate in advance, in writing, to the receiving State full name, functions and class of each consular officer other than the head of the consulate, arrival, final departure or termination of functions, as well as all other changes affecting person's status while assigned to the consulate.

4. The sending State shall also notify the receiving State in writing of:

(a) the designation of all consular employees, their full name, nationality and functions, their arrival, their final departure or termination of their functions, as well as other changes affecting their status while assigned to the consulate;

(b) the arrival and final departure of members of the family of a member of a consulate and when any such individual becomes or ceases to be a member of the family;

(c) the employment or dismissal of consular employee who is a national or permanent resident of the receiving State.

ARTICLE 5

Performance of Consular Functions by Diplomatic Mission

1. The provisions of this Convention relating to consular functions, rights, facilities, privileges and immunities shall apply in the case of consular functions being performed by a diplomatic mission.

2. The names of the members of the diplomatic mission entrusted with the performance of consular functions shall be communicated to the receiving State.

3. The members of the diplomatic mission referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article shall continue to enjoy the privileges and immunities granted them by virtue of their diplomatic status, subject to the requirements of Article 33, paragraph 4, of this Convention.

ARTICLE 6

Terminating Functions of Members of a Consulate

1. The receiving State may at any time and without having to explain its decision, notify the sending State through diplomatic channels that the head of a consulate is *persona non grata* or that any other member of a consulate is unacceptable. In such a case, the sending State shall recall such person or terminate his functions in the consulate.

2. If the sending State refuses or fails within a reasonable time to carry out the obligation contained in paragraph 1 of this Article the receiving State may either withdraw recognition from the person concerned or refuse to consider him as a member of the consulate.

3. The functions of a member of a consulate shall come to an end, among other things upon the:

(a) notification by the sending State to the receiving State that his functions have come to an end;

(b) withdrawal by the receiving State of recognition; or

(c) notification by the receiving State to the sending State that the receiving State has ceased to consider the person as a member of the consulate.

ARTICLE 7

Facilities for the Operation of a Consulate and Protection of Consular Officers

1. The receiving State shall take all necessary steps for the establishment of the proper conditions for the normal operation of a consulate and shall accord full facilities for the performance of the functions of the consulate.

2. The receiving State shall afford appropriate protection to consular officers to prevent any attack upon their person, freedom or dignity and further shall take all measures necessary to ensure that consular officers are able to perform their functions and enjoy the rights, facilities, privileges and immunities provided them under this Convention.

ARTICLE 8

Acquisition of Consular Premises and Residences

1. The sending State or its representative shall be entitled to purchase, lease or acquire in any other way, land, consular premises and residences as appropriate for consular purposes, except residences for members of a consulate who are nationals or permanent residents of the receiving State, and to construct or improve buildings for such purposes.

2. In exercising the rights provided under paragraph 1 of this Article, the sending State shall comply with the law of the receiving State, including the law relating to land, construction, zoning and town planning.

3. The receiving State shall, in conformity with its law, facilitate a consulate of the sending State in the acquisition of suitable consular premises. When necessary, the receiving State shall assist the sending State in the acquisition of residences for members of a consulate.

ARTICLE 9

Use of the National Flag and Emblems

1. The sending State shall be entitled to display the national emblem and the designation of the consulate on the consular premises in the languages of the sending and of the receiving States.

2. The sending State shall be entitled to fly the flag of the sending State on the consular premises and on the residence of the head of the consulate, as well as on the means of transport of the head of the consulate used in the performance of his official duties.

3. In exercising the rights provided by this Article, the sending State shall observe the law and customs of the receiving State.

ARTICLE 10

Inviolability of Premises and Residences

1. The consular premises shall be inviolable. The authorities of the receiving State may

not enter the consular premises without the consent of the head of the consulate or the head of the diplomatic mission of the sending State or a person designated by one of those persons.

2. The receiving State is under a special duty to take all steps necessary to protect the consular premises against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the consulate or impairment of its dignity.

3. The provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall apply likewise to the residences of consular officers.

ARTICLE 11

Inviolability of Archives

The consular archives shall be inviolable at all times and wherever they may be. Documents and objects of an unofficial character shall not be stored in the consular archives.

ARTICLE 12

Freedom of Communications

1. A consulate shall be entitled to exchange communications with its government, with diplomatic missions of the sending State and with other consulates of the sending State, wherever situated. For this purpose, the consulate may employ all ordinary means of communication, including diplomatic and consular couriers, diplomatic and consular bags and codes and ciphers. The consulate may install and use a wireless transmitter only with the prior consent of the receiving State.

2. The official correspondence of a consulate, regardless of the means of communication employed, as well as sealed consular bags and other containers, provided they bear visible external marks of their official character, shall be inviolable. They may contain nothing other than official correspondence and articles intended exclusively for official use.

3. The authorities of the receiving State shall neither open nor detain the official correspondence of a consulate, including consular bags and other containers, as described in paragraph 2 of this Article.

4. The consular couriers of the sending State shall enjoy in the territory of the receiving State the same rights, privileges, facilities and immunities enjoyed by diplomatic couriers of the sending State.

5. If a master of a vessel or captain of a civil aircraft of the sending State is charged with an official consular bag, the master or captain shall be provided with an official document showing the number of containers forming the consular bag entrusted to him; he shall not, however, be considered to be a consular courier. By arrangements with the appropriate authorities of the receiving State, and in compliance with the safety regulations of the receiving State, the sending State may send a member of the consulate to take possession of the consular bag directly and freely from the master of the vessel or captain of the aircraft or to deliver such bag to him.

ARTICLE 13

Immunity of Members of a Consulate from the Jurisdiction of the Receiving State

1. Members of a consulate and their family members shall be immune from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State.

2. Members of a consulate and their family members shall be immune from the civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving State respecting any act performed by them in the exercise of consular functions.

3. The provisions of paragraph 2 of this Article shall not apply to civil procedures:

(a) resulting from contracts that were not concluded by a member of a consulate on behalf of the sending State;

(b) relating to succession in which a member of a consulate was involved as executor, administrator, heir or legatee in a private capacity;

(c) concerning a claim by a third party for damage caused by a vessel, vehicle or aircraft;

(d) concerning private immovable property in the jurisdiction of the receiving State, unless the member of a consulate is holding it on behalf of the sending State for the purposes of the consulate;

(e) relating to any private professional or commercial activities engaged in by a member of a consulate in the receiving State outside of his official functions.

4. No measures of execution shall be taken against any of the persons mentioned in this Article, except in the cases under paragraph 3(d) of this Article, and then under the condition that these measures shall not infringe upon the inviolability of their person or residence.

5. Members of a consulate and their family members may be called upon to attend as witnesses in the course of judicial or administrative proceedings. In the event of the refusal of a consular officer or a member of the officer's family to give evidence, no coercive measure or penalty may be applied to such person. Consular employees and members of their families may not decline to give evidence except with respect to matters mentioned in paragraph 6 of this Article.

6. Members of a consulate are under no obligation to give evidence concerning matters relating to the exercise of their official functions or to produce official correspondence or documents. They are also entitled to decline to give evidence as expert witnesses with regard to the law of the sending State.

7. In taking testimony of members of a consulate, the authorities of the receiving State shall take all the appropriate measures to avoid hindering the performance of their official consular duties. Upon the request of the head of a consulate, such testimony may, when possible, be given orally or in writing at the consulate or at the residence of the person concerned.

ARTICLE 14

Waiver of Immunity

1. The sending State may waive the immunity from jurisdiction of members of a consulate and of members of their families provided in Article 13 of this Convention. Except as provided in paragraph 2 of this Article, such waiver shall always be express and in writing.

2. In the event a member of a consulate or a member of his family initiates legal proceedings, with respect to which he would enjoy immunity from jurisdiction under this Convention, no immunity may be invoked with regard to any counterclaim directly related to the principal claim.

3. Waiver of immunity from jurisdiction with respect to civil proceedings shall not be held to imply waiver of immunity with respect to the execution of judgment, for which a separate waiver shall be necessary.

ARTICLE 15

Exemption from Services and Obligations

Consular officers and consular employees and members of their families who are not nationals of the receiving State and who are not aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the receiving State shall be exempt in the receiving State from obligations and services of a military nature, from any kind of compulsory services, and from any contributions that may be due in lieu thereof. They shall likewise be exempt from obligations relating to the registration of aliens, from obtaining permission to reside, and from compliance with other similar obligations applicable to aliens.

ARTICLE 16

Exemption of Real and Movable Property from Taxation

1. The sending State shall be exempt from all dues and taxes and similar charges of any kind in the receiving State, for which it otherwise would be liable, with respect to:

- (a) the consular premises and residences of members of a consulate referred to in Article 8 of this Convention;
- (b) transactions or documents relating to such immovable property.

2. The sending State shall be exempt from all dues and taxes and similar charges of any kind on movable property which is owned, held or leased or otherwise possessed by it and which is used exclusively for consular purposes, as well as dues and taxes in connection with the acquisition, possession or maintenance of such property.

3. The provisions of subparagraph 1(a) of this Article shall not apply to payment for specific services rendered.

4. The exemptions accorded by this Article shall not apply to such dues and taxes if under the law of the receiving State they are payable by a person contracting with the sending State or with a person acting on behalf of the sending State.

5. The provisions of this Article also

apply to all immovable property used for the official purposes of the diplomatic mission of the sending State, including residences of diplomatic mission personnel.

ARTICLE 17

Exemption of Members of a Consulate from Taxation

1. Except as provided in paragraph 2 of this Article, a member of a consulate and members of his family shall be exempt from payment of all dues and taxes and similar charges of any kind.

2. The exemption provided by paragraph 1 of this Article shall not apply with respect to:

- (a) indirect taxes of a kind normally included in the price of goods and services;
- (b) dues and taxes imposed with respect to private immovable property located in the territory of the receiving State, unless an exemption is provided by Article 16 of this Convention;
- (c) estate, succession and inheritance taxes and taxes on the transfer of property rights imposed by the receiving State, except as provided in paragraph 3 of this Article;
- (d) dues and taxes on private income earned in the receiving State;
- (e) charges for specific services rendered;
- (f) dues and taxes on transactions or on documents relating to transactions, including fees of any kind collected by reason of such transactions, except for fees and charges exemption from which is provided in Article 16 of this Convention.

3. If a member of a consulate or a member of his family dies, no estate, succession or inheritance tax or any other tax or charge on the transfer of movable property at death shall be imposed by the receiving State with respect to that property, provided that the presence of the property was due solely to the presence of the deceased in the receiving State in the capacity of a member of a consulate or a member of his family.

ARTICLE 18

Exemptions from Customs Duties and Inspection

1. All articles, including motor vehicles, for the official use of a consulate, shall, in conformity with the law of the receiving State, be exempt from customs duties and other dues and taxes of any kind imposed upon or by reason of importation or exportation.

2. Consular officers and members of their families shall be exempt from customs duties and other charges imposed upon or by reason of importation or exportation of articles intended for their own personal use, including articles for the equipment of their households.

3. Consular employees and members of their families shall be exempt from customs duties and other charges imposed upon or by reason of the importation or exportation of articles for their own personal use, including articles for the equipment of their households, imported at time of first arrival at a consulate.

4. Articles designed for personal use shall not exceed the quantities required for direct use by the person accorded an exemption by this Article.

5. Personal baggage of consular officers and members of their families shall be exempt from customs inspection. It may be inspected only in cases where there is serious reason to believe that it contains articles other than those mentioned in paragraph 2 of this Article, or articles the importation or exportation of which is prohibited by the law of the receiving State or articles which are subject to the law of quarantine. Such inspection must be undertaken in the presence of the consular officer concerned or member of his family or his representative.

ARTICLE 19

Immunity from Requisition

Consular premises as well as the official means of transport of the consulate are not liable to any form of requisition. If for the needs of the national defense or other public purposes expropriation of consular premises, residences or means of transport becomes necessary, all possible measures must be taken by the receiving State to avoid interference with the performance of consular functions and promptly to pay appropriate and effective compensation to the sending State.

ARTICLE 20

Freedom of Movement

Subject to the law of the receiving State concerning zones, entry into which is prohibited or regulated for reasons of national security, the receiving State shall ensure freedom of movement and travel in its territory to members of a consulate and members of their families.

ARTICLE 21

Exclusion from the Enjoyment of Rights, Facilities, Privileges and Immunities

Members of a consulate and members of their families who are either nationals or permanent residents of the receiving State shall not enjoy the rights, facilities, privileges and immunities provided by this Convention, except immunity from the obligation to give evidence concerning matters relating to the exercise of their official functions as provided in paragraph 6 of Article 13 of this Convention.

ARTICLE 22

Functions of Consular Officers

1. The functions of a consular officer consist of:

- (a) protecting the rights and interests of the sending State and of its nationals, including juridical persons;
- (b) rendering assistance to and cooperating with nationals of the sending State, including juridical persons;
- (c) contributing to the development of

economic, commercial, cultural, scientific and tourist relations between the sending and the receiving States;

(d) promoting in various ways the development of friendly relations between the sending and the receiving States;

(e) ascertaining by all lawful means conditions and developments in the political, commercial, economic, cultural, educational and scientific-technological life of the receiving State, and reporting thereon to the government of the sending State.

2. A consular officer shall, if authorized by the sending State, be entitled to carry out the functions described in this Convention, as well as other consular functions which are not prohibited by the law of the receiving State or to which the receiving State does not object.

ARTICLE 23

Execution of Consular Functions

1. A consular officer shall be entitled to execute his functions only within the consular district. A consular officer may execute his functions outside the limits of the consular district only with the advance consent of the receiving State given separately in each instance.

2. In executing his functions, a consular officer may approach orally or in writing:

(a) the competent local authorities in the consular district;

(b) the competent central authorities of the receiving State, if and to the extent allowed by the law and customs of the receiving State.

3. With the advance approval of the receiving State, the sending State may perform consular functions in the receiving State on behalf of a third State.

4. A consulate may levy in the territory of the receiving State consular fees authorized under the law of the sending State for consular acts. Any such sums levied shall be exempt from all dues and taxes in the receiving State.

ARTICLE 24

Representation Before the Authorities of the Receiving State

1. A consular officer shall be entitled, in accordance with the law of the receiving State, to take appropriate measures for the protection of the rights and interests of nationals of the sending State, including juridical persons, before the courts and other authorities of the receiving State, where, because they are not present in the receiving State or for any other reason, these nationals are not in a position to undertake timely defense of their rights and interests.

2. The measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall cease as soon as the national appoints his own representative or the national assumes the defense of his rights and interests.

3. Nothing in this Article, however, shall be construed to authorize a consular officer to act as an attorney-at-law.

ARTICLE 25

Functions with Regard to Travel Documents

A consular officer shall be entitled to:

1. issue to nationals of the sending State passports or similar travel documents, as well as make amendments in them;

2. issue visas or other appropriate documents to persons wishing to travel to or through the sending State.

ARTICLE 26

Functions Regarding Citizenship and Civil Status

A consular officer shall be entitled to:

1. register nationals of the sending State;

2. accept applications and issue or deliver documents on matters of citizenship;

3. accept applications or declarations relating to civil status from nationals of the sending State;

4. register births and deaths of nationals of the sending State.

ARTICLE 27

Notarial Functions

A consular officer shall be entitled to:

1. receive and witness statements made under oath or affirmation, and, in accordance with the law of the receiving State, to receive the testimony of any person for use in connection with a legal proceeding in the sending State;

2. draw up or authenticate any act or document, as well as copies or extracts thereof, of a national of the sending State, including a juridical person, for use outside the receiving State or of any person for use in the sending State, or perform other notarial functions;

3. authenticate documents issued by competent authorities of the receiving State for use in the sending State.

ARTICLE 28

Legal Force of Documents Prepared by a Consular Officer

The acts and documents certified or legalized by a consular officer of the sending State, as well as copies, extracts and translations of such acts and documents certified by him, shall be receivable in evidence in the receiving State as official or officially certified acts, documents, copies, translations or extracts, and shall have in the receiving State the same validity and effect as the documents certified or legalized by the competent authorities of the receiving State, provided they have been drawn and executed in conformity with the law of the receiving State and with the law of the country in which they are to be used.

ARTICLE 29

Serving Judicial and Other Legal Documents

A consular officer shall be entitled to

serve judicial and other legal documents in accordance with international agreements in force between the sending and receiving States or, in the absence of such agreements, to the extent permitted by the law of the receiving State.

ARTICLE 30

Notification on the Establishment of Guardianship or Trusteeship

1. The competent authorities of the receiving State shall notify the consulate in writing of instances in which it is necessary to establish a guardianship or trusteeship over a national of the sending State who is not of age or lacks full capacity to act on his own behalf, or over property of a national of the sending State when for whatever reason such property cannot be administered by the national of the sending State.

2. A consular officer of the sending State may, on matters mentioned in paragraph 1 of this Article, contact the appropriate authorities of the receiving State, and may propose appropriate persons to be appointed to act as guardians or trustees, in accordance with the law of the receiving State.

ARTICLE 31

Notification Regarding the Death of a National of the Sending State

Whenever the competent authorities of the receiving State learn that a national of the sending State has died in the receiving State, they shall immediately notify the appropriate consular officer of the sending State and, upon his request, send him a copy of the death certificate or other documentation confirming the death.

ARTICLE 32

Notification Regarding the Estate of a Deceased National

1. Whenever the appropriate local authorities of the receiving State learn of an estate resulting from the death in the receiving State of a national of the sending State who leaves in the receiving State no known heir or testamentary executor, they shall as promptly as possible so inform a consular officer of the sending State.

2. Whenever the appropriate local authorities of the receiving State learn of an estate of a decedent, regardless of nationality, who has left in the receiving State an estate in which a national of the sending State residing outside the receiving State may have an interest under the will of the decedent or otherwise in accordance with the law of the receiving State, they shall as promptly as possible so inform a consular officer of the sending State.

ARTICLE 33

Functions Relating to Estates

1. A consular officer shall be entitled to take appropriate measures with respect to the protection and conservation of the property of a deceased national of the sending State left in

the receiving State. In this connection he may approach the competent authorities of the receiving State with a view towards protecting the interests of a sending State national, not a permanent resident of the receiving State, unless such a national is otherwise represented. He may also request the competent authorities of the receiving State to permit him to be present at the inventorying and sealing and, in general, to take an interest in the proceedings.

2. A consular officer shall be entitled to safeguard the interests of a national of the sending State who has, or claims to have, a right to property left in the receiving State by a deceased person, irrespective of the latter's nationality, and if that interested national is not in the receiving State or does not have a representative there.

3. A consular officer of the sending State shall be entitled to receive for transmission to a national of the sending State who is not a permanent resident of the receiving State any money or other property in the receiving State to which such national is entitled as a consequence of the death of another person, including shares in an estate, payments made pursuant to employees' compensation law, pension and social benefits systems in general, and proceeds of insurance policies, unless the court, agency, or person making distribution directs that transmission be effected in a different manner. The court, agency, or person making distribution may require that a consular officer comply with conditions laid down with regard to:

(a) presenting a power of attorney or other authorization from such national residing outside the receiving State;

(b) furnishing reasonable evidence of the receipt of such money or other property by such national; and

(c) returning the money or other property in the event he is unable to furnish such evidence.

4. In exercising the rights provided by paragraphs 1 through 3 of this Article, the consular officer must comply with the law of the receiving State in the same manner and to the same extent as a national of the receiving State and, irrespective of the provisions of Article 13 of this Convention, shall be subject in this respect to the civil jurisdiction of the receiving State. Further, nothing in these Articles shall authorize a consular officer to act as an attorney-at-law.

ARTICLE 34

Provisional Custody of Money and Effects of a Deceased National of the Sending State

If a national of the sending State, not a permanent resident of the receiving State, dies during a temporary stay in or transit through the receiving State, and the deceased person did not leave a legal representative in the receiving State, the consular officer shall be entitled immediately to take provisional custody of the money, documents and personal effects

that were in the national's possession for transfer to an heir, executor, or other person authorized to receive such property, to the extent permitted by the law of the receiving State.

ARTICLE 35

Communication with Nationals of the Sending State

1. A consular officer shall be entitled, in his consular district, to communicate and meet with any national of the sending State, and, when necessary, to arrange for legal assistance and an interpreter. The receiving State shall in no way restrict access between a consular officer and a national of the sending State.

2. If a national of the sending State is arrested or placed under any form of detention within the consular district, the competent authorities of the receiving State shall immediately, but no later than within four days from the date of arrest or detention, notify the consulate of the sending State. If it is not possible to notify the consulate of the sending State within four days because of communications difficulties, they should try to provide notification as soon as possible. Upon the request of a consular officer, he shall be informed of the reasons for which said national has been arrested or detained in any manner.

3. The competent authorities of the receiving State shall immediately inform the national of the sending State of the rights accorded to him by this Article to communicate with a consular officer.

4. A consular officer shall be entitled to visit a national of the sending State who has been arrested or placed under any form of detention, including such national who is in prison pursuant to a judgment, to converse and to exchange correspondence with him in the language of the sending State or the receiving State, and may assist in arranging for legal representation and an interpreter. These visits shall take place as soon as possible, but, at the latest, shall not be refused after two days from the date on which the competent authorities notified the consulate that said national had been placed under any form of detention. The visits may be made on a recurring basis. No longer than one month shall be allowed to pass in between visits requested by the consular officer.

5. In the case of a trial of, or other legal proceeding against, a national of the sending State in the receiving State, the appropriate authorities shall, at the request of a consular officer, inform such officer of the charges against such national. A consular officer shall be permitted to attend the trial or other legal proceedings.

6. A consular officer is entitled to provide to a national to whom the provisions of this Article apply parcels containing food, clothing, medicaments and reading and writing materials.

7. A consular officer of the sending State may request the assistance of the authorities of the receiving State in ascertaining the whereabouts of a national of the sending State.

The authorities of the receiving State shall do everything possible to provide all relevant available information.

8. The rights contained in this Article shall be exercised in accordance with the law of the receiving State. Nevertheless, such law shall be applied so as to give full effect to the purposes for which these rights are intended.

ARTICLE 36

Rendering Assistance to Vessels

1. A consular officer shall be entitled to provide any type of assistance to vessels of the sending State which are in the territorial or inland waters, ports or other anchorages of the receiving State.

2. A consular officer may board a vessel of the sending State as soon as permission has been granted the vessel to make contact with the shore. On such occasions, he may be accompanied by members of the consulate.

3. The master and members of the crew may meet and communicate with the consular officer, observing, however, the law relating to the port and the law relating to crossing the border.

4. The consular officer may request the cooperation of the authorities of the receiving State in carrying out his functions with regard to vessels of the sending State and with regard to the master, members of the crew, passengers and cargo.

ARTICLE 37

Rendering Assistance to Master and Crew

1. In accordance with the law of the receiving State, the consular officer shall be entitled:

(a) to investigate any incident occurring aboard a vessel of the sending State, to question the master and any member of the crew with reference to these incidents, to inspect the vessel's papers, to receive information in connection with the voyage and destination of the vessel and also to render assistance in connection with the entry, stay and departure of a vessel of the sending State;

(b) to settle disputes between the master and a crew member, including disputes concerning wages and employment contracts, to the extent that this action is authorized by the law of the sending State;

(c) to take steps connected with the signing on and the discharge of the master and of any crew member;

(d) to take steps for hospitalization for repatriation of the master or a member of the crew of the vessel;

(e) to receive, draw up or certify any declaration or other document provided for by the law of the sending State in regard to the vessel of the sending State or its cargo.

2. The consular officer may, if permitted by the law of the receiving State, appear together with the master or a crew member

fore the courts or other authorities of the receiving State in order to render them any assistance.

ARTICLE 38

Protection of Interests in Case of Investigations

1. When the courts or other competent authorities of the receiving State intend to take compulsory actions or to start an official investigation aboard a vessel of the sending State which is in the internal or territorial waters of the receiving State, or on the shore with regard to the master or member of the crew, those authorities must notify the appropriate consular officer of the sending State. If, because of the urgency of the matter, it has not been possible to inform the consular officer before initiation of the actions involved, and the consular officer or his representative has not been present when the actions were carried out, the competent authorities of the receiving State shall promptly provide him with the full relevant particulars of the actions taken.

2. Except at the request of the vessel's master or the consular officer, the judicial or other competent authorities of the receiving State shall not interfere in the internal affairs of the vessel on questions of relations between its members of the crew, labor relations, discipline and other activities of an internal character, when the peace and safety of the receiving State are not violated.

3. The provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall not be applied, however, to ordinary customs, passport and sanitary controls, in accordance with treaties in force between the two States, to the saving of human life at sea, prevention of pollution of the sea, or other activities undertaken at the request of or with the consent of, the master of the vessel.

ARTICLE 39

Assistance to Damaged Vessels

1. If a vessel of the sending State is wrecked or grounded, or suffers any other damage in the internal or territorial waters of the receiving State, the competent authorities of the receiving State shall inform the consulate as soon as possible and inform it of the measures taken for saving the passengers, the vessel, its crew and cargo.

2. A vessel which has suffered a misfortune and its cargo and provisions shall be subject to customs duties on the territory of the receiving State unless they are delivered for use in that State.

ARTICLE 40

Functions with Regard to Aircraft

The relevant provisions of Articles 36 through 39 of this Convention shall also apply to civil aircraft on the condition that such application is not contrary to the provisions of

any bilateral or multilateral agreement in force between the two States.

ARTICLE 41

Observing the Law of the Receiving State

1. All persons enjoying privileges and immunities under this Convention are obliged, without prejudice to their privileges and immunities, to observe the law of the receiving State, including traffic regulations, and to respect the customs of the receiving State, and may not interfere in the internal affairs of the receiving State.

2. Consular officers and consular employees who are nationals of the sending State may not carry on any profession or undertake any activity for personal profit on the territory of the receiving State other than their official duties.

3. All means of transportation of the consulate or of members of a consulate and their families shall be adequately insured against civil actions by third parties.

ARTICLE 42

Entry into Force and Renunciation

1. The present Convention shall be subject to ratification. The exchange of instruments of ratification shall take place as soon as possible at Beijing.

2. The present Convention shall enter into force after the expiration of thirty days following the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

3. The present Convention shall remain in force until the expiration of six months from the date on which one of the Contracting Parties gives to the other Contracting Party written notification of its intention to terminate the Convention.

DONE at Washington this seventeenth day of September, 1980, in duplicate in the English and Chinese languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

JIMMY CARTER

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA:

BO YIBO

ACCOMPANYING LETTERS

September 17, 1980

His Excellency
Chai Zemin

Ambassador of the
People's Republic of China

Excellency:

I have the honor to confirm on behalf of the Government of the United States of

America that in the course of negotiating the Consular Convention between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, the two sides reached agreement on the following questions:

1. The two governments agree to facilitate the reunion of families and will process all applications as quickly as possible under mutually agreed arrangements and in accordance with each side's laws and regulations.

2. The two governments agree to facilitate travel between their respective countries of persons who may have a claim simultaneously to the nationality of the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, but this does not imply that the governments of the two countries recognize dual nationality. Exit formalities and documentation shall be dealt with in accordance with the laws of the country in which such person resides. Entry formalities and documentation shall be dealt with in accordance with the laws of the country of destination.

3. All nationals of the sending State entering the receiving State on the basis of travel documents of the sending State containing properly executed entry and exit visas of the receiving State will, during the period for which their status has been accorded, and in accordance with the visa's period of validity, be considered nationals of the sending State by the appropriate authorities of the receiving State for the purpose of ensuring consular access and protection by the sending State as provided for in Article 35 of the Consular Convention between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China. If judicial or administrative proceedings prevent the above-mentioned persons from leaving the country within the visa's period of validity, they shall not lose the right of consular access and protection by the sending State. Such persons shall be permitted to leave the receiving State without the necessity of obtaining documentation from the receiving State other than the exit documentation normally required of departing aliens.

4. Both governments agree that persons residing in one country who are entitled to receive financial benefits from the other country shall receive their benefits under mutually agreed arrangements and in accordance with each country's laws and regulations.

If your Excellency confirms the above by a note in reply on behalf of the Government of the People's Republic of China, this note shall constitute an integral part of the above-mentioned Consular Convention and shall come into effect simultaneously with the Consular Convention. At that time, the Annex on Practical Arrangements to the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Mutual Establishment of Consular Relations and the Opening of Consulates-General, signed on January 31, 1979 will cease to be in effect.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

EDMUND S. MUSKIE
Secretary of State

September 17, 1980

The Honorable
Edmund S. Muskie,
Secretary of State.

Excellency:

I have today received a note from Your Excellency, which reads as follows:

"I have the honor to confirm on behalf of the Government of the United States of America that in the course of negotiating the Consular Convention between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, the two sides reached agreement on the following questions.

1. The two governments agree to facilitate the reunion of families and will process all applications as quickly as possible under mutually agreed arrangements and in accordance with each side's laws and regulations.

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constitute an integral part of the above-mentioned Consular Convention and shall come into effect simultaneously with the Consular Convention. At that time, the Annex on Practical Arrangements to the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Mutual Establishment of Consular Relations and the Opening of Consulates-General, signed on January 31, 1979 will cease to be in effect."

On behalf of the Government of the People's Republic of China, I have the honor to confirm the above contents.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

CHAI ZEMIN
Ambassador of the People's
Republic of China

September 17, 1980

His Excellency
Chai Zemin

Ambassador of the
People's Republic of China

Excellency:

I have the honor on behalf of the Government of the United States of America to confirm that during the course of negotiations concerning the Consular Convention between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, both sides reached agreement on the following matter:

Aside from the consulates whose opening has already been agreed upon, the United States and Chinese Governments agree to the establishment of three additional consulates general in each other's territory.

If your Excellency by return note confirms the above on behalf of the Government of the People's Republic of China, this note and your Excellency's note in reply will constitute an agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of China which shall take effect from the date of the Embassy's note in reply."

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

EDMUND S. MUSKIE
Secretary of State

September 17, 1980

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On behalf of the Government of the People's Republic of China, I have the honor confirm the above contents.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

HIS EXCELLENCY
CHAI ZEMIN,
Ambassador of the
People's Republic of
China

¹Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Sept. 22, 1980

²Press release 257 of Sept. 17, 1980.

³Text from White House press release of Sept. 17, 1980.

⁴For the purposes of this understanding "frequency" shall have the same meaning as that set forth in Annex V, paragraph (1) of the Agreement.

⁵The term "point service" means one weekly frequency with full traffic rights at a point. ■

U.S., China Sign Civil Aviation Agreement

The agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of China relating to civil air transport signed on September 17,

News Conference of September 18 (Excerpts)

1980, is an agreement between the governments of our two countries, which established diplomatic relations on January 1, 1979. As stated in the joint communique issued by the two governments in anticipation of establishing diplomatic relations, the United States recognizes the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China. Within this context, the people of the United States maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan. The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is a part of China.

Under this agreement, air services will be provided on the Chinese side by China's national carrier, the Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC), whose aircraft will bear the national flag of the People's Republic of China. "China Airlines" (Taiwan) continues to provide service between the United States and Taiwan, under a nongovernmental arrangement between two private entities, the American Institute in Taiwan and the Coordination Council on North American Affairs. The United States does not recognize the flag of Taiwan as the flag of a sovereign state but regards it as an insignia or marking identifying an aircraft as coming from Taiwan.

Although attention is naturally focused on domestic politics, events around the world and here at home still demand my attention and action in ways that affect the well-being of American citizens.

Yesterday we completed the normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China with four agreements—for trade, for consulates, for normal airline service, and for textiles. We've opened a new era of normal relationships now between our two great countries.

Also yesterday, the second anniversary of the signing of the Camp David accords, I met with Israeli Foreign Minister [Yitzhak] Shamir and Egyptian Foreign Minister Hassan Ali as efforts continue in our quest for a lasting peace in the Middle East, which is so important to the future of Americans and to the entire world. They have been, since that meeting with me, conducting negotiations or discussions with our own Ambassador [Sol M. Linowitz, Personal Representative of the President for the Middle East Peace Negotiations] responsible for the discussions for peace.

We're preparing now for preliminary exchanges with the Soviet Union on the control of theater nuclear weapons in Europe. These talks should begin next month, and Secretary Muskie will be addressing this important subject in his discussions with Foreign Minister Gromyko of the Soviet Union in New York in the near future.

We've also been concentrating on the slow, difficult, diplomatic effort to free our hostages in Iran.

Q. Earlier this week you raised expectations on the release of the hostages, and then you seemed to back off. What is today's prospect for an early release of the hostages, and aside from the Shah's assets over which we have no control, are all of the latest Iranian demands negotiable?

A. I've not changed my position on the prospects for the hostages' release. I do not predict an early resolution of the issue, because it's not in my hands, unilaterally. It has to be done through very careful negotiations with the Iranians and quite often because of unilateral decisions to be made by them.

One of the major obstacles to progress, in the past, has been the absence of any viable government in Iran. Only in recent weeks—in fact in some instances in the last few days—have they had a Parliament or a speaker of the Parliament who could speak for them or a Prime Minister. They have had a President for a long time. The President himself, Bani-Sadr, has been consistently in favor of the hostages being released.

Now that their government is intact and now that the Ayatollah Khomeini has made a public statement for the first time outlining to some degree the demands to be pursued by Iran, obviously the situation has improved.

Our position has been consistent. We have two goals in mind that have not changed since the first day the hostages were taken. One is to preserve the honor and integrity of our nation and to protect its interests. That's never changed. And the second goal has also never changed, and that is not to do anything here in this country that would endanger the lives or safety of the hostages nor interfere with their earliest possible release back to freedom.

This is an issue that's been constantly on my mind and on the minds of the American people.

Q. Does an apology rule out the question of honor?

A. Yes. The United States is not going to apologize.

We have long said that there would be a legitimate forum provided for the Iranians, who consider themselves to be aggrieved in many ways, to present their case. We encouraged the U.N. mission to go to Iran, to investigate the situation there, to have hearings in

¹ Press release 257A of Sept. 17, 1980. ■

Iran, and to let there be a public exploration of Iran's claims or complaints. At the time we filed our suit in the World Court, in The Hague, we also invited Iran to participate with us—not in a combative way, but in a friendly way—to give them that forum, which would have been well covered by the world press, to express their concerns or their complaints about us or others in the past. So, this is not a new development at all. Our position has been very consistent.

I cannot predict what will happen in the near future, but we are pursuing every possible legitimate avenue—as we have for many months—to reach some agreement with Iran—with those two constraints that I described to you concerning our nation's honor and the safety of the hostages—to relieve this problem between us, which is obviously damaging to the United States and also very damaging to the people of Iran.

Q. In the context of your decisions about the MX missile and Presidential Directive 59, I'd like to ask if it's realistic for any American President to believe that he could limit his response to a Soviet nuclear first strike against U.S. missiles if that first strike incurred, let's say, 20-50 million casualties. Could you limit your response under those circumstances, or would you have to fire off everything that was left?

A. When anyone decides to run for President of our country with any expectation of being elected, the question of the use of atomic weapons has to be addressed, because it's crucial for our nation, for our allies, and for our potential adversaries to know that, if necessary, atomic weapons would be used to defend our nation. And that knowledge is the deterrent that would prevent a potential adversary from attacking our country and, therefore, destroying 100 million or more American lives.

I have done everything I possible could, as President, not only to maintain peace—and I thank God we've

been successful so far—but to lay the groundwork for continued maintenance of peace and the avoidance of ever having to use atomic weapons.

There is a likelihood—I can't say how strong it might be; it's not an inevitability, but it's certainly a likelihood—that if an atomic exchange of any kind should ever erupt, it might lead to a more massive exchange of intercontinental and highly destructive weapons that would result in tens of millions of lost lives on both sides. That very knowledge, which I have very clearly in my mind, is shared by the Soviet leaders, and I have discussed this common knowledge with President Brezhnev in Vienna when we signed the SALT II Treaty.

The policy of our two countries ever since President Eisenhower and President Truman were in office and everyone since then, Democratic or Republican, has been to try to reduce the dependence on atomic weapons and to have balanced atomic forces and, lately, to reduce constantly on an equal basis the arsenals that we have.

I cannot tell you what would happen if an exchange should take place. I would try to defend my nation's integrity and its security and the integrity and security of our allies without resort to atomic weapons, but if necessary to defend the freedom and security of Western Europe and this country, then I would use atomic weapons. I pray to God that that time will never come, but it's important for our people, our allies, and the Soviet Union to know that, if necessary, those weapons will be used. The best weapon of any kind is one that's never used, and the best soldier is one that never dies in war.

But the only way I know to maintain peace for my country and for those who depend on me is to be strong and to let potential attackers know that if they should attack us, their attack would be suicidal.

Q. Yesterday, after meeting with Dr. Burg of Israel [Yosef Burg, Israeli Minister of Interior and Chief Negotiator for the Palestinian autonomy negotiations] and [Foreign

Minister] Hassan Ali of Egypt, you said, without elaboration, that unanticipated progress had been made in restarting those trilateral talks here in Washington on Palestinian autonomy.

But Dr. Burg said today those initial discussions would not include the issue of Jerusalem. Given the importance of that issue, what progress has been made this week, and what's the cause of your optimism?

A. When Sol Linowitz went to Jerusalem and to Egypt a few weeks ago and met with Foreign Ministers Shamir and Gen. Hassan Ali, and also with Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat, we were pleasantly surprised, after a fairly long dearth of direct contacts between Israel and Egypt, to find both nations eager to get back to the negotiating table.

Yesterday, after they left my office, Sol Linowitz, Mr. Shamir, and Gen. Ali sat down to continue top-level negotiations to try to find a basis for carrying out the comprehensive peace.

Following Sol Linowitz' trip to the Middle East, President Sadat announced, both before and after he arrived, that he was eager to see a summit conference later this year. Prime Minister Begin had not, until that time, made that statement. Prime Minister Begin called me on the telephone to say that the Linowitz mission had been remarkably successful, to thank us for what he had contributed, and to say that he would be eager to meet with me and President Sadat at a summit conference either before or after the American elections were concluded.

We will work that out. I am determined that the prospect for a summit meeting will not interfere with the substantive negotiations that must precede it. And I think the fact that yesterday and today the Foreign Ministers of the two countries are negotiating again in the presence of the American Ambassador assigned that task is, indeed, encouraging in itself.

¹Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Sept. 22, 1980. ■

Essentials of Security: Arms and More

Secretary Muskie's address before World Affairs Council in Pittsburgh on September 18, 1980.¹

Recent months the atmosphere has been unusually thick with pronouncements about an American military decline. We cannot let such funereal forecasts go unanswered. They are wrong on the facts, and they can be dangerous in their effect.

I am here today to take sharp issue with the evangelists of American weakness—to affirm that America today is rising and growing stronger. If our nation truly was neglecting its defenses, it would be the duty of all informed people to sound the alarm. But false declarations of weakness only intensify the dangers of peace. They can cause our friends to doubt us and our enemies to discount us, they can distract us from other work necessary to make our society stronger and our world more secure.

Defense Record

Let us evaluate the defense record, but let us evaluate it fairly. Let us weigh the East-West balance realistically. And let us give due regard to our own strength as well as that of our opposition.

Our allies are stronger, our alliances surlier than those of the Soviet Union. In economic power, the United States and NATO allies outstrip the Warsaw Pact more than two to one. Taken together, we devote more to defense than the Warsaw Pact, including the Soviet Union. Our alliances have the added durability that is derived when values and purposes are truly shared. Unlike the Warsaw Pact, NATO members and Japan ally by choice. The purpose of our alliances is not to camouflage the ambition of one member but to defend the common good of all.

At least one-fourth of the Soviet Union's ground combat forces are tied down along a long common border with China. Nations on our borders are friends.

Technology is another American advantage. "Faster," "more accurate," "more advanced"—these generally are terms that apply to American weapons and American systems. Soviet technology is lagged behind.

And our security is also advanced by the content of our foreign policy—by the

international principles we support. On a global basis, we stand for essential precepts of national sovereignty and human rights. Certainly we live in a tumultuous world, characterized by the unremitting nationalism and surging human aspirations of more than 100 new nations. But if such an environment is unsettling to us, it will prove to be even more perilous for nations seeking to dominate others and dictate their systems. Such imperial concepts are the wave of the past. They collide head-on with the historic trends now underway virtually everywhere in the world—from the patriots in Afghanistan to the nationalists in every nation of the Third World, from the democratic forces in Zimbabwe to the gallant workers of Poland who have inspired us all.

In sum, our technology, our solid security partnerships, our identification with national independence and human freedom—all of these assets should strengthen our confidence as we assess the sufficiency of our defenses.

They do not, however, give us cause for complacency. Our military posture continues to require our diligent attention. In the Soviet Union, we face a rival that has engaged for more than a generation in a steady buildup of its military forces, both conventional and strategic. In strategic nuclear forces the Soviets have attained a rough equivalence. In the conventional area they have increased the danger to our Asian and European allies. They have aimed for the status of global power—the capacity for direct involvement even in distant regions. And now in Afghanistan they have shown no hesitancy in applying their power in a brutal attempt to crush a sovereign neighbor.

The question facing Americans is not whether we should respond to these developments; all agree that we must. The real question is whether we will continue with a well-conceived and measured response tailored to the actual threats we face or whether we will run off wildly in all directions at once, spending vastly greater sums to little, if any, effect.

Let me briefly survey what the response thus far has been. In overall terms our arms spending is no longer dropping. It is growing. Our defense spending declined in 7 of the 8 years just before President Carter took office—a total drop of more than 37%.

Since President Carter's inauguration, however, defense spending has in-

creased 4 years in a row—for overall growth of 10% after inflation. And if the President's 5-year plan is carried out, the increase by 1985 will exceed 27%.

To make it absolutely clear that we are not proposing to squeeze our Armed Forces, let me just note here that this 5-year defense program calls for appropriations of over \$1 trillion between now and 1985.

Even so, there are those who pronounce that effort insufficient. They insist upon a still larger arms budget. They will not tell us what it would contain. They leave those decisions for later. They simply want "more"—of whatever, as if shoveling out the taxpayer's money is a desirable end in itself. That is a formula not for greater security but for guaranteed waste—a failing to avoid in defense just as much as in any other part of the budget.

Instead we need a carefully structured defense program that responds effectively to specific dangers. And that is what we have. In conventional forces, the Carter Administration began promptly in 1977 to address the military deficiencies of NATO—matters which previously had received abundant discussion and precious little concrete attention.

Today the NATO Long-Term Defense Program, an American initiative, is in its third year. Problems ranging from readiness and prompt reinforcement to integrating air defenses are no longer simply being studied; they are being solved. These NATO improvements are underwritten by an alliance agreement to increase defense spending by at least 3% each year—another initiative of the United States.

We are engaged in a broad modernization of the Army's weapons and equipment. We have begun the first full-scale modernization of tactical air forces since the Vietnam war. And our shipbuilding program will produce 97 new ships over the next 5 years, building toward a newer and more capable fleet of 550 ships, in contrast to 476 in 1977.

With these programs moving forward, we have also begun bolstering our ability to respond to emergencies outside the major alliance regions—including the vital Middle East-Persian Gulf area. Our naval presence there today is the strongest ever. We have negotiated new agreements for access to ports and airfields. We are prepositioning equipment and supplies in the Indian Ocean area. A new cargo aircraft is being developed. The elements of a rapid deployment force have been designated, and exercises are underway.

Our programs in the area of nuclear

weapons reflect this same commitment to the deterrence of war through the assurance of strength. Last year, NATO adopted our recommendations for modernizing theater nuclear forces in Europe. On intercontinental or strategic nuclear forces, the hard decisions have been made. A sweeping modernization of all three parts of our nuclear triad—land, sea, and air—is moving ahead.

- For the strategic bomber forces, President Carter took the soundest course, even though it meant also taking some political heat. Instead of sinking billions of dollars in a B-1 bomber with a doubtful future, he decided to equip our existing bombers with air-launched cruise missiles. In place of an old concept highly vulnerable to Soviet countermoves, he selected an array of advanced technologies that can surmount foreseeable Soviet defenses.

- At sea, the Trident submarine program was put back on track. The first of those modern submarines will join the fleet next year. Portions of the existing fleet already have the Trident I missile, with major improvements in range and power.

- And on the land, the new MX missile, with mobile basing, will overcome the chief source of potential nuclear instability—the growing vulnerability of missiles fixed in silos. As with our bomber forces, President Carter rejected second-best suggestions and made sure we had the best plan before construction began, so we would not have to waste time and money later fixing the mistakes.

SALT II

Along with these programs—cruise missiles, Trident, the MX—there is a fourth program I want to mention—a “secret weapon,” if you will. Let me list some of its capabilities. By itself, this secret weapon would knock out about one-fourth of all long-range Soviet missiles and bombers that we project for 1985. It would do that without launching a nuclear war; indeed, without even firing a shot. In the process, it would eliminate thousands of individual warheads and bombs that the Soviet arsenal could otherwise have aimed at our country. The secret weapon has surveillance capabilities. With it, we will be able to keep better track of Soviet forces and programs.

For all of its military effectiveness, there is no incompatibility whatsoever between this secret weapon and our other strategic programs. MX, Trident, and air-launched cruise missiles can all go

ahead as planned. Adding this weapon will not require massive new appropriations. In fact, in the long run, money will be saved. Nor does it worry our allies. On the contrary, they know about it, and they strongly support it. Their only concern is that we might not adopt it.

Of course the weapon I am referring to is not a weapon at all. It is an agreement—the SALT II Treaty. But it, nonetheless, will make all the contributions to our security I have just described. There is nothing soft or innocent about it. It is an integral part of a hard-headed strategy of American defense. And it should be recognized as such. Indeed, it may well be that some of those who oppose SALT II would support it—even insist on it—if it were a defense expenditure that could buy the same results.

The contribution of SALT to our defense underscores the second of two messages I want to leave here today. The first, as I have suggested, is that our defenses—alone and in combination with our allies—are second to none. We are determined to see that they remain so. That determination is not just stated in words; it is backed up in the budget. The second message is that simply spending more money and building more arms—even accumulating vast military power—will not be enough to assure our security in today's world.

Enhancing U.S. Security

Even our defense posture itself depends upon other international assets and skills. Recall NATO's Long-Term Defense Program, its agreement on greater defense efforts, the decision on theater nuclear forces, our access to facilities in the Indian Ocean. Actions such as these cannot be manufactured out of either unilateral announcements or unspecified new spending. They are the products of careful negotiation and steady leadership—endeavors every bit as vital to our defense as arms.

And those endeavors have other applications indispensable to our security. True security in a nuclear age demands steps that lessen the risk that war will happen. That is the mandate of arms control—in combination with a strong defense, to help achieve a stable balance and to avoid miscalculation by either side. For we know that nuclear war would mean catastrophe for every side. In such times it would only jeopardize our security to reject arms control and embrace doctrines—including the chimera of nuclear superiority—that invite a nuclear arms race.

Our security is also advanced by a vigorous diplomacy—fashioning a mature, stable basis of cooperation even with countries, such as China, that have different systems from ours. We must not retreat from those efforts, confuse them or be confused by them.

Our security has been enhanced by the success of peacemaking in Zimbabwe. That effort deprived our adversaries of conflict to exploit. Some Americans wanted to disrupt the peace process by prematurely ending our participation in international sanctions. We can all be grateful they did not prevail.

Our security is still more deeply involved in the Middle East, where the Camp David process has produced the first real peace agreement since Israel came into being. Only patient, persistent and imaginative diplomacy can reconcile the remaining issues—the same kind of diplomacy that hammered out the accord at Camp David. Bellicose pronouncements or assaults on the negotiating process that offer no concrete alternatives—neither advance that enterprise nor set the cause of peace.

And our security is affected by a broad range of economic issues that cannot touch. We could never have blasted a new trade agreement into being. We cannot threaten stagnating economies to make them prosper or intimidate hungry people into health.

Yet our fate ultimately turns on such questions, even as it rests on the balance of power. If we neglect such challenges, our fate may be to slide into oblivion, rather than being blown there. But we will get there all the same.

In short, our security in the future requires the same priorities that have marked our foreign policy in the recent past. On defense, we must continue the steady, prudent improvement of our Armed Forces. We must specifically repudiate the false message that ours is a frail nation. And our security requires something more. It requires a realistic understanding of the nature of the world we share, a commitment to peace as well as power, a capacity to work constructively with others to advance common purposes and meet the full range of challenges ahead.

I am convinced that the American people understand the need for such a balanced American approach to the world. I believe they support a defense posture of strength and confidence and a foreign policy of construction and hope.

¹ Press release 262. ■

Question-and-Answer Session Following Pittsburgh Address

Q. You mentioned that in the next 5 years our shipbuilding program will produce 97 new ships, bringing the fleet to 550 ships in contrast to 476 in 1977.

A. Yes, those are the numbers.

Q. How does the Navy plan to provide manpower for the extra 97 new ships when they cannot now not get enough people to operate and maintain the present 475 ships?

A. This Congress, with the support of the Administration, has acted, or is in the process of acting—I haven't followed the appropriations process that closely—to increase the compensation and benefits of people in the military.

Our lack has been in the skilled areas, those who have been in the service awhile and the Warrant Officer grades—people whose skills are highly desired and salable in the private sector—and there has been a tendency for us to lose those skills. The Congress has recognized that it is terribly important that we improve the attractions, the benefits, and the prerequisites for those jobs. I hope we can turn that one around. It is a problem, a serious problem, but it is not being neglected.

Q. Do you see the stockpiling of U.S. military hardware in Norway to strengthen the northern flank of NATO to counter any possible Soviet expansion into this area for the oil-rich North Sea?

A. You're referring to the stockpiling of military supplies and equipment in Norway? That is part of the repositioning exercise that I described in my formal presentation; that is to equip the rapid deployment force to move quickly into action in the event of difficulties in the Persian Gulf-Middle East area. We have adopted the policy of stockpiling, and Norway has indicated its willingness to participate in that program.

Q. If the "Swiss connection" is not successful in communicating with the Iranian Government, what avenue would the United States investigate? Would the Vatican, through Archbishop Capucci, be an acceptable alternative?

A. We have not been limited to any one channel in the 4 months that I've been Secretary of State. There are a number of channels, and it is not useful for me to try to identify them. Only recently, of course, have we supplemented the indirect channels that we've used to get information, to communicate views to the various Iranian leaders as they emerge in their developing political institutions. But recently on the election of a Prime Minister, I sent a letter of my own, which is the first direct contact between our government and theirs, in the hope that with their political institutions falling into place that we might be approaching the time when direct contact and negotiations might emerge. You've mentioned two channels of communication, possible communication, and there are several, if not many, others.

Q. Jimmy Carter is seeking to be reelected President this year. Do you see any alterations of the policy on the security of Israel?

A. I don't think the election will make any difference. Events may.

As you know, the Camp David process has been under assault from a number of quarters—those who wish to see it fail and those who might wish to see it succeed but doubt that it will—so that the process is constantly under pressure and attack. There is an inclination on the part of both Israel and Egypt to respond to these outside pressures and attacks in ways that can undermine the continuing nature of the negotiations.

It has been our effort to keep both parties focused on the process and to continue with it. The important point to remember, that I've made all over the world, is that it is the only negotiation that has ever been put in place with respect to the Middle East since the creation of the State of Israel. More than that, it's the only negotiation with both Palestinian rights and Israel's security at the top of the agenda.

A great deal of work has been accomplished by these negotiations. The obvious one, of course, is the Treaty of Peace with Egypt which 3 years ago would have been regarded as an impossibility. And in addition, with respect

to the autonomy talks for the West Bank and Gaza, which started about 16 or 18 months ago, a lot of the work, a lot of the authorities with respect to the self-governing authority contemplated for the West Bank and Gaza, have been agreed upon.

They are now down to the really tough issues, involving land, water, security, the powers of the self-governing authority, and so on, and it has been agreed that the talks will be resumed. Therefore, we think that the process that has already demonstrated that it can achieve results should be continued to be supported and will be, whatever happens in the election, so far as I know.

Q. To set my question in context, I would like to tell you that I'm a resident of Hawaii, studying at Pitt. Recently, a number of people who are representatives of the emerging countries of the South Pacific met in Honolulu because of the overriding concern about the American desire to store nuclear waste in the Pacific.

I would like to know what the present posture is of our country regarding this issue. And secondly, what is the current Administration's posture regarding the development or involvement in the development efforts of the emerging countries of the South Pacific?

A. With respect to the disposal of nuclear waste, I guess we're going to have to find another planet. Nobody wants it. None of the 50 States do; other countries do not, so I guess the honest answer to your question is that we don't know what the answer is at this point. We continue to search for it.

The second part of your question had to do with development and what role we are playing. Let me say that your question touches upon one of my great frustrations as Secretary of State, and before that as a member of Congress for 22 years. That has to do with the failure of the American people to understand—largely because nobody has tried really effectively to give them the facts—and the failure of the Congress to adequately support assistance programs aimed at helping southern

hemisphere countries largely in their development efforts.

I have been making these kinds of speeches, that is foreign aid speeches. I try to find a different phrase than "foreign aid." One of my table partners reminded me that I had said something about it that was picked up in *The Economist* to the effect that 80% of our foreign aid dollars are spent in this country and produce American jobs—and that is a correct fact.

Although that is correct and perhaps an inducement to people to support foreign aid, the importance of foreign aid to me is as a tool in influencing the future direction of human affairs on this planet. And it's the kind of investment we should be making in our own interest. Our own defense, our own security, our own prospects for a better future are enhanced to the extent that we can contribute to a meeting of those problems of the world's disadvantaged people that create instability.

We can't expect to be prosperous, peaceful, strong, and free of fears in an unstable world. The entire southern hemisphere of this planet is a potential powder keg in the sense that disadvantaged people will not take their situation permanently. Disadvantaged people can be, and are, exploited by those who seek power for that purpose. So that when we concentrate wholly upon—the speech should have been modified to have added that secret weapon because I think it is an important one.

With respect to the countries of Southeast Asia; those in the Indochina Peninsula are not all poor, of course. Indonesia and Malaysia have some of the prime resources of this planet available for their own development, but other countries do not.

Africa perhaps is the poorest in terms of resources, and development there and resources of the kind I am describing are important. Let's take Zimbabwe. I've mentioned Zimbabwe here is this speech. Zimbabwe, if it is to continue on its moderate course—its moderate racial course, its moderate internal political course—has got to meet the aspirations and the problems of its people. Zimbabwe is a rich nation in resources, so the potential is there. It is a country that has been torn by war for all these years. They need outside help to get started, investment to get started, and, frankly, there isn't a

nickel in our foreign aid program available for that purpose. If they succeed, their success may well moderate the whole racial issue in the southern half of Africa.

To me, that is an investment worth consideration by the United States and by our people. There are other examples: Poland. We've all, I'm sure—unless you're different than the people I've run into up to now—have been cheered by the success of the Polish workers. Now, Poland has horrendous economic problems which have been exacerbated by that event.

We have announced some CCC [Commodity Credit Corporation] credits—\$660 million, which is an addition of only \$110 million over what we were going to provide anyway—but we don't have another penny available in our foreign aid program to be of assistance when they put together their economic plans and turn to us and other Western nations for help. These kinds of situations are situations which we cannot afford to ignore in our own interest, and yet, we tie our own hands by failing to respond to the opportunities. That's the best question I've been asked today.

Q. I have been doing a great deal of reading and have a great concern about the acceleration of new, modern airplanes and equipment, and yet not having the people power—I dare not say manpower or I'll be run out of town—to operate the highly-technical airplanes, where sometimes the less complicated, older vintage planes are becoming more effective.

What are we going to do when we keep on accelerating, developing, and exploring highly sophisticated planes with nobody to operate them? I think the attempt of the rescue mission in Iran is an exemplary, unfortunate experience. Would you address that?

A. The breakdown in Iran was not really due to an inability of the crew to operate the craft. It was just that they were extended to the outer limits of their capability, and there were not enough back-up helicopters assigned to that mission, so I don't think that incident gets at the first point that you made.

Secondly, I don't know of any way to stop the momentum of technological development.

Q. I think you misunderstood me. I will rephrase that. Who is going to operate the sophisticated planes if it

appears we don't have enough people trained to do it?

A. But we are operating these sophisticated planes, and we can train them. To the extent that the manpower isn't being attracted into the military, you've got a point. But that has nothing to do with the complexity of the technology; it has to do with our failure to provide the inducements to attract people into the service, and we intend to do something about that, if that's your point.

It is the same point that was raised earlier with respect to our ships, and it is a very appropriate and valid point. If that's your point, I finally got it.

Q. I read recently in the newspaper that you had sent a message to the Iranian Foreign Minister concerning the hostages, and you had received a reply back. Could you kind of outline what that message said or if it was particularly optimistic?

A. I haven't received a reply yet.

Q. You haven't?

A. No.

Q. The newspapers said that you had.

A. No. Let me describe what has happened with respect to my letter. I sent it upon the election of the Prime Minister. It was delivered, through one of the channels that I referred to earlier, to the Prime Minister. He disclosed that he had received a letter from me; did not immediately disclose its contents but obviously regarded it as a serious matter, and he said that he would consider it and reply in due course.

Subsequent to that time, in what appeared to have been an impromptu speech, he read the contents of my letter, embroidered it with some of the usual rhetoric that we get in Iranian reactions to anything the United States does but in such a way to suggest, to me at least, that in due course I may get a formal written response.

We have gotten indications from other Iranian sources that they regard the letter as a serious contact and one to be dealt with seriously. Whether or not that will produce at some point a contact and the start of our negotiations, or talks, we will have to be patient and wait and see. I hope so.

Press release 262A of Sept. 19, 1980. ■

The United States and the World's Refugees

Secretary Muskie's address before the American Lutheran Church in Minneapolis on October 6, 1980.¹

want to talk today about refugees—about the new tidal wave of refugees that is sweeping across the world, impelled by war, famine, and by ruthless suppressions of the human spirit.

That wave of refugees has especially touched America—for our nation, as an historic haven of refuge, has traditionally been a beacon for the homeless and persecuted. But today the influx of refugees into the United States has become so heavy and constant that we face serious questions of refugee policy, questions that challenge both heart and head. These questions concern you—because you live, to your eternal credit, chosen to play a leading role in helping refugees.

The Era of Refugees

History accurately, and very sadly, ours can be called an era of refugees. In recent years, more than 15 million people worldwide have fled their homes as refugees—of war, civil unrest, persecution, and hunger.

- Roughly 6 million are victims of war in Indochina—boat people from Vietnam and refugees from war-ravaged Cambodia and Laos.

- More than 1 million Afghan refugees are estimated to be in Pakistan, their numbers swelled by the Soviet aggression against that country.

- In Africa, the refugee population exceeds 3 million; the figure for the Middle East is roughly 2 million.

- And closest to home, we find that more than 1 million people in the Western Hemisphere have left their homes in recent years in search of asylum from strife and oppression.

Of all the world's people, these may be the most pitiable. For these migrant millions—most of them women and children—are cruelly cut off from home and country, their families often divided or destroyed. It has become commonplace, when discussing immigrants or refugees, to quote the words of Emma Lazarus carved on the base of the Statue of Liberty:

Give me your tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,

The wretched refuse of your teeming shore;

Send these, the homeless, tempest-tossed, to me;

I lift my lamp beside the golden door.

However commonplace they may have become, these words describe precisely the refugees of today. These helpless people are quite literally tired and poor; quite literally huddled—in crowded camps and holding centers around the world; quite literally wretched; quite literally homeless. And in the case of the boat people of Indochina and Cuba, they have been quite literally tempest-tossed—in rotting junks and leaking boats: vessels both of hope and of despair.

In a few cases, the sojourns of refugees have ended with their return home. The settlement of the Zimbabwe conflict this year, for example, made it possible for nearly 200,000 refugees to return home. And in our own hemisphere, a similar number of Nicaraguans returned home when the civil war there came to an end. But such reconciliations are all too rare.

More typically, the odyssey of a refugee is painful and protracted. And the impact of large refugee migrations on the world community and on individual countries is tremendous.

- Last year, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees collected more than \$343 million for refugee relief and resettlement. The great bulk of these funds came from the industrial democracies of the West and Japan; the United States alone contributed more than \$90 million. Yet these funds are inadequate to the task at hand.

- Countries of first asylum like Thailand, Pakistan, and Somalia, are increasingly hard-put to stretch their resources to accommodate refugees.

- Today, as large refugee populations swamp the inadequate machinery for dealing with them, more than 1 million refugees worldwide languish in camps and holding centers. They live under conditions that range from desperate to barely adequate.

And the United States especially has felt the impact of these recent refugee waves.

- In the past 5 years, our nation has received more than 600,000 refugees for

resettlement—a number that dwarfs the figure for any other country.

- This year alone, we have received some 125,000 unexpected Cuban entrants in a swift and sudden influx between May and September.

Let me say here that the role of institutions like the American Lutheran Church in this effort is not simply worthwhile; it is crucial. In the past few years your church and its individual congregations have sponsored more than 35,000 refugees for resettlement. No one can compile statistics to quantify the endless compassion, the numberless acts of love and generosity that mark this effort; they are beyond all counting. It is part of

We are a nation of immigrants and their sons and daughters: No nation with such a history can turn its back on its own traditions without losing something of its soul.

my purpose today to thank you personally—you and all those like you across America who have done this service to your nation and to these people in need.

I also want to thank the citizens of Minnesota and the six Midwestern States who have extended their hospitality, their patience, and their resources to settle thousands of refugees over the past few years.

Practical Burdens

The practical burdens of helping refugees establish new lives in the United States are, as you know, enormous. The sheer numbers of recent years and the unpredictability of recent refugee waves have made careful planning difficult. They have given our national refugee programs an air of permanent emergency. The arrival of unorganized boat flotillas from Cuba over a short span of weeks last spring made it necessary, for example, to press widely scattered military reservations into sudden service as receiving centers.

Our social service programs—national, State, and local—have been hard



(UNHCR photo by Boccon-Gibodi/Sipa)

Afghan refugees at Pishin Camp, Pakistan.

pressed by this sudden surge of refugees. In the fiscal year which ended last month, the Department of Health and Human Services devoted more than \$600 million to refugee activities—\$36 million of which had to be requested in emergency supplemental legislation. And the State and local social-service machinery of Florida—to name the most affected State—has been severely tested by the influx of Cuban and Haitian entrants.

You who have served in refugee sponsorship programs know the challenge of finding jobs in stressful economic times for refugees who may not speak English and whose skills may not be readily transferable to our job market.

Perhaps because of such problems, public opinion is not always receptive to large waves of refugees and immigrants. This was true earlier in this century, and it is true today. For all too many of our citizens, the first impulse upon facing such problems is to pull up the bridge and lock the gates. I was disturbed, for example, to read the results of a recent poll, mentioned in the current issue of *Foreign Affairs*. It showed only 19% of respondents in favor of increasing the number of refugees received by the United States; 80% favored actually reducing the number of legal immigrants who can enter our country each year.

I find it easy to understand such frustration. But we must keep in mind that this question of refugees is one whose moral dimension is as compelling as its practical aspect. It is a question which penetrates to the heart of our history as a nation of immigrants and to the heart of our purpose as a nation which cherishes and upholds human rights.

We are a nation of immigrants and their sons and daughters: No nation with such a history can turn its back on its own traditions without losing something of its soul. And no nation which sees itself as a champion of human rights can keep its credibility unless it is willing to welcome—in the name of human rights—those who have been oppressed and persecuted.

For these reasons, I would argue that the difficulties we have encountered in receiving and resettling refugees are difficulties we must face and overcome—without reversing our long tradition of hospitality to refugees. I would argue also what is apparent in our national life: that we are richer, stronger, more talented and vibrant as a society because we welcome refugees and immigrants. Earlier waves of refugees and immigrants brought figures like Einstein and Toscanini, with their great gifts, to America. I have no doubt that recent arrivals, like the Indochinese and the Cubans, will make similar contributions—contributions that will richly justify our nation's generosity.

U.S. Approach

To agree that we should be open and generous, however, is not to say that the United States can accept—or should accept—unlimited numbers of refugees and immigrants or bear unlimited burdens. In fact, we cannot. And one of the most serious national debates of the next few years will be about refugee and immigration policy. What limits should we set and how? What shall we do about the problem

of massive unlawful entry into the United States? How can we balance our traditions of openness with practical limits, and how can we enforce these limits fairly and equitably? How can we assure that our refugee and immigration policies are free of the taint of racial bias and equitable to people of all origins?

Finding answers to such questions will not be easy. But I have no doubt that our nation, which is both generous and practical, can find answers—and devise laws—which bring into balance our ideals, our interests, and our capabilities. A national commission on immigration and refugee policy, chaired by Father Theodore Hesburgh of Notre Dame University, is working toward this end.

Meanwhile, our government is working overtime to deal with refugee problems at home and abroad.

- We have worked closely with State and local governments, as well as private voluntary organizations, to minimize the disruption to communities and to the lives of the refugees themselves. I am proud that we have successfully resettled from temporary camps some 105,000 of the nearly 125,000 Cubans who have fled to the United States since April.

- We are working to prevent heavy concentrations of refugees in already hard-pressed communities. To this end, the Federal Government has established refugee receiving centers at widely dispersed locations over the country, so that no one State or community need bear too heavy a burden.

- The Department of Health and Human Services and its Office of Refugee Resettlement have launched a massive effort to help states and communities with the costs of resettling refugees. In this fiscal year, for example, the department has channeled more than \$20 million to the State of Minnesota for cash assistance, medical care, and social services to refugee families. And the six Midwestern States of this region—Minnesota, Wisconsin, Michigan, Illinois, Ohio, and Indiana—have received \$52 million in Federal assistance for refugee programs. This is a national challenge to which the nation's government is responding.

- More needs to be done, however, to help areas which have borne the brunt of refugee emergencies. For that reason, the Administration has supported the Stone-Fascell proposal before the Congress to reimburse States and communities for up to 100% of the cost of their refugee relief efforts.

U.S. Nuclear Strategy

*Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on September 16, 1980.*¹

I am pleased to have this opportunity to join Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to discuss our nuclear targeting strategy with you. When I was a member of this committee, I strongly believed we had a responsibility to concern ourselves with issues of strategic nuclear policy. Over the years, I probed a series of Administration officials and outside experts on how changes in our nuclear doctrine, forces, and strategy affected our security and international stability. I did not leave those concerns behind when I became Secretary of State. Indeed, it is a central part of my responsibilities to insure that foreign policy consideration—in the broadest sense—are taken into account in decisions about defense programs and doctrine.

As Secretary of State, I am particularly concerned with the ways in which our strategic doctrine bears on our overall foreign policy toward our allies and adversaries. To support our basic foreign policy and national security objectives, our nuclear strategy should satisfy the following conditions.

- It should insure that potential adversaries are fully convinced of our determination to resist nuclear aggression on any scale, at all times, and in all circumstances.
- It should avoid stimulating a cycle of superpower misperception and miscalculation that could undermine strategic stability.
- It should be fully consistent with our arms control objectives, so that we preserve the opportunities to strengthen security and stability by means of equitable and verifiable arms control agreements.
- It should encourage and justify the willingness of our friends and allies to link their security with our own.

I believe the countervailing strategy meets these tests.

The countervailing strategy underscores and unmistakably communicates to the Soviets two fundamental truths. First, they could derive no conceivable benefit from initiating the use of nuclear weapons, no matter how limited or extensive the attack and no matter at what stage in a conflict they might be

launched. Second, nuclear conflict cannot be an instrument for achieving national policy goals, either for us or the Soviet Union; there surely will be no victor in a nuclear war.

Our strategy and our capability to inflict massive destruction in retaliation provide the bases for convincing the Soviets of both propositions. The countervailing strategy builds on and complements this traditional doctrine. It enhances our ability to launch selective as well as massive retaliatory attacks and to cover the full range of targets the Soviets value. It makes clear our capacity to respond to any Soviet nuclear attack—whatever its magnitude and form—at an appropriate scale, intensity, and focus. We have moved in this direction in order to insure that the Soviets—whatever their notions about nuclear war or the utility of nuclear weapons—do not mistakenly conclude they could achieve some advantage by initiating the use of nuclear weapons or by launching limited strikes.

As such, the countervailing strategy is not a radical departure from previous policy. It is rather the result of a gradual evolution of our doctrine over a period of years in response to changing conditions and new knowledge. The credible capacity to devastate the Soviet Union under any circumstances remains its cornerstone. Thus, we will continue to include the full spectrum of political and military, as well as urban-industrial, targets in our planning. Presidential Determination 59 does not signify a shift to a warfighting strategy nor to a first-strike doctrine. It does underscore—and I believe strengthens—the credibility of our capability to retaliate against any nuclear attack under any circumstances, be it a massive strike against the United States or a more limited one against our forces or our allies.

The public reaction of the Soviets is what one would expect. They claim the countervailing strategy is a warfighting strategy and a U.S. effort to achieve a first-strike capability that would undermine strategic stability. They also charge that Presidential Determination 59 is the real explanation for NATO's decision on theater nuclear forces (TNF) modernization and reflects a U.S. intent to confine any nuclear war to Europe while the United States remains immune from attack. These claims are neither surprising nor true.

But we should expect the Soviets to try to use Presidential Determination 59 to split us from our allies and deprive us

• Diplomatically, through the United Nations and elsewhere, we continue to stress the need for broad international efforts to deal with refugee problems. We have stressed as well the responsibility of nations to help in the search for long-term solutions to the political problems which lie behind the global refugee crisis.

• Here I would also mention the importance of strong and generous foreign assistance efforts. Especially in Africa and Latin America, our efforts to help solve human problems and build strong economies can help alleviate the conditions which create refugees. We can either export more of our assistance or import more refugees.

Which brings me to my final point. Ultimately, we and the world can deal with the human tragedy of refugee migrations only by removing their root causes—by overcoming poverty, by ending abuses of human rights within nations, by resisting military aggression, and by building peace among nations.

We are a long way from having a world that is so just, so humane, so prosperous and stable that no person is forced to flee from home and country. But surely the effort to build such a world deserves your contribution and mine—and deserves the work of all people who cherish human dignity and the sanctity of human life.

¹ Press release 272. ■

of European support for our post-Afghanistan efforts. We can expect the Soviets to focus their energies on undermining the NATO consensus in favor of TNF modernization.

These Soviet accusations, in fact, ring hollow in view of their own doctrine, their attention to nuclear warfighting, and the size and character of their strategic nuclear forces. Moreover, they have never been particularly comfortable with what they regard as our "city-killing" philosophy of nuclear deterrence. I do not believe they genuinely regard this evolution in our nuclear strategy as a move to a first-strike, warfighting doctrine. The central purpose of our deterrence policy is to underscore the consequences for the Soviets if they should ever initiate the use of nuclear weapons.

We want to make sure the Soviets get that message. But we also want to insure that they get the message right. We need to remain fully alert to the risks of misperception and miscalculation, to the danger that the Soviets may see provocation where we intend none. I do not want anyone to wrongly conclude that we suddenly have become confident about our ability to orchestrate nuclear exchanges and control escalation or that we have become complacent about the use of nuclear weapons.

We will continue to emphasize to the Soviets that our intentions are peaceful and that we pose no threat to their legitimate security interests. At the same time, we will continue to insist that they respect the interests and rights of others and remind them of the consequences if they resort to nuclear weapons.

In this connection, I need hardly add that we do not regard the countervailing strategy as in any way a substitute for arms control or as a symptom of disenchantment with the arms control process. On the contrary, the countervailing strategy is fully consistent with the SALT II Treaty and our longer term arms control objectives. Nothing in the countervailing strategy changes or challenges our belief that nuclear arms control can make a significant contribution to our security and to international stability. Nothing in the evolution of our nuclear doctrine has led us to reassess the benefits of equitable and verifiable arms control agreements with our chief adversary. In particular, I continue to believe strongly that SALT II would make a crucial contribution to our national security. We will ask the Senate to act on ratification at the earliest feasible time.

The allies share our concern about the need to deter the full range of Soviet nuclear threats as well as our continued commitment to arms control and to the maintenance of strategic stability. By reinforcing allied confidence in the credibility of our nuclear guarantee, the countervailing strategy will strengthen alliance cohesion and solidarity as well as directly reduce the likelihood of conflict. The countervailing strategy reflects and supports the NATO strategy of flexible response by underscoring the availability of a full spectrum of nuclear responses.

We have discussed the evolution of our nuclear strategy and its relationship to flexible response in the normal course of consultations with our allies. The detailed discussion of the countervailing strategy in Secretary Brown's annual report to the Congress last January provided an excellent basis for our dialogue this year. Secretary Brown also gave an extensive briefing to the NATO Nuclear Planning Group this past June.

In the course of these consultations and in the aftermath of press reports about Presidential Determination 59, the allies have indicated they understand the countervailing strategy and appreciate the ways in which it strengthens the U.S. strategic linkage to their security. I do not want to leave the impression that we take their support for granted: It has to be earned and then protected in the face of Soviet efforts to undermine alliance solidarity. I do want to emphasize, however, that the allied leaders appreciate the rationale behind the countervailing strategy. I am confident that, in the course of our continuing consultations, their support will be sustained.

Nuclear strategy and doctrine are properly sober subjects. This should not, however, obscure the important positive contribution that the countervailing strategy makes to our most basic foreign policy objectives.

I am confident that the countervailing strategy not only strengthens deterrence but also establishes a firmer basis for our diplomacy with the Soviets. It underlines our determination to respond to any challenges to our vital interests, at the same time it confirms that we pose no threat to the legitimate interests of other states. As such, it leaves the Soviets no room for doubt about our will or our peaceful intentions.

The countervailing strategy, of course, will not transform the basically adversarial relationship we have with the Soviets. But it reduces the chances for superpower miscalculation and increases

Soviet incentives to cooperate on managing and containing the competition between us. It therefore contributes to the prospects for reaching arms control agreements that limit the dangers of war.

For like reasons, the countervailing strategy reaffirms to our allies and friends that the United States is committed—in equal measure—to protecting our mutual security interests and to international stability. I expect it will serve to solidify our relationship with them and to strengthen our role as leader of the Western alliance.

Let me conclude my opening statement by briefly addressing the question of the involvement of the State Department and the Secretary of State in the formulation of the countervailing strategy. I have carefully reviewed the record. I have concluded that Secretary Vance and the State Department were involved as the major concepts of the policy were being developed and were in a position to make their views known.

The development of the main lines of the strategy was substantially completed well before I took office, and it had already been outlined in public statements especially in Secretary Brown's January 1980 report to the Congress. Given my Senate responsibilities, I was, of course aware of the direction of the Administration's strategic thinking. In fact, I had addressed some of the same concerns and concepts in a speech I delivered last year.

That said, the preparation and issuance of a presidential determination that codifies our nuclear strategy is itself an important action that has a significant foreign policy dimension. It, therefore, clear that I, as Secretary of State, and the State Department should have been appropriately involved in the action.

I consider the situation that developed here to be an unintended exception to this Administration's record of substantially increased State Department involvement in national security issues. I have discussed this episode with the President as well as with Secretary Brown and Dr. Brzezinski [Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs]. The President has assured me that I and others at the Department as needed will be fully consulted on the foreign policy implications of such major national security policy decisions.

¹ Press release 259. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

The Challenge of Peace

Secretary Muskie's address at Notre Dame University in South Bend, Indiana, on October 11, 1980.¹

Peace is the absence of war among nations. But it is much more. Nations are composed of people. Meaningful peace must also be found in their lives. A nation whose government lives peacefully with its neighbors but wars on its own people is not a nation at peace.

Preserving the working for peace is thus a challenge of extraordinary complexity. Alexander Hamilton once wrote at hostility among nations is caused by their love of power or their desire for preeminence and dominion; the competitions of commerce; or the personal attachments, enmities, interests, hopes, and fears of national leaders.

Human nature has changed little in the 200 years since. But human technology has changed dramatically. And today peace has never been more fragile. It can be destroyed, and with it our collective future, in the miscalculation of a single moment.

To preserve peace, and to expand it, requires more than our best efforts. We need also to understand the ways in which a peace is built and the ways in which it can be shattered. There is no doubt that in a dangerous world, the first requirement of peace is military strength—the strength to assure our allies and deter our adversaries; the strength to prevent attack or, if necessary, to defeat the strength to resist coercion.

But too many voices would have us believe that military power in itself can protect our interests and bring order to an unruly world. So much more is needed. Peace also requires prudence. It is gained through patient and persistent diplomatic efforts. And it is secured through human progress. Let me tell you why each is so important.

Military Preparedness

The bedrock of our security is most certainly our military strength and the strength of our alliances. We live in a hard world which requires hard measures. For almost two decades, our principal adversary, the Soviet Union, has been building its military strength by 4% or more every year. Yet for much of that period, American defense expenditures decreased.

President Carter has reversed that

decline. We are now carrying out the most comprehensive military modernization program since the early 1960s.

Each element of our strategic nuclear forces is being sharply improved to make sure that we can deter any level or kind of nuclear attack. The new Trident submarine and Trident missile will dramatically increase the firepower of our underwater nuclear forces. The area of the ocean in which they can hide will expand tenfold. The new mobile MX missile will render any plan for a disabling first strike against the United States even more hopeless than it already is. Our bomber forces, with new air-launched cruise missiles, will be able to remain safely beyond the range of Soviet defenses and deliver massive explosive force with extraordinary accuracy.

We are strengthening our other capabilities as well. We are enhancing the preparedness of our ground forces; modernizing our tactical air forces; building a larger and more capable navy; increasing our sea and airlift capabilities so we can respond more quickly to emergencies wherever they arise. And with the leadership of Birch Bayh as chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, America's intelligence resources are being strengthened.

Our alliances are growing stronger. Through American leadership the NATO alliance is committed to a new defense improvement program, to an annual 3% increase in defense expenditures, to modernize our theater nuclear forces in Europe. The United States also seeks to strengthen the alliance by supporting strongly the early reintegration of Greek military forces into NATO.

Plainly, any notion that we are neglecting our defense posture is absurd. American and allied military forces—today—are a match for any adversary or combination of adversaries. And through these new programs, our forces will remain that way, despite the Soviet buildup. Our defenses will remain the foundation of peace.

But as we do what is necessary to protect ourselves, let us not be so blinded by the importance of power that we forget what else is necessary to build a more peaceful world.

Prudent Policies

First, we need the perspective of prudence. It is prudent to make sure that our purposes are clear. We are determined to defend our vital interests—in Europe, in Asia, in the Middle East and Persian Gulf, in this hemisphere. But we must be clear—to ourselves and to others

—that we seek no dominion, no control over the affairs of other peoples.

Nor must we pretend that we can recapture the military superiority we once held over the Soviet Union. Such superiority may sound grand in speeches. But the Soviets will no more allow us to gain such a position than we will allow it to them. A search for superiority would simply create a massive, dangerous new arms race. Peace lies in maintaining a prudent balance.

It is this sense of prudence that should also lead us to ratify the SALT II Treaty and pursue further balanced arms control agreements. What prudent person would want a world without SALT?

- A world in which the Soviets can deploy 750 more nuclear weapons systems that allowed under the treaty;
- A world without restraints on the number of nuclear weapons each of those missiles and bombers carries;
- A world where we have to spend tens of billions of dollars on nuclear weapons that could go to our conventional forces—or to the needs of human beings in this country and abroad;
- A world of greater tension between the United States and the Soviet Union.

I think the answer is clear. That is why we will seek ratification of the SALT II Treaty as soon as possible next year. And that is why we must always make it clear to the Soviet Union that while we will continue to oppose aggression in Afghanistan or elsewhere—and we will—our purpose is to help establish patterns of mutual restraint that allow an improved relationship between us. We and the Soviets, as the two superpowers, have a responsibility to all humankind: Even as we compete, we must always be willing to pursue, as well, the works of peace.

Peace also depends on the prudence of statesmen when conflicts erupt—when crises require cool thinking as well as strength. At such times, we need to understand that the use of force is a last resort. Our first recourse must be to the instruments of diplomacy.

And we need to be clear on the difference between threats to our vital interests and foreign internal strife that may affect our interests but is not susceptible to the use of American force. American forces are in the Persian Gulf, for example, to defend vital interests of the United States and our allies in the region. They are not there to interfere in the domestic affairs of any nation.

I raise this point because the air is

now filled with after-the-fact prescriptions of belligerence. We are told that greater American military might could have prevented the course of events in Iran or in Nicaragua. But the fact is that in the world as it is, American military forces cannot provide a satisfactory solution to the internal problems of other nations. If we tried to order the affairs of other nations by force, we would be endlessly at war all over the globe. And how would we then differ from the Soviet Union and its actions in Afghanistan or Ethiopia?

In dealing with disputes both among and within nations, our wisest course is to work to resolve crises before they erupt—through patient and persistent diplomacy and through support for human progress.

Peace Among Nations

Today, the people of Israel and Egypt live in greater security than at any point in a generation. Certainly, both face threats from beyond their borders. But they live at peace with each other.

The Camp David accord that produced this historic peace treaty was an act of courage and statesmanship by President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin. And especially, it was the product of President Carter's determined, persistent efforts to find a formula that could encompass the concerns of both sides.

Now, we are engaged in the next step—negotiations on the fundamental issues of a comprehensive peace in the area. Progress has been slow. It will continue to be. But there is progress. The talks continue. There can be more progress, if we persist.

In this region, and in others, we must recall the words of John F. Kennedy. "We can push a button to start the next war," he reminded us, "but there is no push-button magic to bring a just and lasting peace." That peace will only come if we are as patient as we are determined; if we are steady in our course, because it is the only course that offers practical progress.

Peace Within Nations

We must also recognize the unbreakable connection between peace and human progress. A nation cannot be at peace if its people are not at peace—if their political, economic, and social rights are not protected and advanced. No person who cherishes his or her own rights can rest comfortably when the cancer of discrimination persists or spreads, as we have

seen recently with an alarming increase in ugly incidents of anti-Semitism in various countries. This is a development that all people of decency deplore. It is a denial of the most fundamental human rights.

There is a very practical connection between human rights and our own security. People around the world are demanding that they see in their own lives the benefits of national economic growth. In many countries, they are insisting on greater participation in the affairs of their governments. These are facts. We welcome them for they match our own national traditions.

These demands for progress are demands for change—demands that can create instability. But when they go unmet, governments can lose legitimacy in the eyes of their people. Vicious cycles of violence and repression and radicalism are too often the result.

This is why no one should automatically equate stability and the status quo. We must come to grips with the currents of change in the world. Contrast, for a moment, the peace within such democratic nations as Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Peru, Nigeria, and Ghana to the events we have seen in Iran and Nicaragua, where repression and economic inequities led to an agony of violence. It is, therefore, in our national interest to support human rights and democracy.

Nowhere, in recent years, has the wisdom of this approach—the direct connection between peace and progress—been better demonstrated than in our policies toward Rhodesia. Despite the pressures in this country to support the minority regime there, President Carter held firm for a settlement based on free elections and racial justice. Because of the efforts of many nations, such a settlement was achieved. And today, after free elections, the new nation of Zimbabwe knows more peace than anyone had imagined possible. Our challenge now is to support the economic, human progress there that can preserve this peace in the years to come.

Conclusion

Every American cherishes peace. In such difficult and complex times, it is not surprising that there are different views on how peace is to be nurtured and preserved. Here is what I believe.

- Peace is hard. It will require great sacrifice and courage in the years ahead—the strength to deter aggression and the will to tend to our defenses.

- Peace is also fragile. Without prudence it can easily be shattered. Without

care and patience and steadiness, its web cannot be spun.

- And peace is a human condition, not merely the technical absence of war among nations. So long as injustice exists, peace will only hold if there is constant, visible, tangible human progress.

I believe that on our understanding and application of these points will depend our nation's contribution to peace in the difficult decade ahead and thus our own future safety and success.

¹ Press release 282. ■

News Conferences in New York

SEPT. 25, 1980¹

I assume you have distributed the announcement we have on the TNF [theater nuclear forces] talks.²

Let me say with respect to the Gromyko meeting that Mr. Gromyko emphasized the importance of complete confidentiality, of being able to speak freely, and I don't want to prejudice the dialogue which ought to continue. So I am going to have to be cagier than I usually am about that, and I may even be noncommunicative. We did not cover as many subjects as I thought we might, which suggests that we discussed some of them more comprehensively than I had expected we might. It was, I think—both sides were relaxed—a hard-hitting discussion. One recalls the two speeches we made to the General Assembly. One would expect them to be hard-hitting but not abusive in any sense—verbally abusive or physically. I think it was a chance for both of us to get points before the other that we found disturbing, and we did so, both using frankness and candor to make clear the depth of our concerns about the other's policies and actions.

Q. Can you address yourself more than you did in the statement outside the Soviet mission this morning about we're both neutral to how the two of you approached the Iraqi-Iranian problem and where either our individual efforts or their individual efforts or our collaborative efforts stand at trying to defuse that fighting?

A. Since I opened up that subject that much, I ought to say this much more about it lest there be some confusion. We really each stated what we

aid publicly about our positions.

Ours is clear, that we are neutral in this matter, that we think urgently that the hostilities should cease, and that the parties take their differences to the negotiating table. We welcome a meeting of the Security Council to support such for the purpose of calling for a cease-fire negotiations and also to pursue our respective diplomatic channels to seek to influence both Iraq and Iran in any way we can—our influence in Iran is obviously limited—to influence them to implement a cease-fire. Mr. Gromyko stated their position which is similar: It did not respond to or reject the Security Council or the diplomatic offensive idea. Whether as events unfold, we do pursue parallel lines, only time will tell.

Q. Since the Soviet Union is the largest supplier of arms to Iraq and hence, therefore, presumably it would have some leverage by stating its neutrality, in effect, the Soviets are allowing the fighting to continue. They're not exerting a positive influence and, therefore, in effect they are taking sides on the side of Iraq. Is that a correct analysis?

A. I think there are competing analyses, but I don't think it is useful for me to get into them. I think you ought to take that up with Mr. Gromyko.

Q. Let me put it another way. Would you have preferred that the Soviets become less neutral and fall in behind the U.N. effort?

A. The problem of undertaking to influence the course of action other countries may take in this situation, given the pressures they may feel in this situation, can be a counterproductive proposition.

I stated my view to Mr. Gromyko and I did my government's view, which is my view, because I regarded that as representing the maximum that I could do in trying to influence his actions. His actions he'll decide. I don't think it is useful for me to try to speculate beyond what he said to me.

Q. Trying to conceive, trying to imagine what advantage the Soviets could gain from the war ending, if we can assume there's a lot we have to lose—or the West has to lose—in the war continuing, from your point of view what possible interest do they have in helping to end the war? Why would they? Where do they stand to lose if the war continues? We stand to lose, the West stands to lose oil

supplies. What do they stand to lose?

A. The whole world stands to lose in this area, which is such an unstable area, so potentially explosive. Hostilities erupt which could escalate. It could even escalate to the point where the ultimate, unthinkable hostilities may take place.

We have discussed the Middle East in these terms since the invention of the nuclear weapon, and we have always regarded the Middle East as the most sensitive and the most unstable area, therefore the most dangerous. I doubt that the Russians have lost that perception. I am sure we haven't. And the whole Middle East conflict has been put in this context. Nobody gains. That's the way in which it ought to be viewed. Nobody gains. I don't believe even the Iraqis and the Iranians have gained from the outbreak of hostilities of this kind. If that isn't the perception, then I don't understand why there appears to be widespread understanding in this institution that action ought to be taken, although there is reluctance about taking the initiative. Nevertheless, there is widespread understanding. It must be there's widespread appreciation of the fact that nobody, including the Soviet Union, gains from the continuation of these hostilities.

Q. Can't the Soviets gain by fragmentation of Iran? Isn't there some dividend in that for them, that and, of course, isn't there for us?

A. I don't believe they've gained very much at this point from their intervention in Afghanistan. And, if the situation that has developed is tempting them into a similar situation, you know they have already had a world reaction to their Afghanistan intervention. Would it be in their interest—I doubt it—to confirm that the world's interpretation of their intervention in Afghanistan is justified?

Q. If the premise is that the Soviet Union sees the danger of escalation in that part of the world as clearly as we do and that their views of nonintervention and neutrality are parallel with our own, why shouldn't it be comparatively easy to achieve a joint statement to that effect which would have considerable effect—a joint Soviet-American statement that neither side will intervene and that there should be no other intervention in Iran, that a cease-fire should take place, should be encouraged between Iran and Iraq? We seem to be operating through a pane of glass.

A. That's true. I'm learning, as perhaps you are, that that's the nature

of this institution. It operates through panes of plate glass.

But, with respect to your suggestion, in the first place our position in this conflict is a very delicate and sensitive one given our problem in Iran. Their perception, at least as they have announced it, of our involvement in it is totally false and unfounded. Nevertheless, for us to be perceived as taking an initiative, which if executed at a given moment would find them at a disadvantage, surely would not be helpful to our interests. How the Soviets might interpret the impact of their joining in such an initiative, I would not undertake to define. But there is that problem. We are not in a position to take the lead here at this point. That's not misunderstood around here. So we're undertaking to move as we have for so long now in the Iranian situation—quietly, through diplomatic channels and private consultations, to achieve our objectives. We can't do it by beating the drum or shouting from the rooftops.

Q. Will you be meeting Mr. Gromyko again or will he be going to Washington to discuss this with the President?

A. No. This morning's meeting went beyond the time that was scheduled so that each of us could raise what we regarded as the highest priority items. If there had been others, I think we would have continued longer. There was the possibility that we might have adjourned to come back this afternoon if we hadn't finished.

Q. You've now had two meetings with Mr. Gromyko over several months' period. How would you now describe the state of relations?

A. I think our two speeches to the General Assembly do that. We each find fault—serious fault—with the other's policies to the point where we each question the other's intentions and have doubts about it. Yet I think it's important that we are able to express those questions and doubts to each other face-to-face, to do it in a reasonable, if hardened, way. We've slipped back from the days of maximum accommodation as a result of Afghanistan from our point of view, and as a result of U.S. actions which they identify as a cause of their disillusionment. And it's going to be a slow process to climb out of it, to climb back up to a more normal relationship. We both, I think, indicated today that that is our objective. Each of us would prefer normal relationships. But we see problem A, B,

and C stand in the way of acquiring action by the other, and this is basically the nature of the discussion. We cannot influence changes in policy on the other side in one discussion or two. That has never been the nature of the discussions between the Soviet Union and the United States, even in the most halcyon days.

Q. Is it correct that the United States wanted and would like to see an urgent Security Council meeting, and is it correct that the Soviet Union doesn't want it?

A. I don't believe either of those formulations is a precise statement.

Q. How would you answer it?

A. By asking me to respond to your formulation of our position would put me in one of two uncomfortable positions. If I were to say yes, I can see the headlines now putting us out front. If I was to say no, then I can see the headlines saying the United States doesn't want a Security Council meeting. There's no way for me to answer that question.

I have already stated what our position is. I said that we cannot be out front at this point. We are supporting the idea of a Security Council meeting. We are working hard at undertaking to encourage it. But we think the initiative has to come as a result of what I think is a widespread consensus here in the General Assembly that that's what ought to come. And I do not believe from the reports I get that the Soviets are resisting it. It's when you put adjectives in front of these things that I have trouble with your questions.

Q. Did Gromyko lay down any circumstances, ground rules, or conditions under which the Soviet Union would participate in the Security Council action or resolution?

A. We didn't go beyond what I've already told you.

Q. Did you get in any discussion at all of contingencies should the gulf be closed to tanker traffic?

A. We did not.

Q. Then the subject didn't come up? Either from you or—

A. In our general discussion we stated conditions here in this area of the world in general. We identified the sensitive areas in an overview sort of way, including this one. Obviously, in the two discussions I have had with him, Afghanistan, because of its geography related to the gulf, is the reason

why we're concerned. So that point was repeated, and I don't think the repetition necessarily related to this, but obviously it had a connection with the present hostilities.

Q. Actually, what I'm trying to find is whether you attempted to make clear to him the seriousness with which the United States regards keeping open the free navigation.

A. Oh, yes. Well—

Q. [Inaudible]

A. You reporters ask code questions, too, as well as we give code answers. But obviously this is a sensitive area of the world and was in May in Vienna, not only because there's oil here but because there are sea lanes that carry it to the outside world. That is the geopolitical fact in this area. But if what you are trying to get out of me with that question is whether or not we specifically discussed particular threats involved in these hostilities to the gulf, then no.

Q. Can you describe what you and Prince Sa'ud [of Saudi Arabia] talked about, and why the meeting was moved up? I mean, did they have an obvious concern about the hostilities that are going on? Did he want us to do something or did you want him to do something or did you just discuss the general state of affairs out there?

A. I assume he came here because there was action here that affects his country. And his previously scheduled visit was scheduled at a time when that action hadn't occurred. But we didn't discuss why he came. I rather understood why, and he rather understood that he didn't have to explain. But with respect to what we discussed, that's confidential. He asked me to keep it confidential. It is confidential.

Q. Did the Saudi King today endorse Iraq? Did you two discuss that? The wires are reporting that King Khalid said that Saudi Arabia is fully supportive of Iraq.

A. Having said that the conversation was confidential, there's no way I could answer your question.

Q. Is there any other way you can verify that for us outside of this channel?

A. No.

Q. Maybe we can ask about a *New York Times* article that says here that most Arabs at the United Nations favor an Iraqi victory? That's the

headline. Do you get that impression?

A. I find it very misleading to draw my intelligence from newspaper headlines.

Q. No, I'm trying to make it convenient for you to share your intelligence with us.

A. And if my intelligence were shareable with the *New York Times* headlines, it wouldn't be intelligence.

Q. Are we concerned that the Arabs are going to get themselves lined up behind Iraq and thereby make it more difficult to resolve the Iraqi-Iranian issue because the potential—at least Islamic mediators are all lined up behind Iraq—and is there any hope for some kind of Islamic peacekeeping effort out there?

A. It's never useful to assume the worst. People can be for one side or another in a conflict—and still the conflict is a bad thing in and of itself—and seek to end it. It's different in a football game. A football game is fun to watch whether you are for one side or the other but not a war.

Q. Can you tell us what you have talked about with your Western colleagues in connection with assuring the security, the best you can, of the Strait of Hormuz and the gulf and traffic through it?

A. We've shared our perception of the seriousness of the matter. As a matter of fact, the EC [European Communities] Nine communique clearly identifies their concern and matches our own.

Q. What about doing something about it? I mean, there has been a lot of talk of contingency plans, on consultations on contingencies for defense and international naval forces and the rest. What is there to all this, if anything?

A. There are at least three levels of which obviously anyone in a position of responsibility needs to consider a problem of this kind. One, what are the possible options? At that level one considers—sometimes considers—ideas that are viable and ideas that are not. It's not particularly useful if one wants constructive, creative dialogue to reveal necessarily the range of ideas that are discussed at that level.

The next level of discussion involves a narrow list of options usually, but on an as-if basis. In other words, I think it's inappropriate and negative to

e talking in many cases about possible actions that might be taken in situations which have not yet occurred.

And then finally there's the decisionmaking level of which circumstances may have evolved to the point where some action is needed. I just really don't think it's useful to speculate in the first two levels.

Q. Can you talk about the TNF business? Is there something more than just that announcement? Is there an agreement on what weapons systems can be discussed?

A. I think what will happen—as you know, the U.S. position is that the subject of discussion ought to be long-range theater nuclear missiles. The Soviet position is that we ought to discuss medium-range theater nuclear weapons in organic connection with forward-based systems. I think this announcement indicates that each side will present its view of what the scope of the discussions ought to be.

Q. Has presented it already?

A. No, will. This is not a substantive discussion.

Q. Was there an occasion at today's meeting where these two well-known positions were restated?

A. Of course. It was on that basis at this formulation was agreed to so that it's clearly open to each side to press whatever case it wishes to press. In other words there's no point in trying to achieve a partial agreement in advance as a precondition. The talks wouldn't have started.

So what we've said to each other is, look, we can make our arguments after the talks start; and that's what will happen. What progress will be made remains to be seen. We both thought it was important to get the talks started, to begin to get the tires gripping, and to see where we go. This is an important agreement in my judgment. I think it identifies the fact that both sides, even at a time of relatively deteriorated relationships, agree on the importance of arms control. That's a very important point to make. Just how far we move from this is a question. How this might affect SALT II ratification is a question. And you ought not to forget that at both sides in their formulations of the issue that ought to be discussed there have related it in different ways to the ratification of SALT II. So that even if we should reach agreement in

this area on limitations on some systems, implementation of that agreement will rest on ratification of SALT II.

Q. Awhile ago you referred to the possibility that if this conflict in the Persian Gulf continued, it might eventually get to the final unthinkable. Looking back on what you learned in the past few days and in your discussion today, do you feel that at least at this point things between the two of us—the two sides that have the power of this final unthinkable—are going along about as can be expected at this stage, and do you see a tangible danger rather than a general philosophical danger of this crisis moving toward that kind of a final point?

A. No, I do not at this point see any tangible danger. I don't know whether I would want to use that particular phraseology. But your thought I would agree with; that is, that we must always worry, especially in this kind of area, that a minor—this isn't minor—that a conflict of this kind might escalate to a war. I don't think that's going to happen on the basis of my present perceptions of the attitudes of the member nations and my perception of attitudes of the Soviet Union and ourselves and on the perception that I gather that all nations see a need for a cease-fire and/or limitation of this war. So I think that at this moment, at this point, I do not see that danger as materializing. If that changes, then we have different—

Q. You mentioned the three levels of responsibility. Did you mean to suggest that the—you said that the first two weren't proper subjects for speculation. Do you mean to say that what is operating now in those two levels are not in the third level of decision?

A. All we've had in the gulf up to this point—and on this I'm not up to speed on the latest intelligence; I may not be—is, first, that Iran declared the waters within its 12-mile limit a war zone, with the result of a dramatic escalation of insurance rates which itself is an inhibition on shipping. Secondly, the Iranians have gone so far as to hail a couple of ships to ascertain their destination and cargo, seeking presumably to create uncertainty that would inhibit other shipping.

Those two actions which are known, if no more, would operate as a restraint on shipping. Obviously that's

not sufficient to generate—to trigger—a military response. So you have to watch what happens. The Iranians may go no further than they have gone. That's what I'm saying. And so we're watching carefully their ability to go beyond that. One ought not to escalate the expectations of what might happen or what the response ought to be, because to indulge in that speculation sometimes has the force of a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Q. Do you mean to leave us with the impression that out of this meeting today there was no kind of agreement by the two of us to work together on any sort of effort to make peace between Iraq and Iran?

A. One never knows. By sharing views, sometimes two people follow parallel courses of action without reaching agreement; that is one of the possible benefits of ongoing dialogue. But in the present state of relations between us, reaching explicit agreements involves a lot of it and requires time-consuming discussions that may not be productive, so you do the best you can. But here, at this point, I'm not going to try to prejudge what the Soviets' position is or what ours is with respect to whatever actions may or may not be taken by the Security Council. I'm simply indicating that both have started out so far as I know from similar positions. And what particular tactics or means each uses to implement positions taken, we'll have to wait to see.

Q. Are you ruling out the possibility that the Soviets were behind what is happening, that, in fact, they were the incitement behind the Iraqis?

A. I have no evidence to suggest that they're behind the Iraqis.

Q. There's an Iraqi thing floating around that Bazargan—that the Iranians, through Bazargan—are offering to release the hostages for spare parts. The Iraqis are putting that out. And I wondered if you wanted to escalate it to a Secretary of State denial? Have you got a message from Iran?

A. No such message has been received, and no answer to a nonmessage has been given.

Q. On Poland?

A. I had a meeting with the Polish Foreign Minister today. At this point it's only an outline of the situation in Poland, their economic situation, and

the things they're trying to do to deal with it. But at this point they expressed appreciation for CCC [Commodity Credit Corporation] credits but made no supplementary request at this point. Obviously they are going to do so at some point when they've got their own plans in place. I indicated we would look on with sympathy to the idea of being of help. Resources are limited as I've been saying publicly now for some time. But it was a very good meeting, and I thought he was very clear and forthcoming and practical on what they need to do.

Q. Did he give you any assurance that the accords would be carried out?

A. We discussed the legislation—I guess it's been passed now—the court processes that were being used and the standards that are being applied.

Q. Do you have any reason to believe that the Iraqis decided to launch this whole effort because they felt after Khomeini's letter that we and the Iranians might be on the verge of somehow working something out and that now was a good time to do it?

A. I've no reason to believe that.

OCT. 2, 1980³

I am completing what has for me been a most valuable 9 days of meetings with heads of governments and foreign ministers from countries on every continent. Many of them I have met for the first time. Such meetings have given me valuable insights into their personal and official points of view.

Through larger sessions with the Foreign Ministers of ASEAN [Association of South East Asian Nations], Africa, and Latin America, I have gained a glimpse of the strength and importance of regional cooperation in each of these areas. The war between Iraq and Iran has been at the forefront of concern in many of these conversations.

My being here was fortuitous in that it enabled us to meet directly with countries of the immediate area. I valued particularly my two meetings with His Highness Prince Sa'ud of Saudi Arabia, and my meetings with the Foreign Ministers of Bahrain and the representatives of Oman. My meeting with the Foreign Minister of Iraq was probably only possible because we both happened to be here in New York. I regret that I did not have a response from my offer to meet a representative of Iran.

The meeting with [Soviet] Foreign Minister Gromyko enabled us to continue our periodic sessions and to advance the talks on theater nuclear forces and arms limitations in Europe. I was able to have a series of meetings with our principal European allies. The various conversations gave me an opportunity not only to reiterate our interest in sound, bilateral relations with each of these countries but also to stress the continuing interest of the United States in maintaining a firm international stand against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and in furthering the process of peace in the Middle East.

I come away from this—my first extensive series of meetings with foreign ministers—impressed by the degree to which the role of the United States is important to each one, even when we may disagree on fundamental issues. While each recognized that we were in an election period, nearly all stressed their strong desire of continuity of U.S. attention to the needs of peace and development throughout the world.

Q. May we please have your overview of the current state of diplomatic efforts to resolve the war between Iran and Iraq?

A. The latest development is, of course, the proposed cease-fire offered by Iraq. I'm not sure if there has been a formal response from Iran at this point. My belief is that there has not. I would hope that that initiative, or other initiatives, might lead as soon as possible to a cease-fire and beginning of negotiations of the issues involved in those hostilities.

Q. Does it seem to be a substantive offer or a public relations move by Iraq?

A. No. I take it to be a response solicited by [Pakistani] President Zia representing the Islamic conference in response to that initiative.

Q. The United States is sending radar planes to Saudi Arabia. One of your deputies has said the United States cannot condone the dismemberment of Iran, and President Carter is talking about some sort of a naval task force to protect the Strait of Hormuz. In light of all that, is it not more difficult now for the United States to maintain its professed neutrality, particularly when the Iranians are saying, "Stay out of the war or we'll kill the hostages?"

A. I prefer to describe the situation as it appears to be at the moment and not speculate on hypothetical possibilities which one could frame in horrendous terms. Whenever hostilities begin in any part of the world, and especially in this one, the risks of escalation and the consequences of escalation obviously pose very difficult problems for all concerned.

At the present moment, hostilities seem to have diminished somewhat—the intensity of hostilities—the broad risks seem to have diminished somewhat, and I would hope that we would continue in that direction rather than the direction which your question suggests.

Q. Among oil analysts, some are saying now that there has been tremendous damage heaped upon Iraq and Iran by their bombing in the oil facilities. They are also suggesting that there is no end in sight perhaps to this war. They are also suggesting that unless Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi come in with maybe 2 million barrels of oil a day in extra production, that in 9 months to a year, the Western allies or the United States could begin to experience shortfalls of oil, higher prices, and greater inflation.

Has the Administration begun put into effect any kind of plan that would offset or prepare us for the eventuality of oil shortfalls?

A. Obviously, in a situation of this kind, with all the uncertainties as to the future—and your question is made up of an exposition of uncertainties—it is difficult to project what the need for planning would be or what the goal of the planning should be.

I don't have any personal assessment or any assessment made by any authoritative person or body as to the extent of the damage that is being imposed upon the oil facilities of the two combatants, nor do I have any crystal ball as to how long the infliction of damage on each other's facilities will continue. Unless one has answers to those questions and to the additional question of what the production elsewhere in the world is likely to be in this period, it is very difficult to come up with hard and fast answers to questions like that.

Q. It was reported by the State Department that in your talks with Foreign Minister Hammadi [of Iraq] he brought up the issue of the hostages. There have been reports that he brought it up in the context of Iraq

rs of some potential exchange of hostages for military equipment. you confirm or deny that?

A. Do I confirm or deny what? That subject was raised?

Q. The subject was raised. We know that because the State Department said it, but in what context was it raised? Why did the Iraqi raise the subject of the hostages?

A. They can characterize their concern better than I can. As far as I'm concerned, we have not indulged in speculation as to the basis upon which the hostages might be released. If and when the time comes that we are involved in negotiations on that subject in Iran—we are not involved in negotiations on that subject—one might speculate on a long list of possible requirements that might be presented by representatives of Iran. I don't think it is useful to do so here or with Mr. Hamadi, and I said the same thing to him.

Q. Yesterday the Iranian Charge characterized the AWACS [airborne warning and control system] presence as provocation and a demonstration by this country—the United States—is not really neutral. Today Saudi Arabia is quoted as boosting its production of oil for shipment to the West. Was there any negotiating going on between those two factors—the presence of the AWACS and the subsequent boost in oil production by Saudi Arabia?

A. No.

Q. After this enormous series of bilateral meetings, do you share the view of the President of the 35th session that this session might bring a contribution to disarmament and denuclearization?

A. That, obviously, is a goal which is within the Charter of the United Nations, and I would hope that the United Nations might be affected. One is not always reassured by actions taken here, but at least the existence of an institution with that objective always holds out hope, as far as I'm concerned.

Q. Governor Reagan has been very precise about what he is prepared to do were he is in power concerning the Islamic nations' attempt to expel Israel from the United Nations. What, precisely, are you prepared to recommend? A veto, if such an attempt is made?

A. When one is out of power, it is easy to be precise; when one is in power, one must consider not only public, but private, initiatives that one might take to avoid that result. We are just as strong in our conviction that Israel has a right to be a member of this body as Mr. Reagan is.

Q. In your talks with the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey, was there any progress made for the reintegration of Greece into NATO? Are the prospects now better than they were before your talks with the two Foreign Ministers?

A. Those discussions and negotiations are going on within the military structure of NATO. I am not a party to those negotiations, nor would it be appropriate for me to try to characterize them. As a matter of fact, I have deliberately stayed uninformed as to the details so that there be no question that what the issue involves is a military question rather than a political one.

Q. The Soviet Union has been asking that no country interfere in the Iraqi-Iranian crisis. Would you be able to shed some light for us about what deals the Soviet Union might take—what sort of steps might they take—if the war continues or was escalated? What is the U.S.S.R.'s position, in your estimate?

A. The U.S.S.R. position, as stated to me by Mr. Gromyko, is consistent with what I perceive its public position to be and that is to stand off and away from the conflict in a neutral posture. That was his position as stated to me, and as far as I can see, their actions have been consistent with that.

Q. Would you comment on reports from Tehran that the Iranian Parliament has formed a commission on the hostages and they are also refusing to address deals with the United States on Israel.

A. The commission idea was raised, I think, 2 or 3 weeks ago. I commented on it at that time as potentially a constructive step forward in that it appears to put in place an institution with authority to recommend, maybe to decide, the Iranian position on returning the hostages.

Q. What about the composition of that commission? We're told that they're all hardliners.

A. I don't think it is useful for me to speculate, to try to characterize persons as to views and positions and records. I am not fully informed.

Q. In your discussions with the foreign ministers, there has been a lot of talk about the United States being weak. Do you get that perception? Do they have that perception of the United States? Do they still believe that we are a world power?

A. I can't recall anyone raising any question about that. [Laughter]

Q. Do they have any fears that we are not maintaining our position as a world power, as a voice of democracy?

A. No. They expressed no such fears. I must say that I had no difficulty in arranging meetings with all those who came to meet with me; indeed, we were not able to fit in all those who wished. So I do not detect in their attitude for the prospects of meeting with the United States Secretary of State any lack of interest in our influence or power. As a matter of fact, from time to time I got the notion that they exaggerate our ability to influence the actions of other nations and especially to deal with the internal affairs of other nations.

Q. There have been rather interesting changes in the text of the address by President Zia of Pakistan—between the prepared text and the delivered text—particularly in relation to the remarks concerning the Soviet Union. Have you been made aware of these changes? Have you made any inquiries why they introduced these changes, and how do you assess these changes?

A. The ever-helpful press has brought those changes to my attention.

Q. Since the President goes to Washington tomorrow, do you feel that there is any connection between that visit and the changes?

A. I think it is better to try to make that determination after we have met with President Zia and his representatives than to speculate about it before I meet with them. He should be the best authority.

Q. Are we any closer to having a meeting with other countries on the problem of oil supplies in the Persian Gulf, as President Carter mentioned last week in his messages to other countries? And on the same point, do you think it is more or less likely that you would need some kind of international naval force to keep the strait open?

A. With respect to the first part of your question, discussions at the technical level and on a contingency basis are under way. With respect to the possibilities of such a contingency arising, they seem to have diminished in the last couple of days, and there has been no interruption of shipping and no apparent effort in this period to interrupt, and, indeed, some evidence of deliberate restraint with respect to that. So it may well be that the risk of that exact contingency arising has diminished.

Q. The United States has a military presence in the Middle East crisis area. Is Turkey expected to contribute to these efforts of the United States with its armed forces or with its bases on its soil?

A. I have heard no such expectations.

Q. If Iran this afternoon accepted the cease-fire, what would be the next step? Would there be a U.N. peacekeeping force along that line?

A. Of course the initiative that has been taken, which triggered the Iraqi proposal of the cease-fire, was taken by the Islamic conference, and I would expect that the Iranian response might be to that initiative. If so, it could well be that the negotiations still might be taken under the same initiative. That is not inconsistent, of course, with the action taken by the Security Council, but it may well unfold in a parallel way.

Q. Radio Oman reported yesterday that a top-level Soviet military mission had completed several days of conferences with Jordanian leaders and had met directly with the King. Radio Oman went on to say that the meeting was directed toward better bilateral relations between Moscow and Oman and might lead the way toward Soviet munitions being supplied to King Hussein's forces. If that takes place, wouldn't that be a major setback for the United States in that region?

A. King Hussein was in the United States recently for similar discussions at some length, and no such developments followed. I think to speculate along the lines of your question, or to suggest that I speculate, would be counterproductive, counterinfluential.

Q. In your meeting with Prince Sa'ud of Saudi Arabia, how do you describe his country's security needs at the moment?

A. My discussions with Prince Sa'ud were on a confidential basis, so I

feel that you would have to put that question to him if you have an opportunity.

Q. Did you in any way, or has the U.S. Government in any way, asked the Saudis and Abu Dhabi to increase their oil production in the West?

A. No. Obviously, the question would occur to them as it has to us, and this is evidently in the public press. There have been no direct discussions.

Q. Were you informed that the Saudis were going to increase the oil, or is there any other confirmation of that report which, as far as I can tell, just comes from the Japanese news stories?

A. That is a question to be put to the Saudis. It is their decision, not mine, and I'm not in a position to answer.

Q. Did the last event show that the opening of negotiations, among other things and energy, is even more important after your bilateral meeting? Is there any chance that the United States would change its position toward global negotiations?

A. With respect to global negotiations, I, myself, discussed that in my speech to the General Assembly, and I refer you to that for a complete answer. May I say that we are interested in contributing to a constructive resolution of the issues raised in that debate. But we are also rather concerned that the integrity of the specialized agencies be preserved. We think it ought to be possible to achieve both objectives.

Q. Suppose Iran releases the hostages very soon. Is the United States ready to negotiate supplying Iran with spare parts and ammunition for the fighters and the American-made machine guns, or whatever?

A. I have no way of knowing what may be on the Iranian agenda for negotiations dealing with the release of the hostages. I have not found it useful in the last 4 months to try to speculate about such agenda items publicly, and I see no reason to change that position now.

Q. Did you meet the Foreign Minister of Poland?

A. I did not. [The Secretary corrected this, stating that he did, in fact, meet with the Foreign Minister of Poland during his New York visit.]

Q. Was there a reason why it did not take place? Was there no request

from the Polish, or no request from you?

A. I have met with the representatives of Poland in Washington before I came to New York. This isn't the only place the Secretary of State meets with representatives of other countries. It may just seem that way this week.

Q. Are you satisfied with the way that the Security Council has proceeded on the Mideast war question? Do you think that it looks as though they've got any handle on it at all?

A. Do you mean the Iraqi-Iranian war?

Q. Yes.

A. There has been a lot of discussion. Members have not been inactive. It has been difficult to find a handle in all of the considerations that affect the interests of various members, and the finally chose to pursue an Islamic initiative before the Security Council really acted. It is a difficult one to get a handle on, but I would like to emphasize that the effort over all of those days was constant as members sought a way to get a handle on the problem.

Q. A top-level Iranian diplomat this morning linked the Iraqi plan of what he called "aggression on Iran" with a U.S. plan to invade Iran. He referred to recent articles that were banned by the Carter Administration including Jack Anderson's article, about an American plan to invade Iran. He says that, indeed, that plan of aggression by Iraq against Iran is linked generally to the American plan of aggression of invading Iran. And, therefore, he said that the United States is involved in the Iraqi-Iranian conflict. What is your comment on that?

A. Number one, that I couldn't detect much logic in your question. And, number two, I would say that the United States does not have, has not had, and will not have any intention of invading Iran. Our concern is the release of the hostages. We respect the right of the Iranian people to establish their Islamic Republic. We recognize the fact that they have done so, and we are perfectly willing to discuss our future relationships on any basis that they wish.

So all of those reports are false. There is absolutely no substance to any accusation that we were involved in collusion with Iraq in connection with this current fighting. There never has been; no basis for it; and, as a matter of

Deputy Secretary Christopher Interviewed on "Face the Nation"

Following are excerpts from Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher's interview on September 28, 1980, with George Herman, CBS News (moderator); Robert Pierpoint, CBS News; and William Beecher, The Boston Globe.

et, there is a lot of basis for the opposite conclusion.

Q. When you met Mr. Gromyko, did you discuss Poland?

A. No, we did not. May I say that with respect to the talks with Mr. Gromyko, we did not cover all of the items in an informal way that we had indicated that it would be desirable for us to discuss. Time did run out on us. The fact that Poland was not discussed did not reflect a lack of interest on both sides in discussing it.

Q. Did you receive any answer from Iran for your offer to give them equal time like you gave the Iraqis to clarify their position in the Iranian-Iraqi crisis?

A. As I said in my opening comments this afternoon, I have not heard.

Q. Through any intermediaries have you been in touch with Iran and received any assurances that they will not move to try and attempt to block the Strait of Hormuz?

A. We have had no contact with Iran. As I say, I made observations earlier of the fact that there has been an attempt by Iran to block that shipping or to harass the shipping. The closest they came to it was to hail one or two ships to determine their cargo and destination, and that was several days ago. So I have no evidence to indicate that they intend to try to interrupt these shipping lanes.

Q. Do you have intention to meet with Mr. Gromyko before he leaves? Is there any specific date for another meeting with Mr. Gromyko?

A. No. There is no specific date, but we did agree that these meetings from time to time could be useful and that the two we have had were useful. We have only one agreement out of it at this point, but at least I think we used the time frankly and even bluntly with each other to explain our respective points of view on the issues which have created problems for us.

Q. Considering all the facts in the Iran-Iraq dispute and fighting at the moment, is it your opinion and that of the State Department that this is likely to be a long-term war, or is it something which is likely to wind down or peter out in a matter of a week or two?

A. We can't tell for sure, but our strong hope and our aim is that there would be a cessation of hostilities at the earliest possible time.

Every interest of the United States is served by that—our interest is stability in the area, our interest in keeping the oil flowing, our interest in the safe return of the hostages. So we're working to try to have an early cessation of the hostilities. We hope that will be the situation, but since the parties have not shown any desire at the present time for a cease-fire, I couldn't confidently predict that it will end at an early date.

Q. Is it your impression at the State Department that this fight—this war—between Iran and Iraq is a long-term battle in the sense that either side is pressing for something like unconditional surrender, or is it a limited war to gain certain very small limited objectives?

A. We hope it is a limited war, but it's been a classic case of escalation so far. What began as a ground skirmish escalated into air exchanges and then that escalated into air attacks on civilian targets, on economic targets. And the way it's gone, we can't confidently predict how long it will go.

An analysis of yesterday's activities indicates that the Iranian Air Force is still flying, still fighting. Today's activities indicate that the Iraqis are being very effective in Khuzistan Province having either taken or coming

close to taking several important cities there. So the conflict continues at a pace that is a fairly strong one.

Q. Is there any danger that now the war has gone beyond the point where American analysts thought Iraq had met its initial war objectives, that it will broaden those objectives and decide to try to annex the oil fields of Iran in Khuzistan Province?

A. I think that is one of the possibilities that has to be considered. That is one of the reasons why we think it's in all the world's interest for there to be a very early cessation of the hostilities—a cessation and then negotiation between the parties. We certainly couldn't condone any taking of the land or territory of another government by force.

Of course the conflict in that area is ages old. It's gone on for centuries. It's gone on recently. But we think the time has come for a cease-fire there—cessation of hostilities and a negotiated settlement between the parties.

Q. The President of Pakistan has been in Iran and now I believe is in Iraq trying to get some agreement on mediation or cessation of hostilities. Does the State Department have any indication of any degree of success by President Zia or any other individual or institution that might be calming down this situation?

A. No. We're following his trip with a good deal of hope. We think that it's desirable that an Islamic leader is meeting in both of those capitals. He may have a special capacity to deal with the parties involved, but we don't have any indication that he's yet been successful.

Q. What do you think it's going to take in a military sense or strategic sense for one side or the other, or both sides, to come to the bargaining table and talk about peace?

A. I hope that they will come to a realization that the war is not serving their purposes, that their oil fields—their main asset—are being injured very severely, that the civilian casualties are mounting and come to their

¹ Press release 270.

² At their meeting on Sept. 25, Secretary Muskie and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko had an exchange of views regarding the beginning of discussions on questions of limiting nuclear arms which were raised in previous contacts between the parties. As a result, an agreement was reached that representatives of the United States and the U.S.S.R. would meet in Geneva the week beginning Oct. 13, 1980, in order to begin the discussion of this question.

³ Press release 271. ■

senses and stop this aggression, stop this war, and come to the bargaining table.

Q. You talk about the escalation, of strikes against civilian targets and air targets. Are you of the belief that this war is accidental, that it was not planned by one side or the other but just happened accidentally?

A. I think what started out to be a more limited war has escalated perhaps beyond the initial intention of the parties. Now we don't know for sure what the intention of the Iraqis may have been when this commenced, but I have a strong feeling myself that the skirmishes and then the airstrikes did escalate very rapidly.

And, of course, that is the danger and that is why we work so hard to prevent skirmishes between countries because we know that the escalation can go back and forth to the danger of the economy of the country and to the danger of the citizens.

Q. Everyone is concerned about the continued flow of oil from the Persian Gulf. So far the war has not threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz through which that oil must travel, but President Carter has said that come what may, those straits will be kept open.

Let's be clear on this. Is he saying that the U.S. Navy, with or without support of the British and French fleets in the Indian Ocean, is prepared to keep that strait open if someone tried to close it?

A. What the President has said and what he meant is that the Strait of Hormuz is an international waterway through which nations are entitled to send their ships through the right of free passage. We intend to keep that strait open. We think that other nations have a very strong interest in doing so. Actually, the European countries have a stronger interest in that oil than the United States does. But working with our allies, we intend to see that what is necessary is done to keep that strait open.

Q. But both the Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia have suggested that they would be very unhappy about a Western military fleet acting as policemen in the Persian Gulf. How does that affect our thinking, if at all?

A. Of course we would want to consult with the nations in the gulf, such as Saudi Arabia, but it is in their interests as well as in the interests of the West that the strait remains open. After all, they are the sellers of the oil which passes through that strait just as we're the purchasers of the oil.

Q. Is there a possibility that an allied force can be made up without the United States because of the feelings against the United States which run so strongly both in Iran and Iraq?

A. The French have very significant assets in that area as do the British. Of course the United States is the predominant naval power in that area. We have capacity beyond that of any other country or any combination of countries.

Q. But the other countries have need beyond what we have there for this oil.

A. Yes. Western Europe is more dependent upon the oil from the gulf than the United States is. I believe we get only about 11% of our oil from the gulf.

Nevertheless, the oil from that area is extremely important to the world's economy as a whole. The United States, Western Europe, countries of South America are all dependent on that area for major imports of oil.

Q. What have our allies said? The Japanese and the West Germans have indicated because of constitutional problems that they could not join in a military action with the United States to keep the straits open. But what have the French and what have the British, for example, told us?

A. We've been consulting with them, and I think we all recognize a common need to keep that strait open. I've been at the Department since early this morning, and there is no indication that ships are not passing through there in a normal and customary way at the present time. We'll deal with the contingency of somebody trying to block it when that comes up.

Q. What about the implications of this war on the 52 American hostages in Iran? For 10 months the leaders of Iran appeared to think that they had more to gain than lose by

holding on to those hostages, but given the defeat they're having in the war, the effect on the economy of their oil fields being in flames, the Russians continuing to build up along their northern border, perhaps their perception of what their interest is might be changing. What do you think about that? Is there a chance now that they might be disposed to settle the hostage issue?

A. I certainly hope so. It seemed me that in the last few weeks the Iraqis have been coming to the point where they've been getting ready to address the hostage issue. One of the many reasons why we're working so hard and so strongly believe in the early cessation of the hostilities is to enable the Iraqis to turn back to addressing the hostage issue.

I think we have to recognize that the Iranian Government now is probably preoccupied with the war itself. There are some objective reasons why they ought, in their own self interests, immediately to solve the hostage crisis. But I think we ought to look for them to do that in the context of a cessation of hostilities.

Q. Is there any discussion at an level between the Iranian Government and the U.S. Government or through third parties which it would have to be now, I presume, of military aid for Iran, particularly in the area of spare parts and ammunition which we know they're using up at a great rate in return for the hostages?

A. We've said for a long time that in the context of and in conjunction with the release of the hostages, we would be prepared to talk with the Iraqis about a resumption of more or less normal commercial relations, of lifting the sanctions. Unfortunately, that subject is not under negotiation at the present time.

Q. So the answer to my question basically is, no, there has been no discussion of that?

A. That's correct.

Q. President Carter said that the United States is not involved in this war between Iran and Iraq, but in an indirect sense, of course, we are because Iran, for example, is strongly anti-American, Iraq is strongly

Dealing With the World's Realities

*Secretary Muskie's remarks before the Economic Club of Memphis and the Memphis in May International Festival, Inc. in Memphis on October 6, 1980.*¹

This event is called a "town meeting," and I look forward to an exchange every bit as questioning and lively as the town meetings in my native New England.

Before we get to the most interesting part of our meeting—our discussion of issues you wish to raise—let me make a few remarks about a basic question before us: how our nation will deal with a world of rapid change and new challenge. For more than 200 years, America has thrived and prospered, not by recoiling from change in the world but by working to shape it. We have known that change is the necessary companion of human progress. We have moved ahead by seeing the world as it is and as it can be, not by looking back to a simpler world we remember. The beginning of wisdom is understanding—understanding that we are living today at a time of the most extensive change in human history.

Let me begin by mentioning some of these changes and challenges.

- The Soviet Union has become—and intends to remain—a military superpower. Soviet use of its military power, in Afghanistan and elsewhere, has created new risks to world peace.
- In less than a half a generation, we have seen the birth of more than 100 new nations. Each is struggling to meet growing, sometimes violent, demands by its people for rapid economic and political progress.
- Regional rivalries have taken on new danger with the spread of sophisticated weapons and the willingness of the Soviets, Cubans, and others to exploit them.
- Our domestic economy, to a greater extent than ever before, is part of a global economy. Nations with new economic power are exerting new influence on our daily lives.
- And while the prosperity of our traditional allies in West Europe and Japan adds tremendously to our collective strength, it also has increased the potential for strains among us.

Some of these new realities are threatening. Others have the potential for good or for harm, depending in no small measure on how we seek to shape their direction. But all of them are realities. We cannot wish them away. We cannot reverse them with rhetoric. We must address them, all of them, creatively and without illusion.

For a few moments this evening, I want to talk about how the United States is dealing with these new realities—about where we are and where we are headed.

First, we are building our military strength.

For nearly two decades the Soviet Union has been building its military strength by 4% or more each year. Meanwhile, our underlying military base declined.

Today, the United States is engaged in the most far-reaching military modernization since the early 1960s. We are upgrading each arm of our strategic nuclear forces—land, sea, and air. The President has ordered full development of a powerful new land-based missile—the MX. The first of our sophisticated new Trident submarines was launched this year. We will start equipping our B-52s with new cruise missiles in 1982.

At the same time, we are building the defense forces of our alliances. In 1978, at American initiative, we and our NATO partners launched a long-term military improvement program. That program is well underway. In late 1979, we and our NATO allies agreed to a program for modernizing our nuclear weapons in Europe in order to meet a decade-long Soviet buildup. We will proceed with that program while we seek fair and verifiable negotiated limits with the Soviet Union. And we are building our military capacity to respond swiftly to serious crisis wherever it might arise, including the vital Persian Gulf area.

There should be no mistake. This modernization program involves heavy costs. In the past 4 fiscal years, the United States has increased defense expenditures by 10%. The President's defense program will increase expenditures by another 17% over the next 4 years. This modernization program is necessary

to assure that we maintain a military balance with the Soviet Union in the years ahead. It is a steady and reliable American defense program, not a wasteful and wanton effort to achieve an unachievable "superiority"—an effort that would only produce the dangers of a massive new arms race.

Secondly, the United States today is exercising its leadership to strengthen the international stand against Soviet aggression.

The Soviet effort to destroy the national independence of Afghanistan through military force must be sternly resisted by the international community. It is an attempt to use naked military power to deny a people and a nation their freedom. By precedent and by proximity, it increases the Soviet threat in a region of the world vitally important to the United States, to the industrialized democracies, to the entire world.

By the stands we have taken—on grain, on the sale of technology, on the Olympics—we have conveyed, clearly and concretely, the seriousness of the American people. Most Americans support the steps we have taken. For they understand that we cannot express our national resolve without individual sacrifice—from farmers, from businessmen, from athletes, from all of us. Yet we see, in the Senate and elsewhere, efforts to reverse the grain embargo.

There is a short answer: We cannot fight Soviet aggression more by sacrificing as Americans less. The firm actions the United States has taken in recent months are intended not to provoke confrontation but to avoid confrontation by discouraging future Soviet adventures. These actions are taken to preserve the only basis on which a relaxation of tensions can proceed—demonstrated Soviet restraint. As the President has said, we must be prepared to sustain those measures as long as Soviet troops remain in Afghanistan.

We must also seek Soviet restraint through balanced and enforceable agreements that limit the growth of arms. Now that the Soviets have dropped their preconditions, we will move ahead this month with preliminary talks to limit long-range theater nuclear forces.

And we will work for ratification of

the SALT II Treaty—an agreement that is strongly in our national interest—when it is feasible early next year. Rising tensions do not weaken the case for SALT; instead they remind us why arms control is essential—to curtail the arsenal aimed at us, to avert a futile arms race, to lessen the chance that a fatal miscalculation will reduce both nations to rubble.

For we strengthen our long-term security, not through rhetoric, but through a clear and lasting demonstration that we have the national will to oppose aggression. And we also strengthen our security through a willingness to seek concrete agreements that limit the nuclear threats we face.

Third, the United States today is deeply engaged in the search for peaceful, negotiated solutions to potentially explosive regional disputes.

For the first time since its creation, Israel and Egypt—its most powerful Arab neighbor—live not in fragile truce but in solid peace. And for the first time, negotiations are underway on the basic issues that must be resolved to achieve a broader peace in this part of the Middle East.

The agreement we reached with Panama, after 14 years of negotiation, has provided a sounder future for the canal and has improved our position throughout Latin America.

Our unwavering support for negotiations in Rhodesia helped bring an end to a bloody civil war there, a majority rule government, and a decent hope for peace free from outside interference.

Each step we take today toward easing these international tensions is a step toward preventing broader conflict tomorrow. I believe the American people want us to persist in these efforts.

Fourth, the United States today is working to strengthen our economic position in the world, for the sake of our consumers and businessmen, our farmers and our workers.

We have reached a major international trade agreement that makes sure we can compete fairly. We are pursuing a program for increased American productivity. More than ever before, through summits and constant consultations, we are coordinating our economic policies with our major allies, for the benefit of all.

And perhaps most important, we have improved our energy position. U.S. oil imports are down 25% since 1977; our domestic energy production is up; and, with our allies, we have improved energy-sharing arrangements in case of serious world shortages. We must go further down the road of conservation and increased production. But the thin margin of safety we have achieved, and need during the Iran-Iraqi conflict, shows that we are on the right road.

Fifth, the United States today has a foreign policy that is asserting our national commitment to human rights.

America's strength in the world not only depends upon our military power. It rests more on what we stand for as a nation. We stand for human freedom. Human freedom unites us as a people. Human freedom distinguishes us from our adversaries. And standing for human freedom is deeply in our national interest.

As we Americans know, freedom and stability strengthen each other. Repression can break the ties between a government and its people, increasing the potential for violent change. We have seen how the turmoil of convulsive change—as in Iran—can directly affect our own nation. We will not rest until all of our people are home from Iran, safe and free. This has been a dark chapter for those throughout the world who value human rights.

But as we look at the world clearly, we also see a resurgence of the democratic values we support. In Portugal, Spain and Greece, in Nigeria and Ghana and Zimbabwe, in Ecuador and Peru, democracy has restored to the people control of their own destinies. We should find in this movement renewed confidence that the current of democracy and human freedom continues to run strong in the world, and that it is in our interest to support it and be a part of it.

Sixth and finally, the United States today is building stronger relationships with countries of growing importance on the world scene.

One out of four of the world's people live in China. And today we are building a new relationship with their government, based upon normalized relations.

In less than 20 years, four out of five

people in the world will live in the developing world. The economic progress and long-term stability of developing nations is increasingly important to our own daily lives. We cannot expect to have their support on matters important to us if we are not prepared to provide practical support on issues of importance to them—defending their national independence and building their economies and societies.

Thus, in our own interest, the next several years must be a time when we move ahead—not slide backward—in developing our relations with the nations of Africa, Latin America, Asia, and the Middle East.

These policies, and these accomplishments, are helping to shape a world of change. There inevitably will be debate about specific decisions that have been made. But I am firmly convinced that, for all the frustrations in dealing with this new world, America is on the right road—the road of engagement and progress, not isolation and reaction.

Our course makes sense. We need to continue, not turn back. As an American novelist once put it, "We cannot walk backward into the future." If we try, the future will belong to others. With a steady increase in American strength, with American pragmatism harnessed to American ideals, we will continue to move forward into a future we help create.

¹ Press release 273. ■

Question-and-Answer Session Following Memphis Address

Q. You indicated that one of your greatest concerns was the lack of passage for the foreign assistance appropriations bill, and you indicated that you felt this was a significant alternative to increased defense spending.

A. I would like to know what the current status is of many of the problems that you brought up at that time in terms of Nicaragua, the Cambodian refugees, the World Bank, the African Development Bank, disaster relief—have those been dealt with, or is that still a real problem?

A. Let me cite two rather current situations in which America could use its resources in the pursuit of our own national interest and stability in the world: One is Zimbabwe, and the second is Poland.

In Zimbabwe we have seen years of war converted into peace and the responsibility for maintaining that peace placed in the hands of a government which, a few months ago, might have been regarded as extreme but which has proven in practice to be moderate. The challenge of this government is to justify its policies of moderation with its success or failure in dealing with the needs of the people of a war-ravaged country, for economic development and opportunity.

Zimbabwe is a country of great resources, but the infrastructure has been largely destroyed; so investment is needed—capital from the world's private sector and also government. The unfortunate fact is that in terms of our budget for foreign assistance, the resources which we have available to be used for assistance are largely in the form of a surplus at the present time. If we could make the Zimbabwe experience work, we might then be able to move on to convert the South Africa problem into one of peaceful change for justice and equality.

The Libya problem: The whole northern area of Africa could be converted peacefully rather than in a violent, revolutionary way, but the importance of the investment should be clear.

Poland: I suppose most Americans have cheered at the courage and the persistence and the willingness to take risks on the part of the Polish workers seeking to change their system sufficiently to give them a voice and an influence.

The government is struggling with enormous economic problems, and whether or not they are dealt with effectively could well make the difference in the struggle of the Polish workers for a greater measure of freedom and influence over their own lives, or slipping back into the period from which they have tried to emerge.

There are examples of this all over the world. I see them as doors of opportunity; opportunity to help influence the course of human events in those areas—those countries and others—toward the kind of world that measures up to the American view of what brings stability and peace to a people.

If you were to sit in my seat in the State Department on a day-to-day basis you would be as frustrated as I at the number of times we have to turn away from similar doors of opportunity. We have not had a foreign aid appropriations bill since 1979. We have been operating throughout this fiscal year with a continuing resolution which means that we are permitted the amounts that were provided in the 1979 appropriation, or the amount requested by the Administration for 1980—whichever is the smaller figure.

We never did get a 1980 appropriations bill, and there is a question as to whether or not we will get a 1981 appropriations bill.

Now the Congress and the American people find it relatively easy to support tens of billions of dollars of increases in defense spending. Some of this, of course, is necessary. But we completely overlook this much cheaper route to bringing stability and order to the world.

Q. I understand we still have deployed in Europe roughly 225,000 men in the forward areas as part of the overall NATO force. How long will this deployment be required?

A. Now it's my understanding that the original bill passed by the Congress in 1951 called initially for a U.S. SACEUR [Supreme Allied Commander, Europe] who would, at the end of 5 years turn the command over to either a German or a Frenchman or a Turk or an Italian. And, of course, I think we have a dynasty of 31 years of American SACEURs, and these troops

have remained in place for about the same length of time.

Also, the German deployments now are about 490,000–500,000 troops. I think there is a lot of comment, countrywide—or criticism of that fact at least, to have to continue to maintain those troops in Europe.

A. I think the number of troops in Europe is closer to 300,000, and the figure which you mentioned is lower. They are an essential part of our common defense in Europe.

There was a point, which you will recall at which there was considerable pressure to withdraw our troops from Europe. Senator [Michael J., now Ambassador to Japan] Mansfield sponsored an amendment that I think came within one or two votes of passing, 1 year to that effect.

But then we began to develop a different perception of the Soviet Union, the nature of its threat, and the importance of restraint upon the Soviet Union. So our common effort as a NATO alliance has grown and strengthened in recent years—especially the last 3½–4 years—so the presence of American troops is now—

I am not sure that it wouldn't be sufficient if they had been at 150,000–200,000 at the beginning, and were still at those figures. But to sharply reduce American troops in Europe would be a signal—not only to our European friends but to the Soviet Union—that we were becoming less interested, less concerned about defense of Europe than we were. That kind of shift, I think, would have a very negative effect upon our own security interests.

Now we are undertaking, through the mutual and balanced force reduction talks, to bring about a reduction of both Soviet and allied troops in Europe—and that means principally Americans. We have been stalled on a couple of issues that are somewhat technical, and I won't take the time, unless further questions seek the information, to discuss those technical points.

Our view, at the moment, is that the best chance—due to the tensions in Europe and the risks of war with the Soviet Union in Europe—is to work toward a mutual reduction of forces and

not a unilateral reduction of forces by the United States.

Our European allies have committed themselves, as I indicated in my prepared remarks, to a strengthening and modernizing of our defense, so that it can truly match the Soviet military presence in Europe and establish a stability which will insure deterrence and at least a nonwar climate.

Q. Many citizens in Memphis are concerned for the nearly one-quarter of the world's population that are desperately hungry.

The President's Commission on World Hunger recently brought forward their final report and identified this as a crucial national security issue. They also recommended that the United States place as its primary focus the elimination of hunger in developing nations.

In view of what you said about our great difficulty in providing foreign assistance at this time, I think a situation which places us in a place behind 10 or 12 other nations in the world in the percentage of gross national product which are devoted to that aid would be [inaudible].

In view of the commission's recommendations about the seriousness of the situation, do you have some specific proposals, or dreams perhaps, of what you would like to see happen?

A. There are three main objectives that we seek to pursue with our foreign aid programs. One of them is food, not only the direct provision of food through the PL 480 program and other means but also that technical assistance to enable or to help countries to develop their own food production and to become self-sufficient. And those programs, the latter ones, have been enormously successful.

India is one of the most successful examples of that. With the so-called miracle rice we have enabled India to reach the point where it can provide for its own food needs—not at our standard of consumption but at a standard which avoids the kind of starvation that other countries are faced with, and it even, from time to time, exports food.

So there are ways that we emphasize in our foreign assistance programs to help countries produce their own food. That is a very important part of it.

The same is true with education. We see education as the way of increasing the ability of these countries to govern themselves.

I was interested in one of my

meetings with the foreign ministers—well, I shouldn't mention a country because I don't want to be too negative in my public comments about them—but it's a young black country in Africa, and the issue I raised with him was this: We are about to accredit an American Ambassador to his country and our Foreign Relations Committee in the Senate takes the position that if we are going to send an Ambassador to his country, his country ought to accredit an Ambassador to ours.

And do you know what his answer was? They didn't have enough young people, college educated, in order to staff an embassy in Washington D.C. They were a slave country until they achieved independence, so they do not have the trained personnel in order to provide the leadership, the technical know-how, and expertise to govern their domestic agencies and at the same time send trained representatives and competent staff to represent their interests abroad. That is just a little, I think, down-to-earth and moving example of what these emerging countries are struggling with, and we need to be able to help them.

He was not apologizing. He said: "Given the level of your concern and your interests, we will try next year to find somebody, and it will be somebody young, recently educated, to send to Washington as our Ambassador." But he said: "If we send somebody as Ambassador, we want to be able to send him sufficient staff to represent our country effectively."

So food, education, the ability to produce their own food—these are among the highest objectives of our foreign assistance program.

Q. In your remarks before, you spoke about a world that is changing and a challenge for peace—and that calls to mind the United Nations. You spoke of, as I said, a challenge and a change and a peace—and this calls to my mind the United Nations.

What do you think, or what do you see as the future of the United Nations in the light of its many difficulties in settling international disputes? And would you comment on what, if anything, the United States can or should be doing to strengthen the United Nations and to insure that it carries out the mandate in its original charter?

A. The United Nations, to many, has been a disappointment because it

has not developed as the peacemaking and peacekeeping organization that many hoped it might become. I suspect that the public support in this country for the United Nations is at a low point compared to the high point of our expectations.

The United Nations is a forum—and perhaps the only forum—available to many of these small, developing countries to express their frustration, not only about the kind of world in which they find themselves struggling to advance the objectives of economic and political developments of their own peoples but, also, it's the only place where they can be heard. If the U.N. forum did not exist, where would countries like Belize or some of the other 150-odd countries—where else would they be heard? Where could their voices be raised? Where could their problems and their frustrations be spelled out?

Now the diversity in this world, especially on the North-South axis—the Northern Hemisphere being by and large the industrialized part of the world and the Southern Hemisphere being the developing part of the world—the issues as between these two hemispheres are now becoming, increasingly, the focus of attention, not only of the developing countries but of the industrialized North as well.

The United Nations has been engaged this year, in a special session just a few weeks ago, in an effort to create what is called "global negotiations"—a mechanism within the U.N. framework which makes it possible for the developing nations and the industrialized nations to work out an accommodation of their objectives, which takes into account the limitation of the planet's resources, the desperate circumstances in which so many of the world's people live, and ways of accommodating and closing that gap.

The United Nations is beginning now an evolutionary process which may be its most significant development, if we look back on this period 10 years from now, because this is at the heart of it.

In 20 years four of every five persons on this planet will live in those developing countries, and if we haven't by that time put in place institutions that will enable them to deal with the human problems of their people, then our own will be in jeopardy.

So the United Nations, although it has been a disappointment in a sense, is on an evolutionary path—beginning

with the high hopes following World War II which never fully materialized for some of the reasons that I outlined as taking place on this planet since then through this period where these emerging nations are beginning to take advantage of this forum, express their concerns, their opinions, and their views, and to vote in the United Nations, often in ways that give us frustrations and run counter to our own objectives—to perhaps a new era in which a better balance of view, of resources and opportunities will emerge.

Now I am not going to be living in that world. You are, and others are, but that is what we must be pointing toward.

I think of energy, air, water—all of these, the precious and limited resources, opportunities—freedom—all of this is what everybody born on this planet strives for, and I think the United Nations is the only means available to us, with all of its shortcomings, to harness our energies and our ideals and move in that direction. So I hope we will stick with it, but I must say, I get frustrated when I see the United Nations doing some of the things it does. But what it is doing is not that much different from our own national legislature. It doesn't always make sense either. [Laughter and applause.]

Q. In view of the fact that Israel will never be secure until the Palestinians have a homeland too, why isn't the U.S. Government working with a large number of Israelis and a large number of Palestinians who have formed a peace movement and are ready to live side by side in peace—this instead of continuing military support of Israeli settlements which we admit are a deterrent to peace?

A. I am not sure I accept the assumptions that underlie your question. What we undertook to do—and when I say “we,” I was not a part of that process; it began in previous Administrations and was continued by President Carter—is to create a negotiation and a negotiating process in which these opposing sides might find a way to accommodate their conflicting interests.

Now, unfortunately, that process is opposed by moderate and radical Arab countries, and it is attacked by others.

Interestingly enough, it is the only negotiation that has ever been created that part of the world with respect to the Israeli-Arab conflict since Israel

became a state. It's the only negotiation going in which both Palestinian rights and Israel's security are at the top of the agenda. It is the only negotiation going which, by its terms in the Camp David accords, invites all other interested parties to be participants.

The Palestinians are not excluded from this negotiation. They are specifically invited to be part of it, as well as other Arab states in the area—Jordan and so on.

And so what we are trying to do with the Camp David process is to work out as much by way of agreement between the three parties to it—Egypt, Israel, and the United States—and to accomplish enough to attract the other parties to it, and at some point to thrash out its provisions for Palestinian rights.

I don't know of any other way to do it. I've had to deal these last 5 months with U.N. resolutions—I think eight of them in all—the aim of which has been to frustrate the Camp David process, if not destroy it, by offering simplistic resolutions which offered no substitutes. I mean, these resolutions are not self-implementing or self-executing; they offered no solutions.

If they succeeded in killing the Camp David process, I don't know who else, or where, another negotiation could be created. And without that kind of a negotiation I would foresee simply an escalation of the emotions in the conflicts of the Middle East.

You have to begin somewhere. Camp David was such a beginning. That doesn't mean that it's ordained to be successful. It's an uphill struggle, and it may go down to defeat. If it does, somebody is going to face very difficult problems.

As far as the settlements are concerned, this Administration is opposed to the settlements. We have said so clearly and for the reasons that you suggest.

Q. I believe many people share with me in my confusion about the place of the SALT II Treaty that's signed between the United States and the Soviet Union. Does it agree and meet with the interests and security of the United States and the world or not?

If it is wise? It's not approved. And if it is not wise, and we don't say it gladly, we will not approve it. In such a case we can find some other peaceful alternative rather than this [inaudible] waste.

A. I am not sure I understood all of

your question, but I gather that you are confused, and you say you are joined by others who are equally confused about the SALT II Treaty and whether it's good or bad in terms of our national security interest.

Q. Yes, and what is the fate of this treaty? Is it going to be approved or not?

A. And so the second question is whether or not the treaty is going to be approved or not.

With respect to the treaty, one must see it as part of the process which began with the SALT I Treaty and is seen as part of a process which will culminate in a SALT III treaty.

The objective of the entire process is to stabilize the arms race, preferably at some lower level of armament than the two superpowers are now building with respect to nuclear arms.

SALT II is a complicated treaty, and I can't dispose of it in 2 or 3 minutes. But let me give you three or four specific benefits. It imposes restraints upon the Soviet Union which are important to our national security interests. It forces them to dismantle, I think, 150 or more systems that are now in place. It limits the number of warheads that they can place on a given launcher.

Why is that important? Through almost an accident of the decisionmaking process in both countries, the Russians have built much bigger missiles than we and, as a result, they could place upon their launchers many more warheads than we can on ours—it might be the difference between 10 and 30—so that without building more launchers, without the restraint of SALT II, they could add warheads. It's warheads that kill, not launchers.

So by 1985, without a SALT treaty, they could double the number of warheads on their launchers. Now this treaty limits them to 10 and it limits us to 10. That is a very important restraint.

This treaty requires, that for the purpose of enabling each side to verify the nuclear weapons of the other side and their development and capabilities, that encryption be limited.

What do I mean by “encryption?” That is, as these missiles are tested on each side, the other side can read the signals that are transmitted back from the missile to their launch points so that the launching country can read its capabilities and performance. These signals can also be picked up by the

other side and, thus, we are able to read when they launch their weapons what performance capabilities they are testing and may be achieving. And they can do the same with us. Encryption scrambles those signals so the other side can't read them.

This treaty limits and restricts the ability of each side to use encryption with respect to those signals. Thus, this treaty protects our ability to monitor what the Soviet Union is doing in developing new weapons and new capabilities in existing weapons—an important protection for us.

This treaty does not limit any ongoing program that we have underway, so that our programs like MX [missile experimental], cruise missiles, and the more advanced technologies that we have underway would not be limited.

In fact, this treaty would enable us to improve our capabilities within margins. We are interested only in survivable weapons; we are interested in increasing the lethal nature or character in total of our weapons, so that this treaty has a way of imposing restraints upon the Russians, stabilizing the arms race, and preparing the ground for SALT III and the final negotiations.

I was a member of the Foreign Relations Committee and, as such, I had to study this treaty carefully, and that is the conclusion I reached. I know that other Senators have reached other conclusions, but the point is, from my point of view, if we were to reject the SALT II Treaty on the ground that we should have gotten more than we got out of the negotiations for this treaty, we then face the formidable task of going back to the Russians and asking them to give up more than they have already yielded—but at the same time we retain what we got out of the treaty. Now that is a tough negotiation to try to get, even between two businessmen in this country, let alone between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Rejection of the treaty, especially in the present climate created following the invasion of Afghanistan, could well mean the end of the SALT process, and the cost to us in terms of an arms race would be horrendous.

Q. What would the State Department policy be if the security of South Africa were threatened at the present time, taking into account the possible Soviet interest that might be involved as well as the repressive nature of the present government of South Africa.

A. I don't see any conceivable circumstances in which South Africa's security would be threatened, except by its failure to open up its society to its own people.

It is a very self-sufficient nation with tremendous resources. It has developed them and industrialized. And indeed, one of the frustrations of the situation is that the strength of the South African economy is of importance to the front-line states adjoining, which are all black and which are a part of the movement of black majority rule in the countries north of South Africa. They feel that sanctions on South Africa would hurt them because they are so tied into the South African economy.

Now South Africa has seen this coming a long time and it is pretty self-sufficient economically. It is well able to defend itself against any foreseeable threats, and I can't see the Soviet Union targeting South Africa as a high-priority target from the Soviet's point of view.

Q. According to newspaper accounts, since the taking of our hostages in Iran almost a year ago, in addition to several thousand Iranian students and illegal aliens that have been deported from this country, newspaper accounts indicate that some 11,079 Iranian political exiles have been admitted to the United States since that time.

At the same time, the newspaper account indicates that there are an estimated 100 Iranian Jews who have asked for political exile to the United States who are being held in limbo in Paris and in London.

According to this newspaper report, the State Department says that it is not in the interest of the United States and the human rights interest to let them in. It is not part of our national interest, as we do not want to offend Khomeini's government.

I wonder how we can allow 11,079 Iranian refugees into the United States but cannot allow these 100 Jewish Iranian refugees in at the same time?

A. There are implications in your question, and I don't have the background of that particular figure or an analysis of what went into it. I find it very difficult to believe that the fact that those Iranians are Jewish is the reason why they are being denied—if they are in fact being denied—entrance into the United States.

Q. But this was a published article in the Memphis newspaper, and it's very clear.

A. Occasionally, I have read published articles in newspapers that I knew personally were not accurate. [Laughter and applause.]

But I will take your question seriously and pursue it, and if you will leave your name and address I will personally try to dig into that particular issue and find out what there is to the newspaper story and, if it reflects State Department policy accurately, why that policy was adopted. I will be glad to do that. [Applause.]

Q. Do you feel that our government has any real plans to develop credibility in the Arab world, in view of the fact that, to them, what we seem to be worrying about is Soviet aggression to Afghanistan, and what the Arabs are worried about, from their perception, is an Israeli aggression—and not deferring—hanging onto these lands taken in the 1967 war and the annexing of East Jerusalem.

They seem to have no success in extricating the Israelis from the West Bank or doing anything to reconcile the differences between Israel and Palestine. Do you think that there is any chance—since they regard one section is bad enough—that we could ever count on any support of the Arab world in resisting Soviet expansion? And perhaps then to Iraq—Iraq or Iran.

A. With respect to our general relations with the moderate Arab states, I think they are in a very healthy state at the present time, and I say that following 2 weeks which I spent at the United Nations, meeting some 47 Foreign Ministers over that period of time. This is an occasion which American Secretaries of State take to meet, within a short time, the Foreign Ministers of many countries who come for the General Assembly. I have had the opportunity to talk to the Foreign Ministers and, in some cases, to Prime Ministers of the moderate Arab states and some which are not so moderate.

But in any case, their interest in our views, their interest in being supportive, their interest and their concern about the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan are all at a high level.

They will all say, frankly, that they think we ought to be more effective in dealing with the Israeli-Arab issues, and all of them except Egypt are pessimistic—I think that is the accurate

word to use—about the prospects of the Camp David process. But nevertheless, they support us.

Some of you may have seen Prince Saud of Saudi Arabia on "Face the Nation" Sunday. I had two good talks with Prince Saud, and he represents the royal family of Saudi Arabia. There are aspects of our policy that they do criticize, and they do criticize some aspects of our Middle East policies, but, nevertheless, they have a strong identification with us in many other areas including their very deep concern about the Soviet aggression in Afghanistan.

If you will just look at your maps again, you will find that Afghanistan is not far removed from Iran as a threat of the Persian Gulf, and it is the Persian Gulf which is the heart of the oil resources of these moderate Arab states.

So they are very much with us on that policy, and they are frank with us and critical of us with regard to the Palestinian issues.

There is no question—and I say this as an American as well as Secretary of State—that a resolution of the Israeli-Arab issues is critical, not only from Israel's point of view and that of the neighboring states but that of the United States as well.

It is a block, in some ways, to the kind of rallying to our policies that we might otherwise get from nations which are concerned about this. Yes, that is true.

Q. Some of us can still remember the Kellogg-Briand treaty of the 1920s; its consequences in this country are, notably, many carriers in Japan as a result of our agreeing not to increase the number of battleships that we had—and regrettably—with friends who are dead as a result thereof.

Not that we are opposed to such treaties, but that we find, as I think some of the Senators, your former colleagues, are saying, that we haven't taken proper precautions.

And I know you have talked about SALT II before this evening, but it bothers us very severely that we aren't taking these precautions to prevent the Russians from spreading into new and novel fields where they can do what they intended to do outside the scope of the treaty. And that really seriously bothers us, those of us who have been through these periods.

A. With respect to your first point, there are two Kellogg treaties that I remember. There was a Kellogg treaty which undertook to limit naval ships—and I don't know that that had much to do, one way or another, with the outbreak of World War II or whether it existed or had not existed.

I think it had as much to do with the outbreak of World War II as the other, Kellogg-Briand treaty, which undertook to outlaw war. That was signed about 1928 or 1929, and we have had more wars since that time, and more people killed in wars, than in all the previous history of mankind.

So treaties do not necessarily achieve their objectives any more than some of the legislation that we enact.

But nevertheless, we are dealing, in the case of nuclear armaments, with a destructive force that man has never had to deal with before; to do nothing about restraining that force and to open the door to unlimited competition in developing nuclear technology for weapons—is simply to doom mankind to a hopeless future.

There are many difficulties involved: One is that the defense requirements of the Soviet Union and the United States are not the same. We don't have a long China border to defend. They do. Our NATO allies are next door to them. They have no allies except Cuba, which is not comparable, next door to us.

So undertaking to restrain American nuclear weapons that are located in Europe, which they fear are aimed at them just as much as our central systems located in this country, is a difficult negotiating problem, and we never did negotiate it. We sort of bypassed it on both sides. Now we are in the middle of it as we have agreed to negotiate those weapons in separate talks at this point.

So the question of weighing the relative benefits or shortcomings of the treaty from our point of view is not an easy judgment to make. Now that the prospects of SALT II are diminished so greatly because of the failure of the Senate to ratify it last year and because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, our military Joint Chiefs of Staff are increasingly supportive of the treaty because they see the consequences of a world in which there is no SALT treaty. So there is that problem to be concerned about.

In addition, there is the cost of escalation. These weapons cost in the billions of dollars. If we now unleash the scientists on each side—you know they constantly advance nuclear technology, make it more complicated, more sophisticated—then the problem of controlling such weapons becomes more complicated and more sophisticated and maybe impossible.

I can remember in 1969 or 1970 making a speech on the Senate floor urging that we not deploy the MIRV [multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicle]. To those who don't know what the MIRV is, it is that launcher which can throw a multiple number of targets and individually target them when they arrive over targets. They are independently targeted warheads, so you can send a launcher with 10 warheads, and it could be put on 10 different targets, each precisely targeted.

We launched that before the Soviets had developed it. We deployed it before the Soviet had deployed it—before, indeed, they had tested it and achieved it.

I urged, at the time, that we not deploy it on the grounds that once we deployed it, we would never be able to persuade the Russians to do without it; so we would have escalated the arms race to a new level.

And that is what happened. The MIRV has done more to complicate negotiations over arms control than any other single technological advance.

Now if we suspend the SALT process for reasons that I have indicated and permit the technology to go forward, each side is going to go full speed. And if there is no control, we are going to put tens of billions of dollars into nuclear arms—more sophisticated, more advanced—so controlling it would be even more difficult.

Now as between the choices, I take the SALT II Treaty: given the restraints it imposes on the Soviet Union, the relatively less restraint it imposes on us; we can still go forward with the cruise missiles which we have developed; the Trident submarine which we have developed; we are now working on a new bomber—the Stealth bomber—which we have developed; we can go forward with all of those things, which may be a bad thing in the long run, but at least it does not put us behind the eight ball so far as new technology is concerned.

And so you have got to strike that balance. It's a judgment call, and it may not work because frankly, if SALT II were to be ratified, each of us could still destroy the other.

So SALT II is justified: One, as a restraint, and secondly, as a step that would lead to the third step—SALT III—which hopefully would reduce the level of nuclear arms and, thus, reduce the danger. SALT II doesn't really reduce the ability of either side to destroy the other.

Q. Do you feel that there is a possibility that the nations of the world will ever come to trust each other so much that they will stop completely the race for armaments; that they will believe in the treaty of the people of the other country; that you feel you can have a dream you can build a future world where the people of all the nations can live happily and freely, can live with complete brotherly love; where all the people of the world can grow and develop themselves in complete freedom without being attacked for their personal liberty or their personal beliefs?

A. I am not sure I understand what you are asking.

Q. Do you feel that we can—that you can believe that we can build a future world where all the people of the world can live—

A. Happily together?

Q. Yes.

A. Let me make one observation—the tremendous obstacle that stands between us, where we are, and that world.

There are 15 million refugees in the world today. Fifteen million are scattered over this globe—all of them people who have fled their homes and their country for one reason or another—oppression, lack of liberty, lack of opportunity, hunger, persecution—what else?

From Cambodia to Somalia to Pakistan to Latin America to Africa—millions of people on the march away from home, away from conditions they find unacceptable.

It's those marching feet that tell us more about the disturbed nature of this planet and the lack of circumstances which human beings find acceptable than anything else I could say. I spell out that as one number.

If we can find a way to create circumstances all over this planet from which people do not find it necessary to flee, then we may be approaching the ideal state which you describe.

That doesn't mean that all people must live in the kind of style that Americans have gotten used to. Many of them can be happy with much, much less, but they cannot live in circumstances where children have hunger, where the life span is less than 40, where most people do not get a full meal as much as once a day, and where their children have no better prospects for the future than themselves.

Human beings are not going to accept life at that level. Not only will they flee from it, but there are always

those who seek to exploit that dissatisfaction and mobilize them behind violent movements to bring change—mobilize them behind wrong-headed policies to bring change.

So, it's a very, very challenging task that lies ahead of us.

But on the other hand, my optimism, at the age of 66, tells me that we have made enough progress in enough places toward alleviating circumstances like that—so that if we simply, by our will, add a prayer, use our resources wisely, we can make more progress.

We are not going to achieve it in my lifetime. The great religious leaders didn't in their lifetime, but they left behind them a legacy of ideals and objectives, and practical suggestions for everyday living that still work when we practice them—and I think they can work again.

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against whatever our policies are in the Middle East.

Q. How can the United States—is it not a no win situation? Are we not involved in that sense that no matter which side wins—Iran or Iraq—it's going to denigrate American interests in the whole area?

A. As I said to you, we do have strong interests in that area. President Carter was not wrong early this year when he emphasized the importance of the Persian Gulf to the United States.

It happens at the present time that the furtherance of those interests is best pursued by seeking a cessation of hostilities. It also happens at the present time that it's not helpful for us to choose sides between the two parties, but being neutral doesn't mean that we're being passive. We're working through diplomatic means to try to bring the hostilities to a conclusion. I think that out of this situation can come a cessation of hostilities and I hope a return to a kind of normality in that part of the world.

Q. You spoke earlier about the escalation of the war aims of Iraq as seen by our analysts here.

What is the danger that if Iraq starts to carve up Iran that Iran's northern neighbor—the Soviet Union, which after World War II had troops in the northern provinces of Kurdistan and Azerbaijan—should decide to join in this carving up process? And what would that mean for the United States? Might we get involved at that point?

A. We certainly would be strongly opposed to any dismemberment of Iran. We think it's in the interests of the world for Iran to maintain a basic territorial integrity.

As far as threats from the north, I think the Soviets understand that the United States would regard any effort by them to move into Iran with the utmost gravity.

Q. Does this understanding come out of the Muskie-Gromyko talks in New York?

A. They've understood it well before that, and I think that they understand it especially at the present time.

Q. Would they be able, in fact, to do anything in a military sense in view of the problems they have in Afghanistan and also in a more vital

area perhaps to them, Poland? What is the Soviet posture right now, militarily?

A. Certainly they have some difficulties around the world. Afghanistan has turned out to be a very difficult military endeavor for them; 80,000 troops are tied down within the country of Afghanistan, about half that many on the border. In addition, they have to look west of them in Poland and recognize a very difficult situation there.

I hope that they will understand their own self-interests in restraint with respect to Iran.

Q. Speaking of the Soviet Union on the flanks of Poland, we are aware from stories that Soviet divisions both in East Germany and in the western part of the U.S.S.R. have, in recent days, been increasing their capability to move if called upon. Did Mr. Gromyko in his talks with Secretary of State Muskie the other day give any assurances that the Soviet Union did not intend to invade Poland to crush the nonviolent worker revolt there?

A. I don't want to get into the details of those conversations. The Soviet Union up to this point has shown considerable restraint with respect to Poland. The courage of the Polish workers, fortunately, has been matched by restraint by their government and by the Soviet Union.

There have been some movements near the Soviet-Polish border. We're watching those very closely. There's not any indication at the present time that they intend to move in, but we will be very watchful.

Q. Do you take seriously the repeated Kremlin warnings to the workers of Poland that unfriendly and hostile forces are financing them and taking control of their movement?

A. Yes. I think that we have to be watchful about that. There's been a major change in Poland—a major reform and advance. It's very desirable from the standpoint of the West that there be peace in the Polish situation and that those reforms be accomplished in an atmosphere of tranquillity. We can only hope that the Russian Government and the others involved will exercise the restraint that they have up to the present time.

Q. Is the Russian monolith big enough to handle trouble in Poland, trouble in Afghanistan, trouble in Iran, Iraq, all at the same time, militarily speaking?

A. Let me put it to you this way. My feeling is, and I can't prove this, but my strong feeling is that one of the reasons for the Soviet restraint with respect to Poland is the firm stand that the United States took in Afghanistan and the way that they are tied down in Afghanistan.

I don't want to try to assess their total military capability, but the problems that they're having there in Asia, I think, are one of the reasons for their restraint in Europe.

Q. If 1 month from now or 6 months from now or 8 months from now the Soviet Army should move into Poland, what options are available to the United States and its allies in that kind of crisis?

A. I think the Soviet Union recognizes that if they would take an action of that kind, it would have the most profound effect on the whole set of relationships in Europe.

I certainly think it would mean the end of what the Europeans call detente. Once they're on notice of that, I think the Soviet Union will recognize in their own interests that they should not try to invade a country with the sense of independence that Poland has.

I don't want to speculate on the contingencies of their effort to do that, but I do express the strong hope, indeed perhaps feeling, that they will show restraint with respect to Poland and continue to show restraint with respect to Poland.

Q. Apparently the U.S. Government has decided to send a representative—and I don't know whether it's an official and I don't know who it is and maybe you can tell us—to Hanoi to talk to the Vietnamese Government. And not only would I like to know who he is and what he's doing, but what subjects is he going to bring up?

A. I know that he's going to talk about American soldiers who may have died there. I thought that subject was pretty well over. What is this about?

A. To the best of my knowledge that's a limited endeavor to talk purely about the MIAs [missing-in-action]. It

is an endeavor that has gone on for some time. We have reports of people who have said that there are bodies there that have not yet been returned to the United States. There is an occasional report of somebody who perhaps is still living, and we investigate those, and we follow them up as well as we can. But I wouldn't attach great significance to this report. It does not have political overtones. It is not a political negotiation.

Q. But is there, in fact, an American representative who is going to go?

A. That's what I've been told.

Q. And is he going to go before the election?

A. I don't know the timing of it.

Q. I just wonder if it doesn't have political overtones in the domestic sense and if it isn't a move by the Carter Administration to show once again that we're still trying to do something in an area where it's been pretty well proven we can't do anything.

A. Those efforts with respect to the MIAs have gone on rather continuously and for a long period of time. So I wouldn't attach political significance domestically to it either.

Q. What do you make of Fidel Castro's move to cut off the flow of refugees to the United States, which has been a political thorn in the side of the Administration for some time?

A. I'm glad it's happened.

Q. How about the timing of it?

A. As to the timing of it, I would have to say that Fidel Castro, like other leaders of their country, generally do things when it's in their own self-interest. And I assume that there was some combination of factors that caused him to feel that at this point in history he wanted to cut off that flow.

Obviously there's a real problem for a closed society when that many people want to leave. Obviously there's a real problem for a country in its internal control when that many people want to leave.

So I don't know what was in Mr. Castro's mind, but I do think it will be

helpful here so we can get some sense of regularity about immigration from Cuba to the United States and also handle the Cuban refugees who are now here.

Q. Is it some kind of harbinger of improved relations with the Castro government?

A. It certainly removes a very thorny issue between us. On the other hand, there's a long way to go before the United States has normal relationships with Cuba.

Q. Aren't we having discussions with the Cuban Government? I think that Mr. Watson, the President's Chief of Staff, said that for the last several weeks we had been discussing some problems, apparently including this one.

A. Yes, that's correct. We have an interest section in Havana—an active interest section, and they've been discussing with the Cubans a number of issues, mainly refugee issues.

If you recall, we had about 400 refugees who were in our interest section. Little by little, they've been able to leave, and that part of the problem has been resolved. Now perhaps it appears that the Mariel problem—the boat people problem—is on the way to being solved.

Q. What about the return of criminals?

A. That problem is also under discussion.

Q. The Senate voted the other day to stop the grain embargo to the Soviet Union on the basis that American farmers were punished more than the Russians. Is the President prepared to veto any legislation calling for an end to the embargo?

A. Let me say that I am deeply disappointed with that vote, and I hope that the House of Representatives will not go along with it. One doesn't predict too early a Presidential veto, but I will say to you that no one should misunderstand the President's determination about carrying forward the grain embargo.

It's been a very successful part of our effort. Nine months ago on this program I emphasized the importance of our endurance with respect to our position on Afghanistan and I emphasize it again. We should maintain the embargo. It's hurting the Russians. It's hurt them very badly with respect to their livestock production.

The 17 million tons that we deprived Russia of last year—they've been able to replace only about half of and at greater costs and with considerable shipping difficulties.

So I'm disappointed in the Senate vote and I hope the House will reverse it and the President, I would say, is determined on the issue.

Q. Is the United States leading the attempt to mediate, or are we leaving that to others in Iran-Iraq?

A. We are certainly trying very hard to use the forces that we can find. On the other hand, other countries have some special ability in this area that we lack because we don't have good relations with either of the countries involved. ■

Report on CTB Negotiations

On July 31, 1980, the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom presented the following progress report to the U.N. Committee on Disarmament in Geneva on their tripartite negotiations on a comprehensive test ban (CTB).

This report on the status of the negotiations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America on a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapon test explosions in all environments and its protocol covering nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes has been jointly prepared by the three parties to the negotiations.

2. The three negotiating parties are well aware of the deep and longstanding commitment to the objective of this treaty that has been demonstrated by the Committee on Disarmament and its predecessor bodies. They recognize the strong and legitimate interest of the Committee on Disarmament in their activities, and they have reported to the Committee on Disarmament previously, most recently on 31 July, 1979. They welcome the opportunity to do so again, just as they welcome the continued support and encouragement that their negotiations derive from the interest of the Committee on Disarmament.

3. Since the last report to the Committee on Disarmament, the three delegations have completed two rounds of negotiations. The negotiations resumed on 16 June, 1980.

4. The negotiating parties are seeking a treaty that for decades has been given one of the highest priorities in the field of arms limitation, and the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States continue to attach great importance to it. The desire to achieve an early agreement, which is so widely shared by the international community, has been repeatedly expressed at the highest level of all three governments.

5. Global interest in the cessation of nuclear weapons tests by all states has been recorded by a succession of resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly and by the final document of the Special Session on Disarmament of the United Nations General

Assembly. It has been stated in the preambles to a number of international arms limitation treaties now in force, and its significance will again be underlined in the forthcoming second Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

6. The objectives which the negotiating parties seek to achieve as a result of this treaty are important to all mankind. Specifically, they seek to attain a treaty which will make a major contribution to the shared objectives of constraining the nuclear arms race, curbing the spread of nuclear weapons and strengthening international peace and security.

7. Given the importance of these objectives, it is understandable that the international community has repeatedly called for the earliest possible conclusion of the treaty. At the same time, it is important to note that this treaty is, in many respects, a difficult one to negotiate. Many of the issues are novel, sensitive and intricate. The treaty directly affects vital national security concerns and the process of negotiation requires considerable and painstaking work.

8. In spite of these challenges, however, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States have made considerable progress in negotiating the treaty.

9. The negotiating parties have agreed that the treaty will require each party to prohibit, prevent and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control in any environment; and to refrain from causing, encouraging or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion anywhere.

10. The negotiating parties have agreed that the treaty will be accompanied by a protocol on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, which will be an integral part of the treaty. The protocol will take into account the provisions of Article V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In the protocol, the parties will establish a moratorium on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and accordingly will refrain from causing, encouraging, permitting or in any way participating in the carrying out of such explosions until arrangements for conducting them are worked out which would be consistent with the treaty being negotiated,

the treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Without delay after entry into force of the treaty, the parties will keep under consideration the subject of arrangements for conducting nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, including the aspect of precluding military benefits. Such arrangements, which could take the form of a special agreement or agreements, would be made effective by appropriate amendment to the protocol.

11. To ensure that the treaty does not detract from previous arms limitation agreements, there will be a provision stating that the treaty does not affect obligations compatible with it that have been assumed by parties under other international agreements. Such other agreements include the treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The three negotiating parties have agreed that the treaty will provide procedures for amendment, and that any amendments will require the approval of a majority of all parties, which majority shall include all parties that are permanent members of the Security Council of the United Nations. They have also agreed that, as in other arms limitation agreements, there will be provision for withdrawal from the treaty on the grounds of supreme national interests. They have also agreed that the treaty should enter into force upon ratification by twenty signatory governments, including those of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States.

12. The parties are considering formulations relating to the duration of the treaty. They envisage that a conference will be held at an appropriate time to review the operation of the treaty. Decisions at the conference will require a majority of the parties to the treaty, which majority shall include all parties that are permanent members of the Security Council of the United Nations.

13. The negotiating parties, recognizing the importance of verification, have agreed that a variety of verification measures should be provided to enhance confidence that all parties to the treaty are in strict compliance with it. Such measures in the treaty itself,

and the additional measures under negotiation to facilitate verification of compliance with the treaty, must first be agreed in principle, and then drafted in detail, which is of course a laborious process. It must be done with care because the implementation of these measures will have important impact not only on ensuring compliance with the treaty, but also on political relations among its parties.

14. It has been agreed that the parties will use national technical means of verification at their disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law to verify compliance with the treaty and that each party will undertake not to interfere with such means of verification.

15. It has long been recognized that cooperative seismic monitoring measures can make an important contribution to verifying compliance with the treaty. The Committee on Disarmament and its predecessors have played a leading role in developing such measures. On the basis of the work done in the past few years under those auspices, the negotiating parties have agreed to provisions establishing an international exchange of seismic data. Each treaty party will have the right to participate in this exchange, to contribute data from designated seismic stations on its territory and to receive all the seismic data made available through the international exchange. Seismic data will be transmitted through the global telecommunications system of the World Meteorological Organization or through other agreed communications channels. International seismic data centers will be established in agreed locations, taking into account the desirability of appropriate geographical distribution.

16. A committee of experts will be established to consider questions related to the international seismic data exchange and all treaty parties will be entitled to appoint representatives to participate in the work of the committee. The committee of experts will be responsible for developing detailed arrangements for establishing and operating the international exchange, drawing on the recommendations of the ad hoc group of scientific experts, which was established under the auspices of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and has continued its work under the Committee on Disarmament. Arrangements for establishing and operating the international exchange will include the development

of standards for the technical and operational characteristics of participating seismic stations and international seismic data centers, for the form in which data are transmitted to the centers and for the form and manner in which the centers make seismic data available to the participants and respond to their requests for additional seismic data regarding specified seismic events.

17. In addition to its role in setting up the international exchange, the committee of experts will have ongoing responsibility for facilitating the implementation of the international exchange, for reviewing its operation and considering improvements to it and for considering technological developments that have a bearing on its operation. The committee will serve as a forum in which treaty parties may exchange technical information and cooperate in promoting the effectiveness of the international exchange. The committee of experts will hold its first meeting not later than ninety days after the entry into force of the treaty and will meet thereafter as it determines.

18. The negotiating parties have agreed to other cooperative measures as well. There will be provision in the treaty for direct consultations, and on the exchange of inquiries and responses among treaty parties in order to resolve questions that may arise concerning treaty compliance. If a party has questions regarding an event on the territory of any other party, it may request an on-site inspection for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not the event was a nuclear explosion. The requesting party shall state the reasons for its request, including appropriate evidence. The party which receives the request, understanding the importance of ensuring confidence among parties that treaty obligations are being fulfilled, shall state whether or not it is prepared to agree to an inspection. If the party which receives the request is not prepared to agree to an inspection on its territory, it shall provide the reasons for its decision. Tripartite agreement on these general conditions with regard to on-site inspections represents an important achievement by the negotiating parties in resolving issues regarding verification of compliance with the treaty.

19. The three negotiating parties believe that the verification measures being negotiated—particularly the provisions regarding the international exchange of seismic data, the committee of experts and on-site inspections—break significant new ground in international arms limitation efforts and will

give all treaty parties the opportunity to participate in a substantial and constructive way in the process of verifying compliance with the treaty.

20. The treaty will also contain a provision permitting any two or more treaty parties, because of special concerns or circumstances, to agree by mutual consent upon additional measures to facilitate verification of compliance with the treaty. The three negotiating parties have agreed that it is necessary to develop such additional measures for themselves in connection with the treaty under negotiation.

21. The additional measures to facilitate verification of compliance with the treaty, while paralleling those of the treaty itself, will specify in greater detail the procedures under which on-site inspection would be conducted, and will incorporate a list of the rights and functions of the personnel carrying out the inspection. They will also contain a description of the role to be played by the host party during an inspection.

22. In addition, the three parties are negotiating an exchange of supplemental seismic data that would involve the installation and use by the three parties of high-quality national seismic stations of agreed characteristics.

23. Despite significant accomplishments, there are important areas where substantial work is still to be done.

24. The three negotiating parties have demonstrated their strong political commitment to completion of this treaty by achieving solutions to problems that for many years made a treaty difficult to attain. Most notable in this regard are the agreements concerning the prohibition of any nuclear weapon test explosion in any environment, the moratorium on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, the general conditions with regard to on-site inspections and a number of important seismic verification issues.

25. The negotiating parties are mindful of the great value for all mankind that the prohibition of nuclear weapon test explosions in all environments will have, and they are conscious of the important responsibility placed upon them to find solutions to the remaining problems. The three negotiating parties have come far in their pursuit of a sound treaty and continue to believe that their trilateral negotiations offer the best way forward. They are determined to exert their best efforts and necessary will and persistence to bring the negotiations to an early and successful conclusion. ■

CSCE Review Meeting in Madrid

by Rozanne L. Ridgway

*Statement before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on September 16, 1980. Ambassador Ridgway is Counselor of the Department of State.*¹

would like to speak briefly about the manner in which the United States will pursue its foreign policy objectives at the Madrid review meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) which opens on November 11. I will give special attention to our human rights goals but will also point out other important areas of the Helsinki Final Act, such as military security and economic cooperation, which will be of concern to us.

The Helsinki Final Act, signed in 1975 by the heads of state or government of 33 European countries, the United States, and Canada, was a diplomatic milestone.² In this document, 35 countries, East and West, made a solemn pledge to work for the furtherance of security and cooperation in Europe. They knew full well that wide differences divided them but sought consciously to narrow those differences.

The particular genius of the Final Act was that it recognized the need to use international cooperation on the foundation of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. The Final Act thus gave rise to new hopes among the people of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Some formed groups to monitor their own countries' compliance with the Helsinki accords. Such groups were formed in the United States and other Western countries, but in the East they have been severely repressed, contrary to the intent of the Final Act.

The Final Act established a wide-ranging agenda for cooperation between East and West. We have barely begun to accomplish the tasks the Final Act envisioned for the participating states. These include the full observance of human rights and improvement of human contacts. They also include cooperation in military security, economics, science, culture, and other fields.

The fundamental, long-term U.S. goal in CSCE is the full implementation of the Helsinki Final Act. The Final Act's authors showed remarkable foresight in establishing periodic review meetings

like the Belgrade conference and the upcoming gathering in Madrid. These provide the opportunity to examine how well or poorly the CSCE countries have carried out their commitments. The fact that their performance will be discussed among 35 countries is an important stimulus to do better.

Now let there be no mistake. We are not satisfied with the record so far, particularly in the area of human rights and human contacts. There have been failures and violations of the most serious sort. But they are failures which must now be measured against an international standard, to which even the countries most guilty of violations have subscribed. The fact of violations does not make this standard less important. So the United States will go to Madrid determined to press for progress in implementation and in strengthening of the Final Act. We are under no illusions that achieving full implementation of the Final Act is an easy job or that it can be accomplished overnight. On the contrary, it will require persistence and patience. But we are prepared to pursue this goal consistently and continuously. At Madrid, we will present our views forcefully, as we will in various bilateral meetings under CSCE auspices.

Human Rights Obligations

The Madrid CSCE review conference will have human rights as a central topic. Let me outline some of the major human rights provisions of the Helsinki accords and how the United States intends to approach the subject at Madrid.

Principle seven of the Declaration of Principles [Guiding Relations between Participating States], the first section and guiding light of the Final Act, obligates the signatories to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms for all—including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion, or belief—without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. This provision also confirms the right of the individual to know and act upon his rights and duties in this field. This latter point underscores the fact that the Final Act was designed not only to promote better relations among nations but also to facilitate contacts among private citizens and improve the lives of ordinary people.

Basket 3 of the Final Act—Cooperation in Humanitarian and Other Fields—contains specific provisions to facilitate

the freer flow of ideas, information, and people among the participating states. Of special note are the sections which call on all the CSCE signatories to:

- Facilitate the reunification of families and family visits across national borders;
- Make it easier for people to enter or leave their country for the purpose of marrying citizens from other participating states;
- Reduce barriers to travel for personal and professional reasons;
- Improve the circulation of information and access to it, including filmed and broadcast information as well as printed material; and
- Improve the working conditions of journalists from the participating states.

It is primarily in the area of basket 3, rather than principle seven, that there has been some progress in fulfilling the human rights goals of the Final Act. We note, for example, that the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia have made notable efforts to resolve divided family cases. In other individuals areas, however, there have often been little or no progress and even some backward steps. The arrest and continued incarceration of Helsinki monitors, the exile of Dr. Sakharov, and many similar occurrences are violations of the Final Act which we cannot and should not ignore. The recent resumption by the Soviet Union of jamming the Voice of America and other foreign broadcasts is another case in point.

Despite results which are mixed to date, we consider CSCE to be a valuable instrument for advancing our human rights policy. We will go to Madrid with the aim of seeking frank and serious discussions of the problems in implementation of all the areas mentioned above. Because of the Final Act and the process which it has set in motion, the Eastern European governments in particular have become more sensitive to outside opinion about their human rights records. This sensitivity may act as a brake on more egregious violations of their own laws and the accepted Western norms.

Aside from human rights, which will continue to be the major area of interest for us, there are other CSCE areas which are also of concern. CSCE is a balance of interests—between East and West, between alliance members and neutral and

Coup d'Etat in Turkey

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
SEPT. 12, 1980¹

At 4:00 a.m. local time in Ankara, Gen. Kenan Evren, Chief of the Turkish General Staff, announced that Turkish military authorities were taking control of the country. The announcement stated that the civilian government and Parliament had been dissolved. Our Embassy reports that the country appears calm, that there has been no bloodshed, and that American citizens and property are not in danger.

The United States must be concerned about the seizure of power from any democratically elected government. We note that, in taking power, the Turkish military has stated that it does so to restore a functioning democratic government. For the last several years, Turkey has been beset by increasing politically motivated terrorism and severe economic difficulties. We have admired the Turkish people for their persistent efforts to deal with a deepening economic and political crisis through a democratic system of government. The United States, along with Turkey's other NATO allies and friends, has provided significant levels of assistance to help stabilize its economy and provide for the common defense. This assistance will continue. We look forward to the early restoration of democracy in Turkey and to the establishment of economic and political stability.

¹ Read to news correspondents by Department spokesman John Trattner.

nonaligned states, between large and small countries. It also provides an invaluable framework for enhancing our relations with Eastern and neutral states in Europe. All these varied interests come together in a careful mix. The CSCE process preserves its vitality because it retains elements of interest to all 35 participating states. We cannot afford to let any one aspect predominate to the detriment of others.

Our allies and others among the CSCE states are strong supporters of human rights. They fought tenaciously to have human rights included in the Final Act. But they also tend to put considerable emphasis on the security and economic aspects of the Final Act. These are important aspects of the Helsinki process, and we should take their interest seriously.

Security and Economic Issues

The European interest in security issues, for example, became manifest late last year in widespread support for a post-Madrid meeting to discuss confidence-building measures. Confidence-building measures are designed to increase stability and confidence by requiring, for example, that states notify the other CSCE participating states of planned military maneuvers, exchange information on the size and location of military units, and perhaps limit certain kinds of military activity. There are some confidence-building measures already in the Final Act, including one which requires notification in advance of maneuvers involving more than 25,000 troops. But many believe that the potential of confidence-building measures has not yet been fully explored.

A conference to discuss confidence-building measures has great attraction in Europe for a number of reasons. For one thing, it promises creation of a security forum in which neutral countries and smaller allies would have full participation. Some of these countries believe they have been excluded from European security discussions, and the French proposal offers a greater opportunity for them to have their voices heard. In addition, many Europeans believe that there is much to be gained by expanding and strengthening confidence-building measures beyond those already included in the Final Act. We agree with those who believe there might be security benefits in expanding confidence-building measures, and we have been working with allies to design measures that will promote our security.

At the same time, there are potential difficulties for us in proposals for post-Madrid meetings on security. Chief among these is the possibility that security could be broken out of the CSCE framework into a separate forum, disrupting the balance among human rights and economic and security measures

which we believe necessary to the health of the Final Act. We have, therefore, to our allies and others that we cannot consider any post-Madrid meeting which is not firmly and explicitly part of the CSCE process. Then, too, we are concerned lest this strong and public initiative in the security area distract attention from human rights and shift the focus we believe must be maintained in CSCE. So we take the position that activity in the security area must be part of a balanced outcome at the Madrid meeting. I am happy to report that there is an emerging consensus on both of these issues in favor of our position.

I need not stress that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan only added to our cautions about a security meeting. But the invasion did not foreclose the idea from our point of view. Negotiations which are clearly in our interest should continue through this period of East-West tension. On this basis we have continued our efforts on mutual and balanced force reductions and negotiated limitations of theater nuclear weapons. We have also kept open the possibility of moving to a negotiation of confidence-building measures in some forum, whether Madrid or post-Madrid meeting, but it would be false to say we are determined to scrutinize this idea with great care.

The Final Act also envisions increased cooperation among participating states in economics, science and technology, and the environment. These provisions of the Final Act have become known as basket 2. Basket 2 covers issues of interest to us, and particularly to our business community, in the field of East-West trade. These issues include the availability of timely and complete economic and commercial information, access to Eastern buyers and decisionmakers, and working and living conditions for business representatives in Eastern Europe. Analogous issues in the field of science and technology are also a concern of basket 2. There have been gradual improvements in some areas of basket 2 in some countries, while in other areas implementation has deteriorated. The CSCE process gives us an opportunity to continue to press for further improvements.

At Madrid we intend to pursue a thorough review of implementation of the provisions of basket 2 that will advance our interests, especially in the area of facilitating profitable trade. We expect to press the Communist countries to provide

ore and better information of use to Western business organizations seeking to develop trade with the East, and to ease barriers to contacts between commercial and industrial representatives in East and West. We believe Madrid can so help improve relations with those countries of Eastern Europe which seek a closer and more productive relationship with us. We believe it important, in addition, that basket 2 receive careful and constructive attention in order to maintain the integrity of the CSCE as a whole.

S. Goals

Our goals at Madrid are straightforward.

First, we seek a full and frank review of the implementation of the Final Act as a means of bringing world attention to Final Act violations and, hopefully, bringing pressure to bear for implementation improvements. The generally poor Eastern record on human rights will be a particular concern for the United States. We and our allies take the human rights aspects of the Final Act very seriously. We will not seek to hide deficiencies, even our own. Rather, we will approach this task in a spirit of candor but without polemics. We will pay special attention to principle seven and basket 3.

In this connection, I should note that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan will receive prominent—and critical—mention from the United States and its allies during the review of implementation aspects of the Madrid meeting. The invasion was a blatant violation of key principles of the Final Act—fundamental precepts of accepted international conduct such as refraining from the threat or use of force and nonintervention in internal affairs. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has had a profound, negative impact on security and cooperation in Europe because it has severely shaken the confidence on which the development of true security and cooperation depends.

Second, the Madrid meeting will also afford an opportunity for consideration of concrete new proposals for enhancing the fulfillment of the Final Act's provisions. We are working closely with our allies on a number of specific ideas which we hope will form the nucleus of proposals negotiated and agreed on in Madrid. At Madrid, we would like to see proposals for:

- Increasing the consideration of

human rights in CSCE and enhancing the human rights of individuals;

- Reaffirming and developing the role of private citizens in CSCE;

- Developing specific ways to ease travel and promote family reunification; and

- Improving access to information and effecting greater freedom for journalists to pursue their profession without hindrance.

These topics could be the subject of agreement at Madrid itself as well as further followup activity within the CSCE context.

These proposals address important Western CSCE concerns in areas which the East finds sensitive. Meaningful forward steps will not be easy to negotiate with the Soviets, who will certainly sponsor competing and perhaps unacceptable ideas.

In addition, of course, we will have the goal at Madrid of preserving the CSCE process, which we believe serves our interests as well as the interests of human rights. This can be done essentially by making sure the meeting agrees on the date and place of the next review meeting before it adjourns. In order to maintain the momentum of CSCE and the attention it needs to retain its freshness and importance to the participating states, we would project that a new meeting should be held about 2 years after the conclusion of the Madrid meeting. The CSCE process is also furthered by having a forthright dialogue on the implementation by all signatories of their commitments under the Final Act. Such a review, if not done as a sterile polemic, enhances the value of the entire process.

On September 9, the 35 CSCE countries met to lay the organizational groundwork for the main Madrid meeting which starts in November. The purpose of the preparatory meeting is to determine the procedures and agenda for the main meeting. I am confident that we will achieve our principal aim at the preparatory meeting, which is to develop a format for the main conference which, as at Belgrade, provided ample opportunity for a thorough exchange of views on implementation as well as time for consideration of new proposals.

We hope the preparatory meeting will complete its work in the next few weeks.

We are working very closely with our allies on all aspects of the preparations for the Madrid CSCE meeting. There is

close agreement in NATO on what Madrid should achieve. Our allies played a central role in the attainment of the human rights component of the Final Act, and, given the values we all share, the allies need bow to no one on the issue of human rights. They will support a vigorous and specific review of the human rights performance of the participating states. They also will make presentations at Madrid on the subject of human rights and humanitarian concerns which will leave no doubt that they are intensely interested in this area and disturbed about human rights violations. Though no country's presentations will be identical—nor would we expect them to be so—taken together they will convey to the Soviets and others a clear message of common concern and the intention to press for improvement.

We cannot now predict with any certainty what the outcome of the Madrid followup meeting will be. At a minimum, we expect a frank and full review of the implementation records of the participating states. This is a valuable achievement in itself, because it draws attention to areas where serious deficiencies exist. An international spotlight on these dark areas is one powerful incentive for cleaning them up. We should not, however, draw the hasty conclusion that we will get instant or dramatic results on sensitive issues like human rights. Still, concerted pressure from the United States and other Western countries for implementation improvements will help further establish the Final Act as a standard by which the actions of all civilized nations should be judged.

We are confident that the CSCE process will continue beyond Madrid because it so well reflects the balance of interests, East and West, which have been incorporated in the Final Act.

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

²For text of the Final Act, see BULLETIN of Sept. 1, 1975, p. 323. ■

Conflict in Iran and Iraq

by Warren Christopher

Address before UPI editors in Boston on October 7, 1980. Mr. Christopher is Deputy Secretary of State.

The war between Iran and Iraq has entered its third week. I am grateful for this opportunity to set forth our views on this conflict.

Let me begin with some central observations. We have vital interests at stake in the Persian Gulf region, and as President Carter has made clear, we will defend them. Many of our allies and friends are even more vulnerable than we to disruptions in that region; and their well-being is vital to us. With other concerned nations, we have substantial military strength in the area. Our purpose is to defend our vital interests if they are assaulted. It is not to dominate the affairs of any nation in the region but to help buttress their independence.

Our dispute with Iran over the confinement of our diplomats is no reason for any American to welcome this war. We continue to hold the Government of Iran responsible for the safety of our hostages. International law and common decency require their release. The hostage issue makes peace all the more imperative.

As a final preliminary observation, let me note that we all should find in this crisis confirmation of the wisdom of the President's policies of promoting domestic energy production and reducing our oil consumption. We have made real progress in both respects. We must make more.

Sources of Conflict

With these thoughts as a preface, let me briefly summarize what we see as the sources of conflict, and then outline our views and interests more fully.

As you know, the fighting now underway began on September 22. It was preceded by several months of growing animosity and border skirmishes. In the middle of last month, Iraqi troops took two small strips in the central portion of the Iraq-Iran border. Iraq contends this territory was to have been restored to it under its 1975 treaty with Iran. After Iraq's attack, the fighting escalated, and on September 17 Iraq reacted by renouncing the 1975 treaty with Iran and claiming the entire Shatt al-Arab waterway.

Since September 22 Iraqi ground

troops have advanced a considerable distance into Iran. Each side has sent air strikes deep within the other's territory. Bombs have fallen on both capitals, Baghdad and Tehran, as well as on other cities. The oil installations of both countries have been damaged. There have been significant civilian casualties. The intensity and scope of the fighting has almost certainly exceeded the expectations of anyone involved.

So once again we have seen how easy war is to start and how difficult to contain and conclude. If they have flared in recent days, the embers of this conflict have been smoldering for many years.

- Iran and Iraq have long been at odds over the demarcation of their common border, particularly near the Persian Gulf in the region of the Shatt al-Arab, the delta area of the Tigris and Euphrates River systems. The area in dispute is not large. But it has produced powerful emotions and persistent claims on both sides.

- Three times in this century attempts have been made to settle the frontier. Most recently, in 1975 the Algiers agreement affixed the boundary at the center line of the river channel for the entire length of the Shatt. To some extent each of these agreements reflected the relative power of the parties at the time. Thus the history of the dispute imparts this lesson: If a settlement is to endure, it cannot rely only upon a changeable power equation but must reflect a changeless reality—the mutual interest of the parties in their own security and stability in the region.

- This territorial dispute has been aggravated by religious and cultural differences. Iran, for example, has issued appeals to elements of the Iraqi population. Baghdad sees this as interference in its internal affairs, but it has also sought to undermine the authority of the government in Tehran. On both sides the propaganda has grown increasingly harsh.

- The combatants may also see themselves involved in a wider competition. Over the years each has asserted claims to recognition as a major influence in the region.

- Finally, the implications of the conflict are made more grave by the location of the hostilities. The major Iranian oil province of Khuzestan has been at the center of fighting. Iraq says acquisition of this province is not an objective. But the

area and its major cities are under attack by Iraqi forces. If they take and attempt to keep this area, the nature of the conflict would be fundamentally altered and the danger dramatically sharpened.

U.S. Objectives

These, then, are some of the forces at work. What are the objectives of the United States? We have two principal aims.

The first is peace. The United States has not taken sides in this war, and we will not. But our refusal to take sides is not a signal of indifference. We are concerned about the human suffering. We are concerned about the devastating physical damage. We are concerned about the seizure of territory by force. And we are concerned about the wider implications.

Therefore, the United States has firmly supported the efforts of international institutions to move the dispute from the battlefield to the peace table as quickly as that can be done. And we will continue to urge restraint on the part of all external powers. All should stand for peace. All must respect the basic nation integrity of the countries involved, both Iraq and Iran.

We expect the Soviet Union to exercise its own self-discipline. Soviet media have claimed, without the slightest foundation in fact, that the United States has taken a part in the conflict. Such fabrications can only inflame a situation that holds dangers for East and West alike. They do not reflect the degree of responsibility that is due from a great power.

At the same time the Soviets have associated themselves with the peacemaking efforts of the Security Council. They have behaved generally with caution. Our present understanding is that the Soviet Union, like the United States, supports an early end to the war. They should persist in that course. It is our common interest to assure that a localized conflict does not take on a superpower dimension.

Our second broad objective is to prevent this conflict from spreading. Our aim is to assure, in cooperation with others, that it does not disrupt the peace of the region or the economy of the world.

The other states of the gulf and the Arabian Peninsula have grounds for deep concern. They deserve our help, when they ask for it, in deterring the

possibility of unprovoked attack. That is why President Carter responded promptly to the request that we dispatch U.S. airborne warning and control systems (AWACS) aircraft to Saudi Arabia.

These aircraft threaten no one. Their purpose in Saudi Arabia is strictly defensive—to provide warning time and to assist the Saudis in their own defense if there is such a need. Their presence has not altered in any way our neutrality in the present conflict.

We also wish to keep the conflict from endangering the flow of oil. In this context, we recognize the constructive position Saudi Arabia and a number of other producing countries have taken to maintain global oil supplies as the conflict continues. The availability of crucial oil supplies depends not only upon the willingness of the suppliers but upon the security of shipment. Recent developments have reminded us and other nations of the importance of freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz—a choke point for the flow of petroleum to so many parts of the industrialized and developing worlds.

Iran has recently announced that it has no intention of obstructing traffic through the strait. This was a positive step. Important interests of all states—including both Iraq and Iran—are served by free navigation in the Persian Gulf.

Thus our intentions with respect to the Persian Gulf conflict are clear. Let me summarize.

First, the United States is neutral in the conflict between Iran and Iraq. We will not intervene on either side.

Second, we expect the Soviet Union to act with restraint.

Third, neutrality in this conflict does not mean American indifference. We will defend our vital interests in the Persian Gulf region.

- There must be no interference with free transit in the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf. We will do what is required to prevent such interference.

- To prevent the conflict from expanding in ways which threaten the security of the region, we will also respond to requests for assistance from non-belligerent friends in the area who feel threatened by the conflict.

Fourth, there must be an early end to the conflict. No one stands to gain from its continuation. We will support the efforts of international institutions to bring about a peaceful settlement.



(Map by Michelle Picard, Department of State)

These four principles guide our actions now. They will continue to do so. For they are based on a vision of this region—now so volatile—in which every state respects the rights of its neighbors and none is subject to coercion from beyond its borders. On such principles, an enduring peace can rest. ■

Iran-Iraq Conflict

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT,
SEPT. 24, 1980¹

I've met this morning with my principal advisers to review the very dangerous situation created by the conflict between Iran and Iraq. Although the United States is in no way involved in

this dispute—and charges to the contrary are obviously and patently false—it is important to make clear our position in this matter.

The fighting between Iran and Iraq is causing needless hardship and suffering among the people involved. It represents a danger to the peace and stability of the region. There should be absolutely no interference by any other nation in this conflict. The fighting should be promptly terminated. Any grievances between Iran and Iraq should be settled at the negotiating table and not on the battlefield.

We strongly support international efforts, both the statement made by the Secretary General of the United Nations and also by the President of the Security Council of the United Nations, to bring this fighting to a prompt end

and to obtain a negotiated settlement.

Secretary Muskie, in New York, has consulted with a number of foreign ministers in the last several days, and he's continuing these contacts this afternoon and tonight. I am also in contact with other nations, through our embassies abroad and directly between me and the leaders of some of those nations. We will continue to work vigorously with as many nations as possible and also with international institutions who seek, as we do, a speedy end to the conflict.

I know that the conflict has caused considerable concern that world oil supplies might be severely reduced, therefore driving up oil prices and endangering the economic security of the consuming nations. This concern is not justified by the present situation. It is true that oil companies and shipments relating directly to Iran and Iraq have been interrupted or suspended during the outbreak of the hostilities. But even if this suspension of Iranian and Iraqi shipments should persist for an extended period of time, the consuming nations can compensate for this shortfall.

Oil inventories in the world's major oil-consuming nations are now at an all-time high. The world's margin of oil supply security is much greater today than in the winter of 1978 and 1979, when the Iranian revolution reduced oil supplies at a time when reserve oil supplies were very low.

Our greater security today is due, in part, to energy conservation and also the substitution of other fuels for oil, both in the United States and in other consuming nations. This has facilitated the building up of reserve stocks to much more satisfactory levels than did occur in 1979. Hence, there is no reason for a repetition of the shortages or the price escalations that resulted in 1979.

Of course, a total suspension of oil exports from the other nations which ship through the Persian Gulf region would create a serious threat to the world's oil supplies and, consequently, a threat to the economic health of all nations. Therefore, it's important that I add my own strong support and that of my nation to the declaration which the nine European Community nations made yesterday. Freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf is of primary importance to the whole international community. It is imperative that there be

no infringement of that freedom of passage of ships to and from the Persian Gulf region.

Let me repeat that we have not been and we will not become involved in the conflict between Iran and Iraq.

One final point, very important to Americans, is, in our concern for the dangerous situation created by this conflict, we have not forgotten for one moment the American hostages still held captive in Iran. We continue our work for their prompt and safe release, and we continue to hold the Government of Iran responsible for the safety and the well-being of the American hostages.

Q. Would you do anything to keep the Gulf open? Would you take any actions if necessary?

A. We're consulting the other nations about what ought to be done to keep the Strait of Hormuz open and, therefore, access to the Persian Gulf.

Q. If Iran asked for spare parts in return for releasing the hostages, would you go that far?

A. We're consulting through every means with Iran, as we have been for many months, to try to seek the release of the hostages, but that particular point would perhaps be better for me not to single out from the others.

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, SEPT. 26, 1980¹

Over the past several days, as the President noted in his statement of September 24, the President and the Secretary of State have exchanged views with key friends and allies on a wide range of issues related to the conflict between Iran and Iraq. We have consulted with a number of friendly nations about the status of oil supplies and international shipping in the Persian Gulf area.

In view of the importance of minimizing the economic effects of the conflict on international shipping and world petroleum markets, the United States has indicated that it would be willing to host a meeting to review these issues if that should seem desirable. If it is determined that a meeting of experts is required, we will work out timing and location. No such meeting has been set. In the meantime, our consultations are continuing.

¹Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Sept. 29, 1980. ■

AWACS Aircraft to Saudi Arabia

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, SEPT. 30, 1980¹

The U.S. Government, in response to a request from the Saudi Arabian Government, has initiated the temporary deployment of AWACS [airborne warning and control system] aircraft to Saudi Arabia. This deployment is purely for defensive purposes. It is designed to track aircraft and thus to provide additional warning for Saudi defenses.

The U.S. Government unequivocally reaffirms its position of neutrality. We are committed to as rapid a termination as possible of the conflict between Iran and Iraq, in accordance with U.N. Resolution 479, or other peaceful initiatives. These aircraft are being deployed consistent with these peaceful objectives.

¹Read to news correspondents by acting Department spokesman John Cannon. ■

U.S. Hostages in Iran

LETTER TO IRANIAN PRIME MINISTER RAJAI, AUGUST 20, 1980¹

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
I write to you as one who in my position as Secretary of State has only newly been confronted with the problems which currently beset relations between our two countries. I know that these problems will be but one aspect of the heavy new responsibilities you will be assuming as Iran's first Prime Minister under the Constitution of the Islamic Republic. It is my earnest hope that we, together with the Foreign Minister you will appoint, will be able to work towards constructive solutions to the difficulties between our nations.

With the death of the former Shah, a chapter of Iran's history is now definitely closed. With the establishment of your Government, a new chapter is opened. I believe this is the moment to take a fresh look at the problems between Iran and the United States.

The United States recognizes the reality of the Iranian Revolution and the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic. In a series of

cessive steps, the Iranian people have had the opportunity to participate in the process of creating new institutions. I assure you that the United States has had no wish to interfere in that process. We believe that no outside power should interfere with the right of the Iranian people to make their own political decisions.

Fifty-two of my fellow Americans remain held in Iran after nine months of captivity. I have met with their families. I cannot express to you adequately the deep and desperate suffering these innocent people have experienced. Americans of all political persuasions and strata of society are united in concern for their early release. I hope that you will agree with me that it is time now to bring an honorable end to their ordeal and to send the hostages home to their families.

I recognize that Iranians have suffered, and so have we. The continuance of the impasse can only lead to further bitterness and suffering on both sides. The cups of anguish are now full. Let us empty them and begin anew. I assure you that we will show the fullest respect for your independence, your territorial integrity and for the principle of non-interference.

We recognize that the decision on dealing with the hostage crisis has been entrusted to the Iranian parliament as representatives of the Iranian people. We also recognize that in Iran, as in the United States, there are deep feelings as a result of grievances perceived in the past. There are many difficult issues between the United States and Iran. For our part, we are willing to proceed fairly and to approach each of these issues on a basis of mutual respect and equality.

In order to begin the process of understanding each other better, I think it would be useful to establish a regular channel of communication. I would personally prefer that this be done directly, very discreetly if you wish, between representatives of our two Governments. Speaking frankly and directly is the best way of removing hostility and suspicion. If you would prefer, however, we would be pleased to deal through third parties who could transmit messages between us on a regular basis. The Swiss or the Algerian Embassies could play this role as they are already the protecting powers. Other persons, either official or private intermediaries, could perform the same function.

I would hope that you would be prepared to give us your thoughts on points which might be usefully discussed in such an exchange.

I look forward to hearing from you in the interest of our two peoples.

Sincerely,

EDMUND S. MUSKIE

Iran Chronology, September 1980

September 1

In a letter to Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Rajai, the first direct high-level contact between the U.S. and Iran since the aborted rescue mission last April, Secretary Muskie asks the Iranian Parliament to act in order to bring an early release of the hostages.

Responding to a letter from 187 members of the U.S. House of Representatives who appealed 2 months ago for the release of the hostages, the Foreign Affairs Commission of Iran's Parliament calls for the U.S. to acknowledge its past role in Iran and return Iranian assets frozen in U.S. banks since November 14, 1979.

September 3

Cynthia Dwyer, U.S. freelance writer who was taken into custody by Iranian authorities on May 5 with charges for alleged spying, is said to be held in Evin prison in Tehran. Formal charges have not yet been placed and the Swiss Embassy has not been allowed to visit her despite repeated requests.

September 8

Hostages' families send letter to Speaker of Iran's Parliament, the Ayatollah Hashemi, asking him to find a solution to the crisis.

September 9

In a public speech, Iranian Prime Minister Rajai responds to Secretary Muskie's letter stating that the U.S. would have to "repent" before there is a compromise.

September 10

Iranian Parliament approves 14 candidates approved by President Bani-Sadr on September 7 for 21-member Cabinet.

September 12

Khomeini sets four conditions on which the hostages are released:

- Late Shah's property returned;
- Cancel claims against Iran;
- Unblock frozen assets; and
- A promise not to intervene politically or militarily in Iran's affairs.

Khomeini does not mention a previous demand for an apology and leads U.S. to see a possible resolution to the situation.

September 14

Parliament begins open discussion of hostage issue with Foreign Affairs Commission.

September 15

The Ayatollah Hashemi states that in listing conditions on release of the hostages, Khomeini simply neglected to include the demand for an apology. The U.S. will "definitely" have to apologize.

September 16

Parliament delays hostage issue but agrees to set up a commission to study the issue.

September 17

Department officials announce a message is sent to Iran stating U.S. willingness to have a commission investigate past U.S. policy in Iran.

September 18

President Carter rules out an apology to Iran as a prerequisite to releasing the hostages.

September 21

U.S. orders 12,000 Iranian students, who are in the country illegally, to leave after deportation hearings.

September 22

Members of Iran's Parliament make a 3-hour visit to occupied U.S. Embassy to observe alleged U.S. espionage equipment and to prepare for chambers debate on the hostages.

September 25

At the Revolutionary Guard headquarters in Tehran, a spokesman states that the Iraqi attacks on Iran have not endangered the hostages lives.

September 28

Parliament again postpones discussion on the hostage issue, the third time in a week. ■

Nuclear Fuel Shipments to India

Following is an exchange of letters between Secretary Muskie and Senator Frank Church, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and a White House statement.

SENATOR CHURCH'S LETTER

September 9, 1980

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The Foreign Relations Committee will consider on September 10 what recommendation it wishes to make to the Senate regarding Executive Order 12218 of June 19 authorizing nuclear exports to India. This is an extremely difficult issue that has caused me personal concern. I would like to

¹ Made available to news correspondents by Department spokesman John Trattner on Oct. 9, 1980. ■

support the President on this matter of national security significance. I recognize the nuclear non-proliferation and foreign policy benefits of the course of action taken by the President.

I am concerned, however, that a less than adequate case has been made by the Administration that both fuel shipments really are needed by India at this time. In this regard, as you know, during the past weeks our staffs have discussed in depth the non-proliferation and foreign policy issues related to the President's June 19 decision. In those discussions, several matters were identified on which I believe further administration assurances would make it easier for the Committee and the Senate to support the President's decision.

First, I would like to request your assurance that the Administration will not permit the second fuel shipment to be exported before it is needed to ensure the efficient and continuous operation of the Tarapur Power Station. I understand the time period involved is about a year. This will provide additional time for the Administration to continue to seek to narrow U.S. non-proliferation differences with India.

Second, I would appreciate your commitment to consult with Congress well in advance of permitting the second shipment to be made. We would expect to review with you the progress that is being made in discussions with India on safeguards and other non-proliferation objectives at that time. This will help Congress to determine whether India is willing to strengthen its non-proliferation policies and commitments.

Third, I would like your assurance that the second fuel shipment will not be permitted to occur at all if the President finds India has exploded a nuclear device, is preparing to explode a nuclear device, or is engaging in other activities that would require termination of exports under section 129 of the Atomic Energy Act. In other words, I seek a commitment that, if these sanctions become applicable, the President will not propose to the Congress that these particular provisions be waived in order to permit the second fuel shipment.

I think both the Administration and the Congress must agree that approval of these exports will not constitute a precedent for treatment of future export license applications. Therefore, I request that you provide me your assurance that the Administration will regard the full-scope safeguards licensing criterion as set forth in section 128 a (1) of the Atomic Energy Act as applicable to any future license applications for the export of fuel to Tarapur.

It is my belief that the Administration should provide the Committee these commitments in writing. This will demonstrate our seriousness of purpose in working together to find a solution to this difficult

issue, a solution that will serve the national interest and be widely supported.

Sincerely,

FRANK CHURCH

The Honorable Edmund S. Muskie
Secretary of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

SECRETARY MUSKIE'S LETTER

September 10, 1980

Dear Frank:

Thank you for your letter of September 9 concerning the Foreign Relations Committee's consideration of the President's Executive Order authorizing the export of two nuclear fuel shipments to India. I understand the concerns you raised in your letter and appreciate your desire to find a mutually acceptable solution. The course you propose is acceptable to the Administration.

During the past weeks we have discussed in depth with the members of Congress the non-proliferation and foreign policy benefits we see in proceeding with these exports. As you point out, questions have been raised as to whether the two fuel shipments are both needed in India at this time. In this regard, the Hyderabad fuel fabrication plant in India, which fabricates fuel for Tarapur, is currently out of fresh fuel and urgently needs the first shipment. Once the first export is received the fuel fabrication plant will be able to operate for approximately one year before it is ready to begin work on the second shipment. Since air transport of the fuel is much more expensive than the normal surface transportation, the second shipment should be released in sufficient time to allow India to arrange for surface shipment of the second export (although it will certainly need to air ship the first).

In this light, I wish to assure the Congress that, while the first shipment of Tarapur fuel should leave the United States as promptly as possible after the Executive Order becomes effective, the Administration will not permit the second shipment to leave the United States until it is needed to assure continuity of operations at the Hyderabad fuel fabrication plant, which has consistently been considered by both India and the United States as necessary for the efficient and continuous operation of the Tarapur Atomic Power Station. We will consult with Congress well in advance of the date of the export of the second shipment on the progress that is being made in discussions with India on safeguards and other non-proliferation objectives.

I want to further assure the Congress that export of the second fuel shipment will not be permitted to occur at all if the President finds that India has exploded a

nuclear device, is preparing to explode a nuclear device, or is engaging in other activities that would require termination of exports under Section 129 of the Atomic Energy Act. The President will not propose to Congress that these provisions be waived in order to permit the second fuel shipment.

I agree that approval of these exports will not constitute a precedent for the treatment of future export license applications. The full-scope safeguards export licensing criterion as set forth in Section 128 a (1) of the Atomic Energy Act will apply to any future license applications for the export of nuclear fuel to Tarapur.

The foregoing conditions are intended to demonstrate the continued strong commitment of the United States to the policy of nuclear non-proliferation. I hope you will agree that these conditions will ensure that the exports here at issue will be carried out in a manner that is fully consistent with that commitment.

The proposed exports will assure the continuation in force of important safeguards applicable to Tarapur. We will use the time gained by these exports to seek to reduce our non-proliferation differences with India. I believe it is essential that the Congress not deprive the President of the opportunity to pursue constructive negotiations on this subject.

With best wishes, I am
Sincerely,

Honorable Frank Church, Chairman,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate ■

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT SEPT. 24, 1980¹

We are pleased that the Senate, in a display of bipartisanship, has supported the President's decision on shipment of fuel to the Tarapur Atomic Power Station. The Senate action will help further the administration's policy of seeking to prevent nuclear proliferation and adds support to our discussions with the Government of India toward bringing all of that nation's nuclear facilities under international safeguards.

¹ Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Sept. 29, 1980. ■

Obligations of Peace

by Secretary Muskie

Address before the 35th session of the U.N. General Assembly in New York on September 22, 1980.¹

come today to express anew the U.S. commitment to the United Nations. I come also to express our hopes for its future at a moment when the world is deeply troubled by tension and uncertainty. Peace is threatened by smoldering regional conflicts, by assaults of the strong upon the weak. Nations large and small are buffeted by steeply rising oil prices and serious economic strains. Within many countries, poverty and oppression form an explosive combination.

A few weeks ago, I spoke to this Assembly about the international economy. I stressed the obligation of nations to cooperate in facing world economic problems: payments imbalances, energy inflation, slowed growth in many developing countries, the specters of environmental decay and even famine.

Our inability to reach a consensus on procedures for global negotiations is a failure in the process, not a failure in our objectives. I do not mean to say that the differences that have kept us from finding a formula for global negotiations can be glossed over. They are real. They are substantive. But we are prepared to use the span of this General Assembly to continue discussions that can lead to procedures, to an agenda, and to a negotiating structure that will foster broad agreement among all the nations here represented.

Today I want to look beyond economic problems to the one condition that is a prerequisite to all material progress: peace. If we truly care about building a world in which peace and justice prevail, the world's nations—and this organization—cannot ignore certain political and legal obligations also; obligations every bit as compelling as the economic obligations I spoke of earlier.

These responsibilities are not new. They are proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations. But dangerous new circumstances require that we stress them anew lest we betray the very purpose the United Nations is designed to serve.

Refraining from Aggression

Our first obligation is to refrain from aggression and to deal with it vigorously.

The first article of the U.N. Charter provides for "the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace." The second article prohibits "the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state."

Accordingly, the United Nations must confront the continuing assault upon Afghanistan. I raise this issue not to set off a rhetorical exchange—not in the interest of polemics but in the interest of peace.

Today, more than 1 million refugees

nonaligned nations. We strongly support the basis for a settlement—including the concept of an international conference—contained in that resolution, which was passed by a large majority.

Above all, let us keep in mind two basic purposes for which this body exists: to oppose armed aggression and to assuage its consequences. No achievements can be more important to the future influence and effectiveness of the United Nations; no failure could be more damaging than a failure to deal firmly with these issues.

. . . more than 1 million refugees attest to the human toll of the violence in Afghanistan. . . . If this assault continues, the independence and integrity of every small, defenseless nation will be called into question.

attest to the human toll of the violence in Afghanistan. And more is at stake than the independence of one country. If this assault continues, the independence and integrity of every small, defenseless nation will be called into question.

Last January an emergency special session of this Assembly condemned, by a large majority, the assault upon Afghanistan. We strongly believe that the 35th General Assembly also must work under the charter to reinforce the principles of the United Nations. We must work for a total withdrawal of Soviet troops and a political settlement. We must support the principles of nonintervention, self-determination, and nonalignment for Afghanistan.

In Kampuchea, as well, armed aggression continues. We welcome reports of some progress made under the leadership of the U.N. Secretary General and international organizations in relieving the conditions of deprivation and disease so prevalent a year ago. The threat of renewed starvation requires significant further contributions from the international community.

Despite some improvement in Kampuchea's desperate human situation no progress whatsoever has been made toward securing withdrawal of occupying Vietnamese forces and the restoration of self-determination to the Kampuchean people, as called for by last year's resolution on Kampuchea sponsored by the

Peacefully Settling Disputes

Our second obligation, proclaimed by our charter, is to settle international disputes by peaceful means. Achieving this goal remains urgently important in two key regions: the Middle East and southern Africa.

In the Middle East, the United States is committed to a comprehensive peace—an enduring peace based on the principles of U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338. We are determined to pursue to a successful conclusion the peace process begun at Camp David 2 years ago this month. Already that process has achieved something once thought impossible: peace between Egypt and Israel. Now the negotiations are focused upon a second goal: taking a significant first step toward resolving the Palestinian problem. The current autonomy talks have as their goal arriving at interim arrangements to establish full autonomy for the people of the West Bank and Gaza. After that, the process will proceed to negotiations which will determine the final status of those areas.

As we seek to resolve this conflict, we are committed to finding a solution to the Palestinian problem in all its aspects and at the same time to permanent security for the State of Israel. We have no illusions about the difficulties of this

quest. We are dealing with a conflict of long duration and intense feelings. There can be no shortcuts.

So today I call on all members of this Assembly to lend their support to these negotiations. Camp David has proved so far, and remains for the future, the most hopeful and productive avenue to peace in the Middle East. There is no alternative to negotiations except further conflict. Let us remember that differences are rivers to be crossed, not reasons to turn back.

That persistence can bear fruit—that negotiations can yield peace—has been reaffirmed in recent months in southern Africa. Through arduous negotiations, the new nation of Zimbabwe has been born in peace. Today we have reason to celebrate not only this accomplishment but also the way in which nations worked together to achieve it. And for the future, the Zimbabwe settlement offers hope—and a model—for peaceful settlements in southern Africa and elsewhere.

The United States will continue its strong efforts to advance the U.N. plan for Namibia. There are no major substantive issues left to be resolved. I am convinced that the U.N. plan would be implemented fairly. All that remains is for South Africa to act in its own interest, in the interest of peace in the region, and in the interest of the Namibian people—to accept implementation of the U.N. settlement. If that does not happen soon, this chance for peace could be lost, and we would face a bitter future of protracted conflict and tragic human suffering.

The settlement in Zimbabwe can also provide a precedent for peaceful change in South Africa. We will continue to urge the Government of South Africa to abandon the repugnant policy of apartheid. We consider it urgent that talks among representative leaders begin on the issue of peaceful, orderly change in South Africa—while there is still time.

We must continue our search for peace and restoration of respect for international law in other parts of the world as well. In Lebanon, in Cyprus, and elsewhere, we will lend our full support to the peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts of the United Nations.

And although the holding of American hostages in Iran is not an item on the agenda of this Assembly, it remains a matter of extreme urgency that this tragic impasse be resolved—resolved in a way that strengthens peace and restores

respect for international law. The continuing situation in Iran contributes to uncertainty about security and stability in Southwest Asia. The security of Iran itself and the stability of the area depend on a united, strong, and independent Iran living at peace with its neighbors.

With the end of the former regime and the death of the late Shah, a chapter in Iran's history has closed. As a new chapter opens, we emphasize that we recognize the reality of the Iranian revolution, and we respect the right of the Iranian people to choose their own form of government without intervention of any kind. With the emergence of a new constitution and governmental structure and the gradual consolidation of authority, the Islamic Republic of Iran can assume its obligations and independent role in this community of nations.

An indispensable step will be the safe return to their families of the American hostages in Iran. Throughout the 324 days of their captivity, the members and institutions of the United Nations have expressed their concern for the hostages in numberless ways and channels. With their safe release, as repeatedly called for by the Security Council and the International Court of Justice, Iran could end its isolation from those nations that live in accordance with international law, and sanctions would be terminated.

Today I urge the nation of Iran, its Parliament, and its people also to consider the human face of the hostage problem. These innocent people and their families have experienced acute suffering. I ask this community of nations to join us in urging that their ordeal be brought to a safe, honorable, and prompt end. We also know that in Iran, as in the

United States, there are deep feelings a result of grievances and suffering perceived in the past. We are prepared to do our part in resolving fairly the issues between us.

The Iranian Parliament has announced that it will name a commission to deal with the hostage question. We hope that this positive step will bring the Government of Iran closer to a decision on release of the hostages.

The United States shares many common values with the people of Iran. When the safe return of all the hostages to their families is assured, we are prepared to deal on a basis of mutual respect and equality with all the outstanding issues and misunderstandings between Iran and the United States and to reach understandings on the principles which will govern our relationship.

As we look to the future, I urge the United Nations, as soon as possible, to take firm and effective measures to counter the global menace of attacks upon diplomats and others. The danger it poses to civilized international life is growing; no institution of peace can afford to ignore it.

For our part, the United States seeks peace with all nations. Whether it be with Iran or with the Soviet Union, we are eager to reduce tensions and to restore productive relations as soon as their actions allow. In all cases, our policies will reflect our commitment to noninterference in the internal affairs of other nations. As President Carter has affirmed, we will not interfere in Poland affairs, and we expect that others will also respect the right of the Polish nation to resolve its own problems in its own way.



Secretary Muskie consults with U.N. Secretary General Waldheim.

Controlling Arms

Another obligation of nations is the control and limitation of arms. A period of heightened tension in the world makes this obligation more difficult to fulfill but so more urgently important. For this reason, let me underscore anew today the commitment of my government to arms control—to practical measures that contribute to world peace and enhance international stability. President Carter voiced this basic commitment when he was sworn in as President in January 1977. It remains equally valid today.

Let me give you several concrete illustrations of this commitment. Some of the arms control efforts I will mention involve active participation by the United Nations; others involve negotiations outside the U.N. framework. But all are of intense concern to the international community—for an unrestrained arms race would darken the horizon for all human-

First. It is President Carter's intention to move forward as speedily as possible toward ratification of the SALT II Treaty. Accordingly, the President intends to consult with the leadership of the U.S. Senate soon after the election with a view to resuming the ratification process as soon as feasible.

We consider it of cardinal importance to ratify SALT II and move forward with the SALT process. The Soviet Union, however, must recognize that for many Americans, recent Soviet actions have led into question the Soviet Union's commitment to international peace and cooperation. Accordingly, we call upon the Soviet Union to act in ways that will enhance, not damage, the prospects for SALT II and for other arms control efforts.

Second. We are committed to the pursuit of meaningful and equal limitations on theater nuclear forces in the framework of SALT III. We are ready to begin talks with the Soviet Foreign Minister this week to discuss this subject and seek agreement on the arrangements for beginning these talks promptly.

Third. We are committed to seeking effective and verifiable comprehensive ban treaty. Substantial progress has been made toward this goal, and we are determined to continue pursuing these efforts vigorously.

Fourth. The United States is committed in the Vienna talks to achieving equal and balanced force reductions and

limitations to diminish the risks inherent in the massive presence of military forces in central Europe.

Fifth. We are prepared to develop further the security aspects of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). If the international situation permits and if there is balanced progress in all areas at the CSCE review conference in Madrid—including the human rights area—we are prepared to consider a post-Madrid European conference of the CSCE signatory states on developing militarily significant confidence-building measures.

Sixth. We support the effort of the newly expanded Committee on Disarmament to develop the provisions of an international convention on radiological weapons. We also support its work toward a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons, and we continue to pursue our bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union on an effective prohibition against chemical weapons.

Finally, the further spread of nuclear weapons would constitute a serious threat to international peace and security. We firmly support efforts, therefore, to reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation. The Nonproliferation Treaty is a cornerstone of these efforts. We strongly urge nonparties to embrace the treaty for it enhances the security of all nations, nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon states alike. At the recently concluded Nonproliferation Treaty review conference, there was unanimous agreement on the fundamental soundness of the treaty and the desirability of universal adherence to it. For those non-nuclear-weapon states that have not joined the treaty, we attach particular importance to the goal of achieving comprehensive, full-scope international safeguards coverage. We believe that acceptance of such coverage should become a condition of new nuclear supply commitments to such states. We will continue to work for a world in which all nations can share in the peaceful use of nuclear energy without the danger of spreading nuclear weapons.

Before I leave this subject, let me emphasize our deep concern over another arms control matter: If arms control is to be successful, agreements must be fully honored. Questions such as those raised by persistent reports that chemical weapons have been used in Afghanistan, Laos, and Kampuchea cannot be ignored by the international community. To do so would undermine both arms control and

U.S. Delegation to the 35th U.N. General Assembly

Representatives

Donald F. McHenry
William J. vanden Heuvel
Hannah D. Atkins
Jacob K. Javits, U.S. Senator from the State of New York
Paul E. Tsongas, U.S. Senator from the State of Massachusetts

Alternate Representatives

Nathan Landow
Barbara Newsom
Richard W. Petree
Joan Edelman Spero
H. Carl McCall

Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Sept. 29, 1980.

international law. The United States, therefore, welcomes the emphasis placed by the Committee on Disarmament at its most recent session on the need for international efforts to determine the facts behind these reports. We believe that an impartial investigation into these reports could most appropriately be launched under the auspices of the United Nations.

Important as they are, the obligations I have mentioned by no means exhaust the responsibilities which rest upon us as nations, and as a community of nations, if we are to secure peace. By peace, I mean not the fragile, artificial stability that comes with repression of a people by their government. I mean the true stability of societies that are at peace with themselves because the rights of their citizens are protected and nurtured.

Upholding Human Rights

So let me close by underscoring another obligation of nations: our obligation to uphold human rights and to concern ourselves compassionately with fundamental human needs. In the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the community of nations has nobly defined the concepts of human rights and human dignity—just as in the U.N. Charter we have outlined the precepts of peaceful cooperation.

The failure of nations to live up to these human rights obligations is a continuing tragedy made painfully manifest

United Nations Day, 1980

A PROCLAMATION¹

This year marks the 35th Anniversary of the founding of the United Nations, an organization dedicated to maintaining international peace and security, developing friendly relations among nations, and achieving international cooperation in solving global problems. Today 153 nations work within the United Nations framework to resolve some of the most crucial problems of our time.

Never has the United Nations been more important to the United States and to the world than it is today. The past year has seen momentous international events. Many have not yet run their full course but have already changed the way we see the world around us. We have become more conscious of the risks of war and more aware of the urgent tasks of peace.

Today, peace is threatened in many ways. There are the visible threats like the invasion by a super power of an innocent, defenseless land. And, there are the more subtle threats of hunger, spiraling inflation, inadequate health care, and depleted natural and monetary resources. These threats have filled the United Nations with a strong sense of the urgency of creating an international system based on active and equitable, social and economic cooperation among the countries of the North and South.

The United Nations, through the work of its specialized agencies and programs, its regional organizations and international conferences, has become an indispensable frontline defense against the events and forces that threaten world stability. It has played a central role in setting the pace and

direction for international cooperation in an interdependent world.

The United States has always been an active and dedicated supporter of the United Nations. As President, I have been proud to carry on and expand this tradition. My Administration continues to be firmly committed to a strong United Nations system.

Now, THEREFORE, I, JIMMY CARTER, President of the United States of America, do hereby designate Friday, October 24, 1980, as United Nations Day. I urge all Americans to use this day as an opportunity to better acquaint themselves with the activities and accomplishments of the United Nations.

I have appointed Mr. Charles L. Brown to serve as 1980 United States National Chairman for United Nations Day, and the United Nations Association of the United States of America to work with him in celebrating this special day. I invite all the American people, and people everywhere, to join me in expressing sincere and steadfast support for the United Nations on its thirty-fifth anniversary. It is only through multilateral institutions like the United Nations that the solutions to our ever more urgent global problems will be found.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this twenty-ninth day of August, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and eighty, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and fifth.

JIMMY CARTER

¹ No. 4789 of Aug. 29, 1980 (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Sept. 1, 1980). ■

nations, and by establishing peace among nations so that no person need be forced to flee from home and country. This is why my nation supports the growth of democracy and personal freedom in the Americas and in Africa and in every region of the world.

Conclusion

Achieving these ultimate purposes remains a supreme challenge for the United Nations. Making progress toward them must be the work of this 35th General Assembly.

Let us not ignore facts. Ours is a moment of worldwide economic difficulty and a time of tension between great powers. At such moments, peaceful cooperation becomes even more difficult than usual. At such moments, our obligation as members of this assembly of nations take on new importance. At such times when a cloud of troubling events darkens our aspirations for ultimate peace, we light our path by adhering faithfully to our charter, to the international law that binds us, to the standards of international conduct that protect us. Let us hope that the light we generate by doing so will dispel the clouds of tension and discord that darken the world today.

The United States will do its part. We will live up to our obligations to oppose aggression, to build peace, to limit arms, to support human rights and foster economic justice. For us and for other nations, these endeavors can immeasurably improve life on Earth and build the just and lasting peace for which all our peoples yearn.

¹ Press release 267; USUN press release 100. ■

in the waves of refugees now sweeping across the world. These suffering people present a dramatic challenge to the international community represented by this Assembly. Over the past 5 years, the United States has welcomed more than 600,000 refugees—from Africa, from Asia, from Europe, from the Middle East, and the Western Hemisphere. In the past 5 months alone, we have received more than 120,000 people driven from Cuba to our shores—an influx which has presented extraordinary challenges to our resources.

In recognition of the human need implicit in this worldwide wave of refugees, President Carter has made known the intention of the United States to accept an additional 217,000 refugees over the next

year. Our country, of course, is only one of many which have welcomed and helped refugees. More than 1 million Afghani refugees have fled to Pakistan; 400,000 Indochinese are in Thailand; more than 3 million are homeless in sub-Saharan Africa. Clearly this is a global problem; it requires a global response.

The refugee resettlement efforts agreed upon at Geneva last year demand our energy and our generosity. We must strengthen the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. The humanitarian programs of the United Nations and of other agencies require a renewed commitment from all of us—to their support and to their strengthening.

But ultimately, this human tragedy can be dealt with only by removing its root causes: by overcoming poverty, by ending the abuse of human rights within

Iran-Iraq Conflict

Following is a statement made by Donald F. McHenry, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, in the Security Council on September 28, 1980, and text of the resolution unanimously adopted by the Council that day.

AMBASSADOR McHENRY¹

The United States has historically supported a strong and effective Security Council. President Carter has, himself, taken a deep interest in the work of this Council. In 1977, at the start of his administration, the President advanced for consideration a number of suggestions for strengthening the conduct of Council business. Many other member states have joined in this effort, and I invite the attention of members to the statement concerning the Council's work of Foreign Minister [Knut] Frydenlund of Norway when addressing the General Assembly on September 22.

The charter is clear. Article 24 states that:

In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.

The Security Council usually experiences difficulty in bringing to a rapid end a serious outbreak of hostilities. On occasion we fail. But the Council cannot abdicate the heavy responsibility which the charter has given and to which the entire membership of 154 independent nations has agreed.

In common with other members of the United Nations, the United States supports the initiative undertaken by the organization of the Islamic conference. We are heartened that President Zia [Gen. Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq] of Pakistan has been willing to undertake his present mission. He should know that the United States stands ready to assist him in any way that may be appropriate.

At the same time that we support the Islamic conference mission we, here in this room, are obliged to act in fulfillment of our own responsibilities. We are bound by treaty; we are bound by 50 years of history to do so.

The United States has supported the resolution just adopted as it will support any reasonable action by the Security Council that may help bring these extremely serious and tragic hostilities to the earliest possible halt. Too many lives have been lost, and we are gravely concerned that more lives may be in jeopardy. We share with many others the opinion that the Council must raise its collective voice to this end. We believe that the Security Council can discharge its duties in a way that is entirely compatible with the mission that has been undertaken by the Islamic conference.

The President of the United States has set forth the principles which guide the U.S. position on the Iranian-Iraqi dispute.

First, the United States will continue to observe a strict and scrupulous attitude of neutrality in this dispute. We have not been and we will not become involved in the conflict except to assist, to the extent of our power to do so, the efforts which are made by the international community to bring the conflict to an end.

Second, we expect the other nations will follow the same policy of neutrality and noninterference in the dispute. In particular, we expect all concerned to resist the temptation to exploit this conflict for their own purposes.

Third, the freedom of navigation to and from the Persian Gulf, which is of primary importance to the international community, must not be infringed upon in any way.

Fourth, this dispute must be settled at the negotiating table, not on the battlefield, and there must be an immediate cessation of hostilities.

The Security Council began informal consultations on this violent conflict 6 days ago. On September 23, the President of the Council [Tunisian Permanent Representative to the U.N. M. Taeib Slim], speaking in the name of all the members of the Council, underlined our grave concern that armed activity must cease forthwith. The President appealed to both sides to cease all threats and acts of violence against one another. It is a matter of deep regret that this appeal has not yet been heeded. We urge the Security Council, together with the Islamic conference and all others who may be in a position to assist in the restoration of conditions of peace, to act to help Iran and Iraq

find a way to bring the fighting to an end and to begin the long and difficult task of seeking a resolution of their dispute by peaceful means.

Throughout the week of this grave conflict, the Secretary General [Kurt Waldheim] and his staff have labored with high intelligence and devotion to assist in bringing the hostilities to an end. Indeed, the Secretary General has shown great initiative in this regard. He and his staff have given of themselves untiringly. We believe that they deserve the warm thanks of the community of nations for their efforts. We look forward to the report of the Secretary General as called for in the resolution just adopted.

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 479²

The Security Council,

Having begun consideration of the item entitled, "The Situation between Iran and Iraq",

Mindful that all Member States have undertaken the Charter obligations to settle their international disputes by peaceful means and in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered,

Mindful as well that all Members are obliged to refrain in their international relations from the threat of or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State,

Recalling that under Article 24 of the Charter the Security Council has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Deeply concerned about the developing situation between Iran and Iraq,

1. *Calls upon* Iran and Iraq to refrain immediately from any further use of force and to settle their dispute by peaceful means and in conformity with principles of justice and international law;

2. *Urges* them to accept any appropriate offer of mediation or conciliation or to resort to regional agencies or arrangements or other peaceful means of their own choice that would facilitate the fulfillment of their Charter obligations;

3. *Calls upon* all other States to exercise the utmost restraint and to refrain from any act which may lead to a further escalation and widening of the conflict;

4. *Supports* the efforts of the Secretary-General and the offer of his good offices for the resolution of this situation;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council within forty-eight hours.

¹USUN press release 101.

²Adopted unanimously on Sept. 28, 1980. ■

World Conference on the U.N. Decade for Women Held in Copenhagen

The world conference of the U.N. Decade for Women was held in Copenhagen July 14-30, 1980. The U.S. delegation was cochaired by Donald F. McHenry, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, and Sarah Weddington, Assistant to the President.

Following are statements made by Ms. Weddington in plenary sessions on July 16 and July 30, the text of the Programme of Action adopted by the conference on July 30, a review and assessment of U.S. participation, and a list of the resolutions adopted at the conference.

**MS. WEDDINGTON,
JULY 16, 1980**

Madame President [Lise Ostergaard of Denmark], distinguished delegates, and concerned women who have gathered here in this great city: For all our delegation, it is an honor to join in this conference with the remarkable delegates who have done so much in their nations' quest for equality among men and women. It has been a joy to make new friends and to learn much of our countries as well as to share something of our own.

The next 2 weeks are ours—all of ours—to make of them what we can—what we must—for women around the world. How right that we meet in Denmark—a country which has made progress its tradition and where equality, justice, and dignity are the common heritage of all.

Madame President, your election to the presidency of the conference is a recognition of your special diplomatic talents and of your country's achievements. We look forward to working with you.

Events of importance continue even while we are here. Only yesterday our President sent a note of sadness upon the death of Sir Sretse Khama of Botswana noting that not only the people of that nation but also people around the world share the sadness in his passing.

Just 5 years ago in Mexico City, the world learned that women could no longer accept being excluded from the decisions which affect their lives. Since then time and again we have seen

women demonstrate the will to direct the forces of change. This is the message we hear—this is the message we bring you from the people of the United States. It is their hope that the delegates meeting here will focus upon the problems, aspirations, and goals that unite women throughout the world. Recognizing our diversity, we emphasize our unity. Let our deliberations be an example of goodwill to all who seek to improve the lives of women, men, and children—everywhere.

We come here to evaluate the progress of women in our respective countries in accordance with the World Plan of Action.¹ We are here to rededicate ourselves to complete the unfinished agenda of our times in the firm belief that to advance the cause of women's rights is to advance the cause of human rights.

Here in Copenhagen we will further that cause if we use our energies, our wisdom, and our compassion to study and explore what we and our countries can do to combat the age-old enemies of humankind—poverty, illiteracy, disease. These problems are the special lot of women because for centuries women and their children have been the principal victims of inequities, oppression, and conflict. Their plight and their progress is the principal issue before us—the overriding economic issue, the overriding political issue, and the overriding social issue.

But since Mexico City we know that things will not change unless we, the women of the world, have the will to change things. Since Mexico City we know that the prejudice enshrined in our minds in past millennia cannot be abolished in a single decade. But since Mexico City, too, we know we must try. We know that no amount of sloganeering and finding of scapegoats can change the fact that one of the root causes of our present predicament is the continuing domination of woman by man. The solution lies in the full and active involvement of women in all affairs of life.

This is a fact recognized by U.N. Secretary General Waldheim who minced no words when he told us July 14 that "if the quest for solutions of the world's problems is to emanate from the popular level, as it must, it demands as much involvement from

women as from men." All of us were impressed by his fervor. Over and over from this podium we have heard Her Majesty, the gallant Queen of Denmark; the Prime Minister; the Secretary General of this conference; and you, Madame President, rallying us. Therefore, we women must play the crucial role of confronting these problems in pursuing the goals of this conference—equality, development, and peace.

The task before us will not be easy. The United States has encountered special difficulties in reaching our own objectives, and we've had disappointments in spite of the progress we have made. For example, we have proposed an equal rights amendment, which, if adopted, would become part of our national Constitution and would guarantee equality of rights of women and of men. It yet remains an unfulfilled promise, although seven Presidents have supported it. The majority of men and women in both our political parties support it. The President of the United States is working most vigorously for it. It has passed the U.S. Congress twice. Thirty-five of our fifty States have passed it. But we have to have 38 States. In the few States that remain to ratify, there are a few voices of frightened people who oppose equality for women. Hopefully, the next time we meet in such a conference, we of the United States will have strengthened the Constitution of our nation. The women of our country and the men who join us will not rest until we have overcome.

Now let me speak about our progress. The President of the United States, who has made equality of women before the law a personal commitment, has instructed me to sign the Convention Eliminating All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. I do this with pride and with the prayer that the promise of the covenant will become a reality for all women—everywhere. I will sign the convention with pride because, in the fields of health, employment, and education—the specific themes of this conference—we have made significant progress in our country.

In the area of health, the life expectancy of women has risen to 77

rs. Women have become more active participants in the nation's health care team. Our Cabinet post for health is held by a woman. There are more women doctors today than ever before—but not enough. Infant mortality and perinatal death rates have dropped—but not enough. The incidence of high and unwanted pregnancies has been reduced through family planning—but not enough. There is more research on women-related health problems—but not enough. We will continue our efforts.

Women in our nation in recent years have exposed to the public many ills and problems previously hidden—domestic violence, rape, unnecessary use of drugs, unnecessary surgery, occupational hazards such as hazardous exposure to chemicals, and mental stress caused by dual responsibilities in the home and workplace without the necessary support resources. The many efforts now undertaken to deal with these problems owe much to the public concern and persistence of women. The conference in Mexico City also made a difference. It is a catalyst pushing us on.

Working women present a special challenge: 60% of all women between 18 and 44 years are employed, and it is estimated that by 1990, this figure will rise to 35%. It will be our task to better prepare them for employment and confront the endemic problems of occupational segregation and low wages. It is the task of those women who are seeking their place among the leadership of unions and of corporations to assure that the laws which forbid discrimination in employment are fully observed. Our government has been striving to strengthen the role of women in public life. Women have been appointed to the Cabinet and to key positions in government agencies. The Voice of America is now the voice of a woman—and she is here in our delegation. I, myself, a product of the women's movement, am honored to be part of an Administration which has had 38 of our 44 women Federal judges. We are witnessing an increase in the number of women elected to public office at the State and Federal levels. Two of these women leaders are present here, both members of the U.S. House of Representatives. Our entire delegation is proof that increasing numbers of women have attained distinction in our nation. We are far from leveling the halls of power in Washington, but the fact is that since the

Mexico City conference, our numbers have increased, and our collective voice is stronger and it is heard.

In education, American women have made significant progress since we last met. Most women now complete 12 years of schooling and roughly half of college and university enrollments are women. Today there has been a tremendous increase in the number of women who study to be lawyers, doctors, engineers, and business leaders.

Largely because of efforts of our women's movement, Federal legislation has been passed making it illegal to discriminate against women in the educational system. These laws affect admission of students, hiring and promotion of teachers and administrators, and the apportionment of funds and facilities between male and female students.

Enforcement of these laws is not perfect but our new Department of Education, headed by a distinguished woman, and our voluntary women's organizations are actively monitoring progress and insisting upon full compliance with the laws. They are working, for example, to eliminate gender-role stereotypes from textbooks and to demonstrate that girls and women are active participants of society. Women's study courses have been added to the curricula of many universities.

We know that our progress at home is inextricably linked to the advancement of women everywhere. It is truer today than ever before.

Since Mexico City in 1975, our quest for equality has been hampered by the wrenchings of a world in which tradition as well as modernization often subject women to new degrees of vulnerability. We have seen the process of development place additional burdens on women and create stress within the family structure. We have seen revolutions relegating women to passive roles. And we have witnessed the flight of millions of families from their lands—forced into statelessness by the lawlessness of states.

We are deeply concerned about the special problems of women in southern Africa who must live and attempt to raise their families under apartheid. The documentation prepared by the Secretariat on this item leaves no doubt about the plight of the nonwhite women in South Africa and Namibia. Their sufferings stretch the limits of human tolerance, for not only does apartheid separate the races, it separates families and places a particular burden on women. We will examine measures to

ease those burdens. And we are especially concerned by the plight of refugee women who suffer the multiple pressures of homelessness, discrimination, and despair.

If these are troubled times they must not sway us from our determination that the "Decade for Women" be a time for progress and achievement. For our part, Secretary of State Edmund Muskie has, therefore, reaffirmed that "a key objective of United States foreign policy is to advance worldwide the status and condition of women." The United States is conscious of its obligation to remain an important participant in the economic progress of the developing countries particularly as it affects women. In this area of diminishing resources and growing scarcity, women will bring new vitality to the process of economic and social development. It is their right to do so, and it is our responsibility here at the conference to see that these rights are honored.

The U.S. delegation commits itself to work with you in the days to come to pursue this goal. Just as we have contributed to the voluntary fund for the U.N. Decade for Women, we will also support proposals for a third conference for women to be held in 1985 to assess further progress.

I think the statements of the Cuban representative and the Syrian representative yesterday about the United States were objectionable and unwarranted, but they were particularly offensive because of the urgent objectives which bring over 147 nations to this city. The work of this conference is so important to the achievement of justice for half the world's population that we must not permit it to be jeopardized by the rash polemics unrelated to our purpose here. Because diversion from this purpose is diversion from the unique opportunity to consider crucial improvements in the often-ignored needs of women.

We are convinced that the remainder of this Decade for Women must prepare the next century of peace, a century that insures full equality among all people. But the path to peace lies through mutual tolerance and through the search for permanent and comprehensive solutions. It holds true for the North and the South, for the East and the West, in all corners of the globe, in Southeast Asia as well as in the Middle East. To end the sufferings of women, we must cease the human conflicts. Therefore, it would contribute

greatly to the success of this conference if we demonstrate our unity to the world—the unity of women—and our will—the will of women in seeking peaceful solutions to international problems.

But we must do more than demand peace, seek peace, pray for peace. We ourselves must build peace—step by patient step. There is a song in my country which begins this way: “Let there be peace on Earth, and let it begin with me. . . .”

Our conference will be an even greater success if we translate that noble sentiment into action—here, now in Copenhagen. In our deliberations let us demonstrate to the world our will to act in a spirit of compromise to achieve agreements peacefully and with principle and to respect honest differences of opinion. Let there be peace on Earth—and let it begin with all of us.

**MS. WEDDINGTON,
JULY 30, 1980**

I remember how our delegation felt as we left Washington for Copenhagen. We were excited; we were eager; we were looking forward to joining you here.

Our educators, health specialists, and labor experts came to discuss the substantive areas of health, education, and employment—the subthemes of this conference as determined by the preparatory committee. Our rural women, our disabled, and our displaced homemakers came to address creatively the special problems they face. Our foreign aid and refugee experts came to advise on those important aspects of the agenda here. Our delegation came to Copenhagen to discuss the complex and painful problems of over half of the world's population. We came here determined to contribute to a program of action that would speak directly to women wherever they are in the world by developing appropriate national, regional, and international guidelines to improve the conditions of the world's majority. And, in spirit, our delegation carried the goodwill and hope for the future of millions of American women, hundreds of organizations and diverse constituencies across the United States.

Sadly, our mutual efforts have fallen far below their potential accomplishments. Those efforts have been subverted by those with a different

agenda. The focus on women here was pushed aside and became a victim of those who choose instead to focus on the political polemics of the Middle East situation. We are denied a consensus not by questions of how to help women in developing areas, not by questions of what education women need, not by questions of how to support women who are discriminated against on the basis of race and sex, not by any question uniquely pertaining to women or issues viewed from a woman's perspective. We are denied a consensus by those who want to focus a statement against Zionism, by those who want to advance their special interests in the Middle East—knowing full well that a special session of the U.N. General Assembly is already working on the highly complicated and difficult problem involved. They have not compromised as they claim; they have denied women whatever their race, religion, or national origin a unique opportunity to contribute solutions to their own issues in their own way. And the intemperate and abhorrent attacks against Israel and the Camp David process are completely false and regrettable.

We recognize the difficulties of this conference, but we are disappointed that the collective will of women here at this middecade conference of the U.N. Decade for Women has not been sufficiently strong to overcome the forces operating here and to refocus this conference on the issues and problems we came to discuss.

This disappointment does not negate the contribution that the decade and this conference has made to the cause of women. More women are serving on their countries' delegations in Copenhagen than in Mexico City in 1975. Seventy-five countries (68 of them represented by women) signed the Convention for Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. Networks among women have been strengthened here among the 2,000 government representatives participating in this conference and among the 8,000 women attending the forum. The documentation published by nations, the United Nations, its specialized agencies, and other participating programs, as well as numerous non-governmental organizations, is extremely valuable. And we are pleased that such initiatives as those on the disabled, the elderly, on refugees, and on women in the U.N. system have achieved wide consensus.

Nevertheless, we return to our country with heavy hearts because women have been denied the time they deserved on the world's center stage and have been denied the opportunity to accomplish all that they hoped to achieve. However, we will also return to our country with undaunted determination to continue to work for the cause of women.

We return to pursue ratification of the convention that the U.S. delegation signed here. We will pursue ways to implement a number of important initiatives taken here. We will go home and find ways, working within the government and with the women of our country, to apply our maximum collective influence and strength toward our mutual goal: equality, development, and peace.

TEXT OF PROGRAM OF ACTION:

PROGRAMME OF ACTION FOR THE SECOND HALF OF THE UNITED NATIONS DECADE FOR WOMEN: EQUALITY, DEVELOPMENT AND PEACE

Part One: Background and framework

INTRODUCTION

A. Legislative mandates

1. The mandates for the Programme of Action for the Second Half of the United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace are as follows:

(a) General Assembly resolution 35/XXX of 15 December 1975, in which the Assembly decided that in 1980, at the mid-point of the Decade, a world conference would be convened to review and evaluate progress made in implementing the recommendations of the World Conference of the International Women's Year held in 1975, and to readjust the programme for the second half of the Decade in the light of new data and research;

(b) Economic and Social Council resolution 2062 (LXII) of 12 May 1977, in which the Council requested the Secretary-General to prepare for the consideration of the Commission on the Status of Women, at its twenty-eighth session, a report outlining a programme of concrete action for the second half of the United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace;

(c) General Assembly resolution 33/1 of 29 January 1979, in which the Assembly decided upon the subtheme, “Employment, Health and Education”, for the World Conference and recommended that the Conference should place emphasis on elaborating action-oriented plans for integrating women into the developmental

process, particularly by promoting economic activities and employment opportunities on an equal footing with men, through, *inter alia*, the provision of adequate health and educational facilities;

(d) General Assembly resolution 33/191 of 29 January 1979 by which it was decided at the World Conference of the United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace would be held in Copenhagen.

Objectives of the United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace

In 1975, International Women's Year, a World Conference was held in Mexico City which adopted the World Plan of Action for the United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace. These objectives are still valid in 1985, and the Declaration on the Equality of Women and their Contribution to Development and Peace. The principles and objectives proclaimed at the Mexico City Conference for the Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace are still relevant today and constitute the basis of action for the Decade. They were further reaffirmed by a number of United Nations regional, sectoral and international meetings as well as by the social and economic recommendations of the Conference of Non-Aligned and Developing Countries on the Role of Women in Development held in Baghdad in May 1979, which were endorsed by the sixth summit of Heads of State and Government of Non-Aligned Countries.

3. Equality is here interpreted as meaning not only legal equality, the elimination of *de jure* discrimination, but also equality of rights, responsibilities and opportunities for the participation of women in development, both as beneficiaries and as active agents. The issue of inequality affects the vast majority of women of the world is closely related to the problem of underdevelopment which exists mainly as a result of unjust international economic relations. The attainment of equality presupposes equality of access to resources and the power to participate equally and effectively in their allocation and in decision-making at various levels. Accordingly, it must be recognized that the attainment of equality by women long disadvantaged may demand compensatory activities to correct accumulated injustices. The joint responsibility of men and women for the welfare of the family in general and the care of their children in particular must be reaffirmed.

4. Development is here interpreted to mean total development, including development in the political, economic, social, cultural and other dimensions of human life and also the development of economic and other material resources and also the physical, moral, intellectual and cultural growth of the human person. The improvement of the status of women requires action at the national and local levels and within the family. It also requires a change in the attitudes and roles of both men and

women. Women's development should not only be viewed as an issue in social development but must be seen as an essential component in every dimension of development. To improve the status of women and their role in the process of development, such development must be an integral part of the global project for the establishment of a New International Economic Order based on equity, sovereign equality, interdependence, common interest and co-operation among all states.

5. Without peace and stability there can be no development. Peace is thus a prerequisite to development. Moreover peace will not be lasting without development and the elimination of inequalities and discrimination at all levels. Equality of participation in the development of friendly relations and co-operation among States will contribute to the strengthening of peace, to the development of women themselves and to equality of rights at all levels and in all spheres of life, as well as to the struggle to eliminate imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, Zionism, racism, racial discrimination, *apartheid*, hegemonism, and foreign occupation, domination and oppression as well as full respect for the dignity of the peoples and their right to self-determination and independence without foreign interference or intervention and to promote guarantees of fundamental freedoms and human rights.

C. Nature and scope of the Programme of Action

6. In compliance with the mandates given above, the present Programme of Action has been drawn up for the second half of the Decade, 1980-1985, to promote the attainment of the three objectives of equality, development and peace, with special emphasis on the subtheme—namely, employment, health and education as significant components of development taking into account that human resources cannot achieve their full potential without integrated socio-economic development. The Programme aims at strengthening comprehensive and effective strategies to overcome obstacles and constraints on women's full and equal participation in development including actions to solve the problems of underdevelopment and of the socio-economic structure which places women in an inferior position and to increase their contribution to the strengthening of world peace.

7. The following Programme of Action, formulated at the mid-point of the Decade, recognizes that considerable efforts have been made by the majority of countries in furtherance of the objectives of the Decade, but that progress has been insufficient to bring about the desired quantitative or qualitative improvements in the status of women. On the assumption that the three main objectives of the Decade—Equality, Development and Peace—are closely interlinked with one another, the purpose of this Programme of Action is to refine and strengthen practical measures for advancing

the status of women, and to ensure that women's concerns are taken into account in the formulation and implementation of the International Development Strategy for the Third United Nations Development Decade.

8. The present Programme focuses on ensuring women's increased participation in the realization of the objectives of the World Plan of Action. The recommendations seek to indicate the interrelated nature of actions that need to be taken simultaneously on several fronts such as those related to world economic issues for the International Development Strategies for the Third United Nations Development Decade and the implementation of the Programme of Action for the New International Economic Order thus elaborating the approach adopted in the World Plan of Action. In particular, the World Plan of Action gives high priority to improving the conditions of the most disadvantaged groups of women—especially the rural and urban poor and the vast group of women workers in the tertiary sector. This Programme gives high priority to improving the conditions of the most disadvantaged groups of women, particularly those disadvantaged because of socio-economic and historic conditions, with emphasis on rural and urban poor and on the subtheme: employment, education and health. An attempt has also been made to recommend practical measures to be incorporated in all aspects of the development of society.

9. Although the World Plan of Action for the Implementation of the Objectives of the International Women's Year already contains a comprehensive list of measures necessary to achieve those objectives, it is evident, and has been further borne out by the review of progress made over the past five years, that they cannot be achieved in such a short span of time and that periodic reviews are needed to strengthen the strategies and objectives of the Plan in line with major world developments. Therefore, the possibility of a second decade could be envisaged for the period 1985-1995. The recommendation to hold another conference in 1985 has already been made by two of the regional preparatory meetings—those of the Economic Commission for Western Asia (ECWA) and the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP).

I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

A. The roots of inequality of women: the problems of development and equality of participation of women and men in development

10. The causes of the inequality between women and men are directly linked with a complex historical process. They also derive from political, economic, social and cultural factors. The form in which this inequality manifests itself is as varied as the economic, social and cultural conditions of the world community.

11. Throughout history and in many

societies women have been sharing similar experiences. One of the basic factors causing the unequal share of women in development relates to the division of labour between sexes. This division of labour has been justified on the basis of the childbearing function of women, which is inherent in womanhood. Consequently, the distribution of tasks and responsibilities of women and men in society have mainly restricted women to the domestic sphere and have unduly burdened them. This has led to women often being regarded and treated as inferior and unequal in their activities outside the domestic sphere and to a violation of their human rights. It has given them only limited access to resources and participation in all spheres of life, notably in decision-making, and has also resulted in many instances in institutionalized inequality in the status of women and men.

12. The inequality of women in most countries stems to a very large extent from mass poverty and general backwardness of the majority of the world's population caused by underdevelopment which is a product of imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism and also of unjust international economic relations. The unfavourable status of women is aggravated in many countries, developed and underdeveloped, by *de facto* discrimination on the grounds of sex.

13. It can be argued that the predominant economic analyses of labour and capital insufficiently trace the linkages between production systems in world economics and women's work as producers and reproducers; nor is the subjection, exploitation, oppression and domination of women by men, sufficiently explained in history. Women are not simply discriminated against by the productive systems, but subject to the discrimination that arises by virtue of being the reproductive force.

14. While women's childbearing function and their traditional nurturing roles are respected, in many countries there has been little recognition of women's actual or potential contribution to economic activity. The role of women within the family combined with a high level of unemployment and under-employment of the population in general often results in priority being given to the employment of men in economic activities outside the family household.

15. These cumulative processes of discrimination within and outside the family characterize the dual oppression that women suffer on the basis of their sex and social class. Poverty and underdevelopment have sharpened and continue to sharpen these inequities.

16. The effects of these long-term cumulative processes of discrimination have been accentuated by underdevelopment and are strikingly apparent in the present world profile of women: while they represent 50 per cent of the world

adult population and one third of the official labour force, they perform for nearly two thirds of all working hours and receive only one tenth of the world income and own less than 1 per cent of world property.

B. Review of progress achieved in the first half of the Decade: lessons for the future

17. The review and appraisal of progress achieved during the past five years indicates that the integration of women into development has been formally accepted by most Governments as a desirable planning objective. Many countries have made significant efforts, undertaken a number of activities and measures and established institutional and administrative mechanisms to integrate women in development.

18. The accomplishments of the first half of the Decade include sensitizing planners and decision-makers to women's needs and problems, conducting research and building a data base on women and promoting legislation safeguarding women's rights. However, with the general exception of the countries with advanced social services, serious problems, such as inadequate financial allocation, lack of skilled personnel and so on, continue to exist in many countries. This constraint is to a considerable extent—especially in developing countries—due to the general economic problems such as scarcity of resources and/or under-utilization of existing resources. In many cases it reflects the priority Governments accord to issues concerning women. Another major constraint facing such mechanisms is their limited mandates. Thus, several existing mechanisms do not have strong executive and implementing authority. Similarly, the terms of reference given to such mechanisms tend to restrict them to welfare activities traditionally associated with women and thereby reinforcing stereotyping of women's roles and attitudinal prejudices. The sensitizing task of these special mechanisms has, as yet, insufficiently resulted in an actual integration into policy planning and implementation by Governments and international organizations, of the question of sharing between the sexes of all responsibilities.

19. The review of legislative enactments and provisions reveals that a significant number of Governments reported new constitutional and legislative provisions which guarantee or promote equal rights of women and men. However, legislative provisions are not always matched by adequate enforcement measures and machinery. In many countries specific measures have been taken to redress past discrimination and to promote equal opportunities for women, especially in the fields of education and employment.

20. In the developed market-economy countries significant progress has been made in establishing national machineries, while achievements in the subtheme areas of education, health and employment are impressive. In many countries, new legislation has ensured the legal rights of women in social, economic and political aspects of

national life. The percentage of women in positions of policy formulation has increased significantly. Women have joined the labour force in increasing numbers; enrolments have achieved parity in secondary, university and graduate education in many nations, and expansion of primary health care has reached most rural areas in the various market-economy countries. Current studies on work of comparable value, occupational segregation and valuation of household work are positive signs further progress in the second half of the Decade. Acknowledgement of the double burden has enabled women and men to move forward to challenge existing stereotypes and to develop social programmes aimed at effecting full equality women and men.

21. In the developing countries, despite their resource constraints and the adverse effect of the world economic structure and the world economic situation, initiatives have been taken for integrating women into development, including the establishment of national machineries and legislative enactments and efforts to overcome prejudices against women. The economic contribution of rural women to agriculture and national development is increasingly being recognized in national rural development plans and policies. Research and studies have been undertaken to identify the critical needs of women and formulate and implement programmes and projects for them. In many developing countries efforts have been made in the public sector to increase the participation of women and representation at the decision-making levels. There has been an increase in the enrolment of girls in educational institutions at different levels, an increase in the availability of health care to women and efforts have been made to improve the work conditions and the employment needs of women.

22. In the countries with centrally planned economies a further advancement of women took place in various fields. Women in those countries actively participated in social and economic development and in all other fields of public life of the countries, including the active struggle for peace, disarmament, detente and international co-operation. A high level of employment, health, education and political participation of women was achieved in countries with centrally planned economies, in which national mechanisms are already in existence with adequate financial allocations and sufficient skilled personnel.

23. Women in all countries love peace and women all over the world have conducted active struggles for peace, disarmament, detente and international co-operation against foreign aggression and forms of foreign domination and hegemony. Women have and can play an active role at the national and international level to strive for detente and to make it a continuing and universal process of an all-embracing scope so that the goals of the Decade might be achieved.

24. The review and appraisal of progress achieved during the past five years indicates that in many countries the situation of women from the so-called "backward" sectors has worsened. In particular, it has worsened with respect to the conditions of employment and education for women in the rural and the so-called marginal urban sectors. In many countries the actual number of female illiterates is increasing. In fact, illiteracy rates for the female population appear to have increased and are projected to increase for several countries. In terms of the percentage of enrolment that women constitute of the total enrolment, at the first, second and third levels of education, progress in the participation of women has been made in most countries; however, declines have been reported by several in female participation at the second level. It appears that, in many countries, only in the higher and middle socio-economic strata did women gain some significant increases in educational opportunities. However, this improvement has not been followed by a parallel increase in levels of employment, even in certain developed countries and in those developing countries with higher industrialization rates. In employment, there is evidence of increasing numbers of women being forced into unemployment or being transferred outside the formal sectors of the economy to the peripheral labour market in the developed countries and into the informal sectors of subsistence agriculture, handicrafts and so on. This move from the formal to the informal market is evidenced by estimates of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and projections for over-employment rates in the economies of the developing countries.

25. In many instances transfer of inappropriate technology has worsened the employment and health conditions of women; displacement of labour occurs, and foreign models of consumption accompany such transfer. In certain large industries, sometimes operated by transnational corporations, new discriminatory labour practices have appeared in both rural and urban areas, while in the urban areas increases in the employment of women have been largely the result of an increase in the exploitation of cheap, semi-skilled labour of young and unmarried women, related to increases in the migration of young women to cities.

26. In many countries, women have not been integrated into national development plans. Where special programmes have existed, they have failed for the most part in achieving significant results, owing to their narrow focus on stereotyped sex roles which have further increased segregation based on sex.

27. Finally, the current world economic crisis has contributed to the worsening situation of women in general. Women's employment in industries which

have high levels of female labour participants, has been negatively affected by protectionist measures. In developing countries the negative impact on women is even greater than in developed countries.

28. There have been some significant achievements in the implementation of a number of recommendations of the World Plan of Action both at the regional and global levels in the first half of the Decade. Of particular significance was the establishment of the Voluntary Fund for the Decade for Women and the preparatory work leading to the establishment of the International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women. A joint interagency programme for the advancement of women was prepared and regional programmes were implemented in accordance with the regional plans of action adopted in Mexico. Several United Nations organizations were involved in these activities, including the United Nations, regional commissions, UNICEF, UNDP, UNCTAD, UNIDO, UNFPA, ILO, FAO, UNESCO and WHO. It is apparent that such programmes can be strengthened and that greater efforts could be made to introduce a more multidisciplinary approach in these programmes. In a number of conferences held under the auspices of the United Nations system, linkages were established between women's status and the priority areas of concern including population, food, water, primary health care, education, rural development and agrarian reform, employment, industrialization and over-all development.

29. The review of implementation of the objectives of the second United Nations Development Decade as well as the progress of negotiations on the establishment of the New International Economic Order shows that hopes and expectations in connexion with the International Development Strategy and establishment of the New International Economic Order have not been fulfilled. Instead of a gradual resolution of the world economic situation and encouragement of accelerated economic development of developing countries, the crisis in the world economy has become more acute. This has affected developing countries in particular and bearing in mind the real economic and social situation in these countries, it is women who are most adversely affected. The international development conditions have deteriorated and become an even more limiting factor for the development of developing countries specially restricting the implementation of the objectives of the Plan of Action.

30. The lessons for the future to be drawn from this review are many. First, it proves that any measures for women isolated from the major priorities, strategies and sectors of development cannot result in any substantial improvement in attaining the goals of the Decade. Second, legislative and developmental action, unless they are accompanied by positive and concerted action to change attitudes and prejudices

cannot be fully effective. Third, mere provision of equal rights, development services and opportunities will not, by themselves, help women to avail of them, without simultaneous special supportive measures, e.g. legal aid, earmarking of benefits, information and knowledge, institutional innovation, etc.

31. The three main objectives of the United Nations Decade for Women—equality, development and peace—are closely interlinked with one another. Progress in any one of these has a beneficial effect on the others. In turn, failure in one sphere has negative impact on the others. Since the primary objective of development is to bring about a sustained improvement in the well-being of the individual and of society and to bestow benefits on all, development should be seen not only as a desirable goal in itself but also as a most important means of maintaining peace and of furthering equality of the sexes. However, the present world is by no means tranquil and there exist factors detrimental to peace. Women in some countries are still suffering from wars of aggression.

32. Thus, the universal strengthening of world peace and international security, struggle against foreign interference, aggression and military occupation, respect for national independence and sovereignty, the curbing of the arms race, the achievement of the goals of a general and complete disarmament and reduction of military budgets, the achievement of detente, the establishment of the New International Economic Order and the increased co-operation among States, on the basis of equality, will advance the economic, social and cultural development of countries and the situation of women, while still recognizing their special vulnerability. Consequently, it is only under conditions of peace that it is possible to move forward in the full implementation of the other two objectives of the Decade.

33. In accordance with their obligations under the Charter to maintain peace and security and to achieve international co-operation in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, bearing in mind, in this respect, the right to live in peace, States shall help women to participate in promoting international co-operation for the sake of the preparation of societies for a life in peace.

34. Similarly, a close relation exists between the world economic situation, development and the strengthening of international peace and security, disarmament and a relaxation of international tension. It is imperative that resources released as a result of disarmament be used for promoting the well-being of all nations and contribute to bridge the gap between developed and developing countries, thus increasing favourable conditions for improving the situation of all members of society. In this context particular attention shall be

given to the advancement of women and the protection of mother and child.

35. The lack of progress in the establishment of the New International Economic Order has had a direct effect on the socio-economic situation of the women of the world. Recent studies on the impact of international economic problems on the employment and working conditions of women show that in fact their adverse effects on the wage levels and job stability of women are more extensive than on those of men. For example, women are the first to lose their jobs on plantations that produce crops for export and in the textile, clothing and electronics industries, which are more sensitive to price fluctuations and to protectionist measures, recently introduced by some developing countries.

36. Realization of all above-mentioned aims would provide new possibilities for a more intensive promotion of the status of women. Improvement in the status of women is of over-all national importance and responsibility for this rests upon the State and all sectors of society. Such an improvement can be realized only if it is carried out in accordance with national needs and conditions, as a sovereign right of each country, without any country imposing its own model.

37. In the traditional and agricultural sectors, the effects of such factors, when associated with rapid displacement and changes in women's basic tertiary activities and a lack of appropriate compensatory measures and especially with the lack of corresponding efforts for the integrated development of rural areas and more intensive integration of women in such development are even more detrimental. In other words, the lack of access to land, credit and financial and technological resources worsens the impact of rapid displacements in the work activities of women.

38. On the one hand, the recent expansion of capital- and technology-intensive and large-scale agricultural estates, often operated by transnational corporations, adversely affect women's work in basic tertiary activities, such as those related to small-scale urban, semi-rural and agricultural trade, which are crucial income-generating activities and are essential for community self-reliance. Indeed, in many cases this process has actually jeopardized food production and the distribution of food and basic subsistence goods. On the other hand, in the modern sectors of developing economies, although the expansion of industries operated by transnational corporations has in certain cases increased employment opportunities for women, it has nevertheless also brought new problems both for women and for over-all development. Care must be taken so that the redeployment of industry in the developing countries is not used as a means of providing cheap labour force, especially the women, or that the redeployment of obsolete and "dirty" industries is not carried

out in the developing countries. Industrialization should be carried out in accordance with the over-all national aims, priorities and aspirations of the developing countries, as a part of a process which will contribute to the transfer of technology in the developing countries. Women's right to participate in and benefit from the industrialization process on equal terms with men must be secured.

39. In fact, there has been some concern about future trends in export oriented industries and their impact on employment in developing countries. Such industries are said to be more sensitive to the needs of the international market than to those of the host countries. Although important for creating employment and providing foreign exchange earnings, in other respects their impact on the domestic economy is minimal, since virtually all their input is imported and all their output exported. The Governments of host countries seem to view such enterprises, for the most part, as short-run solutions to the problem of generating employment but for development over the long run. Governments prefer industries that will engage highly skilled workers. If such long-term plans are actually realized, the employment of women in labour-intensive manufacturing might only be a temporary phase in the industrialization of developing countries.

40. As part of the industrialization and development process, activities of indigenous companies and corporations also have an impact on women and their employment options. Although, in some cases, cottage industries and other forms of small industry are replaced or absorbed by larger entities, these corporations often have a multiplier effect on female employment. Under some circumstances the employment options on women are narrowed by corporate development, while in other instances women thus displaced are eventually absorbed into the newly established larger industries.

41. The processes described above demonstrate that, while traditions, customs and practices greatly hinder the advancement of women, some serious constraints to the economic participation of women in national development are international in nature and derive from the pattern of relationships between developing and developed countries.

42. In many countries at the national level, a comparison of the performances of men and women in every sector of economic and social development shows that the wide gap between the economic opportunities available to men and those open to women has not been reduced in proportion to the increases achieved in over-all economic growth, regardless of the levels of development which vary from country to country, the intensity of the world economic crisis increasingly affecting working people in general. Even in countries where significant increases in general wage employment were obtained, women have failed to share equally in this increase,

while men, due to greater job security, have developed opportunities for sustained employment in the labour force, learned skills and increased their relative wages. Women constitute a substantial and growing proportion of the underemployed sector of the population, especially in the area of intermediary services and activities of the so-called tertiary and informal sectors. In those sectors women workers, like men workers, are often underpaid and receive for the most part extremely low wages; they are also subjected to a high degree of job instability and have, in most countries, no legislative protection and existing labour organizations do not always pay sufficient attention to their needs and demands. Moreover, in most countries, new incentives designed to improve their commitment to the labour force, such as occupational mobility, education or training and infrastructure assistance in the areas of credit and finance, have been inadequate.

II. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

A. The need to include new data and strategies concerning the participation of women in development in the Third United Nations Development Decade

43. The sharpening of the world economic crisis in many countries during the latter half of the Second United Nations Development Decade requires an in-depth reassessment of established strategies and imposes the need for undertaking additional and comprehensive measures, at national and international levels, with a view to the strategy for the Third United Nations Development Decade. The shortfalls of the Second United Nations Development Decade have been linked to major problems related to external debts, insufficient increases in food production (a factor that has also affected industrialization) and inadequate levels and patterns of industrialization. Those failures were said to be further intensified by the low capacity of many countries, particularly developing countries for absorbing their constantly increasing unemployment. Moreover, the major failures in productivity have been linked not only to key international factors but also to inadequate and/or non-existent national policies aimed at maximizing the capacitation and utilization of human resources. In this respect, the need for an in-depth reassessment of strategies concerning the mobilization of women (approximately 50 percent of the adult world population) has been consistently emphasized in recent studies and policy-oriented analyses, particularly at the regional and local levels. The discussion of women's issues at a recent United Nations conference on an area of priority in the new international economic order—namely, the World Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development—has forged a new consensus and action proposals in this area.

44. These new developments are of particular relevance in overcoming the

...ing shortfalls in the agricultural sector where women constitute a large proportion of the labour force. In order to promote integrated rural development, to increase productivity in food and other agricultural commodities, the wages, conditions of employment and training of women, as well as their access to credit, and infrastructural technology in rural areas, should be significantly improved; technologies adapted to the needs of rural women should be developed and made accessible to women. Conditions where under-employment is the only possibility for employment could be eliminated by generating productive employment and development through more uniform geographical distribution of economic projects and social services. To this end, such adverse effects of technology transfer to rural women as exist and such effects of migration as adverse to women should be diminished.

45. The International Development Strategy for the Third United Nations Development Decade should formulate goals, objectives, and policy measures which will contribute to the solution of international economic problems and sustained economic development including the accelerated development of developing countries and reduction of the existing gap between developing and developed countries. It is therefore necessary to expedite the establishment of the New International Economic Order. This goal cannot be achieved unless the inequality between men and women is eliminated. In the formulation and review of strategy for the Third United Nations Development Decade full consideration should be given to conceptualization and review presented in the present Programme of Action as well as in the background documents before the World Conference. Furthermore, this new strategy should also include ways and means of developing new data that can adequately measure the participation of women in the development process in every sector and at every level in order to provide a systematic and effective basis for the establishment of new national, regional and international policies to maximize and facilitate the utilization of the resources of men and the involvement of women as full participants in social life and economic development—this being a precondition for the successful development of each and every country.

...the interrelationship of the objectives of the United Nations Decade for Women and the subtheme of the World Conference: "Employment, Health and Education"

46. The experience of the Decade has clearly revealed that the objectives of equality and peace cannot be realized without unequivocal commitment at national, regional and global levels to women's interests in all aspects of development. The objective of development, which incorporates the principle of socio-economic and

political equality is closely related to stability and peace, which is more than an absence of violence within or between countries. In selecting the subtheme of the World Conference—employment, health and education—it was recognized that these interrelated aspects of development are of crucial concern to the advancement of women. The principles of the right of women to work, to receive equal pay for work of equal value, to be provided with equal opportunities for training and education were clearly stated in the World Plan of Action. It was also stressed that the full participation of women in development required that they should be given adequate and equitable access to health, nutrition and other social services including family planning and child care facilities. In all countries there is need for continuing attention to the implementation of these principles. For the remainder of the Decade, they should be given a high priority in Government planning and programmes.

The level of development depends upon international conditions and national efforts towards integrated development particularly in the fields of employment, health and education, being fields of exceptional significance for the under-developed sectors, of which women constitute the major segment. In fact, the sectors of employment, health and education, especially for women workers in the agricultural and industrial sectors of the economy, offer a stark index of the levels and quality of development in any given country. As reproducers of the labour force, women's socio-economic and health conditions are crucial determinants of the prospects for development. Their employment and educational opportunities not only reflect the extent to which a given society offers women the possibility to develop their full potential and eliminates inequalities but also the extent to which countries are maximizing their endogenous technical and economic resources, especially in times of acute economic crisis which threaten world stability. The strengthening of regional commissions by adequate institutional arrangements which would also ensure intersectoral programming and co-ordination of activities for women is essential. The improvement of linkages among the organizations of the United Nations system with a view to co-ordinating implementation where there are separate programmes is also essential.

Part Two: The Programme of Action at the national level

III. THE NATIONAL TARGETS AND STRATEGIES FOR THE FULL PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN IN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

A. National strategies for accelerating the full participation of women in economic and social development

47. The improvement of the status of women requires action at the national, local and

family levels. It also requires a change of men's and women's attitudes towards their roles and responsibilities in society. The joint responsibility of men and women for the welfare of the family in general and the care of their children in particular must be reaffirmed.

48. Governments should explicitly state their firm commitment to accord high priority to legislative and other measures for accelerating the equal and full participation of women in economic and social development with a view to eliminating the existing inequalities between men and women in all sectors.

49. National strategies should as a matter of urgency integrate women into their efforts towards the New International Economic Order and a new international development strategy for the Third United Nations Development Decade by:

(a) Studying and identifying new areas for national projects that would accelerate socio-economic growth and at the same time enhance the socio-economic participation of women by fostering economic and technical co-operation among countries;

(b) Providing advisory services for accelerating national self-reliance in co-operation with United Nations organizations; also ensuring that women assist in determining that technology transfer has a positive impact on the socio-economic situation and health of women, as well as on their working conditions;

(c) Providing women from the most disadvantaged sectors of the population with the ways and means of increasing their access to infrastructure, basic services and appropriate technology in order to alleviate the heavy workload imposed by the basic requirements and demands of their families and communities, women should also be provided with opportunities to gain new skills and with job opportunities in the construction and maintenance of the above-mentioned services, as well as in other sectors;

(d) Adopting measures to make equal opportunities for development and services available to women in rural areas and to women in urban areas by reversing processes of unequal economic growth, implementing special investment and incentive programmes in disadvantaged sectors, controlling mechanisms for the transfer of resources from one sector to another and, where possible, preventing the rural sector from being impoverished to the advantage of the urban sector.

50. Governments should, where appropriate, design certain special transitional strategies and establish compensatory mechanisms aimed at achieving equality of opportunity in education, employment and health as a means of overcoming existing inequalities in national administration, the educational system, employment, health

services and the like, it being clearly understood that the special strategies are designed to correct imbalances and discrimination and will be phased out when such imbalances and discrimination no longer exist.

1. National development plans and policies

51. Governments should undertake the following:

(a) The establishment of qualitative and quantitative targets for the second half of the United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace; projections for the planning cycles of 1985-1995 should be made where appropriate, and reviews conducted in 1985 and 1990. These should especially seek to remove the gap between the attainments of men and women, between rural and urban women and between all women in underprivileged population groups, and other women in all sectors and particularly in the sections of employment, health and education;

(b) Systematic and sustained linking of efforts to integrate women into national development planning and policies, particularly in the sectors of employment, education and health, and in the allocation of adequate material, technical and personnel resources within each sector of national development;

(c) The establishment of appropriate provisions for monitoring and evaluating the extent to which women participate in and benefit from both general and sectoral development programmes. Reliable data should be collected and technical services provided for periodic reviews of the progress made at all levels of society in every major sector of the national development programmes; targets should be established along with the allocation of physical and financial resources in every development programme, in order to ensure a more just distribution of benefits to women;

(d) The development and improvement of infrastructural technology, basic services and incentives, particularly for the rural sectors of the population and the urban poor; women should be given equal rights of land-ownership, equal access to credit and financing, basic sanitation, safe water and energy resources and the skills to maintain and build community self-reliance. Special attention and additional services should be given to women in the area of health;

(e) Initiate where necessary, as a result of socio-economic conditions, processes of integral agrarian reform, which will subsequently make it possible to implement measures to promote the development of women in rural areas:

(i) To mobilize women, particularly poor women, in rural and urban areas;

(ii) To organize learning and productive activity and access to needed developmental services and inputs (e.g., education, primary health and child care, skill development, credit and marketing facilities);

(iii) To organize working women, including in the unorganized sectors, for protection against exploitation, for socio-occupational mobility through education and training and necessary supportive services for children;

(f) Systematic efforts to promote and assist grass-roots level organizations as one of the instruments of development;

(g) The establishment of incentives and concrete programmes for increasing the participation of women in decision-making processes at all levels and in all spheres of national development;

(h) Wherever possible time-tables should be established for the achievement of particular objectives;

(i) Where appropriate initiate consultations between government and employer and employee organizations as well as community groups to examine and improve conditions for women workers.

2. National machinery

52. Where it does not exist, national machinery preferably at the highest level of government, where appropriate, should be established. By national machinery should be understood not only the establishment of central institutions at the national level but furthermore, where appropriate, the establishment of a comprehensive network of extensions in the form of commissions, offices or posts at different levels, including the local administrative level because of its better capacity for dealing with specific local situations as well as working units in the relevant branches of administration, in order to ensure the effective implementation of action programmes ensuring the equality of men and women with a view to:

(a) Upgrading its capacity and role in national development plans;

(b) Achieving a more central location within the existing institutional arrangements for the formulation and planning of and strict compliance with, policies and programmes and for monitoring their implementation and evaluation;

(c) Conceptualizing women's problems in an integrated manner within each sector of development and at the same time developing effective methodologies, policies and mechanisms for affirmative action, where appropriate, to ensure an integrated approach;

(d) Ensuring the full participation of women in measures taken by government or other agencies.

53. Effective institutional links between national machinery and national planning units as well as national women's organizations, should be established with a view to:

(a) Increasing their decision-making powers;

(b) Increasing their technical, financial and personnel resources;

(c) Advising on new approaches to accelerate the full participation of women in every sector of the development process, according to national priorities;

(d) Drawing up national programme women in the priority areas of employ health and education so as to make possible their full participation at the national level. These should also aim at intensifying of all efforts towards the implementation of technical co-operation among countries development in the areas of science and technology, water and energy resources; among others, in line with the strategy of the Third United Nations Development Decade and the programme of action for the New International Economic Order.

54. Women should be represented on the basis of equality in all bodies and institutions dealing with development, so as to be able to influence national policies at the inception—all this with a view to advancing the status of women and their participation in development.

55. The national machinery should increase the participation of grass-roots organizations, such as women's and youth societies, rural workers' organizations, community organizations, religious groups, neighbourhood associations, as well as unions, both in decision-making and in implementation of projects and in this regard should serve as a liaison unit between appropriate government agencies and grass-roots organizations.

56. The national machinery should implement effective programmes aimed at ensuring that women participate in and benefit from the implementation, at the national, regional and international levels, of the relevant recommendations of such major conferences as the World Employment Conference, the World Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development, the United Nations Conference on Science and Technology for Development, and the International Conference on Primary Health Care.

57. The national machinery should provide appropriate channels of communication between women's organizations and other organizations, in order to:

(a) Help women's groups to obtain financial and technical assistance from international and bilateral funding sources;

(b) Provide reliable data on the socio-economic and political participation of women to both governmental and non-governmental organizations, including those that act as formal and non-formal educational agencies, with a view to sensitizing society to the importance of the contribution to be made by women to development and to inform the public of the obstacles to equality of opportunity.

58. To ensure that the national machinery serves its purpose, it is advisable to carry out studies and interdisciplinary research on the actual status of women, drawing on the experience already acquired in some countries with women's studies programmes.

3. Legislative measures

59. All remaining discriminatory legislative provisions in the social, economic and political spheres and in penal and civil

should be examined with a view to repealing all laws and regulations discriminating against women with regard to rights concerning nationality, inheritance, the ownership and control of property, the freedom of movement of married women, the custody of children and the like, or which inhibit their effective participation in or planning, implementation and evaluation of economic transactions.

60. Governments should develop programmes to inform women of their legal rights and should point out ways in which women can use these rights. Where appropriate, Governments should establish commissions to assess women's legal rights and the establishment of priorities for legislative measures and to identify, specify and classify the necessary legislative measures that have not yet been enacted.

61. In countries where large sections of the population are governed by customary law, Governments should carry out investigations into the degree of protection or oppression and amount of discrimination experienced by women under customary law, in order to deal with or reject such practices by statutory legislation at an appropriate time.

62. Governments should implement the provisions of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.

63. Procedures should be provided—or, where they already exist, strengthened—for effectively implementing social legislation, especially that affecting parents.

64. The protection of the social function of parenthood and of maternity must be guaranteed in legislation. Both in the public and in the private sector, the definition of maternity leave should be understood to be the period which is required by expectant mothers for the protection of their health before childbirth and by mothers for the recovery of their health after childbirth. Recognizing that the raising of children is a joint responsibility of parents and the community at large, efforts should be made to provide for parental leave, available to either parent.

65. Legislation should also be enacted and implemented in order to prevent domestic and sexual violence against women. All appropriate measures including legislative ones should be taken to allow victims to be fairly treated in all criminal procedures.

66. Educational and informational programmes on the socio-economic implications of laws should be launched among various professional groups, especially the legal and judicial professions, in order to prevent, where possible, the law from being applied inequitably.

67. Programmes of counselling and legal aid should be developed and implemented to enable women, especially those from the disadvantaged sectors, to have effective protection through legislation. Broad programmes to publicize legislation should also be implemented to make women and, in particular, those from the poorest sectors aware of their rights and obligations and of

the institutional guarantees therefor.

68. The necessary steps should be taken to ratify or accede to all international instruments of the United Nations and its specialized agencies that deal with women's rights, in particular the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. Those affecting the poor, such as those concerning the rights of rural and agricultural women workers, are particularly important.

4. Participation in the political and other decision-making processes, and participation in efforts to promote international co-operation and strengthen peace

Participation in the political and other decision-making processes

69. Every effort should be made to enact, before the end of the Decade, legislation guaranteeing women the right to vote, to be eligible for election or appointment to public office and to exercise public functions on equal terms with men, wherever such legislation does not already exist. In particular, political parties should be encouraged to nominate women candidates in positions that give them the possibility equally with men to be elected.

70. Governments and the organizations concerned should foster knowledge of civil and political rights, promote and encourage political organizations which carry out programmes involving the participation of women and implement broad programmes for the training of political officials.

71. Governments and political parties should, where appropriate, establish goals, strategies and time-tables and undertake special activities for increasing, by certain percentages, the number of women in elective and appointive public offices and public functions at all levels, in order that they be equitably represented.

72. Special governmental instructions should be issued for achieving equitable representation of women in the different branches of Government and in departments at the national, state and local levels. Special activities should be undertaken to increase the recruitment, nomination and promotion of women, especially to decision-making and policy-making positions, by publicizing posts more widely, increasing upward mobility and so on, until equitable representation of women is achieved. Reports should be compiled periodically on the numbers of women in public service and the levels of responsibility in their areas of work.

73. Women should be equitably represented at all levels, especially the senior levels, in delegations to international bodies, conferences and committees dealing with political, economic and legal questions, disarmament and other similar issues. Governments should encourage and support increased employment of women at all levels, technical and professional, in the Secretariat of the United Nations and its subordinate organs and specialized agencies.

74. Where special qualifications for

holding public office are required, they should apply to both sexes equally and should relate only to the expertise necessary for performing the specific functions of the office.

75. Special attention should be given to ensuring that formal or informal practices which result in *de facto* discrimination against women in the selection of candidates for political office or in their exclusion from formal decision-making, particularly in bodies such as public councils, boards or informal committees, should be eliminated.

Participation of women in efforts to promote international co-operation and strengthen peace

76. Women of the entire world should participate in the broadest way in the struggle to strengthen international peace and security to broaden international co-operation and develop friendly relations among nations, to achieve detente in international relations and disarmament, to establish a new economic order in international relations, to promote guarantees of fundamental freedoms and human rights, and in the struggle against colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism, *apartheid*, foreign domination, foreign oppression, foreign occupation. High priority should be given to providing training and educational opportunities at all levels. These might include university or college courses, lectures on international affairs, panel discussions, conferences, seminars and other educational activities.

77. Solidarity campaigns with women struggling against colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism, racial discrimination and *apartheid* and for national independence and liberation must be intensified; such women should receive all possible assistance including support from agencies of the United Nations system as well as other organizations.

78. The efforts of intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to strengthen international peace and security must be intensified in every way. The active participation of women in the activities of such organizations must be supported. Exchange between the national organizations of different countries in favour of international co-operation and the strengthening of peace should be promoted.

79. Intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations must examine more comprehensively the consequences of disarmament for social and economic development in general and for improving the status of women in particular. The results of such studies must be made available to as many women and men as possible and must be given practical effect.

80. In view of the importance of eliminating international inequities, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations should continue to study the impact of the activities of transnational corporations on the status of women and to make use of the results of such studies in practical programmes.

81. Governments should also be made

aware of the results of such studies so that they realize and prevent the negative effects on the status of women which are caused by the activities of transnational corporations, as is the case in South Africa where transnational corporations sustain the system of *apartheid* by their investments.

82. Support should be provided by all women of the world in proclaiming solidarity with and support for the Palestinian women and people in their struggle for their fundamental rights. Moral and material assistance should be extended by the United Nations system to help Palestinian women. Specific programmes and projects should be carried out to fulfill that aim.

5. Measures relating to education and the dissemination of information

83. Independent organizations, including women's organizations at the national, regional and international levels, should study the ways in which the mass communications media, including the news media and advertising, treat the status of women and women's issues. Evidence that women are being treated in a sexist or demeaning way should be brought to the attention of the relevant media for correction.

84. Every effort should be made to encourage the fullest and most active participation of women at all levels of policy-making and decision-making within media organizations. Governments should use the opportunities they have by way of appointments, to regulatory bodies and broadcasting networks, to ensure that women are equally represented in senior decision-making.

85. Special efforts, for example, training programmes to sensitize media personnel at all levels, should be made to ensure that women are portrayed as persons in their own right and that the portrayal of women and women's issues reflects women's rights, needs and interests.

86. Educational programmes and campaigns using the media should be instituted in order to eliminate prejudices and traditional attitudes that limit the full participation of women in society. Such campaigns should also inform women and men of their rights and ways of exercising them. Women's organizations and other non-governmental organizations, political parties and trade unions should play an active role in the process of educating women politically in order to increase their capacities for participation in decision-making bodies. Special attention should be given to the role the media can play to reach the migrant women. Women should also have access to training in the use of various forms of the media, in order to be able to present to as wide a public as possible their own perceptions of their needs, ideas and aspirations.

87. Governments should encourage the mass media to support the increased involvement of women in efforts to strengthen international co-operation and peace and to broadcast programmes to make women more aware of the activities and positions of their

Governments in vital questions of international affairs, thus enabling them to fulfill their roles towards strengthening international peace and security and against colonialism, racism, racial discrimination, foreign aggression and occupation and all forms of foreign domination.

88. Special campaigns should be undertaken to encourage the increased participation of women and girls in rural community and youth development programmes and in political activities.

89. The mass media should *promote* the Programme of Action for the second half of the United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace, as well as other international, regional and national programmes for women, so that the public is made aware of such programmes and thus participate to a greater extent in their implementation.

90. Bearing in mind the fact that one of the impediments to promoting the status of women lies in social attitudes and re-evaluation of women in society, the mass media offer great possibilities as one means of promoting social change. They can help remove prejudices and stereotypes, accelerate the acceptance of the new role of women in society and promote their role as equal partners in the process of development.

91. In all fields of activity, the mass media should become one of the basic means in society of overcoming the contradiction in, on the one hand, the presentation of women as passive, inferior beings having no social significance and, on the other hand, an accurate picture of their increasing role and contribution to society at large. The mass media should also recognize that both parents have equal duties and responsibilities for the training and education of children and for household duties. Governments, as communicators, in preparing communications to or about their countries should ensure that output will reflect government commitment to status of women's issues and concerns.

6. Improvement of the data base

92. All data-collecting agencies should give a sex and age breakdown of any information they gather, wherever relevant.

93. Some of the concepts and analytical tools of research, particularly those relating to economic processes—evaluation, labour, work, employment, social productivity, household, family and the like—should be re-examined so as to improve tools for the analysis and conceptualization of the economic and social roles of women within the home and outside.

94. Priority should be given to research concerning those groups of women that have been neglected in social research—namely, rural workers in agriculture and allied activities and working women from the underprivileged sectors of society. These are women who, far from being the dependents they have generally been assumed to be, have always had to perform multiple roles in order to ensure the survival of their

families. For better evaluation of development programmes, access to and utilization of data need to be ensured.

95. National and regional indicators should be developed and improved for determining the degree to which women have actually been participating in development, as a means of measuring their actual contribution to the development process. A set of statistical indicators should be established by which progress towards equality between the sexes can be monitored. In establishing such a set of indicators, Governments will need to take into account the current state of their country's statistical development as well as their individual policy priorities. A system should be devised to place a monetary value on unpaid work to facilitate its reflection in the gross national product.

96. The level of economic growth in general and the sectoral structure of that growth, should be established so as to determine employment openings. Data on the composition of populations (e.g., age structure and the relation between rural and other sectors of a population) must be collected so that the need for employment openings, health services and education can be identified.

97. Current statistical operations and practices should be reviewed to ensure that they are free from sex-based stereotypes.

98. Where appropriate, permanent advisory committees to national statistical authorities should be established to improve the quantity and relevance of data pertaining to the situation of women, their participation in development and equality between the sexes. The work of such advisory committees may be supplemented from time to time by the organization of larger meetings of users and producers of statistics to address specific issues of mutual concern.

99. Research and testing of new or revised concepts and classifications should be designed or expanded to improve the usefulness and relevance of the statistics needed to describe the role and status of women, their participation in the development process and equality between the sexes. Such research and testing, whether carried out by the national statistical services or by university or other research groups, would need to involve both the users and producers of such statistics and would need to encompass both methods and procedures for data collection and those for the analysis and presentation of data.

7. Role of non-governmental organizations

100. There should be mutual co-operation between Governments and non-governmental organizations, women's and youth groups, employers and workers unions, voluntary agencies, community organizations, including religious groups, the mass communication media, political parties and the like, in implementing the programme of action for the second half of the Decade.

101. Governments should take account

the activities of non-governmental organizations and should support where appropriate the efforts of all relevant organizations, institutions and other associations concerned with the welfare and status of women.

102. Governments should recognize the importance of the role of women's organizations, encourage and assist them and promote them with financial and other assistance, particularly at the grass-roots level, to enable them to perform their functions which include activities such as:

- (a) The mass mobilization of women in particular, poor women in rural and urban areas;
- (b) The provision of all development services and facilities (education, health and social care, expansion of credit and marketing capabilities and facilities, information on social, political and economic rights, etc.);
- (c) The establishment of organizations for women workers in non-trade union occupations both in rural and urban areas as a means of protecting them against exploitation and providing the necessary auxiliary social care services.

103. With regard to the follow-up of the World Conference of the United Nations Decade for Women, Governments should:

- a) Make possible the publication and dissemination of the results of the World Conference and of the NGO Forum;
- b) Enable non-governmental groups to become involved in the realization of the programme of action for the second half of the Decade;
- c) Consider the role and resource of non-governmental groups in the implementation of international, regional and national plans for improvement of women's conditions;
- d) Consider as a plan for the future, to establish strategies for implementation, to report and particular recommendations of non-governmental groups;
- e) Give financial resources to non-governmental groups so that these groups can render a contribution towards the implementation of the programme of action.

104. Non-governmental organizations should support governmental efforts by:

- a) Investigating the problems of different groups of women;
- b) Assisting and promoting organizations of women at the grass-roots level, especially those established among poor and uneducated women, to promote learning and productive and other developmental activities;
- c) Providing liaison services for such groups with educational and other development agencies;
- d) Promoting attitudinal change among men and women;
- e) Promoting solidarity among women's groups;
- f) Influencing and informing the mass media and political groups;
- g) Developing new analytical methodology;

(h) Launching programmes and activities to serve, in particular, rural women;

(i) Promoting public acceptance of family planning, including sex education;

(j) Informing their members of government policies and development plans as well as the international standards and programmes for improving the situation of women.

8. Grass-roots organizations

105. In accordance with the Regional Plans of Action and with a view to implementing the World Plan of Action, Governments and agencies on other levels should, where appropriate, promote the establishment of grass-roots organizations of women as an integral part of their over-all development efforts and should provide adequate financial and personnel resources for such efforts to succeed. Such grass-roots organizations of women will serve as forums for women to develop self-reliance and will eventually enable women to obtain real access to resources and power and to shoulder greater socio-economic and political responsibilities within their communities and their societies.

B. Objectives and priority areas for action taken in connexion with the subtheme of the World Conference, "Employment, health and education"

Introduction

106. The objectives and priority areas of action for improving the employment, health and education status of women in every country have to be promoted within the over-all context of national planning and development for the whole population. Improvement in the condition of women in these areas is also instrumental in the development of the country. Furthermore, the improvements in any one of these sectors also affect the situation in other sectors. Recognition of this interrelated nature of the programmes is essential if their effectiveness is to be maximized. Socio-cultural values should not suffer as a result of physical economic development. Therefore, integrated and innovative programmes and new methodologies should be explored.

107. The programmes should also invariably include measures for building the capacities of women themselves by their training and information programmes and by their organizing themselves, with the assistance of Government and other socio-political forces, to make full use of new opportunities, policies and programmes.

108. To ensure that labour policies and action taken in favour of women workers form part of over-all employment policies and measures for the entire working population, men and women alike, with a view to overcoming the problems that affect women only and preventing measures of protection which discriminate against them. To include in employment policies for underprivileged population groups, such as urban fringe groups, the low-income sector and indigenous population groups, references to the specific situation of women workers.

1. Employment

Objectives

109. To promote full and equal opportunities and treatment for women in employment, bearing in mind that this requires that both women and men have the possibility to combine paid work with household responsibilities and the caring for children. To ensure that women and men receive equal remuneration for work of equal value and equal educational and training opportunities in both rural and urban areas, so that women might secure more highly skilled employment and become integrated into the development of their countries with a view to more rapid and balanced growth in agriculture, industry and other non-traditional sectors, with the aim of ensuring better over-all working conditions for women, in order to achieve more rapid and balanced growth in both agriculture and industry in order to integrate women in development.

110. To increase and promote employment opportunities for women as part of national efforts to bring about a more just international economic order, with a view to achieving national self-reliance, increasing economic and technical co-operation among developing countries and the full utilization of the labour force for their own benefit and to promote the socio-economic development of their own countries.

111. To improve the working conditions and occupational mobility of women workers in the lower and middle levels of the sectors in which the majority of women work.

112. To ensure equal rights and opportunities for the gainful employment of rural women both in agricultural and non-agricultural jobs under proper working conditions, improve the capabilities and productivity of rural women workers, increase food production, diminish migration in countries where this is necessary and whose population policies contain explicit provisions to this effect, promote rural development and strengthening of self-reliance programmes; to extend labour and social security legislation to women working in agriculture.

113. To promote effective policies to increase employment opportunities, to improve existing ones and enable women to obtain jobs involving more skills and responsibility, particularly at the managerial level, in all sectors of the economy to promote occupational mobility for women, in both rural and urban areas, by encouraging the provision of maternity protection, child-care facilities, technical training and health protection, with a view to achieving the industrialization targets for the third United Nations Development Decade.

114. To facilitate paid employment of women by encouraging increased involvement of males in sharing domestic and child care responsibilities.

115. To take measures for the implementation of legislation relating to working conditions for women.

116. To formulate and implement national and local training and employment

programmes and projects, which take particular account of the need to give women access to gainful economic activity and to improve their employment situation in priority areas for the economic and social development of their countries.

117. To adopt measures to ensure that women's entry into certain sectors of the labour market does not result in lowering the working conditions, remuneration and status of those sectors.

118. To promote technology to improve the labour productivity of women while decreasing their work time and to guarantee that women workers are the ones who benefit from such an improvement.

119. To review implicit and explicit job evaluation criteria with a view to overcoming difficulties and obstacles to the job advancement and careers of women.

120. To ensure that, in all sectors, the economic returns from women's work accrue directly to them.

Priority areas for action

121. Special action should be taken to institute programmes which would inform women workers of their rights under legislation and other remedial measures. The importance of freedom of association and the protection of the right to organize should be emphasized, this being particularly relevant to the position of women in employment. Special measures should be taken to ratify and implement in national legislation the relevant conventions and recommendations of the International Labour Organisation concerning the rights of women as regards access to equal employment opportunities, equal pay for work of equal value, working conditions, job security and maternity protection.

122. Information programming should be instituted aimed at making women, especially in the rural areas and from socio-economically disadvantaged groups, aware of employment opportunities and of the opportunities for education, training and skill acquisition.

123. Measures should be taken to ensure that development agencies in different sectors of national planning include larger numbers of women in their staff as a matter of policy and, as part of that policy, allocate resources to programmes for women's employment and training, the provision of supporting services and other essential inputs.

124. Legislative and/or other measures should be adopted and implemented which guarantee women protection against any sexually-oriented practice that endangers a woman's access to or maintenance of employment, that undermines her job performance and thus threatens her economic livelihood.

125. Legislative and/or other measures should be adopted and implemented to secure for men and women the same right to work, to unemployment benefits as well as to prohibit, through *inter alia* the imposition of sanctions, dismissal on the grounds of pregnancy or of maternity leave and discrimination in dismissals on the basis of

marital status. Legislative and other measures should be adopted and implemented to facilitate the return to the labour market of women who have left it for family reasons and to guarantee the right of women to return to work after maternity leave.

126. Measures should be taken to ensure on a basis of equality of men and women the right to protection of health and to safety in working conditions, including the safeguarding of the function of reproduction. Special protection should be provided to women during pregnancy in types of work proved to be harmful to them.

127. Measures should be taken to ensure that migrant workers enjoy equal treatment and access to vocational training as nationals of the host country, and to improve the status of women who, in the process of migration, accompany the migrant workers as members of their family.

128. Ways should be investigated in which the unpaid work in the household and in agricultural tasks which women and men do in all fields can be recognized and reflected in official statistical data collections.

129. Urgently needed infrastructure services should be developed and provided such as adequate housing, safe water, energy and child care centres, for families and poor communities in rural areas and urban slums, in order to alleviate the workload traditionally imposed on women in their performance of tasks essential for the survival of their communities, and to increase their levels of gainful employment and productivity, it being understood that the benefits of higher productivity should accrue to women workers and their families.

130. Where appropriate, flexible formal or informal training programs should be designed and implemented for women in non-traditional areas in order to widen their employment opportunities and to enable them to generate income through production of goods and services.

131. The access of women to special technical training programmes should be increased and women so qualified should be helped to obtain jobs suited to their individual skills; legislative measures should be enacted and appropriate legal assistance provided to prevent exploitation based on sex, race, age, marital status or motherhood in both the traditional and modern sectors. In addition, measures should be taken to ensure that women are introduced, on the same footing as men, to new types of training in the advanced technologies which are now being widely developed.

132. Measures should be taken to provide for part-time workers levels of remuneration and social security benefits which are proportional to those of full-time workers, and the same levels of working conditions and standards of protection.

133. Where necessary, measures should be taken to develop and/or accelerate much-needed changes in policies in the tertiary sector, which includes the informal

subsectors of small-scale trading, domestic services and the like in both urban and rural areas, especially by (a) extending the coverage of labour legislation in particular for domestic services workers; (b) guaranteeing the right to organize trade unions and of appropriate organizations such as credit marketing co-operatives controlled by the women concerned; and (c) increasing access to managerial and technical training and financial resources, credit facilities and other inputs in order to improve the working conditions of women and increase their occupational and educational mobility as well as their productivity and economic return.

134. Measures should be adopted which guarantee that, when transfers of technology take place, account is taken of the factors of production available in the country which the transfers are made in order to avoid any labour force disruptions, which usually affect women more severely. Promote research on appropriate endogenous technology which takes account of national characteristics and, in particular, those of developing countries. Develop new programmes and appropriate policies with regard to industrialization and the transfer of technology aimed at maximizing benefits and preventing adverse effects from the transfer of technology on both the employment, training, health and nutrition of women and over-all development. Standards should be instituted to ensure that technologies transferred are safe for utilization, recipient countries be alerted of the hazards of particular forms of technology.

135. Studies should be carried out on the policies, programmes of action and expanding operations of transnational corporations to ensure that they offer greater employment opportunities for women and to prevent their negative effects.

136. The access of women workers to recreation and culture should be increased since their double workload prevents them from having enough necessary free time; it is therefore essential that household and family care should be shared by men; special emphasis should be placed on the facilitation of couples to share household tasks with a view to facilitating the access of women to gainful employment.

137. Measures should be taken to ensure that in economic recessions the employment market is not less accessible to women than to men. Measures taken under social legislation concerning unemployment should not directly or indirectly lead to inequality between women and men. Retraining facilities should be provided for unemployed women, preferably in growth sectors.

138. To ensure that women and men are able to harmonize their occupational activities with their family life, child care facilities and amenities for adolescents should be provided, the length of the working day be reduced and flexible working hours introduced.

139. The number of women at the decision-making level in both national and

international workers' organizations and advisory bodies should be increased at least so that the proportion corresponds to the number of women exercising a profession.

140. Equal employment opportunity programmes should be developed to promote the access of women to all levels of management and decision-making positions and to devise effective programmes to promote the access of women and girls to non-traditional skilled trades.

2. Health

Objectives

141. To improve the physical and mental health of all members of society through:

(a) An improvement in the health status of men and women, as a necessary aspect of over-all socio-economic development;

(b) Formulation of demographic policies;

(c) An improvement in health care for women throughout their life cycles;

(d) The increased participation of women and men, not only as beneficiaries of the promotion of health but also in the formulation and implementation of policy decisions regarding health at community and national levels;

(e) Studies of the causes of diseases, the establishment of clinical and epidemiological research programmes and the organization of services to deal with national problems;

(f) The development of policies and programmes aimed at the elimination of all forms of violence against women and children and the protection of women of all ages from the physical and mental abuse resulting from domestic violence, sexual assault, sexual exploitation and any other form of abuses;

(g) Training human resources for health programmes of the required quantity and quality;

(h) The inclusion of the mental health aspect as well as alcoholic and drug programmes as part of over-all health programmes for women.

Priority areas for action

142. Promote primary health care with the participation of the communities as the overriding health priority and as a fundamental vehicle for achieving the health goals and objectives of the World Plan of Action.

143. Give high priority to meeting the health and needs of women within primary health care, with particular attention to the special needs of women in rural and depressed urban areas and monitor health programmes in order to secure that women's health needs are properly met.

144. Formulate official policies to involve women in planning and carrying out health programmes at all levels particularly to increase the participation of women at decision-making levels.

145. Ensure accessibility for all women to maternal health care (including care during pregnancy and childbirth and post-natal care), nutrition (including measures to combat nutritional anaemias), family planning, prevention and treatment of infectious

diseases—including sexually transmitted and non-communicable diseases—and parasitic diseases, through the establishment of a comprehensive family health, nutrition and health education network, in order to give women better access to health care.

146. Develop, implement and strengthen child welfare and family planning programmes and family planning information for inclusion also in school curricula for girls and boys on safe and acceptable fertility regulation methods so that both men and women can take the responsibility for family planning to promote the health, safety and welfare of mothers and infants and to enable women to exercise the right to decide freely and responsibly for the number and spacing of their children. Family planning should be facilitated as one means of reducing maternal and infant mortality where high risk factors prevail, such as high parity, too frequent pregnancies, pregnancies at the extremes of the reproductive age and the frequency and danger of secretly performed abortions.

147. To promote the physical and mental well-being of women, make provision for additional research over the next few years to facilitate analysis and assessment of the status of women.

148. Develop programmes to improve the training and utilization of community health workers, especially women, traditional medical practitioners and birth attendants and elderly village women; support women in their contribution to primary health care both within the family and the community particularly with reference to self-care and self-reliance in health.

149. Draw the attention of doctors and other health professionals to the health needs of women in general, not only in relation to pregnancy and childbirth; emphasize preventive medicine and the need to share responsibility and decision-making with professionals in other disciplines and with women themselves.

150. Establish official incentive policies to give women greater access to training in the medical professions and in health-related research in accordance with local and national needs.

151. Develop simple economic, social and cultural indicators in order to obtain better data on trends in morbidity and mortality among women and their access to and utilization of health services. Establish a national basic health information system to provide up-to-date and reliable indicators of prevailing conditions, future trends and resource productivity.

152. Give high priority to the formulation and implementation of food and nutrition policies based on the needs of women, particularly pregnant and lactating women, and those of women and children of lower socio-economic status in both rural and depressed urban areas; establish educational programmes through professional schools and community agencies to improve the

quality, availability, preparation, preservation, rational use of and distribution of food, especially locally grown food.

153. Protect the health and safety of women and their families from contamination, spoilage and adulteration of foods, harmful additives and preservatives, mislabelling, deceptive packaging and irresponsible promotion of foods of low nutritional value and of breast milk substitutes. High priority should be given to the enactment and enforcement of comprehensive legislation, where appropriate, and the creation of appropriate standards of safety, health, product information and quality, including standards for the preparation, preservation, packaging and labelling of foods and other products sold in the markets. Women and men should be instructed as to the right and hygienic use of such products. Information as to the right to such protection should be widely disseminated through schools, the media, and village and community organizations.

154. Develop explicit programmes at national and local levels to improve hygiene, sanitation and access to safe water supplies and shelter as fundamental bases for good health.

155. Develop policies to ensure a safe working environment both in the home and in the work place and provide appropriate technology to relieve the workload of women. Carry out specific studies on labour hygiene and safety, particularly in branches of activity in which the health of women might be affected.

156. Introduce legislation aimed at eliminating occupational health hazards likely to affect reproductive functions, reducing environmental pollution, and controlling disposal of toxic chemicals and radioactive waste.

157. Promote extensive health education programmes, including special efforts to encourage positive traditional practices, especially breastfeeding, and to combat negative practices detrimental to women's health.

158. Formulate specific programmes for the prevention of maternal and infant mortality, giving priority to depressed rural and urban areas and to most vulnerable population groups.

159. Encourage formulation and implementation of social support measures such as maternity and parental leave, child care, breastfeeding breaks, etc. to enable women and men to carry out parental roles in the most optimal and healthy manner.

160. Direct special attention to the needs of elderly women, women living alone and disabled women.

161. Establish programmes giving full medical attention to adolescent women, since adolescence is a critical time in women's biological and psychological development and also involves a change in their relationship to the social environment in which they live.

162. Prevent mutilation practices

which damage women's bodies and health.

163. Promote research into the extent and the causes of domestic violence with a view to eliminating it; take measures to eliminate glorification of violence against and sexual exploitation of women in the mass media, literature and advertising; provide effective help for women and children who are victims of violence, e.g., by the establishment of centres for treatment, shelter and counselling victims of violence and sexual assault.

164. Formulate a plan of action for the protection of women against abuse of alcohol, tobacco and drugs and also excessive use of certain medicaments, principally by informing them of the hazards these substances present for them and their children.

3. Education and training

Objectives

165. To provide equal access to educational and training opportunities at all levels of all types for girls and women in all sectors of society, thus enabling them fully to develop their personalities and to participate on an equal footing with men in furthering the socio-economic aims of national planning and to achieve self-reliance, family well-being and improve the quality of life.

166. To contribute to a change in attitudes by abolishing traditional stereotypes of men's and women's roles and stimulating the creation of new and more positive images of women's participation in the family, the labour market and in social and public life.

167. To take into consideration in educational programmes and methodologies the special perspective of education for non-violence, mainly with regard to relationships between women and men.

168. Include in educational programmes and methodologies a special emphasis on education against violence, particularly violence in relationships between women and men.

169. To provide for women and girls innovative programmes and methodologies which stimulate creative development, promote the right to freedom and develop the ability to communicate for the eradication of illiteracy, while at the same time upgrading functional skills and basic information about employment and health-related matters as well as their political, economic and social rights.

170. To establish transitional links between school life, apprenticeship and working life, whenever possible, in order to insure for women and girls better interaction between education, training and employment.

171. Formulate and implement educational programmes with final-year courses adapted to the specific needs of the economic and social development of the country, designed to improve and increase the access of women to gainful employment and give them opportunities to take part in non-traditional activities.

172. To increase the opportunities and facilities which promote participation of women in science and technology through education and training in these fields.

173. To devise means to encourage girls to stay at school longer and to ensure that courses chosen by girls are in a range of fields including the professions, management, economics and the sciences which will enable them to achieve positions of influence in the decision-making process.

Priority areas for action

174. Education, specifically literacy, being a key to national development and a major requisite for improving the status of women, efforts should be made to establish targets for the abolition of differentials in the literacy and educational attainment rates for girls and boys within over-all national efforts to increase literacy and education for the whole population.

175. To promote national educational accreditation and equivalency programmes designed to encourage the return of women and girls who have dropped out into the formal education system.

176. Promote education programmes for children, particularly those of pre-school age, as well as young people, aimed at strengthening women's contribution to society and at changing the traditional roles assigned by social and cultural norms to women and men.

177. Establish targets for the expansion of educational opportunities and facilities for women, including courses and institutions with adequate personnel and materials, for which resources have been earmarked.

178. Provide new formal and extracurricular education to enable women to combine their household duties with the opportunity to improve their educational level.

179. Encourage, through legislation, free and compulsory education for girls and boys at the primary level, with the provision of assistance to establish co-education when possible. Provide trained teachers of both sexes and, if necessary, transportation and boarding facilities.

180. Increase the enrolment of female students in education courses and, in particular, in science, mathematics and technical courses, and in management training courses in the areas of science and technology, especially by encouraging them to enrol in such courses.

181. Provide for equal access to all levels of general education, vocational education and training for all types of occupations, including those traditionally accessible to men, and to new training schemes and other facilities such as on-the-job training, scholarships, inexpensive boarding and lodging facilities and accessible child care arrangements, ensuring equal job opportunities after completion of vocational education or training for both entry and re-entry, after a period of absence, into professional life.

182. Examine curricula and learning materials with a view to removing sex-bias

and the stereotyped portrayal of the role of girls and women and promote the development of non-sexist resources and circular materials.

183. Establish targets for the nationwide implementation of the learning materials developed to optimize the potential women for countries which have started the work since 1975.

184. Include courses on women's issues in university degree programmes.

185. Develop programmes at the secondary, tertiary and adult education levels to encourage a basic understanding of human rights, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other relevant instruments. Such courses should stress the fundamental importance of the elimination of discrimination on the basis of race and sex.

186. Train guidance counsellors and teachers to assist girls and boys in choosing professions according to their personal capacities and not according to stereotypical sex roles.

187. Design and promote teacher training courses to alert teachers to the stereotyped assumptions which inhibit choice in school subjects and to the need to widen the options available to women and girls in their future training and occupational choices. Provide, whenever possible, counselling services for the benefit of parents, teachers and pupils as well as for workers and employers.

188. Encourage parity of men and women in teaching and administrative positions at all levels of education.

189. Identify the situational constraints on different culturally or socially underprivileged target groups (e.g., girls of school age who are not attending school, literate adults or adults who are engaged in home responsibilities and need additional or diversified education, working women of different age groups in rural and urban areas, mature women and immigrant women) and formulate and implement programmes for such groups.

190. Monitor programmes and take measures to improve the data on drop-out rates of girls and women and causes, course content and levels of skills acquired, in order to facilitate the introduction of remedial or accelerated measures and to generate greater commitment to the policy objectives within the system.

191. Where appropriate, provide for particular target groups, giving priority to those needing them most, counselling and supportive services and certain necessities (childcare, earning and learning schemes, transport, clothing, books, supplementary nutrition, reading centres, special tuition in basic subjects such as mathematics, scholarships and stipends and the like), based on situational analyses, and include resources for such services as priority items in educational budgets.

192. Provide for education for women in the context of life-long education in all major development sectors, in developed and developing countries, and take specific

measures for the necessary funds and personnel.

193. Promote instruction and interdisciplinary research on women and the implications of the goals of the Decade as an input to the educational process, particularly in institutions of higher and teacher education, in order to draw on the experience already acquired in some countries with women's status and to eliminate all attitudinal and conceptual biases and prejudices, especially those relating to class, that hinder understanding of the role and situation of women.

194. Urge Governments to encourage women to enrol in all their technical institutes and to promote, through every means available to them, the establishment of immediate technical courses.

Priority areas requiring special attention

1. Food

Objectives

195. To enhance and stimulate the key role performed by women in all phases of the process of food production and their contribution to the economic and social development of their countries, at the same time raising their status.

196. To ensure proper planning of the agricultural production sector so that the agricultural output covers as a matter of priority the supply of products that are socially and nationally necessary for the nutrition and food requirements of women in rural areas.

Priority areas for action

197. Governments should adopt the necessary measures to:

(a) Promote the incorporation of women in all phases of the agricultural productive process, including post harvesting processing, up to and including the marketing of products;

(b) Provide women with the necessary skills and appropriate technology to enable them to participate better in the process of subsistence food production;

(c) Establish a link between food production and food consumption processes by providing information on the nutrients required for the development of the population and in particular of children and by making rural women aware of the need for proper nourishment. Eliminate inappropriate consumption patterns which have developed as a result of ignorance or manipulation by commercial advertising;

(d) Promote the participation of women, especially in rural areas, in agricultural policy-making, leading to the production of basic foods for family and national consumption;

(e) Ensure access to and use of appropriate technological model of agricultural production for both sexes without distinction;

(f) Stimulate the participation and full voting rights of women in co-operatives and other forms of organization relating to the

production, processing, distribution, marketing and consumption of basic food products;

(g) Ensure access for women in conditions of equality with men to financing mechanisms covering all phases of production, up to and including the marketing of food products;

(h) Support forms of marketing of basic foods for family consumption which will be conducive to the opening up of priority markets for the sale of their products.

2. Rural women

Objectives

198. Enhance the effective contribution of rural women to the economic and social development of their countries who are hampered by reason of their inadequate access to appropriate technology; by the inadequate social infrastructures in rural areas; as well as by the double workload they bear through their participation in working the land and their performance of household duties.

199. Improve the living conditions of women in rural areas, and to this end:

(a) Acknowledge the contribution which women make to the economic and social development of their countries, and take steps to ensure that rural women participate equally and effectively in the development process as beneficiaries and as agents for change by affording them participation as policy-makers, organizers and implementers of development programmes;

(b) Give rural women at all levels access to formal and non-formal courses in leadership and decision-making, as well as to programmes that teach skills appropriate to their lifestyle and skills which could be utilized, if necessary, for paid employment;

(c) Provide rural women with basic human needs including clean water supplies, effective sanitation, adequate food and nutrition, basic health services, shelter and appropriate fuel supplies. They should have access to formal and non-formal education programmes, which should be available at minimum cost and inconvenience to already overburdened women. They should also have assured access to technology at all levels, particularly in relation to food storage and preservation, transport and marketing and labour-saving tools and devices;

(d) Provide rural women access to improved transport and communication systems, and to all forms of media;

(e) Extend to all rural women free and equal access to credit facilities where these are available;

(f) Aid donor countries and recipient Governments should consult on ways of developing programmes at the village level to involve local women in their planning and implementation. Care should be taken to ensure that development assistance programmes do not exclude women from technological training.

Priority areas for action

200. Governments should adopt the necessary measures to:

(a) Eliminate from legislation on rural development, where necessary, provisions that discriminate against women;

(b) Make rural women aware of their rights and duties so that they can exercise and benefit from them;

(c) Ensure access for rural women to the use, enjoyment and development of land, in conditions of equality with men, by according to women the same practical and legal rights as those of men in access to ownership and the use and management of land, in the production of goods from land by means of agriculture or grazing and in the disposal of any such products or of the land itself;

(d) Allocate sufficient financial resources to carry out research, especially field research, which will provide a sound basis for initiating, expanding and strengthening concrete and integrated actions aimed at promoting the development of rural women and their integration in economic and social activity in rural areas;

(e) Examine carefully the possibility of devising statistics which measure rural women's contribution on an equal basis with men's, including labour in the sphere of agricultural production, unpaid family labour and food production for family consumption, as well as to monitor the impact of development so that negative and unforeseen consequences, such as increased workload and loss of income earning opportunities, can be identified;

(f) Provide rural women with the appropriate technology and suitable training to enable them to improve and promote their traditional small-scale in-home industries;

(g) Encourage the participation of rural women, in all forms of social organization of labour, with a view to their achieving, *inter alia*, control over their wage levels participation in the production process and greater equality in working conditions;

(h) Foster the effective participation of rural women in the cultural, political, economic and social activities of the community;

(i) Create and strengthen the necessary infrastructure to lighten the workload of rural women, through, *inter alia*, the application of appropriate technology but ensuring that such measures do not result in occupational displacement of women;

(j) Design and carry out literacy and training campaigns for specific rural areas promoting the effective participation of women in such campaigns;

(k) Improve employment opportunities for women in agricultural and non-agricultural jobs in rural areas by providing training and ensuring an adequate allocation of material, technical and financial resources, so as to provide an alternative to

migration to urban areas, ensure a balanced development in the other social services with a view to narrowing the existing development gap between rural and urban sectors thereby preventing migration and its harmful consequences.

(l) Examine and strengthen rural women's participation and contribution in and benefit from development and diversification of the forest economy;

(m) Establish special schemes to provide basic education for children and adults in remote, sparsely populated or very underprivileged rural areas, for example, by setting up children's hostels which provide board and lodging;

(n) Increase rural women's access to rural services by broadening the range of agricultural training and extension programmes to support women's roles in activities of agricultural production, processing and marketing and by increasing the number of women in the training and extension programmes of development agencies at all levels;

(o) Promote the processing of agricultural products by national, community, State or mixed enterprises; create jobs for rural women and families in the agro-industrial sector; and design and implement national plans for the development of the agro-industrial sector and rural industries.

3. Child care

Objectives

201. To develop or extend government-supported early childhood services appropriate to the individual family's needs.

202. Enable women, and especially working women, to discharge their responsibilities with regard to their children, and combine their work outside the home with their responsibilities as mothers. Special efforts should also be made to enable fathers to assume their share of family responsibilities.

Priority areas for action

203. Governments should adopt the necessary measures to:

(a) Include provision of community-based, work-based and work-related child care services, out-of-school hours and holiday care, crisis care and care for those families engaged in shift work;

(b) Improve the existing services by improving the competence of the persons providing them, the quality of the services provided, health conditions and the material aspects of the services;

(c) Create new services suited to the needs and conditions of working women and undertake the necessary studies to determine the real nature of those needs;

(d) Provide the necessary services at the lowest cost so as to match the resources and possibilities of women with limited incomes;

(e) Involve mothers in the planning of those services, and in their provision and assessment on a continuous basis so that they can be developed;

(f) Encourage child care centres in shopping centres to cater for occasional care needs.

4. Migrant women

Objective

204. Migrant women, including wage earners and the family of migrant workers, should have the same access to education, training employment and support and health services as the national population.

Priority areas for action

205. Governments should adopt the necessary measures to:

(a) Provide language and literacy training facilities in the community and at the work place. Access to these courses must be facilitated by income maintenance and child care services;

(b) Provide orientation and information programmes, including information on employment and training to all migrant women, in their own languages where necessary, to assist them to settle into the host country;

(c) Establish vocational training and counselling programmes, where necessary, including interpretation services;

(d) Ensure that social support and health services provide interpreters or bilingual workers;

(e) Encourage and assist union and employer organizations to inform migrant women about industrial legislation, procedures and rights;

(f) Provide culturally appropriate child care services to meet the needs of migrant and minority children and their families;

(g) Ensure migrant women, on a basis of equality with the national population, general education and vocational/professional training. Measures should be taken to improve the level of education and training of migrant women through languages and literacy courses upon arrival in the host country. Special education and training facilities should be provided for marriageable daughters of migrant workers who are of compulsory school age but who for various reasons do not attend school in the host country. Special attention should be given to reaching migrant women, for instance through the mass media, notably radio. Supplementary training and special guidance is necessary for social workers and teachers. In most cases these will, of necessity, have to be women;

(h) Ensure, on a basis of equality with the indigenous population, equal health care for migrant women. Measures should be taken to improve the health status of migrant women, paying special attention to stress-related ailments caused by differences in cultural, social and religious conditions. Provide additional training for domestic health care workers on the differing cultural and religious attitudes migrant women may have towards health and ill-health.

5. Unemployed women

Objective

206. Governments should take steps to

ensure that unemployed women have access to secure employment.

Priority areas for action

207. Governments should adopt the necessary measures to:

(a) Provide formal and non-formal training and retraining to equip unemployed women with marketable employment skills. Such training should include personal and vocational development programmes;

(b) Guarantee to unemployed women social security benefits, adequate accommodation and medical services on the basis of individual need.

6. Women who alone are responsible for their families

Objective

208. Governments should ensure that women who alone are responsible for their families receive a level of income sufficient to support themselves and their families in dignity and independence.

Priority areas for action

209. Governments should take the necessary measures to:

(a) Provide training and retraining for secure employment through programmes which must include income maintenance, child care, parental leave and personal and vocational development programmes;

(b) Assist women who alone are responsible for their families to obtain secure and appropriate accommodation;

(c) Guarantee favourable access to finance and credit, medical and health services.

7. Young women

Objective

210. Promote specific Government policies for the education, health and employment of young women so that, in view of the role they play in revitalizing and carrying on systems of behaviour, attitudes and values, they receive the guidance and support they need, during the time when they are planning their future lives, to act wisely in crucial situations, such as the adoption of values and attitudes; the choice of a husband, the birth and raising of the first child; access to their first job; and election to office.

Priority areas for action

211. Governments should take the necessary measures to:

(a) Give special attention to the education of young women, who are the only human resource with a possibility of bringing about change in the future, with view to ensuring that they are consciously involved in social and political development; that they enjoy and exercise the right responsibility, deliberately and willingly to found a family; and that they are given more and better opportunities to take part in the process of production;

(b) Give priority attention to young

men in matters relating to food and health in general in order to improve the living conditions of present and future generations and to permit the exercise of the right to health.

Part Three: The Programme of Action at the international and regional levels

IV. INTERNATIONAL TARGETS AND STRATEGIES

212. International targets and strategies both at the regional and the global levels must be based on a clear recognition that peace, security and national independence are essential prerequisites of an environment wherein the rights, responsibilities and roles of women can be promoted and the three objectives of the Decade—equality, development and peace—can be attained.

213. The perpetuation of global economic inequalities and economic dependence, which are the product of an economic system that is unfair and incompatible with development of countries, slows down the process of development of all nations, particularly of the developing countries, and inhibits the full utilization of the material and human potentials of those countries, including women. The elaboration of an international development strategy for the third United Nations Development Decade, formulated within the framework of the New International Economic Order directed towards the achievement of its objectives, is thus of fundamental importance for the achievement of the goals of the United Nations Decade for Women. It is essential to establish goals aimed at the participation by women of full economic, social, cultural and social responsibility.

214. Progress towards disarmament greatly contribute to the achievement of an adequate economic, social and cultural environment and enhance the development process through the reallocation of resources, particularly to the developing countries.

215. One of the concerns of the international community has been the need to restructure and reformulate the policies of the economic and social sectors of the United Nations system so that it can help speed up the establishment of the New International Economic Order, the development of developing countries and the promotion of the goals of the United Nations Decade for Women.

216. The restructuring has taken into account the need for decentralization of economic activities and the strengthening of regional programmes, particularly in the areas of economic and technical cooperation, in advisory services and training and research, data collection and analysis. The past few years have also witnessed the formulation by the regional commissions of regional plans of action for the integration of women into development and programmes aimed at implementation of some of their provisions. Of utmost importance

however is the need to integrate women at both regional and global levels into the priority areas mentioned above in a programme of concerted and sustained international action for the second half of the Decade and beyond, until the plans to attain women's integration in development are fully implemented.

217. Member States are increasingly looking to the United Nations and to organizations in the United Nations system to take more dynamic international action in promoting women's full and equal partnership in development, both as contributors and beneficiaries. This is evidenced by the increasing number of resolutions, plans and policy declarations. Commensurate with the need for more dynamic programmes and policies is the need for co-ordination of activities of the various organizations in the United Nations system as well as the appropriate institutional arrangements, within them, involving wherever necessary, structural transformations. There is also a need for the development of relevant methodologies for integration of women in all their programmes and activities. In line with the integrated nature of the development process itself and with the need to reduce both isolated actions and overlapping of activities, the Programme of Action aims also at greater cohesiveness and co-ordination of efforts between its various organizations.

218. The Programme seeks to outline essential strategies and broad areas for international action. International action in this context includes regional action. However, some recommendations are addressed specifically to regional commissions and to other relevant organizations in the United Nations system for action at the regional and subregional and national levels in order to assist Governments and supplement national programmes.

V. INTERNATIONAL POLICIES AND PROGRAMMES

219. All organizations in the United Nations system, in closer co-operation with relevant intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, should support efforts towards establishing, strengthening and implementing national, regional and global programmes aimed at women's integration in development, revising and redefining if necessary development concepts, objectives and policies to achieve it. These programmes at the international level should take into full consideration the essential linkages in the development process at national, subregional and international levels, and with adequate feedbacks between institutions and machineries related to women and major planning units at all these levels.

220. In order to achieve the targets prepared for the third United Nations Development Decade, all development planning should take due account of the potential contribution and the interests of

women. This consideration will lead to more appropriate development programmes which will increase productivity, whilst at the same time guarding against the possibility of any adverse impact which the transfer of technology and the redeployment of industry may have. Development projects should strongly emphasize the indigenous capabilities of the developing countries and enhance their creative capacity.

221. New approaches should be developed for increasing the mobilization of women's resources both for advancing their socio-economic status and increasing productivity. To this end, they should offer, *inter alia*, special incentives to develop co-operative movements particularly among women of the poorer sectors of society aimed at developing co-operative technology enterprises for community self-reliance in water, energy, health, sanitation and housing, day care centres and other basic services.

222. Multilateral and bilateral development and other organizations as well as non-governmental organizations working in the field of development should continue to provide development assistance to programmes and projects of developing countries which promotes women's integration and participation in all aspects of the development process, also within the framework of technical co-operation among developing countries. In this connexion efforts should be made to fully utilize locally available expertise to project design and implementation and to ensure greater quality in the project results through, among others, flexible implementation procedures. These programmes and projects should, *inter alia*, focus on efforts to strengthen developing countries' capabilities to plan and implement programmes for women including capabilities to develop alternative technology, including research and application of renewable sources of energy.

223. The United Nations Voluntary Fund for the Decade for Women should continue to intensify its efforts to give special support to women most in need, and to encourage consideration of women in development planning. Contributions to the Voluntary Fund will need to be greatly increased during the second half of the Decade if demands now being made on its resources are to be adequately met. Adequate development funds should be available for activities specific to the acceleration of the full participation of women in economic and social development at national, regional and international levels.

224. Studies should be undertaken by the relevant United Nations organizations to identify new ways and means of facilitating the integration of women, especially of the poor sectors of society, into the mainstream of development including women workers in agriculture and industry. The ILO, in co-operation with pertinent bodies such as UNCTAD, UNIDO and FAO, should develop studies to assess the working and employment conditions of

rural women with a view to assisting Governments to revise national and international policies concerning wage and labour policies as well as trade agreements and prices of those commodities where women's and men's wages are adversely affected by and also affect the exchange earnings of the developing countries as obtained from the export of such commodities. UNESCO, in co-operation with other relevant United Nations organs and organizations, should continue to prepare studies and sponsor projects with a view to assisting Governments to assess progress made and obstacles that women face in gaining access to and enjoying primary, secondary and post-secondary educational opportunities and to contribute to the development of research and teaching about women at the university level and in non-formal education. WHO, in co-operation with other relevant United Nations organs and organizations should continue to assess progress made and obstacles women face in gaining access to health care, particularly progress in the development of primary health care.

225. The United Nations Secretariat should undertake the compilation of comparative national legislations which are aimed at promoting sex equality. Such a compilation would assist in the introduction of new laws designed to integrate women into all fields of activities, by way of generating ideas and exerting persuasion. The compilation should be issued within the framework of the United Nations Legislative Series.

226. International and regional organizations should provide assistance, if requested, to national machineries for women, for improving their capabilities and resources to accelerate integration of women in the development process and take up programmes and projects for them.

227. In the framework of bilateral development co-operation efforts should be made, in conformity with national priorities, to strengthen national programmes aimed at the full participation and integration of women in all aspects of development, including participation of women at the grass-roots level. In all bilateral development activities women should participate in the preparation and implementation of programmes and projects.

228. The special session of the United Nations General Assembly on economic development should take into full account the women's role in economic development; the forthcoming United Nations Conference on New and Renewable Sources of Energy, the programmes for the International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade and other forthcoming international conferences should also take into account issues of particular interest to women.

229. The United Nations and its organizations should, in co-operation with national Governments, develop strategies to increase women's participation in the social, economic and political life, to ensure full and effective participation of women in

all sectors and at all levels of the development process, including planning, decision-making and implementation, and in order to facilitate this, seek to:

(a) Reduce the burden on women of tasks traditionally performed by them in the home and in food production and child care through appropriate technology and a fair division of labour between women and men;

(b) Counteract factors which tend to keep girls and women out of schools and training centres;

(c) Create new employment and occupational mobility opportunities for women;

(d) Increase the economic returns to women for their labour, and implement the principle of equal pay for work of equal value;

(e) Recognize the important contribution of women to economic development, raise the productivity of women's labour for their own benefit and the benefit of their own families and at the same time undertake appropriate structural changes to prevent women's unemployment;

(f) Recognize the vital role of women in agriculture and guarantee them equitable access to land, technology, water, other natural resources, inputs and services and equal opportunities to develop their skills;

(g) Promote equal participation of women in the industrialization process, counteract possible negative effects of industrialization and ensure that scientific and technological development will benefit both women and men;

(h) Ensure women's active participation in and access to primary health care, considering their specific health needs.

230. International programmes and policies—including regional ones—are grouped into five areas. Each is covered below in a separate section.

A. Technical co-operation, training and advisory services

231. Technical co-operation programmes for women should be conceived in the context of over-all development and not as welfare programmes.

232. Technical co-operation activities should be directed towards assisting and complementing Governments' efforts aimed at enhancing the development of human resources particularly among the most disadvantaged groups of population with a special emphasis on women.

233. All organizations of the United Nations system including the regional economic commissions should:

(a) Review existing and proposed plans and projects in this area with the aim of integrating the issues of concern to women in all programmes and projects in order to improve the effectiveness of those projects as well as to improve the status of women;

(b) Encourage and support Governments and non-governmental organizations, including research institutions, in

elaborating appropriate technology projects and in identifying ways in which women can participate in and contribute to the effectiveness of development projects and improve their own economic and social condition;

(c) Organize seminars and workshop on the issues related to women and development and ensure that the topic of women and development be included in substantive discussions of international conferences;

(d) Assist Governments in organizing more training courses with the assistance of the International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (INSTRAW) for improving women's planning, technical and managerial skills in different fields, especially of functional implementing programmes and policies for women. Promote fellowships and other special educational and training programmes to increase the capacity of workers and planners so that they can gain better occupational and social status;

(e) Assist national and regional programmes benefiting women in rural areas. Programmes for women should be viewed as an investment in the process of development and women should be included as active participants in the design, planning and implementation of projects in all sectors and not simply as beneficiaries of services;

(f) Ensure that technical co-operation training and advisory services by the organizations of the United Nations system should be in accordance with country objectives and with policies outlined in the work plan of action and the programme for the second half of the Decade.

234. UNDP should intensify its efforts to encourage and assist Governments to find innovative approaches to achieve their development goals through incorporating and benefiting women by:

(a) Continuing its support for the Voluntary Fund for the Decade for Women;

(b) Continuing to promote regional, subregional and national projects through regional commissions, national machineries for women and research and training centres, especially activities enabling technological innovation and development of new programmes in order to achieve the integration of women in development;

(c) Instructing resident representatives to include issues of particular interest to women in the country programming cycle, and to regularly monitor existing programmes and promote project development, co-ordination and co-operation among United Nations and other programmes which will contribute to the achievement of the goals of the Decade.

235. Governments should formulate, as part of their development co-operation policies, guidelines for the implementation of the programme of action for the second half of the United Nations Decade for Women.

Mobilization of human resources

236. Efforts should be intensified within the programmes of organizations of the United Nations system to involve more women in programmes for attitudinal change in all the relevant sectors, particularly employment, health, education, rural development and political participation. Men should be involved in health programmes to ensure that the responsibility of improving conditions of their families and communities is not the sole responsibility of women.

237. The effective participation of women particularly in the developing countries in the programmes of organizations in the United Nations system should be encouraged, including their participation in interregional and regional seminars and meetings.

238. Women at all levels especially those from grass-roots organizations should be encouraged to play a more effective role at the decision-making level in international organizations.

239. United Nations organizations and Member States are urged to take the necessary measures to increase the proportion of women by nominating and appointing women, particularly from developing countries, for posts in decision-making levels in secretariats and expert bodies. Member States are also urged to increase the proportion of women on their delegations to all United Nations meetings, including meetings of Preparatory Committees for International Conferences and to prepare women to take an active role in such Conferences. In this regard, Member States in co-operation with United Nations agencies should provide arrangements for developing items on women's issues to be included in the agendas of such conferences.

240. Reinforce efforts of Member States, with particular emphasis on developing countries, for the development and strengthening of endogenous capabilities and capacities for the elaboration of policies for science and technology and for their application for the solution of problems of development, with special emphasis on the disparities in the access of women to scientific and technical education and training.

Assistance to women in southern Africa

241. The recommendations are addressed to United Nations organizations, specialized agencies, Governments, international and regional intergovernmental organizations, women's and anti-apartheid groups, non-governmental organizations and other groups.

242. The assistance provided will be channelled through the southern African liberation movements recognized by the Organization of African Unity. It is divided into the following categories of assistance:

(a) Legal, humanitarian, moral and political assistance to women inside South

Africa and Namibia persecuted under repressive and discriminatory legislation and practices and to their families and to women in refugee camps;

(b) Training and assistance to integrate women into positions of leadership and support within the national liberation movements in the struggle for liberation;

(c) Training and assistance for women to play roles in all areas after liberation in the reconstruction of their respective countries;

(d) International support for and co-operation with the southern African women's struggle;

(e) To disseminate information about apartheid and racism and its effects on women in southern Africa in particular, and to involve all women in efforts to eradicate apartheid and racism and to promote and maintain peace;

(f) To assist in the strengthening of women's sections where they already exist in the national liberation movements and the creation of such sections where they do not currently exist as a means of accelerating the achievement of equal opportunity for women and their full integration in national life. Such women's sections through the national liberation movements should, in consultations with the United Nations organizations, the specialized agencies, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, determine and make known their policy and programme priorities.

243. To call on Member States of the United Nations which have not yet done so to ratify the 1973 International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid.

Assistance to the Palestinian women inside and outside the occupied territories

244. The United Nations organizations, its specialized agencies, United Nations organs and funds, Governments, international and regional intergovernmental organizations and other groups are called upon to provide assistance in consultation and co-operation with the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people:

(a) To undertake studies and research pertinent to the social and economic conditions of the Palestinian women with a view to identifying their specific needs and to formulate and implement relevant programmes to meet their needs and to develop resources and potentialities of women;

(b) To provide legal, humanitarian and political assistance to Palestinian women in order to allow them to exercise their human rights;

(c) To establish, expand and diversify educational and training programmes for Palestinian women with particular emphasis on expanding technical and vocational training;

(d) To safeguard and promote the Palestinian heritage and values as the core of

the educational content with a view to preserving the Palestinian national identity;

(e) To eliminate all restrictive legal and social measures that hinder Palestinian women from having access to available employment opportunities and equal pay for equal work, and to provide them with equal training and employment opportunities so that they can contribute effectively to the formation of an integrated Palestinian labour force;

(f) To assist materially and technically women's organizations and associations, and to provide support to the General Union of Palestinian women with a view to develop their institutional capabilities to undertake extension programmes, adult education and literacy programmes for women and child care services;

(g) To formulate and implement integrated health and nutrition programmes; to train Palestinian women in the various medical and paramedical professions and to strengthen existing health services provided by the Palestinian Red Crescent, particularly those related to maternal and child care;

(h) To collect and disseminate information and data about the effect of Israeli occupation on the social and economic conditions of the Palestinian women and their struggle for achieving self-determination, right of return and right to national independence and sovereignty.

Assistance to women refugees and displaced women the world over

245. Humanitarian assistance to and resettlement of refugees, regardless of sex, race, religion or national origin, and wherever they may find themselves, is an international responsibility which all nations concerned should help bear. Because the overwhelming proportion of refugees are women, who generally suffer more radical changes in role and status than male refugees, the United Nations and other international organizations are urged to address themselves specifically to the problems and vulnerabilities of women.

246. The following recommendations are addressed to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and, within their competence or special interest, the organizations of the United Nations system, specialized agencies, international, regional and intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, women's groups and all other relevant institutions, competent associations and Governments.

247. The United Nations High Commissioner and other bodies mentioned in paragraph 184, as appropriate, in assisting women refugees, are requested to formulate specific programmes relevant to them in all phases of refugee life: relief, local integration, resettlement and voluntary return to their homes. All Governments concerned are invited to help do this, thereby easing the burden on countries of first

asylum in particular. Third countries should be urged to receive refugees for resettlement without discrimination on the basis of sex or lack of qualifications. There is a particularly urgent need for senior level responsibility for the special needs of refugee women, including monitoring, in the UNHCR and other agencies and organizations involved in refugee relief. These programmes should also apply to displaced women, wherever appropriate.

248. It should be recognized that in refugee situations and of displaced persons, women and children form the bulk of the refugees and have particular needs. Therefore special efforts are necessary to ensure their survival and well-being, and to prevent their abuse and exploitation. The traditional disadvantages of many women in society are intensified in refugee situations as well as for displaced persons. This must be recognized in formulating any programmes of assistance. The assistance provided through the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, or through bilateral intergovernmental channels as far as resources permit should include the following categories of assistance:

(a) Legal, humanitarian and moral assistance to women refugees ensuring for them the fullest respect for their human rights in accordance with the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to prevent exploitation of their ignorance of their rights and of their comparatively weak positions;

(b) Special relief efforts directed to refugee women and children, and particularly to handicapped persons, to ensure that available aid reaches them;

(c) Assistance and counselling to women refugees at an early phase of their arrival in the country of asylum, with emphasis on the development of self-reliance;

(d) Special health care measures and health counselling including family planning services on a nationally acceptable and voluntary basis for women refugees, as well as supplemental feeding programmes for pregnant and lactating women, provided through means relevant to their culture and traditions, and by women medical workers where necessary;

(e) Training and educational programmes, including orientation, language and job training, designed to facilitate the necessary adjustments of women refugees to their new life and the preservation of their cultural links with their country of origin;

(f) Special efforts to facilitate family reunion and support for tracing programmes;

(g) Skill development programmes for refugee women so that they may learn to employ their potential for income-earning activity;

(h) The UNHCR should encourage Governments in whose territory abuses of women refugees take place to bring to justice the perpetrators of such abuses. Host

country Governments should be encouraged to allow sufficient international personnel in refugee camps to discourage exploitation or any attacks upon women refugees.

249. Assistance should be provided in strengthening the counselling programme for women refugees, both in rural settlements and urban centres, and the design of special social work programmes to reach women refugees, where such programmes do not at present exist. Special orientation programmes should be provided for women refugees awaiting resettlement in third countries.

250. The role of women refugees in the operation and administration of refugee camps should be substantially expanded, including distribution of food and other supplies, and the design of training and orientation programmes. The UNHCR is urged to develop policies which actively involve refugee women in self-help programmes in an effort to fully utilize their skills and talents.

251. The United Nations system should give high priority in its public information activities to the need to assist refugee women and children the world over.

B. Elaboration and review of international standards

252. Every effort should be made by the United Nations and organizations in the United Nations system to encourage Governments:

(a) To sign and ratify or accede to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution 34/180, of 18 December 1979, so that it will come into force at an early date within the period of this programme;

(b) To sign and ratify or accede, if they have not yet done so, to all conventions of the United Nations and specialized agencies which relate to women.

253. The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women should keep under review the reporting systems under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women once it comes into force. The Commission on the Status of Women should keep under review the reporting system for the implementation of the World Plan of Action and the implementation of the Programme for the second half of the Decade.

254. The United Nations and organizations in the United Nations system should, in the formulation of international standards in areas where they do not exist, take into account the needs of women.

255. The specialized agencies should submit reports on the implementation of the Convention in areas falling within the scope of their activities, when requested to do so, and should attend the meetings of

the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women when invited to do so.

256. Measures should be taken by bodies and organizations in the United Nations system, particularly UNCTAD, UNIDO, the Centre on Transnational Corporations, the International Labour Organisation and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations to include specific provisions relating to work in the International Code of Conduct for transnational corporations and on the transfer of technology aimed at diminishing any adverse effects of redeployment of industry and technology.

C. Research, data collection and analysis

257. The United Nations, the specialized agencies and the regional commissions should give high priority to undertaking multisectoral and interdisciplinary action-oriented research in relevant and important areas where information does not already exist on the ways of integrating women in development, with a view to formulating development objectives, strategies and policy measures responsive to the needs of women and men. Such research should utilize existing institutions such as the United Nations Institute for Research and Training for the Advancement of Women as well as more use of joint institutions which deal with questions concerning status of women. The research should be aimed at developing effective methodologies of planning for women's development and at evaluating the participation of women in the informal sectors of economy; the health status of women, the double burden of working women and the degree of absence of women because of maternity, educational opportunities lack thereof for women, in particular factors contributing to illiteracy, full access for women including drop-outs among the female population to all types and all levels of education, the conditions of the female headed household, the participation in the formal sectors of the economy, political participation and the nature of the contributions of women's organizations. Emphasis should also be given to fuller and more systematic analysis of all the interrelationships between women's roles in development and demographic phenomena. Research should also be conducted on employment opportunities projected for a period of five or ten years after the Decade for Women, and on training/educational programmes that will meet the need for a specific work force so identified.

258. Taking into consideration that international migration has become an enduring process in the labour market, the special problems of migrant women, as related to their economic functions, legal and social status, difficulties arising from language barriers and the education of the second generation deserve special attention. The ILO, in co-operation with relevant bodies such as UNESCO, FAO and WHO should continue and develop studies

assess the employment, health and educational conditions of migrant women with a view to assist Governments in viewing their national and international policies concerning employment, social security, housing, social welfare policies and the preservation of the cultural heritage as well as the impact of mass media for supportive channels of information for migrant women.

259. The United Nations, in close collaboration with specialized agencies and regional commissions and on the basis of the work done by INSTRAW, should prepare and make available compendiums of statistics on women, containing the most recent data, time-trend analysis where available, as well as national and international measures designed to improve the situation of women. The *Directory of International Statistics*, prepared by the Statistical Office, Department of International Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, should include a special section indicating where relevant data exist by which progress toward equality between the sexes can be monitored.

260. The Sub-Committee on Statistical Activities of the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination, in agreement with INSTRAW, should, as soon as possible, include in its programme of work consideration of statistics relating to women and develop short- and long-range goals for improving the quality and relevance of data relating to the conditions of women. Such discussions should include plans to relate data concerning women with a particular emphasis on the development, evaluation and updating of estimates and projections of the participation of women in various areas of national life.

261. The United Nations should, in collaboration with the specialized agencies, the regional commissions and national Governments encourage statistical methods and practices that are free from sex-based stereotypes and appropriate research methodology that would have relevance to the participation of women in development and equality between the sexes.

262. The United Nations, with the co-operation of specialized agencies, should pay special attention to the industries in which a overwhelming majority of employees are female, analyse the causes of their existence and the possibilities of new technological patterns leading to deep changes in their respective branches.

263. At the regional level the regional commissions in collaboration with the specialized agencies should:

(a) Assist the countries of the region to establish indicators by which progress toward equality between the sexes can be monitored. In establishing such a set of indicators, Governments should be advised to take into account the social and cultural realities of the country, the current state of the country's statistical development as

well as their individual policy priorities;

(b) Prepare for each region an inventory of social, economic and demographic indicators relevant to the analysis of the status of women in the region. For a better evaluation of development programmes, the utilization of and access to, such data should be ensured;

(c) Assist countries in the development of surveys carried out as part of the national household surveys capability programme including batteries of questions of special relevance to the participation of women in development and equality between the sexes;

(d) Increase their level of investment in long-range fundamental research on women and development, without violation to national priorities, so as to provide a sound scientific base for development planning.

D. Dissemination of information and experience

264. The respective specialized agencies of the United Nations, during the second part of this Decade, should give special consideration to the conditions of work of women, including the problems of working hours and working norms for women, and bring their conclusions to the attention of member States.

265. The United Nations and UNESCO should ensure the inclusion of women in the current work undertaken in preparation for the new international information order as both recipients and participants in information systems in which their problems and issues are considered. In the definition of new communication policies the participation of women and their positive and dynamic image must be emphasized.

266. The United Nations system should ensure that women's issues form an integral part of the existing international information systems and data banks (such as AGRIS, INRES, INTIB, DIS), particularly ISU information system unit within the Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, in order to facilitate free exchange of experience and knowledge among international organizations and their member States.

267. The Joint United Nations Information Committee (JUNIC) in carrying out its responsibilities for programmes of social and economic information should:

(a) Ensure that the annual JUNIC plans of action take into consideration issues and topics of particular interest to women, matters which particularly affect women, as well as their participation in information activities such as press, publications, radio programmes, film and television projects, reportage of field trips, seminars, etc.;

(b) Advocate that an information component be built into projects such as those assisted by the Voluntary Fund for the Decade and by other organizations of the United Nations system, and which would be disseminated by the Department of

Public Information, specialized agencies, etc.;

(c) Ensure that guides and directories of the United Nations Information Centre contain relevant data and information about programmes and activities of the United Nations relating to women.

268. The United Nations and other organizations in the United Nations system such as UNCTAD, UNDP, UNFPA, UNEP, UNIDO, UNICEF, UNITAR, the ILO, FAO, UNESCO, WHO and WFP should include in their publications, media support activities, training programmes and seminars etc., specific guidelines on issues and topics of particular interest to women and those in which women could be successfully integrated. In particular, United Nations agencies concerned with development, education, employment, health, population, food production etc., should increase their information output on matters affecting women especially in developing countries with emphasis on reaching mass audiences in rural and isolated regions and countries where women tend to be cut off from the main media channels.

269. In its programme on major political, economic and social issues as well as on human interest stories, United Nations radio should include contributions and participation of women in all these areas. The present weekly radio programme on women should be continued through the Decade or longer as the need may be with adequate provision being made to adapt it in different languages and distribute it more extensively. Co-production agreements between United Nations visual service and local networks to expand the number of films on United Nations topics should include co-production with women producers in developing countries on films related to women's issues.

270. The United Nations should issue booklets, pamphlets and publications with periodic progress reports on Decade activities and encourage the exchange of information and experience between women in Member States through study visits and the distribution of publications. The United Nations Handbook on the New International Economic Order should include data and information on aspects of women's participation. The *Development Forum* and other publications should contain items related to the Decade. The United Nations information centres should improve their library materials on women and disseminate information on women more actively, especially in developing countries. Information on women should be on the agenda of the meeting of the UNIC directors for the duration of the Decade.

271. The United Nations and organizations of the United Nations system dealing with development should strengthen their information component relating to women

in development and highlight the communication component of development projects. Well-documented and built-in communication components should be included in all development programmes or projects for the integration of women in development and more adequate evaluation of the uses of media in development support to spread knowledge and increase the possibility of transfer. The United Nations and organizations of the United Nations system should collect and disseminate information on training programmes in development communication with special reference to programmes for women.

272. Information including detailed bibliographies of studies and other materials produced by the United Nations and its specialized agencies on women in the development process should be widely distributed to member nations and appropriate private research organizations to facilitate access to such information.

E. Review and appraisal

273. The United Nations system should continue to carry out a comprehensive and critical biennial review and appraisal of progress achieved in implementing the provisions of the World Plan of Action and of the programme of the second half of the Decade. The central role in the carrying out of this review and appraisal should be played by the Commission on the Status of Women. The reporting system as well as the measures for dissemination of information should be designed for the effective use of the result of monitoring by all bodies concerned.

274. The Commission on the Status of Women and the Branch for the Advancement of Women should be strengthened by resetting priorities within existing budgetary resources. The integrated reporting system should be improved, as should the Commission's ability to consider communications and the capacity for publicizing its work.

275. With a view to achieving the full integration of women into the over-all development planning of the United Nations, the review and appraisal of progress made in implementing the World Plan of Action and the Programme of Action for the second half of the Decade should be part of the procedures for the review and appraisal of progress made in the implementation of international development strategy for the third United Nations Development Decade.

276. The specialized agencies and organizations of the United Nations system as well as other relevant intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations should consider the Plan of Action for the second half of the Decade and assist in its implementation.

277. The existing special mechanisms within the United Nations bodies and existing specialized agencies should be strengthened to implement the Plan of Action, to increase the incorporation of women's needs into all their programmes and activities and also to increase women's

participation in and benefit from those programmes and activities.

278. The secretariats of all organizations within the United Nations system as well as of relevant intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations should amend their recruitment, training, promotion and remuneration policies as necessary in order to ensure equal treatment and status for men and women employed by the organizations whether as temporary, fixed-term or permanent employees or as consultants. Such organizations should, when requesting data on women's employment from member countries with a view to publication, provide and publish comparable data on the situation as regards women's employment within the organization concerned.

279. Guidelines should be established wherever they do not already exist for the study of programmes and projects in respect of their likely impact on women, and measures for monitoring and evaluating such programmes with respect to their benefits to women should be taken.

280. Co-ordination and co-operation among the specialized agencies and United Nations bodies should be effected by increasing use of the Inter-Agency Programme for the Decade of Women and of the Branch for the Advancement of Women.

281. The regional commissions in their periodic reviews and appraisals submitted to the Economic and Social Council should report fully on specific aspects of the situation of women in every sector of their development programmes based on replies to the questionnaire on the implementation of the World Plan of Action and the Programme of Action for the second half of the Decade. These should be supplemented by appraisals of specific sectors undertaken by the regional commissions and specialized agencies, reports of relevant regional meetings of the United Nations and other documents and independent research.

282. Regional commissions should submit reports regularly to the Centre for Social Development and Humanitarian Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat on this programme as part of the over-all review and appraisal of the World Plan of Action. There should be a close co-ordination of the regional programmes for the advancement of women with United Nations Headquarters to ensure a better use of resources.

283. Regional commissions should ensure that the high-level regional intergovernmental and expert meetings which they periodically convene should include their over-all periodic appraisal, an assessment of the situation of women as a fundamental prerequisite for planning action programmes to meet the objectives of the third development decade and the New International Economic Order.

284. Special efforts should be made by

the United Nations and regional commissions to provide assistance to Member Governments which have difficulty in providing resources to complete the questionnaire and submit data required for review and appraisal.

VI. REGIONAL POLICIES AND PROGRAMME

285. The international policies and programmes outlined above have clear application at the regional level and should also be regarded as regional priorities. In addition, the regional commissions in co-operation with the regional offices of the specialized agencies have specific responsibilities to provide assistance to Governments and non-governmental organizations for developing policies, strategies and programmes for the second half of the Decade in the light of the review and appraisal of progress achieved in the first half.

286. The strengthening of appropriate regional action programmes for women should be based on the development of co-operation between the countries of the region with the aim of promoting the principle of self-reliance. The formulation of regional policies and programmes is a multidimensional process requiring the adoption of action-oriented measures that are both bilateral and multilateral in scope and which require an increase in financial, technical and personnel resources to implement effectively regional programmes and priorities. To this end, regional commissions should adopt the following measures:

(a) Integrate the recommendations of this programme into the work programme of their respective sectoral units so that implementation contributes to the development strategy of the third United Nations Development Decade;

(b) Promote fellowship and other special training programmes, particularly in the tertiary sectors which comprise the majority of the female labour force both in rural and urban areas, so that they can also improve and/or gain better occupational and socio-economic status;

(c) Strengthen the information and data collection systems with a view to providing better analysis of data on the situation and work of women, including, in particular, improved national, regional and subregional reviews of progress achieved in the implementation of this programme of action; and providing a basis for more effective advisory services to Governments regarding programmes for women;

(d) Intensify their activities in promoting adequate national social infrastructure allowing women and men to discharge their dual role in the family and in society

(e) Undertake "skilled womenpower" inventories at national, subregional and regional levels so that trained women can have equal opportunities to be recruited in jobs related to main areas of the development process at national, regional and international levels.

Institutional arrangements

287. Measures should be taken for:

(a) Strengthening the offices of the regional commissions by recruiting women posts at a high level of decision-making responsibility. Such posts should include those of programme officers provided in regular budgets and not only from extrabudgetary sources, and charged with implementing the programmes for the second half of the Decade. The regional commissions should establish posts at a high level to co-ordinate and implement policies and programmes relating specifically to the status of women;

(b) The reinforcement of the regional centres for research and training.

REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT U.S. PARTICIPATION³

The mid-decade World Conference of the U.N. Decade for Women, held in Copenhagen, Denmark, July 14-30, 1980, now is part of the long history of women's struggle for equality. Its declared purpose, and the objective of the U.S. delegation, was to address the inequities that exist between women and men world wide by developing for the second half of the decade a Programme of Action that could be adopted by consensus. The meeting fell short of its goal, for although a Programme of Action was adopted, the United States, Israel, and other major Western nations voted against the plan, and no consensus adoption was reached.

The 1980 World Conference for Women was convened as a result of a resolution passed at the 1975 International Women's Year Conference in Mexico City calling for a mid-decade reassessment of women's progress. The Copenhagen conference had two goals: first, to assess progress in the first 5 years of the decade in the implementation of the World Plan of Action within nations, as well as regionally and internationally; and second, to develop strategies and action programs for the remaining 5 years of the decade through a Programme of Action.

The United States prepared for the conference by establishing a Secretariat to organize its national outreach effort and to develop, in conjunction with the Department of State, the policy positions that would guide the U.S. delegation.

The members of the U.S. delegation successfully addressed some of the major inequities faced by women; and

this is reflected in the program that resulted. However, that program, in spite of much positive content, was seriously impaired for the United States by three additions related to Israel and the Middle East.

Contained in three separate paragraphs, these additions include references to U.N. documents which questioned the Camp David accords; list Zionism with imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism, and racism, as an impediment to world peace and cooperation among states; and call for financial assistance for Palestinian women by U.N. organizations, specialized agencies, and organs and funds to be provided "in consultation and cooperation with the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people."

Major efforts were made to eliminate such language from the program, but they failed. Consequently, on July 30, 1980, the United States, Canada, Australia, and Israel voted against the adoption of the Programme of Action. The final conference vote was 94 yes, 4 no, and 22 abstentions. One hundred and forty-four nations sent official delegations to Copenhagen.

Several delegations, including those who had voted for the program, took the floor to voice their protest against the intrusion of politics on subjects which were outside the authority of the women's conference called to address women's concerns and which were allowed to overshadow those concerns. Discussions which focused on political issues that the conference could not resolve drew attention away from other important issues on which delegates could effect change and have major impact.

Speaking on behalf of the U.S. delegation, cochair Sarah Weddington pledged that although the United States did not support the program in its entirety, the United States would continue to move forward on women's rights. Weddington emphasized: "We will . . . return to our country with undaunted determination to continue to work for the cause of women. We return to pursue ratification of the convention [against discrimination on the basis of sex] that the U.S. delegation signed here. We will pursue ways to implement a number of important initiatives taken here. We will go home to find ways, working within the government and with the women of our country, to apply our maximum collective

influence and strength toward our mutual goal: equality, development, and peace."

U.S. Secretariat Director, Vivian Lowery Derryck observed: "Although we do not endorse the Programme of Action in its entirety, there are many positive recommendations in the document that we hope to implement both nationally and regionally. In addition, women's roles and responsibilities in foreign policy decisionmaking were highlighted at Copenhagen, and we hope to continue to build on that awareness within the United States."

As both Weddington and Derryck noted, there were important initiatives taken at Copenhagen; initiatives to which the U.S. delegation contributed significantly and successfully. For example, among the resolutions sponsored by the United States and adopted by the conference are those on battered women and family violence, elderly women, rural women, women refugees, safe drinking water, women and the U.N. system, and female sexual slavery. The United States also introduced a resolution on discrimination based on race; however, that resolution was withdrawn because of efforts by some nations to amend the resolution in ways that would have changed its original meaning. Nevertheless, its concepts have been discussed and introduced into the U.N. lexicon.

- The Copenhagen meeting served to heighten the awareness of women nationally with respect to the importance of their participation in U.S. foreign policy positions and decisions.

- More women served as delegates of their countries to the Copenhagen meeting than did delegations attending the first World Conference for Women in Mexico City in 1975.

- The draft Programme of Action listed imperialism, racism, colonialism as barriers to women's equality but did not mention sexism. The inclusion of sexism was resisted by many nations (Latin American, Asian, African, and East European), which insisted that sexism did not exist in their countries. After extended debate "discrimination based on sex" was added finally to the program qualified by a footnote—"which in a group of countries is called sexism"—the first time the concept has been specifically mentioned in a U.N. document. (The word sexism did not appear in the World Plan of Action

adopted by consensus in Mexico City.)

- The conference also acknowledged that female subjugation is due far more to women's reproductive function than to their relatively minor role in economic productivity.

- Women in the U.S. delegation gained an in-depth knowledge and understanding of the working of the U.N. system—knowledge that will be shared with other U.S. women and to benefit the United States at future U.N. conferences and meetings.

- The conference expanded opportunities for networking among women. The U.S. delegation, for example, met eight times in Copenhagen with U.S. representatives to Forum 80, the non-governmental organizations meeting which took place during the first week of the U.N. meeting. The U.S. delegation meetings brought together nearly 500 women and men to exchange ideas and information about events occurring both at the conference and the forum.

- On July 21 and July 28, *Dateline Copenhagen* held its teleconference, linking women in Copenhagen with women in the United States via satellite for discussion on women's concerns in health, education, and employment—the subtheme of the world conference. This was the first time this technology was used by women, for women.

- The conference served as a catalyst to the Departments of Health and Human Services, Education, and Labor in reassessing programs on health, education, and employment from the perspective of women's special needs and concerns.

The U.S. delegation reflected the full diversity of the nation. The 37-member U.S. delegation, cochaired by Donald F. McHenry, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, and Sarah Weddington, Assistant to the President, included representatives respectively of rural women, minority women, disadvantaged women, labor unions, industry, education, leaders in health and employment, women in communications, handicapped women, environmentalists, American Indians, Americans of Asian origin. Twelve persons—women and men—served as advisers to the delegation. Representative Thomas P. O'Neill, Speaker of the House of Representatives, named Congresswomen Barbara Mikulski and Mary Rose Oakar as congressional

delegates; and they participated with congressional staff advisers.

In 1985 the U.N. Decade for Women will conclude with another world conference, now scheduled to be held in Nairobi, Kenya.

¹ For text of the World Plan of Action adopted on July 2, 1975, in Mexico City, see BULLETIN of Aug. 18, 1975, p. 242.

² Adopted by the conference on July 31, 1980, by a vote of 94-4 (U.S.), with 22 abstentions.

³ Press release 256 of Sept. 15, 1980. ■

RESOLUTIONS (WITH VOTES) ADOPTED BY THE CONFERENCE

Family planning (consensus)
 Improving the situation of disabled women of all ages (consensus)*
 Migrant women (consensus)
 Elderly women and economic security (consensus)*
 Battered women and violence in the family (consensus)*
 Review and evaluation of progress made in the implementation of the World Plan of Action at the national level (consensus)
 The role of women in the preparation of societies for life in peace (97-0-30)
 Gathering of data concerning women through census questionnaires (consensus)
 Intensification of drought control in the Sahel (consensus)
 Assistance to Lebanese women (112-0-9)
 Women's participation in the strengthening of international peace and security and in the struggle against colonialism, racism, racial discrimination, foreign aggression, and occupation and all forms of foreign domination (77-6-35)
 The situation of women refugees and displaced women the world over (consensus)*
 The situation of displaced and refugee women the world over (97-0-29)
 Integrated approach to the health and welfare of women (consensus)
 International Center for Public Enterprises in Developing Countries (consensus)
 International Conference on Sanctions against South Africa (25-7-22)
 International legislation to prevent the abandonment of families (75-0-35)
 Situation of women in Chile (69-8-39)
 Situation of women in El Salvador (55-11-46)
 Control of illicit traffic in drugs (consensus)
 Strengthening the women's programmes and appointment of women in the Secretariat of the regional commissions and agencies of the United Nations (consensus)**
 Co-ordination of issues relating to the status of women within the United Nations system (consensus)**

Question of missing and disappeared persons (consensus)
 Women in the United Nations Secretariat (consensus)
 International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade (consensus)*
 On the right of all countries to seek development assistance from any and all sources, free from threats and attack (65-0-42)
 Special measures in favour of young workers (consensus)
 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (consensus)
 Women living in conditions of extreme poverty (consensus)
 Promotion of equality in education and training (consensus)
 Women and discrimination based on race (78-3 (U.S.)-39)**
 Condemnation of South African aggression against the People's Republic of Angola (100-0-17)
 Question of convening another world conference on women in 1985 (consensus)
 Assistance to Sahrawi women (51-10-38)
 International assistance for the reconstruction of Nicaragua (consensus)
 Women and development assistance programmes (consensus)
 Health and well-being of the women of the Pacific (consensus)
 The International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (consensus)
 Establishment and strengthening of machinery for the integration of women in development (consensus)
 Strengthening the role of the Commission on the Status of Women (consensus)
 Women and nutritional self-sufficiency (consensus)
 Voluntary Fund for the United Nations Decade for Women (consensus)
 Exploitation of the prostitution of other and traffic in persons (consensus)**
 Women in agriculture and rural areas (consensus)*
 Apartheid and women in South Africa and Namibia (63-4-24)
 The situation in Bolivia (63-2-30)
 Implementation of the goals of the United Nations Decade for Women within the framework of the United Nations effort to achieve the New International Economic Order (92-0-11)
 Expression of thanks to the host country (acclamation)

* Initiated by the U.S.

** Cosponsored by the U.S.

*** U.S. sponsorship withdrawn because of efforts by some nations to amend the resolution in ways that would have changed its original meaning. ■

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Agriculture

Convention on the Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences. Done at Washington Jan. 15, 1944. Entered into force Nov. 30, 1944. 58 Stat. 1169. References deposited: Grenada, May 7, 1979; Suriname, Aug. 28, 1980.

Convention on the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture. Done at Washington Mar. 6, 1979.¹

Ratifications deposited: El Salvador, July 1980; Guyana, July 1, 1980; Panama, Aug. 13, 1980; Peru, July 17, 1980.

Senate advice and consent to ratification: Oct. 17, 1980.

Arbitration

General treaty of inter-American arbitration and protocol of progressive arbitration. Signed at Washington Jan. 5, 1929. Entered into force Oct. 28, 1929; for the U.S. Apr. 16, 1935. 49 Stat. 3153. Ratification of denunciation: Venezuela, Sept. 8, 1980.

Inter-American convention on international commercial arbitration. Done at Panama City Jan. 30, 1975. Entered into force June 10, 1976.²

Signature: Dominican Republic, Apr. 18, 1977.

Ratification deposited: El Salvador, Aug. 11, 1980.

Aviation

Convention for the unification of certain rules relating to the precautionary attachment of aircraft. Done at Rome May 29, 1953. Entered into force Jan. 12, 1937.² Accession deposited: Togo, July 4, 1980.

Conservation

Amendment to the convention of Mar. 3, 1931, on international trade in endangered species of wild fauna and flora (TIAS 8249). Adopted at Bonn June 22, 1979.¹

Senate advice and consent to ratification: Oct. 17, 1980.

Convention on the conservation of Antarctic marine living resources, with annex for an arbitral tribunal. Done at Canberra May 20, 1980.¹

Signatures: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, F.R.G., G.D.R., New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, U.S.S.R., U.K., U.S., Sept. 11, 1980.

Consular

Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at Vienna Apr. 24, 1963. Entered into force Mar. 19, 1967; for the U.S. Dec. 24, 1961. TIAS 6820.

Ratification deposited: Finland, July 2, 1980.^{3,4}

Optional protocol to the Vienna convention on consular relations concerning the compulsory settlement of disputes. Done at Vienna Apr. 24, 1963. Entered into force Mar. 19, 1967; for the U.S. Dec. 24, 1969. TIAS 6820.

Ratification deposited: Finland, July 2, 1980.

Cultural Relations

Protocol revising the convention of Nov. 22, 1928 (TIAS 6548) relating to international expositions, with appendix and annex. Done at Paris, Nov. 30, 1972.

Accession deposited: Japan, June 9, 1980. Entered into force: June 9, 1980.

Judicial Procedure—Letters Rogatory

Inter-American convention on letters rogatory. Done at Panama City Jan. 30, 1975. Entered into force Jan. 16, 1976.² Signature: U.S., Apr. 15, 1980.

Ratification deposited: El Salvador, Aug. 11, 1980.^{3,4}

Additional protocol to the Inter-American convention on letters rogatory, with annex. Done at Montevideo May 8, 1979. Entered into force June 14, 1980.²

Signatures: Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay,⁵ Venezuela, May 8, 1979; El Salvador, Aug. 11, 1980; U.S., Apr. 15, 1980. Ratifications deposited: Peru, Uruguay,⁵ May 15, 1980.

Load Lines

Amendments to the international convention on load lines, 1966 (TIAS 6331).

Adopted at London Oct. 12, 1971.¹

Acceptances deposited: South Africa, Nov. 13, 1979; Yugoslavia, July 25, 1980.

Maritime Matters

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Adopted at London Nov. 14, 1975.¹

Acceptance deposited: U.S., Aug. 28, 1980.

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Adopted at London Nov. 17, 1977.¹

Acceptance deposited: U.S., Aug. 28, 1980.

International convention on maritime search and rescue, 1979, with annex. Done at Hamburg Apr. 27, 1979.¹

Signature: Greece, Aug. 20, 1980.^{3,7}

Nationality

Convention on the nationality of women. Signed at Montevideo Dec. 26, 1933. Entered into force Aug. 29, 1934. 49 Stat. 2957.

Adherence deposited: Dominica, Aug. 21, 1980.

Oil Pollution

International convention on civil liability for oil pollution damage. Done at Brussels Nov. 29, 1969. Entered into force June 19, 1975.²

Ratification deposited: Iceland, July 17, 1980.

International convention relating to intervention on the high seas in cases of oil pollution casualties, with annex. Done at Brussels Nov. 29, 1969. Entered into force May 6, 1975. TIAS 8068.

Ratification deposited: Iceland, July 17, 1980.

International convention on the establishment of an international fund for compensation for oil pollution damage. Done at Brussels Dec. 18, 1971. Entered into force Oct. 16, 1978.²

Accession deposited: Iceland, July 17, 1980.

Pollution

Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by dumping of wastes and other matter, with annexes. Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, and Washington Dec. 29, 1972. Entered into force Aug. 30, 1975. TIAS 8165.

Ratification deposited: Honduras, May 2, 1980.

International convention for the prevention of pollution from ships, 1973, with protocols and annexes. Done at London Nov. 2, 1973.¹

Accession deposited: Norway, July 15, 1980.⁶

Protocol relating to intervention on the high seas in cases of pollution by substances other than oil. Done at London Nov. 2, 1973.¹

Accession deposited: Norway, July 15, 1980.

Protocol of 1978 relating to the international convention for the prevention of pollution from ships, 1973. Done at London Feb. 17, 1978.¹

Accession deposited: Norway, July 15, 1980.

Amendments to the convention of Dec. 29, 1972, on the prevention of marine pollution by dumping of wastes and other matter (TIAS 8165). Adopted at London Oct. 12, 1978.¹

Senate advice and consent to ratification: Sept. 17, 1980.

Property—Intellectual

Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. Entered into force Apr. 26, 1970; for the U.S. Aug. 25, 1970. TIAS 6932.

Accession deposited: Guinea, Aug. 13, 1980.

Amendments to various treaties administered by the World Intellectual Property

Organization (WIPO) changing the budgetary cycles from triennial to biennial. Adopted at Geneva Sept. 28, 1979. Enters into force 1 month after written notifications of acceptance have been received by the Director General of WIPO from three-fourths of the states entitled to vote when the amendment was adopted. Acceptance deposited: U.S., June 2, 1980.

Rubber

International natural rubber agreement, 1979. Done at Geneva Oct. 6, 1979.¹ Provisional application: Australia, Sept. 9, 1980. Ratification deposited: Indonesia, Aug. 28, 1980.

Safety at Sea

Amendment to chapter VI of the international convention for the safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted at London Nov. 20, 1973.¹ Acceptance deposited: Yugoslavia, July 25, 1980.

Satellite Communications System

Convention on the international maritime satellite organization (INMARSAT), with annex. Done at London Sept. 3, 1976. Entered into force July 16, 1979. TIAS 9605. Ratifications deposited: France, Oct. 18, 1979; F.R.G., Oct. 23, 1979; Iraq, July 21, 1980.

Operating agreement on the international maritime satellite organization (INMARSAT), with annex. Done at London Sept. 3, 1976. Entered into force July 16, 1979. TIAS 9605.

Signature: Iraq, July 21, 1980.

Seals

Convention for the conservation of Antarctic seals, with annex and final act. Done at London June 1, 1972. Entered into force Mar. 11, 1978. TIAS 8826. Accession deposited: Poland, Aug. 15, 1980.

Telecommunications

Partial revision of the radio regulations (Geneva, 1959), as revised, relating to the aeronautical mobile (R) service, with annexes and final protocol. Done at Geneva Mar. 5, 1978. Entered into force Sept. 1, 1979, except for the frequency allotment plan for the aeronautical mobile (R) service which shall come into force on Feb. 1, 1983.²

Senate advice and consent to ratification: Sept. 17, 1980.

Terrorism

Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents. Adopted at New York Dec. 14, 1973. Entered into force Feb. 20, 1977. TIAS 8532.

Accession deposited: Haiti, Aug. 25, 1980.

Tonnage Measurement

International convention on tonnage measurement of ships, 1969, with annexes. Done at London June 23, 1969.

Accession deposited: Turkey, May 16, 1980.

Acceptance deposited: Japan, July 17, 1980.

Enters into force: July 18, 1982.

Treaties

Vienna convention on the law of treaties, with annex. Done at Vienna May 23, 1969. Entered into force Jan. 27, 1980.²

Accession deposited: Haiti, Aug. 25, 1980.

United Nations

Convention on the privileges and immunities of the U.N. Adopted at New York Feb. 13, 1946. Entered into force Sept. 17, 1946; for the U.S. Apr. 29, 1970. TIAS 6900.

Accession deposited: Seychelles, Aug. 26, 1980.

UNIDO

Constitution of the U.N. Industrial Development Organization, with annexes.

Adopted at Vienna Apr. 8, 1979.¹

Ratification deposited: Niger, Aug. 22, 1980.

Wheat

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement), 1971 (TIAS 7144). Done at Washington Apr. 25, 1979. Entered into force June 23, 1979, with respect to certain provisions, July 1, 1979, with respect to other provisions.⁸

Senate advice and consent to ratification: Sept. 17, 1980.

Protocol modifying and further extending the food aid convention (part of the international wheat agreement), 1971 (TIAS 7144). Done at Washington Apr. 25, 1979. Entered into force June 23, 1979, with respect to certain provisions, July 1, 1979, with respect to other provisions.⁸

Senate advice and consent to ratification: Sept. 17, 1980.

Food aid convention, 1980 (part of the international wheat agreement), 1971, as extended (TIAS 7144). Done at Washington Mar. 11, 1980. Entered into force July 1, 1980.⁸

Senate advice and consent to ratification: Sept. 17, 1980.

Women

Inter-American convention on the granting of political rights to women. Signed at Bogota May 2, 1948. Entered into force Apr. 22, 1949; for the U.S. May 24, 1976. TIAS 8365.

Signatures: Bolivia, Mar. 10, 1980;

Dominica, Aug. 21, 1980.

Ratification deposited: Dominica, Aug. 21, 1980.

Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women. Adopted at New York Dec. 18, 1979.¹

Signature: Romania, Sept. 4, 1980.

BILATERAL

Cameroon

Agreement concerning the provision of training related to defense articles under the U.S. international military education and training (IMET) program. Effected exchange of notes at Yaounde Mar. 3 and June 19, 1980. Entered into force June 19, 1980.

People's Republic of China

Arrangement relating to a visa system for exports to the U.S. of cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products from the People's Republic of China. Effected by exchange of letters at Beijing July 23 and 25, 1980. Entered into force July 25, 1980.

Agreement relating to civil air transport with annexes and exchanges of letters. Signed at Washington Sept. 17, 1980. Entered into force Sept. 17, 1980.

Consular convention, with exchanges of notes. Signed at Washington Sept. 17, 1980. Enters into force after the expiration of 30 days following the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

Agreement on maritime transport, with exchange of letters. Signed at Washington Sept. 17, 1980. Entered into force Sept. 1980.

Agreement relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products, with annexes. Signed at Washington Sept. 17, 1980. Entered into force Sept. 17, 1980; effective Jan. 1, 1981.

Colombia

Agreement relating to cooperation to curb the illegal traffic in narcotics. Effected by exchange of notes at Bogota July 21 and Aug. 1, 1980. Entered into force Aug. 1, 1980.

Agreement extending the agreement of Apr. 22, 1976, (TIAS 8244) concerning procedures for mutual assistance in the administration of justice in connection with the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation matter to include the Bethlehem Steel Corporation and its subsidiaries or affiliates. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington Aug. 28 and Sept. 10, 1980. Entered into force Sept. 10, 1980.

Egypt

Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income. Signed at Cairo Aug. 24, 1980. Enters into force 30 days after the date of exchange of instruments of ratification.

Grant agreement for a basic village services project, with annexes. Signed at Cairo Aug. 31, 1980. Entered into force Aug. 31, 1980.

France

Convention for the avoidance of double

ation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on estates, instances, and gifts. Signed at Washington Nov. 24, 1978.
Claimed by the President: Sept. 9, 1980.

Yemen Democratic Republic

ular convention, with exchange of notes. Signed at Berlin Sept. 4, 1979.
Instrument of ratification signed by the President: Aug. 7, 1980.

Yugoslavia

Postal agreement, with detailed regulations. Signed at Washington May 11, 1979.
Entered into force provisionally: May 1979.
Entered into force definitively: Aug. 8, 1980.

Agreement concerning Japan's financial contribution for U.S. administrative and related expenses for the Japanese fiscal year 1980 pursuant to the mutual defense assistance agreement of Mar. 8, 1954 (S 2957). Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo July 29, 1980. Entered into force: Aug. 29, 1980.

Memorandum of understanding on participation and cooperation of Japan in the international phase of ocean drilling of the sea drilling project. Signed at Tokyo Washington Aug. 5, 1980. Entered into force: Aug. 5, 1980; effective Oct. 1, 1980.

Agreement concerning the grant of defense articles and services under the military assistance program. Effected by exchange of notes at Amman Aug. 14 and 30, 1980. Entered into force: Aug. 30, 1980; effective Aug. 28, 1980.

Yugoslavia

Agreement amending the agreement of July 17 and June 8, 1978, as amended (S 9180, 9763, 9602, 9718), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington and New York July 23 and Aug. 8, 1980. Entered into force: Aug. 8, 1980.

Yugoslavia

Agreement amending the agreement of July 26, 1979, as amended (TIAS 9419), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington July 28 and Aug. 6, 1980. Entered into force: Aug. 6, 1980.

Agreement grant agreement for resource conservation and utilization. Signed at Kathmandu Aug. 31, 1980. Entered into force: Aug. 31, 1980.

Agreement grant agreement for integrated health-family planning services.

Signed at Kathmandu Aug. 31, 1980. Entered into force: Aug. 31, 1980.

Netherlands

Agreement relating to express mail service. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington and The Hague Mar. 17 and Aug. 3, 1972. Entered into force: Aug. 3, 1972. TIAS 8903.

Terminated: Sept. 1, 1980.

International express mail agreement, with detailed regulations. Signed at The Hague and Washington May 19 and June 10, 1980. Entered into force: Sept. 1, 1980.

Oman

Agreement relating to the provision of technical assistance and services to the Directorate General of Civil Aviation of Oman, with annex. Signed at Washington and Muscat Dec. 14, 1979, and May 18, 1980. Entered into force: July 1, 1980.

Agreement to establish a joint commission on economic and technical cooperation. Signed at Muscat Aug. 19, 1980. Entered into force: Aug. 19, 1980.

Economic and technical cooperation agreement. Signed at Muscat Sept. 4, 1980. Entered into force: Sept. 4, 1980.

Panama

Agreement relating to the status of the Cardenas (FAA housing) area under the agreement in implementation of Article III of the Panama Canal Treaty. Signed at Panama Aug. 29, 1980. Entered into force: Aug. 29, 1980.

Philippines

Agreement concerning the grant of defense articles and services under the military assistance program. Effected by exchange of notes at Manila Aug. 12 and 22, 1980. Entered into force: Aug. 22, 1980.

Portugal

Agreement concerning the grant of defense articles and services under the military assistance program. Effected by exchange of notes at Lisbon Aug. 12 and 28, 1980. Entered into force: Aug. 28, 1980.

Singapore

Agreement amending the agreement of Sept. 21 and 22, 1978, as amended (TIAS 9214, 9610, 9719, 9774), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington July 14 and 18, 1980. Entered into force: July 18, 1980.

Sudan

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of Dec. 22, 1979. Effected by exchange of notes at Khartoum Aug. 7, 1980. Entered into force: Aug. 7, 1980.

Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of payments due under PL 480 Title I agricultural commodity agreements.

Signed at Khartoum Aug. 18, 1980. Entered into force: Aug. 18, 1980, for 1979-80 debt; for 1980-81 debt, upon receipt by Sudan of written notice referred to in Article III, paragraph 1 of May 17, 1980, debt rescheduling agreement.

Switzerland

Agreement on social security, with final protocol. Signed at Washington July 18, 1979.
Entered into force: Nov. 1, 1980.

Administrative agreement for the implementation of the agreement on social security of July 18, 1979. Signed at Bern Dec. 20, 1979.

Entered into force: Nov. 1, 1980.

United Kingdom

Memorandum of agreement concerning exchange of personnel. Signed at Washington Aug. 29, 1980. Entered into force: Aug. 29, 1980.

Venezuela

Maritime boundary treaty. Signed at Caracas Mar. 28, 1978.¹

Senate advice and consent to ratification: Sept. 17, 1980.

¹ Not in force.

² Not in force for the U.S.

³ With reservation.

⁴ With declaration.

⁵ With statement.

⁶ Does not accept optional Annex IV.

⁷ Subject to ratification.

⁸ In force provisionally for the U.S. ■

September 1980

Events pertaining to Iran may be found on page 55.

September 3

Ambassador Sol M. Linowitz, the President's Personal Representative for the Middle East Peace Negotiations, announces that Israeli Prime Minister Begin and Egyptian President Sadat agree to resume talks on Palestinian autonomy and to join with the U.S. in a summit meeting before the end of the year.

September 10

Trade Working Group of the U.S.-Mexican Consultative Mechanism meets in Mexico Sept. 10 and 11. U.S. delegation is headed by Coordinator for Mexican Affairs and the Deputy U.S. Trade Representative Ambassadors Robert Krueger and Robert Hormats, respectively.

September 11

Felix Garcia Rodriguez, a member of the U.N. Cuban Mission, is assassinated in New York.

September 12

Government of Turkish Prime Minister Demirel is overthrown in a military coup d'etat.

September 15

Soviet enlisted man enters U.S. embassy in Afghanistan and initially asks for asylum.

September 16

35th session of the U.N. General Assembly opens in New York. St. Vincent and the Grenadines becomes 154th member of the U.N.

September 17

A State Department debriefing is held for representatives of nongovernmental organizations to discuss the results of the 1980 World Conference of the U.N. Decade for Women held in Copenhagen last July.

Former Nicaraguan President Anastasio Somoza Debayle is assassinated in Asuncion, Paraguay.

U.S.-China sign four bilateral agreements—civil air transport, textile, maritime transport, and consular.

September 18

Secretary Muskie visits Pittsburgh, Pa. to address the World Affairs Council.

Japanese Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ito makes official visit to the U.S. Sept. 18-25 and to Washington, D.C., Sept. 18-22.

U.S. House of Representatives votes 298 to 98 to reject proposed shipment of 38 tons of low-enriched uranium to India.

September 21

Soviet enlisted man, after meeting with the Soviet Ambassador at the U.S. embassy in Afghanistan, decides to depart.

September 22

Secretary Muskie visits New York City to address the 35th session of the U.N. General Assembly.

Ten Iranian airfields are attacked by Iraqi fighter-bombers; Iran confirms the raids and announces a retaliation raid on two unidentified Iraqi bases, further escalating the long-time conflict between the two countries.

September 24

U.S. Senate approves by a vote of 48 to 46 the sale of 38 tons of low-enriched uranium to India defeating the House vote opposing the shipment.

Iran and Iraq halt shipment of oil from Persian Gulf region taking out of international circulation some 2.7 million barrels of oil a day.

September 28

By unanimous vote, the U.N. Security Council approves a resolution calling for a cease-fire in the Iranian-Iraqi conflict. ■

Department of State

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

| No. | Date | Subject |
|------|------|---|
| *239 | 9/3 | International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR), study group 1, Oct. 8. |
| *240 | 9/3 | CCIR, study group 6, Oct. 9. |
| *241 | 9/3 | Shipping Coordinating Committee (SCC) Subcommittee on Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), working group on radio communications, Sept. 18. |
| *242 | 9/3 | SCC, SOLAS, working group on safety of fishing vessels, Sept. 23. |
| *243 | 9/3 | SCC, SOLAS, national committee for the prevention of marine pollution, Nov. 5. |
| *244 | 9/4 | Allen Clayton Davis sworn in as Ambassador to Guinea (biographic data). |
| *245 | 9/5 | Peter Jon De Vos sworn in as Ambassador to Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde (biographic data). |
| *246 | 9/5 | Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission Advisory Committee, U.S. National Section, Sept. 25. |
| 247 | 9/8 | Secretary Muskie interviewed on CBS-TV's "Face the Nation," Washington, D.C., Sept. 7. |
| *248 | 9/10 | Barbara Watson sworn in as Ambassador to Malaysia (biographic data). |
| *249 | 9/9 | International North Pacific Fisheries Commission Advisory Committee, U.S. Section, Oct. 2 (partially closed). |
| *250 | 9/11 | Results of Copenhagen World Conference for Women: discussion at State Dept. Conference, Sept. 17. |
| *251 | 9/12 | U.S., Colombia amend bilateral textile agreement, July 31 and Aug. 20. |
| *252 | 9/12 | U.S., Mexico Trade Group meeting, Sept. 10 and 11. |
| *253 | 9/12 | U.S., China initial textile agreement, Sept. 11. |
| 254 | 9/15 | Secretary Muskie's news conference. |

| | | |
|------|------|---|
| *255 | 9/3 | Walter C. Carrington sworn in as Ambassador to Senegal (biographic data). |
| 256 | 9/15 | Review and assessment of U.S. participation in World Conference of U.N. Decade for Women. |
| *257 | 9/17 | U.S., China sign bilateral textile agreement. |
| *258 | 9/18 | Advisory committee to the U.S. national section of the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, Oct. 15 and 16. |
| 259 | 9/16 | Muskie: statement on clear targeting strategy. |
| *260 | 9/18 | Advisory Committee on International Investment, Technology, and Development, working group on U.N./OEC investment undertakings, Oct. 8. |
| *261 | 9/18 | Advisory Committee on International Investment, Technology, and Development, working group on preparation for U.N. Conference on New and Renewable Sources of Energy, 14. |
| 262 | 9/18 | Muskie: address before World Affairs Council Pittsburgh. |
| 262A | 9/19 | Muskie: question-and-answer session following Pittsburgh address. |
| *263 | 9/19 | U.S., Korea amend textile agreement, Sept. 8. |
| *264 | 9/22 | SCC, SOLAS, working group on fire protection, Oct. 7. |
| *265 | 9/22 | SCC, Oct. 16. |
| *266 | 9/22 | SCC, SOLAS, Nov. 19. |
| 267 | 9/22 | Muskie: address at opening of 35th U.N. General Assembly, New York. |
| †268 | 9/23 | U.S., Canada agree on monitoring arrangement for the Poplar River. |

*Not printed in the Bulletin.

†Held for a later issue. ■

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*Department
of State*
bulletin

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December 1980

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Department of State bulletin

Volume 80 / Number 2045 / December 1980

Cover photo:

Secretary Muskie
Matthew Nimetz
Ralph Earle II
Elliot L. Richardson
Donald F. McHenry

The DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, published by the Office of Public Communication in the Bureau of Public Affairs, is the official record of U.S. foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide the public, the Congress, and government agencies with information on developments in U.S. foreign relations and the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIN's contents include major addresses and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State; statements made before congressional committees by the Secretary and other senior State Department officials; special features and articles on international affairs; selected press releases issued by the White House, the Department, and the U.S. Mission to the United Nations; and treaties and other agreements to which the United States is or may become a party.

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EDMUND S. MUSKIE
Secretary of State

WILLIAM J. DYESS
Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs

PAUL E. AUERSWALD
Director,
Office of Public Communication

JOHN CLARK KIMBALL
Chief, Editorial Division

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG
Editor

JUANITA ADAMS
Assistant Editor

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Department of State
Superintendent of Documents

JAN 20 1981

DEPOSITORY



Department of State Bicentennial 1781-1981

The Department of State will celebrate its 200th anniversary on January 10, 1981.

To commemorate the occasion, the BULLETIN will carry in January a short history of the Department of State. Written by the Department of State Historian, David F. Trask, the article will trace the development of the State Department's domestic and overseas operations.

The Editors

President Addresses World Bank Group and IMF Representatives

Following are the remarks President Carter made on September 30, 1980, at the annual meeting of the Board of Governors of the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), the International Development Association, and the International Finance Corporation.¹

It's a special pleasure for me as resident of our country to welcome you again for this meeting, which is so important to the entire world. This is the 35th annual meeting of its two great institutions. And it's also a special pleasure for me to welcome the new members.

Your presence here symbolizes a commitment of more than 140 countries to a dynamic system of international economic cooperation and to its central institutions, as you well know, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Your commitment strengthens the prospects for a lasting peace, because peace cannot be assured if hundreds of millions of people are offered no hope of escape from hunger or poverty or economic instability or deprivation. The Bank and the Fund provide that hope.

Both institutions are rapidly adapting to new circumstances and new changes and also new challenges. We support this process of adapting to change. The response of a changing world can best be charted within these institutions, acting in your own fields of competence and experience. Your work should not be diverted by extraneous political disputes. And as you mold and adapt, you must be assured that your decisions will not be determined or renegotiated in some other meeting. Your record of success justifies this vote of confidence. Any political pressure or unwarranted influence from any international forum which might undermine your integrity would be neither necessary nor desirable.

The Fund is the world's principal official source of balance-of-payments financing. So far this year, Fund programs of more than \$5.5 billion have been arranged; even more is needed. Action is underway to expand these resources. The IMF is also adopting

important changes in policy, making it more responsive to changing needs and the concerns of its members.

During the last 12 months, the World Bank group has lent more than \$12 billion to developing member countries. Nearly \$4 billion of that was provided on concessional terms to the poorest nations.

The Bank is mounting initiatives to enable developing countries to find and produce more energy, while also carrying out other important bank functions. An enlarged World Bank program for energy exploration and development would benefit all of us. The World Bank has also launched a program of lending and advisory services to help developing nations and to help them make the structural adjustments required by higher energy prices.

It's not possible for me to discuss the role of the World Bank without paying personal and professional tribute to the leadership and the dedication of Robert McNamara over the last 12 years. Under Bob McNamara's outstanding leadership, the Bank has become the focus of world cooperation to improve the human condition and a fine example of how such cooperation can be effective. Bob, you will leave to your successor a high standard and a firm foundation for the future, based on an open heart, sensitivity about people's human needs, and the sound economic judgment that has maintained the integrity of the World Bank.

U.S. support of the Fund and the Bank reflects both our fundamental humanitarian principles and also our own economic interests. Legislation enabling our participation in the IMF quota increase passed the House of Representatives last week. I'm now pressing for a passage of this legislation in the Senate, and I will sign it as soon as it reaches my desk. Moreover, I will urge the Congress of our country to give high priority to the sixth IDA [International Development Association] replenishment later this year. Next year we will submit legislation for our subscription to the general capital increase of the World Bank. Both the Fund and the World Bank group must have all the resources they need for their crucial work.

Let me also mention several other steps the United States has taken that will help to stabilize the world economy. We've adopted a strong anti-inflation program of fiscal and monetary restraint. We've begun a nationwide program to revitalize our own industrial base and to accelerate productivity growth. This new program would increase the portion of our own gross national product devoted to investment in new industry and in new jobs and in new production. The program will reduce inflation. It will restore innovation and vigor to our economy. And we've also put into place a comprehensive program to rebuild my country's energy base.

This new program is already paying rich dividends; it's already bearing fruit. In the last 3 years, for instance, we've reduced oil imports by 24%. This year we are drilling more oil and gas wells than any other year in history. And this year we are producing more coal in my country than in any previous year in history. We are acting to insure that the United States can meet much of the world's need for coal. We've started a massive investment program to increase production of synthetic fuels. We're spending \$4 billion per year on energy research and development and additional billions of dollars on incentives to use energy more efficiently in our homes, in our industries, our commerce, and our transportation.

Because of sustained oil production and because of worldwide conservation measures, the world's oil stocks are now at an alltime high, and these reserves will help to offset the effect of temporary reductions in supply, such as that which has been caused by the present conflict between Iran and Iraq. However, we are keenly aware that some nations are seriously threatened by even a temporary interruption in normal oil supplies. Thus we are working with your countries in the United Nations and through other public, international fora to end this conflict as quickly as possible.

Our energy program is part of a far-reaching effort to which we pledged ourselves at the recent Venice economic summit conference. Our common goal there, as expressed by the seven na-

U.S. Position in the Persian Gulf

Secretary Muskie's address before the General Pulaski Association in Buffalo on October 14, 1980.¹

tions involved, is to conserve more oil and to produce the equivalent in alternative fuels of 15-20 million barrels of oil per day by the end of this decade. This will ease pressure on world oil markets. It will alleviate balance-of-payments problems and will let developing countries obtain a larger share of the world oil supply now and in the future.

The common purpose of all countries, in both our domestic and international energy actions, should be to strengthen the world economy and to assure fair treatment for all nations. Our common goal should be to minimize the threat of abrupt changes in the price of oil, to assure a reasonable, predictable level of supply of energy, to avoid compounding inflationary pressure that robs us all. The oil-importing countries and the oil-exporting countries as well can all contribute to this effort. We all have a stake in its outcome.

This meeting comes at a crucial time for us all. The world has come to place enormous confidence in your judgment, in the judgment and the services of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. That confidence, down through the years, has never been misplaced, and I'm certain that it will be even more justified by your actions and your services in the future.

On behalf of the United States of America, I assure you that we intend to remain active in the decisions made within these two institutions and supportive of the work which lies ahead of us all. Congratulations on what you've accomplished. My full support and best wishes now and in the future.

¹Made in the Plenary Hall at the Sheraton Washington Hotel (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Oct. 6, 1980). ■

Over the past 5 months, I have made it one of my prime purposes to speak to the American people about our nation's foreign policy. Everywhere in my travels I have found people eager to be informed and warmly hospitable. But this occasion, for me, is special. You and I share a common heritage. We are, first of all, Americans. But we are Americans who trace our roots back to the same land—another land whose people work hard, revere God, and cherish human freedom.

For you and me—and for other people of Polish ancestry—the past year has brought some stirring moments. Pope John Paul II has inspired the whole world with his radiant character and with his simple but compelling message of human brotherhood and peace. The Nobel Prize for literature has been awarded to Czeslaw Milosz, whose writings have voiced what lives in so many Polish hearts.

And most of all, in recent weeks, our hearts have gone out to the brave people of Poland, as they have confronted one of the most difficult—and perhaps most pivotal—moments in their recent history. Poland's entire history has been a history of challenge. The land of our forefathers was partitioned three times. Indeed, for over a century, while America was becoming the great nation that it is, there was no Poland on the map.

But the Poles are more than a brave and a civilized people; they are a resilient people. They came back from partition to independence. They are trying now to come back from a period of economic, political, and social troubles that would test the will and the skills of any nation—even a nation of 35 million people occupying a key position in Europe.

It will not be easy for Poland to resolve its problems, and it will take time. We will not interfere in Poland, and neither should others. But Poland's people and Poland's leaders can be assured, as they face the formidable tasks that lie ahead, that our own people and government will want to offer them both our sympathetic understanding and, where this is feasible and proper, our assistance.

War in Iran and Iraq

On this Pulaski Day, when we celebrate the memory of a man who helped us gain our own independence, I want to speak to you about another region of the world in which the independence of nations, our interests, and peace itself are at stake. I want to tell you what your government is doing to secure peace, to guard our interests and thus to help insure that the values we cherish will survive and prosper in the world. I am speaking about the war between Iran and Iraq and more generally about our position in the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia.

The war between these two Persian Gulf states is in its 4th week now. Behind this brief conflict lie years of bitterness and rivalry. But it would be a mistake to view this conflict only as a local flareup between two rival states. Its implications are far broader. If not contained and resolved, it could do severe damage to our nation's vital interests.

Several things are at stake—first among them the peace and stability of the Persian Gulf. In the tensions and instabilities of that area, even small wars threaten to become larger ones. Also affected are the safety and independence of our friends in the area who look to us for support and help to safeguard their own independence. And potentially at stake in this conflict are vital economic interests of the United States.

We buy less than 1% of our oil from Iraq and none from Iran. But our European allies, Japan, and many developing countries are major buyers of oil from Iraq; Iraq is the world's second largest supplier of oil after Saudi Arabia. Clear if the economies of our allies are disrupted, our own vital interests will suffer.

Moreover, the war could spread to interfere with shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. And it is through this vital chokepoint that 16 million barrels of the world's oil must pass each day, not only oil from Iraq and Iran but also oil from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and other producers in the gulf—a significant share of the world's daily oil supply.

Finally, in the light of Afghanistan, we must be concerned about the possibility of new intervention presented by any such instability in the region.

U.S. Goals

The United States has nothing to gain by taking sides in this conflict, and we have

refused to do so. But to be impartial is not to be inactive; to declare that we will not take sides is not to declare that we have no interests at stake. In fact, the United States has been working steadily, since the war broke out, in pursuit of three goals.

First, we are working for an end to the fighting between the two nations. We have strongly supported international efforts, in the United Nations and elsewhere, to end the fighting and to bring Iran and Iraq to the negotiating table. The President has been in contact with foreign leaders, and I have worked with Secretary General Waldheim of the United Nations and with other diplomats to pursue an early end to this conflict.

Second, we are working to keep the conflict from spreading beyond Iran and Iraq. To this end, for example, we are helping our nonbelligerent friends in the area who are threatened by this conflict. The President's prompt decision to send advance warning-and-control aircraft to Saudi Arabia underscores our determination to strengthen the defenses of our friends—so that they can guard their own independence and territorial integrity.

We are also urging all other nations in the region and beyond—to avoid involvement and to work to limit and reduce the fighting. It is in no one's interest to see the hostilities widen. We have exchanged views with the Soviet Union. Each of us has assured the other of impartiality in the conflict. We will continue to exercise restraint and expect the Soviets to do likewise.

And third, we have pledged to do what is necessary to protect free shipping in the Strait of Hormuz from any interference. We believe that the oil-producing nations must be free from external coercion or control and free to ship their oil safely through international waters. We and our allies do not seek to dominate the oil production decisions of the oil-producing nations. But all nations—not only industrial but the world's developing nations as well—have a profound interest in the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf.

Steps

Today, we are in a position to pursue this policy of firm but prudent action. Our capacity to pursue our goals—and our capacity, in particular, to make a credible pledge to protect free shipping in the Strait of Hormuz—are no accident. Our

position is the result of careful, deliberate steps by President Carter and his Administration.

As the President said last January in his State of the Union message, “. . . we are prepared to work with other countries . . . to share a cooperative security framework that respects differing values and political beliefs, yet . . . enhances the independence, security, and prosperity of all.”

That is a tall order. But no one should doubt our determination or our ability to fulfill it. We, and our allies, have both the power and the will to defend our interests and to sustain our friends in the region. Our allies are playing an essential role in strengthening the defenses of Europe itself and through their own military, diplomatic, and economic position in Southwest Asia.

Let me review with you some of the specific steps we have been taking—singly and with others—to build and strengthen that vital security framework of which the President spoke. Our actions have been taken on three broad fronts: military, diplomatic, and economic.

Military Actions. I will mention our military actions first, because our ability to defend our interests, if they are assaulted, is absolutely basic.

- We have moved to strengthen our peacetime military presence in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. Since early 1979, the United States has had on station the most powerful naval force ever deployed to the Indian Ocean. And our Mideast naval force inside the Persian Gulf itself has been increased from three to five ships. We will maintain a substantial military presence in the area, composed primarily of off-shore naval forces but including also periodic deployment of air and ground units for training and exercises.

- We are improving our ability to add quickly, during a crisis, to that continuing military presence. We have organized and are developing a rapid deployment force which will be available for dispatch worldwide on short notice. And we are increasing our ability to move ground, air, and naval forces to potential trouble spots. This effort includes programs to improve the reach, mobility, and strength of our airplanes and to procure new, fast, sealift ships.

- We are working with friendly nations in the area to improve their self-defense capabilities and military facilities. And we have expanded our access to needed facilities in the region.

All these steps, let me emphasize, are taken in the interests of defense and peace. They threaten no one whose purpose is peace. They are designed to buttress the independence of the region and rights of free passage in its waterways. Our actions will remain carefully calibrated to these goals, so we neither create new, needless tensions with the Soviet Union nor appear to threaten the freedom of decision of our friends in the area.

Diplomatic Efforts. On the diplomatic front, two specific efforts are especially important.

The Camp David accords stand as a major achievement. Peace between Israel and Egypt is now a reality. And the ultimate aim of the peace process—a settlement between Israel and its other Arab neighbors—will, if we can achieve it, serve Israel's security interests, the strategic interest of the United States and its allies, and indeed the interest of all states in the region. It will not assure stability in the Middle East. But the absence of a serious effort to achieve this peace will assure continued danger.

The sanctions levied by the United States and our allies in the wake of the Soviet aggression against Afghanistan are also highly important for they are a strong signal that we will firmly oppose armed aggression; that we support the independence of nations in this region and elsewhere.

Our other major diplomatic efforts have been in pursuit of better ties with nations in the region with which we have shared interests. In several cases, notably Egypt and the moderate Arab states, we have had considerable success. In other cases, such as Iran, we have made it clear that, while we will never yield on matters of principle, we stand ready to compose our differences. But we will not rest until all our captive citizens are home and free. We are continuing, through every avenue available, to seek their release.

Economic Measures. The third front on which we have moved to protect our interests is the economic front. And here the measures taken by the President and the Congress over the past 3 years to guard our energy security assume key importance. These energy-security steps have been taken in two directions—toward conservation and toward increased production of energy here at home. They are working.

In large part because the United States and our allies have reduced our consumption of oil, we are weathering

the world market loss of oil from Iran and Iraq. And our careful cooperation and planning with our allies in Europe and Japan give us reason to hope that together we can face future emergencies—even serious supply interruptions—with a measure of confidence and a minimum of disruption and panic.

Since President Carter signed the National Energy Act of 1978—the first comprehensive energy law in our national history—our dependence on foreign oil has been dramatically cut. Oil consumption has decreased in both of the last 2 years. Our net oil imports have declined steadily: During the first 9 months of this year, for example, our imports declined by 25% from the same period in 1977.

President Carter's energy policy—which includes a windfall tax on oil profits to pay for new fuel development—will also encourage stepped-up energy production here at home. The evidence is already apparent. Coal production is up 16% over last year. A new synthetic fuels corporation has been established. And we are aggressively promoting solar energy and other new technologies.

We have a long way to go. But the United States and our allies have demonstrated that we are serious about overcoming our dependence on foreign oil supplies and about dealing skillfully with potential interruptions of supply. The Iran-Iraq conflict demonstrates the importance of these efforts.

Conclusion

My purpose in citing all these efforts—military, diplomatic, and economic—is to underscore our progress, not to claim that the job is done. It is to suggest that we are on the right road, not that we relax our efforts to foster peace and security in this crucial region of the world.

Achieving our purposes will never be easy. The region is a tangle of ancient hostility, of religious rivalry, of competition for territory and influence. Its wealth and strategic importance have long made it an arena of competition among outside powers.

Our own interests in the region are complex and may sometimes seem contradictory. We want good relations, for example, with several nations which are adversaries to one another. The variety of our interests guarantees complexity and difficulty in shaping our policies. And we must be aware that the nations of this region are fiercely independent. This sense of independence is very much in

The Frontier of Development

Secretary Muskie's address before the Peace Corps rededication ceremony in Ann Arbor on October 14, 1980.¹

I am delighted to share this celebration with you. And I'm honored to stand where John Kennedy stood 20 years ago this evening and gave life to the Peace Corps idea: that the energy and the idealism of individual Americans could be harnessed in a practical way to the needs of those living in the deepest poverty around the world and that, in the process, both we and they could benefit.

The idea of a Peace Corps was not new. It had been germinating in the fertile minds of people like Hubert Humphrey and Henry Reuss for some time. But John Kennedy ignited that idea, and the spark was set here that evening.

There were a number of early skeptics. But they were quickly tamed—if not by the extraordinary public response, then eventually by the determination of Sarge Shriver.

The Peace Corps idea seized us for a number of reasons. Clearly, there was an element of East-West competition involved. It has been said that the Peace Corps “took root between the horizons of hope and of fear.” But hope was far the

our interest. They adamantly resist domination by anyone, but their strong feelings may cause them to misinterpret even friendly gestures as interference.

Faced with such intricate challenges, it would be wrong to rely solely on our military forces, impressive as they may be, or on diplomacy alone. Because the challenges we face are military and diplomatic and economic, this Administration has always believed that our responses must be equally varied. I cannot warn strongly enough against one dimensional approaches to this or any other area of international tension.

Great as the dangers and uncertainties are in Iran and Iraq—in the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia—I believe our policies are wise and prudent. I believe we are on the right track. And while the times may not permit an easy optimism, I do have faith—faith that with time and patience and wisdom, we can achieve a compelling American objective: to help build peace in this troubled region and a greater measure of peace in the world.

stronger force, for the Peace Corps struck a chord of compassion and decency deep within the American character, a core of human values that has been—till now—among our most powerful national assets.

And the Peace Corps captured the spirit that John Kennedy helped awaken—the energy, the dedication, the faith in our purpose, the confidence of success was a powerful vision that enlisted the commitment of thousands, including many former volunteers here today—vision of poverty eased, of hunger tamed, of disease alleviated, of human potential more fully realized.

The buoyant optimism of that time has been tempered in the years since by our experiences and by tides of change that have swept the world, both developed and developed.

- Some 50 nations that were colonies in 1960 have become independent nations determined to preserve that independence and to chart their own course.

- A growing sense of common cause has emerged among developing nations. It has found expression in regional and international groupings—in the United Nations and the nonaligned movement, the Organization of African Unity and Organization of American States, in the Association of South East Asian Nations and elsewhere.

- At the same time, we have seen growing diversity among developing nations. The boundary between “developing” and “developed” itself has eroded. And we have come to understand that there is no single path to development, that the past and the future must be reconciled in a uniquely local blend.

- New problems have emerged to compound the old—the shocks of energy inflation, the consequences of urbanization, the surge of population, the impact of rapid growth on the ecological balance—on tropical forests and farmland and available water.

- And over this same period, we have also come to recognize the scope of our own challenges here at home—to build a growing, competitive U.S. economy, to break our own costly and dangerous energy dependence, to open new opportunities for Americans who have been left behind while we maintain the promise of a better future for all Americans.

¹ Press release 285. ■

Our nation, like many Peace Corps volunteers serving in the field, has come face-to-face with the enormity and complexity of the challenge. We have been sobered by our understanding. For some, that experience has given birth to despair. "We can't make a difference on global poverty even if we try," is the lament of some. "Our money and energy could be spent here, not in countries half way around the world," is the refuge of others.

I am here today for one purpose—to say to you, and to others who hear these words: We must reject that defeatism. We have no room for that despair. We have made a difference. And for our sake as well as for others, we must continue the battle—against world poverty and anger and hopelessness.

I have rarely spoken to a returned Peace Corps volunteer who did not believe that he or she, in some way, had made a contribution—however modest than their original expectation. And that remains true for today's Peace Corps.

- In Malaysia, a new Peace Corps project is helping small cattle farmers increase milk production through better veterinary practices and new marketing approaches.

- On the small island nation of Antserratt in the eastern Caribbean, which now imports half of all its food, volunteers are helping build farmer cooperatives and better irrigation to increase domestic production.

- Upper Volta faces the need to increase the wood available for fuel tenfold in the next 20 years. Peace Corps volunteers there are helping rural villagers plant and grow the new forests they will need for the future.

- In Malawi, where 3 out of 10 children do not live to see the age of five, volunteers are helping rural villagers increase local water supplies and improve local health care.

These are just a few examples. But they reflect a larger fact: Peace Corps today is making a difference, in the only way that matters—on the daily lives of individuals whose daily lives are harsher.

And when we look from the village to the globe, we can also see that, for all that remains to be done, progress has been made.

- In 1950 average life expectancy in the lower income countries was only 35 years. Today it has risen to 50.

- For the first time in human history, and through the work of thousands

of dedicated health workers, the ancient scourge of smallpox has been eradicated from the world.

- Twenty years ago primary school education was not available to most children in developing countries. Today 6 out of 10 children in the developing world attend school.

- Since 1950 real per capita income for the people of the developing world has doubled.

I cite these figures, not to mask the staggering dimensions of the human suffering that remains; for it is also true that 600 million people in the world today live in the most desperate poverty. Nor am I for a moment suggesting that we can claim even primary credit for these developments. But the fact is that outside assistance has made a difference. It is important that we clearly see the difficulty of the road ahead. But it is also important that we know the distance that has been traveled. For the progress that has been made is evidence that further progress is possible.

I refuse to accept the dispirited voices for another reason—not only is progress possible, America's genuine commitment to that progress is vital to our own future. To a far greater extent than when Peace Corps was launched, what happens in the developing world is important to us here.

It is important to our security. Whether we look at the Middle East or Southeast Asia, at Africa or the Caribbean, at Central or South America, we see our stake in peaceful development. For hopelessness breeds frustration; and with frustration can come violence, radicalism, and the ingredients for broader confrontations. We have a direct national interest in helping developing nations reconcile the combustible disparity between a privileged few and an embittered multitude.

The jobs of 1.2 million American workers today depend on exports to developing countries. Developing nations are our fastest growing markets. They supply us with critical materials that turn the wheels of American industry. We cannot expect those patterns to continue unless we continue to demonstrate, in practical and concrete ways, our responsiveness to the needs and priorities of developing nations.

Finally, what happens in the developing world is important to the quality of our own lives. A recent study by our government, called "Global 2000," carried some stern warnings about what our world could look like in just 20 years if we

fail to see our stake in the progress of others. We could see an increase in the world's population in the next 20 years that equals the entire population of the globe in 1950. Will there be adequate food and shelter and jobs and education for a world of 6 billion people? Or will we see hunger and despair grow; brutal competition for scarce resources increase; violent disruptions multiplied many times over?

These stormclouds are not so distant in either time or place. They will shape our lives, just as certainly as they shape the lives of others. For all of these reasons, our efforts to help developing nations solve their problems are not "give-away" programs. They are not international charity. They are investments we make in the future of others, and thereby in the future of ourselves:

- Investments in the long-term stability that comes when governments are meeting the basic needs of their people;

- Investments in an expanding international economy that can open new opportunities for all of us;

- Investments in growing cooperation on long-range global problems that can be solved only through common action.

This new reality—this growing together of our future with the futures of peoples in the developing world—needs to be made clearer to the American people. Their support for the human and material resources we need to help shape the currents of change in the developing world depends upon that growing public understanding.

I am committed to do all in my power as Secretary of State to help build that understanding and to enlist that support. For unless the American people better understand how important these efforts are, the plain fact is that Congress will not fund our requests.

Those of you who have served with Peace Corps around the world have a first-hand appreciation of the histories that separate the world's peoples and the destiny that unites us. You have a continuing responsibility to build and share that understanding in your own communities. And so today I ask you to volunteer again, for a task that sends you home not abroad: to build a broad national constituency for an active and constructive American engagement with the developing world and for the resources to support it.

The past 20 years have made us more sober, perhaps, in our views of what

SALT and the Future of Arms Control

*Secretary Muskie's address before the Women's National Democratic Club in Washington, D.C., on October 16, 1980.*¹

I want to spend a few minutes at the outset talking about something that is very much on my mind: the future of the SALT II Treaty and, indeed, of arms control itself. As a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last year, I listened carefully to the debate over the treaty. I reached a clear and firm conclusion: that ratification of this treaty, in its present form, is strongly in the interest of this nation.

Nonetheless, as a proponent of the treaty, I supported the President's decision to seek a postponement of full Senate debate on the treaty in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan last December. It was clear that our attention—as a government and a people—needed to be focused on the significance of the Soviet action and on a strong U.S. and international response. And it was also clear that the Soviet invasion made the road to ratification even steeper.

The Soviets remain in Afghanistan. That is a fact we cannot afford to ignore. As a nation that cherishes our freedom, we must be concerned about the freedom of the Afghan people from military aggression. And we cannot ignore the

can be accomplished and how soon. But we have also learned that much can be accomplished. We have learned, in the past 20 years, that our resources are limited. We have also learned that we must, therefore, use our resources with greater sensitivity and effectiveness. We have learned that the developing world may not always welcome the enthusiasm of crusaders. But it does want the expertise and the cooperation of partners.

Twenty years ago, John Kennedy proclaimed a new frontier. By doing so, he reminded us of something unique in our American view of the world. In other, older cultures the word "frontier" means a boundary—a place to stop. But for us, the word has meant ever-beckoning horizons, new challenges, new obstacles to overcome. That is one thing that has not changed in the past 20 years. Today, as then, the frontier of development beckons. Today, more than ever, that frontier must be explored.

threat that the Soviet invasion poses to a region vital not only to the United States but to the world. We must be fully prepared to protect those vital interests.

So long as Soviet forces remain there, Afghanistan cannot be permitted to recede from our attention or from the international agenda. The Soviet leadership must understand that aggression will be resisted and that the only basis upon which an improvement in our relations can proceed is one of mutual restraint.

It is precisely because SALT II assures an appreciable measure of restraint on Soviet capabilities—restraint that almost certainly will be lacking without the treaty—that we should ratify the SALT II Treaty as soon as possible. This is not something we should do for the Soviets; it is something we must do for ourselves, for the treaty reduces the threats we would otherwise face over the next 5 years.

Concrete Benefits of SALT

Let me very briefly give you some examples of what I mean by that.

- Without the treaty, the Soviets can deploy 25% more strategic bombers and missiles by 1985 than they can if the treaty is in force.

- Without the treaty, we estimate that they will have several thousand more individual nuclear weapons on those bombers and missiles by 1985 than they could under the treaty. Each of their heavy missiles alone could carry 20–30 nuclear weapons instead of the 10 permitted under the treaty.

- Without the treaty, there is no prohibition on either party concealing their strategic programs, from putting the signals from their missile tests in code, or simply hiding their programs from our satellites and other technical monitoring.

- Without the treaty, we would, in effect, know less about more. Our ability to observe Soviet military efforts could be severely impaired at a time when there were no agreed limits on what they could do. In such an unrestrained environment, our own defense planning becomes more difficult, less certain, more costly.

- Without the treaty, we could be forced to spend more of our dollars on strategic programs than now planned, at the expense of social programs and our

conventional military forces or through new tax burdens.

The treaty achieves these restraint on Soviet capabilities without significantly interfering with our own strategic modernization programs. The MX missile, cruise missile, our new Trident submarine and missile—all of the programs we have undertaken in the past several years to assure that we maintain a stable nuclear balance in the 1980s—can and will proceed on schedule under the SALT agreement.

Clearly, this treaty does not mean an end to the arms race or the risk of a nuclear catastrophe. The dangers inherent in two massively armed nuclear states will persist. But the treaty reduces those dangers by making the nuclear balance more stable, by reducing the uncertainties that can lead to a fatal miscalculation by either side, by avoiding the risk of pouring new billions into a stepped-up arms race that will buy us less, not more security.

That is why the Joint Chiefs of Staff unanimously support early ratification of the SALT II Treaty. That is why all of our European allies strongly urge us to ratify it promptly. That is why the President has made clear that when the Senate reconvenes, he will consult with the leadership with a view toward resuming Senate consideration and bringing the treaty to vote as soon as that is practical, for we must understand a critical fact about this treaty: We can lose its benefits not only through rejection but also through inaction. In the months since the treaty was signed, both we and the Soviets have avoided actions that would be inconsistent with the terms of the treaty. As time goes on, however, such voluntary self-restraint may become less tenable.

The agreements involve timetables—schedules that were an integral part of the bargain. Those timetables are running. There are specific actions called for in 1981; the Soviets, for example, must dismantle systems that would place them above the new limits. And while the treaty itself does not expire until 1985, there is a separate protocol that expires at the end of 1981. As the protocol shrinks, the bargain could unravel. In short, as lawyers like to say, time is of the essence of this agreement. And time is running out. We must make our decision or it will be made for us—by default.

Future of Arms Control

I have stressed the concrete, immediate benefits to us of the SALT II Treaty, because I believe they constitute an over-

¹ Press release 283. ■

The Foreign Policy of Human Rights

*Secretary Muskie's address before a public forum at the University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee on October 21, 1980.*¹

My purpose tonight is to listen as well as to speak—to give you an opportunity to ask questions. So I will be deliberately brief. But I do want to begin with a few formal, stage-setting words about the root purposes of our American foreign policy.

A few years ago, in a toast he delivered at the White House in President Kennedy's Administration, the French philosopher Andre Malraux observed that America was the first nation on Earth consciously organized around an idea. That idea, of course, was the idea of human freedom: the idea of unfettered individual expression, of respect for the sanctity of the individual; the idea of full play for the citizen's political rights.

That idea, of course, remains central to our political union. It is what makes America the wellspring of the world's

contemporary human liberation movements, from the civil rights movement to the crusade for women's rights. And that idea of human freedom is one of the motivating forces of our nation's foreign policy.

Tonight I want to talk briefly about the foreign policy of human rights. And I want to touch specifically on a forthcoming event of great significance to all of us who care about human rights: this year's Madrid conference of 33 European nations, the United States, and Canada. In November these nations will begin to review compliance with the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. The Helsinki Final Act established CSCE—the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe—as a continuing process, and it made fidelity to certain human rights standards a matter of joint obligation and concern to all 35 signing nations.

Let me begin with an observation or two about the emphasis placed by President Carter and his Administration on human rights as a major theme of Ameri-

The Basic Choice

Some suggest that we can preserve the arms control process and obtain a better treaty by reopening the negotiations. I am convinced that is a prescription not for progress but for breakdown. This treaty is a product of 7 years of negotiation by Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter. Like all complex agreements, it is a series of smaller bargains tied together in an overall balance both sides see to be in their interest. Can we reasonably expect to extract greater concessions from the Soviets while giving no concessions in return? That would not be a formula for negotiation but for stalemate, while the Soviets acquired arms this treaty would deny them.

And if at the same time, our nation were proclaiming a new strategic doctrine—a doctrine of "superiority"—the prospects of those negotiations would evaporate. Whether it is called "superiority" or "margin of safety," this doctrine rejects the central principle of this treaty—that the greatest safety comes from an overall balance in our forces. It proclaims, in effect, that we would accept no treaty unless it is unbalanced, unless an edge for the United States is locked in.

That is the unmistakable meaning of the terms. If one party requires

"superiority," the other must accept inferiority; if one demands a margin of safety, the other must accept a margin of peril. As a practical matter, we could not negotiate or renegotiate arms control agreements on that basis, for they would not be negotiable.

Our nation faces a basic choice: whether we will secure the benefits of this treaty and move on to further limits in SALT III, or whether we will tear up this agreement and try to start over at square one. In my 35 years in public life, I can think of few national decisions with more profound consequences. The path we take on this fateful question will shape our future for years to come.

Nuclear weapons are the invention of man. They cannot be uninvented. But just as we met the earlier challenge of splitting the atom, we must summon the same determination, the same unfaltering commitment to the task of bringing these instruments of self-destruction under sensible control. SALT II is at the heart of that quest. I know that ratification will be difficult, but I also know that it is necessary.

¹ Press release 290. ■

whelming case for ratifying the treaty at the earliest possible moment. But there is something even more far-reaching at stake in our decision on this treaty: It is the future of arms control itself.

Seven American Presidents have pursued, with the deepest conviction, the effort to control humankind's most terrifying creations. That process has been painfully slow, failing to keep pace with the technology we seek to limit. But it has produced a series of agreements that have made a dangerous world less dangerous:

- The ban on poisonous nuclear explosions in the atmosphere;
- The ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile] Treaty which headed off a perilous and costly race in these defensive weapons;
- The SALT I agreement which froze the level of strategic missiles at a time when the Soviets were building up and we were not;
- And now this SALT II agreement.

If we turn our back on this treaty, we will not only jeopardize the progress we have made; we will enter an uncertain new world—an indefinite period without the binding restraints of SALT II or even the expired SALT I agreement. And while we try to pick up the pieces and start again, the technology of modern strategic weapons will not stand still. It will move ahead. We will have to reach even further to seize control of the arms race, without the foundation we have already built. What is already hard could become hopeless—to gain control over an arms race that imperils the future of all humanity.

Our allies understand this reality. Each of them strongly supports the treaty, because they see their stake in a stable nuclear balance and because they see SALT II as a necessary step on the path to further limits and further reductions. In particular, they see ratification of SALT II as a prerequisite to full-scale negotiations on limiting long-range theater nuclear systems in SALT III. Withdrawal of this treaty would be a profound blow to the alliance.

And it would severely undermine our ability to work for arms control elsewhere. Our ability to seek restraint from nations on the verge of acquiring nuclear weapons would badly suffer if our own commitment to mutual restraint is called to question. For the United States to be seen as the opponent of arms control could be a propaganda coup of enormous value to our adversaries. Our credibility in our standing in the world as a nation of peace—also rests on the fate of this treaty.

can foreign policy. President Carter clearly signalled that new emphasis in his inaugural address. "Because we are free," he said, "we can never be indifferent to the fate of freedom elsewhere." From the beginning, President Carter was determined that our foreign policy should give active, explicit support to three important categories of human rights:

- The right to be free of violations of the human person—torture, arbitrary arrest or imprisonment, summary execution, and denial of due process;
- The right to fulfillment of vital economic needs such as food, shelter, education, and health care; and
- Civil and political rights—freedom of thought, expression, assembly, travel, and participation in politics.

In the past 3½ years, human rights has become an active issue on our diplomatic agenda. Serious discussions of human rights now take place between us and the nations with which we deal. And human rights performance has become one of the key criteria we use in determining whether and how we deal with other nations.

We do all this not out of a naive idealism and not only because it is right. We do all this because we have domestic and international legal obligations to promote respect for human rights. As signatories of the U.N. Charter and by our own laws, we are required to work for increased observance of human rights by all countries. We also are convinced, in the most hard-headed, practical sense, that emphasis on human rights serves our national interests.

We are convinced, first of all, that emphasis on human rights serves our long-term interest in peace and stability.

We have learned that the heavy silence of repression is not stability: It is too often the ominous calm before a storm. We are convinced that by alleviating the sources of tension and discard before they erupt into violence, nations can help build real stability. We are convinced that the United States, by encouraging this process, can help prevent damage to its long-term interests and can help remove the inviting target that social unrest presents for intervention by our foreign adversaries.

There are several cases I could cite as illustrations, but I need mention only one: the new nation of Zimbabwe. There, a process of negotiation and a free election—which we unswervingly supported

—ended a violent civil war; gave new credibility to U.S. policy in Africa, and frustrated the hope of the Soviet Union to exploit racial violence to its own ends.

Second, we are convinced that the United States will be more secure in a world where more governments respect the rights of their people.

We believe that countries which respect human rights make stronger allies and better friends. Our allies in Western Europe, the Andean pact nations, Japan, and Israel underscore this point. Because they strive to respect human rights, they have an inner strength and resilience that helps them stand with us against the challenges we face together. And to the extent that our other friends in the world commit themselves to human rights, we believe they will gain the same kind of inner strength—inner strength which enhances their security and ours.

Third, we are convinced that our support for human rights enhances the influence of the United States in important world arenas.

I can attest, for example, from my own recent conversations with the President of Nigeria, that our visible support for human rights in Zimbabwe and southern Africa have improved our standing on that continent. And I believe that our emphasis on human rights—here at home and in our foreign policy—will strengthen us at the forthcoming Madrid conference. We will go to the table at Madrid armed not just with rhetoric but with a solid record of devotion to human rights and human dignity.

Fourth, our visible devotion to human rights underscores the dramatic differences—differences of philosophy and behavior—between us and the Soviet Union.

We uphold human rights fundamentally because to do so is right: Because to do so comports with our own best ideals. But it is inescapable that human rights and closed societies are incompatible. And today, around the world, the contrast between our system and the closed societies of our adversaries is dramatically visible. The Soviets dislike and fear our emphasis on human rights, because they know what a powerful attraction freedom has for millions of people everywhere on Earth.

Few people could have predicted in the early 1970s that the Helsinki conference would have such far-reaching ef-

fects. For years, the Soviet Union had been calling for a conference on security in Europe which would exclude the United States. In the early 1970s, as part of an effort to improve East-West relations, and with firm understanding that such a conference must include the United States and Canada, we and our allies accepted the idea. And we insisted further that the conference must cover a full range of issues involving individuals as well as nations.

The conference began in 1973, and in 1975 the 35 nations represented in Helsinki signed a document which, among other things, proclaimed 10 principles to guide relations between them. Those principles—to which the signatories freely obligated themselves—included respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of thought, of conscience, and of religion or belief.

The Helsinki Final Act has three subdivisions, or "baskets." One basket concerns military security and cooperative efforts to reduce military tensions. Another concerns cooperation in economics, science, technology, and the environment. Basket 3 deals with important humanitarian issues. But it is principle 7—the declaration concerning human rights—that has become perhaps the most famous and controversial single feature of the Helsinki Final Act. This principle requires signatory states to abide by the U.N. Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and other international human rights agreements. It has been our policy to consider the human rights principles of the Helsinki Final Act as solemn and important as all its other provisions.

Our goal has been, and is, to bring our influence to bear, as effectively as we know how, to insure that all the signatories, including the Soviet Union, live up to the obligations they have themselves freely undertaken—including the human rights obligations proclaimed in principle 7. That is emphatically our goal as we approach the conference in Madrid.

In the 5 years since their signing, the Helsinki accords have become a real force in the world. They have become an international benchmark for human rights performance. And they have improved day-to-day life for thousands of Eastern Europeans, enhancing opportunities to visit loved ones, offering the chance for many to emigrate as their nations seek to live up to the provisions of the act. Even before the workers' movement of 1980, for example, there was a slow but visible improvement in the human rights situation in Poland. Romania's emigration

Secretary Muskie Interviewed on "Issues and Answers"

Secretary Muskie was interviewed on ABC's "Issues and Answers" on October 19, 1980, by Bob Clark, ABC's chief correspondent, and Barrie Dunsmore, ABC-TV's diplomatic correspondent, and again on November 2 by Mr. Dunsmore and Ted Koppel.

OCT. 19, 1980¹

Q. Iran's Prime Minister indicated yesterday that the prospects for the release of the American hostages would improve if we removed our radar planes from Saudi Arabia and kept Jordan from helping Iraq in the war between Iran and Iraq. He also said that Iran's Parliament would set the conditions for the release of the hostages very soon. Where does this all leave us? Does it give us any cause of optimism about the hostage issue?

A. With respect to the prediction that the Majlis [Parliament] may act soon, we have heard statements like that so many times over recent weeks, indeed, that we've learned not to raise our expectations. I hope it does act

cosmetic measures or talks which go nowhere. And we will not permit discussions of security at Madrid to overshadow or in any way diminish the attention paid to human rights.

The chairman of our delegation to Madrid, former Attorney General Griffin Bell, put it this way not long ago. Our delegation to Madrid, he said, will be a bit like twin-faced Roman deity Janus, who looked both forward and back. "We shall focus our gaze on the Eastern record and speak plainly about it," Judge Bell said, "leaving no doubt of our concern for the Helsinki monitors, for Andrei Sakharov, and other champions of human rights. We shall also look to the future and attempt to negotiate concrete steps forward in all the major areas of the Final Act."

By displaying this spirit, in my judgment, the United States can best serve both the cause of human rights and our own interest. And in the process, we can help build a world in which freedom, the dream of all people, becomes a reality for more people.

¹ Press release 298. ■

soon, and there are some indications that it may.

With respect to the AWACS [airborne warning and control system] and Jordan issues, I think first that they ought to be put in the perspective of two principles which the President announced early in the hostage crisis:

- One is that we would, of course, pursue the safe and prompt release of the hostages as soon as possible.
- The second principle was that we would do nothing that was not consistent with our national interests and national honor.

Having said that, with respect to the two issues which Mr. Rajai raised yesterday, I consider them to be expressions of concern by Iran on the two points—AWACS and the posture of the Government of Jordan. With respect to AWACS, we deployed AWACS to Saudi Arabia at the Saudis' request. They are friends; we share mutual interest in the uninterrupted flow of oil through the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. We are interested in preserving the territorial integrity of the Saudis. The AWACS is a purely defensive piece of technology that has the radar capacity to see longer distances than any capability which the Saudis had at the time. It has no offensive capability. The information which is produced by AWACS goes only to the Saudis. It does not go to either of the belligerents, as suggested by Mr. Rajai yesterday; and we have indicated this through appropriate channels to the Iranian Government directly.

With respect to Jordan, we have said to Jordan, as we have to all nations—you will recall that I had some 50 or more bilateral meetings at the United Nations just 2 or 3 weeks ago—that we are impartial, that it is in our interests and the interests of all nations to bring the hostilities to an end and to do nothing which would have the effect of widening it or prolonging it. We have said that to Jordan as we have said it to other nations. Jordan, of course, is a sovereign nation and will have to make its own decisions. But our own view with respect to any actions which would have the effect of widening or prolonging the war is clear to Jordan and other countries.

policies have become more flexible since Helsinki. Hungary has been more cooperative in resolving family reunification problems.

Unfortunately, it is also clear that there are dark corners where Helsinki obligations are ignored. In the Soviet Union, Andrei Sakharov has been banished to exile. More than 40 other individuals—men and women who were members of Helsinki monitoring groups and took seriously the Soviet commitments at Helsinki—have been arrested; their only crime was to monitor Soviet compliance with the accords. Emigration by Soviet Jews has been severely restricted again this year. Pentacostalists face innumerable obstacles in leaving the Soviet Union as well. We see these restrictions as contrary to the spirit of the Helsinki provisions concerning freedom to travel and migrate. So clearly, there is a long way yet to go toward full compliance with all the principles proclaimed in Helsinki.

The United States will not go to Madrid to make propaganda. Nor will we neglect other aspects of the Helsinki accords. But to ignore human rights violations that are clearly contrary to the Helsinki accords would be to weaken that agreement and to diminish the force and power of the Helsinki Final Act. The United States will make clear in Madrid that we are serious about human rights—whether at home or in Europe, whether in Afghanistan or East Asia, whether in South Africa or the Soviet Union. And we will strongly oppose procedural restrictions—such as arbitrary limits on discussion and other artificial curbs—designed to prevent a full discussion of all issues at the conference in Madrid.

Our goals at Madrid are threefold.

First, we will press for progress on human rights. Our approach will be straightforward as we assess the records of compliance of the participants.

Second, we will work at Madrid for an increase in contacts between ordinary people in Eastern Europe and in the West. We will seek specific progress, for example, in resolving emigration problems and reuniting families. We also will seek progress in the cases of those persecuted or imprisoned for their political or religious beliefs or for monitoring the Helsinki accords.

Third, in the security field, we will explore the possibility of further measures which can reduce military tensions. We believe these confidence-building measures should apply to the entire Continent of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals. But we are not interested in

Q. Just talking about the AWACS or radar planes for a moment, you give the impression that there is no room for compromise in our position on this; that if this was intended to be a condition set for release of the hostages, it is a condition that is unacceptable to us. Is that the impression you meant to leave?

A. First, I don't think there is anything in what Mr. Rajai said to indicate it is a condition. He has said, indeed, as you reminded us in your question, that the Majlis will lay down what it conceives as the conditions. So I think to treat it as a condition would not serve a useful purpose. I have chosen to treat it as a concern of the Iranians, and with respect to that we consider our decision to deploy the AWACS as being in our national interest, consistent with the principle laid down by the President earlier.

Q. You have indicated that the United States doesn't want to see anything happen which would have the effect of expanding the war or prolonging the war. However, last week you also said that if Iran would release the hostages, the embargo—the sanctions—would be automatically lifted, which would seem to indicate that we would then provide them with some of the military equipment which was paid for by the Shah some time ago. Is there some inconsistency there? Or, in fact, did we get the wrong message?

A. The point I sought to make there was that the trade sanctions, which are multinational in nature—you will recall the effort we made to persuade our NATO allies and the European Community to impose trade sanctions, which they did. And it's clear that the trade sanctions were related to the release of the hostages. I would, therefore, expect, and I would think it a reasonable expectation, that if the hostages were released those trade sanctions would be lifted.

Now with respect to other aspects of the situation involving the hostages, we took a number of steps at that time on our own related to the seizure of the hostages and the refusal to release them. I would think that all of those would be on the table if at some point we establish a negotiating contact with the Iranians. Just how they would be dealt with I think is highly speculative, and I don't think it's productive to try to pick out one or another of them to deal with them.

Q. But the issue of spare parts is a major issue; and if the United States did provide military spare parts and missiles and tanks and so on to Iran in the middle of a conflict, certainly that would make it very hard for us to claim neutrality.

A. With respect to the actions taken by the United States in connection with the hostages, those actions were taken long before the outbreak of hostilities between Iran and Iraq. It would seem to me that that is one issue to be dealt with separately from the war.

With respect to the war, our position is one of impartiality. That may have to be adjusted as circumstances develop. The AWACS deployment, as I said, raised some questions which I think we carefully considered; and I think our response produced a decision which was consistent with impartiality.

Q. It seems to me a clear line has to be drawn here as to how far we might be willing to go if the hostages were released. We would clearly resupply military parts, spare parts for planes and that sort of thing. Is it conceivable that we might move beyond that to rebuild our former military relationship with Iran or to supply Iran with new weapons—new tanks or planes or anything of that sort?

A. Let me make it clear that I don't think this program is the place to negotiate for the terms of the hostages' release. In the first place, we are not in contact with Iran; we are not in negotiations with them; we do not yet know what requests they might make or what terms they may lay down. To try to anticipate them and give them a response in anticipation I don't think would be useful. That's the first point I would make.

The second point I would make is that a number of Iranians have spoken out on what they think ought to be the terms of release. Since they have not yet appeared to agree with each other, again I don't think it's useful to set up hypothetical situations. I do emphasize the point that the hostage issue arose long before this war broke out. We were not consulted by Iraq and Iran with respect to the date for hostilities to begin. The hostage situation was pending then; the actions we had taken with respect to it had been taken then. The hostages were still being held; and it is in our national interest, and we've announced it, that we're going to proceed when the time is right, when the

Iranians are ready, to discuss the terms for their release, consistent with the two principles which the President has laid down.

Q. Granting all that you have said, when you do not say that we would not move beyond the resupply of spare parts, don't you leave the door open to our doing something else, to our taking a more active role in supporting Iran in the war?

A. I do not think that refusing to discuss hypothetical situations with respect to the conditions which the Iranians might ask us to consider in order to release the hostages ought to lead to any conclusions with respect to the question you've just asked.

Q. What about the war itself? How is it going? Is there a danger that Iran could be dismembered permanently as a result of it?

A. Whenever hostilities of this kind break out, of course, the possibilities of a wider war, a deepening war, and the impact on the combatants are uncertainties which are difficult to put a cap on in advance. The Iraqis have said—and the Foreign Minister of Iraq has said to me directly—that their aims are limited to the disputed territory over which they claim jurisdiction and that they have no interest in any piece of Iranian territory. If that is the case, then the question of how far they may seek to penetrate into Iran seems to be limited by that statement of Iraq's war aims.

With respect to the impact upon the political situation in each country—and each country has political vulnerabilities, from the perception of outside analysts—whether or not those vulnerabilities would produce instability in either country depends to a great extent on the intensity of the war, how long it continues, and the ability of each to sustain the fighting with the support of the people. My impression, with respect to Iran, is that the people are pretty solidly behind this war effort. Indeed, it seems to have had a unifying effect, at least in the first 30 days. Khomeini seems to still be in control of the situation. President Bani-Sadr is in control of the war effort, and there is every indication that the Iranians do not feel vulnerable in their ability to sustain the fighting and seem determined to continue it. That's true also of the Iraqis.

Now whether, indeed, they both continue it to the point where it threatens to widen and to deepen and

involve an ever-increasing risk of intervention by other countries is an uncertainty that we need to guard against by pressing for an end to the hostilities through the United Nations, through the Islamic conference, through other multinational groups which may be influential.

Q. Would you be afraid more or less now of possible Soviet intervention at this stage?

A. The Soviets have told us that their posture is one of impartiality. To the best of our knowledge they are maintaining that posture. We are maintaining the same restraint. We each do so in the light of what we perceive to be our national interests. I'm sure we are each conscious of the fact that the other is carefully monitoring our stated policy with respect to our actions.

Q. In the past few days you seem to have been determined, if you could, to make SALT and the treaty itself, a benefit to the United States, and to make it a major political issue in the Presidential campaign. It seems you are determined to try to get the treaty ratified very soon. Do you think realistically that that can happen as long as the Soviets are in Afghanistan?

A. I think it depends upon our success in presenting the merits—indeed, the crucial importance—of the SALT II Treaty in terms of our national security interests. I am determined not so much to make it a political issue as I am to make it a substantive issue which will attract the attention of the American people, because I think it is critical. Time is running out on it. There are provisions in the SALT II Treaty requiring the Soviet Union to dismantle certain systems; the time for dismantling is running out. If that time runs out, the Soviets would be in a difficult position to implement that provision of the treaty within the time constraints of the treaty. That may then require reopening the treaty; and if it's reopened, great uncertainties are created. So I think it's terribly important that we focus on this issue, that the American people focus on it; and I don't think of a better time for them to do so than in a Presidential campaign when they are more alert to issues of this kind than they are otherwise.

Q. In your speeches you almost never mention Ronald Reagan or the Republican Party by name, but certainly the inference is there. Do you

feel that, if Mr. Reagan were to be elected, the treaty would effectively be finished and that arms control as we know it might be very, very difficult to ever put together again?

A. If I understand what the Republican platform says and what Mr. Reagan has said, the two together say (1) the SALT II Treaty is not satisfactory, they would not support it—which means, in effect, tearing it up and going back to square one, and (2) Mr. Reagan has said and the Republican platform has said that we must first achieve superiority over the Soviet Union before we negotiate. I don't see any way in which either we or the Soviet Union would accept superiority on the part of the other as the basis for an arms control treaty.

Now both those points are very clear. If my interpretation of them is not an accurate reflection of Mr. Reagan's views, then I hope that, having raised the issue, he will have an opportunity to modify his views or give his own interpretation. But I think those points need to be clarified because they have to do with the question of whether or not SALT II will be ratified and, if we do not, the effect of that upon arms control of any sort. That has to be debated.

I realize there are those who think that by participating in that debate I am somehow becoming part of the politics of this campaign. I find that an incredible notion—that, with foreign policy being shaped by this campaign, the principal spokesman of this Administration on foreign policy should not be speaking it. If I were to follow that line, I shouldn't be sitting here with you two gentlemen discussing foreign policy. I'm getting a bigger audience through this program than I would in speaking to a foreign policy council in Chicago, and yet somehow that's described as political and this is not. I should not have appeared on "Face the Nation" or "Meet the Press," to mention a couple of other well-known programs. So I think it's rather incredible, at this point that the Secretary of State ought not to be debating foreign policy.

I don't think that I ought to be involved in partisan gatherings or that I should be out doing some partisan cheerleading. That kind of politics I should not be engaged in, and I have not.

Q. Let me quote the sort of language that you have used that has enraged or infuriated or incensed the Reagan camp. In your speech at Notre

Dame, as I recall, a week or so ago, you said that the Reagan defense policies could keep the United States endlessly at war all over the globe. Should the Secretary of State be involving himself in domestic politics to that extent with that kind of language?

A. Of course not. And I never said that. That's the worst presentation of a speech by a wire service that I've seen in this campaign. I have the text of the speech. It's available. You'll find no such language in the speech; you'll find no reference to Mr. Reagan. The only thing I said about Mr. Reagan on the Notre Dame campus was this: I said: "I didn't come here to urge you to win one more for the Gipper." That's the closest that I came to mentioning Mr. Reagan or his policies. That quotation you've just given me is a wire service version, totally distorted and inaccurate, of what I actually said on the Notre Dame campus.

Q. Let's explore for a moment what you did mean. As I recall the wire service story, it said that the pursuit of Reagan version defense policies, or some such phrase, could keep the United States "endlessly at war all over the globe." Is that what you meant to say?

A. I did not say it, and I did not mean to say it.

Q. You never used the phrase "endlessly at war all over the globe"?

A. In connection with Mr. Reagan or anything that he has said or any foreign policy he has announced, absolutely not. You're free to have a copy of the text. And if I am misstating to you what I said on the Notre Dame campus, you would be free to challenge my veracity. But that statement does not in any way reflect what I said on the Notre Dame campus.

Q. Perhaps we would serve a more useful purpose by just asking you whether you think that Ronald Reagan as President would be dangerous if he pursues his defense and foreign policies as they are now perceived.

A. I don't believe that he has policies designed to take us to war. Now whether or not his policies might raise the risk of war is a question that I think is the subject of legitimate debate between those who have the responsibility of political debate in this campaign. He has criticized President Carter's policies as leading into a position

of weakness which could lead to war, so policies and their implications for war or peace are important things to discuss. But I don't regard Mr. Reagan as a war-like man who intends to take us to war, and I certainly never made the kind of reference to him or to his policies that was contained in that wire service story.

Q. Do you think the Reagan policy of seeking military superiority for the United States before there is any new SALT agreement or the conclusion of a new arms control agreement would be likely to increase the risk of American involvement in wars somewhere in the world?

A. I've already said, in response to Mr. Dunsmore's question, that with respect to SALT, as I understand both the Republican platform and Mr. Reagan's position, we must have nuclear superiority before we will negotiate, and we must have that superiority after negotiations are finished. If that's the case, there will never be an arms control treaty because, as I said a moment ago, I can't conceive of either the United States or the Soviet Union accepting a treaty which freezes itself into a position of nuclear inferiority and freezes the other into a position of nuclear superiority. If that is a correct prognostication of what would happen following the policy that I've just described, then what we would have is an arms race as each side sought superiority, and the whole basis of the SALT process, the whole basis of arms control—which has been supported by President Nixon, President Ford, President Johnson, and by President Carter—would be out the window. The whole basis of arms control was that an arms race increases the possibility of war, that arms control would diminish that possibility. The risks of war associated with the two differing policies are appropriate issues to raise and to discuss.

Q. On the subject of differing policies, we have read of late of your future and differences that you may be having with the National Security Adviser—once again a rather old story. But I think you have taken the position that you will come back if, indeed, Mr. Carter is reelected, and he has said that he would love to have you. Did those stories make that decision for you? Or is, indeed, that your decision?

A. I've been perfectly happy in this job, and, indeed, I get along very well with Mr. Brzezinski. On a day-to-day basis, we couldn't have a more amicable relationship.

With respect to my future in this job, there is no job I'd rather have after January 20 than this one.

Q. Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko was in Poland today, conferring with the new leaders there. Do you think the danger of Soviet military action to back up the Polish Government in its dispute with labor unions has passed?

A. I think that the Polish Government, the Polish workers, and the Polish people ought not to be insensitive to Russian reactions to how they finally achieve and resolve the issue which is before them. I think that the Soviets have been restrained up to this point. Indeed, I gather in one story I read today that there was even a Soviet almost approval of the agreement that was negotiated between the Polish Government and the workers. Implementation of that agreement is still a difficult challenge; it obviously is, as we read the day-to-day reports. But I think that the Polish people ought not to be insensitive to pressures from outside, not only from the Soviet Union but from other countries in the Eastern bloc.

NOV. 2, 1980²

Q. You heard the conditions that appeared to have been stated by the Iranian Parliament, and among those conditions is a conditional phasing of the release of the American hostages. In the past that has always been unacceptable to the U.S. Government; you've always insisted that there has to be an all-or-nothing release. If they want to let a few go without condition, that's fine. Has that changed?

A. That is still our position.

Q. Therefore, if, in fact, this were conditional, there is no such thing, as far as the American Government is concerned, as one condition being met and a group of hostages being let out, if all the conditions are not met and all the hostages are not released?

A. Whether or not all the conditions are met or can be met is the first question. The predicate is not should there be a staged withdrawal, but whether or not all the conditions can be met and are met.

And if they're all met at the same time, gather all the hostages will be released.

Q. All right. I stand corrected. Let me pose to you your own question. Can they be met?

A. No decision has been made on that point at this time.

Q. In your news conference yesterday you strongly suggested that it would require negotiations once the Majlis had made the decision. Could you give us some indication as to how things are going to proceed now?

A. First of all, let's get a little chronology established here. At this point what we've received are unofficial reports of what the Majlis has laid down. As I listened to the first half hour of this program, some of the oral descriptions coming from Tehran are modifications and significant changes of what we have achieved up to this point. So it is very difficult to respond definitively to what we have in hand at this point. Secondly, the four points that have been described in the first half hour of this program and which have been covered by the information we've received from other sources seem to fit within the framework of the Ayatollah Khomeini's four points which he stated sometime in September.

So we know generally the areas within which we have to make decision. But until we see the fine print, or understand more clearly the fine print, we cannot be sure precisely the limits within which we are being asked to act by the Majlis. And I say that not to suggest a nonexistent problem. I think some of the problems have already been indicated in the first half hour of this program. And so we must deal with the actual problem once we know whether there are some and what they are.

Q. Does the U.S. Government have the legal power to free all Iranian assets frozen by President Carter, including those under attachment by the courts?

A. The legal answer to that is a complicated one. But what is involved is not only the legal answer but also what would be the wise answer, and, at this point, I don't know what we are being asked to do. We're not entirely sure about that at this point.

Q. You have had some time now to study the Ayatollah's four points, and we understand that the American Government lawyers have been very busy trying to figure this out. Do you think that that's going to be a stumbling

block, the unfreezing of the assets and also the elimination of all claims?

A. The difficulty with trying to answer a question like that at this point, before we know specifically—before we can be sure what, specifically, the Iranian Majlis is requesting, is that we might suggest a negative attitude about what they've proposed before we've determined whether or not a negative attitude is required. And to suggest a negative attitude to an Iranian Parliament which has labored to come to this decision, obviously with great difficulty, might well create an environment entirely negative to the prospect of achieving release of the hostages. You could tick problems off with respect to the four points which may not be problems in the context of what the Parliament has said and means.

Secondly, the Iranian Parliament has said, as we understand from our reports, that the executive is to present us with an official translation—Persian text and English text—of what the Majlis has said. And there is some ambiguity as to what additional authority the executive may have. It may have some additional substantive authority, at least to the point of clarifying language, that has been at least contained in whatever the Majlis has enacted into law.

So until we've got that, I don't find it useful to indicate either positive or negative attitudes about specifics. It's very difficult to do. Bear in mind that these unofficial reports of what has taken place at the Majlis have come to us in the weeks ours of the morning. We've had 5 or 6 hours at most to consider them.

There are obvious technical complications of the kind that you are raising with your questions that have to be evaluated in terms of specific language by our experts. That analysis is underway. Contrary to the impression that some would make about this Administration's attitude, we are not waiting to just leap at just any proposition. We have to study it; we have to evaluate it and evaluate it in terms of principles which the President has laid down.

Number one, that what we do is consistent with American interests and American honor; and, secondly, whether or not what we're being asked to do is in accordance with American law and American principles. It has to be evaluated in those terms, and that evaluation cannot take place quickly.

Q. It seems to me the bottom line of what you're saying, then, is that it's absolutely unrealistic to expect that the hostages will be out before Tuesday or by Tuesday.

A. I haven't found absolutes in this business, but this is obviously going to be time consuming. And you heard Mr. Ghotbzadeh's evaluation of the time that it might take. He said it might take as much as 10 days from their point of view. So they must also envision some complexities that have to be worked out.

Q. You've alluded to two different sets of problems. One, the diplomatic problem, but also there is the political problem. Could you take us behind the scenes a little bit and let us know how you and the President, in resolving those two conflicting issues, how do you handle this issue politically and diplomatically, being true to both the demands that are upon you. The President has to get reelected, from his point of view.

A. I can speak only for myself. I would presume to speak only for myself on each of those questions. With respect to the politics of it, I never could see how this could be manipulated for political purposes. If there were such a way, we've certainly not used it. I don't think that this thing breaking on the Sunday before Tuesday, election day, is a maximum political resource for anybody.

It's a very delicate question, I would think, from both sides. What is involved are 52 Americans—52 American lives—and what is also involved are our national interests. And we must make sure that they do not conflict with each other. We've got to serve both objectives. And that's been the President's attitude about this ever since I joined his Administration as Secretary of State. He's not regarded it as a political resource since that time. Of that I can assure you.

Q. Insofar as you can, would you walk us through the four points? For example, noninterference in Iran's internal affairs—not really a problem, is it?

A. I think we've said that publicly, in effect, over and over again. Whether or not they're asking us something more than we've already said publicly, we can't be sure until we are sure that we have the precise proposal before us.

Q. All right. Unfreezing of the Iranian assets in this country. More complex.

A. It is complex. In effect, what this, and other provisions which I'm sure the Iranians are interested in, is this: When they seized our hostages, we retaliated with some specific actions, including the

freezing of Iranian assets, trade sanctions with our allies, condemnation of the seizure in various places—the United Nations, the World Court, the Islamic conference, and so on—so that we've taken a number of steps. And implicit from the beginning has been this point: That if they undo what they did, we would undo what we did. The passage of time and attachments which have been placed on Iranian assets have complicated the question, obviously.

Q. What about U.S. claims? That's, I believe, the third point.

A. We must understand precisely what U.S. claims they mean.

Q. All right, the final point, then, the issue of the Shah's wealth. Can that be returned?

A. With respect to the report from your correspondent in the early part of this show, what that means, as he understands it—and he was in Tehran, I was not—was that it seems to me an identification of the Shah's assets now. If it means nothing more than, that is something different than you suggest by your question, confiscation. To which point should I reply? You see, I can reply to neither until I know which is which.

Q. The Majlis made no mention of spare parts for its army from the United States. However, the whole issue of the United States sending military supplies, that were supposedly bought and purchased by the Shah, to Iran in the midst of its war with Iraq is one which has been kicking around for the last 10 days. Could you clarify for us what the American position is vis-a-vis those spare parts?

A. You have made the point which is obvious in all reports that we've had, about action taken by the Majlis that spare parts are not mentioned. We do know there has been a divided view in Iran about spare parts. There are some who rejected the notion that they should accept spare parts that they need from "the great Satan," as they like to refer to us, and there are others who think they should [accept spares]. That is another clarification that needs to be made.

On this whole point of whether undoing what we did in retaliation for taking of the hostages represents a tilt in this Iraq-Iran war, let me make this point: that the hostage crisis emerged months before the Iraq-Iran war. The hostages were seized months before that war; and our retaliatory actions were taken months before the Iran war. And the fact that

these various sanctions were in place when the Iraq-Iran war emerged, in effect, to tilt in the direction of Iraq.

If these sanctions had not been in place, Iran would not have been as vulnerable to the Iraqi attack as it was with the sanctions in place. Yet, nobody has accused us of tilting against Iran by maintaining the sanctions. It seems to me that one needs to put the two problems in perspective. What is involved is not the opening of a new military supply line, in any case. What is involved is undoing what we did—if spare parts are indeed involved in the Iranian proposal—and doing what we did months before the Iraq-Iran war began.

Q. But if we send any military equipment to Iran in the middle of a war, we will find ourselves in an unholy alliance with Iran, Syria, Libya, and North Korea, against our traditional friends in the Persian Gulf, and even against our own planes that are protecting Saudi Arabia. How can we possibly rationalize that?

A. What I just said to you is this; that by withholding months before this war, spare parts that belong to Iran, we put them in a vulnerable position with respect to Iraq. So, you know, you have to put it in that perspective. At this point we don't know whether or to what extent that may be an issue in what the Majlis has done. But I think that if that issue arises, as we examine their proposal, that we need to put it in the context which I have suggested and not the other context which assumes that we should have known that the Iraq-Iran war was coming, and that, therefore, whatever actions we took—releasing the frozen assets, billions of dollars—strengthens Iran's position in this war. I can't see making these 52 people hostages not to Iran but to Iraq's war aims.

Q. One senior official has suggested that we might be prepared to send weapons but nonlethal weapons only. Is that a distinction which we may draw?

A. It's been drawn, as Secretary Kissinger has pointed out earlier in this program.

Q. On other occasions?

A. Yes.

Q. Might it be brought out on this one?

A. We exclude no possibilities. That doesn't mean that we include them all, until we know what we are dealing with.

Q. I would like to ask another question now about the possible release of the hostages. Let me use one of those horrible diplomatic words—modalities. How do you now go about negotiating what you and the Iranians still have to resolve?

A. There are indirect channels available to us that we've been using for months, as I pointed out.

Q. Do you still have to reply on those, sir?

A. We may or we may not. I indicated in my letter to Prime Minister Rajai at the time of his selection that we would be glad to deal with him directly or indirectly, whatever suited their purpose. The Majlis, presumably, directed the executive to make an official translation of the Majlis action available to us. That would seem to presume a direct contact. If in fact it is a direct contact, I would assume that we would respond in the same way.

Q. Forget about whether it is or is not; would this not seem an appropriate time for the United States to make a direct contact? It almost seems irrelevant to be arguing now about whether there should be direct contact or whether we still need to go through third parties. Would you not, personally, prefer that it be direct at this point? Wouldn't that make it easier, clearer, simpler?

A. It would make it easier for us. Whether it would for them is yet to be determined. What you're asking is, shouldn't we answer their message before we get it? That's what you seem to be suggesting.

Q. No, what I'm asking is—

A. There is no requirement for determining the nature of the contact until we've got the message.

Q. Perhaps I could put it this way: On your schedule right now is a trip to Latin America, which I believe you are supposed to start on Wednesday. Is it possible that you will postpone that trip so that you could be available to participate in some kind of direct contacts with Iran?

A. Of course, that's possible.

Q. Is it likely?

A. Again, you're asking me to try to predict a timeframe. I think the odds are that it is likely.

Q. Would you participate in negotiations personally in some other place, other than Washington?

A. That depends on whether there are negotiations.

Q. What role is the United Nations playing at the moment, or what role would the United States like it to play?

A. The United Nations has indicated a willingness to play any role which would be useful to us. I talked to Mr. Waldheim this morning, and he reported to us the situation in Tehran as he had learned it through his representative there, and he indicated every willingness to be useful in any way that might serve our interests.

Q. I think there is a voracious hunger by the American public to know as much as possible, understandably. Could you just take us through the night? How did the news reach you? How did the news reach the President? In what form did the news reach you? Through whom?

A. We have been watching the developments in Iran through many eyes for months, and, of course, the wire services are available to us. When the Majlis assembled, about 1:00 a.m. our time, it was clear that a quorum was going to be present, unlike 2 or 3 days ago, and so we knew that there was going to be some kind of action. Whether or not they would resolve the issues today wasn't necessarily assured from our perspective at the beginning. I think it was about 4:00 or 4:30 a.m. that the news of the vote came to us and the first news about the content of what the Majlis had done came to us.

The President was called, I think, within 15 minutes of that time so that he would know what had taken place, and within a few minutes, made the decision to come back to Washington—left Chicago sometime between 6:00 and 6:30 this morning. We assembled in the Cabinet room about 8:00 at his arrival and were in session together until shortly after 10:00, when I had to get ready for appearance on this show.

We had to put in motion certain decisions that were taken, and we are to meet again at 2:00 this afternoon in the Cabinet room.

Q. Will there be any direct contact with those three Ambassadors—the Algerian, the Syrian, and the Libyan? Are they playing a useful role?

A. I'm not sure that we've gotten to those three specifically today, but we are establishing contact with every useful channel that we have used over the past few months, to get whatever supplementary information, or even analytical in-

Secretary Muskie's News Conference of November 1

Q. Can you bring us up to date on the hostage crisis? When do you expect to see it end and do you expect to see it end soon?

A. With respect to the first part of the question, I have no basis upon which to set a timeframe for a final resolution of the hostage question. Perhaps it might be useful if I were to briefly review the nature of our efforts up to this point, and in the context of that review, try to answer your questions. I have been hit with questions on the run—on the road so many times—and have not succeeded apparently in putting it in perspective.

Our efforts have been directed toward three circumstances which we regarded as essential to a final resolution of the problem.

- First, to contribute to a growing awareness on the part of the Iranians that it is in their interest to put the hostage issue behind them. The actions that we took almost a year ago were part of that effort: the freezing of assets, trade sanctions, and so on; the resolutions adopted by several international institutions including the actions taken by the United Nations, the World Court, the Islamic conference, and so on; and then with respect to diplomatic initiatives through all of the various channels to which I've referred before by which we could get messages to the Iranian people from their natural trading partners, from their countries; to develop that sense of isolation which we think is essential—economic isolation, diplomatic isolation, and so on, that we think is essential to the development of that awareness on the part of the Iranians.

- Secondly, we learned rather early on that they would have to develop politi-

cal institutions, governmental institutions with authority and responsibility, before we could hope to have a decision on the hostage question, and we have seen those institutions develop. A parliament has been put in place. It has been elected by a good turnout of Iranian voters; a prime minister selected, court put in place, and so on, so now that circumstance has been realized.

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- Then, finally, the question of how we get the hostages out and on what terms, that is the stage at which we now find ourselves. There has been and is a growing awareness on the part of the Iranians, including Iranian leaders in all segments of their political environment—a growing indication that it is in Iran's interest to get the issue behind them. We get statements of that kind every day; we read them in our press now, in addition to getting them in reports through the various channels through which we try to communicate.

Now that the Majlis [Parliament] is engaged in the process of answering that question, how do we get them out, on what terms? Until they decide what terms they think are in their interest, it is difficult for us to respond to those terms. We have tried to prepare ourselves to deal with whatever terms they may propose; and it is no secret what the range of options is. I mean, the first range of options is the actions we took in retaliation to the seizure of the hostages.

Another range of options is found in the various statements made by Iranians over these past months as to conditions that one or more of them think indispensable. Khomeini is perhaps at the top of the list because he is the supreme authority in Iran, so his four-point proposal of 2 or 3 months ago is one that we've looked at and undertook to analyze and prepare ourselves to deal with.

There have been others, and there may be some surprises because, for the first time, the Majlis has been dealing with it—they have been dealing with it in secret—and we don't really know what they may propose if they take a decision tomorrow. So when you speak about a timeframe, one must take into account how long it will take for the Majlis to reach a decision; whether or not the boycott of the Majlis meeting will continue, and that's hard to read from where we are. It may very well be that they will have a quorum tomorrow and then start debating.

Secondly, it may take them as long to debate an issue as it takes our Congress to debate issues from time to time, so we don't know how long that will take. Then, presumably, that debate will conclude with a decision on terms. And then we will have to evaluate those terms, whether we are prepared to meet those terms in the light of preparation that I have already described, or whether or not they will require further consideration and even negotiation with the Iranians. That could be a very time-consuming process, going through what is not yet finished in the process. It could be, depending upon what they are prepared to suggest to us.

Q. On that point of the conditions, the other night in the debate, President Carter said the United States would be prepared, and is prepared, to send those arms which Iran has already bought and paid for. Is that not inconsistent with our other policy which is that we don't send arms to countries which support terrorism, since the taking of the hostages, I think, has been defined as an act of terrorism by this government?

A. I don't think it is useful to discuss possible terms. We don't know what the Majlis is going to propose. There are some of them who have said that they would not trade their freedom for spare parts. If they released the hostages, they would reject the notion of spare parts. Others have said that the spare parts ought to be part of the deal. Until we get their proposal, I'm not inclined to try to shape their proposal by speculation on what we may or may not do.

What the President was saying in effect is that these are two steps that we took almost a year ago when the hostages were seized, and we're prepared to undo what we did in retaliation—that's the general proposition. But with respect to the details, I think we are better off responding when we know what we have to deal with.

Q. I was going to ask you to peer into your crystal ball, and have a look at Poland, but your exposition of the Iranian situation, I think, calls for at least one question. Are you suggesting the arms question has always been an open question—but I thought the President had dealt straight out and resolved the question of lifting the sanctions. In other words, I thought it was a simple matter, that if the hostages were freed, the sanctions would be lifted. You are speaking of our seeing what they do before we really decide

¹ Press release 292.

² Press release 313. ■

what we do. Is there any problem on lifting the sanctions if the hostages are released? Isn't that pretty much a straight-forward reflex action on our part?

A. Obviously, with the passage of time—I think it is obvious, because it has been discussed in the press—our flexibility in dealing with this issue has been somewhat constrained by developments beyond our control. There have been attachments; there have been other developments, and I am not going to go into those in detail. I'm not technically qualified to go into all the technical details. What the President was laying down was a general policy, which to be implemented would require an evaluation of the developments that have taken place since then; that may limit our ability to respond.

Q. I would like to follow that up. One of the legal constraints against acting on what Carter put forward as his negotiating position at the Tuesday debate is Section 3FI of the Arms Export Control Act. State Department sources now say that the President would waive this restriction against arming terrorist countries, or terrorist-supporting governments, by claiming overriding national security interests.

Could you discuss what the overriding national security interest is in getting the hostages out by election day, and what implication does this definition of national security have for our future credibility in dealing with terrorists, military deterrence, and also the possibility of embroiling ourselves in the anti-Arab side of the gulf war?

A. You see, your question is an excellent demonstration of the reasons why I don't think it is useful to speculate about a proposal which hasn't yet been presented. You've already made judgments about actions we haven't taken, and I don't think that's useful. All you do by that sort of thing is risk stirring up emotions in Iran or stirring up emotions here, and I don't think that's very helpful.

Q. A question about taking action to prepare yourself to meet the conditions that might be imposed by the Iranians, can you describe what preparations have been made?

A. To do that would be to do what I just said I wouldn't do.

Q. Could you tell us whether you have had any informal or formal warning from the Soviet Union that the provision of arms to Iran would be a

breach of the neutrality that you have agreed on with the Soviets?

A. No. No, we have not. We have taken no action yet. We have no proposal yet. Obviously, since we took certain actions in retaliation for the taking of the hostages, there are certain issues, areas, and problems which we expect Iran will ask us to deal with. And until we know specifically what they propose, it's not helpful to try to shape their proposal by responding to hypothetical questions as to how we would respond to hypothetical propositions.

Q. Are you concerned at all that any provision of even spare parts to Iran will be interpreted in the rest of the Arab world—in Saudi Arabia, in Jordan, and in other countries—as an American tilt toward Iran?

A. That's a concern of which we are fully aware, bearing in mind that the hostage crisis and our actions in response to their taking, preceded the Iraq-Iran war by months, and taking into account that from the beginning it was clear that if the Iranians undid what they did, that we would undo what we did, as a general proposition. It seems to me that anyone reacting to whatever we may be asked to deal with and whatever our response may be ought to take that into account.

As I told the Iraqi Foreign Minister, they didn't consult us on the timing of their invasion of Iran, and they were quite aware that we were involved with Iran in this very delicate hostage problem. They weren't deterred by that from following their interests as they perceived them. And we really have to be very careful, of course, about the implications of what we find it possible to do. But, on the other hand, we don't want to put ourselves in the position of making these 52 people hostages to Iraq.

Q. As you evaluate the situation in general now, do you think it will require negotiations with Iran to have the hostages released, or do you think it's possible they might just put all or some of them on an airplane and start shipping them out?

A. We try to evaluate all of those proposals without coming down hard on any of them.

Q. In other words, you're not sure in your own mind that negotiations will be required? You think the other is a possibility?

A. Having dealt with Iran and their leaders for 6 months now, I exclude nothing from the range of possibilities. But that doesn't mean I think they are possible.

Q. The question is interesting in particular because in, I think, your last news conference in this room, if I remember correctly, you said you thought negotiations would be necessary and made a point of the fact that none had been started. I just wondered if your evaluation of that had changed.

A. There are some complicated questions, conceivably. But again, I don't know what the proposal will be. I don't exclude negotiations. I don't state that they are essential. I think that they are a probability because of the complexity of the issues.

Q. The leading Iranian newspaper today had an editorial which advocated releasing the hostages, or at least taking that decision before the American election day, on the grounds that Iran would be able to get better concessions—that's their word—before election day than it would after election day. A similar viewpoint has been expressed, I think, by some political opponents of the President who have been charging, either directly or insinuating, that the President is ready to make a much softer arrangement because of the impending elections.

I don't want to be prolonging this question unduly, but I just want to ask another point: In April, the President did say, when he broke diplomatic relations with Iran, that inventories of Iran's assets were being drawn up as well as American claims, with an aim toward possibly submitting legislation to make Iran pay for the damages it had inflicted upon the hostage families as well as the Embassy. More recently, nobody in the Administration has talked about securing claims from Iran. I just wonder, are those still on the table? And what about the charges about concessions before election day?

A. If that is really the President's objective, his timing isn't very good. It, obviously, would have been much better to get the hostages home 1 week ago, 2 weeks ago, 3 weeks ago, 1 month ago. To wait until the last day is to minimize the prospects. I mean, if we could really control the Majlis, their decisionmaking process, and the time within which they would do it, anybody with an ounce of political brains or instincts wouldn't wait

until the Sunday before the Tuesday of election. I find that an incredible proposition. In a political campaign, I expect anything, responsible or irresponsible.

Our objective has been to get the hostages home and to do it consistent with their safety, their well-being, and consistent with the national interests and national honor. The President has said that from the beginning, and that is the test we are trying to meet. We are not dragging our feet. We have no way of knowing when it will come to fruition, and I certainly am not going to contribute to delay for political reasons. The question of whether or not it is done earlier than later is in the hands of the Iranian Majlis, not us.

Q. The second part of that question—I'm sorry—as to whether the United States would still expect Iran to pay some kind of damages for what it has inflicted on the hostages and on the American Embassy.

A. I think that if you will reread Khomeini's four points, you will see that one of them could conceivably cover that issue, and so I would expect that the Iranian proposal may touch on it either directly or indirectly.

Q. His proposal of course, is that the United States waive all claims and the implication from the statements in the last 2 weeks is that that's agreeable to the United States, and I was just trying to check the guiding factors of the case.

A. I know what you are trying. You're trying to do what several questions have tried to do, to get me into a discussion of the specifics of our response to a proposal we have not yet received.

Q. There is a report out of Paris this morning, saying that the Iranian public will be able to go inside the U.S. Embassy in Tehran on Tuesday at the end of a major nationwide demonstration on the anniversary of the taking of the hostages. Every Iranian will be allowed inside. What's the State Department's reaction to that?

A. It's difficult, one, to characterize the demonstration until it takes place. There's nothing in the story that indicates it's intended to be a violent demonstration or an antihostage demonstration. Secondly, we don't know whether the hostages are in the Embassy, so that that's a question.

So we have the same questions and concerns about the welfare and well-being of the hostages. We'd like to know

more about it; we don't. I can't conceive that if the Majlis is debating a proposal to submit to us for the purpose of releasing the hostages, that the Majlis at this point would condone a demonstration that might be harmful to the hostages. So I think at this point, although the situation there is often unpredictable, that there is no reason to assume that at one and the same time they're considering ways to release the hostages and also to harm them.

Q. Could you tell us about a report that is out that the United States is going to try to settle the conflict between Iran and Iraq through the good offices of the United Nations in another new effort? And could you give us your evaluation of that conflict at the present time?

A. I notice that the story leaked the speech I gave 2 weeks ago as the basis for that speculation. That's the first time I've ever had a speech leaked. [Laughter.] Maybe that's the best way to get attention to a speech. But, no, we are and have been since the beginning of that war working constantly with the United Nations, with countries in the nonaligned and Islamic movements in an effort to produce a Security Council action that would be effective in dealing with the crisis.

We think that some additional time, obviously, is going to be required before both parties are as receptive as they need to be to those kinds of initiatives. We'll continue to do that. What the story this morning suggested is that we were going to take a more visible role, but I'm not sure that more visibility to our role is necessarily helpful in this situation since our relations with both of the combatants are not of the best. And I think we still need to proceed as we have been, which is a major effort, which is a continuing effort, and hopefully we can eventually get a Security Council resolution that will have some effect.

Q. Do you have a timeframe in mind at all for when—you said some additional time would be required before the two parties would be ready—do you have any idea when that will be?

A. It will be some time, I expect, although there are internal pressures on both of them, political and also economic. But they seem to be digging in for a low-level war of attrition at the moment. If that proves to characterize their military posture, whether or not that also is designed to create an opportunity to end the conflict, we can judge only after we have pursued opportunities with them.

Q. Could you please tell us what standards our government uses for defining a terrorist government? And do you stand by President Carter's characterization Tuesday night of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as a terrorist organization?

A. I stand by the State Department's characterization of the PLO which, I think, is essentially what the President intended to say.

Q. Could you elaborate on that definition for me, please?

A. The PLO is an organization, elements and individuals of which have performed terrorist acts. That's different than characterizing the organization as a whole.

Q. You and the President, in your speeches of the last few weeks, have made SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] into an effective referendum issue in the election next Tuesday. In the context of polls which show that the President is now given an even chance of losing—

A. Does that mean he has an even chance of winning, too? [Laughter.]

Q. I'm wondering if you've considered that this may have been a risky approach, because if the President loses, it may be taken, at least in the terms that you and the President have set, as a defeat for SALT II, as an indication the American people do not want this kind of arms control?

A. It may have another effect, if I listened to the debate accurately. It may have produced a change in the other candidate's position.

Q. Can you please elaborate on that? What change do you see in Mr. Reagan's position?

A. You've given me a very tempting opening, but—[Laughter.] You know how reluctant I am to be political. Tease me a little. [Laughter.]

Q. Could you address yourself to the various reports that the United States and Iran have actually reached some kind, or at least a secret understanding of some sort, on the terms for release of the hostages and that what's really going here is an attempt by the Iranians to bring their side of it into line with some kind of agreement that's alleged already to have been made between the two countries?

A. You don't have much respect for parliaments. I don't see how you make a deal with Iran without getting Parliament in on the deal. No, there is no deal. We don't even know what terms the Parliament is debating. Until we know, we can't tell you whether there's been a deal.

I think one of the stories was to the effect we've shaken hands on it. I haven't shaken hands with Parliament. I don't know of anybody else who has, and so you can't have any deal. I think that's a story that's been floated in this election season to prejudice the political climate.

Q. Quite apart from the Parliament, is there an understanding, as far as you know, with the other authorities in Iran? Have we reached any agreement with them?

A. No. We haven't reached any agreement with them. They are not inclined, obviously, to reach agreement with anybody until they've consulted with each other and reached agreement. They're having quite considerable difficulty in reaching agreement, and we would be foolish, indeed, to be committing ourselves to something to which they're not prepared to commit themselves.

Q. A couple weeks ago you cautioned the Polish people to demonstrate an awareness of Soviet sensitivities. Is it your impression over the past couple weeks they have done so, and do you find anything particularly ominous in recent events there, including a fast trip by the Polish leadership to Moscow?

A. The word I used, I think, was "sensitive," that they should be sensitive to what is going around. The alternative to that, of course, is to be insensitive, which I would not think would be wise. To answer your question directly, the agreement which the workers and the government appear to have reached, following the visit of Kania and Pinkowski to Moscow, appears to have moved the Poles away from the kind of confrontation that everybody was worrying about.

I don't know whether that is a premature judgment. I think we have to wait to see what the reaction to it is. But certainly there's a little more comfortable feeling about the situation today than there was a couple of days ago.

Q. You keep telling us here today that you've got to wait to see what the Parliament does. But since you're so emphatic on the point of waiting to see what the Parliament does before we see what the United States does, can you be

forthcoming to the degree possible about the succession of indirect contacts that may fall short of semantic precision about a deal being made, but to the effect that we, in fact, have been in a nonnegotiation, but indirect communication, working out the terms that may be acceptable to Iran and to us?

A. The President has made statements today to which you people have made reference, which I'm sure the Iranians have read, and it may be that they regard those statements as concessions. There have been all sorts of indirect communications through many channels with them, and I wouldn't be able to characterize them. For instance, they said at one point that they thought we had made an apology. I'm not aware of any apology we've made, but in my letter to the Prime Minister, I acknowledged that we each had perceived grievances against the other. And I got some indirect report that he thought that was by way of a partial apology.

I don't regard that as such, but if he does, and if that eliminates that issue, I'm ready to accept his characterization of it. So I don't know what kind of leads have led them to what conclusions. Khomeini, obviously, on the basis of somebody's judgment, listed four points, and you know what they are.

Mr. Reagan, incidentally, responded to those very positively at the time. And that may be a basis for working out an agreement. I mean, if the two Presidential candidates could find a way to agree on terms, within the framework of Khomeini's proposals, you may have something to work on. And so it's that sort of preparation that we make, you know, what is within the realm of possibility; so that when we are asked to respond to a proposal, we may be as prepared as we can be to respond to specifics.

Q. But you have, in fact, through the indirect communication, I take it, responded. It isn't something that you're doing in-house to be ready for any possible negotiations; you've let the Iranians know about this.

A. We've let them know about it publicly. We said, the President has said, you have reminded me of what the President has said, what would be involved is the unfreezing of the assets and the lifting of sanctions and military spare parts.

With respect to an apology which is, was, at one time another condition, I've tried to give you the best I can on that. The question of trials has sort of dropped out of their rhetoric for some time now, so we don't have as much concern about that.

The question of a staged release—we've said publicly that we want all the hostages, and all at once. Whether or not that has been impressed on them, I can't be sure until we hear tomorrow. I don't know how I could go any further than that.

Q. I know you don't like to answer hypothetical questions, as you made clear—

A. It depends on whether it's useful.

Q. Yes. But, if by Thursday of this coming week, the hostage situation is still in a state of flux, but shows signs of possible imminent movement, do you still plan to go ahead with your trip to Latin America?

A. I'm not sure about that. The hostage thing could delay the trip. We would try to find another timeframe. There's always a possibility of events that would require me to reconsider a trip of that kind or any other kind. This could happen.

Q. Mr. Rajai is quoted to have said that one condition among the other conditions—additional conditions to the Khomeini four—which was the bringing back of the AWACS [airborne warning and control system] planes from Saudi Arabia. In what circumstances are you ready to pull these planes out of Saudi Arabia?

A. I'll answer what I think you asked, and if I don't touch your point, please repeat. As I said on "Issues and Answers" [on October 19, 1980], I had read Rajai's statement; and, as I read it, he was not imposing it as a condition for the release of the hostages but simply expressing a concern. It's still conceivable, I suppose, that the Majlis might add that as a condition. I have no way of knowing, but as of now I don't see that emerging as a condition, but it might.

Q. This is a hypothetical question: Would you be prepared to bring these planes out if they asked for it as a condition?

A. Would we consider it?

Q. Yes.

A. I doubt it. I'll say a flat no.

Q. You have stated your reluctance to talk in hypothetical terms to any possible proposal, but does the United States have any objections in principle to swapping the hostages for war materiel that Iran may need to carry on the war against Iraq?

A. Just another way of trying to get me to do what I've said all morning I'm not going to do.

Q. Could I ask you another question on another area, please? There's been a debate, I understand, within the last few days within the Department over whether to forward the request to Congress, the President's decision to Congress, to sell arms to Morocco, tanks and planes, with some of your closest advisers urging you to do it and some of your closest advisers opposing it.

A. My understanding is that unless it goes to the Senate by the 12th of November, the deal will be dead and that has angered the Moroccans to a great extent. Can you give us any idea how you feel about this, whether you are going to follow through on the President's decision to, in fact, sell these planes and tanks to Morocco?

A. The question is still under consideration.

Press release 310. ■

Secretary Holds Press Briefing in Memphis

The following is a press briefing Secretary Muskie held in Memphis on October 6, 1980.¹

Q. What is your response to a report in the *Washington Star* about having no interest in a second term in the Carter Administration.

A. A report absolutely without foundation. I think I was in Memphis when the President called me to invite me to take this job. I am as enthusiastic about it now as I was that day and sufficiently enthusiastic to continue in it as long as the President wishes me to.

Q. Referring to that *Washington Star* report that said, I believe, that you had become weary of the bureaucracy in the State Department and the fact that the President did not draw a line between your responsibilities and those of National Security Adviser Brzezinski, is there any sort of friction there with the National Security Adviser and yourself?

A. We have different opinions from time to time, but as far as the President is concerned, he has been completely supportive of my efforts. He has indicated quite clearly that my role is what I understood it to be when I took the job.

That report spoke of my complaining to alleged friends that I was bitter about my relations with the President. I don't know who these alleged friends are. I have not expressed such thoughts to myself or to my wife or to anybody I know, so there is absolutely no foundation whatsoever to any suggestion that my relations with the President are anything different than he promised me and that he assured me of when I took this job.

Now, there seems to be a misunderstanding among members of the press as to the character of the foreign policy decisionmaking in the executive branch. We are not all of the same opinion about particular issues. If we were, there would only be a need for one of us, not for several of us. There are several Agencies which have foreign policy implications—the Department of Defense, National Security Council, State Department, Department of Commerce, Treasury Department; there are many of them.

It is the role of the National Security Council to serve as a coordinating agency, which gives the National Security Adviser an influence on foreign policy across the board, and one has to understand that when one is involved in the process.

The President is a man who likes to be challenged by ideas and differences of opinion, and I can assure you that he is challenged and he makes up his own mind. The Constitution makes him "the" foreign policymaker. I have found myself comfortable in that role. I have found myself given every opportunity to express my views, and I have found the President supportive when he thought I was right. He often seeks to balance views. So it's a living kind of process into which many people have an input, and my role is no less than the President said it would be. I like to work with him, I find him knowledgeable, and I find him prudent and careful but I find him tough.

He makes up his own mind about what course this nation ought to follow, and I like people like that. I like leadership like that. So he has my support now, as he did then; and as I said a few moments ago, I am willing to serve as long as he wants me to.

Q. About the relocation of Cuban refugees in Puerto Rico, I understand that they don't want the refugees there. They have filed suit in a hearing today in Federal court about it. Where would those refugees come—if there's any chance—where would the relief come as far as overcrowding refugees here? Do you have any idea?

A. I don't know of any plans to bring them here.

Q. No, but what I mean is is this to relocate refugees from this country to Puerto Rico?

A. What we are trying to do is to consolidate the refugee centers and also to disperse them as widely as possible so that the burden doesn't fall too heavily on one community or on one State—which I think is reasonable. We must find someplace for them.

It's a burden, I suppose, for any place if that is the way they perceive it in the first instance. But you know, I am an immigrant. My father, in a sense, was a refugee, and he found a place in this country for himself—and for me—and I think it is in this spirit that Americans generally, I think, will recognize that although there are practical problems in receiving and resettling these refugees, doing so is in the American tradition. I think we have to share the burden and share the load, and that is what we are trying to do in locating these resettlement centers.

May I point out also that it is not simply an American responsibility; it is an international responsibility. There are some 15 million refugees around this planet, and we are not bearing the total load of that responsibility. But somebody is and the international community is responding and must continue to respond. These people are fleeing repression, they are fleeing hunger, they are fleeing all sorts of conditions that cause people to leave their homes and their nations ever since the world began. That's why 40 million Europeans came to this country, including my father and others at the turn of the century—fleeing oppression, fleeing lack of opportunity, and so on—and they continue to do so and we must find a way.

Our means are not unlimited, and we cannot ask intolerable burdens of our people in dealing with the problem. But surely we can find a way to deal with it.

The wave of Cuban refugees was unexpected. It was the result of a deliberate decision on the part of Cuba,

and as a result it suddenly hit one State with a flood of people. We have resettled 105,000 out of some 120,000 who came; but there are still some for whom, because they lack the skills to fit into our job market or because they can't speak English or have other limitations, it has been more difficult to find places to resettle. But it's the kind of job that Americans have found possible to do over the years.

Q. When it was first announced that we were going to—that we were having a situation because of the Iranian and Iraqi war—can you tell us anything more about that now or whether what we are hearing in the national press is—

A. It seems to have settled down into a more prolonged kind of struggle than was originally anticipated—certainly longer than was anticipated by the President of Iraq. The Iranians have found a capability for resisting and sustaining that resistance that many people did not credit them with. So it looks as though we have got a longer struggle ahead of us there than we expected.

Secondly, the risks for a widening war, beyond the territory of the two combatants, do not seem to be as high as they were a week or two ago. But we must never overlook the possibility that that may happen, that the war could spread to Iran's neighbors or to Iraq's neighbors. Then we would truly have an explosive possibility, for the obvious reason that the Western world's pipeline goes through the area.

Q. How much of an influence did the Americans—did the United States—have in the Saudi decision to up production of oil?

A. We are happy to see that happen. But I think in all candor it was a Saudi initiative, from my perspective.

They are really pretty responsible about their use of their resource. They understand that the rate of production, as well as the price of oil, affects their own economy as well as that of the consuming nations of the world, and they seek to use it in ways that will contribute to a stable supply and a stable price. I think that is what their motivation is in this situation.

They recognize that this war in that area creates high risks for them and their resource and that this resource is a means for them to contribute to stability which is in their interest as well as ours.

Q. How would you describe your relationship with Mr. Brzezinski? Would you say that it was strained like it was under your predecessor?

A. There is no strain at all in our personal relationship. We are both Poles, you know—we are not poles apart. [Laughter.]

We get along fine on a personal basis and you know he has a background in foreign policy. He is a very energetic, idea man, and the President likes to be exposed to that kind of thinking. He has a different slant on things than I do from time to time, but our differences of opinion are discussed and debated in a civilized way. Sometimes I win, sometimes I persuade him and sometimes he persuades me. That's his job, really, as coordinator.

The differences of opinion are not the result of personal strains in the relationship. They tend to be made to look that way in the media for obvious reasons—you people enjoy a fight more than you do a debate—so it has been made into a personal kind of thing. But it isn't as far as I am concerned. I can't speak for what it was with Mr. Vance and Mr. Brzezinski.

But to say that our personal relations are cordial—and they are—is not to say that we always agree. And the fact that we don't always agree doesn't generate any bitterness on his part or on mine—and it certainly doesn't generate any bitterness toward the President. We are both doing our respective jobs as best we can, as the President wants us to do, and I find that his decisions often are a balance of the two points of view: mine and Mr. Brzezinski. Often Mr. Brzezinski and I agree more often than perhaps the press believes.

Q. Do you think that that is the best way to handle foreign affairs in the United States—two separate advisers to the President having authority? Or shouldn't the Secretary of State have the total authority?

A. No, foreign policy advice comes to the President from many sources. The President's foreign policy breakfast every Friday morning is made up of anywhere from six to eight people, depending upon the particular issues we expect to deal with that morning and depending upon the inputs from the various areas concerned.

If the World Bank happens to be involved in the problem that comes to our attention then the Secretary of the Treasury may well be present. The

President's General Counsel may be present. Or the Vice President may be present. The Secretary of State and the Deputy Secretary of State are usually present.

So there are a number of people, depending upon the issue and the problems, who may be gathered with the President on Friday morning to discuss foreign policy issues.

Now with respect to the National Security Council, that was created in the late 1940s, I believe, because during the war the Defense Department had grown enormously into a worldwide organization because of the nature of the war. And with obvious foreign policy implications, sometimes running at odds with the State Department, the NSC was created. I was just coming out of the war at that point, but I am told the NSC was created for the purpose of coordinating foreign policy. And that is still a very important part of its role.

It's understandable, since the National Security Adviser is in the White House, that if the President wants a quick perspective on a foreign policy problem that crosses his desk or some background in the course of the day for him to turn to his National Security Adviser who obviously has a lot of background in foreign policy. That has been happening for 30 years.

The job began to grow to its present dimensions, I am told, when George Bundy served as National Security Adviser to President Kennedy. Then it grew under Walt Rostow, and then Henry Kissinger expanded it to its present dimensions, and then Mr. Brzezinski.

But I have found with this President that it doesn't matter what seat you are holding. What he is interested in is what your advice is and how useful it is in dealing with a particular problem.

But to form a role of the role of the State Department as the foreign policy department—with 10,000 people spread all over this planet in consular offices and embassies all around the planet—that is the source of the President's foreign policy information. The source of information as to what problems are arising at any part of the globe on a 24-hour basis is the State Department, and it's the State Department analysts and it's the Secretary of State who are his channel of information and channel of analysis with bodies. That is not to say that he doesn't consult Mr. Brzezinski, because obviously, he does.

Q. Would you say that earlier—I believe it was when some new weapons policy—when that mention of that new nuclear weapons policy was released by Mr. Brzezinski and the press, as you said, reported that you acted rather violently against it—you didn't know that they were going to move ahead and release the information on the nuclear weapons policy. And I believe that was when, more recently, you had—they seemed to say that you had a violent reaction to Mr. Brzezinski's revealing that information. Was that much ado about nothing?

A. You see your very question reveals that the press did not tell you the story accurately. I did not react in any way that could be described as violent or even angry. I remember the incident very clearly.

I was traveling, I think, to the west coast on an Air Force plane and the story had come out that morning, which was written by a reporter named Curt of the *New York Times* revealing that the Presidential Determination 59 was about to be released involving strategic nuclear policy. And I was asked whether I had been informed of it. I'll tell you, my answer was: "No." How is that a violent word?

Q. Was that all you had to say about it at the time?

A. That's all I had to say about it at the time.

Now since that time, the whole sequence of events has been described, and I have testified with [Defense Secretary] Harold Brown before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the development of the PD 59. And it was not the intention to exclude the Secretary of State, Mr. Vance or myself, but the development of PD 59, which was a document codifying the strategic nuclear policy which had previously been agreed to with the involvement of the State Department—that was supposed to have been taken care of with Mr. Vance and then with me at the time that Mr. Vance left the Department and I came into the Department, so our involvement sort of fell through the cracks.

I came in, and immediately I was off to Europe with the NATO Defense Ministers, then at the Austrian state ceremony when I met with Mr. Gromyko, and then the Venice summit, and the ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) Foreign Ministers conference in Indochina. In that period

when I would otherwise have been consulted about the PD 59, it sort of fell through the cracks.

Now I have been assured that it is not the policy to ignore the State Department. The President personally assured me that the Secretary of State, obviously, should be involved in such decisions involving strategic nuclear policy. So the whole thing has been perfectly explained.

But when I was asked whether I had been involved, I had to give the honest answer, which was, no. It came as a complete surprise to me, but my reaction was not violent. Of course there are people who say that I have only to look at somebody to look violent, but I am not sure that is so. [Laughter.]

Q. The hostages have been in Iran for nearly a year. What is going on now? Is the Administration just kind of waiting to see what this Iranian-Iraqi thing is going to do? Are there any plans in the works? Are we talking to them more; are we talking to them less? What is being done?

A. No, we are not waiting for anything. We haven't waited for a year. We have been trying through indirect and direct means—increasingly direct means when the opportunity arises—to influence the gradually evolving Iranian leadership and political institutions to come to grips with the issue and to make a decision with respect to this.

We were hoping that as their political institutions form, as they had been, that someone with authority would finally be created who could come to grips with the issue.

As the Parliament has been put in place, we have tried more and more to get into touch directly with the emerging leaders.

When the Prime Minister was selected, for example, I wrote him directly. He read my letter publicly, and we had some reason to believe we would get a formal, written response in due course. Members of Congress have written to the Speaker of the Majlis—the Parliament. The hostage families have communicated on a compassionate basis. In addition to that, we have communicated through the Swiss Embassy, which protects our interests there in Iran in the absence of our own Embassy.

We have communicated indirectly through friends from many countries—some of them official and

some of them unofficial—who had any possible access to people with influence in Iran.

The whole objective was designed to make increasingly clear to the Iranians that the hostage crisis was a problem to them and not an opportunity. And increasingly, they seem to be aware of that.

Until this war struck, we thought that they were beginning to move toward a position in the Majlis where they would take it up. They have continued, they have named a commission specifically charged to examine the question and to make recommendations to the Majlis, and they did this after the war began, so conceivably they may continue to debate it and discuss it and in due course respond to my letter.

Or if they prefer not to deal with our government directly, they might deal with the congressional letters. They seem to think the Congress isn't part of our government—I don't know why. Or they might simply broadcast through the public media their terms, the basis for negotiation, or whatever.

But increasingly for the last couple of months or more, all of them have been saying—the hardliners, the moderates, the clerics, and others—that the Parliament is now charged with dealing with the hostage question and will. We had thought that they were beginning to move toward that, so that we could at least begin to know on what basis we might be able to talk. Whether the war has delayed that, we will know in due course.

Q. Maybe about a month ago Democratic Presidential [inaudible] and he said that he felt the Ayatollah Khomeini didn't like President Carter, to put it mildly—in other words, this is what was holding up the release of the hostages. Do you think that is the case? Do you think it's a personal situation, the way the Ayatollah Khomeini feels about President Carter?

A. I have no way of knowing. We may be as uninformed as to his motives as the press seems to be about my attitude toward my job. [Laughter.]

I mean, it's just not productive, I don't think, to try to speculate out loud about the motives of Khomeini or others. We don't know. There is no way of reading their minds. If you were to try to read his mind you would have to try to read his mind about Mr. Carter, about Mr. Reagan, about Mr. Ander-

Somalia and the U.S. Security Framework

by *Matthew Nimetz*

*Statement before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the House Appropriations Committee on September 16, 1980. Mr. Nimetz is Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology.*¹

I welcome the opportunity to testify before you today. Although the specific subject is the reprogramming of foreign military sales (FMS) funds for Somalia in FY 1980, the issues are obviously broader ones. Is our relationship with Somalia in our national interest? How does it relate to our broader strategy in the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf region? What role will Somalia and its facilities play in that context? My statement will address these points. I will also address the general situation in the Horn of Africa and, in particular, the Ogaden, for it is essential to see clearly exactly what this reprogramming action will mean to our policy direction, what it will permit us to do, and what are the limits of its effect. It is, by itself, a small step, but as so often in the conduct of foreign policy, it is an important one both symbolically and in real terms. Let us begin by looking back for a moment over what will be familiar ground for some of you to see what its origins are, what it means, and why so many of our key policy objectives in relation to the Soviet Union, to the defense posture of the United States, to our relations with our allies in Europe and Asia, to our purposes in the Middle East, to our energy policies are involved in this action by our government. As always, we must at the same time ask ourselves what would be the effect of our not taking this action.

Our attitudes and our perceptions of American interests in the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean area have come a

A. I came here, as I recall, to speak to a water conference of some kind—water pollution conference.

Q. Was that in last spring—or was that in May?

A. It was in May.

¹ Press release 280 of Oct. 10, 1980. ■

son, because, after all, one of those three might be the person he has to deal with. So I think that is unproductive.

I think that even those who are using the hardest rhetoric publicly against us are considering how to get this crisis behind them.

They are obviously far more isolated from the world, and they surely must feel isolated in the course of this war. And they would resent my saying that. But nevertheless, by their own account, the sanctions we have imposed have added 25% to the cost of things which they import when they can get them.

They see sentiment in the area turning against them and toward Iraq, for whatever reason. They find problems in replenishing their military supply and equipment and maintenance. So even in war, they must feel the isolation that this crisis has visited upon them. We believe now, and we think time will support this belief, that in due course they will decide that their own interests are better served to get this hostage crisis behind them.

And when they do, and when they find somebody in a position to make that decision and not lose his job doing so, they will make that decision. And we will know what the terms are, and we can negotiate those terms perhaps and finally reach that objective we have all been agonizing about for almost a year.

Q. In light of that, though, do you think because of the economic penalties being put on Iran by the United States and also the loss of all their oil fields during the war—do you think that that government can withstand? Or do you foresee a revolution there?

A. They have withstood a great deal. They are people motivated by religious fervor—a belief that they are doing something ordained from on high—and when people have that kind of motivation, they can withstand a great deal. Already, they have done much better in this war in sustaining their effort than a lot of outside observers and impartial observers thought them capable of doing.

Q. What were you doing in Memphis when you said that you got the call here earlier to serve as Secretary of State?

long way in the past year or two and, indeed, since the oil embargo of 1973. The vital significance of oil supplies from the region for the economic well-being of the United States, Western Europe, and Japan helps to define our interests in the area. And the value of those supplies, along with their vulnerability to a variety of threats, has both attracted Soviet attention to the region and brought increased stresses and pressures, from within and without, to the societies and states in the area.

The Soviet Challenge

Throughout the 1970s it became possible to distinguish a clear trend in Soviet strategic moves related to the Indian Ocean and the Gulf. I will not go into detail about those actions which established the trend, because you are familiar with them. Broadly, they include the major new pattern of Soviet naval activity and presence; Soviet support for, and encouragement of, subversive forces in key nations, as well as for those regimes openly aligned with the Soviet Union, such as South Yemen and Ethiopia; and the appearance of surrogate Cuban forces in the region.

Parallel to this Soviet-managed pattern and not necessarily related to it, a rising level of discontent developed within some of the regional states. Events in Iran—whatever their origin and whatever their eventual outcome—brought a dramatic shift in alignment in the region and played on forces which also exist in other regional states, among them some of the most significant oil producers.

I have sketched this longer term background briefly because I think we must bear in mind that our original steps to improve our military forces for possible deployment into the area and our actions seeking greater access to facilities in Somalia, Kenya, and Oman came about in response to the trends well established before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan shed dramatic new light on these trends. In response to the wider Soviet threat symbolized by this aggression, the President, in his State of the Union message, declared that: "An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an

assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force." Thus Afghanistan lent powerful emphasis and powerful force to the rationale we believe supports our policy. That policy responds to the clear, inimical, long-term trend in power relationships which had developed in the area, and it is thus best understood as part of a long-term effort on our part to protect our vital interests and those of our allies and friends.

These interests are threatened. Not only has the Soviet Union engaged in a steady building of military capabilities, but the Soviet leadership has shown that they are not hesitant to use either their own power or that of others. South Yemen's attack on North Yemen, the introduction of Cuban combat forces into Angola and Ethiopia, and the Soviet buildup in the Indian Ocean were all cause for concern even before Afghanistan. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has underscored that concern by placing the Soviets within 300 miles of the Indian Ocean, and it has demonstrated that we cannot rule out direct Soviet aggression.

Our strategy for Southwest Asia is thus based on the interests we share with our allies and the friendly states of the region. Both we and our allies have an important interest in preventing Soviet domination or interruption of our access to the region's oil. Thirty percent of the oil we import comes from the Persian Gulf. The percentages are even higher for our friends: 66% for Western Europe and 75% for Japan. We must so insure that the countries of the region are not compelled to make their political and economic decisions under the shadow of preponderant Soviet power or the threat of aggression.

In response to the global challenge posed by the Soviets:

- We have in recent years increased our real annual expenditures for defense, and we will continue to do so;
- We are helping to strengthen NATO and our other alliances;
- We are working to achieve a peaceful solution to the problems of the Middle East;
- We are engaged in a positive dialogue with nations of the Third World on economic and political issues of concern to them and to us; and
- Through political initiatives and economic sanctions, we and other members of the international community

are making the Soviets pay a substantial cost for invading Afghanistan.

Today, however, I will be talking primarily about our steps to deal with a Soviet military threat to Southwest Asia.

It is a fundamental given that only the United States can directly deter, or counter, a direct threat from the Soviets. We recognize the concerns of the regional states that they not be drawn into a superpower conflict, but we expect them to recognize that the alternative to a countervailing U.S. Policy—expressed in concrete terms—would be greater Soviet boldness, both politically and militarily.

Our ability to deter and defend against such a threat will not by itself guarantee peace, security, and economic development in this region. We must and will encourage cooperation, moderation, and stability through political and economic means. However, in the absence of a militarily and politically credible counterweight to the Soviet Union, there can be no real security for regional states, no stable, nonthreatening framework within which these other aims can be achieved. Without that kind of environment, these states become hostages to fortune or prisoners of hope and trust in Soviet benevolence. We believe they know this, and that is why we believe we have much in common. It is also why we are improving our capability to project substantial power into the region quickly so that the Soviet Union cannot count on achieving their objectives through military action or the threat of military action.

I will not minimize the size of the task nor leave the impression that it can be accomplished overnight. The interests that engage our efforts are vitally important to the well-being of our country, and a sustained commitment of attention and resources over several years will be required. Nevertheless, we have embarked on a course that is bringing us nearer our goal.

We are taking three broad steps to improve our military capability in the region.

First, we have increased our peacetime military presence. This presence is largely naval—two carrier battle groups and a marine amphibious unit are deployed in the region. From time to time, these forces may be supplemented by tactical Air Force training missions.

Second, we are improving our capability to introduce our rapid deployment forces into the area, if needed to meet a

Soviet military challenge, by prepositioning military equipment on ships in the region and procuring fast sealift and strategic airlift which can move forces rapidly.

Third, we are obtaining access to facilities in the area, to support both our expanded presence and our ability to move forces rapidly to the area. As you know, we have secured access to the facilities in Oman, Kenya, and Somalia. Elsewhere in the region, we are improving our facilities on the British Island of Diego Garcia and are encouraged by President Sadat's offer of temporary and limited access to facilities in Egypt.

Finally, recognizing that U.S. efforts cannot alone meet the threat, we are strengthening regional countries by providing security and economic assistance to help them develop their own defensive capabilities.

In developing our strategy, we recognize the political implications of our military actions—especially, as I mentioned earlier, the sensitivity of regional nations about being drawn into a superpower confrontation—and we have sought to minimize the adverse effects. Thus, we do not envisage a large U.S. presence on the ground; instead, we have emphasized peacetime naval presence so that we can reassure our friends without the political problems that a large ground presence would entail. By arranging for access to facilities in several different nations we reduce the political exposure of any one and minimize the presence of U.S. forces in any one location. Moreover, we have not asked the countries of the region to accept U.S. bases. Instead, we have sought access to their own facilities with minimal U.S. presence so that we can more effectively meet our mutual security interests.

The concept of facilities we have developed for this region is critical. If we are to be in a position to deter or defeat a Soviet threat to our interests in the region, in whatever form it takes, we, in fact, need access to a network of facilities, a network which will enable us to provide logistical and combat support to our forces in the area and, if necessary, to bring in additional people, equipment, and supplies. Such a network must provide the flexibility and redundancy necessary to respond to a variety of contingencies.

U.S.-Somali Relationship

It is in this context that, in order to enhance our capabilities in the region and to strengthen regional stability and

security, we have established a cooperative relationship with Somalia in addition to those with Oman and Kenya. Our analysis of the many factors at work leads us to the firm conclusion that there are substantial benefits to the United States of this closer relationship with Somalia.

Facilities in Somalia are an important part of the network we have planned, primarily because of their location and their capability. I would simply suggest that you will grasp the essentials of the Somali situation if you look at the location of other facilities to which we have access and the distances between them—and between them and areas of potential concern. You can see that Somalia occupies an important position; Somalia is also strategically located along our two most important sea lanes into the Persian Gulf area. Clearly then the Somalia facilities, properly utilized, can play a pivotal role.

Capabilities are as important as location. We are primarily interested in ac-

cess to facilities at Berbera and, to a lesser extent, to those at Mogadishu, and the recently concluded access agreement provides for our use of those Somali facilities. At Berbera, there are an airfield and a sheltered port already in existence. With relatively limited improvements, permitted by our agreement with Somalia, they will be quite adequate for our needs.

A second element of the relationship involves economic and security assistance to Somalia. Somalia is one of the world's poorest nations, with a per capita income of less than \$100 annually. We are aware of the many problems which face Somalia's economy, including a need for improving agricultural productivity and meeting short-term balance-of-payments difficulties. To help meet these needs, we have told the Somalis that we will seek nearly \$53 million for development assistance over the next 2 years and \$5 million in economic support fund (ESF) assistance.

Somalia's problems are, as you know, compounded by a massive influx of refugees. The government has taken some 750,000 destitute inhabitants of the Ogaden region into refugee camps, and we estimate that an equal number of refugees remains outside of the camps. Most of these are women and children fleeing the fighting between Somalis and Ethiopians in the Ogaden. We have provided about \$50 million in emergency refugee assistance this year to help alleviate this tragedy, and we have also encouraged other donors, public and private, to assist in meeting the humanitarian needs of these unfortunate people.

Finally, the third major element in our relationship is based on our recognition that Somalia has a legitimate right to provide for its own defense. We will soon discuss with the Somali Government the type of military equipment they will acquire with the limited loan funds we hope to have available through reprogramming. I can assure this subcommittee that we will scrutinize their requests carefully to insure both their suitability to Somali defense needs and the appropriateness of the equipment and services requested for defensive purposes.

We have informed the Somalis of our intention to seek \$20 million in FMS credits in each of FY 1980 and 1981 to enable them to purchase from us defensive weapons and equipment.

We have transmitted a formal reprogramming notice to the Congress for FMS financing in FY 1980. We have also informed the Somalis that we will provide \$5 million in ESF funds and \$300,000 in international military education and training in 1981. We have informed the Congress that we will be reprogramming \$5 million in ESF funds this fiscal year to cover the transportation costs of 60,000 metric tons of grain provided under PL 480 to help overcome serious shortages that currently exist in Somalia.

It is appropriate to review the agreement which we have concluded with Somalia in the context of the situation in the Horn of Africa, and I would like to present to the subcommittee a brief survey of recent events there and our role in them.

Recent Events in the Horn of Africa

Bitter tensions have existed in the Horn of Africa for a very long time indeed. They are rooted in intense nationalism, differing interpretations of history, and centuries-old religious and

Nigerian President Visits U.S.

President Alhaji Shehu Shagari of Nigeria made an official visit to Washington, D.C., October 7-8, 1980, to meet with President Carter and other government officials. Following is the White House statement issued on October 7.¹

President Carter and President Alhaji Shehu Shagari of the Federal Republic of Nigeria met this morning at the White House for a comprehensive and cordial discussion of bilateral and international issues of mutual concern.²

In reviewing bilateral relations, the Presidents discussed the U.S.-

Nigerian Joint Agricultural Consultative Committee, which was established as a result of the fifth bilateral economic talks in Lagos in July 1980. President Shagari will meet tomorrow, October 8, with the American members of this committee, which was created to encourage joint investment in Nigerian agriculture. Both Presidents expressed satisfaction with the progress in this field and reaffirmed their commitment to promote further extensive agricultural cooperation. In addition, they explored other means of diversifying and strengthening bilateral relations in trade, investment, science, and technology.

President Carter and President Shagari also discussed priority items in African and international affairs, with particular attention to the hostilities in the Sahara and the continuing effort to bring about a peaceful transfer of power to majority rule in Namibia and South Africa, as well as the impact of events in the Middle East.

President Shagari and President Carter



(White House photo)

¹Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Oct. 13, 1980, which also carries the texts of the two Presidents' remarks made at the welcoming ceremony on Oct. 7 and their dinner toasts that evening.

²List of other officials attending the meeting is not printed here. ■

ethnic rivalries. These factors took a more tangible form during the last quarter of the 19th century. In the Somali view of the history of the region, Ethiopia acquired the Ogaden at that time as the traditional Somali homeland was being divided up by the major European powers, principally Britain, France, and Italy. Given the fact that the majority of Ogadeni people are ethnic Somalis, the Somali concept of nationhood embraces them and rests on the argument that the process of decolonization and self-determination should apply to the Ogaden as well as to the former European colonies. In contrast, the Ethiopian concept of the nation rests on territorial boundaries—a principle firmly established in international law and endorsed by the Organization of African Unity in its opposition to altering internationally recognized borders by any but peaceful means, regardless of the colonial origin of such borders.

U.S. views on the contradictory claims by Somalia and Ethiopia are clear. We believe the issue should be resolved peacefully by the parties. We have never wavered in our support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ethiopia, and we oppose the introduction of Somali military forces into territory outside Somalia's internationally recognized borders. We are willing to utilize our diplomacy in efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement of the problem.

Let us then, given this historical context, review quickly U.S. relations with Somalia in recent years. In mid-1977, as you know, the Soviet Union was well established in Somalia, as it had been since 1969 when the present Somali Government came to power. Although U.S. relations with Somalia were then minimal, the Siad government approached the United States with a formal request for military aid. The United States in return informed the Somalis that we were agreeable "in principle" to help Somalia meet its defensive military needs.

There the matter stood in July 1977, when the Somalis launched an attack in the Ogaden and sent in regular Somali military units to aid the Western Somali Liberation Front. Discussions with Somali officials regarding U.S. military assistance were not pursued.

Then in November 1977, President Ford abrogated the Somali friendship treaty with the U.S.S.R. The Soviet Union promptly began a massive airlift to Ethiopia, bringing in more than \$1 billion of military equipment and nearly 10,000 Cuban combat troops in the course of the ensuing year. By March

1978, the Somali forces in the Ogaden had been effectively defeated.

We believed it necessary, in these circumstances, to avoid being drawn into a pattern of response and reaction to the ups and downs of Somalia's intermittent strife with Ethiopia and to build a long-term policy which recognized the key fact that Somalia had broken with the Soviets. I believe we can show that, in practice, this policy has been prudent and responsible. We have paid very special attention to the political issues involved to insure that the Somali leadership and Somalia's neighbors understand clearly that our military cooperation is for the purpose of strengthening Somalia's defense capability and not directed at Ethiopia or any other neighbor of Somalia.

In March 1978, after Somali regular units withdrew from the Ogaden under Ethiopian and Cuban military pressure, we sent an emissary to President Siad to discuss the question of U.S. defensive assistance. We told the Somalis that we would consider supplying defensive equipment but only following assurances from the Somali Government that it would not use force against any country nor permit equipment supplied by the United States to be used for any purposes other than preserving internal security and for the defense of the internationally recognized territory of Somalia. Such assurances were provided, but it again proved impossible to agree on the specifics of the defensive arms that the United States might supply.

In 1979, however, in view of the challenge posed by the growing Soviet presence and regional tensions, the President decided to seek U.S. access to military facilities in Oman, Kenya, and Somalia. An agreement with Somalia was concluded on August 22, 1980, allowing our military forces increased access to port and airfield facilities in Somalia.

In developing this new relationship, we have been alert to take every advantage of our new association with the Somalis to urge moderation in the Ogaden and to promote a peaceful resolution of Somalia's dispute with Ethiopia. In this regard, negotiations on the agreement provided an occasion for frank discussions between them and ourselves on this specific issue. We have carefully pointed out to the Somalis, both orally and in writing, that we are opposed to the presence of regular Somali forces in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. They were informed that such

activities could jeopardize our cooperative relationship. We also reviewed for them the conditions imposed by law on the provision of security assistance.

For their part, senior Somali officials have acknowledged our concerns and have declared that it is the policy of the Somali Government to avoid the presence of any Somali units in the Ogaden. They have also provided written and oral assurances of their intention to comply with the conditions imposed by law on our military supply relationship with Somalia. During our recently completed negotiations the written assurances to this effect given by the Government of Somalia in 1978 were explicitly reaffirmed.

We take the Somali assurances seriously. I believe that they represent, first, a net gain over the situation which pertained prior to our discussions with Somalia, and second, that they are a token of the further progress which we believe could be made as a result of our relationship with Somalia. We certainly intend to take them in a positive sense and to do what we can to reduce tension in the Horn and improve the prospect of a political settlement. Moreover, we will continue to assess our relationship, seeking opportunities to promote a peaceful resolution of differences. At the same time, it is important not to lose sight of the compelling reasons that brought us to the decision in the first place. Those reasons involve important aspects of U.S. national security, given the importance of the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean region and the heightened Soviet activities there.

We should also bear in mind, as I suggested earlier, that the judgment of cost and benefit must be applied to a decision *not* to take advantage of those facilities whose use is part and parcel of the relationship we seek to develop with Somalia. We have all seen how, in crisis and in conflict, foresight and planning can make the difference between success and failure. I will not sketch for you today any of the possible scenarios that might involve the use of U.S. forces, or positioning of U.S. forces, to secure or defend our interests and those of friendly countries in the critical area of the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. You can imagine as well as I how such a scenario might develop. What is clear, though, is that if and when a crisis develops, there will not likely be time or opportunity to provide ourselves with the facilities we may desperately need. We will have to rely on what we have

had the foresight to negotiate and put in place ahead of time.

The facilities we have been seeking in Oman, Kenya, Somalia, and elsewhere, in the judgment of the President and his military advisers, are necessary to the kind of flexibility and reach we are likely to need. Thanks to the common interests which we and these nations share in circumscribing the forward thrust of Soviet influence, those facilities are available to us at what we believe to be acceptable costs and costs which in the event of crisis may seem very small indeed. I cannot prove to you today that facilities in Somalia will make the difference between our ability to deal effectively with, or to remain impotent before, contingencies that may develop in that area. Without the Somali facilities, though, it is our considered judgment that we would be deprived of an important element in our long-term position. For these reasons, we believe this agreement, taken together with those signed with Oman and Kenya, is of great benefit to our country and that the reprogramming of \$20 million in FMS credits to Somalia is very much in our national interest.

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

U.S. Policy Toward Liberia

by Richard M. Moose

*Statement before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations on August 19, 1980. Mr. Moose is Assistant Secretary for African Affairs.*¹

As you know, we have submitted proposals for reprogramming FY 1980 economic support, development assistance, and foreign military sales funds in order to support U.S. policy toward Liberia in the wake of the April coup. We seek the committee's approval of these extraordinary steps because of Liberia's pressing needs, particularly in the economic sphere, and because of the importance of Liberia to our interests.

I recently returned with Ambassador [to the United Nations Donald F.] McHenry from my second visit to

Liberia since the coup and would like to discuss with the committee what has happened in that country, the nature and significance of our interests there, and the actions we have taken and propose to take in pursuit of those interests.

What Happened

Liberia is Africa's oldest independent black republic. It had long been one of the most politically stable countries on the continent. On April 12, a small group of enlisted men broke into the Presidential Palace and killed President Tolbert. There was little support for the Tolbert government or resistance to the coup from any quarter. Overnight Master Sergeant Doe and his colleagues found themselves in charge of a country.

These soldiers come from the rural areas of Liberia. Most have no experience outside the military and none outside Liberia. Prior to the coup, they were not organized politically and had no particular ideological orientation.

They did, however, share a strong sense of grievance toward the Americo-Liberian elite who had ruled the country since 1847. They were resentful of the corruption in the Tolbert government and of the general indifference of the ruling elite to the plight of the people at large. In particular, the sergeants had lost all respect for the military leadership, which permitted ill treatment, low pay, and slum-level housing for enlisted personnel.

The coup leaders established an all-military People's Redemption Council (PRC) as the country's supreme ruling body. Sergeant Doe is Chairman of the 17-member body and has been named Head of State. The PRC appointed a cabinet composed of four military members, three ministers from the Tolbert government (two of these have since left the country), and six members representing the two political groups which had been in opposition to the previous regime. Despite the changes, there is substantial continuity of personnel. In most of the government departments, career staffs remain in place. The ministries enjoy substantial autonomy, although the PRC decides matters of key importance.

The post-coup government is a diverse mixture of ideologies, levels of sophistication, political ambitions, and tribal identification. They are far more concerned about economic, social, and political equities than their predecessors but are decidedly not "radical."

Immediately after the coup, the soldiers arrested upwards of 150 persons closely associated with the overthrown government — politicians, officials, businessmen, and members of the Tolbert family. Without proper trial and despite numerous forceful interventions by our Ambassador, 13 prominent officials of the former government were publicly executed on April 22 in one of the most shocking spectacles in recent memory.

The executions provoked sharp outcry not only from us but from European and African governments. International criticism of the human rights abuses of the new regime has had some impact. On April 29, Sergeant Doe announced there would be no more executions, and to our knowledge there have been none.

The new regime faces urgent financial and economic difficulties, which in large measure predate the coup. Liberia enjoyed a 5% rate of economic growth during the decade ending in 1974. Since then, real growth has been virtually stagnant, and at the time of the April coup the treasury was all but empty.

Major causes of the stagnation remain beyond the government's control. The prolonged recession in the world steel industry has adversely affected iron ore exports, which account for up to two-thirds of the country's export earnings in a good year. Import costs led by oil prices, have increased sharply. Rubber sales have declined with weakening demand by the U.S. automobile industry.

The April coup further damaged business confidence, which had already been shaken by the Easter 1979 riot over rice prices. Investment continued to stagnate, capital flight intensified, and commercial credit lines were frozen. The new government, unaware of the serious state of the Liberian economy, made things worse by granting wage increases to the military. The business climate further deteriorated as a result of unauthorized arrests, harassment, and other arbitrary action by members of the PRC and the military against individual businessmen. These actions have resulted in emigration of businessmen and professionals, both foreign and domestic, which has had a significant negative impact on the Liberian economy.

All of these factors increased government expenditures precisely when revenues were depressed. The government now confronts a critical cash-flow problem. Its ability to pay salaries and

meet debt service payments, owed primarily to U.S. banks, is in jeopardy. With \$40 million in obligations due in this month, the Liberians now face a crucial watershed. Since the country's currency is the U.S. dollar, the Liberians cannot simply print money. They must either earn or borrow the funds they need.

U.S. Interests

The United States has extensive interests in Liberia:

- A Voice of America transmitter that broadcasts to all of Africa, the Middle East, and the southwestern part of the Soviet Union;

- A telecommunications relay station that transmits the diplomatic traffic between Washington and almost all of our Embassies in sub-Saharan Africa;

- An OMEGA navigation station, one of seven in the worldwide network, which enables ships and aircraft to calculate continuously their exact positions;

- Approximately 3,500 American citizens residing in Liberia;

- Private investment of \$350 million, with a replacement value of up to three times as much. (This investment includes Firestone, Goodrich, and Uniroyal rubber plantations; an iron mine which Bethlehem Steel has a 25% interest; and local branches or affiliates of Chase Manhattan, Citibank, and Chemical Bank. Liberia is a principal stopping point for Pan American, which also has a management contract for the airport.); and

- American bank loans outstanding aggregate about \$100 million; the Agency for International Development (AID) has outstanding loans of \$76 million; and Export-Import Bank exposure amounts to nearly \$12 million.

Because of our interests in Liberia and our historically close relationship with that country, other leading donors and our friends around the globe, as well as U.S. banks and business enterprises, look to us to take the lead in helping Liberia meet its immediate financial problems and begin the long process of restoring international confidence. Our ability and willingness to help Liberia may well affect its prestige generally throughout Africa.

Meanwhile, other countries have begun to take an interest. The PRC has announced a policy of genuine

nonalignment and indicated a willingness to accept assistance from various quarters. It has reportedly received offers of military and possibly financial assistance from Libya and Ethiopia. The Soviets have invited Sergeant Doe to visit Moscow.

U.S. Policy

We have maintained an active, frank, and open dialogue with the new Liberian Government. While deploring the manner in which the new government came to power and dealt with its predecessors, we sympathize with the goals of the revolution. For its part, the new government has affirmed its desire to continue close association with the United States. It turned to us first for assistance. On our side, we are pursuing four objectives with the new government with some measure of success.

First, we are trying to avoid economic collapse that could lead to instability and hardship for the Liberian people. The government has reached agreement, in principle, with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a 2-year stabilization program that gives them access to \$85 million during this period. However, the government has not yet reached agreement on a budget that would meet the IMF's deficit ceiling. We have urged them to act quickly on this to insure access to the IMF's first drawing in early October and more favorable consideration of loan requests by commercial banks.

Second, we are strengthening our representations for a return to civilian rule, release or fair trials for the remaining political prisoners, and fair treatment for businessmen and others. Sergeant Doe indicated to Ambassador McHenry and me last month that—assuming satisfactory progress toward social and economic goals—he contemplates return to civilian rule prior to the elections scheduled for 1983.

We have stressed to the Liberians that the protection of human rights is a crucial factor in our continued support in normalizing relations with their neighbors and the rest of the world and in rebuilding foreign investor confidence in the country. Recently defense counsel has been provided those charged with attempting a coup; prison conditions have improved, some lesser politicians have been released, and the house arrest of female members of the Tolbert family has been lifted. There remain, however, over 100 political prisoners.

Third, we want to assure the government of our attention to and support for their basic security considerations. The new government is genuinely worried about a possible coup and fears that further release of prisoners could threaten its security. They remain concerned that a neighboring country might launch an attack, perhaps in conjunction with some of the former elite. They have repeatedly requested increased military assistance from us to allow for purchases of weapons, trucks, and radios. Our provision of ongoing basic infantry training during this period has maintained contact with the military and responded to one of their most urgent requests. They have stated that once the armed forces are better equipped, they will move ahead on prisoner releases.

Fourth, we want to support the long-term development of the country. The government has announced its intention to pursue economic and social development more vigorously than the previous government. We hope this will be the case. We have continued our AID projects which are primarily in the areas of health, agriculture, and education—all target sectors of the new government. Long-term development is, of course, dependent on finding solutions to the immediate financial and economic problems.

We have developed a modest but important package of increased FY 1980 assistance for Liberia to further our objectives. We have notified Congress of our intention to grant \$5.2 million from the economic support fund and to reprogram \$5.5 million in development assistance and \$1.07 million in foreign military sales (FMS) credits. A PL-480 Title I rice program agreement was signed on August 13. I would like to describe in specific terms what these reprogramming proposals will do in relation to the broad objectives I just outlined.

Economic Improvement. Our proposed \$5 million in economic funds for budgetary support will, together with our other aid, demonstrate to the Government of Liberia and to other prospective donors our commitment to helping Liberia. Without our participation there would be little hope for an early improvement in the economy. Commercial banks have made clear the need for such a sign of official U.S. resolve and confidence before they are prepared to act.

We view the grant as a catalyst and a beginning to what we expect will be a long process. It will help lessen the government's sense of insecurity, encourage private credit flows, assist the government in adhering to the IMF stabilization program, and encourage other donor assistance.

We will give the government these funds once they have drawn up a budget that is acceptable to the IMF. We have established sensible guidelines for the use of this grant. It will be used for salaries at the development ministries (agriculture, health, education, etc.) and will involve an undertaking by the Liberians to expend a like amount on development projects over the next 12-18 months. Thus, ongoing U.S. development projects in the country will not have to be curtailed or abandoned.

Security Considerations. With respect to FMS, under the already existing FY 1980, \$1.40 million program, Liberia is acquiring vehicles and small quantities of ammunition and replacing obsolete or wornout equipment. The proposed additional \$1.07 million will allow purchase of much needed cargo trucks and communications equipment. We have, in the meantime, acceded to the Liberian request to purchase a small quantity of weapons and communications equipment through commercial channels. Willingness to help on the military side will also counter the temptation to accept the reported offers of military assistance by such countries as Ethiopia, Libya, and the Soviet Union.

Human Rights. This military help is intended not only to give evidence of support but to respond especially to the new government's insecurity about its ability to handle a possible counter-coup, which has caused it to hesitate in adjudicating the cases of political detainees. We hope that once the troops are better equipped, there will be further progress in the human rights areas. The prisoners are an issue which, as I have mentioned, has inclined other countries to isolate Liberia in the present critical period.

Long-Term Development. The reprogrammed \$5 million in development assistance will be for a rural information system. It will be the first new development aid since the coup and will demonstrate our support for the new government's particularly strong commitment to economic development. The project will provide the rural poor with

access to information by radio on government health, agricultural, and education services. Looking ahead to FY 1981, we are contemplating further development assistance, another PL-480 agreement, FMS, and international military and education training programs.

But U.S. help alone will not be enough. We and the Liberians are in close touch with other sources of help—the IMF, U.S. commercial banks, the World Bank, and other donors. The World Bank appears prepared to extend new loans to Liberia. We are urging a number of African and European governments to normalize relations with Liberia and to assist the new regime. I personally have been consulting with American banks about bridge finance pending access to IMF drawings, which should be available in October. I have conferred with officials of a number of West African governments about possible measures to bring Liberia back into the African fold.

Our immediate purpose is to enable Liberia to meet its most urgent obligations and encourage it to take the necessary political and economic steps to restore the country to good standing in the world community. We believe that such action is essential to facilitate long-term aid and private trade and investment flows, which will in turn assist Liberia to return to the growth and development it earlier enjoyed.

Prospects

Liberia is at a critical juncture. Responsible, constructive leaders are in the ascendancy, popular support for the new government is holding, and life outside the capital city remains essentially normal. The government is experiencing internal tensions, however, and external temptations could weaken U.S.-Liberian ties, frustrate economic recovery, and undermine prospects of progress toward restoration of civil and political rights.

Predicting what will happen in Liberia in the immediate future is venturesome. Much depends on the determination and ability of the new leaders in insuring fiscal responsibility and justice for all. If they meet this challenge, then the future will turn on whether the country receives prompt assistance and is able to restore internal and external confidence. The reprogramming proposals before you are crucial in this regard.

If we act promptly, we will be in a position to be of assistance at a relatively modest cost and to exercise influence on the course of events. The situation is uncertain and fragile. There is no assurance our proposed strategy will succeed. Our failure to act, however, would likely result in the loss of one of our longest standing African friendships, our credibility in the eyes of Europeans and Africans, and important economic and strategic assets.

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

The United States and Angola

by Richard M. Moose

*Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on September 30, 1980. Mr. Moose is Assistant Secretary for African Affairs.*¹

The events of 1974 and 1975, including our action in the Angolan civil war, continue to cast a long shadow over our relations with Angola. We are engaged in a process of reconciliation with a government with which we have differed on some issues and collaborated on others. That process takes time; it is complicated by the presence of large numbers of Cuban combat troops in Angola. Our policy is designed to encourage the reconciliation process, while taking account of the broad range of American foreign policy interests and objectives.

The United States continues to look forward to the eventual establishment of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of Angola. While we have not normalized relations, we have sought to work with the Angolan Government on issues of mutual concern and in ways designed to avoid isolating ourselves from that government.

U.S. and Angolan interests have proven compatible in the resolution of regional disputes. Most notably, Angola has played a leading role among the front-line states in working with the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) and in developing initiatives

to further the Namibia negotiations. Angola will continue to play a major role in the way that Namibia's independence and other future changes in southern Africa are brought about—whether by armed struggle or through peaceful processes. In addition, in June 1978, President Neto of Angola and President Iobutu of Zaire agreed to stop supporting movements based in their respective countries opposed to the government of the other. That agreement has endured, and both nations have sought to strengthen the provisions of the accord.

We have also promoted our commercial relationship with Angola, potentially one of Africa's richest nations. The United States purchases a substantial portion of Angola's present oil production of about 140,000 barrels per day. The Angolans have sought to do business with U.S. firms in a number of sectors where these firms offer the best products or service. Primary among these have been petroleum firms, such as Gulf and Texaco. Boeing and Lockheed have established good relations with the Angolan airline, TAAG. The Angolans have negotiated Export-Import Bank financing for major projects and are planning to purchase additional reputable or high technology U.S. products in the near future. Both the Angolans and U.S. firms have indicated that trade and investment would probably increase substantially with the establishment of diplomatic relations.

The Cuban Issue

The United States has not established diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of Angola because of our concern about the presence of 15,000–20,000 Cuban troops in Angola, the role they play, and our opposition in principle to Cuban intervention in regional conflicts for purposes that serve Soviet objectives.

We believe the Cuban military presence fulfills three functions.

A Deterrent Role. Both the MPLA Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola government and the Cubans have maintained that the Cuban combat forces will remain in Angola as long as they are needed to defend the country from outside attack. It appears the presence of Cuban combat forces in substantial numbers is intended primarily to play a deterrent role against the threat of a large-scale South African invasion such as that of 1975 which was signed to bring about or contribute to the fall of the MPLA government.

Support and Advice to FAPLA.

The Angolans assert that the Cubans no longer have a combat role against UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) and that the Cuban role is evolving from a combat function to that of supporting and advising the FAPLA (Angolan Armed Forces). Although the FAPLA appear to be assuming a larger share of Angola's defense burden, the evidence suggests that the Cubans apparently still provide garrison, logistical, artillery, and air support to the FAPLA.

Protection of the MPLA Leadership. The Cuban presence also probably provides a deterrent to coup attempts. In 1977, the Cubans played an important role in putting down a coup attempt against the Neto government from an MPLA faction.

The Cubans have enjoyed some access to other African liberation movements which have elements based in Angola but do not appear to have gained substantial influence with these groups. Although incomplete evidence suggests that the Cubans may have had a role in encouraging or supporting the two Shaba invasions in 1977 and 1978, they do not appear to be playing an important role with the Katangans at present. The Cubans trained some Zimbabwe (ZAPU-Zimbabwe African People's Union) guerrillas in eastern Angola. We hear little about Cuban contacts with SWAPO in Angola, although the Cubans are believed to provide some training and advice.

The evolution of the Cuban role inside Angola and the restraint on Cuban involvement in other regional conflicts suggest that the Angolans both want to and do exercise control over the Cubans and intend gradually to diminish the Cuban military role.

In fact, the Angolan Foreign Minister stated publicly on June 30, 1980, that with a Namibia settlement Angola would be in a position to inform the Cuban Government that Angola is able to dispense with the Cuban military presence.

However, it is our opinion that a Cuban military presence may be prolonged as long as the UNITA insurgency continues. We regard the continued presence of large numbers of Cuban combat troops in Angola as inimical to Africa's own interests in not becoming an East-West battleground. We continue to work to create conditions, such as a Namibia settlement, that would promote the early withdrawal of South African

troops from Namibia and Cuban combat troops from Angola.

In the meantime, we are aware that the lack of formal diplomatic relations constrains our ability to pursue other important U.S. interests in Angola and the region. Ironically, our absence from Luanda because of our concerns about Soviet and Cuban adventurism gives the Soviets greater flexibility to extend their influence over the MPLA and makes it more difficult for Angola to pursue a truer nonaligned course and better relations with the West. Moreover, our absence from the Angolan scene handicaps our ability to encourage effectively a peaceful settlement of the internal hostilities between the MPLA and UNITA.

Angolans have indicated to us that trade with the United States would in all likelihood increase substantially if there were diplomatic relations. Similarly, there are American businesses which are reluctant to pursue existing opportunities in Angola absent an official U.S. presence there. Finally, we are unable to offer consular services to Americans in Angola, including those who are in prison there.

Current Situation in Angola

Since the death of Angola's first President, Agostinho Neto, in Moscow following surgery in September 1979, the Angolan Government of President Jose Eduardo dos Santos has continued to pursue the policy guidelines laid down by Neto. The Angolans have continued their active pursuit of a negotiated Namibia settlement and, in general, sought to establish a truer nonaligned policy by establishing diplomatic relations with Western countries.

In anticipation of an MPLA party congress in December of this year, and given the provisional nature of Dos Santos' appointment as President, the MPLA is reviewing the policies it has followed to date. Future policy will be influenced by MPLA reactions to pressures emanating from five sources.

The South African Attacks. The South Africans frequently conduct cross-border military strikes against SWAPO bases in Angola, where some 5,000 SWAPO guerrillas are said to be located. While the primary objectives are SWAPO installations, the South Africans have increased their attacks on the Angolan infrastructure, including targets such as bridges, key railroad links, trucks, factories, and other

facilities. They have also bombed Angolan towns and villages, forcing the population to flee into the bush. Occasionally they have also become embroiled with Angolan forces, although they seemingly have tried to avoid doing so. The most recent large South African military operation was conducted in June 1980, when the South Africans sent in a sizable force supported by air power to destroy the principal SWAPO base camp in southern Angola and numerous smaller bases.

In a statement before the U.N. Security Council hearings on that attack, Ambassador [William] vanden Heuvel said:

... No principle enshrined in the U.N. Charter is more fundamental to the maintenance of good relations between states than mutual respect for the territorial integrity of all nations. South Africa's disrespect for this principle is intolerable to the international community. It is an affront to the people of Angola, with whose suffering and loss the people of the United States deeply sympathize. We should, and do, condemn it.

Angola has asserted that the South African attacks to date have cost the country well over \$100 million in damages to its economy. Although casualty figures have not been confirmed, they are believed to be high. While the South African attacks are highly damaging in themselves, they also support Angolan fears of another South African invasion on the order of that of late 1975, when South African troops intervening in the Angolan civil war penetrated close to Luanda itself. The South African attacks are cited by the Angolans and the Cubans as the principal reason for the presence of Cuban combat troops. To date, the South African Government has not deterred the Angolan Government from pursuing a negotiated Namibia settlement nor from supporting SWAPO. However, delay in attaining agreement on implementation of the U.N. plan for Namibia only strengthens the hand of those who believe that increased military support to SWAPO is the only viable means to attain an independent Namibia.

The UNITA Insurgency. The MPLA has established control of the country through its control of the central government. Government administration and social services in the provinces, however inadequate, are provided by the Luanda government.

The MPLA appeal is national in character and, as such, is directed to a variety of racial and ethnic groups. UNITA, on the other hand, draws substantial support from the Ovimbundu and related subgroups, who comprise 45% of Angola's population. Although the movement conducts military operations with relative facility across wide areas of central and southern Angola, it cannot be said to exercise administrative control over or provide services to much if any territory. Much of UNITA's appeal to its tribal base is due to the charisma and shrewdness of its President, Jonas Savimbi.

Since its defeat in the 1975-76 Angolan civil war, UNITA has conducted guerrilla warfare against the central government. It continues to receive external assistance from Middle Eastern and European countries and from South Africa. UNITA's major military success has been to keep the important international Benguela railway virtually closed.

On balance, we view the hostilities between the MPLA and UNITA as a stalemate. The MPLA and their Cuban military supporters have shown themselves unable to diminish the military activities of UNITA. On the other hand, UNITA is unable to expand its operational areas beyond its areas of tribal support or consolidate control in its traditional areas of activities. Therefore, we see as alternatives either a prolonged conflict with attendant costs in human and material resources, with a potential for greater outside intervention and with serious consequences for regional stability and development, or a political settlement between the MPLA and UNITA.

The Economy. The severely depressed state of Angola's economy is a matter of critical concern to the MPLA. Today, only the petroleum sector of the economy is generating income at anywhere near preindependence levels; all other sectors are either stagnant or operate at a fraction of their prewar levels. Angola was formerly the world's fourth largest coffee producer and sixth largest diamond producer. Current activity in these sectors is perhaps one-fourth or one-third of previous levels. Once nearly self-sufficient in food production, Angola now imports a major portion of its requirements.

As a result of the South African attacks, fighting between the MPLA and UNITA, and recent droughts, international agencies have estimated that be-

tween 300,000 and perhaps as many as 800,000 persons in the central area of Angola are facing famine or severe food supply problems. The exodus in 1974 and 1975 of more than 300,000 Portuguese who supplied managerial and technical expertise left the economy crippled and dependent on technical expertise, mostly from Cuba, to keep government ministries and the economy operating at even a minimum level. The effective closure of the Benguela railway by UNITA has meant the loss of perhaps \$100 million annually in income from transit of Zairian and Zambian goods.

Despite the general economic malaise, oil production at current high world market prices has enabled Angola to maintain a small overall surplus in its balance of payments. It is unlikely that meaningful economic development, especially outside the petroleum sector, will take place until political stability has been attained.

Soviet Pressure. Since Neto's death available evidence points to a resurgence of Soviet attempts to exert influence in Angola. The Soviets may be more involved in directing and advising military operations. There is a more strident pro-Moscow tone in official statements and in the media, and the Angolans are under pressure to funnel lucrative contracts to Soviet or Eastern bloc suppliers rather than to Western corporations. The Angolans have resisted Soviet attempts to gain military bases, although it appears the Soviets do have limited use of naval maintenance facilities in Luanda, where Soviet naval ships occasionally call.

Pragmatism vs. Ideology. Historically, the MPLA has not been a monolithic party. This is true today. Many MPLA members are deeply concerned over Angola's severe economic problems and lack of development and are generally discontented with the scanty economic assistance provided by the Soviets and their friends.

MPLA policy has been undergoing intense review since Neto's death, and this likely will continue at least until the December 1980 party congress of the MPLA. In practice, the MPLA has maintained the essence of the foreign policies established by Neto—constructive participation in the Namibia negotiations and pursuit of better relations with the West and with Angola's neighbors. If these policies are to be maintained and pragmatic policies followed in other areas, they must be seen as producing results for Angola.

NPT Review Conference Held in Geneva

Elements within the MPLA point out that after 3 years of negotiations the West is unable or unwilling to "deliver" the South Africans on the Namibia issue and maintain that an enlarged armed struggle is the only way to realize an independent Namibia. They also point out that the "opening to the West" has produced neither diplomatic relations with the United States nor substantial Western economic assistance.

A Namibia settlement, problematic as it may be, would have an important impact on the political and economic scene in Angola. It would:

- Remove the threat of South African military attacks from Namibia and enable the Angolans to reduce the Cuban military presence, which they have stated publicly they would do;
- Sever, in the MPLA view, assistance to UNITA from South Africa;
- Allow the MPLA to divert human resources from the military to economic development and improve the climate for investment;
- Reduce Soviet leverage; and
- Validate the pursuit of pragmatic policies.

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

The second international conference to review the implementation of the provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was held in Geneva August 11-September 7, 1980. The U.S. delegation was headed by Ralph Earle II, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). Following are Ambassador Earle's statements before the conference on August 12 and September 7.

AUG. 12, 1980¹

The President of the United States has asked me to read the following message from him to this conference.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons—which has now been in force for more than a decade—remains indispensable to the efforts of the nations represented at this conference to achieve a safer, saner, and more secure world. The acquisition of nuclear explosives by additional states would decrease the security of the states acquiring them, decrease the stability of the regions in which they are located, and increase the risk of nuclear conflict. In reviewing the operation of this treaty, we must not lose sight of its importance in helping to avert such dangers.

The United States recognizes that proliferation is only one aspect of the problem of controlling nuclear weapons. We must also vigorously pursue our efforts to curb the nuclear arms race. This goal—already difficult to achieve—could be rendered unattainable if the number of states with nuclear weapons were to increase. The United States also recognizes the contribution that nuclear power can make to meeting energy needs. But this contribution requires confidence that international nuclear cooperation will not be misused for military purposes.

For all these reasons, it is important that the Non-Proliferation Treaty be preserved and encouraged. The United States will give its fullest support to the fulfillment of this treaty and to the achievement of its objectives, which are so essential to a stable world order.

That concludes the President's message. I have asked that it be published and circulated as an official document of this conference.

Articles I, II, and III

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has the widest adherence of any arms control treaty in history. It now has 114

parties, of which 31 joined it since the beginning of 1975 and 16 since the close of the first review conference.² They include all members of NATO and the European Communities except France, all members of the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, 33 African states, 20 Latin American states, and 23 states in Asia and the Middle East.

Together with France—which has made clear that it will act as if it were a party to the treaty—these parties constitute a nonproliferation regime that represents:

- An aggregate population of over 2 billion;
- An aggregate gross national product of \$7.7 trillion;
- 98% of the world's installed nuclear force capacity;
- 95% of nuclear power capacity under construction;
- All of the world's exporters of nuclear power reactors and all major exporters of key components and materials therefore;
- All of the world's exporters of enriched uranium;
- All of the world's exporters of heavy water;
- 94% of all foreign aid donations; and
- 87% of the funding of international financial institutions.

These figures are persuasive testimony to the significance of the participants in this regime. And these figures also demonstrate that—for nonparties—the road to developing a nuclear power program in the foreseeable future must be traveled in cooperation with one or more of the participants in this regime.

The primary purpose of this regime is, of course, to insure that international security and nuclear arms control are not threatened by an increase in the number of nuclear weapon states. In this respect, we should celebrate the fact that—notwithstanding their enormous peaceful nuclear capacity—the parties to the treaty have lived up to their undertakings to avert this shared danger.

But we must not be complacent. There are developments, in a very small number of countries that have not joined this regime, that are of serious

concern to those who share our common objectives. In each case, these nonparties have sought to avoid commitments—of the type contained in articles II and III of the NPT—not to acquire nuclear explosive devices and to accept international safeguards on all their peaceful nuclear activities. And several of them have built or are building unsafeguarded facilities of types capable of yielding weapons-usable material. In the view of the United States, it should be a prime objective of this conference to deal with this increasingly urgent problem.

As participants at this conference are well aware, non-nuclear-weapon states party to the NPT are already required by the treaty to accept full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on all their peaceful nuclear activities. Nonparties are not, and, consequently, they have been able to obtain nuclear cooperation while retaining unsafeguarded facilities. The 1975 review conference sought to rectify this discrimination against NPT parties—and to reduce the serious proliferation risks inherent in it—by urging that: “. . . in all achievable ways, common export requirements relating to safeguards be strengthened, in particular by extending the application of safeguards to all peaceful nuclear activities in importing states not party to the Treaty.”

Since 1975 there has been movement toward that objective by a number of states. But the objective will not be realized until truly concerted action is taken. The United States, therefore, strongly recommends that this conference promote the objective of full-scope IAEA safeguards in a way that can most realistically be expected to have the desired effect—by calling on members of the nonproliferation regime to enter into new nuclear supply commitments only with those states that undertake to accept IAEA safeguards on all their peaceful nuclear activities.

At the same time, we expect this conference to review in depth the progress that has been made in carrying out the other recommendations of the 1975 review conference with respect to safeguards and physical protection and to make recommendations with respect to the further improvement of safeguards implementation. On this subject, I am gratified to be able to report two noteworthy recent developments:

First, the unanimous approval by the U.S. Senate last month of the

treaty implementing the U.S. offer to permit the IAEA to apply its safeguards to civil facilities within the United States. This demonstrates that we are not asking others to accept safeguards that we are unwilling to accept for ourselves.

Second, the opening for signature of the convention on the physical protection of nuclear material. The United States signed this convention on March 3, 1980 and is proceeding with the steps necessary to ratify it. We believe this conference should encourage the widest possible adherence to this convention.

Articles VI and VII

An objective of equal importance to preventing the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons is that of curbing the nuclear arms race. The United States is acutely aware of its undertaking under article VI of the treaty “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.”

Having spent more than 6 years as an active participant in the SALT negotiations, I am personally aware of the vast amount of determination and effort that went into achieving the SALT II agreements. Since the 1975 review conference, these negotiations were successfully completed and the agreements signed by the heads of state of the United States and the Soviet Union. We regard SALT II as a major step in the ongoing process contemplated by article VI and believe that SALT II agreements themselves will make an important contribution to international security and stability. It has not been feasible in recent months to complete ratification of agreement. But we are determined to do so and to refrain from actions inconsistent with that objective. Further, we are determined to resume efforts to achieve more substantial reductions and further qualitative limitations in the period ahead.

We have also made marked progress since 1975 toward achieving a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. Trilateral negotiations began in 1977. As demonstrated in their recent detailed joint progress report that will be made available to this conference, the negotiating parties have overcome many difficult hurdles—hurdles that at our last review conference appeared to some as insurmountable barriers to agreement. We recognize the importance of the comprehensive test ban (CTB),

particularly to the subject matter of this conference, and we will continue our efforts to conclude a comprehensive test ban at the earliest possible date.

Since 1975 we have also taken an important further step in support of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America—the treaty of Tlatelolco. Earlier, we ratified protocol II of that treaty—under which we undertook to respect the Latin American nuclear-weapons-free zone, not to contribute to its violation, and not to use or threaten to use force against the Latin American parties adhering to that treaty. In 1977 President Carter signed additional protocol I to that treaty, under which U.S. territories within the zone will become subject to the treaty's regime. This protocol has been submitted to the U.S. Senate for its advice and consent, and we are hopeful that the Senate will be able to complete action on it in the near future.

At the U.N. Special Session on Disarmament in 1978, we took another significant step in response to the call by a number of NPT parties at the 1975 review conference for negative security assurances. We announced the following declaration by the President of the United States, which he has instructed me to reaffirm at this conference.

The United States will not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT or any comparable internationally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear explosive devices, except in the case of an attack on the United States, its territories or armed forces, or its allies by such a state allied to a nuclear-weapon state or associated with a nuclear-weapon state in carrying out or sustaining the attack.

This U.S. formulation—which gives special recognition to adherence to the NPT—was designed to benefit those countries that are the most appropriate recipients of such assurances.

We have also been striving to achieve mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe. We have offered to negotiate mutual limitations on long-range theater nuclear force systems in the region.

We believe that all of these arms control achievements should be recognized and supported for what they are—important steps forward in what is an arduous, ongoing process. My government wishes that more rapid and extensive progress would have been possible by now, and I am sure that no one here will disagree. But it is essential to keep in mind that we are dealing here not with abstractions but with ac-

tual military capabilities that are acquired in support of what are perceived as vital national security interests. Consequently, the task of constraining this process—of limiting and reducing arms—cannot be treated as an abstract matter, divorced from strategic and political realities. Diverse military capabilities must be carefully balanced; verification measures must be devised to promote confidence in compliance. Every step of the way, the process is fraught with technical complexities and political sensitivities of an unprecedented nature.

But I can pledge today that the United States will not be deterred or discouraged by these difficulties. While there may be setbacks and delays along the way, we will persevere in the effort to achieve a more secure and peaceful world. We are determined to do so not only because we are formally committed to this endeavor under article VII of the NPT—although we attach great importance to that obligation—we are determined to do so because balanced and verifiable arms control can make a major contribution to the security of the United States and of the entire world.

Finally, we are determined to pursue this objective because there is no rational alternative. As President Carter stated on June 18, 1979, on the occasion of the signing of the SALT II Treaty in Vienna: "If we cannot control the power to destroy, we can neither guide our own fate nor preserve our own future."

Article IV

A third main goal of the NPT is to facilitate the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The United States takes very seriously its undertaking in article IV of the treaty.

Nuclear Power Programs. Since the beginning of 1975, the United States has licensed for export to NPT parties, nuclear power reactors representing a total of 11,000 megawatts of electric generating capacity. In the same period, we have licensed for export to such parties over 9 million kilograms of enriched uranium, having an energy value equivalent to 3 billion barrels of oil. To generate the electric power used to produce this amount of enriched uranium, we have used the equivalent of some 33 million tons of U.S. coal.

During that period we have not denied a single license for the export of

power reactor fuel to an NPT party. And most such licenses in the past year were issued within 1 month after receiving the application.

To help NPT parties finance these exports, we have furnished over \$3.5 billion of financial assistance to such parties through the Export-Import Bank. In 1978 we reaffirmed our willingness to provide such financial assistance for appropriate nuclear projects in countries that meet our nonproliferation requirements, with preference for NPT parties.

Research and Technology Sharing. Turning to the record on nuclear research, technology sharing, and other nuclear cooperation, we find that:

- All recipients of U.S. research reactors exported in the past 5 years are NPT parties;
- The 17 principal nuclear research and development agreements entered into by the U.S. Department of Energy since 1970 are all with members of the nonproliferation regime, as are all U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission agreements for research in nuclear safety;
- Since the beginning of 1975, over 4,000 persons from 51 NPT countries—representing all regions of the world—have participated in peaceful nuclear research programs of the U.S. Department of Energy or its contractors; and
- In the same period, we have provided over 18½ million separative work units of uranium enrichment services to NPT parties and exported to NPT parties over \$80 million worth of isotopes, heavy water, and other nuclear-related materials.

We are in the forefront of all nuclear suppliers in the amount of information we have published on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Since the beginning of 1975 we have contributed over 100,000 abstracts and nearly 40,000 technical reports to the IAEA's international nuclear information service. In the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation, we shared our most advanced ideas and research results on reactor improvement and better fuel utilization. And we are making every effort to make available to all, the results of our research on nuclear safety, bearing in mind the significance of Three Mile Island.

Technical Assistance to Developing Countries. We have significantly increased our funding and sup-

port for technical assistance to developing countries through the IAEA. Since the beginning of 1975, our voluntary cash contributions to the IAEA's technical assistance program have totaled nearly \$11 million. We have also provided over \$2 million in the form of training courses. In addition, in keeping with the recommendations of the 1975 review conference, we have earmarked for NPT parties over \$2 million of gifts in kind and gifts of special nuclear material totaling \$300,000.

At the U.N. Special Session on Disarmament, the United States pledged that it would provide increased technical assistance for NPT parties and would provide uranium for use in research reactor fuel and related fuel cycle services. I am pleased to inform the conference that in 1980 the United States increased support of technical assistance provided through the IAEA by 14% over 1979. Included in this support is over \$1 million of extra budgetary assistance to 19 NPT countries in the field of nuclear power plant safety, medical and agricultural applications of nuclear science, and in uranium exploration.

In connection with our program to develop fuel substitutes for the highly enriched uranium used in some research and test reactors, the United States has made specific offers to provide nearly \$800,000 worth of uranium for use in research reactor fuels to nine NPT countries which might have an interest in collaborating with the United States on research designed to reduce enrichment levels. And more recently, in connection with this same program, the United States has indicated that it is willing to provide additional low enriched uranium without cost to seven NPT countries.

NPT Preferences. In many ways we have reflected the special importance we attach to NPT adherence in decisions upon nuclear cooperation.

- Since 1975, all new U.S. agreements for cooperation have been with NPT parties and all U.S. materials supplied through the IAEA have gone to NPT parties. (In the past year, we have agreed to initiate new cooperation through bilateral agreements with Morocco and Peru and with Malaysia through the IAEA.)

- We recently passed legislation removing the ceilings on low enriched uranium transfers under agreements for cooperation with NPT parties, thereby allowing the supply of additional fuel for power reactor programs

to such states without amending such agreements.

- Our laws governing participation in international financing institutions instruct the U.S. representatives to consider, in carrying out their duties, whether the recipient country is a party to the NPT.

- We have recently made available to NPT parties that meet our nonproliferation requirements the benefit of multiple reload licensing—under which a single export license covers up to five reloads of reactor fuel over time periods of up to 10 years.

- We have also decided to eliminate the need for individual licensing of exports of components for U.S. supplied reactors in a number of NPT countries and streamlined the licensing procedures for export to NPT parties of dual use items, such as computers.

- We are initiating a program to assist several NPT parties in the manpower training needed for their establishment of a viable nuclear power program.

We recognize that there are some problems still requiring resolution and that new issues may arise as the nuclear industry evolves. Clearly many

countries believe that greater confidence and predictability needs to be restored to the field of nuclear trade. But I believe that the facts I have cited underscore the strong continued commitment that the United States has to civil nuclear cooperation and to the participants in the NPT in particular.

Conclusion

I have tried in my statement to point out the many ways in which the United States has been implementing the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to provide our thinking on how well the treaty has operated during its first decade, and especially since the last review conference.

We recognize, of course, that each of us will have somewhat differing assessments of how successfully the treaty's various provisions are being carried out and how rapidly its goals are being realized. This is only natural. With a membership of well over 100 nations, the community of NPT parties cannot possibly reflect anything like an identity of national perspectives on such critical matters as national security and energy needs. We fully expect our deliberations during the next several weeks to reveal this diversity of

opinion, and we look forward to a full and animated exchange of views.

At the same time, we should not lose sight of the very strong tie that binds us together as parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Each of the parties to the NPT, in reaching a decision to join the treaty, made its own careful calculation of national self-interest. Each came to the conclusion that its national security interests, as well as its civil nuclear energy goals, were better served by membership in the NPT regime than by avoidance of its obligations—and that those national objectives could be severely jeopardized by the acquisition of nuclear explosives by additional states. These conclusions are more valid today than ever.

We continue, individually and collectively, to have a vital stake in the preservation and strengthening of the NPT regime. Consequently, we all have a common interest in a successful review conference—one that underlines the continuing value of the treaty, that reviews its 10-year record in an objective and balanced way, and that outlines a series of realistic recommendations for strengthening its future operation. Each delegation, I am sure, has its own thoughts on what is needed to strengthen the NPT. But what we need to do in the weeks ahead is to make every effort to forge a common approach, including a practical series of effective recommendations that can and will command the broad support of the parties.

The impact of the first review conference is instructive in this regard. When one looks systematically and fairly at the record of the last 5 years in implementing the consensus recommendations of that conference, I believe the inescapable conclusion is that those recommendations were taken seriously as a program of action and were followed conscientiously. As a result, considerable progress has, indeed, been made. And I would submit that the success of those recommendations in stimulating concrete actions can be attributed in no small degree to the fact that the program of action was realistic and based on consensus.

I have no illusion that the work ahead of us will be easy. But we are confident that, if we all approach our task in a constructive and cooperative spirit and if we keep in mind our strongly shared and overriding interest in an effective NPT regime, we will be able to achieve the outcome I know we

U.S., Canada Agree on Power Plant Monitoring

JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT,
SEPT. 23, 1980¹

The United States and Canada have agreed on a cooperative monitoring arrangement for the Poplar River. The arrangement was developed in response to U.S. concerns about possible environmental effects in Montana from the Saskatchewan Power Corporation power plant at Coronach, Saskatchewan.

The arrangement was made public on September 23, 1980, by Montana Lieutenant Governor Ted Schwinden and Saskatchewan Environment Minister Ted Bowerman at a ceremony in Coronach.

The United States and Canadian Federal Governments developed the arrangement in close consultation with the governments of the State of Montana and the Province of Saskatchewan. It provides for the exchange of data collected from the monitoring programs in both countries in the Poplar River area at or near the international bound-

ary. It will also insure that this information is made available in both countries and that any definitive changes in water quality, water quantity, and air quality are detected and reported. Implementation of the arrangement will be carried out by a newly established Poplar River Monitoring Committee.

The arrangement results from recent efforts by both countries to cooperate in assuring that there is no significant environmental impact on the United States from the Saskatchewan Power Corporation project as it goes into operation. The monitoring arrangement will enable both governments to detect at an early stage any unforeseen effects should they occur. It will also help to insure that the mitigation measures being required by the Saskatchewan and Canadian Federal Governments are providing adequate protection.

¹Press release 268. ■

U.S. Economic Relations With Japan

by Harry Kopp

*Statement before the Subcommittees on Asian and Pacific Affairs and International Economic Policy and Trade of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on September 18, 1980.*¹

Thank you for the opportunity to review with this committee the important matter of our economic relations with Japan, including the automobile problem.

Japan is the most important trading partner of the United States, after Canada. Our bilateral trade last year exceeded \$40 billion. While we compete worldwide for markets in many major industrial sectors, we share a common commitment to the maintenance of a trading system in which all may compete fairly and openly. As allies, we have joined together in imposing economic sanctions on the Soviet Union and Iran. Moreover, we cooperate closely in areas of mutual economic concern, such as energy and aid to developing countries.

proper balance could be struck, and on how far the recommendations should go. As did most delegations, the United States demonstrated its willingness to negotiate on the text of a final document and made every effort to arrive at mutually acceptable wording. We regret, however, that a few took extreme positions insisting on an "all-or-nothing approach" which prevented consensus. I think it is obvious that this type of intransigence does not help to advance our common objectives nor does it promote realistic arms control.

But there was nothing in the mandate of the conference that required production of a negotiated document, desirable as that might have been. The actual mandate—which was the review by the parties and consideration of ways in which the treaty's implementation could be improved—was fulfilled in a manner that we consider constructive.

¹Text from ACDA arms control report.

²For documentation on the first review conference held in Geneva May 5–30, 1975, see BULLETINS of June 30, 1975, p. 921, and Aug. 4, 1975, p. 193.

³Text from ACDA arms control bulletin 80–8 of Sept. 8, 1980. ■

all seek. We will be able to say that the Non-Proliferation Treaty examined at the second review conference enjoys the continuing support of its parties, is capable of attracting even wider adherence, and can be relied upon in the future as a mainstay of global efforts to reduce the terrible threat of nuclear war.

SEPT. 7, 1980³

This conference has fulfilled its purpose of providing the parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty an extended opportunity to review together the operation of the treaty and progress toward achieving its objectives. We have all devoted the past 4 weeks to an intensive analysis and exchange of views on these matters.

In this review, there was virtually no criticism of the treaty itself or of its objectives. The parties continue their strong dedication to both and share a common desire to convince states that have not yet joined it to do so. They recognized the value of international safeguards and the importance of achieving full scope safeguards coverage in non-nuclear-weapon states not party to the treaty.

There were, of course, serious concerns expressed at this conference. The first was a strong desire for greater and faster progress toward fulfilling the objectives of article VI, relating to nuclear arms control and disarmament. This is a concern that is broader than the NPT and which is the focus of discussion in many other important fora. One could hardly have expected to settle it here. But the conference did provide useful impetus to the ratification of SALT II, the initiation of SALT III, and completion of a comprehensive test ban treaty.

The other principal concern was never the state of peaceful nuclear cooperation and special attention to the needs of developing countries. On these subjects the conference provided a much needed opportunity to reduce misunderstandings and recommend improvements. Progress was made in this area which should not be ignored simply because it was not reduced to the form of an agreed conference document.

One thing we did not achieve in this period was the completion of a single document that reflected the important discussion and progress I have just described. There were difficulties in reconciling differences over how the various views should be reflected, on how a

Japan's External Balance

There is a common misconception about Japan—a persistent view of Japan as a mercantilist supereconomy driven by a relentless quest for export markets around the world while being extremely reluctant to import. Economic trends during the last 2 years belie this perception. Japan's trade surplus, nearly \$25 billion only 2 years ago, has been replaced by a trade deficit this year projected at \$3.5 billion. Likewise, Japan's current account, in surplus by almost \$17 billion in 1978, has deteriorated markedly. It is projected to be in deficit \$16.5 billion by the end of the year.

Contributing to this turnabout, first and most obviously, is Japan's nearly complete dependence upon foreign oil for its domestic energy needs. Japan depends on foreign suppliers for 90% of its primary energy requirements. Japan's oil import costs have rapidly risen from \$23 billion in 1977 to a projected \$63 billion this year. In response, the Japanese Government has established long-term energy security as the highest national priority and has proposed a program to diversify energy sources.

Other factors are of nearly equal importance. Sluggish growth in the world economy has reduced foreign demand for Japanese goods. The appreciation of the yen vis-a-vis the dollar, almost 15% during the last 18 months, makes Japanese exports more expensive. Finally, the Japanese Government has instituted measures to sustain the country's economic performance by stimulating domestic demand rather than encouraging exports, which had been a key source of Japanese economic growth during the last decade. This new policy orientation should result in more consumption by Japanese consumers of both foreign and domestic products.

Bilateral Trade

In our economic relations with Japan, trade is the most volatile element. Frictions sometimes overshadow the fundamental interests our countries share as the world's two largest and most advanced free-market economies. Nevertheless, we have been able for the most part to contain and resolve trade disputes in the context of our common interests.

Perhaps it would be useful to mention some areas of dispute in the recent past where satisfactory solutions have been achieved—admittedly, in most cases, only with great effort and with the expenditure of some political capital. Applied Japanese tariffs on industrial goods were cut in the multilateral trade negotiations (MTN) by 47%, to a final average of 4.0%. (By contrast, U.S. tariffs were cut by 32%, to a final average of 4.6%.) Japanese tariffs on color film, computers, and computer peripherals were cut by more than the average; the tariff on automobiles was eliminated, and negotiations after the MTN eliminated the worst of the barriers that Japanese standards posed to auto imports. In agriculture, Japan with great reluctance has expanded its imports of U.S. citrus products and high-quality beef and has resolved a dispute of nearly a decade's standing on the treatment of oranges with fungicides needed to retard spoilage during shipment. We have recently reached an understanding on Japanese surplus rice disposal that should prevent disruption in traditional U.S. markets. Japan accepted U.S. quotas on imports of Japanese color TVs and specialty steels (both now terminated) and tariff increases on CB [citizen band] radios. The Japanese Government and Japanese steel companies cooperated fully with the U.S. Government in the introduction and administration of the trigger-price mechanism for steel.

The bilateral trade deficit with Japan remains a difficult and persistent source of tension. The deficit this year is projected at close to \$10 billion, not markedly different from last year's level; we have improved our trade balance with Japan by \$3 billion since 1978. It is interesting to note, however, that we are currently running a trade surplus with the European Community which is similar in size to our deficit with Japan. This illustrates the danger of over-emphasizing the bilateral perspective in analyzing our trade performance. The right approach, I think, is to look at U.S. trade in a global context and to deal with specific trade barriers and sectoral problems in ways which will expand trade, enhance our competitive strengths, and contribute to efficient use of scarce resources.

Still, it is fair to question why this large trade deficit persists. Many Japanese contend that U.S. companies do not make genuine efforts to penetrate the local market. In their eyes, potential U.S. exporters appear unwilling to in-

vest the time, effort, energy, or funds to establish a profitable and permanent presence in the Japanese market. This is probably true to some extent. However, American exporters of some important and potentially very competitive products still experience difficulties in achieving fair market access in Japan. They have complained of being frustrated by Japan's still elaborate system of nontariff barriers and restrictive measures: intricate customs procedures, apparently arbitrary product-approval procedures, restrictive government-procurement practices, rumored "administrative guidance," and the complex internal distribution system.

The U.S. Government has sought to expand American exports by negotiating with the Japanese to reduce or eliminate nontariff and tariff barriers and to encourage U.S. manufacturers to sell competitive products to Japan. Substantial progress toward realizing these goals has been achieved during the last few years. More needs to be done.

In some areas where the U.S. competitive position is strong—most notably, in telecommunications equipment—Japan maintains unreasonable barriers to imports as a matter of national policy. Such policies must end. I will not here discuss the details of our negotiations with Japan about the procurement policies of the Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation, the public corporation which is the only important buyer of telecommunications equipment in Japan. Powerful Japanese political interests and large amounts of potential trade are involved, and no one is surprised that the talks are difficult. I hope Japan will understand the benefits to Japanese society of opening this sector to international competition; I am certain that Japan does understand the consequences of failure to do so—denial to Japanese companies of the opportunity to bid on U.S. Government procurement covered by the government procurement code negotiated in the Tokyo Round.

Similarly, the practices of another Japanese Government corporation—the Japan Tobacco and Salt Monopoly—that prevent fair market access for our manufactured tobacco products are the subject of hard negotiations.

If we are to retain domestic political support for an open trading system, we must show American firms and workers that we have a fair chance to export products in which we are competitive.

Automobile Trade

We have seen over the last 20 months in our domestic automobile market both a cyclical downturn in overall demand and an unprecedented shift in consumer preference from larger to smaller cars. Japanese imports of the suddenly more popular, fuel-efficient cars in which they specialize have grown mainly at the expense of the larger models produced by domestic manufacturers. Last month Japanese autos captured 22.5% of our auto sales, up sharply from the 16%–17% levels of the summer of 1979 but down slightly from July's record of 23.8%. Although sales by U.S. automakers are now at the lowest rate in nearly two decades, industry analysts believe that sales will pick up sharply with the introduction of new fuel-efficient model lines next month by Ford and Chrysler and in the spring by GM.

It is not self-evident that import restrictions would provide significant stimulus to sales or production of additional U.S.-built cars. As you know, the U.S. International Trade Commission is conducting an intensive investigation to determine whether increased imports are a substantial cause or threat of serious injury to the U.S. industry. We await its conclusions in November.

In a related sector, the U.S. decision to change the customs classification applied to certain light trucks, imported almost solely from Japan, has the effect of increasing the tariff on these trucks from 4% to 25%. Before the decision took effect August 21, imports of these trucks from Japan were running at an annual rate of about \$2 billion. Japan is raising its objections to the decision in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and we will respond to Japan in that context.

Cooperative Elements

Although the fascination lies always with the problems and conflicts of our economic relations with Japan, we must not lose sight of the cooperative elements of that relationship and of the vast potential for expanding our cooperation.

Together, Japan and the United States are seeking complementary and mutually beneficial relationships with developing countries in the Asian-Pacific area which will enhance the security and stability of the region. Last year, Japanese official development assistance surpassed ours on a per capita basis for the first time. Japanese foreign aid is in-

World Economic Crisis in the 1980s? An American Viewpoint

by Richard N. Cooper

Address before the Alpbach European Forum in Alpbach, Austria, on September 1, 1980. Mr. Cooper is Under Secretary for Economic Affairs.

My assignment is to give an American perspective on the world economy in the 1980s. I will begin with two caveats.

First, it is always difficult to foresee a decade ahead. One thing we can be sure of: Any current forecast will be wrong, partly because new and unforeseen developments intervene, and even more because our collective behavior will be influenced by the forecast and our reactions to unwanted outcomes will negate the forecast. Second, the United States is an extremely diverse, pluralistic society, so there is no such thing as a single American view. Rather, we have a cacophony of views, even—some foreigners observe critically—from government officials. What I offer is, therefore, one American view, although I know it is shared by many other Americans.

I will answer the question in the title in the affirmative: I do see economic crisis in the 1980s unless we act decisively to avert it. I see economic events in the 1980s driven largely by two factors—rapid growth of world population and inadequate supplies of oil at existing prices. Many other developments flow from these two factors. Rapid urbanization, congestion, famine, deforestation, severe competition for water, large-scale migration, urgent calls for more foreign aid—all these and more will flow from vastly increased population, unless we do something about it. Inflation, eco-

trade frictions from having repercussions on other aspects of U.S.-Japanese relations. I am convinced that Japan understands and is responding to the efforts of this Administration, of this Congress, and of many private parties to explain U.S. concerns and political realities and to preserve and strengthen the economic ties that link our two great industrial democracies across the Pacific.

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

omic stagnation, higher unemployment, imbalances in international payments, and instability in exchange rates—all these and more will flow from the shortage of oil, again, unless we do something about it. I will focus my remarks first on population growth and then on energy.

Population Growth

On current projections, as reported in a recent U.S. Government study, *The Global 2000 Report*, world population in 1990 will be 5.3 billion, nearly 1 billion in excess of what it is now, reflecting a growth equivalent to nearly half the total world population when I was born. Even at that time, some political leaders were complaining of congestion and calling for more *lebensraum*. This increase, 90% of which will occur in developing countries, is truly staggering. We may be tempted to respond: out of sight, out of mind. And if the developing countries have their way with a new world information order, they may contribute to that temptation, as when, due to concealment, we failed to appreciate the full gravity of the Ethiopian famine several years ago until it was too late to save thousands of people. But, more likely, this vast population growth will impinge on us in a variety of ways—some direct, some indirect, none fully predictable.

First of all, there will be population pressure against agricultural land. This will lead to domestic and international conflict such as caused the Central American football war more than a decade ago. This pressure against land will also lead to deforestation—forests are even today being eliminated annually at the rate of 18–20 million hectares, roughly one-third the size of France—which, in turn, will lead to floods, loss of soil, reduced rainfall, and loss of biological species. (An estimated 500,000–1,000,000 species will be driven to extinction by 2000, with possibly important loss of genetic material. The losses will be predominantly in the wet tropics.)

Second, increased population growth will lead to greater urbanization and human congestion, which, in turn, will lead to political unrest, open conflict, greater terrorism, and possibly localized anarchy within many countries. (By the year 2000, 10 cities in developing coun-

creasingly extended, untied, to countries where Japan and the United States have shared security interests—to Turkey, to Pakistan, to Thailand. This year, Japan began an untied concessional aid program to assist the modernization of China, and thus far—would you believe it?—a majority of the contracts under that aid program have been won by non-Japanese firms. Japan has also assumed heavy financial burdens for the care of refugees from Indochina.

Even more important, and holding enormous promise for the future, is U.S.-Japanese cooperation in energy. The United States and Japan are working together in international planning for conservation and resource sharing and in research and development of the alternative energies that one day will lessen our dependence on uncertain sources of overseas oil. For example, the Japanese Government is contributing \$350 million toward the development of a coal liquefaction plant in West Virginia. This project, one of the first under the synfuels program, will help develop a new technology that could increase U.S. and Japanese energy security and stimulate U.S. exports of the coal and coal-processing equipment that we have in abundance.

I would like to conclude by making some general points about the U.S.-Japanese trade relationship.

Through the mid-1960s, Japan followed a relatively protectionist course to spur development of major industrial sectors—autos, steel, heavy machinery. Starting with the Kennedy Round and continuing through the Tokyo Round, and in various bilateral agreements, Japan, in hard negotiations, has notably reduced its official trade barriers. We expect Japan to continue this course.

But even if all official trade barriers were removed, there would remain formidable impediments to U.S. access to the Japanese market. There are the structural barriers of the Japanese distribution system—complex, layered, and fragmented; costly to the Japanese consumer; and baffling to the non-Japanese, would-be exporter. There is the strong cultural bias of Japanese consumers for Japanese goods. And there is the question of the real competitiveness of American goods.

I cite these factors to emphasize that the U.S. trade deficit with Japan cannot be attributed solely, or perhaps principally, to Japan's commercial policy. I believe the Japanese Government is sincere in its efforts to resolve trade issues with the United States and to prevent

tries are expected to exceed 15 million people, with Mexico City leading the way at 30 million on current projections.)

Third, increased population will lead to vast increases in demand for food and paid employment to sustain life. On current projections, there will have to be over 300 million more jobs by 1990—three times the current U.S. labor force—and 750 million more jobs by the year 2000. Food imports by developing countries will rise sharply and so must their exports of manufactured goods in order to pay for food and energy. There will also be periodic famine and increased calls—some plaintive, some threatening—for much greater economic assistance, especially to pay for food. Demand for oil by developing countries will rise to fuel growing industry, to substitute for the declining availability of wood, and to intensify agricultural production, especially through increased use of fertilizers.

Finally, increased population will lead to increased international migration, partly as political refugees escaping from anarchy or terrorism or repressive governmental reaction to both of those, partly as economic refugees seeking to better conditions of life, just as Europeans moved to America in the last century. There will also be international appeals, both for financial assistance to refugees and for provision of places for permanent settlement. (There are already several million international refugees today.)

Can anything be done about population growth, or should we simply turn a deaf ear and put up the barricades?

Turning a deaf ear is not possible because of humane sentiments within our own societies. Fortunately, there is something we can do, both about population growth and about food production. The rate of population growth has been falling slowly but surely in developing countries. This decline in fertility is attributable, in part, to active family planning programs in many countries. Much more can be done. Family planning accounts at present for only 2% of foreign economic assistance. These sums could be effectively doubled and could be increased further during the course of the decade.

With actions that can be taken between now and the end of the century, it is estimated that world population could be reduced from a projected 6.3 billion people to 5.9 billion people. We will be faced with substantial population growth, but it will be consequentially

reduced. Moreover, the impact cumulates over time. Because of the momentum built into population growth, it takes several generations for stable conditions to be established throughout the population, even after the birth rate has been reduced to a level that permits long-run stability. Thus, the difference between 6.3 billion and 5.9 billion in the year 2000 generates a difference of over 2 billion people by the year 2100, assuming that the underlying conditions for population stability (i.e., each woman has only two children on average) has been established by the year 2000.

Beyond extension of existing programs and dissemination of existing techniques, we can productively spend more money on fertility research, especially in the area of temporary and reversible sterilization.

It is important to note that population control is not these days an issue of North-South contention. Increasingly, developing countries recognize that population growth is a powerful drag on their economic development. Government leaders from many countries—Bangladesh, Indonesia, Kenya, Morocco, to name only a few—have made strong statements supporting the need for population control. And other governments, where the issue is still somewhat sensitive, have nonetheless mounted effective family planning programs. Moreover, strongly supportive language can be found in numerous international resolutions, most recently from the U.N. Conference on Women at Copenhagen.

Even with larger efforts on this front, population growth will necessarily remain substantial. We, therefore, also need to support programs to increase food production. Projections in *The Global 2000 Report* suggest that grain imports by food-importing developing countries will grow from a level of 45 million tons in 1973-75 to 90 million tons by the year 2000 and that the real price of food will rise 45%-90% during this period. This last figure, of course, has a direct bearing on our own economies and our ability to contain inflation. Growth in food production will diminish pressure on food markets. The 1974 World Food Conference target of a 4% per annum increase in food production in developing countries was not achieved in the late 1970s. But it could be achieved during the 1980s. There is much more room for intensive production—some through small-scale programs involving information on new agricultural techniques, new seeds, and the use of fertilizers, combined with

modest amounts of agricultural credits; some through large-scale, often multinational projects entailing control and distribution of water, as in northern India and western Africa. Large water projects have the not incidental advantage of generating substantial amounts of hydroelectric power, thus helping to alleviate the world oil shortage. (Harnessing the water running off the southern slopes of the Himalayas alone is estimated to be capable of generating as much hydroelectric power as there is in all of North America.)

Finally, some of the remaining increased food imports will necessarily have to be on concessional terms. For a start, we should strive to meet the agreed World Food Council target of 10 million tons of grain a year in food aid, perhaps conditioning some of it on improvements in indigenous agricultural programs. But over time the target will undoubtedly have to be enlarged.

Oil Scarcity

On past trends, but allowing for price increases that took place in 1979, projections of demand for oil over the next decade suggest that by 1990 the industrialized countries will import about 27-28 million barrels a day to meet this demand. Oil supply to satisfy this demand, in contrast, is likely to amount to only 21 or 22 million barrels a day. These projections, of course, involve many assumptions, which we can be confident will not be realized. They show an emergent "shortage" of oil at existing prices. The one thing we can all be sure of is that we will not consume more oil than is available. The question is not whether these projections will become true, but rather what adjustments will take place to eliminate the projected shortfall between supply and demand.

The adjustment can take place through higher prices for oil, through lower economic growth in consuming nations, or through conscious action by governments and citizens to reduce their demand for imported oil—or, of course, some combination of all these. But, if we do not rely on the third possibility, we will find that inflation is aggravated in all our countries. For each 10% increase in oil prices, the general price level is raised an estimated 0.3% in the first year and 0.8% after 4 years in the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries. And in the absence of conscious action

to reduce demand for imported oil, economic growth will be slowed both directly—growth rates are reduced by 0.25% for every 10% price increase in oil—and indirectly, because of restrictive monetary and fiscal policies governments pursue in their struggle against inflation. Unemployment will grow and remain higher under these circumstances.

Indeed, economic policymakers in industrialized countries, taken together, face an acute dilemma. If our policy actions are keyed to maintaining moderate growth and employment, we will put pressure on the world oil market that will force us to trim back. But that, in turn, leads to what may become politically unacceptable levels of unemployment. Active energy policy is thus a necessary concomitant to growth policy. We need an active energy policy in order to preserve our economic growth and employment and to bring inflation under control.

In addition to these domestic impacts, failure to pursue an active energy policy will lead to imbalances in payments and to pressure on exchange markets as countries respond differentially to oil price increases. It will lead also to further borrowing by developing countries on top of an already large external debt, bringing ever nearer the possibility of a major default, which would have major reverberations throughout the international financial system.

These problems all arise if world shortage of oil emerges gradually and without surprise. In addition, we face the possibility of a sudden disruption in supplies, either as a conscious political act or as a result of social turmoil. A sudden disruption would lead to all of the problems mentioned above, but the impact could be even more severe. A large disruption could cripple our industrial activity and transport. I can think of no other area that represents such a profound threat to the cohesion of Western countries as friends and allies and to the very viability of our economic system.

Of course, we have not simply sat by and done nothing in the face of these possibilities and projections. To guard against disruption, we have created in the International Energy Agency (IEA) an emergency-sharing system whereby oil will be allocated among countries in accordance with an agreed formula for a disruption in oil supplies in excess of 7%. We have also committed ourselves to the IEA to hold oil stocks equivalent to at least 90 days of imports. These stock levels were reached in some coun-

tries for the first time, ironically, after the disruption of production in Iran and the competitive scramble for oil during 1979. The United States is building a strategic reserve of oil, and other countries also have government stock programs.

To address the longer term scarcity of oil, the IEA has established a system of national ceilings in the framework of an aggregate import target, along with a system for monitoring national performance in relation to the ceilings. The

IMF Quota Increase

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT,
OCT. 7, 1980¹

This act authorizes U.S. participation in a 50% increase in quotas in the International Monetary Fund. The quota increase is essential to enable the IMF to support a stable international monetary system and the open world economy so important to our own economy and the strength of the dollar.

Our participation is important not only because we have a deep self-interest in the health of the world economy but also because our quota gives us important financial rights and influence over decisions in the international monetary system. Many Americans do not realize that of the entire membership of the IMF, the United States is itself the second largest user of IMF resources. For example, we drew \$3 billion in German marks and Japanese yen from the IMF in November 1978—a critical part of our highly successful program to combat speculative attacks against the dollar and restore its strength and stability, which have remained ever since.

The appropriation for the quota increase passed the House by a large margin on September 25. The Senate was unable to complete action before it recessed last week. It is extremely important to our nation and the world that the Senate take this up as a priority item and complete legislative action when it reconvenes in November.

¹ Made on signing S.2271 into law. As enacted S.2271 is Public Law 96-389 approved Oct. 7, 1980 (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Oct. 13). ■

IEA targets, if achieved, would eliminate the projected oil imbalance over the next decade.

A substantial adjustment to emerging oil shortage has already taken place in all industrialized countries. The United States, in particular, now has in place an impressive and comprehensive program to conserve energy, to encourage the substitution of other fuels for oil, and to increase oil production in the United States. The traditional one-to-one relationship between growth of gross domestic product and growth of demand for energy has been substantially reduced over the last several years in all industrial countries. But some of the adjustment that has taken place has been induced by higher-than-necessary prices and some has been induced by lower-than-desirable growth.

I do not want to suggest that higher oil prices than those that prevailed before 1974 are not a necessary part of our oil conservation efforts. They clearly are, and our consumers should pay the full cost of oil. High oil prices are a necessary part of the solution to the emerging shortage, but ever higher prices are also part of the problem. Oil is not your normal run-of-the-mill commodity. Consumption of oil is sufficiently great, and demand for oil is sufficiently insensitive to price increases in the short run, that sharp price increases have substantial macroeconomic effects, raising inflation and retarding growth.

Rapid increases in oil prices place economic policymakers in each of our countries in an impossible dilemma. In our modern economies wage earners call for increased wages to cover price increases coming from any quarter. They do not distinguish between price increases originating outside the country—a loss of real income to the country as a whole—and those originating inside. Policymakers can either sanction the higher oil prices, along with the induced wage increases, thereby encouraging inflation. Or they can resist this pass-through of oil price increases, thereby generating economic recession.

Oil price increases also create exceptionally acute problems for developing countries. Scarce foreign exchange, crucial for capital investment needed for development, must be diverted into higher oil payments. In 1973, for example, Brazil paid the equivalent of 12% of its export earnings for oil, and India paid 22% of its export earnings for oil. The corresponding figures for 1980 are estimated at 50% for Brazil and 60% for India.

Extension of MFN Waivers for China, Hungary, Romania

by Rozanne Ridgway

Statement submitted to the Subcommittee on International Trade of the Senate Finance Committee on July 21, 1980. Ambassador Ridgway is Counselor of the Department of State.¹

I am pleased to have this opportunity today to testify on behalf of further extension of the President's waiver authority under Section 402 of the Trade Act, and specifically his authority to continue the waivers permitting most-favored-nation (MFN) tariff treatment for the People's Republic of China, Hungary, and Romania. The extension of the waiver for China represents a first for that country following the entry into force on February 1, 1980, of the U.S.-China trade agreement. The President's waiver authority has proven to be a valuable device for furthering U.S. interests with Romania and Hungary, and we believe that it will also prove so in the case of China.

China

We are particularly pleased with the recent development of our relations

the world economy and then carry on with our national economic policies in confidence that they would not be disturbed by the oil sector in the ways that I have outlined above. This proposal presupposes, of course, that such an agreement could be negotiated with the OPEC countries at an acceptable cost. I want to raise a doubt whether such an agreement, assuming it could be negotiated, would in fact provide the security that its advocates claim for it.

We have now lived through a revolution in Iran, before 1979 the world's second largest oil-exporting country. Is there a credible agreement among nations that would insure us against a repetition of those events sometime during the next decade? And if there is not, should we not pursue policies which guard us against disruption of oil supplies, even if we did have such an agreement? We must, of course, engage in active and constructive dialogue with the oil-exporting countries. There are many interests we have in common, and we especially have in common the joint task of managing our actions so as to mini-

with China. The U.S.-China trade agreement marked a significant step toward establishing a normal trade and economic relationship between our two countries. The agreement provides significant benefits and assistance to American businessmen while creating a solid foundation for continued expansion of economic ties. We anticipate that the trade agreement will contribute to growth in our trade and that the total two-way turnover will exceed \$3 billion in 1980 with a large U.S. surplus.

Normal economic interchange with China is an essential element of our overall relations with Beijing. Our objectives in furthering and expanding relations with China are to build meaningful political, cultural, and economic relations. All of these objectives, we believe, will work to the mutual benefit of our countries.

With respect to emigration, Chinese Government policy is to facilitate applications by Chinese either to go abroad or to return to China. In accordance with this policy, substantially increased numbers of people have been authorized to leave China in the last 2 years. In the past 12 months, for in-

mize disruption to the world economy. But I believe that we must rely principally on our own efforts to relieve the emerging shortage of oil in the coming years and to protect ourselves against sudden disruption of supplies.

Let me try to recapitulate. We should not be lulled into a false sense of security by the low year-to-year visibility of population growth or by the present surplus of world oil supplies. Many other problems that we face—inflation, slow growth, higher unemployment, protectionism stemming from greater competition from developing countries, degradation of the environment, even political unrest and terrorism—either stem from or are greatly aggravated by these two underlying factors. I have suggested, however, that there are actions we can take to deal with these basic underlying problems. If we wish to avoid economic crisis in the 1980s, we must push ahead with the important tasks of limiting population growth, augmenting food production, and reducing our demand for imported oil. ■

Clearly, we should seek measures that mitigate these dilemmas for both developed and developing countries. Domestic energy programs in the industrialized countries are necessary to accomplish this. In addition, actions by the developed countries to help augment alternative sources of energy in developing countries are in our own interests as well.

For these reasons, it is not appropriate to leave oil conservation entirely to "market forces." Private consumers of oil are guided in their decisions by present and future expected prices of oil. In their purchasing decisions they do not take into account the domestic and international macroeconomic costs associated with rapidly increasing oil prices.

There are two other costs not adequately taken into account by private decisionmakers. First, they do not take into account the total incremental cost to a nation arising from an increase in demand for oil. An increase in demand from a large country or by the industrialized countries as a group will increase the total bill for oil by driving up prices on all oil, as it did in 1979. The true cost to consumers of an incremental barrel of imported oil may be as much as twice its apparent cost, because it drives up oil prices.

Second, private consumers do not take adequately into account the risks of disruption. Private holders of oil ran down their stocks in 1978 when they could have built them cheaply and easily, but built up their stocks in 1979, thereby aggravating the oil shortage and driving the price of oil much higher than it need have been. And, of course, private consumers of oil give no concern in their purchasing decisions to national security or foreign policy considerations.

I sum up this discussion by arguing that the price mechanism must be supplemented—not replaced, but supplemented—by governmental action and guidelines encouraging or requiring conservation of oil. These actions are designed to protect the smooth functioning of our national economies. It is not sufficient to rely exclusively on the price mechanism.

I want, in concluding, to express doubts about another possible "solution" to the world oil problem. That is the suggestion that if we could only negotiate an agreement with the members of the Organization of Oil Exporting Countries (OPEC) over the price and supply of oil, we could restore some order to

tance, over 75,000 Chinese have entered Hong Kong, the primary exit point, with Chinese Government exit permission. Our Embassy in Beijing has issued over 8,000 nonimmigrant visas in the same period. Since November 1978, over 16,000 Chinese have entered Hong Kong to apply for immigrant visas to join relatives in the United States. Thus, performance has conformed with policy. The major impediment to increased immigration from China to the United States at this time, in fact, is not Chinese policy or practice but rather the numerical limitations required by U.S. immigration law.

Romania and Hungary

Turning to Romania and Hungary, I would like to state briefly the general policy considerations on which our relations with the countries of Eastern Europe are based. I would like to note that I visited both countries 6 weeks ago, and received a first-hand impression from the respective officials of the importance which both countries attach to their relations with the United States. In the course of my discussions, I reiterated the importance that we also attach to these relations and the concern which we have in the United States with regard to the respect of human rights.

During the 1970s, we made steady progress in our relations with most of the countries of Eastern Europe. This progress was especially noteworthy during the latter half of the decade. As we move into the 1980s, we remain committed to the course of attempting to strengthen these relations further. We do not hold the Eastern European countries accountable for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan which they did not participate in and evidently were not consulted about. Thus, we continue to encourage a broad range of commercial, economic, political, and cultural relations with Hungary and Romania and with the other Eastern European countries as well. We require only that, as we have in the past, there be reciprocity and respect for our concerns.

We expect that the continuation of our efforts to expand relations with the individual Eastern European countries will provide the necessary framework within which to carry out more open and productive exchanges on many topics, including human rights, which are of interest to us. The continued expansion of trade and economic cooperation is also of direct benefit to U.S. industrial and agricultural producers and U.S. consumers.

We continue to have basic disagreements with the governments of Eastern Europe on a wide range of questions dealing with political and religious freedoms, as well as with interpretations of basic human and social values. However, an activist policy of political, economic, and cultural exchange with these countries is a means of encouraging change and building on the diversity which has become more evident over the years.

Romania. Specifically concerning Romania, we believe that it is in our best interest to encourage Romania's determination to maintain its distinctive independent posture within the Warsaw Pact. In spite of apparent increased pressures toward conformity—mostly arising from Romania's energy problems—Romania has persevered in its commitment to formulate its own foreign policy. Romania's opposition to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is a recent case in point.

The numerous exchanges and high-level visits which we have conducted with Romania since the last hearings, including my own in June to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and Romania, have afforded us new opportunities to emphasize the importance that we attach to freedom of emigration and to respect for all human rights. We believe that these discussions have produced significant results, as is shown by the increase in emigration to the United States and to Israel. We are well aware that many of Romania's policies do not conform with our own. However, the willingness of the Romanian Government to discuss various aspects of human rights questions, including such sensitive matters as the treatment of the Hungarian minority in Romania, represents a significant development.

U.S. trade with Romania, as will be elaborated by my colleagues, has grown and diversified considerably since the granting of MFN and last year reached a two-way total of \$830 million.

Hungary. I am pleased to note that the constructive dialogue which has characterized U.S.-Hungarian relations since the return to Budapest of the Crown of Saint Stephen and the conclusion in 1978 of our bilateral trade agreement continues. Our ability to deal frankly with each other on a basis of mutual respect has persisted, despite the downturn in U.S.-Soviet relations. Both we and Hungary place emphasis

on our commitments to full implementation of the Helsinki Final Act, on the one hand, and to maintaining and extending the positive aspects of bilateral relations, on the other. Overall, there is a balance of interests and results. Economic and commercial relations have developed, while at the same time we have been able to expand relations under auspices of the Helsinki Final Act in the cultural and humanitarian fields, including a series of unprecedented visits by religious leaders.

Hungarian performance on emigration has continued to be positive. The number of problem cases outstanding at any one time remains small, and Hungary's record in resolving problem cases continues to be quite good. In fact, six of the seven cases we presented to the Hungarian Government last October have now been favorably resolved.

U.S.-Hungarian economic relations, as will be described later in detail, show promise of continued expansion to the benefit of both countries. In 1979 our two-way trade totaled \$190 million, which represented a 14% increase from the previous year.

In conclusion, we believe that the continuation in effect of the waiver for China is essential for the future development of an enduring, friendly, and cooperative relationship with that country. Similarly, we believe that continuation of the waivers is also fully justified with respect to Romania and Hungary in view of the emigration records of both countries. It is apparent that the impact on our relations with these countries of MFN tariff treatment and the other trade and economic relationships which flow from our bilateral trade agreements has been most beneficial. These relationships also are an essential element in our ability to continue to develop broad and meaningful contacts both in the political and economic areas.

In view of these factors, the Administration strongly recommends the extension of the President's authority to waive Section 402 of the Trade Act to continue in effect the waivers for China, Hungary, and Romania and to permit the extension of future waivers to other countries as circumstances permit.

¹ The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

The U.S. and Its Allies: Building Essential Unity

by George S. Vest

Statement before the Subcommittee on Europe of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on September 15, 1980. Mr. Vest is Assistant Secretary for European Affairs.¹

It has now been almost 9 months since the Soviets invaded Afghanistan and even longer since Iran descended into chaos. We are moving into a new period of diplomatic activity with the U.N. General Assembly and the intense round of consultations that take place on its margins.

There can be no doubt that we are facing a more complex world in the years ahead. A quick recounting of recent developments indicates that we have moved out of the period which was characterized as detente—a relaxation of tensions between East and West—and into one that will see more chill and more competitiveness in East-West relations; one that will be more uneasy and difficult to manage.

Consider the following:

- The extraordinary growth of Soviet military power beyond purely defensive requirements as we can perceive them;

- Its demonstrated willingness to use this power beyond Soviet borders in Afghanistan—the continued occupation of that previously nonaligned country and the maintenance of an illegitimate regime in Kabul;

- The recent labor crisis in Poland, the uncertain future there, the incalculable effect that its resolution may have on the rest of Eastern Europe, and the impact on relations between the Soviet Union and its neighbors; and

- Continued economic problems in the West: inflation, recession, and the spiraling cost of imported oil.

All these events and issues give us cause to consider how to respond to what lies ahead.

Achieving Common Goals

Within the NATO alliance these developments and others have sparked an unprecedented series of consultations of both a multilateral and bilateral nature. Herein lies the basic strength of the North Atlantic alliance—the opportuni-

ties provided for frank exchanges of views on the entire gamut of issues affecting the security of all the allies. This has led to essentially a common assessment of the problems confronting us. There continues to be a clear recognition of the need to pull together to achieve agreed major policy goals. The allies are committed, therefore, to crafting and implementing a rational and equitable division of labor which would respect the special possibilities of each ally.

In working to achieve these objectives, we must be reminded of the democratic diversity which marks the alliance and which often results in differing perspectives being brought into play on crucial issues. The realities of European life, politics, and economics cannot be avoided. The proximity of the Soviet Union, a continental superpower, to our European allies; the greater role of Marxist social theory in the intellectual histories of most countries and the existence of Communist parties in many European countries; the still fresh memory of two World Wars fought on Europe's territory—all of these factors interact to create a strong belief in the need to maintain a dialogue with the Soviet Union and a strong impetus toward arms control and disarmament.

Growing economic and trade relations with the Eastern countries, including, in recent years, an increasing role for Soviet energy supplies, are factors of unquestionable importance to Western Europe which must be weighed in considering measures to meet even a commonly perceived Soviet threat. But finally, and most importantly, the Europeans, conscious of the Soviet military power to their east, place a primary emphasis on being prepared militarily to meet potential direct thrusts by Soviet force.

U.S. Role

When they consider the necessary division of labor, it is natural for them to look to the global superpower, America, to take the largest role in protecting the vital Western interests in areas such as Southwest Asia. Suffice to say that defining concrete actions to meet these threats while meeting the needs of 15 allied democracies has

never been, is not, and will not be an easy task. It requires U.S. leadership but also patient, effective consultation and dialogue.

Taking into account these various perspectives, the allies have reached important agreement on a series of defense responses to the Soviet challenge in Afghanistan and to the major buildup of Warsaw Pact military forces.

- They have in most cases taken the difficult economic and political decision of a 3% real annual growth in defense expenditures.

- They have agreed to the Long-Term Defense Program and to steady progress in armaments cooperation and rationalization, standardization, and interoperability of allied equipment.

- They agreed last December on a program of long-range theater nuclear force modernization coupled with arms control negotiations.

- They are cooperating with the United States in several aspects to increase Western security in the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia area.

- They have agreed to speed up modernization of NATO conventional forces in Europe and pick up more of the slack caused by redeployment of U.S. forces elsewhere.

While seeking to redress the military balance, at the same time, we and our allies continue to express a willingness to pursue arms limitations negotiations with the Soviets as being in the best security interests of the alliance and contributing to world peace and stability. Afghanistan has made arms control more difficult; it has delayed the ratification of SALT II. We have made it clear to our allies that we remain committed to its ratification and to the maintenance of the arms control negotiating process. Through the course of our response to the Soviet military intervention, we have made clear, to friend and foe alike, that the purpose of a firm, measured Western response was to preserve the possibilities for eventually returning to sound relations when the Soviet Union demonstrated a readiness to act with restraint. This will require patience on the part of all of us.

We recognize that the structure of East-West relations, built up with difficulty over past decades, has evolved slowly but surely to bring daily benefits to the people of Europe. We are committed to preserving this structure. For example, the U.S. delegation led by Ambassador Max Kampelman is presently in Madrid participating in a

conference to prepare procedures for the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] followup meeting which is to take place in November. At this major conference in November we are also prepared to do our part to work for a constructive outcome—one which would produce measures designed to improve the implementation of the Helsinki Final Act and thus enhance real security and cooperation in Europe. In our view this can be achieved only through maintenance of a proper balance in the treatment of human rights and security issues at the Madrid meeting.

Conclusion

Through these and other efforts, we are sending a message to the Soviets that the alliance remains united against the threat posed by actions in Afghanistan and elsewhere, while at the same time preserving that structure of East-West relations which we find useful for facilitating a return to better relations. Such a return is vital to all.

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

21st Report on Cyprus

MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, SEPT. 24, 1980¹

In accordance with the provisions of Public Law 95-384, I am submitting the following report on progress made during the past 60 days toward a negotiated settlement of the Cyprus problem.

Intercommunal talks between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots resumed in Nicosia on August 9 under the auspices of Ambassador Hugo Gobbi, the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General on Cyprus. At the August 9 session, Ambassador Gobbi read a statement outlining the Secretary General's understanding of the common ground between the parties and the matters which will be discussed in the negotiations. (A copy of the opening statement is attached.)

The parties agreed to meet on a weekly basis with the following major subjects to be dealt with in rotation:

(A) Reaching agreement on the resettlement of Varosha under United Nations auspices;

(B) Initial practical measures to promote goodwill, mutual confidence and normal conditions;

(C) Constitutional aspects;

(D) Territorial aspects.

The first substantive meeting was held September 16 to address the issue of Varosha. The meeting was characterized as having been a good beginning on this issue. The negotiations will return to this topic after having dealt in turn with the other three major subjects noted above in weekly sessions. The next meeting will take place on September 24.

I welcome the resumption of the Cyprus intercommunal talks. The painstaking efforts of the Secretary General and United Nations' Secretariat officials are to be commended. We hope that the resumed talks will be conducted on a serious, sustained and productive basis and will lead to a just and lasting settlement of all outstanding issues.

Sincerely,

JIMMY CARTER

OPENING STATEMENT AT INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS BY AMBASSADOR HUGO GOBBI

August 9, 1980

I note that both parties have indicated their readiness to resume the intercommunal talks, which were recessed in consultation with the parties on 22 June 1979, and to do so within the framework of the good offices mission entrusted to me by the Security Council and on the basis of the high-level agreements of 12 February 1977 and 19 May 1979.

Both parties have, in this regard, signified their intention to carry out the resumed talks in a continuing and sustained manner, to get down to concrete negotiations, discussing constructively, and giving full consideration to, all aspects of the Cyprus problem.

In this connection, I should like to outline the Secretary General's understanding of the common ground that was worked out in the course of consultations which took place over the past several months:

(A) Both parties have reaffirmed the validity of the high-level agreements of 12 February 1977 and 19 May 1979;

(B) Both parties have reaffirmed their support for a federal solution of the constitutional aspect and a bizonal solution of the territorial aspect of the Cyprus problem;

(C) Both parties have indicated that the matter of security can be raised and discussed in the intercommunal talks. It is understood that this matter will be dis-

cussed, having regard to certain practical difficulties which may arise for the Turkish Cypriot community, as well as to the security of Cyprus as a whole;

(D) Both parties have appealed to the Secretary General for the continuation of the intercommunal talks.

The practical implementation of the concepts in (B) and (C) above will be dealt with in the context of the substantive consideration of the constitutional and territorial aspects and will be reflected in the substantive positions and proposals of the parties concerning the various items of the agenda.

Concerning the matters to be discussed, the Secretary General understands, on the basis of the 19 May agreement, that these will include the following subjects:

(A) Reaching agreement on the resettlement of Varosha under United Nations auspices, in accordance with the provisions of point 5 of the 19 May agreement;

(B) Initial practical measures by both sides to promote goodwill, mutual confidence and the return to normal conditions, in accordance with the provisions of point 6, which states that special importance will be given to this matter;

(C) Constitutional aspects;

(D) Territorial aspects.

Concerning procedure, it is understood that the four items above should be dealt with concurrently in rotation at consecutive meetings. At an appropriate early stage, committees or working groups will be set up by the interlocutors.

¹Identical letters addressed to Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of Representatives, and Frank Church, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Sept. 29, 1980). ■

Refugee Admissions and Resettlement Plans for FY 1981

by Victor H. Palmieri

Statement before the House Judiciary Committee on September 24, 1980. Ambassador Palmieri is U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs.¹

I am pleased to have this opportunity to consult with you on the Administration's proposed plans for refugee admissions and resettlement in FY 1981, as required by the Refugee Act of 1980. I look forward to hearing your views on our refugee programs, which I will transmit to the President for his consideration before he makes his final determination on the level and allocation of refugee admissions for the coming fiscal year.

We have attempted to keep this committee informed on a regular basis of the development of all of our refugee programs, as well as the arrival of undocumented Cubans and Haitians. Nonetheless, this set of consultations, the first under the terms of the Refugee Act covering our plans for an entire fiscal year, provides a convenient means of reviewing the steps we have taken in recent months both to respond to the tumultuous and tragic refugee situations around the world and to implement the spirit of the Refugee Act of 1980.

In the 6 months since the act came into effect and we consulted with this committee on refugee programs for FY 1980, refugee problems have continued to deteriorate on practically every continent, with particularly alarming developments in the Horn of Africa, Pakistan, and along the Kampuchean border in Thailand. At the same time, we faced the unexpected, disorderly, and unsafe arrival of nearly 125,000 Cubans directly on our shores, without the benefit of the overseas screening and processing required by our laws for refugee admissions. In addition, thousands of Haitians have continued to arrive in south Florida in a similar fashion. Both groups have challenged our legal system and strained communities already burdened with the need to care for other illegal aliens, refugees, immigrants, and disadvantaged Americans.

Efforts to respond to this crisis—combined with the planned admission of some 230,000 refugees and support for ever-increasing international relief programs—have tested our resources,

our humanitarian commitment, and our patience. Under the circumstances, I feel we as a nation have met the challenge well. However, this is obviously a long-term process with many complex problems to resolve along the way. With continued cooperation from the American public, private voluntary agencies, State and local governments, Federal agencies, and the Congress, I am convinced that the resettlement of refugees here will remain a source of pride and long-term benefit to this country.

Despite the growing refugee challenges we face overseas and at home, we have made progress toward establishing the comprehensive and more equitable system of admitting and assisting refugees that the Refugee Act envisages. As you know, the act eliminates the outmoded ideological and geographic restrictions on refugee admission in past legislation. As a consequence, we are authorized to consider applications for admission of needy refugees wherever they find themselves and regardless of country of origin. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and the State Department's Bureau of Consular Affairs have worked closely in recent months to develop interim guidelines and provide sufficient personnel in order to extend refugee processing to areas where refugees are likely to apply, while assuring that the requirements of our immigration laws are upheld.

As a result of these efforts, for instance, it is now possible for refugees to apply for admission to the United States from many first-asylum countries in the Middle East and Africa. In the past, few refugees from those areas were able to meet our admission criteria or to travel to Europe for processing at an INS post. As we work up the procedures necessary to implement the Refugee Act, the allocation of our proposed admission numbers is beginning to reflect broader access to refugees in urgent situations around the world.

This year there are significant increases in the numbers allocated for refugees from areas that were essentially ineligible before. We expect that the pattern will continue to change incrementally. But frankly, we do not foresee dramatic changes immediately

or an equalizing of numbers for various regions. Our policy remains one of responding to the need for third-country resettlement of refugees of special humanitarian concern to the United States, rather than an arbitrary system of quotas for regions or ethnic groups. And fortunately, there are areas where millions of refugees whose prospects for voluntary repatriation or local settlement in first-asylum countries eliminate the need for third-country resettlement. In the last year our increasing support for international relief efforts has helped encourage solutions to refugee problems that are often more humane and less costly than resettlement in the United States. And in pursuit of solutions to the fundamental conflicts that give rise to refugee problems, we continue to rely on active diplomacy, economic and security assistance programs, and practical support for progress in human rights.

In the short run, however, we must be realistic about the persistent needs of existing large groups of refugees, the impact of refugee populations on countries of first asylum—particularly in the developing world—and the prospects for further deterioration of refugee situations on every continent.

While strengthening our contribution to immediate humanitarian relief, we are also offering resettlement to refugees of special humanitarian concern to the United States who have no other chances of resettlement or voluntary repatriation. We hope that our dual approach will not only relieve human suffering and promote stability in regions of concern but also encourage other countries to do their share in supporting humanitarian relief and providing resettlement opportunities. Today refugee problems are truly international in scope and implication, and their solutions must, therefore, be the product of international cooperation and commitment.

As this committee knows well, we face a serious challenge in trying to strike a balance between overseas refugee assistance and refugee admissions, as well as between foreign and domestic policy concerns. The problem has become even more acute in the last few years, in the face of growing numbers of refugees seeking resettlement in the United States and increasing claims on domestic resources necessary for resettlement. In determining our proposed levels and allocations of refugee admissions for FY 1981, we have carefully considered the specific circumstances in each case, but we have also used some of the following guiding principles.

• We continue to give priority to refugees with close ties to the United States through relatives in this country or past employment with the U.S. Government.

• Where the United States has stood uniquely as a symbol of freedom from oppression for particular groups, we seek to respond to their aspirations for safe haven.

• We are mindful that refugee resettlement efforts can advance broader foreign policy objectives, in particular to promote stability in democratic countries of first asylum.

• We have also taken into consideration the opportunities for resettlement in other countries and the practical limits on U.S. resources.

Refugee Admissions

For FY 1981, we propose to admit to the United States a total of up to 17,000 refugees, including 168,000 Indochinese, 33,000 refugees from the Soviet Union, 4,500 from Eastern Europe, 4,500 from the Near East, 3,000 from Latin America, and 3,000 from Africa. The FY 1981 total is 4,700 fewer admissions than FY 1980.

Indochina. With regard to the Indochinese program, our proposal calls for continuing the 14,000 monthly level President Carter pledged to establish in June 1979. The situation in Southeast Asia continues to be fraught with uncertainty and hardship. There are still approximately 230,000 Indochinese refugees in first-asylum countries, some of whom have been waiting for resettlement offers for more than 5 years. In addition to the very real and pressing humanitarian concerns, the political problems in the region and the need to maintain stability and support the Association of South East Asian Nations are in the forefront of our concerns.

Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In addition, we propose to admit 37,500 refugees from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, areas that have long been of concern to the United States. Emigration from the Soviet Union has, unfortunately, been subject to more stringent controls than usual in the past year, but we expect that the departure rates will rise again this coming year.

Near East. Our proposal for the Near East is set at 4,500. Numbers will be allocated to various groups depending on the emergence of special conditions or needs. Afghans, Iraqi-

Assyrians, and Iraqi-Kurds have applied for admission as refugees from this area of the world. In addition, large numbers of people are still fleeing the chaotic conditions in Iran, and while there is not yet a clear pattern of persecution, we are prepared to consider applications for refugees admission on a case-by-case basis.

Latin America. The recommendation for Latin America is for 4,000 refugee admissions, including 2,500 Cubans and 1,500 other Latin American refugees. Approximately one-half of the Cubans would come from Madrid before we terminate that program, and the

remainder would be Cubans who have already been processed and who were ready to travel to the United States prior to the mass exodus from Mariel. Our first priority for the Latin American program will be given to political prisoners and their families and to former political prisoners.

The Latin American figure represents the biggest reduction of any of the groups for FY 1981. The FY 1980 proposal was for 20,500, of which 19,500 was to be for Cubans. The reduction reflects the massive influx of Cubans to the United States in contravention of both U.S. law and our guiding principle

U.S. Government Costs of Refugee Assistance, FY 1981 (est.; million US \$)

| | |
|--|--------------|
| Department of State | |
| Care and maintenance of refugees abroad | 169.0* |
| Admissions processing | 14.75 |
| Transportation to U.S. | |
| initial reception and placement grants | 132.4 |
| Administrative and operational | 105.95 |
| Other international programs | 5.0 |
| Subtotal | 105.2 |
| Department of Health and Human Services | |
| Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) | |
| Cash assistance | 269.4 |
| Supplemental security income (state supplementation) | (5.0) |
| Aid to unaccompanied minors | (4.8) |
| Medical assistance | 139.4 |
| Social services | 93.7 |
| State administrative costs | 49.6 |
| Educational assistance** | 44.3 |
| Voluntary agency program (aid to non-Cuban, non-Indochinese) | 26.0 |
| Preventive health | 7.8 |
| Center for Disease Control | (3.0) |
| Health Service Administration | (4.8) |
| Applicants for asylum | 12.0 |
| Federal administration | 6.5 |
| Cuban phasedown program | 44.8 |
| Subtotal | 693.6 |
| Aid to families with dependent children | 41.0 |
| Supplemental security income (Federal) | 17.4 |
| Medicaid | 26.5 |
| Subtotal | 84.9 |

| | |
|--|------------------|
| Department of Agriculture | |
| Food stamp and other programs | 175.0 |
| Department of Education | |
| | 33.0 |
| Immigration and Naturalization Service | |
| | 2.5 |
| Agency for International Development | |
| Food for Peace | 87.1 |
| Department of Defense | |
| | 4.0 |
| Department of Commerce | |
| | 0.3*** |
| Department of Housing and Urban Development | |
| | 17.6*** |
| Department of Labor | |
| | 53.0*** |
| Department of Justice | |
| | 1.0*** |
| Security clearance | 1.5 |
| ACTION | 1.5*** |
| Grand Total | \$1,687.3 |

*This figure may overstate the cost of care and maintenance for refugees resettled in the U.S. in FY 1981, since it represents U.S. contributions to international and private organizations whose caseloads also include refugees not destined for the U.S. However, in some areas, such as Southeast Asia, the majority of the refugees resettled leave for the U.S., yet third country contributions account for 70% of the UNHCR budget.

**Administered by the Department of Education.

***These figures are based on estimates by Federal agencies as of Feb. 15, 1980. Funding is generally not earmarked specifically for refugees nor is an estimate available of costs for 1981 arrivals v. prior arrivals.

Iran's Proposals for Release of American Hostages

of refugee admissions—orderly processing and departure to the United States from abroad.

Africa. The proposal calls for admission of 3,000 African refugees, a number double the FY 1980 level. This represents our best estimate of the number of eligible refugees who may wish to apply for admission to the United States. The largest proportion is likely to continue to be Ethiopians, but Africans from other regions of the continent are also expected to seek resettlement.

Resettlement

In addition to the refugee groups and numbers I have outlined, the act authorized adjustment to permanent resident alien status of up to 5,000 persons in the United States who have been granted political asylum in previous years. The adjustment of these 5,000 brings to 222,000 the total number of admissions and adjustment to permanent resident of refugees for FY 1981.

We estimate that the cost to the Federal Government of processing, transporting, and initially resettling the 217,000 refugees we propose to admit in FY 1981 will be about \$712 million. This compares with the projected total cost of U.S. refugee assistance in FY 1981 of approximately \$1.687 billion, which includes aid for millions of refugees and displaced persons overseas who may never come to the United States, as well as assistance to refugees who entered this country in prior years. In consultation with my office, the Department of Health and Human Services administers the bulk of Federal assistance to refugees, and it is the lead Federal agency in domestic resettlement.

The Federal commitment to refugee assistance is substantial, particularly at a time of economic stress and competition for limited resources. We should keep in mind that these funds allow us to reach out to millions of people around the world—to save their lives and ease their suffering until conditions permit their voluntary repatriation or resettlement in peace in countries of first asylum—and to bring some of those of greatest need and concern to us to begin new and productive lives in this country. Although the costs of resettlement are high in the United States, we should remember that we are actually making a long-term investment in the futures of people who in turn will enrich our nation as a

Following are the U.S. translation of the original Farsi text of the Iranian Government's proposals for the release of the American hostages issued November 2, 1980, President Carter's statement of November 2, and Secretary Muskie's statement of November 3.

IRAN'S PROPOSALS

In the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful: The special commission investigating the issue of the American spies submits the following proposals to the Islamic Consultative Assembly, according to the guidelines of the Imam:

1. Since, in the past, the American Government has always interfered in various ways in Iran's political and military affairs, she should make a pledge and a promise that from now on she will

whole, as have generations of immigrants and refugees before them.

We should also remember that the Federal Government is not alone in making a commitment to refugees and helping them become contributing members of society as soon as possible. Refugee resettlement has traditionally been the primary responsibility of private groups in this country, and the relationship between the government and the voluntary agencies remains the centerpiece of our refugee efforts. Resources and expertise available to the voluntary agencies supplement the Federal contribution and allow us to help many more people of different backgrounds and talents than would otherwise be possible.

In addition, in the last few years we have seen a remarkable growth in the number of State and local agencies that have become involved in various aspects of refugee resettlement. One of the major priorities of my office since I took up the position of U.S. Coordinator last November has been to encourage this developing network of public and private-sector agencies. I believe we have considerably strengthened the entire system by meeting on a more regular basis with officials of voluntary agencies and State and local governments, setting up conferences on regional problems, and providing monthly reports on projected refugee arrivals to help communities plan needed services. In an effort to

in no way interfere, either directly or indirectly, politically or militarily, in the affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

2. Unfreeze all of our assets and to put all these assets and all the assets and capital of Iran which are in America or which are in organizations belonging to America and to American subjects in other countries at the disposal of Iran in such a way that the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran can use them in any manner it wishes. And that the decree of the American President dated 14 November 1979 and subsequent decrees concerning the blocking of Iranian assets will be declared null and void. To return to the normal conditions prior to 14 November 1979 regarding all the financial relations between the two sides. To annul all consequences resulting

lessen the burden of assisting new arrivals, we have also instituted a program in camps throughout Southeast Asia of English-language training and orientation for refugees destined for admission to the United States.

These steps have made it possible to meet President Carter's pledge to double the admission rate of Indochinese refugees within a very short period of time. Clearly there have been strains on many communities, and maintaining our programs at projected levels will require continued commitment, generosity, and coordination. But the framework for this system is now solidly in place, thanks in large part to the support and vigilance of Congress. We will be seeking your continued support as we move ahead to implement our planned programs.

As you know, we have submitted detailed information to this committee on our proposals for FY 1981, as required by the Refugee Act. I should point out that we now have revised budget figures, which I would like to submit for the record to replace those in the copy of the consultation document you received.

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

from this decree, such as all the transactions which have been carried out. To carry out all the necessary legal and administrative actions by the American President to cancel and annul the decrees by all the American courts regarding the blocking. To guarantee the security and free transfer of these assets regardless of all American or non-American individuals or legal persons in America.

3. Abrogation and cancellation of all economic and financial decisions and measures against the Islamic Republic of Iran and implementation of all the necessary administrative and legal measures with regard to cancellation and abrogation of all claims by the U.S. Government and U.S. companies and institutions against Iran in any form and for any reason. Implementation by the American Government of all necessary administrative and legal measures with regard to not raising any form of new legal or criminal or financial measures by official and unofficial and legal persons. Should any claim be made against Iran and Iranian nationals in any court in connection with the Islamic Revolution or the question of occupying the center of the U.S. plot or those arrested in it, or any verdict issued concerning Iran or Iranian nationals, then the U.S. Government should undertake and guarantee to be answerable. It is also to undertake and guarantee to pay any compensation resulting from this.

4. Return of the assets of the cursed Shah, while officially recognizing the measures taken by Iran and their effectiveness in asserting its sovereignty in confiscating the assets of the cursed Shah and his close relatives, whose assets, according to Iranian laws belong to the Iranian nation. The U.S. President should issue an order concerning the identification and seizing of these assets and take all the necessary administrative and legal measures to transfer all these assets and property to Iran.

According to this recommendation, the Islamic Republic Government will release all 52 U.S. criminals in return for the fulfillment of these conditions by the U.S. Government. However, should some of these conditions require more time, then when all conditions are accepted by the U.S. Government, with the fulfillment of each condition a number of criminals will be released at the discretion of the Islamic Government.

The Government is required to prepare the said recommendation in

two languages, Persian and English, and communicate it to the U.S. Government for implementation. Should any differences between the two texts emerge, the Persian version is valid.

The Islamic Republic Government is required to enforce this recommendation, after ratification by the Islamic Majlis, while taking into account the Islamic independence and the general policy of neither east nor west. Should the U.S. Government fail to comply with all or some of the conditions, then the judicial system, in accordance with its required duty, will carry out its duty and punish the criminals.

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, NOV. 2, 1980¹

The Iranian Parliament today has finally taken a position on the release of our hostages. This is a significant development. We have long been aware that there would be no resolution of this problem until the new Iranian Government was in place and the Parliament had acted.

Many months ago we made clear the steps that we would be prepared to take when the hostages are released. Ever since the American hostages were illegally seized in Iran, I have affirmed that our policy is based on two fundamental objectives—protecting the honor and the vital interest of the United States and working to insure the earliest possible safe release of the hostages. As we understand the Parliament's proposals, they appear to offer a positive basis for

achieving both of these objectives. We are pursuing the matter through diplomatic channels. Any action taken by our government will be in full accordance with our laws and with our Constitution.

I know that I share with the hostages, with their families, and with the people of this country the desire for a prompt return of those for whom we have waited so long. I know also that all Americans will want that return to be on a proper basis, which is worthy of the suffering and sacrifice which the hostages have endured.

Let me conclude with a final comment. We are within 2 days of an important national election. Let me assure you that my decisions on this crucial matter will not be affected by the calendar. We are in contact with the bipartisan leadership of the Congress, with Governor Reagan, with Congressman Anderson, and we will keep the American people informed.

I wish that I could predict when the hostages will return. I cannot. But whether our hostages come home before or after the election, and regardless of the outcome of the election, the Iranian Government and the world community will find our country, its people, and the leaders of both political parties united in desiring the early and safe return of the hostages to their homes but only on a basis that preserves our national honor and our national integrity.

Iran Chronology, October 1980

October 2

Iran's Parliament names seven Islamic fundamentalists to serve on a special commission to debate on the fate of the hostages. The debate, however, is postponed because of disputes over whether Iran should agree to direct talks with the U.S.*

October 29

U.S. informs Iran that once the hostages are freed it would be willing to consider the release to Tehran of military equipment Iran purchased from the U.S. during the Shah's reign but which was frozen, along with other Iranian assets, when the hostages were seized.

October 30

Parliament again holds open debate on the hostage issue and again fails to make

any progress because a quorum cannot be assembled. A boycott, organized by hard-line-legislators opposed to a settlement before U.S. elections on Nov. 4, blocked the quorum, and the debate is again delayed until Nov. 2.

October 31

Despite the numerous delays by Iran's Parliament, Administration officials appear optimistic that Iranian authorities seem to have committed themselves to releasing the hostages.

In Cairo, the late Shah's son, Crown Prince Riza Pahlavi, assumes title to his father's throne, proclaiming himself Shah Riza II.

* During the period of Oct. 2-29, Iran's Parliament holds a series of open and closed meetings to debate on the hostage issue but fails to gain any significant progress. ■

SECRETARY'S STATEMENT,
NOV. 3, 1980

Middle East Peace Negotiations

We have seen, during the past 12 hours, several developments in the hostage issue. These should be viewed as initial steps in a process which will require time, patience, and diplomacy. Reports from Tehran state that Ayatollah Khomeini has agreed with the militants that the hostages can be transferred to government control. We believe, as we have said previously, it is in our interest for the government to assume direct responsibility for the well-being and security of the hostages.

We welcome reports that the Algerian Government will be involved. Deputy Secretary Christopher has met with the Algerian Ambassador and discussed their role in connection with the actions of the Iranian Parliament. Finally, the reports from Tehran that the Prime Minister's office has established a working group in connection with implementation of the Parliament's decision are also welcome.

The President said yesterday that we cannot predict when the hostages will be home with us. We have affirmed that any decisions we make will be consistent with two fundamental objectives stated by the President—a solution must protect our national honor and vital interests and insure the safe return of the hostages. There has been progress; however, much remains to be done. We will continue to pursue our goals with patience, diligence, and determination. Americans are united in their desire to see their fellow citizens come home safely with honor and with pride in their nation.

¹Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Nov. 10, 1980. ■

Ambassador Sol M. Linowitz, Personal Representative of the President for the Middle East Peace Negotiations, visited Israel and Egypt to discuss with Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat the current status of the Palestinian autonomy negotiations, August 29–September 5, 1980.

Following is a news conference he held on September 6.

Q. Why has Egypt agreed to resume the talks? What concessions have Israel and the United States made to encourage them to come back?

A. I think it's a mistake to focus on this notion of so-called concessions. What I found when I went on this trip, in both Egypt and Israel, was two leaders deeply determined to go back into negotiations in order to advance the prospects for a comprehensive peace in the Middle East.

President Sadat, as you know so well, is a man of peace. He felt that it would serve the cause of peace far better if he could go back to the negotiating table and undertake to talk about the issues rather than to allow them to remain in a suspended state.

It's trite, but it ought to be said, that the greatest impetus for negotiation and peace is the danger of war. President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin, very definitely, recognize the dangers of an outbreak in the Middle East and what that might mean for the planet as a whole and the danger of a major conflagration.

In my discussions with President Sadat, I found that he was desirous of returning to the negotiating table, not because of so-called concessions but because he believed that the opportunity for making progress was now better perhaps than it had been, that there was a clear understanding on both sides of the concerns of the other, and that it would serve the interests of Egypt, the interests of Israel, and the interests of the United States for the negotiations to resume. It was just that simple!

Q. It's still a little unclear to me what the relationship is between the resumption of the autonomy talks and the holding of a later summit. Is progress in the former necessarily precedent to the latter?

A. No. Let me be clear about that because I think there has surfaced some

apparent misunderstanding based on comment from either Egypt or Israel as to what was or was not agreed, and there ought to be no misunderstanding at all. The facts are very clear and mutually agreed upon.

The parties will resume the autonomy negotiations on a date to be mutually agreed. That date is now being discussed in the early stages and will, at the proper time, be announced. The summit will be held sometime before the end of the year and after the negotiations have resumed. Therefore the two are agreed upon and the expectation is that we will, in due course, be able to give you the dates for each.

Q. Do you rule out holding a summit prior to the elections?

A. I don't think any of the parties contemplates a summit prior to the elections.

Q. The Foreign Ministry official in Egypt are saying that what they agreed upon is to talk about preparations for the summit and not really resumption of negotiations. Is that your understanding or is that—

A. I would change your question by saying what the people in Egypt had said because Dr. Boutros Ghali [Egyptian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs] had made such a statement before I met with him the day before yesterday. After our meeting, we both held a joint press conference at which I said that the understanding is that the autonomy negotiations, when they are resumed, will deal with the substantive issues involved in the negotiations and also lay the groundwork for the summit meeting, and that, Dr. Ghali said, fully accords with his understanding.

Q. I think before leaving Israel—when you were in Egypt, you talked about your impressions of what the Israelis would be willing to do to facilitate the process of negotiations. Can you elaborate on that?

A. Yes. I was asked whether there had been any specific commitments or promises or assurances which I was able to convey to President Sadat. What I said was, rather than that, I conveyed impressions. From my discussions which had gone on for a number of hours with Prime Minister Begin, with members of his Cabinet, and with the autonomy team, I formed

certain judgments, certain impressions as to what might or might not happen in the future. These I conveyed to President Sadat. They dealt with the issues involved in the exchange of letters between President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin, and President Sadat found helpful the views I gave him based on these impressions.

Q. There are some reports, I believe, coming from Egypt that the first step in the resumed negotiations would be bilateral Egyptian-American talks with the possible formulation of a document. Is that planned?

A. Yes. In order to get talks resumed, you have to go through certain steps to lay the necessary preparatory groundwork; so there will be these stages, first, indeed, starting today and yesterday. Talks have been undertaken between the United States and Israel with reference to a document which we have put forward to both parties, variously called a heads of agreement or a memorandum of understanding.

This document, which we have produced at the suggestion of both parties, undertakes to codify both those points already agreed upon during the course of the negotiations and sets forth suggestions for dealing with most of the issues involved in the negotiations.

I delivered that document to Prime Minister Begin and also to Dr. Ghali. When we get back to the negotiations, I think the focus will be on that document. Right now, as I say, that document is being discussed bilaterally between us and the Israelis and, in a few days, will be discussed preliminarily between us and the Egyptians.

This will be followed up by further meetings on a bilateral basis, probably here in the United States. This, in turn, will be followed by the first of a trilateral session, probably at a lower level, dealing with these issues and this document. All of this will lead to the formal resumption of negotiations at a date to be determined some time in October.

Q. On which level are the talks now between the United States and Israel, and at which level will they be here in the States—the bilateral talks?

A. They are at a very high level in both countries. Dr. Burg [Yosef, Chief Israeli Negotiator for the Palestinian autonomy negotiations] and Dr. Ghali, for example, are involved in Israel and Egypt, and my deputy, Jim Leonard, is

undertaking to talk to them on my behalf now. The visits here in the United States will also be at a similar level.

Q. Is that a draft of an autonomy agreement, in effect?

A. It's not a draft of a final autonomy agreement. It is a draft of an interim agreement which deals with most of the issues which would be involved in an autonomy agreement.

Q. How does that document deal with the points of disagreement? Does it present a draft of what the Americans think should be a compromise position or does it say "this language" or "this language" or "this language," presenting the various options?

A. The former rather than the latter. What we have tried to do, based on our discussions with the parties, over the months now—and I've told you this, I think, before—we have from time to time put forward issue papers, a little paragraph or two on various issues and, around those papers, had some kind of discussion or negotiation.

Based on those discussions and some ideas which we have evolved from our bilateral, as well as trilateral, talks, we have now formulated ideas which we think fairly take into account the concerns of each of the parties and, therefore, would not be alternative approaches, but we think sensible approaches to issues as diverse as land, water, security, and so forth.

Q. Throughout the process you've talked about the undesirability of holding a summit conference, feeling that once a summit had been called, it would be very tough to make any type of substantive accomplishments in the talks at any level below that. Why, at this point, was the decision made to go for a summit conference?

A. First, let me say that I have indicated, in the past, that I thought a summit conference without adequate preparation would not be something I would advise the President to undertake, because I said that before this happens, we ought to be sure that the groundwork has been laid and that we are at the point where a meeting of the chief executives would be profitable and fruitful.

The structure we've put together envisages that, that we will have a resumption of the negotiations, and then following that, there will be a summit which will undertake to deal with the issues that can be most fruitfully discussed.

Admittedly, we can't be certain of where we will be after the negotiations are resumed, as they go on. However, to go back to the first question that I was asked, one of the first things that President Sadat did want was a summit conference; therefore, if you look in terms of how this thing evolved, there was an agreement to a summit conference from Prime Minister Begin which was one of the things that President Sadat had clearly felt was important to him in going back to the negotiating table.

Q. Was there any discussion about what happens if the summit conference winds up with a lame-duck President? Is there any agreement not to set a date for a summit until after the election?

A. No, we didn't talk about that far-off possibility, but I think in due course, we will focus on it. The assumption is—and I think it is not a far-fetched assumption—no matter what happens in the election, the President will still be President between now and the end of the year.

Q. You say that after your talks in Israel you shared with President Sadat, I believe you used the words, your "judgments or impressions"—

A. Impressions, yes.

Q. —with the Israelis. Would you like to share some of those judgments or impressions with us?

A. I would like to, but I won't. Let me be candid with you. What I was trying to do was present to President Sadat what had emerged from some 5 or 6 hours of discussion with the Prime Minister and with the members of his Cabinet about issues that I knew were of foremost consequence to President Sadat and, by the same token, issues that are of foremost consequence to Prime Minister Begin.

It would not surprise you that the agenda for these discussions, if you will, were the exchange of letters between the two, and so therefore, I think I was able to bring to President Sadat, in this one-on-one very frank discussion, the results of my very frank discussions with Prime Minister Begin.

I think this was helpful. By the same token, I had some sense of the concerns of President Sadat which I was able to pass on to Prime Minister Begin before.

Q. Would you address yourself to the Jerusalem issue and give us your thoughts about to what extent the

passing of the law by Israel, making it the eternal and undivided capital, to what extent does that present an obstacle to the negotiations?

A. As you know, the Jerusalem law was the factor which, I guess, more than anything else, led President Sadat to suspend the negotiations. The feeling in Israel was that the law really did not, in any substantive way, change the situation from what it had been before and, that as a matter of fact, Jerusalem was an issue which is not involved and should not be involved in the current negotiations.

I think for the moment, both parties recognize that we ought to be focusing on the issues which are central to the negotiations. At Camp David, it was understood, implicitly or explicitly, that Jerusalem would not be tackled until the time was right, that moving it center-stage under the white light of publicity when we were engaged in these negotiations destroyed the negotiations, derailed them, and that it was important to sort things out again and go back to our negotiations, recognizing we're not going to deal with the problems of Jerusalem now.

Under those circumstances, I hope we are at a point where we can go forward and that the Jerusalem issue will not be a factor which interferes with our making progress.

Q. On that very point, one of the open issues, as I understand it, was whether the East Jerusalem Arabs would be able to vote in autonomy elections. Do the suggestions that you have now put forth include a recommendation on that?

A. They are not covered in the document itself, but there has been discussion about that issue.

Q. Did the Prime Minister explain to you about his plans to move his office to East Jerusalem and what he intends to do about it?

A. We discussed that issue, and I conveyed the substance of that discussion to President Sadat. I will not discuss it here, I think. All I can say to you on that is, let's wait and see.

Q. You were on the record, I think, in *The Washington Post* the other day, saying that Prime Minister Begin agreed to postpone the move indefinitely.

A. I was on a bad record, then. No, I can't say that I ever said that nor can I ever say that he offered me that kind of an assurance. I didn't ask for that.

What I did get was an impression as to what he might or might not do, and as I said before, let's just wait and see what happens.

Q. Related to that, did Prime Minister Begin discuss any other good will gestures with you; for example, the release of some Arab prisoners or the cessation of more settlements. If so, was today's report that there will be four new settlements a surprise to you?

A. No, I was not surprised by the announcement. We had had some discussion about that. We also had had a discussion about moves that might be made in the West Bank and Gaza on other things which I think you referred to, or which have been referred to, as so-called confidence-building measures. And once again, though I don't like to be unresponsive, all I can say to you is, let's wait and see what now happens.

Q. Can you shed any light at all on the interim agreement that the United States has presented? If it doesn't cover the issue of voting rights for East Jerusalem Arabs, what are some of the subjects that it does cover? And why wouldn't it cover that since that is one of the major—

A. Because that is one that still has to be discussed. That's the first point. In other words, I didn't say it covered every issue. I'm trying to say where we are so far and where we can see answers and how we would go at it.

Sure, it covers land, water, security, even settlements. I think that you ought not to have any feeling that this is a nonsubstantive document. It is a paper that undertakes to present positions on these issues that not only cover, as you might expect, a list of the areas of responsibilities and the areas to be under the aegis of a self-governing authority that I mentioned to you in the past but also now focuses on some of the toughest issues that, in the past I've said to you, have to be dealt with if we are to reach an agreement.

Q. What is the position on these four things? What is the U.S. recommending in these four areas you mentioned?

A. That I won't tell you. Let me just tell you again why. What I am trying to do is negotiate quietly, and if you want to know a hard chore, it's negotiating quietly in Israel or Egypt.

I'm trying to negotiate quietly to see whether the kind of suggestions we have put forward will be mutually ac-

ceptable. One sure way to keep them from being mutually acceptable is to tout them in the press and talk about American ideas rather than have them emerge from discussion among us. So don't think it would be appropriate for me to disclose them.

Q. Are there political issues in the interim agreement covered? Are there some covered and some not covered? In other words, are these on technical issues, the interim agreement; basically, on land, water, security, that sort of thing? Or do they go into the autonomy election itself and the makeup of a constituent body? In other words, how much of the political issues are covered in this interim agreement?

A. They're covered. I don't want to mislead you. They're not fully covered. I don't want anybody to think that what I'm saying is we put down a piece of paper which covers everything about every issue. What I am trying to say is we have tried to approach each of the issues in a way that will make progress in dealing with them, political and non political alike.

Q. You just said that you were, in other words, misquoted about the comments of Prime Minister Begin to postpone his move into Israel indefinitely.

Do you have, then, an assurance from President Sadat that when and if Prime Minister Begin decides to move to East Jerusalem, that the negotiations, if resumed by then, will not be suspended again?

A. I'm not going to give you a double subjunctive answer. I, one, am not going to tell you—for reasons which I tried to explain—what I did or did not convey. I will merely tell you that the alleged quotation is inaccurate because I did not convey that. But I will tell you that I discussed with both of them that particular issue.

Q. Were you able to reach a satisfactory understanding with Israel on the question of settlements, which was one of the reasons that prompted Egypt to call off the talks?

A. We discussed the settlement issue. I think it's fair to say that Prime Minister Begin and his Cabinet are aware of our longstanding concern about settlements; our feeling that the proliferation of settlements has been an obstacle to the negotiations; that we feel that it does not advance the negotiations or the cause of peace for an un-

imited settlement policy to continue; the response to all this, I conveyed to President Sadat.

Q. Was there a satisfactory response?

A. Following what I told him, he agreed to go back into the negotiations, so I can only assume that President Sadat, who calculated this very carefully, thought that it, in some measure, responded to his concern.

Q. Were you, personally, impressed by the Israeli response? Do you think it is an improvement?

A. Over what?

Q. Over the question of settlements?

A. As you know, bluntly, we have never, in the past, been satisfied with their response, so I think this is a little better than the past, yes.

Q. President Carter indicated Thursday night that a summit will be, if necessary, or if needed—he said it twice—

A. Yes.

Q. Isn't it already set up, the summit?

A. No, it's not set up. But I think that the President meant was if the parties wanted a summit, if they felt it was necessary, he would be pleased to participate. Both parties have agreed that they do think it is necessary and a good idea, and so I think the President will participate.

Q. Do I understand correctly that in the powers of the self-governing authority, you have given some suggestions, but you haven't exhausted the issues? There are still some areas that are open that you haven't made suggestions on?

A. Yes. Most of them we've dealt with. When you say "the powers," you mean a listing of the powers to be exercised?

Q. Yes, and going back to an earlier question, the authorities, of the self-governing authority.

A. To a very large extent we've covered most of that. There are some that we have not yet covered, so it is not a complete thing.

Let me put it this way, as I think I've said to you before: We have, in the past, agreed on some 80% of the areas of responsibility to be conveyed to the self-governing authority; our discus-

sions have focused on the so-called 20%. We are, in this new document, making progress with the additional 20%.

Q. On the East Jerusalem-Arab voting rights, are you intending, effectively, and are you signaling today that the intention is to put this off until the summit?

A. No, I'm not saying that. I'm saying that I think both sides recognize that it's an issue that has to be looked at. We're going to have to decide now the right time, the right place, the right way; what, if anything, has to be done preparatory to the summit, if it can be done.

Q. We know that Prime Minister Begin will be in Washington around the 11th. Will this occasion be used for full-scale talks on the autonomy between him and the President?

A. I doubt it. As you know, he's coming here on an informal visit which he told me about—I guess there's an anniversary for Jabotinsky that he's coming for to speak in New York—and while here, he will have an unofficial visit to Washington. He's been invited, I think, on November 11th, to meet with the President.

I don't think the contemplation is to turn this into a full-scale talk on the autonomy. I'd be surprised if autonomy did not come up in the course of his visit.

Q. Is it your hope that this document, once it's negotiated and completed to the satisfaction of all three parties, would then be released after a summit by the three heads of state?

A. I don't know. I don't want to presume, at this point, what I really don't know. What we have is a document that's going to be studied now in the weeks ahead and discussed among us.

It's not a ploy for a summit; it's an effort to reach agreement on at least some issues as an interim step toward full agreement. We haven't even got to the point of knowing whether we can get a full agreement on such a document and, if so, what the time of issuance is.

Q. Assuming that you do reach agreement on this document, what would be the stage that would follow?

A. I don't know. I mean, I think we would then talk with one another and say, what do we do with it now?

Q. Would the achievement of this document lead to the holding of elections on the West Bank and Gaza?

A. I think it would need more. No, it would need more work before we're ready for that. This is not a document—if that's what you're asking—is this a document which could be put before the Palestinians and say, vote on it? No, I don't think so, no.

Q. Was this the first time that such a document was presented to the parties, or had it been in circulation among the parties before?

A. There was an earlier document—a short draft document—which some weeks ago we presented to both parties and which we have discussed over the past weeks. We have now taken that short document—taking into account the results of our discussions—amplified it, added new provisions, and tried to put together now a more substantive document which can now become the focus of attention.

Q. How do you see the schedule or the timetable of all those stages that you described until the full-scale, three-side resumption of the talks? When do you expect those ministers to come here for the talks, and when do you expect a three-side meeting for the first time again?

A. I shouldn't try, without consultation with my colleagues, to give you a schedule now. I can surmise for you, as you can for yourself. If we are now engaged in some bilateral discussions which will continue—there will be the interruption of the Jewish holidays, as you know—then there will be some preliminary trilateral meetings—perhaps that will get us into October. Then I would assume sometime perhaps around the middle of October the full-scale negotiations might resume—maybe a little earlier, maybe a little later—I don't know. Something like that.

Q. I wonder if you could tell us where the idea for the draft document came from in the Administration—whether President Carter should be credited with the idea or you or former Ambassador Strauss [Ambassador Linowitz' predecessor] or who?

A. You're making it very difficult for my modesty, but let me first say I am responsible for the negotiations. My instructions from the President have been general: to proceed as seems best in order to advance the negotiations and the prospects for them.

I discussed with the President and with the Secretary of State what my thoughts are about how we proceed, but I am in charge; I have undertaken responsibility for formulation of the document, for the timing of its presentation, for the effort to amplify it, and for the decision to put it before the parties—all this with the knowledge and approval of the President and the Secretary.

Q. You said that President Sadat, as well as Mr. Begin, recognized the danger of war, and this prompted them to resume the negotiations.

War between who and who? Between Egypt and Israel, or between Israel and its neighbors, or between Israel and the Palestinians?

A. I said war, broadly, because you know, every bit as well as I, that in the explosive part of the world, it doesn't take very much to set off violence. Violence in turn begets further violence, and we don't know when something erupts with enough intensity so it becomes a Middle East shooting war and then involves the possibility of a worldwide conflagration.

We have seen enough already—for example, on the West Bank—about the dangers of shooting and killing. We've seen it in Lebanon, we've seen it in other places, and we know that what we have there is a dangerous situation for the world.

But the issue is war and peace, not only in that part of the world but even more broadly. And I think it's a very sobering, serious awareness of that which led President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin to feel that they must put aside whatever minor skirmishes they have had on issues and focus on their major goals as statesmen: How can we move toward peace; how can we negotiate; how can we resolve this issue in a manner that will lower the temperature and lessen the danger of an outbreak?

Q. Would the purpose of the summit be to complete this interim agreement, or would you have to complete the interim agreement before you would go to the summit? Would that be preferable?

A. Again, I don't know how to answer that because what we're going to try to do is move with this interim agreement as best we can in the course of our negotiations.

I don't know where it will stand at the end of 3 weeks or 4 or a month or

so. I don't know what the right time might be for approval of it and issuance.

All I am saying is that it is now the next step, and, by the way—maybe worth underlining—one of the reasons I personally think that there is perhaps a better prospect for advancing negotiations now—when we get back to the negotiating table—than there would have been a few months ago is because we now have a document, such as this one, on which to focus our attention and to see what progress we can make in resolving the disputes.

Q. Let me go back to my basic question, which is the war. So now we expect to see a lower temperature in the area and the ceasing of the Israeli incursion into southern Lebanon and the dangers of outbreak on that side. Am I correct in my understanding or—

A. I didn't say that.

Q. So how, then, does the resumption of negotiations affect the outcome of war and peace?

A. Let's wait and see.

Q. You said we're talking about autonomy, and autonomy had been designed for the Palestinians—the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. Up to now those people had been refusing this outfit, this dress, they want different ones.

Have you through your visit—recent visit to that part of the world—come out with the sort of feeling that they might accept whatever you're preparing for them? Do you have more chances now that they're going to accept, or are we going to witness a continuation of the refusal of what you have been designing?

A. I can't say to you that I know with certainty what the reaction will be. I can tell you that we have some reason to believe that, if we are able to make progress—substantive progress in the negotiations—the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza are going to be very interested and are going to look at it carefully.

Whether this will be enough to attract their participation, I don't know. But we are cognizant of the fact that what we are doing is negotiating a document which should be, must be, attractive to the Palestinians to be effective. Therefore, we have that very much in mind, hindered as we are by the absence of the Palestinians, themselves, from our negotiating table.

Q. You have said that actions which focused a lot of publicity on Jerusalem are disruptive and that the settlement issue is also a factor which makes the autonomy talks difficult. You have exchanged impressions between the two presidents on the subject.

Can you say whether the resumption of the autonomy talks is based now on a clear understanding that there should be no innovation on Jerusalem and on the settlements issues?

A. No innovation?

Q. No new changes. None of these factors that are disruptive.

A. I am going to repeat again: I can't tell you that I got firm assurances.

Q. Could you go through the timing of this interim agreement one more time? Did you have this in hand on this trip, or is this something you put together as a result of your latest round of discussions with Sadat and Begin?

A. The interim agreement?

Q. Yes.

A. Most of it I had in hand when I left, as a document which we would put forward if there were encouragement on the earlier, shorter document and if the results of our separate conversations led us to believe there might be a welcome for this.

I think I've said before, in your presence, that I've tried to be very careful not to appear to come with an American plan; therefore, I felt it only appropriate to put this forward when this was welcomed and we were encouraged to do it and when I was able to give it to them with the knowledge that they would read it carefully and would regard this as a helpful contribution.

Q. When did they accept the earlier plan?

A. Received it, rather than "accept it." I want to be sure you—

Q. Right.

A. Yes. They received it about 3 or 4 weeks ago, I would say.

Q. There had been reports from Israel that four more settlements are going to be approved tomorrow at the Cabinet.

Did the Prime Minister of Israel inform you of this, and do you think

Prospects for Middle East Peace

by Sol M. Linowitz

Address before the National Press Club in Washington, D.C., on September 18, 1980. Ambassador Linowitz is Personal Representative of the President to the Middle East Peace Negotiations.

they go ahead with it, that will help create a constructive atmosphere you have been trying to create? Has he told you what they plan to build four more settlements near Hebron?

A. Yes. I knew it, and I discussed this with him at length. I conveyed the substance of that discussion. I think that's all I ought to say.

Q. You've sketched a scenario in which we're going to have—the talks are going to increase in intensity, perhaps climaxing a week or two before the election, and then the sort of unfortunate interruption of the election before Mr. Begin comes here and the summit is held.

Do you interpret, yourself, the agreement of Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat to this process as a vote of confidence in your work and in the Carter Administration?

A. I think I interpret it as an affirmation of their strong commitment to negotiation, of their reaffirmation of their strong confidence that the way to peace is through the Camp David process, and that it is the only viable path toward that peace.

It's not a matter of vote of confidence in a person or in a particular government; it is unquestionably true, because both of them have asserted to me their deep appreciation to the President for the part he had played at Camp David and for his continued commitment to the process.

But I would not want to put it in personal terms. I think neither of these men would have undertaken this statement and undertaken these commitments if he did not believe that move was in the best interests of his own country and in the interests of peace. And that's why I think they did it. ■

Just 2 years ago yesterday an event took place which was as dramatic as it was historic. After 13 days of arduous and intensive negotiations, President Anwar Sadat of Egypt and Prime Minister Menachem Begin of Israel, having met with President Carter at Camp David, announced to the world that they had reached agreement on the so-called Camp David framework for Middle East peace. In a moving ceremony at the White House, the Camp David accords were signed, and a new chapter in the history of the Middle East was opened.

Today I want to talk with you about where that process stands 2 years later. I want to report to you on my recent discussions with Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat and to affirm to you that the Camp David peace process has managed to survive its premature obituaries and is once again moving forward.

Before discussing with you details of my recent trip and our current negotiating efforts, I would like to focus on some of the most significant elements of the present situation—elements that give us reason for hope that the way to comprehensive peace in the Middle East will yet be found.

Elements of the Present Situation

First, there is today a growing global awareness of the stakes involved in peace in the Middle East. It is trite, but undeniably true, that the greatest impetus for peace is the constant danger of war. And the stark fact is that another Middle East war would invite global disaster.

Our own unrelenting efforts for peace between Israel and its neighbors proceed from an unshakable commitment to the security of Israel and a recognition that Israel's long-term security is best assured by the achievement of a stable peace throughout the region. Moreover, our work for peace in the Middle East is an essential element of our strategy for maintaining and defending our vital interests in Southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf.

Clearly, the strategic importance of this region has never been greater. It is equally manifest that the threats to peace in the region have multiplied as a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. And the danger that the spark of local conflict could ignite a major conflagration has never been more serious. So today the world understands, perhaps better than ever before, the vital significance of finding the way to peace in the Middle East.

The United States, Israel, the Arab states, our allies outside the Middle East—all have a strategic interest in a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. And each of us can find in peace the possibilities of bountiful new progress—in our relations with one another, in our economies, in our efforts toward the resolution of disputes in other areas.

Second, there is reason for hope and satisfaction in what has already been accomplished in the search for the Middle East peace. For over 30 years, the Arab-Israel conflict provided fertile ground for the congenial nay-sayers and the traditional prophets of doom. Except for such historic moments as the visit of President Sadat to Jerusalem or the signing of the Camp David accords, the problems always loomed larger than the possibilities. Yet the most important fact is that since Camp David there has been very significant progress.

We have only to think back to the situation in 1947—or 1967—or even 1977 and compare it with the situation now.

- Then there was a formal state of war and, on occasion, its terrible reality. Now we have a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel.

- Then there was a gulf of hostility and distrust and suspicion. Now there is real and evident determination in both Egypt and Israel to find a larger peace.

- Then the mechanism for achieving a peaceful settlement did not exist. Now it does in the Camp David process.

The treaty between Egypt and Israel marks a peace without victor or vanquished, entered into by two nations determined to reject a legacy of hostility and warfare. The terms of the Peace Treaty have been scrupulously followed. Israel has given up on schedule not only most of the Sinai—won and defended at such cost in blood—but also the Alma oil fields from which it had derived the majority of its energy needs. Egypt, for

its part, has proceeded to normalize its relations with Israel in the face of the strong, even fierce, reaction of its Arab neighbors and former allies.

Embassies have been opened, ambassadors exchanged. In civil aviation, in agriculture, in tourism, in other areas—Egypt and Israel have signed agreements that will enable their relations to move forward in defiance of their history of antagonism. Today the flag of Israel flies in Egypt and the flag of Egypt flies in Israel.

As important as these achievements are, they are not, in my judgment, the most important result of this new era of peace between two old enemies. More significant are changes of attitudes—on both sides. Everytime I sit down with President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin and with my colleagues in these negotiations, I am reminded that these shifts in perception are deep and genuine and permanent. Neither Egypt nor Israel is willing to return to the situation as it was before President Sadat's electrifying initiative in the fall of 1977. Both have set their feet on the road to peace and cooperation. Both understand that there can be no turning back. And both are determined that they will not turn back.

The third reason for hope in these negotiations is the fact that we have launched and are pursuing a practical process for future progress. In saying this I do not in any respect underestimate the immense difficulties before us. By the same token, however, none of us can overlook the opportunities.

Significant as it was, the treaty between Israel and Egypt was not the most far-reaching accomplishment of Camp David. Recognizing the potential vulnerability of their own treaty if left to stand alone, Egypt and Israel committed themselves to work as partners to achieve a comprehensive peace. And they decided that the next logical step toward that broader peace would be an agreement assuring Israel's security and well-being while providing full autonomy for the people of the West Bank and Gaza during a transition period.

These are the negotiations in which we are now engaged—negotiations which for the first time place on the same agenda the security of Israel and the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. The agreed objective of these negotiations is to provide for the free election of a self-governing authority by the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza and for transitional arrangements not to exceed 5 years in duration.

No one at Camp David in September 1978 believed that this process would be easy. The Camp David accords call on the negotiating parties to translate the words "full autonomy" from a verbal concept to a practical reality. Never before had there been an attempt to define "full autonomy" in similar circumstances. So it is small wonder that progress has been slow—sometimes agonizingly slow.

But the fact is that there has been progress in the past 2 years—considerable progress. The parties have already agreed upon a very substantial number of powers and responsibilities to be transferred to the self-governing authority. They have also made very significant progress in agreeing on the modalities—the mechanisms—for the free election in which the members of the self-governing authority will be chosen. And both parties remain determined to reach their common goal.

Recent Egyptian-Israeli Agreement

Clear and gratifying proof of that lies in the agreement reached 2 weeks ago between President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin—an agreement few anticipated. After my meetings with them earlier this month, Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat authorized me to announce a joint statement of agreement on their behalf. The agreement is short in length but its importance should not be underestimated.

It contains four major points and I would like to focus on them separately.

First, it states: "Both parties are agreed that they are and remain firmly committed to the Camp David accords and process and are convinced that they offer the only viable path toward comprehensive peace in the Middle East. Both are determined to see the process through to a successful conclusion regardless of temporary difficulties that may arise along the way."

All of us involved in the negotiations recognize that we have in the past—and surely will again in the future—encountered temporary difficulties. By the same token, we recognize that frustrations and disappointments are to be expected in these as in any other negotiations. I can assure you that as the President's Personal Representative since last December, I have often felt firsthand that disappointment and frustration.

In recent weeks our frustrations have been intensified by a myriad of external disturbances and disruptions—matters that have diverted attention from the issues actually under negotia-

tion. Such developments as violence on the West Bank, the seemingly endless stream of U.N. resolutions, and the various statements and actions touching on the status of Jerusalem—all have buffeted the negotiating process at the very time the parties have been trying to focus on the most difficult and complex issues. For example, the deeply sensitive issue of Jerusalem suddenly was pushed from the wings onto center stage, bringing with it predictable storm clouds and thunderclaps.

The leaders who met at Camp David knew that the problem of Jerusalem would need time for solution, and they agreed not to try to solve it in the current negotiations. They understood that Jerusalem touches the very souls of hundreds of millions of people—Jews, Muslims, and Christians alike. This is the reason for our belief that the city should remain forever undivided, with free access to the Holy Places for believers of all faiths. Its final status, however, can only be resolved at the right moment, in an atmosphere of deep trust, cooperation, and understanding among all the parties. And that moment has not yet come.

Until it does, there are other important issues to be dealt with. Recognizing this, President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin have once again committed themselves to the Camp David accords and process as the only—let me repeat only—available path toward comprehensive peace in the Middle East.

Some will say—and indeed some already have—that this is merely a reaffirmation of commitment to an inadequate process. They point out—correctly—that the Camp David accords do not settle the Jerusalem problem; they do not answer Palestinian questions about the final status of the West Bank and Gaza; they do not guarantee permanent Israeli security. Some outside the present negotiations, seduced by the illusion of easy answers and quick solutions, contend that the pace of the negotiations evidences their ineffectiveness and ultimate failure.

But these arguments miss the central point. The genius of the negotiators at Camp David was that they understood that past efforts to achieve peace in the Middle East had failed precisely because they had grasped for too much too soon. They recognized that the issues in this region are so complex, the emotions so deep, the contending forces so many, the stakes so great that the problems defy shortcut solutions. The wisdom of Camp David was to recognize this fact, to understand that bitterness dies hard while trust grows slowly. The key to

Camp David was its recognition that the best hope for enduring peace lay in a phased process—one in which agreements attainable at one stage become building blocks for future progress on more difficult issues.

So by abandoning the quest for comprehensive "breakthroughs," Camp David itself became a breakthrough. By deciding to pursue peace in relatively modest steps, the parties at Camp David took a giant step.

What was sensible then remains sensible today. Our goal remains not dramatic breakthroughs but steady incremental progress.

With full awareness of this, President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin have now reaffirmed their belief in the soundness of this approach. They have recommitted their countries to see this process through to success.

The second point in the recent agreement between President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin was their joint recognition that "for the negotiations to succeed, they must rest on a firm foundation of mutual trust and friendship." Not only did they concur in the statement of principle; they affirmed their intention to act in order to strengthen that foundation during the coming weeks.

The most profoundly disturbing aspect of the period between May and August of this year was the growing rift between Israel and Egypt. Exchanges between them had become increasingly sharp; tensions were exacerbated; and each side began to see in the other's actions and inactions cause to doubt the other's good faith. This deteriorating situation invited the critics and opponents of the Camp David process to intensify their rhetoric and essential egotivism.

Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat both recognized the dangers in this situation. Both are aware that their mutual trust and respect and friendship—today as at Camp David—remain the cornerstones for progress. They know that in any negotiation the opposing parties must develop and maintain mutual trust and respect if they are to be able to work together constructively in an effort to bridge their differences and that this is especially true in negotiations such as those in which we are now involved, where the issues are so complex and arouse such strong emotions. Both Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat know that to fulfill their continued commitment to the Camp David process, each must be sensitive to the concerns of the other and responsive to the opportunities to reas-

sure the other. And this awareness is already reflected in their very recent actions.

Third, President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin agreed to resume the autonomy negotiations at a mutually agreed date. Prior to this agreement, there had been some who doubted whether Egypt or Israel were truly committed to meaningful progress in the coming weeks. Others doubted whether such resumed negotiations could be productive prior to the U.S. elections. The present undertaking to go back to the negotiating table next month indicates the seriousness of the commitment by all parties.

Given the difficulty of the issues with which we are now grappling, there is a natural temptation to seek to avoid coming to grips with the formidable problems. Consider the questions the parties are trying to resolve.

- How can Israel be assured that its security interests will be fully preserved and protected under the new autonomy arrangement?
- How can the water resources of the region best be fairly and equitably shared?
- How should we deal with the public lands in the West Bank and Gaza areas during the 5-year transitional period?
- What powers should be exercised by the self-governing authority during the transitional period, recognizing that the final status of the territories will later have to be determined by agreement among Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and the Palestinians?
- And should the Arab inhabitants of East Jerusalem participate in the election of the self-governing authority?

At the direction of President Carter, I made clear in my talks with both Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat that the United States is prepared to work intensively and actively with them during the weeks ahead to help them resolve the key issues that still separate the parties. In other words, they are assured that the United States stands ready to play its role as a full partner.

In that spirit of full partnership, I gave both Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat a document we had prepared in an effort to help the parties bridge the differences between them. In accepting our document and agreeing to study it, both parties reaffirmed their continuing commitment to serious exchanges on the outstanding issues. And both welcomed the active and substantive participation by the United States.

Finally, in their joint statement, Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat agreed that a summit meeting with President Carter could contribute significantly to the peace process. Accordingly, they agreed to consult about when and where such a summit might be held later this year; and preparations will soon begin to lay the groundwork for the summit.

This recent agreement gives me as a negotiator new reason for hope and even optimism that the way to a broader Middle East peace will one day be found. Indeed, I remain today—2 years after Camp David—convinced that despite the frustrations, anxieties, and disappointments, the prospect of achieving a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace between Arabs and Israelis is still better than at any time in the past 30 years.

As a negotiator I cannot allow myself the temptations of impatience or discouragement. Pessimism at this important time does not serve our nation's interests or the interests of peace. It does not serve the interests of those—both Arab and Israeli—who have the most at stake. It holds in cheap regard the historic accomplishments of the leaders of Egypt and Israel. It ignores the overriding fact that seemingly intractable obstacles have been overcome before. And it overlooks the fact that what was considered merely a dream but 2 years ago is today a reality.

Because we care about Israel's security, because we care about a more promising future for the Palestinians, because we care about continued progress for Egypt and Israel and the entire region, and because we understand our strategic interests as well as our moral obligations, we must continue to be resolute in our efforts to fulfill the promise of Camp David.

In the Chinese language, the word crisis is written by combining two symbols—the symbol for the word "danger" and the symbol for the word "opportunity."

In the Middle East, the danger is great and we know it. But the opportunity is also great—and that we also know. At this extraordinary moment in history, we are determined that this opportunity not be lost. ■

U.S. Interests in the Middle East

Addresses by Secretary Muskie and Sol M. Linowitz before the Economic Club of New York on October 28, 1980. Ambassador Linowitz is Personal Representative of the President for the Middle East Peace Negotiations.

SECRETARY MUSKIE¹

Tonight I will make some general observations about our broad interests in the Middle East. Ambassador Linowitz will discuss the status of the autonomy talks between Israel and Egypt. That is our division of labor here tonight. It is not a distinction of issues. These topics—our interests and the quest for peace—are inseparable.

Let me begin with a partial listing of Middle East challenges during the years of this Administration.

- A peace between Israel and Egypt has been agreed, and a framework for the next stage is in place. But the task of building a comprehensive peace between Israel and all of its neighbors lies ahead.

- Today Lebanon is caught up in a web of violence, struggling to escape the ravages of civil war.

- In Iran, social and political upheaval has created a stark new reality with global implications and an affront to law and decency in the captivity of American citizens. We are pursuing every avenue to achieve their release. We will not rest until they are home.

- Hostilities along the border between North and South Yemen have threatened the stability of the Arabian Peninsula. They highlight the potential for mischief of a Soviet client state in a vital place.

- And last month Iraq and Iran went to war—a classic case of a local conflict harboring danger for nations throughout the world.

This brief survey underscores fundamental realities about the Middle East. One is that the region is a mosaic of many peoples, with rivalries reaching back to antiquity. Ethnic and religious divisions in the Middle East long predate our own creation as a nation. Indeed, some struggles—including that between Arabs and Persians, as well as that of the Jewish people to find a secure existence—predate the beginning of modern Western civilization.

Another reality is that those ancient animosities now exist in the context of rapid and profound change. The region holds some of the richest nations of the world and some of the poorest, some adaptive cultures and some deeply traditional. The process of modernization inevitably strains the social order. Often the result is instability and turmoil.

So we have two sets of influences—ancient tensions and new ferment—both contending for disorder. These influences are facts. We can neither ignore them nor wish them away. Rather we must take them fully into account as we design our policies and carry them out. With this as background, let us examine the nature of our interests in the region.

Nature of U.S. Interests

First, we want to see local disputes in the region confined, to avoid wider threats to peace. The region's tangle of internal tensions makes it all the more vulnerable to outside powers seeking to exploit local disputes. The same characteristics that make the region a challenge to peacemakers make it a magnet for troublemakers. The Soviet Union has a tradition of ambition in the Middle East. Now its effort to crush a sovereign neighbor, Afghanistan, has added a grave new dimension.

Facing these circumstances, our best course is to work tirelessly for peace and steadily to build our strength. We will play whatever role we can to resolve local conflicts peacefully. Thus we have remained impartial in the hostilities between Iraq and Iran. We have supported the United Nations and Islamic conference efforts to end the fighting.

But there must be no mistake on another count: We are prepared to do all that is necessary, together with other nations of similar purpose, to assure that this conflict does not disrupt the flow of petroleum from the Persian Gulf and thereby rupture economies all over the world.

A second overriding American interest is in the security, the strength, and the well-being of the State of Israel. The commitment of the United States to Israel is irrevocable. It has been sustained and intensified by President Carter. Let me express that commitment in a personal way. With so many Americans, I have found inspiration in the vision, the energy, the boundless

courage of the people who endured the pogroms, who suffered the darkest episodes in human experience in the holocaust, who then came to found a nation and make it prosper.

I recall the sense of awe and the sense of history I felt in 1971 in the presence of David Ben Gurion on his kibbutz. I remember vividly my conversations in Jerusalem with Prime Minister Golda Meir on Israel's security needs. I remember then going to the Soviet Union and pressing on Soviet leaders the case for free emigration. And I recall, in 1975, joining in the Senate effort that effectively put a stop to the so-called reassessment of our policy toward Israel during the negotiations underway half a decade ago.

A commitment to Israel has been a part of my public life for 35 years. And it is from that perspective that I say: America has a President deeply committed to the security and the prosperity of Israel. That is not only my opinion. It is something I know to be true. I know it the surest possible way—not because I have heard it pledged but because I have seen it happen, time and time again, both before and after I became Secretary of State.

As a Senator, and chairman of the Budget Committee, I saw President Carter seek from the Congress over \$10 billion in economic and military aid to Israel. In the past 4 years, we have provided almost half of the American aid Israel has received in all of its 32 years. I saw an Administration insist that Israel should have the most advanced and effective defenses we could supply—including modern surface-to-air missiles, the M-60 tank, and the F-15 and F-16 aircraft. And I was there when President Carter returned from his trip to Israel and Egypt—a mission that many thought was far too risky, far too difficult.

Yet we saw him devote himself—day after day—to the painstaking search for peace. At Camp David with President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin, he labored to hammer out an agreement once thought impossible to achieve. As a result there is a first peace—a treaty between Israel and Egypt. That treaty means that Israel, today, knows more real security than ever before. As Moshe Dayan has said, President Carter “has done more and gone farther to bring peace than any other president.” And that may be the clearest demonstration of all of the President's commitment.

We intend to help maintain Israel's strength. We intend to persevere in the Camp David process, to seek a broader

peace that will provide a greater measure of long-term security for Israel and for its Arab neighbors. And we are determined to stop the abuse of international bodies—from UNESCO [U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization] to the U.N. General Assembly itself—as forums for unjustified attacks upon Israel. All the world must know our position on such issues.

- We will veto any attempt to impose sanctions upon Israel.
- We will veto any change in Resolution 242.
- By all available means we will reject any effort to deny Israel its place in the United Nations; as the President has said, such action would raise the gravest doubts about the future of the General Assembly itself and our own participation in it.
- And I pledge here today, on behalf of President Carter, that whenever, in the future, the United Nations is misused and abused on Arab-Israeli issues, with malicious, unfair, or one-sided resolutions, we will oppose them and, in the Security Council, veto them.

Our support for Israel is founded most of all on this truth: Israel's security is a matter of America's national interest. We know that no great power can long retain greatness if it deals loosely with its closest friends. And Israel's security is essential to us because it is indispensable to the achievement of a comprehensive Middle East peace—for Israel must have confidence that agreements made will be kept. Such a peace, in turn, is central to all of our interests in the region and many beyond. So there is the most direct relationship between Israel's strength and our ability to pursue our most basic interests.

Third, we also have a vital interest in sound relations with the peoples of the Arab world. The Arab nations include more than 150 million people. They live along the shores of crucial waterways—the Strait of Gibraltar, the Mediterranean Sea, the Suez Canal, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf. We have long shared and supported their aspirations for independence and progress.

We have an abiding interest in assuring that the balance of power and influence in the gulf region and the Indian Ocean does not turn against the West. The ability of the United States and its Western allies to defend our interests in that area will depend greatly on the quality of our relationships with the Arab states in the region. The vast majority of Arab states share our interest in the sta-

bility of the region. They share our desire for a comprehensive peace. Thus far the United States and most of the Arab countries have differed on how best to achieve that goal. Nevertheless, it is important to have the kind of relations within the Arab world which allow us to discuss the quest for peace in an atmosphere of common purpose rather than in one of hostility. In the final analysis, an agreement which is unable to achieve widespread support in the Arab world is an agreement which cannot endure.

In recent years the energy issue has made Americans more sensitive to our relationship with Arab countries. But even if that issue could be resolved overnight—and it cannot be—the quality of our relations with the Arab world would still be of crucial importance to us, to them, and to international peace.

Comprehensive Strategy

Clearly there are few areas of the world where so many American interests intersect. Because each of our interests in the Middle East is so important, the only sensible national policy is one which enables us to pursue all of those interests at once and to neglect none.

This explains why no prudent Middle East policy can be proclaimed in a single ringing phrase but must attend to a range of challenges. That is the character of our strategy now. It must remain so. We must work to help our friends in the Middle East build their strength in ways that do not threaten other friends. We must work to advance the cause of human development—in ways that are sensitive to cultural realities and respectful of tradition. We must reflect the concerns of other nations with similar interests in the region—including our European and Asian allies—but always recognizing that the American role is unique and that we have a particular responsibility for leadership. And above all, we must continue to sustain, as the centerpiece of our policy, the search for a comprehensive peace. For it is this element of our policy which most clearly serves every one of our interests.

The surest test of our strategy is how it serves our interests in times of rising uncertainty, such as the present. The war between Iran and Iraq deeply concerns us. But imagine how much greater the peril would be if there were no treaty of peace between Israel and Egypt. Clearly when progress is being made toward achieving agreement, Israel enjoys greater security. At the same time, such progress enhances our ability to build our

relations with other key states in the region and reduces the pressure on them to look elsewhere for support. With each practical step toward peace moderate forces are strengthened, the momentum toward peace grows, and our vital interests reinforce each other more.

At the beginning of my remarks I listed sources of uncertainty and turmoil in the Middle East. The region fully reflects Whitehead's phrase: "It is the business of the future to be dangerous." But these are also times of opportunity in the region. That is true in major part because of the courage of three national leaders—President Sadat, Prime Minister Begin, and President Carter—and the hopeful new reality they have created. Our task for the future is clear: We must resist impatience. We must not give way to the lure of simple answers, to those who think slogans are solutions. We must hold to the course we are on. As we do, we will help define the fate of the Middle East, our role there, and the well-being of much of the world—for the rest of this century and beyond.

AMBASSADOR LINOWITZ

Against the backdrop of Secretary Muskie's overall picture of the Middle East and its uncertainty, instability, and conflict, I want to talk with you about the negotiations in which we are now engaged with Egypt and Israel, trying to fashion an autonomy arrangement for the Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza.

The Secretary mentioned that these are times of opportunity in the Middle East. Let me start by setting forth my conviction: that despite the complexities and frustrations, the United States has a real opportunity in these peace negotiations. The opportunity for enhanced American influence in the region, the opportunity to achieve lasting peace for Israel and its neighbors, the opportunity to move forward the whole peace process in the Middle East. And I submit to you that despite the frequent premature obituaries for the Camp David process, the prospects for achieving a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace between the Israelis and the Arabs are still better today than they have been for 30 years. And I would like to talk with you about why that is so.

Two weeks ago I met with the representatives of Egypt and Israel in Washington for formal resumption of the autonomy negotiations after a troublesome suspension of several months. I am pleased to be able to tell you that these talks were both satisfying and construct-

ive. We made progress in the search for mutually acceptable answers to some of the difficult issues we are now confronting, and we discussed preparation for a summit meeting to be held during the next few months with the President, President Sadat, and Prime Minister Begin.

These discussions made unmistakably clear, as had my meetings with President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin last month—that Israel and Egypt are deeply committed to these negotiations as (in their words) “the only viable path toward comprehensive peace in the Middle East.” And for its part, the United States is committed to play its proper role as a “full partner” in these negotiations. In order to make clear what we conceive that role to be and how we hope to proceed, let me focus on a few basic questions.

Goals

First, what is it we are trying to achieve in these autonomy negotiations? The answer to that question arises directly from the Camp David meetings held a little over 2 years ago. As you remember, in September 1978, President Carter invited Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat to Camp David. What happened there became one of the most dramatic stories of our century. As a result of 13 days of intensive and difficult negotiations, the two most powerful states in the Middle East agreed to make peace after decades of hostility and flashes of outright war. Beyond that, the two nations—with the United States as a full partner—pledged themselves to the achievement of a broader peace that would extend throughout the region.

The Camp David agreement was in itself a momentous achievement. But it was only a beginning. For what was more important than the meeting itself was the process it set in motion. At Camp David the parties agreed upon three clear and specific goals.

First, they sought to achieve peace and a productive working relationship between Israel and Egypt.

Second, they set as their goal the provision of full autonomy to the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza under a transitional arrangement, which would not exceed 5 years and which would involve the election of a self-governing authority by these Palestinian inhabitants. Both parties believed—and continue to believe—that such an autonomy arrangement would provide the next logical step in the quest for a broader peace. The

parties explicitly agreed that this transitional arrangement must respect the security concerns of all parties, notably the security of Israel. In addition, it was agreed that Jordan would be invited to join the autonomy discussions and that the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza could join the delegations of Egypt or Jordan.

The **third**, and by far the most ambitious, goal set forth by the parties at Camp David was a comprehensive peace among all the parties of the region.

This was a dramatic agenda—one which electrified the world. The pledge of peace rightly brought the Nobel Prize to both President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin. And now, 2 years after Camp David, it is timely and appropriate to ask: How far have we come toward achievement of these goals?

Progress

At the outset, we can observe with satisfaction that the first goal—peace between Israel and Egypt—has been achieved to a remarkable degree. A formal peace treaty was signed a year ago March. This treaty, let me remind you, marks a peace without victor or vanquished, entered into by two nations determined to reject a legacy of hostility and warfare. Since the treaty came into effect, both nations have scrupulously adhered to their commitments. Thus Israel has turned over to Egypt on schedule not only the major portion of the Sinai but also the Alma oil fields, despite the immense burdens that the loss of this oil imposes on the Israeli economy. For its part, Egypt has proceeded diligently to normalize its relations with Israel in the face of strong, even fierce reaction of its Arab neighbors and former allies.

Embassies have been opened, ambassadors exchanged. In civil aviation, in agriculture, in tourism, in other areas—Egypt and Israel have signed agreements that will enable their relations to move forward in defiance of their history of antagonism. Today the flag of Israel flies in Egypt and the flag of Egypt flies in Israel.

Beyond these tangible achievements, there has been an intangible one of perhaps even greater importance—an achievement in spirit. In that connection, I am reminded of Macauley's words: “It is not the machinery we employ but the spirit we are of that binds men together.” Today an atmosphere of cooperation and trust prevails where only bitterness, suspicion, and hatred once reigned. Each

time I sit down with President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin and with my colleagues in these negotiations, I am reminded that the shifts in perception are deep and genuine. These changes reflect the steadily evolving attitudes of the people of both nations, for both Egypt and Israel have set their feet on the road to peace and cooperation. Both understand there can be no turning back. And both are determined that they will not turn back.

As to the second goal—the effort to achieve full autonomy for the people of the West Bank and Gaza—Israel, Egypt, and the United States are now working to reach an agreement that will accommodate the principle of full autonomy for the Palestinians with the parties' legitimate and vital security interests.

From the beginning we have known that this would be an exceedingly difficult undertaking. The Camp David accords specifically call upon the parties to define the powers and responsibilities that would represent the “full autonomy” for the Palestinians to which both Israel and Egypt are committed. It is important to understand that no one has ever defined “full autonomy” in similar circumstances. So we are now engaged in grappling with this most difficult question and trying to find practical solutions to the complex and emotion-laden problems involved.

We have already made considerable and gratifying progress in agreeing upon a substantial number of such powers and responsibilities that both Israel and Egypt believe should be transferred to the authority. We have also made substantial progress in agreeing on the modalities—the mechanisms—for a free election in which the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza would participate to choose the members of the self-governing authority.

In recent weeks and months the negotiations have been disturbed by external disruptions which have diverted attention from the issues actually under negotiation. Such developments as violence on the West Bank, the seemingly endless stream of U.N. resolutions, and the various statements and actions touching on the status of Jerusalem—all have buffeted the negotiating process at the very time the parties were trying to focus on the most difficult and complex issues. For example, the deeply sensitive issue of Jerusalem was suddenly pushed from the wings onto center stage bringing with it predictable storm clouds and thunder claps.

The leaders at Camp David knew that the problem of Jerusalem would

need time for solution, and they agreed not to try to solve it in the current negotiations. They understood that Jerusalem touches the very souls of hundreds of millions of people—Jews, Christians, and Muslims alike. This is the reason for our belief that the city should remain forever undivided, with free access to the holy places for believers of all faiths. Its final status, however, can only be resolved at the right moment in an atmosphere of deep trust, cooperation, and understanding. And that moment has not yet come.

Remaining Issues

Until it does, there are other important issues to be dealt with. Now we are focusing on the several remaining critical and decisive issues in the negotiations.

- How can Israel be assured that its security interests will be fully preserved and protected?
- What arrangements can be worked out to assure that the water resources of the area are fairly and equitably shared among the parties?
- How should we undertake to deal with the problem of public lands in the West Bank and Gaza and the respective rights and claims involved?
- What should be the nature of the powers exercised by the self-governing authority during the transitional period, recognizing that the final status of the territories will have to be determined by agreement among Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and the Palestinians during that 5-year transitional period?
- And should the Palestinian inhabitants of East Jerusalem participate in the election of the self-governing authority?

These are immensely difficult problems; on all of them there have been, and will continue to be, intensive and arduous negotiations. But the fundamental point is that both Egypt and Israel clearly recognize that the self-governing authority must be credible and viable; that it must have real power over the lives of the people on the West Bank and Gaza; and that it must offer them meaningful participation in the decisions that affect their lives. By the same token, both sides agree that Israel's security must be fully reserved and protected and that the dangers of attack, terrorism, and disorder must be carefully guarded against.

Admittedly, the problems still unresolved are enormous. But we must look at them in the light of progress which has already been made, remembering that less than 2 years ago relatively few

people here or elsewhere believed that peace between Egypt and Israel was even thinkable.

As you might expect, the difficulties in reaching agreement have been compounded by the fact that the Palestinians, for whom the self-governing body is intended, have thus far been unwilling to participate in the negotiations. I have talked with Palestinian leaders both on the West Bank and Gaza, as well as in this country, in an effort to learn firsthand about their concerns and aspirations. It is my belief that Palestinian involvement is possible if the parties can make real progress toward full autonomy and if the parties can persuade the Palestinians that the present peace process can, indeed, assure them a more promising future.

When I first entered these negotiations, I said that if I were a Palestinian I would not then have wanted to become involved in the negotiations. My point was that at that juncture the parties had

not begun to focus on the substantive aspects of autonomy; rather they had dealt largely with procedures and semantics. But real and substantial progress has now been made toward giving the concept of "full autonomy" significant meaning and content. And I believe we are now at a point where the Palestinians should look long and hard at our process. And I hope they can be persuaded to do so.

Another concern we have had has been the refusal of Jordan to participate in the talks and the lack of support from Saudi Arabia and other moderate Arab states. We have met with King Hussein and have talked frankly with him about the progress of our negotiations. I have also met with Crown Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia and King Hassan of Morocco. With all of them I have discussed our objectives in the negotiations and the reasons why we believe our course holds out the promise of a better way of life for the Palestinians. I can tell you that they are watching our negoti-

Anniversary of Lebanese President Sarkis' Inauguration

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
SEPT. 23, 1980¹

Four years ago today, the nation of Lebanon, emerging from bitter civil conflict, inaugurated a new President and began the process of rebuilding and reconciliation. This anniversary of the inauguration of President [Ilyas] Sarkis is a fitting moment to reaffirm the great importance the Government of the United States and the American people attach to the free and democratic state of Lebanon.

The people of Lebanon have endured many difficult years. The scars of the tragic 1975-76 civil conflict remain. Nevertheless, the constitutional Government of Lebanon—under the leadership of President Sarkis—has made progress toward dealing with Lebanon's problems. The government has been rebuilding the nation's armed forces. It has worked to give greater authority to all national institutions. It has taken steps to promote economic and social development for all Lebanese.

The United States has warmly and consistently supported these efforts.

The Government of Lebanon, however, has faced and still faces challenges from within and without the

country. There are those who still withhold cooperation from the government and seek their own independent objectives.

The United States firmly believes that all involved in the destiny of this important country have a vital interest in the development of the broadest possible national consensus in Lebanon. The United States calls on all to assist Lebanon's legitimate government to achieve this objective which will offer security, opportunity, and the glimpse of a better future for all of Lebanon's citizens.

The United States will continue to give full support to the achievement of Lebanon's basic national goals and will encourage others to do the same. The United States will continue to work with the elected Government of Lebanon to enhance the unity and cohesiveness of the Lebanese nation and to extend its authority throughout the country. The United States will continue to work to assure Lebanon's territorial integrity, its sovereignty, and its lasting independence.

¹ Read to news correspondents by acting Department spokesman John Cannon. ■

Seabed Mining and Law of the Sea

by Elliot L. Richardson

Address before the American Mining Congress in San Francisco on September 24, 1980. Ambassador Richardson is Special Representative of the President for the Law of the Sea Conference. He resigned on October 1, 1980, and was replaced by his deputy, Ambassador George H. Aldrich who will be Acting Special Representative.

Early in the last Law of the Sea Conference session in Geneva a friend gave me a bit of paper salvaged from a fortune cookie. Instantly recognizing its applicability to the conference, I taped it into my wallet and began showing it to my colleagues. It said: "This is the month when ingenuity stands high on the list."

The motto proved prophetic. At the beginning of the session an extensive list of stubborn issues remained outstanding. At its close only four were generally recognized as requiring further negotia-

tion at next spring's final session. They are boundary delimitation and the "three Ps"—participation, the Preparatory Commission, and preparatory investment protection. In addition, a handful of less important but desirable improvements remain to be worked out.

Assuming that these last few problems are solved and that the balance of the entire interlocking structure is not destroyed at the final stage by formal amendments, we will then have a treaty which, in my judgement, the deep seabed mining industry and American industry in general should wish to see ratified.

The standards on which I base this judgment have not changed since just over 3 years ago I branded as "totally unacceptable" the seabed mining part of the Informal Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT). Thanks to a lot of ingenuity and even more very hard bargaining, the present draft convention is vastly better than the ICNT. Since 1977,

ations with great interest—as the only game in town.

For over 30 years, the Arab-Israel conflict has provided fertile ground for the congenital nay-sayers and the traditional prophets of doom. Except for such historic moments as the visit of President Sadat to Jerusalem or the signing of the Camp David accords, the problems always loomed larger than the possibilities.

The Camp David process has been and is being criticized and denounced during past months as an inadequate and unpromising process. Some critics point out (correctly) that the Camp David accords do not settle the Jerusalem problem; that they do not answer Palestinian questions about the final status of the West Bank and Gaza; that they do not guarantee permanent Israeli security. Some—outside of the present negotiations, seduced by the illusion of easy answers and quick solutions—contend that the pace of the negotiations evidences their ineffectiveness and ultimate failure.

But I submit that all of these arguments miss the central point, for it was the genius of the negotiators at Camp David that they understood that all too many past efforts to achieve peace in the Middle East had failed precisely because they had grasped for too much too soon. They recognized that the issues in this region are so complex, the emotions so deep, the contending forces so many, the stakes so great, that the problems defy shortcut solutions. The wisdom of Camp David was to recognize this fact, to understand that bitterness dies hard while trust grows slowly. The key to Camp David was its recognition that the best hope for enduring peace lay in a phased process—one in which agreements attainable at one stage become building blocks for future progress on more difficult issues.

So by foregoing a quest for comprehensive "breakthroughs," Camp David itself became a breakthrough. By deciding to pursue peace in relatively modest steps, the parties at Camp David took a giant step.

What was sensible then remains sensible today. Our goal remains not dramatic breakthroughs but steady incremental progress. It was with full awareness of this that President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin last month reaffirmed their belief in the soundness of the Camp David approach and recommitted their countries to see this process through to success regardless of temporary difficulties that may intrude on the process. I find cause for hope—even some optimism—in this reaffirmation and in our subsequent negotiations.

Reasons for Hope

I know that to many people who have watched the agonies of the Middle East over the years, it seems surprising—even mystifying—that any negotiator on the Middle East can still be hopeful. Often I am asked how, in the light of the history of violence and hostility and deep-seated emotion, how, in the light of the difficulty of the issues and the slow pace of the negotiations, can I retain hope and even a measure of optimism?

There are several reasons for this. To begin with, I am a negotiator, and negotiators are by definition optimists. We had better be. The business of a negotiator, after all, is to try to fashion practical solutions from the most unpromising raw material. And I must admit I take some comfort from the thoughtful observation of that great American philosopher Casey Stengel who said: "They say you can't do it, but sometimes that doesn't always work." But I am also a realist, and as a realist I find reason for hope in the record that has been built since Camp David. Think of it: We have a peace treaty and normalized relations between Egypt and Israel; we have the demonstrated commitment of both countries to reach agreements in these negotiations; we have made significant substantive progress, even though there is still a distance to go; and we have the United States in-

involved as a full partner in the process, permitting us to act as a catalyst and as a constructive spur to progress.

In a world torn by uncertainty and conflict, the continuing hostility between Israel and the Arab world can only be described as a crisis. In the Chinese language the word crisis is written by combining two other symbols—the symbol for "danger" and the symbol for "opportunity."

In the Middle East the danger is great and we know it. But the opportunity is also great, and that too we know. At this moment in history, we owe it to ourselves, to our children, and their children to do all we can to assure that our present opportunity is not lost.

Over 100 years ago, Ralph Waldo Emerson put very well the challenge and the opportunity we face in these words:

If there is any period one would desire to be born in, is it not the age of revolution when the old and the new stand side by side and admit of being compared; when the energies of all men are searched by fear and by hope; when the achievements of the past era can be compensated by the rich possibilities of the new?

This time, like all times, is a very good one, if we but know what to do with it.

¹ Press release 303. ■

oughly 135 changes have been made in the seabed mining provisions; 120 of these are improvements from our point of view. All the objectionable features of the ICNT that I denounced in 1977 have been replaced by fair and workable compromises.

The ICNT itself improved the navigational provisions of earlier texts. Hence then the articles on protection of the marine environment, marine mammals, scientific research, and dispute settlement have also been improved; useful general clauses and an acceptable preamble have been added; and all but one of the final clauses—that relating to participation—have been satisfactorily negotiated.

The result by any standard is an unprecedented achievement for multilateral negotiation. That it was possible to find ways of accommodating such diverse and intense national interests can be accounted for only by the commitment of most participants to what they saw as an overriding and inspiring goal: the prevention of conflict and the tension of a generally agreed system of law to more than two-thirds of the earth's surface.

General Considerations

For inspiration, I realize, will not lift manganese nodules from the deep ocean floor. As some of this audience can attest from firsthand experience, that requires creative engineering, sustained hard work, and entrepreneurial risktaking of a high order. Whether such risktaking will be justifiable and prudent during the next decade is a matter of business judgment which only the potential investors can decide.

In addition to assessing the risks normal to investment in a hard-mineral mining venture on land, seabed mining investors have had to reckon with the presence of a generally accepted legal regime. Our view, as you know, is that deep seabed resources may be recovered lawfully by any state or its nationals as an exercise of a traditional high-seas freedom. We see nodules as analogous to the living resources of the high seas—the fish—that are found beyond the 200-mile fisheries zone.

This is not merely a defensible position but one that rests on a solid foundation of established international law. There are, however, difficulties with it. One is that it is totally rejected by most governments, including those of all the developing countries. A second is that deep seabed nodules can't swim, and seabed miners aren't fishermen. Miners

must have an exclusive legal right to a suitable ore body before they undertake the large, long-term investments necessary to recover and process the ore. Commercially exploitable manganese nodules, with negligible exceptions, do not occur in parts of the seabed subject to the resource jurisdiction of any nation. No nation can confer a right to mine them which is enforceable against the nationals of any other country. Indeed, the position that mining is a high-seas freedom cannot be squared with the assertion of any such power.

In our view, however, nations can license their own nationals to mine the deep seabed and can reciprocally agree to respect the licenses granted by other nations. The United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, as you know, have each enacted legislation that would authorize such reciprocal licensing, not as an alternative to the Law of the Sea convention but to foster the continued development of seabed mining capability. It is likely that several other advanced industrial countries will in due course follow suit. The number of these countries, however, is not likely in the foreseeable future to exceed six or eight. Can they collectively provide sufficient security for seabed mining investment? This in itself is a question of some difficulty. The fact that there have been threats of reprisal is not, of course, dispositive: We have no way of knowing whether or not such threats would in fact be carried out or, if they were, what damage they might inflict. That there would be legal challenges to any claims purporting to rest on national legislation is certain; only the outcome is in doubt.

The only sure way of removing these threats and uncertainties, quite obviously, is through the establishment of a universally recognized international legal regime for the exploitation of deep seabed minerals. This is what the Law of the Sea treaty undertakes to do. How secure and how reasonable is the regime that would be established by the treaty?

Before I attempt to answer this question, I should like to make two preliminary points.

The first is that the real test of the viability of the regime is how it would work on the nonreserved side—that is, under a contract between a consortium of private companies and the proposed International Seabed Authority. While the treaty would permit all kinds of joint arrangements between private corporations and the Enterprise, the opportunity to negotiate a joint arrangement on

an arm's-length basis depends on the existence of a realistic option to operate independently.

Second, I take it as a realistic assumption that the regime will operate in a manner consistent with the letter and spirit of its charter as embodied in the treaty. This has been made probable by the fact that the rules, regulations, and procedures of the Authority will have been developed by the Preparatory Commission before the treaty enters into force and can be changed thereafter only by consensus. These specific and detailed directives will preclude actions relying on worst-case interpretations of general treaty language that have often been invoked by critics of the treaty. I would urge both the mining companies and the Senate of the United States, however, to defer a final decision on the treaty's merits until after the Preparatory Commission has completed its work.

Having established these ground rules, let's take a closer look at the system.

Viability of the System

To justify spending \$1 billion on a single seabed mining project, an investor is entitled to insist on:

- Assured access to the opportunity to exploit a specific minesite;
- A fair chance to earn a return on investment commensurate with the risk undertaken;
- Solid protection against the arbitrary or unpredictable use or abuse of the Authority's power.

How adequately will the treaty satisfy these requirements? Rules, regulations, and procedures aside, this question can be addressed now since it is highly unlikely that there will be further changes in the text important enough to have any substantial effect on the answer.

Assured Access. To be assured of access to the opportunity for deep seabed mining, a prospective miner who has the necessary capital and know-how must be assured that the International Seabed Authority's contract approval process is fair, clear, and well-nigh automatic. The criteria spelled out in Annex III of the treaty satisfy this requirement. An applicant has only to be sponsored by a state party and to satisfy the financial and technical qualifications specified by the regulations. His plan of work must fulfill the specifications with

respect to such matters as size of area, diligence requirements, and mining standards and practices—including those relevant to protection of the marine environment—that will also be set forth in the regulations. If these requirements are met, his plan of work *must* be approved; there is no discretionary basis for its rejection.

The determination that the applicant and his plan of work do in fact comply with the applicable criteria is the job of the Legal and Technical Commission. The Commission will have 15 members elected to 5-year terms, by a three-fourths vote of the 36-member Council, from among candidates nominated by states parties who meet the "highest standard of competence and integrity with qualifications in relevant fields." The Commission is obligated to base its recommendations solely on the provisions of Annex III and to report fully to the Council. The majority required for decisions by the Commission will be established in the rules, regulations, and procedures, and I expect our representatives on the Preparatory Commission to insist that this must be no more than a simple majority.

Any plan of work which the Commission finds consistent with the requirements of Annex III will be deemed approved by the Council within a fixed time unless the Council decides—by consensus—to disapprove it. While we would have preferred the "deeming" device to apply regardless of the Commission's findings, the conference—understandably, I think—felt that some organ of the Authority would have to attest to conformity with the applicable standards of Annex III. (Indeed, this would also have been true even of the simple licensing proposal originally advocated by the industrial countries.) The automaticity of the system could only be frustrated if three-fourths of the members of the Council made a conscious and determined effort to elect unsuitable Commission members who would ignore the requirements of the treaty.

The Production Ceiling. Although we were able to get agreement in Geneva that approval of a plan of work will no longer be tied to the availability of a nickel-production allotment, the timing of access still depends on the authorization of production under the ceiling. The very existence of the ceiling is, of course, objectionable from our point of view, but we and other consumers of seabed metals confronted a coalition of land-based producers and

developing countries whose insistence on transitional protection against the loss of markets demanded some accommodation. As now formulated, the production ceiling is not likely to bar access for any qualified miner. The amount of permitted production is substantial, a "floor" has been added, and the constraint on seabed production is limited in duration.

Because the formula in the text is based on a projection forward of past trends, it is impossible to predict exactly what level of production will be allowed during the 15 years the limit will, in effect, apply. Taking 3.4% as a reasonable and conservative projection of the nickel-consumption growth rate (the Bureau of Mines' mid-range projection for the balance of this century) and 1988 as the earliest practicable startup date for commercial production, we find that the first group of miners to apply for production authorizations could produce annually an aggregate of about 200,000 tons of nickel. On the same assumptions, the limit would be 320,000 tons in 1992, 490,000 tons in 1997, and 590,000 tons in 2002.

In fact, the 15-year, trend-line growth rate for nickel consumption is currently about 3.9% and, if that rate were to hold up in the future, the tonnage allowed to seabed mining would be considerably higher. If future growth should turn out to be significantly lower than anticipated, the full effect would not be felt because of the "floor" provision in the formula. This substitutes a minimum 3% growth rate for any actual rate lower than 3%. Even if the growth rate fell as low as 2.2%, seabed miners could—if they thought they could make money in the kind of economic climate implied by such a discouraging trend—still supply up to 18% of the nickel market in the first year of production and up to 36% by the 15th year. Notwithstanding the share of production taken up by the Enterprise, acting alone or in joint ventures, there would still be sufficient tonnage under any reasonable set of assumptions to insure that private miners would get their authorizations when they need them. It is thus probable that market forces, not the production limitation formula, will determine how much nickel and, therefore, how much copper, cobalt, and manganese will be produced by the first generation of seabed mining projects.

Return of Investment. Capital outlay, operating costs, and metal prices, of course—not payments for the right to mine such as fees, royalties, and

profit shares—are the dominant factors governing the return on any mining investment. The latter, nevertheless, must not be excessively burdensome, and in this respect the treaty's financial provisions are not worse than most other tax systems. The front-end load is modest in proportion to the size of the investment involved. It consists of an application fee, a sort of "ground rent" payable until production begins, and the cost of prospecting the minesite which is turned over to the Enterprise under the banking system. The application fee is tied to the actual cost of processing the application but is limited in any case to \$500,000. The "ground rent" of \$1 million per year is creditable against royalties (the "production charge") once production begins and is waived if a contractor is held up by a lack of tonnage under the production ceiling. The cost of prospecting a minesite is roughly \$10 million.

Once production begins, the production charge and profit-share payments come into play. They take effect in two stages; the first before the investment has been recovered and the second afterward. In the first stage, the production charge is 2% of market value of the processed metals produced by the project. In the second stage, it increases to 4% unless the return on investment in a given year would fall below 15% if the 4% rate were applied, in which case the production charge reverts to 2% for the year. The profit-sharing payments are based on a graduated, incremental schedule. During the first stage, the rates are 35% for that income providing a return on investment of 10% or less, 42.5% for that income providing a return between 10% and 20% and 50% for that income providing a return in excess of 20%. In the second stage, the corresponding rates are 40%, 50%, and 70%. Unlike the production charge, which applies, in effect, to all proceeds, the profit share applies only to the actual fraction attributable to the mining portion of the project—or to 25% of total proceeds, whichever is higher.

Of course, this system of payments cannot be looked at in isolation. Miners will also have to pay national taxes, and the relationship between the two systems is important in determining the financial viability of a project. The question of how the U.S. tax system should take into account payments made by U.S. citizens to the Authority has yet to receive systematic attention. In my judgment, however, a tax credit for profit-sharing payments is likely to prove both

appropriate and necessary if seabed mining is to be conducted under the U.S. flag.

Transfer of Technology. Originally proposed by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in 1976 as part of a package designed to win support for the "parallel system," some form of assistance to the Enterprise in acquiring technology has ever since been integral to any seabed mining deal. Since I came on board in 1977, our negotiating objectives have been to confine the obligation to its accepted purpose and to make sure that it did not undercut the miner's chance for a fair return on his investment. This has been a tough, hard-fought battle, but I believe that the outcome is tolerable.

One of the unacceptable defects of the ICNT was a provision making the transfer of technology a condition of obtaining a contract. The text now bars the Enterprise from invoking the technology transfer obligation until after the contract is in effect and until it has found, despite a good-faith effort in conducting tenders for bids, that it cannot purchase the technology it needs on the open market. There may well be sellers glad to spread their research and development costs. And since the Enterprise can in any case acquire technology under a joint arrangement, it may never seek to obtain it by other means. If the Enterprise does have occasion to invoke the obligation, it must do so on the basis of "fair and reasonable commercial terms and conditions," and any dispute as to the application of this standard is subject to commercial arbitration. The obligation expires, in any case, 10 years after the Enterprise has begun commercial production.

The technology covered is limited to "specialized equipment and technical know-how . . . necessary to assemble, maintain and operate" the mining system. We successfully overcame a major effort by the Group of 77 to get the obligation extended to processing technology. We were also able to exclude manufacturing data. In the case of technology that he uses but does not own, the miner is required to obtain the owner's written assurance, which need not be legally binding, that the owner will be prepared to do business on a similar basis with the Enterprise. The miner must also be willing to try to acquire the legal right to transfer to the Enterprise the mining technology he uses but doesn't own if he can do so without substantial cost to himself.

That is not all, unfortunately. Despite our strong opposition, the technology-transfer provisions still contain the so-called Brazil clause. This clause allows one or more developing countries to take advantage of these provisions in the event that the Authority authorizes them to exploit the reserved site banked by the miner whose technology is sought, instead of keeping the site for the Enterprise. The problem is more political than practical, as there is little chance that the option will ever be exercised. Given the cost of buying the technology and meeting the other capital requirements of a mining project, it is scarcely conceivable that any developing country or group of developing countries will ever undertake seabed mining on their own. It would make far more sense, and it is thus far more likely, that they would choose instead to enter into some form of association either with the Enterprise or with a multinational company, both of which will have technology.

Protection Against the Abuse of Power. In addition to the assurance of access and the chance to earn a fair return on investment, the third essential requirement of a viable seabed mining regime is protection against the arbitrary or unpredictable use or abuse of power.

As I have already pointed out, one measure of protection is the barrier against distortion of the text erected by the fact that the Preparatory Commission will be charged with preparing the Authority's initial rules and regulations. The Commission will meet essentially full-time for perhaps 2 years. Experts will have more influence in such a forum than in the Law of the Sea Conference itself. The United States will have a head start in getting ready for the Preparatory Commission because implementation of our own legislation will require the preparation of similar rules and regulations. Our colleagues in the Commission will be aware, moreover, that the prospect of Senate advice and consent will be strongly influenced by the acceptability, or otherwise, of the rules and regulations. They will also be aware that the Authority is not likely ever to be created without our participation.

A second measure of protection against the abuse of power is the care with which the powers and functions of the Authority have been allocated. Although the text still refers to the Assembly as the "supreme organ" of the

Authority, it is no longer possible to read this phrase in its present context as conferring power to usurp the executive role of the Council in managing the seabed mining regime.

Third, the Council itself has been prevented from taking majority action contrary to the vital economic interests of its seabed mining and consumer members. This was the most important single achievement of the Geneva session. Amendments to the initial rules and regulations adopted by the Preparatory Commission, which will govern matters critical to the conduct of mining operations, will now require a Council consensus. Consensus will also be needed for the rejection of a plan of work approved by the Legal and Technical Commission as well as for amendments to the treaty and measures to protect land-based producers. Most other issues will be subject to a three-fourths vote and the remainder to a two-thirds vote. Any new power assigned to the Council will require a consensus, if so provided in the rules and regulations conferring the power or if no voting rule is specified, and any dispute as to the voting category to which an issue belongs will be decided by the higher— or highest—of the majorities in question. Not least, the United States has now been effectively assured a seat on the Council by a new provision which gives each interest group or regional group entitled to representation the right to select its own representatives.

Fourth, the security of contract is explicitly protected both against action of the Authority and against amendment by the review conference. In fact, rules and regulations issued or revised subsequent to the conclusion of a mining contract cannot retroactively be applied to that contract—a provision which may warrant some modification in the case of environmental regulations.

As a final measure of protection in the event that none of the foregoing safeguards proves sufficient, provision has been made for the binding adjudication of disputes. The dispute settlement procedures can be summarized as follows.

- Any contractual dispute between a miner and the Authority, or a dispute as to whether the terms offered by a miner for the sale of his technology to the Enterprise, are within the range of fair and reasonable commercial terms and conditions, may be taken to commercial arbitration by either party.

- The Seabeds Disputes Chamber is also available to any state party, to any party to a contract, and to any miner who applies for a contract. The Chamber has the power to correct abuses of discretion or actions taken in excess of power, including failure to approve a plan of work. The Chamber is an 11-member body selected by the Law of the Sea Tribunal from among its 21 members. The Chamber can also be called upon by a commercial arbitral tribunal to interpret the convention.

- Disputes between states parties may, at the option of either party, be brought before an ad hoc panel of the Seabed Disputes Chamber.

The Interim Problem

Up to now I have been talking only about the seabed mining regime that would come into existence after the convention enters into force. The acceptability of the ultimate regime, however, is inescapably affected by the situation that will exist during the interval between signature of the convention and its entry into force. The very existence of the convention as a document that may become binding upon the United States at some future date—depending upon when and whether we and others ratify it—creates uncertainties and therefore risks for the prospective miner. These uncertainties include:

- The possibility that he may be denied the eventual right to mine the particular site which he has spent large sums to explore and for which his equipment is specifically adapted;

- The worry that the Authority will find some unjustifiable excuse for refusing to approve his plan of work;

- Uncertainty as to obtaining the authorization of sufficient production under the production ceiling early enough to start mining as soon as everything else is ready to go; and

- The concern that he may not be allowed to continue mining without interruption if the treaty enters into force as to the United States after January 1, 1988, and after he has begun commercial production under our domestic legislation.

A well-drafted grandfather clause written into the treaty would, of course, give the miner complete protection against all these risks. It is obvious, however, that the conference will never go that far. For one thing, such a clause would preempt the Authority's role with respect to the first group of contracts; for another, it would be seen to give the

nonreserved side of the parallel system an unjustified advantage over the reserved side. As I see it, the most we can realistically aim for is a combination of risk insurance under domestic legislation and some form of preparatory investment protection under the treaty which might include the right to continue mining until the Authority can act.

The chances of persuading the executive branch and the Congress to agree to risk insurance, which could be patterned on the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, have been enhanced by recent improvements in the text—for example, the clear provisions of Annex III and their elaboration in the rules and regulations—sharply reducing the likelihood of any of the worrisome possibilities which I enumerated a moment ago. The desirability of risk insurance is also influenced by the degree to which it would be in the national interest for the exploitation of seabed minerals to take place under the treaty rather than under domestic legislation. Although the national interests served by other parts of the treaty—air and naval mobility, for example, or protection of the marine environment—cannot make acceptable a treaty whose seabed mining regime is incapable of attracting investment, these other interests, when added to the national interest in the earliest practicable access to seabed minerals, may help to tip the scales in favor of risk insurance. Without such insurance, the development of seabed mining might have to be delayed until it is known for certain whether or not the treaty will enter into force as to the United States. Without such insurance, moreover, the seabed mining industry might see the prevention of delay as justifying the treaty's quick demise—an outcome contrary, I believe, not only to the national interest but to the interest of the industry itself.

Meanwhile, the chances of persuading the conference to agree on an adequate measure of preparatory investment protection would be improved if the interval between signature and entry into force could be used in ways that would enable the Enterprise to get an earlier start than would otherwise be possible. The parallel system has two parts, after all, and it is essential to each that the other succeed. One possibility, if some means of meeting the cost can be found, would be to use the interval to explore a minesite for the Enterprise. Another possibility would be a beginning on the training of the future

employees of the Enterprise. Such possibilities, it seems to me, may offer challenge and an opportunity: Whatever helps the capital "E" side of the system get off to a fast start could at the same time smooth the way for the small "e" side.

Seabed mining is in the truest sense a pioneering venture. So too is the effort of the world community to build the structure of a new international seabed mining regime on the proposition that the global commons are not subject to the jurisdiction of any state. It has been a difficult effort, the most difficult I have ever been a part of. But the same pioneering spirit and the same confidence in the future that have brought seabed mining and the seabed mining regime so close to reality can also assure a harmonious relationship between the two. And don't forget ingenuity—it still stands high on the list. ■

The Moon Treaty

by Roberts B. Owen

Statement before the Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on July 9, 1980. Mr. Owen is the Legal Adviser of the Department of State.¹

I am pleased to have the opportunity to appear before you to address matters related to the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, more frequently referred to as the Moon Treaty. Secretary Muskie regrets that he was unable to represent the State Department at these hearings.

However, as you are perhaps aware, State Department lawyers have regularly served on or chaired the U.S. delegation to the Legal Subcommittee of the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space—the Outer Space Committee—since its creation as an *ad hoc* body in 1958. It was in this subcommittee that the Moon Treaty, the fifth treaty directly related to man's activities in outer space, was in large part negotiated from 1972 to 1979. The treaty received the consensus approval of the Outer Space Committee on July 11, 1979, and it was approved by the U.N. General Assembly on December 5, 1979. Since then, France, Austria, Chile, the Philippines, and Romania have signed the treaty but have not yet ratified it. The treaty will come into force once five states have ratified it and thus become parties.

Over the past 9 months the treaty has been both criticized and supported by a broad range of interests. For this reason, when the Administration began to examine matters related to possible signature of the treaty and its transmittal to the Senate, an interagency study of the treaty was initiated to insure that the various political, economic, and legal issues would receive the most careful consideration.

The study, which is still going forward, clearly should take into account the matters developed at the present hearings. Since the study is not complete, obviously I cannot now provide a definitive Administration position as to signature and ratification of the Moon Treaty, but perhaps my testimony will be helpful in clarifying, if not resolving, certain issues, particularly those of a legal nature.

The Administration's study will, of course, cover all aspects of the treaty. During the current hearings, however, I would anticipate a division of subject matter as among those appearing for different Federal agencies. I would expect a witness from the Department of Defense to deal with those provisions of the treaty relating to arms control, while the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) will concentrate on the institutional context within which the treaty was negotiated and the issues relating to space exploration.

My focus will be upon those aspects of the treaty relating to the exploitation of nonterrestrial natural resources. It will be in this context that I will take up those issues to which you referred in your letter to Secretary Muskie on June 17, namely, the State Department's interpretation and views on the Moon Treaty, the development of U.S. policy with respect to the treaty, and our views of the "common heritage of mankind" concept. It is, of course, important that one keep in mind that the Moon Treaty is not limited to the exploitation issue, although that is the area which seems to have generated the most controversy. The arms control and space exploration provisions of the treaty also contain elements of political, military, and scientific significance to the United States.

1967 Outer Space Treaty

In the debate over the Moon Treaty, it is essential to bear in mind the existence and consequences of the first and most important treaty negotiated by the Outer Space Committee—the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, generally known as the Outer Space Treaty. Because of the fundamental importance of this treaty in assessing and understanding the Moon Treaty and U.S. positions during its negotiation, I wish to place on the record some specific language from the Outer Space Treaty, to which the Senate gave its consent without reservation and which has been binding upon the United States for the past 13 years.

... The exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of all mankind. [Article I]

Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for ex-

ploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality . . . and there shall be free access to all areas of celestial bodies. [Article I]

Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means. [Article II]

... The activities of non-governmental entities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall require authorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate State Party to the Treaty. [Article VI]

In the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, States Parties to the Treaty shall be guided by the principle of cooperation and mutual assistance and shall conduct all their activities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, with due regard to the corresponding interests of all other States Parties to the Treaty. [Article IX]

All stations, installations, equipment and space vehicles on the moon and other celestial bodies shall be open to representatives of other States Parties to the Treaty on a basis of reciprocity. [Article XII]

The development of U.S. policy with respect to the Moon Treaty obviously had to be carried out within the legal context established by the Outer Space Treaty, which is not only legally binding upon us but also generally regarded as the cornerstone of U.S. space policy and vital to American interests in outer space. In fact, as is the case with the three outer space treaties negotiated immediately prior to the Moon Treaty, the Moon Treaty essentially represents an elaboration of the basic principles of the Outer Space Treaty. Against that background the present inquiry relating to the Moon Treaty should focus, presumably, on those areas where the Moon Treaty goes beyond the 1967 Outer Space Treaty in order to see how such provisions may affect the interests of the United States.

Negotiating History and Other Background

My testimony will often refer to the negotiating history of the treaty. This serves two purposes.

First, the negotiating history of any treaty is obviously relevant to complete understanding of the treaty, and arguments either pro or con the treaty can be better analyzed and judged with knowledge of how the treaty text came to be what it is. As a legal matter, the preparatory work of a treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion are, of course, recognized by

the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to be a supplementary means of interpretation to be resorted to where the meaning of provisions is ambiguous or obscure. In this regard, the printing by the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of Eilene Galloway's admirable study of the negotiating history of the treaty and the committee's intention to print, as part of the record of these proceedings, Professor Carl Christol's detailed article on the common heritage concept in the Moon Treaty are invaluable in enhancing a general understanding of the treaty.

Second, in recent months there has arisen some controversy as to how the treaty was negotiated. For example, accusations have been made that in June 1979 the U.S. delegation to the Outer Space Committee surrendered to a negotiating attack by the U.S.S.R. and certain less developed countries, with the result that the final treaty represents essentially a Soviet-inspired text. The negotiating history of the treaty corrects such inaccuracies and sheds light on other matters related to the treaty.

The institutional context in which the treaty was negotiated, i.e., the Outer Space Committee and its Legal Subcommittee, should also be understood, and the NASA witness will discuss this aspect in detail. In this connection I will only say that because these bodies operate on the consensus principle, under which no proposal may be adopted over the opposition of a committee member, the Moon Treaty contains no provisions which were included over the objection of the United States or any other country. Such a process obviously necessitates a certain amount of accommodation to the interests and desires of others, but it also enables each state, including the United States, to protect fully its essential interests during the course of negotiations. Whether the United States adequately perceived its interests in the Moon Treaty negotiations has been questioned by critics of the treaty, but it should be understood that our negotiators were in no way forced to accept provisions in the treaty by being outvoted by a Soviet/Third World majority. There was no voting.

Finally, I will in my testimony make several references to the Law of the Sea (LOS) negotiations, either noting difficulties which critics of the Moon Treaty have with these negotiations or pointing out differences or similarities between the LOS negotia-

tions and the Moon Treaty. It would be impossible to adequately address the Moon Treaty and the views of its critics without such references. However, I am not an expert on the LOS negotiations and do not intend to comment on their substance. The views of the Administration on the LOS negotiations are well known, and nothing in my testimony should be taken as in any way altering these views.

Historically, discussions leading to the Moon Treaty commenced in 1970 when Argentina pointed out to the Outer Space Committee's Legal Subcommittee that the use of the Moon's natural resources had already begun and that the 1967 Outer Space Treaty did not include specific regulations for this activity. Specifically, Argentina proposed a "draft agreement on the principles governing activities in the use of the natural resources of the Moon and other celestial bodies," article 1 of which provided that the natural resources of the Moon and other celestial bodies should be the "common heritage of mankind."

While no action was taken in the Outer Space Committee on the Argentine proposal, less than 1 year later Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Gromyko requested that the 26th session of the U.N. General Assembly consider the "preparation of an international treaty concerning the Moon." A Soviet draft text was submitted on June 4, 1971.

The United States was not enthusiastic about this initiative because we did not regard the Soviet text as constituting a significant advance in outer space law as it existed at that time. For example, the Soviet draft treaty gave little attention to the issue of exploiting natural resources. As the Soviet delegate subsequently explained, the ". . . basic purpose [of the 1971 Soviet draft] was that there should *not* be included in the draft Moon Treaty a provision concerning the regime for the use and exploitation of the Moon's natural resources." [Emphasis added.]

Nevertheless, a review of the Soviet text suggested to the United States that the Soviet initiative might be converted into one which would positively carry forward U.S. interests. In particular, it was considered that there was potential benefit for the United States in having a treaty which would cover all celestial bodies in the solar system, would mandate notification of intended activities on celestial bodies and the dissemination of information on

their results, and which would lay the basis for a reasonable approach to the use of nonterrestrial natural resource

Initial U.S. Positions on Exploitation Question

Regarding the matter of exploitation, the subject had occasionally arisen in the course of negotiations of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, but no specific provisions on exploitation appear in the 1967 treaty. The United States has long taken the position that Article I of the treaty, which provides that: "Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for exploration and use by all States . . .," recognizes the right of exploitation. We were and are aware, however, that this view is not shared by all states or commentators, some of whom take the position that the nonappropriation provisions in Article VI of the 1967 treaty preclude exploitation of celestial natural resources and their reduction to private property.

In 1972, then, the United States saw in the Soviet draft an opportunity to make clear that the prohibition against national appropriation of celestial bodies contained in the Outer Space Treaty did not preclude the exploitation of nonterrestrial natural resources for any of three purposes: scientific investigation (such as the return of lunar samples to Earth), the sustaining of missions on celestial bodies, and exploitation for commercial purposes. Thus, while the United States saw no urgent need for the Moon Treaty in 1972—and this remained our view throughout the 7-year course of the negotiations—we did consider that important U.S. interests, including those related to exploitation, could be advanced via a Moon Treaty.

In discussing the development of U.S. policy on the exploitation matter, I wish to stress that the United States constantly maintained several themes, which I would like to set forth and illustrate through references to the negotiating history of the treaty.

First, the United States was willing to accept the concept that the natural resources of celestial bodies were the common heritage of mankind. Indeed, it was the United States which first proposed the phrase in the course of active negotiations. However, the U.S. view was—and is—that this concept embodies no substantive rules or a predetermined form of legal regime, and the United States has consistently

sisted efforts to give the phrase content which would be adverse to U.S. interests. In our view the phrase can acquire substantive meaning only by reference to the specific context in which it is employed.

Second, the United States has consistently rejected any suggestion that the Moon Treaty should impose a moratorium on unilateral exploitation of nonterrestrial natural resources pending the establishment of an international regime; indeed, we have insisted at even after such a regime is established, the right of unilateral exploitation will continue to be available to those states which do not choose to participate in such a regime.

Third, the United States has been aware of the vital role that American enterprise can play in outer space, and the U.S. positions were designed to promote this role, both by insuring that nothing in the treaty would circumscribe this potential and by inserting into the treaty certain rights which would be important to commercial exploitation by private or public entities.

Fourth, our negotiators obviously were aware of developments related to the Law of the Sea negotiations; the two negotiations were somewhat parallel in time, and the two negotiating texts contain some common phraseology. However, the U.S. view was and is that the substance and meaning of the Moon Treaty should be determined independently of other international instruments and negotiations.

These were the principles which guided the United States when it inserted the exploitation issue into the Moon Treaty negotiations in 1972. It is, of course, entirely proper to examine the Moon Treaty and its negotiating story in order to determine whether the final product adequately meets the objectives we set for ourselves at the commencement of negotiations. This is the reason for the Administration's ongoing study of the treaty and, I assume, for these hearings. Obviously there are those who believe that the treaty falls short of our goals, just as there are those who believe they have been met. However, it should be clearly recognized that the three Administrations which approved the negotiating instructions on the Moon Treaty from 1972 to 1979, as well as to our negotiators, consciously took into account America's stake in outer space exploitation and the role private in-

vestment could play in such exploitation. As to the importance of these matters, I am sure that both critics and supporters of the treaty are of one mind.

1972 U.S. Proposal on Exploitation

Returning to the negotiating history, the text on exploitation tabled by the United States during the very first negotiating round in April 1972 and the explanatory statement on this text by the U.S. representative, both of which may be found on page 14 of the Galloway study, are an excellent illustration of the U.S. approach to the exploitation issue. The 1972 U.S. text contained the statement—the antecedent to Article 11 of the Moon Treaty—that “the natural resources of the Moon and other celestial bodies shall be the common heritage of all mankind.” Paragraph 3 of the U.S. text made reference to the need “for the encouragement of investment,” and the U.S. statement made clear that at a conference to negotiate an exploitation regime “participants would need to bear in mind not only common goals of economic advancement but the need to encourage investment and efficient development as well.” Finally, paragraph 3 of the U.S. text recognized the possibility of such a conference being convened when practical utilization of nonterrestrial natural resources had “already begun,” making it clear that the establishment of a regime was not to be a precondition for exploitation.

Proceeding from this seminal text and statement, I would now like to turn to the key issues of common heritage, moratorium, relationship to the LOS negotiations, and the role of private investment under the Moon Treaty.

The “Common Heritage” Concept

In advancing the common heritage concept in April 1972, the United States drew upon several sources—the 1969 Argentine proposal in the Outer Space Committee, President Nixon's 1970 statement on the seabeds, and Brazil's November 1971 proposal in the General Assembly that the Soviet draft Moon Treaty be revised to incorporate the common heritage principle. The United States did not and does not believe that the common heritage concept carried with it substantial legal baggage. Our position, in essence, was that the common heritage concept would not prejudice possible future exploitation but

would simply parallel and conform to established space law, especially Articles I and II of the Outer Space Treaty which already established that celestial bodies as a whole and all parts of them are areas beyond national sovereignty, to which all states have free access, and that activities in such areas shall be for the benefit and in the interests of all countries.

This is what lay behind the U.S. statement in April 1972 that “on the broadest level of generality it seems right to state that such resources are part of the common heritage of all mankind.” Given this context, it was, therefore, considered reasonable to agree that other states accepting the new treaty should be legally entitled to participate in future efforts to establish a legal regime to govern activities in such areas.

If the common heritage notion has any legal content, it would be a “procedural” one, specifically that for areas with the characteristics I have just enumerated, it would be appropriate for the international community to attempt to elaborate an international regime. It has even been argued that within the legal context just described—a context established by the 1967 Outer Space Treaty—an acceptable international regime might well be vital in order to provide the requisite legal stability for commercial-scale on-site exploitation; otherwise, given the right of free access by all states to all areas of the “commons” and the absence of a sovereign power to assure order, such exploitation might not be possible. So too, such a regime could reduce controversies over activities in the “commons.”

Be this as it may, my point is that while the United States saw the convening of a conference to attempt to negotiate a regime as a reasonable outgrowth of the common heritage principle, the United States consistently resisted all efforts to establish the common heritage concept as embodying substantive rules or a predetermined form of legal regime.

As fully discussed in the Galloway study and Professor Christol's article, from the introduction of the common heritage concept in 1972 to April 1979, the Soviet Union adamantly rejected the inclusion of the concept in the Moon Treaty, citing various legal, philosophical, and political difficulties with the phrase. One of the more interesting Soviet arguments was that “mankind” was not a proper subject of international law, only states were. This is, in-

deed, a standard Soviet position, one which is often used to oppose any notion that international law can provide individuals with human rights vis-a-vis their government.

Soviet opposition to the common heritage concept is not cited merely as a curiosity; it is useful in understanding the wording of Article 11(1) as it exists in the final text. During the informal negotiations at the 1978 Legal Subcommittee which resulted in the so-called Austrian draft, which subsequently was adopted almost unchanged as the Moon Treaty, the Soviets for the first time showed some flexibility regarding the common heritage concept; they insisted, however, upon an extremely qualified reference to the phrase, to wit: "*For the purposes of this Agreement, the Moon and its natural resources shall be considered the common heritage of mankind, which finds its expression in the relevant provisions of this Agreement, and in particular in paragraph 5 of this article.*" The developing countries had difficulties with this language, but the final price of obtaining Soviet support for the treaty was the retention of the phrase "which finds its expression in the relevant provisions of this Agreement, and in particular in paragraph 5 of this article." Thus, the intention behind the phrasing of Article 11(1) is exactly what the words imply, namely that the "common heritage" concept in the Moon Treaty finds its meaning solely within the Moon Treaty itself. On behalf of the United States, moreover, this interpretation was unequivocally set forth by Ambassador [Richard] Peetree in his statement of November 7, 1979, before the U.N. Special Political Committee as it debated the treaty. This statement, on the record and uncontradicted, is legally authoritative as a matter of treaty interpretation under relevant international law.

Given the clarity of the legal position, it would be hard for anyone to argue that when the time comes to devise an international regime for the Moon, the inclusion of the common heritage phraseology in the treaty *legally* requires some particular type of regime. On the other hand, opponents of the Moon Treaty are not so much worried about possible legal requirements as they are about the practical consequences which they foresee as flowing from the use of the common heritage phraseology. They vigorously argue that, even though the common heritage phrase does not legally require

any particular kind of Moon regime, nevertheless the phrase has taken on a particular meaning in the minds of some of those who will presumably be participating in the regime negotiations of the future.

Specifically they argue that to many countries of the Third World, the phrase "common heritage" essentially means common property and that such countries, when they come to the negotiating table, will do everything they can to force through a "U.N. style" international regime with one vote per state, under which any kind of unilateral exploitation of the Moon's resources would be forbidden on the ground that what belongs to all belongs to no one. In short, there are those who believe that, to the extent that the United States wants to retain the right to exploit the resources of celestial bodies, the inclusion of the common heritage concept in the Moon Treaty has brought about irretrievable prejudice.

There is, of course, an opposing point of view. Thus it can be argued with equal vigor that, when the parties to the Moon Treaty assemble 15-30 years from now to negotiate about an international regime, each party will bring to the table arguments favoring its own self-interest. Those whose self-interest will be advanced by reference to a particular definition of the common heritage concept will speak in these terms, and those whose self-interest will be advantaged by a different definition will argue to the contrary. Under this theory, in other words, any phraseology in the Moon Treaty which does not have legal consequences is really not going to control the course of future bargaining, which will in any event be governed by self-interest. Consistent with this theory the United States might be well-advised to participate in any negotiations for an international regime in order to help shape the best possible regime—and refuse to agree to one that is unsatisfactory.

Conversely, the treaty's critics think that, at best, a U.S. commitment to a negotiation that may not take place for 15-30 years is premature and that at worst the terms of those negotiations are not likely to produce a satisfactory result. They argue that there is no pressing reason for the United States to endorse a long-range approach to celestial resources based on politically charged terminology which could skew the basis on which regime negotiations would proceed. They also question the

degree of freedom we would have to walk away from regime negotiations taking place under a treaty to which, by our adherence, we would have given greater respectability.

This position is opposed by the strong school of thought which favors international cooperation as envisaged by the Moon Treaty and which sees heavy political and other costs in a refusal by the United States to become party to a treaty because of objection to language supported by the United States during negotiations, particularly when that language only commits states parties to negotiate, not to accept, an international regime.

The bottom line is that with respect to the common heritage concept there are two strongly contrasting views as to the costs and benefits which would flow from U.S. adherence to the Moon Treaty. It is precisely because these differences of view that the interagency task force is now proceeding with its study.

In connection with the question whether the United States should sign and ratify the treaty, serious consideration could be given to the recommendation of the American Bar Association (ABA) international law section, which proposes that the meaning of "common heritage" be clarified through the inclusion, in the instrument of ratification of an additional explanatory interpretation. Assuming ratification, I am not persuaded, pending further study, of the necessity of such clarification, but the substance of the proposal is generally satisfactory, subject perhaps to certain very minor modifications. For example, to my mind the common heritage concept affirmatively cannot that an effort will be made to establish a mutually acceptable international regime, and the section's clarification does not mention the point. In any event, the desirability of an interpretive statement along the ABA lines will be carefully studied.

The Moon Treaty and LOS Treaty

This line of discussion naturally leads to a broader discussion of the relationship—or lack thereof—between the Law of the Sea negotiations and the Moon Treaty. I have already noted that certain similarities do exist in terms of language, and, of course, both deal with the exploitation of natural resources in a "global commons," if that term may properly be

applied to outer space. However, while the Law of the Sea experience, along with other examples of international efforts at cooperation, will be relevant, it is by no means clear that a future regime for nonterrestrial natural resources will, as a political matter, be decisively influenced or controlled by the LOS regime, regardless of its merits. There are, after all, significant differences in the economic, political, and legal contexts of the two potential regimes. I would like to point out three factors in this regard.

- Most immediately, the LOS negotiations are almost completed, while negotiations for a regime to govern exploitation of celestial natural resources will not be undertaken until such exploitation "is about to become feasible" (Article 11(5)), i.e., at least 15-30 years from now. The lessons to be learned from the LOS experience will by then be available and can be taken fully into account by the United States and other interested states.

- The desire of land-based producers for particular conditions on the extraction of resources from the deep seabeds resulted from fear that these resources would be directly or indirectly competitive with resources they produce. However, this consideration will not necessarily be present in negotiations on a regime to govern celestial exploitation, in that it is the view of NASA experts that resources from the Moon are, within currently foreseen economics, not competitive with terrestrial resources. The present thinking is that the value of lunar resources is predominantly in the reduced transportation costs for building structures in space or on the Moon itself. The "producer/consumer" dynamics which have helped shape the LOS exploitation regime would not, therefore, automatically be transposed to another context.

- The LOS treaty is not the only model for a future celestial exploitation regime. In outer space, the international community's experience with the International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium (INTELSAT) and the International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT) would also be assessed, and in 15-30 years time other models of international cooperation will almost surely be available.

In sum, however difficult negotiations for the seabed regime have been, there are enough differences between the circumstances in which the LOS treaty is being negotiated and those in which the regime for extraterrestrial

exploitation will be negotiated in some 15-30 years to preclude an automatic transposition of the results of the LOS treaty into the extraterrestrial context.

In this regard, it has been argued by critics that the Moon Treaty establishes vague terms of reference for a future negotiation—e.g., "common heritage," "rational management," "equitable sharing"—which many nations are likely to define in ways prejudicial to our interests. In the critics' view, the compromise which would emerge from this negotiation could thus be less satisfactory than if the negotiation began within a more favorable context.

The argument the other way is that, as I have already stated, parties to the negotiations will argue their self-interest, and vague phraseology without legal content will not control the course of the negotiations. Moreover, the U.S. Government has declined to adhere to unacceptable international agreements, and there is no reason why we should depart from the great tradition in this context. Indeed, it may be argued that a failure by the United States to sign the Moon Treaty would give rise to the greater danger that a U.S. absence from the negotiations for a Moon regime will lead to a significantly worse regime than would evolve if the United States participated.

Legal Moratorium

The next point I would like to address is the much-debated question whether the Moon Treaty establishes, as a legal or *de facto* matter, a moratorium on the exploitation of nonterrestrial natural resources, pending the development, through future negotiations, of an international legal regime.

The argument that there is a legal moratorium is generally based on two provisions of the Treaty.

First, it is said that anything denominated as the "common heritage of mankind" can only be exploited with the approval of an international regime. It would, therefore, follow, according to this view, that no exploitation could occur until such a regime is established.

Second, since Article 11(5) provides for negotiating an international regime "... to govern the exploitation of the natural resources of the Moon as such exploitation is about to become feasible," it is argued that a fair reading of this provision would be that a moratorium is imposed until the regime is established.

Again there are responsive arguments. The negotiating history of the treaty—from the April 1972 U.S. text on through Ambassador Petree's comprehensive statement in November 1979—is replete with unequivocal statements by the United States that we would not accept a moratorium and that the common heritage concept did not imply a moratorium. Specific proposals for a moratorium were advanced by some states, were decisively rejected, and form no part of the treaty. Moreover, Article 11(8) of the treaty provides that "all activities," with respect to natural resources, shall be carried out in a manner compatible with the purposes of the regime set forth in Article 11(7), and this provision was specifically included in the treaty to establish principles which would cover exploitation carried out *before* establishment of an international regime.

Similarly, as the report of the ABA's international law section has pointed out, Article 11(3) was drafted in such a way as to make clear that there should *not* be such a moratorium [Report at 6-7]. According to the international law section: "No moratorium was either intended or established" [Report at 7]. Quite the contrary: As made clear in Ambassador Petree's statement, the treaty contemplates that the nationals of a state party may exploit the resources of outer space outside the context of an international regime—either before such a regime is established or in the event a state chooses not to join an established regime.

Conceivably, other states may claim that there should be such a moratorium, but there is no reason why such a claim should interfere with our right to proceed in accordance with our own understanding of the treaty. The proposed clarification on this point suggested by the ABA's international law section is fully consistent with our understanding of the treaty, although, again, we have not yet reached a conclusion as to whether, if the United States is to sign and ratify the Moon Treaty, it is really necessary to include such an interpretation in an instrument of ratification.

De Facto Moratorium

I think it is fair to say that the central focus of those who oppose American adherence to the Moon Treaty hinges on whether the treaty creates a *de facto*, as opposed to a legal, moratorium on exploitation. The issue is necessarily

difficult to analyze because it involves commercial, political, and even psychological considerations projected into the relatively distant future.

Those who believe that the Moon Treaty creates a *de facto* moratorium draw upon lessons which they believe may be derived from the LOS negotiations and the involvement of American companies in ventures to mine the deep seabeds. It has been said that while the Moon Treaty does not foreclose the possibility that *governments* may one day undertake to exploit the resources of outer space, the treaty limits or forecloses free enterprise initiatives in outer space because of the ambiguity of the "common heritage" concept and uncertainty over the powers and operating procedures of a future international regime, as well as the rules and regulations the regime will adopt to govern exploitation.

It is argued that in an area that requires substantial investment in new technology, no private corporation would be willing to engage in the necessary 15-20 years of expensive research and development if there were a substantial risk that it would then be politically impossible for the company to enter the exploitation or commercial recovery phase of its project.

As part of our effort to assess this view, we have sought the views of major American aerospace and extractive industry companies and trade organizations. The replies thus far received are far from unanimous in support of this view—or in support of the Moon Treaty. About half of the respondents believe that the treaty would inhibit free enterprise from exploiting nonterrestrial resources, while the other half support the position of the ABA's international law section, i.e., that the treaty will be acceptable if its ratification includes the declarations and interpretations recommended by that section.

In analyzing this issue the proper approach, I believe, is to recognize that the Moon Treaty exists and to address, as the key question, whether a *de facto* moratorium based upon perceived uncertainties about the future is more likely to arise if we adhere to the treaty than if we do not.

Here again, there are different schools of thought which provide different answers. One is that if the United States refuses to become a party to the Moon Treaty at this time, and the treaty fails to gain wide acceptance, especially among other space powers, this would reduce the likelihood that

negotiations will be convened for an international legal regime under the Moon Treaty. This approach, it is argued, would leave the United States with the option of acceding to the Moon Treaty at a later date or pursuing other alternatives.

The other school of thought expects wide adherence to the Moon Treaty. It is thus argued that because U.S. interests would be served by an acceptable, broad-based, international regime, the United States should put itself in a position to make such a regime acceptable through participation in the negotiations contemplated by the Moon Treaty. Although a degree of uncertainty would exist between now and the time the regime is developed, such uncertainty would exist even without the Moon Treaty, and certain steps can be taken to reduce uncertainty if it, in fact, produces undesirable consequences.

Supporters of this view point out that in assessing the uncertainties of the future, it should be borne in mind that, because of the efforts of American negotiators, the Moon Treaty contains rights which would be crucial to the successful establishment of a commercial exploitation operation. One example of such a right is that contained in Article 11(3). As explained at pages 6-7 of the report of the ABA's international law section, that provision was drafted so as to recognize the existence of property rights in natural resources moved or extracted from their original situs.

While it is the position of the United States that this right also exists under the 1967 treaty, our view is not universally shared, as I stated earlier, which means that adherence to the Moon Treaty would arguably provide us with useful reinforcement for the property rights involved. Moreover, as a party to the Moon Treaty, the United States and its nationals would be in a far better legal position to block efforts by other states to deny us such property rights.

Similarly, Article 8 of the Moon Treaty specifically establishes a right to place equipment and facilities on or below the surface of the Moon and forbids parties from interfering with the activities of other parties on the Moon. This provision could be vital in assuring that the general rights to explore and use the Moon and to have free access to all areas of celestial bodies—which rights are set forth in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty—cannot be utilized to interrupt or disturb exploitative operations by a party.

Of course, if the United States does not adhere to the treaty, American companies and financial institutions will eventually have to determine whether or not the 1967 Outer Space Treaty provides sufficient certainty for them to commit the tens of billions of dollars necessary for lunar exploitation.

We recognize that there are and will continue to be uncertainties as to the future of exploitation in outer space, and it may be that in due course Congress will wish to consider the unilateral enactment of national legislation establishing a legal framework for U.S. companies to engage in nonterrestrial exploitation.

In this context an analogy to the Law of the Sea negotiating environment may be appropriate. The recently enacted Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Resources Act (PL 96-283) acknowledges a period of investor uncertainty and proposes certain government backing. If investor insecurity regarding celestial exploitation poses a problem and the government wishes to encourage early exploitation of lunar resources by private industry, passage of a comparable bill appropriate to the lunar context might be considered. Because negotiation of a lunar resources regime cannot be expected to begin for 15-30 years, the United States would have ample time to put into place legislation tailored to the task. Nothing in the Moon Treaty prohibits such legislation.

As to other methods of reducing future uncertainties and thus encouraging private investment in the exploitation of nonterrestrial natural resources, we are, as I have indicated, studying the desirability of attaching to any instrument of ratification understandings and declarations possibly similar to those proposed by the ABA's international law section, which are obviously directed at eliminating to the greatest extent such uncertainties about the future. While the section's proposals have not yet been fully considered, it does appear that they are fully consistent with statements made by U.S. negotiators in the course of negotiations.

It might be useful to add at this point that, should such declarations and understandings be incorporated in an instrument of ratification, they would not be, as some have contended, merely indications of U.S. intentions and without a legal effect. As a matter of customary treaty law, if other state parties to a treaty do not contest such declarations within a reasonable time, the declarations become an integral

part of the treaty relationship between the state making the declaration and each nonobjecting state. If the declarations are contested by another state, and the objecting state feels so strongly about the matter that it wishes to avoid having a treaty relationship with the United States which would incorporate the U.S. declarations, then it must state that there simply is no treaty relationship between the state making the declaration and the contesting state.

There are no circumstances under which the United States could be considered, as a matter of international law or domestic law, as having undertaken legal obligations inconsistent with Senate reservations or understandings. A U.S. domestic court could not construe our treaty obligations in a manner inconsistent with such qualifications, nor could an international tribunal.

Conclusion

In the report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, the basic precepts of which I set out at the commencement of my statement, concluded with the following words: "In ratifying this treaty the United States will give up nothing; but we stand to gain much from this commendable effort to allow law and common sense to precede power and competition into outer space." American space policy has been guided from the beginning by the spirit expressed in the Senate report, and this was the spirit and policy guiding the United States during the 7 years of negotiations on the Moon Treaty.

I have tried to explain what this and previous Administrations intended to accomplish by the Moon Treaty in the realm of exploitation of nonterrestrial natural resources, and I have attempted to set forth what we presently regard as the proper legal interpretation of the treaty. Although we have not completed our analysis of the treaty, as I conclude my statement I would like to sum up these legal points very briefly.

I think it is generally agreed that the treaty would place no legal limitations on the exploitation of celestial natural resources by any government or private entity beyond those already contained in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty; the only qualification would be that activities with respect to the natural resources of the Moon must be carried out in a manner compatible with the environmental protections con-

tained in Article 7 and with the purposes specified in Article 11(7). Although the latter provision speaks of "equitable sharing," we do not regard that reference as in any way diminishing the exclusive right of the United States to determine how it shares the benefits derived from exploitation by it or its nationals.

In regard to the international regime referred to in Article 11(5), neither the "common heritage of mankind" concept as embodied in the treaty nor any other provision of the treaty would legally require any specific form of international arrangement for the regulation of the exploitation of Moon or other celestial body resources. Neither the treaty nor the "common heritage" concept gives rise to any specific obligation on states in regard to the establishment of such a regime except the commitment to engage in good faith negotiations to attempt to establish a mutually acceptable international regime to govern the exploitation of natural resources on celestial bodies when exploitation of such natural resources is about to become feasible.

While the common heritage concept in the context of Article 11 implies that every state party to the treaty has a significant interest in the possible future exploitation of nonterrestrial resources and that their views are to be given serious consideration at a future international conference to establish a regime, such an interest has long since been established by the legal principles incorporated in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty.

The Law of the Sea experience with the common heritage concept, while relevant, could not properly be regarded as legally controlling in the negotiations of any such future agreement on the legal regime. Article 11(1) of the Moon Treaty was intended to make clear that the common heritage concept in the Moon Treaty finds its meaning totally within the text of the Moon Treaty itself. During future negotiations as to the Moon regime there will undoubtedly be efforts to draw on the Law of the Sea experience, and there may also be references to such other multinational cooperative ventures in outer space as INTELSAT, an organization which itself establishes that the criteria set forth in Article 11(7) of the Moon Treaty can be met by institutional arrangements quite different than those contemplated in the Law of the Sea negotiations on seabed mining.

At any future negotiation to establish an international regime, there will, of course, be no legal obligation that agreement be reached at the conference or that the United States accept any results of the negotiations. The United States will be free at that time, as before, to assess the results against its own national interests and priorities. Any resulting treaty establishing an international regime specifically concerned with the exploitation of celestial natural resources would also have to be signed and presented to the Senate for its advice and consent before it would become binding on the United States. Refusal by the United States to accept any such international regime would not preclude either the United States or its nationals from unilaterally exploiting the natural resources of the Moon or other celestial bodies.

I should add that many of the foregoing observations on the Moon Treaty are considered and supported by the very comprehensive and valuable study by the Office of Technology Assessment, which was undertaken at the request of Senators Stevenson and Cannon, and is now nearing completion. For example, that study observes that the common heritage provision was worded so as to preclude the definition of the concept from being controlled by external sources, that the Moon Treaty contains no commitment to conclude a new treaty, and that the treaty cannot legally be interpreted as imposing a moratorium on exploitation.

Our study of the treaty will continue with a view to reaching final conclusions as to whether the United States should become a party thereto or whether we should remain aloof. We continue to believe that "law and common sense" are criteria which have served the national interests of the United States, and we will proceed with our study in this spirit.

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Pakistan's President Meets With President Carter

President Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq of Pakistan called on President Carter on October 3, 1980. Following are remarks the two Presidents made to reporters at the conclusion of their meeting.¹

President Carter

First of all, I'd like to express to the people of our country and Pakistan the deep honor that I consider having been paid to us and to our country by the visit of President Zia. I've told him privately and would like to express publicly that the people of the United States have the greatest admiration for the courage of the people and the leaders of the great nation of Pakistan.

They live in a troubled region. Their security has been threatened as has the security of other nations in the region. And the tenacity with which they've adhered to their own deep commitments for peace and for sharing their responsibility for the maintenance of peace has indeed aroused the renewed admiration of the entire world. In addition, the humanitarian attitude of the people of Pakistan in receiving hundreds of thousands of refugees from Afghanistan is a matter that causes great admiration for the people of President Zia's country.

In my State of the Union message this year, I pointed out that the independence and the freedom and security of Pakistan was very important to our country. On a mutual basis we understand that the relationship between our countries is of the utmost importance. Our commitment to consult very closely with Pakistan was expressed in an agreement signed in 1959; if Pakistan should be in danger, that commitment stands today as it did in 1959 and at the time of the State of the Union message that I delivered this January.

In addition, our countries share with almost every other nation on Earth the belief that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is contrary to the laws of peaceloving nations, contrary to the peace and stability of the entire world, and that the Soviets should withdraw their occupying forces immediately. This was expressed by more than a hundred countries through the United Nations earlier this year. Our commitment to this U.N. action still stands even though time has passed.

In addition, we are deeply grateful for President Zia's role as a spokesman for the Islamic conference. His recent visit to Tehran and then to Baghdad to try to limit the combat, the loss of blood, and also to bring to an early conclusion the war between Iran and Iraq is of great importance to us all.

And finally let me say that we are honored personally by his visit. He's a military man who received part of his training in our country. He's familiar with our nation. His knowledge of the sensitivities and ideals of America make him particularly dear to us. And his role now as the President of that great country has shown by all of his actions the political leadership and its worth not only to the people of Pakistan but to that entire troubled region and to our country as well.

President Zia, we are deeply grateful to you and your associates for coming here on a mission of great importance to the United Nations and now to Washington. We wish you well and express again the great value of the friendship that exists between our two people.

Bangladesh President Meets With President Carter

JOINT STATEMENT,
AUG. 27, 1980¹

President Carter and President Ziaur Rahman of Bangladesh met for an hour today.

The two Presidents reviewed bilateral relations and discussed regional and international issues of mutual concern. They agreed to work for upholding the principles of the U.N. Charter and expressed opposition to foreign armed intervention or interference of any kind in the internal affairs of any country and called for the immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops from Afghanistan and Kampuchea. They also discussed the Middle East problem and stressed the need for a comprehensive

President Zia

Through the President of the United States, President Carter, I wish to thank you for giving me this opportunity.

I am very grateful to President Carter himself for giving me this opportunity, particularly at the time when he's so busy with a very crucial campaign at home. We wish him all the best.

I'm also very grateful to him for giving me this opportunity of establishing personal contact. Being an army man, I've learned one thing—that it is different talking man-to-man rather than communicating from 12,000 miles away. I have found it equally true today in my meeting with President Carter, whom I found exactly a little more than my expectations were—a man of deep understanding, a humane personality, and who has at the bottom of his heart love of humanity, the right of men to live as men, as free men. As President of the United States, I found him a competent personality to bear the beacon of light that the free world expects of him to bear.

I think this meeting has been very purposeful. And if the relationship between Pakistan and the United States continues to be meaningful and pur-

and peaceful settlement of this problem at an early date.

President Ziaur Rahman thanked President Carter for the meaningful role played by the United States in economic cooperation with Bangladesh. He described the various measures adopted for social, political, and economic development in Bangladesh including restoration of democracy and also the launching of the new 5-year plan. President Carter expressed his personal admiration for the economic and political progress Bangladesh has made under President Ziaur Rahman's leadership and assured him of all possible cooperation in the successful implementation of the second 5-year plan.

Both Presidents noted with satisfaction the excellent state of relations between the two countries and agreed to work to further improve the friendship and understanding which already exist.

¹ Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Sept. 1, 1980 (list of participants omitted here). ■

Iran-Iraq Conflict

Donald F. McHenry

*Statement made in the Security Council on October 23, 1980. Ambassador McHenry is U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations.*¹

In 1 month Iran and Iraq have been at war. Despite this Council's urgent call in September 28 for a cessation of hostilities, the tragic conflict still continues, bringing anguish and loss to countless innocent families in its wake.

Representatives of Iran and Iraq have both presented their views to this Council. Islamic, nonaligned, and other States continue their efforts to bridge the gap between the two sides and to lay the basis for a peaceful settlement of this tragic dispute. Their efforts deserve our vigorous support. But, as we are all aware, the responsibilities which the charter imposes on us here cannot and must not be delegated to others.

We are deeply concerned that this conflict be resolved with respect for the cardinal principles of international law. No territory must not be seized by force and that disputes should be settled peacefully and not by armed invasion. The work of the Security Council in matters of peace and war is premised on the adherence of member states to the undisputed principles of international law. These principles have direct relevance to the actions which the bel-

ligerents must, as members of this Organization, undertake without delay.

First, member states of the United Nations have renounced war as a tool of national policy. Whatever the provocations adduced by Iran and Iraq and whatever they may understandably regard as the imperatives of self-defense, their charter obligations and the distress of their own civilian populations require them to cease hostilities.

Second, as members of the United Nations, Iran and Iraq have undertaken not to seek the acquisition of territory by force of arms. This is the law of the charter, and it is the rule that all members solemnly reiterated in 1970 when the entire membership of the United Nations adopted the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. The declaration provides: "The territory of a State shall not be the object of acquisition by another State resulting from the threat or use of force. No territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force shall be recognized as legal."

Third, as members of the United Nations, Iran and Iraq are bound to seek to settle their disputes by peaceful means. We in the Council, charged as we are with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, are bound to insist that they do so. Iraq's representatives have reasserted their government's respect for the United Nations and have consistently affirmed their government has no claims to Iranian territory. Territory claimed by both belligerents should be the subject of peaceful negotiations. The Council must work vigorously to assist Iran and Iraq to achieve a cease-fire, to begin withdrawal, and to initiate a process of negotiation in a manner acceptable to both. The United States has no specific proposal to offer as to the manner and form in which these negotiations should be undertaken, but we believe it imperative that the Council insist that they begin promptly.

Finally, we believe that a fourth universal principle of international law should also guide the parties in their search for the peaceful settlement of their differences. It seems to us essential to a lasting resolution of this conflict that both sides should solemnly undertake not to interfere in the affairs of the other.

All of us must be opposed to the dismemberment of Iran. The United

States believes that the cohesion and stability of Iran is in the interest of the stability and prosperity of the region as a whole. The national integrity of Iran is today threatened by the Iraqi invasion.

We would also recall that every state has the right to choose its own forms of government and organize its domestic society, subject only to the obligations of international law. Statements and actions by national leaders intended to incite civil strife in another country cannot be condoned by the world community even in time of war and gravely undermine the efforts of those seeking to establish the foundations for a peaceful settlement.

The position of the United States from the beginning of this dispute has been clear. We will not take sides. But to declare that we will not take sides is not to declare that we intend to remain aloof or that we do not recognize our responsibilities to this Organization. The political ramifications of a continuing war need no elaboration. Neither are we indifferent to the threat which the conflict presents to a region which is of vital concern to the economic health of the world. We believe strongly that there must be no infringement of the internationally recognized freedom and safety of navigation in the Persian Gulf which is of such importance to the international community. We welcome the assurances given by both Iran and Iraq in this regard.

The United Nations was founded on a noble ideal: to save succeeding generations from what the charter rightly calls "the scourge of war." It would be foolish to assert that when the bitterness of years erupts into overt war, the oath of the peacemakers is easy to discern. The United States, however, believes deeply that the principles of international law to which I have referred do point the way forward to peace. It is inconceivable to us that Iran and Iraq wish the present suffering to continue. If both are prepared to respect the principles of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force, of peaceful settlement of disputes, and of noninterference in the internal affairs of the other, it should be possible to bring this tragic conflict to an end without further delay and to do so in a manner which does justice to the legitimate concerns of both sides.

Centuries of armed disputes the world over have surely taught that the peace which is imposed by military superiority is no more than a truce. Only a settlement which Iranians and

Iraqis can both regard as fair and equitable will create the conditions for the lasting peace which is their objective and the objective of all of us in the Security Council, where we are tasked to act on behalf of all the members of the United Nations.

¹USUN press release 118. ■

Namibia

by Donald F. McHenry

*Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on September 9, 1980. Ambassador McHenry is U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations.*¹

I am pleased to have this opportunity to speak with you today on the subject of Namibia—a matter of importance to the Administration and one which I know has been a concern of the subcommittee for some time. I last addressed the subcommittee on the question of Namibia, also known as South-West Africa, on May 7, 1979. At that time I described in some detail the history of the Namibia dispute:

- The League of Nations' mandate given to South Africa to administer the territory following World War I;
- South Africa's steady imposition of its own system of apartheid on the territory and the subsequent 1966 decision of the U.N. General Assembly, with the support of the United States, to terminate South Africa's mandate;
- The ruling by the International Court of Justice that South Africa's presence in Namibia was illegal and that South Africa was obliged to withdraw; and
- South Africa's refusal to withdraw and the development of the armed struggle, led by the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO).

I also described the decision in April 1977, by the then five Western members of the U.N. Security Council—Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States—to jointly launch an unprecedented effort to find an internationally acceptable solution to the Namibian problem, based on the set of principles unanimously adopted by the U.N. Security Council in Resolution 385 in

January 1976. I outlined some of the problems with which the five's settlement effort has been faced, and I explained the proposal for a settlement which the five placed before the U.N. Security Council on April 10, 1978.

That proposal includes among its key elements:

- The holding of free and fair elections for a constituent assembly leading to independence;
- The cessation of all hostile acts by all parties;
- The restriction of South African and SWAPO armed forces to base and the subsequent phased withdrawal from Namibia of all South African troops—that withdrawal to be completed 1 week after the certification of the elections;
- The administration of the territory during the transitional period leading to the elections by a South African-appointed administrator general, with all acts affecting the political process under the supervision and control of a U.N. special representative appointed by the Secretary General of the United Nations.
- The introduction of a U.N. civilian and military presence to insure the observance of the terms of the settlement;
- The release of all Namibian political prisoners and detainees;
- The return of exiles; and
- The establishment of conditions for free and fair elections, including freedom of speech, movement, press, assembly, and the repeal of discriminatory or restrictive legislation.

When I last addressed the subcommittee on this subject, I indicated that both South Africa and SWAPO had agreed to the five's settlement proposal but that South Africa had not agreed to the U.N. Secretary General's plans for implementation of the proposal—plans which the five regarded as consistent with the original proposal which South Africa had accepted. SWAPO, on the other hand, had indicated its acceptance of the Secretary General's implementation plans and its readiness to move ahead with that implementation.

I would recommend my earlier testimony to the members of the subcommittee for a fuller discussion of the events which I have just recalled. Today, however, I would like to provide you with an update on the developments which have taken place since and with an assessment of the current state of our continuing settlement effort.

Recent Developments

In May of 1979 South Africa raised to principal objections to the Secretary General's plans for implementation. The one which then seemed to be South Africa's primary objection concerned Secretary General's proposal that any SWAPO armed personnel inside Namibia at the start of the cease-fire would be restricted and monitored by the United Nations at designated locations inside Namibia. South Africa objected to this proposal on the grounds that it would provide SWAPO with bases inside Namibia. The five support the Secretary General's proposal as a sensible way of dealing with the practical problem of monitoring those SWAPO armed personnel inside Namibia at the time of the cease-fire. The question became moot when the front-line states, in the interest of advancing the settlement effort, prevailed upon SWAPO to agree that upon South Africa's acceptance of implementation of the settlement plan, SWAPO would no longer insist on such designated locations. Those SWAPO armed personnel inside the territory at the start of the cease-fire would, therefore, be given the choice either of turning over their arms to the United Nations and participating peacefully in the electoral process or being granted safe passage out of the territory.

The second South African objection concerned South Africa's insistence on the monitoring by the United Nations SWAPO bases outside Namibia. South Africa maintained this insistence despite the fact that the five's proposal, which South Africa had previously accepted, made no such provision. In the view of the five, this factor had been adequately taken into account in determining the size and composition of the proposed U.N. presence during the transitional period. Moreover, the front-line states had committed themselves to insuring the scrupulous observance of the cease-fire, an assurance which the five had every reason to regard as genuine.

Nevertheless, in an effort to overcome this South African objection, the late President Neto of Angola proposed a compromise: the establishment of a demilitarized zone 50 kilometers on either side of Namibia's northern border with Angola and Zambia. Under this compromise, the U.N. forces would not only monitor the border from the Namibia side, as envisioned in the five's

original proposal, but also would be permitted to operate on the Angolan and Zambian sides of the border within the demilitarized zone. Both the South African Government and the Governments of Angola and Zambia would be permitted to retain certain forces within the 100-kilometer-wide zone at designated locations. No SWAPO forces would be permitted in the demilitarized zone. The South African forces would be withdrawn from their side of the demilitarized zone 12 weeks after the cease-fire, in accordance with the provisions of the five's proposal.

In a letter to Secretary General Waldheim dated May 12, 1980, the South African Government stated that it had studied and evaluated the feasibility of the demilitarized zone. Among other things, South Africa in its letter asked that it be allowed to retain its forces at 20 designated locations within the demilitarized zone, about three times the number envisioned in President Neto's original proposal. Despite the fact that such a large number of locations was never envisioned, the front-line states, meeting in Lusaka, Zambia, on June 2, once again prevailed upon SWAPO to accept the South African insistence on 20 locations in the hope that this would lead to a final settlement. Angola and Zambia further agreed that their forces would have only seven such locations on their territories within the demilitarized zone.

These agreements were conveyed by front-line and SWAPO representatives to Secretary General Waldheim, who in turn conveyed them to the South African Government in a letter dated June 20, 1980. In his letter, the Secretary General expressed his hope that the forthcoming positions taken by the front-line and SWAPO in order to meet South Africa's remaining reservations about the demilitarized zone concept would now permit South Africa's early agreement to implementation of the settlement plan.

On August 29, South Africa sent a further letter to Secretary General Waldheim, replying to the Secretary General's letter of June 20. In its letter, South Africa sets forth a number of interpretations and assumptions about aspects of the settlement proposal and the demilitarized zone concept. It goes on to state that if these interpretations and assumptions are accepted, South Africa would be prepared to proceed with discussions on the implementation of the settlement plan.

I regret to say that this qualified willingness to discuss implementation of the settlement plan, while not unwelcome, nevertheless falls short of the clear-cut response that had been hoped for. Secretary General Waldheim and the five are currently giving the South African letter detailed study and analysis. For that reason, I am not in a position to comment further at this time on its substance.

Apart from the substance, however, I feel obligated to address at least briefly some of the other aspects of the South African letter that are certain to receive attention. The letter contains a number of allegations and interpretations of fact that can only be described as distorted. In particular, we regard the direct attacks on the Secretary General personally as both unhelpful and unjustified. I do not care to speculate on South Africa's motives in this regard, but I do wish to commend the Secretary General and the other parties involved for their restraint thus far in withholding comment.

If there is a genuine issue buried within the rhetoric of the South African letter, it is the issue of the impartial implementation of the U.N. settlement plan. In this connection, South Africa has charged that the U.N. General Assembly's designation of SWAPO as "the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people" raises questions as to the ability of the United Nations to supervise impartially the elections in Namibia, and South Africa has called on the United Nations to exhibit complete impartiality henceforth.

There are several comments which should be made here.

First, as South Africa is aware, the settlement plan for Namibia would be carried out by the Secretary General under the authority of the Security Council, not the General Assembly. The Security Council has never adopted or endorsed the disposition of the General Assembly to regard SWAPO as the sole representative of the Namibian people. On the contrary, Security Council Resolutions 385 and 435, on which the U.N. settlement plan is based, fully endorse the principle that the leadership of the territory must be determined through free and fair elections in which all political parties, including SWAPO, will be placed on an equal footing. Finally, it should be noted that significant elements of the Namibian people, including political parties and the Namibian council of churches—whose member churches comprise among their con-

Namibia—A Profile

Geography

Area: 320,827 sq. mi. (slightly smaller than Tex. and Okla. combined). **Capital:** Windhoek (pop. 61,369—1970).

People

Population: 1–1.25 million 1980 est.). **Annual Growth Rate:** 2.9%. **Ethnic Groups:** Africans and colored (90%), Europeans (10%). **Religions:** Protestant (70%), Catholic (18%), animist (12%). **Languages:** Afrikaans, English, German. **Literacy:** whites (100%), blacks (20%).

Government

Type: South Africa administers Namibia, originally under a League of Nations mandate (1920–66) and since 1966 illegally on a de facto basis. **Branches:** *Executive*—Administrator General (appointed). *Legislative*—National Assembly (60 members), not recognized by international community. *Judicial*—Supreme Court. **Political Parties:** Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), SWAPO-Democrats, Namibia National Front, Aktur, Reformed National Party (HNP). **Suffrage:** Universal adult.

Economy

GNP: \$1.4 billion (1978 est.). **Annual Growth Rate:** 2.5–3%. **Per Capita Income:** \$1,400. **Inflation Rate:** 12%. **Natural Resources:** Diamonds, copper, lead, zinc, uranium, lesser amounts of other minerals, fish. **Agriculture:** *Products*—livestock, corn, millet, and sorghum (subsistence). **Work Force**—62%. **Manufacturing:** Canned fish and beef, dairy products, tanned leather, textiles, clothes, mineral concentrates. **Trade (1977 est.):** *Exports*—\$800 million: diamonds, copper, lead, uranium, fish, beef, cattle, karakul (sheep) pelts. *Imports*—\$630 million: construction materials, fertilizer, grain and other food products, manufactured goods. **Partners**—South Africa, West Germany, U.K., U.S. **Official Exchange Rate:** 1 South African rand=US\$1.27 (May 1980). **Economic Aid Received:** South Africa supplements revenues to finance development projects; no U.S. aid.

Principal Government Officials

Namibia: Administrator General—D. J. Hough. **United States:** Consul General—Alan W. Lukens (resident in Cape Town, South Africa).

gregations more than half of the territory's adult population—support prompt implementation of the settlement plan.

Second, the United Nations has over the years established an excellent record for impartial peacekeeping operations in even the most difficult and demanding circumstances. We need only look at the examples of Cyprus and the Middle East. With regard to the Namibian settlement plan, the Secretary General of the United Nations has repeatedly and publicly given South Africa assurances of his complete impartiality and that of his U.N. staff in the implementation of the plan, most recently in his letter of June 20. In that letter, as on previous occasions, the Secretary General stated that the requirement of impartiality is one that applies to all parties to the settlement, and he has called upon South Africa to give a reciprocal assurance of its own impartiality in the implementation of the settlement plan.

Thirdly, as in any negotiation, each side in the Namibia dispute has taken positions with a view to maximizing their bargaining leverage with the other. These positions will inevitably be altered once a final agreement is reached and implementation of the settlement plan begins. In insisting that SWAPO now be denied that stature it presently derives from its recognition by some in the international community, South Africa is in effect seeking to extract a major concession without committing itself to an agreement. There is considerable wariness on the part of SWAPO and its supporters in the international community about abandoning the remaining positions and leverage they now enjoy, just as there is wariness on the part of South Africa about surrendering its advantages in the negotiations. The task that confronts the five and the Secretary General is to bring both sides to final agreement and to begin the implementation of the settlement plan, in which case most of the reservations currently voiced by both sides will become moot.

For their part, the five have made clear that their efforts to insure a fair settlement in Namibia will not cease once implementation begins. We will remain ready to do all in our power to insure that the provisions of the plan will be scrupulously adhered to, not least those which provide for the fair and equal treatment of all parties in the electoral process.

Let me say that we fully intend to pursue the major task before us, which is to complete the work and fulfill the

promise of 3½ years of arduous negotiation in order to bring about an internationally acceptable settlement in Namibia. We will, therefore, focus our attention in the days ahead on those substantive aspects of South Africa's position which must be addressed if a settlement is to be achieved. We are confident that the other parties involved, including the Secretary General, are prepared to proceed with the same determination and seriousness of purpose.

Need for Agreement

In this regard, let me say that, despite the 3½ years which have been spent already on this settlement effort, there is urgency to it. The situation inside Namibia is constantly changing, and those changes threaten to unravel the agreements which have already been reached. The most significant action inside Namibia has been South Africa's creation of a so-called council of ministers, composed entirely of members of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, the party which won the South African-supervised elections of December 1978. These elections were boycotted by major internal political parties as well as by SWAPO and not recognized by the five or by the international community. This council of ministers has been given considerable authority by South Africa, and the government seems to be scaling down the visibility and scope of the administrator general. In response to this

Namibia

*The following statement was issued by the Governments of Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United Nations on July 11, 1980.*¹

The Governments of Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States continue to believe that implementation of the U.N. settlement plan and of Security Council Resolution 435 is the best available means of achieving an internationally acceptable settlement in Namibia. The five governments remain resolute in their efforts to achieve that goal.

The governments of the five are, therefore, concerned by the South African Government's establishment of a

action, the governments of the five released a statement on July 11, making clear their refusal to recognize the council of ministers and their insistence that the South African Government must continue to be held fully accountable for the implementation of the U.N. settlement plan.

The fighting along Namibia's northern border also increases, with losses to both SWAPO and South Africa ever growing and with South African raids into neighboring states becoming more frequent. The front-line states have given the five their cooperation and support, but their willingness to participate in this settlement effort cannot be taken for granted. Likewise, SWAPO's willingness to implement the settlement plan cannot be taken for granted. SWAPO has been brought to this point with considerable persuasion from the front-line states. If the settlement cannot soon be implemented, the front-line states and SWAPO may have second thoughts.

As I stated in my previous testimony, most African members of the United Nations are convinced that South Africa has never had any intention of proceeding with an internationally acceptable settlement in Namibia. The front-line states believe that, since they have brought SWAPO to accept the settlement, it is now up to the five to obtain South Africa's agreement. If South Africa does not agree, there will be increasingly strong calls at the United Nations for us to support our own negotia-

"Council of Ministers" in Namibia. Such action raises legitimate questions as to South Africa's intentions and complicates an already difficult settlement process.

The governments of the five do not recognize the "Council of Ministers," just as they do not recognize the "National Assembly" in Namibia, which was based on the internal elections of December 1978 which the government of the five regard as null and void. These developments do not alter the responsibility of the South African Government for the implementation of the U.N. settlement plan under the terms of Resolution 435. The five governments call on the South African Government to refrain from any action which could jeopardize the successful resolution of the negotiations.

¹ USUN press release 79. ■

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Agriculture

Convention on the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture. Done at Washington Mar. 6, 1979.

Instrument of ratification signed by the President: Oct. 10, 1980.

Ratification deposited: U.S., Oct. 23, 1980.

Antarctica

Recommendations, including agreed measures for conservation of Antarctic fauna and flora. Adopted at Brussels June 2-13, 1964. Entered into force July 27, 1966, except for III-VII, III-VIII, III-XI; Sept. 1, 1966, for III-XI; Dec. 22, 1978, for III-VII. TIAS 6058.

Notification of approval: Australia, Sept. 1, 1980, for III-VIII.

Measures relating to the furtherance of the principles and objectives of the Antarctic treaty. Done at Santiago Nov. 18, 1966.

Entered into force Oct. 30, 1968 for IV-20 through IV-28. TIAS 6668.

Notification of approval: Australia, Sept. 1, 1980, for IV 1-19 inclusive.

Measures relating to the furtherance of the principles and purposes of the Antarctic treaty. Done at Paris Nov. 29, 1968. Entered into force May 26, 1972, for V-1 through V-4 and V-9; July 31, 1972, for V-7 and V-8. TIAS 7692.

Notification of approval: Australia, Sept. 1, 1980, for V-5 and V-6.

Recommendations relating to the furtherance of the principles and objectives of the Antarctic treaty. Done at Tokyo Oct. 30, 1970. Entered into force Oct. 10, 1973, for VI 1-7 and 11-15. TIAS 7796.

Notification of approval: Australia, Sept. 1, 1980, for VI-8, 9, and 10.

Recommendations relating to the furtherance of the principles and objectives of the Antarctic treaty. Adopted at Oslo June 20, 1975. Entered into force Dec. 16, 1978, for VIII 6-8 and 10-14.

Notification of approval: Australia, Sept. 1, 1980, for VIII 1-5 inclusive.

Entered into force: Sept. 1, 1980, for VIII 3-4.

Atomic Energy

Agreement concerning the transfer of a research reactor and enriched uranium to Malaysia, with annexes, exchange of notes, and related letter. Signed at Vienna Sept. 22, 1980. Entered into force Sept. 22, 1980. Signatures: IAEA, Malaysia, U.S., Sept. 22, 1980.

Protocol to suspend the agreement of July 11, 1969 (TIAS 6718), between the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Portugal, and the U.S. for the application of safeguards and providing for the application of safeguards pursuant to the non-

proliferation treaty of July 1, 1968 (TIAS 6839), and pursuant to the agreement of Nov. 18, 1977, between the U.S. and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in the U.S., with exchange of letters. Signed at Vienna Sept. 23, 1980. Entered into force Sept. 23, 1980.

Signatures: IAEA, Portugal, U.S., Sept. 23, 1980.

Protocol to suspend the agreement of Feb. 28, 1972 (TIAS 7294), between the IAEA, Switzerland, and the U.S. for the application of safeguards pursuant to the non-proliferation treaty of July 1, 1968 (TIAS 6839), and pursuant to the agreement of Nov. 18, 1977, between the U.S. and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in the U.S., with exchange of letters. Signed at Vienna Sept. 23, 1980. Entered into force Sept. 23, 1980.

Signatures: IAEA, Switzerland, U.S., Sept. 23, 1980.

Collisions

Convention on the international regulations for preventing collisions at sea, 1972, with regulations. Done at London Oct. 20, 1972. Entered into force July 15, 1977. TIAS 8587.

Accession deposited: Turkey, May 16, 1980.

Conservation

Convention on international trade in endangered species of wild fauna and flora, with appendices. Done at Washington Mar. 3, 1973. Entered into force July 1, 1975. TIAS 8249.

Acceptance deposited: Japan, Aug. 6, 1980.²

Accession deposited: Central African Republic, Aug. 27, 1980.

Amendment to the convention of Mar. 3, 1973 on international trade in endangered species of wild fauna and flora (TIAS 8249). Done at Bonn June 22, 1979.³

Acceptance deposited: Japan, Aug. 6, 1980. Instrument of acceptance signed by the President: Oct. 8, 1980.

Consular

Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at Vienna Apr. 24, 1963. Entered into force Mar. 19, 1967; for the U.S. Dec. 24, 1969. TIAS 6820.

Accession deposited: Suriname Sept. 11, 1980.

Optional protocol to the Vienna convention on consular relations, concerning the compulsory settlement of disputes. Done at Vienna Apr. 24, 1963. Entered into force Mar. 19, 1967; for the U.S. Dec. 24, 1969. TIAS 6820.

Accession deposited: Suriname, Sept. 11, 1980.

Diplomatic Relations

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at Vienna Apr. 18, 1961. Entered into force Apr. 24, 1964; for the U.S. Dec. 13, 1972. TIAS 7502.

Accession deposited: Vietnam, Aug. 26, 1980.¹

ns by exerting real pressure, including economic sanctions if necessary, South Africa to comply.

The South African Government meanwhile appears to be continuing its off-track strategy of participating in the five's settlement effort while at the same time taking actions inside Namibia which move toward an ill-conceived and ill-timed internal settlement. Concerning implementation of the settlement plan, South Africa has not made a decision to proceed with implementation. No one can say with certainty what South Africa ultimately intends, but a variety of reasons have been advanced as to why South Africa may hope to postpone a decision.

We have continually told the front-line states and other African nations that negotiation is a real alternative to the armed struggle in southern Africa. The settlement in Zimbabwe is certainly proof of that premise. But the settlement in Zimbabwe only came when the war was so advanced that the destruction of all of then-Southern Rhodesia was near. The challenge in Namibia is to achieve an internationally acceptable settlement before the armed struggle reaches that stage, as it otherwise eventually will—to avoid the bloodshed and devastation which the settlement in Zimbabwe has so vividly shown to be unnecessary.

At present, the key to an internationally acceptable settlement in Namibia lies with the South African Government, and the five must continue their efforts to convince South Africa that such a settlement is their best alternative. We have come a long distance in this settlement effort—much farther than many skeptics originally thought possible—and I believe that a peaceful settlement is possible in the near future. Those who allow further delay must shoulder the burden of responsibility for the resulting deterioration. I believe that South Africa has in its government the leadership which is necessary to bring about a settlement. I hope that the South African Government will display the political wisdom and the political will which is now all that is required, for the attainment of peace and independence in Namibia.

USUN press release 94. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Environmental Modification

Convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques, with annex. Done at Geneva May 18, 1977. Entered into force Oct. 5, 1978; for the U.S. Jan. 17, 1980. TIAS 9614.

Accession deposited: Vietnam, Aug. 26, 1980.

Finance

Articles of agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development formulated at the Bretton Woods Conference July 1-22, 1944. Entered into force Dec. 27, 1945. TIAS 1502.

Signatures and acceptances deposited:

Dominica, Seychelles, Zimbabwe, Sept. 29, 1980; Djibouti, Oct. 1, 1980.

Articles of agreement of the International Monetary Fund, formulated at the Bretton Woods Conference July 1-22, 1944. Entered into force Dec. 27, 1945. TIAS 1501.

Acceptance deposited: Zimbabwe, Sept. 29, 1980.

Human Rights

Optional protocol to the international covenant on civil and political rights. Adopted at New York Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force Mar. 23, 1976.⁴

Ratification deposited: Peru, Oct. 3, 1980.

International Court of Justice

Declarations recognizing as compulsory the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court.

Declaration deposited: Barbados, Aug. 1, 1980.²

Nationality

Convention establishing the status of naturalized citizens who again take up their residence in the country of their origin. Signed at Rio de Janeiro Aug. 13, 1906. Entered into force May 25, 1908. 50 Stat. 1317.

Notification of termination: U.S., Oct. 20, 1980; effective Oct. 20, 1981.

Pollution

Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by dumping of wastes and other matter, with annexes. Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, and Washington Dec. 29, 1972. Entered into force Aug. 30, 1975. TIAS 8165.

Ratification deposited: Japan, Oct. 15, 1980.

Amendments to the convention of Dec. 29, 1972, on the prevention of marine pollution by dumping of wastes and other matter. TIAS 8165. Done at London Oct. 12, 1978.³

Instrument of acceptance signed by the President: Oct. 8, 1980.

Convention on long-range transboundary air pollution. Done at Geneva Nov. 13, 1979.³

Ratifications deposited: Hungary, Sept. 22, 1980; Portugal, Sept. 29, 1980.

Property, Intellectual

Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. Entered into force Apr. 26, 1970; for the U.S. Aug. 25, 1970. TIAS 6932.

Accession deposited: Gambia Sept. 10, 1980.

Safety at Sea

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1974, with annex. Done at London Nov. 1, 1974. Entered into force May 25, 1980. TIAS 9700.

Accessions deposited: Tunisia, Aug. 6, 1980; Turkey, July 31, 1980.

Protocol of 1978 relating to the international convention for the safety of life at sea, 1974 (TIAS 9700). Done at London Feb. 17, 1978.³

Accession deposited: Tunisia, Aug. 6, 1980.

Seals

Convention for the conservation of Antarctic seals, with annex and final act. Done at London June 1, 1972. Entered into force Mar. 11, 1978. TIAS 8826.

Ratifications deposited: Argentina, Mar. 7, 1978; Chile, Feb. 7, 1980; Japan, Aug. 28, 1980.

1980 protocol amending the interim convention of Feb. 9, 1957, as amended and extended (TIAS 3948, 5558, 6774, 8368), on conservation of North Pacific fur seals. Done at Washington Oct. 14, 1980. Enters into force on the date on which instruments of ratification or acceptance have been deposited by all the signatory governments.

Signatures: Canada, Japan, U.S.S.R.,⁵ U.S., Oct. 14, 1980.

Approval deposited: U.S.S.R.,⁵ Oct. 17, 1980.

Shipping

U.N. convention on the carriage of goods by sea, 1978. Done at Hamburg Mar. 31, 1978.³

Accession deposited: Tunisia, Sept. 15, 1980.

South Pacific Commission

Agreement amending the agreement of Feb. 6, 1947, as amended (TIAS 2317, 2458, 2952, 5845, 8120), establishing the South Pacific Commission. Done at the 18th South Pacific conference held in Noumea from Oct. 7-12, 1978. Entered into force June 4, 1980.

Acceptances deposited: Australia, Oct. 5, 1979; Fiji, Sept. 20, 1979; France, June 4, 1980; Nauru, Aug. 17, 1979; New Zealand, Nov. 2, 1979; Papua New Guinea, Apr. 14, 1980; Solomon Islands, Sept. 18, 1979; Tuvalu, Sept. 27, 1979; U.K., Oct. 3, 1979; U.S., Nov. 28, 1979; Western Samoa, Oct. 8, 1979.

Telecommunications

Partial revision of the radio regulations (Geneva, 1959), as revised, relating to the aeronautical mobile (R) service, with annexes and final protocol. Done at Geneva Mar. 5, 1978. Entered into force Sept. 1, 1979.

Instrument of ratification signed by the President: Oct. 8, 1980.

Ratification deposited: U.S., Oct. 22, 1980. Entered into force: U.S., Oct. 22, 1980. Approval deposited: Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, July 17, 1980.

Terrorism

Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents. Adopted at New York Dec. 14, 1973. Entered into force Feb. 20, 1977. TIAS 8532.

Accession deposited: El Salvador, Aug. 1980.²

International Convention against the taking of hostages. Adopted at New York Dec. 17, 1979.³

Signatures: Austria, Oct. 3, 1980; Iraq, Oct. 14, 1980.

Ratification deposited: Philippines, Oct. 1980.

U.N.

Charter of the U.N. and Statute of the International Court of Justice. Signed at San Francisco June 26, 1945. Entered into force Oct. 24, 1945. 55 Stat. 1600. Admitted to membership: St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Sept. 16, 1980.

UNIDO

Constitution of the U.N. Industrial Development Organization, with annexes. Adopted at Vienna Apr. 8, 1979.³

Signatures: Korea, Paraguay, Oct. 7, 1980; Suriname, Sept. 19, 1980.

Ratification deposited: Tanzania, Oct. 3, 1980.

Acceptance deposited: Netherlands, Oct. 10, 1980.

Women

Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women. Adopted at New York Dec. 18, 1979.³

Signature: Dominica, Sept. 15, 1980.

Ratification deposited: Dominica, Sept. 1980.

BILATERAL

Argentina

International express mail agreement, with detailed regulations. Signed at Buenos Aires and Washington Sept. 4 and 26, 1980. Enters into force on the date mutually agreed upon by the administrations, after it is signed by the authorized representatives of both administrations.

Bangladesh

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of Oct. 4, 1974 (TIAS 7949), with agreed minutes. Signed at Dacca Sept. 5, 1980. Entered into force Sept. 5, 1980.

Belgium

Transport agreement. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Oct. 23, 1980. Entered into force Oct. 23, 1980.

Naturalization convention. Signed at Brussels Nov. 16, 1868. Entered into force July 1869. 16 Stat. 747.

Notification of termination: U.S., Oct. 20, 1980; effective Oct. 20, 1981.

Canada

Protocol to amend the convention for the protection, preservation, and extension of sockeye salmon fisheries in the Fraser River System of May 26, 1930, as amended (Stat. 1355, TIAS 3867). Signed at Washington Feb. 24, 1977.

Notifications exchanged: Oct. 15, 1980. Entered into force: Oct. 15, 1980.

Protocol amending the convention of Mar. 1953, for the preservation of the halibut fishery of the Northern Pacific Ocean and the Bering Sea (TIAS 2900). Signed at Washington Mar. 29, 1979.

Notifications exchanged: Oct. 15, 1980. Entered into force: Oct. 15, 1980.

Agreement amending and supplementing the agreement of Mar. 9, 1959, as amended and supplemented (TIAS 4192, 5117, 5608, 6748, 7408, 9003), governing tolls on the St. Lawrence Seaway. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Oct. 7, 1980. Entered into force Oct. 7, 1980.

Agreement relating to the fisheries for albacore tuna off the Pacific coasts of the U.S. and Canada. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Aug. 21, 1980. Entered into force Aug. 21, 1980.

Convention with respect to taxes on income on capital, with exchange of notes. Signed at Washington Sept. 26, 1980. Entered into force upon the exchange of instruments of ratification.

Colombia

Agreement amending the agreement of July 3, 1978, as amended (TIAS 9515, 9713), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of letters at Bogota July 31 and Aug. 11, 1980. Entered into force Aug. 11, 1980.

Costa Rica

Naturalization convention. Signed at San Jose June 10, 1911. Entered into force May 1912. 37 Stat. 1603.

Notification of termination: U.S., Oct. 20, 1980; effective Oct. 20, 1981.

Agreement relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products, with annex. Effected by exchange of notes at San Jose Sept. 22, 1980. Entered into force Sept. 22, 1980; effective Jan. 1, 1980.

Agreement on a consultative mechanism relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products, with annex. Effected by exchange of notes

at San Jose Sept. 22, 1980. Entered into force Sept. 22, 1980; effective Jan. 1, 1980.

Denmark

Arrangement for the exchange of technical information and cooperation in nuclear safety matters, with patent addendum and appendices. Signed at Copenhagen Sept. 29, 1980. Entered into force Sept. 29, 1980.

Egypt

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of Oct. 4, 1979 (TIAS 9793), with agreed minutes. Effected by exchange of notes at Cairo Aug. 27, 1980. Entered into force Aug. 27, 1980.

El Salvador

Naturalization convention. Signed at San Salvador Mar. 14, 1908. Entered into force July 20, 1908. 35 Stat. 2038.

Notification of termination: U.S., Oct. 20, 1980; effective Oct. 20, 1981.

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities. Signed at San Salvador June 18, 1980. Entered into force June 18, 1980.

Finland

Arrangement for the exchange of technical information and cooperation in nuclear safety matters. Signed at Helsinki Sept. 26, 1980. Entered into force Sept. 26, 1980.

France

Technical exchange and cooperation arrangement in the field of light water reactor safety research, with appendices. Signed at Paris and Washington July 16 and Sept. 12, 1980. Entered into force Sept. 12, 1980.

Agreement on research participation and technical exchange in the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Loss of Fluid Test (LOFT) research program with appendix. Signed at Paris and Washington July 30 and Sept. 12, 1980. Entered into force Sept. 12, 1980.

Haiti

Naturalization treaty. Signed at Washington Mar. 22, 1902. Entered into force Mar. 19, 1904. 33 Stat. 2101.

Notification of termination: U.S., Oct. 20, 1980; effective Oct. 20, 1981.

Treaty extending the time within which may be effected the exchange of ratifications of the treaty of naturalization signed Mar. 22, 1902 (33 Stat. 2101). Signed at Washington Feb. 28, 1903. Entered into force Mar. 19, 1904. 33 Stat. 2157.

Notification of termination: U.S., Oct. 20, 1980; effective Oct. 20, 1981.

Honduras

Naturalization convention. Signed at Tegucigalpa, June 23, 1908. Entered into force Apr. 16, 1909. 36 Stat. 2160.

Notification of termination: U.S., Oct. 20, 1980; effective Oct. 20, 1981.

Israel

Contingency implementing arrangements for the memorandum of agreement of June 22, 1979 (TIAS 9533), concerning an oil supply arrangement, with related letter. Signed at Washington Oct. 17, 1980. Entered into force Oct. 17, 1980.

Korea, Republic of

Agreement amending the agreement of Dec. 23, 1977, as amended (TIAS 9039, 9350, 9566, 9758), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Sept. 8, 1980. Entered into force Sept. 8, 1980; effective Jan. 1, 1980.

Liberia

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities. Signed at Monrovia Aug. 13, 1980. Entered into force Aug. 13, 1980.

Lithuania

Treaty defining liability for military service and other acts of allegiance of naturalized persons and persons born with double nationality. Signed at Kaunas, Oct. 18, 1937. Entered into force July 20, 1938. 53 Stat. 1569.

Notification of termination: U.S., Oct. 24, 1980; effective Oct. 24, 1981.

Mexico

Minute 260 of the International Boundary and Water Commission amending and extending Minute 240, as amended and extended (TIAS 8712, 9290), relating to emergency deliveries of Colorado River waters for use in Tijuana. Signed at El Paso Aug. 11, 1979.

Entered into force: Dec. 7, 1979.

Minute 263 of the International Boundary and Water Commission amending and extending Minute 240, as amended and extended (TIAS 8712, 9290), relating to emergency deliveries of Colorado River waters for use in Tijuana. Signed at El Paso Aug. 6, 1980. Entered into force Sept. 22, 1980.

Morocco

Agreement to establish the U.S.-Moroccan Joint Committee for Economic Relations. Signed at Washington Sept. 25, 1980. Entered into force Sept. 25, 1980.

Nicaragua

Naturalization convention. Signed at Managua Dec. 7, 1908. Entered into force Mar. 28, 1912. 37 Stat. 1560.

Notification of termination: U.S., Oct. 24, 1980; effective Oct. 24, 1981.

Supplementary naturalization convention. Signed at Managua June 17, 1911. Entered into force Mar. 28, 1912. 37 Stat. 1563.

Notification of termination: U.S., Oct. 24, 1980; effective Oct. 24, 1981.

October 1980

Events pertaining to Iran may be found page 47.

October 5

Portugal holds parliamentary elections. Prime Minister Francisco Sa Carneiro's Democratic Alliance wins 134 seats in the 250-member parliament.

West Germany holds parliamentary elections. Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's alition Government of Social Democrats and Free Democrats is returned to office.

October 6

Nigerian President Shehu Shagari makes official visit to U.S., Oct. 3-8, ar to Washington, D.C., Oct. 7-8.

October 17

U.S.-Soviet delegates meet in Geneva to begin discussions of questions related to the limitation of certain U.S. and Soviet nuclear forces.

U.S. and Israel sign agreement to implement emergency oil supply guarantee June 22, 1979.

October 18

Australia holds parliamentary elections. Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser's Liberal Party is returned to office.

October 23

Soviet Premier Kosygin resigns and replaced by his First Deputy, Nikolai A. Tikhonov.

October 25

After a 5-week meeting in Belgrade, delegates of the 21st UNESCO general conference approves UNESCO's program and budget for the coming 2 years and establishes a new communications development clearinghouse. It also adopts a resolution which noted the McBride commission report."

October 30

Jamaica holds parliamentary election Edward Seaga of the Jamaica Labor Party replaces the Democratic Socialist Party's Prime Minister Manley.

Press briefing on international communications issues discussed at the 21st UNESCO general conference in Belgrade held at State Department. ■

Norway
Naturalization convention and protocol. Signed at Stockholm May 26, 1869. Entered into force June 14, 1871. 17 Stat. 809.
Notification of termination: U.S., Oct. 3, 1980; effective Oct. 3, 1981.

Protocol amending the convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and property, signed at Oslo on Dec. 3, 1971 (TIAS 7474). Signed at Oslo Sept. 19, 1980. Enters into force upon the exchange of instruments of ratification.

Panama
Agreement relating to jurisdiction over vessels utilizing the Louisiana Offshore Oil Port. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Aug. 15 and Oct. 10, 1980. Entered into force Oct. 10, 1980.

Papua New Guinea
Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace Corps program in Papua New Guinea, with related note. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Oct. 6, 1980. Entered into force Oct. 6, 1980.

Peru
Naturalization convention. Signed at Lima Oct. 15, 1907. Entered into force July 23, 1909. 36 Stat. 2181.
Notification of termination: U.S., Oct. 24, 1980; effective Oct. 24, 1981.

Portugal
Naturalization convention. Signed at Washington May 7, 1908. Entered into force Nov. 14, 1908. 35 Stat. 2082.
Notification of termination: U.S., Oct. 20, 1980; effective Apr. 20, 1981.

Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts of the U.S. Signed at Washington Oct. 16, 1980. Enters into force on a date to be mutually agreed by exchange of notes, upon the completion of internal procedures of both governments.

Saudi Arabia
Agreement concerning the testing of Saudi Arabian iron ore, relating to the technical cooperation agreement of Feb. 13, 1975, as extended (TIAS 8072). Effected by letter signed at Washington Aug. 5, 1980, with concurrences at Riyadh Sept. 15, 1980. Entered into force Sept. 15, 1980.

Agreement extending the project agreement of Sept. 27, 1975 (TIAS 8490), for technical cooperation in statistics and data processing. Letter dated Sept. 22, 1980 at Washington and confirmed Oct. 4, 1980, at Riyadh. Entered into force Oct. 4, 1980.

Sierra Leone
Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of Aug. 8, 1980. Effected by exchange of notes at Freetown Sept. 29, 1980. Entered into force Sept. 29, 1980.

Somalia
Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of Mar. 20, 1978 (TIAS 9222). Signed at Mogadishu June 25, 1980. Entered into force June 25, 1980.

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of June 25, 1980. Effected by exchange of notes at Mogadishu Aug. 14 and 17, 1980. Entered into force Aug. 17, 1980.

Suriname
Agreement concerning the provision of training related to defense articles under the U.S. international military education and training (IMET) program. Effected by exchange of notes at Paramaribo Aug. 22 and 25, 1980. Entered into force Aug. 25, 1980.

Thailand
Agreement concerning a program to combat attacks by pirates on boat refugees in the Gulf of Thailand. Effected by exchange of notes at Bangkok Sept. 30, 1980. Entered into force Sept. 30, 1980.

Togo
Agreement concerning the provision of training related to defense articles under the U.S. international military education and training (IMET) program. Effected by exchange of notes at Lome Mar. 10 and July 17, 1980. Entered into force July 17, 1980.

United Kingdom
Agreement extending the Polaris sales agreement of Apr. 6, 1963 (TIAS 5313), to cover the sale of Trident I weapons system. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Sept. 30, 1980. Entered into force Sept. 30, 1980.

Uruguay
Naturalization convention. Signed at Montevideo Aug. 10, 1908. Entered into force May 14, 1909. 36 Stat. 2165.
Notification of termination: U.S., Oct. 20, 1980; effective Oct. 20, 1981.

Venezuela
Maritime boundary treaty. Signed at Caracas Mar. 28, 1978.³
Instrument of ratification signed by the President: Oct. 10, 1980.

Zaire
Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of certain debts owed to, guaranteed or insured by the U.S. Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Kinshasa July 28, 1980. Entered into force Oct. 20, 1980.

¹With declaration(s).
²With reservation(s).
³Not in force.
⁴Not in force for the U.S.
⁵With statement. ■

Department of State

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

| Date | Subject | No. | Date | Subject |
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| 10/1 | Program for Nigerian President Shagari's official visit to Washington, D.C., Oct. 7-8. | *286 | 10/14 | 1980 Protocol amending the interim convention on conservation of North Pacific fur seals. |
| 10/25 | Muskie: news conference, New York. | *287 | 10/14 | Shipping Coordinating Committee (SCC) Subcommittee on Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), working group on the carriage of dangerous goods, Nov. 6. |
| 10/2 | Muskie: news conference, New York. | *288 | 10/14 | SCC, SOLAS, panel on bulk cargoes, Nov. 12. |
| 10/6 | Muskie: address before the American Lutheran Church, Minneapolis. | *289 | 10/14 | Muskie: press briefing, Ann Arbor. |
| 10/6 | Muskie: address before the Economic Club of Memphis and Memphis in May International Festival, Inc., Memphis. | 290 | 10/16 | Muskie: remarks before the Woman's National Democratic Club. |
| 10/11 | Muskie: question-and-answer session following Memphis address, Oct. 10. | *290A | 10/17 | Question-and-answer session following Woman's National Democratic Club address, Oct. 16. |
| 10/6 | Advisory Committee on International Investment, Technology, and Development, Oct. 23. | *291 | 10/17 | U.S., Portugal sign new fisheries agreement, Oct. 16. |
| 10/6 | U.S. Organization of the International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee (CCITT), study group A, Oct. 22. | 292 | 10/19 | Muskie: interview on ABC-TV's "Issues and Answers." |
| 10/6 | Overseas School Advisory Council, Dec. 17. | *293 | 10/20 | Muskie: address before various organizations, Chicago. |
| 10/6 | Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, Nov. 13. | *294 | 10/20 | Muskie: address before the Inland Daily Press Association, Chicago. |
| 10/8 | Fernando E. Rondon sworn in as Ambassador to Madagascar (biographic data). | *295 | 10/20 | Harry E.T. Thayer sworn in as Ambassador to Singapore (biographic data). |
| 10/10 | Jerrold Martin North sworn in as Ambassador to Djibouti (biographic data). | *296 | 10/21 | Muskie: address before group sponsored by the Missouri Athletic Club and KMOX, St. Louis. |
| 10/10 | Muskie: press briefing, Memphis, Oct. 6. | *297 | 10/21 | U.S., Costa Rica sign bilateral textile agreements, Sept. 22. |
| 10/9 | Lyle Franklin Lane sworn in as Ambassador to Paraguay, Aug. 27 (biographic data). | 298 | 10/21 | Muskie: address before group sponsored by the University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee and the Institute of World Affairs, Milwaukee. |
| 10/11 | Muskie: address at Notre Dame University, South Bend. | *299 | 10/23 | U.S., Belgium bring new air agreement into force. |
| 10/14 | Muskie: address at the Peace Corps rededication ceremony, Ann Arbor. | *300 | 10/27 | Fourth Annual Caribbean Conference on Trade, Investment, and Development, Miami, Nov. 23-25. |
| 10/16 | Muskie: news conference, Buffalo, Oct. 14. | *301 | 10/27 | Muskie: address at the University of Scranton, Scranton. |
| 10/14 | Muskie: address before the General Pulaski Association of the Niagara Frontier, Buffalo. | *301A | 11/5 | Muskie: question-and-answer session following Scranton address, Oct. 27. |
| | | *302 | 10/28 | Muskie: address before the Chamber of Commerce, Portland. |
| | | *302A | 11/5 | Muskie: question-and-answer session following Portland address, Oct. 28. |

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| 303 | 10/28 | Muskie: address before the Economic Club, New York. |
| *303A | 10/28 | Muskie, Linowitz: question-and-answer session following New York address. |
| *304 | 10/28 | Advisory Committee on the Law of the Sea, Nov. 13-14 (partially closed). |
| *305 | 10/28 | Advisory Committee on International Investment, Technology, and Development, Nov. 13. |
| *306 | 10/28 | SCC, SOLAS, working group on standards of training and watch-keeping, Nov. 18. |
| *307 | 10/28 | SCC, SOLAS, working group on bulk chemicals, Nov. 13. |
| *308 | 10/28 | SCC, SOLAS, working group on international multimodal transport and containers, Nov. 13. |
| *309 | 10/29 | Muskie: question-and-answer session before Jewish Community Relations Council, New York. |

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Press releases may be obtained from the Public Affairs Office, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, 799 United Nations Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10017.

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| *32 | 4/18 | Spero: World Assembly on the elderly, ECOSOC. |
| *33 | 4/21 | Vanden Heuvel: Lebanon, Security Council. |
| *34 | 4/22 | "Earth Day" celebrated. |
| *35 | 4/22 | McCall: statement at "Earth Day" celebrations, New York. |
| 36 | 4/22 | McHenry: address before the UNA-USA, Apr. 19. |
| *37 | 4/23 | Morgenthau: development activities, ECOSOC. |
| *38 | 4/24 | McHenry: Lebanon, Security Council. |
| *39 | 4/25 | McHenry: address to the Washington Bar Association. |
| *40 | 4/28 | Spero: human rights, ECOSOC. |
| *41 | 4/30 | McHenry: Palestine, Security Council. |
| *42 | 5/1 | McCall: address to the National Workshop on Christian-Jewish Relations, Dallas, Apr. 30. |
| *43 | 5/1 | Spero: UNHCR assistance for the Horn of Africa, ECOSOC, Apr. 29. |

- *44 5/2 Spero: assistance to the Kampuchean people, ECOSOC, May 1.
- *45 5/7 McCall: proposed sale of 931 First Ave., New York, Community Board No. 6.
- *46 5/8 McHenry: address at the University of Michigan, May 3.
- *47 5/8 McHenry: statement on the death of Yugoslov President Tito, UNGA.
- *48 5/8 Vanden Heuvel: occupied Arab territories, Security Council.
- *49 5/12 McCall: address at Tougaloo College, Tougaloo, Miss., May 11.
- *50 5/16 Petree: information, Committee on Information.
- *51 5/19 McCall: TTPI, Trusteeship Council.
- *52 5/19 Winkel: TTPI, Trusteeship Council.
- *53 5/19 Petree: disarmament, Disarmament Commission.
- *54 5/19 Formation of a joint N. Y. Police Department and FBI terrorism task force.
- *55 5/20 Camacho: Mariana Islands, Trusteeship Council.
- *56 5/20 Nakamura: TTPI, Trusteeship Council.
- *57 5/22 Benton: UNICEF.
- *58 5/23 McHenry: address to Operation Crossroads Africa, May 22.
- *59 5/27 Spero: science and technology, Intergovernmental Committee on Science and Technology for Development.
- *60 5/27 New York regional conference for women, June 2.
- *61 5/30 McCall: TTPI, Trusteeship Council.
- *62 6/2 Petree: Indian Ocean, ad hoc committee.
- 63 6/5 McHenry: occupied Arab territories, Security Council.
- *64 6/8 McCall: address at the Cathedral Church of St. John the Divine.
- *65 6/10 Petree: Indian Ocean, ad hoc committee, June 3.
- 66 6/13 McHenry: South Africa, Security Council.
- *67 6/13 Petree: UNFICYP, Security Council.
- *68 6/16 Kahan: Indian Ocean, Committee on the Indian Ocean.
- *69 6/17 Petree: UNIFIL, Security Council.
- *70 6/23 McHenry: address before the Council on Religion and International Affairs, June 19.
- *71 6/23 Strasser: Virgin Islands, Subcommittee on Small Territories of the Special Committee on Decolonization.
- *72 6/24 McHenry: Caribbean, Caribbean Group for Cooperation in Economic Development, IBRD, Washington, D.C.
- *73 6/25 Vanden Heuvel: space, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.
- *74 6/27 U.S. delegation to the World Conference of the U. N. Decade for Women (biographic data).
- *75 6/27 Vanden Heuvel: Angolan complaint, Security Council.
- 76 6/30 McHenry: status of Jerusalem, Security Council.
- *77 7/7 McHenry: global negotiations, Committee of the Whole.
- *78 7/8 McHenry: ECOSOC, Geneva.
- 79 7/11 Western five statement on Namibia.
- *80 7/18 Ambassador McCall goes to the Caribbean.
- 81 7/24 Vanden Heuvel: Palestine, UNGA emergency special session.
- *82 7/25 Kahan: Indian Ocean, ad hoc committee.
- 83 7/29 Vanden Heuvel: Palestine, UNGA emergency special session.
- *84 7/30 McHenry: Zimbabwe membership, Security Council.
- *85 7/31 Kahan: Indian Ocean, ad hoc committee.
- *86 8/4 McHenry: address before the National Urban League.

* Not printed in the BULLETIN. ■

Department of State Publications

Free, single copies of the following Department of State publications are available from the Public Information Service, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

The President

National Security Policy, American Legion, Boston, Aug. 21, 1980 (Current Policy #214).

Secretary Muskie's News Conference

Subjects: hostages, nuclear fuel to SALT and Soviet relations, seat Democratic Kampuchean regime Poland, Foreign Service Act, Sec 1980 (Current Policy #218).

Africa

U.S. Policy Toward Liberia, Assistant Secretary Moose, House Appropriations subcommittee, Aug. 19, 1980 (Current Policy #210).

Arms Control

U.S. Nuclear Strategy, Secretary of State, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Sept. 16, 1980 (Current Policy #219).

Essentials of Security: Arms and International Security, Secretary Muskie, Pittsburgh World Affairs Council, Sept. 18, 1980 (Current Policy #220).

Obligations of Peace, Secretary Muskie, U.N. General Assembly, Sept. 22, 1980 (Current Policy #225).

East Asia

U.S.-China agreements signed Sept. 1980 (Selected Documents #18). U.S.-China Relations (GIST, Sept. 1980).

Economics

World Economic Crisis in the 1980s, Under Secretary Cooper, Alpbach Forum, Alpbach, Austria, 1980 (Current Policy #217).

Europe

Export Restrictions on U.S.S.R., Secretary Cooper, Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee, Aug. 20, 1980 (Current Policy #218). Eighth Semiannual Report: Implementation of the Helsinki Accords, Dec. 1979-May 31, 1980 (Special Report). U.S. Partial Embargo on Grain Sales to U.S.S.R. (GIST, Sept. 1980).

Human Rights

Human Rights and the National Intelligence Community, Deputy Secretary Christopher, American Bar Association, Honolulu, Aug. 4, 1980 (Current Policy #206).

Middle East

U.S. Relations With Persian Gulf States, Assistant Secretary Saunders' annual report, House Foreign Affairs Committee, Sept. 3, 1980 (Current Policy #215).

U.S.-Libyan Relations Since 1969, Secretary Newsom, Senate Judiciary subcommittee, Aug. 4, 1980 (Current Policy #216).

U.S. Relationship With Persian Gulf States, Assistant Secretary Saunders' oral statement, House Foreign Affairs subcommittee, Sept. 3, 1980 (Current Policy #226).

Prospects for Middle East Peace, Assistant Secretary Linowitz, National Press Club, Sept. 18, 1980 (Current Policy #227).

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**CYRUS R. VANCE
EDMUND S. MUSKIE**
Secretaries of State

**HODDING CARTER III
WILLIAM J. DYESS**
Assistant Secretaries for Public Affairs

PAUL E. AUERSWALD
Director,
Office of Public Communication

JOHN CLARK KIMBALL
Chief, Editorial Division

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG
Editor

JUANITA ADAMS
Assistant Editor

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
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