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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication compiled and edited in the Division of Publications, Office of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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Guarding the Ramparts of Freedom

by Philip C. Jessup
Ambassador at Large¹

From time to time there is a recurrent demand that there should be "one more try" to negotiate a settlement with the Soviet Union. Sometimes this demand comes from people who have the idea that if only four men would sit around a table they would be sure to reach agreement. Doubtless, four men grouped around a table can accomplish much when they are all interested in reaching agreement. But I have sat at several tables, and I can add to the abundant testimony, based on our experience thus far, that where one of the four is a representative of the Soviet Union there is, as of today, little reason to expect that agreement will result. If you want detailed evidence about this, I suggest that you read a recent book entitled *Negotiating with the Russians*—a collection of 10 essays written by Americans who have participated in such negotiations.

These experiences make clear that up to now Soviet representatives have come to conference tables with their minds primarily set upon the making of propaganda rather than upon the solution of international tensions. Nevertheless, in spite of the difficulties and the disagreements, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom have never closed and will never close the door to settlement of the great issues dividing the world. Whenever the Soviet Union is ready to undertake real negotiation, we will not be found wanting.

To understand the obstacles confronting us in establishing a stable relationship with the Soviet Union, it is worthwhile to remind ourselves from time to time of what the record shows on some of the principal areas of negotiation with the Soviets since the end of the war. Many men of good will have entered hopefully into such negotiations and have come out disillusioned as to the prospects of ready agreement. This has been the experience of all of our Secretaries of State from

Stettinius at San Francisco through the many meetings attended by Secretaries of State Byrnes, Marshall, and Acheson. A characteristic reaction was that expressed by Mr. Byrnes, looking back upon his many sessions with Molotov:

I have had quite a broad experience in dealing with men. My active practice as a trial lawyer was rich with such experience. In my service in the House of Representatives and in the Senate I served with over two thousand Representatives and nearly two hundred Senators. I conferred with most of them in the adjustment of differences within each branch and between the two branches of Congress. As Justice of the Supreme Court, as Director first of Economic Stabilization, and then of War Mobilization, I met many men with many interests, and settled many issues. But through all these years I had no experience that prepared me for negotiating with Mr. Molotov.

I remember once at London one of the newspaper correspondents, reluctant to believe that Mr. Molotov would break up the conference rather than meet the view of the rest of us, asked me incredulously:

"But are you certain you have explored every avenue of approach to the problems?"

"My friend," I replied, "I've not only explored every avenue, but I've gone down every lane, byway and highway. I've tried everything I ever learned in the House and Senate. But there I worked with a majority rule. This is more like a jury. If you have one stubborn juror, all you can expect is a mistrial."

World Negotiations for Unity and Peace

On the question of Germany, we have been negotiating for 7 years. Some of the negotiation has been carried on by correspondence and much of it has been carried on in meetings at various levels. The Council of Foreign Ministers has dealt with the subject six times. At various levels representatives of the Four Powers have met endlessly in Berlin. It has been discussed in Moscow. Last year my colleagues and I spent over 3 months meeting day after day with Gromyko in the Palais Rose in Paris, and we got exactly nowhere. When we found that they had absolutely no desire to agree on an agenda for a meeting of the Ministers, the three Governments invited the Soviets to come to Washington and meet without a prearranged

¹Address made before the Toronto Women's Canadian Club at Toronto on Sept. 26 (press release 750 dated Sept. 24).

agenda. The Soviets did not come. In March of this year they started again to write notes about the subject, and the negotiation by correspondence is still continuing. An analysis of these recent exchanges, like the earlier experience, leads inescapably to the conclusion that the Soviet Union is not trying to reach an agreed settlement on Germany but is intent on disrupting the notable progress which is being made in Western Europe toward unity and strength in freedom.

In regard to Austria, in addition to the meetings of the Foreign Ministers themselves, their deputies have met 258 times. We called another meeting of the deputies in January of this year, but the Soviets refused to attend. We did not give up but suggested by correspondence a short form of a treaty which would provide for the restoration to Austria of the free status which the Soviets joined in promising to them in the Moscow Declaration of 1945. When the Soviets raised four specific objections to our new draft, we agreed to meet them on all four points. Another meeting of the deputies has been called for Monday, September 29, and we will see whether the Soviet deputy will attend and, if so, whether the Soviet attitude has changed.

Let us turn for a moment to the other side of the world and look at the situation in Korea. Everyone is familiar with the Communist obstinacy which for so many months has blocked the patient efforts of the U.N. negotiators at Panmunjom. Although the Soviet representatives are not personally in attendance at the armistice negotiations, the pattern is familiar to those who have spent thankless months arguing with the Soviets. Indeed, the Panmunjom pattern is particularly familiar to those who recall the 2 years of fruitless negotiation in 1946 and 1947 when we tried to reach agreement with the Soviets upon a settlement which would provide for the unification of Korea. But I do not mean to suggest that a moment of the Panmunjom negotiations is wasted time; if and when an armistice is achieved, the effort will have been amply repaid.

Essential Steps Taken by U.N.

In analyzing the process of negotiation with the Soviets, it is particularly important to note the diversity of techniques which we have attempted over these many years. We have tried public meetings, restricted meetings, and secret meetings, Palais Rose, for example. When the negotiations have not been successful we have gone to the United Nations. Thus, when the Soviets started the Berlin Blockade in 1948, the U.K., the U.S., and France negotiated in the Allied Control Council in Berlin, through our Embassy in Moscow, and finally in the U. N. Security Council. In that instance, further negotiations finally led to the lifting of the Blockade, but it is important to remember that for our part our negotiations were backed up by the stupendous achievement of the

Berlin Airlift and by countermeasures, both of which made the Soviet lawlessness a distinct loss to them.

More recently, having failed to get Soviet agreement on the essential steps leading up to free elections throughout Germany in order that Germany might be united, we again turned to the United Nations. The General Assembly appointed a U.N. commission to investigate and make recommendations. They were given the fullest support by the German Federal Republic and by the German authorities in the Western sectors of Berlin. The Soviets never even answered the Commission's letters.

In regard to Austria, the Austrian Government has appealed for U.N. assistance in bringing about the settlement for which the Three Powers have striven so long, and we welcome the fact that this question is on the agenda of the forthcoming meeting of the General Assembly.

In regard to Korea, when our negotiations with the Soviets brought no results in 1947, we took the matter to the United Nations and the United Nations helped to set up the Republic of Korea. The U.N. Commission was refused access to the territory controlled by the Soviet Union. When the Communists resorted to blatant aggression we turned to the United Nations—and the United Nations, with your participation and ours and that of other members, has successfully thrown back the aggression and with amazing patience is still conducting the armistice negotiations.

Problem of Disarmament

Let us also consider another subject of negotiation—disarmament. In 1946, the United States made a proposal which, I believe, will go down in history as one of the most extraordinary offers ever made by a great power. At that time we had a monopoly of the atomic bomb. We went into the United Nations and offered to turn over our monopoly to an international authority under the United Nations. The members of the United Nations, with no exception except for the members of the Soviet bloc, have repeatedly endorsed the U.N. plan which was developed as the result of a discussion of the original U.S. offer. Concurrently, we have attempted over these 6 years to negotiate a settlement of the general problem of disarmament with which men have wrestled throughout this century.

At the opening of the General Assembly last fall, the Governments of the United States, United Kingdom, and France made a new specific proposal outlining in broad and imaginative terms the possibilities of general agreement on the control and reduction of armaments and calling for the achievement of such agreement through a new U.N. organ—the Disarmament Commission—which was to supersede the old U.N. Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission on Conventional Armaments. We negotiated on this proposal in

the General Assembly. Again, in response to the thought of many that private conversations might succeed where public debate failed, the representatives of the United States, United Kingdom, and France met in secret sessions with Mr. Vyshinsky, under the chairmanship of Padilla Nervo, the President of the General Assembly. In spite of the fact that there seemed to be no progress, we did not give up but instead have worked most diligently in the newly established Disarmament Commission. Like the representatives of your own and other member governments, Ambassador Cohen of the United States has returned again and again to the effort to find some solution to the impasse. To assist Ambassador Cohen in searching out every remote possibility of progress, our Government has appointed a distinguished advisory group which is hard at work. But the Soviet representative on the Disarmament Commission has not moved. Nevertheless, in this field of negotiation, as in others, we shall persevere.

I should like to comment in a little more detail on the nature of the difficulty in reaching agreement with the Soviets on disarmament. With that parrot-like repetition which is so characteristic of the Soviet negotiators, they have argued over and over again that the only approach to disarmament is to begin by agreeing to a prohibition on the use of atomic weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Now, this kind of a proposal marked some progress when it was discussed at the first Hague Peace Conference in 1899 on the initiative of the Czar of Russia. At that time the world had not moved in the direction of international organization, and so the nations concerned agreed upon a multilateral exchange of promises providing for the prohibition of such military practices as the use of dum-dum bullets and the poisoning of wells. Scholars who have studied the history of these early efforts have pointed out that, to the extent these reciprocal promises were observed, observance was principally due either to the military inefficacy of certain of the practices banned, or, as to other practices, to the dangers of retaliation in kind. Today, such considerations are largely inapplicable. In the atomic realm, for example, we all know the efficacy of the weapons; we also know that, although reliance on the deterrent effect of the free world's atomic might is a present necessity, such reliance cannot be regarded as a satisfactory long-range guaranty against aggression.

Moreover, there is another new element in the present situation. Although modern history affords several examples of aggressive totalitarian regimes, the Soviet Union is the first great nation which, since the opening of Japan to the West in 1853, has shut itself off from the rest of the world behind an Iron Curtain. When you combine the three factors—the nature of modern war and modern weapons, the existence of a great military power which operates as a great conspiracy for

world domination, and the fact that this power is completely shut off from the rest of the world and operates in total secrecy—you have an indication of why a simple prohibition no longer meets the need of the world community. The Soviet Union wants to continue to make atomic bombs while promising not to use them except for “civilian purposes.” But the simple and inescapable fact is that we would not trust the Soviets to keep such a promise. We of the free world would keep it, and the Soviets would therefore have bought our disarmament without paying anything for it. We cannot stake the security of the free world upon their unproved word.

We have, therefore, insisted, and properly insisted, that any plan for the control and reduction of armaments, whether atomic or other, must be put into operation in such a way that nations can rely on knowledge of the facts and not on simple promises. You and we, and the others outside of the Iron Curtain, are ready to agree to effective international inspection and control. The Soviets are not willing.

U.N. Plan for Atomic Control

More broadly, this problem needs to be viewed in terms of one of the really basic issues which confronts—and divides—the world today. That issue can be stated as follows: “Are the governments of the world willing to accept limitations on their sovereignty in order to make peace secure under the United Nations?” Your country and mine and the overwhelming majority of members of the United Nations agree we are willing. We gave that answer when we approved the U.N. plan for the control of atomic energy. That plan is not limited to a mere promise that certain weapons would not be manufactured or used. It is a plan for the surrender to effective international ownership or control of one of the most vital resources of states. This willingness of governments to submit to international control under the United Nations is of the utmost significance. It reveals a new approach to the problem of international peace. The same spirit has now inspired the nations of Western Europe to set up a supra-national institution to control the coal and steel industries and to follow that same course in providing for the common defense in the European Defense Community.

How does the Soviet Union answer this basic question concerning limitations on sovereignty as that question arises in the field of atomic energy? The Soviet Union states that some form of international control of atomic weapons is desirable—so long as that control does not impinge upon its “domestic” affairs—i.e., its “sovereignty.” But the Soviet Union has thus far refused to state what international controls it would find compatible with its sovereignty. The Soviet Union has persisted in this obdurate attitude despite re-

peated requests for clarification from other members of the Disarmament Commission. For in the atomic realm, the Disarmament Commission, under the mandate of the General Assembly, is directed not only to consider the U.N. plan but any other equally effective plan.

The one fact which is obvious in this intricate field is that any effective plan must involve elements of international control which modify our traditional concepts of sovereignty. The non-Soviet world accepts this fact. We want to exercise our sovereignty to build up an international organ for peace. But the Soviet Union says "Nyet."

I think you will be interested in a typical formulation of that attitude—Mr. Vyshinsky's words of response to Mr. Pearson in 1949, after your distinguished Minister of External Affairs had urged the advantages of what the Soviets always deliberately mislabeled the "United States" plan on atomic energy:

Mr. Pearson stated that he considered that the Soviet Union assertion that the United States plan liquidated state sovereignty was absurd. He said that his plan was a step forward in the strengthening of state sovereignty; that it meant not a loss of sovereignty but the enjoyment of sovereignty. Regardless, however, of the way in which one may assess the United States plan from the point of view of sovereignty, one thing is doubtless: that the United States plan obviously means an abandonment of sovereignty.

Soviet Rejection and Concealment

Mr. Vyshinsky was trying to conceal in one of his storms of words the fact that the Soviet Union is afraid that any form of international inspection or control within their territory would bring their people into touch with the true world which is now concealed from them by the Iron Curtain. The Soviet Union fears that its despotic regime would crumble if exposed to the light and the truth.

For all its boasting about alleged progress in the Soviet Union, the Soviet rulers are still back in the days of the Czar. Suppression and secrecy are their replies to offers for cooperation and confidence.

The Soviet rejection of this great new international spirit which is now alive in the world can be documented by volumes of quotations from their official statements, both at home and in the organs of the United Nations. Let me cite just one other illustrative example.

Last June, Soviet war planes shot down two unarmed Swedish aircraft flying over international waters in the Baltic. After making its protest against this cruel and illegal act, the Swedish Government suggested that there be a resort to some international procedure "to elucidate the facts and to determine the legal consequences." The Swedish Government suggested that the International Court of Justice would be the most suitable organ. The Soviet Government replied to this suggestion that it—

considers it necessary to draw attention to the fact that the guarding of the Soviet Union frontiers is the undeniable right and duty of the Soviet Union. The USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs sees, therefore, no grounds to turn to some international procedure or other for the examination of questions connected with the encroachment of the frontiers of the Soviet Union.

The complete and fitting commentary on this kind of reasoning was made by Ambassador Cohen in a recent speech:

True and legitimate self-interest in the international field as in the national field seldom suffers from justifying itself within the framework of the general good. In an interdependent society, supreme selfishness rarely accords with true self-interest. We all know that individuals, groups and nations may carry the pursuit of naked power and aggrandizement to a point where, far from promoting self-interest, it may prove actually self-destructive. In this Twentieth Century, Germany destroyed its own rich heritage by a blind and unrestrained pursuit of what it called its national interest.

In the tent at Panmunjom, in the ornate Palais Rose in Paris, in the council chambers of the United Nations in New York, the representatives of the free nations continue with patience and persistence to meet and counter this reactionary insistence upon the doctrine of secret sovereignty. We must never retreat from the new positions to which we of the free world have advanced in the United Nations. We cannot abandon our striving for the new concepts of international cooperation and go back to precedents of the last century which are not only outmoded but which today would lead the free countries into positions of mortal damage.

I think we will all agree that, despite the difficulties and frustrations, we must always be ready to talk to the Soviets in the hope that some day they will really be ready to negotiate.

Continuous Watchfulness Needed

But what should the free nations do in the meantime? There are sincere people who are pacifists and nonresisters. I respect those whose religious teachings lead them individually to this way of life, though I, myself, cannot agree with this view. Even, however, from the point of view of such people, it must be recognized that there is a vast difference between the position of an individual and the position of a government. An individual may follow the teachings in which he believes in conscientious objection to war and, if necessary, undergo imprisonment or personal suffering. But a government, responsible for all its people, cannot accept subjection to a foreign tyranny.

No—faced by a great military power whose airfields spread from the center of Europe to the Bering Strait, and whose huge armies, whether Soviet or satellite, are poised at the borders of many a free nation—we must look to our own defenses.

A colleague of mine, Wilson Compton, has recently recalled the Old Testament story of the Prophet Nehemiah. After the city of Jerusalem had been destroyed by the armies of Babylon, Nehemiah obtained permission from the Babylonian king to return to the "City of his fathers." Nehemiah found the walls of Jerusalem "broken down and the gates thereof consumed with fire"; and he said unto his people: "Let us rise up and build."

But the Ammonites in the surrounding plains did not want Jerusalem rebuilt. They laughed at Nehemiah and his little crew of helpers. But Nehemiah kept on building the wall. Then they tried cajolery, then propaganda, then threats. But Nehemiah kept on building. He "set a watch against them day and night," as the ancient story goes. He "set in the lower places behind the wall, and on the higher places, the people and their families, with their swords, their spears, and their bows. And it came to pass that half of the people wrought in the work and the other half of them held the spears, the shields, the bows and the habergeons," and "everyone with one of his hands wrought in the work and with the other hand held a weapon."

Finally the Ammonites tried trickery. Sanballat, the chief of the plainsmen, sent a messenger to Nehemiah saying: "Come down in to the plains of Ono and let us reason together," for they thought to destroy him. But Nehemiah would not be deflected from his purpose to rebuild the walls of Jerusalem; and the answer which he sent to Sanballat still comes down through the ages of history as a ringing challenge to you and to me and to all those who would build a better world. This was Nehemiah's answer: "I am doing a great work and I will not come down. Why should the work cease whilst I leave it and come down to you?" So they finished the wall!

You Canadians, and we in the United States, have stretched our hands across the North Atlantic which binds us to our friends in Europe. In the North Atlantic Treaty Organization we are building the wall. Like Nehemiah's countrymen there are those who must hold the spears, the shields, the bows, and the habergeons, and there are others who work in the factory, in the mines, in the forests, and on the farms to continue to build up righteous strength. Like Nehemiah, we will not halt our building to talk. We are ready, however, to talk as we build or, when the wall is completed, to talk as we maintain our guard over the ramparts of freedom. But we will not be tricked into coming down, defenseless, into the plain.

There is another part to the old story of Nehemiah which reminds us of the necessary task which all of us must perform. Nehemiah was also a religious leader of his people and exhorted them not to forget their spiritual defenses. In our de-

mocracies, each one of us has the privilege and the duty of making known and holding fast those principles of belief in "fundamental human rights" and "in the dignity and worth of the human person" upon which our countries and the Charter of the United Nations are founded. If we can hold those principles fast—if we can demonstrate that free communities of free men can meet the needs of all men everywhere—in time the Soviet Union will learn that the faith and resolution, and hence the might, of the free world are greater than its own, and that it must seek ways to live peacefully with those who live in freedom.

Soviet Ambassador Zarubin Presents Letter of Credence

Press release 756 dated September 25

Text of Ambassador's Remarks

MR. PRESIDENT: I have the honor to present to you the Letters of Recall of my predecessor and the credentials by which the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics accredits me as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to Your Excellency.

I can assure you, Mr. President, that the people of the Soviet Union entertain a feeling of sincere friendship towards the people of the United States and that the Government of the Soviet Union, in pursuing consistently the policy of the strengthening of peace, is striving to maintain friendly political, economic, and cultural relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America in the interests of the people of our countries and of a universal peace.

All my activities as Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will be devoted to the strengthening of peace and cooperation between our countries.

May I express the hope that in the fulfillment of this task I shall meet with the necessary understanding and assistance from you, Mr. President, and from the Government of the United States.

Text of the President's Reply

MR. AMBASSADOR: It gives me pleasure to accept the Letter of Credence by which the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics accredits Your Excellency as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Government of the United States of America. At the same time, I accept the Letter of Recall of your predecessor, Alexander S. Panyushkin.

I am glad to note Your Excellency's assurances that the peoples of the Soviet Union entertain a feeling of sincere friendship toward the people of the United States. In turn, I assure you that the people of the United States have only the friendliest feelings for the peoples of the Soviet Union.

You may rest assured, Your Excellency, that the Government of the United States desires only to see a world wherein friendly, neighborly relations

exist between every country. It is the constant policy of this Government to seek to create conditions which will result in a stable and prosperous world wherein all peoples may live at peace.

As Ambassador of the Soviet Union your activities devoted to strengthening the peaceful relations between our two countries will be reciprocated and supported by the Government and by the people of the United States.

U.S., U.K., France Renew Proposal for Four Power Meeting To Discuss Commission on German Elections

The Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, through their respective Embassies at Moscow, on September 23 delivered identical notes to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs in reply to the Soviet note of August 23, 1952 concerning Germany. Following is a statement by Secretary Acheson, together with texts of the U.S. and Soviet notes.

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY ACHESON

Press release 748 dated September 24

The note which the U.S. Government delivered on September 23 to the Soviet Government on the subject of Germany is another attempt to persuade the Soviet Union to face up to the one problem which must be met if we are to end the present artificial division of Germany. That problem is to hold free elections throughout Germany.

The Soviet Government has been seeking through this whole exchange of notes to talk about German unity but to avoid talking about a free election, which is the only way to get unity in freedom. The Soviet Government wants to talk about an eventual peace treaty, or about the North Atlantic Treaty, or almost any other matter, but not about elections.

The Soviet Government leans heavily, for example, on the provisions of the Potsdam Agreement calling for the restoration of Germany as a "united, independent, peace-loving, democratic state." This is indeed our objective in Germany. But what does the Soviet Government mean by these words?

We have learned in these postwar years that such words have meanings for the Soviet Government and for Communist Parties everywhere which are entirely different from their traditional meanings in the Russian, English, French, German, or any other language.

We have learned that Soviet statesmen use the word "democratic" exclusively for countries or groups tightly run by elements recognizing the political authority of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

We have learned that "independent" means about the same thing and is used most frequently to describe states having the outward trappings of sovereignty but which are actually in Soviet Communist leading strings.

We have learned that "peace-loving" means to Soviet statesmen anything which advances the cause of Communist Parties recognizing the authority of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. By the same token it appears that anything which implies resistance to the aims of such Communist Parties is immediately branded as "warlike" or "aggressive" in intent.

It behooves us, therefore, to take a good long look when the Soviet Government says it wants an "independent, peace-loving, democratic" Germany. We can well understand that these words, Soviet style, scarcely fit in with free elections.

Conditions in the Soviet zone are not such as to encourage the belief that elections can now be held there under conditions of freedom. We would like an impartial commission to go in, give us a factual report, and suggest what needs to be done in order to prepare the way for a really free election in which people can vote as they wish and for men and women truly representative. This is the only logical way to start the process of unification.

I think the free world will agree that day by day the need for changing conditions in the Soviet zone, if free elections are to be held there, is reinforced more strikingly. The area is one from which kidnapers can issue forth and to which kidnaped persons can be taken and held for weeks, months, and years without trial or sign of life.

The case of Dr. Linse, kidnaped out of free Berlin, is a recent shocking example.¹

The area is one where farmers and villagers are dispossessed overnight without recourse, in the name of security against nonexistent "spies, diversionists, terrorists, etc." The area is one from which a steady stream of thousands of refugees flee every month.

The necessity for an impartial commission is abundantly clear from the "elections" started in the Soviet zone in the autumn of 1950, which the German people know to have been anything but free and democratic.

The world has noted the decision taken at the July conference of the Communist Socialist Unity Party that the Soviet zone should press forward on the road to communism, thus alienating the Soviet zone still further from the major part of Germany and clearly pushing aside the attainment of a unified democratic Germany.

It is precisely because developments in the Soviet zone have proceeded in this manner that we insist that conditions must be examined and changed in order to make possible free elections and thus to bring about German unity in freedom.

In our note we have been very plain-spoken and down-to-earth. We refuse to be distracted by attacks on extraneous subjects. We want to unify Germany. Therefore, we want free elections. So we have asked the Soviets once more whether they are ready to do something about it.

U.S. NOTE OF SEPTEMBER 23

Press release 747 dated September 23

The United States Government has carefully considered the Soviet Government's note of August 23 about Germany. It had hoped that the note would have marked some progress towards agreement on the essential question of free all-German elections. This is the first question which must be settled among the four powers so that Germany can be unified, an all-German Government formed and a peace treaty concluded.

Possibly in order to divert attention from this issue, the greater part of the Soviet note of August 23 is, however, devoted to wholly unfounded attacks upon the Atlantic Pact, the European Defense Community and the conventions signed at Bonn on May 26. As the United States Government has often emphasized, these agreements are purely defensive and threaten no one. The Bonn conventions and the Epc treaty, far from being imposed on the German people, are a matter for free decision by freely elected Parliaments, including of course that of the German Federal Republic. Insofar as the Bonn conventions reserve certain strictly limited rights to the three Western powers, a fundamental consideration has

been specifically to safeguard the principle of German unity and to keep the door open for agreement with the Soviet Union on the unification of Germany.

The United States Government must insist on the necessity of starting four-power discussions at the only point where they can in fact start, which is the organization of free elections. In its note of July 10,² the United States Government drew attention to the obvious fact that this is the first point which must be settled if any progress is to be made towards uniting the Soviet zone with the Federal Republic, which constitutes the greater part of Germany. In its first note, as in its last, the Soviet Government has evaded this clear issue. Instead of putting first things first, it now relegates to the background the problem of elections and proposes that the four-power conference "should discuss in the first place such important issues as a peace treaty with Germany and the formation of an all-German Government". But until elections are held, no all-German Government can be formed, nor can Germany be unified. Until an all-German Government is formed which will be in a position to negotiate freely, it is impossible to discuss the terms of a German peace treaty.

In complete accord with the views of the United States, French and United Kingdom Governments, the Soviet Government originally said that "the preparation of the peace treaty should be effected with the participation of Germany in the form of an all-German Government".³ The Soviet Government has now shifted its ground. It now substitutes for this, the participation of representatives of the Soviet zone and the Federal Republic in the four-power meetings "during the discussion of relevant questions". The United States Government cannot accept this proposal. A peace treaty for the whole of Germany cannot be negotiated with, and accepted by, any German representatives other than the all-German Government which would have to carry it out. Such a government can only proceed from free elections. It is moreover well known that the East German administration is not representative of the German population of the Soviet zone. This fact is not controverted by the assertion in the Soviet note of August 23 that this administration acted "at the request" of that population in enforcing recent measures further dividing East and West Germans in defiance of their clear desire for unity in freedom.

The United States Government is compelled to remind the Soviet Government that conditions have altered radically since the Potsdam Agreement of 1945, which laid down certain political and economic principles to govern the initial con-

² *Ibid.*, July 21, 1952, p. 92.

³ For text of the Soviet note of Mar. 10, 1952, see *ibid.*, Apr. 7, 1952, p. 531.

trol period. The Soviet conception of a peace treaty drafted by the four powers and imposed upon Germany is entirely unsuitable in 1952. The United States Government could never agree to a peace treaty being drafted or negotiated without the participation of an all-German Government. Any other procedure would mean a dictated treaty. That indeed would be "an insult to the German nation".

The United States Government again insists that genuinely free elections with a view to the formation of an all-German Government must come first. It has however learned by hard experience in recent years that terms such as "free elections" have one meaning in common parlance and another in the official Soviet vocabulary. The contrast between the concept of free elections which obtains in West Germany and that which prevails in the Soviet Zone is clear. It is for the German people to choose between these alternative ways of life. But they must be able to make their choice in genuine freedom and full responsibility. Only genuinely free elections can reflect the will of the German people and permit the formation of an all-German Government with the necessary freedom of action to discuss and accept a peace settlement.

In order to create the conditions necessary for free elections, there has been four-power agreement that there should be a commission of investigation. The Soviet Government has now proposed that this commission should be composed of representatives of the People's Assembly of the "German Democratic Republic" and of the Bundestag of the German Federal Republic. A commission of investigation must, however, be genuinely impartial. A German commission would be no more able than a four-power commission to meet this requirement. The underlying principle of the present Soviet proposal was contained in one which emanated from the Soviet zone on September 15, 1951. This was rejected by the Bundestag, which then suggested investigation by a United Nations Commission. It was thus the freely elected representatives of fifty millions of the German people who themselves proposed the creation of a neutral investigation commission under United Nations supervision. Nevertheless, the United States Government repeats its readiness to discuss any practical and precise proposals, as stated in its note of the tenth of July.

The United States Government continues to seek a way to end the division of Germany. This will not be accomplished by premature discussions about a peace treaty with a Germany not yet united and lacking an all-German Government. The United States Government therefore renews the proposal made in its note of July 10 for an early four-power meeting—which could take place in October—to discuss the composition, functions and authority of an impartial commission of investigation with a view to creating the

conditions necessary for free elections. The next step would be to discuss the arrangements for the holding of these elections and for the formation of an all-German Government, as proposed in paragraph 11 (IV) of the United States Government's note of May 13. When free elections have been held and an all-German Government formed, the peace settlement can be negotiated. The United States Government, in concert with the French Government and the United Kingdom Government and after consultation with the German Federal Government and the German authorities in Berlin, most earnestly urges the Soviet Government to reconsider its refusal to join the other powers in a single-minded effort thus to come to grips with the problem of free elections in Germany.

SOVIET NOTE OF AUGUST 23

[Unofficial translation]

In connection with the note of the Government of the U.S.A. of July 10 of this year, the Soviet Government considers it necessary to state the following:

1. In its note of May 24⁴ as well as in its previous notes, the Soviet Government proposed to the Government of the U.S.A. as well as to the Governments of Great Britain and France to proceed without delay to immediate negotiations concerning a peace treaty with Germany and the formation of an all-German Government. The Soviet Government in order to facilitate the decision of these questions had already on March 10 proposed for joint examination by the four Governments—the U.S.S.R., U.S.A., Great Britain, and France—its own draft on the basis for a peace treaty with Germany, expressing at the time its readiness to discuss other possible proposals as well on this question. However, as is known, the Government of the U.S.A. and also the Governments of Great Britain and France evaded immediate negotiations with the Soviet Government on the question mentioned above.

The note of the Government of the U.S.A. of July 10 shows that the three Governments are continuing, just as they formerly did, to delay discussion of such important questions as the question about restoration of unity of Germany and the conclusion of a German peace treaty.

2. The Governments of the U.S.A., Great Britain, and France, while delaying the exchange of notes with the Soviet Government on the German question, entered into a deal with the Adenauer government. In flagrant violation of the Potsdam Agreement, the Governments of the Three Powers on May 26 concluded with the Bonn Government a separate so-called "agreement," calling it a convention concerning relations between the three Western Powers and the German Federal Republic.

⁴ *Ibid.*, July 21, 1952, p. 93.

lic,⁵ and following that on May 27 there was signed in Paris an "agreement" concerning a so-called "European Defense Community." Having signed these "agreements," the Governments again demonstrated that they were not at all interested either in unification of Germany or in the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany, but were aiming at strengthening and deepening of the division of Germany and at tying in West Germany and the West Germany Army organized by the Governments of the three Western Powers with the North Atlantic bloc and utilizing West Germany more completely for aggressive purposes of that bloc. The separate Bonn "agreement" of the United States, Great Britain, and France with the Adenauer government represents an open military alliance plainly pursuing aggressive purposes. This "agreement" legalizes the rebirth of German militarism, the creation of a West German mercenary army, headed by Fascist Hitlerite generals. We place the word "agreement" in quotation marks, since the separate Bonn "agreement" was not freely accepted by the Germans of West Germany; it was imposed upon West Germany against the will of the German people.

The Governments of the Three Powers are trying in every way to conceal from the German people the character of the separate Bonn "agreement," which is one hostile to their national interests and dangerous to the cause of peace. They are trying in this connection to create an impression that the "agreement" opens up to Germany the possibility for a wide and free association with other nations of Europe, and they wish to make the people believe that the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, and France in some way are striving for the creation of an all-German Government which, according to their statement, "must have the necessary freedom of action and powers inherent in a government." However, the content of the separate Bonn "agreement" is in direct conflict with these assurances. As is evident from the text of the separate Bonn "agreement," the Governments of the three Western Powers have fully reserved to themselves the so-called "special rights," giving as their motives for this the peculiarities of the international position of Germany. These "special rights" give the Governments of the U.S.A., Great Britain, and France unlimited possibility for stationing their forces on the territory of West Germany, as well as at any time within their own discretion the bringing about in West Germany the establishment of a state of emergency and taking into their own hands full power. The Government of the U.S.A., and also the Governments of Great Britain and France, have by this "agreement" assured themselves of the right of intervention on a wide scale in the internal affairs of West Germany up to and

including the use of armed forces of the Occupying Powers for the purposes of imposing their *Diktat* on West Germany.

All this is evidence that the Bonn separate "agreement" does not only not open up for Germany any possibility of future free development, as the Government of the U.S.A. proclaims in its note of July 10, but excludes such a possibility, leaving West Germany in a state of complete subordination and dependence on the Occupying Powers, as this has been under the Occupation Statute.

3. Evading immediate negotiations concerning the formation of an all-German Government and the conclusion of a treaty of peace, the Government of the U.S.A., for the purpose of disguising its position, raises in its note of July 10 the question of guaranties which should be given by the Four Powers to the effect that an all-German Government established as a result of free elections, would have the necessary freedom of action in the course of the period prior to the entry into effect of the peace treaty.

However, there can be no question of any "freedom of action" of an all-German Government as long as there exists the separate Bonn "agreement," from article 7 of which it is evident that the very possibility of the creation of a united Germany is made provisional upon the obligatory retention by the Governments of the three Western Powers of all privileges which were envisaged in the Bonn "agreement" and which deprived Germany of her governmental independence and integrity.

It is entirely clear that the Government of the U.S.A., as well as the Governments of Great Britain and France, in signing the separate Bonn "agreement," are actually not striving for the unification of Germany, the establishment of an all-German Government, and the extension to that Government in reality freedom of action. The question raised in the note of the Government of the U.S.A. of July 10, concerning the guaranties of "freedom of action" for the future all-German Government, is a false phrase, designed to conceal the aspirations of the Governments of the three Western Powers to subordinate Germany entirely to themselves, and their aggressive purposes. Insofar as the Government of the U.S.A. raises in its note of July 10 the question concerning the guaranties of freedom of action of an all-German Government, which is immediately connected with the question of the authority of an all-German Government, the Soviet Government finds it necessary to recall that the position of the Soviet Government on this question was exhaustively set forth in its note of May 24. In this note it was stated "as far as an all-German Government and its powers are concerned this Government must, of course, also be guided by the Potsdam provisions, but after the conclusion of a peace treaty by the provisions of the peace treaty, which must serve the establishment of a firm peace in Europe."

⁵ For a summary of this convention, see *ibid.*, June 9, 1952, p. 888.

This flows directly from the Potsdam Agreement, which established the principles on which the German state—peace-loving, democratic, independent, united, German state—must be established. The entire activity of the Government of the United States in Western Germany is in plain contradiction to these principles.

In connection with this, the Soviet Government finds it necessary to note that the Government of the United States is interpreting in distorted fashion the reference of the Soviet Government in its note of May 24 to the Potsdam Agreement, making it look as though in this note there was envisaged the “re-creation of a Four Power system of control” although in reality the note of the Soviet Government of May 24 spoke not of the establishment of a Four Power system of control but of the necessity for the observance of the principles of the Potsdam Agreement concerning the reestablishment of Germany as a unified, independent, peace-loving, and democratic state.

4. The Government of the United States in its note of July 10 again raises the question regarding the right of the German people to “join other nations in peaceful aims” and to conclude appropriate agreements. In this regard, the Soviet Government in its note of April 9⁶ pointed out the provision contained in the Soviet draft of a “basis of a peace treaty” regarding the obligation of Germany “not to enter into any kind of coalition or military alliance directed against any other power which has participated with its armed forces in a war against Germany.” As is quite evident this provision in no way limits the right of Germany to join other nations for peaceful purposes. But this provision deprives Germany of the possibility of joining such groups as, for example, the North Atlantic bloc which pursues aggressive aims and the activity of which represents the threat of development of a new world war. The Soviet Government continues to consider that in such provision there is no limitation on sovereign rights of the German state and that such provision is in accordance with the agreements of the Four Powers on the German question and fully responds also to the interests of all states neighboring Germany and is equally to the national interests of Germany itself.

5. The Government of the United States in its note of July 10 refers to the measures carried out at the present time in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) for the strengthening of its security, stating that these measures in some way are “deepening the division of Germany” and in some way are directed to the prohibition of contact between the Germans living in the GDR and Western Germany.

Such a statement has no foundation. As is known the Government of the GDR has widely

published that mentioned measures are taking place at the request of the population which suffers injury on the part of spies, diversionists, terrorists, and contrabandists sent from the Western zone of Germany with provocative purposes which are directly connected with the policy of remilitarization of Germany and the inclusion of Western Germany in preparation of a new war.

6. In reply to the Soviet Government's proposal in its note of May 24 to enter joint discussion on the questions regarding a peace treaty with Germany without delay and the creation of an all-German Government, the Government of the United States states it considers it impossible for a German peace treaty to be worked out before an all-German Government is created and in view of this, it is necessary to limit itself only to the creation of a commission of investigation in Germany. However, such an assertion does not correspond to the Potsdam Agreement which placed on the Council of Foreign Ministers the obligation to prepare a “peace settlement for Germany to be accepted by the Government of Germany when a government adequate for the purpose is established.

The Soviet Government considers as without any kind of foundation the refusal of the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, and France to work out a peace treaty with Germany before an all-German Government is created. It would be incorrect and in no way justified to put off for an indefinite time the discussion of such important questions as the question of a peace treaty with Germany and the re-establishment of the unity of Germany as proposed by the Governments of the United States, Britain, and France.

As is evident, the proposals of the Government of the United States are designed to continue to prolong for an indefinite time the discussion of the question of a peace treaty with Germany and the re-establishment of the unity of Germany and consequently retain Occupation forces in Germany for an indefinite period.

7. Regarding the question of the creation of a commission to determine the existence of German conditions for the conduct of general free elections, the position of the Soviet Government was set forth already in its notes of April 9 and May 24. The Government of the United States mentions some sort of advantages to the inspection in Germany by such a commission. But the proposal for the creation of an international commission for inspection in Germany and thus to convert Germany into a subject of investigation cannot be considered other than an insult to the German nation. Such a proposal can be brought forward only by those who forget that Germany, in the course of more than 100 years, has lived under conditions of a parliamentary regime with general elections and organized political parties and that therefore it is impossible to put before

⁶ *Ibid.*, May 26, 1952, p. 819.

Germany such requirements which ordinarily are put before backward countries.

As regards the composition of a commission for the investigation of the existence in Germany of conditions for the conduct of general free elections, the most objective such a commission would be that created, with the agreement of the Four Powers, by the Germans themselves and composed of Germans representing, let us say, the People's Chamber of the GDR and the Bundestag of Western Germany. Such a commission which would not insult the Germans at the same time would represent the first step of the road toward the unification of Germany.

As regards the inspection of Germany with the aim of determining the existence of conditions for the conduct of free all-German elections, it is self-evident that the first question is to determine in what measure there are being fulfilled the decisions of the Potsdam Conference, the realization of which represent the condition for actual free all-German elections and the formation of an all-German Government representing the will of the German people. Such a decision of the Potsdam Conference is the decision regarding the demilitarization of Germany in order, as mentioned in the Potsdam Agreement, "permanently to prevent the revival or reorganization of German militarism and Nazism," that Germany never again can threaten its neighbors or the maintenance of peace throughout the world. Such a decision is the realization of the political principles enunciated by the Potsdam Agreement regarding Germany which obligate: "to destroy the National Socialist Party and its affiliated and supervised organizations, to dissolve all Nazi institutions, to ensure that they are not revived in any form, and to prevent all Nazi and militarist activity or propaganda." To such principles also is related the provision of the Potsdam Conference "to prepare for the eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis and for eventual peaceful cooperation in international life by Germany."

8. The Governments of the United States, Great Britain, and France propose to convene a meeting of representatives of the four Governments for discussion only of the question of the creation, function, and powers of a commission for the investigation of the existence in Germany of conditions necessary for the conduct of free elections. It may be noted that correspondence on this question has in some measure reconciled the points of view of the Soviet Government on the one hand and the Government of the United States as well as the Governments of Great Britain and France on the other hand, but the Soviet Government does not see any foundation for the limitation of the questions set forth for discussion at a meeting of representatives of the Four Powers only to the question of the above-mentioned commission. In limiting the scope of questions put forth for discussion of the representatives of the mentioned

Four Powers and to avoid review of the most important questions relating to Germany, the Government of the United States, and also the Governments of Great Britain and France, act as though they were striving that the meeting of the representatives of the Four Powers should produce the least possible results or should have absolutely no result. Nonetheless, the Soviet Government is prepared to discuss at the meeting of the Four Powers proposed by the Governments of the Three Powers the question of a commission for investigation of conditions for the conduct of free elections in all of Germany. But the Soviet Government, meanwhile, considers that a meeting cannot and should not limit itself to discussion of only this question. The Soviet Government considers it necessary that this meeting as a matter of first importance discuss such important questions as the peace treaty with Germany and the formation of an all-German Government.

Proceeding from the foregoing the Soviet Government proposes to convene at the earliest time and in any case in October of this year a meeting of the representatives of the Four Powers with the following agenda:

- A. Preparation of a peace treaty with Germany.
- B. Formation of an all-German Government.
- C. Conduct of free all-German elections and a commission for the verification of the existence in Germany of conditions for the conduct of such elections, its composition, functions, and powers.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Government proposes to discuss at this meeting of the Four Powers the question of the date of withdrawal from Germany of Occupation troops.

The Soviet Government proposes also that representatives of the Germany Democratic Republic and the German Federal Republic take part in a meeting to examine appropriate questions.

The Soviet Government has sent similar notes also to the Governments of Great Britain and France.

U.S. Rejects Soviet Charges on Administration of Trieste

Press release 744 dated September 22

Following is the text of the U. S. reply to the Soviet note of June 24, 1952, on Trieste, delivered to the Soviet Foreign Office on September 20. A parallel note was delivered by the U.K.

U.S. Note of September 20

The United States Government categorically rejects the allegation of the Ministry's note of June 24 that the Memorandum of Understanding of May 9 between the United States, the United Kingdom and the Italian Governments concerning administrative arrangements in Zone A of the

Free Territory of Trieste¹ in any way controverts the peace treaty with Italy.

The United States Government also calls attention to its note dated June 16, 1950² which contained a reply to the allegations of an earlier Soviet note making identical assertions in regard to the maintenance of the United States-United Kingdom military occupation and administration of Zone A of the Free Territory of Trieste.

Finally, with reference to the Peace Treaty, the United States Government wishes to state that it remains convinced that, in so far as the provisions regarding the Free Territory of Trieste have not been implemented, the principal responsibility rests with the attitude and conduct of the Soviet Government itself, which first rendered impossible the execution of the settlement envisaged by the Treaty.

Soviet Note of June 24

[Unofficial translation]

In connection with the agreement published May 10 between the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, and Italy, on the question of the participation of Italy in the government of the Anglo-American Zone A of the Free Territory of Trieste, the Soviet Government considers it necessary to state the following:

On November 17, 1951, the Soviet Government sent the Government of the United States and also the Governments of Great Britain and France a note³ concerning statements published in the press of official representatives of the mentioned Western Powers, pointing out that, as was evident from these statements, the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, and France with the participation of the Italian and Yugoslav Governments were preparing a division of the Free Territory of Trieste between Italy and Yugoslavia. The Soviet Government also pointed out in its note that the projected division of the Free Territory of Trieste has as its aim to adapt this territory, neutral according to the peace treaty with Italy, its human and material resources to the war plans of the aggressive Atlantic bloc and to strengthen the Trieste area as a permanent military and naval base of the United States and Great Britain.

It was also mentioned in the note that this division, which is a continuation of the policy of violation of the peace treaty with Italy, is incompatible with the problems of maintenance of peace and security in Europe and is contradictory to the interests of the population of this territory, depriving it of the possibility of enjoying democratic rights foreseen in permanent statute of the Free Territory of Trieste.

The Soviet Government in its note of Novem-

ber 17 insisted on fulfillment by the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, and France of their obligations regarding the Free Territory of Trieste, particularly on the withdrawal of foreign troops from this territory and liquidation of illegal Anglo-American military and naval base in Trieste and proposed that the Security Council without delay take measures for appointment of a Governor of the Free Territory of Trieste.

The Governments of the United States and Great Britain not only did not take measures dependent on them for appointment by the Security Council of a Governor of the Free Territory of Trieste, for removal of the occupation regime, and withdrawal of occupation troops from the territory of Trieste which would be the first step in the matter of fulfillment of the peace treaty with Italy re Trieste, but rather moved to further violations mentioned in the treaty.

Conversations which took place in London from April 3 to May 9 between the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, and Italy accomplished conclusion of the agreement for introducing Italy into the government of Zone A, Free Territory of Trieste. As is evident from the text of the agreement which established that "commander of troops of the United Kingdom and United States retains full authority for government of the zone," the Anglo-American occupation authorities who use this zone in the aggressive aims of North Atlantic bloc remain, as before, complete masters Zone A, Free Territory of Trieste. Having concluded the mentioned agreement, the Governments of the United States and Great Britain strive to strengthen the regime of military occupation of the Free Territory of Trieste for an indefinitely long time in order to retain the illegally created Anglo-American military and naval base at Trieste.

The agreement concluded May 9 between the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, and Italy was dictated by interests which have nothing in common with the problems of the maintenance of peace in Europe. This agreement is directed toward the further violation of the provisions of the peace treaty with Italy of February 10, 1947, regarding the Free Territory of Trieste and simultaneous deprivation of the population of Trieste of the possibility to enjoy democratic rights and basic freedoms guaranteed it by the peace treaty with Italy.

The Soviet Government considers it necessary to direct the attention of the Governments of the United States and Great Britain to the illegality of the agreement signed by them at London May 9 of this year and charges the governments of the mentioned countries with full responsibility for their new violation of the obligations which they accepted in the peace treaty with Italy.

A similar note has been sent to the Government of Great Britain.

¹ BULLETIN of May 19, 1952, p. 779.

² *Ibid.*, June 26, 1950, p. 1054.

³ *Ibid.*, Dec. 3, 1951, p. 911.

Soviet Noncooperation Paralyzes Prisoner of War Commission

The U.N. Ad Hoc Commission on Prisoners of War, meeting at Geneva, has submitted the following special report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations:

U.N. doc. A/AC.46/10
Dated Sept. 12

1. The *Ad Hoc* Commission on Prisoners of War, established under the terms of General Assembly Resolution 427(V) and consisting of Mr. J. G. Guerrero, Vice-President of the International Court of Justice, as Chairman, Countess Bernadotte, and Mr. Aung Khine, Judge of the High Court of Burma, convened for its third session on 26 August 1952 at the European Office of the United Nations, Geneva.

2. Mr. King Gordon was Secretary of the Commission.

3. The Commission held three public meetings and fifteen private meetings and was in session from 26 August to 13 September 1952.

4. Independently of its report to the Secretary-General on the work of its third session as a whole, the Commission has decided to consult the Members of the United Nations on a special aspect of its terms of reference under General Assembly resolution 427(V) of 14 December 1950.

5. It appears from paragraph 3 of this resolution that the Commission would only be in a position to bring its work to a successful conclusion if it received the co-operation of all the governments concerned in its task of settling the question of the prisoners of war in a purely humanitarian spirit.

6. From the outset, at its first session held at New York from 31 July to 15 August 1951, the Commission tried to win the confidence of all the governments by informing them of the way in which it interpreted its humanitarian task. During that session it asked governments to give it their assistance, particularly in the following ways:

(a) Transmission to the Commission of any information which it may deem necessary to request from the governments concerned with a view to facilitating the accomplishment of its task;

(b) Transmission to the Commission of any suggestion which would come within the framework of its mission;

(c) The establishment of direct contact between the Commission and representatives of the governments concerned.

7. In reply to a special invitation to consult with the Commission addressed to certain governments specially concerned with the problem of prisoners of war the Governments of Australia, Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America signi-

fied their readiness to collaborate with the Commission in its work, and sent representatives to the second and third sessions, held in Geneva in February and August 1952. The only government from which the Commission has had no reply is that of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

8. In the course of its second session the Commission, not having received from the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics any of the information specified in paragraph 2 of the Resolution of the General Assembly, again approached that Government and asked it to furnish the Commission with a list of the names of prisoners of war who had died in its custody. In a letter dated 9 February 1952 addressed to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics the Commission recognized that owing to the devastation of war certain relevant records and archives might have been destroyed; and consequently it requested the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to furnish it with as complete a list as possible of such deceased prisoners of war and at least with a list of those prisoners who had died since 1947.

9. In accordance with a decision taken at its second session (A/AC.46/8, paragraph 18) the Chairman addressed letters dated 18 April and 31 July 1952 to certain governments that were detaining prisoners of war on charges of war crimes or under sentence for such crimes, requesting them to send it such detailed information as the following:

- (a) name of person prosecuted;
- (b) date of trial;
- (c) place of trial;
- (d) offence with which the person was charged;
- (e) date of judgment;
- (f) conviction or acquittal;
- (g) penalty imposed; and
- (h) place where sentenced person is under detention.

The Governments so addressed were the following: Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Norway, Philippines, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and Yugoslavia. On 31 July 1952 a reminder letter was despatched to the same Governments.

10. The Commission has received no response to these requests for information from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

11. The Commission is obliged to state, therefore, that its attempts to obtain the co-operation of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have been unsuccessful. Consequently the Commission has regretfully come to the conclusion that it is unable to perform the basic task for which it was set up, namely, to settle "the question of the prisoners of war in a purely humanitarian spirit and on terms acceptable to all the Governments concerned".

12. The *Ad Hoc* Commission considers it to be its duty to inform the Secretary-General of this

obstacle that is paralysing its work and increasing the difficulty of verifying the large amount of information furnished by other governments directly concerned in the repatriation of prisoners who have not yet returned to their homes.

13. In accordance with the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 14 December 1950 (resolution 427 (V)) the Commission intends, at its next session, to prepare the final report on the results of its work together with such conclusions as may be drawn from the documentation in its possession.

14. In the meantime, the Commission has decided to send this special report to the Secretary-General, with the request that he transmit it to the Members of the United Nations before the opening of the seventh session of the General Assembly. The Commission hopes that a fresh appeal for international co-operation among the Members of the United Nations and to their spirit of humanity might have the effect of giving a more promising direction to the work that has so far been carried on, with only limited success, by the *Ad Hoc* Commission on Prisoners of War.

Japan's Application for Membership in the United Nations

On September 18 the United Nations Security Council voted on a draft resolution proposed by the United States (U. N. doc. S/2754) recommending the admission of Japan to the United Nations. Jacob A. Malik, the U. S. S. R. representative on the Council, cast the 52d Soviet veto to defeat the resolution. Ambassador Warren R. Austin, permanent U.S. representative to the United Nations, spoke twice on the resolution—on September 17 and again on September 18, after Mr. Malik's explanation of his country's stand. On September 24 Robert D. Murphy, U.S. Ambassador to Japan, discussed the subject before the directors of the United Nations Association of Japan.

Following are texts of Ambassador Murphy's remarks in Tokyo and of Ambassador Austin's two Security Council statements.

REMARKS BY AMBASSADOR MURPHY¹

[Telegraphic text]

This opportunity to meet with you on the occasion of the seventh session of the Board of Directors of the United Nations Association of Japan is a great privilege. I know something of the struggle and hard work it has meant for you gentlemen to found and develop this organization. You have passed through difficult years, but you have succeeded in making a genuine contribution

to the prestige and future of the new Japan in a complex world situation. I congratulate your distinguished President and the able and devoted members of the Board of Directors on a record of patriotic service having for its object the re-establishment of Japan in its rightful place in the fraternity of nations. And I wish you every success in the solution of the problems which lie ahead.

My Government, as you know, is an ardent supporter of Japan's desire to be admitted among the great powers as a full member of the United Nations. It has continued to give practical and unqualified support to Japan's application and it will continue to do so. How happy we all would be today if the Security Council had not been frustrated in its overwhelming desire to vote Japan's admission this past week. All the members of the Security Council representing the free nations, including the U.S. representative, voted in favor of Japan's application for membership. Who alone voted against it? Why was it disapproved? What was said against Japan's application?

The person who vetoed approval of Japan's entry to her rightful place in the United Nations was the Soviet representative on the Security Council, Jacob Malik. Mr. Malik has grown up in the hard school of Russian dialectics and the education he has received apparently enabled him to ignore with supreme indifference any distinction between truth and falsehood. Despite what Mr. Malik's masters have said about the fine principles and lofty ideals of the world movement in which they are engaged, unfortunately it is simply

¹ Made before the directors of the United Nations Association of Japan at Tokyo on Sept. 24.

the case that the spiritual world in which he and they live is so distorted that all distinction between honesty and dishonesty has disappeared. In their book the end justifies the means and resort is permitted to cynicism, hypocrisy, and fraud as instruments to an end. That end is world domination.

Why was Malik the only one of 11 representatives on the Security Council to vote against Japan's application for membership in the United Nations? Why did he say "Nyet"? Was it for the same reason that the Soviet Union would not join with other nations in the conclusion of a peace treaty which Japan had earned? Is it for the same reason that Japanese prisoners of war are not allowed to return from the Russian labor camps 7 years after the war ended? Is it the same reason that sees Russian forces illegally occupying the Japanese Islands of Habomai and Shikotan? Mr. Malik did not explain these things. He resorted with characteristic hypocrisy to the threadbare device of falsely accusing Japan of militarism. What cynicism; what hypocrisy. The truth is that the Soviet masters feared the addition to the membership of another free nation determined to exercise its rights of independence in the family of democratic nations.

Thus, for the fifty-second time, the Soviet representative exercised the right of veto permitted under the United Nations Charter. Witnessing the debasement of the rules by one of the powerful members of the organization, no doubt we are justified in wondering whether it can succeed in its purposes when such obstructionism is possible. But the free nations are determined that it will succeed and that determination will win over all odds.

Not content with this type of sabotage in the United Nations, the forces of Russian imperialism and expansionism have adopted the device of "peace" conferences set up in satellite countries. These things can be organized so that no dissenting voice mars the harmonious progress of the propaganda steam roller. Thus the campaign of hate can be developed without opposition. So it has been in Poland and Czechoslovakia and now the world is to be treated to another exhibition of *Pax Sovietica*, this time in Peiping. The forum of the United Nations is not only available for legitimate peace proposals but is designed for discussion of them. But in the United Nations some of the rules are inconvenient for partisan maneuvers. It is much easier to announce in a well-rigged partisan forum, where there will be no jeers, that baseball was invented in the Soviet Union or that South Korea attacked North Korea.

Japan's Progress in the Free World

But it is not my intention to bore you by belaboring a dead horse. I do want to say something constructive about relations between Japan and the United States. The U.S. Government is

particularly pleased that Japan recently was admitted to membership in the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. My Government also notes with satisfaction Japan's increasing participation in the economic activities of the free world. For the United States firmly believes that Japan's resumption of international trade and economic relations is an important factor in world economy. It is, of course, obvious that economic recovery after a devastating war is not without tremendous difficulties. In line with U.S. objectives in contributing to the security and economic well-being of friendly nations in the Far East, the responsible agencies of the United States are following with the closest attention Japan's efforts to strengthen its economy and improve the living standards of the Japanese people, which is one important aspect of the economic development of the whole area. The U.S. Government, naturally, is willing to consider rendering technical and economic assistance in the furtherance of this development.

The United States will continue to procure a substantial volume of goods and services in Japan and thus directly aid in balancing its international accounts. Such procurement will include expenditures:

- (1) For the maintenance of U.S. forces stationed in Japan;
- (2) By U.S. military and Government employees and their dependents in Japan;
- (3) For goods and services needed in connection with the Korean hostilities and Korean relief and rehabilitation; and
- (4) For goods and services needed in connection with U.S. assistance programs in the Far East.

The United States anticipates that the total of such expenditures will approximate 750 million dollars in the current U.S. fiscal year, that is, between July 1 of this year and June 30, 1953.

The Japanese should have no difficulty in discerning the difference between spurious claims of friendship mouthed by the Soviet Union and concrete evidence of support given by Japan's true friends. Even though Japan is not a member of the United Nations, the United States looks upon Japan as an equal partner in the efforts of the free world to build a stable and secure society.

Even though denied membership, Japan has nevertheless a contribution to make and an obligation to fulfill to the world community of free nations. Neither her contribution nor her obligation can be vetoed by the willful action of one state. If Japan's representative is denied the opportunity to sit at the Councils of the United Nations and cast his vote, there is no doubt that Japan's influence will be felt just the same, for the great majority of the free nations of the world have already shown their willingness to accept Japan as a sovereign partner. Meanwhile, I hope the U.N. Association of Japan will not become discouraged but will con-

tinue the important work it has begun, applying greater zeal than ever against the day when justice will be done as it ultimately must.

Again, Mr. President, I wish to thank you and your associates for this privilege of meeting with you and to hope that the eighth session of the Board of Directors of the U.N. Association of Japan will see Japan established as a full member of the United Nations.

AMBASSADOR AUSTIN'S STATEMENT OF SEPTEMBER 17

U.S./U.N. press release dated September 17

The United States has submitted a draft resolution recommending a great nation, Japan, for membership in the United Nations (S/2754). After almost 4 years of the most bitter hostilities in which the United States and other Allied Powers and Japan were engaged, the Japanese people repudiated their military masters and undertook to rebuild a new Japan. They have succeeded in their undertaking. They have produced a new structure of government and brought into leadership those who know the ways of freedom and of peace. The Japanese people have a genuine love of peace and warm appreciation of duty. They are a people of art, beauty, and sentiment. They possess high skills.

Our decision here will touch their lives. Through membership, the United Nations can offer them new avenues of political and economic cooperation as well as a system of collective security.

In its application for membership which Japan filed on June 23, 1952, the Minister of Foreign Affairs said:

The Japanese people have an earnest desire to participate in the work of the United Nations and to utilize the purposes and principles of the Charter as a guide to the conduct of their affairs. There exists among the Japanese people nation-wide sympathy with the objectives of the United Nations to foster international peace and cooperation among nations. The Government of Japan is eager to apply for membership in the United Nations and therefore will undertake to fulfill the obligations of membership in the organization by all means at its disposal.

The United States accepts this statement as a true indication of the intentions of the Japanese Government and of the Japanese people.

The application of Japan comes to us as a logical consequence of the Treaty of Peace with Japan which entered into effect on April 28, 1952. This re-established Japan as a sovereign and independent state. Upon that date Japan resumed not only her rights but also her duties as a member of the family of nations. Japan had already recognized these duties when, in the preamble of the peace treaty, she declared her intention to apply for membership in the United Nations and in all cir-

cumstances to conform to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

The significance of this pledge is, I think, recognized by all of the 48 states who signed the Treaty of Peace at San Francisco.

By her acts, Japan has shown that she honors this pledge and has taken her place in the organized international community. She has a long history of cooperation in many areas with the United Nations. Japan has cooperated with the United Nations in combating aggression by complying with the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

Japan is a responsible member of most of the specialized agencies of the United Nations: the International Telecommunication Union, the Universal Postal Union, the World Health Organization, the International Labor Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, and UNESCO.

Recently Japan became an associate member of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East.

Japanese women have for several years attended as unofficial observers the meetings of the U.N. Commission on the Status of Women.

The ideals and objectives of the United Nations and its specialized agencies have received wide support in the cities and towns throughout Japan. Associations dedicated to advancing knowledge of the United Nations and its specialized agencies have been established from Hokkaido to the southernmost islands. The Japanese people have made sizable contributions to the U.N. International Children's Emergency Fund.

These, then, are some of the facts indicative of Japan's attitude toward the United Nations and what it stands for. By such facts we can test the reality of the declaration that the Government of Japan will undertake to fulfill the obligations of membership.

It is significant that Japan, having declared her intention in the Treaty of Peace to apply for membership in the United Nations, submitted her application for membership in the United Nations less than 2 months after the treaty came into force. It seems to my Government entirely appropriate that now, on the first occasion that the Security Council has been considering recent applications, it should address itself to the application of Japan.

It is for the Security Council to say whether Japan is a peace-loving state, able and willing to carry out its obligations under the Charter. In the opinion of my Government, Japan fully possesses all of these qualifications. Japan desires to be a part of and play an important role in the international community. As a state which now lacks the means of self-defense, she needs collective security as envisioned by the U.N. Charter. The United Nations needs this nation of 85,000,000 people. Japan's membership will strengthen the United Nations and will assist in achieving the maintenance of international peace and security.

The United States is proud to recognize Japan's return to the international community of nations and to put before the Security Council the draft resolution in support of Japan's application for admission to the United Nations.

This draft resolution is simple and self-contained. Japan's application is not related to the application of any other state. I submit it to you to be considered and voted on solely upon its merits.

The question before the Security Council when it votes on this draft resolution is a simple one: Does Japan possess the qualifications for membership required by the Charter? The world will see the answer to that question by the vote of each member of the Security Council on the draft resolution.

AMBASSADOR AUSTIN'S STATEMENT OF SEPTEMBER 18

U.S./U.N. press release dated September 18

I should like to comment briefly on some of the charges which the representative of the U.S.S.R. made yesterday.

(1) What Mr. Malik calls a separate peace treaty is a treaty with Japan signed by 48 states, all members of the United Nations or applicants for membership. Is it the opinion of 48 states or the opinion of the U.S.S.R. which determines the international consensus of opinion with respect to Japan's eligibility to return to the family of nations? If the U.S.S.R. is still at war with Japan it is the choice of the U.S.S.R. Incidentally, the U.S.S.R. declared war on Japan but 6 days before the cessation of hostilities. The Soviet Union refused to become a party to the peace settlement with Japan reached at San Francisco. Efforts of the United States to consult with the U.S.S.R. were rebuffed during the preliminary stages of negotiations which led to the draft peace treaty. The U.S.S.R. sent a delegation to San Francisco ostensibly to be present on the occasion of signing the treaty. In fact, this delegation attempted to obstruct the conclusion of the treaty which, as I have said before, was signed by 48 states.

It is also appropriate to note that Japan is at peace with the Government of the Republic of China.

(2) Mr. Malik characterizes Japan as still existing under a foreign military occupation. The Treaty of Peace with Japan provides that all occupation forces of the Allied Powers shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as possible after the coming into force of the treaty. This has been done. But the signatories of the peace treaty, including Japan, recognized that Japan, lacking the means of self-defense, could not exist in a power vacuum with the danger of uncalled-for aggres-

sion in the world. The treaty therefore recognized that foreign armed forces might be stationed in Japan under agreement between one or more of the Allied Powers on the one hand and Japan on the other. The Japanese people, clearly seeing this danger of aggression, concluded a security pact with the United States under which U.S. troops would be retained in Japan temporarily, until the danger was passed or international peace and security would have been assured under the United Nations' auspices or a collective security arrangement. This is a matter of public record and represents one step that a free nation is taking in order to assure itself some measure of security as she returns to the international community of nations.

(3) The representative of the U.S.S.R. alleges that the United States is fostering the resurgence of militarism in Japan. What are the facts? Japan was completely demilitarized and its forces demobilized after the surrender. Japan today has only a national police reserve of some 75,000 men to maintain internal order and security. This force is in the process of being expanded to 110,000 men. No nation can suspect Japan of aggressive designs because of this small internal security force.

(4) The Soviet representative alleged that the members of the Japanese National Police Reserve have participated in U.N. actions in Korea. The United States categorically denies this allegation. All states supporting U.N. action in Korea are similarly aware of the untruth of the Soviet allegation.

(5) The Soviet charges that Japan is undemocratic, that it is being tyrannized by the United States, and that its sovereignty is subject to U.S. control, thereby making Japan ineligible for membership in the United Nations, have already been repudiated by the members of the Security Council who spoke yesterday in favor of Japan's admission to the United Nations.

The unity of 10 out of the 11 members of the Security Council increases the strength and moral power of those countries of the world which believe the gospel of the Charter of the United Nations.

The renewed opposition by the Soviet Union to the application of Japan challenges the peoples of those 10 states to develop the effectiveness of public opinion toward liberalization of the practices of the Security Council. The present threat of the use of the veto should strengthen the interest of those who have long considered improvement in the means of executing policies and principles under chapter VI, in pacific methods of settling disagreements, and in the admission of new members. Many young people who are students of international problems can well review the policies stated by my country and our colleagues in the Security Council and in the General Assembly, of

the spirit of the Charter, contemplated, for example—

The General Assembly,

MINDFUL of the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and having taken notice of the divergencies which have arisen in regard to the application and interpretation of Article 27 of the Charter;

Eagerly requests the permanent members of the Security Council to make every effort, in consultation with one another and with fellow members of the Security Council, to ensure that the use of the special voting privilege of its permanent members does not impede the Security Council in reaching decisions promptly;

Recommends to the Security Council the early adoption of practices and procedures, consistent with the Charter, to assist in reducing the difficulties in the application of Article 27 and to ensure the prompt and effective exercise by the Security Council of its functions; and

Further recommends that, in developing such practices and procedures, the Security Council take into consideration the views expressed by members of the United Nations during the second part of the first session of the General Assembly.

The situation in the Security Council today, on the draft resolution submitted by the United States August 28, 1952, is a cause for repetition of a portion of the address, on September 17, 1947, by the Honorable George C. Marshall, Secretary of State, before the General Assembly of the United Nations, to wit:

The effective operation of the United Nations Security Council is one of the crucial conditions for the maintenance of international security. The exercise of the veto power in the Security Council has the closest bearing on the success and the vitality of the United Nations.

In the past the United States has been reluctant to encourage proposals for changes in the system of voting in the Security Council. Having accepted the Charter provisions on this subject and having joined with other permanent members at San Francisco in a statement of general attitude toward the question of permanent member unanimity, we wished to permit full opportunity for practical testing. We were always fully aware that the successful operation of the rule of unanimity would require the exercise of restraint by the permanent members, and we so expressed ourselves at San Francisco.

It is our hope that, despite our experience to date, such restraint will be practiced in the future by the permanent members. The abuse of the right of unanimity has prevented the Security Council from fulfilling its true functions. That has been especially true in cases arising under chapter VI and in the admission of new members.

The Government of the United States has come to the conclusion that the only practicable method for improving

this situation is a liberalization of the voting procedure in the Council.

The United States would be willing to accept, by whatever means may be appropriate, the elimination of the unanimity requirement with respect to matters arising under chapter VI of the Charter and such matters as applications for membership.

We recognize that this is a matter of significance and complexity for the United Nations. We consider that the problem of how to achieve the objective of liberalization of the Security Council voting procedure deserves careful study. Consequently, we shall propose that this matter be referred to a special committee for study and report to the next session of the Assembly (Resolution 21 November 1947). Measures should be pressed concurrently in the Security Council to bring about improvements within the existing provisions of the Charter, through amendments to the rules of procedure or other feasible means.

It is well for us to remember on this occasion that resolutions have been adopted at meetings of the General Assembly, of the Interim Committee, and of the Security Council aiming at the accomplishment of these policies and principles "to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace."

On several occasions the representative of the United States, as President of the Security Council, has invited the permanent members to consult toward solution of the veto problem of voting in the Security Council but has not achieved progress beyond the point of meeting. Obviously, greater pressure of moral power is necessary on the part of the peoples of the United Nations. Repetition of the defeat of the applications of states that are admittedly qualified as peace-loving states, and which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter, and, in the judgment of the organization are able and willing to carry out those obligations, occurs because of one veto based on horse-trading methods.

While we increase the doctrines of the Charter of the United Nations through practice in the Security Council, by so large a majority as approximates unanimity, we believe that development on present improvement of the rules and practice, and other means, can be achieved if peoples and governments become animated by the spirit of the Charter.

The United Nations: Cornerstone of U.S. Foreign Policy

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT¹

Since I first came to the White House in 1945, I have worked to build and strengthen the United Nations. In this work, I think that I have done no more than the American people wanted me to do.

This Nation looks upon the United Nations as the cornerstone of our foreign policy. We see in the United Nations the world's best hope for peace. We have pledged our support to the United Nations because it stands for the only principles upon which true peace can be based. These are the principles of mutual respect among nations and justice and morality in international affairs.

These great principles were brutally violated by the aggression in Korea. The authority and the future existence of the United Nations were threatened by that aggression. This Nation understood then and understands now that if we let brute force destroy the United Nations there can be no hope for peace any time in the future. The other free nations also realize this fact. They have joined with us in the defense of Korea and in the defeat of the Communist aggressors there.

When we entered the United Nations in 1945, we did not know that it would be put to the test so soon. But we did not enter lightly on this great international compact. We were determined at the outset—and we are determined now—that the United Nations will work, and we have sacrificed much to make it work.

In spite of the great achievements of the United Nations, in spite of the hope that it holds for all mankind, we face within our borders a growing attempt to undermine it.

Since Senator Vandenberg died, the old isolationists have grown bolder. They are urging us to abandon our Allies, to pull out of Europe and out of Korea, to slash our Mutual Security Program, and to turn back in our onward march toward peace. This attack on the United Nations offers us no plan for the future and no hope for eventual success. The enemies of the United Na-

¹ Made at the White House on Sept. 26 before the National Citizens' Committee on U.N. Day. October 24, the anniversary of the day the U.N. Charter came into force in 1945, is observed as U.N. Day.

tions tell us one day to pull out of Korea, and on the next day they tell us to extend the conflict even further. They ask us to reduce our defenses and at the same time to take steps that create a greater risk of total war. They lament the loss of millions of people to Communist enslavement, and yet, at the same time, they recommend that we should cut off aid to those who are still free.

We must disregard this hysterical and conflicting advice. We must withstand the efforts of those who would play politics with security and the welfare of our Nation and the freedom of our Allies.

This is the last time that I shall meet with this group while I am President. My last official word to you is to continue your work for the United Nations with all your might and main. You must give even more of your energies to telling the people in this country and around the world about the basic concepts of the United Nations. You must make it clear that the United Nations is supported by the people.

REMARKS BY SECRETARY ACHESON²

Press release 765 dated September 26

First of all, I want to thank you deeply and from the bottom of my heart for the tremendous work which you are doing under Mr. [Frank L.] Weil's brilliant chairmanship for this year's U.N. Day. It has gone further and deeper than ever before, the work of your organizations with CARE, with the Advertising Council, to bring home not only to the people of this country but all over the world the significance of U.N. Day. It is a tremendous contribution. I am very grateful indeed.

The President has already expressed his gratitude to you. All of this effort of yours is to bring home to people the significance of something which it is so easy to forget, to have drift out of our lives because it is not always as successful as once we hoped it would be. But it remains the great hope of the future, it remains something so essential to the progress of international life today that if this

² Made on Sept. 18 at a meeting in the Department of State auditorium.

United Nations did not exist now we would have to set about immediately to create it. Therefore, it is most important, in all the multiple activities which you have set in motion for U.N. Day, that there should be centered around, clustered about, an understanding of the United Nations, an understanding of its problems, an understanding of what it has done, what it has not done, what it is trying to do, and what we hope it will do. That is the central purpose.

Now, when this great endeavor was launched in 1945, the hope was—and a well-founded hope as expressed by Mr. Hull in one of his last speeches—that the great powers would harmonize their interests, and that through the United Nations they, and small and medium sized powers, would all subject themselves to the rule of law and justice. That didn't mean merely subjecting themselves to an international court. That is by no means the extent of what we mean when we talk about the rule of law. It means subjecting themselves, first of all, to restraints, and the great restraint is that force and the threat of force is not to be used as an instrument of policy.

Secondly, that they would subject themselves to the opinion of the world.

Thirdly, that they would subject themselves to what amounts to an international legislative system, not imposing laws enforced by sanctions, but by creating international programs, policies, standards, to which the international life of the world would conform.

The United Nations was to deal in three great fields. It was, first of all, to bring about security, to eliminate force, and the threat of force.

In the second field it was to deal with the life of people throughout the world, the economic and social conditions which would bring about a fuller and better life for the millions and millions of people who dwell on this earth.

Third, it was to deal with the individual, and the rights of the individual. It was to attempt to bring home to all nations, all governments throughout the world the fundamental necessity of creating that barrier around the individual into which no government, no country, no majority might intrude, and to guarantee to the individual certain inalienable rights. Those were the three fields in which it was to work.

Soon we all met with a great disappointment. It appeared that one of the great powers, the Soviet Union, was not going to harmonize its interests with the others. It was not going to subject itself to these restraints and disciplines about which I have spoken, but it was to use every opportunity which it could find to advance its own interests and to undermine the interests of others. That was a great disappointment, but that did not mean that this organization was destroyed. It didn't mean that it had no usefulness. It meant really that its importance was even greater, and

the United Nations has done much and will continue to do much.

The Prohibition of Force

If we take, for instance, this field of the prohibition of force or the threat of force as an instrument of national policy, we have to look not only at what the United Nations has done itself but what it has inspired in others throughout the world. It is no small thing that wars have been stopped, that the killing of people has been brought to an end, that the spread of destruction of war has been stopped in such instances as that of the Israeli-Arab war, of the troubles in Kashmir, of the fighting in Indonesia. That is no small thing. It is no small thing either that where an aggression did break out, as in Korea, it was through the machinery of the United Nations that that aggression was met and stopped.

But what the United Nations has done, and I think that this is of preeminent importance, is to bring home to the entire civilized world that the use of force to achieve one's end is immoral, illegal, is condemned by the rest of the world and is a crime. That is very important indeed. It has also brought home to everyone that the right of individual and collective self-defense, pending some operation of an international machinery, is an inherent right and with that goes the inherent duty so that when aggression is resisted it is not merely the choosing up of sides because the interests of some people lie on one side and the interests of others lie on another side. It is the fact that others are rallying in support of a people who are engaging in one of the fundamentally just activities of any people, which is to defend themselves. And when other nations come to their aid, whether through the machinery of the United Nations or through the exercise of collective self-defense, they are doing something regarded by all the world as essential and necessary and moral and right.

Now, that is important. That puts a wholly new idea into the world and animates people with a wholly new emotion, and we must look at things which are being done in this field outside of the United Nations as well as through its machinery.

It soon became clear that a very large, almost a predominant amount of the force of the world was on the side of a group that did not want to carry out the principles of the United Nations, and that those who believed in these principles, those who believed that they should be carried out, were not strong enough to maintain that position in the event of conflict. Therefore, through a whole series of regional arrangements, people began to get together to put themselves in a position of strength so that they could say, "We are going to defend the right as it is announced in this Charter, and we are going to be strong enough to do it." That is very important.

This was not a ganging up of alliances created helter-skelter around the world. It was a combination of those who believed in peace, those who believed that force was evil and wrong, to protect themselves against those who were denouncing and not abiding by these principles. That has been an essential element of the development of the world in this postwar period.

Social and Economic Problems

Now, there are other fields in which the United Nations is working. We mentioned the economic one. Much of your activity in this committee's work is directed to that through your cooperation with CARE. In other fields the United Nations is bringing technical cooperation, relief to refugees, instruction in higher standards, all through the world. Here again it has stimulated a great amount of activity outside of the United Nations. Our own programs are going on in cooperation with the United Nations. Those of the Commonwealth are doing the same thing. Those of many other countries, with a group of our own friends in Latin America, are doing the same thing.

This comes from another great idea which lies in the Charter, and that is that the social and economic condition of peoples throughout the world is a matter of international concern. It is a matter on which we ought to be and should be and must be concerned and, therefore, whether we are working through the machinery of the United Nations or whether we are working through our own programs with our own friends, we are animated by that idea which springs from the Charter.

Then there is the field of the position of the individual as against the government, the community, the majority, whoever it may be, the rights of the individual, the obligations of the community to the individual and of the individual to the community.

Here, as you know, Mrs. Roosevelt has done heroic work. It is a field of incredible difficulty because those who operate in this whole field with the tongue in the cheek are continually putting insincere provisions into these documents which are being drawn up, provisions which they haven't the faintest idea of ever carrying out, and which are so fanciful in many cases that people who really wanted to carry them out couldn't do it.

Again it is difficult because so often people who have not really wrestled with this question of the individual being protected against the majority and against the state want to put in ideas which seem wonderful but are totally impracticable, ideas which have no relation between the capacity and the state of development of the country and the aspirations which it has. So it is a very difficult field. It is a field to which Mrs. Roosevelt, as I said, has devoted herself and will continue

to devote herself and in which some day, I hope and believe, we will have real progress.

These are some of the things which we should study, which we should bring to the attention of everybody in this country and in other countries on U.N. Day and in connection with it. We should not be discouraged that the United Nations is not able to solve every question in the world. Many questions can only be solved by the peoples involved having the desire and the understanding that they must be settled.

For instance, in the very grave situation of the Palestine war, the United Nations was able to bring that to an end, was able to stop the fighting, but it has not been able to bring the people of that part of the Middle East to a condition where they are ready to have a lasting peace between them as the result of mutual agreement, and nobody can force that on people. It has got to be a process of education in which the United Nations can help, help in many ways, help by preventing the destruction of war from starting again, help by bringing understanding, help by taking care of the refugees of the war, help by bringing up the standard of living in those countries so that a settlement becomes possible.

I am sure that in this session of the General Assembly we will have considerable discussion about other conflicts between peoples who are aspiring to freedom or have newly come to freedom and peoples of the European part of the world. These questions cannot be settled in the sense that an imposed settlement can be put on people. The most that can be done is to approach them in an atmosphere of understanding, an atmosphere of calm, not exchanging epithets but looking for solutions and realizing what the basic interests of all the parties to the controversies are. The United Nations plays a great part, can play a greater part in doing that.

It is impossible to say that one of these aspects of the United Nations is more important than another. There is one which particularly appeals to me. That is the effect of the United Nations in bringing to a nation which, without its wish, has found itself in a position of leadership in the free world, the moral discipline which is necessary in order to exercise that leadership wisely and well.

The Responsibility of Leadership

We all become so sure in the purity and virtue of our own purposes, sometimes it comes to us as a shock that they are not automatically recognized by all the rest of the world. It should not come to us as a shock because we have not always recognized the purity and disinterestedness of the motives of other people, but it is particularly important that a nation that wishes to exercise leadership among free peoples—this would not be true if you were dealing with satellites that you order

about—but if you are exercising leadership among free peoples, you must subject yourself to criticism, to the debate of that great assembly which I am going to attend within a month

You must accept the necessity of being able to persuade people of the rightness of views which you put forward and accept the result that if you are not able to do that there is probably something wrong with the views.

It means, I think, that leadership in the free world means responsibility, responsibility for what one does. To lead, therefore, one has the responsibility of putting forward views and proposals which recognize and protect interests wider than the immediate and narrow interest of the country which puts them forward.

If all we are doing is putting forward the most narrow conception of American interests, how can we ask the rest of the world blindly to go along with us? What people want in a leader is leadership which encompasses their interests also, and that means responsibility. That means that we cannot brush off other peoples' points of view with impatience. It means we must understand them. It means that in what we do they must be taken into account. It means that in the proposals we make we are furthering and advancing the inter-

ests of all who wish to join with us in the great effort of maintaining peace without war, without battle, and advancing the world toward a better life.

If there was any one realization which I could hope that my years of service in the Government would bring to the people of the United States, it would be the essentiality of this idea of responsibility. If we could once see, once feel deeply in our bones throughout this country, that we are responsible for more than ourselves, that we are responsible for wise and enlightened leadership, that we are responsible in a very true way for the fate of those who follow our leadership, then we will have achieved the responsibility of which I speak. It means a sense of humbleness in considering programs, considering ideas which one wishes others to accept.

Now, that to me is one of the great functions which the United Nations performs for us. It is a function for which we ought to be profoundly grateful every day of the year. For here is an institution which prevents us from being proud, from being headstrong, from believing that we are always right, because we must subject ourselves to the opinion of mankind, and we must abide by that opinion.

Iranian Prime Minister Rejects U.S.-U.K. Proposal, Offers Counterproposal

Press release 757 dated September 25

*Following is the English translation of a letter dated September 24 from the Iranian Prime Minister to President Truman transmitting the text of a letter from Prime Minister Mossadegh of the same date to Prime Minister Churchill of the United Kingdom in reply to the Churchill-Truman Joint Proposals of August 30, 1952:*¹

Letter from the Iranian Prime Minister to the President

In acknowledgment of the receipt of Your Excellency's message dated August 30, 1952, I beg to submit herewith the duplicate of the reply which is being sent to the British Government.

I avail myself of this opportunity to convey the reassurances of my highest esteem.

DR. MOSADEQ,
Prime Minister

Second of Mehr, 1331, September 24, 1952

¹ BULLETIN of Sept. 8, 1952, p. 360.

Letter from the Iranian Prime Minister to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom

Your Excellency's message, which was received in the form of a proposal for the solution of the oil problem and the settlement of the dispute between the former company and the Iranian Government, has been carefully considered and examined. Although one would have thought that after having spent a year and a half the British Government should have appreciated the real meaning of the national movement of Iran, and should have ceased giving improper protection to the former company, unfortunately, contrary to expectations, the effort, which, ever since the approval of the law nationalizing the oil industry of Iran, has been made by the former company to revive the invalid 1933 agreement, is plainly noticeable and obvious in the latest message in changed terms of phraseology. Since it was certain that such a proposal would never be accepted nor approved by the Iranian nation, I pointed out immediately to your government's *chargé d'affaires* that if there was desired a solution of the oil problem, it would be better if this proposal

were withdrawn and drafted in such a way that it could be presented to Iranian public opinion and could be used as a basis for future negotiations. This request had no result and after a few days, that is on Sharivar 8, 1331 (August 30, 1952), the message was delivered to me without any change whatsoever.

Before proceeding with the transmission of a counterproposal I find it necessary to explain briefly the position of the Iranian Government in regard to the message.

The said message, like previous proposals, is inconsistent with the laws of nationalization of the oil industry. Of course, whatever has been mentioned in the beginning of the message concerning the creation of friendly relations for the early solution of the dispute between the two countries is in conformity with the wishes and aspirations of the Iranian nation which has always endeavored and is still endeavoring to strengthen friendly relations with the British people notwithstanding the heavy damages and interminable injuries that it has suffered during recent centuries from the imperialistic policy of the British Government.

My Government as shown by documents and other proofs has from the very beginning not neglected this matter in any way whatsoever, and has always been prepared to negotiate within the limits of legal principles for the settlement and solution of the oil problem. The failure to achieve any result up to this time has been due to the fact that the British Government has desired to retain the influence of the former company under other titles in the same shape and form as before, in violation of the law and of the rights and desires of the Iranian nation. This has been and still is intolerable to the Iranian nation.

Another point worthy of attention in this message is the word "equitable" which has been included therein and the solution which has been proposed following this word, which solution is not only inequitable but far more inequitable than previous solutions and proposals.

In its latest message the British Government has wanted to convert the oil question, which is an internal affair and which has been confirmed as such by the decision of The Hague Court, into a dispute between two governments through the signing of an agreement.

Article I of the annex to the message speaks of compensation which should be paid to the former company for the nationalization of the oil industry. This Article has been drawn up in such a manner that it is feared that it is desired thereby to legalize the invalid 1933 agreement which has never been acceptable to the Iranian people because reference has been made therein to the legal position of both parties immediately prior to the nationalization of the oil industry. If it were

intended that compensation for the property of the former oil company in Iran should be paid, my government has always been prepared to enter into negotiations with due regard to the claims of both parties and to find a just and equitable solution. If it were meant that, in the event of disagreement the question should be referred to the International Court of Justice, such procedure should be agreed to between the Iranian Government and the former oil company and there would be no need of an agreement between two governments.

If by Article II of the annex the purchase of oil is intended, the Iranian Government has always been prepared to sell and has repeatedly declared this to the world. If, however, it is intended that a purchase monopoly be given to a specific company and interference in the management of the oil industry be renewed, this will never be approved by the Iranian nation, for, as a result of such monopoly and interference, economic crises and difficulties might be created which would lead to the same situation which existed before the nationalization of the oil industry.

It is in fact admitted in Article III that the British Government's motive in its previous measures are to bring economic pressure on the Iranian nation as well in order that the latter should submit to the unfair terms of that government. In paragraph A of this article it is stated that if the other terms are accepted they would be prepared to move the oil stored at Abadan but nothing is said about the price, the fixing of which is postponed until subsequent agreement is reached. If the object of this were to aid and assist they should have specified their views about the price as well, in order that the Iranian Government would be able to make a definite decision.

In paragraph B of this article mention is made of existing restrictions on exports of commodities and the use of sterling funds by Iran which have repeatedly been the subject of protests by the Iranian Government. It has been expressly admitted that such restrictions which have been imposed until now do exist, and it has been promised that in the event the other terms are accepted these restrictions will be removed. Contrary to what has been claimed in the message it is neither friendly nor equitable to make the removal of illegal restrictions contingent upon the acceptance of certain terms; furthermore, the restrictions by the British Government directed against the Iranian Government and nation are not confined to these two instances.

After having stated briefly the objections of the Iranian Government I wish to inform Your Excellency that the Iranian people after suffering interminable hardships have unanimously nationalized the oil industry in the country, a right which is within the province of any nation in respect of

its sovereignty. It had two motives in taking this action, namely:

1. To eradicate foreign influence and agents in the country and thus take charge of its own destiny and insure the political independence of the country while cooperating shoulder to shoulder with the other freedom-loving nations in maintaining world peace. During the half century of the former company's domination it has never been possible for the Iranian Government to make a free decision in its internal affairs and its foreign policy. Your Excellency having been at the head of the British Government over a long period of years is of course aware, as was once expressly admitted by His Excellency Mr. Eden, Foreign Secretary in your Cabinet after the cruel occupation of Iran during the last World War, that the attitude of the British Government towards Iran was not just and should be changed and that England must take useful and effective steps to win over the public opinion of the Iranian nation and to make up for the past. Unfortunately, however, this promise was never kept and no sign of a change in the British attitude became apparent and as soon as signs of the awakening of the Iranian nation were noticed, British capitalists persuaded the British Government to employ all kinds of pressure so that the Iranian nation should never be able to check their covetous aims. Consequently, after the Iranian nation decided to nationalize the oil industry the British Government, instead of appreciating the true desires of the Iranian people against principles, intervened in the dispute and gave protection to the former company, doing everything it could to put obstacles and difficulties in the way of the carrying out of the desires of the Iranian people. It wrongfully dragged the case before the Security Council and from there to the International Court of Justice in The Hague, and now that it has been proven in both places that the Iranian nation is justified, it is not prepared to abandon its old attitude in order that an agreement may be reached between the former company and the Iranian Government for the settlement of the dispute.

2. The Iranian nation's other motive in taking this action was to improve economic conditions because during the period when the former company was engaged in exploiting the resources of Iran, it was never prepared to consider and observe the rights of the Iranian nation, even in conformity with the D'Arcy concession and the invalid 1933 agreement. During this time the taxes which the company paid to the British Government and which were wrongfully assessed on the dividends accruing to the Iranian Government, were several times the income paid to the original owners of the oil, i. e., the Iranian nation. It is surprising that in spite of its participation in the profits, the Iranian nation was never able to ascertain the quantity of oil which the British Admiralty had ob-

tained from the company nor the amount of money which had been paid.

By nationalizing the oil industry the Iranian people wanted to take for themselves the maximum profits made from their resources by a foreign company over a long period of years and by making up for the past injustices and by recouping their losses to make every effort to provide for the welfare of a people, 90 percent of whom are deprived of all the advantages of life in human society.

In the present circumstances the Iranian nation may follow one of two roads; either it should endeavor to improve the social conditions and ameliorate the situation of the deprived classes, something that would be impossible without the income from oil, or, if this road should remain blocked, it should surrender itself to probable future events which would be to the detriment of world peace.

I have repeatedly stated and I explicitly declare once more that the Iranian Government is exceedingly eager that the existing differences be removed as soon as possible in order that the two nations may, as a result of a good understanding, enjoy the results of cooperation and mutual assistance, and fulfill their duty for the preservation of world peace in the best manner.

With reference to the above, I bring the following to Your Excellency's attention. Iranian courts are the only competent channel for investigating the former company's claims and are prepared to adjudicate them, but should the company not wish to refer its claims to the above-mentioned competent authorities and should the International Court of Justice at The Hague be able to deal with the dispute between the Iranian Government and the former oil company on the basis of an agreement between the two parties, and should there be no illusion that such action recognizes the existence of a dispute between the two governments, my government in order to show its complete good will after agreement on the four articles below is prepared to agree to the judgment of the International Court, and in this case the International Court will be requested to issue its final verdict as soon and as far as possible within six months.

Article I. Compensation. Determination of the amount of compensation to be paid for property belonging to the former oil company at the time of the nationalization of the oil industry in Iran and arrangements for paying this by installments based on any law carried out by any country for nationalizing its industries in similar instances which may be agreed to by the former oil company.

This is the only compensation which the Iranian Government will pay to the former company and the company will have no right to make any further claims whatsoever.

Article II. Basis of Examination of Claims. Examination of claims of both parties on the basis on one of

the following three provisions to be recognized by the International Court of Justice as fair and just for settling the parties claim and used by it as the basis for judgment:

A. Examination of claims of two parties up to the date of nationalization of the oil industry on the basis of the D'Arcy agreement with due regard to the calculation of income tax which the Iran Government should have received in accord with the country's enacted laws.

The above-mentioned agreement is referred to only for the purpose of settling the financial differences up to the date of the nationalization of the oil industry (ninth of Ordibehesht 1330 which is equivalent to the thirtieth of April 1951). As from that date this agreement ceases to apply and can in no way be used or invoked by either of the parties, and from that date the company has been acting as a trustee.

B. Examination of claims of both parties from 1933 to the end of 1947 on the basis of the invalid 1933 agreement and from the beginning of 1948 to the thirtieth of April 1951 on the basis of the above-mentioned invalid agreement and the Gass-Golshayan supplementary draft agreement, which was agreed to and signed by the former company but which both Houses of the Iran Parliament did not consider adequate for obtaining the Iranian nation's rights.

Reference to the 1933 agreement is solely and exclusively for the purpose of solving financial differences between the parties up to the end of 1947; and the above-mentioned invalid agreement, with the addition of the Gass-Golshayan supplementary draft agreement, is solely and exclusively for solving financial differences from the beginning of 1948 to the thirtieth of April 1951. All effects of the agreements cease from the date of nationalization of the oil industry and cannot be used or invoked in any way by either of the parties and from that date the company has been acting as a trustee.

C. Examination of the claims of both parties on the basis of the fairest concession agreements of other oil producing countries in the world, where the cost of producing oil, according to that concession, is not cheaper than the cost of producing Iran oil during a corresponding period. Obviously, from the date of nationalization of the oil industry the company is acting as a trustee.

There is no need to mention that the use of any of the three above-mentioned provisions as a basis is merely in order to calculate the financial claims of the parties up to the date of the nationalization of the oil industry and has no connection with the articles of the above-mentioned agreements which refer to the investigation of differences.

The claims of both parties as specified above should be judged directly by the International Court of Justice.

Article III. Determination of damages. Examination and determination of the amount of damages caused to the Iranian Government resulting from the difficulties and obstacles put in the way of the sale of Iranian oil by direct and indirect activities of the former oil company as well as losses resulting from the delay in payment of funds, which are definitely debts owed by the company.

Article IV. Payment in Advance and on Account. Payment in advance and on account of 49 million pounds shown on the former oil company's balance sheet for 1950 as increases in royalty, taxes and dividends due to Iran from the reserves.

From this amount any part due from royalty and tax, as it was guaranteed on a gold basis, must be paid in sterling convertible into dollars.

Although the said amount is definitely owing to the Iranian Government by the company, in order to show its utmost good will the Iranian Government agrees that if the International Court of Justice does not consider Iran entitled to all this amount or any part of it, sums received in this connection will be regarded as the Iranian Government's debt to the former oil company and will be settled without delay by delivery of oil.

Reference to the judgment of the International Court of Justice on the basis of the four articles mentioned above, which is a sign of extraordinary concessions on the part of the Iranian Government, is binding on the latter only when they are accepted in their entirety. None of these articles can be invoked separately.

Of course, the Iranian Government will take up through the International Court of Justice, as a case between two governments, the question of losses caused by various difficulties and obstacles created by the British Government in their attempt to support the former company, as well as losses resulting from restrictions imposed on exports to Iran and on the use of sterling which the British Government has acknowledged in subparagraph B of Article 3 of the annex to the joint message.

This proposal is valid for 10 days from the date of delivery.

In conclusion I bring to Your Excellency's attention the fact that the National Iran Oil Company is always prepared to sell its oil products.

Prime Minister,
DR. MOHAMMAD MOSADEQ

TEHRAN, 2 Mehr 1331

Point Four Aid to Iran in Land Distribution

Press release 739 dated September 18

The long-range plan of the Shah of Iran for dividing his vast holdings into small farms and selling them to nearly 50,000 peasants living on them will be carried out with American technical advice and financial assistance through the Point Four Program.

The Shah in a brief ceremony in Tehran on September 17 inaugurated the Bank for Rural Credit, an integral part of the joint program in

which the Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA) is cooperating with the Crown Lands Commission. The bank will finance cooperatives and other rural services and provide trained Iranian farm supervisors to help the peasants through the first 5 years of their new undertaking in self-management and independent ownership.

William E. Warne, Point Four director in Iran, informed the Shah that TCA would contribute \$500,000—half the initial capital—to get the bank started. Point Four will also provide an American financial adviser to assist the bank in developing its policies and carrying out its operations.

The Shah said, in thanking Mr. Warne,

The help of the United States through Point Four in this program is greatly appreciated by myself and Iran. This program cannot be permitted to fail. Your interest in it is most encouraging.

The Near East Foundation will help train the village supervisors. Ultimately, the bank will receive nearly 25 million dollars from the proceeds of the land sales. No part of these proceeds is to revert to the Crown, nor are they to be used for general economic or industrial development. All of the money from the sale of lands is to be devoted to rural services and other benevolent purposes for the direct benefit of the peasants, according to the terms of the Shah's decree.

Arrangements with the Crown Lands Commission covering Point Four participation in this program are expected to be completed later this week.

This marks the first major step by the United States to implement in the Middle East its policy of cooperating with other governments in carrying out programs of land reform which they initiate themselves.

The Shah of Iran, on January 27, 1951, ordered the crown lands distributed to the peasants living on them. Since then the Crown Lands Commission has made surveys, divided up some of the lands, and transferred title to about 900 small farms in the Varamin area, about 30 miles east of Tehran.

Several months ago the Crown Lands Commission sought American advice on development of basic policies and machinery for assuring the success of this immense and highly significant undertaking. The agreement which was signed today is the result of intensive study and recommendations made in Iran earlier this year by Paul V. Maris, one of the foremost experts in the United States in matters of land tenure, supervised agricultural credit, and rural improvement. Following the request of the Crown Lands Commission for American advice, Mr. Maris, a veteran of 37 years with the Department of Agriculture, was sent to Iran in April by the Technical Cooperation Administration.

During the ensuing 9 weeks, Mr. Maris made a series of detailed recommendations covering every

aspect of the crown-lands program, from the training of Iranian farm supervisors all the way through to completion of the distribution some 20 years from now. TCA Director Warne described Mr. Maris' work as "the best job of its kind I have ever seen done at home or abroad."

These recommendations were accepted in principle by the Crown Lands Commission and the TCA mission in Iran.

Basic U.S. Contribution

The most important American contribution to the program in the long run may prove to be the application of principles which are considered to be essential in all efforts to improve tenancy conditions among peasant-type farmers. These principles include division of lands into family-size units; intensive advice and supervision in farm management during the first few years of independent operation; extension of credit in direct combination with such supervision; organization of cooperatives for buying, marketing, and supplying of needed services; and help in organizing rural services for education, health, transportation, water supply, and the like.

The Shah's program for distributing the crown holdings, a plan which is entirely benevolent in character, was intended as a model and an inspiration to other landlords to follow suit. As such, it is considered imperative by the Shah and the Crown Lands Commission that the scheme be successful. The Commission has moved with great care and deliberation, first making a general survey of the extensive holdings, with their 300,000 acres now in cultivation, 131,000 acres of arable land not presently in cultivation, and 494,000 acres suitable for cultivation if properly irrigated. It was decided first to survey and divide into fairly uniform plots the 17,000 acres in the Varamin Plains area. Distribution of these lands to the peasants living on them has now been completed.

But land reform is much more than simply dividing up lands and transferring title. It was in recognition of this fact that American advice was sought by the Crown Lands Commission.

The prospective farm owners have a tradition of many years of peasantry behind them, in which they have had few management decisions to make and few business responsibilities. As a rule, they have little education, their tools are simple and inefficient, their livestock is of inferior quality, they know little of modern farming techniques. Suddenly finding themselves in the position of ownership and responsibility, with annual payments to make, they would have little chance for success unaided, in spite of a great capacity for hard work.

To guard against the discouragement and failure which would be the lot of many of the new owners, the heart of the program is a plan to

make available to each group of about 75 peasant families the services of a technically trained Iranian farm supervisor.

A service charge of 1 percent of the price of the peasant's land allotment will be levied annually for 15 years to meet the cost of supervisory service. This means that the peasant's annual payments will be about 75 dollars a year while he is receiving the benefits of technical guidance, whereas they would be about 15 dollars less than that if the help of supervisors were not provided. The returns to the farmer from such a guidance are expected to exceed the cost many times.

Villagers To Be Trained as Supervisors

The supervisors, all of whom will be Iranian villagers, trained in a special school conducted by the Near East Foundation under the auspices of the Iranian Ministry of Education, will help the farmers with advice, planning, and supervision in developing cropping systems, applying proper fertilizers, controlling insects and diseases, organizing and using cooperative services, installing and maintaining farm irrigation works, and in various other ways.

The cost of training the supervisors will be borne by Point Four. Inasmuch as the proceeds of the 1-percent service charge will not be sufficient at the outset to cover costs of supervision, the salaries of supervisors in the Varamin Plains demonstration area will be paid out of the Point Four contribution to the Rural Credit Bank funds.

The bank will make loans to farmers and will finance cooperatives and other enterprises of direct benefit to farmers, for purposes such as acquiring improved livestock and seeds, needed machinery and supplies; providing basic community facilities in the villages; developing irrigation works, and so on. Its activities will include 1-year crop loans, 1-to-5-year farm improvement and equipment loans, and longer-term community facility loans.

The funds of the bank will be progressively augmented by the annual purchase-price payments by farmers on the crown lands. These will average about 60 dollars each (not including the service charge for farm supervision), amounting in 20 years to almost 25 million dollars. The purchase

price of the farms will be about 80 percent of the assessed valuation, without any interest charge. None of the proceeds revert to the Crown.

The surveying, allotment, distribution, sale, and settlement of the crown holdings will take a good many years to complete. Under present plans, the peasants will be given 25 years to pay off their interest-free notes, and it will be almost 20 years before all the 49,117 farm families on the Shah's estates will be started on the road to ownership. Approximately 3,000 farms will be laid out and transferred to the peasants each year after the program gains momentum.

Point Four work in village improvement, health, education, water development, irrigation, and other fields is being planned and carried out in Iran with a view to supporting the basic objectives of the crown-land program. The farm supervisors will develop and encourage participation in these and other community activities and services. The Point Four Program will assist in meeting village needs in these respects.

Military Assistance Negotiations With Dominican Republic

Press release 745 dated September 22

The Departments of State and Defense have announced that negotiations were initiated September 22 in Ciudad Trujillo with the Government of the Dominican Republic looking toward the conclusion of a bilateral military assistance agreement between the United States and the Dominican Republic.

The American Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim* in Ciudad Trujillo, Richard A. Johnson, is being assisted by representatives of the Department of Defense in the negotiations. They are being carried on under the terms of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended, which authorized a program of military grant aid for Latin America.

The Dominican Republic is one of several American Republics with which conversations on this subject have been carried on.

Breaking the Barriers to Capital Investment Abroad

by Eric A. Johnston

Chairman of the International Development Advisory Board¹

Nothing I have been able to do in my 7 months' association with the International Development Advisory Board has been more significant or more useful than what I am doing at this moment. For I am convinced that you hold the key to the door of progress and a better way of life for a billion human beings in the less advanced nations of the still-free world.

More than that, I believe your willingness to turn the key of progress for these people may well determine the future of the democratic institutions of free men. Perhaps you think that is an overstatement. Perhaps you believe I am laying it on a bit too thick. If you do, I can only invite you to consider the premises which have led me to that conviction.

First of all, you represent the social force that built America—the creative power of American free enterprise that made possible the American achievement. That force, with its vast resources of experience, capital, and skill, must now be put to work to help give economic strength and vitality to the community of free peoples who share our belief in the dignity of man.

Necessity for Economic Security

For the security of the free world is more than a matter of armaments or military alliances or containment. The threat to democratic institutions lies less in the might than in the method of the aggressive totalitarianism that stalks the peoples of the world today, preying on their misery and discontent, undermining their allegiances with hollow promises and fallacious doctrine.

The subtle danger is the greater. We must be sure that the strength and solidarity of the free

world is not sapped and weakened, like a house destroyed by termites, bit by bit. We know that communism thrives on misery. But it starves on progress. We must starve it to death in every corner of the still-free world.

Once we have thus identified the necessity of developing the economic structure of less advanced nations with the ultimate security of our democratic system, it seems to me that the problem becomes mainly one of mechanics.

By what means, in other words, can we best extend our help to the people of those countries? What is the best formula for bringing our resources of skill, scientific knowledge, and capital to their aid?

I think the answer to that question is Point Four.

Interpreting Point Four

Now there seem to be some very widespread and fundamental misconceptions about Point Four, and I would like to take just a moment to make it clear what I think Point Four is.

Many people seem to regard it as another "Government give-away," or as an adventure in "global do-gooding." Somehow the idea has got about that it is an expensive system of generous hand-outs to indigent nations, from whom we may expect nothing in return but recrimination and dislike.

But Point Four is none of these things, I assure you. Indeed, I think it is inaccurate even to consider it a Government program, for it is considerably more than merely that.

Point Four, it seems to me, is an idea as big and as broad as American life itself. It is the idea that the people of the United States, through their own democratic institutions, *private* as well as public, can help the less advanced nations of the free world to develop their human and material resources as we have developed ours.

¹ Address made before Government and business leaders at the Pacific Coast Conference on Private Investment in International Development at San Francisco, on Sept. 24.

Evidence of the practicality of this idea is right under our noses, in the prominent role played by European capital and know-how in the development of our resources in North America over past decades—to the mutual profit and benefit of all concerned. There's no reason, given proper planning and cooperation between governments and businesses, why our North American experience cannot be repeated elsewhere in the world.

Very few people understand that private enterprise—on our part and on the part of those we want to help—is the very essence of the Point Four idea. Very few appear to realize that American industry is the strong right arm upon which the whole idea depends.

For Point Four, as spelled out by Congress in the Act for International Development, clearly recognizes the traditional spheres of activity reserved in our system for public and private initiative. Government activities under the act have been directed primarily toward the job of helping underdeveloped peoples to increase their production of food and to improve their levels of education and public health. These certainly are legitimate functions for Government, in line with our basic conception of the respective spheres of public and private action.

And, also in line with that conception, Point Four relies upon the initiative and imagination of private capital for the enormous task of industrial and commercial development which must be accomplished before the underdeveloped nations can be said to have achieved a solid base of economic and social stability. It does this wisely, in my opinion, because in the long run, only the continuous flow of private investment capital into sound and productive undertakings in these countries—undertakings profitable to the country itself as well as to the investor—can do the job that must be done.

3 Years of Point Four in Government

Stanley Andrews² will tell you this afternoon what the Government has been able to do in the 3 years since Point Four began. I will only say that in those 3 years, technical-cooperation activities under the Act for International Development have cost the American people a total of 280 million dollars. I leave it to you to decide, after hearing Mr. Andrews, whether that money is being wisely spent.

In any event, I urge you to broaden your thinking about Point Four. I urge you to think of it not as a Government program but as a means of focusing all of the creative forces of our free society on a task that can only be accomplished by all of them together.

Our purpose at this meeting is to examine the part of private capital in the performance of that

² Administrator, Technical Cooperation Administration, Department of State.

task. At the risk of presuming upon the prerogatives of a keynote speaker, I should like to offer a suggestion or two regarding our discussions on that question.

Surmounting Investment Obstacles

First of all, I suggest that we assume that we all know about the obstacles to a larger flow of investment capital to the underdeveloped areas. Very formidable impediments do exist; but surely by this time they are too well known to all of us to require further definition.

I believe I could name a dozen lengthy reports by highly competent groups in private industry and in the Government setting forth in great detail the nature of the barriers to capital investment abroad.

I hope, therefore, that we will concern ourselves this afternoon and tomorrow with the problem of finding out how to break these barriers down, or surmount them, or get around them in one way or another. Let us start out with the attitude that nothing is impossible. The situation calls for imagination and resourcefulness. The obstacles—many of them, at least—are a part of the reality of our time; and our job, it seems to me, is to find out how to live with that reality.

Second, I propose the empirical approach. We are after practical, workable solutions. I believe we shall find many of them in the experience of hundreds of investors who have found it possible and profitable, despite the obstacles, to establish successful operations in many countries of the free world.

Just before I left Washington, I asked a Government expert to give me a short list of companies now engaged in foreign enterprise of one kind or another. The reply was that a representative list would have to include the names of something like a thousand of the best known corporations in the country. What becomes of the obstacles and hazards in the light of that illuminating fact?

Third, I would suggest that we regard the U.S. Government as a willing partner in the search for ways and means of facilitating foreign investment. It is the policy of the Government, clearly expressed in the Act for International Development, to encourage private enterprise to invest in the underdeveloped countries; and I can assure you that the agencies of Government concerned are eager to provide every measure of encouragement within their power.

An Exchange of Views Between Government and Business

Representatives of those agencies are present here today. They have come for the purpose of obtaining your ideas and suggestions as to how they might do more to encourage capital to go

abroad. They are prepared also to help you find out what the various agencies of the Government can do now to help the potential investor in the international field. The discussions at the conference are designed to be free and frank, in the nature of an exchange of views between Government and business, and I hope you will take full advantage of the opportunity they are intended to provide.

Finally, with respect to our discussions at this conference, I hope we will undertake to learn and understand the point of view of some of the countries whose development means so much to the security and prosperity of the free world.

From those countries, at our invitation, have come representatives of government and of business to discuss with you the nature of their own problems and the opportunities open to American capital. My only regret is that it was impracticable to invite representatives from all of the free nations of the world.

I believe that we shall learn from those who have honored us by their presence at this conference that we can solve most of the problems, surmount most of the obstacles, by the time-tested American process of sitting down and talking things over. We will find on their part, I believe, a sincere welcome to American capital if it is willing to come into their countries in a spirit of cooperation and work for the people of the country as well as for itself. It is necessary, I believe, to try to understand the other fellow's situation if we are to act with intelligence and statesmanship.

Investments Abroad—A Sound Enterprise

Not long ago, a news reporter in Washington asked me why we should expect American capital to go abroad when there are ample opportunities with less risk in the United States.

The answer, it seems to me, is that it has proved to be good business. Income from our direct investment abroad was 1 billion, 148 million dollars in 1949. In 1950 it was 1 billion, 469 million dollars. And in 1951 it totaled 1 billion, 632 million dollars. That was an increase of nearly half a billion dollars between '49 and '51. During that period, the total value of American direct foreign investment grew from 11 billion, 200 million dollars to more than 13 billion, 500 million dollars.

Yet during those years, the annual outflow of direct investment capital, exclusive of reinvestment of earnings abroad, declined from 786 million dollars to approximately 600 million dollars.

Now one can only hazard a guess at the amount of private capital we might reasonably be expected to send abroad annually. As a possible yardstick, however, we might consider the fact that Great Britain, at the height of her world economic power, sent as much as 2½ percent of her national income into foreign investment. Two percent of our own national income today would

exceed 5 billion dollars, but even such an optimist as I would scarcely hope that the total will reach that figure.

But it would seem to be apparent that American industry should be able to put a far larger stake into the industrial development of the less advanced countries of the world than it is now investing.

The opportunities are abundant. The profit potential is good. In many of these countries, such as India, Pakistan, and Colombia, for example, the climate for foreign investment is good or steadily improving as the result of deliberate efforts to attract development capital from abroad. And even where the climate is reported to be less favorable, American concerns appear to be operating successfully.

What, then, is the reason for the lag? Why are we holding back? What can be done to break the jam? These are the fundamental questions I hope this conference will help to answer.

For I am convinced that we are on the threshold of an era of industrial statesmanship that will see American enterprise at work throughout the world in new patterns of cooperation with the capital of other nations. Those patterns are already beginning to emerge from the experience of imaginative and constructive American industrialists who have found that partnership with the enterprise of other lands produces not only profits but friends.

And in a politically bipolar world, the friendship and confidence that grows from working and building together for mutual benefit and the common good is more important to us than ever before. It can be the strongest of the nails that hold the structure of the free world together.

Very often I am advised not to talk to businessmen in terms of moral responsibility and the obligations incumbent on us all as citizens of the Nation to which the free world looks for leadership. Businessmen, I am told, are not interested in abstractions of that kind; talk to them in solid terms of dollars and cents.

Interplay of Social and Economic Forces

Well, I haven't followed that advice before and I haven't followed it today. I simply refuse to accept the idea that the members of the business community are insensitive to the interplay of social and economic forces which condition and influence the course of world affairs. Perhaps that is why I find it so easily possible to assume that American initiative and capital will accept the challenge to statesmanship inherent in the realities of our time.

One of those realities pertains directly and immediately to the future of American industry itself. It seems to me to remove the whole question of foreign investment from the realm of the desirable into the realm of the essential. That reality

is our growing dependence upon foreign sources for the supply of raw materials essential to the continued expansion of our own economy.

Increasing Need for More Raw Materials

Doubtless many of you have read the report of the President's Materials Policy Commission,³ headed by William Paley of the Columbia Broadcasting System. Those of you who have not will find it, I believe, one of the most illuminating and provocative documents produced in recent years. Let me quote from the report:

By the midpoint of the twentieth century we had entered an era of new relationships between our needs and resources; our national economy had not merely grown up to its resource base, but in many important respects had outgrown it. We had completed our slow transition from a raw materials surplus nation to a raw materials deficit nation.

The hard political facts of the mid-twentieth century add further great weight to the proposition that it will be to the mutual advantage of all freedom-loving peoples of the earth to work toward a greater economic and political cooperation founded on the principles of mutual help and respect.

Security and economic growth for the United States and the rest of the free world must be the essential aim of any policy worth the name. Materials strength is a prime ingredient of general economic strength and growth, which in turn is the foundation of rising living standards in peace and of military strength in war. This Commission is convinced that if the United States and other free nations are to have such strength, they must coordinate their resources to the ends of common growth, common safety, and common welfare. In turn, this means that the United States must reject self-sufficiency as a policy and instead adopt the policy of the lowest cost acquisition of materials wherever secure supplies may be found.

It now requires something like two and a half billion tons of raw materials to feed the gigantic maw of our industrial machine, according to the report. By 1975, it probably will take double that amount. Technology, conservation, and development of new domestic sources will help to keep pace with this enormous growing appetite, but they will not be enough.

The sober fact is that we must seek abroad for an ever-increasing proportion of the essential ingredients of our industrial production. Our ability to maintain the level of our own economy depends on how successfully we are able to find and develop new sources of raw materials supply.

³ H. doc. 527, 82d Cong., 2d sess.

Incentive for a Program of Results

In other words, the chips are down. If there is a question of incentive, it can no longer be phrased solely in terms of the obligations of world leadership or of moral responsibility for the less fortunate peoples of other lands. Our own economic self-interest has become inextricably bound up with theirs.

Let me try to sum up the situation as I see it.

In the free world there are a billion people just emerging from centuries of social lethargy. They are the people of the ancient lands of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, whose aspirations for a better life have produced the cataclysmic social upheavals which rock those regions of the world today. They are the people, also, of the young lands of Latin America, sensitive of their independence, and eager for growth.

These billion people want a greater share of the fruits of progress and enlightenment in the modern world, and we have the capacity to help them get it.

They, in turn, have the capacity to help us. They own the sources of raw materials supply on which our industrial economy increasingly depends. More than that, they are a vast potential market for the produce of our industry.

What we do to help them will determine their ability to help us; how we go about it will determine their willingness. We must consider their interests on an equal basis with our own, in a relationship of partnership and mutuality. They can be our friends; today they look to us for leadership and aid in the enormous tasks confronting them. If we fail them, they may turn tomorrow to our enemies.

That brings me to the point I made when I began. Whether we fail them depends upon the willingness of American private enterprise to turn the key of economic development and progress for these lands. If we fail them, we shall have also failed ourselves.

Now there is work to be done. I invite you to share in it with a sense of mission as well as with the practical common sense that has made American industry what it is.

I do not expect miracles from you at this one conference. But as the first of a series of regional meetings on this subject, I believe you can point the way to a practical program which will bring substantial results.

So, let's get down to business.

The Totalitarian Theater

by Marc Connelly¹

[Telegraphic text]

Napoleon I loved the drama and acknowledged its power to enhance and embellish his empire. A case in point is the Congress of Princes he convoked in Erfurt in 1808. Napoleon brought the greatest French actor, Talma, and the choice ensemble of the Comédie Française for what a witness called a "veritable *levée en masse* of tragedy." There was just one thing wrong with that "*levée en masse*"—the tragedy all stemmed from the period of Louis XIV. The contemporary French playwrights wrote only the lightest of light comedy.

This sorry state of affairs irritated Napoleon very much. What he did not or would not grasp was that the censorship which Fouché and Savary practiced in his name, and which even expurgated the subversive lines of Corneille, was not conducive to great dramatic writing.

It was at this Congress of Princes in Erfurt that Napoleon had his famous conversation with Goethe, in the course of which he suggested that Goethe ought to write a new *Caesar's Death* with a more constructive twist. That new *Caesar's Death*, he said, should demonstrate to the world that Caesar would have brought about the happiness of humanity if only he had been given time to carry out his vast projects. Goethe was a great admirer of Napoleon. In our time he would have probably been condemned as a collaborationist. He professed to find the Emperor's proposition divinely naive and ingenious. Still, he never followed it up.

And here you have in a nutshell the theatrical problem which confronts all dictators and all dramatists working under the dictatorships:

¹ Address made on Sept. 24 at the first International Conference of Artists held at Venice, Sept. 22-28, under the auspices of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Mr. Connelly, well-known playwright, is a member of the National Commission for UNESCO and was the principal speaker on the subject of the theater at the Conference.

That is, the chemistry of the drama and the chemistry of political expediency never coincide. That is why dictators never get their money's worth out of their theater when they subject it to censorship and thought control. And yet they invariably try to do just that.

The Theater in Hitler Germany

Hitler was one of those dictators who, though fond of the theater, signally misunderstood its nature. It was characteristic of his ilk that with the Third Reich hardly under way, he put the German theater under the control of Dr. Goebbels' Propaganda Ministry. He could not have proclaimed his intentions more blatantly. It was to make Schiller's "moral institution" into a political instrument. As was to be expected, it worked only in the negative. That is, no plays could be produced which made fun of the regime or reflected the lurid and tragic conflicts caused by its monstrous principles and laws. But on the other hand, no plays were produced which promoted Nazi ideology. There weren't any. In fact, during the 12 years while the Nazis lasted, not one new play of any interest was created in Germany. Nor did any provocative foreign play reach the German stage, a stage which in general is notably hungry for new things and very catholic in its tastes. Even some of the German classical works were put on the Nazi index—especially Lessing's *Nathan the Sage*, a play extolling racial tolerance and therefore downright subversive.

Still there wasn't total censorship. Goebbels thought it inadvisable to forbid Schiller, with the result that the German audience broke into wildly demonstrative applause whenever they heard Marquis Posa pronounce his famous line "Sire, give us freedom of thought."

We will have more to say about the totalitarian theater in another context. But let me note that while censorship impoverishes the repertoire, it would be a mistake to believe that it kills the

theater. Nothing can kill the theater. As we said before: no reality is ever so deadening as to end man's hunger for that "world of dimly remembered beauties." Thus, even though the choice of plays was restricted, the Germans flocked to their theaters under the Nazis, seeking solace there from gruelling air attacks and impending defeat.

All of which indicates that the vitality of the theater borders on the miraculous. At this very moment it is asserting itself all across the world and under the most varied circumstances. In some countries the theater leads a free and vigorous existence. In other countries it has to put up with ideological corsets which threaten to squeeze the breath out of it. But it is a safe bet that when the ideologies in question will have been long dead, the theater will still live.

Behind the Iron Curtain

The question is, how is the theater doing in the world which is not so free—the world "behind the Iron Curtain"?

There is perhaps no other country which has a greater national affinity to the theater than Russia. The names of a Stanislawski, of a Meyerhoff, of a Tchekov evolve delight in the hearts of all theater lovers. Up to about 1936 the Soviet theater functioned in comparative freedom. Theatrical artists enjoyed considerable privileges. They were well-housed, well-dressed and well-paid. The Kremlin, realizing that the Russian theater enjoyed world fame, took considerable pride in it. It still does, for that matter. Moscow still counts 15 big national theaters, each with its own creative traditions and style. Their production level is still of the highest. But each year thought control and censorship weigh more heavily on these wonderful theaters. Stalin, like other dictators before him, is wildly determined to make the drama into an instrument of political propaganda.

True, the Russians are still allowed to play Gogol, Tolstoy, Tchekov, and even Shakespeare and Calderon. But generally plays which fail to carry the Marxist message are stigmatized as "formalistic," "naturalistic," or "cosmopolitan." "Cosmopolitanism" is the latest and worst criticism which can befall a Russian dramatist. The suspicion that he believes in the universality of art and in the possibility of an artistic *rapprochement* between East and West makes a writer very unloved all around. Then, too, one can only pity the playwrights who are scolded by Pravda for ignoring themes arising from the great new power and irrigation projects, the feats of progressive workers and collective farmers and the growth of Russian culture and living comforts. If only the dictators didn't confuse theater plays with propaganda tracts! The result is that the new Russian play writing is exceedingly poor. But how could it be otherwise?

Poland, Czechoslovakia, and all the other satellites take their cue from Moscow's theater policy. Theoretically, they too see in the theater an instrument designed to educate the perfect Communist citizen and frown on "counter-revolutionary" plays which advocate views contrary to the party line.

The satellites still make concessions to bourgeois taste. In Poland especially, where there reigns an immense enthusiasm for theater, they still play musical comedies American style. It is interesting to note that Warsaw, with a population of 700,000 people, has 12 professional theaters and only 9 film houses. It could easily fill 10 more theaters.

In Czechoslovakia, *Mrs. Warren's Profession* and *The Importance of Being Earnest* are still hits. But most of the new Czech play writing is very political and strictly Marxist. Some of the new Czech plays, especially Ota Safranek's *The Honorable Lieutenant Baker*, are outright anti-American propaganda.

As I said before, censorship and thought control stifle the theater, but they don't kill it. Nothing can really kill it. But we cannot be content with indestructibility. We must ask how it can be brought to its most perfect flowering at a time when its spiritual aid is so greatly needed by a suffering humanity.

The old Greeks knew the curative effect of the theater. Up on the hills, overlooking the great hospital city of Epidaurus, they built a large theater. Here the sick who underwent the therapy of the healing waters of the springs also underwent the spiritual therapy of the theater.

The theater is still a hospital of the spirit. Both the clown and the poet serve as part of its health-restoring and strength-renewing personnel. Both provide the cleansing, replenishing element of man's examination of himself. This is why the theater must receive governmental assistance, preferably through regional rather than federal agencies. And it must be free of political control. The theater is a part of the human rights objectives to which UNESCO is dedicated. The personal and intellectual freedoms of all peoples, the enjoyment of physical and mental health by a peaceful world are merely stages of advance in the preparation of man for his ensuing enrichments from art. In terms of finalities, art is as abstract and intangible as democracy. Democracy is a stream, an urgency toward, and an evidence of, the good in man's spirit. Although by its nature it can never have definite culmination, a point of final accomplishment where man can some day stand and regard everything behind him as an approach to a realized perfection, it must never halt or civilization will die. The theater as a form of art sheds light, a light governments should keep burning so that at every pause of his journey man may look at himself, and by what he sees, be encouraged to continue to his destiny.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of Meetings¹

Adjourned During September 1952

Inter-American Seminar on Vocational Education	University of Maryland	Aug. 2-Sept. 6
International Conference on Agricultural and Cooperative Credit	Berkeley, Calif	Aug. 4-Sept. 12
Sixth International Edinburgh Film Festival	Edinburgh	Aug. 17-Sept. 7
Thirteenth International Exhibition of Cinematographic Art	Venice	Aug. 8-Sept. 12
UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization):		
International Conference to Negotiate a Universal Copyright Convention.	Geneva	Aug. 18-Sept. 6
International Congress of the Arts	Venice	Sept. 22-28
ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization):		
First Aeronautical Information Services Division Meeting	Montreal	Aug. 19-Sept. 9
ITU (International Telecommunication Union):		
International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR): Study Group X	Geneva	Aug. 25-Sept. 4
UN (United Nations):		
Forty-first General Assembly of the Interparliamentary Union	Bern	Aug. 28-Sept. 2
International Anthropological and Ethnological Congress: 4th Session	Vienna	Sept. 1-8
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization):		
Working Party of Experts to Study an International Emergency Food Reserve.	Rome	Sept. 1-13
<i>Ad Hoc</i> Commission on Prisoners of War: 3d meeting	Geneva	Aug. 25-Sept. 13*
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East:		
Second Regional Conference of Statisticians	Bangkok	Sept. 1-13
Working Party of Experts on Mobilization of Domestic Capital: 2d Session.	Bangkok	Sept. 22-27
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund: 7th Annual Meeting of the Boards of Governors.	Mexico	Sept. 3-12
Eighth General Assembly of the International Astronomical Union	Rome	Sept. 4-13
Second International Congress of Analytical Chemistry	Oxford (England)	Sept. 4-9
GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade):		
<i>Ad Hoc</i> Committee on Agenda and Intersessional Business	Geneva	Sept. 4-12
UN <i>Ad Hoc</i> Committee on Factors (Non-Self-Governing Territories)	New York	Sept. 4-9
Conference of the International Union of Family Organization	Oxford (England)	Sept. 8-16*
Nineteenth International Geological Congress	Algiers	Sept. 8-15
Thirteenth International Horticultural Congress	London	Sept. 8-15
ILO (International Labor Organization):		
Chemical Industries Committee: 3d Session	Geneva	Sept. 9-20
WHO (World Meteorological Organization):		
Executive Committee: 3d Session	Geneva	Sept. 9-30
PASO (Pan American Sanitary Organization):		
Executive Committee: 17th Meeting	Habana	Sept. 10-12
Sixth Meeting of the Directing Council and Fourth Meeting of the WHO Regional Committee.	Habana	Sept. 15-24
Executive Committee: 18th Meeting	Habana	Sept. 25-26
Fourth International Congress of African Tourism	Lourenço Marques	Sept. 15-20
UN Advisory Committee to the High Commissioner for Refugees: 2d Session.	Geneva	Sept. 15-20*
Twenty-first International Congress of Housing and Urbanization	Lisbon	Sept. 21-27
WHO (World Health Organization):		
Fourth Meeting of the Regional Committee (See also PASO)	Habana	Sept. 15-24
Western Pacific Regional Conference: 3d Session	Saigon	Sept. 25-30
Fourth Meeting of the International Committee of Research on Trypanosomiasis.	Lourenço Marques	Sept. 25-30
Fourth Meeting of the Executive Board of the International Council of Scientific Unions.	Amsterdam	Sept. 30 (1 day)

¹ Prepared in the Division of International Conferences, Department of State, Sept. 24, 1952. Asterisks indicate tentative dates.

Calendar of Meetings—Continued

In Session as of September 30, 1952

FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization):		
Eucalyptus Study Tour	Australia	Sept. 1-
FAO-ECLA Central American Seminar on Agricultural Credit	Guatemala City	Sept. 15-
ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization):		
Council: 17th Session	Montreal	Sept. 9-
Special Diplomatic Conference to Conclude a Convention on Damage Caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third Parties on the Surface.	Rome	Sept. 9-
Air Transport Committee	Montreal	Sept. 10-
Statistics Division Meeting: 2d Session	Montreal	Sept. 16-
Air Navigation Commission: 11th Session	Montreal	Sept. 23-
UN (United Nations):		
Economic and Social Council:		
Restrictive Business Practices: 3d Session	Geneva	Sept. 8-
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East:		
Subcommission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities: 5th Session.	New York	Sept. 22-
Committee on Industry and Trade, Subcommittee on Electric Power.	Bangkok	Sept. 29-
General Assembly Committee on Administrative Unions	New York	Sept. 23-
UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization):		
International Seminar on the Role of Museums in Education	Brooklyn	Sept. 14-
ILO (International Labor Organization):		
Seminar on Social Security	Rio de Janeiro	Sept. 15-
First Inter-American Congress of Public Health	Habana	Sept. 26-
CEM (Council of Foreign Ministers):		
Deputies for Austria	London	Sept. 29-
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea	Copenhagen	Sept. 29-
Committee on Improvement of National Statistics: 2d Session	Ottawa	Sept. 29-

Scheduled October 1-December 31, 1952

Sixth General Assembly of the International Council of Scientific Unions		
ITU (International Telecommunication Union):	Amsterdam	Oct. 1-
International Plenipotentiary Telecommunication Conference	Buenos Aires	Oct. 1-
International Conference on Legal Metrology, Meeting of Provisional Committee.	Brussels	Oct. 2-
GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade):		
Seventh Session of the Contracting Parties to GATT	Geneva	Oct. 2-
South Pacific Commission: 10th Session	Nouméa	Oct. 6-
UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization):		
Seminar on Education of Asian Youth	Rangoon	Oct. 7-
Fourth Meeting of Representatives of National Commissions	Paris	Nov. 8-; Dec. 11-
Seventh Session of the General Conference	Paris	Nov. 12-
First Regional Conference on Free and Compulsory Education in South Asia and the Pacific.	Bombay	Dec. 12-
International Committee on Weights and Measures: Biennial Session .	Sèvres	Oct. 7-
PICMME (Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe):		
Finance Committee	Geneva	Oct. 9-
Fourth Session of PICMME	Geneva	Oct. 13-
PAIGH (Pan American Institute on Geography and History):		
Sixth Consultation of the Commission on Cartography	Ciudad Trujillo	Oct. 12-
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization):		
European Forestry and Forest Products Commission: 5th Session . . .	Geneva	Oct. 14-
Indo-Pacific Fisheries Council: 4th Session	Manila	Oct. 23-
Coordinating Committee	Rome	Oct. 27-
Technical Advisory Committee on Desert Locust Control: 2d Meeting	Rome	Nov. 3-
Committee on Commodity Problems: 20th Session	Rome	Nov. 5-
Committee on Financial Control	Rome	Nov. 5-
Committee on Veterinary Matters: 1st Meeting	Rome	Nov. 10-
Council: 16th Session	Rome	Nov. 17-
Forestry and Forest Products Commission for Asia and Pacific: 2d Session.	Singapore and Kuala Lumpur.	Dec. 1-
Meeting of Experts on Index Numbers	Rome	Dec. 1-
Technical Meeting on Storage of Rice	Bangkok	Dec. 1-
Inter-American Meeting on Livestock Production	São Paulo	Dec. 8-
FAO/WHO Joint Meeting on Malnutrition in Mothers, Infants and Children.	Gambia, Africa	Nov. 28-
ILO (International Labor Organization):		
Petroleum Committee: 4th Session	Scheveningen	Oct. 14-
Asian Advisory Committee: 4th Session	Geneva	Nov. 17-

October 6, 1952

Calendar of Meetings—Continued

Scheduled October 1–December 31, 1952—Continued

ILO—Continued

Governing Body: 120th Session	Geneva	Nov. 25–
Latin American Manpower Technical Conference	Undetermined	Dec. 1–
Technical Meeting on the Protection of Young Workers in Asian Countries, with relation to their vocational preparation.	Ceylon	Dec. 1–
UN (United Nations):		
General Assembly: 7th Session	New York	Oct. 14–
<i>Ad Hoc</i> Committee on Forced Labor: 3d Session	Geneva	Oct. 14–
Economic and Social Council:		
Economic Commission for Europe, Seminar on Rural Electrification .	Geneva	Oct. 12–
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East: Seminar on Power Alcohol.	Lucknow	Oct. 23–
Trusteeship Council: 11th Session (2d part)	New York	Nov. —
UN South-West Africa Committee (<i>ad hoc</i>)	New York	Oct. 1–
First Ibero-American Congress on Archives, Libraries and Copyrights .	Madrid	Oct. 20–
Pan American Highway Congress, Committee on Programming and Planning.	Mexico City	Oct. 20–
ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization):		
Aerodromes, Air Routes and Ground Aids Division Meeting: 5th Session.	Montreal	Oct. 21–
Special European-Mediterranean Regional Frequency Allocation Meeting.	Paris	Oct. 28–
Standing Committee on Aircraft Performance: 3d Session	Montreal	Nov. 11–
Pan American Highway Congress, Extraordinary Session	Mexico City	Oct. 26–
Fourth Inter-American Congress of Radiology	Mexico City	Nov. 2–
American International Institute for the Protection of Childhood: Regional Meeting of Technical Delegates	Mexico City	Nov. 3–6
International Wool Study Group: 5th Meeting	London	Nov. 3–
West Indian Conference: 5th Session	Jamaica	Nov. 24–
UN International Children's Emergency Fund:		
Executive Board	New York	November
Program Committee	New York	November
Caribbean Commission: 15th Meeting	Jamaica	Dec. 1–
Sixth International Conference of Social Work	Madras	Dec. 14–
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization):		
Council: 10th Session	Paris	Dec. 15–
American International Institute for the Protection of Childhood: Meeting of the Directing Council.	Montevideo	December

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

Council of Scientific Unions

The Department of State announced on September 26 (press release 758) that the United States will be represented at the sixth General Assembly of the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU), to be held at Amsterdam, October 1–3, by the following delegation:

- W. Albert Noyes, Jr., *Chairman*, Dean of the Graduate School, University of Rochester, Rochester, N. Y.; Chairman of the Division of Chemistry and Chemical Technology, National Research Council
- Wallace W. Atwood, Jr., Director, Office of International Relations, National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council
- Lloyd V. Berkner, President, Associated Universities, Inc., Brookhaven National Laboratory, Upton, Long Island, N. Y.
- Dirk Brouwer, Professor of Natural Philosophy and Astronomy, Director of the Observatory, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.
- Walter H. Bucher, Professor and Chairman, Department of Geology, Columbia University, New York; President, American Geophysical Union

- Donald B. Eddy, Foreign Affairs Officer, Division of International Conferences, Department of State
- James Wallace Joyce, Deputy Science Adviser, Department of State
- C. Eugene Sunderlin, Deputy Director, National Science Foundation

International scientific unions affiliated in ICSU comprise those in the fields of astronomy, biology, chemistry, crystallography, geodesy and geophysics, geography, history of sciences, mechanics, physics, and radio science. ICSU provides for cooperation among the representative scientific agencies of various countries and among international scientific organizations; directs international scientific activity on certain subjects not within the purview of existing international associations; and enters into relationships with governments of member states through the national adhering organizations in order to promote scientific investigation in those countries. The National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council adheres to ICSU on behalf of the United States.

The work of the Council is directed by the General Assembly, held triennially, which reviews the

IcSU program and expenditures for the 3 years past and establishes the program and budget for the succeeding period. The forthcoming Assembly at Amsterdam will consider the adoption of revised statutes, the admission of new unions, and the appointment of National Committees for the International Geophysical Year 1957-8. The fifth General Assembly was held at Copenhagen in September of 1949.

The membership of IcSU expected to participate in the Amsterdam Assembly consists of (a) the 10 international scientific unions enumerated above and (b) 43 countries, which adhere to the Council either through their appropriate national scientific bodies or directly through their governments.

Subcommittee on Electric Power (ECAFE)

The Department of State announced on September 26 (press release 763) that the United States will be represented at the second meeting of the Subcommittee on Electric Power of the U. N. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) by Anthony Bisgood, Industries Officer of the Mutual Security Agency Mission at Bangkok, Thailand. The meeting will take place at Bangkok from September 29 to October 2. Mr. Bisgood's advisers will be two private experts who are currently on loan to the Government of Japan from their respective organizations in this country. They are F. Douglas Campbell of the Detroit Edison Company, an internationally known expert on electric-power survey procedures, particularly on heavy-power equipment availability, and Leroy L. Hinckley of the Pacific Gas and Electric Company, a specialist in methods of forecasting loads and system capability.

The availability of electric power on a reasonable basis is considered fundamental to the sound expansion of modern industry in any area of the world. Increases in electric-power generation and distribution are particularly important elements in achieving Asiatic and Far Eastern goals of greater industrialization and economic development.

Important topics scheduled for discussion at the forthcoming meeting are the requirements and availability of electric-power plants and equipment, and techniques of estimating future power demands.

Statistics Division of ICAO

The Department of State announced on September 16 (press release 735) that the U.S. delegation to the second session of the Statistics Division of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), to be convened on that date at Montreal will be as follows:

Delegate

Ernest A. Lister, alternate U.S. Representative on the International Civil Aviation Organization Council

Advisers

Allan Craig, Acting Chief, Accounting and Statistics Division, Civil Aeronautics Board

Ben W. Ashmead, Acting Chief, Analysis (Accidents) Division, Civil Aeronautics Board

Mary C. Hillyer, Air Transport Examiner, Civil Aeronautics Board

Stafford Kernan, Chief Statistician, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

R. L. Jones, Pan American Airways Assistant Chief Accountant, Air Transport Association of America

The collection, analysis, and publication of statistics on air transport is one of the most important responsibilities of ICAO. Certain of the organization's statutory duties in the technical, economic, and legal fields can be discharged only on the basis of reliable, complete, and up-to-date statistical data. Such information is also necessary to assist civil-aviation authorities in contracting states to formulate their own national policies in the light of established facts.

In 1945, the first year of its existence, the Provisional International Civil Aviation Organization approved forms to be used by states for reporting data, including traffic reports, cost statistics, and financial statements, and also established within the Secretariat a section responsible for receiving and collating the data. In 1947 the Organization decided that a Statistics Division should be convened for the general purpose of revising the statistical reporting forms. The first session of the Division, held at Montreal in January 1948, was attended by representatives of 18 ICAO member states and observers from 4 non-contracting states and five international organizations.

Delegates to the forthcoming meeting will review in detail the statistical activities of the organization and the statistical reporting system, which have now been in effect 6 years. Other items to be discussed are cooperation of statistical experts within states or groups of states, definitions for aviation statistics, statistical publications and work program, and plans for the third session of the Division.

The Air Transport Committee, which approved the agenda for the Division's meeting, also decided that the Division should bear in mind methods to insure that (1) the statistics collected and published by ICAO are adequate to meet the requirements of contracting states and of other users of aviation statistics; (2) the reporting procedures required are sufficiently simple and economical to be within the capabilities of contracting states; (3) all contracting states discharge fully and promptly the reporting obligations agreed upon and that the information so furnished, or a suitable résumé thereof, is promptly published; and (4) the statistical publications of ICAO are designed to furnish contracting states with essential

information in a form that will facilitate reference, comparison, and analysis. Finally, the Division is asked to consider that the Secretariat be authorized to interpret the reporting requirements, to waive or modify nonsubstantive provisions in proper cases, and to initiate revisions in scope, content, format and definitions—all with the purpose of providing the program with flexibility.

Petroleum Planning Committee (NATO)

The Department of State announced on September 24 (press release 753) that the U.S. Government will be represented at the third meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Petroleum Planning Committee, to be held at Paris on October 2, 1952, by the following delegation:

U.S. Representative

J. E. Brantly, Assistant Deputy Administrator, Foreign Petroleum Operations, Petroleum Administration for Defense, Department of the Interior

U.S. Alternate Representative

Oscar E. Bransky, Chief of Petroleum Section, Office of the Special Representative in Europe, Paris

Advisers

Robert H. S. Eakens, Petroleum Policy Staff, Department of State

Charles Hedlund, Director, Program Division, Petroleum Administration for Defense, Department of the Interior

Col. G. H. Montgomery, Munitions Board, Department of Defense

The Petroleum Planning Committee is composed of representatives from each member country of NATO. Its first meeting was held at London on April 2, 1952, and the second at NATO Headquarters at Paris on May 19, 1952.

The forthcoming meeting will be attended by petroleum experts from most of the NATO countries, who will study the subject of the petroleum requirements of North Atlantic Treaty members in the event of an emergency. The Committee does not concern itself with any current international petroleum problems.

IMC Allocation of Tungsten and Molybdenum

The Tungsten-Molybdenum Committee of the International Materials Conference (IMC) announced on September 25 its recommended distribution of tungsten and molybdenum for the fourth calendar quarter of 1952.¹ The Governments of all 13 countries represented on the Committee have accepted the recommendations. These countries are Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan,

¹ For distribution tables (not printed here), see IMC press release dated Sept. 25.

Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

In accepting the recommendations, the Government of the United States made the condition that domestic users of tungsten and molybdenum in the United States should be authorized to purchase the quantity of such materials allocated to other countries participating in the International Materials Conference and not used by any such participating country. In view of this, the Committee agreed to make arrangements whereby such domestic users in the United States or other countries would have the opportunity to purchase tungsten or molybdenum allocated to other countries participating in the International Materials Conference but not used by any such participating country.

Tungsten and molybdenum have been under international plans of distribution since July 1, 1951. Although availabilities of the two metals have been increasing, both continue to be in short supply as compared with the requirements of the consuming countries. This is especially so when the stockpiling requirements of these countries are taken into consideration.

The total free-world production of tungsten in the fourth quarter of 1952 is estimated by the Committee at 4,957 metric tons metal content, and the free-world production of molybdenum at 5,680 metric tons metal content. The above estimate of tungsten production shows an increase of 37 percent as compared with the actual rate of production in the second half of 1951 and more than double the rate of production in 1950. Molybdenum production as above estimated shows an increase of nearly 15 percent as compared with actual production in the second half of 1951 and over 50 percent above the rate of production in 1950. On the other hand, the defense and stockpiling requirements of the free world are still in excess of the production in the case of both metals. It is necessary, therefore, that all countries of the free world should do their utmost to implement the present recommendations for the distribution of the metals and give every attention to the measures recommended by the Committee for conservation and substitution.

The plans recommended provide for the distribution of the whole free-world production of tungsten and molybdenum, both in the form of ores and concentrates and primary products. Primary products are defined, as in the case of previous distributions by the Committee, as ferrotungsten, tungsten powder, tungstic acid and tungsten salts, and ferromolybdenum, molybdic acid and molybdenum salts, including calcium-molybdate and molybdic oxide. Roasted molybdenum concentrates are regarded by the Committee as being included in ores and concentrates, as in the case of previous distribution plans.

In framing the recommended plans of distribution, the needs of all countries, whether members

f the Tungsten-Molybdenum Committee or not, were carefully considered. The distribution plans are now transmitted to all governments, including those not represented on the Committee, wherever the countries concerned are interested in the export or import of tungsten or molybdenum in the form of ores and concentrates or primary products. All governments are being requested to carry out the plans of distribution recommended.

Of the quantity of 4,957 metric tons metal content of tungsten estimated to be produced in the third calendar quarter of 1952, the distribution plan provides that 4,709.4 metric tons are to be distributed in the form of ores and concentrates and 247.6 metric tons in the form of primary products. This latter quantity is distributed, in the first instance, in the form of ores and concentrates to countries manufacturing this material into the primary products. Similarly, of the total estimated production of 5,680 metric tons metal content of molybdenum to be produced in the fourth calendar quarter of 1952, the distribution plan provides that 5,362.8 metric tons be distributed in the form of ores and concentrates and 297.2 metric tons as primary products, this latter quantity also being distributed, in the first instance, to countries manufacturing primary products from ores and concentrates.

Table III shows the export and import quotas of the two metals derived from the distribution shown in tables I and II. The quantities shown in table III are the export and import quotas of tungsten and molybdenum (ores and concentrates only) for the period October 1 to December 31, 1952. These quotas correspond with the quantities set forth in tables I and II. The import quotas include the quantities to be imported for processing and reexport as primary products.

In issuing the above described plans of distribution, the Committee recommends that existing contracts be respected as far as possible. If such contracts provide for the supply of tungsten or molybdenum to any one importing country in excess of the amounts allocated, it is recommended that the importing country should divert shipments to other importing countries which have not yet filled their import quotas, so far as possible without upsetting the original contractual arrangements.

U.N. Offers New Proposals for Settling Prisoner of War Issue

*Lt. Gen. William K. Harrison, Jr., chief United Nations negotiator at the Panmunjom armistice talks, on September 28 made the following statement to the Communist delegation:*¹

I have an important statement to make. For many weeks the prisoner of war issue has blocked the achievement of an armistice in Korea. On

July 1 we suggested to you that a solution to the problem must be one that to a reasonable degree meets the requirements of both sides. You have admitted the soundness of that proposition.

It must now be clear to you that one of the requirements of our side which cannot be compromised is that of no forced repatriation.

Within this humanitarian principle the United Nations Command has made honest efforts to achieve an armistice. So that there can be no doubt of the objectivity and sincerity with which the United Nations Command delegation has attempted to find a solution to the prisoner of war question, I will restate the proposals which we have previously offered and which you have summarily rejected.

We have previously proposed that joint teams or Red Cross teams, with or without military observers of both sides, be admitted to the prisoner of war camps of both sides to verify the fact that non-repatriates would forcibly resist return to the side from which they came. As an alternative we proposed that all prisoners of war of both sides be delivered in groups of appropriate size to the demilitarized zone and given the opportunity to express their preference on repatriation, the interview to be done by one or a combination of the following:

- A. International Committee of the Red Cross
- B. Teams from impartial nations
- C. Joint teams of military observers
- D. Red Cross representatives from each side

Either one of these proposals, if accepted by your side, would have allayed any legitimate fear you might have had that the prisoners of war were being coerced into rejecting repatriation to your side and would have produced an armistice.

I now present to you three additional alternate proposals any one of which will lead to an armistice if you truly desire one.

I ask that you give careful consideration to them because they represent the only remaining avenues of approach on which our side can agree to an armistice. All of these proposals are based on the prior formal acceptance of an armistice by both sides, with the disposition of prisoners of war to be determined thereafter according to one of the following procedures.

A. Proposal Number One:

As soon as the armistice agreement goes into effect all prisoners of war in the custody of each side shall be entitled to release and repatriation. Such release and repatriation of prisoners of war shall begin in accordance with the provisions of article three of the armistice agreement. Both sides agree that the obligation to exchange and repatriate prisoners of war shall be fulfilled by having them brought to an agreed exchange point in the demilitarized zone. The prisoner of war shall be identified and his name checked against the agreed list of prisoners of

¹ For a statement made on Sept. 6 by Lieutenant General (then Major General) Harrison on the prisoner of war problem, see BULLETIN of Sept. 29, p. 474.

war in the presence, if desired, of one or a combination of the International Committee of the Red Cross, joint Red Cross teams, or joint military teams. The prisoner of war shall thereupon be considered as fully repatriated for the purposes of the agreement. Both sides agree, however, that any prisoner of war who at time of identification states that he wishes to return to the side by which he had been detained shall immediately be allowed to do so.

Such former prisoner of war shall thereupon go into the custody of the side to which he wishes to go, which side shall provide him with transportation from the demilitarized zone to territory under its control in Korea. Such individual, of course, shall not be detained as a prisoner of war but shall assume civilian status, and, in accordance with paragraph 52 of the armistice agreement, shall not again be employed in acts of war in the Korean conflict.

B. Proposal Number Two:

As soon as the armistice agreement goes into effect all prisoners of war who desire repatriation will be exchanged expeditiously. All prisoners objecting to repatriation will be delivered to the demilitarized zone in small groups where, at a mutually agreeable location, they will be freed from military control of both sides and interviewed by representatives of a mutually agreed country or countries whose forces are not participating in the Korean hostilities, such persons being free to go to the side of their choice as indicated by such interview. The foregoing procedure will be accomplished, if desired, with or without military representation from each side and under the observation of one or a combination of the following:

1. International Committee of the Red Cross
2. Joint Red Cross teams
3. Joint military teams

C. Proposal Number Three:

As soon as the armistice is signed and becomes effective, all prisoners of war who desire repatriation will be exchanged expeditiously. Concurrently, if logistical capability permits, or as soon as possible thereafter, those prisoners of war who have previously expressed their objections to repatriation will be delivered in groups of appropriate size to a mutually agreed upon location in the demilitarized zone and there freed from the military control of both sides. Without questioning, interview, or screening, each individual so released will be free to go to the side of his choice. We will agree, if desired, to have this movement and disposition of non-repatriates accomplished under the observation of one or a combination of the International Committee of the Red Cross, joint teams of military observers, or Red Cross representatives from both sides.

We have now offered you the widest selection of choices the United Nations Command can offer. Each of them will produce an armistice.

I urge that you give mature and careful consideration to our proposals.

For that purpose I propose a recess for 10 days, and that we meet again here at 1,100 hours on 8 October.

Our staff officers will be available at any time to answer questions on any of our proposals.

The United States in the United Nations

[Sept. 29—Oct. 3]

Security Council

The Secretary-General reported to the President of the Security Council on September 30 that Valerian Alexandrovitch Zorin, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., will serve as Soviet representative on the Council. Mr. Zorin replaces Jacob A. Malik.

Hernan Santa Cruz (Chile) succeeds Joao Carlos Muniz (Brazil) as President of the Security Council for October.

Disarmament Commission—Over strong objections on the part of the Soviet representative, Mr. Zorin, the Commission decided on October 1 by a vote of 9-2 (U.S.S.R., Chile)-1 (Pakistan) to take up its second draft report in closed meetings. Mr. Zorin attributed this decision to a prearranged deal and contended the U.S., U.K., and others were trying to hide the Commission's shortcomings from public opinion.

The Soviet spokesman made it clear his delegation was not satisfied with the report and indicated it would submit amendments on the form of the draft.

Before taking up the second report, the Commission heard Canada's representative state that Canada accepted the ceilings on armed forces provided for in the tripartite proposals on limitation of armed forces.¹ It was necessary and desirable, according to David M. Johnson, to make a distinction between the armed forces of the five major military powers and those of other states. After pointing out that the sponsors had repeatedly stated the plan was only one element in the comprehensive disarmament program, Johnson commented that he could not see much logic in refusing to discuss a part because it was not the whole. Although incomplete, the tripartite proposals had gone a great deal farther toward getting down to brass tacks than had the proposals of any other delegation. Canada thought they had made a real contribution to the Commission's work—a contribution which had not been sufficiently recognized.

It was a big thing, Mr. Johnson declared, for one of the two most powerful nations in the world to offer to cut its armed forces in half if the other did likewise, as part of a general scheme of disarmament which would include prohibition of all weapons of mass destruction. His Government hoped those who did not want to take the tripartite proposals as a basis of discussion would provide the Disarmament Commission with equally specific alternative proposals. The Commission then might be able to begin the work of serious negotiation.

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Aug. 25, 1952, p. 292.

In opening discussion of the second draft report, Mr. Zorin said the U.S.S.R. believed it would be appropriate to submit amendments to and comment on the draft. The French delegate was prepared to discuss the procedure for the handling of the report but not the substance of it. Mr. Zorin replied that all members had had an opportunity to study the report, and added that in view of the short time before the opening of the General Assembly he did not deem it desirable to postpone the discussion. The U.K. delegate suggested the report be taken up at closed meetings and that amendments be submitted in writing. Mr. Zorin countered that since disarmament questions were of great interest to the public, he saw no reason to hold private sessions.

Ambassador Benjamin Cohen (U.S.) stated that the primary objective should be to adopt a procedure to facilitate prompt agreement. The U.S. had nothing to hide from the public, but it was opposed to reopening debates. The Disarmament Commission should follow the Security Council's practice of considering the report in private meetings. However, the U.S. would not insist on this point.

During subsequent procedural discussion, France, China, the Netherlands, Brazil, and Greece endorsed the U.K. proposal to hold the discussion in private sessions. Mr. Zorin attributed these endorsements to a prearranged deal not to publicize the Disarmament Commission's work. Following adoption of the proposal for closed meetings, Mr. Zorin stated that the decision confirmed his view that there had been a deal. The U.S.S.R. was against hiding the results of the Commission's work, which revealed substantial shortcomings.

General Assembly

Committee on Administrative Unions—The Committee, on September 30, approved a Brazilian resolution on the British Togoland Administrative Union, following acceptance by Brazil of several Indian Amendments bringing it into closer accord with the Trusteeship Council's own conclusions. It was agreed to use the same text, suitably modified, for the British Cameroons.

A Secretariat draft reflecting previous Committee discussion of Ruanda-Urundi was adopted, along with the first part of a similar paper on Tanganyika. Action on the remainder was deferred pending circulation of U.S. amendments.

Ad Hoc Committee on South West Africa

The Committee has been meeting at intervals during September and October to make a further effort to reach agreement with the Union of South Africa as to means whereby South Africa would carry out its international obligations toward the mandated territory of South-West Africa, which in the opinion of the International Court of Justice

remain in force. Except for the replacement of Denmark by Norway, the membership of the Committee remains the same as that of last year's *Ad Hoc* Committee. Other members of this year's Committee are Syria, Thailand, and the United States. Benjamin Gerig has continued as U.S. representative. Although negotiations with South Africa have been resumed, the Committee has not yet completed its task.

Communiqués Regarding Korea to the Security Council

The Headquarters of the United Nations Command has transmitted communiqués regarding Korea to the Secretary-General of the United Nations under the following United Nations document numbers: S/2763, September 2; S/2764, September 3; S/2765, September 4; S/2766, September 5; S/2767, September 9; S/2769, September 9; S/2772, September 10; S/2774, September 15; S/2775, September 15; S/2776, September 15; S/2777, September 11; S/2778, September 16.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: Sept. 22-26, 1952

Releases may be obtained from the Office of the Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.

Press releases issued prior to Sept. 22 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 735 of Sept. 16 and 739 of Sept. 18.

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†743	9/22	Meeting of Working Party (ECAFE)
744	9/22	U.S. reply to Soviet on Trieste
745	9/22	Military assistance for Dominican Republic
*746	9/22	Awards to newsmen
747	9/23	U.S. reply to Soviet note on Germany
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753	9/24	NATO petroleum committee
*754	9/25	Land credit conference
†755	9/25	India: Letter of credence
756	9/25	U.S.S.R.: Letter of credence
757	9/25	Letter to President from Mossadegh
758	9/26	Council of Scientific Unions
†759	9/26	Sargeant: Military factors
*760	9/26	Panama: Presidential inauguration
*761	9/26	Acheson: Press Club speech, Jan. '50
†762	9/26	Resignation of Katharine Lenroot
763	9/26	Electric power meeting (ECAFE)
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The Role of the Bible in Our National Life

*Remarks by Secretary Acheson*¹

The President has asked me to express his deep regret that he is unable to be with you this evening and to participate with you in the celebration of this august event.

I am most honored and happy to present his greetings to you and to join with you in this great meeting to inaugurate a new version, a new translation of the Bible. Years of patient scholarship and devoted labor have culminated in presenting with new learning and with the language of our time the ageless narrative, the incomparable poetry, and the revealed wisdom and teaching of these basic documents of our Nation's spiritual life—the documents which we rightly describe as the Word of God.

It is right and necessary that these eternal and vigorously living books should continually be reborn in fresh and living words, just as the earth is continuously reborn and renewed. It is right, too, that many of us should cling to the older words—particularly those who, if they apply Lincoln's phrase to themselves, must describe themselves as old men. For when he said that of himself in February 1861, he was almost 10 years younger than I am now.

We are made from the soil out of which we grew. And as we grow older we continually go back to origins. For each of us those origins are different. For me they lie in the Connecticut Valley and in the King James Version. As my mind goes back beyond clear memory, there is a merging. Soon we shall come to All Saints Day and the Advent season. The mail trucks will exhort us to mail Christmas packages early and tell us the days that remain. This brings to me, like wood smoke, memories not seen but felt—the squeak of dry snow under foot, voices no longer heard, the laughter of greetings about a doorway, the steam of breath in the cold air—and these words:

¹Made before a meeting sponsored jointly by the National Council of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. and the Washington Federation of Churches at the National Guard Armory, Washington, D.C., on Sept. 29 and released to the press (No. 766) on the same date.

And it came to pass in those days, that there went out a decree from Caesar Augustus that all the world should be taxed. And this taxing was first made when Cyrenius was governor of Syria. And all went to be taxed, every one unto his own city.

Then one knew that it was indeed Christmas.

So our rejoicing in a new version of the Bible does not, and need not, diminish our love for the older ones.

Apart from the familiarity with a particular version which engages our affections, the important thing for us is the place of these books in the civilization which we have inherited and which we are strengthening and defending in our own lives and in the national life of our country.

Its place is enormous—shared only, I think, by the influence of the land itself, the country in which we live. I am not forgetful of the great inheritance of Greek thought—indeed it is felt in these books themselves—or Roman institutions, or of the effect of the ideas and passions which spread across the ocean from eighteenth century France and England. But the effect of this Bible and this country were in my judgment predominant. And effect upon what? And this forms the third element to produce the United States of America—the people who came here and who were born here.

Identified With Early History

In the earliest days in the Northeast, the Book was All. The settlers came here to live their own reading of it. It was the spiritual guide, the moral and legal code, the political system, the sustenance of life, whether that meant endurance of hardship, the endless struggle with nature, battle with enemies, or the inevitable processes of life and death. And it meant to those who cast the mold of this country something very specific and very clear. It meant that the purpose of man's journey through this life was to learn and identify his life and effort with the purpose and the will of God. To do this he must purge his nature of its rebellious side. And this, in turn, meant

that the struggle between good and evil was the raging, omnipresent battle in every life, every day.

The test was not one's own will or desire, not the dictate of the government, not the opinion of the day, but the will of God as revealed by the prophets and to be found, in the last analysis, by the individual conscience—guided, instructed, chastened, but in the end, alone.

Out of the travail of these lives the idea of God-fearing was given powerful content and effect. It meant a voluntary, eager, even militant submission to a moral order overriding the wills of the low and great and of the state itself. And this carried with it the notion of restraints against all, of areas blocked off into which none might enter because here the duty of the individual conscience must be performed.

But this was not all. This did not exhaust the teachings of this Bible. For it taught also that the fear of God was the love of God and that the love of God was the love of man and the service of man.

What was written in the Book was taught also by the life of this country. Never was self-reliance so linked with mutual help as in those early days, when from birth to death neighbor turned to neighbor for help and received it in overflowing measure. No characteristic so marks Americans to this day as this quick and helping hand, a hand offered not only to our fellow citizens but to our fellow men.

Contrast to Soviet Teachings

It shocks and surprises us to be told that this is a weak and soft attitude. A few weeks ago I read to another audience the teaching which is being given to a people who only a few years ago regarded us as friends.² Here it is:

Soviet patriotism is indissolubly connected with hatred toward the enemies of the Socialist Fatherland. "It is impossible to conquer the enemy without having learned to hate him with all the might of one's soul. . . ." The teaching of hatred toward the enemies of the toilers enriches the conception of Socialistic humanism by distinguishing it from sugary and hypocritical "philanthropy."

This is a quotation from a Soviet encyclopedia.

Now philanthropy means love of man. It is sad and tragic that a people who once read the same books should be taught today to hate in order to avoid the softness of the love of man.

In order to love our own country we do not have to hate anyone. There is enough to inspire love here. And the first thing is the country itself. I am not speaking now of abstractions, the national entity, its institutions, its history, and power—great as these are—but of some piece of earth with the sky over it, whoever owns it, which we think of when we think of our country. For it is this

love of a specific place which gives great strength and comfort to the human heart.

Not far from here there are a few acres which even to think of brings me peace, and to be on, to see and touch, gives unending joy and refreshment. They came to me from the same family which received them from the Lord Proprietor and which, at the beginning of our country's history, built a modest house under the trees. Here for generations men and women have worked hard and with loving care to make a livelihood and to make a home. The house, the barn, the workshop were built to outlast the centuries and have done so. To every effort nature has responded a thousandfold, entering a partnership to make the land each season more beautiful than before—the turf softer and richer, the trees greater to shelter the small house under their embracing spread. To carry on man's side of this partnership brings a sense of merging with the land and with the generations who have been at one with it before.

It is a good beginning to the love of country to love some small piece of it very much.

And, finally, the central figure of this heritage—man himself. Who are these people, the Americans? They are a people who, as we have said, hold sacred the Word of God. They are a people molded by the dangers and the beauty and the open bounty of this continent.

Out of many, they are one. Theirs is a unity based upon the brotherhood of man under the Fatherhood of God; theirs, too, the great and vigorous diversity based on respect for man, the individual. Here is no orthodoxy, no worship of authority. At the center of this society stands the individual man. His back is straight, he looks you in the eye—and calls no man his master. Sometimes our friends abroad ask whether, because of our machines and our worries about the world, we are losing this American quality, whether a pressure for uniformity is gradually turning us into so many sausages, all alike, in our dress, our thinking, and in the way we live. I do not think this will be our fate. We are too proud, too stubborn, too cussedly independent for the bridle. And this, indeed, is the secret of our strength, and of the lasting power of our society. For the solidarity which is built, not upon servility, but upon the common loyalty of free men, is resilient and enduring.

And the source and record of the spiritual purpose of this community of men is the Holy Writ—the Book which brings us together this evening. This occasion reminds us of the tremendous vitality of these writings, which form the core, the vertebra of our society.

These reflections upon the interplay of the Bible, the land, and the people in creating the national life of our country are made vivid for me as I go home these autumn evenings. With me, as I leave, are the worries, the exasperations, the frustrations of the day. Then the rush of the city traffic falls

² For the Secretary's address to the International Association of Machinists on Sept. 11, see BULLETIN of Sept. 22, 1952, p. 423.

away. Instead there are fields and lines of cattle facing the same way, with heads down. Lights spring up in the thinning houses. In time, the road becomes a dirt lane, which leads through a grove of oaks around a Quaker Meeting House, hidden in its ivy, beside it, the graveyard, with its rows of little headstones. I know that as I breast the hill, there will be lights at the end of the lane.

And there is peace.

And I think of the moving prayer that we should be kept all the day long of this troublous life 'til the shadows lengthen, and the evening comes, and the busy world is hushed and the fever of life is over; and our work is done; and that then we be given a safe lodging and a holy rest and peace at the last.

In the times in which we live there is no safe lodging and no rest. But all that we do and shall do is that there may be peace among men. So striving, we may find peace within ourselves.

U.S.S.R. Requests Recall of Ambassador Kennan

*Statement by Secretary Acheson*¹

Press release 777 dated October 3

The U. S. Government today received a note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union stating that the Soviet Government considers Ambassador George F. Kennan as *persona non grata* and requesting Mr. Kennan's immediate recall from the post of Ambassador of the United States of America in the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government in its note bases its request on the statement made on September 19 in Berlin by Mr. Kennan to representatives of the West Berlin press and American correspondents, which the Soviet Government characterized as "slanderous attacks hostile to the Soviet Union in rude violation of generally recognized norms of international law." The Government of the United States does not accept as valid the charges made by the Soviet Government.

Ambassador Kennan is recognized not only in this country but throughout the world as a man deeply versed in knowledge of the Soviet Union and sympathetic to the legitimate aspirations of the Russian peoples. There is no doubt that the request of the Soviet Government reflects their knowledge that the factual statement Ambassador Kennan made in Berlin on September 19 will be recognized in most parts of the world as a truthful one.

The reasons given by the Soviet Government for requesting the recall of Ambassador Kennan are that he has violated "generally recognized norms

of international law." This comes from a Government which has itself, over a period of years, created practices in international intercourse which violate the traditions and customs of civilized peoples developed over generations, and which adversely affect efforts to maintain good relations with the Soviet Government. The Russian peoples themselves must be shamefully aware that foreigners within the Soviet Union are customarily treated by the Soviet Government in ways which are the exact contrary of civilized international usage. The violator of accepted usage is the Soviet Government, which has created the situation accurately described in Ambassador Kennan's Berlin statement.

The Soviet Government will be informed of this conclusion. Ambassador Kennan is now in Geneva. He will remain in Western Europe temporarily and will later return to Washington for consultation.

Text of Soviet Note

Press release 778 dated October 3

Following is an unofficial English translation of the note handed on October 3 to John M. McSweeney, Counselor of the American Embassy at Moscow, by Andrei Vyshinsky, Soviet Foreign Minister, requesting the recall of Ambassador Kennan:

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has the honor to inform the Government of the United States of America of the following:

As is known, the Ambassador of the United States of America in the U.S.S.R., Mr. Kennan, on September 19 at Tempelhof Airport in Berlin made a statement before representatives of the West Berlin press and American correspondents in which he made slanderous attacks hostile to the Soviet Union in a rude violation of generally recognized norms of international law. In this statement, published in a number of West German papers, Mr. Kennan allowed himself to compare the situation of Americans in Moscow with that which he allegedly experienced when in 1941-1942 he was interned by Nazis in Germany, and stated that "if the Nazis had permitted us to walk along the streets without the right to converse with any kind of German that would have been exactly the same situation in which we must live today in Moscow."

This statement of Mr. Kennan is completely false and hostile to the Soviet Union.

In view of the foregoing the Soviet Government considers it necessary to state that it considers Mr. Kennan as *persona non grata* and insists on Mr. Kennan's immediate recall from the post of the Ambassador of the United States of America in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

¹ Made at a special press conference on Oct. 3.

Understanding Today's World

by Howland H. Sargeant

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs¹

I am very happy to be here today. For the theme of this Institute is as crucial as it is timely.

I regret that I am not better qualified to discuss military matters as such. I am not a professional soldier. And I make no pretense at being able to carry on a highly technical discussion of the military factors in American foreign policy.

However, I can give you some general ideas on the relationship between a sound military defense and a sound foreign policy. I can try to put military considerations in their proper focus in the making and carrying through of foreign policy. And I particularly want to pinpoint the relationship between American foreign policy and a specific military action—the action in Korea.

But before we get into any of these things, it would be wise to dispose of one or two popular misconceptions as to the process by which foreign policy is made.

There is a widely held belief that American foreign policy should be able to find the solution to any problem with the instinct of a homing pigeon or the precision of a radar-controlled rocket. Those who hold this belief assume that foreign policy can be fixed with mathematical certainty.

They assume that we can control all the factors which determine our foreign policy or that we can anticipate every move another nation is going to make.

Such is not the case.

The *objectives* of American foreign policy can be determined. They are determined. They are realistic. And they are the product of the closest kind of teamwork at the Cabinet level.

But the *problems* of foreign policy are not and cannot be solved with a calculator. Our friends abroad—even our best friends—neither jump nor want to jump every time Washington sneezes.

Foreign policy is a highly complex thing and

international politics a highly complex business.

Hand in hand with the mistaken impression that foreign policy is a simple matter goes the habit of using words like “peace,” “unity,” “strength,” and “understanding” as if we had but to press a button to achieve all four. These words make excellent slogans. They also happen to be descriptive of things America wants and is actively seeking. They are among our most vital objectives.

The road ahead of us remains hard, long, and treacherous—if we are truly to achieve the best of what each of those objectives implies.

Let us look at each of them—at “peace,” “unity,” “strength,” and “understanding.” Let us look at them closely. In the process, I think, we will begin to see the role military factors can and must play in carrying out American foreign policy. We will also begin to see that the power that America and the entire free world must have to meet the menace facing us is more than a purely material thing.

Peace Necessary to Progress

Take *peace*. Peace is not a luxury. It is a necessity if we are to continue to progress.

No less a soldier than Gen. Douglas MacArthur made that clear in a recent speech when he said: “War is outmoded as an instrument of political policy” and then went on to refer to global war as “national suicide.”

America's basic foreign-policy aim is a decent and just peace. America can be secure only with such a peace. We cannot achieve a just peace by dropping atomic bombs on everybody who disagrees with us. Nor can we produce such a peace by launching a preventive war. That is clear.

With conditions as they are, we must think in terms of military power and a sound defense. We have no alternative if we are to preserve our freedom. And we are thinking in these terms. But we must never forget that military strength is a means to an end—not an end in itself.

¹ Address made before the Institute of Military Factors in U.S. Foreign Policy conducted by the University of Minnesota at Minneapolis on Sept. 29 (press release 759 dated Sept. 26).

The Communists would like nothing better than to convince the world that America does not distinguish between end and means. They have gone all out to try to do that very thing.

Communist propagandists seek to obscure the threat posed by Soviet imperialism by perpetually calling us names. They constantly refer to our defense effort as "warmongering" and regularly charge us with "preparations for a global war." Facts such as these—the use of outright lies—are standard equipment of the Communists' worldwide propaganda machine. They make up the mask behind which the Soviets seek to hide their aggressive intentions.

Just saying "it isn't so" hardly solves the problem posed by Communist lies. And it certainly does not begin to answer the "Hate America" campaign which has recently become a central theme of Communist propaganda.

The Communists have tried to foment hatred against us before but never on the scale of the present. Their current drive is a strenuous effort to develop hatred for the American people as well as for the United States as a nation.

I will not here go into detail on this venomous hatred campaign. I want only to make the point that hatred—when coupled with the traditional Soviet "Big Lie" technique—can become a most effective propaganda weapon if it is not quickly and effectively countered.

The fact that Communist imperialism is itself the greatest threat to peace makes it no easier for us. Many peoples—so desperately hoping for a lasting peace—are inclined to overlook the deeds of the Soviet ogre when he points his finger elsewhere and insists that his only aim is peace.

There are people in Western Europe—people who are friendly to America and Americans—who have paused to listen to what the Communists are saying. Some of these people are concerned lest our defense measures lead down the road to war.

Let us face it. The Western Europeans have but emerged from the most devastating war in modern history. They have seen their nations serve as battlefields, their homes destroyed, their democracy temporarily trampled.

Today, they live almost beneath the muzzles of Soviet guns. Should war come, they believe their homelands would be the immediate targets of atomic weapons. Can they be blamed if they fear that we—through some error in political judgment—might act so as to endanger their security?

Consider the peoples of the Near and Far East. They are not without admiration for our accomplishments. But many of them have just won their independence or are in the process of doing so. Theirs is the new nationalism.

Is it any wonder that these peoples question some of the steps we are taking to strengthen our ties with those very Western nations which have been colonial powers? Is it easy for them to forget that among our closest allies are the countries who

have wielded great influence in the Near and Far East?

It is not.

We Americans want peace. Our entire foreign policy is geared to achieving a peace of justice and decency.

But we dare not forget that there are millions of people throughout the world who must be constantly assured that we are indeed motivated by peace. We must not only talk peace. We must—by our actions—demonstrate that we seek the kind of peace other peoples want and need to share.

The Problem of Unity

And that brings me to the second problem—the problem of *unity*.

We have learned the hard way that peace and security can be achieved only if we are willing and able to work with others for the common good. America cannot "go it alone." We are strong. But not that strong.

Those who would have us seek refuge behind our two great oceans are looking through the wrong end of the telescope. America is no longer an island—if indeed it ever was. Our oceans are mere puddles. Our greatest cities are 12 hours by air from Moscow.

Technology has indeed made this "one world." And the menace of Communist imperialism has made it imperative that we join with other nations in preserving our common heritage of freedom, liberty, and individual dignity. To use the jargon of the political scientists, power in today's world is polarized. That is, there are only two major centers of power. The Soviet Union and its satellites. We and our free world allies.

This means that any gain made by international communism anywhere is a loss to free men everywhere.

From our own point of view, it means that we must be as concerned with events in the Far East, the Near East, and South America as we are with those in Western Europe.

There is no question but that our mutual relationships with Western Europe are of the highest importance—for cultural as well as for political, economic, and strategic reasons. But our efforts to help deter aggression in Europe will be fruitless if—in the process—we stand idly by while other areas of the free world are gobbled up by the Kremlin. We can truly foster freedom, stability, and security in the United States only if we are willing to help foster it everywhere else.

Creating Strength for the Free World

And that brings me to the third of these key words or symbols—*strength*.

Strength means different things to different people. What do we mean when we say the United

States seeks strength for the free world? Military strength? Certainly.

We have no recourse but to build our own defenses and to work with others to develop the power with which to contain the Kremlin.

You will note that I have used the word "contain." I should like to look briefly at just what that term implies. Now, there are those who say that containment is purely negative. I admit that the word "containment" can leave you with that impression. But America's "containment policy" as such is anything but negative. It is and always has been positive. It is not only designed to be against something—against Soviet expansionism. It is also for something—for a secure America in a decent, stable world.

The containment policy is concerned with creating strength—strength for ourselves and the entire free world. Consider some of the accomplishments that are firmly rooted in the containment policy.

Take Western Europe. In keeping with the United Nations Charter, we have helped the Europeans to build economic and political stability and to make their own way along the path toward genuine unity. The Marshall Plan, the Mutual Security Program, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization—these are some of the means through which we have cooperated and are cooperating with the Western Europeans in defending their security and ours against communism.

The Schuman Plan, the European Defense Community, the Council of Europe—these are some of the achievements of a cooperating free Europe willing and able to work with us for the common good of the free peoples.

Take Greece and Turkey. Both were threatened by Stalinist ambitions at the close of World War II. Has not our aid to these two nations helped to create a bastion of strength in the northern Mediterranean for the entire free world?

We have further strengthened our security ties in the Western Hemisphere by far-reaching mutual defense agreements with our Canadian and Latin American neighbors.

In the Pacific, we have worked out a pattern of security in cooperation with Australia and New Zealand, with the Philippines, and with Japan. And we have joined our allies in resisting aggression on the Asian Continent.

The Point Four Program is helping the peoples of underdeveloped areas to strengthen and modernize their economies. We are thus opening the road to a decent standard of living to millions who have never before had it. We are helping to tackle the age-old scourges of disease, illiteracy, and hunger. In the process, we are making friends. And those friends are achieving the stability and the stamina to withstand the threat of Communist aggression.

These, then, are some of the accomplishments to which the containment policy has led us. I am

sure that you will agree that these are positive rather than negative.

I am equally certain that you can see why military power is not the only measure of strength. There is a very real relationship between a nation's ability to defend itself and its standard of living, its morale, and the stability of its government. This we cannot—dare not—forget.

To expect a friendly European nation to do its part in bearing the mutual burden of military defense while its economy is tottering or its government is paralyzed is to expect the impossible. We may carp about the failure of some of our friends to keep up with us in terms of military production or the number of divisions in the field. That is only natural. The American taxpayer is carrying a heavy load. But the fact is that, proportionately speaking, his load is not nearly so heavy as that in several European countries where the standard of living is far below our own.

Yes, America seeks strength—strength for herself and for the entire free world. But we Americans must be realistic. We must bear in mind that strength is not purely material. It must have a solid moral and spiritual foundation.

The Need for Mutual Understanding

And that brings me to the fourth of our slogans—*understanding*.

We—the peoples of the free world—will have neither peace nor unity nor genuine strength unless we also have mutual understanding. We can work effectively for peace and against tyranny only if we know each other. We can reach our objectives only if we are as tolerant of each other's differences as we are certain of our agreement on basic principles.

America and her friends must continue to share their common belief in individual dignity, freedom of expression, and the other basic liberties which characterize democracy. We must never lose sight of those ideals which distinguish us from the brutal, enslaving soul-destruction of Communist totalitarianism.

America must never forget that it is under the greatest pressure to foster mutual understanding, if only because its position of leadership demands it. What does this mean? It means that all of us—private individuals as well as government officials—must learn to avoid making irresponsible statements which add nothing to America's security and serve only to alienate our friends overseas.

It is one thing to take a firm position against aggression or the threat of aggression. It is quite another to make empty, threatening gestures which create grist for the Soviet propaganda mill and add to the fears and tensions of those friendly nations that live under the immediate shadow of Soviet power.

The proposal that America use force to liberate

the peoples behind the Iron Curtain is a case in point.

Of these enslaved peoples, President Truman has said: "We shall never forget these people. We shall never cease working to help these people gain their rightful chance for freedom." However—as the President went on to point out—the liberation-by-force proposal would not benefit the Eastern Europeans nor would it improve our relations with our free allies.

If pursued, the proposal would simply raise false hopes among the Eastern Europeans and might well lead to even greater repression by their Communist rulers. It might also foster fruitless bloodshed by inciting revolt against regimes which have the power to crush such revolt with comparative ease.

Inasmuch as liberation by force implies the use of military power, our friends in Western Europe could hardly continue to see us as a peaceful nation if the proposal were kept alive. Our allies could not help but feel that we were being hypocritical in urging peace on one hand while, on the other, some of our well-known citizens were advocating the use of force in Eastern Europe.

I am happy to state that the liberation-by-force proposal seems to be fading from the scene. But I want to repeat that we have not forgotten the people behind the Iron Curtain. Nor will we forget them. These peoples will regain their freedom. I am convinced of that. For I am confident that Soviet tyranny cannot stand up to the free way of life in the long run.

We can best meet our obligation to those behind the Iron Curtain by building and maintaining our own strength. Given that strength, the powerful attraction that freedom can hold for all peoples will inevitably force the Communists to release their grip on those whom they have enslaved.

Practicing What We Preach

Another obligation is that we practice what we preach.

This is as true in the economic field as it is in others. We dare not proclaim our desires for progressive freeing of trade on one hand while erecting unnecessarily stiff tariff barriers on the other. We dare not promise to purchase thus-and-so in other countries, if, at the same time, we are giving in to selfish domestic pressure exerted in the interest of excessive profits.

Obviously we can and should look out for the reasonable needs of our domestic industries. But we must understand that we can do so most effectively in the long run only if we recognize the needs of other countries as well. We would do well to remember that the day when one could measure good will exclusively in dollars and cents is behind us.

We cannot afford to think like the General who, when told that all of his artillery had been captured by the enemy, responded: "Oh, well, it hasn't been paid for!"

The battle between freedom and Communist totalitarianism is a global one. And it is being fought at every level. Ideas are as important as bullets in this battle. And we can win only if we can continue to show other peoples that it is to their own best interest to work with us. We can win only if we are able to project an honest image of a decent America into the minds of those many millions who now have false or inadequate impressions of us.

Our international information program is making great progress toward both of these objectives. It is getting results. But the program is a young one. We would be deluding ourselves if we were to assume that the job were done or nearly done. We have only begun it.

Yes, we must have genuine understanding. And we must be willing to give it to others. How does this need for understanding fit in with the military considerations with which this Institute is concerned?

Wise Use of Power

Let me give you a brief summary.

Military factors do play a crucial role in the determination of how our foreign policy is to operate in a given situation. Military power is one major factor in our efforts to build situations of strength at strategic points where the free world and the slave world meet. We have tried to pursue a policy consistent with our capacities. We have sought to avoid political commitments which are beyond our material power to discharge. We do realize that power—material power—affects decisions in the field of international politics.

At the same time, we try to heed the advice of the Roman, Seneca, who said: "He who has great power should use it lightly."

Our great power in today's world is beneficial only to the extent that we use it wisely. And wisdom demands that we work with others in the common interest of peace and democracy. If we can continue to use our power wisely, we can win the respect and the confidence of other nations. We must have that respect and that confidence if we are to be secure.

Did we use our power wisely in Korea? Were we right in supporting the U.N. action there?

These are vital and immediate questions. For Korea is not only a crucial "military factor" in American foreign policy. Korea is of direct human concern to every American family with a son, a brother, or a husband fighting there. Korea is a tragic personal thing for many thousands of American homes.

But Korea also holds real meaning for the security of America and for everything we hold dear. The charges that American diplomacy gave North Korea to the Communists or that we failed to help the Republic of South Korea to prepare its defenses are false. They are also

dangerous. They strike at our well-being if only because they tend to obscure the facts about Korea that every thinking American has a right to know and understand.

One fact that is particularly obscure for many people is *why* we went into Korea. The simple truth is that we went in to help stop aggression. Not only have we stopped it, but we have also driven the aggressor back along most of the battle line to the point from which his aggression was launched.

Accomplishments in Korea

But let us look at specifics. What have we accomplished by halting the brutal, unprovoked, carefully planned assault which the Communists launched in June of 1950?

We have taken part in modern history's first successful containment of aggression by collective security. We have helped the United Nations to maintain and strengthen its position as mankind's best hope for peace. We have kept an independent Republic from being overrun by communism, and thus have preserved an ally for the free world in Asia. We have shattered the myth of Communist invincibility and given new heart to the forces fighting communism in Asia and elsewhere. We have undoubtedly deterred the Communists from launching other aggressions elsewhere.

We have localized a conflict that might well have spread into global war. We have fought in Korea so that we would not have to fight with our backs to our own walls. By the forthright action in Korea, the free nations have an added respect for the United States and renewed confidence in our aims. The United Nations has likewise gained prestige.

A few of the achievements I have listed may seem relatively unimportant to some people. After all, Korea is thousands of miles away from Minneapolis or Portland or Cleveland. But distance does not change the fact that our very existence has been at stake in Korea. Let me quote a few sentences from an intelligence report which was made public some months ago. It concerns a statement a Communist officer in the Far East made to his men shortly before the invasion of Korea. This is what the officer said:

In order to successfully undertake the long-awaited world revolution, we must first unify Asia. . . . Java, Indochina, Malaya, India, Tibet, Thailand, the Philippines, and Japan are ultimate targets. . . . The United States is the only obstacle on our road for the liberation of all countries in southeast Asia. In other words, we must unify the people of Asia and crush the United States.

Let me repeat those words: "We must . . . crush the United States." Does that look as if the United States can afford to be unconcerned with what happens in Korea—or, for that mat-

ter, with what happens anywhere in Asia? No. The Communists launched their aggression in Korea with every intention of making it a step toward swallowing Asia and ultimately the world. We had no alternative but to act as we did.

The cold-blooded Communist aggression in Korea has alerted the free world to the need for stepping up its defense efforts, and the U.N. operations in Korea have given us the time and the impetus to do so. Now, one thing that particularly concerns most Americans today is the fact that the Korean truce negotiations have been dragging along for some 15 months. There is an understandable impatience—a feeling that perhaps we ought to adopt certain additional drastic measures to force the Communists to come to an agreement. There is, for example, the school of thought which holds that we ought to extend the Korean conflict to the Chinese mainland.

Truce Negotiations

Now, I will agree that the negotiations have lasted a long time. Admittedly, the going in the truce tent at Panmunjom has not been easy. But there are several very vital facts that we ought to bear in mind before we allow our impatience to get the best of our good judgment. In the first place, the truce negotiations have not been fruitless. Only a single issue—that of the prisoners of war—stands between the negotiators and full agreement. The Communists are demanding that we forcibly repatriate all prisoners in our hands. Thousands of these prisoners have said that they do not want to return to Communist control because they fear that they will be tortured or shot if they do so.

We have refused to force these prisoners of war to return. As President Truman has pointed out, we have no intention of going back on the very morality which distinguishes our freedom from Communist tyranny. We have no intention of sending prisoners of war to their death.

We have no intention of sacrificing principle for expediency.

A second point that needs to be borne in mind is that a primary consideration in Korea is the security of our troops there. Prior to the Communist request for truce negotiations, we had inflicted heavy casualties upon the aggressor. We have not been allowing him to relax during the negotiations. He has continued to suffer heavy losses. His defense industries and military supply lines in North Korea have been subjected to a constant and heavy pounding by our bombers. Many of his key sources of power—electric power, in particular—have been knocked out.

It has been suggested that the truce negotiations have given the Communists a chance to build up their forces. The fact is that we have not been sitting still either. General Van Fleet pointed out only a few weeks ago that we are in position to

take anything the Communists can throw at us. The General also stated that the morale, equipment, and general level of readiness of U.N. forces in Korea are excellent.

A third point about the current situation in Korea—and a very crucial point it is—concerns the proposal that we expand the conflict there. Expansion of the conflict would not necessarily solve our problem. It would certainly increase the danger of an all-out global war. Gen. Omar Bradley, speaking for our Joint Chiefs of Staff, of which he is Chairman, had this to say to Congress. I quote him:

Enlargement of the war in Korea to include Red China would probably delight the Kremlin more than anything else we could do. It would necessarily tie down additional forces, especially our sea power and our air power, while the Soviet Union would not be obligated to put a single man into the conflict.

That was the view of General Bradley, a view shared by all of the Joint Chiefs. As I have said, I personally do not know much about military science. But our Joint Chiefs of Staff do know. Like an overwhelming majority of Americans, I have great confidence in their understanding and judgment.

I know that no matter how the truce negotiations in Korea come out we will not unnecessarily endanger the security of our forces there. We will certainly not go back on the principles by which we live. We will not abandon those who look to us to stand firm on our convictions. The U.N. military objective in Korea was to stop aggression. I repeat—that objective has been achieved.

It is to our best interest to bear that in mind as we consider our future course of action. It is to our best interest to remember that the United States is not the only nation fighting in Korea. We must recognize that any decision we may make on Korea will affect our free-world allies. We must painstakingly measure any contemplated steps against any loss that we may suffer in the unity, the strength, and the trust we share with other peoples.

The military action in Korea has had and will continue to have a strong psychological impact upon other nations, whether they are directly concerned or not.

The Korean conflict is limited. But it is not isolated.

I do not presume to know what no man can—except perhaps the Communist leaders who are blocking settlement in Korea. I cannot tell you when we are going to reach a settlement. Nor can I tell you that there is any easy road to a Korean solution. There is none.

But I can tell you this—as long as we hold to our ideals, our self-confidence, and our willingness to work for better understanding with other peoples, we can be confident that we will achieve our objectives.

Broadcast by Rumanian Escapee

Press release 770 dated October 1

Panait Calcai, escaped Rumanian Olympics athlete, warned his fellow countrymen in a Voice of America broadcast on October 1 not to be deceived by the Communists. The 28-year-old Rumanian marksmanship champion, who fled to freedom during the recent Olympics in Helsinki, is now in Western Germany. In a statement pre-recorded for the Voice of America broadcast to Rumania, Calcai said:

I am filled with deep emotion in speaking to those in my country from this radio station which I myself have listened to for years with hope and confidence.

The statement, which was released simultaneously at a news conference in Frankfort, said that the lies and falsities of the Communist regime in Rumania came into striking focus as soon as he reached the free world.

"It is this unmasking of their deception," Calcai continued, "that the Communists are most afraid of. For it is this knowledge which gives the lie most effectively to Communist propaganda and which will most strengthen the captive people's will to resist."

Calcai made his escape as the Rumanian team was waiting at the Helsinki railroad station after the end of the Olympics. He claimed that he had forgotten his knapsack and then started an altercation with the guard who accompanied him to get the knapsack. The guard disappeared when police and a crowd were attracted by the struggle and he was permitted to go his own way.

"I could not return to my country," he declared, "and permit my further use as an instrument of a regime which wants its athletes to defame Western Europeans and Western achievements. I prefer to do what any honest Rumanian would have done in my place."

The Communists imagine they can muffle the love of freedom and the attachment of the entire Rumanian people toward the free world. But the Communists cannot make fools of honest Rumanians—of Rumanians who know and value freedom as much as their own life.

Calcai told his fellow countrymen that the tragedy of those behind the Iron Curtain is fully understood by free peoples everywhere. He added:

My countrymen in Rumania, it is your duty to maintain your confidence. Do not allow yourselves to be deceived by the Communists.

Current Legislation on Foreign Policy

Approving Puerto Rican Constitution. Hearings Before the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, United States Senate, 82d Cong., 2d sess. on S.J. Res. 151, A Joint Resolution Approving the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico Which Was Adopted by the People of Puerto Rico on March 3, 1952. Apr. 29 and May 6, 1952. Committee print. 126 pp.

Private Enterprise in Turkish-American Relations

by *George C. McGhee*¹
Ambassador to Turkey

The success of private commercial enterprise, which I count as the principal force in the economic relations between free nations, is dependent upon a broad base of cooperation and understanding between the peoples and the countries concerned. Such success depends upon the existence of certain common standards of business conduct and ethics and upon the acceptance of common commercial procedures. It also depends upon broad agreement between the countries concerned on basic political and economic policy. Even though trade is possible between governments permitting private trading and those engaged in totalitarian state trading, it is no coincidence that healthy economic relations have, in fact, never developed between such nations. I would like, therefore, to preface my remarks by commenting on the understanding between the Turkish and American Governments which makes your business enterprise possible.

I believe it accurate to state that never in history have Turkish-American relations been so close. In remarks which I made some weeks ago before another distinguished group here in Istanbul, I ventured to refer to our relations as a partnership—a Turkish-American partnership.² I consider the term partnership, which connotes mutual confidence and trust between equals, a term peculiarly applicable to the happy relationship which has developed between our two countries in the postwar period.

This partnership was strongly cemented by the Truman Doctrine, enunciated in March 1947. That Doctrine, as you will recall, was the American answer to Soviet-inspired pressures upon Turkey and Greece. Pursuant to that policy, the United States has been able to extend to Turkey military and economic aid in an aggregate of over

1 billion dollars. The Turkish people have matched this American aid in true partnership fashion with a remarkable national effort. Turkey has clearly demonstrated her determination to stand firm. We regard her as one of our staunchest allies. We share her pride in her magnificent record in Korea. We are gratified that Turkey's position in the Western community has been further solidified by her adherence to the North Atlantic Treaty. We welcome the accumulated wisdom of Turkish statecraft which will be brought to bear on NATO decisions and in deliberations affecting the creation of the proposed Middle East Defense Organization.

During the 5 years in which our Turkish-American partnership has taken on strength, there has been concomitantly a marked degree of economic progress in Turkey. Increases in agricultural production—especially cereals and cotton—have been spectacular. Starting from an import position in wheat, Turkey last year exported 800,000 tons, and this year expects to export 1,500,000 tons. There has been a steady expansion in industrial output and power facilities. Coal, chrome, manganese, and copper have been coming out of Turkish mines at an accelerated rate. The Turkish road system has been greatly expanded and transport substantially improved.

These are generalized statements of improvements which all of us have witnessed. The Turkish people deserve full credit for this progress. They have worked hard indeed to take advantage of the economic potentialities of their country. We are proud, however, that our economic mission has been able to assist Turkey during this period of progress. We are most happy that American equipment, supplies and technical assistance, furnished under our aid programs, have made an important contribution.

I hope that my Turkish friends share my conviction that the Turkish-American partnership, with its manifest solidarity in the military, economic, and cultural fields, stands on a very firm and broad

¹ Address made before the Propeller Club of the United States of the Port of Istanbul at Istanbul, Turkey, on Sept. 9.

² BULLETIN of May 19, 1952, p. 774.

foundation. It is because of this fundamental strength that you gentlemen, interested in Turkish-American commercial relationships and sparked by the concept of private enterprise, can chart your future course in relative security.

American Clipper Ships in Early Trading

And now let us go back to the central theme of private enterprise in Turkish-American relations. As Propeller Club members, with a basic interest in maritime matters, you know that the American clipper ships of the early 1800's ranked foremost of all vessels afloat. They were swift, smart, strong of construction, and were navigated with pluck. These vessels, their skippers and their crews represented early American private initiative at its best. These clipper ships, while by no means the first American ships to call at Turkish ports, were responsible for an expanded Turkish-American trade with cargoes valued in excess of a million dollars yearly from 1811 on.

Most of this early trade was with Izmir. The first American vessel that ever penetrated the Black Sea was the brig *Calumet*, of Boston, in 1810. Trade with Istanbul, however, was not undertaken on any appreciable basis until after the conclusion of the Turkish-American Treaty of 1830, through which the U. S. Government obtained for its citizens in Turkey rights equal to those enjoyed by the citizens of the most favored nations. Thus the Black Sea was permanently opened to American commerce and navigation. With diplomatic relations established between the U.S. Government and the Sublime Porte, a number of Americans settled in Turkish port cities. Some of their descendants continue to play a part in Turkey's business life.

There are three particular side lights which may interest you in connection with the Turkish-American Treaty of 1830: Ratifications were exchanged in Kandilli on the Bosphorus (opposite the present site of Robert College), where the Reis Effendi, or Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, resided. Of the three U. S. representatives who conducted the lengthy negotiations which led to the treaty of 1830, two were businessmen—Charles Rhind, a New York merchant long interested in trade in the Levant, and David Offley, an Izmir trader who afterward became the first American Consul in Turkey under the treaty. It was an American clipper ship, and the private ingenuity which it embodied, that attracted the Sublime Porte and laid the ground work for formalized Turkish-American trade relations.

Basis of Commercial Intercourse

Present-day Turkish-American commercial intercourse is conducted within the framework of three formal agreements: The Commerce and Navigation Treaty of October 1, 1929; the Estab-

lishment and Sojourn Treaty of October 28, 1931; and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

The Commerce and Navigation Treaty mutually guarantees to Turkish and American foreign traders unconditional most-favored-nation treatment with respect to their imports and exports. In addition, it accords reciprocally to Turkish vessels in the United States and U. S. vessels in Turkey much of the same treatment accorded national vessels.

The Establishment and Sojourn Treaty mutually guarantees to the nationals and corporations of either country in the territories of the other, most-favored-nation treatment as concerns matters implicit in the treaty title—establishment and sojourn.

The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade—generally referred to as GATT—is a multilateral instrument to which both the United States and Turkey are now parties. Turkey's accession occurred on September 17, 1951. Trade concessions which the United States and Turkey negotiated within the GATT framework at Torquay, England, during the summer of 1951, went into effect on October 17, 1951. The bilateral trade concessions, benefits of which accrue to all GATT partners, represent a further liberalization of the tariff treatment previously accorded Turkish and U. S. products and supersede the provisions of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement between Turkey and the United States of April 1, 1939.

The three agreements which I have just mentioned constitute the legal basis on which Americans can do business in Turkey and Turks can do business in the United States. Those of you Americans who have interests in Turkey and those of you Turks who have such interests in the United States have been able to establish and maintain them by virtue of the Establishment and Sojourn Treaty. Because of it, private Americans have made investments in Turkey and have established themselves here for both commercial and philanthropic purposes with reasonable assurance of protection and continuity.

U.S.-Turkish Trade Flourishing

It should, of course, be the objective of our two countries continuously to consider means by which the basis of fruitful trade can be expanded and improved, and it is my hope that progress in this direction can be made in bringing our treaty structure up to date. In the meantime, however, trade and investment between Turkey and the United States has flourished. American investments in Turkey are substantial. They exceed 33 million dollars. Of this amount, approximately 11 million dollars is invested in oil distribution facilities, 8 million dollars in American-sponsored schools and hospitals, and 6 million dollars in tobacco processing installations. In this latter connection you might be interested to know that the tobacco

plants shipped 32 million dollars worth of Turkish tobacco to the United States in 1951. Other fields of activity involving considerable American investments include sewing machine distribution, electric light bulb production, licorice processing, pharmaceutical manufacture, and the distribution of photographic equipment.

Total trade between the United States and Turkey amounted in 1951 to 60 million dollars in Turkish imports and 67 million dollars in Turkish exports. In addition to tobacco, America has emerged as the major purchaser of other Turkish products. Last year, for example, the United States bought about 70 percent of Turkish chrome output, which was 59 percent by value of total American imports of metallurgical grade of this vital commodity. The United States is also purchasing increasing amounts of manganese. The United States exhibit at the current Izmir Trade Fair, which I recently had the honor of attending to open the American Pavilion, is evidence of interest in maintaining trade between the two countries on a solid and enduring basis.

Promotion of Domestic Investment

While I have no comparable data to offer on Turkish activity in my country, there are a number of Turkish nationals whom we regard as "treaty merchants" and who are associated with very active commercial establishments in the United States. Some of these are doing most creditable service in the procurement of essential ores, such as chrome and manganese, from Turkey. There are other Turks who have chosen to make the United States their permanent home. They have joined the other elements of the American population in helping make our country the land of economic accomplishment that it is.

I am often asked why there is not more foreign private investment in Turkey. With about the same frequency I am asked why there is not more domestic private investment in Turkey. The second question should obviously come first because, generally speaking, a climate which is conducive to domestic private investment tends to attract outside capital.

As concerns Turkey, I believe it important to stress that evolution in the direction of domestic private investment has been occurring in progressive stages since the formation of the Turkish Republic in 1923. Those who understand the economic problems which faced Ataturk and the Grand National Assembly in those early days understand why it was considered necessary to inject a strong element of state planning and state enterprise into the economic life of the country as the first phase of Turkey's modern economic development. Turkey, both as a country and as a composite of individuals, lacked capital. If the industrial base required for a modern state was to be created upon the existing agricultural econ-

omy, it was considered necessary for the state itself to take the initiative. In recent years Turkey has swung into a new phase of economic development: the phase of increased economic freedom and intensified economic effort. I have heard it argued effectively that this phase could never have come about in Turkey without the steps which preceded it.

The important point is that Turkey today is one of the few countries in the world whose policy calls for diminishing rather than broadening state control of industry, business, and banking. By delimiting the future role of state enterprise, the Turkish Government recognizes the contribution that the spirit of private initiative can, as it did in our country, make toward the development of Turkey's great natural resources.

I see widespread evidence that the Turkish Government wishes to promote domestic private enterprise and investment. Let me cite a few examples: The state match monopoly has been lifted, making possible the private import, sale, and domestic production of matches. Salt production for export has been opened up to private interests. Sugar beet growers are able to buy shares in heretofore fully state-owned sugar factories, and three new sugar factories are projected on a wholly private capital basis. Many millions of lira have been contributed by businessmen and other residents of the Adana area to help finance the Seyhan Dam. The Turkish Government has authorized the creation of the Industrial Development Bank of Turkey, which was sponsored by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The express three-fold purpose of the Development bank is to stimulate and assist the establishment of more private industry in Turkey, to encourage the investment of private capital as such, and to promote and encourage individual ownership of security holdings.

And now let us pick up the thread of foreign private investment which we dropped a little earlier. The highly encouraging signs in the domestic picture find their counterpart in action by the Turkish Government to encourage foreign private investment. A great step forward in creating favorable conditions for foreign investment was taken by the passage of a law designed for this specific purpose. While it does not fully match the provisions of laws in those countries which have attracted large sums of foreign capital, it nevertheless is a splendid start and should go far in improving the investment climate of Turkey. The law provides special opportunities for foreign investment in the fields of economic development which are open to private Turkish capital. A guaranty is provided within certain limits for the transfer abroad of earnings. It also provides for repatriation of capital after liquidation. Relaxation in favor of foreign capital of statutes which restrict certain crafts and mine investment to Turkish citizens is permissive.

U. S. Encourages Private Investment

Our Government has also taken steps to encourage foreign private investment. As Turkey is a participating country under the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, private American investors have been able to obtain additional U.S. Government guaranties for the reconversion into dollars of their Turkish investment, profits, and earnings. These guaranties constitute one of the incentives which the U.S. Government offers to American investors willing to make investments in countries participating in the Mutual Security Program. The incentives which our Government offers American investors abroad are the natural product of the strong emphasis which is placed on private investment as a matter of basic U.S. economic policy. The real significance of our private investment abroad is that it does not leave home alone. It has a very effective traveling partner—managerial experience and technical know-how.

It is no secret that I am highly enthusiastic about the future of Turkey. I am enthusiastic about it for many reasons which need not be elaborated here. But within the context of my present remarks I am enthusiastic about this country because it has a basic economic soundness which should appeal strongly to foreign investors. This basic economic soundness is composed of many elements and I mention but a few.

First, the Turks are an intelligent and hard-working people; they are sound of mind and body, they are honest, they have keen perception, and even the most modest farmer has the enviable qualities of strong pride and intuitive good judgment. Modern Turkey is a true democracy, which, representing a united people, possesses a high degree of political stability.

Second, Turkey is wealthy in natural resources. Only 30 percent of her vast expanse of arable land is under cultivation. Her water resources are scarcely touched, and the nature of the country's watersheds suggests large accumulations of underground water. Turkey has already developed substantial production of important minerals. Unquestionably there are even larger hidden reserves which await discovery through intensified geological exploration. The prospects for production of petroleum are good. All these and other resources await development in a country whose ratio of resources to population is among the highest in the world. Turkey offers substantial availability of raw materials for many processing industries. This is true of animal and vegetable fibers, oil seeds, fruits and vegetables, as well as minerals for smelting.

Third, the economy of Turkey is dynamic. There is a normal healthy growth in population of about 2 percent per year. Using 1948 prices as a base, national income is increasing at a rate of about 7 percent per annum—with a jump to 14

percent from 1950 to 1951. This rate of increase would be exceedingly high anywhere. The 1950-51 increase is comparable to the current rate in the United States, where we are in a more mature stage of our economic development and have under way a vast defense program. There is no reason, however, to suspect that it cannot continue in Turkey. The combination of growing population and increasing national income clearly indicates an expanding economy.

Turkey's Standing High With U. S. Businessmen

It is my pleasure to see many American businessmen who come to Turkey. I am glad to say that they are coming here in ever-increasing numbers. Recently we had the visit of representatives of a well-known American corporation which is looking for countries holding promise for establishing manufacturing operations. Their study of the economic potentialities of Turkey was one of the many similar studies which the same representatives have been making for the same company around the world. Their conclusion will interest you. They concluded in their survey that, from their standpoint, Turkey is today the best foreign country in the world in which to invest. They maintained that with one exception it far surpassed in potential the six foreign countries in which the company already has plants.

You and I, and businessmen like those I have just mentioned, are looking into Turkey's future. Present trends point to the growth of the Turkish nation to a population of 50,000,000—a population which Turkey's national resources when developed will have no difficulty in supporting. At that point Turkey will rank high among the great production and trading nations in the world. A country which offers an expanding market for an estimated 70 years to come is certainly a first-class place in which to invest.

I believe Turkey merits high praise for the sagacious evaluation of her future economics. She has made a sound choice—a choice which but few countries in the world have had the wisdom to make—in deciding to retrench state control of production facilities and investment and to give private initiative and capital, both domestic and foreign, scope within which to operate and develop. It is only necessary for Turkey to proceed in her development in an orderly way, to maintain the soundness of her currency and her international credit, and to maintain her reputation for fair and businesslike relations by scrupulously fulfilling all commitments and obligations to those who have shown their confidence in the future of Turkey by trading or investing here.

Turkey's new economic era, now that it is possible for her to turn more to private enterprise, heralds great benefits for her. It heralds great benefits for those individuals—Turks and foreign-

ers—who participate in the expansion of private enterprise in Turkey. Private enterprise provides the necessary driving force, a force for economic development which can at the same time be harnessed and made socially responsible. Where it can be employed, it has no equal in the development of an expanding economy. Private enterprise in trade and industry, like the private holding of land, is one of the bulwarks of civilization. It is productive, creative, and imaginative. The state benefits in many ways, including higher tax returns on an expanding volume of production. The state has adequate means at its disposal to assure protection of its own interests, and those of the worker and the consumer. Productive private investment, whether domestic or foreign, is first and foremost an asset to the country in which it is invested.

Private enterprise and foreign investment went hand in hand in the development of the United States. We remember that our economic progress was made possible by monetary aid and technical assistance which came originally from abroad. Many were the investors in Europe who supplied the capital which built our railroads, founded our heavy industry, and mined our resources. Many were the inventors and artisans of the Old World who came to our country and brought with them their crafts and skills to be passed on to those unacquainted with new techniques. Our Nation is peopled by the descendants of Old World immigrants, and we remember the benefits given us by them.

We stand ready to give in much the same manner what we received. American capital and its accompanying technical skills can undertake in Turkey on an increased scale what you gentlemen are already doing. The Turkish Government has wisely laid the fundamental ground work for the era in which private enterprise will play an outstanding role in the relationship between Turkey and the United States.

Point Four and World Peace

*Remarks by the President*¹

White House press release dated September 26

It is a pleasure indeed to have you come to Washington and to pay a visit to the White House. I am vitally interested in the work which you have been studying. I am more than vitally interested in the successful operation of what we call the Point Four Program. It is a program to help people to help themselves. It is a program to help

¹ Made at the White House on Sept. 26 before delegates to the International Conference on Agricultural and Co-operative Credit, who conferred with Washington officials after the close of sessions held at the U. of Calif., Berkeley, from Aug. 4 to Sept. 13. For an article on the Conference, see BULLETIN of Sept. 22, 1952, p. 453.

the development of the natural resources of all these great countries for the benefit of the people themselves who live in the countries who own the resources.

It has wonderful implications, in that if it can be successfully operated all around the globe, the improvement of the living standards and conditions of all the people in the world will be affected.

And if that is done, our objective will be attained, because that will be the greatest contribution that we can make to peace in the world. }

It is starving people and people who have grievances against their overlords that cause revolutions and that contribute to the Communist movement, which in the long run is the greatest totalitarian force in existence in the world today—the greatest force for evil that ever has been in existence.

There isn't any difference between the manner in which the totalitarian so-called Communist states treat their inhabitants and the way in which Hitler treated his people. They are exactly parallel in the way they manage things, only they call them by different names.

What we are trying to do is get the free peoples of the world to understand that freedom of action, and freedom of approach—such as you have been studying here today—is much the better way to get prosperity and a better standard of living in the world.

I am more than happy that you have had a session at the University of California, one of our great universities; and I sincerely hope that these meetings and these instructive conferences can be continued over the years.

You see, I am going to be out of a job on the 20th of January, but I don't want this Program which was inaugurated under the good Doctor Bennett to be stopped on that account. And I don't think it will because you people can keep it going.

And I want to say to you that this country has no ambitions territorially to dominate any country in the world. We have all we can do to take care of our own country.

I want to call your attention to one thing in particular. We have neighbors on the south of us. We have neighbors on the north of us. You won't find those neighbors in any way alarmed or afraid of the great Republic of the United States. We are their friends and they know we are their friends. They know we have no ulterior motives on their resources or their peoples or their political setup.

Now if we could get the whole world to feel that way, if we could get the neighbors of the Soviet Republic to feel that way, if the Soviet Republic would act to its neighbors as we act to ours, I don't think there would be any chance for a third world war.

Peace is what I want. And I think this organization, and this Program, will make a greater contribution to peace than any other one thing that could happen in the world.

Proposals to Iran Clarified

Press release 780 dated October 5

Following is the text of a note from Secretary Acheson to Prime Minister Mossadegh of Iran, delivered on October 5 by Ambassador Loy W. Henderson:

I have been in touch with the President since he received your message of September 24, 1952,¹ and, since he is away from the Capital at this time, he has authorized me to acknowledge your letter. He is disappointed to learn from it that you have found unacceptable the proposals which were put forward on August 30, 1952.²

It had been our understanding that the Iranian Government's position was that negotiation for settlement of the oil dispute must take into account: (a) the fact of nationalization, (b) the complete independence of Iran in the operation of its oil industry, and (c) the freedom of Iran to sell its oil on other than a monopoly basis.

It was and is our sincere belief that the proposals which were put forward on August 30 met these points. These proposals clearly recognized the fact of nationalization and did not seek to revive the 1933 Concession, or any concession. Foreign management of the industry was not put forward as a condition, or even suggested. There was no intent to propose a monopoly of the purchase of Iranian oil.

As regards claim for compensation by the Company and the counter claims by Iran, we suggested a method of settlement of all claims by impartial adjudication. There are doubtless other equitable methods. In regard to the question of the price to be paid for Iranian oil, we suggested that this should be worked out between purchaser and seller rather than by Governments.

Regardless of the acceptability of the proposals of August 30, it is a matter of regret to us that their meaning should have been misunderstood. We have tried to correct this because of the real importance which attaches to our words being understood by you as they were meant by us.

Import Fees Imposed on Almonds

A PROCLAMATION³

1. WHEREAS, pursuant to section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as added by section 31 of the act of August 24, 1935, 49 Stat. 773, reenacted by section 1 of the act of June 3, 1937, 50 Stat. 246, and amended by section 3 of the act of July 3, 1948, 62 Stat. 1248, and section 3 of the act of June 28, 1950, 64 Stat. 261 (7 U. S. C. 624), I caused the United States Tariff Commission to make an

¹ BULLETIN of Oct. 6, 1952, p. 532.

² *Ibid.*, Sept. 8, 1952, p. 360. For a press conference statement by Secretary Acheson on the joint U.S.-U.K. proposals of Aug. 30, see *ibid.*, Sept. 15, 1952, p. 405.

³ No. 2991; 17 *Fed. Reg.* 8645.

investigation to determine whether certain free nuts are being or are practically certain to be imported into the United States under such conditions and in such quantities as to render or tend to render ineffective, or materially interfere with, certain programs or operations undertaken by the Department of Agriculture with respect to such nuts, or to reduce substantially the amount of any product processed in the United States from such nuts with respect to which any such program or operation is being undertaken; and

2. WHEREAS the Commission instituted such investigation on April 13, 1950, and on November 24, 1950 reported to me that there was at that time no basis for any action under the said section 22 with respect to imports of such nuts, but that it was continuing the investigation; and

3. WHEREAS, after further investigation, including a public hearing, the Commission, on November 28, 1951, reported to me regarding the need for action under the said section 22 in order to protect the programs of the United States Department of Agriculture for the crop year 1951-52 with respect to almonds, pecans, filberts, and walnuts, in which report the Commission found that the imposition of a specified fee on imports of shelled almonds and of blanched, roasted, or otherwise prepared or preserved almonds (not including almond paste) entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption during the period October 1, 1951 to September 30, 1952, inclusive, in excess of a specified aggregate quantity, was necessary to prevent imports of such almonds from rendering ineffective or materially interfering with the program undertaken by the Department of Agriculture with respect to almonds; and

4. WHEREAS, in accordance with the Commission's recommendation in the said report of November 28, 1951, on December 10, 1951 I issued a proclamation pursuant to the said section 22 imposing a fee on imports of shelled almonds and on blanched, roasted, or otherwise prepared or preserved almonds entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption during the period October 1, 1951 to September 30, 1952, inclusive, in excess of a certain aggregate quantity, as specified in the Commission's recommendation; and

5. WHEREAS the Commission continued the said investigation for the purpose of reporting to the President regarding any later action which might be found to be necessary to carry out the purposes of the said section 22; and

6. WHEREAS, after further investigation, including a hearing, for the purpose of determining what action, if any, should be taken under the said section 22 with respect to imports of certain free nuts, to prevent imports of such nuts from entering during the 1952-53 crop year under such conditions and in such quantities as to render or tend to render ineffective, or materially interfere with, programs undertaken by the Department of Agriculture with respect to almonds, filberts, walnuts, or pecans, or to reduce substantially the amount of any product processed in the United States from domestic almonds, filberts, walnuts, or pecans, the Commission reported to me on September 25, 1952 its findings resulting from such investigation; and

7. WHEREAS, on the basis of such further investigation and report of the Commission, I find that shelled almonds, blanched, roasted, or otherwise prepared or preserved almonds (not including almond paste) are practically certain to be imported into the United States during the period October 1, 1952 to September 30, 1953, both dates inclusive, under such conditions and in such quantities as to render or tend to render ineffective, or materially interfere with the program undertaken by the Department of Agriculture with respect to almonds pursuant to the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, as amended; and

8. WHEREAS, I find and declare that the imposition of the fees hereinafter proclaimed are shown by such investigation of the Commission to be necessary in order that the entry of imported shelled almonds, blanched,

roasted, or otherwise prepared or preserved almonds (not including almond paste) will not render or tend to render ineffective, or materially interfere with, the said program undertaken by the Department of Agriculture with respect to almonds:

NOW THEREFORE, I, Harry S. Truman, President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by the said section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended, do hereby proclaim:


That a fee of 5 cents per pound shall be imposed upon shelled almonds and blanched, roasted, or otherwise prepared or preserved almonds (not including almond paste) entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption during the period October 1, 1952 to September 30, 1953, both dates inclusive, until an aggregate quantity of 7,000,000 pounds of such almonds have been so entered or withdrawn during such period, and a fee of 10 cents per pound shall be imposed upon such almonds entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption during such period in excess of an aggregate quantity of 7,000,000 pounds: *Provided*, That in neither case shall the fee be in excess of 50 per centum ad valorem.

The fees imposed by this proclamation shall be in addition to any other duties imposed on the importation of the articles subject to such fees.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this 27th day of September in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and fifty-two, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and seventy-seventh.

[SEAL]



By the President:
DEAN ACHESON
Secretary of State.

Press Conference Statements by Secretary Acheson

The Secretary made the following extemporaneous remarks in reply to questions at his press conference on October 1 (press releases 771, 772, and 773):

Peiping "Peace Conference"

This conference is, of course, an obvious propaganda operation in which the Chinese Communists, while taking an active part in defying the United Nations and carrying the war into Korea and while joining with the Soviet Government in its violent "hate campaign," are continuing to hold "peace conferences." I think this deceives nobody.

In regard to your other question about the Americans, we have heard reports that certain American citizens were attending. From the reports that we have gotten, we think we have about 15 of these Americans identified. Now, some of them were in China already. However, no persons have been issued passports to attend this conference or have asked for passports to attend the conference.

All passports have been stamped since May 1, "Not valid for travel to . . . China . . ." We are now making efforts to find out whether any of the people that we have identified have obtained passports on false information furnished to the Department or whether they have violated the instruction which is on the passport. That is stamped on it as I have said, and there are appropriate statutes which cover both of these cases.

Austrian State Treaty

Well, the Russians did again exactly what they did last January. We asked them to come to a meeting of the deputies in London and set the date. The other three deputies arrived and no Russia. Instead of telling anyone in advance what they would do, or appearing, they again sent around a message as they did in January raising all these extraneous issues which are quite outside the field of the Austrian peace treaty.

I think if anyone had any additional proof that the Russians do not want to have a peace treaty, you have it here. Now, we and our British and French associates are determined to go ahead and do our very best to carry out the pledge which was made to the Austrian people in 1943, and therefore we shall continue our efforts to advance a peace treaty.

Korean Question in U.N.

Any rumor or report that the Government has decided to produce some new plan or has decided on any plan in regard to Korea in the General Assembly is quite untrue.

We are conducting, through our military representatives in Korea, the negotiations looking toward an armistice and you are familiar with what General Harrison has done there in the last few days.¹ Whether there will be an armistice or whether there will not be an armistice, I cannot tell you and I doubt whether anybody can tell you now except the people on the other side and they'll not do so, I take it, until the next meeting.

What happens in the negotiations will of course affect very largely what happens in the General Assembly. What we have been doing is exploring the situation with a great many delegations and working out various contingencies, various stands that we might take on various contingencies. Nothing has been firmed up and nothing can be in the nature of the situation.

I think this is what has given rise to the respective rumors lately.

What I am pointing out is that any report that we had crystallized our position or that we had come to conclusions as to what should be done is not correct.

¹ For Lt. Gen. William K. Harrison's proposals for settling the Korean prisoner-of-war issue, see BULLETIN of Oct. 6, 1952, p. 549.

The Problem of Dependent Peoples

by Philip C. Jessup
Ambassador at Large¹

The very natural, human impulse to try to simplify a complex problem almost inevitably leads to oversimplification. In thinking about international affairs, people tend to assume that the whole problem can be summed up in terms of conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States. This, of course, is not true. One of the great fallacies in it is the revelation of the line of thought that we have a situation today comparable to that which was familiar to Europe prior to World War I in which the international situation was analyzed in terms of the balance of power and rivalries between two or more great powers or alliances of powers. The actual conflict today is between the Soviet Union and its satellites on the one hand, and the free world on the other. It is true that, because of its power, the United States is that country of the free world on which the Soviets tend to concentrate their attacks and pour out their venom. So far as we are concerned in the United States, we have no feeling of being alone in our resistance to the Soviet effort to obtain world domination by the use of its Communist parties backed by large armed forces.

The fact that there is diversity rather than rigid uniformity in the relations between various countries in the free world may well seem to the planners in the Kremlin to be an element of weakness. Actually, it is an illustration of the strength of a system which depends upon a cooperation of equals instead of on domination.

Canada and the United States are joined with 12 countries across the Atlantic in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. As Mr. Pearson, your Minister of External Affairs, has said, Canada is no "yes-man" to the United States. To this we say, "Amen." Canada is connected with a number of other countries inside the flexible framework of the Commonwealth. The United

States has a close and long-established tie with the other republics of the Western Hemisphere, a tie that is formalized in the Organization of American States. We also have other special relationships including our recently concluded security treaties with the Philippines, Japan, and Australia and New Zealand. There are, however, many other countries with which we have close and friendly relations even though these are not expressed in the form of any special treaty.

Disagreements or controversies exist between and among a number of countries whom we count as our friends. These are disputes to which we are not a party. We do have, however, a very intense interest in seeing them settled. The interest arises not only out of the fact that we are a member of the United Nations and as such are interested in the peaceful settlement of all disputes. It arises also from that same reaction which any one of you as an individual feels when two of your friends are quarreling.

These disagreements among our friends include prominently the very difficult question of the relationship between states exercising the responsibility of governing other peoples and the peoples whom they govern. This is not by any means a new problem. Throughout recorded history, this kind of conflict has existed. Historically, the handling of the problem has been marked by selfishness, greed, and cruelty, and also by idealism and farsighted statesmanship. Peoples have not been hesitant to criticize their own government for its discharge of responsibilities to dependent peoples, and they have not been hesitant to criticize other governments.

Review of Dealings With Dependent Peoples

The United Kingdom has a long history of dealing with dependent peoples. A distinguished British colonial administrator, Sir Gordon Lethem, expressed the highest standard for discharging responsibilities in this field when he said:

¹Address made before the Ottawa Women's Canadian Club at Ottawa on Sept. 25 (press release 749 dated Sept. 24).

Unless there is realized the need of meeting the human sentiments and ambitions and ideas for the future, even the prejudices and weaknesses, of the peoples concerned, and the adequate meeting of them made a very important criterion in planning, many of the schemes, no matter how well-conceived in themselves will fade to failure in the shimmer and mirage of the tropic sunshine.

When the United States took on the responsibility for administering the Philippines, I am proud to say that its Government was inspired by the same general thought. In the instructions to the first Philippine Commission, written by Elihu Root, as Secretary of War, and signed by President McKinley on April 7, 1900, the following standard was laid down:

In all the forms of government and administrative provisions which they are authorized to prescribe, the commission should bear in mind that the government which they are establishing is designed, not for our satisfaction or for the expression of our theoretical views, but for the happiness, peace and prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands, and the measures adopted should be made to conform to their customs, their habits, and even their prejudices, to the fullest extent consistent with the accomplishment of the indispensable requisites of just and effective government.

Upon all officers and employees of the United States, both civil and military, should be impressed a sense of duty to serve not merely the material but the personal and social rights of the people of the islands, and to treat them with the same courtesy and respect for their personal dignity which the people of the United States are accustomed to require from each other.

France has equally expressed the French attitude toward these problems through the provision incorporated in the French Constitution of 1946 which declares:

Faithful to her traditional mission, France proposes to guide the peoples for whom she has assumed responsibility toward freedom to govern themselves and democratically to manage their own affairs; putting aside all systems of colonization founded on arbitrary power, she guarantees to all access to public office and the exercise of the individual or collective rights and liberties . . . which are conferred upon all Frenchmen by the Preamble to the Constitution.

Statesmanship Seeks a Steady Course

Secretary Acheson has frequently called attention to the fact that there is now a great surge of feeling through the world which gives expression to the national aspirations of many peoples who do not now have full control of their own affairs.

The United States supports the nationalist aspirations of those peoples who are progressively advancing toward the United Nations Charter's goal of self-government or independence. It is the policy of our Government to use the full measure of its influence to support the attainment of greater freedom by all peoples who, by their acts, show themselves worthy of it and ready for it. We appreciate the advantages flowing from a transfer of authority which is based upon mutual accommodation. We recognize the farsighted statesmanship of those who transfer authority

and the sense of deep responsibility with which those who take authority assume the burdens of government.

There will always be the impatient ones who consider measured progress too slow, and the inflexibles who think that any step is taken too soon and goes too far. It is the part of statesmanship to steer a steady course between the "Scylla" of impatience and the "Charybdis" of inflexibility. It is the part of the United Nations, not to try to blast out the rocks on either side of the channel, but like some *deus ex machina* to disperse the storm clouds and provide favoring winds. Those who advocate particular courses of action must ask themselves in all honesty, "Will such proposals really contribute to the improvement of the given situation or are they merely for 'our satisfaction or for the expression of our theoretical views'?"

The record of many countries in the free world, particularly since the end of the last war, is something in which they properly take pride. In accordance with our promises, the Philippines has become an independent state. Following the development of the British Commonwealth, full freedom has been granted to India, Pakistan, Ceylon, and Burma, of which the first three remain within the Commonwealth. Independent Indonesia, as a member of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union, has also become a separate member of the United Nations where it shares with other members the position of "sovereign equality." The Associated States of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia have attained their independence within the French Union, and would today be members of the United Nations in their own right if their applications like that of Ceylon had not suffered the Soviet veto.

On the other hand, no territory which was under Russian domination has been voluntarily released. On the contrary, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia have been overrun and absorbed. The formerly independent states of Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Albania, and Poland, while maintaining the trappings of separate existence, have lost their independence. Byelorussia and the Ukraine, the two constituent members of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which are separate members of the United Nations, do not even have any contact with the outside world. Under Soviet regulations promulgated last January, their capitals are actually included in districts which the Soviet Government has closed to the entry of any foreigner.

Inside the U. S. S. R., the Volga German autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was abolished in 1940 and some 400,000 Volga Germans were deported *en masse* to Siberia. In 1946 the Chechen-Ingush A. S. S. R. was dissolved and the Crimean A. S. S. R. reorganized into a county. Some 650,000 Chechens and Crimean Tatars were "resettled," in the euphemistic term used by the

Government. The official reason stated was that during the war the "main mass" of the people in these two "autonomous republics" had been guilty of disloyal acts.

Continued Imperialistic Expansion by U. S. S. R.

In Asia, the Soviets have continued the imperialist expansion which was begun under the Czars. In 1871, Russian military forces occupied large areas of China's Sinkiang Province and retained control for 10 years. Withdrawal of these forces was secured only at the price of preferential treatment for Russian commerce. This same technique marked Sinkiang's relations with the Soviet Union from 1920 through 1933. Despite the fact that it recognized the Chinese Government in Peking, the Soviet Union pursued a dismemberment policy by negotiating directly with the Governor of the Province. From 1933 onward, Soviet control of Sinkiang was increasingly overt until the European war obliged the Soviet Union to withdraw its official and garrison forces. But the retreat was only temporary. Soviet-oriented elements soon gained control of the western part of the Province. Chinese Communist forces progressively extended their authority until, in 1949, the process of removing Sinkiang from the effective control of the Nationalist Government of China was completed.

In Mongolia, a similar pattern has prevailed. Even the division of this huge area into Outer Mongolia and Inner Mongolia was the product of the secret treaty between the Russian and Japanese Governments in 1907. Following the Chinese revolution in 1911 and the proclamation of Outer Mongolian independence, Russia demanded that no Chinese units be stationed in Outer Mongolia, but continued to keep its own troops there.

Beginning with the occupation of Outer Mongolia's capital city by the Red army in 1921, the Soviet Union has clearly established that it is no less determined than the Czars to maintain an imperialistic sphere of influence in this region. Although pledged to treat Outer Mongolia "as an integral part of the Republic of China," the Soviet Government ignored the authority of the Nationalist Government even to the extent of exercising consular functions abroad on behalf of Outer Mongolia. Today, although Outer Mongolia is allowed to have even less contact with the world than the Ukraine and Byelorussia, the Soviets block the admission to the United Nations of such states as Italy, Japan, and Ceylon until Outer Mongolia is also admitted.

The fate of Tannu Tuva may indicate what is in store for Outer Mongolia. In 1921, Tannu Tuva declared itself independent. But in October 1944, its independence disappeared and it was annexed to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government did not even bother to announce that the annexation had taken place until 2 years later.

The fate of Outer Mongolia and Tannu Tuva is

suggestive of the plans the Kremlin has in mind for other peoples whom it hopes to ensnare with its special brand of "national independence." The spider is hungry and alert to snare and devour the unwary. The blueprint of the Soviet plan for perverting noble causes was stated quite blandly in an article in the Moscow University *Herald* of December 9, 1951:

First, incite nationalism, which is inherent in all races. Second, promote a national "united front" including if necessary vacillating bourgeois political parties.

Third, let the working class and its political party, the Communist Party, seize leadership of the United Front.

Fourth, form an alliance of the working class and the peasantry, led by the Communist Party.

Fifth, the Communist Party takes complete control, ousting the others.

Sixth, remember that true national independence can be achieved only in unity with the Soviet Union. There is no third, middle, or neutral road. The choice is between the camp of imperialism on the one hand and the camp of socialism and democracy on the other hand.

Seventh, form powerful "Peoples' Liberation Armies" under the leadership of the Communist Party. Identify the struggle of the masses with the armed struggle which is the chief activity in "colonial" national liberation movements.

The Kremlin's Subjugation Plan

There is nothing new in the tedious Communist program which I have just quoted. The Kremlin's plan for the subjugation of dependent peoples—and particularly Asiatic peoples—goes back at least as far as Stalin's famous formulation in his book on the problems of Leninism. There, as we will do well to remember, Stalin pointed out that the first task of the Communist movement in Asia was to promote nationalism in order to throw out the old colonial powers; when nationalism had been pushed to the point of ousting the responsible governments, the theme would then shift to internationalism in the sense of the Communist International and "unity" with the Soviet Union. But the history of responsible nationalism in India, Indonesia, Vietnam, and elsewhere proves that the Communist plot has not succeeded in its calculated deceit.

Thus, while in recent years other great powers have helped dependent peoples along the path to self-government, the Soviet Union has concentrated on absorbing its neighbors into the monolithic Soviet hegemony. Westward through Europe and eastward through Asia, Soviet imperialism has pushed its way—"liberating" nations from the cares and responsibilities of freedom.

It is interesting to note that the Soviets, in welding together their vast land empire, have tried to make a virtue of necessity by promulgating the theory that there is something evil about any control which extends over a great body of water. They seem to think there is some magic interrestrial contact. Like other Marxist-Leninist dogma which outlive their usefulness, this notion would, of course, immediately be a prohibited

bourgeois thought if the Soviets could get their hands on any overseas territories. Although there was no competition in this sport at the Olympic Games, the Soviets could enter an unbeatable team in the mental gymnastics of shifting from such positions as antinazism to the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and from anguished complaints about the "remilitarization" of Germany to the proposal of March 10, 1952, for a German national army.

The peoples of the world which have not yet attained the full measure of self-government vary widely in their geography, their population, their advancement in the art of self-government, and their desire for freedom. This is recognized in chapter XI of the Charter of the United Nations which calls upon those exercising responsibility in developing self-government "to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions, according to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement." Furthermore, in chapter XII of the Charter, which lays the basis for the international trusteeship system, it is recognized that some territories may develop local self-government and that other territories may eventually achieve full independence.

U.S.-U.N. Approach

The U. N. General Assembly realized the existence of such differences when it came to discharge the responsibility given to it under the Italian peace treaty, to determine the future of the former Italian Colonies in North Africa. These colonies were three in number: Libya, Eritrea, and Italian Somaliland. In each place there were individuals and groups who aspired to immediate independence and these aspirants had their supporters among other peoples of the world. However, in the course of long debates extending over three sessions of the General Assembly, the United Nations reached differing decisions with respect to the three different situations confronting it. In the case of Libya, it was agreed that Libya should be independent no later than January 1, 1952, and that meanwhile a U. N. commission and commissioner would assist the administering powers in preparing for transition. In the case of Somaliland, it was decided that the people were further away from the stage at which they could assume responsibility for the complete control of their own affairs, and the territory was put under trusteeship with a promise of independence at the end of 10 years. In the case of Eritrea, it was finally determined that Eritrea and Ethiopia would form a federation under the Ethiopian Crown.

We in the United States have had our own experience with these problems. At the end of the Spanish-American War, we found ourselves in actual control of three places which had been ruled by Spain—Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines.

In the case of Cuba, we followed the congressional declaration made at the outset of the war "that the people of the Island of Cuba are and of right ought to be free and independent." Our Army was withdrawn as soon as the Cubans had time to call a constitutional convention, frame their constitution and set up their Government. In the case of the Philippines, full independence would have been given in 1944 had it not been for the war with Japan, which required the postponement of liberation until July 4, 1946, when the free and independent Philippine Republic was established.

In the case of Puerto Rico, military government was rapidly replaced by civil government with the Governor and other major officers appointed by the President of the United States. In 1917, the Puerto Ricans were permitted to select their own legislature which could transmit to the President of the United States any bill vetoed by the Governor. In 1947, Congress passed further legislation permitting the Puerto Ricans to elect their own Governor, and a Puerto Rican Governor was so elected in 1948. In 1950, Congress adopted another law which they said was "in the nature of a compact" between the Congress and the people of Puerto Rico. Under this act, the Puerto Ricans were to draw up their own constitution and organize their own Government. This proposal was by its own terms submitted to a referendum of the Puerto Rican people and was approved. Accordingly, the Puerto Ricans in 1951 held a constitutional convention and drew up a constitution providing for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico which now exists. In this constitution the people of Puerto Rico say that they created this Commonwealth "within our union with the United States of America."

The United States also has responsibility over other peoples who are not so far advanced in terms of capabilities for full autonomy. In connection with the improvement of the conditions of these peoples and the process of leading them toward a fuller capacity and better life, we have joined in the work of international commissions. In regard to the Virgin Islands, we are members of the Caribbean Commission to which Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands also belong. We join with representatives of those countries in studying the problems of the people of the area. In the Pacific area, where we are in charge of American Samoa, Guam, and the Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands, we work in the South Pacific Commission in which also Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands participate along with Australia and New Zealand.

Pending Problems at Next U.N. Session

The General Assembly of the United Nations will be called upon in its session which begins next month to deal with problems of the kind which

I have been describing. The considerations noted above might well be kept in mind by the various delegations who will surely wish to approach these subjects with a deep sense of responsibility and with a desire to contribute to the real achievement of progress in the development of peoples for whom they have a feeling of concern.

There are legitimate causes for complaint against governmental treatment of persons within its power. The Department of State has recently issued a pamphlet,² in which it exposes in detail the system of concentration camps and forced labor which prevail in the Soviet Union and which are the fate of many non-Soviet peoples over whom the Soviets have secured control by the use of force. The constant effort, fortunately often successful, of thousands of persons who escape from the Soviet Union and its satellites, is further evidence of the conditions prevailing in the U. S. S. R. One has only to remember the millions who fled from the Soviet area in North Korea to South Korea even before the Communist aggression began in 1950. One recalls also that there has been a steady flow of refugees from the Eastern European satellites and from Eastern Germany into the free West. When the Soviets began their recent program of further isolating East Germany from the rest of Germany, people poured across the frontier at the rate of over a thousand a day. The evil of the situation is clearly established in spite of the Iron Curtain which attempts to conceal it.

The totalitarian Communist system with its total disregard of moral standards and respect for the rights of the individual is responsible for the situation behind the Iron Curtain. In the free world, where government exists for the benefit of the governed, it has been proved that a government can exercise responsibility for the development of a minority group under its control without such abuses. Therefore, the mere existence of such a relationship between those who govern and those who are governed is not *in and of itself* proof that the government is evil. One cannot start in considering any such case with a glib assumption that such peoples should immediately be established as a separate independent state, or even that they are in a position fully to administer their own affairs. There are, for instance, American Indians and Eskimos under the jurisdiction of your country and of mine and large American Indian communities in many Latin American countries. There are several millions of primitive tribesmen in India. The Kurds in Iran and Iraq have for decades had leaders arguing for their independence. There are such peo-

² *Forced Labor in the Soviet Union*, Department of State publication 4716 (for excerpts, see BULLETIN of Sept. 22, 1952, p. 428).

ples in the Philippines as the Igorots and Negritos. There are the Nagas in Burma.

The fact that such peoples are racially different from the predominant group in the states does not of itself mean that they should be separated from those states and set up as independent countries. Self-determination in the international area, like individualism in the national area, is a useful principle but not an absolute one. Carried to extremes, it invites chaos.

The United Nations, through the discussions in its Trusteeship Council and in the Commission on Dependent Territories, has the regular—although not the exclusive—machinery for the study of problems such as these. Cases may exist or may arise in which the General Assembly can make a contribution by considering dispassionately and on the merits particular situations. In doing so, however, the Assembly must consider under all of the circumstances in each case whether its action will be actually helpful or harmful to the people concerned.

This is not the occasion for discussing in detail particular items which have been proposed for inclusion on the agenda of the pending session of the General Assembly. The U.S. position on these items will, of course, be stated at the appropriate time. What I have tried to do today is to explain some of the problems with which foreign policy must deal and to indicate what I believe to be some of the underlying considerations to be taken into account in determining policies.

These problems which I have discussed are merely illustrative of the general proposition with which I started. There are strains and stresses in the world today. There are conflicts and jealousies between and among many groups of states. The real purpose of the United Nations, I repeat, is to try to provide an atmosphere of tranquility in which the solutions of these problems can be sought without prejudice and without passion.

Letters of Credence

Guatemala

The newly appointed Ambassador of Guatemala, Guillermo Toriello, presented his credentials to the President on September 24. For text of the Ambassador's remarks and of the President's reply, see Department of State press release 751 of September 24.

Iran

The newly appointed Ambassador of Iran, Allah-Yar Saleh, presented his credentials to the President on September 24. For text of the Ambassador's remarks and of the President's reply, see Department of State press release 752 of September 24.

First Caribbean Conference on Home Economics and Education in Nutrition

by Lydia J. Roberts

A recent conference held in Trinidad, B. W. I., illustrated the growing and continuing interest in home economics and education in nutrition throughout the Caribbean area, and the recognition there of the importance of work in this field for the improvement of home and family life.

From June 30 to July 5, 1952, at Port-of-Spain, Trinidad, under the joint sponsorship of the Caribbean Commission and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), specialists in agriculture, education, health, and social welfare met for the first international conference on problems and developments in the Caribbean with respect to home economics and education in nutrition. The purpose of the conference was to promote an exchange of information and ideas, explore ways in which participating countries and territories might be of mutual assistance, and obtain advice on how the sponsoring agencies might be of greatest service in promoting sound programs of home economics and nutrition in the area. The careful preparations for this conference by the Commission and FAO reflected the growing recognition by governments members of FAO that more attention should be paid to home economics and nutrition both as a means of promoting the better utilization of food and raising living standards.

The conference was attended by 36 delegates and observers. Official participants came from Barbados, British Guiana, Dominican Republic, the French Caribbean Departments, Jamaica, the Netherlands Antilles, Puerto Rico, Surinam, Trinidad and Tobago, the Virgin Islands, and the Windward Islands; the Governments of France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States; the Holy See; and the United Nations, the World Health Organization, and the two sponsoring agencies.

The U.S. delegation was composed of Lydia J. Roberts, head of the Home Economics Depart-

ment, University of Puerto Rico, who was chairman of the delegation and also served as chairman of the conference; Miss Ata Lee, Program Specialist, Home Economics Education, Office of Education, Federal Security Agency; and Dr. Esther Seijo de Zayas, Director of the Bureau of Nutrition and Dietetics, Department of Health of Puerto Rico. All members of the delegation participated actively in the work of the conference, and the three from Puerto Rico presented a symposium on home improvement programs in Puerto Rico.

Since home economics in the Caribbean is in its early stages of development (except in Puerto Rico) and was of concern to the workers in all fields represented at the conference, the group met as a whole in order that all participants might derive maximum benefit from the discussions on the different specialties.

As a first step, the conference clarified its conception of home economics as education for family living. Home economics is now becoming more and more concerned with the broad aspects of family and home life—nutrition, meal planning and food preparation, housing, adequate and safe water supply and sanitary facilities, home management, clothing for the family, care of children, relations of members within the family and in the community, and other problems related to the well-being of the family—in contrast to the earlier conception of this field as being limited to methods of performing household tasks.

The conference considered the extent and type of training being offered in the field of family-life education in the Caribbean, the problems encountered, and ways in which more effective programs can be promoted. Attention was centered on education in family betterment through extension work, through the schools and school-feeding programs, and through health, social welfare, and voluntary organizations. The need for coopera-

tion among these agencies was stressed, and special emphasis was given to the need for more and better trained workers in this field.

The conference formulated 35 specific recommendations for extending and improving work in this important field on family living. Comment on some of the major discussions and their outcomes follows.

Extension

The term "extension" is applied to the process by which knowledge is passed on to families and community groups through informal teaching. Through common usage, the term has become associated chiefly with education in rural areas through agricultural agencies. Extension in home economics, however, should not be confined to agricultural education, but should include instruction given by any agency concerned with better family living.

Most of the countries represented at the conference have at least the beginnings of an agricultural extension program. In most cases, however, the only persons employed are men agents who work on problems of soil, crops, livestock raising, and on other problems of farm management, so that the home making and home improvement aspects of a rural betterment program are neglected.

The conference stressed that a joint program for both farm and home improvement is essential if real success is to be attained in improving living conditions of rural families. It recommended that trained home economists be employed along with agricultural agents to work with the families on problems of the home, and that the training of both men and women agents be broadened to include certain aspects of the other's field so that they can render maximum service to families with whom they come in contact.

For example, it was pointed out that if men agents had some training in simple carpentry, they could help the families in various phases of home improvement such as building cupboards, shelves, and smokeless fireplaces and making simple home repairs. With an elementary knowledge of nutrition they could emphasize the need for providing a milk supply for the family, the importance of a home vegetable garden, and the best types of vegetables to grow. Similarly, the woman agent with some training in agronomy could help to promote and teach home gardening, and the care of chickens, pigs, and rabbits as a means of providing better nutrition for the family. Such broadened training of the workers would extend and strengthen the program, especially until such time as an adequate number of both farm and home agents is supplied.

Recognition was given in the discussions to the valuable service that can be rendered in family-life education by workers from various agencies who have contact with the homes in some capacity. Among these are social welfare workers, nurses,

health officers, and workers in a variety of voluntary organizations. Each of these touches some aspect of family life and could, with a broader training and outlook, render a valuable contribution to education for better home living. The conference recommended that every effort be made to encourage, train, and utilize such workers in promoting programs in family life.

Home economics in some form and to some extent is included in the school curriculum in all the countries represented. Its scope, however, varies widely. Most commonly it is limited to the teaching of cooking, sewing, laundry, and housewifery. Yet the teaching of even these subjects is often unrealistic and unrelated to the pupil's needs. Moreover, only a small proportion of the school population is reached. Even in schools where the subject is taught, many pupils receive no training in it since it is offered only to girls 11 years of age and over and many leave school at a younger age.

Home Economics in the Schools

As remedies for this situation, the conference suggested: That home economics be taught in all schools, elementary and secondary, and be made available to all pupils regardless of sex or academic proficiency; that a broader interpretation be given to the subject so as to include the more important aspects of family living, especially nutrition, child development, and family relationships; that every effort be made to teach all boys the use of simple tools, and that manual training include the production of articles which could be used for improving their own homes and the making of simple home repairs; that the work in home economics begin at a lower age level in order to reach students before they leave school; and that late afternoon and evening classes in home economics be given for the benefit of girls who have left school and also for adults.

It is not enough merely to provide for training in home economics. It is important to insure that the training will be realistic in relation to the needs of the homes from which the pupils come. The teacher, through home visits, should become familiar with these needs and should plan her teaching to make the maximum contribution toward filling them. To this end the equipment for teaching in the school should bear some relationship to that found in the homes, and the foods and other materials used should be ones that are familiar and are available to the families. Supervised home projects should also help to carry over the school's teaching into practical home betterment.

Education in Nutrition

The need for strengthening the program of nutrition and making it more effective in terms of the needs of the people was emphasized through-

out the discussions. Greater effort, it was believed, should be made to base nutrition teaching on the needs of the people as revealed by a study of their diets, their food customs, their facilities for preparing food, and their resources.

School Gardens—Although school gardens are fairly common in the Caribbean area, too often they are used solely for show and in competition for prizes. They have little or no influence in stimulating home gardens or in education in nutrition. Yet the school garden if effectively utilized could be valuable in improving the nutrition of the community. The vegetables grown in them should be those that contribute most to good nutrition; the foods produced in the garden should be used in the homes and/or in school-feeding programs; the pupils should be encouraged to cultivate plots at home under the school's supervision; and the students and their parents should be taught the value of the vegetable garden in promoting better health for the family. The school garden for winning of prizes should be discouraged.

School Feeding Programs—All territories in the area have some form of school or community feeding, but there is great variety in total coverage and in procedures. In some only 5 percent of the school population is reached, in others the large majority. The food served varies from a complete meal to a snack consisting of milk only, or of milk and biscuits, which in some cases are fortified with food yeast. Requirements for admission to the programs also vary. Some programs are limited to the most needy children; in others, factors such as distance from school may also be considered. In some places, contributions from the children are required or encouraged, either in money, food, or fuel; in others, the lunches are entirely free.

In practically all cases the limited funds available make it difficult to provide a balanced meal for any considerable number of children. Frequently, too, the funds available are not used to best advantage. Too great a use is often made of canned foods and vitamin tablets when the needs could be better and more economically supplied by locally produced foods. The educational value of the feeding program is not adequately utilized.

The conference recommended that when funds are limited it is preferable to give a nutritious snack that supplements home meals to a larger number of children rather than to serve a complete meal to a few; that the greatest possible use be made of fresh vegetables and fruits in preference to imported canned or synthetic substitutes; that when there is an insufficient supply of fresh milk at reasonable price, efforts be made to utilize dry skim milk as it is a low cost food of high nutritional value; and that the educational value, both nutritional and social, of any feeding program be fully utilized.

Joint Action in Home Improvement Programs

There is need for joint action of school, home, and community in promoting home-improvement programs. Families, teachers, community groups, and agencies should plan together if maximum benefit is to be derived from their efforts. All of the government agencies, voluntary organizations, and religious groups engaged in activities affecting some aspect of home life are hampered by lack of adequate trained personnel, space, equipment, funds, or other resources.

The conference stressed the fact that far more could be accomplished in raising the standards of family living, even with the present workers and facilities, if there were joint planning and effective cooperation among these agencies. Although it is the policy of these groups to cooperate in carrying out their programs, coordination is usually infrequent and ineffective, since the initiation of cooperative effort is left to the individual agencies. It was the belief of the conference that to be effective such cooperation should be provided for at the policy-making levels of the governments of the territories in the area. It therefore recommended that governments take steps to facilitate such coordination at the appropriate governmental level.

Publications and Other Teaching Aids

The need for books and other teaching aids for home improvement programs was pointed out. Pamphlets and leaflets dealing in simple language with home problems are especially needed. Movies, filmstrips, and slides are also useful adjuncts. There is a special need for a textbook on home economics for elementary schools suited to West Indian conditions and customs.

In some territories no funds are available for such teaching materials; in most they are limited. Since conditions and needs are similar in the various territories, maximum use could be made of available materials by providing for their exchange. The conference therefore recommended that the Caribbean Commission be requested to serve as a clearinghouse for the interchange of teaching materials and aids among the territories, and that all governments be asked to send copies of selected materials published in their respective countries which might be useful to others.

Training of Workers

Throughout the conference the need for more and better-trained workers was repeatedly voiced. It was recognized that the level of work can never rise above the level of training of the workers. Few opportunities exist in the Caribbean for training of home economics workers at college level except in Puerto Rico where the University offers a 4-year course leading to a B. Sc. degree. In other territories limited training in domestic subjects is

given in some training institutions; some students attend colleges outside the area.

The conference made several suggestions for improving the situation. It recommended that, until further facilities are available, the University of Puerto Rico be utilized for the preparation of workers in home economics for the whole area; that its assistance be especially sought in developing regional training by offering short courses to workers in the area; and that the Caribbean Commission approach the University regarding the possibility of a 3-month course to be offered during 1953, and request FAO to grant fellowships for the proposed training course. The conference also suggested that one or more centers be established in the area to offer 1-year courses in home economics, and that the University College of the West Indies be invited to formulate a long-term policy looking toward the establishment of degree courses in home economics and postgraduate courses in nutrition.

Technical Cooperation and Coordination

The conference noted that although many international, national, and private organizations offer various types of technical assistance, such services are not widely used in the Caribbean. Many problems confronting the area, such as the need for public education in all matters affecting the child and the parent-child relationship, data on the nutritional value of foods produced and consumed, improvement of the limited food and agricultural resources available, and the coordination and development of a sound home-economics program, could be attacked cooperatively if the available technical assistance were utilized. Accordingly, the conference recommended that the attention of governments be called to the technical assistance offered by international and other organizations, and specified several projects for which the Caribbean Commission should request help now in order to further the improvement of family and home life in the area.

There was general agreement among the participants that the Conference was a fruitful one. The conference voiced its belief that such meetings of technical workers are valuable in enabling workers to exchange views and experiences and so derive a better understanding of the problems in the entire area, to keep abreast of progress in such matters as are continually under review, to ascertain to what extent the several proposals put forward are being implemented or are capable of achievement, and, in the light of the findings, to determine the next course of action. The conference unanimously recommended that a similar conference on home economics and nutrition be held in the Caribbean every 3 years.

International Materials Conference

Pulp-Paper Committee Ends Work

The Pulp-Paper Committee of the International Materials Conference announced on September 23 that its member governments have accepted a recommendation that it be dissolved forthwith.

This action was based upon further evidence of improvement in the supply position of dissolving wood pulp and newsprint in the free countries of the world, since its last appraisal in July.

Specifically, the Committee reported:

1. A record level of North American production for January-July 1952, which shows an increase of almost 4 percent over the corresponding period of 1951.
2. An encouraging increase in exports from North American sources to other parts of the world despite the sustained high level of North American consumption.
3. Lack of requests for emergency supplies of newsprint.
4. A continued satisfactory newsprint supply situation in Europe.
5. Increased inventories in some consuming countries and notably in the United States.

The Pulp-Paper Committee has been in existence since April 30, 1951, and was set up to examine and recommend action on newsprint and wood-pulp supply problems. A number of emergency allocations of newsprint were made in 1951 and early 1952 to 18 countries in all. The Committee did not find it necessary at any stage to recommend allocations of wood pulp.

Fifteen countries were represented on the Pulp-Paper Committee. They were Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Distribution of Primary Copper

The Copper-Zinc-Lead Committee of the International Materials Conference (IMC) on September 30 announced that its member governments have accepted its proposals for the allocation of copper for the fourth quarter of 1952.

The Committee has noted a steady improvement in the supply position during the year and certain indications that the market is easing. Nevertheless, requirements for defense and essential civilian purposes, as stated by Governments, continue at a level which, in the view of the Committee, does not justify the discontinuance of allocation at this time.

The Committee again agreed to make arrangements whereby domestic users in the United States or in other countries would have the opportunity

to purchase any copper allocated to other countries participating in the International Materials Conference and not used by them.

In accepting the Committee's recommendations, the Chilean Government made a reservation by which, without reference to the distribution plan, it may dispose of a limited tonnage of its copper. Notwithstanding this reservation, the Chilean Government has stated its desire to take into account the recommendations of the Committee and to consider them whenever possible.

The Committee has recommended a plan of distribution¹ of 747,655 metric tons of copper in the fourth quarter, as compared with 744,290 metric tons for the third quarter. Direct defense needs have again been given priority.

The allocation to each country is based upon its requirements for defense and essential civilian production. The U. S. allocation of 362,000 tons includes, however, provision for direct defense needs, essential civilian production, and stockpiling. Furthermore, the United States is authorized to purchase an additional 16,000 tons specifically for strategic stockpiling.

Primary copper only (blister and refined) is included in the plan. As in previous quarters, semi-fabricated products have not been allocated, but all exporting countries are again asked to maintain their exports of such semis at a level commensurate with their allocations of primary metal for civilian consumption, in accordance with normal patterns of trade.

Twelve countries are represented on the Committee. They are Australia, Belgium (representing Benelux), Canada, Chile, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Mexico, Norway, Peru, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The plan of distribution has been forwarded also to the governments of 26 other countries, not represented on the Committee, for which allocations have been recommended.

Wool Committee of IMC To Be Dissolved

The Wool Committee of the International Materials Conference (IMC) announced on September 29 that its member governments have agreed that it be dissolved at this time.

This action was based on evidence that wool is no longer in short supply in the free countries of the world.

The Committee has been in existence since April 2, 1951, and was set up by the member governments "to consider and recommend or report to governments concerning specific action which should be taken in the case of wool in order to expand production, increase availability, conserve supplies, and arrive at the most effective distribution and

utilization of supplies among consuming countries." In accordance with these terms of reference the Committee kept the statistical position of wool under continuous review but never decided to recommend allocation or other international action regarding distribution of wool supply.

Eleven countries were represented on the Committee: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Uruguay.

Distribution of Nickel and Cobalt

The Manganese-Nickel-Cobalt Committee of the International Materials Conference (IMC) on September 30 announced its recommended distribution of nickel and cobalt for the fourth quarter of 1952. The countries represented on the Committee are Belgium (for Benelux), Brazil, Canada, Cuba, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Norway, Sweden, the Union of South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

All of the 14 member governments have agreed to comply with both plans of distribution,² which have been forwarded to other interested governments for implementation.

As in the third quarter, the Committee agreed to make arrangements whereby domestic consumers in the United States, or in other countries, would have the opportunity to purchase any nickel or cobalt allocated to countries participating in the IMC and not used by any such participating country.

The nickel distribution covers all primary forms of metal and oxides, but has not included salts since December 31, 1951. The availabilities for this quarter have been estimated at 37,060 metric tons of nickel content, against an amount of 36,580 tons in the third quarter. Although this represents an anticipated increase of some 480 tons over the third quarter, the essential needs of the free world continue to increase at the same time, due mainly to growing demands for defense. It is inevitable, therefore, that the allocations recommended will be insufficient to meet the full requirements of most countries.

The total quantity of cobalt available for distribution, which includes primary metal, oxides and salts, amounts to 2,890 tons of cobalt content for this quarter, while estimates for the third quarter showed total availabilities at 2,475 tons. In view of this improvement in the supply position, which is likely to develop further in the first part of 1953, the Committee will consider, before the end of the present year, whether or not the international distribution of cobalt should be continued beyond December 31, 1952.

¹ Not printed here; see IMC press release dated Sept. 29.

² Not printed here; see IMC press release of Sept. 30.

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

South Pacific Commission

The Department of State announced on October 3 (press release 779) that the U.S. delegation at the tenth session of the South Pacific Commission, to be convened at Nouméa, New Caledonia, on October 6, 1952, will be as follows:

Senior Commissioner

Felix M. Keesing, Professor of Anthropology, Stanford University

Acting Commissioner

Robert R. Robbins, Office of Dependent Area Affairs, Department of State

Advisers

Philip E. Haring, American Consul, Nouméa
John C. Elliott, Governor, American Samoa

The South Pacific Commission was created in 1948 by the Governments of Australia, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States to serve as a consultative and advisory body to those Governments in matters affecting the welfare and advancement of the peoples of the 17 non-self-governing territories within the scope of the Commission. The ninth session of the Commission, which holds two regular sessions each year, was held at Nouméa, New Caledonia, April 28–May 7, 1952. Commissioners and advisers from the six member governments attend the sessions.

The general purpose of the forthcoming meeting is to further cooperation among the participating Governments in promoting economic and social development in the territories of the region. The principal items to be considered at this session are the progress of work projects, including reports on the South Pacific Fisheries Conference (Nouméa, May 1952), coral atoll development, the establishment of the Central Vocational Training Institute, housing, and nutrition; preparations for the second South Pacific Conference (1953); report of the fourth meeting of the South Pacific Research Council, together with the appointment of members of that body for 1953; appointment of an executive officer for economic development; the 1953 budget; and publications. Other related administrative and financial matters will also be discussed.

Plenipotentiary Conference of ITU

The Department of State announced on October 1 (press release 774) that the U.S. delegation to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) International Plenipotentiary Conference, scheduled to begin at Buenos Aires, October 1, 1952, will be as follows:

Chairman

Francis Colt de Wolf, Chief, Telecommunications Policy Staff, Department of State

Vice Chairman

Harvey B. Otterman, Associate Chief, Telecommunications Policy Staff, Department of State

Members

E. E. Berthold, Captain, U.S.N., Director of Communications, Western Sea Frontier, Department of Defense
Sidney Cummins, International Administration Officer, Division of International Administration, Department of State

Louis E. DeLaFleur, Assistant Chief, Frequency Allocation and Treaty Division, Federal Communications Commission

Mucio F. Delgado, Special Assistant to the Chief, Office of International Broadcasting, International Information Administration, Department of State

John D. Tomlinson, Adviser, Office of United Nations Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State

Florence A. Trail, Telecommunications Policy Staff, Department of State

Adviser

Philip F. Siling, Engineer-in-Charge, RCA Frequency Bureau, Radio Corporation of America

The Plenipotentiary Conference is the supreme organ of the ITU, an organization which for more than 85 years has assured the international regulation of telegraphs and telephones (first by wire and later by both wire and radio) so well that most people are not aware of its existence, merely assuming that their telegrams and telephone calls to points abroad will go forward without interruption, that their planes and ships will be guided by radio in perfect safety, and that they can watch or listen to their favorite television or radio program without interference.

Under the terms of the International Telecommunication Convention of October 2, 1947, the Plenipotentiary Conference, which meets once every 5 years, is required to consider the report of the Administrative Council of ITU on the activities of the Union; establish the basis for the budget of the Union for the next 5 years; finally approve the accounts of the Union; elect the members of the ITU Administrative Council; revise the convention if it considers this necessary; if necessary, enter into any formal agreement or revise any existing formal agreement between the Union and any other international body; and deal with such other telecommunication questions as may be necessary. The principal purpose of the forthcoming conference is to consider such revisions of the convention as have been proposed.

The United States has taken an active role in this organization in keeping with its outstanding communications interests. This Government is among the ITU member states which have submitted proposals for revision of the convention and its annexes.

Contracting Parties to GATT

The Department of State announced on October 3 (press release 775) that the U.S. delegation to the seventh session of the contracting parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which convened at Geneva on October 2, 1952 is as follows:

Chairman

Willard L. Thorp, Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, Department of State

Vice Chairman

Raymond Vernon, Deputy Director, Office of Economic Defense and Trade Policy, Department of State

Special Adviser to Chairman

J. Thomas Schneider, Assistant Secretary for International Affairs, Department of Commerce

Advisers

Louis C. Boochever, Jr., Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State

George Bronz, Special Assistant to the General Counsel, Department of the Treasury

John J. Czynzak, Office of Legal Adviser for Economic Affairs, Department of State

Mortimer D. Goldstein, Assistant Chief, Exchange Restrictions and Payments Agreements, Monetary Affairs Staff, Department of State

Joseph A. Greenwald, Economic Officer, American Consulate General, Geneva

John W. Hight, Economic Specialist, Office of the Special Representative in Europe, Mutual Security Agency, Paris

W. E. Higman, Chief, Division of Classification, Entry, and Value, Bureau of Customs, Department of the Treasury

Florence Kirlin, Special Assistant, Congressional Relations, Department of State

Robert B. Schwenger, Chief, Regional Investigation Branch, Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, Department of Agriculture

William O. Shofner, Staff Assistant, Office of Price, Production and Marketing Administration, Department of Agriculture

Clarence S. Siegel, Assistant Director, European Division, Office of International Trade, Department of Commerce

Executive Secretary

Henry F. Nichol, Conference Attaché, American Consulate General, Geneva

Technical Secretary

Ruth S. Donahue, Office of Economic Affairs, Department of State

Members of Staff

Angelina G. Agin, American Consulate General, Geneva

Alexander E. Giffin, Office of Financial and Development Policy, Department of State

Eleanor J. Hoekman, Office of Economic Affairs, Department of State

Andrey Macfarland, Geneva

Vivian Morrison, Office of Economic Defense and Trade Policy, Department of State

Pursuant to a recommendation of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, negotiations in which

23 countries participated were carried on at Geneva in 1947 for the purpose of effecting a reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers and of eliminating preferences on a reciprocal and mutually advantageous basis. Those negotiations resulted in the formulation of the General Agreement and of a protocol of provisional application of that agreement. Further tariff negotiations have taken place and the number of contracting states is now thirty-four.

The General Agreement provides that representatives of the contracting parties shall meet from time to time for the purpose of facilitating the operation and furthering the objectives of the agreement. The sixth session was held at Geneva, September 17–October 26, 1951.

Working Party on Mobilization of Domestic Capital (ECAFE)

The Department of State announced on September 22 (press release 743) that the U.S. delegation to the second meeting of the Working Party of Experts on the Mobilization of Domestic Capital, sponsored by the U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), to be held at Bangkok, September 22–27, 1952, is as follows:

Chairman

George Springsteen, Jr., Investment and Economic Development Staff, Department of State

Members

Konrad Bekker, Economic Officer and Attaché, American Embassy, New Delhi

Flournoy H. Coles, Jr., Economist, Mutual Security Agency Mission, Bangkok

Herbert K. May, Treasury Attaché, American Embassy, Manila

Lynn Olson, Vice Consul, American Embassy, Bangkok

The United States was active in stimulating the organization of the first meeting of the Working Party, held at Bangkok in November of 1951, which made certain specific and practical suggestions looking toward the increased use of domestic capital resources in the economic development of the countries of the ECAFE region. It is believed that successful implementation of those proposals would lead to better marshaling of internal capital for developmental purposes thus strengthening Far Eastern economies.

A number of studies which have been undertaken by participating governments and the secretariat in accordance with the work program approved by ECAFE will be submitted to the Working Party. Participants in the meeting will discuss (1) measures being taken and experience of countries in encouraging the mobilization of domestic capital, including institutional and other developments, and the relation of tax and fiscal policies to the mobilization of private capital; (2) industrial and agricultural development and finance corporations; (3) relation between foreign

capital and mobilization of domestic capital; and (4) the work program of the ECAFE secretariat in the field of finance.

The first meeting of the Working Party was attended by representatives of 11 member governments and 6 associate member governments of ECAFE, besides observers from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the

International Monetary Fund, and the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (on behalf of Japan). Several officials from the ministries of finance, central banks, and cooperative and other savings institutions of the countries of the region were among the representatives. Attendance at the forthcoming meeting is open to the 14 members and the 10 associate members of ECAFE.

The United States in the United Nations

[Oct. 6-10, 1952]

General Assembly

Collective Measures Committee.—Harding Baneroff (U.S.), on October 6, made the following statement:

I should like to pay tribute to you, Mr. Chairman, for the continued constructive guidance you have given to the Committee in its second year of work. We have, I think, added a useful supplement to the foundations laid in our first report.

Lists have been prepared which are now available for use when the Security Council or General Assembly decides upon or recommends a selective embargo on exports to an aggressor or to a state which threatens international peace.

Further consideration has been given to the role of the specialized agencies. They, as well as other international agencies and arrangements, are part of the fabric of collective peace. . . .

Further work has been done on the question of equitable sharing of the burdens involved in collective action, and we have suggested the need for some machinery to deal with this problem when it arises.

The committee has studied the important subject of obtaining the maximum contribution from states in support of collective action and has suggested the possibility, and outlined the functions, of a negotiating committee to deal directly with nations for this purpose. . . .

We have tried by appropriate letters to states to continue to encourage them to take the preparatory steps recommended by the Assembly in the Uniting for Peace resolution and in the resolution adopted in Paris in January of this year. . . . There is no time when it can be said that the United Nations has a perfected system of collective security. It is a long term enterprise. Our recommendations suggest the methods and the machinery for carrying forward the momentum under the principles of the Charter.

Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)

Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities.—Except for its draft report, the Subcommission completed its 5th session on October 7 with adoption by a vote of 9-2 (U.K., Belgium) of a comprehensive resolution on its future work program.

The text of this resolution—a compromise between the tripartite proposal of Mr. Masani (India), Mr. Meneses-Pallares (Ecuador), and Mr. Shafaq (Iran) and an amendment by Mr. Daniels (U.S.)—was rejected by Mr. Nisot (Belgium) and Mr. Hiscocks (U.K.) because of the retention of two subparagraphs providing “especially” that information on non-self-governing and trust territories should be analyzed and supplied to the Subcommission. Mr. Hiscocks explained that he favored most of the resolution but saw no reason to single out voluntary reports on dependent areas for study while less readily available data on discrimination in other parts of the world was neglected. These passages were retained by a vote of 5-4 (U.S.)-2 (Ecuador, Iran).

The adopted resolution provides for appointment of a special rapporteur to initiate a study of discrimination in the field of education immediately, and to perform certain other tasks. It also calls for study of measures to combat discrimination in additional fields, and schedules a discussion at the 6th session on the variety and scope of the problem of protecting minority rights.

Foreign Policy Legislation in the 82d Congress

As is customary, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives have prepared summaries of their activities during the two sessions of the 82d Congress, which began January 3, 1951 and ended July 7, 1952.¹ Both documents are valuable sources of information on foreign policy.

Printed below are the introduction to the Foreign Relations Committee's Legislative History, the sections dealing with bilateral treaties and international conventions of a commercial and financial nature, and an appendix summarizing Senate action on treaties.

SUMMARY

Collective security was the theme of much of the activity of the Foreign Relations Committee during the Eighty-second Congress.

The 2-year period of 1951-52 was one in which existing security arrangements were strengthened and new ones established.

The political face of the world as the Eighty-second Congress adjourned in July 1952 was not greatly different from what it had been when the Congress met in January 1951. These 18 months had been full of turmoil abroad; yet, developments abroad were marked by a growing strength and unity among the free nations, and at home every important foreign-policy measure on which the Senate acted was approved by a large bipartisan vote as noted below.

Summary of votes in Senate on major items of foreign relations

<i>Measure</i>	<i>Senate vote</i>
Connally-Russell Resolution (S. Res. 99) ----	69-21.
Mutual Security Act, 1951-----	61-5.
Mutual Security Act, 1952-----	64-10.
Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act (Battle Act).	55-16.

¹ Copies of the *Legislative History of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eighty-Second Congress* (S. doc. 161) may be obtained from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office. For copies of the *Survey of Activities of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives*, write to the Committee itself.

<i>Measure</i>	<i>Senate vote</i>
Extension of North Atlantic Treaty to Greece and Turkey.	73-2.
Convention on Relations with Germany-----	77-5.
Extension of North Atlantic Treaty to European Defense Community.	72-5.
Japanese Peace Treaty-----	66-10.
Mutual Defense Treaty with Philippines-----	Voice vote.
Mutual Defense Treaty with Australia, New Zealand.	Voice vote.
Security Treaty with Japan-----	58-9.

As the Eighty-second Congress convened in January 1951, the Chinese Communists were threatening to drive the United Nations forces off the Korean Peninsula and were putting the principle of collective security to its severest test. As the Eighty-second Congress adjourned in July 1952, one of the Senate's last acts was to ratify the agreements with Germany and with the European Defense Community, agreements which, if properly executed, should mark the greatest advance in hundreds of years toward the unification of Europe and a great boost for collective security.

During these 18 months, the committee had before it more measures relating to national and collective security than during any other comparable postwar period. It had more meetings and spent more hours considering these measures than at any other time since the war.

The committee took three main steps to strengthen and expand existing security arrangements and to clarify the United States' commitments to her partners in the free world.

The first of these steps was the long series of hearings on the question of sending additional divisions of American ground troops to Europe as a part of the United States contribution to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization armies, which were just coming into being in early 1951 under the command of General Eisenhower. These hearings, in which the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees sat jointly, resulted in passage of the Connally-Russell resolution approving the plans of the President to send four more United States divisions to General Eisenhower's command but calling for congressional approval in the event additional ground forces are sent.

The second step was the Mutual Security Program, authorized by the Mutual Security Act of

1951 and continued by the Mutual Security Act of 1952. These acts consolidated and expanded United States foreign-assistance programs, which had been authorized in separate legislation by previous Congresses, and shifted the emphasis from economic to military aid. They marked the end of Marshall-plan aid to Europe and a rapid acceleration in NATO rearmament. During the 2 years, a total of about \$14 billion was authorized for mutual aid, compared with about \$10 billion authorized during the Eighty-first Congress.

These large expenditures abroad, the increasing military emphasis of the program, and particularly the Chinese Communist intervention in Korea, aroused concern that no American assistance should find its way, directly or indirectly, behind the iron curtain and thereby increase the war-making potential of the Soviet Union or its satellites. In an effort to cope with this problem realistically, the Congress passed the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 (the Battle Act), which established certain controls with respect to east-west trade.

The third step in the effort to expand existing security arrangements was the broadening of the North Atlantic defense system to include Greece, Turkey, and Western Germany.

The Eighty-second Congress was also marked by a stepped-up campaign to liquidate the legal and political vestiges of World War II and to transform former enemies into friends and allies. Treaties of peace with Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Italy had been ratified in the Eightieth Congress, and Italy had been brought into the western defensive alliance through the North Atlantic Treaty approved by the Eighty-first Congress. The Eighty-second Congress ratified a peace treaty with Japan and passed a joint resolution ending the state of war with Germany.

In each case arrangements were made to integrate these former enemy states into the defensive system of the free world. In the Pacific, as a part of the Japanese settlement, the United States entered into mutual defense treaties with Australia and New Zealand and with the Philippines. A bilateral defense treaty was also negotiated with Japan, supplementing the peace treaty.

In Europe, the unilateral declaration terminating the state of war with Germany was followed up by the negotiation of a convention on relations between France, Great Britain, and the United States, on the one hand, and the Federal Republic of Germany, on the other. A significant part of the European settlement was the formation of the European Defense Community (Edc) and an international army. Besides Western Germany, members of the community are Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, France, and Italy. The Edc and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization exchanged reciprocal security guaranties of the kind contained in the North Atlantic Treaty.

The problems of collective security, and more

particularly of conducting coalition warfare, were also at the heart of the long hearings which the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees conducted jointly on the military and political situation in the Far East. The investigation was touched off by the President's recall of Gen. Douglas MacArthur from his Far East commands in April 1951, and by the time it was concluded in the following July it had filled five volumes with testimony. No formal report or other legislative action resulted from the investigation.

Besides these broad trends developing out of the international situation, the committee's record during the Eighty-second Congress is remarkable in several respects which deserve special mention. One of these was the unusual number of treaties approved.

During this Congress, the Senate received 39 treaties which together with the 34 held over from previous Congresses made a total of 73 treaties before the committee. Of these, the Senate gave its advice and consent to the ratification of 39, and consented to the withdrawal of 4 by the President. This record compares to 25 treaties approved by both the Eightieth and Eighty-first Congresses. It is interesting to note that 24 of the treaties approved were bilateral and that 10 others (such as the Japanese Peace Treaty, the German contractual agreements, and the NATO protocols) had among their signatories only nations of the free world. The only treaty approved to which the Soviet Union was a party was the amendment to the International Load-Line Convention. Some of its satellites, however, were signatories to the four International Labor Conventions approved during this Congress.

Notable also was the far-reaching utilization of the consultative subcommittee system established during the Eighty-first Congress and continued during the Eighty-second. Consultation between officials of the Department of State and members of the committee through these seven subcommittees reached a new high both in number of meetings and importance of these meetings. This development, more fully described below, shows a commendable effort on the part of both the legislative and executive branches to shape foreign policy on a partnership basis.

Another notable feature of the committee's record during the Eighty-second Congress was the number of hearings held. The extensive hearings on the "troops to Europe" issue and the situation in the Far East arising out of the dismissal of General MacArthur have already been referred to. In addition, the committee held long hearings on the Mutual Security Acts of 1951 and 1952, the nomination of Philip C. Jessup, as a delegate to the U. N. General Assembly, the St. Lawrence seaway, the Japanese Peace Treaty and related security pacts, the German contractual agreements, and other matters. While the committee during the Eighty-first Congress spent only 70 days in

hearings, during the Eighty-second Congress it spent 123 days—almost double the number. These hearings filled 10,010 pages, a new record in the committee's history.

As usual, the committee handled a wide diversity of matters—from North Pacific fisheries to the use of highways in Panama, from extradition to sanitation, from children to widows, from wheat to sugar. These activities, summarized below, show the wide scope of the international activities of the United States and the responsibilities of the committee.

For the statistical record, the committee had referred to it and took action on fewer measures (excluding treaties already referred to above) than during the previous Congress.

It had on its calendar 30 bills (23 Senate and 7 House bills) and 76 resolutions (71 Senate and 5 House). This total of 106 measures compares to 150 measures before the committee during the Eighty-first Congress. Of these, 13 were enacted into law, compared to 36 for the previous Congress. It must be remembered in this connection, however, that the Mutual Security Acts included nine programs separately authorized in the Eighty-first Congress. An additional 11 resolutions, seven of them simple Senate resolutions and four concurrent, were approved by the committee and passed by the Senate, and all but one of the concurrent resolutions passed the House. And, finally, two bills were reported by the committee but not passed by the Senate.

Although the volume of business before the committee (in terms of the actual number of bills passed) decreased somewhat during this Congress, the importance of its business did not. This is reflected in the number of meetings held by the committee. The committee and its legislative subcommittees met 251 times during these 2 years, compared to 175 times during the Eighty-first Congress. One hundred and eighty-eight of these were executive sessions, of which the transcripts of 84 were subsequently made public, and 63 were public meetings. The fact that 96 of the executive sessions were held jointly with the Armed Services Committee of the Senate underlines the close relationship between the foreign policy of this Nation and its national security.

COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL MATTERS: BILATERAL TREATIES

Most civilized nations regulate their normal commercial relations with each other by bilateral treaties and conventions covering various types of activities. The United States, for instance, has treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation, and consular conventions, with practically all states of the world. Some of these treaties date back to the early days of the Republic. The Department of State is constantly revising the old

conventions, negotiating new ones with states newly emerging or previously not covered, and devising solutions to new problems arising out of modern conditions, such as double taxation. The Eighty-second Congress had an unusual number of such treaties before it: 18 double-taxation conventions, all but one of which were approved; 3 consular conventions, which were approved; and 6 commercial treaties on which no final action was taken.

Double-Taxation Conventions

Background.—Double taxation arises, in the absence of reciprocal conventions, from the fact that the various governments assume and exercise broad and frequently overlapping taxing jurisdictions. Several years ago, the United States embarked on a program of negotiating conventions to eliminate double taxation on its citizens residing, deriving an income, or inheriting an estate in a foreign state.

Senate action.—(1) The 14 conventions: In January 1951, a subcommittee with Senator George as chairman and Senators Gillette, Smith of New Jersey, and Hickenlooper as members was appointed to consider the 13 double-taxation conventions then pending before the committee and 1 other transmitted to the Senate during the course of the subcommittee's deliberations. The subcommittee held 2 days of public hearings in April and on June 1, 1951, the subcommittee agreed to report the 14 conventions favorably to the full committee with certain reservations to several of them. The full committee promptly endorsed the subcommittee's recommendations and the Senate ratified them in due course. These were the conventions ratified and the reservations thereto:

1. Convention with the Union of South Africa relating to income taxes, signed at Pretoria, December 13, 1946 (Executive O, 80th Cong., 1st sess.): Approved with an understanding relative to the collection provisions of article XV.

2. Convention with the Union of South Africa relating to estate taxes, signed at Capetown, April 10, 1947 (Executive FF, 80th Cong., 1st sess.): Approved with an understanding relative to the collection provisions of article VIII.

3. Convention with New Zealand relating to income taxes, signed at Washington, March 16, 1948 (Executive J, 80th Cong., 2d sess.): Approved subject to a reservation relative to taxes collectible from public entertainers.

4. Convention with Norway relating to income taxes, signed at Washington, June 13, 1949 (Executive Q, 81st Cong., 1st sess.): Approved subject to an understanding relative to the collection provisions of article XVII.

5. Convention with Norway relating to estate taxes, signed at Washington, June 13, 1949 (Executive R, 81st Cong., 1st sess.): Approved subject to a reservation respecting the collection provisions of article IX.

6. Convention with Ireland relating to estate taxes, signed at Dublin, September 13, 1949 (Executive E, 81st Cong., 2d sess.): Approved subject to no reservations or understandings.

7. Convention with Ireland relating to income taxes, signed at Dublin, September 13, 1949 (Executive F, 81st Cong., 2d sess.): Approved subject to reservations rela-

ive to the capital-gains provisions of article XIV and the accumulated-earnings provisions of article XVI.

8. Convention with Greece relating to estate taxes, signed at Athens, February 20, 1950 (Executive K, 81st Cong., 2d sess.): Approved subject to a reservation regarding the collection provisions of article IX.

9. Convention with Greece relating to income taxes, signed at Athens, February 20, 1950 (Executive L, 81st Cong., 2d sess.): Approved subject to an understanding with respect to the collection provisions of article XIX.

10. Convention with Canada relating to income taxes, signed at Ottawa, June 12, 1950 (Executive R, 81st Cong., 2d sess.): Approved subject to a reservation relating to the professional earnings of public entertainers.

11. Convention with Canada relating to estate taxes, signed at Ottawa, June 12, 1950 (Executive S, 81st Cong., 2d sess.): Approved subject to no reservations or understandings.

12. Protocol with the Union of South Africa, relating to estate taxes, signed at Pretoria, July 14, 1950 (Executive T, 81st Cong., 2d sess.): Approved subject to an understanding relative to the collection provision referred to above under Executive FF.

13. Protocol with the Union of South Africa, relating to income taxes, signed at Pretoria, July 14, 1950 (Executive U, 81st Cong., 2d sess.): Approved subject to a reservation relating to the profits of public entertainers and the understanding referred to under Executive O above.

14. Convention with Switzerland, relating to income taxes, signed at Washington, May 24, 1951 (Executive N, 82d Cong., 1st sess.): Approved subject to reservation regarding profits of public entertainers.

(2) The three conventions: Toward the close of the second session, three additional conventions on double taxation, referred to the committee since its consideration of the previous 14, were considered by Senator George as a subcommittee of 1. His recommendation for approval was accepted by the full committee on June 23, 1952 and by the Senate a few days later. The conventions, ratified without reservations, were the following:

1. Convention with Finland relating to estate taxes, signed at Washington, March 3, 1952 (Executive K, 82d Cong., 2d sess.).

2. Convention with Finland relating to income taxes, signed at Washington, March 3, 1952 (Executive L, 82d Cong., 2d sess.).

3. Convention with Switzerland relating to estate taxes, signed at Washington, July 9, 1951 (Executive P, 82d Cong., 1st sess.).

Provisions. The conventions and protocols listed above fall into two groups, nine dealing with taxes on income and eight dealing with taxes on the estates of deceased persons. In general they follow the postwar pattern of the conventions with the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, and Denmark.

The income tax conventions are designed to eliminate double taxation with respect to income, either by exemption in one of the countries or by granting appropriate credit for taxes paid, or both. They also establish a system of reciprocal administrative assistance between the tax authorities of the signatories. They contain provisions relating to business income, dividends and interest, compensation for personal services, government salaries, private pensions and annuities, professors, teachers, students and business ap-

prentices, religious, charitable and similar organizations, ships and aircraft, rentals and royalties, capital gains, accumulated earnings and profits, etc.

The conventions on estate taxes seek to eliminate double taxation, principally by a credit system with respect to the estates inherited by nationals of one country in the territory of the other. They also set up a system for exchange of information and administrative assistance. The provisions are essentially the same as those of previous conventions.

The reservations adopted by the Senate on the estate tax conventions apply to provisions on mutual assistance in the collection of taxes. The committee felt that these were too broad and recommended that they be omitted entirely. This reservation was adopted by the Senate.

The reservations adopted by the Senate to the various income tax conventions all relate to the same provision, which exempted public entertainers from the tax relief for personal services extended to residents of one State temporarily within the taxing State. This was deemed by the committee and the Senate to discriminate unfairly against a particular occupational group, and reservations were adopted withholding Senate advice and consent from that provision.

Dates Documents

(1) THE FOURTEEN CONVENTIONS

Subcommittee appointed, January 22, 1951.	
Subcommittee hearings, April 12 and 13, 1951.	Printed hearings.
Subcommittee report, June 29, 1951.	Executive transcript.
Reported to Senate, August 6, 1951.	Senate Executive Report 1, Eighty-first Congress, first session.
Approved, September 17, 1951.	Congressional Record, same date.

(2) THE THREE CONVENTIONS

Subcommittee appointed, May 19, 1952.	
Reported to full committee and Senate, June 23, 1952.	Executive Report 13, Eighty-second Congress, second session.
Approved, July 4, 1952-----	Congressional Record, same date.

Consular Conventions

The United States has consular conventions with most nations of the world. The general nature of these treaties has been described by the committee as follows:

Consular conventions are bilateral agreements whereby the parties agree that they will reciprocally grant consular establishments and consular officers and employees certain privileges and rights within each country. These privileges and rights are given in order to enable the countries party to the conventions to assist and protect their nationals while in the territory of the other party to the convention.

In recent years, the Department of State has negotiated consular conventions to complete this network. The President in 1950 sent to the Senate consular conventions with Ireland and the United Kingdom. An article in these two conventions relating to the appointment of administrators of decedent's estates, however, raised certain questions which persuaded the Department of State to withdraw the United Kingdom convention and submit a new one, and to negotiate a protocol to the Irish convention. A subcommittee of Senators Sparkman (chairman), Fulbright, and Hickenlooper held public hearings on these three conventions—the new United Kingdom convention, the Irish convention, and the protocol thereto—and reported them favorably to the committee. Both the full committee and the Senate approved them.

The conventions with Ireland and the United Kingdom are the first such instruments signed between the United States and those two nations. They follow closely the pattern of the only other postwar consular conventions entered into by the United States—those with the Philippines (1947) and Costa Rica (1948). They concern—

the status of consular establishments, the rights, privileges, and immunities of consular officers, and the duties and functions of consular officers stationed in the territories of the parties to the convention (Ex. Rept. 8, 82d Cong., 2d sess.).

<i>Dates</i>	<i>Documents</i>
First United Kingdom convention signed, February 16, 1949.	
Transmitted to Senate, January 9, 1950.	Executive A, Eighty-first Congress, second session.
Withdrawn, October 16, 1951.	Congressional Record, same date.
Second United Kingdom convention signed June 6, 1951.	
Transmitted to Senate, June 20, 1951.	Executive O, Eighty-second Congress, first session.
Irish convention signed, May 1, 1950.	
Transmitted to Senate, June 7, 1950.	Executive P, Eighty-first Congress, second session.
Protocol to Irish convention signed March 3, 1952.	
Transmitted to Senate, March 28, 1952.	Executive N, Eighty-second Congress, second session.
Public hearings, May 9, 1952.	Printed as appendix to Executive Report 8, Eighty-second Congress, second session.
Reported to Senate, May 21, 1952.	Executive Report 8, Eighty-second Congress, second session.
Approved, June 13, 1952.	Congressional Record, same date.

Commercial Treaties

Although the commercial treaties were not reported by the committee, they deserve mention because they were considered at some length by

the same subcommittee that considered the consular conventions. The six commercial treaties studied were those between the United States on the one hand and Colombia, Israel, Ethiopia, Italy, Denmark, and Greece. In most respects these treaties follow the general pattern of previous treaties although there were many improvements in language. The treaties covered such matters as the protection of nationals and their property in the territory of the contracting parties, the promotion of trade, the reduction of discrimination based on nationality, and similar matters. One provision relating to the extension of national treatment to nationals of contracting parties engaged in the professions raised several questions which were still under consideration when the Eighty-second Congress ended and it was not possible to conclude the subcommittee's study of the conventions.

<i>Dates</i>	<i>Documents</i>
Signed:	
Colombia, April 26, 1951	
Israel, August 23, 1951	
Ethiopia, September 7, 1951	
Italy, September 26, 1951	
Denmark, October 1, 1951	
Greece, August 3, 1951	
Transmitted:	
Colombia, June 13, 1951	Executive M, Eighty-second Congress, first session.
Israel, October 18, 1951	Executive R, Eighty-second Congress, first session.
Ethiopia, January 14, 1952	Executive F, Eighty-second Congress, second session.
Italy, January 29, 1952	Executive H, Eighty-second Congress, second session.
Denmark, January 29, 1952	Executive I, Eighty-second Congress, second session.
Greece, January 30, 1952	Executive J, Eighty-second Congress, second session.
Public hearings, May 9, 1952	Printed hearings.

COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL MATTERS: INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS

Certain problems by their nature cannot be solved on a bilateral basis, as those discussed above, but must be settled for greater effectiveness on a multilateral basis. Among these are international commodity, conservation, transportation, and communications problems. The committee during this Congress had before it several such multilateral conventions designed to eliminate specific problems, two protocols to the international agreement on the regulation of production and marketing of sugar, a number of international labor conventions, and an amendment to the International Load Line Convention. These are described below.

Protocols to the International Convention on the Regulation of Production and Marketing of Sugar

Since 1944, the Senate has each year extended, by means of approving a protocol, the international agreement regarding the regulation of production and marketing of sugar of 1937. Such extension has served to keep alive the framework, but not the operative chapters, of that agreement for possible future revision. The 1951 protocol was approved along with the 1952 protocol toward the end of the 1952 session.

Dates	Documents
Signed August 31, 1950, and August 31, 1951.	
Transmitted to the Senate, June 7, 1951, and April 1, 1952.	Executives I, Eighty-second Congress, first session, and O, Eighty-second Congress, second session.
Reported to Senate, May 19, 1952.	Executive Report 7, Eighty-second Congress, second session.
Approved, July 4, 1952-----	Congressional Record, same date.

International Labor Conventions

The United States has been a member of the ILO since 1934 and has taken a very active part in the organization. ILO conventions and recommendations, however, have not been particularly applicable in the United States because labor standards on the whole in the United States are higher than those advocated in these instruments. Senate action has not been pressed on a number of conventions and recommendations referred to it over the course of the years. During this Congress a special effort was made to secure action on some of these instruments.

The conventions acted upon by the committee were four (Nos. 68, 69, 73, and 74) adopted at Seattle in 1946, all relating to minimum working standards for seamen. ILO Convention No. 68 concerns food and catering for crews on seagoing vessels, No. 69 concerns ships' cooks, No. 73 medical examination of seafarers, and No. 74 the certification of able-bodied seamen. These four conventions deal with conditions of work for maritime employees. The committee report states that the adherence of the United States to the four conventions—

will serve to protect the standards of the most advanced countries, such as the United States, from the lower standards of countries that lag behind.

A subcommittee of Senators Green (chairman), Sparkman, and Tobey held hearings on the four conventions and reported them favorably with several understandings. The purpose of these understandings was to make the conventions—as was intended by the framers—apply only to vessels plying the high seas and to exclude them from application to inland, coastal, or Great Lakes waters. The full committee adopted the subcom-

mittee's recommendations and report, which in turn were adopted by the Senate.

Dates	Documents
Signed, June 29, 1946-----	
Transmitted to Senate, June 23, 1947.	Executives R, S, Y, and Z, Eightieth Congress, first session.
Public hearings, January 21 and 23, 1952.	Typed transcript.
Reported to Senate, June 9, 1952.	Executive Report 11, Eighty-second Congress, second session.
Approved, July 4, 1952-----	Congressional Record, same date.

Amendment to International Load Line Convention

Background.—In its report on this convention, the committee stated the background of the International Load Line Convention as follows:

The International Load Line Convention, which was negotiated in 1930, approved by the Senate on February 27, 1931, and proclaimed by the President on January 5, 1933, prescribes the depths to which ships engaged in international commerce may be loaded. It requires that ships of participating nations engaged in international voyages shall be surveyed and marked with load lines in accordance with the convention's terms. Load lines are placed on ships to mark the point beyond which a vessel may not be safely submerged by reason of the load it carries. The convention recognizes that the load line may with full regard to safety differ at varying seasons of the year and in different parts of the oceans of the world and therefore fixes zones and seasons in which and during which different rules for fixing the load lines apply.

Both Australia and Canada proposed modifications to the original conventions, which were approved by the interested authorities and shipping concerns in the United States. The Canadian modification consisted of including the port of Prince Rupert, British Columbia, in the "summer" zone instead of the "winter seasonal" zone, thereby permitting more deeply laden vessels to operate there. The Australian modification proposed to permit ships to remain in the "summer" zone on voyages between the Indian Ocean and ports of southern and eastern Australia, thereby again facilitating the carriage of heavier loads. Since both modifications involved no lowering of safety standards and were supported by all interested parties, the committee and Senate took favorable action.

Dates	Documents
Submitted to the Senate, October 3, 1951.	Senate Executive Q, Eighty-second Congress, first session.
Reported, March 7, 1952----	Senate Executive Report 4, Eighty-second Congress, second session.
Approved, April 1, 1952-----	Congressional Record, same date.

ACTION ON TREATIES

Summary.—During the Eighty-second Congress, the Senate received 39 treaties, which in addition to the 34 still pending from previous ses-

sions made a total of 73 treaties before the committee. Of these 4 were withdrawn at the

request of the President of the United States and 39 were approved by the Senate for ratification.

Document	Title	Date approved by Senate
Ex. O, 80th, 1st-----	Convention between the United States of America and the Union of South Africa, signed at Pretoria on Dec. 13, 1946, in the English and Afrikaans languages, for the avoidance of double taxation for establishing rules of reciprocal administrative assistance with respect to taxes on income.	Sept. 7, 1951
Ex. R, S, Y, and Z, 80th, 1st--	4 conventions, formulated at the twenty-eighth (maritime) session of the International Labor Conference, held at Seattle, Wash., June 6-29, 1946, which were transmitted to the Senate by the President on June 23, 1947.	July 4, 1952
Ex. FF, 80th, 1st-----	Convention between the United States of America and the Union of South Africa, signed at Capetown on Apr. 10, 1947, in the English and Afrikaans languages, for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on the estates of deceased persons.	Sept. 17, 1951
Ex. J, 80th, 2d-----	The convention between the United States of America and New Zealand, signed at Washington on Mar. 16, 1948, for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income.	Do.
Ex. Q, 81st, 1st-----	A convention between the United States of America and Norway for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income, signed at Washington, June 13, 1949.	Do.
Ex. R, 81st, 1st-----	A convention between the United States of America and Norway for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on estates and inheritances, signed at Washington on June 13, 1949.	Do.
Ex. E, 81st, 2d-----	A convention between the United States of America and Ireland, signed at Dublin on Sept. 13, 1949, for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on the estates of deceased persons.	Do.
Ex. F, 81st, 2d-----	A convention between the United States of America and Ireland, signed at Dublin on Sept. 13, 1949, for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income.	Do.
Ex. K, 81st, 2d-----	A convention between the United States of America and Greece, signed at Athens on Feb. 20, 1950, for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on the estates of deceased persons.	Do.
Ex. L, 81st, 2d-----	A convention with Greece, signed at Athens on Feb. 20, 1950, for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income.	Do.
Ex. P, 81st, 2d-----	A consular convention between the United States of America and Ireland, signed at Dublin on May 1, 1950.	June 13, 1952
Ex. R, 81st, 2d-----	Convention between the United States of America and Canada, signed at Ottawa on June 12, 1950, modifying and supplementing in certain respects the convention and accompanying protocol for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion in the case of income taxes, signed at Washington on Mar. 4, 1942.	Sept. 17, 1951
Ex. S, 81st, 2d-----	Convention between the United States of America and Canada, signed at Ottawa on June 12, 1950, modifying and supplementing in certain respects the convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion in the case of estate taxes and succession duties, signed at Ottawa on June 8, 1944.	Sept. 17, 1951
Ex. T, 81st, 2d-----	A protocol between the United States of America and the Union of South Africa, signed at Pretoria on July 14, 1950, supplementing the convention for the avoidance of double taxation and for establishing rules of reciprocal administrative assistance with respect to taxes on the estates of deceased persons, which was signed at Cape Town on Apr. 10, 1947.	Do.
Ex. U, 81st, 2d-----	A protocol between the United States of America and the Union of South Africa, signed at Pretoria on July 14, 1950, supplementing the convention for the avoidance of double taxation and for establishing rules of reciprocal administrative assistance with respect to taxes on income, which was signed at Pretoria on Dec. 13, 1946.	Do.
Ex. W, 81st, 2d-----	A highway convention between the United States of America and the Republic of Panama, signed at Panama on Sept. 14, 1950.	July 4, 1952
Ex. C, 82d, 1st-----	A convention between the United States of America and Canada, relating to the operation by citizens of either country of certain radio equipment or stations in the other country, signed at Ottawa, on Feb. 8, 1951.	Apr. 1, 1952
Ex. I, 82d, 1st-----	A certified copy of a protocol dated in London Aug. 31, 1950, prolonging for 1 year after Aug. 31, 1950, the international agreement regarding the regulation of production and marketing of sugar, signed at London on May 6, 1937.	July 4, 1952

Document	Title	Date approved by Senate
Ex. N, 82d, 1st.....	A convention between the United States of America and Switzerland, signed at Washington on May 24, 1951, for the avoidance of double taxation with respect to taxes on income.	Sept. 17, 1951
Ex. O, 82d, 1st.....	A consular convention and an accompanying protocol of signature between the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, signed at Washington on June 6, 1951.	June 13, 1952
Ex. P, 82d, 1st.....	Convention between the United States of America and Switzerland, signed at Washington on July 9, 1951, for the avoidance of double taxation with respect to taxes on estates and inheritances.	July 4, 1952
Ex. Q, 82d, 1st.....	Texts of a proposal by the Government of Canada and a proposal by the Government of Australia relating to seasonal zones established in annex II of the international load line convention, signed at London on July 5, 1930.	Apr. 1, 1952
Ex. A, B, C, and D, 82d, 2d..	Treaty of peace with Japan, signed at San Francisco on Sept. 8, 1951; mutual defense treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of the Philippines, signed at Washington on Aug. 30, 1951; security treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States of America, signed at San Francisco on Sept. 1, 1951; security treaty between the United States of America and Japan, signed at San Francisco on Sept. 8, 1951.	Mar. 20, 1952
Ex. E, 82d, 2d.....	A protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of Greece and Turkey, which was opened for signature at London on Oct. 17, 1951, and had been signed on behalf of the United States of America and the other parties to the North Atlantic Treaty.	Feb. 7, 1952
Ex. G, 82d, 2d.....	A supplementary extradition convention between the United States of America and Canada, signed at Ottawa on Oct. 26, 1951.	Apr. 1, 1952
Ex. K, 82d, 2d.....	A convention between the United States of America and the Republic of Finland, signed at Washington on Mar. 3, 1952, for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on estates and inheritances.	July 4, 1952
Ex. L, 82d, 2d.....	A convention between the United States of America and the Republic of Finland, signed at Washington on Mar. 3, 1952, for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income.	Do.
Ex. M, 82d, 2d.....	An agreement between the United States of America and Canada, signed at Ottawa on Feb. 24, 1952, for promotion of safety on the Great Lakes by means of radio.	Do.
Ex. N, 82d, 2d.....	A protocol between the United States of America and Ireland, signed at Dublin on Mar. 3, 1952, supplementary to the consular convention, signed at Dublin on May 1, 1950.	June 13, 1952
Ex. O, 82d, 2d.....	A protocol dated in London Aug. 31, 1952, prolonging for 1 year after Aug. 31, 1951, the international agreement regarding the regulation of production and marketing of sugar, signed at London on May 6, 1937.	July 4, 1952
Ex. Q and R, 82d, 2d.....	Convention on relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany, signed at Bonn on May 26, 1952, and a protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at Paris on May 27, 1952.	July 1, 1952
Ex. S, 82d, 2d.....	An international convention for the high-seas fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean, together with a protocol relating thereto, signed at Tokyo, May 9, 1952, on behalf of the United States, Canada, and Japan.	July 4, 1952

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

Repatriation and Liberation of German Prisoners of War. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2405. Pub. 4600. 12 pp. 5¢.

Understanding between the United States and France—Dated at Paris Mar. 11 and 13, 1947; entered into force Mar. 13, 1947 with annex dated Mar. 7, 1947.

Health and Sanitation, Cooperative Program in Paraguay. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2423. Pub. 4601. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Paraguay supplementing agreement of Sept. 18 and Nov. 11, 1950—Signed at Asunción Nov. 5 and Dec. 7, 1951; entered into force Dec. 13, 1951.

Aviation, Establishment of Customs, Public Health, and Police Controls at Payne Field. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2410. Pub. 4605. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Egypt—Signed at Cairo Jan. 5, 1946; entered into force Jan. 5, 1946.

Prosecution of the War, Portuguese Timor Air Base on Santa Maria Island. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2338. Pub. 4611. 9 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Portugal—Signed at Lisbon Nov. 28, 1944; entered into force Nov. 28, 1944.

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773	10/1	Acheson: Korean question in U.N.
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775	10/3	Contracting parties to GATT
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777	10/3	Acheson: Recall of Kennan
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Soviet Reaction to Free World's Growing Strength

Address by Secretary Acheson¹

I have come here to pay my respects to a fighting union.

To look around this room, at this great and vigorous convention of a union less than 3 years old and already one of America's most important labor organizations, is to find proof enough of what courage and determination can do.

This convention is a tribute to the hard work of your rank and file, your officers, and especially to the fighting spirit of your brilliant young president, Jim Carey.

The battle you have been carrying on during these 3 years is far more important than the question of who is to represent the electrical workers of this country. Every American citizen has a stake in your fight against communism in the American labor movement. For this fight of yours is part of the great world struggle between freedom and tyranny.

I say this, not only because it has loosened the grip of a Communist-dominated union upon one of America's defense industries, but even more because working men and women in every industrial country are prime targets for the Communists. The outcome of this world-wide struggle may hang almost as much upon the success or failure of the Communist effort to capture the labor movement as upon our strength of arms. That is why it is significant that you have shown the world how free trade unionists can hand a smashing and decisive defeat to what the Cio has called "the Communist Party masquerading as a labor union."

We in the State Department have sent to European labor leaders thousands of copies of the reports of your officers, describing how you have been fighting and winning this battle. We have carried on the Voice of America your radio program, "American Labor Answers Radio Moscow." This public-service program has been most effective

in exposing the myths and lies spread by the Communists about American working men and women. It is proof of the effectiveness of this program that Jim Carey has had the honor recently of receiving several blasts from Radio Moscow.

There is another reason why I think your fight has meaning that goes far beyond yourselves. And that is because there is a right way and a wrong way to fight communism. You have been demonstrating to the American people how to go about it the *right* way, the effective way.

Some who call themselves "anti-Communist" seem to believe that their best weapons are a strong voice and a weak conscience.

But indiscriminate denunciations and character assassination are not the way to defend democracy from communism. The people who use these weapons do not know what democracy is.

You know that the people who attack legitimate labor organizers as "Bolsheviks" make it harder, not easier, to fight the real Bolsheviks.

And those who call themselves "anti-Communist" only confuse the issue and hinder the real fight against communism, when they attack as a traitor one of our greatest living patriots, Gen. George C. Marshall.

You have shown that the effective fight against communism can and must be carried on by democratic means. The reports of the trial committees designated by the Cio to hear and decide charges of Communist domination against some of its affiliates were published by a Committee of the United States Senate² because it believed them of consuming interest to the Senate and to the American people. The Senate Committee pointed out that these reports threw a flood of light upon the strategy used by the Communist conspirators in their efforts to subvert unions as democratic institutions. The Committee pointed out something else equally and perhaps even more important. "They

¹ Made before the International Union of Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers (Cio) at Pittsburgh, Oct. 6 (press release 781).

² *Communist Domination of Certain Unions*, S. doc. 89, 82d Cong., 1st sess.

demonstrate," said the Chairman, Senator Humphrey, "how an alert and democratically governed organization destroyed Communist infiltration by due process."

To defend democracy by antidemocratic means—by the Big Lie, by the smear, by indiscriminate accusations—will destroy democracy.

There is another good lesson for all of us in your experience, and this has special application to our foreign policy. For you have been fighting the Communists with all your might, and at the same time, you have been striving vigorously and successfully to improve the conditions of the workers and in this way taking from the Communists the arguments and claims which form their chief appeal to the unsuspecting.

As Jim Carey has said on many occasions, it isn't enough to be anti-Communist; you have to lick them with a positive program of your own. And this, in a nutshell, is the basic idea of our foreign policy.

It is no accident that the man who has done most to stiffen the backbone of the free world against communism has also cared more about, and done more about, human needs at home and abroad than anyone else.

That man is the President of the United States, Harry S. Truman.

The President has fought, not only for the defense of democracy but for the affirmation of democracy. His programs have been built upon the faith that free men can create and sustain strength of arms while they demonstrate that democracy more truly provides the way toward genuine progress.

He has held to that faith, with courage and consistency, against both the reckless and the faint-hearted. He has been unmoved by those who were ready to throw off restraint and plunge into ever-widening warfare. He was unmoved by others who would have held back the building of strength and of collective security against the Communist challenge. The President has held to a steady course.

Communists Forced To Change Tactics

I have no worry about the final judgment which history will pass on what has been done. It is of more concern to us now to note the significance of some recent events. These events, I believe, show that the Communist world is being forced to adjust its tactics to the new situation created by the growing strength of the free world.

Just how the Kremlin will adjust its tactics is not yet clear. It will become clear only from the actions of the Communist world, not from words—not even the words of Stalin or the resolutions of a Party Congress.

But this much, I think, can be said on the basis of the evidence now available. The expectation that has apparently dominated Soviet policy since

the end of the war was clearly evident at the time of the founding of the Cominform in September 1947. It was that all Europe and all Asia were ready to crumble before Soviet pressure and, if necessary, Soviet force. This expectation has been frustrated. The Communist world made important gains in the earlier part of this period, in China and in Czechoslovakia, while power factors were greatly in their favor. But as the strength and the spirit of resistance grew in the free world, the Soviet high hopes for easy conquest were disappointed.

The measures responsible for the rise in confidence and strength of the free world are familiar to you: the staunch resistance of Iran in 1946, the Greek-Turkish aid programs and the Marshall Plan in 1947, the Vandenberg Resolution in 1948, the North Atlantic Treaty, the military-aid program and the Point Four Program, both inaugurated in 1949, and more than any other single act, I believe, the resolute response by the United Nations against aggression in Korea in 1950. Then, add to this, in the past 2 years, the Japanese peace treaty, the contractual agreements with the German Federal Republic, the Schuman Plan, the European Defense Community, the treaties with the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand, and the growing strength and confidence of the United States itself.

The central purpose of these measures was to deter war, to create a realization in Moscow that a course of aggression would be doomed to defeat. I believe that this policy is succeeding, that this realization has begun to sink in.

The failure of previous Communist tactics in several parts of the world is leading the Communists to search for new ways of gaining their ends.

In France, the serious set-backs suffered by the Communists have apparently led them to modify their line of militant action. Since 1947, the circulation of the leading French Communist newspaper has dropped from 600,000 to less than 200,000. In the same period, membership in Communist-controlled labor unions has dropped from 5,500,000 to 1,500,000. In May, when General Ridgway arrived in Paris to take over the Supreme Command of the North Atlantic Treaty forces, the Communists attempted widespread riots throughout the country, aimed at the authority of the Government. These attempts ended in dismal failure. Only the militant hard core attempted to defy the police, and in so doing brought about the arrest of Jacques Duclos, the Acting Secretary General of the Communist Party. Strikes called by the Communists to protest the arrest of Duclos also ended in failure. By the middle of June, the French Communists were giving up violence and attempting to create a united national front under the guise of joining with others for peace and for economic and social progress. They have now thrown overboard two of their most militant old-time leaders and are

pressing hard and insidiously for a united front, particularly with the Socialists and the non-Communist labor unions.

This move is an old one, a familiar one, and one which counts on the people of France having a short memory. It is quite as dangerous as, perhaps more dangerous than, violence. But it does demonstrate that violence ended in failure.

In Japan, too, Communist violence has proved a fiasco, and the decline in Communist strength has been spectacular. Before the recent election in Japan, the Communists made a desperate effort to switch from a "hard" line to one of broad cooperation. They offered a united front to the Left-wing Socialists. But the Socialists refused to be taken in.

Smashing Defeat in Japan

As a result, the Communists suffered a smashing defeat in the election. From a popular vote of almost three million in January 1949, the Communist vote dropped to about 350,000. Starting with 35 seats in the Japanese Lower House in 1949, they now have none.

In the Federal Republic of Germany, in Sweden, in the Netherlands, and elsewhere, there are similar reports of the decline of Communist power and influence. In the Philippines, the Communist Huk forces, diminished and on the defensive, no longer threaten the security of the Government. In Burma, the Communist insurgents have lost control over one area after another and are trying to draw other insurgent groups into a "united front."

Such local actions as these could foreshadow a considerable change in Soviet tactics. If they do, it will be due to our steady program of reinforcing the free world.

Don't misunderstand me. The evidence is by no means clear that such a change is already under way. Nor do I mean that, even should the Soviet Union turn from the general method of violence to the more insidious "united front," "boring-from-within" method, all its actions would be of this type. There would still be the kidnappings, the bullying and blustering notes to NATO governments, the aggressive assertions that NATO is designed and operated for war. And, most of all, there would doubtless still be particular singling out of the United States for abuse and hostility, for reasons to which I shall refer in a moment. What I am suggesting is that there are indications of a change in the Kremlin method of undermining our friends in the free world.

And if subsequent events make it clear that the Kremlin is in fact silencing the rattling of the sabers and is beginning to talk soothingly of stabilization, of "broad fronts," of "peaceful coexistence," there are several points which we shall have to keep in mind.

One is that we must not confuse a shift in

method with a change in underlying purpose. The international Communist movement has been through many shifts in method, without the slightest change in its fundamentally hostile purpose against the rest of the world.

A second point is that if such a shift does come about, it will be only because of the rebuilding of Western strength and the repeated demonstration of the free world's will to defend its freedom. We can be sure that the method of open aggression would be instantly renewed if the non-Communist world were to be lulled into complacency, into the slightest relaxation of its defensive efforts.

A third point for us to keep in mind is that a genuine reduction in tensions will require more than a few pronouncements by Soviet leaders about "peaceful coexistence." It will take action. One such opportunity for action will come within the next 48 hours. The Communist delegates are to return to the truce table at Panmunjom to give their reply to the recent proposals concerning prisoners of war made by General Harrison.³

Patience and Ingenuity at Panmunjom

I do not need to repeat to you the fact which is clear to everybody—that throughout the many months of armistice negotiations we have drawn on every resource of patience and ingenuity in order to reach an honorable settlement. We will not compromise with the basic principle that no prisoner shall be forced against his will to return to the Communists.

The proposals which General Harrison made, and which the Communists are now to answer, seem to me to make every reasonable effort to answer the objections they have brought up in the negotiations. They have claimed that the United Nations was trying to force prisoners to say they would resist being returned. To meet this, General Harrison's proposals even include the ingenious device that prisoners should be taken in small groups into a neutral area and there, free of control by anyone, should be allowed to walk north or south. It does not seem possible to offer anything more reasonable or more fair. The world will be watching to see what the Communists do about it. Action, rather than argument and quibbling, is what the world expects of them if their talk about peace has any relation to their intentions.

There is also opportunity for Soviet action for peace in Germany and Austria and all the other places around the world where the Communist forces are now engaged either in violence or in the obstruction of peace.

Finally, and most importantly, there is this point for us to think about. Although we would welcome any step by the Soviets—even a tactical one—that reduced the danger of hostilities, we

³ For text of the proposals, see BULLETIN of Oct. 6, 1952, p. 549.

must not delude ourselves that our task will be any easier than it has been. Even though this shift, if it occurs, would represent a response to the success of our previous efforts, we can't waste time in congratulating ourselves. The hostility of purpose on the part of the international Communist movement will still be there. The steady increase of Soviet military strength will continue, even though it moves on carpet slippers instead of hob-nailed boots. We can expect continued, and even intensified, efforts to subvert, to drive wedges between the free nations, to exploit the real difficulties with which the free nations are confronted. Indeed, this is the clear warning to us of the most recent statement by Stalin and of the pronouncements at the Soviet Party Congress which opened yesterday in Moscow.

Soviet Efforts To Isolate U.S.

The tasks of diplomacy in the period ahead may, if anything, be greater than those in the period through which we have just passed. We should, and I believe that we shall, be quick to discuss any problems about which the Soviet Union wishes sincerely and honestly to negotiate. Unhappily, the Soviet Government has shown no such sincere and honest desire. As the recent exchange of notes with them regarding Germany⁴ has so clearly shown, their desire to meet with us was not for the purpose of solving the problems involved but to use the meeting as a forum for propaganda to defeat treaties now pending before Western European Parliaments. In this situation, we shall have to continue our vigilance and our efforts to build strength against aggression; and we shall have to grapple with the tough and complicated problems within the free world. Recently, in talking to the machinists,⁵ I pointed out—and I think this is even clearer now than it was then—how great is the emphasis placed by the Soviets on the possibility of political and economic disintegration, in Europe, in Asia, and in Africa, and especially among the former colonial territories.

Disintegration and division—these may become the principal reliances of the Soviet Union in the period ahead. This is one of the indications of the unwarranted and invalid charges made by the Soviet Government last week against our Ambassador, George Kennan. Whatever else may lie behind the Soviet attack on Ambassador Kennan, it is abundantly clear that his wide knowledge of the Soviet Union, of its history, of its peoples, and of the Russian language worries and disturbs the Soviet rulers. The Iron Curtain is to remain tightly closed. But it is also clear from this action, and from the continuation of the violent and vicious "Hate America" propaganda, that the Soviet rulers, even though they may turn a sunny smile on the rest of the world, are prepared to

continue their expressions of hostility toward the people of the United States in an effort to isolate us, to divide us from our allies.

We can face this challenge with confidence. The cause of freedom has infinite resources of will and of strength. We have no reason to doubt that whatever hope and expectation the Kremlin has for disintegration and division will prove to be as vain as its hopes and expectations for the crumbling of Western resistance.

But the outcome is not automatic. It depends upon what we do.

These developments which I have been discussing come at a time when the people of the United States are faced with a fateful choice, a choice between two attitudes toward the world situation, a choice between two courses of action.

One course which has been offered to the American people means facing up to our responsibilities seriously and honestly, without any sugar-coating, without trying to deceive ourselves about how hard and how long the road ahead may be. This course means facing the hard responsibilities, as well as the benefits, of the defense of Korea; it means facing squarely up to the costs of our defense programs, and what this means in military service and in taxes.

The other course offers escape from responsibility. It offers a return to the days when our problems were simpler. It offers short cuts and tax cuts. It promises to bring the boys home (and how familiar that sounds). This course appeals to all our natural reactions to the burdens and anxieties of the job before us. This course fulfills the wish we all share, that our problems were simpler and easier than, in fact, they are. This course is made to appear short and easy. But around the corner, it comes to an abrupt end, at the edge of the cliff of disaster.

Many of us, obeying a natural human instinct, have the feeling that, after all, we occupy a favored position with destiny and that there can be no other outcome than a happy one to our problems. This has not, however, been the judgment of history on nations that failed to meet the problems of their times.

The span of some states is long and of others, short. One of the lessons of history is that the length of that span depends, not merely on natural and human resources, but also on the capacity and willingness of people to appraise intelligently the dangers amid which they live and to act with vigor, reason, and character.

The Empires of Babylon and of Assyria, each of which dominated for several hundred years that vital center of civilization in the Middle East spreading out from the valley of the Tigris and the Euphrates, appeared to be immune to decay or conquest. Each of them in turn gave way before invading hordes of more vigorous people.

The individual city states of ancient Greece, in which the lamp of civilization burned so brightly

⁴ *Ibid.*, Oct. 6, 1952, p. 517.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Sept. 22, 1952, p. 423.

for many generations and to which we are so heavily indebted, were increasingly torn with internal dissensions and were fatally weakened by persistent rivalries and recurrent wars among themselves. Our word "demagogue" comes down to us from the men of Athens who induced their fellow citizens to destroy the alliance of the Greeks, of which Athens had been the leader. When this mutual security alliance had been destroyed, the Greek states were overcome by the less civilized but more disciplined power of Macedon.

High Price of Irresolution

However great our power and our prestige among nations, we are not immune to the consequences of weakness or error. We no longer have a cushion of time and a cushion of space to protect us, and the price of irresolution or self-deception may not only be the loss of our privileged position but the submergence of our civilization in a new age of darkness.

But this Nation has not weathered the ordeals of Valley Forge and Gettysburg and Guadalcanal to fall prey now to a weakness of will. The outward aspect of our national life may now be riven with faction and dispute, but beneath the surface the pulse is strong and sure. The American people have not lost the honesty and courage to face without flinching this generation's hard trial.

The course we are on, though it offers no easy promises, though it may be hard and it may be long, is not a bleak one for those who really believe in freedom and in the power of freedom.

The mark of that power may be seen in the distance we have already come in strengthening the free world and in thwarting the Communist dream of easy conquest.

Even more, the mark of that power may be seen in the incredible lengths to which the Communists have gone to keep their people from escaping.

In the satellite countries bordering on the Western democracies, along many parts of the border, strips of land more than 50 yards wide have been

completely cleared of trees, bushes, even tree stumps and structures of any kind which could provide concealment. Observation towers have been erected, spaced from 800 yards to 1,000 yards apart. Rows of barbed-wire fences charged with electricity parallel the border in places and are interspersed with land mines and signal rockets which explode on contact. There are slit trenches manned by guards equipped with searchlights and high-powered rifles with telescopic sights. In some areas, double patrols assisted by police dogs are constantly on the move. Where there are rivers, the police unceasingly patrol by boat.

Why do they do this? Is it to keep the outside world from flocking to their new paradise?

You know that it isn't. The barbed wire and the machine guns are attempts to keep the knowledge of freedom out, and those who, despite all suppression, have that knowledge, in. But despite the barriers, despite the threats of punishment and reprisals, the number of people who manage to escape through the Iron Curtain into Western Europe is still between 400 and 500 a month. And in Germany, where the barriers have not yet been completed, the number of Germans who flee the Soviet zone into Free Germany averages between 600 and 700 *a day*.

There is no greater force on the face of the earth than man's desire to be free.

Freedom is our cause. It is what we are striving with all our might to defend, and it is our greatest source of strength.

This has been true from the very beginning of America. Is it still true of Americans? Think this over; and remember that we have always had patriots who had no heart for the long pull. They were vocal in 1787, and 1863, and they're still vocal. Is freedom worth 1 or 2 years of high taxes and meeting force with force, but not 4 years, or 10, or 20? Is there a new American principle that after a good try at defending our freedom and all that one word means, we give up, sell America short, and get taxes down? Think it over. It's worth a lot of thought.

Korean Armistice Negotiations Suspended

PRESS CONFERENCE STATEMENT BY SECRETARY ACHESON

Press release 786 dated October 8

As was made clear by General Clark's statement, the armistice negotiations at Panmunjom are not terminated. After the Communists rejected all of the latest proposals made by the U.N. Command delegation, General Harrison called a recess. The duration of the recess is entirely up to the Communists. General Harrison made it clear that the U.N. Command delegation continues ready to negotiate and will again meet with the Communist delegation whenever they are ready to accept any one of our numerous proposals or make a constructive proposal of their own for an honest settlement of the prisoner-of-war question. However, the U.N. Command delegation will not continue to go to Panmunjom merely to be subjected to Communist abuse and propaganda harangues.

For many months we have been attempting to negotiate an honorable armistice with patience and sincerity. The three alternative proposals which General Harrison presented on September 28¹ represented a further earnest effort by the United Nations to find an acceptable solution to the prisoner-of-war question. All three of those proposals preserve the humanitarian principles of nonforcible repatriation. Any one of these proposals could lead to an armistice.

The Communists have claimed that the U.N. Command has forced prisoners to say they would resist repatriation, although, in fact, the opposite was the case. The U.N. Command pointed out to each prisoner the possibilities that his family might be persecuted if he refused repatriation and that the U.N. Command could make no promise whatever as to the ultimate fate of those who refused to go home. General Harrison's proposals even included the device that the prisoners should be taken in small groups to a neutral area and there be released to walk north or south. Certainly, nothing could be more fair or reasonable. If the Communists want to settle this issue, our latest proposals point the way.

We have submitted numerous proposals throughout the negotiations and have thoroughly

explored every possible solution, while the Communist negotiators have utilized the negotiating table as a sounding board for false and vicious propaganda. We have tried everything we can think of to meet the considerations raised by the Communists.

We have said and will continue to say that we shall not compromise on the principle that a prisoner should not be forced to return against his will. For us to weaken in our resolve would constitute an abandonment of the principles fundamental to this country and the United Nations. We shall not trade in the lives of men. We shall not forcibly deliver human beings into Communist hands.

General Harrison's action last night does not represent a loss of hope in an armistice; we believe that it is an affirmative step toward obtaining an armistice. The Communists must now recognize that the position of the U.N. Command is firm as well as right. The Communists must now recognize that they cannot continue to toy with the hopes of the world for a Korean peace. We continue to believe that a humanitarian solution to the prisoner-of-war question can be found, and that this can be done at Panmunjom.

As General Clark said this morning, we remain ready at any time to conclude an armistice acceptable to the conscience of free peoples. It is up to the Communists to show whether they too want such an armistice.

STATEMENT BY GENERAL MARK CLARK, UNITED NATIONS COMMANDER IN KOREA²

Telegraphic text

1. The United Nations Command [UNC] has striven earnestly and patiently for 15 months to end grievous costs in Korea. Guided by those basic ideals of mankind which are the foundation of the United Nations, it has sought to persuade the Communists to join in an armistice both reasonable and honorable as a step toward restoration of peace and stability to the Korean people.

2. However, representatives of the North Korea Communist regime and the Chinese Communist forces who entered the conflict from Red China refuse to allow the issue of prisoners of war to be

¹ BULLETIN of Oct. 6, 1952, p. 549.

² Made at Tokyo on Oct. 8.

resolved in accord with moral dictates which most of humanity holds to be fundamental. They, and presumably those who stand behind them, refuse to recognize that the individual has certain inalienable rights. They refuse to acknowledge that many of their men now in our hands would resist to the death any effort to return them to Communist tyranny.

3. The United Nations Command has made repeated and earnest efforts to settle this question. We have offered a number of proposals any one of which would lead to an early and honorable armistice. On September 28 the Unc delegation offered three new proposals. This presentation culminated 8 months of constant effort to solve the prisoner-of-war question.

4. Today the Communists rejected these proposals. They have still made no constructive proposal of their own and have again continued to use meetings at Panmunjom solely for vilification and false propaganda. By doing so they showed clearly that they have no interest in an honorable solution to the prisoner-of-war question. They showed that they are without compunction in violating fundamental human rights if they affect the fragile prestige of the Communist creed. I can only conclude that they do not sincerely desire an armistice.

5. After the Communists clearly rejected our latest proposals (and again launched a propaganda attack), General Harrison, in accord with instructions, informed the Communists that the Unc delegation will not continue to go to Panmunjom merely to be subjected to abuse and propaganda harangues. He told the Communists that the Unc delegation continues ready to negotiate in good faith. The numerous proposals that the Unc has offered remain open. The Unc delegation told the Communists that it stands ready to meet with them when they are ready to accept any one of our numerous proposals or to make in writing a constructive proposal of their own for honest settlement of the prisoner-of-war question. Meanwhile, liaison officers will remain available for consultation at any time.

6. We continue ready to conclude an armistice acceptable to the conscience of free peoples. It is up to the Communists to show whether they want such an armistice.

STATEMENT BY GENERAL HARRISON, CHIEF U.N. NEGOTIATOR²

Telegraphic text

1. On September 28 the Unc delegation reviewed proposals that our side had previously offered you and, in addition, submitted three new proposals for your consideration. It is clear that you have categorically rejected our proposals.

2. On 25 June 1950 the North Korean Army

² Made at Panmunjom on Oct 8.

invaded the Republic of Korea. These facts were attested to by the U.N. Commission in Korea at that time, a commission composed of representatives from Australia, China, El Salvador, France, India, the Philippines, and Turkey.

3. With the sole objective of repelling the armed attack and restoring internal peace and security in Korea and thereby removing real danger to the peace and security of the world, the U.N. came to the assistance of the Republic of Korea and opposed you on the battlefield. It is with this same objective of restoring peace that Unc has ever since 10 July 1951 made every sincere effort toward an honorable armistice which would bring an end to hostilities in Korea.

4. On 28 April the Unc offered a proposal to facilitate resolution of outstanding issues preventing armistice. By this proposal the Unc offered to give up its very reasonable insistence that there should be no rehabilitation and construction of military airfields if, and only if, you would accept the humanitarian position of the Unc on prisoners of war. You have, however, continued to insist that the Unc must use force to drive unwilling prisoners of war back to your control. It should by now be clear that the Unc will never agree to any proposition which violates its basic principle of no forced repatriation. Consistent with the principle of no forced repatriation, the Unc has offered you numerous alternative proposals, any one of which would provide a humane and honorable agreement. You have rejected all these proposals.

5. Free peoples of the world, whom the Unc represents, respect human rights and insist on the individual enjoying the fundamental freedoms. Your side apparently considers that the individual is the property of the state, as though he were an inanimate and inarticulate possession. Although you have described your position as adherence to a principle, it is illogical to call your position a principle, for yours is a wholly unprincipled, cruel, and oppressive position. In fact, only a short while ago you clearly indicated that if the numbers of prisoners of war to be returned to your control were sufficiently large you would be willing to accept an armistice, even though there should remain numbers of your people who would not be returned. Evidently you were willing to bargain and haggle over the number of men to be returned to you, as though they were so many sheep. You completely ignored their rights as men. It would appear that your so-called "principle" is only a convenient invention. On the other hand, the concept of the dignity and worth of the individual which underlies the position of the Unc is a fundamental ideal and principle upon which the U.N. was founded and which cannot be surrendered for the mere sake of temporary expediency. This is a truth that you seem totally unable to comprehend.

6. Your objections to our principle of no forced

repatriation have never been consistent. At one time you appeared to have agreed to our use of the principle when you supplied us with an amnesty declaration to be read to prisoners of war in our custody prior to screening. As you know, we used your amnesty declaration and conducted screening in such a manner as to encourage the maximum number of your personnel to return to your side. When results of the screening were announced, and it became apparent to you that the riots which you inspired in our prisoner-of-war camps did not deter large numbers of your former personnel from renouncing communism, you contended that the screening was not fairly conducted.

When we offered to conduct rescreening and let you observe the process, or have it conducted by impartial nations, you suddenly announced that you would not agree to any type of screening by anybody, anywhere, or under any circumstances. Thus you have completely reversed your previous position and you denounce our humane policy as one of "forced retention" of prisoners of war. It is apparent that you have changed your position because you are not willing to admit the incontrovertible fact that large numbers of your former personnel violently oppose returning to your side. Free peoples everywhere recognize this fact. They also recognize that the Uxc has no desire to retain or to make any particular disposition of any prisoner of war unwilling to be repatriated.

7. You have attempted to camouflage the unreasonableness of your stand by associating it with the Geneva convention of 1949. In fact, it is the position of the Uxc which is consistent with the principles of the Geneva convention, and with its primary concern for the rights of the individual prisoner of war. You, however, have tried to deceive the world into believing that you are concerned with the rights and welfare of individuals. You have used these conferences as a forum for the most vicious types of propaganda. You have not hesitated to use lies, half truths, and distortion to further your ends.

8. In contrast to what you would have the world believe, that you are champions of the Geneva convention, your actions belie your words. From the beginning of these conferences you have obstinately and inhumanely refused to agree to immediate exchange of seriously sick and wounded prisoners of war. You have consistently placed your prisoner-of-war camps close to military targets. You have refused to turn over the names of captured Uxc personnel to the International Committee of the Red Cross, and you refuse to allow the ICRC or other impartial visitors to your prisoner-of-war camps. You will not even agree to the humane action of allowing prisoners of war to receive relief packages.

This is your record. You have talked loudly

about humane treatment of prisoners of war but you have not put any of this fine talk into practice. Yet you are well aware that the Geneva convention expressly provides for each of these measures which you have ignored, measures designed solely for the relief and well-being of prisoners of war held by both sides.

9. The greatest contradiction of all is your insistence that all prisoners of war in our custody must be returned to you regardless of their own desires, whereas you admit that many thousands of our personnel whom you boasted of having captured early in the war were incorporated in your armed forces. In view of your record, it is fraudulent for you to insist that you are holding out for an armistice based on the Geneva convention.

10. Another example of your inconsistency is your insistence that Chinese soldiers fighting in Korea are volunteers. You strongly support the right of these individuals to volunteer in the North Korean venture, but now you adopt the inconsistent position that these same individuals in custody of the Uxc have not the right to refuse to return to your control.

11. Uxc has made honest efforts to achieve an armistice. We have offered to exchange the approximately 83,000 of your former personnel held by our side whom we can repatriate for Uxc prisoners of war held by your side. Moreover, we have offered to agree to any one of many possible arrangements for impartially determining the attitudes of prisoners of war on repatriation. We have indicated our willingness to send to your side all additional prisoners of war who may change their minds and accept repatriation. We have presented to you every possible means for solving this question honorably.

12. The Uxc has no further proposals to make. The proposals we have made remain open. The Uxc delegation will not come here merely to listen to abuse and false propaganda. The Uxc is therefore calling a recess. We are not terminating these armistice negotiations; we are merely recessing them. We are willing to meet with you again at any time that you are ready to accept one of our proposals or to make a constructive proposal of your own in writing which could lead to an honorable armistice. Our liaison officers will be available for consultation and for transaction of their customary duties.

13. I say again that it remains the sincere hope of the Uxc that an honorable armistice can be realized. We will meet with you whenever you indicate that you are willing to accept one of our proposals or have presented in writing the text of any constructive proposals designed to achieve an armistice which you desire to make.

14. I have nothing more to say. Since you have offered nothing constructive, we stand in recess.

U.S. Rejects Soviet Charges Against Ambassador Kennan

Text of U.S. Note of October 8¹

Press release 790 dated October 8

The receipt is acknowledged of the note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of October 3² informing the United States Government that the Soviet Government considers Ambassador George F. Kennan as *persona non grata* and requesting Mr. Kennan's immediate recall. The Soviet Government in its note bases its attitude on statements made on September 19 by Ambassador Kennan in Berlin to representatives of the press which the Soviet Government characterizes as "slandorous attacks hostile to the Soviet Union in gross violation of generally recognized norms of international law."

Ambassador Kennan's statement accurately and in moderate language described the position of foreign diplomats accredited to the Soviet Government. It is this treatment of diplomatic representatives, systematically applied over a period of years by the Soviet Government, which grossly violates the traditions and customs in international intercourse developed over generations.

In the light of the above, the United States Government cannot accept the charges made by the Soviet Government as constituting valid reasons for acceding to the request for the recall of Ambassador Kennan.

Correspondence With Senator Knowland of California

Senator Knowland to Secretary Acheson, October 4

Telegraphic text

In view of Soviet action relative to Ambassador Kennan strongly urge that the Soviet Ambassador be sent home and recognition of uncivilized Communist regime supplying arms and equipment to Communist aggressors in Korea be withdrawn. This action will lessen espionage and fifth column activities of Communists in the United States.

WILLIAM F. KNOWLAND
United States Senator

Secretary Acheson to Senator Knowland, October 7

Press release 789 dated October 8

I have received your telegram of October 4 urging that in retaliation for demanding the recall of Ambassador Kennan, the United States Government take similar action with respect to the Soviet

Ambassador here and "withdraw recognition" of the Soviet Government.

I assume that what you have in mind is breaking diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.

You will, of course, recognize that the breaking of diplomatic relations would be a step of the utmost seriousness with world-wide consequences and that many factors other than those cited in your telegram would have to be carefully considered in connection with a decision of this kind. I am sure you will agree that the United States national interest and the interest of those who look to us for wise and calm judgment must govern our actions.

We are continuing to examine all aspects of our relations with the Soviet Government and your recommendations will be borne in mind. Meanwhile, you will have noted that on October 3 I stated³ that the Government of the United States does not accept as valid the charges made by the Soviet Government against Ambassador Kennan and that the factual statement he made in Berlin will be recognized generally as accurately reflecting the treatment accorded foreigners by the Soviet Government in direct contravention of established international usage.

Departure of Sir Oliver Franks

Statement by Secretary Acheson

Press release 782 dated October 3

It is with real and deep regret that we have learned that Sir Oliver Franks will leave his post as British Ambassador to the United States which he has filled so ably since 1948. I have greatly enjoyed working with him. His great ability, his keen perception and knowledge of the United States and its people have enabled him to carry out his responsibilities with outstanding success. We shall miss him as a warm friend and as a distinguished representative of his country.

I know that the countless friends of Sir Oliver and Lady Franks in Washington as well as those who have met them on their many tours throughout the country will join me in regretting their departure and in extending to them all good wishes for the future.

Sir Roger Makins, who has been named to succeed Sir Oliver, will find a hearty welcome on his return to this country. The knowledge gained during his earlier tours of duty in Washington and his recent assignment as Deputy Under Secretary of State, Foreign Office, particularly qualify Sir Roger for his future duties. He will find many old friends to welcome him back to Washington.

³ *Ibid.*

¹ Delivered to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the American Embassy at Moscow.

² BULLETIN of Oct. 13, 1952, p. 557.

Paving a Road to Peace

by Wilson Compton

Administrator, International Information Administration¹

You have invited me to speak to you about the United States International Information Program. As leaders in public affairs in this country, you should have the means of knowing where our country stands on issues vital to our national security and vital to our effort for peace. No group of citizens is better able to help find the road to peace than men who have themselves been in war. You do not want generalities. You want facts, not merely statistics.

The world-wide battle of ideas in which we are engaged is for the most part forced upon us by the aggressive policies and tactics of international communism. As you see, the propaganda with which we are contending represents an unprecedented low level of political immorality stemming from the Kremlin. It is not a "featherduster" campaign. The U.S. Government knows it. You know it. Many of our citizens do not fully comprehend it—or else think that the *sole* answer to it is either bigger armaments and armies or that we hide behind our seas and our mountains. This is all a part of the problem of our overseas information program.

The International Information Administration (IIA) is an information and propaganda agency. It is not a propaganda agency in the "cloak-and-dagger" sense. Its activities are overt. It is not responsible for the formulation of U.S. foreign policy. That is a responsibility of the Congress, the President, and the Secretary of State. It must, of course, operate within the framework of U.S. foreign policy but it has its own specific objectives.

We are charged with the duty of promoting mutual understanding between the Government and people of the United States and the governments and peoples of other countries. We seek to fortify the deterrents to the spread of international communism. We seek to encourage the spirit of confidence and hope and to strengthen the sense of

determination and interdependence amongst the peoples of the world who are free or who seek freedom. This means exposing deceptions, distortions, and lies about the United States as well as promoting a better understanding of American life and institutions and of the American peoples' earnest desire for peace. We seek the support of peoples everywhere for the policies and programs which the United States considers vital to its security. This, gentlemen, is a rather formidable assignment.

In this battle of ideas we have both advantages and disadvantages. One of our major disadvantages is psychological. We are trying to build something. International communism is trying to destroy something. Construction is a slower process than destruction. It takes patience as well as resourcefulness; and we Americans are not a patient people. We get "hot and bothered" when we can't knock out at one blow something that we don't like. But we can't knock out ideas that way.

I have often been asked: "How long will this propaganda war last?" That is a natural and a sensible question. But no one knows the answer. No one can honestly say how long it will last. It *may* last indefinitely. I should think it would at least be sensible for the American people to act on that assumption—and not be caught off guard.

Psychological warfare is not like military warfare. We are dealing with intangibles. We cannot, through sheer might, force a quick result. We must work for strategic positions. The international Communists are playing their game of power politics with chess-like strategy. They advance when situations are favorable, retreat when they are unfavorable. But always they keep at it. No fertile propaganda issue is ever "dead," as witness their revival a third time of the "germ warfare" propaganda attack which never from first to last had any basis in fact.

We will of course eventually win this war of ideas. But the sooner we learn to look at it through the eyes of a chess player the sooner we will get ahead. We must be prepared to meet

¹ Address made before the American Legion National Executive Committee at Indianapolis, October 11 (press release 797). For text of address as actually delivered, see Department of State publication 4757.

fantastic propaganda wherever it breaks out. This is not easy. In fact it is very difficult for Americans to comprehend the unprecedented low levels of political immorality which nowadays motivate and largely activate the international Communist propaganda. It is even more important that we find the basis and the means of positive attack. In the war of ideas—as in the war of guns—a good offense is a better defense than a good defense. We must learn that.

As a society of free people, we are dedicated to the proposition that the State is the servant of the individual, not the individual the servant of the State. Our concept of freedom has deep spiritual and moral roots.

As a people we believe in God; we believe in the dignity of the individual; we believe in truth, in justice, in humaneness. By and large we are “good neighbors.”

These you may say are our *ideals* and so they are. Yet they are the source of our strength as a nation. We do have ideals and we do try to live by them. In the force and power of this fact lies our great advantage over the Kremlin. It is less expensive to maintain a “big truth” than to establish a “big lie.”

The contradiction between what the Soviets say and what they do is becoming increasingly apparent, even behind the Iron Curtain. Here is one example: Only a few days ago a Rumanian Olympic athlete, who fled the Iron Curtain during the recent games in Helsinki and is now in Western Germany, told his people in a VOA broadcast:²

I am filled with deep emotion in speaking to those in my country from this radio station which I myself have listened to for years with hope and confidence. . . . It is this unmasking of their deception that the Communists are most afraid of. For it is this knowledge which gives the lie most effectively to Communist propaganda and which will most strengthen the captive people's will to resist.

Weapons To Combat the Big Lie

Within the framework of our governmental purposes and our American principles, how is the International Information Administration going about its task of combatting the Big Lie, building unity and strength in the free world, and promoting the security of the United States?

What are the tools we are using? They include about every means of communication.

The International Broadcasting Service, popularly known as the “Voice of America,” broadcasts programs in 45 languages on an around-the-clock schedule for a daily total of over 50 program hours to a potential overseas audience of 300 million persons.

The International Press Service provides a daily *Wireless Bulletin* to 10,000 foreign newspapers with a reading audience of 100 million in 88 coun-

tries. Last year it distributed about 200 million pamphlets prepared here or overseas to fit specific groups in specific areas.

The International Motion Picture Service produces films in 42 languages which are exhibited in 87 countries to approximately 250 million persons annually.

We maintain overseas 195 “information centers” in 62 countries. These provide information on all aspects of American life.

We provide selected persons from overseas an opportunity for first-hand knowledge of America and Americans through the exchange-of-persons program. Last year the U.S. Government sponsored 7,300 educational-exchange grants. Several thousand more educators, students, teachers, government and labor leaders, and business and professional men visited the United States under the sponsorship of more than 500 private organizations.

Each of these tools has its unique advantages in reaching particular types of audience, or to convey a particular type of message. Their use requires study, careful planning, constant experiment, and constructive imagination. We are seeking constantly to improve their use. Also gradually we are getting better guidance.

To pull together IIA's activities and the other programs with which the United States is fighting the cold war, a Psychological Strategy Board has been set up to determine over-all strategic policies, objectives, and programs. This board includes representatives of the Departments of State and Defense and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. The IIA uses its guidances.

To facilitate the accomplishment of these objectives overseas, the widest reasonable latitude is now being given our overseas missions and their staffs of information officers. Our world-wide information program is now a composite of 89 individual country plans. These programs are under constant review. We are gradually getting more objective appraisals of our own work. We are not yet hitting the target everywhere. But we have a good plan; on the whole we have a good staff; and the operations, although still ineffective in some respects, are improving.

This year we are trying an experiment in four selected countries, Italy, India, Siam, and Venezuela. In each of these countries our overseas staff is determining its own program, subject only to general policy supervision from Washington. In effect we are asking the field to “tell” Washington instead of Washington “telling” the field. If this experiment proves successful, we will try it more generally.

Enlisting Aid of Local Groups

We are trying, of course, to get close to the people whom we are trying to reach and influence. We are trying, with considerable success, to encourage local groups overseas to spread our mes-

² BULLETIN of Oct. 13, 1952, p. 563.

sage for us. As you pointed out in your resolution regarding psychological warfare adopted at your recent national convention, "More and more of the propaganda tasks [should] be entrusted to foreign nationals. . . . These people will be understood and believed, where Americans sometimes meet with skepticism."

If you were to project in graphic form the successes and reverses of the contest of ideas or the "propaganda war," it would show an irregular line moving gradually but steadily upward.

In Western Europe, the Soviet objective has been to tear down, confuse, and divide; our objective is to expose the Soviet lies and distortions about the United States and its intentions and to encourage strength through unity, peace through order, and economic security through productivity.

In 1946 and 1947, conditions in Western Europe were as the Soviets would like. The European economy had been losing its fertility, had become progressively less productive. The spirit of Europe was broken. People were hungry. Thousands in misguided desperation were joining the Communist Party. Today the picture is brighter. In France, for example, the circulation of the Communist newspapers has dropped enormously. *L'Humanité*, the leading French Communist daily which had a circulation of 600,000 in 1947, now has a circulation of less than 200,000. Membership in Communist-controlled labor unions has fallen even more—from 5,500,000 in 1947 to 1,500,000 in 1952. Through NATO and the European Defense Community, the military integration of Western Europe is on the way to realization. The economists' dream of a solvent Europe is gradually materializing through the Schuman Plan and the Organization for European Economic Cooperation.

The Kremlin understands as we do the importance of European integration to the free world. As Europeans, encouraged by our words and deeds—and our financial help—began to throw off despair and apathy for hope and faith in Europe's free future, the international Communists have redoubled their propaganda efforts. When they found themselves on the defensive, they launched their fantastic "Hate America" campaign. That is where we now stand.

In 1951, according to reliable estimates, the Soviets spent the equivalent of 150 million dollars in France alone in an effort to break down what we had built up. This is more than the United States spent last year on all of its world-wide information programs. Before General Ridgway arrived in Paris to take over the NATO Command, the Communists laid down a barrage of lies, crisscrossing France in a vicious propaganda effort to drive General Ridgway and all American troops from the Continent of Europe. The U.S. International Information Administration at the same time, in cooperation with the Mutual Security Administration, was working to promote support

among Europeans for General Ridgway and the goal of mutual security which he personified. We answered the Red propaganda with the simple facts. We were merely fortifying our "Campaign of Truth."

Our Campaign of Truth in Europe was a success. General Ridgway is still in France. The promised Communist demonstrations were a failure. The chain of events which followed General Ridgway's arrival in Europe so discredited the Communists that a few weeks thereafter the Central Committee of the French Communist Party met for a session of self-criticism and analysis of what it called the Party's "past mistakes and weaknesses."

Left-handed Praise from the Soviets

Our propaganda activities in Western Europe have come in for considerable, shall we say, *left-handed* praise from the Soviets themselves. *La Nouvelle Critique*, a French Communist magazine, devoted 28 pages to a description of the International Information Administration's program in France. Under the title, "The American Occupation in France is also an Ideological Occupation," this spokesman of international communism wrote in part:

. . . As early as 1948 the American services organized sessions of studies for professors of English in the Lyon area. These meetings were described as cultured manifestations—but in the end, they were crafty means of propaganda. A complete program of seduction was put in order, contacts in person and in small gatherings, invitations by the American services . . .

Western Europe is only one battle front. What are we doing in other parts of the world? Our problem in Eastern Europe has been technical as well as psychological. The captive states and the Soviet Union are reached through the Voice of America. At present, radio is not only our best means of reaching behind the Iron Curtain; it is our only means. We have had to build new facilities powerful enough to overcome Soviet jamming. Our Munich Radio Center, which went into operation last October, and the radio ship *Courier*,³ broadcasting from Mediterranean waters since August, have improved our technical position in the Soviet-dominated world. But we still have a long way to go. Despite hundreds of expensive jamming devices used by the U. S. S. R., the Voice of America is penetrating the Iron Curtain, about 20 percent in the large urban centers of the Soviet Union and about 75 percent in the more remote communities.

The Soviet Union's grip on its captive states has tightened. Experts seem to agree that the feasibility of local uprisings in Eastern Europe at present is remote. So, our message of hope stresses

³ For an article on the *Courier* see *Field Reporter* for September-October 1952, Department of State publication 4714, p. 27.

the steadily growing strength of the free peoples, U. S. rearmament for security, the American public recognition of the evils of communism, its threat to the security of the free world, and the profound wish of the American people to live at peace.

In our feature broadcasts, we try to influence the youth of Eastern Europe. Under the Soviet system of education, the young people of these countries are taught a twisted version of their own national heritage and little knowledge of the great works of their own culture. They hardly know the standards of good usage of their own national languages, for a part of the Soviet system is to debase the language of a conquered country and thus gradually to weaken the sense and the pride of nationality.

But the most potent resistance to Communist domination in Eastern Europe is in its deep-seated religious interest. Religion is an integral part of the national history of these countries. Yet today most Eastern Europeans are unable to join in their chosen worship of God. The Communists, with their inveterate mistrust of all religion, have destroyed their churches and jailed their priests. So we try to fill a spiritual need of these people, to make life in the present more tolerable, and to encourage faith and hope for the future.

The Mecca Airlift

In the Near East, Africa, South Asia, and the Far East are the great underdeveloped nations of the world and most of the nations which have recently achieved independence. A great number of them are rich in natural resources. This is not an unmixed blessing. Years of colonial status have made these countries, if not unfriendly, at least suspicious of the West. All phases of our relations with these countries require particular understanding and tact. Our greatest psychological gain in the Arab world in many years was the recent "Magic Carpet" of the U.S. Air Force, a gigantic airlift which enabled 3,500 devout Arabs to get to Mecca in the great Moslem pilgrimage this year. During the "hadj" or annual spiritual gathering of Moslems in Mecca, the Voice of America broadcast:

The open road to Mecca—the road from free countries—was packed to capacity last week with sincere men and women of the Moslem world. . . . Free governments of the world helped pilgrims reach Mecca in time . . . the road from Stalin-land to Mecca has been blocked for the last 30 years when Marxist godlessness endeavored to . . . make the world unsafe for the devout . . . Moslems remember . . . that the Kremlin had . . . the effigy of Prophet Mohammed burned at the hands of the Soviet League of Militant Atheists. . . .

Today, in these areas, we are demonstrating modern solutions of age-old problems. Our help with irrigation, water supply, agriculture, public health, and sanitation has again created in the countries of this vast area the knowledge that the

United States is not the imperialist warmongering monster which the Soviets have been charging.

In India suspicion of the West still runs deep and the promises of international communism are inviting. The job of the IIA has been slow and tedious.

A few years ago the Indian press was highly critical of every move we made. But today we find friendly editorials in the Indian press, such as this one in *Urdu Milap*. Referring to Ambassador Bowles' statement that the United States is anxious that the great experiment in democracy in India should not fail, the paper said:

This is precisely the aim of U.S. aid. Neither more nor less. And anyone within his senses can say that there is nothing wrong with this American objective. . . . If we want to have Communist dictatorship in India, if we want to destroy the individual's freedom, if we want to oppose democracy, we must certainly refuse to accept U.S. aid. But if we do not want to do that, it becomes our duty not only to accept the aid *with thanks* but make our country financially, industrially, and agriculturally so strong as to become the defender of other democratic countries.

A news story in the New York *Herald Tribune* datelined Tokyo, October 2, said:

Premier Shigeru Yoshida's Liberal party, which is strongly pro-American, piled up a commanding lead today in early unofficial returns from yesterday's elections. . . . The Communists, who held 23 seats in the recently dissolved Diet, suffered a smashing setback. . . . not a single Communist had been elected to the 466-member House.

In the Philippines, during the 6-month period from December to June, the Communist party was condemning itself for having as it said "lost touch with the masses."

Our good neighbors to the South, despite political differences in some of the Latin American Republics, have joined with us and have stood by us in the Rio Pact for hemisphere defense and the Organization of American States.

Gentlemen, there are many discouragements in the world today. Also there are many encouragements and they rarely happen by accident.

The Campaign of Truth is of course an undertaking of the U. S. Government, but the Government alone will never win a war of ideas. If we are to succeed, we must have the help of interested citizens throughout the United States and the active support of patriotic organizations, such as the American Legion, who know that winning a war does not mean winning a peace.

I have read with interest the resolutions adopted by the American Legion at your recent national convention expressing your views on our psychological war with the Soviet Union. I am heartened to see that you have so clearly seen the nature of the contest, a gigantic struggle between world faith and world fear.

I have spoken to you today of one of the most important enterprises of your Government—an enterprise which with the help of American citizens like yourselves and those for whom you speak,

may be a beacon on the road to world peace. I am not a professional publicist, nor a professional diplomat, nor a politician. I am not even a member of the Administration party in the Government which I serve. I am merely an American citizen proud of his country and wishing to help preserve for his grandchildren and yours the "promise of American life." We need guns! Yes,

and we are getting guns. Armaments may win wars, but arms alone will never win a peace. Peace like freedom is everybody's business. Ideas in the long run are more powerful than guns.

Gentlemen of the American Legion, you will do a further great service to your country if you will again shoulder arms, this time in the world-wide crusade of ideas which is the only road to peace.

Validation of German Dollar Bonds

by Roland F. Moores

On August 25, 1952, the Federal Republic of Germany enacted a law which will affect every American citizen or resident who holds German dollar bonds. The legislation is entitled the Law Concerning the Validation of German Foreign Currency Bonds, popularly known as the Validation Law.¹ It is a complex act which, like most postwar social and economic laws of Western Germany, finds its motivating force in the conditions arising out of the war.

The war left Germany's financial structure in an unprecedented state of chaos. Securities were lost and destroyed by war action. They were also unlawfully acquired and looted. The matter of looting, particularly, raised problems of such importance for the Federal Republic of Germany that it considered their solution to be a matter of national interest. A large number of German foreign-currency bonds had been reacquired by the issuers for amortization but had not been presented to the trustees or paying agents for cancellation. These bonds were for the most part lying in the vaults in Berlin when the Russian armed forces invested the city. They were never recovered, and nothing is known (although much is suspected) concerning their whereabouts.

The remarkable recovery which has taken place

since currency reform in 1948 provides a striking demonstration of West Germany's basic economic potential. Full realization of that potential cannot be achieved, however, without Germany's participation in international trade and finance on a normal basis. Settlement of the public and private prewar external debts of the former Reich to the extent possible under the present circumstance of a divided Germany is thus a matter of singular importance, opening the way for the development of normal financial relations between the Federal Republic and other free-world countries. The Conference on German External Debts met at London from February to August 1952 to work out this settlement.² The recommendation of this conference will be embodied in a debt agreement which is now in the course of preparation and which will be submitted to the interested governments for their approval. However, before the process of resuming payments by German debtors under the terms of this debt agreement can begin, it is necessary to separate the obligations which are valid from those which are not. This is the function of the Validation Law. It will not of itself insure payment on German dollar bonds.

The aggregate of principal and accrued interest due on the outstanding dollar bonded indebtedness of German corporate and public entities is approx-

¹ Copies of an English translation of the text of the law may be obtained by writing the Bureau of German Affairs, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C. Relevant portions of the schedule which is annexed to the law are printed at the end of this article.

² For text of the communiqué issued at the close of the conference and portions of its final report, see BULLETIN of Aug. 18, 1952, p. 252.

imately 510 million dollars. The Validation Law ultimately will determine what portion of this sum is represented by the looted securities; German officials believe that it will be quite substantial. From the standpoint of the American holder, the Validation Law should find a welcome response, since it will insure that the German Government's dollar resources will be conserved to service only valid obligations.

Jurisdictional Limitations of Law

The Validation Law has jurisdictional, as well as substantive, limitations. It does not apply to dollar bonds issued by public or corporate entities having their seat in that part of Germany which is under Soviet control or under Polish administration. Moreover, the law will deal only with those bonds which are listed in the schedule of the law. Accordingly, outstanding bonds of issuers located in Western Germany and the Western sectors of Berlin, which are not so listed, are not affected by the law and need not be validated. The bonds are identified in the schedule by issue, not by individual serial number, since information regarding the serial numbers of looted bonds is fragmentary and inconclusive. The law is internal German legislation. In order that it may be given effect in the United States, an agreement will be concluded between the two Governments. This, together with a regulation to be issued under the Validation Law, will establish the validation procedure which will be introduced in the United States. Negotiations with the German Government on these supporting measures will be concluded in the near future.

The Validation Law provides that foreign currency bonds listed in the schedule remain valid only if they are validated in the manner prescribed in the law. There are a number of ways in which this may be accomplished. However, the validation procedure which most American holders will be invited to follow is concerned with only one of these methods.

A dollar bond of an issue listed in the schedule which was outside Germany on January 1, 1945, is by that circumstance alone eligible for validation. A bond which is shown to have been outside Germany on this key date automatically qualifies for validation. This is the principle upon which the procedure in the United States will be based. The effectiveness as well as the practicability of this simple test becomes apparent when the circumstances surrounding the trading in German securities in the United States exchanges during the war and postwar period are reviewed.

On December 9, 1941, the securities exchanges

in the United States, at the request of the Securities and Exchange Commission (suspended dealings in listed securities of German origin. Brokers and dealers were likewise requested to cooperate by refraining from effecting transactions in such securities. The Securities and Exchange Commission has not withdrawn its request, and the suspension of trading continues. It thus becomes readily apparent that most American holders, or their successors in interest, will have no difficulty showing that they held their bonds outside Germany prior to January 1, 1945, the date specified in the Validation Law.

The conclusion of the London Conference on German External Debts has stimulated an active interest in German bonds, and numerous inquiries are being received as to when trading will be resumed. On September 9, 1952, the Securities and Exchange Commission reminded the public that it was not prepared to withdraw its request until the validation procedure had been placed in operation.³ The Commission pointed out that only through this means could assurances be given to investors that no bonds except those which would constitute good delivery would be afforded a market in the United States.

Validation Procedures

As stated above, the agreement and the regulation under the Validation Law will determine the procedure to be followed. The principal elements of the procedure will consist of the following: (1) the appointment of a foreign representative with whom applications for validation may be filed; (2) the creation of a Validation Board which will decide the question of validation in each case; (3) the designation of depository banks where holders may take or send their bonds; (4) the form for the submission of information and evidence; (5) the giving of appropriate notice to the public; and (6) an arbitration procedure. The Validation Law provides for a 6-month period to deal with these and other problems. This period will expire on March 1, 1953, at which time, but not prior thereto, applications for validation will be received. The details of the procedure which bondholders will be invited to follow will be examined in a subsequent article at the time the agreement and the regulation are published.

• *Mr. Moores, author of the above article, is an officer in the Bureau of German Affairs.*

³ Securities and Exchange Commission press release No. 4749 of Sept. 9, 1952.

SCHEDULE OF THE LAW FOR THE VALIDATION OF GERMAN FOREIGN CURRENCY BONDS

A. BONDS OF THE GERMAN REICH AND THE FORMER STATE OF PRUSSIA
(U.S. dollars only)

No.	Title	Currency	Country of offering
1	German External Loan, 1924 (Dawes Loan). (i) 7% Gold Loan (Total issue in the U.S.A. \$110,000,000) . . .	\$	U.S.A.
3	International 5½% Loan of the German Reich, 1930 (Young Loan). (i) 5½% Gold Bonds (Total amount issued in the U.S.A. \$98,250,000).	\$	U.S.A.
4	6½% Prussian External Loan, 1926. The Free State of Prussia— 6½% sinking fund gold bonds—External Loan, 1926.	\$	U.S.A.
5	6% Prussian External Loan, 1927. The Free State of Prussia— 6% sinking fund gold bonds—External Loan, 1927.	\$	U.S.A.

B. BONDS OF THE KONVERSIONSKASSE (CONVERSION OFFICE FOR GERMAN FOREIGN DEBTS)
(U.S. dollars only)

No.	Interest rate	Currency	Description	Date of issue	Country of offering
11	Percent 3	\$	Old issue	July 1, 1936	U.S.A.
12	3	\$	New issue	June 1, 1937	U.S.A.

PART IV. COUNTRY OF OFFERING: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
(All issues denominated in dollars)

No.	ISSUER		Original interest rate	Description	Year of issue
	German title	American title			
1	Allgemeine Elektrizitäts-Gesellschaft (AEG).	General Electric Co., Germany.	Percent 7	Twenty-year sinking fund gold debentures—due January 15, 1945.	1925
2	Allgemeine Elektrizitäts-Gesellschaft (AEG).	General Electric Co., Germany.	6½	Fifteen-year gold sinking fund debentures—due December 1, 1940.	1925
3	Allgemeine Elektrizitäts-Gesellschaft (AEG).	General Electric Co., Germany.	6	Twenty-year sinking fund gold debentures—due May 1, 1948.	1928
4	Bayerisch-Pfalzische Städte . . .	Bavarian Palatinate Consolidated Cities, Germany.	7	External serial gold bonds . . .	1926
5	Bayern, Freistaat	Free State of Bavaria . .	6½	Serial gold bonds	1925
6	Bayern, Freistaat	Free State of Bavaria . .	6½	External twenty-year sinking fund gold bonds—due August 1, 1945.	1925
7	Berlin, Stadt	City of Berlin	6½	Twenty-five year sinking fund gold bonds—due April 1, 1950.	1925
8	Berlin, Stadt	City of Berlin	6	Thirty-year external sinking fund gold bonds—due June 15, 1958.	1928
9	Berliner Stadtische Elektrizitätswerke Akt.-Ges. (jetzt: Berliner Kraft- und Licht (Bewag)-Aktiengesellschaft).	Berlin City Electric Co., Inc.	6½	Twenty-five year sinking fund debentures—due December 1, 1951.	1926
10	Berliner Stadtische Elektrizitätswerke Akt.-Ges. (jetzt: Berliner Kraft- und Licht (Bewag)-Aktiengesellschaft).	Berlin City Electric Co., Inc.	6½	Thirty-year sinking fund debentures—due February 1, 1959.	1929
11	Berliner Stadtische Elektrizitätswerke Akt.-Ges. (jetzt: Berliner Kraft- und Licht (Bewag)-Aktiengesellschaft).	Berlin City Electric Co., Inc.	6	Twenty-five year debentures—due April 1, 1955.	1930
12	Bezirksverband Oberschwabische Elektrizitätswerke.	Consolidated Hydroelectric Works of Upper Wurttemberg.	7	First mortgage thirty-year sinking fund gold bonds—due January 15, 1956.	1926

No.	ISSUER		Original interest rate	Description	Year of issue
	German title	American title			
13	Braunkohlen-Industrie-Aktiengesellschaft, Zukunft.	Brown Coal Industrial Corp., Zukunft.	<i>Percent</i> 6½	Sinking fund mortgage gold bonds, Series A—due April 1, 1953.	1928
14	Bremen, Freie Hansestadt	State of Bremen (Free Hanseatic City of Bremen).	7	Ten-year external loan gold bonds—due September 1, 1935.	1925
15	Central-Ausschuss für die Innere Mission der Deutschen Evangelischen Kirche.	(Protestant Church in Germany Welfare Institution Loan).	7	Twenty-year secured sinking fund gold bonds.	1926
16	Deutsch-Atlantische Telegraphengesellschaft.	German Atlantic Cable Co.	7	First mortgage twenty-year sinking fund gold dollar bonds—due April 1, 1945.	1925
17	Deutsche Landesbankenzentrale Aktiengesellschaft.	Central Bank of German State & Provincial Banks, Inc.	6	First mortgage secured gold sinking fund bonds Series A—due August 1, 1952.	1927
18	Deutsche Landesbankenzentrale Aktiengesellschaft.	Central Bank of German State & Provincial Banks, Inc.	6	Mortgage secured gold sinking fund bonds Series B—due October 1, 1951.	1927
19	Deutsche Landesbankenzentrale Aktiengesellschaft als Zentralagent für: Hannoversche Landeskredit-Anstalt, Landesbank der Provinz Schleswig-Holstein, Brandenburgische Provinzialbank und Giro-Zentrale, Landesbank der Rheinprovinz, Landesbank der Provinz Westfalen, Nassauische Landesbank, Badischen Sparkassen- und Giroverband, Badische Girozentrale, Württembergischen Sparkassen- und Giroverband und Andere Kommunalbanken Mittel- und Ostdeutschlands.	Central Bank of German State & Provincial Banks, Inc.	6½	German provincial and communal banks consolidated agricultural loan—secured sinking fund gold bonds Series A—due June 1, 1958.	1928
20	Deutsche Rentenbank-Kreditanstalt Landwirtschaftliche Zentralbank.	German Central Bank for Agriculture.	7	First lien gold farm loan sinking fund bonds—due September 15, 1950.	1925
21	Deutsche Rentenbank-Kreditanstalt Landwirtschaftliche Zentralbank.	German Central Bank for Agriculture.	6	Farm loan secured gold sinking fund bonds—due July 15, 1960.	1927
22	Deutsche Rentenbank-Kreditanstalt Landwirtschaftliche Zentralbank.	German Central Bank for Agriculture.	6	Farm loan secured gold sinking fund bonds—second series of 1927—due October 15, 1960.	1927
23	Deutsche Rentenbank-Kreditanstalt Landwirtschaftliche Zentralbank.	German Central Bank for Agriculture.	6	Farm loan secured gold sinking fund bonds—Series A of 1928—due April 15, 1938.	1928
24	Deutscher Sparkassen und- Giroverband.	German Savings Bank and Clearing Assoc.	7	German consolidated municipal loan—sinking fund secured gold bonds—series of 1926 due 1947—due February 1, 1947.	1926
25	Deutscher Sparkassen und- Giroverband.	German Savings Bank and Clearing Assoc.	6	German consolidated municipal loan—sinking fund secured gold bonds—series due 1947.	1928
26	Dortmunder Wasserwerksgesellschaft m. b. H., Dortmunder Aktiengesellschaft für Gasbeleuchtung, Dortmunder Strassenbahnen G.m.b.H. (jetzt: Dortmunder Stadtwerke Aktiengesellschaft).	Dortmund Municipal Utilities.	6½	Twenty-year sinking fund mortgage gold bonds—due October 1, 1948.	1928
27	Düsseldorf, Stadt	City of Duesseldorf.	7	External serial gold bonds	1925
28	Duisburg, Stadt	City of Duisburg.	7	Serial gold bonds	1925
29	Elektrizitätswerk Unterelbe, Aktiengesellschaft.	Unterelbe Power & Light Co.	6	Twenty-five year sinking fund mortgage gold bonds, Series A—due April 1, 1953.	1928

No.	ISSUER		Original interest rate	Description	Year of issue
	German title	American title			
30	Elektrowerke Aktiengesellschaft. .	Electric Power Corp. . .	6½	First mortgage sinking fund gold bonds series—due 1950.	1925
31	Elektrowerke Aktiengesellschaft. .	Electric Power Corp. . .	6½	First mortgage sinking fund gold bonds series—due 1953.	1928
32	Frankfurt am Main, Stadt. . . .	City of Frankfort-on-Main.	7	Serial gold bonds external loan of 1925.	1925
33	Frankfurt am Main, Stadt. . . .	City of Frankfort-on-Main.	6½	Twenty-five year sinking fund gold bonds municipal external loan of 1928—due May 1, 1953.	1928
34	Gas- und Eltwerke kommunale Aktiengesellschaft Recklinghausen.	Municipal Gas and Electric Corp., Recklinghausen.	7	First mortgage twenty-year sinking fund gold bonds—due December 1, 1947.	1927
35	Gesamtverband der acht bayerischen Diözesen.	Roman Catholic Church in Bavaria.	6½	Twenty-year sinking fund gold bonds, Series A—due March 1, 1946.	1926
36	Gesellschaft für elektrische Hoch- und Untergrundbahnen in Berlin—(jetzt: Berliner Verkehrs-Betriebe [BVG])	Berlin Electric Elevated and Underground Railways Co.	6½	Thirty-year first mortgage sinking fund gold bonds—due October 1, 1956.	1926
37	Gesfurel (Gesellschaft für Elektrische Unternehmungen).	Gesfurel	6	Sinking fund gold debentures—due June 1, 1953.	1928
38	Grosskraftwerk Mannheim Aktiengesellschaft, Pfalzwerke Aktiengesellschaft.	Mannheim and Palatinate Electric Cos.	7	Fifteen-year sinking fund mortgage gold bonds—due June 1, 1941.	1926
39	Gutehoffnungshütte, Aktienverein für Bergbau und Huttenbetrieb; Gutehoffnungshütte Oberhausen Aktiengesellschaft.	Good Hope Steel and Iron Works.	7	Twenty-year sinking fund mortgage gold bonds—due October 15, 1945.	1925
40	Hamburger Hochbahn Aktiengesellschaft.	Hamburg Elevated Underground and Street Railways Co.	5½	Ten-year gold loan—due June 1, 1938.	1928
41	Hamburger Staat (Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg).	State of Hamburg (Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg).	6	Twenty-year gold bonds—due October 1, 1946.	1926
42	Hannover, Stadt	City of Hannover	7	Ten-year external convertible gold bonds—due November 1, 1939.	1929
43	Hannover, Stadt	City of Hannover	7	External sinking fund gold bonds—due November 1, 1959.	1929
44	Harpener Bergbau-Aktiengesellschaft.	Harpen Mining Corp. . .	6	Gold mortgage bonds, series of 1929—due January 1, 1949.	1927
45	Harzwasserwerke der Provinz Hannover.	Province of Hannover Harz Water Works.	6	Sinking fund gold bonds, first series—due August 1, 1957.	1927
46	Harzwasserwerke der Provinz Hannover.	Province of Hannover Harz Water Works.	6½	Sinking fund gold bonds, second series—due February 1, 1949.	1929
47	Iseder Hütte	Iseder Steel Corp.	6	Gold mortgage bonds, series of 1928—due August 1, 1948.	1928
48	Rudolph Karstadt Aktiengesellschaft.	Rudolph Karstadt, Inc. .	6	First mortgage collateral sinking fund bonds—due November 1, 1943.	1928
49	Köln, Stadt	City of Cologne	6½	Twenty-five year sinking fund gold bonds—due March 15, 1950.	1925
50	Königsberger Zellstoff-Fabriken und Chemische Werke Koholyt Aktiengesellschaft.	Koholyt Corp.	6½	First (closed) mortgage sinking fund gold bonds.	1928
51	Kommunale Landesbank in Darmstadt.	Municipal Bank of the State of Hesse.	7	Serial gold bonds	1925
52	Lüneburger Kraft-, Licht- und Wasserwerke Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung.	Lüneburg Power, Light and Waterworks, Ltd.	7	First mortgage twenty-year sinking fund gold bonds—due May 1, 1948.	1928
53	Mansfeld Aktiengesellschaft für Bergbau und Huttenbetrieb.	Mansfeld Mining and Smelting Co.	7	Fifteen-year (closed) mortgage sinking fund gold bonds—due May 1, 1941.	1926
54	“Miag” Mühlenbau und Industrie-Aktiengesellschaft (jetzt: G. m. b. H.).	Miag Mill Machinery Co.	7	Closed first mortgage thirty-year sinking fund gold bonds—due June 1, 1956.	1926
55	München, Stadt	City of Munich.	7	Serial gold bonds	1925
56	Norddeutscher Lloyd (Bremen). .	North German Lloyd, Bremen.	6	Twenty-year sinking fund gold bonds—due November 1, 1947.	1927

No.	ISSUER		Original interest rate	Description	Year of issue
	German title	American title			
57	Norddeutscher Lloyd (Bremen).	North German Lloyd, Bremen.	4	Sinking fund bonds of 1933—due November 1, 1947.	1933
58	Nurnberg, Stadt	City of Nuremberg	6	External twenty-five year sinking fund gold bonds—due August 1, 1952.	1927
59	Oberpfalzwerke Aktiengesellschaft fur Elektrizitatsversorgung (jetzt: Energieversorgung Ostbayern Aktiengesellschaft).	Oberpfalz Electric Power Corp.	7	First mortgage sinking fund gold bonds.	1926
60	Oldenburg, Freistaat	Free State of Oldenburg.	7	External serial gold bonds	1925
61	Pfalzische Stadte: siehe Bayerisch-Pfalzische Stadte.
62	Pfalzwerke Aktiengesellschaft: siehe Grosskraftwerk Mannheim.
63	Preussische Elektrizitats-Aktiengesellschaft (Preussenelektra).	Prussian Electric Co.	6	Sinking fund gold debentures—due February 1, 1954.	1929
64	Rhein-Elbe Union.	Rhein-Elbe Union	7	Twenty-year sinking fund mortgage gold bonds—due January 1, 1946.	1926
65	Rheinisch-Westfalisches Elektrizitatswerk Aktien-Gesellschaft.	Rhine-Westphalia Electric Power Corp.	7	Direct mortgage gold bonds—due November 1, 1950.	1925
66	Rheinisch-Westfalisches Elektrizitatswerk Aktien-Gesellschaft.	Rhine-Westphalia Electric Power Corp.	6	Direct mortgage gold bonds—due May 1, 1952.	1927
67	Rheinisch-Westfalisches Elektrizitatswerk Aktien-Gesellschaft.	Rhine-Westphalia Electric Power Corp.	6	Consolidated mortgage gold bonds—due August 1, 1953	1928
68	Rheinisch-Westfalisches Elektrizitatswerk Aktien-Gesellschaft.	Rhine-Westphalia Electric Power Corp.	6	Consolidated mortgage gold bonds—due April 1, 1955	1930
69	Rhein-Main Donau Aktiengesellschaft	Rhine-Main Danube Corp.	7	Sinking fund gold debentures, Series A—due September 1, 1950	1925
70	Romisch-Katholische kirchlich-Weohlfahrtseinrichtungen in Deutschland (Der Deutsche Caritasverband Eingetragener Verein, Die Katholische Schulorganisation Deutschlands (Landesausschuss Preussen) Eingetragener Verein und Der Reichsverband der Katholischen Gesellenhauser, Lehrlings- und Ledigenheime Eingetragener Verein)	Roman Catholic Church Welfare Institutions in Germany	7	Twenty-year secured sinking fund gold bonds	1926-28
71	Ruhrchemie Aktiengesellschaft.	Ruhr Chemical Corp.	6	Sinking fund mortgage bonds, Series A—due April 1, 1948	1928
72	Ruhrgas Aktiengesellschaft	Ruhr Gas Corp.	6½	Secured sinking fund bonds, Series A—due October 1, 1953	1928
73	Ruhrwohnungsbau-Aktiengesellschaft.	Ruhr Housing Corp.	6½	First mortgage sinking fund bonds—due November 1, 1958	1928
74	Leonhard Tietz Aktiengesellschaft (jetzt: Westdeutsche Kaufhof Aktiengesellschaft).	Leonhard Tietz, Inc	7½	Twenty-year mortgage gold bonds	1926
75	Vereinigte Badische Stadte	Consolidated Municipalities of Baden	7	External sinking fund gold bonds—due January 1, 1951	1926
76	Vereinigte Elektrizitatswerke Westfalen G. m. b. H. (jetzt: Aktiengesellschaft).	Westphalia United Electric Power Corp.	6	First mortgage sinking fund gold bonds, Series A—due January 1, 1953	1928
77	Vereinigte Industrieunternehmungen Aktiengesellschaft (Viag).	United Industrial Corp. (Viag)	6	Hydroelectric first (closed) mortgage sinking fund gold bonds	1925
78	Vereinigte Industrieunternehmungen Aktiengesellschaft (Viag).	United Industrial Corp. (Viag)	6½	Sinking fund gold debentures.	1926
79	Vereinigte Stahlwerke Aktiengesellschaft.	United Steel Works Corp.	6½	Twenty-five-year sinking fund mortgage gold bonds, Series A—due June 1, 1951	1926
80	Vereinigte Stahlwerke Aktiengesellschaft.	United Steel Works Corp.	6½	Twenty-five-year sinking fund mortgage gold bonds, Series C—due June 1, 1951.	1926
81	Vereinigte Stahlwerke Aktiengesellschaft.	United Steel Works Corp.	6½	Twenty-year sinking fund debentures, Series A—due July 1, 1947.	1927

No.	ISSUER		Original interest rate	Description	Year of issue
	German title	American title			
82	Vestische Kleinbahnen Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung (Vestische Strassenbahn G. m. b. H.).	Vesten Electric Railways Co.	Percent 7	First mortgage twenty-year sinking fund gold bonds—due December 1, 1947.	1927
83	Wasserwirtschaft im Rheinisch-Westfälischen Industriegebiet (Ruhrkohlenbezirk), G. m. b. H.	Rhine-Ruhr Water Service Union.	6	Twenty-five-year sinking fund external gold debentures—due January 1, 1953.	1928
84	Wohnhaus - Grundstücks - Verwertungs - Aktiengesellschaft am Lehminer Platz.	Housing and Realty Improvement Co., Berlin	7	First (closed) mortgage twenty-year sinking fund gold bonds.	1926
85	Württembergische Städte und Gemeinden.	(State of Wurttemberg Consolidated Municipal External Loan of 1925.)	7	Serial gold bonds	1925

A Basic Decision for the U. S.: Trade or Aid

*by Eugenie Anderson
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I am delighted to have this opportunity to speak to so many of Philadelphia's world-minded citizens. Having been back in the States only 2 days, my mind is still full of European problems. It is to a few of those problems that I will address myself today. I especially want to discuss some economic considerations. One does not need to be an American representative in Europe for several years in order to be convinced that economic difficulties lie at the root of many of our other problems. Nevertheless, as an American Ambassador abroad, I have had an unusual opportunity of studying the relationship of economic problems to our foreign policy in general. We speak often these days of our pressing defense concerns, and so we should. But we need to remember also that military strength rests on economic, social, and moral strength. And we need constantly to consider the ways in which our own economic affairs affect those of our European allies.

While my experience of the past 3 years has been largely in Denmark, I have learned that Danish economic problems are similar to those of Western Europe as a whole. If I shall use Denmark as an example in the course of my remarks, it is also

a fairly typical example as regards European economic problems today.

This is an election year. It is inevitable that in the heat of the political campaign many things are said that give a distorted picture of the situations we face and what we have been doing about them. It is therefore appropriate to give sober consideration to some of the basic problems with which we are confronted. For the new administration which takes office in January, whether Republican or Democratic, will have to deal with these problems. They are difficult and serious. Many of them are economic problems. To deal with them effectively, it is of major importance to develop the broadest possible basis of public understanding and support.

Size and Strength of the Soviet State

The most significant and most serious fact for America and for all the free world is the existence of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Here is a nation occupying over one-sixth of the world's land mass. It dominates today not only its own large population but millions of people of many other nations which once were free. The Soviet state today controls approximately 35 percent of the people of the world, over 800 million persons.

It is not, of course, merely the size and popu-

¹Excerpts from an address made before the World Affairs Council at Philadelphia on Oct. 10 (press release 796).

lation of the Soviet realm which is significant. This massive bloc is governed by a small group of 14 men. They maintain as tyrannical and complete a dictatorship as the world has ever known. This is a dictatorship dedicated to its own preservation and extension by force. Its contempt for human liberty and the rights of man is utter and complete. In the Soviet world the individual exists only as long as he does serve the State. Soviet dictatorship is based upon a ruthless and complete suppression of individual freedom.

The men in the Kremlin have not disguised their ultimate objective. Just as Hitler in *Mein Kampf* outlined his plans for power, so have the Soviet leaders clearly enunciated the course they will pursue. World domination is their openly stated purpose.

It is in the context of this threat to their liberties that the peoples of the non-Soviet world must live. The reality of this threat cannot be lost sight of. Its existence complicates and renders infinitely more difficult the solution of the many other problems with which the free world must deal.

Powerful Forces Unleashed by World War II

For while the fact of an aggressive imperialist Soviet Russia is in itself the most serious problem with which the free world must deal, if it is to survive, it would be a very grave error to assume that the removal of this problem would leave us without others. Essentially the free world must not only find ways and means of successfully resisting the spread of Communist power but must, at the same time, find ways and means of solving those other political and economic problems with which it is beset. The end of World War II found a vastly different world than existed when it began. We are only beginning to appreciate the extent to which the war marked the unleashing of powerful social and economic forces. They have already drastically changed the political character and structure of much of the world. The extent to which these powerful forces can be channeled to improve, rather than to destroy, the world depends very greatly on our ability to understand their causes and to adjust ourselves to their existence.

The United States was certainly not the country least affected by these developments. The same cataclysm which caused such vast changes in the world thrust the United States into a position of power and affluence greater than it had ever known. For the fact is that World War II left the United States as the most powerful nation in the world and, most important, as the only really powerful nation in the free world. These tides caused the near bankruptcy of the British Empire. They brought about the economic and political devastation of Europe. They created revolutionary chaos in much of Asia. And they

left the United States richer and stronger in both absolute and relative terms.

This wholly unsought and unexpected position of power for the United States inevitably carries with it grave and heavy responsibility. The change in our relative power necessarily increases the significance to other countries and to other peoples of all of our actions, whether large or small.

The development of transportation, especially air transport, and of communications, which was vastly accelerated by the pressures of military needs during the war, also affected the United States. The speed with which people can now move or communicate with each other means essentially that the world has shrunk. What takes place in one part of the world quickly becomes known in the other areas. The effects of actions by the United States are not only greater because of our greater power but because the speed with which these effects are felt and produce results is so much greater.

Clearly the United States today stands in a position of great power and awesome responsibility. It is the United States which must lead and on which the free nations of the world must depend. With intelligent and responsible U.S. leadership, the free peoples of the world can contribute much to the solving of our mutual problems. Without such leadership, or in the event of a U.S. retreat into isolation, the free world will flounder and inevitably fall under aggressive Communist forces.

These are the facts with which we must deal. This is not a situation which we sought nor one which we like, but it is the world in which we live.

We may be both grateful and proud that up to now the United States has met the challenge of these facts with humility, with courage, with intelligence, and with success. We have *not*, we fully realize, been free from error nor have we solved all of our problems. But we have made progress.

Preserving Europe From Soviet Control

One of the greatest problems with which we were confronted was that of Europe. The end of the war left Europe in virtual chaos. Ravaged by war, numbed by the terrors of Occupation, the peoples and nations of Europe emerged from war weak and disorganized. Governments were confused and bewildered by the gigantic task of political and economic rehabilitation and reconstruction. Their peoples, weary and fearful, lacked confidence either in themselves or in their leaders. This was a situation made to order for communism, which tends to flourish where people have lost both means and hope.

That the problem of Europe was a problem for the United States was clear. Europe was and is of great importance to us. This is not just because it is the source from which most of our

people come. Nor is it just because we have a great common heritage, share common ideals and culture. Besides these important factors, there is another basic fact and that is that the security of Europe is a part of our security and essential to it.

Europe is a source of power. The population of free Europe is greater than that of either the United States or the Soviet Union. The production potential of Europe, free Europe, is great. It exceeds that of the Soviet Union; it compares favorably with our own. Europe has a skilled and intelligent manpower, experienced in the technics and arts of modern industrial civilization.

We cannot afford to permit these power sources to be added to the existing strength of the Soviet Union. Such an addition would mean that over 1 billion people would be under Soviet control. Such a unit would equal us in steel capacity, exceed us in coal production, and rival us in the output of electric energy. The Soviet system, with Europe added, would equal us in production capacity and exceed us in manpower seven times.

That the significance of preserving Europe from Soviet control has been fully appreciated by our Government and by our people is reflected in the course of our foreign policy over the past several years. Under the leadership of the Administration, bold and imaginative measures have been taken. The European Recovery Program, the North Atlantic Treaty, the Mutual Defense Assistance Program are all milestones on the road to securing prosperity and preserving peace and security in this part of the free world.

The objectives of our policy neither are, nor should they be, confined to the forestalling of aggression by the Soviet Union. So long as the threat of such aggression exists we must, of course, be concerned with it. We must continue vigilantly to constrict and maintain defensive strength adequate to deter it. But we must also concern ourselves with the solution of basic economic and social problems.

Accomplishments in European Recovery

The European Recovery Program was the first great measure directed toward the solving of the basic economic problems in Europe. The accomplishments of this program are indeed magnificent. This Program brought order out of the chaotic economic situation which existed in Europe following the war. There had been a tremendous loss of financial, industrial, and productive resources.

The final press statement issued by the Economic Cooperation Administration² lists many positive achievements, constituting a most impressive record. It is a record without parallel in history. Following the First World War, when we did not have the awful destruction of strategic air bombardment and when a major part of Western Eu-

rope was free from Occupation, it took 7 years to regain the prewar level of production. Under the Marshall Plan, industrial production in Western Europe was increased 64 percent in 3 years. By the end of 1951, it was over 40 percent higher than before the war. Steel production was doubled in 3 years and was more than 20 percent greater than before the war. In 1951 Western Europe's steel production was 60 million tons as compared with 35 million tons produced in the Soviet system. Petroleum products were four times more than before the war. Electric energy output was double prewar levels. Transport had been rehabilitated.

In the field of agriculture similar striking gains have been made. The total agricultural production at the end of 1951 was nearly 10 percent more than prewar and 25 percent above 1947. Potatoes, sugar, milk, and oils are above prewar levels; cereals, grains, and meat are back up to prewar volume.

Expressed in terms of total production of goods and services, an economic level 15 percent better than before the war had been achieved. There was a gain of 25 percent in less than 4 years.

These are indeed real and significant accomplishments. Much credit must be given for achieving these results to those who conceived and executed the program. Equal credit belongs to the courageous and vigorous efforts of the governments and peoples of Western Europe working together in free cooperation.

It in no way dims the luster of this performance to point out that, despite these impressive gains, we are still faced with difficult and serious economic problems in Western Europe.

One of the major reasons for the continued existence of economic problems is the effect of the war in Korea. And here I want to digress for a moment to say that Korea has also been of decisive actual and moral strength to our allies in Europe. Korea has proved to our friends—as well as to the Communists—that we would resist aggression. Korea has once more demonstrated our military superiority. It has stayed aggression in South-east Asia. It has also been a forceful proof of our determination to prevent a world conflagration. It has given new strength to the United Nations. It has brought a new security against Communist aggression in Europe. We are paying a high and a terrible price in Korea—but we Americans need to remember that our sacrifices have not been in vain.

Nevertheless it was true that the brazen use of military force by a Soviet satellite came as a shock to the free world. It served to emphasize the need for effective and adequate defensive military strength. Korea proved to the governments of Western Europe, just as to us Americans, that the defense build-up must be accelerated. We were determined to reduce the danger of another Korea elsewhere along the Soviet front. The economic

² BULLETIN of Jan. 14, 1952, p. 43.

improvement resulting from the European Recovery Program stood the people of Europe in good stead. These gains made possible a military effort which could not have been even contemplated a few short years before.

I cannot today recite the many accomplishments of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. But believe me, they are impressive. Two million men are today under arms in Europe. There has been an increase of over 500,000 European troops since 1949. Military budgets have nearly doubled. Training periods have been greatly increased. Defense plans have been coordinated. Military resources have been combined. Morale has been lifted. Self-confidence and determination have replaced defeatism and despair. Military production has been dramatically increased—more than four times over its 1949 level. A steadily increasing proportion of effort and resources is being devoted to achieving an adequate defense.

Some Effects of an Expanding Defense Economy

The increased application of resources to meet the requirements of defense cannot of course be painless. Nations, like families, must budget their incomes. Choices must be made between expenditures for defense and those for such other essential and desirable purposes as housing, schools, public health, and the general welfare. There are limits to the revenue to be acquired through taxation or borrowing. The inevitable effect of higher taxation and greater expenditures for defense must be to retard improvement in the standard of living or even to decrease it.

Thus there are difficult decisions to make. The U.S. Government agrees with the European governments that it would be most unwise to undertake levels of military expenditure and of taxation which would result in losing the gains which have been made. If the lot of the average citizen becomes again one of misery and despair, if freedom and democracy become synonymous with hunger and hopelessness, they cannot survive.

The level of consumption in Western Europe is perhaps a better index of the lot of the ordinary citizen than any other economic symbol. This is on the average still lower than before the war, although slightly higher in most of the European countries. A major task of any responsible democratic government must be to improve the standard of living of its citizens. In planning defense programs, care must be taken to insure as an absolute minimum that there is not a decline which will lose all that has been achieved in the fight against communism.

Another and most serious effect of the war in Korea was its impact on the prices of raw materials. The tremendous increase in demand for basic supplies, stimulated in large part by heavy U.S. purchases, caused rapid and sizable increases in the prices for such goods. The result for Europe was indeed serious. Europe is an industrial

economy, which is in large measure dependent upon imports of raw materials which it processes and in turn sells to the rest of the world. The sudden increase in costs of materials which Europe had to buy was not, of course, matched by a similar increase in demand and consequently in price for the things Europe had to sell. In economic jargon, there was an alarming deterioration in the terms of trade for Europe. In simplest terms, costs went up while income remained stable.

To some degree, of course, it is inevitable that increased demands for raw materials must bring these consequences. However, much can be done by a greater measure of international planning and cooperation in both the acquisition and use of basic supplies. The U.S. Government and others of the major producing and consuming countries are presently engaged in efforts to alleviate these strains. Much remains to be done if there is to be an assurance of an adequate and intelligent development and utilization of the basic resources of the world. No one country, not even the United States, is possessed of an inexhaustible and plentiful supply of all basic materials. This is a field in which international cooperation is most obviously essential.

Problems of Trade Within Europe

These are not the only problems involved in the rehabilitation of Europe's economy and in the construction of a stable international situation. To revert a moment to the European Recovery Program, mention should be made of the problems of trade within Europe. It was obvious that the existence of multiple national barriers to the free movement of goods and services was itself a barrier to sound economic development. If efficient use of European resources was to be made, it was essential to reduce these barriers to trade. Yet equally clear, indiscriminate and precipitate leveling of such controls would also do serious injury to many established interests. The social and economic results of such action had to be considered. Nevertheless, a great deal has been accomplished. By cooperative effort a goal of liberalization of trade has been established. For the first time in modern European history there is free trade in a large number of categories of goods. Substantial progress is being made.

In this connection a most significant development is the Schuman Plan. Today the coal and steel production of six European countries is operating under a single system of economic and political control rather than under six.

However, even if a completely efficient use of Europe's economic resources is achieved, it is still a basic fact that Europe must import raw materials and food and export finished goods. One is closely tied to the other. Exports must pay for imports. The European Recovery Program essentially represented a financing by the United States of the imports required by Europe from

the dollar area. This was to provide Europe with an opportunity to rehabilitate and develop its productive capacity in order to export enough goods to pay for its imports. As I have pointed out, productive capacity in Europe has largely been restored and increased. This is, of course, to no avail if there are not markets for the production. For if Europe cannot sell, it cannot buy, and if it can neither buy nor sell, it cannot live by its own efforts.

It would be an oversimplification of the problem of the basic maladjustment of world trade to say that European stability depends on selling more to the United States. Yet it is not an exaggeration to say that it is of major importance. Most of the billions of dollars spent by the U. S. Government under the European Recovery Program were spent *in the United States*, not in Europe. They went to pay U. S. farmers, U. S. factories, U. S. labor, U. S. businessmen for U. S. goods and supplies. These funds came from taxes. To the extent that European farmers, laborers, factories, and businesses sell goods in the United States, they can earn the dollars which are needed to buy these U. S. goods and supplies. Of course, to sell in the United States, Europeans must make things we want. They must make them as good or better than our local products, or they must supply things we do not make ourselves. They must learn how to package, how to advertise, how to satisfy the American consumer. This they are willing to do and in many cases can do. But these things are in turn futile if we insist on excluding European goods from our markets.

A Story About Danish Blue Cheese

I'd like to tell you a little story in this connection. It is a story about cheese. It is a story about blue cheese, Danish blue cheese. Probably many of you never saw or even heard of Danish blue cheese. But you would have if you had been in Denmark. Denmark is an agricultural country. It is a small country of 4 million people, with very little in the way of natural resources. It must import almost everything. Coal, machinery, minerals, protein foods for cattle, fertilizers, cotton—all must be bought from abroad. Much of this need can only be met by purchases from the United States.

Now the Danes are proud, hard-working and self-respecting people. They prefer to earn their way. They would vastly rather trade goods for dollars than accept them as gifts from the United States. The American Government shares this preference. So we worked together with the Danes. We tried to help them put before the American consumer a product he would want and would buy. The Danes make very fine cheese. They make a very fine blue cheese. This cheese they decided to try to sell in the United States.

They packaged it to suit American tastes. They marketed it in American style. And they sold it in the States. In a short time the Danes began to earn the dollars they needed. The need for our dollar gifts decreased. The American consumer was getting a cheese he liked better, and he was getting it cheaper. His cheese bill was less and his bill for taxes for foreign aid was on the way to being reduced. Both the Danish and American Governments were pleased. But what happened? Suddenly the Danes found themselves barred from meeting the demands of U. S. consumers for blue cheese because of a new American law. The American cheese buyer suddenly found he could no longer get the cheaper, better Danish cheese. Why? Because a rider had been attached to a defense production bill, restricting the import of cheese into the United States. This rider was introduced to protect a small new group of cheese producers from the competition of Danish cheese. So the taxpayer not only gets no reduction in his foreign-aid costs, not only pays more for his cheese, but in the process subsidizes a few selected American cheese producers.

Europe's Need for Imports

Now the quantity of cheese involved in this story and the costs mentioned are not in themselves of major economic significance to the United States. But to the Danes it is significant. Not only was there a loss of investment and a loss of income, but there was a blow to morale. Of what use to try to earn dollars in fair competition if success meant the erection of new and artificial barriers to trade which made it impossible. Similar effects were felt all over Europe. The psychological impact of the Cheese Amendment—Section 104 of the Defense Production Act—was widespread.

The European countries, as I have said, must trade to live. Trade with Eastern Europe presents many difficulties. In the first place such trade never represented the major part of Western Europe's trade. Less than 6 percent of Western Europe's total external trade is conducted with the Soviet Union and its satellites. Furthermore, the free European countries, like ourselves, are keenly aware of the undesirability of a trade with the Soviet system which provides that system with items which increase its potential for military aggression. They also are aware of the fact that trade for the Soviet system is not an objective in itself but an instrument of national policy to be used to further Soviet political objectives. Such trade is undependable and risky. The free European countries maintain controls over trade with the Soviet bloc to assure that such trade as does take place is of net advantage to the Western nations.

Nevertheless, the need of Europe for imports creates a pressure which makes it difficult indeed to deal with the problem of trade with the Soviet

system. A primary example is in the case of coal. Although European production of coal is above prewar levels, it has not increased in proportion to the increase in industrial consumption of coal. While efforts to increase coal production continue and promise ultimate success, it is still a fact that for some years yet Western Europe must import coal. Now there are two principal sources for these imports—one is the United States and the other is Poland. To get coal from the United States requires dollars, earned dollars or gift dollars. To get coal from Poland requires providing Poland with goods she wants. Under the control of the men from the Kremlin, Polish demands increasingly include goods of strategic importance, items of military value.

It is a matter of record that the Western European nations have courageously resisted these demands. To date they have succeeded in negotiating for essential imports without providing strategic goods of comparable significance and value. This is not to say that no items of strategic importance have been exported. It does mean that we believe the West has had the best of these deals.

The problem of coal is but a part of the general problem of essential imports with which Europe is confronted. Again I want to emphasize that Europe must trade to live. If, as I believe we are agreed, the survival of Europe is of fundamental importance to us, we must concern ourselves with European trade. If Europe is to obtain the goods she needs from us, she must acquire the dollars to buy them. Neither we nor the Europeans wish to continue indefinitely with aid programs. To do so is not good for either the one who gives nor the one who receives. An alternative is open to us—an alternative which is mutually beneficial, economically sound, and consistent with the interests of both America and Europe. Briefly, there is an important choice to be made. Trade or aid? You must make the decision.

The economic problems of Europe which I have sketched are, of course, not our only international problems. Nor are they unrelated to the problems of economic and political development in other world areas. All over the free world, at home and abroad, we have problems to solve, work to be done. The free nations of the world working together must find answers, must provide solutions. I believe that they can and I believe that they will.

This faith rests on what I know we have done so far. Looking back over the past 4 years, we can be deeply encouraged by what we have accomplished up to now. We are facing our immense problems with realism and courage. We have our eyes wide open. We need not be afraid. We are

acting in our own self-interest. We are adhering also to basic American traditions. We have been building steadily on sound democratic principles. International cooperation and voluntary mutual assistance: these are the solid pillars of free-world strength and unity.

I have faith in the basic capacity of free men to face their problems and to solve them. And I believe that we will select our next government in the light of the great issues before us. We know that our future depends on choosing those leaders who understand the deep needs of our times. We are agreed on our basic goals. We seek peace, human welfare, and human freedom. We know that they cannot be won in a day.

But we will continue our progress along the great, bold lines we have started. Our goals are clear. They are noble.

In Secretary Acheson's words, "our aim is to create a world in which each human being shall have the opportunity to fulfill his creative possibilities in harmony with all. . . . We must always go forward under the banner of liberty. Our faith and our strength are rooted in free institutions and the rights of man."

Resignation of Miss Lenroot

The President has accepted the resignation of Katharine F. Lenroot as U.S. representative on the Executive Board of the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund and appointed as her successor Martha M. Eliot, M. D., Chief of the Children's Bureau of the Federal Security Agency.¹

Corrections

BULLETIN of Sept. 22, 1952, p. 460, bottom of first column, "International Labor Office" should read "International Labor Organization." In the same issue, p. 464, delete footnote 1.

BULLETIN of Sept. 29, 1952, p. 491. Third paragraph, second line should read: "shipments from the United States under intra-European aid."

In the index to the same issue, the last two items in the first column should read:

Iceland

MSA allotments for Iceland.

Immigration

Executive director of Immigration and Naturalization Commission appointed.

¹ For texts of Miss Lenroot's letter of resignation and the President's reply, see press release 762 dated Sept. 26.

Treaty Rights of the United States in Morocco

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE RULING OF AUGUST 27, 1952

by Joseph M. Sweeney

The case of the *Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco* recently decided by the International Court of Justice was the first contentious proceeding of the United States before the World Court. The litigation concerned legislation enacted in the French zone of Morocco on December 30, 1948, putting into effect a system of import controls which prohibited American nationals from importing into Morocco except as permitted by licenses issued by the Protectorate.

The United States contended that the decree contravened its treaty rights and thus should not have been applied to American importers without the prior consent of this Government. France denied that the United States had any such treaty rights. When the *modus vivendi* negotiated between the parties failed to provide a stable solution to the controversy as a result of congressional action refusing foreign aid to any nation which, in the opinion of the President, failed to comply with the treaty rights of the United States,¹ France brought the dispute to the Court.

Upon notification from the Court of the filing by the French Government of the application instituting the proceedings on October 28, 1950,² the United States appointed as its agent, Adrian S. Fisher, Legal Adviser, Department of State. The Court, having ascertained the views of both agents regarding time limits for the filing of their written pleadings, issued on November 22, 1950, an order pursuant to which the French Government filed its first written pleading, or memorial, on March 1, 1951.

After the registrar of the Court directed the attention of the United States to the practice of the Court of regarding the pleadings of the parties to a case as having a confidential character, the Amer-

ican agent filed with the Court a request for immediate release of the documents in the case under article 44, paragraph 3, of the rules of court. The French Government declined to give its consent, and the Court decided that the pleadings of the parties should not be made accessible to the public before the termination of the case.

Before going into the case on the merits by filing its counter-memorial, the United States filed on June 21, 1951, a preliminary objection under article 62 of the rules of court, citing the failure of the French Government to specify in its pleadings whether it was acting on its own behalf or as protector of Morocco, or both.³ Following exchanges of written observations and a waiver of oral hearings by the agents, the Court requested the French Government on October 4, 1951, to clarify its capacity in the case. The French Government complied on October 6, 1951, by stating that it was acting both on its own behalf and as the protecting power of Morocco, and the preliminary objection was withdrawn.⁴

Pursuant to the order of the Court of October 31, 1951, the United States filed its counter-memorial on December 20, 1951. The French Government thereupon filed its reply on February 15, 1952, and the United States a rejoinder on April 18, 1952. The public hearings took place at The Hague from July 15 to July 26, 1952. The Court rendered its decision in the case on August 27, 1952.

"Economic Liberty Without Any Inequality"

The first point involved in the proceeding was the French contention that the decree of December 30, 1948, did not contravene the economic rights of the United States in Morocco. The treaty rights of the United States in the matter were

¹ General Appropriations Act for 1951, chap. 11, Title 1.

² BULLETIN of Dec. 11, 1950, p. 950.

³ *Ibid.*, July 30, 1951, p. 179.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Dec. 17, 1951, p. 978.

based on its treaty of September 16, 1836, which contained a most-favored-nation clause securing for the United States the right to freedom of imports later granted by Morocco to other nations such as Great Britain and Spain. The U.S. treaty rights were predicated as well upon the Act of Algeiras of April 7, 1906, an international instrument including France and Morocco, among other parties, and pledging them to "the principle of economic liberty without any inequality."

According to the French argument, neither Great Britain nor Spain, nor other nations, claimed in Morocco the freedom of imports once granted to them by treaties. Hence, the United States could not claim such freedom through its most-favored-nation clause. As to the Act of Algeiras, the principle of economic liberty without inequality was too vague and general to incorporate a specific bar against prohibitions of imports. Moreover, the issue was really one of enforcement of exchange controls. Exchange controls were in force in the French zone of Morocco with the consent of the United States, but importers who did not request an allocation of foreign exchange from the protectorate to finance their operations remained free to import. The proceeds of these imports found their way illegally to markets where they were converted into dollars and adversely affected the position of the franc. Control of imports was, therefore, necessary. Far from being prevented from imposing such controls by the Act of Algeiras, France had a duty as protecting power to impose controls designed to safeguard the financial and economic position of Morocco. The United States had recognized the responsibility of France in the matter by its formal recognition of the protectorate and by adhering to modern international instruments which reflected a common design on the part of the community of nations to consider control of exchange and imports as legitimate measures.

The U.S. argument attacked the discriminatory character of the legislation of December 30, 1948, under which French goods were excepted from the requirement of an import license and thus from the prohibition to import. The United States was entitled to an equal position with France by virtue of the most-favored-nation clause in its treaty of 1836. Moreover, the import-control legislation at issue was precisely what the framers of the Act of Algeiras had intended to prevent, by making the principle of economic liberty without any inequality the controlling principle of the Act. Commerce with Morocco at the time was free and all nations had a right to import freely. As a part of its plans for ultimate control of Morocco, France was suggesting to the Sultan a reorganization of his customs and finance administration. Aware of the implicit threat of elimination of their own commercial rights, the other interested states had adopted the Act of Algeiras to guard against it. Neither the establishment of the protectorate, nor its recognition, could be relied upon

by France in the circumstances to justify a departure from the commercial rights guaranteed by the treaties.

With respect to the theory that France could, irrespective of treaty rights, take any measure necessary to protect the financial and economic interests of Morocco, there was no support in fact or in law for such a position. The evidence offered by the French Government did not show a correlation between the variations in strength of the French franc and the volume of imports into Morocco financed without allocation of exchange, either before or after the enactment of the decree of December 30, 1948. Moreover, the French authorities could have exercised their authority to stamp out the black markets where the proceeds of such free imports were allegedly converted. Hence the fluctuations in the value of the franc afforded no proof of the necessity of controlling imports upon which the French theory was based. As to the law, modern treaties, while recognizing import and exchange controls as temporary exceptions to free trade, showed a policy of establishing safeguards designed precisely to prevent the parties from asserting a unilateral and arbitrary right to their imposition and use of such controls.

The Court ruled unanimously that, in view of the circumstances preceding the Act of Algeiras, the principle of economic liberty without any inequality in the preamble of the Act was intended to be of a binding character and not merely an empty phrase. The establishment of the protectorate of France over Morocco had not changed the situation. In economic matters France was accorded no privileged position in Morocco. The provisions of the decree of December 30, 1948, contravened the rights of the United States under the Act of Algeiras because they discriminated between imports from France and imports from the United States, France being exempt from control of imports without allocation of currency and the United States being subject to such control. The same conclusion could be predicated on the right of the United States to equality of treatment under its treaty of 1836. The Court, having decided the point on these grounds, considered it unnecessary to pass upon the other grounds on which the parties had based their contentions.

Extraterritorial Jurisdiction

The next points concerned the French contention that the decree of December 30, 1948, was applicable to American nationals without the prior assent of the United States. The rights claimed by the United States in this matter were based upon an express provision of its treaty of 1836 granting extraterritorial jurisdiction to decide "disputes" arising between American citizens. By virtue of the most-favored-nation clause, the United States claimed the broader right later granted to other nations such as Great Britain

and Spain to exercise jurisdiction in any case where an American national was defendant, irrespective of the nationality of the plaintiff. As a corollary of such jurisdiction, the United States claimed the right to require that Moroccan legislation be submitted for its assent before it could become applicable to its nationals. The United States was the only state exercising such rights in the French zone of Morocco at the time of the dispute.

France argued with respect to the question of jurisdiction that the word "dispute" in the treaty of 1836 was confined to civil disputes, and that crimes are offenses against the state and not disputes between private individuals. In addition, all other states, including Spain and Great Britain, had surrendered their rights of jurisdiction. Hence the United States could claim no rights of jurisdiction by virtue of the most-favored-nation clause and could exercise in Morocco only the rights of jurisdiction expressly acquired in the treaty of 1836.

On this point, the Court ruled unanimously that the word "dispute" clearly covered both civil and criminal disputes at the time of the conclusion of the treaty, and thus gave to the United States jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases arising between its citizens. By a vote of 6 to 5 the Court ruled that the claim of the United States to the broader rights of jurisdiction granted to Spain and Great Britain came to an end with the surrender of such rights by Spain and Great Britain. To hold otherwise would be contrary to the intention of the most-favored-nation clause to maintain at all times fundamental equality between the countries concerned, and there was not sufficient evidence to enable the Court to reach a conclusion that the United States could justify its claim on an alternate ground of custom or usage. But the Court ruled by 10 to 1 that the United States could continue to exercise jurisdiction in civil and criminal cases brought against an American national by a party other than an American to the extent required by the provisions of the Act of Algeiras providing for the exercise of this type of jurisdiction.

On the corollary point of the right of assent, the Court unanimously denied the claim of the United States that the application of Moroccan laws to its nationals always required its previous assent. The claim was linked with the extraterritorial jurisdiction claimed by the United States and subject to the same objections. Moreover, there was no provision in any of the treaties involved conferring upon the United States any such right.

Taxation and Customs Valuation

The remaining points concerned the question of taxation and the question of customs valuation. Both issues had been involved in the course of the controversy over the application of the import

control legislation of December 30, 1948, and were submitted to the Court as counterclaims.

The United States, while claiming immunity from taxes for its nationals under the treaties, except as otherwise and specifically provided in such treaties, had followed a constant policy of assenting to the application of Moroccan taxes to its nationals, unless they were discriminatory or aimed at the system of economic liberty established by the Act of Algeiras. The consumption taxes enacted by the protectorate in 1948 affected numerous imported products and thus raised a question whether they were not calculated to operate against imports by evading in effect the maximum rate of customs duties on imports of 12½ percent prescribed by the Act of Algeiras.

By a vote of 6 to 5 the Court ruled that the fiscal immunity granted by treaty to other states could not be claimed by the United States once these other states had surrendered their fiscal privileges. The provisions referring to tax immunity in a multilateral agreement such as the Convention of Madrid of 1880 merely presupposed the existence of the principle of tax immunity without providing a new and independent ground for claiming it. The Court further rejected, by a vote of 7 to 4, the claims of the United States with respect to the consumption taxes of 1948, since the mere fact that it was convenient to collect the consumption taxes on imports at the customs did not alter their essential character as a tax levied upon all goods.

The question of customs valuation turned upon the interpretation to be given of article 95 of the Act of Algeiras providing "The *ad valorem* duties shall be liquidated according to the cash wholesale value of the merchandise delivered in the custom-house and free from customs duties and storage dues." According to the French argument, this value was the value of the merchandise after its passage through the customs and thus its value on the local Moroccan market. According to the argument of the United States, this value was the value of the merchandise before it passed through the customs and thus its value in the country of origin plus the expenses necessary for transportation to the customs in Morocco.

In the view of the United States the method of valuation which it supported would avoid the possibility of arbitrary and discriminatory practices which had given rise to the complaints of American importers in 1948.

By a vote of 6 to 5 the Court ruled that article 95 laid down no strict rule on the issue in dispute and, in view of the past practice, required an interpretation more flexible than either of those for which the two parties contended. The customs authorities in the French zone of Morocco should fix the valuation of imported goods for customs purposes by taking into account all relevant factors, including the value in the country of origin and in the market of the French zone. The same methods, however, must be applied without dis-

crimination to all importations, regardless of the origin of the goods or the nationality of the importer, and the power to make such valuations should be exercised reasonably and in good faith.

Judges Hackworth (U.S.), Badawai (Egypt), Carneiro (Brazil), and Rau (India) dissented in a separate opinion from the conclusions of the Court on jurisdiction, fiscal immunity, and customs valuation.

As a result of the Court decision, and in view of the statutory provisions vesting the ministers and consuls of the United States with judicial authority so far as allowed by treaty, the U.S. Government notified the French Resident General in Morocco on September 12, 1952, that all cases pending on August 27, 1952, in its consular court in the French zone of Morocco, and not within its jurisdiction by the terms of the decision of the International Court of Justice, were being dismissed.

The Court decision is expected to have an important effect upon the economic relations between Morocco and the United States as well as all other parties concerned under the Act of Algceiras.

• *Mr. Sweeney, author of the above article, is assistant to the Legal Adviser, Department of State. He was counsel to the agent of the United States in the proceedings before the International Court of Justice.*

Morocco Lifts Restrictions on Imports

Press release 776 dated October 3

In its opinion of August 27, 1952, in the case between France and the United States to determine the nature and extent of U. S. treaty rights in Morocco, the International Court of Justice at The Hague, among other things, ruled that a Moroccan decree of December 30, 1948, putting into effect import license requirements on imports from all monetary zones including the United States but not on imports from France and the franc area, contravened the treaty rights of the United States in Morocco because it discriminated between imports from France and imports from the United States.

The French Resident General at Rabat, Morocco, in a note delivered to the American Chargé d'Affaires at Tangier on October 2, 1952, set forth the action which the French Protectorate Government is taking to implement the decision of the International Court of Justice regarding import controls in the French zone of Morocco. The text of the note is as follows:

After consultation with representatives of elected bodies in Morocco and examination of the question by the competent administrations in Rabat and Paris, a series of measures designed to give full effect to the provisions of the judgment of August 27, 1952 of the International Court of Justice with respect to imports into Morocco has just been adopted.

The principal characteristics of the new import regime which has just been established at Rabat are the following:

The Residential decrees of March 11, 1948 and December 30, 1948 as well as all of the texts in application thereof are rescinded.

As a result of this fact and as a general rule, all merchandise regardless of origin and source, acquired without an official allocation of foreign exchange, can be imported without authorization. This decision applies equally to imports of goods from outside of the franc area and goods originating within the franc area. Consequently, both categories of imports will benefit from the same exemption. Thus, the principles established by the Act of Algceiras and referred to by the Hague Court are being rigorously observed. The present procedures followed by the Moroccan administration in allocating foreign exchange for the payment of merchandise essential to the country remain in effect notwithstanding the lifting of controls on imports without exchange.

As concerns the imports of certain merchandise regardless of origin (principally arms, narcotics, wines, cereals and their derivatives, oleaginous products), restrictions remain in effect. If in the future similar measures become necessary for other merchandise as a result of changes in the economic and social situation in Morocco, such measures likewise shall not be discriminatory in any way regardless of the exporting country.

Since experience has shown that imports without allocation of exchange often give rise to illegal purchase of foreign exchange which are detrimental to the currency, appropriate provisions make it possible to assure that such operations conform to exchange control legislation. As a counterpart to the lifting of restrictions on imports not requiring an official allocation of foreign exchange, importers carrying out such operations are obliged, when so requested by competent authorities, to describe the use of funds from the sale or utilization of imported merchandise.

Regarding economic relations between the International Zone of Tangier and the French Zone of Morocco, certain new provisions are envisaged.

This series of measures, compatible with the interests of the Moroccan economy, will make it possible for all to participate in the development of this economy under conditions of liberty which conform to the spirit of equality of the General Act of Algceiras.

Iran Willing To Begin Negotiations If U. K. Pays 20 Million Pounds

Press release 787 dated October 8

The Iranian Prime Minister to Secretary Acheson

Following is an English translation of a letter addressed to Secretary Acheson from the Prime Minister of Iran, delivered to Ambassador Loy W. Henderson at Tehran on October 7, together with a translation of the enclosure, a letter of the same date from Dr. Mossadegh to Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden:

I have received the reply to my counterproposals which was sent on behalf of His Excellency, the President of the United States of America, through the Honorable, the American Ambassador in Tehran.¹

I have gratefully examined the explanations which were furnished with a view to removing the ambiguity of the joint message dated August 30, 1952 (Shahriva 8, 1331). I am most grateful for the efforts exerted by the respected authority of Your Excellency's Government toward the settlement of current disputes. However, as to the statement that "he is disappointed to learn from it that you have found unacceptable the proposals which were put forward on August 30, 1952," I think that in my counterproposals dated September 24, 1952, the reasons for the nonacceptance of the joint message were sufficiently explained. It is possible that His Excellency, the President, does not remember that 19 months have elapsed since the date of the nationalization of the oil industry throughout Iran, while in the meantime nothing useful has been accomplished toward this element of differences, and the question of determination of compensation has been entirely left to correspondence and procrastination.

The Iranian Government and nation have every day been faced with new social and economic difficulties arising from the economic blockade of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.

The greatest good will was shown and maximum possible concessions for the settlement of this question were made in my counterproposals. In order that this good will and earnest desire to bring this matter to an end may even more be fully evinced, I have, in reply to the message from His Excellency, Mr. Eden, Her Britannic Majesty's Foreign Secretary, made a proposal, a copy of which is enclosed for Your Excellency's information, to the effect that plenipotentiary representatives of the former Anglo-Iranian Oil Com-

pany be sent to Tehran to discuss the terms of the counterproposals dated September 24, 1952. With a view to alleviating the economic and financial situation of Iran, and also in order that the former company may provide a token for the fulfillment of obligations assumed by it in the past, it has been added to the said proposal that prior to the departure of the plenipotentiary representatives of the company, which will be one week from this date, it should place at the disposal of the Imperial Ministry of Finance a sum of 20 million pounds sterling on account convertible into dollars (out of the 49 million pounds), and arrange for the payment of the balance thereof upon the termination of negotiations which are anticipated to last 3 weeks.

It is not necessary to explain that during the last year and a half the Iranian Government and nation have suffered huge losses as a result of procrastination and exchange of notes and correspondence, in such a way that no fair-minded and unbiased individual would hold the Iranian Government and nation responsible for any sinister consequence and unfortunate development which may result from the maintenance of this policy.

I wish to invite Your Excellency's careful personal attention to the serious and basic implication of the preceding sentence and to existing conditions. I am certain you will agree that the prompt and immediate settlement of this matter would be a great and important contribution toward insuring the peace and public security of one of the sensitive areas of the world.

I request you to convey to His Excellency, the President, the expression of my highest consideration and to accept my sincere appreciation of the efforts he has exerted and is still exerting to find a solution for the existing differences.

DR. MOHAMMAD MOSADEQ,
Prime Minister.

October 7, 1952
(Mehrماه 15, 1331)

The Iranian Prime Minister to the British Foreign Secretary

Your note dated 5 October 1952² which recognized in its entirety the action of the Iranian Government in nationalizing its oil industry, and stated that it did not intend to revive the invalid 1933 concession agreement, nor to interfere in the administration of the Iranian oil industry and recognized the Iranian Government's freedom to sell its oil products was handed to me by the British Chargé d'Affaires in Tehran.

With due regard to the fact that the contents

¹ For text of Dr. Mossadegh's counterproposals of Sept. 24, see BULLETIN of Oct. 6, 1952, p. 532; for Secretary Acheson's reply of Oct. 5, see *ibid.*, Oct. 13, 1952, p. 569; for the joint U. S.-U. K. proposals to Iran, see *ibid.*, Sept. 8, 1952, p. 360.

² Not printed. Mr. Eden's note to Dr. Mossadegh was similar in content to that sent by Secretary Acheson on the same date.

of the message in question in the parts mentioned above are in accordance with the indisputable rights of the Iranian nation, I take cognizance of the foregoing and at the same time regret that in this message, which was in answer to my message of 2 Mehr 1331 (24 September 1952), you did not make any reference to the counterproposals dated 2 Mehr 1331 (24 September 1952). I find it necessary to inform you again that the object of my counterproposals was to avoid wasting time and to find an equitable way of investigating the claims of the former oil company and the counterclaims of the Iranian Government.

Now I once again with the same object in view declare my readiness for discussion and settlement of this question. In order that the dispute may be definitely and clearly disposed of as soon as possible, representatives of the former AIOC [Anglo-Iranian Oil Company], invested with full powers, are invited to leave for Tehran within a week as from today's date, for the purpose of necessary discussions within the limits of the Iranian Government's counterproposals. Taking into consideration the several years delay by the former company in paying its debts to the Iranian Government and also the Iranian Government's need for immediate aid, before the departure of its representatives for Iran the former oil company should put at the disposal of the Iranian Ministry of Finance the sum of 20 million pounds convertible into dollars, out of the 49 million pounds mentioned in Article 4 of my counterproposals dated the 2nd Mehr 1331 (24 September 1952). The remainder of the above-mentioned sum should be placed to the credit of the Iranian Government at the end of negotiations, for which a maximum period of 3 weeks is envisaged.

In conclusion it is expected that the complete good will of the Iranian Government toward a just solution of differences which has been reaffirmed in this note, will be well received and made use of. Your Excellency's attention is particularly drawn to the point that the Iranian Government has always indicated the serious consequences of procrastination and delay in reaching agreed and definitive solution of the differences. I once again remind you of the impossibility of the continuation of this state of affairs and any eventuality arising from pursuit of this policy is not the responsibility of the Iranian Government.

Dr. MOHAMMAD MOSADEQ,
Prime Minister.

15 Mehr 1331.

U.S. Chargé d'Affaires Visits William Oatis

Press Conference Statement by Secretary Acheson

Press release 785 dated October 8

I wish to tell you that our chargé d'affaires at Prague, Nat B. King, visited William Oatis yesterday at Prague Police Headquarters. The Embassy's telegram on the meeting indicated that Mr. Oatis appeared in about the same physical and mental condition as when he was last seen by Ambassador Briggs. Oatis said he had not been in ill health and medical and dental care were available when necessary. He was permitted to read and write and had adequate exercise. He was benefiting from the funds deposited to his account by the Embassy for cigarettes and articles of comfort. He replied in the negative to the question whether the Embassy could supply any specific items such as cigarettes, clothing, or extra food. He said he had received the volume of Shakespeare and books on harmony and composition which had been sent him (as he requested in his meeting with Ambassador Briggs on April 30) and asked to thank Ambassador Briggs for them. He expressed a desire for books on the technical side of play production in New York, on musical instruments and their capabilities, on forms of musical composition, and on geology, meteorology, or other fields of natural science. These books will be provided and it is expected that they will be transmitted to him through the Czechoslovak Foreign Office as before.

The chargé d'affaires conveyed messages to Oatis from his wife and received messages for her. The regard and assurances of Ambassador Briggs were communicated. Mr. King said that Ambassador and Mrs. Briggs had seen Mrs. Oatis in June and that she was well and waiting for him. He inquired about the health of other members of his family. Mr. King informed Oatis of a special citation to be awarded him this month by DePauw University in a ceremony honoring a number of outstanding alumni. Oatis expressed his appreciation for the messages and information. He said that he was glad to see Mr. King and hoped to be able to see him more often. The chargé d'affaires reiterated with emphasis that Oatis had not been forgotten and that efforts to obtain his release were continuing and would continue unabated.

The Undersecretary called Mrs. Oatis as soon as this telegram was received and informed her of the report.

Demilitarization of Jammu and Kashmir

FOURTH REPORT BY FRANK P. GRAHAM, U. N. REPRESENTATIVE FOR INDIA AND PAKISTAN

U.N. doc. S/2783
Dated Sept. 19, 1952

[Excerpts]

In accordance with his letters of 29 May and 30 July 1952 to the President of the Security Council¹ the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan wishes to inform the Security Council (a) regarding negotiations carried out in agreement with the Governments of India and Pakistan from 29 May to 16 July 1952 in New York, and (b) regarding the Conference held at Ministerial Level from 26 August to 10 September 1952 in Geneva.

This report should be read in connexion with the first, second and third reports of the United Nations Representative.²

This report is divided into three parts. Part I deals with the negotiations held in New York in United Nations Headquarters from 29 May to 16 July 1952. Part II deals with the Conference held in Geneva in the European Office of the United Nations, from 26 August to 10 September 1952. Part III sets forth certain conclusions.

* * * * *

CONFERENCE IN GENEVA FROM 26 AUGUST TO 10 SEPTEMBER 1952

The Conference took place in the European Office of the United Nations in Geneva from 26 August to 10 September 1952.

The delegations of India and Pakistan were composed as follows:

India: Mr. Gopalaswami Aiyangar, Minister for Defence, Leader of the Upper House

Mr. D. P. Dhar, Deputy Minister, Government of Jammu and Kashmir	Adviser
Major General K. S. Thimayya	Military Adviser
Mr. V. Shankar, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Defence	Adviser
Mr. B. L. Sharma, Principal Information Officer	Adviser
<i>Pakistan:</i> Sir Mohammad Zaf-rulla Khan, Minister for Foreign Affairs	Leader
Mr. M. Ayub	Secretary-General
Major General K. M. Sheikh	Senior Military Adviser
Brigadier Altaf Quadir	Adviser
Lt. Colonel M. Iqbal Khan	Adviser

Revised Proposals of 16 July and 2 September 1952

The Conference may be divided into two different stages. The first stage began with the opening statement by the United Nations Representative³ and the subsequent discussion of the revised proposals.⁴ Paragraph 7 of these proposals suggested brackets of 3,000 to 6,000 armed forces on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line and an Indian army force of 12,000 to 18,000 on the Indian side of the cease-fire line. The United Nations Representative suggested that an effort be made to reach agreement within these brackets, on the number of forces to remain on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization. Joint meetings and separate conversations took place at the representative and advisory level.

As a result of these meetings and conversations, in a joint meeting on 2 September the United Nations Rep-

¹ U.N. docs. S/2649 and S/2727.

² For excerpts from Mr. Graham's previous reports to the Security Council, see BULLETIN of Nov. 5, 1951, p. 738; Jan. 14, 1952, p. 52; and May 5, 1952, p. 712.

³ Annex IV (Not printed here).

⁴ Annex III (Not printed here).

representative submitted a new draft of his proposals⁵ suggesting in paragraph 7 A (iii) and B (ii) a minimum force of 6,000 on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line and of 18,000 on the Indian side. The United Nations Representative made it clear that in this draft, as in the draft of 16 July 1952, these figures did not include the Gilgit and Northern Scouts on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line, and the State militia on the Indian side of the cease-fire line.

In addition to suggesting definite minimum figures, this draft, in a provisional clause attempted to accommodate the concern expressed during the conversations that the agreement should not come into effect until the programme (schedule) of demilitarization had been agreed upon in a subsequent meeting between Representatives of India and Pakistan and approved by the two Governments.

On 3 September it appeared that no agreement could be secured on the basis of the figures proposed, either within the brackets suggested for discussion in the 16 July 1952 proposals, or on definite numbers as in the 2 September 1952 proposals.

The position of the Two Governments on the main issues as stated by their Representatives was set forth in memoranda submitted to the United Nations Representative (see Annexes V and VI)⁶ and can be summarized as follows:

A. Character and quantum of forces to remain on each side of the cease-fire line

The character and quantum of forces should be considered in connexion with paragraphs 7 A (iii) and B (ii) and paragraph 11 of the revised proposals submitted by the United Nations Representative to the Governments of India and Pakistan on 16 July and 2 September 1952.

Position of India

(a) On the Indian side of the cease-fire line

(i) The Government of India maintain that they are constitutionally responsible for the defence of the State of Jammu and Kashmir which includes aid to the civil power:

(ii) According to paragraph 4 (a) of part II of the UNCIP [United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan] resolution of 13 August 1948,⁷ the Government of India must have the minimum forces required to assist the local authorities i.e. the Government of Jammu and Kashmir, on the Indian side of the cease-fire line, in the maintenance of law and order. India considers that UNCIP itself interpreted this to include adequate defence. Under paragraph 4 (a) of the UNCIP resolution of 5 January 1949⁸ the disposal of Indian and State armed forces on the Indian side of the cease-fire line has to be with due regard to security, which, according to the Government of India has a wider significance than law and order.

(iii) Having regard to these commitments of internal and external security, the responsibilities under the cease-fire agreement and the fact that Pakistan would be free

to locate its forces as it likes within its own borders, which for some length are common with the borders of the Jammu and Kashmir State and for a still greater length within practically striking distance of the cease-fire line and important areas of the Jammu and Kashmir State, the Government of India consider that a minimum force of 28,000 is required.

(iv) However, on complete disbandment and disarmament of the Azad Kashmir forces and as a further gesture towards a settlement they are prepared to effect a further reduction of 7,000 but it is impossible to reduce this absolute minimum figure of 21,000. The Government of India will under no circumstances be prepared to include the militia in these calculations. The militia is a special armed police force which is under the administration of the Jammu and Kashmir Government for its normal law and order responsibilities and is only temporarily, for the period of emergency, under the operational control of the Indian Army.

(b) On the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line

(i) The Government of India maintains that the administration of this area would, under para. 3 of Part II of the Resolution of 13 August 1949 [1948], vest in local authorities to be established or recognized for the purpose; to these local authorities under the same resolution only local administrative functions have been assigned. In the very nature of things such authorities can be in charge only of local law and order whether in the area or with reference to the cease-fire line. To give them any armed force equivalent to troops would not be consistent either with their status or with their functions and would be a violation of the sovereignty of the Union of India and the Jammu and Kashmir State. In the very nature of things, therefore, these local authorities can be entrusted only with a civil armed force.

(ii) The Government of India consider that a civil armed force of 4,000 would be on the liberal side considering the pre-aggression strength of forces policing this area. However, they would be prepared to consider an appropriate increase to provide for the needs of the Northern areas or should the United Nations Representative, under whose surveillance these forces would be operating, make out a case that this strength is inadequate.

(iii) Having regard to the functions these forces are to discharge and the conditions of a fair and impartial plebiscite, these forces should consist of an equal proportion of Azad Kashmir and other elements. The Government of India would be prepared to agree to a suitable readjustment of the armed and unarmed portion of this force.

(iv) The civil armed force should be under neutral and local officers.

Position of Pakistan

(i) The Government of Pakistan maintain that security on each side of the cease-fire line has to be ensured and neither side should be able to steal a march against the other, but the over-riding consideration is that neither India nor Pakistan should be placed in a position to intimidate the population and influence their vote in the plebiscite. India cannot be the sole judge of the steps

⁵ Annex VII (See below).

⁶ Not printed here.

⁷ U.N. doc. S/1100.

⁸ U. N. doc. S/1196.

needed to ensure the security of the State. During the plebiscite stage, the United Nations Representative and the Plebiscite Administrator, in accordance with the 5 January 1949 resolution, have the right to determine, in consultation with the authorities concerned, the final disposal of all the forces remaining in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, "such disposal to be with due regard to the Security of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite."

(ii) The Government of Pakistan consider that after the processes outlined in clause 7 of the United Nations Representative's proposals of 16 July 1952 have been carried out, there should remain on each side of the cease-fire line only the minimum forces necessary for the maintenance of law and order and the preservation of the cease-fire line. The character of the forces must be the same on both sides of the cease-fire line.

(iii) In regard to the figures established by the United Nations Representative in clause 7 of his proposals of 2 September 1952 the Government of Pakistan consider that it leaves too many soldiers in the State. Before partition, they add, the Maharaja's Government managed with less than a quarter of the forces suggested by the United Nations Representative—8,000 as against 33,500.⁹ The ratio of the forces proposed is also unfair to Pakistan considering the ratio on the date of the cease-fire.¹⁰

(iv) Subject to these observations, the Pakistan delegation was prepared to accept the proposals of 2 September 1952 of the United Nations Representative.

B. Final disposal of forces

Connected with the character and quantum of forces is the question of the functions and responsibilities of the United Nations Representative and the Plebiscite Administrator with regard to the final disposal of forces as set out in paragraph 4(a) and (b) of the UNCIP resolution of 5 January 1949.

Position of India

The Government of India contend that the term final disposal in paragraph 4(a) of the resolution of 5 January 1949 means only disposition. Moreover, once it is accepted in principle that the demilitarization contemplated under the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, should be effected in a single continuous process, no interference with the strength of forces in the State is possible at the plebiscite stage. Furthermore, if the matter of the reduction or withdrawal of forces at the plebiscite stage (according to the Pakistan Government's interpretation of 4(a) and (b) of the resolution of 5 January 1949) is brought into the demilitarization stage, the process of demilitarization must be deemed to have exhausted itself and the United Nations Representative and

⁹This figure includes 18,000 Indian and State armed forces plus 6,000 State Militia on the Indian side and 6,000 armed forces plus 3,500 Gilgit and Northern Scouts on the Pakistan side.

¹⁰India estimates that at the time of the cease-fire she had 130,000 troops in the State. Pakistan estimates that at the same time she had 81,000 troops in the State.

the Plebiscite Administrator can in the plebiscite stage deal only with the question of disposition.

Position of Pakistan

The Government of Pakistan maintain that the term "final disposal" covers reduction by withdrawal or disbandment as well as location or stationing of the armed forces concerned. If it is contended that "final disposal" means only the location or stationing of the forces then there is by the same token no provision in the UNCIP resolutions for the reduction or disbandment of the Azad Kashmir forces.

C. Induction Into Office of the Plebiscite Administrator

Position of India

The Government of India's view is that the Plebiscite Administrator can properly function only after (i) the process of demilitarization is completed and the United Nations Representative is satisfied that peaceful conditions have been restored and (ii) the local authorities are recognized and are functioning on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line under the surveillance of the United Nations Representative. In the interests of agreement, however, the Government of India would be prepared to agree to his induction on the last day of the period of demilitarization provided that it is completed according to plan and is exhaustive so that the Plebiscite Administrator would, as regards the forces remaining in the State after demilitarization is fully implemented, be concerned only with their disposition.

Position of Pakistan

Under the UNCIP resolution of 5 January 1949, the Plebiscite Administrator has to be inducted into office as soon as the tribesmen, Pakistan volunteers and the Pakistan army and the bulk of the Indian army have withdrawn. The proposal of the United Nations Representative that the Plebiscite Administrator should be appointed not later than the last day of the demilitarization programme represents in the opinion of the Government of Pakistan a big concession to the Indian point of view. Nevertheless, Pakistan is prepared to accept it as part of the twelve truce proposals suggested by the United Nations Representative.

Draft Proposals of 4 September 1952

The second stage of the Conference began on 4 September 1952. The United Nations Representative was faced with the objections of the two Governments to essential parts of his proposals as revised on 16 July and 2 September. As he had stated before, these objections derived mainly from the different conceptions that the Governments of India and Pakistan had of their status in the State of Jammu and Kashmir,¹¹ as well as the different interpretations that they give to the UNCIP resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949. As it was not

¹¹For a summary of these conceptions, see Mr. Graham's first report (U. N. doc. S/2375, paragraphs 33-35 inclusive; BULLETIN of Nov. 5, 1951, p. 739).

possible under the circumstances to secure agreement on the minimum forces to be left on each side of the cease-fire line, the Representative thought it might be possible for the two Governments to agree on some principles based on the requirements of each side of the cease-fire line. These principles could then serve as the criteria for fixing the quantum of forces in the Conference of civil and military representatives contemplated in the provisional clause of the revised proposals of 2 September.

The United Nations Representative accordingly submitted a new draft proposal¹² in a joint meeting on 4 September 1952. Paragraph 7 of these proposals reads as follows:

"Agree that the demilitarization shall be carried out in such a way that at the end of the period referred to in paragraph 6 above the situation will be:

A. On the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line:

(i) the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally resident therein who had entered the State for the purpose of fighting will have been withdrawn;

(ii) the Pakistan troops will have been withdrawn from the State;

(iii) large-scale disbanding and disarmament of the Azad Kashmir forces will have taken place; so that at the end of the period of demilitarization there shall be the minimum number of forces that are required for the maintenance of law and order and of the cease-fire agreement with due regard to the freedom of the plebiscite;

B. On the Indian side of the cease-fire line:

(i) the bulk of the Indian forces in the State will have been withdrawn;

(ii) further withdrawals or reductions, as the case may be, of the Indian and State armed forces remaining in the State after the completion of the operation referred to in B (i) above will have been carried out; so that at the end of the period of demilitarization there shall be the minimum number of Indian forces and State armed forces that are required for the maintenance of law and order and the cease-fire agreement, with due regard to the security of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite."

The responses of the representatives of India and Pakistan were as follows:

Position of India

The Government of India consider that "the principles enumerated in paragraphs 7 A (iii) and B (ii) of the proposals of 4 September 1952 were conceived in the right spirit having regard to the two UNCTE resolutions. As a basis for the evolution of a suitable definition of functions of forces on both sides of the cease-fire line they contained the germs of a settlement." The Government of India maintain that they cannot accept any equation of their responsibilities with the local authorities on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line or agree to anything more than a local character to the maintenance of public order in that area by the local authorities. Constitutionally the defence of the entire State of Jammu and Kashmir is the concern of the Government of India and they alone are entitled to maintain a military armed force for the purpose. India maintains that this is the only position consistent with the assurance given by the Commission and the practice observed hitherto by the United Nations authorities of giving recognition to the

sovereignty of the Indian Union and the State which derived originally from the Instrument of Accession and has since been embodied in the Constitution of India.

Position of Pakistan

The Government of Pakistan fully agreed with the United Nations Representative that every effort should be made at the Geneva Conference itself to agree on the number and character of forces which should remain on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the demilitarization programme. Failing this, the Conference should at least agree on the guiding principles for determining the number and character of forces. The Pakistan delegation felt that the words "with due regard to the freedom of the plebiscite" used in sub-clause 7 A (iii) and the phrase "with due regard to the security of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite" used in sub-clause 7 B (ii) of the draft proposals should be deleted. The object of this amendment was to avoid the recurrence in the Military Sub-Committee of the political controversies which had held up progress in the main Conference itself. If this proposal had been accepted, Pakistan would not have insisted on further reduction of forces under paragraph 4 (a) and (b) of the 5 January 1949 resolution, and would have been satisfied with the disposition of all remaining forces by the United Nations Representatives and the Plebiscite Administrator, in consultation with the respective authorities, and with due regard to the security of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite.

Subject to the above observations, and some drafting changes, the Pakistan delegation was prepared to accept the United Nations Representative's draft proposals of 4 September 1952.

The revised proposals of 4 September were agreed upon by the Representatives of India and Pakistan to the following extent:

(i) Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 A (i) and (ii), 7 B (1), 8, 9, 10, 12 and the provisional clause; with the redrafting of paragraphs 5, 6 and 9 as follows:

"5. Agree that the demilitarization of Jammu and Kashmir contemplated in the United Nations resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 shall be effected in a single continuous process;

"6. Agree that this process of demilitarization shall be completed during a period of 90 days, starting from the date on which the programme of demilitarization referred to in paragraph 7 below is approved by the Governments of India and Pakistan, unless another period is decided upon by the two Governments.

"9. Agree that pending a final solution the territory evacuated by Pakistan troops will be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the United Nations. Effect shall be given to this by the time the process of demilitarization mentioned in paragraph 6 has been completed on both sides of the cease-fire line."

(ii) Concerning paragraph 12 the Representative of India accepted it with the understanding that the differences referred to the United Nations Representative should be only on technical details referring to the actual implementation of the agreed programme.¹³

(iii) In regard to paragraphs 7 A (iii) and 7 B (ii)

¹² Annex VIII (see below).

¹³ See also U.N. doc. S/2448, paragraph 28.

the remaining difference in position of the Representatives has been stated in paragraph 25.

(iv) Paragraph II of the proposals was deleted to be substituted with another one to be agreed upon by the two Representatives, connected with the definite wording of paragraph 7 and with the functions and responsibilities of the United Nations Representative and the Plebiscite Administrator in accordance with paragraph 4 (a) and (b) of the UNCIP resolution of 5 January 1949.

III. CONCLUSIONS

In his third report, submitted on 22 April 1952, the United Nations Representative recommended³⁴ that the negotiations with the Governments of India and Pakistan be continued with a view to:

"(a) Resolving the remaining differences on the twelve proposals, with a special reference to the quantum of forces to be left on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization, and

"(b) The general implementation of the resolutions of UNCIP of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949."

The agenda of the Geneva Conference was the implementation of the UNCIP resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949. The meetings began with the examination of the revised draft proposals of 16 July 1952 and continued with discussion of the subsequent redrafts.

After two weeks of discussion it was evident that agreement could not be reached at this Conference on any of the revised drafts presented for consideration. The positions of the two Governments on the main issues were such that the contemplated examination of the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, resolution by resolution and paragraph by paragraph, did not appear to be a useful further line of approach. The possibility envisaged by the United Nations Representative, in his statement of 16 July 1952,³⁵ of discussion of any further suggestions that the representatives of the two Governments might wish to make did not arise during the Conference and no alternative suggestions were made.

The United Nations Representative, on his part, has limited himself to carry out his mediatory functions under the terms of reference³⁶ given him by the Security Council.

The Security Council is familiar with the dispute between India and Pakistan on the State of Jammu and Kashmir. It has been before the Security Council since January 1948. The present positions of the two Governments are derived from their differing conception of their status in the State. This more than anything else is the origin of their different interpretations with regard to their commitments.

These conceptions have been stated repeatedly by both Governments during the discussions in the Security Council and during the negotiations with the UNCIP, with Gen-

eral A. G. L. McNaughton and with Sir Owen Dixon.

Growing out of the basic difference in the interpretation of the two Governments regarding their status and commitments under the 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 resolutions of the UNCIP, is their difference over the character and number of forces to be left on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization.

Demilitarization, as a condition for the induction into office of the Plebiscite Administrator,³⁷ is but one of the important steps necessary in the preparation for the plebiscite.

The heart of the integrated programme for demilitarization and the plebiscite, is the induction into office of the Plebiscite Administrator. This was made a central part of the twelve proposals,³⁸ original and revised.

The preparations for, and the holding of, the plebiscite follow upon the induction into office of the Plebiscite Administrator. His induction into office follows upon the solution of the crucial problem of the character and number of forces to remain on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization. For the solution of this problem the United Nations Representative, after submitting brackets of figures within which discussion might proceed, later suggested to the parties in the Geneva Conference definite figures. Then, alternatively, he suggested criteria for establishing definite figures on the basis of the functions and requirements on each side of the cease-fire line.

The present Representative has been instructed to secure an agreement on a plan of demilitarization under the two resolutions, and, in case of no agreement, to report the remaining differences thereon to the Council. He has made three reports to the Council which have narrowed the problem down to what appears to be the prerequisite for an agreement on a plan of demilitarization, namely, agreement on the number and character of forces to remain on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization.

The representative holds the view that for reaching an agreement on a plan of demilitarization it is necessary either:

(a) to establish the character and number of forces to be left on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization; or

(b) to declare that the forces to remain on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization should be determined in accordance with the requirements of each area, and, accordingly, principles or criteria should be established which would serve as guidance for the civil and military representatives of the Governments of India and Pakistan in the meeting contemplated in the Provisional Clause of the revised proposals.

³⁷ Admiral Chester Nimitz has been designated for this position.

³⁸ For text of Mr. Graham's original 12 proposals and of his Oct. 18, 1951 statement before the Security Council analyzing them, see BULLETIN of Nov. 5, 1951, p. 740.

³⁴ BULLETIN of May 5, 1952, p. 713.

³⁵ Annex II (not printed here).

³⁶ BULLETIN of Nov. 5, 1951, p. 738.

2 September 1952

*Proposal of United Nations Representative based upon his twelve proposals**The Governments of India and of Pakistan*

1. Reaffirm their determination not to resort to force and to adhere to peaceful procedures and specifically pledge themselves that they will not commit aggression or make war, the one against the other, with regard to the question of Jammu and Kashmir;
2. Agree that each Government, on its part, will instruct its official spokesmen and will urge all its citizens, organizations, publications and radio stations not to make warlike statements or statements calculated to incite the people of either nation to make war against the other with regard to the question of Jammu and Kashmir;
3. Reaffirm their will to observe the cease-fire effective from 1 January 1949 and the Karachi Agreement of 27 July 1949;
4. Reaffirm their acceptance of the principle that the question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan will be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite under the auspices of the United Nations;
5. Agree that subject to the provisions of paragraph 11 below the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir contemplated in the UNCIP resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 shall be effected in a single, continuous process;
6. Agree that this process of demilitarization shall be completed during a period of 90 days, starting from the date of the entrance into effect of this agreement, unless another period is decided upon by the Governments of India and Pakistan;
7. Agree that the demilitarization shall be carried out in such a way that at the end of the period referred to in paragraph 6 above the situation will be:

A. On the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line:

- (i) the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally resident therein who had entered the State for the purpose of fighting will have been withdrawn;
- (ii) the Pakistan troops will have been withdrawn from the State;
- (iii) large-scale disbanding and disarmament of the Azad Kashmir forces will have taken place; so that at the end of the period of demilitarization there shall be an armed force of 6,000;

B. On the Indian side of the cease-fire line:

- (i) the bulk of the Indian forces in the State will have been withdrawn;
- (ii) further withdrawals or reductions, as the case may be, of the Indian and State armed forces remaining in the State after the completion of the operation referred to in B (i) above will have been carried out; so that at the end of the period of demilitarization there shall be an Indian Army force of 18,000 including State armed forces.
8. Agree that the demilitarization shall be carried out in such a way as to involve no threat to the cease-fire agreement either during or after the period referred to in paragraph 6 above;
9. Pending a final solution the territory evacuated by the Pakistan troops will be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the United Nations. The local authorities shall undertake the fulfillment of such duties as are necessary for the observance within that territory of the provisions of the Karachi Agreement of 27 July 1949;
10. Agree that the Government of India shall cause the Plebiscite Administrator to be formally appointed to office not later than the final day of the demilitarization period referred to in paragraph 6 above;
11. Agree that the completion of the programme of de-

militarization referred to in the provisional clause below will be without prejudice to the functions and responsibilities of the United Nations Representative and the Plebiscite Administrator with regard to the final disposal of forces as set forth in paragraph 4 (a) and (b) of the 5 January 1949 resolution;

12. Agree that any differences regarding the programme of demilitarization contemplated in the provisional clause will be referred to the Military Adviser of the United Nations Representative, and, if disagreement continues, to the United Nations Representative, whose decision shall be final.

PROVISIONAL CLAUSE

This agreement shall enter into effect when the Governments of India and Pakistan have approved a programme of demilitarization in conformity with paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 8 above, the draft of such programme to be drawn up in meetings between the representatives of the Governments of India and of Pakistan assisted by their Military Advisers under the auspices of the United Nations. The first meeting shall take place within two weeks after the signature of the above agreement.

ANNEX VIII

4 September 1952

*Proposal of United Nations Representative based upon his twelve points**The Governments of India and Pakistan*

1. Reaffirm their determination not to resort to force and to adhere to peaceful procedures and specifically pledge themselves that they will not commit aggression or make war, the one against the other, with regard to the question of Jammu and Kashmir;
2. Agree that each Government, on its part, will instruct its official spokesmen and will urge all its citizens, organizations, publications and radio stations not to make warlike statements or statements calculated to incite the people of either nation to make war against the other with regard to the question of Jammu and Kashmir;
3. Reaffirm their will to observe the cease-fire effective from 1 January 1949 and the Karachi Agreement of 27 July 1949;
4. Reaffirm their acceptance of the principle that the question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan will be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite under the auspices of the United Nations;
5. Agree that the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir contemplated in the UNCIP resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 as set forth in paragraph 7 below, shall be effected in a single continuous process;
6. Agree that this process of demilitarization shall be completed during a period of 90 days, starting from the date of the entrance into effect of this agreement, unless another period is decided upon by the Governments of India and of Pakistan;
7. Agree that the demilitarization shall be carried out in such a way that at the end of the period referred to in paragraph 6 above the situation will be:

A. On the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line:

- (i) the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally resident therein who had entered the State for the purpose of fighting will have been withdrawn;
- (ii) the Pakistan troops will have been withdrawn from the State;
- (iii) large-scale disbanding and disarmament of the Azad Kashmir forces will have taken place; so that at the end of the period of demilitarization there shall be the minimum number of forces that are required for the maintenance of law and order and of the cease-fire agreement, with due regard to the freedom of the plebiscite;

B. On the Indian side of the cease-fire line:

(i) the bulk of the Indian forces in the State will have been withdrawn;

(ii) further withdrawals or reductions, as the case may be, of the Indian and State armed forces remaining in the State after the completion of the operation referred to in B (i) above will have been carried out; so that at the end of the period of demilitarization there shall be the minimum number of Indian forces and State armed forces that are required for the maintenance of law and order and of the cease-fire agreement, with due regard to the security of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite.

8. Agree that the demilitarization shall be carried out in such a way as to involve no threat to the cease-fire agreement either during or after the period referred to in paragraph 6 above;

9. Agree that pending a final solution the territory evacuated by the Pakistan troops will be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the United Nations;

10. Agree that the Government of India shall cause the Plebiscite Administrator to be formally appointed to office not later than the final day of the demilitarization period referred to in paragraph 6 above;

11. Agree that arrangements for the plebiscite shall be completed after the United Nations Representative declares that he is satisfied that peaceful conditions have been restored in the State;

12. Agree that any differences regarding the programme of demilitarization contemplated in the provisional clause will be referred to the Military Adviser of the United Nations Representative, and, if disagreement continues, to the United Nations Representative, whose decision shall be final.

PROVISIONAL CLAUSE

This agreement shall enter into effect when the Governments of India and Pakistan have approved a programme of demilitarization in conformity with paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 8 above, the draft of such programme to be drawn up in meetings between the representatives of the Governments of India and of Pakistan assisted by their Military Advisers under the auspices of the United Nations. The first meeting shall take place within two weeks after the signature of the above agreement.

Supplementary Agenda Items for Seventh General Assembly¹

U.N. doc. A/2193
Dated Sept. 24, 1952

1. Question of an appeal to the Powers signatories to the Moscow Declaration of 1 November 1943, for an early fulfillment of their pledges toward Austria: item proposed by Brazil.

2. Application of Japan for membership in the International Civil Aviation Organization: item proposed by the Secretary-General.

3. The question of Morocco: item proposed by Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen.

4. The question of race conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of the Union of South Africa: item proposed by Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen.

¹ For the Provisional Agenda, see BULLETIN of Sept. 1, 1952, p. 334.

5. The Conciliation Commission for Palestine and its work in the light of the resolutions of the United Nations: item proposed by Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen.

6. Violation by Arab States of their obligations under the Charter, United Nations resolutions and specific provisions of the General Armistice Agreements concluded with Israel, requiring them to desist from policies and practices of hostility and to seek agreement by negotiation for the establishment of peaceful relations with Israel: item proposed by Israel.

7. Administration of the United Nations: item proposed by the Secretary-General.

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

Petroleum Committee (ILO)

The Department of State announced on October 10 (press release 798) that the U.S. delegation to the fourth session of the Petroleum Committee of the International Labor Organization (ILO), which will be held at Scheveningen, Netherlands, October 14-25, 1952, will be as follows:

REPRESENTING THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES

Delegates

John Edward Brantly, Assistant Deputy Administrator for Foreign Petroleum Operations, Department of the Interior

Robert R. Behlow, Regional Director, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Department of Labor, New York

Adviser

John W. Piercey, Labor Attaché, American Embassy, The Hague, Netherlands

REPRESENTING THE EMPLOYERS OF THE UNITED STATES

Delegates

John C. Quilty, Manager, Industrial Relations Department, Shell Oil Company, New York

H. W. Jones, Manager, Industrial Relations Department, Atlantic Refining Co., Philadelphia

Advisers

C. Francis Beatty, Director, Socony-Vacuum Oil Company, Inc., New York

M. H. Diaz, Legal Staff, Gulf Oil Corp., Tampas, Mexico

W. M. Roberts, Director, Industrial Relations, Standard Oil Company of California, San Francisco

REPRESENTING THE WORKERS OF THE UNITED STATES

Delegates

Lloyd A. Haskins, International Representative, Oil Workers International Union, Congress of Industrial Organizations, District No. 5, Alexandria

James A. Garrett, International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 351, American Federation of Labor, Phillips, Tex.

The Petroleum Committee is one of eight industrial committees established by ILO to give continuing and close attention to economic and social problems in certain industries. The other industrial committees are concerned with building, civil engineering, and public works; chemicals; coal mines; inland transport; iron and steel; metal trades; and textiles. The United States is represented on each of these committees.

Delegates to the forthcoming session of the Petroleum Committee will consider (1) a general report on the actions taken in various countries in

the light of the conclusions reached at the first three sessions; (2) principles and methods used in determining wages in the petroleum industry; and (3) social services in the industry. Among the technical subjects with which the Committee has dealt at its previous sessions (February 3-12, 1947, held at Los Angeles; November 10-19, 1948, at Geneva; and October 24-November 3, 1950, at Geneva) have been the recruitment and training of employees for the petroleum industry, safety in the petroleum industry, industrial relations, and social conditions in the petroleum industry.

The United States in the United Nations

[October 14-18, 1952]

The seventh session of the General Assembly opened on October 14 in the new United Nations Headquarters buildings. After Luis Padilla Nervo (Mexico), President of the sixth session, called the members to order, Mayor Vincent R. Impelleteri of New York City made a welcoming address. He said in part:

I assure you that the people of this city have a deep-seated faith in the ability of men of all nations, all creeds, and all walks of life to reach a common understanding—without subsequent rancor, recrimination, or resort to force of arms.

It was this kind of faith which prompted us to urge upon you the selection of our great metropolis as your permanent home. . . . As we view the spacious and imposing panorama that has emerged from the welter of 3 years' construction work, we feel well rewarded.

Ambassador Warren R. Austin (U.S.), chairman of the Headquarters Advisory Committee, paid tribute to the craftsmen who had planned and built the "noble Capitol for Universal Peace." (Excerpts from his statement will appear in the BULLETIN of October 27.)

After a welcome by Secretary-General Trygve Lie, Dr. Padilla Nervo addressed the delegates in his capacity as temporary chairman. The value of the United Nations had been proved in the social and economic fields, and by its activities in bettering human existence it was "sowing the seeds of a peace that will arise one day from human welfare and wisdom." But in the field of political accomplishment, the credit side this year was "not very heartening." All the great questions pending before the Assembly had either become acute or were "hopeless of immediate solution." After the longest and most patient

negotiations recorded in history, the Korean question was again being "debated by guns." German unification and the treaty with Austria were "in suspense."

If only the capitalist world and the Communist world could convince each other of one thing, that neither of the two plans the destruction of the other, the suspicion that divides them would be eliminated.

In the balloting for President of the seventh session, Lester B. Pearson (Canada) received 51 votes and was declared elected.

During the afternoon session the General Assembly elected chairmen of the six main committees and the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, as follows:

- First (Political and Security) Committee—Joao Carlos Muniz (Brazil)
- Ad Hoc* Political Committee—Alexis Kyrrou (Greece)
- Second (Economic and Financial) Committee—Jiri Nosek (Czechoslovakia)
- Third (Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural) Committee—Amjad Ali (Pakistan)
- Fourth (Trusteeship) Committee—Rodolfo Munoz (Argentina)
- Fifth (Administrative and Budgetary) Committee—Carlos P. Romulo (Philippines)
- Sixth (Legal) Committee—Wan Waithayakon (Thailand)

Secretary Acheson's Address

Secretary Acheson delivered his opening address as chairman of the United States delegation when general debate began on October 16. (The complete text will appear in the BULLETIN of

October 27.) He outlined three groups of problems confronting the Assembly: those concerning security, the fulfillment of national and individual aspirations, and the economic progress of both individuals and communities. On the first, he asserted that the solidarity of the nations supporting the Charter was absolutely essential in the field of collective security. The responsibility to cooperate should be reflected not only in readiness to participate in United Nations action but also in other ways, such as regional and collective self-defense arrangements, sanctioned by the Charter, he said.

It is in Korea that our whole structure of collective security is meeting its supreme test. It will stand or fall upon what we do there.

The United Nations fight in Korea is the fight of every nation and every individual who values freedom. Had our nerve failed at the time of this ruthless act of aggression, these new buildings in which we meet today might already be the empty husks of our defeated hopes for this organization. . . . Had the Republic of Korea been allowed to fall to the aggressor, the Delegates to these Assemblies would now be looking to their left and to their right and asking which would be the next victim on the aggressor's list.

Korea is a test, not only of our courage at the initial moment of decision, but even more of the firmness of our will, the endurance of our courage. The aggressor, having defied the United Nations and lost, having found himself pushed back behind his initial line of attack, now counts for victory upon those of faint heart who would grow weary of the struggle. . . .

We must convince the aggressor that continued fighting in Korea will cost him more than he can gain. This means the training and commitment of troops; it means food, clothing, matériel, money. I urge every member of the United Nations to look to its responsibility to support the common action in Korea and to participate in the reconstruction of that unhappy land.

The Assembly, he said, would have the opportunity to review the record of the armistice negotiations and, by action, to demonstrate to the aggressor that "we are united in purpose and firm in resolve."

Soviet Delegate Speaks

Andrei Vyshinsky (U.S.S.R.) addressed the delegates on October 18. Excerpts from his statements follow:

. . . On Thursday, Mr. Acheson attempted to describe United States intervention in Korea as a fight of the United Nations against aggression. He repeated the fully discredited version that the war imposed by the American interventionists on the Korean people was defensive and did not, he said, pursue any aggressive purposes. In truth, it does pursue aggressive objectives.

As regards the question how long the war in Korea will continue, Mr. Acheson answered, "we must fight as long as it will be necessary to put an end to aggression and to restore peace and security in Korea." . . .

All the terms that have so far been offered by the United States Command in Korea . . . can only be called a flagrant violation of all the rules of fairness and equity. . . .

This applies to the United States demand for the so-called screening of war prisoners and the placing of them in categories, with some to be sent home by the

United States Command and others to be retained in captivity. . . .

It is clear that the United States ruling circles are working against any armistice . . . as their purpose is to stall these negotiations in endless talk so as to prevent the conclusion of an armistice in Korea. They have fished out a pretext, the question of the exchange of war prisoners. . . .

They did not shrink from the flagrant violation of the Geneva Convention of 1949, particularly Articles 118 and 119, which call upon all warring parties without any reservations to ensure the return to their homeland of all war prisoners except those who are *sub judice* for alleged war crimes.

Although the convention is signed by the United States representative . . . they did not hesitate to use any measures and all forms of pressure and force calling for the so-called screening of war prisoners, forcing them to make statements about their unwillingness to go home. The protests of the Korean and Chinese war prisoners against such willful and illegal action of the United States command have been suppressed, as happened in the Koje Island camp. The suppression in Koje Island took place by way of extermination and this is still going on every day in United States camps for war prisoners . . . the task of solving the Korean question stands squarely on the agenda of the peace-loving peoples of the world. . . . They demand that imperialistic aggressors should be curbed, and they are standing up to the United States' aggressive policy. . . .

We are warmly in favor of the proposal of our Polish colleague, which calls upon the General Assembly to recommend to the warring parties that they put an end to military activities on land, at sea and in the air. We warmly support the proposal of the Polish delegation for the repatriation of all war prisoners in accordance with established international stipulations.

We warmly support the proposal of the Polish delegation for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea, including the Chinese volunteers, this to be done within a period of two or three months. We warmly support the Polish proposal for the peaceful settlement of the Korean question on the principle of the unification of Korea, to be carried out by the Koreans themselves under the supervision of a commission on which the parties directly concerned and also other states that did not participate in the Korean war will be represented. . . .

The United States aggressor has sought to utilize Korea as a proving ground for the effectiveness of death-dealing bacteria. Thus, the Soviet Union delegation deems it essential to stress in particular the significance of the Polish proposal which calls upon all states which have so far failed to adhere to the Geneva protocol of 1925, or to ratify that protocol, to do so. That applies first and foremost to the United States of America, which still obstinately refuses to ratify the Geneva Protocol. . . .

. . . If one examines the work of the so-called Disarmament Commission, created at the sixth session of the General Assembly, one cannot fail to note that, far from bending its efforts toward the reduction of armaments and prohibition of the atomic weapon, the delegation of the United States bent every effort toward legalizing the further increase of armaments and toward furthering, in the interests of the United States, the stockpiling of atomic bombs. . . .

The Soviet Union struggles for peace by its methods which are based on the principle of respect for independence; sovereignty; the equality of states; mutual support of effective mutual assistance without ulterior motives for the purpose of attaining new achievements in the cause of strengthening new regimes of peace, democracy and socialism; for a sincere, honest and decent peaceful co-operation; and for mutual defense of the interests of all countries and peoples of the Soviet Union, which interests are indistinguishable from the interests of all people of the world. . . .

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

Technical Cooperation. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2409. Pub. 4572. 9 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Chile—Signed at Santiago Jan. 16, 1951; entered into force July 27, 1951.

Technical Cooperation. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2413. Pub. 4592. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Iraq—Signed at Baghdad Apr. 10, 1951; entered into force June 2, 1951.

Treaty of Peace With Japan. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2490. Pub. 4613. 173 pp. 40¢.

Signed at San Francisco Sept. 8, 1951; entered into force Apr. 28, 1952.

Health and Sanitation, Cooperative Program in Uruguay. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2408. Pub. 4620. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Uruguay—Signed at Montevideo July 21, 26, and 27, 1949; entered into force July 27, 1949.

Unemployment Insurance Benefits. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2452. Pub. 4621. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Canada—Signed at Ottawa July 31 and Sept. 11, 1951; entered into force Sept. 11, 1951; operative retroactively from Apr. 1, 1951.

Telecommunications, Operation of Certain Radio Equipment or Stations. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2508. Pub. 4622. 6 pp. 5¢.

Convention between the United States and Canada—Signed at Ottawa Feb. 8, 1951; entered into force May 15, 1952.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Its Development and Significance. General Foreign Policy Series 75. Pub. 4630. 50 pp. 20¢.

Pamphlet giving the origin and organization of NATO; questions and answers pertaining to NATO and the text of the treaty.

Claims, Operation of Smelter at Trail, British Columbia. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2412. Pub. 4635. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Canada—Signed at Washington Nov. 17, 1949, and Jan. 24, 1950; entered into force Jan. 24, 1950.

Technical Cooperation. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2414. Pub. 4636. 7 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Haiti—Signed at Port-au-Prince May 2, 1951; entered into force May 2, 1951.

Technical Cooperation, Cooperative Program of Agriculture and Livestock. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2430. Pub. 4640. 14 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Chile—Signed at Santiago Jan. 16, 1951; entered into force Jan. 16, 1951.

Teaching About the United Nations in the Schools and Colleges of the United States in 1950 and 1951. International Organization and Conference Series III, 83. Pub. 4649. 29 pp. 10¢.

A report prepared for the U. S. National Commission for UNESCO by the U. S. Office of Education, Federal Security Agency.

Guide to the United States and the United Nations. International Organization and Conference Series III, 84. Pub. 4653. 21 pp. 15¢.

Chronology of the United States and the United Nations from 1941 up to June 26, 1952.

THE FOREIGN SERVICE

Appointment of Officers

Harold Shantz as Minister to Rumania, effective September 27.

George Wadsworth as Ambassador to Czechoslovakia, effective October 8.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: Oct. 6-10, 1952

Releases may be obtained from the Office of the Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Press releases issued prior to Oct. 6 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 762 of Sept. 26 and 776 of Oct. 3.

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†784	10/7	Seminar for foreign students
785	10/8	Acheson: Oatis case
786	10/8	Acheson: Armistice negotiations
787	10/8	Letter to Acheson from Mossadegh
*788	10/8	Acheson: Koreans for front lines
789	10/8	Acheson: Reply to Sen. Knowland
790	10/8	U.S. note to U.S.S.R. on Kennan
791	10/9	Wadsworth: Amb. to Czechoslovakia
†792	10/9	Burma: Point Four Program
†793	10/9	Andrews: Farmer in world picture
†794	10/9	Japanese war criminals board
*795	10/9	Thorp: Chairman of GATT delegation
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Achieving the Goals of the Charter

*Address by Secretary Acheson*¹

This is our first meeting in the new home of the United Nations. We join in our congratulations and gratitude to all of those who have had a part in the completion of this work. The result of their efforts is an enduring symbol of accomplishment and of aspiration.

We meet here to take up our labors to bring together and to harmonize the hopes and desires of the people of the United Nations. This is a never-ending task for each Assembly in its turn.

This year marks the seventh anniversary of the ratification of the Charter. These 7 years have demonstrated that the role of the United Nations in the community of nations is an essential one and one that will continue to increase in influence and importance in the years ahead.

The importance and influence of the United Nations is reflected in the problems that come before it. They indicate the powerful currents that make our period in history one of turbulence and change. Many of these problems will be with us for years to come. We cannot shy away from them even if we wish to do so. Our task is to face them squarely and realistically, with good faith and good sense, in the light of our joint and several responsibilities under the Charter.

Moreover, there is an interdependence between these problems. Each is made more difficult of solution by the existence of the others. We cannot solve them all at once. But we can solve some; we can chip away at others; and we can use all the resources of the United Nations to prepare the way for more effective cooperation between nations.

One of the most important of these resources is the General Assembly. There is no more representative or more influential international institution than the one in which we are now participating. The Charter entrusts the Assembly with a wide variety of tasks and an equal variety

of methods which it can employ. Three groups of problems lie before us: first, those that concern security; second, those that relate to the fulfillment of national and individual aspirations; and third, the problems that have to do with economic progress of both individuals and communities.

The chief lesson of our experience in the field of collective security is that the solidarity of the nations which support the Charter is absolutely essential. The alternative to this solidarity is the disintegration of the United Nations and the triumph of lawlessness in the world.

The program which started in 1950 with the *Uniting for Peace Resolution* constitutes General Assembly recognition that members of the United Nations must, by virtue of their membership, stand together and act together for the maintenance of peace.

To make this work, wholehearted cooperation is essential. The institution of the United Nations can be no stronger than its members. It is the governments and peoples of all member nations who have the responsibility to be physically prepared and to be morally resolute to concert their strength for the cause of peace.

This responsibility to cooperate must be reflected not only in readiness to participate in action undertaken by the United Nations itself but also in other ways recognized and sanctioned by the Charter. Regional and collective self-defense arrangements, entered into and developed in accordance with the Charter, are an integral part of a universal collective-security system. When individual strength and collective strength are all dedicated to the cause of peace and the purposes of the Charter, the structure of security becomes a reality.

The Secretary-General put this matter forcefully in his report to this Assembly.² "The final test of effective collective security," he said, "will always be that a sufficient number of member governments are firmly committed in their policies to

¹Made before the U.N. General Assembly at New York on Oct. 16 (press release 814). Secretary Acheson is Chairman of the U.S. delegation to the seventh session of the General Assembly, which opened Oct. 14.

²U.N. docs. A/2141, A/2141/Add. 1.

join in resisting armed aggression wherever it occurs and that they have at their disposal military power strong enough to strike back with punishing effect against any aggressor nation."

This is the lesson of the past 7 years. It would be folly for us to lose sight of it.

The Supreme Test in Korea

It is in Korea that our whole structure of collective security is meeting its supreme test. It will stand or fall upon what we do there.

The U.N. fight in Korea is the fight of every nation and every individual who values freedom. Had our nerve failed at the time of this ruthless act of aggression, these new buildings in which we meet today might already be the empty husks of our defeated hopes for this organization. Had Korea been allowed to fall to the aggressor, the words of John Donne would have applied to each one of us:

"Never send to know for whom the bell tolls;

It tolls for thee . . ."

Had the Republic of Korea been allowed to fall to the aggressor, the delegates to these Assemblies would now be looking to their left and to their right and asking which would be the next victim on the aggressor's list.

Korea is a test not only of our courage at the initial moment of decision but even more of the firmness of our will, the endurance of our courage. The aggressor, having defied the United Nations and lost, having found himself pushed back behind his initial line of attack, now counts for victory upon those of faint heart who would grow weary of the struggle.

There are moments in history when determined will through dark hours brought victory. My country's trials came at the very outset of its history. The darkest moment for the United Nations in Korea came at Pusan. We met and overcame that trial and now face the test of staying power. Ours must be the determination and the will to sustain this crucial test. I will not pretend that the burden is light. My countrymen, like those of many of you, regard with anxiety and grief its human cost. But to the question: How long shall this be? We must answer: We shall fight on as long as is necessary to stop the aggression and to restore peace and security to Korea. We shall stop fighting when an armistice on just terms has been achieved. And we shall not allow faint-heartedness or recklessness to defeat our cause, which is to defend peace.

We must convince the aggressor that continued fighting in Korea will cost him more than he can gain. This means the training and commitment of troops; it means food, clothing, matériel, money. I urge every member of the United Nations to look to its responsibility to support the common action

The Capitol of Peace

. . . . In these headquarters of the United Nations there are combined stone, glass, metal, wood, and textiles, with elements of the human heritage which the Charter promotes. Thus, "we, the peoples of the United Nations" animate our symbols with soul-stirring desire for supremacy of morality, law, and order.

These buildings are grounded physically on the rock of Manhattan; but they are established in venerable aspirations of men—Hearers and Doers of the Word—men, likened to "a wise man, who built his house upon a rock." They are founded upon the sacrifice of those who have died for the United Nations in Korea, and in the selflessness of others who, like Count Bernadotte, have given their lives to the ideal of peaceful settlement of disputes.

These buildings symbolize our faith, and our collective determination to defend human lives and extend human freedom. But these great structures would remain inert, "without works." Aggression could crush the craftsmen who have lifted these buildings of peace. Power to destroy has grown to include power to sear the cultural resources which collectively gave rise to these buildings.

However, resources of moral power can be achieved and magnificently strengthened through deeds and the spirit of the word. Better understanding of men and women in all nations is the vital necessity for unity and cooperation to maintain international peace and security through these United Nations Headquarters.

As we take our places in the General Assembly, and at the Council meetings, let us begin all our work in the name of God, for the solution of all our problems is a spiritual one.

Our collective practice of truth, justice, and friendship among nations can radiate the beam of history into every region among all peoples.

Thus, to craftsmanship we shall add statesmanship in the Capitol of Peace.

—Remarks made on Oct. 14 by Ambassador Warren R. Austin, U.S. Representative to the U.N., on the convening of the seventh session of the General Assembly in the new U.N. Headquarters Buildings.

in Korea and to participate in the reconstruction of that unhappy land.

The United Nations went into Korea to repel aggression and to restore peace and security. Aggression has been stopped. But despite patient and sincere efforts of U.N. negotiators, the Communists have so far rejected reasonable terms for an armistice.

This Assembly will have the opportunity to review the record of the armistice negotiations which have been proceeding over the past 15 months. The record shows that the U.N. representatives have been patient, flexible, and resourceful, always defending the principles of the Charter. We shall have an opportunity, by action at this Assembly, to demonstrate to the aggressor that we are united in purpose and firm in resolve; that we are as one in desire for a just peace and in determination to achieve it.

A Specific Disarmament Pledge

No consideration of security can overlook the importance of the work which has been done since our last Assembly in the field of disarmament. For, even though we are no closer to a universal agreement, the Disarmament Commission set up last year has shown by its work that the obstacle to disarmament is not technical but a matter of will. Practical methods are at hand by which the possibility of aggressive warfare can be reduced and ultimately erased.

Those practical methods are not based on the fallacious idea that our safety will be insured by piecemeal pledges not to use this weapon or that weapon. All members of the United Nations have made a solemn commitment to "refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations." This commitment is a pledge against aggression, in any form or with any weapon, against the use of armed force "save in the common interest." On behalf of my Government, I reaffirm this pledge.

We can make that pledge absolutely specific: We will not commit aggression with rifles or machine guns or tanks. We will not commit aggression with atomic bombs or any other kind of bombs. We will not commit aggression with chemical weapons or bacteriological weapons, which we have been falsely and slanderously accused of using. We will not commit aggression with any weapons or by any means. We reaffirm for all the world to hear that, pursuant to our solemn commitment under the Charter, we pledge—not just that we will avoid the use of one weapon or another—but that we will not use *any* form of force contrary to the Charter.

We reaffirm our Charter obligations to settle "international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered."

Nations committed under the Charter not to use force to impose their will on other nations should not have to maintain huge armaments to protect themselves from one another. The maintenance of huge armaments itself constitutes a danger to peace. But disarmament cannot be achieved unilaterally. It cannot be achieved by denunciation in a battle of epithets. It can be achieved only by international agreements under effective safeguards which will protect law-abiding states from the hazards of violations and evasions. Until all states with substantial armaments are willing to cooperate in effective, guaranteed disarmament, the free, law-abiding nations of the world must arm and remain armed in self-defense. But we will continue to work to achieve the fourth of the four freedoms of President Roosevelt—freedom from fear.

The United States with other members of the Disarmament Commission has sought to outline a comprehensive disarmament program with a view to reducing the possibility and fear of war. The program seeks not only the elimination of all major weapons of mass destruction, including the atomic and bacteriological, but the elimination of large mass armies. The program calls for a reduction of well over 50 percent in the armed forces of the United States and the Soviet Union and for comparable limitation on the armed forces of all other states. The program provides for the effective control of atomic energy to insure its use for peaceful purposes only. It provides effective safeguards to insure an open world with no secret armies and no secret weapons.

In submitting this program, we gave outlines, not details; we did not insist that ours were the only proposals that could carry out the General Assembly resolution. We submitted them for discussion and genuine negotiation. Out of negotiation, done in good faith, the General Assembly resolution could be achieved and the maximum reduction of all armed forces and armaments consistent with the avoidance of any imbalance of power dangerous to international peace in any part of the world can be made. The United States is ready to carry out such a program. We will continue earnestly and in good faith to induce others to join us toward that end. We will apply all the ingenuity and resourcefulness we can muster. If other states do the same, we can succeed.

Aspirations of Dependent Peoples

A second group of issues lies before us—those which grow out of the legitimate aspiration of dependent peoples for a determining voice in their own affairs.

It is important to note at the outset that these matters are not issues in the sense that anyone disputes the right of a dependent people to ultimate self-government. The right is enshrined in the Charter, and the obligation to help fulfill that right rests with each of us, including each of the administering states. These states recognize that the peoples under their control must some day determine their own destinies. These states are working toward that end, just as the dependent peoples are preparing themselves for the responsibilities of self-government.

This is, I think, illustrated by the following facts: Of the 800 million people in the free world who were in the dependent category 10 years ago, some 600 million have already attained full independence. In this period a dozen new nations have emerged, and most of them are now playing an important role in the United Nations. Furthermore, rapid progress has been and is being made toward self-government for the 200 million others who

still remain in varying stages of dependency. What these facts suggest is that the differences confronting us are not differences of purpose; they are differences of method and of timing, and they can be solved through wise statesmanship.

Over 175 years ago the American people asserted and established their right to their own national life. Surely we can and do understand the similar aspirations of other people. Indeed, our record establishes this far more conclusively than any assertion I could make. Our own experience and responsibilities have also taught us the necessity for wisdom and understanding between administering powers and dependent people. For it requires understanding on both sides to solve the complicated problems which arise in preparing a people for a stable and viable self-government in the complex world of today. The result of this kind of understanding is reflected in the presence among us in this great Assembly of our colleagues from the Philippines, India, Pakistan, Burma, and Indonesia. And there is a place in this Assembly for others.

But, in the nature of things, it is not enough that the states comprising the United Nations agree on the abstract principle of self-determination and the desirability of the evolution of dependent peoples toward self-government. For we are concerned with specific situations involving the aspirations of present and future generations. In examining these situations it will inevitably appear to some that the process of fulfilling those aspirations is too long, too tortuous. By the same token, it will seem to others that the transfer of powers is going forward at too rapid a rate—that people are being called upon to govern themselves before they have attained adequate political experience and before there exists a sound economic, social, and educational basis for lasting self-government.

If the sole question were whether it was going too fast or too slow, the answer undoubtedly in most cases would be to try to find some accommodation between these two sides. This would not, of course, wholly satisfy either one. But this is the way things have to be done in reconciling conflicting views.

But in many situations this is not the only point. There is another point which is very often lost sight of in the assertions of absolutes in regard to the right to self-rule. The fact we are apt to overlook is the deep economic interdependence between the parties. It would be utterly destructive to the interests of both if the solution were made on the basis of theoretical absolutes. If people can harmonize their views and then work a little faster or a little slower together, then their mutual dependence becomes a factor which helps to bring the matter to solution.

This fact is reflected in the evolution of formerly non-self-governing peoples. While some have chosen to move toward complete independence,

many others have chosen an independent position within a commonwealth or union, and still others have chosen to identify themselves in some other form of association with another state or group of states.

What is the proper role of the United Nations in these matters? When specific disagreements arise as to the adequacy of the progress being made by a dependent people toward self-government, the responsibility for settling such matters lies in the first instance with those immediately concerned. This is not to say, however, that the United Nations is without responsibility to assist in the achievement of peaceful solutions. On the contrary, the United Nations would be derelict in its duty if it failed to be concerned with the rate of progress toward the Charter goals being made by those states—including the United States—which hold in trust the futures of dependent peoples.

But it follows from what I have said before that the role to be played by the General Assembly should in most situations of this kind be one of accommodation. These are not cases in which it is the function of the General Assembly to impose settlements upon the parties involved. Here it is rather the primary function of the United Nations to create an atmosphere favorable to settlements which accord with Charter principles but which should be worked out by the parties directly concerned.

Various articles of the Charter employ different terms to indicate the type of action which the General Assembly may take—it may “discuss,” “consider,” “recommend,” or “decide.” As we review our 7 years of experience, it sometimes seems that we have felt that we are bound to “recommend” whenever we “consider” or “discuss.” But the Charter does not assume this to be true, nor should we do so. We must always seek solutions but not necessarily resolutions. Calm and dispassionate consideration and discussion may in such matters as these be the Assembly’s most useful contribution toward a solution.

The United Nations has a twofold interest in encouraging and assisting peaceful and orderly transition toward self-government. First, it serves to assure that the aspirations of the people involved will find constructive and genuine fulfillment. Second, it represents the general interest of the rest of the world in peaceful settlements and orderly progress—all except those who are more interested in the exploitation of differences than in genuine solutions.

The unfortunate fact is that we cannot approach this problem, or indeed any other problem before this Assembly, without being mindful of the events that are taking place in another part of the world. There, whole nations have been swallowed up and submerged by a new colonialism. Others have been reduced to a state of servile dependence. The tragic events behind this dark boundary not

only are in stark contrast with the evolutionary process toward self-government which we have been discussing, but they are so fraught with danger to all of us that we can never afford to forget them.

I have touched briefly upon the role of the United Nations with respect to the conflicts which inevitably arise in the evolution of dependent peoples toward full self-government. But much of what I have said is equally applicable in my judgment to other problems of great moment and great delicacy with which the Assembly is currently confronted.

U.N. Promotion of Individual Human Rights

I refer particularly to the role to be played by the United Nations—and especially the General Assembly—in the promotion of those individual human rights recognized by the Charter.

Our starting point is the Charter obligation assumed by all of us, as individual states and as participants in the work of the United Nations, to promote the fundamental rights of those within our jurisdiction.

To carry out this obligation faithfully means several things. It means, first of all, that we must look facts in the face. It means that we must examine our own conduct and that of other states with candor and that we cannot condone deeds which do not square with the articles of democratic faith embodied in our Charter. I venture to suggest that in the field of human rights no state represented here is wholly without fault. In our closets each of us can find the skeletons of racial, class, or religious discrimination. If this is so, it neither justifies being sanctimonious about our neighbors' faults nor being tolerant of violations of Charter obligations. We must approach these problems soberly and without hypocrisy, mindful of our human weaknesses but unremitting in our determination to fulfill our promises.

If our first job is to be honest about the facts, our second job is to be honest about the remedies available to us. The teachings of Confucius and Mohammed, of Moses, of Buddha, and of Christ will not gain instant and universal acceptance merely because they are echoed in our official pronouncements.

But the fact that we are limited in what we can accomplish does not mean we can abdicate the field. On the contrary, we would betray the basic tenets of human decency if we came to regard the human-rights provisions of the Charter as pious hopes which feed the eye but starve the spirit. To give reality to the Charter provisions, we must concentrate upon doing those things which are in the realm of practical statesmanship.

Our aim in this most delicate of fields must be the aim provided in the Charter itself. By chapter IX, all members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the

United Nations to promote, among other things, universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. Our actions must be responsive to that pledge. We must work with patience and with honesty toward achievement of the Charter goals.

Finally, I turn to a third group of problems before this session of the General Assembly, problems that have to do with the improvement of living conditions. In looking back over the record of the past 7 years, it is in this field of economic cooperation that we find the most hopeful and promising aspect of the work of the United Nations.

The beginnings that have been made in this work of economic and social cooperation through the United Nations are greatly encouraging to all who have participated in it. This is a new force in international relations. It expresses a growing sense of international responsibility for the needs and hopes of individual human beings. Behind this work lies a growing awareness that, in the twentieth century, international cooperation must mean not only treaties and conferences but people of many nations working alongside each other to grow more food, to wipe out illiteracy and disease, to increase production and trade.

The key to economic progress, to the expanding world economy for which we are all striving, is found in cooperative action to enable the world to increase its output of agricultural and industrial products. This is the heart of the matter. We are only beginning to appreciate the tremendous possibilities of the less-developed areas for this kind of expansion with the creation of basic economic facilities, particularly power and transport.

As the technical-assistance programs of the United Nations and its agencies continue to work their transformations in the economic and social fields, I am confident that we shall see an acceleration of private investment, both domestic and foreign. This is a process that may take many years of work, but in no other field of action, I believe, will we find that our efforts have so multiplied an effect as in the field of technical assistance.

There is no greater challenge to our ingenuity than that which is to be found in the stark contrast between present levels of production of food and industrial products and the knowledge available to us by which that production could be multiplied many times over.

The tragedy is that, in spite of tremendous progress in agricultural science, over half the world's people still suffer from malnutrition and many live on the verge of starvation. Despite progress in food production in many parts of the world, the fact is that world food output is increasing at a slower rate than is world population, and the world today has less food per person than it did before the war.

There are several active programs in this field that are deserving of more widespread attention and support. A good beginning has been made by the members of the Food and Agriculture Organization, who have pledged themselves to increase agricultural production in their countries over the next 5 years, so that there will be an increase of food production over population growth amounting to one or two percent each year.

At this session of the General Assembly we shall have an opportunity to review some of the promising work that has been done by member governments and the agencies of the United Nations in the vital field of land reform. This is, in my opinion, central to the whole problem of increasing food supply.

Two years ago, before this body, I expressed the conviction that common efforts to apply existing knowledge to the use and ownership of land could have a tremendous effect in relieving the misery and suffering of millions of people.³ I spoke of the "vast opportunity (that) awaits us to bring, by such means as the United Nations has been developing, new hope to millions whose most urgent needs are for food, land, and human dignity." Since that time, much progress has been made in dealing with this problem and this opportunity. Programs of land reform have been launched in a number of countries in Asia and the Near East—programs which are already bringing new hope to the people of these lands. Universities and governments have cooperated in regional seminars for the exchange of information on land use and tenure. We shall, I believe, find great encouragement in hearing the reports of this progress.

This Assembly will also have an opportunity to consider the steps that have been taken to stimulate increased productivity in other fields. It is clear from the report submitted by the Secretary-General to the Economic and Social Council that methods are available by which marked increases in productivity could be achieved immediately. These methods would differ greatly from country to country according to local conditions, but the essential fact is that considerable increases can be achieved by the countries themselves through technical assistance and better utilization of existing tools and equipment.

Increases in productivity by such methods can result—and indeed, in many places they have resulted—in direct and immediate improvements in standards of living. And, as I have remarked before, the best guaranty of increased investment, both public and private, is such increases in productivity. It is imperative, of course, that such increased output be fairly distributed in the form of better incomes for workers and lower prices to consumers.

These activities demonstrate the vitality and inventiveness with which many nations are working together to improve living standards, even now in the midst of world attention.

It is tragic that forces should exist in the world whose concept of their interests requires them to hinder and obstruct international action by all the rest of the world toward better conditions of life.

There are some schools of thought which doubt the capacity of free nations to meet the problems of a changing world without falling into economic catastrophe. To them I would say that such expectations are based upon an analysis which events have shown to be faulty—and, at best, out of date.

The free nations reject any notion that man is incapable of influencing events, that he is a helpless puppet in the face of determining forces, that crisis is inevitable.

The Free Nations' Record

The record, I think, will bear me out when I say that the economies of the free nations have shown great capacity for growth and adaptation. It will show that despite the burdens we have inherited from World Wars I and II, despite the burdens we are now assuming to avert a third such catastrophe, the free nations have not been inhibited by doctrine or dogma from adaptability and ingenuity in meeting their economic problems. As a result, and despite the dire prophecies to the contrary, there has been a long-term rise in living standards among the industrially advanced nations. And this rise has been accompanied by an ever broader distribution of income. In the United States, for example, the real income in terms of purchasing power of the average American citizen has risen at least 40 percent since 1929. And this improvement, reflected in higher living standards, has been greatest among people in the middle and lower parts of the income scale.

The record will also show that the free nations have learned a great deal since the depression of the 1930's and that this learning has been applied in a whole series of measures which offer protection against a recurrence of that experience. We have built into our economies a series of stabilizers to protect our living standards and to encourage the productivity which makes them possible. Our social-security programs, price supports against severe declines in farm incomes, bank deposit insurance, modernized flexible banking and credit policies, as well as the tremendous accumulated demand for housing and public works—all of these are but a few of the stabilizers which would operate to counterbalance any substantial changes in economic conditions.

So much for the ability of the free economies to handle their domestic problems with skill and

³ For text of the Secretary's address, see BULLETIN of Oct. 2, 1950, p. 523.

flexibility. But what of their ability to work together in coping with forces that threaten economic stability? Here too, I think, the postwar record will show that the free nations are able to get together to create machinery to solve mutual economic problems. Consider the instruments that have been developed just in recent years to meet problems of international cooperation—such instruments as the International Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Regional Economic Commissions for Europe, Asia, and Latin America, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the Schuman Plan, and many others.

These instruments, together with many other works, have been put together in the face of the tremendous burdens we have inherited from previous wars and also in the face of the burdens we now bear to prevent future wars.

We look forward with confidence to the opportunities for further growth and expansion which will open to us and to all free nations whenever the threat to our freedom and independence sub-

sides and we can safely release our great creative energies from the burden of armaments.

We all have a transcending common interest in this interdependent world in expanding freedom and increased well-being. We all have much to gain by cooperating together to advance this common interest in “better standards of life in larger freedom.”

Our differing ways of life may impel us to pursue our objectives in various ways. But if we have confidence in our own particular ways we should be willing to submit them to the test of experience. We should be willing to be judged by the results of our works rather than by the prowess of our arms.

Let us then work to banish force and the threat of force as an instrument of national or ideological policy. Let us in this interdependent world share freedom with all men and all nations. Let us vie with one another, not in the arts of war but in the ways of peace, in the ways of building a world of expanding freedom and increased well-being for all mankind.

Problems Facing the Seventh General Assembly

by John D. Hickerson

Assistant Secretary for United Nation Affairs¹

It is good to be back with you again at this annual reception to our delegates to the United Nations.

This year, perhaps by accident or perhaps by design, you are meeting midway between the opening of the seventh session of the General Assembly and the celebration of the seventh anniversary of the ratification of the Charter. This is a good occasion to talk about some of the problems facing the General Assembly and the part we Americans can play in helping to find solutions.

We all know that the United Nations has not transformed the world in the first 7 years of its history. That, we can freely admit without denying the validity of the ideals expressed at San Francisco or the value of the organization in these 7 years.

We have found that peace, real peace, has not

been as easy to achieve as all of us had hoped in 1945. But we are still guided and inspired by the goals of the Charter—to maintain international peace and security, to develop friendly relations among nations, and to achieve international cooperation. The obstacles to these goals have made us more determined than ever to make the United Nations work. This is not easy, but we believe that it can be done and must be done. It can be done if we marshal all our ingenuity, all our energy, all our powers of persuasion and leadership in getting all freedom-loving members of the United Nations to assume and carry out their responsibilities under the Charter. This is the task before us every day in the year. It is especially challenging as we face the problems of the seventh session of the General Assembly.

When people talk about the United Nations, they often do not distinguish between the Security Council, the General Assembly, or other organs of the United Nations. However, it is important to

¹ Address made before the American Association for the United Nations at New York on Oct. 19 (press release 818).

make these distinctions and to keep them clearly in mind, because of the fundamental differences in the responsibilities given them under the Charter. One of the main reasons the General Assembly has such a great variety of difficult problems on its agenda is this: The 55 Soviet vetoes in the Security Council have demonstrated that the Security Council can act effectively only when the U.S.S.R. wants it to. Inevitably, the other members of the United Nations have turned to the General Assembly as an action body. Admittedly, it is far from ideally suited to this role. But it is the best we have available. Since it was not expected to handle many of the problems now given to it, it has a special responsibility to consider them soberly and responsibly.

Continuing Crisis Atmosphere

There has been talk about the highly charged atmosphere of this General Assembly session. We shouldn't let that bother us too much. We ought to be getting used to it. Just about every Assembly session opens against a background of tension and frustration. That's due to the state of the world, not the state of the General Assembly. This is the third session of the General Assembly while men are dying for the United Nations in Korea. Just as all of us have had to harden ourselves to live in a continuing crisis atmosphere, the General Assembly has had to accustom itself to meeting against a background of crisis. As realists, we don't expect the General Assembly to find adequate solutions to all the problems before it this year. We do expect to play our part in assisting the General Assembly to consider carefully the issues before it and, where possible, to contribute to their solution.

It seems to me that a simple test should be applied to each issue that confronts the General Assembly: What can the Assembly do to improve the prospects for settlement of that issue? The answer in each case must take into account many factors: What are the direct responsibilities of the parties concerned? Are they carrying out their obligations under the Charter? If not, what is the most effective way of getting them to do so?

Under the Charter, the General Assembly is given many types of responsibility and is equipped with a wide variety of powers. For example, it can be a forum to hear grievances. It can be a meeting place for important diplomatic conversations. It can make or review reports and studies. Or it can take specific action in vital matters of collective defense against aggression. There may be instances where doubt arises as to the legal authority of the General Assembly to take particular action. But usually the most important question in each instance is whether the proposed action would be wise and practical.

The application of wisdom and practical statesmanship to each of the issues before the Assembly will be difficult enough in the face of honest differences of opinion and strong national emotions.

The difficulty is intensified by the efforts of the Soviet bloc to exploit every disagreement, actual or potential, to its own advantage. We may look forward to efforts to inflame passions, to stir up trouble, to threaten, to deceive—to do anything in fact, which will tend to impede the settlement of problems in accordance with the Charter or which will further the Soviet foreign policy of splitting us from our allies and other friends.

We had a good sample of this yesterday when Mr. Vyshinsky disappointed those who had hoped against hope that he would modify, if only slightly, his typical vitriolic performance.² Instead he played again his same old worn-out phonograph record of lies and hate. Of course, this refusal to carry out the obligations of the Charter will complicate the solution of problems. Nevertheless, we believe that the other representatives in the United Nations now understand the nature and purpose of Soviet tactics and that they will join with us in frustrating them. We must therefore not become so discouraged by cynical Soviet tactics that we unwittingly further their objectives by ourselves abandoning hopes and efforts to deal with the issues before us.

The most important issue before the General Assembly is Korea. As Secretary Acheson said last Thursday, "The United Nations fight in Korea is the fight of every nation and every individual who values freedom."

We come to this Assembly with a record in Korea which every American can be proud of. In 28 months of fighting, the Communist aggressors have been thrown back beyond the starting point of their aggression. They have suffered terrible losses in men, matériel, and prestige. The plain fact is that they failed in their first overt aggression. Hitler did not fail until his last.

Proportionate Sharing of the Korean Burden

Along with the gallant South Koreans, whose losses have exceeded ours, we have borne a disproportionate share of the military burden in Korea. We have had fighting with us 15 other forces of U.N. members. They have fought well—sensationally well. But there should be more troops there now, ready to continue the fighting as long as necessary. We intend to press hard in the General Assembly to get as many U.N. members as possible, who have not done so, to face up to their responsibilities in Korea. We have shown the aggressors that we will not flinch at the time of attack. We must also show them that they cannot wear us down. We have the moral and physical stamina to outlast them.

In Korea, we were entrusted by the United Nations with the conduct of the military operations, including the armistice negotiations. We have

² For excerpts from Andrei Vyshinsky's Oct. 18 statement in the General Assembly, see BULLETIN of Oct. 20, 1952, p. 634.

never lost sight of our goals—to achieve peace on terms consistent with the Charter and to avoid World War III. Yesterday we sent the Secretary-General a special report for the members of the United Nations on our stewardship.³ I believe that it will show that the Unified Command has been worthy of the trust reposed in it.

I want to say a few words about the armistice negotiations. For almost 15 months we have been negotiating with the Communists on behalf of the United Nations. This has been an incredibly difficult task. In spite of every conceivable frustration and obstacle, our negotiators have dealt with the Communists with firmness, skill, and infinite patience. We have sincerely made every effort to achieve an honorable armistice. Only one issue remains unsettled: Should prisoners of war who resist repatriation be returned to the Communists at the point of a bayonet? On this matter of principle, we have said that we cannot and will not yield. We have made many alternative proposals to settle the question, but all of them have been categorically rejected by the Communists. They have not yet come forward with a single constructive proposal. By “constructive” we do not mean warmed-over versions, such as mentioned yesterday by Mr. Vyshinsky, of the same old Communist insistence on repatriation by force. It has been made clear that the responsibility for continuing the hostilities rests with the Communist aggressors. Yet we have not given up, nor will we give up, our hope or our efforts for peace. We have not broken off the negotiations. Our proposals remain open to the Communists. The duration of the present recess in the truce talks is up to them. As General Clark said on October 8, “We continue ready to conclude an armistice acceptable to the conscience of free peoples. It is up to the Communists to show whether they too want such an armistice.”⁴

There will be nothing in our Korean proposals to the General Assembly suggesting that the truce negotiations be transferred to New York. That would solve nothing. Our program on Korea in the General Assembly will have one central objective—to demonstrate to the Communist aggressors in every possible way that on this issue—collective resistance to aggression—the free nations stand solidly together. The best chance for an armistice is for the United Nations to show that it is united and resolute.

In addition to mobilizing support for the U.N. action in Korea, the General Assembly must go forward with its long-range efforts to build a sound structure of collective security. There are many lessons to be learned from the Korean experience. The Assembly should frankly recognize that the record of performance in Korea is not good enough for a permanent system of collective resistance to

aggression. There must be no free rides. Every nation desiring the protection of such a system must be prepared to share proportionately in the sacrifices and the risks. Each must be willing to make the most precious contribution that can be made—manpower, human lives. We have amply demonstrated that we are willing to do our share—more than our share—but we are entitled to point out that while we may have the greatest per capita income in the world, our population per capita is the same as any other country. If the United Nations is to succeed, these patient efforts must continue from Assembly to Assembly.

Disarmament Program Outlined

There is another record we Americans can be proud of as the General Assembly meets—our efforts in the field of disarmament. We have not yet succeeded in these efforts and Mr. Vyshinsky made it clear again yesterday that there is no immediate prospect that we will. But, together with our British and French colleagues, we have set forth the broad outline of a possible and workable disarmament program. We have proposed great reductions in all armed forces, over 50 percent in the case of the United States and the U.S.S.R. We have suggested procedures to reduce armaments. We have given our ideas on the broad relationship between the principal elements in a disarmament program. We have shown that effective safeguards can be devised. We have shown that we do have a genuine and serious will to reduce armed forces and armaments to the point where aggression will be unlikely. I think our record on disarmament has strengthened our relations with other free nations in the United Nations because it is a demonstration of our will to peace. We shall review that record in the current General Assembly. We feel that despite Soviet obstruction, the efforts of the Disarmament Commission should continue. But, as the Secretary said in addressing the Assembly, “Until all states with substantial armaments are willing to cooperate in effective, guaranteed disarmament, the free law-abiding nations of the world must arm and remain armed in self-defense.”

There is another type of problem confronting the General Assembly—that which grows out of the aspirations of peoples for a determining voice in their own affairs. Here is an area where the General Assembly must grope slowly and carefully with baffling and sensitive issues. Here is an area where the United States must play the cautious, thankless role of moderator. Our own history and our present responsibilities make it inevitable that this be our role.

We have listened to both sides and their friends on each of the disputed issues. We have learned to understand and appreciate the depth of feeling of each of the parties. There are honest differences of opinion as to what role the General Assembly should play in settling each of these issues. There

³ See U.S./U.N. press release (No. 1554) dated Oct. 18, 1952.

⁴ BULLETIN of Oct. 20, 1952, p. 600.

is only one clear conclusion: No magic formula exists to solve these problems. Each issue must be handled from beginning to end with the utmost care so that the situation is improved and not worsened. Those of us who are not directly involved in these controversies, but have the confidence of all of the parties, have a special responsibility to assist the parties to come nearer to a solution. That's what we're trying to do.

In the nature of things, we should not expect to succeed fully. In spite of earnest efforts to promote sober and temperate discussion, there may well be some bitter words, some inflamed tempers—perhaps even some action we consider ill-advised. But these will not be the only tests of success in this field. The real test will be whether, by the end of the session, some progress has been made

in bringing the parties closer together and in advancing the goals of the Charter. Measured by this yardstick, rather than by the daily headlines, I am not pessimistic about the prospects for success.

Let me say a little more about these headlines. The United Nations is always competing for space with many dramatic world events, not the least of which at this time is our own election campaign. It is only natural that many stories about the General Assembly should feature "clashes," "crises," "splits," "bitterness," et cetera—in fact, that some should at times even reflect almost contemptuous impatience with the slowness of the whole process. Remember, though, when you see the headlines and the spicy stories, that we are dealing with problems which cannot be solved overnight and

Summary of Proposals Made to the Disarmament Commission

The Disarmament Commission established by the sixth session of the General Assembly (U.N. doc. A/L.25, dated January 12, 1952; BULLETIN of March 31, 1952, p. 507) began work on March 14, at the U.N. Headquarters in New York. On that date the United States presented a proposed plan of work (U.N. doc. DC/3; BULLETIN of March 31, p. 503) suggesting five major subjects for consideration:

1. A verified census of all troops and arms, including atomic weapons;
2. Limitation of armaments, and elimination of atomic weapons and all instruments adaptable to mass destruction;
3. Negotiation of agreements on troops and arms permitted each state;
4. Enforcements and safeguards;
5. Procedure and timing of program.

On April 5 the United States presented as a basis for discussion a working paper proposing an armaments-and-armed-forces census to be carried out in five successive stages, beginning with a count of less secret armaments and progressing to the "detailed disclosure of stockpiles of novel [i.e., post-World War II] armaments including atomic" (U.N. doc. DC/Comm.2/1; BULLETIN of Apr. 14, 1952, p. 586).

For the purpose of seeking advance agreement on the objectives which should guide the Commission, the United States, on April 24, listed six principles which it considered essential to an effective disarmament program (U.N. doc. DC/C.1/1; BULLETIN of May 12, 1952, p. 752):

- (1) The goal of disarmament is not to regulate but to prevent war by relaxing tensions and fears created by armaments and by making war impossible.
- (2) To achieve this goal, all states must cooperate in reducing armed forces and armaments so that none will be able to prepare for war openly or secretly.
- (3) All states must join in international agreements restricting arms to types and quantities needed for internal security, and to carry out their obligations under the U.N. Charter.
- (4) These agreements must insure the progressive and balanced reduction of arms and armies, and the

elimination of all weapons adaptable to mass destruction.

(5) There must be effective safeguards provided for all phases of the disarmament program. Prohibition of atomic weapons must be accompanied by an effective system of international control of atomic energy to insure that atomic energy is used for peaceful purposes only.

(6) The agreements must provide for an effective system of progressive and continuing disclosure and verification of all armed forces and armaments, including atomic.

On May 28 the United States joined the United Kingdom and France in presenting the first of two proposals for setting up limitations on armed forces (U.N. doc. DC/10; BULLETIN of June 9, 1952, p. 910). The tripartite working paper suggested that the U.S., the U.S.S.R., and China might limit their military forces to a maximum of, say, between 1,000,000 and 1,500,000 men each; the U.K. and France, to a maximum of, say, between 700,000 and 800,000; and all other countries with substantial armed strength to less than 1 percent of their populations except in unusual circumstances. A supplement to this proposal for numerical ceilings was presented to the Commission by the three powers on August 12 (U.N. doc. DC/12; BULLETIN of August 25, 1952, p. 292). The supplementary working paper calls for limiting armaments in types and quantities to those necessary to support permitted armed forces; suggests that the five permanent members of the Security Council hold a conference to negotiate tentative agreement among themselves as to the bases for establishing numerical ceilings and the distribution of permitted armed forces among national military services; and outlines the correlation between the major elements of a disarmament program.

On August 15, 1952, the United States gave its views favoring the elimination of bacterial weapons as part of a comprehensive disarmament program, emphasizing the necessity for safeguards in which the disclosure and verification proposals played an important role. These views were summarized on September 4 in a U.S. working paper presented to the Commission (U.N. doc. DC/15; for text see p. 671).

For an analysis of the tripartite disarmament program by Durward V. Sandifer, Deputy Assistant Secretary for U.N. Affairs, see BULLETIN of September 29, 1952, p. 478.

which usually cannot be solved in terms of "victory." Remember, too, that the main achievements of the United Nations are rarely reflected in headlines or news stories. How often do you see a headline or story about Dr. Frank Graham's patient efforts to bring India and Pakistan closer to agreement on the Kashmir problem; about the World Health Organization's campaign against malaria; about improving living standards through technical assistance; about making international air travel safer; about developing and exchanging statistics on trade, commerce, production—so important to the emerging countries of the Middle and Far East; about the thousands of other daily activities of the United Nations and its specialized agencies? These are true measures of success. I hope that you who know about them will see that they become better and more widely known.

Finally, may I share with you a few thoughts about our role of responsible leadership in the United Nations? How can we exercise that leadership most wisely and effectively? First of all, the positions we take must be sound and morally right. They must, of course, be truly representative of the American public. I believe that we come as close as possible to meeting this requirement by reason of the bipartisan nature of our delegation and our constant consultation with American leaders and groups.

The second test of our leadership is whether we

can count on the firm support of our allies. This means that we must have a true partnership with them. We must consult them. We must take into account their viewpoint and their problems. Incidentally, sometimes our allies get blamed for things which never happened or aren't their fault. For instance, a few days ago a story made the rounds that Secretary Acheson had "watered down" his opening address because of pressure from certain friendly delegations. There was no basis for the story at all. Not only had no drafts been discussed with them, but there had been no "watering down" in successive drafts.

Third, in order to obtain the support of the other non-Soviet members of the United Nations we must be able to persuade them of the essential correctness of our position. To do this effectively, we must understand their doubts and answer them patiently and convincingly in terms of their own self interest. We must welcome their constructive suggestions. We must seek to lead and not to dominate. This means that we cannot always act as quickly or as decisively as we would sometimes like. But the end result will be worth the trouble.

These are the elements of responsible leadership which your delegation will bear in mind as it approaches the issues of the seventh General Assembly. With your support and understanding, we shall do our utmost to help the Assembly make a real contribution to peace.

U.S.S.R. Charged with Misrepresenting Facts in Bomber Incident

On October 12 Deputy Foreign Minister Pushkin of the Soviet Union handed to the U.S. Chargé at Moscow, Elim O'Shaughnessy, a note charging that on October 7 a U.S. B-29 bomber violated Soviet frontiers in the area of Yuri Island. The note further charged that the aircraft opened fire on two Soviet fighter planes, which returned the fire, and that the American aircraft then disappeared in the direction of the sea. On October 17 the American Embassy at Moscow delivered to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs the U.S. reply of protest against this unprovoked Soviet attack on an American plane.

Printed below are texts of the Soviet note of October 12 and the U.S. reply of October 17.

SOVIET NOTE OF OCTOBER 12

Telegraphic text

The Government of the U.S.S.R. considers it necessary to state the following to the Government of the U.S.A.

According to a verified report from competent Soviet agencies on October 7, 1952, at about 15 hours 30 minutes, Vladivostok time, a four-motored B-29 bomber with U.S.A. identification signs violated the state frontier of the U.S.S.R. in the area of the Yuri Island. Two Soviet fighters which had taken off demanded that the American bomber follow them for landing at the nearest air drome. Instead of fulfilling the legitimate demand of Soviet fighters, the violating airplane

opened fire on them. After returning the fire of the Soviet fighters, the American bomber went off in the direction of the sea.

The Soviet Government expresses decisive protest against this new case of violation of the state frontier of the U.S.S.R. by American military airplane and insists that the U.S. Government take measures for prohibition of violations of the state frontiers of the U.S.S.R. by American airplanes.

U.S. REPLY OF OCTOBER 17

Press release 816 dated October 17

The Embassy of the United States of America acknowledges the receipt of the Ministry's note of October 12, 1952, and upon instructions from its Government, states the following:

In its note, the Ministry asserts that on October 7, 1952, at approximately 15 hours 30 minutes, Vladivostok time, a U.S. B-29 bomber aircraft violated the state frontier of the Soviet Union in the area of Yuri Island, that this aircraft opened fire on two Soviet fighter planes, and that the Soviet fighter planes then returned fire after which the U.S. aircraft went off in the direction of the sea.

The American aircraft referred to in the Ministry's note was a U.S. Air Force plane with a crew of eight officers and men on a routine flight over Japan from which it did not return. The plane was not equipped for combat operations of any kind. It carried no bombs and its guns were inoperative. Its officers were under explicit instructions to remain within Japanese territory at all times.

A thorough investigation by U.S. authorities has established that the U.S. Air Force plane did not, as alleged, violate any Soviet state frontier and that it did not at any time fly over Yuri Island. In fact, the radar plot of the tracks of the U.S. and Soviet aircraft shows conclusively that the interception by the Soviet fighter aircraft occurred 32 miles from Yuri Island and approximately 6 miles from the Island of Hokkaido.

Moreover, the question of a violation of the Soviet state frontier could not arise in any case since the island of Yuri is not Soviet territory, but as an island of the Habomai Group is Japanese territory under Japanese sovereignty.

By its calculated misrepresentation of the facts of this incident the Soviet Government has sought, not for the first time, to evade responsibility for a wanton and unjustifiable attack carried out on an undefended plane by fighter planes of its air force. This responsibility must be borne by the Soviet Government, however, and the U.S. Government would urge the Soviet Government seriously to consider the grave consequences which can flow from its reckless practice, if persisted in, of attacking without provocation the aircraft of other states.

Accordingly, the Embassy has been instructed to reject the Ministry's note of October 12 as being without foundation in fact, to protest in the strongest terms against the unprovoked shooting down of the U.S. plane, and to request the payment of appropriate compensation for the loss of this aircraft and the lives of any of its crew who may have perished.

The Soviet Government is further requested to furnish an immediate report on the results of the search operation which, on the basis of an eyewitness account reported in the investigation conducted by the U.S. Government, is believed to have been carried out by a Soviet patrol boat operating from Suisho-To Island, and to provide full information on the whereabouts and welfare of any crew members who may have survived with a view to their prompt repatriation to the United States.

Toward European and Atlantic Unity

*by Ambassador William H. Draper, Jr.
U. S. Special Representative in Europe¹*

Powerful forces are driving the countries of the Western World to change the political patterns of centuries and to move toward new forms of association. Aggressive dictatorship in this twentieth century leaves free peoples of the West only this choice: Unity in freedom or unity in slavery. We are choosing unity in freedom.

Within the past few months events have been taking place in Europe which will stand out sharply in the perspective of history. Six nations in the heart of continental Europe have taken important steps toward the merger of their sovereignties in a single community. On a broader front we have just witnessed a great surge of activity by the 16 nations in the Council of Europe. In Paris, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation continues its vital work directed toward creating a single market in Europe that is both wide and deep.

The European Coal and Steel Community—the so-called Schuman Plan—merging the basic resources of six countries, has come into being.

Other important European projects are in the wind. A new spirit is growing in Europe today—a European spirit—and with it the hope that adequate security, economic well-being, and a life of dignity, so uncertain on a national scale, can be found in a wider context.

The pressures and incentives that favor European unification are plain. Clearly, the free coun-

¹Address made before the New York *Herald Tribune* Forum at New York City, Oct. 20 (press release 811 dated Oct. 16).

tries of Europe are in danger, if separate, of falling one by one under Soviet domination.

But the Soviet threat is not the only force driving Western Europe toward unification. Let us not forget, for Europe certainly does not, that nationalist aggression originating in Germany caused two world wars that brought the civilized world to the brink of destruction. During the long agony of World War II there was born a grim determination among people in many countries of Europe, including Germany, that nationalist aggression must never happen again. This determination sustains the statesmen of continental Western Europe as they fashion an integrated European army to prevent aggression by one country against the other, while building the defensive strength of all against outside aggression from the East.

Economic and political necessities likewise drive Europe toward unity. Insufficient production and narrow markets; national barriers to commerce, transport, and movement of labor; low productivity—these have hindered its economic progress and its resistance to Communist subversion. It has become increasingly evident to the people of Western Europe that they can survive in freedom and economic decency only with wider groupings of political and economic power, capable not only of solving more of Europe's basic problems without outside aid but also of playing a more influential role in world affairs.

European Unification: An Attainable Goal

Today, European unification is no longer a remote ideal but an attainable objective.

It is an attainable objective *provided*—and to my mind this proviso is crucial—*provided* the movement toward unity in Europe continues to take place as a part of the growing unity of the Atlantic community.

If you chart the growth of European institutions in the last few years you have also to chart the growth of the Atlantic community. And you have to trace initiative, action, and interaction back and forth endlessly across the Atlantic. For European unity has grown only within the framework of a developing Atlantic community. And European and Atlantic institutions are intertwined and interdependent.

It was General Marshall's initiative in 1947, in response to Europe's manifest need, that called into being the Committee for European Economic Cooperation. In turn, it was the Brussels Pact of 1948 that was the progenitor of the North Atlantic Pact of 1949 and that led directly to the creation of the Council of Europe. It was in the Council of Europe that a European defense force was first proposed and debated; but it was a decision of the North Atlantic Council regarding a German defense contribution that called forth the proposal for a European army from Mr. Pleven,

then Prime Minister of France. The treaty for a European defense community was brought to signature primarily by great European statesmanship, but with the strong encouragement of the United States as essential to the security and well-being of the Atlantic community.

It is not by chance that the growth of unity in Western Europe in the past 5 years has been paralleled by the growth of the Atlantic community. It is not mere coincidence that continental Europe has created organs of unity step by step with the commitment of U.S., British, and Canadian resources and power to the defense and economic well-being of Europe as part of the Atlantic community.

These parallel developments—toward European unity and toward Atlantic unity—are impelled by the same hopes, fears, and pressures.

Soviet imperialism threatens Western Europe, but it threatens no less the United States. And it is clear beyond question that Europe alone, no matter how organized, cannot within the foreseeable future successfully defend itself against Soviet attack. Nor can the United States afford to be without allies. Both Europe and we ourselves need a greater coalition of strength—the Atlantic coalition.

The revival of German or other aggression in Western Europe itself is a danger that the countries there must guard against as must we in the United States. This, at least, we have learned from two world wars in our time. This threat can be partially guarded against by a continental Europe so organized—with national military power and resources so merged—as to make nationalist aggression difficult. But the full guaranty lies in Atlantic community organization, with European defense forces merged into a NATO army.

Likewise, continental Europe's basic economic and social problems can be partially solved by purely European action to create a single market and to rationalize and expand production over a wider area. But their solution is also dependent upon the tariff rates, foreign-investment practices, and raw-materials policies of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada—and upon the level of economic activity in the United States.

It is highly significant, I think, that progress toward greater economic cooperation and integration in Europe in the past 5 years has been made within the context of large-scale U.S. economic aid which has relieved external balance-of-payments difficulties. Long-range progress is likely in the future only if Europe finds means of earning its way in the world and of assuring a decent standard of living to its people without large-scale outside aid.

We have made great strides the past 2 years in strengthening our military defenses. But General Ridgway, the Supreme Commander, has

given clear warning that we have not done enough—that we must build greater and greater strength in the face of today's danger. He is right. We must hold to our course. Mutual security must come first.

But we in the United States have not, as yet, faced frontally and frankly the fact that sound businesslike economic foundations for the Atlantic community must also be built and maintained. Instead we have kept standing a veritable Chinese Wall of customs barriers and procedures. With too little trade we have been shoring up the community with grants of aid. Neither do I think the other members of the Atlantic community have faced up to their side of the same problem. In my opinion, Europe must *produce much more*, and we must *buy much more* from Europe. Unless we import more, the existing dollar gap threatens our own export trade and may unfavorably affect our mutual defense effort. We must consider together the longer range economic and social problems of the Atlantic community—as a community—and move toward sound solutions and closer association.

If the North Atlantic Treaty nations are to build and maintain common defenses over a long period—military defenses, economic defenses, political defenses—it will be necessary to reach clear understandings, to hammer out common policies, and to reach rapid agreement on the tactics of mobile defense. We are 14 sovereign nations with a common purpose and a common objective. Differences in points of view—and they will of course continue to arise—must and can be resolved in a spirit of mutual good will and of full equality.

Soviet Blueprint for Power and Conquest

Institutional unity in the North Atlantic area is growing today, as we have seen, in several concentric circles. There is the developing federal structure of the six continental nations; there is the wider association of Western Europe as a whole, of which the Community of Six is an inescapable part; and there is the still wider Atlantic community. All are interdependent; each requires for its most effective operation the successful operation of the other. Each, at its level, is capable of solving certain problems. Each is incapable of dealing with problems all across the board. The great challenge to statesmanship in the period ahead is to make certain that the growing unities of the West develop in harmonious relation among themselves and also with the free world as a whole.

It is just such unity and harmony in the West that the Kremlin most fears. For more than 2 weeks we have witnessed the public spectacle of Stalin, Malenkov, and others of the Soviet oligarchy sharpening their ideological weapons for a renewed assault upon freedom and pointing out just where, for fullest effect, the main blows are to be delivered.

And where are those most vital spots? Precisely those points at which free peoples are drawing together and presenting a united front. The tremendous power of the Soviet Empire—its propaganda, its diplomacy, its economy, its world-wide subversive apparatus—is to be concentrated upon disrupting the growing solidarity of the free world, to prevent the unification of Europe, and to break up the Atlantic alliance. Stalin predicts our economic collapse. Moreover, he even openly predicts that he will not need to attack us because we will attack and destroy each other.

It was not very long ago that Hitler described in *Mein Kampf* the means by which he expected to rise to power in Germany and how he proposed to use that power to dominate the Eurasian Continent. Many people who should have known better persisted, right up to the end, in disbelieving and ignoring his blueprint for power and conquest.

Today, Stalin's plan of action for the period ahead is in print—right before our eyes. We, the free world, can checkmate that plan. Let us, this time, use our knowledge wisely and well. Let us unite now in political, economic, and military defense.

First Report to Congress on Battle Act of 1951

W. Averell Harriman, Director for Mutual Security, in his capacity as Administrator of the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951, on October 15 released his first semiannual report to the Congress on security controls over exports to the Soviet bloc, commonly known as the Battle Act.

A companion law to the Mutual Security Act of 1951, the Battle Act was enacted by the Congress to support, extend, and strengthen the controls exercised by the free nations over the export of strategic materials to the Soviet bloc.

In presenting the report, Mr. Harriman stated that "substantial progress had been made in controlling strategic trade in such a way as to reinforce our total security."

The report certifies that for several years, the important free world nations "have refused without any exception, the shipment to the Soviet bloc of arms, ammunition, implements of war, or atomic energy materials."

These nations also deny the Soviet bloc a large range of other strategic products and control shipments, in quantity, of still other export materials.

Export licensing systems have been strengthened and illegal trade cut down, the report points out.

In addition, stricter measures have been invoked by the free nations against Communist China after the United Nations recommended in

May 1951 a strategic embargo on exports to that aggressor nation.

In his letter of transmittal to the Congress, Mr. Harriman, while emphasizing the necessity for preventing highly strategic goods from falling into Soviet hands, pointed out that at the present time "cutting off trade entirely would harm our common defense effort more than it harms the potential aggressor."

"Other free nations," he said, "obtain commodities from the Soviet bloc that are extremely valuable to their own defense efforts and the economic stability on which their defense is based."

The most effective control system at this time, he asserted, is a *selective* one, which stops highly strategic exports to the Soviet bloc at the same time as it allows the flow of other exports in return for commodities which the free world needs.

The report traces the history of joint controls since 1948, when Soviet actions made necessary a series of defensive measures in both the military and economic field in order to insure the survival of the West.

It tells the story of an informal committee set up by the free nations to deal with the security aspects of their trade with the East and to determine the areas for which common controls were necessary.

The report warns that Kremlin policy is directed toward making trade controls an issue which will "stir up resentment and disagreement for the purpose of splitting the United States from its allies and destroying our mutual defense system." Under the Battle Act program, which became operative early this year, the Administrator, after consultation with technical and other experts in many U.S. agencies, listed for complete embargo a comprehensive group of military and industrial products. Most of these items were already embargoed by other friendly nations.

The Battle Act provides that in the event a nation receiving aid from the United States "knowingly permits" shipment of embargo materials, such aid shall be terminated unless the President determines that cessation of aid would be

"clearly detrimental to the security of the United States." In a few cases, embargoed items have been shipped in fulfillment of contracts concluded before the enactment of the Battle Act. The Administrator's report sets forth Presidential determinations in these cases.

The report also reviews the levels of control established over "lesser" strategic items, whose importance is primarily related to quantities shipped. It points out the manner in which goods are added to or deleted from control lists in the light of technical and other information which becomes available. This procedure is roughly similar to the continually changing "priority lists" set up by this Government for a different purpose—to make available rather than deny vital materials to our defense industries.

The latter part of the report deals with the particular problems posed in Western Europe and other free-world areas in terms of the imports they continue to require from the Communist countries. Measures taken to provide alternate markets and sources of supply and to increase domestic production, the document states, are directly related to the success of security controls. Special attention is paid to the problem of the dollar gap which, if unsolved, increases the economic pressure on European and Asiatic free nations to trade with the Soviet bloc in order to acquire commodities for which they are unable to pay in dollars.

The report explains that, since the Soviet bloc is relatively self-sufficient in most basic raw materials and already possesses basic armament industries, no amount of controls can stop Soviet war production. It is possible, however, to slow down that war production, and the report states that there is evidence that security controls are succeeding in this objective.

Reemphasizing the dual Battle Act objectives of building free-world strength and impeding Soviet war potential, the report concludes that these can continue to succeed "if the free nations preserve their unity of purpose in the face of Soviet attempts to divide us."

Japanese Education in Review

by Jane M. Alden

The history of modern Japanese education dates from the Meiji Restoration in 1868. The transfer of political power from the Shogun to the Emperor was preceded by the reopening of Japan to Western influence. The aim of the leaders of the Restoration was to develop, as rapidly as possible, a strong, homogeneous state, modern in the Western sense, capable of resisting the encroachments of the Western Powers. Education was immediately recognized as a primary means to achieve these goals.

The formative years for the educational system coincided with the period when Japan was formulating a system of modern government and society. At the outset there was a marked tendency toward indiscriminate acceptance of everything Western which eventually precipitated a conflict between Western materialism and traditional Japanese values. The system of government which finally emerged in the Constitution of 1889 was authoritarian, centralized, and modern. The development of the Japanese educational system, proceeding as it did concurrently with the development of a modern governmental system, was subject to the same influences, conflicts, and pressures. It was inevitable that the educational system that finally emerged would bear a direct relationship to the system and theory of government which the Japanese adopted.

Early Development of the Educational System

The Ministry of Education was established in 1871, and the following year it inaugurated a modern, centralized educational system. During the initial period of development, from 1872 to 1886, the philosophy of utilitarianism dominated Japanese education at the expense of classical learning and traditional Japanese moral and cultural values. The influence of American, British, and French educational policies and practices was considerable during this period. Those Japanese educational leaders who were most influenced by these contacts opposed centralization and stand-

ardization and sought to establish, especially in the private schools, a tradition of independent thought. The growing emphasis on Western materialism and the perceptible, but far lesser, inroads made by Western educational philosophy only served to sharpen the conflict within Japanese society and to increase the fears of the dominant leadership group.

By 1886 a strong reaction to the "over Westernization" of the educational system set in. An Imperial Ordinance in that year defined the function of the Imperial University as providing education to meet the needs of the state. Instruction in morals, national language, and classics was reinstated and increasingly emphasized at all levels in the school system. In 1890 the Imperial Rescript on Education was issued, which defined for the succeeding 60 years the role of Japanese education: to prepare Japanese youth for service to the state. The Rescript set forth the broad ethical principles which would henceforth govern pupils and teachers and paved the way for nationalist indoctrination through the educational system. During this period the ascendancy of Prussian influence on Japanese education as well as government was apparent. As contrasted with other Western influences, it proved to be more compatible with traditional Japanese values.

The development and expansion of the educational system was rapid during the period from 1890 through the early 1920's. By the late 1920's the tempo of expansion had slowed and attention was concentrated on the inculcation of the national spirit through the educational system. This renewed emphasis on education as the means of advancing national policies was a direct outgrowth of the rise to power of the military and ultranationalist groups at home and a renewal of aggressive conquests abroad. This situation called for complete national acceptance and support for national policies. The educational system was again a primary means to achieve the goals of the dominant political leadership.

Education Before World War II

A brief discussion of the educational system as it existed just prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War will serve as a basis for evaluating the changes in its organization and philosophy which were brought about by the occupation during the postwar period.

The progress from elementary schools to a university degree required 17 years. Progression from one level to the next was determined by ability to pass the entrance examinations and financial ability to meet the tuition fees. Only about one-half of one percent of the students who entered elementary schools ultimately managed to obtain a bachelor's degree. This educational system was characterized by the acquiring of factual knowledge (necessary to pass entrance examinations), increasing competition because of the prestige of a few schools as a student fought his way up the educational pyramid, a minimum of student expression, and a maximum of standardization of subject matter. Throughout his passage through the educational system the student was imbued with a sense of loyalty and duty to the state, of obedience to higher authority, and conformity to the accepted social pattern. Only in the private schools could the student escape the full impact of these forces, but in the years immediately preceding the war this relative freedom enjoyed by private educational institutions was all but extinguished.

In 1940 there were 52,474 schools throughout Japan with 494,538 teachers and 17.4 million students. Compulsory education extended for the first 6 years of the elementary school, and although this period was extended to 8 years in 1941, the war prevented the carrying out of this regulation.

Elementary schools provided 6 years of compulsory education. There were nearly 26,000 elementary schools in 1940, almost all of which were public. Nearly three-fourths of all students were enrolled in these schools. The curriculum included the Japanese language, arithmetic, science, physical education, geography, and history. Boys received training in military arts and girls in sewing. Textbooks were either compiled by the Ministry or approved by it. Standardization of teaching methods and subject matter and learning by rote characterized elementary schooling.

Students proceeded from the elementary schools either to attend higher elementary schools for 2 or 3 years, after which their education terminated, or to enter secondary schools. A relatively small number of students received no schooling beyond the compulsory 6 years in the elementary grades.

Entrance into secondary or middle schools was by written entrance examinations until 1939, when oral examinations were substituted in many cases. Tuition fees were charged. Approximately 25 percent of the elementary-school graduates entered secondary schools each year. The course

was for 5 years. Boys and girls attended separate schools with different curriculums, and the standards in girls' schools tended to be lower than those in boys' schools.

Teachers in secondary schools had little freedom to experiment in teaching methods or to vary subject content. Pupil discussion was not encouraged and conformity rather than individuality was emphasized. Organized military training by military officers was given in boys' schools.

In the boys' schools the entire curriculum was designed primarily to prepare the student for the entrance examinations for the higher schools; in the girls' schools the curriculum was directed toward preparing them for their place in society since, for most of the students, formal education ended at this level.

The Ministry of Education controlled directly or indirectly this vast educational system. There were three types of schools: (1) government or national schools, which were established and directly controlled by the Ministry; (2) public schools established by prefectural and municipal governments, and only indirectly controlled by the Ministry through the prefectural government; and (3) private schools established by individuals and organizations which were licensed by the Ministry but had some degree of freedom within the general framework of regulations. The national government bore the full costs of the national schools, while the public schools were supported by the national, prefectural, and municipal governments, the latter providing buildings and maintenance. Small tuition fees were also paid by the students, even in the compulsory elementary grades, and private gifts, often raised by associations formed to support the schools, contributed to school revenue.

Following graduation from secondary schools, students entered either colleges or normal schools where their education was completed, or entered the higher schools for a 3-year university preparatory course. Entrance into all three types of schools was by written examination.

The universities offered a 3-year course leading to a bachelor's degree. Postgraduate work from 2 to 5 years was also offered. In 1940 there were 47 universities in Japan, 22 of which were located in Tokyo. Greatest prestige was attached to graduation from one of the nine imperial universities, especially from Tokyo Imperial. Instruction in the universities was by lectures and from texts chosen by the professor. Emphasis was on careful memorization of both lectures and texts, and class discussion was not encouraged. The freedom of the professor to express views that differed radically from the prevailing policies of the government or the basic tenets of Japanese society became increasingly dangerous as the government intensified its purge of so-called liberal professors in the 1930's. Extracurricular student activities were

carefully organized and supervised by the Ministry of Education and the school administration.

Although the disadvantages from a Western point of view of this educational system are most often emphasized, the accomplishments should not be overlooked. In the short space of 60 years the Japanese developed a system which provided mass education, to which the high literacy rate bears witness, and this system provided a body of technically competent professional people capable of assuming the leadership of a modern industrial society. The Japanese have long had a high regard for education, and continuous efforts were made to improve the caliber of education provided. The fact that this educational system tended to reinforce the authoritarian character of the state and Japanese society, that it discouraged independence of thought and individual initiative, was primarily because this was the purpose it was designed to serve.

Educational Reforms Under the Occupation

The magnitude of the task which the Occupation undertook in the field of education is evident when the basic philosophy laid down in the Imperial Rescript on Education of 1890 is compared with the philosophy which the Occupation sought to introduce. This new philosophy of education is perhaps best stated in the directive of the Far Eastern Commission to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), dated March 27, 1947,¹ which reads in part:

Education should be looked upon as the pursuit of truth, as a preparation for life in a democratic nation, and as a training for the social and political responsibilities which freedom entails. Emphasis should be placed on the dignity and worth of the individual, on independent thought and initiative, and on developing a spirit of inquiry.

The Occupation policies in respect to education can be divided into two general categories: (1) on the negative side, to eliminate from the schools militaristic and ultranationalist ideology and its exponents, and (2) on the positive side, to establish an educational system and ideology which would further the development of a representative government and a society based on the freedom and dignity of the individual. The negative task was undertaken immediately after the surrender despite the dislocation of the school system at the end of the war and the urgency of reopening the schools to maintain law and order.

In October 1945 the Japanese Government was directed by SCAP to eliminate from the educational system those teachers and school officials who were known to be "militaristic, ultranationalistic or antagonistic to the objectives and policies of the Occupation." These individuals were removed and/or barred from occupying any position in the educational system. Further, no one who

served in the military was eligible to serve in the school system. The Japanese Government set up an elaborate screening process to eliminate such persons, in accordance with standards drawn up by SCAP and subject to SCAP review. The entire purge program was under continuing review by SCAP officials.

Other negative actions followed in quick succession. The Japanese Government was directed to eliminate the dissemination of Shinto doctrines by the educational institutions supported in whole or in part by public funds. Military education was eliminated from the schools. Courses in morals, Japanese history, and geography were suspended until their content could be reviewed and revised and new textbooks prepared. All textbooks and teachers' manuals relating to these subjects were withdrawn from the schools.

On the positive side, the new Constitution which came into force in May 1947 and the Fundamental Law of Education of 1947 provide the framework for the new educational system. The Constitution specifically guarantees academic freedom and accords to all people "the right to receive an equal education correspondent to their ability." Compulsory education is free, and all persons having children under their protection are obligated to see that they receive such education. The Fundamental Law of Education outlines the basic aims of the new educational system such as academic freedom, equal opportunity in education, 9 years of free, compulsory education. Furthermore, coeducation is recognized, religious teaching in the public schools is prohibited, and political education or activity for or against any specific political party is prohibited.

The New School System

The school system was completely revised by the School Education Law of 1947 which established the 6-3-3-4 system, i. e. 6 years of elementary school, 3 years of junior high school, 3 years of senior high school, and a 4-year university course. Compulsory education was extended to 9 years, to become fully effective in 1949. At least one government university was established in each prefecture in order to provide greater educational opportunities.

Within this new educational system far greater freedom is permitted both teachers and pupils. Textbooks are no longer compiled by the Ministry of Education; teachers and local school authorities are permitted to select books from a list of authorized texts. Coeducation has been accepted, although not uniformly throughout the country. Generally, however, boys and girls receive equal education, and the opportunities for women to advance through the educational system have been greatly increased. In the classroom the former emphasis on teaching by rote has been replaced by methods designed to encourage individual expression and initiative.

¹ BULLETIN of Apr. 27, 1947, p. 746.

The decentralization of control over the educational system is one of the most important changes introduced by the Occupation. In place of the highly centralized prewar system, control over education is legally divided between (1) the Ministry; (2) the prefectural boards of education, governors, and assemblies; and (3) the local boards of education, mayors, and local assemblies. The role of each is defined by law. The Ministry's primary functions are to provide professional and technical guidance and advice, to prepare draft legislation on minimum educational standards for submission to the national Diet, and to compile and administer the national education budget.

On the prefectural and local levels popularly elected boards of education² were created to administer education in all local public schools. Universities were excluded from the jurisdiction of these boards.

The prefectural boards of education are responsible for certifying teachers, appointing superintendents of education, approving textbooks and curriculums, and advising local boards of education. There is some overlapping of functions between the prefectural and local boards. Local boards of education are required to establish adequate schools to provide 9 years of compulsory education. Schools are controlled and operated by the local boards, which determine curriculum, select textbooks from the lists approved by the prefectural boards, appoint and dismiss teachers and principals, and perform other functions that relate to operation and management of the local school system. The boards of education do not control the school budget. They draw up the budgets for presentation to the local and prefectural assemblies, but the latter are free to act as they see fit on the draft budget. The Diet determines the size of the national contribution to local education.

On the university level, the Ministry of Education has primary jurisdiction over all universities, whether public or private, although this power is greatly circumscribed compared to the prewar period. Each university is semiautonomous, and the administration and faculty have considerable control over internal university affairs. The Ministry retains the authority to set the standards that must be met for the creation of universities. In the postwar period the number of universities has risen from 47 in 1940 to 221 in 1951.

In 1951 there were 20,000,000 students, 708,000 teachers, and 45,000 schools of all levels throughout Japan. This represents an increase in the number of students and teachers but a decrease of about 7,500 in the number of schools. War damage is the primary reason for this decrease.

² Six of the seven members of the prefectural boards and four of the five members of the local boards are elected; one member on each board is selected by and from the prefectural and local assemblies, respectively.

Outlook for the Post-Treaty Period

The future development of the Japanese educational system has been profoundly affected by the impact of Occupation-sponsored reforms upon a well developed, centralized, educational system. When the Japanese peace treaty became effective on April 28, 1952, the Japanese were free for the first time to review and modify their new educational system. There can be little doubt that the Japanese will undertake some modifications. The key question is the extent and nature of these modifications and whether they will be confined to the organization of the school system or whether they will affect the basic philosophy which was the goal of the reforms.

In assessing the importance of future modifications in Japanese education, it is well to keep in mind that the Occupation utilized American concepts, practices, and philosophy as the basis for remodeling the Japanese educational system. Prior to the Occupation, Japanese education differed from its American counterpart not only in its organization and structure but more importantly in its aims and philosophy. Although these two aspects are closely related, it is possible to maintain the basic philosophic concepts of American education without adhering to the American system of organization in its entirety.

The present and future status of the educational system is a matter of great concern to Japanese leadership and there is considerable divergence of views on its future role and development. At the present time attention is centered on modifications and adjustments in the organization of the educational system, leaving the larger question of educational philosophy for future consideration.

It is quite possible that the 6-3-3-4 system will be modified. The economic situation has limited, and will continue to limit, the funds that can be devoted to erecting new school buildings and renovating damaged ones, and a shortage of trained teachers will continue to hamper the creation of new schools. Moreover there is some inclination on the part of some Japanese educators to favor a return to the more familiar pattern of school organization, although not necessarily to the older system of centralized control and standardization. A reduction in the compulsory school period, at least temporarily, may be another result of the stringent financial situation and of the shortage of school buildings and teachers.

Problems of the Decentralized System

Of far greater significance to the fundamental concept of democratic education is the future of the decentralization of control over the school system. The operation of the boards of education has proved to be the weakest link in the present decentralized system. There is pressure for the elimination of popular election and the substitution of appointment as the means for selecting board

members. This pressure has been particularly evident, since the establishment of municipal, town, and village boards of education by popular election is scheduled for this fall. This election will bring the number of boards of education in Japan up to about 10,500. Moreover teachers are eligible to be members of the boards and they, or their representatives, have been elected in significant numbers. There is a tendency for the teachers to be the more active members of the boards and as a result there is opposition to this teacher domination of the school system. Another major problem of the board-of-education system is the board's lack of control over school budgets.

These problems are capable of solution short of eliminating the boards themselves. Teachers can be made ineligible for board membership, or their representation limited in proportion to the non-teacher elements on the boards. Present school districts can be consolidated, thus decreasing the number of boards of education.

Although it is probably not desirable, for reasons quite apart from education, to circumscribe the financial power of the local and prefectural assemblies, it is possible to limit their consideration of the education budget to the size of the budget and to major policy decisions concerning expenditure of the allocated funds. This would curtail the current practice of detailed review and recommendation by the assemblies. Such a step would at least increase the ability of the boards to determine educational policy and development through budget administration. Whether the Japanese will adopt this course or will abolish the boards is not evident at present. Abolition of the boards will not necessarily destroy the system of decentralized control over education since, assuming a continuation of local autonomy, control could remain at the prefectural and local levels with the popularly elected executives and assemblies. Such a solution would not be without its disadvantages, notably in terms of involving local politics more closely in educational affairs.

The extent to which the new basic aims of the educational system will remain unchanged is far more difficult to assess. No one would contend that the old attitudes and concepts have been eradicated either in relation to education specifically or in the broader field of social organization and government. The future of these educational reforms is to a considerable extent dependent upon the survival of the social and legal reforms just as in the earlier period the development of Japanese education and the form of government and the organization of society finally adopted were inter-related. While progress was made during the Occupation in creating a vested interest among broad segments of the body politic in the survival of a free educational system, it is equally true that older ideas and their exponents still have a considerable influence. This situation will undoubtedly give rise to a modification in the philosophy of educa-

tion, but beyond this it is still too early in the post-Occupation period to speculate on the final role of education.

• *Mrs. Alden, author of the above article, is a special assistant in the Office of Field Programs of The International Information Administration.*

U.S., Japan Consider Alaskan Forest Products Market

Press release 800 dated October 10

A mission representing the Japanese Government and Japanese pulp and timber industries is now in Washington exploring with U.S. authorities the possibility of obtaining forest products from Alaska.

The mission, headed by Junichiro Kobayashi, Director General, Council of Japanese Forest Resources, outlined to American authorities Japan's long-term requirements for forest products and the reasons for Japanese interest in the establishment of an American corporation to secure supplies from Alaska. Mr. Kobayashi pointed out that at the present rate of cutting, Japan's softwood resources will be virtually eliminated within approximately 15 years. He stated that Japan cannot reduce its present rate of cutting because of its heavy requirements, which include supplies to the U.N. forces in Japan. It was imperative, therefore, he said, that Japan find a supplementary source of supply of forest products for essential construction and other needs. Mr. Kobayashi pointed out that since softwoods are not available to Japan from nearby East Asiatic areas, Alaska is the closest major source of undeveloped forest resources in the free world. Mr. Kobayashi cited the fact that before World War II Japan obtained large quantities of forest products from Sakhalin and Siberia. He stressed that Japan's interest in Alaskan timber is not motivated by speculative considerations but by the need to meet Japan's serious deficit in these products.

The mission's immediate goal is to determine the feasibility of establishing a sawmill in Alaska from which substantial quantities of sawn lumber could be exported to Japan. Consideration has also been given by the mission to the possibility of the establishment in Alaska at a later date of an integrated pulp mill to meet Japan's pulp requirements. Mr. Kobayashi also explored with American authorities the possibility of utilizing Japanese labor in Alaska should it prove feasible to establish a sawmill and pulpmill there.

The restrictions of the immigration laws covering the migration of foreign workers into the United States were carefully reviewed. It appeared that it would be extremely difficult under the law to permit foreign workers to enter the country to participate in the cutting and produc-

tion of wood products in Alaska. It was explained the employment opportunities involved in any such project would have to be filled by available American labor before consideration could be given to use of workers from any other country. It appears that American manpower would in fact be available for labor demands that might emerge from the project under discussion.

The Forest Service has outlined to the Japanese mission the conditions under which timber is sold from the Tongass National Forest in Southeast Alaska and the possibilities for expansion in the production of various classes of forest products. The opportunities for procurement of lumber from the mills now established in Alaska were outlined. It was made clear that all exploration by the Japanese of the possibilities of obtaining forest products from Alaska should be made on the premise that any new enterprise must be fitted into established Forest Service timber-sale policies for building up the cut of the Tongass National Forest to sustained yield-cutting capacity and for support of the economic development of the Territory. This would include compliance with the regulations of the Secretary of Agriculture which require that Alaskan national forest timber be given primary processing within the Territory.

It was pointed out to the mission that an enterprise sponsored by the Japanese for manufacture of forest products in Alaska for shipment to Japan would have to be incorporated under American laws, bid successfully for national forest timber, and conform to all the applicable laws, regulations, and contract terms in the same manner as its possible competitors.

The Japanese have indicated that they propose to send a technical mission to Alaska in the near future to make detailed investigations of the advisability of organizing a sawmill enterprise to operate under the conditions outlined by the Forest Service. Although the mission expressed an interest in the possibility of establishing a pulp-mill in Alaska, it indicated that the large investment required for a pulp-production project would be deferred until it has obtained satisfactory experience in Alaskan timber through a sawmill enterprise.

Members of the Japanese mission now in Washington other than Mr. Kobayashi are Shinichi Tanaka, Executive Director, Council for Integrated Countermeasures for Forest Resources, and Dr. Koichi Aki, Vice Director, Resources Council, Prime Minister's Office, Tokyo.

The mission's discussions have been with officials of the State, Labor, and Interior Departments, with the Forest Service of the Department of Agriculture, and other agencies.

Japanese War Criminals Board

Press release 794 dated October 9

The Board of Clemency and Parole for War Criminals set up by the President on September 4, 1952, by Executive Order 10393,¹ is organized and in operation. The Board consists of Conrad E. Snow, Assistant Legal Adviser in the Department of State, Chairman; James V. Bennett, Director of the United States Bureau of Prisons, Department of Justice, and Roger Kent, General Counsel, Department of Defense.

The Board meets weekly at the office of the Chairman in the Department of State and is presently considering recommendations which have been received from the Government of Japan for clemency for, or parole of Japanese war criminals. The Board is authorized by Executive Order 10393 to make the necessary investigations in, and advise the President with respect to, such recommendations. In making its investigations the Board may examine witnesses and take testimony to the extent deemed necessary or advisable. The Board will be ready now to consider the views of anyone interested in the subject.

The Board will have before it recommendations made by the Japanese Government, under the authority of the Treaty of Peace, for clemency or parole for Japanese war criminals who are now in prison in Japan. Under the treaty, Japan has agreed to carry out the sentences imposed upon these Japanese nationals by the United States, and the power to grant clemency and to parole may not be exercised except on decision of the U.S. Government and on the recommendation of Japan. The Board of Clemency and Parole for War Criminals appointed by the President will recommend to the President the action which should be taken on each Japanese recommendation.

The Board now has before it Japanese recommendations for parole in 72 cases of Japanese officers, soldiers, and civilians who are serving sentences in Sugamo Prison of from 8 to 25 years each for mistreatment of prisoners of war or other atrocities during World War II. Most of the cases recommended have now served 6 or 7 years of their sentences and all of them are eligible for parole under the parole system set up by General MacArthur while he was Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan. Prior to the coming into effect of the Treaty of Peace, some 300 war criminals convicted by the United States after serving one-third of their sentence had been released on parole under General MacArthur's parole system. None have been released since the termination of the occupation, although Japanese law, subject to U.S. approval, has provided a parole system identical with that of General MacArthur's.

¹ BULLETIN of Sept. 15, 1952, p. 409.

Economic Development Program in Burma

Press release 792 dated October 9

Frank N. Trager of New York City has been appointed as Director of the Point Four Program in Burma, the Department of State announced on October 9. Mr. Trager took his oath of office on that date.

Mr. Trager went to Burma in October 1951 as deputy chief of the economic-assistance program then administered by the Economic Cooperation Administration (now the Mutual Security Agency). At the direction of Congress, MSA transferred responsibility for the Burma program to the Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA) on July 1, 1952. Mr. Trager has been acting as country director since then. He has been in Washington for the past few weeks for consultations with TCA officials and will return to Rangoon this month.

The Point Four Program in Burma is being geared into Burma's own 8-year economic program for self-sufficiency. First elements of the Burmese program were announced by Prime Minister U Nu in August. The program was drafted with the help of private American engineering consultants. It calls for a level of national output by 1959 about 100 percent above the present level and about 20 percent above the level of 1938-39. In terms of 1951-52 dollars, Burma's gross national product in 1938-39 would have been approximately 1.1 billion dollars. Now it is only 700 million dollars. The development program seeks a gross national product by 1959, in terms of 1951-52 dollars, of about 1.5 billion dollars.

The cost of the Burma development program is estimated at 1.5 billion dollars of which Burma expects to be able to provide at least 1.1 billion from its own resources. The remaining 400 million dollars would come from private investments, loans, and grants. The plan contemplates the restoration, modernization, and expansion of agricultural and forest production; the development of new industry using domestic agricultural, forest, and mineral resources; and the improvement of health and education on a Nation-wide basis.

The ECA/MSA program in fiscal years 1951 and 1952 made available to Burma approximately 24 million dollars. Most of this was earmarked for the rehabilitation of devastated ports and irrigation systems and for the purchase of capital and consumer goods needed in a war-torn society. Approximately 14 million dollars of the ECA/MSA

funds were spent for goods and services to be delivered during this fiscal year, so that the supply pipeline will be full for some time, even though the Point Four budget for the present fiscal year amounts to only 7 million dollars.

A 12-man technical mission under M. A. Raschid, Minister of Housing and Labor, is in Washington conferring with Point Four Administrator Stanley Andrews and other U.S. Government officials on the ways in which Point Four can support Burma's program most effectively.

Burma's major objective in agriculture is to restore, in the next 5 years, its prewar level of rice exports of 3.5 million tons. Rice production now permits exports of approximately 1.5 million tons. Burma proposes to reclaim for cultivation 2.5 million acres of land lost to weeds and jungle during the war and to open up to cultivation for the first time 1.4 million acres of new land. This will require mechanization for land clearing as well as cultivation. Along with this program will go land resettlement, farm credit, agricultural research and extension, rural health, and education. Point Four is prepared to supply technicians and some equipment for training and demonstration purposes.

Burma's teak production is less than 25 percent of the prewar level and the country has many other species of commercially valuable timber. To rebuild the forest-products industry will also require mechanization. Burma lost two-thirds of its elephant power during World War II, and it takes 18 years to raise and train a logging elephant. Point Four is prepared to help Burma build up a skilled timber-industry labor force by demonstration and training in the use of modern logging and processing equipment.

It has been estimated that as many as half of Burma's 18 million people suffer from malaria. Point Four is carrying on work begun by ECA/MSA in malaria control, supplying DDT and training public-health teams for campaigns throughout the country. Point Four has also joined the Burman Government in programs to improve village sanitation, restore hospitals, and train public-health and professional medical personnel.

At present Burma lacks a sufficient number of skilled men to carry out its own development program. At Burma's request Point Four is participating in a broad and varied education program which includes the training of teachers for elementary and secondary education, particularly in vocational fields; the training of agricultural technicians, engineers, and industrial supervisors; and adult education.

Values at Stake in Settlement of Kashmir's Status

*Statement by Frank P. Graham
U. N. Representative for India and Pakistan*¹

The Security Council discussions on Kashmir were resumed in New York on October 10. At the opening meeting Frank P. Graham made an introductory statement in which he explained his efforts at negotiation over the last 18 months and appealed to the parties to reach a final settlement of this long-standing dispute. The Pakistan representative thanked Dr. Graham for his recent efforts and suggested that the Council recess for a few days to consider his statement. No other speeches were made; the President of the Council announced he would confer with the members and the parties on a date for a future meeting.

U.N. doc. S/PV.605
Dated October 10

[Excerpts]

In seeking to carry out the responsibilities entrusted to him by the Security Council, namely, to aid the parties in reaching an agreement on a plan of demilitarization, the United Nations representative proposed a 12 point programme of demilitarization as one step in the solution of a complex problem. He wishes to make clear to the Members of the Council that the narrowing of the differences on the twelve point programme to one main point, upon which the whole plan depends, emphasizes the depth of the difference on this point. As we have sought to remove many obstacles, surmount boulders, and to narrow and more precisely to define the differences, the remaining difference on the issue of the number and character of forces is still deep. It is related to the differing conceptions of the two Governments, often set forth—and I cite the UNCIP Interim Report, Security Council Records, Fourth Year, Special Supplement 7, S/1430/Rev. 1, pp. 37–39; and UNRIP Report to Security Council, 15 October 1951, par. 35—relating to (1) the status of the State of

Jammu and Kashmir, (2) the nature of the responsibilities of the appropriate authorities on each side of the cease-fire line after demilitarization, and (3) the obligations of the two Governments under the two agreed Resolutions of 13 August 1948 and of 5 January 1949 with its provisions for a plebiscite. Upon the acceptance of definite provisions for a plebiscite came the cessation of fighting. Under the two resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 the consideration of the conditions and requirements for a free, fair and secure plebiscite would proceed in part from the studies of the Plebiscite Administrator.

Toward reaching an agreement on the remaining difference on Proposal 7 the United Nations representative made his suggestion for alternative approaches either (1) through the establishment of the number and character of forces to be left on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization or (2) through the declared policy that the number and character of such forces should be determined in accordance with the requirements of each area and, accordingly, that principles or criteria should be established which would serve as guidance for the civil and military representatives of the Governments of India and Pakistan in the meeting contemplated in the Provisional Clause of the revised proposals.

¹Made before the Security Council on Oct. 10 as a supplement to his fourth report to the Council. For excerpts from the report, submitted Sept. 16, see BULLETIN of Oct. 20, 1952, p. 626.

The settlement of the Kashmir dispute involves the preservation of the existing cease-fire line, a proposed agreement on demilitarization, and certainly not less important, the requirements and conditions for holding the plebiscite. The peaceful settlement of the whole complex Kashmir problem is important for the State, for both nations, and for all nations.

To fail to solve the Kashmir problem rather than to bridge present differences is inconceivable as a practical policy in the face of a situation heavily charged with long-accumulated high potentials. The peoples of the subcontinent have the opportunity to challenge the peoples of the world with their own adventurous programmes for both individual freedom and the general welfare, for both national security and world peace. For the peoples of the subcontinent to fail to solve peacefully the Kashmir problem and to drift or stumble into greatly increased danger rather than bridge the chasm which divides them would be a tragedy for the two nations and for the people of the world who look with hope to the humane leadership of two great peoples. Programmes which now provide sustenance, freedom and hope for hundreds of millions of people might give way to violence. At this important and critical time in the history of the subcontinent, an agreement on Kashmir could be a great demonstration for peace by peace-minded leaders, whose position for peace would be re-enforced by an agreement. In case of conflict and destruction, fear and hunger might stalk the villages where the people mainly live in the hopeful lands between the mountains and the seas. Violence and then tyranny might seek to feed on hunger and hate while humane programmes were engulfed in the deep catastrophe.

The values of an early settlement of this dispute would, in my view, be tremendous for (1) the four million people of the State, (2) the four hundred million people of the two nations involved, and (3) the people of the world.

A settlement of this dispute would mean that the status of the people of the State would be finally determined not by the sovereignty of princes but by the sovereignty of the people, not by the might of armies but by the will of the people, not by bullets but by ballots, through self-determination of peoples by the democratic method of an impartial plebiscite conducted with due regard for the security of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite under the auspices of the United Nations.

A settlement of this dispute might help to settle the dispute over evacuee property. It might thus help bring adjustment of the claim of the hosts of refugees who, in their tragic trek and counter-trek

from one country to the other, left behind their homes and their property and yet carried in their minds and hearts the horrors of communal slaughter. These adjustments in belated justice would assuage some of the pain of their losses and memories and contribute much to the morale and productive energies of millions of people in both nations.

Moreover, the settlement of the Kashmir dispute would contribute much to the relief of the fears and tensions over canals and rivers from which come the waters for the fields, and the hopes of food and opportunity for millions of people. A settled basis for the co-operative development of the natural resources of the rivers and their wide valleys would make more promptly and broadly possible the connecting of the engines of production, transportation, and communication with nature's ceaseless cycle of mighty but unharnessed power between the sun and the seas, between the mountains, the snows, the rains and the rivers, between the clouds and the lands of the vast subcontinent.

Food and freedom, goods and equal opportunity, health and education, dynamic hope and the liberation of the human spirit for the good life of these great, free societies can thus become the way of life for the peoples of India and Pakistan with all their meaning to the peoples of the world.

The co-operation of India and Pakistan in the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, in the self-determination of the people of the State, and in the larger release of budgets into constructive programmes, might become one of the turning points in the history of our times toward the co-operation of all nations for the larger self-determination of all peoples; toward universal disarmament and the harnessing of atomic power for the moral equivalent of war in the campaigns against poverty, illiteracy and disease; and toward the more effective co-ordination of the national programmes, the point IV programme, the Colombo Plan and the United Nations Technical Assistance programme for advances in agriculture and industry, health and education, freedom and peace, for all people.

On the subcontinent of Asia is a juncture of the forces of strategic geography, historic peoples, high traditions, ancient religions, humane leadership, fresh currents of national freedom and democratic power of high potential for peace or conflict, weal or woe, in the present world. May the prompt, fair and peaceful settlement of the Kashmir dispute by the Governments of India and of Pakistan set the example, provide the leadership and point the way from fear and conflict to peace and hope for the peoples of the earth.

Recent Developments in the Kashmir Dispute

by Frank D. Collins

On September 16 Frank P. Graham, U.N. representative for India and Pakistan, submitted his fourth report to the Security Council covering the results of his negotiations with India and Pakistan at New York from May 29 to July 30 and at Geneva from August 26 to September 10.¹

From his appointment on April 30, 1951, to the conclusion of the recent Geneva talks, Dr. Graham has concentrated his efforts on bridging the differences between India and Pakistan over the question of the demilitarization of Kashmir preparatory to the holding of a plebiscite under the auspices of the United Nations.

When India and Pakistan attained independence and dominion status on August 15, 1947, the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir was one of about 560 such states whose status was left undetermined. Under the Indian Independence Act, these states could decide whether to join India or Pakistan. For most of these states, geographical proximity to one of the dominions, as well as preponderance of either Hindu or Moslem population, made the decision relatively easy. Since Kashmir lies between India and Pakistan and has a mixed population, it became the scene of armed conflict soon after partition.

In January 1948 the dispute was brought before the Security Council and in this month the Council established the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP). A year later UNCIP succeeded in obtaining the agreement of both India and Pakistan to a cease-fire and to the general principles under which a truce (i.e., a plan for the withdrawal of the armed forces from the area) and a plebiscite under U.N. auspices might be carried out. This agreement was formalized in the "UNCIP resolution" of January 5, 1949. On March 21, 1949, the U.N. Secretary-General named Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz as administrator of the projected plebiscite to be held under the terms of the January 5 resolution.

¹ U.N., doc. S/2783 dated Sept. 19; for excerpts, see *BULLETIN* of Oct. 20, p. 626.

During 1949 and 1950 UNCIP, Gen. Andrew G. L. McNaughton of Canada, acting under special temporary authorization of the Security Council, and Sir Owen Dixon of Australia, designated as successor to UNCIP, tried unsuccessfully to bring about a settlement. In January 1951 efforts of the London Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers failed to break the impasse on demilitarization. When the Security Council met on February 21, 1951, the United States joined the United Kingdom in submitting a joint draft resolution.² The resolution provided for the appointment of another U.N. representative to succeed Sir Owen Dixon and instructed him to effect demilitarization on the basis of the proposals made by Sir Owen, with appropriate modifications, and to present to India and Pakistan detailed plans for carrying out a plebiscite. The representative was directed to report to the Security Council 3 months after undertaking negotiations with the governments on the subcontinent.

To accomplish this task the draft resolution authorized the new representative to take into account such possibilities as (1) the provision of U.N. Forces to facilitate demilitarization and the holding of a plebiscite; (2) the assignment to the loser in the plebiscite of local areas, contiguous to its frontier, in which the vote had been overwhelmingly in the loser's favor; (3) different degrees of supervision as might be appropriate in different areas. Finally, the resolution called upon both India and Pakistan to accept arbitration on all unresolved points which remained after their discussions with the U.N. representative and which the latter designated as points of difference.

Both parties objected to certain parts of the resolution. Pakistan objected to the clause concerning boundary adjustments because it could mean a partial partition and was, in Pakistan's view, a contravention of the January 5, 1949, agree-

² For Ernest A. Gross' statement on that occasion, see *ibid.*, Mar. 5, 1951, p. 394.

ment. India took exception to a number of aspects of the resolution, particularly the provisions for arbitration and for the possible entry of U.N. troops. As a result of the objections by both sides, the United States and the United Kingdom presented on March 21 a revised resolution which directed the U.N. representative to effect demilitarization on the basis of the January 5, 1949 resolution to which both parties had agreed. This new draft, however, retained in its preamble the original reference to the Kashmir Constituent Assembly and also included the arbitration provision. Pakistan accepted the resolution, but India rejected it. The Security Council approved the resolution (S/2017/Rev. 1) on March 30, 1951, by a vote of 8 to 0 with three abstentions (India, Soviet Union, Yugoslavia).³

On April 30 the Council appointed Dr. Graham, former U.S. Senator from North Carolina, as U.N. representative for India and Pakistan. Thus began the most recent phase of the Kashmir negotiations. These negotiations fall into four periods, at the end of each of which Dr. Graham reported to the Security Council.

First Report, July–October 1951

On October 15 Dr. Graham submitted his first report to the Security Council.⁴ When he arrived on the subcontinent in July, he reported, he found an atmosphere of hostility. The press in both India and Pakistan had begun a barrage of charges and countercharges which had given rise to considerable tension. Dr. Graham decided to adopt the procedure of separate, informal conversations with officials of the two governments. On September 7 he submitted a 12-point draft proposal on demilitarization to the governments and requested their comments. He was able to obtain the agreement of the parties to four of the 12 points. (It should be mentioned that both parties had previously committed themselves to these four points under the January 5, 1949 agreement.) In addition to reaffirming their determination not to resort to force, to avoid warlike statements, and to observe the cease-fire the parties reaffirmed their acceptance of the principle that the question of the accession of the state of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan will be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite under U.N. auspices. The points of difference under the remaining eight proposals, according to Dr. Graham, centered around the period of demilitarization, the withdrawal of troops, the size of the forces to remain on each side of the cease-fire line, and the question of whether a date should be set for the formal induction of the Plebiscite Administrator. Dr. Graham reported that because of the situation pre-

vailing on the subcontinent, he had not been able to effect demilitarization within the prescribed time limit. He added, however, that agreement was still possible, and suggested that the Security Council consider instructing him to implement its decision by continuing the negotiations with the two governments, such negotiations to be carried out at the seat of the Council. Dr. Graham suggested that he be instructed to report to the Security Council again within 6 weeks from the time negotiations were resumed.

On October 18 Dr. Graham made a statement to the Security Council⁵ explaining his report and paying high tribute to the late Pakistan Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, who had been assassinated 2 days earlier at Rawalpindi, Pakistan. Later in the month the Security Council moved to Paris, where discussions were resumed on November 10. At this meeting the United States joined the United Kingdom in sponsoring a resolution⁶ which noted with approval the basis for a program of demilitarization put forward by Dr. Graham, and instructed him to continue his efforts to obtain agreement on a demilitarization plan. In addition, the resolution instructed Dr. Graham to report to the Security Council within 6 weeks, giving his views on the problems confided to him. The resolution was approved by a vote of 9 to 0 with two abstentions (India and U.S.S.R.).

Second Report, November–December 1951

On December 18 Dr. Graham reported the results of his 6-week negotiations at Paris.⁷ He stated that his procedure had been, first, to try to reach an agreement between the parties on his 12-point proposals of September 7, 1951. Failing this, he hoped to obtain each party's plans for demilitarization under the UNCIP resolutions of August 13, 1948, and January 5, 1949, in order to establish the points of difference in interpretation and execution of those resolutions that must be resolved before such demilitarization could be carried out.

Under the first point of that procedure Dr. Graham had endeavored to narrow the differences to two fundamental issues:

- (1) the minimum number of forces to be left on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the demilitarization period;
- (2) the date on which the Government of India would cause the Plebiscite Administrator to be inducted into office.

On December 7 Dr. Graham presented to the parties a statement and questionnaires relating to these issues. Informal conversations were held

⁵ U.N. doc. S/PV 564; for excerpts, see *ibid.*, p. 740.

⁶ U.N. doc. S/2390; for text, see *ibid.*, Dec. 10, 1951, p. 959.


⁷ U.N. doc. S/2448; for excerpts, see *ibid.*, Jan. 14, 1952, p. 52.

³ For text, see *ibid.*, May 5, 1952, p. 713.

⁴ U.N. doc. S/2375; for excerpts, see *ibid.*, Nov. 5, 1951, p. 738.

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- — — — — Provincial boundary

The international boundaries shown in this map do not necessarily correspond in all cases to the boundaries recognized by the U. S. Government.



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separately with the two delegations by Gen. Jacob Devers, U.N. military adviser to Dr. Graham. Dr. Graham reported that the disparity between the number and character of the forces which each party proposed should be left at the end of the demilitarization period had been so wide that agreement on the whole plan could not be reached at that stage. In addition, agreement on the important question concerning the date of induction of the Plebiscite Administrator could not be obtained. The Indian Government had insisted that the Plebiscite Administrator should be appointed as soon as conditions in the state permitted of a start being made with the arrangements for carrying out a plebiscite. The Pakistan Government had attached much importance to the appointment of the Plebiscite Administrator to office "as much in advance of the final day of demilitarization as possible."

Dr. Graham pointed out that agreement had been obtained on 4 more of his 12 demilitarization proposals of September 7, 1951, and suggested some revisions of the 4 remaining points, i. e., proposals 5, 6, 7, and 10. Of these the most significant was his revision of proposal 7 on troop numbers; he suggested that ". . . there will remain on each side of the cease-fire line the lowest possible number of armed forces based in proportion on the number of armed forces existing on each side of the cease-fire line on January 1, 1949."

The Security Council resumed its hearings on January 17, 1952. On that date Dr. Graham formally submitted his report and after discussing his negotiations made a strong plea to India and Pakistan to arrive at a settlement of this long standing dispute. He stated his view that agreement on proposals 7 and 10 (troop numbers and date of appointment of the Plebiscite Administrator) would be the linchpin binding all 12 proposals together in an effectively integrated program and would prepare the way for the plebiscite. "The plebiscite," Dr. Graham stated, "would keep the promise made to the people of Jammu and Kashmir, who are worthy of the right of their own self-determination through a free, secure, and impartial plebiscite." (U.N. doc. S/PV 570.) He remarked further:

The people of Jammu and Kashmir through a free and impartial plebiscite would signal through the darkness of these times a ray of hope that not by bullets but by ballots, not through the conflict of armies but through cooperation of peoples, is the enduring way for people to determine their own destiny and way of life On the subcontinent of India and Pakistan today, the place, the time, the opportunity and the leadership have met in one of the great junctures of human history, for the possible weal or woe of the peoples of the world.

Immediately following the introductory statement by Dr. Graham, Jacob Malik, the U.S.S.R. representative, indicated he would like to speak briefly. His statement came after the Soviet Union had maintained a virtual silence for 4 years in the Security Council on the Kashmir question.

After noting that the United States and the United Kingdom had been particularly active in the Council's consideration of the Kashmir issue, Mr. Malik stated:

What is the reason why the Kashmir question is still unsettled and why the plans put forward by the United States of America and the United Kingdom in connection with Kashmir have proved fruitless from the point of view of a settlement of the Kashmir question? It is not difficult to understand that the explanation of this is chiefly and above all that these plans in connection with Kashmir are of an annexationist, imperialist nature, because they are not based on the effort to achieve a real settlement. The purpose of these plans is interference by the United States of America and the United Kingdom in the internal affairs of Kashmir, the prolongation of the dispute between India and Pakistan on the question of Kashmir and the conversion of Kashmir into a protectorate of the United States of America and the United Kingdom under the pretext of rendering it "assistance through the United Nations." Finally, the purpose of these plans in connection with Kashmir is to secure the introduction of Anglo-American troops into the territory of Kashmir and convert Kashmir into an Anglo-American colony and a military and strategic base. . . .

The United States of America and the United Kingdom are taking all steps to exclude a settlement of the question of the status of Kashmir by means of a free and unconstrained declaration by the people of Kashmir themselves. When in October 1950 it became known that the General Council of the "All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference" had adopted a resolution recommending the convening of a Constituent Assembly for the purpose of determining the future shape and affiliations of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the United States of America and the United Kingdom immediately interferred in the matter so as not to allow the people of Kashmir to decide their own future and determine the affiliations of their country independently. They hastened to foist upon the Security Council a resolution in which it was stated that the convening of a Constituent Assembly in Kashmir and any action that Assembly might attempt to take to determine the future shape and affiliation of Kashmir or any part thereof would not constitute a disposition of Kashmir. . . .

The U. S. S. R. representative concluded by proposing the following solution:

The U.S.S.R. Government considers that the Kashmir question can be resolved successfully only by giving the people of Kashmir an opportunity to decide the question of Kashmir's constitutional status by themselves, without outside interference. This can be achieved if that status is determined by a Constituent Assembly democratically elected by the Kashmir people. . . .

Both the U.S. and U.K. representatives challenged the Soviet charges. Sir Gladwyn Jebb, the U.K. representative, stated:

I should merely like to say that the really extraordinary fantasies apparently entertained by our Soviet friend and colleague in regard to the Kashmir dispute are typical, as I think, of the whole Soviet approach to international problems. Whatever the dispute before us, the first thing to do is, it seems, to discover how and why it is part of an anti-Soviet plot designed merely to advance the cause of the ruling circles of the United States and of the United Kingdom with the object of clamping down an Anglo-American domination or dictatorship on a suffering world. Any attempt by the Security Council to deal with the dispute by applying principles of reason must, unless, of course, it is concurred in by the Soviet Government, be viewed in the

light of those general principles; and it is by such a process of reasoning, if it can indeed be so termed, that the Soviet Government comes to the conclusion that, for instance, the Kashmir dispute has been invented and subsequently carefully fostered by the diabolical Anglo-Americans for the one end of turning Kashmir into an Anglo-American armed camp full of imperialistic troops destined for an eventual invasion of the Soviet Union.

No doubt there are people who can be persuaded to believe this, just as there are people who could believe that, for instance, a United Nations mission to Antarctica to study the habit of penguins could only be an indirect slander on totalitarianism or on a Marxist society. It is possible to believe that; and people, indeed, can always be found who will believe anything. But when it comes to accusing our friend, Mr. Graham, of being the secret agent of the Pentagon—well, that should, I think, cause even the most ingenuous to sit up and think and think. . . .

Surely the Kashmir dispute is capable of being considered with some degree of objectivity, and surely the dictates of reason, if they are firmly and consistently fostered by this Council, will, one day, succeed in enabling the two great nations involved to agree on a settlement which will be satisfactory to both and which will, or which may, relieve even the Soviet Union of the nightmares which now seem to surround its contemplation of this long-standing dispute. . . .

The U.S. representative, Ambassador Ernest A. Gross, associated himself with the remarks of the U.K. representative and further observed:

The attacks on Mr. Graham do not merit a reply and do not require a denial. The dispute between India and Pakistan regarding Kashmir is one which my government earnestly hopes to see settled in accordance with United Nations principles and in accordance with agreements already reached between the parties. I think it would serve no useful purpose to continue the debate at this time. The business before the Security Council, as the representative of the United Kingdom has already said, is to give the most careful and respectful consideration to the report which has just been given to us by the representative of the Council. My Government will give it the attention which it deserves.

At the meeting of the Security Council on January 30 Sir Zafrullah Khan, Pakistan's Foreign Minister, spoke in part as follows:

At the meeting of the Security Council held on January 17, 1952, a representative of the U.S.S.R. referred to certain press reports relating to the granting of military bases in Kashmir to the United States. I wish to state clearly and with authority that these reports relied upon by him for his statement are utterly false and without any foundation whatsoever. We have neither been asked for, nor have we offered, any military or other bases to the U.S. or any other power. . . .

Throughout this controversy, India, Pakistan, and the Security Council have been agreed that the question of the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan or India should be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite. This fundamental principle is embodied in the preamble to the Security Council Resolution of April 21, 1948, and in clause I of the Commission's Resolution of January 5, 1949. (U.N. doc. S/PV 571.)

Sir Gladwyn then stated his Government's view that Dr. Graham should pay a further visit to the subcontinent to attempt to bring about a solution of the two outstanding points of difference. Am-

bassador Gross supported this suggestion, as did the majority of the Security Council members.

The following day, the Indian representative, Mr. Motilal Setalvad, expressed India's willingness to continue the discussions under Dr. Graham's direction and stated:

I have already declared that India is anxious to settle the Kashmir dispute quickly and peacefully. This is so not only because India is anxious that the people of Jammu and Kashmir should have an opportunity, without further delay, to determine freely their own future, but also because we most earnestly desire to prepare the way for firm and lasting friendship with our neighbor, Pakistan. It is no less to our interest than to the interest of Pakistan, and to the interest of the world, that these two countries which have so much in common should live side by side in complete amity, each fully sovereign but both fully and wholeheartedly in cooperation in the pursuit of the common task of peace and progress. This is no language of convention but the free expression of a deep and sincere sentiment. It seems to be the sense of the Council that the negotiations should be continued under the auspices of the U.N. representative to find a settlement of the differences that still divide India and Pakistan over certain parts of Mr. Graham's plan. India has no objection to this course and would cooperate in finding a settlement in the spirit that I have just described. (U.N. doc. S/PV 572.)

The President of the Security Council, Jean Chauvel, speaking as the representative of France, stated that "it was the sense" of the Security Council that the U.N. representative, acting under the resolutions of March 30, 1951, and November 10, 1951, was authorized without any new decision by the Council to continue his efforts to fulfill his mission and submit his report, which the Council hoped would be final within 2 months. The Soviet representative objected to this decision and indicated that "if such a proposal or conclusion is submitted to a vote the delegation of the Soviet Union will abstain."

Third Report, December 1951–April 1952

Following this Security Council debate and some discussions in Paris with the parties, Dr. Graham departed for New Delhi, where he arrived on February 29 and remained until March 25. His third report was submitted to the Security Council on April 22, 1951.⁸

At New Delhi Dr. Graham continued his previous procedure of separate negotiations with the parties, having concluded that a meeting with representatives of the two Governments was inadvisable before sufficient preliminary agreement had been reached to insure positive results from a joint conference. This round of negotiations had two purposes: To assist the parties in removing the obstacles still blocking agreement on the proposals submitted to them and to obtain, if possible, further withdrawals of troops from the state of Jammu and Kashmir on both sides of the cease-fire line.

⁸ U.N. doc. S/2611; for excerpts, see *ibid.*, May 5, 1952, p. 712.

He reported that the Government of India maintained its position concerning the minimum number of forces to be left on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization, i. e., 21,000 regular Indian army forces plus 6,000 state militia, on the Indian side and, on the Pakistan side, a force of 4,000 men normally resident in Azad Kashmir territory, half of whom should be followers of Azad Kashmir. The Indian Government, Dr. Graham stated, considered that the questions of a definite period for demilitarization and of a date for the induction into office of the Plebiscite Administrator could be settled without difficulty, provided agreement was reached on the scope of demilitarization and the number of forces to remain at the end of the demilitarization period.

Pakistan, Dr. Graham stated, accepted the four remaining points of his 12-point demilitarization proposals, i. e., 5, 6, 7, and 10, with certain qualifications regarding the character of the forces to be demilitarized. In his view the demilitarization of the state had reached a stage at which further reductions of troops were directly related to the preparation of a plebiscite. Accordingly, he deemed it necessary that the Plebiscite Administrator-designate should be associated with him in his studies and the consideration of common problems. Dr. Graham recommended that both parties should undertake to reduce the forces under their control in the state and that the U.N. representative's negotiations with the two Governments should be continued with a view to

(a) resolving the remaining difficulties on the 12 proposals submitted to the parties, with special reference to the number of forces to be left on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization, and

(b) the general implementation of the UNCIP resolutions of August 13, 1948, and January 5, 1949.

Fourth Report, May-September 1952

Dr. Graham, in a letter dated May 29, 1952, informed the President of the Security Council that, in agreement with the Governments of India and Pakistan, the negotiations on the question of the state of Jammu and Kashmir had been renewed and that at the appropriate moment he would report to the Council on the outcome of that phase of negotiations.

His fourth report, submitted on September 16, detailed the recent round of negotiations held at New York and Geneva. He had first attempted to bridge the remaining differences between the parties by proposing bracketed figures of 3,000 to 6,000 armed forces on Pakistan's side and 12,000 to 18,000 on the Indian side to break the deadlock on the number of troops. As he was unable to obtain agreement on this suggestion, he submitted another

draft proposal on September 2 which fixed the figures at 6,000 and 18,000 excluding Gilgit and Northern Scouts on the Pakistan side and the state militia on the Indian side. Pakistan accepted this proposal, with certain reservations; India did not.

Concluding that he could not obtain agreement on fixed figures, Dr. Graham decided it might be possible for the two Governments to agree on certain principles which could serve as criteria for fixing the number of forces in a conference of civil and military representatives of both sides. Instead of including a fixed troop quantum, his new proposal, presented on September 4, provided that the minimum number of forces to be maintained on each side of the cease-fire line be defined as those "required for the maintenance of law and order and of the cease-fire agreement with due regard to the freedom of the plebiscite." In the case of India, the proposal added the phrase "with due regard to the security of the state" and expanded the term "forces" to include "Indian forces and state armed forces."

Dr. Graham reported the following reaction of the parties to this proposal: India, although it believed that the proposal contained "the germs of a settlement," indicated it could not accept any equation of its responsibilities with those of the local authorities on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line and insisted that the defense of the entire state is the concern of India. Pakistan objected to certain clauses in the proposals which it suggested should be eliminated to avoid the recurrence of political controversies.

Dr. Graham stated that it was evident after 2 weeks of discussion at Geneva that agreement could not be reached on any of the revised drafts he presented. He attributed the differences in the positions of the parties to their differing concepts of their status in the state and stressed the importance of the induction into office of the Plebiscite Administrator, a matter which he termed "the heart of the integrated program for demilitarization and a plebiscite." He concluded by expressing the view that to reach an agreement on a plan of demilitarization it is necessary either:

(a) to establish the character and number of forces to be left on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization; or

(b) to declare that the forces to remain on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization should be determined in accordance with the requirements of each area, and, accordingly, principles or criteria should be established which would serve as guidance for the civil and military representatives of the Governments of India and Pakistan in the meeting contemplated in the Provisional Clause of the revised proposals.

• *Mr. Collins, author of the above article, is an officer in the Office of South Asian Affairs.*

Report of U. N. Command Operations in Korea

FORTY-SEVENTH REPORT: FOR THE PERIOD JUNE 1-15, 1952¹

U.N. doc. S/2774
Transmitted Sept. 15, 1952

I herewith submit report number 47 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 1-15 June 1952, inclusive. United Nations Command communiqués numbers 1282-1296 provide detailed accounts of these operations.

Plenary sessions of the Military Armistice Conferences met daily with the exception of a three-day recess from June 8th through the 10th. These meetings were again characterized by an endless repetition of Communist propaganda themes. For this reason the senior United Nations Command delegate recessed the conferences for three days with the hope that the Communists would seriously consider and accept the United Nations Command package proposal designed to attain an honourable armistice. Unfortunately the Communists returned to the conferences repeating their violent propaganda themes. In refutation of the Communist propaganda blast and to attempt to keep the discussion on germane topics, there follow fair examples of statements made by the senior United Nations Command Delegate.

From the proceedings of June 14th:

After days, weeks and months of negotiating terms for an armistice, the end of April saw only three remaining issues to be resolved—namely, the questions of rehabilitation of airfields, the composition of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and the exchange of prisoners of war. In an honest and sincere effort to effect an early cessation of hostilities, the United Nations Command made its compromise proposal of 28 April. The concessions made by our side in this final offer were of great magnitude, and we stated clearly and specifically that no substantive changes would be made thereto. The current

¹ Transmitted to the Security Council by the representative of the U.S. to the U.N. on September 15. Texts of the 30th, 31st and 32d reports appear in the BULLETIN of Feb. 18, 1952, p. 266; the 33d report, *ibid.*, Mar. 10, 1952, p. 395; the 34th report, *ibid.*, Mar. 17, 1952, p. 430; the 35th report, *ibid.*, Mar. 31, 1952, p. 512; the 36th and 37th reports, *ibid.*, Apr. 14, 1952, p. 594; the 38th report, *ibid.*, May 5, 1952, p. 715; the 39th report, *ibid.*, May 19, 1952, p. 788; the 40th report, *ibid.*, June 23, 1952, p. 998; the 41st report, *ibid.*, June 30, 1952, p. 1038; the 42d report, *ibid.*, July 21, 1952, p. 114; the 43d report, *ibid.*, Aug. 4, 1952, p. 194; the 44th report, *ibid.*, Aug. 11, 1952, p. 231; the 45th report, *ibid.*, Aug. 18, 1952, p. 272; and the 46th report, *ibid.*, Sept. 29, 1952, p. 495.

deadlock in the armistice talks has been brought about by your inhuman and truculent demands on the prisoners of war issue.

During the sessions in this tent, our side has patiently and carefully explained its fair and humane position on the exchange of prisoners. We have pointed out repeatedly that it was with your acquiescence that our side screened the prisoners of war in its custody in order to determine the number who would not forcibly resist repatriation to your side. The result of this screening, which neither side could predetermine, was obviously a disappointment to you. Consequently, by using false allegations and distortions you have fruitlessly attempted to discredit the fairness of the screening procedures.

As further evidence of our sincere desire for peace, we have offered to permit a rescreening of prisoners of war by an international, neutral body in the demilitarized zone and witnessed by representatives of your side. Your acceptance and adherence to the results of this proposal would make possible the final settlement of these negotiations. The future welfare and happiness of thousands of soldiers and their families on both sides will be directly affected by your decision. You are charged with full responsibility for the delay in these negotiations. You cannot escape or evade this responsibility.

Our final compromise proposal is as firm and unalterable now as it was on 28 April. We will never agree to any substantive change, but at any time our side will gladly explain and clarify any provisions of this offer. If your side is ready to accept our proposal, we can proceed with the final arrangements for the signing of the Armistice; otherwise I suggest that we recess.

From the proceedings of June 7th:

The record of the staff officer meetings showing when and how the decision to screen the Prisoners of War was taken has been cited in these meetings. That record establishes clearly the full acquiescence of your side in that step. Thus the screening was undertaken in good faith and the procedure employed was scrupulously fair. Whatever the results they would have been accepted by the United Nations Command. But not so with your side. Because the results were found to be less favorable than you might have hoped, you have attempted to deny your participation in the decision to effect the screening of the prisoners of war. It is a futile effort. Prisoners were screened with your acquiescence. Once screened they had to be segregated according to their determination.

You are now attempting to compel our side to abandon these persons who with your acquiescence manifested their strong opposition to return to your side. You are seeking to compel the United Nations Command to place the lives of these persons in jeopardy by insisting that they be delivered to you by force and violence. You are motivated not by consideration of the welfare of these per-

sons but by a desire to punish those who prefer death to return to your control. The United Nations Command will never force them to return to your control. If your refusal to recognize this results in delay in the attainment of an armistice the responsibility for such delay is yours.

On the other hand the United Nations Command does not seek to retain any prisoners of war. In order that your side may be assured that all prisoners except those who violently oppose repatriation will in fact be repatriated, our side has proposed an impartial rescreening at the prisoner of war exchange points. Your refusal to accept this completely reasonable offer shows only that you fear to confirm what the world already knows, that thousands of your personnel absolutely will not return to your control. While the United Nations Command does not seek to detain any prisoners of war it will not participate in the forced delivery of those persons who strongly refuse to be repatriated to your side.

Since we have been meeting here almost daily since the 2nd of May your side must by now be fully aware that there is no possibility that this stand of the United Nations Command will be altered. What purpose you seek to achieve by the daily reiteration of the arguments you have used since early December to oppose the United Nations Command stand of no forced repatriation is not known to our side. However, we can assure you that the continued repetition of these well known arguments will not serve to alter our position in any respect.

The bold and unscrupulous attempt of Communist Prisoner of War leaders to embarrass the United Nations Command by their capture of General Dodd served as a clear indication of the extreme limits to which they would go if given the opportunity. The rebellious and arrogant hard-core Communists had created a situation in which it was impossible for the United Nations Command properly to discharge its duties toward the prisoners of war in its custody without using forceful measures. Accordingly, the Commanding General, Eighth Army, was directed to take necessary steps to insure the attainment of uncontested control of all prisoners of war at Koje-do.

Careful and detailed plans were made to reduce the density of the Prisoner of War population at Koje-do by spreading Prisoners of War into smaller, more separated compounds. On 10 June this operation started in Compound seventy-six, one of the most violent of the Communist installations. Beginning at 0545, and continuing until United Nations Command troops entered the compound at 0615, messages were broadcast over a public address system to all prisoners advising them of the plan to move them to new areas and emphasizing that they would not be harmed if they cooperated. When it became apparent that the inmates were not going to obey the order to form into groups preparatory to movement, but instead were openly arming themselves with sharpened spears and improvised knives, troops moved in with a show of force to begin segregation.

Using tear gas, United Nations Command forces advanced to a position midway in the compound. Most of the prisoners were evacuated without difficulty, but in one corner of the compound more than 1,500 had gathered in a group. Efforts to move them were met with stubborn and fanatical resistance. By the use of tear gas and concussion grenades alone, the mob was finally brought under control. No shots were fired. Throughout the entire operation, the discipline and self-control exercised by United Nations Command troops were outstanding. Several of the Prisoner of War ringleaders who had instigated

previous riots were apprehended and segregated. By 0845 the compound was cleared. Total casualties included one U.S. enlisted man killed and fourteen others wounded; thirty-one Prisoners of War were killed and 139 wounded. It is significant to note that in the heat of the action some prisoners were seen attacking fellow prisoners.

The Commanding General, United Nations Prisoner of War Camp Number One, in a personal report to higher headquarters, stressed that he himself had given both written and oral orders to Colonel Lee Hak Koo, North Korean Communist Prisoner of War leader, to form his people in groups of 150. This order was ignored. After the compound was subdued, Lee and other leaders were segregated. A complete plan was found for Prisoner of War resistance which had been followed during the operation. Following the fall of Compound seventy-six, the remainder of the strong pro-Communist compounds were segregated and moved without resistance.

As an indication of the ruthlessness and premeditated violence which had been planned, a survey of Compound seventy-six, which held about 6,000 prisoners, revealed the following:

Prisoners were armed with about 3,000 spears, 1,000 gasoline grenades, 4,500 knives and an undetermined number of clubs, hatchets, hammers and barbed wire traps. These weapons had been covertly fashioned from scrap materials and metal-tipped tent poles over a long period of time in preparation for armed resistance.

One tunnel was under construction from Compound seventy-six to seventy-seven.

Entrenchments around each hut were connected from one building to another.

In Compound seventy-seven the bodies of sixteen murdered prisoners were found. This was the compound in which, the day prior to movement, the compound leader had assured the Camp Commander that he would insure cooperation.

As a further measure to insure adequate control, plans were being formulated for the construction of additional camps away from Koje-do to house Communist prisoners who have already been segregated for return to Communist control at such time as an exchange takes place.

Enemy action along the 140 mile battle line consisted generally of small scale attacks launched for the purpose of eliminating United Nations Command outposts or gaining intelligence. These probing efforts were unsuccessful and generally of minor significance. Toward the end of the period these attacks increased in frequency on the western front where on one occasion a battalion strength attack against United Nations Command outpost positions was repulsed only after bitter hand-to-hand fighting. This increased enemy aggressiveness was attributable to earlier United Nations Command local attacks which had wrested several forward positions from stubbornly defending enemy units. Indicative of the enemy's steadily increasing combat capabilities was the employment of over 5,000 rounds of artillery fire against elements of a United Nations Command division on the western front during a twenty-four-hour period. The enemy recently concluded the relief of two frontline Chinese Communist armies on the western front. On the central front prisoners indicate the relief of an additional Chinese Communist army.

These reliefs appear to be in conformity with the enemy's policy of rotating his units on line. Except for these reliefs hostile troop dispositions and front lines remained unchanged. In South Korea, the vigorous pursuit and elimination of dissident elements continued. As a result, the estimated strength of dissident elements has declined steadily. The present strength of these elements, 2,400, is now lower than at any time since the North Korean invasion.

The western front was the scene of the most frequent enemy contact for the period. The majority of the clashes occurred in the Mabang and Sangnyong areas where, beginning on 7 June, United Nations Command elements seized four hill masses from stubbornly defending enemy units. The enemy reacted swiftly to his losses. For several successive days, usually during the hours of darkness, the enemy launched attacks up to company size in an unsuccessful effort to retake the lost positions. The largest enemy effort was made on 11 June when hostile units, totaling a battalion, launched a three-pronged attack in the Sangnyong area. These attacks were all repulsed despite the unusually liberal quantities of artillery and mortar fire expended to support these hostile attacks.

Enemy action along the central and eastern fronts consisted of scattered probing efforts and determined counteraction to United Nations Command patrols and raiding elements. On 12 June United Nations Command elements, in a local attack, seized a position in the Kumsong area against determined enemy opposition. During the two following nights the enemy launched repeated attacks, in rapid succession, in a costly and futile attempt to regain the positions. The Yuusil area on the eastern front was the only other site of any appreciable enemy aggressiveness. In this area the enemy launched attacks of company and battalion strength on 10 and 12 June respectively. Both of these attacks terminated with the withdrawal of the hostile units.

Prisoner of war statements, hostile vehicle movement, and the steadily improving combat effectiveness demonstrated by forward enemy units make it unmistakably clear that the enemy is prepared for a continuation of hostilities. The enemy, however, has shown no definite inclination to exercise his capability for launching a major offensive. Prisoners of war still make vague references to a future hostile offensive. But as yet, there is no evidence as to when the enemy may initiate such an operation.

United Nations Command fast carriers, operating in the Sea of Japan, launched attacks against North Korean transportation facilities and supply routes. The attacks, flown by jet and propeller driven aircraft, were concentrated on enemy rail lines along the Korean east coast where numerous cuts were made. In addition, the enemy suffered destruction and damage to installations and material including railway bridges, locomotives, rail cars, military buildings, trucks, guns, highway bridges, and sampans.

United Nations Command carriers operating in the Yellow Sea furnished cover and air spot for the surface units on blockade patrols and anti-invasion stations. They also flew reconnaissance missions and offensive strikes as far north as Hanchon and into the Chinnampo area,

the Hwanghae Province and in close support of the front line troops. The bulk of the damage inflicted was on military structures. Additional destruction and damage included numerous supplies, bridges, gun positions, warehouses, boats, oxcarts and pack animals.

United Nations Command naval aircraft based ashore in Korea flew in support of friendly front line units. These missions resulted in the destruction of numerous bunkers, mortar and gun positions, personnel and supply shelters, and trucks and rails were cut in many places. One enemy fighter, of the conventional type, was shot down.

Patrol planes based in Japan conducted daylight reconnaissance missions over the Sea of Japan, the Yellow Sea and the Tsushima Straits. They also flew day and night anti-submarine patrols and weather reconnaissance missions for surface units in the Japan and Yellow Seas.

The naval blockade along the Korean east coast continued from the bomblines to Chongjin with surface units making day and night coastal patrols firing on key rail targets along the coastal main supply route daily. The siege by surface vessels continued at the major ports of Wonsan, Hungnam, and Songjin, subjecting the enemy forces at these ports to day and night fire.

Destruction along the east coast at Wonsan and to the north, as reported by spotting aircraft, shore fire control parties, and the firing vessels themselves, included enemy casualties, rail cars, military structures, boats, and many guns, bunkers and warehouses. Damage was extensive and rails were cut in many places.

Fire support vessels at the bomblines provided gunfire on call for the front line troops. Destruction included bunkers, military structures, gun and mortar positions, and troop and supply shelters.

On the night of 2 June, a United Nations Command armed patrol boat encountered two enemy armed picket sampans at Hon Wan Roads. The enemy crews used false surrender tactics, and as the sampans were being made fast for towing, a concealed man tossed a grenade into the friendly boat. Friendly casualties were one killed and two wounded. Of the ten enemy there were no survivors.

Enemy shore batteries were active almost daily against the blockading vessels and minesweepers all along the coast. In many instances friendly units were straddled but there were no hits or casualties reported. In each instance the battery was taken under counter fire with several guns destroyed and damaged. Minesweepers operating close inshore received machine gun and small arms fire. There were no reports of damage or casualties.

On the Korean west coast, the United Nations surface units manned blockade and anti-invasion stations along the coast from Chinnampo to the Han River Estuary, in support of the friendly islands north of the battle line. Daylight firing into enemy positions started many fires and secondary explosions, inflicted enemy casualties and destroyed numerous military shelters. Patrols into the Yalu gulf netted several sail junks destroyed and prisoners taken.

On the night of 11 June, enemy forces attacked the friendly island of Yongmae-do in the Haeju approaches, after subjecting it to artillery and mortar fire the night of 10 June. The attackers, coming across the mud flats

at low tide, were repulsed with the help of United Nations Command vessels which illuminated and fired on the attacking troops and fired on their mainland bases. A United Nations Command air force strike was called and planes were credited with many enemy casualties.

Vessels of the Republic of Korea Navy conducted close inshore patrols and blockade along both coasts and assisted United Nations Command naval forces in mine-sweeping duties.

United Nations Command minesweepers continued operations to keep the channels, gunfire support areas, and anchorages free of mines of all types. Sweepers also enlarged areas and swept close inshore as needed by the operating forces.

United Nations Command naval auxiliary vessels, Military Sea Transportation Service, and merchant vessels under contract continued to provide personnel lifts and logistic support for the United Nations Command naval, air and ground forces in Japan and Korea.

The pattern of air activity remained relatively unchanged during the period with United Nations Command air force fighter interceptors holding the upper hand in North Korea, fighter bombers continuing large scale rail cutting missions and close support sorties, light bombers making night armed reconnaissance of the enemy's main supply routes and medium bombers hitting key rail bridges. Combat cargo units performed their regular transport mission.

The fighter interceptors engaged enemy jets on five days, destroying thirteen of the Communist aircraft and damaging four others before they were able to return to their bases across the Yalu River. No United Nations Command aircraft were lost in the engagements. United Nations Command fighter interceptors are continuing to destroy Communist jets at a ratio of more than eight to one. The MIGs appeared in formations of two to ten aircraft and friendly pilots continued to observe a decrease in the number of enemy sorties. The MIG pilots again showed aggressiveness when attacking the fighter bombers, but generally broke off the fight when fighter interceptors entered the engagement. The enemy attacks were, for the most part, timed to catch the fighter bombers as they completed their bomb runs. During the early part of the period they showed some aggressiveness against the fighter interceptors. There was some indication that the MIGs were being directed by radar stations since some of their attacks were made out of the overcast.

The United Nations Command fighter bombers flew an increasing number of sorties in support of the United Nations Command ground forces. The attacks by these aircraft destroyed numerous gun positions and bunkers and inflicted heavy casualties on enemy troops.

The fighter bomber aircraft hit rail lines within a few miles of the Manchurian border with hundreds of aircraft attacking a short section of the track. The pilots' claims of numerous separate rail cuts were confirmed by photographs which showed damage which would require major repairs or the construction of by-passes.

Light bomber aircraft continued their night combat patrols over the main supply routes in North Korea to destroy truck convoys and trains and to harass repair crews

working on rail lines where fighter bombers had attacked. A new attack program was launched which concentrates the light bomber effort on only three or four main routes each night. The program is flexible and permits immediate diversion of aircraft to any routes where heavy traffic is reported.

The medium bombers were again scheduled primarily against key rail bridges on the line from Sinuiju to Sinanju and the route from Kanggye to Kunuri. Bridges on these routes were hit repeatedly, with excellent results reported. Enemy night fighters were sighted on several occasions and on the night of 10/11 June made concentrated attacks on the medium bombers but were unable to prevent them from knocking out the Kwaksan bridge.

The regular close support effort by the medium bombers each night was continued and one medium bomber was scheduled nightly to drop leaflets over North Korean cities.

United Nations Command transport aircraft were used on air evacuation missions and regular cargo runs transporting supplies and special equipment to United Nations Command naval, air and ground units in Korea. Joint air transportability exercises were conducted in Japan.

United Nations Command reconnaissance units continued to conduct visual and photographic reconnaissance along the enemy's main line of resistance, rear area troop and supply locations, main supply routes, airfields, and communication centers, obtaining Bomb Damage Assessment and Surveillance photography of these targets.

United Nations Command leaflets, radio broadcasts, and loudspeaker broadcasts continued to report the determined opposition of thousands of Chinese and North Korean prisoners to Communist demands that they be forcibly repatriated to face slavery or death at the hands of their former masters. Accounts by these prisoners, together with information contained in the Communists' own broadcasts, have been used to expose the conditions in Communist territory which have caused these prisoners to resist repatriation at all costs. On the basis of these reports, United Nations Command media have described the corruption, negligence, and incompetence of the Communist puppet regimes in China and North Korea, and the oppressive tyranny which they have imposed upon the people in the guise of fallacious reforms.

U.S. Proposals for Elimination of Bacterial Weapons

U.N. doc. DC/15
Dated Sept. 4, 1952

United States of America: working paper setting forth a summary of proposals, made by the United States representative in the Disarmament Commission on 15 August 1952, for elimination of bacterial weapons in connexion with elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction

1. A comprehensive programme for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all

armed forces and armaments should provide for the elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction, including bacterial, and for the effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only.

2. Bearing in mind that all Members of the United Nations have agreed to refrain not only from the use of germ warfare but from the use of force of any kind contrary to the law of the Charter, the programme envisaged in paragraph 1 must be approached from the point of view of preventing war and not from the point of view of regulating the armaments used in war or of codifying the laws of war. The programme as a whole should ensure that armed forces and armaments are reduced to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that:

(a) No State will be in a position of armed preparedness to start a war;

(b) No State shall be in a position to undertake preparations for war without other states having knowledge of such preparations long before the offending State could start a war.

3. Safeguards must be devised to ensure the elimination of bacterial weapons and facilities and appliances for their production and use along with the elimination of all armed forces and armaments not expressly permitted to States to maintain public order and to meet their Charter responsibilities. The principal safeguards to ensure the elimination of bacterial weapons are to be found in an effective and continuous system of disclosure and verification of all armed forces and armaments such as that suggested in the working paper submitted by the representative of the United States on 5 April 1952, entitled "Proposals for progressive and continuing disclosure and verification of armed forces and armaments" (DC/C.2/1). It is proposed that at appropriate stages in an effective system of disclosure and verification agreed measures should become effective providing for the progressive curtailment of production, the progressive dismantling of plants, and the progressive destruction of stockpiles of bacterial weapons and related appliances. Under this programme, with co-operation in good faith by the principal States concerned, all bacterial weapons and all facilities and appliances connected therewith should be completely eliminated from national armaments and their use prohibited.

International Bank Activities

Economic Mission to Japan

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development is sending an economic mission to Japan in response to a request from the Japanese Government, it was announced on October 20. The mission is expected to arrive in Tokyo on October

21 and will remain in Japan for approximately 2 months.

The mission consists of John C. de Wilde, economic adviser to the Bank's Department of Operations for Asia and the Middle East, who will head the mission, and William M. Gilmartin of the same Department. Japan is one of the Bank's newest member countries and this will be the first visit of Bank officials.

The mission will not consider or discuss any specific projects which may be submitted for financing by the Bank. As a normal preliminary to any subsequent consideration of lending operations, the mission will make a general appraisal of the Japanese economy. It will collect pertinent economic and financial information bearing on Japan's economic prospects and her capacity to service present and additional indebtedness. The mission will survey industrial and agricultural production and study the principal economic and financial problems which will affect the future reconstruction and development of Japan.

Report on Mexican Economy

A report entitled *The Major Long-Term Trends in the Mexican Economy*, prepared by a group of economists from the Mexican Government and the International Bank, is to be published within the next few months in Spanish by the Mexican Government and in English by the International Bank, it was announced on October 17.

This study stems from a proposal made in February 1951 by the Nacional Financiera, an official financing agency of the Mexican Government, that the Mexican Government and the International Bank set up a combined working party to assess the major long-term trends in the Mexican economy with particular reference to Mexico's capacity to absorb additional foreign investments. The Combined Mexican Working Party held its first meeting in April 1951, and work on the project continued for more than a year.

The report reviews the course and effects of investment in Mexico from 1939 to 1950 and makes an assessment of the prospects for changes in the national income and the balance of payments over the next 10 years. The data contained in the report and the conclusions drawn are the responsibility of the members of the Working Party as technical experts and are in no way binding on the Mexican Government and the Bank.

The study covers every segment of the Mexican economy including agriculture, mining, petroleum, electric power, industry, and transportation and communications, as well as education, public health and welfare, and public finance. Much of the data on public finance, external debt, the balance of payments, and the estimates of national income, gross national product, consumption, and public and private investment is new and appears for the first time in this report.

The United States in the United Nations

General Assembly

Additional Agenda Items—At its plenary meeting on October 21, the General Assembly decided, on the recommendation of the General (Steering) Committee, to include the following additional items in the agenda of its seventh session:

72. Measures to avert the threat of a new world war and measures to strengthen peace and friendship among the nations.
73. Question of impartial investigation of charges of use by United Nations Forces of bacteriological warfare.

The latter item was requested by the United States. The Soviet Union in June had vetoed a Security Council resolution for impartial investigation of germ warfare charges. As was the case during the Security Council discussions, the Soviet representative now proposed simultaneous adoption of a resolution inviting representatives of the Chinese Communists and the North Koreans to participate in the General Assembly's consideration of the item. Selwyn Lloyd (U.K.) spoke in opposition to the Soviet proposal; Ernest A. Gross (U.S.) then declared:

... It is our position, as the representative of the United Kingdom has brought out, that the question of inviting the Chinese Communists or the North Koreans to participate in the consideration of this question is a problem which cannot and should not logically be raised and decided in this body, in the General Assembly. It is a question which should be left for consideration and decision in the First Committee when this item is reached for debate in that Committee. ... I cannot conclude without pointing out that the essence of the charge against the United Nations forces in Korea, the repetition of the charges, has centered in Moscow, has been deliberately planned, staged, and developed from that source, and the question which will be before the First Committee is: Who is the instigator of this false charge; whose is the responsibility for the constant attempt to poison the atmosphere, to divide, to confuse the free world and to discredit the United Nations action in Korea?

The Soviet proposal was defeated by a vote of 46-5 (Soviet bloc)-7. The Members abstaining were Argentina, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Yemen, and Burma.

On the United States request the vote was 53-5 (Soviet bloc).

The Polish request to include item 72 to the agenda was approved unanimously. The proposal

calls for an end of the Korean war, an exchange of all prisoners, withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea, the reduction by one-third of the armed forces of the great powers, unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons, condemnation of NATO, a five-power peace pact, and ratification of the Geneva Protocol, *inter alia*. The U.S. delegation did not oppose placing the proposal on the agenda, since, as Ambassador Gross pointed out, "... we feel that the best way to expose a fraud is to bring it out into the market place of ideas, and men who are free to think for themselves will soon enough see the truth." He declared that:

The resolution ... is a scrap heap of discarded ideas. ... Each subject it refers to is more appropriately discussed under some other item on our agenda. The resolution is as unnecessary and stale as it is unproductive.

Committee I (Political and Security)—On October 23 the Committee voted unanimously to place the Korean item first on its agenda. It also voted (34-20-6) to give second and third places respectively to the questions of Tunisia and Morocco.

The opening debate on the Korean question on October 23 was marked by a lengthy discussion as to whether the North Korean government should be invited to participate. A Soviet resolution in favor of such an invitation was rejected by a vote of 38-11-8 (U.S.S.R., Soviet bloc, Burma, India, Indonesia, Iran, Pakistan, Yemen). The Committee decided (54-5-1) to invite the Republic of Korea to send a representative.

In a major statement on October 24 (the text of which will be printed in the issues of November 3 and November 10) Secretary Acheson traced the Korean question from the Cairo Conference in December 1943 through the recent breakdown in armistice negotiations and presented a 21-power draft resolution calling on the Chinese Communists and North Koreans to agree to an armistice based on voluntary repatriation of prisoners of war. Following is a summary of his statement:

At Cairo in 1943, the Secretary pointed out, representatives of China, the United States, and the United Kingdom pledged that, in due course, Korea should become free and independent. At Potsdam on July 26, 1945, the same three powers repeated that pledge. The Soviet Union, upon its entry into the war against Japan, adhered to

the Potsdam Declaration; it stated on August 8, 1945:

Loyal to its Allied duty, the Soviet Government has accepted the proposal of the Allies and has joined in the Declaration of the Allied Powers of 26 July.

At Moscow on December 27, 1945, the Foreign Ministers of the U.S., the U.K., and the U.S.S.R. agreed that a provisional government should be set up for all Korea with a view to the re-establishment of Korea as an independent state.

When the Japanese surrendered in September 1945, it was necessary to arrange for the acceptance of the surrender of the Japanese forces in Korea. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers ordered that the surrender of the Japanese troops should be accepted by the U.S. military forces south of the 38th parallel and by the Soviet military forces north of the 38th parallel.

The sole purpose of that Order was to divide the area in which the surrender of defeated Japanese troops should be made to one group of officers or to another.

Immediately after the surrender, the American Military Command in Korea approached the Soviet commander and asked him to develop with the American commander a joint policy for the administration of the area as a whole as a first step in the creation of a government for all Korea and the orderly transfer of power to that Government. The Soviet commander north of the 38th parallel rejected this approach.

At the Council of Foreign Ministers at Moscow in December 1945, an agreement was reached to create a joint commission of the United States and the Soviet Union, and a joint conference of the two powers.

U.S. Proposals in 1946.—The Joint Conference met in January 1946, and the U.S. proposed a series of measures to advance the economic and administrative coordination of all of Korea. They provided for uniting the key public utilities creating uniform fiscal policies. The Soviet Union rejected all these proposals.

The Joint Conference met disaster early in 1946. The Joint Commission, which met in March 1946, suffered a similar fate. After it had held 24 sessions without accomplishing anything, Secretary Marshall took the matter up directly with Foreign Minister Molotov and corresponded with him about reassembling the Joint Commission. Subsequently the Commission was reconvened on the basis that there should be the broadest possible consultation with Korean groups and that no group or individual could be excluded from consultation except by mutual agreement between the U.S.S.R. and the United States.

When the Joint Commission met, however, the U.S.S.R. representatives repudiated Mr. Molotov's agreement and went back to their original position in 1946, insisting that nobody could be

consulted unless he had agreed to the trusteeship provisions.

On August 26, 1947, Robert Lovett, the Acting Secretary of State, made another effort to carry out the Moscow Agreement and the pledge made at Cairo and Potsdam. He wrote a letter to the Governments of the U.K., China, and the U.S.S.R., proposing a Four-Power conference.

The Soviet Union rejected this proposal. Since it was clear that nothing could be hoped for from bilateral discussions with the U.S.S.R., the U.S. brought the matter to the United Nations. During its second session in 1947 the General Assembly considered resolutions put forward by the Soviet Union and by the U.S., and finally adopted a resolution providing for elections for a national assembly which was to establish a national government throughout all of Korea, for subsequent withdrawal of all occupying troops, and for the establishment of a commission to carry out the U.N.'s intentions.

The U.N. Commission was set up and went to Korea. U.S. military officers who were in command south of the 38th parallel put everything at its disposal, but it was not permitted to carry out its functions in North Korea.

Election in South Korea.—On May 10, 1948, Korea's first democratic election took place, with 75 percent of the eligible voters south of the 38th parallel voting.

A Constituent Assembly was set up; a Constitution was worked out; elections were held for the executive officers of the Government; and on August 25 the Government of the Republic of Korea was inaugurated. By September 11, 1948, the U.S. had transferred all authority to that Government.

In accordance with the will of the General Assembly, the withdrawal of U.S. troops was completed on June 29, 1949.

The U.S.S.R. withdrew its occupying forces in 1948 but continued to exercise control in North Korea through its official representatives there, through North Korean leaders who were either citizens or one-time residents of the Soviet Union, and by the tradition of subservience inculcated during the occupation.

Efforts to subvert South Korea were carried on through political and guerrilla warfare, military pressure on the border, and ceaseless propaganda. Overt political activity ended in 1947, with the suppression of the Communist Party in South Korea.

Covert activities were continued by guerrilla forces which infiltrated into the South. In the beginning these forces were made up of South Korean Communists, but soon considerable numbers of armed North Korean Communists infiltrated into South Korea and kept up constant pres-

sure on the Korean Government. Secretary Acheson explained:

There were three main purposes in this activity. One was to lay the basis for a future attempt at an internal coup. The second was to harrass the South Korean Government and not to give it an opportunity to get on with the pressing problems of organization in the country. The third was to give the impression to the outside world of mass discontent in South Korea.

Unprovoked military incidents along the border occurred almost daily, and at least four major military operations took place before that of June 25, 1950.

In the field of propaganda, efforts to subvert the Government of South Korea took the form of appeals to South Koreans to rise up against their Government and overthrow it, and of "proposals for the peaceful unification of Korea", i. e. by the Communists.

All these efforts were completely defeated in South Korea, with the result that in the late spring of 1950, the South Korean Government, the Government of the Republic of Korea, presented the strongest attitude to the world which they had ever presented. It had defeated the Communists who had infiltrated from the north and cleaned up these pockets of rebellion within its own country. It had solidified the loyalty of its own people and established the basis of its own democratic control. It had met every attempt to invade it over its border and thrown them back. It had met all this propaganda. It is quite significant that after all these efforts had been defeated, it was only a few weeks later that the attack occurred.

According to a report of the United Nations Commission on June 25, 1950, the armed forces of the Republic of Korea consisted of 100,000 men organized into eight divisions but not armed for offensive combat.

On June 24 one day before the aggression began, the U.N. Commission had received a report from field observers who had made a complete inspection of the entire Thirty-eighth Parallel. This inspection began on June 9 and ended on June 23.

During their tour the observers were given an opportunity to see everything in South Korea along the parallel. They said that they had obtained a clear picture of the deployment, on a defensive basis, of the South Korean forces. The Commission said that on the basis of this report and of its knowledge of the general military situation,

the Commission is unanimously of the opinion that no offensive could possibly have been launched across the Parallel by the Republic of Korea on 25 June 1950.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: Oct. 10-18, 1952

Releases may be obtained from the Office of the Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Press releases issued prior to Oct. 10 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 784 of Oct. 7, 792 of Oct. 9, 794 of Oct. 9, 800 of Oct. 10, and 802 of Oct. 10.

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*Not printed.

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The Problem of Peace in Korea

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY ACHESON¹

[Excerpts]

As I suggested yesterday, in considering the last two Commission reports before us [i. e. those presented to the General Assembly by the U.N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea in 1950 and 1952] it seems necessary that we should take a long and broad look at the whole Korean question, starting with the beginning of this matter and following it through to the present day.

There are many things which we are likely to lose sight of, things which should be present in our minds when we are considering the questions before us. My Government has thought it important to report very fully to the United Nations on all that we have done in your behalf—all that we have done as the United Nations Command, organized by us at your request in accordance with the resolution of July 1950.

We have had many reports; biweekly reports are filed. On October 18 a longer report was filed by the Unified Command.² Now I propose to supplement that by a very full oral report and review of the Korean question.

This will require looking at some history. It will require going back to the early days and recalling, as I shall do in more detail, the early hopes which were held by all of us for a free and unified

democratic Korea. We shall have to recall the frustration of those hopes. We shall have to recall the persistent efforts by the United Nations to bring those hopes into being. We shall have to recall the establishment of the Republic of Korea and its Government. We shall have to recall the attempts to subvert that Government. Then we shall come to the actual aggression by force upon the Republic of Korea, and we shall have to recall again the role of the United Nations, making it very clear that the role of the United Nations from the very beginning was to brand as aggression what was aggression, to unify the world so far as it could to resist aggression, and never at any moment to lose sight of the possibility that efforts other than military efforts might be able to restore peace and security in Korea.

We shall have to recall this afternoon the heroism of the few who have been fighting in support of the principles of the Charter against the many who have been fighting against the principles of the Charter. We shall have to recall the many nations which have supported this effort and those fewer nations which have borne the chief brunt of it. And we shall also have to recall, because we must, that the aggressor has friends—the aggressor has friends in the Assembly and in this Committee. And we shall have to recall the activities of those friends.

We do this not merely because this is history but because these are the facts that face us and we must face those facts.

We shall also want to examine the course of action which has been followed since the aggression began. As we examine in detail what has happened, we must not be too self-deprecating. I think we shall conclude that the United Nations has done all that is possible to try to bring about peace and that the aggressor and those who support him have done nothing to bring about peace and everything to impede it.

I shall want to set out in full before you the armistice negotiations, the issue which now remains open, and I should also like to examine the observations with respect to those issues which

¹ Made before Committee I (Political and Security) of the General Assembly on Oct. 24 and released to the press on that date by the U.S. delegation to the General Assembly. The complete text is available as Department of State publication 4771.

² This report (U.N. doc A/2228) summarizing the present status of the military action and the armistice negotiations in Korea was transmitted to the Secretary-General by Ambassador Warren R. Austin. It is not printed here since it contains material already presented in detail in the biweekly reports of the Unified Command. For texts of recent reports, see BULLETIN of Feb. 18, 1952, p. 266; Mar. 10, 1952, p. 395; Mar. 17, 1952, p. 430; Mar. 31, 1952, p. 512; Apr. 14, 1952, p. 594; May 5, 1952, p. 715; May 19, 1952, p. 788; June 23, 1952, p. 998; June 30, 1952, p. 1038; July 21, 1952, p. 114; Aug. 4, 1952, p. 194; Aug. 11, 1952, p. 231; Aug. 18, 1952, p. 272; Sept. 29, 1952, p. 495, and Oct. 27, 1952, p. 668.

were made yesterday in this Committee and last week in the plenary meetings by the Soviet Union representative.

Does the Aggressor Want an Armistice?

This is a broad outline of what I wish to lay before you this afternoon. I do so because this Committee and the Assembly must come to some conclusion as to whether the aggressor really wants an armistice. If there is an honest armistice which is wanted in accordance with the principles of the United Nations, then my Government, and I am sure most of the other Governments here, will do everything in their power to achieve it. But if that is not the case and if the resistance must go on, then we shall have to examine our positions and our ability to carry that resistance forward. If, in the words of the psalmist, "I am for peace but when I speak they are for war," we must know that and we must prepare ourselves to meet it.

There must be always present in our deliberations the thought of those who are suffering by reason of this wanton act of aggression. We must think of the homes in many countries represented here and in Korea where loved ones are missing—in some cases because they are dead and in other cases because they are absent supporting the principles of the United Nations in a distant land to many of them and with superb courage. We must think of the suffering which is being brought to Korea, to those who are supporting Korea, and also to the aggressor. It is a sad thing that a million and a half of the men of the aggressor have been killed or wounded in this vicious and illegal act. To them, it is just as sad that they are killed in that sort of act as in a good one because I suppose that they have very little volition in the matter. But we must think about our own men and our own responsibility to them. I can assure you that those who have the burden of conducting the effort and making the decisions in the Unified Command never for one moment forget that responsibility and their duty.

The Cairo Conference, December 1943

Our story begins on December 1, 1943, at Cairo. At that time, the representatives of China, the United States, and the United Kingdom pledged themselves as being determined that, in due course, Korea shall become free and independent. That pledge at Cairo was repeated by the same three powers at Potsdam on July 26, 1945. There, it was agreed that the terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out. And upon its entry into the war against Japan, the Soviet Union adhered to the Potsdam Declaration, stating on August 8, 1945—and these were the words used by the Soviet Government—

Loyal to its Allied duty, the Soviet Government has accepted the proposal of the Allies and has joined in the Declaration of the Allied Powers of 26 July.

This pledge was reaffirmed at Moscow on December 27, 1945. At that time, the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union agreed that a provisional Korean democratic government should be set up for all Korea with a view to the reestablishment of Korea as an independent state. Those were the promises. Those are the principles accepted by

Draft Resolution on Korea*

U.N. doc. A/C.1/725
Dated Oct. 24, 1952

The General Assembly,

1. HAVING RECEIVED the special report of the Unified Command of 18 October 1952 on the status of military action and the armistice negotiations in Korea,

2. NOTING with approval the efforts of the United Nations negotiators to achieve a just and honourable armistice to bring an end to the fighting in Korea in accordance with United Nations principles.

3. NOTING FURTHER that disagreement on one remaining issue has prevented the achievement of such an armistice,

4. REAFFIRMS the earnest intention of the United Nations to reach a just and honourable settlement of the Korean conflict;

5. NOTES WITH APPROVAL the tentative agreements which the United Nations Command has reached on behalf of the United Nations;

6. NOTES WITH APPROVAL the principle followed by the United Nations Command with regard to the question of repatriation of prisoners of war, and the numerous proposals which the United Nations Command has made to solve the questions in accordance with this humanitarian principle;

7. NOTES FURTHER that other suggestions consistent with the basic humanitarian position of the United Nations Command have been made by various Members of the United Nations;

8. CALLS UPON the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and upon the North Korean authorities to avert further bloodshed by having their negotiators agree to an armistice which recognizes the rights of all prisoners of war to an unrestricted opportunity to be repatriated and avoids the use of force in their repatriation;

9. REQUESTS the President of the General Assembly to transmit this resolution to the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and to the North Korean authorities, and to make a report to the General Assembly as soon as he deems appropriate during the present session on the result of his action.

*Sponsored by Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Honduras, Iceland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, and Uruguay.

the Governments of China, of the United States, of the United Kingdom, and of the Soviet Union; namely, that Korea should be united, free, and independent.

We must now go into the record of the various Governments in the fulfillment or nonfulfillment of those promises. When the Japanese surrendered in September 1945, it was necessary to ar-

range for the acceptance of the surrender of the Japanese forces in Korea. In order to effectuate that, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers issued General Order No. 1. This order provided that the surrender of the Japanese troops should be accepted by U.S. military forces south of the 38th parallel and by Soviet military forces north of the 38th parallel. There was no intention to have any provision for zones of occupation. The pledge was that Korea should be united, should be free, and should be independent. The 38th parallel had the significance only of dividing the area in which the surrender of defeated Japanese troops should be made to one group of officers or to another. That was the sole purpose of General Order No. 1.

Immediately after the surrender in the fall of 1945, and in accordance with the obligations which my Government had undertaken, as I have just stated to you, the American Military Command in Korea approached the Soviet Commander and asked him to develop with the American Commander a joint policy for the administration of the area as a whole. He stated that this was intended as a first step in the creation of a government for all Korea and the orderly transfer of power to that government. This approach was rejected by the Soviet Commander north of the 38th parallel.

Decisions at Moscow, December 1945

We then turn to a meeting of Foreign Ministers a few weeks later in Moscow in December 1945. At that time, this whole matter was taken up by Secretary of State Byrnes, and an agreement was reached to create two institutions. One was a Joint Commission of the United States and the Soviet Union; and the other was a Joint Conference of the two powers. The Joint Commission was set up to work out the long-range political and economic problems, including the establishment of a provisional democratic structure for all of Korea and the negotiation of a four-power trusteeship agreement. That was the duty of the Joint Commission—a long-range effort to create a government. At that time, it was considered that the government would be placed under trusteeship in order to deal with the basic economic problems. The Joint Conference, on the other hand, was set up to deal with immediate and pressing questions. These had to do with the administrative and economic problems then existing in Korea. It was thought that by the joint efforts of the military authorities of the United States and the Soviet Union, those pressing immediate economic and administrative questions could be solved.

The Joint Conference met in January 1946, and the United States proposed a series of measures to advance the economic and administrative coordination of all of Korea. These were very practical, possible, and important steps. They were

to unite the key public utilities, something which obviously should be done in a country which was about to be unified; and to create uniform fiscal policies, obviously very necessary to provide for the free flow of commodities back and forth throughout Korea. All of these proposals were rejected by the Soviet Union. Without going into the reasons given for each rejection, one reason is sufficient to give you an idea of what was in process of evolution in the North.

The U.S. proposal to unify the key utilities throughout Korea was rejected on the ground that to do so would impinge upon the absolute authority of the Soviet Union in the Northern zone. That is the first time that we were told clearly that there was such a thing as the absolute authority of the Soviet Union north of the 38th parallel. It had not been the idea of anybody up to that time that any one had absolute authority in Korea except the Government of the Korean people which we were pledged to set up. But here our proposals were rejected because they would interfere with the absolute authority of the Soviet Union north of the 38th parallel. As a result, the Joint Conference accomplished almost nothing. There was an agreement—limited agreement—on the exchange of mail, radio frequencies, and offices representing the two commands and some small agreement on rail, motor, and water-borne transportation. However, when we came to carry out even these limited agreements, that proved to be impossible, with the exception that for some time, a short time, there was a limited exchange of mail between the areas north and south of the 38th parallel.

Therefore, this Joint Conference which was to deal with the immediate and urgent questions met disaster in the very early days of 1946. The Joint Commission suffered a similar fate 3 months later. That met in March 1946. It held 24 sessions and accomplished exactly nothing. The whole difficulty arose over a provision of the Moscow Agreement which was that political and social groups in Korea should be consulted by the Joint Commission, so that the Korean people would have a voice in the Provisional Government which was set up. The U.S. representatives said quite clearly that there should be the broadest possible consultation with the Korean democratic parties and social organizations. But the Soviet Union said that there should be no consultation with any Korean group or party which at any time—whatever it was doing then—had voiced opposition to the trusteeship provided for in the Moscow Agreement.

Since everybody in Korea at one time or another had objected to the trusteeship agreement, except the Communists, what this meant was that the Joint Commission could not consult with any one except Communist groups and, of course, that was not acceptable to the U.S. delegation, since they completely denied the right of free expression by the people in the country as to the most important thing that was going to happen, and that was the

evolution of their own government of their own country.

In this state of affairs, after the 24 meetings and no progress of any sort, Secretary Marshall took the matter up directly with Foreign Minister Molotov and corresponded with him on the basis of reassembling the Joint Commission for the purpose of getting on with its work. The result of that was an exchange of letters and the reconvening of the Commission on the basis, so it was thought and so it was said in the letters, of the view which the U.S. representatives had taken—that is, that there should be the broadest possible consultation with Korean groups, and it was expressly provided that no group or individual could be excluded from consultation except by mutual agreement between the Soviet Union and ourselves. In other words, there was not a veto right of exclusion. The only people who could be excluded were those people who we both agreed should be excluded.

With that very hopeful charter, the Joint Commission met, and it immediately discovered that it was right back where it started from. The Soviet Union representatives on the Joint Commission wholly repudiated Mr. Molotov's agreement, his written letter and word, and went right back to their original position in 1946, insisting that nobody could be consulted unless he had agreed to the trusteeship provisions. Finally, the Soviet Union representatives proposed that the whole business should be dissolved—that is, the whole Joint Commission should be dissolved—and that effort given up and that there should be an immediate Provisional Assembly set up on the basis of equal representation from the North and South. That is, there should be equal numbers from north of the parallel and south of the parallel of those parties which fully supported the Moscow Agreement.

End of the Joint Commission in 1947

That was a very interesting proposal because, of the 30,000,000 people in Korea, 20,000,000 live south and 10,000,000 live north of the 38th parallel and, therefore, it was suggested that there should be equal numbers. That would not occur to you as being the normal thing that would come into your mind. If two-thirds of the population lives south and one-third north, that ought to be the general area of representation. However, it was said to be equal, and equal representatives of what? Not of the people who lived north and south but of those political groups north and south who fully supported the Moscow Declaration, i.e. the Communists. So an equal number of Communists from the North and an equal number of Communists from the South were to come together to form the Provisional Government of Korea. That was the Soviet Union Government's proposal in 1946 and that, of course, was not satisfactory. In 1947, that effort, through the Joint Commission, ended after

almost 2 years of utter and complete frustration.

However, the U.S. State Department was not wholly discouraged. On August 26, 1947, Mr. Robert Lovett, who was then Acting Secretary of State, went and made one more effort to carry out the Moscow Agreement and the pledge made at Cairo and Potsdam. Mr. Lovett wrote a letter to the Governments of the United Kingdom, China, and the Soviet Union proposing a four-power conference, and I particularly invite your attention to this effort, because yesterday I heard quite a little said about the importance of having four or five or other power conferences on Korea.

This will be an instructive bit of history on that point. Mr. Lovett on August 26 sent a letter to the Governments of the United Kingdom, China, and the Soviet Union proposing a four-power conference to consider the speedy implementation of the Moscow Agreement on Korea. Accompanying the letter, he included some proposals for discussion at that conference. These proposals were very simple and quite practicable. They provided, first of all, that there should be elections in North and South Korea which should be observed by the United Nations for the purpose of establishing zonal legislatures. That is, there would be a legislature elected by an election supervised by the United Nations north of the parallel and a legislature set up by a similar election south of the parallel.

The Korean Provisional Government and the representatives—first of all, the representatives of these two legislatures—should then work out a national provisional legislature charged with the duty of setting up a provisional government. In other words, you would have a legislative group—a provisional one in the North and one in the South. They should get together and set up a provisional government for all of Korea. Second, that provisional government and the four powers should then work out measures to aid in the establishment of a firm and enduring Korean independence. It was obviously not enough merely to establish a provisional government. There should be a permanent government. There were grave economic problems to be solved, and that was to be done by the four powers with the Provisional Korean Government. It was also proposed that the four-power conference with the Provisional Korean Government should agree upon a date for the withdrawal of all occupying forces. That was a demand about which you heard a great deal in the past and you undoubtedly will hear about it in this debate. It was proposed by Mr. Lovett in August 1947 that a four-power conference should be held for establishing that date as well as the other things which I have mentioned.

This proposal of Mr. Lovett was rejected completely by the Soviet Union. Not only was the proposal for a four-power meeting rejected, but the proposals which had been included in the letter were also rejected.

At this point it became clear to the representatives of the United States that nothing further could be hoped for from bilateral discussions with the Soviet Union. We concluded that we had done all we could think of to redeem the pledges made, but we had absolutely no response of any sort from the other side. Therefore, the matter was brought by the U.S. Government to the United Nations. That was done during the second session of the General Assembly in 1947. The U.N. General Assembly considered this matter; it considered resolutions put forward by the Soviet Union and by the United States; it heard suggestions of modification by others; and finally adopted, by a vote of 43 to none, with 6 abstentions, the resolution of November 14, 1947.³

That resolution provided for the holding of elections for a national assembly which was to establish a national government throughout all of Korea. It provided that there should be elections throughout the whole country to establish a national assembly, to establish a national government. It provided that all occupying troops should be withdrawn as soon as the national government created its own forces and took over authority from the military representatives of the United States and the U.S.S.R. It provided for the establishment of a nine-nation Temporary Commission on Korea to facilitate and expedite the fulfillment of the program as worked out by the United Nations. In the words of the resolution, it recognized "the urgent and rightful claims to independence of the people of Korea," and it laid down the principle of the participation of Korean representatives in the discussion of the problem.

This seemed to the U.N. General Assembly to be a very fair and very constructive resolution. However, the Soviet Union representative declared, before the vote was taken, that the Soviet Union would not take any part in the work of the Commission and would not vote on the resolution. The resolution was passed, however, by 43 votes to none. The Commission was set up and went to Korea. It immediately got in touch with the U.S. military officers who were in command south of the 38th parallel, and who put everything at the disposal of the Commission, and the Commission went to work in that area. It was not permitted to carry out its functions in the north of Korea and, therefore, the Commission immediately turned to the Interim Committee of the United Nations to know what to do.

It had been sent out under a resolution which told it to observe elections throughout all of Korea and to set up an all-Korean legislature. It was not permitted to go into the North; it was not permitted to hold or observe elections; what should it do? The Interim Committee of the United

Nations considered this problem and then advised the Commission in Korea that it should do as much as it could of what the General Assembly told it to do. In other words, if it could not supervise elections throughout Korea, it should supervise them where it could. Since it could do that in South Korea where two-thirds of the people live, the Interim Committee thought that was most desirable.

The Commission on Korea did exactly that. On May 10, 1948, it held the first democratic election ever held in Korea. Seventy-five percent of the eligible voters south of the 38th parallel voted in the election, and the election was universally acclaimed in the South as a great step in the direction of Korean independence. The Commission observed the elections from April 5 to May 11. After the results were known and after this observation period ended, the Commission adopted a resolution—the resolution of June 25—in which it found that the elections were—

a valid expression of the free will of the electorate in those parts of Korea which were accessible to the Commission and in which the inhabitants constitute approximately two-thirds of the people of all Korea.

Establishment of the Republic, August 1948

As a result of those elections, there was set up a Constituent Assembly; a constitution was worked out; elections were held for the executive officers of the Government, and on August 25 the Government of the Republic of Korea was inaugurated.

Immediately, the United States set about transferring authority to that Government, and this transfer of authority was completed by September 11, 1948. But one very ugly fact remained, and that was that Korea was still divided. This fact was brought to the attention of the General Assembly by the Commission on Korea in its report, in that form. The third session of the General Assembly was informed by the Commission that all developments in South Korea were overshadowed by the grim reality of a divided Korea. "All Koreans are united in their condemnation of this disunity," the Commission said. It then reported the following situation to be true in Korea:

On the one hand, there is a People's Republic in the north set up arbitrarily by steps which were not under international observation; on the other hand, there is a Government of the Republic of Korea, established in the south as a result of elections observed by the Commission.

The General Assembly considered this subject again in the following year, in 1948. At that time it passed another resolution,⁴ following the report of the Commission. It approved the conclusions of the Commission. It established a permanent Commission on Korea to take the place of the temporary one. The resolution then contained these major provisions: first, that member states "refrain from any acts derogatory to the results

³ BULLETIN of Nov. 30, 1947, p. 1031.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Dec. 19, 1948, p. 760.

achieved and to be achieved by the United Nations in bringing about the complete independence and unity of Korea"; and second, that the Government of Korea was established as a lawful Government having effective control and jurisdiction over South Korea, and that this Government "is based on elections which were a valid expression of the free will of the electorate," and that this was the only such Government in Korea. The resolution urged the withdrawal of the occupying forces as early as practicable. The Commission was asked to seek the unification of Korea and to observe the withdrawal of the forces.

This resolution was adopted by a vote of 48 to 6, with 1 abstention.

At the same session, the Soviet Union Government introduced a draft resolution which provided only for abolishing the U.N. Temporary Commission on Korea. That was defeated by a vote of 46 to 6.

Withdrawal of U. S. Troops, June 1949

In accordance with the resolution which I have just described, the United States announced its intention of withdrawing its occupation forces, in accordance with the will of the General Assembly, not later than June 30, 1949. The troop withdrawal was completed on June 29, 1949, and was verified by the U.N. Commission on Korea.

The Soviet Union announced that its complete troop withdrawal took place on December 25, 1948. This withdrawal could not be and was not verified by anyone. However, we believe that it did take place sometime about those dates given, and that all that was retained in North Korea of a strictly military nature was the military mission. A similar military mission was retained in South Korea at the request of the South Korean Government.

As the Soviet Union moved out of North Korea, it left North Korean armed forces consisting of between 50,000 and 60,000 people, exclusive of paramilitary border constabulary and railroad guards armed with weapons given to them by the Soviet Union Government. These troops had been under training since 1946.

In 1949, at its fourth session, the General Assembly took note of the fact that its objective, the unification of Korea, had not been achieved.⁵ It also noted the withdrawal of the U.S. occupying forces. It continued the Commission in order to bring about the unification of Korea and to verify, if it could, the withdrawal of Soviet forces, and to observe and report any developments which might lead to or otherwise involve military conflict in Korea. The Commission, being thus instructed and its continuation being provided for, again went to Korea and again sought contact with the authorities in North Korea. The members of the Commission were not only denied any

access, they were not only rebuffed in private, but Radio Pyongyang took to the air with a bitter denunciation of the United Nations and of its Commission. They were never permitted in North Korea.

Consequences of the Division

I should like to pause from my purely chronological recitation at this moment to point out some of the consequences of this division of Korea which had been brought about as I have described and had continued over the years which I have mentioned. It had two very severe results. One was to create great tension throughout Korea. The Korean people, as the U.N. Commission has recorded, were deeply preoccupied with the unification of their country and they believed that Korea could not be free and independent unless it was united. This formed the major preoccupation in the political life of Korea. And since there was the opposite idea being promulgated in the North and since there were bitterly antagonistic philosophical ideas in the two areas, the tensions grew and grew.

The other consequence of the division of Korea was an economic one. Although, as I have pointed out, two-thirds of the people lived in South Korea and only one-third in North Korea, the resources of the country were very inequitably divided. North of the parallel were the major industrial facilities—the iron industry and the steel industry of Korea. There was also the chemical industry, which produced the fertilizers very largely used in the agricultural South. All these facilities were situated in the North. Almost every hydroelectric project was situated in the North. Furthermore, the North, by the policy which it was conducting, sent 2,000,000 refugees into the already crowded South and, by thus thinning out its population, was able to be self-sustaining in food whereas the South was not. Finally, all the basic minerals were in the North, so that it was impossible for the South to begin industries to take the place of those to which they were denied access in the North.

As a result of this, the burdens imposed upon the South were that they were left without essential fertilizers, without hydroelectric power equipment, without the industrial plants necessary to provide for their wants, and without sufficient mineral resources to develop new industry. And all of these burdens were added over and above the burdens remaining from the war.

Now, to continue our story: We have seen how there was established this Government in the South. We have seen its problems. What I now wish to bring before you is an account of the Communists' efforts to subvert and destroy the Government in the South of Korea. So far, it has appeared that the efforts of the Soviet Union were purely negative, that they were purely obstructive. It would indeed have been happy if that

⁵ *Ibid.*, Nov. 7, 1949, p. 695.

had been so—because we now come to a chapter in which their activities are only too positive.

Let us first look at the Government, so-called, of North Korea. In 1949, the U.N. Commission gave the following description of it:

The Northern regime is the creature of the military occupant and rules by right of a mere transfer of power from that Government. It has never been willing to give its subjects an unfettered opportunity, under the scrutiny of an impartial international agency, to pass upon its claim to rule. The claims to be a people's democracy and its expressions of concern for the general welfare are falsified by this unwillingness to account for the exercise of power to those against whom it is employed.

Since the time of that report, we have acquired a good deal of information about what went on in North Korea. This was acquired from prisoners, from deserters, from the masses of refugees who poured into the South, and also from the U.N. military forces when they were in occupation of very large parts of North Korea. . . .⁶

In many respects, the information which we have obtained on North Korea makes it appear to be almost the model satellite. I say "model" because it represented a form of "people's democracy" in which local institutions played no part whatever. It represented the pure doctrine. And Soviet domination of the Government in North Korea continued.

When the Soviet Union withdrew its occupying forces from the North, it left embedded there a mechanism of covert Soviet controls, which meant that the only change that really occurred was the change of headquarters, when the troops withdrew, from military headquarters to the Soviet Embassy at Pyongyang.

This control was exercised in these ways: first, through the Soviet Government agencies and official representatives in North Korea; second, through North Korean leaders who were either citizens of the Soviet Union or one-time residents of the Soviet Union and who dominated the key positions of authority in the North Korean Government; and, third, by a tradition of subservience which had been inculcated in North Korea during the occupation.

In order to help these controls, the Soviet Union Government retained a near monopoly of trade and conduct of foreign affairs for North Korea. It played a direct and major role in the industrial activities in North Korea. It trained the future leadership of North Korea in the Soviet Union, and it imposed on North Korea a cultural conformity to the Soviet patterns on the grounds of absorbing the superior Soviet culture. . . .

Soviet Efforts To Subvert South Korea

Those are the methods of control which were set up in North Korea. Now, what about the efforts

⁶ For a description of life in the town of Yangyang, North Korea, under the Communist regime, see *ibid.*, Dec. 10, 1951, p. 928.

to subvert South Korea? How was it done? These efforts were carried on in three particular and most important ways. In the first place, there was political and guerrilla warfare. That is a way which I shall describe in a moment. Secondly, there was military pressure on the border, and I shall go into that; and, third, there was ceaseless propaganda.

Political and guerrilla warfare—Turning to the political and guerrilla warfare, in the period from 1945 to 1947, two operations were carried on. One was an overt operation and one was a covert operation. The overt operation was the organization of the Labor Party in South Korea and activities taken in the open by that Party. That overt activity ended in 1947, with the suppression of the Communist Party in Korea. The covert activities, which began early and continued afterward, were the infiltration of guerrilla forces into the South and the keeping up of constant pressure upon the Government. In the beginning, these forces were made up of South Korean Communists. That was the beginning of the thing, but very soon they became of minor importance in it and considerable numbers of North Korean Communists were infiltrated into South Korea. They went into the mountains, they were armed, and they kept up that constant pressure on the Korean Government.

There were three main purposes in this activity. One was to lay the basis for a future attempt at an internal coup. The second was to harass the South Korean Government and not to give it an opportunity to get on with the pressing problems of organization in the country. The third was to give the impression to the outside world of mass discontent in South Korea. I think it is fair to say from all the information which we have, and it is a great deal, that after 1948 the guerrilla forces were led, were manned, were financed, were equipped, and were directed from the North. From the time these activities began until the overt attack in 1950, the principal activity, which took almost all the energy and funds of the South Korean Government, was the suppression of these guerrilla forces. The U.N. Commission in Korea reported in 1950,⁷ in a very detailed manner, on the training of these forces and—this is one of the things the Commission said—"on the carefully planned campaign to infiltrate thousands of guerrillas and political agents into the South."

Military Pressure on the Border—That was the method of political and guerrilla warfare. The second attempt to subvert, which went on contemporaneously, was through military pressure on the border. Almost daily, there were unprovoked military incidents along this border, and there were at least four major military operations before that of June 25, 1950. In June and again in August of

⁷ For a summary of this report, including excerpts, see *ibid.*, Oct. 2, 1950, p. 540.

1949, North Korean forces launched large-scale attacks on the Republic of South Korea in the Onjin Peninsula. Twice in one year, large-scale attacks from across the border were made into that part of the Onjin Peninsula which, as is known, is on the west coast of Korea and is not now under U.N. control. That was attacked twice from the North in 1949. Again in 1949, the city of Kaesong was attacked. On July 5, 1949, it was attacked by infantry and artillery upon a large scale, and on April 29, 1950, not long before the final attack, it was subjected to a severe artillery barrage.

The U.N. Commission in its 1950 report stated that it was of the opinion that the objective of this activity of the North Koreans along the parallel was to play upon the apprehensions of the Government of the Republic of Korea and, at the same time, to test the strength of the forces arrayed against them.

Ceaseless Propaganda—The third effort was in the field of propaganda. This third effort to subvert the Government of South Korea by propaganda took two main forms. One form was the appeal to South Koreans to rise up against their Government and overthrow it. That went on constantly. The other form was the making of what were called "proposals for the peaceful unification of Korea," all of which were of the nature I have described earlier, whereby there would be a unification of Communists. Those two main themes of propaganda were endlessly repeated, and I may say that it is of some significance that the final attack on June 25, 1950, was preceded by two of these so-called "peaceful proposals for unification."

All these efforts were completely defeated in South Korea, with the result that in the late spring of 1950, the South Korean Government, the Government of the Republic of Korea, presented the strongest attitude to the world which they had ever presented. It had defeated the Communists who had infiltrated from the North and cleaned up these pockets of rebellion within its own country. It had solidified the loyalty of its own people and established the basis of its own democratic control. It had met every attempt to invade it over its border and thrown them back. It had met all this propaganda. It is quite significant that after all these efforts had been defeated, it was only a few weeks later that the attack occurred.

Communist Preparation for Aggression

The next chapter in this report which I wish to make to you is the Communist preparation for aggression. This, again, is from information acquired very largely after the aggression started from deserters and prisoners and from U.N. personnel in Korea.

I turn first of all to the training and expansion of the North Korean Army. This began in the latter part of 1945. At that time the Soviet Union recruited 10,000 young Koreans and sent

them to Soviet Siberia for training. In 1946, the training of the North Korean Army proper began in North Korea. By 1948, this force numbered some 50,000 to 60,000 men and it was equipped with weapons given to the Army by the Soviet Union Government. In 1949, the military force in North Korea was doubled in strength. This was done by adding to it between 30,000 and 40,000 conscripts. There were returned from the Soviet Union the 10,000 trainees referred to a moment ago who had now been equipped and trained to handle tanks and aircraft. At this time also there were moved from Communist China two divisions of former Korean volunteer groups—that is, persons of Korean origin who were organized into divisions and were in the Chinese Communist Army were moved at this time into North Korea. It was these additions that formed the corps of the North Korean Army.

In the late summer of 1949, obviously in preparation for something, the North Korean Labor Party—that is, the Communist Party—was purged and secretly absorbed the South Korean Labor Party, which was the South Korean Communist Party, and finally, at the end of 1949, divisional training was undertaken in North Korea. In the early months of 1950, steps were taken to bring about the mobilization of North Korea. The Army was again expanded to 150,000 to 180,000 men—something in that neighborhood—with additional conscripts, with the return of further persons who were being trained in the Soviet Union, and with 10,000 more veterans from the Chinese Communist Army.

In the spring of 1950, all civilians in North Korea were given basic military training. In April and May of 1950, the heavy equipment for which the North Korean Army had been waiting was sent in from the Soviet Union. Some of it came directly across the border, some of it came through Manchuria, and both the army and the air force were equipped with it. It included heavy artillery, trucks, tanks, automatic weapons, and new propeller-driven aircraft.

At this time also, Soviet military advisers were attached at every grade in the North Korean Army, beginning with the battalion level and including General Headquarters where the plans for the invasion of South Korea were worked out, as I shall point out in a moment.

Thus there was created over this period of time in North Korea a large army. It was raised, trained, heavily equipped, and tactically and strategically advised by the Soviet Union Government. In June 1950, the population in North Korea was ready, and it was given its last psychological preparation by the unification proposals to which I referred just now.

At this point the transportation system was mobilized. The main part of the army was moved secretly down to the border at the 38th parallel, and finally the operational plan for the invasion of South Korea was distributed to the com-

manders. On May 2, 1951, the representative of the United States to the United Nations forwarded to the Secretary-General the documents which I have mentioned. These documents were the captured plan to invade South Korea, several copies of which were taken by U.N. Forces when they went north of the parallel, and they are here in the custody of the United Nations at this moment.⁸

Below the 38th parallel, the situation was far different. According to the report of the U.N. Commission, on June 25, 1950, the armed forces of the Republic of Korea consisted of 100,000 men organized into eight divisions and only lightly armed. They were not armed, according to the Commission's report, for offensive combat.

It so happened that on June 24, one day before the aggression began, the U.N. Commission had received a report from its field observers who had made a complete inspection of the entire 38th parallel.⁹ This inspection began on June 9 and ended on June 23. The report was given to the Commission on the 24th and the aggression took place on the 25th, so that obviously this report is one of very great importance.

During their tour the observers were given every opportunity to see everything in South Korea along the parallel. They said that they obtained a clear picture of the deployment, on a defensive basis, of the South Korean forces. The Commission said that on the basis of this report—that is, the report of its observers who had been there 2 days before the attack—and of its knowledge of the general military situation, “the Commission is unanimously of the opinion that no offensive could possibly have been launched across the parallel by the Republic of Korea on 25 June 1950.”

Who Is Resisting and Who Is Aiding Aggression?

I shall, in a minute, read some more from that report, but I wish to ask the Committee to listen with particular care to this. It is the findings of the United Nations' own Commission, the findings of men who were on the spot up until 2 days before this attack took place. I ask representatives to listen to it because they heard again yesterday what I am sure they will hear throughout this debate—the noisy repetition of the charge that the United States is the aggressor, that the United States, in some way as yet undisclosed, made an attack across the 38th parallel or instigated one.

⁸ For texts, see *ibid.*, May 21, 1951, p. 828, and *The Conflict in Korea*, Department of State publication 4266, p. 26. This pamphlet also contains a summary and chronology of events relating to Korea from Dec. 1, 1943, to June 25, 1950. A chronology of the period from the latter date to Feb. 1, 1951, is printed in *United States Policy in the Korean Conflict, July 1950–February 1951*, Department of State publication 4263.

⁹ For the text of this report as transmitted to the Security Council on June 29, 1950, see *United States Policy in the Korean Crisis*, Department of State publication 3922, p. 22.

The answer to that is, “What do you believe? Who attacked whom?” Once one knows that, one does not have any trouble with this noise. And, second, who is resisting aggression and who is aiding aggression? If we just get those ideas perfectly clear in our minds, then we shall not be disturbed by anything that is said.

The attack, as I stated, was launched from North Korea on June 25, 1950. I shall not go in detail into the military operations, but I think that it is important to recall that from the very beginning the United Nations has been clear about who was the aggressor. It has been very clear about its own role in this matter. This is not just a fight between two people. This is the United Nations resisting aggression, and that has been the role of the United Nations from the beginning. It has been common action. That situation is in no way changed by the intervention of the Chinese Communists. They merely compounded the original felony by engaging in another of their own. They added very greatly to the problems and difficulties of the United Nations and, of course, to our problems in resisting aggression.

Now let me come to the findings of the Commission again. I read a little from those reports; I should like to come back to them again. The U.N. Commission was made up at that time of the Chairman (India), Australia, China, El Salvador, France, the Philippines, and Turkey. The representatives of those countries are the ones who made these reports.

It reported immediately after June 25 to the United Nations, and it expressed unanimous gratification at the prompt reply which had been given to the Security Council's action. This is what the Commission said to the United Nations in its report:

On the basis of this report and of its knowledge of the general military situation, the Commission is unanimously of the opinion that no offensive could possibly have been launched across the parallel by the Republic of Korea on 25 June 1950.

The invasion launched by the North Korean forces on 25 June cannot have been the result of a decision taken suddenly in order to repel a mere border attack or in retaliation for such an attack. Such an invasion, involving amphibious landings and the use of considerable numbers of troops carefully trained for aggressive action and, in relation to the area, of great quantity of weapons and other war material, presupposes a long-premeditated, well-prepared and well-timed plan of aggression. The subsequent steady advance of the North Korean forces supplies further evidence, if further evidence is needed, of the extensive nature of the planning and preparation for the aggression.

It is the considered opinion of the Commission that this planning and preparation were deliberate, and an essential part of the policy of the North Korean authorities. The objective of this policy was to secure by force what could not be gained by any other means. In furtherance of this policy the North Korean authorities, on 25 June 1950, initiated a war of aggression, without provocation and without warning.

That is the verdict which was given by the United Nations Commission and which has been

sustained by the Security Council and by the General Assembly on many occasions, as I shall cite. The verdict was true then; it is true now.

Verdict of the Security Council

The Security Council met on June 25 and confirmed this verdict. It recognized that the North Koreans had committed an armed attack against the Republic of Korea and called for the immediate cessation of hostilities and withdrawal by North Koreans. The resolution also called upon all members to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution, and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities.¹⁰

The response to this resolution was immediate on the part of the United States. We gave immediate assistance to the Republic of Korea, and other nations followed not long after. But the aggressors paid no attention to the resolution and pursued their aggression.

In the face of this continuing attack, on June 27 the Security Council noted from the report that the Communists had disregarded the resolution of June 25 and that urgent military measures were required to restore international peace and security. It recommended that the members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area.¹¹ The Secretary-General sent word of this resolution and a copy of it to all members of the United Nations. Fifty-three responded supporting the resolution of the Security Council, and only three attacked it. Those three were Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the Soviet Union.

On July 7 the Security Council met again. It welcomed the prompt and vigorous support evoked by its previous resolutions and recommended that forces and assistance from all Governments be made available to a Unified Command and asked that the United States Government should set up that Unified Command and designate the commander for the forces.¹²

At the time of these resolutions, the Soviet Union was not attending meetings of the Security Council. It returned to those meetings in August and, immediately upon returning, it publicly supported the aggressor and prevented further Security Council action to meet the aggression.

Let us turn for a moment to the actions of the General Assembly. We have been considering up to now the Security Council. On October 7, 1950,

the General Assembly turned its attention to the Korean aggression. It recognized the desirability of having U.N. Forces take all appropriate steps to insure conditions of stability throughout Korea. It established a U.N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea and directed it to seek to bring about a unified, independent, and democratic government for the whole country.¹³

On February 1, 1951, after the Chinese intervention and after efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement of the Korean question had been rejected by the Communists, the General Assembly found that the Chinese Communists and the North Koreans had engaged in aggression in Korea. It called upon the Chinese Communists to withdraw their forces and their nationals from Korea. It reaffirmed the U.N. determination to continue the action to meet the aggression. It called upon all States and authorities to continue every assistance to the U.N. action and to refrain from giving assistance to the aggressors. It again confirmed that it continues to be the policy of the United Nations to bring about the cessation of hostilities and the achievement of U.N. objectives by peaceful means.¹⁴

On May 18, 1951, after the Communists had rejected all efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement, the General Assembly recommended an embargo upon war munitions and strategic materials. . . .¹⁵

At this point Secretary Acheson summarized Soviet tactics in the Security Council from August through November 1950.

The Military Action

We come now to military action in Korea. The details of this are reported on by the U.N. Command in its biweekly reports. They are well known to all of us here and I shall not undertake to review the military operations as such. However, I wish to underline certain aspects of them.

The first aspect is that the aggression has been halted. That was the purpose of the intervention by the United Nations and that has been achieved. It has been halted and it has been thrown back beyond the line from which it started. A moment ago I spoke of the human cost in lives and suffering, which is vast. We must again pause to think of that with sympathy for those who have met with this sorrow but also with honor for them.

The next aspect is with regard to the participation by member nations in the military operations. Sixteen members of the United Nations, a very considerable number, are contributing to the fighting itself and other members of the United Nations

¹⁰ BULLETIN of July 3, 1950, p. 4. The text of this and of subsequent resolutions referred to also are available in *United States Policy in the Korean Crisis* and in *United States Policy in the Korean Conflict*.

¹¹ BULLETIN of July 3, 1950, p. 7.

¹² *Ibid.*, July 17, 1950, p. 83.

¹³ *Ibid.*, Oct. 23, 1950, p. 648.

¹⁴ *United States Policy in the Korean Conflict*, p. 37.

¹⁵ BULLETIN of May 28, 1951, p. 849.

are assisting in this operation. The Unified Command in its report communicated on October 18 has set forth in full the contribution of member nations and I draw that to your attention.

I now wish to underline the fact that the United Nations, although it is opposed by Communists who are operating from outside of Korea, has limited the conflict to Korea itself. There have been many difficulties and vast provocation but the conflict has been limited to Korea itself; and it is the intention of the U.N. Command to continue that limitation.

I wish to comment on the efforts of the U.N. Command to protect civilians. Before conducting bombing operations it has repeatedly warned civilians where and approximately when they were to take place, although this carried with it very great risks to the operations and to the personnel engaged in them. This warning has been given in advance of the intended bombings.

I wish to call attention to the charges of the use of biological, bacterial, and gas warfare which have been made against the U.N. Command. These charges will perhaps be discussed under another item or even under this one. . . .

I also wish to emphasize that there have been Communist atrocities, unfortunately, committed against the prisoners of war of the United Nations, both directly against individuals and, on a larger scale, against the prisoners as a whole. They consist of not marking the prisoner-of-war camps so that they cannot be seen from the air in bombing operations; and also, in violation of international morality and convention, locating these prisoner-of-war camps beside important military targets.

Let me turn from the military operations and speak for a few moments on the efforts to obtain U.N. objectives by negotiation and by peaceful means. First of all, let us take up the efforts with respect to negotiations by the United Nations itself. The Security Council, in its resolution of June 25, to which I have referred, called on the Communists to desist from their effort. They paid no attention to that. The Security Council draft resolution of November 10¹⁶ would have called on the Chinese Communists to withdraw from Korea and sought to assure them that their frontiers would be inviolate. They paid no attention to this and the Soviet Union vetoed the resolution. The General Assembly, on December 14, 1950,¹⁷ expressed itself as—

Anxious that immediate steps should be taken to prevent the conflict in Korea spreading to other areas and to put an end to the fighting in Korea itself and that further steps should then be taken for a peaceful settlement of existing issues in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

To do that, it set up the Cease-Fire Committee. The Cease-Fire Committee was to consist of the

President of the General Assembly, and the two members chosen by him. The Unified Command offered every cooperation to that group. The Communists rejected every effort to communicate with them. The Cease-Fire Committee promulgated five principles on the basis of which the fighting should end. The Unified Command accepted these in principle; the Communists flatly rejected them.

The resolution of February 1, 1951, reaffirmed the determination of the United Nations but it contained this paragraph as well—

The General Assembly,

Affirms that it continues to be the policy of the United Nations to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Korea and the achievement of United Nations objectives in Korea by peaceful means, and requests the President of the General Assembly to designate forthwith two persons who would meet with him at any suitable opportunity to use their good offices to this end.

This was the second group which was sent out and was called the Good Offices Committee. Three men attempted to bring about negotiations. The Unified Command cooperated in every way. The Communist authorities did not even reply to the letter sent by the Good Offices Committee.

Again the General Assembly, in its resolution of May 18, 1951, stated:

Reaffirms that it continues to be the policy of the United Nations to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Korea, and the achievement of United Nations objectives in Korea by peaceful means, and requests the Good Offices Committee to continue its good offices.

The Good Offices Committee renewed its efforts and again it was rejected by the Communists.

Diplomatic Efforts

The U.N. Command itself on October 1, 1950, October 9, 1950, and March 24, 1951, called on the Communists to cease their aggression but they paid no heed to that. We have had diplomatic efforts from the beginning. They have been made by the U.S. Government, by other governments participating in the fighting in Korea, and by governments not participating in the fighting.

Let us run over some of these efforts. On June 27, 1950, the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow called to the attention of the Soviet Government the North Korean attack and used these words—

In view of the universally known fact of the close relations between the U.S.S.R. and the North Korean regime, the United States Government asks assurance that the U.S.S.R. disavows responsibility for this unprovoked and unwarranted attack and that it will use its influence with the North Korean authorities to withdraw their invading forces immediately.

That would seem like a pretty reasonable request to make. It was met by the Soviet Union Government with an answer that it was the South Koreans who were attacking the North Koreans and that they would have nothing to do with the matter at

¹⁶ *U.S. Policy in the Korean Conflict*, p. 22.

¹⁷ BULLETIN of Dec. 25, 1950, p. 1005.

all. Shortly after that, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom made a similar approach in Moscow and was given a similar answer.

On December 8, 1950, Mr. Attlee, then Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and Mr. Truman, President of the United States, met in Washington. They put out a communiqué on December 8, in which they expressed the readiness of their two Governments participating in U.N. action to join in settling the Korean question by peaceful means.¹⁸ There was no response to this whatever.

On December 5, 1950, 13 Asian nations made an appeal to the Communists not to pursue their aggression again across the 38th parallel. This was totally and wholly disregarded.

In December 1950 several U.N. members tried to get the Chinese Communists to consider peace. Their efforts were entirely rebuffed, and General Wu, who was here in New York representing Communist China, rebuffed and attacked the General Assembly's efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement.

In talks with Ambassador Kirk, the U.S. Ambassador, during October 1951, Mr. Vyshinsky, the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, endorsed the Communist position on the demilitarization line to which I referred—this has to do with the discussions for an armistice—and he was against moving the talks away from Kaesong. He refused to intercede to break the deadlock in the negotiations.

Informal approaches by U.S. representatives and by representatives of other countries to the Soviet Union representatives here in New York have been wholly unproductive.

The Armistice Negotiations

This brings me to the armistice negotiations. On June 23, 1951, Jacob Malik, who was then Soviet representative on the Security Council, made a radio address here in New York. In the course of it he said this—

The Soviet peoples believe that the most acute problem of the present day, the problem of the armed conflict in Korea, could also be settled. The Soviet peoples believe that, as a first step, discussions should be started between the belligerents for a cease-fire and an armistice providing for the mutual withdrawal of forces from the 38th parallel.

That seemed to be a pretty important announcement by a power which had a pretty direct relation to this matter in Korea and, of course, a great deal of attention was paid to it. Immediately, the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow called upon Mr. Gromyko and asked for clarification of this statement by Mr. Malik. Mr. Gromyko explained that, in his view, the armistice should, in the first place, include a cease-fire and, second, should be limited to strictly military questions without involving any political or territorial matters. That

seemed to be pretty hopeful; that seemed to be a sensible way of getting at the matter. So General Ridgway immediately established contact with the Communist Command and arrangements were made to initiate the negotiations. . . .

I shall only talk about the actual steps in the negotiations. These have been so involved and have gone on over so long a time that it is quite important to try to see what the U.N. Command was attempting to do. What were its objectives here? What are the main principles? It had three main purposes in mind. The first one was to bring an end to the fighting on a basis which achieves the purpose of repelling the aggression. That was essential.

Secondly, the purpose was to get the maximum possible assurance against a renewal of the fighting. Again, that is an essential element in any armistice.

Thirdly, the purpose was to bring about a fair exchange of prisoners.

Those were the big objectives here of the U.N. Command. Let us go over the position taken on some of these points. In the first place, it took 2 days more than 2 weeks to obtain an agenda. Anybody who has conducted negotiations with the Communists knows that the business of the agenda is, for some reason or another, very, very important. In this case, it took 2 weeks and 2 days to get the agenda, and here it was: Item 1 was the fixing of a military demarcation line between both sides so as to establish a demilitarized zone as a basic condition for a cessation of hostilities in Korea. This is a very important thing to do. But you would not think you would have to talk so long to do it.

The second item was: Concrete arrangements for the realization of a cease-fire and an armistice in Korea including the composition, authority, and functions of a supervising organization. That is an essential thing to add to an agenda. Why take 2 weeks to say so?

Then there were arrangements relating to prisoners of war. Finally, there were recommendations to the Governments of the countries concerned on both sides. That was the agenda.

On the military demarcation line, it took 4 months to get agreement. The Communist attitude was that the demarcation line should be the 38th parallel, although they had previously stated that the 38th parallel ceased to exist, although Mr. Gromyko had said that purely military and not political questions ought to be involved in this. Nevertheless, the Communists spent 4 months arguing that it should be the 38th parallel. The U.N. Command took the view that the 38th parallel had no military significance whatever; that the line must be based on the actual military situation and that it must be a line which left both sides in a defensible position. Finally, this was agreed to on November 27, 1951.

There was a great deal of discussion about this

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, Dec. 18, 1950, p. 959.

recommendation to the governments. All sorts of political questions were introduced by the Communists into that area. The U.N. Command took the position that it was not able to discuss political questions of any sort. Finally, after a great effort, the agreement was on a recommendation that a political conference on a higher level of both sides be held 3 months after an armistice was to become effective to settle through negotiations the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, et cetera. In agreeing to this recommendation, the U.N. Command negotiator stated that so far as that Command was concerned, the recommendation is directed to the United Nations as well as to the Republic of Korea; that is, that the United Nations has a stake in the future settlement of these questions; that "foreign forces" meant all non-Korean forces, and finally, that the mystic word "et cetera" should not be construed to relate to matters outside of Korea. They then took up the arrangements for a cease fire and for the supervision of a cease fire; and whereas the demarcation-zone discussion had taken 4 months, this one took 5 months.

The only purpose of the U.N. Command under this item, was to get the maximum assurance against a renewal of aggression. Therefore, at all times the U.N. negotiators stood by these principles. In the first place, they were quite willing to have the same supervisions, the same restrictions imposed on them as they asked should be imposed on the other side. There was never a departure from complete reciprocity of treatment. Therefore, the same limitations and arrangements behind the U.N. lines were to be accepted as on the other side. Secondly, they insisted that there should be no increase in the strength of the armed forces on either side, but that there should be provision for the rotation of personnel. You could not add to the strength, but you could change people, so that people who had been there a long time would not have to remain there indefinitely, and their places could be taken by others.

In the third place, they insisted, on the U.N. Command's side, that the impartial commission must have free access to the territory of both sides to observe how the armistice was being observed. They were not willing to take the word of the other side. This had to be observed by impartial observers.

The Communists continually referred to principles which caused a great deal of trouble. One of these principles was the freedom of their internal affairs from interference, which came up every time anybody suggested that anything should be done behind their lines, or that there should be inspection, or that there should be anything else. That was claimed by them to be an interference in the internal affairs of their country—whether it was that the airfields should not

be repaired, or what not. That principle, of course, was a very troublesome one.

They refused to agree that the airfields should not be reconstructed and rehabilitated. Another matter which took a very long time was that it had been agreed that there might be impartial nations nominated by each side on this inspection commission, provided that no side had a right to nominate a country which was offensive or not regarded as impartial by the other side. Therefore, when the United States suggested that Sweden, Switzerland, and Norway would be impartial nations satisfactory to it, the Communists named Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union. The presence of any of those nations as impartial ones was of course ridiculous, but the presence of the Soviet Union which, as I pointed out, had organized, equipped, advised, directed, trained, and maintained this aggression, on a group of impartial observers was intolerable, and that could not be accepted.

Negotiations Come Down to Three Points

Finally, the negotiations got down to three points: The airfields, the question of the impartial nations, and the treatment of prisoners. At that point the U.N. Command put forward what was called a package proposal; that is, a proposal which would settle all three of these things at once.¹⁹ The proposal was that the U.N. Command would give up its insistence that the airfields should not be rehabilitated. It would withdraw that position, provided it was agreed on the other side that the impartial group, so-called—or the supervision group, which is a better name for it—should be Sweden, Switzerland, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, and that the U.N. position on prisoners of war should be accepted. That was the package proposal which was put forward, and it was rejected.

From that time on the discussion revolved around the prisoner-of-war question. But I wish to bring the Committee back to the fact that the prisoner-of-war question is part of a 3-point proposal, where it was said that all the three points would be settled on that basis which I have mentioned: One, that we should withdraw objection to the rehabilitation of airfields unconditionally; two, that the supervisory group should be the four nations named; and that the U.N. view should be taken on prisoners. That remains. But the discussion has been on the prisoner-of-war question.

I should like to make a few general observations on this prisoner-of-war matter. In the first place, it was a wholly unexpected issue to the U.N. Command. It never occurred to the U.N. negotiators that this would be an issue, or that it would take the time that it has taken. It was quite a surprising one. The second thing that I should

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, Aug. 18, 1952, p. 272.

like to make very clear, is that the U.N. Command would have been quite satisfied to have all prisoners returned, provided no humanitarian considerations entered into the matter. There is no desire on the part of the U.N. Command to keep one prisoner—not one. We have no desire whatever to keep any prisoner or to return any prisoner to any particular place. We would be perfectly happy if there were not other considerations, no humanitarian considerations, simply to exchange prisoners and forget about them. I also want to make it clear that the U.N. Command at all times has said that it would consider any plan or proposal which accepted the U.N. view that prisoners should not be made by force to return to the other side. We have asked for suggestions; we invite proposals; we welcome all the proposals which have been made. Proposals have been made by the Government of Mexico²⁰ and many others which are useful and helpful. All of these we welcome. All of these come to grief upon the insistence on the Communist side that prisoners must be forced to return. . . .

The present status of the armistice negotiations is that they have been recessed. They can be reconvened at any time whenever the Communists will either accept any one of the propositions which has been made or make one of their own in good faith. We remain ready to solve this question of the prisoners of war upon any basis whatever that anybody can suggest which preserves the fundamental principle of nonforcible return. It remains our sincere hope that the Communists will give us an indication at an early moment that they intend to do that.

In order to perform what seems to us and to some of our associates in the United Nations to be one of the preliminary steps in the consideration of this Korean question—that is, to find out further, if we can, whether the Communists really wish to have an honest armistice in North Korea—it seems to us that it would be wise, necessary, and helpful to have this General Assembly through this Committee, affirm the principle of nonforcible repatriation as representing the will of this body. To that end, we have joined with the delegations of Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Honduras, Iceland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and Uruguay in presenting the following draft resolution to this Committee.

[The Secretary then read document A/C.1/725. For text see p. 680.]

This session of the General Assembly has a great responsibility in facing the grave question of

peace in Korea. We all share a deep yearning for that peace. The whole object and purpose of all that we do here is to further the cause of peace, and we shall continue these efforts with all of our strength. But we must not and we cannot buy peace at the price of honor. Great sacrifices have been made and are being made by the members of the United Nations and by the men of the United Nations in order that the principles on which this Organization is based may be preserved against attack. These sacrifices have a place of honor in the record of mankind's struggle for a world of law and order in which decency and freedom may survive and flourish. Let no act of ours weaken or destroy the noble purpose of those sacrifices.

ADDRESS BY JOHN D. HICKERSON¹

[Excerpt]

What has been accomplished in Korea so far? Our losses have been grievous and we have borne too much of the burden. But I think every American can take pride in the results.

We have proved to the Communists that we and the other free nations have the courage, determination, and ability to stand up to aggressors. We have shown them that there is real and growing strength in the free world and have given notice that aggression will not succeed. We have made it clear that the free nations will not appease aggressors or allow them to keep the fruits of aggression. We have shown them that aggression does not pay.

We have proved that if we build our strength and show the Communist aggressors that they cannot succeed in their aggression, war can be ended or avoided and negotiation and peace become possible. With armed strength and patience and courage and responsible leadership, little aggressions can be stopped and world war prevented.

For the first time in man's history, nations have successfully joined and fought through an international organization for the principle of maintaining peace. We have proved to the nations of the world that collective security can be made to work; that when the free nations, large and small, stand together determined to maintain their independence and their freedom, they are a match for any aggressors. We have given the nations of the world new courage, new hope, and new determination to resist aggression.

We have proved to the peoples of the world that the Communists are far from invincible and that small nations need not, therefore, be afraid to stand up for their independence.

We have shown that the United States and the

²⁰ See p. 696.

The remainder of Secretary Acheson's review of the prisoner-of-war question will appear in the BULLETIN of Nov. 10.

¹ Made before the Business and Professional Women's Clubs of Wisconsin at Milwaukee on Oct. 24 (press release 836). Mr. Hickerson is Assistant Secretary for U.N. Affairs.

United Nations live up to their obligations and their commitments; that our friends can rely on us to help them defend themselves.

We have shown the world that the United States is not bent on aggression or conquest; we have proved the justice and the morality of our cause and the responsibility of our leadership. We have shown that we want peace, not war.

We have shown the people of the world that they must not be fooled by Soviet lies; that the Kremlin is for war though it hides behind talk about peace. We have shown the people in the Communist countries, especially the people of China, that their leaders have fooled them and tricked them into aggression which has brought only death and suffering to them.

We have shown that the free world is stronger in its determination, in its staying power, in its human resources, in its spiritual forces, than any slave state. We have shown that the U.S. soldiers, and the soldiers of other free nations, are magnificent and are more than a match for soldiers who are treated as slaves. Above all, in doing all of these things, we have directly strengthened the defense and security of the United States of America.

All this has been accomplished in spite of the fact that fighting is still going on and the truce negotiations are stalled.

We can get some idea of how much has been accomplished if we try to imagine what would have happened if the United Nations had failed. If we had flinched from the duty of standing by our commitments under the U.N. Charter our own national security would have been gravely jeopardized.

Within a few weeks at most, the North Koreans would have been established at Pusan, on the doorstep of Japan, which is a vital link in the defense of the Pacific and the United States. The Soviets would have hailed the unification of Korea under a so-called People's Democracy, and would have called on all outsiders to keep hands off. The United Nations would have been revealed to be a hollow shell—destined to go the way of the League of Nations.

With the collapse of the United Nations the free world would have started to ravel out all along the borders.

All that was needed on June 25, 1950, to overthrow the confidence and loyalty of the free nations would have been for the United Nations to side-step the challenge of Korea. In every free nation the isolationists, the neutralists, the faint-hearted, and the Communists would have set up great debates. They would have proclaimed that the United States was controlled by isolationists, that the United States was neutral, and that there could be no hope of resisting the Soviet wave of the future. The border states might soon have fallen. The free countries of Southeast Asia, the Turks and the Greeks, the Yugoslavs and West

Germans, the Swedes and Finns—all would have been placed in dire peril. All these brave people who have stood firm under the very mouths of Soviet cannon might have had to make what terms they could with the conqueror.

If we have accomplished so much, why, then, are we still in Korea? The plain answer is that the job is not yet finished. The U.N. Forces have repelled the aggression in Korea, but they have not yet brought peace and security to the area. Whether this will be done through more fighting or through a successful conclusion of the armistice negotiations remains to be seen. But one thing is clear: If we don't stick it out, all these achievements will be undone; all that we have already sacrificed will have been in vain.

Now let me be frank with you about the armistice negotiations. We went into the negotiations with our eyes open. Of course, we were aware of the possibility that the Communists might just be using the negotiations as a stalling device to replace their losses or that they hoped to achieve at the conference table what they had been unable to win on the battlefield. Of course, we realized that they might deliberately prolong and complicate the negotiations so as to try to wear us down. But as long as there was a possibility that the Communists might be serious about wanting an armistice, we had an obligation to test them out by actual negotiation. I know of no responsible person who questioned this decision at that time.

These difficult, frustrating negotiations have been in progress over the past 15 months. During this period the Communists have considerably increased their military strength. But so have we.

Training and Equipping of ROK Troops

We have, among other things, used this time for a great program of training and equipping the South Korean forces. When we removed our troops from Korea in 1949, pursuant to the General Assembly resolution, we left behind a training mission of 500 men to help the Koreans build their own army. Unfortunately, the brave Korean Army was slashed to pieces by the Communist onslaught in the summer of 1950. Due to shortages in personnel and matériel, significant further progress could not be made until after the lines had been stabilized again in the following spring. Compared to a Korean force of less than 100,000 at the time of the attack, we are today supporting Republic of Korea military forces totaling approximately 400,000 splendid soldiers as well as a Korean service corps which performs vital service functions for both Korean and U.S. troops. The Koreans' carefully developed training and replacement system is now feeding hundreds of trained men into the Republic of Korea forces each day.

To provide the training and leadership, a vigor-

ous military-training system, patterned after the U.S. Army model, has been initiated in Korea. This system includes infantry replacement training centers, schools for artillery and combined arms, officer candidate schools (and advanced officers school), as well as numerous technical schools for the development of specialists. A highly qualified and experienced instructor staff, in which Koreans outnumber Americans by approximately 6 to 1, is utilized in conducting this training. Throughout the training period the young Rok soldiers have demonstrated a great desire to learn. General Clark and General Van Fleet, who, along with General Ridgway, have devoted so much thought and time to the swift development of the Korean school system, are enthusiastic about its progress and product.

To supplement this Korean school system, the Army has made available the resources of its school system in the United States. Nearly 600 selected Rok officers received instruction in U.S. Army schools during the last fiscal year and an even larger number is projected for the current fiscal year. Rok officers, despite language difficulties, have consistently done well in their classes in U.S. Army schools.

The most recent evidence of our success in building a capable army of Koreans was the great battle of White Horse Hill where Rok troops showed not only desperate valor but skill and discipline equal to any soldier on earth. The free world can draw real inspiration from the magnificent military performance of the Rok Army.

When the armistice negotiations began it was specifically agreed that military operations would not cease until after an armistice had actually been concluded. Throughout these negotiations we have taken substantially the same military action we would have taken had the armistice negotiations not been in progress. Whatever build-up of Communist forces has taken place has been in spite of our military counteraction. I think it is fair to say that there is no basis for any speculation that we have been put at a military disadvantage because of the negotiations.

Our armistice negotiators have been men of great skill and infinite patience. They have been more than a match for the Communists during the long, weary months of negotiating. They have succeeded in narrowing the issues down to one: Shall we drive back to the Communists, at the point of a bayonet, those prisoners of war who would forcibly resist repatriation?

Let us not minimize the gravity of this issue. It means much to the Communists, and much to us too. To them it has revealed an escape hatch from the slave world; they are determined to close it. The Communists know well that vast numbers of their drafted soldiers—including the so-called Chinese "volunteers"—hate them and all their works. They can drive the reluctant soldier into battle with a bayonet pointing at his

back. But what if he escapes by running forward into our lines? What the Communist rulers desperately want is for us to drive him back with *our* bayonets. This we will not do. We believe that such a course would be morally indefensible. It would be a body blow to the hopes of the people who now suffer under Soviet tyranny. Moreover, if we hold on until the Communists are forced to accept an armistice without getting the anti-Communist prisoners back, Communist rulers will have good reason to worry about the loyalty of their troops should they again think of pitting them against U.N. forces. This in itself might be a powerful deterrent to future Communist aggression.

Moral Principle Behind U.N. Stand

I am sometimes asked how it is that we allowed this to become an issue at Panmunjom. Why did we not simply provide for mutual repatriation of prisoners of war and not raise the issue of principle? I'll tell you why. Because the issue raised itself. It raised itself in the form of over 86,000 human beings in our custody who renounced communism, denounced its leaders, pleaded with us not to return them to their masters, and swore they would kill themselves or resist unto the death if we tried to return them.

Now I grant you, it's very hard for an American mother, whose son is a prisoner of war of the Communists, to understand why we should not get her son back even if we have to use force to exchange some former Communist soldiers for her son. It was having her and others like her in mind that made this decision such a hard one. I must make one thing clear: We have in no way bargained these Communist prisoners of war off against our own boys. We have made it absolutely clear that we shall insist upon the return of every single U.N. prisoner of war upon the conclusion of an armistice. But we feel that the decision to uphold nonforcible repatriation is the right one, and in the long run it will save more American lives than if we capitulated to the Communist demand.

Now, you may ask, what guaranty do we have that the Communists will agree to our position? There are no guaranties in Korea. The U.N. Command has made it clear to the Communist negotiators that, while we remain firm on the question of nonforcible repatriation, we are willing to consider any reasonable suggestion for resolving the deadlock. We remain confident that when the Communists come to realize that the cost of continuing is too high for them, they will accommodate themselves to a formula recognizing the realities of the situation.

We are all quite naturally restive about our future course of action in Korea. We are impatient. We are frustrated. But let us soberly consider the alternatives. None will be to our liking, but a

choice must be made. May I repeat, let us consider these alternatives soberly—for much is at stake. Any time anyone complains to you about the interminable Korean conflict, I hope you will ask him what he would do if he were in charge. So far, I regret to say, the field of ideas expressed to us privately has been a narrow one. And the public “Monday morning quarterbacking,” while perfectly proper in a democracy such as ours, tends to make a truce more difficult by leading the Kremlin to believe that we are torn by dissension and unable to stick it out in Korea much longer.

What are the alternatives? We could pull out of Korea. That would make a mockery of the sacrifices we have already made. Such a course might be understandable if we were about to be forced into the sea. But to abandon our hard-earned and well-prepared positions voluntarily is to me inconceivable.

We could extend the conflict. Our combined military and political judgment is that such a course would in all likelihood not end the fighting in Korea but, rather, spread it elsewhere as well. We would get much more deeply involved than we are now. That certainly is no solution to the problem in Korea.

The Only Realistic Alternative

Let's face it. The only realistic alternative open to us is to hold on in Korea, inflicting heavy losses upon the enemy while keeping those of ours as low as possible. “Holding” until what? Holding as long as necessary to bring an honorable armistice. Meanwhile, we should continue to build up our strength and to help our allies build up theirs. Don't think for a minute that this will not affect the problem of an armistice in Korea.

Let us not minimize either the magnitude of the resources of the free world or the difficulties in developing them.

One resource of the free world is moral, and it is an important one. We know that we are doing the right thing in Korea, and that is worth many divisions. The United Nations represents the moral judgment of organized mankind. It has condemned the Communists as aggressors, and it did so by overwhelming votes. This in itself took courage for some countries in the face of bitter Soviet opposition. The current session of the General Assembly will have an opportunity to take further steps. We have made a special report to the General Assembly on the present status of the military action and the armistice negotiations in Korea. We are asking the General Assembly to endorse the stand that we have taken. Many speakers to the Assembly have already done so but we believe that a formal resolution is necessary. To those who are dubious of the possible effect of such an action on the Communists, I would only call attention to the tremendous lengths to which the Communists go in

order to split us from our allies and friends. If we can continue to maintain unity and solidarity on these great issues, we can have a major impact on the Communists.

Second, we must have more military assistance in Korea from other U.N. members. Along with the gallant South Koreans, whose losses have exceeded even ours, we have borne a disproportionate share of the military burden in Korea. We have had fighting with us 15 other forces of the U.N. members. They, too, have fought magnificently. But there should be more troops there now ready to continue the fighting as long as necessary. We intend to press hard in the General Assembly to get as many U.N. members as possible who have not done so to face up to their responsibilities in Korea. I say this in full realization that some of our allies have not received their just due for their fight against Communist armed subversion elsewhere—e. g., the French in Indochina and the British in Malaya.

But the General Assembly should frankly recognize that the record of performance in Korea is not good enough for the kind of military pressure that is needed in Korea, and it is not good enough for a permanent system of collective resistance to aggression. There must be no free rides. Every nation desiring the protection of such a system must be prepared to share proportionately in the sacrifices and the risks. Each must be willing to make the most precious contribution that can be made—manpower, human lives. We have amply demonstrated that we are willing to do our share—more than our share—but we are entitled to point out that while we may have the greatest *per capita* income in the world, our population *per capita* is the same as any other country.

Our third pressure point against Communist activities in Korea is in the economic field. This takes two forms: Denying strategic materials to the aggressors and providing relief and reconstruction assistance to the Republic of Korea. Under U.N. auspices, there is already in effect a comprehensive strategic embargo against the North Korean and Chinese Communists. Frankly, we recognize that the United Nations is at a disadvantage because of the proximity of the U.S.S.R. to the aggressors. Nevertheless, we must continue to find methods of shutting off from the aggressors every possible source of material they need.

On the positive side, we must do as much as we can to meet the economic needs of the Republic of Korea. We have already done a tremendous amount under the U.N. Civil Assistance Program. Other members of the United Nations have also contributed substantially, and many specialized agencies of the United Nations have been doing fine work. The U.N. Korean Reconstruction Agency (known as UNKRA) has just announced an important new operating program of 70 million dollars in coordination with the U.N. mili-

tary command. This program should do a good deal toward maintaining civilian morale while the military operations continue.

Finally, we must have staying power. This is the guts of the matter. Apparently the Communists, having suffered a military defeat, think they can outlast us in Korea. They think they can wear us down. They regard us as spoiled and decadent and weak, incapable of sticking to a grueling task very long. Hitler made the same mistake about the British and ourselves. Dictators never seem to learn that the free can argue and gripe among themselves, that they can even extravagantly criticize their allies, but they do not knuckle down to tyranny. They would surely learn this lesson some day, as Hitler did, but our job is to try to see that they learn it sooner, without another world war.

Mexican Proposal for Settling Korean Prisoner of War Issue

Ambassador Padilla Nervo to the Secretary-General of the U.N.

Following is an English translation of a letter, dated September 2, 1952, to Secretary-General Trygve Lie from Ambassador Luis Padilla Nervo, Permanent Representative of Mexico to the United Nations:

I have the honor to inform you that His Excellency Miguel Alemán, President of the United Mexican States, voicing the sentiments of the people of Mexico, who deplore the necessity of prolonging the military campaign in Korea, has instructed me through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to transmit to you a plan which in the view of my Government may contribute to remove an issue that, so far as we have been able to determine, is the obstacle to the signing of a truce in that region, namely, the exchange of prisoners of war.

My Government's proposal, reduced to its essential terms but susceptible of being modified in the light of the opinions of the other members of the United Nations might follow the general lines set forth below:

The prisoners of war, held by either party, who may have voluntarily expressed their wish to be repatriated would be exchanged without delay.

As regards the others, each member of the United Nations that signifies its approval of this plan would pledge itself to receive in its territory a number of said prisoners in the ratio that might be agreed upon with the understanding that, once in the country of temporary asylum, the corresponding authorities would grant them an immigration status that would allow them to find work so as not to become public charges.

As soon as normalcy returns to said part of the Asiatic Continent, the Government of their respective countries of origin would grant the prisoners the facilities and assurances that might be required for their immediate repatriation. Said Governments would proceed in a similar way in the case of those prisoners that, without the fulfillment of the condition stated above, would later express their willingness to return to their countries of origin, in which case the United Nations would afford them the necessary means to carry out their wishes.

The Mexican Government is not unmindful of the fact that should this plan be accepted, the states approving it would bind themselves to make certain sacrifices; but these certainly would not be excessive if, through them, a firm step could be taken to facilitate the suspension of hostilities.

To the foregoing objectives, which by themselves are sufficiently important to warrant their careful consideration, another should be added, namely, that of raising the social status of the prisoners by restoring to them the dignity that only free labor can bestow. At the same time, a contribution to the progress of international law might be made by reaffirming the principle that prisoners of war are not to be treated as just a conglomeration of human beings whose fate the authorities may decide at will, but on the contrary, that man's inalienable right to freely work out his own destiny should prevail. Finally, if the plan herein submitted leads to an effective agreement, it would strengthen the confidence of the peoples of the world—including the prisoners of war in Korea who have refused repatriation—in the universal scope of the cause of the United Nations and in the solidarity of the members of this Organization.

I shall, therefore, sincerely appreciate your transmitting this plan to the competent organ of the United Nations.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to you, Mr. Secretary General, the assurances of my high and distinguished consideration.

Ambassador LUIS PADILLA NERVO,
*Permanent Representative of Mexico
to the United Nations.*

Ambassador Austin to the Secretary-General of the U.N.

U.N. press release dated Oct. 7, 1952

Following is a letter, dated October 6, 1952, to Secretary-General Trygve Lie from Ambassador Warren R. Austin, Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations:

EXCELLENCY,

I have the honor to refer again to your Excellency's note of September 2, 1952, transmitting a communication from the Permanent Representa-

tive of Mexico to the United Nations concerning a proposal by His Excellency Miguel Alemán, President of the United Mexican States, regarding the disposition of prisoners of war captured by the United Nations Forces in Korea who have indicated they would forcibly resist repatriation.

The United Nations Command has made numerous efforts to achieve agreement with the Communists on the prisoner-of-war question. The United Nations Command has made it clear that it is willing that all prisoners of war captured by United Nations Forces be returned, but that it will not use force to return any prisoners of war who resist repatriation.

This basic position has been fully supported by the other United Nations Members with troops in Korea as well as, we believe, by non-Communist Governments and people generally. The United Nations Command has also made it clear that it has no desire to retain or to make any particular disposition of any prisoner of war unwilling to be repatriated. Within the basic principle that it will not use force to repatriate any resisting prisoner of war, the United Nations Command has made numerous efforts and has offered numerous proposals to settle the prisoner-of-war question. Although the Chinese Communists and North Koreans state that they hold in prisoner-of-war status and are able to return only about twelve thousand, the United Nations Command has stated that it will return all prisoners of war not resisting return, and that this number would be approximately eighty-three thousand. The United Nations Command also agreed, on April 28, 1952, to give up its very reasonable insistence that there should be no rehabilitation and construction of airfields, if the Communists accepted the enlightened and humanitarian position of the United Nations Command on prisoners of war.

The proposals which the United Nations Command has made for solving the prisoner-of-war

question also include no less than five different plans, any one of which if accepted by the Communists could lead to an immediate armistice in Korea: three different alternatives have been offered at the meeting on September 28. Unfortunately, the Communists have thus far rejected all the efforts of the United Nations Command, have offered no constructive proposal, and continue to insist that the United Nations Command use force to return to Communist hands prisoners of war who resist repatriation.

As indicated in my communication to you of September 19, the United States Government has welcomed the Mexican proposal.¹ It has carefully considered it in light of the history of the negotiations on prisoners of war and the present status of these negotiations. The United States Government is pleased to note that this proposal is fully consistent with the basic principle of non-forcible repatriation and believes the suggestion to be very useful. Of course, this proposal assumes Communist agreement in principle that prisoners of war should not be forcibly repatriated, agreement which unfortunately has not yet been forthcoming. If the Chinese Communists and North Korean representatives are prepared to accept any of our proposals, all of which involve the principle that there should be no forcible repatriation, the suggestion made by His Excellency the President of the United Mexican States could well provide a basis for determining the disposition of prisoners not returned, in particular those of non-Korean origin.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

WARREN R. AUSTIN.

¹ Ambassador Austin's letter further stated: "The United States Government is giving this proposal careful consideration with a view to determining the most effective way of utilizing this and other suggestions in a manner most likely to bring about peace in Korea."

United Nations Day, 1952

by *Howland H. Sargeant*

*Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs*¹

Seven years ago today the Charter of the United Nations went into effect. Fifty-one nations had signed that Charter. Our own Senate had ratified it, 89 to 2. The people of a world still at war had declared for peace. The end of World War II was in sight, but few of the people of the world had the heart for celebrating. We were glad, desperately glad, that the bloody, bitter business was over, but we sensed that there would be no victory for any of us.

The mood of our own people—the people of the United States—was vastly different from that of 1918. Someone once said that Woodrow Wilson had gone into World War I with the attitude of a policeman breaking up a barroom brawl. That was the attitude of most Americans in World War II. In 1945 we were glad that the brawl had been broken up, that the hoodlums had been thrown out. But we were in no mood for dancing in the streets.

Those who remembered looked back to 1918. They thought of the League of Nations. They saw its tragic failure as the world's failure. As that grand old man of South Africa, Jan Smuts, once said: "Not Wilson, but humanity failed at Paris."

In 1945 it looked as though humanity had been given another chance. And we, the peace-loving peoples of the world, determined to seize that chance. We resolved that this time there should be no failure.

The United Nations was born of that resolve.

Today, 7 years later, that resolution is unchanged.

There have been discouragements. There have been set-backs. There have been, yes, failures, if we judge these 7 years against the bright hopes so many cherished as the great adventure was launched. But there were those, even then, who realized that the world could not be remade in a day. They did not expect miracles. They knew

that only persistence, hard work, and, above all, faith could accomplish the objectives the United Nations had set.

The dedicated men and women who have worked in the United Nations these 7 years have had faith. They have persisted.

They have maintained that faith in the face of betrayal by some of their own number. The Soviets, remember, had signed that Charter.

Statement by Secretary Acheson

Press release 840 dated October 24

Today on the 7th anniversary of the United Nations, more Americans than ever before are joining with peoples of other lands in community celebrations of United Nations Day.

On this day, we express our continuing faith in the principles of peace which "we, the peoples of the United Nations" wrote into the Charter at San Francisco. This faith which brought the United Nations into being out of the waste and sorrow of the Second World War is now reinforced by a record of achievement through 7 of the most difficult and dangerous years in the history of the modern world.

I hope the observance of this day will bring wide attention to the long roster of United Nations' constructive actions against the ancient enemies of mankind: hunger and violence, ignorance and disease.

Many perils still lie ahead before the purposes of the Charter can be fulfilled. We face them with courage and hope because we approach them with increased wisdom and strength that we have gained in 7 years of collective effort on behalf of a just and lasting peace.

They had shared that glorious time in San Francisco. That they had done so with betrayal in their hearts seems, even now, almost unbelievable. But they had done just that. No one today can doubt it.

But the men and women of the United Nations have persisted. They have maintained the faith.

¹ Address made at the University of Washington, Seattle, Wash., on Oct. 24 (press release 823 dated Oct. 20).

Understand me, I do not think that they could have done so alone. But they were backed, and they knew it, by all people of good will throughout the world. They were backed, and actively supported, by groups such as yours, the American Associations for the United Nations. They were backed by the private citizen on the street. They were backed by you and me, all of us, who believe in the United Nations' objectives.

Korea and the Myth of Communist Invincibility

Today, on this seventh anniversary of the United Nations, those U.N. pioneers can look back on their work with pride. Look at the record. The greatest test of the United Nations has been Korea. Two years ago, when the armies of Communist North Korea swept across the borders of South Korea, the United Nations acted promptly, decisively.

Mussolini once confessed that, had the League of Nations acted at the time he sent his legions into Ethiopia, he would have had to back down. He would not have had, for one thing, the oil to carry out his plans. Hitler, it is said, waited trembling the night of the reoccupation of the Rhineland, waited to see what the world would do.

Had it been possible for the League to have acted, as the United Nations did in Korea, the history of the past two decades might well have been vastly different. The world situation today might be different. But the League did nothing. The United Nations has profited by that mistake. The Korea conflict, to be sure, is unresolved. The truce talks have not brought peace. But the Communists have failed to achieve their objective, both on the battlefield and at the peace table.

They have gained nothing by their costly venture—costly in both blood and resources—and lost much. They have failed to add the Republic of Korea to their string of docile satellites. An ally has been preserved for the free world. With Korea, the myth of Communist invincibility has been shattered. New heart has been given those forces fighting communism elsewhere.

The free nations, too, have lost, but they have also gained. They have gained, perhaps above all, awareness of their danger. With the attack on South Korea, the Communist mask came off. Only the persistently deluded now believe the Communist so-called peace campaign. The purpose of the Kremlin is clear. The importance of Korea to the plans of the Communists has been clearly stated by the Communists themselves.

President Truman has quoted an intelligence report of a talk by a Red army officer to North Korean troops a few weeks before the invasion. This officer said

In order to successfully undertake the long-awaited world revolution we must first unify Asia . . . Java, Indochina, Malaya, Tibet, Thailand, the Philippines, and Japan are our ultimate targets . . . the United States

is the only obstacle in our path . . . we must crush the United States.

About the same time another North Korean officer told a group of Communist spies and saboteurs “. . . the attack [on South Korea] marks the first step toward the liberation of Asia.”

Note the Communist double talk. Ask the people of Rumania, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, any of the satellites, what their “liberation” by the Communists has meant.

But the United Nations acted. That “first step” failed. Admittedly, complete unity of action between the U.N. nations was not immediately attained. It has not been, in fact, even yet. There were, and are, differences of opinion, which is to be expected when so many peoples are involved.

But there was action—decisive action. Today 17 nations have contributed military forces to the campaign in Korea—among them both the United Kingdom and France, and these two are, at the same time, fighting Communists in Malaya and Indochina.

For the free nations, “collective security” became a fact in Korea. Furthermore, the United Nations has so far been successful in its efforts to confine the conflict to Korea. It has not exploded into general war. The action in Korea, too, seems to have somewhat cooled Communist enthusiasm for such ventures. A Red assault on Indochina, for example, had been almost hourly expected. It has not occurred.

Let them who will call this failure for the United Nations. History, I am confident, will give it another name.

Kashmir, Palestine, Indonesia, Iran—each has presented the United Nations with a crisis. Each carried a threat of war that might have spread to include us all. In each case the United Nations acted. War was averted. The disputants are settling their differences around a conference table.

The Disarmament Question

The United Nations has taken the lead in tackling the tough question of disarmament. In a world engaged in the most deadly armament race in history this may sound impractical, unreal.

But is it? Benjamin V. Cohen, deputy U.S. representative to the U.N. Disarmament Commission, said recently:²

If the effective outlawing of international war and of national armaments is too visionary and impractical an idea for our generation, it is not inconceivable that the wheel of history will whirl back and future generations will have to struggle again to outlaw private wars.

It is true that in the past all efforts toward disarmament have failed. But to quote Mr. Cohen again:

. . . there is much reason to suspect that the failures in the past were caused by the unwillingness of men and

² BULLETIN of May 26, 1952, p. 837.

nations to go far enough—by the lack of vision rather than visionary ideas.

The United Nations refuses to be defeated by the failures of the past. It refuses to be defeated by the “unwillingness” of certain nations and certain men to accept today a joint solution of the problem. It is going ahead.

True enough, as long as the Soviet Union and its satellites persist in their present course, a satisfactory and acceptable solution to the problem of disarmament has little chance of being put into operation. But, as President Truman has said, when we are strong enough, there will come a day when we can hope that the Soviet Union, seeing that it cannot make aggression and subversion work, will modify its policies, when it will permit the nations of the world to live together in peace.

The Disarmament Commission of the United Nations has before it proposals submitted by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France.³ These proposals could be the first step toward lightening the burden of national armaments for the sorely pressed nations of the world. To doubt that *someday* some such proposal will be accepted is to doubt reason.

In the meanwhile, the United Nations remains a world-wide forum in which these proposals, as well as others, can be discussed. Through the United Nations, the world tests the sincerity of all nations on the subject. The Soviets' unwillingness to cooperate becomes increasingly clear under the U.N. spotlight.

United Action on Hunger, Disease, and Ignorance

The United Nations has proved that it can act in emergencies. It has proved, also, that it can act on long-range problems.

Those who drafted the Charter of the United Nations recognized fully that they must put a stop not only to war but to the causes of war. Digging deeply into history, they saw those causes, not infrequently, in terms of man's age-old miseries—hunger, disease, ignorance—the ancient enemies of mankind, as President Truman has put it.

The United Nations has recognized that no one nation, no matter how wealthy, how powerful, can hope to solve these problems alone. True to its basic philosophy, it has called for *united* action against all three. And it has not called in vain. Let me give you a few examples.

Take Lee Vee, U.S. soil conservationist, working in Pakistan to push back the desert and bring water—and with water, food—to the farmers of the Sind.

There is Plymouth-born Olive Warren and her aide, Hulda Wenger, a Swiss, who are teaching Bornean girls how to work as nurses among their fellow women.

Dr. G. Sambasivan, an Indian malariologist, is

heading a U.N. mission in the “Humming Swamp” of Northern Thailand fighting the deadly, malaria-carrying mosquito.

A Norwegian engineer, Inge Lyso, has joined the faculty of a new Indian engineering school near Calcutta. These are task forces sent out by specialized agencies of the United Nations. Their objective—a better world, better fed, healthier, and wiser.

With the skills and resources of the entire free world at its disposal, the United Nations recognizes *no* problem as beyond the ability of men to solve.

Let us take the matter of hunger. As I speak to you, two out of every three people in the world will go to bed hungry tonight. Millions face an early death either through outright starvation or undernourishment. And yet the world *could* feed its people, if the skills and resources of the world were tapped. The United Nations has created a world Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) to tackle the job.

World food production, FAO declares, can be increased 110 percent in the next 25 years. Admittedly, this is a tremendous task. But it can be done. It *must* be done. The Director General of FAO told the General Assembly of the United Nations:

I ask your leave to speak for a few minutes about such homely things as a loaf of bread, a bowl of rice, a cup of milk in a child's hands. Reduced to such simplicities, the subject may seem scarcely worth the attention of this globe-encircling body.

Yet every other crisis which so stirs our anxiety would be forgotten instantly if this assembly were convinced that there would be no bread for the world's breakfast tomorrow.

FAO's job is to see to it that the world has bread. FAO is working on that job, and its work is showing results. For example, I recall a story told me by a friend who had visited the tombs of the Pharaohs. He was interested in the murals on the walls of one of the inner enclosures. He noted particularly the type of hoe being used. Outside the tomb he passed a field. The hoes used by the farmers, he told us, were identical with those he had just seen inside. The handle was short and the blade narrow. The farmers handled them with difficulty.

FAO specialists have introduced in this area hoes with double-sized blades, with double-sized handles. Farmers using these hoes are today producing just *twice* as much food as formerly.

In Asia and Africa, for centuries 9 cows out of 10 have died in periodic rinderpest epidemics. FAO launched a world-wide campaign to stamp out the disease. In one country, Thailand, it has been practically eliminated. In others, losses are being reduced to a minimum. There are other examples. In each case the objective is more food—more bread, rice, milk, and meat.

The U.N. World Health Organization (WHO) has undertaken the job of bettering the world's health. This, again, is a *world* campaign. It is

³ For a summary of these proposals, see *ibid.*, Oct. 27, 1952, p. 648.

as important to me or to you as it is to the inhabitants of some remote African village. Germs recognize no frontiers. Let me illustrate. Last year a "flu" epidemic broke out in England. Through Wno, the United States was able to prepare fully against the danger should the epidemic cross the Atlantic. It was checked in England and stopped at her shoreline.

In 1947 a cholera epidemic in Egypt was brought under control in 5 weeks. Wno's warning service alerted neighboring countries, and the epidemic was confined to the area in which it had first appeared.

In Afghanistan Wno is fighting typhus; in South America yellow fever; in India polio.

The Wno campaign is, at this point, directed primarily against malaria, tuberculosis, and venereal disease—killers which destroy an estimated 10 million persons a year.

These killers are not invincible. It is not improbable that they can, in time, be stamped out completely. But the attack must be world-wide. It demands the *united* efforts of all nations. Hunger and disease, the United Nations is fighting on both fronts. The main enemy, however—and this the United Nations recognizes—is the incredibly low-living standards of many areas of the world.

To raise the living standards of the *world* is, admittedly, a difficult task. But, and this the United Nations believes, it is not an impossible one.

The United Nations has set up programs of technical assistance. It is giving financial aid through the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. All of these programs operate on a long-range basis. They do not anticipate remaking the world overnight. They are premised on the theory, however, that with hard work, persistence, and faith the job can be done.

The United Nations has tackled problems of trade, transportation, and communication. It has concerned itself with the drug traffic, prostitution. It has set up programs for refugees, children.

The United Nations' *primary* objective is peace. But it knows that peace, if it is to endure, must have a solid foundation of shared well-being among the peoples of the earth.

In every case *collective* action is the keynote of the attack. The United Nations, it must be remembered, is not a world government. It does not seek to be. It is, as it was planned, a voluntary, democratic society of sovereign nations. It can settle disputes, develop collective security, promote social and economic progress, *only* through the free consent of the nations concerned. The job of building the *will* to collective action is the United Nations' greatest challenge.

UNESCO'S Assignment

Each of the specialized agencies contributes to the building of this will. It is the *special* assign-

ment of the U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization—UNESCO. The purpose of UNESCO, as defined in its constitution, is to:

... contribute to peace and security by promoting collaboration among the nations through education, science and culture.

Education, UNESCO believes, is fundamental. "If we want to live in a united world," says Jaime Torres-Bodet, Director General of UNESCO, "we must not allow the most unjust of all frontiers to go on existing—the frontier that divides those who can read and write from those who cannot."

It is difficult for us in the United States to understand the importance of just being able to read and write. We accept both as verities of existence. It is not so in many other lands. I was reading the other day the story of an American who traveled to a remote little village of India. He asked the village headman:

"What do you think of Korea?"

"What is Korea?" asked the man.

Slightly baffled, the visitor asked:

"How about the rice sent by America?"

"Where's America?" came the answer.

I am not vouching for any of this story, but according to the tale, the American then asked:

"Are you better off since the British left?"

"Were they here?" countered the headman in surprise.

The story *may* be exaggerated but I have heard tales almost as incredible.

To tackle this problem UNESCO has launched a world-wide fundamental-educational program. It got off to a good start last year with the opening of a teacher-training center in Mexico where the emphasis was upon fundamental education. A network of such centers is on UNESCO's agenda—for Southeast Asia, Equatorial Africa, the Far and Near East.

It takes some imagination to make the jump from programs designed for education at this level to a UNESCO project in Pakistan where a 4-man team is taking what amounts to a new inventory of the land, below and above. The Pakistan Meteorological Department wants to know *why* certain areas in the country are periodically disturbed by earthquakes, and what can be done about them. Or to a 140-boy trade school in Cha Choeng Sao, Thailand, where a group of bright-eyed lads are learning under UNESCO instructors to handle power tools, preparatory to careers in the building trades. Or—but the list is almost endless. UNESCO's educational projects circle the free world.

To break down the barriers of ignorance, to raise the level of understanding, that is UNESCO's job. The individual is all-important in all of the U.N. program. And it is to the individual that the United Nations must always look for its hope of success. I would like you to remember—now as I talk to you and later—that these programs I have discussed are yours. You have a

part in their operation. You have a tremendous stake in their success.

The New York *Times* ran an editorial several years ago which comes to my mind in this connection. It said:

The common man may protest if told the responsibility for making history rests upon him, that he does not know how to make history. He thinks he is waiting for some third person, singular or plural, some elected or appointed "he" or "they" to attend to history making.

But he is mistaken. A President is not 150 million times as wise as another American. A member of Congress is not 300,000 times as wise. . . . each must answer to the surge and flow of popular desire.

That is true, too, of the United Nations. It, too, must answer to the "surge and flow of popular desire." That desire, 7 years ago, was for peace. I am convinced it remains strong.

But the individual American has a job to do

if the United Nations is to go on and if the U.N. objectives are to be attained. That job is relatively simple. Mrs. Roosevelt, I think, made the point crystal-clear in a recent speech. She said:

We should remember that the U.N. is not a cure-all. It is only an instrument capable of effective action when its members have a will to make it work. It cannot be better than the individual nations are.

Make your country the best possible country for all its citizens to live in and it will become a valuable member of the Neighborhood of Nations.

And the "Neighborhood of Nations" is the United Nations.

I think that is the right note with which to conclude this seventh anniversary of the United Nations. Be a good neighbor, help to make your country a good neighbor, and the neighborhood of nations cannot fail.

Achievements of Inter-American Cooperation

by Edward G. Miller, Jr.

*Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs*¹

The postwar period has marked a transition into a new phase in our inter-American relations. For some 60 years prior to 1948 the statesmen of our countries worked hard on the structure of the inter-American system. Today this system is based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance signed at Rio de Janeiro in 1947 and the Charter of the Organization of American States signed the next year at Bogotá. The first provides that an attack on one country is an attack on all. The second spells out the structure of the Inter-American Organization. When these treaties came into effect, the organizational period in our inter-American system had come to an end. And I might point out that this was the first regional arrangement for collective security that our country joined. We quite logically gave Latin America first priority in this regard since it is contiguous to us and we are in effect all in the same boat.

One of the main points that had been agreed upon by 1948 was that each country would never intervene in the affairs of other countries. This is the basis of the mutual confidence which is the es-

sence of the inter-American system. From the standpoint of the Latin Americans this meant that the Big Stick policy of earlier days had been replaced by the Good Neighbor policy.

We are now in a different phase of inter-American relations. It is not enough to sign treaties and create organizations. We must give substance and vigor to these relationships—we must put meat on the bones of inter-American cooperation. This is what we have been doing since the end of World War II. It is a job that encompasses all phases of our relations with Latin America—political, military, and economic. The things we do are not as spectacular as the debates in the conferences of the '20's, the '30's, and the '40's, when the inter-American system was being evolved. Someone once said that "becoming" is more dramatic than "being," and I think that this applies to inter-American relations. Nevertheless, I think that the sum total of what we have been doing in recent years is impressive.

Our regional agencies are operating effectively. Disputes in the Caribbean which threatened the peace have been effectively smoothed over on more than one occasion.

The Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers at Washington in March and April of

¹ Excerpts from an address made before the Third Kentucky World Trade Conference at Louisville, Oct. 14 (press release 806).

1951 was described as one of the most successful ever held. The Inter-American Economic and Social Council sits regularly in Washington, as does the Inter-American Defense Board, and both are now a permanent part of our community. The Committee for Cultural Action of the Inter-American Cultural Council sits regularly in Mexico City. Ten years ago none of these agencies existed.

Our entire community can be deeply thankful that we have as Secretary General of the Organization of American States one of the finest citizens of this hemisphere, Dr. Alberto Lleras, the distinguished former President and Foreign Minister of Colombia, who has made a contribution to inter-American harmony that can never be measured.

The United Nations and its agencies also are contributing greatly through their technical assistance and other programs.

And on a bilateral basis we are doing things undreamed of a few years ago.

Improved Relations With Mexico

Let us take Mexico, for example. This great country long was suspicious of the United States. Yet President Alemán recently said that relations between Mexico and the United States are better now than ever. This is a tribute to a unique record of cooperation.

We have projects such as the vast Falcón Dam which is being built on the Rio Grande and in which both Governments participate financially and administratively. This and many other cooperative power and irrigation works which are being built in Mexico will permit Mexico to raise more food, to pay higher wages to its citizens, and to have more dollars to buy goods in the United States and elsewhere.

Then there has been the campaign to eliminate hoof and mouth disease. This terrible scourge hit Mexican herds about 6 years ago, and it was a matter of vital concern to every cattleman in this country. We closed our border with Mexico to cattle movements, and both countries moved in with a drastic program executed by a joint U.S.-Mexican commission which eradicated the disease after a combined expenditure of 250 million dollars and the tragic but essential slaughter of some 990,000 head of Mexican livestock. Today Mexico is free of hoof and mouth disease; its herds are back to normal size; the border was reopened last month; and badly needed Mexican meat is once again moving into our country.

A sore spot in our relations with Mexico has been the problem of migrant labor coming across the border from Mexico into Texas and the other States in the Southwest—a problem which concerns American workers who worry about this type of competition; which concerns the Mexican Government because of its desire to see its citizens

protected in this country and to be free of any kind of discriminatory treatment; which concerns farmers in the Southwest who badly need labor on a seasonal or regular basis to pick their crops; and which has concerned our Government because of the frequent illegal entry of migrant workers across the border. Today after months, indeed years, of laborious and painstaking negotiation with the Mexican Government on the part of my Department and the Department of Labor in conjunction with representatives of labor and of employer groups in the Southwest, we have worked out with Mexico an agreement sanctioned by our Congress which regularizes the problem of recruitment, entry, and working conditions in the United States of these migrant workers from across the border.

Through the International Bank and the Export-Import Bank, we are cooperating with Mexico in vast programs to place the Mexican economy on a sounder footing. Some of the things which we have done or are doing include: the modernization of the entire Mexican railway system; the increase of Mexico's electric power by a projected total of about one million kilowatt-hours in 7 years; the expansion of Mexico's steel capacity; the development of badly needed sulfur deposits as well as coal mines, sugar mills, slaughter houses, and other industries. Today Mexico is buying goods from us at an annual rate of about 800 million dollars per year; its currency is stable as a result of economic growth and a tremendous tourist travel involving nearly 200 million dollars a year; and its people are getting more of the good things of life.

It can truly be said of Mexico today that it is well along the road to fulfilling the great aspiration of the Latin American peoples, namely, to achieve economic stability and to improve the lot of the common man. Since these were likewise the ideals of Jefferson and Lincoln, it is only natural that we should applaud the progress of our sister Republic and that we should be proud that through our cooperative programs we have helped in this great cause.

Panama and Canal Zone Problems

Panama is of concern to every American because it is the link between the two continents of the hemisphere and between the two great oceans which our continents divide. Panama is a small country whose economy has always depended upon transit across the Isthmus. Our occupation of the Canal Zone creates problems in our relations with Panama which are of great variety and complexity. I was in Panama only 2 weeks ago for the inauguration of the new President of that country, and I have returned convinced that we have a unique opportunity to move ahead on many of these problems. On some we are already making progress.

The Panamanians naturally look to the Canal Zone and the military establishment based there as a market for their products so that industries and commerce can develop there. We have been working hard on this problem, helping the Panamanians to produce goods which we need in the Canal Zone. This makes sense because it will reduce the zone's dependence upon overseas sources of supply in times of war. But many Panamanians realize that the future of their country lies not simply in trade with the zone but in concentrating on Panama's agricultural resources.

Panama needs roads to tap virgin farm land. Through our participation in building the Inter-American Highway we are moving constantly inland toward the Costa Rican border—a truly pioneering venture. Next, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development is studying means to extend rural credit to farmers.

Meanwhile, under the Point Four Program, a mission which we have contracted for from the University of Arkansas is actively at work in the interior conducting agricultural experimentation and helping the Panamanian farmer through the kind of rural extension work that has contributed so greatly to agriculture in this country.

In Panama our relations have been troubled by charges of discrimination against locally recruited labor in the Canal Zone. The wise policies of the present farsighted administration of the zone are doing much to improve working conditions and housing for locally recruited labor and to prove that the relations between the United States and Panama in regard to this waterway so vital to world commerce can constitute a model working partnership in international democracy.

Progress on the South American Continent

Peru is a singularly fortunate country in the hemisphere because of the great diversification of its economy. Cotton, sugar, minerals, and petroleum form the base of the growth of a country which is today making great progress and which because of its recently adopted liberal petroleum and mining legislation will be even better off 5 years from now. Our relations with Peru are exceptionally favorable today, although they were threatened last year by a proposal in Congress to impose a substantial import duty on fresh and frozen tuna fish, a tax which would have done damage to a new and growing industry in Peru—the fifth in importance in that country. Fortunately the proposal was defeated by 43 to 32 votes in the Senate. Both as consumers and as exporters, groups such as those represented here must be aware of the implications to your own self-interest of proposals of this kind. I am glad that both Kentucky Senators voted to defeat this measure.

Nowhere in the world is our Point Four Pro-

gram so diversified as in Peru, and nowhere has the participation of the other Government been more effective. These are truly cooperative programs administered through binational agencies to which the Peruvian Government contributes around four times more than we do. In agriculture, our technical assistance ranges from crop experimentation, especially in the Amazon jungle region, to assistance in farm irrigation, soil conservation, farm-machinery operation, and demonstration farms. The dissemination of information on fertilizers, new seeds, and insecticides has raised yields of particular crops up to 400 percent. Our health and sanitation service operates in the Peruvian jungle and northern coastal area, its activities ranging from sewage disposal and water-supply projects to the administration of hospital and aid stations. One mobile dispensary alone in the jungle region, for example, treated nearly 12,000 patients in the first 18 months of its operation.

In the case of Venezuela we were faced recently with a problem of a very different kind. Venezuela is a country which is friendly to us and of which Americans are sincere friends. Many of our citizens live there, and there is a feeling of mutual respect and liking between them and the Venezuelans.

This great country produces about 1,800 million barrels of oil a day, a staggering amount which is nearly three times the maximum output ever attained in Iran, of which we read so much. The Venezuelans asked us to revise our trade agreement with them and to reduce the import duty on petroleum products. This presented difficulties to us since the Tariff Commission, under the peril-point amendment to the last extension of the Trade Agreements Act, found that the peril point for petroleum imports was higher than the level to which the Venezuelans hoped that we could reduce this duty. We had to find a compromise which would protect the interests of domestic oil and coal producers and meet the legitimate aspirations of our Venezuelan friends. We also wanted to get from them concessions on some of our exports, and our demands presented difficulties for them. Our trade with Venezuela is running at an annual rate of exports to that country of about 500 million dollars, and this is a market to which exporters would want us to give special attention. The negotiations lasted 2 years. It was at times a nerve-racking task. However, as a result of patience on both sides and in part because of the personal friendship and trust which existed between the Venezuelan Foreign Office and my own Department, we concluded these negotiations last month, and the new tariff schedules have just gone into effect.² While we have not achieved as much as either side wanted, we have a good sound agree-

² For text of the Supplementary Trade Agreement with Venezuela signed Aug. 28, see BULLETIN of Sept. 29, 1952, p. 487; for a statement by the President see *ibid.*, Sept. 15, 1952, p. 401.

ment. I predict that as a result of the trade agreement and of new developments in Venezuela, particularly the tremendous investment now going into the production of iron ore, our export trade with that country will increase substantially in the next few years.

Chile is a country with which we have had especially friendly relations for many years. Many of our problems with Chile revolve around the exportation of Chilean copper, which constitutes an important part of our total consumption in this country. When I took over as Assistant Secretary of State in 1949, the price of copper had fallen to 16 cents a pound. In order to enable the Chileans to proceed with development programs of great urgency, we consented to the unusual device of making the Chileans a 25 million dollar balance-of-payments loan—unusual because Export-Import Bank loans are generally made only for specific construction projects. By the time of Korea the price of copper was 24½ cents, and it was at this price that the Ors ceiling was imposed. However, since the price of copper had not risen to the same extent as other commodity prices, the Chileans in 1951 asked for a price increase, and the ceiling was moved up to 27½ cents for imported copper, although the domestic price was not increased. Last spring the Chileans became dissatisfied with the agreement largely because the world market price was higher than the U.S. ceiling price for copper imports. United States buyers were unable to obtain the quantities of copper allocated for U.S. use. Consequently, we agreed to the termination of the agreement, and the U.S. Government amended U.S. price regulations so as to permit the import of copper at world prices. Copper continues today to be extremely important to our rearmament effort. Our Communist enemies talk about unfair treatment by our country of Latin American commodities, but the price ceiling on domestic copper is still 24½ cents a pound today whereas Chile is receiving 36½ cents for its copper. The only concern which a true friend of Chile need have as to the price of copper is that the Chileans exercise restraint lest they prejudice their position as a principal supplier of copper in the world market, a mistake which is not without precedent in the history of Latin American commodities.

The friendly relations between Chile and the United States have been marked in recent years by joint programs which have resulted in the construction of a large steel mill, from which Chile is actually exporting steel to neighboring countries; the planned increase of Chile's electric-energy output by about 40 percent in less than 10 years through the construction of some six major hydroelectric plants; the development of industries for the fabrication of copper and the production of cement, cellulose, pulp and paper, and rayon; the expansion of a ferromanganese plant; and irrigation and land-clearance programs. This coopera-

tion has furnished the illustrious Chilean Navy with two first-rate heavy cruisers which were transferred last year under the Mutual Security Program at prices which Chile could afford. It has meant that our Department of Commerce has accorded high priority ratings for materials in short supply so that the needs of our rearmament effort would not impede Chile from building its first oil refinery and pipeline, so that Chile could expand its new steel mill, and so that it could build roads and improve its railways. A new administration will come into office in Chile in November. We trust that the same cooperative attitude will continue between Chile and our country which has brought so much benefit to the people of that great country.

Last summer I had the honor of accompanying our Secretary of State on his visit to Brazil. He described himself as being staggered by that great country—by its vastness, its actual and potential wealth, and by the dynamic spirit of the Brazilians whom he saw both in Rio de Janeiro and in the great industrial city of São Paulo, one of the fastest growing cities in the world today and one of the most beautiful.³ The tempo of our relations with Brazil has reached the point where during September and October we shall have had the privilege of welcoming to our country the Brazilian Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of Finance, the Ministers of War and of the Navy, and the Chief of Staff of the Brazilian Air Force. All will have come as friends, and our business with them will be done as it always is between allies. As exporters, you will be glad to know that when Dr. Lafer, the Brazilian Finance Minister, was with us last month he talked frankly with us about the steps which he is taking and intends to take about Brazil's commercial indebtedness—a problem which we can hope is of only a transitory nature. On his return to Rio, Dr. Lafer stated to the press that Brazilian relations with the United States "have never been on a higher level than at present."

With Brazil we have two kinds of experiments in international cooperation which are ideally adapted to the special relationship between countries of the size and complementary character of Brazil and the United States. One is the first Joint Commission for Economic Development which was created last year under the Point Four legislation. To that commission both Governments have contributed outstanding leaders and technical experts to work on plans for enabling Brazil more promptly to realize its tremendous economic potential. When we met with the Joint Commission last July, we were deeply impressed by the scope of its programs which are now being turned into specific projects for the rehabilitation

³ For texts of addresses made by Secretary Acheson in Brazil, see *ibid.*, July 14, 1952, p. 47, and July 21, 1952, p. 87.

of port works and railroad transportation, the improvement of agriculture, and the development and diversification of the country's electric-power resources. Added to what already has been accomplished through cooperative programs in Brazil, the work of this commission will accelerate the realization by Brazil of its full economic potential.

In the military field we have had since 1942 two joint U.S.-Brazilian military commissions, one in Rio and one in Washington. These two commissions have been active for more than 10 years, including the period of our great wartime collaboration, in planning the cooperative activities of Brazil and the United States to protect the vital strategic points, to guard the trade routes, and to render secure against aggression the populations of the hemisphere in which we live. Military talks in Rio de Janeiro last month have provided for streamlining and coordinating the work of these commissions. Never have military talks between two countries been held on a more friendly basis.

We have also recently negotiated with Brazil, as well as with certain other countries in the hemisphere, bilateral military agreements under which the United States will furnish military equipment free of charge in return for the agreement of the other countries to carry out specified tasks related to the defense of the hemisphere in the event of war, under plans worked out by the Inter-American Defense Board. This program is our contribution to making effective the inter-American understandings with regard to collective defense. The Communists, with their usual divisive tactics, have spread confusion about these agreements. The fact that they have tried so hard to do this is, of course, another demonstration that they don't like to see our hemispheric arrangements becoming more effective. I wish to make it clear once and for all that these agreements have no aggressive design; that they have nothing to do, as the Communists have charged, with making raw materials available to us at low prices; and that there is nothing in them which impairs the sovereignty of the other countries concerned. On the positive side, they will help other countries to defend themselves and the hemisphere if war should come.

Communist Efforts To Divide the Hemisphere

While on the subject of Communist efforts to divide our hemisphere, I might point out one great difference between the United States in this part of the world and Russia. In this hemisphere the United States has a position of great responsibility. It is a position which has steadily increased in the last decade not only because of our emergence as a great world power but also because of the decline in importance of certain European countries and Japan, which formerly had much larger investment and trade interests in Latin

America than they now have. These countries were in a sense competitors of specific U.S. interests in the economic field. But, at the same time, they helped to discharge certain of the responsibilities which now devolve more completely upon this country as a whole in regard to such factors as furnishing capital for development, supplying a market for their raw materials, and providing scarce manufactured goods. I do not believe that, in appraising our Latin American relations, account is taken sufficiently of the tremendous responsibilities that now devolve upon the United States in this area—politically, economically, and militarily. In the American family of nations there is a tendency to take the United States for granted, just as families of individuals take a particular member for granted. On the other hand, Russia has never had any important ties with Latin America either commercially, through investment, through immigration, or through religious or cultural affinity. It is thus in a position of total irresponsibility. Its only interest in Latin America is to keep it weak and to divide our community by sowing suspicion and playing upon discontent. The propaganda line of the Soviet Union can be changed at will at any time to suit its advantage as day-to-day tactics may require, but the long-range strategy of aggression remains the same.

The U.S. Government has no propaganda line. We do not say one thing one day and another thing the next. Through the U.S. Information Service we tell the truth about the United States and our efforts to save freedom throughout the world. Through our Educational Exchange Program we help to further inter-American understanding. One interesting new departure in this program has been to invite to the United States groups from different labor organizations so that they can have direct contact with our own labor groups. There are in this country at this time groups of labor leaders from Mexico, Colombia, and Nicaragua. Respecting the complete integrity and independence of the organized labor movement in this country, we nevertheless have regular exchanges of views with U.S. labor leaders on Latin American relations. We also have had very fruitful consultations with business groups through the Latin American Committee of the Business Advisory Council of the Department of Commerce.

During the period that I have been in office I have visited all of the 20 countries of Latin America at least once. During this period I have traveled over 100,000 miles. When I visited Honduras in 1950, I was told that I was the highest ranking official of our Government to go to that country since 1911, the year that I was born. When I went to Paraguay that same year, I was the highest ranking official of our Government ever to visit that country. I wish that I could speak more in detail about some of the things that

I have seen. I shall never forget, for example, the visits which I made to the gallant and progressive country of Uruguay, which is a staunch friend of the United States and of democracy and which all Americans who have been there love forevermore. Nor shall I forget my visits to that other great democracy of Costa Rica, whose Government is giving its people an administration of the highest degree of competence in fiscal matters and, at the same time, living up with complete fidelity to the democratic ideals and traditions of that beautiful and progressive country which is known throughout the world for its democracy.

I wish I could speak in detail about the gallant troops from the Republic of Colombia who are fighting side by side with our own men in that great test of whether or not we shall let aggression run rampant again as it did in the late '30's. General Lemnitzer, who commanded the U.S. Seventh Division in Korea, said of the Colombian troops that no country had a better right than Colombia to feel proud of its troops and that "Operation Climbet" (the name given the attack carried out by the Colombian Battalion) was, in small scale, the most successful military action that he had witnessed in two wars.

International relations today consist of a complex of all kinds of relations in all sorts of different levels. We in the Department of State have a function which, though it is important and must be exercised with the highest degree of public accountability, is nevertheless only one factor in the totality of our relations. Our efforts can never rise above the standards fashioned by our country as a whole. A single American corporation in a foreign country can have a greater impact—and I mean an impact for either good or bad—than all the efforts that we in the Government can make. The petroleum companies in Venezuela, for example, have pursued policies of such enlightened self-interest that they are a credit to this country as a whole. American tourists or American families who reside abroad are, in the eyes of the people among whom they travel and live, the image of our country. An American leader or an American newspaperman who comments on our international relations often has, depending upon the degree of his prestige (or, unfortunately on occasion, upon the degree of his inaccuracy), an impact greater than the impact, if any, of the words uttered here tonight by the official directly entrusted with the conduct of our governmental relations with this part of the world.

And I wish to carry this theme of responsibility

for international relations one step further. This responsibility lies not only on all the people of this country, but our relations with any other country of the world at any given moment depend just as much upon the government and people of the other country concerned. I frankly become impatient when I read continually allegations that our Government is responsible for a deterioration in relations with another country, whereas I seldom read about another government's responsibility to maintain good relations with the United States. I am impatient because the state of our relations can never be any better than the people and officials of the other country wish them to be. International cooperation is a two-way street. Like human friendship it is up to both sides. Today one of the great factors in our relations with Latin America is the growth which occurs in some countries more than in others of nationalism. Now nationalism is something which is not inherently bad. We have some of it ourselves. Nationalism is only bad when it hurts the interests of the country concerned. It is especially bad where, as all too often happens, what is taken for nationalism is merely the effort of a public official or a citizen in another country to exculpate himself for failure or to divert attention from that failure. The readiness of the United States to help another country should never be confused with willingness on our part to accept responsibility for other peoples' negligence or inaction.

I believe that we can look forward to a long period of mutually profitable relations with our sister Republics in the hemisphere, relations based upon respect for human dignity and for the national sovereignty of other countries. Democracy is still a goal rather than a reality in many parts of this hemisphere. The pendulum has swung one way and then the other; democracy has had its ups and downs. Yet we must never have faint hearts. We must not tire in the struggle and confuse a temporary set-back with permanent disaster. We must never lose sight of the goal of democracy even though reality may be yet to come. And we in this country with our Anglo-Saxon traditions must never judge others by ourselves; we must never forget that our neighbors to the south are people who are intensely proud of themselves and of their traditions and their cultures. If we can work together with patience and understanding, we can look forward to a community of nations which will be stronger and more closely knit and where the interests of the individual will always be better served.

The American Farmer in the World Picture

by Stanley Andrews

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The remarks which I shall make revolve around three principal points, briefly as follows: (1) the role that farmers played in helping to win World War II; (2) the international factors behind the rather extraordinary demand for the products of American farms since 1945, with a discussion of some of the factors in that demand, as well as some of the danger signals that may be looming over the horizon; (3) the impact and objectives of the Point Four Program in today's world agricultural picture.

I do not think I need to dwell very long on the first point in this discussion, that is, the farmers' role in war, because this group of bankers from all over Missouri can hardly have escaped the full realization of the importance that American farm production played in the last war.

It is no exaggeration to say that, without this extraordinary farm production from America, we could not have won the war, and the disorganized, disturbed, and hungry people that grew up behind the armies as we rolled from Africa to Berlin literally would have exploded into chaos without the foods which came from America, often on the same ship carrying the munitions of war. American agricultural production, to meet the challenge of the times, was kept at a peak rate with the smallest number of men and women employed and produced more and achieved a greater degree of efficiency than any nation had ever before achieved.

With just about 15 percent of the employed people in America engaged in agriculture, production was increased over the 10 years between about 1940 and 1950 by a little better than 40 percent. A great part of this increase was achieved during the war years and represented the largest production per man employed in any country in the world.

I do not think we ought to pass this off as a mere patriotic gesture or even a more than ordinary desire of American farmers to help out in the war.

Certainly farmers are no more or no less patriotic than those from other walks of life. Let's give a little credit to the wartime agriculture policy in this country; namely, we wanted production and we paid handsomely for it. Farmers, like anyone else, respond to price. So much then for American agriculture up to the end of the fighting in 1945.

Many people were freely predicting an agricultural slump in about 1946 or 1947 very similar to what occurred after World War I and it was a safe assumption to make that prediction if we looked at the historical factors, and if we looked only at the then position of American agriculture and disregarded things that happened in the windup of the little peace we did achieve.

Dislocation of Agriculture by War

The first fact that was vitally important in this picture was that this war had dislocated people and wreaked havoc and destruction more completely and over a greater area than any other war in the history of the world. Production capacity, from agriculture to electronics, was badly disorganized and the materials and the manpower and the tools for production were woefully lacking. Even those things were rather rapidly overcome and in a period of some 4 or 5 years after the war Western Europe, particularly, was well on the way to its postwar production. Something else happened when victorious allies sat down at Potsdam to devise and work out a mechanism of organizing the peace.

Because of the position of the battle lines at the end of the war, the Russians came out in control of practically every surplus food-producing area in Europe, while the Western Allies controlled the Western European industrial plant. In other words, the great eastern plain of Germany became the Russian zone; the great bread basket of Poland became a responsibility of Russia and later a satellite; the Danube Basin countries of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, which

¹ Summary of remarks made before the Missouri Bankers Association Agricultural Short Course, Columbia, Mo., Oct. 9 (press release 793).

once literally fed the hungry mouths of Western Europe, fell into Russian hands. Even the single small area in the Danube Basin in the little country of Austria, the only area in that unfortunate land which has a surplus of wheat and potato production, was taken over by the Russians and for a period up to the close of the Greek War, the Macedonian Plain, about the only area in Greece which could produce surplus food, was in the hands of insurrectionists. All of these areas in normal times shipped from 3 to as high in some years as 11 million tons of food into the Scandinavian countries, into France, into England, into Italy, and in a general way helped supply that extra 30 percent of food and raw materials which Western Europe must get from somewhere else if it survives. But that was not the total picture.

In the Far East, where you recall there was also a war, a war which America and her allies won, we conquered Japan, a nation of 75 million people, but it was a liability from the standpoint of food rather than an asset. Japan, in the years before Pearl Harbor, had developed a food supply in Formosa, in Korea, and in the islands of the Pacific. What little extra food she needed, she traded with the United States for that food. The great rice bowl of Asia—Burma, Indochina and Siam—was torn with the bitterest kind of internal strife and political revolution. Only Siam was able to organize itself very quickly and get back to something like a normal production of rice, which is the lifeblood and the life line of the great masses of the Orient. China, of course, in the years that followed the signing of the peace, fell into a revolution and is now little more than a Russian satellite, and there is an Iron Curtain across whatever supplies used to come from that part of the world. Burma, now a new and sovereign state, is beset with internal difficulties, and an area which was once used to moving as high as 3 million tons of rice into the channels of international trade, does well to move 1 million tons. Indochina, which before the war moved from 500,000 to 1½ million tons of rice into international trade now does well to move 200,000 to 500,000 tons. Almost parallel with all of this has been a decline in the food-production potential of countries like Argentina. Further, rising domestic consumption is reducing the exportable supplies of countries like Australia. Only Canada and the United States have remained in the column of major surplus cereal-producing countries on a large and consistent scale.

Rising Food Demand

In the years which followed 1945, right up until the present hour, the United States of America has taken from American farms something like an average of 15 million tons of principally wheat, rice, and corn and shipped it to various parts of the world to plug up the gap to keep people off the starvation line in the countries I have mentioned.

Possibly the greatest single danger to the Far East in the present difficult and uneasy situation is the possibility that Russia may sooner or later cause the Chinese Communists to march again, and Burma and Siam on the borders of Communist China, where an army of untold thousands stands poised, will be enveloped. They could close off that vital rice bowl from the millions in the Orient and that would mean that something near 750 million people in the Far East would have to turn to the West again for something like 15 to 30 percent of their food supply. So you see there has been a demand, there has been a market, there have been hungry millions who have demanded, needed, and consumed this extra food which America has produced.

There is another factor which is very important in this picture and something we should take account of when we survey the future possible needs for food production and fiber production. The world population has increased in the 10 years since 1939 by something like 230 million people. A good part of that increase has been in the Orient where food production is still far behind the post-war period. There has been a measurable increase in Western Europe and of course here in the United States. Two hundred and thirty million additional people—a population equal to Russia's—must be clothed and fed.

That is the challenge of this hour not only for America but, more important, a challenge to the people of the world to increase their production and at least try to keep pace with the rising food demand. If you want to put it another way, food production in the last 10 years has increased by 9 percent world-wide; the population has increased by 13 percent.

Wide Exchange of Products Required

There is another extraordinary factor in this world food picture, and that is the fact that the United States through military aid, through Marshall Plan aid, through UNRRA, and other means has financed from the Treasury of the United States about half of all this food which has been shipped abroad in the years from 1945 to this date. That simply means that the American taxpayers have voted money and have given it to these countries and they, in turn, have used our money to buy our food. I would be the last to suggest that we should not have done this. As a matter of fact, I can bear testimony to the fact that without this aid and without this food, Western Europe certainly would have gone down in chaos, and I am not so sure that Japan today would not be behind the Iron Curtain if we had not played the role of a generous conqueror and helped that beaten nation back on its feet and kept it from starving, and starve it most certainly would have without the wheat, rice, fats, and oils which came from this country. Thus, we stand in the last quarter of 1952. In the current crop year

we have in America probably the second largest crop in our history. Our sister country to the north, Canada, has one of its largest wheat crops, some 650 million bushels. The return of cotton, tobacco, and rice production in some areas leads some to believe that possibly we may begin entering an era of American surpluses. This can hardly be true of rice because right at this time America, which is not supposed to be a great rice producing area, is rationing what supplies it has among the claimants of the world.

So we do not know just what the answer is or should be. But certainly the assured market which we have been enjoying in recent years, primarily through aid which we have pumped into the other countries, is not as sure as it has been in years past. As a matter of fact, American aid to European countries is on the decline and food is only bought with American aid when it supplements the defense effort or releases funds to be used in defense that would otherwise have to go for food. So without another increased aid program along these lines, the chances are there will be some decline in American exports. There is another danger signal on the horizon which, in my opinion, may vitally affect the whole course of America's world relations and America's role in the present tremendously critical international situation. I refer to the rising cry for protectionism not only among certain industries in the United States but among farm groups. Surely we should realize that we cannot sell our surplus products such as wheat, fats and oils, corn, cotton, tobacco, and even certain fruits and other exotic food unless the countries which normally need our food have something with which to buy. Unless those countries have an opportunity to sell in the American market those products which they can produce most efficiently and which they have in surplus and which they can sell, America is closing the door in the face of its friends. I will not go into details here, but I can relate to you by the hour the foolish, insignificant laws or administrative rulings devised to protect some small favored group in this country, the result of which is literally to destroy friends and discourage commerce and trade faster than all of our efforts can build it.

A third danger signal is the rising restriction not only in our country against freer and larger trade between the United States and the free world but the rising restriction upon the part of countries themselves outside the United States area who are trying to achieve everything at once and feel they can achieve certain industrial and other developments by the simple process of an Iron Curtain type of economic diplomacy which restricts the normal flow of goods and services. The United States is not the only big bad wolf in this field. Only through the widest possible exchange of products over the world can there be anything resembling this so-called expanding world economy which is the lifeblood of trade and the lifeblood of human progress.

The Meaning of Point Four

I come now to my last point in this discussion—the Point Four Program and its meaning to the world. I do not think I need to go into the details of how this program, which represents one of the many points or facets of our American foreign policy, came into being. It is another attempt to carry on our responsibilities which have either been thrust upon us or at least which we have assumed. This program, designed primarily to pass on technical skills we may have acquired here in the United States to the less fortunate countries of the world, is now operating in some 35 countries. There are something over 1,500 Americans who have given up their jobs and their associations in their communities here in the States, and are out on the frontiers in these countries, which stretch from far-away Afghanistan to the tip of South America, in an attempt as individuals to meet and work with other individuals to the end that total production, agricultural and industrial, may be increased and thus the standard of living of the underprivileged people raised just a little bit.

I want to repeat to this group that this is not a hand-out program. We are not setting up a global WPA to give everybody a tile bathtub or a quart of milk.

If you had been with me in recent weeks in two widely separated portions of the world—far-away Indonesia and Burma and close-at-home El Salvador and Brazil—and if you had met the Americans there, I think you would have got the idea that they were not out with a checkbook and a hand-out, but were there with whatever skill they possessed and with a willingness and a sincerity to walk beside their counterparts in these countries and attempt an attack on some of the difficult problems that multiply by the hour in these countries.

These men and women are working as public-health people, along with their counterparts in these countries; they are working as skilled industrial engineers; they are working as county agents; they are working as educators, transportation experts, administration experts, and what have you. Things are being achieved—nonspectacular things to be sure but that is the only way you can do very much with very little. That is, we must multiply the effort—the small effort of many people if we are going to achieve the things that the present situation in the world demands. I am not one who is trying to tell you that the Point Four Program is an answer to communism. The Point Four Program is democracy's way of achieving a peaceful and more stable world. I am not even going to say that it can meet the problem of communism. I do say that with all of our military might, and we must have it, with all of our building up of force with which to hold back communism, we may be able to contain communism that way, but we shall never "stop it" with

military might alone. We shall never stop the spread of it even behind a military wall. So I believe our aid programs in the form of technical assistance, our trade and economic policy, which we hope is designed to keep friends and promote wider distribution of goods in the world, may well be two of the real factors in this more stable peace we are all looking for.

I think the evidence is conclusive that American farm production has sustained the free world, has kept a good part of the free world from actual starvation and chaos since 1945. Whether we can continue this through another decade of cold war, whether we should or not is not for me to say. The facts are inescapable. We have done this up to now. It seems to me without extraordinary luck, without extraordinary increased production in many areas, without the miracle of some sort of settlement between the United States and Russia, we *shall* probably have to carry this role for some time in the future. It is my hope that we can maintain an economic policy and create a trade policy which will enable people to work, to produce with their best skills, and to sell to us, thus enabling them to have the dignity of paying their way by their own work and their own skill.

Agreement for Transport of Iron Curtain Escapees

The following was released to the press at Geneva on September 30 by the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe:

An agreement to move to new homes overseas refugees who have fled from countries of the Soviet bloc has been concluded between the U.S. Government and the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe.

Pierre Jacobsen, Acting Director of the Migration Committee, announcing the signing of the agreement, estimated the Committee would provide transport by the end of this year for several thousand recent refugees from Iron Curtain countries.

The U.S. Escapee Program provides assistance in the permanent resettlement overseas for those refugees who have become an added burden to the economies of hard-pressed Western European countries and who hold valid emigration visas for an overseas country. Realizing that the free countries bordering on the Iron Curtain could not and should not shoulder the complete burden of providing food and shelter for the destitute refugees, President Truman on March 23, 1952, authorized the use of Mutual Security Act funds up to 4,300,000 dollars for this purpose and for assistance in resettling the refugees in overseas countries.

Under the agreement just signed, retroactive to July 1, the U.S. Department of State designates the refugees it wants moved and the Migration Committee then provides transport for them from their place of present residence in Europe to the country of immigration.

Mr. Jacobsen said that the fullest cooperation would be maintained with U.S. authorities and with the voluntary agencies participating in the U.S. Escapee Program, in order to give refugees up-to-date information on migration plans and possibilities. Projects for the migration of escapees and their families will be submitted to the European offices of the U.S. Escapee Program by voluntary agencies.

The Migration Committee has already begun moving refugees under this plan, and several hundreds have been transported to their new homes overseas.¹

Transfer of Capital Accounts in the Netherlands

Press release 801 dated October 10

The American Embassy at The Hague has reported to the Department of State that the Netherlands Bank on October 9 announced that the free transfer of capital accounts (the so-called non-transferrable Guilder accounts) owned by persons who were nonresident aliens on June 30, 1952 has been authorized. Such transfers, according to the Bank announcement, will have to be effective before January 1, 1953.

The major exception in the Bank announcement concerns undivided estates.

Eligible holders of hitherto nontransferrable accounts should get in touch with their bank in the Netherlands for further details concerning application for transfer.

Point Four Consultant for Foreign Investment

The appointment of August Maffry as special consultant to stimulate private investments abroad as an integral part of the Point Four Program was announced on October 22 (press release 829) by the Department of State.

Mr. Maffry will work closely with Administrator Stanley Andrews of the Technical Cooperation Administration in carrying out statutory requirements that the Point Four Program assist sound business investments in aiding the development of 35 countries of Latin America, the Middle East, Asia and Africa, where the Point Four Program is operating.

¹ For an article summarizing progress under the Escapee Program, see BULLETIN of Aug. 18, 1952, p. 261.

Copyright Benefits Granted to Principality of Monaco

A PROCLAMATION¹

WHEREAS section 9 of title 17 of the United States Code, entitled "Copyrights", as codified and enacted into positive law by the act of Congress approved July 30, 1947, 61 Stat. 652, provides in part that the copyright secured by said title shall extend to the work of an author or proprietor who is a citizen or subject of a foreign state or nation only:

"(a) When an alien author or proprietor shall be domiciled within the United States at the time of the first publication of his work; or

"(b) When the foreign state or nation of which such author or proprietor is a citizen or subject grants, either by treaty, convention, agreement, or law, to citizens of the United States the benefit of copyright on substantially the same basis as to its own citizens, or copyright protection, substantially equal to the protection secured to such foreign author under this title or by treaty; or when such foreign state or nation is a party to an international agreement which provides for reciprocity in the granting of copyright, by the terms of which agreement the United States may, at its pleasure, become a party thereto."; and

WHEREAS section 1 of the said title 17 provides in part as follows:

"Any person entitled thereto, upon complying with the provisions of this title, shall have the exclusive right:

"(e) To perform the copyrighted work publicly for profit if it be a musical composition; . . . *Provided*, That the provisions of this title, so far as they secure copyright controlling the parts of instruments serving to reproduce mechanically the musical work, shall include only compositions published and copyrighted after July 1, 1909, and shall not include the works of a foreign author or composer unless the foreign state or nation of which such author or composer is a citizen or subject grants, either by treaty, convention, agreement, or law, to citizens of the United States similar rights."; and

WHEREAS section 9 of the said title 17 further provides that "The existence of the reciprocal conditions aforesaid shall be determined by the President of the United States, by proclamation made from time to time, as the purposes of this title may require . . ."; and

WHEREAS a Sovereign Ordinance has been issued this day by His Serene Highness the Prince of Monaco whereby citizens of the United States as of this day are entitled to obtain copyright protection in the Principality of Monaco for all their artistic and literary works on substantially the same basis as nationals of Monaco, including rights similar to those provided by section 1 (e) of the said title 17:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, HARRY S. TRUMAN, President of the United States of America, do declare and proclaim:

That as of this day the conditions specified in sections 9 (b) and 1 (e) of title 17 of the United States Code exist and are fulfilled with respect to nationals of the Principality of Monaco, and that nationals of the Principality of Monaco as of this day are entitled to all the benefits of the said title 17 except those conferred by the provisions embodied in the second paragraph of section 9 (b) thereof regarding the extension of time for fulfilling copyright conditions and formalities.


Provided, that the enjoyment by any work of the rights and benefits conferred by the said title 17 shall be conditioned upon compliance with the requirements and formalities prescribed with respect to such works by the copyright laws of the United States:

And provided further, that the provisions of section 1 (e) of the said title 17, so far as they secure copyright controlling parts of instruments serving to reproduce mechanically the musical work, shall apply only to compositions published on or after this day, and registered for copyright in the United States which have not been reproduced within the United States prior to this day on any contrivance by means of which the work may be mechanically performed.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this fifteenth day of October in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and fifty-two and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and seventy-seventh.

[SEAL]



By the President:

DAVID BRUCE,
Acting Secretary of State

Procedures for Periodic Review of Trade Agreement Concessions

EXECUTIVE ORDER¹

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the statutes, including section 332 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (46 Stat. 698), the Trade Agreements Act approved June 12, 1934, as amended (48 Stat. 943; 57 Stat. 125; 59 Stat. 410; 63 Stat. 697; Public Law 50, 82d Congress), and the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951 (Public Law 50, 82d Congress); and in the interest of the foreign-affairs functions of the United States, in order to carry out international obligations of the United States, and in order that the interests of the various branches of American economy may be effectively promoted and safeguarded in the administration of the trade-agreements program, it is hereby ordered as follows:


1. So long as a trade-agreement concession remains withdrawn, suspended, or modified, in whole or in part, pursuant to action taken under section 7 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951 or comparable provisions of any statute or Executive order, the Tariff Commission shall keep under review developments with regard to the product to which such concession relates, and shall make periodic reports to the President concerning such developments. The first such report shall in each case be made at such time, not more than two years after the original withdrawal, suspension, or modification of the trade-agreement concession, as will best enable it to be based upon a full marketing year for the product involved, and any subsequent reports with respect to such product shall be made at intervals of one year. The Tariff Commission shall also make such a report in any case at such other time as it may consider appropriate or as may be requested by the President, and a report so made shall constitute compliance with any requirement of this paragraph for a periodic report within six months before or after the date of its submission.

2. Whenever in the judgment of the Tariff Commission conditions of competition with respect to the trade in the imported article and the like or directly competitive do-

¹ No. 203; 17 *Fed. Reg.* 9159.

¹ No. 10401; 17 *Fed. Reg.* 9159.

mestic product concerned have so changed as to warrant it, or upon request of the President, the Commission shall institute a formal investigation to determine whether, and, if so, to what extent, the withdrawal, suspension, or modification of a trade-agreement concession remains necessary in order to prevent or remedy serious injury or the threat thereof to the domestic industry concerned. As a part of any such investigation, the Commission shall hold a hearing at which interested parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to be present, to produce evidence, and to be heard. Upon completion of such an investigation the Commission shall report to the President its findings as to what extent, if any, the withdrawal, suspension, or modification involved remains necessary in order to prevent or remedy serious injury or the threat thereof to the domestic industry concerned. The Commission may prescribe such rules and regulations for the conduct of investigations under this paragraph as it shall deem appropriate.



THE WHITE HOUSE,
October 14, 1952.

Suspension of Korean Tonnage Duties

A PROCLAMATION¹

WHEREAS section 4228 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, as amended by the act of July 24, 1897, c. 13, 30 Stat. 214 (U. S. C., title 46, sec. 141), provides, in part, as follows:

"Upon satisfactory proof being given to the President, by the government of any foreign nation, that no discriminating duties of tonnage or imposts are imposed or levied in the ports of such nation upon vessels wholly belonging to citizens of the United States, or upon the produce, manufactures, or merchandise imported in the same from the United States or from any foreign country, the President may issue his proclamation, declaring that the foreign discriminating duties of tonnage and impost within the United States are suspended and discontinued, so far as respects the vessels of such foreign nation, and the produce, manufactures, or merchandise imported into the United States from such foreign nation, or from any other foreign country; the suspension to take effect from the time of such notification being given to the President, and to continue so long as the reciprocal exemption of vessels, belonging to citizens of the United States, and their cargoes, shall be continued, and no longer . . .";

AND WHEREAS satisfactory proof was received by me from the Government of Korea on October 1, 1952, that no discriminating duties of tonnage or imposts are imposed or levied in the ports of Korea upon vessels wholly belonging to citizens of the United States, or upon the produce, manufactures, or merchandise imported in such vessels, from the United States, or from any foreign country:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, HARRY S. TRUMAN, President of the United States of America, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the above-quoted statutory provisions, do hereby declare and proclaim that the foreign discriminating duties of tonnage and imposts within the United States are suspended and discontinued so far as respects the vessels of Korea and the produce, manufactures, or merchandise imported in said vessels into the United States from Korea or from any other foreign country; the suspension to take

¹No. 2992; 17 *Fed. Reg.* 9125.

Dedicatory Ceremonies Held at Obregon Dam

The Export-Import Bank on October 16 announced that Herbert E. Gaston, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank, would attend dedication ceremonies on that date at the Obregon Dam at El Oviachic on the Yaqui River, 40 kilometers upstream from Ciudad Obregon in the State of Sonora, Mexico. This dam is a part of a vast program for the development of irrigation and power which began in the Yaqui Valley of southeast Sonora early in the century. At present 117,000 hectares are irrigated from the flow as now controlled by the Angostura Dam which was completed in 1942. At both the Obregon and Angostura Dams electric energy can be generated.


The storage provided by the Obregon Dam not only will assure a dependable water supply for this original area under irrigation but will permit the irrigation of 103,000 additional hectares of land. This land has required the construction of the Yaqui Alto Canal for which 17,500,000 dollars was provided from the proceeds of a 31-million-dollar credit authorized by the Export-Import Bank in December 1950. Also included in this authorization were funds for the construction of the Falcón Dam and the Anzalduas Diversion Dam, both on the Rio Grande.

These latter two projects could not have been undertaken had it not been for the understanding reached between the United States and Mexico which culminated in the execution of the Water Treaty of February 3, 1944, providing for the utilization for the mutual benefit of both countries of the waters of the Colorado and the Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande. This is an outstanding example of what can be accomplished through international collaboration when two countries cooperate in developing boundary rivers.

effect from October 1, 1952, and to continue so long as the reciprocal exemption of vessels belonging to citizens of the United States and their cargoes shall be continued, and no longer.

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this thirteenth day of October, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and fifty-two and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and seventy-seventh.



By the President:

DAVID BRUCE,
Acting Secretary of State.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of Meetings¹

Adjourned during October 1952

FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization):		
Eucalyptus Study Tour	Australia	Sept.-Oct.
FAO/ECLA Central American Seminar on Agricultural Credit . . .	Guatemala City	Sept. 15-Oct. 15
European Forestry and Forest Products Commission: 5th Session .	Geneva	Oct. 14-25
Committee on Relations with International Organizations: 1st Meeting.	Rome	Oct. 23-24
ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization):		
Special Diplomatic Conference to Conclude a Convention on Damage Caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third Parties on the Surface.	Rome	Sept. 9-Oct. 6
Statistics Division Meeting: 2d Session	Montreal	Sept. 16-Oct. 6
UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization):		
International Seminar on the Role of Museums in Education . . .	Brooklyn	Sept. 14-Oct. 12
Seminar on Education of Asian Youth	Rangoon	Oct. 7-28
ILO (International Labor Organization):		
Seminar on Social Security	Rio de Janeiro	Sept. 15-Oct. 4
Petroleum Committee: 4th Session	Scheveningen, Netherlands .	Oct. 14-25
UN (United Nations):		
Economic and Social Council:		
Subcommission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities: 5th Session.	New York	Sept. 22-Oct. 3
Economic Commission for Europe:		
Industry and Materials Committee, Working Party on Housing Statistics.	Geneva	Oct. 6-7
Timber Committee	Geneva	Oct. 13-20
International Children's Emergency Fund: Program Committee and Executive Board.	New York	Oct. 6-10, 13
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East: Committee on Industry and Trade, Subcommittee on Electric Power.	Bangkok	Sept. 29-Oct. 2
WHO (World Health Organization):		
Western Pacific Regional Conference: 3d Session	Saigon	Sept. 25-Oct. 1
Expert Committee on Bilbarzias: 1st Session.	Puerto Rico	Oct. 4-10
Expert Committee on Biological Standardization: 6th Session .	Geneva	Oct. 20-25
International Conference on Agricultural and Cooperative Credit (Washington phase).	Washington	Sept. 26-Oct. 2
First Inter-American Congress of Public Health.	Habana	Sept. 26-Oct. 1
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea.	Copenhagen.	Sept. 29-Oct. 7
Committee on Improvement of National Statistics: 2d Session . .	Ottawa	Sept. 29-Oct. 10
Meeting of International Sugar Council	London.	Oct. 3
International Sugar Council, Meeting of Special Committee . . .	London.	Sept. 29-Oct. 3
Sixth General Assembly of the International Council of Scientific Unions.	Amsterdam	Oct. 1-3
International Conference on Legal Metrology: Meeting of Provisional Committee.	Brussels.	Oct. 2-4
South Pacific Commission: 10th Session	Nouméa.	Oct. 6-16
International Committee on Weights and Measures: Biennial Session.	Sèvres	Oct. 7-14
International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries: Meeting of Panel for Sub-Area 1.	Copenhagen.	Oct. 8 (1 day)
PICMME (Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe):		
Finance Subcommittee.	Geneva.	Oct. 9-11
Fourth Session of Committee.	Geneva.	Oct. 13-21
Sixth Consultation of the Commission on Cartography of the Pan American Institute of Geography and History.	Ciudad Trujillo	Oct. 12-24
Pan American Highway Congress, Committee on Programming and Planning.	Mexico City.	Oct. 20-23

¹ Prepared in the Division of International Conferences, Department of State, Oct. 24, 1952. Asterisks indicate tentative dates.

Calendar of meetings—Continued

In Session as of October 31, 1952

ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization):		
Council: 17th Session	Montreal	Sept. 9-
Air Transport Committee: 17th Session	Montreal	Sept. 10-
Air Navigation Commission: 11th Session	Montreal	Sept. 23-
Aerodromes, Air Routes & Ground Aids Division Meeting: 5th Session.	Montreal	Oct. 21-
Special European-Mediterranean Regional Frequency Allocation Meeting.	Paris	Oct. 28-
ITU (International Telecommunication Union): International Plenipotentiary Telecommunication Conference.		
GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade): 7th Session of the Contracting Parties to GATT.	Geneva	Oct. 2-
UN (United Nations):		
Economic and Social Council: Economic Commission for Latin America: Iron and Steel International Conference.	Bogotá	Oct. 13-
General Assembly: 7th Session.	New York.	Oct. 14-
<i>Ad Hoc</i> Committee on Forced Labor: 3d Session.	Geneva.	Oct. 14-
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East: Committee on Industry and Trade, Seminar on Power Alcohol.	Lucknow	Oct. 23-
Economic Commission for Europe: Joint Meeting of Officers of Working Parties on Coordination, Transport Costs and Accountancy and Statistical Information.	Geneva.	Oct. 1-
First Ibero-American Congress on Archives, Libraries, and Copyrights.	Madrid.	Oct. 20-
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization):		
Fourth Session of the Indo-Pacific Fisheries Council.	Manila	Oct. 23-
Coordinating Committee.	Rome.	Oct. 27-
Pan American Highway Congress, Special Meeting.	Mexico City.	Oct. 26-

Scheduled November 1-January 31, 1953

International Wool Study Group: 5th Meeting	London.	Nov. 3-
American International Institute for the Protection of Childhood, Regional Meeting of Technical Delegates.	Mexico City.	Nov. 3-
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization):		
Second Meeting of the Technical Advisory Committee on Desert Locust Control.	Rome.	Nov. 3-
Committee on Commodity Problems: 20th Session	Rome	Nov. 5-
Committee on Financial Control	Rome	Nov. 5-
Meeting of the Committee on Integration of FAO and the International Office of Epizootics.	Rome	Nov. 10-
Council: 16th Session	Rome	Nov. 17-
FAO/WHO Joint Meeting on Malnutrition in Mothers	Gambia (Africa).	Nov. 28-
Forestry and Forest Products Commission for Asia and Pacific: 2d Session.	Kuala Lumpur and Singapore	Dec. 1-
Meeting of Experts on Index Numbers	Rome	Dec. 1-
Technical Meeting on Storage of Rice	Bangkok	Dec. 1-
Inter-American Meeting on Livestock Production.	São Paulo	Dec. 8-
UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization):		
Fourth Meeting of Representatives of National Commissions.	Paris	Nov. 8, Dec. 11
General Conference: 7th Session	Paris	Nov. 12-
First Regional Conference on Free and Compulsory Education in South Asia and the Pacific.	Bombay	Dec. 12-
UN (United Nations):		
Permanent Central Opium Board and Drug Supervisory Body: 8th Session.	Geneva.	Nov. 4-
Permanent Central Opium Board: 61st Session	Geneva.	Nov. 11-
Trusteeship Council:		
11th Session (2d Part).	New York	Nov. 7*
12th Session	New York	January
Economic and Social Council:		
Consultative Group in the Field of Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders—Combined European and North American Regional.	Geneva.	Dec. 8-
Consultative Group in the Field of Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders—Latin American Regional.	Latin America.	December
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East:		
Committee on Industry and Trade: 5th Session	Bandung	Jan. 26-
Inland Transport Committee: 2d Session	Bandung	Jan. 9-
Inland Transport Committee, Railway Subcommittee: 1st Session.	Bandung	Jan. 14-
Inland Transport Committee, Inland Waterway Subcommittee: 1st Session.	Bandung	Jan. 14-

Scheduled November 1—January 31, 1953—Continued

UN (United Nations)—Continued

Economic and Social Council—Continued		
Economic Commission for Europe: Meeting of Coal Committee	Geneva	Nov. 25-
Fiscal Commission: 4th Session.	New York	January
ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization):		
Standing Committee on Aircraft Performance	Montreal	Nov. 11-
Second South East Asia Regional Air Navigation Meeting (and Limited South Pacific).	Melbourne	Jan. 13-
Legal Committee: 9th Session	Montreal*.	January
ILO (International Labor Organization):		
Asian Advisory Committee: 4th Session	Geneva	Nov. 17-
Governing Body: 120th Session.	Geneva	Nov. 25-
Latin American Manpower Technical Conference	Lima	Dec. 1-
Technical Meeting on the Protection of Young Workers in Asian Countries.	Kandy, Ceylon	Dec. 1-
Meeting of International Sugar Council	London	Nov. 24-
West Indian Conference: 5th Session	Jamaica	Nov. 24-
Caribbean Commission: 15th Meeting	Jamaica	Dec. 1-
Sixth International Conference of Social Work	Madras	Dec. 14-
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization): 10th Session of the Council.	Paris	Dec. 15-
Meeting of Directing Council of the American International Institute for the Protection of Childhood.	Montevideo	December
International Wheat Council: Reconvening of 8th Session	Washington	Jan. 12-
International Wheat Council: 11th Session.	Washington	January
WMO (World Meteorological Organization): 1st Session of the Regional Association for Africa.	Tananarive (Madagascar).	Jan. 19-
WHO (World Health Organization): Executive Committee: 11th Session.	Geneva	January

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Economic and Social Council

Full Employment. Implementation of full employment policies. Replies of governments to the full employment questionnaire covering the period 1951-52, submitted under resolutions 221 E (IX), 290 (XI) and 371 B (XIII) of the Economic and Social Council. E/2232/Add. 7, Aug. 28, 1952. 42 pp. mimeo.

Descriptive List of Research Projects and Action Programmes on Discrimination and Minority Problems Initiated or Being Planned by United Nations Organs, Bodies, and Specialized Agencies. E/CN.4/Sub.2/144, Sept. 18, 1952. 9 pp. mimeo.

Environmental Sanitation and its Relation to Child Health. A Memorandum to the UNICEF Executive Board by the Director-General of the World Health Organization. E/ICEF/200, Sept. 5, 1952. 16 pp. mimeo.

¹ Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

The United Nations Secretariat has established an Official Records series for the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and the Atomic Energy Commission, which includes summaries of proceedings, resolutions, and reports of the various commissions and committees. Information on securing subscriptions to the series may be obtained from the International Documents Service.

Report on the BCG Programme, July 1951-June 1952. Memorandum to the UNICEF Executive Board by the Director-General of the World Health Organization. E/ICEF/203, Sept. 25, 1952. 34 pp. mimeo.

A Review of the Achievements of the WHO/UNICEF Malaria Control Demonstration Projects Undertaken in Southeast Asia During 1949-1950. Prepared by the WHO Regional Office for Southeast Asia. E/ICEF/204, Oct. 2, 1952. 30 pp. mimeo.

General Progress Report of the Executive Director. E/ICEF/205, Oct. 1, 1952. 75 pp. mimeo.

Cooperative Insect Control Programmes in Central America. E/ICEF/206, Oct. 1, 1952. 60 pp. mimeo.

General Assembly

Comments Received From Governments Regarding the Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind and the Question of Defining Aggression. Addendum. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. A/2162/Add.1, Sept. 16, 1952. 13 pp. mimeo.

Report of the Special Committee for the Consideration of the Methods and Procedures of the General Assembly for Dealing With Legal and Drafting Questions. A/2174, Sept. 8, 1952. 12 pp. mimeo.

The U.S. in the U.N.:

The summary for the week of October 27-November 1 will appear in the next issue of the BULLETIN.

Strengthening the U.N. Collective Security System

SECOND REPORT OF THE COLLECTIVE MEASURES COMMITTEE

by Joseph J. Sisco

For the past 2 years the Collective Measures Committee, which was established by the General Assembly at its fifth session in 1950, has been studying ways and means to strengthen the collective security system of the United Nations. The Committee has submitted its second report,¹ and the General Assembly is expected at its present session to review its contents and make further recommendations to carry forward the efforts of the United Nations in this field.

The Uniting for Peace program represents a pragmatic adaptation of the U.N. Charter in the security field. It derives its principal characteristics from the lessons learned at the time aggression was committed in Korea. The United Nations had a commission in Korea which was able to provide the organization with accurate information as to what party had actually committed aggression. The absence of the Soviet Union from the Security Council permitted this body to adopt two resolutions which contained recommendations to member states that they render assistance in support of the U.N. operation in Korea. An integrated U.N. force had to be organized in Korea, since the failure to conclude article 43 agreements meant that no military forces were available to the United Nations at the time.

The question in mid-1950, then, was how to prepare the United Nations so that, in the event of future aggression, collective measures would be applied with maximum promptitude and effectiveness. How could the United Nations insure that in the future it would have full information at its disposal in order to determine what party or parties were actually threatening or breaking the peace? How could procedures be adapted so as to make certain that the United Nations could exercise its role of peace and security in the event of a veto in the Security Council? What could the United Nations do to build up military forces for use against future aggressions? In response

to these needs, the Uniting for Peace Resolution, or so-called Acheson Plan, was devised and adopted by the General Assembly in November 1950.

Its five principal features are:

(1) A provision that the General Assembly can meet in 24 hours if the Security Council is prevented by the veto from exercising its primary responsibility for international peace and security.

(2) A provision that in such cases the General Assembly can make recommendations to member states for collective measures, including the use of armed forces.

(3) A recommendation that each member state maintain within its national armed forces elements that could promptly be made available for possible service as U.N. units.

(4) The establishment of a Peace Observation Commission to observe and report in any area where international tension exists.

(5) The creation of the Collective Measures Committee to study and report on the ways and means to strengthen international peace and security in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

The Uniting for Peace program is an alternative route toward peace and security designed to carry forward the concepts and purposes of the Charter. The procedures envisaged would not come into operation unless the Security Council had failed to take action. The Uniting for Peace program seeks to develop the potentiality of the General Assembly in the security field until such

¹ U.N. doc. A/2215.

time as the Security Council can assume its primary responsibility.

First Report of the Collective Measures Committee

During the first year the emphasis of the Collective Measures Committee was on the type of planning which sought to eliminate or reduce the amount of improvisation which would normally be necessary in a collective action. Thus the Collective Measures Committee concentrated on the formulation of methods, procedures, and techniques which may guide U.N. action in coordinating and integrating the resources of states in the event of a breach of the peace or an act of aggression. Furthermore, the Committee assembled and correlated political, economic, and military collective measures and principles of general applicability.

The conclusions and guiding principles outlined in the first report of the Collective Measures Committee² merit constant reappraisal and particular reemphasis primarily because of their relevance to the development of a strong U.N. collective security system. In general, the conclusions and guiding principles of the first report emphasize that the erection of a system of collective security requires advance preparation by states as well as by the United Nations and that, where collective measures are undertaken, there should be coordination of national action on as nearly a universal basis as possible. The report lays considerable stress on the necessity for the United Nations to have the means to apply collective measures. It indicates that the readiness of states to make contributions to U.N. action is an essential part of any security system, that speed and promptitude in the application of collective measures are essential to their effectiveness, and, above all, that the success of any collective effort depends upon the will and determination of individual states to accept their responsibilities to give fullest support to future U.N. collective measures in accordance with their capacities.

The General Assembly, at its sixth session, carried forward the work of the Collective Measures Committee by adopting a resolution on January 12, 1952,³ which in essence reordereed the progress made in developing the U.N. collective-security program, which drew the principal findings to the urgent attention of all states and which authorized the Committee to continue its studies for another year. The common thread of the specific recommendations contained in the General Assembly resolution is the strong emphasis on the need for states to take further national action in order to put themselves in a position of readiness to participate in U.N. collective measures. The impetus

given to further preparatory steps by states as the result of the overwhelming support of the resolution by the General Assembly influenced the basic orientation of the Committee in the second year of its studies.

Second Year's Work of the Committee

The Committee, in its second year of work, devoted considerable attention to the question of preparatory steps by states, giving particular emphasis to steps relating to armed forces, assistance and facilities, and legislation and administrative arrangements. The Committee developed appropriate ways to stimulate such national action and therefore, although not limiting itself to this function, it placed less emphasis on the type of planning which relates to coordination of procedures and techniques involved in collective measures.

The Committee examined the report and filled in a number of gaps noted in its previous preliminary examination of available collective measures and techniques of coordination. It studied a number of topics which had been suggested in its first report with a view to giving them more detailed treatment. In addition, it broadened its scope of study to include topics suggested by member states not represented on the Collective Measures Committee.

POLITICAL COLLECTIVE MEASURES

This year the Committee did not give further consideration to the question of collective measures of a political character which might be recommended by the Security Council or the General Assembly alone or in combination with other collective measures against an aggressor state. The Committee believed that the treatment of these types of measures in its first report, which had listed the political measures available to the United Nations and suggested the possible use of appropriate machinery in such circumstances, went as far as possible.

ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL COLLECTIVE MEASURES

Arms Embargo and List of Strategic Materials—The Committee prepared lists of arms, ammunition, and implements of war which are now available for use if the Security Council or General Assembly decides upon or recommends an embargo. The lists were prepared on the assumption that their availability in the circumstances of future collective measures would assist in cutting down the amount of time which would be necessary to apply effectively and promptly either a total or a selective embargo.

The Role of Specialized Agencies—The Committee examined further the role of the specialized agencies in the event of a future case of collective measures. It was recognized that these agencies, as well as other international agencies

² For an analysis by Mr. Sisco of the first report of the Collective Measures Committee, see BULLETIN of Nov. 12, 1951, p. 771.

³ U.N. doc. A/2049.

and arrangements, are part of the fabric of collective peace. The main findings of the Committee include the following: (a) none of the specialized agencies had been organized with a view to assisting in collective measures; (b) nevertheless, the specialized agencies, within their own fields of endeavor, can perform important and useful functions in support of collective measures in accordance with their own constitutional limitations; (c) the means and ways in which specialized agencies could assist would be by participation in programs of assistance and by withholding benefits and services or suspending membership rights where this is constitutionally possible; and (d) each specialized agency is responsible for deciding the kind and the extent of its participation in future collective measures.

Equitable Sharing of Burdens—The Committee examined the economic and financial aspects of equitable sharing of burdens involved in collective action. In the view of the Committee, this problem could not be usefully discussed before a given situation arose except as regards its nature and the procedures which might be used in dealing with it. The Committee's work this year was essentially an elaboration of guiding principle 5 of paragraph 4 of the first Collective Measures Committee report, which stated:

The application of economic and financial measures whether to weaken the aggressor or to assist the victim states or cooperating states, should, as a matter of mutual assistance, be equitably shared as far as possible among the cooperating states, taking into account the total burden borne by them in relation to the collective action, and their abilities.

Although the Committee did not go beyond this general statement, it did, nevertheless, express the view that consideration should be given by the Security Council or the General Assembly to the setting up of machinery in which consultations on all such problems could be undertaken promptly after the application of collective measures.

Economic Assistance to Victims of Hostile Economic Pressures—The Committee explored the kinds of economic measures which might be appropriate in the event the Security Council or the General Assembly determined that a state was a victim of hostile economic pressures. The Committee concluded that essentially the same kind of measures which would assist victims of aggression would be appropriate in cases of states being subjected to economic pressures. These measures could include steps to expand the trade of the victim, to improve the access to raw materials of the victim state, and to transfer directly supplies, services, or purchasing power to the victims.

MILITARY MEASURES

Panel of Military Experts—This year the Secretary-General, with the approval of the Collective Measures Committee and in consultation with the states concerned, appointed members of

the Panel of Military Experts. It is the job of the Panel members to be available to states that might desire to obtain technical advice regarding the organization, training, and equipment of elements of their armed forces for possible service as U.N. units. In last year's report, the Committee outlined in some detail the nature and functions of the Panel. No additional guidance to the Panel was considered necessary until such time as it has had some advisory experience.

Maximizing Assistance in Support of Collective Military Action—The New Zealand Government proposed for study the question of the equitable sharing of military, financial, and other assistance in support of collective military measures. The Collective Measures Committee concluded that it is essential that collective action under the aegis of the United Nations should be supported by the maximum number of states with all possible military, economic, and other forms of assistance. The Committee also outlined the functions of a negotiating committee to deal directly with nations as a means of achieving the objective of maximum participation in future collective measures.

U.N. Volunteer Reserve—In brief, this plan, which was suggested by the Secretary-General, envisages reserves within the national military establishments which would be available to the United Nations in a case of future collective action. This plan was considered another way to enhance the organizational readiness of the United Nations to deter and suppress future aggressions. In the time at its disposal, the Committee was able to give only preliminary consideration to the Secretary-General's plan and was therefore not able to make any decision on its merits, in terms of either its political possibilities or its military feasibility. However, the Committee concluded that there should be additional study of the proposals and that such further consideration should take into account the views of interested states. The views of states would give the Committee an opportunity to ascertain whether the Secretary-General's proposals constitute another possible way to carry out the Uniting for Peace program.

Sustaining the Uniting for Peace Program

The Committee recommended in its report that the important work it has performed in the last 2 years should be continued by an appropriate U.N. body. The purpose of this body would be: (a) to suggest to the Security Council or the General Assembly specific ways and means of encouraging further preparatory action by states; (b) to continue such studies as may be deemed desirable on the general subject of strengthening the United Nations to maintain peace; and (c) to report to the Security Council and the General Assembly.

• *Mr. Sisco, author of the above article, is an officer in the Office of U.N. Political and Security Affairs.*

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

European Commission on Forestry and Forest Products

The Department of State announced on October 15 (press release 810) that the United States will participate in the fifth session of the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization's (FAO) European Commission on Forestry and Forest Products, which convened on October 14 at Geneva. Participants from the United States are as follows:

Avery B. Cohan, Economic Adviser to the U.S. Representative to the Economic Commission for Europe, Geneva
Elmer C. Parker, Forest Products Branch, Industry Division, Mutual Security Agency, Washington, D. C.
Robert W. Tyson, Commodity Specialist, Food and Agriculture Division, Mutual Security Agency, Washington, D. C.

The main topic for discussion will be the results of a study of European timber trends undertaken by the FAO and the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (ECE). The purpose of the study was to discover the major factors that affect the production and consumption of forest products. It is believed that this study, together with the results of similar studies planned for other regions, may supply important data for use in the establishment of long-term forest policies. During the discussion of European timber trends, the FAO European Commission will meet jointly with the ECE Timber Committee, which is now holding its tenth session at Geneva.

Other items which the European Commission will consider are progress reports presented by member governments on forest policy, afforestation and reforestation, the report of the third session of its Subcommittee on Mediterranean Problems, the report of its Pilot Committee on Logging Techniques and Avalanche Control and the report of its Working Group on Statistics.

Pan American Consultation on Cartography

The Department of State on October 10 (press release 803) announced that the U.S. Government will be represented by the following delegation at the sixth Pan American Consultation on Cartography, which convened at Ciudad Trujillo, Dominican Republic, on October 12, 1952.

Chairman

Robert H. Randall, Bureau of the Budget, Executive Office of the President

Members

Arthur P. Biggs, Attaché, American Embassy, Caracas
Samuel W. Boggs, Special Adviser on Geography, Department of State
Gerald Fitzgerald, U.S. Geological Survey, Department of the Interior

Otto E. Guthe, Office of Libraries and Intelligence Acquisition, Department of State
George H. Harding, Ohio State University, Columbus
Charles B. Hitchcock, American Geographical Society, New York
Albert J. Hoskinson, Capt., U.S.C.G.S., Department of Commerce
John C. Ladd, Col., U.S.A., Commanding Officer, Army Map Service
Robert C. Miller, Col., U.S.A., Director, Inter-American Geodetic Survey, Panama
Frank A. Pettit, Col., U.S.A., Joint Chiefs of Staff
Murray Y. Poling, U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey, Department of Commerce
Robert H. Randall, Jr., Hydrographic Office, Department of the Navy
Elliot B. Roberts, Capt., U.S.C.G.S., Department of Commerce
Paul C. Schauer, Col., U.S.A.F., Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery, Ala.

This consultation is one of a series sponsored by the Commission on Cartography of the Pan American Institute of Geography and History. The Institute is an intergovernmental organization devoted to the development, coordination, and dissemination of geographical, historical, and related scientific studies, and the initiation of pertinent projects. It was established in 1929 pursuant to a resolution of the Sixth International Conference of American States and has become one of the specialized organizations of the Organization of American States. All 21 American Republics are members of the Institute; the United States has been a member since 1935. The scientific and cultural activities of the Institute are carried out through the Commission on Cartography, established in 1942, and the Commissions on Geography and History, both established in 1946.

At the forthcoming consultation, technical-working committees will discuss specific aspects of cartography and will draft proposals and recommendations for the consultation to consider in full session. Delegates will present scientific papers and discuss topics related to geodetic operations, gravity and geomagnetics, seismology, topographic maps and aerophotogrammetry, aeronautical charts, hydrography, tides, special maps, and urban surveys.

During the consultation, the U.S. delegation will present a report concerning national cartographic activities during the period from July 1, 1950 to June 30, 1952. This report notes some of the positive steps taken by this Government to comply with the recommendations of the fifth consultation and describes the progress made in this country in the various fields of cartography mentioned above. Accompanying maps delineate the areas in the United States, Alaska, and the North Polar Region for which new aeronautical charts have been prepared by agencies of this Government, and the areas in North and South America for which new nautical charts have been prepared; other maps show the progress in land-

use capability mapping, geologic mapping, triangulation, and leveling in the United States, as well as topographic mapping and hydrographic surveys in the United States and Alaska. The account also includes some special reports for consideration by the technical committees of the consultation.

The Federal agencies which have contributed to U.S. progress in cartography are listed in the report, as are the technical and professional societies of the United States which are active in cartography. The report comments that the United States continues to give technical assistance to other nations on cartographic problems through the Pan American Institute of Geography and History, the Mutual Security Agency, and the Department of State.

The report of the United States and those of other member governments, all of which have been requested to present information of this type, will be available in English and Spanish and will constitute an important part of the documentation of the conference.

Another integral part of this consultation, as in the past, will be displays designed to show the results of the most recent developments in the field of cartography by member states, as well as the instruments used in executing cartographic projects. In addition, the Dominican Government has arranged for the visiting cartographers to tour points of geographic interest on the island following the consultation.

The fifth consultation on cartography was held concurrently with the fifth general assembly of the Institute at Santiago, Chile, during October 1950.

Aerodromes, Air Routes, and Ground Aids Division (Icao)

The Department of State announced on October 20 (press release 824) that the U.S. Government will be represented at the fifth session of the Aerodromes, Air Routes, and Ground Aids Division of the International Civil Aviation Organization (Icao), scheduled to open at Montreal on October 21, 1952, by the following delegation:

U.S. delegate

Joseph D. Blatt, *Chairman*, Chief, Planning Staff Division, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

Alternate U.S. delegates

James F. Angier, International Aerodromes, Air Routes, and Ground Aids Specialist, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

Phillip A. Hahn, Chief, Airport Engineering Division, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

Advisers

Dudley S. Billet, Jr., Commander, Test Pilot (Helicopter), Naval Air Test Center, U.S.N.

Frank B. Brady, Visual and Electronic Aids Specialist, Air Transport Association of America

Francis C. Breckenridge, in charge Civil Aviation Lighting, National Bureau of Standards, Department of Commerce

Arthur L. Catudal, Airways Engineer, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

George K. Clement, Chief, Visual Aids Section, Directorate of Installations, U.S.A.F.

William C. Peck, Civilian Chief, Plans Division, Directorate of Installations, U.S.A.F.

Renold W. Stoppelmann, Lt. Comdr., Operational Requirements Specialist, Visual Aids Branch, Bureau of Aeronautics, U.S.N.

The Aerodromes, Air Routes, and Ground Aids Division, one of the technical subcommissions of the Icao Air Navigation Commission, has the responsibility for recommending to Icao modifications of the technical annex concerning aerodromes to the Convention on International Civil Aviation. The Divisions of the Air Navigation Commission are now particularly concerned with the development of amendments to existing annexes and with the problems of implementation of the convention.

In connection with the topics to be discussed at the forthcoming meeting are (1) physical characteristics of aerodromes, including airports for conventional-type aircraft and for helicopters; (2) obstruction clearing and marking; and (3) visual ground aids, including approach, threshold and runway lighting and marking. Experts will consider highly technical aspects of planning and establishing aerodrome facilities. Participants will also hear a report on the action taken by Icao on the recommendations of the fourth session of the Division, held at Montreal from November 1 to December 2, 1949. Division sessions are open to the public, with official participation restricted to the representatives of states that have ratified the Convention on International Civil Aviation. The number of contracting states is now 57. The forthcoming meeting is expected to remain in session from 3 to 4 weeks.

Indo-Pacific Fisheries Council

The Department of State announced on October 23 (press release 833) that the U.S. delegation to the fourth meeting of the Indo-Pacific Fisheries Council, which opened on that date at Manila, is as follows:

U.S. Delegate

O. Lloyd Meebean, Chief, Branch of Gamefish and Hatcheries, Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior

Advisers

Claude M. Adams, Fisheries Officer, Special Technical and Economic Mission, Mutual Security Agency, Formosa
William Neville, Fishery Attaché, American Embassy, Tokyo

William Royce, Aquatic Biologist, Pacific Oceanic Fishery Investigations, Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior, Honolulu

Harry E. Timmif, Fisheries Officer, Special Technical and Economic Mission, Mutual Security Agency, Indochina

The major objectives of the Indo-Pacific Fisheries Council are (1) to determine technical approaches to the problems of development and proper utilization of the fisheries resources of the Indo-Pacific area, (2) to encourage and coordinate research and the application of improved methods in everyday practice, and (3) to assemble, publish, and otherwise disseminate technical information relating to living aquatic resources. Council sessions provide an opportunity for specialists representing the interested governments to discuss all aspects of the fishing industry in the Indo-Pacific area.

The greater part of the Council's work during the forthcoming meeting will deal with technical subjects. These have been receiving the attention of technical committees, subcommittees, and working groups which were appointed at the Council's third meeting and subsequently by member governments. Following the practice of previous years, delegations will submit technical papers for discussion. Internationally known experts will conduct symposia on specific problems in the area.

The agreement establishing the Indo-Pacific Fisheries Council was formulated at a fisheries meeting held at Baguio, Philippines, February 25-28, 1948, under the auspices of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. The Council, which is composed of representatives of member governments and meets at least once a year, held its third meeting at Madras, India, February 1-16, 1951. Previous Council meetings were at Singapore (1949) and Cronulla, New South Wales, Australia (1950). The following 16 countries are now parties to the agreement: Australia, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, China, France, India, Indonesia, Korea, Netherlands, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Vietnam.

International Bank Activities

Appraisal Missions to Africa

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development on October 9 announced that it is sending three missions to Africa—to the Union of South Africa, to the Gold Coast, and to East Africa.

The mission to South Africa expects to arrive in Johannesburg on October 26. It follows earlier missions which the Bank has sent to South Africa from time to time in accordance with its policy of keeping in touch with developments in member

countries. It will make a broad appraisal of South Africa's current position and prospects and the development plans of the Government. The mission is headed by D. Crena de Iongh, the Bank's treasurer; other members are A. M. Kamarek and J. H. Collier. The group expects to be in South Africa from 3 to 4 weeks.

Toward the end of October, B. B. King of the Bank's staff will visit the Gold Coast. This will be the Bank's first contact with West Africa. The purpose of the visit is to obtain first-hand information on the economy, potentialities, and development plans of this British Colony where Africans have recently made great progress toward complete self-government.

The mission to East Africa will visit Kenya, Uganda, and the U.N. Trusteeship of Tanganyika. This mission, like the others, will appraise the economy, prospects, and development plans of these territories, which are administered by Great Britain and together make up East Africa. M. L. Lejeune will head the mission, which also includes J. H. Williams and A. Dore.

Since 1950 the Bank has made loans totaling nearly 157 million dollars for development in Africa. It made two loans to Ethiopia in 1950; one for roads and the other for a development bank, and a third loan was made for telecommunications the following year. In 1951 it made two loans in the Union of South Africa; one for transport and the other for electric power, and two loans to help finance the development program of the Belgian Congo. In early 1952 a loan was made to Southern Rhodesia to help finance its development program. During the summer the Bank had missions in Ethiopia and Central Africa. The Central African mission visited Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, and Southern Rhodesia.

Technical Research Institutes in Pakistan and Ceylon

Officials of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development are expected to arrive in Karachi on October 28 to begin a 5-week visit to Pakistan and Ceylon. The purpose of their visit is to explore, on behalf of the Bank and the U.N. Technical Assistance Administration, the feasibility of establishing and sponsoring technical-research institutes in Pakistan and Ceylon. The officials are Richard H. Demuth, Director of the Technical Assistance and Liaison Staff, and Francis Godwin of the same office.

The principal functions of the technical-research institutes would be to make field and laboratory studies of the production, processing, and utilization of local raw materials with a view to suggesting new products, processes, and uses; and to develop processes for new industries, build and operate pilot plants, and design and test cottage-industry equipment. The institutes would also make studies of existing local industries, when

requested to do so, with a view to solving technical problems, improving production techniques, finding byproducts, and instituting improved methods of quality control.

THE DEPARTMENT

Raymond C. Smith Appointed TCA Director for Haiti

Press release 809 dated October 15

Raymond C. Smith of Washington, D.C., has been appointed Director of Technical Cooperation in Haiti, where he will also serve as Chief of Field Party, Division of Agriculture and Natural Resources, IAA. He is the officer on the American Ambassador's staff who will direct all U.S. Point Four activities in Haiti for the Institute of Inter-American Affairs. Mr. Smith will succeed Vance Rogers, who has been transferred to Panama as Director of Technical Cooperation for the Institute of Inter-American Affairs.

Mr. Smith comes to the Institute of Inter-American Affairs from the U.S. Department of Agriculture where, since 1946, he has been Assistant Chief of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics. In 1949, he conducted an economic survey in Colombia and in 1950 went to Venezuela as observer and adviser on the joint program of the American International Association and the Venezuelan Government.

In Haiti, Mr. Smith will direct a cooperative technical-assistance program that began in 1942. Under the present Point Four Program, the work consists of projects in health and sanitation, agriculture, rubber development, and public administration.

U.S. trade with Haiti is becoming increasingly important. U.S. imports from Haiti, which in 1949 had a total value of 19,800,000 dollars, rose to a total value of 32,600,000 dollars in 1951. These imports were chiefly sisal, essential oils, coffee, and bananas. The value of U.S. exports to Haiti increased from 23,300,000 dollars in 1949 to 28,200,000 dollars in 1951. These exports consisted chiefly of farm machinery, textiles, foodstuffs, and chemicals and pharmaceuticals.

As Latin American Regional Office for the Technical Cooperation Administration, the Institute of Inter-American Affairs administers all U.S. Point Four activities in 19 countries of Central and South America.

Appointment of Officers

George Carnahan as Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, effective October 6.

Edward A. Jamison as Deputy Director, Office of Regional American Affairs, effective October 6.

Current Legislation on Foreign Policy

Inaugural Addresses of the Presidents of the United States From George Washington 1789 to Harry S. Truman 1949. H. Doc. 540, 82d Cong., 2d sess. 244 pp.

Communication From the President of the United States Transmitting the Report of the President's Materials Policy Commission, June 1952, "Resources for Freedom," Vols. I to V, Inclusive. Volume I. H. Doc. 527, Vol. I, 82d Cong., 2d sess. 184 pp.; Volume II. H. Doc. 527, Vol. II, 82d Cong., 2d sess. 210 pp.; Volume III. H. Doc. 527, Vol. III, 82d Cong., 2d sess. 43 pp.; Volume IV. H. Doc. 527, Vol. IV, 82d Cong., 2d sess. 228 pp.; Volume V. H. Doc. 527, Vol. V, 82d Cong., 2d sess. 154 pp.

Letters of Credence

India

The newly appointed Ambassador of India, Gaganvihari Lalubhai Mehta, presented his credentials to the President on September 25. For text of the Ambassador's remarks and of the President's reply, see Department of State press release 755 of September 25.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: Oct. 20-24, 1952

Releases may be obtained from the Office of the Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Press releases issued prior to Oct. 20 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 755 of Sept. 25, 793 of Oct. 9, 801 of Oct. 10, 803 of Oct. 10, 806 of Oct. 14, 809 of Oct. 15, and 810 of Oct. 15.

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†832	10/23	Mesta: Our foreign policy today
833	10/23	Indo-Pacific fisheries
†834	10/23	Duke: Pt. 4 in El Salvador
†835	10/24	Byroade: Turkey, 29th anniversary
836	10/24	Hickerson: Facts about Korea
†837	10/24	Czechoslovakia: Letter of credence
†838	10/24	4th honor awards ceremony
*839	10/24	Delegation to Chilean inauguration
840	10/24	Acheson: Observance of U.N. Day
†841	10/24	Burma: Pt. 4 agreements signed

†Held for later issue of the BULLETIN.

*Not printed.

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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication compiled and edited in the Division of Publications, Office of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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Religion and the Voice of America

by Roger Lyons

In the field of religion, the Voice of America seeks to encourage the free people of the world in their search for the divine. And to those constantly barraged by Soviet propaganda, the VOA seeks merely to tell the truth—to tell the real story of the place religion holds in the United States and the rest of the free world and in the Soviet Union.

In its efforts to inform its audience about the place of religion in the United States, the VOA has the benefit of counsel from the Religious Advisory Panel of the International Information Administration.¹

How does the Voice present the spiritual factors of American life? It covers important religious news; it records conferences, religious services, and statements by church leaders and members. It gives attention to important religious holidays, both those celebrated in the United States and those of the areas to which programs are beamed. It rebroadcasts domestic programs on religious themes, for example, Christmas and Easter programs, sermons, or special messages by the clergy.

Yet in presenting the positive contributions of religion in American life, the VOA does not confine itself to programs of this sort. Since spiritual and moral factors constitute a fundamental premise motivating the personal, social, and working lives of the American people, the Voice seeks to convey the importance of these influences in its programs, whether they tell the story of a mid-

western farmer, cover a meeting of the American Foreign Policy Association, or record a village church service.

The Problem of Language Barriers

It is a relatively simple problem to tell English-speaking peoples about American spiritual life. It is more difficult in other cases, although the problem of language barriers has been largely solved. For the most part, VOA reports religion through translation, through the news, and through commentaries.

A specialized knowledge of the religious climate of each listening area, as well as of its culture as a whole, is required. Each language unit of the VOA has personnel specializing in the treatment of religious subjects.

To Europe and the Far East goes a regular half-hour religious weekly broadcast called "A Nation at Worship," which is transmitted in English. It includes broadcasts taken from domestic radio programs and services specially recorded for the VOA. The latter are mostly denominational and are carefully selected to represent proportionately the major faiths.

Broadcasting to Yugoslavia presents a special problem because of the country's mixed population. The great majority of its Serbians are Orthodox; the Croats and Slovenes are Catholic. To satisfy all religious and language groups, the Yugoslav service of the VOA broadcast 18 different Christmas programs last year. Since 11 percent of the population is Moslem, the Yugoslav service also gives attention to important Moslem events.

In Finland, Poland, and Greece, the dominant religions are Lutheran, Catholic, and Greek Orthodox respectively. To be acceptable, religious programs for these countries must center largely around these denominations. For each area the religious makeup of the audience demands a different approach. Arabic broadcasts operate on the principle that the Koran enjoins upon Moslems

¹The Voice of America is the broadcasting service of the International Information Administration. The other major services are press and publications, motion pictures, exchange of persons, and the overseas information centers.

The Religious Advisory Panel consists of Dr. Albert J. McCartney, religious adviser, International Information Administration; Isaac Franck, executive director, Jewish Community Council of Greater Washington; Monsignor Thomas McCarthy, director, Bureau of Information, National Catholic Welfare Conference; and Dr. Edward Pruden, pastor of the First Baptist Church in Washington and former president of the American Baptist Convention.

belief in Christ as a great prophet and tolerance of Christianity and Christians. On Fridays and Moslem holidays the Voice broadcasts readings from the Koran; Christian holidays are observed, and Christian features are often used on Sundays.

Bias Avoided in Broadcasts

Events of universal significance, such as "World Brotherhood Week," "World Day of Prayer," and movements of prayers for the oppressed behind the Iron Curtain receive attention. Interdenominational broadcasts are included wherever possible. Special services on religious holidays and for persecuted peoples are frequently recorded and broadcast, and religious music and dramatizations of religious themes are also commonly beamed. Religious programing is most effective when it demonstrates practically and in a human way the virtues of charity, religious tolerance, and cooperation among different racial and religious groups.

The Voice of America, it must be remembered, represents abroad a form of government which separates church and state and which guarantees in its Constitution complete religious freedom. VOA does not originate programs which might be interpreted as officially advocating any particular theological doctrines, and it avoids broadcasting anything which might seem to assume functions that would properly belong to a church of any faith. When the Voice broadcasts church music, religious ceremonies, professions of faith or doctrines, or messages from clergymen, it does so as part of its reporting of an important facet of American life. Program materials include documentary reports and personal testimonies of the beliefs and works of great spiritual personalities or of movements which might edify or create good will among overseas listeners. The principle of freedom of religion implies that the Voice must avoid bias to any particular profession of religious belief. It is rather the function of VOA to unite people to protect all faiths.

Exposing Persecution Behind the Iron Curtain

Another function of the Voice of America is to tell about religious persecution behind the Iron Curtain, which, unhappily, shows no sign of abating. As long as such persecution exists, the world must be kept informed of the facts about it, for nothing shows more clearly the mendacity of the Kremlin's lip service to freedom of worship than the torture, mock trials, and murder of thousands of priests and ministers of all faiths. Where the Communists are in control, places of worship are converted into Communist meeting halls and militant atheism is taught in the youth organizations.

There is, however, a Communist pseudo deity. His name is Stalin. As Prof. Reinhold Niebuhr said in an interview for the Voice: "The real dan-

ger of communism is this false religion . . . which guarantees the Communists the right to manage history and their fellowmen. And the cruelty comes from idolatry." As Martin Luther put it: "You must not worry about people saying that they do not believe in God. You must worry about the false gods they do believe in." Where there is a spiritual vacuum, as in Communist countries, the false gods pour in.

The role of the Voice in the field of religion is to demonstrate to the world that the United States has a conscience toward mankind and that it is a nation under God. As a nation, the United States must understand the peoples of the world in order to communicate with them. To do this, it must fight against prejudice; it must strive for objectivity. The following prayer for the United Nations well represents the approach of the Voice of America in its handling of the religious phases of its activity:

Yet most of all, grant to us brotherhood, not only for this day but for all years—a brotherhood not of words but of acts and deeds. We are all of us children of the earth—grant us that simple knowledge. If our brothers are oppressed, then we are oppressed. If they hunger, we hunger. If their freedom is taken away, our freedom is not secure. Grant us a common faith that man shall know bread and peace—that he shall know justice and righteousness, freedom and security, and equal opportunity and an equal chance to do his best, not only in our land but throughout the world.

● *Mr. Lyons, author of the above article, is director of Religious Programing of the International Broadcasting Service, International Information Administration.*

Trial of Bulgarian Catholic Clergy

Press release 822 dated October 20

The Bulgarian Government has just staged (Sept. 29–Oct. 3) another of its elaborate "trials" of religious leaders, designed, in this instance, to destroy the last remnants of the Catholic Church in Bulgaria. As in the infamous trials of Bulgarian Protestant leaders in the spring of 1949, the 40 Catholic leaders accused in this latest "trial" were charged with various vaguely defined anti-State activities, including, in the course of the proceedings, allegations that certain of the defendants had engaged in espionage as employees of "the Americans" and had for this purpose been in touch with a U.S. Government official on duty with the former American Legation in Sofia.

These charges are groundless and absurd. The same crude attempt to accuse the U.S. Government and its official representatives in Bulgaria of being involved in clandestine efforts to overthrow the Bulgarian Government has recurred in each of the many "trials" in which the Soviet satellite dictatorship in Bulgaria has sought to eradicate every form of opposition to its regime.

Cynical disregard for the truth characterized the whole "trial." At the end, the court dutifully meted out the sentences—four defendants, including one bishop to be shot, all but five of the rest sentenced for periods ranging from 10 to 20 years.

In a speech just prior to the trial, Bulgarian Minister of Interior Georgi Tsankov revealed with crude brutality the atmosphere in which the trial was to be staged. "Let all [who oppose the Communist regime] know," he said, "that the People's Rule, through the organs of the Ministry of Interior, is able to put everyone where he belongs, and will deal mercilessly with all who try to

hinder us. Neither God nor their imperialist masters can help them."

In accordance with this avowed policy, under the flimsiest pretense of legality, a last vestige of free religion in Bulgaria has now been stamped out. The Government of Bulgaria, which already stands accused before the tribunal of world opinion of the most blatant violations of its solemn obligation to guarantee human rights and fundamental freedoms to its citizens, has by this new act proved again how justly its vicious tyranny deserves the condemnation of free men everywhere.

The Free World Rediscovered Turkey

by Henry A. Byroade

Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs¹

It is indeed an honor to join with you in commemorating the twenty-ninth anniversary of the founding of the Turkish Republic. It is furthermore a matter of personal pleasure. I have twice had the privilege of visiting Turkey. Once in 1947, I had a brief visit shortly after the United States had undertaken the task of assisting Turkey to defend herself against Soviet threats. The second trip was a more extended one, this spring after I had assumed my present position. Because of this latter interest, I was particularly keen to observe as much as I could.

Both times that I visited Turkey I was struck with the courteous hospitality with which we were greeted, the serious sense of responsible leadership and the firm loyalty of the Turkish people. Though my two visits were spaced only 5 years apart, I noticed many changes in the appearance of the cities. The trees which were relatively small in Ankara in 1947 were full of leaf in 1952, the city was a beehive of activity and growth. Ankara breathed a spirit of life and dignity. Istanbul also had put on a new dress in its parks, avenues, and well-constructed buildings. I have heard that this same phenomenon of bursting energy and life is apparent throughout the coun-

try. The visitor is impressed with the energy and confidence in their future expressed by the Turkish people.

There were certain impressions I gained on my visits which are confirmed by many guests who have had the opportunity of seeing Turkey. The feeling of "being at home" is one of these. Others express it in a different way by saying they feel they are "on firm ground" when they are working with Turks. Turkey and the United States have great differences in their geographical setting, in their historic background, and in language. It might be expected then that Americans would feel like strangers or ill at ease in the Turkish environment. But that is not the case.

One recent writer humorously remarked that Americans and Turks share certain characteristics and then lists them in this order—both Turks and Americans are erratic and naive, inexperienced and suspicious, but they also are enterprising and energetic, hospitable and generous. They both believe in opportunity for everybody, making education available to everyone, and have a sense of humor in common—they laugh at one another's jokes. The same writer then adds that Turkish taxi drivers like to argue with cops and that waiters in either country are equally bad.²

¹ Excerpts from an address made before the American-Turkish Society at New York on Oct. 29 (press release 835 dated Oct. 24).

² Reference here is to Joseph Wechsberg writing in the *New Yorker* of Oct. 4, 1952, p. 98.

U.S.-Turkish Possession of Common Traits

Perhaps we could stop with that list of common traits and argue that they were sufficient to account for the fact that over 4,000 Americans find a congenial climate in Turkish life and that perhaps as many Turks in the United States adjust with ease to our way of life. But I believe we can reduce the above miscellany of traits to a few of more fundamental value. I would like to make the attempt.

SIMILAR APPROACH TO PROBLEMS

1) The Turks seem to approach problems in a manner similar to our own. Most of my contacts with Turks have been associated with some form of planning. In 1947 the United States and Turkey were laying out long-range plans for the best use of U.S. military aid. We are now working on further plans for mutual security aid, for a Middle East defense organization, on NATO and other matters of mutual interest. Judged by the smoothness with which we are able to coordinate these complex plans, it becomes evident that there is great similarity in the way in which we "use our heads."

We equally evaluate the Soviet threat of aggression. We both agree our armed forces must be strong and ready to stop this aggression. We agree that this high level of military preparedness can only be supported by a higher level of national production. We both believe the greater effort demanded can only be generated by a free and informed citizenry. With agreement on these evaluations and assumptions, half the battle is won in drawing up plans to meet our mutual needs.

When in 1947 the President of the United States and the Congress made aid available to Turkey, we again found our rational processes paralleling one another. Most of this aid was to go directly to Turkish defense efforts, but a small part would be applied to a defense support plan which had certain economic advantages as well. The Turks alone could contribute the main components in the plan—the manpower, most of the local finances and matériel, leadership, morale, and courage. The United States could add some materials which had to come from abroad and some experience gained from the recent war. It was hard to find any important points of view on which we disagreed. Good planning and good execution have produced most satisfactory results. That the Turkish Army has attracted the attention of the free world is made obvious by the number of references one reads in the press of the other nations.

Gains in the economic sphere have been equally dramatic. Some newsmen complain that Turkey contributes no crisis news to the headlines. A journalist no more expects to be caught in a mob in Ankara than in Washington. Turks, like Americans, are too busy going about their business. They do not dissipate their reserves of strength

by emotional outbursts concerning events or causes far removed from their field of interest. So the reporter who expects to find stories of violent disturbances need not go to Turkey.

However, the reporter who expects to find a story of encouraging development should go there. Ever since 1923 when Kemal Ataturk assumed the leadership in Turkey, the country has developed an impetus worthy of note. When in 1947 the United States made available defense-support aid, there were no great differences of opinion or emphasis on how it might best be used. With Turkey contributing by far the greater share of the necessary requirements, the United States and Turkey have annually come up with a plan for joint co-operation. The results are most encouraging.

During the last few years the annual increase in Turkish gross national production has averaged, roughly, 7 percent. This is phenomenal anywhere. It is when this gross development is broken down into details that one gets a picture of what has released this outpouring of energy. The agricultural production of the country is rapidly being realized and the output in many categories is far above prewar levels. This increase is due in large measure to the energetic postwar program of mechanization and modernization. Modern farm machinery is bringing more land under cultivation. Technical advice extended under the ECA/MSA program is resulting in better methods not only in tilling the soil but in drainage, irrigation, use of insecticides, and so forth.

Supplementing this is the 9-year road program started in 1949 and involving the construction of around 23,000 kilometers of two-way, all-weather roads. This program is well over half done. Truck transportation is now available to many communities where the high costs of the camel caravan had made it impossible to get goods to the ports for shipment abroad. But thanks to the new roads, costs in interior areas for a ton-mile have fallen from one dollar to seven cents. That means the farmer living inland can grow crops and get them to the ports. The ports have been improved but the pressure of goods passing in and out have congested facilities. Warehouses have become inadequate to the demand.

From many reports we receive, it is clear that this is no accidental development, nor one related to only part of the Turkish people. It embraces every segment of Turkish life and has stimulated interior villages as well as urban centers to greater activity. It is also a further stage of development of the blueprint which the founder of Republican Turkey had in his mind when he started his revolutionary program 29 years ago. Such growth can only be possible where the people of a nation have confidence in themselves as well as in their future. This is a firm foundation on which to build national dignity and respect. It is the kind of an atmosphere which contributes to a healthy part-

nership anywhere. Both Turkey and the United States fortunately share in it.

RELATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE STATE

2) There is another factor in U.S.-Turkish relations that is part of the atmosphere which makes us feel at home in one another's society. We have common goals in the controversial matter of the relation of the individual to the state. One of the greatest battles of modern times is over the question of the organization of society. Not far from Turkey is the best illustration of a society which ignores completely any individual rights. The state makes all individuals its slaves. There are other societies where individualism is so strong that the state has no stability nor continuity.

The theme of the struggle to find a satisfactory balance between these two poles has marked Western civilization since the days of the Magna Charta. The same is true of the recent history of Turkey. In 1923 Turkey faced a very different set of facts than those which faced the United States in 1776; nevertheless, the Turkish Republic aimed at the same goals we had in mind. Starting from different points wide apart, we seem to be converging on a similar point of view as to the relationship of the individual to his national society.

Ataturk emphasized education and the freedom and participation of women in national life. He established the forms of government by which the individual would eventually be free to choose his own representatives and make his own laws. In spite of the drive of the Founder of the Republic, only a part of his blueprint had been implemented by 1938. It remained for his successors to build a superstructure upon this plan. Faithful to his vision, they have done well. There has been a healthy increase in freedom of political expression and in the latitude allowed a self-disciplined free citizenry.

In 1950, new strength was built into the structure of Republican Turkey. In a free and honest election, the citizens elected a new government. The former government, in a manner as dignified and mature as if this had always been the way in Turkey, turned over the reins of authority.

In economic life, Turkey is also making healthy strides in giving the individual increased opportunity for initiative and effort. It is Ataturk's vision of an intelligent, independent, and intensely loyal citizenry which is coming into being that creates confidence in Turkey as it is now and as it will be in years ahead. It is no wonder that Americans and Turks have little difficulty in their mutual associations.

REASSESSING ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL WEALTH

3) There is a third feature common to our peoples and our history. The two Americas were discovered by various European explorers whose

successors quickly exploited the surface wealth of these two continents. As long as there were expanding boundaries, these colonizers paid scant attention to conserving the wealth of our land or to finding hidden resources. They left behind them partial devastation in the form of eroded lands, exhausted forests, depleted surface mines, and such institutions as slavery.

When territorial expansion came to an end, a new phase began in our history which might be called the Rediscovery of the United States. We have been forced to reassess our wealth. The assumption that a free citizen was a greater national asset than a slave brought about the end of slavery. We began to conserve our forests and harness our rivers, to save the soil and produce power, to dig deeper into our mines.

This Rediscovery of America has led to significant results in our national and international life. Areas partially abandoned a half century ago, because they were considered exhausted, are now teeming with industrial life and supporting a high level of cultural attainment. And in international affairs, this rediscovery of resources has made it possible for the United States to play an important role in discouraging the aggressive designs of totalitarian powers who would encroach on their free neighbors.

Turkey likewise has had a parallel experience. The early Turkish conquerors exploited the surface wealth of the lands they entered. The Ottoman Empire had an expanding frontier for centuries. It tended to ignore the genuine and permanent elements of national wealth at home and lived at the expense of its subject peoples. When the Ottoman Empire could no longer expand, its internal weaknesses increased in intensity.

Kemal Ataturk started the Rediscovery of Turkey. With severely reduced frontiers, he began to reassess the wealth of Turkey. He inspired a loyal, hardworking, and self-sacrificing citizenry to hold those frontiers and revealed an asset of the first magnitude. The world learned that the average Turk was capable of great courage, determination, patience, and self-sacrifice, and that Turks in general had a united will to survive. Conservation of this asset demanded the institution of health measures, a reorientation of town and village life, experimentation and intensification of scientific agriculture, the establishment of essential industries, and many other innovations. The Turks found that there were hidden resources scarcely touched by former generations. Mines were capable of greater production, soils could be more effectively used, rivers could be harnessed, and better communications could make goods available to internal and external markets. Education must be broadened and raised to higher levels.

While this program of the Rediscovery of Turkey was in process, the threat of totalitarian aggression loomed over the Turkish border. Ag-

gressors do not like the love of homeland by an independent people on their borders. Nor do they like to see progressive and creative growth in countries which they would like to penetrate.

It was then that the United States rediscovered Turkey. The characteristics shown by the Turkey of 1947 were those which strongly appealed to American sentiments. These characteristics were not only national assets to Turkey but to all free peoples who organized for peaceful purposes. Everyone knows the result. The United States offered to participate in a program for the strengthening of Turkey. I have already mentioned the successful development that occurred in the next 5 years. This rediscovery of Turkey's assets moved ahead early this year with the entry of Turkey into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The free world is learning that peace is not a negative abstract—merely the absence of war—but something positive and vital. It is something for which free men must work, especially when facing a great aggressive conspiracy like international communism. By the entrance of Turkey into NATO, a new area and a new force was added to those who have organized to build a peaceful world.

Turkey's Stabilizing Effect in the Middle East

Turkey, however, lies in a strategic location in the center of that long frontier from the China Sea to the Atlantic shores, where free peoples are taking positive steps to build up areas of strength against this cynical and unscrupulous conspiracy. As one of the sponsoring powers in the proposed Middle East defense organization, Turkey can and will play a constructive role in the stability of this very important area in the center of the line.

And when one goes to the extreme eastern end of this long line of struggle, there one finds a Turkish force taking its place in the U.N. Army throwing back the forces of destruction intent on destroying Korea.

So as the world of free men rediscovers Turkey, it finds that the concepts with which Republican Turkey is identified are laudable. They include plans for the enrichment of the meaning of life for the Turk at home and enlargement of the boundaries of freedom and stability abroad. Thus, the spirit of Republican Turkey has attained world significance. And much of this has occurred in the span of a single generation. Truly Turkey has packed centuries of experience into the past 29 years.

It is fortunate that the firm foundations on which Turkish-American relationships are based are not the monopoly of any one people—or nation. They are universal in potentiality. Turkey and the United States will find a congenial atmosphere of friendship wherever peoples or nations use their heads in calm judgment to solve their problems,

wherever the authority of the state rests upon the free choice of an intelligent and loyal citizenry, and wherever nations spend their energies on rediscovering the wealth that lies within themselves. The more such peoples and nations combine their spiritual and material strength, the greater is the hope for peace.

Commemoration of Czechoslovak Independence Day

White House press release dated October 25

The President on October 24 sent the following letter to Dr. Petr Zenkl, President of the Executive Committee of the Council of Free Czechoslovakia, Washington, D.C.:

DEAR DR. ZENKL: You have asked on behalf of the Council of Free Czechoslovakia that October twenty-eighth of this year, the traditional Independence Day of Czechoslovakia, be remembered with words of encouragement to the suffering millions in your homeland who are faithful disciples of democracy.

The American Government and people note that this thirty-fourth anniversary of independence, formerly a national holiday, will pass unrecognized by the Government of Czechoslovakia for the first time since the Republic's founding. Even before such a departure the communists sought to subvert the day's meaning by attributing the success of the Czechoslovak independence movement of 1918 to the Soviet October Revolution of the preceding year. This patent deceit, so typical of the communist falsification of history, could not have impressed the great majority of the people of Czechoslovakia who are fully conscious of the close collaboration of Woodrow Wilson and Thomas G. Masaryk, the founder of the Republic, and the role played by the Allied Powers in its establishment.

The dark night of communist enslavement, bringing the loss of freedom, civil rights and human dignity, the corruption of the cultural heritage of the Czechs and Slovaks, and the repression of religious life, now unhappily covers your land. Yet this anniversary continues to symbolize the historic devotion of the people of Czechoslovakia to democratic and humanist ideals and the mutual bonds of friendship between them and the people of the United States. The twenty-eighth of October this year will be revered, however silently, by the forces of democracy inside Czechoslovakia who look forward to the day when their free institutions will be restored and the nightmare of communist dictatorship and exploitation be lifted from their land.

Outside, in the free world, this day will be commemorated with even more meaning than in the past, not only for its historic importance, but in

token of the deep concern and sympathy with which the Government and people of the United States and all free countries look upon the present plight of the people of Czechoslovakia. With other nations we are now in the midst of a great effort to build the common strength of all in the face of the Soviet menace. We are seeing to it that the people of Czechoslovakia are made aware of this joint effort and purpose, so that they may take heart and remain firm in these trying times, assured that the cause of truth and freedom will prevail.

Very sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN

Letter of Credence

Czechoslovakia

The newly appointed Ambassador of Czechoslovakia, Karel Petrzelka, presented his credentials to the President on October 24. For text of the Ambassador's remarks and of the President's reply, see Department of State press release 837 of October 24.

Oil Imports and the U.S. Economy

by *Robert H. S. Eakens*

*Chief, Petroleum Policy Staff*¹

There is a broad framework within which we must deal with all of our problems. The civilized world of the West is challenged by an opposing philosophy which threatens our security, our freedom, our economic institutions, and our way of life. America must be vigorous and vigilant in protecting its national security. We have learned by now that we cannot live alone in the world and that our national security depends upon the economic strength, defense capacities, and good will and cooperation of the other countries in the free world, just as their national security is dependent upon us.

Therefore, to strengthen our national security and theirs, we have developed cooperative arrangements for defense such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the mutual security programs. These must be supplemented by such economic institutions as the International Bank and the Monetary Fund, the Export-Import Bank, Point Four, and the U.S. Mobilization Program under the Defense Production Act.

One of the major objectives in this program for national security is the development of a strong and vigorous free-world economy which will sup-

port itself by its own production and trade without material or financial assistance from us. This takes time to develop, but such an economy is part of the bulwark we are constructing against aggression and against the danger from an alien philosophy which seeks to dominate all of us. It is in this context that we must develop all our foreign and domestic policies.

A major objective also in this program of developing strength to prevent aggression is the maintenance of a sound, productive domestic economy. We know that the United States is the arsenal of democracy and that it has achieved this position as a result of the ingenuity and enterprise of the American people. Those of us who are concerned with foreign affairs know that the strength of America in international relations is grounded on the strength of America at home.

We know that oil has an important place in this picture. There is a real appreciation of the importance of a healthy and expanding domestic oil industry, of its contribution in peacetime to all phases of our existence, and of its even more vital role in an emergency. It is inconceivable that any government agency which is faithful to its task would wish to do anything to impair the effectiveness or threaten the soundness of our petroleum industry.

It is against this broad background that I wish to discuss the place for imports in our oil economy. The oil industry long ago recognized, I believe, that there is a place for imports. The question that arises is whether that place shall, within certain broad limits, be left to the operation of competitive forces in the industry or whether it shall be defined in specific terms and new governmental controls instituted to enforce adherence to those terms. It is my impression that the oil industry has a long tradition of resistance to governmental controls or interference of any kind.

In this tradition, the National Petroleum Council, in 1949 in its statement of "A National Oil Policy for the United States," enunciated as a fundamental principle: "The public interest can best be served by a vigorous, competitive oil industry operating under the incentives of private enterprise." It seems to me that imports thus far have been left to find their place in a manner consistent with the traditions of the industry.

Safeguards Against Excessive Imports

There are, however, certain safeguards to prevent imports from becoming excessive as a result of concessions granted to foreign countries under the terms of a trade agreement. These safeguards operate both before a trade agreement has been negotiated and after it has become effective. Let me describe them briefly.

In the first place, the Government must consider what concessions it may offer to the other country. All available information is studied

¹ Address made before the Independent Petroleum Association of America at Oklahoma City, on Oct. 24 (press release 828 dated Oct. 22).

with the utmost care by such agencies as the Departments of the Treasury, Labor, Defense, Commerce, Interior, Agriculture, and State, and the Tariff Commission. Hearings are held at which interested parties may fully express their views.

After these hearings and studies, the agencies as a group recommend to the President what should be offered and sought. The concessions sought are important to various sectors of our own economy, and the President must decide before he accepts the recommendations that the proposed concessions would be of equivalent value on both sides. Thus, before a negotiation begins and before any concessions are offered, a very careful assessment of the impact of these concessions and of those sought in exchange is made, not solely by the State Department but by all interested government agencies. In case an agency dissents from the majority opinion, it must present its dissenting views to the President. There is a further safeguard which operates after a trade agreement has become effective.

If the Tariff Commission and the President conclude that the result of a concession has been the importation of goods in such quantities as to cause or threaten serious injury to a domestic industry producing like or directly competitive products, the concession may be withdrawn. The President may also raise duties, impose such quotas, or make such other modifications as the Tariff Commission finds to be necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury to the domestic industry. If the Tariff Commission recommends action along these lines and the President does not act within 60 days, he must submit a report to the appropriate committees of the Congress explaining why he has not done so. This procedure is the protection which any industry has against a flood of imports. You may or may not consider it adequate with respect to oil.

But assuming that you don't, is there in fact a serious prospect that oil imports will flood the U. S. market? In a report early this year which has been widely heralded by the industry as the most realistic oil report ever made by the Government, the President's Materials Policy Commission has provided an encouraging answer. You will recall that the Commission was given the task of studying the longer-range aspect of the Nation's materials problem. The Commission estimates that demand for petroleum in the United States in 1975 will total 13,700,000 barrels daily. Of this, the Commission estimates that domestic production will be able to supply 11,200,000 barrels, thereby leaving a net deficit of 2,500,000 barrels daily to be made up by imports. The Commission thus foresees an increase in domestic production between 1950 and 1975 of 5,290,000 barrels daily. This increase is equal to the growth of production that took place here in the United States from 1859 until 1947.

It is also interesting to take a look at what the

Commission thinks will happen outside of the United States, for those developments will determine the availability of oil for shipment to the United States. The Commission expects the requirements of the free nations, excluding the United States, to increase from 3,490,000 barrels daily in 1950 to 13,100,000 barrels daily in 1975. To supply this increase in demand and the 2½ million barrels daily of imports which the Commission says we will need, foreign production must be increased by 11,460,000 barrels daily. On the basis of the Commission's figures, expanding world consumption will thus offer tremendous scope for expansion of the oil industry both at home and abroad.

Supplementary Trade Agreement With Venezuela

For the best practical illustration of the place for imports, I believe we must take the case of Venezuela. Just a few days ago—on October 11—a supplementary trade agreement, which had been concluded with Venezuela on August 28, became effective.² I believe we find in that agreement, and in the reasons which led to its negotiation, examples of the contribution which imports can and should make.

I would like to take the most important reason for the negotiation of that agreement first—security. We all know that a strong and healthy domestic oil industry is our first line of defense. But also vital to us and to our allies is a strong and healthy oil industry in the rest of the free world. During World War II, Venezuelan oil exports reached a level of almost a million (956,000) barrels daily. This oil was available for the defense of the free world. It went into the common pool just as ours did. Even so, we all remember how short our supply was. We might not have had our 2 gallons without it. If we refuse Venezuela's exports and equitable opportunity to enter our market in peacetime, can we expect to have the needed supply of Venezuelan oil in an emergency?

My second point is that Venezuela sends us oil we need. Perhaps you would question whether higher-gravity crudes meet this test. That residual fuel oil and lower-gravity crudes do hardly seems open to question. Last year we consumed and exported 593,000,000 barrels of residual fuel oil. Our domestic supply was 475,000,000 barrels. The deficit of 118,000,000 barrels was made up by imports. Our supply is not sufficient to meet our requirements. And it is not economic for us to produce our requirements from our own resources.

Third, imports are essential if we are ever to be paid for the products we send abroad. We must

² For text, see BULLETIN of Sept. 29, 1952, p. 487; for an analysis of its provisions, see *ibid.*, Sept. 15, 1952, p. 400.

import unless we are prepared to continue giving our goods away. I am sure we all agree that this is true, although I know many people prefer to have the imports occur in the other fellow's industry. Whether or not the products of any particular industry are exported, all industries nevertheless have a major stake in an economy operating at a high level of employment and income. When our economy stagnates, few industries escape the consequences. Our foreign trade plays a crucial role in maintaining production, employment, and trade. It strengthens our bonds with the countries of the free world. It permits us and our friends to make the best use of manpower, resources, and productive facilities. Venezuela is one of our best customers in the Western Hemisphere. Last year, we shipped Venezuela some 456 million dollars in goods. About 60 percent of these goods is covered by revised concessions in the supplementary trade agreement. In addition, items such as insurance, profits on American investments, shipping, and other services make up an additional sum about as large. The latest figures for these items are for 1948, when they amounted to some 445 million dollars. Our direct and indirect purchases from Venezuela in 1951, consisting almost entirely of crude and fuel oil, on the other hand amounted to 488 million dollars. We thus sell to Venezuela roughly twice as much in goods and services as we buy. And there is no problem in obtaining payment in dollars. Unfortunately there are not enough markets like that.

There is one further point which I would like to make in regard to the supplementary trade agreement with Venezuela. Insofar as petroleum is concerned, the import duties under this agreement differ in only one respect from those provided for in the trade agreement with Mexico which was in effect from 1943 to 1950. The duty on crude and residual fuel oil of 25° A. P. I. gravity or above was set at 10½ cents per barrel, the Mexican agreement rate, and the duty on these products below 25° was set at 5¼ cents. This latter reduction, which was at a level below the rate in the Mexican agreement, was made only when it became evident that it represented the only possible way of concluding an agreement. Venezuela believed that on the basis of her long cooperation with the United States she was entitled to better terms than had been accorded Mexico in 1943. In your consideration of the agreement I ask you to bear these

facts in mind. I also ask you to bear in mind that the reduction to 5¼ cents per barrel was made only on those products which compete least with our own oil resources.

These are the reasons we entered into a supplementary trade agreement with Venezuela. I believe they illustrate the real place for oil imports in our economy. I believe the desirability of attempting to define that place in terms of specific quantities is open to serious question. To attempt to define it in this way and then to circumscribe it with new governmental controls would, I believe, be contrary to the traditions and interests of the industry. Moreover if imports are at all times to find their place and to perform their functions effectively, they must be flexible and responsive to the rapid changes in conditions in this country.

U.N. Staff Appointments

Press release 846 dated October 28

The Charter of the United Nations provides that the staff shall be appointed by the Secretary-General under regulations established by the General Assembly. It also provides that the Secretary-General shall not seek or receive instructions from any government and enjoins member nations to respect the exclusively international character of his responsibilities. Accordingly, the U.S. Government does not attempt to instruct the Secretary-General as to whom he may employ or may not employ; it neither recommends U.S. citizens for employment nor gives loyalty or security clearance to those employed.

At the same time, the Department of State has made known to the Secretary-General its view that the employment of U.S. citizens who are Communists is not in the best interest of the United Nations, and the Department has long had assurance of the Secretary-General's agreement to this principle. Under a confidential arrangement with the Secretary-General, the Department of State, drawing upon its access to information held by the security agencies of the U.S. Government, has for some time been of assistance to the Secretary-General in identifying U.S. citizens, employed or contemplated for employment, who would appear to be Communists.

America's Responsibility in Today's World

by *Howland H. Sargeant*

*Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs*¹

I—like you—am concerned with education. I am concerned with keeping the American public informed on foreign-policy matters and in keeping the Department of State posted on what Americans are thinking about such matters. I am also concerned with the relationship between domestic public opinion and what we are telling people abroad through our international information and educational-exchange programs.

You are concerned with bringing a broad, basic education to young America and with the development of personality and character that this implies. The responsibilities of the teacher have always been considerable. I have often wondered whether or not our society fully recognizes the nature and extent of those responsibilities. One would doubt it if he were to judge solely by the salaries so many of our teachers receive.

But your responsibilities in today's world are perhaps greater than ever before. You are educating the future voters of America. You are educating the leaders who will pilot this democracy through what may well be an era of continued tension and difficulty.

There is a little story—one of my favorites—which bears directly on this question of educational responsibility. A grade school teacher was trying to convince her 7-year-olds that they should avoid overexposure to the winter cold. "Children," she said, "you must be careful about colds and overexposure. I had a darling little brother, only 7 years old. One day he went out into the snow with his new sled—and caught cold. Pneumonia set in and 3 days later he died." There was silence in the room for a few long seconds. Then a youngster in the back row raised his hand and asked, "Where's his sled?"

Humor aside—this points up a crucial fact. We do not always make the impression upon others that we think we are making or seek to make. In this kind of world, the United States must not

only make the best possible impression upon others. We must do everything to live up to those ideals which lead other people to respect us and to have confidence in our leadership. We must do everything to show others that their interest and ours coincide. There is no alternative if we are to be secure.

Communist Assault on Western Culture

Our support of the United Nations rests upon that conviction. It stems from the belief that we must have understanding among peoples if we are to have a peaceful world. To quote Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, the United Nations is "a place where political opinions of all kinds can be expressed in words, rather than bullets."

The ideals upon which the United Nations is founded are those upon which this America prospered and became great: freedom, justice, and the dignity of the individual. They are the ideals of a good world society. Unfortunately, there are those who seek to frustrate those ideals. There are those who have done everything in their power to make aggression a synonym for peace and slavery a synonym for freedom.

International communism and its architects, the power-mad men of the Kremlin, threaten not only American security but every decent thing that Western civilization stands for. They have launched an all-out global assault on Western culture. And I use the term "culture" in its broadest sense.

To understand the nature of this assault, I think we need to know the enemy we face. I think we need to understand fully that the so-called Communist society of the U.S.S.R. rests upon deceit, distrust, and distortion.

Consider these evidences of Soviet culture. Few weeks pass when Moscow does not claim credit for inventing something which Western scientists developed generations before most Russians ever heard about it. During the past several years, the Soviets have claimed that Russians were

¹Address made before the Colorado Federation of Teachers at Denver on Oct. 23 (press release S20).

the inventors of devices ranging from the first airplane to the first electric light. They even claim to have invented the great American pastime "beisbol." Apparently, Thomas Edison and the Wright brothers were mechanical pirates.

But the Soviets do not stop at stealing credit for the inventions of others. No, indeed. They are also past masters at rewriting history. They have rewritten the story of the role Stalin played in the Russian Revolution. In fact, they have done that rewrite job several times. They have doctored the history of their own Communist Party. They have carefully purged all of their school textbooks of any honest appraisal of the vast amount of material and other assistance the West gave the Soviet Union during World War II.

A small American contingent was part of a much larger Allied force which went into the Russian Far East during the closing months of World War I to guard rail and supply centers against the possibility of seizure by German troops. Early in 1951, Soviet propagandists suddenly "discovered" that these American soldiers committed wholesale atrocities against the Russian people. Ever since, these Soviet hucksters of hatred have been droning on and on about the tortures, the murders, and the rapes Americans are supposed to have inflicted upon the Russians.

A careful survey of Soviet publications in the period 1919 to 1950 reveals not a single word about these alleged atrocities. If anything, these publications treat the American role in World War I in almost heroic terms because of our success in encouraging other Allied troops to leave Russian soil after the war. The fact is that the Soviets decided to rewrite the history of American activities in Siberia because they believe the atrocity theme—false though it is—will help to develop hatred for America.

Soviet Hate Campaign

Most revealing as to the depths to which Soviet immorality has sunk is the manner in which the Communists are handling their young people. Youth is told, day in and day out, that they are expected to act as informers and stool pigeons—even to the denunciation of their own flesh and blood.

A youthful informer, one Pavlik Morosov, is literally a patron saint in the Soviet Union. Morosov has been commemorated in stone statues throughout the Soviet Union, and 2 years ago his picture graced a new issue of postage stamps. Morosov's fame rests upon his having informed on his own parents during the bloody Soviet collectivization drive of the early 1930's.

This, then, is the culture of the Soviet Union. This is Moscow, whose constant hymn of hate against America and Americans has portrayed us as "warmongers," "cannibals," "gangsters," and "rapers of innocent, defenseless women."

Insofar as the Kremlin is concerned, propaganda—lying propaganda—has long been the handmaiden of subversion, economic pressure, and aggression. Propaganda is but another of the Soviet's many tools for world conquest.

Soviet-inspired aggression in Korea was a threat to the United Nations, to America, and to the entire free world. So were the Communist efforts to subvert Greece. So were the attempts to drive the Western powers out of Berlin.

The current Soviet-propaganda campaign of hate against Western culture in general, and American in particular, is no less a threat.

Working together with our free-world allies, we stopped the Communists short in Korea, Greece, and Berlin. We must continue to stand together with equal determination if we are to meet the global psychological assault the Soviets have launched against us.

The recent Communist Party Congress in Moscow and what was said there may lead some people to believe that the Soviets have let up in their efforts to communize the world. There is no evidence to support this belief. Lenin taught that Communists must be prepared to execute a "zig-zag" in tactics as long as they did not depart from their general strategy. At Moscow, Communist leaders appear to be doing just such a "zigzag" today in an effort to split the free-nation alliance. But their goal is still a communized world.

Unless we are prepared to continue to strengthen the moral and spiritual ties between ourselves and the rest of the free nations, our planes, our tanks, and our guns will mean relatively little. Unless we can maintain and improve our relations with the other peoples, we will have lost the global battle of ideas to the Soviets.

When I say that we must do everything possible to build understanding with others, I refer to people in all parts of the world. I mean the Far East and the Near East as well as Latin America and Western Europe. We must not forget the millions of people behind the Iron Curtain who have known freedom and who are thirsting for freedom's rebirth in their homelands. Nor can we forget the compelling reasons which led us to support the United Nations in Korea.

Importance of Stabilizing Europe

Those who assume that we can stand idly by while Communist imperialism swallows any part of the free world are deluding themselves. Every Soviet gain at the expense of free people is our loss.

However, I should like to talk for the most part about Western Europe—an area of vital importance to our Nation's security. Western Europe's importance to us is not only a matter of its industrial power, its skilled technicians, and its strategic position. Western Europe is, to a great extent, the cradle of our culture. Whether

we like it or not, we are the strapping child of a troubled parent. And the child needs the parent as much as the parent needs the child.

Now, I believe that the great majority of Americans understand this. But there are many Europeans—even among those who do know free Europe's importance—who have become resentful of the Western Europeans. And that is understandable.

The American taxpayer has done his share to give aid to a Europe sorely in need of it. He sees his country carrying a greater share of the mutual-defense burden than any of its allies. He knows that America—the most powerful nation in the world and the power center of the free-world alliance—must do more if only because it is able to do more. But still he asks himself, "When are the Europeans going to get off our backs?"

Let us answer that query by taking a closer look at these Western European nations. The first point I would make is that great obstacles—many great obstacles—have been overcome in bringing about the existing mutual-defense system and the existing spirit of mutual cooperation which ties us to Western Europe.

The most obvious evidence here consists of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Schuman Plan, and the European Payments Union. Through NATO, we are working with the free Europeans in developing the military, economic, and moral strength with which to deter aggression and—if necessary—to repel it. The Schuman Plan, in providing a single, unified market for steel and coal in Western Europe, fosters both economic and defense stability. The European Payments Union acts as a financial clearinghouse and thus encourages freer trade.

These are concrete achievements—and all of them are vital to our own security as well as to Europe's. But not one of these achievements has become reality without considerable diplomatic pulling and hauling. Intense nationalistic feelings have had to be softened. Basic differences have had to be adjusted. The complexity of a Western Europe of many tongues and varying political and economic systems has had to be welded into a great team for defense of the free world. That the team was developed is—in no small part—due to our help. But it is primarily due to the efforts and the willingness of the Western Europeans themselves. We, in effect, helped them to help themselves.

It is then not a question of "getting the Europeans off our backs." It is a question of doing everything possible to work with the Europeans in building a stable group of free peoples who can stand on their own feet and resist any and all Communist encroachments. Understanding—mutual understanding—must be the foundation of these mutual efforts.

European Attitudes Toward U.S.

What sort of things condition European attitudes toward us? Let us look at the facts.

Most of the Western European peoples live at a material level far below our own. In many places, they have just begun to reach prewar levels. The rearmament effort, imposed upon these people by the threat of Soviet aggression, has added to an already existing economic strain.

Most of the Western Europeans lived on the field of battle during World War II. They saw their countries occupied, their cities and towns devastated, some of their greatest leaders shot as enemies of the Nazi state. They suffered to the full the degradation of the conquered. People who have been directly exposed to the horrors of modern war do not easily forget it.

Our status as the greatest power of the free world also conditions the way the Europeans look at us. Patriotic Europeans, whose pride in their nations equals our own, cannot be expected to fall headlong into love with a new superpower whose material strength and prestige surpasses their own.

A fourth very important factor is the feeling that—in the event of war—the Europeans would be directly in the path of destruction. America, from the European viewpoint, is less likely to suffer because of its distance from the center of Soviet power. This belief that Western Europe is running the greatest risk in the event of war is, I think, one of the greatest influences on European public opinion about the United States. These are only a few of the more obvious factors which affect the outlook of the peoples of the Western European nations.

Specifically, then, how do the great majority of Western Europeans feel about the United States? On the positive side, I think it can be said that most Western Europeans admire us for our technical know-how. They respect us for our material accomplishments. They look to us for support against aggression. Though there is some neutralist sentiment in Western Europe today, the great majority of Europeans earnestly believe that we are doing much more for peace than is the Soviet Union.

They appreciate what we have done to raise their standards of living through the Marshall Plan and other aid programs. They recognize America as the leader of the free-world coalition and look to us for continued material support and leadership.

But there are less favorable reactions which we must consider. For example, many Western Europeans have a marked fear of domination by the United States. They think that their dependence upon American material support may lead to the loss of their independence. Closely linked to this is the feeling that America is interfering in their domestic affairs.

Georges Bidault, former French Premier, referred to this feeling recently when he said: "It's only human . . . because America is too strong and rather impetuous. The French have the feeling that as soon as an idea emerges in the United States, it comes with such pressure that everyone is expected to yield to it immediately." Mr. Bidault is a long-time friend of the United States. His comment was made in the spirit of friendliness. It is safe to say that few men can equal Mr. Bidault's knowledge of his own people.

There are some Europeans who believe that the United States wants political and economic domination of the world. And I do not refer solely to the Communists when I say this. For the people who share this sentiment are of all shades of political opinion.

There is some tendency in Western Europe to question our judgment. And a considerable body of opinion holds that our rearmament program is increasing the danger of war.

The element of personal jealousy and dislike has been—to a great extent—fostered by on-the-spot reactions to well-paid GI's and free-spending American tourists. During World War II, these reactions were brought home rather sharply by the widespread comment that "Americans are overpaid, oversexed, and over here."

Then, of course, there is a strong feeling that the dollar sign is the truest expression of American culture. These, then, are some of the unfavorable attitudes with which we must cope in Western Europe.

You might well ask how it is possible for people to appreciate our economic and military aid on one hand and distrust our intentions on the other. We human beings are very complex. Our attitudes are often—to use an impressive technical word—"ambivalent." We can like and dislike the same person for exactly the same trait. Try that out on some of your immediate friends and neighbors. I think you will see what I mean.

If individuals react in this way to each other, just think of the problem faced in adjusting relations between entire peoples. It is tremendous.

Assaulting the Barriers to Understanding

But—insofar as the relations between ourselves and the Western Europeans are concerned—it is a problem that must be brought much closer to solution. Are we moving closer to that solution? Are we effectively assaulting the barriers to mutual understanding? Are we winning the "cold" war which the Communists have forced upon the world?

The answer to each of these questions is clearly "yes." Let me present some of the supporting evidence. Our International Information and Educational Exchange Program is using every available medium to get the truth about America to all areas of the world. We are combatting the "Big

Lie," which is basic to Soviet propaganda. We are working to show other peoples that their interests coincide with ours.

The results achieved through exchange of persons are typical of what we are accomplishing. American teachers, professors, students, journalists, and others are going overseas to visit, study, and learn about other ways of life. In the process, they also act as grass-roots ambassadors of ideas and good will for the United States.

Foreign leaders from all walks of life are visiting the United States and going away with a new or revised impression: "Americans are not barbarians after all."

There was the Asian labor leader who, after spending several months in this country, said—and I quote, "I have been highly impressed by the extent of individual freedom enjoyed by American citizens and by their inherent belief in the dignity of labor."

And there was the Dutch educator who set his impressions of America down on paper. This is what he wrote: "The arrogance with which people in Europe so often speak of American culture is by no means justified. . . . Films, press and radio often give us an unfavorable impression of American life but that impression is wrong and untrue. . . . People are convinced in America that one should make sacrifices for culture's sake."

So it goes. Slowly but surely, our Campaign of Truth is grinding away at the obstacles to mutual understanding between ourselves and our free-world neighbors.

But there are still other evidences of progress in the global battle we are waging against Communist ideology. There is the great decline in Communist strength which has taken place in Western Europe between 1946 and the present. In 1946 Communists held key posts in several of the Western European cabinets. Today, no Communist holds a cabinet post anywhere in Western Europe.

Membership in the Communist parties of Western Europe is down about one-third from what it was in 1946. Communist-controlled unions, including the powerful ones in France and Italy, have lost both membership and influence among the general population. Circulation of Communist Party publications has fallen off. For example, the circulation of the major French Communist organ has dropped from 600,000 in 1946 to 200,000 in 1951.

The number of Communists holding seats in the parliaments of Western Europe has dropped drastically since 1945. In France, the number of Communist-held seats went from 181 in 1946 to 103 in 1951. In the Netherlands, the drop was from 10 to 8. In Belgium, the decline was from 23 to 7.

Incidentally, Belgium held nation-wide municipal elections less than 2 weeks ago. In Brussels, the Belgian capital, the Communist popular vote dropped 60 percent from what it was in 1946. The

estimated drop in the Communist popular vote for the country as a whole was 50 percent.

There are no Communists at all in the parliaments of Great Britain and Norway today. I might add that—in both of these countries—there is a very strong labor party in the legislature.

That, it seems to me, is one of the best possible answers to those few die-hards who chronically associate labor with communism. The record shows that free labor in general and American labor in particular has been in the forefront of the battle against communism. The record shows that America's labor unions are not only fighting communism here at home. They have joined with the free labor unions of other nations to fight communism on a global basis.

Still another type of evidence as to the advances freedom is making at the expense of communism may be found in the number of defectors fleeing into Western Europe from behind the Iron Curtain. The stream of escapees continues to flow steadily despite the terror tactics the Communists are using to try to halt it. In Germany alone, the number of Germans who escape from the Soviet zone averages between 600 and 700 a day.

The almost paranoiac insecurity which the Soviets themselves exhibit is further evidence of the progress we are making in combatting Communist ideology. At the present time, something very close to a purge is going on among Soviet Communist Party officials. The Party is busy expelling what a top Politburo member has referred to as "opportunists, deviationists, bourgeois nationalists and other undesirable elements." That is Communist double-talk for "people who cannot be trusted by the Party leaders."

It is true, of course, that the purge is a regular pastime among the Communists. It is fully in line with the terrorism and deceit by which Communist governments regularly seek to keep their enslaved peoples in line. But the purge—the current one in the Soviet Union included—is particularly significant because it reflects a fear and an insecurity in large part due to the pressure of external forces. The ideal of freedom is certainly one of the most important of those forces.

These, then, are some of the evidences which testify to our effectiveness in the field of ideas. We are penetrating the armor of propaganda behind which the Communists are seeking to hide their true motives. We are building understanding with other free peoples.

But—and again we must be absolutely frank—the job has really just begun. Our current Government information program is doing much. But that peacetime program is only about 7 years old. You cannot change the attitudes and habit patterns of generations overnight.

Furthermore, our Government information program is but one of America's many, many voices. We are not like the Soviet Union which speaks with but one voice—the voice of Stalin's dictator-

ship. The United States, like any democracy, makes itself known abroad through the student, the tourist, the visiting professor, the soldier, the free press, radio, and motion pictures—as well as through its Government spokesmen.

U.S. Speaks with Many Voices

Where the Soviet Union speaks with but one opinion, we speak with many. To try to do otherwise would be to impose upon ourselves the very totalitarianism we are struggling to avoid.

It is clear, then, that the burden of cementing our psychological unity with the free peoples whose friendship we must have falls heavily upon private groups and individuals. It falls upon the shoulders of Americans as a people whose actions speak as loudly as words. It falls particularly heavily upon you—the educators of America.

We Americans must not only permit others to see us as we are. We must convince them that we stand for something which it is to their advantage to share. We must convince them that we desire their confidence and respect, that we are interested in their welfare, and that they can better themselves by working with us.

We must show them that the American way is the way of dynamic, democratic progress—that ours is the true revolution which can guarantee all men freedom of spirit and equality of opportunity. We must show them that the revolution of which the Communists prate is really a dark reactionary conspiracy and the complete suppression of individuality.

Simply being against something will get us nowhere. We must be for something good, decent, and just. We must be prepared to accept criticism, good or bad. And we must be willing to right the wrongs that others detect in us.

I have already commented on your great responsibility in this trying period of our Nation's existence. I should like to reiterate that that responsibility goes far beyond teaching the fundamentals of reading, writing, and arithmetic. It goes far beyond providing a general background in the physical and social sciences.

You are engaged in molding young America. The sort of person that Mrs. Jones' little boy will be as an adult is becoming increasingly dependent upon the classroom. The sensitivities, the attitudes, the habit patterns of youth—more and more you are sharing their development with the parents and the home. The principles we live by—political, economic, and social—these too you teach the youth of America.

In this connection, I want to stress the need for giving American youth a chance to learn the difference between true patriotism and its obnoxious counterfeits. In these times, an honest, unflinching patriotism is absolutely vital to our Nation's security. Youth must understand that the true patriot is not one who spends his time preaching

hatred and distrust for all who disagree with him. The true patriot does not brand every idea which he does not want to accept as either "Communist" or "Fascist."

The true patriot does not stoop to the nefarious smear tactics which the Communists themselves have made routine. The genuine patriot has positive convictions about American democracy. He is confident in its staying power. He is tolerant of ideas with which he himself may not agree as long as it is clear that those ideas do not threaten the structure of democracy. The true patriot understands that democracy is sufficiently strong to withstand any alien ideology if only democracy is given a chance to function.

Surely, you can see—you must see—that much of the future of America lies in your hands. Our chances for building secure relationships for this Nation tomorrow rest—to a great extent—upon what you do today. For you are engaged in helping to create the image of America that other peoples will see and come to know in the future. I have every confidence that you will continue to do your share to make that image an honest reflection of a sound, a strong, and an understanding America.

Propaganda Attacks on U. N. and UNESCO

*by Perle Mesta
Minister to Luxembourg¹*

The fight you are making for better understanding between peoples—for peace—is ours. The goals you seek belong to all of us. It seems to me that the most important thing I can say to you is to make you understand how very deeply we feel this. To, perhaps, bring you a message of hope and encouragement from one of those back of the firing line.

When I think of the responsibility that is yours I am, frankly, awed. The responsibility and the opportunity both are tremendous.

I have no doubt that you can handle this responsibility. You have in the past. I am equally sure that you will rise to the opportunity before you.

In your hands lies the future—the future of not only America but of the world. For, whether we like it or not, the future of the United States and all mankind are today irrevocably linked. And the future of the United States lies with its youth—the boys and girls in your classrooms. I have the greatest respect and admiration for the teachers of America. You are doing and have

done a splendid job. And with, I regret to say, very little reward other than the satisfaction of a job—a worth-while job—well done.

That job is, of course, complicated by the attacks under which many of you are now suffering—unjust attacks. I refer specifically to the attacks upon your efforts to teach the facts about today's world. To give your students understanding of the free world's effort to build peace through the United Nations.

The Enemy's Character in the War of Ideas

The man on the Korean front has, at least, this advantage. He has little trouble in identifying his enemy. The gun in that enemy's hand is visible. The situation has clarity.

In this war of ideas the enemy is not wearing a uniform. His weapons are of the mind and can be identified only by the mind. He fights with ideas, and often these ideas are purposely confused.

In their campaign for power, world power, total power, the masters of the Kremlin have very clearly recognized that this is, basically, a war for the minds of men. They are backing up that war militarily and economically, but fundamentally the victory will be won or lost on the ideological front.

They recognize fully the potency of the idea of peace, and they have seized on that idea subverting it to their own ends just as they have tried to do with the idea of democracy, with the idea of freedom and the whole long list with which they have, and can have, no sympathy.

The mockery of the Soviet "peace" crusade is almost unbelievable. They talk "peace" while threatening the world with war—with World War III.

They have resorted to the most callous exploitation of mankind's deep longing for peace. Their propaganda machine is geared to a program of undermining the morale of the democratic peoples by the most monstrous lie ever invented—that the United States and its allies seek war while the Soviet Union and its satellites want only peace.

William Foster, chairman of the Communist Party in the United States, opened the Moscow peace campaign in this country in a key speech in March 1950. Foster called the Communists' "peace" crusade their "most decisive political task." Every Communist organization, every club, every section, he said, must have a plan for this peace—this phony peace.

These tactics have enlisted in the crusade all of the Communists, American brand, and their sympathizers. That was to be expected. I am not going to discuss them.

The groups who really distress me are those who ignorantly play the Soviet game—who do not

¹Excerpts from an address made before the Oklahoma Education Association at Oklahoma City on Oct. 31 (press release 831 dated Oct. 23).

realize that their activities are directed toward achieving the Soviet objectives.

You teachers have become the special target of certain individuals and certain groups. Why? Well, because you have so responsible and important a job in this fight. Because you are, indeed, on the front line.

Take the attacks on your discussions of the United Nations and UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) in your classrooms. To anyone familiar with Soviet strategy the *why* of these attacks is all too clear. To date, the United Nations has been one of the greatest obstacles in the path of Soviet ambitions. Korea is a case in point.

The United Nations seeks peace—a real peace. UNESCO proposes to build a foundation of understanding for that peace—understanding between nations and between people.

The Soviets would like to see these efforts fail. They are working actively everywhere in the world to make them fail.

A Grand Prize for the Soviets—An Isolated America

Let me repeat, I do not for one moment think that all the groups and individuals in this country criticizing the United Nations and UNESCO are knowingly working for the Communists. On the contrary, many of them are rabid anti-Communists. They fear and dread Soviet imperialism as deeply and sincerely as you or I. Yet they are playing the Soviet game. They are seeking to destroy the united world front against Soviet communism. They would, for one thing, give the Soviets the grand prize—an isolated America.

Listen to this:

Having come under the thumb of the American imperialists this humanitarian organization (UNESCO) endeavors to divert the masses by false talk about universal respect for justice and the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind.

And who is that talking? The Soviet-controlled *New Times* of Moscow on March 20, 1950. Just about the time the famous "peace" crusade was launched.

Again: "UNESCO is sparing no effort in spreading the reactionary ideology of the United States." This was a message beamed from Moscow to Turkey on May 5 of this year.

Daily the Soviet press, the Soviet radio, all their weapons of ideological warfare, din this thesis into the ears and minds of men and women in every area of the world. UNESCO must be destroyed. Its work must be rendered futile.

But let us put on another record.

"UNESCO is a movement far more dangerous than communism," asserted an officer of a well-known Pacific Coast women's organization in a recent radio broadcast. "We are gradually being taken over by UNESCO to put our minds in chains," declared another well-known American club-

woman, the former head of one of our greatest patriotic women's organizations.

On October 18, 1951, a highly distinguished member of the U.S. Congress attacked UNESCO on the floor of the House of Representatives as "the greatest subversive plot in history."

Attacks on the United Nations and UNESCO are, in many instances, closely related to attacks on schools. This is not a coincidence because UNESCO stands for many of the same things that our schools stand for—freedom of information, access to facts, independence of thought. And so UNESCO is labeled a greater danger than communism—as subversive, as an instrument to put chains on the minds of our youth.

The voice is Jacob's voice, my friends, but the hands are the hands of Esau.

Actually, you know, the U.S.S.R. has never been a member of UNESCO. They have never even applied for membership. Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary belong but take very little part in UNESCO's activities. Their delegates walked out when UNESCO refused to seat Communist China in place of representatives of the Chinese Nationalist Government.

The Soviets do belong, of course, to the United Nations, and their efforts always have been to prevent unity and unified action. Whatever the United Nations has accomplished—and its accomplishments have been substantial—has been in the face of Soviet obstruction, and this very obstruction in the United Nations has served to awaken many nations of the free world to the true nature of Soviet policy.

But I do not believe I need defend either the United Nations or UNESCO to you. I can only warn you to be constantly on the alert in your schools and in your communities to identify both the voice of Jacob and the hands of Esau.

Keeping Open the Minds of Tomorrow

Your great task is to keep the minds of tomorrow open. Not long ago I was reading a very interesting article by H. A. Overstreet. Some of you may have seen it. In the course of a discussion of the political ideology of totalitarianism, Mr. Overstreet said:

Totalitarianism of whatever sort—religious, political, economic, educational—is a plan for fixating the many in immaturity. It is a plan for preventing the majority of men and women from growing up.

Those who would limit discussion in your schoolrooms would do just that. They would put a stop to growth; they would "fixate the many in immaturity."

Continued Mr. Overstreet:

Political totalitarianism comes with Plan in hand. To its own passionate belief, it has the way, the truth, and the light. It announces to the world it has the sole way of human salvation. All the other ways are of the Devil—capitalism, liberalism, democracy. With complete assur-

ance of rightness, it calls for an utter surrender and obedience.

Under communism, education has been shaped to fit this pattern.

Those who would force this pattern upon American education have, I feel, no faith in democracy. They have no faith in man. The peace we seek will come only through a faith in man. It can come only through understanding—mature understanding. If you, our teachers, teach the coming generations to think, you will have helped to make that peace sure.

Throughout the ages the thinkers of all nations, of all peoples, have recognized the futility, the stupidity of war. They have seen that the brotherhood of man is not merely a beautiful but unattainable ideal, but a fact. And it is a fact we must recognize if we are to survive.

We, however, must have patience. We can't win this fight overnight. Patience and courage. It has taken great courage for you, our teachers, to stand up under the attacks leveled at you and to continue with your great task. That you have so stood is a matter of pride for all Americans.

Obviously, whatever you do will be limited in its effect unless your communities back you. Education that stops when the children leave the schoolroom will never be very effective. Most of you, I know, are working in your communities, and the majority of your communities, I am sure, support you.

The American people have, I think, grown up tremendously in these past few years. Responsibility breeds responsibility. As we have, of a necessity, taken on world responsibilities, we have developed the maturity it takes to handle our new tasks.

Additional Fees on Imported Filberts Found Unjustified

Statement by the President

White House press release dated October 20

On September 25 I received from the Tariff Commission a report and recommendation with respect to additional fees on imports of almonds and an import quota on shelled filberts. I accepted the recommendation with respect to almonds and issued a proclamation in time for it to be effective on October 1.¹ The matter of filberts was left for further consideration.

Since that time I have found no need for the imposition of a quota limitation on imports of shelled filberts, and I therefore am taking no action to impose new restrictions on imports of filberts for the coming crop year. My decision is based on several facts. One of these is that American growers seem assured of a return from their

in-shell sales alone, in excess of their returns from their entire crop last year. I can find no justification for the belief expressed in the report that there is, or is likely to be, so severe a threat to American filberts as to warrant the imposition of an import quota.

Restrictive action with regard to filberts would fall almost entirely upon Turkey and would reduce its annual dollar earnings by over one and one-half million dollars. This would be on top of a loss of dollar earnings already incurred by reason of an increased tariff on dried figs.² Imposition of the recommended quota would seriously interfere with the emergency efforts to combat the serious Turkish financial crisis.

Point Four Director for Liberia

Press release 530 dated October 23

John W. Davis, president of West Virginia State College and an outstanding American educator, has been named U.S. Director of Technical Cooperation in Liberia, the Department of State announced on October 23.

Mr. Davis will have charge of the Point Four Program of technical cooperation in Liberia under the general direction of Ambassador Edward R. Dudley. He will succeed C. Reed Hill, who was transferred from Monrovia to Washington to become chief of the Liberian Branch of the Technical Cooperation Administration. At present 84 American technicians are in Liberia, assisting in its country-wide development program. Several Liberian trainees are studying in the United States under the auspices of Point Four. The United States and Liberia signed a general Point Four agreement on December 22, 1950.

Cooperative activities in economic development in Liberia are among the most extensive of any under the Point Four Program, which is now operating in 35 countries. During the current fiscal year the Liberian Government is contributing 20 percent of its total national revenue, or about \$1,400,000, toward the cost of the program. The United States is contributing \$1,506,000.

In addition to direct contributions, the Liberian Government expends considerable sums of its own revenue toward cost of capital-development projects on which U.S. technicians are assisting. The Liberian Government also is spending \$6,330,000 of Export-Import Bank loan funds to accelerate the economic development of the country.

A joint commission for economic development, composed of seven Liberians and six Americans, surveys the economic resources of the country and plans and assists in carrying out the Liberian Government's 5-year development plan, in which Point Four is playing an important, coordinated role.

¹ BULLETIN of Oct. 13, 1952, p. 569.

² *Ibid.*, Sept. 1, 1952, p. 337.

The Prisoner Question and Peace in Korea

*Statement by Secretary Acheson*¹

U.S./U.N. press release dated Oct. 24 [Excerpt]

Let us talk for a moment about the background of the prisoner question. From the very beginning the United Nations Command has followed the provisions of the Geneva Convention of 1949, and it has particularly done so by promptly sending lists of prisoners to the International Committee of the Red Cross, which, in turn, has sent these lists to the other side. Vast numbers of prisoners have been captured by the United Nations side. One hundred and seventy thousand odd names were sent in. Subsequently, it was discovered that during the period of the wholesale surrenders by the North Korean Army and the mass movement of refugees from the North, 37,000 odd people were sent into these prisoner-of-war camps who were not prisoners at all. These were civilian people, and they were reclassified—some 37,000 odd people—and they were set free. The International Committee of the Red Cross was informed of the people by name. Subsequently, we gave a revised list to the Communists containing 132,000 names. Investigation of those revealed that an additional 11,000 were Republic of Korea citizens who were not properly classified as prisoners of war, and they too are being released. The United Nations Command, therefore, has in custody as prisoners of war about 121,000 persons.

As compared with what I have just reported as to United Nations observance of the Geneva Convention, the Communist practice has been not to inform the International Committee of the Red Cross or the United Nations Command, through any channel, of the names and numbers of prisoners of war, as required by law. When they finally

agreed to list the prisoners of war, they listed 11,500, including all Koreans and all United Nations Command prisoners. This was disappointing because, only months before, on April 8, 1951—and before that, on February 9, 1951—the Communists had announced over the radio that, in the first 9 months of hostilities, they had captured 65,000 persons. They were very proud of it, and they announced it over the radio twice—65,000 prisoners in the first 9 months of hostilities. But, when they were asked about the difference between 65,000 and 11,500, they had a most interesting explanation. They said that the difference was accounted for by people who had been “reeducated” at the front—so quickly that it was impossible to get their names. Most of these people had almost instantaneously been reeducated—and had done what? What do you suppose these reeducatees had done so quickly that one could not get their names? You have guessed it, I am sure: they joined the North Korean Army. And that was the difference between 65,000 and 11,500.

In the treatment of prisoners of war, the United Nations Command has not only sent the lists, but it has admitted the International Committee of the Red Cross to its prisoner-of-war camps; it has given that Committee every facility to investigate every camp; and, on every occasion on which it has been criticized by the International Committee for any conduct, it has promptly met that criticism and changed what was going on in the camp.

Communist practice, as I have said, has been that they have not given lists of names. They have failed to appoint a protecting power or a benevolent organization such as the Red Cross. They rejected the efforts of the International Committee of the Red Cross to get into the Communist prisoner-of-war camps. They have refused to exchange relief packages, and, until very recently, they have refused to exchange mail—and now that is allowed only on a most limited scale. They have refused to report on the health of prisoners of war, and they refuse to exchange the seriously

¹ This review of the prisoner-of-war question constituted the last portion of the Secretary's report on the Korean problem in Committee I (Political and Security) of the U.N. General Assembly on Oct. 24. For excerpts from the preceding portions, which trace the history of Korea from the Cairo Conference in 1943 to the current recess in the armistice negotiations, see BULLETIN of Nov. 3, 1952, pp. 679-692. The complete text is printed as *The Problem of Peace in Korea*, Department of State publication 4771.

sick and wounded, as is required by the Geneva Convention. They have failed to give the accurate locations of the prisoner-of-war camps, and they have failed to mark them properly. And they have situated their camps in places of danger near legitimate military targets, in defiance of the Geneva Convention.

The Repatriation Question

We now come to the origin of this repatriation question. As increasing numbers of prisoners came into United Nations hands, it began to be found out that more and more of these prisoners believed that, if they were returned to Communist hands, they would be executed or imprisoned or treated brutally in some way. They therefore took the position that they would not be exchanged and that, if an attempt was made to exchange them, they would resist by force. It was quite unthinkable to the United Nations Command that it should use force to drive into the hands of the Communists people who would be resisting that effort by force. That was the attitude taken by the United Nations Command. It was the attitude taken by all other governments whose troops were in Korea and who would be required to carry out this forcible return if it were instituted. So far as I know, there has been no member of the United Nations outside the Communist group that has ever suggested that it was right, proper, legal, or necessary to return these prisoners by force.

Even our knowledge that many of the prisoners had this attitude did not give us the slightest idea of the magnitude of the problem until the interrogation period came along in April 1952. At that time, when we saw the numbers who held these views and the violence with which they held them, it became clear that it would not only be highly immoral and illegal to force these prisoners to return but that it would also require a military operation of no inconsiderable proportions to do it.

Let us be clear about the attitudes and positions which have been taken. Early in the negotiations and throughout the negotiations, the United Nations Command has taken the view that all prisoners in its possession were entitled to the opportunity to be repatriated. There is no question about that. Every one of them is entitled to it—the entire 121,000—even though the result of an exchange of that magnitude would be that prisoners being returned to the United Nations Command would number 11,500, while these others would come to a vastly greater number. Our point is that the prisoners are entitled to an opportunity to be repatriated, and we have never departed from that view after the early days of the discussion. And what we have tried to do throughout these discussions is to be as ingenious as possible in finding ways of meeting the Communist objections.

Now let me talk for a moment about the so-called

screening of prisoners, which really means the interrogating of the prisoners to find out whether or not they would resist violently a return to the Communist side. It is important to note that, in seeking a solution of this problem, a principal step involved finding out what the prisoners thought, whether or not they would resist by force. The Communists have always claimed that it was wrong to find that out—that that was a wrong thing to do. And yet, what I would rather stress here is that the screening was done with their knowledge and with their acquiescence. Now, how did that come about? It came about in this way: In April 1952, when we were arguing with the Communists as to this principle, they said: "Well, how many people are involved in this? Let us find out whether this is a serious question before we just argue about it on principle. How many of these prisoners do you say would violently resist going back?" And we said: "The only way we can find out is to ask them. We don't know any other way of finding out. And we think it would be very helpful and very much to your interests on the Communist side if you put out a proclamation of amnesty, so that we could tell anybody who was worried about himself that you are ready to pardon him." The Communists said: "That is a good idea; we will do that." And so they put out a proclamation of amnesty for any prisoner of war who would return—for the very purpose of affecting, if they could, the decision of the prisoners in this period of interrogation. Therefore, when they say that this is all wrong and wicked and illegal, what you have to know is that they themselves agreed to it.

We tried to be as careful and as fair in the screening as we possibly could. In order to achieve that, the interrogation of the Chinese prisoners of war was done exclusively by United States military personnel; there were no Chinese personnel used in that operation. In the case of the Koreans, it was very largely United States military personnel, but in some cases others assisted.

Also I wish to stress that the prisoners were encouraged to agree to repatriation. A prisoner who does not want to go back is a problem. It is not something one wants to happen; it is something one does not want to happen. Therefore, they were encouraged to agree to repatriation. They were warned of the possible ill effects which might result to their families in the Communist area if they did not return. They were told that no promises would be made to them about their future, and if there was any doubt whether a prisoner was going to resist or not, we put him in the group which had agreed to return home. It was only when those who carried on the interrogation were convinced that the prisoner would violently resist—not just argue about it but violently resist—repatriation that the prisoner was classified as not available for repatriation.

The original screening of prisoners of war in April applied only to those who were in camps where this interrogation was permitted. In some of the camps the Communist leaders of the prisoners refused to permit any interrogations, and such interrogations were not possible until later. Thus, the first results were that 70,000 would be available for repatriation. In most camps where we could not carry on an interrogation, we had to estimate, and that was done on the basis that most of these prisoners would want to return. Therefore, we reported that there were 70,000 who would be available for repatriation.

Even in the camps where the Communist leaders were in complete control and where no interrogation was permitted, a thousand prisoners escaped at the earliest possible moment to get away from these leaders, and a considerable number who attempted to escape were murdered by their own fellow Communist prisoners of war.

Subsequently, the United Nations Command completed the interviewing of all those who had not been screened previously and reported that 83,000 wished to be repatriated. This number was made up of 76,600 Koreans and 6,400 Chinese. They were the ones who said they would not violently resist repatriation.

But let me say here, as we have said over and over again, that the United Nations is willing to have all this screening redone by any impartial body in the world. We have made that offer over and over again. The Command has done the best it can, but it does not set itself up as final and absolute, and if any other group of people acceptable to all and whose word would be taken could do that screening, then let them do it by all means.

The first results when these figures were announced were that the Communist leaders inspired disturbances at the Kojima camps for the purpose of discrediting the United Nations Command and the interrogation. These were very disagreeable affairs. Order was finally restored by the use of the minimum force necessary, but force was necessary to restore order and discipline.

Now let us look for a moment at this repatriation question in connection with international law and international practice, because you will hear it shouted out violently around this room, as it has been at Panmunjom, that under international law it is necessary that these prisoners shall be forcibly returned to their own side. Is that true? Let us find out whether it is true. The Communists have insisted that the prisoner must be returned, regardless of his own attitude. They have also said that, in fact, all the prisoners do want to return to the Communist side, but that it is only the imperialistic warmongers who are keeping them. Finally, they say that the Geneva Convention and international practice require this forcible repatriation. We, on the other hand, have said that we have lived up to the humanitarian principles of the Geneva Convention. We have said that we have abided by them and will

abide by them and that our position on repatriation is wholly consistent with that convention.

Provisions of the Geneva Convention

Let us see whether that is correct. The Geneva Convention has many provisions about the repatriation of prisoners. Some of these provisions deal with prisoners who are sick or wounded or who, for one reason or another, are out of the fight. Other provisions deal with the repatriation of prisoners at the end of hostilities. All the provisions have one purpose, and their language is directed to that. They say that, subject to special agreements which do not derogate from the rights of prisoners, and certainly the special agreement we are talking about here does not derogate from his rights but increases his rights, the prisoner shall be released and repatriated if he is sick and it is established that he is out of the battle. As to the others, that shall be done at the end of hostilities. What is the purpose of this? These people who are prisoners of war have been captured by force and are being held by force out of the conflict. They are no longer participating in the war, and the purpose of the convention is that when it is clearly established that the prisoner is out because physically he cannot get back into it, or when the hostilities themselves are over, then he can be set free and sent home. That is entirely the proper thing to do, and that is the purpose of this convention. The ordinary presumption, and the presumption which is true in a large number of cases, is that the prisoner wants to go home. That is where he came from, and he wants to go back there.

But what the convention gives here is the opportunity to go home. It is the right and the opportunity which is given by the treaty. The Committee does not have to take my word, because the United Nations has voted upon it. This is the interpretation put upon this treaty by the General Assembly of the United Nations. On December 14, 1950, the General Assembly adopted resolution 427 (V). That resolution concerned prisoners of war from the Second World War, many of which, it was alleged, were being detained in the Soviet Union. That is, French prisoners, German prisoners, and Japanese prisoners were being held in the Soviet Union and not allowed to go home. The resolution called upon all states to abide by international law and conventions, and it particularly referred to the Geneva Convention of 1949 and urged that that should be obeyed by everyone. What does the resolution say about it? All governments still having control of such persons were called upon—

to act in conformity with the recognized standards of international conduct and with the above-mentioned international agreements and conventions which require that, upon the cessation of active hostilities, all prisoners should, with the least possible delay, be given an unrestricted opportunity of repatriation . . .

The phrase "above-mentioned international agreements and conventions" referred to the Geneva Convention of 1949. That is the resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations, made at a time when this particular controversy was not raging. It stated the universally accepted meaning of the Geneva Convention of 1949.

Is there anything in the convention which would lead one to believe that a prisoner of war must be forced at the end of a bayonet, fighting, perhaps dying, to go back when he does not want to go?

Is there anything in the treaty? I assure you there is not. You will search the treaty in vain for any such provision. I also assure you that this matter was discussed when the 1949 convention was being negotiated. This precise question was talked about, and it came up in this way. The question being discussed was whether the previous international law, the existing, recognized international practice should be enlarged—not whether it should be narrowed but whether it should be enlarged. There were delegates present who claimed that it should be enlarged and that the prisoner of war should have an absolute right to stay, if he wanted to, in the detaining state. The detaining states said no; that had never been the case before. The situation before had been that if the prisoner claimed asylum, and if the detaining state believed that that claim was honest and bona fide—if it believed that in making that claim the prisoner did not just want to change his residence because he liked the climate or because he had fallen in love with somebody or something of that sort—then the detaining state could permit him to remain. But those states said that they could not agree to accept a kind of immigration which would mean that a prisoner could become a citizen and a permanent resident just because he happened to like them. That was not right at all.

After discussion it was decided to reject the new proposal, and what remained was the existing practice, namely, that a detaining state retains discretion as to whether it shall honor a claim for asylum or not. It may, of course, exercise that right; it would be unthinkable for anything else to be the case. Therefore, the international practice was maintained in the treaty as it had been before.

What was this international practice? It is just what I have said: If a prisoner believed that it was dangerous for him, that he might die if he were sent home, and if he claimed asylum, and if the detaining state thought that it was an honest, bona fide claim, the detaining state could grant asylum. That was the practice.

I will not take up the time of the Committee by going over all the instances in which this principle has been applied, but it is rather interesting to direct our minds to a few instances, and I have chosen for the purpose some treaties entered into by the Soviet Union, because they are the loudest in screaming that this is quite illegal, wholly

wrong, and has never been engaged in before and that it is an imperialist warmonger's idea dreamed up by the Americans. Let us look at the record, which is always a good thing to do.

A Look at the Record

I should like to draw your attention to certain treaties entered into by the Soviet Union Government over quite a period of time. The treaties, perhaps, are not spread over a long period, but the practice is. The first one is a treaty with Germany, signed by the Soviet Union Government on March 3, 1918, at Brest Litovsk. Chapter 5, section 17, reads:

Prisoners of war of both parties will be released into their homeland insofar as they do not, with the consent of the capturing state, desire to remain within the latter's territory or betake themselves into another country.

Section 18 of the same treaty reads:

The interned or deported civilian nationals of both Parties will be conveyed home as soon as possible and without expense insofar as they do not desire, with the consent of the State in which they sojourn, to remain within the latter's territory or betake themselves into another country.

Pretty good doctrine, very early in the life of the Soviet Union Government. The next treaty was signed on the same day, March 3, 1918, with Austro-Hungary. Section 6 reads:

Prisoners of war on each side are, provided they do not elect to remain in the country of their present sojourn or to betake themselves to another country, to be returned to their own country with all possible dispatch.

That is, they were to be returned with all possible dispatch if they did not elect to remain in the country of their present sojourn. Next, on December 18, 1919, the Soviet Union Government and Denmark signed an agreement relating to the mutual repatriation of nationals. It was signed at Copenhagen. Part of it reads:

As soon as the Soviet Government notifies the Danish Government that the former Russian prisoners of war now found in Denmark who desire to return to Soviet Russia may enter within Soviet Russia's frontiers, and as soon as the vessels necessary for this movement are available, the said prisoners of war shall be dispatched to the place indicated by the Soviet Government.

The Soviet Government shall give the Danes remaining in Soviet Russia who desire to return to Denmark the opportunity to do so as soon as the conditions of war permit.

Next, the treaty of peace, with annexes, signed with Estonia at Tartu on February 2, 1920; paragraph 1 of the annex to article 9 reads:

Prisoners of war of both Contracting Parties shall be repatriated unless they prefer to remain in the country in which they are (with the consent of the Government of that country) or to go to some other country.

A treaty was signed by the Soviet Government with France: an agreement relating to the mutual repatriation of nationals with a note, supplement-

tary agreement, and a declaration signed at Copenhagen April 20, 1920. It reads in part:

1. The French Government shall repatriate to Soviet Russia and the Soviet Ukraine all the Russian military personnel who so desire as well as those who form part of the Russian expeditionary force in France and in Macedonia and those who have become prisoners of war now present in France, Algiers, Salonika or in any other territory subject to French authority where they might have been sent by the French Government. According to the conditions mentioned below, the People's Commissars shall notify the representative commissioned for this purpose by the French Government of all French nationals, civilians as well as military, found in localities subject to the authority of Soviet Russia and the Ukraine who do not refuse repatriation by written announcement.

Next is a treaty between the Soviet Government and the United Kingdom, signed at Copenhagen on February 12, 1920, containing an agreement regarding the exchange of prisoners of war, with annexes. Article 4 reads:

The British Government undertakes, subject to the provisions of article 8, to secure the delivery to the Soviet Government of the Russian combatant prisoners and civilian officials who are in the custody of the Archangel Government and who have been captured at any time since the landing of the British forces in North Russia. This undertaking will apply to all those whose release is desired by the Soviet Government and who themselves desire to leave the territory under the control of the Archangel Government.

Article 7 says, and I might as well read it all:

The Soviet Government will repatriate all British combatants including those who may subsequently fall into the hands of the Soviet armies within one month from the signing of this agreement and all civilian prisoners except those committed for grave offenses and all British nationals at present in Soviet Russia as far as they can be identified who may wish to return to any portion of the British Empire.

Then comes a treaty between the Soviet Government and Germany, signed in Berlin on April 19, 1920—an agreement regarding the mutual repatriation of prisoners of war and interned civilians:

Prisoners of war and interned civilians of both sides are to be repatriated in all cases where they themselves desire it. The repatriation shall begin without delay and shall be carried out with the utmost dispatch.

Next is a treaty between the Soviet Government and Italy, signed at Copenhagen on April 27, 1920, an agreement regarding prisoners of war and interned civilians:

The Royal Italian Government shall undertake to transport under the best possible conditions all the Russian prisoners who have expressed the desire to return to Soviet Russia, to Odessa or to another Black Sea Port of the Soviet Republics (which will be indicated by the Soviet Government), while supplying in that respect all the necessary means for transporting said prisoners. With respect to the natives of those provinces which constitute a part of the Soviet States but have detached themselves from Russia, the Soviet Government shall not admit such natives to its territory unless they have signed a declaration expressing the desire to return to the territory of the Soviet Republics.

There is a treaty with Austria concerning the return of prisoners of war, signed at Copenhagen on July 5, 1920. According to article 1:

Both Contracting Parties declare their acceptance of the principle that such prisoners as wish to remain in the country shall not be prevented from doing so.

A treaty with Latvia, signed by the Soviet Government at Riga on August 11, 1920, states in the annex to article 7:

Prisoners of the two Contracting Parties shall be repatriated unless, with the consent of the Government on whose territory they are, they express the desire to remain in the country in which they are or to proceed to any other country.

Another treaty with Latvia: agreement regarding the repatriation of prisoners of war, signed at Riga on November 16, 1920:

Those who express a desire to remain in the country of their imprisonment shall file the proper application with the competent authorities of the State wherein they reside. Upon the satisfaction of such application, said persons shall have the right to remain on the basis of the conditions set forth by these authorities.

A treaty with Poland, convention regarding repatriation, with additional protocols, signed at Riga on February 24, 1921:

The two contracting parties undertake, immediately after the signature of this present agreement, to proceed with the speedy repatriation of all hostages, civilian prisoners, interned persons, prisoners of war, exiles, refugees and migrants who are at present within the boundaries of their respective territories.

Article 2 defines these categories which I have mentioned. According to article 3, "The above-mentioned persons are free to return to their native countries; they cannot be directly or indirectly compelled to do so."

A treaty with Turkey: convention regarding repatriation, signed by the Soviet Union Government at Moscow on March 28, 1921:

Article 2: The mutual repatriation of prisoners shall be effected with their consent. Forced repatriation shall in no way be admissible.

That is very vigorous.

The bureau for the registration of prisoners shall gather from the military and civilian prisoners who have declared their unwillingness to be repatriated detailed information regarding place of birth, name and surname, place of residence, positions occupied and profession; such shall be communicated to the delegation of the other party, as foreseen by Article 9 of the present convention.

A treaty with Hungary: agreement regarding the exchange of prisoners of war and interned civilians, signed at Riga on July 28, 1921:

Article 3: those of the persons mentioned in the annex (Russian prisoners of war and civilians and Hungarian prisoners of war and civilians) who do not desire to leave Hungary may remain there. In this case existing convictions shall not be withdrawn. In order to establish that there is a free expression of will among such persons, the Russian Government shall be permitted to send to Hungary a neutral person who will be permitted, directly and

without limitations, to communicate with such persons in order to establish a free expression of their will.

According to Article 5:

In order to notify the prisoners of war and civilians about the possibility of repatriation offered them, the contracting governments shall undertake to publish the resolutions of the present treaty throughout their country in the usual way.

Then there is a little homily in this treaty which is very interesting:

Repatriation ought not to be enforced; it is left to the free choice of the prisoner to return to his homeland, in agreement with the present treaty, or to remain in the country in which he resides at present, with the agreement of the government of that country. This free expression of will may be established by the representatives of the two countries or expressed in written form by the prisoner. The contracting parties shall undertake to transmit at will to one another these written expressions of will.

The treaty with Austria, signed in Vienna on December 7, 1921, entered into force February 14, 1922: agreement concerning the repatriation of prisoners of war and civilian internees:

Article 1: the contracting Governments assume the responsibility of conducting with the utmost dispatch the repatriation of the prisoners of war and civilian internees who have not yet been repatriated. Only in agreement with the Government of their homeland may prisoners of war or civilian internees be retained because of investigations or sentences based on disciplinary infractions or any kind of offense committed before the date of the signing of this supplementary agreement. No retained person, however, may be delivered to his homeland against his will.

Those are treaties signed by the Soviet Union Government. As Mr. Casey, the Foreign Minister of Australia, told us the other day, in World War II the Soviet Union, in an ultimatum to the commander of the German troops at Stalingrad on January 8, 1943, guaranteed to all who surrendered that, after the end of the war they would be allowed to return to Germany, or to any country where war prisoners might desire to go.

Later, in the Budapest area, a similar offer was made to German troops. And this is very interesting: a Soviet Union publication refers to these episodes as expressing the highest act of humanitarianism. And I agree with that. That, indeed, is the international practice, the international law, in relation to this subject.

Present State of Proposals Regarding Prisoners of War

Now, let us look at the present state of the proposals in regard to prisoners of war. The package proposal, as I mentioned a moment ago, is still open. With regard to the prisoners of war, here are the variations which have been offered by the Unified Command at the present time.

First, it has been offered that joint Red Cross teams from both sides, with or without military observers from both sides, shall be admitted to the

prisoner-of-war camps of both sides to verify whether alleged nonrepatriates would, in fact, forcibly resist return to the side from which they came. That is, this question of screening which we were talking about a moment ago should be undertaken by joint Red Cross teams from both sides, with or without military teams.

Another suggestion which we have made is that all prisoners of war on both sides should be delivered in groups in a neutral area and should there be given opportunity to express their attitude toward repatriation. This attitude could be expressed to and determined by any one of the following groups or combinations of groups: one, by the International Committee of the Red Cross; another, by teams from impartial nations; a third, by joint military teams from the Communist side and the United Nations side; a fourth, by joint Red Cross teams. Or, it might be done by any combination of any of these.

That would mean that they would be taken to a neutral zone and asked by this impartial body—which may be composed of any one of these groups, or all of them—whether they would resist or whether they would not. If they said they were going to resist, they would not have to be returned.

On September 28 we gave three more variations of this suggestion. One was that the agreement should say that all prisoners are entitled to be released and repatriated. That is their right; they are entitled to it. The obligation of the two military sides is discharged by taking a prisoner to this agreed neutral place, where he will be identified and his name checked against the agreed list of prisoners of war, and at that time any prisoner who indicated that he wishes to return to the side which had detained him will be permitted to do so, and if he does return to this side he would not be kept as a prisoner of war but will be released. We thought that this was very ingenious and met almost all difficulties. It met the question of repatriation. The prisoner was repatriated in the neutral zone but not turned over to the Communists. He was brought there and then, if he said he wished to return, he returned. But it was all done on an accepted principle. We thought that a fairly promising arrangement.

Another suggestion was that prisoners who would not resist repatriation should be expeditiously exchanged and that all prisoners who had indicated to the Unified Command that they would forcibly resist repatriation would be delivered to the demilitarized zone in small groups, where they would be entirely free from the military control of either side. There, they would be interviewed by representatives of a mutually agreed country or countries not participating in the Korean hostilities, and they would be free to go either north or south as they might choose.

A third proposal was that there should not be any interviewing at all. The prisoners would be taken in small groups to the neutral zone and

there they would be turned loose and told, "that way is north, that is North Korea; that way is south, that is South Korea—take whichever way you wish." They would not be interviewed or asked any questions but would themselves decide which way they wanted to go.

All of those suggestions were submitted. They were rejected on October 8. Mr. Vyshinsky told us a number of times that on that day some new proposals were made and that the members would not have known anything about them if he had not mentioned it. His idea of what is new is, of course, his, and if he regards these as new, why then to him they are new. They are, in fact, the proposals which had been made by the Communist side without any change or interruption for at least the past 5 months. Perhaps that makes them new—I do not know—but that is what they are.

When this was done, General Harrison recessed the discussions. He expressed his willingness to return at any time when the Communist side would either say it was ready to accept any one of the variations we put forward or make some proposal of its own in good faith. But they have not done that. Therefore, let us examine this so-called new proposal of October 8 and see how new it is.

"New" Soviet Proposal

This is the proposal, and it is contained in the letter which the representative of the United States here sent to the Secretary-General on October 20, 1952.² It reads as follows:

On the basis of the just command that war prisoners of both sides shall all be repatriated home to lead a peaceful life, our side proposed that when the armistice agreement becomes effective, all war prisoners may be brought to the agreed exchange point in the demilitarized zone as your side has proposed, to be delivered to and received by the other side.

This is how new this is. All prisoners are to be brought to this neutral zone and turned over to the Communists. Very well, then what happens?

After they are delivered and received, the Joint Red Cross Teams will visit the war prisoners of both sides in accordance with paragraph 57 of the draft Korean Armistice Agreement as your side has proposed—

We have not proposed anything like this, but I suppose that does not matter—

to explain to them that they are ensured to return home to lead a peaceful life and not to participate again in hostilities in Korea.

In other words, the Red Cross teams go to them and say, "You are going home. We hope you are going to lead a peaceful life, but we do not know."

Thereafter, considered classification of the war prisoners will be carried out in accordance with the above-mentioned principle of classification according to nationality and area as proposed by our side.

Now that is not very clear. You will find that true of most communications from the Communists on this subject. What it means is that after we have turned over all the prisoners to the Communists, considered classification of the war prisoners will be carried out. That is, the war prisoners will be classified in what way? In accordance with the above-mentioned principle of nationality and area.

That means you classify everyone as Chinese or Koreans, and then you divided the Koreans into North Koreans and South Koreans. That is the classification which takes place. Then what happens?

Repatriation will be carried out immediately after the classification; these tasks of exchange, visit, classification and repatriation may be accomplished under the observation of Neutral Nations Inspection Teams.

This is a very confused and wordy way of saying what the Communists have always said, namely, "All North Koreans and all Chinese must be turned over to us, and the people whom you have in custody who lived in South Korea can remain there." They have been saying that without interruption for the past 4 or 5 months, and that is what Mr. Vyshinsky says is new. I hope that he will have plenty of time in which to explain to us just why it is new.

It is not only not new, but it is disingenuous and calculated to mislead. I think that can be seen already. The statement about all prisoners of war shall be brought to the exchange point, as the United Nations side has proposed, sounds as though they are accepting something that we have proposed. We said that they should be brought to this neutral point for the purpose of being questioned by neutral observers to find out whether or not they want to go any farther. That is what we proposed.

The Communists say that they will be brought to this neutral point "as your side has proposed" and there they shall be delivered to and received by the other side. Then they say that after they are delivered and received, the Joint Red Cross Teams will visit the war prisoners of both sides in accordance with paragraph 57 of the agreement to explain to them that they are going home. All that paragraph 57 says is that during repatriation, the Red Cross can go along and give them coffee and sandwiches and care for their wounds if they are sick. That is all they are supposed to do. The Red Cross is coming into this to do something which it looks as though we had proposed. All they are going to do is to tell these poor fellows, "The Chinese are going back to China and the North Koreans are going back to North Korea." That is no job for the Red Cross. Then there is talk here that the "classification and repatriation may be accomplished under the observation of Neutral Nations Inspection Teams." What difference does that make? If they are going to be

² See p. 753.

classified as Chinese and North or South Koreans, the only fellow who can ever get a break out of that is someone who claims he is a South Korean and obtains confirmation by the inspection team that he is South Korean.

That is what the new proposal was. It goes right back to forcible repatriation. In order that it will not be thought that all of this is spun out of that one paragraph, before they get into this the Communists make it very clear that that is what they are talking about. They say:

Therefore, no ground whatsoever can be found either for your so-called principle of voluntary wishes or for your so-called principle of screening in international practice or the Geneva Convention, or even in the draft armistice agreement agreed upon by both sides; in contradistinction, the proposition firmly maintained by our side that prisoners of war of both sides shall all be repatriated home is a principle recognized by the whole world. It is solely due to the obstinate insistence of your side upon its unreasonable proposition that the only remaining question in the Korean armistice negotiations, that is, the question of repatriation of war prisoners, had dragged on for five months . . . (document A/2230).

So you see that there is no question about the fact that they are reasserting what they say they have reasserted for 5 months. And when they were pointing out that this is a principle which is universally recognized by the whole world, they unfortunately did not know of the 17 cases about which I told you this afternoon and to which their great friend and patron, the Soviet Union, had agreed.

Communist Position on Armistice

Press release S25 dated October 21

In a letter on October 16 to General Clark, Commander of the U.N. Forces in Korea, Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh-Huai, commanders of the North Korean and Chinese Communist troops, presented the latest Communist position on the armistice.

A careful analysis of this communication reveals that it not only contains nothing new but is actually, in several respects, a retrogression from proposals previously agreed upon.

However, the October 16 letter to General Clark clarified some of the ambiguities in the statement made by the Communists at Panmunjom on October 8, and the letter sent by General Nam Il, senior member of the Communists' armistice delegation, to General Harrison on October 11 makes it even clearer that the Communists are not accepting any part of the proposals advanced by General Harrison on September 28¹ nor does it advance any constructive proposals of their own.

The Communist efforts to represent their position, which was fully stated at the October 8 meeting at Panmunjom and in the letters to Generals Harrison and Clark, as even a partial acceptance

¹ BULLETIN of Oct. 6, 1952, p. 549.

of the U.N. Command proposals for the repatriation of prisoners of war, is a flagrant misrepresentation of the factual situation and is designed to conceal and confuse the fact of their total rejection of the three reasonable solutions offered by the U.N. Command on September 28.

The letter to General Clark, which represents the latest and most detailed statement of the Communist position, proposes that prisoners of war be brought to a demilitarized zone to be delivered to and received by the other side. After they are delivered and received, the letter states, joint Red Cross teams would visit prisoners of both sides to explain that they are to be returned home to lead peaceful lives and that they are not again to take part in hostilities in Korea. Thereafter, the letter adds, classification of prisoners according to nationality and area would be carried out.

The Communists claim that this represents a concession to proposals of the U.N. Command. However, it already had been agreed in the armistice draft that prisoner-of-war exchange would take place in a demilitarized zone. The armistice draft also provides that joint teams would visit prisoners of war, pending completion of exchange, for humanitarian purposes, but the Communists have now regressed to the position that joint teams would visit the prisoners only after the exchange had been completed. This scheme is nothing but forced repatriation, with the joint teams standing by as helpless witnesses.

The letter to General Clark represents a further regression on the part of the Communists in that it apparently requires the turning over to the Communists of even those prisoners whose homes are in the Republic of Korea so the Communists can determine the location of their homes before repatriation occurs. In March 1952 the Communists had agreed that they would not demand the return of prisoners whose residence had been in the Republic of Korea prior to June 25, 1950.

The Communists' proposals clearly demand that the U.N. Command turn over all prisoners to the Communists by force, where necessary, and in the foregoing respects are a step backward from the agreements so far arrived at in the negotiations.

In his reply of October 20, General Clark very properly made it clear that he does not consider that the letter provides a basis for resuming the meetings of the armistice delegations.

Texts of Correspondence

U.S./U.N. press release dated October 20

Letter of 11 October 1952 from General Nam Il, Senior Delegate, Delegation of the Korean People's Army and Chinese People's Volunteers, to Lieutenant-General William K. Harrison, Senior Delegate, United Nations Command Delegation

On 8 October your side, in disregard of the reasonable proposal put forth by our side for the settlement of the

question of repatriation of war prisoners through negotiation, unilaterally declared an indefinite recess, and, without waiting for our side to speak, left the conference in the middle and categorically called off the Korean armistice negotiations in which the people of the whole world are concerned. This series of unreasonable actions on the part of your side is obviously a clear demonstration of your systematic disruption of the negotiations. It is absolutely not to be tolerated by the peace-loving people of the whole world. Since the beginning of the discussion of the question of repatriation of the so-called voluntary repatriation which is in actuality forcible retention of war prisoners, a proposition which is in complete violation of the 1949 Geneva Convention. Your side has never made any earnest negotiatory effort for the settlement of the question. In order to realize this unreasonable demand, your side has carried out a series of provocative actions inside and outside of the conference. This time your side even refused to negotiate and broke off the negotiations at a time when our side put forth a reasonable proposal which is capable of settling the question of repatriation of war prisoners. This is indeed a premeditated action taken by your side in an attempt thereby to bring pressure to bear on the forthcoming plenary session of the General Assembly of the United Nations so that it may approve the plot of your side to break up the negotiations and extend the war. On our part, we have consistently maintained that all the questions in the armistice negotiations should be settled through negotiation on a fair and reasonable basis. In the case of the question of repatriation of war prisoners which is now the sole issue blocking an armistice in Korea, our side holds firmly the righteous position of the Geneva Convention and adheres to the paragraphs of the armistice agreement which are already agreed upon by both sides; our side will never abandon the fair and reasonable principle of the total repatriation of war prisoners by both sides. However, for the sake of settling the question our side has always held that method and procedure of the release and repatriation of all of the war prisoners can be negotiated, and in the proposal made by our side this time our side has adopted the views of your side with respect to the transport of all of the war prisoners to the demilitarized zone to be exchanged. A distinct and sharp contrast is formed between the repeated negotiatory efforts made by our side for the settlement of the question of war prisoners and the action of your side which dogmatically refused to negotiate and broke off the negotiations. Facts are more eloquent than words. Your side cannot escape the grave responsibility for disrupting the Korean armistice negotiations. Regarding your action of refusing to negotiate and breaking off the negotiations, I am instructed to lodge with your side a strong protest. Your side must bear full responsibility for all the consequences arising from your action.

Letter of Reply of 16 October 1952 From Lieutenant General Harrison to General Nam Il

This is in reply to your letter of 11 October 1952.

The proposal set forth by your side at the meeting on 8 October was considered by the United Nations Command delegation at the time you presented it. It was found to be neither new nor reasonable, and only reiterated your insistence that the United Nations Command must return all prisoners of war to your control even though you realize that we must use force to do so. Mere reiteration of a proposal which requires the United Nations Command to forcibly repatriate all prisoners of war does not constitute a constructive proposal designed to achieve an armistice.

I note that you recognize the action taken by the United Nations Command delegation to be a recess. Having recognized this fact, any attempt on your part of employing half-truths, lies, and distortion of facts in your propa-

ganda effort to make the peace-loving people of the world believe otherwise is doomed to failure.

To avoid any possibility that you might have, intentionally or otherwise, misunderstood my statement on 8 October, I say again, we have merely recessed them. We will meet with you whenever you indicate that you are willing to accept one of our proposals or have presented in writing the text of any constructive proposal designed to achieve an armistice that you may desire to make. Our liaison officers will be available for consultation and for transaction of their customary duties.

Letter of 16 October 1952, from Kim Il Sung, Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army, and Peng Teh-Huai, Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, to General Mark W. Clark, Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command

When the people throughout the world including the people of the United States of America were eagerly awaiting the realization of peace in Korea, when a complete agreement was nearly reached in the Korean armistice negotiation, your delegation, in disregard of the proposal put forth by our delegation, suddenly declared unilaterally an indefinite recess on 8 October 1952, refused to negotiate and broke up the negotiations. This unreasonable action is in itself sufficient to prove that your side has no sincerity at all for an armistice in Korea, and that your side should bear the total responsibility for the disruption of the armistice negotiations.

The Korean armistice negotiations have gone on for fifteen months. During these fifteen months, your side has made various unreasonable demands, including that of drawing the military demarcation line between both sides deep in the area of our side, dispatching military personnel to conduct ground and air inspection in our rear following the armistice, interfering in the construction of air fields by our side, and other unreasonable demands. In the meantime, your side incessantly violated the agreement of neutrality in the conference site area and resorted to the so-called military pressure outside of the conference, even resorting to the bombing of peaceful inhabitants and peaceful towns and villages with germ bombs, napalm and poison gas bombs, in an attempt thereby to force our side into submission. But what your side has not been able to gain on the battlefield is likewise never to be gained by your side in the conference. These unreasonable actions and attempts of your side have failed and will continue to fail. On the other hand, our side had, during these fifteen months, maintained the principle of fairness and reasonableness with great effort and patience so that the draft armistice agreement of sixty-three paragraphs including the nine agreed paragraphs pertaining to the arrangements relating to prisoners of war was finally completed in the armistice negotiations. Had there not been the deliberate obstruction by your side to the settlement of the question of prisoners of war, the Korean armistice should certainly have been realized long ago, peace should certainly have been restored long ago in South Korea and North Korea, and the prisoners of war of both sides should certainly have returned home long ago to lead a peaceful life.

The proposition held by your side on the question of prisoners of war is that of the so-called "no forced repatriation." But this proposition is devoid of any basis either in law or in facts; it is a pretext fabricated by your side purely for the purpose of delaying and disrupting the negotiations. As everybody knows, prisoners captured in war are totally different from political refugees. Therefore, it is especially stipulated in article 118 of the 1949 Geneva Convention relating to the treatment of prisoners of war that "prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities"; it is further laid down in article 7 that "prisoners

of war may in no circumstances renounce in part or in entirety the rights secured to them by the present Convention". These stipulations are obviously designed to prevent either belligerent from taking the inhuman action following the armistice of retaining prisoners of war by force and refusing to repatriate them home under the pretext of the so-called principle of voluntary wishes. Actually, in past international wars, prisoners of war of both belligerents were always repatriated in toto after the cessation of hostilities. That is why your delegation could not but agree to the following provisions in the draft armistice agreements: "All prisoners of war held in the custody of each side at the time this armistice agreement becomes effective shall be released and repatriated as soon as possible" (paragraph 51), "within this time limit (referring to the time limit of two months after the armistice agreement becomes effective) each side undertakes to complete the repatriation of all of the prisoners of war in its custody at the earliest practicable time" (paragraph 54).

In fact of international practice, the stipulations of the Geneva Convention, and the paragraphs already agreed upon by both sides in the draft Korean armistice agreement, your side has already no reason whatsoever to oppose the principle that prisoners of war of both sides shall be repatriated in toto. Yet your side dogmatically asserts that there are captured personnel of our side who indicate that they are unwilling to rejoin their beloved ones to lead a peaceful life and, on the contrary, wish to remain as refugees and cannon fodder under the dark tyranny of their enemy, notorious to the whole world, to which they have also been opposed. This is utterly against common sense of human beings and is therefore wholly incredible. In order to expose the falsity of your assertion, it is sufficient to cite the facts that to date, in the prisoner of war camps of your side, day after day, our captured personnel are still being slaughtered, persecuted, fattened and forced to make finger-printing and they are protesting against these atrocities. The message addressed by your Brigadier General Colson to our captured personnel is a definite proof of these facts.

When the classification of the war prisoners was being discussed, in view of the fact that your side had raised the matter of their being Korean prisoners of war of both sides whose homes were in the area of the detaining side, our side proposed to recheck the name lists in accordance with the principles of classification according to nationality and area, that is, armed personnel of foreign nationality captured by either side, i. e., captured personnel of the United Nations Forces or of the Chinese People's Volunteers, shall all be repatriated home; of the Korean armed personnel captured by either side, i. e., of the captured personnel of the South Korean Army or of the Korean People's Army, those whose homes are in the area of the side which they belong shall all be repatriated home, while the others whose homes are in the area of the detaining side may be permitted to return home directly without having to be repatriated. It is also stipulated in the draft Korean armistice agreement that "the release and repatriation of such prisoners of war shall be effected in conformity with lists which have been exchanged and have been checked by the respective sides prior to the signing of this armistice agreement" (paragraph 51) and that "each side insures that it will not employ in acts of war in the Korean conflict any prisoner of war released and repatriated incident to the coming into effect of this armistice agreement" (paragraph 52).

However, when the name lists were actually checked, your side in both occasions did not follow the principle of classification proposed by our side, but applied to the prisoners of war the so-called principle of screening, which is in actuality forcible retention, in total violation of the provisions of the Geneva Convention and the draft armistice agreement concerning the total repatriation of war prisoners and the assurance that they will return home to lead a peaceful life. Therefore, no ground whatsoever can be found either for your so-called prin-

ciple of voluntary wishes or for your so-called principle of screening in international practice or the Geneva Convention, or even in the draft armistice agreement agreed upon by both sides; in contradistinction, the proposition firmly maintained by our side that prisoners of war of both sides shall all be repatriated home is a principle recognized by the whole world. It is solely due to the obstinate insistence of your side upon its unreasonable proposition that the only remaining question in the Korean armistice negotiations, that is, the question of repatriation of war prisoners, had dragged on for five months since May this year and has been prevented from attaining any settlement.

Recently, because the people throughout the world, and firstly the people of Asia and the Pacific area, have become increasingly impatient with the delay of the Korean armistice negotiations, because even the American people have come to consider the war of intervention against Korea a "damned war", and because the meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations and the United States presidential Election have approached, your delegation on 28 September spuriously put forth three proposals for the repatriation of war prisoners in an attempt to hoodwink the people of the world with the words of the so-called "total repatriation", but in substance, these proposals are still run through by your unreasonable demand of the so-called "no forced repatriation" which is in fact forcible retention of war prisoners. In the meantime, your side audaciously and unilaterally disposed of our captured personnel without waiting for the conclusion of an agreement on the question of repatriation of war prisoners. It can be seen from this that you are not even prepared to carry out your own proposals.

Yet on our part, in order to hold firmly to our stand for a peaceful settlement of the Korean question and to meet the eager desire of the world people for an armistice in Korea, we still adopted certain reasonable factors from your proposals in spite of the fact that the principle underlying your three proposals was wholly unacceptable, and on 8 October we put forth our new proposal.

On the basis of the just demand that war prisoners of both sides shall all be repatriated home to lead a peaceful life, our side proposed that when the armistice agreement becomes effective, all war prisoners, may be brought to the agreed exchange point in the demilitarized zone as soon as your side has proposed, to be delivered to and received by the other side. After they are delivered and received, the Joint Red Cross Teams will visit the war prisoners of both sides in accordance with paragraph 57 of the draft Korean Armistice Agreement as your side has proposed, to explain to them that they are insured to return home to lead a peaceful life and not to participate again in hostilities in Korea. Thereafter considered classification of the war prisoners will be carried out in accordance with the above-mentioned principle of classification according to nationality and area as proposed by our side. Repatriation will be carried out immediately after the classification; these tasks of exchange, visit, classification and repatriation may be accomplished under the observation of Neutral Nations Inspection Teams.

The above-mentioned proposal of ours is in full accord with the provisions of the Geneva Convention and the draft Korean Armistice Agreement. At the plenary conference of the delegations on 8 October, your delegation not only ignored this reasonable proposal of ours and refused to conduct discussion, but immediately read a statement prepared beforehand and unilaterally declared an indefinite recess; furthermore, your delegation left the conference in the middle without waiting for our reply and categorically broke off the Korean armistice negotiations in which the people of the whole world are concerned. This unreasonable action of disrupting the negotiations taken by your side is obviously premeditated. Your side possibly attempts thereby to press the General Assembly of the United Nations to endorse your plot to violate international conventions, to disrupt the armistice negotiations and to extend the war. But it can be definitely said that

the peace-loving people all over the world absolutely will not permit your plot to win through.

The situation is already very clear, but we are still willing to make our greatest effort to promote an armistice in Korea. We hereby put forth to you the following requests:

1. That the unreasonable action of breaking off the armistice negotiations taken by your delegation be stopped immediately.
2. That total repatriations of war prisoners must be carried out in accordance with international practice, of the 1949 Geneva Convention and with the already agreed draft Korean Armistice Agreement. The method and the procedure of its concrete implementation can be settled through consultation in the negotiations.
3. That an armistice in Korea be realized speedily on the basis of the draft Korean Armistice Agreement.

If your side still has the slightest sincerity for an armistice in Korea and a peaceful settlement of the Korean question, you should give an affirmative reply to the above-mentioned reasonable request by our side. The peace-loving people and nations all over the world are focusing their attention on this action of your side.

Letter of Reply of 20 October 1952 from General Clark to Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh-Huai

Your letter of 16 October 1952, has been received. I regret that you have seen fit to use this means to repeat completely false and unfounded charges and to indulge generally in a pointless harangue. I have no intention of replying in kind.

For fifteen months the United Nations Command, acting in good faith, has made an honest effort to negotiate an armistice that is fair and reasonable to both sides. A great deal of progress has been achieved and the people of the world have looked with hope for an armistice which would end the bloodshed in Korea. This hope could have become a reality many months ago had your side exhibited similar good faith and been willing to accept the humane principle of not forcing prisoners who feared for their lives to be returned to you against their will.

The United Nations Command Senior Delegate presented to your delegation three additional proposals on 28 September 1952, any one of which could have led to a fair and just armistice. Your side summarily rejected these reasonable proposals without offering any constructive counterproposal which would recognize the individual's right of self-determination. One of the proposals offered by the United Nations Command provided for the release of those prisoners of war who had previously expressed their objections to repatriation by their delivery in groups of appropriate size to a mutually agreed-upon location in the demilitarized zone to be there freed from the military control of both sides. This proposal further provided that without questioning, interview or screening, each individual so released would be free to go to the side of his choice, and that, if desired, this movement and disposition of non-repatriates would be accomplished under the observation of one or a combination of the International Committee of the Red Cross, joint teams of military observers, or Red Cross representatives from both sides. This procedure parallels in principle the action which your side claims it took in releasing some 50,000 unaccounted for United Nations Command personnel admittedly captured by your side and allegedly "released at the front." The fact that your side claims to have previously followed such a practice makes your present position in refusing to accept the United Nations Command proposal completely inconsistent and clearly exposes the fraudulent nature of your charge that the United Nations Command desires to forcibly retain any prisoners. Each of our proposals submitted on 28 September refutes this false charge. Each abounds with

absolute safeguards which would preclude any possibility of coercion by either side.

Your delegation, by refusing to accept any obviously fair and just proposals offered by the United Nations Command, has created grave doubt in the minds of people everywhere concerning the sincerity of your expressed desire for an end to the bloodshed in Korea.

The United Nations Command Senior Delegate made it completely clear in his statement at the 8 October session and in his letter of 16 October that the United Nations Command delegation was not terminating the negotiations but stood ready to meet with your delegation at any time it is ready to accept any one of the United Nations Command proposals or to submit in writing a constructive proposal which would meet the reasonable requirements of the United Nations Command. The United Nations Command did not break off negotiations as you falsely charge and the United Nations Command delegation is ready and willing to meet with your delegation as soon as you indicate willingness to negotiate in good faith on the basis indicated by the United Nations Command delegation in the plenary session of 8 October 1952.

I consider that your letter of 16 October 1952 contains nothing new nor constructive. Although for your own devious reasons you have sought to embellish your so-called new proposal with tinsel trimmings, claiming that you have adopted "certain reasonable factors" from our proposals, in fact, your so-called proposal bears not the slightest resemblance to the United Nations Command proposals of 28 September. The underlying nature of your proposal is clearly revealed in your demand that "all war prisoners . . . be delivered to and received by" your side. This is nothing more than a demand that the United Nations Command turn over to your custody by force thousands of prisoners of war who have stated positively that they would violently resist repatriation to your side. You further glibly propose that after the United Nations Command has forced unwilling prisoners into your hands you would then carry out a classification according to nationality and area of residence and repatriate prisoners in accordance with this classification. As far back as July you proposed such a classification, knowing full well that irrespective of nationality many prisoners were determined not to go back to your side. The United Nations Command exposed the falseness of this device of yours months ago. Thus, when all is said and done your so-called new proposal is nothing more than the same old package containing your time-worn demand that the United Nations Command drive unwilling prisoners back to your custody. It should be clear to you by now that the United Nations Command will never agree to nor negotiate further on the basis of any proposal that would require the United Nations Command to use force to repatriate prisoners to your side. Accordingly, the United Nations Command considers that your letter of 16 October 1952 does not constitute a valid basis for resumption of delegation meetings.

Communiqués Regarding Korea to the Security Council

The Headquarters of the United Nations Command has transmitted communiqués regarding Korea to the Secretary-General of the United Nations under the following numbers: S/2755, August 28; S/2781, September 17; S/2785, September 23; S/2787, September 24; S/2788, September 25; S/2790, September 26; S/2792, September 29; S/2795, September 29; S/2797, October 2; S/2799, October 3; S/2800, October 6; S/2806, October 7; S/2807, October 9; S/2813, October 16; S/2814, October 14.

Continued Support Urged for Palestine Refugee Program

Statement by Philip C. Jessup

U. S. Delegate to the General Assembly¹

The Committee has before it two reports dealing with the work of the U.N. Relief and Works Agency—the Annual Report of the Director and the special report of the Director and Advisory Commission.² These reports, together with Mr. Blandford's admirable statement to this Committee last Thursday, have furnished an account of the accomplishments of the Agency in the first year of its 3-year program of relief and reintegration initiated by the General Assembly last year without an opposing vote.

The Assembly's action in adopting this forward-looking 3-year program was significant for the refugees, for the Near Eastern states which have given them refuge, and for the United Nations. For the refugees, this program serves a dual function: It provides relief where relief is needed but offers real hope of a self-sustaining and self-respecting future. For the Near Eastern states, the program means a substantial increment in financial and human assets and a simultaneous easing of one of the most difficult problems besetting this great and troubled region. For the United Nations, the program furnishes a graphic example of the highly practical ways in which the international community can deal with problems of widespread human misfortune.

Under the thoughtful guidance of Mr. Blandford and his able staff, the program of the Relief and Works Agency is now launched. The action required by the Assembly this year is to take the necessary administrative steps to maintain the program already set in motion by last year's Assembly. These necessary steps are set out in the two reports before us and arise out of the

present status of the program as described in these reports. In considering the action this Assembly should take, it is important not to lose sight of the magnitude of the Agency's task and the extent of its accomplishments.

During the past year, the Agency has housed, fed, and clothed more than 880,000 Palestine refugees scattered over an area of more than 100,000 square miles. In addition to carrying out this immediate task, the Agency has moved forward with plans for long-range and large-scale projects—projects the launching of which will mean jobs and wages for thousands now on relief rolls. Pending the initiation of these projects, the problems confronting the Agency have been difficult indeed; it is obvious that it has not been possible to do all that one would have wished to see done. If it had been possible, Mr. Blandford would have accomplished it. His skill and devotion as Director merit our gratitude and highest praise.

The difficulty is, however, inherent in the situation as long as the major task confronting the Agency remains one of relief. The difficulty will not diminish until the long-range aspects of the Agency's program are well under way. Neither the refugees, nor the governments of the countries in which they reside, nor the contributing states, nor the United Nations can accept in perpetuity a program of relief which can, at best, furnish only a stop-gap solution to this inheritance from the Palestine conflict. Indeed no one maintains that they should accept it. For those refugees who do not choose the alternative of repatriation, we must offer something better than continual relief.

Planning for Ultimate Self-Support

Accordingly, my Government is following with particular interest progress in the planning and negotiation of projects looking toward the refugees' self-support. We agree with the suggestion in the report of the Director that the Agency

¹ Made in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee on Oct. 27 and released to the press by the U.S. delegation to the U.N. on the same date.

² Annual Report of the Director [John B. Blandford, Jr.] of the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, 1 July 1951–30 June 1952, U.N. doc. A/2171; Special Joint Report of the Director and Advisory Commission of the Agency, U.N. doc. A/2171/Add. 1.

should seek large projects and the cooperation of other sources in their financing to obtain the ultimate large-scale benefits to the refugees that will ensue from coordinated economic development. Individual projects which have as their principal goal enabling the refugees to live by their own efforts can provide the maximum benefits to the refugees only if they are coordinated with each other and with the economic developments in the area of which they will be part. The refugees, for their part, when they find opportunities for productive life, will become a source of great strength to the Near East as useful members of their communities. It is encouraging to note in this connection recent statements made by authorities in Jordan and in Syria which relate to the welcome given to the Palestine refugees in those countries. It is only through cooperative effort by the refugees, the Near Eastern countries, the contributing countries, and the Agency that real and lasting progress will be made.

My Government is encouraged by the general interest in this cooperative effort manifested in the contributions which have been forthcoming—with some notable exceptions—from member and non-member states alike. The records indicate that to date 47 countries have made contributions to our common endeavor. Toward the 250-million-dollar program, my Government has thus far made available 110 million dollars, of which only part has as yet been required for the Agency's operations. We are encouraged to believe that this measure of support in which states, private groups, and specialized agencies of the United Nations have joined can make it possible for the Agency and the governments concerned to make firm plans for projects directed toward the execution of the basic program adopted at the sixth session of the General Assembly. My Government is ready to ask our Congress for further funds for the prosecution of the Agency's program, with the proviso, of course, that a fair share of the cost will be met by other nations in a genuine united effort. Nevertheless, the fact is that pledges to the fund are as yet inadequate to fulfill the long-range plan; to succeed, the program must receive wider and more generous support.

We regret that the original time schedule of the Agency of the 3-year plan of rapidly declining relief and rapidly expanding development has not thus far been met. Development projects on which refugees could be gainfully employed are not yet sufficiently advanced.

It follows that it is necessary to make adjustments in budgetary levels previously set for relief; we have no doubt that the relief budget must be expanded for the current year beyond the figure of 18 million dollars which was set at the sixth session of the Assembly. It appears equally clear, unfortunately, that adjustments within the 250-million-dollar program will be necessary for the ensuing fiscal year.

For the present fiscal year, it is the view of my

delegation and the delegations of France, Turkey, and the United Kingdom, that the appropriate figure for relief should be the 23-million-dollar figure recommended to the Assembly in the Joint Report. This view is reflected in the draft resolution which is before you and which I shall shortly discuss in more detail.

Text of Resolution *

U.N. doc. A/Resolution/4
Dated Nov. 6, 1952

The General Assembly

RECALLING its resolutions 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949, 393 (V) of 2 December 1950, and 513 (VI) of 26 January 1952,

HAVING EXAMINED the Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and the Special Joint Report of the Director and Advisory Commission of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency,

NOTING THAT negotiations have taken place between the Agency and Governments of Near Eastern Countries under the programme approved in resolution 513 (VI).

HAVING in mind the goals for the reduction of relief expenditure envisaged in the three-year \$250 million relief and reintegration programme, approved by the General Assembly in its resolution 513 (VI) without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III) or to the provisions of paragraph 4 of resolution 393 (V) relative to reintegration either by repatriation or resettlement.

RECOGNIZING that immediate realization of these goals has not proved possible and that increased relief expenditures are therefore required, with a resultant reduction in the reintegration funds,

1. *Authorizes* the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to increase the budget for relief to \$23,000,000 for the fiscal year ending 30 June 1953, and to make such further adjustments as it may deem necessary to maintain adequate standards; and to adopt a budget for relief of \$18,000,000 for the fiscal year ending 30 June 1954 which shall be subject to review at the 8th regular session of the General Assembly;

2. *Authorizes* the Agency to allocate funds remaining for reintegration according to time schedules deemed appropriate up to 30 June 1954;

3. *Requests* that negotiations regarding contributions for the programme be carried out with Member and non-Member States by the Negotiating Committee for Extra-Budgetary Funds.

*Sponsored by France, Turkey, the U.K. and the U. S. The resolution was approved by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee on Oct. 30 by a vote of 50-0-7 (Soviet bloc, Chile, Iraq) and adopted by the General Assembly on Nov. 6 by a vote of 48-0-6.

In considering the adequacy of the proposed 23-million-dollar figure, note should be taken of certain anticipated—and very substantial—savings which should do much to simplify the financing of relief for the present year. I have in mind the drop in the price of basic foodstuffs, which is expected to result in an economy of roughly 1,700,000 dollars. A second category of saving—amounting to 750 thousand dollars—arises from the progressive removal from relief rolls of those refugees finding employment on the Agency's long-range projects and from the pruning from

the rolls of persons who are not properly classifiable as refugees. A similar reduction in relief expenditures, in the approximate amount of 600 thousand dollars, flows from Israel's action in assuming full responsibility for the 19,000 refugees remaining within her borders. Finally, we must keep in mind the quantities of contributions in kind—for example, the generous donations of Canadian flour and Australian wheat—which comprise an increment for this fiscal year of the equivalent of approximately 800 thousand dollars.

But my Government, and the three governments with which we are cosponsoring the resolution tabled for your consideration, have felt that it would be unwise to set an absolute ceiling on permissible expenditures for relief for the coming year. The proposed 23-million-dollar budget is the best estimate of required expenditures which can be made by those most intimately connected with the program—Mr. Blandford and the members of the Advisory Commission. But this estimate, despite the impressive accuracy suggested by the supporting data, is after all a human estimate. So, since we are dealing with human lives, we feel that some flexibility should be afforded the Agency to modify the stated budgetary figure if circumstances require such action. Accordingly, our draft resolution would permit the Agency to adjust its relief expenditures upward if necessary to maintain adequate standards—or, I may add, downward if unexpected economies can be achieved or if progress on reintegration projects is faster than the Agency presently anticipates.

By contrast, for the ensuing fiscal year of 1954, we have proposed a concrete figure for the relief budget, without provision for Agency revision of that figure, because we shall have the opportunity to review the subject again at the eighth session of the Assembly. I would like merely to note at this time that the relief figure we have in mind for the fiscal year of 1954 will be a substantial reduction from the figure for the current year. This does not mean doing less for the refugees; it means doing more and doing it in a more helpful way. It is the hope of my Government that the U.N. Relief and Works Agency and the states concerned in the Near East will, before the next Assembly meets, have utilized the considerable capital funds available to the Agency to make substantial strides toward carrying out programs of economic development on a cooperative basis. As refugees are afforded increasing opportunities to work on these unfolding programs, wages will progressively replace relief and the refugees will move forward as self-sustaining members of an ever more prosperous Near Eastern community.

And now, if the Committee will bear with me a little longer, I should like to discuss in some detail the brief resolution which my delegation has joined with the delegations of France, Turkey, and the United Kingdom in putting before you.

The draft resolution is a brief and simple document limited to the provisions which are necessary

from the administrative viewpoint to carry forward, in the light of the present circumstances, the 3-year program approved by the Assembly last year.

The preamble of the resolution recalls the relevant previous Assembly resolutions as well as the two reports on which our draft resolution is based; it notes the negotiations between the U.N. Relief and Works Agency and the Near Eastern Governments referred to in Mr. Blandford's report; and it also mentions the goals for the reduction of relief expenditure set forth in the last year's resolution, recognizing the unfortunate fact that the immediate realization of these goals has not proved possible. The preamble thus makes clear that the resolution does not abandon or go back on the principles which the Assembly has already accepted as governing the U.N. program for the Palestine refugees.

The first operative paragraph gives the Agency authority to increase the relief budget to 23 million dollars for the current fiscal year. This is a net increase of 5 million dollars over and above the figure set as a goal by the Assembly last year. Moreover, as indicated on page 16 of the annual report of the Director, the Agency reports inventory adjustment and outstanding commitments of over 2 million dollars which have not actually been used as yet but will be available during the current year, thus providing in effect the equivalent of 25 millions for this fiscal period. Moreover, this paragraph of the resolution gives the Agency the authority to make such further adjustments of the 23-million-dollar figure as it may deem necessary to maintain adequate standards of relief for the refugees. This means, as I have already indicated, that the Agency can spend more than 23 million dollars if more is required. The same paragraph authorizes the Agency to adopt a relief budget of 18 million dollars for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1954, which shall be subject to the review of the next regular session of the Assembly.

The second paragraph authorizes the Agency to allocate any available funds which remain after the relief needs have been taken care of for the long-range projects according to such time schedules as the Agency considers appropriate. This provision, in effect, removes any limitations on the Agency's allocation of available funds for reintegration purposes.

The third and last operative paragraph gives necessary authority to the Negotiating Committee for Extra-Budgetary Funds to carry out negotiations regarding contributions for the program with member and nonmember states.

My delegation hopes that this resolution will commend itself to the Committee and that this Seventh Assembly, following the example of the last Assembly, will provide for the continuation of this very important task without a dissenting vote.

Human Rights Provisions in the Puerto Rican Constitution

U.N. doc. A/2135/Add. 2
Dated September 23, 1952

Introductory Note—Supplementary to the Report on the Application of Human Rights in Non-Self-Governing Territories administered by the United States of America transmitted by the Government of the United States of America to the Secretary-General of the United Nations in October 1951,¹ the following summary of the principal provisions of the new Constitution of Puerto Rico as they relate to the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has been transmitted by the Government of the United States of America in September 1952.

A new Constitution, creating the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, was written by the Puerto Rican people,² ratified by them in a popular referendum, approved by the President, accepted by the United States Congress,³ and proclaimed by the Governor on July 25, 1952.

The preamble to the Constitution reads:

We the people of Puerto Rico, in order to organize ourselves politically on a fully democratic basis, to promote the general welfare, and to secure for ourselves and our posterity the complete enjoyment of human rights, placing our trust in Almighty God, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the Commonwealth which, in the exercise of our natural rights, we now create within our union with the United States of America.

In so doing, we declare:

The democratic system is fundamental to the life of the Puerto Rican community;

We understand that the democratic system of government is one in which the will of the people is the source of public power, the political order is subordinate to the rights of man, and the free participation of the citizen in collective decisions is assured;

We consider as determining factors in our life our citizenship of the United States of America and our aspiration continually to enrich our democratic heritage in the individual and collective enjoyment of its rights and privileges; our loyalty to the principles of the Federal Constitution; the coexistence in Puerto Rico of the two great cultures of the American Hemisphere; our fervor for education; our faith in justice; our devotion to the courageous, industrious, and peaceful way of life; our fidelity to individual human values above and beyond social position, racial differences, and economic interests; and our hope for a better world based upon these principles.

¹ U.N. doc. A/1823/Add.1.

² Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 1952.

³ Public Law 447, 82d Cong., 2d sess. 66 Stat. 327.

Civil and Political Rights (Articles 1-20)

The Bill of Rights embodies all of the traditional provisions regarding the basic rights, dignity and equality of man, characteristic of the United States Constitution and the several State Constitutions and in addition recognizes modern economic and social rights.

The dignity of the human being is inviolable; all men are equal before the law; there is no discrimination on grounds of race, color, sex, birth, social origin or condition, or political or religious ideas. There is complete separation of church and state, and no law can be made respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.

The laws guarantee the expression of the will of the people by means of equal, direct and secret universal suffrage and protect the citizen against any coercion in the exercise of the electoral franchise.

There is guarantee of freedom of speech and of press and of the right peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for redress of grievances. Persons may join with each other and organize freely for any lawful purposes, except in military or quasi-military organizations.

The right to life, liberty and the enjoyment of property is recognized as a fundamental right of man. All people are given equal protection of the laws. The death penalty does not exist. No person can be deprived of his liberty or property without due process of law, and no law can be enacted impairing the obligation of contracts. A minimum amount of property and possessions shall be exempt from attachment.

Every person has the right to the protection of law against abusive attacks on his honor, reputation, private or family life.

Just compensation must be made in payment for private property taken or damaged for public use. Printing presses, machinery or material devoted to publications of any kind are exempt from condemnation, and the buildings which house such objects may be condemned only after a judicial finding of public convenience and necessity.

Wire-tapping is prohibited. There is guarantee of the right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. No warrant for arrest or search and seizure can be issued except by judicial authority and only upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation.

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused is presumed innocent, has the right to a speedy and public trial, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted with witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have assistance of Counsel. He cannot be compelled to be a witness against himself and his failure to testify can neither be taken into consideration nor commented upon against him.

In all prosecutions for a felony, the accused has the right of trial by an impartial jury of twelve residents of the district and the verdict must be by a majority vote and in no case less than nine. No person can be put twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.

There is no imprisonment for debt. Before conviction, every accused person is entitled to be admitted to bail. No jail period, prior to trial, can exceed six months.

Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude exists except in the latter case as a punishment for crime after the accused has been duly convicted. There cannot be cruel and unusual punishment. The right to vote and other civil rights are restored when the term of imprisonment has ceased.

The writ of *habeas corpus* is granted without delay and free of costs. The privilege of this writ cannot be suspended unless the public safety requires it as in the case of invasion, rebellion or insurrection and only the Legislative Assembly has the right to suspend this writ.

The military authority is subordinate to civil authority.

Participation in Government (Article 21)

The legislative power is vested in an autonomous Legislative Assembly consisting of a House of Representatives (lower house) and a Senate (upper house) elected by direct vote at each general election. There are unusual provisions, designed to protect minority political parties, guaranteeing them representation in the Legislative Assembly in proportion to their total voting strength whenever more than two-thirds of either house are elected from one political party. There are no property qualifications for the legislators.

The Chief Executive is the Governor who is elected by direct vote. The powers and duties of the Governor are those customarily found in State Constitutions. However, the Governor's emergency powers are more circumscribed than those of State Governors in regard to invoking martial law and the suspension of the writ of *habeas corpus*. In the case of the proclamation of martial law, the Legislative Assembly meets immediately

on its own initiative to ratify or revoke the proclamation.

All important territorial officials are now either elected directly by the people or appointed by the Governor by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. In some cases the consent of the House is also required. For example, the Governor has the power to appoint all of the heads of the executive departments, the Justices of the Supreme Court and the Controller.

There is no literacy or property qualification to vote. There is universal adult suffrage.

Labor and Social Security (Articles 22, 23, 24 and 25)

There is prohibition of the employment of children less than fourteen years of age in any occupation which is prejudicial to their health or morals or which places them in jeopardy of life or limb. [Children less than 16 years of age cannot be kept in custody in a jail or penitentiary.]

The following rights are recognized for every employee: To choose his occupation freely and to resign; to equal pay for equal work; to a reasonable minimum salary; to protection against personal or health risks; and to an ordinary workday not to exceed eight hours. An employee may work in excess of eight hours only if he is paid extra compensation at a rate never less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed.

Persons employed by private businesses, enterprises and individual employers and by agencies of the government operating as private businesses or enterprises have the right to organize and bargain collectively with their employers through representatives of their own free choosing. In order to assure their right to organize and to bargain collectively, these employees have the right to strike, to picket and to engage in other legal concerted activities.

A Department of Labour is provided for in the Constitution.

Education, Health and Welfare (Articles 25, 26 and 27)

The Preamble to the Constitution recognizes as one of the determining factors in their life the co-existence in Puerto Rico of the two great cultures of the American Hemisphere. A qualification of a member of the Legislative Assembly is that he be able to read and write the Spanish or English language.

The Bill of Rights provides that every person has the right to an education which shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. There is a system of free and wholly non-sectarian public education at the elementary and secondary levels, and is compulsory in the elementary schools to the extent permitted by the facilities of the state. Compulsory attendance at public schools is

not required where students are receiving elementary education in schools established under non-governmental auspices. Only state supported schools can use public funds or public property.

Separate Departments of Education and Health are established.

Cooperation with the United Nations and other International Bodies (Article 28)—(Supplementary material)

Puerto Rico has developed a well coordinated program for the training of scholars and fellows of the United Nations and the specialized agencies. During 1952, Puerto Rico offered under this program the free use of its facilities to 56 fellows and scholars from Latin America, the Caribbean, Asia, the Far East, the Near East and Africa. The training programs, which averaged three months each, were in the fields of agriculture, cooperatives, social welfare, health, housing, industrialization, public administration and planning, vocational education and community education. In addition, Puerto Rico has acted as host to visiting United Nations study groups.

To aid in developing "a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in the Declaration can be fully realized", as stated in Article 28, the United States Government reported in 1951 that its territories participated directly in two regional advisory Commissions—the Caribbean and the South Pacific Commissions. The United States Government further notes in this connection that by agreement of the six Member Governments of the South Pacific Commission in November 1951, the scope of that Commission was enlarged to include Guam and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.

Supplementary Distribution of Crude Sulfur

The Sulfur Committee of the International Materials Conference (Imc) announced on October 20 a supplementary distribution of crude sulfur for the last 6 months of 1952.

Sixteen governments are represented on the Sulfur Committee. They are Australia, Belgium (representing Benelux), Brazil, Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, India, Italy, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the Union of South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

On July 18, 1952, when the International Materials Conference set up proposals for the distribution of crude sulfur during the last 6 months of 1952, the plan of distribution was stated to be for the whole of the last 6 months, on the understanding that the Committee might review the allocation for the fourth quarter.¹ The Committee has

not found it necessary to carry out a general review of the allocation for the fourth quarter, but new evidence has been presented of increased export availabilities from certain exporting countries, mainly in Latin America. The original allocation also provided for a quantity to be set aside as a contingency reserve. The balance of this contingency reserve is now being distributed. After reviewing these factors the Committee has recommended a supplementary distribution of 29,800 long tons for the last 6 months of 1952.

Requests have been received from member and nonmember importing governments for increased import quotas, and in view of these, the Committee has agreed that the import quotas of the importing countries should be increased.²

Current United Nations Documents: A Selected Bibliography³

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Information From Non-Self-Governing Territories: Summary and Analysis of Information Transmitted Under Article 73 e of the Charter. Report of the Secretary-General. Summary of information transmitted by the Government of Belgium. A/2129, Aug. 27, 1952. 34 pp. mimeo; Summary of general trends in the Territories under French administration. A/2131/Add.1, Aug. 8, 1952. 13 pp. mimeo; Summary of information transmitted by the Government of France. Corrigendum. A/2131/Add.2/Corr.1, Sept. 18, 1952. 16 pp. mimeo; Summary of information transmitted by the Government of New Zealand. A/2133, Sept. 24, 1952. 11 pp. mimeo; Summary of information transmitted by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. A/2134/Add.7, Sept. 10, 1952. 62 pp. mimeo. A/2134/Add.9, Sept. 30, 1952. 46 pp. mimeo; Summary of information transmitted by the Government of the United States of America. A/2135/Add.1, September 1952. 19 pp. mimeo; Supplementary Report on the Application of the Declaration of Human Rights in Non-Self-Governing Territories Administered by the United States of America. Information transmitted by the Government of the United States of America. A/2135/Add.2, Sept. 23, 1952. 10 pp. mimeo.

International Criminal Jurisdiction. Comments Received From Governments Regarding the Report of the Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction. A/2186, Sept. 16, 1952. 48 pp. mimeo.

Economic Development of Under-Developed Countries. Memorandum by the Secretary-General. A/2192, Sept. 19, 1952. 5 pp. mimeo.

² For allocation table showing the new import quotas, see Imc press release dated Oct. 16.

³ Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

The United Nations Secretariat has established an Official Records series for the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and the Atomic Energy Commission which includes summaries of proceedings, resolutions, and reports of the various commissions and committees. Information on securing subscriptions to the series may be obtained from the International Documents Service.

¹ BULLETIN of Aug. 4, 1952, p. 196.

The United States in the United Nations

[October 27–November 17]

General Assembly

Election of Members of Councils—At its plenary session on October 27, the Assembly completed action on the election of six members of the Economic and Social Council by electing Yugoslavia. The 40 votes in favor were one more than the required majority. Two days earlier, the Assembly had elected Australia, India, and Turkey and re-elected the United States.

On October 25 the Assembly also had elected three nonpermanent members to the Security Council (Colombia, Denmark, and Lebanon). At the same session it adopted a resolution recommended by the Credentials Committee, postponing for the remainder of the session “consideration of all proposals to exclude the representatives of the Government of the Republic of China and to seat representatives of the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China.” The vote was 42–7 (Burma, Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Sweden, Ukraine, U.S.S.R.)–11 (Afghanistan, Bolivia, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Israel, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, Yugoslavia). No vote was taken on a Soviet proposal to unseat the delegation of the Republic of China. The United States introduced the motion that the Assembly not vote on this proposal in view of the decision postponing consideration of all such proposals; the vote on the United States resolution was 45–6 (Burma, Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukraine, U.S.S.R.)–4 (Afghanistan, India, Indonesia, Iran).

Elected to two impending vacancies on the Trusteeship Council on October 27 were El Salvador (55 votes) and Syria (53 votes).

Ad Hoc Political Committee—The Committee on October 27 resumed consideration begun the previous week on the first item on its agenda, the reports of John B. Blandford, Jr., Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. In a statement before the opening of debate, Mr. Blandford said that the Agency’s new program “offers a way out of declining, deteriorating, degrading relief” for the more than 800,000 refugees still on the rolls. “Two hundred million dollars of economic investment in sound projects, with large employment

during construction, and with large secondary benefits, still stands as the answer to the futility of relief.”

Philip Jessup (U.S.) opened the debate with a statement in which he paid tribute to the “skill and devotion” with which Mr. Blandford had so far carried out his tasks. He analyzed the reports under consideration, emphasizing his belief that the development of large-scale projects is the most important responsibility before the Agency. Only by such projects can the refugees substitute self-support for continuing relief. These projects must be coordinated with the economic developments in the areas of which they will be part, he said. (For full text, see p. 755.)

Mr. Jessup presented a joint draft resolution authorizing the Agency to increase its relief budget for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1953 to \$23,000,000.

The resolution was adopted October 30 (for text and vote, see p. 756).

Committee I (Political and Security)—On October 29 the U.S.S.R. entered the debate on the Korean item with a lengthy statement by Andrei Vyshinsky, who concluded by presenting a resolution which would “establish a commission for the peaceful settlement of the Korean question with participation of the parties directly concerned and of other states, including states not participating in the war in Korea,” and would “instruct this Commission to take immediate measures for the settlement of the Korean question in the spirit of the unification of Korea, implemented by the Koreans themselves under the supervision of the above-mentioned Commission.”

Following are excerpts from his statement:

On October 24 the First Committee heard a statement from the United States Secretary of State, who spoke for nearly three hours. He fixed his attention on the background and history of the Korean question from its inception to date. He misrepresented facts; he permitted himself a number of gross mistakes; and he did not even shrink from direct distortion.

From the very outset the Soviet Union Government consistently championed measures to establish the conditions for the setting up of a true independent, democratic and unified Korea.

The question of consultation with democratic parties has also been outlined by Mr. Acheson, to state it mildly, with a number of clear departures from reality.

Mr. Acheson devoted a substantial part of his speech to an attempt to indict the North Koreans—and the Soviet

Union also—for subversive activities in Southern Korea which were allegedly designed to overthrow the Syngman Rhee Government. In so doing he attached particular significance to the Soviet Union's activities in connection with the preparation of cadres of Koreans who were, he said, on the side of the Soviet Union and who occupied responsible party and state posts in North Korea.

Mr. Acheson said that this preparation and training of cadres was taking place in the Soviet Union and there were on that occasion a number of outbreaks. These were outbreaks, hostile to the Soviet Union, about the alleged Soviet Union secret police that was ranging throughout Southern Korea and about the Soviet Union domination which Mr. Acheson said was being exerted over the North Korea government. There is no reason further to emphasize the ludicrous and absurd character of such allegations.

Mr. Acheson stated that the activities of the Communist party in North Korea were designed to subvert the South Korean Government. Is it not clear that nothing was capable of subverting the authority of the South Korean Government as much as was the brutal reactionary policy to which that government was committed, since it found itself in overt war with its own people?

Is it not clear what the leaders of the South Korean Government were doing and what the leaders of the South Korean political and Fascist parties were preparing? They were preparing to attack North Korea; they were preparing for war. They said so, and not only did they say it, but they were working in that direction. They were working toward it, not in secret, but with the support, protection and connivance of their great protectors from beyond the seas.

Mr. Acheson devoted a great part of his speech to the thesis that the aggression in Korea was prepared and carried out from North Korea.

Among the pieces of evidence of aggression originating in North Korea, Mr. Acheson cited certain secret documents which included, he said, a plan for the invasion of South Korea which had been captured by United Nations troops and which now could be found in the archives of the United Nations. This is the first time we have heard about that. More than two and a half years have elapsed since our differences in Korea began, but this is the first time we have heard of this document.

Mr. Acheson argued that the issue in the cease-fire talks in Korea at the present time was what to do with those prisoners who did not want to be repatriated. Mr. Acheson alleged that this was quite in keeping with the principles of international law and international practice. But what he was doing in fact was to supplant one issue by the other.

The type of compulsory interrogation and screening that is being carried out actually means that the prisoners are being retained by force. Mr. Acheson requested that we consider this proposal and he stated that the United States' side was prompted by the humanitarian principles of the Geneva Convention and that the position of his side was fully in keeping with that convention. Mr. Acheson proposed that we consider this view and that we check up on whether this was correct.

We are prepared to consider this, to check it and to prove that it is not correct, that the position of the United States' side, far from being in agreement with the Geneva Convention, is actually in flagrant contradiction of the Geneva Convention, and not only of the convention of 1949, but also of the convention of 1929 and of the Hague Convention of 1907, as well as of the practices of the United States itself.

Mr. Acheson argued that the position of the United States was fully in keeping with the standards of international law and practice. Let us look into that. Mr. Acheson deemed it fit to draw attention to a number of treaties that were entered into by the Government of the Soviet Union in the first year of the revolution. He cited a number of agreements entered into by the Soviet Government in 1918, 1919 and 1920 which make it clear that

that Government, as Mr. Acheson alleged, did not press for repatriation of all those war prisoners who might prefer to remain in the territory of the power under whose authority they were.

However, Mr. Acheson seemed to think that his task was easier than it actually is. Having refrained from the labor of analyzing the above list of treaties, he just cited texts. He eliminated the conditions and the reality of that day. He just saw before him the dry-as-dust texts, the legal juridical formulas and forgot the social and political relations under which those texts arose on which the events that were raging then placed their stamp.

There was a struggle on contradictory political conceptions and of social and class interests that were antagonistic. The treaties referred to by Mr. Acheson were merely the result of that struggle and it was natural that the stamp of compromise could not have failed to be put upon them. This fact must not be lost sight of, inasmuch as it is correct to evaluate and appraise the documents only in their political and historical settings.

The United Kingdom and France replied to Mr. Vyshinsky's proposal at the next session, October 30. Selwyn Lloyd (U.K.) said that he did not see how the commission proposed by the U.S.S.R. would help end the Korean war if the Soviet delegate would not acknowledge the basic principle of non-forcible repatriation, and, on the other hand, if that principle were accepted no commission would be necessary. "We are not only ready but eager to examine any and every proposal that may be put forward in good faith to overcome the present difficulty, provided it does not involve forcible repatriation."

Stating that his intention was not merely to refute Mr. Vyshinsky's arguments, Mr. Lloyd declared:

"It is impossible to forget that whilst we are debating this matter men are dying in Korea. Every day there are casualties, not only to the soldiers concerned, but also, unfortunately and unavoidably, among noncombatants."

Speaking for France, Henri Hoppenot referred to Mr. Vyshinsky's statement that the Soviet Union had signed treaties providing for voluntary repatriation only under the special circumstances that followed the Russian revolution. He proposed that the Soviet delegate join in an examination of the question whether "special circumstances" also exist at present to justify exceptions to the Soviet stand on repatriation.

M. Hoppenot urged that every effort be exerted to reach an "honorable" solution. He said he addressed his appeal especially to those nations "culturally and geographically" closer to the Chinese and North Koreans, who were therefore perhaps in a better position to explain to them the real position of the United Nations.

Committee III (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural)—In the course of its consideration of freedom of information, the Committee on November 1 adopted a resolution sponsored by Egypt, France, Lebanon, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia which would open for signature a Convention on the Right of Correction.

In a statement on October 24, Charles A.

Sprague (U.S.) said that the right-of-correction provisions of the Convention on the International Transmission of News and the Right of Correction (adopted by the General Assembly in 1949 but not opened for signature) "could be badly abused" and could become a vehicle for propaganda and even a source of friction among States.

During the subsequent discussion, the representative of Byelorussia, Miss F. A. Novikova, charged that in the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, information media were misused by "aggressive circles" to mislead public opinion. Amendments proposed by the U.S.S.R. to the draft Convention on Freedom of Information would "promote the dissemination of truthful and objective information," independently of "dictation by trusts and monopolies."

Mr. Sprague later intervened to reply to charges made by the "representatives of the Soviet Union and other countries of the Soviet bloc."

"I am not unaware of defects in the American press," he said, but the picture presented to the Committee was so "grotesque and distorted" that he was unable to relate it to reality. Denying that there was a monopoly of ownership in the United States, Mr. Sprague said that ownership of the country's 1,773 daily newspapers and over 3,000 radio stations was most widely diversified.

(Full texts of Mr. Sprague's statements will appear in the next issue of the BULLETIN.)

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

Movement of Migrants From Europe

The Department of State announced on October 10 (press release 802) that the U.S. delegation to the fourth session of the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe, which convened on October 13, 1952, at Geneva is as follows:

U.S. Representative

George L. Warren, Adviser on Refugees and Displaced Persons, Department of State

Alternate U.S. Representative

Donald C. Blaisdell, U.S. Representative for International Organization Affairs, American Consulate General, Geneva

Advisers

David E. Christian, Mutual Security Agency, Paris
Eric M. Hughes, Deputy Chief, Escapee Program, Special Unit, Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, Frankfurt

Guy J. Swope, Chief, Displaced Populations Division, Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, Bonn

At this session, the Migration Committee will consider reports on the various phases of its operations, including reports by the Director on such subjects as refugees of European origin resident outside Europe; budget and plan of expenditure

for the period February 1-August 31, 1952; technical aid and financing; staff regulations; and the establishment of headquarters.

Hugh Gibson, a former Ambassador of the United States, is Director of the Migration Committee, having been elected to that post at the Committee's third session, which was held at Washington June 10-13, 1952.

Pan American Congress of Architects

The Department of State announced on October 17 (press release 817) that the U.S. delegation to the eighth Pan American Congress of Architects, to be held October 19-25, 1952, at Mexico City, will be as follows:

Chairman

Glenn Stanton, President, American Institute of Architects, Portland, Oreg.

Delegates

Thomas D. Broad, Dallas
Samuel Inman Cooper, Atlanta
Clair William Ditchy, Detroit
Rockwell K. DuMoulin, Architect, Institute of Inter-American Affairs, San José, Costa Rica

Howard T. Fisher, Chicago

Raymond M. Foley, Administrator, Housing and Home Finance Agency, Washington, D. C.

Kenneth Franzheim, Houston

Morris Ketchum, Jr., New York

Donald R. Laidig, Housing Consultant, Institute of Inter-American Affairs, Washington, D. C.

Pieter C. Pauw, Housing Adviser, Institute of Inter-American Affairs, Quito, Ecuador

Henry Retter, Sanitary Engineer, Institute of Inter-American Affairs, San Salvador, El Salvador

Marshall A. Shaffer, Chief, Technical Service Branch, Division of Hospital Facilities, Public Health Service, Federal Security Agency, Washington, D. C.

George Dick Smith, Jr., Buffalo

Mies van der Rohe, Chicago

This series of congresses was initiated in 1920 to enable the architects of the American countries to render greater services to the public, to the profession, and to the governments of their respective countries as a result of consideration of problems of education, ethics, and practices relating to architecture, as well as the relationship of the architect to contemporary civilization. The United States has participated in the seven previous congresses in the series.

The themes of the eighth congress will be continental, national, regional, and urban planning, with reference to the architecture of homes, hospitals, and university cities. The objective of the forthcoming meeting is to correlate ideas and accomplishments looking toward the solution of certain of the social problems of the Americas. The work program includes conferences, seminars, plenary sessions, and visits to the exhibits, both official and private, being held in conjunction with the congress. An exhibit depicting planning and contemporary architecture in the United States has been prepared under the auspices of the American Institute of Architects and the Department of State.

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United States Commitments

PART I. THE END OF ISOLATION

by Charles B. Marshall

I am going to discuss the foreign policy of the United States not in terms of chronology and arithmetic but in broader terms which I hope will make clear the world outlook of my country and its role in international life as an American sees it.

Let us start with what a foreign policy is. It is a settled course of action undertaken by a government to affect matters beyond the span of its own jurisdiction.

I wish to dwell a moment on that word "government." A metaphoric expression, it derives from a Greek word related to the control and guidance of a ship in motion.

The metaphor is just. By understanding its implications we can understand some of the canons of government relevant to its exterior relationships as well as to the internal exercise of power.

Let me take first of all the idea of responsibility. I recall once congratulating a Philippine pilot for a cool and deft performance in bringing a hospital ship alongside a tanker in a heavy sea. He said in response: "The pilot's job is to watch the signs and the instruments and not to listen to the beat of his own heart."

That comment reflected a responsible rather than a romantic view of his role. In the proportions applicable to the art of steering a ship, the ship is antecedent to the pilot. He is essentially only its servant.

Power Limitations

Let me add something concerning the limits of power. The discretion exercised on the bridge of a ship has capability to destroy far greater than the capability to achieve. A moment's misjudgment or one passing decision dictated by passion rather than reason can bring on catastrophe. Yet to bring a ship soundly through a voyage requires

unremitting judgment and tedious work done under pressure over a long span of time. It is given to the authority on the bridge only to contribute to the achievement and never alone to ordain it. Success depends on many factors beyond the authority of the ship's master.

The man functioning on the bridge must take the ship and the situation as they are. In determining a course ahead he can take as his point of departure only the actual locus of the ship at the moment. The elements which bear upon the sailing are beyond his fiat. He can foresee them limitedly. He cannot ordain them. He can only use them as they develop.

One cannot exercise discretion in government any more than in navigating a ship by pretending that it is another day, another place, and a different situation.

It may properly be given to a government to modify and to help in improving step by step the conditions of the society within which it functions. Tyranny takes over when a government presumes to transcend limits of what is feasible in freedom and by force to make over a society in the image of the dreams of those who rule.

If it is tragic to disregard the limits of power within, it is catastrophic to disregard them in external relations. Nothing else has brought so much suffering in our lifetime as the impulse of rulers to attempt to extend their domination beyond the feasible scope and to seek by will and force what the limits imposed by reason deny.

If it is tragic for government to become only the wanton employment of power by rulers who regard it as an instrument of their own impulses and desires and who use their power only for the sake of begetting more power, it is fatal for it to become merely a device for arresting change altogether.

Progressive Aims Important

The simple and enduring purpose of American foreign policy is to preserve in the world a situation enabling the survival and success of those principles as political realities in the United States.

Those ideas underlying the American constitutional structure were not the invention of Americans. They came from Europe. They were adapted into American forms by a generation whose leaders had learned from Locke, Harrington, Bellarmine, Montesquien, and others the wisdom of politics in its highest sense developed over the centuries of European experience.

The American Nation is in an essential way a product—and if I may say so without undue boasting, in some ways a most successful product—of a movement of peoples, culture, and power out of Europe and into areas across the seas, beginning roughly 450 years ago.

The results of that movement have varied widely area by area in relation to a number of factors: the degree of the motherland's desire to keep leading strings on the overseas outpost; the character of the political institutions translated overseas; the accessibility, the contours, the climate, and the value of natural resources of the overseas areas; the numbers of the native peoples and the depth and strength of their culture; the conditions of politics and power in the world framework coincident with the development of the overseas land.

With respect to the emergence of the United States the combination of factors was most favorable.

First, the burdens of overseas interference with the English colonists in America were minimal. The attempt of the homeland authority to attach leading strings came too late, and its result was only to impel the colonists to cut the lines of allegiance.

Second, the institutions implanted here from abroad were those of free individuals regarding government as their instrument and not themselves as the instrument of government.

Third, nature was kind but not indulgent. It offered opportunity rather than bounty. The continental range was well forested, richly endowed in soil in broad and accessible expanses, with a proliferation of natural wealth under the surface and natural waterways without equal. Others often misjudge the degree of our ease and our plenty. D. W. Brogan closes his latest book with a story of an immigrant outside the Grand Central Station in New York. He was asked what 40 years of observing life in America had taught him. He reflected and replied, "There is no free lunch."

Fourth, the aboriginal population presented no great problems. It was sparse. Its culture was simple. Though the Indians confronted the settlers in some three dozen wars—the last of them only 62 years ago—their hostility was sporadic.

Fifth, the position was far enough away to avoid immediate and heavy pressures from the powers in other continents and yet not so remote as to impede commerce and restrict the flow of objects and ideas of culture and the influx of immigrants.

Sixth, the circumstances of world politics afforded the Americans a golden chance. This point I shall spell out.

Though I should not wish to say this in a Fourth-of-July oration, I shall admit here that the success of the Americans' bid for independence was not the product solely of their feats at arms but was attributable also to foreign assistance and to a resourceful diplomacy which made avail of its opportunities, first to win independence in combination with enemies of the Crown and second to win recognition of independence in a separate peace.

Moreover, the great movement of the Americans out from their Atlantic beachhead and across the continent was made possible by the shielding circumstance of the distribution of power in world relations among several nations of great magnitude.

This dispersion of power only half explains, however, the insulation enjoyed by the Americans in the period of expansion. The other half of the explanation we can find in their reciprocal determination to go it alone, to avoid involvements that could only impede their penetration of the continent. This was in keeping with Washington's farewell advice to avoid alliances until the maturing of the Nation's institutions.

The Monroe Doctrine

That combination of a dispersion of power in the Old World and a determination by the Americans to go the course alone was reflected in the historic attitude—given in the course of time the name of the Monroe Doctrine—by which the United States marked out the American Hemisphere as a zone of immunity against colonial penetration and interdicted the reconquest of the areas to the south where political independence from the European homelands had been established.

That prudent determination to stand aloof was essential as a condition for the diplomacy which, in a series of successes in foreign negotiation never surpassed and perhaps never equaled by a state in a like period, opened the way for the filling in of the continental position. One needs only to recall the main points of the series—the Jay Treaty, the Louisiana Purchase, the Florida annexation, the Oregon boundary settlement, the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the Gadsden Purchase, the acquisition of Alaska, and the establishment of exclusive American rights in an isthmian canal. This aspect of the American expansion has largely been forgotten by Americans,

who tend to think of the national development as the work of the pioneers unassisted.

This old habit of aloofness from the political concerns of the old Continent was essential in its time also to the growth of the American Nation to a variousness of peoples and culture far beyond the original situation. The Nation founded by a generation born and brought to maturity as subjects of the British Crown came to encompass lands whose peoples traced their antecedents to Spain and France. The expansion invited—indeed it required—an inthronging from southern, eastern, northern, central, and western Europe and the British Isles. To have attempted taking sides in foreign issues before these had been transformed in the alembic of America might have been dangerously divisive.

In brief, I am saying that America grew to its greatness in isolation.

The word "isolation" has become a charged word in the American lexicon, taking on the meanings of default in the wider responsibilities and of obscurantism in policy. Virtually no one is willing to admit to being an advocate of isolation.

Yet we must see it in historic proportions. Isolation was the logical and prudent condition of U.S. foreign relations in the epoch of creating a nation from a potpourri of ethnic origins and filling out a continental range.

Isolation presented the opportunity for the Americans to develop the free institutions of government which reflect the best elements of the traditions of Europe's development over many centuries—combining the standards of the Greek with those of the Roman tradition, the test of rightness with the test of effectiveness.

Death of Isolation Policy

It is well here to distinguish between isolation as the situation serving in the historic past as a framework of U.S. foreign policy and isolation as a set of subjective attitudes toward the world.

As a framework of policy, isolation did not represent unconcern about the conditions of power in the world. It represented a realistic appreciation of the conditions of power during the decades in which the United States filled out its domain—and I take leave of it here in the words of a song popular in my youth, "Wasn't it wonderful while it lasted?"

The byproduct in terms of assumptions and feelings about the world and politics and the factors of power was something else.

Some of the byproduct attitudes of the epoch of isolation still clutter the way of thinking about foreign policy in the United States. Their occasional emergence in public discussion reminds one of Lord Salisbury's observation to the effect that the most common error in politics is to stick to the carcasses of dead policies. That the policy is

dead is more significant for us here than that the force of habit still occasionally calls up the modes of thinking that were relevant in the era of its vitality.

I cannot tell the precise moment at which the pattern of isolation expired. We can date the beginning of its decline at about the end of the last century when, within a short span of time, the United States, by eliminating the last of the internal frontiers, rounded out its continental domain and in the Spanish-American War emerged as a naval power. Thereafter the isolationist pattern sank and rallied by turns over a considerable span. Finally it passed away at some unperceived moment. Its death certificate was issued in the pattern of alliances into which the United States has entered in the past 5 years.

The Making of U.S. Foreign Policy

Now here I might well digress to say something about the making of foreign policy in the United States and about the great running debate through which the American people and their Government have been resolving the national will in the face of changing factors in recent years as related to foreign policy in general and to the strategic policy aspects in particular.

Our foreign policy has, I think, three general purposes related to serving the national interests. One of them is keeping the position safe—that is, preserving the territorial integrity of the United States. The second is keeping our creed intact. The third is the preservation of the physical standard of life for our people.

Now do not construe too narrowly what I mean by the serving of the interests of the United States. Any country's foreign policy should serve its national interests. The real test is whether the country concerned undertakes to serve them wantonly or responsibly—that is, whether it conceives its national interests to exclude the interests of others or seeks to discover and enhance the identities of interests between itself and others.

By strategic policy I refer to that part of foreign policy which is aimed to protect the territorial integrity of the United States, and in that I include all the steps necessary to prevent attack against our country and to insure a capability to bring to bear the forces required to defeat any powers set against us.

The President's Role in International Relations

The chief authority as to our foreign policy is the President. The Supreme Court has referred to him as "the sole organ of the Federal Government in international relations." He makes the decisions about engaging in or breaking diplomatic interchange with other governments, disposes the power to command our Armed Forces,

appoints or removes the highest agents in foreign policy and the highest military magistrates, and can speak out with the highest authoritativeness for other governments or the world to hear.

One of his attributes is that he is the chief of the state, filling the role, replete with symbolic significance, of head of the Nation on a level above all particular differences.

Another of his attributes is that he is the head of the Government. That is, he disposes power at the efficient as well as the formal apex of authority.

The third is that he is the head of one or the other of the two political groupings—called parties, though they are distinctly less unified and subjected to central discipline than parties in the European sense—which compete for support and position before the American electorate.

A fourth attribute is that he is an organ of public information. When the President says something, the word gets around, because his saying it will make it news. The most devoted editor of a newspaper of the opposite political persuasion would feel constrained—not by law or compulsion but by the usages of American life—to give space and prominence in his columns to what the President says.

A President does not carry on foreign policy alone. For one thing he needs counsel in making up his mind about how to dispose his power in particular situations of crux requiring decision.

He can draw this where he wishes—within or beyond the confines of the Government. If the matter in hand involves relations with other governments, he will certainly seek—though he is not bound to follow—the advice of his Secretary of State. If the matter involves the disposal of the military power, he will certainly seek, though again he is not bound to follow, the advice of his leading military subordinates. If the matter impinges on both foreign affairs and military considerations, he will certainly seek the advice of his advisers in both fields, and it will be his role to resolve any differences in their advice.

If a decision is one requiring a contractual undertaking with some other government or governments, then the President can initiate the contract, but he alone cannot effectuate it. In such an instance he must get the concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate—that is, the House of our Legislature whose membership is equally distributed among our forty-eight component States.

If a decision is one requiring an authorization in statutory law or the commitment of money, then the President can effectuate it only after both Houses of the Congress have assented by giving the authorization required or granting him the funds. The Congress may add its own conditions to the authorization or the appropriation. Moreover, in granting either, the Congress acts exactly. A determinative majority of the members of each House must be persuaded to go along.

They cannot be compelled, for such compulsion is beyond the usages and resources of our party system.

Public Support Essential

The members of the Congress and the President himself are imbued with a sense of accountability to their constituencies. Whether the President, in initiating and carrying out a foreign policy, or a member of the Congress, in voting assent and appropriating the substance for it, the political leaders of our Government must stay within the limits of public support.

I do not mean that the public must give an articulate assent to every action. I mean only that public understanding and affirmation set the limits within which actions can be taken, and any course in foreign policy which transcends those limits can be carried through only after thorough public debate and examination have brought about a widening of the limits within which public support can be elicited.

Debate on such matters in our channels of information and opinion—uncontrolled as they are—is a strenuous business. Our practice is that no doubt can be resolved until it has been aired.

Those who hear from afar the recurring mutterings of doubt and dissent in our forums should understand them as the echoes of a free people who take life seriously and are having to resolve their wills on questions of enormous importance growing out of drastic changes in the factors that bear on their lives.

The Shift from Historic Concepts

I shall try to focus my attention on my main objective—to interpret the conclusions and attitudes which enlighten American foreign policy as it relates to the pattern of coalitions and which mark the great shift from the concepts of American foreign policy in the historic past.

The first of these is the simple recognition that we can no longer stand apart from the concerns of power and the issues of war and peace.

Within one quarter of a century the equipoise of power upon which the United States had relied in the period of filling out its continental position broke down. Two world wars were fought. Enormous physical devastation and political disruption were the consequences.

In both instances of war a preponderant majority of the American people hoped to stay uninvolved, even though recognizing that their country had huge strategic stakes in the outcome.

In each instance their hopes were cheated by the course of events. Both times the American Nation entered the conflict much as a voluntary fireman might attend to his duties in a conflagration. The Americans regarded the occasion as the regrettable result of someone's carelessness or malevolence. They hoped—and they supported

the hope with great effort and sacrifice—that the blazes might soon be quenched so as to permit a resumption of the normal course of affairs, and they trusted that no one would ever be so foolish as to start another such fire.

The experience of reluctant involvement in two world wars led Americans into two lines of judgment on what had happened.

One line asked the question: "Would it not have been better to interpose our strength from the start so that the addition of American power as an active and immediate factor in the crucial world equation might have prevented the outbreak of war altogether or at least have brought the situation under control soon enough to have prevented such enormous damage on the world?"

The other was along the line of this question: "Since the result of the wars was so unsatisfactory, was it not a mistake to participate at all?"

Now let us suppose that we had stayed out of World War II. Suppose we had permitted the Nazis in their evilly dynamic way to subdue and then to organize the resources and positions which they sought as their dominion. Suppose then that the Nazis were ranged along the Eastern Atlantic with the weapons of atomic energy at their command and with the resources of Europe and the heartlands of the Eurasian land mass and Africa at their disposal. Suppose rampant Japan had been permitted, as an ally to the Nazis, to aggrandize its war potential by assimilating the resources of all Eastern Asia and all its offshore islands. Now obviously the situation of the United States would be vastly worse than the one it faces now. We should be confronted by an equivalent of the very situation which our policy now strives to prevent.

I think Americans have come preponderantly to understand the tragic necessity of participating in World War II and to accept the impossibility of ever again enjoying the exemptions of our earlier times.

They have come to understand that the United States would be in the front line of attack in any renewal of world war. This is made possible by the great advances in the techniques of attack—the speed and stealth with which attacks can be delivered and the range over which the blows can land. There is a general understanding that in evolving from the status of a reserve area in the world's power arrangements, we necessarily emerge in the position of a prime target. The same circumstances—our scope, our economic resources—as make it of primary importance to the adversary to try to isolate us in the cold war mean that he must try to bring his force to bear on us directly at the outset of a hot war.

The idea of imminent involvement in any war carries on inevitably to the conclusion of putting strength in the balance to prevent a war from occurring.

The second great element in American thinking

is the recognition that as of now and for the calculable future a universal organization is not alone an adequate, workable answer to the problem of maintaining the kind of peace that free institutions require.

• *Mr. Marshall is a member of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State. The above article is taken from an address made before the NATO Defense College at Paris on Oct. 20 and 22.*

Secretary Acheson, M. Schuman Discuss Assembly Problems

Following is the text of a communiqué issued at New York on November 8 by the United States Mission to the United Nations after a meeting on that date between Secretary Acheson and French Foreign Minister Schuman.

Foreign Minister Robert Schuman and Secretary of State Dean Acheson discussed problems before the General Assembly, particularly the items dealing with Tunisia and Morocco. The two Ministers met on the basis of a long and close personal friendship. The Secretary took the opportunity to familiarize Mr. Schuman with the points of view which have come to his attention in his conversations with the heads of other delegations. Mr. Schuman stressed to Mr. Acheson the very strong views which are held by the French Government and people on the Tunisian and Moroccan questions. The discussion served to develop mutual understanding of the respective points of view of the French and United States Delegations.

General Eisenhower Invited to White House Conference

White House press release dated November 5

The President on November 5 sent the following telegram to Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower:

Thank you for your prompt and courteous reply to my telegram. I know you will agree with me that there ought to be an orderly transfer of the business of the Executive branch of the Government to the new Administration, particularly in view of the international dangers and problems that confront this country and the whole free world. I invite you, therefore, to meet with me here in the White House at your early convenience to discuss the problems of this transition period, so that it may be made clear to all the world that this Nation is united in its struggle for freedom and peace.¹

HARRY S. TRUMAN

¹ On Nov. 6 General Eisenhower telegraphed his acceptance of President Truman's suggestion and proposed that they meet the week of Nov. 17.

A United Nations Balance Sheet

by Howland H. Sargeant

*Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs*¹

As we all know, the United Nations has recently been on the receiving end of some criticism. It is called a windy, powerless, debating society. It is blamed for not having settled today's number one problem—the deep conflict between the Soviet Union and the free world. It is accused of futility. It is, we are told, a threat to the sovereignty of the United States. These are serious charges. They must be answered.

Let us go back to that time—7 years ago—when the United Nations was born. Most of you, I am sure, remember. Perhaps some of you were in San Francisco when the Charter was signed. It was breath-taking. Practically every race, every creed, in the world had participated in its drafting. The world was taking—most men believed—the first great step toward outlawing war forever.

Actually, of course, a great part of the world was then still at war—the most deadly, most destructive, bloodiest war in all history. But the end was in sight. And “Never again, please God” was a prayer that echoed in every honest heart.

To be sure, the problems facing the world were tremendous. But they did not seem insoluble. For the first time in the long history of mankind, the tools to solve them actually were available. We had only to put those tools to work and, with hard work and persistence, the job could be done.

Against the background of those bright hopes, the disillusionment that has set in for some people is not too difficult to understand. Those who expected miracles were doomed to disappointment when they found they would have to settle for less. That is only natural. The United Nations has not accomplished miracles.

It has not created that “one world”—a world in which all nations cooperate—that was the hope of so many at the close of World War II. It has not averted or even slackened the bitter Cold War

between the free nations and Communist totalitarianism.

It has not yet solved a number of pressing political problems. There is the thorny issue of self-determination for dependent peoples. There is the problem of Kashmir and other areas in dispute between members of the United Nations. There is the unrest in the Middle East—an unrest traceable to social and economic causes as well as to purely political ones. Some two-thirds of the human race continues to live in poverty. Disease, hunger, and illiteracy continue to plague millions upon millions of people. There are differences of opinion as to how areas now under trusteeship ought to progress toward greater control of their own affairs.

The problem of disarmament—and it is a very basic problem in today's world—is still a long way from solution. And it is all too evident that fighting is still going on in Korea.

All of these things that I have mentioned are problems in today's world. Some of them—like the question of self-determination—are slowly being worked out by the peoples immediately concerned. It is the United Nations business to give these peoples every opportunity to do so. But the United Nations cannot stand aloof if solutions are not reached. All problems which have a bearing on the peace and the stability of the world are—in the long run—the United Nations business.

To the extent that these problems continue to exist, I suppose you could look upon them as debits in the U.N. account. But it would be entirely unrealistic to blame the United Nations for the existence of debits that mankind has had on the books for generations. And it would be tragic if we were to allow these debits to destroy our faith in the United Nations.

The United Nations is that way. Korea was the test—it was a test and a challenge. The United Nations met both.

The Communists banked a lot on Korea. Just

¹Excerpts from an address made at the University of Utah, Salt Lake City, on Oct. 23 (press release 827 dated Oct. 22).

how much has been clearly stated by the Communists themselves. This is what a Red army officer told Communist troops a few weeks before they launched the Korean aggression:

In order to successfully undertake the long-awaited world revolution we must first unify Asia . . . Java, Indochina, Malaya, Tibet, Thailand, the Philippines, and Japan are our ultimate targets . . . the United States is the only obstacle in our path . . . we must crush the United States.

Another Red officer declared—again I quote—“. . . the attack [on South Korea] marks the first step toward the liberation of Asia.” But the Communists’ “first step” failed because the United Nations acted.

The success of the U.N. action in Korea forced the Communists to request the opening of truce negotiations. The United Nations agreed to negotiate.

Sixteen months have gone by since those negotiations began. During that period, the patience of the U.N. negotiators has been sorely tried. The Communists have not been easy to work with. But the U.N. negotiators have not faltered in principle or purpose. And they have gotten results. Today, only a single issue—that of the prisoners of war—stands in the way of a decent armistice.

Some 3 weeks ago, the United Nations requested a temporary suspension of the negotiations. But that request was made only after the Reds had replied to a reasonable U.N. compromise offer on the one remaining issue with a torrent of abuse and distortion.

The U.N. negotiators have made it clear that they stand ready to resume negotiations whenever the Reds are willing to substitute constructive effort for obstruction and to abandon their practice of using the talks as a sounding board for propaganda. The United Nations has, however, made it clear that it will never agree to forcibly repatriate prisoners of war to the torture or the death that might await them in Communist hands. It is to be hoped that the Reds will come to their senses.

The results of the U.N. action in Korea go well beyond those we have already mentioned. The attack on the Republic of Korea unmasked the Communist purpose and alerted the free nations. To meet that danger, the free nations are building their collective security. The United Nations has reorganized its machinery for dealing with aggression. We should not overlook the success of the United Nations in confining hostilities to Korea and preventing a general war.

I am not, tonight, attempting to predict the final outcome of Korea. But this I do say. The halting of this aggression makes the world a safer place for all nations and all people who abide by the law. Maybe it is only a *little* safer, but the gain is there.

Had there been no United Nations, the Com-

munist program—so clearly stated by that North Korean officer—might well have succeeded. Indochina, Indonesia, Thailand, Burma, and Malaya today might be in the hands of the Communists. Their materials (and they are rich in materials), their manpower, might be added to the Communist strength. I used the word “might.” Perhaps I should have said “would.”

What would have stopped the Communists had Korea gone? Had the United Nations so failed its test, the other free, but weak, Asian nations would have had no recourse but to bow to their fate.

The free world has paid a heavy price for Korea. We, in this country, have paid a price. But we have gained much more than we have lost. We have taken a long step toward the objective we set ourselves in San Francisco—a world in which all aggression is outlawed and in which all nations, great and small, may live free from fear.

The Problem of Global Social Conditions

Recently the United Nations published the first report in history on social conditions prevailing over the globe. It is a lengthy report—100 pages. I would like to quote a paragraph:

. . . there has been spread among impoverished peoples of the world an awareness . . . heightened by modern communications and movements of men . . . that higher standards of living not only exist for others but are possible for themselves. Fatalistic resignation to poverty and disease is giving way to the demand for a better life. The demand is groping and uncertain in direction . . . but it is nonetheless a force that is establishing an irreversible trend in history.

From its inception the United Nations has recognized this trend. It has taken steps to help the world to find an answer to this demand.

The primary problem has to do with the life-and-death matter of food. Two-thirds of the world’s population are hungry. And as Prof. A. S. Bokhari, Pakistan’s permanent representative to the United Nations recently said: “A hungry man will choose four sandwiches instead of four freedoms.”

The U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) has tackled this problem. It seeks, of course, as many immediate results as possible, but the objective is a permanent rather than an emergency answer. World food production, says FAO, can be increased . . . 110 percent in the next 25 years. That is a staggering but not impossible task.

And it must be done. The truth is that if all available foods were evenly distributed, each of the 2 billion people in the world would have a little *less* to eat today than in the 5 prewar years. Says FAO: “It would seem that hunger is steadily haunting our civilization.”

FAO is seeking to produce the necessary additional food through (1) increased production, and

(2) prevention of waste. Both are essential and are feasible. We have the skills and means to do both.

When I say "we," I mean the peoples and nations of the world. No one nation and no one person could hope to accomplish the task alone. This is a job that demands our combined resources, our combined skills, and our combined energies. And that is the way the United Nations is handling it.

Take this little story. Three years or so ago, a popular magazine in the United States published an article about FAO which emphasized the importance of such simple things as the use of scythes instead of sickles, or even cruder implements. The article was noted in a number of countries, among them Austria, which before the war was famous for the production of small farm implements. It came, also, to the attention of the Government of Afghanistan.

Both countries turned to FAO. As a result, two Austrian experts, W. Faiss and R. Hartman, went to Afghanistan in a jeep carrying a varied supply of small agricultural tools. They joined the FAO mission in Kabul and under the direction of W. Sommerauer, a Swiss, went out into the countryside demonstrating the use of scythes, spades, forks, and so forth. They found the Afghan farmers eager to learn. And the results were so good that FAO is setting up a demonstration center in the area for improved farm tools.

In fighting waste, FAO is concentrating upon diseases of livestock. That is too broad a field to discuss at length here. I would like, however, to mention the rinderpest campaign in Thailand. Formerly, in periodic epidemics of this killer, Thailand lost from 75 to 90 percent of its cattle. Since the FAO campaign was launched 2 years ago, not a single case of rinderpest has been reported in the entire country.

Another example. Throughout recorded history, the locust has been a destroyer of food. The insects have just two urges: to get food and to breed. They recognize no national boundaries. They do not care about differences in politics. FAO has declared war on these "flying stomachs."

On another tack the FAO is hammering away at the job of arousing government and public interest in improved handling and storage of grain. "We are," says FAO, "fools if we let weevils and rats steal our food when it can be prevented." Actually, you know, it is comparatively easy to outwit weevils. The preventive is to dry the grain with artificial heat to a moisture content as low as 12 percent and provide storage facilities that will keep it dry. The weevil cannot break through the surface when the grain is dry and hard.

Costa Rica has followed FAO's advice and with technical assistance has reduced its losses from weevils substantially and, of course, increased the food supply for its people.

Hand in hand with its campaign to prevent

hunger goes the U.N. fight to preserve life and cure the sick. It is an uphill battle. A DDT campaign organized by the U.N. World Health Organization (WHO) has practically eliminated malaria from Italy, Brazil, and Ceylon. Yet 300 million people still continue to suffer from the disease and, of these, some 3 million die each year.

Who is fighting yaws in the East. One U.N. doctor working in Java tells the story of Tumali, age 10. The child came to him with a foot so badly crippled by yaws that he could not walk. A shot of penicillin in the lad's little brown thigh was all that was needed. In a week the sores had disappeared.

Who is fighting typhus in Afghanistan and polio throughout the world. It contained and stopped a cholera outbreak in Egypt.

The fight, again, is collective action. An Irish nurse is teaching Thai housewives to "scrub and scrub with soap and water" in maternity cases. A Canadian nurse is teaching elementary nursing in Formosa. A Danish woman doctor is instructing Bornean girls in scientific midwifery. An American physician is showing Iranians about scientific nutrition, and an Indian is doing the same job in Burma.

The United Nations recognizes that in each of these campaigns the real enemy is the low living standards of the people. Raise those standards, and hunger, disease, and ignorance would disappear. But hungry, sick, and ignorant people can't do much to help themselves. It is a vicious circle.

Technical Aid Projects and the Work of UNESCO

The United Nations, however, is not ignoring the need for action in this field. There are, for example, power projects with the United Nations helping out with technical aid. Let me tell you the story of a tractor firm in Yugoslavia. "We are producing about 600 tractors a year," said Stevan Buranji, the 29-year-old manager of the plant. "But we have to speed up. We have to make better machines."

Buranji appealed to the U.N. Technical Assistance Program. William Harrigan, an American engineer, made a survey of the plant. When he left 6 weeks later, Buranji had the information he needed. His factory is turning out more and better tractors. Not a *big* project, of course. Not to be mentioned, perhaps, in the same breath with some of those power projects, but to Buranji it was important. And to the farmers in his area it was vital. It meant a "lift" in the standards of living for all of them.

I would like to mention the community self-help projects inaugurated in Greece with technical assistance and advice from the United Nations. The program has the imposing title of "Community Development Employment for the Utilization of Idle Manpower." We will call it CDE for convenience. Under CDE, the local communities decide what they want and need to do and provide

almost all of the tools and equipment. The people contribute their services.

Most of the projects are for small villages or rural communities—roads, drainage, and the like. Patras, however, is a community of 100,000 persons. It is a big city, even by our standards. A few years ago, only about 10 percent of the homes in Patras had water and sewer connections. Today, the percentage is 75. All of the sewer mains were made from native rock and home-produced cement. No imported materials were used. With the water and sewer project well under way, Patras tackled its streets, sidewalks, parks, and squares.

Most of the work, remember, was done by the people. The United Nations supplied only technical assistance and inspiration. All of this work, you will note, is done not only on a cooperative basis but through the free consent of all the nations involved. That includes the nations receiving as well as those contributing help.

At the root of collective action is the will to achieve it. The creation and the strengthening of this will is the special assignment of one specialized agency of the United Nations—the Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, more popularly known as UNESCO. The Constitution of UNESCO states that its purpose is to “contribute to peace and security by promoting collaboration among the nations through education, science and culture.”

In this country, we have long held that education was a requisite of a united nation. Through UNESCO, that concept is being projected on a world scale. Jaime Torres Bodet, the Director General of the agency, has declared that a united world depends upon the elimination of “the most unjust of all frontiers—the frontier that divides those who can read and write from those who cannot.”

Here in this country the significance of being able to read and write is lost on us. We take it for granted. Long ago, we enacted laws compelling attendance at school and went on to other matters. Many of us would be surprised to know that the frontier mentioned by Mr. Torres Bodet is a current and grave problem in many lands.

The list of educational projects is long and varied. Each is a component of a comprehensive program aimed at clearing away barriers erected by ignorance and at lifting the level of understanding. In short, UNESCO is getting on with its job.

Charge of U.N. Violation of National Sovereignty

At this point, I would like to discuss the charge that the United Nations and its specialized agencies violate the sovereignty of the United States—that it is a threat to us as a nation. That charge ignores one of the fundamentals of the U.N. concept—that it must operate as a free society of sovereign nations. The independence and integrity of each member, great and small,

are respected. Not only respected but protected.

I challenge anyone to show me where the United Nations has violated the sovereign dignity of the United States. Or of any other law-abiding nation. It uses force only with the lawless. And then only to insist that they respect the rights of others. The majority of the U.N. members, for example, may not like the present political system in the U.S.S.R. But there is no thought of forcing any other system on that nation. It is only when the Soviet Union tries to force their system on us—any of us—that we object.

In a recent speech to the Communist Party Congress, Prime Minister Stalin told Communist parties and Communist-front organizations throughout the world to raise high “the banner of national independence and of national sovereignty.” Was Stalin telling the Communists abroad that they owed their allegiance to their home countries rather than to the Soviet Union? Nothing of the sort. Stalin was telling these Communists and fellow travelers to parade as genuine patriots so as to obscure their real intentions. He was telling them to hide their revolutionary aims by posing as champions of the sovereignty and stability of the nations within which they operate.

We may expect, therefore, an increase—in this country and others—of crocodile tears shed over the alleged surrenders by each nation of some part of its sovereignty to international agencies. We may expect trumpet calls to rally around the banners of economic isolationism. We may expect attempts to pass the counterfeit coinage of actual allegiance and subservience to the Kremlin as genuine patriotism.

This is not a new dodge. But it is one that we, here in America, must watch closely. We must examine very carefully the motives of those so-called super-patriots who constantly attack the United Nations on the ground that it is undermining our national sovereignty. We must be alert to those who wave the American flag even as they are fomenting division within our country and between America and her associates in the United Nations.

If we find that we are dealing with Communists or Communist-fronters, we can draw our own conclusions as to the validity of their arguments.

If, on the other hand, we find that the United Nations is being criticized by loyal Americans, we should accept that criticism in the spirit in which it is offered. And if the criticism is constructive, as much of it is, we must do what we can to help the United Nations in its efforts to correct the faults to which the criticism is directed.

But, above all, we must strengthen—not weaken—our support of the United Nations. The United Nations has justified and is justifying that support.

The United Nations applies to the U.S.S.R. the

system of manners imposed in the playgrounds by an old teacher I once knew. She used to tell her pupils, "Your right to swing your fist ends where Billy Jones' chin begins."

That is what we are saying to the Communists in Korea. We are saying it to the North Korean Communists, to the Chinese, and to the Russians. "All right," we tell them, "we do not like communism. You do, or think you do. That's your business. But when you try to push any of us around it is another matter. Where our chins begin is the place where you can pull back your fist."

My old teacher's playground was orderly. The smaller children were not bullied. We all had more fun and got along better because of her rule.

That is the kind of world we want. It is the kind the United Nations is building. And, despite some of the debits on the ledger, it has gone a long way toward reaching its goal.

Yes, to be sure there is talk in the U.N. Council. But that talk is better than bullets.

And the United Nations hasn't, I admit, settled the question of the Soviet's drive for world domination. But it has stopped the Soviets in their well-planned and well-organized campaign. It has given the free nations time to build their security.

And it has given the world hope that some day the dream of those men and women of San Francisco—a world in which war is forever outlawed and lasting peace abides—will be realized.

The Application of Point Four in El Salvador

by *Angier Biddle Duke*
*Ambassador to El Salvador*¹

My experience has been in the Spanish-speaking world and so I will confine my observations on the execution of [U.S. foreign] policy to Latin America in general, and Central America in particular, with the accent on El Salvador.

Broadly speaking our major objectives in the Western Hemisphere have been defined by Secretary Acheson as the security of our Nation and our neighbors; the encouragement of democratic representative institutions; and the positive cooperation in the economic field to help in the attainment of those first two goals. If those then are our aims, then in their fulfillment the Secretary of State outlined for our guidance certain basic principles on which the development of our policy has rested and will rest. They are:

Our essential faith in the value of the individual:

¹ Excerpts from an address made at Duke U., Durham, N.C., on Oct. 24 (press release 834 dated Oct. 23).

The juridical equality of all the American Republics;

The preservation of our way of life without attempting to impose it upon others;

The perfection of an inter-American system for the maintenance of international peace;

Protection of the legitimate interests of our people and Government, together with respect for the legitimate interests of all the other peoples and governments;

Nonintervention in the internal or external affairs of any American nation; and

The promotion of the economic, social, and political welfare of the people of the Americas.

Call this policy by any name you will, but it is the long-range program of our country; an historic, bipartisan, truly national policy, perhaps as much the concept of President Hoover and Secretary Stimson as it was of Franklin Roosevelt and Cordell Hull.

Removed from the arena of the Great Debate, today this policy is working, and working far better than many have any idea. It is the reverse, the set-backs we hear about so frequently perhaps, and thus we may be inclined to feel the fault lies with our Government—not taking into account that the responsibility for good relations is a mutual obligation between two governments, not a unilateral one on our part. Just because we have good neighbors in the Americas and not satellites does not mean that we do not have the right to expect scrupulous reciprocity from these countries in regard to our legitimate rights and interests. Our size, our wealth, our ability, our generosity, and above all our restraint in the exercise of our power, must not be mistaken for one who is purposeless or soft.

Within the framework of these ideas let me explore with you the application of our objectives and principles to the relationship of the United States of America with a neighbor whose dimensions are roughly 50 miles wide and 200 miles long. The nation to which I am accredited is a most independent state wherein is reproduced a scale model of just about all the problems that confront many contemporary countries regardless of size. The familiar problems of taxation, of communism, and Presidential elections can be as absorbing in one degree or another in El Salvador as they are elsewhere. In addition, something new has been added; I have two other factors to worry about personally which did not exist in Argentina or Spain, my previous posts—earthquakes and the Point Four Program. As they usually seem to happen at night, I stay in bed resignedly for the first of these, but as I am responsible for the administration of the second, I am fast becoming used to carrying out what Adlai Stevenson calls "diplomacy in overalls." I think that old query "Just what is Point Four, anyway?" is largely dying down, and I would not presume to inflict

upon this high I. Q. group today one more interpretation. But there are a few observations I would like to make which I feel are pertinent.

You will remember President Truman's statement in April of this year:

Mass suffering has been used by every dictatorship of our times as a stepping stone to power. . . . To have peace we must strike at the conditions of misery that envelop half the people of the earth. This is the purpose and meaning of Point Four.²

The concern of the President is not just humanitarianism, although that element must be present in the foreign policy of a democracy. But that does not mean that it is a policy of simple charity. Most emphatically not. We are out giving a helping hand to people because in so doing we are giving strength to associates in our common struggle for survival. We have embraced this realistic policy of enlightened self-interest because we know very well that we cannot stand alone in this world—we dare not stand alone. Point Four then, as an instrument of national policy, is a happy combination of genuine idealism and a means of strengthening the non-Communist world to the end that it will be able to withstand the physical pressure and the political penetration of our enemies. This is the dynamic Program designed to fill the vacuum created by inadequate and negative doctrines of mere anticommunism.

Now let us take a look at how technical assistance works out in El Salvador. I wish I could take you all there in person for I know you would love that place and its friendly people. It is a little gem of a country where I find my work rewarding, important, and absorbing.

The difficulties they have to overcome are immense, but they are attacking them courageously, intelligently, and in large part successfully; and the United States is not indifferent to their efforts.

The responsibility for Point Four there, as I have said, is placed upon the Ambassador who, assisted by a director of technical cooperation, coordinates the work of our three technical missions in agriculture, in health and sanitation, and in fisheries. One more mission is to be established—in education; and we also are assisting the Salvadoran Government with the services of an American economist.

The point to bear in mind about the work of each technical mission is the fact that our organization is not there to do the job for the Salvadorans but to train them to do it themselves.

The Principal Problem in El Salvador

To understand the principal problem of this fascinating country, you may picture to yourselves the rich agricultural State of Kansas with its nearly 2,000,000 population. Now think of the lush, tropical agricultural nation of El Salvador with about the same population as Kansas and

only one-tenth of its area! Not more than half of even this small area is completely tillable, for this Central American nation is a land of mighty mountains and volcanoes, of rivers and coastal swamps, as well as of rich, fertile soil in its farm lands. Imagine how agriculture must be made more and more scientifically productive in order to support this population.

Coffee is the backbone of the state economy, and last year this country was outranked in the world only by Brazil and Colombia in the production of coffee. Last year El Salvador exported nearly 86 million dollars worth of produce, mostly coffee, while at the same time the value of its imports came to 64 million dollars in goods, of which 40 million dollars went for goods bought from the United States. The whole foundation of the nation's social progress depends mainly on the sale of that wonderful bean without which no American breakfast is a success.

Our agricultural mission offers the clearest example there of the possibilities of the Program. The Government of El Salvador has set up two large agricultural stations, largely at their own expense, to which we contribute the services of nine of our technicians who are engaged in training hundreds of Salvadorans in a research and technical program aimed at increasing the production of food for home consumption, export crops, and above all, coffee.

These binational centers are carrying their training program and research results directly to more farmers than otherwise would be possible through a national extension service to educate them to better management practices, cultivation methods, soil-conservation practices, and to bring to them information on fertilizers, new seeds, and insecticides.³

Point Four is also particularly active in the field covered by the public-health mission. The Salvadoran Government has allocated funds to build, staff, and maintain clinics, hospitals, and sanitary centers with our help and advice. Incidentally, we have a young American architectural engineer on the staff whose creativeness is very refreshing in the realm of functional design. Very often such a utility structure as a pump house for a town water-supply system will be the most attractive local building. The pride of the inhabitants in its appearance often has the useful effect of insuring their loving care and attention to the building's maintenance and upkeep.

To say the country needs more doctors would be quite an understatement, but El Salvador is fortunate in the high caliber of its medical profession. Many doctors receive training in the United States, many of them under Point Four grants. The health level of the nation is rising. Life in that part of Central America today bears little

³For an article on agricultural extension work in El Salvador, see *Field Reporter* for July-August 1952, Department of State publication 4574, p. 31.

²BULLETIN of Apr. 21, 1952, p. 607.

relationship to the stories of fever-ridden jungles that we may have read about years ago.

Technical Cooperation in the Maritime Field

One of the more colorful aspects of the Program is that of the third mission—fisheries.

Oddly enough, El Salvador has not heretofore made any serious effort to exploit the maritime wealth which may exist on her Pacific Ocean doorstep. Fish is important as a cheap protein food, which is badly needed to augment the diet of the mass of the population there.

Now obviously it is logical that the country should develop the demand for fish among its people, both from the standpoint of health and on behalf of the national economy. And that is where our technical cooperation comes in.

At their request, we lent the country an expert from the Fish and Wildlife Service who advised them on the purchase of a boat in San Pedro, Calif. It has an American captain, an American mate, and a Salvadoran crew who are fishing the coastal waters and finding out just what there is to be had in the way of sea life. If they come to the conclusion that there is the proper quantity and variety of fish, then private capital has indicated it will promptly establish a local fishing industry. At present, the catches are being given away by the Government to hospitals and schools. People are eating fish they probably seldom, if ever, tasted before. So we hope that before long a whole new area of nutrition will be opened for the people of El Salvador and a profitable new private industry established.

I mentioned a moment ago that many Salvadoran doctors had received their training in the United States. This is true not only in the profession of medicine but in other fields as well. The State Department is making it possible for many students and leaders of Central America and other areas to come to the United States to learn the latest American techniques for better living and, incidentally, to get a good close-up view of life in the United States. In this connection, it has been our experience that one of the best ways to make friends in foreign nations is to have as many of their nationals as possible come here to take a searching look at how we do things here. Almost without exception, they come to appreciate our way of living and seek to interpret it when they return to their native lands.

The Government of El Salvador faces the problem of a high percentage of illiteracy among its people and therefore it has already attacked the situation with vigor. Our projected Point Four mission in education is scheduled to be of assistance in the vocational field. We are already giving aid to that Government in organizing an industrial trade school and plan to assist it in

further development of a national school of agriculture.

In these days wherein we are increasingly concerned with the high cost of government, you will find it refreshing to note that the ratio of cost to the United States in the Point Four operation is constantly going down. When we started out in El Salvador 10 years ago, we split the cost of Point Four 50-50 between the two Governments; now the host Government is contributing about five dollars to every one of ours. There is also the matter of specialists; we have 20 Americans operating the Program with several hundred Salvadorans. As time goes on, it is expected that the U.S. ratio in both dollars and men will constantly be reduced as their technical and economic progress really takes hold. This is a self-satisfying work that is being done which does not at all infringe upon the sovereignty of El Salvador—indeed it strengthens it—and which can in no way lessen the self-respect of a proud and hard-working people.

There are many other phases of our Program down there and I have touched only the high lights. But that, I believe, gives you a pretty fair picture of how busy we are in one small country in carrying out our part in a world-wide attack against conditions of ignorance and squalor and in assisting our friends in making their democracy stronger and stronger.

One note of caution against overoptimism: many of the problems our two Governments face there are complex and to these there are no easy solutions. The United States can only contribute partially to the solution of their economic problems—the destiny of El Salvador is in its own hands.

As a corollary to the actual technical assistance we are giving the country, I am keenly interested in an information program whereby the Salvadorans of every level come to value our economic cooperation. I want the work we are doing to have a meaning to them so that they appreciate not only our practical help but come to know what is behind it—to have a sympathy for us as a people, for our kind of government, and for our economic system.

What we are doing must be recognized as the stamp of a system which offers hope for a better life, real practical hope. Democracy as a symbol of hope must be made manifest by accomplishments to draw to it the faith of the unlettered and the underprivileged. Our dynamic democracy is accomplishing things, getting things done which show more and more that in our beliefs there is practical, true hope for a progress that becomes a new reality every day—giving the lie to the empty doctrines of those who promise light when there is only darkness in their plans.

Achievements of Public and Private Investment in Underdeveloped Areas

Statement by Isador Lubin

*U.S. Representative to the General Assembly*¹

U.S./U.N. press release dated Oct. 29

It is all too easy to agree that poverty, disease, and ignorance are the enemies which mankind must eliminate. It is equally easy to agree that social and economic progress are desirable objectives. What is difficult, what requires thought, energy, and effort is doing something to achieve these objectives.

It is this difficult task—the achievement of social and economic progress—that we have set for ourselves in the United Nations and the specialized agencies. By common consent, we have set it at the forefront of our discussions and actions, in the Economic and Social Council, in the Regional Economic Commissions, and in this Committee. Great effort and much time have been devoted to determining the basic elements of the problem and to exploring ways and means of dealing with them.

The results of our efforts have taken concrete form in the work and accomplishments of the technical-assistance programs of the United Nations and the specialized agencies, the International Bank, the Colombo Plan, our own U.S. Point Four Program, and various other cooperative programs for the economic and social advancement of the less developed countries.

Altogether, as we assess our combined experiences, we find we have made important strides. But it is patently clear that we still have a great distance to go. The problem of assisting the less developed countries will be with us for a long time. It will be a continuing problem, one which will give rise to continuing responsibilities on the part of every member of the U.N. community.

This task of helping people to help themselves is one to which the American people have long subscribed. As a Nation, we are convinced that security and progress must be the essential aim of all members of the United Nations. We in the United States are convinced that we cannot achieve the kind of security and progress which we seek

for ourselves while a large part of the people of the world are—if I may use the words of President Roosevelt—ill-housed, ill-clothed and ill-fed.

It is because of this conviction, Mr. Chairman, that we in the United States have supported—and will continue to support—the social and economic advancement of the less developed areas through practical action on a bilateral basis, through the United Nations, and through the specialized agencies.

The widespread and urgent need of the less developed areas for basic facilities in such fields as transportation, power, communications, education, and public health has been continually emphasized in the discussions of every U.N. agency. There can be little disagreement with this emphasis. These are the foundations on which the advance toward higher standards of living must in large part rest. The job of creating those basic facilities is one which countries are understandably impatient to get done. Yet, we must not permit ourselves to forget that, because of the very nature of these basic facilities, it often takes a considerable period of time to bring them into existence. Additions to basic assets are generally large-scale and at times massive undertakings. They involve the preparation of detailed plans, the assembling of supervisory staff and skilled workers, the solution of problems of financing, and the procurement of capital equipment. All of this takes skill, patience, and time. Moreover, once such projects are completed, time must elapse before they can play their full role in the local economy.

Clearly, despite the importance of financing economic development, it does not always constitute the crux of the problem. In fact, our experts in the field of water use and reclamation, who have made a world-wide study of current plans and projects, conclude that the limiting factor is not finance but trained technicians. They tell us that there are now available less than 25 percent of the total number of scientists and engineers needed to harness unused water resources at the rate required

¹Made in Committee II (Economic and Financial) on Oct. 30.

to raise living standards and keep up with population growth.

Certainly, no one would deny that there are important problems of financing still to be resolved, among them the broad place of the United Nations in any practical scheme of making funds available for financing economic development. As to further action in this field, we must await results of the various decisions taken by the Economic and Social Council in its last session.²

Effectiveness of Present Efforts Weighed

In the face of all of our efforts in the field of economic development, the question is often raised: Is anything really significant happening? Is the ground for the achievement of better standards of living actually being laid in the less developed countries? Or, are we, in our debates on this matter, simply talking of dreams?

After 7 years it might be well to take stock of what has been done in this vital area. What has been accomplished in terms of the funds expended? How have our efforts been reflected in dams built, electric generating capacity installed, acreage cleared, drained, and irrigated, transportation facilities built?

It is unfortunate that data which would enable us to measure what has been happening in these fields are not conveniently available. Indeed, we even lack comprehensive and authoritative figures on the total amount of funds—external and domestic—that have been invested in the less developed areas. We hope that the answers to the most recent questionnaire circulated by the Secretary-General under the full-employment resolution of Ecosoc will give us more concrete facts on which to base our future discussions.

Such data as are at hand on external investment show that in 1951, a total of approximately 2 billion dollars of new external capital was made available for economic and social development in the less developed countries by private investors, the International Bank, and Governmental institutions.

Over the past 7 years the Government of the United States has provided almost 6 billion dollars in the form of loans or grants directly to countries in these areas. This does not include our paid-in subscription of 635 million dollars to the International Bank, all of which has been available to the Bank for lending purposes. Nor does it include the contributions which we have made to the United Nations and the specialized agencies—all of which have directly and indirectly assisted in the improvement of economic and social conditions in these areas.

Within the last 16 months the U.S. Export-Import Bank has approved over 200 million dollars of loans to less developed countries. This

has brought the total of its loans to these areas to date to over 2½ billion dollars.

The funds provided by the International Bank are equally significant. Between July 1951 and October of this year it made loans exceeding 250 million dollars for projects in 13 underdeveloped countries. The total of International Bank's loans to such countries has aggregated over 600 million dollars.

In order that we may continue our bilateral program of grant assistance to agriculture and industry in these areas, the Congress of the United States has authorized an appropriation of 460 million dollars for the current fiscal year alone.

These figures, of course, only sketch the great amount of effort and resources that have been going into economic development. To them should be added approximately 2 billion dollars that was invested by the European metropolitan governments, in the past 5 years, in their dependent overseas territories.

And it should be emphasized that none of these figures include the very large amounts that the less developed countries themselves have invested from their own domestic resources. Although no authoritative data are available, it would be logical to assume that the total of such domestic investment has been even greater than the figures I have just cited.

Significant as these figures are, they do not, however, tell the dramatic story that often lies behind them—the story of the harnessing of great rivers, the creation of new farm areas and new industrial areas where before there had been only wilderness, the story of the building of highways and railroads through previously unbroken country.

Even though we have no comprehensive worldwide picture of the scale of accomplishment in the field of economic development, there are nevertheless sufficient scattered facts to show some of the results of the investments made, of the loans and the grants that have been extended, of the services of the experts that have been made available, and of the efforts of the less developed peoples themselves.

Growth in Production

According to Raoul Prebisch, the Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Latin America, the gross product *per capita*, for all of Latin America, in the 5-year period 1946–50, increased at the rate of 3.5 percent annually. This compares with an annual growth of only 1.4 percent in the preceding 5-year period. Unfortunately, similar data are not available for other less developed areas.

Among other data available to us are the figures on the growth of the generation and distribution of electricity. What has been the story here? According to figures of the U.N. Secretariat, the pro-

² For a review by Mr. Lubin of Ecosoc's 14th session, see BULLETIN of Aug. 25, 1952, p. 288.

duction of electricity more than tripled in the less developed countries between 1929 and 1950. It rose from about 41 billion kw.-hrs. in 1929 to over 130 billion kw.-hrs. in 1950. This increase of 89 billion kw.-hrs. is six times the total power production of the 36 plants of the Tennessee Valley Authority in 1951.

If one looks at specific countries, one finds that in India, the production of electricity totaled 345 million kw.-hrs. per month in 1947, 425 million in 1950, and 514 million in May of 1952. In Mexico, the monthly figure rose from 207 million in 1937 to 369 million in 1950 and to 450 million in May of the current year. In the Philippines, monthly production increased from about 11 million in 1937 to 30 million in 1948, and to over 47 million in July 1952. In Brazil, monthly production increased from 85 million kw.-hrs. a month in 1937 to 204 million in 1948 and to 266 million last June.

The same story of progress is reflected in the statistics of cement production. In 1937 Venezuela produced less than 4,000 metric tons of cement a month. In 1948 the monthly output was 18,000 tons. In May 1952 it was over 73,000. A program is under way to expand this capacity by an additional 395,000 tons annually. Brazil produced about 48,000 tons of cement a month in 1937, 92,000 tons a month in 1948, and over 130,000 in December 1951.

Similar trends can be cited for iron and steel. In 1946 the average monthly production of crude steel in Chile was less than 2,000 metric tons. Production in May 1952 was over 20,000 tons. A program of expansion begun in 1951 is designed to increase this capacity to 280,000 tons annually. At the same time it is planned to increase the annual capacity of finished steel products from 185,000 to 214,000 tons. In Mexico, monthly crude-steel production rose from 22,000 metric tons in 1948 to over 64,000 in January 1952. In 1937 India produced 78,000 tons of steel a month. In 1948 her monthly output was 106,000 tons. In January of this year production exceeded 140,000 tons.

So much for the over-all picture as revealed by the available statistics. Now let us look at some of the specific projects that promise even greater progress in the future.

Specific Projects

In the Philippines the National Power Corporation has begun the construction of a dam and reservoir near the Agno headwaters. It proposes initially to install a generating capacity of 75,000 kws. This will serve the growing demands of the Manila area. The project will also provide electrical energy for industrial operations around Baguio, as well as flood control and irrigation for large areas in the heavily populated central portion of Luzon Island. It is being financed in part by a 20-million-dollar loan from the Export-Import Bank.

In Ceylon, the Government has recently undertaken a combined hydroelectric, irrigation, and jungle-clearing project on the eastern part of the island. It involves the irrigation of over 100,000 acres of land. It also involves the installation of a 25,000-kw. hydroelectric power station. The dam upon which this whole scheme depends was completed in 1951. Construction of irrigation canals and the clearing of jungles by modern machinery is proceeding rapidly. It is expected that some 200,000 people will be settled in the area over a 10-year period. Some of these colonists are already on their new landholdings. Of the anticipated 200,000, about half will consist of small holders and their families. Thus far, this project has been financed entirely out of domestic resources.

In Pakistan, the main work on the Thal irrigation scheme, which will irrigate 1½ million acres, has been finished. The Lower Sind Barrage scheme is in an advanced stage and its first phase is scheduled for completion by the end of 1953. A number of new hydroelectric power projects will soon come into operation, and a group of new textile and other factories will be in production in 1952-53.

In Latin America, as a result of the efforts of the Colombian Government, the different sections of Colombia are literally being brought together. Until recently, the Colombian railroad system consisted of an eastern and a western network. There was nothing to connect them except the Magdalena River, which often ran dry. This, of course, meant serious shipping delays, heavy transshipment costs, and other assessments. Now, assisted by a 25 million-dollar loan by the International Bank, a 235-mile railroad link is to be built in the Magdalena River Valley, thus bringing together the country's eastern and western rail nets. Railroad and repair shops will be built in Bogotá. This construction will, of course, take time. By 1956, a modern, all-rail transportation system will have been established between Colombia's Pacific port of Buenaventura and the areas of Bogotá and Medellín. There will also have been established a fast and reliable rail-river route between central Colombia and her Caribbean ports. The country will have been joined together.

In Iraq, 80 percent of the people depend for their livelihood on agriculture. The full development of Iraq's agricultural potential depends on irrigation, and irrigation in turn depends on the control of the country's principal rivers—the Tigris, the Euphrates, and their tributaries.

To cope with this, Iraq's Irrigation Development Commission has drawn up plans for a comprehensive system of flood control and irrigation. In June of 1950, the International Bank loaned Iraq 12,800,000 dollars to finance her Tigris River flood-control project. A smaller project for the

control of the Euphrates River is being financed from Iraq's own resources. These, together with several smaller projects included in the over-all plan, will eliminate the frequent and often disastrous flooding of Iraq's two main rivers. They will also bring under irrigation a total of 9 million acres of land which will become an important factor in the Iraqi land-reform program.

In Mexico, President Alemán's regime initiated a 6-year program to put 2½ million acres of land under irrigation. Since 1946 Mexico has allotted about 10 percent of its budget for irrigation projects—a percentage unequalled by any other country in the world. With justifiable pride, the Mexican Government has pointed out that the work to be accomplished under this plan will be greater than that completed in the United States during the first 25 years of our own Bureau of Reclamation—the Federal agency that is concerned with similar land-development problems.

In Thailand, one of the world's largest dredging projects, and certainly the largest ever undertaken in Asia, is well under way near the entrance to Bangkok, Thailand's largest port. Here, the bar at the mouth of the river port has prevented the entry of large vessels. Lighters must carry cargoes from oceangoing vessels across the bar into the harbor. This has increased freight costs and interfered with foreign-trade expansion. To overcome this, funds were appropriated from the National Budget and loans were obtained from the International Bank. Dredging began in 1951. It is expected that the work will be finished by April 1953. Completion of the project will open a new era in trade for the port of Bangkok, and for Thailand generally.

In Brazil, a highway 400 kilometers long was recently completed between São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro in Brazil. This new road has cut the average travel time between these two important cities from 11 to 6 hours. Trucking rates have been reduced by almost 50 percent and a regular passenger bus service has been established for the first time.

Relation Between Public and Private Investment

These are only random examples of what is going on in the less developed countries to increase production and raise living standards. A complete accounting would take hours. And I might point out that these projects are being undertaken and completed at a time when the free nations of the world have had to devote so large a proportion of their resources to their defense.

Mr. Chairman, thus far I have been discussing "basic" economic development—the type of development that often involves projects which, at least in their early stages, are not self-liquidating. For this reason, and because of the fundamental role which they play in the economy, projects in these areas are increasingly being considered as a

field for large public investment in practically all countries. They have become more and more the concern of governments and intergovernmental financial institutions.

Clearly, so long as the problem of building essential basic facilities in underdeveloped areas remains so important, we must continue to be concerned with the problems of public financing. But, basic and necessary though they may be, projects undertaken by governments can only be one part of the development picture in a society which does not wish to subject itself completely to governmental controls. At best they can supply only the ground work and the frame for the real development which will bring the benefits which the people seek.

Investment in Point Four Countries

In order to develop private capital investment in Point Four countries, the Department announced November 5 (press release 860) that the following airgram has been sent to U.S. missions concerned:

It has become increasingly clear that the success of our Point Four efforts in underdeveloped countries depends in large measure upon increased investments of private capital from the United States, other capital exporting countries, and from local sources.

There is agreement in the executive branch that a considerable part of our total effort in the Point Four Program must be directed to this end.

The investment of private funds from capital exporting countries, particularly from the United States, has the added advantage in most cases of providing managerial and technical know-how to industrial development and will favorably affect the world dollar situation.

The Congress has recently reemphasized its interest in efforts to make wider use of private enterprise in the foreign-assistance program, and the Director of Mutual Security has asked all agencies concerned to cooperate in an intensified program.

The Technical Cooperation Administration and the Department of Commerce will pool their resources to carry out a joint program. . . .

In the field, the mission, working with the host government, local business groups, and individual businessmen, will be responsible for identifying and developing specific information on opportunities for investment, assisting in supplying background information, and in carrying out negotiations with the host government in an attempt to make the investment climate more attractive.

To carry out this program it is suggested that all officials of the mission, including Point Four staffs, should be instructed to keep in mind constantly the desirability of encouraging private participation in developmental activities of all kinds. . . .

All means of furthering private enterprise through jointly agreed technical-assistance projects should be explored. Of particular long-range importance are projects designed to facilitate private investment through advice in such fields as government fiscal policies and administration, tax laws, mining and corporation laws, etc., and through advice and possibly joint action with respect to improvement of credit facilities and establishing and strengthening of institutions directed at channeling private capital into approved development enterprises.

In and of themselves, neither vast irrigation and power systems nor elaborate highway or railway networks will improve the standard of living. They will not produce the clothes, food, and the housing required to provide a more decent living. It is only as these facilities permit and encourage innumerable individual efforts that an increasing volume of goods and services can be created for the consumer.

If the peoples of the less developed countries are to derive the maximum advantages from these facilities, we must think of the problem of economic development as something more than the problem of implementing governmental investment programs. We must think of it, rather, as a problem of focusing all the creative forces of society on the increase in the volume of productive activity and on the output of those commodities—shoes, houses, refrigerators, and the countless other things which go to raise living standards.

Of course, each country must decide for itself what it is willing to do about its economic development. Of course, each country must decide what institutions it will employ to bring about the production of the things its people want. In the United States, our accepted policy has been to develop our economy through private enterprise. We are convinced that the results have justified this policy.

Where governments desire to further economic activity through private investment, they must decide whether they are prepared to establish the conditions necessary for such investment. Foreign private enterprise will play its part wherever countries indicate that they are prepared to encourage it.

Despite the fact that the outflow of private investment to the less developed areas, in recent years, has been small in relation to need, the fact remains that direct investment from the United States reached a record total in 1951. On the basis of available statistics it seems headed for an even larger total this year. In the 18 months which ended on June 30, 1952, the flow of American direct investment to less developed areas amounted to almost 1 billion dollars.

Moreover, the available data show that the distribution of this new investment is more diversified than in the years immediately after the war. Whereas in the early postwar years the bulk of private investment went into extractive industry, the recent trend has been for such investment to go into manufacturing and distribution. Between the end of 1949 and 1951 American investment in manufacturing and distribution in the underdeveloped countries rose by about 525 million dollars, as compared with an increase of about 325 million dollars in petroleum.

There is still considerable hesitation on the part of private investors to send their capital abroad. But, as the record will show, their funds are flow-

ing abroad to areas where it is met with cooperation and sympathetic treatment.

Free Enterprise Contributions to Growth

Mr. Chairman, I want to say in all frankness that we in the United States recognize that there have been occasions when some American businesses have operated abroad in a manner which led them to be looked upon with suspicion. But, I want to say with equal frankness that such practices find no encouragement or support in the U.S. Government or the American people.

The records of our debates are replete with statements about the adequacy or inadequacy of private investment. These statements, however, for the most part, have been of a general nature. It might be well to examine specific instances of what is actually being done through private investment to assist in the growth and give vitality to the economies of underdeveloped countries throughout the world. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I shall cite a few of these instances.

Let me first take the case of the Grace Company at Paramonga in Peru.

New Peruvian Paper Industry—When Grace first came to Paramonga all it had was a run-down sugar mill and surrounding cane fields. The company rehabilitated the cane fields by fertilization. It modernized the factory by installing new processes. It developed new techniques. It developed new crops. As a result, Paramonga is today a thriving town of 10,000 people, with their own markets, library, schools, swimming pool, theater, and hospital.

Nor does the community live by sugar refining alone. New industries have been established. By developing a process for making paper from bagasse, a byproduct of sugar refining, the company built a paper industry. With this came a chemical industry which manufactures caustic soda, chlorine, and muriatic acid. Initially, all of this was done through capital supplied by Grace. Further expansion was financed by the plowing back of profits year after year.

Of the 4,200 workers now employed, only four are U.S. citizens in permanent residence. Training is being provided in various branches of engineering, and skilled labor is being made available for other segments of Peru's growing industrial economy. At the same time Peru—which formerly had to import almost 100 percent of her paper—now can *export* paper.

New Factory Techniques in Ceylon—But private enterprise does more than bring capital and modern productive facilities into the less developed countries. It also brings techniques and know-how.

A case in point is the work of the Singer Sewing Machine Company in Ceylon. Without cost to the local owners, Singer has agreed to supply the necessary techniques for setting up a shirt factory. It is providing experts to advise on factory build-

ing, lay-outs, and flow charts. It is helping to train the employees of the new factory.

Parts Manufacturing Introduced—Wherever possible, American firms manufacturing complex machinery or equipment for sale in underdeveloped areas are increasingly moving the actual manufacturing of parts into these countries. It has been the practice of companies like General Motors and International Harvester to open sales agencies abroad which merely sold their U.S.-made products. In more recent years they have built assembly plants where parts manufactured in the United States were assembled for the local market. Now increasing numbers of these parts are being manufactured locally. International Harvester is now in the process of completing a plant in Santo Andre, Brazil. Here the most modern techniques for the manufacture of parts, as well as the assembly, of farm equipment, tractors, and trucks will be employed. A similar plant has been built at Saltillo, Mex.

Local Capital Mobilized—Possibly even more significant to the stimulation of economic development than the contribution of capital and technical know-how is the contribution that foreign private enterprise is often able to make in the mobilization of indigenous capital. Experience has shown that, in many cases, indigenous investors, who previously had been unwilling to participate in productive domestic industries, have been willing to do so in partnership with successful foreign companies.

Such has been the case of the C.O.I.A. Enterprise in Chile. The company manufactures paint and edible oils and refines sugar. Originally, these industries were established entirely at the initiative and with the capital of the Grace Company. As the enterprises have become firmly established and profitable, their stock is gradually being sold to local investors.

In India, the American Cyanamid Company recently formed with domestic interests a joint enterprise, known as Atul Limited. The factory they are establishing in Bulsar, India, will produce Aureomycin and other pharmaceutical products as well as dyestuffs and sulfur. Although the American company holds only 10 percent of the capital stock, it is contributing all its newest techniques and patents. It is also training Indian engineers in the United States to take over the operation of the plant. Eventually, there will only be one American actually at work at the factory.

New Local Industries Stimulated—Private foreign investment also often encourages the creation of new local industries which supply goods or services required by the foreign enterprise.

An interesting example in this connection is the experience of International General Electric in Mexico. The Company manufactures radio and television sets. In order to meet its cabinet needs it made an agreement with Industria

Mueblera, S.A. under which General Electric supplied loan capital and undertook certain other obligations. It trained the employees of Industria Mueblera in mass-production methods and quality specifications. The Mexican company has, on this basis, been able to expand its annual production from 10,000 cabinets in 1948 to 45,000 in 1951. It is still expanding. I understand that the Mexican company has now begun exporting furniture to the United States.

Greater Employee Earning Power—Another contribution of foreign capital is its work in training and teaching the people it employs, thus raising their earning power and living standards. A typical example of this is the program of the Creole Petroleum Company in Venezuela. When Creole began its operations, it discovered that although its workers were extremely eager and intelligent, the high degree of their illiteracy kept them from being promoted to the skilled jobs. Accordingly the Company, in cooperation with the Venezuelan Government, provided educational facilities for its workers. In 9 years the illiteracy rate among its employees fell from 82 to 12 percent. Workers who a relatively short time ago were holding unskilled jobs are today in supervisory positions.

These, then, are but few of the ways in which private foreign investment can and does help to further economic development. It is potentially able to provide large amounts of capital. It provides know-how techniques, skill, and the managerial experience required to start new industries.

It mobilizes domestic funds. It is inducing people in the less developed countries who formerly invested their money in jewels, gold, or real estate to put their savings into their own productive enterprises which directly contribute to a rise in living standards.

It stimulates the creation of new industries which are ancillary or related to the original enterprise.

It often provides the education and the housing, the sanitation, and many of the social amenities which are basic to the growing welfare of people.

The Sears, Roebuck Story—If I may, Mr. Chairman, I would like to conclude this discussion of the work of American private enterprise in the less developed countries by referring to one more firm—Sears, Roebuck and Company. Sears, as you may be aware, is one of the largest distributors of general merchandise in the world.

Sears began its overseas operations by opening its first store in Havana in 1941. Today, it operates 20 stores in Latin America—in Mexico, Cuba, Venezuela, and Brazil. The twenty-first is to be an 800-thousand-dollar air-conditioned building in Barranquilla, Colombia.

In 1947 when Sears opened its store in Mexico City, 90 percent of the merchandise it sold was made in the United States. Shortly afterward, the Company contracted with a Mexican manu-

facturer of refrigerators to produce the Company's standard model. This process has been repeated all along the line. On the basis of contracts whereby Sears agrees to purchase their products, Mexican manufacturers have expanded or set up new businesses. In turn, Sears has supplied the technical knowledge to enable these manufacturers to adopt modern mass-production methods. It has frequently supplied the capital to establish these businesses. In some cases, it has persuaded local businessmen to mobilize local capital. In other instances it has provided credits for the purchase of raw materials and the machinery needed to establish new industries.

Today, Sears no longer uses Latin America as an outlet for U.S.-made goods. All told, about 60 percent of its Latin American merchandise is manufactured by Latin Americans in Latin America. In Brazil 90 percent of the goods sold by Sears is locally manufactured.

Employment, too, has been local. Of Sears' 5,000 employees in Latin America, less than 2 percent are U.S. citizens.

Altogether, Sears has invested 27,850,000 dollars in its Latin American operations. With the exception of one small dividend from a Cuban subsidiary, every cent of profits has been plowed back into the countries where they were earned, to finance new stores and new products.

Non-American Investment Potential

I have taken the liberty of citing the contributions of *American* private investors to the development of economic activity abroad. But I do not want to imply that it is *only American* investment that can bring benefits to less developed countries. In fact, I think it is most important that we keep in mind the possibilities of overseas investment from other countries as well. The production trends in countries which historically have been capital exporters show a growing potential in their capital-goods industries. It was not so long ago that Western Europe was the fountain-head from which most of the development capital flowed. It should—indeed, it must—play that role again.

Nor have I intended to imply that foreign private investment can or should by itself meet the tremendous needs of the underdeveloped areas of the world. Under present-day conditions, it is all too apparent that there are important segments in the economies of the underdeveloped countries that require governmental initiative and government investment.

Nor am I suggesting that the contributions to the health and educational needs of their employees by private foreign investors is a substitute for governmental programs in these fields.

Nor, finally, is private foreign investment a substitute for the mobilization of local capital. In the last analysis, domestic capital must be the

largest component of any successful development program. We realize that the mobilization of such resources is not easy. We hope that the excellent work of ECLA and ECAFE in this field will help speed the solution of that problem.

Mr. Chairman, I have reviewed the important strides that the world has made in the field of economic development. I have pointed out that it is patently clear that we still have a great distance to go. Since the problem is a continuing one, it will give rise to continuing responsibilities on the part of every member of the U.N. community.

U.S. Attitudes

In this respect, I do not think that it is necessary for me to repeat what has so frequently been said by representatives of the U.S. Government in this and other organs of the United Nations, namely, that the people of the United States are fully appreciative of the size of the job that must still be done in the economic development of the underdeveloped countries. We recognize that many of these countries, particularly those that are least developed, will continue to require external assistance to provide the impetus to their basic development.

The fact that the free world has found it necessary to defend itself against military aggression does not mean that we are not ourselves aggressive in the war against poverty, ignorance, and disease.

We are moving forward along many avenues. Europe's postwar economic recovery, the great U.N. programs of emergency aid, the expanded U.N. program for technical assistance, and the cooperative undertakings in economic development as exemplified by the Colombo Plan and by our own programs of economic and technical assistance to the less developed countries—all of these are contemporary elements in our forward march together. All of these are major investments in a peaceful future.

The American people have contributed their share to these investments because they have faith in the future and in peace. And just as they have pledged their resources to fight military aggression so have they pledged their support to the war against want and human misery.

But I know that many of you are asking: Will this continue to be the policy of the American people and their Government?

I think I can truthfully say that the answer is: It will. This was made perfectly clear by each of our Presidential candidates a little over a week ago. Both have pledged their support to the continuation of our efforts to achieve the expansion of the world economy.

The American people, Mr. Chairman, are aware that we live in a closely knit and increasingly interdependent world. Knowing this, we shall fulfill our responsibilities in that world.

Soviet Harassment of Foreign Diplomats

Statement by Senator Theodore F. Green

U.S. Representative to the General Assembly¹

U.S./U.N. press release dated Oct. 29

Yesterday I listened attentively to the delegate from Yugoslavia as he described the mistreatment the diplomats of his country have suffered at the hands of the Cominform régimes. I regret to say that diplomats of my country, as well as U.S. citizens, have also been mistreated by these régimes.

In the view of my Government, conduct of this kind is a serious barrier to the normal communication of peoples and states. It is contrary to the basic precepts underlying the Charter. It is detrimental to the maintenance of peace.

Let me mention briefly the functions served by the old and universal practice of the exchange of representatives among civilized states. In recent years, as international life has increased in complexity, these functions have increased in number. I think we should find a wide measure of agreement on these four statements of principle:

First, a diplomat accredited to a foreign state represents his Government in important affairs of state, such as the negotiation of treaties.

Second, he serves as an official observer of developments and events which may affect the course of relations between the two countries.

Third, he serves as a protector of the persons and property of his country's nationals in the foreign state.

Fourth, and in modern times particularly, he engages in a two-way dissemination of information. Through information libraries and by related means, he tries to make available to the citizens of the foreign country such materials as will

¹Made in Committee VI (Legal) on Oct. 30 on the item, "Giving Priority to the Codification of the Topic 'Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities' in accordance with article 18 of the Statute of the International Law Commission." (The Commission is bound to give priority to requests from the General Assembly. Yugoslavia has proposed that the Assembly request priority for this item, which is the eleventh of 14 on the Commission's agenda.) The Committee adopted the proposal on Oct. 31.

promote friendship and mutual understanding. At the same time, he interprets to his own people at home the aspirations and way of life of the people among whom he lives and works.

Now I think that as you reflect upon these functions, you will agree that the ultimate issue raised by the treatment of foreign diplomats working behind the Iron Curtain cuts far deeper than a concern for diplomatic niceties and polite manners, important though these may be. For diplomats are not only human beings—in the last analysis, they are the living symbols of the countries they represent. Behind the Iron Curtain, they are, practically speaking, the only foreigners remaining there who can speak for the nations and peoples they represent. Restriction of their movements, officially inspired harassment of their activities, the leveling of false accusations against them—all this signifies more than an attempt to make life difficult and to interfere with their normal work. It would seem to be part of a systematic and deliberate effort to impair relations between peoples and to deepen existing tensions.

Cases From the Record

Indeed, what is particularly alarming is the way this effort has been intensified in the postwar period. Totalitarian governments have never been known to permit their citizens to have easy and friendly intercourse with the citizens of other countries. The Soviet régime is no exception to this rule. From its earliest days, it has tried to isolate its people from contact with the outside world. But since the end of the war, the period ironically which coincides with Soviet membership in the United Nations, this isolationism has been gaining frenzied momentum. Today, it seriously affects the work of diplomatic officials.

Let us briefly examine some case histories from the record.

U.S.S.R. Restrictions on Foreigners—In Janu-

ary of this year, the Soviet regime issued a decree which in effect converts 80 percent of the land mass of the Soviet Union into a forbidden zone.² This decree is the third and most far reaching of its kind to be issued since 1941. It prohibits foreigners, or even diplomats, from setting foot in any of the banned areas. The effects of this decree reach into this very Committee Room, in which representatives from the Ukraine and Byelorussia are sitting. Kiev and Minsk, the capital cities of these members of the United Nations, are on the forbidden list. If officials of the United Nations wanted to visit them, they would be unable to do so unless they received a special dispensation from Moscow.

Now these travel restrictions in the Soviet Union form only part of the total picture. Another Soviet decree, the State Secrets Act of 1947, drastically limits even the possibility of spoken or written communication between Soviet citizens and foreign diplomats. The average Soviet citizen thinks twice before speaking to a foreigner, lest he run afoul of the law. Our diplomatic officials similarly hesitate to speak to a Soviet citizen for fear of rendering him a suspicious character in the eyes of the Soviet regime.

These restrictions have contributed heavily to a tragedy involving some 2,000 persons in the Soviet Union of known or presumed American citizenship. In the early years of the postwar period many of them communicated to us their desire to return to the United States. Some of them came personally to the American Embassy in Moscow to present proof of their American citizenship. Today we have lost contact with them. The Soviet Government refuses to permit our officials to travel to the forbidden areas to see them. They in turn are refused permission to travel to Moscow to visit the Embassy. They are afraid to communicate with us by mail or telephone; and even when they live in the Moscow area, they are afraid to come to the Embassy in person.

It is certainly no exaggeration to say that this situation is unique in recent history. To describe it accurately, one would have to say that the Soviet regime has in effect placed foreign officials in a straight-jacket and, not content with this, has erected a towering soundproof wall around them.

So much for the situation in the Soviet Union. Is it, we may ask, any better in the Soviet-controlled countries of Eastern Europe? Unhappily the answer is "No." The pattern of Soviet practices in this, as in so many other matters, has spread throughout Eastern Europe.

Travel restrictions, state secret laws, false accusations, all the familiar elements of the Soviet pattern, are present in Eastern Europe. Let me

² A map showing the restricted areas as of January 15, 1952, appeared in the BULLETIN of Mar. 24, 1952, facing p. 451. For a summary of Soviet travel restrictions, see *ibid.*, p. 452.

recall for you some of the cases which have occurred in recent years and which explain in part why the relations of my country with the regimes of Eastern Europe are so troubled and unsatisfactory.

The Shipkov Case—In 1950, you may remember, my Government was led to break off diplomatic relations with Bulgaria and recall its envoy, Donald Heath. The reason was the refusal of the Bulgarian Government to retract its prefabricated and unsubstantiated charges of subversion against Mr. Heath. What is unusual about this case is that only a few days after our Envoy's recall, the world was given a clear picture of the way in which such charges are invented. The U.S. Department of State released the affidavit of Michael Shipkov, a Bulgarian national who had worked for the American Legation in Sofia and had been arrested and tortured by the Bulgarian Secret Police into confessing every offense his torturers could invent. After a brief detention, Shipkov was ordered to return to the American Legation in Sofia and to serve as a spy for the Secret Police. Shipkov was a man of great courage and integrity. On his return to the Legation, he gave a sworn affidavit, describing the tortures he had suffered and retracting the confession the police had wrung from him. Unfortunately, Shipkov was arrested again, tortured again, tried by a so-called court, and imprisoned after one of the most tragic judicial farces of our day. Nonetheless the affidavit he gave our envoy before his second arrest throws a pitiless light on Communist justice and on the atmosphere in which our diplomats live and work behind the Iron Curtain.

Hungary's Detention of U.S. Fliers—Another important case of the same nature occurred while the sixth General Assembly was in session. You will recall that last year four American airmen, flying a C-47 plane, got lost and inadvertently crossed the Hungarian frontier. They were detained and held incommunicado by Soviet and Hungarian authorities.

What concerns us most here is the stubborn and implacable manner in which both Soviet and Hungarian officials refused U.S. representatives repeated requests for access to the airmen. Not only this, but both our diplomats and the airmen were prevented from obtaining their own legal counsel in the trial which took place. The trial itself was held in secret, without, as is normal, prior notification to the U.S. mission of its time and place. Need I add that the trial was a complete mockery of justice.

The restrictions imposed on U.S. representatives in Hungary have been equaled or surpassed by those of the Czechoslovak regime. Here again we find it practically impossible for a diplomat to carry out his normal tasks. The case of William Oatis is a tragic illustration. Let me recall it to you briefly.

The Oatis Case—William Oatis was the head of

the Associated Press Bureau in Prague. He was arrested on April 23, 1951, charged with being a spy. In present day Czechoslovakia this is an elastic term which can be stretched to cover the most innocent activity, if the regime so desires. A spy, according to article 86, part 2, of the Czechoslovak Penal Code of July 12, 1950, is "anyone who attempts to obtain state secrets with the intention of betraying them to a foreign power."³ And a "state secret" is defined as "Everything that should be kept secret from unauthorized persons in an important interest of the Republic." This law speaks for itself.

After his arrest and before his mock trial, Oatis was kept incommunicado for 71 days. Official requests to see him were repeatedly denied. U.S. Embassy observers were permitted to attend his staged trial in seats at the rear of the courtroom from which they could with great difficulty follow the proceedings; but they were unable to communicate with the defendant. During the trial, Oatis was forbidden even to turn and look in their direction for fear he might receive some mental or moral encouragement which would affect the proceedings. This is what passes for justice behind the Iron Curtain.

Accusations Against Diplomats—Finally, to conclude this brief review, may I refer to another kind of harassment to which our diplomats are constantly being subjected behind the Iron Curtain. Hardly a month goes by that does not witness in one or another Eastern European country so-called trials in which foreign diplomats are accused of espionage or subversion. In recent months Poland and Czechoslovakia have staged such judicial travesties. Well-rehearsed witnesses recite their set pieces which invariably implicate U.S. diplomats in imaginary tales of espionage or subversion. No one takes these fictional dramas seriously, but the assumption which underlies them is serious. In effect, the Communists would have us believe that all foreign diplomats and consular officials are spies and saboteurs. Certainly, the proper conduct of international relations becomes practically impossible, when those officially entrusted with this task are constantly subjected to malicious accusations.

Inevitably, in considering the facts I have presented, one is led to ask: What are the real reasons and motives of this campaign of harassment and isolation of foreign diplomats behind the Iron Curtain?

Preventing Cracks in the Curtain

The answer, I think, is obvious. The regimes in power wish to prevent our representatives from seeing how they function and how their peoples live. At the same time, they do not want their own people to have the slightest chance of finding

out what other countries are like and how other peoples live. Basically the rulers of the Soviet world are well aware of the enormous disparity between their propaganda about life in their own workers' "paradise," as they call it, and the reality of that life as their people know it through bitter experience. They are afraid of internal dissatisfaction at home if their people should learn of better conditions existing in the outside world.

That is why they have rendered normal intercourse between their peoples and the outside world virtually impossible. That is why, for example, they go to such effort and expense to jam the broadcasts of the Voice of America. And it is why they must constantly increase the isolation of the handful of foreign diplomats in the vast Soviet empire. Any crack in the Iron Curtain is a danger.

The Soviet authorities constantly harp on something they call "diversionist" activities. This term is applied to any action of either their own peoples or foreigners which does not conform to the current Party line. It seems to me that the sponsors of this campaign are the true "diversionists." It is they who are desperately trying to *divert* their peoples' minds from oppression at home to hatred of all who are not subservient to the Kremlin. It is they who are trying to *divert* their peoples' anger and discontent from their own Government to all those who oppose Soviet domination.

These I think are some of the real reasons and motives behind the Soviet and satellite campaigns of harassment of foreign diplomats. This Committee should do what it can to help remedy the situation I have described. Obviously to encourage agreement on the rules and practices affecting the treatment of diplomatic and consular officials is a step in the right direction.

Moreover, agreed and accepted formulations would be particularly helpful if they contained provisions regarding such matters as personal privileges and immunities, asylum, protection of premises and archives, and the selection and recall of personnel. I also think these formulations should recognize that diplomatic and consular officials are entitled to all the freedoms necessary to perform their generally accepted duties—freedom of access to their own nationals for example, or access to all parts of the country except such small areas as are closed off for reasons of vital national security.

In the view of my Government, therefore, the proposal put forward by the Yugoslav Government is a sound one. At the same time I should like to advance two suggestions for consideration by the Yugoslav delegate and the Committee. First, the item as it now stands is limited to the question of the rules of diplomatic privileges and immunities. It would seem wise to broaden its scope and include within its frame of reference consular privileges and immunities. These two subjects are so closely related, it would be desirable and practical to have them treated together.

³ For text of this article and of Mr. Oatis' indictment, and excerpts from the proceedings of his trial, July 2-4, 1951, see *ibid.*, Aug. 20, 1951, pp. 283, 285-288.

Second, I suggest that we ask the International Law Commission to consider the advisability of taking up the item on a priority basis rather than directly requesting it to do so. The Commission already has a list of priority items. Any request requiring a change in the order of these items might seriously interfere with the orderly work of the Commission.

We must recognize in all frankness, meanwhile, that the work of the International Law Commis-

sion by itself cannot be expected to alter the deeply rooted behavior patterns of the Cominform regimes. Nonetheless, I think that a formulation of the accepted rules and practices in this field will be of definite value. It will help standardize the various rules and practices. It will serve as a measuring rod by which to judge the actions of all civilized governments. It may even, let us hope, help improve the formal relations between different states, and in this way contribute to the cause of peace.

U. N. Considers Freedom of Information

Statements by Charles A. Sprague

U.S. Representative to the General Assembly

THE NEED FOR A NEW APPROACH¹

As a newspaperman, I have followed the deliberations of the United Nations in the past in the field of freedom of information because the work this body has undertaken affects me very closely. It affects me as an editor first of all but also as a consumer of news who is interested in obtaining as much of it as possible, from as many sources as possible, in as truthful a form as possible.

The events that have taken place in the United Nations in the 4½ years following the Geneva Conference on Freedom of Information have been most significant. They are, I might say, among the most significant in the long history of man's struggle for free expression and of his efforts to safeguard the freedom already attained. But what has happened is quite different from what we hoped would happen.

The Geneva Conference brought forth the drafts of three conventions which the General Assembly reviewed in the fall and winter of 1948-49. Here arose the first unmistakable signs that all was not going well. Some delegates saw dangers in the right of free and objective news gathering. The right of correction,² an unprecedented concept in international news, was looked upon skeptically by other delegations.

¹Made in Committee III (Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural) on Oct. 24. Mr. Sprague is editor and publisher of *The Oregon Statesman*, Salem, Oreg.

²The right-of-correction provisions finally worked out

The discussions of the Convention on Freedom of Information, both in 1949 and in 1950, reflected sharp and persistent clashes of views and concepts.

In 1950 the Assembly created an *ad hoc* committee to undertake a new draft of a Convention on Freedom of Information. Its product was so lacking in general support, even among its own members, that the Chairman declined to take a final vote on the draft as a whole. The U.S. delegation feels that there is sound ground for believing that the attitudes expressed by governments in the

in the U.N. General Assembly in 1949 for inclusion in the Convention on the International Transmission of News and the Right of Correction (generally referred to as the "News Gathering Convention") provide that in cases where a Contracting State contends that a news dispatch capable of injuring its relations with other states or its national prestige or dignity, transmitted from one country to another by correspondence or information agencies and published or disseminated abroad, is false or distorted, it may submit its version of the facts to the Contracting States within whose territories such dispatch has been published or disseminated. A Contracting State receiving such a communiqué would be obligated to release it to correspondents and information agencies operating in its territory, through channels customarily used for the release for publication of news concerning international affairs. If a Contracting State to which a communiqué has been transmitted fails to carry out this obligation, the protesting state may submit the communiqué to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who would then be called upon to give appropriate publicity to it through information channels at his disposal.

On Nov. 1 the Committee voted 25-19-10 to open for signature the Convention on the Right of Correction. The United States voted against the proposal.

course of these debates were more restrictionist than those of the press or radio people in the same countries.

The special committee recommended a special conference to complete the Convention. The Economic and Social Council in 1951 recommended to the contrary.

A similar history of backing and filling, of decisions reversed only to be themselves reversed, has taken place in connection with the work of the Subcommittee on Freedom of Information. Its objectives were most meritorious, but it fell far short of these objectives. The Economic and Social Council recommended that it be abolished. The General Assembly in 1951 gave it a new but temporary lease on life. Now a temporary rapporteur has replaced the Subcommittee in an effort to find a new and better method, experimentally, for reaching our goals. The whole history of United Nations in this field is well reviewed in the statement of Mr. Lopez which you have on your desks this morning.³

To sum up, Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that the history of the last 5 years dictates its own conclusion. It has been shown that the writing of treaties on freedom of information is not the way to promote freedom of information, at least at this time. Our disagreements range over too wide a sphere and they are not growing smaller. We have cross currents of ideas and tides of opinion which ebb and flow. We cannot tell where they will take us, except that it appears certain that if we continue our present course we will skirt perilously close to rocks and shoals dangerous to liberty.

The distinguished delegate of Saudi Arabia has asked why the United Nations has made so little progress in drafting international instruments concerning freedom of information. He has asked why the Economic and Social Council appears to shelve these instruments. The answers to these questions are to be found in the records of many different meetings of U.N. organs. There is simply no general agreement at the present time on what should go into an international instrument. For this reason, it is the view of the U.S. Government and of the American press that it is better for the world to have no treaty than to have a treaty that provides, as the distinguished delegate of Sweden said yesterday, freedom from information instead of freedom of information.

In these circumstances, it seems to my delegation that the only alternative is to undertake a new approach, to search for other methods which will carry us safely to our common objective.

Our first consideration, it seems to me, should be our combined safety and security. We live in times of tension and apprehension. Therefore since unity is vitally important, it is imperative

that the free world know more about its various parts, that we gain in mutual understanding.

Now let me be plain, Mr. Chairman, that I am not advocating, as I say this, a solution that I think simple and easy of execution. The task of reaching a meeting of the minds is exceedingly difficult. In many instances, our respective national histories and our ways of life have taken widely separate paths. We have differences which we must learn to understand in order that we may work them out in harmony.

Moreover, while I advocate the course of maximum freedom, I am fully aware that freedom of the press can be abused and is abused, in my own country as well as in others. None of us is perfect; we all have among us emotional people, and people who lack good judgment, and people who are just plain dishonest. Editors, being human, have their share of these unfortunate traits of human nature.

In my country we have laws against libel and slander, but otherwise we depend mainly upon overcoming falsehood and propaganda by the free circulation of the truth. The best form of restraint upon abuse is more information and more accurate information.

Restriction of information hides abuse and makes it more difficult to detect and curb. But equally important, and deeply affecting relations among nations, is the fact that restricting the flow of information across international boundaries breeds isolation, and isolation breeds suspicion, distrust, and fear. The greater the flow of free and objective information, the stronger can be the ties of friendship and understanding which form the basis of our common safety and our common well-being.

Rapporteur Appointed

The appointment of a rapporteur on freedom of information by the Economic and Social Council is an excellent first step in this direction. My Government is doubly pleased with this step because of the election to the post of Salvador Lopez of the Philippines. He has had wide experience in press affairs and in U.N. affairs. I am confident that the press of my country will give him every cooperation in his difficult task.

If the rapporteur plan works as I think the Council intended, the Economic and Social Council will have a report on the obstacles which impede the free flow of information. From that we may better determine by what manner or means we can break down those barriers. We would hope to discover through him not only the violations of freedom of information—though we must surely watch over these—but also the constructive ways in which our respective needs for information can be met.

As a second point, my delegation recognizes that many countries lack adequate media of commun-

³ The statement of Salvador Lopez, the temporary rapporteur on Freedom of Information, is U.N. doc. A/C.3/L.250/Add.1, dated Oct. 23, 1952.

ications due to the limitations of their available resources. The dearth of free, independent, and competently manned newspapers, magazines, radio stations, and of news-gathering organizations impedes the free flow of information to their peoples.

Strengthening of Domestic News Media Vital

Yet it is vitally important that the domestic news media of such countries—indeed, of all countries—do grow and become strong and independent. I say this not only because personally I believe it to be essential to a healthy, democratic national life but because it is in the interest of my own country. The foreign policy of the United States toward each nation and toward the United Nations depends in the final analysis upon the information that the *people* of the United States have about other countries, whether they understand their problems and our *common* problems. Those of you who are familiar with newspaper and radio operations know how a strong domestic press can contribute to that understanding. As your correspondents visit the United States, they cannot possibly “cover” so vast an area by themselves. They depend heavily on what they read in our newspapers. The same is true when our correspondents travel overseas. The growth of the press in each of your countries is a contribution to our knowledge and at the same time your people learn more about us.

It is the hope of my delegation that this process of growth can somehow be speeded up. We feel that perhaps we have not used the tools of technical assistance as fully and effectively as we might in the field of press and radio. Under one of the resolutions adopted by the Economic and Social Council last summer, UNESCO has been asked to prepare recommendations on methods by which the development of domestic news media can be stimulated. I suggest that it would be worth while both for our rapporteur on freedom of information and for UNESCO to look into the question of utilizing what we call the “regular” program of technical assistance in the U.N. budget to help meet this need.

In our examination of this problem within my Government, we have found that a great deal already is being done, both publicly and by private organizations. Under the Exchange of Persons Program operated by the Department of State, 486 persons in the mass-media field visited the United States in the last year, and the number is expected to increase during the current year. Under the Mutual Security Program, 69 visitors have come from Europe.

In addition, the newspaper and radio media organizations in the United States themselves have provided extensive assistance to visiting groups of editors, publishers, radio broadcasters and executives, and others seeking to learn about our meth-

ods. Again, I believe it would be profitable for our rapporteur and for UNESCO to explore this field also.

Another technique worth looking into is the seminar. U.N. agencies have obtained beneficial results in social welfare, in resource development, and in other fields by bringing together experts to exchange ideas. Similar meetings, bringing together the actual editors, publishers, and organizers of mass media who would have to face the financial and technical problems of news gathering and distribution, might be of great value in the information field. This might be done on a world-wide or, perhaps preferably, on a regional basis.

These are a few of the ways in which we in the United Nations can approach our common information problems in a manner designed to promote understanding and good will. We have learned, through 6 years of inconclusive discussion, that the drafting of a treaty in this field is not only difficult and costly but usually futile. We find that we are no nearer agreement today than we were a year ago, or 3 years ago, or 6 years ago.

Something far more basic than the writing of legal language must take place before we can go forward profitably with the drafting of treaties. There must be a drawing together of the minds—of the minds that now are widely divergent in their thinking. This will come about, I believe, mainly by sharing our experiences and our problems. We can aid the process by enabling editors, and publishers, and reporters, and managers to meet in greater numbers and in a manner that will cause them to focus upon their common problems, compare them, and share the methods of cooperation by which they have been overcome.

For these reasons, I suggest on behalf of my delegation that we leave the various treaties on freedom of information which have been drafted and proposed in *status quo*. Let the rapporteur proceed with his work. Let the Economic and Social Council hear his report and the report of UNESCO. Then we will have better light in which to study our future course.

As matters stand now, our differences make it most impractical to attempt anew to draft a treaty on freedom of information or to ask a special conference to do so.⁴ The right of correction as contained in the News-gathering Convention could be badly abused, becoming a vehicle for propaganda and even a source of friction among states. The news-gathering sections themselves never have had the wide support my Government hoped for them. While we consider the freedoms contained in these articles to be highly important, as an interim measure we do have the alternative of working out bilateral treaties with countries desir-

⁴ Committee III on Oct. 30 rejected by a vote of 23-23-8 a proposal to draft the proposed treaty on freedom of information at this session of the General Assembly. The United States voted against this proposal.

ing to protect the gathering and transmission of news under legal instruments.

It is plain, it seems to me, that the Committee and the United Nations stand to gain the most by deferring to a course now being tested by the Economic and Social Council.

I said as I began my remarks that I was a consumer of news. As such, I am but one among hundreds of millions in the world. These consumers of news are the persons we must think about in our deliberations. Are they to have greater knowledge from their schools and universities? Are they to have greater skills and better techniques? Are they to have a better understanding of their own problems, of the problems of their neighbors, and of the problems facing the world? These are the problems which determine peace or war, progress or stagnation, hope or frustration. The wisdom to solve them comes only with greater knowledge and greater information. This should be the direction of our efforts.

DEFENSE OF THE U.S. PRESS⁵

U.S./U.N. press release dated October 28

The delegation of the United States has already participated in the general debate and it has expressed its views with reference to the broad subject of freedom of information, and I do not intend to supplement that expression at the present time.

In the course of that expression, the delegation of the United States avoided political issues and avoided making any adverse comment or reference to the press or publicity media of other states. It is a matter of regret to me that the delegation representing the Soviet Union and others of the Soviet bloc have seen fit in the course of their participation in the debate to make an attack or a criticism and a severe and sweeping condemnation of the press of the United States and of certain other countries. In view of that fact I, at the conclusion of the address of the delegate from the Soviet Union, reserved the right to reply. And that is what I wish to do at this time.

I am not unaware of defects in the press of the United States, as I admitted on the occasion of my earlier address, and I relish very much those lines of Bobbie Burns: "Oh wad some power the giftie gie us, to see oursels as others see us."

But the picture which has been presented to us by the delegate of the Soviet Union and others of the Soviet bloc is so grotesque and distorted that it seems to me a masterpiece of surrealist art. I am wholly unable to identify any of the elements of the picture which he has drawn as a true depiction of the American press. I am confident that the vast majority of the delegates to this Committee and to this Assembly, who have had and are having familiarity with the newspapers and radios

of the United States, are likewise unable to relate the picture which has been drawn to the reality which they experience from day to day by their residence in this city.

Let me address myself to some of the specific charges which are brought.

The first charge was that of monopoly. Now, by monopoly we would understand that it is a monopoly of ownership or monopoly of control. Let me give you some information with reference to the number of periodicals and radio stations in the United States.

There are in this country 1,773 daily newspapers, 543 Sunday newspapers, 9,591 weekly newspapers, 1,421 weekly periodicals, 221 semimonthly periodicals, 3,643 monthly periodicals, 625 quarterly periodicals. There are three Nation-wide press associations. There are four radio networks. There are over 3,000 radio stations including AM and FM stations and television stations. Moreover, these are not in any single ownership by any manner of means. The ownership is most widely diversified.

Reference has been made to what is called the McCormick press. There are only three papers in the United States that might be so designated.

Reference has been made to the Hearst press. I think it numbers only around 12 or 14; yet, we have among daily papers 1,773 scattered over the United States.

Press and Radio Ownership in U.S. Diversified

So it is folly to say that there is a monopoly of ownership or of control.

Let me cite my own case, because I am an American journalist and perhaps I might offer myself as "Exhibit A" for the press of the United States. I operate—my family and I own, and I am the publisher and editor—a small daily paper, relatively small, with a circulation of less than 20,000 in a city of less than 50,000. There are in that same city one other daily paper, one weekly paper, and three radio stations, all under separate and independent ownership and control.

That is a fair illustration of the diversity of ownership and control of the American press and radio stations. This ownership is largely either personal or family or corporate. There are very few papers with stocks in public hands or stocks which are traded on the exchanges. And the same is true of magazines. The American press and radio stations are privately owned and professionally operated.

The charge has been made with some citation from American authority that the newspapers of the United States are controlled by their advertisers. Now, that is an ancient fiction. It may have been true and it may yet be true that there are isolated instances where advertisers on occasion exert undue influence in the editions of particular papers. However, that is not generally true. As

⁵ Made in Committee III (Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural) on Oct. 28.

a general rule, in the papers of the United States, there is strict segregation of responsibility between the business office, so-called, and the news and editorial departments. And it is one of the elements of ethics within the newspaper profession of the United States that the editorial and news departments shall be run professionally and that they shall not be subjected to the influence of the business office. I have had many experiences where advertisers have sought to suggest omission of news that they thought might be detrimental to them, but regularly we ignore them, reject any such overtures. That is the prevailing attitude among the newspapers and the responsible editors of the United States.

The Development of the Press in the U.S.

The second thing, I think, that is necessary is that we understand something of the nature of the development of the press of the United States. Let me quote from the Constitution of our country, the first amendment to the Constitution, adopted almost simultaneously with the adoption of the original document:

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or of the right of people peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.

You will note there that Congress is prohibited from abridging the freedom of speech or of the press.

Let me quote from the Constitution of the State of New York:

Every citizen may freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for abuse of that right, and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press.

Then, another sentence with reference to liability under the Law of Libel. And this is an extract from the Constitution of my own State under which I operate a paper:

No law shall be passed restraining the free expression of opinion or restricting the right to speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever, but every person shall be responsible for the abuse of this right.

Now, the history of freedom of the press in the United States antedates the adoption of the Constitution of the States of the Government. It antedates the formation of the United States of America. It goes back to a certain trial held in this city in the year 1733, when John Peter Zenger, a printer, published a matter which was regarded by the Royal Governor of the then New York Colony as scurrilous and reflecting upon him as the official representative of His Majesty. A trial was held; Zenger was thrown in jail but he demanded a trial. That trial was held and became one of the historic trials in the history of American jurisprudence. At the conclusion of that trial,

the jurists' verdict was "Not guilty." That became the foundation of the American principle of freedom of the press, which then was incorporated in the first amendment to the Constitution and subsequently in the Constitutions of the various States of the Federal Union.

Now, when we say freedom in this country, we mean freedom; and just as you have exercised wide liberty of expression here in the presentation of your views on this subject, so we of the American press and radio exercise wide freedom in the expression of our views on public questions of all kinds.

When you have this freedom, you do open the way to abuse. There are those individuals who may be irresponsible, those individuals whose judgment may not be sound, those individuals who may not have had very much experience in affairs, individuals who may be driven by selfish interests or driven by emotional outbursts. They may vent themselves either in the columns of a newspaper or by putting out some handbill or by making some appeal over a radio station. That is one of the prices we have to pay for freedom. But in the United States we relish that freedom so much that we pay that cost, and we feel that under this institution of a free press, the press of the United States has risen to a very high standard when it comes to the delivery of information that is true and valid to our people and giving reasonable and honest comment thereon.

You have here in the city of New York an excellent example of the range of this freedom of expression in the newspapers of this city. That range will extend, let me say, from a paper like the *Daily News*, which is ultraconservative, or the *New York World-Telegram & Sun* in the same category, on to the other extreme of the ultra-liberal, *New York Compass*, or the Communist *Daily Worker*. You have here exhibited before you this very wide range of freedom of expression. You have within that group certainly that paper recognized world-wide as a superior medium of information, the *New York Times*, and one which is closely parallel to it, the *New York Herald Tribune*.

U.S. Papers Not Dependent on Government Subsidy

The decision as to the prosperity of those papers rests upon the persons who go to buy those papers. Our papers are not dependent upon any government subsidy. They are not dependent upon business for subventions. They are dependent on two sources of revenue. One is their circulation revenue and the other is their advertising revenue. And their advertising revenue depends very largely upon the extent and the nature of their circulation. So it is the customer who decides the strength of a newspaper. It is the customer who decides, as he goes to a newspaper stand and picks up the *New York Post*, or the *New York*

Journal American, or the *New York Times*, or the *Daily Worker*. He is the one who decides what it is that he wants to read. And that is his privilege. But we put out these various organs of opinion for the choice of the public, and as they choose so is the prosperity or the continuity of that newspaper or of that publication or of that radio station decided.

Reference has been made in the presentation by the delegation of the Soviet Union to certain criticisms of the American press. The "Hutchins' Report," for instance, was cited, and that report has been replied to by certain other circles in the American newspaper field. However, I would call your attention to the fact that the "Hutchins' Report" was financed in whole or in very large part by one of the publishing organizations in the United States. I think virtually all of the citations that have been made by the delegation from the Soviet Union and the other delegations within the Soviet bloc have been taken from American publications, from reports, and studies. We admit those abuses but what we call your attention to is the fact that we are aware of them and that we are under constant pressure to improve the standard of performance of our papers. We are under pressure within our own professional circles. We are under pressure at our schools and colleges of journalism. And we are under pressure from critics in the general public scene. That very awareness, which is evidenced by these comments appearing in books, in magazines, in newspapers, certainly is proof that we are trying conscientiously and continuously to improve the character and the truthfulness of our publications.

Warmongering Charge Refuted

I want to say something with reference to this accusation of warmongering which is leveled against the United States. Now, by the process of selectivity, one can prove almost anything when he has the range of opinion from A to Z, and so forth, to draw from. If one were to extract from the addresses made here in this Committee certain selected portions he could prove almost any case with reference to the subjects we have had under discussion. But I submit to you that selectivity in a case where we have complete and general freedom of expression is no proof of the general character of the press and the radio and the other media of communication within the United States. It is merely building a case by selection of material or evidence which might go to support introduction of what you might say is a bill of particulars. We cannot judge the American press by any such process of selectivity.

Let me say this for my own part as the editor of a small paper. I write my own editorials, with

some assistance from members of my staff. I am subject to no control from the government or from anyone else. And over and over, and over and over, I have emphasized the necessity of settling our international disputes through the processes of negotiation and diplomacy and through the use of the facilities of the United Nations which was set up as a great instrumentality for the maintenance of world order and justice.

I know of no responsible newspaper within my area, or within the United States, which is promoting consciously a third world war.

Now, one of the speakers from the Soviet bloc made certain citations from the American press with reference to the dropping of bombs on cities in China and the blockade of the Chinese coast. I would say that that is not germane to the point which they sought to prove for the reason that a war is in progress in the Far East in which the United Nations already has branded North Korea and Communist China as aggressors. And the purpose of those citations, the purpose of the editors of those periodicals was not to initiate a global war, but rather it was to bring to an early end the war which has been launched by the Communist bloc and has been characterized as an aggressive war against the principles of the United Nations.

With reference to other citations, I do not think you can dredge up in the whole American press more than isolated instances of where there may be recommendations that we should initiate any war. Certainly, the whole body of opinion in the American press, as I have been familiar with it, is disposed to hate war, to want to avoid it, to exert every effort that we possibly can to avert a global war, with all of the horrors which it would bring to us and to the whole world. That reflects the true and honest attitude of the press of the United States, and I cannot emphasize it too strongly to all of the delegates who are here assembled. The ambition of the press of the United States is to bring the war in Korea to an early and an honorable conclusion. The armament which we are engaging in at the present time is something that has been forced upon us, but I do not mean to infringe upon questions that properly belong in the Political Committee.

I merely want to repeat that the press of the United States is not a warmongering press, that it is sincerely devoted to the cause of peace and justice in the world.

Now, I should like to reserve my reply with reference to the statements of the delegate from the U.S.S.R. and others of the Soviet bloc with respect to the devotion of their periodicals and publications to the cause of peace, to the time when the resolution offered by the delegation from the Soviet Union is under consideration by this Committee.

Report of U.N. Command Operations in Korea

FORTY-EIGHTH REPORT: FOR THE PERIOD JUNE 16-30, 1952¹

U.N. doc.S/2789

Transmitted September 25, 1952

I herewith submit report number 48 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 16-30 June 1952, inclusive. United Nations Command communiqués numbers 1297-1311 provide detailed accounts of these operations.

The senior United Nations Command Delegate recessed the plenary armistice session twice during the period for three days each recess. The first recess covered the period from 18 through 20 June and the second from 27 through 30 June. These recesses were serious attempts to impress the Communists that the United Nations Command would not allow the Armistice Conferences to become an official outlet for their violent propaganda outbursts. In addition, it was hoped that the Communists would realize that the United Nations Command position on prisoners of war was reasonable, firm and final. The main Communist propaganda theme was their distorted version of the Geneva Convention.

In order to refute the illogical arguments and bitter propaganda attacks against the free world, there follow examples of statements made by the senior United Nations Command Delegate:

From the proceedings of 26 June:

I would like to refer to your remarks of yesterday and today regarding the actions of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in extending the right of self-determination to certain German and Hungarian soldiers during World War II. By some obscure form of logic which must surely be as incomprehensible to the world as it is to us of the United Nations Command Delegation sitting inside this tent, you have arrived at the conclusion that because the historical situations are dissimilar, the moral principles involved are dissimilar. You emphasize the point

¹ Transmitted to the Security Council by the representative of the U.S. to the U.N. on September 25. Texts of the 30th, 31st, and 32d reports appear in the BULLETIN of Feb. 18, 1952, p. 266; the 33d report, Mar. 10, 1952, p. 395; the 34th report, Mar. 17, 1952, p. 430; the 35th report, Mar. 31, 1952, p. 512; the 36th and 37th reports, Apr. 14, 1952, p. 594; the 38th report, May 5, 1952, p. 715; the 39th report, May 19, 1952, p. 788; the 40th report, June 23, 1952, p. 998; the 41st report, June 30, 1952, p. 1038; the 42d report, July 21, 1952, p. 114; the 43d report, Aug. 4, 1952, p. 194; the 44th report, Aug. 11, 1952, p. 231; the 45th report, Aug. 18, 1952, p. 272; the 46th report, Sept. 29, 1952, p. 495; and the 47th report, Oct. 27, 1952, p. 668.

that the actions we cited were those of "a victorious army demanding the surrender of a losing army during hostilities." Is it your contention, then, that under one set of circumstances a nation may adopt a certain code of national morality and that under the other circumstances an entirely different standard is acceptable? Is it your proposition that a nation should provide itself with an adjustable scale of decency—that it is wholly justified in being humane at one time and barbarous at another? If this is not the true meaning of your reply, what do you mean? Or is it possible that you are condemning the Soviet declarations?

As though any statement you make must be accepted as true merely because you make it, you blandly state that the examples we cited are out of context, are out of place, and have no bearing on the subject of our present discussions. You cannot dismiss evidence so easily. Any person reading the historical facts which we provided you cannot help but be aware that they are both specific and substantial. Their meaning is too evident to be at variance with any other portions of the declarations of which they are a part. Your attempts to defend yourselves against those uncomfortable facts would be ludicrous were our present business not so vitally concerned with human suffering and tragedy.

If you intend ultimately to agree to an armistice, your present attitude rejecting our proposal of 28 April² is a hopeless procedure in which you waste your time and continue to suffer the damages of war.

From the proceedings of 25 June:

Today, on the second anniversary of your treacherous attack against the Republic of Korea, we are meeting here in an effort to conclude a just and honorable armistice and put an end to this bloody conflict.

On 28 April, the United Nations Command presented to you a compromise proposal capable of resolving our remaining differences. This proposal is fair and reasonable. It represents major concessions on the part of the United Nations Command and is our ultimate negotiatory effort. However, after nearly two months you persist in your refusal to accept our humane proposal which would lead to peace for this war-torn peninsula. You insist that the United Nations Command ignore a fundamental human right and deliver prisoners of war to you by force. That we will never do. Your stand on this issue is a willful perversion of the humanitarian aims of the Geneva Convention. You completely ignore the basic purpose and intent of a document which was designed to delineate and protect the rights of prisoners of war.

You stand alone in your malevolent misinterpretation of the Geneva Convention. You even disagree publicly with the stated policy of the country from which you

² For text, see BULLETIN of Aug. 18, 1952, p. 272.

adopted your political and social ideology. On 21 June we documented for you the historical precedent set by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in offering in 1943 the right of self-determination to German and Hungarian soldiers. We also documented for you the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic's official endorsement of this policy in 1951.

The United Nations Command has presented you with a fair, reasonable, and humanitarian proposal to end hostilities in Korea entirely in accord with the aims of the Geneva Convention. Unless you are guided by ulterior motives, unless you have no desire for peace and are completely lacking in good faith, you will accept that proposal. I suggest that we recess to permit you to reconsider your position.

On 15 June, the United Nations Command requested the Communists to furnish information on the location of unmarked prisoner of war camps. On 17 June, the Communists answered by indicating that Camp No. 11 had been abolished and its prisoners incorporated into other prisoner of war camps. In addition, the Communists stated that all their prisoner of war camps have been provided with clear markings. This claim by the Communists could not be substantiated by detailed and careful aerial reconnaissance and photography, which revealed that Camps numbered 2, 6, 9 and 10 were not marked.

As the operation for segregating the Communist prisoners of war into smaller, newly constructed compounds continued, it became increasingly apparent that the United Nations Command would be successful in re-establishing internal order within its prisoner of war camps.

By 20 June, over 70,000 prisoners were affected in the move to the new compounds. Incidents were few and minor. The orders of the camp authorities were promptly obeyed. Among those moved were approximately 47,000 prisoners who were formerly in compounds where the mutinous and violent attitudes of the Communist prisoners of war leaders prevented interviewing of the prisoners of war. In order to determine a round number for submission to the Communists, the United Nations Command had previously made an estimate of the number in this group who could be repatriated to Communist control. This estimated number was added to the results obtained in those compounds where the prisoners of war were actually interviewed. The sum was a round number of 70,000 individuals which was submitted to the Communists as our estimate. This was an approximation and we were always prepared to repatriate any larger number resulting from more complete information. Accordingly, it was decided to complete the screening of the unscreened prisoners of war and civilian internees. The reasons for doing this were twofold: first, to segregate the Communists from the anti-Communists in order to reduce the incidents which had always occurred when individuals of these opposite political beliefs lived in the same compounds together. The second reason was to obtain an accurate figure of those whom the United Nations Command could offer in the Armistice Negotiations to repatriate to the Communists.

The final phase of the screening operation began on 23 June and was completed 27 June. The same procedure was employed in this operation as was used in the previous screening called Operation SCATTER. Again, careful steps were taken to insure that there was no forced

screening of individuals. The entire operation was completed without incident. The press of many nations witnessed the operation. Based on the results of the completed screening an accurate figure of those to be repatriated to the Communists is being prepared. This completion of screening in no way alters the United Nations Command offer to the Communists for a re-screening of those who indicated that they would forcibly resist repatriation.

In line with its previously stated position that loyal civilian internees would be released as soon as circumstances permitted, the United Nations Command directed the release of approximately 27,000 of the Republic of Korea civilian internees now being held in protective custody. The release of these civilians began on 29 June and will be effected over a period of several weeks. These civilians are residents of the Republic of Korea who have been taken into protective custody by the United Nations Command during the fighting in Korea. As nationals of the Republic of Korea, their disposition is an internal affair of that government. Their names were not included in the lists of prisoners of war exchanged by the armistice delegations at Pannunjom on 18 December 1951. Included among them are some who had been impressed into the service of the North Korean Peoples Army when its forces were overrunning the Republic of Korea and who had served the enemy forces prior to being taken into custody. Others had been taken into custody as security risks even though not identified with the armed forces of the enemy.

The enemy's common practice of wearing civilian clothes for the purpose of infiltrating our front lines during the early days of the Korean war resulted in the detention of many innocent civilians. Release of these civilian internees has been delayed because of the difficulty of performing dependable screening and investigation to determine that they are, in fact, loyal Republic of Korea citizens. A thorough and complete loyalty check—a precaution fully justified by later developments—has now been effected. The civilians will be returned to their areas of residence in all provinces of the Republic of Korea including Kyongsang Namdo, Kyongsang Pukto, Cholla Namdo, Cholla Pukto, Chunchong Namdo, Chungchong Pukto, Kyonggi-do and Kwangwan-do. Each released civilian will be given a thirty-day supply of rations, a shirt, a blanket, a pair of trousers, underwear, shoes, two pairs of socks, a hat or cap, and overcoat.

During the mass evacuation of civilians which took place in the early days of the Korean conflict, the United Nations Command had no civil assistance organization. In the absence of such an organization, many wounded civilians were evacuated through military channels in order that they might be provided medical attention. They are included among those to be released. The medical facilities of Enclosure 10 at Pusan will be available for the continued hospitalization of civilians under medical treatment pending their final release.

Also included among the civilians to be released are many young children who in most cases were taken into custody along with their parents in order to avoid separating families. These are being cared for by the United Nations Command as war victims. The United Nations

Civil Assistance Command for Korea (UNCACK) is assisting in the return of these civilians to their home areas. The move is expected to assist the economy at a time when maximum manpower is needed to work the farms and assist in reviving industry in the Republic of Korea.

On the ground the enemy continued to react vigorously to United Nations Command offensive operations and patrolling. The heaviest fighting occurred on the western front where the enemy launched attacks of up to regimental strength against newly won United Nations Command outpost positions. These attacks were supported by artillery fire of unprecedented volume.

On the western front the enemy made a determined bid to regain outpost positions lost early in June. Action was heaviest in the Mabang area where two battalion strength attacks were mounted on successive days. The first enemy battalion attack south of Mabang was repulsed after a five-hour fire fight leaving United Nations Command elements in possession of their recently won positions. The second attack, supported by tank or self-propelled gun fire, was turned back after only twenty minutes of fighting during the early morning hours of 17 June. This series of attacks culminated in a regimental strength attack during the night of 20/21 June supported by the heaviest enemy artillery concentrations of the war. Over 10,000 rounds of artillery fire fell on forward elements of a United Nations Command division. The attack was repulsed without loss of United Nations Command-held territory after a six-hour fight. The enemy lost ground in the Mabang area again on 26 June when a United Nations Command attack forced an estimated enemy battalion from high ground southwest of Mabang after eight hours of stubborn enemy resistance. This outpost repulsed three battalion-size attacks during the hours of darkness 27-28 June. Elsewhere on the western front the enemy was kept off balance by several small-scale limited objective attacks by United Nations Command elements.

Enemy action along the central and eastern fronts was characterized by scattered probes and strong resistance to continuous United Nations Command patrolling. An exception was the vicinity of Kumsong where, on 18 June, the enemy began a series of six attacks ranging from company to battalion strength in an unsuccessful attempt to recapture commanding terrain southeast of Kumsong. Heavy fighting continued until the afternoon of 19 June without the loss of any United Nations Command position. Again on 21 June two enemy companies supported by heavy mortar and artillery fire attacked a United Nations Command outpost in the same area without success.

In friendly rear areas no significant change occurred in the level of guerrilla activity. Upwards of 150 guerrillas attacked and destroyed a South Korean train twenty miles north of Kwangju on the evening of 24 June. United Nations Command security forces continued their pursuit of dissident elements whose sporadic bandit-type attacks have, for the most part, been confined to small raids on villages or farms in search of food and supplies.

At no time during the period was any major change in enemy troop dispositions or front lines noted. Although the enemy continued to improve his combat capabilities, there is no evidence as to when he may initiate a major offensive.

On the night of 6-7 June, critical and strongly held terrain features in the sector of the 45th Infantry Division were captured and held against numerous strong enemy counter-attacks for the next fifteen days. During the several engagements it is estimated that the enemy suffered over 3,500 casualties.

From 12 June thru 27 June, when strongly defended enemy positions in the sector of the 6th Republic of Korea Division were captured, these positions were held against strong enemy attacks in superior numbers. The results included 207 confirmed enemy dead and ten prisoners of war.

United Nations Command fast carriers in the Sea of Japan operated against North Korean transportation facilities and supply routes. Attacks by jet and propeller driven aircraft were concentrated on targets along the Korean east coast. Rail lines were cut in numerous places and many installations and quantities of matériel were destroyed and damaged including the following: power plants, railway bridges, highway bridges, rail cars, supply dumps, military buildings, troop barracks, trucks and AA guns.

Rescue operations were conducted in the face of heavy ground fire and proved costly. A United Nations Command air force helicopter attempting to rescue a downed United Nations naval pilot, picked up the downed pilot but was shot down by anti-aircraft fire en route to safety. A second United Nations Command air force rescue helicopter, returning to its base to lighten the craft of a crewman, crashed on landing and was destroyed. Meanwhile a United Nations Command air force aircraft flying rescue counter air patrol over the downed pilot was hit by anti-aircraft fire and crashed. Other rescue aircraft later observed the first helicopter crew and the naval pilot being captured. Two days later a United Nations Command naval helicopter rushed to pick up a United Nations Command air force pilot who had bailed out of his jet aircraft near the east coast of Korea. Despite enemy opposition the helicopter crew recovered the pilot's body and returned to its base.

United Nations Command aircraft carriers continued to operate in the Yellow Sea as their planes furnished cover and air spot for the surface units on blockade patrols and anti-invasion stations. They also flew reconnaissance missions and offensive strikes as far north as Hanchon into the Chinnampo area, the Hwanghae Province and in close support of the front line troops. The bulk of the damage inflicted was on military structures. Six major transformer stations on the Hwanghae Peninsula were destroyed and one damaged as part of the effort against enemy power installations. Additional destruction and damage included numerous supplies, bridges, gun positions, warehouses, boats, oxcarts and pack animals.

United Nations Command naval aircraft based ashore in Korea flew in support of the interdiction programme and the front line units. These aircraft destroyed bunkers, mortar and gun positions, tanks, personnel and supply shelters, trucks, and military buildings. Rails were cut in many places and numerous enemy casualties were inflicted.

Patrol planes based in Japan conducted daylight reconnaissance missions over the Sea of Japan, the Yellow Sea

and the Tsushima Straits. They also flew day and night anti-submarine patrols and weather reconnaissance missions for surface units in the Japan and Yellow Seas.

The naval blockade continued along the Korean east coast from the bomblines to Chongjin, with surface units making day and night coastal patrols firing on key rail targets along the coastal main supply route daily to maintain rail cuts, bridge cuts, and blocked tunnels at these several specific points. The siege by surface vessels continued at the major ports of Wonsan, Hungnam, and Songjin, subjecting the enemy forces at these ports to day and night destructive, harassing and interdiction fire.

Fog along the east coast at Wonsan and to the north hampered spotting aircraft, shore fire control parties, and the firing vessels themselves. Destruction reported included enemy casualties, military buildings, boats, rail cars, rail bridges, warehouses, guns, bunkers, and locomotives. Rails were cut in several places.

Fire support vessels at the bomblines provided gun fire on call for the front line troops. Destruction and damage included bunkers, military buildings, gun and mortar positions and warehouses.

Enemy shore batteries were active almost daily against the blockading vessels and minesweepers all along the coast. In many instances friendly units were straddled but no hits or casualties were reported. In each instance the battery was taken under counter fire with many guns destroyed and damaged.

Minesweepers operating close inshore received machine gun and small arms fire. There were no reports of damage or casualties.

On the Korean west coast, the United Nations Command surface units manned anti-invasion stations along the coast from Chinnampo to the Han River Estuary, in support of the friendly islands north of the battle line. Daylight firing into enemy positions started many fires and caused secondary explosions, inflicted many enemy casualties and destroyed numerous military structures. Three friendly guerrilla raids were carried out with the support of surface and air units resulting in 239 enemy casualties and the capture of five prisoners.

Vessels of the Republic of Korea Navy conducted close inshore patrols and blockade along both coasts and assisted United Nations Command forces in minesweeping duties.

United Nations Command minesweepers continued operations to keep the channels, gunfire support areas, and anchorages free of mines of all types. Sweepers also enlarged areas and swept close inshore as needed by the operating forces.

United Nations Command naval auxiliary vessels, Military Sea Transportation Service, and merchant vessels under contract provided personnel lifts and logistic support for the United Nations naval, air and ground forces in Japan and Korea.

United Nations Command air activity was highlighted by the joint air force-naval attack on thirteen vital hydroelectric installations in North Korea on 23 and 24 June. This represented the largest combined aerial operation since the beginning of the conflict in Korea. Combined attacks were made against the Suiho power plant and three other plants in the Kongosan complex. Each force attacked six other power plants each in co-ordinated attacks.

Sufficient information was available to the United Nations Command to indicate that these power plants were providing direct support to the Communists' military effort. The generated power was being used in the manufacture and repair of military equipment and explosives. These attacks, based on military considerations alone and conducted against legitimate military targets, were designed to deny the power plants as a source of power for support of the Communist operations in Korea.

On 23 June simultaneous strikes were conducted against the power plants at Suiho, Chosen and Fusen. The Suiho installation on the Yalu River is the largest power plant in Far Eastern Communist territory and is reputedly the fourth largest in the world. The power house was destroyed, transformer and generator units were hit and fires were started in many buildings.

Although the Suiho attack was conducted within sight of large Communist air bases, none of the enemy MIG aircraft based thereon rose to challenge the United Nations Command aircraft. United Nations Command air force interceptors provided protective cover throughout the attack, patrolling to the south and east of the Yalu River. Two MIGs were observed taking off from a Communist base in Manchuria but they landed almost immediately without leaving their sanctuary.

On the other side of the Korean Peninsula the hydroelectric complexes at Fusen, Chosen and Kyonsen were targets for closely co-ordinated and precisely timed attacks of fighter bombers of the United Nations Command air and naval forces. Large explosions and fires were observed in all target areas. Surge tanks were ruptured or completely destroyed and other equipment was damaged beyond repair.

On 24 June, the United Nations Command aircraft returned to the three eastern complexes at Chosen, Fusen and Kyonsen to compound the damage done on the previous day. All pilots returned to their bases safely and only minor damage from anti-aircraft fire was reported. On 26 June the Chosen and Fusen plants were again attacked, resulting in further destruction and damage.

Although the medium bomber effort was held in readiness for attacks on the hydroelectric targets, the effort was diverted to close support and other targets since the fighter attacks were so successful. Evidence of the destruction wrought by the fighter attacks is indicated by the fact that of the thirteen power plants attacked, all are without doubt unserviceable with the exception of Chosen No. One, which is probably unserviceable.

United Nations Command air force medium bombers continued to attack rail bridges on the Kunuri-Kanggye line, tearing out spans and approaches. The largest attack took place on 19/20 June when the medium bombers struck the rail bridge at Myongmudong. Rail traffic between Sinanju and Sintuju was blocked by attacks on the Mumudong Bridge and the Kogunygong Crossing. Night operations in close support of the ground forces were greatly increased with excellent results being obtained. These included the largest close support operation by medium bombers since early in the war.

United Nations Command air force interceptors patrolled the northwest areas of Korea whenever the weather permitted, but were able to locate enemy fighters

on only seven days. Although the number of enemy sorties observed was not the lowest yet recorded, the trend toward a decrease in daytime sorties continued as in the past ten weeks.

On 20 June the interceptors caught six enemy LA-9 aircraft on the Korean side of the Yalu River, destroying two and damaging two more. The interceptor pilots also destroyed four MIGs, probably destroying one other.

United Nations Command pilots reported observing ninety-one enemy night fighter sorties. This is the largest number in any comparable period since the start of hostilities. United Nations Command air force night operations continued in force, however, and no friendly aircraft were lost to the Communist night interceptor planes.

Continuing the trend which began early in June, United Nations Command fighter bombers markedly increased their effort on missions designed to inflict the maximum destruction against the enemy's vehicles, rolling stock, supplies and military personnel. These missions consisted of close support along the homeline, general support within one hundred miles to the rear of the enemy lines, and interdiction attacks deep in enemy territory.

Night intruder aircraft made regular attacks on rail rolling stock and vehicles and reported numerous enemy motor transports destroyed. Continuing the policy of furnishing additional close support for United Nations Command ground forces, the light bombers attacked many targets in the frontline area. The aircraft were aided by ground-controlled radar units and often bombed through overcasts to destroy targets which were reported by the ground units.

Transport aircraft performed regular cargo lift, hauling supplies and equipment to Korea and conducted air resupply missions over certain installations. The cargo aircraft returning from Korea to Japan carried wounded troops and personnel being rotated.

Reconnaissance units continued to conduct photo reconnaissance along the enemy main line of resistance, rear troop and supply locations, main supply routes, airfields, and communications centres, obtaining bomb damage assessment and surveillance photography of these targets, as well as performing surveillance and bomb damage assessment on the North Korean hydroelectric plants.

United Nations Command leaflets, radio broadcasts, and loudspeaker broadcasts gave especial attention to the second anniversary of the brutal Communist assault against the Republic of Korea. These media recounted the circumstances of the unprovoked Communist attack on the Korean people, and reviewed the documentary proof which showed how the Communists had planned their aggression far in advance. The United Nations Command leaflets and broadcasts then recapitulated the events which followed the Communist invasion: the swift answer of the free nations to the Korean Government's request for assistance; the firm consolidation of world-wide popular support behind the forces resisting Communist aggression; the eventual repulse, defeat, and rout of the aggressor forces; and the prolongation of the war by the Chinese Communist invasion of Korea and the Communist obstruction of armistice negotiations.

In the sweep of the North Korean invading army in

1950 to the Pusan perimeter the invaders stripped bare all hospitals and dispensaries; doctors and nurses were kidnapped and carried away into North Korea. In addition to these inroads by the enemy medical facilities and services, the Republic of Korea Army, of necessity, utilized practically all hospitals and many public buildings equipped as emergency hospitals during the first year of the war. Doctors were drafted to serve in the hospitals of the Republic of Korea Army.

Emergency shipments of materials were made from Japan and the United States, principally by air transports, of substantial quantities of drugs, vaccines, serums, antibiotic preparations, and human blood plasma, together with surgical dressings, surgical equipment, and insecticides with insect-control equipment. Quantities of medical supplies for treatment of malaria were made available from United Nation member nations, with additional large quantities from United States Army supplies and procurement, so that at present there is on hand sufficient atabrine to meet the needs in Korea for many years to come. Sulfonamides and antibiotic drugs specifically indicated for the treatment of acute gastro-intestinal infections have been and are continuing to be supplied to meet any emergency in Korea. Serums for treatment of tetanus and diphtheria were supplied in large quantities and used whenever and wherever required. Ample supplies of insecticides, larvicides, spraying and dusting equipment, and water purification chemicals and equipment were expeditiously supplied to control and destroy insect vectors in transmission of communicable diseases and to destroy pathologic organisms in water supply systems.

Public health medical facilities have grown from emergency front line military first aid and evacuation stations to a current programme of 491 dispensaries and ninety-seven hospitals having 9,200 bed spaces. As early as April 1951 there were 283 dispensaries and seventy-one hospitals. Present daily "in patient" load approximates 6,000, monthly "out patient" load approximates 910,000. Four and one-half million patients have been treated since 1 January 1952. In addition, there is one mobile hospital (forty bed capacity) for civilians in each United States combat corps area and one civilian dispensary in each United States division area.

In 1950 the United Nations Command devised a basic medical unit assembly consisting of medical equipment and hospital supplies basically for a forty bed hospital with an initial one-month supply of drugs and other expendable medical items. Dictated by experience in the field, both the basic medical and the hospital unit assembly were changed in Fiscal Year 1952 to meet the particular conditions encountered in Korea. It was found expedient to supply additional canvas cots with each hospital unit to expand the bed capacity two or three times. Equipment and supplies for X-ray diagnosis of internal injuries and fractures were furnished to rehabilitate X-ray service in hospitals. In addition, equipment and supplies to establish nation-wide diagnostic laboratory service for civilians were furnished by the United Nations Command.

Supplies and equipment for 500 small medical teams were distributed throughout Korea in the early part of

1952. These medical teams, located in now urban areas, do the bulk of the medical relief work and immunization in Korea. They were furnished additional expendable supplies from the basic medical unit assembly. Sulfone drugs were made available to institutions for the treatment of 12,000 lepers. Similarly, sufficient streptomycin and para-aminosalicylic acid were furnished for specific treatment to 2,000 tubercular cases in institutions.

Problems of sanitation and medical care were attacked with such success that no large scale epidemics of insect-borne or filth diseases have occurred in South Korea. Moreover, the record of immunizations is remarkable. Sixty-seven per cent of the Korean population were immunized against typhus by Korean nurses and medical teams working in hospitals, dispensaries, and mobile units during the period February thru August 1951; eighty-seven per cent were immunized against typhoid and seventy per cent against smallpox during the same period. As of 1 June 1951, seventy-nine per cent of the population of the port cities had been immunized against cholera. In

addition seventy-five per cent of the population had been dusted with DDT as of 30 September 1951. Latest information indicates that during the first four and one-half months of 1952 deaths from typhoid have averaged only twenty-two per month, as compared with 1,669 per month in 1951; from smallpox thirty-seven per month, as compared with 1,032 per month in 1951; and typhus eighteen per month, as compared with 433 per month in 1951. No cases of cholera have occurred during 1952.

The immunization vaccine programmes since hostilities began have utilized twenty-nine million cc. for typhus; thirty-six million cc. for smallpox; thirty-seven million cc. for typhoid; ten million cc. for cholera. Sanitation supplies furnished to date are as follows: ten per cent DDT—4,000,000 pounds; seventy-five per cent DDT—264,455; one hundred per cent DDT—80,000 pounds; five per cent liquid DDT—280,500 gallons; chlorine liquid—132 liquid tons; calcium hypochlorite—161,000 pounds; and boosters—12,500 each; creosol—520 boxes; sprayers—6,153 each; and chlorinators—forty-six each.

The United States in the United Nations

[November 3-7]

Security Council

Dr. T. F. Tsiang, representative of the Republic of China, opened the Nov. 6 meeting in his capacity as president for the month of September. The Soviet representative, Valerian Zorin, immediately challenged his right to the presidency on the grounds that he "does not represent China" and that his "presence in the Security Council is illegal. China can only be represented in the United Nations by a person appointed by the legal Government of China—the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China." Dr. Tsiang replied:

This point of order was raised a year ago when I in my turn became the President of the Security Council. I ruled then that it was out of order. Its repetition does not make it any more correct than on the previous occasion. I again say that it is out of order.

Kashmir dispute—The U.S. and the U.K. on November 6 introduced a resolution urging that India and Pakistan begin negotiations in New York immediately to work out a specific agreement on demilitarization of their forces in Kashmir. The resolution recommended that the forces on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line number 3,000 to 6,000 and on the Indian side of the cease-fire line number 12,000 to 18,000, as suggested by Frank P. Graham, the U.N. representative for India and Pakistan, on July 16, 1952. Both sides would report back to the Council on the progress

of their negotiations within 30 days after adoption of the resolution.

Following are excerpts from the statement of Sir Gladwyn Jebb (U.K.), who opened the debate:

In a world beset by so many intractable and seemingly insoluble problems, this particular one has always seemed to be eminently susceptible to settlement by reasoned negotiations and compromise. I am sure that my colleagues on the Security Council will agree with me on one thing: that it is the plain duty of the Council to use its best endeavours to promote such a settlement.

The parties have agreed—and they have many times reaffirmed their agreement—to decide the future accession of the State by means of a free and impartial plebiscite to be held under the auspices of the United Nations. And I repeat that: "under the auspices of the United Nations." Can the United Nations, therefore, do other than continue to strive to create the conditions in which this plebiscite may be held? Indeed, the danger, which we all have reason to fear might arise, to the peaceful relations of the peoples of India and Pakistan if this question were to be shelved by the United Nations is enough to persuade us that there can be—or there should be—no relaxation of effort on our part to bring about a settlement.

In the first place, as we understand it, it has been agreed by the two Governments that demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir should be effected in a single continuous process. We, for our part, have always felt that this would be more logical and, indeed, more suitable than for the demilitarization to be done in two separate operations, as provided for in the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949. We therefore welcome the acceptance by the parties of Dr. Graham's proposal on this point.

It has also been agreed that on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally resident in the State will have been with-

drawn by the end of the period of demilitarization. In fact, we understand that this has long been the case. Nevertheless, we welcome also this restatement of agreement by the two parties.

We understand that they are further agreed that the Pakistan regular army units should be withdrawn from the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line and that on the Indian side of the cease-fire line the bulk of the Indian and State armed forces should likewise be withdrawn. These are the steps which the two Governments concerned have agreed on as the method of reducing the military forces in the State to whatever final figures they may determine between them.

Dr. Graham has also reported that they have accepted his proposal that demilitarization should be conducted in such a way as to involve no threat to the cease-fire agreement either during or after the demilitarization period. This seems to us at any rate to be of great significance. If it is taken as a criterion in deciding the stages by which the extent to which the military forces on each side of the cease-fire line should be reduced, it should provide a way of resolving at least the major differences of view that may exist between the two Governments. We believe that Dr. Graham, in suggesting the limits within which the final number of armed forces on each side of the cease-fire line should be fixed, was guided by this principle.

If the two Governments could now decide on a final figure for the strength of their armed forces within the limits suggested by Dr. Graham and, indeed, within the limits which we have incorporated into our draft resolution, they can, we think, assure themselves that, in spite of a considerable reduction in the strength of the armed forces on each side of the cease-fire line, this reduction will, at any rate, involve no threat to the integrity or to the security of the territory on either side.

Therefore, it is our view that, within these limits, final figures for the strength of the armed forces on each side of the cease-fire line can and should be determined; that within these limits figures could be agreed upon which would enable a free and impartial plebiscite to be arranged—and this must, in our view, be the first and principal consideration—and which would at the same time take into account the need to safeguard law and order, the integrity of the cease-fire line and the security of the territory on each side of that line.

In the draft resolution which the United Kingdom and the United States have placed before the Council, attention is sought to be concentrated on this one question, namely, of determining finally the figures to which the armed forces on both sides of the cease-fire line are to be reduced. It will be seen that the suggestion contained in the draft resolution is that the two Governments should negotiate directly with each other to this end. We would hope that Dr. Graham will be ready to assist the two parties in any way they may indicate, and we have framed the draft resolution so as to provide for this possibility. We would hope, however, that the Council will agree that at this moment the primary responsibility for working out an agreement should lie with the two Governments themselves. The United Kingdom Government, therefore, would earnestly hope that the Governments of India and Pakistan would each appoint representatives with adequate powers to enable them to negotiate a final agreement on demilitarization. In the draft resolution we have suggested that these negotiations should take place in New York. This seems likely to be the most convenient arrangement since, after all, while the General Assembly is in session, the ministers and representatives of the two Governments who will be concerned with the negotiations are in addition likely to be engaged with the work of the General Assembly.

It will also be seen that the draft resolution requests the two Governments to inform the Security Council of the results of their negotiations within a period of thirty days. In view of the urgency of a solution and the narrow gap, as we think, to which the differences between the two parties seem to have been brought, the sponsors

U.S.—U.K. Draft Resolution on Kashmir

U.N. doc. S/2839 dated Nov. 5, 1952

The Security Council

RECALLING its resolutions of 30 March 1951, 30 April 1951, and 10 November 1951:

FURTHER RECALLING the provisions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 which were accepted by the Governments of India and Pakistan and which provided that the question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan will be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations;

HAVING RECEIVED the Third Report dated 22 April 1952 and the Fourth Report dated 16 September 1952 of the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan:

ENDORSES the general principles on which the United Nations Representative has sought to bring about agreement between the Governments of India and Pakistan;

NOTES with gratification that the United Nations Representative has reported that the Governments of India and Pakistan have accepted all but two of the paragraphs of his twelve point proposals;

NOTES that agreement on a plan of demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir has not been reached because the Governments of India and Pakistan have not agreed on the whole of paragraph 7 of the twelve point proposals;

URGES the Governments of India and Pakistan to enter into immediate negotiations at the Headquarters of the United Nations in order to reach agreement on the specific number of forces to remain on each side of the cease fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization, this number to be between 3,000 and 6,000 armed forces remaining on the Pakistan side of the cease fire line and between 12,000 and 18,000 armed forces remaining on the India side of the cease fire line, as suggested by the United Nations Representative in his proposals of 16 July 1952 (Annex III of S/2783) such specific numbers to be arrived at bearing in mind the principles of criteria contained in paragraph 7 of the United Nations Representative's proposal of 4 September 1952 (Annex VIII of S/2783):

RECOMENDS its gratitude to the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan for the great efforts which he has made to achieve a settlement and REQUESTS him to continue to make his services available to the Governments of India and Pakistan to this end;

REQUESTS the Governments of India and Pakistan to report to the Security Council not later than thirty days from the date of the adoption of this resolution; and further requests the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan to keep the Security Council informed of any progress.

of the draft resolution believe that members of the Council will think it desirable that a further report should be placed before them within the period which we have indicated in the draft resolution.

Once agreement is reached on the level of the armed forces at the end of demilitarization, surely it will be but a short step for representatives of the two Governments, sitting in joint session with military experts, of course, to draw up a detailed programme of disbandment and withdrawal.

The two Governments have already agreed that such a programme should be carried through within ninety days from the date of its signature by them. Within a matter

of mouths, therefore, we might hope to see the forces in Kashmir reduced to the level at which a fair and impartial plebiscite could take place. Within a matter of months we might hope to see the plebiscite administrator formally appointed and established inside Kashmir to begin the final task of preparing for the voting to take place.

So near are we to a solution—or so it seems to us—of this difficult and dangerous problem which has so long exercised our minds and unsettled and weakened an extensive and vitally important region of the world; so near are we to a solution if only the spirit of compromise and the determination of both parties to achieve a settlement can be brought to grapple with the outstanding differences between them.

The sponsors of this draft resolution hope that there will be no tendency on the part of either of the two Governments to go behind the agreements enshrined in the two agreed resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. These resolutions, as we think, contain all the elements of a settlement. Reinforced and amplified as they are by the agreements of the two Governments to all but 2 of Dr. Graham's 12 proposals, they provide the Security Council and the parties with a framework on which to build, and they also provide certain agreed principles according to which that building should be done.

The ultimate objective of a fair and impartial plebiscite under the auspices of the United Nations has, after all, been written into solemn agreements by the two Governments and endorsed by this Security Council. These agreements have been affirmed and reaffirmed by the two Governments many times during the last three and a half years. The transformation of this agreement into the reality of the actual voting ought not to present insuperable difficulties. We have recently seen the tremendous achievement—if I may say so, with respect—of the Government of India in organizing and carrying through a fully democratic election throughout its vast territory. From this great example it is clear that the will of the people of Kashmir and Jammu in this question of accession could be ascertained without any insuperable difficulty.

Is it therefore too much to hope that the two Governments can now resolve their differences and show by example how the precepts which the United Nations frequently affirms can be put into practical effect and made the instrument of a political settlement which would not only satisfy the aspirations of the people of Jammu and Kashmir but would also add greatly, as we all know, to the happiness, prosperity and security of peoples throughout the free world?

General Assembly

Refugee Relief Plan Adopted—On November 6 the Assembly adopted by a vote of 48-0-6 (Soviet bloc, Iraq) the plan recommended by Committee III for continuing aid to the Palestine refugees (see BULLETIN of Nov. 10, p. 756).

Japan Admitted to ICAO—At the same session the Assembly approved Japan's application for membership in the U.N. International Civil Aviation Organization. The vote was 53-0-6 (Soviet bloc, Philippines).

Peace Observation Commission—The Assembly reapointed for 1953 and 1954 the members of the 2-year-old U.N. Peace Observation Commission (China, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Iraq, Israel, New Zealand, Pakistan, Sweden, U.S.S.R., U.K., U.S., and Uruguay).

U.N. Staff—Secretary-General Trygve Lie on

Nov. 7 announced the appointment of William De Witt Mitchell of the United States, Sir Edwin Herbert of the United Kingdom, and Paul Veldekens of Belgium to advise him on questions arising from the refusal of certain U.N. employees to answer questions concerning possible Communist activities put to them by a subcommittee of the Senate Internal Security Committee. The three will try to resolve "certain issues of law and policy regarding the conduct required of international civil service."

Ad Hoc Political Committee—The Committee on Nov. 3 began consideration of the question of the treatment of people of Indian origin in the Union of South Africa.

Mrs. Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit (India) introduced on behalf of her delegation, and 13 other delegations, a draft resolution calling for the establishment of a three-member United Nations Good Offices Commission, "with a view to arranging and assisting in negotiations between the Government of the Union of South Africa and the Governments of India and Pakistan in order that a satisfactory solution of the question in accordance with the principles and purposes of the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights may be achieved."

Pending solution of the negotiations, the Government of the Union of South Africa would be asked to suspend the enforcement of the provisions of the Group Areas Act, a controversial legislative act referred to in previous General Assembly resolutions on this subject.

The Good Offices Commission would be asked to report to the next session of the Assembly and the item would be retained on the agenda.

G. P. Jooste (Union of South Africa) stated his Government's continued adherence to the position that this matter was one falling within its domestic jurisdiction and that therefore the Assembly was debarred by the terms of Article 2 (7) "from concerning itself with it in any way whatsoever."

Mr. Jooste said that under such circumstances the South African Government "cannot be required, legally and therefore legitimately, to give effect to the Assembly resolution on this matter, however well intentioned or however frequently repeated." These resolutions, he added, were mostly conceived "in a spirit of condemnation."

Speaking on Nov. 5, Charles A. Sprague (U.S.) indicated this country's support for a Good Offices Commission. He emphasized that its objective must be to bring together the parties to the dispute for the purpose of working out a mutually satisfactory solution.

Committee I (Political and Security)—Two draft resolutions on Korea were introduced Nov. 3. Peru proposed a commission to deal with the repatriation issue. Under Peru's plan, prisoners who were unwilling to return home after the cessation of hostilities would be placed under the

jurisdiction of the proposed commission, which would act as a "good offices committee" for all prisoners. Mexico circulated a resolution based on the proposal of President Miguel Alemán which was transmitted to the Secretary-General on Sept. 2.¹

There are now four resolutions relating to the Korean item before the Committee. Secretary Acheson introduced the first resolution, sponsored by 21 countries, on Oct. 24; the second was submitted on Oct. 29 by the U.S.S.R.

Committee II (Economic and Financial)—In the course of general debate on economic development of underdeveloped countries, the Committee on Nov. 6 heard a two-hour statement by Andrei Gromyko (U.S.S.R.) on the Soviet view as to the reasons for the lack of development in the areas under discussion. These countries were not masters of their own resources, he charged, but were controlled in many cases by foreign investors who reaped the profits. He attacked the U.S. for using underdeveloped areas as sources of strategic war materials, for devising the Point Four Program for nefarious purposes, and for selling exports at high prices while obtaining bargains in raw materials. No international organization could help underprivileged countries under present circumstances, he concluded.

Committee III (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural)—In the course of its consideration of freedom of information, the Committee, on November 3, rejected an amended U.S.S.R. draft resolution which, as originally drafted, sought to prevent the use of information media for any kind of propaganda in favor of aggression and war, racial discrimination, slanderous rumors, or false and distorted reports. The final roll-call vote by which the proposal as a whole was defeated was 21-19, with 12 abstentions. During the Committee's debate on the proposal on November 3, Charles A. Sprague (U.S.) attempted in a detailed statement "to expose the hypocrisy of the Soviet Union" in proposing this resolution. He said that "in order to condition the thinking of the Russian people the Soviet Government controlled the press and radio, restricted the entry of foreigners, and denied Soviet citizens freedom to travel abroad." He charged that "the calculated distortion and hate-mongering" against the U.S. in the Soviet press, which was "controlled down to the last comma," had reached an all-time low following the out-break of the Korean war. To support this contention, he quoted from the Soviet press and displayed Soviet cartoons.²

¹ BULLETIN of Nov. 3, 1952, p. 696.

² For texts of Mr. Sprague's previous statements on freedom of information, see p. 789.

Committee IV (Trusteeship)—Without a dissenting vote, the Committee on Nov. 3 approved a draft resolution on race discrimination in dependent territories. The resolution would have the General Assembly recommend to powers administering dependent territories:

- (1) Abolition of discriminatory laws.
- (2) Examination of all laws, and their application in the territories, to abolish discriminatory provisions and practices, "of a racial or religious character."
- (3) Examination of laws distinguishing between "citizens and non-citizens, primarily on racial or religious grounds."
- (4) Opening all public facilities to inhabitants of the territories, without race distinction.
- (5) Examination of laws providing "particular measures of protection for sections of the population" to see whether exemptions should be made.
- (6) All measures designed to improve "understanding among all pupils in all schools of the needs and problems of the community as a whole."

In a roll-call vote on the resolution as a whole, 46 nations voted in favor. France and India abstained and twelve countries were not present for the voting. The text as adopted represented a draft resolution proposed by the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories, as amended by Venezuela, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The U.S. amendment would refer the resolution to the Commission on Human Rights.

Committee V (Administrative and Budgetary)—On Nov. 4, 1953 appropriations as recommended by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions for the United Nations Office at Geneva (Section 20) were approved in the amount of \$4,306,800. The appropriation, subject to possible further supplementary estimates, was approved as a whole by a vote of 41 to 5 with 1 abstention, following a chapter-by-chapter examination.

The Committee also approved a U.S.S.R. motion requesting the Advisory Committee to make a comprehensive study of the work of the Geneva office with a view to submitting to the eighth session of the Assembly "practical recommendations for the efficient and economical use of the offices, staff and premises" in the light of any decisions the General Assembly may take on the future schedule of conferences. The U.S.S.R. proposal was approved by a vote of 45 to 1 with 1 abstention.

Other U.S.S.R. proposals to reduce appropriations for general services at Geneva by \$100,000 and for common staff costs for the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees by \$71,000 were rejected.

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†862	11/7	Forced labor in Soviet economy
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United States Commitments

PART II. THE NEW RESPONSIBILITIES

by Charles B. Marshall

Americans embraced the United Nations with the highest enthusiasm 7 years ago. They saw in it an opportunity to avoid repeating the default in the sequel to World War I, when we passed up participation in the League of Nations.

Some belief, derived from the habits of our historic past, in the availability of perfect solutions to problems also impelled the Americans to welcome the idea of an organization that would encompass the world and provide the framework for an enduring answer to the problem of peace.

Yet the United Nations was not intended to be, and could not be, the agency for solving the problems of the uncompleted peace. To have tried to make it a mechanism for creating the peace would have placed insupportable burdens on it. Its utility was to be in preserving peace once peace had been established.

This is not derogatory to the United Nations. It has not fulfilled the most optimistic expectations. Yet on balance, the world and especially our side in the great confrontation are much better served by having it than not having it.

The establishment of a new and complete framework of world peace and the fulfillment by the United Nations of its mission of preserving the peace once it was established depended on a unison among the Great Powers. That unison has not materialized. The reason for this is the waywardness of the Soviet Union and those in its camp.

In retrospect it seems unrealistic for anyone ever to have expected in the wake of the war that unanimity necessary for making and keeping peace through the universal channel.

Yet we must remember that collaboration of a sort had been established during the war between the western allies and the Soviet Union. They pursued efforts against a common enemy even if they were not quite common efforts. They had agreed at least on the rhetoric stating the aims for peace. The Russian defense of the homeland had

obscured for a time the inherent character of the regime. So there were reasons, even if misleading ones, for the high hopes.

The collaboration between the western allies and the Soviet Union was nothing like as close and systematic as that obtaining among the western allies, which came to common policies in all vital respects. It is easy to use the wisdom of hindsight and observe that the western coalition should have been kept intact as a necessity in the sequel to, as in the course of, hostilities. Yet it does no more good to criticize the policies of an earlier year in the light of the wisdom of a later one than for a man to sit in judgment upon his boyhood.

U.S. Policy Toward the U.S.S.R.

When abroad, and even back in the United States, I often hear the observations that the foreign policy of the United States is just the negative one of being anti-Soviet and that, except for the Soviet Union, the United States would not have the foreign policy which it does have.

These two contentions amount to about the same thing. I shall not dispute them.

To be negative about subversion is to be positive about upholding decency and order. To be negative about oppression is to be positive about free institutions. To be negative about reaction is to be positive about progress. To be negative about aggression is to be positive about security. So I do not regard it as a reproach to say that U.S. foreign policy is anti-Soviet. That is just an unclear way of identifying the things advocated by the United States as the things which the Soviet Union would destroy and the things which the Soviet Union would impose as the things which the United States would prevent.

I see little merit in trying to imagine what U.S. foreign policy would be in a world situation minus Soviet power and implacability, for these are two

cardinal factors of the world situation. The main question is what our policy is in response to the situation as it is, rather than what it would be if the situation were different.

Let us look at the critical points about the adversary's camp as an American sees them. I shall refer only to the general essences and not attempt a detailed description of the Soviet Union itself and its satellites in Europe and its Asian partner and the Asian satellites.

The first characteristic is the conspiratorial character of the rulership. As conspirators who achieved power and than have never dared risk their hold on it by any valid procedure of consent, they can only use oppression as an instrument of ruling. This requires a monopoly on the communication of ideas because they dare not suffer the emergence of any grouping capable of independent opinion.

This requires the envelopment of society and the closure of the boundaries, for any set of ideas coming in from abroad would inevitably be a challenge to the control which the rulers require.

This carries with it the identification of the small ruling elite with the state itself. It is more accurate to say that it is a conspiracy which uses the state as a screen, as a mask.

The dogma employed in its service focuses upon the elements of conflict as the norm of politics, emphasizing class war, subversion, and the like. It also purports to offer the believer certitude about the way of the future, a one-shot solution for everything, a simplification of every complexity into absolutes, a deceptive refuge from the contingent nature of life itself. The dogma fits supremely well the purposes of an unaccountable and tyrannous rule simply because it provides utopian irrelevance rather than the pertinent facts as a basis for rationalizing its actions.

This is the use of ideology in the strict sense in which Napoleon used the term—a set of theories designed to conceal political reality. By conspiratorial character and by ideology the regime is enabled to lead a double life—to act one way and proclaim another and to work in ceaseless and covert hostility even while engaging in the forms of legitimate relationship. One is reminded of lines from *Henry IV, Part 2*—

Upon my tongues continual slanders ride:
The which in every language I pronounce,
Stuffing the ears of men with false reports,
I speak of peace while covert enmity,
Under the smile of safety, wounds the world. . . .

Earlier I spoke of the evolving movement outward from Europe in past centuries and of the United States as perhaps the most successful product of that process. I want to emphasize the sharp contrast between the Soviet system and the evolving relationship of the overseas outposts and Western Europe.

The Soviet system began with a base taken over by conspiratorial communism from historic Russia—which had moved eastward through the Urals, across Siberia, and onto Central and Eastern Asia in the same period as the movement outward from Europe.

By conquest through military means and by the imposition of regimes national in outward form but morally the subjects of the Kremlin, this base was enormously aggrandized in World War II and its sequel. The scope and resource of the imperium were enormously expanded by the accession of control in China by a regime having common cause with the Kremlin.

This imperium, bearing now on North and Central Europe, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, and the Asian subcontinent, on Southeast Asia, on South Korea, Japan, and across the Polar Cap onto Canada and the United States, is served by auxiliary forces beyond its borders—political groups disguised as parties but in substance embryo governments responsive to the purposes of the Kremlin.

This arrangement for extending the span of control, yet always keeping it rigidly under the will of the central authority, seeks to do with greater effect and imagination what the misguided program of the Nazis tried to do—exercising a claim of allegiance and obedience over citizens and subjects of other states and trying to reverse the trend toward equality and freedom among the world's components and extend a central imperial dominion over areas of established independence.

There has been a lot of sterile argument whether the Kremlin has a design for world conquest. Certainly the ruling group there regards as its enemy everything not subject to its will. Certainly the existence anywhere in the world of a potential for effective action counter to its will is a challenge to the Kremlin. Certainly it must remove such challenge if it can. So the argument about a design, a schedule for conquest, is really beside the point. The Kremlin can accept the existence of other forces, other wills, only if they are too weak to be of account or if they are too strong to risk confronting. Wherever feebleness in morale or in the capabilities of resistance gives it the opportunity, it will impose its power directly or insinuate it through those who do its bidding.

Whether conquering by design or by inertia, a Soviet control first over Europe and then extended over the Eurasian land mass would establish a position of utmost danger to the United States and to the survival at home of the values set forth in its Constitution.

This brings us to the logic of the interdependence in the world of peoples who prefer to stand beyond the Kremlin span of control. The United States cannot be strong enough if the others fall. It cannot count on their retaining the morale and

the resources to stand in independence if they are weak. It cannot count on their generating sufficient strength without American help. So the security of the United States calls for a strong United States among strong friends. That is the simple logic behind the system of coalitions as we see the logic.

Strength, moreover, is not the product merely of military capability but derives also from political, economic, and social forces. The relation among the factors is one of multiplication and not of addition. Deficiency in any factor throws the whole equation out of balance. This means that an effective coalition in the modern sense must correlate all the factors of strength.

An awareness of all this, not dawning in one moment but emerging stage by stage in the experiences from 1945 onward, brought the United States to the necessity of creating the conditions for peace as best it could in the portions of the world with which it was still possible to enter into relationships based on mutual respect and comity.

The general precedent was already established in our minds in the inter-American structure.

The Monroe Doctrine, which we had developed in the era when we were a land power dependent on Britain for the securing of the oceans, came with the passage of time to be an obsolete framework for the security of the Americas.

The first steps in obsolescence were our emergence on the world stage as a sea power and the concomitant emergence of Latin America as an overseas cosmopolis playing a role in world affairs in its own right.

With the coming of air power the changes in the picture were further sharpened. Security in an air age requires the collaboration of friendly areas in positions of internal as well as external integrity. In an air age the security of the American Hemisphere came to require the free collaboration of the Latin Americans and could no longer be the function merely of the United States holding onto a few marginal bases.

This change, toward which events had developed over decades, was registered in the American consciousness with final clarity in World War II. It produced a declaration of mutual security subscribed to by the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics at Havana in 1940. It was further articulated in a declaration of the Foreign Ministers at Rio de Janeiro in 1942, soon after the coming of World War II to the American Continent. At Mexico City in 1945, in the waning months of hostilities, the Governments of the American Republics drew up a systematic regional arrangement for international peace and security in the American Hemisphere and recommended the conclusion of a treaty "to prevent and repel threats and acts of aggression against any of the countries of America." This last step was taken at a conference at Rio de Janeiro in the late summer of 1947, and the Rio Security Pact is now public law

in the American Hemisphere along with regional charters of international cooperation in all fields in the Organization of American States. Care was taken in the drawing up of the U.N. Charter to accommodate such regional arrangements, and the Rio Pact represents in essence an attempt to realize in one great area the purposes which the Charter stipulated for the world.

We must not exaggerate the merits of the conditions of the American Hemisphere. Democracy is still a goal rather than a reality in many of its parts. The component states of the American system are not in perfect unison in their purposes. South America is pulled, even if it is not riven, by rivalries; and by the inexorable principles of politics, the United States, being in a continent apart, serves as a balancer of these rivalries just as the United Kingdom historically served as a balancer of the power equations in respect to the European Continent.

In the main, the position looks sound and we can regard as a success the United States' first venture into an alliance since the passing arrangement with France during the American Revolution.

North Atlantic Arrangements

Let us look now to the North Atlantic arrangements in which Canada and the United States serve as the Western mainstays. Incidentally, in connection with the uniqueness of the American position in the world we should mention that the United States alone among all the countries has the privilege of having Canada for a neighbor. Whatever else we may disagree on in foreign policy, all Americans agree that that is an enviable position.

The North Atlantic arrangement has developed not with the logic of a plan struck off in a moment of intellectual enlightenment but in the logic determined by events.

The first impulse in that direction came in the spring of 1947 when the United States brought its support to bear to bolster up Greece and Turkey, then confronting a Moscow-inspired effort which combined the techniques of military pressure and those of political demoralization and, in the case of Greece, the employment of large-scale violence.

The same logic as impelled our support of Greece and Turkey applied, as events made clear, to the sustaining of the areas of Western Europe disposed to stand in independence against Soviet pressure and encroachment.

The Marshall Plan was brought forward to help our friends act in concert in pulling themselves out of the economic doldrums and to correct the dislocations which provided the Soviet thrust with its opportunity to undermine them from within.

The North Atlantic alliance, coupled with the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, formed the pattern for enabling our allies to withstand the pressure which Soviet military power was exerting against them from without. It simply registered the situation that the Soviet Army was deployed into Central Europe and was leaning against them and that they could not lean back against it without the brace of American support.

Some voices in America were raised in support of the idea of a guarantee to Europe in the pattern of the Monroe Doctrine, which had once served but had now grown obsolete as the frame of security for the American Hemisphere. They were not so much concerned about adding the weight of American power to redress the balances in Europe as they were about the idea of doing this in a collaborative arrangement. They simply did not want to face or to permit our actions to reflect the circumstance of mutual dependence between ourselves and our allies.

Yet by now, I think, most Americans see and accept that the resort to an alliance simply registers the circumstance that American military power is not self-sufficient but requires for its full effectiveness the maintenance of air bases abroad in surroundings of integrity. By the same token they have come to accept the deployment of American forces to help redress the ground balances in Europe until such time as our allies shall be able to produce strength enough alone.

Coalition Problems

The way of a coalition is not easy. The experience of being in one calls to mind repeatedly the limitations of power, the disparity between what we would and what we can do.

It is easier to do for another nation in the material sphere than in the moral sphere.

No part of the West feels strong enough to face the challenge confidently alone. The problems arise from the question: How are the parts of the West to pull themselves together so as to face the challenge successfully in concert? Now if it can thus pull itself together, the conclusion of its struggle with the adversary seems foregone. On balance, the peoples, the talents, the positions, and the resources available to the West are preponderant over those that might be brought to bear against them.

If the tangible factors were all that counted, the crisis could be settled on an adding machine. But the tangible factors are not all that count. The final determinants appear to be the imponderables to which Napoleon referred as the ruling factors of history.

One of these is will. A second is confidence. Both of these turn on how the West looks at itself—that is to say, how the determining number of individuals of the West look upon life, upon their role in life, and the role of the nations to

which they belong, on how the view of the determining number is evoked and made politically effective. Still further, that itself involves another imponderable—political power and leadership.

The process of enabling the West to pull itself together embraces two ranges: The first is within Europe itself—how the Western continental nations are to combine their efforts. The second is the transatlantic range—how the strength of the Western Hemisphere is to be combined with that of the eastern reaches of the Atlantic and of the European Continent.

These are different yet interrelated problems. Progress must be concurrent and developments in either range contingent upon developments in the other.

The problem on the Continent is first of all a moral one. The recovery plan and the defense effort have worked. Their success is measurable in every concrete category. There remains the problem of Europe's regard for itself. For that there is no vicarious solution. That is in the range of things where a society, as an individual, must master its own problems.

Europe's second problem derives from an inner mistrust. There is a reason for this. In the long past the military strength generated in the West has been turned upon the West. The wounds from which the West has been recovering were largely self-inflicted wounds. So there is a fear of strength itself lest the strength again be turned inwardly. That is the problem of Germany.

Whether and how the paradoxes can be resolved so as to permit German strength to serve rather than be parasitic upon the defense of Europe, and to insure against German dominance, and how the internal margins of political power can be enlarged among the countries of the West so as to enable them to forge ahead with confidence and continuity in their programs—those problems remain with us and their solution lies beyond the span of American decision. We can only note these problems here and pass on to other areas.

In the Pacific and East Asia we find the contest for the future in a phase of active hostilities in two places—Indochina and Korea. At a third point—at Formosa—American armed strength is interposed to prevent a position of consequence from falling into the hands of those who serve the adversary's purposes.

I shall speak only briefly of these three points. We admire the intrepidity of native and French resistance in Indochina and are supporting it.

As agent of the United Nations in the command in Korea we have demonstrated a determination to avoid being drawn into a generalized war that could serve only the ultimate purposes of the adversary. At the same time we have steadfastly refused to end hostilities on terms that would only redound to the adversary's ultimate success. We also have shown that we value the blood of Asian friends as highly as our own.

As to Formosa, there is certainly no present or foreseeable intention that the United States will permit this position to pass into the control of adversary forces.

The Communist Threat in Asia

Communist imperialism is a greater immediate threat in East Asia than in Europe. Through the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Pact the free nations of Europe have built up strength to such a position as to block the adversary from making further gains without engaging in all-out war. This is not yet true in the Far East. Many of the new countries just beginning to reach stability have many still unsolved problems and lack a sufficiency of trained leaders. It is easy for communism to spread chaos in Asia. That is why I say the greater threat is there. The greatest source of danger is constant pressure, subversion, and infiltration whereby the new and weak governments of Asia can be kept weak and divided among themselves. We are trying to prevent that by helping these countries to help themselves through our economic and military aid programs.

The oceans are one entity. Loss of security in any ocean area means for a maritime power the instant impairment and the potential loss of security in others. The security of the Pacific and the security of the Atlantic are thus functions of each other.

The Pacific undertakings represent a beginning in an attempt to do something quite novel in political experience—the organization of an extensive ocean area by bringing together the island elements and the appertinent lands not by conquest but by free cooperation.

This reflects a difference in requirements brought about in an air age, as distinguished from the preceding period when sea power was the only determining factor on oceans.

In the earlier stage it would have been necessary for a pacifying power only to control the narrows and to have outlying repair and fueling stations. With the coming of air power and the attendant requirement for protecting merchant marine and naval forces from air attack, the security of the ocean-going powers requires integrity of position in all the islands and on the margins that bear on the ocean area. The Atlantic experience bears this out. Once the air age entered, it became necessary to organize into the system of security the remoter North Atlantic positions which could be neglected in the time of sea power alone. It becomes necessary to insure the presence of reliable governments of friendly disposition or, at least, the prevention of any of the areas concerned from coming under the influence of a potential enemy.

The program for the Pacific is complex because of the disparities among the political elements in the area.

It is not possible at this time to have a Pacific pact in the same sense as a North Atlantic Pact. In Europe, members of the North Atlantic Pact have, generally speaking, common problems, common outlooks, and complementary economies, and all have reached roughly similar levels of political, economic, and social development. That is not so in the other great ocean area. There we find countries ranging from crown colonies and satrapies such as Borneo to modern, industrialized Japan. Some of them, such as Japan and Thailand, have been independent for centuries. Others, like Indonesia, Burma, and the Philippines, have achieved full independence only in the last 6 years. Some of the countries of Asia still recognize the National Government of China as the only legitimate Chinese Government. Others recognize the Communist regime as the legitimate Government of China. Some, such as the Philippines, are willing to align themselves publicly on the side of the West. Other countries, particularly the newer ones such as Burma and Indonesia, see as their first task that of putting their own houses in order. They wish to be left alone to do so and do not wish to take sides in the world struggle at this time.

Another impeding factor is residual from World War II. There are still psychological reservations as to entering directly into mutual-security arrangements with Japan on the part of some of the peoples who suffered heavily and directly in consequence of Japan's ill-fated effort to organize the Pacific area by conquest. This must await time's healing.

What we have as of now is a set of separate mutual-security pacts schematically interlocked by the circumstance that the United States is a member of each. The other parties respectively are Japan, the Philippines, and in combination Australia and New Zealand.

When it was announced in April of 1951 that these treaties were to be concluded, President Truman described them as "initial steps" in the formation of an over-all security system for the Pacific. The United States looks forward to the time when the nations of the area will see their way clear to act in concert to insure their free development and to help each other maintain their independence. The United States will be ready and willing to play its part in helping them to do so. The initial steps already taken can be the foundation for this greater cooperation.

I have not attempted to deal with other areas where our strategic interests are great even though we have not brought them into the focus of commitments present or prospective—the Near and Middle East and the Asian subcontinent, for example.

What opportunities for building better foundations of security may materialize in any of these areas I shall not attempt to predict, recalling that it was only 5 years or so ago that we began afford-

ing assistance to the Greeks and the Turks without any commitment to them and that now they are solid elements in the pattern of our alliances as members of the North Atlantic Treaty. "Freedom," Matthew Arnold said, "is a good horse, but a horse to ride somewhere." Greece and Turkey rode it somewhere and others may do likewise. I hope this may be prophetic of what may occur in relation to the idea of a Middle East Command.

Let me now make some final observations from an American point of view.

Hub of Alliance Systems

The United States stands as the hub of all the systems of alliances designed to stand against the encroachments of the Communist-dominated land power whose imperium reaches across the upper range of the Eurasian land mass. If the United States were impaired in its security in any of the areas covered by its coalitions then, all in all, the other areas would suffer impairment of their security.

The United States stands in a peculiar geographic relationship to the rest of the world in lying in both the great land-mass hemispheres, in facing in great extent on both of the greatest water courses, the Atlantic and Pacific, and in stretching from the Arctic to the tropics.

We can get some idea of the linear scope of the United States by imagining that one extreme of its perimeter were superimposed at Tunisia and another at the Normandy Coast. If we then regard the United States as comprising the territory of its 48 component States, the range would extend upward to Oslo and then eastward to the Aral Sea. The United States includes more than the 48 component States. It reaches out to continental Alaska and the Aleutian chain. If we add these to the superimposition, the linear stretch northward will be from Tunisia to Spitzbergen and eastward from the Normandy Coast to Vladivostok.

From such a range in such a position we get perhaps a peculiar sense of the oneness of the general strategic problem. Security-wise there are no quadrants. Necessarily our problems of supply and planning and political initiatives must be conceived in relation to special areas, but we must not let the nomenclature of administrative convenience mislead us into thinking that the world is districted in respect to the fundamental problems of security. Many Americans still talk about

the problems of the Pacific and the Atlantic as if the Mercator projection gave a realistic picture of the world. Some Americans still fall into the habits of a departed day by referring to the American area as "this Hemisphere"—just as if East and West were separable. Fundamentally, however, we see the problem of the confrontation with Soviet-controlled power as all of a piece.

Unlike previous periods in the experience of nations, there are no reserve areas, no strategic backwaters, no buffers, no margins for error. The policy of security is no longer an exercise in geometry, dividing the world into districts. It is an exercise in integral calculus, with continuous interaction among all the factors and all the areas of concern. This is what we learned in that moment of truth when the attack on Korea was launched and we faced up to the circumstance that a default, a supine acceptance of the aggression, would reverberate through the structure of security and weaken it throughout the world.

As the Nation in the pivotal position in these coalitions, as the one with the greatest resources and the one therefore thrust by circumstances into a certain preeminence, we are keenly and continuously aware of our responsibilities in a leadership new to us in a situation new to history.

The abandonment of isolation is full and final. We try to face the new exigencies in the spirit of some prophetic lines of Walt Whitman:

Sail, sail thy best,
Ship of Democracy,
Of value is thy freight,
Tis not the Present only,
The Past is also stored in thee,
Thou holdest not the venture of
thyself alone,
Not of the Western continent alone,
Earth's résumé entire floats on thy keel
O ship, is steadied by thy spars,
With thee Time voyages in trust,
The antecedent nations sink or swim with thee,
With all their ancient struggles, martyrs,
heroes, epics, wars, thou bear'st
the other continents,
Theirs, theirs as much as thine,
The destination-port triumphant;
Steer then with good strong hand and wary eye
O helmsman, thou carriest great companions. . . .

• *Mr. Marshall is a member of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State. Part I of this article, which is from an address made before the NATO Defense College at Paris on Oct. 20 and 22, appeared in the BULLETIN of Nov. 17, 1952, p. 767.*

Collective Defense Efforts To Safeguard Freedom

ADDRESS BY AMBASSADOR ANDERSON¹

I am home for only a few days. Tomorrow I go back to my job in Europe.

While in the United States I feel I would be doing less than my duty if I did not try strongly to point out the grave dangers which lie ahead of the free world—sly, subtle dangers which the recent Congress of Moscow² has clearly and plainly blueprinted for us.

The recent speeches of Stalin, Malenkov, and Bulganin in Moscow were a clear, warning bell of their intentions to lull, divide, discourage, embitter, and conquer the alliance of free nations opposing Soviet aims.

You, Gentlemen, are writers, molders of public opinion. I am particularly glad that I can say what I have to say today to you.

The free world is entering a period more difficult and potentially more dangerous than any it has known since the early years of the last war. The West is gaining steadily in military strength. But the danger that our political, moral, and economic defenses may be breached in the period ahead is increasing. And as our military commanders insistently point out, military defenses cannot possibly hold if our political, moral, and economic defenses yield.

The danger that confronts us does not offer itself in the form of a dramatic crisis. We free people know how to rally around in a crisis, and we have had many crises in recent years. In 1947 the economies of many countries of Europe were in a state of virtual collapse—and communism was mounting rapidly. The answer there was the Marshall Plan. There arose the danger of Soviet seizure of control of the countries of Europe, one by one, either by invasion or subversion. The answers there were the Atlantic Pact and the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. In 1950 there was no alternative to meeting aggression in

Korea with force and to rearming in the West.

In these cases the gravity of the crisis was evident, the compulsions to counteractions were tremendous, and the solutions themselves clear-cut in conception.

The danger that confronts us in the period ahead, however, is wholly different in nature. It is not a crisis, and it therefore arouses no powerful compulsion to counteraction. Moreover, the danger is such that solutions cannot be simple. They must be complex and sustained over a long period. They require extraordinarily constructive leadership and a high degree of public understanding and response. Moreover, they require international cooperation and organization far beyond that which exists today. The job of defense we have before us is therefore more difficult than any that has yet confronted the free peoples of the world.

The Soviet Blueprint

We do have one big advantage. We know the dimensions and character of the danger. It has been blueprinted for us and publicly exhibited in Moscow. We know directly from Stalin, Malenkov, and others of the Soviet oligarchy the assumptions upon which the Kremlin plots our destruction and tactics they prepare to employ against us. It is high time that we examine this blueprint and plan our defenses accordingly.

The basic reasoning of the Kremlin is this:

First, the men in Moscow are persuaded that the Soviet world, extending from the Elbe to the China Sea, is much better able to play a waiting game than the free world. The Soviet economy is largely self-sufficient. It is held in a tight, enforced unity by the very nature of the Soviet political system. It needs time to consolidate its position, expand its industrial base, and increase its military strength, while at the same time improving morale by modest increases in living standards.

Secondly, in the eyes of the Kremlin the Atlantic alliance is in a far weaker position to withstand a long period of strenuous alertness. The all-

¹ Made before the Overseas Writers Club at Washington Nov. 10 (press release S69). Ambassador Anderson is deputy U.S. special representative in Europe.

² The 19th Soviet Communist Party Congress, which convened on Oct. 5 and adjourned on Oct. 14.

embracing world market on which capitalist countries of the West formerly depended is now divided, with a large part under Soviet control. The West has not made and cannot make, the Russians think, an adjustment to this situation. The Marshall Plan, the war in Korea, and rearmament have been, in their view, an effort at economic and military defense which cannot be sustained. The application of Western capital and skill to world resources, they believe, will not expand in the years ahead and markets may well contract. The Soviet world will do its part to disrupt by dumping its own surpluses here and there. Idleness and depression in the West will, they hope, become chronic.

Thirdly, the Kremlin is convinced that increasing poverty, tension, and scrambling for markets and raw materials will bring the capitalist countries of the West, and especially France and Great Britain, to break away from the Atlantic alliance and even enter open conflict with us to secure, as Stalin puts it, once more an independent position and, in his words, "of course high profits." Likewise, he predicts Japan and Germany will rise to their feet, break with the United States, and embark upon a course of nationalistic competitive development.

These, then, are the Soviet assumptions. And from these assumptions an explicit Soviet strategy has emerged as blueprinted by the recent Moscow Congress. It comprises first and foremost relaxing pressure on the European members of the Atlantic alliance by easing fears of invasion, by abandoning direct and uncouth methods of internal subversion, by stressing to Europe the possibilities and blessings of—in Soviet words—"peaceful co-existence." This relaxation of pressure, it is calculated, will make the comfort-loving peoples of the West question and largely deny the need for rearmament and for making the sacrifices necessary to develop those new forms of political, economic, and military unity that might enable Western peoples to solve their problems and grow in strength.

Meanwhile, the tremendous power of the U.S.S.R., including its world-wide Communist organization, will be deployed to promote division, suspicion, and mistrust among members of the Atlantic alliance. There will be propaganda appeals to fears, to hatreds, and to nationalism to stem the growing movement toward European unity. There will be full-scale mobilization of anti-American feeling to check the growing unity of the Atlantic community. Economic warfare will be waged in an attempt to cause deterioration of the West.

Through these methods, the Soviet leaders hope to keep the West divided, quarrelsome, nationalistic, and weak while they use their totalitarian power to make the U.S.S.R. increasingly strong, both militarily and economically. And in the end they expect to take us over. They have not aban-

doned their implacable hostility to capitalism, nor have they renounced aggressive war as a means if the necessity or a good opportunity should arise. As Bulganin told the Moscow Congress, the Soviet machine can be very quickly converted to the needs of war.

Reasons for Changed Tactics

Why has this change in Soviet tactics come about?

It has come about partly, I think, because of the success the Western Allies have been having, under the pressure of immediate danger, in organizing the political, economic, and moral strength of free Europe and the Atlantic community. It has come about partly because the Soviet Union and its satellites need a breathing period. They probably figure, for example, that in the production of atomic weapons they can, with time, narrow the gap between U.S. and Soviet atomic power.

But I am very strongly convinced that the shift in Soviet tactics proceeds in very large part from a shrewd analysis of the extremely difficult problems confronting Europe, the Atlantic community, and the free world and from a genuine Kremlin conclusion that if Soviet-Communist pressure is apparently relaxed we of the free world will not continue to do what is necessary to save ourselves.

There is a lot of Marxist nonsense and dialectical rubbish in what Stalin and Company have been saying to the faithful in Moscow; but there is also a great deal of penetrating insight. We of the West shall be guilty of gross neglect if we do not examine our weaknesses in the light of the Soviet analysis, discover which are real and which are false, and develop a plan of action on whatever scale is required to remedy them.

What are those weaknesses?

Consider first the extreme difficulties that democracies face in building and maintaining a high level of armed preparedness in time of peace. This will continue to be for us a primary task, the main guarantee of our defense, the main buttress of our policy. The Soviet dictatorship continues year after year to devote a high percentage of the national product to armies and armaments. But in our democracies, military budgets must be voted each year by representatives of the people according to their estimate not only of the danger itself but of their own political position. Democracies in modern history have seldom maintained costly defenses for long periods in time of peace. If we are to succeed now we must find means, compatible with our democratic processes, whereby peoples can be kept in a state of informed alertness.

The problem is even more complicated by the fact that a large number of free countries are concerned. Varying national estimates of the danger and of the sacrifices required for defense leave the door open to mutual recriminations and

suspicions. Some countries may feel that others are not doing their share, and this may lead to a competitive diminution in effort. This in turn would lead to a weakening of the alliance.

It is of the greatest importance that we recognize our own difficulties, as democracies, in maintaining a state of preparedness and take special steps to overcome them. Remedies will probably include a great deal more public, official analysis and debate of our common danger and a great stepping-up of the public-information effort.

Consider also the economic problems of the Atlantic community and of the free world. The dropping of the Soviet Iron Curtain around a large part of the world is a serious economic blow to the free world, and it would be foolish not to admit it. It is a serious blow to Western Europe which in modern times has depended to an important degree upon a thriving trade with China. It is a serious blow to the whole free world that has depended upon a world market. This is not to say that we cannot redirect our trade, that we cannot promote development in other regions of the earth, that we cannot intensify production and productivity in our homelands—that we cannot in these ways overcome our losses. But it does mean that we have got to face the problem frankly in its largest proportions and organize the tremendous effort required to build at home and around the world new sources for raw materials and new markets for products.

Need for Steady Economic Expansion

Nor does it mean that the loss of Western markets and Western sources of raw material does not raise similar difficulties for the Soviet world. But the Kremlin is confident that it can in the years ahead continue to expand its industrial base and provide for increasing armaments and also for slowly rising standards of living. We in the United States have no real fear that we cannot continue our own economic expansion here at home. But we have got to face the fact that economic expansion in Europe has been slowing down after several years of impressive postwar recovery. We must recognize that economic expansion throughout most of the free world is proceeding at too slow a pace due to many factors, including a lack of investment capital. A continued growth of the disparity between rates of expansion and productivity in Europe and the United States would subject the Atlantic alliance to steadily increasing strain between the dollar and nondollar areas of the free world. Moreover, failing steady economic expansion, the whole free world will remain vulnerable to Communist lures, encroachments, and propaganda.

Here again there are things that can and must be done if we are not to fall into the Soviet trap. Europe can do many things to increase productivity, to integrate its economy, and thereby create

a market that is wide and deep and infinitely expandable. The United States can do many things to open up its own market to increased trade and to organize a flow of U.S. capital around the world large enough to provide a foundation for a thriving free-world economy. The free-world economy as we have known it for well over a hundred and fifty years has never functioned without a large and continuous flow of private capital and technical skills. Today, private capital is going abroad only in trickles. This at a time when the security of the free world requires a large and steady economic expansion. It is clear that all possible steps must be taken to encourage private capital to underwrite the economic expansion of the free world. If private capital is to do the job, more encouragement must be given by the areas needing investment, and profit possibilities must be found, explored, and emphasized. Our own and European governments may have to offer guarantees against some of the political risks involved. On both sides of the Atlantic it is time that we stop just talking about these problems and do something about them.

I think the Soviet leaders have very shrewdly and accurately calculated that the unity that has grown in Europe and in the Atlantic community in the last few years has occurred within the context of large scale U.S.A. aid to Europe that has relieved Europe's chronic balance-of-payments difficulties. I think they are aware that the whole policy and practice of large U.S. annual grants-in-aid to Europe is wearing thin. They know that the U.S. Congress has grown more and more reluctant to vote annual grants-in-aid and that the countries of Europe increasingly find dependence upon American grants unsatisfactory. They know, just as we know, that we have not yet built new economic relationships within the Atlantic community and between the Atlantic community and the rest of the free world that are self-sustaining and businesslike. This requires tremendous initiative and tremendous effort. We can overcome our weaknesses. But we must first recognize them and then act boldly and promptly.

Consider next the political relations between the members of the Atlantic community. We have developed an alliance which thus far is predominantly military in character. We have built and progressed well with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. But NATO has a great undeveloped potential. The extremely complex problems that arise between various members of the alliance are dealt with largely on a bilateral basis. The dangers of this situation have become evident in the past weeks. It is intolerable, for example, both to the United States and to Europeans that family discussions between us as to the level and kind of armaments and aid should develop into a mistaken feeling on the part of people in any country that they are being coerced by a stronger ally. This is

just what Stalin and Company would gleefully welcome and just what they would exploit to the fullest.

There is a defense against this danger, but we must build it. We must strengthen the NAT Organization itself. We must develop a more effective international staff. In the forum of the NATO Council of Permanent Representatives we must arrive at more decisions on a NATO basis, de-emphasizing these delicate problems in the bilateral field.

Increased Unification Necessary

Finally, the growing unity of Europe and of the Atlantic community must continue. Ambassador Draper pointed out a few weeks ago that a unified Europe is essential to the strength of the Atlantic community, just as the Atlantic coalition is essential to the defense and well-being of Europe.³ Just now the projects of unification are running into stormy weather. Old fears and old nationalisms are being revived. They are being picked up and amplified by Communist propaganda. Doubting Thomases bob up to question and worry. They always have; they always will.

Actually, what the European community of six and the NATO community of fourteen have accomplished in the last few years has really given pause to the Kremlin. The leaders of the Soviet Union could hardly have expected the countries of continental Europe to seriously consider merging their sovereignties into a stronger whole. Nor could they think, 5 short years ago, that not only Great Britain but far-away Canada and the United States as well would join Western Europe in the wider framework of an Atlantic organization dedicated to political and military defense.

The men of the West who are working for this goal of unification and strength may occasionally get discouraged and weary, but they do not doubt their eventual success.

They have only to look at the great progress which has already been made. In terms of history, Europe in the past few short years has taken strides along the road to unification which in the past must have been counted in terms of centuries.

I have seen at first hand the work of the councils of the Schuman Plan, of the European Defense Community, and of the Council of Europe. The leaders of these groups are sincere statesmen who believe honestly that an allied and unified Europe is not only necessary but inevitable—a product of political and historical evolution which a few men may hinder but no man can stop. I think the great majority of the peoples believe it is both necessary and inevitable. I believe that too.

Together we of the West have come far on the

road to peace and security. To allow ourselves to falter now—or to fall prey to those who would divide and embitter us—is unthinkable.

ADDRESS BY GENERAL RIDGWAY⁴

[Excerpts]

On my arrival in Europe nearly 5 months ago, I found the solid foundation [of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's military forces] laid by General Eisenhower, Field Marshal Montgomery, Marshal Juin, Air Chief Marshal Saunders, Admiral Lemonnier, General Gruenther, and countless others, in uniform and out. An integrated staff of highly selected officers representing the 14 nations of NATO was functioning smoothly despite the difficulties of different languages and cultural backgrounds. The first phases of organization and planning had been accomplished. There were armed forces in being to serve notice on any potential aggressor that we of the free world intended to defend to the utmost our lands and our liberties. Although our forces today are far stronger than they were 2 years ago, and have been greatly augmented by Greece and Turkey, we are still far from the minimum we need to deal with an all-out surprise attack. These forces are, however, more than a symbol of our strength. They could today, if attacked, make the path of an aggressor both difficult and costly.

These 14 nations of the free Western world have banded together in a collective effort to resist aggression from whatever direction it may come and whether from without or from within.

The issue is clear. Either we exist as God-fearing, free, and self-respecting peoples, or we succumb to slavery and the doom of a dead existence in a Godless world.

Only through strength—properly planned and directed strength—can our objective be achieved. History shows that brute force has contempt for the weak and respects only the strong. The world should ever remember however that free-world strength is for the sole purpose of deterring, or if need be, defeating aggression. Our armies, navies, and air forces will never be used as an aggressive weapon for assaulting peoples who keep the peace. These forces are solely for use in our own self-defense.

The later light of history will show that following World War II, every human effort was made by the democracies to live in harmony with their neighbors and that they were ever ready to promote the good and further the dignity of free men in peaceful pursuits. Only when these efforts proved fruitless did these free countries bind themselves together for self-defense.

³ For text of the address made on Oct. 20 by Ambassador William H. Draper, Jr., U.S. special representative in Europe, see BULLETIN of Oct. 27, 1952, p. 650.

⁴ Made before the Pilgrims' Dinner at London on Oct. 14 and released to the press by the Public Information Division, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, on the same date.

In the short time of my command of these NATO forces, I have called on the governmental and military leaders of most of the member nations. In many cases I have visited their forces in the field to observe their morale, training, and equipment. What I have learned has been heartening. The leaders and the men themselves understand our mission. They will do their utmost to help fulfill it. Yet probably most important of all is the extent to which the civilian populations realize our aims and are contributing their share to the effort. In some cases this spirit is superb.

It is, however, apparent that high taxation can easily become a cause for discord among people if they do not understand the reasons for it. Therefore, it seems to me imperative that every citizen should be fully informed by his own government of the necessity we are under, for reasons beyond our control, for devoting so large a part of national budgets to military establishments.

Each Must Contribute Full Share

My staff and principal commanders fully recognize the basic importance of the relation of national economic capability to collective military requirements. They fully recognize that the maintenance of a viable economy definitely limits the military strength, active and reserve, which any particular nation can maintain. They see as clearly as any that, if the economic floor falls, the military structure resting on that floor is sure to be damaged, perhaps seriously weakened, and the attainment of our common objective—the preservation of our freedom by peaceful means—jeopardized.

At the same time, it must, I think, be recognized that each country is responsible for contributing its full share within its economic capability. The price of freedom assumes a quite different value if the alternative to paying that price is slavery. For us, freedom is no luxury item to be dispensed with because its cost is high. It is an essential element of life. If our sense of values should ignore these facts, we would indeed be on the downward path.

As the French Minister of Defense, Monsieur Plevin, recently stated: "Whatever the price of national defense may be, it is always lower than that of a prolonged war or, worse still, defeat."

There is only one catastrophe which could befall us greater than another world war and that would be the loss of our liberties. We are striving with sober and earnest determination to avert both catastrophes. We believe our best hope for doing so lies in having the strength to command respect in council, to avoid political blackmail, and to deter open aggression.

Measured in pounds sterling or any other monetary unit, that cost will be high. Measured in spiritual values, it is acceptable, however high. Only with this strength can we have any confi-

dence that these dire misfortunes, whether begun by accident or by design, might not engulf us.

It is the indisputable responsibility of the civil authorities of each member state to decide how much of our collective military requirements its economy can support. It is likewise, I believe, the unquestioned responsibility of the military to furnish the civil authorities with a reasoned estimate of what minimum military strength is required.

It is not, I submit, for the NATO commanders to take stock of the economic factors and then to assess military requirements based on their views of economic capabilities. Such an assessment would be beyond their competence and a departure from their fundamental responsibility. That responsibility is to evaluate the threat to our security from the professional military viewpoint, and, from the same viewpoint, to recommend the minimum forces believed essential successfully to meet that threat should it ever materialize.

This has been done. It is not a static evaluation. It is under continuing review, as the many major variables in this exceedingly complex equation change. It is under intensive scrutiny now, to determine its honest, accurate objectivity.

This assessment is concerned with more than just the creation of minimum military forces. It is concerned with their maintenance for as long as the need may continue. Above all it is concerned, and vitally so, with their creation in the shortest practicable time.

Time Factor All-Important

It is this factor of time—this inextensible, incompressible, intangible element—that demands our most thoughtful consideration. For plans to build our defensive strength, however well conceived, would be sheer wasted effort, if action in implementing them were to be overlong deferred.

We have yet to reach our minimum military requirements. Until we do, military commanders cannot accept responsibility for lessened effort or reduced goals. They must face the fact that the potential aggressor is capable of moving at any time of his choosing in strength much greater than today we can muster. We have no information which would lead us to believe that this strength has in any way diminished. On the contrary, our information indicates it has definitely grown and continues to grow.

It is for the statesman to estimate Kremlin intentions. It is for the civil authorities to accept responsibility for acting in accordance with such estimate. It is for the military properly to inform the civil authorities of the consequences, as the military sees such consequences, of basing action on estimates of intentions.

As military men we shall continue to base our recommendations on consideration of the capabilities of those who might attack us. We know those

capabilities to be great. For the safety of our peoples and their lands, we feel that we must build minimum military strength with the greatest practicable speed. At the same time, we feel most earnestly that our peoples by every means at their disposal must, by well-planned programs, convey to all the world the truthful nature of our stated purpose—to make attack upon us unprofitable, to preserve the peace and our continued free existence in a world at peace.

NATO's Basic Military Concept

Our basic concept as to how to do this does not call for huge standing forces, the maintenance of which might jeopardize other basic objectives—the economic stability and the raising of the standard of living. Rather, our concept calls for an adequate though small covering force of land, sea, and air, always on guard, capable of meeting any sudden onslaught and of parrying any potentially disastrous or decisive thrusts. Backing up this “ever-ready” active component we must have rapidly mobilizable, well-trained, and well-equipped reserves. Furthermore, these reserves must be capable of rapid commitment to relieve the heavy pressure which will inevitably be brought to bear upon the covering force and to provide the depth in which we can slow down the momentum of the hostile assault and eventually bring it to a halt. Reserves which could only be committed to battle after we had been conquered would be of little use.

Finally, and it is this element of our basic concept which gives me acute concern, both our active and reserve components must have essential supporting facilities and supplies in adequate quantity, ready in the proper areas by the time required. Courage and skill cannot defend against well-trained forces adequately armed and equipped. A man's bare hands cannot compete with a tommy gun or tank. Post-hostilities re-cremations could not restore lives and limbs lost through careless gambling with our fate.

I wish to emphasize again the overriding importance, if we in the military are to accomplish the mission the civil authorities have assigned us, of the timely attainment of minimum requirements in active and reserve forces and in the means for adequately supplying and sustaining both.

Our active forces must always be ready. Our first-line reserve forces must be brought quickly to such level of training as will warrant commitment to action with little or no additional training after an emergency develops. Our supply and service capabilities must at all times be prepared to function on call and to continue functioning effectively despite all the grave dislocations which the full impact of hostilities would inevitably bring.

The basic concept just stated involves another important point—the need for the participation of

German forces in our collective effort, as it would be essential to reinforce the covering forces at the earliest possible moment so the availability of German ground units already located well forward would obviously be a great asset. Moreover, German participation would permit our defending further to the east and thus better provide for the common defense of all of Western Europe, Germany included.

You know, I am sure, that participation of armed forces of the German Federal Republic in our collective defense effort awaits ratification by the six member governments of the European Defense Community. With ratification, the initiative and imagination of French statesmanship will have carried Western Europe another long step toward unity. Western Germany and its 50 million people will then be in a position to share in both the benefits and the responsibilities of our great collective effort to safeguard our freedom.

In conclusion, permit me to reiterate the fact that in NATO we have made real progress in which every man and woman who is helping to carry these great burdens can take solid satisfaction. We still have, however, a long hard road to travel to reach our goal.

It has been and continues to be a challenging task. It is one to which we can in sober pride devote our finest efforts. It will be, when accomplished, enduring evidence of our integrity, our vision, and our courage.

Let us pray for the faith that moveth mountains and in that faith, with all possible speed, let us accomplish, as I know we can, the great task at hand, leaving to our descendants a monument they will be proud to preserve.

Vienna “Peace Congress”

Press release 870 dated November 13

The Department of State has received requests for information from Americans who have been asked to attend a so-called “Congress of the Peoples for Peace” to be held at Vienna on December 12, 1952.

Permission to hold this “Congress” was never asked of the Austrian Government, which, on November 4, officially termed it a Communist propaganda maneuver.

The truth of this is evident in the light of the fact that behind the scenes the Congress is being staged by the Communist high command which has taken the trouble to import one of its prize propagandists, Ilya Ehrenburg, from Moscow to Vienna for this show.

The true purpose of this uninvited, unwanted Congress is completely exposed by Stalin's recent call to the Communist Parties outside of the Soviet Union to promote “popular front” activities. The Congress has but one objective: to serve the Soviet policy of underwriting aggression while holding “Peace Congresses.”

U.S. Again Asks U.S.S.R. To Return Lend-Lease Vessels

Press release 859 dated November 5

Following is the text of a note addressed by Acting Secretary Bruce to Soviet Ambassador Georgi N. Zarubin and delivered to the Soviet Embassy at Washington on November 5, and the text of a note dated June 16 from the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires, Boris I. Karavaev, to Secretary Acheson:

TEXT OF U.S. NOTE OF NOVEMBER 5

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to Mr. Karavaev's note No. 44 of June 16, 1952 concerning the negotiations for a settlement of the obligations of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics under the Master Lend-Lease Agreement of June 11, 1942.¹

In his note of June 16, 1952, Mr. Karavaev expressed the readiness of the Soviet Government to return to the United States 186 naval craft, the return of which the Government of the United States initially requested in its note of September 3, 1948 and has repeatedly requested since that time. On June 18, 1952, United States lend-lease representatives in a meeting with the Soviet lend-lease delegation proposed the immediate establishment of a working group to arrange the details of the return of these vessels. The Soviet delegation, however, was unwilling to agree to the establishment of such a working group or otherwise to arrange for the return of the vessels. Thus, the Soviet Government, although formally professing its readiness to return these vessels, has not been prepared to take concrete action for this purpose. If it is in fact the intention of the Soviet Government to return these vessels, the Government of the United States desires that it be informed, without further delay, of the dates and ports of return, or alternatively of the date when Soviet representatives will be available to work out with representatives of the Government of the United States the details for the return of the vessels.

Mr. Karavaev's note also reiterates the desire of the Soviet Government to purchase lend-lease merchant vessels and certain of the lend-lease naval craft now in its custody. The Government of the United States had made its position with respect to lend-lease vessels clear in its notes of April 6, 1951² and January 7, 1952³ and in meetings of the lend-lease delegations of our two Governments since January 1951. The offers of the Government of the United States early in the settlement negotiations to sell lend-lease merchant vessels and a number of lend-lease naval vessels were expressly conditioned upon the prompt conclusion of a satisfactory over-all lend-lease settlement. When it became unmistakably clear that the Soviet Government did not intend to conclude a settlement promptly, the Government of the United States in January 1951 withdrew these offers and requested the return of all lend-lease vessels.

That the Soviet Government has consistently avoided the conclusion of a prompt settlement is fully documented in the history of the negotiations. A particular example of the attitude of the Soviet Government toward the prompt conclusion of a settlement is its failure to return the 186 vessels which were requested by the Government of the United States over four years ago and were never offered for sale. This attitude is further exemplified by the refusal of the Soviet Government to resolve the question of a financial settlement through arbitration as proposed by the Government of the United States in its note of April 27, 1951⁴ and also by the refusal of the Soviet Government to submit the question of the return of lend-lease vessels to the International Court of Justice for adjudication, as proposed by the Government of the United States in its note of January 7, 1952.

Since the Soviet Government has not only failed to return the vessels but also has refused to submit the matter to adjudication, the Government of the United States must conclude that it is the

² BULLETIN of Apr. 23, 1951, p. 646.

³ *Ibid.*, Jan. 21, 1952, p. 86.

⁴ *Ibid.*, May 7, 1951, p. 744.

¹ For summary of these negotiations, see BULLETIN of June 2, 1952, p. 879.

intention of the Soviet Government to remain in default of Article V of the Agreement of June 11, 1942.

As regards the question of a financial settlement which is also mentioned in Mr. Karavaev's note, the Government of the United States has offered to accept the sum of \$800 million which it considers fair and reasonable compensation for the vast quantities of civilian-type lend-lease articles remaining in Soviet custody at the end of hostilities. However, in the interests of achieving a settlement promptly, this Government offered to reduce further the amount requested provided a truly constructive offer was made by the Soviet side. The Government of the United States, in its note of January 7, 1952, has already stated that it considers the latest offer of the Soviet Government of \$300 million as far from fair and reasonable compensation for the residual lend-lease articles. Furthermore, the Government of the United States must take into account the fact that by not returning the 186 naval craft and other vessels requested, the Soviet Government is in clear default of the very agreement under which negotiations of a lend-lease settlement have been carried on since April 1947. It is the position of the Government of the United States, therefore, that when the Soviet Government has made arrangements to fulfill its obligations under Article V of the Lend-Lease Agreement of June 11, 1942, the Government of the United States in the interest of a settlement will be prepared to make further proposals concerning a financial settlement.

If it is the serious intention of the Soviet Government to advance the conclusion of a mutually satisfactory settlement agreement, it can do so by returning the lend-lease vessels promptly.

Accept [etc.]

DAVID BRUCE

TEXT OF SOVIET NOTE OF JUNE 16

No. 44

SIR: In connection with your note of January 7, 1952, concerning the settlement of lend-lease accounts, I have the honor to state the following.

The Soviet Government in its previous notes has already shown that scrupulous observance of the agreement achieved earlier is a necessary condition for reaching a general and a mutually satisfactory settlement of lend-lease accounts. Non-observance of this condition cannot but cause delays in the settlement of the entire question of lend-lease accounts.

As is known, on the question of lend-lease vessels the Governments of the USSR and the USA earlier reached an agreement setting forth that the United States agreed to the sale to the Soviet Union of the merchant vessels and a certain number of the

naval vessels. In this connection it was intended that the experts of both sides should discuss the question both of the terms of sale of the above-mentioned vessels and of the procedure and dates of the return of the remaining vessels. Later on, the Government of the United States, deviating from the previously achieved agreement, refused to discuss the question of the sale of the merchant vessels and a part of the naval vessels, insisting on the return both of all merchant vessels and of the naval vessels delivered to the Soviet Union under lend-lease. Refusing to fulfill the agreement reached earlier, the Government of the USA thereby impedes the achievement of agreement on the general settlement of lend-lease accounts, to which fact the Soviet Government considered it necessary to call the attention of the Government of the USA in its note of August 21, 1951.⁵

The Government of the USA seeks to justify its refusal to sell to the Soviet Union the vessels regarding which an agreement has already been reached between the Governments of the USA and the USSR by references to the fact that the agreement was conditional on "prompt achievement of a mutually satisfactory over-all lend-lease settlement" and that this condition allegedly was not fulfilled by the Soviet Government. Such an assertion of the Government of the USA is groundless, because the Soviet Government for its part took a series of measures toward the most rapid settlement of the lend-lease question.

It is known that the Soviet Government made substantial concessions and introduced several constructive proposals which created the possibility of a successful completion of the negotiations regarding the settlement of lend-lease accounts. For this purpose, the Soviet Government, in the course of the negotiations which were held, agreed to a considerable increase in the overall sum of compensation for residual lend-lease goods, and in particular on August 24, 1951, increased this amount of compensation from 240 million dollars to 300 million dollars, which constitutes an amount almost twice as great as the amount originally stipulated. It is also necessary to note that the amount of 300 million dollars represents a higher percentage of compensation than, for example, was the case in establishing the amount of compensation for lend-lease deliveries to Great Britain. Eight months has already passed since the introduction by the Soviet Government of the proposal to set the overall amount of compensation at 300 million dollars. However, the Government of the USA for its part has not named a lower amount of compensation than the previously stipulated sum of 800 million dollars, although in the course of the negotiations the representatives of the USA repeatedly declared their readiness to lower the amount of compensation named by the Government of the USA, if the Soviet Union would consent to an increase of the overall amount above 240 million dollars. It is

⁵ *Ibid.*, Jan. 21, 1952, p. 87.

sufficient, for example, to point out the statements made during the negotiations by Mr. Wiley on January 27, February 7, and March 7, 1951, and the statements of Mr. Reinhardt on August 21 and 24, 1951. It is necessary to note that although on August 24, 1951, Mr. Reinhardt promised to communicate at the next meeting the position of the Government of the USA regarding the amount of 300 million dollars proposed by the Soviet side, the American side has not yet designated the date of the next meeting. It follows from this that the delay in reaching a mutually acceptable settlement of lend-lease accounts is the result of the position taken by the Government of the United States.

In its note of January 7 of this year the Government of the United States asserts that the Soviet Government, in the note of August 21, 1951, allegedly stated that it did not intend to fulfill its obligation regarding the return of the lend-lease vessels. This assertion is also devoid of any foundation. The Soviet Government, as is known, has already returned to the United States 27 frigates, 3 icebreakers, 7 tankers and 1 dry cargo vessel, which the Government of the USA did not desire to sell to the Soviet Union. As to the 186 naval vessels which the Government of the USA requests be returned, the Soviet Government has not de-

clared its refusal to satisfy this request either in its note of August 21, 1951 or any previous time. The Soviet Government expresses its readiness to return to the United States the 186 vessels indicated. After appropriate preparation this transfer could be begun in four or five months at foreign ports nearest the Soviet Union. At the same time, the Soviet Government expects that also the Government of the USA will carry out the agreement already reached regarding the sale to the Soviet Union of merchant vessels and a part of the remaining naval vessels from the number suitable for use.

As to the proposal of the Government of the USA to submit the question of lend-lease vessels to the consideration of an international court, the Soviet Government cannot agree to such a proposal for the same reasons for which it could not agree to the submission of the question of compensation for residual lend-lease goods in the USSR to the decision of a court of arbitration, which reasons were set forth in the Soviet Government's note of August 28, 1951.⁶

Accept [etc.]

B. KARAVAEV

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 88.

New Information on Forced Labor in U.S.S.R.

Press release 862 dated November 7

New information on conditions in Soviet forced-labor camps as recent as May 1952 was made public on November 9 when the U.S. Government presented to the U.N. *Ad Hoc* Committee on Forced Labor at Geneva additional material on Soviet forced-labor practices.

As revealed by Walter M. Kotschnig, deputy representative of the United States in the Economic and Social Council, the new material covers practically the entire history of Soviet forced labor and for the first time gives evidence on very recent conditions. This supplements earlier material offered to the *Ad Hoc* Committee by the U.S. Government on June 27, 1952.¹

The entire new documentation was presented in two parts. Part I consists of affidavits and depositions of 105 persons, buttressed in a number of cases by official Soviet documents. Most of these witnesses are former Soviet citizens; the others

were sent to forced-labor camps while living in the U.S.S.R. as foreigners. Their experiences offer a comprehensive review of Soviet forced-labor methods from 1924 until 1947.

This evidence was obtained from questionnaires filled out by former inmates and relates predominantly to the pre-1945 period. It provides further confirmation of Soviet police methods during the 1924 purges in the Caucasus, the liquidation of millions of peasants during the collectivization drive of the early 1930's, the 1936 and 1937 repressions which accompanied the famed Moscow trials, and the wholesale arrests for so-called "sabotage and counter-revolutionary activity" in 1941 shortly after the break with Hitler.

Part II is a collection of information which extends the evidence of large-scale forced labor in the U.S.S.R. into the current year. It was obtained from German military and civilian prisoners and a Soviet refugee with experience in or information about existing Soviet forced-labor camps. Their testimony makes it possible to bring the Soviet forced-labor record up to early 1952.

The information from the German prisoners

¹ BULLETIN of July 14, 1952, p. 70. A report based on the earlier material has since been printed (*Forced Labor in the Soviet Union*, Department of State publication 4716); an excerpt appeared in the BULLETIN of September 22, 1952, p. 428.

came out in detailed interviews covering their experiences in a number of regular Soviet concentration camps up until their release by Soviet authorities in May 1952 from the Kiev and Brest-Litovsk camps. Other facts, learned from the former Soviet citizen, relate to two forced-labor camps in the Astrakhan region of the U.S.S.R. as of May-June 1951.

An analysis of these studies reveals that in recent years there has apparently been some improvement in the conditions of those interned in the camps. This may be attributed to two factors. First, there is a continual conflict among Soviet forced-labor functionaries as to whether forced labor should be used for punishment and liquidation of "undesirable elements" or for the exploitation of apparently cheap prison labor. Since the Soviet economy is presently geared largely to war production, the exploitative factor would seem now to be dominant, requiring that the laborers be fed, clothed, and housed at a survival level. Second, the continued activity of the United Nations, certain of its specialized agencies, and organs of the free labor movement in investigating forced labor has focused world public opinion on Soviet forced-labor practices and may have induced Soviet police authorities to pursue a more cautious policy.

Despite these apparent improvements inside the barbed-wire enclosures, many of the brutal procedures and methods of the early purge days continue to be used by Soviet authorities in apprehending, sentencing, and transporting their victims to the forced labor camps.

Midnight arrests, baseless accusations, physical and psychological torture, confessions signed under duress, and transport, sometimes for thousands of miles, in overcrowded and unhygienic cattle cars are still part of the standard routine suffered by the unfortunates selected to work in the Soviet forced-labor battalions.

Typical of the practices still being employed in the U.S.S.R. are the methods described in the following excerpts selected from the testimony offered today by Mr. Kotsehnig:

On circumstances of arrest

At 12:05 A.M. the house manager with an NKVD agent and guard came into my room, showing me an order for arrest and a search warrant. They looked at my papers and books, two of which the agent said I should have got rid of long ago. They searched the apartment until 7:00 A.M. examining the walls, beds, floor, ceiling and so forth. They asked me about the actors and artists of the Bolshoi Theatre. I told them I knew them in the line of duty. They then took me to Lubyanka Prison by car. I took no belongings with me, for I was told that it was useless, that I would soon return.

On formal accusations made by Soviet officials

No accusation was presented to me. The authorities wanted to liquidate us, the peasants, and make state slaves of us. It was announced to me when I was sentenced that I was accused of being a "member of the White Eagle Union".

They did not have any grounds for my arrest. It was not a case of my having been guilty or not, but of the

liquidation of the peasantry as a class by means of collectivization. My father was in the Czar's army and a good farmer. They did not accuse me of anything definite, they just asked where my father had been in 1918.

Interrogation

I was sent to a cell called "the sack" where one could only stand upright. I do not remember how long I remained in the "sack" and I regained my senses when cold water was poured over me. Once I was undressed and wrapped in a wet sheet. They then beat me with rubber clubs, so that no bruises would show. Four persons took position in the corners of the narrow premises. I was pushed in the middle and they started beating me off towards one another like a ball.

The reaction of the public prosecutor to my answer that I had no knowledge of it (black marketeering in 1946) and that I could bring witnesses to prove it—was that he threatened me with hanging if I wouldn't tell the truth, and that he needed only people who could testify against me and not prove my innocence. I had to sign the record of my interrogation and, because I refused to do so, at first the public prosecutor pointed a pistol at me and said he would shoot me if I didn't give my signature. The interrogation lasted from 9:00 A.M. to 6:00 P.M.

Trial

I do not even know when the trial was held, because I was tried by the troika of the NKVD.

The trial took place in the middle of August, 1947, and lasted about 20 minutes. The court was represented by one person, a Russian major, as judge, and there was a Russian civilian as audience. The judge was simultaneously entrusted with the functions of prosecutor.

Conditions of transport to camps

We got 400 grams of salt fish every two days, and 300 grams of bread daily. Sometimes we went two or three days without water. Usually they gave us one pail for 70 persons to scramble at. Whoever was quick got something to drink. Many did not drink at all.

The cars were overcrowded. In one freight car there were about 70 to 75 persons. It was impossible to count how many, since people were squeezed in. . . . There were three-storied plank beds. Sick, dead and healthy people were lying together.

The journey lasted about 21 days. We travelled in cattle-cars in which we were pressed together like herrings in a box. The conditions in general were as bad as could be imagined. There was neither heating nor light. A hole in the floor served as latrine. [1947]

Together with another 900 interned persons, we were loaded into cattle-cars. The journey lasted 3 months, and we didn't know what our destination was. The conditions were terrible. Except the first few days when we got up to 600 grams of fresh bread and sometimes potato soup, we got only dry bread, salted herrings and nothing to drink. Only occasionally could we have some water from the locomotive. [1947]

Release and after

Before my release, I had to sign a paper to the effect that I wouldn't speak to anybody, not even to my family, about what I had heard or seen in the forced labor camps. If I violated this order, I was told that I would be shot without any further charge or trial.

We had a couple of soldiers accompanying the transport who had to see that we shouldn't come into contact with the population. Nevertheless, as long as the Russian soldiers were not directly at our heels, we entered into conversation with the population. People in the Eastern zone (of Germany) were greatly astonished that there should still be Germans in Russia. They didn't know anything at all about "punishment camps" or "camps of silence", and at first didn't want to believe what we were telling them. [May, 1952]

The new material offered by Mr. Kotschnig shows that the Soviet system of forced labor embraces both Soviet citizens and persons drawn from the Soviet orbit. The system shows no signs of vanishing but has become an integral part of the Soviet economy.

Investigation of Kidnaping of Dr. Walter Linse

Telegraphic text

The following is a translation of a press statement made in Berlin on November 13 by Johannes Stumm, Police President of West Berlin, concerning the kidnaping of Dr. Walter Linse, a resident of the American sector:

A thorough and widespread investigation covering a period of 4 months following the kidnaping of Dr. Walter Linse has resulted in the identification of four East Berlin professional criminals who stand accused of assaulting and abducting Dr. Linse from in front of his home in West Berlin on July 8, 1952.

This sweeping inquiry, conducted by scores of Berlin's most skillful police officers, represents a combination of exhaustive effort, the study of hundreds of leads and the application of all modern police methods. The investigation has disclosed not only the names of the four principal kidnapers but also of 13 other hand-picked and professional outlaws and gangsters who played important roles in one of the most brazen and repugnant crimes in the history of Berlin.

The four East Berliners who had been convicted previously of charges of murder, burglaries, embezzlement, and safecracking are

Harry Liedtke, 22, whose most recent address is Berlin-Friedrichshain, Barnimstrasse 17;

Erwin Knispel, 50, who has many addresses in East Berlin;

Herbert Nowak, 27, whose most recent address was Berlin-Friedrichshain, Heidenfeldstrasse, near the Zentralviehhof;

Josef Dehnert, 22, who has changed his address frequently in East Berlin.

These four men are identified as part of a criminally organized and criminally subsidized ring of kidnapers approved, sponsored, and directed by the GDR Ministry for State Security which has become widely known as the dread Mss, which not only is modeled after the MGB, the Ministry of State Security of the Soviet Union, but is an integral, thriving organ of the Russian Police State.

The relentless investigation into the abduction of Dr. Linse from in front of his home in Gerichtsstrasse, Berlin-Lichterfelde, has disclosed the heinous methods which the Mss employs in organizing its syndicate of kidnapers. By the very nature of its criminal mission the Mss is com-

elled to rely completely upon murderers, dope addicts, highly trained burglars and black market operators. The Mss's masters even enlist prostitutes of all ages to assist them in their outlawed operations in West Berlin.

The Mss, which has been established only for a relatively short time, adopted a system of recruitment which is not particularly new in the annals of crimes against decent and law-abiding citizens, but is definitely effective. For example, the Mss leaders visit criminals in their prison cells and make nefarious deals with them. It operates something like this: A gangster may be serving a sentence for murder, as in the case of Nowak, or for 18 separate cases of safecracking, burglary, and other felonies, as in the case of Knispel, will be approached by an Mss stooge who holds out a promise of a reduced sentence or freedom if the imprisoned criminal agrees to join the kidnapers club. Since these criminals are offered such fine opportunities their answers to these proposals are obvious.

Once these crooks and killers are let out of prison to perform even worse crimes, their files and records are invariably removed from the police and prosecuting attorney's files and sometimes destroyed. But sometimes they are retained by the Mss which holds these records as a club or threat over the heads of the criminal hirelings.

It was under this system that the four East Berlin bandits were directed to attack and kidnap Dr. Linse. The execution of the crime was well planned. The habits and movements of Dr. Linse were studied and reported in details. There were to be no mistakes, no margin for error. Every move, every plan, every step, every report, every observation made by the four principal kidnapers and their 13 accomplices, whose records are just as bad as their companions, constituted a major crime in themselves.

The kidnap ring even went so far as to stop a West Berlin taxicab driven by Wilhelm Woiziske, of Berlin-Kreuzberg, Ohlauerstrasse 26, with the purpose in mind of removing its KB license plate for transfer to an Mss sedan which was used in the actual kidnaping. The taxicab driver was actually kidnaped himself and locked up in the cellar of the Prenzlauer Berg police inspection at Schoenhauser Allee 23. After the assault and kidnaping of Dr. Linse had been successfully concluded, Woiziske was released and retrieved his taxicab.

The following is a review of the kidnaping as it actually happened on July 8, 1952:

At approximately 7:30 on the morning of the above date Dr. Linse emerged from his home. The kidnapers' car was parked on Gerichtsstrasse Nardrakestrasse. Liedtke and Dehnert stepped out of the kidnap car. Dehnert, who approached Dr. Linse as though to ask for a light, struck the jurist in the face with a sandbag blackjack while Liedtke held Linse from behind.

The two culprits then yanked Dr. Linse into the car and dashed off at high speed with Dr. Linse's feet protruding from one of the rear doors of the car. The driver of a delivery truck, parked nearby, saw the abduction and pursued the kidnap vehicle. One of the kidnapers threw several tetrahedral nails onto the street in a vain attempt to halt the pursuer. Nowak has been identified as the gangster who fired two shots at the pursuing vehicle, both of which struck the car but not the driver.

The kidnap car sped down Drakestrasse at 90 to 100 kilometers per hour. When the kidnap car crossed Karwendelstrasse the kidnapers pulled Dr. Linse's legs into the car and shut the door. At this point one of Dr. Linse's shoes fell to the pavement.

The fugitive car then crossed Teltow-Kanal and then turned down Giesendorferstrasse and Berlinerstrasse to Schwelmerstrasse and subsequently roared across the Soviet zone border where a zonal barrier had been raised to accommodate the kidnaper's vehicle.

The crime from beginning to end was witnessed by many Berliners. This crime, of which the Soviet authorities have repeatedly denied knowledge, was aided and abetted by the following 13 accomplices, all of whom have criminal records:

Paul Liebig, 38 to 42. This man, an official of the Mss, in charge of the *Unsichtbar-Gruppe Weinmeister* is the most mysterious character of the lot. It is not even known whether Liebig is his correct family name, since he is commonly known simply as "Paul."

Fritz Vahle, alias Paul Schmidt, aged 31, last known to have lived at Berlin-Mitte, Weinmeisterstr 10. He is assistant to Paul. He is also a drug addict and claims to be a physician. In 1946 he was tried, convicted, and sentenced to 3 years in prison in the British zone for illegally using the title "Dr." Later that same year Vahle was declared to be not completely sane and was committed to a Schleswig sanatorium for observation. He escaped May 20, 1947.

Hans Richard Joswig, alias Bauer, aged 30; a man of many addresses, the most recent of which was Berlin-Mitte, Lottumstrasse 13. Joswig, a professional criminal, is wanted for the theft of \$220 and DM 20 committed on August 18, 1950, in Berlin-Steglitz. Subsequently he was arrested by Soviet sector police and later released.

Elsa Joswig, wife of Hans Joswig, 25 to 26 years of age.

Kurt Knoblauch, 22 to 23, formerly of Berlin-Mitte, Anklamerstrasse, another paid gangster known to have been held in the Dirksenstrasse prison in February 1950.

Sonja Ballentin, 23, who has relatives at Berlin-Friedrichshain, Rigaerstrasse. Sonja who has lived with Harry Liedtke at Barnimstrasse 18 is engaged to the criminal Liedtke.

Fritz London, 26, last known to reside at Berlin-Prenzlauer Berg, Immanuelkirchstrasse 24.

Walter Paerschke, personal data unknown but whose record shows an arrest more than 2 years ago by East

sector police in Berlin-Treptow for stealing an automobile, and a sentence to Barnimstrasse prison.

Wladimirowicz Feder, 40 to 45, last known address Berlin-Weissensee, Pistoriusstrasse.

Siegfried Benter, 26 to 27, of Berlin-Friedrichshain, Palisadenstr 4.

Leiser, first name unknown, 35, Berlin-Weissensee, Pistoriusstr.

Skrolek, first name unknown, 30 to 35, brother of Wladimirowicz Feder.

Schura, first name unknown, 35, address unknown.

The West Berlin police have unimpeachable evidence that this Mss-sponsored and protected kidnap organization is financed by the sale of great quantities of cigarettes, coffee, and silk stockings on the black market.

These then are the type of people, guarded and supported by the Soviet-controlled and dominated East Berlin, who assaulted and kidnaped Dr. Linse.

Death of President of Israel

Press release 866 dated November 10

The following messages of condolence were sent November 9 on the death of Dr. Chaim Weizmann, President of Israel:

His Excellency

JOSEF SPRINZAK,

*Acting President of Israel,
Tel Aviv, Israel.*

The people of the United States join with me in extending to you and to the people of Israel our deepest sympathy on the passing of your beloved President, Chaim Weizmann.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

His Excellency

DAVID BEN GURION,

*Prime Minister of Israel,
Tel Aviv, Israel.*

Please accept my sincere condolences upon the death of President Weizmann. The news of his passing has been received by this Government and Americans throughout the country with deep sorrow. As a founder of his country, President Weizmann's courage and resolution were an inspiration to his people.

DEAN ACHESON
Secretary of State

Continuation of Economic Assistance to Yugoslavia

by James L. Colbert

By an exchange of letters dated October 13, 1952, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France on the one hand and Yugoslavia on the other confirmed their understanding as to the basis on which tripartite economic aid to Yugoslavia will continue through the 12 months July 1952-June 1953. The assistance the three Governments have agreed to give is being provided to strengthen Yugoslavia's economy in order to increase its defense capabilities and preserve its independence from Soviet and satellite pressure. Although no sums were mentioned in the exchange of letters, the total tripartite contribution for the period July 1, 1952, to June 30, 1953, has been set at 99 million dollars, with the United States tentatively contributing 78 million dollars, the United Kingdom £4½ million (12.6 million dollars), and France 2,940 million francs (8.4 million dollars).

Pursuant to the agreement on the aid program, the Mutual Security Agency has made available 30 million dollars of the total amount in order that Yugoslavia may proceed with its efforts to remedy the critical economic situation caused by the 1952 drought. Since no aid had been made available for fiscal 1953, pending agreement on the program, reserves of raw materials were running low, with the result that a substantial portion of the U.S. allocation will be used to buy industrial raw materials. Wheat and fats will also be bought and shipped immediately to areas which suffered from the drought.

The arrangements for furnishing economic assistance to Yugoslavia were confirmed by the tripartite Governments in the Washington report signed on April 21, 1952. The three Governments incorporated certain portions of their agreement, which involved responsibilities on the part of Yugoslavia, in the diplomatic notes just exchanged. The notes call for internal efforts to achieve equilibrium in the Yugoslav balance of payments in the shortest time possible and, in view of uncertainty concerning the availability of

foreign exchange, the Yugoslavs have been asked to follow a system of priority criteria in planning their investment program. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development is to be regarded insofar as possible as the source of future loans for the Yugoslav investment program.

The four Governments have agreed to exchange views regarding future loans for the Yugoslav investment program and have further agreed to consult together with a view to arriving at an effective means of achieving an amelioration in Yugoslavia's debt position. The four Governments recognize the importance of the industrial development of Yugoslavia, as well as an increase in its agricultural production, in assisting it to arrive at independence of outside assistance. The provisions regarding investment and debts are intended to assure the most effective use of U.S., U.K., and French assistance. The four Governments have also agreed to promote in the highest degree the provision of technical assistance to Yugoslavia.

Although the United States provided the major part of the large UNRRA program to Yugoslavia in 1945 and 1946, direct U.S. grant assistance to Yugoslavia is of recent origin. Following Tito's break with the Cominform in 1948, the United States found it advantageous for political and military reasons to assist Yugoslavia's efforts to resist Soviet pressures. In 1949 and 1950 the Export-Import Bank extended three loans, totaling 55 million dollars, to Yugoslavia. The United States, however, made no direct grant assistance available to Yugoslavia until the latter half of 1950. The drought of that year, combined with the disruption occasioned by the orientation of Yugoslavia's trade toward the West, mounting Yugoslav indebtedness, and the hostile pressures being exerted upon Yugoslavia by the Soviet bloc were situations deemed to be of serious importance to the United States and required aid.

With a view to preventing the suffering of the

Background on Aid to Yugoslavia

- Nov. 20, 21, 1950—Notes exchanged at Belgrade established the basis for MDA assistance to Yugoslavia (BULLETIN of Dec. 18, 1950, p. 985).
- Nov. 24, 1950—The President notified the Congress that Mutual Defense Assistance funds would be used for food as part of an interim-aid program for Yugoslavia (BULLETIN of Dec. 4, 1950, p. 879).
- Nov. 29, 1950—The President requested emergency legislation to relieve the food shortage (BULLETIN of Dec. 11, 1950, p. 937).
- Dec. 29, 1950—The Yugoslav Emergency Relief Assistance Act of 1950 was approved (Public Law 897, 81st Cong.; text, BULLETIN of Feb. 12, 1951, p. 277).
- Jan. 6, 1951—An agreement signed with Yugoslavia set forth the terms for providing food under the Emergency Relief Assistance Act (BULLETIN of Jan. 22, 1951, p. 150).
- Apr. 16, 1951—The President notified the Congress that MDA funds would be used for raw materials critically needed by Yugoslavia (BULLETIN of Apr. 30, 1951, p. 718).
- Apr. 18, 1951—A note to Yugoslavia stated the mutually agreed basis for the provision of raw materials (*ibid.*, p. 717).
- Nov. 7, 1951—The President notified the Congress that military and economic assistance would be furnished Yugoslavia under the Mutual Security Act of 1951 (BULLETIN of Nov. 19, 1951, p. 826).
- Nov. 14, 1951—An agreement signed at Belgrade set forth the conditions governing military assistance to Yugoslavia under the Mutual Security Act of 1951 (BULLETIN of Nov. 26, 1951, p. 863).
- Jan. 8, 1952—An economic cooperation agreement was signed at Belgrade setting forth the understandings as to U. S. economic and technical assistance to Yugoslavia (for text, see *Supplement to the First Report to Congress on the Mutual Security Program*, p. 7).
- Feb. 5, 1952—The President notified the Congress that Mutual Security funds granted to Yugoslavia as well as to several other European countries would be transferred from military assistance to economic assistance (BULLETIN of Feb. 25, 1952, p. 317).

For a chronology covering the period June 1948–November 1950 entitled "Moves of Yugoslavia Away from the Kremlin Toward the West," see House Foreign Affairs Committee print, *Yugoslav Emergency Food Assistance Program*, dated Nov. 27, 1950, 81st Cong., 2d sess.

Yugoslav people, the Congress approved the Yugoslav Emergency Relief Assistance Act of 1950, which, together with other funds made available to meet Yugoslavia's food needs, resulted in the extension of approximately 70.5 million dollars (of which 5.7 million dollars was a portion of a 15-million-dollar Export-Import Bank loan). This action was followed by an allocation in early 1951 of 29 million dollars from Mutual Defense Assistance funds when it became evident that Yugoslavia's defense effort was impaired by inability

to secure raw materials on the world market, normally obtained in exchange for Yugoslav export of foodstuffs. The President informed the Congress that these conditions constituted a threat to the security interests of the United States, and funds to meet the raw-materials needs of the armed forces were provided.

Yugoslavia found itself heavily in debt to the countries of the West, with little prospect of ameliorating its deficit position or continuing to meet its obligations without placing added strain upon the economy. In order to meet the crisis from this source, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France conferred in London in the spring of 1951 to formulate a tripartite program of assistance. It was agreed that the three Governments would undertake to cover Yugoslavia's trading deficit by extending grant aid in the ratio of 65 percent by the United States, 23 percent by the United Kingdom, and 12 percent by France. Concurrently the three Governments encouraged Yugoslavia to approach its creditors for postponement of debt payments with a view to minimizing the amount of aid necessary to cover Yugoslavia's trading deficit and to maximizing the effectiveness of the aid extended. Arrangements to postpone debt payments were made with Germany, Austria, Belgium, and the Netherlands.

Under the program from July 1951 through June 1952, a total of 120 million dollars in economic assistance was provided. The United States supplied 78 million dollars, the United Kingdom 27.6 million dollars, and France 14.4 million dollars. U.S. aid is now being extended under the terms of a bilateral agreement with Yugoslavia dated January 8, 1952, concluded in accordance with the Mutual Security Act of 1951.

• *Mr. Colbert is an international relations officer in the Office of Eastern European Affairs.*

"Yugoslavia: Titoism and U.S. Foreign Policy"

Department of State Publication 4624, available from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C. (5¢).

One of the most significant events in the history of world communism is the split between Communist Yugoslavia and Communist Russia. This explanation of U.S. foreign policy toward Yugoslavia shows how and why a democracy and a Communist nation work together to resist Soviet imperialism.

International Labor Cooperation: A Powerful Adjunct to the U.N.

by Bernard Wiesman¹

To discuss international labor cooperation seems an easy task. An impressive array of examples can be cited to demonstrate that workers in three-score nations are linked together in voluntary associations for high purposes of mutual aid and united progress. Such cooperation is a mighty force, a powerful adjunct to the collaboration embodied in the United Nations.

The particular significance of international labor cooperation is not merely the fact that it stems from so many millions of workers located in so many nations and of so many races, creeds, and colors. It is equally significant because a united world structure of free trade-unions can become an integral part of a world order founded on voluntarism and safeguarded by checks and balances. When a national trade-union center joins a bona fide trade-union international, it gives strength and it gets strength. While contributing to the development of world institutions it compels a separation of powers, a distinct economic element paralleling the political structure.

Just as the Constitution of the United States safeguarded the freedom of American citizens by building a political structure of government in three distinct compartments, so also has individual liberty here been further buttressed by the respective autonomies of labor organizations, business organizations, and agricultural organizations.

Is it too much to expect that trade-union internationals can and will make important contributions to international peace, economic stability, and individual freedom? The answer is that international labor cooperation is already contributing to all three.

¹Address made before the Silver Jubilee Conference, Catholic Association for International Peace, at Washington on Nov. 8 (press release 864 dated Nov. 7). Mr. Wiesman is labor adviser in the Office of Policy and Plans of the International Information Administration.

Activities of the ILO

We know that in World War I, recognition developed among many leaders that real peace can only be established upon a basis of social justice. Samuel Gompers was one of those who saw so clearly and worked so vigorously that part XIII of the Treaty of Versailles established the International Labor Organization. The ILO was and is unique in that it recognizes representatives of industrial organizations of workers and employers respectively, as sharing on a par with those of governments the responsibility for drafting international treaties to set forth basic standards for conditions of employment. The ILO continues as a specialized agency of the United Nations and demonstrates that international codes can be worked out by conference and negotiation of interested parties.

In the maritime field, for example, the ILO has obvious opportunity for setting standards which it is in the self-interest of competitive employers and competitive labor to accept as common minima.

But I think that the ILO has also demonstrated that some of its earliest advocates were unrealistic in expecting international labor legislation to emerge directly from the ILO. Today many of its leaders recognize that organized labor and organized business want to avoid, not to encourage, the practice of legislating their contracts through government. The role of the ILO as the stimulator and moulder of better national labor practices has grown out of the forum of discussion, the laboratory of research and technical assistance, far more than out of the ratification or implementation of international labor conventions. It has brought employers and workers to the same table to face their own problems and to seek to reach acceptable formulas. The ILO has demonstrated that collaboration among nongovernmental organ-

izations can be orderly, consistent, and fruitful.

The outstanding cooperation of trade-unions after World War II has thus far been as much political as economic and has grown out of the conflict between the free world and the slave-masters.

WFTU Becomes Ineffectual

I believe that history will record the failure of the Soviet effort to capture the machinery of free labor as one of the pivotal events of the world struggle. Even before V-E Day had arrived, a World Federation of Trade Unions [WFTU] had been convened through Soviet exploitation of the genuine desire of world labor to work together for peace. It comprised virtually all the trade-union centers of the world, except the several national Christian trade-union centers and the American Federation of Labor, which refused to accept the Soviet labor front as a bona fide trade-union. The WFTU had an impressive beginning. It was hailed as a pattern of a new day. Its importance in the Soviet scheme was evidenced, on the eve of the first session of the U.N. Assembly in London in 1946, by the Russian demand that the WFTU be given a 19th seat in the Economic and Social Council—plus a consultative role in the Assembly itself. This extraordinary demand was so extreme that it fell of its own weight, but only after sounding an alarm among many responsible leaders. The subsequent demand for a unique consultative status for the WFTU within Ecosoc precipitated one of the two major conflicts within the Assembly at its first session.

Had the WFTU demand for unique status been granted, it is possible that the subsequent development of the United Nations might have been fatally dominated by this Trojan Horse within. Surely in the Communist scheme, the role of the labor front is not limited by national frontiers. The coup in Czechoslovakia showed how a labor front can be manipulated by the Soviet.

Being one of several consultants rather than unique, and unable to maintain a pretense of universality, WFTU has become a noisy but relatively ineffectual consultant within the United Nations. In January of 1946, however, it could point to national affiliates in almost every U.N. member nation. Had WFTU possessed an exclusive franchise to pose as the voice of world labor within the Economic and Social Council, how extreme a provocation would have been required to force its non-Communist members to sacrifice what would have been their only opportunity to share in U.N. counselling by withdrawing from the WFTU? The failure to achieve unique status within the United Nations not only limited the original importance of WFTU but it left the door open for responsible free trade-unions to exit when the completely Soviet domination of the WFTU was demonstrated repeatedly and unmistakably.

The principle having been established at the first Assembly, Ecosoc has had several "category A" consultant organizations from the beginning. The American Federation of Labor won its credentials through the contest at the first Assembly. The International Federation of Christian Trade Unions [ICTU] also secured status at an early date. Subsequently the A. F. of L., in effect, passed its consultative role to the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions [ICFTU] soon after ICFTU was founded late in 1949. Hence, the WFTU has never been able to carry out its self-intended function within the United Nations as a self-supported voice of world labor transcending national governments.

Even outside the United Nations, the WFTU failed to accomplish its mission. Its attempt to set up a sort of supervisory function within the allied occupation organizations in Germany and Japan was thwarted at the outset. Then its efforts to subjugate the international trade secretariats were blocked by the skill and determination of some alert and rugged free trade-unionists. Its masquerade as a legitimate trade-union federation ended when Jim Carey of the CIO insisted that the WFTU inform its membership about the Marshall Plan. He pointed out clearly that this plan for economic reconstruction of Europe would accomplish the purposes of the WFTU resolution which had been unanimously adopted at its initial meeting in London. But logic, which could not overcome the Soviet veto within WFTU, nevertheless could and did supply the remedy for free trade-unions. Every free, non-Communist trade-union center which belonged to the WFTU has subsequently withdrawn. It operates today as an unrestrained voice of Moscow, a dangerous machine for entrapping the unsophisticated, a propaganda mill within the United Nations, an apparatus through which Soviet agents can operate, a front which facilitates sinister operations, especially in Asia.

Progress of the ICFTU

Late in 1949, the A. F. of L., the CIO, and the United Mine Workers together with the great majority of the great free trade-union centers of the non-Communist world met in London and established the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. Today the free labor movements of some 70 countries with a membership of about 54 million are operating together through this organization. Except for the Christian Trade Unions which form the International Federation of Christian Trade Unions, the ICFTU includes practically all bona fide trade-union centers. It was established not as a negatively anti-Communist machine but as a positively constructive force to build better lives for workers everywhere with peace and freedom from all totalitarianisms.

The ICFTU has progressed a substantial distance

in its 3 years of existence. Having originated *de novo*, with no cadres trained in underground schools for 30 years, such as serve the WFTU, the ICFTU has had to recruit, train, and develop an organization. It has not been easy and its results thus far have not been sensational. Building a world organization through a free constituency of diverse backgrounds and aims, languages and conditions has many difficulties. The internal tensions are obvious. Yet ICFTU can call attention to achievements which in ordinary times would have been triumphs indeed. German, Austrian, Italian, and Japanese members are together in the ICFTU leadership alongside of American, British, French, Scandinavian, Indian, Pakistani, Latin American. Regional organizations have been established in Latin America and Asia, in Africa and Europe. A functioning school for training union leadership opened last week in Calcutta, and training projects in Latin America followed close after summer schools began in Europe. Within the United Nations, the ICFTU has carried forward the major activities begun so skillfully by the A. F. of L. through one of which a U.N. *Ad Hoc* Committee is now studying the evidence of forced labor exploitation by the Soviet and its satellites. Through another, machinery for investigating charges of violations of trade-union rights has been established. In the economic field, the ICFTU has not only contributed to U.N. study of such basic questions as full employment but has contributed its first president, Paul Finet, as one of the members of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community.

Such achievements are real but so much has been expected of ICFTU that its members are impatiently pressing for more and more, faster and more effective.

The International Federation of Christian Trade Unions, which collaborated with ICFTU unions in the European Recovery Program Trade Union Advisory Committee, has continued to work for the accomplishment of the European community. Its members endorsed the election of Paul Finet to the Schuman Plan authority and has put forward, with ICFTU members' support, its veteran leader P. J. S. Serrarens to become a member of the High Court of the European community.

The strength, progressiveness, and growth of Christian trade-unions in Europe are impressive. In France, Belgium, and the Netherlands, the Christian Trade Unions have become major factors in collective bargaining and in economic and political life. For example, the veteran Gaston Tessier of the French movement is one of his country's delegates to the U.N. Assembly. Several new affiliates from Latin America and Dutch Guiana and one from Vietnam are evidences of the scope and vitality of ICFTU.

At a time when need for cooperation of all non-Communist elements is so pressing, it is encourag-

ing to note that the ICFTU has declared itself ready to collaborate with the ICFTU on condition that the autonomy as well as the spirit and methods of the Christian Trade Union Movement should be respected. One of the first duties of its able new Secretary-General, Vanistendael, will be to explore such possibilities.

Time does not permit adequate discussion of the less spectacular but important collaboration along industrial or craft lines of the so-called international trade secretariats. The International Transport-Workers Federation, the International Metal Workers, the Mine Workers International are the most prominent of a score of organizations through which national trade-unions combine to analyze and discuss common problems of their respective fields. This work has been stimulated by the Industrial Committees of the ILO and by the active participation of American unions, especially during the past 2 or 3 years. The ones named are associated with ICFTU and similar organizations are linked with ICFTU.

After the WFTU had lost its free trade-union members and had failed to capture any trade secretariats except the Journalists' Organization, the Soviet agency established nearly a score of industrial departments. They constitute a substantial outlay of Communist cash and presumably are regarded as important propaganda vehicles as well as a fabric for linking individual Communist-controlled unions such as the Harry Bridges' ILWU with their accomplices elsewhere.

Other elements for international cooperation exist through the International Trade Union Center in Exile and the central European Federation of Christian Trade Unions, which focus world attention upon the suppression of trade-union rights in their homelands.

Importance Attached to International Functions

✓ The international activity of major free trade-union centers deserves special mention here. The British, French, and German centers have a tradition of international activity, but I believe none of them can point to a more extensive and energetic activity than that of the A. F. of L. Free Trade Union Committee. Such widespread recognition has been given to the work of Irving Brown in combatting the Communist program in Europe that it is necessary here only to say that the credit for his mission belongs to himself and the Committee. Communist attribution of his work as an accomplishment of the State Department is a compliment which we simply do not deserve. In fact, one of the many proofs of the genuineness of the free trade-union movement has been its complete freedom and frankness in criticizing governmental action. They tell us how we should operate; we have neither the right nor the competence to steer them. It would be a serious omission, moreover, if due credit were not given to the Committee, especially to its executive secretary, Jay Lovestone,

for its constructive contribution to the free world. The Committee has had the guidance of Matthew Woll, Dave Dubinsky, and George Meany and has drawn on the zeal of a Dick Deverall in Asia as well as on the organizing skill of an Irving Brown or a Henry Rutz or the ideological experience of a Harry Goldberg or Harry Kirsh.

The Cio, also, has expanded its field service with the energetic operations of Victor Reuther and his staff in Europe. His work has helped to emphasize training of officers at the plant level and to contribute to the development of trade-union schools and to progress in organizing and administrative methods.

The international responsibilities of Phil Delaney at A. F. of L. and Mike Ross at Cio headquarters are further examples of the importance attached by top trade-unionists to the international function today.

In almost every important foreign mission of the United States, labor attachés or reporting officers are assigned to study labor developments and keep ambassadors and Washington informed and advised. In the International Information Administration, the high importance of labor is also recognized in the development of American propaganda. In several posts, men out of the American labor movement are moulding Usis output to carry the common message of freedom to working people. These are not merely anti-Communist words; the practical building-up of united action for freedom is the really effective way to hurt communism and their totalitarianisms. For example, the sturdy trade-unionism of our Labor Information Officer in the Philippines, Tom Flynn of Brooklyn, has given life and substance to the informational techniques and American examples which show rank and file workers in that great new nation how to make progress toward real freedom. The Voice of America and local radio, press and publications, the International Motion Picture Service, Information Centers, and the exchange of persons programs are major programs of the Department of State, all of which are being used to help bring the facts of free labor to, and to stimulate effective cooperation among workers everywhere.

Specific examples of useful labor cooperation in all areas could be recited at length but even more evidences could be enumerated of the need for real understanding of common dangers and of practical self-help and united effort to win political, economic, and social freedom and security.

In a nondenominational approach to strengthen the cause of real peace throughout the world, growing awareness exists of the need for religious content. In the task of the International Information Administration, we know that no mere enumeration of materialistic attainments will win the spirit of mankind to our side. Further, since our Campaign of Truth aims at the goal of Peace with Freedom, it necessarily is dedicated to freeing the

human personality from the tyranny of totalitarianism.

Devout men and women of any religion share that goal and can help in its realization just as can and do the practical leaders of free labor of the free world.

Engineers Appointed to International Boundary Commission

Commissioner L. M. Lawson has announced the appointment (press release 849 of October 31) of Joseph F. Friedkin as principal engineer (supervising), and Lyle H. Henderson as principal engineer (planning), of the U.S. section of the International Boundary and Water Commission, United States and Mexico.

The International Boundary and Water Commission consists of the U.S. section at El Paso, Tex., and the Mexican Section at Ciudad Juárez, Mexico. Functioning as an international body under the Department of State and the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Relations, the Commission is charged with the conduct of a positive program for cooperative action between the two countries in the solution of numerous common boundary problems. Each section is headed by an engineer commissioner and consists of two principal engineers, a legal adviser, and a secretary.

Export-Import Bank To Supply Credit for Mexican Sulfur Plant

The Export-Import Bank of Washington on October 24 announced signing of an agreement under which the Bank will lend 3,664,000 dollars to the Pan-American Sulphur Company of Dallas, Tex., and its Mexican operating subsidiary, Gulf Sulphur de Mexico, S.A. This credit will assist in financing the construction of a 6.7 million-dollar sulfur-extraction plant near Jaltipan, State of Vera Cruz, Mexico. The operation of the Frasch process plant is expected to produce 300,000 or more tons of elemental sulfur per year as an addition to the world supply of this essential material.

The Jaltipan salt dome on the Isthmus of Tehuantepec is a geological formation similar to the sulfur domes of the Gulf Coast which have been a major source of sulfur. Exploratory drilling by Gulf Sulphur de Mexico has disclosed substantial reserves of sulfur which it is planned will be extracted by the Frasch process. The principal features of the plant, financed under this credit, consist of boilers capable of producing 3,300,000 gallons of superheated water per day and associated water-treatment plants, pumps, generators, and related equipment for processing sulfur. A complete town site for employees also will be provided.

The Task Ahead for UNESCO

by Howland H. Sargeant

*Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs*¹

On a hot July afternoon over a year ago, I declared the sixth session of the General Conference of UNESCO adjourned. At that time I pledged the delegates to serve truly and faithfully as ambassadors of UNESCO's ideas. As we meet again in the seventh General Conference of UNESCO, I am happy to see so many of my old friends among the returning ambassadors of ideas. I welcome new delegates bringing fresh ideas to our deliberations.

I greet with pleasure the representatives of the United Nations and of our sister specialized agencies and those of the nongovernmental organizations whose collaboration is of such importance to the success of UNESCO.

This will be an important General Conference. We find that some of the problems we struggled with last year are still more acute and difficult today. This does not frighten us. We look back on 7 years of UNESCO's steady, healthy growth. Seven years ago this month on November 20, the first General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization convened here in Paris. At that meeting, 48 states were represented, but only 30 of them were voting members. Today 65 states are participating members. They share the responsibility for creating and maintaining the understanding and the cooperation essential to the realization of peace between peoples and the achievement of human progress.

Through 58 National Commissions, through the interest and support of a large number of nongovernmental organizations, and through its own works, UNESCO is becoming known to increasing numbers of people throughout the world. We all take pride in this development. We must also recognize that, as more people come to know UNESCO, we are under heavier obligation not to disappoint their expectations.

The first session of the General Conference of

UNESCO might have adopted a timid course. It might have decided to concentrate merely on promoting intellectual cooperation among scholars or it might have planned a purely technical role for UNESCO. But, a bolder course was charted. The eminent French statesman, M. Leon Blum, who was president of the first session of the General Conference, foresaw two kinds of achievements for UNESCO—on the one hand precise, methodical, and progressive enterprise in a number of essential technical spheres, on the other hand a general combined action affecting the spiritual condition of peoples and individuals.

During succeeding years UNESCO successfully mobilized resources to help restore educational, scientific, and cultural institutions sorely damaged by a devastating war without losing sight of its long-term objectives. During these formative years UNESCO moved forward in technical spheres by encouraging scholarly enterprises and developing ways to bring about closer collaboration between scientists, educators, humanists, creative artists, and writers.

As we open our seventh conference, we are enjoying once more the generous hospitality extended to us by the Republic of France. We meet again in the great city of Paris, the heart of a cultural tradition from which man has derived some of his noblest inspiration. May we draw from these surroundings renewed courage and confidence.

I want to take this occasion to express my personal sorrow at the death since we met together last year of Count Stefano Jaecini who contributed so greatly to the development of our organization. During his term as president of the General Conference, his abilities as statesman and scholar gave us a balanced guidance.

We need to remember his words to us last year when he described UNESCO as "the great institution for the defense and dissemination of culture, science, and education." He told us further: "Its subject is human personality—its method is the

¹Excerpt from an address made before the seventh General Conference of UNESCO at Paris on Nov. 12 (press release 867).

free circulation of ideas and of the instruments of culture—its purpose is peace.”

We shall sorely miss his counsel.

As we gather here, the General Assembly of the United Nations is in session. These two great conferences have certain elements in common. In each case, the Assembly is the democratic community in which the wills of the member nations are expressed. During the period of our deliberations here in Paris, it is we, the delegates to the General Conference, who must speak in the name of UNESCO.

Achievements of the U.N.

At the General Assembly of the United Nations, tremendously difficult problems are being discussed. Although sharp ideological differences are creating divisions among men and although there have been many threats to the peace during the life of the United Nations, each threat to the peace has been dealt with within the framework of the United Nations. In each case save one, the United Nations has helped bring about a cessation of hostilities. The exception is Korea, where member nations are proving the worth of the concept of collective security and of their determination to preserve peace with honor for nations both small and large.

Many who are here today will recall the honor paid us last year by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Trygve Lie, in his personal visit to the sixth General Conference. I still recall his eloquent words:

For the first time in history a world organization acted to meet armed aggression with collective forces. Because of that action, and because of the courageous and self-sacrificing fight waged by the United Nations forces in Korea, the development of collective security against war anywhere in the world has been greatly advanced. The men who are fighting and dying under their national flags and the flag of the United Nations serve the noblest of all causes; they are fighting to prevent a third world war.

From these developments we can well take encouragement. I feel that the successes of the United Nations, the parent organization, and of UNESCO, show that a third world war can be avoided. I believe this because I am sure that the peace which men of good will have envisioned can become a reality.

That the peace we want and plead for does not exist today should not discourage us. Rather it should strengthen our resolution to build this peace. UNESCO complements the work of the United Nations in its ability to increase the educational, cultural, and scientific resources of the world and in our ability to promote greater understanding by the peoples in our world of the true requirements for lasting peace. For, unless peoples can be made to understand the present problems of the world sufficiently well to make individual and national choices, they will not see

how they can help fashion the peace. They must understand the substance of the problems which must be solved before peace can be constructed. UNESCO's role is to join in the creation of this understanding, to make peoples aware of the changes that are taking place in the world today so that they can act harmoniously both as individuals and as groups.

UNESCO's Vital Role

I believe this is the task which Secretary-General Lie was describing to us last year when he said:

UNESCO has a key position in the efforts which the United Nations organizations must now make to fulfill in an unsettled world the great purposes for which they were established. Through the wide scope and diversity of its various activities, it has an immense range of contacts throughout the world. Through the nature of its work, it has the possibility of influencing the minds of men and the ideas which motivate men's actions. It has a vital role to play in support of the total United Nations effort for peace.

This is a great and noble task. And in considering this task, it is relevant to ask: How can nations collaborate through education, science, and culture to achieve universal respect for justice and for the rule of law unless their peoples can obtain a clear view of the actions of men and nations which tend to achieve justice and to promote regard for the rule of law, and unless they are equally able to discern what actions taken by men or by nations ignore justice and reject the rule of law?

The intellectual and moral climate conducive to the realization of peace can hardly be achieved unless men come to understand the nature of the world as it is. Is it not, then, a duty of UNESCO to contribute to this understanding by helping men to obtain a clear view of each other's ways of life and of those forces which tend to unify as well as those which tend to divide men among themselves?

We should not be discouraged by the enormity of this task. Instead we should be all the more determined not to let this General Conference become submerged in consideration of petty details and thereby lose sight of the major challenge posed for us by the nature of the world in which we live today.

We should face these problems squarely and courageously in the hope that by taking counsel together we may find solutions and satisfying realistic answers, based firmly upon the principles of UNESCO's charter.

In the present world UNESCO may find that to live up to the principles of its charter may seem frustrating, but each time that our General Conference, our Executive Board, our Director General, or a single member state speak out in defense of our principles when those principles are placed in jeopardy or violated, our cause is strengthened

and our course is made clearer. Every delegate here represents a sovereign nation. He knows that UNESCO was founded on the concept of the independence and integrity of his and every other nation. As our Director General, whose distinguished leadership has served as such an inspiration to us, has so well said:

It has never been the purpose of UNESCO to turn citizens from their national loyalties, we are trying to do something quite different: to train citizens—since we are concerned with education—who will be faithful in their duty to their country and who, for that very reason, will also be loyal to the international obligations which their country has assumed.

Every delegate here knows that UNESCO hopes to preserve the “fruitful diversity of cultures” of its member states. We realize the rich treasures of creative achievement springing from these diverse cultures. We of the New World have long been aware of our indebtedness to other cultures, to the Near East and Far East, and to Europe. We know also that we are busy opening spiritual and cultural frontiers of our own; that, in a cultural sense, we are continuing Columbus’ spirit of discovery.

Delegates from other nations value their cultures as fully as we Americans cherish ours. Together in UNESCO we seek the free exchange of knowledge and the free flow of ideas that bring about a more perfect understanding of each other’s cultures. We want none of their values to be lost. We want each to contribute to the utmost in our common human endeavor.

The strength of the nations, which can honestly and genuinely subscribe to and uphold UNESCO, lies in their recognition of the wide diversity among cultures and their basic agreement on fundamental principles and obligations.

U.N. Begins New Consideration of South African Racial Question

*Statement by Charles A. Sprague
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly*¹

For the sixth time, the General Assembly is called upon to deal with this complaint that persons are being discriminated against because of race and color. The very fact that this problem has repeatedly come before us is in itself an index of the difficulties that have been encountered in finding a satisfactory solution.

Because it is so difficult, it is important for us to state clearly the purposes for which we enter this discussion. If this definition of purpose does not shorten the road it may increase our courage to go forward.

I speak for a country which was founded upon

¹ Made in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee on Nov. 4 on the question of treatment of Indians in South Africa.

the belief that all men are created equal and that the function of government is to protect the rights of all men alike to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Safeguards for these basic rights were written into our Constitution and then further and more detailed safeguards were worked out in the 10 amendments which we know as our Bill of Rights.

We were then a country of many national strains and many religious beliefs who treasured individual liberty all the more because of personal experience with intolerance and oppression.

Since that time we have learned again and again the value in diversity as our economy and our culture have been enriched and enlarged by streams of immigrants of many nationalities and the most varied habits and beliefs. In signing the Charter of the United Nations, whose preamble implicitly affirms the faith of our organization in the dignity and worth of the individual human being and in the equality of human rights, we reaffirmed a belief which many of us consider fundamental to our national strength and vitality.

But let me say that to translate ideals into realities in the field of human relations is a long and difficult task as we well know. Though our Declaration of Independence proclaimed that all men are created free and equal, the Emancipation Proclamation by President Lincoln was not made until 87 years later. It took a long and bloody civil war to end the evil of human slavery. And although we adopted three additional amendments to our Constitution to confirm equality under the law, the question of civil rights remains one of the acute problems in my own country. My own State of Oregon, and others, have passed laws for fair employment practices to prohibit discrimination in employment on the grounds of race or color or religion; but there is still resistance in many areas to compulsory legislation on this subject, and related matters of civil rights.

The roots of discrimination run deep. They may lie in fear, or ignorance, or prejudice, or they may lie in wide disparities of culture and education and resources which cannot be erased by a mere fist of law. The relations vary as conditions vary within nations and among groups. Progress comes in human relations when equality of opportunity is provided through the spread of education and through moral enlightenment. That is slow, painfully slow, discouragingly slow, as our own experience has shown.

All nations in any true confessional would have to admit their own shortcomings. Racial pride and prejudice are the more pronounced where groups of the more advanced civilizations are in contact with less developed peoples and where the standard of living is low and the struggle for existence sharpens the ancient prejudices.

Despite the difficulties that lie along this path there should be no controversy over the direction in which the path should lead. The Charter sets

forth as the third of the purposes of the United Nations:

To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.

So the test is not just how bad conditions are in the country but whether efforts are being made to improve those conditions in the direction of the goals set by the Charter. That is where the concern of this Committee arises over the subject now under consideration—the treatment of persons of Indian origin in South Africa. Here there appears to be a serious difference in direction in national policy from that endorsed by the Charter.

There is an important distinction to be drawn between the haphazard, vestigial, unsanctioned violations of human rights which continue to occur in all countries and a situation such as this where it is complained that governmental policy runs counter to the whole current of modern philosophy and scientific knowledge and to the line of social and humanitarian conduct recommended in the Charter.

It is true that the question before us today has its own peculiar dimensions of geography, of numerical proportion, of cultural divergence and economic relationships. However, extreme and peculiar difficulties do not relieve a government of its responsibilities; nor can it relieve the United Nations of its obligations in this field.

Creating a Favorable Atmosphere

The question remains: What can we hope to accomplish by this renewed discussion of a problem which has already occupied the attention of five Assemblies?

My hope and the hope of my Government is to create an atmosphere favorable to negotiation between the parties. A complaint has been brought before us and we must lend whatever wisdom and experience we have to the discussion without attempting to impose any solution—however ingenious—to a problem that must finally be solved by the parties themselves.

We can hope for progress only to the extent that the parties are willing to confer. The many and disappointing set-backs in this case have occurred precisely because contact has been broken off, thus making impossible even the exchange of views essential to any settlement. It is for this reason that we believe our activity can most usefully be directed toward bringing the parties together. Conversely, we must try to avoid any action which may in any way hinder the resumption of negotiations.

This is not a new definition of our purposes or of our methods. All of the resolutions passed by previous sessions of the Assembly have been directed toward this end.

The history of this question before this Assembly need not be rehearsed. All are familiar with the fact that previous efforts to settle this question have met with failure. What the Assembly may do must be considered in the light of our experience. Of one thing we should be sure and that is that any proposal must be measured by the purpose set forth in article I, subparagraphs 3 and 4 of the Charter:

To achieve international cooperation . . . in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and

To be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.

Note that the purpose must be to *promote* and to *encourage* the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Every proposal must be squared with that intent. Resolutions should not be provocative nor such as would excite adverse nationalist reactions. Rather they must follow the path of accommodation through negotiation in the true spirit of the Charter.

Doubtful Provisions of New Resolutions

My delegation will consider every proposal by this yardstick defined in the Charter. Using this yardstick, the United States believes that the proposal before us sponsored by the 14 delegations sets forth a possible approach to the problem; but it does, by the same measure, contain certain provisions about which my delegation has some doubts.

I have in mind, first, the provision in paragraph 4 which "calls upon the Government of the Union of South Africa to suspend the implementation of enforcement of the provisions of the Group Areas Act, pending the conclusion of the negotiations." With respect to this paragraph, the passage of time has strengthened the doubts which we expressed last year of the advisability of singling out for censure a specific piece of national legislation, however unacceptable the philosophy of that legislation may be to many of us.

Furthermore, in my judgment, there is a more important objection to the paragraph. This paragraph appears to impose a condition precedent to the negotiations between the parties. Although this condition may represent our own view of a satisfactory negotiating situation, its inclusion may actually impair the achievement of our first and immediate objective: to have the parties sit down together and resume their negotiations. Finally, the subject of this paragraph would seem to fall more logically under the next item on our agenda, namely: The Question of Race Conflict in South Africa.

My delegation also has some doubts about paragraph 2 and paragraph 5. These paragraphs request the Good Offices Commission to report to the eighth session of the General Assembly and

Text of Resolution ¹

U.N. doc. A/AC.61/L.7
Dated November 12, 1952

The General Assembly,
RECALLING its resolutions 44 (I), 265 (III), 395 (V) and 511 (VI) relating to the treatment of people of Indian origin in the Union of South Africa,

NOTING that the Government of the Union of South Africa has expressed its inability to accept General Assembly resolution 511 (VI) in respect of the resumption of negotiations with the Governments of India and Pakistan,

NOTING further that the Government of the Union of South Africa has continued to enforce the Group Areas Act in contravention of the terms of General Assembly resolutions 511 (VI) and 395 (V).

1. *Establishes* a United Nations Good Offices Commission consisting of . . . members to be nominated by the President of the General Assembly, with a view to arranging and assisting in negotiations between the Government of the Union of South Africa and the Governments of India and Pakistan in order that a satisfactory solution of the question in accordance with the Principles and Purposes of the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights may be achieved;

2. *Requests* the Good Offices Commission to report to the General Assembly at its eighth session;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide the members of the Commission with the necessary staff and facilities;

4. *Calls upon* the Government of the Union of South Africa to suspend the implementation or enforcement of the provisions of the Group Areas Act, pending the conclusion of the negotiations referred to in paragraph 1 above;

5. *Decides* to include this item in the agenda of the next regular session of the General Assembly.

¹ Sponsored by Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand, and Yemen.

The resolution was approved by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee on Nov. 11 by a vote of 41-1 (Union of South Africa).

Assembly at such time as it deems appropriate; the last paragraph of the draft resolution could be omitted altogether.

With these reservations my delegation will support the 14-power draft.

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

Social Welfare Conferences in India

The Department of State on November 14 (press release 873) announced that many Americans distinguished in the field of social-welfare work in the United States are planning to attend two international conferences which are to be held in India during the month of December.

On December 5, 1952, at Bombay, the International Union for Child Welfare is convening an international study conference with the general theme "Child Welfare in Relation to Social Services and the Raising of Standards of Living." Participants will discuss (1) the education of parents with regard to the physical health of the child, including feeding and housing; (2) the education of parents with regard to the mental health of the child; (3) the role of health visitors in relation to the education of parents; (4) the role of other services and organizations. Before the adjournment of the conference on December 12, there will be a special session, in cooperation with the International Society for the Welfare of Cripples, on "Care and Education of the Physically Handicapped Child."

The International Union for Child Welfare is a federation of national and international organizations, mostly voluntary agencies, concerned with promoting the well-being of children the world over.

At Madras, India, December 14-19, 1952, the Sixth International Conference of Social Work will be held. Since 1928, when the First International Conference of Social Work was held at Paris, this series of nongovernmental conferences has served as an international forum for the discussion of important social-work issues and for the exchange of information and experience among social workers and social agencies throughout the world. It has consultative status with the United Nations. The main theme for discussion will be the role of social services in raising standards of living everywhere, with particular reference to the development of social services in underdeveloped areas. It is expected that the Sixth Conference will serve as a focal point for the coordination of activity, integration of planning, and stimulation of social-welfare and health-development projects in the Far East for the years ahead. The Seventh Conference is to be held at Toronto in 1954.

the inclusion of this item on the agenda of that Assembly.

Our doubts about these paragraphs are also connected with our single aim of encouraging and assisting negotiations between the parties. It seems to my delegation that we may not be helpful to the Good Offices Commission in instructing it when to report and in deciding now to put this item on the agenda of the eighth General Assembly. If the Good Offices Commission deems it useful to report to the next session, it will be mandatory under Rule 13 of our Rules of Procedure for the Secretary-General to include the report on the provisional agenda. Moreover, even if the Good Offices Commission should choose not to report to the eighth session, any member is entitled to propose the inclusion of the item on the agenda of that session. It would thus be sufficient to request the Good Offices Commission to report to the

American participation in these conferences will be under the leadership of the U.S. Committee for the International Conference of Social Work. Lester B. Granger, Executive Director of the National Urban League, and Fred K. Hoehler, Director of the Illinois Department of Public Welfare, are co-chairmen of the committee for the international conference at Madras.

U.S. Government officials attending both Conferences in their individual capacities include: Oscar R. Ewing, Administrator of the Federal Security Agency; Jane M. Hoey, Director of the Bureau of Public Assistance of the Federal Security Agency and Alternate U.S. Representative on the Social Commission of the United Nations, which is concerned with the raising of living standards in underdeveloped areas; Wilbur J. Cohen, Technical Adviser to the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Federal Security Agency; and Melvin A. Glasser, Special Assistant for State and National Relations of the Children's Bureau, Federal Security Agency, and President of the International Federation of Social Workers.

Other Government officials attending in private capacities are Mildred Arnold, Director of the Division of Social Services of the Children's Bureau; Ruth Bartlett, Regional and Child Welfare Representative, Children's Bureau; and Bessie Trout, Consultant on Staff Development, Children's Bureau.

Among the heads of national organizations in the field of social welfare who will be attending the conference in Madras will be Robert E. Bondy, Director of the National Social Welfare Assembly; Joseph P. Anderson, Executive Secretary of the American Association of Social Workers; Loula Dunn, Director of the American Public Welfare Association; and Margaret Hickey, Vice Chairman of the Board of Governors of the American National Red Cross.

Dr. Henry H. Kessler of the Kessler Institute for Rehabilitation, and past President and member of the Council of the International Society for the Welfare of Cripples, is planning to attend both Conferences, as are approximately 90 other specialists in the field of social work from the United States. The Fifth Conference, held at Paris in 1950, was attended by approximately 1,800 persons from 47 countries.

At this time it is known that the Conferences will also be attended by interested specialists from Belgium, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, Denmark, Egypt, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Japan, Malaya, the Netherlands, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Trinidad, the United Kingdom, and Yugoslavia.

While he is in Bombay, Mr. Ewing will attend a regional conference, held under the auspices of the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, on free and compulsory education in South Asia and the Pacific. En route to and from

these Conferences, Mr. Ewing will visit a number of countries for the purpose of holding discussions with Government officials and others interested in social welfare. It is expected that in these discussions he will describe in particular U.S. Government activities in the fields of education, health, and social security, as well as the ways in which the various economic-aid programs, including Point Four, have assisted in the development of the social-welfare activities of the underdeveloped areas.

Seventh Conference of UNESCO

The Department of State announced on November 6 (press release 861) that the U.S. delegation to the seventh General Conference of the U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) which convenes at Paris on November 12, 1952, will be as follows:

U.S. representatives

Howland H. Sargeant, *Chairman*, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs

Walter W. Laves, *Vice chairman*, Vice President for Research, Governmental Affairs Institute, Washington

Luther Evans, Librarian of Congress, Washington

Alternate U.S. representatives

Robert C. Angell, Chairman, Department of Sociology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

Walter M. Kotschnig, Director, Office of U.N. Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State

Max McCullough, Director, UNESCO Relations Staff, Department of State

Congressional adviser

Charles W. Tobey, U.S. Senate

Advisers

David Apter, UNESCO Relations Staff, Department of State

Sarah Caldwell, President, National Education Association, Washington

Monsignor Frederick G. Hochwalt, Director of Education, National Catholic Education Association, Washington

Caroline C. Laise, Division of International Administration, Department of State

Paul H. Sheats, Professor of Education, University of California, Los Angeles

Elvin C. Stakman, Chief, Division of Plant Pathology and Botany, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis

Charles A. Thomson, Counselor of Embassy for UNESCO Affairs, American Embassy, Paris

Secretary of delegation

David Persinger, Division of International Conferences, Department of State

Technical secretary

Robert S. Smith, Assistant Attaché, American Embassy, Paris

Reports officer

Mary W. Umbarger, Office of U.N. Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State

Administrative officer

Mason A. LaSelle, Assistant Conference Attaché, American Consulate General, Geneva

UNESCO is a specialized agency of the United Nations which carries on widespread and varied educational, scientific, and cultural activities designed to promote international understanding and to contribute to improved conditions of stability and well-being in many countries. Within its broad mandate it is focusing its work increasingly on three major lines of effort: (1) assisting underdeveloped countries to accelerate their development through programs of technical assistance and fundamental education; (2) facilitating interchange of knowledge and information among scholars, educators, and other specialists through international seminars, publishing of materials, and creation of international voluntary associations; and (3) contributing to citizen understanding of international relationships.

Pan American Highway Congress

The Department of State announced on October 25 (press release 842) that the U.S. Government will be represented at the Special Session of the Pan American Highway Congress, which will convene on October 26 at Mexico, D.F., by the following delegation:

Chairman

Jack G. Scott, Under Secretary of Commerce for Transportation, Department of Commerce

Special Congressional delegate

Spessard L. Holland, U.S. Senate

Delegates

Robert B. Brooks, Consulting Engineer, St. Louis, Mo.

Edwin W. James, Chief, Inter-American Regional Office, Bureau of Public Roads, Department of Commerce

Henry H. Kelly, Office of Transportation and Communications, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State

Charles P. Nolan, Officer in Charge, Transportation and Communications, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State

Paul B. Reinhold, President, American Roadbuilders' Association, Washington, D.C.

Russell Singer, Executive Vice President, American Automobile Association, Washington, D.C.

Francis Turner, Assistant to the Commissioner, Bureau of Public Roads, Department of Commerce

Secretary

Melville Osborne, Assistant Attaché, American Embassy, Mexico City

During the Special Session, representatives of the 21 American Republics will discuss important measures looking toward the earliest possible completion of the Pan American Highway System and the development of continental highways. Important agenda items relate to the best means of financing the uncompleted portions of the Pan American Highway System from Alaska to Argentina, the creation of an efficient highway department, the planning of highway development in each country, and the possible establishment of technical committees to function during the intervals between the periodic highway congresses.

Inter-American Congress of Radiology

The Department of State announced on November 3 (press release 855) that the U.S. delegation to the fourth Inter-American Congress of Radiology, which is to be held at México, D. F., November 2-8, 1952, will be as follows:

Chairman

James T. Case, M.D., Professor Emeritus, Department of Radiology, Northwestern University, Chicago

Delegates

Paul C. Aebersold, Ph.D., Director, Isotopes Division, Atomic Energy Commission, Oak Ridge, Tenn.

Joseph C. Bell, M.D., Associate Professor in Radiology, University of Louisville Medical School, Louisville

George C. Bess, Lt. Col., U.S.A.F. (MC), 5th Medical Group, Travis Air Force Base, Calif.

Howard P. Doub, M.D., Chief, Department of Radiology, Henry Ford Hospital, Detroit

Gioscelino Failla, M.D., Member, Advisory Committee for Biology and Medicine, Atomic Energy Commission, Washington

Lowell S. Goin, M.D., Roentgenologist to Queen of Angels Hospital, Los Angeles

Ross Golden, M.D., Professor of Radiology, Columbia University, New York

Philip J. Hodes, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Radiology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia

Maurice Lenz, M.D., Professor of Clinical Radiology, College of Physicians and Surgeons, Columbia University, New York

Egon Lorenz, Ph.D., Chief, Laboratory of Biophysics, National Cancer Institute, Bethesda, Md.

Eugene P. Pendergrass, M. D., Professor of Radiology, Hospital of University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia

Edith H. Quimby, Sc. D., Associate Professor of Radiology, College of Physicians and Surgeons, Columbia University, New York

Juan A. del Regato, M. D., Director Penrose Cancer Hospital, Colorado Springs

Waldron M. Sennott, M. D., Chief Roentgenologist, U. S. Public Health Service Hospital, Stapleton, N. Y.

The discussions and the technical papers to be presented at the fourth congress relate to the therapeutic benefits and the toxicities resulting from the use of radioisotopes.

In addition to the governmental delegation, participants from the United States will include other specialists attending in their private capacities as members of the Radiology Society of North America, the American Roentgen Ray Society, the American Radium Society, the American College of Radiology, and the section on radiology of the American Medical Association.

Special Meeting on Frequency Planning (ICAO)

The Department of State announced on October 28 (press release 843) that, under the auspices of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), a special meeting on Frequency Planning for the European-Mediterranean Region would convene on that day at Paris. As a member state in ICAO, with U.S. planes operating in the region, the U.S. Government is participating in the meeting through an official delegation, which is as follows:

Chairman

Seymour Stearns, Major, Frequency Branch, Directorate of Communications, U.S. Air Force

Members

Elery E. Estes, Chief, Frequency Utilization Section, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

William J. McKnight, Manager, Liaison Activities, Aeronautical Radio, Inc.

Donald C. Mitchell, Assistant Chief, Aviation Division, Federal Communications Commission

Advisers

William O. Ezell, Major, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force Europe

Gordon W. Smith, Captain, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force Europe

Standing Committee on Performance (ICAO)

The Department of State announced on November 12 (press release 868) that the third meeting of the International Civil Aviation Organization's Standing Committee on Performance had convened at Montreal on November 11. The U.S. delegation to this meeting is as follows:

Delegate

Raymond B. Maloy, Chief, Engineering Flight Test Branch, Office of Aviation Safety, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

Alternate delegates

John A. Carran, Chief, Aerodynamics Section, Office of Aviation Safety, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

Hugh B. Freeman, Aeronautical Engineer, Airworthiness Division, Civil Aeronautics Board

Advisers

Joseph Matulaitis, Chief, International and Regulations Staff, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

F. Stanley Nowlan, Jr., Engineering Consultant to the Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

Since 1950 various ICAO bodies have worked on the development of aircraft-performance standards for inclusion in the Operations and Airworthiness Annexes (Annexes 6 and 8) to the Convention on International Civil Aviation. In 1951, on the recommendation of the ICAO Airworthiness and Operations Divisions and with the approval of the ICAO Council, the Air Navigation Commission established a small standing committee to carry on necessary technical studies and discussions. This committee, which is composed of technical specialists provided by interested ICAO contracting states and the International Air Transport Association, has held meetings at Montreal, November 6-16, 1951, and at Copenhagen, May 19-June 9, 1952, and is reconvening for the purpose of compelling draft standards so that trial applications may be made of those standards before its fourth meeting in Europe in 1953.

The development of aircraft performance standards requires detailed study of many highly complex technical operating factors. The standing committee has been concerned, for example, with

the effects of various systems of feathering propellers, the design and power factors which must be observed to provide for safety in the event of the failure of one or more engines of a plane in flight, the analysis of data on balked landing statistics, study of the speeds essential to take-off safety, and an analysis of the flight paths (speeds, heights, configurations) essential to safety in connection with final approaches and balked landings. All such studies must of course take into account the different characteristics of different types of transport aircraft, as well as differences between turbine and reciprocating-engined aircraft.

International Wool Study Group

The Department of State announced on November 3 (press release 854) that Eric Englund, attaché, American Embassy, London, will be the U.S. delegate to the fifth meeting of the International Wool Study Group, which will begin on that date at London. He will be assisted by Eugene T. Ransom, Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, Department of Agriculture, who will serve as alternate U.S. delegate.

The main objectives of the forthcoming meeting are to examine the current position of wool in the world, using various reports prepared by the Management Committee of the Study Group and other available information, and to review the statements presented by each member country on its wool situation.

The membership of the Wool Study Group, which is open to any country substantially interested in the production, consumption, or trade in wool, consists of Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, India, Iran, Israel, Italy, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Switzerland, the Union of South Africa, the United Kingdom, the United States, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia. In addition, Brazil, Ireland, Japan, Norway, Portugal, and Spain have been invited to attend the forthcoming meeting.

Dr. Martha M. Eliot Attends Meeting on Child Care

Press release 856 dated Nov. 3

Dr. Martha M. Eliot, U.S. technical delegate on the Directing Council of the American International Institute for the Protection of Childhood, attended the third regional meeting of technical delegates at Mexico, D.F., November 3 to 6, at the request of the Director of the Institute.

This meeting, one of a series of regional discussions organized by the Institute, was convened for the purpose of presenting reports of the work being done and advancement made in the field of child care in the areas of Cuba, the Dominican

Republic, Haiti, the United States, and probably Venezuela. Each meeting in this series is designed to enable the participants to discuss reports on such subjects as health, social welfare, education, and legislation pertaining to children in their respective countries: to explore opportunities for encouraging the training of persons engaged in activities relating to children; and to consider the possibility of establishing closer interrelationships among the professional groups concerned with child welfare in the various countries represented.

Dr. Eliot participated as an observer in the second regional meeting of technical delegates held at Montevideo on June 12, 1952, which was attended by representatives from Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay. A fourth meeting will

be held early in 1953 to consider activities in the countries of the north and northwest part of South America.

The Institute, established in 1927, serves as a center of social action, information, documentation, and study of all aspects of child life and welfare. The governing body of the Institute, known as the Directing Council, is composed of two delegates from each member country—a resident delegate at Montevideo, which is the headquarters of the Institute, and a technical delegate having responsibility for matters relating to childhood and resident in the country he represents. Dr. Eliot, who is Chief of the Children's Bureau, Federal Security Agency, was appointed U.S. technical delegate by the President on January 12, 1952, for a 3-year term.

The United States in the United Nations

[November 8-14, 1952]

General Assembly

Secretary-General's Resignation—In the Nov. 10 plenary session, Trygve Lie read the following letter which he had handed that morning to Lester Pearson, President of the Assembly:

Dear Mr. Pearson, I wish to refer to our personal and confidential conversation on the eleventh of September, in which I informed you that I had decided, after lengthy consideration over many months, to submit my resignation as Secretary-General of the United Nations.

It had been my intention—as I informed you then—to take this step at the opening of the seventh session of the General Assembly. I have delayed until today, when the Foreign Ministers of the five Permanent Members of the Security Council are all present for the first time during this session, in the hope that this will facilitate agreement on my successor.

I shall be grateful if you would propose as a new item on the agenda "Appointment of the Secretary-General of the United Nations."

He explained to the delegates that his resignation, postponed in 1950 because of the aggression in Korea, was based on his belief that a new Secretary-General might be more helpful at this stage of the Korean situation. The completion of the headquarters buildings and the organization of the Secretariat were also factors in his decision "that this is the time to leave without damage to the United Nations, and that it would be better for the United Nations if I do so now." He concluded:

I would like the members to know that I am stepping aside now because I hope this may help the United Nations to save the peace and to serve better the cause of freedom and progress for all mankind.

The Assembly voted Nov. 13 to place the appointment of a Secretary-General on its agenda.

General Debate Continues—Robert Schuman, French Foreign Minister, addressed the Assembly on Nov. 10, emphasizing particularly the attitude of his Government on the Tunisia and Morocco items. Following are excerpts:

The Assembly decided, in spite of the reservations we have expressed, to place on its agenda two charges regarding the situation in Tunisia and Morocco.

The representative of France finds himself under the obligation of cautioning this Assembly not only against the injustice which certain people are trying to have it perpetrate; against the insult that is being inflicted upon his country by accusing it; against the repercussions that any intervention of any sort is bound to have outside the United Nations; but also and primarily against the harm that would thus be done to the organization itself.

It is the duty of the Assembly in its wisdom to know how to keep within the limits of its mission and not to take, before history, the responsibility laden with incalculable consequences, of jeopardizing, by exceeding its powers, a task that France, in faith and pride, has undertaken, is pursuing, and shall continue to carry on in North Africa.

France is bound to Tunisia and Morocco by treaties contracted between sovereign states. In accordance with these treaties, the foreign relations of Morocco and Tunisia can be conducted only within the framework provided by the treaties—that is, through the intermediary of France. These same treaties stipulate that the reforms which are to be carried out in the two countries shall be effected in close and exclusive cooperation with France and upon France's initiative.

As the Assembly well knows, the U.N. organization has not been given competence to deal in any way, even indirectly, with the revision of treaties.

What is the general system of relations between France on the one hand and Tunisia and Morocco on the other,

first with regard to the terms of these treaties themselves, then with regard to their actual implementation? It is essentially a matter of an exchange between the signatory states of reciprocal rights and responsibilities.

France insures their diplomatic representations in the other states and their citizens abroad are protected in the same way and to the same extent as French citizens.

On the security level, Tunisia and Morocco are included in the French national defense perimeter and plans, which, furthermore, relieves them of one of the most crushing burdens that states must carry in our time.

On the economic level, the economies of these countries—quite rudimentary at the start, now prosperous, complex and stable, thanks to the task performed by France—are expanding with her support, thus finding markets and assistance within the broader economy of our country, which insures their equipment while balancing their budget, their foreign trade, and their balance of payments.

From the social standpoint, France brought to the states to whom she thus grants assistance, labor laws and relations which enable the workers of these countries to benefit from the great emancipating surge of our time.

Finally, on the cultural level, France places her culture within the reach of Tunisian and Moroccan nationals, as she does for her own citizens, while at the same time scrupulously respecting their traditions, institutions, civilization, and religion.

France considers that it would be a grave, an unpardonable error on her part, if territories still imperfectly developed, for which she is now responsible in varying degrees, should set themselves up as independent states before they are able to meet the heavy responsibilities this would imply.

Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden (U.K.) spoke during the general debate on Nov. 12. He mentioned as major problems confronting the U.N. the question of free German elections, the Austrian treaty, disarmament, questions relating to dependent peoples, and Korea. The four basic principles to be taken into account in ending the Korean conflict, he said, are—

That every prisoner of war has the right, on the conclusion of an armistice, to be released.

That every prisoner of war has the right to be speedily repatriated.

That there is a duty on the detaining side to provide facilities for such repatriation.

That the detaining side has no right to use force in connection with the disposal of prisoners of war.

In other words, after an armistice, a prisoner of war may not be either forcibly detained or forcibly repatriated.

He hoped that the U.S.S.R. representative would examine these principles carefully. If they were accepted, "then it should be possible to put them in a clearly understood resolution which will command agreement among all the parties." Mr. Eden also said that the revised Soviet resolution (see below) did not help to solve the present *impasse*, as it stipulated that all prisoners must be repatriated. He added, however, that at a later stage there might be scope for some such commission as proposed by the Soviet Union.

Ad Hoc Political Committee—On the item relating to the treatment of people of Indian origin in South Africa, the Committee on Nov. 11 approved by a vote of 41-1 (Union of South Africa)-16 a resolution establishing a good offices com-

mission "with a view to arranging and assisting in negotiations" between the parties so that a "satisfactory" solution of the problem could be achieved. (For statement by U.S. representative and text of resolution, see p. 835.)

Debate began Nov. 12 on the item, "The question of race conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of the Union of South Africa." Opening arguments centered around the competence of the General Assembly to deal with the question. Gerhardus P. Jooste (South Africa) reviewed his Government's position on competence, stressing that article 2 (7) removed matters of domestic concern from the scope of the Charter, except for enforcement measures under chapter VII.

As to the allegation that South Africa was threatening the peace, he argued that a threat existed only when the territorial integrity or political independence of another state was threatened. It was up to the Committee to decide whether it adhered to the interpretations put on the Charter at San Francisco or whether the guarantees and protection inscribed in article 2 (7) "have now become extinct." Never before, he concluded, had the U.N. been called on to give a competent decision which could have such tremendous consequences.

Mrs. Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit (India) declared that the question of competence could be appreciated only against the background of the subject and proceeded to describe South Africa's discriminatory legislation. She said it had brought about a situation which flagrantly violated Charter principles and was a growing threat to international peace.

Subsequent arguments upholding the Assembly's competence to discuss the question were offered by Sweden and Norway. The U.K. and New Zealand representatives expressed the view that the Charter excluded the item from the Assembly's competence. Brazil favored postponement of a decision on competence until after the conclusion of general debate on the subject.

Committee I (Political and Security)—Andrei Vyshinsky (U.S.S.R.) introduced on Nov. 10 a revised text of the Soviet draft resolution submitted by him on Oct. 29. The revised text provides for the establishment of a commission for the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, to be composed of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the U.S.S.R., the People's Republic of China, India, Burma, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, the People's Democratic Republic of Korea, and South Korea. The original text did not specify the membership of this commission.

The new Soviet draft also adds to the terms of reference of this commission the task of extending "all possible" assistance to the repatriation of "all prisoners of war" by both sides.

Mr. Vyshinsky introduced the revised proposal at the end of a lengthy statement in which he

declared that international obligations of states could not be subordinated to the will of individual prisoners of war. The Geneva Convention, he argued, made repatriation of all prisoners of war mandatory. Mr. Vyshinsky rejected as "unacceptable" both the Mexican and the Peruvian proposals which deal with the prisoner-of-war issue.

Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan (Pakistan), speaking on Nov. 14, proposed an immediate cease-fire in Korea without waiting for agreement on the repatriation question. His delegation agrees with the U.N.'s stand against forced repatriation, he emphasized, but "we would beg to be forgiven for stating that we see no logical connection between the resolving of these questions and the continuation of the fighting. We consider that the fighting, and the prolongation of all the suffering, misery, and agony consequent upon it, can and should be stopped, even failing an immediate agreement on these points and pending their more leisurely consideration."

Another proposal for a solution was introduced by Abba S. Eban (Israel), who asked that the Assembly agree on a formula as to the principles of repatriation and then recommend the creation of a joint body that would "decide upon the claims and submissions of prisoners desiring not to utilize their rights of repatriation." Technical procedures could be left to that body.

Committee II (Economic and Financial)—Isador Lubin (U.S.) replied on Nov. 11 to statements made by representatives of Czechoslovakia, the U.S.S.R., the Ukraine, and Byelorussia during general debate on the item, economic development of underdeveloped countries, which concluded Nov. 8. He pointed out that the ratio of earning of capital for all direct U.S. investment abroad, excluding petroleum, was 12.4 percent, while the ratio of earnings of capital invested in the U.S. was 10.7 percent. This, he said, indicated that the relatively greater risk involved in foreign investment was compensated for by only about 1.7 percentage points. Mr. Lubin added that, of the profits actually earned in 1946-52, over 4.8 billion dollars, or about half the total earned, were ploughed back.

Mr. Lubin further drew attention to the fact that, during the period 1920-40, the net loss of capital value of portfolio investments suffered by American investors abroad was almost 3.5 billion dollars. He added that more and more American private investment was tending to go into manufacturing and distribution and less into extractive industries.

Mr. Lubin declared he was proud of the way in which the Point Four Program had contributed to the security and progress which were the goals of the U.N. He related the recent economic difficulties of Poland and Czechoslovakia, such as the appearance of shortages in supplies and of bottle-

necks in transportation, to the very heavy claims of the Soviet armament effort.

Andrei A. Gromyko (U.S.S.R.), in reply to statements made by various representatives, pointed out that his own previous statement had been based on utterances of a number of U.S. personalities. He reiterated that U.S. aid to other countries was aimed at the militarization of the latter in the interest of "the American war machine" and for the benefit of American businessmen.

Mr. Gromyko regretted that certain delegations felt unable to speak their minds on the real significance for them of U.S. aid, although, he said, at this session, a greater number of delegations had expressed dissatisfaction with the present state of affairs.

He denied that the Soviet Union had failed to come forward with any constructive proposal. As proof of the contrary he mentioned the Soviet request for elimination of U.S. imposed discrimination in international trade. He added that the U.S.S.R. could supply a number of goods that would be useful for economic development.

On Nov. 12 the Committee took up the sub-item, expanded program of technical assistance. David Owen, chairman of the U.N. Technical Assistance Board, reported that the Board had recruited 1,598 technical experts as of Oct. 1; 956 were now in the field. He said the Technical Assistance Program faced bigger demands than ever before and called on member countries to increase their contributions for the coming year in order to arrive at the total of 25 million dollars which would be needed.

Speaking on Nov. 13, Mr. Lubin confirmed his Government's support of the Program. He emphasized the importance of technical-assistance work in the field of public administration, which he said was fundamental to the success of the entire program.

The success of economic-development programs within any country depends to an important extent upon the effectiveness of the administration and the services provided by the government of the recipient country. This is as true of financial as it is of technical aspects of the program. And it is equally true whether the program is of international or local origin. The technical-assistance experts have to rely upon the departments of the recipient governments that have the responsibility to carry out the programs which the experts recommend. No matter how good a technical-assistance project to increase cotton production through the introduction of modern methods is, it will not yield any great results unless the local Ministry of Agriculture can bring the new techniques supplied by the foreign experts within the reach of the average farmer.

In the improvement of public administration, much can be gained from an interchange of experience between different governments and the preparation of bulletins and reports showing how various countries have solved common administrative problems. We are therefore pleased that the U.N. has placed so much importance upon such exchanges of experience. Possibly such exchanges can best be carried out on a regional basis, and we have noted with interest that the distinguished delegate of Egypt has suggested that the administrative problems involved

in land-reform programs be dealt with in a regional seminar in the Middle Eastern area.

It is clear that more trained public administrators are needed. There appears to be a particular lack of these essential technicians in many countries in the process of economic development. I am glad that my delegation is pleased to note that a number of fellowships have been awarded by the U.N. in this field and that a number of seminars and institutes are in preparation. The U.S. will continue fully to cooperate with the multilateral programs which provide technical assistance along such lines. Such exchanges of information, of experience, and of training have paid real dividends in the U.S., where we have had long experience in doing this between our various States and cities and our national Government. The U.S. itself has also profited from such exchanges of ideas and from our participating in conferences with government officials of other countries.

Committee III (Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural)—The Committee completed the agenda item relating to problems of freedom of information by passing two resolutions on Nov. 10 and a third on Nov. 11. The first resolution proposes an international conference for the purpose of preparing a draft International Code of Ethics in the field of information. The vote was 43(U.S.)-5-7.

The second proposal, designed to prevent dissemination of false news, was sponsored by El Salvador and Guatemala and was approved by a vote of 37-1(Denmark)-12. The final resolution, proposed by Egypt and amended by the U.S., France, Greece, and the U.S.S.R., urges that Governments, the Secretary-General, and media of information disseminate information about action taken by the U.N.

Committee IV (Trusteeship)—The Committee on Nov. 8 voted to continue the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories for a 3-year period, at the end of which, unless the General Assembly decided otherwise, the Committee would be continued automatically "for as long as there exist territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government." The vote was 40-12(U.S.)-2.

Philip Jessup (U.S.) had stated on Nov. 5 that, although there seemed to be general agreement that the Committee on Information should be continued, it was not possible to say at the current stage whether it was desirable to make it permanent. The U.S. and Venezuelan delegations had proposed that after the initial 3-year period the Committee should be continued for additional periods of 3 years unless the General Assembly decided otherwise.

On Nov. 10 the Committee adopted by a vote of 34-2(Belgium, France)-12 a resolution expressing the hope that administering powers "will furnish annually as complete information as possible on any action taken to bring the reports of the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories to the attention of the authorities responsible for the territories for the implementation of educational, economic, and social policy, and on any problems which may arise in

giving effect to the general views expressed in these reports."

Discussion then turned to the third item on the Committee's agenda, the question of participation of non-self-governing territories in the work of the Committee on Information; on Nov. 11, a resolution favoring such participation was adopted.

Committee V (Administrative and Budgetary)—Approval of a joint resolution sponsored by 22 delegations completed the Committee's consideration of the question of the adoption of Spanish as a working language for the Economic and Social Council. The United States and the Philippines joined the countries of Latin America in sponsoring the proposal. The vote in favor of the adoption of Spanish was 43-11-1.

During the debate on the next item, the report by the Contributions Committee on the scale of assessments for the apportionment of U.N. expenses, Senator Alexander Wiley on Nov. 11 stated the U.S. view. He acknowledged that the Committee on Contributions each year has taken some steps toward the implementation of the principle that no member government shall contribute more than one-third of the U.N. ordinary expenses in any one year. He continued:

However, my Government has been and continues to be critical of the slow pace at which the necessary adjustments in the contribution scale are taking place. From 1949 to 1951, the United States percentage share was reduced 2 points and for 1953 the recommendation before us is for a further scaling down of only 1.78. We can understand that there may be reasons why the Contributions Committee, within its frame of reference, has hesitated to make what might appear to some to be drastic recommendations, but we see no reason why this Committee or the General Assembly should consider itself to be so limited. In fact, we believe that the Assembly has an obligation to go beyond the Committee's recommendations whenever this course is necessary for the good of the organization. My Government considers it to be a matter of prime importance that the one-third ceiling for the largest contributor be fully implemented. We also think it is imperative that those states which have experienced very substantial economic improvement since the end of the war should have this improvement reflected to the greatest possible extent in their rate of contribution to the United Nations.

G. F. Saksin (U.S.S.R.) argued on Nov. 13 that the proposed increase in his Government's assessment from 9.85 percent to 12.28 percent violated three criteria for determining assessments: per capita income, destruction caused by World War II, and ability to obtain foreign currency. It also exceeded the 10 percent ceiling on increases in assessments, he declared.

A U.S. proposal to make the one-third ceiling effective in 1953 was modified by an amendment put forward by Canada to change the effective date to 1954. This amendment was adopted on Nov. 14 by a vote of 19-10-19 (U.S. among those abstaining). Thus, although the U.S. proposal was not accepted for 1953, adherence to the one-third ceiling is assured for 1954. This action was

more favorable to the United States than were the recommendations of the Committee on Contributions.

Later that day, the Committee approved the 1953 scale of assessments by a vote of 38-7 (Soviet bloc, Cuba, Mexico) -3 (U.S., Philippines, Pakistan). The United States assessment, pending final action on the resolution by the Assembly, now stands at 35.12 percent for 1953.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2393. Pub. 452S. 71 pp. 25¢.

Third protocol of rectifications to the agreement of Oct. 30, 1947, between the United States and Other Governments—Dated at Ancey Aug. 13, 1949; entered into force Oct. 21, 1951.

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2394. Pub. 4542. 230 pp. 50¢.

Protocol replacing schedule I (Australia) of the agreement of Oct. 30, 1947, between the United States and Other Governments—Dated at Ancey Aug. 13, 1949; entered into force Oct. 21, 1951.

Passport Visa Requirements. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2471. Pub. 4602. 7 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Spain—Dated at Madrid Jan. 21, 1952; entered into force Jan. 21, 1952.

Mutual Defense Assistance. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2418. Pub. 4663. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Norway—Signed at Oslo June 30, 1950; entered into force June 30, 1950.

Road Traffic. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2487. Pub. 4606. 57 pp. 20¢.

Convention, with annexes and protocol, between the United States and Other Governments—Dated at Geneva Sept. 19, 1949; ratified by the Senate Aug. 9, 1950; proclaimed by the President Apr. 16, 1952; entered into force Mar. 26, 1952.

Criminal Offenses, United States and Polish Armed Forces. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2409. Pub. 4627. 8 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Poland—Signed at Warsaw Aug. 5 and 29, 1946; entered into force Aug. 29, 1946 and amendment dated at Warsaw Feb. 6 and Apr. 3 and 14, 1947; entered into force Apr. 14, 1947.

Health and Sanitation, Cooperative Program in Ecuador. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2419. Pub. 4637. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Ecuador supplementing agreement of Sept. 15, 1950—Signed at Quito Oct. 4 and 24, 1951; entered into force Oct. 29, 1951.

Termination of Reciprocal Trade Agreement of May 7, 1942. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2421. Pub. 4638. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Peru—Signed at Lima Sept. 12 and 28, 1951; entered into force Sept. 28, 1951.

Leased Naval and Air Bases, United States Fleet Anchorage in the Gulf of Paria. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2431. Pub. 4641. 8 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and United Kingdom amending agreement of Mar. 27, 1941—Signed at Washington Feb. 6 and Mar. 6, 1951; entered into force Mar. 6, 1951.

Mutual Defense Assistance. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2424. Pub. 4657. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and the Union of South Africa—Signed at Washington Nov. 9, 1951; entered into force Nov. 9, 1951.

THE DEPARTMENT

Appointment of Officers

Harold W. Mosely as Chief of the Division of Biographic Information, effective September 29.

Joseph S. Henderson as Chief of the Division of International Administration, effective October 29.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: Nov. 10-14, 1952

Releases may be obtained from the Office of the Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Press releases issued prior to Nov. 10 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 842 of Oct. 25, 843 of Oct. 28, 849 of Oct. 31, 854 of Nov. 3, 855 of Nov. 3, 856 of Nov. 3, 859 of Nov. 5, 861 of Nov. 6, 862 of Nov. 7, 864 of Nov. 7, and 868 of Nov. 12.

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866	11/10	Death of President of Israel
867	11/12	Sargeant: UNESCO conference
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869	11/10	Anderson: European unity
870	11/13	Vienna—peace congress
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The Department of State bulletin

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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication compiled and edited in the Division of Publications, Office of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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Chief Imperatives Bearing Upon the Atlantic Coalition

*Remarks by Secretary Acheson*¹

The common theme of visitors to one side of the border or the other is the happy and cordial relations which exist between our countries and our peoples, in the course of which the inevitable reference to the border appears.

What seems to me perhaps more interesting than the obvious fact of this relationship is how it came to be so, particularly in view of some of the impediments in the way. Let me refer to one of those impediments which is perhaps not as well-known as some others.

Forty years ago, an eminent predecessor of mine, Elihu Root, was testifying before a Senate Committee on the Boundary Waters Treaty between the United States and Canada. During the hearings he said:

Before starting on the treaty, however, let me make an explanation. There have been great difficulties between the U. S. and Canada for years because of the fact that we had to negotiate with Great Britain regarding affairs between us and our next neighbor. I would make some proposition to the British Ambassador here. He would send it to the Foreign Office in London, the Foreign Office would send it to the Colonial Office, and the Colonial Office would send it to the Government at Ottawa. They have no foreign office there. . . .

Finally, Sir Wilfred Laurier would find some time to pay some attention to it, and he would send back what he had to say to the Colonial Office, the Colonial Office would send it to the Foreign Office and the Foreign Office would send it to the British Ambassador here, and he would come to us, and by that time, I would probably have forgotten what it was about. It would take 6 months to get through each step, particularly if we had an Ambassador here who didn't care anything about it. . . . Another incident to that situation is that Canada was never satisfied with anything that was done.

Well, things are much swifter and I think much happier since the days described by Elihu Root. Today, all kinds of devices, mechanical and electronic keep our two capitals in constant and instantaneous communication.

In fact we are blessed in this era with a form of diplomatic communication which is faster than instantaneous. I refer to the press, which, such are

the wonders of modern journalism, often precedes the event, and sometimes reliably. Indeed, the press rumor or "leak" has become an almost indispensable adjunct to modern-day diplomacy. Perhaps this is a form of government austerity, designed to reduce cable tolls. In any case, there is no diplomatic interchange nowadays that is not preceded by, enlarged by, refracted by, or nullified by a covey of press rumors, speculations, and leaks, propelled, like those pneumatic tubes in the department stores, by air—mostly hot. Elihu Root was better off than he knew.

There is one respect in which he was not better off, and that is in the friendship and understanding that has grown steadily more close between us. I think my friend Mike Pearson expressed it well when he said, last spring:

U.S.—Canadian relations remain close and friendly and we must keep them that way. This will require on our part in Canada an appreciation of the enormous burden which the U.S. is shouldering in the struggle to keep men free. . . . It will require on the part of the U.S. knowledge and understanding of Canada, its present position and its potential greatness.

I think that is right, and that this relationship is a fact of considerable importance.

What most of us see and feel is the way these close bonds are illustrated in the patterns of our daily lives—in the millions of Canadians and Americans who visit each other's country each year—in the great flow of trade across our borders, a trade which benefits the people of both countries—and in the day-to-day cooperation we have on a multitude of problems.

The Permanent Joint Board on Defense

But perhaps even more important is the closeness of the approach both you and we take to international problems. Since as far back as 1940, we have given evidence of our understanding that we share a common fate, by our successful efforts through the Permanent Joint Board on Defense.

I should like to digress for a moment to talk

¹Made before the Canadian Club at Ottawa on Nov. 21 (press release 886).

about the Permanent Joint Board as a particularly significant expression of the entirely unique relationship between our countries.

I speak about it out of the most affectionate knowledge, because one of the happiest recollections of my public life is the memory of my period of service as chairman of the American section of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense.²

The name of the Board is both significant and interesting. The expression "Permanent Joint Board" was no accident, but was the careful decision of Prime Minister Mackenzie-King and President Franklin Roosevelt, both of whom laid great stress on the word "permanent."

Now this was an act which was not only imaginative but showed real insight by both men into their own and each other's country.

This Permanent Joint Board is not founded on any treaty or any legislative act. It is not set up to devise treaties or agreements. It is an organization made up of equal numbers of Americans and Canadians, who consider defense questions and make joint recommendations to their two governments. They do not ask their governments for agreements or binding obligations of any sort. Yet the interesting and significant fact is that in the history of the Board, already more than 12 years old, I believe that every recommendation made by the Board has been and is being carried out by both governments as an act of voluntary will.

I remember particularly one thorny question which for years bedeviled the Department of State and the Department of External Affairs. Unable to solve it, someone had the happy idea of referring it to the Permanent Joint Board, which in a remarkably short time came up with a joint recommendation that solved the problem.

I hesitate to believe that this incident reflects on the diplomats of either country. I think rather the success came out of the habits of work of the Permanent Joint Board: Colleagues work over a problem continuously and exhaustively until, through the pressure of good will and hard work, the solution is forced out.

I think this Canadian-American experience has been helpful in developing the common defense work which 14 nations have been carrying out in NATO. Here again, Canada and the United States have been working closely together to help create a strong Atlantic community as an effective deterrent to Soviet aggression in Europe.

And here again, many of the actions taken lie in the field of coordination of effort rather than through binding agreements upon the nations concerned. For, as the Atlantic countries take voluntary action to carry out common programs developed in common—as they do, much of the friction and difficulty which comes about in trying to arrive at binding agreements is obviated.

We are, in my judgment, entering a period in which the close union of free nations is becoming even more important than ever before as a key to the world situation. Unity among the free nations has always been desirable, always important; but it is now becoming a major point of attack by the Communists, and a condition essential to the survival of freedom.

Now, it is not very hard to get agreement on the word "unity." It is one of those favorable symbols that everyone acknowledges at once as a good thing to have. But the difficulty comes when you go beyond the word, beyond the symbol, when you apply the idea of unity in practice.

The problems which concern us in the relationships between the free nations are so manifold, so complex, and so difficult that we all have a natural tendency to oversimplify and to sloganize in our popular discussions of these issues. When on top of this, these slogans and simplifications become charged with emotion, when they are loaded with our frustrations and anxieties, when they are picked up and exploited for partisan purposes, and directed against allies, then there is apt to be mischief between us.

And this is something that is happening, in various places, and something that we must all guard against.

Pressures Created by Defense Programs

Now, one of the reasons this is happening, I believe, is that the defense program has created pressures and burdens which we should all like to avoid if it were possible to do so. We do not all have the same assessment of the degree of danger that confronts us, or the same degree of urgency in our approach to the necessity for building our defenses. As you know, the United States has believed it essential to build up the strength and unity of the free nations to the point where it will be a deterrent against attack. We realize that this is not a popular position to take. We understand that, as a consequence of this, some of the inevitable and understandable resentment against the effects of the arms-building program have been and are being directed against us. But the important thing is that progress has been made; where there was weakness and vulnerability to attack, there has been built up an increasing measure of strength and resolution.

And particularly is this true among the nations of the Atlantic community, which has developed in a very short space of time from a conception to a reality, from a defense plan to a defense organization.

Now, as the progress has been made, as NATO and the other alliances have been strengthened, as Japan and Germany have moved toward association with the community of free nations, two important things have been happening.

One is that, in some quarters of the free world,

² January 1947–January 1948.

there has developed a false, and at best premature, sense of security. Some among our people have been influenced by their own hopes in estimating the true nature of the danger confronting us. This has led them to the dangerous illusion that the very effort which has brought us this far in our pursuit of security can now be safely relaxed, and that we can now indulge in the luxury of baiting our allies for partisan or other purposes.

The other consequence of this progress has to do with its effect on the Soviet side. We are not privy to the inner plans of the Soviet high command, but they have given public evidence recently of a redirection of their effort toward an increased exploitation of the strains and fissures among the free nations.

The speeches and articles published in connection with the recent Soviet Communist Party Congress all suggested high expectations for crisis and conflict among the non-Soviet nations. Stalin, in his now-famous article in the magazine *Bolshevik*, reaffirmed the standard Leninist thesis that wars are inevitable under capitalism, and he implied that a war between the so-called capitalist states was as likely as a war between the Soviet Union and the rest of the world.

One after the other, speakers before the Communist Party Congress presented an analysis that economic competition, political rivalries, colonial questions, and other problems would bring the free nations into increasing conflict with one another. In laying down the tactics for the period ahead, emphasis was placed on aggravating these differences, especially between the United States and its allies, and also between the peoples and their present governments within the free countries. The point of this tactic is to check the progress that is being made to restore the power of the free nations, to break up the unity that has been developing among them, and to do this by exploiting the real difficulties they are facing.

These difficulties we face are real, and they are by no means all created by the Soviets, though they are made much more difficult of settlement by the threatening policies of the Soviet Union.

I am confident that these expectations of the Soviet Union can and will be disappointed, just as their expectations of wide-spread collapse of the non-Soviet world after the war were frustrated by the resolute action of the free nations.

Unity of Peoples and Governments

As I have said many times in talking with United States audiences, the difference between confidence and complacency in regarding the future rests with an understanding that a satisfactory outcome will not present itself automatically. It depends upon what we do. And the special emphasis I should like to leave with you this afternoon is that this is a matter for people as much as it is for governments.

We have achieved a fair degree of unity among governments among the free nations, particularly in the Atlantic community. But we shall not have a secure base unless we have a unity of people as well as a unity of governments. Our coalition would be fragile if it rested only upon a close understanding between governmental leaders, without a strong base of popular support.

One of the urgent tasks before us is to see to it that a common appreciation of the danger is shared and understood all the way down to the "grass roots" in each of our countries, and that there is common agreement on and popular support for the main lines of action that are required.

The durability of our alliance, and its capacity to throw back this latest form of the Soviet onslaught, depends now upon the support it receives in our towns and villages, and not just in our capital cities.

The chief imperatives which bear upon the free nations today require not so much genius and inspiration at the top as comprehension and determination all the way down.

This is true of our fight in Korea. The conflict in Korea is far more important, I believe, than most of our people have yet understood. Far more than the fate of that remote peninsula will be determined by the staunchness and steadiness of our support of that action. Here is the first real effort to make collective security a reality. If collective security is to be more than a slogan, more than a pious expression, if it is to be instead the foundation of peace and security, then this action in Korea must be supported with unshakeable determination by all free nations and all free men. If our governments or our people, through failure of will or of understanding, destroy the significance of this action, we shall be thrown back upon the futile pieties of the twenties and the thirties as our sole defense against the approach of another World War.

This is no less true of the movement toward European unity. It is not enough for a few outstanding statesmen to share the vision. Unless the people of Europe, of whatever party and whatever country, really understand that all their present differences are as nothing compared to the fate that awaits a disunited Europe, the heroic labors of Europe's statesmen will come to nothing.

And the same is true of the urgent requirement that faces us in the field of economic policy. It is widely recognized now that the emergency-aid basis of propping up the economic foundations of our alliance is at best a temporary device, and must be supplanted by coordinated policies on all sides that will encourage production and trade. This again is a matter in which a weakly articulated general interest will suffer before the militant and organized special interest, unless we succeed in creating broad comprehension and support among the people in each of our countries. Perhaps it is in this field that article 11 of the North

Atlantic Treaty, in which Canada has always expressed the deepest interest, will have its greatest fruition.

In short, it is not enough to have a cat-walk at the top between our respective leaderships; we must have connecting passageways between our peoples at all levels. Only then can we keep our problems and our differences in some kind of decent perspective, a perspective which reminds us that our common interest and our common fate are far greater and far more important than any conceivable differences between us.

To create this kind of approach to our problems seems to me the most urgent job facing all of us who believe in the future of freedom, whether we are public officials or private citizens.

President, General Eisenhower Discuss International Problems

White House press release dated November 18

President Truman and General Eisenhower met on November 18 at the White House. After conferring by themselves, they met with the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury, the Director of Mutual Security, and General Eisenhower's associates, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge and Joseph E. Dodge.

At the end of the talks, the President and General Eisenhower issued the following statement:

We have discussed some of the most important problems affecting our country in the sphere of international relations. Information with respect to these problems has been made available to General Eisenhower.

Under our Constitution the President must exercise his functions until he leaves office, and his successor cannot be asked to share or assume the responsibilities of the Presidency until he takes office.

We have worked out a framework for liaison and exchange of information between the present Administration and the incoming Administration, but we have made no arrangements which are inconsistent with the full spirit of our Constitution. General Eisenhower has not been asked to assume any of the responsibilities of the Presidency until he takes the oath of office.

We believe, however, that the arrangements we have made for cooperation will be of great value to the stability of our country and to the favorable progress of international affairs.

We are confident that this meeting and that the arrangements we have made today for liaison and cooperation between the present Administration and the new Administration furnish additional proof of the ability of the people of this country to manage their affairs with a sense of continuity and with responsibility.

Latest Czechoslovak Charges Against Mutual Security Act

Following is the text of a note delivered on November 18 by the American Embassy at Prague to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

TEXT OF U.S. NOTE OF NOVEMBER 18

Press release 880 dated November 20

The American Embassy presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has the honor to refer to the latter's note No. 133.152/52-ABO/1 of October 13, 1952, alleging aggressive and hostile activities of the United States Government against Czechoslovakia.

The United States Government categorically rejects the allegations contained in the note under reference which recapitulate charges repeatedly made by the Czechoslovak Government and clearly refuted in previous communications of the Embassy to the Ministry.

As stated in the United States note of December 19, 1951 to the Soviet Union,¹ the text of which was enclosed in the Embassy's note No. 169 of December 26, 1951, the Mutual Security Act is designed to strengthen the defense of the free world, to support the freedom of Europe through assistance to the defense of the NATO countries, and to provide assistance for victims of oppression when such assistance has been determined to contribute to the defense of the North Atlantic area. As is well known, the Mutual Security Act has helped the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to fulfill its purposes which, set forth in the North Atlantic Treaty, are collective defense and preservation of international peace and security in support of the principles of the United Nations Charter. Expenditures under the Act are authorized only for programs conforming to these essential purposes. The various Mutual Security Act programs, including military, economic and technical assistance have no aggressive aims. They represent a broad, constructive response, in full conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, to the needs of the free world in face of the threat from the aggressive tendencies of international Communism.

The Czechoslovak Government has made numerous charges in connection with Section 101 (a) of the Mutual Security Act, authorizing expenditures up to \$100 million in assistance to the victims of communist tyranny. The United States has not carried on aggressive activities contrary to the United Nations Charter and has no intention of doing so in connection with this \$100 million authorization or otherwise. On the contrary, the United States now has in operation under Section

¹ BULLETIN of Dec. 31, 1951, p. 1056.

101 of the Mutual Security Act a continuing program for extending care and assistance in resettlement to refugees from communist oppression in Eastern Europe. This purely humanitarian program follows the tradition of the American people to come to the aid of the suffering and oppressed. It is completely consistent with the policy of the United Nations in regard to the rendering of assistance to persons fleeing from their homelands. The United States will not be deterred from the continuance of these efforts by false charges of aggression and interference in the domestic affairs of Czechoslovakia or other communist states.

Only the congenital suspicion of the communists prompting them to see espionage everywhere and their habitual practice of accusing others of their own acts could cause humanitarian assistance to refugees to be treated as subversion. It can be only too plain to world opinion that Czechoslovakia has again made false charges of United States aggression and interference in its domestic affairs in order to conceal the unhappy conditions in that country which impel its citizens to seek freedom by escape and to distract attention from communist espionage operations in many countries.

The note of the Czechoslovak Government repeats shopworn charges against Radio Free Europe, the Voice of America and the United States diplomatic officers in Czechoslovakia. The first of these has already been refuted in the Embassy's note of August 24, 1951.² The United States Government must regard as a wild phantasy the allegation that the Voice of America supports, or issues directives to, agents in Czechoslovakia. A country which constantly conducts a vicious hate campaign against the United States proceeds with singular inconsistency in protesting objective presentation and legitimate criticism by the Voice of America. As for United States diplomatic officers in Czechoslovakia, they are adhering scrupulously in pursuit of their duties to the established standards of international conduct. The Czechoslovak Government's attempts to distort their activities otherwise are totally unwarranted and incompatible with long-standing diplomatic practice, and unfortunately contribute to intensify international tensions.

TEXT OF CZECHOSLOVAK NOTE OF OCTOBER 13

[Unofficial Translation]

No. 133.152/52-ABO/1

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compliments to the Embassy of the United States of America and has the honor to advise the following:

On September 21, 1952, two agents sent to the territory of Czechoslovakia from Western Germany murdered Frantisek Mika and Karel Jugl, members of the Local National Committee of Revnicov, District of Nove Straseci.

² *Ibid.*, Sept. 10, 1951, p. 417.

In the course of rounding up these agents who were equipped and armed by United States authorities, weapons, forged identification papers, and documents were found, which together with other material proved that the intelligence service of the United States of America organized espionage and terrorist activities on the territory of the Czechoslovak Republic.

The murder of two brave Czechoslovak citizens caused deep indignation throughout the country. The Czechoslovak people know that this is not the only case of such character. The United States Government has been using for its systematic hostile activities against Czechoslovakia the territory of Western Germany and Austria occupied by United States troops. In the so-called Mutual Security Act of October 10, 1951, under which 100 million dollars had been allocated to subversive and armed activities against peace-loving countries, the United States Government proclaimed such activities as its program. Organs of the United States intelligence service have been recruiting agents from among war criminals, emigré traitors, and common criminals who fled to Western Germany to escape the punishment they deserved. These agents are trained in special training centers, supplied with large amounts of money, weapons, forged documents, explosives, and other equipment, and are sent to Czechoslovakia to commit espionage, terrorist activities, and murder. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has protested many times against these hostile activities of the United States authorities and pointed out that these agents were supported and instructed by broadcasts of the official United States radio service the Voice of America and of the so-called Radio Free Europe whose officials closely cooperate with United States authorities. In many cases bands of such agents had been directed, financed, and directly organized by officials of the United States diplomatic offices in Czechoslovakia.

On October 10, 1951, the United States Government declared in the so-called Mutual Security Act that in the future it intended to carry on without any disguise its aggressive hostile activities which violate the fundamental standards of international law and all the rules of international relations. This law is designed to transform the territory of countries dependent on the United States into armed bases for the aggressive plans of the United States foreign policy. Its significance was characterized by Representative Smith of Wisconsin, who said:

"For six years our foreign policy has been to buy our way to world power and prestige. Having failed in that approach, we now prepare to shoot our way to that position."

As a means to achieve that purpose Congressman Kersten of Wisconsin proposed to include a provision into the law, which would allocate 100 million dollars to finance hostile activities against Czechoslovakia and other countries listed in the Act by sending escaped traitors to organize armed terrorist bands within the territory of those countries. Congressman Kersten himself confirmed the meaning of that provision by stating that the proposed amount was to serve first of all the creation of organized terror.

The United States Congress adopted the Kersten Amendment, the President of the United States signed it, and the United States Government has been implementing it. Together with the so-called Mutual Security Act it has been extended to cover also the year 1952-53.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in its notes No. 150.004 of December 7, 1951, and No. 153.532 of February 8, 1952, protested against this Act which made terror a law. The United States has thus violated not only its obligations under the Charter of the United Nations Organization which binds all its members to abstain in their international relations from the use of force, to settle their disputes by peaceful means, and not to interfere in the domestic affairs of other states, but all the fundamental rules of peaceful coexistence of nations as well. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in its notes pointed out that

the so-called Mutual Security Act was nothing but an open declaration of the policies which the United States Government in a long series of hostile acts and attempts to interfere in the domestic affairs of Czechoslovakia had in fact been carrying out already in the past, particularly since the time when in February 1948 the Czechoslovak people decisively defeated the attempt to transform Czechoslovakia into a willing instrument of the aggressive plans of the United States and foiled the coup which was to restore the domination of international monopolies over the economy, as well as the political life of Czechoslovakia. This policy of the United States has demonstrated itself in the sending of spies, saboteurs, and killers, in the espionage activities of numerous officials of United States diplomatic offices in Czechoslovakia, in economic discrimination, in hostile and slanderous campaigns against Czechoslovakia, and in many other ways.

The Embassy of the United States of America answered the first of the mentioned notes evasively, and the second one, which contained a number of facts and data on the criminal activities of the captured and condemned American agents, it did not answer at all. This silence itself is a proof of the fact that the United States authorities could not—and cannot—disprove the serious charges made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, because they have been irrefutably substantiated not only by the investigation of the Czechoslovak authorities, not only by confessions of many of the captured American agents and by verdicts of Czechoslovak courts but also by numerous statements of leading personalities of the United States, who do not in any way hide their intentions to strive by all means to overthrow the Government of Czechoslovakia.

In their attempts to achieve their aims the United States authorities have been using the most brutal methods and the services of the worst criminals, as, for example, shown in the recent case of the terrorist group "White Legion" which was led directly by the agent of the United States intelligence service, Josef Vicen. Vicen on one hand was directly associated with the American intelligence organs in Austria, whom he supplied with material on Czechoslovak armed forces, gained through the "White Legion," and on the other hand he is a member of the so-called "National Committee for the Liberation of Slovakia" which is headed by Stefan Krajeovic. Krajeovic publicly admitted that he was employed by United States military authorities on whose orders he had gone to the United States, and that the headquarters of the espionage organization which directed the "White Legion" were in Washington. In addition to that Krajeovic closely cooperates with Congressman Kersten who in 1951 arranged a press conference for him directly in the building of the House of Representatives.

According to the statements of the members of this criminal organization themselves, its task was to disturb and obstruct the economic development of Czechoslovakia by arson and murder, to carry out sabotage of important communication lines, particularly of railroads, and to supply the American espionage center in Vienna with information on the location of units of the Czechoslovak armed forces. In carrying out their activities the members of the "White Legion" murdered three persons and

have been attempting to commit a number of other murders; among them they tried to murder the whole family of a gamekeeper under whose house they planted a big charge of explosives for the sole reason that he supported the establishment of a Unified Agricultural Cooperative.

Another example of what kind of people the United States intelligence service has been using against Czechoslovakia is the case of Josef Latal. Latal, a professional criminal, fifteen times convicted for theft and sexual offenses, escaped to Western Germany where he committed another theft. An American military court sentenced him to 20-months imprisonment. After having served his prison term he was recruited by the American Intelligence service and sent to Czechoslovakia with instructions to supply information on airfields, types of aircraft, military objects, et cetera.

These cases clearly show how the United States authorities have been conducting their hostile activities against Czechoslovakia. They are directing the activities of their criminal agents from the United States occupation zone in Germany and Austria, which at the same time they are transforming into military bases for an aggressive war. The spies, saboteurs, and killers, whom the United States authorities use against the Czechoslovak people, serve the same policies as the Nazi generals and other war criminals who are being released from prison to carry out in pay of the United States Government the remilitarization of Western Germany. They serve the aggressive policies of the United States Government whose major instrument is the North Atlantic war pact and whose main objective is the unleashing of a new world war.

This policy is meeting with a constantly growing resistance of the people also in those countries whose governments depend on the Government of the United States for their existence. The people of Czechoslovakia, the same as the people of other democratic and peace-loving countries, work on the development of their country with the firm conviction that it is such work as they are doing which serves best the interests of world peace. At the same time they are determined to expose and check anyone who would want to disturb and threaten this peaceful development, be it by open aggression or by terrorism.

The Government of the Czechoslovak Republic true to its duty as the representative of the will of the Czechoslovak people, through its security organs exposes those who carry on their criminal activities on Czechoslovak territory and brings them to court to be justly punished. The same duty commands it to defend in the name of the people their interests against those who use the services of criminals to achieve their aggressive aims.

For these reasons the Government of the Czechoslovak Republic most resolutely protests against the activities of the United States authorities who organize and direct espionage and terrorist activities on the territory of Czechoslovakia, as again proved in the cases of the "White Legion" and of the agents who murdered Karel Jugl and Frantisek Mika.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of the United States the assurance of its consideration.

Education for Living in a World Community

by *Howland H. Sargeant*

*Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs*¹

Telegraphic text

For several days now we have listened to an interesting and stimulating debate. Without exception, those participating in the debate have expressed appreciation of the Director General's report and the speech with which he introduced it. I should like to join with all those who have spoken before me. We owe the Director General a deep debt of gratitude for an excellent report and an outstanding introductory statement to the Conference which we hope will set a high level for all our deliberations.

The Director General spoke of the progress achieved by UNESCO. That progress is marked and real and we rejoice with him over it. UNESCO is a vital, a living organization. It must remain so and grow in influence and power. There is nothing static about it and nothing unchangeable except our determination to have it succeed, to make it an ever more effective instrument of our common quest for mutual understanding; the improvement of the conditions of living of our peoples; and the establishment of a world order within which we shall all be able to enjoy a secure peace.

Unfortunately the world in which we live today is not a peaceful world. Some progress has been made through the last 2 years to check wanton aggression, but our peace is far from secure. Political tensions have increased rather than decreased, and divisive forces are at work which threaten peace and progress within a large number of countries and in their relations with each other.

The recent report of the United Nations on world social conditions shows how far we are from having attained standards that even approximate the basic needs of hundreds of millions of people in many parts of the world. It reveals that much

progress has been made in improving health and education but that the rate of progress in the various countries has differed widely, with the result that the differences between highly developed and less developed countries have increased rather than diminished.

The age of fatalistic acceptance of misery and want is passed. Even in remote and underdeveloped parts of the world we witness a revolution of rising expectations. Even in those parts the poor and the hungry and the sick, illiterate as most of them are, are realizing how futile and unnecessary are their sufferings. They either clearly see or dimly perceive that modern technology, better social organization can put an end to their misery—that a better, fuller life is within their grasp. And as they reach for that life, there frequently develops conflict between the old and the new. Internal tensions and conflicts have a tendency to carry over into the international field, endangering international stability and the peaceful evolution of orderly international relations.

This is all the more true since the strains and stresses of our age are accentuated and exploited by men of ill will who are attempting to set man against man and nation against nation in order to establish their own ruthless rule.

It is a tragic fact that the tensions thus created, the distrust among individuals and nations, interfere with the realization of some of the main objectives of UNESCO, which if attained would help to lessen existing tensions and contribute to the fuller life. Cultural exchanges are impeded; ever new obstacles are raised to the free flow of information; and mutual understanding suffers—that understanding without which we cannot hope to achieve a peaceful world with better living conditions for all people.

This, then, is the world in which we live—a world divided against itself in which the forces of darkness and of light are locked in a heroic struggle. It is a world holding out a challenge to

¹ Address made before the seventh General Conference of UNESCO at Paris on Nov. 17. Mr. Sargeant is chairman of the U. S. delegation.

UNESCO which staggers the imagination, as the delegate from Ecuador so eloquently told us in emphasizing the moral and spiritual basis of law.

Let me define this challenge in terms of what UNESCO can do to answer the fervent prayer of men and women everywhere that there be peace and an opportunity for a fuller life for all. UNESCO can stimulate the creative energies of man.

A Climate of Opinion for Scientists and Artists

First of all, we are far from having reached an adequate understanding of the basic forces and factors in human relations which mold our destinies. It is one of the great tasks of UNESCO to promote such understanding through the stimulation of research and study. We need to secure the collaboration of the best minds of our generation to gain a full comprehension of these forces and factors, whether they be ideological, political, economic, cultural, social, or other. We must face squarely not only those elements in the contemporary scene which make for greater unity but also those which make for strife and conflict. Here we must assign a large place to the work of the social sciences.

In this context, continued, concentrated attention must be given also to the contributions which the natural sciences have to make to the well-being of mankind. It is gratifying that emphasis is being placed in the program before us on "research to improve the living conditions of mankind." Applied sciences and technology are urgently needed in many areas of the world where food and health still are among the most acute primary wants of millions of people. The U. S. delegation believes that humanitarian principles should determine where UNESCO's major effort should be concentrated in the field of scientific exploration. It believes that the natural and engineering sciences have the obligation to serve society as directly and effectively as possible.

Basic science is important because future programs require that curiosity be encouraged and that basic principles be formulated as a foundation for future procedures in solving the problems of a continually changing world. The basic and applied sciences are not mutually exclusive but mutually complementary. To attain the best balance between them within the framework of UNESCO's activities will require continual vigilance and study.

Related to this problem of how best to develop the sciences as a tool of human progress is the need of gaining a better understanding of the impact of technology and industrialization upon the lives, habits, and institutions of our peoples and their relations to each other. We are encouraged to see that UNESCO is paying increasing attention to this complex of problems, which was recognized last summer by the Economic and Social Council as deserving high priority consideration.

(Parenthetically, I should like to suggest that, as we redouble our efforts to stimulate research and study best designed to give us an understanding of the most important contemporary problems and the means of meeting them, we must take care to avoid over-organization. My delegation is not opposed in principle to the creation of new organizations or institutes, but we feel that what might be called the "institutional approach" has certain dangers. Our limited efforts and resources might be expended on the creation of new institutions where greater and more immediate results might be achieved through the stimulation and use of existing institutions and facilities. The creation of new organizations and new councils and new institutions and new buildings is not necessarily the best way to encourage free inquiry, to stimulate human inventiveness, and to make use of existing knowledge.)

This holds true also in the encouragement of the arts which enrich our lives and which we cherish above all in our heritage. In the creative arts, less than in any other field, can the human spirit be regimented and organized. What we can do, however, what we must do, is to help create the conditions—the climate of opinion—which will enable the artist and the thinker to give freely to the world of his God-given genius. And we must assure easy, workable ways for exchange of ideas which will benefit the individual artist as they will benefit all of us in a fuller sharing in the cultural riches of our world. It seems to me that the creative artist throughout history often comes closest to answering the description given in these lines from Maxwell Anderson's play *Valley Forge*:

There are some men who lift the level of the age they inhabit, until all men stand on higher ground in that lifetime.

UNESCO can help man use better what man has created.

If the stimulation of the creative energies of man is one of the primary tasks of UNESCO, the application of the fruits of such creativeness is another. Here again we are facing a number of basic and all-important tasks.

Promoting Fundamental Education

There is little hope for the future of the world as long as more than half of the population of the world remains illiterate and as long as the opportunity to enjoy and to participate in the cultural, scientific, and educational life of mankind is limited to elite groups in many lands.

Through the promotion of fundamental education, UNESCO has sought to lay the foundation for the progressive raising of standards of human existence. Fundamental education will help create the will and ability of people themselves to cope with the problems they face in the communities, in the villages, in the cities, and in the nations

where they live. This is one of the great challenges to UNESCO that the delegate of India described so vividly in his remarks. Fundamental education is much more, therefore, than a smattering of reading, writing, and arithmetic. Because its purpose is broad, it uses the wide variety of educational, scientific, and cultural resources which comprise UNESCO. And it calls for the closest collaboration with the other specialized agencies of the United Nations. To this problem of coordination, the delegate from Afghanistan made special reference in his address.

While a great concentration of effort is required to provide tangible help in fundamental education, there is room still for greater effort to bring the riches of education, science, and culture to larger bodies of people. Through programs of popularization of science, through the development of museums as educational institutions, and through other means, opportunities for fuller participation in the cultural, scientific, and educational life of our civilization must continually be encouraged.

This, however, is not enough. As is well known to everyone in this Conference, the Government and the people of the United States attach paramount importance to what, in the program before us, has been called "education for living in a world community." This concept is so important, as we see it, and has such broad implications for UNESCO's objectives as a whole that it deserves a special word of comment.

Education for living in a world community can mean in one sense a program as wide as UNESCO itself. In this sense it means the promotion of the teaching of the sciences which will enable man to gain a better control of his environment, to assure economic and social progress, and promote higher standards of living. In so doing, we make our contribution in the struggle against misery, want, and premature death.

Education for living in a world community in this broad sense, furthermore, means extending the observance of fundamental human rights which assert the dignity of the individual and set him free. In this we shall give the best answer to discrimination of any kind. It is the answer to bigotry, to ill-founded racial pride, and to the false prophets of authoritarianism and dictatorial regimes.

In my earlier address to this Conference,² I expressed the belief that our mission at this General Conference must be to continue a relentless search to find better ways to educate people to live as citizens of sovereign states in a community of all mankind, preserving the values of diverse cultures and the rights and responsibilities of national citizenships.

In the program before us a beginning has been made to identify a more precise objective to which

all disciplines can contribute and upon which several work plans can be centered. In the education chapter, a few activities are focused directly upon this concept for living in a world community.

It is my hope that as we undertake a more detailed examination of the program, we will make a particular effort to find in each chapter those work plans which contribute directly to this vital concept.

Such a more precise program should aim, in our judgment, to provide people with knowledge of those elements in our society which make for cooperation and unity as well as knowledge of the diverse forces which disturb international relations and jeopardize peace. More needs to be done to spread an understanding of the great aspirations for a world order which, within our generation, have found expression in the creation of the United Nations and the various specialized agencies as well as of other international organizations through which we are trying to cooperate in a common effort to improve our conditions of life and to secure peace.

The engagements we have entered into as member states of these international organizations have force only insofar as they are actively and effectively understood and supported by men, women, and children throughout our lands. They can be effective only insofar as this knowledge also makes clear the implication of engagements for individual and national conduct.

As we promote education about the ideas and ideals of the United Nations and the means at their disposal—from technical assistance to collective security—we shall help to create a sense of responsibility to international cooperation without which the United Nations cannot hope to succeed.

This understanding of the heroic efforts for peace and well-being made by the United Nations and the organizations and agencies cooperating with it, has to be supplemented through education for a better appreciation of differences in national attitudes. A vital, creative world community can be established only on the basis of a full recognition of the diversity of our several national heritages. Unity without such diversity means sterility.

One thing I would like to point out has already been said by implication. There are many parts of UNESCO's program outside the education chapter which could be identified as contributing to education for living in a world community. Once agreement has been reached in the General Conference on those projects and methods of work best calculated to advance this concept during the next 2 years, I am confident the Director General will assure that all necessary administrative steps are taken to relate each part of this effort, in whatever chapter or organizational unit it is found, to all of the others. If this can be done, I believe we may return to our homes assured that UNESCO will provide that vital spark

² BULLETIN of Nov. 24, 1952, p. 831.

necessary to light the fires of cooperation in each of our own countries.

One last comment about this concept: I want to point out emphatically that our efforts to develop this world community in no way infringe on the relationship between a citizen and his own government. On the contrary, in an interdependent world the recognition of the need for international cooperation is an essential safeguard for the fullest possible development of the several national states and countries which are the strength and the glory of any world community of democratic peoples living their own lives in freedom and contributing voluntarily to the greatness and well-being of all. What are the ways and means UNESCO can employ?

There is a third aspect of the work of UNESCO which deserves special mention. To stimulate research and study and to disseminate available knowledge for purposes of achieving a fuller life, free from fear and from want, requires a most judicious use of the means and methods at our disposal. Our resources are limited and will remain limited as long as we cannot prove to all the effectiveness of our endeavors in terms of improved conditions of living. This means that we have to scrutinize continuously our work plans. We must have the courage to lay aside methods and projects which can be replaced by other methods and other projects more likely to assure the greatest benefits to the greatest numbers in the immediate future or over a long period.

More Effective Use of Technical Assistance

Among the most effective means so far discovered are the various methods of technical assistance through which the knowledge and technical achievements of the fully developed countries can be shared with the peoples of the less developed countries, which are at present going through the revolution of rising expectations of which I have spoken. The importance of this program to their countries has been underlined by many delegations during recent days.

Through technical assistance, it has become possible to telescope into a few years what it has taken some of the really developed countries hundreds of years to achieve. My Government stands ready to support programs of technical assistance provided they serve the interests of the many rather than the few.

The record shows that we have not taken full advantage of the opportunities offered by these programs. This is not the fault of our Secretariat which, by and large, has done an outstanding job in developing technical-assistance programs where it was asked to do so. But the various member states have been slow in requesting such assistance, particularly in such fields as the fight against illiteracy and the extension of fundamental education. As a result, UNESCO has not been able to lay

claim to all of the funds which might have been made available to it under the expanded program of technical assistance of the United Nations. There will be a large carry-over in the special technical-assistance account of the United Nations at the end of this year. Substantially increased funds should be available in 1953.

Thus, at a time when we find it difficult to reach agreement over a few hundred thousand dollars in the regular budget of UNESCO, we are not using much larger resources within our reach. This is a paradoxical situation which, if resolved, should greatly facilitate our budget discussions. My Government, for one, will support the maintenance of the special UN fund of technical assistance at a level which should permit UNESCO to draw from this fund in 1953 the amount necessary to finance its proposed program of about \$5,500,000 above and beyond our regular budget, and close to \$2,000,000 more than this year.

After all I have said, I do not need to tell you of our deep and abiding interest in UNESCO. Our one concern is that its labors and limited resources shall be applied where the most significant results can be obtained, significant in terms of the problems that face mankind at this stage of our history. It means recognizing urgency in point of time and in point of possible results. It means doing what is most important and what UNESCO particularly can best do. It means doing these things which will help the greatest number of mankind in achieving the aspiration of a good life, lived as a good neighbor, and made possible by a sound prospect of an enduring peace.

It is with this in mind that my delegation has proposed that the Programme Commission set up a working party on priorities, which we ourselves suggested should be renamed a Working Party on Future Program and Development. We suggested this change in order to avoid any possible misunderstandings. We do not propose that this working party should reshape our program for the next 2 years. To review these programs is the exclusive task of our Programme Commission. Nor is the working party intended to deal with budgetary issues. We do expect it, however, to develop a comprehensive resolution or statement, or both, indicating which activities of UNESCO, in the light of contemporary and developing needs and in contrast with other UNESCO activities, warrant special consideration and intensification of effort. We were impressed, as I am sure you were, by the persuasive remarks on the future development of UNESCO's program by the delegate of Sweden. And we do hope that the Conference will agree that such statement or resolution should serve as a guide to the Director General and the Executive Board in the execution of the 1953 and the 1954 programs and the planning and drafting of the programs for 1955 and 1956.

Let me conclude by looking beyond this hall and

beyond the short space of time during which we shall be together in this beautiful city of Paris. Our Director General, in a brilliant formulation of an essential truth, warned us against "a surfeit of international resolutions" not matched by the "national resolution in each country to put them into effect." Whatever we do here will remain barren unless it can be translated into action by ourselves, by our national commissions, by our governments in our respective countries. This means an obligation rests upon member states to develop national commissions—and I was happy to hear the leader of the Australian delegation speak of the key role they have to play, but it also

obligates this General Conference to pass resolutions with self-restraint.

In my own country the interest of the American people and their will to cooperate in the great work of UNESCO is reflected in the vigorous labors of our national commission, which is representative of what is best in American life, of intellectual and religious leaders, of artists and scholars, of workers and employers, of men and women in all walks of life.

I speak for them, I speak for the American people when I assure you that we shall do everything in our power to help in laying the foundations of a lasting peace.

Japan and Free Asia

by John M. Allison

*Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs*¹

It is with great pleasure and pride that I appear before you today. Just a little more than 25 years ago I first came to Japan, and from the very beginning I attended functions of the American-Japan Society. I recall that it was considered a great honor to be asked to address the Society, and it seemed to me that only men of great age and distinction were chosen. With the passing of time I am beginning to be able to qualify as far as age is concerned. On the other count, I only thank you for permitting me to appear at the same table as have such illustrious men as Prince Tokugawa, Count Kabayama, and Joseph Grew.

When I first came to Japan your Diet had just passed the law providing for universal manhood suffrage, and a great step forward in modern democratic government had thus been taken. Since then there have been further advances as well as set-backs in the development of modern democratic institutions. However I believe that today the essential fundamentals have been established—you have not only universal manhood suffrage—but the women also vote—and not only vote but take an active part in political life. You have a free press, an essential safeguard of democratic institutions, and you have a Parliament which by

law can exercise greater power and be a truer representative of the people than was possible for your prewar Diet. These things are of great importance not only for Japan but for the rest of the world. It is probable that many of the detailed measures worked out during the occupation will change with time, but if the three fundamentals I have just mentioned remain—a vigorous electorate, a free press, and a responsible and responsive Diet—it will not be possible for a small military clique to rise as in the past and lead your Nation and the world once more into the horror of war. Those are the institutions which have made it possible for the United States, the United Kingdom, and other nations of the West to maintain internal freedom and democracy while still building up the powerful military might necessary in this uncertain age to defend that freedom.

Since my last visit to Tokyo just over a year ago the peace treaty has come into effect and Japan has plunged again into the stormy seas of world politics aligned on the side of the free nations. One of the choicest memories I shall have of my career in the American Foreign Service is the fact that I was privileged to play a part, under the inspiring leadership of John Foster Dulles, in bringing this peace treaty into being. This treaty broke new ground in the history of international

¹Address made before the Japan-American Society at Tokyo on Nov. 1.

relations and is a milestone in the history of the relations between Asia and the West. As Sir Zafrullah Khan, the distinguished Foreign Minister of Pakistan, said at the peace conference in San Francisco:

It opens to Japan the door passing through which it may take up among its fellow sovereign nations a position of dignity, honor and equality. . . . It is evidence of a new departure in the relations of the East and West as they have subsisted during the last few centuries.

Let us all resolve that the high purpose with which the treaty was signed not be forgotten.

Improved Conditions in Southeast Asia

During the past few weeks I have visited the free nations of Southeast Asia as well as Free China, and I have had an opportunity to learn something of what they think about the new Japan that has come into being since the war and that has now, through the peace treaty, regained its sovereignty. It may perhaps be of interest to you to hear briefly some of the things I heard and consider with me for a while the future of Japan and these other nations of Free Asia.

Since the end of September I have visited and talked to Government and private leaders in Manila, Saigon, Phnom Penh, Bangkok, Rangoon, Djakarta, Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, and Taiwan. The peoples of each of these places are faced with different problems and different conditions, but there is one problem which is common to all of them in greater or lesser degree—that is the Communist-inspired and often Communist-led subversive activities and in some cases, such as Indochina, outright hostilities on a large scale.

This Communist aggression in Asia which has been most evident in Korea is not a new thing nor is it likely to diminish in the near future. As you all know, Stalin has said that the road to victory for communism in the West is through the East. It was almost 30 years ago that this statement was made but less than one year ago, in December of last year, that the Communist interest and aims in the Far East were again made clear in an article in the Moscow University *Herald*. This article, which was on the lessons of China for the revolution, set forth a 7-point program for Communist conquest. It followed the expected line of advocating the incitement of nationalism, then the promotion of a "united front" and the other intermediate steps until, as point 5 says, "the Communist Party takes complete control, ousting the others." But point 6 in this blueprint of revolution is even more interesting. It says:

Remember that true national independence can be achieved only in unity with the Soviet Union. There is no third, middle or neutral road.

It is the Communists themselves who say there is no room for coexistence.

It is against this background of Communist aggression that we must consider the position of Japan and Free Asia.

I have completed my tour in the countries of Southeast Asia and Free China with a feeling of what I call "cautious optimism." I have definitely been encouraged by what I have seen, and I can assure you that conditions in these countries to the South are better than they were a year ago.

My encouragement has been due chiefly to two factors. In the first place, in all of the nations I have visited in Southeast Asia there has been a decided improvement in internal stability and in the general prosperity of the country. This has been especially true in Burma. Just a little over 1 year ago it was impossible to travel in Burma very far from the capital, Rangoon. Today, while there are still subversive elements holding large areas of the country, it is nevertheless possible to travel in country districts far away from the capital. The armed forces of Burma are making real progress in liquidating Communist-inspired subversive movements in their country. In Malaya, the Government forces have for the first time begun to get the better of the Communist guerrillas. In Indonesia, the large island of Sumatra with its important oil refineries is almost free of disorder, and the Indonesian Government is making steady progress against the insurgents who are now chiefly active in west central Java. In the Philippines, Secretary of Defense Magsaysay has broken the back of the Huk movement there. Whereas about 1 year ago it was dangerous to go far from Manila, today such is not the case.

In all these areas the military action which is eliminating the threats of violence has made possible improvements in political, economic, and social conditions. The Governments of these countries are aware that if they do not take steps to improve radically the political, and economic, and social condition of their peoples, the military victories will not be long standing. General Sir Gerald Templer, the British High Commissioner in Malaya, told me that in that country the battle was only 25 percent military—that 75 percent of the battle was creating proper conditions in the political and economic field so that the people of Malaya would realize that they had a real stake in the Government and that it was working in their interest. About the same proportion is true in all the other countries I have visited, and the fact that the leaders of these countries are aware of this is definitely cause for encouragement.

The second factor is the growing understanding between leaders of these countries of the true menace of Chinese communism in this part of the world. When the Chinese Communists first came to power, there were many who welcomed them as being more representative of the Chinese people than the Nationalist Government. Today leaders of Southeast Asia, as well as elsewhere, realize, I

believe, that the Chinese Communists, like Communists everywhere, are false prophets, and have turned their backs on the finest traditions of China.

The increasing strength of these countries, together with their growing awareness of the Communist menace, gives us reason to hope that these free nations of Asia will eventually be able to stand on their own feet and contribute to the general cause of peace and prosperity in this part of the world.

Most of these countries have but recently obtained independence, and they naturally are primarily concerned with building up their own strength and not becoming embroiled in adventures abroad. In this process of getting strong, they naturally are concerned with what road Japan is going to follow during the coming year. The scars of the last war still remain, and there is reluctance among some of the people to see Japan again become strong. However, the leaders of these countries recognize the necessity of having Japan cooperate with them in strengthening the fabric of peace in the Pacific. From questions they asked me it was evident that their concern with Japan centers upon two points. While, as I said, recognizing the necessity of Japan's playing its part, they worry lest Japan get in a position to dominate them again either militarily or economically. There is, therefore, necessity for Japan and the Japanese people to reassure the peoples of Southeast Asia by their actions that there is, in fact, a new Japan which does not intend to follow the patterns which previously led to destruction.

In several of the countries I met Japanese consular and trade officials who had but recently arrived, and I was glad to note that they were making friends for Japan and were gradually gaining an acceptance of new Japan among the peoples with whom they worked.

The Reparations Problem

One of the most complicated problems which vexes the relationships between Japan and these countries to the South is the question of reparations. This is a matter upon which only experts should speak, and I have no intention of making any specific proposals as to how this question should be solved. However, I firmly believe that Japan has much to gain and but little to lose if it will make some concrete proposal to the peoples of the South looking toward payment in some form of reasonable reparations in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace. I do not believe that any responsible official in any of these Governments expects Japan to pay fantastic sums, as it is generally recognized that this is out of the question, but I do believe that until some settlement of this problem is reached which is acceptable to the countries invaded by Japan that it will be difficult for Japanese commerce and industry

to play the vital part it must in that part of the world if Japan is to become more nearly self-supporting.

If Japan can solve this reparations problem, and if by the action of its businessmen and officials abroad it can show that it seeks no special privileges and that it intends to live up to the generally accepted standards of fair trade, I can see no reason why there should not be a prosperous future of economic cooperation between Japan and Southeast Asia. The United States will do what it can to encourage the development, for it is in the American interest to see the development of strong, prosperous, independent, and enlightened Asiatic States. Mutual cooperation to build economic strength will help create the power to withstand the siren call of the Communists, which is often so tempting to persons discouraged by economic chaos.

But unfortunately it is not enough just to build economic and social strength. The aggressors often do not give time for such strength to be created.

Korean Example of Soviet Aggression

I have just returned from Korea, a country which well illustrates the point I am trying to make. In early 1950 the Republic of Korea was making long strides toward political and economic stability. But the vicious attack which struck from the North on June 25, 1950, not only undid much of the progress so laboriously achieved in Korea but also threatened the peace of the entire world.

This threat to the free world has not receded with time. The relentless pressure which the Communists have continued to bring to bear in Korea, together with their stubborn unwillingness at the conference table even to consider any just solution, clearly shows that the Communists powers have not deviated from their original plan of conquest.

Japan has made impressive progress in the past few years toward creating conditions of economic stability and toward identifying and resisting those who would overthrow political, economic, and social institutions of this country. But the example of Korea shows that a nation cannot be confident of its own safety and stability while powerful forces of aggression and imperialistic expansion are pressing upon its very borders. The Communists have not abandoned their aggression in Korea. They have not abandoned their desire to seize power in Japan. Soviet aircraft increasingly carry out hostile operations over the Habomai Islands and Hokkaido, which are Japanese territory not in any way affected by the peace treaty. The plotting of Japanese Communists at home and abroad to overthrow your Government and our form of society will not cease, even though the tactics they follow may vary from time to time.

Last May the Communists in Japan resorted to large-scale violence to test the strength and determination of the newly independent Japanese Government. I was glad to see that the Japanese authorities effectively met and put down this violence and that they acted vigorously to punish the offenders. I was also pleased to note the results of the recent election, in which the people of Japan showed their strong distaste for Communist violence by voting out all Communist representation in the House of Representatives.

For some time after the last war, the United States hoped that the Government of the Soviet Union meant what it said about wanting to live in peace and harmony with the rest of the world. No one can say that the United States has not been patient; in fact, we have probably been too patient. But hatred of war is ingrained in the American people. We have shown, I believe, that our purposes are just and that our aims are honorable. But we have seen no reciprocal gestures from the Soviet Union. We have learned from countless examples that the Soviets seek to exploit any weakness in their neighbors, and that the only language which they understand is the language of force.

Strengthening the Free World's Defenses

We have therefore embarked on the creation of strong forces in our country. We have taken the lead in working for the development of a European community of nations, which have joined together their individual forces for mutual defense and for the preservation of free institutions. The Vandenberg Resolution approved by the United States Congress in 1948 declared as our policy that the United States looks with favor on the creation of collective security arrangements within the scope of the U.N. Charter and on the basis of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid. In the Far East there has as yet been no such general grouping of nations determined to protect their freedom by joint action. However, at the time of the signing of the Japanese peace treaty, the United States entered into three security pacts which, as President Truman then said, constituted "initial steps" in the development of an overall security system for the Pacific area. These pacts were the Security Treaty with Australia and New Zealand, the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Philippines, and the Security Treaty with Japan.

U.S.—Japanese Security Treaty

Because of the Security Treaty with the United States and the presence in Japan by its terms of U.S. forces, Japan has been largely free from the open Communist pressures so often seen in other areas. The U.N. effort in Korea shields Japan from direct attack—in fact, there is reason to believe that the initial Communist aggression in Korea was at least in part due to the unarmed

condition of Japan and the belief of the aggressors that domination of the Korean Peninsula would make more easy the ultimate domination of Japan with its great industrial base and its industrially trained population.

The presence of these American troops creates many problems, but it also offers us an opportunity. If we can prove that the United States and Japan can cooperate as partners in this enterprise with the rights of both peoples being equally respected, we will do much to undercut the Communist propaganda which says that nations of the East and West cannot work together and that the West is in the East only to dominate and rule. But naturally it is sometimes difficult for all Japanese to understand why there must still be American troops in Japan—while still other Japanese express the fear that the United States is not committed to the defense of Japan and may at any time pull out and leave Japan helpless. I can assure you that the United States is fully cognizant of its responsibilities and its rights under the Security Treaty. On the one hand it has no intention of attempting to dominate Japan or treat her as a junior partner—we shall deal with you as equals in all things. On the other hand, the United States has no intention of withdrawing its forces and leaving Japan exposed just a few miles from active Communist aggression on the mainland. But I believe it important to recall to your mind the words of the preamble to the Security Treaty—it says:

The United States in the interest of peace and security is presently willing to maintain certain of its armed forces in and around Japan, in the expectation, however, that Japan will itself increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense against direct and indirect aggression. . . .

We in the United States have full confidence in the ability of Japan to carry out this responsibility. We are confident that the Japanese spirit of self-reliance and self-respect will move the nation forward in this program. We also believe that the time has come when a beginning must be made in developing the ability of Japan to defend itself.

This ability of Japan to defend itself against internal and external aggression would in itself constitute a real contribution to the security of the Pacific area, just as ability to defend themselves on the part of Indochina, Thailand, the Philippines, and other nations is a contribution to the security of the region.

In this way a firm structure of peace in the Pacific may gradually—but we hope not too gradually—be established and broadened. There need be no fear that stronger defense measures by Japan will lead to war. On the contrary, such measures will make it possible for Japan to join with other free nations in a common front which will reduce the threat of war by making would-be aggressors realize they cannot succeed. This I

think is the justification for stronger defense measures by Japan.

I should like to emphasize most strongly that the purpose of collective-security arrangements is not to provoke or stimulate military action but to deter any would-be attacker. The purpose of collective security is not to bring war but to avoid war. This goal is, in my opinion, being successfully realized in Europe. It is my hope that such collective action may increasingly become possible and effective in this part of the world and that Japan will be able to play her proper role in this endeavor. I know that some of you have reservations about reviving armed forces within Japan. You learned by bitter experience that military forces not subject to proper civilian control can destroy the very institutions they were established to protect. But I ask you to have confidence in your own institutions and in your own abilities. As I said in the beginning, as long as Japan continues to maintain free elections open to all, a free press, and a representative and responsible Parliament—you can be confident that the necessary military forces will be your servant, not your master. The economic burden of defense measures is a painful one but one which we have all found necessary to bear—I am confident that the industry and integrity of the Japanese people will, if given proper scope, be able to meet this problem as time goes by.

Japan has been giving great assistance to the United Nations by making available facilities and services to the U.N. Forces participating in the Korean operation. This cooperation has been most valuable and is greatly appreciated. I know I speak for the U.N. Forces when I say it is our hope that Japan will continue this assistance. And I wish to point out that your making available these facilities and services in the interest of the U.N. effort has been repaid by an enormous contribution to the security of Japan in shielding your country from attack.

Let me emphasize one other point. Japan is a free country. Japan is free to make its own decisions as to defense and to participation in collective arrangements. I have tried to outline the considerations that seem important to my Government, as well as to describe some pertinent observations from my recent trip. But the great and fateful decisions which must soon be made and which may decide the fate of this country in a world divided between free and slave, between dictatorship and democracy, between self-rule or Kremlin rule must be made by the people and Government of Japan.

In making this decision, may I ask you to keep in mind this brief quotation from a recent book published in America:

The central objective has to be somehow to keep the thread of civilization alive—to avert war, if possible, because war is the second greatest threat to civilized survival; but to be prepared for war, if necessary, because the greatest threat of all is totalitarian victory.

Rejection of Charges Made by Soviet Official in Berlin

Tripartite Letter of November 3

Press release 857 dated November 3

The U.S., U.K., and French High Commissioners for Germany on November 3 replied to complaints made on October 1 by General Vassily I. Chuikov, Commander-in-Chief of Soviet Occupation Forces in Berlin. Following is the text of U.S. High Commissioner Walter J. Donnelly's letter:

In your letter of October 1 you felt obliged to inform me that in recent months disorders have occurred in the Soviet zone. You attribute the blame for these occurrences to the activities of organizations in Western Berlin which, for the purpose of your argument, you describe as centers of espionage and sabotage and which, you maintain, indulge in criminal activities directed against the population of Eastern Berlin and the Soviet zone. I reject these charges, which are baseless and a travesty of the facts.

The organizations which you mention have, with the exception of RIAS, been voluntarily formed by Germans who have the interest of the German people at heart. So far from committing any crimes against the German people of the Soviet zone, these organizations are concerned only with giving help to the refugees from this zone who, in increasing numbers, flee from persecution; to assemble and disseminate evidence about illegal measures and violation of the rights of man, of which so many Germans in the Eastern zone are victims; and to tell them the truth about the free world from which they are separated.

As regards RIAS, the radio in the American sector of Berlin, you may recall that the organization was established under the direction of American personnel in 1946 after the Soviet authorities, in violation of the principle of Four Power cooperation in Berlin, refused to allow any but Soviet influence in radio Berlin. Your allegations that RIAS is a center of espionage and sabotage are without foundation. On the contrary, RIAS fulfills a much needed function in providing factual information not otherwise available in Eastern Germany and it will continue to do so.

I will not enter into the diverse accusations which you make on the basis of the evidence provided by various "court trials" in the Soviet zone. Public opinion throughout the world is only too well informed of the methods whereby so-called "confessions" may be extracted from those who are accused by such "courts." Moreover these "courts" seem to have acquired the habit of describing as "crimes" acts which in democratic

GENERAL CHUIKOV'S LETTER TO THE HIGH COMMISSIONERS, OCTOBER 1

[Telegraphic text]

It has come to our knowledge that on the territory of the American, British, as well as French sectors of Berlin there exist numerous espionage and diversionist centers which are carrying out criminally subversive activities, directed against the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the Eastern sector of Berlin.

In the course of court trials undertaken recently in Berlin, Dresden, Leipzig, Halle, Potsdam and other cities, against terrorist and diversionist bands seized in the act of committing criminal acts on GDR territory and in the Eastern sector of Berlin, it was established that these bands had been assigned tasks, given instructions, and the means for perpetuating diversionist acts, as well as a reward for criminal acts committed by them, by West Berlin espionage-diversionist organizations masquerading under hypocritical names, such as "Fighting Group Against Inhumanity," "Committee of Free Jurists," "Association of Political Refugees From the East," "Eastern Bureau of the CPU," the editorial office of the *Telegraf*, and others.

It was established, on the basis of statements made by the defendants and witnesses, that the basic aim of these organizations is the perpetration of crimes designed to undermine the economy and peaceful construction processes in the German Democratic Republic, and to cause injury to the population of the Republic, including the murder of activists in the people's economy, mass poisoning of the population, arson and explosions directed against public institutions, diversionist acts in people's enterprises and transportation, the burning of arms and administrative buildings thereon.

During the trial of Hoese, Metz, Gudelitx and Wentzel, which took place on May 13-14, 1952, in Berlin, it was disclosed that these persons, on instructions given them by the leaders of the so-called "fighting group against inhumanity," Hildebrandt and Tillich, had in the Eastern sector of Berlin set fire to stores, newspaper stands, raided the offices of democratic organizations, and forcibly abducted into West Berlin, and there murdered activists of people's enterprises, employees of the people's police, members of the Free German Youth. Hoese and Metz had been acting according to a plan that envisaged a systematic perpetration of terrorist acts with a view to intimidating the population of the German Democratic Republic and the Eastern sector of Berlin.

During the trial that had taken place on May 23-24, 1952, versus Burianek and other criminals, it came to light that Burianek had been receiving from the leaders of the "fighting group against inhumanity"—Leeder (alias Bentz) and Rogler (alias Schleda)—criminal instructions, including one to set fire to the House of Culture in the center of Berlin, to mine the railroad bridge in the district of Erkner, at the very time when a passenger train was scheduled to cross it; to blow up the Klingenberg power station, etc.

In August 1952 a trial was carried out in Berlin involving a band of criminals headed by Kaiser and Mueller. It was disclosed during the proceedings that the Kaiser-Mueller band had been preparing a series of diversionist acts with the purpose of putting out of commission tons of important equipment belonging to the people's economy and the transportation system of the GDR. Thus, under Mueller's leadership a group of bandits was getting ready to blow up the lock on the Paretz-Nieder-Nenendorf Canal in order to bring about an inundation that would result in the destruction of populated localities and in the mass loss of life among the population.

According to the conclusion of experts, such a criminal act would have resulted in inundating 50,000 hectares of useful soil. In accordance with instructions from the leaders of the "fighting group against inhumanity," Tillich and Leeder, Kaiser had organized in Western Berlin the manufacture of bombs, of suitcases carrying explo-

countries are considered to be a normal part of daily life. For example, a person only has to express an opinion contrary to the Government in power or to repeat a piece of news which is already known but which the regime has an interest in suppressing for him to be described as a "spy" or "traitor." Such a perversion of the accepted meaning of words would be laughable were its consequences not so serious.

In your letter you refer to "forceful abduction of activities of people's enterprises to West Berlin where they, and the employees of the people's police, and members of the FBJ, were murdered." If there were any truth in this, I would condemn criminal activities of such a kind just as strongly as you do. But you do not cite any instances of abduction and murder. I, however, am in a position to cite instances of abductions from Western Berlin.

I should be obligated if you would give your urgent attention to the case of Dr. Linse who was abducted from Western Berlin on July 8,¹ and inform me when he will be returned to Western Berlin. Likewise, I should welcome information about "a certain Weiland" to whom you attribute one of the "confessions" made before a court in Greifswald on August 27, 1952. I assume this to be a resident of West Berlin named Weiland who was kidnaped from the American sector on November 11, 1950, and forcibly taken into the Soviet sector. Nothing has been heard of him since then until I received your letter. I should be glad to have full details about the circumstances of his arrest and an account of what has happened to him since his arrest.

I repeat that the activities of the organizations which you mention have no concern with spying, diversionism, or terror. These organizations would not be necessary and would cease to exist if basic human rights, such as freedom of speech, freedom of movement, and freedom from arbitrary arrest existed in the Soviet zone and Eastern Berlin. Nor can their activities justify the measures taken since last May, at the instigation of the Soviet authorities, whereby the principal channels of communication between East and West Germany have been obstructed or curtailed. I take the opportunity of reminding you that I have not received a reply to Mr. McCloy's letter of June 30² in which your attention was called to this serious matter. I cannot but conclude that the purpose of your letter was to attempt, by its many unfounded allegations, to provide a belated justification of these measures which hinder the reunification of Germany and which, as you are no doubt aware, have aroused widespread and fully justified indignation throughout Germany.

¹ For a statement relating to this case made by Johannes Stumm, Police President of West Berlin, see BULLETIN of Nov. 24, 1952, p. 823.

² *Ibid.*, Sept. 1, 1952, p. 319.

sive material, incendiary ampoules, poisons, and other means for the purpose of committing terrorist and diversionist acts.

In July and August 1952, trials were instituted in Dresden, Halle, Potsdam and other cities of spies of the so-called "Committee of Free Jurists," which disclosed that this organization, which is enjoying the protection of the American authorities, had been systematically carrying out under the leadership of a certain Erdmann (alias Friedenau) acts of sabotage and diversion within factories of the GDR, planting its agents in the enterprises and Ministries of the Republic and, through them, collecting espionage information about the Republic's industries, as well as terrorizing the population by sending out threatening letters. [End of part one.]

Acting under the false name of "association of political refugees from the East," a band of criminals, including Kuentzel, Ehren, Gese, Wegelan and others, have since 1949 been trying stubbornly to create on GDR territory so-called "resistance groups" for the purpose of staging acts of sabotage and to gather espionage information. This very same Ehren is at the head of the West Berlin "Eastern bureau of Cdu," the most active leaders of which are Schwarze, Brechinger and Striewer. By setting up in GDR territory underground centers, the "Eastern bureau" assigns to them the task of sabotaging the peaceful construction in the Republic. Ehren is orienting his agency, in the event of a war, in the direction of carrying out terrorist acts en masse, and the physical destruction of activists and his country's patriots.

It has been established that a band of criminals from the editorial office from the West Berlin office of the *Telegraf*, particularly Nicke, Schloz, Kurz and others, are systematically and by means of intimidation and blackmail recruiting spies and diversionists among residents of the GDR, and are fabricating and distributing antidemocratic literature and pamphlets.

The radio-station RIAS, operating in Western Berlin, is in reality an important espionage-diversionist center. This radio station is giving special broadcasts which contain instructions to their agents concerning the staging of diversionist acts, sabotage and subversive activities.

To keep the criminal agency operating in GDR territory supplied, special enterprises manufacturing weapons used in carrying out diversionist and espionage acts have been established in West Berlin. Thus, at 106 Kurfuerstendamm there has been set up a laboratory for the making of "sympathetic" UNK³ for the purpose of forwarding espionage information, of potent poisons, grenades, suitcases carrying explosive material and sulphuric acid—for putting machinery in the enterprises of the Republic out of commission—and other diversionist weapons. A similar establishment is located at 9 Kaiser-Wilhelm Str.

During the above-mentioned trials it was disclosed as a result of statements made by the defendants and witnesses that all these criminal organizations are being managed and financed by the American intelligence. They are also in close contact with British and French intelligence. At his trial in Berlin defendant Kaiser disclosed publicly that the Tillich-led section II B of the "fighting group against inhumanity" which is carrying out diversionist acts in GDR territory, was receiving from American sources a sum of 20,000 marks per month. The same Kaiser declared that he together with other "experts" had in November 1951 been carrying out tests with diversionist weapons at the U.S. firing grounds in Grunewald. A certain Weiland, who had acted on instructions issued by the American intelligence, declared at the court trial of August 27 in Greifswald that he had been turning over espionage information, including information of a military character, to the U.S. press officer in Western Berlin, M. Josselson.

It would be possible to enumerate additional facts,

equally eloquent, bearing on the activities directed against the GDR and the Eastern sector of Berlin, from West Berlin territory. All these facts are on hand with the general prosecutor of the Republic and most of them have been published in the press.

Taking note of your request, during our meeting on September 9, 1952, I am sending the addresses of the more prominent espionage-diversionist centers operating in West Berlin territory, particularly in the U.S. sector of Berlin: "fighting group against inhumanity"—Ernststrasse 2-4; "committee of free jurists"—Limastrasse 29; the laboratory for the manufacture of terrorist and diversionist weapons, as well as the office of the "fighting group against inhumanity" up to February 1952—Kaiser-Wilhelm Str. 9 in Steglitz; in the British sector of Berlin: Section II B of the "fighting group against inhumanity," since February 1952, as well as the laboratory for the manufacture of diversionist and terrorist weapons—106 Kurfuerstendamm; "association of political refugees from the East"—Hohensollerndamm 51; "Eastern bureau of Cdu"—Reichsstrasse 4; editorial office of the *Telegraf*—Bismarekplatz 2.

From the foregoing it follows that Western Berlin has turned into a nest of espionage, diversionist and terrorist activities against the GDR and the Eastern sector of Berlin, a fact which gives rise to a feeling of resentment among the population which demands that decisive measures be taken in order to put an end to these criminal activities.

Despite the fact that the information concerning the above-mentioned crimes as well as the names of the organizers thereof had long been brought to the attention of the public, the U.S., British, as well as the French occupation authorities have up to now taken no steps to put an end to these criminal activities. The leaders of the criminal centers, particularly Hildebrandt and Friedenau, are playing a prominent role in the social life of West Berlin and are openly underscoring their close contact with the Western occupation authorities. On the pages of the press, under the control of the U.S., British and French authorities, the criminals are being openly defended. In particular, *Der Tagesspiegel*, a newspaper which stands close to the Commandant of the U.S. sector of Berlin, on August 29, 1952, published an article eulogizing Kaiser, written by Hildebrandt, as well as a picture of Kaiser, who had been preparing monstrous crimes against the GDR population and people's economy. In connection with court trials of the espionage and terrorist hands, carried out in the GDR, the West German press published cynical statements to the effect that, in view of the disclosures made, the West Berlin criminal organizations must "reorganize" their work.

The above-cited facts show that the U.S., British, as well as French occupation authorities, in Western Berlin, are aiding criminal activities whose purpose it is to inflict damage upon the population of the GDR and Eastern sector of Berlin and to undermine their economy. Such activities constitute a gross violation of the rights and obligations of the U.S., British, as well as French authorities in Berlin resulting from Four Power agreements, and are causing injury both to the population of the GDR, the immediate sufferer from the criminal activities of the above-mentioned hands, and to the population of Western Berlin inasmuch as the authorities of the GDR are compelled to take steps in protection against the penetration of West Berlin criminal elements into the Republic which also affects communications between the West Berlin population and the GDR as well as the Eastern sector of Berlin and serves to disturb the normal life of the West Berlin population.

I categorically demand the immediate closing of all the espionage-diversionist and terrorist centers located within the U.S., British and French sectors of Berlin, and the discontinuance of their criminal activities against the German Democratic Republic and the Eastern sector of Berlin.

Please inform us concerning the measures taken.

³ Text garbled.

Point Four Agreement With Burma

Press release 841 dated October 24

Frank N. Trager, Point Four Technical Director for Burma, and Hla Maung, Chairman of the Burma Economic Aid Committee, on October 24 completed a program agreement for the operation of Point Four in Burma during the fiscal year 1953. The agreement provides for the continuance of assistance initiated under the original Economic Cooperation Agreement signed by Burma and the United States on September 13, 1950. Hla Maung is in this country as a member of the Economic Mission headed by Burma's Minister of Labor and Housing, M. A. Raschid.

The new agreement provides for a contribution by the United States, through Point Four, of \$6,582,000 while the Government of Burma will contribute 35,000,000 kyats—the equivalent of about \$7,350,000. The American contribution is to defray costs of technicians, materials, and services from outside Burma and the Burmese sum will defray local costs of the projects covered by the agreement.

Last August, Burma announced the formulation of an 8- to 10-year development plan.¹ The agreement just concluded between Point Four and the Burma Economic Aid Committee provides for close coordination with Burma's own over-all plan. It calls for cooperation in projects in public health and sanitation, education, agricultural development, and other fields of activity related to the economic development of the Union of Burma.

Before World War II, Burma was known as the "rice bowl" of the Far East. Because of war damage and postwar insurgency, the production of rice fell off materially until it left an exportable surplus of less than half the prewar figure of 3,500,000 tons annually. This decline in production seriously reduced Burma's national income and presented serious problems to nations of the Far East normally dependent upon Burma for rice.

Efforts already are under way, through improved cultivation methods and the reclamation of farm land and irrigation systems, to bring the country back to its prewar prominence in the rice-export field. The new agreement will insure close cooperation between American and Burmese technicians to continue this campaign for more food.

Other important phases of the Burma plan and of the cooperative Point Four Burma program are health and sanitation project, including a malaria-control program to reduce the ravages of the disease which today affects almost half of Burma's population, and a broad and varied educational program, including the training of teachers for elementary and secondary education. Point Four technicians are cooperating with their Burmese

counterparts in each of these fields today in the continuation of the program initiated by the Economic Cooperation Administration (now the Mutual Security Agency). The volume of the present program in terms of dollars is smaller than the two preceding ones.

Program emphasis has changed, and is further changing, from one of an emergency-aid nature to a longer-term process, stressing technical assistance. The aim is to help make Burma economically self-sufficient by supplementing its own comprehensive plan for national rehabilitation and development.

Agricultural Assistance to Iraq

Press release 883 dated November 20

The University of Arizona, under an agreement with the Technical Cooperation Administration (Tca), will assist in the development of the agricultural college at Abu Gheraib, Iraq, the Department of State announced on November 21.

The university will assume the responsibility of providing professors and teachers for agricultural courses, will furnish the necessary materials and equipment for carrying out the expanded program, and will advise in the selection of Iraqi students for postgraduate study at the University of Arizona. The work will be under the general direction of the Point Four mission in Iraq, with technical advice and cooperation of the U.S. Department of Agriculture.

President Richard A. Harvill of the University of Arizona announced in Tucson that the dean and director of the College of Agriculture, Phil S. Eckert, has departed for Iraq to discuss plans with officials of the Government and of the Point Four mission there.

The United States and Iraq signed a general Point Four agreement on April 10, 1951.¹ Iraq has substantial revenues, mostly from oil, but the country is handicapped in its economic and social development by a severe shortage of technical people and of facilities for training them. An Iraqi Development Board was created in 1950 to administer the 70 percent of oil income which is allocated for development purposes, including the development of the vast water supplies of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers and large areas of land capable of being brought into production through irrigation.

The agricultural college at Abu Gheraib was established in 1948. The Government of Iraq proposes to develop it as a center for research and teaching in agriculture and related sciences, and to make it the foundation of a nation-wide exten-

¹For a description of this plan, see BULLETIN of Oct. 27, 1952, p. 660.

¹For announcement of the agreement, see BULLETIN of Apr. 23, 1951, p. 653.

sion service along the lines of the American "county agent" system. The University of Arizona, under the present 18-month agreement with Tca, will provide American instructors in agronomy, agricultural practices, field crops, soil sciences, genetics, animal and poultry husbandry, and dairying. The work will be financed by a Point Four grant to the university of \$125,000.

Enforcement of the Convention For Safety of Life at Sea

EXECUTIVE ORDER¹

WHEREAS under Article I of the International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea, signed at London on June 10, 1948, ratified by the United States of America, and proclaimed by the President on September 10, 1952² (Treaties and Other International Acts, Series 2495), the Government of the United States of America, together with the governments of the other countries which have become parties to the Convention, undertakes to give effect to the provisions of the said Convention and of the Regulations annexed thereto, to promulgate all laws, decrees, orders, and regulations, and to take all other steps which may be necessary to give the Convention full and complete effect, so as to insure that, from the point of view of safety of life, a ship is fit for the service for which it is intended; and

WHEREAS it is expedient and necessary, in order that the Government of the United States of America may give full and complete effect to the said Convention, that several departments and agencies of the executive branch of the said Government perform functions and duties thereunder; and

WHEREAS in accordance with Article XI of the Convention it has been determined that the Convention will come into force on November 19, 1952;

Now, THEREFORE, by virtue of and pursuant to the authority vested in me as President of the United States of America, it is ordered as follows:

1. The Department of State, the Department of the Treasury (Coast Guard), the Department of Commerce (Weather Bureau), and the Federal Communications Commission, respectively, are hereby directed, in relation to the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken by the Government of the United States of America under the said Convention, to perform the functions and duties therein prescribed and undertaken which appertain to the functions and duties which they severally are now directed or authorized by law to perform. Each of the said departments and the said commission shall cooperate and assist the others in carrying out the duties imposed by the Convention and by this order.

2. The Department of the Treasury (Coast Guard), or such other agency as may be authorized by law so to do, shall issue certificates as required by the said Convention, and in any case in which a certificate is to include matter which appertains to the functions and duties directed or authorized by law to be performed by any department or agency other than the issuing agency, the issuing agency shall first ascertain from such other department or agency its decision with respect to such matter, and such decision shall be final and binding.

3. Whenever the Coast Guard operates as a part of the Navy, the functions to be performed by the Department

of the Treasury (Coast Guard) under this order shall vest in and be performed by the Department of the Navy (Coast Guard).

4. This order supersedes Executive Order No. 7548 of February 5, 1937, entitled "Enforcement of the Convention for Safety of Life at Sea, 1929", to the extent that the said International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea signed at London on June 10, 1948, replaces and abrogates the International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea signed at London on May 31, 1929.

5. This order shall be effective as of September 10, 1952.



THE WHITE HOUSE,
October 30, 1952.

Export-Import Bank To Finance Canadian Mines Expansion

The Export-Import Bank of Washington on November 10 announced authorization of a credit of up to 5 million dollars to Falconbridge Nickel Mines, Ltd., of Toronto. This credit will assist in financing the company's expansion program, designed to increase substantially its production of nickel, cobalt, and copper from its extensive Canadian reserves. Approximately one-half of the total cost of the program will be provided by the company from its own resources, the remainder being provided by funds made available by the Defense Materials Procurement Agency and the loan from the Export-Import Bank.

Falconbridge Nickel Mines, Ltd., is the second largest producer of nickel in the world. It operates mines, mills, and smelters in the Sudbury District of the Province of Ontario, a refinery in Norway, and sells metals in the United States as well as in Western European markets. With assets recently reported in excess of 20 million dollars, the company has had a successful financial and operating history from its establishment in 1928. It has just obtained more than 3,700,000 dollars of new working capital from its Canadian stockholders, and in addition a stockholder has subscribed for 1,050,000 dollars to be made available next year.

The borrower contracted with the Defense Materials Procurement Agency on February 14, 1952, to deliver to the U.S. Government by 1961 not less than 50,000,000 pounds of nickel and 1,500,000 pounds of cobalt and has an option to deliver an additional 25,000,000 pounds of nickel and 25,000,000 pounds of copper. These metals, the production of which will be accelerated by the Bank's loan, are of vital importance to the military and industrial strength of the United States. The credit will be used mainly to assist in deepening the present main shaft and sinking a new shaft at

¹ No. 10402; 17 Fed. Reg. 9917.

² For the Department's announcement of the proclamation, see BULLETIN of Sept. 22, 1952, p. 464.

the company's Falconbridge Mine, developing and equipping its new Hardy Mine, and expanding the capacity of its mill and smelter so as to produce a minimum of 35,000,000 pounds or more of combined nickel and cobalt per year.

The credit, with interest at 5 percent per annum, is to be repaid in 10 semiannual installments beginning in 1955.

Quarterly Report Issued by International Bank

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development on October 31 reported a net income of 4,888,434 dollars for the 3 months ended September 30, 1952, the first quarter of the fiscal year.¹ This figure compared with 4,261,872 dollars for the same period in 1951. The net income was placed in the General Reserve, increasing this reserve to 62,916,534 dollars.

Gross income, exclusive of loan commissions, was 10,059,824 dollars, compared with 8,067,284 dollars for the first quarter of 1951. Loan commissions amounted to 2,192,041 dollars and were credited to the Bank's Special Reserve, as required by the Articles of Agreement, increasing this reserve to 29,876,695 dollars. Total reserves on September 30, 1952, were 92,793,229 dollars.

The Bank made four loans during the quarter: 50 million dollars to Australia, 1.3 million dollars to Peru, 25 million dollars to Colombia, and European currencies equivalent to 854,000 dollars to Iceland. These loans increased total loans signed by the Bank to 1,489,287,000 dollars. Disbursements on loans were 57,224,646 dollars, bringing total disbursements to 933,728,779 dollars on September 30.

Repayments of principal were received from borrowers as due; they totaled 506,070 dollars. The Bank also sold to private investors 2,536,447 dollars of securities from its loan portfolio: 1,359,000 dollars with its guarantee and 1,187,047 dollars without. These transactions brought total portfolio sales to 58,913,135 dollars.

On August 18 the Bank redeemed the 2½ percent Swiss-franc serial bonds of 1948, due 1953-54, in the principal amount of Swiss francs 17,000,000

¹ For a detailed breakdown of the Bank's quarterly statement, including its balance sheet as of Sept. 30 and a comparative statement of income and expenses during the same quarter of 1951, see attachments to the Bank's press release 309 dated Oct. 31.

(equivalent to 3,955,788 dollars). A premium of ½ of 1 percent (equivalent to 19,779 dollars) was paid.

Italy gave the Bank permission to use Italian lire equivalent to 820,000 dollars from its paid-in lire subscription to the Bank's capital for disbursements under a loan of July 1950 to Turkey. In addition, the Belgian Government authorized the Bank to relend the proceeds of any repayments on loans that have been made out of Belgium's paid-in franc subscription to the Bank's capital.

During the quarter Japan, Germany, and Jordan became members of the Bank, increasing subscribed capital by 583,000,000 dollars. On September 30, 1952, 54 countries were members of the Bank and the total subscribed capital amounted to 9,036,500,000 dollars.

Loan for Finnish Wood-Products Industry

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development on November 13 made its first loan in Swedish currency. It lent 18,000,000 Swedish kronor (approximately 3,500,000 dollars) to the Bank of Finland for the modernization and expansion of Finland's wood-products industry.

This is the fifth loan the Bank has made entirely in European currencies. Iceland has received three, totaling the equivalent of 4,312,000 dollars, and Yugoslavia has received one, equivalent to 28 million dollars. The Swedish kronor were made available for the loan to Finland by the Swedish Government from the paid-in portion of Sweden's subscription to the capital of the Bank.

The loan will supplement the 9,500,000 dollars which the Bank made available for the Finnish wood-products industry in a 20-million-dollar loan last April and will finance equipment to be purchased in Sweden. The equipment will be used in a program being carried out by Finnish companies to increase production of chemical pulp, newsprint, paperboard, cardboard, and other wood products. Timber is Finland's most important source of wealth, and the wood-products industry accounts for about 90 percent of Finland's exports.

The Bank has now made four loans in Finland totaling the equivalent of 38,300,000 dollars. Of this amount, about 25,700,000 dollars has been for the timber and wood-products industries. A timber loan of 2,300,000 dollars was repaid in full in September 1951.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of Meetings¹

Adjourned During November 1952

GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade): 7th Session of the Contracting Parties	Geneva	Oct. 2–Nov. 10
UN (United Nations): Economic and Social Council: Economic Commission for Latin America: Iron and Steel International Conference	Bogotá	Oct. 13–Nov. 15
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East: Seminar on Power Alcohol	Lucknow	Oct. 23–Nov. 6
<i>Ad Hoc</i> Committee on Forced Labor: 3d Session	Geneva	Oct. 14–Nov. 22
Trusteeship Council: 11th Session (2d Part)	New York	Nov. 21–26
1st Ibero-American Congress on Archives, Libraries, and Copyrights	Madrid	Oct. 20–Nov. 4
ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization): Aerodromes, Air Routes & Ground Aids Division: 5th Session	Montreal	Oct. 21–Nov. 20
Special European-Mediterranean Regional Frequency Meeting	Paris	Oct. 28–Nov. 11
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization): 4th Session of the Indo-Pacific Fisheries Council	Manila	Oct. 23–Nov. 7
Coordinating Committee	Rome	Oct. 27–Nov. 4
Technical Advisory Committee on Desert Locust Control: 2d Meeting	Rome	Nov. 3–6
Committee on Commodity Problems: 20th Session	Rome	Nov. 5–15
Committee on Financial Control	Rome	Nov. 5–15
Meeting of the Committee on Integration of FAO and the International Office of Epizootics	Rome	Nov. 10–15
Council: 16th Session	Rome	Nov. 17–29
Pan American Highway Congress, Special Meeting	Mexico City	Oct. 26–Nov. 1
4th Inter-American Congress on Radiology	Mexico City	Nov. 2–8
Regional Meeting of Technical Delegates, American International Institute for the Protection of Childhood	Mexico City	Nov. 3–6
International Wool Study Group: 5th Meeting	London	Nov. 3–6
ILO (International Labor Organization): Asian Advisory Committee: 4th Session	Geneva	Nov. 17–18
Governing Body: 120th Session	Geneva	Nov. 25–28
Meeting of International Sugar Council	London	Nov. 24–30*

In Session as of November 30, 1952

ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization): Council: 17th Session	Montreal	Sept. 9–
Air Transport Committee: 17th Session	Montreal	Sept. 10–
Air Navigation Commission: 11th Session	Montreal	Sept. 23–
Standing Committee on Aircraft Performance: 3d Session	Montreal	Nov. 11–
ITU (International Telecommunication Union): International Plenipotentiary Telecommunication Conference	Buenos Aires	Oct. 1–
UN (United Nations): General Assembly: 7th Session	New York	Oct. 14–
UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization): 4th Meeting of Representatives of National Commissions	Paris	Nov. 8–
General Conference: 7th Session	Paris	Nov. 12–
West Indian Conference: 5th Session	Jamaica	Nov. 24–
FAO/WHO Joint Meeting on Malnutrition in Mothers, Infants and Children	Gambia (Africa)	Nov. 28–

¹ Prepared in the Division of International Conferences, Department of State, Nov. 21, 1952. Asterisks indicate tentative dates.

Scheduled December 1–February 28, 1953

Caribbean Commission, 15th Meeting	Jamaica	Dec. 1–
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization):		
Forestry and Forest Products Commission for Asia and the Pacific: 2d Session	Singapore & Kuala Lumpur	Dec. 1–
Meeting of Experts on Index Numbers	Rome	Dec. 1–
Inter-American Meeting on Livestock Production	São Paulo	Dec. 8–
Meeting on Rice	Bangkok	Jan. 5–
ILO (International Labor Organization):		
Latin American Manpower Technical Conference	Lima	Dec. 1–
Technical Meeting on the Protection of Young Workers in Asian Countries, with relation to their Vocational Preparation	Ceylon	Dec. 1–
Textile Committee: 4th Session	Geneva	Feb. 2–
UN (United Nations):		
Economic and Social Council:		
Consultative Group in the Field of Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders—Combined European and North American Regional	Geneva	Dec. 8–
Fiscal Commission: 4th Session	New York	Jan. 19–
Population Commission: 7th Session	New York	Jan. 19–
Statistical Commission: 7th Session	New York	Feb. 2–
Transport & Communications: 6th Session	New York	Feb. 2–
Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations	New York	Feb. 16–
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East:		
Inland Transport Committee: 2d Session	Bandoeng	Jan. 9–
Railway Subcommittee: 1st Session	Bandoeng	Jan. 14–
Inland Waterway Subcommittee: 1st Session	Bandoeng	Jan. 14–
Committee on Industry and Trade: 5th Session	Bandoeng	Jan. 26–
9th Session of the Commission	Bandoeng	Feb. 6–
2d Conference on Trade Promotion	Manila	Feb. 23–
6th International Conference of Social Work	Madras	Dec. 14–
UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization):		
First Regional Conference on Free and Compulsory Education in South Asia and the Pacific	Bombay	Dec. 12–
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization):		
10th Session of the Council	Paris	Dec. 15–
Inter-American Research Seminar on National Income	Santiago	Jan. 5–
ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization):		
2d Southeast Asia Regional and Limited South Pacific Air Navigation Meeting	Melbourne	Jan. 13–
1st Air Navigation Conference	Montreal	Feb. 21–
WMO (World Meteorological Organization):		
1st Session of the Regional Association for Africa	Tananarive	Jan. 19–
Commission for Climatology	Washington	Feb. 23–
Executive Board: 11th Session	Geneva	Jan. 21–
International Wheat Council: Reconvening of 8th Session	Washington	Jan. 30*
11th Session	Washington	Jan. 30*
Inter-American Economic and Social Council: 3d Extraordinary Meeting	Caracas	Feb. 9–

South African Case Calls for Neighborly Attitude

Statement by Charles A. Sprague

U. S. Representative to the General Assembly¹

U.S./U.N. press release dated November 15

This item on the agenda of our committee—race conflict in South Africa—presents one of the most difficult questions confronting the General Assembly at this seventh session. It involves the subject of race relations *within* a member state; and the authority of the Assembly to consider the matter has been promptly challenged by the distinguished delegate of South Africa, who cites the limitation

imposed by article II, paragraph 7 of the Charter. Beyond this, there rises the very pertinent question of what the United Nations may find it wise to do in dealing with the problem. Let me say that this whole matter has been one of deep concern to my Government, whose primary desire is to promote the objectives of the United Nations within the framework of the Charter. My delegation has given close attention to the statements which have been made by the other delegates. It has noted the very divergent views presented by the sponsors of the agenda item on the one hand, for whom the distinguished delegate of India was the first spokesman, and on the other hand, by the delegations of South Africa, United Kingdom, New Zealand, France, and others. It has observed the inclination of the delegates of Sweden, of Norway, and of Brazil to probe further into the subject

¹ Made in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee on Nov. 15.

before arriving at definite conclusions. My delegation shares with the latter group a concern to avoid both excess of zeal and timid legalism.

The statement made by my delegation on the preceding, related item, concerning the treatment of persons of Indian origin in South Africa, made clear the historic position of my Government on essential human freedoms.² It reviewed our national history and noted the progress over the years, admittedly slow but nevertheless substantial, in making real the freedom and equality of all men which our own Declaration of Independence had proclaimed to the world. It endorsed a national policy of attempting steady progress toward removal of discriminations which the Charter condemns. It is not necessary to repeat that recital. I will only take time to say again that belief in the equality of all men is the foundation of our American democracy. We do not feel there can be any lasting solution for racial problems short of full participation of all races in the life of the nation. Yesterday, we heard the eloquent delegate of Pakistan read from our Declaration of Independence. That was and is the Charter of our Liberty.

The pending item, however, projects more sharply than the former the question of the extent of the authority of the United Nations. The delegation of South Africa has tabled a motion to declare that this committee is not competent to consider this item, and that motion has drawn very able support from other delegations. Others have suggested that since a legal question is involved, it should properly be referred to the International Court of Justice for a ruling. In the past, however, there has been a general reluctance to take such a course. The preference has been for the Assembly to feel its way in these matters, giving it the opportunity to grow through experience.

It is the opinion of my delegation that the motion of the distinguished delegate of South Africa, which would declare our committee not competent even to consider the item, is too broad. We feel that the Assembly and the committee enjoy under the Charter the full right of discussion of relevant matters and that the exercise of that right does not contravene the restriction imposed by article 11, paragraph 7 of the Charter. Therefore, my delegation will vote against the motion, on the ground that it would preclude even discussion.

My delegation would like to offer some general comments on this point. It is frankly concerned not to see the door of legality strongly bolted in a way which would prevent adequate consideration of the vital and far-reaching problems of human rights in this changing world; but we are equally concerned not to open the door at this time to every sort of proposal. Wise statesmanship suggests that we leave the door ajar and neither close it tight nor open it wide. That conclusion flows out of our own experience under a

written constitution. It was the broad construction of the United States Constitution by Chief Justice John Marshall which gave that document vitality and permitted the nation under it to grow and mature.

U.S. Expresses Serious Concern

I should like to turn aside now from the legal difficulties arising on this question, which admittedly are real, and give consideration to the heart of the problem presented by this item. My Government respects fully the sovereignty of the great Union of South Africa with which it has long been associated in friendly relationship. There is steady interchange of travel and trade between our countries. We have not forgotten the fine record of the Union's fighting men, who won some of the earliest victories of World War II against the oppressive forces of fascism. Nor are we unmindful of the sacrifices now being made by South Africans in the United Nations struggle against aggression in Korea.

My delegation is exceedingly reluctant in this gathering of the nations to point an accusing finger at this member state and does not intend to do so. It is, however, seriously concerned over the matter at issue, for the present and future well-being of the people of South Africa. We recognize the very complex situation which exists in that country, the variety of its racial components, the differences in levels of culture, and the conflicts within as well as among groups.

The body of legislation which the Government of South Africa has adopted for the handling of its races is under attack here as discriminatory on the ground that it imposes segregation and is designed to insure a permanent economic and political supremacy for the the minority holding the reins of power. Authors of this program of legislation admit that a policy of segregation is being followed, but deny that it is discriminatory and oppressive. They assert that it is the best solution they can find for the difficult problem which they face.

Without assuming to sit in judgment on the internal affairs of South Africa, my delegation feels impelled to raise questions as to the practical wisdom of such a policy. It is concerned, because in other societies the trend is toward steady diminution of legal segregation and the steady increase of equal participation in the political and economic life of the community as peoples become qualified.

To adopt a policy of increased restriction does not seem to my delegation to be in harmony with the generally accepted interpretation of the goals and of the obligations of the Charter. There is the further fear that in the long run, the repercussions from pursuit of such a settled policy may be adverse to the government principally concerned and harmful to the development of racial harmony elsewhere in the world.

² For text of a statement made by Mr. Sprague on this item, see BULLETIN of Nov. 24, 1952, p. 833.

Now we arrive at this point: What can or should the United Nations do in this situation? The United Nations is not a super-government. It is barred from intervening in the essentially domestic affairs of a member state. There is real danger, as the distinguished delegate from New Zealand said yesterday, lest the United Nations "diffuse its efforts too widely." But while the United Nations has no power to impose standards, it does have power to proclaim them, and in this area of fundamental freedoms it has done so. It is clearly within the authority of the United Nations to affirm and reaffirm the principles of respect for human rights which have gained general acceptance among enlightened peoples, and to call on all member states to set the course of their national policy in the direction of embodying those principles in law and custom as rapidly as local conditions permit.

If we can do so in general terms, we avoid the vexing issue of competence and avoid also the danger of the stability of this organization inherent in singling out for direct action special legislation of a member state. And this course may be more effective in accomplishing the aims of United Nations than another which wounds the national pride of a member.

Turning now to the resolution before the committee, my delegation expresses grave doubt as to its desirability, in its present form. It proposes the establishment of a commission, another commission to be added to the already large number of United Nations subsidiary organs. The commission would be charged with finding out the international aspects and implications of the racial situation in the Union of South Africa.

How much could this commission add to what is being brought out already in our discussions here? As the distinguished delegate from Pakistan said day before yesterday, the facts in this matter are well-known. He said, "There is not a library in the world where anyone who cares to read cannot obtain dozens of books written from all angles, describing the situation in South Africa." Is there a better forum for bringing out the international implications of these facts than this committee in which 60 member nations present the views of their governments and their understanding of these implications?

U.N. Exercise of Its Persuasive Powers

We have no power to enforce change. We have only the power to urge in order to persuade. Whatever the findings of the commission would

be, is this the right path toward influencing the minds of those whose course of action this Assembly is seeking to moderate? Or will the appointment of this commission only serve to stiffen their resistance to our persuasion? We believe that such a commission is not a practical means of using our influence.

My delegation strongly favors the approach offered in the amendment submitted by the delegations of Iceland, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway. If added to the three preambular paragraphs of the 18-power draft resolution, the text of this amendment provides in unequivocal terms a broad basis for agreement among most of us in this committee. It draws a conclusion from our discussion here and expresses in more specific terms the meaning of our obligation under the Charter. It points out the direction in which the national policies of all members should proceed. It calls on all members, not just one, to bring their policies into conformity with Charter principles and obligations. It preserves the basic solidarity which is of overriding importance for the preservation of our organization. It offers what, in our view, is the best means for exercise by the Assembly of its important powers of persuasion.

In any roll call of nations, the United States wants to be found on the side of human liberty, but it wants the poll to be taken on a measure which it can wholeheartedly support, such as the amendment now before the committee.

We would leave enforcement to the lively conscience of the citizens of each country and to the power of the public opinion of the world. This course may not satisfy those eager to crack down on a member whom they regard as delinquent. It will not satisfy those who, not recognizing the limitations of this organization, want the United Nations to do something about distressing situations. But in the long run, this course may accomplish far more than abrupt and direct action. Let us not impute evil purpose or lack of intelligence to the people of South Africa. Rather our attitude should be one of neighborly helpfulness in working out just solutions to the difficult problems they face in the field of race relations in their country.³

³ The 18-power draft resolution calling for a commission to study the racial situation (U.N. doc. A/AC.61/L.8/Rev. 2) was adopted by the Committee on Nov. 20 by a vote of 35-2-22 (U.S.). On the same date the committee adopted by a vote of 20 (U.S.)-7-32 a resolution embodying the Scandinavian amendment referred to by Mr. Sprague. The South African motion declaring the committee not competent to consider the item was defeated.

An Answer to Soviet Attacks on U.S. Policy Toward Underdeveloped Areas

*Statement by Isador Lubin
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly¹*

U.S./U.N. press release dated November 11

The general debate on financing economic development has come to an end. We have learned a great deal about the progress, the problems, the needs, and the hopes of the various governments represented here. But we have also heard many fairy tales—fairy tales that were told by the representatives of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Byelorussia, the U.S.S.R., and the Ukraine. In these tales they described the wonderful accomplishments of the so-called people's democracies—accomplishments so vast that in countries like Poland and Czechoslovakia the governments last year were forced to go back to a rationing system for certain food products and other essentials of life; accomplishments so great that only within the past year such necessities as fish, butter, cheese, flour, sugar, and potatoes practically disappeared from the retail stores in Poland. Of these "accomplishments" I shall speak more later.

In these fairy tales we also heard, in five different speeches, of those terrible bogeymen—the American monopolists. Indeed, if I understood the interpreter correctly, one of the representatives of the so-called people's democracies labeled me personally as the representative of the American monopolists. It is quite apparent that in their eyes any American businessman who invests his funds abroad, no matter what the size of his investment, is a monopolist.

But the most fantastic tale of all was the formula that was proposed for the economic development of the less developed areas by the representatives of the countries of Eastern Europe. As I heard the Soviet record played and replayed, I thought back to a meeting of the Economic, Employment, and Development Commission that took

place about a year and a half ago. At that meeting, the same record was played. What is the real theme of the Soviet song? I think I can best describe what it means to economic development by quoting what the American representative on the Economic, Employment, and Development Commission said at that time—away back in the spring of 1951. Remember, Gentlemen, this was some 18 months ago.

At that time the U.S. representative said:

Mr. Katz-Suchy, the Representative of Poland, suggested that the road to development would best be found with no private investment, no public loans, no loans by international organizations. And I wasn't quite sure whether he also said no grant assistance. If I have correctly understood the rest of the debate, the more usual complaint is that there has been too little, rather than too much of this sort of thing. Hence, on this I think I need make no further comment.

But then Mr. Katz-Suchy adds a further bit of advice—there should be no foreign trade!

And I might add, we heard similar advice from Mr. Gromyko the other day.

In particular, his indignation was vented on the imports of raw material by the United States and the other developed countries. To sustain his thesis he cited some striking figures of American dependence on the outside world, and for the most part the underdeveloped areas of the world, for these materials.

I might add that we have heard these same figures repeated in this Committee during the past 2 weeks.

But he left out some of the best figures. Not only are we dependent for nearly a third of our copper and some of the other items he listed (he could have pointed out that there is a long list of such items); we are dependent on outside sources for 100 percent of our natural rubber, tin, and cordage fibres, and for nearly all of our manganese. Seventy-five percent of our tungsten comes from outside the United States, about a third of our lead and zinc—and so on. This is not a new development, something which has recently happened as a result of our defense effort. It has been one of our facts of life for a number of years.

¹Made in Committee II (Economic and Financial) on Nov. 11.

For these purchases the United States pays cash. They form an important income item for countries seeking to acquire the supplies needed for their development. Would they be better off if their copper, tin, or rubber had to be kept at home?

What Mr. Katz-Suchy's advice adds up to is this: No external financing and no income from exports. In effect, what he is advocating is no development.

Alleged Profits of U.S. Investors

As the Soviet gramophone record went round and round, we heard again and again the monotonous charge: "The American who invests abroad makes unconscionable profits from the enslavement of the labor population in the underdeveloped countries and from the draining off of their resources."

Certainly, no one would deny that individual investors in particular countries have made large profits in certain years. Nor would anyone deny that during recent years the return on investment in oil abroad has been higher than on similar investment at home. During the period 1949 to 1951 the return on this type of investment abroad has been from 5 to 6 points.

But how have American foreign investments in other lines of activity made out as compared with what they have yielded at home? Let us look at data compiled by my Government showing the rates of return actually realized by U.S. private direct investments for the years 1949 to 1951.

These statistics show that in 1949 the ratio of earnings to capital for all direct U.S. investment abroad, excluding petroleum, was 12.4 percent. The ratio of earnings to capital invested in the United States was 10.7 percent. In other words, the relatively greater risk involved in foreign investment, as compared with investment at home, was compensated by only about 1.7 percentage points. In 1950 this difference amounted to only 1.5 percentage points. In 1951 it was about 4 percentage points.

More specifically, in the field of manufacturing, American investors abroad earned 16 percent in 1949 compared with a return of about 14 percent on similar investment at home. In other words, the return on this type of investment abroad, in 1949, was but 2 percentage points higher than in the United States. But in 1950 investment in manufacturing at home earned a return of over 17 percent while it earned only 16 percent abroad. In 1951 somewhat higher returns were again available abroad, the foreign investor in manufacturing earning 2.3 percentage points more than he would have received at home.

Now, we have heard a lot about mining profits. What is the record here? In 1949 mining investment in the United States earned a return of 12 percent; the return on American mining investment abroad was only about 10 percent. In 1950 the comparable figures were 13 percent at home and 12.4 percent abroad. In other words, in these years, there was in fact no reward to American

investors as a whole for taking the additional risk of investing their capital in foreign mining operations. In those years, the return from such investment abroad was actually smaller than could have been obtained at home. In 1951 the balance had shifted, with foreign mining investment receiving returns 1.3 percentage points greater than similar investment at home.

Finally, let us look at public utilities. In 1949 the total American investment in public utilities abroad earned 3.8 percent. In 1950 American investments in public utilities abroad earned 4.5 percent. In 1951 they earned 3.6 percent. In contrast, in these same 3 years, American investors in the United States averaged 9 percent per annum. In those 3 years, the American capital invested in foreign utilities actually earned less than half of what the same type of investment yielded in the United States.

I do not believe it is necessary to point out that the rate of earnings on American investments abroad is in no way a measure of what the American investors actually receive in profits. Of the profits actually earned in 6 years—1946-52—over 4.8 billion dollars were plowed back—reinvested—in the countries where they were earned. This amount is equal to 50 percent of the total profits earned. To put it another way, for every dollar earned from American direct investments abroad, 50 cents was reinvested, that is, put back to work further developing the economy of the country where the profit was earned.

In Latin America, during the period from 1946 to 1951, the total earnings of U.S. companies that had subsidiaries in Latin America were approximately 1.6 billion dollars. During the same period these subsidiaries reinvested a total of over 860 million dollars. In other words, these companies, on the average, earned 270 million dollars a year and reinvested an annual average of about 145 million dollars or one half of these earnings during this time.

And, since we are talking about profits, there is one other point which is worth mentioning and concerning which the delegates from Eastern Europe have been singularly quiet. I refer to the other side of the coin, that is—the losses that have been incurred by American investors who have ventured abroad. It might interest them to know, when they talk about the profits that are "wrested" from the underdeveloped countries, that during the period from 1920 to 1940 the net loss on the capital value of portfolio investments suffered by American investors abroad was almost 3½ billion dollars.

Does the U.S. Prevent Industrial Growth?

Mr. Chairman, the representatives of certain Eastern European countries have charged that the United States deliberately prevents the development of manufacturing in underdeveloped areas.

We have heard repeatedly that the United States is "forcing" these countries to concentrate almost exclusively upon the production of primary products for American industry and upon the production of strategic war materials. We have been told that the United States stands in the way of genuine economic development.

The representatives from the Soviet orbit have told us that this is the case in Latin America. But what actually has been the story of industrial production in Latin America since the war? The facts are publicly available. They are to be found in the 1950 economic survey of Latin America prepared by the Economic Commission for Latin America. This is the most recent economic review available for this area.

That survey states that during the period between 1945 and 1949 the rate of industrial expansion in six of the Latin American countries was between 4 and 5 percent annually. In four other Latin American countries, during the same period, the rate of industrial expansion was between 6½ percent and 12 percent. The survey points out that the rate of industrial development during the period since the war was "particularly outstanding" in Argentina and Chile, among other countries. Only 2 months ago, in an address given to the Board of Governors of the International Bank at Mexico City on September 10, 1952, Raoul Prebisch, Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Latin America, pointed to the increasing production of capital goods—chiefly iron, steel, cement, and machinery—in a number of Latin American countries, and he mentioned Brazil in particular.

The representatives of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Poland have asserted that American investment is interested only in the development of strategic raw materials. The record clearly proves the falsity of these charges. Had these representatives been interested in the facts, they would have taken the time to read the published reports of the U.S. Export-Import Bank loans. They would have found that this Government-owned institution is playing an important part in the industrial development of many parts of the world.

They would have found that among the loans of the Export-Import Bank are advances for building steel mills in Mexico, Brazil, and Chile; for the mechanization of rice production in Ecuador; for electrification programs in Indonesia; for the construction of cement plants in Saudi Arabia; for equipment for dam and canal construction in Afghanistan; as well as for railways, hydroelectric plants, fertilizer plants, and irrigation systems in many other underdeveloped countries. And may I note that these types of loans comprise, by far, the largest number made by the Bank?

As far as private investment is concerned, it is true that in the years immediately after the war a

large part of American private foreign investment went into the petroleum industry. But, as I have already pointed out, more and more American private investment is tending to go into manufacturing and distribution, and less is tending to go into extractive industries. If I may repeat what I said in my previous statement, between the end of 1949 and the end of 1951, American investment in manufacturing and distribution in the underdeveloped countries rose by about 525 million dollars, while the amount invested in petroleum increased by only 325 million dollars.

Mr. Chairman, in my previous statement I gave a number of examples of the way in which American private investment was contributing to the general economic development of underdeveloped countries. But let us look at what the Secretariat of the Economic Commission for Latin America has to say about this question of American private investment in Latin America. In the studies on Brazil and Chile, for example, private American investments are listed by the Economic Commission for Latin America as among the *most important* sources of capital in public utilities, manufacturing, and trade. In Brazil, according to the Economic Commission for Latin America, U.S. investors are represented in meat packing, assembly of automobiles, production of automobile tires, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, electrical supplies, and radios. United States concerns, jointly with Brazilian interests, are engaged in the manufacture of rayon, rubber goods, and electric-light bulbs. In Chile, American investments are to be found in the manufacture of glass products, automobile tires, asbestos, and synthetic textiles—most of which are consumed by the local population.

Attacks on Point Four

The representatives of the Eastern European countries could not resist repeating their usual allegations that the Point Four Program of the United States is designed to "dominate" the underdeveloped countries, to obtain from them their strategic resources, and to gain other selfish ends.

Now, the fact is that the technical-assistance program of the U.S. Government is not a new development in American policy. It began over 15 years ago as a program of cooperative assistance to Latin America and was given new impetus by President Truman in 1949. It might be interesting to examine more closely the "dominating" and "strategic" projects which are now being carried out under this program and about which we have heard so many false charges.

First of all, in what fields is the U.S. Point Four Program active? I have here the status report of our Point Four activities as of the beginning of September of this year. It shows a total of 2,090 experts authorized, of which 1,265 are already in the field at work. In what fields are they to work? Of these 2,090 experts, 616 or about 30 percent are

to help develop agriculture, forestry, and fisheries; 333 or 16 percent are to work in public health and sanitation; 207 or about 10 percent are to improve education; 172, or just over 8 percent, are in the field to aid in the development of natural resources. The latter are mostly concerned with irrigation and hydroelectric power. In the case of minerals, our Point Four experts do not get into the question of actual extraction. Their function is to help requesting countries to determine what their mineral resources are. Seventy-seven or about 3 percent of our Point Four experts are to work in the improvement of public administration and government services. Smaller numbers are allocated to transport and communications, housing, social services, and labor problems. All of these experts are in these fields of activity only because they were asked for by the host country.

Possibly some of our friends from the Soviet group may find something sinister in our working in the field of public administration. In this field, we are trying to help governments, both national and municipal, to improve the services which they can render to their citizens. If I might cite just a few cases: In Costa Rica a public administration consultant is helping work out the "strategic" problems involved in street cleaning and garbage collection in the city of San José. This is being done at the request of the Director of Public Health. Eight professors from Brazil are now studying public administration at the University of Southern California. Upon their return to Brazil, they will teach in the fields of personnel administration and research and statistics. Another case is a project to survey the administration and organization of one of the state governments in Colombia. This involved the improvement of tax systems and tax-collection methods.

The Soviet representatives apparently consider these types of projects as "sinister, strategic, or dominating." Can this mean, perchance, that in the Soviet mentality such projects can only have such purposes?

The kind of thing we are trying to do through our Point Four Program is the same kind of thing all of us who are interested in human welfare are trying to do through the United Nations—that is, all of us except the Soviet Union and the so-called people's democracies who refuse to contribute a single red rouble to the U.N. Technical Assistance Program.

On other occasions, we have elaborated on the kind of projects we are carrying on under our Point Four Program. We are working in education, in sanitation and public health, in agronomy, in insect control, and on countless other projects designed to raise living standards. If I may cite a few examples:

In Peru, we have been working with the Peruvian Government to set up a new experimental ranch in the jungle country east of the Andes.

We have brought in cattle by truck over the mountains and have set up a sawmill. We are helping the Peruvian Government to find out whether this large area can be used for food production. We have set up another experimental farm for sheep raising in the High Sierras. We have been training workers to do agricultural extension work. The Peruvian Government already has more than 100 of its own citizens out working with the farmers. In 1951 these Peruvian extension workers reached 200,000 farm families.

The results are already rewarding. The 12,000 bushels of improved wheat seed contributed under Point Four has already brought about an increased yield of 25 percent on the farms where it was used. Another interesting result has been with potatoes. The potato originated in Peru, but the new methods of cultivation which have been developed elsewhere are only now reaching back to the country of origin. The extension workers have succeeded in raising potato production per acre by five times in some cases.

In Chile the "Servicio," through which our Point Four Program operates, has worked with the Sanitation Department of the city of Santiago to build a sewerage system for the northern part of the city. This will help more than 200,000 people who have hitherto been without adequate sanitation. It will make the area ready for industrial purposes and render 40,000 hectares suitable for truck gardening.

Turning to Iran, Point Four experts and Point Four funds are being used to complete a textile mill, a slaughter house, and a meat-packing plant. The city of Shiraz is being helped to improve its electric-power system and Tehran's new water system is being speeded. Point Four is aiding in establishing farm-machinery cooperatives so that farmers who previously had only primitive tools will now have access to modern machinery.

In India, on October 2, Mahatma Gandhi's birthday, the first of a series of large-scale rural-development projects involving an eventual 18,500 villages was begun. Teams of Indian and American experts will work in the villages to help villagers to solve village problems—increasing food production; providing pure water; improving irrigation methods; learning the use of fertilizer; learning to read and write; forming cooperatives; and improving the conditions of land tenure.

In 1952 India needs nearly 300,000 tons of iron and steel to make simple farm machinery. Point Four is supplying 39,000 tons of it. India needs water so that farmers may grow two crops a year instead of one. Point Four is sharing in the cost of drilling and equipping 2,000 wells.

Mr. Chairman, the representative of the Soviet Union has described our Point Four Program as a weapon of American diplomacy. That charge was, for once, correct. We are proud of this weapon. We are proud of the way our Point Four Program has helped the people of Latin America

the Middle East, and Asia to improve their standards of living. We are proud of the way in which our Point Four Program has contributed to the security and progress which are the goals of the United Nations. We intend to continue using this weapon to help build a better and more peaceful world.

The Situation in Poland and Czechoslovakia

In contrast to what has been described as "dominating and strategic" projects carried on under the U.S. Point Four Program, we have been told of "the great and unselfish contributions of the Soviet Union" to the underdeveloped countries in the Soviet bloc. In the case of his own country, the delegate of Poland has said that this "unselfish contribution has strengthened Poland's political and economic independence and has allowed it to play its part in maintaining peace."

Mr. Chairman, this "unselfish contribution" of the Soviet Union seems to have yielded some paradoxical results. As I have already stated, rationing was reintroduced in Poland 6 years after the war. In September 1951 it began with meats and fats. Last spring soap and washing powder were added to the rationing list. On May 11 sugar and other sweets were added to the ration list. Seven years after the war, the food situation is still so grave that the Government has been forced to fall back on its earlier postwar rationing measures.

And it is here that the paradox arises. Poland's present population is about 30 percent smaller than its population before the war. Since the war, Poland has gained the rich agricultural lands of Eastern Germany. It has also gained the valuable coal and industrial resources of Silesia. As a result—and also, no doubt, as a result of the "unselfish contributions of the Soviet Union"—Poland's national product has been significantly increased.

Let me repeat. On the one hand there are fewer Poles than before the war. On the other, Poland's resources—both agricultural and industrial—and Poland's output have increased. There is no evidence of large savings by the people. Then why the necessity for rationing? Does this mean that the Polish workers are consuming less?

What is happening to this greater national product? Some of it, of course, is going into new investment. But what of the rest? Since Poland no longer publishes national product or income statistics, we cannot say specifically. Still, the missing part of the national product must go somewhere. The delegate from Poland has assured us that it is being used to strengthen Poland's political and economic independence. Could this mean, by any chance, that the larger part of the increased national product is being sent to the Soviet Union? Could it be that the rest is being

stockpiled in Poland for the purposes of future Soviet wars?

From Czechoslovakia, such information as is available shows how the Soviets are encouraging the "political and economic independence" of other so-called people's democracies.

One instrument for encouraging this "independence" seems to be the fostering of trade within the Soviet sphere. But who is calling the signals on this trade between Czechoslovakia and the U.S.S.R.? Is there, as certain delegates would have us believe, a condition of "equality" between the partners in this trade? The answers to a few questions might help us here.

Is it not true that when the Soviets have made certain types of purchases in Czechoslovakia, they have imposed conditions regarding delivery dates and quality—conditions which it was obvious in advance could not be met? And is it not also true that every delay cost the Czechs a line which was deducted from the price they received for their goods?

In the face of the stories we have been told about the high living standards in Czechoslovakia, is it not strange that on August 18, Joseph Nepomusky, Minister of Agriculture, warned Czech farmers that their agricultural production was lagging? And is it not also strange that few vegetables or fruits are available in the Czech markets and that there has been a serious potato shortage since the first of the year—all of this in a country which, before the war, had one of the highest living standards in Europe?

Did not the newspaper *Rude Pravo* on August 25 deplore the serious coal shortage in Czechoslovakia? And, is it not strange that on October 23 the Czech Government imposed rationing on household and nonindustrial electricity—7 years after the war?

And finally, did not Minister of the Interior Nosek announce a crisis in rail transport—a crisis described by Nosek over the Prague Radio as "a threat to our national economy, to our supply system, and to the functioning of some factories?" That was on October 27—just 2 weeks ago. On November 8, just last Saturday, and again over the Prague Radio, Food Minister Jankovecova had an answer for this transport crisis—but this answer, typically, was at the expense of the Czech people. She appealed for volunteers to move the best harvest by wheelbarrows and carts. Food was to be moved by hand and by cart, Mr. Chairman, thus freeing railroad cars for other purposes. I leave it to the imagination of this Committee what those other purposes are.

Mr. Chairman, it has been said that in the Soviet Union all men are equal—but that some men are *more* equal than others. Apparently, the same kind of equality exists between the Soviet Union and its affiliated States.

Mr. Chairman, the representative of the Soviet Union has called for a program of deeds and not

words. The first deed he called for was a halt to the armaments race. But, where does his own Government stand on this question? I shall not discuss the attitude of the Soviet Union on the question of disarmament in the United Nations. Every delegate in this room knows only too well that the Soviet Union has at no time since the war reduced its armament effort in any significant way.

It might be interesting to point out what the Economic Commission for Europe, of which the U.S.S.R. is a member, has to say on this particular point. In its discussion of the Soviet economy on page 144 of its 1951 report, the Secretariat of the Economic Commission for Europe has this to say:

The claims of national defense have been extremely heavy, equalling or exceeding the 1940 level in each of the last several years and, in 1951, being roughly two-thirds greater than the total volume of resources devoted to investment and defense purposes combined in 1937. In contrast, the Economic Commission for Europe reports that the amount of resources devoted to consumption increased only moderately above pre-war levels.

Mr. Chairman, if I may restate what I said in my earlier discussion of the problems of economic development—the accomplishments of the past few years give us hope and promise for the future. But they do not blind us to the size of the job that is still before us. Clearly, these accomplishments are not sufficient—especially when measured

against the needs and desires of people throughout the world.

But certain incontrovertible facts *do* stand out. The gross product *per capita* for Latin America as a whole, as stated by Mr. Prebisch, the Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Latin America, has increased at the rate of 3.4 percent annually in the 5-year period 1946-50—and it is still increasing. Every year does show more and more electricity being consumed in the less developed countries. Cement production in the underdeveloped countries is increasing by large percentages. The production of iron and steel in Latin America has actually grown from next to nothing just before the war to an important industry at the present time. Thousands of miles of new roads have been built throughout many of the underdeveloped areas.

Can the above facts be interpreted to mean that economic conditions in these areas are really growing absolutely worse?

Despite the accomplishments, the job ahead in the field of economic and social advancement in many parts of the world is still tremendous.

The American people are acutely aware of the urgency of the job that still remains to be done. In the accomplishment of that task, they will continue to play their full part as responsible members of the United Nations.

Seventh Session of GATT Closes

Press release 865 dated November 10

The 34 countries contracting parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)¹ concluded their seventh session November 10 at Geneva. The session, which opened October 2, was marked by the prompt handling of a number of highly significant economic problems and the solution of several items arising under the complaints procedure. Completion of the session in less than the usual time was attributed largely to preparatory work which had been done under the intersessional machinery which the contracting parties had set up tentatively last year and which they have extended and strengthened for the period between the seventh and eighth sessions.

¹ Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Italy, Liberia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Southern Rhodesia, Sweden, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom, and United States.

Among the most significant actions taken in the session were:

(1) Granting of a waiver of certain obligations in the General Agreement, particularly the most-favored-nation provisions, in order to permit the six countries participating in the European Coal and Steel Community to fulfill their responsibilities under their treaty without violating the GATT;

(2) Provisional settlement of the dispute between the United States and Belgium concerning import restrictions imposed by Belgium against U. S. products;

(3) Approval of a text of an international convention to ease the import of commercial samples and advertising matter and of a code of standards to reduce documentary requirements for the importation of goods;

(4) Consultation with a number of countries on import restrictions imposed for balance-of-payment reasons;

(5) Consideration of an application for accession to the General Agreement by Japan;

(6) Successful settlement through a Panel on Complaints of a number of disputes among countries involving charges of violation of the General Agreement or the impairment of rights under the Agreement;

(7) Authorization to the Netherlands to reduce its imports of wheat flour from the United States as an offset to restrictions against Netherlands dairy products imposed by the United States under Section 104 of the Defense Production Act.

Coal and Steel Community—The contracting parties at the seventh session agreed to waive provisions of the General Agreement to the extent necessary to permit France, Italy, the German Federal Republic, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg to fulfill their treaty obligations as members of the European Coal and Steel Community. In general, as far as coal and steel products are concerned, the rights and obligations of governments of member states in the GATT, whether acting singly or as the Community, are hereafter to be the same as if they were a single contracting party whose customs territory included European territories of the member states. Provisions were also made for working relationships between the high authority of the Community and the contracting parties.

Belgian Import Restrictions on Dollar Goods—Early in 1952, the United States filed a formal complaint that import restrictions imposed by the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union were damaging U.S. trade and constituted a departure from GATT obligations. At the seventh session, Belgium announced its intention to return to a regime free of quantitative restrictions and, as a first step within the next 2 or 3 months, to put in effect significant measures of relaxation in its dollar import restrictions. The delegations of the United States and of Canada (which was also affected by the restrictions) expressed their satisfaction with the Belgian proposal and agreed that no useful purpose would be served in further consideration of the matter by the contracting parties pending announcement of the details of the Belgian proposals.

Balance-of-Payments Import Restrictions—The contracting parties conducted consultations with seven countries on import restrictions which they apply for the purpose of safeguarding their balance-of-payments and monetary reserves. Consultations took place with Italy, the Netherlands, France, Pakistan, Australia, Ceylon, and the United Kingdom.

The contracting parties discussed in considerable detail with the consulting countries the financial basis and the policy and method of the administration of their import restrictions. Discussions covered a variety of specific commodities which illustrated the problems facing countries

imposing restrictions as well as difficulties created by restrictions for exporting countries.

The consultations were characterized by full and frank discussion and free exchange of opinions. As provided for in the General Agreement, there was also full consultation with the International Monetary Fund. Representatives of all of the consulting governments indicated that the views expressed by the contracting parties in the consultations would be conveyed to their respective governments for consideration.

The contracting parties made arrangements to carry out similar consultations at a future convenient time with Brazil, Chile, Finland, New Zealand, Southern Rhodesia, Sweden, and the Union of South Africa.

International Chamber of Commerce Resolutions—The International Chamber of Commerce, at its thirteenth congress, June 1951, passed a series of resolutions urging governments to enter into agreement to reduce "red tape" in import and export formalities. These resolutions were passed on to the contracting parties and action on these was begun at the sixth session. Continuing their work at this session, the contracting parties have now approved the text of an international convention providing for duty-free entry of samples and of certain advertising matter. The convention will be opened for signature February 1, 1953, and will enter into force when 15 states have accepted it. The contracting parties have also agreed to review steps taken by governments to give effect to principles of valuation contained in the GATT and to ascertain current methods of determining the nationality of goods. A code of standards was adopted on documentary requirements for importation of goods and the abolition of consular invoices and consular visas by the end of 1956 was recommended.

Pending such abolition, certain standard practices in this field are recommended to governments. The contracting parties also recommended that governments imposing or intensifying trade restrictions should authorize, to the fullest extent possible, fulfillment of contracts which were in effect at the time the restrictions were imposed.

Application of Japan—Last July the Government of Japan notified the contracting parties of its desire to negotiate for accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The contracting parties at the seventh session approved a resolution recognizing that Japan should take its rightful place in the community of trading nations and to that end should be admitted to appropriate international arrangements. An intersessional committee is directed to make a detailed examination of matters involved, discussing this with Japanese officials. Two meetings with Japanese officials were held during the seventh session, and the contracting parties decided the intersessional committee meeting on Japan should be February 2, 1953. Some contracting parties have indicated

that they may enter into bilateral tariff negotiations with Japan immediately, with the intention of incorporating the results of such bilateral negotiations into later multilateral negotiations directed toward Japanese accession to the General Agreement.

U.S. Dairy Product Restrictions—Cheese exporting countries claiming to be affected adversely by U.S. restrictions under Section 104 of the Defense Production Act asked the contracting parties at this session to recognize their right to withdraw certain concessions from the United States to offset injury caused by U.S. restrictions. The Netherlands was the only country prepared at this session to specify items it might wish to withdraw. The contracting parties recognized the impairment caused by the restrictions and recognized that it might be necessary to convene a special session to deal with their specific proposals. In the case of the Netherlands, the contracting parties authorized that country to reduce its imports of wheat flour from the United States by 12,000 tons in 1953, as an offset to the dairy-product restrictions imposed by the United States under Section 104 of the Defense Production Act.

Other Complaints—Turkey and Greece indicated they were seriously injured by the "escape clause" action the United States took last summer which increased the duty on dried figs above levels incorporated in the U.S. schedule of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The U.S. delegation continued consultations, which had been begun in Washington, with these countries. In the case of Turkey, agreement was reached on a series of provisional withdrawals permitting Turkey to increase duties on certain U.S. products entering Turkey. The Greek delegation felt that no advantage to Greece would be obtained from any withdrawals it might make and asked the United States to consider additional U.S. concessions to offset the loss of the dried-fig concession. A study of trade between the two countries will be made during the intersessional period to see if it is possible to find additional concession items. The U.S. delegation stated the intention, expressed by the President when he announced the fig duty increase, of reexamining the need for this increase whenever circumstances justify and not later than before the next fig marketing season.

Greece, supported by Turkey, also declared itself injured by the U.S. export subsidy on raisins. The U.S. delegation expressed its willingness to consult but pointed out that the subsidy had been designed to maintain the traditional U.S. export market for the product and had not increased U.S. trade or expanded U.S. production. Consultations were begun but, because of limited data available and complicated nature of the problem, it was not possible to conclude consultations during the session.

The contracting parties considered the complaint brought by the United Kingdom concerning

the increase in tariff rates imposed by the Greek Government with regard to a number of commodities by revising upward previously agreed factors used in calculating import duties. The contracting parties considered this a violation of the General Agreement and the Greek Government undertook to eliminate the violation by July 1, 1953.

Another complaint was made against a Greek "contribution tax" imposed on imported goods. The contracting parties were unable to determine whether this levy should properly be considered an exchange measure, a customs duty, or an internal tax and decided to seek advice from the International Monetary Fund on the exchange aspect of the problem before making a decision.

The contracting parties considered Norway's complaint concerning discriminatory treatment by Germany of Norwegian-type sardines. Germany was requested to consider ways and means of removing inequality of treatment accorded this product and to consult with Norway, reporting back to the contracting parties at the eighth session.

Another complaint which was considered at the seventh session concerned the Belgian allocation "familias," a tax to provide allowances to workers' families, which is levied on products imported by Belgian governmental, provincial, and municipal authorities. Exemptions can be granted in cases of importation from countries where similar contributions are imposed. The Norwegian and Danish Governments claim they are being discriminated against since certain other contracting parties have obtained exemption from the tax. The contracting parties felt that the legislation was inconsistent with the provisions of the General Agreement and urged the Belgian Government to expedite the adoption of measures to remove the discrimination.

Still another complaint which was disposed of at the seventh session was the U.K. purchase tax, long objected to by the Netherlands, Canada, France, and Italy because of its discriminatory effect on certain imported goods as compared to domestic goods. At this session the U.K. delegation was able to announce that these discriminatory aspects had been eliminated.

No progress was made in eliminating discrimination in certain Brazilian internal taxes. The Brazilian delegation attributed lack of action to the change in the Brazilian Government and expressed the hope that the discrimination would be removed before the next session of the contracting parties.

Tariffs and Tariff Negotiations—Work was continued at the seventh session on a plan put forward at the sixth session by the French delegation that tariffs should be lowered by 30 percent on a worldwide basis in three yearly stages of 10 percent. The report of the working party at the seventh session indicates that a great deal of work remains to be done before a specific plan will be available

for the consideration of the contracting parties. Most countries were not prepared at this time to express a view on the principle of the proposal. Study of the problem will continue intersessionally with the possibility that several technically feasible plans of varying degrees of flexibility may be developed for further consideration.

The Council of Europe also submitted to the contracting parties a recommendation concerning the adoption of a common policy for lowering tariff barriers in Europe. This proposal was dealt with separately from the French plan and a report on technical implications, prepared during the seventh session by a group of experts, will be submitted to the Council of Europe. Since this is an experts' report, it did not go before the contracting parties for approval.

The eighth session of the contracting parties will be held September 17, 1953.

U. S. Delegations to International Conferences

Sixteenth Session of FAO

The Department of State announced on November 17 (press release 875) that the Council of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) convened its sixteenth session on that date at Rome. The U.S. delegation is as follows:

U.S. Member

Clarence J. McCormick, Under Secretary of Agriculture

Alternate U.S. Member

John J. Haggerty, Director, Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, Department of Agriculture

Associate U.S. Member

John W. Evans, Acting Director, Office of International Materials Policy, Department of State

Advisers

Ursula H. Duffus, Office of United Nations Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State

Stanley B. Fraeeker, Agricultural Research Administration, Department of Agriculture

L. Wendell Hayes, Attaché for FAO Liaison, American Embassy, Rome

John H. Richter, Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, Department of Agriculture

Ralph S. Roberts, Director of Finance, Department of Agriculture

Robert C. Tetro, Agricultural Attaché, American Embassy, Rome

Adviser and Secretary

Thomas E. Street, Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, Department of Agriculture

In 1947 the FAO Conference established the Council to act for it between its sessions and to keep the world's food and agricultural situation, including national conditions and policies, under constant review.

At its present session, the Council will for the first time be substituting for the Conference in reviewing the world food and agricultural situation. In this connection, participants in this meeting will discuss a report of the FAO Director General, entitled "The State of Food and Agriculture: Review and Outlook 1952," which has been submitted to FAO member governments. The report presents a detailed picture of the changes in world production and consumption of agricultural products from 1950-51 to 1951-52 and a brief outlook for production in 1952-53. It also contains a review and outlook by regions, and a similar analysis of major commodities.

Progress reports will be made to this session of the Council on investment for agricultural development, production of pulp and paper, expanded technical-assistance program, locust control, and the progress and improvement of statistical technology.

In establishing the FAO program of work and budget for 1953, the Council will review its information, educational, and extension services and FAO activities in the fields of agriculture including the progress in the reform of agrarian structures, economics, fisheries, forestry, and nutrition. Constitutional, administrative, financial, and other matters will also be discussed.

The present session, which will be open to the representatives of the 18 governments which are members of the Council, is expected to last 10 days. The fifteenth session of the Council met at Rome, June 9-14, 1952.

Communiqués Regarding Korea to the Security Council

The Headquarters of the United Nations Command has transmitted communiqués regarding Korea to the Secretary-General of the United Nations under the following United Nations document numbers: S/2817, Oct. 20; S/2818, Oct. 20; S/2819, Oct. 20; S/2820, Oct. 21; S/2821, Oct. 22; S/2822, Oct. 23; S/2824, Oct. 24; S/2825, Oct. 27; S/2827, Oct. 28; S/2828, Oct. 30; S/2829, Oct. 30; S/2830, Oct. 31.

The United States in the United Nations

[November 15-21, 1952]

General Assembly

Ad Hoc Political Committee—Speaking on the proposals relating to the question of race conflict in South Africa, Charles A. Sprague (U.S.) told the Committee on Nov. 15 that his Government opposed the South African resolution under which the Committee would declare itself not competent to consider the item, “on the ground that it would preclude even discussion.” Turning to the 18-power draft resolution which called for establishment of a commission to study the problem, Mr. Sprague expressed his delegation’s grave doubts as to the desirability of establishing another commission. The United Nations has only the power to persuade, not to enforce change, and he questioned whether appointment of a commission might not stiffen resistance. The Assembly’s “power of persuasion” would be put to better use by an amendment proposed by the Scandinavian countries, which would replace the proposal for a commission by an affirmation that policies not directed toward racial equality are inconsistent with the Charter and would call upon member states to bring their policies into conformity with their obligation under the Charter. This approach, Mr. Sprague said, “would leave enforcement to the lively conscience of the citizens of each country and to the power of the public opinion of the world.” (For full text, see p. 868.)

The Scandinavian proposal was submitted as a separate resolution on Nov. 19, and the original 18-power draft was amended by Ecuador and Brazil to include a reference to article 2 of the Charter.

On Nov. 20 the Committee rejected the South African motion on noncompetence by a vote of 4 (Australia, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, U.K., South Africa)—45 (U.S.)—8. Both the 18-power resolution (further amended by the U.S.S.R. to include a reference to article 1 (2) of the Charter) and the Scandinavian proposal were approved. The vote on the first was 35-2 (Peru, South Africa)—22 (U.S., U.K., France); on the Scandinavian draft, the vote was 20 (U.S.)—7 (Soviet bloc, South Africa, Mexico)—32 (U.K., France, India).

Committee I (Political and Security)—The Indian delegation on Nov. 17 circulated a draft

resolution on the Korean prisoner-of-war question which would permit prisoners unwilling to return to their homes to remain in the custody of a repatriation commission until their status was decided at the political conference to follow the conclusion of an armistice. On Nov. 19 V. K. Krishna Menon (India) commented point-by-point on his delegation’s proposals. The following day Anthony Eden (U.K.) spoke in support of the resolution, emphasizing his belief that, with certain modifications, it “would bring us nearer agreement on the one outstanding issue.”

Committee II (Economic and Financial)—Having adopted on Nov. 14 a resolution on the financing of the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance, the Committee on Nov. 17 took up the question of the financing of economic development of underdeveloped countries. A 12-member working group unanimously reported a three-part draft, dealing with the proposed Special Development Fund, the proposed International Finance Corporation, and measures to stimulate the flow of private capital. Chile, Brazil, U.K., and Canada expressed support for the composite text on Nov. 19.

In his supporting statement Isador Labin (U.S.) noted that his Government approved particularly of part C (measures to stimulate the flow of private capital to underdeveloped areas). In voting for Part A (Special Development Fund), he wanted it made clear that the Economic and Social Council should continue to give its attention to other types of international financing and that study of such a plan in no way committed governments taking part in the study. The U.S. has not changed its substantive position and still does not favor establishment of a world development fund. It still is determined, however, to continue doing its share toward meeting the needs of underdeveloped countries in the most appropriate manner.

After spokesmen for the Netherlands, France, Belgium, Colombia, New Zealand, and India had expressed general approval of the text, Argentina’s representative introduced a resolution recommending equitable international prices for primary commodities and execution of national programs of integrated economic development.

The working group’s text was approved Nov. 20 in three separate votes, 46-0-5, 46-0-5, and 45-0-6. Only one change was made in the text:

Incorporation in Part C of a Guatemalan amendment specifying that private capital should effectively contribute to the economic and social development of underdeveloped countries.

Committee III (Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural)—In its general debate on the right of peoples to self-determination, the Committee is considering two resolutions prepared by the Commission on Human Rights. Resolution A suggests plebiscites to ascertain demands for self-government; Resolution B suggests submission of information on the application of the right to self-determination.

Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt (U.S.) said on Nov. 18 that "self-determination is a process. It is in essence the process of democracy as contrasted with the process of dictation." It would be unfortunate, she said, if the United Nations limited its concept of self-determination to the non-self-governing world. There were, in our time, flagrant examples of peoples and nations, vigorous and independent, which had been over-run by a dictator. "These peoples and nations are entitled to the restoration of their independence."

Committee IV (Trusteeship)—On Nov. 18 the Committee concluded its consideration of factors determining whether a territory is fully self-governing by adopting a 9-point resolution recommending, among other things, that a 10-member special committee be set up to carry further the study on factors.

The resolution represented a proposal introduced originally by Burma, Cuba, Egypt, Guatemala, Iraq, and Venezuela, to which an amendment by the Dominican Republic and Peru was introduced. In its final form, the text incorporated amendments by Argentina, Ecuador, the Netherlands, Poland, and the U.S.S.R.

The resolution was adopted at the close of a 3½-hour session involving a 90-minute discussion of procedure and 24 separate votes. The vote on the resolution as a whole was 34 to 12, with 8 abstentions. The U.S. voted against the proposal.

The resolution asks the Assembly to:

(1) Approve provisionally "as a guide" the factors listed in the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Factors.

(2) Consider individual cases individually, taking into account the right of self-determination of peoples.

(3) Declare that the list of factors should in no way be interpreted to hinder the attainment of self-government.

(4) Declare that "for a territory to be deemed self-governing in economic, social or educational affairs, it is essential that its people shall have attained a full measure of self-government as referred to in Chapter XI of the Charter."

(5) Recommend that the list of factors be taken into account provisionally in cases examined by the General Assembly concerning cessation of transmission of information on territories or the obligation to transmit information.

(6) Decide to set up a new *ad hoc* committee of 10 members with instructions to continue and carry out a more thorough study of the factors.

(7) Invite the new committee to take into account also earlier statements by governments as well as the following

"additional elements," in relation to chapter XI of the Charter:

- (a) the possibility of defining the concept of self-government;
- (b) the features guaranteeing the principle of the self-determination of peoples;
- (c) the manifestation of the freely expressed will of the peoples.

(8) Invite members to transmit by 1 May 1953 a statement of their views on "the subjects contained in the terms of reference of the committee."

(9) Convene the committee 4 weeks before the opening of the next General Assembly.

In explanation of vote, Benjamin Gerig (U.S.) stated that two theories underlying the resolution had led the U.S. to vote against its adoption as a whole. The first of these was the concept of the indivisibility of autonomy, which was embodied in the resolution. The second, he said, was the idea that the General Assembly was the authority which was competent to decide when a territory was fully self-governing.

Committee V (Administrative and Budgetary)—Continuing its reading of 1953 budget estimates, the Committee on Nov. 17 approved appropriations for the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, for sessions of the General Assembly and subsidiary bodies, and for the International Bureau for Declaration of Death.

The \$650,000 for the High Commissioner's Office was approved by 43 votes in favor, 5 against, with 1 abstention. For sessions of the General Assembly, its commissions, and committees, \$640,000 was unanimously approved, and a supplementary amount of \$22,000 under this section for a Geneva session of the International Law Commission was approved by 39 votes in favor, 5 against, with 3 abstentions. A sum of \$12,500 for the International Bureau for Declaration of Death was accepted by 40 in favor, 5 against, with 1 abstention. In all three cases, negative votes were cast by the Soviet bloc.

On the appropriations for the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees, the Committee rejected, 5 in favor to 41 against, a U.S.S.R. proposal to delete the entire provision for this Office.

Georgi N. Zarubin (U.S.S.R.), supported by the representatives of Czechoslovakia and the Ukraine, moved his proposal on the grounds that the High Commissioner's Office was created "illegally" in contradiction to previous decisions of the Assembly concerning the early repatriation of refugees to their native countries. Jaroslav Pscolka (Czechoslovakia) added that the Office was the "obedient servant" of the United States and other "aggressive powers" which used the refugees as "spies and diversionists." He also charged the Office with recruiting "cheap labor" and said it was directly connected with the U.S. Mutual Security Act for the training of "armed units" for espionage purposes.¹ The Office, he

¹For an exchange of notes with Czechoslovakia on the Mutual Security Act, see p. 850.

said, was a "blind tool" of the "imperialists interests" for "the propagation of a third world war."

The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, G. J. van Heuven Goedhart, denied these charges, dismissing them as "fantasy," and invited the representatives making the allegations to present proof. He emphasized that his job was purely humanitarian, to help those in misery. As for repatriation, he said that his Office helped only those who wished to be repatriated and that forced repatriation was never applied.

Committee VI (Legal)—By a roll-call vote of 23-16 (U. S.)-7, the Committee on Nov. 17 adopted an amended Swedish draft proposal on the question of the establishment of an international criminal court. In its operative part, the Swedish draft reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

1. Expresses to the Committee (on International Criminal Jurisdiction) its appreciation for its valuable work on the draft statute,
2. Decides to postpone the consideration of this matter for one year in order to give sufficient time to Member States to present their observations;
3. Urges the Member States which have not yet done so to make their comments and suggestions on the draft statute, in particular if they are of the opinion that further action should be taken by the General Assembly with a view to the establishment of an International Criminal Court;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to publish the comments and suggestions received from governments for such use as the General Assembly may find desirable at a later stage and to place this question on the provisional agenda of the eighth session of the General Assembly.

At the request of Ake Holmback (Sweden), the Committee approved, by a vote of 21-13-9, a proposal that the Swedish revised draft be voted on before the revised draft submitted jointly by Cuba, El Salvador, France, Iran, Israel, the Netherlands and the United States. This joint draft, in effect, expressed the opinion that the matter under discussion should be further considered, and proposed the establishment of a 17-member committee for this purpose.

George Maurice Morris (U. S.) stated during the debate preceding the vote that his Government was neither in favor of nor opposed to the establishment of an international criminal court. It would cooperate in exploring all aspects of such a possible institution. It was neither optimistic nor pessimistic with regard to the results of further studies. He thought it desirable that all aspects of the idea be laid before Committee VI before any final decision be taken and said it would be useful to commission a small group to survey the suggestions and criticisms made regarding the question. He believed that the work and conclusions of such a group would be helpful, as those better informed usually made the best decisions. He would therefore vote in favor of the joint draft.

Senator Theodore F. Green (U.S.) was first speaker on Nov. 19 when the Committee began consideration of the question of defining aggres-

sion. He questioned "most seriously" the wisdom of trying in the General Assembly to prepare a definition of aggression. In the U.S. view, an effort to particularize the standards of peaceful conduct laid down by the Charter would not be likely to help in deterring acts of aggression.

A resolution submitted by the U.S.S.R. would have the General Assembly declare that in an international conflict that State "shall be declared the attacker which first commits one of the following acts:

- (a) Declaration of war against another State;
- (b) Invasion by its armed forces, even without a declaration of war, of the territory of another State;
- (c) Bombardment by its land, sea or air forces of the territory of another State or the carrying out of a deliberate attack on the ships or aircraft of the latter;
- (d) The landing or leading of its land, sea or air forces inside the boundaries of another State without the permission of the government of the latter, or the violation of the conditions of such permission, particularly as regards the length of their stay or the extent of the area in which they may stay;
- (e) Naval blockade of the coasts or ports of another State;
- (f) Support of armed bands organized in its own territory which invade the territory of another State, or refusal, on being requested by the invaded State, to take in its own territory any action within its power to deny such bands any aid or protection."

The U.S.S.R. draft lists the measures which should not be used as justifications for attack. Among these were, for example:

The backwardness of any nation politically, economically or culturally; alleged shortcomings of its administration; any danger which may threaten the life or property of aliens; any revolutionary or counter-revolutionary movement, civil war, disorders or strikes; the establishment or maintenance in any State of any political, economic or social system; the violation of international treaties; the violation of rights and interests in the sphere of trade, concessions or any other kind of economic activity acquired by another State or its citizens; the rupture of diplomatic or economic relations; measures in connection with an economic or financial boycott; repudiation of debts; prohibition or restriction of immigration or modification of the status of foreigners; the violation of privileges granted to the official representatives of another State; refusal to allow the passage of armed forces proceeding to the territory of a third State; measures of a religious or antireligious nature; and frontier incidents.

Trusteeship Council

A 4-member mission will visit the Pacific trust territories early in 1953, the Trusteeship Council decided Nov. 20 as it resumed its eleventh session, which had adjourned on July 24.

Consideration of a special report on the Ewe and Togoland unification problem is the principal business of the second part of the Council's

eleventh session. The Council has before it on this subject a special report by the visiting mission which went to West African trust territories this year.

The mission to the Pacific, agreed on Nov. 20, will be composed of the Dominican Republic, France, Syria (which becomes a member of the Council in January 1953), and the United Kingdom. It will leave New York on about February 9

and will return in mid-May. Territories which the mission will visit are the Pacific Islands (under U.S. trusteeship), Nauru and New Guinea (under Australian trusteeship) and Western Samoa (under New Zealand trusteeship). Countries to be members of the mission were decided by ballot and the names of representatives will be submitted later for approval of the Council, which will also consider the terms of reference of the mission.

Report of U.N. Command Operations in Korea

FORTY-NINTH REPORT: FOR THE PERIOD JULY 1-15, 1952¹

U.N. doc. S/2805

Transmitted October 9, 1952

I herewith submit report number 49 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 1-15 July 1952, inclusive. United Nations Command communiqués numbers 1312-1326 provide detailed accounts of these operations.

The Delegations to the Armistice Negotiations met in plenary sessions daily through 13 July. During the open sessions of 1-3 July inclusive, the Communists continued their violent propaganda charges against the United Nations Command, using selected quotations from the 1949 Geneva Convention to attempt to force the return of all Prisoners of War to Communist control, with the use of force if necessary. The Senior United Nations Command Delegate refuted the Communists' illogical arguments, re-emphasized the reasonableness and fairness of the United Nations Command proposal, and reviewed the current obstacles standing in the way of an honorable armistice.

On 1 July the Senior United Nations Command Delegate stated, in his defense of the draft agreement proposed by the United Nations Command on 28 April (see United Nations Command Report Number 45), that the possibility existed for a mutually acceptable armistice within the terms of paragraphs 51 and 52 thereof. The Communists displayed considerable interest in this statement and on 3

July suggested that the meetings again be held in executive session. With the concurrence of the Senior United Nations Command Delegate, the executive sessions were re-opened on 4 July, and have continued since that date. It is not yet apparent whether this step was taken by the Communists to present a new compromise proposal or whether the Communists misinterpreted the United Nations Command statement as indicating that the United Nations Command was ready to abandon its firm stand and was willing to accept some compromise solution. The United Nations Command has not wavered from nor will it alter its position as expressed in the proposal of 28 April. On the morning of 14 July the Communist Delegation requested a two-day recess.

On 13 July the following message from the Senior Communist Delegate was delivered to the Senior United Nations Command Delegate:

July 12, 1952. Major General William K. Harrison, Senior Delegate, United Nations Command Delegation. At about 2300 hours on July 11, 1952 military aircraft of your side carried out bombing and strafing against our Prisoner-of-War Camp Nine situated at Mukhyon-ni, Pyongyang, resulting in the killing of thirteen, serious wounding of nineteen, light wounding of fifty-three, and missing of twenty-five of your captured personnel. I hereby lodge with your side a serious protest regarding this grave bloody incident.

The stated Prisoner-of-War Camp was provided with conspicuous marking in accordance with the agreement between both sides, and its exact location had been furnished to your side long ago. Your wanton bombing is in full violation of agreement. Your side has not hitherto dealt with the previous five incidents of bombing and strafing against our Prisoner-of-War Camps, and yet there has occurred again this new serious incident of wanton bombing of our Prisoner-of-War Camp Nine. This proves once again incontrovertibly that your side willfully violates International Law and principles of humanity, and that in order to execute your barbarous policy of bombing peaceful cities, your side does not hesitate to kill your own captured personnel.

Your side must immediately deal with this serious incident of bloodshed responsibility. Any attempt to shirk the responsibility or continued act of violation against the agreement between both sides will only aggravate your guilt. General Nam Il, Senior Delegate, Delegation of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers.

¹ Transmitted to the Security Council by the representative of the U. S. to the U.N. on Nov. 4. Texts of the 30th, 31st, and 32d reports appear in the BULLETIN of Feb. 18, 1952, p. 266; the 33d report, Mar. 10, 1952, p. 395; the 34th report, Mar. 17, 1952, p. 430; the 35th report, Mar. 31, 1952, p. 512; the 36th and 37th reports, Apr. 14, 1952, p. 594; the 38th report, May 5, 1952, p. 715; the 39th report, May 19, 1952, p. 788; the 40th report, June 23, 1952, p. 998; the 41st report, June 30, 1952, p. 1038; the 42d report, July 21, 1952, p. 114; the 43d report, Aug. 4, 1952, p. 194; the 44th report, Aug. 11, 1952, p. 231; the 45th report Aug. 18, 1952, p. 272; the 46th report, Sept. 29, 1952, p. 495; the 47th report, Oct. 27, 1952, p. 668; and the 48th report, Nov. 17, 1952, p. 795.

Photographs which were taken immediately after the attacks on vital military targets within the Pyongyang area, and of Prisoner-of-War Camp Number Nine, revealed that not a single bomb or shot landed within close proximity of Prisoner-of-War Camp Number Nine. A message to this effect was prepared for delivery to the Senior Communist Delegate in response to the Communist allegation quoted above.

The continued dispersion of the once heavily populated prisoner-of-war camp at Koje-do proceeded without incident. Concurrent with the movement of personnel who had been segregated for return to Communist control, construction of small, scattered 500-man compounds continued at Chogu-ri, on the southwest end of Koje-do, at Pongam-do and Yoncho-do, small islands southwest of Koje-do, and at Cheju City on the north central extremity of Cheju-do.

Throughout all prisoner of war and civilian internee camps, Eighth Army authorities have been instructed to be especially vigilant in detecting signs of Communist-inspired subversion. The commanding officer of the pro-Communist Chinese prisoner-of-war camp at Cheju City reported that plans had been uncovered which indicated that continued efforts may be made to disrupt the orderly discipline in that installation. These plans included:

- (a) Deliberate misunderstanding of orders.
- (b) Ignoring instructions or explanations of camp supervisory personnel.
- (c) Continued demonstrations and loud noisemaking.
- (d) Surreptitious communications between compounds.

The release of civilian internees and their resettlement within the Republic of Korea proceeded satisfactorily and without incident. Through the close co-operation of civilian authorities and United Nations Civil Assistance Command in Korea, each shipment to the respective provinces is being handled efficiently and is receiving continued favorable reaction from the Republic of Korea. With the exception of those civilian internees who are hospitalized in Pusan and not deemed physically able to be discharged at this time, it is expected that the entire group of about 27,000 who elected not to return to Communist control will be released from United Nations Command custody by mid-August.

United Nations Command ground forces found enemy-initiated action most frequent and intense along the central and extreme eastern fronts where several local attacks of up to battalion strength were launched against United Nations Command outpost elements. All of these hostile efforts were amply supported by artillery, and in one case enemy armor assisted the attackers.

Enemy action along the western front diminished. The much disputed United Nations Command outpost position in the Mabang area experienced a three-pronged attack of battalion size on 4 July. After a four-hour action, the enemy was forced to withdraw. Apparently disheartened by his earlier heavy losses and lack of success in this area, the enemy made no further attempts to assault United Nations Command positions which had been subjected to repeated hostile attacks. United Nations Command raiding elements launched several punishing attacks in the Sangyong and Punji areas. The first action occurred southeast of Sangyong where United

Nations Command raiders forced an enemy unit to vacate its position after an all day battle. Again, on 3 July, a hostile battalion suffered several hundred casualties as a result of a United Nations Command raid in the Punji area.

On the central front action flared again in the Kumsong sector on 7 July when a hostile company supported by thirteen tanks attempted a penetration of twin outposts southeast of Kumsong. The attack was blunted after a two-hour fight and the enemy force withdrew. A see-saw battle for two outpost positions southeast of Yulsa occurred during the night of 8-9 July. The enemy force, gradually reinforced from platoon to battalion strength, finally forced United Nations Command elements from the easternmost outpost. On the previous day the enemy reacted violently to a United Nations Command raid which had successfully seized commanding terrain. In this action, United Nations Command elements were later forced to relinquish their gains by a counterattacking enemy company.

On the eastern front a comparative lull was broken on 9 July when a strong United Nations Command raid was conducted against an enemy position one mile northwest of Oemyon. Heavy casualties were inflicted against the tenacious hostile defenders during the ensuing day-long fight in which United Nations Command elements beat back three enemy counterattacks. On the following day, two miles further north, two enemy companies struck a United Nations Command position situated on dominating terrain. The attackers, reinforced to battalion strength during the night, forced United Nations elements to withdraw. This began a vicious battle which continued for three full days. During this time United Nations Command elements succeeded in regaining the crest of the hill but were subsequently forced again to relinquish it to the enemy. A series of United Nations Command counterattacks beginning on 13 July netted partial control of the hill mass which was completely re-secured on 14 July.

The estimated strength of dissident forces operating in United Nations Command rear areas decreased slightly during the period. There has been no significant change in the level of dissident activity and no slackening in the pursuit and elimination of these elements by the United Nations security forces.

No major change in enemy troop dispositions or front lines occurred during the period. The upward trend of enemy artillery fire continued with an average of over 7,000 rounds falling each day across the battle front. This fact, coupled with increased supply and frontline activity, is evidence that the enemy combat capabilities continue to improve. However, there is still no indication of any early Communist departure from their present defensive attitude.

Aircraft from United Nations Command fast carriers operating in the Sea of Japan flew against North Korean transportation facilities, supply routes, and supply storage areas. Attacks by jet and propeller driven aircraft were concentrated on targets along the Korean east coast. Rail lines were cut in many places. Destruction and damage were inflicted on bridges, by-passes, rail

cars, military buildings, boats, warehouses, trucks, troop barracks, gun positions, and transformer stations.

Supply, ammunition, and fuel dumps, as well as vehicle loading areas were attacked repeatedly in the area south of Wonsan, mostly with unassessed results.

The Funei hydro-electric complex was attacked with two plants rendered unserviceable, and the third temporarily unoperational. This is the smallest complex in North Korea, furnishing about one-half of one percent of all power. It serves Northeast Korea and the Musan Iron Mines.

United Nations Command carriers continued to operate in the Yellow Sea. Their planes furnished cover and air spot for the surface units on blockade patrols and anti-invasion stations. Support was furnished for friendly guerrilla operations. These units also flew reconnaissance missions and offensive strikes as far north as Hanchon, into the Chinnampo area, the Hwanghae Province, and in close support of the frontline troops. Rail and highway bridges were attacked, supply dumps and storage areas were demolished or damaged, and destruction and damage were inflicted on numerous military buildings, rail cars, gun positions, warehouses, boats, ox-carts and pack animals.

United Nations Command naval aircraft based ashore in Korea flew close support missions for the frontline units, destroying and damaging numerous bunkers, mortar and gun positions, tanks, personnel and supply shelters, trucks, railroad bridges, road bridges, and military buildings. Rails were also cut in many places.

Patrol planes based in Japan conducted daylight reconnaissance missions over the Sea of Japan, the Yellow Sea and the Tsushima Straits. They also flew day and night anti-submarine patrols and weather reconnaissance missions for surface units in the Japan and Yellow Seas. On 12 July, a patrol aircraft while on a routine reconnaissance patrol received 20 mm. fire from two unidentified surface vessels flying red flags while in the Yellow Sea area. The aircraft received no damage.

The Naval blockade along the Korean east coast continued from the bomblines to Chongjin, with surface units making day and night coastal patrols, firing on key rail targets along the coastal main supply route daily to maintain rail cuts, bridge cuts, and blocked tunnels at these several specific points. The siege by surface vessels continued at the major ports of Wonsan, Hungnam, and Songjin, subjecting the enemy forces at these ports to day and night destructive, harassing and interdiction fire. The Communists were hampered in the use of coastal waters for shipping, and fishing was curtailed as craft detected were taken under fire and either destroyed or driven ashore.

Fog along the east coast at Wonsan and to the north hampered spotting aircraft, shore fire control parties, and the firing vessels themselves. Destruction and damage included many enemy casualties, rail cars, military buildings, boats, railroad bridges, guns, bunkers and warehouses. Rails were also cut in several places. A total of seventeen prisoners were taken from small craft by blockading vessels. These include refugees who ventured out to surrender and fishermen who were captured.

Fire support vessels at the bomblines provided gunfire on

call for the frontline troops and accounted for the destruction and damage of many bunkers and military structures.

Enemy shore batteries were active almost daily against the blockading vessels and minesweepers all along the coast. In many instances friendly units were straddled; only one vessel was affected, suffering superficial damage and minor personnel injuries from a close air burst. In each instance, the battery was taken under counter fire with many guns destroyed and damaged. In many cases the minesweepers, while operating close inshore, received machine gun and small arms fire. There were no reports of damage or casualties.

On the Korean west coast, the United Nations Command surface units manned anti-invasion stations along the coast from Chinnampo to the Han River Estuary, in support of the friendly islands north of the battle line. Daylight firing into enemy positions started many fires and secondary explosions, destroying numerous military buildings. Three friendly guerrilla raids were carried out with the support of surface and air units. A total of 164 casualties were inflicted on the enemy and two prisoners were taken.

Vessels of the Republic of Korea Navy conducted close inshore patrols and blockade along both coasts and assisted United Nations Command naval forces in mine-sweeping duties.

United Nations Command minesweepers continued operations to keep the channels, gunfire support areas and anchorages free of mines of all types. Sweepers also enlarged areas and swept close inshore as needed by the operating forces.

United Nations Command naval auxiliary vessels, Military Sea Transportation Service, and merchant vessels under contract provided personnel lifts and logistic support for the United Nations Command naval, air and ground forces in Japan and Korea.

Operation Spreadout, the transfer of prisoners of war and internees from Koje-do, continued with a new lift of 36,900 persons scheduled for the period 3 to 10 July. Tropical storms damaged compounds at new locations delaying the lift about five days; however, 26,900 have been lifted as of 12 July.

United Nations Command air operations were highlighted on 11 July when the United Nations Command air force, assisted by naval air units, conducted a massive, co-ordinated attack on the numerous supply targets and military installations in the P'yongyang, Sariwon and Hwangju areas. In well planned and precisely timed strikes, the aircraft bombed, strafed and spread napalm on factories, ammunition dumps, vehicle parks and repair shops, storage buildings, troop concentrations and military headquarters buildings.

Beginning late in the morning with a flak suppression mission which softened up the area for the main effort, the attacks were conducted in three successive waves of fighter bombers. The attacking planes reported numerous secondary explosions and fires in the factory areas and vehicle parks. Post strike photography and assessment indicated extensive damage in all target areas, the destruction or major damage of numerous buildings and vehicles, and good coverage in rail centers.

Throughout the attack period United Nations Command

air force interceptors patrolled between the target and the Manchurian bases of the enemy jets, while others provided cover for the fighter bombers conducting the attacks. The cover missions were timed to arrive in the target area prior to the attacking fighter bombers, remain throughout the strike and cover the withdrawal.

The interceptors patrolling in the northwest areas observed fifty MIGs between the Yalu and Chongchong Rivers and engaged thirty of them in eight separate air battles. The United Nations Command pilots claimed one MIG probably destroyed and two others damaged. No damage was suffered by United Nations Command aircraft.

After the daylight raids by fighter bombers, the medium bombers conducted the largest night air strike of the Korean conflict when ordnance and supply targets at Pyongyang, Hamhung and Kyomipo and Sinmak were blasted. The main effort was assigned to the Pyongyang targets where bombs were dropped on vehicle storage and repair facilities and industrial plants. Targets had been carefully selected by use of photo reconnaissance and intelligence reports. Pilots were able to report from visual observation that bombs were on target and good coverage was obtained.

The bombers encountered only meager enemy flak and crews gave high praise to the flak suppression conducted by the fighter bombers.

For approximately one month prior to the raid on Pyongyang and other main supply targets, the United Nations Command aircraft had dropped leaflets warning civilians to stay away from military targets. Immediately after the strikes more leaflets were dropped telling civilians to beware of delayed action bombs and to stay away from bomb craters. Every precaution was taken to attack only military targets and to prevent injury to non-combatants.

United Nations Command air force operations saw medium bombers hit rail bridges and marshalling yards to block traffic and destroy Communist supplies, rolling stock and equipment. The largest attack on rail bridges was conducted on 2 July when the medium bombers knocked out the Sanwangdong railroad bridge and destroyed portions of the bridge at Huichon. On the same night the medium bombers hit the Yongmidong bridge.

The medium bomber effort was then shifted to key marshalling yards in North Korea as they bombed yards at Yongdok, Huichon, Kunuri, Chongju, Sinanju, Kujangdong and Hamhung.

The main airfields in North Korea remained unserviceable, therefore no medium bombers were scheduled to attack these targets.

The United Nations Command interceptors continued their regular patrols along the Yalu River in search of enemy jets, although weather hindered operations on four days. The MIGs seemed reluctant to appear in force and major engagements occurred on only two occasions.

On 4 July, when the fighter bombers were attacking targets very near the border, seventy-four MIGs attempted to block the attack, but interceptors in the area prevented all except four of the enemy from reaching and damaging the fighter bombers. The day ended with the interceptor pilots recording thirteen MIGs destroyed and eight others damaged.

An unusual event of the day occurred when a United Nations Command interceptor scored hits on a MIG plane and then flew up in close formation with the enemy jet. The enemy pilot shook his fist at the United Nations Command pilot and tried to ram the United Nations Command aircraft, but did not succeed. The enemy pilot then bailed out.

The fighter bombers continued to schedule a large number of sorties on general support missions to destroy enemy supplies and equipment stockpiled along main supply routes. The aircraft also hit rail lines, gun positions and troop concentrations in forward areas and made numerous strikes on small supply points and vehicles.

On 4 July United Nations Command fighter bombers, carrying high explosive bombs and napalm, struck a North Korean officer training school located within a few miles of the Yalu River. Fires were started throughout the target area.

Light bombers flew night close support sorties all along the battle line and conducted night intruder missions along the important supply routes. The practice of concentrating on a few routes, with the aircraft maintaining a constant patrol, was continued and resulted in the destruction of numerous enemy vehicles.

Transport aircraft conducted regular operations lifting supplies and equipment to United Nations Command forces in Korea and evacuating wounded troops and personnel being rotated.

In connexion with the first anniversary of the opening of the Korean armistice negotiations, United Nations Command leaflets, loudspeaker and radio broadcasts reviewed the origin and course of the discussions. These media again summarized the salient points contained in the 28 April United Nations Command proposal for a realistic and equitable settlement of the remaining issues confronting the armistice delegations. In reporting current developments at Panmunjom, United Nations Command news sheets and radio newscasts have carefully adhered to the agreement governing the executive sessions which began on 4 July. In consonance with the United Nations policy of taking every possible step both to restore peace and to prevent needless loss of life, United Nations Command leaflets and radio broadcasts are being used continually to warn civilians in enemy-occupied northern Korea to move away from places where the Communists have concentrated war material factories and military equipment, supplies and personnel.

These warnings are a humanitarian measure taken to minimize civilian loss of life in United Nations Command attacks on military targets.

A summarization of reports on incidence rates for communicable diseases indicates decided progress in combatting disease among the South Korean civilian population. During the first five months of 1952, the incidence rates for typhus and smallpox averaged only two percent of the rates for the same period of 1951. For other diseases during the same periods, the 1952 rates for typhoid averaged only 3.5 percent and for diphtheria only twelve percent of 1951 rates. No cases of cholera or plague were reported in 1952. Adequate supplies of vaccines, sera and antibiotics were major factors in the improved health conditions.

Conflict Between Free World and Communism Defined

Press release 877 dated November 19

The Department of State on November 23 released an illustrated booklet¹ designed to present a guide to the causes underlying present world tensions.

Written and illustrated for Americans against the background of our own history, *Let Freedom Ring* defines the conflict between the free world

of America's actions to meet the threat to our security: foreign military and economic aid programs, our alliances with the nations of the free world, the Campaign of Truth, and our own defense program.

Let Freedom Ring acknowledges that the present way to peace is "hard and costly" and describes the constant efforts being made to bring about the regulation and balanced reduction of all armaments. "We hope," the booklet states, "that in time the Kremlin, in its own self-interest, will come to recognize the necessity of settling peaceably the issues that divide us."



and Soviet communism. It explains the nature of the police state and its expansionist ambitions. It tells in detail why, as long as Soviet communism continues its present course of action, the free world "has no choice but to become strong and stay that way."

The booklet also tells the story and purpose

¹Department of State publication 4443.

Let Freedom Ring tells the American people how they, as citizens of a great world power, can contribute to the security and interests of the Nation, and at the same time play a leading role toward building a real peace based on freedom and justice.

Let Freedom Ring is for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C., for 50 cents a copy.

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No.	Date	Subject
†874	11/17	Point 4 director to Pakistan
875	11/17	16th session of FAO
*876	11/17	Seymour: Chief, N.Y. Information
877	11/19	Release of "Let Freedom Ring"
†878	11/19	Mexican claims installation paid
†879	11/19	Safety of life at sea
880	11/20	U.S. note to Czechoslovakia
*881	11/20	Exchange of persons
†882	11/20	Educational agreement with Sweden
883	11/20	Point 4 assistance to Iraq
†884	11/21	U.S. holders of German bonds
†885	11/21	Brown: Escapee program
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*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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The Development of United States Policy in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa, 1951-1952

PART I. SOME MAJOR PROBLEMS

by *Harry N. Howard*

During the course of 1951-52, the United States fully recognized the basic importance of the Near East, South Asia, and Africa and the problems which came to America's doorstep from this vast area. The Greek question, the Anglo-Iranian oil controversy, the Anglo-Egyptian issues with regard to the Suez Canal and the Sudan, the problems of Palestine, Tunisia, and Morocco, the Kashmir problem, the development of defenses against aggression in the Middle East, the economic development of underdeveloped territories—these were among the more significant issues of an eventful year.

President Truman well characterized the problems with which the Near East, in particular, confronted the United States in his message to the Congress on March 6, 1952, presenting the new Mutual Security Program:¹

The Near East presents a sharp challenge to American statesmanship. The countries of these areas are of vital importance to the security of the free world, but the problems of achieving constructive and orderly development are extremely difficult. Living standards are generally very low. Transportation and land tenure systems are often archaic. Political and religious controversies simmer throughout the region. Nationalism is sometimes misdirected into fanatical outbursts which ignore the benefits to be gained from international cooperation. The Communists are doing their best to stir up confusion and trouble.

The President expanded on this theme on April 8, 1952, stressing that "the tremendous developments" which had "taken place in the Western world in modern times" were "having a profound effect upon the ancient civilizations in Asia and Africa."²

EDITOR'S NOTE: An article by Harry N. Howard entitled "The Development of United States Policy in the Near East, 1945-1951," was printed in the BULLETIN of Nov. 19, 1951, p. 809, and Nov. 26, 1951, p. 839.

¹ BULLETIN of Mar. 17, 1952, p. 403; also printed as Department of State publication 4531.

² BULLETIN of Apr. 21, 1952, p. 607.

Among the more general problems raised by the representatives of the Arab-Asian-African states at the sixth and seventh sessions of the General Assembly of the United Nations were the following:

1. The emerging nationalism of the peoples of Asia and Africa and their demand for equality of treatment;

2. Problems of trusteeship and non-self-governing territories, related principally to the urge toward self-government or independence;

3. The expressed need for large-scale U. N. technical and economic assistance, despite the reluctance of the United States and the Western democracies to support such a program at this time;

4. The economic development of underdeveloped territories, on which great stress was laid.

Within the United Nations it became quite clear, in view of these developments, that, in addition to the issues involved in the struggle of the free world with the Soviet Union, there was another definite set of problems. For example, in the introduction to his 1952 annual report to the Assembly,³ Secretary-General Trygve Lie referred to—

the problem of political, economic and social adjustments between the more advanced, industrialized nations on the one hand and the under-developed nations on the other hand. This problem is especially acute in parts of Asia, the Middle East and Northern Africa. . . . The rise of nationalism and the demand for greater equality of rights, freedom and economic opportunity among all these peoples are facts of our times as significant as the "East-West" conflict. These are historic forces that will not be denied. They constitute one of the greatest challenges to contemporary civilization. The question is whether,

³ U. N. doc. A/£141/Add. 1.

by enlisting moderation and realism on all sides, we can find effective ways to answer this challenge by peaceful and evolutionary means rapidly enough to prevent the violent upheavals and widespread chaos that are likely if we do not.

Here, too, when we consider the political aspects of the problem of peaceful adjustment between old and new interests and rights, we find that progress has been made through United Nations action in Libya and Eritrea and through evolution towards self-government in some dependent areas. On the other hand, no solution is yet in sight for such critical questions as the Iranian oil problem, the Anglo-Egyptian dispute, peace between Israel and the Arab states, and rising nationalism in North Africa.

Both Lester Pearson, Minister for External Affairs of Canada and President of the seventh session of the General Assembly, and Secretary Acheson emphasized the importance of these problems in their opening statements before the Assembly in October 1952. Secretary Acheson declared:⁴

Of the 800 million people in the free world who were in the dependent category 10 years ago, some 600 million have already attained full independence. In this period a dozen new nations have emerged, and most of them are now playing an important role in the United Nations. Furthermore, rapid progress has been and is being made toward self-government for the 200 million others who still remain in varying stages of dependency. What these facts suggest is that the differences confronting us are not differences of purpose; they are differences of method and of timing, and they can be solved through wise statesmanship.

The Greek Question

The "question of threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece," which had been a concern of the General Assembly since 1947, was not on the agenda of the seventh session. The session considered, however, questions relating to the repatriation of Greek children and Greek nationals detained by certain of the northern neighbors of Greece and other Soviet satellites.⁵ In the period since the end of World War II, the United States, in one way or another, has invested more than \$2,000,000,000 in economic and military assistance to Greece.⁶ With the liquidation of the Greek guerrilla movement in 1949, the Greek people moved gradually toward political stability.

In the international field, during 1951-52, Greece came to closer understanding with Turkey, and her relations with Yugoslavia improved so much that Greek and Yugoslav parliamentary and military missions exchanged visits, and problems

⁴ BULLETIN of Oct. 27, 1952, p. 639.

⁵ For the latest report of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the League of Red Cross Societies on the *Repatriation of Greek Children* see U.N. doc. A/2236. For the report of the Secretary-General on the same subject, see A/2241, Oct. 30, 1952.

⁶ The total grants for economic assistance between July 1, 1945, and June 30, 1952, reached \$1,448,000,000 net. (*Survey of Current Business*, Department of Commerce, Oct. 1952, pp. 6-11.)

of common defense against common dangers were discussed. Meanwhile, on December 20, 1951, Greece was elected to membership in the Security Council of the United Nations. Greece continued to contribute to the collective defense of the Republic of Korea, within the framework of the United Nations, as she had done since the fall of 1950. On February 15, 1952, together with Turkey, Greece became a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Looked at in perspective, Greece had traveled a considerable distance since the tragic era of 1945-47.

The Anglo-Iranian Oil Controversy

Full advantage was taken of the visit of Prime Minister Mossadegh to the United States during October and November 1951 to discuss the possibilities of a settlement of the Anglo-Iranian oil controversy. The U.S. Government had been concerned with this problem from the beginning and wanted to determine whether there was any "fresh" basis for a solution. These discussions did not result in the finding of any new basis on which a practical solution could be reached. Nevertheless, the United States continued to hope that Iran and the United Kingdom would be able "to find a mutually acceptable basis for a satisfactory settlement" and indicated that it would "continue to do everything possible to assist them to this end."⁷

During the visit of Prime Minister Churchill to the United States in January 1952, Mr. Churchill and President Truman, on January 9, expressed the hope "that the initiative taken by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development will lead to a solution of the Iranian oil problem acceptable to all the interests concerned."⁸ The Bank had set forth proposals embodying, among other things, an offer to operate the oil properties through a neutral management for a limited period and without prejudice to the legal rights of the parties. Its efforts to solve the problem were not successful; as before, failure to obtain agreement was due to the inability to arrive at solutions of the problems of price, personnel, and compensation.

Naturally, the United States was much disappointed at the failure to find a solution of this pressing question. In response to a number of requests from Iran for direct financial assistance "to ease the acute situation" arising from the loss of oil revenues, the Department of State announced on March 20, 1952,⁹ that although it

⁷ BULLETIN of Nov. 26, 1951, p. 864. Iran arranged to purchase \$8,750,000 from the International Monetary Fund on Nov. 13, 1951.

⁸ *Ibid.*, Jan. 21, 1952, p. 84. For the proposals of the International Bank, see International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *Seventh Annual Report to the Board of Governors, 1951-1952* (Washington, 1952), pp. 17-18.

⁹ BULLETIN of Mar. 31, 1952, p. 494.

desired to render every proper and necessary assistance,

it could not justify aid of the type requested at a time when Iran has the opportunity of receiving adequate revenues from its oil industry without prejudice to its national aspirations.

The United States has not . . . established as a condition for granting financial aid to Iran that the Iranian Government should accept any particular proposals. The United States has consistently maintained that a settlement is possible in which the legitimate interests of both Iran and the United Kingdom will be protected and which will make the resumption of the oil-industry operation feasible and practicable from the economic viewpoint. We believe that the offer of the International Bank to assist in this matter has provided a good opportunity to reach this objective, even though on an interim basis. We continue to hope that a formula will be found which will be acceptable to both parties.

A month later, an exchange of notes between Prime Minister Mossadegh and Ambassador Henderson on April 24, 1952,¹⁰ provided that military assistance from the United States to Iran should be continued and that shipments of military supplies would be resumed as soon as possible.

By this time the question of the Anglo-Iranian oil controversy once more was coming before the International Court of Justice which, on July 5, 1951, had indicated interim measures to insure continued production of petroleum and urged that no action be taken prejudicial to the rights of either party. The Security Council, on October 19, 1951, had adjourned discussion of the problem until the International Court could decide on its own competence in the case.¹¹ Public hearings in the case began on June 10, 1952, and on July 22 the International Court decided that it was incompetent to hear the case on its merits.¹²

On August 7, 1952, the Iranian Government presented a note to the United Kingdom concerning the controversy, once more outlining its views but offering no essentially new proposals. On August 30, President Truman and Prime Minister Churchill submitted to Prime Minister Mossadegh proposals involving the following:¹³

1. Submission of the question of compensation to be paid in respect of the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in Iran to the International Court of Justice;

2. Appointment of suitable representatives by the parties for the purpose of making arrangements for the flow of oil to world markets;

3. Provided the Iranian Government agreed to the above, (a) representatives of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company were to seek arrangements for the movement of oil stored in Iran; (b) the United Kingdom was to relax its restrictions on exports to Iran and on Iran's use of sterling; and (c) the United States was to make an immediate grant of \$10,000,000 to Iran to assist in its budgetary problem.

However, Mr. Mossadegh rejected these proposals and explained that he had decided to call Parliament into session so that, with consultation, the necessary reply could be prepared.

Secretary Acheson sought to clarify matters on September 3,¹⁴ stating that the joint proposals accepted the "nationalization of the oil industry in Iran as a fact" and "proposed a forum for the determination of compensation." He also stressed that, while the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company seemed to be the logical entity to open negotiations with Iran, the joint message did not propose that it be "the sole purchaser of Iranian oil." It was also recognized, the Secretary pointed out, that there must be a fair settlement of claims and counter-claims arising from the nationalization of the oil industry in Iran. The United States and the United Kingdom had proposed, therefore, that the International Court of Justice, as an impartial body, be asked to consider all claims; "this proposal should be acceptable to the Iranians, especially in view of the recent decision of the International Court of Justice, which was favorable to Iran." Mr. Acheson explained that the offer of a grant to Iran of \$10,000,000 was to provide it with funds to assist financially until the flow of Iranian oil to world markets could be resumed. He expressed his belief that "the proposals meet the outstanding issues in the oil dispute and deserve careful consideration as a basis for negotiations to end the unhappy dispute between two good friends of the United States." The United Kingdom took a similar position.

These proposals were also rejected, although the door to negotiations remained open. On September 24, in messages to Prime Minister Churchill and President Truman,¹⁵ the Iranian Government substantially reaffirmed its previous rejection and threatened to break off relations with the United Kingdom if, within 10 days, it did not accept the Iranian demand for payment of £49,000,000 (\$137,200,000) and its proposition for arbitration on the matter of compensation for the nationalized oil properties by the International Court of Justice. Mr. Mossadegh seemed under the impression that an attempt was being made to revive the 1933 concessions, and, concerning the question of compensation, he stated:

If it were intended that compensation for the property of the former oil company in Iran should be paid, my Gov-

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, May 12, 1952, p. 746.

¹¹ For a brief review of the problem in the Security Council, see U.N. doc. A/2141, pp. 41-44.

¹² *Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case (jurisdictional)*. Judgment of July 22nd, 1952; *I. C. J. Reports*, p. 93; *ibid.*, Order of July 5th, 1951; *I. C. J. Reports*, p. 89; *ibid.*, Order of February 11th, 1952; *I. C. J. Reports 1952*, p. 13.

¹³ BULLETIN of Sept. 8, 1952, p. 360. Meanwhile W. Alton Jones, president of the Cities Service Co., together with experts, arrived in Tehran on Aug. 25, 1952, on a purely private mission, to see whether he could assist in a possible settlement.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, Sept. 15, 1952, p. 405.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, Oct. 6, 1952, p. 532.

ernment has always been prepared to enter into negotiations with due regard to the claims of both parties and to find a just and equitable solution. If it were meant that, in the event of disagreement the question should be referred to the International Court of Justice, such procedure should be agreed to between the Iranian Government and the former oil company and there would be no need of an agreement between two governments.

Mr. Mossadegh also expressed fear of the possibility of a "purchase monopoly" on the part of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, and referred to the "illegal restrictions" imposed by the United Kingdom concerning purchase of Iranian oil. One motive behind the nationalization of the oil industry, he declared, lay in the desire to "eradicate foreign influence" and to "insure the political independence of the country while cooperating shoulder to shoulder with other freedom-loving nations in maintaining world peace." The other motive was—

to improve economic conditions because during the period when the former company was engaged in exploiting the resources of Iran, it was never prepared to consider and observe the rights of the Iranian nation, even in conformity with the D'Arcy concession and the invalid 1933 agreement.

Although the Iranian Government contended that the Iranian courts alone were competent to investigate the former company's claims, the Iranian Government was prepared to agree to the judgment of the International Court of Justice, subject to agreement on (1) determination of the amount of compensation to be paid; (2) the basis of the examination of claims; (3) determination of damages; and (4) payment in advance and on account of £49,000,000, which the Iranian Government claimed as due from the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.

The United Kingdom replied to Mr. Mossadegh on October 5, 1952,¹⁶ explaining that his fears were "without foundation":

... The proposals in no way fail to recognise the fact of Persia's nationalization of her oil industry or seek to revive the 1933 concession. There was no suggestion that there should be foreign management of the oil industry, still less was this put forward as a condition. We did not contemplate a monopoly of the purchase of oil.

The proposals suggested an equitable method, not necessarily the only method, of settling all claims and counter-claims of both sides by impartial adjudication. We said nothing about the price of oil because that falls to be discussed between seller and purchaser and not between Governments.

In a note delivered to Mr. Mossadegh on October 5,¹⁷ Secretary Acheson also expressed regret that the Iranian Government had misunderstood the proposals of August 30 and reaffirmed that "it had been our understanding that the Iranian Government's position was that negotiation for settlement of the oil dispute must take into account (a)

the fact of nationalization, (b) the complete independence of Iran in the operation of its oil industry, and (c) the freedom of Iran to sell its oil on other than a monopoly basis."

In a note of October 7,¹⁸ a copy of which was transmitted to the United States, the Iranian Government informed the United Kingdom that Iran was willing to discuss and settle the dispute but still demanded a deposit on account before entering negotiations. Inviting the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company to send a delegation to Tehran, Prime Minister Mossadegh asked that it place £20,000,000 (\$56,000,000) at the disposal of Iran, prior to the negotiations. This sum would be a first installment on the £49,000,000, the rest to be paid after the conclusion of the negotiations, which, it was suggested, should not last more than 3 weeks.

The United Kingdom, in a note of October 14, 1952, to the Iranian Government,¹⁹ reaffirmed and clarified the principles which had been enunciated in the joint Anglo-American proposals of August 30. Among other things, the United Kingdom considered the Iranian counterproposals for settlement of the oil controversy to be "unreasonable and unacceptable." The Foreign Office stated that it could not pay the £49,000,000 demanded by Mr. Mossadegh and reiterated that it would claim compensation for the termination of the British oil concession in Iran. Although it rejected the Iranian demands, the British note stated that, as soon as an agreement could be reached for adjudication of compensation, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company would be prepared to open negotiations for resumption of the Iranian oil sales, preserving in the meanwhile the "full legal rights" of the company.

There was no reply to the Iranian suggestion of October 7 that a mission from the company come to Tehran within one week to negotiate. A supplementary statement by the Foreign Office in London categorically denied the various Iranian charges against the United Kingdom, declared that "the maintenance of the independence and integrity" of Iran had always been the objective of the United Kingdom, and recalled the events of 1946, when the Soviet Union was a genuine threat to Iran. It also upheld the record of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in Iran.

At the same time, the United States urged both the United Kingdom and Iran to continue to work for a friendly settlement of their controversy and indicated that it would "continue to be helpful where possible." The oil question, in fact, was so disturbing and "so important that both parties must continue to work for an amicable solution." The concern of the United States was hardly lessened when, on October 16, Iran severed diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom, mark-

¹⁶ British Information Services, Washington, D. C., Oct. 5, 1952.

¹⁷ BULLETIN of Oct. 13, 1952, p. 569.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, Oct. 20, 1952, p. 624.

¹⁹ See British Information Services, Washington, D. C., Oct. 15, 1952, for text.

ing the first complete rupture in Anglo-Iranian relations since 1859.

The formal break in diplomatic relations came on October 22, when Mr. Mossadegh notified the British Embassy of the severance of relations. Among other things, the Iranian note stated:

The Iranian Government greatly regrets that it has been obliged to adopt such a decision. In the course of the dispute with the former oil company, my Government always made every effort to insure that this dispute should not damage the friendly relations between the two Governments.

My Government is convinced that if the British Government had paid proper attention, consistent with justice and friendship, to the aims of the Iranian nation and Government, which have only been seeking to secure their rights which had been infringed, the relations between the countries would never have reached such a stage.

The Swedish Government was asked to look after Iranian interests in the United Kingdom and the Swiss Government to perform a similar service for the United Kingdom in Iran. The United States felt that the severance of diplomatic relations did "not contribute to a solution of the problem" involved in the Anglo-Iranian oil controversy.

Meanwhile, the United States continued to assist Iran in strengthening its economy and raising the standard of living of its people. In so doing, it was giving tangible evidence of its interest in their welfare and helping alter an atmosphere in which communism might well thrive. But this problem, like so many others in the Near and Middle East, showed prospect of being a continuing one.²⁰

The Anglo-Egyptian Controversy

The United States was also much concerned with developments in Egypt, especially in view of its interest in the defense of the vital area of the Suez Canal. Following the abdication of King Farouk in July 1952 and the institution of a new Government under Major General Mohammed Naguib, Secretary Acheson on September 3, 1952, noted that there had been "some encouraging developments in Egypt, including the reform program announced by the Egyptian Government," and stated that the United States had been following these events "with much interest."²¹ He wished the Egyptian Government every success in its efforts to solve internal problems and declared:

Relations between the United States and Egypt remain most friendly and cooperative. I am hopeful that in the interest of our two countries these relations, as well as

²⁰ For the remarks of Ambassadors Ardalan and Entezam, the Iranian representatives, in the General Assembly on Nov. 12-13, 1952, see U.N. docs. A/C.2/SR.209 and A/PV.397.

²¹ BULLETIN of Sept. 15, 1952, p. 406. For the remarks of Ahmed Mohammed Farrag, the Foreign Minister of Egypt, on the Anglo-Egyptian controversy, in the General Assembly on Nov. 12, 1952, see U.N. doc. A/PV.395.

those between Egypt and all the nations of the free world, will be increased and strengthened. We look forward to an era in which new areas of cooperation and mutual benefit can be brought into being.

When Prime Minister Ali Maher resigned on September 7, 1952, the Department of State announced that it saw no fundamental significance in the move, since the program of the Egyptian Government remained "based on principles rather than personalities," and that there was no change in U. S. policy toward Egypt as expressed on September 3.

Meanwhile, through friendly counsel to both parties, the United States, because of its basic interest in order, stability, and security in the region of the Suez Canal, continued to seek an equitable and constructive settlement of the issues involved in the Anglo-Egyptian controversy with regard to the Suez Canal and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.

Hope for an early settlement of the question of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan was advanced by the agreement reached on October 29, 1952, between the Egyptian Government and representatives of the leading Sudanese political parties.

Palestine Questions

During 1951-52, the United States continued to be concerned with and to seek a balanced solution of the various Palestine issues. On September 17 and 21, 1951, the Palestine Conciliation Commission submitted comprehensive proposals for a general political, territorial, and economic settlement between Israel and the Arab States. In its progress report to the sixth session of the General Assembly, however, the Commission stated:²²

The Arab States insisted upon a prior solution of the refugee question, at least in principle, before agreeing to discuss other outstanding issues. In their opinion, a solution of the refugee problem could be reached only as a result of unconditional acceptance by Israel of the right of refugees to be repatriated. Israel, on the other hand, has maintained that no solution of the refugee question involving repatriation could be envisaged outside the framework of an over-all settlement. As regards the right of the refugees to return, Israel refused to accept a principle that might involve her in a repatriation operation of unknown extent.

The Commission was unable to conciliate these points of view and, in the end, because of its conviction that all Palestine problems were closely interrelated, it expressed the opinion that in any further approach to the problem it was "desirable that consideration be given to the need for co-ordinating all United Nations efforts aimed at the promotion of stability, security and peace in Palestine."

Meanwhile, in a special report to the General

²² U.N. doc. A/1985. See also *United States Participation in the United Nations* (1951), Department of State publication 4583, pp. 108-117. For a statement by Ambassador Philip C. Jessup in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee on Jan. 6, 1952, see BULLETIN of Jan. 28, 1952, p. 129.

Assembly on November 28, 1951,²³ the Director and Advisory Commission of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) requested the General Assembly—

to endorse and urge contributions for a 250 million dollar program of assistance to Near East governments for the relief and reintegration of Palestine refugees to be carried out over a period of approximately three years starting 1 July 1951, composed of \$50 million for relief and \$200 million for reintegration, with local governments assuming the maximum possible administrative responsibility at the earliest possible date. . . .

On January 26, 1952, the General Assembly adopted, by a vote of 49-0-5 a resolution embodying a 3-year program calling for the expenditure of \$250,000,000 for relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction among the Arab refugees from Palestine.²⁴ The United States, Israel, and the Arab States were among those voting in favor, the Arab States insisting once more on the principle of repatriation. In this connection, it may be noted that the General Assembly increased UNRWA's 1951-52 budget from \$50,000,000 to \$77,000,000, of which \$50,000,000 was to be for reintegration and \$27,000,000 for relief, and for the period of 1952-53 it approved UNRWA's budget recommendations of \$100,000,000 for reintegration and \$18,000,000 for relief.

The problem of Jerusalem did not come formally before the General Assembly at Paris. On May 4, 1952, the Israeli Cabinet announced its intention to move the Israeli Foreign Office to Jerusalem. On July 9, the United States "noted with concern" this announcement and in an *aide-mémoire* to the Israeli Government stated:²⁵

Since the question of Jerusalem is still of international importance, the U.S. Government believes that the United Nations should have an opportunity to reconsider the matter with a view to devising a status for Jerusalem which will satisfactorily preserve the interests of the world community and the states directly concerned. Consequently, the U.S. Government would not view favorably the transfer of the Foreign Office of Israel to Jerusalem.

The Government of the United States also wishes to convey that in view of its attitude on the Jerusalem question, it has no present intention of transferring the Ambassador of the United States and his staff to Jerusalem.

Israel and the United States reached an agreement on July 23, 1952, whereby the former became eligible to receive military equipment on a reimbursable basis from the United States under the Mutual Security Act of 1949, as amended. Israel was thus enabled to apply for the purchase of

equipment and materials from U.S. stocks, in return for payment at a fair value.²⁶

The United States expressed its gratification at the settlement of the problem of compensation for Nazi victims between Israel and the Government of Western Germany, on September 10, when the Bonn government agreed to pay Israel \$822,000,000 in goods and services.²⁷

Although it had been desired, if possible, to avoid stormy discussion of Palestine political problems in the seventh session of the General Assembly, the representatives of Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen requested on September 12, 1952, that consideration of the work of the Palestine Conciliation Commission be placed on the agenda.²⁸ In their supplementary memorandum the Arab representatives declared that the Middle East was "becoming more and more a center of world interest." They added that, among the various issues, "none is more crucial for peace and security, none is more actual and effective in leading either to healthy international relations or to strife, than the Palestine question, as it is developing today." Declaring that the refugee problem was not the essential element in the Palestine question, the Arab representatives denied Arab responsibility for the problem and stated that since 1947 the General Assembly had "deliberately and continuously assumed a responsibility for this question which it would not now shirk." They expressed fear that the question might be shelved, although it was unsolved, and that the resolutions of the General Assembly might be ignored.

Two days later, on September 14, Israel requested that alleged Arab violations of the Charter and of resolutions with regard to Palestine be placed on the agenda. In a supplementary memorandum of October 9, the Israeli Government made detailed charges against the Arab States, while declaring that Israel had "at all times indicated its readiness to meet with representatives of the Arab countries with a view" to achieving peace.²⁹

Meanwhile, the problem of the 880,000 Arab refugees from Palestine remained. In his report to the seventh General Assembly, the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees stated:³⁰

The existence of vast numbers of able-bodied individuals who for four years have looked to the United Nations for the provision of all their basic needs—medical and health care, education, shelter, clothing and food—is a social and

²⁶ BULLETIN of Sept. 1, 1952, p. 331. Egypt and Saudi Arabia were already eligible.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, Sept. 22, 1952, p. 448. Secretary Acheson stated on Sept. 10 that the agreement was "a material demonstration of the resolve of the vast majority of the German people to make redress for the sufferings of the Jews under the Nazis."

²⁸ U.N. doc. A/2184.

²⁹ U.N. doc. A 2185/Add. 1.

³⁰ U.N. doc. A/2171, par. 26.

²³ U.N. doc. A/1905/Add. 1.

²⁴ General Assembly resolution 513 (VI). For text, and for a statement by Ambassador Jessup on Jan. 17, 1952, see BULLETIN of Feb. 11, 1952, pp. 224, 226.

²⁵ BULLETIN of Aug. 4, 1952, p. 181. For pertinent General Assembly resolutions on the status of Jerusalem, see resolutions 181 (II), 185 (S-2), 186 (S-2), 187 (S-2), 194 (III), 303 (IV), 393 (V), 512, 513 (VI).

economic blight of incalculable dimensions. The presence of refugees in host countries is more than the measurable economic waste of manpower and of economic potential. The intangible waste in terms of lost pride, emotional conflict, despair and hopelessness cannot be measured, nor can the potential danger to the safety and security of the Near East be adequately assessed without taking into account the existence of these factors.

The problem was duly considered in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, and, on November 6, 1952, the General Assembly approved by a vote of 48-0-6, with Iraq abstaining, a resolution authorizing an increase in the relief budget to \$23,000,000 and requesting the Negotiating Committee to solicit for the \$250,000,000 3-year program.³¹

The Palestine Conciliation Commission, in the meantime, made it clear in its Twelfth Progress Report on October 9, 1952,³² that no progress had been made toward a solution of the major political issues between Israel and the Arab States, namely the problems of war damages, repatriation of Palestine Arab refugees, the status of Jerusalem, and the terms of a peace settlement. Nevertheless, the Commission concluded that "the most promising way in which it could lend its assistance to the parties would be by further efforts to solve the questions of compensation for the Palestine refugees and the release of bank accounts blocked in Israel." It announced Israel's agreement to the release of all blocked accounts belonging to Palestinian Arab refugees, a sum estimated at \$14,000,000 to \$15,000,000. Although the political impasse continued, the Commission felt "encouraged" and believed that "further progress" could be made.

The Problems of Morocco and Tunisia

Since 1951, in particular, the United States has been faced with the complicated issues of Morocco and Tunisia, brought to the United Nations by Arab, Asian, and African nations. On December 13, 1951, it voted for postponement of the Moroccan issue because of its view that "persons concerned with problems and controversies should in good faith exhaust efforts for their solution by less formal means than debate in the General Assembly."³³

Similarly, when 11 Arab-Asian-African states sought to place the Tunisian issue on the agenda of the Security Council, Ambassador Ernest A. Gross, on April 10, 1952, indicated that the French reform program offered a basis for the resumption of negotiations "looking toward the establishment of home rule in Tunisia." He expressed the hope that France would "bring about far-sighted and genuine reforms in Tunisia," stressed the desirability of direct negotiation between the parties, declared that the Security Council would "remain

open to any member of the United Nations to bring the question to the Council's attention again," and stated that the United States "will naturally re-assess the situation if that is done."³⁴ The vote in the Security Council on April 14 was 5 to 2, with Greece, the Netherlands, Turkey, and the United States abstaining, and the question was not included on the agenda. In a statement of April 16, Secretary Acheson reaffirmed the American position, stressing that "the sound way to proceed here is to give time for the French authorities and the Tunisian authorities to discuss, negotiate, and find a solution," and adding: "Now if they can't, another situation is created."³⁵

On June 20, 1952, the Secretary-General received a request for calling a special session of the General Assembly to consider the question of Tunisia, signed jointly by Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, the Philippine Commonwealth, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen.³⁶ On July 21 it was announced that the move for a special session had failed of adoption, since only 23 states had voted in favor of the proposal, whereas a majority was required.

In a letter of July 30, the 13 Arab-Asian delegations requested that the Tunisian question be included in the provisional agenda of the seventh session of the General Assembly. The accompanying memorandum recalled that 11 Arab-Asian members had brought the problem to the attention of the Security Council in April 1952 as a threat to international peace and security and stated that the situation in Tunisia had further deteriorated since the Security Council's refusal to place the item on its agenda. It also stated that the expected Franco-Tunisian negotiations had not materialized, that tension had increased in Tunisia, and that there was now "a deep sense of frustration among people in many countries of the world, and especially in Asian and African countries."³⁷

Similarly, on September 3, 1952 (inclusion of the question having already been requested by Iraq on August 7) 13 Arab-Asian delegations asked inscription of the Moroccan problem on the agenda of the seventh General Assembly. An explanatory memorandum declared that "in the face of the rising tide of nationalism in Africa," continuation of the French protectorate in Morocco could not "but constitute a mounting threat to the peace," and contended that the Treaty of Fez (1912) had been forced on the Sultan of Morocco. It also charged that human rights were denied, in contravention of the principles of the United Na-

³¹ For text, and for a statement by Ambassador Jessup on Oct. 27, see BULLETIN of Nov. 10, 1952, pp. 755, 756.

³² U.N. doc. A/2216.

³³ U.N. doc. A/PV.354, pp. 258-259 and *passim*.

³⁴ U.N. doc. S/PV.575, pp. 1-30; S/PV.576, pp. 11-20. See also S/PV.574, S/2508, S/2574-2584, and S/2598.

³⁵ BULLETIN of Apr. 28, 1952, p. 678. For criticism of the U.S. position on the Tunisian issue, see *ibid.*, May 19, 1952, p. 799, and statement by Senator Lister Hill, *Cong. Rec.*, vol. 98, no. 69, pp. 3724-3725.

³⁶ For communications of June 20 and July 21, 1952, see U.N. docs. A/2137, 2143.

³⁷ U.N. doc. A/2152.

tions Charter.³⁸ Without prejudice as to the question of competence or as to its substantive position, the United States supported inclusion of these items on the agenda.

The Kashmir Problem

Like the problem of Palestine, the Kashmir issue has confronted the United States and the United Nations since 1948, shortly after the establishment of India and Pakistan as independent members of the Commonwealth. Because of the possibility that failure to solve this issue might lead to serious conflict between Pakistan and India, thereby threatening peace and stability in the Asian subcontinent, the United States has sought an equitable and constructive solution of the Kashmir problem through the United Nations and its organs and through direct counsel to both parties immediately concerned. Although the United States, working with other members of the U.N. Commission for India and Pakistan, was helpful in promoting a cease-fire between the parties, its efforts and those of other U.N. members and agents such as Frank P. Graham, the present U.N. representative dealing with the problem, have not served to effect a final settlement.³⁹

On November 6, 1952, the United States and the United Kingdom introduced in the Security Council of the United Nations a resolution urging that India and Pakistan begin negotiations immediately to work out an agreement on demilitarization of their forces in Kashmir.⁴⁰ The draft resolution recommended that the Pakistan forces be limited to between 3,000 and 6,000 and the Indian armed forces to between 12,000 and 18,000. The parties were to be asked to report to the Security Council not later than 30 days from the date of the adoption of the resolution, and the U.N. representative was to keep it informed of any progress.

● *Harry N. Howard is United Nations Adviser, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs. Part II of his article, dealing with mutual security and assistance programs in these areas, will appear in the December 15 issue of the BULLETIN.*

³⁸ U.N. docs. A/2153, 2175, and 2175/Add. 1, 2.

³⁹ For excerpts from a statement by Mr. Graham on the Kashmir problem before the Security Council on Oct. 10, 1952, see BULLETIN of Oct. 27, 1952, p. 661. See also Frank D. Collins, "Recent Developments in the Kashmir Dispute," *ibid.*, p. 663.

⁴⁰ For text of draft resolution and excerpts from a statement by Sir Gladwyn Jebb, before the Security Council on Nov. 6, see *ibid.*, Nov. 17, 1952, pp. 800, 801.

MSA Allotments for Far East Programs

Announcing that 54.7 million dollars has been allotted for its Far East program for the October-December calendar quarter, the Mutual Security Agency (MSA) reported on November 26 that total Far East allotments for the 6 months ending December 31, 1952, amount to 133.4 million dollars.

The country breakdown for the first half of the 1953 fiscal year is Formosa \$66,237,000; Associated States of Indochina 45.5 million dollars; Philippines 18 million dollars; and Thailand 3.5 million dollars. An additional \$163,000 was allotted for program costs not allocated by country. The allotments were made against the \$202,778,250 appropriated for MSA's Far East program for the year ending June 30, 1953.

The Formosa and Indochina allotments, MSA said, include funds for defense-support items as well as for general economic and technical assistance. Indochina's 45.5-million-dollar allotment includes 30.5 million dollars for support of the military effort and Formosa's allotment of \$66,237,000 includes about 15 million dollars for purchases of such items as machine tools for ammunition manufacture, fabrics for army uniforms, and vehicles for military use.

The country breakdown on the October-December allotments of 54.7 million dollars is Formosa 32.7 million dollars; Associated States of Indochina 10 million dollars; Philippines 10 million dollars; and Thailand 2 million dollars.

Dollar allotments are used by the Far East countries as the basis for submitting requests for MSA authorizations to purchase essential commodities and services in dollar areas. The allotments are also drawn on for the payment of dollar expenses of sending U.S. experts to the Far East countries and bringing trainee specialists here to observe and learn U.S. technical practices under MSA's technical-assistance program.

Through MSA's support program in the Far East, American technical knowledge and practices, backed where necessary with complementary supplies and equipment, are made available to the participating Asian governments to help them carry out their own development programs in such basic fields as agriculture, industry, public administration, and public health. Dating back to June 1950 when it was initiated by MSA's predecessor, the Economic Cooperation Administration, the MSA Far East program is designed to help the free peoples of Asia build up their economic strength in the face of the threat of Communist aggression.

Progress Toward World Security

SECOND REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT ON THE MUTUAL SECURITY PROGRAM¹

Released to the press on November 18 by the Office of the Director for Mutual Security

The President on November 18 described the Mutual Security Program (MSP) as a "positive program for peace" and one which is "absolutely essential to the security of the United States" in presenting his Second Report to the Congress on the operations of the MSP. The report is a statement of military, economic, and technical activities carried on during the first 6 months of 1952 by the United States and other free nations around the world.

The Mutual Security Act of 1951 unified the direction, supervision, and coordination of all U.S. programs of military, economic, and technical assistance to other nations. All three programs are under the coordination of the Director for Mutual Security, W. Averell Harriman.

The report reviews progress made in building what the President called "sufficient strength—military, economic, political, and moral strength—to keep the peace." The MSP is in operation in Europe, the Near East and Africa, in Asia, the Pacific, and in the other American Republics.

In connection with the build-up of strength in Europe, the President's report said that "despite many difficulties . . . major progress had been made by the mid-year toward the ambitious goals established at the Lisbon conference. . . ." The report states that "European economy continued to produce at an overall high level," but the relatively satisfactory production performance was accompanied by a continuation of a deficit in Western Europe's trade balance.

Commenting upon political affairs in Western Europe, the President's report states "Western Europe moved closer to a realization of the ancient dream of European unification." Included in the move were the creation of the six-nation Coal and Steel Community, the signing of a treaty calling

for the establishment of an European Defense Community, the extension of the European Payments Union, continuation of joint economic and financial action through the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, and increased desire in Europe for early consideration of a Western European political community.

In the Near East, the United States, through the Mutual Security Program, continued assistance to the armed forces of Greece, Turkey, and Iran. In addition, programs of technical cooperation to help raise the level of agriculture, health, education, public administration, and other fields were started or continued in 10 countries of the Near East and Northern Africa. The President reported progress in the programs for rehabilitation and resettlement of refugees from Palestine and immigrants into Israel.

The report described at length ambitious projects of technical cooperation in South Asia—India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Nepal—to expand food supplies and to promote general economic and social development. In the South Asian countries live more than one-third of all the people in the non-Communist world. "Economic and technical assistance from the United States is designed to strengthen the ability of governments of the various nations in South Asia and Southeast Asia to carry on essential governmental functions, to support the build-up of military and police forces, and to help the achievement of greater and more diversified production, including production of strategic materials needed by other nations of the free world."

In describing the MSP in the Asian and Pacific areas, the report said: "In Asia and the Pacific, Communist aggression has been stalled since 1950. While the United Nations forces fought and negotiated in Korea, the Chinese Nationalists on Formosa were strengthened by the arrival of American equipment and a marked improvement in training; the French and the peoples of the Associated States of Indochina, with material help from the United States, held the Communist forces to a standstill in Indochina; and the armed forces of the Philippines moved in strong pursuit of the Communist-inspired Huk insurrectionists. In Formosa, Burma, Indochina, Indonesia, the

¹ H. doc. 561, 82d Cong., 2d sess. Copies of the report are available from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. (30¢).

For a summary of the President's First Report, see BULLETIN of Mar. 24, 1952, p. 471.

Philippines, and Thailand, the assistance program brought help in the fight against hunger and disease and illiteracy—the conditions which lead hopeless people to desperate political choices. Support also was given to the development of production of basic materials needed for an expanding economy in the United States and in the free world.”

Arrangements were completed for providing military assistance on a grant basis to some of the American Republics. Prior to supplying such assistance, it was necessary to negotiate agreements as required by the Mutual Security Act of 1951. The necessary agreements were signed during the first 6 months of 1952 with Ecuador, Peru, Cuba, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Uruguay. In addition Point Four programs continued on a joint basis in 19 of the Latin American countries.

The remainder of the report dealt with other parts of the Mutual Security Program: encouragement of free enterprise, the production-assistance program, investment guaranties, aid to U.S. small business, the acquisition and development of strategic materials, compliance with the 50-50 American flag provision,² international technical-assistance programs, and reimbursable military assistance.

Although recounting progress, the report stated, “Many of the major steps of the 6 months under review have been difficult and time-consuming. Deliveries of American military equipment to Europe fell below earlier expectations; the period of military conscription in some European countries was less than had been hoped for; some areas of the world were in a state of acute unrest; and the problems of the underdeveloped areas remained formidable. The ultimate success of certain crucial steps—such as ratification of the treaty to create the European Defense Community—is not yet fully assured. There are obstacles and, no doubt, disappointments ahead.”

The report stated, “A world-wide conspiracy backed by a powerful nation cannot be dissipated easily or cheaply. The economic and social ills of centuries cannot be cured overnight.” The President concluded, however, in his letter of transmittal, that “real progress was made in strengthening the Free World.”

PRESIDENT'S LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

To the Congress of the United States:

I am transmitting herewith the Second Report on the Mutual Security Program, covering operations during the first 6 months of 1952 in furtherance of the purposes of the Mutual Security Act of 1951 (Public Law 165, 82d Cong.). The report

² The Economic Cooperation Act of 1948 provided that 50 percent of all cargoes shipped to or from the United States under the act were to be transported on U.S. flag vessels “so far as is practicable,” and subsequent legislation contained a similar provision.

reviews the steps that we have taken with other nations to work for peace and security.

The Mutual Security Program is a positive program for peace. It is absolutely essential to the security of the United States. At a time when one nation is bent upon world conquest—as the Soviet Union is today—other nations, large or small, have but two real choices: To pay the ransom of appeasement or to pay the price of building together sufficient strength—military, economic, political, and moral strength—to keep the peace. The United States and other free nations have chosen to build up their strength. That is what the Mutual Security Program is all about.

During the 6-month period reviewed in this report, real progress was made in strengthening the free world. Although much remains to be done, we are heading in the right direction. If we keep on, if each of the partners in this joint effort makes every effort to meet problems in a sensible manner, we shall eventually reach our goal of a secure, peaceful, and confident world.



THE WHITE HOUSE,
November 18, 1952.

Credit to Austria for U.S. Cotton

On November 29 the Export-Import Bank of Washington announced the signing of a loan agreement establishing a credit of 6 million dollars in favor of the Republic of Austria to finance shipments of U.S. cotton to Austria. The credit will carry an interest rate of 2¾ percent and is to be repaid in 18 months. Arrangements for the operation of the credit will be announced later.

No Ship Movements to Antarctica During 1952-53 Season

Press release 889 dated November 26

The Government of the United States is pleased to learn that, being anxious to avoid any misunderstanding in Antarctica which might affect the friendly relations between Argentina, Chile, and the United Kingdom, the Governments of these three countries have informed each other that in present circumstances they foresee no need to send warships south of latitude 60 degrees during the 1952-53 Antarctic season, apart, of course, from movements such as have been customary for a number of years.

For its part, the U.S. Government does not, during the 1952-53 Antarctic season, contemplate sending any vessels to Antarctica.

Four Pillars of Friendship With Latin America

by Roy R. Rubottom, Jr.

*Director, Office of Middle American Affairs*¹

Our subject for today, Friendship With Latin America, has pleasant connotations. It deals with an area which is close to us and which many of us know first-hand. It is removed from controversy. The good-neighbor policy here at home has no party lines. And our Latin American friends have responded to that policy in kind; as, for example, President Alemán's emphasis in his speech to the Mexican Congress on September 1 on the excellent state of relations between the United States and Mexico. You can't have good relations with a country very long without friendship, and the converse is true.

I believe there are four principal pillars supporting this structure of friendship we are building with Latin America. They may be listed in any order, depending on your point of view, but I would define them as spiritual, political, cultural, and economic.

Spiritual and Political Pillars

320,705,000 people live in the Western Hemisphere. This number is impressive regardless of what you are measuring, but, when counted in terms of the spiritual cohesiveness of human souls, it becomes infinite. It results in a transcendent power to settle their own difficulties and to reflect Good in a world where Evil is always striving to get the upper hand. Almighty God, faith in whom unites us and our neighbors, will not permit our earthly differences to divide us.

Here it should be recalled that all of the discoverers and the first settlers—Spanish, French, English, Swedish, Dutch, from Columbus on, always thanked God and prayed for His blessing when they first went ashore in this hemisphere.

Recently the United States was conducting an important economic negotiation with a country in

¹ Address made before the Council on World Affairs and the Foreign Trade Bureau of the Chamber of Commerce at St. Louis on Dec. 2 (press release 895 dated Nov. 28).

Latin America. One of the head negotiators was Catholic, the other Protestant. Each was invoking Divine guidance in his own way during the course of the negotiations. This was never discussed until after their work had been successfully concluded, but then each revealed to the other his faith that God would lead them to accord. Here is revealed the existence of a spiritual bond between the Americas, a bond uniting both individuals and governments.

Next, let us examine our political ties with Latin America. We have shared a democratic heritage since the Revolutionary period a century and a half ago. The dedicated lives of Bolívar, San Martín, O'Higgins, and Hidalgo are as well known to us as those of Washington, Franklin, Jefferson, and Monroe are to them. The centenaries of the deaths of Joel Poinsett and Henry Clay were commemorated just this year in Chile and Venezuela, respectively. Freedom was our objective then as now. Today we can no more relax in our vigilance to guard our freedom than our forebears did. Indeed, the penalty for its loss might be greater than ever.

In spite of the early preoccupation of nations in the Americas with their individual growth and progress, they soon acknowledged their interdependence, and the inter-American system was born in 1889. For 60 years statesmen studied the blueprints of the organization and finally, with the signing of the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance at Rio de Janeiro in 1947, and the Charter of the Organization of American States at Bogotá in 1948, the framework was finished. The first provides that an attack on one country is an attack on all. The second provides the organizational basis for the Organization of American States.

It should be recalled that this was the first regional arrangement for collective security that our country joined, quite logically since Latin America is contiguous to us and we are in effect all in the same boat. The emergence of this organ-

ization does not mean that our mutual task is finished, if it ever will be, but it has served notice on would-be aggressors while providing inspiration to the world that cooperation between nations can be achieved, and it is an earnest pledge to each other of our mutual confidence and friendship.

The Cultural Pillar

Next, we should discuss the cultural basis for our friendship with Latin America. Differences of language and diversity of culture, far from being a barrier which we have not wanted to or been unable to penetrate, have provided us with the intellectual stimulus to get better acquainted. We of this country have been thrilled with the poems of Rubén Darío and Gabriela Mistral, and in Latin America they admire the works of Poe and Whitman.

Our people of heterogeneous culture have found the study of Latin culture most rewarding. Excellent courses in this field are available at dozens of our best educational institutions, while scholars can specialize in Mexican studies at the University of Texas or California, in Middle American studies at Tulane, in Brazilian studies at Vanderbilt, and in South American studies at Harvard or Michigan. Moreover, the United States is exchanging students with Latin America in ever-increasing numbers—last year large numbers of U.S. students attended universities in Latin America, and 6,000 Latin American students enrolled at U.S. educational institutions, of whom 159 were enabled to do so through the educational-exchange program of the Department of State.

The full value of such cultural interchange will not be realized until later, when these students assume leadership in their respective countries. Meanwhile, tangible present-day dividends, more than just the monies spent, are derived from the steadily increasing tourism between the United States and Latin America. The people here and there are inherently friendly and open-hearted. They see that they are more alike than they are different. They get to know each other, and this knowledge begets understanding. This Western Hemisphere communion of free peoples, *not* just governments, is a dynamic unifying force in the World.

The Economic Pillar

Now, we should examine the economic pillar supporting U.S. friendship with Latin America. We have invested approximately 6 billion dollars in Latin America, and in addition the Export-Import Bank has approved loans of 1 billion dollars to that area. Virtually every kind of enterprise, mining, agricultural, industrial, highway, railway, irrigation, hydroelectric, iron and steel, is included in this panorama of economic development. This will lead to savings in dollar ex-

change and earnings in the export of surplus production.

We have been the principal customer of Latin America's raw materials since World War II. We buy 60 percent of our food imports and 25 percent of our industrial raw materials from that area. In 1950 we purchased 1.2 billion dollars in foodstuffs, mainly coffee, 1.1 billion dollars of industrial raw materials, and 7 million dollars in other goods, or a total of 3 billion dollars which Latin America exported to us.

On the other hand, Latin America is our next to the largest regional customer of the manufactured goods, foodstuffs, and raw materials which we export. In 1951 this amounted to 3.906 billion dollars. In fact, not counting grants-in-aid, military equipment, and mutual aid under NATO, which swelled our exports to Europe last year, Latin America was neck and neck with Europe as our best customer in 1951.

We are naturally anxious to keep those markets. The only way Latin America can continue to buy from us is by increasing production of what she sells us to enable her to earn the exchange required to pay for our goods. Our task is so to plot our economic futures that we can continue to sell to each other. This can be done by diversifying production and keeping abreast of technological advances. Our Latin American friends have sometimes wondered whether the prices paid for their raw materials have not lagged behind prices paid us for manufactured goods. However, as pointed out in a recent issue of *Industry Tomorrow*, the world outlook for minerals producers is exceedingly promising:

There is evidence that the balance has shifted after a long period during which raw materials supplies exceeded demand, and their prices were low in relation to prices of manufactured goods. For sixty years commencing in 1873, the terms of trade moved against commodities until by 1937 they had lost 40 percent of their value in relation to manufactures. From 1938 there has been a definite improvement trend, and it now appears, at least in the field of minerals, that the development of new sources of supply has fallen well behind manufacturing capacity. In metals, particularly, there is strong evidence that the world is in a position of far more than an emergency shortage.

The maintaining of good economic relations between nations required both good sense and good faith. If this pillar of friendship is not properly maintained, the others will certainly be strained. Our policy of negotiating with other nations for the exchange of tariff concessions has contributed vitally to our own economic soundness and has also strengthened our neighbors. The trade-agreements program, begun in 1934, established the basis for bilateral negotiations to reduce tariffs; then in 1947 we entered into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade along with 31 other countries whereby tariff concessions can be exchanged on a multilateral basis. Several Latin American countries have joined GATT and we have trade agreements with most of the others.

In this connection, recently I had the privilege of working 6 months in the last phase of the negotiations with Venezuela to revise our trade agreement of 1939. This tedious job took 2 years altogether. The revised agreement, which entered into effect on October 11, increased from 88 to 179 the number of items we sell to Venezuela included under the agreement. These items constitute approximately 60 percent of the 456 million dollars of goods which we shipped last year to Venezuela, normally our second or third best customer in Latin America. This contrasts favorably with the old agreement, which covered only 35 percent of our exports to Venezuela. At the same time, we agree to remove the tariff quota and to lower the duty on certain heavier grades of petroleum shipped to us by Venezuela. Oil is her principal export and we are her main customer, paying her approximately 288 million dollars for this product in 1951.

Here, in all candor, I should point out that neither government achieved all that it aspired to in this agreement. However, we would make little progress if we waited until we got everything on our own terms. The agreement as negotiated was deemed to be in our public interest. It represents the kind of honest give-and-take we have carried

out with Latin America, which is, I believe, a prerequisite to good relations and friendship.

The continued economic development of Latin America will require great outlays of capital. Some of this they themselves can provide, but much will have to come from outside, principally the United States. I shall not linger long on the need for a favorable climate to attract investment. This favorable climate already exists in a number of countries, and where it doesn't exist I doubt that any satisfactory substitute can be found.

There is also a step which we could take to induce greater flow of capital abroad. The negotiation of treaties to avoid double taxation would provide incentive to U.S. investors, as would more of the modern type treaties of friendship, commerce, and development.

This is the end of my remarks. It is not, however, the end of our job of building friendship with Latin America. This task will continue indefinitely, for friendship has to be constantly nurtured lest it wither away. But I believe we have laid a strong foundation, supported by these four firm pillars which have been discussed today, and nothing should be permitted to stop us from adding story after story to this edifice of friendship we and our neighbors are building.

U.S. High Commissioner McCloy Submits Final Report on Germany

On July 31, 1952, John J. McCloy submitted the last of his series of reports on Germany to Secretary Acheson and W. Averell Harriman, Director for Mutual Security. The report, which summarizes developments that occurred during Mr. McCloy's term of office as U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, includes sections on Germany's Political Progress and Economic Recovery; the German Public Affairs Program; Berlin as an Outpost of Freedom; Allied Postwar Aims; Management and Administration of the U.S. High Commissioner's Office; and a Chronology for the Period (September 21, 1949-July 31, 1952).

Following is the text of Mr. McCloy's letter of transmittal:

I have the honor of submitting my final report as U.S. High Commissioner for Germany.

This report covers the period from the first of May to the end of July 1952 and therefore completes the series of my quarterly accountings. In addition, it summarizes the events of the last 3 years in the major areas of my responsibility.

This was a period during which Western Germany went through a rapid transition from Military Government rule to virtual independence. In order to present a complete picture of the metamorphosis of the vanquished and prostrate nation into its present state of political and economic health, it has been necessary in many instances to go back to 1945. The progress recorded is impressive; we may regard the U.S. contribution to the political, economic, and social revival of Germany as a major if not a decisive factor in bringing it about.

With the collapse of the Nazi Reich in the spring of 1945, all German administration, which was completely nazified, from the central government down to the local level, disintegrated and then ceased to exist. It required more than 2 years to rebuild Germany's local administrative and political structure but at the end of this period state governments, democratically elected in accordance with constitutions adopted by the people, were in existence and functioning in the U.S. zone of occupation. Comparable progress in the re-

establishment of local government had been made in the zones under the control of the United Kingdom and France. The Soviet zone singly set about to change from one totalitarian control to another. Meanwhile Russian unwillingness to coordinate their occupation policies through the Allied Control Council, as had been intended when that body was set up, meant that Germany was denied unified government. Inevitably the zones drifted apart.

The first important step toward the reunification of Germany was the creation in January 1947 of the Bizonal Economic Administration for the combined U.S. and U.K. zones. This was followed by the gradual incorporation of the French zone into the arrangement. In September of 1949 the Federal Republic of Germany was established, thus politically uniting the three Western zones. At the same time, Military Government was replaced by the Allied High Commission, with powers limited and defined by an Occupation Statute. These events crowned the efforts of my predecessor, Gen. Lucius D. Clay, who, as U.S. Military Governor, had striven with energy and determination, first to make a success of Four Power occupation control, and, when that failed, to achieve a unified and constructive Allied policy at least in the three Western zones.

The 3 years which followed witnessed the rapid progress of the Federal Republic toward political sovereignty. The Petersberg Protocol of November 1949, decisions of the several Western Foreign Ministers' conferences, and the revision of the Occupation Statute in March of 1951, resulted in a series of extended relaxations of Allied controls. Moreover, the Foreign Ministers decided at Brussels in December 1950 to explore changes in the occupation arrangements which might logically attend a German defense contribution. This led to the negotiations which produced the Bonn Conventions and the European Defense Community (Edc) Treaty which were signed in May of this year. Upon their ratification, Western Germany will again enjoy political independence, except in a few fields where the international situation requires the Western Allies to retain authority for the purpose of preserving German interests, as well as their own, pending the final peace settlement. Today, through the progressive stages outlined above, the Western zones find themselves with a thoroughly representative type government in operation; elections are well attended; the various legislative bodies function, with only intermittent lapses, as freely elected democratic institutions are expected to function; and such control as the High Commission exercises on their conduct is so light as to be scarcely perceptible.

Because of the complete breakdown of the German economy at the end of the war, economic progress was at first painfully slow. Cities were a mass of rubble, transportation was paralyzed, sanitation was in jeopardy, food and heat were in

stages of shortage. Nevertheless, progress in repairing these conditions was made even before June 1948, when currency reform provided the necessary financial basis for rebuilding a sound economic structure. After currency reform, the economic tempo increased rapidly; today, the economy of the Federal Republic is one of the strongest in Western Europe, while the new *Deutschemerk* may almost be termed a hard currency.

This accomplishment was achieved by the combined efforts of the Germans and the Western Allies, and with the cooperation of other countries of the free West. American, British, and French aid given to Germany before the inauguration of the Marshall Plan and since then economic- and mutual-security assistance from United States funds have contributed greatly to Germany's economic rehabilitation. In one form or another some 4 billion dollars of U.S. aid have been applied to the economic recovery of West Germany in accordance with a policy of assistance to a defeated foe unduplicated in history and in violent contrast to the treatment accorded the areas of Germany under Soviet domination. The West German Government, industrial management, labor unions and above all the German people themselves are responsible for having put this large amount of aid to very good use.

Meanwhile there has been remarkable progress toward European integration with German participation. The Federal Republic became a member of the Council of Europe in 1950; subsequently it became a member in its own right of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) and the European Payments Union (EPU). The Federal Republic is a member of the Schuman Plan coal and steel organization, which will pool the coal and steel resources of France, the Federal Republic, Italy, and the Benelux countries. This plan went into effect on July 25, 1952, with the formal deposit of instruments of ratification by all six member nations. At this time all restrictions on construction of steel capacity and limitations on steel output of the Federal Republic were removed. The progress toward the European Defense Community (Edc) is another significant step toward integration. The Federal Republic is also a member of other international bodies, including certain specialized agencies of the United Nations.

When Four Power occupation of Germany began, certain Allied postwar aims were formulated. It is appropriate that these aims be reviewed and the progress made in their realization be recorded. They included among others: demilitarization; denazification; democratization in the broadest sense of the word; punishment of the war criminals; reparations; external and internal restitution; the voluntary repatriation or resettlement of displaced persons. Re-creation of a dictatorial police state and the recrudescence of extreme nationalist and

aggressive political movements were, in accordance with these aims, to be prevented. Agreed Allied policies required that Germany should be treated as a single economic unit and their eventual purpose was the reintroduction of a peaceful Germany into the family of nations. As will be shown in this report, much has been achieved toward the realization of these aims, despite the failure of Four Power control to attain the full objective.

Political developments on the international scene caused the Western Allies to revise their policies in certain respects. As early as the end of 1946, cooperation with the U.S.S.R. in the Control Council had become difficult. Later it became virtually impossible. Meanwhile, Soviet intransigence at the meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Moscow and London in 1947 forced the Western Allies to proceed independently with a constructive program for Western Germany. In 1948, the Soviets walked out of the Control Council and the Berlin Kommandatura, thereby disrupting the quadripartite administration of the four zones and Berlin.

Shortly thereafter, in an effort to drive the Western Allies out of Berlin, the Soviets imposed a series of transport restrictions culminating in the total blockade of the city. The blockade, which lasted from June 22, 1948, to May 12, 1949, utterly failed to achieve its purpose, thanks to the determination of the Berlin population and to the Allied airlift which at its height provided Berlin with 8,000 tons of supplies daily.

The East-West tension which began developing in Germany in the winter of 1946-47 paralleled Soviet imperialistic moves elsewhere, which came to a climax in 1950 with the outbreak of the Korean conflict. The shock that the Communist aggression in Korea induced in Germany was most apparent and most immediate. The parallelism to the German situation was plain enough even without the emphasis which Communist propaganda placed upon it. Considerable evidence of fear and hesitation developed in Germany as the first Korean attack took place and the evidence recurred when the U.N. Forces in Korea suffered their early reverses. The Western Powers were forced to reassess their military position; the way things were going it was apparent that without adequate defense the West would fall prey to Communist encroachment. Under pressure of these events, the Western nations increased their efforts toward building collective security. The Brussels Treaty of 1948 had already established collaboration in the defense field among the United Kingdom, France, and the Benelux countries. The North Atlantic Treaty had extended this principle in 1949 to the whole North Atlantic community. Concurrently, U.S. aid to Europe shifted its emphasis from purely economic to defense aims. As the Federal Republic was developing rapidly into a democratic, peaceful member of the Euro-

pean Community, was desirous of resisting the Communist threat, and, in effect, had its territories protected by the presence of Allied forces in Germany, it is not surprising that Germany should have been invited to participate in the common effort to build collective strength to preserve the peace. This participation has come significantly closer during the past few months.

On May 26, the three Western Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany signed at Bonn a series of conventions, known as the Contractual Agreements, designed to establish a new relationship between themselves. The next day the European Defense Community Treaty was signed in Paris by France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg). Thus, that phase of Germany's postwar history during which full exercise of sovereignty was denied to the German nation is coming to a close. When the Contractual Agreements are ratified, the Federal Republic will no longer be an occupied country but a free partner with other European nations determined to preserve their independence and to guard their precious heritage against the resurgence of barbarism from the East.

The European Defense Community (Edc), in which the six Schuman Plan nations agreed to participate, lays the basis for a European Army. At the same time it necessarily provides for closer political cooperation among the participating countries. The Edc establishes a supranational Defense Commissariat for the creation and administration of the European force. This force will be under the military command of the Supreme Commander for Europe established under the terms of the North Atlantic Treaty. The Edc will share a Common Assembly and a Court with the Schuman Plan Authority. It will permit German units to contribute to European defense without the establishment of a German national army, an alternative rejected by Germans and Allies alike. The Edc and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will be tied together by mutual-security guarantees when the protocol recently approved by the North Atlantic Council and the Edc Treaty are ratified.

Although ratification involves complicated parliamentary procedures, it is hoped that protracted delays will be avoided. The Senate of the United States took the lead by consenting to the ratification of the Contractual Agreements by an overwhelming majority on July 1. On the same day, the Senate approved the NATO Protocol on the relationship to Edc. On August 1 the conventions and the NATO-Edc Protocol were also ratified by the British House of Commons. When fully ratified, the conventions and the European Defense Community Treaty, together with the Schuman Plan organization, should contribute greatly to European integration in the political, economic, and defense fields. When European defensive

strength is fully developed it may be expected that there will be a gradual relaxation of tension between the East and West. Certainly the dangerous potentiality of rapid Soviet military domination of Western Europe will have receded. This should permit greater attention being paid to raising the standard of living of the European peoples and other peacetime problems.

During the past 4 months the understandable desire of the Germans for their country's unification continued to be stirred by the Soviets in an effort to obstruct the Federal Republic's integration with the West. The last-minute Soviet effort in the form of the note of May 23 did not prevent the Germans from signing the Contractual Agreements and the Epc Treaty. It may be expected that new Communist efforts will be made and intensified if not to prevent ratification then at least to delay it as long as possible. While the Western Allies are determined to do all in their power to assure the peaceful reunification of Germany on democratic terms, they are equally determined to resist all attempts to use the unification issue as a means of bringing the whole of Germany under Soviet control.

Just before and at the time of the signing of the Contractual Agreements and the Epc Treaty, the Communists launched a series of harassing actions designed to terrorize the West German and Berlin populations. In the West, Communist demonstrations were held, accompanied by open violence. Energetic countermeasures by the West German authorities, however, prevented these outbreaks from assuming dangerous proportions. More serious were the actions taken by the Communists in Berlin and along the border separating West Germany from the East zone.

On May 27, the three Western sectors of Berlin were almost isolated from East Berlin and the surrounding Soviet zone. Telephone communications between West and East Berlin were interrupted and the lines leading out of West Berlin to the Federal Republic were severely curtailed. Certain secondary railway crossing points along the border were closed; the access of West Berliners to the surrounding Soviet zone was severely limited; and small West Berlin exclaves in the Soviet zone were occupied by Eastern authorities. It was only after the Communist radio studio in Berlin, which is located in the British sector, was surrounded by British troops that negotiations with the Soviets led to the freeing of these exclaves. A particularly outrageous kidnaping in the American sector of Berlin continues to be condoned by the Soviet authorities in spite of high-level protests.

The Communists began also to create a no-man's-land on their side of the zonal border. This involved wholesale removal of the population, the establishment of police posts at short intervals, and very much closer patrolling of the whole borderline, including the establishment of a 10-meter-

wide cleared strip along the border itself. These measures immediately resulted in an increased influx of East German refugees into the Federal Republic and Western Berlin. About 30,000 were counted within 2 weeks after these steps were initiated and an average of 600 refugees per day continued to enter throughout June and July. The inconsistency between these measures and the professed Soviet desire for Germany's unification was obvious.

Certain acts of a hostile nature were taken also against the Western Allies. The first of these occurred when two Soviet war planes fired on a French passenger plane en route to Berlin. Two passengers were severely wounded and the plane was damaged. U.S.S.R. military authorities also stopped the U.S. and U.K. military patrols which have for years traversed the Autobahn between Berlin and Helmstedt in order to give assistance to Allied motorists. The Soviets also suddenly "discovered" that certain small borderline exchanges carried out at the beginning of the occupation resulted in a few hectares of "German Democratic Republic territory" being under the jurisdiction of the Federal Republic. They demanded a "revision" of the frontier, but in the meantime actually took possession of a small area heretofore administered by Great Britain.

It was not a great surprise when the German "Minister President" of the Soviet zone announced that, in view of the Federal Republic's plans to participate in Epc, East Germany "would have to create a national army." Since the so-called "People's Police" is already fully trained and heavily armed, this statement probably presaged a change in the designation of this military body from "People's Police" to "People's Army."

All of this attempt at intimidation and harassment failed to produce the intended effects on the West German population or on Berlin. The people of Berlin, whose morale had been tested during the Soviet blockade of 1948-49, continued to ignore Soviet threats and hostile actions. Although Berlin's economy was still marginal and needed continuing aid in order to maintain the present levels, the courage of the population remained high. Berlin morale was stimulated on June 28 by the visit of Secretary Acheson, who once more stated unequivocally that the Western Allies would consider an attack on West Berlin as an attack on themselves and that they were determined to stay in that city until its freedom was assured.

In contrast with Berlin, the economy of the Federal Republic in mid-1952 was a picture of prosperity. The index of industrial production was 140 (1936=100). Coal production averaged 400,000 tons daily in June. The number of unemployed was down to just about 1.2 million, 113,000 below last year's level. The Federal Republic's payment position in Epc was strong,

with about 370 million dollars in West Germany's favor. The Federal Republic has become the second largest creditor nation (after Belgium) within that organization. Moreover, this favorable position was achieved after an 80 percent liberalization of trade. This picture was made even brighter by the expectation of an excellent harvest, which would improve Germany's over-all economic position. Progress in the field of agriculture was reflected in a 42 percent rise in bread-grain stocks above last year's figures. Barring unexpected developments, this favorable trend was expected to continue.

The Government of the Federal Republic continued under statesmanlike leadership to face its internal and external problems with determination. Notwithstanding strong opposition from the Social Democrats, the Communists, and certain elements of the extreme right, it pressed for a speedy ratification of the Contractual Agreements and of the Epc Treaty. A thoroughgoing debate will engage both Houses on these questions. This is both expected and desired.

In transmitting this my final report on my administration as U.S. High Commissioner with the incontestable evidence of material and political progress in West Germany, it is also well to point out the elements of concern in the picture of Germany's postwar development.

First, there is the continuing menace of totalitarian aggression from the East which, with its still greatly predominant military strength, the vigor and scope of its propaganda offensive and the advantage derived from its Communist allies in every country, greatly outweighs the defensive apparatus of any single nation of Western Europe or of any possible Western European alliance in the old sense. This, together with the truncated condition of Germany, creates a situation of tension and an uneasiness, particularly in Germany, which can only be dispelled by a strong combination of political and economic health. The attainment of such a combination in turn requires assistance from outside.

Second, the all-prevailing power of the National Socialist regime has left many former officials with a longing for a return to power. This element and the undercurrent of extreme nationalism, which has pervaded German political life in the past, might form a combination willing again to set Germany off on another disastrous adventure. This is a possibility which cannot be ignored in the light of the past but it has less chance, in my judgment, of recurring than at any time in recent German history. The recollection of the defeat, the shamefulness of Nazi excesses, which no amount of rationalization can dispose of, and the sturdy growth of democratic institutions since the close of hostilities all count heavily against such a possibility.

On the whole, the events of the past 3 years,

during which I have closely observed the growth of democracy in the Federal Republic, cause me to look with confidence into the future. There will be difficulties ahead, but I am convinced that the German nation will face them with courage and that its leaders will find solutions worthy of a nation dedicated to the principles of freedom and democracy.

July 31, 1952

JOHN J. McCLOY
U. S. High Commissioner for Germany

Detention of U.S. Officer by East Berlin Authorities

Following are texts of three press releases issued by the Berlin Element, Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, relating to the arrest of William L. Stonebraker, U.S. Army lieutenant stationed in Berlin. Lieutenant Stonebraker was released on October 31 after a 6-day detention.

HICOG press release dated October 31

Soviet Officials Refuse To Discuss Case of Missing Officer With U.S. Commandant

Officials of U.S. headquarters stated late today that Maj. Gen. Lemuel Mathewson, U.S. commander in Berlin, was refused audience with Mr. I. F. Semichastnov, first deputy chairman of the Soviet Control Commission in Germany, as well as his four deputies when he went personally to Karlshorst in order to seek the release of Lt. William L. Stonebraker, who disappeared on Sunday, Oct. 26, from the autobahn between Berlin and Helmstedt.

General Mathewson proceeded to Soviet headquarters today after many hours of vain attempts to obtain an appointment with the proper Soviet authority to determine the whereabouts of the missing American officer and to effect his return to the American sector of Berlin.

A subordinate Soviet official, who received the American commandant, explained that Mr. Semichastnov was unavailable. Whereupon General Mathewson said he would desire to meet with any of the four following deputies whom he named in this order: B. Z. Kobulov, A. F. Mashirin, M. I. Perelivchenko, or N. V. Ivanov. They, too, were not available.

At this point the Soviet representative suggested that General Mathewson might see Sergei Dengin, Berlin representative to the Soviet Control Commission. The U.S. general said that while he held Mr. Dengin in high esteem, he believed that Mr. Dengin (who returned to Berlin only 3 days ago after a protracted absence) was not competent to discuss the matter at hand since it involved an inci-

dent which extended beyond the borders of Greater Berlin.

Further, General Mathewson stated, his representatives had attempted since Monday to obtain satisfaction in the matter to no avail.

When it was insisted that Mr. Dengin was ready to receive General Mathewson, the U.S. commander replied that if Mr. Dengin "in fact had been specially deputized for this occasion he should have been there to receive me."

HICOG press release dated November 1

U.S. Lieutenant Is Released by Soviets

Lt. William L. Stonebraker, who had been missing since October 26, was released to U.S. authorities by Soviet authorities last night, U.S. headquarters officials announced today.

At 7:45 p.m. yesterday, the Soviet representative at the Air Safety Center informed a member of the Provost Marshal Liaison Section by telephone that Lt. Stonebraker was in custody at Karlshorst and requested him to come to Karlshorst to effect the Lieutenant's release. The release was effected at 9:10 p. m.

Lt. Stonebraker stated that he lost his way on the autobahn about one hour after leaving Berlin for Helmstedt on October 26, and that he was arrested by Soviet Military Police in the Soviet zone at about 10:30 a.m. He was taken to Karlshorst where he was detained until his release yesterday.

Soviet authorities repeatedly denied knowledge of Lt. Stonebraker's whereabouts during the 6 days he was detained.

Lt. Stonebraker was not mistreated or bodily searched. His vehicle and belongings were released with him last night.

HICOG press release dated November 6

U.S. High Commissioner Protests Detention of Officer by Soviets

U.S. High Commissioner Walter J. Donnelly protested against the six-day detention by Soviet authorities of Lt. William Stonebraker, U.S. Army officer formerly stationed in Berlin, in a note delivered this afternoon to Soviet headquarters in Berlin's East Sector.

Text of Mr. Donnelly's letter, which was addressed to Gen. V. I. Chuikov, chairman of the Soviet Control Commission in Germany, follows:

DEAR GENERAL CHUIKOV:

It is my duty to bring to your personal attention the actions of your subordinates in the case of the American Lt. William L. Stonebraker. They would be ludicrous if they were not so serious, and I cannot believe that your subordinates would themselves willingly bring the facts to your attention.

Lt. Stonebraker had orders to return to the United States for release from active duty. He set out on October 26 from Berlin to drive his personal car to Bremerhaven for shipment back to the United States. At one of the junction points on the Berlin-Helmstedt autobahn, he took a wrong turn. He discovered his error and attempted to return to the Helmstedt autobahn. Before he could accomplish this, he was arrested by a Soviet patrol.

It is impossible for the outside world to see what sinister motivation could have been read by your subordinates into this simple error. Here is a man about to return to his home and to civilian life. What conceivable motive could have led him to drive a few miles into the Soviet Zone on a wrong road and then turn around and try to drive back again? To ask the question is to answer it. There is no motive, but a simple mistake.

So, what happened? Lt. Stonebraker was taken under guard to the Soviet headquarters in Karlshorst. The inexorable Soviet security system went into operation. He was held incommunicado for six days. He was questioned. He was asked his views about capitalism and Communism, whether his parents were workers, and what he thought about Korea and about the withdrawal of troops from Germany, etc. He was offered the opportunity to meet American soldiers alleged to have deserted.

You will understand, I am sure, when I say that under the circumstances such interrogation is simply absurd. I suspect you share my view.

As if this were not enough, the Soviet authorities, with Lt. Stonebraker in their custody and under interrogation for six days, denied any knowledge of him. They must have known—even when they threatened him with indefinite detention and told him he might never again see freedom—that the day would come when he would be released. Their denials that they knew where he was were sheer stupidity—unless of course we are to assume that a man can be held in custody in your headquarters without the knowledge of your senior officers.

I confess that I do not understand the mentality which leads the Soviet security system to play games of this kind. Its complete futility and its childishness baffle me.

While the action is childish, it is also dangerous. Surely there are enough serious issues between the Soviet Union and the United States without adding an irritant of this preposterous character.

If these facts have come to your attention I am sure that the culprits have already received well-merited punishment. If not, I demand that such punishment be meted out and that steps be taken to avoid a repetition of this incident.

Sincerely yours,

WALTER J. DONNELLY
*United States High Commissioner
for Germany*

Educational Exchange Agreement Signed with Sweden

Press release 882 dated November 20

The Government of Sweden on November 20 signed an agreement with the United States putting into operation the program of educational exchanges authorized by the Fulbright Act. The signing took place at Stockholm with Acting Foreign Minister Dag Hammarskjöld representing the Government of Sweden and Ambassador W. Walton Butterworth representing the Government of the United States.

The agreement provides for the expenditure of the equivalent of \$110,000 in Swedish currency to finance exchanges between that country and the United States for purposes of study, research, or teaching. The program will be financed from certain funds made available by the U.S. Government resulting from the sale of surplus property to the Government of Sweden.

All recipients of awards under this program are selected by the Board of Foreign Scholarships, appointed by the President of the United States.

Under the terms of the agreement, a U.S. Educational Commission in Sweden will be established to assist in the administration of the program. The Board of Directors of the Commission will consist of eight members, four of whom are to be citizens of Sweden and four of whom are to be citizens of the United States.

After the members of the Commission have been appointed and a program formulated, information about specific opportunities will be made public.

Point Four Director for Pakistan

Ralph R. Will, veteran farm extension worker and specialist in land and water development, has been named director of the Point Four Program in Pakistan, the Department of State announced on November 17 (press release 874). Mr. Will comes to Point Four from the Department of Agriculture where he has been staff director of land and water programs since 1945.

Operational agreements covering major projects were signed late in fiscal year 1952 so that some phases of the program are just getting under way. Core of the program is village development. Training centers for village development workers are now being established. Village workers will be trained to help rural dwellers improve their agricultural and industrial output, fight malaria and other diseases, establish basic education facilities, and organize cooperatives. The program, supported by a U.S. contribution of 10 million dollars and a Pakistan contribution of an equal amount in rupees, also includes the development of commercial-scale fertilizer production facilities, fertilizer demonstration in farm areas, development of agricultural extension services in

addition to village development as such, forestry research and timbering, support of medical facilities and training in health and sanitation, and road planning and training in road construction.

Specified Exemption Laws for Escapee Program

EXECUTIVE ORDER ¹

By virtue of the authority vested in me by section 532 of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as added by section 7 (m) of the Mutual Security Act of 1952 (Public Law 400, approved June 20, 1952, 66 Stat. 146), it is hereby determined that the performance of functions with respect to the escapee program, authorized by section 101 (a) (1) of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended, and administered by the Department of State, without regard to the three following-designated provisions of law will further the purposes of the said Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended:

1. Section 3648 of the Revised Statutes, as amended, 60 Stat. 809 (31 U. S. C. 529).

2. Section 305 of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, approved June 30, 1949, ch. 288, 63 Stat. 396 (41 U. S. C. 255).

3. Section 3709 of the Revised Statutes, as amended (41 U. S. C. 5).



THE WHITE HOUSE.

November 14, 1952.

Appointment to Escapee Program

The Department of State announced on November 21 (press release 885) that Richard R. Brown, former General Manager of Public Affairs in the Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, has been appointed Chief of the Field Coordinating Office at Frankfurt of the President's Escapee Program. He succeeds Guy J. Swope, Chief of the Displaced Populations Division in the Office of the U.S. High Commissioner, who was designated as the temporary chief at the beginning of the Escapee Program in May of this year. Mr. Brown's appointment, which is effective immediately, will permit Mr. Swope to resume his full-time duties as Special Assistant to the U.S. High Commissioner in refugee and displaced persons matters.

In his new post, Mr. Brown will coordinate the activities of the escapee units attached to U.S. missions in Bonn, Trieste, Vienna, Rome, Athens, and Istanbul with the humanitarian work of the many U.S. voluntary agencies in Europe on behalf of the newly arriving escapees and in administering the funds made available under the Mutual Security Act for the President's use in assisting persons who have escaped from Russia and the Russian-dominated countries of Europe.

¹ No. 10410, 17 Fed. Reg. 10495.

U.S. Reaction to India's Proposal on Prisoners of War

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY ACHESON¹

I think that any delegate who had a moment of despair after listening to Mr. Vyshinsky's speech and who felt that perhaps no outcome could be reached of our efforts to labor upon terms for an armistice in Korea would be fully justified. But I think we must all agree that that moment must pass and that we must continue with courage and determination and good will to evolve here the wisest and best provisions for that armistice of which we are capable. For I believe that no nation or nations in the world, no matter how powerful, can long stand against the combined moral opinion of the world.

We have had many able and helpful contributions in our discussions. Some difficulties have emerged in our discussions. But I think that we should put these difficulties in proper perspective. I think we should realize that we have difficulties about an armistice today because for 2 years the United Nations has been resolutely and bravely resisting aggression and has succeeded in doing so. If it had not done that, if it had not taken the stand which it took in 1950, if it had not continued for 2 years to resist this aggression, and resist it bravely and successfully, then all these questions would belong to the past. We would not be talking about an armistice. We might be passing regretful resolutions about the conquest of Korea. For the United Nations, in my judgment, Mr. Chairman, has been for 2 years performing its greatest duty, the duty of resisting aggression. The test which is going on in the world today is whether there shall be a world of law and order supported by collective security or

whether there shall be a world of international anarchy where aggression is unstopped, unhindered, and where each one of us is under the threat of it. Every member of the United Nations and every nation, whether or not it is a member of the United Nations, has a great stake in the success of this effort.

Korea, in my judgment, represents the greatest step forward which the United Nations has ever made, and it represents the possibility of the United Nations becoming the greatest force in the world today if we press forward to bring to a successful conclusion, by a just and honorable armistice and peace, the joint resistance to aggression.

For there has been an act of aggression in the world, an open, patent act of military aggression, and there has been a gallant collective response of resistance to it. That is the heart of the matter which is before us. If the aggression stops, then there is no insuperable obstacle to a peace and an armistice. But we cannot, and I urge everyone in this room to realize this, we cannot make any sacrifice of principles in order to induce the stopping of aggression.

The people of my own country have taken a part of which they are proud in this effort of the United Nations. They have done so because they believe in the principles of the United Nations and in collective resistance to aggression. They believe that, if this great effort fails, then we go back to the futile efforts of 20 years ago to build a world barrier against war and aggression.

Now, Mr. Chairman, out of this debate there seems to me to have come a very wide area of agreement, a very wide area of agreement indeed. Perhaps not unanimous agreement—that is too much to hope for—but a very wide area in numbers and a very wide area in subject matter. I think we all agree that the aggression in Korea has been stopped. I think we all agree that there is no need and purpose of continuing the fighting if the aggression will end, if there are safeguards against

¹Made before Committee I (Political and Security) of the General Assembly on Nov. 24 and released to the press on that date by the U.S. delegation to the General Assembly. The Secretary spoke following a statement by Foreign Minister Andrei Vyshinsky of the U.S.S.R., who rejected all proposals for ending the Korean war except that introduced by the Soviet Union. Other statements to which the Secretary refers were made in Committee I by V. K. Krishna Menon of India on Nov. 19 and by Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden of the U.K. on Nov. 20.

a renewal of aggression, and if agreement can be reached upon honorable terms for dealing with the military questions leading up to an armistice.

It is clear that the efforts of the U.N. Command to settle the military questions leading up to the armistice have met with very wide approval here. The articles of the armistice so far drafted seem to have very wide support indeed. Not a word of criticism has been spoken in regard to them and many words of approval and praise. I think there has been overwhelming agreement that the attitude taken by the U.N. Command in regard to the prisoner-of-war question is right.

There has been almost complete unanimity of opinion that force should not be used either to return or to detain the prisoners. Now, whatever reasons lead people to this conclusion are not as important as the fact that they have come to this conclusion.

I shall follow Mr. Menon's excellent example and not reopen the legal argument. I would make one observation only and that is that we must almost rub our eyes sometimes to believe that we are in what is perhaps whimsically called "real life" when we hear the Soviet Union resorting to every form of technical legal argument to torture out of a treaty some results which support their stand, when they do this on behalf of their friends in China and North Korea who have violated almost every provision the treaty invoked. If their delegate to this committee would turn his unquestioned talents to arguments in North Korea and in Peiping that the treaty should be observed, that the International Red Cross should be allowed to visit the prisoners, that the prisoners who are ill or sick should be exchanged, that they should receive medical care from the Red Cross, that they should be allowed to have packages, that they should be allowed to have mail, I believe that his talents would be much more usefully employed.

In our judgment, both law and morality combine to support the humanitarian position on which there is such wide agreement here.

Resolutions Before the Committee

We have a variety of resolutions before this committee. Speaking briefly about them, I should like to suggest that there are two criteria which we should have in mind. One is what action by the Assembly would be best calculated to bring about an armistice consistent with our basic principles; another criticism might be—and this should go along with the first—what action is best calculated to determine whether the Communists do want an honorable armistice, and, if not, which would leave the record perfectly clear that they do not wish one.

Now, the United States and 20 other countries, acting together as co-sponsors, have introduced what is known as the "21-power resolution."² It

² For text, see BULLETIN of Nov. 3, 1952, p. 630.

is a very simple resolution. It says that every prisoner of war should be released, every prisoner of war should be given unrestricted opportunity to be repatriated, that there should be no force used, and it requests the Communists to agree to an armistice on this basis.

It had been thought by those who introduced this resolution that that was a simple way to get forward with the negotiations and to find out whether it was possible to go forward, because I think all of us are agreed that an armistice on any other principle is not possible for us.

The 21-power resolution did not seek to set up the machinery to carry out the details. It was felt that the various proposals which had been made at Panmunjom were open for that purpose, the offer still remained open, and it was stated that any combination of those provisions in regard to machinery, or any others which were suggested consistent with the principle, could do it.

In connection with that offer, Mr. Vyshinsky was asked a direct question: Does the Soviet Union insist that force should be used to return resisting prisoners of war? He has not until today given us his answer to that question. However, I think we got it very clearly this afternoon, and I think it is that every form of coercion must be used to accomplish the purpose of returning every last prisoner of war to the nation which is waiting to receive them, for good or ill.

Now, the 21 nations who introduced that short resolution did not believe that they had a monopoly of wisdom. They recognized that other resolutions, perhaps more elaborate, perhaps different in some of their expressions, might reach and will reach the desired goals. They welcomed any constructive criticisms and contributions. As has been mentioned several times, the delegation of Mexico has produced a resolution, and this resolution we believe has most helpful provisions which might well be of practical importance in working out the settlement of prisoners of war who resist repatriation. The Peruvian delegation has also introduced a resolution which could well, if that is the desire of the committee, be combined in many respects with the 21-power resolution.³ Most important and useful contributions were made by Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Pakistan, and many other delegations.⁴ The Soviet resolution,⁵ including the amendment spoken of today, is, I regret to say, in my opinion not helpful. It does not accept the principle that no force shall be used. It seems to mix up military and political questions and to confuse the issues in both. The latest version does not help us on our way, and clearly there

³ For information on the Mexican and Peruvian resolutions, see *ibid.*, p. 636 and *ibid.*, Nov. 17, 1952, pp. 802-803.

⁴ For information on the Israeli and Pakistani proposals, see *ibid.*, Nov. 24, 1952, p. 811.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Nov. 10, 1952, p. 761 and *ibid.*, Nov. 24, 1952, p. 840.

cannot be a cease-fire which does not return the U.N. Command prisoners and settle the prisoner-of-war question.

The latest of the resolutions presented to the committee was one presented by the Indian delegation. That was a most important and statesmanlike effort to advance our work, both the original resolution and the revision of it which was circulated yesterday.⁶ No one who listened to the brilliant speech of Mr. Menon could fail to be moved by the deep dedication to his task, the task of peace, which his speech indicated. No one can fail to be moved by the great statement of the Prime Minister of India, which was just quoted by our colleague from Afghanistan.

I deeply regret that Mr. Vyshinsky felt it necessary to reject in one sweeping speech every proposal which has been made here in the course of our debates, Mr. Menon's proposal along with the rest. I do not believe that that is a way to help the constructive work of this committee. If there are some parts of Mr. Menon's draft which to our minds are not yet clear and not altogether satisfactory in their present form, we nonetheless respect and welcome the statesmanship of the resolution which he produced and the speech which he made in putting it forward. Particularly, we note that the Indian resolution went forthrightly and directly to the basic and fundamental point, the principle that force should not be used to detain or to return prisoners. We said, and we repeat, that we welcome and will consider with an open mind any proposal which affirms this basic principle, and we so received the resolution introduced by the Government of India.

Now, of course, there are some differences of approach between the Indian resolution and the 21-power resolution. One difference which strikes you immediately is that the 21-power resolution was a short one, stating a few principles, whereas the Indian resolution works out in much more detail the machinery to be used in carrying out these principles. However, that does not seem to me to be a basic or fatal difference at all. We thought, when we introduced our own, that the shorter form was simpler, but we have no stubbornness about that view and we shall consider with an open mind and take part in the discussion gladly to develop a more complicated plan, if that is the wish of the committee.

I suppose, in working on any plan before us, we will all have several matters in mind. One of them would be that the plan and the program must make clear that the prisoner-of-war problem shall be solved on the basis that force is not used, either to detain or to return. Second, the plan I think we would all agree, must be a workable one, one which is capable of being carried out and one which will not break down and result in mutual bitterness and

mutual charges that the armistice has been breached.

Therefore, I think we come to specific points on which we can get wide agreement: That no prisoner of war shall be subjected to any force or coercion, physical or mental, duress of any type at any time during the process of repatriation; that when procedures indicated have been put into operation and completed, the prisoner-of-war question should be fully settled, not partially settled, but fully settled; that all prisoners of war should be speedily released as required by international law; that those who do not resist and will not resist repatriation should be repatriated quickly; and that those who would resist repatriation should be released and settled elsewhere.

Now these are the points on which we can all agree. Thereafter, there will be some practical problems in dealing with so large a number of people, and I imagine we would not think it wise to work out every detail here in New York, but leave some practical details to be settled in the field.

An Examination of the Indian Resolution

With these considerations in mind, let me examine more closely the provisions of the Indian resolution. In the first place, and I say so gladly, it meets fully the first requirement which we have mentioned: that is, a fair and clear affirmation of the principle that force shall not be used upon prisoners to retain or return. As to the second principle, it sets up machinery which would handle the prisoner-of-war problem on a basis which is consistent with the principle that force shall not be used. That is in the main what it does. But I think we do have some problems in connection with this which I have no doubt can be worked out satisfactorily. The problem which I find most perplexing to me is not in what Mr. Menon said at all. Because with what he said on that subject I am in complete agreement. But I think that he has not yet been altogether successful in translating his intention and purpose, as I understood it from his words, into the more formal language of the resolution. And I think here it is necessary for us to act with some care. For in matters as important as this, we must say what we mean and mean what we say. We should not be satisfied with anything which is not clear, because that can only lead to the gravest trouble later on.

Now, in discussing the two matters which I have discussed, Mr. Eden spoke somewhat fully in his address to this committee and with what Mr. Eden said I am in complete and wholehearted agreement. Mr. Eden pointed out that the nonrepatriated prisoners of war must be released and cared for and resettled by an agency of the United Nations. With that I am in entire agreement. He said that the commission should be organized in such a way as to make it effective, and with that I

⁶ U.N. docs. A/C. 1/734 (dated Nov. 17) and A/C. 1/734/Rev. 1 (dated Nov. 23).

am also in agreement. Now when we come to the problem of the disposition of the prisoners of war, Mr. Menon indicated that his plan was designed not merely to deal with the problem of prisoners of war, but to settle and dispose of it completely. That was his purpose and I agree with that purpose. But I do not think it has been accomplished yet in the resolution.

As we see it, the solution of the prisoner-of-war question must be consistent with the nonuse of force. This means that you have a total disposition of the whole problem and not merely part of the problem, and that this total disposition must be consistent with the nonuse of force. I think it is not too difficult to do this because the principle of nonforcible repatriation or detention means exactly what it says. It means that no force, no coercion, no duress is to be used to compel the prisoners to return or remain—and if that principle is to be real, the prisoners must have a true choice. It is not nonforcible repatriation if the only alternative to repatriation is indefinite, and perhaps permanent, captivity.

Indeed, I think that the whole notion that the prisoners can be kept in captivity after the cessation of hostilities violates every humanitarian principle as well as established international practice and the Geneva Convention.

What is clear, it seems to me, is that the prisoners must be released. I don't think that there has been any doubt in this committee on that point. I think it is also clear that the Unified Command does not have the right to agree that anybody else should detain the prisoners indefinitely. And, therefore, those prisoners who cannot be repatriated without the use of force within a definite period of time must be released. At the same time, it has been pointed out that the United Nations has a duty to care for these prisoners and to aid in their settlement and return to peaceful pursuits. It will not be caring for them as prisoners of war, for at the moment the repatriation commission will have finished its duties and released these prisoners, they are no longer prisoners but are free men whose future must be provided for.

Mr. Eden pointed out how we must deal with this problem. He said

I think there is much to be said in favor of transferring the responsibility for them after a given period from the Repatriation Commission to a resettlement agency. . . . I suggest to you that here is an important constructive task for the United Nations. The object is that these men should become free and useful citizens of peaceful communities.

Mr. Eden also made a specific suggestion with which I strongly agree. He said

We could create a special body to look after these men, a resettlement commission, or we could extend the functions of the U.N. Korean Reconstruction Agency to cover this particular task.

And with that I also agree.

Now, I think that Mr. Menon is in agreement

with this basic view also, if I understand his words right. In his speech he agreed that the problem must be disposed of and that the prisoners of war who cannot be repatriated must, nevertheless, be released. This I quote from Mr. Menon's address to us.

It is also to be considered in an event of this kind there must be an understanding that you cannot keep human beings in captivity all their lives or for indeterminate periods. This has good precedents and authorities because if you read the history of the exchange of prisoners of war, going back to the American Civil War, or later on to the wars in Europe in 1914, the Treaty of Versailles, and everywhere else—there are times given where it is said a prisoner may not be kept in internment more than that period, this period, or other periods. Therefore, if as a result of all this there should be a number of persons whom it has not been possible to return to their homeland for one reason or another, whatever the reason may be, and if there are people who are in this state of suspended animation then there must be some provision made.

Later on he said :

It cannot be humanitarian to keep people in captivity for indefinite and unknown periods without any hope of their release or of their freedom, to which a human being is entitled. Equally, we would have to conform to such things as the Declaration of Human Rights and things of that character where a person cannot, without charges stated—at the end of hostilities—except for organizational and other purposes, be detained forever.

Mr. Menon also recognized that those who could not be repatriated without force must be provided for in other ways and that the United Nations has a special responsibility in this—

But if it should so happen that neither party would take the responsibility for them, or could find a home for them, or they will not find homes on either side for one reason or another, then it will become the responsibility of the United Nations to see that they are looked after.

From the statements on both sides, it is quite apparent that there would be people who may not be wanted by one side or the other. For all those reasons, if there should be a residue, that residue would constitute people who have to be cared for, and it would be up to the repatriation commission to make recommendations, and the United Nations would certainly have a responsibility.

And again Mr. Menon said that these non-repatriable prisoners must be quickly disposed of. He put it in rather a picturesque way. "It simply means that it is necessary to provide a paragraph within a short period."

So, I take it from what Mr. Menon has said, and Mr. Eden and others have said on this subject, that there is general agreement with two fundamental principles: That those prisoners who cannot be repatriated without the use of force cannot be detained in indefinite captivity; and, second, the United Nations has the responsibility for caring for and resettling such persons within a brief fixed period after the end of hostilities.

With that general agreement, if we approach the language of the Indian resolution, and I am directing your attention to paragraph 17, I think it

has not yet captured the meaning which seems to be so widely held. The original draft said

At the end of 90 days the disposition of any prisoners of war whose return to their homelands has not been effected in accordance with the procedure set out above shall be referred by the Repatriation Commission to the political conference to be called under Article 60 of the Draft Armistice Agreement.

Now the practical effect of leaving the matter that way is that you would have referred the disposition of the prisoners, you would have given jurisdiction to a body which I feel sure will not be able to discharge that duty. I shall return to that in a moment. Here I will merely say that if the discussions of over 6 months in Panmunjom and the discussions of over 4 weeks in this committee are indicative, and I think they are, then it is rather futile to hope that within any period that you can imagine, this political conference made up of representatives of the two sides, is going to be able to solve the question which has not been solved in this debate. The point is that the indefinite captivity continues, because anything you state would happen to the prisoners, and the power to dispose of them, is given to a body which is not able to exercise that power. The conference may go on for months or years. It may break up without any constructive conclusion and you would have it in the armistice agreement that only this body can dispose of them, and the prisoners would continue in detention.

It seems to me that that result is not intended by Mr. Menon. It would be inhumane to do that and it would be quite contrary to Mr. Menon's purpose, and I am sure that neither Mr. Menon nor the Indian delegation would sanction either of these two things.

Insuring True Nonforcible Repatriation

There has to be a real alternative offered to these prisoners in order that their repatriation shall be truly nonforcible. They must have the true opportunity to go home and not be held in indefinite captivity. Within a quite definite period of time, they must have the understanding that they will be released and find peaceful homes and peaceful pursuits with the help of the United Nations. If this is not done, you might get into a dangerous situation where it might be necessary to use the very force, which we repudiate here, to turn them over to a commission from which they have no exit except repatriation or indefinite captivity.

As I said, I am quite sure that Mr. Menon did not intend this result, and in his draft circulated yesterday he had a new version. But I think the new version is still open to the difficulty that the old one was. The new one says

At the end of 90 days, after the Armistice Agreement has been signed, the disposition of any prisoners of war whose return to their homelands may not have been

effected in accordance with the procedure set out in these proposals or as otherwise agreed, shall be referred with recommendations for their disposition, including a target date for the termination of their detention, to the political conference to be called as provided under Article 60 of the Draft Armistice Agreement.

Perhaps a wiser idea might be to have some provisions to provide for the repatriation commission's having a period of time during which it would repatriate all those that it could, having its period of custody extend over and overlay the beginning of the political conference so that if the political conference should make decisions which affect these prisoners, then those decisions can be taken into consideration and given effect before they are released and repatriated. That suggestion, I think, is almost exactly the one made by Mr. Eden and it is one I think which deserves all of our careful consideration.

So, if I may sum up, on this point, I would say, let us consider carefully the question of referring the matter to the political conference. Let us see if we can't work together in harmony and good will and work out some words which say that after a period given for repatriation, if there are some who will not be repatriated without the use of force, that they should be released within a definite period and their care and maintenance and settlement should be assumed by an agency of the United Nations. This agency might be, as Mr. Eden suggested, the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency. That is in existence—it has money and is staffed. But if the General Assembly wishes to set up some other body with finances and power, I certainly would not object to that.

That, it seems to me, is the way in which we might well approach this question of article 17 and I am sure that it is possible to work this thing out.

There are one or two other things which I might mention very briefly. They do not go to the heart of this question of one's attitude toward the Indian resolution, but they might be useful things to have in mind.

One has to do with a suggestion which Mr. Eden made and which has been in part, I am very happy to say, accepted by the Indian delegation and carried out. Mr. Eden suggested that the umpire should not be someone who is called in to arbitrate, from time to time, but that he should be a responsible executive officer sitting with the commission and serving as its presiding officer, with the right to vote throughout. Now, that has been adopted by Mr. Menon and I think it is a very great improvement, and that is excellent.

There is another aspect of this matter which is whether one would ever get an umpire. There, the present draft says that if the parties do not agree within a short period of time the matter shall be referred to the United Nations. I imagine that the purpose of the reference would be either to select an umpire or to reconsider the whole sit-

uation. I get the most discouraging impressions from Mr. Vyshinsky's speech that no umpire is ever going to be selected because he appears not to like the idea of an umpire at all. However, if this scheme is to be given completeness, it seems to me it does require the settlement of that question. If the powers cannot agree upon it and it is not agreed in the armistice arrangements that the General Assembly may select the umpire, then the whole scheme in the Indian resolution breaks down, for without an umpire you have no commission, and without the commission you have no armistice, and we would be back again where we started. This, I say, is not a matter which goes to the heart of the situation at all, but it is worth study.

Another matter which I think is worth study has to do with article 5. In article 5, it is provided that classification of prisoners of war according to nationality and domicile, as proposed in the letter of October 16,⁷ shall be carried out immediately. I am sure that what is meant by that is that it shall be carried out immediately by the commission, because it is the commission's duty and they are in possession of the prisoners. However, it does not say so, and the letter itself, to which reference is made, states that the classification shall be carried out by the side whose prisoners are being turned over. I am sure that some weeks of futile argument will be spared if that question could be definitely determined here so that at least what you are recommending to the negotiators will be clear. Again, this is a matter which does not go to the heart of the situation at all.

That provides again that the disposition is left to the political conference, but there would be recommendations including a target date. It does not give us any guarantee that these recommendations would reach fruition through the actions of the conference. Then it continues

If, at the end of a further sixty days, there are any prisoners of war whose return to their homelands has not been effected or provided for by the political conference the responsibility for their care and maintenance until the end of their detention shall be transferred to the United Nations.

But there is still no end in sight to their detention. This merely states that this body shall have the responsibility for their care and maintenance until the end of their detention.

I believe that since we all agree on what we want to do, it should not be very difficult to find the right language to do it. It seems to me that what we are seeking here is some limitation upon their detention, some time period when they cease to be detained.

In passing I should like to come back to this reference of the question of the disposal of the prisoners to the political conference. I have grave doubts—my Government has grave doubts as to

whether that is a wise thing. This doubt has nothing to do with the desirability of calling the political conference. That is already provided for in the draft Armistice Agreement. The recommendations are made to governments that this shall be done. My doubt has to do with the wisdom of referring to that conference this question of the disposal of prisoners who will not be repatriated without the use of force. I have already mentioned one reason—I don't think they will be able to solve it. We have been talking about it for a very long time. And another reason is that it is most important that this political conference shall have some success about the grave problem of the future of Korea which will come before it, and it would be a very bad start for that conference to turn over to it a difficult question—one on which it is most certain to be deadlocked, which would give rise to renewed bitterness and keep the conference from getting on to a discussion of the real problem of the peaceful unification of Korea and other Korean questions.

Referring Question to Political Conference

Again I am somewhat puzzled as to just what it is the conference would discuss about prisoners of war. The phrase is "the disposition of such prisoners shall be referred," but surely one does not expect that conference to take up again the very question we thought we have been settling here. What is the conference going to discuss? Is it going to discuss whether or not force shall be used? That would certainly be a retrograde step of the worst sort, and it should be made clear in the resolution that this is not the purpose of referring this to the political conference.

What else would they discuss? They might discuss where the prisoners should be resettled. But surely a political conference is not the best body to discuss and settle that. Rather the United Nations is, because it has the task of resettling and caring for them until they become established. So, without taking an adamant position on this question, I urge that we all consider carefully whether this is a wise idea.

To come back again to the broad things, I again want to say that we welcome with gratitude the statesmanship that Mr. Menon and his delegation have shown in going forward with the constructive work of their resolution. We welcome it heartily. We are grateful for it. We believe that the difficulties which I have mentioned, the principal ones having to do with article 17, can be met, because I am sure we really all intend and mean the same thing. If those difficulties can be met, which should not be impossible at all, then my Government will most heartily support the Indian resolution. We will not only support it here, but we will faithfully and loyally do our best to carry it out, if it should be adopted by this Assembly.

We are wholly in agreement with the spirit of

⁷ BULLETIN of Nov. 10, 1952, p. 752.

this resolution and this effort. Our hope is that the resolution can be and will be perfected along the lines suggested, which I feel quite sure, if I understand his speech correctly, are the purposes of its sponsor. If that can be done and if it can be adopted, then I think that this resolution will deserve and will carry the blessings of all of us here as it goes forward to Korea and carries with it a hope that an armistice may result.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION ON PRISONERS OF WAR

U.N. doc. A/Resolution/18
Adopted December 3, 1952

The General Assembly

HAVING RECEIVED the Special Report of the United Nations Command of the 18th October 1952 on "the present status of military action and armistice negotiations in Korea"¹ and other relevant reports relating to Korea;

NOTING WITH APPROVAL the considerable progress towards an armistice made by negotiation at Panmunjom and the tentative agreements to end the fighting in Korea and to reach a settlement of the Korean question;

NOTING FURTHER that disagreement between the parties on one remaining issue, alone, prevents the conclusion of an armistice and that a considerable measure of agreement already exists on the principles on which this remaining issue can be resolved;

MINDEFUL of the continuing and vast loss of life, devastation and suffering resulting from and accompanying the continuance of the fighting;

DEEPLY CONSCIOUS of the need to bring hostilities to a speedy end and of the need for a peaceful settlement of the Korean question;

ANXIOUS TO EXPEDITE AND FACILITATE the convening of the political conference as provided in Article 60 of the Draft Armistice Agreement;

AFFIRMS that the release and repatriation of Prisoners of War shall be effected in accordance with the "Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of Prisoners of War", dated Twelfth August 1949, the well-established principles and practice of International Law and the relevant provisions of the Draft Armistice Agreement;

AFFIRMS that force shall not be used against Prisoners of War to prevent or effect their return to their homelands, and that they shall at all times be treated humanely in accordance with the specific provisions of the Geneva Convention and with the general spirit of the Convention;

ACCORDINGLY REQUESTS the President of the General Assembly to communicate the following proposals to the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and to the North Korean Authorities as forming a just and reasonable basis for an agreement so that an immediate cease-fire would result and be effected; to invite their acceptance of these proposals and to make a report to the General Assembly during its present session and as soon as appropriate:

PROPOSALS

1. In order to facilitate the return to their homelands of all Prisoners of War, there shall be established a Repatriation Commission consisting of representatives of

EDITOR'S NOTE. The text printed here is that adopted in the plenary session on Dec. 3. An amendment, introduced before the revised Indian draft was approved in Committee I on Dec. 1, altered the wording of the second sentence in proposal No. 17, which had read: "If at the end of a further sixty days. . . ." In plenary session the Indian representative proposed the insertion of the phrase "so that an immediate cease-fire would result and be effected" in the paragraph preceding the proposals.

¹ U.N. doc. A/2228.

Czechoslovakia, Poland, Sweden and Switzerland, that is, the four States agreed to for the constitution of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and referred to in paragraph 37 of the Draft Armistice Agreement, or constituted, alternatively, of representatives of four States not participating in hostilities, two nominated by each side, but excluding representatives of States that are permanent members of the Security Council.

2. The release and repatriation of Prisoners of War shall be effected in accordance with the "Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of Prisoners of War", dated Twelfth August 1949, the well-established principles and practice of International Law and the relevant provisions of the Draft Armistice Agreement.

3. Force shall not be used against the Prisoners of War to prevent or effect their return to their homelands and no violence to their persons or affront to their dignity or self-respect shall be permitted in any manner or for any purpose whatsoever. This duty is enjoined on and entrusted to the Repatriation Commission and each of its members. Prisoners of War shall at all times be treated humanely in accordance with the specific provisions of the Geneva Convention and with the general spirit of that Convention.

4. All Prisoners of War shall be released to the Repatriation Commission from military control and from the custody of the detaining side in agreed numbers and at agreed exchange points in agreed demilitarized zones.

5. Classification of Prisoners of War according to nationality and domicile as proposed in the letter of October 16th from General Kim Il Sung, Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army, and General Peng Teh-Huai, Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, to General Mark W. Clark, Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command,² shall then be carried out immediately.

6. After classification, Prisoners of War shall be free to return to their homelands, forthwith, and their speedy return shall be facilitated by all parties concerned.

7. In accordance with arrangements prescribed for the purpose by the Repatriation Commission, each party to the conflict shall have freedom and facilities to explain to the Prisoners of War "depending upon them" their rights and to inform the Prisoners of War on any matter relating to their return to their homelands and particularly their full freedom to return.

8. Red Cross teams of both sides shall assist the Repatriation Commission in its work and shall have access, in accordance with the terms of the Draft Armistice Agreement, to Prisoners of War while they are under the temporary jurisdiction of the Repatriation Commission.

9. Prisoners of War shall have freedom and facilities to make representations and communications to the Repatriation Commission and to bodies and agencies working under the Repatriation Commission, and to inform any or all such bodies of their desires on any matter concerning themselves, in accordance with arrangements made for the purpose by the Commission.

10. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 3 above, nothing in this Repatriation Agreement shall be construed as derogating from the authority of the Repatriation Commission (or its authorized representatives) to exercise its legitimate functions and responsibilities for the control of the prisoners under its temporary jurisdiction.

11. The terms of this Repatriation Agreement and the arrangements arising therefrom shall be made known to all Prisoners of War.

12. The Repatriation Commission is entitled to call upon parties to the conflict, its own member governments, or the Member States of the United Nations for such legitimate assistance as it may require in the carrying out of its duties and tasks and in accordance with the decisions of the Commission in this respect.

13. When the two sides have made an agreement for

² BULLETIN of Nov. 10, 1952, p. 752.

repatriation based on these proposals, the interpretation of that agreement shall rest with the Repatriation Commission. In the event of disagreement in the Commission, majority decision shall prevail. When no majority decision is possible, an umpire agreed upon in accordance with the succeeding paragraph and with Article 132 of the Geneva Convention of 1949 shall have the deciding vote.

14. The Repatriation Commission shall at its first meeting and prior to an armistice proceed to agree upon and appoint an umpire who shall at all times be available to the Commission and shall act as its chairman unless otherwise agreed. If agreement on the appointment of an umpire cannot be reached by the Commission within the period of three weeks after the date of the first meeting, this matter should be referred to the General Assembly.

15. The Repatriation Commission shall also arrange after the armistice for officials to function as umpires with inspecting teams or other bodies to which functions are delegated or assigned by the Commission or under the provisions of the Draft Armistice Agreement, so that the completion of the return of Prisoners of War to their homelands shall be expedited.

16. When the Repatriation Agreement is acceded to by the parties concerned and when an umpire has been ap-

pointed under paragraph 14 above, the Draft Armistice Agreement, unless otherwise altered by agreement between the parties, shall be deemed to have been accepted by them. The provisions of the Draft Armistice Agreement shall apply except in so far as they are modified by the Repatriation Agreement. Arrangements for repatriation under this agreement will begin when the armistice agreement is thus concluded.

17. At the end of ninety days, after the Armistice Agreement has been signed, the disposition of any Prisoners of War whose return to their homelands may not have been effected in accordance with the procedure set out in these proposals or as otherwise agreed, shall be referred with recommendations for their disposition, including a target date for the termination of their detention to the political conference to be called as provided under Article 60 of the Draft Armistice Agreement. If at the end of a further thirty days there are any Prisoners of War whose return to their homelands has not been effected under the above procedures or whose future has not been provided for by the political conference, the responsibility for their care and maintenance and for their subsequent disposition shall be transferred to the United Nations, which in all matters relating to them shall act strictly in accordance with international law.

The Universal Validity of Man's Right to Self-Determination

by Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt

U.S. Representative to the General Assembly¹

U.S./U.N. press release dated November 18

Before giving the views of my delegation on the question of the self-determination of peoples, I should like to reserve my delegation's right to reply at a later stage to the misstatements and distortions of fact about the United States, particularly with reference to territories under U.S. administration, contained in the statements of the representatives of Byelorussia and Poland, as well as to any other such misstatements that may be made in the course of this debate.

The desire of every people to determine its own

¹Excerpts from a statement made in Committee III (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural) on Nov. 18 on the self-determination item. In the latter part of Mrs. Roosevelt's statement, which is not printed here, she proposed amendments to resolution A, a plan for plebiscites to ascertain demands for self-government. The first amendment suggested deletion of the first two paragraphs of the preamble which refer, among other things, to "slavery". The second proposed two new paragraphs for the preamble. The third was a minor drafting change in the operative part. The fourth would broaden the scope of the resolution to cover not only non-self-governing and trust territories but states as well.

destiny, free from dictation or control by others, is one of the most deep-seated of all human feelings. Throughout history groups of individuals having common bonds of language, religion, and culture have developed a sense of solidarity as a people and have tended to resent any effort of the outsider, the foreigner, to interfere with them. So strong is this feeling that men of many peoples have at various times been willing to lay down their lives to be free from domination by others.

The fact that wars have sometimes resulted from the failure of one people to respect the wishes of another led us all as members of the United Nations to agree that one of our major purposes is "to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples." In our present discussion we find ourselves faced with the problem not only of giving greater moral weight to this principle but at the same time giving it clearer definition so that it may have universal validity in the complex world of today.

While the underlying concept of self-determination is, I suppose, as old as human society, the term

"self-determination" is relatively new. It appears to have been used first with regard to the nineteenth-century struggle of certain European peoples for a separate national existence. It occurs in the writings of the radical German philosophers of 1848 as *Selbstbestimmungsrecht*, which was translated into English as "the right of self-determination of nations" in a resolution adopted by a Conference of European Socialists in 1915. As a number of speakers, including the representatives of Egypt and the United Kingdom have pointed out, this phrase was given wide currency as a principle of international diplomacy by an American President, Woodrow Wilson. However, as several speakers have also reminded us, Woodrow Wilson from the beginning recognized that the principle of self-determination has its limitations. Because I think it important that we keep President Wilson's thought in this matter clearly in mind, I should like to quote again the statement he made in setting forth his "four principles" before the U.S. Congress on February 11, 1918. He asserted—

that all well defined national aspirations shall be accorded the utmost satisfaction that can be afforded them without introducing new, or perpetuating old, elements of discord and antagonism that would be likely in time to break the peace of Europe and consequently the world.

Today we discuss the question of self-determination in quite a different and much more complex setting. The stage is no longer Europe alone; it is world-wide. In a single resolution of a few paragraphs, we are setting forth certain guidelines for the respect of a principle, not only in Europe but in Asia, Africa, and the Americas as well. Consider for a moment the wide variety of cultures of the peoples with whose self-determination we are concerned—the culture of the spear and the earthen hut, the culture of vast rural peasantries, the complex culture of industrial cities, and confused combinations of culture. The complexity would seem to me enough to make us cautious lest we be too precise, narrow, or rigid in drawing up rules for promoting respect for the principle of self-determination.

In this debate, as with any resolution we adopt, we are molding for generations to come a principle of international conduct. If self-determination is a right which belongs to all people, it is inappropriate for us to express ourselves here in a general resolution with respect only to certain people. Our words and phrases must be made to apply as much to those who once exercised the right and had it snatched from them as to those who have never possessed it.

Emergence of New and Larger "Peoples"

We, like others before us, would ask ourselves, therefore, what may constitute a "people" to whom the principle of self-determination shall be applied. What are their characteristics? What

are their cultural or political or geographic boundaries?

In our search for an answer we find the very concept of a "people" undergoing rapid evolution. Possibly the very first group of human beings seeking to maintain itself as an entity free from the control of others was the family or kinship group. The trend of history, in varying degrees and with numerous set-backs, seems to have been that larger and larger groups of once separate peoples have been formed and have come to think of themselves as a single people. Almost every nation represented at this table is composed of disparate elements of population that have been combined in one way or another into a unified or federated political system.

Here differences among formerly separate peoples either have been or are being submerged and new and larger peoples are emerging. This process of evolution and merger is still going on. It is a trend which diminishes the possibilities of conflict. Must we not exercise the greatest care lest anything we do here tend to freeze the pattern of peoples along present lines and thus instead of promoting the unity of mankind, emphasize certain obstacles to such unity?

We in the United States have gained the conviction from our own experience that the combination of peoples is a process of enrichment. Right here in New York City the number of persons of Irish descent total nearly 550,000, more than in the city of Dublin; the Italian population, similarly defined, is well over 1,000,000 and exceeds the population of Naples. New York has more people of Jewish origin than all Israel. Our 12,000 Arabic-speaking people are the equivalent of a small Middle Eastern city. Yet, as I am sure you have seen demonstrated many times, their children are not Irishmen, Italians, Jews, or Arabs. They are Americans.

We do not claim for one moment that the process of creating a new people is easy or that we have fully succeeded in doing so for all elements of the population, but we know it can be done and we are convinced that this process is to be preferred to clinging overzealously to the separateness of peoples.

At the same time we believe it is possible and desirable to retain a good deal of diversity within large political entities. Through our federated system of government, each state and each community preserves for its people the maximum voice in their own affairs. Louisiana has continued its legal system adopted from France, passed on from the earliest settlers of the region. Arizona and New Mexico have Spanish as one of the official languages of their legislatures. Throughout the country, people worship in Norwegian and Russian, publish newspapers in German and Greek, broadcast over the radio in a variety of tongues. In every state, county, and town the people decide for themselves who shall teach in their schools and what shall be taught.

Their policemen come from their own communities and are subject to their control.

This is self-determination exercised to a high degree, yet without sacrificing cooperation in the larger fields of common interest. Each element of the national community contributes to the national government, takes part in it, and helps to shape the decisions which lead to a national destiny. Yet it must be equally clear that to grant the automatic exercise of the absolute right of political self-determination to every distinct section of our population would be detrimental to the interests of the population as a whole. And such considerations would apply to the territories whose future rises or falls with ours.

In this context we might ask ourselves: Does self-determination mean the right of secession? Does self-determination constitute a right of fragmentation or a justification for the fragmentation of nations? Does self-determination mean the right of people to sever association with another power regardless of the economic effect upon both parties, regardless of the effect upon their internal stability and their external security, regardless of the effect upon their neighbors or the international community? Obviously not.

As I have suggested, the concept of self-determination of peoples is a valid and vital principle, but like most other principles it cannot be applied in absolute or rigid terms. Surely it is not consonant with realities to suggest that there are only two alternatives—*independence or slavery*. Just as the concept of individual human liberty carried to its logical extreme would mean anarchy, so the principle of self-determination of peoples given unrestricted application could result in chaos. Is either principle thereby invalidated? Certainly not! On the contrary, we feel sure that human freedoms can find their fullest expression only in the context of responsibility.

The resolution before us, in at least one other respect, raises the question of absolutes. It speaks of granting the right of self-determination, upon a "demand for self-government," by ascertaining the wishes of the people through a plebiscite.

We are compelled to ask, is this not an extremely limited concept of self-determination? Is the demand for self-government the only question on which the people should be consulted? Is the plebiscite the only method of consultation?

The Essence of Self-Determination

Were self-determination synonymous with self-government, we would find these questions easier to answer. But self-determination, as applied to non-self-governing territories, whose peoples have not had the opportunity to attain their full political growth, is a much more complicated matter. It has application at all stages along the road to self-government.

Self-determination is a process. It is in essence the process of democracy as contrasted with the

process of dictation in any society developed or underdeveloped. It is, as has been said by other speakers, a process which involves responsibilities as well as rights. It is the process by which people develop their own laws and provide their own justice. This means not merely the right to compose a code of law, nor even the actual writing of a code; it also means general agreement to abide by the laws in the interests of society as a whole, even though one's individual or group freedoms are thereby limited. Self-determination is the process by which people agree to finance their own affairs, spread their burdens among themselves, and see that individual contributions to the common good are made. Self-determination is the building of roads and schools; not just deciding to build them, but finding the engineers, the money, the workmen, the teachers, and seeing the job through.

These matters are the essence of self-determination. If self-determination can be increasingly developed in all phases of the life of a people, their self-governing or independent institutions, when achieved, will be strong and lasting. If we conceive of self-determination as synonymous with self-government, we ignore the nature of the process by which true self-government is attained. Mistaking the form for the substance, we might in fact jeopardize the very rights we seek to promote.

There are not only many aspects of the life of any people to which the principle of self-determination can be applied; there are also many ways of learning the wishes of the people, and they must be appropriate to the question involved, as well as to the literacy and understanding of the citizens.

Furthermore, as I indicated a moment ago, it would be unfortunate if we limited our concept of self-determination to the non-self-governing world. We have seen in our own time flagrant examples of peoples and nations, vigorous and proud and independent, which have been overrun by a conqueror and subjected to his dictatorial control. These peoples and nations are entitled to the restoration of their independence.

At a time in history when the freedoms of so many individuals and peoples have been destroyed or are seriously threatened, it is, in the view of my delegation, important that the United Nations reaffirm the principle of self-determination and promote international respect for it. It is important that it do so for *all* peoples, and not solely for peoples in some form of colonial status. In considering the recommendations to this end drafted by the Commission on Human Rights, my delegation would strongly urge that we consider them within the framework of universality and of responsibility lest we frustrate the very purpose for which the principle of self-determination was set forth in the Charter—that is, "to develop friendly relations among nations."

Performance of the Dependent Press in the Soviet Union

Remarks by Charles A. Sprague

*U.S. Representative to the General Assembly*¹

U.S./U.N. press release dated Nov. 3

The delegation of the United States is prepared to address itself to the resolution which is now before us and which has been submitted by the U.S.S.R. Inasmuch as the subject matter of this resolution goes right to the heart of the differences, in my judgment, between the press of the free world and the press as it is exhibited within the Soviet Union and its satellites, my delegation would like to make a statement in discussion of that subject.

In the opinion of my delegation, this is a Trojan horse clothed in fine phrases. The resolution has as its true object, not the promotion of peace but the imposition of a pattern of conformity in communication which would stifle the free flow of information and the free expression of opinion.

Already in the course of the general debate, the contrast in the concepts of press freedom between countries behind the Iron Curtain and those of the free world has been made plain. Within the Soviet orbit the press and radio and all media of communication are organs of government. In the free world, the press is free of the dictation of government save where national security is involved. Here the press is free to approve or to condemn the actions of its government, and does not hesitate to exercise that freedom.

The whole tenor of the resolution now under consideration is to invoke the authority of government to prescribe a particular pattern which organs of the press and information must follow. The professed object is to suppress propaganda in favor of war and incitement to hate between nations, or dissemination of slanderous rumors, and so forth. Now the press of the free world is zealous and sincere in its eagerness to help avert war and to promote the cause of peace, but it is unwilling to become a tool of government even for such a laudable purpose. For, once it becomes a

propaganda instrument for government, it sacrifices its independence and is no longer free to proclaim the truth and to gather and transmit information with sincere objectivity. I believe I speak not only for the press of the United States but for the press of the democratic world in protesting any move toward putting the shackles of government control over the press and media of information.

We need only to examine the situation within the Soviet Union to see the final result of this government control of all media of communication.

Not only is the content of the press in the Soviet Union controlled in order to condition the thinking of the Russian people. The entry of persons, and of papers, and of ideas from the outside world is under most severe restrictions, and citizens of the Soviet Union are denied freedom to travel outside its borders. The phrase "Iron Curtain" is not an idle one; it faithfully describes a grim reality.

The Soviet Union's Information Vacuum

In order to prevent the Soviet people from hearing the other side, the Soviet press virtually never prints a statement or information from the free world. It spends a minimum of 20 million dollars and uses the efforts of some 1,200 transmitters and at least 2,500 engineers to prevent the Soviet people from hearing foreign-language broadcasts. Even Soviet-bloc radio amateurs have been told not to speak to other amateurs abroad. Although it censored both the U.S. magazine *Amerika* and the British newspaper *British Ally*, this was not sufficient to calm its fears. Beginning in the autumn of 1950, the circulation of these publications was greatly curtailed. They were no longer placed as agreed in the kiosks of cities throughout the U.S.S.R. as investigation proved. Finally, in July of this year, when the circulation of *Amerika* had fallen by Soviet estimates to less than 13,000 copies out of 50,000 copies printed, and virtually

¹Made in Committee III (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural) on Nov. 3.

none of these 13,000 appeared to be for sale, my Government realized that this particular effort to explain our country to the Soviet people, to offset the daily dish of hate being set before them, was of no avail.

The new travel restrictions issued in January 1952 extended the portion of the Soviet landmass restricted for diplomatic travel from approximately 47 percent to 80 percent and involving approximately 65 percent of the Soviet population. Twenty-two new cities are on the list, including the capitals of 14 of the 16 so-called "sovereign" Union Republics. It is fantastic to think that among these cities are the capitals of two "sovereign" United Nations members—Byelorussia and the Ukraine.

To maintain its people in a perfect vacuum, the Soviet Government is of course compelled to screen carefully those who might visit them from the outside world and those who, for official reasons, must of necessity be exposed abroad to the virus of truth. By the same methods of careful screening, the Soviet leaders also insure that the outside world will get the correct impression of the U.S.S.R. The effect of this policy is to make the Soviet people and the Soviet Union one of the least visited of all lands. What Soviet officials baldly refer to as support for a policy of cultural exchange has involved the admission into the Soviet Union each year of under 3,000 generally handpicked Communists and fellow-travelers—labor delegations, women's delegations, and so forth. Non-Communists have been admitted notably for the Moscow Economic Conference this year, but it is the exception rather than the rule.

In 1951 over 400,000 persons visited the United States and at least 300,000 Americans went abroad. Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Malik, in his interview with British Quakers in July 1951, cited as evidence that there was no Iron Curtain the fact that in 1950 a nation of 200 million had sent 1,893 persons abroad and received some 2,134 persons. Earlier in 1950, Soviet Foreign Minister Vyshinsky stated at the United Nations General Assembly that the U.S.S.R. only let "friends" into the U.S.S.R. If this is the Soviet criterion, then it must indeed feel itself without friends in this world. We, for our part, do not feel that those who visit our shores must be friends so long as they have not come with the intent actively to destroy us. However, we hope that after they have visited with us awhile, they will go away friends.

Let us look for a moment at the scope and content of freedom of information in the Soviet Union, remembering that what is true for the Soviet Union is becoming increasingly true for every satellite and will be true for any state unhappy enough to fall under the Communist yoke.

The Soviet regime has been faced with three main problems in the field of information. First, it has sought to insure that everything which might influence the thoughts and, consequently,

the actions of its citizens conforms to the party line and serves the ends of the state. Secondly, it has sought to prevent the intrusion of alien influences, as I have just noted. And thirdly, it has sought to prevent the real facts concerning the Soviet utopia from reaching the outside and undermine Communist influence abroad.

How the Soviets Spread the "Simple Truth"

How does it go about this vast enterprise? In the first place, the government controls the greatest press monopoly in the world. It owns or monitors all information media. The main lines of propaganda are set down by the Politburo, or its successor. The sections of propaganda and agitation of the Communist Party's Central Committee then see that these broad directives are implemented and determine the specific course of action in all matters affecting Soviet opinion. It is helped in its effort to secure uniformity of facts and interpretations by the main administration for literary and publishing affairs, the so-called Glavlit. Glavlit, for example, supervises the content of all publications, manuscripts, folders, lectures, radio broadcasts, and exhibits. It has its representatives scattered down even to the county level. Every book or magazine published bears the stamp of the Glavlit censor.

Within the Soviet Union and increasingly within the satellite states, there is as much emphasis placed on the training of propagandists of the party line as on the training of any other group of specialists. We have identified some 6,000 special schools for this purpose on the local level with a constant enrollment of more than 165,000 students. On the regional level there are 177 additional schools that train an additional 135,000 students. Then, on the national level, there are some dozen higher universities giving the equivalent of graduate instruction in this field to several thousand students. The teacher, Red army officer, engineer, or trade-union member are all given instruction in the field of spreading the "simple truth."

With the addition of some local news, also censored, the regional press and radio contain essentially the same commentaries and information relayed to them by the central press and central radio stations. There is never any complaint of too much uniformity. There is often complaint of failure to observe party directives in a particular field.

The purpose of this tremendous effort is to make the Soviet bloc peoples, like the famed Pavlovian dog, react automatically to given stimuli.

That atrophies one of the fundamental freedoms of human beings—freedom of thought and expression.

In the course of the general debate, the distinguished delegates from the Soviet Union, and others within the Soviet orbit, voiced unstinted

praise of the press within that orbit. It is, they said in chorus, devoted to the cause of peace—hostile to all the forces of war and aggression. All is sweetness and light in the Soviet Communist world, and it is only the press of the capitalist world which is busy fomenting a third world war. Under such a cloak of virtue, the Soviet Union offers this resolution, A/C. 3/L. 254 Rev. 1, and a companion, A/C. 3/L. 255 Rev. 1.

In the latter it proposes that the General Assembly recommend that all member states take all necessary steps including legislative steps with a view to—

preventing the use of the press, radio, cinema and all other media of information and artistic expression for purposes of propaganda of any kind in favor of aggression and war, of incitement to hate between nations, of racial discrimination, and of dissemination of slanderous rumors, and false and distorted reports.

Once again, my delegation recommends that we examine the sincerity of the sponsors of this resolution. Unfortunately, the reality does not accord with the claim. For there has been in progress for years a studied campaign of hate against the Western World in the press and on the radio of the Soviet world. It has become so extreme that when George Kennan returned to Moscow as ambassador after an absence of several years, he was shocked at the virulence of the "Hate America" campaign.

Birth of the Campaign of Hate

This campaign of hate against Western so-called "bourgeois" ideas began as far back as the autumn of 1945 when the Soviet people were warned by their leaders to beware of possible new aggressors. In August 1946, the Central Committee of the Communist Party attacked the inclusion of bourgeois plays in theater repertoires as "an attempt to poison the consciousness of the Soviet people with a world outlook hostile to Soviet society." Nine days later, the Soviet film industry came under fire from the Central Committee. A commentary on this attack stressed the important role reserved for films in the ideological struggle and stated that "everything we do must be subordinated to the decisive and supreme struggle of our ideology against the depraved ideology of the bourgeois world." This, let me remind you, was in 1946, when the rest of us were looking forward to a world of peace. Soviet playwrights and the film industry took the hint. The first of a long series of anti-American films and plays came out in 1947. To cite some of the more vicious examples, in 1949 a play opened in Moscow entitled, *The Mad Haberdasher*, depicting the American President "as a provincial American Fuehrer," conspiring to set up a dictatorship in the United States. In 1950 the film *Secret Mission* was released, depicting the United States secretly

negotiating a truce with Germany during the last war, in order to engender an attack on the U.S.S.R.

I am sure you will find that the play *Alien Shadows* struck a familiar chord. The Soviet people were presented in that play with the picture of U.S. agents seeking to steal a special formula from Soviet scientists in order to develop germ-warfare weapons. Only recently, the director of a Sebastopol theater, in featuring coming attractions, placed first on his list the so-called "active preparation of American imperialism for war."

Beginning in 1946, a notable effort was made to educate Soviet youth in the spirit of struggle toward the outside world. The foremost task of the Soviet teacher was defined as the encouragement of "Soviet patriotism." This is a commendatory objective, but not when we find it described by the small Soviet encyclopedia issued in 1947 as being "indissolubly connected with hatred toward the enemies of the Socialist Fatherland." The encyclopedia continued to say that "it is impossible to conquer an enemy without having learned to hate him with all the might of one's soul." Even an encyclopedia in the Soviet Union must be a weapon of class warfare.

The calculated distortion and hate-mongering by a press which, above any other, must be defined as "responsible" since it is controlled down to the last comma, reached an all-time low following the outbreak of the Korean war. The Soviet leaders, who were already Stakhanovites in the field of distorting history, outdid themselves in 1951. The Director of the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute in January set in motion the most monstrous and artificial hate campaign in the history of propaganda. Ignoring the fact that the Soviet Government, when it sought to establish diplomatic relations with my Government in 1933, officially absolved the United States from assessment for damages resulting from its actions in Siberia in 1918-20 after an examination of the record of our occupation—knowing that no one in the U.S.S.R. had read the exchange of that diplomatic correspondence since it was not published in the U.S.S.R.—the Soviet leaders set in motion a nation-wide campaign geared to the theme that the Soviet people will "never forget nor forgive the bloody crimes of the American interventionists on Soviet soil in the period 1918-20." In every section of the country—the Baltic states, the Caucasus, Siberia, the Karelo-Finnish Republic—in every forum—schools, churches, trade-union halls, and street corners, old citizens were brought forward who claimed to have seen U.S. crimes. These alleged eye witnesses were formed into a type of traveling road show: documents were fabricated; museums set up; and countless books and articles rolled off the press.

The climax has come in the current campaign directed primarily against the United States for its part in support of the United Nations in resisting Communist aggression in Korea. The whole

vast propaganda machine of the Soviet Communist world has been geared to propagate the most vicious slanders against United States Forces. The allegations of U.S. resorting to germ warfare in Korea are lies out of whole cloth. The charges of ruthless slaughter of prisoners of war are utterly false.

I shall avoid disussing these charges because that belongs to the Political Committee. My delegation wants to tell you how the Soviet propaganda machine has exploited these charges, giving them world-wide currency, and reciting them over and over again with the evident purpose of conditioning the minds of their own people, and of people in other lands, to hatred of the United States.

A Leaf from the "Truth" Scrapbook

I shall read from a scrapbook of translations of articles in the Soviet press. And you should keep in mind that the Soviet press is a kept press that is absolutely dominated by the government. These articles are not bits selected from a free and independent press where irresponsible persons often mouth distortions and falsehood. No, they are quotes from the government-controlled press, the deliberate output of a propaganda machine.

Let me quote from *Pravda*, the organ of the Central Moscow Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, February 22, 1952; *Tass* from Peiping, citing an article on American atrocities:

Prisoners of war are soaked in gasoline and then set on fire. Pencils of light from powerful electric lamps are directed into their eyes until they become blind. Their nails are torn out. Their bodies are burned with heated irons. Many prisoners of war are led out into the fields and shot like targets. The treatment by Americans of women in prisoner of war camps is still more cruel and inhumane. . . . women were first raped, then their breasts were cut off. Their arms and legs torn off. And how many women were soaked in gasoline and burned alive?

Citing *Trud*, March 8, which had as a headline, "Stay the Hand of the Murderers"; a letter from a worker in a certain plant.

The whole world learned with a shudder of new monstrous crimes of the overseas barbarians in violation of the most elementary principles of human moral behavior. They have openly begun bacteriological warfare against the Korean peoples. American aircraft over Korea are dropping black flies, fleas, ticks, and mosquitoes infected with plague, cholera and other diseases. The savage imperialists hope by this criminal effort to break the will of an unsubdued people.

Again from *Trud*, March 19, "Civilized Savages":

Devices for mass destruction and above all, morbidic bacteria, are arms of the doomed. Only a doomed class can threaten the peoples with deadly epidemics. Only the doomed can choose the plagued rat and typhoid touse as allies.

Again, from *Izvestia*, April 27, citing a report of

the Chinese Fact-Finding Commission on Use of Germ Weapons by Americans:

804 occasions in which germ infected objects were dropped all over Korea and in China from Northeast China to Tsingtau and other areas. Most often Americans dropped insects, mostly flies, but they also dropped spiders and ticks of the larger bodies, mainly rats, were dropped. The idea obviously being that the fleas on rats would spread bubonic plague. Also, fish, birds, rabbits, snakes and pig carcasses were dropped. The American aggressors also dropped infected cotton wool, chicken feathers, medicants, foodstuffs and other objects.

I could go on with other selections from this scrapbook.

I would call your attention also to certain cartoons which depict American soldiers in a grossly insulting manner. Here is one from *Pravda*, entitled "American civilization in Korea." It shows an American soldier having shot down a Korean woman, and the blood is shown as dripping into the pockets of presumably an American capitalist. I will hold it up for you to see, as an example of the hate campaign against America.

Here is a panel of four other cartoons, showing germ warfare. The soldiers are labeled, "Cholera Plague." They are all alike. And the egg is labeled in one cartoon as the United States budget. The rat is the plague; the snake is espionage. This panel was from the *Literary Gazette*. And there are other cartoons in this scrapbook.

The delegation from the United States deeply regrets the necessity of baring these facts to this committee. It would not do so, save to expose the hypocrisy of the Soviet Union in proposing this resolution, which contemplates fixing a pattern of conduct for the press of all member nations, when the sponsoring country is engaged in gross violation of the very program it endorses. The performance of the dependent press in the Soviet Union and its satellites stands as a warning to the free press everywhere not to sacrifice its freedom.

My delegation expresses regret for consuming so much time in what may seem to many an old and profitless debate between East and West. But my delegation and my country cannot remain silent when charges as false as any ever released by the minions of hell are spread broadcast. Nor can my delegation permit this resolution dealing with the vital subject of freedom of information to pass to a vote without disclosing the truth about the Soviet press as an organ of government propaganda now engaged in a hate campaign of its own against fellow members of the United Nations.

So as a plain citizen of the United States, I appeal to those with whom we were so lately allied in the crushing of evil aggressors to end their own campaign against the democratic world, remove the Iron Curtain of fear and distrust, and join hands in the true promotion of peace and upbuilding of culture among all the nations.²

²The Third Committee on Nov. 3, by a vote of 19-21-12, rejected the U.S.S.R.'s draft resolution on the use of information media.

The United States in the United Nations

[November 22-28, 1952]

General Assembly

In plenary session on Nov. 25, the Assembly concluded action on four administrative and budgetary items by voting to establish a 12-member *ad hoc* committee to coordinate the programming of U.N. conferences both at Headquarters and at Geneva and by approving reports of Committee V dealing with (1) financial reports and accounts and reports of the Board of Auditors, (2) supplementary estimates for 1952, and (3) Headquarters of the United Nations.

Ad Hoc Committee on South-West Africa—According to the committee's report released Nov. 25, talks between the 5-member negotiating group (Norway, Syria, Thailand, U.S., Uruguay) and the Union of South Africa concerning the future of the former mandated territory of South-West Africa were suspended Nov. 18 so that the committee might report to the seventh session of the General Assembly, as instructed. The recent series of meetings, held during the last 2 months, has proved "inconclusive," the committee reported.

Agreement in principle on several points was achieved, but the "same fundamental divergencies" which prevented a final settlement in similar negotiations last year "still remained unresolved." The committee's report will be considered by the General Assembly's Committee IV (Trusteeship).

Principal points still unresolved between the negotiating group and the Union of South Africa concern the method of supervision of the territory by the Union Government and the selection of the "second party" with whom South Africa would agree to negotiate a new instrument for the former mandated territory.

Ad Hoc Political Committee—Continuing debate on the question of the repatriation of Greek children, which opened on Nov. 21, the committee heard Mrs. Edith S. Sampson (U.S.) on Nov. 22 refute statements made earlier by the U.S.S.R. delegate who had alleged that the United States was illegally detaining 11 Soviet children in the U.S. zone of Germany. These charges, Mrs. Sampson said, were being investigated thoroughly, as usual, and our authorities would reply in due course to the Soviet protests. However, she

pointed out, careful investigation of such charges in the past had never produced evidence supporting the Soviet charges. The Soviet representative, she charged, had merely "tried and failed to divert our attention" from the fate of thousands of Greek children being detained in Eastern Europe. The "Cominform policies" were in complete contradiction to the laws of humanity in respect to these children, she concluded.

Consideration of the item was completed on Nov. 24, when the committee approved in amended form a joint Brazil-New Zealand draft resolution which "condemns the failure of the harboring states other than Yugoslavia to cooperate in efforts to enable the Greek children to return to their homes." The resolution also provides for discontinuance of the Standing Committee on the Repatriation of Greek Children. The vote on the resolution as a whole was 46-5 (Soviet bloc)-7. Byelorussian efforts to delete paragraphs expressing deep regret at noncompliance with General Assembly recommendations and condemning harboring states were defeated by votes of 5-41-11 and 5-36-16, respectively.

Pierre Ordonneau (France), chairman of the Conciliation Commission for Palestine, was called upon Nov. 26 to present the commission's twelfth progress report. He began by explaining that the commission had felt it should remain out of the debate and that it had not proposed the agenda item ("The Conciliation Commission for Palestine and its work in the light of the resolutions of the United Nations"). He went on to point out that the climate for wide-scale negotiations did not exist. Since any action on a general level appeared doomed to failure, the commission had devoted its attention to more limited issues, i. e., compensation and the release of blocked accounts.

The work done on compensation was not intended to prejudge the final solution, he pointed out. The commission had felt it would be useful to gather all the technical data so that when the time came for a settlement there would be no delay. Regarding release of blocked accounts, he pointed out that a "decisive step" had been taken. He concluded with the hope that a new attempt at a general settlement would be made in the near future.

Finn Moe (Norway) then presented a six-power draft resolution urging that the governments concerned enter into direct negotiations for the establishment of a settlement of their outstanding differences on Palestine. He said his delegation felt that the time had come for a serious effort at an agreed peaceful settlement and was convinced of the necessity for a "new start on a new basis." The primary responsibility for reaching a settlement, he pointed out, rested with the parties themselves; "we would do well to insist on this principle every time we are faced with a dispute."

The resolution's sponsors (Canada, Denmark, Ecuador, Netherlands, Norway, Uruguay) were fully aware of the difficulties, particularly the one presented by the refugee problem, the Norwegian delegate explained. He suggested it might be easier to find a solution if this issue were considered as part of a global settlement rather than as an isolated problem.

Ahmed Shukairi (Syria) agreed that direct negotiation was the normal way to settle disputes and indicated that the Arab States were willing to enter into direct negotiations on the basis of the General Assembly's resolutions; it was now up to Israel to say whether it would accept the resolutions, he concluded.

Committee I (Political and Security)—Secretary Acheson and Andrei Vyshinsky both spoke Nov. 24 on India's draft resolution relating to the Korean prisoner-of-war issue. The latter declared that the resolution was not a constructive effort to end the deadlock. It just attempted to reinforce and cover up, with the help of the Geneva convention, the U.N. refusal to return prisoners of war. Of all the proposals before the committee, Mr. Vyshinsky said, only the revised Soviet draft called for an immediate cease-fire.

Secretary Acheson called the Indian resolution a "most statesmanlike effort." He said he deeply regretted that Mr. Vyshinsky had rejected all proposals including the Indian plan. (For text of the Secretary's statement, see p. 910.)

Support for the revised Indian draft also was given by Syria, Afghanistan, and Iran; the Iranian delegate, Nasrollah Entezam, expressed the view that it had the best chance of winning Assembly approval and acceptance by the Chinese and North Korean authorities and moved that it be given voting priority. At a brief meeting on Nov. 25, the U.S.S.R. and Czechoslovakia spoke in opposition to the Iranian motion, which was adopted on Nov. 26 by a vote of 45-5 (Soviet bloc)-1 (China). Mr. Vyshinsky spoke again at this meeting, introducing numerous amendments to the Indian draft and announcing he had just learned that the Chinese Communists had rejected the plan 2 days earlier. Other amendments were offered by Iraq, and after the meeting India circulated a revised draft of its proposal, according to which responsibility for final disposition of those prisoners who could not be repatriated would be transferred to the United Nations.

Nine speakers expressed general support for the revised proposal on Nov. 27; the Ukraine and the U.S.S.R. attacked it. The chairman said he hoped the question could come to a vote the next day. However, V. K. Krishna Menon (India) said he would not be ready to speak before Dec. 1. His speech and the vote were then scheduled for Dec. 1.

Committee II (Economic and Financial)—Isador Lubin (U.S.) spoke Nov. 26 on the Argentine resolution calling for the financing of economic development through establishment of equitable relationships between raw materials and manufactured articles. He noted the practical difficulties involved in the proposal and assured the committee that his Government was willing at all times to consider entering into commodity agreements with individual states regarding individual commodities.

Committee III (Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural)—General debate on the right of peoples to self-determination ended Nov. 24, and the following day the committee began to examine Resolution A submitted by the Commission on Human Rights. Amendments have been proposed by the U.S. (see p. 917, footnote 1), Saudi Arabia, India, Syria, and jointly by Costa Rica, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, and Nicaragua; the United Kingdom has introduced a substitute resolution. Mrs. Roosevelt (U.S.) said on Nov. 26 that she would accept the Indian suggestion for changing the wording she had proposed for the two operative paragraphs but that her Government could not support the five-power amendments nor those of Saudi Arabia and Syria.

Committee IV (Trusteeship)—Debate continued on the report of the Trusteeship Council. The committee decided on Nov. 28 to hear representatives of 11 African organizations before considering resolutions on the report.

Committee VI (Legal)—Continuing the discussion of the question of defining aggression, the committee heard Sture Petren (Sweden) on Nov. 22 cite the Russo-Finnish war and the Korean aggression as examples of the impracticality of attempting to define aggression. Gilberto Amado (Brazil) pointed out that a list of acts of aggression could hardly be complete, and any omission would be dangerous.

The Union of South Africa representative stated his Government's preference for a briefer description in more general terms than the Soviet proposal offered, should the U.N. decide to define aggression now; he believed it premature, however, to attempt such a definition before a criminal code was in existence.

Speaking for the U.S.S.R., P. D. Morozov declared that the arguments presented thus far were distortions of fact, intended to divert the committee from the concrete task of defining aggression.

Refuting Andrei Vyshinsky's lengthy statement

of Nov. 21, G. G. Fitzmaurice (U.K.) declared on Nov. 24 that the Soviet representatives "want a definition of aggression, and want their particular definition of aggression principally as a weapon of propaganda in the so-called cold war—in particular as a weapon with which to pillory the powers belonging to the North Atlantic Organization, and to travesty their motives and intentions."

Trusteeship Council

After considering the special report of its second Visiting Mission to study the Ewe and Togoland Unification problem, the Trusteeship Council on Nov. 25 adopted a U.S. proposal which in general supported the conclusions and findings of the Visiting Mission. The resolution was adopted, with several amendments introduced by China, by a vote of 7-2 (U.S.S.R., France) -3 (Iraq, U.K., Australia).

The resolution considers that the report represents an objective and detailed account of all aspects of the problem and carefully sets forth the views of all sections of the population. It notes that, although the general demand for the unification of the two Togolands is gaining wider support, there is no one form of unification which would be acceptable to the majority of the inhabitants of the two territories, and that therefore a change in existing administrative arrangements is not warranted. It further notes that the majority of the written communications received by the mission were in favor of unification and independence, although no general consultation of the population was made.

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

Governing Body of International Labor Office

The Department of State announced on November 25 (press release 887) that the 120th session of the Governing Body of the International Labor Office will meet at Geneva November 25-28, 1952.

Arnold L. Zemple, Executive Director of the Office of International Labor Affairs, Department of Labor, has been designated as substitute Government representative at this session. He will be assisted by Robert M. Barnett, resident U.S. delegation to international organizations, Geneva; Richard F. Pedersen, Office of United Nations Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State; and Edward B. Persons, Chief of the ILO Division, Office of International Labor Affairs, Department of Labor.

The Governing Body meets three times a year to receive reports on activities of the International Labor Office, outline the work program of the Office, and appraise the progress being made. It

plans the agenda for the annual sessions of the General Conference of the ILO and reviews the Organization's budget for submission to the Conference. In addition, the Governing Body determines the time, place, and agenda of ILO committee meetings and regional conferences.

Among the numerous items on the agenda for the forthcoming session are (1) study of problems related to the functioning of the eight ILO Industry Committees as well as the committees on plantation work and salaried and professional workers; (2) consideration of the application by ILO of the work program priorities adopted by the United Nations for itself and recommended for the specialized agencies; and (3) the topics to be discussed at the next ILO General Conference, which will be held in 1954.

Forestry and Forest Products Commission for Asia and the Pacific (FAO)

The Department of State announced on November 28 (press release 892) that the United States delegation to the second session of the Forestry and Forest Products Commission for Asia and the Pacific of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), which will meet at Singapore, December 1-13, 1952, will be as follows:

Chairman

Tom Gill, Forestry Consultant, Mutual Security Agency
China Mission, Taipei, Formosa

Members

Paul W. Bedard, Forest Management Adviser, Mutual Security Agency Philippine Mission and Philippine Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Manila

Harold B. Donaldson, Lt. Col., U. S. A., Chief, Natural Resources Branch, Office of Civil Affairs and Military Government, Department of the Army

The Forestry and Forest Products Commission for Asia and the Pacific was established by FAO in response to a recommendation of a conference on forestry and timber utilization in Asia and the Pacific held at Mysore, India, in 1949. The first session of the Commission was held in Bangkok in October 1950.

Among the topics to be discussed at the forthcoming session are (1) the technical-assistance programs of FAO and other agencies for the development of the forests of Asia and the Pacific area; (2) the possibilities of increasing the production of pulp and paper in the region; (3) technical questions relating to tropical silviculture and forest management; (4) progress reports on standardization questions such as timber nomenclature, testing methods, grading, and dimensions; (5) progress reports by member governments on the development of forest policies in their respective countries; and (6) the use of aerial photog-

raphy for inventories of tropical forests. From December 7 to 10 an opportunity will be extended for delegates to make an observation tour to Kuala Lumpur in the Federation of Malaya.

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¹ Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

The United Nations Secretariat has established an Official Records series for the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and the Atomic Energy Commission which includes summaries of proceedings, resolutions, and reports of the various commissions and committees. Information on securing subscriptions to the series may be obtained from the International Documents Service.

Secretariat

Documents Index Note No. 43. Consolidated List of United Nations Document Series Symbols. St/LIB/SER.D/43, September 1952. 31 pp. mimeo.

Security Council

- Letter Dated 9 July 1952 Addressed to the Secretary-General by the Secretary of State of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France, on Behalf of the President of the French Union, Transmitting the Application of the Kingdom of Laos for Admission to Membership of the United Nations. S/2706, July 16, 1952. 5 pp. mimeo.
- Letter Dated 30 September 1952 From the Representatives of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America Addressed to the President of the Security Council, Transmitting the Report of the Administration of the British-United States Zone of the Free Territory of Trieste, 1 January to 31 December 1951. S/2794, Sept. 30, 1952. 35 pp. mimeo.

Economic and Social Council

- Full Employment. Implementation of Full Employment Policies. Replies of governments to the full employment questionnaire covering the period 1951-52, submitted under resolutions 221 E (IX), 290 (XI) and 371 B (XIII) of the Economic and Social Council. (China; Taiwan; Thailand). E/2232/Add. 9, Oct. 23, 1952. 27 pp. mimeo.
- Allegations Regarding Infringements of Trade Union Rights Received Under Council Resolution 277 (X). Communication from the General Union of the Confederated Trade Unions of Morocco (Union générale des syndicats confédérés du Maroc). E/2333/Add. 1, Nov. 15, 1952. 8 pp. mimeo; Communication received from Eenheidsvakeentrale (Netherlands Unified T. U.) (Amsterdam, Netherlands). E/2333/Add. 3, Oct. 14, 1952. 7 pp. mimeo; Communications received from International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. E/2333/Add. 6, Oct. 14, 1952. 6 pp. mimeo.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: Nov. 25-28, 1952

Releases may be obtained from the Office of the Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Press releases issued prior to Nov. 25 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 874 of Nov. 17, 882 of Nov. 20, and 885 of Nov. 21.

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†888	11/26	West Indian Conference, Caribbean Commission
889	11/26	No vessels to Antarctica
*890	11/26	Delegates to Mexican inauguration
†891	11/28	Foreign Relations volume released
892	11/28	U.S. delegation to Fao
*893	11/28	Albanian anniversary
*894	11/28	Retirements: Gardner, Becker
895	11/28	Rubottom: Latin American friendship

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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The Department of State

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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication compiled and edited in the Division of Publications, Office of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East

by Henry A. Byroade

Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs¹

I have primary responsibility within the Department of State for an area ranging from Morocco to India, from Greece and Turkey to Southern Africa. This territory—which includes the continent of Africa, what we call the Middle East, and the subcontinent of South Asia—encompasses about one-fourth of the world's total land mass and approximately one-third of the world's total population. It is an area which has 91 separate political entities—an area where the United States maintains 51 foreign posts for the care of American interests abroad. This territory has over one-half of the free world's common borders with the Soviet Union and the satellites, and within it has arisen about one-half of all the problems before the United Nations.

While there are many matters within the whole area which I am sure would interest you, I shall confine my remarks to that portion of territory which we might call the "Middle East." For practical purposes, I define the Middle East as including the Arab States of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen; the Sudan; various Arab sheikhdoms; and the new State of Israel, fashioned from the old mandate of Palestine. We shall also include the nation of Iran. The size of these neighboring countries varies considerably—from Lebanon, which is about twice the size of Delaware; through Jordan, which corresponds closely to Illinois; to Saudi Arabia, which is one-third the size of the continental United States. In a broad sense, the climate within the Middle East is uniformly arid, and the lands bear a close resemblance to our American Southwest. The forms of government, however, are as varied as the sizes of the states—dictatorships, monarchies, and republics can all be found there, as well as the Sudan Condominium, one of two such administrations remaining in the entire world.

¹ Address made before the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations at the World Affairs Center, Chicago, on Dec. 5 (press release 899 dated Dec. 4).

Area of Increasing Importance to U.S.

The United States has been thrust into the Middle Eastern scene suddenly and without adequate national preparation. During most of our national growth the peoples and problems of the Middle East have seemed remote from our daily lives. Because of our expanding continental boundaries, our eyes were naturally turned toward our own West until 1900. Our concern was with national developments and with Latin America. The United States, later involved in two world conflicts, then focused most of its attention on Europe and the Far East. For long the Middle East knew only the band of American missionaries, doctors, and educators, and possibly Mark Twain and his *Innocents Abroad*.

Yet today we find ourselves with a rapidly increasing awareness of the Middle East and of the influence which it bears upon our lives. What have we discovered about the area which would make us see more than the picturesque and the fairy tales, the camels and the pyramids, and the Garden of Eden, magic carpets, and the *Arabian Nights*? What else from a region which has given the world its three great religions of one God—Christianity, Islamism, and Judaism?

There is first of all the strategic position of the Middle East in the present East-West conflict. This factor is so well understood generally that it needs little additional emphasis. Soundly exemplified with the names of our world's would-be conquerors who have been continued indefinitely in their friend of the United States. Every major international power has sought to see the British re-assert their influence in the Middle East. The Middle East is the key to the world's oil supply, to world shipping, to the world's raw materials, and to the world's strategic position.

with its deposits of oil and copper. The difficulties between the United States and Egypt. Since the end of World

is no more strategically important area in the world."

Second, the area contains approximately one-half of the world's proved oil reserves. It supplies a large proportion of the oil requirements of Europe, Asia, and Africa. American petroleum companies operate extensively in Saudi Arabia, and they share substantial interests in the rich deposits of Kuwait, Bahrein, and Iraq. Without that oil the industries of our allies would be paralyzed and our own would be overworked.

Finally, but foremost in importance, are the inhabitants of the Middle East, some 65 million souls, whose welfare concerns us very much—and whose views and policies are influential throughout the whole Arab-Asian-African belt of restive peoples. Their desires we must take into account in our efforts to work in genuine harmony for a better world.

Objectives of U.S. Policy

Out of these three points, come the objectives of American policy in the Middle East. In themselves these appear as simple matters: (1) a desire to see governmental stability and the maintenance of law and order; (2) the promotion of peace in the area among the Middle Eastern states themselves as well as better understanding between them and the Western Powers; (3) the creation of conditions which would bring about a rise in the general economic welfare; (4) the preservation and strengthening of democracy's growth—not necessarily in our own pattern but at least in a form which recognizes the same basic principles as the democracy in which we believe; (5) the encouragement of regional defense measures against aggression from the Soviet world.

Yet the troubles and undercurrents which exist today in the Middle East make it exceedingly difficult for us to reach our objectives. Many of the nations in this area are newly independent, and therefore extremely jealous of their national sovereignty. After years of occupation—or foreign entanglements of various sorts—they are suspicious of all foreign influence. In some cases, the doctrine of nationalism has assumed extreme forms.

Some of these states are fearful. In certain instances the fear of one's neighbor exceeds that from the other direction. It is a surprise to many in the United States to see the Soviet Union's attitude toward the Arab States. Soviet encroachment and im-

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... closer at hand. They are suspicious not toward the United States but toward the Soviet Union. It is not to the security of one's neighbor that we have a military vacuum. The Soviet Union might be

... self. To many in the United States has for too long been a cold and selfish

body little interested in the welfare of the people under it. Therefore, whom to trust? Whom to believe in? Whom to work for? The result has been a pattern of political instability.

Finally, the difficulties are made even greater by the economic poverty and the economic inequalities in the region. Many of the Middle East nations would literally have to pull themselves up by their own boot straps in order to reach a higher standard of general welfare.

Now let us study these complications as we find them expressed in three specific issues: the Arab-Israeli controversy, the Anglo-Egyptian dispute, and the Anglo-Iranian oil issue.

The Arab States and Israel

I have spoken of the absence of peace in the area. The glaring example of this is the Arab-Israeli conflict, which grew from the Palestine mandate and remains in a state of uneasy armistice. You are, of course, aware of the general factors underlying the establishment of Israel. In lending their support, the American people acted in large measure because of traditional sympathy for a Jewish national home and because of horror at the outrages committed against the Jewish people in Europe during the past 25 years.

The people of the Arab States have cried out against this policy of the United States. The birth of the tragic Arab-refugee problem out of the Palestine conflict has added to the real and deep-seated bitterness toward Americans throughout the Arab world, a bitterness which replaced, to some extent at least, an earlier faith in the United States. The emotions which surround this problem in the Middle East are so tense that any immediate or dramatic solution of the problem is impossible. Even progress toward solution of any segment of the problem is at best exceedingly difficult. Yet I am convinced that the United States must, in its own interests, devote a major effort toward easing the tensions that have sprung from this situation. There is today a blockade, one might say almost an iron curtain, between the Arab States and Israel. In these circumstances new generations of youth are being brought up in isolation and cannot judge for themselves the truth of the propaganda falling on their ears. It is a case which, if not corrected, has in it the seeds of still more disastrous conflict in the Middle East.

The State of Israel is now a going concern in the family of nations. The people who inhabit it are working industriously to build up their new home. At the same time, this nation is in the heart of the Middle East and its territory slices into Arab lands. Its future well-being, as well as that of its neighbors, depends upon the development of friendly relations with its neighbors and upon the establishment of a measure of trust among these nations.

There exists now an armistice between Israel and the several Arab States, but there is little

prospect of an immediate peace settlement. It is unlikely that peace will follow any single agreement. However, it is our hope that no opportunity will be lost by either side to improve the atmosphere and step by step to relieve tension. Meanwhile, there is along the borders almost continual conflict, riots, and killing. Families have seen their homes and farm lands separated. In many cases, these people are now completely destitute. There are somewhere in the neighborhood of 850,000 Arab refugees, many of them living in tent camps, supported largely by relief funds from the United Nations. These people, living in this fashion for nearly 4 years, have little opportunity constructively to occupy their minds or their hands. Recriminations of the past on the part of all concerned are not productive and can in fact be harmful to the point of preventing any solution. It is time for all concerned to suppress emotions to the extent that they find this humanly possible and to search out and apply workable solutions.

As a practical matter, it is difficult if not impossible to envisage the return of the majority of the Arab refugees to Israel, although room for some of them might be found. In any case, it seems that the larger portion of these unfortunate families must be aided to find a livelihood in areas which can absorb them and in fact benefit from their productivity. Workable arrangements must be devised to compensate the refugees for lost properties. Such a program calls for the development of new areas in which the refugee areas the only possible assistance in such an Americans that substantial funds have been perialism is not recog this end. East as the primary dis, I am convinced that East see an enemy muc, most difficult of is- turn their thoughts and at United Nations security of the whole region ability for final against the other, and they le, disrupts the num into which the Soviet t in any man- tempted to move. rstanding of

And then there is fear of one We must as Middle Easterners "government" States will meant oppression, tax collectors, a the Arab-

932

ination on the Brit- l that we Arab or free will of the people concerned. There must be no doubt in the area that we mean what that declaration says.

I have just mentioned a dispute in which the United States must accept a share of responsibility. Two other problems involve primarily disputes between our Western allies and Middle Eastern nations. While we are not directly participants, we are naturally concerned in their solution.

The Iranian Oil Dispute

The dispute between the United Kingdom and Iran has resulted in the recent breaking of diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom by the Iranian Government. This controversy has made itself felt throughout the Middle East and in the world beyond, since it started some 20 months ago with the Iranian Government enacting a law to nationalize its oil industry. The British Government and the Iranian Government have since that time failed to reach a compromise, and oil from Iran has ceased to flow to world markets. The issues have been greatly narrowed but disagreement on a few fundamentals still exists.

It is difficult for the average American to visualize the factors in such a problem as this. The Iranian oil industry and the Abadan refinery were among the largest in the world. The marketing of oil from Iran involved the world's largest fleet of approximately 300 tankers. The annual revenue to Iran reached 57 million dollars in royalties. In addition Iran benefited from taxes and from profit on foreign exchange by nearly an equal amount. Those who seek a simplified and quick solution to the problem often fail to realize the size of the operations and the complexities of the international oil situation.

The question of nationalization by the Iranian Government has been accepted as a fact by the British. There remains, however, the difficult problem of compensation for the British for the loss of their assets in Iran, as well as the problem of arranging for the shipping and marketing of oil from Iran again to world markets. The principle of compensation is accepted and recognized in the Iranian nationalization law. There has been no agreement as yet, however, on the method of settling the magnitude of compensation or the claims and counterclaims that can be entertained in such a settlement. In the absence of such agreement and with title to the oil thus in dispute, there has been no agreement upon the question of shipping and marketing.

The United States has done its utmost to assist in a settlement of this dispute in a manner which would be consistent with internationally recognized principles of compensation for lost assets. As a friend of Iran we have wished to see the resumption of large-scale revenues to that country. These are vital if Iran is to regain a sound economic and financial posture and if, in fact, it is to retain the stability to insure its continued independence and security. As a friend of the United Kingdom we have wished to see the British receive adequate and effective compensation for their losses.

Support for New Egyptian Regime

I am delighted that I can be somewhat more optimistic about the difficulties between the United Kingdom and Egypt. Since the end of World

War II, the Egyptians have sought a revision of their 1936 treaty with Britain, to the end that Britain would evacuate both the Canal Zone and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. In October 1951 the Egyptian Parliament unanimously voted abrogation of the 1936 treaty and of the 1899 agreement which established the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium over the Sudan. This unilateral abrogation was followed by severe disorders throughout Egypt. In late January a violent emotional outburst threatened to destroy the city of Cairo. Organized mobs suddenly enveloped sections of the city, killing a number of persons and burning blocks of property. Martial law was declared; the Wafd Cabinet was dismissed, and a new government formed. There was then a rapid succession of governments, each of which came into existence on two basic platforms. One was to secure an agreement which would see the British evacuated from the Canal Zone and an agreement upon the Sudan which would result in the unity of the Nile Valley. The other was to eliminate corruption within the Egyptian Government. Each succeeding government found it impossible to make sufficient progress on these issues in order to remain long in power. Finally, when it appeared that the situation was approaching disaster for both Egypt and the West, the Egyptian military seized power. King Farouk abdicated and General Naguib became Prime Minister of Egypt.

The policy goals and actual accomplishments of the new regime in Egypt are such as to deserve our full support. It has devoted itself energetically to the question of removing corruption from the government and to the question of reforms for the general benefit of the Egyptian people. Even while faced with this tremendous internal task, the Egyptian Government has moved to seek agreement with the United Kingdom and the Sudanese themselves on the matter of the Sudan's future. There is reason to hope that this matter can soon be settled. We believe that this regime deserves the support of the Western Powers. We should all be ready to assist where possible in helping it attain its proclaimed goals for the future. It is certainly our hope that this disagreement between our two friends is on its way to rapid solution.

Influence of Region's Economies

Turning from the three specific disputes we have just covered, let us now look at the influence which the economies of the region have had on our objectives and on the condition of the area. The picture is not a happy one.

Some of the countries are barren of land, water, and mineral resources. Others possess lopsided economies—great petroleum wealth but no water or arable land, or potentially rich agricultural land but no water or no means of water distribution. Characteristically we find insufficient popu-

lation or excessive population, or population riddled with disease and deep in poverty; no industry or an improper balance between industry and agriculture; in one case a precarious dependence upon international free trade markets; in most cases a concentration of wealth in the hands of a few while the majority suffer privation, with the result that capital even when available is not invested properly. Low production, increasing population, and inadequate food, shelter, medical care, and education are the lot of the masses of the populace.

In some places it is wrong to call the area underdeveloped. A more apt term from an agricultural point of view would be that the area is abused. It needs rehabilitation as much as it needs new development. In other fields, such as transportation and communication, development of a nature entirely new to the Middle East is clearly needed. It will be impossible to find a quick solution to many of these problems, even were there complete cooperation and a pooling of all available means. Yet the peoples of the Middle East are striving for the solution, with assistance from the United States and other members of the free world.

In Iraq, oil revenues under a new agreement will reach nearly 500 million dollars over the next 5-year period. Seventy percent of those revenues are set aside to finance river- and flood-control measures and irrigation systems along the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, to build rural and urban primary schools, to bring cheap and regular medical attention to the population, to encourage diversification in small industry, to effect land reform, especially in the Dujaila project along lines similar to our homestead system.

Syria is planning construction of a new port at Latakia, a port which will serve the agricultural hinterland and bring goods to and from market at lower costs. Syria and Jordan are ready to complete agreement on joint development of the Yarmuk River waters. Plans are afoot to drain the great Ghab Swamp and create new agricultural land for Syrian farmers.

Egypt is instituting a vast program of land reform and social welfare; Lebanon is busy with irrigation projects; Israel is putting to remarkable use the latest farming techniques in what was once desert; Saudi Arabia is fighting the insect-borne diseases which plague its people.

By means of Point Four and the Mutual Security Programs, by Export-Import Bank loans, and by private philanthropic organizations, the United States is supporting the self-help which the nations of the Middle East have exhibited. American engineers are sparking the Litani River dam and power project in Lebanon, supplying technicians in Iraq, Israel, Jordan, and elsewhere to train the local people in agricultural techniques, in animal husbandry, in education, and medicine. The amount of our aid to the Middle East in terms of

capital and techniques is not great when set alongside some of our efforts elsewhere—and in my opinion must be increased. However, we must temper our assistance in line with the capacity of each country to absorb it. What may appear to be favored treatment of one nation over another may in reality be a carefully measured application of the right amount at the right time, lest inflation and misdirection of effort result from attempting too much too fast.

In final consideration of the obstacles which face our Middle Eastern objectives there comes the lack of defensive strength and capability within the area. From a military point of view, adequate organization, training, and equipment are not at hand. It is furthermore true that many of the nations, particularly those which are primarily agricultural, are unable to find the resources with which to maintain an adequate defense for their own protection and to assist in any large-scale joint effort for the defense of the region as a whole. It is with these factors in mind that the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Turkey have sought to encourage formulation of a Middle East Defense Organization, a unit within which Middle Eastern nations could join with Western nations and promote their common defense in an efficient pooling of resources and minds. It is our sincere hope that such a regional concept of defense can be realized in the near future and that a military vacuum will be denied in the Middle East.

Instability, a Fertile Field for Communism

That the Soviet Union has ambitions in the Middle East is common knowledge. Aside from the unrest and turmoil which the Communists try to foment in the area, the Russian leaders have made clear their aggressive designs. For example, the straits at Istanbul have been the object of much intrigue, both Tsarist and Soviet. During the alliance with Nazi Germany, Mr. Molotov sought Axis recognition of Soviet aspirations in the general direction of the Persian Gulf. There is every reason to believe that this remains the policy of the neighbor of this area to the north.

This fact becomes particularly important when we think about our prospects of a successful foreign policy in the Middle East. Under the circumstances, it would be foolhardy to be completely optimistic. It would also be dangerous and quite unwarranted to be totally discouraged. Some progress is being made and there are several grounds for encouragement. One hope is un-

doubtedly the steady growth of American awareness of Middle Eastern problems and a determination to see the United States fulfill its part in resolving those problems. Another hope is the general evolution now taking place in the Middle East, whereby leaders are becoming more responsive to the demands of popular welfare. In fulfilling these demands, there will inevitably be change amounting to virtual revolution. We are sympathetic with the motives behind this revolution, and we would like to assist it as much as possible to run in an orderly, productive channel.

Much of our success, much of the welfare of the Middle East, hinges upon how well the three solutions—economic, political, and military—are made to work in common without harm to one another. Much depends upon the local reaction to the pressure which the Soviet Union may choose to exert, overtly or covertly, on the Middle East. Much depends upon how the peoples of the Middle East will recognize true dangers and act correctly to ward them off.

There is a story about a Baghdad merchant who sent his servant to buy provisions. In a little while the servant came back, white and trembling, and said, "Master, just now when I was in the market place I was jostled by a woman in the crowd. When I turned, I saw it was Death that jostled me. She looked at me and made a threatening gesture; now, lend me your horse and I will ride away from this city and avoid my fate. I will go to Samarra and there Death will not find me."

The merchant lent him his horse, the servant mounted it, and galloped away at a furious pace. Then the merchant went down to the market place and saw Death standing in the crowd. He went up to Death and said, "Why did you make a threatening gesture to my servant when you saw him this morning?"

"That was not a threatening gesture," Death replied, "it was only surprise. I was astonished to see him in Baghdad, for I had an appointment with him tonight in Samarra."

We can no more avoid the responsibilities that have been forced upon us in view of our world position than could this servant by seeking to avoid the inevitable. Much of the success of our goals for the Middle East will depend upon our willingness to accept this responsibility and—within the very real limitations of our own resources and the many demands being placed upon them—to move forward with impartiality to help meet the monumental problems which the Middle East poses for the free world.

The Development of United States Policy in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa

PART II: MUTUAL SECURITY AND ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

by Harry N. Howard

The Problem of Security in the Near and Middle East

GREEK AND TURKISH ENTRY INTO NATO

An important aspect of the security program in the Near East lay in the association of Greece and Turkey with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which came into being on August 24, 1949.⁴¹ As early as October 1950, Greece and Turkey accepted an invitation to participate in certain planning phases of NATO concerning the defense of the Eastern Mediterranean, and on September 20, 1951, the North Atlantic Council recommended Greek and Turkish membership. In a statement to the Foreign Relations Committee of the U.S. Senate on January 15, 1952, General of the Army Omar Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, remarked: ⁴²

From the military viewpoint, it is impossible to overstate the importance of these two countries. . . . Greece and Turkey occupy strategic locations along one of the major east-west axes. . . . Located as they are—and allied with the free nations—they serve as powerful deterrents to any aggression directed toward Southern Europe, the Middle East, or North Africa. The successful defense of those areas—any one or all of them—is dependent upon control of the Mediterranean Sea. Greece and Turkey block two avenues to the Mediterranean which an aggressor might endeavor to use should they decide upon a thrust there. . . . Greece . . . presents a barrier along the overland route from the Balkan States

located to her north. Turkey, astride the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, guards the approach by water from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean and to the Suez Canal and Egypt farther south. Turkey, too, flanks the land routes from the North to the strategically important oil fields of the Middle East.

On February 15, 1952, the protocol, opened for signature on October 17, 1951, entered into force, and the provisions of the treaty were extended to the Eastern Mediterranean with the accession of Turkey on February 18, 1952. Representatives of Greece and Turkey attended the ninth session of the North Atlantic Council at Lisbon, February 20-25, 1952. In an address on February 20, Secretary Acheson said: ⁴³

. . . . We welcome Greece and Turkey into the North Atlantic Council. This marks a significant milestone in the efforts of the free world to insure international peace and security. These countries have long been making an effective contribution to the attainment of that end by their steadfast opposition to all aggressive oppressions, by their active role in the United Nations, and by their effective contribution to the collective action in Korea. Their entry into NATO constitutes recognition by Greece and Turkey and by the other NATO countries that the principles and purposes of collective security to which we are all dedicated will be furthered by this new association.

It may be added that the Council agreed that the ground and air forces of Greece and Turkey, assigned to NATO, would operate under the over-all command of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), and that the Greek and Turkish naval forces, for the present, would remain under their national Chiefs of Staff, operating in close coordination with all other naval forces in the Mediterranean.

General Eisenhower referred to the entry of Greece and Turkey into NATO on the first anniversary of SHAPE as an operational headquarters, mentioned the new strength on the eastern flank which their membership would add, and recalled

⁴¹ BULLETIN of Mar. 10, 1952, p. 370.

EDITOR'S NOTE. Part I of this article, dealing with political problems, appeared in the BULLETIN of Dec. 8, 1952, p. S91. For an article by Mr. Howard on *The Development of United States Policy in the Near East, 1945-1951*, see BULLETIN of Nov. 19, 1951, p. S09, and Nov. 26, 1951, p. S29.

⁴² *North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Its Development and Significance*, Department of State publication 4630.

⁴³ S. Ex. Rept. No. 1, 82d Cong., 2d sess. *Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Greece and Turkey*, pp. 11-12. By a vote of 73 to 2, with 21 members not voting, the Senate approved ratification of the protocol on Feb. 7, 1952, thereby confirming the unanimous vote of Jan. 29, when, however, only six Senators had been present.

"the stimulating experience" he had had in visiting Greece and Turkey. "Knowing the courage they have shown in the face of direct Communist pressure," General Eisenhower was proud "to welcome them as allies."⁴⁴

THE MIDDLE EAST COMMAND

The United States also continued its interest in the defense of the Middle East as a whole and realized that the security of this area must rest on partnership with the Middle Eastern states, which are equally concerned with the preservation of their independence. It therefore continued its interest in the projected Middle East Command, based on the project of October 13, 1951, and the principles enunciated on November 10, 1951, although that project had been rejected by the Egyptian Government on October 15.⁴⁵ As early as November 24, 1951, it may be noted, the Soviet Government made certain charges against the projected Middle East Command, more particularly that it was an attempt to draw the Middle Eastern countries into "the aggressive Atlantic bloc" and that it would deprive them "of their national independence." At the same time, the Soviet Government denied any threat to the Middle East.⁴⁶

The United States replied to the Soviet note on December 18, 1951,⁴⁷ noting that it was "abundantly clear" that the proposed Middle East Command was based on voluntary defense cooperation in the Middle East and was intended to assist the

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, Apr. 14, 1952, p. 572. See also Henry A. Byroade, "The Free World Rediscovered Turkey," *ibid.*, Nov. 10, 1952, p. 729.

⁴⁵ For the remarks of the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Salah-el-Din, at the sixth session of the U. N. General Assembly, Nov. 16, 1951, see U.N. doc. A/PV. 347, pp. 172-178.

⁴⁶ For text of the Soviet note, see BULLETIN of Dec. 31, 1951, p. 1054. Meanwhile, on Nov. 3, 1951, the U.S.S.R. protested Turkey's prospective entry into NATO, made various charges, and drew Turkey's attention to its responsibility in entering "the aggressive Atlantic bloc." Turkey replied on Nov. 12, 1951, that (1) the Atlantic Pact was purely defensive and in accord with the U.N. Charter; (2) the peaceful aims of Turkey were recognized by the entire world; (3) Turkey's participation in NATO arose from its desire to safeguard its security and to promote collective security; and (4) if the U.S.S.R., which had threatened Turkish security in the past (especially in 1945-47), examined its own "conscience," it would know where the responsibility for the present world situation lay. For a statement by Foreign Minister Fuad Koprulu, in the General Assembly Nov. 15, 1951, see U.N. doc. A/PV. 345, pp. 140-141. Soviet notes of Nov. 24, Nov. 30, and Dec. 10, 1951, protested to Turkey concerning both NATO and the Middle East Command.

For Egyptian aspects of the problem, see Egypt No. 2 (1951). *Anglo-Egyptian Conversations on the Defense of the Suez Canal and on the Sudan, December 1950-November 1951*. Cmd. 8419; Egyptian Kingdom, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Records of Conversations. Notes and Papers Exchanged between the Royal Egyptian Government and the United Kingdom, March 1950-November 1951* (Cairo, 1951), p. 195.

⁴⁷ BULLETIN of Dec. 31, 1951, p. 1055. A similar Soviet note of Jan. 28, 1952, was not answered.

states in that region "to preserve and strengthen their independence and freedom so that their economic well-being and social institutions can develop in an atmosphere unclouded by fear for their security." The note placed the Middle East Command squarely within the framework of the U.N. Charter, with particular reference to the inherent right of self-defense set forth in article 51. But the United States expressed surprise at the Soviet statement that there was no threat from the U.S.S.R. to the Middle East. It recalled the Soviet proposal of November 25, 1940, for possible entry into the Axis,⁴⁸ in which spheres of influence were delimited between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, and pointed out that the proposal provided, among other things:

that the U.S.S.R. be enabled to establish "a base for land and naval forces" within range of the Turkish Straits and that "the area south of Batum and of Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf is recognized as the center of the aspirations of the Soviet Union." In light of the Soviet attitude toward the Middle East area since the end of World War II, the United States Government can only assume that the aims set forth by Mr. Molotov in 1940 remain the policy of the Soviet Government.

The United States made it clear that there was no aggressive intent whatsoever either in NATO or in the Middle East Command and that "the decision as to whether" the Middle Eastern States would choose "to participate in the Command and freely accept the benefits and responsibilities of such participation belongs to these states alone and not to the Soviet Government." Finally, the Soviet Government, not the states taking legitimate measures of self-defense, was charged with responsibility "for the present situation."

During the visit of Prime Minister Churchill to the United States in January 1952, a joint statement by the United States and the United Kingdom⁴⁹ reaffirmed their resolution

to promote the stability, peaceful development, and prosperity of the countries of the Middle East. We have found a complete identity of aims between us in this part of the world, and the two Secretaries of State will continue to work out together agreed policies to give effect to this aim. We think it essential for the furtherance of our common purposes that an Allied Middle East Command should be set up as soon as possible.

As regards Egypt, we are confident that the Four Power approach offers the best prospect of relieving the present tension.

In his address to the Congress on January 17,⁵⁰ Mr. Churchill paid tribute to Israel and noted that "Britain's power to influence the fortunes of the Middle East and guard it from aggression is

⁴⁸ For texts of Hitler-Molotov-Ribbentrop discussions in November 1940, see *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941: Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office*, Department of State publication 3003, pp. 217-259; for a summary of the talks, see Harry N. Howard, "Germany, the Soviet Union, and Turkey During World War II," BULLETIN of July 18, 1948, p. 67.

⁴⁹ BULLETIN of Jan. 21, 1952, p. 83.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, Jan. 28, 1952, p. 116.

far less today, now that we have laid aside our imperial responsibility for India and its armies." "It was no longer for Britain alone," he said, "to bear the whole burden of maintaining the freedom of the famous waterway of the Suez Canal," which had become an international, not merely a national, responsibility. Mr. Churchill, therefore, welcomed

the statesmanlike conception of a Four Power approach toward Egypt announced by the late British Government, in which Britain, United States, France, and Turkey may share with Egypt in the protection of the world interest involved among which Egypt's own interests are paramount.

The Prime Minister indicated that it would aid the British "enormously" if "even token forces" of the other partners in the project were stationed in the Suez Canal Zone "as a symbol of the unity of purpose which inspires us," and noted that in the Middle East there lurked "dangers not less great than those which the United States has stemmed in Korea." Meanwhile, Anglo-Egyptian negotiations were being carried on, with the controversy centering around the two basic issues of British evacuation of the Suez Canal and the future of the Sudan.

A MIDDLE EAST DEFENSE ORGANIZATION (MEDO)

The United States continued to work toward a regional project for Middle Eastern defense during 1952, although it was realized that such a project could not be worked out overnight, especially in view of the complex problems involved. On August 6 the Department of State reiterated its frequently expressed interest in promoting the strength and stability of the Middle East, recalling the principles enunciated in October and November 1951. In the view of the United States, a fundamental feature of the proposed organization was its cooperative character and the opportunity it would provide for joining the efforts of both Middle Eastern and other states which felt a genuine concern for the security of the Middle East. Secretary Acheson, on October 1, reaffirmed the American view that it was highly desirable and important to consult the Arab nations in connection with the British-sponsored plans for establishing a Middle Eastern defense organization, as distinct from a military command. He also indicated that the United States was discussing the proposal with representatives of the United Kingdom, France, Turkey, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa.

The Mutual Security Program

THE BASIC PROGRAM FOR MUTUAL SECURITY

The Mutual Security Program for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1953, sketched by the President on March 6, 1952, recognized that mutual

security could rest only on the solid foundations of genuine cooperation for mutual defense, the promotion of economic and social well-being, and the development of political stability. The problems in the Near East and Africa, the importance of which to the free world was difficult to exaggerate, were characterized as follows:⁶¹

Political unrest and intense nationalism characterize many of the countries in this area, and in part reflect deep-rooted social and economic ills. All of the countries in the region have natural resources not now being used effectively; and the causes of poverty lie in inefficient and unscientific land and water use techniques, an untrained and inefficient labor force for industry, antiquated feudal land-tenure systems, and inadequately developed land and water resource base, and a lack of capital for investment, except for the petroleum industry in a few of the Arab States.

The poverty resulting from these factors, together with the disease and illiteracy contributing to them, form a vicious circle which we can help to break by the application of technical skills.

It is our objective in the Middle East to assist the people and governments of the area to achieve not only greater military security, through the Middle East Command and limited military assistance, but also to assist responsible leaders in getting under way orderly reform and development, in which the energies of the people can find constructive expansion. Our purpose is to demonstrate to these countries, by concrete cooperative effort, that they themselves can achieve their desires for economic and social progress as a part of the free world. People who have evidence of this will not turn in desperation to communism.

The program called for a total of \$196,000,000 for economic and technical assistance for the Near East and Africa, of which \$55,000,000 was for technical assistance, \$76,000,000 for relief and resettlement of refugees in Israel, and \$65,000,000 for the U.N. Palestine Refugee Program. The military-assistance program for the Near East and Africa totaled \$606,370,000, most of which was for Greece and Turkey. While its nature varied according to the needs of individual countries, essentially the program in the Near East and Africa, as elsewhere in underdeveloped areas, was designed to promote the development of an agricultural economy.

It was considered vital that the states of South Asia—India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Ceylon—remain free and independent. Nevertheless, the security problem could not be met "through the furnishing of arms and implements of war, or of creating and maintaining large military forces. . . . The critical problem in South Asia lies in the danger of internal collapse, economic and political, and of successful subversion from within." The overriding need was "for programs designed to raise the productivity of labor and resources," especially in agriculture, "to educate the people in the use of modern methods, to bring about an increasing rate of capital formation and

⁶¹ *The Mutual Security Program for Fiscal Year 1953. Basic Data Supplied by the Executive Branch*, Committee Print, 82d Cong., 2d sess., p. 20. For text of the President's message to Congress transmitted on Mar. 6, 1952, see BULLETIN of Mar. 17, 1952, p. 403.

the creation of plants and facilities to produce more goods and to provide greater employment opportunity for the people." The total program for South Asia called for an appropriation of some \$150,000,000 and was largely designed to promote agricultural development.

Secretary Acheson explained on February 29, 1952, that the purpose of both economic and military assistance "in the whole crescent from the Far East, through Southeast Asia and the Middle East" was "to help strengthen and unite free nations, so that there will be no tempting opportunity for further aggression."⁵² Mr. Acheson presented the case for the new Mutual Security Program before a joint session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee on March 13, 1952. Among other things, he stressed:⁵³

In some countries . . . and particularly in Asia, there is a flowing tide of nationalism, a desperate discontent, a ferment of communism—or all together—creating an *urgent* need.

India is the most striking example of a need for urgent and effective action.

These programs of military aid, of military support, and of economic and technical aid to our friends in the Far East, in Southeast Asia, and across the Middle East are directed both against the short-range military threat and toward meeting the long-range need for economic and political growth and stability. Both are a necessary part of our security program in this area.

ACTION BY CONGRESS

In the end, the Congress approved the new Mutual Security Act, although it reduced the program as a whole from \$7,900,000,000 to \$6,447,730,750. The military program for the Near East and Africa, for example, was cut from \$606,370,000 to \$560,316,500, technical assistance from \$55,000,000 to \$50,822,750, assistance to Arab refugees from \$65,000,000 to \$60,063,250, and assistance to Israel refugees from \$76,000,000 to \$70,228,000. All in all, the program in the area was cut 7.6 percent from \$196,000,000 to \$181,114,000. Similarly, the military program for Asia was cut from \$611,230,000 to \$564,807,500, economic assistance from \$258,000,000 to \$202,778,250, and technical assistance from \$150,000,000 to \$118,624,250, the total reduction being from \$408,000,000 to \$321,412,500. It may also be noted that the appropriation for U.N. technical assistance was reduced from \$17,000,000 to \$15,708,750

⁵² BULLETIN of Mar. 10, 1952, p. 363.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, Mar. 24, 1952, p. 463. In a similar statement, Averell Harriman, Mutual Security Administrator, stated: "In nations like India, Pakistan, and Iran our economic and technical assistance programs are of substantial size to meet the needs of an urgent situation. If there were no danger of internal subversion, we could probably carry out programs of technical cooperation in these countries at a slower pace. . . . But we do not have the time. We cannot afford to risk doing it the slow way in these areas." *Ibid.*, p. 470.

and that for the U.N. International Children's Emergency Fund was placed at \$16,481,000.⁵⁴

Although disappointed in the reductions, the President signed the act on July 15, 1952.⁵⁵

The Program of Technical and Economic Assistance

THE OVER-ALL PICTURE

As has been noted above, by 1951-52 the programs for technical and economic assistance had become part and parcel of the Mutual Security Program, for very natural reasons. Yet such assistance is also a separate problem and requires separate treatment. Essentially, it originated in President Truman's inaugural address of January 20, 1949.

Between 1945 and the end of the fiscal year 1952, total foreign aid extended in grants and credits, in one form or another, reached \$38,094,000,000. For the Near East, South Asia, and Africa, the total was approximately \$2,493,000,000 gross, or \$2,201,000,000 net, distributed generally as follows:⁵⁶

*Summary of Foreign Aid (Grants and Credits)
In the Near East, South Asia and Africa, 1945-52*

Country	Gross	Net
Greece.....	\$1,526,000,000	\$1,448,000,000
Turkey.....	376,000,000	343,000,000
Iran.....	37,000,000	27,000,000
Israel.....	174,000,000	173,000,000
India.....	223,000,000	190,000,000
Near East and Africa (undesignated).....	167,000,000	36,000,000
Total.....	2,493,000,000	2,201,000,000

U. S. TECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

Most of the general agreements for technical cooperation with other countries were concluded during 1950-51. By the end of 1951 there were

⁵⁴ See *Legislative History of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate Eighty-second Congress*, S. doc. 161, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 16 and 19.

⁵⁵ BULLETIN of Aug. 4, 1952, p. 199.

⁵⁶ "Foreign Aid in Fiscal Year 1952", *Survey of Current Business* (Department of Commerce), October 1952, pp. 6-11. Total military and economic assistance to Greece reached about \$2,500,000,000; that to Turkey about \$1,000,000,000. (See also Ambassador George C. McGehee, "Private Enterprise in Turkish-American Relations," BULLETIN of Oct. 13, 1952, p. 564.) Undesignated assistance to Asia and the Pacific reached \$553,000,000 (gross) or \$525,000,000 (net). The total aid furnished to foreign countries by the United States between 1940 and 1951 reached \$82,000,000,000, of which \$49,000,000,000 was provided during World War II. Reciprocal foreign programs offset a portion, with the net aggregating \$72,000,000,000. See *Foreign Aid by the United States Government, 1940-1951*, Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Office of Business Economics (Washington, 1952). For a brief general survey, see U.N. doc. E/2193/add.3/Rev. 1: *Summary of Economic Developments in the Middle East* (New York, 1952).

more than 30 such bilateral agreements in force. The general agreements were supplemented by a number of specific agreements covering individual projects, distribution of costs, and dispatch of American advisory missions, especially in the fields of agriculture, health and sanitation, and education. As a result of requests from governments, and of agreements signed subsequently, there were, by the end of 1951, 619 American technicians working on more than 200 projects in 33 countries. As Secretary Acheson remarked on September 8, 1952, the Point Four Program "is steadily strengthening the human and material resources of the free world and encouraging the growth of free institutions through which peoples can develop their respective cultures and ways of life."⁵⁷

Because of the very nature of its complex problems, the Near East, South Asia, and Africa provided an excellent testing ground for the entire technical-assistance program.⁵⁸ The following countries in this area had signed agreements:

- | | |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| 1. Iran, October 19, 1950 | 8. Afghanistan, February 7, 1951 |
| 2. Ceylon, November 7, 1950 | 9. Pakistan, February 9, 1951 |
| 3. Libya, November 11, 1950 and a new agreement signed on January 21, 1952, following independence | 10. Israel, February 26, 1951 |
| 4. Liberia, December 21, 1950 | 11. Jordan, February 27, 1951 |
| 5. India, December 28, 1950 | 12. Iraq, April 10, 1951 |
| 6. Saudi Arabia, January 17, 1951 | 13. Egypt, May 5, 1951 |
| 7. Nepal, January 23, 1951 | 14. Lebanon, May 29, 1951 |
| | 15. Ethiopia, June 14, 1951 |

SOME ASPECTS OF TECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

No one could contend, of course, that the programs for technical and economic assistance held all the answers to all the problems in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa. But few serious students could deny that the programs, if properly developed and administered, held great promise for the future. A few details will suffice as an illustration of the projects developed between 1950 and 1952.

Africa—A general technical-assistance agreement was signed with Liberia on December 21, 1950, together with an understanding which provided for a Joint Commission for Economic Development to survey the economic resources of Liberia. It was expected that about \$32,500,000 would be required within a 5-to-10 year period, with financing, in part, through loans and private investment. The major effort was to be concentrated in five major fields: (1) Engineering proj-

ects (\$11,300,000); (2) agricultural development (\$4,200,000); (3) health projects (\$8,700,000); (4) basic education projects (\$7,100,000); and (5) public administration (\$1,200,000).⁵⁹

Ethiopia had signed a general agreement on June 14, 1951. On May 15, 1952, a special agreement was signed for the establishment of an Agricultural-Mechanical College, with Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical College assisting in the project.⁶⁰ Among the projects to be undertaken by the new college were a country-wide agricultural extension service and agricultural experimental stations. The initial contribution of the United States, to be matched by the Government of Ethiopia, would be \$400,000.

Greece, Turkey, and Iran—While there were some special agreements for particular projects, the needs of Greece, impoverished and torn by war and occupation, were largely cared for under separate programs of assistance for Greece and Turkey and under the Mutual Security Program. In the case of Turkey, the Mutual Security Agency announced on September 17, 1952, a grant of \$3,155,000 for road construction, both for defense needs and for Turkey's economic development.⁶¹ Some \$2,655,000 was to be used to purchase additional road construction and maintenance equipment, while \$500,000 was for technical services. Among other things, 15 highway maintenance shops were to be established under the Bureau of Public Roads. The project, under which more than 3,500 miles of two-lane, all-weather highways had been built since its inception in December 1947, had received assistance under the Marshall Plan from April 1949 to the present.

The first comprehensive technical-assistance agreement had been signed with Iran in October 19, 1950, and the program has been under the direction of William E. Warne, former Assistant Secretary of the Interior, since November 1951. A technical-assistance program for well-drilling was announced on December 10, 1951, as part of a long-range plan to provide water for villages and small farms.⁶² As a result of an agreement of January 19, 1952, the program in Iran was greatly expanded, with the United States contributing \$23,450,000 as compared with \$1,460,000 in 1951.⁶³ Devoted largely to rural development, the program was designed to raise the level of food production and the health and living standards of the people. Within this framework, on April 1, 1952, new agreements were signed which called for an expenditure of about \$11,000,000 by the United States for agricultural development, in-

⁵⁷ BULLETIN of Sept. 22, 1952, p. 449. See also *Aspects of Point Four Progress* (Department of State publication 4751).

⁵⁸ See Cedric H. Seager, "Point Four's Impact on the Middle East," in BULLETIN of Sept. 22, 1952, p. 450 and *Reports of Staff, TCA, Department of State, Status of Point 4 Operations as of July 31, 1952.*

⁵⁹ BULLETIN of Jan. 1, 1951, p. 27. John W. Davis, former president of West Virginia State College, was named Director of Point Four for Liberia on Oct. 23, 1952.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, June 9, 1952, p. 906.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, Sept. 29, 1952, p. 490.

⁶² *Ibid.*, Dec. 24, 1951, p. 1016-1017.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, Feb. 11, 1952, p. 217-218.

cluding a public health and an education program.⁶⁴

On September 10, 1952, three large public health coaches with clinical laboratories were displayed at Tehran, to be assigned to the Tehran, Tabriz, and Babolsar regions for the purposes of health surveys, treatment, inoculations, public-health education, and initiation later of the country-wide health program with permanent clinics. The Shah on September 17 inaugurated the Bank for Rural Credit under the joint program in which the Technical Cooperation Administration was cooperating with the Crown Lands Commission. It was announced on September 18 that the Shah's long-range plans, initiated in January 1951, for dividing his land holdings into small farms and selling them to nearly 50,000 peasants would be carried out with American technical advice and financial assistance. This was the first major step in implementation of the U. S. policy of cooperation with other governments in land-reform programs. The Near East Foundation was to assist in training village supervisors, and ultimately the bank was to receive \$25,000,000 from the proceeds of land sales.

On April 7, emergency assistance was extended to some 1,000 Iranian students in the United States, and on September 12, the project was extended to cover the period to August 31, 1953.⁶⁵

The Near and Middle East—The State of Israel signed a technical-assistance agreement on February 26, 1951, and since then has received some \$133,000,000 from the United States in various grants, in addition to private assistance from sources in the United States. On December 7, 1951, Israel and the United States signed an interim agreement to make available immediately up to \$25,730,000 for economic assistance under the Mutual Security Act of 1951, which had authorized the utilization of not more than \$50,000,000 in the fiscal year 1952 for specific refugee relief and resettlement projects in Israel to be administered by the Technical Cooperation Administration. In an exchange of notes on February 27, 1952, the United States made available the remainder of the \$50,000,000.⁶⁶

Libya first became a beneficiary of the technical-assistance program on the basis of an agreement on November 11, 1950; a new agreement, largely for the promotion of agriculture, was signed on January 21, 1952, shortly after the proclamation of independence on December 24, 1951.⁶⁷

Egypt had signed a general agreement on May 5, 1951, and on November 14, 1951, it was an-

nounced, among other things, that American technicians would work with the Egyptian Government in aiding self-help, low-cost housing and in extending social-welfare projects under agreements which had been signed in the interim. American experts were already cooperating with the Egyptian Government in a program to enable communities to improve housing in 150 centers.⁶⁸

Saudi Arabia, which was the first of the Arab states to sign a general agreement (January 17, 1951), was also the first to participate in the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (June 18, 1951). It was announced on June 13, 1952 that Saudi Arabia, in completing the first major Point Four project in the Near East, had established the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, authorized on April 20, to administer the country's finances.⁶⁹ The purpose of the Agency was to strengthen the currency and fix its value in relation to foreign currencies. The first governor was to be George Albert Blowers of Pineville, Ky.

Lebanon, which had signed an agreement on May 29, 1951, signed another on June 26, 1952, under which the United States was to contribute \$3,100,000 toward such projects as animal husbandry, irrigation, marketing, cooperatives, agronomy, and agricultural credit, as closely related components of a broad rural-improvement program with concentration on food production.⁷⁰ Work was also to continue on surveys of the Litani River basin, the development of which was of primary importance to the economy of the country.⁷¹ Health and sanitation programs were of major significance in the new agreement, which also provided for demonstration projects in housing to serve as a guide for slum-clearance work, and for the training of Lebanese nationals in the United States and at the American University in Beirut.

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan had signed a general agreement on February 27, 1951, and on December 18 the United States agreed to supply Jordan with 9,650 long tons of wheat to help cope with a serious food shortage caused by failure of the wheat crop; the shipment, which would cost about \$1,400,000, was to be financed by the Mutual Security Agency as part of the program of technical and economic assistance. The wheat was to be sold through commercial channels, the proceeds to provide Jordan dinars with which the Government would share expenses in development projects in agriculture, health, education, water resources, and small-scale industries.⁷² An expanded agreement was signed on February 12, 1952, under which the United States

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, Apr. 28, 1952, p. 658-659.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, Sept. 22, 1952, pp. 452, 453; Oct. 6, 1952, p. 535.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, Dec. 24, 1951, p. 1035; Mar. 10, 1952, p. 381.

Ambassador Edwin A. Locke, Jr. was named special coordinator for the program in the Near East.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, Dec. 31, 1951, p. 1057; Feb. 11, 1952, p. 218. John W. Jago was named Point Four Director for Libya on Nov. 14, 1951.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, Nov. 26, 1951, p. 865.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, June 30, 1952, p. 1018.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, July 14, 1952, pp. 62-63.

⁷¹ For an article on this project, see *Field Reporter*, Department of State publication 4574, July-August 1952, p. 16.

⁷² BULLETIN of Jan. 14, 1952, p. 48.

was to contribute \$2,780,000 and Jordan more than \$1,000,000 in dinars. This program called for increasing agricultural production, developing water resources, making effective use of mineral resources, organizing processing plants for raw materials, and improving transportation.⁷³

Of interest in U.S.-Iraq relations was the visit of King Faisal II to the United States during August-September 1952 to obtain an acquaintance with the American scene, especially irrigation and development projects.⁷⁴ Of general interest was the assistance given by the U.S. Air Force in August 1952 in transporting Moslem pilgrims from Beirut to Saudi Arabia for the pilgrimage to Mecca.⁷⁵

South Asia—The programs for technical and economic assistance in South Asia, and more particularly in India and Pakistan, were of special importance.⁷⁶ India had signed a general agreement on December 28, 1950, and Pakistan on February 9, 1951. On June 15, 1951, President Truman approved an act to furnish emergency food aid to India, which provided a loan of \$190,000,000 for the purchase and shipment of some 2,000,000 tons of wheat.⁷⁷ Section 7 of this act provided that a sum not to exceed \$5,000,000 on the interest paid by India on or before January 1, 1957, be placed in a special deposit account in the Treasury of the United States for use by the Department of State in (1) assisting Indian students in the United States and American students in India; and (2) selecting, purchasing, and shipping American books and equipment to Indian schools and higher educational institutions. India concluded an expanded technical-cooperation agreement on January 5, 1952, under which the United States was to make \$50,000,000 available during fiscal year 1952, to be deposited in a special Indo-American Technical Cooperation Fund; India's contribution in rupees was to be 50 crore, which in terms of dollars is the equivalent of \$100,000,000. Primary purposes of the fund would be to raise agricultural production and reduce India's dependence on food imports.⁷⁸

Eleven agreements determining the final technical-cooperation program in India, toward which the United States was to supply \$50,000,000 and India \$86,000,000 in rupees, were signed on June 19, 1952. Among other projects, the agreements included (1) community development, \$8,671,000 (including 12,000,000 people in 16,500 villages); (2) fertilizer imports, \$10,650,000; (3) tube wells for irrigation, \$13,700,000 (2,000 wells in Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, the Punjab, and Pepsu, each well to irrigate 500 acres); (4) iron and steel imports for agricultural uses, \$8,385,000; (5) river development, \$1,784,000; (6) fisheries, \$2,462,000; (7) locust control, \$230,000; (8) soil surveys, \$200,000; (9) village worker training, \$166,000; (10) forestry research and desert afforestation, \$104,000; (11) malaria control, \$648,000.⁷⁹ Under terms of a supplementary agreement, signed at New Delhi on November 3, 1952, India was to receive \$45,000,000 in addition to the \$50,000,000 granted previously. Under the new grant, the Technical Cooperation Administration was to contribute \$38,350,000 for the advancement of development projects, including community-development projects, and \$7,050,000 for administrative and training expenses and special technical assistance in the expansion of the Government-owned Sindri fertilizer plant, the Damodar Valley irrigation and power project, and privately owned industries, especially foundries.

A new operational agreement was signed on November 26 by which the United States was to furnish Indian village blacksmiths with 39,000 tons of iron and steel and farm-implement factories with 16,000 tons of iron and steel, at a total value of \$8,500,000.

The program for Pakistan although less pretentious, was important. Pakistan signed an expanded technical-cooperation agreement on February 2, 1952, under which the United States was to make available \$10,000,000 for technical development primarily in agriculture and industry, and Pakistan was to supply the rupees necessary for the success of the program.⁸⁰ One project, to which \$2,390,000 was assigned, consisted of rural agricultural-industrial programs which would reach some 600,000 people in 1,000 Pakistan villages. Another provision carried \$4,000,000 for a fertilizer plant at Mianwali, West Punjab, to produce 50,000 tons of ammonium sulphate annually, and for the import of 10,000 tons of fertilizer. About \$1,100,000 was to be devoted to a road demonstration and transportation project in East Pakistan. Health measures included making DDT available for use in preventing disease among 5,000,000 refugees in certain Pakistan com-

⁷³ *Ibid.*, Mar. 3, 1952, p. 334. See also *Field Reporter*, Department of State publication 4714, September-October, 1952, p. 4. Jordan became a member of the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development on August 29, 1952, its quota being \$3,000,000 and its subscription to the capital stock of the Bank being 30 shares, with a total par value of \$3,000,000. (BULLETIN of Sept. 8, 1952, p. 368.)

⁷⁴ BULLETIN of July 7, 1952, p. 12; Aug. 18, 1952, p. 265. Under an agreement announced on Nov. 21, 1952, the University of Arizona is to assist in the development of the agricultural college at Abu Gheraib, Iraq. (*Ibid.*, Dec. 1, 1952, p. 864.)

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, Sept. 15, 1952, p. 406; *Field Reporter*, Department of State publication 4744, November-December 1952, p. 20.

⁷⁶ See Ambassador Chester B. Bowles, "The Partnership Which Must Not Fail," BULLETIN of Feb. 4, 1952, p. 161.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, July 2, 1951, p. 37.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, Jan. 14, 1952, p. 47.

⁷⁹ BULLETIN of June 30, 1952, p. 1017; see also Ambassador Chester Bowles' survey in *Field Reporter* of July-August 1952, p. 2, and Stanley Andrews, "Point 4 in Perspective," *ibid.*, September-October 1952, p. 2.

⁸⁰ BULLETIN of Feb. 25, 1952, p. 296; see also Wilfred Malenbaum, "The Colombo Plan: New Promise for Asia," *ibid.*, Sept. 22, 1952, p. 441.

munities in which U.N. health personnel were already working. Sixty Pakistanis were training in the United States under technical-assistance grants, and the number was to be increased to some 200.⁸¹

Afghanistan had signed a general agreement on February 7, 1951, which provided, among other things, for important economic surveys.⁸² On June 30, 1952, \$348,740 was made available to Afghanistan, including \$93,446 to supply American technicians and needed equipment to help the Afghans in settling families on existing land. An estimated 800,000 acres of newly arable land was expected to develop from irrigation projects financed by Afghanistan and a \$21,000,000 loan from the Export-Import Bank.

The technical-assistance program in Afghanistan embraced both educational and agricultural projects, including locust control. The Technical Cooperation Administration worked with the United Nations and prepared to pool efforts in a development plan in the Helmand Valley. The irrigation project, consisting of a system of dams and canals with laterals and ditches, utilized the Helmand and Arghand Ab Rivers. The Arghand Ab Dam and a diversion dam were completed, and the Kajaki Dam, across the Helmand River, was scheduled to be ready for water storage in 1953. The authorization also included \$69,519 for education; \$75,675 for 16 Afghan trainees in agriculture, coal mining, irrigation, and education; and \$43,300 for locust control.⁸³

Nepal, which had signed an agreement of general character on January 23, 1951, thereby paving the way for an immediate mineral survey project, was also a beneficiary of the technical-assistance program.⁸⁴ American specialists assisted the Government in Nepal to establish a program of agricultural education, and American technicians trained Nepalese to develop the program, with similar cooperation in the fields of health and sanitation.

SOME EDUCATIONAL ACTIVITIES

Technical assistance activities in the Near East covered a wide range of other fields, all of which, in one way or another, were related to the economic development of the region, including both education and public administration. At the American University in Beirut, for example, 120 Arab nationals were recently graduated after a special course of training for work in economic development and the public service in their respective countries. Moreover, at the end of June 1952, 84 foreign nationals from the various countries of the Near East and North Africa were in

the United States under technical-assistance grants. Of these, 17 were from Egypt, 21 from Iran, 24 from Iraq, 10 from Israel, 2 from Jordan, 4 from Lebanon, 5 from Liberia, and 1 from Libya. Some were leaders in the affairs of their country; the others were technical workers preparing for some field of public service or economic development.⁸⁵ Under another educational program, nearly 500,000 paper-bound volumes were sent to India in August 1952, destined for some 4,500 towns and cities.

EXPORT-IMPORT BANK LOANS

Long before the enunciation of the Point Four Program, the Export-Import Bank of Washington had authorized a number of loans in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa for the economic development of countries in that region. By September 1952, these loans were substantially as follows:⁸⁶

Export-Import Bank Loans in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa, 1945-1952

Country	Date	Authorized amount	Purpose
Greece.....	1/9/46	\$25,000,000	U.S. products and services. (Some \$10,000,000 of the loan was canceled or expired; approximately \$4,000,000 is outstanding.)
Turkey.....	9/11/45- 11/26/47	33,860,000	Various types of industrial, electrical, railway, port, and shipping equipment. (Some \$13,400,000 is now outstanding.)
Iran.....	10/6/50	25,000,000	Agricultural and highway projects. (This loan was authorized for negotiation, but not completed.)
Israel.....	10/19/49- 10/26/49	135,000,000	Loans for agricultural equipment, transportation, housing, telecommunications, port and industrial equipment. (Approximately \$109,300,000 outstanding.)
Egypt.....	7/16/47	7,250,000	Equipment for fertilizer and chemical industries.
Saudi Arabia..	1/3/46- 7/20/50	44,000,000	Products and services, cement plant construction, materials, and equipment. (\$15,000,000 canceled by Saudi Arabia leaving total of \$29,000,000, of which about \$1,000,000 disbursed and \$1,000,000 outstanding. \$2,536,000 was allocated on September 14, 1951 out of previously allocated funds.)
Afghanistan..	1/22/49	21,000,000	U.S. equipment, materials, and services for canal and dam construction. (About \$13,800,000 disbursed and outstanding.)
Pakistan.....	9/17/52	15,000,000	Wheat purchases in the United States.
Ethiopia.....	6/10/46- 6/22/50	3,000,000	Aircraft and spare parts, communications equipment, and industrial machinery. (\$2,700,000 repaid; approximately \$97,200 outstanding.)
Liberia.....	4/27/49- 6/14/51	10,350,000	Iron ore production, highway improvement and construction, water supply and sewage system. (\$4,000,000 disbursed; \$3,600,000 outstanding.)
Total.....		\$319,400,000	

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, July 14, 1952, p. 63. On Sept. 17, 1952, Pakistan was granted a loan of \$15,000,000 from the Export-Import Bank for wheat purchases in the United States, under the Mutual Security Act of 1951. (*Ibid.*, Sept. 29, 1952, p. 490.)

⁸² *Ibid.*, Feb. 19, 1951, p. 299.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, July 14, 1952, p. 62.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, Feb. 5, 1951, p. 212.

⁸⁵ *The Mutual Security Program for a Strong and Free World. Second Report to Congress for the six months ending June 30, 1952* (Washington, 1952), p. 22.

⁸⁶ Export-Import Bank of Washington, *Fourteenth Semi-annual Report to Congress for the Period of January-June 1952* (Washington, 1952), pp. 32-35, 48-52, 56, 58-59.

In addition to its own programs for technical and economic assistance, the United States contributed generously to the various U.N. programs.⁸⁷ A few examples will serve to illustrate the character of these programs and of the American contribution. While 55 governments pledged \$20,000,000 during 1950 for the U.N. Technical Assistance Program from July 1, 1950 to December 31, 1951, the United States itself contributed \$12,007,500 or some 60 percent and pledged another \$11,400,000 out of total pledges of some \$19,000,000 for the year ending December 31, 1952. Congress authorized \$14,708,750 for the U.N. program for the fiscal year 1953 and actually appropriated \$8,171,333. Among typical projects, a fish harbor was being constructed in Pakistan, plague control studied in Egypt, and both consumer and producer cooperatives stimulated in Iran.⁸⁸ In Libya, a special responsibility of the United Nations since World War II, the United Nations and a number of specialized agencies have worked to meet the two basic problems of broadening and diversifying the agricultural economy and helping to create necessary administrative services. In India, the malaria-control program, coordinated under the World Health Organization's leadership, has proved a decisive factor in doubling land values in certain areas.

The United States also contributed heavily to the capital of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which has helped finance a number of assistance projects. By November 15, 1952, out of an authorized capital of \$10,000,000,000, the subscribed capital totaled \$9,036,500,000. The total paid-in subscription of the United States, amounting to \$635,000,000, was available to the Bank for lending purposes. Between July 1951 and June 1952, the Bank made loans exceeding \$298,000,000 for projects in 19

countries. By November 15, 1952, loans totaled \$1,492,787,000. Among loans in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa were the following:⁸⁹

Loans of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa

Country	Date	Amount	Purpose
Ethiopia.....	9/13/50	\$5,000,000	Highway rehabilitation.
	9/13/50	2,000,000	Foreign exchange for development bank.
	2/19/51	1,500,000	Development of telecommunications.
India.....	8/18/49	34,000,000	Railway rehabilitation (\$1,200,000 canceled).
	9/29/49	10,000,000	Agricultural machinery (\$2,500,000 canceled).
Iraq.....	4/18/50	18,500,000	Electric power development.
	6/15/50	12,800,000	Flood control project.
Pakistan.....	3/27/52	27,200,000	Railway rehabilitation.
	6/13/52	3,250,000	Agricultural development.
Turkey.....	7/7/50	3,900,000	Construction of grain storage facilities.
	7/7/50	12,500,000	Port construction and development.
	10/19/50	9,000,000	Foreign exchange for development of private industry (Industrial Development Bank of Turkey).
	6/18/52	25,200,000	Electric power, irrigation, and flood control.
Total.....	-----	\$164,850,000	

Note should also be made of the Bank's technical-assistance activities, which are an outgrowth of a conviction that external financing would be of most value in countries which were already making the best possible use of their own resources. The general survey mission has been the Bank's most important means of assisting countries to achieve this aim. Organized at the request of governments, these missions are composed of experts drawn from the Bank's own staff, from other international organizations, and from national organizations, both public and private. They make intensive first-hand studies of a country's resources and formulate recommendations on which a government can base a concrete program of long-term development. Thus far missions have gone to eight countries, including Turkey (1950), Iraq (1951), and Ceylon (1951).⁹⁰ There has been encouraging evidence

⁸⁷ Senator Alexander Wiley pointed out in Committee V of the General Assembly on Nov. 12 (U.N. doc. A/C.5/SR.361) that the United States paid 30 percent of the \$37,000,000 total for specialized agencies, 65 percent of \$250,000,000 for Korean relief and rehabilitation, 70 percent of the Arab refugee program, 60 percent of the U.N. Technical Assistance Program, and 72 percent of the UNICEF program. As Senator Wiley stated, the United States has contributed some \$580,000,000 to the United Nations, its special programs, and the specialized agencies since 1945. See also *Foreign Aid by the United States Government, 1940-1951*, cited, p. 65.

⁸⁸ See *United States Participation in the United Nations. Report by the President to the Congress for the year 1951* (Department of State publication 4583), pp. 134-140. See also U.N. docs. A/2210: *Report of the Negotiating Committee for Extra Budgetary Funds* (6 October 1951); E/TAC/R.50: *Technical Assistance for Economic Development. Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance for the Economic Development of Under-Developed Countries. Agreements with Governments signed by Organizations Represented on the TAC for the Provision of Technical Assistance* (10 October 1952). See also U.N. docs. E/TAC/53, 54 (Dec. 1 and 2, 1952).

⁸⁹ See International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *Seventh Annual Report to the Board of Governors, 1951-1952* (Washington, 1952), pp. 7-12 and 14-20. Other Bank loans in Africa have been \$40,000,000 to the Belgian Congo for general development (\$30,000,000 to Belgium for the Congo); \$28,000,000 to Southern Rhodesia for electric power; and \$50,000,000 to the Union of South Africa for electric power development and transportation.

⁹⁰ See *The Economy of Turkey: an Analysis and Recommendations for a Development Program. Report of a Mission sponsored by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in Collaboration with the Government of Turkey* (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1951, pp. 276, and *Summary* (1951)); *The Economic Development of Iraq: Report of a Mission Organized by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development at the Request of the Government of Iraq* (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1952), pp. 463, and *Summary* (1952); *The Economic Development of Ceylon, Part I of Report of a Mission Organized by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development at the Request of the Government of Ceylon* (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1952), p. 131.

that the work done by these missions is achieving the desired results in most of the countries surveyed.⁹¹

The United States has contributed in major degree to WHO, which in 1952 had a budget of some \$8,480,000 and which has carried on programs of assistance in the field of public health throughout the world. In Pakistan, a malaria-control demonstration mission brought about a 15 percent increase in the crop yield of the DDT-sprayed areas and a 10 percent decrease in the man-hours of labor required per acre in these areas. In Egypt, an antivenereal-disease demonstration has been under way in one city, while an antituberculosis center in Turkey is operating with the assistance of WHO experts. In 1951, WHO provided emergency assistance for the purchase of medical supplies to prevent outbreaks of cholera and malaria in famine-stricken India.

The United States has also made large contributions to the U.N. International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF); by October 1952 its cumulative contribution reached \$87,416,667, exclusive of its share of UNRRA assets. The total pledges or resources for UNICEF amount to some \$166,000,000 with an additional \$6,666,667 appropriated for 1952 out of an authorized \$16,481,000. By 1951-52, UNICEF was shifting its emphasis to underdeveloped areas, with significant projects in the countries of the Near East, South Asia, and Africa. Thus, the target program and budget approved for the year ending June 30, 1952, out of a total target budget program of \$30,000,000, earmarked \$2,000,000 for Africa, \$7,000,000 for Asia, and \$3,000,000 for the Eastern Mediterranean area.⁹² The target programs and budget for the period of July 1, 1952 to June 30, 1953, which included target programs for maternal aid and child welfare, mass health programs, training programs, and child feeding, included \$1,710,000 for Africa, \$5,630,000 for Asia, and \$1,850,000 for the Eastern Mediterranean, out of a total target budget of \$20,000,000.⁹³

The United States also strongly supported UNESCO's programs of assistance in the Middle East, which stress fundamental education, arid-

zone research, schools for Arab refugee children, and technical assistance.⁹⁴

The general picture of American assistance to underdeveloped areas, of which the Near East, South Asia, and Africa constitute an important segment, was well characterized by Isador Lubin in Committee II (Economic and Financial) of the Seventh General Assembly of the United Nations on October 29, 1952:⁹⁵

... we in the United States have supported—and will continue to support—the social and economic advancement of the less developed areas through practical action on a bilateral basis, through the United Nations, and through the specialized agencies.

Such data as are at hand on external investment show that in 1951, a total of approximately 2 billion dollars of new external capital was made available for economic and social development in the less developed countries by private investors, the International Bank, and Governmental institutions.

Over the past 7 years the Government of the United States has provided almost 6 billion dollars in the form of loans or grants directly to countries in these areas. This does not include our paid-in subscription of 635 million dollars to the International Bank, all of which has been available to the Bank for lending purposes. Nor does it include the contributions which we have made to the United Nations and the specialized agencies—all of which have directly and indirectly assisted in the improvement of economic and social conditions in these areas.

Within the last 16 months the U.S. Export-Import Bank has approved over 200 million dollars of loans to less developed countries. This has brought the total of its loans to these areas to date to over 2½ billion dollars.

The funds provided by the International Bank are equally significant. Between July 1951 and October of this year it made loans exceeding 250 million dollars for projects in 13 underdeveloped countries. The total of International Bank's loans to such countries has aggregated over 600 million dollars.

In order that we may continue our bilateral program of grant assistance to agriculture and industry in these areas, the Congress of the United States has authorized an appropriation of 460 million dollars for the current fiscal year alone.

Between the end of 1949 and 1951 American investment in manufacturing and distribution in the underdeveloped countries rose by about 525 million dollars, as compared with an increase of about 325 million dollars in petroleum.

Some Summary Observations

This brief outline of the course of U.S. policy during 1951-52 gives some indication of the persistent problems which have confronted the United States and of the attempts made to set them in process of adjustment. Throughout this troubled era, as in the entire period since the end of World War II, there has been a realization that the issues involved are complicated and that, in most instances, short-range or simple solutions are not to be found. This has been particularly true in

⁹¹ In addition, aid of a more specialized nature has been provided through seminars, training institutes, the provision of specialists in various fields, and missions, such as those sent to Uruguay and Chile under the joint sponsorship of the Bank and FAO, which have recommended broad programs of agricultural development.

⁹² See U.N. docs. E/1144, 1144/Add. 1, 1144 Add. 2: *Report of the Executive Board of the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund* (3 February-10 March 1949); E/1737: *United Nations Children's Emergency Fund, Report of the Executive Board* (19-20 June 1950).

⁹³ U.N. doc. E/2214: *United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund. Report of the Executive Board* (22-24 April 1952).

⁹⁴ *UNESCO in the Middle East* (Department of State publication 4647). See also UNESCO doc. 7C/4: *Reports of Member States Presented to the General Conference at its Seventh Session*, Paris, November-December 1952 (Paris, 1952).

⁹⁵ BULLETIN of Nov. 17, 1952, p. 779.

an area like the Near and Middle East and along the North African shores of the Mediterranean, where the long-range and the immediate security interests of the United States, as a leader of the free world, have been in such delicate balance; it has also been the case in the vast Indo-Pakistan subcontinent of Asia.

Nevertheless, American policy has been criticized on the ground that it has been too negatively military in character; that it has relied on dollars to "buy friendship"; that it has been too closely identified with the interests of other great powers in this area. In developing its policies, the United States has borne in mind the basic elements of the current situation in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa: resurgent nationalism, the desire of the people to develop and strengthen their independence, Soviet pressure throughout the area, and the abiding interest of the United States in international peace and security in this vital region.

It is clear from the record that, in dealing both with the tough, concrete issues of the period, di-

rectly or within the United Nations, and with the broad issues of trusteeship and non-self-governing territories and the economic development of underdeveloped territories, the United States has sought to meet its obligations with balance and understanding, within the framework of its own broadly conceived interests, its capabilities, its commitments, and its world-wide responsibilities. It has sought to solve the problems confronting it not by arms alone, but with the knowledge that security and political stability, if they are to be achieved at all, must rest on the broad and solid foundations of orderly social and economic development. The United States has realized that success cannot be achieved in a day and that the dictum of the elder Masaryk, "In politics impatience is fatal," has a special application in this area of the world.

• *Mr. Howard, author of the above article, is United Nations Adviser for the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs.*

U.S. Attitude Toward Purchase of Oil From Iran

Press release 906 dated December 6

Questions have been raised regarding the present attitude of the U.S. Government toward the purchase of oil from Iran by American nationals or American firms. It would seem advisable at this time to clarify the Department's position on this matter.

Prior to the passing of the oil nationalization law in Iran, some 32 million tons or approximately 240 million barrels of oil and refined products were produced in that country and marketed per year. The gross income on royalties, taxes, and wages received by Iran exceeded 100 million dollars. As will be recognized at once, this constituted a vast commercial operation engaging the world's largest fleet of tankers and required the services of an enormous distributing and marketing organization.

Ever since the oil ceased to flow and the refinery at Abadan was shut down, the United States has made every effort to assist in resolving the differences between the parties to this dispute. The United States wished to see as rapidly as possible the resumption of Iran's revenue. Also in the interests of the entire free world, the United States wished to minimize the dislocation of a great industry and avoid the attendant waste in manpower and monetary resources.

Since the passing of the oil nationalization law in Iran the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC)

has turned to other sources for its supplies, and, in the absence of an over-all settlement, facilities of the AIOC have not been available to move and market oil from Iran. The question of moving relatively small quantities of oil or oil products has seemed to us as of minor importance in comparison with the necessity to find some solution which could drive to the heart of the matter and result in resumption of large-scale movement of Iranian oil. Thus we believe that the relatively small amount of oil which could be moved without the assistance of large tanker fleets and distribution and marketing organization will not solve the problem nor enable Iran to benefit from significant revenues from its great resources. Indeed on occasions it has seemed to us more likely than not that such shipments with the attendant legal complexities involved could be harmful to a general settlement of the major problem.

Under present circumstances, this Government believes that the decision whether or not such purchases of oil from Iran should be made must be left to such individuals or firms as may be considering them, and to be determined upon their own judgment. The legal risks involved are matters to be resolved by the individuals or firms concerned.

The Department of State will continue to address itself to the main problem which is the resolution of the dispute so that the essential international principle of adequate and effective compensation may be given effect and Iran may again benefit from the large scale resumption of its oil production.

U.S. Bondholders Urged To Communicate With Committee for German Corporate Bonds

Press release 884 dated November 21

The Department of State on November 21 urged all holders of defaulted prewar German corporate dollar bonds to communicate with the U.S. Committee for German Corporate Dollar Bonds and make known their holdings of such issues. This appeal was made following a meeting at which Ganson Purcell, a member of the committee, informed the Acting Secretary of State of the activities and future plans of the committee. Mr. Purcell also advised that the first of the negotiations with German corporate debtors has been launched.

The committee was formed in February of this year at the invitation of the Department of State in consultation with the Securities and Exchange Commission.¹ The committee represented the interests of holders of dollar bonds of German corporations, and other private German debtors, at the London Conference on German External Debts which concluded early in August.² Members of the committee are Herbert F. Boynton, former chairman of the National Association of Security Dealers, Inc.; Ganson Purcell, Washington attorney and former chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission; and Beardsley Ruml, economist and former chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

The committee has agreed to represent bondholders in the negotiation of final individual settlements with German debtors pursuant to the general arrangements agreed upon in London. The exchange of letters between the Secretary of State and the committee to this effect is attached. Although the debt settlement arrangements concluded in London will not become effective until an intergovernmental agreement giving international authority to the plan has been completed and put into effect, the committee is prepared to undertake preliminary negotiations in order to expedite settlements with individual German debt-

ors as soon as possible after the intergovernmental agreement enters into force.

The Acting Secretary expressed the Department's appreciation of the work of the committee, and of the willingness of its members to undertake the important work which is yet to be done. He emphasized that its activities are in the interest of every individual holder of a German corporate dollar bond.

Following are texts of a statement issued by the committee and of the correspondence between Secretary Acheson and the committee.

Statement by the Committee

The first in a series of negotiations for the final settlement of defaulted German corporate bonds originally issued in this country is under way. Representatives of the U.S. Committee for German Corporate Dollar Bonds began conversations last week in Düsseldorf, Germany, with the Liquidators of the giant United Steel Works Corporation and other interested parties to work out the details of the new securities to be exchanged for the four defaulted dollar issues of bonds and debentures of the former German steel combine.

Involved in the present negotiations is an amount of 20 to 25 million dollars of debt according to conservative estimates. These estimates include the principal amount of the bonds outstanding and accrued interest since about 1933 when dollar bonds of most German corporations went into default.

Settlement of the United Steel obligations is expected to be made in accordance with the terms of the agreement reached at the Conference on German External Debts which was concluded at London in August of this year. Generally speaking, the agreement calls for new principal amounts equal to outstanding principal plus two-thirds of the interest arrears. New obligations will have medium and long-term maturities of not more than 25 years and will bear interest at three-fourths of the old rates.

Mr. Boynton, who led the committee's delegation at the London Conference last spring and summer, has been in London again for the past few weeks endeavoring to work out a few problems left unresolved in August. He has gone on to Düsseldorf with the Committee's financial advisers to attend the United Steel Works negotiations.

The United States Committee for German Corporate Dollar Bonds has its headquarters in Washington with an office in the Barr Building at 910 17th Street, N. W. While the Committee is not inviting or accepting deposits of bonds or proxies from bondholders at this time, it is anxious to obtain all possible information as to the

¹ BULLETIN of Feb. 11, 1952, p. 206.

² *Ibid.*, Aug. 18, 1952, p. 252. For an article on the law enacted by the Federal Republic of Germany on Aug. 25 relating to the validation of German dollar bonds, see *ibid.*, Oct. 20, 1952, p. 608.

holdings and location of German corporate dollar bonds in the United States. It is also now prepared to furnish information with regard to the debt settlement program on request of bondholders and other interested persons.

Negotiations with other German debtor corporations are expected to proceed rapidly so that definitive settlement offers may be made to bondholders as soon as the debt settlement plan worked out at the London Conference becomes effective.

Letter from Secretary Acheson to the Committee

SEPTEMBER 26, 1952

Sirs: Now that the London Conference on German External Debts has come to a close, I wish to express the appreciation of the Department of State for the high degree of capability and diligence shown by your Committee in representing the interests of holders of German corporate dollar bonds at the Conference.

As you know, the provisions of the settlement plan covering German corporate bonds adopted at the London Conference (Appendix 4 to the Final Report of the Conference) contemplate that the committees which participated in the Conference in the interest of the holders of these bonds will undertake, subject to the approval of their respective governments, to represent the bondholders in the negotiation of individual settlements with the German debtors, or to appoint such representatives as they may find necessary for that purpose.

I understand that your Committee is in agreement with this recommendation in the Report and is prepared to represent the holders of German corporate dollar bonds in the next phase of the settlement program. It would seem to be in the best interests of the bondholders, from the point of view of expedition and economy, for your Committee to continue to act in their behalf. As a result of the work of your Committee at the Conference, it has become evident that you have the full confidence and support of the financial community, and the Department is unaware of any opinion that other means of representing the bondholders would be more appropriate. It gives me great pleasure, therefore, to inform you that the Government of the United States approves this arrangement. You, of course, recognize that special arrangements will be necessary should any conflicts of interest develop in the settlement of particular bond issues.

It is assumed that your Committee will continue to consult interested bondholders, groups of bondholders, indenture trustees and their representatives and, where deemed appropriate, will collaborate with them in working out the individual settlements.

Should the Committee deem it desirable to appoint a representative to negotiate with the German debtor in any particular case, the Department would appreciate being consulted about the appointment. It is assumed that any settlement arrangements arrived at by any such representatives will be subject to review and approval by your Committee.

It is also noted that provision is made in the Final Report for reimbursement of the expenses and the payment of reasonable compensation to the corporate bondholders' representatives by the German obligors. The Department has no objection to such an arrangement. However, to protect your Committee and the Government from any possible charge that the expenses and compensation are unreasonable, it is suggested that the Committee's expenses and compensation, including the expenses and compensation of representatives appointed by it, be reviewed by the Department from time to time. Should your Committee consider it necessary to levy a charge against the bondholders, the Department would appreciate being consulted before arrangements are made for such a charge.

As you know, the German debt settlement plan will not become effective until the Intergovernmental Agreement, which will give international authority to the plan, has been negotiated, signed and approved by the requisite num-

ber of governments. Nevertheless, in view of the desirability of completing the settlements with the individual German debtors as soon as possible after the plan becomes effective, it is hoped that your Committee will find it possible to initiate preliminary negotiations at an early date, as contemplated in Article XI of Appendix 4, in respect of the individual bond issues, including, of course, those issued by obligors who are subject to the provisions of Allied High Commission Law No. 27. It is assumed that the Committee will make periodic reports on the general progress of the negotiations.

Should a vacancy occur in the membership of the Committee or should the Committee find it desirable to expand its membership, the Department would expect to be consulted.

I wish again to thank the members of the Committee for their generous cooperation in regard to this important matter.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN ACHESON

Committee's Reply to the Secretary

SEPTEMBER 29, 1952

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The Committee has received your letter of September 26, 1952 stating that the Government of the United States approves the arrangement whereby, pursuant to the recommendations in the Report of the Conference on German External Debts, this Committee will represent the holders of German corporate dollar bonds in the negotiation of final individual settlements with German debtors.

The Committee is pleased to inform you that it is fully prepared to undertake the important new task involved in reaching final settlement of particular dollar debt obligations in accordance with the terms of the general Settlement Plan covering such debts agreed to at the London Conference and the arrangements set forth in your letter.

We, the members of the Committee, deeply appreciate your generous expressions of approval of the Committee's work at the London Conference and of the renewed evidence of confidence contained in your letter. With the knowledge and experience gained at the Conference we shall endeavor to discharge with the utmost effectiveness our responsibility toward those whose interests have been entrusted to the Committee.

Respectfully yours,

HERBERT F. BOYNTON
GANSON PURCELL
BEARDSLEY RUMI

General Eisenhower's Visit to Korea

Following is the text of a communiqué released to the press at Seoul on December 5 by the United Nations Command:

President-elect Dwight D. Eisenhower has completed his historic visit to the Korean combat zone, Gen. Mark W. Clark, Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, announced today.

During his unprecedented three-day tour of the combat zone, the President-elect followed a crowded schedule which included visits to a United States Air Force base in Korea, First Marine Division, First United States Corps, First British Commonwealth Division, 8055 Mobile Army surgical hospital, First R.O.K. Division, Second United States Division, Third United States Division, and the Capitol R.O.K. Division. The schedule also included conferences with President

Rhee and other officials of the Republic of Korea; Admiral Robert Briscoe, commander, Naval Forces Far East; Gen. O. P. Weyland, commanding general, Far East Air Forces; commanders of all United States corps and divisions, and commanders of United Nations units serving with the Eighth United States Army.

General Eisenhower was accompanied throughout his visit in Korea by Gen. Mark W. Clark, commander in chief, United Nations Command, and Gen. James A. Van Fleet, commanding general, Eighth United States Army in Korea, and members of the President-elect's personal party.

The official party, traveling in United States Air Force Planes, arrived in Korea at a United States Air Force base near Seoul at 9 P. M. Tuesday, 2 December. With General Eisenhower were: Charles E. Wilson, Secretary of Defense-designate; Herbert Brownell, Jr., Attorney General-designate; Gen. Omar Bradley, chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff; Admiral Arthur W. Radford, commander in chief, Pacific; Maj. Gen. Roger Ramey, United States Air Force; Wilton B. Persons, special assistant to the President-elect; James C. Hagerty, press secretary; Col. Paul Carroll, aide; Lieut. John Davies, personal secretary.

Discussion of Transition Problems

Statement by John Foster Dulles

Press release 898 dated December 3

I have just completed a talk with Secretary Acheson about the problems of transition which will be involved in the incoming of the Eisenhower Administration.

Secretary Acheson was very kind in offering me all the facilities in order to make that transition a smooth one, and I have confidence that it will take place without any interruption or prejudice to the vital business of the United States.

The Foreign Service of the United States is a permanent service made up of people who are on the whole, in my opinion, competent persons. They are career men who have made the service their career and they are protected in their positions by law except in the case of disloyalty or proven incompetence. That is a permanent part of our Government organization which goes on from administration to administration and is something which, in my opinion, ought to be protected as a nonpartisan career group of people who dedicate their lives to promoting the Foreign Service and foreign interests of the United States. Insofar as it is sound and free of corruption, it should be protected and I believe will be protected by the new administration.

There are, of course, many angles that need to be looked into and will be looked into very thoroughly, but the loyal servants of our Government have nothing to fear.

Property Protocol With Finland

Press release 900 dated December 4

A protocol modifying article IV of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights of February 13, 1934, between the United States and Finland was signed December 4 at Washington. Secretary Acheson signed for this Government and Minister Johan A. Nykopp for Finland.

The new protocol broadens the scope of that part of article IV which relates to the inheritance of personal property. Article IV, as amended by the protocol, provides for national treatment with respect to the acquisition of personal property by will or by intestate succession: i.e. each of the Governments agrees to permit citizens of the other country to take such property by inheritance on substantially the same basis as the citizens of its own country. The new protocol thus brings the inheritance provisions of the treaty of 1934 into line with the provisions on this subject which have been included in treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation entered into by the United States since the end of World War II.

In its original form article IV was more limited. It permitted citizens of either country freely to dispose of personal property in the territories of the other country and assured to their heirs the right of succession to such property without regard to their nationality or their place of residence. However, the provision did not cover a number of situations in which citizens of one country become heir to personal property in the other. Its limitations were illustrated most recently when the U.S. Supreme Court held, in a decision handed down in 1947, that a treaty provision identical in wording with article IV of the treaty of 1934 did not cover personal property located in the United States which an American citizen sought to leave to nationals of the foreign country concerned.

The new protocol also sets forth certain rules for the protection of the foreigner's financial interest in personal property which he is not permitted to acquire or which he may acquire but may not own indefinitely because of his status as an alien.

The protocol is to be ratified by each Government and, upon entering into force, will form an integral part of the treaty of 1934.

The text of the protocol is as follows:

The United States of America and the Republic of Finland, desiring to conclude a Protocol modifying the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights between the United States of America and the Republic of Finland, signed at Washington on February 13, 1934,

Have designated for this purpose as their respective Plenipotentiaries:

The President of the United States of America:
Dean Acheson, Secretary of State of the United States of America, and

The President of the Republic of Finland:
Johan A. Nykopp, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister

Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Finland to the United States of America,

Who, having communicated to each other their full powers found to be in due form, have agreed as follows:

Article I

Article IV of the Treaty of February 13, 1934, is amended by deleting the second paragraph thereof and substituting therefor the following paragraph:

Nationals of either High Contracting Party shall be accorded within the territories of the other High Contracting Party treatment no less favorable than that now or hereafter accorded to nationals of such other High Contracting Party with respect to acquiring movable property of all kinds, both tangible and intangible, by testate or intestate succession. Should they because of their alienage be ineligible to own or possess any such property, they shall be allowed a reasonable period in which to dispose of their interest therein in a normal manner at its market value; but in the case of ships and shares therein a specially limited period may be prescribed by law. They shall be protected in the legal equities of every kind which they may have or acquire in movable property and shall be entitled to the benefit of appropriate legal processes in order to realize the monetary value thereof.

Article II

This Protocol shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged at Helsinki as soon as possible.

Article III

This Protocol shall enter into force on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification. It shall continue in force in accordance with Article XXXII of the Treaty of February 13, 1934 as though this Protocol were an integral part of that Treaty.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed this Protocol and have affixed their seals thereto.

DONE at Washington in duplicate, in the English and Finnish languages, both authentic, this fourth day of December, 1952.

Mexico Pays Installment on U.S. Property Claims

Press release 878 dated November 19

The Chargé d'Affaires of Mexico has presented to Edward G. Miller, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, the Mexican Government's check for \$2,500,000, U.S. currency, representing the eleventh annual installment due to the United States under the Claims Convention concluded November 19, 1941. The Assistant Secretary of State requested the Chargé d'Affaires to convey to his Government an expression of this Government's appreciation.

Under the terms of the convention, Mexico agreed to pay the United States \$40,000,000, U.S. currency, in settlement of certain property claims of citizens of the United States against the Government of Mexico, as described in the convention. Payments heretofore made amount to \$31,000,000. With the present payment of \$2,500,000 the balance remaining to be paid amounts to \$6,500,000 to be liquidated over a period of years by the annual payment by Mexico of not less than \$2,500,000 U.S. currency.

Authorization of Credit for Mexican Steel Operations

The Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank of Washington on December 4 announced the authorization of a credit of 4,500,000 dollars in favor of Cia. Fundidora de Fierro y Acero de Monterrey, S.A., Mexico. The financing is to assist in the acquisition and transportation to Mexico of U.S. machinery, equipment, and services required for supplementing and modernizing the Company's steel operations at Monterrey. The credit, bearing interest at 5 percent per annum, is to be repaid over a period of 10 years.

Fundidora, organized in 1900, owns iron-ore mines and has been the principal supplier of high-grade ore to Sheffield Steel Company of Houston, in addition to producing steel. In 1945 the Export-Import Bank authorized an 800-thousand dollar loan to the company for the purchase of a rolling mill and other equipment to expand its production.

The present improvement program is designed to round out the operation, particularly to improve the efficiency of the merchant and rod mills.

Point Four Agreement With Brazil

A Point Four agreement was signed on October 23 between the Governments of Brazil and the United States for a cooperative program of technical assistance to Brazilian industry, C. O. Rowe, acting president of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs, announced on November 6.

The objective of the program is to provide technical assistance to medium and small-sized Brazilian industries, introducing improved industrial methods and expanding the interchange of knowledge, ability, and techniques between the two countries. This cooperative effort is expected to increase supplies of certain basic consumer goods—through the more productive use of available equipment and labor—to meet the needs of the Brazilian home market.

The program will cover the following points:

- 1) The Institute of Inter-American Affairs will provide a select group of specialists in modern industrial techniques;
- 2) Activities such as introducing improved plant layout, methods engineering, equipment use, rational organization of work, materials handling;
- 3) Planning of production, statistics on productivity, industrial and financial organization for low-cost output;
- 4) Personnel and labor policies with respect to productivity, industrial training, training processes;
- 5) Training of Brazilian industrial specialist personnel in the United States.

Efforts of the productivity program will be directed toward improving the productivity of entire industries and groups of plants by acquainting them with the latest manufacturing practices developed by U.S. industry and appropriate to the scale of industry in Brazil. Individual plants will be used for demonstration purposes, much as demonstration farms have been set up in some of the Latin American countries under Point Four so that farmers can observe how better agricultural practices result in better crops. These demonstration farms have proved to be effective means of spreading agricultural know-how. In the same way, a demonstration factory will be a focal point to which other members of an industry or allied industries can come to see improved manufacturing practices actually being used. The results of their observation will tend not only to show up in their own plants but also to spread their knowledge to other industries which have similar problems.

To carry out this program, a technical bureau to be known as the "Industrial Servicio" will be set up under the Brazilian Ministry of Labor, Industry and Commerce. Brazil will put up 8,000,000 cruzeiros to finance the program, and the United States will contribute \$160,000. (At the official rate of exchange on November 3, 1952, the value of a cruzeiro was \$.0550.)

As the help of specialists is needed, they will be engaged by the Institute or borrowed from private companies in the United States. For example, if a major problem with Brazilian metal-product manufacturers is to increase production and cut costs in order to be able to supply the home market, one or more production and cost-accounting specialists from comparable U.S. industries will be sent to Brazil to advise on the installation of improved production and cost-accounting procedures in one or more demonstration plants. If, on the other hand, the Brazilian metal-product industry needs most to obtain consumer acceptance for their products, a marketing specialist will be sent to Brazil to advise marketing procedures which have proved successful in meeting these problems. At the same time, the regular Servicio staff, Brazilian and U.S. technicians alike, will be working with Brazilian universities and professional organizations to install courses in production management and cost accounting. This will insure that locally trained people will be available to take over this work in the future.

Plans are being made to use other means for making the industrial know-how developed in the United States available to Brazilian manufacturers. Through the Servicio, technical information available from private industry and research organizations will be supplied. Another program will include the preparation of digests of pertinent articles from technical magazines. The Servicio will assemble technical materials, authoritative textbooks, and other recent U.S. technical publi-

cations. Brazilian factories will be able to send samples of their products to the United States for an expert product analysis leading to suggestions for improvement. The Institute of Inter-American Affairs, in carrying on this program, will have at its disposal the services of other Government agencies that are cooperating in the Point Four Program, among them the Department of Labor with its productivity specialists and the Department of Commerce with its technical service and marketing specialists.

Since 1942, Brazil and the United States have cooperated chiefly in the fields of health, education, and agriculture. This new phase of Point Four is one more example of the cooperative spirit at work between neighboring nations in the Western Hemisphere. It is one more step toward increasing world trade since it has been proved repeatedly that, where a nation's living standards improve, the people of that nation become better buyers of the world's goods.

Afghan Agricultural Problems To Be Studied

Press release 902 dated December 5

Dean H. M. Briggs, of the Wyoming University College of Agriculture, will leave Washington on December 6 for Afghanistan to make a study of conditions preliminary to the establishment there of vocational agriculture courses under a Point Four contract, the Department of State announced on December 5. The Wyoming educator expects to remain in Afghanistan for approximately 6 weeks. He will study the requirements of the Afghan Agricultural School and assist in setting up machinery necessary for the selection of trainees for advanced instruction at Wyoming in agriculture, education, engineering, and other fields.

The contract between Point Four and Wyoming University was made in accordance with a request from the Government of Afghanistan for assistance in perfecting the curriculum of its agricultural school and for advice and assistance in the solution of agricultural training problems in general.

Early in January, Dean Briggs will be joined by Dr. Herbert Winner, a vocational agricultural specialist of the University of Wyoming and formerly of the University of Idaho, who will remain in Afghanistan for 2 years. He will head the Afghan Vocational Agricultural School. Additional vocational agricultural specialists will be sent by the university to work with Dr. Winner.

The University of Wyoming was selected for this job, Point Four officials said, because of the similarity of topography, climate, and agriculture between Wyoming and Afghanistan.

Trainees from the Asian country will be sent to Laramie for further study. They will be given practical experience in surroundings similar to those they will encounter in their homeland when they return to take up positions in the country's agricultural development program.

The U.S. Department of Agriculture's Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations also is a signee to the contract and agrees to furnish any advice and assistance called for by the university team of technicians once they reach the field and study the problems to be met.

The Point Four general agreement between the Governments of Afghanistan and the United States was signed on February 7, 1951.¹ The first technician to be sent out under this agreement was a specialist in coal mining. He was able, through the importation of the most elementary types of mining equipment, to materially increase coal production in a country badly in need of fuel. Since that time other Point Four technicians have been sent to the field and are actively cooperating with Afghan Government officials, especially in the field of agriculture.

The Helmand Valley dam and irrigation project, involving two large storage dams and an extensive irrigation canal paid for out of Afghan resources and a loan from the U.S. Export-Import Bank and built by the American firm of Morrison-Knudson, will bring many hundreds of thousands of acres of land into production. One of the dams and the canal are now completed. The second dam will be completed this winter. This poses problems of land and water utilization and also that of the settlement of tribes which have been nomads for generations.

Under the agreement with the University of Wyoming, Afghan agricultural technicians will be trained to work with their countrymen in the Helmand Valley.

Agreement for Great Lakes Safety Enters Into Force

Press release 871 dated November 13

On November 13, 1952, the Acting Secretary of State and the Canadian Ambassador in Washington exchanged the instruments of ratification of the agreement between the United States and Canada for the promotion of safety on the Great Lakes by means of radio which was signed at

Ottawa on February 21, 1952.¹ Pursuant to article 17 of the agreement, the agreement shall come into force 2 years after the date on which the instruments of ratification are exchanged. Accordingly, the agreement will enter into force on November 13, 1954.

The agreement will be effective on the Great Lakes and their navigable connecting tributary waters as far east as Montreal. It authorizes the use of radiotelephony as a means of communication of distress signals for shipping on the Great Lakes with the distress frequency 2182 kc/s and the continuance of the present working frequencies. It provides for the compulsory installation of radiotelephone equipment on all Lake shipping of 500 gross tons and over, on all passenger-carrying vessels over 65 feet in length, and on certain other vessels. All such vessels and all shore stations will be required to maintain constant listening watch on the distress-calling frequency.

The need for such an agreement with Canada has long been recognized. The Congress in Public Law No. 97 (70th Cong.), approved May 20, 1937, directed the Federal Communications Commission to study the problem of safety on the Great Lakes. The congressional committees considering this subject also expressed the hope and expectation that the Department of State would insure that any action taken by the United States affecting radio on ships on the Great Lakes would be worked out in agreement with Canada. The Commission made its report to the Congress on December 16, 1940. Subsequently, discussions were held with interested shipping and communications companies operating on the Great Lakes and with Canadian authorities.

The project had to be postponed during the war years and work on it was not resumed until early 1950. The agreement of February 21, 1952, was coordinated with all interested industry and government organizations and was the result of negotiations between U.S. and Canadian authorities which were held at Ottawa in May 1951.

The agreement was transmitted by the President to the Senate on March 24, 1952, for advice and consent to ratification (S. Ex. M., 82d Cong., 2d sess.). The Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification on July 4, 1952. The President executed the ratification for the United States on July 17, 1952. The exchange of instruments of ratification completes the international action necessary to bring the agreement into force in accordance with its terms.

¹ For announcement of the signing, see BULLETIN of Mar. 3, 1952, p. 338.

¹ BULLETIN of Feb. 19, 1951, p. 299.

A Review of the Palestine Conciliation Commission's Work

*Statement by Philip C. Jessup
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly¹*

U.S./U.N. press release dated Nov. 29

My delegation has listened with great interest to the debate so far as it has already developed this year on the Palestine question. I do not propose at this moment to deal with specific arguments which have been advanced in many of the statements to which we have already listened. But I would like to join in the very fitting tributes which have been paid to the appeal voiced by the distinguished representative of Mexico, and just now so eloquently endorsed by my dear friend and neighbor in this committee room, Professor Fabregat of Uruguay.

The situation this year, unlike previous years when the United States joined with other interested delegations in presenting to this Committee our views on the Palestine question in the form of draft resolutions, has led us this year to the conclusion that we should refrain from making any proposals, or any comments, until we had had an opportunity to hear the views of other members of this Committee, including specifically those of the parties.

This was not the result of any slackening in our interest, any desire to avoid responsibility where responsibility is owed, or, in fact, any doubts in our minds about what the real issues in the Palestine case actually are. But we have been guided at this eighth debate upon Palestine in the General Assembly by the desire, first, to hear what the weight of opinion on the Palestine question is and to test the validity of our own ideas against the weight of that opinion. We should, therefore, have preferred deferring our statement until we had heard from more members of this Committee. We believe in the value of the discussions which we collectively have here in the Committee.

If I may go back into history, I would remind you that in 1787 a Constitutional Convention, meeting in Philadelphia, drew up a Constitution for the projected United States of America. It is

hard to realize now how different were the views and interests of the thirteen states then loosely joined under the Articles of Confederation. Just before the final signature of the draft constitution, Benjamin Franklin commented on the process and the results. He said,

I doubt . . . whether any other convention we can obtain may be able to make a better constitution. For when you assemble a number of men to have the advantage of their joint wisdom, you inevitably assemble with those men all their prejudices, their passions, their errors of opinion, their local interests and their selfish views.

But Franklin found the result of such mixture and exchange of views good. I think history has affirmed that conclusion. We hope the attempts of all of us in the United Nations to deal with the Palestine question will enable history to record another wise and successful adjustment.

As I have said, we would have preferred to defer our intervention in this debate. We are speaking now frankly in response to your appeal yesterday that we should move ahead with our consideration of this case. We hope to hear further expressions of the views of the members of this Committee and to exercise later the right of reply to any proposals which may be put forward.

In addition to our desire to gain the opinion of the Committee, we have been guided in our attitude by the experience we have gained from participating for 4 years in the work of the Palestine Conciliation Commission. During those 4 years, the U.S. delegation, collaborating with its colleagues of the French and Turkish delegations, has explored all of the avenues open to a U.N. body searching for a settlement of the Palestine question in accordance with U.N. resolutions. Having made these efforts over so long a period, as conscientiously and diligently as we could, we frankly felt that if there were any better ways than we and our colleagues had been able to find for settling these difficulties, we did not wish by any premature interventions to prejudice their success.

¹ Made in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee on Nov. 29.

In other words, we came to the meetings of this Committee with as open a mind as it is possible under the circumstances to have, in the sincere hope that the opinion of the members of this Committee would illuminate the problem and move us further in the direction of settlement. We naturally would be the first to acknowledge that our own view is substantially conditioned by our experiences as a member of the Palestine Conciliation Commission. But the experience of that Commission is part of the experience of the United Nations. It is for this reason that I should like to summarize briefly the work of the Commission since 1948, and to recall to the Committee the various efforts the Commission has made to carry out the wishes of the Assembly.

Groundwork of the Conciliation Commission

Within a short time after its establishment under the resolution of December 11, 1948, the Commission held meetings in the capitals of Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Israel, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, and in Jerusalem. In this series of conferences, the Commission explored with the governments concerned the best procedures to follow for giving effect to the Assembly's resolution. The Commission investigated on the spot the conditions left by the Palestine war and the wishes and desires of the peoples who were concerned with removing the vestiges of that war. In accordance with its instructions, the Commission consulted at the same time with the representatives of governments and religious communities on the question of an international regime for Jerusalem.

Having laid this groundwork, the Commission brought representatives of the Arab States together in Beirut and prepared for the opening of a full scale conference at Lausanne in April of 1949. From April to the middle of September 1949, the Commission engaged at Lausanne in daily discussions, formal and informal, with representatives of the Arab States and Israel, in a persistent effort to find areas of agreement.

It set up a special body, the Jerusalem Committee, to work out a draft statute for the internationalization of Jerusalem to be submitted to the next General Assembly as required by the terms of the 1948 resolution. The Jerusalem Committee devoted the time from April to September in 1949 to the subject of Jerusalem.

The Commission itself exhausted every possibility for exploring with the parties their views, and the Commission attempted to find between them some bridge whereby a settlement for the question of the refugees, territorial adjustments, and Jerusalem could be found. It was during this period that the Commission established, on the 14th of June 1949, the Technical Committee to undertake detailed studies relating to the refugee problem. The Committee proceeded to Palestine for an on-the-spot investigation and re-

ported to the Commission on the 7th of September 1949. This report dealt with the whole problem of repatriation, resettlement, and social and economic rehabilitation of the refugees, and discussed at length the immediate, preliminary measures considered necessary for the preservation of the rights, property, and interests of the refugees.

Likewise, on the 23d of August in that same year, the Commission established the Economic Survey Mission pursuant to the General Assembly's resolution of December 11, 1948. This mission, building upon the work of the Technical Committee, carried out extensive surveys in the Middle East for dealing with the refugee problem, and its report to the Palestine Conciliation Commission resulted in the creation by the General Assembly, on the 8th of December 1949, of the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees, which is now carrying out a 250-million-dollar program.

Protocol of May 1949

Continuing its efforts at Lausanne to find areas of agreement between the parties, the Commission emphasized in its discussions that the matters outstanding between the governments concerned, particularly the refugee question and territorial questions, were closely interlinked. The Commission, therefore, strongly urged the Arab and Israeli delegations to extend their exchange of views to all the problems covered by the General Assembly resolution. It asked Israel, on the one hand, and the Arab States, on the other, to sign with the Commission a protocol which would constitute the basis of work. This is the protocol of May 12, 1949, to which frequent reference has been made in our debates here.

I would like to read to the Committee the protocol of the 12th of May 1949, in order that there may be no misunderstanding of the efforts the Commission made at that time:

The United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, anxious to achieve as quickly as possible the objectives of the General Assembly's resolution of 11 December 1948, regarding refugees, the respect for their rights and the preservation of their property, as well as territorial and other questions, has proposed to the delegations of the Arab States and to the delegation of Israel that the working document attached hereto be taken as a basis for discussion with the Commission.

The interested delegations have accepted this proposal with the understanding that the exchanges of views which will be carried on by the Commission with the two parties will bear upon the territorial adjustments necessary to the above-indicated objectives.

A map was attached to this protocol on which were indicated the boundaries defined in the General Assembly resolution of the 29th of November 1947. This map was taken as the basis of discussion with the Commission and, by virtue of the signing of this protocol, the Commission was able to obtain from the parties their views on all outstanding questions.

I do not want at this time to examine the substance of the parties' views, but only to point out that the Commission in its reports to the General Assembly exposed fully the wide gap between the respective positions of the parties as revealed in the discussion of the May 12 protocol. All of this and the full record of the Commission's efforts were reported to the General Assembly in New York in the autumn of 1949, and after extensive discussion in the General Assembly the Commission was asked to continue its efforts.

At the end of that session of 1949, the Commission reconvened with the parties in Geneva and set to work again to find ways and means of bringing them together. It had become apparent to all in the previous year what premises the parties themselves adopted as the starting point for any settlement. Moreover, up to this time, the parties had been unable to agree on meeting together and the Commission had to continue to meet first with one side and then with the other. The Commission therefore devoted its thought and energy during the winter and spring of 1950 to finding new procedures which would provide a way for overcoming the obstacles to direct discussions between the parties, for by this time it had become apparent to the Commission that little progress was possible unless the parties sat down with each other and discussed their problems in a spirit of true negotiation.

The Commission, after full exploration with the parties, put before them a practical scheme for mixed committees of Arab and Israeli representatives to sit together under the chairmanship of a representative of the Commission to discuss specific problems confronting them. The Commission devoted weeks to an effort to persuade the parties that such a procedure was a practical method whereby each of them could assert their interests and preoccupations and hoped to find a way to reach an agreement which took those interests into account. The Commission's plan was an effort on the procedural level to mediate as the Arab delegations had requested the previous autumn in New York at the time of the General Assembly. Unfortunately, the Commission's plan was not accepted.

Special Office Established

In the ensuing debate in the General Assembly in the autumn of 1950, the Commission again made clear its view that direct negotiations were the most helpful method that the parties could adopt if they were to resolve their differences and obtain the desired ends. In its report to the General Assembly, it recommended that the General Assembly should urge the parties to engage without delay in direct discussions under the auspices of the United Nations and its assistance, in order to arrive at a peaceful settlement.

As a result of that debate in the fifth General

Assembly, the Commission was instructed to continue its efforts and at the same time to establish a special office to facilitate under the Commission's direction the repatriation, compensation, and resettlement of the refugees. Pursuant to these directives, the Commission established such an office, having first proceeded to its headquarters in Jerusalem, where it spent the next 6 months in numerous consultations with representatives of the parties and in further efforts to find areas of agreement. Its labors during that period were not confined to discussions with the parties alone, but in accordance with the terms of its instructions, it set to work through its refugee office to devise machinery for finding ways and means of establishing the claims of the refugees to compensation and methods for the payment of those claims. The task alone of assessing, on a global basis, the value of the refugees' property, even in a preliminary way, occupied the constant attention of the Palestine Conciliation Commission's staff throughout 1951. But this was not the full extent of the Commission's efforts in 1951.

Having so far failed to bring the parties together for negotiations in the sense that I believe the General Assembly understood the terms when it adopted its resolution of December 11, 1948, the Commission decided to try a further effort at mediation, this time not on a basis of proposals of a procedural nature but on the basis of the Commission's own proposals on the substance of the issues dividing the parties. With this purpose in view, an invitation was extended on August 10, 1951, to the parties to meet with it in Paris, at which time the Commission would put before them a comprehensive plan dealing with all of the questions arising under the resolution of 1948.

Now, it has been contended that the Commission has from the beginning lost sight of the principles underlying the 1948 resolution and that the proposals which the Commission finally presented to the parties in Paris in 1951 represented a whittling down of rights recognized under that resolution. I do not wish to enter into a discussion of these proposals in detail, but I do wish to point out that when the Commission put forward these proposals in Paris, it at least expected the parties to make counterproposals in a true spirit of negotiation. In fact, the Commission's proposals were designed for that very purpose and were in response to that earlier request for mediation which had been made in New York in 1949.

Negative Attitude Toward Negotiations

I am sure that the members of this Committee can appreciate the disappointment which the members of the Conciliation Commission felt when, after efforts carried on throughout September, October, and the first half of November to obtain some positive response to the Commission's plan, no such counterproposals were forthcoming.

Thus, for the third year, after a succession of efforts to find some way to induce in the parties a true spirit of negotiation, the Commission was confronted once more with their refusal to accept all of the implications of negotiations, as I believe the General Assembly had understood them. By their failure to put forward counterproposals, I venture to say, the parties had shown no readiness to negotiate either directly or indirectly, if I understand what negotiations of either sort really involve.

It was with this situation that we were confronted at last year's General Assembly in Paris, and it was on this basis that the Assembly, as I understand it, reminded the parties that it was their responsibility primarily to settle their differences and asked the Palestine Conciliation Commission to be available to the parties for this purpose. The Commission had been available throughout this year, and its progress in working on the Palestine question has been largely the result of its own initiative in dealing with those problems with which it felt it was possible to deal in the absence of negotiations.

It should be noted that the Commission had formally informed the parties that it was available to assist them in accordance with the Assembly's resolution of January 20, 1952. The Government of Yemen replied to the Commission's communication but, of those governments with which the Commission had regularly dealt, only the Government of Jordan replied and this was a simple acknowledgment. No request for the Commission's assistance from the parties was received at any time during the past year.

Results of Commission's Persistent Efforts

It has been said that the Commission could have been more helpful if it had been physically present in Jerusalem. Its headquarters have remained in Jerusalem. It has had a representative in Jerusalem. It was never reluctant to proceed to Palestine if there was work to be done there. In New York, it was constantly available to the permanent delegations of the parties. Yet it never received orally or by mail any request for its assistance. Whatever may be the reason for lack of progress towards final solutions, it cannot be said that this was due to any inaccessibility of the Commission.

Now, we have already heard in the report of the chairman of the Palestine Conciliation Commission of the results of the Commission's own efforts this year. The Government of Israel has agreed to the full release of the accounts of Arab refugees and the contents of safe-deposit boxes blocked in banks located in Israel. Further progress has been made on the question of compensation. Some have said that these results are inconsequential. I venture to differ with this view and to say quite plainly that considering the history of the efforts of the United Nations to compose

the differences between the parties, no effort which has resulted in agreement for release of some 14 million dollars belonging to the refugees who are in such great need can be regarded as inconsequential.

Moreover, the Commission on its own initiative has continued the work of devising procedures for the payment of compensation to the Arab refugees. Examination of the thousands of records of refugees' property left in Israel to facilitate the establishment of the owners' claims is a tremendous task and is of vital importance to the needy people with whose future we are very much concerned. These are not final solutions. Nor are they substitutes for any of the solutions which the Assembly has contemplated in its resolutions on the Palestine question. They are, however, worthwhile in themselves and they are some indication of what persistent efforts by the Palestine Conciliation Commission can achieve.

I hope that I have not dwelt too long on past efforts to solve these difficult problems. I think that perspective on the Palestine question is needed and that understanding the 4-year cycle of efforts by the Palestine Conciliation Commission can widen the perspective of all of us. I believe that the debates in this Committee and indeed the debates of past assemblies have revealed a growing realization that there is a fundamental problem which we must face if we are to deal effectively in the future with the question of Palestine. The sentiment of this Committee, if I understand it correctly, confirms our own views, born of experience, that there is no substitute in the regulation of international differences for negotiations directly between the parties. In this case, the United Nations has negotiated with the parties and the parties with the United Nations, but the parties have not yet negotiated with each other. This general statement is true in regard to the main political issues, although there have been fruitful direct negotiations in the mixed armistice commission and in the mixed committee on blocked accounts. These very exceptions to the generalization show both the possibility and the utility of direct negotiations on the larger problem. It is less important, in our view, that negotiations of the parties with each other should be in the presence of U.N. representatives, such as the members of the Conciliation Commission, than that the parties should in fact meet together.

U.S. Emphasis on Direct Negotiations

The attitude of my Government in this respect is not directed only to the Palestine question. We have advocated direct negotiations in numerous disputes before the United Nations—for example, in the Iranian case, in the case of Syria and Lebanon, in the Anglo-Egyptian case, in the Indonesian and Kashmir cases, and in the Indian-South African dispute. I would recall to this Commit-

tee that in the very early stages of U.N. consideration of the Palestine question, when the General Assembly, in 1948, had under consideration the resolution of December 11, speaking for the U.S. delegation, I emphasized in Committee I that it was the function of the Conciliation Commission, under this resolution, "to assist the parties in reaching agreement," and again in the same debate that "the points of differences ought to be settled by processes of negotiation and conciliation and that the Conciliation Commission can play a valuable role in assisting the parties." Likewise, during the debate in the General Assembly on December 11, when the resolution establishing the Commission was about to be passed, John Foster Dulles, the U.S. representative, said that

Analysis of the voting shows, we believe, that the parties interested have in effect told the Assembly that the remaining issues in Palestine can be dealt with only through the processes of conciliation or negotiation and they do not want the Assembly at this time to attempt to give shape to the settlement. . . . Of course, the primary responsibility devolves upon the parties directly concerned. The General Assembly does not have the power to command them or lay upon them precise injunctions.

Now, if agreement is to be reached, I think we must keep these considerations in mind. And I believe that the Committee will agree that this position of my delegation has been clear and consistent since the Assembly dealt with this question in its resolution of December 11, 1948. Our experience in the work of the Palestine Conciliation Commission has served to confirm our view. This does not mean that we believe the parties in undertaking negotiations should first abandon what they consider to be their legitimate rights and interests, or cast aside the expressions of the General Assembly's views that have been set forth in the various resolutions on Palestine. Nor should the parties in discussing together what in the final analysis are their common problems close their eyes to each other's interests.

It seems to my delegation, therefore, that the important thing to agree upon is a basis on which further efforts by the United Nations can be made, and that this is bound up intimately with the question of negotiations between the parties themselves. If agreement can be reached that the parties should negotiate in accordance with the accepted meaning of the term, it should not be difficult to achieve agreement on procedures whereby the United Nations can assist them.

I should like to emphasize at this point that while we believe primary responsibility under the Charter rests with the parties, we are convinced that the United Nations will always be ready to assist them.

Now as I said at the outset, I thought it was wise to try to put before the Committee this ex-

planation of our general attitude because as a member of the Palestine Conciliation Commission we feel that our part in its efforts should be understood in this context. As I have said, I have not attempted to deal at this stage with specific points which have been raised in statements made by various members of the Committee in the debate hitherto, nor have I attempted at this stage to deal specifically with the text of the draft resolution which has been placed before us. I should like to reserve the right of my delegation to speak further in regard to the terms of this resolution or any other proposal which might be laid before the Committee at an appropriate time.

Discontinuance of Cobalt Distribution Plans

On December 1 the Manganese-Nickel-Cobalt Committee of the International Materials Conference announced that an improvement in the supply position of cobalt makes it unnecessary to recommend the adoption of distribution plans for this metal for the first quarter of 1953. The 14 member governments of the committee concurred in this decision.

The committee will continue to keep the supply-demand picture of cobalt under review, however, in accordance with its terms of reference. Any development which would justify further action by the committee, such as the resumption of allocations, will be given due consideration. Governments are assured by the committee that the discontinuance of allocations for cobalt does not imply the termination of international consultation regarding this commodity.

When cobalt was first allocated in October 1951 for the fourth quarter of that year, actual production of cobalt metal, oxides, and salts amounted to 2,100 metric tons of cobalt content, whereas production for the first quarter of 1953 is estimated at more than 2,800 metric tons. Further increases in production are expected.

The committee believes that information received from governments of participating countries discloses that essential requirements have been met satisfactorily during the fourth quarter of 1952. There is no indication of any sizable variation in requirements for the forthcoming quarter.

The 14 countries represented on the Manganese-Nickel-Cobalt Committee are Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Cuba, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Norway, Sweden, the Union of South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Report of U. N. Command Operations in Korea

FIFTIETH REPORT: FOR THE PERIOD JULY 16-31, 1952¹

U.N. doc. S/2835

Transmitted November 4, 1952

I herewith submit report number 50 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 16-31 July 1952, inclusive. United Nations Command communiqués numbers 1327-1342 provide detailed accounts of these operations.

The Delegation to the Armistice Negotiations met in Plenary-Executive Sessions daily from 18 July through 26 July. The following summary is the pertinent information covered during the executive sessions which began on 4 July.

The proposal presented by the Communists in Executive Session on 6 July was that both sides reclassify and recheck the lists of war prisoners exchanged on 18 December 1951 in accordance with the principles of paragraphs fifty-one and fifty-two of the Draft Armistice Agreement and according to the nationality and area of the war prisoners of both sides. In addition, they stated that if the United Nations Command lists contained a reasonable total, including 20,000 Chinese prisoners, the question of exchanging Prisoners of War would be settled. They further stated that they considered a figure in the neighbourhood of 110,000 prisoners as a reasonable total for the United Nations Command to submit.

Following this announcement by the Communists the United Nations Command Delegation spent days attempting to determine how it could develop acceptable lists without having to forcibly return prisoners. Discussions served only to indicate that the Communists

were chiefly interested in obtaining the repatriation of at least 20,000 Chinese prisoners.

By this time the complete results of the United Nations Command screening became available. These figures totalled 83,000 prisoners who would not oppose repatriation including approximately 6,400 Chinese prisoners. Since the Communists refused to give any further clarification of their position and insisted on the exchange of revised lists, the United Nations Command Delegation decided to present the new totals. This new figure of 83,000 was presented to the Communists on 13 July in lieu of the 70,000 estimate given them on 19 April 1952. It was hoped that this new figure might prove more palatable and at least stimulate the Communists to present some acceptable compromise proposal which could solve the question of repatriation of the Chinese Prisoners of War.

Following receipt of this new United Nations Command figure the Communists requested a two-day recess which they later extended to a four-day recess. On 18 July, following this recess, they rejected the new figures and restated their position of 6 July, but now increased their demands to require that the United Nations Command repatriate a total of approximately 116,000, including 20,000 Chinese People's Volunteers.

Throughout the Executive Sessions the United Nations Command Delegation attempted in every way possible to have the Communists clarify their position and suggest some means by which mutual agreement could be reached within the framework of the United Nations principle of non-forceable repatriation. The Senior United Nations Command Delegate asked them specifically how the United Nations Command could satisfy their requirement for including 20,000 Chinese names on our lists without abandoning its firm moral principle of protecting the rights of individuals. He explained the United Nations Command's willingness to adopt any honourable means of reaching agreement so long as it was not required to use force in repatriating any of the prisoners we hold.

The United Nations Command Delegation's efforts were of no avail as the Communists remained adamant in insisting on the return of approximately 116,000 prisoners, including at least 20,000 Chinese prisoners. The ensuing

¹ Transmitted to the Security Council by the representative of the U.S. to the U.N. on Nov. 4. Texts of the 30th, 31st, and 32d reports appear in the BULLETIN of Feb. 18, 1952, p. 266; the 33d report, Mar. 10, 1952, p. 395; the 34th report, Mar. 17, 1952, p. 430; the 35th report, Mar. 31, 1952, p. 512; the 36th and 37th reports, Apr. 14, 1952, p. 594; the 38th report, May 5, 1952, p. 715; the 39th report, May 19, 1952, p. 788; the 40th report, June 23, 1952, p. 998; the 41st report, June 30, 1952, p. 1038; the 42d report, July 21, 1952, p. 114; the 43d report, Aug. 4, 1952, p. 194; the 44th report, Aug. 11, 1952, p. 231; the 45th report Aug. 18, 1952, p. 272; the 46th report, Sept. 29, 1952, p. 495; the 47th report, Oct. 27, 1952, p. 668; the 48th report, Nov. 17, 1952, p. 795; and the 49th report, Dec. 1, 1952, p. 883.

deadlock culminated in the Communists calling an end to the Executive Sessions on 25 July. Open Sessions were resumed on 26 July 1952.

During the Executive Session on 25 July, the Communists proposed that Staff Officers of the Delegation meet to discuss and finalize the Draft Armistice Agreement. On 26 July, the Senior United Nations Command Delegate, in open Plenary Session, agreed that the Staff Officers would discuss the Draft Armistice Agreement but only unimportant mechanical changes would be agreed to. He implied that there was no need to continue Plenary Sessions and expressed the hope that the Staff Officers could determine a means of obtaining an Armistice. The Senior United Nations Command Delegate therefore recessed the Plenary Sessions for a seven-day period. The Staff Officers met for the remainder of the period, working on what appeared to be minor changes in wording and translations of certain words that involved the three languages.

The construction work on the newly established United Nations Command prisoner of war camps in South Korea continued with major emphasis being placed on the drainage, sanitation, living accommodations, and roads. The movement of the prisoners of war to the newly established camps, for all practical purposes, has been completed. The discipline of the prisoners and internal order of all camps was good, although some incidents between the prisoners themselves did occur. A complete investigation of each incident is made and appropriate measures taken to reduce the chance of recurrence.

The release of civilian internees in Operation **HOME-COMING** continued, with a cumulative total of approximately 19,000 released.

On 17 July the Communist Delegation, through its liaison officers, furnished the United Nations Command with the locations of six (6) newly established Prisoner of War camps. At the same time the Communists informed the United Nations Command that they had abolished three (3) of their original Prisoner of War camps.

United Nations Command ground forces found the major enemy action centered in the Mabang area of the western front. Hostile attacks in battalion strength succeeded in wresting a dominating outpost from United Nations Command elements during a week-long battle. All of these enemy attacks were well coordinated and supported by a heavy volume of tank and artillery fire. Action diminished on the central and eastern fronts where scattered, ineffective probing attacks by small enemy units and numerous patrol clashes dominated the battle scene.

On the western front enemy-initiated activity flared again in the Mabang area where, during the month of June, several United Nations Command outposts withstood attacks of up to regimental size. The enemy launched a series of determined attacks that culminated in the occupation of a United Nations Command outpost on dominating terrain five and one-half miles southwest of Mabang. The battle for the possession of this hill position began on the night of 17 July when a reinforced enemy battalion, supported by a heavy volume of artillery and tank fire, attacked United Nations Command forward positions. The enemy succeeded in occupying the hill crest on 18 July after stubborn fighting. For the next five days the

struggle for the ground continued with United Nations Command elements regaining the crest of the hill on 22 July. The position was lost again on the same day to another enemy force after furious fighting. Hostile defense of the crest was determined and effective in subsequent United Nations Command attempts to regain lost ground. Another aggressive enemy force of battalion strength struck a United Nations Command-held outpost on high ground further to the east of the aforementioned action. This hostile attack was repulsed with heavy losses in a three-hour engagement during the early morning hours of 25 July. Ground action after 25 July in this area, as along the remainder of the front, was brought to a virtual standstill by the deluge of rains which made the movement of troops and supplies increasingly difficult.

Enemy action along the central and eastern fronts was characterized by scattered probes and determined resistance to United Nations Command patrolling. At the beginning of the period the enemy made a final bid for a disputed hill position northeast of Oemyon which was wrested from the enemy on 11 July. Seven unsuccessful enemy counterattacks were launched against the position on 16 July. During the remainder of the period action consisted of minor raids and desultory patrol skirmishes.

Dissident activity in South Korea retained the pattern of small-scale foraging attacks and raids for food. Most of this activity has been concentrated in the Chiri-san Mountain area of southwest Korea which has long been a bandit stronghold. The guerrilla and bandit groups followed much the same pattern in previous summers by taking advantage of local harvests to replenish their food supplies for the coming fall and winter.

During the period there was a thinning out of enemy unit strength along the battle line. This was accomplished by a readjustment of unit boundaries which resulted in a withdrawal from contact of one Chinese Communist Army on the western front and a North Korean Corps on the eastern front. These latter units have reverted to reserve positions in the immediate forward areas. By thus increasing his reserves, the enemy has improved his military capabilities, both offensive and defensive. There still, however, is no evidence of any early Communist departure from their present defensive attitude.

Despite ten days of poor to marginal flying weather, United Nations Command fast carriers in the Sea of Japan operated against North Korean transportation facilities, supply routes, and supply storage areas. Jet and propeller driven aircraft continued attacks against the major hydroelectric complexes on the east coast to forestall enemy repair efforts. Thermo electric plants and transformer stations were also hit in an effort to complete a North Korean blackout. Close air support sorties were flown against enemy forces and positions. Among the different types of targets which were destroyed and/or damaged were: railroad bridges, railroad by-pass bridges, highway bridges, locomotives, railroad cars, trucks, military buildings, warehouses, boats, gun positions, supply stacks, radar stations, transformer stations, oil tanks and thermo electric plants. Also many cuts were made in railroad tracks, and numerous personnel casualties were inflicted.

United Nations Command carriers in the Yellow Sea

furnished cover and air spot for the surface units on blockade patrols and anti-invasion stations. Support was furnished for friendly guerrilla operations. Their aircraft also flew reconnaissance missions and offensive strikes as far north as Hanchon, into the Chinnampo area, the Hwanghae Province, and in close support of the front line troops. Results achieved were: the damage and/or destruction of numerous railroad bridges, highway bridges, railroad cars, trucks, military buildings, warehouses, boats, gun positions, bunkers, supply dumps, radar stations, transformer stations and power sub-stations.

Numerous enemy personnel casualties were inflicted and railroad and road cuts were made. Six United Nations Command naval aircraft were attacked, two of which were damaged, by MIGs which escaped in cloud cover.

United Nations Command naval aircraft based ashore in Korea flew close support missions and in support of the interdiction program. Pilots reported destruction of weapons, bunkers, military buildings, personnel and supply shelters, supply stacks, and warehouses.

Patrol planes based in Japan conducted daylight reconnaissance missions over the Sea of Japan, the Yellow Sea and the Tsushima Straits. They also flew day and night anti-submarine patrols and weather reconnaissance missions for surface units in the Japan and Yellow Seas. On 27 July, the Yellow Sea patrol aircraft on routine reconnaissance patrol received antiaircraft fire from three unidentified surface vessels while in the Yellow Sea area. The aircraft received no damage.

The naval blockade continued along the Korean east coast from the homblin to Chongjin with surface units making day and night coastal patrols, firing on key rail targets along the coastal main supply route daily to maintain rail cuts, bridge cuts, and blocked tunnels at these several specific points. The siege by surface vessels continued at the major ports of Wonsan, Hungnam, and Songjin, subjecting the enemy forces at these ports to day and night destructive, harassing and interdiction fire. Fog along the east coast at Wonsan and to the north hampered spotting aircraft, shore fire control parties, and the firing vessels themselves. The results included the destruction and/or damage of many locomotives, railroad cars, military buildings, gun positions, sampans, tanks, trucks, railroad bridges and a thermo electric plant.

Railroad track cuts were observed, and numerous personnel casualties inflicted. A total of fourteen prisoners were taken from four small craft by blockading vessels. These include refugees who ventured out to surrender and fishermen who were captured.

Fire support vessels at the homblin provided gunfire on call for the front line troops. Results reported by spotters included bunkers, gun positions, mortar positions and military buildings. Trenches were reported cut in many places, and several troop casualties observed.

Enemy shore batteries were active almost daily against the blockading vessels and minesweepers all along the coast. In many instances friendly units were straddled although only two vessels suffered any damage. The ships were able to carry on routine operations. In each instance the battery was taken under counter fire. In many cases the minesweepers, while operating close inshore, received machine gun and small arms fire. There were no reports of damage or casualties.

On the Korean west coast, the United Nations surface units manned anti-invasion stations along the coast from Chinnampo to the Han River Estuary, in support of the friendly islands north of the battle line. Daylight firing into enemy positions started many fires and secondary explosions, destroying numerous houses and buildings occupied by the enemy. A friendly guerrilla raid was carried out with the support of surface and air units. Two hundred and twenty-five North Korean troops were killed and twenty-seven wounded. An estimated force of 156 North Korean troops in two sail junks and four twenty-five-man folding boats attacked and occupied the friendly island of Changindo at 0200 on 15 July. Friendly guerrilla units counterattacked that evening with the aid of surface and air units and reoccupied the island. Enemy losses were eighty killed in action, forty-one prisoners of war, thirty drowned, and five unaccounted for.

Vessels of the Republic of Korea Navy conducted close inshore patrols and blockade along both coasts and assisted United Nations Command forces in minesweeping duties.

United Nations Command minesweepers continued operations to keep the channels, gunfire support areas, and anchorages free of mines. Sweepers also enlarged areas and swept close inshore as needed by the operating forces. Enemy fishing sampans were dispersed and driven ashore when encountered.

Naval auxiliary vessels, Military Sea Transportation Service, and merchant vessels under contract provided personnel lifts and logistic support for the United Nations Command naval, air and ground forces in Japan and Korea.

Operation Spreadout, the transfer of prisoners of war and internees from Koje-do, was completed on 18 July with 37,000 persons lifted to new locations. Logistic support of these groups will continue.

Activity by the United Nations Command air forces was highlighted when, on the night of 30/31 July, medium bombers staged a maximum effort attack on the Oriental Light Metals Company, an aluminum alloy plant located within five miles of the Yalu River. This was the largest attack yet scheduled against a limited area target since the beginning of the conflict. Assessment of damage was not immediately possible since weather prevented complete photo reconnaissance of the target.

The medium bombers employed electronic aiming devices to bomb transportation targets, including marshaling yards at Chinnampo, Samdong-ni and Hamhung. They also struck at the Yangdok yard and the rail junction at Kowon north of Wonsan.

When reconnaissance showed repair operations at Chosen Number Two hydro-electric plant which could put the plant back in service, the medium bombers attacked the installation with excellent results. The target was hit on 19 July and again on 21 July.

The medium bombers reported flak at most targets as meager to moderate. Several enemy night fighters were sighted, but few attacks were made. On one occasion a Red fighter did attack a medium bomber over the east coast of Korea and the friendly bomber was given credit for damaging the attacking aircraft and probably destroying it.

Other United Nations Command aircraft destroyed

enemy equipment, personnel shelters, vehicles and gun positions. While interceptors maintained air superiority and provided protection, fighter bombers conducted attacks on front line targets and hit enemy positions and supply targets a few miles behind the lines. Night flying light bombers also blasted supply storage areas before conducting regular night armed reconnaissance missions along the main supply routes from Pyongyang to Wonsan and the lines running south to the battle area. Transport aircraft performed normal cargo operations and carried on training exercises with airborne combat units.

The interceptors, while flying screening cover for fighter bomber operations and reconnaissance missions in north-west Korea, engaged the Russian-built enemy MIG-15 jets on fifteen occasions, destroying two of them and damaging two others.

The MIGs were apparently willing to engage the United Nations Command interceptors only on a hit-and-run basis. On several occasions the enemy MIGs initiated attacks on friendly interceptors, but when the United Nations Command aircraft turned to do battle the MIGs broke off.

The capability of the Communist radar net was demonstrated on 16 July when a single MIG was apparently vectored onto a United Nations Command reconnaissance aircraft flying a weather reconnaissance mission over the Korean Bay. The MIG made six or seven firing passes, but was unable to damage the United Nations Command aircraft due to the evasive tactics used by the United Nations Command pilot while flying 100 to 400 feet above the water.

As ground activity increased during the period, the fighter bombers hit gun positions, vehicles, bunkers and supply targets in the front line area and immediately behind enemy lines with tons of high explosives, rockets and .50 caliber ammunition. They spread napalm on troop concentrations to assist United Nations Command ground forces in the fight for key hill positions. Daily close support missions were flown with Mosquito aircraft spotting targets for the fighter bombers.

When weather permitted, fighter-bombers ranged deep into enemy territory to bomb tunnels, bridges, rolling stock, and supply buildings, and to make rail cuts.

In attacks against a troop and supply center at Osani south of Wonsan on 23 July and in concentrated fighter bomber strikes against a locomotive repair shop near Pyongyang, numerous vehicles and military buildings were destroyed. In these attacks the fighter bombers also set fire to two fuel dumps.

United Nations Command fighter bomber strength was increased early in the period by the arrival in Japan of an additional fighter wing after a history-making flight from the United States to Japan. The flight proved the ease with which jet fighter units can be moved to any part of the world within a short time. In-flight refueling was utilized and additional tanker aircraft were positioned at points along the route to provide emergency fuel. Procedures developed during this operation will be further tested by training exercises and special missions utilizing air-to-air refueling.

Targets for light bombers included a vehicle repair shop and oil storage area north of Haeju, the marshalling

yard at Sinchon and supply storage areas at Chaeryong, Sariwon, Yongju and Namchonjon. After attacking these targets the light bombers patrolled the main road and rail routes and destroyed Communist trucks attempting movement of supplies under cover of darkness. The attacking aircraft were assisted by flare-dropping planes and were relieved on station by additional aircraft in order to maintain a constant patrol over selected routes.

Late in the period, the light bombers started creating temporary road blocks by spreading butterfly bombs at certain points. These drops were made shortly before daylight to stop enemy truck traffic so that fighter-bombers on first light missions could attack the vehicles.

During periods of bad weather, the light bombers were utilized on round the clock close support missions in the immediate front line area and were vectored over obscured targets by ground controlled radar installations.

Combat cargo aircraft continued to lift supplies between Japan and Korea as well as passengers and air evacuees.

United Nations Command leaflet and radio warnings to civilians to move away from military targets in northern Korea are being disseminated with increased frequency so that needless loss of lives can be avoided. Enemy efforts to prevent these humanitarian warnings from reaching the people are further demonstrations of the characteristic Communist disregard for the suffering their aggression has brought to the Korean people. In view of mounting evidence that Communist authorities are compelling workers to serve on military construction projects or to work in war material factories, the United Nations Command warning messages urge workers to send their families to safety if they are unable to leave military target areas themselves. Paralleling these leaflets and radio broadcasts are continuous messages to North Korean and Chinese Communist soldiers at the front, informing them of their leaders' prolonged obstruction of an armistice and urging them to abandon the Communist cause.

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

West Indian Conference and Caribbean Commission

The Department of State announced on November 26 (press release 888) that the fifth session of the West Indian Conference will convene at Montego Bay, Jamaica, B. W. I., from November 24 to December 4, 1952. Delegates from all the dependent territories of the Caribbean, including the French West Indian departments and the U. S. territories of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, will participate in the Conference, which is being held under the auspices of the Caribbean Commission. Representatives of the member Governments of the Caribbean Commission (France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States) will attend the Conference as observers. Other Governments which will participate in an observer capacity are Canada, Cuba, and the Dominican Republic.

The principal themes of this session of the West

Indian Conference will be "Industrial Development" and "Vocational Training" in the area. In addition to the discussion of various topics under these broad subjects, the Conference will also consider reports of progress made by member and territorial governments in implementing recommendations made by the West Indian Conference in its four previous sessions, relating to the broad fields of economic and social development.

Topics to be discussed in connection with the industrialization of the Caribbean area are the existing industries and industrial potential of the area; the agricultural bases for industrialization in the Caribbean, including the relation of agricultural and forestry products to such industrialization, the problems and benefits of local processing of agricultural products, and the present and potential markets for products processed in the area; and the role of government in promoting industrialization, including such aspects of the question as government inducements for the development of industry, industrial legislation in the Caribbean, and the health of the worker and industrial medicine. A seminar on certain financial aspects of industrialization, which is one of several specialized discussions to be held during the Conference, will be led by an official of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

Problems relating to vocational training, an aspect of education the importance of which was strongly emphasized at the fourth West Indian Conference held at Curaçao in 1950, and other measures to increase the productivity of labor in the area will be discussed at the Conference under the general headings Guidance Services, Vocational Agricultural Training, Trade and Industrial Education, Apprenticeship and On-the-Job Training, and Labor and Management Groups. A representative of the International Labor Organization will serve as discussion leader in the consideration of some of the aspects of a program of vocational education for the Caribbean area. An exhibit of educational materials, prepared by the Office of Education, U. S. Federal Security Agency, will be on display during the meeting.

The West Indian Conference will summarize its discussions on industrial development and vocational education and report its conclusions to the fifteenth meeting of the Caribbean Commission, which will also meet at Montego Bay, November 29-December 9, 1952. The U.S. delegation to this meeting will be as follows:

U. S. Commissioners

Alonzo G. Moron (Acting Co-Chairman), President, Hampton Institute, Hampton, Va.
Sol Luis Descartes (Commissioner), Secretary of the Treasury, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
James P. Davis (Acting Commissioner), Director, Office of Territories, Department of the Interior

Robert R. Robbins (Acting Commissioner), Officer in Charge of Non-Self-Governing Territories Affairs, Department of State

Advisers

Edward Anderberg, Jr., American Consul, Kingston, Jamaica
Ralph Bedell, Office of Education, Federal Security Agency
William H. Christensen, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Department of State
Albert J. Powers, Office of International Trade, Department of Commerce
Frances McReynolds Smith, Office of Dependent Area Affairs, Department of State

The present Caribbean Commission is an international consultative and advisory body, the outgrowth of the earlier cooperation between the United States and the United Kingdom through the original Anglo-American Caribbean Commission. The four-power Caribbean Commission was established by international agreement to be concerned with economic and social matters of common interest to the peoples of the Caribbean area, particularly agriculture, communications, education, fisheries, health, housing, industry, labor, social welfare, and trade.

At the forthcoming meeting of the Commission, the representatives of France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States will plan the Commission's work program for the coming year and approve the proposed budget for 1953. Projects to be considered by the Commissioners in connection with the 1953 program will include a trade promotion conference and a low-cost housing conference, and arrangements to be made with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) for the joint sponsorship of a training course in home economics and of a training course and workshop in agricultural cooperatives. The Commissioners will be asked to approve the assignment by FAO of a home economist for the Caribbean area and to consider a further study of the important question of the utilization of bagasse (a byproduct of sugar cane) for the manufacture of insulation board, wallboard, and paper.

Latin American Manpower (ILO)

The Department of State on December 2 (press release 896) announced that Edward L. Keenan, Deputy Director, Bureau of Employment Security, Department of Labor, is representing the U.S. Government at a technical conference on Latin American manpower problems which convened on December 1 at Lima, Peru, under the auspices of the International Labor Organization. The general purpose of this conference is to determine methods for the full utilization of manpower in the development of Latin American countries and to outline the future activities of the International Labor Organization in Latin America with respect to this field.

The United States in the United Nations

[November 29–December 4, 1952]

General Assembly

In plenary session on Dec. 3, the revised Indian draft resolution dealing with the Korean prisoner-of-war question was adopted by a vote of 54–5 (Soviet bloc)–1 (China). The final version was, with one exception, identical with that approved 2 days earlier in Committee I;¹ an amendment adopted in a separate vote, 53–0–5 (Soviet bloc), added the phrase “so that an immediate cease-fire would result and be effected” in the paragraph requesting the President of the Assembly to communicate the proposals to the Communist Chinese and North Korean authorities.

Later in the same session, the Assembly rejected the Soviet resolution calling for a cease-fire by a vote of 5–40–11 (Afghanistan, Argentina, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen). The vote was taken at the insistence of Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Vyshinsky; the draft had been defeated in Committee I.

In an explanation of the vote, Ernest A. Gross (U.S.) said that in his view the Indian resolution expressed the principle to be applied in solving the prisoner-of-war problem and suggested the machinery for implementing this principle. If there was a will for peace, he believed the gaps could be filled and details worked out. The U.S. Government, he said, fully supported the text and pledged itself, in its capacity as the Unified Command, to exert every effort to carry out its provisions loyally and completely. If the Communists did the same, an end to the fighting would not be long delayed, he stated.

By affirming that no force should be used to effect or impede the return of prisoners of war, Ambassador Gross said the United Nations had summed up man's struggle to achieve respect for the human being. Once again, he noted, the United Nations took the initiative to end the fighting and restore peace in Korea, and recognized (1) that there had been aggression which the U.N. forces had repelled, (2) that the fighting could end if the aggressors agreed to an honorable

armistice, and (3) that force should not be used to return or detain prisoners following a cessation of hostilities.

The amendment which had been accepted made clear beyond any possibility of distortion that the purpose was to restore conditions of peace and security on an honorable basis at the earliest possible time, he asserted. It stood in contrast to the cynical attempt of Soviet representatives to exploit desires for peace. The peoples of the world would not agree to let prisoners remain in indefinite captivity or in a situation which might allow their use by the Communists as hostages or pawns.

The U.S. delegation hoped the resolution would achieve its purpose, Ambassador Gross said, and, despite Andrei Vyshinsky's “peremptory” rejection, believed no nation could long withstand the moral force of world opinion. Rejection would show that the Communists did not want a peace in Korea acceptable to the conscience of civilized man. Today, he concluded, the United Nations “speaks to the Chinese and North Korean people,” asking them to join others of the world and “accept what we have done here as a basis for peace with honor and dignity.”

Ad Hoc Political Committee—Continuing its debate on the Palestine Conciliation Commission's work, the committee on Nov. 29 heard Philip C. Jessup (U.S.) review past U.N. efforts to assist the Arab States and Israel to reach a peaceful settlement of their problems. He said that it had become apparent to the Conciliation Commission that little could be done to bridge the gap between the parties unless they sat down together to discuss their problems directly, in a spirit of conciliation. He reserved his right to speak later on the six-power proposal calling for direct negotiations between the parties as well as on any others that might be submitted. (For text, see p. 953.)

On Dec. 1 Abba S. Eban (Israel) outlined what he called a “blueprint for peace” in the Near East, giving his Government's views on methods of dealing with questions relating to security, refugees, territorial problems, economic problems, regional cooperation, and diplomatic and juridical rela-

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Dec. 8, 1952, p. 916.

tions. He urged that the General Assembly recommend a direct and freely negotiated peace without "preconditions of any kind." He claimed that to require the parties to negotiate in conformity with "unfulfilled proposals of the past" would be "an error of historic proportions."

Almed Shukairi (Syria) declared that any idea of negotiations that put aside past U.N. resolutions on the Palestine question "could not be tolerated." Concluding his statement on Dec. 2, he suggested the creation of three mixed Arab-Jewish committees to deal separately with the internationalization of Jerusalem, the refugee question, and a territorial settlement. All three would work under the auspices of the Conciliation Commission and in the light of the resolutions of the General Assembly. He felt that the joint draft resolution (the sponsors of which had now been increased to eight, with the addition of Cuba and Panama) would serve no purpose since one party refused to adhere to its obligations under past resolutions.

Aouney W. Dejany (Saudi Arabia) said on Dec. 2 that although he did not doubt the good intentions of the eight sponsors, he was "amazed" that they should think that their proposed resolution could solve the question since Israel had no desire to seek peace except on its own terms.

A new resolution, introduced on Dec. 3 by Pakistan and cosponsored by Afghanistan and Iran, would request the Conciliation Commission to continue its efforts, would increase its membership from three to five, and would establish its headquarters at Jerusalem. The Commission would be requested to report to the eighth General Assembly.

On Dec. 4 Indonesia became the fourth cosponsor of this resolution, and amendments to the eight-power draft were submitted by Chile, Peru, and a group of five delegations including Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Haiti, and Honduras.

Committee I (Political and Security)—By a roll-call vote of 53-5 (Soviet bloc)-1 (China), the Committee on Dec. 1 adopted the second revision of the Indian resolution, as amended by Denmark, for solving the Korean prisoner-of-war problem. (Lebanon, which was absent during the voting, indicated at the next day's session that it supported the resolution.) The Danish amendment reduces from 60 to 30 days the period after which responsibility for prisoners unwilling to be repatriated would be transferred from the post-armistice political conference to the United Nations, in case the former does not reach agreement.

On Dec. 2 the committee rejected the Soviet draft resolution by a vote of 5-41-12 and suspended further debate on the Korean question pending the report of the President of the General Assembly on the implementation of the Indian proposals.

Two days later, discussion of the Tunisian question began. Mohammed Zafrullah Khan (Pakistan) opened the debate with a lengthy statement during which he introduced a 13-power resolution. The resolution recommends "that negotiations be resumed between France and the true representatives of the Tunisian people for the purpose of implementing the right of self-determination and the fulfillment of the national aspirations of the Tunisian people" and "decides to appoint a commission of good offices . . . to arrange and assist in the proposed negotiations." The French delegation was absent from the session, having informed the chairman that it would be unable for reasons previously given to be present during consideration of the Tunisian and Moroccan items.

Committee II (Economic and Financial)—A consolidated Argentine resolution, amended by Brazil, was adopted Nov. 29 by a vote of 29-16 (U.S.)-8. The proposal recommends a series of measures designed to promote the financing of economic development through the establishment of fair and equitable international prices for primary commodities.

On Dec. 1 the committee adopted a resolution on migration, proposed by Uruguay and amended by Haiti, recommending that member and non-member states conclude agreements for the resettlement of groups of emigrants as a part of general economic development. The vote was 29 (U.S.)-0-20 (Soviet bloc).

At its Dec. 2 session, the committee began debate on land reform. It has under consideration a progress report of the Secretary-General, a Pakistani proposal for a study of the financing of land reform (to be made by the committee of experts to be set up to study plans for a special fund), and a joint Egyptian-Indian-Indonesian draft resolution recommending *inter alia* that member governments take every possible step to expedite their land-reform programs and, where appropriate, to bring new lands under cultivation.

Commenting on the Secretary-General's report, Isador Lubin (U.S.) said it provided tangible evidence that the fifth General Assembly's resolution on land reform had started a chain reaction throughout the world. The joint draft resolution had his full approval; he proposed an amendment asking the Secretary-General to assist member governments to give the widest possible circulation to actions of the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council with regard to land reform. Referring to the Pakistani draft, Mr. Lubin indicated that the request for a study of the financing of land reform should be addressed to the governing body of the proposed fund, rather than to the committee of experts assigned to study plans for establishing the fund.

Committee III (Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural)—A much-amended resolution on ways to promote the right to self-determination, based on

a draft submitted by the Commission on Human Rights, was adopted Dec. 1 by a roll-call vote of 34-13(U.S.)-6. Three U.S. amendments (paragraphs 3 and 4 of the preamble and the first operative paragraph) were approved without change.

Later in the Dec. 2 session, the committee began consideration of a Lebanese draft resolution calling for voluntary submission of information concerning the exercise of the right of self-determination in non-self-governing territories. A revision of this draft was approved the next day by a vote of 38-10(U.S.)-4; an eight-power resolution requesting the Economic and Social Council to ask the Human Rights Commission to continue preparing recommendations concerning the right of self-determination also was accepted, 38(U.S.)-7-8. This action concluded the committee's work on self-determination.

Committee IV (Trusteeship)—Acceding to a request from the Wa-Meru tribe, the committee on Nov. 29 heard its spokesman make a plea for U.N. aid in restoring to the tribesmen 38,000 acres of land in the British-administered trust territory of Tanganyika. W. A. C. Mathieson (U.K.) spoke on Dec. 1, warning the committee against "intemperate haste" in acting on the petition. At the next day's meeting, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Indonesia, Liberia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria presented a joint draft resolution urging immediate restoration of the land to the tribesmen and asking the Assembly to call for the restitution to the Wa-Meru of legal rights to the land, compensation for their losses, and indemnities for damage.

An amendment proposed by Brazil, Ecuador, and Peru would omit from the original draft the conclusion that it is clear "that the Administering Authority expelled some 3,000 Wa-Meru tribesmen from their lands, forcibly and against their will, with the purpose of transferring these lands to European settlers." It would also eliminate sections of the eight-power draft disapproving the action of the Administering Authority and the Trusteeship Council's resolution on the question. An Indian amendment, also proposing more moderate wording, was introduced at the same meeting.

In a statement on Dec. 3, John Muccio (U.S.) said:

My delegation has been moved, as I am certain others have been, by the plight of the Wa-Meru who have been removed, against their will, from their land. I would like to join in the tribute which has been paid to their representatives for the dignity and restraint with which they have presented their case. There is probably no deeper human feeling than attachment to one's home. It is, therefore, thoroughly understandable that those Wa-Meru who have been obliged to leave their homes should feel very strongly on this matter.

It is also thoroughly understandable that the plight of this group should evoke the genuine sympathy of the

members of this committee. On the other hand, the Administering Authority has stated its considered conviction and has supported that conviction in the Trusteeship Council and here with extensive documentation that this plan will operate to the general interest of the majority of the people of the area. If we are not disposed to accept this contention, then we must undertake a study to determine if the plan is indeed not in the interest of the general welfare, and I do not believe that it is the purpose of this committee to study the complicated plan for land development upon which the movement of these people was based.

That leaves us with the problem which can, I believe, be stated in these terms: "What can the Fourth Committee usefully do about this problem with the information it has at hand?"

Beginning with the assumption that the general plan has as its motive the creation of conditions of greatest good for the greatest number, we succeed in narrowing our problem to that which is concerned with the manner in which this particular aspect of the scheme was carried out. My delegation is convinced, along with the other members of the committee who have expressed themselves on this point, that the manner in which the relocation of the Meru people was carried out was not without fault. Mr. Chairman, the Trusteeship Council was also of this opinion. In operative paragraph 2 of Resolution 468 (x) the Council expressed its regret that the Administering Authority should have found it necessary to move any of the Meru people from land on which they had settled—and operative paragraph 3 regretted further that a process of forcible eviction was found necessary by the Administering Authority in the course of which damages and loss were suffered by members of the Meru people.

I note, too, that the Trusteeship Council went a step further and considered that "the Administering Authority should be guided in future schemes by the principle that African communities settled on the land should not be moved to other areas unless a clear expression of their collective consent has been obtained".

I believe that we are all in agreement with the judgment of the Trusteeship Council on these aspects of the problem.

We must now move to a consideration of the practical measures which we can recommend to the Administering Authority to compensate the Meru people for the hardships that they have endured and to relax the tensions which have been created by the incident. The Trusteeship Council in its resolution has urged the Administering Authority to do all in its power to relieve the hardships of the Meru people and to grant compensation to the families affected for the loss of property, as well as for disturbance, on a generous scale as a means to help overcome the resentment which has arisen.

Often during the debate on this question the sentiment was voiced that conditions must prevail in the territory which will enable the Africans to live on a basis of parity with the European and the Indian inhabitants of the territory. My delegation believes that this was the very idea which caused the Trusteeship Council to recommend to the Administering Authority in operative paragraph 7(b) that it draw up and put into effect a plan for community development and welfare.

The Trusteeship Council recognized, however, that it could not foresee all the possibilities which the Administering Authority could avail itself of in providing for the development of the Meru people and in particular to afford relief to congestion on tribal land. It saw clearly that the Administering Authority in all good faith must, in the final analysis, make the decision to achieve these results. To that effect the Council expressed the hope that the Administering Authority will continue to take all practical measures to make adequate provision for the increased numbers of the Wa-Meru tribe and afford relief to congestion on occupied tribal land by opening up and developing new lands for both cultivation and grazing.

The Trusteeship Council, after having pronounced itself on this matter in these ways, did not close the book and mark the case closed. Instead, it requested the Administering Authority to keep the Trusteeship Council fully informed of any further developments in the matter of resettlement in the Arusha District. We shall certainly expect that the Council will keep the Fourth Committee fully informed on all measures undertaken to aid the development of the Meru.

In the face of this decision of the Council, arrived at I might add after careful study of the problem, we are asked in this Committee to disapprove the Council's action. My delegation cannot be a party to the approval of a resolution of such a broad and sweeping character which would contribute to undermining the good faith upon which the operation of the Trusteeship System depends.

I cannot refrain from emphasizing the strong view of my delegation that the Trusteeship Council, which is seized with this problem, has adopted a thoughtful and comprehensive resolution on the question, and has indicated its intention to pursue the matter until a final adjustment is reached, should receive the full cooperation and not the rebuke, express or implied, of this body. It is not the part of wisdom to seek to remove this issue from the hands of the Trusteeship Council with its specialized knowledge and continuing responsibilities for periodic and detailed review of the situation in Tanganyika.

In our deliberation we must not lose sight of the fact that the United Nations has granted to the United Kingdom the responsibility for the administration of this trust territory. It seems to me to be a mistake to impose detailed administrative judgments, which a Committee, this size, so far from the scene is not properly equipped to formulate.

Judging from the remarks that were made in the general statements on the Report of the Trusteeship Council, we must conclude that there is general satisfaction among the members of this committee that the United Kingdom is positively facing up to its obligations under the trusteeship system.

Accordingly, I am sure that the Administering Authority will give every assistance to the Wa-Meru people in that they may acquire the skills which will enable them to participate successfully in the cattle-ranching business; and in addition, that the Administering Authority will undertake to enable the Meru to participate in the land-development scheme for this area. This desire has been

eloquently expressed in this committee by the representative of the Wa-Meru himself.

The amendments proposed by Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden (L. 245) seem to my delegation to strike the right note of constructive assistance. The proposal looking toward the establishment of an experimental farm in the disputed area and for training the Meru and other indigenous people in modern cattle-raising methods is forward looking and we particularly endorse it. My delegation will support the amendments contained in document L. 245.

In conclusion let me express the hope that we here do nothing to delay progress by weakening the structure of the trusteeship system. It is this system which gives the soundest foundation to all of our hopes for the day when the African, fortified with knowledge and skill, can successfully compete with other elements of the population in any endeavor he chooses.

Committee V (Administrative and Budgetary)—1953 appropriations for U.N. tribunals in Libya and Eritrea were approved Dec. 1 by the committee, which also informed the General Assembly of the budgetary implications of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee's decisions establishing two commissions on the South African racial questions.

On Dec. 2 the committee decided that the Secretary-General should be authorized to draw upon the working capital fund to meet costs required for the repatriation commission and umpire proposed by the Indian resolution on Korea. The U.S.S.R. opposed any financial provision under this subject.

Committee VI (Legal)—During the concluding day of general debate on defining aggression, Andrei Vyshinsky (U.S.S.R.) defended the Soviet proposal for a definition and refuted claims made by those in opposition. He claimed that the concept of aggression was not applicable to the Korean "civil" war, that the Baltic republics wanted a place in the Soviet society, and that the facts relating to the Russo-Finnish hostilities and the Soviet-German nonaggression pact were quite different from the conclusions drawn by other speakers.

Trusteeship Council

The Council on Dec. 3 concluded the second part of its eleventh session with the adoption by a vote of 7-1 (U.S.S.R.)-2 (U.K., France) of its special report on the Ewe and Togoland unification problem. A Soviet proposal to include in the special report a six-line summary of U.S.S.R. objections to the conclusions of the visiting mission was rejected, as was a subsequent request for incorporation in the report of a statement that the U.S.S.R. had voted against the Council's resolution since the resolution approved the visiting mission's conclusions. The Council agreed without objection, however, to Aleksei A. Roschin's request that a statement of minority views be appended to the report.

THE DEPARTMENT

Department's Position on U.N. Appointments

Press release 897 dated December 2

As recently confirmed by the report of the U.N. committee of three international jurists,¹ the decision to hire or fire is made by the Secretary-General and not by the United States. The Department of State is not in a position to instruct the U.N. Secretariat on the employment of anyone, not even an American.

As has been disclosed in a statement on October 28, 1952,² the Department of State has identified for the Secretary-General U.S. nationals on the Secretariat whom it believes to be Communists. In response to a request from the grand jury, the Department of State identified for the grand jury 28 persons previously separated from the United Nations or now suspended. In 24 cases out of the 28 the Department had made an adverse comment.

The Department of State did not disclose the names of people in the Department who evaluated the cases in which no adverse comment was made, as this could only result in their being asked what they thought of a confidential file—something which they are not authorized to discuss.

It is hoped that the opinion of the U.N. committee of jurists, recently issued, affirming the powers of the Secretary-General to discharge staff members will dispose of the remaining problem.

THE FOREIGN SERVICE

Consular Offices

The Consulate at Georgetown, British Guiana, will be closed as soon as practicable after November 30, 1952. The Georgetown consular district will be transferred to the Consulate General at Port-of-Spain, Trinidad.

On October 19, 1952, a Special Purpose Post was established at Khartoum, Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. The post will be known as a U.S. Liaison Office.

The work of this post will be confined to political reporting. It will perform no consular functions. The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan will remain under the informal consular jurisdiction of the Embassy at Cairo, Egypt.

¹ The committee, appointed by Secretary-General Trygve Lie on Nov. 7 (BULLETIN of Nov. 17, 1952, p. 802), consists of William De Witt Mitchell of the United States, Sir Edwin Herbert of the United Kingdom, and Paul Veldekens of Belgium. In preparing their report, made public Nov. 30, they served as experts in their own right, not as representatives of their Governments.

² BULLETIN of Nov. 10, 1952, p. 735.

Resignation of Walter J. Donnelly

Press release 903 dated December 5

The White House announced on December 5 that the President has accepted the resignation of Walter J. Donnelly, U.S. High Commissioner for the Federal Republic of Germany, effective December 31, 1952. Ambassador Donnelly will likewise retire as a Foreign Service officer of the United States on that date.

Ambassador Donnelly's resignation has been prompted by his desire to retire from the Foreign Service after 30 years of service. The Department was aware of Ambassador Donnelly's desire to retire prior to his present assignment but asked him to defer his plans until the end of the current year.

Ambassador Donnelly has been U.S. High Commissioner in Germany since August 1, 1952. Although his stay in Germany has been short, he has borne with distinction and ability the heavy diplomatic burdens involved. Prior to August, he served as U.S. High Commissioner, and later Ambassador, to Austria for nearly 2 years.

Previously, Mr. Donnelly had been one of the United States leading experts on relations with the American Republics. After early commercial assignments in the service of the Department of Commerce at Montreal, Bogotá, Habana, and Rio de Janeiro, he served successfully as Counselor of Embassy at Rio de Janeiro, Panamá, and Lima, and then as Ambassador to Costa Rica and later to Venezuela.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: Dec. 2-6, 1952

Releases may be obtained from the Office of the Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.

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902	12/5	Point 4 study in Afghanistan
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U. S. Information Programs at Home and Abroad

Chief State school officers from 43 States and three Territories came to Washington December 9 for a 3-day meeting sponsored by the U. S. Office of Education, Federal Security Agency. The role of American education in international affairs was one of the topics under discussion. At the December 9 session, the educators heard Joseph B. Phillips, Acting Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, describe the domestic information program of the Department of State and Reed Harris, Acting Deputy Administrator of the International Information Administration, tell about overseas information activities. Texts of their addresses are printed below.

ADDRESS BY REED HARRIS

Press release 905 dated December 8

First of all, I am not going to talk today about the serious world situation which we are facing. As educators—as thoughtful persons—you are aware of the facts of international life. You are equally aware that this country of ours has had its soul tried in one way or another ever since the days of Tom Paine. The main difference between our present involvements and those of yesteryear is only one of dimension—and degree.

I prefer to discuss with you some of the things we are doing about our troubles, and what we *can* do about them.

One thing we are doing about our international problems is to conduct a great Campaign of Truth, a world-wide psychological offensive—the Voice of America. This is a major effort of course and it is conducted through the International Information Administration—a program of international information and educational exchange. Other American Government activities overseas are coordinated with this comprehensive effort.

But the official Voice is but one of many voices heard overseas. There are American businessmen, missionaries, soldiers, and tourists. What they do and what they say either adds to or subtracts from the effectiveness of America's psychological effort to win an enduring peace.

We seek your help and that of all other Americans in carrying out this vast educational crusade—for that is what it is. You may find your part in helping foreign teachers and students who visit these shores to understand basic American principles. You may give advice to our own

(Continued on page 975)

ADDRESS BY JOSEPH B. PHILLIPS

Press release 908 dated December 8

I don't think the relationship between education and foreign policy has ever been more forcefully stated than it was by the late Elihu Root, a distinguished former Secretary of State. He wrote

When foreign affairs were ruled by autocracies or oligarchies the danger of war was in sinister purpose. When foreign affairs are ruled by democracies the danger of war will be in mistaken beliefs. The world will be the gainer by the change, for, while there is no human way to prevent a king from having a bad heart, there is a human way to prevent a people from having an erroneous opinion.

That is an important fact for all of us to remember who are concerned with the foreign relations of the American Government. But Mr. Root did not stop with that comment. He made it even more apropos to our discussion today. He went on to explain the way "to prevent a people from having an erroneous opinion." These are his words

That way is to furnish the whole people, as a part of their ordinary education, with correct information about their relations to other peoples, about the limitations upon their own rights, about their duties to respect the rights of others, about what has happened and is happening in international affairs, and about the effects upon national life of the things that are done or refused as between nations; so that the people themselves will have the means to test misinformation and appeals to prejudice and passion based upon error.

Those words spell out for us a common task, a task both for you in the field of education and for us in the Department of State—to help keep the American people informed on foreign policy and affairs.

With the passage of time, this task has steadily increased in both importance and urgency. The shaping of foreign policy is a responsibility which is shared by the Government and the people. We must provide for the public the facts of the world situation. We must then apprise the people of the manner in which American interests are involved and spell out what we are doing and why we are doing it. Finally, it is essential to enlist public support for the resulting policy.

In this day of almost instantaneous communication and high-speed transport—surface and air—most actions which our Government takes evoke a prompt reaction in the most remote as well as the nearest nations.

Overcoming Archaic Prejudices

While scientific advances have shrunk the physical world and created new problems of great intricacy, there has been no corresponding psychological change, no matching shift in the mental attitudes of the people. We may flash our words around the world and speed our jet planes across the continents and oceans, but we are still up against many horse-and-buggy prejudices and stone-age misconceptions among our people everywhere in the world.

The traditional popular distaste for diplomats is an example of a prejudice to which Americans cling tenaciously. To many, the diplomat is a dilettante who is automatically suspect because he associates with foreigners. Perhaps there was a time in our history when we could afford such misconceptions. If so, that time is long past. The U.S. position of leadership, the increased pace and sharpened impact of events, and the need for fast and sound decisions require public judgments arrived at logically.

The persistence of archaic prejudices amid the scientific miracles of the twentieth century is a hazard to all of us. It poses a special problem for the Government. If it is to bow to these prejudices and abide by the warped judgments they produce, it might just as well try to build jet planes with stone-age hammers. To root out these prejudices would seem a task for our educators in equipping young people to live in today's world.

When we consider the exceedingly complex nature of foreign policy in today's world, it is clear that we face no easy task. A ready illustration of this complexity is to be found in the aggression against the Republic of Korea. This demonstrates vividly how our international actions nowadays must be coordinated with those of other nations. Developments in the years since World War II have made it a prime consideration for us, as a leader of the free world, to enlist the cooperation of other nations on practically any international issue.

In recent weeks, the issue of Korea has been before the U.N. General Assembly. You know

something of the difficulties in getting agreement among the free nations on a compromise proposal for an armistice. This makes plain the fact that nations in the present state of world affairs seldom can act alone.

Within the U.N. system we work with other governments in about 15 international groups, including the 10 specialized agencies, such as the World Health Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization and, directly in the field of education, UNESCO.

Aside from the United Nations, we work with the 20 other members of the Organization of American States toward hemisphere goals. We work with the other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization toward mutual security. We belong to some 50 international organizations and work with them.

The Hoover Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, recognizing the cooperative nature of our foreign relations, summed it up this way: "Unilateral action by the United States without obtaining agreement of other nations is now the exception rather than the rule."

About 10 days ago a Washington newspaper declared that the average person can see about 500,000 different colors. Sometimes I feel that about that many different factors go into the making of any single policy in the field of current foreign affairs.

The extraordinary complexity of world affairs in this twentieth century and the extreme importance that they have assumed indicate the scope of the problem. If, as Mr. Root advised, we are "to furnish the whole people . . . with correct information about their relations to other peoples, about the limitations upon their own rights, about their duties to respect the rights of others, and about what has happened and is happening in world affairs . . ." it is clear that our work is cut out for us.

We must first recognize that public opinion sets the boundaries within which the Government can operate in foreign affairs. President Truman spoke from experience when he said:

In this nation, foreign policy is not made by the decisions of a few. It is the result of the democratic process, and represents the collective judgment of the people. Our foreign policy is founded upon an enlightened public opinion.

All of us here, I am sure, recognize the importance of public opinion. Yet communication between any branch of the Government and the people is always extremely difficult. Throughout our history there have been few times when there has been widespread sustained public interest in foreign affairs. The interest has come in times of crisis and then vanished. The Government may have been partly to blame for this lack of interest, but it is more logical to attribute it to the position of geographic isolation we used to enjoy.

The Publications Program

That lack of interest no longer exists. The American public today is keenly concerned with foreign policy. The problem of the Government has been to develop adequate mechanisms both for determining public opinion and for keeping the public informed. In the postwar period, the Department was authorized to establish an Office of Public Affairs and, for the first time in its history, it acquired the machinery to set about creating the desired "informed public opinion." The developments to date have been many-sided, and I believe that a great deal has been achieved. We have, for example, been able to broaden the publications program. Many of you here, I am sure, are familiar with the very recent booklet *Let Freedom Ring*, which presents a guide to the causes underlying present world tensions and tells the story and purpose of America's actions to meet the threat to our security. This booklet, in my opinion, represents a new high in Government publications. The graphics are striking and the text deals with our problems in clear and simple language. I commend it to your attention.¹

Our distribution centers throughout the country—there are 20 in all which handle our publications—report an encouraging interest in foreign-policy pamphlets and periodicals. These centers, of course, are not supported by the Department of State. They are nonprofit organizations, such as the World Affairs Councils or universities.

One of our publications, the *Field Reporter*, carries pictures and stories from many countries.² It shows foreign policy at work in far-away places. A distribution center reports that this bimonthly periodical has been proposed in at least one instance as a classroom text.

Some distribution centers describe our series of Background Summaries as "those good country pieces." There is a steady and growing demand for these summaries, which tell briefly and simply the story about developments in a particular country or area.³

The streamlined news sheet, which we get out every 2 weeks under the title of *Foreign Policy Briefs*, is growing in popularity. It helps the distribution centers take care of many requests for current official information and has been very favorably received in newspaper and other offices.⁴

We do not rely entirely upon printed matter to

reach the American people. Extensive contacts are made on a person-to-person basis through the Division of Public Liaison.

The Division maintains relations with private groups, organizations, and individuals interested in international affairs and provides them with information and with consultative services. It also of course arranges for the presentation of their views to the Department.

Another aspect of the Department's effort to keep in close touch with public opinion is carried out through the Division of Public Studies. This Division collects, analyzes, and interprets every available type of public expression on U.S. foreign affairs. It learns the nature of public opinion on pending problems in many ways—through the press, radio, television, through church and club leaders, through trade associations, labor unions, and other organizations. Many expressions come directly from citizens by letters and telegrams.

Education and Public Opinion

At this point, I offer you a fact about public opinion uncovered by surveys made in recent years which is of concern to us in the Department and of particular interest to persons in the educational field. The surveys show that there is a striking relationship between the amount of education a person has and his attitude toward our foreign policies. This relationship has been especially evident at times when new policies have been announced. For example, when the Marshall Plan was put forward in 1947, those who had attended college were more favorable toward it than those who had only attended high school, and high school graduates were much more favorable toward it than persons who had not gone beyond grammar school.

Nearly half the adult population of the United States today has had only a grammar school education, although the number of those attending high school now is much larger than it was 30 years ago.

To me, this suggests that it is of great importance for us to reach our primary and secondary schools. If our high schools can give more time and attention to the discussion of world affairs and foreign policy, this change should quite soon—and progressively—be reflected in increased public understanding and acceptance of the problems which confront America in its new role as leader of the free world.

To return to our information program: The activities which I have outlined are in line with the recommendations of the Hoover Commission Task Force Report on Foreign Affairs as it deals with the role of public opinion in foreign policy. The Report states:

The broad democratic basis upon which the United States must conduct its foreign affairs today makes

¹ *Let Freedom Ring*, Department of State publication 4443, is available from the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C. (50¢).

² *Field Reporter* is for sale by the Government Printing Office—Subscription (6 issues): \$1.50 a year; foreign \$2.00; individual copies, 30 cents.

³ Latest of these is *Berlin: City Between Two Worlds*, Department of State publication 4747; available from the Government Printing Office (15¢).

⁴ *Foreign Policy Briefs* is for sale by the Government Printing Office—Subscription (26 issues): \$1 a year; foreign \$1.50; individual copies 5 cents.

American public opinion a vital factor both in the determination of fundamental objectives and in the formulation and execution of policy.

The Commission adds that the State Department "is forced not only to ascertain what American opinion is but also to win its acceptance and support."

Despite the great amount of thought and effort which has gone into the Department's information program, the results so far attained fall somewhat short of the ideal. I say this without apology because I believe that we have made, and are making, great strides toward our objectives.

We are confronted with the major difficulty of how to present simply and concisely some extremely intricate and involved subjects. The language of diplomacy is as specialized as the language of the law. And while official documents, treaties, and protocols may detail a problem adequately for the professional diplomat or the expert in foreign affairs, lay readers would quickly become lost in strange terminology and unexplained references—assuming that they had the patience and the time to tackle such a project. So, in a very real sense, the pertinent documents and the circumstances to which they apply must be translated into language which gives an account which is accurate and, at the same time, understandable to the uninitiated.

It will probably be a long while before this problem of "translation" is resolved to the mutual satisfaction of the technicians in the Department and the readership. Frankly, I do not anticipate that the question will be settled within the span of my lifetime.

In my discussion so far I have been dealing with the work of the State Department both in determining public opinion and in keeping the public informed. I have felt that these facts would be helpful to you in considering the role of foreign affairs in the curricula of the schools in your States.

Education Facing a New Dimension

We have seen that a suitable foreign policy in a democracy requires that the people must understand major foreign issues. They must also be aware of the world they live in. In the interests of peace they must be informed on the basic needs of international cooperation.

Our position as a leader of the free world and our membership in the United Nations and other international bodies have introduced a new dimension into the education of our young people.

Congress has provided for the establishment of the U.S. National Commission of UNESCO, whose members advise the Government on matters related to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

This Commission has shown a deep interest in developing a strong program for the improve-

ment of teaching and teaching materials for international understanding. It gives major emphasis to projects for more effective teaching regarding the United Nations and the specialized agencies, both in the schools and in adult-education groups.

UNESCO includes in the preamble to its constitution the statement that "since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defenses of peace must be constructed." And so it seeks "to contribute to peace and security by promoting collaboration among the nations through education, science, and culture."

One of UNESCO's primary aims is to educate people about the principles and problems of the United Nations. We in this country believe that the United Nations is the world's best hope for peace and security. We believe that the United Nations is necessary to peace. It provides a means whereby the nations can cooperate to settle their disputes. We believe our citizens should be informed about it.

Secretary Acheson states it this way: "The foreign policy of the United States is based squarely upon the United Nations as the primary instrumentality of international peace and progress."

In addition to the domestic aspects of its information work the Department of State, as you know, conducts an international information program. That is an activity which Reed Harris, Deputy Administrator of the International Information Administration, will discuss with you this morning.

I should like however to discuss the domestic end of one portion of this program. I refer to the exchange-of-persons program and to the participation of your home communities in this exchange. I believe Mr. Harris plans to mention some of the details of these educational exchange activities.

Through this program we are creating person-to-person contacts to bring about better understanding between our people and other peoples. We want to create this understanding not merely because of the exigencies of the moment, although it is true that the nations of the free world are brought closer together by an awareness of a common danger. We should look beyond this danger, confident that the seeds of good will which we are sowing today will bear fruit in the years to come.

In closing, let me focus your attention on a problem facing the Department which goes to the roots of its capacity to act effectively and which is essentially a problem of public relations and public information. To me, it synthesizes the subject of our discussion this morning.

American foreign policy is and has been subjected to widespread criticism. This public dissatisfaction with our foreign policy as a whole is a serious matter.

However, when this popular dissatisfaction is analyzed, we encounter an astounding paradox.

The major components of American foreign policy—such as the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, NATO, Mutual Security, and Point Four (as well as others) have general public approval. And included among those who accept—even applaud—these individual programs are those people who are the severest critics of our foreign policy as a whole.

A majority of the American people approve the individual parts—but reject the whole. While this, necessarily, oversimplifies the picture, I believe the summary brings it into sharp focus. The illogical factors here seem to stem from a lack of information. The finite nature of the *individual* programs—the relative simplicity of their purpose—enables the average individual to grasp and to accept the point involved.

The lack of understanding for the *composite*, which is the whole mosaic of foreign policy, may

derive from a corresponding inability to follow the complex relationships between these programs and to view the whole in terms of American interests and the American capacity to act.

Whatever the source, there can be little question that the nub of the problem is one of mutual exchange of information—or rather lack of it. Certainly, the major responsibility for supplying the information rests with the Department of State. But I think part of it also rests with our educators. I say this because of the unmistakable relationship between the individual's education and his views on world affairs. There appear to be two things to be done. The Department must increase the scope and effectiveness of its two-way relationship with private groups and individuals, and the educators should strive to instill in our students a realistic grasp of America's place and responsibilities in world affairs.

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students and teachers going overseas. You, as educators, are listened to with respect, and you may thus influence tourists and business travelers to carry the American message overseas.

In this educational crusade, the first need is to help other peoples to know America and American aims—and the processes of education, of reaching people and of informing them are found in every so-called propaganda activity in which we are engaged. Secondly, we need an armament of ideas as well as of guns. That kind of armament—and Americans always have been people with ideas—must be coupled with a total effort among all those in Government and among all leading private citizens when we face the rest of the world.

In short, it is obvious that the United States, for its own security, needs a united voice of America speaking throughout the world. It must be a voice which is clear, powerful, and convincing. It must be the voice of freedom, of faith, and of friendship.

Educators have a real sense of their mission, and those of us in the IIA also have a sense of our mission. We can scarcely do otherwise, for we quickly realize in our work that the success of our mission will help determine the answer to the awful question of war or peace. If we are successful, the chances of peace will be enhanced. But if we fail, if we should lose the "cold war," if we do not help to convince other peoples of the worthwhileness of our cause—then the chances of World War III are inevitably advanced.

As you know, the IIA is an overseas propaganda agency of the United States. All its responsibilities have been clearly stated. Our job is to promote understanding of and support for the foreign policies of the United States. It is our job to help prevent Soviet communism from deterring the free progress of free peoples. It is our job

to encourage other peoples to channel their aspirations into constructive courses. And, finally, it is our job to maintain the hope of ultimate liberation among the captive peoples behind the Iron and Bamboo Curtains.

In a great area of the world—such as the Near East, Africa, and South Asia—the United States, through the Point Four and the Mutual Security Programs, is demonstrating how age-old problems can be solved with modern practices, science, and shirt-sleeve diplomacy. People in those areas are finding new ways (to them) of irrigating their croplands, of improving the health of their children, and of overcoming centuries-old plagues. At the same time, they are discovering that the helping hand of the United States is honestly extended; that we are not the imperialist warmonger that the Soviets charge us with being.

We work closely with the people in Point Four and the Mutual Security Agency to make certain that the recipients of American aid will know that our deeds will match up with our words. Nothing has quite so much meaning to the people of any country as proof that American promises are backed by American deeds.

To tell this story to people in all areas of the world, the IIA today is using every means of communication. Perhaps the most telling way to do the job is through the personal contacts encouraged by educational exchange programs, by our information centers, and by the voluntary cooperation of individual Americans and American organizations in projects auxiliary to our operations.

Exchange of Persons

Now, the exchange of people between countries is not a new idea; it has been studied widely. There is some difference of opinion as to the direction such a program should take. Particularly is this true in the exchange of students, teachers,

and professors. Some think its aim should be purely academic. In contrast, the Kremlin directs such activity solely as a propaganda weapon. We in the IIA subscribe to neither concept.

The first course is commendable and will always be a major result of international exchanges. But it is a luxury we cannot afford today. This fact is recognized by the purposes for educational exchanges as defined by the Congress.

The second view—educational exchange only for propaganda purposes—is contrary to our basic ideals.

So the middle course between these two extremes becomes our path. We are convinced that the national interest is best served through unmanipulated but selective exchanges and the best interest of the scholar is not neglected.

Those who benefit directly from the exchange program first of all get a personal contact with the life of America and of other countries. That is an effective way to influence public opinion in both countries to the mutual advantage of each. We hope that the foreign visitor will enjoy a significant experience, will gain understanding and respect for our institutions and our motives, and that he will become a genuine friend of Americans. He will not transplant *Americana* to other lands but instead will translate his experiences into terms which apply to the progress of his own country.

Just so, the same philosophy applies to the Americans we send abroad. They will not only interpret America to the people with whom they associate but they will influence those people by their conduct. Returning home, they will add significantly to what we know and understand of other peoples and other cultures. Their story of America is naturally more convincing to their people than anything we can say.

Today, for example, there are thousands of graduates of American universities who have returned to their home countries. They form a core of friends of the United States in all areas of the world. They include important officials, teachers, administrators of schools, and other leading citizens. When they go home, many of them openly extol our school system; they introduce into their colleges many principles from our system; and they, perhaps most important of all, help their associates and countrymen to understand us better.

Similarly, the leader-specialist program has been effective in assuring for the United States that we have good friends in high places. We have brought over from some countries their outstanding specialists, their government officials, their newsmen, and still other representatives. They can speak for their people and they are highly respected spokesmen at home.

And we do even more, for example, in that we send American teachers and other specialists to countries where they can teach in foreign schools

and where they can help other people to set up an improved school system.

Achievements of Exchangees

Here are a few instances of the things we enable people from other countries to do, following upon their courses of study and training in the United States.

A specialist from one country who studied industrial relations in America has been responsible for organizing a division of industrial relations in a major institute of his country. He also has served on a workers' education committee, prepared an entire syllabus on the subject of labor for several universities, helped in the distribution of pamphlets which were prepared by the American Federation of Labor, and cooperated directly with American business firms.

Another teacher, by her use of American methods and philosophy, has made her school into a model institution. Its practices are now being copied in other parts of her country. A young doctor who studied in the United States, since his return home, has been demonstrating the newest methods in plastic surgery. And in another country, a returned lawyer's series of articles about American democracy met with such favorable reception that it is now being printed there in book form by a commercial publisher.

The list of people, such as these, is growing every year. We intend to build up this impact on leadership groups in every possible country.

Necessarily, our programs in this field must be adapted to the needs and interests of each country. In France, for example, as in all countries, one of our major objectives is to encourage the cooperation of the people with Americans; to convince them that our courses of action are designed to promote their welfare and independence; and to combat the widespread neutralism which usually exists as an aftermath of war. Here, for example, are some of the results we have seen in France:

(1) The work of American lecturers is so respected and accepted that French universities are now including lectures on American literature and civilization as a regular part of the curriculum. This is something which was unheard of just a few years ago.

(2) The favorable impression made upon French youth who have visited the United States is rather remarkable. They have formed an alumni association among themselves, more than half have already joined this organization, and they use it to keep themselves in touch with the United States.

Likewise, the contributions of other Americans are extending far beyond the classroom. Dr. Mercer Cook of Howard University, while engaged in research work in Paris, frequently accepted invitations to lecture for IIA in Bordeaux, Marseille,

and Toulouse. Dr. Rayford Logan, also of Howard University, similarly lectured at Strasbourg, Nancy, Metz, and Lille.

These are not unique examples. But the two men are especially noteworthy because, as competent Negro scholars, they were able to give the lie to Communist propaganda about the so-called "downtrodden Negro" in American life. Once again, others found that our deeds matched our words.

In summary, the IIA exchange-of-persons program last year brought about the exchange of nearly 7,200 persons. They represented 72 countries, and there were thousands more of course under private grants. Some 30,000 students, most of whom are privately sponsored, are on 1,400 American campuses this year.

Much of what I have been discussing relates to only one phase of our educational exchange—the official grant-in-aid program. Of equal importance is our effort to encourage and assist institutions and organizations which conduct exchange programs without the use of public funds. This work is varied. Last year, we utilized on a contractual basis the services of nearly 50 different American institutions and organizations to help us screen, place, supervise, and set up a program for our grantees. Private organizations boosted the program by giving direct financial support. In 1951-52 more than 1.3 million dollars was thus contributed to backstop the partial grants awarded by the Government.

Another form of aid is the hospitality services of community groups and the voluntary work of hundreds of university officials, foreign-student advisers, and Fulbright advisers who helped to make this program more successful. In turn, our people have been assisting private exchanges in many ways. Last year, they worked with more than 500 organizations and institutions and with 57 foreign governments.

The Role of the Information Centers

The education activities of the IIA program do not stop with those we pursue in exchange of persons. An equally important effort is made through the 191 information centers located in 63 countries, and through 34 binational centers in 22 countries. The average center is about the size of a library in an American town of 10,000. It is a meeting place, a library, from which we reach other people through nearly every means of communication. Last year, the centers were visited by some 32 million people. Their libraries range in size from 1,000 to 50,000 volumes; nearly 8 million books were loaned out, in addition to those read on the spot. To support this activity, the IIA last year produced 150 translations in 20 languages, actually more than a million copies. This year we hope to work out 400 translations in 39 languages and more than three million copies.

These centers are alive with activity. For example, in Peru, one month last year, 14 schools including the Peruvian "West Point" asked for English teachers from the binational center at Lima. Across the world, in the Associated States of Indochina, English lessons were given to 40 classes and more than 1,000 persons were on the waiting list. There also were weekly English lessons on five of the seven radio stations.

Likewise expanding our list of personal contacts is the varied assistance we secured from private enterprise last year. The IIA encouraged private initiative to participate in all possible ways, and by June 30, 1952, we had obtained more than 600 contracts with individual Americans and organizations. Included were business firms, non-profit organizations, American communities, and fraternal groups as well as clubs, State agencies, and schools.

You can see clearly the educational process being employed in these many activities, which we put to work at the grass roots in each country. For many people, the information center, for example, provides more than just "learning." It also gives many of them their first opportunity to "see" the United States and to understand something of our science, history, economics, and philosophy. They begin to realize, if they have not done so before, that we are seeking the same goals and that Americans share with them the same aspirations.

In helping to educate the peoples of other countries about America, the IIA utilizes to the greatest possible extent their regular means of communications. This effort usually requires a combination of our operations through press, radio, and motion pictures with the available media in other countries.

Thus, we reached an estimated half billion people in 88 countries in 1952 by publishing 44 magazines, 16 newspapers, and by sending a daily *Wireless Bulletin*—a fast news service—to 10,000 foreign newspapers and periodicals. These foreign publications alone are read by 100 million subscribers. We also have distributed around the world about 200 million copies of booklets, posters, and pamphlets, of which 87 million were put into the hands of other people in the last fiscal year. Roughly 9 out of 10 were prepared to meet local conditions and then printed by IIA posts and regional service centers overseas. And they are getting results.

For example: The *Informaciones Obreras*, a weekly publication on labor developments in the United States, is sent to labor leaders and newspapers in Argentina. Many articles from this weekly have been reprinted with front-page attention. In Syria, as much as half of all space devoted to world news published in the newspapers is of IIA origin. *Wireless Bulletin* material was used on an average of 350 column inches per

week in English and Urdu newspapers of Pakistan.

Radio and Film Activities

Through the Voice of America, the IIA speaks every day in 46 languages to potentially 300 million people. The programs sent out over the Voice system now equal the combined program output of three major American broadcasting companies. We not only have to lick the program problem in many languages but also the facilities problem in erecting and maintaining broadcast and relay stations around the world. We must also overcome the problems of distance, of natural barriers, and of Soviet jamming. Together with their satellites, the Soviets are using more than 1,000 stations just trying to smother our radio messages.

You may be interested in another fact: about 60 percent of our total radio effort and a good two-thirds of all our facilities are devoted to reaching the 800 million people who are prisoners of propaganda in Russia, Eastern Europe, and China. We are reaching many of them, and there is a highly important secondary method of distribution of VOA messages by grapevine. This news grapevine is very active behind the two Curtains, even though anyone who participates may be imprisoned or shot.

Our motion-picture activities are particularly useful in several ways. First, they permit us literally to show America and Americans in daily pursuits and to picture the possibilities of democracy for other people. Through film, the progress of an American aid program in a particular village can be shown and is shown to all people in the same country by local productions in native dress and native tongue. Secondly, the films enable IIA to tell America's story to many people who may be semiliterate or for whom there are no other means of communication with the outside world.

Last year, the sound tracks of our motion-picture films were scored in 42 languages. They were heard and seen in 87 countries by an audience of nearly 450 million. This audience included those who saw our films in commercial theaters, those who watched them in school and union halls and in auditoriums, and those countless thousands who were reached by 364 mobile units and over 6,000 projectors as they sat on hillsides in mountainous, rural, and jungle country.

IIA films, it is estimated, are now reaching more than 1½ million Philippines each month; they encouraged whole villages to refuse help to the Communist Huks. A sound-truck tour in Mexico, for example, visited 47 villages, gave 127 showings, and reached more than 116,000 persons. From Bombay, 59 film showings were made in the first half of 1952 before rural audiences of 40,000 per-

sons on one mobile-unit tour. In Afghanistan, film audiences at IIA presentations went as high as 25,000 per month at Kabul.

We are now making a special effort to place our films in schools. For one thing, our films are more effective when shown by others, and they inevitably will help teach the children something about democracy. The films also will exert an influence, we hope, which will be carried back to their parents.

Together, these are the regular means of communications which are used by the IIA to reach other people. Every educator of course knows that to do these things costs money. In good part, all education is dependent upon how much money you have to attract better teachers, to improve upon your materials, and to maintain classrooms. Just so does this great educational effort by the IIA require funds. Congress appropriated 88-million dollars for the present fiscal year for IIA. If my arithmetic is correct, this means that 160 million Americans each contributed about 55 cents in taxes for the IIA overseas program during the last year.

Personally, I don't think that's too much to ask of Americans. However, there are some who question the total expenditures. They say that it can be done for much less. I have even heard it said that the program could be run with a handful of experts. On the other hand, there are those who think we should be spending billions instead of millions—experts in the field of public opinion, like George Gallup. Listen to what he had to say in the December 2 issue of *Look Magazine*:

If the great gains made by Russia since the end of World War II had been made by conventional methods of warfare, we would all be shivering in our boots today.

But Russia's conquest in Asia, her growing strength in the Middle East, and her strong minority position in other parts of the world have come about not by force of arms, but by force of propaganda.

I wrote about a year ago that we should spend about \$5 billion a year if we want to make headway in this battle for the minds of men. Today, I am inclined to regard this amount as a minimum expenditure.

And for comparison, how much are the Soviets and their satellites spending on propaganda. According to the best intelligence estimates, they are now spending not less than 1.7 billion dollars each year on direct propaganda, plus several billion on indirect propaganda. In France, for example, it is costing the Soviets more than 150 million dollars a year to aid their Communist Party followers.

Right now, there are some 200 Soviet commercial publishing houses turning out books, pamphlets, and posters in 120 languages for distribution through the local Communist Parties in many countries. To visualize what these expenditures mean to the Kremlin, the gross national income of the U.S.S.R. is about 70 billion dollars a year and, except for military spending, the Soviets are

allocating fractionally more of their national budget on propoganda than on any other activity of the State.

Combatting Soviet Lies and Half-Truths

But even more important in the scheme of things than costs—more important than specific activities—and *most* important in the final success of our efforts is one favorable factor. It is a crucial advantage we hold over Soviet communism.

This one factor is that we have truth on our side—we really believe in our ideas; they truly represent all the things we stand for and have stood for.

What this means is that we have the advantage of history, because it is impossible for the Soviets to match up their actions with their words; they do not have truth on their side.

In this respect, our overseas information problem, while inevitably complex, is not so difficult as that facing the Kremlin.

There is another way to view our problem in the overseas information program. Here in America, as we know, we have different races, creeds, political parties, and organized groups. To influence public opinion in the United States, advertisers must adapt their messages to reach diverse interests. And to reach 160 million Americans, they spend hundreds of millions of dollars each year. They have a big job, I am sure all of us will agree.

Now turn to the world. There we find even more diverse races, and customs, and languages, as well as hundreds of millions of peoples. To reach the free peoples and those in the captive world, we have a truly great problem. It requires that we adapt our message so that it will be understood in many different areas. It requires us to be highly selective in the use of those methods of communication which are available to us in each country. It necessitates that we coordinate all our operations across the seas and with careful timing. And perhaps most important of all, we must marshal our resources—and the resources and efforts of every cooperating individual and organization—into a coordinated program.

That is the basic reason why there must be a close coordination of American enterprise in the Campaign of Truth, among all Government agencies in Washington and in the field, and among all interested citizens.

The Big Lie, remember, is directed primarily at us—at you and me, as well as against the United States. It has been intensified into a "Hate America" Campaign of staggering proportions. And the lies and the half-truths of Soviet communism are still influencing large numbers of people

in the world. There are many, of course, who may have believed the Soviets yesterday but do not trust them today. The Soviets are surely, though slowly, getting caught up in their lies—on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

We get a lot of evidence that this is so, and especially from escapees out of Iron Curtain countries. You will recall reading, not long ago, the comments of a Rumanian athlete who fled the Iron Curtain after the Olympic games at Helsinki. He told his people over the Voice of America:¹

I am filled with deep emotion in speaking to those in my country from this radio station which I myself have listened to for years with hope and confidence. . . . It is this unmasking of their deception that the Communists are most afraid of. For it is this knowledge which gives the lie most effectively to Communist propoganda and which will most strengthen the captive people's will to resist.

Yet, international communism has this one more advantage in its propoganda campaign. It is found in our psychological problem. We are trying to build, while the international Communists seek to destroy. That makes their task the easier and ours the more difficult simply because in any field it is always true that construction is more difficult than destruction.

The world situation today, you well know, leaves no room for complacency. Nor is there room for half-hearted efforts.

The problems we face are dangerous and they demand all-out action. We need the help of your group in getting at those problems. It is our job—our business—to influence the minds of men in the cause of democracy. And there is no segment of the American society which is better equipped than our educators to advance that single objective.

We are engaged in an information program, a propoganda effort. But as I have stated earlier, the fundamental process in all our efforts is an educational process. The main job is to help educate the people of the world in the values of democracy and the sovereignty of the individual.

Of the people in our society, you are among the most important in the accomplishment of these goals in the United States. For you are implanting the American idea—the democratic way—in the minds of all of our people. That is what we teach our children in our schools, as well as in our homes and in our churches. You can—and you must—participate in the great Campaign of Truth, lending your collective know-how to this endeavor so that America will fulfill its destiny in leading the forces of freedom to a better and safer world.

¹ BULLETIN of Oct. 13, 1952, p. 563.

U.S. Asks Return of Property Seized in 1951 Plane Incident

Press release 909 dated December 10

Upon instruction of the Department of State, the Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim* of the United States at Moscow, Elin O'Shaughnessy, and the Minister of the United States at Budapest, Christian M. Ravndal, on December 10 delivered diplomatic notes to the Soviet and Hungarian Foreign Ministers, respectively, concerning the detention and treatment last year by the Soviet and Hungarian Governments of four American airmen, Capt. Dave H. Henderson, Capt. John J. Swift, Sgt. Jess A. Duff, and Sgt. James A. Elam.

On November 19, 1951, a C-47-type cargo aircraft of the U.S. Air Force left Erding, Germany, for Belgrade, Yugoslavia, carrying supplies for the office of the American Air Attaché at Belgrade. The plane and the crew were unarmed. When the plane failed to arrive at its destination, Yugoslav and American authorities made inquiries among other governments in whose territory the plane might have come down, including the Hungarian Government. Hungarian Government authorities denied knowledge of the whereabouts or fate of the plane and its crew. An elaborate search for the missing plane in Yugoslav territory was conducted without result.

On December 2, 1951, for the first time, the U.S. Government learned from a Soviet announcement that the aircraft had been brought down by Soviet authorities in Hungary and subsequently turned over with its crew to Hungarian authorities. Attempts by the United States then to obtain access to the men and to effect their immediate release and the return of the plane failed.

On December 23, 1951, the Hungarian Government announced that the men had been found guilty by a military court of deliberately violating the Hungarian border. The trial was secret, and the United States was given no opportunity to be present through any representative. To effect the release of the men and prevent their continued abuse by the Soviet Government and its satellites the United States paid to the Hungarian Government, under protest, the amount of the fine demanded by the Hungarian Government, 123,-

605.15 dollars. On December 28, 1951, the men were released.¹

The purpose of the actions by the Soviet and Hungarian Governments in this incident was made clear in the General Assembly of the United Nations then meeting in Paris. The Soviet representatives, particularly Andrei Y. Vyshinsky, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Government, sought to exploit the incident as propaganda in support of the Soviet line in the General Assembly that the United States was guilty of subversive activity within the Soviet orbit.

Speaking in the General Assembly of the United Nations in Paris after release of the airmen, Representative Mike Mansfield, a member of the American delegation, stated: "In no sense do we consider the incident closed."² Meanwhile, the Department of State, with the cooperation of the Department of the Air Force, inaugurated an intensive investigation. As set forth in the notes delivered to the Soviet and Hungarian Governments, serious discrepancies were confirmed between what the Soviet and Hungarian authorities, including Foreign Minister Vyshinsky in his speeches to the General Assembly last year, asserted the facts to have been and what actually took place.

The United States is therefore considering appropriate legal action. However, in accordance

¹ See BULLETIN of Jan. 7, 1952, p. 7, for texts of: (1) Department's announcement that the fine would be paid; (2) statement made by Secretary Acheson, following release of the fliers, warning the Budapest regime that ". . . we have not paid willingly, and we state clearly, in order that there may be no misunderstanding of our attitude in the future, that our patience is not inexhaustible. . . ."; and (3) the U.S. note of Dec. 28, 1951, notifying the Hungarian Government that Hungarian Consulates in the United States would be required to cease all operations and be closed by midnight, Dec. 13, 1951.

² *Ibid.*, Jan. 28, 1952, p. 128. For text of a previous statement made by Mr. Mansfield and one by Ernest A. Gross, who was also a U.S. delegate to the sixth General Assembly, made in refuting charges of U.S. subversive activity within the Soviet orbit, see *ibid.*, Jan. 7, 1952, pp. 28-35.

with accepted judicial procedures, the United States has determined first formally to provide these two Governments with an opportunity to return to the United States the property seized from the airmen, including the plane, its equipment, and its cargo, and to make available to the United States all other original evidence now in the possession of those governments, such as the minutes of the trial and the judicial dossiers, if they exist, as well as the flight documents of the airplane.

Following are texts of the notes sent by the United States to the Soviet and Hungarian Governments:

TEXT OF U.S. NOTE TO THE U.S.S.R.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to present to you, upon the instruction of my Government, the following communication:

The Government of the United States of America draws the attention of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the case of the four United States Air Force personnel, Captain Dave H. Henderson, Captain John J. Swift, Sergeant Jess A. Duff, and Sergeant James A. Elam, who were brought down on Hungarian territory by a Soviet airplane on November 19, 1951, were detained by Soviet and Hungarian authorities within Hungary, and were thereafter tried and convicted of crime by Hungarian authorities, and to effect whose release the United States Government paid to the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic on December 28, 1951, under protest, the sum of \$123,605.15.

It will be recalled that the Soviet Government did not disclose to the United States authorities prior to December 3, 1951, that the Soviet Government had seized and detained the airmen and their airplane, C-47 type USAF 6026, bearing the identification symbol 43-16026, and both the Soviet and Hungarian authorities prevented access to the airmen by United States authorities at all times until the release of the airmen on December 28, 1951. The United States was therefore unable to determine whether any evidence whatever existed, of however doubtful validity or credibility, to justify or sustain any of the allegations of fact, charges, and findings announced by the Soviet and Hungarian authorities at various times in the matter or what acts had been engaged in by the Soviet and Hungarian Governments with respect to the incident. Since the return of the airmen, the United States has engaged in an exhaustive inquiry to ascertain all the essential facts with respect to the entire incident. As the United States is separately informing the Hungarian Government, this inquiry has disclosed so serious a variance between the actual facts as now ascertained and the representations with respect to these facts theretofore made by the Hungarian and Soviet Governments that the United States

is compelled to consider whether it should not now take further action in this matter.

The United States finds, as a result of the inquiry, that as to certain important issues of fact the best legal documentary evidence was seized by the Soviet Government from the aircraft and its crew or has otherwise come into the possession of the Soviet Government. The United States desires to defer the taking of further action in this matter until it has been able to review that evidence, if the Soviet Government will make all such evidence in its possession available to the United States Government for that purpose.

1. The United States Government has confirmed in the course of this investigation that it was the Soviet authorities stationed in Hungary who on November 19, 1951, seized C-47 type USAF airplane 6026 and its contents from the custody of the United States Air Force personnel above named, who had unwittingly become lost over Hungarian territory, and whom a Soviet plane had shown to a landing field in Hungary. The property seized was and is property of the United States Government. It consisted of:

(1) United States Air Force airplane 6026, C-47 type and its equipment, value \$96,436.40.

(2) Cargo thereof, itemized in the manifests on board the airplane when seized by the Soviet authorities, value \$2,342.89.

Total value \$98,779.29

The United States Government requests the Soviet Government to make prompt return of the airplane, its equipment and its cargo, or to make prompt provision for the payment of the value thereof as shown above, with interest at 6 percent from November 19, 1951, in the event that the return should not for any valid reason be possible.

2. In particular, and apart from the foregoing, the United States requests the Soviet Government to return to it specifically certain articles, property of the United States, which were on board the airplane when it was seized by the Soviet authorities and which are known by the United States Government to have been and are therefore believed still to be in the possession of the Soviet authorities. These articles are:

(1) Aeronautical charts entitled "World Aeronautical Charts" published by the United States Government, Forms Nos. WAF 230, 231, 252, 253, 320, 321, 343, 423, 424, 425; and two aeronautical planning charts, Nos. 11 and 12.

(2) A *Radio Facilities Chart of Europe*, published by the United States.

(3) The flight plan, bearing the signatures of the pilot, Captain Dave Henderson, and other United States Air Force personnel.

(4) The navigation log, as filled out by United States Air Force personnel, showing the details of the anticipated flight from Erding, Germany, to Belgrade, Yugoslavia.

(5) AF Form No. 1, being the log of aircraft 6026, showing number of passengers carried, place and time of take-off, landings et cetera, kept by the engineer and the pilot.

- (6) AF Form 35, being the log kept by the radio operator, Sergeant James A. Elam, and all notes of the same radio operator, whether or not in the log.
- (7) AF Form 75, being the retained copy of the pilot, Captain Henderson, of the clearance form issued by American authorities at Erding, Germany, on the aircraft's leaving that place November 19, 1951, showing the persons carried, the weather briefing, the route to be flown, the estimated time of flight, the amount of fuel carried by the plane and other flight information.
- (8) Navigation computer, described as Form E6B.
- (9) *Pilot's Handbook* published by the United States.
- (10) AF Form 15 and pad, showing the condition of the plane on departure.
- (11) Leather brief case, called a navigator's kit, and all other contents thereof in addition to these described above.
- (12) One portable United States Air Force emergency radio transmitter.
- (13) Twenty-one blankets.

The Soviet Government, in replying to the foregoing request, is asked to specify whether the maps (in item 1 above), the radio transmitter (in item 12 above) and the blankets (in item 13 above) are those to which Mr. Andrei Y. Vyshinsky, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Government, referred to in his several speeches on this subject in the course of the meetings of the General Assembly of the United Nations at Paris in December 1951 and January 1952.

3. The United States is informed further, as a result of the investigation, that the Soviet authorities in Hungary interrogated the four United States Air Force personnel mentioned above from November 19 to December 3, 1951. The United States Government requests the Soviet Government to provide the United States Government with:

- (1) Duly authenticated copies of each statement made by each of the four airmen, however taken from them, whether in writing or by other forms of transcription.
- (2) Duly authenticated copies of all reports with respect to the facts of the case made by the interrogators and other investigators to the Soviet Government.

Should the Soviet Government prefer, the United States is prepared to make copies of the contents of the dossiers of the case and of the documents to which reference is made, upon the representation of the Soviet Government that the dossiers and the documents under reference are complete and intact, and if reasonable access thereto for the purpose is provided by the Soviet authorities.

4. With further respect to the facts in the case the United States makes reference to various statements on this subject by Soviet authorities and particularly Mr. Andrei Y. Vyshinsky, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Government, during the course of the United Nations General Assembly held in Paris in December 1951 and January 1952. In this respect the United States Government requests the Soviet Government to provide the United States Government with the

specific provisions of all treaties, agreements and other arrangements between the Soviet Government and the Hungarian Government by which, in the Soviet Government's view, Soviet authorities were legally entitled to bring down and detain the aircraft 6026, its personnel, cargo and other contents, to interrogate the personnel, to refrain from informing the United States of such facts and from returning the airmen, the plane, or the cargo and other contents, to the United States authorities, and to turn the airmen, and to the extent it has done so any of the property described, over to the Hungarian authorities.

5. The Soviet Government is further informed that should it fail promptly to effect the return of the property requested, or promptly to make available for the examination of the United States the documentary evidence as requested, or promptly to provide the information requested, the United States Government will consider itself entitled to take such substantive action on account of such failure as it may then find appropriate, and also to rely on and produce secondary evidence, to the extent available to the United States, in any proceedings hereafter in which the property, the documents, or the information, as original or best legal evidence, may be relevant. The United States Government reserves the right to proceed upon the promise that return of the articles, examination of the documents and provision of the information, so requested and not made, would be unfavorable to the Soviet Government and the United States Government will consider and contend whenever and wherever appropriate that the Soviet Government should be estopped from producing as evidence in its behalf the original or best legal evidence thus concealed from the United States or from contesting the admissibility or value of the secondary evidence.

6. The United States wishes to make clear that the return of the airplane, its equipment and its cargo, or their value, and the documents and other property taken by the Soviet Government in connection therewith will not be considered by the United States to relieve the Soviet Government or the Hungarian Government in any way of liability for damages caused by either government to the United States or its nationals in this matter and remaining unsatisfied.

The United States Government requests the favor of a reply from the Soviet Government at the Soviet Government's earliest convenience.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of my high consideration.

TEXT OF U.S. NOTE TO HUNGARY

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to present to you, upon the instruction of my Government, the following communication:

The Government of the United States draws the attention of the Government of the Hungarian

People's Republic to the case of the four United States Air Force personnel, Captain Dave H. Henderson, Captain John J. Swift, Sergeant Jess A. Duff, and Sergeant James A. Elam, who were brought down on Hungarian territory by a Soviet airplane on November 19, 1951, were detained by Soviet and Hungarian authorities within Hungary, and were thereafter tried and convicted of crime by Hungarian authorities, and to effect whose release the United States Government paid to the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic on December 28, 1951, under protest, the sum of \$123,605.15.

Since the release of the four named airmen the United States has engaged in an exhaustive inquiry to establish all the essential facts with respect to the entire incident. Inasmuch as the United States Government was denied access to the four men before and during the trial and prior to the payment of the fines above mentioned, the United States Government was unable to determine before the release of the airmen whether any evidence whatever existed, of however doubtful validity or credibility, to justify or sustain any of the charges and findings announced by the Soviet and Hungarian authorities at various times in the matter or what acts had been engaged in by the Soviet and Hungarian Governments with respect to the incident. The inquiry which the United States Government has conducted since the return of the airmen has disclosed such serious variance between the facts as they actually were and the representations of those facts theretofore made by the Hungarian and Soviet authorities as to compel the United States Government to consider whether further action should not be taken by it in this matter.

The United States finds, as a result of the inquiry, that in important respects the best legal evidence as to the issues of fact may be in the possession of the Hungarian Government. The United States desires to defer the taking of further action in this matter until it has been able to review that evidence, if the Hungarian Government will make all such evidence in its possession available to the United States Government for that purpose.

The United States takes this opportunity, therefore, to call upon the Hungarian Government to provide the United States with the following material facts and data:

1. The names, ranks and services of all Hungarian authorities in whose custody the airmen were held, and those by whom they were interrogated, particularly on and after December 3, 1951, specifying whether such authorities were civil or military, the places where they were so held and interrogated, and the provisions of Hungarian law authorizing such detention and such interrogation.

2. A transcript, duly certified, of the official court proceedings against the four airmen, in-

cluding in particular the statement of charges or indictment, the defendants' pleadings, the minutes of the trial, the judgments, orders and opinions of the court, and all other documents relating to the arrest, trial, conviction and punishment of the four airmen; and a similar transcript of all appellate and review proceedings, including in particular the documents perfecting appeal, the documents submitted by the appellants and by the appellees, if any, to each Hungarian court concerned and the judgments, orders and opinions thereon; and a transcript of all other documents relating to the review of the cases of these defendants.

Should the Hungarian Government prefer, the United States Government is prepared to make copies of the contents of the dossiers of these cases, upon the representation of the Hungarian Government that the dossiers are complete and intact, and if reasonable access thereto for the purpose is provided by the Hungarian authorities.

The United States notes, parenthetically, that it has heretofore called upon the Hungarian Government upon several occasions to provide the United States with a record of the trial, without any affirmative or responsive action with respect thereto on the part of the Hungarian Government; the United States Government calls attention to various requests of December 23, 1951, December 24, 1951, December 28, 1951, January 2, 1952, January 16, 1952, and January 22, 1952.

3. The names, addresses and ranks of:

- (a) The person acting as prosecutor at the trial,
- (b) Each of the judges participating in the trial,
- (c) The interpreter serving in the trial,
- (d) The recorder at the trial, and
- (e) All other Hungarian officials present or participating in the trial or at any stage thereof, and at all pretrial proceedings.

4. The names and addresses of the lawyers tendered by the prosecutor to the defendants, specifying, defendant by defendant, those selected to represent the defendants. The Hungarian Government is requested to state how the lawyers tendered, believed now to have been eight in number, were chosen by the government and the full content of any instructions given them by or on behalf of the government.

5. The names, ranks and addresses, and the total number of persons, other than those enumerated above, present at the trial at any time in the course thereof.

6. Should the records above referred to in paragraph 2 not include all statements made by the four airmen to Hungarian or Soviet authorities or taken from the airmen in writing or in any form of transcription by such authorities, the United States Government requests further that duly authenticated copies of all such additional

documents and records be provided to the United States. Should the Hungarian Government prefer, the United States is prepared in this case likewise to make copies of such documents upon the representation of the Hungarian Government that the documents are complete and intact and if reasonable access thereto for the purpose is provided by the Hungarian Government.

7. Duly authenticated copies of all reports made by each investigator and each interrogator to the Hungarian Government with respect to the facts of the case. Here again, should the Hungarian Government prefer, the United States is prepared to make copies of such reports upon the representation of the Hungarian Government that the reports are complete and intact and if reasonable access thereto for the purpose is provided by the Hungarian authorities.

8. The provisions of Hungarian law under which (a) the men were detained, (b) the trial of the defendants by a military court, as distinguished from a civil court, was justified, (c) the trial was held in the city of Budapest as distinguished from the city of Papa where the airmen allegedly landed.

9. The breakdown of all arithmetic computations by which the court's fine of 360,000 forints against each defendant was arrived at, together with the relevant provisions of the laws and decrees involved in this computation; and the laws or decrees setting the rate of exchange for United States dollars used by the Hungarian Government in converting 360,000 forints each into the final sum of \$123,605.15, demanded by the Hungarian Government and paid under protest by the United States Government; and whether the period of detention preceding trial was applied in reduction of the punishment and, if so, the extent to which that was reflected in the punishment by the court or, if not, why not.

10. The provisions of each agreement or treaty with the Soviet Union by which the seizure, arrest, detention and interrogation of the airmen by the Soviet authorities in Hungary, their subsequent rendition to the Hungarian authorities, and the conversion of any part or all of the airplane, its contents and the cargo are claimed by the Hungarian Government to have been authorized.

The Hungarian Government is informed that should the material requested herein from the Hungarian Government not be promptly supplied, as requested, the United States Government will consider itself entitled to take such substantive action as it may then find appropriate, and also to rely on and produce secondary evidence, to the extent available to it, in any proceedings hereafter in which the material as original or best legal evidence may be relevant. The United States Government reserves the right to proceed upon the premise that the facts requested and not disclosed would, if disclosed, be unfavorable to the Hungarian Government, and the United

States Government will consider and contend whenever and wherever appropriate that the Hungarian Government should be estopped from producing in its behalf any of the evidence so requested and not supplied, or from contesting the admissibility or value of the secondary evidence.

The United States Government requests the favor of a reply from the Hungarian Government at the Hungarian Government's earliest convenience.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of my high consideration.

Message to Israeli President

Press release 911 dated December 10

The following message has been sent by President Truman to Izhak Ben-Zvi, who on December 8 was elected President of Israel.

In the name of the American people and in my own I extend congratulations on your election and best wishes for success in your new duties. It is my fervent hope that you will exert your strength toward the lessening of tensions between your people and neighboring states to the end that peace may be attained as early as possible.

Key Steps Taken on EDC Treaty and Contractual Conventions

Statement by the President

White House press release dated December 6

I am gratified by the news from Germany of the first Parliamentary action with regard to the European Defense Community Treaty and pleased to note that the Bundestag at the same time passed in second reading the Contractual Conventions. I am conscious of the profound significance of this demonstration of the will of the people through their elected representatives. Together, these agreements will in due course enable the Federal Republic to assume an important and honorable role in the family of free nations, will help create a common defense force for the protection of Western Europe, and will constitute an additional major step toward European unity, a goal which is ardently desired by Europeans and their friends throughout the democratic world.

It is realized that the vote by the Bundestag does not constitute final action on account of certain other requirements connected with the ratification process in the Federal Republic. It is, however,

our earnest hope that these can be completed as promptly as possible, and that this will soon be followed by ratification by the other states which have signed the conventions. I feel confident that all those concerned with these key steps will act, conscious of the serious political and other consequences to the position of Germany and to the defense of the free world if ratification is long delayed or not accomplished.

North Atlantic Council Meeting

Press release 912 dated December 10

In response to questions at his press conference on December 10, Secretary Acheson gave the following extemporaneous résumé of what is expected at the meeting of the Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization which convened at Paris on December 15:

I do not think that this will be a meeting at which any very great conclusions are reached. You recall that when the NATO was reorganized at Lisbon, it was thought that many of the matters which come up in the regular course could be dealt with by the permanent representatives. That has proved to be the case. It was also thought that we should have regular meetings, several each year, on a ministerial level for the purpose not of dealing with some matter of far-reaching importance at every meeting but to establish the habit of regular consultation with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Finance present, to exchange ideas and see where we are, whether we are going fast enough, whether we should go faster, slower, or in what direction. And then there would be meetings at which very considerable decisions would be made.

It had been hoped at one time that this meeting in December could complete the annual review of the force goals for 1953. However, that has not proved possible. It took longer than was expected to get in some of the data from some of the countries, and the analysis of it has not gone as fast as at one time seemed possible. Therefore, I think there can only be a preliminary consideration of that important matter at this meeting and it will have to be definitively acted upon at a later meeting.

I think we should not get into the habit of believing that every meeting must be one of great

importance, out of which comes some new decision. It is important, as I said before, that we establish the habit of constant consultation, so that we can exchange ideas and get in the habit of working together.

Czechoslovak Purge Trial

Press Conference Statement by Secretary Acheson

Press release 910 dated December 10

The recent trial of Slansky and others which concluded with the imposing of drastic sentences of death or life imprisonment for all of the accused is another in the series of staged spectacles patterned on the purge trials at Moscow during the 30's. There is nothing new or unexpected about it.

This show trial in which Stalinist communism devours its own children, and some of its most faithful votaries, has been repeated time and again to sound a macabre warning to those Communist leaders who survive. We may expect it to recur in the Soviet empire wherever it is deemed necessary to teach the lessons of utter unquestioning dependence upon the Kremlin and unswerving and successful compliance with its purposes.

It is an elaborate pretense with innumerable false charges, forced testimony, and induced confessions but its essence is a technique of totalitarian control. It is designed to terrorize satellite regimes, to punish them for shortcomings, to compel greater exertions, to produce scapegoats, and to provide a propaganda demonstration of the Kremlin's favorite hates whether states, organizations, or individuals of the free world.

As to the anti-Israel, anti-Zionist and anti-Jewish aspects of the trial, occasion was taken to introduce numerous hostile allegations against the Zionist movement and the State of Israel. It is not yet clear what consequences this development may have for Jews generally in Czechoslovakia and in other satellite areas of Eastern Europe.

The record of the proceedings presents an interesting review of all the deficiencies of the regime in Czechoslovakia since the February coup as adjudged by Moscow. That it was necessary to have this trial is evidence of Moscow's dissatisfaction with what the Communists have done or failed to do in Czechoslovakia, especially with performance of that country in the economic sphere.

Tunisian Question Comes Before General Assembly

Statement by Philip C. Jessup

U. S. Representative to the General Assembly¹

U.S./U.N. press release dated December 6

In giving consideration to "the Tunisian Question" which is now before this committee, it is helpful, if our thinking about it is to be calm and logical, to place the item in a category.

It would be artificial to attempt to draw up a comprehensive list of categories of items which may come before the General Assembly. It would perhaps be futile to devote the time of the Assembly to a discussion of the preliminary question of sorting a particular item into the appropriate category. Nevertheless, in the thinking of my delegation, this and other items do need to be examined in this way, and I am exploring the subject with the committee in order that the views of the U.S. delegation may be fully understood. I am encouraged to believe that this is a sound approach by the fact that the representative of Pakistan, in the comprehensive eloquence of his statement to this committee a few days ago, used an analogous approach. He reached the conclusion that he preferred to view this question principally as a human problem. Our analysis leads us to a somewhat different result.

In his address to the Assembly during the general debate on October 16,² Secretary of State Acheson used three convenient categories to describe the groups of major problems lying before us at this session. The first of these, he said, are those which concern security. The second are those that relate to the fulfillment of national and individual aspirations. The third is composed of problems that have to do with economic progress of both individuals and communities.

It is clear that a single item may involve elements of two or of all three categories. There may be instances in which it is hard to say in which category an item should be placed. Where such allocation is possible and useful in order to arrive

at the best appreciation of the problem, the exercise is worth while.

Secretary Acheson naturally referred to the Korean item as the prime example of a problem that concerns security. There can be no question about this. It is also clear that when the Assembly is dealing with an item that belongs in the security category such as Korea, the members of the Assembly are called upon to form a judgment. The Assembly recognized this fact on February 1, 1951, when it adopted its historic resolution recognizing that an aggression had been committed in Korea and identifying the Chinese Communist regime as an aggressor.

It is also easy in regard to such items as the economic development of underdeveloped countries to conclude that they fall within the third category of problems having to do with economic progress.

The powers of the General Assembly under the Charter are so broad that one is unable to conclude that a case belongs in one or another category merely because it is on the agenda. In this respect the General Assembly is quite different from the Security Council. Aside from a few specific functions which may be described as administrative, the Security Council under the Charter deals fundamentally with actual breaches of the peace or with disputes, or with situations which might lead to international friction, or give rise to a dispute. The Assembly, on the other hand, "may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope" of the Charter.

Thus, when the Tunisian question was submitted to the Security Council, the submission contained 11 separate, but similar, letters supporting the inclusion of the item on the agenda of the Security Council stated that, in the opinion of the submitting government, the Tunisian situation seriously endangered the maintenance of international peace and security and therefore fell within the scope of article 34 of the Charter.

The same 11 states have joined with two additional states in submitting this item for inclusion

¹ Made in Committee I (Political and Security) on Dec. 8.

² BULLETIN of Oct. 27, 1952, p. 639.

on the agenda of the General Assembly.³ One notes in the explanatory memorandum that the situation is presented to the General Assembly as being one of increased tension and one which has created a deep sense of "frustration among people in many countries of the world and especially in Asian and African countries." The memorandum concludes by saying that "the situation in Tunisia continues to be serious." We are told that "the question is being referred to the General Assembly in order that a just and peaceful settlement may be achieved." Reference is made to article 11, paragraph 2, which confers on the General Assembly the power to discuss any question relating to the maintenance of international peace and security and to make appropriate recommendations.

The category into which an item falls cannot be conclusively determined merely on the basis of the statements made by a state or states in proposing the item. The proposal of an item is in effect a submission to the Assembly. It is often a pleading in which the proponents seek to persuade the members of the Assembly to share their point of view about the item in question. This is a legitimate purpose of the explanatory memorandum which, under rule 20, a proponent must furnish in support of an item. The memorandum filed by 13 states in support of the item called "the Tunisian Question," which is reproduced in document A/2152, is a pleading of this kind. As such, it deserves our respectful attention and our careful study. It is not, however, binding upon the other members, and it is only proper that the other members of the United Nations should give the matter their independent consideration and reach their own conclusions, which may or may not be fully in accord with those of the proponents.

Classifying the Problem

As we have considered the item on Tunisia, it has seemed to us that it falls within the second category because, as it is brought before us, it is essentially a problem that relates to the fulfillment of national aspirations. It can be argued that any such problem may have its impact upon international security, and I would not controvert that thesis. In terms, however, of General Assembly consideration and possible action, we believe that the proper course is to deal with an item as it exists in its present stage and not in some hypothetical future stage. The efforts of U.N. organs have often concentrated on the one step of creating an

³ The 11 states which requested inclusion of the item on the Security Council agenda were Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen; the additional states requesting general assembly consideration were Lebanon and Syria. The letter addressed to the Secretary-General by representatives of the 13 states (U.N. doc. A/2152, dated Aug. 6, 1952) contained the explanatory memorandum to which Ambassador Jessup refers.

atmosphere in which negotiations will take place and be meaningful.

Let me make clear that in this basic appreciation and classification of the problem, I am talking about the analysis which a delegation must make of the brief of the sponsors of the item. In the stage of the consideration, one does not jump to conclusions. One is not forced to decide, at this stage, the exact nature of the aspirations or whether they are being satisfied or thwarted. Neither does one have to explore the distant future in order to decide whether there is an existing situation which either now or hereafter might be disturbing to international peace and security.

In my opinion, it is only when a delegation has had an opportunity to analyze an item from this point of view that it is in a position to move to the next point of considering what, if anything, the Assembly can properly and usefully do in regard to the problem presented to it.

As one studies this memorandum and the various statements in the general debate and in this committee by the proponents of the item, one is impressed by the fact that emphasis is laid upon the problem as one involving a desire for the fulfillment of national aspirations. That is a basic point upon which all the proponents seem to agree. Many of them have drawn to our attention also their own conclusions concerning the possible future effects of this situation if it is not improved.

As I have already indicated, when a case is clearly within the category of security questions, members of the Assembly are called upon definitely to make a judgment and to take sides. In such case, the United Nations is called upon to identify an actual aggression and to act against the aggressor. The Assembly, however, has dealt with a number of other cases involving political elements and engendering strong feeling. It is entirely natural that the parties on both sides of a political issue should feel strongly about the justice of their own cause. They properly seek to persuade the Assembly that they are right. They are frequently unhappy when the General Assembly seeks to exercise a moderating influence without definitely taking sides with one or the other party. Yet this function of accommodation is one which the Assembly must not neglect. The Assembly is not a body which must act as a court and pronounce categorically in favor of the contentions of one side and against the contentions of another. The Assembly cannot be called upon to be judge, to be jury, in every case which comes before it.

One of the great elements in the moral strength of the General Assembly is the representation here of so many states. Among them, in most instances, there are states not directly involved in the controversy, states which are friends of both parties.

As the Tunisian question is presented to us, the sponsors of the item do not undertake to lay

before us a direct dispute between them and France. It is not alleged that France intends to commit an act of aggression or a breach of the peace against any one of the complaining states. It is not even directly charged that the action of France would lead to a breach of the peace between France and the complaining states.

In reality, this is one of those situations where the proponents of the item, for reasons which they themselves have set forth in detail, assert that the situation of which they complain is harmful to another people. They assert that they disapprove of the actions of the French Government and believe that the French Government should act in a different way. The French Government, as we all know, has taken the position that they do not consider that this is a dispute between themselves and the states proposing the item. They do not admit that it is a problem with which the General Assembly can deal. At the same time, the statement made by the French Foreign Minister in the general debate included declarations regarding the policies which France has been following and intends to follow in regard to Tunisia.

I do not wish my statement about the position of the states sponsoring this item to be misunderstood. I am not attempting at this point to analyze the accuracy or inaccuracy of the statement appearing in their explanatory memorandum or in their speeches.

When a situation so deeply disturbs a group of important and respected states that they are moved to take the responsibility of bringing it to the attention of the General Assembly, we are all bound to be concerned. Some may conclude that the proponents' fears and anxieties are unjustified, but if those fears and anxieties remain a fact, they constitute a factor—a disturbing factor—in international relations.

We may disagree with some of the allegations, assertions, and denials of the protagonists in a case without questioning the sincerity of their own beliefs, the intensity of their own convictions. We ask in return that the protagonists recognize our friendliness, our devotion to the cause of peace, and to the cause of social and political progress for all mankind. Amid differences of opinion on facts and on the choice of remedies, we may unite in mutual respect and confidence. That mutual respect and confidence should not be diminished because some members may sincerely believe that legal limitations in the Charter may, in some cases, preclude any action by the United Nations.

Dispassionate judgment may lead other members to conclude that while some action would be juridically possible, it would be politically unwise. This judgment may stem from the conclusion that forces already at work, programs or policies already envisaged or undertaken, may be conducive to an amelioration. The view may be held that at least time should be afforded to test whether this conclusion is correct. Such a view may be sup-

ported by the conviction that action by the Assembly would retard, and not accelerate, progress toward a solution by the party or parties on whose action, in the last analysis, we must depend for such progress.

The counsel of moderation is born of interest, not indifference; of hope, not despair.

Let me turn your attention from the general to the particular. We are discussing the question of Tunisia. Tunisia is a sovereign state. France is also a sovereign state. These facts are not in dispute. Since 1881 these two states have been linked together by a treaty relationship. That relationship is well-known in international law; it is a protectorate. The essence of that relationship is that one party entrusts certain rights, powers, privileges, and responsibilities to the other party. Mr. Schuman has described it as "essentially a matter of an exchange between the signatory states of reciprocal rights and responsibilities."⁴

This relationship, as we understand the statements which have been made officially, is not conceived to be a static one. If it were so conceived other states might form in their own minds an opinion concerning the perpetuation of the present position. It is precisely because the relationship is a developing one that such sharp differences of opinion exist concerning methods and the timing of progress.

The U.S. Position

Insofar as the position of the United States is concerned, I should like to state that we have recognized and continue to recognize the existing treaty relationship between France on the one hand and Tunisia on the other. The United States supports the evolutionary development in the relations between France and Tunisia contemplated by the Treaties of Le Bardo and La Marsa. We further believe that any development interfering with this orderly process would be the wrong way to deal with the situation.

Mr. Schuman declared in the general debate that the goal France has set for itself is "to guide the peoples for whom it has assumed responsibility toward freedom to govern themselves and toward the democratic administration of their own affairs." These are the words written into the Preamble of the French Constitution, "France shall not disavow this mission," the Minister of Foreign Affairs solemnly declared to this General Assembly. Again he said: "Our objective is that they [the Tunisians] be enabled to assume ever greater responsibilities—France will be ready gradually to renounce the powers that it holds under the treaties and which it exercises at the

⁴ Robert Schuman, French Foreign Minister, addressed the General Assembly on Nov. 10; for excerpts from his statement, see BULLETIN of Nov. 24, 1952, p. 839.

present time in the name of sovereign Tunisia as a result of a contractual delegation of powers.”

For our part, we hold that the function of the U.N. debates on this subject should be to facilitate the task of France in achieving its announced goal. To this end, it was and is our conviction that the primary function of the General Assembly in this field is, as Secretary Acheson has said, to “create an atmosphere favorable to settlements which accord with Charter principles but which should be worked out by the parties directly concerned.”⁵ We believe that such problems as may exist between France and Tunisia should be handled so as to facilitate the carrying out of France’s responsibilities in North Africa including those to which Mr. Schuman has referred of guiding those peoples “toward freedom to govern themselves and toward the democratic administration of their own affairs.”

I do not understand that the proponents of the item now before us disparage the goal which France has announced for itself. In effect, they seem to plead with us to distrust the sincerity of France and its willingness to carry out its pledge under the Charter. We say to them in all candor, “We cannot accept that plea. For our part, we trust France and wish to support and not in any way to make more difficult the achievement of the high purpose to which France has pledged itself.”

Those who make this plea are also our friends. They represent great countries that also declare their sense of mission in helping to guide non-self-governing peoples toward freedom. They are, in many instances, inspired by the freshness of their own struggle for freedom. A number of them recognize in the Tunisians a people of their own race, their own religion. They take justifiable pride in the fact that they are inheritors of great and ancient civilizations.

Our own memory of the American struggle for freedom stems from an earlier historical date, but I assure our friends that it is still fresh and vivid. All of us who are citizens of the United States are steeped in the tradition of Jefferson and the Declaration of Independence. That tradition has been freshened throughout our history by the fervor and eloquence of a Lincoln, a Wilson, a Franklin Roosevelt. Who would ask us at the same time to forget Lafayette and Rochambeau? Who would deny that, parallel to the current of our national spirit, has flowed the great liberal tradition of France, of Montesquieu, and Montaigne? We know from painful experience, as Woodrow Wilson said, that

The great stream of freedom, which “broadens down from precedent to precedent” is not a clear mountain current such as the fastidious man of chastened thought likes to drink from: it is polluted with not a few of the coarse elements of the gross world on its banks; it is heavy with the drainage of a very material universe.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Oct. 27, 1952, p. 642.

No action of the General Assembly would be wise if it impeded the flow of this stream of freedom, which we believe should be navigated by the French and Tunisians together.

The United States is a land in which many races and creeds have blended to form a nation. It is not arrogant for us to say that we cannot recognize that Arab peoples or any other peoples are strangers to our concern for freedom. We need no bond of race or religion to stir our sympathies. In all humility we will seek greater understanding and knowledge. We will not profess an indifference which we do not feel.

We will be told that the goal which France has set for herself is noble but that progress toward that goal is too slow. The historian of *The Idea of Progress*, Professor J. B. Bury, reminds us that “The preponderance of France’s part in developing the idea [of progress] is an outstanding feature of its history.” It is an idea that France will not forget.

We of the United Nations cannot sit in judgment between our friends to say, “This should be done today and that tomorrow.” Nearly half a century ago, Secretary of State Elihu Root spoke in the capital of the Republic of Uruguay, where the memory is still fresh of another great apostle of freedom—José Artigas. Mr. Root spoke of the feeling that the progress of a country is slow. “Slow,” he said, “as measured by our lives, perhaps, but not slow as measured by the lives of nations.”

The march of civilization is slow; it moves little in single human lives. Through the centuries and the ages it proceeds with deliberate and certain step. Look to England, whence came the principles embodied in your constitution, and ours, where first were developed the principles of free representative government. Remember through how many generations England fought and bled in her wars of the White and the Red—her blancos and colorados—the white rose of York and the red rose of Lancaster, before she could win her way to the security of English Law.

Look to France, whence came the great declarations of the rights of man, and remember—I in my own time can remember—the Tuilleries standing in bright and peaceful beauty, and then in a pile of blackened ruins bearing the inscription, “Liberty, equality, and fraternity,” doing injustice to liberty, to equality, and to fraternity. These nations have passed through their furnaces. Every nation has had its own hard experience in its progressive development, but a nation is certain to progress if its tendency is right.

We believe the tendency of the Tunisian Nation is right. We believe the tendency of the French Nation is right. They stand together on the shores of the Mediterranean Sea whose waves have seen the slow march of civilization. History has seen the end of many an estrangement, the sweetening of many a bitterness.

We place our trust in the peoples and Governments of France and Tunisia. It is they who must work out their destinies. Let us here in this Gen-

eral Assembly declare that the responsibility and the opportunity are theirs. In common friendship let us say to them:

Move forward on the peaceful path to progress in mutual confidence and restraint. Encourage mankind by an example of accommodation and of statesmanship. In so doing you will serve yourselves and your children and all the world.

A draft resolution, introduced by a group of countries, has just been distributed. The resolution has been explained to us just now by the representative of Brazil, and, from that description, it seems to us to speak in that spirit and to carry that message. Therefore, the U.S. delegation is prepared to support that draft resolution.

Two Patterns for Land Reform: The Free World vs. the Soviet

Statements by Isador Lubin

*U.S. Representative to the General Assembly*¹

PROGRESSIVE STEPS TOWARD WORLD LAND REFORM

U.S./U.N. press release dated December 2

It is now just over 2 years since the Secretary of State, Mr. Acheson, called the attention of this body to "the problem of the use and ownership of land, a source of misery and suffering to millions."² He cited the efforts of many nations, especially in Asia, to achieve better systems of land ownership and land use. He urged the United Nations and the specialized agencies to undertake programs which would bring "new hope to millions whose most urgent needs are for food, land, and human dignity."

This call echoed the cry of the vast majority of the world's agricultural people for human dignity and for the greater social stability and economic productivity which flow from a secure stake in one's community. And, from our deliberations at the Fifth Assembly, to which many in this room made notable contributions, there came a resolution on land reform³ which recognized that the relationship of man to the land is one of the most

important issues facing our world today. The members of the United Nations agreed to work toward systems of land tenure which would achieve for their peoples the twin goals of social justice and increased agricultural production. They called on the Secretary-General to report on the degree to which unsatisfactory agrarian structures impede economic development and thus contribute to the misery and suffering to which Mr. Acheson and many others had referred. Finally, they called on member states to avail themselves of the advice and technical aid of the U.N. system to assist in their programs of improved land use and land tenure.

To examine the state of existing agrarian structures as well as the ways in which governments, at their request, could be helped to eliminate inequities and spur production—that was the essence of our 1950 resolution. Since then, much has happened in this area of increased land use and more equitable land ownership. In the world at large, and here at the United Nations, much has been done to translate our original resolution into concrete acts. What are some of these developments?

The first was the publication in June 1951 of the Secretary-General's report on agrarian structures.⁴ This became the basis of our land-reform discussions at the thirteenth session of the Economic and Social Council. Here there was further highlighted the extent to which equitable land distribution must be supported by a whole series of closely coordinated programs. At that session it was agreed that the converse also follows:

¹ Made in Committee II (Economic and Financial) on Dec. 2 and 5.

In addition to Mr. Lubin's statements on land reform as printed above, attention should be drawn to his statements contained in "Land Reform—A World Challenge" (Department of State publication 4445). This booklet also includes selected addresses and statements by Secretary Acheson, Former Assistant Secretary Thorp, and Henry G. Bennett.

² BULLETIN of Oct. 2, 1950, p. 527.

³ *Ibid.*, Dec. 4, 1950, p. 888.

⁴ U.N. doc. E/2003.

that is to say, the effectiveness of efforts to encourage improvements on the land and output from the land are likely to be limited unless accompanied by appropriate changes in land tenure.

Definition of Land Reform

Land reform, however, includes much more than improved systems of land tenure. Indeed, as it was my privilege to point out at the 13th session of the Economic and Social Council:⁵

... land reform comprises improvement in all the social and economic institutions surrounding farm life. It embraces the redistribution or consolidation of holdings into plots of efficient size; the reduction of exorbitant rental charges; security of tenure for the tenant; and the improvement of working conditions for farm laborers. It embraces the settlement of title to water and land. It embraces reform of the tax system; measures to assure agricultural credit on reasonable terms; and the establishment of rural industries. It also involves the establishment of cooperative societies for common purchase, marketing and credit. In short, land reform means a positive program for more effective use of the land for the benefit of the agricultural population.

The action taken by the thirteenth session of the Economic and Social Council was subsequently approved by the sixth General Assembly. Our U.N. efforts have been carried still further by the actions of the Food and Agriculture Organization, the specialized agency most directly concerned—and also most competent—to assist governments in their land-reform programs. As the U.S. delegate at the last FAO conference stated:

... the great objectives of FAO cannot be achieved unless a high percentage of the world's farmers have an opportunity to own their own land, operate it under conditions which will enable them to reach maximum production, achieve fair returns, and at the same time conserve and rebuild the fertility of the soil for future generations.⁶

The U.S. Government has earnestly and consistently sponsored the cause of land reform in the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, and the Food and Agriculture Organization. As Mr. Acheson put it at a ceremony in the new FAO headquarters in Rome, "land reform is absolutely foremost in our whole international policy."⁷ I trust that it is also foremost in the policies of the various governments represented here. The urgency of the land-reform problem is such that the need for action is now. Human suffering will not wait until perfect laws are written. We must proceed even with imperfect laws and imperfect knowledge—but we must proceed.

The real test of the efficacy of the work of the United Nations in this field does not lie in the investigations made and the reports published. It lies, rather, in the steps taken by government after

government to reform traditional forms of land ownership and land use. We have already heard from the representatives of some governments about the progress they have made. We are looking forward to hearing from many others.

In passing, however, I would like to express my hope that some of the agricultural leaders of the countries here represented have been assisted in their work by their participation in the University of Wisconsin Land Tenure Conference.⁸ That conference, held a year ago, enabled 71 delegates from 50 countries and territories to share with each other their experiences with land-reform problems.

This year, at a conference sponsored by the University of California, another 64 delegates were enabled to exchange experiences in the field of agricultural credit and cooperatives. Association with these people from so many lands has greatly profited U.S. agricultural leaders, and they hope to welcome many more such guests for further studies and discussions in these vital areas.

Land Reform in Italy

I have said that we have already heard, and are looking forward to hearing more details about the progress of the land-reform movement in many of the countries represented here. There are, however, two large countries, unhappily not yet members of the United Nations, whose efforts in the field of land reform also merit attention. One of these is Italy.

The present land-reform program was instituted in Italy in 1950. Under the Italian program, the new land owners pay the former owners on an installment basis over a 30-year period. Interest rates are low. The new owners, once having assumed title, cannot dispose of their land in any manner except to turn it back to the Land Reform Agency for alternative distribution.

Moreover, the new owners are obliged by the land-reform agencies to bring about an optimum development of their land. The Government assists this development by making available low-cost credit and technical assistance to the new owners. As a further step, it also assists them to organize themselves into purchasing and marketing cooperatives. These, in turn, assist them in the better use of production and processing facilities.

Actual land redistribution under the Italian agrarian reform began in the fall of 1951. Within a few months, 100,000 acres had been allotted to new owners. By late October of this year, an additional 165,000 acres had been improved and distributed. Twenty-three thousand families have already received land under the reform plan. Again, as of late October, plans have been made for the distribution of another million and three

⁵ BULLETIN of Sept. 17, 1951, p. 469.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Dec. 17, 1951, p. 999.

⁷ *Ibid.*, Feb. 11, 1952, p. 202.

⁸ *Ibid.*, Oct. 22, 1951, p. 660.

quarter acres. Of these, nearly 650,000 have already been acquired by the land-reform agencies.

Japanese Land Reform

The same long-range and well-rounded policy has characterized the land-reform program in Japan. In 1945, at the time of the Japanese surrender, approximately 70 percent of Japan's 6 million farm families rented all or part of their land at rentals varying from 50 to 70 percent of the annual crop.

Under the Japanese program of land reform that was instituted in 1946, three million of these farm families acquired land. By early 1950, 70 percent of Japan's farmers owned the land and an additional 24.5 percent owned a part of the land they had under cultivation. Only 5.5 percent could still be classified as tenant farmers—and all of this in vivid contrast to the 70 percent who were tenant farmers in 1945. Altogether, the Japanese Government acquired and resold nearly 4,630,000 acres of farm land during the course of the program. Tenant farming was thereby reduced from an estimated 46 percent to a mere 10 percent of the total cultivated area.

The question remains: Is Japanese land reform here to stay? I am happy to answer in the affirmative. Since 1946 only a very small proportion of the beneficiaries of Japanese land reform have become indebted to their former landlords. And only an insignificant percentage of former tenants have resold their newly acquired land to former owners. Today, the Japanese can rely on agricultural credit cooperatives and on local banks for his financing needs, and not on the local landlord.

Moreover, the Japanese Government and representatives of all major parties have expressed support for the basic principles of the land-reform program, and no significant legislative revision is proposed.

The Government already has advanced proposals designed to preserve and strengthen the benefit accruing to the average farmer from the land-reform program. Such proposals include the provision of more adequate marketing and credit facilities and the strengthening of agricultural cooperatives.

In view of the continuing widespread popular support and the determination of the Japanese Government to insure its successful operation, the future of the land-reform program in Japan seems assured.

Secretary-General's Progress Report

We have before us a most useful progress report by the Secretary-General on the work now under way by the several U.N. agencies.⁹ This is tangible evidence that our resolution of 2 years ago has already started a chain of reactions whose

results we can scarcely foresee. I should like to make a few brief observations about this report.

First, we were glad to hear Mr. Blough's¹⁰ statement yesterday that the Secretary-General had dispatched to governments the comprehensive questionnaire on "defects in agrarian structures" which is to be the means of providing the most complete information on land tenure and related problems ever gathered on a world-wide scale. We are gratified to note that the secretariats of the regional commissions, as well as of the Food and Agriculture Organization, are ready to assist member governments in the preparation of the material required in answering the questionnaire. We join Mr. Blough in urging member governments to take this questionnaire seriously and to reply as fully as possible. I assure you my Government will do so.

We shall also be keenly interested in the results of the studies on cooperatives and on fiscal problems, both of which are reported to be under way.

The reference to regional studies and seminars on land-tenure problems planned by the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East and the Economic Commission for Latin America jointly with the Food and Agriculture Organization is particularly significant in view of paragraph 7 of the joint Egyptian-Indian-Indonesian draft resolution.¹¹ This paragraph advocates regional conferences or seminars on the technical and practical problems encountered in carrying on a program of reform and how these problems should be dealt with. In the Near East, where so much interest is being taken and so much progress is being made, this would seem to be particularly appropriate. In the same connection, we assume that the proposed conference on land administration, including tax administration, which is being called by the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East and the U.N. Technical Assistance Administration, will also include the Food and Agriculture Organization.

As to the provision of technical assistance, we can only urge interested governments to request the U.N. organizations for technical assistance in the many related aspects of land reform. Only in this way can the excellent facilities which are already available in this field be utilized. We have been informed that several governments in Southeast Asia and Latin America have requested the Food and Agriculture Organization for technical assistance in land reform. We hope that more countries will accept the suggestion contained in the Secretary-General's report and make requests in this field. We hope that in his next report the Secretary-General will be able to tell us of a considerable expansion of this work.

My delegation commends the Secretary-General, the regional commissions, and the specialized agencies for their prompt action in developing

⁹ U.N. docs. A/2194, 2194/add. 1.

¹⁰ Roy Blough of the U.N. Secretariat.

¹¹ U.N. doc. A/C.2/L.60.

concrete programs. We know that it is unnecessary to remind this body of the importance of interagency consultation so that all U.N. agencies may work toward a common objective with a minimum of overlapping and lost motion.

We feel that the Food and Agriculture Organization should assume special leadership among the agencies in defining the problems involved and helping all agencies to orient their work toward productive action. We hope that the Food and Agriculture Organization will in the future give lower priority to functional monographs and studies and, instead, give emphasis to action programs and to the appraisal of actual land reforms.

We feel that the extensive legal studies in the field of land reform and the extensive studies of cooperative problems which the U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization proposes to make might be better handled by other agencies. Our delegation to the current U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Conference is suggesting, instead, that higher priorities be given to education on land-reform problems, expansion of all types of fundamental education programs, and cooperation with the Food and Agriculture Organization in certain social science studies relating to land reform. The details of such programs will, of course, be discussed in the conferences of the respective agencies.

Comments on Resolutions Before the Committee

Turning, now, to the amended joint resolution presented by the delegations of Egypt, India, and Indonesia, my delegation is glad to give it our wholehearted support. We are glad to support the practical suggestions contained in the resolution.

I would like to suggest, however, a short additional paragraph as an amendment to the draft resolution. This new paragraph would deal with the question of education and publicity. It seems to us that one of the important functions which the United Nations can perform in this field is the stimulation of general interest in the question of land reform and the stimulation of an awareness of the urgent need for taking practical steps in this regard. This objective cannot, however, be realized unless something is done to let people everywhere know about the action taken by the Assembly and the Council and about the work which is being done within the U.N. system. We have been somewhat surprised to discover that various people in countries which are taking a particular interest in the land-reform question, and who are themselves active in furthering programs in this field, had never heard of the work of the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization on land reform.

Now, as to the Pakistan draft resolution on land reform contained in document L.158, the last paragraph of this resolution would request the Committee of Experts which is being set up under

Ecosoc resolution 416, to consider the financing of land reform as one of the important fields of activity for the proposed special fund for economic development.

The task which has been given to these experts, as we understand it, is to consider in detail the nature of possible international arrangements for assisting the financing of economic development. This consideration will involve study of such questions as the volume of resources which an international development agency should have at its disposal, the nature of these resources, and the conditions under which contributions to and payments from the fund would be made. The last paragraph of the Pakistani resolution would, however, require the expert group to deal with what is essentially an operating problem, that is, what specific field of basic economic development should receive special attention by the fund. The United States delegation does not believe that directives of this kind should be added to the instructions to the committee which have been agreed upon by the Economic and Social Council.

This is a type of recommendation that should, in our opinion, more properly be made to the governing board of a development fund.

To begin, at this stage, to give detailed instructions as to the purposes for which a special fund should be used—when that fund is still under study—seems to us to be premature.

For these reasons, the U.S. delegation cannot support this paragraph of the Pakistani resolution. This does not mean that we do not recognize the great importance of pushing forward vigorously with programs of agricultural and agrarian reform. We have always given first priority to the problems of increasing food production and distribution in the work of the Economic and Social Council. We will continue to support the efforts of the United Nations in these fields in every appropriate way.

We can, however, support the rest of the Pakistani resolution, with the comment that it appears to duplicate, to some extent, the material in the revised joint draft of Egypt, India, and Indonesia. We suggest, therefore, that the sponsors may wish to get together and merge their resolutions so that this Committee may have before it one resolution covering the entire field.

THE SOVIET BLUEPRINT FOR FARMERS

U.S./U.N. press release dated December 5

We have heard the usual charges from Soviet bloc delegates alleging terrible conditions among farmers in many areas of the world and the usual claims of the great successes of Soviet agriculture. The Soviet delegate expressed deep concern over the shortage of foodstuffs in certain parts of the world. Since he has shown such concern, I should like to ask him a question: Will he deny that since the middle of 1951, Poland has experienced its

worst food shortage of the postwar period? Will he deny that during the second half of 1951, this shortage, especially in meats and fats, gave rise to sporadic unrest and protest strikes among workers? Will he deny that as a result of this unrest, in addition to instituting compulsory farm deliveries of meat, grain, milk, and other products, the Government was compelled, as I have already pointed out, to return to rationing which had been abolished at the beginning of 1949? As I have already said, and it has not been denied by the representative of Poland or of the U.S.S.R., rationing began with meat and fats at the end of September 1951. Five months later it was extended to include soap, washing powder, sugar, and a number of other staples. Simultaneously the Government revived the dual-price system—lower prices against ration coupons and higher prices for the same commodities without such coupons. Will the Soviet representative deny that frequently even ration coupons are not honored in retail food stores owing to lack of staples?

As I have said, we have heard a lot from the Soviet countries about the benefits of the Soviet system of land reform. But we haven't heard what this program means for the individual farmer. It appears that, somehow or other, the farmers in certain east European countries are not interested in producing when the state takes both their profit and their crops. Yet, the only answer that the Soviet and the east European governments have is more and more repression and more and more savage penalties on those who refuse or are not in a position to comply with the demands of the state.

Hungary and Soviet Land Reform

Hungary has been mentioned in these discussions. Let us take Hungary as an example of the Soviet type of land reform. Every bit of information coming out of Hungary indicates that the chief concern of Hungarian farmers during this last harvest season has been to try to withhold enough from the state to enable them and their families to stay alive during the coming year. The only concern of the Government is to take every bit of food it can from the countryside. It does this regardless of the welfare of the farmers. It does this by adopting ever more stringent measures to force the farmers to produce and deliver at starvation prices.

This situation is the inevitable result of the Communist agrarian system. However, it may be disguised, and wherever it may be imposed, this system has one basic purpose—to *compel* the farmers to deliver their crops at prices fixed by the state. These prices are almost invariably *below* what is required to furnish the farmer with the minimum income necessary to support himself and his family. The farmers have, therefore, only one recourse—that is, to conceal and hoard what they produce.

The Hungarian Government has only one answer to this—force. No attempt is made to conceal this policy. It is only here at the United Nations that the representatives of Communist governments attempt to conceal it. The Hungarian Ministry of Agriculture's production report, published in the Hungarian press on July 10, stressed the fact that "proceedings have been started everywhere against the kulaks who sabotage the harvest." A "kulak," by the way, is any Hungarian farmer who objects to handing over so much grain to the state that he and his family go hungry.

The Ministry of Agriculture certainly means what it says about "punitive measures" and "punishments." This was demonstrated in the July 13 editions of three Hungarian newspapers. On that one day alone, these papers reported the following sentences handed down against Hungarian farmers:

- Joseph Pandur, Jr., who lost 5 percent of his grain in harvesting: 15 months in prison and a 6,000-forint fine.
- John Lukacs, who failed to reap his crop in time: 15 months plus a 3,500-forint fine.
- Antal Beres, accused of "sabotaging the harvest": 15 months and an 8,000-forint fine.
- Andras Kovacs, for failure to repair his threshing machine: 8 months plus a 4,000-forint fine.
- Mihaly Dallos, chief mechanic at the Erd machine station, for failure to repair machines on time: 18 months.

These farmers, among others, were reported sentenced in one day alone—in July. Since then, over 500 so-called kulaks have been sentenced to similar prison terms of 3 to 5 years. They were charged with failure to fulfill their crop quotas, refusing to surrender their crops, or hoarding.

These are but a few examples of what Communist land reform means to the individual Hungarian farmer.

It is true that the Soviet and Soviet bloc governments have been able to drive their farmers into collectives, but they have never been able to make them like it, nor to produce willingly, nor to stop dreaming of owning their own land again. We have plenty of evidence of the hostility of the farmers in the Soviet Union itself toward the Soviet authorities from these authorities themselves. For 20 years now, the collectives have been subject to annual denunciations from such leaders and the press for failure to cooperate the way the Government thinks they should.

The major emphasis of this criticism is on the failure of those responsible to carry out the agricultural program as outlined by the state. For instance, *Soviet Byelorussia* of July 30, 1952, complains that

It is clear that *anti-Kolkhoz* and grasping elements, infected by the psychology of private property, will try,

under any pretext, to hold back grain, giving the least possible to the state and holding back the most possible for themselves.

This is only one of several thousand such statements that have appeared in the Soviet press. Others refer to the failures of harvesting, of machine-tractor stations, and of stock breeding and care, of failure to repair and put back into operation farm machinery, of inefficiency and deceit in collective bookkeeping, and above all, of the failure of many collectives to deliver to the state its pound of flesh—that is, its lion's share of the harvest.

The picture is one of failure—of failure of the collectives to produce according to the plans of the central authorities. Of failure of attempts to instill farmer morale. Of failure, in brief, to convince the peasants of the desirability of collectivism in any form, past, present, or future.

If this were not so, why do the Soviets, after more than 20 years of enforced collectivization, still find it necessary to restrict farmers to the Kolkhoz by law, as well as by economic necessity?

Land Reform Comes to Lithuania

Let us take a look at what land reform is like in an area that has been occupied by the Soviet Union. One might take as an example the land reform situation imposed upon the people of Lithuania. How is a Lithuanian peasant brought into a collective farm? The local Executive Committee chairman and the local Communist party secretary call upon him with a printed "declaration of intent." This affidavit states that the farmer is "voluntarily" pledging himself to work for the benefit of the collective. It also states that the farmer is bringing to the collective all his assets, every item of which is carefully specified. If he refuses to sign, he goes into a labor camp. If he does sign, he is foregoing his rights to go elsewhere. Thus, in fact, when the peasant enters the collective, he becomes a serf.

What are the chances of a member of a collective escaping from the conditions that are forced upon him? The travel restrictions that are imposed upon him are as rigorous as any ever enforced on the serf under the Czarist regimes. I would like to ask the representative of the Soviet Union and the representative of Poland whether the collective worker can make even the shortest kind of a trip without showing where, when, how, and for what purpose he seeks to travel.

Obviously, measures such as these would never have been forced upon the farmer if there had been any chance of persuading him to join a collective voluntarily. Obviously, measures such as these would never have been imposed if there had been any chance of getting the farmer to remain in a collective once he has been forced to become a member.

This is the condition of the collective farmer in

Lithuania. It is also his condition in the Soviet Union. And all this more than 20 years after the Soviets introduced their collective system of land reform—the system that was to have made an agrarian paradise of the Soviet countryside.

In all their blueprints the Soviets forgot or cared nothing about one fact—the simple fact of human nature and human desires. Even the Soviets cannot reduce the farmers to cogs in their agricultural machine. No wonder—as is indicated in his recent article on "The Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.," published in *Bolshevik* on October 2, 1952—Stalin himself is disturbed about the Soviet agricultural situation.

U. S. Delegations to International Conferences

Ministerial Meeting of North Atlantic Council

The Department of State announced on December 8 that a ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council will be held at Paris beginning December 15, 1952. This will be the first meeting of the ministers of the participating states since the North Atlantic Council decided, during its ninth session held at Lisbon February 20-25, 1952, that the Council, while continuing to hold periodic ministerial meetings, should function in permanent session through the appointment of permanent representatives.

The U.S. delegation¹ to this meeting will be as follows:

U.S. Representatives

Dean Acheson, Secretary of State
John W. Snyder, Secretary of the Treasury
Robert A. Lovett, Secretary of Defense
W. Averell Harriman, Director for Mutual Security

U.S. Permanent Representative

William H. Draper, Jr., U.S. special representative in Europe

Advisers:

James C. Dunn, American Ambassador to France
J. Lawton Collins, General, U.S.A., Acting United States Representative on the Military Committee
George W. Perkins, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
Frank C. Nash, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
Livingston T. Merchant, Alternate U.S. Permanent Representative
Frederick L. Anderson, Deputy U.S. Special Representative in Europe
Luke W. Finlay, Deputy for Defense Production, Office of the U.S. Special Representative in Europe
Paul R. Porter, Deputy for Economic Affairs, Office of the U.S. Special Representative in Europe

¹ For a complete list of the U.S. delegation see press release 907 dated Dec. 8.

The United States in the United Nations

[December 5-11, 1952]

Security Council

Henri Hoppenot (France) assumed the presidency of the Council at the Dec. 5 meeting, during which debate was resumed on Frank P. Graham's fourth report to the Council on the Kashmir question. Ernest A. Gross (U.S.), listed the following principles "on which we are trying to proceed to assist the parties to carry out their Charter obligations":

In the first place, a lasting political settlement must be an agreed settlement.

Secondly, the Security Council will always welcome agreement of the parties which they themselves can reach on any theory that will settle the dispute which is consistent with the principles of the Charter.

Thirdly, it is the role of the Security Council to assist the parties in seeking to reach agreement. In this case the Security Council has made available the services of Dr. Frank Graham as United Nations Representative.

Fourthly, agreement most frequently is reached step by step through negotiation, and negotiation involves an element of compromise.

Finally, the Security Council should consider with care the views and the recommendations of its Representative and indicate to him and the parties its views on the positions he has taken.

He then analyzed the joint U.S.-U.K. draft resolution introduced Nov. 5 (for text, see BULLETIN of Nov. 17, p. 801) in the light of these principles. He pointed out that U.N. Representative Graham's carefully formulated suggestions concerning the quantum of forces to be left on each side of the cease-fire line represented his considered judgment. The United States, as a co-sponsor of the resolution, supported these suggestions and urged the parties to use them in seeking agreement among themselves. The range of numbers contained in the resolution was taken from the U.N. representative's July 16, 1952 proposals, he explained.

The resolution also urged the parties to bear in mind the criteria suggested by Mr. Graham on Sept. 4, 1952, Ambassador Gross continued. These criteria were worthy of careful consideration because "in the nature of things, they must be the considerations which have led the U.N. representative to arrive at the concrete figures he had suggested to the parties, including the range of figures in which we are urging the parties to negotiate."

It was fair to say that Mr. Graham considered that some Azad-Kashmir forces would remain at the end of the demilitarization period, he pointed out. It was also clear that they should be separated from the administrative and operational control of the Pakistan High Command, he thought, noting that this position was apparently acceptable to Pakistan when it indicated it was prepared to accept the July 16, 1952 proposals.

The operative part of the resolution attempted to organize and put before the Security Council and the parties some of Mr. Graham's suggestions on the one issue which was at the root of the problem. Like the U.N. representative, the sponsors had attempted to build on the resolutions of the U.N. Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP). He hoped there would be no tendency on the part of either India or Pakistan to reopen questions already agreed to under these resolutions. The joint draft, he made clear, does not in any way impair or limit Mr. Graham's authority under previous Security Council texts; it requests him to continue to make his services available to the parties and endorses the principles on which he based his previous efforts.

The joint draft offered the parties an opportunity by their negotiations to arrive at a settlement of the final issue now standing in the way of demilitarization and plans for a plebiscite. The United States, Ambassador Gross added, would welcome the agreement of the parties on any just basis which would settle the dispute. It took seriously Mr. Graham's view that there was danger "to us all" in allowing the case to drift.

In a statement on Dec. 8, Mrs. Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit (India) rejected the proposals contained in the joint draft resolution, which she said sought to "go behind . . . or to ignore" the basic and vital principles contained in previous decisions reached by UNCIP with the agreement of both parties. She stated that India was, as always, prepared "to cooperate in and to persevere in the exploration of all peaceful procedures for the settlement of this problem." In the course of her remarks, she paid tribute to Mr. Graham for his "patience, skill, and diligence."

She argued that no solution has yet been found "because the root cause of the conflict, namely the unlawful occupation by Pakistan of the territory

of the Jammu and Kashmir State, and the creation of subversive forces and authorities therein, continues. . . . India derives its status in the Jammu and Kashmir State by virtue of the accession of the State to India on 26 October 1947, by an instrument which was accepted by the then Governor-General of India, Lord Mountbatten of Burma. The validity of the accession has at no time been questioned. . . . But what is Pakistan's status in Kashmir? The Council must face up to the stark fact that Pakistan entered the State by an act of aggression, and that it continues in possession of a large part of State territory in the capacity of an invader. . . ."

The representative of India charged that the joint draft ignored the vital question of the "character" of the armed forces which are to remain on each side of the cease-fire line in Kashmir, and declared that the figure of 21,000 was the "irreducible minimum" India could accept for the number of its troops.

Sir Zafrullah Khan, Pakistan's Foreign Minister, remarked briefly that he agreed with the Indian representative's statement that "evasion and misrepresentation had served to cloud this plain and straight-forward issue and to bar the way to a solution." He added that it would take a little time to explain to the Council where the evasion and misrepresentation lie, and requested time to prepare a reply.

General Assembly

In plenary session on Dec. 5, the Assembly approved three resolutions of Committee VI. Adopted without change was a proposal that the International Law Commission should give priority to the codification of the topic "Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities" and a resolution on ways and means for making the evidence of customary international law more readily available. The Committee VI resolution which, in essence, would have postponed for a year the consideration of the establishment of an international criminal court was amended; the Assembly decided to establish a 17-member committee to meet at U.N. Headquarters sometime in 1953 to explore the possibilities of establishing such a court.

The votes on the three items were 42-5 (Soviet bloc)-0, 44-0-5 (Soviets), and 33 (U.S.)-9-8, respectively.

On the same date the Assembly adopted resolutions recommended by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee establishing a Good Offices Commission to help arrange negotiations between the Union of South Africa on the one hand and India and Pakistan on the other, for the purpose of solving the problem of the treatment of persons of Indian origin in South Africa, and another commission "to study the racial situation in the Union of

Citation for Persons Killed in Service of the U.N.

Statement by Edith Sampson¹

U.S./U.N. press release dated December 5

It is with reverence that I speak now, on behalf of the United States, supporting the resolution presented to this Assembly by the delegation of France. It is indeed fitting that tribute to those who have died for the United Nations should be proposed by the great French Republic, whose traditions of liberty and human progress are renowned throughout the world.

The resolution now before us would confer a mark of honor on those who have lost their lives in the cause of the United Nations and in the cause of peace. In thinking of this proposal, our minds and hearts turn to Korea. It was there that the United Nations met the challenge of aggression, in the first collective action in history by an international organization.

The Republic of Korea is the child of the United Nations. This organization gave it life. When that Republic was wantonly attacked by Communist force, bent on crushing out the beginnings of liberty with the iron heel of totalitarianism, the United Nations had to make a decision. Would it resist? Or would it yield to the plans of those who had calculated on easy conquest?

The answer has been impressive. Fifty-three states joined in the decision to defend the Republic of Korea. Under resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly, 16 members of the United Nations have sent units of their armed forces to repel the attack in Korea. The aggression was turned back, and it has been made clear to the aggressors "that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest."

The cost has been heavy. In adopting the resolution proposed by the delegation of France, we do not wipe out the debt owed to those who have sacrificed their lives that there may be peace in the world. We only acknowledge the debt. We need to do more. In defining that "something more," I can think of no better words than those of the great American President who spoke in the midst of our own Civil War.

He, too, wished to honor men who had given their lives. And he wished to tell his countrymen how they, the living, could begin to pay their debt to these men. "It is," he said, "rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us—that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to the cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion—that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain."

For the General Assembly, this should be a day of rededication to the ideals set down in the Charter of the United Nations. With the will to accomplish, the nations can move forward in the achievement of the Charter goals. As peoples gain confidence in collective security for attaining world peace, the human energies of all nations can be directed ever increasingly to the realization of man's creative possibilities.

¹ Made in plenary session of the General Assembly on Dec. 5. Mrs. Sampson, who is a U.S. representative to the General Assembly, was speaking on the resolution (U.N. docs. A. L. 121 and A. L. 121/corr. 1 dated Dec. 5) proposed by France for use of the citation "Died for the United Nations" in respect to persons, who in certain circumstances, are killed in the service of the United Nations. The resolution was adopted on Dec. 5 by a vote of 43-5 (Soviet bloc)-0.

South Africa." The United States voted in favor of the former resolution, abstained on the latter, and voted in favor of a third proposal calling upon member states to "bring their policies into conformity with their obligation under the Charter to promote the observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms." G. P. Jooste (Union of South Africa) cast the single dissenting vote against all three resolutions; his motion to the effect that the General Assembly found itself unable, because of article 2 (7) of the Charter, to adopt the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee's proposals relating to his Government's *apartheid* policies was rejected (6-43-9). In introducing the motion, Mr. Jooste recalled that his delegation had argued both in the Assembly, during debate on the agenda, and in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee that the General Assembly was not competent to deal with the question, since it was within the domestic jurisdiction of the Union of South Africa. After the adoption of the two resolutions on the *apartheid* item, he stated that his government would regard them as null and void."

The 1953 scale of assessments, as recommended by Committee V, was approved by a vote of 44-6-2 (U.S.). The U.S. assessment for 1953 will be 35.12 percent, a reduction of 1.78 percentage points. In the following year the U.S. share will be reduced to 33 $\frac{1}{3}$ percent. Explaining his delegation's abstention on the vote, Senator Alexander Wiley said that the reduction of the U.S. share to one-third is considered by the United States to be an important matter of principle since no organization of 60 sovereign states should be dependent upon one member state for more than one-third of its regular financial resources. The United States had proposed that the reduction of this country's share to 33 $\frac{1}{3}$ percent should take place at once. Since this proposal had not prevailed, the United States had no alternative but to abstain on the scale as presented. Senator Wiley added that "any commitment of the United States to contribute more than 33 $\frac{1}{3}$ percent is based on the provisions of the Charter, and not on the vote of United States representative." He expressed appreciation for the efforts of a number of other delegations which had resulted in a definite assurance that the one-third ceiling would be put into effect a year hence. In conclusion, he said that the United States "will continue to do its part" in the United Nations; it has "faith that here there will be developed a basis for harmony and international cooperation, and that eventually we will find a way to solve our differences, so that peace can come over the horizon."

A revised version of Committee IV's resolution relating to the continuation of the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories was approved at the Dec. 10 plenary session. The effect of the revision is to continue the Committee for 3 years after which period the Assembly would reconsider its further con-

tinuation. The United Kingdom, France, and Belgium had stated that they would be unable to participate in the Committee if it were set up on a permanent basis. The vote on the revised text was 53-2 (Belgium, France)-3 (U.K.).

Committee IV's recommendation for abolition of "discriminatory provisions or practices of a racial or religious character" also was adopted with modifications; a U.K. amendment reworded the text to replace "of a racial or religious character" by the phrase, "contrary to the principles of the Charter and of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights."

Four other resolutions relating to non-self-governing territories recommended by Committee IV were adopted without change. They dealt with social conditions; educational, economic, and social policies; participation of the territories in the work of the Committee on Information; and factors which may determine if a territory is self-governing.

U.N. Personnel—In a statement addressed to the Secretariat on Dec. 5, Secretary-General Trygve Lie reported that he had carefully studied the opinion presented on Nov. 29 by the three jurists and intended to use their conclusions and recommendations as the basis of his personnel policy. He would establish an advisory panel to assist him in dealing with specific cases. His statement expressed the "earnest hope that on this basis it will be possible for the United Nations and the host country by mutual efforts to maintain harmonious relationships on matters affecting the staff of the Secretariat, which, in the words of the opinion, 'depend mainly upon a good understanding as to the necessities of the international organization and its staff on the one hand, and the necessities of the host country on the other.'"

Ad Hoc Political Committee—General debate on the work of the Palestine Conciliation Commission was concluded Dec. 5. At the Dec. 8 session, the sponsors of the eight-power draft resolution calling for direct negotiations between the Arab States and Israel presented a revised text of their proposal, and the Latin American countries which had sponsored various amendments to the original draft withdrew their proposals in favor of the revised text. In introducing the new draft, Finn Moe (Norway) said it resulted from informal talks with the sponsors of amendments and with the sponsors of the other draft which requests the Conciliation Commission to continue its efforts.

The new draft, among other points, "recalls the existing resolutions" on Palestine and "urges the Governments concerned to enter at an early date, without prejudice to their respective rights and claims, into direct negotiations for the establishment of such a settlement, bearing in mind the principal objectives of the United Nations on the

Palestine question, including the religious interests of third parties.”

Israel endorsed the new draft, but Syria and Iraq rejected it. The Iraqi representative, Mohamed Fadhil al-Jamali, said on Dec. 9 that no resolution at all would be better than the revised eight-power draft and appealed to the sponsors to withdraw it in order to allow the Conciliation Commission to continue its work under past resolutions. He would be willing to have the whole item withdrawn from the Committee's agenda, provided it was agreed also to withdraw the Israeli item concerning complaints of violation by Arab States of their obligations under the Charter, U.N. resolutions, and the armistice agreement with Israel.

Luis Quintanilla (Mexico) agreed that no resolution would be better than a bad one. To offer any possibility of success, a formula must be accepted by both parties, and it would be regrettable if the Committee adopted a resolution which could achieve nothing. However, he felt it preferable to pass a resolution and suggested that paragraph 4 of the eight-power draft might be amended so as to urge the parties to bear in mind *both the resolutions of the General Assembly and the principal objectives of the United Nations on the Palestine question*. The italicized portion later was revised by the eight sponsors to read “the resolutions of the General Assembly as well as . . .,” in which form it was incorporated into the revised eight-power draft.

During debate on Dec. 10, Ahmed Shukairi (Syria) proposed that the International Court of Justice should be asked for an advisory opinion on certain points relating to states' negotiations concerning refugees' rights.

Philip C. Jessup (U.S.) expressed regret that the debate had not resulted in a text acceptable to all parties. He noted that four revisions had been made to meet Arab objections and that now the main point of the resolution—direct negotiations—had been challenged. He hoped his Arab colleagues would recognize that the United States could not repudiate a stand it had advocated since 1928. He reiterated his view that the eight-power proposal did not destroy or change any rights or create new ones. It only suggested a special procedure which might result in an advance.

On Dec. 11 the Committee approved the revised eight-power draft by a vote of 32 (U.S.)-13-13. The four-power proposal to enlarge the Conciliation Commission, which had Arab-Asian support, was rejected, 14-27 (U.S.)-13, as was the Syrian motion to refer the questions to the International Court of Justice (13-26 (U.S.)-19).

Discussion of the next item, Israel's complaint against the Arab States, was adjourned and the Eritrean item was taken up instead.

Anze Matienzo, U.N. Commissioner for Eritrea, reviewed his report, and Sir Gladwyn Jebb

(U.K.) presented the administering power's report. A joint resolution was introduced by Charles A. Sprague (U.S.) on behalf of his delegation and the representatives of 12 other states. Following is the text of Mr. Sprague's statement:

On December 2, 1950, the General Assembly adopted a resolution providing that Eritrea “shall constitute an autonomous unit federated with Ethiopia under the sovereignty of the Ethiopian crown”. In less than two years that decision has been successfully carried out in accordance with the principles and detailed arrangements laid down in the Assembly's resolution.

Before reaching its decision on the disposition of Eritrea, the General Assembly had the benefit of the most thorough study and consideration of that question. It was discussed in the General Assembly both at the spring and fall sessions of 1949; it was the subject of extensive on-the-spot study and investigation by a United Nations Commission during 1950; and the report of that Commission was reviewed by the members of the Interim Committee before its submission to the Fifth Session of the General Assembly.

In reaching its decision on Eritrea, the General Assembly was discharging a responsibility which had devolved on it in September 1948, for determining the disposition of the three territories of Libya, Eritrea, and former Italian Somaliland. The decisions by the Assembly on these three territories have provided the solution of complex territorial problems which the four great powers principally concerned with the drafting of the Treaty of Peace with Italy had been unable to settle.

In the opinion of the United States Delegation, Mr. Anze Matienzo, United Nations Commissioner for Eritrea, has rendered outstanding service to the people of Eritrea and to the world organization. He has discharged the functions vested in him by the Assembly's resolution of December 2, 1950 with patience, skill and integrity. The task, as the Commissioner has explained in his Report, has required extensive consultation with the Eritreans, with the representatives of the Government of Ethiopia, and with the representatives of the United Kingdom—the administering power prior to establishment of the federation. The Eritrean Constitution, which the Eritrean Assembly developed on the basis of the draft prepared by the Commissioner, is an instrument which is well-designed to serve the particular needs of Eritrea on the one hand and to meet the requirements of the Federal Act on the other. A balance has been struck, and the necessary safeguards for human rights and democratic principles are contained in that constitution. The achievement reflects great credit on the people of Eritrea and their Assembly.

Step by step the process leading to establishment of the Federation on September 11, 1952 has witnessed the active cooperation on the part of the Ethiopian Government, under the leadership of His Majesty the Emperor. The Ethiopian Government has progressively adapted itself to the new relationship required by the Federation. My Delegation welcomes the statement made to this Committee by the representative of Ethiopia, in which he again expressed the firm determination of the Ethiopian Government to respect the Federal Act and the autonomy of Eritrea. Great credit is due also, we believe, to the United Kingdom which, as administering authority in Eritrea until the transfer of powers, conducted the affairs of Eritrea so as to facilitate the establishment of the Federation.

My Delegation is confident that the practical problems of adjustment within the federal structure which will inevitably arise in the future will be dealt with in the same constructive spirit of mutual respect and loyalty to the objectives of the United Nations which has guided Ethiopia and Eritrea in establishing their new federal relationship. We are glad that, through the Federal Ethiopian Government, the people of Eritrea now find representation in the United Nations. The Government

of the United States and the American people salute the Federation and offer our congratulations to all those who took part in making it a reality, including the peoples of the Federation. The United Nations can justly feel satisfaction at having provided a workable and fair solution to the Eritrean problem, and at having assisted the parties concerned in bringing the United Nations decision to fruition. Through United Nations action, and with the cooperation of Ethiopia, and the people of Eritrea, and the United Kingdom, this territorial settlement should make a significant contribution to the peace, security and stability of East Africa.

My Delegation is pleased to join the Delegations of Brazil, Burma, Canada, Denmark, Ecuador, Greece, Liberia, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Turkey in offering a simple resolution which gives expression to these sentiments of satisfaction and appreciation. All these Delegations co-sponsored the Eritrean resolution in 1950, and their present initiative is a logical outgrowth of their action two years ago. I hope that the draft resolution now before the Committee will prove readily acceptable to all of us as a fitting conclusion to the General Assembly's efforts in effecting the disposition of Eritrea.

Committee I (Political and Security)—A new resolution expressing confidence that “in pursuance of its proclaimed policies, the Government of France will endeavor to further the effective development of the free institutions of the Tunisian people, in conformity to the purposes and principles of the Charter” was introduced on Dec. 8 by Brazil. Co-sponsors were Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The draft also expresses hope that the parties will continue negotiations on “an urgent basis” with a view to bringing about self-government for Tunisians, and appeals to the parties concerned to conduct their relations and settle their disputes in accordance with the spirit of the Charter and to refrain from any acts or measures likely to aggravate the present tension.

Commenting on the joint draft, Philip C. Jessup (U.S.) expressed his delegation's belief that the function of U.N. debates on this question should be to facilitate the task of France in achieving its announced goal in Tunisia, namely, to guide the peoples for whom it had assumed responsibility toward freedom to govern themselves and toward democratic administration of their own affairs. “We place our trust in the peoples and governments of France and Tunisia,” he declared. “It is they who must work out their destinies. . . . In common friendship let us say to them: Move forward on the peaceful path to progress in mutual confidence and restraint.”

Since the joint resolution just submitted seemed “to speak in that spirit and to carry that message,” the U.S. delegation was ready to support it. (For full text of Ambassador Jessup's statement, see p. 986.)

A motion by Pakistan asking the Committee to invite the Bey of Tunis to appoint a representative to sit in on the Committee's debate was rejected on Dec. 10 after a debate in which 27 representatives took part. The rejected Pakistani motion also asked the French Government to reconsider its decision and to instruct its delega-

tion to resume its seat in the Committee. Ambassador Jessup abstained from voting on the part of the motion relating to the French Government and voted against the invitation to the Bey. The Treaty of Le Bardo stated that the Bey could not take any international action without the consent of the French authorities, he said; therefore, an invitation to him to appoint a representative would in effect ask him to violate his treaty obligations.

Committee II (Economic and Financial)—Two land-reform proposals were adopted at the Dec. 5 session. A Pakistani resolution recommending further study of the financial implications of land reform was approved by a vote of 47-0-5; a joint Egyptian-Indian-Indonesian resolution, recommending that land reform be expedited and that practical measures of increasing food production be studied, was adopted unanimously. A final paragraph added to the latter resolution as a result of a U.S. amendment reads:

Requests the Secretary-General to assist Member Governments at their request to give the widest possible circulation to the actions of the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council with regard to the question of land reform among farm organizations and other interested persons or groups in order “to ensure that the policy recommendations of the United Nations shall be widely known and understood.”

The Committee then turned to a discussion of nationalization. A Uruguayan draft resolution recommends that member states recognize each country's right to nationalize and freely exploit its national wealth, as an essential factor of economic independence; an amendment introduced by Bolivia would replace this recommendation with one that member states, in deference to the right, should not use their governmental and administrative agencies as instruments of coercion or political or economic intervention.

On Dec. 9 Uruguay introduced a revised text, with Bolivia as cosponsor, recommending that member states “maintain proper respect for the right of each country freely to use and exploit its natural wealth and resources as an indispensable factor in progress and economic development, and therefore . . . refrain from the use of any direct or indirect pressure such as might jeopardize, on the one hand, the execution of programs of integrated economic development or the economic stability of the underdeveloped countries, or, on the other hand, mutual understanding and economic cooperation between the nations of the world.”

The joint draft was approved on Dec. 11 by a vote of 31-1 (U.S.)-10. Amendments proposed by the United States to replace the operative part of the Uruguayan-Bolivian draft were rejected. In an explanation of vote, Isador Lubin (U.S.) said:

The United States Delegation had hoped it would be able to express its views on the resolution submitted by Uruguay and Bolivia. For this purpose we, as well as

other delegations, had placed our names on the speakers list. However, due to the action by the committee to close debate we were prevented from making our views known. Moreover, the closure of the debate made it impossible for us even to explain the amendments that we had submitted to the resolution before us.

The United States Delegation considered the Uruguayan-Bolivian resolution as one-sided. It specified the responsibility of Member States toward governments that felt that their economic development would be furthered by nationalizing their wealth and resources. No mention was made in the resolution of any responsibility on the part of governments that nationalized their resources toward private investors. I mention this fact because of the statement of the sponsor of the resolution, the distinguished representative from Uruguay, that he would welcome amendments covering reimbursement to foreign investors. The resolution as submitted did not make a single reference or intimation to the rights of private investors or the responsibility of governments to private investors when they nationalized property held by private individuals or private corporations.

In order that we might be able to secure a balanced resolution that recognizes both the obligations of Member States toward governments that nationalize their resources and the obligations of states that nationalize to compensate private owners, the United States Delegation submitted certain amendments which, if they had been adopted, would have made the Uruguayan-Bolivian resolution acceptable to us. However, this Committee apparently could not see its way clear to accepting the United States amendments which recognized that certain responsibilities lay on governments that felt that their economic development could best be furthered by nationalizing their resources.

Accordingly, the United States Delegation found it necessary to vote against the resolution as a whole.

Committee III (Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural)—By a vote of 42-0-5 (Soviet bloc) the Committee, on Dec. 9, decided to recommend an appeal to governments and individuals to contribute to the U.N. Children's Emergency Fund as generously as possible during 1953 in order to fulfill the target program of \$20,000,000. By the same vote, the Committee adopted a resolution proposed by Argentina on coordination between social and economic studies and the need to integrate development programs in both fields. These actions completed the Committee's consideration of social questions included in the report of the Economic and Social Council.

Later the same day, G. J. Van Heuven, U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, presented his second annual report. He suggested that the General Assembly might invite the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and his own office to explore possibilities of international financial assistance for long-range economic projects to aid the integration of refugees. He also stressed that only one-third of the emergency fund established to aid needy refugees so far had been contributed.

Resolutions on these two topics were introduced on Dec. 10, both under the joint sponsorship of Colombia, Denmark, France, and the Netherlands. The former draft, with a U.K. amendment, was approved on Dec. 11 by a vote of 33 (U.S.)-5-13; the second, slightly modified by Sweden, was adopted the same day by a vote of 35 (U.S.)-5-11.

At the close of general debate on the refugee item, Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt (U.S.) replied to Soviet attacks and said the United States would never force a refugee to return to his homeland against his will. She supported the two resolutions and related amendments, but added that her vote on the resolution relating to the emergency fund did not imply that the U.S. Government would contribute to the fund.

Committee IV (Trusteeship)—A resolution relating to administrative unions was adopted on Dec. 6 by a vote of 43 to 5, with 3 abstentions, after withdrawal of a Brazil-India proposal to refer the question of administrative unions to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion as to their compatibility with the Charter and the trusteeship agreements. The proposal adopted by the Committee had been recommended by the General Assembly's Committee on Administrative Unions.

On Dec. 8 the Committee approved the following membership of the Committee on Factors whose establishment had been recommended earlier: Australia, Belgium, Burma, Cuba, Guatemala, Iraq, the Netherlands, United Kingdom, United States, and Venezuela. The next day an amended 11-power draft on participation by indigenous inhabitants in the work of the Trusteeship Council was adopted by a vote of 25-1 (Belgium)-24. The text incorporated a U.S. amendment which deleted all operative paragraphs of the original draft and replaced them with provisions inviting the administering authorities to "give careful attention" to the hope expressed by the Trusteeship Council that the administering authorities "will find it appropriate to associate suitably qualified indigenous inhabitants of the Trust Territories in the work of the Trusteeship Council."

Committee VI (Legal)—A recommendation that the Assembly establish a 15-member special committee to study further the question of aggression and to submit to the ninth Assembly session draft definitions of aggression was approved on Dec. 9. The vote was 36-9 (U.S.)-9.

Communiqués Regarding Korea to the Security Council

The Headquarters of the United Nations Command has transmitted communiqués regarding Korea to the Secretary-General of the United Nations under the following U.N. document numbers: S/2831, Nov. 4; S/2834, Nov. 4; S/2838, Nov. 5; S/2842, Nov. 10; S/2843, Nov. 11; S/2844, Nov. 11; S/2848, Nov. 14; S/2849, Nov. 17; S/2851, Nov. 17; S/2852, Nov. 18; S/2853, Nov. 19; S/2854, Nov. 20; S/2855, Nov. 21; S/2856, Nov. 25; S/2859, Nov. 25; S/2860, Nov. 28; S/2861, Nov. 28; S/2862, Dec. 2; S/2864, Dec. 2.

“Foreign Relations of the United States”: 91 Years of American Foreign Policy

A unique series of documentary volumes this month completed its 91st year of service to the U.S. Government and to scholars of this and other countries. Sometimes referred to as “the Historical Voice of America,” Foreign Relations of the United States is the basic source of information on U.S. diplomatic history. The history of the series itself is of interest, illustrating as it does this Government’s continuing policy of making its files accessible to the public to the fullest possible extent. The BULLETIN therefore requested E. R. Perkins, editor of the series, to prepare the following account.

One room in the Division of Historical Policy Research, Department of State, presents a strange contrast to most Government offices. In its center is a big antique desk, badly worn by long usage, at which, according to tradition, Secretary of State William H. Seward negotiated with the Russian Minister, Edward de Stoeckl, and signed the treaty for the purchase of Alaska. This is not a museum piece, but the working desk of the editor of *Foreign Relations of the United States*. The association is fitting, for the series he edits also dates back to the Seward period, and copies of the annual volumes of the series, from the first, issued in 1861, to the latest volume released this month,¹ are contained appropriately in a bookcase of only somewhat less antiquity than the desk.

This series of publications started when President Lincoln sent to the Congress his first annual message on December 3, 1861. Declaring it was not his purpose to review discussions with foreign states, he wrote: “The correspondence itself, with the usual reservations, is herewith submitted.” The Message with the *Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs* was printed as Ex. Doc. No. 1 of the Second Session of the 37th Congress. Except for a circular instruction of February 28, 1861, to all American Ministers concerning efforts of southern agents to gain recognition for the Confederacy, all the correspondence in this volume is that of the Lincoln Administration, and it deals mostly with problems connected with the Civil War.

The procedure of submitting *Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs* with the annual message to the Congress was continued each year from 1861 through 1868, and each year these papers were printed. After 1862, one volume no longer sufficed

to contain the correspondence; two to four volumes were issued for each year of Seward’s service, which lasted until 1869. The fourth volume for 1865, of special interest to students of Lincolniana, is an appendix of 717 pages containing expressions of condolence, both official and private, from foreign countries on the assassination of President Lincoln and the attempted assassination of William H. Seward, Secretary of State, and Frederick W. Seward, Assistant Secretary.

For some reason not now known, the publication of diplomatic correspondence with the annual message to the Congress was omitted for 1869, the first year of the Grant Administration, when Hamilton Fish served as Secretary of State. The practice was revived in 1870 when the title of the publication appeared as *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States*. This volume included an index as well as the analytical list of papers which had been printed from the beginning of the series. From that time on, the publication was often limited to one volume for each year.

Up to and including 1880, the correspondence presumably accompanied the annual message to the Congress in December, for the publication date on the title page of each volume is that for the year covered and the latest documents included have November dates. The volume for 1881, however, bears a publication date of 1882 and, though described as “transmitted to Congress, with the annual message of the President, December 5, 1881,” has documents dated up to the last day of December. From that time through 1906 the usual publication date was the year following that covered, the only exception being the period subsequent to the Spanish War when some delays occurred. For instance, the 1898 volume did not appear until 1901. It may be noted here that 48

¹ For Department’s announcement of this release, see p. 1006.

years later, Mrs. Bertha S. Rodrick of the Passport Division told the present editor that she had been hired temporarily in 1900 and permanently in 1901, to assist in bringing *Foreign Relations* up to date, since Department officers had expressed their concern over the 3-year lag in publication.²

Early Editorship of the Series

Until recent years, *Foreign Relations* was published anonymously and little is known of the early editorship of the series. *The Register of the Department of State* describes the functions of the Bureau of Indexes and Archives, established in 1873, as including "the arrangement of the papers to accompany the Messages and Reports to Congress." However, an account of the Department of State by Gaillard Hunt in 1893, states that: "Although not a part of its regular duties, the preparation of the volumes known as 'Foreign Relations' falls usually to some official of the Diplomatic Bureau." Mrs. Natalia Summers, in *Outline of the Functions of the Offices of the Department of State, 1789-1943*, gives citations to indicate that in 1898 this function was transferred to the Chief Clerk, and in 1901 to the Bureau of Indexes and Archives. In 1909, the Division of Information took over the publication. The name of this Unit was changed in 1917 to the Division of Foreign Intelligence.

From 1898 on, there is more definite knowledge as to the editorship of *Foreign Relations*. The record of Spanish-American War diplomacy seems to have been compiled by John Bassett Moore after his return from an assignment as Secretary of the American Commission To Negotiate Peace. An order signed by Secretary of State John Hay on July 20, 1900, directed Edward S. Glavis to proceed to prepare for publication *Foreign Relations* correspondence for 1899 and also for 1900 "as far as practical," under supervision of the Second Assistant Secretary of State, Alvey A. Adee.

Mrs. Rodrick relates that, when she was working on the series, the compilation was in charge of William Brett, a clerk in the Division of Indexes and Archives, and that the selection of papers was then a one-man job. The extent of review by higher officers of the Department is not known. At a later time, the compilation was done by George H. Schultze, previously employed as a clerk in the Division of Indexes and Archives, who asked for detail to this work when the United States entered World War I because as a native of Germany he preferred not to handle current confidential documents. Mr. Schultze continued on that assignment until his retirement in 1931, his

² Mrs. Rodrick, who retired on Apr. 30, 1951, was the first woman employee in the history of the Department to achieve a record of 50 years' service. An interview with her entitled "Viewing 48 Years in the Department of State" appeared in the BULLETIN of Nov. 14, 1949, p. 741.

service overlapping that of some of the present *Foreign Relations* staff who remember him with appreciation.

After 1906, the Department seems to have adopted a less liberal policy than formerly both as to time of release for *Foreign Relations* and as to completeness of coverage. John Bassett Moore, as editor of the *Digest of International Law*, had occasion to examine Department of State records thoroughly, and in an article in the *Virginia Law Review* for June 1937 he stated that he could personally attest to the fact that volumes for the Civil War and thereafter embraced all important diplomatic exchanges. In contrast to this, Gaillard Hunt, in an article in the *American Journal of International Law* for January 1911, stated that publication of *Foreign Relations* was often delayed for reasons of policy, that it was freely edited so as not to disturb diplomatic relations, and that the most interesting correspondence did not appear in the volumes. Considerable research would be necessary to check the accuracy of this description for the period of which Dr. Hunt was writing. The statement as to content certainly would not be correct for most earlier years or for the volumes published in the last 30 years. As to time of publication, it is true that after 1906 the annual volumes gradually fell behind. By the end of World War I the gap was 7 years.

The first move to put the historical work of the Department on a professional basis was made in 1918 when Dr. Hunt, who had been Chief of the Division of Manuscripts in the Library of Congress, was brought into the Department of State to edit a history of the World War. In 1921 he was made editor of the Department and also chief of the newly created Division of Publications, which took over responsibility for *Foreign Relations*. The contemplated history of the World War included a narrative account. Though much work was expanded upon it, it was never completed and was not published. Dr. Hunt died in 1924 and in December of that year Tyler Dennett, the well-known diplomatic historian, became Chief of the Division of Publications.

The Kellogg Order as a Guiding Rule

Dr. Dennett gave vigorous leadership to the publication program. In 1925, he brought in Joseph V. Fuller of the University of Wisconsin to assume charge of editing *Foreign Relations*. A Department order was drafted to set forth the principles under which the volumes should be edited. The order was approved and issued by Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg on March 26, 1925.

The Kellogg order is printed in the preface to *Foreign Relations*, 1914, Supplement, The World War. It laid down principles of completeness and objectivity, with allowed omissions to prevent the

embarrassment of current negotiations, to preserve confidence, and to avoid needless offense, as well as to condense the record by omitting trivial details and personal opinions not adopted and not needed to show choices presented for Department decisions. The purpose and importance of the publication is well stated in the opening paragraph of the Kellogg order:

The publication of diplomatic correspondence relating to matters which are still current often presents an insuperable obstacle to effective negotiation, but it is obvious that after the completion of the business in hand, as much of the correspondence as is practicable ought to be made public. This object is attained by the publication of *Foreign Relations* which presents, in a form economical, compact and easily accessible, the documentary history of the foreign relations of the United States. The editing of *Foreign Relations* must, therefore, be recognized as an important part of the duties of the Department of State.

This order, condensed but essentially the same in content as that of more recent Department regulations, has been the guiding rule for editing *Foreign Relations* from 1925 to the present.

The regular annual volume for 1914, published in 1922, contained the following editorial note: "Diplomatic correspondence concerning the World War will be printed in separate volumes of 'Foreign Relations of the United States: The History of the World War, as shown by the records of the Department of State.'" This "History of the World War" took the form of nine *World War Supplements* to the annual *Foreign Relations* volumes for the years 1914-18 inclusive, published from 1928 to 1933. Credit for their compilation goes to Dr. Fuller, assisted by Carlton Savage. Three special volumes on Russia for 1918 were also published in this period. Later, a volume on Russia for 1919 was published (1937), as were two volumes of the *Lansing Papers, 1914-1920* (1939, 1940).

Work on the special war supplements had taken priority over that for the regular annual volumes, so that by 1930 the gap of the publication date had lengthened to 12 years. To remedy this situation, Dr. Dennett, now head of the Office of Historical Adviser, which in 1929 had taken over the duties of the former Division of Publications, planned a much enlarged Research Section. Although the coming of the depression, with attendant budgetary cuts, checked the carrying out of this program, it was found possible to add five new researchers to the staff in 1930 for work on the annual volumes. The unusual continuity in the *Foreign Relations* staff is illustrated by the fact that, of the present 12 researchers working on *Foreign Relations*, two entered the Office of the Historical Adviser at that time and two were already employed in the Office.

In 1934 the Research Section became part of the Division of Research and Publication. During the depression years no additions to the section were made, and until 1936 no vacancy was filled. Dr. Fuller died in 1932 and Morrison B. Giffen was promoted to head the Research Section.

After he transferred to another division in 1936, E. R. Perkins took over the position and has continued in the capacity of chief editor of *Foreign Relations* to the present. With the research staff reduced to five over a period of several years and increased only to eight before the entry of the United States into World War II, the lag in publication increased to 15 years.

Discussion of the "15-year gap" (mistakenly believed by some to be an established policy) led the Department in 1938 to inquire of 10 foreign governments whether they would object in principle to the publication of diplomatic correspondence within a shorter period. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Germany, Italy, Mexico, Peru, and the United Kingdom agreed in principle, though generally requesting that permission be asked in each case for the publication of documents originating with their governments. Argentina and Mexico suggested a 10-year limit, the British Foreign Office 7 years. The Soviet Union perceived no necessity for shortening the 15-year period but, recognizing that the decision rested with the Government of the United States, stated it would prefer to be consulted prior to publication of any official documents or correspondence relating to U. S.-Soviet affairs. France alone objected to shortening the period, pointing out that French diplomatic archives were open to the public only up to the year 1877. The question was not submitted to the Japanese Foreign Office in view of Ambassador Joseph C. Grew's opinion that such action might result in a counterproposal that the 15-year period be lengthened.

Since 1938, despite the Department's declared policy to speed publication, the gap has increased to 18 years, because of insufficient funds for printing and for an adequate staff, in addition to the pressure of other assignments upon the existing staff.

When the *Foreign Relations* volumes for 1919 were published, the records of the Paris Peace Conference were not included. In 1938, the British, French, and Italian Governments consented in principle to publication of these records. For their agreement, credit may be given to the persistent efforts of Cyril Wynne, Chief of the Division of Research and Publication, which was the successor to the Office of the Historical Adviser. The Paris Peace Conference records were published in 12 volumes released between 1942 and 1947. Minutes of the many committees and commissions of the conference were not included since they would have necessitated many additional volumes. These and other unpublished supplementary documents were, however, declassified by agreement with the other governments concerned and opened for private research. A thirteenth volume was added to the conference series in the form of an annotated text of the Treaty of Versailles.

Other special volumes of *Foreign Relations* prepared in recent years to supplement the annual

volumes are two on relations with Japan, 1931-41 (published 1943), and one on relations with the Soviet Union, 1933-39 (published 1952).³

Changes Introduced in 1932 Volumes

With the publication of *Foreign Relations* for 1932 (published 1947, 1948), certain changes were introduced. The name which the series had carried since 1870, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States*, was changed to *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers*. The second change was in number of volumes. Previously, from one to three volumes had sufficed to give a comprehensive record of American diplomacy for each year except for war periods. The immense importance of international relations in the fateful decade preceding World War II and the increasing bulk of Department records for that period presented the choice of increasing the number of volumes or sacrificing traditional standards of completeness. It was decided to increase the number of annual volumes to five. Except for 1935, for which only four volumes were found to be needed, compilation has been made on the basis of five volumes for each year through 1940.

A third change was in the grouping of subjects. Prior to 1932, the volumes had started with a "General" section containing correspondence on subjects of a multilateral nature followed by sections for each country arranged alphabetically. The new arrangement, beginning with the 1932 volumes, continues the "General" section but arranges the countries by areas: The British Commonwealth, Europe, the Near East and Africa, the Far East, and the American Republics. A fourth departure was the inclusion, in a preface to the first volume for each year, of a statement naming the staff members responsible for the compilation. The early practice of anonymous publication had continued until this time, except for the *Lansing Papers* and Paris Peace Conference volumes, which had carried statements as to editorship. The practice of anonymity had received some criticism as failing to fix responsibility or to give a basis for judging the qualifications of the editors.

Up to the present, 168 volumes of *Foreign Relations* have been published. These include the annual volumes through the year 1934 and Volume II, *The British Commonwealth; Europe* for 1935. Compilation has been completed through 1939 and for all but one volume for 1940. These 27 volumes are in various stages of editing, printing, or clearance. Work on the compilation for 1941 is now in progress with some exploratory research done beyond that year.

Since 1946, when the Division of Historical

Policy Research and the Division of Publications were created, the responsibility of preparing *Foreign Relations* has been shared by the two divisions. The Foreign Relations Branch of the Division of Historical Policy Research, with a present staff of 13, is responsible for the basic research involved and for the selection, arrangement, and annotation of documents as well as for obtaining clearance. The researchers are, for the most part, area specialists and, in addition to their work on *Foreign Relations*, are frequently called upon for special studies in their respective fields. The work of editing copy, proofreading, and preparing lists of papers and indexes is done by the Foreign Relations Editing Branch of the Division of Publications. This branch also has a staff of 13 at present, with Miss Elizabeth A. Vary serving as Chief. The Division of Publications, in addition to its editorial function, is responsible for preparation and support of the budget for printing costs.

Clearance of Documents

Clearance of documents for publication in *Foreign Relations* has two aspects: Clearance with interested policy offices within the Department, and obtaining from foreign governments permission to print documents originating with those governments. The former clearance is obtained through direct consultation with those policy officers most directly concerned with the subject matter of the topics treated. Reference is made to higher levels only in doubtful cases.

Hitherto unpublished documents received from friendly governments are not published without their consent. Governments with which the United States has been at war are not asked for permission to print documents received before friendly relations were reestablished. The practice of asking consent for publication of foreign documents is based on international courtesy rather than on any legal right. Indeed, permission to print foreign documents in *Foreign Relations* was apparently not asked at all previous to World War I; the practice began with the volume for 1912, published in 1919.

The practice of clearance has given rise to frequent misunderstanding as to the completeness of documentation in *Foreign Relations*. Only a very small proportion of the documents selected for publication in the series needs to be submitted to foreign governments, and of these not one in 20 has to be omitted because of objections raised. Occasionally policy officers within the Department request deletion of a passage, under Department regulations which allow omissions "to avoid needless offense to other nationalities or individuals." Omissions have not been made to gloss over what might be considered mistakes of policy. Documentation on certain controversial subjects

³ For a survey article on the Soviet volume by Rogers Platt Churchill, see BULLETIN of May 19, 1952, p. 767, and May 26, 1952, p. 822.

has been omitted, but in no case has major American foreign policy been involved, and, as a general rule, notation of the omission has been made. Future researchers in Department of State archives are likely to be disappointed if they expect to gain distinction by discovering unpublished diplomatic secrets.

A Scholar's Experience

A typical experience of a research scholar who checked published material against the complete files is described by Thomas A. Bailey of Stanford University in his book, *The Policy of the United States Toward the Neutrals, 1917-1918* (Johns Hopkins Press, 1942). Commenting on the absence of scholarly studies on the subject of U.S. neutrality during World War I, he wrote:

But perhaps the strongest deterrent to a study of America's relations with the neutrals was the relative unavailability, up to the present time, of the manuscript records. It is true that from 1931 to 1933 the Department of State published several volumes of *Foreign Relations of the United States* which contained about 2,000 pages of documents bearing upon the present subject. Yet prospective students of the problem may have felt that the printed records were not reasonably complete; that the editors had carefully culled out all material discreditable to the United States; and that a scholar should not waste his time in preparing a monograph which could not, in the nature of things, be "definitive."

This situation was definitely altered when, in 1939, the Department of State issued an order making its records up to 1919 available to certain classes of scholars. Shortly thereafter the present writer applied for and secured permission to examine the papers concerning the neutrals. Every file that he asked for was turned over to him without reservation; and during the course of his researches he made the gratifying discovery that few, if any, policy documents of primary importance had been omitted from the published record. He took notes on a large amount of material of a somewhat supplementary nature, and found some new items that were of considerable importance from the rather restricted point of view of this study. But he can testify, after an exacting comparison, that the editing of the official documents was done with intelligence, discrimination, and care; and he can further testify that he found no evidence whatever that any important document had been withheld from publication because it would reflect unfavorably upon the government of the United States. . . .

Writers and teachers of history, political science, and international law have long found the volumes invaluable as primary source material in their research work and in interpreting American foreign policy to their classes and to lecture audiences. A recent study on international relations in the Far East contained no fewer than 236 citations to the series. Joseph C. Grew, former Ambassador to Japan, makes 198 citations to the volumes in his new book, *Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years*.

The volumes are in constant use by officers of the Department. The indexes and summaries of documents simplify the task of assimilating background material on current questions. In preparing the U.S. brief on American rights in the French zone of Morocco, for example, the Legal

Adviser's Office made use of the volumes for 1880, 1905, 1906, 1911-17, 1922, 1923, 1925, 1928-31, and 1933, and was supplied page proof of the 1935 volume containing material on the subject.⁴ Reference to the volumes on this and other occasions saved valuable time and lengthy research in the Department's files. Other executive departments, the Congress, and the courts also make use of the volumes.

The volumes as they appear are widely and favorably reviewed in political-science, historical, and international-law journals. Popular interest in the volumes is indicated by newspaper coverage of the releases. Timeliness of the documents with respect to current matters has occasionally led to wide publicity. The second volume issued called forth a 71-page critical pamphlet entitled *The Diplomatic Year; Being a Review of Mr. Seward's Foreign Correspondence of 1862, by a Northern Man*. This treatise in turn was criticized in an eight-page pamphlet entitled *A Diplomat on Diplomacy*. The release of *Foreign Relations, 1933, Volume V, The American Republics* was followed by a series of five illustrated articles in the popular Cuban weekly *Bohemia* giving translations and summaries of documents on the Cuban Revolution of 1933.

To present within reasonable limits of space the record of U.S. diplomacy in the recent war and postwar years offers serious problems of research and organization. The difficulties are great but the need for a published record is greater; with the increasing complexity of international relations and the expanding accumulation of records, the search for documents in the archives becomes proportionately harder, not only for private scholars but even for Department officers who are familiar with the material. For both groups, the previously published documentation will provide an indispensable resource.

Foreign Relations Volume Released

Press release 891 dated November 28

The good-neighbor policy of the United States, as exemplified in refraining from interference in the domestic affairs of other countries and in taking positive action to promote international commerce through the reciprocal trade-agreements program of Secretary of State Cordell Hull, is documented in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1934, volume V (The American Republics)* which was released on November 28 by the Department of State. This is the final volume in the series for 1934, the other four volumes having been previously released. The countries treated in this volume are Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador,

⁴For an article on this International Court of Justice case, see BULLETIN of Oct. 20, 1952, p. 620.

Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, and Uruguay. The record on multilateral negotiations among the American Republics and on bilateral relations with Argentina and Brazil is printed in volume IV.

Of outstanding interest in 1934 were relations with Cuba where the revolution which overthrew President Machado in 1933 had not run its full course. Machado was followed by President Carlos Manuel de Cespedes and the latter by President Ramon Grau San Martin, who was in office at the beginning of 1934, but neither of these provisional regimes had gained stability or recognition by the United States. At the head of the American Embassy was Jefferson Caffery as personal representative of President Roosevelt. During political maneuvers in January which led to Grau's resignation and the succession of President Carlos Mendieta, Caffery was asked what the United States would require for recognition. Caffery replied that the Cuban Government was a Cuban matter and that it was for Cubans to decide what they would do about it. He reported to the Department that he had taken no part in the conversations going on but was keeping informed.

By January 14, affairs in Cuba had reached a critical stage and Caffery requested authority to recognize Mendieta who, it was reported, would assume the Presidency only if assured in advance of recognition by the United States. Caffery expressed the opinion that a government headed by Mendieta and supported by Colonel Batista would represent a majority of the Cuban people, both men being extremely popular with different sectors of the public. In reply the Department instructed Caffery that no pledge of recognition could be made in advance to any individual or group but that the United States would recognize a Cuban provisional government substantially supported by the Cuban people and able to maintain law, order, and the normal functions of government. Grau turned over the office of Provisional President to Carlos Hevia, Secretary of Agriculture, on January 15, and on January 18 the latter gave way to Mendieta. Caffery reported on January 22 that the new government was supported by all political groups save the extreme left and possibly adherents of Machado. The next day the United States extended recognition.

Reestablishment of a stable government in Cuba was soon followed by further implementation of the traditionally friendly relations between the United States and that country. A Treaty of

Relations was signed on May 29 abrogating the treaty of May 22, 1903, which contained the famous "Platt Amendment" giving the United States the right to intervene in Cuba under certain conditions. Action was also taken by the United States to help in marketing Cuba's sugar crop and a reciprocal trade agreement was signed on August 24.

With other countries also steps were taken to strengthen the policy of nonintervention in domestic affairs. Withdrawal of U.S. Marines from Haiti was accomplished at an earlier date than had been agreed upon. President Roosevelt also expressed his hope for complete withdrawal of the United States from all participation in the administration of Haitian finances, but negotiations to achieve that end failed to reach an agreement that year.

In Central America the United States cooperated with Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua in working out a plan for the recognition of the Martinez government in El Salvador.

Nicaragua, disturbed by political unrest marked by the killing of Sandino, was another country in which the policy of nonintervention was put to the test. The American Minister, Arthur Bliss Lane, while expressing the hope for free elections, informed General Moncada, a former President seeking return to that office, that Nicaragua must decide her internal problems, that the United States would not interfere with respect to the *Guardia*, or intervene in any way in those elections or in the financial affairs of Nicaragua.

The reciprocal trade agreement with Cuba was the only one signed with any of the American Republics during 1934, but this volume also records preliminary discussions or negotiations on the subject with Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Uruguay. Other sections of the volume deal with various trade and financial matters, the protection of American interests, border problems with Mexico, and questions arising in connection with the Panama Canal.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1934 volume V (*The American Republics*) was compiled in the Division of Historical Policy Research by Victor J. Farrar and Matilda Axton, under the direction of E. R. Perkins, editor of *Foreign Relations*. Copies of this volume (lxii, 674 pp.) may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. for \$2.75 each.

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†915	12/12	Venezuela: Letter of credence (rewrite)
†916	12/12	U.S.-Philippine air agreement
†917	12/12	Ambassador Locke resigns

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

The Department of State

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The Importance of the United Nations to the United States

by Howard Meyers¹

A recent article in a nationally known magazine referred to the possible parallel between the League of Nations Assembly of September 1937, which moved into its magnificent new quarters in Geneva shortly after Mussolini had successfully defied the League by his Ethiopian adventure and Hitler's legions had marched into the Ruhr, and the present session of the U.N. General Assembly, which was meeting for the first time in the spectacular new building on New York's East River. The parallel was resolved in favor of the United Nations, with the firm statement that, fortunately, the United Nations begins its tenancy of the new Assembly building with considerably more in the bank, politically and morally speaking, than the Geneva institution had in 1937, particularly because the United Nations had proved its ability to do more than merely voice condemnation of wanton aggression by organizing military resistance in Korea. This article declared that, if the lessons of history mean anything, the determined reaction by the United Nations to the Korean challenge has not only saved its own life but probably prevented World War III.

From the standpoint of my own professional interest in the United Nations, it was a pleasure to read an interpretation of this nature. But I cannot be unaware, despite this laudatory support, that the United Nations is today the target of sharp criticism. Of course, criticism of the United Nations and the specialized agencies and attacks on U.S. membership in these organizations has existed almost from the days of the San Francisco Charter. This criticism has been intensified in the past year.

In the early days of the U.N.'s existence, there was criticism of the veto because it enabled the five Great Powers to protect their own national interest or their national sovereignty at the expense

of international cooperation. Now, the United Nations is criticized as a supergovernment, and we find resolutions seeking to limit our participation in the U.N.'s activities introduced in the Congress, such as a proposal that the United States withdraw from the United Nations and a resolution designed to limit the traditional treaty powers of the Executive Branch of the U.S. Government because of fears inspired by various activities carried on by the United Nations.

There is objection that the United Nations does not include all of the world's states in accordance with the principle of universality and, contrariwise, there is the assertion that the United Nations should be reorganized without the Communists or scrapped.

Suspicion is voiced and pamphlets are widely distributed declaring that the United Nations is an instrument of un-American elements, if not of agents of the Soviet Union. But on the other hand we even find the criticism that the United Nations has become a captive bureau of the State Department.

Bitter comments are aroused by what is considered the indifference of other U.N. members to the heavy casualties which have been suffered by the predominantly American and South Korean troops in meeting the Communist aggression in Korea.

There are wide and varied attacks on UNESCO, as you here well know, for allegedly attempting to use American schools to indoctrinate our children with the idea that their first loyalty is to a world government or for supposedly carrying on an insidious campaign for world government and for world citizenship. UNESCO has probably been singled out for a great proportion of these attacks because, as Anne O'Hare McCormick of the *New York Times* and Carroll Binder of the *Minneapolis Tribune* have suggested, UNESCO invites the widest individual participation of all U.N. agencies and makes the greatest local and popular impact and because UNESCO operates in

¹ Address made before the annual meeting of the Kansas Commission for UNESCO at Emporia on Dec. 13. Mr. Meyers is an officer in the Office of U.N. Political and Security Affairs.

the field of ideas and thus offers an opportunity for many individuals and organizations to make militant assaults on ideas and institutions which do not conform to their concept of patriotism.

While some of the attacks on the United Nations, particularly those on UNESCO, have emanated from groups which are on the Attorney General's list of subversive organizations, a great many others have come from far more reputable and influential sources. I would like to suggest that these criticisms leveled against the United Nations and our participation in its work are actually a healthy indication of normal growth. The development of the United Nations, notably the collective security effort in Korea, is bound to provoke a reexamination of the entire relationship between the United States and the United Nations. These questions are asked, these criticisms are provoked, because the United Nations today has great impact upon the consciousness of the people of the United States and because U.S. participation in the United Nations influences the daily lives of all Americans.

I sincerely trust that the United Nations will emerge stronger by reason of these questions asked. I think that it is significant that recent public-opinion surveys in this country have demonstrated widespread support for the United Nations, particularly by church groups, women's organizations, and business and professional associations. One survey in October found that 80 percent of the general public believes the United Nations is a useful organization, with attitudes varying from belief the United Nations was very useful to a feeling that it was merely moderately useful. Only 10 percent thought the organization was of no use at all. I might note, particularly, that President-elect Eisenhower has publicly expressed himself as hoping that there would be no doubt of his unwavering support of the principles and ideals on which the United Nations was founded.

Against this briefly sketched background of opposition, criticism, inquiry about and support for the United Nations, it seems worthwhile to take a realistic look at the value which the United Nations has for our country. What is the importance of the United Nations to the United States?

U.N. Charter Expresses U.S. Aims

I would like to suggest that the Charter of the United Nations is, in effect, a contract among the member states to maintain international peace and security and to promote the economic and social advancement of all peoples, in order to build and maintain a durable world order. The United States supports the United Nations and keeps this contract because the U.N. Charter expresses our fundamental aims in this difficult world. Fulfillment of the aims declared in the Charter will best advance the vital interests of the United States—

peace founded on justice, freedom, economic and social progress for ourselves and for all peoples. It is because realization of the aims expressed in the U.N. Charter will materially advance U.S. interests that support of the United Nations is a fundamental element in our foreign policy.

This is not lip service to an ideal. It is plain, practical common sense.

Speaking realistically, the United States is best off in a world at peace, where we can live our own lives, trade with each other and with the peoples of other countries, try to solve our problems without being burdened by the fear of aggression. The history of the past 50 years should have taught us that the nations of the world are interdependent and that major unrest, widespread disease, or serious economic disturbance in any part of the world will inevitably affect us here. Our security is compounded of many things. It consists of superior military and economic power on the side of law and order. It depends upon strong and free allies. And it depends also upon the good will, the respect, the confidence, and the moral support of decent people everywhere.

These decent people and their governments are aided by and look to the United Nations for help in their difficulties. The U.N.'s record of response to their needs, for the most part, is a good one. It is a record which the United States has materially helped build and in turn the U.N.'s record helps us.

With this in mind, I think that we can best see what the United Nations means to the United States by looking at the U.N.'s three major tasks to see how they aid the interests of the United States.

Maintenance of Peace and Security

First, in the field of political and security problems, the United Nations has found ways to exercise its responsibilities in maintaining international peace and security. This has been accomplished despite obstruction on the part of the Soviet Union and despite the fact that the participation of 60 sovereign states with 60 different national opinions multiplies almost geometrically the difficulties of achieving agreement. The United Nations has exercised its responsibilities in the political and security area in two ways: by improving and strengthening the machinery of collective security; by utilizing the practical devices for peaceful settlement of disputes provided in the Charter.

With reference to collective security, the United Nations was originally conceived as operating on the basis of continuing cooperation on the part of the five Great Powers. That was soon proved illusory because of the attitude of the Soviet Union, and I know I do not need to describe events undoubtedly familiar to all of you here. Korea was the final demonstration of the length to which the Soviet Union and its satellites were willing to go.

And the United Nations met that challenge. The Security Council moved with rapidity and decisiveness, branding the attack as a breach of the peace and calling upon all members of the United Nations to aid the Republic of Korea. The prompt support of 53 member nations for the measures proposed by the Security Council clearly showed that this was not a move solely by the Western Powers but was action strongly favored by the free world, including Asiatic countries which had been rather critical of various actions by the Western Powers.

General Ridgway has pointed out that the U.N. Command in Korea involved 16 nations of differing languages, creeds, races, and colors; that these units found complete mutual confidence in fighting the aggressors. A common belief moved and supported them. In addition to the 16 U.N. members with armed forces in Korea, 42 members and 5 nonmembers are contributing material aid. This has been an unprecedented demonstration of the U.N.'s will to resist aggression, and I think this point bears remembering, no matter what criticism people may have concerning the extent of aid given in Korea by other members of the United Nations.

The Korean situation demonstrated the adaptability of the United Nations to meet difficult situations and discharge its responsibility. But the Security Council had been able to act and meet the threat of aggression in Korea only because the Soviet Union was not present to veto the proposed action. Consequently, the General Assembly in November 1950 adopted the "Uniting for Peace" resolution enabling the Assembly to meet in an emergency session within 24 hours if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, failed to act when there was a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression. The General Assembly, then, can make recommendations to members of the United Nations to take action deemed necessary, provided that the members so agree.

This was only one part of the Uniting for Peace resolution. It also established a Peace Observation Commission to observe and report on the situation in any area in which international conflict threatens, upon the invitation or with the consent of the state in whose territory the Commission would go. It recommended that member states maintain forces so trained, organized, and equipped that they could promptly be made available for service as U.N. units, on recommendation by the Security Council or the General Assembly. And it established a Collective Measures Committee to study and report on methods which might be used to maintain and strengthen international peace and security.

Thus the framework has been provided for a workable collective-security system. The means has been established by which to determine aggression. The machinery has been set up by which to decide upon action, as acceptable to the

members of the United Nations. Devices have been suggested by which existing military forces may be readied and may be held available for necessary and acceptable action. The moral and the material bases for future collective action have been provided. This is a modest beginning; it has long-range implications. We can continue to build on this basic foundation to achieve our goal of a stronger U.N. collective-security system for deterring or suppressing future aggression.

I believe that this ability on the part of the United Nations to adapt itself to meet changing situations is important evidence of the vitality of the organization and the role it can play in international affairs, provided that the United States and many other powers give the support necessary to aid the organization and thus to aid themselves as individual states.

Speaking in broad terms, our political obligations at times may exceed our military abilities if we act unilaterally, or even in concert with one or more of our closest allies. It has been pointed out fairly often recently that our resources are not limitless; that, although the United States is the richest nation in the world, it does not have the materials or the manpower to do all that needs to be done. We want to help promote situations of strength where people are united behind a popular government and determined to maintain their independence; where people can count on strong support from other free countries or from the United Nations; where people can hope to create a better life by their own efforts. In order to do this, we need and we want to act together with the majority of the members of the United Nations. This does not mean military action alone, and I emphasize this point. We need to develop collective policies for a constructive, dynamic peace which goes far beyond the joint use of arms. But it does mean that, when resort to arms is necessary, we act under the sanction of the United Nations collectively.

U. N. Achievements in Peaceful Settlements

In Korea, the United Nations acted with force of arms. However, there have been many situations in which the United Nations has made substantial gains in peaceful settlement of disputes, in preventing or stopping hostilities, by applying a variety of means. This is the other way in which the United Nations exercises its responsibilities in the field of political and security problems. I can cite the withdrawal of British and French troops from Syria and Lebanon and of Soviet troops from Iran, following Security Council consideration of these problems in 1946. The U.N.'s persistent conciliatory efforts played a major role in achieving Indonesian independence and in bringing about peaceful settlement of the issues between the Dutch and Indonesians. In Greece, observance of that country's northern borders by the

United Nations certainly contributed to the easing of a dangerous situation between Greece and its neighbors, if in no other way than by providing the United Nations with clear and irrefutable evidence of the responsibility of various Soviet satellites for the dangerous situation in that valiant country.

The General Assembly's efforts in Palestine ended the armed conflict between Israel and the Arab States and, while there is no final peace agreed upon as yet in this area, the armistice arranged by the United Nations is still honored. While the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan is not finally settled, Security Council efforts have not only brought about a cease-fire but, step by step, achieved agreement between the parties on many elements of their dispute. Not the least of these peaceful settlements was the Berlin blockade, an extremely dangerous situation involving the Great Powers and the prestige of both the Soviet Union and the United States, which was settled by peaceful negotiations in which U.N. channels were used.

The settlements achieved in these cases, whether permanent or temporary, testify to the general effectiveness of the processes of peaceful settlement which are available under the Charter of the United Nations. In every instance, such settlements redound to our political advantage, for we want and need a world living in peace which is founded on justice, freedom, and economic and social progress. Normal bilateral diplomatic processes all too often are not sufficient to bring about this kind of world. We have learned the mutual interdependence of all peoples, and I think that we can see that many international problems often can best be settled through the international agency of the United Nations. I do not mean to minimize bilateral diplomatic processes, the standard fare of day-to-day contact between governments. I would like to stress, however, that so many of world problems, issues, and disputes today are interrelated that the U.N.'s processes of peaceful settlement very often offer the necessarily wide variety of devices which aid in reaching a solution. There is a form of protection given to the interests of both small and great powers by virtue of the fact that the United Nations is so all-embracing an organization.

Progress in Economic and Social Fields

Now the second major task of the United Nations is in the economic and social field. When we look at political and security problems, as we have just done, it is apparent that the difficulty of the problems has permitted only modest progress in their solutions. When we look at international cooperation in economic and social matters, we can see greater and more heartening progress which sometimes proceeds so quietly that its success is not properly noticed. In an interdependent world the prosperity of individuals and nations every-

where depends upon the mutually advantageous international exchange of goods, of services, and of ideas. Cooperative action is growing through the efforts of various agencies of the United Nations, particularly the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and its commissions, and the specialized agencies. The record of the achievement is so extensive that I can do no more, in this brief period of time, than touch upon the ways in which the United Nations has aided governments to deal with the conditions of poverty, disease, and hunger under which two-thirds of the world's population now live.

The technical-assistance program of the United Nations and the specialized agencies is now operating in about 70 countries and is providing assistance in innumerable fields. There are 742 experts actually at work in these countries and over 400 specialists have finished their tasks. As a result of these experts' efforts, a number of governments are already beginning to provide increased capital for projects whose feasibility has now been established.

The International Labor Organization, in addition to its better-known functions, has participated in the U.N. technical-assistance program, particularly to aid governments with the organization of employment services, with vocational training guidance, and with methods of facilitating migration of workers.

The Food and Agriculture Organization brought improved varieties of corn into Europe and the Near East and better breeds of poultry into the Orient. It has conducted temporary schools in technical subjects, such as how to improve livestock in Europe. Many governments have received FAO assistance in various projects leading to economic development in the fields of agriculture, fisheries, forestry, and nutrition.

UNESCO's activities are, of course, well known to you. UNESCO's efforts have been great in helping to eliminate illiteracy and encourage fundamental education through the clearinghouse for the exchange of information and through the establishment of fundamental-education centers such as the one in Mexico. UNESCO has developed international collaboration in social and natural scientific fields through the Field Science Cooperative Offices in various parts of the world and through establishing international associations to forge the essential links for effective cooperation among social scientists. UNESCO's exchange-of-persons program, its varied cultural activities, its aid in the rehabilitation of schools and educational facilities in war-devastated areas or underdeveloped countries, and the part UNESCO is playing in the technical-assistance program in 12 countries demonstrate the vitality and scope of your organization's interests.

The World Health Organization has aided Greece, India, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Associated States of Indochina

in fighting malaria: it has given assistance in combating tuberculosis in the Far East, the Middle East, and South America. It has taken active part all over the world in the struggle against contagious diseases, and it has assisted countries in emergencies such as the typhus epidemic in Egypt and the infantile paralysis epidemic in Bombay.

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development as of the present has made 73 loans totaling almost 1,500 million dollars in 27 countries in order to assist in the reconstruction or development of these countries.

The International Refugee Organization, during the course of its operations, repatriated more than 72,000 displaced persons, resettled over 1,045,000 refugees, and operated vocational-training and rehabilitation services for more than 1,057,000 refugees.

I could go on almost indefinitely reciting the history of progress in mutual aid to save people, to save cattle, to save material resources, to develop skills, to help alleviate the social and economic ills which provide a fertile breeding ground for communism and other similar reactionary doctrines. The progress which has been made by the United Nations in these fields very directly helps the United States, because widespread disease, serious economic ills, and major social unrest in any part of the world inevitably affects us. I have said before that our security involves not only military power but also the good will and respect, the confidence, and the moral support of decent people anywhere in the world. Millions upon millions of these people are helped by the United Nations and look to the United Nations for continued help. The United States has been applauded because of the support which we have given to the United Nations in the economic and social fields—not only money but also technical “know-how.” It is a two-way proposition which more than repays us because it helps create the forward-looking stability which we want to see exist in the world. And it is helping to minimize and eradicate conditions conducive to international tensions, insecurity, and war.

Self-Government for Dependent Peoples

The third major job of the United Nations is helping work out the orderly advance of dependent peoples toward some form of self-government. Ten years ago, there were 800,000,000 people in the free world who were not fully self-governing. Today 600,000,000 of them have attained full independence. In the past, independence was usually achieved through bloodshed. It is one of the principal responsibilities of the United Nations to try to help create conditions which insure that this path to self-government is a peaceful and enduring one. If this can be done, these 200,000,000 remaining dependent peoples will probably not succumb to the blandishments of a communism

which is basically reactionary and imperialist in design.

The importance of these problems of self-government can be seen by merely looking at the agenda of the present session of the General Assembly, where we not only have the Tunisian and Moroccan issues but also find that the problems of dependent areas arise in nearly every Committee (almost without reference to the topic under consideration).

The United Nations has already demonstrated its ability to help bring about an orderly solution of the difficulties inherent in this field of dependent area problems. I have previously mentioned the aid which the United Nations gave in solving the Indonesian dispute, resulting in the creation of the independent state of Indonesia, a nation of over 70 million, which became the sixtieth member of the United Nations in September 1950. Seventy million people became independent despite Communist efforts to interfere with the creation of their Republic.

After the four Great Powers spent 3 fruitless years trying to find a solution to dispose of former Italian Colonies, the General Assembly succeeded in cutting the Gordian knot. The result is that Libya became an independent state at the beginning of this year; that Somaliland is under Italian trusteeship, approved by the United Nations, with independence projected in 10 years; that Eritrea has become an autonomous unit federated with Ethiopia. Furthermore, the welfare of the millions of people living in trust territories is guaranteed by the supervision of the Trusteeship Council, working through visiting missions which try to promote educational, political, social, and economic advancement.

A Positive Force for Peace

In other words, in another field of great potential danger for international peace and stability, the United Nations has demonstrated and is demonstrating its ability to help find peaceful solutions and thus avoid disorder which can only redound to the detriment of the United States.

I have spoken at some length on what the United Nations means to the United States, but I have only indicated the outline of this relationship. I believe, from this brief review, we would be justified in depicting the United Nations as a positive force for peace, which operates within the limits of present reality. Remember that it is an organization of 60 sovereign and legally equal states, with widely varying national cultures and public attitudes. The United Nations cannot be better than the sum of its parts and what those nations comprising its parts are willing to do to further their obligation for the maintenance of international peace and security, as well as the other forms of international cooperation. Do not condemn the United Nations because it is imperfect. This is a reflection of reality in today's world. Con-

sider that the organization has demonstrated ability to deal satisfactorily with a tremendous number of extraordinarily difficult problems. Reflect upon the adaptability to changing needs which the United Nations has demonstrated in developing an increasingly important role for the General Assembly. The United Nations is still the most important international aid to peace that we have and I believe that a strong United Nations can well help bring that peace closer to us all.

I said at the very beginning that support of the United Nations is a fundamental element in our foreign policy; that this was not lip service to an ideal but plain common sense. I would like to qualify that statement, in part. The U. N. organization does represent an ideal. It represents the hope that the peoples of the world can live together in harmony, uniting their strength to main-

tain international peace and security and to employ international measures for the promotion of economic and social advancement on the part of all peoples. The United Nations offers the possibility of reconciling these ideals and the harsh realities of divergent international interests. The Bible says that man does not live by bread alone. Ideas and ideals are in many ways as important to the peoples of the world as food, clothing, and shelter. I see no other organization in existence which offers so much of practical idealism to the doubting and distressed peoples in this world as does the United Nations. It is only to our advantage to give the United Nations all the support we can. We will receive dividends in return in the form of needed support from the peoples of the free world to achieve commonly desirable goals. This is mutually enlightened self-interest.

Understanding Point Four

by Jonathan R. Bingham

Deputy Administrator of Technical Cooperation Administration¹

Point Four is almost too good an idea. People tend to get so excited by it that they begin to talk a lot of glib nonsense about it, and we have heard a lot of that the last 3 or 4 years.

There have been those who proclaimed that American money was all that was needed, provided we spent enough of it; they have talked in terms of billions of dollars a year, not realizing how difficult it would be to spend that money wisely and with lasting results. On the other hand there have been those who believed that American know-how was so unique and so magical that all we had to do was to send out a few hundred technicians armed with it and in a scant space of years the "backward areas" would be booming. This of course was a tremendously attractive picture, which was seized upon by the economy-minded as proof that the whole job could be done cheaply.

Both of these extreme points of view have been based, I think, on a lack of appreciation of the nature of the problem. The one overstates what can be done with money, the other what can be done by a few experts giving advice. Both have

¹ Excerpts from remarks made before the Americans for Democratic Action at Boston on Dec. 6 (press release 904 dated Dec. 5).

tended to make the American people expect the deserts to bloom in a few short years, to expect ignorance, and hunger, and disease to be overcome; to expect, in short, miracles.

Obviously there is a great danger here. If progress in the early years is meager, if some country that we are trying to help kicks us in the teeth, if mistakes are made in the operation of the program, there may be a tendency to get discouraged and turn on the whole idea as a bad one or a luxury we can't afford.

What we all here in the United States must do is to see to it that the program is better understood than it is; what the problems and the difficulties are; in short, what our expectations of Point Four should reasonably be. If the American people know they have a long, hard road ahead of them, they will face it with stamina, determination, and courage. If they are led to believe the road to peace is easy and short and it turns out to be otherwise, they may conclude the road is a wrong one.

This last summer I spent 2 months in the area from Egypt on the west to India on the east, visiting nine Point Four missions at work there. Let me give you a brief sketch of the problems we face in that area.

Problems in the Near East

Most of the governments in the area are acutely aware of the necessity of raising the living standards of their peoples and some are making heroic efforts to that end. But their resources, either in terms of funds or trained people, are woefully insufficient. In all but one or two cases, they do not have the institutions, governmental or private, to begin to cope with the problem. Although they have many technically qualified people, they are characteristically unable to bridge the gap between the experiment station and the farm, between the laboratory and the workshop. Some are enfeebled by corruption and sheer incompetence. Some tend to blame their troubles on political grievances. One or two are making real progress, economically and socially; others are holding their own; still others, for all of their efforts, are going backward, losing the race with a growing population.

These, very roughly, are the dimensions of the problem in an area which, if it is not entirely typical of the underdeveloped areas as a whole, is probably the most critical. Now what do we in Point Four have as resources in attempting to make a dent in this problem?

In the first place, we have about 550 people at work in the area, including experts in agriculture, public health, education, and a variety of other fields. For the salaries of these experts and for the purchase of supplies and equipment needed to support their work, we have available a total in this fiscal year of a little over 100 million dollars, which is about half what we asked the Congress for. This amounts to less than 20 cents per person in the area.

In certain respects these figures represent a big advance. In 1950-51 the total amount available for the U.S. bilateral Point Four Program, worldwide, was 23 million dollars. So far as number of technicians are concerned, the present figure represents a fivefold increase since the first of the year. By the end of the fiscal year, we hope to have in the area more than half again as many as we do now.

In addition to the members of the U.S. Point Four teams, there are in the area a little over 300 technicians from the United Nations, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the World Health Organization, Unesco, and other international organizations, and a sizable number of devoted individuals working on similar programs for private organizations such as the Near East Foundation.

But taking all our resources together, our army is pitifully small and is backed with pitifully small funds to cope with the problems I have described. I do not mean to suggest that the answer is necessarily a lot more technicians or a great deal more money. There are dangers and drawbacks to both. What I am trying to say is simply, to emulate British understatement, helping the underdeveloped areas to help themselves is not

precisely easy no matter how you approach the job.

Let me call to your mind some of the factors which set limits to what we can do. I have heard it said by very responsible people that we should send thousands of technicians into the Near East, mobilizing our young men and women to go into the villages and help people to raise their standard of living. To be blunt, this is a naive and absurd suggestion. For one thing, there is not the slightest chance that it would be acceptable to any of the countries involved. They simply do not want that many Americans wandering around.

On the basis of my trip this summer and of what has been reported to us since, I think it is fair to say that Point Four has made a good start, under the circumstances, but that it is no more than a start.

Perhaps our outstanding achievement to date is that, without exception, our missions have won the confidence of the local officials they are working with, in spite of the very considerable political obstacles in a number of cases. They have done this, I think, by the simple human process of demonstrating their good will and their desire to be helpful and by following some of our fundamental Point Four principles, namely: that we will do only what we are requested to do; that our desire is to help the host government through cooperative methods to achieve progress of which *it* can be proud; that we do not attempt to impose American standards on alien cultures; and that Point Four is not a carrot for which we try to exact a political *quid pro quo*. Curious and suspicious at first, the local officials have gradually come to understand that our interest is to see them succeed in *their* efforts where those efforts are directed toward the social and economic development of their countries, not to win credit for ourselves.

Some Concrete Achievements of Point Four

So far as concrete achievements are concerned, I can only tell you a little bit about some of the things we are doing here and there. In Iran, as in most other countries, our program concentrates mainly on three types of activity, representing the greatest problems the people face: hunger, disease, and ignorance. In the agricultural field, we are helping Iranian officials carry out a program of research which in the long-run may have enormous impact: grasses are being developed which may flourish even on the barren hillsides of Iran; tests are being carried out on sugar beets and many other crops to see what varieties are best suited for Iran, when they should be planted, how much water they need, and to answer many other questions. Every possible assistance is being given to the Shah's program for the distribution of the Crown lands to landless peasants, especially through the establishment of facilities for credit so that the farmers may have the where-

withal to operate their land and for the training of local agents to give the landowners essential guidance in the carrying out of their new and frightening individual responsibilities. Seventy-five thousand baby chicks were shipped to Iran by air last spring, and more than half of them have been distributed to farmers in exchange for old stock. The rest are being kept in brood flocks in the various provincial centers, and next year it is expected that 350,000 chicks can be distributed in the same manner.

In the health field great strides have been made in the elimination of malaria by means of the spraying of village houses with DDT, with the enthusiastic cooperation of the villagers themselves. Although statistics are lacking, it is estimated that in some areas the incidence of this debilitating disease has dropped in 2 years from 80 percent to as little as 5 percent, with a consequent direct effect not only on the welfare of the people but on their ability to work and produce crops. In a number of dry and dusty villages, deep wells have been sunk, bringing to the inhabitants the miracle of clean, fresh water.

This summer for the first time a training course for Iranian primary school teachers was held in nine provincial centers, the faculty themselves having been trained in a Point Four demonstration school in Tehran. In this way a thousand teachers, most of them with very little education themselves, received an inkling of how to teach their pupils to prepare better for life.

These are just some of the things that have been done, but what does it all amount to? It will not solve the political problems arising out of the oil dispute nor will it necessarily keep Iran friendly to America. But, here and there in scattered parts of the country, it will have given a sizable number of Iranians a feeling that there is some chance of improvement in their lives after all, which means that they may for the first time have a sense of hope instead of a sense of despair.

Let me just recount one incident which occurred in a village in the Veramin Plains area east of Tehran where the Near East Foundation has been working under a grant from Point Four. The houses of the village proudly displayed on their outside walls the big red stencil marks showing that they had been sprayed with DDT; literacy classes had been started among the adults; village sanitary facilities had been improved, and the villagers had started their own vegetable gardens on land which the landlord had been persuaded to make available for that purpose. As our party walked through the vegetable garden, a farmer rushed up and said: "We were dead and now we are alive."

In India, an ambitious program is under way which was largely American in inspiration but which will necessarily be principally Indian in execution. Drawing on experience in certain limited areas, such as at the famous Etawah project,

indicating that very substantial increases in food production and other gains could be achieved by patient work at the village level, teaching and demonstrating, the Indian Government has launched this year 55 similar projects in different parts of India, and hopes in the next 3 or 4 years to reach one-third of India by this method. Point Four is contributing technical help and supplies and equipment to these projects, and together with the Ford Foundation is helping to train the hundreds of workers that will be needed. I visited three schools engaged in this work, one at Nilokheri for the project leaders, another near Lucknow for the intermediate grade of workers with some degree of specialization, and a third at Allahabad for village workers. In all of them I found an extraordinary spirit on the part of the trainees which augurs well for the success of the program. Perhaps encouraged by the example of Americans pitching in at hard jobs, they had abandoned the notion all too prevalent in the underdeveloped areas generally, that an educated person should not soil his hands.

Some of the examples I have mentioned suggest the answer to the perennial question: "What are we doing to see that our aid does not simply make the rich richer and the poor poorer?" There have been those in high places who have argued that we should not lend assistance to any country unless it is doing all that we think it should in the field of land reform, for example. In our view, it would be fatal to seek to impose any such conditions. If we did, we would have neither any reforms nor any Point Four Program. What we can do is to encourage practical steps toward reform and then when they are taken, step in vigorously with assistance so as to be sure that they do not fail and thus set back for decades the cause of reform.

So far as lack of capital is concerned, Point Four is neither equipped nor authorized to attempt to meet the problem by providing loans or grant aid. But we can help the local governments to mobilize such sources of capital as may exist, both domestically and from foreign sources, including the International Bank. Often the hardest money to come by is that needed for the initial surveys, for such projects as water development, transportation improvements, and the like, and this we can often provide.

I do not believe it is too much to say that in a year or so our programs will have gone far enough so that they will have begun to be felt by millions of people in the area. The net effect on the total problem in physical terms will probably be very small but the psychological effect may be much larger. The farmer in Iran who made such a moving little speech was still living under conditions of inconceivable hardship to us; yet a start had been made: he had been given the feeling that, through his own efforts and with some help, he could go on improving his lot, bit by bit.

U.S.-Canadian Construction of Power Works in St. Lawrence River Authorized

The Department of State announced on October 31 that it had received from the International Joint Commission the Order of Approval authorizing the construction of power works in the International Rapids Section of the St. Lawrence River. Following are the texts of the order authorizing the construction, signed October 29; the dissenting opinion of Commissioner Roger B. McWhorter, of November 19, in the matter of the St. Lawrence River improvement applications of the Governments of the United States and Canada, dated June 30, 1952; and the majority opinion of the Commission, released on November 28, in regard to the dissenting statement:

ORDER OF APPROVAL

Press release 851 dated October 31

WHEREAS the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America under date of 30 June, 1952, have submitted Applications¹ to the International Joint Commission (hereinafter referred to as the "Commission") for its approval of the construction, jointly by entities to be designated by the respective Governments, of certain works for the development of power in the International Rapids Section of the St. Lawrence River, these being boundary waters within the meaning of the Preliminary Article of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 11 January, 1909 (hereinafter referred to as the "Treaty"), and of the construction, maintenance and operation of such works subject to and under conditions specified in the Applications, and have requested that the Applications be considered by the Commission as in the nature of a joint application; and

WHEREAS pursuant to the aforementioned request of the two Governments, the Commission is considering the two Applications as in the nature of a joint application; and

WHEREAS notices that the Applications had been filed were published in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the Commission; and

WHEREAS Statements in Response to the Applications and Statements in Reply thereto by both Applicants were filed in accordance with the Rules of the Commission; and

WHEREAS pursuant to published notices, hearings were held by the Commission at Toronto, Ontario, on 23 July, 1952; at Ogdensburg, New York, on 24 July, 1952; at Cornwall, Ontario, on 25 July, 1952; at Albany, New York, on 3 September, 1952; at Montreal, Quebec, on 8 September, 1952; and at Washington, D.C., on 20 October, 1952; and

WHEREAS by reason of the said notices of the said applications and hearings, all persons interested were afforded convenient opportunities of presenting evidence to and being heard before the Commission; and

WHEREAS, pursuant to the said Applications, the hear-

ings before, the evidence given, and material filed with the Commission, the Commission is satisfied that the proposed works and uses of the waters of the International Rapids Section comply with the principles by which the Commission is governed as adopted by the High Contracting Parties in Article VIII of the Treaty; and

WHEREAS the Commission has been informed that the Government of Canada has designated The Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario as the entity to construct, maintain and operate the proposed works in Canada, and that the Government of the United States intends in due course to designate the entity to construct, maintain and operate the works in the United States; and

WHEREAS the program of construction of the works, as proposed by the Applicants, includes the removal of Gut Dam from the International Rapids Section and the Government of Canada has informed the Commission that it is its intention to take steps for the early removal of Gut Dam as soon as the construction of the proposed works is approved and as soon as river conditions and the protection of down river and other interests that will be affected during its removal will permit, thereby advancing the time of removal of Gut Dam;² and

WHEREAS the Commission finds that suitable and adequate provision is made by the laws in Canada and by the Constitution and laws in the United States for the protection and indemnity of all interests on either side of the International Boundary which may be injured by reason of the construction, maintenance and operation of the works; and

WHEREAS the Commission finds that it has jurisdiction to hear and dispose of the Applications by approval thereof in the manner and subject to the conditions hereinafter set out;

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the construction, maintenance and operation jointly by the Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario and an entity to be designated by the Government of the United States of America of certain works (hereinafter called "the works") in accordance with the "Controlled Single Stage Project (238-242)", which was part of the joint report dated 3 January, 1941, of the Canadian Temporary Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Basin Committee and the United States St. Lawrence Advisory Committee, containing the features described in Appendix "A" to this Order and shown in Appendix "B" to this Order, be and the same are hereby approved subject to the conditions enumerated below, namely,

(a) All interests on either side of the International Boundary which are injured by reason of the construction, maintenance and operation of the works shall be given suitable and adequate protection and indemnity in accordance with the laws in Canada or the Constitution and laws in the United States respectively, and in accordance with the requirements of Article VIII of the Treaty.

(b) The works shall be so planned, located, constructed,

² Demolition of the dam was completed on Dec. 15.

¹ For texts of the notes exchanged between the two Governments regarding details of the applications, see BULLETIN of July 14, 1952, p. 65.

maintained and operated as not to conflict with or restrain uses of the waters of the St. Lawrence River for purposes given preference over uses of water for power purposes by the Treaty, namely, uses for domestic and sanitary purposes and uses for navigation, including the service of canals for the purposes of navigation, and shall be so planned, located, constructed, maintained and operated as to give effect to the provisions of this Order.

(c) The works shall be constructed, maintained and operated in such manner as to safeguard the rights and lawful interests of others engaged or to be engaged in the development of power in the St. Lawrence River below the International Rapids Section.

(d) The works shall be so designed, constructed, maintained and operated as to safeguard so far as possible the rights of all interests affected by the levels of the St. Lawrence River upstream from the Iroquois regulatory structure and by the levels of Lake Ontario and the lower Niagara River;³ and any change in levels resulting from the works which injuriously affects such rights shall be subject to the requirements of paragraph (a) relating to protection and indemnification.

(e) The hydro-electric plants approved by this Order shall not be subjected to operating rules and procedures more rigorous than are necessary to comply with the provisions of the foregoing paragraphs (b), (c) and (d).

(f) Before the Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario commences the construction of any part of the works, it shall submit to the Government of Canada, and before the entity designated by the Government of the United States commences the construction of any part of the works, it shall submit to the Government of the United States, for approval in writing, detailed plans and specifications of that part of the works located in their respective countries and details of the program of construction thereof or such details of such plans and specifications or programs of construction relating thereto as the respective Governments may require. If after any plan, specification or program has been so approved, The Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario or the entity designated by the Government of the United States wishes to make any change therein, it shall, before adopting such change, submit the changed plan, specification or program for approval in a like manner.

(g) In accordance with the Applications, the establishment by the Governments of Canada and of the United States of a Joint Board of Engineers to be known as the St. Lawrence River Joint Board of Engineers (hereinafter referred to as the "Joint Board of Engineers") consisting of an equal number of representatives of Canada and the United States to be designated by the respective Governments, is approved. The duties of the Joint Board of Engineers shall be to review and coordinate, and, if both Governments so authorize, approve the plans and specifications of the works and the programs of construction thereof submitted for the approval of the respective Governments as specified above, and to assure the construction of the works in accordance therewith as approved. The Joint Board of Engineers shall consult with and keep the Board of Control, hereinafter referred to, currently informed on all matters pertaining to the water levels of Lake Ontario and the International Rapids Section and the regulation of the discharge of water from Lake Ontario and the flow of water through the International Rapids Section, and shall give full consideration to any advice or recommendations received from the Board of Control with respect thereto.

(h) A Board of Control to be known as the International St. Lawrence River Board of Control (herein referred to as the "Board of Control") consisting of an equal number of representatives of Canada and of the

United States, shall be established by this Commission. The duties of the Board of Control shall be to give effect to the instructions of the Commission as issued from time to time with respect to this Order.

During construction of the works the duties of the Board of Control shall be to keep itself currently informed of the plans of the Joint Board of Engineers insofar as these plans relate to water levels and the regulation of the discharge of water from Lake Ontario and the flow of water through the International Rapids Section, and to consult with and advise the Joint Board of Engineers thereon.

Upon completion of the works, the duties of the Board of Control shall be to ensure that the provisions of this Order relating to water levels and the regulation of the discharge of water from Lake Ontario and the flow of water through the International Rapids Section as herein set out are complied with, and The Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario and the entity designated by the Government of the United States shall duly observe any direction given them by the Board of Control for the purpose of ensuring such compliance. The Board of Control shall report to the Commission at such times as the Commission may determine.

In the event of any disagreement amongst the members of the Board of Control which they are unable to resolve, the matter shall be referred by them to the Commission for decision. The Board of Control may, at any time, make representations to the Commission in regard to any matter affecting or arising out of the terms of this Order with respect to water levels and the regulation of the said discharge and flow.

(i) Upon the completion of the works, the discharge of water from Lake Ontario and the flow of water through the International Rapids Section shall be regulated to meet the requirements of paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) hereof, and, subject as hereinafter provided, shall be regulated in accordance with Method of Regulation No. 5 as prepared by the Department of Transport, Canada, dated September, 1940, and shall be based on the rule-curves forming part of that Method of Regulation. The flow of water through the International Rapids Section in any period shall equal the discharge of water from Lake Ontario as determined for that period in accordance with such Method of Regulation and shall be maintained as uniformly as possible throughout that period.

Subject to the requirements of paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) hereof, the Board of Control, after obtaining the approval of the Commission, may temporarily modify or change the restrictions as to discharge of water from Lake Ontario and the flow of water through the International Rapids Section set out in this paragraph, for the purpose of determining what modifications or changes therein may be advisable. The Board of Control shall report to the Commission the results of such experiments together with its recommendations as to any changes or modifications in said restrictions. Recommendations as to any changes or modifications which the Commission desires should be made permanent will be referred by the Commission to the two Governments, and if the two Governments thereafter agree, they shall be given effect as if contained in this Order.

(j) Subject as hereinafter provided, upon completion of the works, the works shall be operated initially for a test period of ten years, or such shorter period as may be approved by the Commission with the forebay water level at the powerhouses held at a maximum elevation of 238.0 feet, sea level datum. Subject to the requirements of paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) hereof, the Board of Control after obtaining the approval of the Commission, may temporarily modify or change the said forebay water level in order to carry out experiments for the purpose of determining whether it is advisable to increase the forebay water level at the powerhouses to a maximum elevation exceeding 238.0 feet. If the Board of Control, as a result of these experiments, considers that operation during this test period at a maximum elevation exceeding 238.0 feet would be advisable, and so recommends, the Commission

³ For a summary of the problem of the high-water level in Lake Ontario, see *ibid.*, June 9, 1952, p. 903. Complaints of property owners were referred to the International Joint Commission on June 25, 1952 (*ibid.*, July 14, 1952, p. 67).

will consider authorizing operation during this test period at a maximum elevation exceeding 238.0 feet. At the end of this test period, the Commission will make such recommendations to the two Governments with respect to a permanent forebay water level as it deems advisable or it may recommend an extension of the test period. Such of these recommendations as the two Governments thereafter agree to adopt shall be given effect as if contained in this Order.

(k) The Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario and the entity designated by the Government of the United States shall maintain and supply for the information of the Board of Control accurate records relating to water levels and the discharge of water through the works and the regulation of the flow of water through the International Rapids Section, as the Board of Control may determine to be suitable and necessary, and shall install such gauges, carry out such measurements, and perform such other services as the Board may deem necessary for these purposes.

(l) The Board of Control shall report to the Commission as of 31 December each year on the effect, if any, of the operation of the downstream hydro-electric power plants and related structures on the tailwater elevations at the hydro-electric power plants approved by this Order.

(m) The Government of Canada shall proceed forthwith to carry out its expressed intention to remove Gut Dam.

AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the allocation set out in Appendix "C" of the costs of constructing, maintaining and operating the works approved by this order between the Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario and the entity to be designated by the Government of the United States be and the same is hereby approved but such approval shall not preclude the applicants from submitting to the Commission for approval any variation in the said allocation that may be agreed upon between them as being appropriate or advisable.

AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Commission retains jurisdiction over the subject matter of these Applications, and may, after giving such notice and opportunity to all interested parties to make representations as the Commission deems appropriate, make such further Order or Orders relating thereto as may be necessary in the judgment of the Commission.

Signed at Montreal, this 29th day of October, 1952.

SIGNED: A. G. L. McNAUGHTON
A. O. STANLEY
GEORGE SPENCE
EUGENE W. WEBER
J. LUCIEN DANSEREAU

Commissioner Roger McWhorter dissenting.

(Dissenting opinion to be filed and attached to this Order.)

Appendix A—Features of the Works Approved by This Order:

(A) Channel Enlargements

Channel Enlargements will be undertaken from above Chimney Point to below Lotus Island, designed to give a maximum mean velocity in any cross-section of the channel which will be used for navigation not exceeding four feet per second at any time, also between Lotus Island and Iroquois Point and from above Point Three Points to below Ogden Island designed to give a maximum mean velocity in any cross-section not exceeding two and one-quarter feet per second with the flow and at the stage to be permitted on the first of January of any year, under regulation of outflow and levels of Lake Ontario in accordance with Method of Regulation No. 5, as prepared by the General Engineering Branch, Department of Transport,

Canada, dated Ottawa, September, 1940. Downstream from the power houses channel enlargements will be carried out for the purpose of reducing the tail water level at the power houses.

Final locations and cross-section of these channel enlargements will be determined from further studies.

(B) Control Facilities

Adequate control facilities will be constructed for the regulation of the outflow from Lake Ontario.

(C) Power House Structures

The power house structures will be constructed in the north channel extending from the lower end of Barnhart Island to the Canadian shore, and so located that one structure will be on each side of the International Boundary. Each power house structure will include the main generating units to utilize economically the river flows available to it, with provision for ice handling and discharge sluices.

(D) Dams and Associated Structures

A control dam will be constructed extending from Iroquois Point on the Canadian side of the river in an easterly direction to the United States mainland above Point Rockway.

A dam will be constructed in the Long Sault Rapids at the head of Barnhart Island.

Dykes and associated works will be provided as may be necessary in both the Province of Ontario and the State of New York.

All the works in the pool below the control dam will be designed to provide for full Lake Ontario level.

(E) Highway Modifications

In both the Province of Ontario and the State of New York provincial and state highways, and other roads, will be relocated in those portions subject to flooding, and reconstructed to standards at least equal to those now in existence.

(F) Railway Modifications

Such railway relocations as may be required as a result of the works herein described will be made in the Province of Ontario and the State of New York to standards at least equal to those now in existence.

(G) Navigation Facilities

Provision will be made for the continuance of 14-foot navigation throughout the International Rapids Section during the construction period.

(H) Flooded Areas

Lands and buildings in both the Province of Ontario and the State of New York will be acquired or rehabilitated as required. Inundated wooded areas will be cleared.

[Appendix B, a map, is not printed here.]

Appendix C

1. The power development works under this Application are those specified in Section 8 of the Application.
2. Total costs of the works described in Section 8 shall be based on Canadian costs and United States costs and the total shall be equally divided between the two constructing entities.
3. The costs to be divided should be based on actually experienced and audited expenses.
4. In relation to the three principles above, the three following provisions apply:

(A) The amount to be paid to Canada, as specified in the Agreement of December 3, 1951, between Canada and Ontario, in lieu of the construction by the power-developing entities of facilities required for the continuance of 14-foot navigation, shall be excluded from the total cost of the power project to be divided between the Canadian and United States power-developing entities, in considera-

tion of the fact that actual replacement of 14-foot navigational facilities will be rendered unnecessary by reason of the concurrent construction of the deep waterway in Canada.

(B) The Authority to be established pursuant to the provisions of the St. Lawrence Seaway Authority Act, Chapter 24 of the Statutes of Canada, 1951 (Second Session), shall contribute an agreed sum of money towards the cost of the channel enlargement which the power-developing entities must undertake in the St. Lawrence River, as set out in paragraph 4 of the Annex to the Canada-Ontario Agreement of December 3, 1951, and in section 8 of the Application to the International Joint Commission, in consideration of the benefits which will accrue to navigation from such channel enlargement.

(C) All costs for construction, maintenance and operation of the project except machinery and equipment in the respective power houses shall be borne equally by the two entities. All costs for construction, maintenance and operation of machinery and equipment in their respective power houses shall be paid by the respective entities and shall be deemed to satisfy the principle of an equal division between the two entities.

COMMISSIONER McWHORTER'S DISSENTING OPINION

In this case, Docket No. 68, the Governments of the United States of America and Canada have in effect agreed by the terms of their applications that the necessary facilities for the production of hydroelectric power in the International Rapids Section of the St. Lawrence River and all St. Lawrence seaway facilities necessary to provide a navigation channel with depth of 27 feet from Montreal Harbor to Lake Erie shall be constructed concurrently.

In the International Rapids Section of the River, which extends from Chimney Point to St. Regis, New York, a distance of about 48 miles, the applicants contemplate certain major works of construction having joint value for power development and navigation but surprisingly neither of the applications makes any provision for apportionment of the costs of such joint-use facilities between power development and navigation. On the basis of the wording of the applications it might be argued that power should bear all of the joint costs and indeed such unreasonable arguments have been made from time to time since the applications were filed.

During the past 20 years it has been assumed by authorities in the United States, particularly the Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army, and also by authorities in Canada, that the joint costs should be shared equally by power and navigation. In this exceptional dual-purpose project both power and navigation are of great importance and no one can say at the moment which of the two is the more important. I find no reason, therefore, to take exception to proposals made at various times in the past for equal sharing of the joint costs by those two functions.

On that basis the procedure apparently contemplated by the two applications would result in loading upon power more than \$100,000,000 of costs which navigation rightfully should bear. My dissent in this case stems principally from the possibility of such a grossly unwarranted imposition of financial burden upon all classes of power consumers on both sides of the International Boundary within economic transmission distance of the St. Lawrence River power plants. I am also concerned, however, with certain other questions arising in connection with these applications, some of which are serious from the viewpoints of both the United States and Canada and others from the viewpoint of the United States only.

The estimated costs of facilities in the International Rapids Section having joint value for navigation and power development, as presented before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 29 February

1952 by Lieutenant General Lewis A. Piek, Chief of Engineers, United States Army, on the basis of December 1950 cost levels, are as follows:

<i>Works Common to Navigation and Power International Rapids Section, St. Lawrence River</i>	
Channel Excavation-----	\$71,867,000
Ice Cribs-----	1,170,000
Iroquois Dam and Dikes-----	20,432,000
Dikes (Detached Dikes)-----	2,462,000
Massena Canal Intake and Attached Dikes-----	6,663,000
Long Sault Dam, Diversion Cuts and Attached Dikes-----	32,533,000
New Cornwall Canal-----	14,431,000
Work at Lock 25-----	1,184,000
Railroad Relocation-----	6,489,000
Clearing Pool-----	722,000
Rehabilitation of Morrisburg-----	7,234,000
Rehabilitation of Iroquois-----	4,865,000
Acquisition of Lands-----	34,283,000
Highway Relocation-----	5,440,000
Raising Lock 21 and Dikes-----	254,000
Administrative Facilities-----	2,000,000
Power-Distribution Facilities for Construction-----	444,000
Relocation of Transmission Lines-----	334,000
Total-----	\$212,807,000

The total of \$212,807,000 shown above is now too low because current construction costs are considerably higher than those prevailing in December 1950. It is also too low because the Corps of Engineers did not include in the costs of joint-use facilities an appropriate part of the estimated cost of the large combination dam and powerhouse structure extending from the lower end of Barnhart Island to the Canadian shore, which will form a barrier or dam sufficiently high and stable to raise the pool to the level of Lake Ontario just as will certain other joint-use structures, namely, the Long Sault Dam, the Iroquois Point Dam, and the dikes. Hence it is logical that an appropriate part of the cost of that structure should be included in the cost of facilities having joint value for power development and navigation. In this connection attention is invited to the fact that the Corps of Engineers in setting up the cost of facilities having joint value for power development and navigation at the Booneville Project on the Columbia River, in a situation strictly comparable to this, included in joint costs an amount which that agency adjudged to be a reasonable and proper part of the cost of the combination dam and power plant extending across the south channel of the Columbia River from Bradford Island to the Oregon shore.

I especially desire that it be clearly understood that I do not want power development relieved of any cost which it should properly bear. Every dollar of construction cost properly chargeable to power development should be so charged; and likewise navigation should bear all of the costs properly chargeable thereto, including of course a reasonable share of the costs of facilities having joint value for navigation and power development. Thus revenue derived from the sale of power would amortize the power costs and revenue from navigation tolls would amortize the seaway costs; and as to both power and navigation, it is my opinion and to my knowledge the view of informed authorities in both Countries that the revenues will be abundantly adequate to amortize the power and navigation costs, respectively, as so determined.

Development of the International Rapids Section of the St. Lawrence River for navigation and power has been strongly advocated in both the United States and Canada for many years, particularly since 1940, on the grounds that both the additional power and transportation facilities are urgently needed for defense purposes as well as for strengthening the peacetime economy of the two Nations. Recognizing the soundness of such advocacy—and I am firmly convinced that it has been and is sound—it is highly desirable from the viewpoints

of both the United States and Canada that defense industries of the type which are bulk consumers of low-cost electric energy, such for instance as aluminum reduction plants, be induced to locate along the international section of the River on either side of the boundary. This objective can, in my opinion, be achieved if an abundant supply of low-cost power is made available in that immediate locality but not otherwise. In this connection it may be observed that the production of pig aluminum is a highly competitive business which requires enormous quantities of very low-cost electric energy.

If the cost of the St. Lawrence power is increased by arbitrarily loading onto power development certain costs which navigation tolls should amortize, the rates at which the power is sold must be commensurately higher, thus tending to defeat one of the principal purposes which prompts the United States and Canada to improve the International Rapids Section of the River.

During the extremely brief period which the majority was willing to devote to consideration of the record in this important case following the conclusion of the final hearing in Washington, 20 October 1952, I urged that power should not be expected to bear more than its just share of the joint costs and suggested that the Order be so drawn that it would not become effective until after allocation of such costs to power and navigation in some reasonable proportion to be determined by competent authority set up or designated by the two Governments; but while the Commission members comprising the majority apparently were unanimously in favor of apportioning the joint costs in a reasonable manner as a matter of simple fairness and justice and equity, and also of wisdom, yet they were not agreeable to insertion of the proposed condition in the Order.

The International Joint Commission may and customarily does attach conditions to its approval of applications filed under the provisions of Articles III and IV of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 11 January 1909, and this may be done for reasons satisfactory to the Commission regardless of whether the applicant be a private citizen or corporation of either Country or one of the two Governments, or both of them. This was conceded in open hearing by the United States speaking through Counsel in the presence of Counsel for the Government of Canada who took no exception to the opinion thus expressed.

In order that there may be no misunderstanding of my views, perhaps it is well that I say here that I did not at any time say or think that the Commission could *require* the two Governments to allocate the joint costs to navigation and power, but I had good reason to think that they would be willing to do so without hesitation. As a matter of fact, the Commission cannot force any applicant to do anything but unless applicants are willing to comply with reasonable conditions imposed by the Commission they simply do not proceed further.

The two Governments may reasonably expect that the Commission, in passing upon applications filed with it, will see that violence is not done to the public interest; but in the instant case, with respect to the burden of joint costs, not even a reasonable effort was made in that direction. It follows that power consumers of all classes in both Countries, and the public welfare, will suffer if the situation is not remedied.

In this case much is being asked of the United States. Among other things the United States is expected to make possible the construction of the deep waterway in Canada through which all waterborne commerce between the Great Lakes and the sea will pass, and in the process do grave injustice to its own citizenry—and incidentally to the people of Ontario across the boundary.

Tolls are to be charged for use of the deep waterway and United States shipping will predominate—no one would suggest otherwise—yet the United States is to have no voice in establishing or changing the tolls, nor in fixing the period over which tolls shall be charged. The St. Lawrence River is, potentially, one of the great trans-

portation routes of the world. It may confidently be expected that ultimately the tonnage passing through the waterway will be limited only by the capacity of the locks to pass ships, and of course new locks can be added as needed, within reason. But the United States would not have the slightest measure of control over any of this, notwithstanding its sacrifices and contributions.

It is true that the United States could build navigation works on its own side of the boundary along the international section of the River but it is hardly reasonable to expect that the deep-waterway facilities first built would be duplicated. The practical situation is, therefore, such that the United States must decide whether as a Nation it is willing virtually to surrender its sovereignty over one of its greatest potential arteries of commerce.

When the Congress of the United States gives attention to the matters reserved for its consideration in paragraphs 12 and 14 of the application of the United States, it will necessarily come face to face with the important questions raised herein.

ROGER B. McWHORTER
Commissioner

November 19, 1952

COMMISSION'S MAJORITY OPINION IN REGARD TO MR. McWHORTER'S STATEMENT

All members of the Commission are in agreement that the proposal for the development of power in the International Rapids Section of the St. Lawrence River which the two Governments submitted to the Commission for approval on 30 June 1952, complies with 11 requirements specified in the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, which compliance is a prerequisite to approval by the Commission of such proposal. Moreover, there is no disagreement within the Commission as to the specific terms of the Order made by the Commission on 29 October 1952 approving the construction, maintenance and operation of the works set forth in the Applications.

In his statement of dissent, Mr. McWhorter puts forward the view that, while the Applications relate to works for the development of power, nevertheless the Commission, in order to cheapen the cost of hydro-electric power, should require as a condition of its approval that certain of the costs to be incurred for power works should be made incident on navigation. The other five members of the Commission do not agree with this view, and no such condition is contained in the Commission's Order dated 29 October 1952.

Since this was the only matter of difference between the five members of the Commission comprising the majority and Commissioner McWhorter in regard to the terms of the Commission's Order, it is therefore necessary in this majority opinion to deal only with this question.

The Applications relate solely to works for the development of power and as set forth therein the two Governments have agreed that the development of the power potential of the International Rapids Section of the St. Lawrence River is of such importance that it is to be proceeded with by joint action in the two countries. The Commission has been requested to give its approval to such joint action giving priority to these Applications, and to expedite its consideration thereof and its action thereon so that the construction of the project may be undertaken at the earliest possible date.

In the Applications, the Commission has been informed that there is an understanding between the two Governments that Canada will provide, as nearly as possible concurrently with the completion of the power development works for which the Applications request approval, all such works as may be necessary to provide and maintain a deep waterway between the Port of Montreal and Lake Erie.

The Applicants have, in effect, stated that the works for which they request approval by the Commission are

necessary to develop hydro-electric power and that they consider themselves justified in constructing the works for power purposes and in incurring the costs necessary therefor. The Applicants have not requested the Commission to apportion the costs of the proposed works between power and navigation, and any such apportionment is not subject to determination by the Commission in its action upon the Applications as submitted.

The sole duty imposed upon the Commission in connection with navigation is to ensure that all main features of the power works shall be so planned, located, constructed and operated as to be adaptable to the use of the International Rapids Section of the St. Lawrence River for navigation purposes.

The matter before the Commission under the Applications is, therefore, for the approval of certain works for the development of power, which are to be made adaptable to the use of the International Rapids Section of the St. Lawrence for navigation purposes; no question in relation to the provision of the works for these navigation purposes is before the Commission.

It is manifestly not within the authority of the Commission, under the Treaty of 1909, to undertake to deal with any project which has not been submitted to it for approval by the Governments, as required by Article 3 of the Treaty of 1909, in regard to works within their respective jurisdictions.

The majority, therefore, feel that Mr. McWhorter's dissenting opinion deals with questions which are beyond the jurisdiction of the Commission.

A. O. STANLEY
A. G. L. McNAUGHTON
GEORGE SPENCE
EUGENE W. WEBER
J. LUCIEN DANSEREAU

Safety of Life at Sea Convention Enters into Force

Press release 879 dated November 19

The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1948, came into force on November 19 between the 18 countries which have accepted it. Article XI of the convention provided that it should enter into force one year after 15 countries, 7 of which possessed one million tons of shipping, had accepted it. The fifteenth acceptance was deposited with the Government of the United Kingdom on November 19, 1951. Since then the United States has been notified that three additional countries have filed their acceptances.

The 18 countries presently parties to the convention are the following:

Belgium	Japan	Sweden
Canada	The Netherlands	Union of
Denmark	New Zealand	South Africa
France	Norway	United Kingdom
Iceland	Pakistan	United States
Israel	Portugal	Yugoslavia
Italy		

The new safety convention was adopted at a conference held at London, April 23 to June 10, 1948, which was attended by representatives of 34 governments and of 6 specialized agencies of the United Nations. It was ratified for the United

States on December 16, 1949, this country being the second one to deposit its instrument of ratification. It is the third international convention on the subject of safety of life at sea.

The first safety conference was held in 1914, largely as a result of the Titanic disaster. Because of World War I the 1914 convention never entered into force. In 1929 a second safety at sea conference met at London. The resulting convention was accepted by 35 nations and came into force in 1933, although the United States did not ratify until 1936. This latter convention is now to be superseded by the 1948 document.

The 1929 convention will remain effective for one year as between the United States and countries parties to it which have not accepted the 1948 convention. After November 19, 1953, the denunciation of the 1929 convention, filed today by the United States, will be effective. Ships of countries which by then have not accepted the 1948 convention will no longer have the protection in U.S. ports of an international certificate and will consequently be subject to the requirements of U.S. statutes in respect of safety equipment.

U. S., Philippines Discuss Air Transport Agreement

Press release 916 dated December 12

United States and Philippine Government delegations met at the Department of State on December 12 to discuss matters concerning the United States-Philippine Air Transport Agreement. The agreement was signed at Manila on November 16, 1946.

The Philippine delegation included Ambassador Carlos P. Romulo; Melquiades Gamboa, Counselor of the Philippine Embassy; Eduardo Quintero, of the Philippine Foreign Office; Col. Victor Dizon, Acting Administrator of the Philippine Civil Aeronautics Administration; and Daniel Gomez, Secretary-General of Philippine Air Lines.

The U.S. delegation included U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs; Philip W. Bonsal, Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs; Edward A. Bolster, Chief, Aviation Policy Staff; H. Alberta Colclaser, Assistant Chief, Aviation Policy Staff; and Frank G. Jarvis, Economic Officer, Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs.

The Civil Aeronautics Board was represented by Col. Joseph Adams, Member of the Board; Walter D. Peck, Chief, Foreign Air Division, and George K. McClelland, Foreign Air Division. Stuart Tipton, General Counsel of the Air Transport Association, attended as an adviser.

The agreement covers air routes and services between the Philippines and the United States.

Export-Import Bank To Assist Philippine Development Projects

The Export-Import Bank of Washington announced on December 4 the earmarking of 5 million dollars which will be available for lines of credit to Philippine private and governmental lending institutions in order to assist them in financing dollar costs of private Philippine development projects. This action follows recent discussions by the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank with Governor M. Cuaderno of the Central Bank of the Philippines.

Agreements covering the lines of credit and the manner in which they are to be used are to be negotiated directly between the Export-Import Bank and Philippine lending institutions, including the Philippine Rehabilitation Finance Corporation. Governor Cuaderno has agreed that the Central Bank will review and advise the Export-Import Bank on individual loan applications under these lines of credit, in view of the Central Bank's responsibility for Philippine foreign-exchange policy and its concern with Philippine economic development. The Export-Import Bank will require that each application be approved by the Central Bank.

In making the announcement Herbert E. Gaston, chairman of the board of the Export-Import Bank, expressed the Bank's appreciation of Governor Cuaderno's cooperation in developing this arrangement and said that the Export-Import Bank looked forward to the Central Bank's further assistance in carrying it out.

The effect of the earmark will be to increase the credit facilities available to private business in the Philippines needing to borrow in order to initiate, or expand, enterprises contributing to the economic development of the Philippines.

Details regarding the operation of the credits are to be developed by the Export-Import Bank with Philippine lending institutions after Governor Cuaderno's return to the Philippines early in December and in consultation with him.

Recommendations for Agricultural Development Program in Chile

Recommendations for a broad program of agricultural development in Chile were made public on December 1 in the report of a mission sent to Chile at the request of the Government. The mission was sponsored by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

Eugene R. Black, President of the International Bank, and Sir Herbert Broadley, Deputy Director General of FAO, presented the report in Washing-

ton to Felix Nieto del Rio, Chilean Ambassador to the United States, for transmittal to the President of Chile.

The mission, under the leadership of Egbert deVries, Chief of the Economic Division of the Bank's Technical Operations Department, spent 4 months in Chile in 1951 studying agricultural problems and policies. Before final formulation of the mission's recommendations, Dr. deVries returned to Chile for 4 weeks in June-July 1952 for further study and consultation with the Government.

In their letter transmitting the report, the President of the Bank and the Director General of FAO express the belief that the report can help the Government substantially in determining the general lines of the country's future program for agriculture and the economic policies and administrative arrangements necessary for carrying out the program. Their letter points out, however, that the report can be useful only if effective action is taken to arrest inflation.

It is our considered opinion that unless the inflationary process is arrested, the distortion to which the country's economy has been subjected, will grow worse, and will constitute a most serious obstacle to the execution of any program of development. We hope that it will be the first objective of Chile's new government to bring inflation to a halt, and thereby to permit economic forces to perform their function of guiding production into the most effective channels.

In reviewing the present condition of agriculture in Chile, the report points out that for more than a decade Chile has been undergoing a period of rapid development and in recent years has made great strides in expanding industry and electric power. Comparable development has not taken place in agriculture. The growth of population and a rising standard of living have brought about a steady increase in the consumption of food. Agricultural production, however, has lagged behind, with the result that food imports have risen sharply. If a better balance is to be achieved in the Chilean economy, intensive efforts must be made to put into effect a program for the expansion and improvement of agriculture. With such a program the mission believes that the Chilean nation can economically meet its requirements for food from its own soil. The mission suggests that the program aim at increasing agricultural output over the next 8 years to a level of 38.5 percent above the 1945-49 period.

Correction

BULLETIN of Dec. 22, 1952, p. 971, lines 7 and 8 of italic paragraph, under heading "U.S. Information Programs at Home and Abroad," should read . . . Reed Harris, Acting Administrator of the International Information Administration . . .

Discussion of U.S. Employees' Status in the U.N.

Statement by John D. Hickerson

*Assistant Secretary for United Nations Affairs*¹

In discussing the status of American employees of the U.N. Secretariat, it is well to review, at the outset, the U.N. Charter provisions respecting the Secretariat.

Article 7, paragraph 1 states that "There are established as the principal organs of the United Nations: a General Assembly, a Security Council, an Economic and Social Council, a Trusteeship Council, an International Court of Justice, and a Secretariat."

Articles 97 through 101 recite the detailed Charter provisions in regard to the composition of the Secretariat. These articles read as follows:

Article 97

The Secretariat shall comprise a Secretary-General and such staff as the Organization may require. The Secretary-General shall be appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. He shall be the chief administrative officer of the Organization.

Article 98

The Secretary-General shall act in that capacity in all meetings of the General Assembly, of the Security Council, of the Economic and Social Council, and of the Trusteeship Council, and shall perform such other functions as are entrusted to him by these organs. The Secretary-General shall make an annual report to the General Assembly on the work of the Organization.

Article 99

The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 100

1. In the performance of their duties the Secretary-General and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any government or from any other authority external to the Organization. They shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as international officials responsible only to the Organization.

2. Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to

respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the staff and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities.

Article 101

1. The staff shall be appointed by the Secretary-General under regulations established by the General Assembly.

2. Appropriate staffs shall be permanently assigned to the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and, as required, to other organs of the United Nations. These staffs shall form a part of the Secretariat.

3. The paramount consideration in the employment of the staff and in the determination of the conditions of service shall be the necessity of securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity. Due regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible.

I would call the Committee's particular attention to article 100. The first paragraph of this article calls upon the Secretary-General not to seek or receive instructions from any government in the discharge of his duties. The second paragraph of article 100 is a commitment by each member state to respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the staff and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities.

Article 101 states that the Secretariat staff shall be appointed by the Secretary-General under regulations established by the General Assembly. When this article is read in conjunction with article 100, it seems clear that the Charter contemplates that the appointment of members of the Secretariat will be the responsibility of the Secretary-General alone, in accordance with regulations established by the General Assembly. The United States has acted accordingly in its relations with the Secretary-General since the beginning of the United Nations Secretariat in 1946.

Difficulties Encountered

At the first session of the General Assembly in 1946, Trygve Lie was elected Secretary-General and, under regulations established by the General

¹Made before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee at New York on Dec. 10 and released to the press on the same date.

Assembly, he proceeded to appoint the Secretariat staff.

Subsequently, in 1946 the Secretary-General discussed with the Department the recommendation of an American as Assistant Secretary-General for Administrative and Financial Services, and the general question as to whether the U.S. Government proposed to make recommendations with respect to other U.S. nationals to be employed in the Secretariat. J. B. Hutson was recommended for the post of Assistant Secretary-General and was appointed by Mr. Lie. At the same time, Secretary Byrnes indicated that it would be the policy of the U.S. Government not to make recommendations with respect to subordinate positions. The Department, in pursuance of this policy, has not recommended persons for employment in the Secretariat. It has not given instructions to the Secretary-General, nor has it assumed a responsibility for "clearing" employees.

When I assumed my present duties as Assistant Secretary of State for U.N. Affairs in August, 1949, I found that the Department of State was concerned over the situation which investigative reports were disclosing. A few days after assuming these duties I discussed this problem with one of the principal assistants of the U.N. Secretary-General. As a result of our mutual concern with the problem, there was worked out a highly confidential arrangement under which the U.S. Government was to identify for the Secretary-General U.S. nationals employed by the United Nations or contemplated for employment who would appear to be members of the Communist Party or under Communist discipline.

The U.N. official with whom I discussed this arrangement made it clear that the Secretary-General and he both considered that the employment of members of the Secretariat and their discharge from such employment was, under the U.N. Charter, the duty of the Secretary-General for the execution of which he was responsible exclusively to the General Assembly. The Secretary-General has always adhered to that position, as he had made clear in his handling of cases where the United States commented adversely on the continued employment of Secretariat employees.

Agreement With Secretary-General

It was agreed between the Department and the Secretary-General that actual operations under the arrangement would have to be handled in a most highly confidential manner. Up to very recently, the Secretary-General has not believed that he could discharge U.S. nationals on the grounds of their being disloyal to the United States. In discharging such employees for cause, the Secretary-General had to contend with the fact that many of them had satisfactory efficiency ratings. Further, he had to contend with an appeals procedure which could bring into play a

joint management-staff Appeals Board, with recommendatory powers, and an Administrative Tribunal, with power to demand a reversal of the Secretary-General's action or damages in lieu thereof. The obstacle presented by the Administrative Tribunal is apparent in its decision that the Secretary-General is required to make a statement of cause in discharging an employee. The damages it has assessed on the United Nations have amounted to as much as 7,500 dollars in one case. All of these circumstances have made it essential that the Secretary-General protect himself against the charge that he was taking instructions from the U.S. Government, in violation of the Charter, when moving against persons identified by the Department under the confidential arrangement referred to.

Under this arrangement, the Secretary-General undertook to submit to the Department lists of names of U.S. nationals on the Secretariat and U.S. nationals being considered for employment with the request that the Department inform the United Nations whether readily available information disclosed any police or criminal record. The Department of State initiated name-check investigations on the basis of the names and identifying data. Such information as was available in the Department, together with such information as was made available by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other investigative agencies of the Government, was reviewed by the Department. A routine reply was then made to the United Nations on each individual addressed to the question of evidence of a criminal or police record. If the national agency checks had produced information which was considered to warrant an adverse comment on the grounds of Communist membership or subjection to Communist discipline, this adverse comment was conveyed by word of mouth before dispatch of the cover reply. The security practices of the U.S. Government made it impossible to communicate to the United Nations information going beyond the adverse comment of the Department. We did not undertake to "clear" anybody and this was understood by the Secretary-General.

Throughout this period of the operation of the secret arrangement, we have been involved in the serious and delicate problems inherent in an international staff of a world-wide organization. It is difficult for the United Nations to justify one rule for American employees and other rules for other nationalities. There are a number of valued and capable employees whose countries have lost their freedom since their employment by the United Nations. The home countries of these employees would welcome a chance to terminate their employment with the United Nations and to submit substitutes for them in the Secretariat. At the present time, approximately one-half of the nationals of Poland and Czechoslovakia on the Secretariat were employed before the Communists took over the Governments of these countries, and

the Secretary-General has resisted pressure from their present Governments to effect their removal. Loyal, competent Secretariat employees should be protected from political changes of government, peaceful or revolutionary, in their home countries, if an effective Secretariat is to be maintained.

Because of the complexities of the problem and of the U.S. concern which has culminated in the recent hearings, the Secretary-General on November 7 announced the appointment of a commission of international jurists, consisting of William De Witt Mitchell, former Attorney General of the United States, Sir Edwin Herbert of the United Kingdom, and Professor Paul Veldekens of Belgium, to study this whole problem and submit

recommendations to him. On November 29 the commission's report was published and is, of course, available to this Committee. In effect, the commission of jurists reported that an international organization should not employ persons who were disloyal to the host government and that the Secretary-General of the United Nations therefore had the authority to discharge and to deny employment to disloyal U.S. nationals.

According to the press, the Secretary-General has notified the Staff of the Secretariat that he has accepted and will be governed by the recommendations contained in the jurist's report. The Department of State believes the report points the way to a satisfactory solution of the whole problem.

U.S. Views on Prospects for Settling Kashmir Controversy

Statement by Ernest A. Gross

*U.S. Representative to the General Assembly*¹

U.S./U.N. press release dated December 5

This controversy is now familiar but no less a problem for that reason. As members of the Security Council, the United Kingdom and the United States have attempted in the draft resolution to put forward the elements for a settlement.² I would like briefly to review the role of the Security Council and of the parties, as my Government sees it, in attempting to resolve this controversy. When one considers that it has been before the Security Council for nearly 5 years we can conclude, unless past efforts of the Security Council are largely discounted, that the solution will not come simply.

It seems to me that the principles on which we are trying to proceed to assist the parties to carry out their Charter obligations are these:

In the first place, a lasting political settlement must be an agreed settlement.

Secondly, the Security Council will always welcome agreement of the parties which they them-

selves can reach on any theory that will settle the dispute which is consistent with the principles of the Charter.

Thirdly, it is the role of the Security Council to assist the parties in seeking to reach agreement. In this case the Security Council has made available the services of Dr. Frank Graham as U.N. representative.

Fourthly, agreement most frequently is reached step by step through negotiation, and negotiation involves an element of compromise.

Finally, the Security Council should consider with care the views and the recommendations of its representative and indicate to him and the parties its views on the positions he has taken.

Let us now examine the draft resolution in the light of these principles.

The draft resolution recalls the basic agreements which the parties have reached thus far, the UNCIP [United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan] resolutions of August 13, 1948, and January 5, 1949. They provided that the question of the accession of Kashmir would be decided through a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations. We shall be concerned here with the principles they set out which would form the basis for a truce agreement. The U.N. representative is well aware of them. He

¹ Made on Dec. 5 in the Security Council. For an article reviewing U.N. efforts to settle the Kashmir dispute and a map of the area involved, see BULLETIN of Oct. 27, 1952, p. 663.

² For excerpts from a statement by Sir Gladwyn Jebb and text of resolution, dated Nov. 5, see BULLETIN of Nov. 17, 1952, p. 801.

set them out verbatim on pages 7 and 8 of his first report.³

The draft resolution goes on to recall the three resolutions of the Security Council during the period when Dr. Graham has been acting.⁴

Then it endorses the general principles which he has formulated and all but two of which have now been agreed between the parties. It then goes on to note that a plan of demilitarization is not now in existence because agreement has not been reached on one issue. The U.N. representative having narrowed the difference down to this one issue, makes us feel that it is quite appropriate for the Security Council to examine the ways in which the U.N. representative and the parties have approached this issue. As cosponsor of the draft resolution, my Government's examination of this process and reflection on Dr. Graham's views have led it to arrive at the document now before you.

Only One Issue Remaining

After 16 months Dr. Graham is reporting that he has narrowed the problem down to number and character of forces to remain on each side of the cease-fire line. He put before the Security Council two methods, either of which might, in his view, help the parties to settle this issue, either (a) establishment of the number and character of forces to remain on either side of the cease-fire line; or (b) the determination of these numbers as a result of studying criteria or principles. This means that the parties would look at why any troops are needed, what they are needed for, and, in view of their mission, how many are needed.

The draft resolution in its operative paragraph urges the parties to negotiate to agree on a specific number of forces within certain bracketed ranges suggested to them by the U.N. representative and it urges them to negotiate bearing in mind the principles or criteria which would lead to a decision on what the precise numbers should be. Presumably the U.N. representative suggested these bracketed ranges of figures as a result of his own study of these principles or criteria which he later put to the parties.

The U.N. representative, Dr. Graham, reported to the Security Council on October 10, 1952, that the parties have been able to agree on 10 points of his 12-point program and that the differences between them on the 12-point program have been narrowed down to one main point on which the whole plan depends.⁵

Dr. Graham describes this as "the issue of the

number and character of forces" to remain on either side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization. In his third report to the Security Council, dated April 22, 1952,⁶ he recommended that his own negotiations with the parties be continued with a view to "resolving the remaining differences on the 12 proposals with special reference to the quantum of forces to be left on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization."

He has put before the Security Council various proposals which he has suggested to the parties during his 16 months of devoted effort. Originally he left open, in the form of blank spaces to be inserted by the parties, the number of forces on which they would agree. On another occasion he suggested that the numbers be arrived at by relating them to the proportion of forces as they existed at the time hostilities ceased. Again more recently he suggested, on July 16, 1952, certain bracketed numbers within which he recommended that the parties seek a figure. After that he arrived at the point of suggesting on September 2 that, at the end of the period of demilitarization, there should be an armed force of 6,000 on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line, the tribesmen and Pakistan troops having been withdrawn and large-scale disbanding and disarmament of the Azad-Kashmir forces having taken place, while on the Indian side of the cease-fire line there should be an Indian army force of 18,000 including the State armed forces. He also came forward with the suggestion that it might be helpful to the parties to consider the principles or criteria for arriving at figures, and this he suggested on September 4, 1952.⁷

I think it is fair to conclude that in coming forward with these proposals Dr. Graham had taken the advice of his military adviser and that the number he has suggested are not guesses arising from some sense of political expediency. Rather, it is fair to view them as carefully considered suggestions of the U.N. representative, bearing in mind the basic agreement of the parties heretofore reached in the form of the two UNCTEP resolutions. Dr. Graham has emphasized over and over again the importance of these agreements, the way in which they present problems which will exist for both parties at the end of the period of demilitarization. In his most recent statement Dr. Graham tells us that there is agreement between the parties; that on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally resident therein who have entered the state for the purpose of fighting

³ U.N. doc. S/2375; for text of the principles, see *ibid.*, Nov. 5, 1951, pp. 740-741.

⁴ Resolution of Mar. 30, 1951 (U. N. doc. S/2017/Rev. 1; BULLETIN of May 5, 1952, p. 713); resolution of Apr. 30, 1951 (*Official Records of the Security Council, Sixth Year*, 543d meeting, p. 4); and resolution of Nov. 10, 1951 (U.N. doc. S/2390; BULLETIN of Dec. 10, 1951, p. 959).

⁵ For text of Dr. Graham's statement of Oct. 10, see BULLETIN of Oct. 27, 1952, p. 661.

⁶ U.N. doc. S/2611; for excerpts, see *ibid.*, May 5, 1952, p. 712.

⁷ For text of the proposals of Sept. 2 and Sept. 4, annexed to Dr. Graham's fourth report to the Security Council (U.N. doc. S/2783 dated Sept. 19, 1952), see *ibid.*, Oct. 20, 1952, p. 631. For a summary of the July 16 proposals (Annex III of the report), see *ibid.*, p. 626.

will have been withdrawn; and that the Pakistan troops will have been withdrawn from the state. There is also agreement that on the Indian side of the cease-fire line the bulk of the Indian forces in the state will have been withdrawn. He has suggested the various methods I have outlined for assisting the parties to agree on what forces will remain.

Having considered the U.N. representative's carefully formulated suggestions on this question and recognizing the considerable thought and effort that must have gone into arriving at them, the United Kingdom and the United States, in putting forward the draft resolution, have urged the parties to negotiate. We have urged them to negotiate to arrive not at a number which we suggest but at a number within the range which Dr. Graham himself suggested on July 16 of this year. It was on the basis of these ranges of figures, the Security Council will recall, that Dr. Graham reported the willingness of the parties to negotiate at Geneva. We therefore have arrived at these suggestions of the U.N. representative as a considered judgment of his which we support and now urge the parties to use in seeking agreement between themselves.

As the U.K. representative has pointed out, the Kashmir militia and the Gilgit Scouts, occupying as they do a special position, would not be computed in arriving at figures within the range on which the parties are urged to negotiate in our draft resolution.

The ranges of numbers contained in the draft resolution were taken from the July 16, 1952 proposals of the U.N. representative on which the parties had agreed to travel to Geneva and negotiate.

Thus, the cosponsors are relying on a suggestion of the mediator and for that reason the draft resolution reads:

This number to be between 3,000 and 6,000 armed forces remaining on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line and between 12,000 and 18,000 armed forces remaining on the Indian side of the cease-fire line, as suggested by the United Nations Representative in his proposals of July 16, 1952 (Annex III of S/2783).

Suggested Negotiating Principles

The Security Council will notice that the draft resolution urges the parties to negotiate "bearing in mind" the principles or criteria which the U.N. representative suggested on September 4, 1952. The cosponsors feel they are worthy of careful attention.

These principles, as they relate to the point we are discussing, are contained in Annex VIII to the U.N. representative's fourth report. Paragraph 7 reads as follows:

7. Agree that the demilitarization shall be carried out in such a way that at the end of the period referred to in paragraph 6 above the situation will be:

A. On the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line:

(i) the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally resident therein who had entered the State for the purpose of fighting will have been withdrawn;

(ii) the Pakistan troops will have been withdrawn from the State;

(iii) large-scale disbanding and disarmament of the Azad-Kashmir forces will have taken place; so that at the end of the period of demilitarization there shall be the minimum number of forces that are required for the maintenance of law and order and of the cease-fire agreement, with due regard to the freedom of the plebiscite;

B. On the Indian side of the cease-fire line:

(i) the bulk of the Indian forces in the State will have been withdrawn;

(ii) further withdrawals or reductions, as the case may be, of the Indian and State armed forces remaining in the State after the completion of the operation referred to in B(i) above will have been carried out; so that at the end of the period of demilitarization there shall be the minimum number of Indian forces and State armed forces that are required for the maintenance of law and order and of the cease-fire agreement, with due regard to the security of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite.

It will be recalled that the parties had agreed that: ". . . the demilitarization shall be carried out in such a way as to involve no threat to the cease-fire agreement either during or after the period referred to in paragraph 6 above."

They had agreed to a revised version of the ninth principle, which is firmly based on the two UNCIV resolutions that: ". . . pending a final solution the territory evacuated by the Pakistan troops will be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the United Nations."

I have read these principles or criteria because, in the nature of things, they must be the considerations which have led the U.N. representative to arrive at the concrete figures *he* has suggested to the parties, including the range of figures in which *we* are urging the parties to negotiate. It will be noted Dr. Graham has suggested as one principle here, as on previous occasions, that the large-scale disbanding and disarmament of the Azad-Kashmir forces will have taken place, so that at the end of the period of demilitarization there shall be the minimum forces required for the maintenance of law and order and of the cease-fire agreement with due regard to the freedom of the plebiscite. We have accepted what we conclude to be the view of the U.N. representative that the forces, and that is what he calls them, which remain on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line should be those Azad-Kashmir forces which would remain after large-scale disarming and disbanding of the Azad-Kashmir forces. We have also accepted the view of Dr. Graham that on the Indian side of the cease-fire line the forces should be Indian army forces and state armed forces.

The UNCIV resolution of August 13, 1948, provides, in part, that:

Pending a final solution, the territory evacuated by the Pakistan troops will be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the Commission (Part II, August 13 resolution; Paragraph A.3).

For the word "Commission" we may read "the United Nations" because that Commission, UNCTP, is no longer in existence.

Thus one of the U.N. representative's first problems, and one still before us, was how to reduce this principle to the factual situation that would exist at the end of the period of demilitarization. Originally he proposed, but lacking agreement of the parties did not pursue this proposal after December 1951, that on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line the force should consist of civil armed forces. He has since consistently suggested, if we read his language correctly, that these forces should be Azad-Kashmir forces. After dropping his original proposal in December 1951, he suggested that the U.N. surveillance be effected by removing the Azad-Kashmir forces from the administrative and operational control of the Pakistan High Command and, by having them officered by neutral and local officers, as I have stated, under the surveillance of the United Nations.

He finally suggested that the remaining Azad-Kashmir forces should be the minimum number necessary for the maintenance of law and order, with due regard to the freedom of the plebiscite. Thus, it is fair to say that the U.N. representative considers that some Azad-Kashmir forces would remain. The cosponsors agree with this position.

He has specified what the functions of these remaining Azad-Kashmir forces would be—"The maintenance of law and order and of the cease-fire agreement, with due regard for the plebiscite."

As the UNCTP resolution states, in the part which I have just read, these forces would be in territory evacuated by the Pakistan troops and administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the United Nations. Considering then that the functions of these remaining Azad-Kashmir forces would be as Dr. Graham has stated them and operating in an area evacuated by Pakistan troops, I think it is clear that they would be separated from the administrative and operational control of the Pakistan High Command. This position was apparently acceptable to the Government of Pakistan when it indicated to Dr. Graham that it was prepared to accept, subject to certain observations not here material, his proposals of July 16, 1952. The draft resolution takes into account the conclusion which the U.N. representative had previously reached.

He also indicates that the role of the Indian army forces on the Indian side of the cease-fire line would call for a minimum number of Indian forces remaining, required for the maintenance of law and order and for the cease-fire agreement and with due regard for the security of the state. This also is entirely consistent with the UNCTP resolution of August 13, paragraph B (3).

Element of Urgency Seen

It may well be that the U.N. representative's assistance will help the parties in approaching these problems. Thus the operative paragraph of this resolution attempts to organize and put before the Security Council and the parties some of the suggestions of the U.N. representative on the one issue which all are agreed is at the root of the problem. From what I have said, it must be clear that the cosponsors, like the U.N. representative, have attempted to build on the UNCTP resolutions and at each stage to lessen rather than broaden the areas in which agreement is thus far lacking. As the representative of the United Kingdom has observed,⁸ we hope there will be no tendency on the part of either of the two Governments to reopen questions already agreed to under these resolutions.

We have attempted to put before the parties some of the wisdom and some of the suggestions of the U.N. representative and urge them to negotiate to attempt to reach a solution. We have asked them to provide the Security Council with their own account in their own words of where these negotiations led them. This we have done because we see in this case an element of urgency. It is a case which, as Dr. Graham stated to the Security Council on October 10, should not be allowed to drift so that the parties and the organized society of nations will find themselves in a position of greater danger.

In the areas of agreement thus far reached, the U.N. representative, by formulating his proposals and by his negotiations, has, in the view of my Government, assisted the parties. The draft resolution does not in any way impair or limit Dr. Graham's authority under the previous Security Council resolutions, and we expect that he will continue to exercise his functions under them. Therefore, the draft resolution not only expresses the gratitude of the Security Council to him but requests him to continue to make his services available to the Governments of India and Pakistan. It also endorses the principles on which he has sought to bring about agreement.

In conclusion, I return to the general principles with which I began. This draft resolution offers the parties an opportunity by their negotiations to arrive at a settlement of the final issue now standing in the way of the demilitarization of the state and the planning for a plebiscite, including the induction into office of the Plebiscite Administrator.

The settlement itself, when it comes, will be the result of free agreement by the parties themselves. The Security Council and the U.N. representative

⁸ For excerpts from Sir Gladwyn Jebb's statement of Nov. 6, 1952, see BULLETIN of Nov. 17, 1952, p. 800.

can simply assist the parties in reaching agreement.

The United States would welcome the agreement of the parties on any just basis which would settle this dispute. The road we have suggested reflects much thought and much negotiation. The U.N. representative recognizes that there may be more than one road to settlement. He has told the Security Council in his fourth report that when he invited the parties to negotiate at Geneva, he made it clear to them that he would at all times welcome suggestions from either Government, directed to settling the main differences on the 12 proposals, the general implementation of the UNSCOP resolutions, and the solution of the dispute. The representative of the United Kingdom stated to the Council on November 6 that his Government had in no sense closed its mind to the possibility of a settlement of the problem on lines different from those which we have considered in the Security Council up to now.

Of course, the number of troops which we have urged the parties to negotiate on and the criteria which we have urged them to bear in mind are not agreed by them. If such agreement had occurred, then there would be no occasion for this or any other draft resolution except an expression of gratification for a solution reached. Negotiation must in the nature of things involve the element of give and take and the possibility of compromise. We have attempted to restate in the draft resolution an appreciation of the views of the U.N. representative about how such compromise might occur.

The United States takes seriously the view of Dr. Graham that there is danger to us all in allowing this case to drift. As the U.K. representative put it, we cannot leave it to settle itself.

All members of the United Nations have an interest in seeing this dispute settled peacefully. The United States has more than an interest; it has the most earnest desire to see the two great states of the subcontinent join together to assure their mutual peace and security as well as their mutual prosperity.

These two nations have much more in common than the fact that they are neighbors. Whole areas of understanding between them should, and we believe will, exist once this case has been settled. Leadership and statesmanship by the Governments of India and Pakistan can bring about that result which we devoutly seek.

I have no words to match the eloquence of Dr. Graham. He told us in this Council a year ago that—

The opportunity in time and place is for the leadership on the subcontinent, tested in the struggles and sufferings for the human liberty of 400 million human beings, to help prevent the destruction of human freedom and the self-destruction of civilization by setting challenging examples of demilitarization, self-determination, reconciliation, and reconstruction in a fearful and broken world . . .

The subcontinent is the place for a timely example of demilitarization and self-determination. Now is the time for the dedicated leadership of two great peoples to rise to the call of their spiritual heritage, the responsibility of their power and the opportunity for their greatness to give in a dark world challenging examples and fresh hopes to the peoples in the unresting adventure of the human spirit, through the United Nations, in the long pilgrimage toward a freer and a fairer world, in answer to the prayers of the people for peace and freedom on God's good earth.

Communist Charges Against U.S. Territorial Policies

*Statement by Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly¹*

U.S./U.N. press release dated November 24 (Excerpts)

I should like to express the appreciation of my delegation for the serious and responsible way in which most of the members of this Committee have conducted this debate on the self-determination of peoples—a matter on which practically all of us have very strong feelings. We are also appreciative of the interest and understanding which our amendments to resolution A have so generally received.

Unfortunately, during the course of this debate an effort has been made by certain delegations to distort and discredit not only our motives in this debate but also U.S. policies, particularly with regard to the territories under our administration. So familiar and so stereotyped have such attacks become that we who have heard them over and over again are inclined to react to them much as we do to a bit of disagreeable weather. However, so that the principal misstatements may not remain unchallenged in the records, and so that those who are not familiar with these misstatements may not be misled, I should like to introduce a few facts to set the record straight.

Puerto Rico Cited as an Example

The distinguished representative of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic² at our meeting of November 13 spoke at some length on what he called the "deplorable conditions"³ in Puerto Rico. Among other things, he alleged that the national culture had been annihilated. This is indeed a strange charge when one considers that after 54 years of U.S. administration, less than 25 percent of the people know English well. While English is taught in the schools, Spanish is the predominant language. The preamble to the 1952 Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, written by the Puerto Rican people

¹Made in Committee III (Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural) on Nov. 24.

²K. V. Kiselyov.

and ratified by them in a popular referendum, "recognizes as one of the determining factors in their life the coexistence in Puerto Rico of the two great cultures of the American hemisphere." This duality of culture, with full freedom of choice, is expressly recognized in Puerto Rican political life. For example, there is a qualification that a member of the legislative assembly must be able to read and write either the Spanish or the English language.

The distinguished representative of Byelorussia alleged that the economy of Puerto Rico was adapted solely to the needs of the United States. It is hard to reconcile such a statement with the fact that the Puerto Ricans have freely chosen to retain the same tariff and trade protections as enjoyed by States of the United States and that under their own economic development program they have experienced over the past 10 years a notable expansion of local industry and enterprise. He charged that large numbers of Puerto Ricans had been deprived of their lands. Not only is this a gross distortion of the facts but he said nothing of the agrarian reform introduced in 1941. This was undertaken through the establishment of the Land Authority to enforce the law prohibiting corporate ownership of over 500 acres of land and to aid *agregados*, or landless peasants, to acquire land on which to build homes.

He referred to certain statistics on the extent of unemployment. Unemployment in Puerto Rico is admittedly a serious problem, but he failed to point out that it is, in fact, a result of improved conditions and consequent population growth and that the Puerto Ricans are, with our help, overcoming the problem. This is illustrated by the fact that the number of persons employed in 1951 increased by 20,000 over the previous year.

The representative of Byelorussia also made some charges concerning the average annual wage in Puerto Rico. If he had based himself on the official information supplied to the United Nations by my Government instead of on a magazine article, he would have given quite a different impression. For example, on page 45 of our latest report on Puerto Rico³ it is stated that the average wage rate in all industries in Puerto Rico in 1950 (the most recent year for which statistics have been supplied) was 44 cents an hour. While this is not a high rate when compared with wages in the United States, it is much higher than the figure quoted by the representative of Byelorussia, and it compares favorably with wage rates in the region. Furthermore, as the report also shows, wage rates in Puerto Rico have in almost all cases been steadily rising from year to year, while between 1948 and 1950 the consumer's price index rose only about 1 percent, a situation which many of us might envy.

Similarly, in the fields of health and education, where the Puerto Rican and U.S. Governments

made no effort to hide the difficult problems that exist, the representative of Byelorussia, by ignoring the substantial progress made in overcoming these problems, left no doubt that the purpose of his comments was to mislead and confuse.

Ignorance of Democratic Processes

As for his reference to the new Puerto Rican Constitution, it may be that his failure to understand the free democratic processes by which it was drawn up by elected representatives of the Puerto Rican people and ratified in a popular referendum by an overwhelming majority is due to a lack of personal familiarity with such democratic processes.

With regard to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands administered by the United States under a trusteeship agreement with the United Nations, it is scarcely necessary to deal here with the wholesale charges made by the distinguished representatives of Byelorussia and the Ukraine. These charges have been made before by Soviet representatives in the Trusteeship Council and have been answered fully and frankly by U.S. representatives. It is perhaps sufficient to point out that after examining the most recent report on the Pacific Islands, the Trusteeship Council, with the sole exception of the Soviet representative, "noted with approval the progress made in the political, economic, social, and educational fields during the period under review."

In closing, I cannot help commenting on the bitter irony in hearing certain representatives among us support the self-determination of peoples, when we are convinced that the system they represent is devoted to the systematic denial of that principle. One of the ideas expressed by Secretary Acheson in his opening statement to this Assembly is highly pertinent to this aspect of our present discussion. I refer to that passage in which he said:⁴

The unfortunate fact is that we cannot approach this problem, or indeed any other problem before this Assembly, without being mindful of the events that are taking place in another part of the world. There, whole nations have been swallowed up and submerged by a new colonialism. Others have been reduced to a state of servile dependence. The tragic events behind this dark boundary not only are in stark contrast with the evolutionary process toward self-government [in non-self-governing territories] . . . but they are so fraught with danger to all of us that we can never afford to forget them.

Thus, in our present discussion of the self-determination of peoples we must not forget the vast populations who have been deprived of their self-determination. I am sure none of us will be deceived for a moment by the pretended support of this principle by the representatives of a movement which purges all those who seek any form of self-determination which differs from that dictated by their leaders.

³ U.N. doc. A/2135.

⁴ BULLETIN of Oct. 27, 1952, p. 642.

Reports of U.N. Command Operations in Korea

FIFTY-FIRST REPORT: FOR THE PERIOD AUGUST 1-15, 1952¹

U.N. doc. S/2836

Dated November 5, 1952

I herewith submit report number 51 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 1-15 August 1952, inclusive. United Nations Command communiqués numbers 1343-1357 provide detailed accounts of these operations.

The plenary sessions of the Armistice Negotiations remained in recess until 3 August, at which time they were resumed. At this meeting the Senior United Nations Command Delegate asked the Communists to present any new proposals they might have, and patiently listened to an intemperately worded Communist harangue that merely repeated time-worn arguments and contained no new suggestions for solving the issue of repatriation of prisoners of war. Since no change in the Communist Delegation's attitude was indicated, the Senior United Nations Command Delegate proposed a recess until 11 August. After registering the usual protest that such a recess would unduly delay an Armistice, the Communists agreed to meet again on 11 August.

Meanwhile, during the period from 1 to 5 August, Staff Officer Meetings were held daily to resolve questions on the details of wording to be used in the Draft Armistice Agreement. Numerous minor changes in text proposed by the Communists were accepted, but the United Nations Command proposal to amend Paragraph 40B was rejected by the Communists. This amendment was proposed for the practical purpose of overcoming a lack of qualified interpreters and consisted of an addition to the last sentence indicated in parentheses: "The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission may provide itself and the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams with such of the above personnel and equipment of its own as it may desire; provided, however, that such personnel (except interpreters) shall be personnel of the same Neutral Nations of which the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission is composed." The United Nations Command Staff Officers also formally requested that the Communists take steps with the least possible delay to permit the exchange of parcels or col-

lective shipments for prisoners of war as prescribed in Article 72 of the Geneva Convention of 1949. This request was also delivered in written form in a letter from the Senior United Nations Command Delegate to the Senior Communist Delegate. On 5 August Staff Officers of both sides agreed that all questions of texts in the Draft Armistice Agreement were resolved, and the Communists delivered texts of the Draft Armistice Agreement prepared by them in Korean, Chinese and English. Further details of wording were left to be resolved by the interpreters of both sides, and the Staff Officer Meetings were then terminated by mutual agreement.

While the Delegations were in recess communications were maintained through the Liaison Officers who met almost daily. In addition to delivering letters dealing with requests for accounting for prisoners of war, information on locations of prisoners of war camps, a request for corrections to the Draft Armistice Agreement, and protests regarding alleged violations of the neutral area at Panmunjom and the replies thereto, the Liaison Officers held several discussions of incidents that occurred. These incidents and the United Nations Command reactions are listed below:

- 2 Aug. United Nations Command shell fragments fell astride the outer perimeter of the conference site area. Inasmuch as the United Nations Command had conducted firing in that general area at the time and because of the possibility that some shell fragments might have fallen on the perimeter, the United Nations Command accepted responsibility for the incident.
- 4 Aug. Communists charged that three United Nations Command aircraft overflew the conference site. United Nations Command rejected the charge as false.
- 10 Aug. Communists charged that three United Nations Command aircraft overflew the conference site. United Nations Command accepted responsibility and expressed regret.
- 11 Aug. Communists charged that three United Nations Command aircraft overflew the conference site. United Nations Command noted that no witness positively identified markings of those planes but concluded that they were probably United Nations Command, and expressed regret.
- 12 Aug. Communists charged United Nations Command overflight of conference site. Incident still under investigation by United Nations Command.

The Plenary Session held on the morning of 11 August saw a repetition of familiar Communist arguments and threatened retaliation against any United Nations Command increase of military pressure. The Communists also introduced Major General So Ilui of the North Korean

¹ Transmitted to the Security Council by the representative of the U.S. to the U.N. on Nov. 3. Texts of the 30th, 31st, and 32d reports appear in the BULLETIN of Feb. 18, 1952, p. 266; the 33d report, Mar. 10, 1952, p. 395; the 34th report, Mar. 17, 1952, p. 430; the 35th report, Mar. 31, 1952, p. 512; the 36th and 37th reports, Apr. 14, 1952, p. 594; the 38th report, May 5, 1952, p. 715; the 39th report, May 19, 1952, p. 788; the 40th report, June 23, 1952, p. 998; the 41st report, June 30, 1952, p. 1038; the 42d report, July 21, 1952, p. 114; the 43d report, Aug. 4, 1952, p. 194; the 44th report, Aug. 11, 1952, p. 231; the 45th report, Aug. 18, 1952, p. 272; the 46th report, Sept. 29, 1952, p. 495; the 47th report, Oct. 27, 1952, p. 668; the 48th report, Nov. 17, 1952, p. 795; the 49th report, Dec. 1, 1952, p. 883; and the 50th report, Dec. 15, 1952, p. 958.

People's Army as the relief for Rear Admiral Kim Won Mu. After the Senior United Nations Command Delegate had restated the offer to repatriate 83,000 Communist prisoners of war, and the position that the United Nations Command would not resort to forced repatriation, he observed that there seemed to be no reason for daily Plenary Sessions until the Communists had some new proposals. After further repetitious statements by the Communists the Senior United Nations Command Delegate proposed a recess until 19 August to which the Communists agreed with their usual professed reluctance.

During the period from 11 August to 15 August, Liaison Officers continued to meet, and the interpreters proceeded with regular meetings to finalize the Draft Armistice Agreement.

An investigation of an incident which occurred on 27 July 1952 at Nonsan, United Nations Prisoner of War Camp No. 16, housing North Koreans who had indicated they would violently resist repatriation to Communist control, produced the first evidence of possible pro-Communist infiltrators into the non-repatriate camps. Testimony taken from anti-Communist prisoners alleged that a group of North Koreans who had been shipped from Koje-do were posing as anti-Communists in order to penetrate mainland camps to cause unrest and violence. It was further alleged that this group planned to assassinate anti-Communist leaders and later take over control of entire compounds. This situation resulted in the seizure of the agitators by prisoner leaders who interrogated them and attempted to force confessions of planned resistance, by beating them into submission. One prisoner died as a result of injuries and seven were evacuated for treatment. While conclusive evidence is lacking, camp authorities felt it appeared definite that this incident was anti-Communist counteraction against actual Communist agitators.

A second incident on 30 July at Nonsan, which followed the general pattern of the 27 July foray, resulted in injuries to twenty-four North Korean prisoners. Interrogation of the injured by Counter Intelligence Corps and security personnel indicated that this incident was related to an internal struggle for power between pro- and anti-Communist elements. Investigation by United States personnel did not substantiate previous allegations of assassination plots. It was becoming apparent, however, that some Communist prisoners of war were in this camp with a deliberate purpose of creating trouble.

A series of scattered incidents occurring at other prisoner of war installations did not appear to be part of an over-all resistance movement. Instead, they seemed to be unrelated, varying in degree of violence, and purely local in nature.

As of 15 August, 24,088 civilian internees had been released during Operation HOMECOMING. This cleared almost all of the population at Yongchon except for those civilian internees hospitalized in the Pusan-Tongnae area.

Enemy-initiated ground action during the period was more pronounced in the Yulsa area of the central front than elsewhere along the battleline. Determined resistance by United Nations Command outpost elements in this sector succeeded in blunting a series of company and

battalion size attacks in a week-long battle. Toward the end of the period action flared on the western front where a bitter local contest took place over possession of two hills in the vicinity of Punji. No major change in forward enemy troop dispositions or front lines occurred during the period.

On the western front United Nations Command elements in a co-ordinated air-ground attack regained a disputed hill five and one half miles southwest of Mabang on 1 August. This outpost, initially seized by the enemy on 17 July, was the scene of fierce fighting in late July which was interrupted, with the enemy still in possession, by heavy rains and floods. Later in the period ground action increased further to the south where the enemy in a company strength attack forced the withdrawal of a United Nations Command outpost situated on a low-lying hill one and one half miles southeast of Punji. Heavy fighting ensued and in the following two days the position changed hands five times with hostile elements in final possession. This Communist gain was then nullified by a United Nations Command attack which forced hostile defenders from an immediately adjacent and dominating hill. United Nations Command elements on the latter position were subjected to repeated hostile attacks employing units of up to reinforced battalion strength on 12 and 13 August. These attacks, although strongly supported by mortar and artillery fire, were repulsed with heavy losses to the enemy.

Along the central and eastern front the predominant action occurred southeast of Yulsa. On the night of 6-7 August an enemy battalion forced a slight withdrawal of a newly won United Nations Command outpost on high ground three miles southeast of Yulsa. An immediate United Nations Command counter-attack regained the hill position one and one half hours later. This was followed by a series of hostile company-size attacks, all of which were repulsed by United Nations Command elements in a stubborn defense. During a single day on 7 August, the enemy in support of one of these attacks fired over 5,600 rounds of artillery and mortar fire. After four days of repeated failures the enemy made no further attempts to seize this position. On the east coast on 11 August, two enemy companies tried to take a United Nations Command hill position in the area north-northeast of Oemyon but after three hours of fighting the battered enemy force withdrew.

Aerial reconnaissance indicates that the forward movement of enemy supplies in the area south of the 39th Parallel was impeded during the period by washed out bridges, flooded fords and many landslides, all of which resulted from heavy rains. These conditions will probably serve to reduce, but not seriously impair, the enemy's offensive capability. Available evidence indicates that the temporarily reduced volume of enemy supplies reaching frontline areas, when added to stockpiles already accrued there, are sufficient to meet the Communist logistical requirements for an appreciable period of time. This is evidenced by the definite increase in the amount of artillery and mortar fire employed by the Communists during the period. The combined fire attained a record daily average of 8,700 rounds with the unprecedented amount of 21,688 rounds fired in a single twenty-four-hour period.

There still, however, is no firm indication of any early enemy change from his present defensive posture.

Naval aircraft from United Nations Command fast carriers operating in the Sea of Japan attacked enemy supplies and transportation facilities as part of the Navy effort in support of the United Nations Command interdiction programme. Jet and propeller driven aircraft attacks were concentrated mainly against enemy supply storage and troop concentration areas south of Wonsan. Also, attacks were continued against major hydroelectric complexes, thermoelectric plants, and transformer stations along the east coast to deny North Korean industry much needed power for support of military operations. Results attained by these attacks include the destruction and damage of railroad bridges, highway bridges, railroad cars, trucks, military buildings, gun positions, warehouses, barracks, boats, supply areas, fuel dumps, and an ammunition dump. Railroad tracks were cut in numerous places and many troop casualties were inflicted. A fire aboard the United States ship *Boxer* resulted in major damage to several aircraft. Electrical circuits received the largest part of the ship's damage. Casualties were eight killed, one missing, and thirty-two personnel injured.

United Nations Command naval aircraft, from carriers and land bases, conducted offensive strikes and reconnaissance missions as far north as Hanchon, in the Chinnampo area, the Hwanghae Province, and in support of frontline troops. Cover and air-spot were furnished for the surface units as they conducted the sea blockade and patrolled at island anti-invasion stations. Attacks on electric sub-stations and transformer stations on the west coast were continued in order to destroy the power being utilized to support military operations in Korea. Three days of strikes on railroad and highway bridges resulted in all major bridges south of Chinnampo being rendered unserviceable. Other results achieved included destruction and damage of railroad bridges, highway bridges, military buildings, warehouses, bunkers, gun positions, transformer stations, boats, and electric sub-stations. Numerous enemy troop personnel casualties were inflicted and several railroad and road cuts were reported. Four engagements with MIGs in the Chinnampo area were reported, during which one MIG was destroyed.

Shore based naval aircraft provided friendly frontline units with close support missions. Pilots reported destruction of numerous weapons, bunkers, military structures, personnel shelters, supply shelters, railroad cars and warehouses. Spans were dropped in three railroad and seven road bridges. Railroad and road cuts were made and numerous personnel and troop casualties inflicted.

Patrol planes based in Japan conducted daylight reconnaissance missions over the Sea of Japan, the Yellow Sea, and Tsushima Straits. They also flew anti-submarine patrols and weather reconnaissance missions for surface units in the Japan and Yellow Seas. On 13 August an aircraft on routine patrol over the Yellow Sea was attacked by two MIGs. The attacking aircraft made three firing passes killing one crew member and wounding four others.

The Naval blockade continued along the Korean coast

from the bomblines to Chongjin with surface units making day and night coastal patrols firing on key rail targets along the coastal main supply route daily to maintain rail cuts, bridge cuts, and blocked tunnels at several specific points. The siege by surface vessels continued at the major ports of Wonsan, Hungnam, and Songjin, subjecting the enemy forces at these ports to day and night destructive, harassing and interdiction fire. The Communists were denied the use of coastal waters for shipping as all craft detected were taken under fire and either destroyed or driven ashore. Results obtained by these vessels included destruction and damage of trains, railroad cars, trucks, gun positions, sampans, military buildings, railroad bridges, highway bridges and bunkers. Several cuts were made in railroad tracks, and numerous personnel casualties were inflicted.

Gunfire support vessels at the East Coast bomblines provided gunfire on call for the frontline troops. Results reported by spotters included destruction and damage of bunkers, guns, mortars, military buildings, sampans, an ammunition dump, and supply areas. Enemy shore batteries were active almost daily against the blockading vessels and minesweepers along the coast. During this period four vessels were hit. Damage to the one ship necessitated shore repair assistance; however, the other three ships were able to complete their own repairs and continued operations. Personnel casualties were two killed and fifteen wounded.

In many cases, the minesweepers, while operating inshore, received machine gun and small arms fire. There were no reports of damage or casualties.

On the Korean West Coast, the United Nations Command surface units manned anti-invasion stations along the coast from Chinnampo to the Han River Estuary, in support of the friendly islands north of the battleline. Daylight firing into enemy positions started many fires and secondary explosions, destroying numerous military buildings. Two night attacks by 100 and 300 enemy troops against the friendly island Taksom were repulsed. Enemy casualties inflicted in repulsing the first raid totalled forty killed or wounded. The small, friendly island of Mudo was taken under fire by enemy shore batteries almost daily; however, little or no damages were received.

Vessels of the Republic of Korea Navy conducted close inshore patrols and blockade along both coasts and assisted United Nations Command forces in minesweeping duties.

United Nations Command minesweepers continued operations to keep the channels, gunfire support areas, and anchorages free of mines of all types. Sweepers also enlarged areas and swept close inshore as needed by operating forces. Enemy fishing sampans were dispersed and driven ashore when encountered during sweeping operations.

Naval auxiliary vessels, Military Sea Transportation Service, and merchant vessels under contract provided personnel lifts and logistic support for the United Nations Command naval air and ground forces in Japan and Korea.

The United Nations Command interceptors again demonstrated their superiority over the MIG-15s by destroy-

ing twenty-two enemy jets and damaging twenty-two others in the first eight days of the period. After approximately four months of reduced MIG sorties, the total for the first week in August rose sharply to more than 600, the highest since the period ending 4 April 1952.

The intensive aerial battles during the early days of the month, as compared to recent activity, could possibly be credited to the stepped-up offensive air strikes of United Nations Command fighter bomber units following a period of relatively poor weather.

The MIG pilots displayed an aggressiveness similar in pattern to that of the previous weeks; however, their attempts to close with United Nations Command Aircraft was limited by an evident lack of experience or proficiency. In several instances, MIG pilots, using previously developed tactics to position themselves, lost their kills through poor gunnery, inept maneuvers, and overeagerness. It is probable that new units comprised a substantial part of this Communist effort.

Only once did the Russian-built MIGs get through the United Nations Command fighter screen to attack the fighter bombers. This was on 5 August, and on this occasion the fighter bombers damaged one of the faster MIGs without receiving any damage themselves.

The results of the increased activity demonstrated once again that the Communist pilot-plane combination remains somewhat inferior to the United Nations Command fighter interceptor and pilot. The first two weeks of August saw twenty-four MIGs destroyed, one probably destroyed pending film assessment, and twenty-five others damaged.

Fighter bombers successfully attacked supply targets, troop concentrations and cut rails in enemy rear areas. On close air support sorties immediately in front of United Nations Command troops they blasted enemy bunkers, destroyed gun positions of various calibers and inflicted numerous Red troop casualties.

On 4 August the fighter bombers attacked a military headquarters area located east of Pyongyang and destroyed eighty buildings, one fuel dump and six gun positions. The fighter bombers also hit troop concentrations southeast of the headquarters area where an undetermined number of Red troops were killed.

The light bombers continued their programme of hitting supply storage areas and then conducting armed reconnaissance of the main supply routes. Supply installations in the Sariwon, Chaeryong area were hit on several occasions.

The light bombers were also utilized on close support missions operating under the control of ground radar stations during the hours of darkness and when poor weather prevented visual attacks. They also continued the practice of creating temporary road blocks by dropping butterfly bombs (four-pound fragmentation bombs).

Medium bombers bombed marshalling yards at Huichon, Hamhung, Osan-ni, Naewason-ni and Singosan to destroy transportation facilities and knock out supply transfer points.

On 5 August, medium bombers bombed the Hocchang Ore Processing Plant by use of electronic aiming devices.

They rendered the plant unserviceable and destroyed ninety percent of the buildings in the area.

On 11 August medium bombers struck the Hokusen Steel Mill and electric power installations at the factory. They destroyed forges, electric furnace buildings, destroyed or damaged machine shop buildings and demolished adjacent structures. Two days later they bombed a large supply centre near Anak. The medium bombers inflicted maximum damage to the dug-in and well dispersed supply stacks.

Close support missions were also flown under the control of ground radar installations.

The localized Psychological Warfare programme was continued through the use of special leaflets and radio broadcasts. On 3 August, twenty minutes in advance of a light bomber attack on Sinchon, radio broadcasts were made warning civilians in the area to stay clear of military targets. The radio warnings, which were repeated every five minutes prior to the attack, were preceded by leaflets which notified civilians that military targets would be destroyed and directed them to get away from supply targets and military equipment. The raid by the light bombers destroyed supply stacks and set fire to fuel storage areas. After the attack more leaflets were dropped pointing out the fact that United Nations Command air power would strike when and where it desired but that it was not the United Nations Command intention to injure innocent people. This operation was repeated one day later when Yonan was the target area.

On and before 15 August, the seventh anniversary of the liberation of Korea and the expulsion of foreign armies from China, United Nations Command leaflets and radio broadcasts reminded enemy soldiers and civilians of the series of events by which alien Communist dictatorship has enslaved northern Korea and China and nullified the people's hopes after World War II. These media noted that, for the third time, this anniversary of liberation finds the Korean people suffering under ruthless Communist military aggression, and the Chinese people in the grip of unscrupulous alien exploitation. At the front, United Nations Command leaflets and loudspeaker broadcasts continue to keep enemy soldiers informed of the refusal of their Communist leaders to work for an early and realistic Armistice Agreement that would halt their aggression. Continuous warnings, by leaflets and broadcasts, are being given to civilians in northern Korea, urging them to leave areas where military targets are located.

FIFTY-SECOND REPORT: FOR THE PERIOD AUGUST 16-31, 1952²

U.N. doc. S/2837
Dated November 5, 1952

I herewith submit report number 52 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 16-31 August 1952, inclusive. United Nations Command communiqués numbers 1343-1358 provide detailed accounts of these operations.

The Armistice Negotiations continued in recess as mutually agreed until 19 August at which time the Delegations reconvened. In his opening statement the Commu-

² Transmitted to the Security Council by the representative of the U.S. to the U.N. on Nov. 3.

nist Senior Delegate again pointed to the repatriation of war prisoners as the sole obstacle to the conclusion of an Armistice, and insisted that all prisoners of war must be repatriated except for those Koreans whose homes are in the area of the detaining side. He charged the United Nations Command with the entire responsibility for non-attainment of an Armistice in Korea. He then concluded by stating that increased United Nations Command military pressure would never change the Communist determination that all war prisoners must be repatriated but would only invite a United Nations Command defeat.

In reply, the United Nations Command Senior Delegate reviewed briefly the history of Communist aggression in Korea and termed it a failure. He placed the responsibility for the continuation of hostilities on the Communists and asserted that this left the United Nations Command no choice except to continue attacks with calamitous results for North Korea and the loss of more Communist soldiers than the total number of non-repatriates still in dispute. He pointed out the gross inconsistency of the Chinese Communist allegations that Chinese Red troops in Korea are volunteers with the Communist refusal to agree to the right of these volunteers to exercise a free choice not to return to the North Korean side. Weighing the terrible damage to North Korea against the return of several thousand unwilling Chinese prisoners of war, he challenged the sincerity of the Chinese Communist desire for an Armistice. He then repeated the United Nations Command offer to settle the problem by repatriating 83,000 willing Communist prisoners in exchange for over 12,000 United Nations Command captured personnel. He concluded by proposing another recess until 27 August if the Communists were not willing to conclude an Armistice on the foregoing basis.

The Senior Communist Delegate, in an attempted rebuttal of the United Nations Command statement charged that South Korea had started the Korean War at United States instigation, and restated his threat that the United Nations Command delay of an Armistice would result in United Nations Command defeat. He repeated his statement that all prisoners must be repatriated and accused the United Nations Command of lying in its statements that any war prisoners would have to be repatriated by force. He charged the United Nations Command with forcing Chinese Prisoners of War to act as special agents, and asserted that he was prepared to prove this charge. He then registered the routine protest concerning recesses, stated that attempts to create discord between the Korean and Chinese people were useless, and agreed to recess as proposed by the United Nations Command Senior Delegate.

On 27 August the Delegations reconvened. The Senior Communist Delegate immediately read a blustering tirade against United Nations Command treatment of its prisoners of war which he then handed to the United Nations Command Senior Delegate in letter form. He continued with a statement that differed from the one he made the week before only by being somewhat milder and less offensive in expression.

The United Nations Command Senior Delegate answered by querying the Communists as to when they proposed to reply to the United Nations Command request, made three

weeks before, to permit receipt by United Nations Command personnel in Communist custody of individual parcels or collective shipments of relief supplies. He stated the United Nations Command willingness to permit the Communists reciprocal privileges, and noted that Communist failure to give a satisfactory answer made the sincerity of their avowed adherence to the Geneva Convention open to question. He then offered to exchange lists of prisoners of war on the basis of numbers already stated, in order to put an end to the conflict. In the event of Communist non-acceptance of this offer, he proposed a further recess until 4 September.

The Communist Senior Delegate promptly claimed Communist adherence to the principles of the Geneva Convention of 1949; accused the United Nations Command of attempting to divide the Korean and Chinese people, and falsely charged the United Nations Command with brutal treatment of its prisoners designed to forcibly retain captured personnel. He stated that the matter of exchange of parcels was under study, and agreed to recess until 4 September.

During the periods while the main Delegations were in recess a series of meetings between Liaison Officers took place. On 17 August the Communists protested two overflights of the conference site by United Nations Command aircraft which occurred on 16 August. On 20 August the United Nations Command accepted responsibility for this violation but rejected earlier charges of overflight, alleged to have been made on 12 August, as unverified. On 23 August the United Nations Command Liaison Officer turned over to the Communists a letter and maps giving new designations and locations of all United Nations Command Prisoner of War camps. On the 28 and 30 of August the Communist Liaison Officer delivered strongly worded letters of protest from the Senior Communist Delegate complaining of United Nations Command treatment of Communist prisoners in its custody as reported by United Nations Command news media. No formal acknowledgment of these protests was made. On 31 August the Communist Liaison Officer delivered a formal protest regarding the alleged strafing of Communist Prisoner of War Camp Number Eight at Kandong. The Communist note charged that the camp was distinctly marked and that as a result of United Nations Command strafing, six prisoners were killed and twenty-two wounded, sixteen seriously. The United Nations Command is investigating this report.

At a final meeting of interpreters on 29 August, agreement was reached on all major points of the wording of the draft Armistice Agreement in English, Korean and Chinese except for the proper term for "United Nations Command" in the Communist-prepared Korean version, and for "Korea" in the United Nations Command-prepared Chinese version. The Communist interpreters stipulated that the agreed version was not to be considered absolutely final, but the United Nations Command interpreters avoided becoming involved in minor editorial changes suggested by the Communists.

Throughout this period a series of scattered and relatively minor incidents occurred at pro-Communist Prisoner of War installations which apparently were inspired by leaders of the various enclosures attempting to test the degree of control being exercised by camp security

forces. In each case the incident was handled quickly and expeditiously by camp authorities with a minimum of force. The interior operation of each of the enclosures is being subjected to the closest scrutiny to determine whether any pattern of planned resistance may be developing.

Throughout all of the camps, both those housing pro-Communists and anti-Communists, construction and general improvements are being carried out. With more than 25,000 civilian internees having been released to date under Operation *HOME COMING*, sufficient space was made available at Yongchon to accommodate about 8,000 North Korean non-repatriate Prisoners of War originally housed at Pusan. The United Nations Command Prisoner of War Command intends to complete in the near future the movement of all pro-Communist Korean patients from the Pusan hospital to Koje-do and pro-Communist Chinese Communist Force patients to Cheju-do. This will leave in the mainland camps only those prisoners who have indicated they would resist return to Communist control.

Enemy ground action, restricted by weather that included "Typhoon Karen", decreased in intensity toward the end of the period. The most noteworthy fighting occurred on the western front southeast of Punji where a determined but out-fought enemy threw numerous unsuccessful attacks against United Nations Command elements defending a hill position won early in August. A general decrease in the enemy's expenditure of mortar and artillery fire was noted with a daily average of 6,000 rounds being fired compared to 8,700 rounds during the previous period. As the period ended the ground action had diminished greatly with enemy-initiated action reduced to a minimum. Dissident elements in United Nations Command rear areas displayed slightly increased aggressiveness southeast of Taejon where three small-scale attacks were made against United Nations Command rail traffic causing several casualties and negligible delays in train schedules.

The western sector of the United Nations Command front was the scene of the heaviest fighting as Communist troops launched repeated attacks against an outpost position southeast of Punji. This position was seized during the first week of August when United Nations Command Forces, attempting to take a small hill mass to the south, occupied this commanding position in a counter-thrust which caught the enemy by surprise. Two battalion strength attacks, one on the 16 of August, and another on the 25 of August, resulted in heavy enemy losses and failed to drive the United Nations Command elements from their positions. Despite weather-inflicted hardships, the enemy exhibited, during the past month, unusual determination in his efforts to seize United Nations Command outposts in this vicinity. No further hostile action in this direction has been attempted since 25 August, possibly as a result of high losses suffered in his many fruitless attempts.

The central sector's most prominent ground action centred around Talchon where opposing forces countered each others every move. On 16 August a Communist company, supported by a large volume of artillery and mortar fire, attacked United Nations Command positions four miles southeast of Talchon only to withdraw after an in-

tense fire fight of one and one-half hours' duration. On 17 August an enemy unit attacked another outpost in this area and succeeded in seizing a portion of the position, but at the close of the day a United Nations Command unit was in possession of the terrain feature. While this engagement was in progress a United Nations Command raiding party drove entrenched enemy defenders from their positions on top of a hill three miles south of Talchon. Later, the enemy, supported by over 1,400 rounds of mortar and artillery fire, assaulted this outpost forcing the United Nations Command unit there to retire. Another engagement of three and one-half hours' duration took place at this locale during the early morning hours of 27 August, when a United Nations Command raiding party unsuccessfully attempted to re-occupy this position. In an effort to thwart a United Nations Command psychological warfare broadcast, Communist elements employed for the first time a searchlight in their forward areas just before dawn 20 August. The loudspeakers were four miles south of Sutaе and were broadcasting to elements of the 45th Division of the 15th Chinese Communist Force Army. The remainder of the ground action in this sector was limited to patrol clashes and minor probes during which the enemy demonstrated his usual degree of stubbornness in all but a few instances.

On the eastern front, United Nations Command aggressiveness was evidenced during the early morning of 23 August when a raid was initiated on an entrenched Communist unit in position northwest of Oemyon. The defenders were forced to withdraw after two and one-half hours of close-in fighting which included hand-to-hand combat. The enemy's ability to defend and screen his main battle positions was made apparent by the stubborn resistance encountered in the numerous patrol clashes which comprised the bulk of the ground action in the eastern sector.

There was a marked decrease in enemy vehicular traffic during the latter part of the period as a result of "Typhoon Karen" and heavy rains. Visual air reconnaissance of areas in North Korea indicated that the majority of the enemy's supply routes remained trafficable despite the considerable damage caused to bridging and road nets. Any impairment of the enemy's logistical position caused by the weather, particularly in view of the previously existing stockpiles of supplies in hostile forward areas, cannot be construed as an appreciable reduction in the enemy's capability for offensive action. As yet, however, there is no firm evidence to establish the conclusion that a major enemy offensive is imminent. To the contrary, both air and ground observations indicate a continued enemy defence. These observations are substantiated by the statements of the great majority of prisoners of war which also indicate a continued defensive attitude on the part of hostile ground forces in Korea.

United Nations Command naval jet and propeller-driven aircraft operating from fast carriers in the Sea of Japan ranged over the eastern half of North Korea striking the enemy from the bombline to as far north as Chongjin. Poor to marginal flying weather on nine days of this period, a condition usually encountered during this season of the year, lessened the effect of the interdiction programme on transportation facilities which need almost

daily attention in view of the enemy's rapid repair effort. Hence, the heaviest strike emphasis was directed against supply, fuel, and ammunition dumps, truck-loading areas, and troop concentrations south of Wonsan in the bomblines area. Attacks continued against strategic military importance to the enemy such as hydroelectric plants, electric transformer stations, and industrial plants. Attacks on interdiction targets resulted in numerous rail cuts, and destruction or damage to rail and highway bridges, a locomotive, rail cars, trucks and boats. Close air support sorties were also flown opposite United Nations Command ground force positions along the eastern part of the bomblines. Naval aircraft flew across Korea to hit a troop building and supply area near Sukchon in conjunction with an Air Force attack. Six MIGs engaged twelve navy jets with no friendly claims or damage. The U. S. S. *Boxer*, recently damaged by fire, resumed launching aircraft against the enemy.

United Nations Command naval aircraft, land and carrier based, conducted offensive strikes and reconnaissance missions on the west coast as far north as Hanehon, in the Chinnampo area, the Hwanghae Province, and in support of front line troops. Cover and air-spot were furnished for the surface units as they conducted the sea blockade and patrolled at island anti-invasion stations. Attacks on electric sub-stations and transformer stations on the west coast were continued. Two days of strikes on rail and highway bridges resulted in many major bridges south of Chinnampo being rendered unserviceable. Strikes on two troop concentrations resulted in an estimated 300 enemy killed. Other results included destruction or damage to gun positions, bunkers, barracks, warehouses, junks, railroad cars, trucks, and a radar station. Numerous rail and road cuts were inflicted.

Shore based naval aircraft provided friendly front line units with close air support, and flew strike and reconnaissance sorties deep into enemy territory. These attacks resulted in destruction or damage to numerous gun positions, mortar positions, bunkers, military buildings, supply shelters, warehouses, rail cars, and rail and highway bridges. In addition, numerous enemy troop casualties were inflicted.

Patrol planes based in Japan conducted daylight reconnaissance missions over the Sea of Japan, the Yellow Sea, and Tsushima Straits. They also flew anti-submarine patrols and weather reconnaissance missions for surface units in the Japan and Yellow Seas.

The Naval blockade continued along the Korean east coast from the bomblines to Chongjin with surface units making day and night coastal patrols, firing on key rail targets along the coastal supply routes daily to maintain rail cuts, bridge cuts, and blocked tunnels at several specific points. The siege by surface vessels continued at the major ports of Wonsan, Hungnam, and Songjin, subjecting the enemy forces at these ports to day and night destructive, harassing and interdiction fire. The Communists were denied the use of coastal waters for shipping as all craft detected were taken under fire and either destroyed or driven ashore. Railroad track cuts and enemy casualties were inflicted by naval gunfire with destruction and damage reported to trains, rail cars, trucks, gun positions, sampans, military buildings, rail

and highway bridges, and bunkers. Major surface units struck inland at Kyosen Number Four hydroelectric plant to lay shells in the plant area.

Cruisers and destroyers at the East Coast Bomblines patrolled the area north of Wonsan daily and provided gunfire support on call for the front line troops on the eastern front. The shore fire control parties reported destruction and damage to guns, mortars, bunkers, supply areas, sampans, and personnel shelters.

The typhoon which crossed Korea during this period caused high seas which tore many enemy mines loose from their moorings. From 19 to 23 August, thirty-seven mines were sighted, twenty-nine of which were destroyed by patrolling vessels. The remainder were sighted after being washed up on the beaches.

Enemy shore batteries were active almost daily against the blockading vessels and minesweepers along the coast. One destroyer was hit in the vicinity of Songjin with three men killed and another ten wounded. Damage to the ship was superficial and her operational readiness was not impaired. Minesweepers and motor torpedo boats, while operating inshore, received enemy machine gun and small arms fire. A fleet tug on patrol east of Hungnam struck a mine and sank almost immediately. Ninety-two of the ninety-seven personnel aboard were recovered. Casualties were two killed, three missing, and four injured seriously.

On the Korean West Coast, United Nations Command surface units manned anti-invasion stations along the coast from Chinnampo to the Han River Estuary, in support of the friendly islands north of the battle line. Daylight firing into enemy positions started many fires and secondary explosions, destroying numerous buildings. Patrols were made nightly, and mainland positions opposite friendly islands illuminated to deter any enemy attack plans. The small friendly islands of Mudo and Sosnapto were taken under enemy shore battery fire several times with little or no damage received. Surface vessels provided counter battery support.

Vessels of the Republic of Korea Navy conducted close inshore patrols and blockade along both coasts and assisted United Nations Command Forces in minesweeping duties.

United Nations Command minesweepers continued operations to keep the channels, gunfire support areas, and anchorages free of mines of all types. Sweepers also enlarged areas, and swept close inshore as needed by operating forces. Enemy fishing sampans were dispersed and driven ashore when encountered during sweeping operations.

United Nations Command Naval auxiliary vessels, Military Sea Transportation Service, and merchant vessels under contract, provided personnel lifts and logistic support for the United Nations air and ground forces in Japan and Korea, and to the operating Naval Forces.

United Nations Command Air Forces aircraft established a new record effort during a twenty-four hour period on 29 August. Fighter bombers climaxed a series of attacks on Pyongyang military targets and supply areas on this date in the operation against the North Korean capital. Protection from enemy MIG aircraft was provided by United Nations Command interceptors.

The fighter bombers struck in three separate waves to destroy military supplies, industrial plants, troop billets, headquarters buildings, ammunition dumps and vehicle parks. United Nations Command fighter bombers were joined by Navy aircraft operating from carriers located off the east coast of Korea. The joint effort by Air Force and Navy planes was closely co-ordinated to permit maximum coverage of all target areas. Prior to each strike, antiaircraft defenses were hit by fighter bombers.

Attacking fighter bombers gave particular attention to small, well-defended targets which had not been attacked in previous raids. Destruction of military targets was heavy, and included two ammunition dumps destroyed, three fuel storage areas destroyed and eight supply stacks destroyed.

United Nations Command medium bombers blasted military targets in the Pyongyang area on four occasions during the period. The largest strike was on 20 August when a mass attack was made on two separate supply storage areas comprising 400 acres of supply stockpiles with excellent results. Good photography of part of the target area showed 292 supply buildings destroyed and fifty-three damaged.

On 23, 26 and 30 August the medium bombers returned to Pyongyang to blast other military facilities which had been previously located through photo reconnaissance.

The Sunpondong marshalling yard, located near the Yalu River, was attacked by medium bombers on 23 August. During the raid the friendly aircraft encountered concentrated and co-ordinated enemy fighter attacks. Most of the attacking fighters were propeller driven types. One enemy fighter was shot down. No friendly aircraft were lost or seriously damaged in the operation.

Other medium bomber operations included an attack on the Nakwon Munitions Plant. This factory reportedly turned out 1,000 anti-tank grenades and 3,000 to 5,000 hand grenades daily. The attack destroyed the main factory building and fifteen other structures. On 27 August, aircraft were scheduled against the Sopo ordnance supply area and marshalling yard northeast of Pyongyang. Crews reported excellent results. The Chosen Number One hydroelectric plant was again bombed by medium bombers when reconnaissance of the area indicated that Communist forces were attempting to return the plant to operation. In addition, throughout the period, the all-weather medium bombers flew close support missions along the battle line.

United Nations Command Air Force operations were somewhat curtailed by poor flying weather during the period. Typhoon "Karen" passed through the battle area during the early part of the period and forced the evacuation of certain units to safer locations. No aircraft were damaged by the typhoon and damage at air installations was not serious.

By 20 August, the number of fighter and fighter bomber sorties returned to normal and on 21 August light bombers joined the fighter bombers to attack a cement plant east of Sariwon. However, the majority of fighter bomber sorties during the period were on close air support missions and general support missions.

A large portion of the light bomber effort was shifted to daylight formation bombing of military supply storage

areas. Approximately one-third of their sorties were scheduled on night intruder missions and night reconnaissance of the main supply routes. The light bombers also flew missions in close support of United Nations Command ground forces. Bombing near the front lines was accomplished under control of radar installations.

United Nations Command interceptors patrolled the area between the Chongchon and Yalu Rivers during the nine days of marginal to operational weather, but observed enemy jet aircraft on only seven days. The enemy pilots apparently had lost some of their willingness to engage United Nations Command jet fighters. Seven Russian built MIG-15 aircraft were destroyed and eighteen damaged. No United Nations Command interceptors were lost in combat with the MIGs.

During the continued celebration of the seventh anniversary of Korean liberation, United Nations Command leaflets and radio broadcasts denounced Communist prolongation of the war which has nullified North Korean aspirations for full and true liberation. These media also reiterated the determination of the free nations to continue working for an armistice despite Communist obstruction and meanwhile to continue vigorous action to defeat Communist aggression. Repeated radio and leaflet warnings informed North Korean civilians of impending United Nations Command air attacks on military targets and urged them to evacuate their families to safety. With characteristic Communist contempt for human life, the enemy is attempting to prevent these warnings from reaching the people, but many are nevertheless getting through to them.

The United Nations Command continued assisting the Republic of Korea to produce the maximum possible amount of its own foodstuffs. The fishing industry has been rehabilitated, boats and fishing tackle have been provided, ice plants have been repaired, and salt has been supplied to fisheries. The effectiveness of these measures has enabled South Korea not only to meet its own requirements, but also to export fish and other marine products which are above the needs of the country. Farmers have been encouraged to continue their activities despite wartime conditions and agriculture has suffered less than any other part of the Korean economy. Because of the fighting and the fact that military installations occupied some agricultural lands, the crop yield for 1951 was about five to ten per cent less than prewar yields. However, the harvest for 1952 is expected to be slightly higher than that for 1951. Fertilizer imports and technical assistance provided by the United Nations Command played a large part in sustaining agricultural output. There has actually been no serious shortage of food for refugees since the early emergency days when United Nations Command forces were confined in the Pusan perimeter. At that time transportation was barely sufficient to support military necessities. The flow of foodstuffs has varied with need, thus avoiding excessive storage costs. The import of food and its distribution to refugees and war sufferers presents a record [of] which all agencies concerned may well be proud. During the period from 25 June 1950 to 30 June 1952 a total of 554,599 long tons of grain with a value of \$75,194,140 was delivered to Korea through the United Nations Command.

The United States in the United Nations

[December 12-18, 1952]

Security Council

Sir Zafrulla Khan (Pakistan), in a lengthy statement on the Kashmir question on Dec. 16, said that his Government was prepared to "go forward" on the basis of the U.S.-U.K. resolution despite the fact that the force numbers suggested were "unfair" to the Pakistan side. He also found fault with the idea that the parties should seek out each other and report to the Council themselves; the initiative should remain with the U.N. representative, he said. After a review of the negotiations, in which he pointed out Pakistan's acceptance of numerous suggestions rejected by India, he concluded with a "concrete offer": If India would reduce the forces on its side of the cease-fire line to 28,000 without armored equipment, Pakistan would for its part agree to fulfill its obligations under the 1948 U.N. resolution—provided India agreed that the U.N. plebiscite administrator would then take over and carry out his mandate.

Following are excerpts from the Pakistan Foreign Minister's statement:

I find myself this afternoon in a position of some embarrassment in having to attempt a reply to the statement which the representative of India made at the Security Council's last meeting. The statement contained certain charges against Pakistan which no country could let pass without challenge. On the other hand, I have always had so much esteem for the representative who spoke on behalf of India and continue to entertain such respect, esteem and—if I may say so without impertinence—affection for her that I am afraid lest anything I might say should in the slightest degree jar upon her feelings. I shall try to avoid that. I can fully appreciate that she had to put her Government's case as her Government saw it. I am not making any complaint whatsoever. I am sure the Security Council and the representative of India will appreciate that I, also, have to put my side of the case—first, with reference to the allegations which were made against Pakistan and, secondly, with reference to the merits of the dispute as it stands today and the draft resolution now under discussion.

The fact is that there was this freedom movement in Kashmir, which swelled into a revolt. As I have said, the Maharajah's forces were defeated in that area and the Maharajah was forced to flee from the capital. He asked for military aid from India. In those circumstances, the people objected to his inclination or desire to accede to India. Not only was there a difference between them; a revolt had started. He appealed to India, asking for military aid to deal with the situation. India made it clear that it could not give him military aid unless he

offered to accede. He wrote a letter of accession, as dictated by Mr. Menon, the Secretary of the Government of India, dealing with the Indian states. The letter itself is proof of his meaning. That was on 26 October 1947.

Lord Mountbatten, then Governor-General of India, signified his acceptance of the accession, and this acceptance was on 27 October. Already, on the morning of 27 October, Indian troops had occupied Kashmir.

Was this aggression by Pakistan? Or was this aggression by India against the people of Kashmir, in support of the tyranny of the Maharajah?

The acceptance of the so-called accession of Kashmir by India could not but be regarded by the Government of Pakistan as an encroachment on Pakistan's sovereignty and territory and inconsistent with friendly relations that should have existed between the two dominions. This action of India was considered by the Government of Pakistan to be a clear attempt to cause disruption in the integrity of Pakistan by extending the influence and the boundaries of the Dominion of India in utter violation of the principles on which partition was agreed upon and effected.

There is no question here of continuing accession, of choosing whether to remain or not to remain.

The question is today really academic. This question of the validity of the accession, of the alleged aggressions by one side or the other—these matters have long been left behind. The crux of the matter, as the representative of India put it the other day, is the implementation of the two resolutions which constitute the agreement between the two Governments on this matter. Since those resolutions were accepted by the two Governments during the last week of December 1948, long after all these matters had happened and had been debated and had been clarified between the Commission and the two Governments, these questions as I have said, have long been academic. The happenings in Kashmir of August, September, October, November and December of 1947, the action taken by the Government of Pakistan on 8 May 1948—these were all long before these two resolutions were even propounded by the Commission, let alone before they were accepted by the two parties. I would therefore beg the Security Council to remember that, although they are repeatedly raised, they have really now become a form of abuse in which the Government of India chooses to indulge against the Government of Pakistan.

I shall now conclude with one concrete offer.

I make this offer—and I am willing that on this basis, if it is agreeable to India, we should proceed—and the resolution of 13 August 1948 may be implemented immediately on this basis:

India shall retain on the Indian-occupied side of Kashmir 28,000 troops, all told, which includes State armed forces, without armor or artillery. On our side, we will carry out the full obligations undertaken by us under that resolution: The tribesmen and Pakistan volunteers are already out, and the Pakistan army will move out on that basis.

If it is agreeable to India, let us agree on that, and then let the resolution of 5 January 1949 take care of the rest—provided that then the Plebiscite Administrator takes over and carries out all the duties and responsi-

bilities which the resolution of 5 January 1949 entrusts to him.

If the representative of India will signify her assent to this, now or later, we can proceed, under the auspices of the United Nations Representative, on this basis immediately.

General Assembly

At the Dec. 16 plenary session, all resolutions submitted by Committee III on freedom of information and self-determination were adopted. Voting on the former was as follows: Resolution A, opening the Right of Correction convention, 25-22 (Soviet bloc, U.S.)-10; B, on future work in the field of freedom of information, 50-0-7 (Soviets); C, appreciation to the subcommission on freedom of information, 50-5 (Soviets)-1; D, technical assistance regarding information facilities, 52-0-5 (Soviets); E, dissemination of false information, 50-0-10; F, draft code of ethics, 50-5 (Soviets)-2; G (dissemination of U.N. resolutions, 53-5 (Soviets)-1. In explaining the U.S. vote against Resolution A, Charles A. Sprague said:

The U.S. delegation opposed the opening of the convention on the international right of correction when it came up in the third committee, and its reasons were set forth fully at that time.¹ I would like, therefore, merely to explain briefly why my delegation is unable to vote for the resolution now before us.

In the first place, we find in this convention an unlimited right to initiate a correction and no means of determining whether the offending article or the correction itself is an accurate presentation of the facts. Nor is there any assurance that any publication will pay any attention to the correction. If a publication is a reputable one, it will print the correction without the necessity of a treaty. If it is an irresponsible one, then there is no way under this convention to force the printing of a correction.

A far greater and more effective safeguard against incorrect reporting is to increase the supply of news and the sources of news so that editors and readers, by comparing reports, may judge for themselves what is to be believed.

In the second place, Mr. President, it is our belief that the convention is likely to be a source of disagreement and friction among nations. It obliges a nation receiving a "correction" to make it available to its press even though it disputes the facts alleged in the correction. A government is thereby placed in the position either of disseminating information which it believes to be in error, or openly disregarding the treaty; and if it chooses the latter course it opens the way for serious controversy with another government.

In short, the convention now before the General Assembly offers little prospect of achieving its objectives. It could make these objectives more difficult to attain. In the course of our deliberations in the third committee, we have produced a number of proposals which tend toward a constructive line of action in the field of freedom of information. We are looking forward to a comprehensive report by the *rapporteur* elected by the Economic and Social Council. We are anticipating a study by the Council and UNESCO which will speed the development of independent domestic news media in underdeveloped countries. We have a convention on hand to protect the newsgathering and transmitting rights of foreign correspondents which should promote the more extensive flow of news everywhere. All these, Mr. President, are the positive ways to meet our problems; they make the con-

vention on the international right of correction an unnecessary and probably a hazardous step.

Now, to proceed to the draft resolution submitted by the delegation of the Soviet Union (A/L.125).

The draft resolution before this plenary meeting is exactly the same as a draft resolution submitted by the Soviet delegation in the third committee. That draft resolution was thoroughly considered by the third committee. A number of amendments were submitted and several of them were adopted. The Soviet draft resolution, as amended, was then voted on by the committee. It was rejected by a roll call vote of 19 in favor, 21 against, with 12 abstentions.

The decision of the third committee in rejecting the Soviet draft resolution was a wise one. The sole purpose of the draft resolution was to furnish the basis for a propaganda attack by the Soviet and other delegations against the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. As I made clear in the committee debates, these charges that the United States, the United Kingdom, and France are engaged in hate campaigns and propaganda for war came with ill grace from Governments which have turned the press, radio, and motion pictures of their countries into one gigantic vehicle for fomenting hatred and fear of the rest of the world and which make every possible effort to shut off their peoples from knowledge of the rest of the world.

In conclusion, Mr. President, the General Assembly has before it a number of important and useful resolutions on freedom of information—resolutions which will really contribute to strengthening news media and to increasing the flow of news. It would seem to be completely unnecessary, therefore, for the Assembly to adopt this draft resolution, which is submitted merely for propaganda purposes and which serves no useful purpose.

The Soviet anti-war mongering proposal was rejected, 9-35-14.

Resolution A on self-determination in non-self-governing territories carried by a vote of 40-14 (U.S.)-6. Before the vote, Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt (U.S.) explained:

... My delegation ordinarily does not favor the submission of amendments in plenary after an item has been thoroughly debated in a committee, but in this case, because procedural difficulties prevented the principal elements in the U.S. amendments from ever coming to a vote in the third committee, we are reintroducing two amendments to the second operative paragraph.

The U.S. Government and the American people believe wholeheartedly in the principle of self-determination of peoples and nations; they believe that the right of self-determination should be exercised by peoples of all territories, according to the particular circumstances of each territory and the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned. For this reason, the U.S. delegation would like to be able to vote for Resolution A, but it cannot do so in view of certain defects in the present text of that resolution, particularly as regards its application to a limited group of territories, and as regards the suggestion that the democratic processes of our territories be placed under the auspices of the United Nations.

The U.S. delegation asks for a separate vote on the first paragraph of the preamble because it wishes an opportunity to vote against this paragraph. In our view, the first preambular paragraph contains an incorrect statement of fact. We cannot admit that the peoples of non-self-governing and trust territories under U.S. administration do not fully enjoy all fundamental human rights as this paragraph would imply.

My delegation would not consider the second operative paragraph fully satisfactory unless the Assembly adopts the two amendments which it has submitted. According to the present text of the second operative paragraph, the right of self-determination should be exercised only by the peoples of non-self-governing and trust territories. This is a restriction on the right of self-determination

¹ BULLETIN of Nov. 17, 1952, p. 789.

which in the view of my delegation falls so far short of the concept expressed in the Charter that we should not endorse it. If a right is valid for one group of peoples, it is equally valid for all peoples. There is another difficulty, Mr. President. The present text of the second operative paragraph would place not only "plebiscites" but also "other recognized democratic means" under the auspices of the United Nations. This seems completely impractical to my delegation. Furthermore, insofar as this might involve placing our own democratic processes, or those of the territories under our administration, under the auspices of the United Nations, it is impossible for us to accept. We would be unable to vote for this paragraph as long as it contains this concept.

Finally, my delegation asks for a separate vote on the third operative paragraph. The substance of this paragraph has considerable merit, and it recommends policies which we follow in the territories under our administration, but it still seems to us that this paragraph is inappropriate in this resolution. This is particularly true, as in our view, it detracts from the universal character of the resolution. Deletion of this paragraph would improve the resolution by focusing greater attention on its main purpose—to bring about greater respect for the right of self-determination of all peoples.

In conclusion, Mr. President, the United States will vote in favor of Resolution A if the first and last paragraphs are deleted and if the second operative paragraph is improved. My delegation earnestly hopes that these changes can be made as it desires to vote for the resolution. The U.S. delegation believes that any resolution on self-determination should command the support of an overwhelming majority of the General Assembly. It believes this not simply because the resolution is subject to Rule 84, as it relates to an important question and to the operation of the trusteeship system, but essentially because a resolution on so vital a matter should be so phrased as to appeal to the whole Assembly and not just to a small majority of the Assembly.

U.S. amendments to broaden the application of the resolution "to all territories" and permit plebiscites for the purpose of ascertaining the wishes of inhabitants were rejected, 22-28-5 and 13-30-12. In separate votes, the first preambular paragraph and the third operative paragraph were confirmed, 38-13-9 and 39-3-17.

By a vote of 39-12 (U.S.)-5, the Assembly recommended that administering authorities include in their reports information on self-determination; a request to the Human Rights Commission to continue preparing recommendations concerning international respect for the right to self-determination was approved 42 (U.S.)-7-8.

On Dec. 17, the Assembly approved Committee I's resolutions on Tunisia (44-3-8) and on the Eritrean item (51-0-5). The *Ad Hoc* Political Committee resolution on the repatriation of Greek children was adopted by a vote of 46-5-6 after approval of New Zealand amendments restoring the passage agreeing to the suspension of Red Cross work, except in Yugoslavia. The International Committee of the Red Cross had cabled the Secretary-General on Dec. 2, after approval of the Committee's text, stating that it was unable to do effective work because of the attitude of the harboring governments. Explaining his delegation's support, the Greek representative said that he bowed to the inevitable, with sorrow and bitterness. No one could take exception to the Red Cross request to be relieved, nor to the Assembly's action

in complying with the request, he said. The door had been left ajar, and Greece would never give up hope that the children would some day be returned.

The proposal for direct negotiations between the Arab States and Israel, recommended by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, failed to obtain a two-thirds majority in the plenary session on Dec. 18. The vote was 24-21-15. The five states of the Soviet bloc, which had abstained from voting in the Committee, were among those casting negative votes; states which abstained in the plenary session, after having voted for the resolution in the Committee, were Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Liberia, and Venezuela. Amendments submitted by the Philippines, introducing a reference to "the principle of the internationalization of Jerusalem" and directing the parties to negotiate "on the basis of" past Assembly resolutions rather than "bearing in mind" such resolutions, were defeated. Speaking against the Philippine amendments before the vote, Philip C. Jessup (U.S.) said the text as approved by the *Ad Hoc* Committee did not "surrender" or "impair" Arab rights or ignore legitimate Arab interests.

Committee I (Political and Security)—Consideration of the Tunisian question was completed Dec. 12 with the adoption of a resolution, introduced by 11 Latin American states, expressing confidence that the "Government of France will endeavor to further the effective development of the free institutions of the Tunisian people" and the hope that the parties will continue negotiations on "an urgent basis" with a view to bringing about self-government for Tunisians. The resolution also appeals to the parties to conduct their relations and settle their disputes in accordance with the spirit of the Charter and to refrain from actions likely to aggravate the present tension. The vote was 45-3 (Belgium, Luxembourg, South Africa)-10 (Soviet bloc, Argentina, Guatemala, U.K.): El Salvador and France were absent. A draft resolution on the question proposed by 13 Arab-Asian states was rejected (24-27-7).

During the Committee's general debate on the Moroccan item, Philip C. Jessup (U.S.) on Dec. 15 declared that there are significant differences between the problems of Morocco and Tunisia but that all agree it would be most beneficial to Tunisia, Morocco, and France and to world peace if these two protectorates progressed steadily toward the fulfillment of their national aspirations. He expressed the hope that the spirit of moderation would predominate in Morocco and Tunisia. The Moroccan problem, he said, was more complex than the Tunisian one and its solution required "very high statesmanship." He concluded:

We say again: We trust France and wish to support, and not in any way to make more difficult, the achievement of the high purposes to which France has pledged herself. We have faith in the peoples and governments of

Text of Resolution on the Tunisian Question¹

U.N. doc. A. Resolution 41
Adopted Dec. 17, 1952

The General Assembly

HAVING DEBATED the question proposed by thirteen Member States in document A/2152,

MINDFUL of the necessity of developing friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples,

CONSIDERING that the United Nations, as a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of their common ends under the Charter, should strive towards removing any causes and factors of misunderstanding among Member States, thus reasserting the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security,

Expresses the confidence that, in pursuance of its proclaimed policies, the Government of France will endeavour to further the effective development of the free institutions of the Tunisian people, in conformity to the purposes and principles of the Charter,

Expresses the hope that the parties will continue negotiations on an urgent basis with a view to bringing about self-government for Tunisians in the light of the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations,

Appeals to the Parties concerned to conduct their relations and settle their disputes in accordance with the spirit of the Charter and refrain from any acts or measures likely to aggravate the present tension.

¹ Adopted by Committee I (Political and Security) on Dec. 12 and by the General Assembly on Dec. 17.

France and Morocco who must and will work out their destinies together.

A draft resolution circulated on Dec. 15 by 13 Arab and Asian delegations requested the French Government and the Sultan of Morocco to enter into negotiations for an early peaceful settlement in accord with the sovereignty of Morocco, the aspirations of her people, and the U.N. Charter. The next day a draft resolution was introduced by the same 11 Latin-American delegations that had sponsored the resolution on Tunisia adopted by the Committee (and later by the plenary session).

The Latin-American draft expresses the confidence that, "in pursuance of its proclaimed policies," the Government of France will endeavor to "further the fundamental liberties of the people of Morocco in conformity with the Purposes and Principles of the charter." It goes on to express the hope that the parties will continue negotiations "on an urgent basis" toward "developing the free political institutions of the people of Morocco with due regard to legitimate rights and interests under the established norms and practices of the law of nations." The proposal also appeals to the parties to conduct their relations in an atmosphere of good will, mutual confidence and respect, and to settle their disputes in accordance with the

Charter, thus refraining from any acts or measures likely to aggravate the present tension.

A Pakistani amendment introduced on Dec. 17 revised the wording of one paragraph to express the hope that "the parties will continue negotiations on an urgent basis with a view to bringing about self-government for Moroccans in the light of the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations." With this amendment, the resolution was adopted, 40-5 (U. S.)-11, after the Arab-Asian draft had been defeated. Ambassador Jessup, in an explanation of vote, said the 11-power text had been carefully drafted to deal with the situation in Morocco, which, as he had said previously, was different from that in Tunisia; the Pakistan amendment tended to becloud and obscure the distinction between the two cases. Because the amendment had seriously impaired the approach of the original draft, the United States must cast a negative vote.

At the outset of discussion on the Austrian item, Andrei Gromyko (U.S.S.R.), on a point of order, recalled his delegation's objections to inclusion of the question on the Assembly's agenda. The abbreviated draft offered by the U.S., U.K., and France was incompatible with previous agreements. Consideration of the question by the Assembly would not expedite the conclusion of the treaty nor the establishment of a free, democratic Austria. He charged that the introduction of the item was a maneuver by the "Big Three" to divert attention from truly urgent problems such as arms reduction, the ban on atomic weapons, cessation of the Korean war, and conclusion of a "Big Five" peace pact. The U.S.S.R. would not participate in consideration of the Austrian question nor in the voting on proposals arising from the debate, nor would it recognize any resolutions which might be adopted since they would have no legal force.

Chairman João Carlos Muniz (Brazil) declared that under the rules of procedure the Committee was bound to consider the item. On another point of order, Luis Quintanilla (Mexico) moved that the Austrian Foreign Minister be invited to participate in the debate, without the right to vote; the motion carried, 47-5-0.

Brazil then introduced a 4-power resolution, cosponsored also by Lebanon, Mexico, and the Netherlands, appealing to the parties concerned to make a renewed and urgent effort to reach agreement on the terms of the Austrian treaty. Foreign Minister Karl Gruber welcomed Brazil's initiative, warning that the Austrians' patience with regard to the continued occupation of their country could not last indefinitely.

Selwyn Lloyd (U.K.) reviewed the background of the question, recalling that every concession by the Western Powers had been followed by Soviet demands for further concessions or the introduction of further objections. The proposal for an abbreviated treaty was an attempt to end this deadlock. As in the past, the Western Powers

stood ready to meet with Soviet representatives to discuss any points connected with the treaty, provided only that such points were relevant and were intended to facilitate conclusion of the treaty. His delegation therefore endorsed the 4-power resolution.

Benjamin V. Cohen (U.S.) on Dec. 18 charged that the U.S.S.R. was trying to "perpetuate and increase its power over Austria." Since the end of the World War II the Soviet Union had seized Austrian property worth \$700,000,000 and set up its own corporations, through which it could "exert a strangle-hold on the economic life of Austria." He supported the 4-power proposal in the hope that it would provide the "something more" required to make possible an agreement.

Ad Hoc Political Committee—Conclusion of debate on the Eritrean item was marked by praise for the part played by the U.K., Ethiopia, and Italy in the solution of the Eritrean problem, and by tributes to U.N. Commissioner Anze Matienzo. A 13-power resolution, welcoming the establishment of the Federation and congratulating its people and governmental authorities for their fulfillment of the 1950 resolution, was approved on Dec. 12, 52-0-5 (Soviets).

Debate on the question of the admission of new members began later the same day. El Salvador introduced two draft resolutions sponsored jointly by its delegation and those of Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. One draft states that the Assembly has the right and the duty to decide on membership applications; the second provides for a 15-member special committee to study all proposals and suggestions relating to the membership question. Peru also introduced a proposal for Assembly consideration of applications.

Senator Alexander Wiley (U.S.) said that his delegation saw "great merit" in the 5-power proposal for a committee to study the question. He warned that "hasty or ill-considered action, born of impatience," might have "unfortunate results." Andrei Gromyko (U.S.S.R.) opposed the proposal for a special committee but supported a Polish resolution requesting the Security Council to reconsider simultaneous admission of 14 States (Albania, Mongolia, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Finland, Italy, Portugal, Ireland, Jordan, Austria, Ceylon, Nepal, and Libya).

On Dec. 15 the U.S. delegation circulated a resolution to the effect that Japan is qualified for membership, and France circulated similar proposals relating to Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. At the Dec. 17 session, Senator Wiley reaffirmed the U.S. Government's belief in the goal of universality of membership and described as "an attempt at hold-up" the Soviet demand that five applicants sponsored by the U.S.S.R. be admitted as the price for agreeing to the admission of the 14 peace-loving applicants. He commended to the Committee the U.S. resolution on the Japanese

application, as well as the texts relating to Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

Committee II (Economic and Financial)—An amended Chilean resolution expressing satisfaction with the work of the regional economic commissions was approved on Dec. 13 by a vote of 37-0-8. The approved text incorporated amendments proposed by the United States. Consideration of chapter II of the Economic and Social Council's report then began, with the introduction of an Ecuadoran resolution calling the attention of U.N. organs to the increased need for coordinated action regarding the problem of increasing food production.

Committee III (Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural)—Discussion of the "Draft Convention on the Political Rights of Women" opened on Dec. 12. The convention, prepared by the Commission on the Status of Women and approved by the Economic and Social Council, proposed three substantive articles:

Article 1. Women shall be entitled to vote in all elections on equal terms with men.

Article 2. Women shall be eligible for election to all publicly elected bodies, established by national law, on equal terms with men.

Article 3. Women shall be entitled to hold public office and to exercise all public functions, established by national law, on equal terms with men.

During the opening debate, Mrs. Roosevelt said that in 45 of the 60 U.N. member nations, women voted on the same terms as men and that in 7 more States they had partial voting rights.

However, even in countries where for many years women have been eligible for public office, there were still too few women in positions of "real leadership." The object of article 3, she said, was to "encourage opportunities for women in government service"; her delegation did not consider "public office" as including military service. She concluded: "The Convention is a symbol of the progress women have made in the past hundred years, and a challenge to them to claim and make full use of the political rights they achieve." The U.S. representative spoke again on Dec. 15 in reply to charges by Soviet representatives that the United States discriminates against women. On Dec. 17 the Committee adopted the draft convention, as amended by India, to include a provision that a contracting state may stipulate that the convention shall not apply to certain of its territories and may later, by notifying the Secretary-General, extend the application to any or all of such territories. The vote was 35 (U.S.)-0-11. A resolution opening the convention for signature also was adopted, 40 (U.S.)-0-6.

At the same session, the Committee completed another item, chapter V (Human Rights) of the Economic and Social Council's report.

Committee IV (Trusteeship)—After hearing representatives of Togoland organizations, the Committee on Dec. 13 opened general debate on

the Ewe and Togoland unification problem. Charles A. Sprague (U.S.) introduced a draft resolution on Dec. 15 proposing joint talks between France, the U.K., and the Togolandese to bring about "a prompt, constructive, and equitable settlement" of the problem. The U.S. draft also proposed reestablishment of the Joint Council for Togoland Affairs on broader terms of reference.

Amendments offered by Guatemala would invite France and the U.K. to discuss unification of the two Togolands under a single trusteeship administration to meet the aspirations of the Togolandese. Another counterproposal, jointly offered by 10 states, would extend the Joint Council's terms of reference to enable it to discuss all matters, including the question of unification.

On Dec. 16 John J. Muccio (U.S.) introduced a revised text of the U.S. resolution on the Ewe question, explaining that it incorporated the substance of a number of amendments. His delegation could not accept Guatemala's proposal relating to the negotiation of a single trusteeship arrangement for the two Togolands.

Iraq, Brazil, and others of the 10 powers continued to maintain their proposal that the Joint Council should be reconstituted "by means of direct negotiations on the basis of universal adult suffrage exercised by secret ballot." A Mexican proposal to request the administering authorities to give increased attention to the possibilities of technical assistance was accepted by the U.S. as part of its draft resolution, as was a suggestion by Syria for a report to be made by the Trusteeship Council to the next session of the Assembly.

In the voting, the United States cast negative votes on the 10-power amendment relating to direct elections and universal adult suffrage and on the Guatemalan amendment, both of which were approved (28-10-10, 18-13-18). The resolution as a whole was approved, 30-11-9. In voting against the amended resolution, Mr. Muccio explained that the United States would have preferred to support it, but inclusion of the 10-power amendment and the Guatemalan proposal made that impossible.

On Dec. 15 the Committee elected Brazil, China, India, and Iraq members of the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories beginning in 1953.

THE FOREIGN SERVICE

Resignation

On December 6, 1952, President Truman accepted the resignation of William O'Dwyer as American Ambassador to Mexico. For the text of Mr. O'Dwyer's letter of resignation and the President's reply, see White House press release of November 26, 1952.

December 29, 1952

Federation of Eritrea With Ethiopia

Effective September 15, 1952, in accordance with the decision made by the United Nations, Eritrea, which has been under temporary British administration since 1941, was federated with Ethiopia. The Embassy at Addis Ababa will now bear the relationship to Asmara of a mission to a consulate.

Also, effective September 15, the consular districts of the Embassy and Consulate were redefined as follows:

Addis Ababa

All of Ethiopia except the northwestern portion which is bounded on the east and south by a line that follows the meridian of 41° E. of Greenwich from the boundary of Eritrea southward to latitude 12° N., and thence due west, passing immediately south of Lalibala and north of Duncur (Dongur), to the demarcated boundary with the Sudan; also the portion of Eritrea that lies to the east of the meridian of 41° E. longitude (east of Thio on the Red Sea).

Asmara

All of Eritrea except the portion that lies to the east of the meridian of 41° E. of Greenwich (east of Thio on the Red Sea); also the northwestern portion of Ethiopia bounded on the east and south by a line that follows the meridian of 41° E. of Greenwich southward to the latitude of 12° N., and thence due west, passing immediately south of Lalibala and north of Duncur (Dongur), to the demarcated boundary with the Sudan.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

Technical Cooperation. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2457. Pub. 4658. 8 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Lebanon—Signed at Beirut May 29, 1951; entered into force Dec. 13, 1951.

Agriculture, Cooperative Program in Paraguay, Additional Financial Contributions. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2468. Pub. 4668. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Paraguay—Signed at Asunción Sept. 10 and Oct. 24, 1951; entered into force Oct. 24, 1951.

Extradition. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2454. Pub. 4709. 5 pp. 5¢.

Supplementary convention between the United States and Canada supplementing convention of Dec. 13, 1900—Signed at Ottawa Oct. 26, 1951; entered into force July 11, 1952.

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