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## U.S. and France Discuss Measures To Promote Peace

### TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE OF MARCH 28

Press release 160 dated March 28

1. Representatives of the United States and France, meeting in Washington, today concluded a detailed review of a wide range of problems which face both governments in Europe, the Far East and the Near East. Peace will always remain the basic policy of the United States and France. The discussions, therefore, centered on measures for obtaining peace where there is fighting and for consolidating peace where threats exist.

2. It was agreed, in the absence of any tangible proof to the contrary, that recent developments in the Soviet Union had not changed the basic nature of the threat confronting the free world. The representatives of both countries were in full agreement on the necessity of concerting their efforts so as to defeat Communist aggression in the Far East and to strengthen the defenses of the free countries in the West. They remain convinced that true peace can be achieved and maintained only by constructive efforts of all free nations.

3. It was recognized that Communist aggressive moves in the Far East obviously are parts of the same pattern. Therefore, while the full burden of the fighting in Indochina falls on the forces of the French Union including those of the Associated States, and similarly the United States bears the heaviest burden in Korea, the prosecution of these operations cannot be successfully carried out without full recognition of their interdependence. This in turn requires the continuation of frequent diplomatic and military consultation between the two Governments.

The French Government reasserted its resolve to do its utmost to increase the effectiveness of the French and Associated States forces in Indochina, with a view to destroying the organized Communist forces and to bringing peace and prosperity to her free associates within the French Union, Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam. The Ambassadors of Viet-Nam and Cambodia were present and participated in this phase of the discussions.

Advantage was taken of this meeting to con-

tinue discussion of plans prepared by the High Command in Indochina for military action there. These plans are being developed with a view to achieving success in Indochina and are being given intensive study so as to determine how and to what extent the United States may be able to contribute materiel and financial support to their achievement.

Obviously any armistice which might be concluded in Korea by the United Nations would be entered into in the hope that it would be a step toward peace. It was the view of both Governments, however, that should the Chinese Communist regime take advantage of such an armistice to pursue aggressive war elsewhere in the Far East, such action would have the most serious consequences for the efforts to bring about peace in the world and would conflict directly with the understanding on which any armistice in Korea would rest.

4. The two Governments reaffirmed their common interest in controlling together with other nations of the free world the movement of strategic materials to nations whose policies jeopardize the peace and security of the free world. Both Governments undertook to continue action toward that end.

In order to render more effective the application of the United Nations General Assembly resolution of May 18, 1951,<sup>1</sup> the French Government intends to take the measures necessary to prevent

- a) the bunkering of ships carrying to Communist China cargoes of strategic materials, and
- b) the transportation by French ships of cargoes of strategic character to ports of Communist China.

The two Governments in cooperation with other interested Governments will keep under constant review the list of items embargoed to Communist China in order to include goods whose strategic character will have been demonstrated.

5. In their discussions on the European area, the two Governments recognized the continuing urgent need to permit a German military contri-

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of May 28, 1951, p. 849.

bution to the defense of Europe and through the Contractual Agreements replace the present occupation regime of Germany. Both Governments agreed on the necessity of the establishment, with minimum delay, of the European Defense Community, which will promote sincere cooperation between France and Germany and thus serve the interests of the Atlantic Community as well as advance the security and unity of Europe.

The two delegations noted with satisfaction the agreement by the Interim Committee of the European Defense Community on the protocols interpretative to the Treaty. For their part the representatives of France foresaw their acceptance by their Government.

It was recognized that this important step toward ratification of the Treaty would enable rapid progress in the Interim Committee on the technical steps preparatory to the Treaty coming into force and thereby ensure that its benefits would be secured as soon as possible after ratification.

The importance of a settlement of the question of the Saar was recognized and it was agreed that this should be sought at the earliest opportunity on a basis which would provide a European status for the Saar conforming to the principles of the European Defense and the Coal and Steel Communities. The French delegation explained in detail the reasons which, in its view, justify and render necessary a Franco-German agreement on such a settlement prior to ratification of the European Defense Community Treaty.

6. The French delegation explained the economic and budgetary implications for France of carrying out her defense programs in Europe as well as in the Far East.

7. The two delegations recognized that the European Defense Community is to be constituted within a constantly developing Atlantic Community.

Therefore they place great importance upon efforts to improve the effectiveness of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

This general question as well as that of the essential balance between military necessities and economic possibilities will again be considered during the next meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Paris on April 23.

8. The participation by France in the European Community alters in no way her interests and responsibilities outside of Europe. In the light of the world position of both nations, which is reflected in particular in the charter of the United Nations, the United States Government and the Government of France will consult with one another on general problems as occasion demands in the future as in the past.

9. An exchange of views was also held on economic and financial questions.

The discussions included a survey of the budgetary position and outlook as well as a review

of economic developments in the United States and in France.

The French representatives outlined their views on the recent talks at the Organization for European Economic Cooperation in Paris concerning progress toward better balanced and expanding world trade, and the objective of convertibility of currencies and multilateral trade and payments. It was agreed that steps to advance this progress would require further study by the United States, the member countries of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation and other governments.

## ARRIVAL OF FRENCH MINISTERS

Press release 155 dated March 25

*Following are the texts of statements of welcome made by Vice President Nixon and Secretary Dulles to the French Ministers on their arrival at the Washington National Airport on March 25, together with the reply of Prime Minister René Mayer:*

### Vice President Nixon

I am honored on behalf of the President and the Government of the United States to welcome the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, the Minister for the Associated States of Indochina, and the Finance Minister of our great sister Republic of France.

It is quite significant that this is the first official visit of the Head of Government of a foreign state since the inauguration of President Eisenhower. It is, I think, particularly fitting that this is the case because we all recall that the Government of France was the first to enter into diplomatic relationships with our Government during our war of independence. It was 175 years ago during a very bitter cold winter at Valley Forge that the treaty of alliance and friendship between our two countries was entered into, and since that time, over a century and a half, our two peoples and our two Governments have stood together in meeting great crises.

Today we are confronted with great problems in the world but we are convinced that the discussions and meetings which will take place at the very highest level between the representatives of our two Governments will not only assist in solving the mutual problems which confront us but also will serve the cause of peace and freedom throughout the world. Thank you.

### Secretary Dulles

We welcome the Prime Minister of France, Mr. Mayer, and the Ministers who accompany him. We meet as personal friends as well as official friends. I have long known Mr. Mayer and Mr.



Bidault, now the Minister of Foreign Affairs. We resume here conversations which Mr. Stassen and I began in Paris last month.

We meet here as representatives of two great and friendly powers. We in the United States respect and admire France, whose leaders vigorously seized the opportunity to advance postwar Europe toward unity and strength. Among those leaders stands Prime Minister Mayer, a man of vision and determination who boldly and courageously fights for victories of peace in Europe and victories of war against communism in Asia. That is the spirit which symbolizes the France we love and are proud to acclaim as our ally.

### **The Prime Minister**

Mr. Vice President, Mr. Secretary: I am deeply moved by your very kind words, so deeply moved that before I venture to go to my prepared statement I will try from the bottom of my heart to convey to you the appreciation and friendship of the people of France to the sister of liberty who in our history have always been on the same side.

We have fought in two wars and come out on top, and in Asia we are fighting side by side and with our common determination and our cooperation we shall both see through to victory and to peace.

And now may I turn to my statement: In the course of the past few years, Mr. Bidault, my colleagues and myself have several times enjoyed the hospitality of this beautiful capital and we already find a great pleasure in this same friendly atmosphere. As I told you in Paris a few months ago, it will be a special privilege for us to meet President Eisenhower again. To the French, his name has been, since the war, a symbol of victory and freedom and it has more recently become also the symbol of unity in the Atlantic community.

We will devote much time, during our visit here, to discuss the political, economic, and military problems this community is presently faced with.

In this respect, we will stress our efforts to build up a united Europe and to create the European Defense Community (Edc). The Government I preside has submitted the Edc treaty to the French Parliament and has committed itself to request its ratification. I have clearly stated the prerequisite conditions of this ratification.

We will likewise discuss our common problems outside Europe. In Asia, our two countries have unfortunately a large number of soldiers engaged in bitter fighting against the same enemy. How we can best defeat aggression will be an essential part of our talks. We are confident we will, like you in Korea, reach victory in Indochina with the participation of the peoples of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. In many other areas of the world, we also have common responsibilities or identical

duties, among which the advancement of democracy and the progress of economic welfare in underdeveloped areas occupy a prominent place.

I feel sure that our mutual understanding and our unity of action will greatly benefit from these consultations.

## **U.S. Represented on Commission for Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Elections**

The Department of State announced on March 23 (press release 154) that, in reply to requests received from the Governments of Egypt and the United Kingdom, the Government of the United States has agreed to participate on the Mixed Electoral Commission for the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. Warwick Perkins, a Foreign Service career officer of class one, has been nominated as U.S. representative on the Commission. Mr. Perkins departed for Khartoum on March 19, 1953, and has been accorded by the President the personal rank of Minister for the duration of his service on this Commission.

The Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of February 12, 1953, on the Sudan provided for the election of a Sudanese Parliament as a step toward self-government and self-determination in that country. The election is to be supervised by a Mixed Electoral Commission consisting of representatives of the Sudan, Egypt, India, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Harold W. Glidden, who is at present a member of the Department's Division of Research for the Near East, will assist Mr. Perkins. Also a Foreign Service officer, he formerly was attached to the Embassy at Cairo.

## **President Expresses Sympathy on Death of Queen Mary**

White House press release dated March 24

*The President on March 24 sent the following cable to Winthrop Aldrich, U.S. Ambassador to the Court of St. James, for delivery to Queen Elizabeth II:*

Please extend to Her Majesty and to all the members and peoples of the British Commonwealth my deep personal sympathy on the passing of Queen Mary. The hearts of all Americans go out to Her Majesty tonight as our prayers are extended to her, Princess Margaret and the members of the Royal Family for the great personal loss they have sustained. Queen Mary was a good and great Queen. Free peoples the world over will mourn her loss.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

## Exchange of Sick and Wounded Prisoners of War

*On February 22 Gen. Mark Clark, U.N. Commander in Korea, asked the North Korean and Chinese Communist leaders to agree to an immediate exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war. The proposal was one that had been made several times since the beginning of truce negotiations in July 1951. On March 28 the Peiping radio broadcast the text of a reply in which the Communist leaders expressed willingness to proceed with the repatriation of sick and wounded prisoners and proposed resumption of the truce negotiations which were suspended on October 8, 1952. Following are texts of the correspondence and of statements by Secretary Dulles and Lincoln White, Deputy Special Assistant for Press Relations.*

### GENERAL CLARK'S LETTER

To Kim Il Sung, Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army, and Peng Teh-Huai, Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers:

The Executive Committee of the League of Red Cross Societies, in a resolution adopted in Geneva, Switzerland, on 13 December 1952 called on both sides in the Korean conflict as a gesture of good will to take immediate action in implementing the humanitarian provisions of the Geneva Convention by repatriating sick and wounded prisoners of war in accordance with appropriate articles of the Geneva Convention.

As has been repeatedly stated to you in the course of negotiations at Pammunjom the United Nations Command has from the very beginning adhered scrupulously to the humanitarian provisions of the Geneva Convention and in particular has been prepared to carry out the provisions of the Geneva Convention in regard to the sick and wounded prisoners in its custody. The United Nations Command remains ready immediately to repatriate those seriously sick and seriously wounded captured personnel who are fit to travel in accordance with provisions of Article 109 of the Geneva Convention.

I wish to be informed whether you are prepared for your part to proceed immediately with the re-

patiation of seriously sick and wounded captured personnel of the United Nations Command who are in your hands. The United Nations Command liaison officers will be prepared to meet your liaison officers to make necessary arrangements for impartial verification of the conditions and for the mutual exchange of such seriously sick and wounded in accordance with the provisions of Article 109 of the Geneva Convention.

### COMMUNISTS' REPLY

General Mark Clark, Commander in Chief, United Nations Command:

We received your letter, dated February 22d, concerning the question of repatriation, with priority, of seriously sick and seriously injured prisoners of war of both sides. The delegates for armistice negotiations of both sides had, as a matter of fact, reached agreement in accordance with humanitarian principles on paragraph 53 of the draft Korean armistice agreement.

It was solely because the Korean armistice negotiations were suspended that there was no way to implement this agreed provision. In consequence, it has not been possible, up to the present, to repatriate seriously sick and seriously injured prisoners of war of both sides.

Since your side now expresses readiness to apply the provisions of the Geneva Convention to sick and injured prisoners of war in the custody of both sides, our side, as an expression of similar intent, fully agrees to your side's proposal to exchange sick and injured prisoners of war of both sides during the period of hostilities.

This proposal could be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of Article 109 of the Geneva Convention.

At the same time we consider that the reasonable settlement of the question of exchanging sick and injured prisoners of war of both sides during the period of hostilities should be made to lead to the smooth settlement of the entire question of prisoners of war, thereby achieving an armistice in Korea, for which peoples throughout the world are longing.

Therefore, our side proposes that the delegates for armistice negotiations of both sides immediately resume the negotiations at Panmunjom. Furthermore, our liaison officer is prepared to meet your liaison officer to discuss and decide on the date for resuming the negotiations.

*Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army.*

**KIM IL SUNG**

*Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers*

**PENG TEH-HUAI**

## STATEMENT BY SECRETARY DULLES

Press release 159 dated March 28

For some time in the past, the U.N. Command in Korea has been seeking an exchange of wounded and sick prisoners of war as a humanitarian move. These efforts have been without result until on February 22, 1953, that effort was resumed. It now appears that our offer made on that date has been accepted.

The U.S. Government hopes that this exchange of prisoners will occur promptly and provide relief to those who suffer and to their anxious relatives and friends.

## STATEMENT BY PRESS OFFICER WHITE<sup>2</sup>

[Excerpts]

The Communist message is an unconditional acceptance of the proposal made by General Clark on February 22 for the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war who are fit to travel in accordance with article 109 of the Geneva Convention.

That article provides just that: that prisoners of war—that is, sick and wounded prisoners of war who are fit to travel—be permitted to go home on a voluntary—I emphasize voluntary—basis.

Clark's letter made the specific proposal that arrangements be made to carry this out through the liaison officers. Therefore, this does not require a resumption of armistice negotiations by the delegations. The acceptance of this Pow proposal is an entirely separate question. . . .

Now, as I say, the precise figures will have to be worked out between the liaison people, and on the exchange itself Clark has full authority to go ahead. He has had it since this offer was made. . . .

<sup>2</sup> Made at a press and radio conference on Mar. 28.

EDITOR'S NOTE. Following are the texts of the relevant articles of the Geneva Convention:

### ARTICLE 109

Subject to the provisions of the third paragraph of this Article, Parties to the conflict are bound to send back to their own country, regardless of number or rank, seriously wounded and seriously sick prisoners of war, after having cared for them until they are fit to travel, in accordance with the first paragraph of the following Article.

Throughout the duration of hostilities, Parties to the conflict shall endeavour, with the cooperation of the neutral Powers concerned, to make agreements for the accommodation in neutral countries of the sick and wounded prisoners of war referred to in the second paragraph of the following Article. They may, in addition, conclude agreements with a view to the direct repatriation or internment in a neutral country of able-bodied prisoners of war who have undergone a long period of captivity.

No sick or injured prisoner of war who is eligible for repatriation under the first paragraph of this Article, may be repatriated against his will during hostilities.

### ARTICLE 110

The following shall be repatriated direct:

- (1) Incurably wounded and sick whose mental or physical fitness seems to have been gravely diminished.
- (2) Wounded and sick who, according to medical opinion, are not likely to recover within one year, whose condition requires treatment and whose mental or physical fitness seems to have been gravely diminished.
- (3) Wounded and sick who have recovered, but whose mental or physical fitness seems to have been gravely and permanently diminished.

The following may be accommodated in a neutral country:

(1) Wounded and sick whose recovery may be expected within one year of the date of the wound or the beginning of the illness, if treatment in a neutral country might increase the prospects of a more certain and speedy recovery.

(2) Prisoners of war whose mental or physical health, according to medical opinion, is seriously threatened by continued captivity, but whose accommodation in a neutral country might remove such a threat.

The conditions which prisoners of war accommodated in a neutral country must fulfill in order to permit their repatriation shall be fixed, as shall likewise their status, by agreement between the Powers concerned. In general, prisoners of war who have been accommodated in a neutral country, and who belong to the following categories, should be repatriated:

- (1) Those whose state of health has deteriorated so as to fulfill the conditions laid down for direct repatriation;
- (2) Those whose mental or physical powers remain, even after treatment, considerably impaired.

If no special agreements are concluded between the Parties to the conflict concerned, to determine the cases of disablement or sickness entailing direct repatriation or accommodation in a neutral country, such cases shall be settled in accordance with the principles laid down in the Model Agreement concerning direct repatriation and accommodation in neutral countries of wounded and sick prisoners of war and in the Regulations concerning Mixed Medical Commissions annexed to the present Convention.

## Formal Diplomatic Claims Preferred Against Hungary and U. S. S. R. for Their Conduct in 1951 Plane Case

### SUMMARY OF U. S. NOTES OF MARCH 17

Press release 140 dated March 17

The U.S. Government on March 17 preferred formal diplomatic claims against the Soviet and Hungarian Governments on account of their conduct in the case of the USAF C-47 airplane 6026 and its crew who came down in Hungary on November 19, 1951. These claims were contained in notes delivered on March 17 to the Soviet Government by Jacob D. Beam, Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim* of the United States at Moscow, and to the Hungarian Government by George M. Abbott, Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim* of the United States at Budapest.<sup>1</sup>

The note directed to the Soviet Government incorporates, by reference, the allegations in the note directed to the Hungarian Government, and vice versa. The notes assert a joint and several liability on the part of both Governments for all the damage caused by them to the United States and to the four American airmen who constituted the crew of the airplane: Capt. Dave H. Henderson, Capt. John J. Swift, Sgt. Jess A. Duff, and Sgt. James A. Elam.

The notes demand payment of \$637,894.15 in damages, broken down into \$98,779.29 with interest at 6 percent from November 19, 1951, for the value of the airplane, its equipment, and cargo; \$123,605.15 with interest at 6 percent from December 28, 1951, on account of the fine paid by the U.S. Government to the Hungarian Government under protest to obtain the release of the four airmen; \$200,000, the amount of the damages to the four airmen in consequence of their unlawful detention and mistreatment, and manifest denials of justice concerted against them by both accused Governments; and \$215,509.67 on account of the damages to the United States by both accused Governments acting in concert. The notes state:

<sup>1</sup> Texts of the notes, in pamphlet form, may be obtained by writing to the Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.

The United States Government declares that the figure of \$215,509.67 . . . does not include any sum on account of the item of intangible injury deliberately and intentionally caused the United States Government and the American people by the wrongful actions of the Soviet and Hungarian Governments. Such injury is not easily calculable in money and money could not compensate for it. The United States Government has determined, therefore, for the present to defer the formulation of the kind and measure of redress or other action the Soviet Government and the Hungarian Government should take which would be appropriate in international law and practice to confirm the illegality of the actions directed by them against the United States Government and the American people.

The liability of the two Governments being joint and several, any payments by either Government would be considered as a credit to the account of the other, but both remain liable to the United States for the entire sum.

If the Soviet and Hungarian Governments, in their reply, acknowledge indebtedness and agree to pay damages due the United States, the U.S. Government is prepared to present detailed evidence in support of its calculations of damages suffered and alleged. The notes conclude that in the event that the accused Governments contest liability they should so state, and they are notified that the U.S. Government proposes in that event that the disputes be presented for hearing and decision in the International Court of Justice. Since the Soviet and Hungarian Governments have not accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, they are requested to take the necessary steps to empower the Court to determine the issues of fact and law set forth in the notes.

Notes heretofore delivered by the U.S. Government to the two accused Governments<sup>2</sup> were intended as preliminary to the preference by the United States of formal diplomatic claims. The

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Dec. 22, 1952, pp. 981-984; *ibid.*, Jan. 12, 1953, pp. 51-52; and *ibid.*, Feb. 16, 1953, pp. 258-259.

preliminary notes gave both Governments adequate opportunity to return the plane and its equipment and cargo which they had unlawfully seized, to disclose evidence in their possession bearing on the incident, and to provide justification, if any existed, for the actions which they took. Both Governments failed or declined to make responsive or satisfactory replies or to provide any of the material requested. Thereupon the liability of both Governments for acts of concerted and deliberate international wrong to the four airmen and to the United States became legally absolute.

The notes delivered on March 17 set out in considerable detail, for the first time, the essential facts which an intensive investigation by the U.S. Government since the incident occurred has disclosed, and which the U.S. Government "is prepared to prove in an appropriate forum by evidence." The violations both of international law and existing treaty obligations, of which the Soviet and Hungarian Governments are guilty, are also set out.

The notes show the flight of C-47 6026 from Erding, Germany, on November 19, 1951, was solely for the purpose of delivering air freight to the American air attaché at Belgrade; that the airplane was blown off course by winds whose direction and velocity were unknown to the crew; that the plane unknown to the crew flew north of course to Rumania; that, therefore, being unable to descend at Belgrade the crew turned westward to return to their base; and that unwittingly they crossed the Hungarian border.

The notes assert further that the crew, finding they were lost, in darkness, and running low in fuel, made every effort to obtain assistance from persons on the ground; that the Soviet and Hungarian authorities knowing these facts deliberately withheld assistance and then, by prearrangement, when the airplane was a few minutes from the safety of the British Zone of Austria, a Soviet fighter craft brought the plane down at what turned out to be a Soviet-controlled field near Papa, Hungary. It is asserted that the crew at no time knew that they were overflying any country but Yugoslavia and thought they had landed in Yugoslavia when they came down at 6:00 p. m. on the evening of November 19, 1951.

The note to the Soviet Government then details the various illegal actions taken by the Soviet authorities against the men, such as their seizure and detention, refusal to notify the U.S. Government that the plane had come down safely on Hungarian soil and was in Soviet custody, causing the United States to spend large sums in fruitless search; although the men truthfully answered all questions put to them, the Soviet authorities deceived them into believing that they would be freed but refused them access to American officials in Hungary and then turned them over to Hungarian

authorities. Both notes point out that the Soviet Government had no authority whatever to turn the men or the plane over to Hungarian authorities, and assert that the Soviet Government remains liable for the seizure and conversion of the airplane and its contents.

The legal authority of the Soviet Government to exercise sovereignty in Hungary is flatly denied.

Asserting that the Soviet Government and the Hungarian Government aided and abetted each other in the events that took place from November 19 on, the note to the Soviet Government specifies various false statements made by the Soviet Government on this subject, particularly those by the Soviet Foreign Office and by the Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Y. Vyshinsky in the course of debates in the U.N. General Assembly at Paris in December 1951 and January 1952. Point by point, the United States demonstrates the falsity of the statements made by Vyshinsky and states that these statements were known to the Soviet Government to be false when they were made.

The note to the Hungarian Government sets forth in detail the actions which the Hungarian Government took against the men after they were turned over to Hungarian custody. It details the acts of deception and fraud against the four airmen, and recounts in detail the star-chamber proceedings against the men on trumped-up charges by a military court in Budapest.

The recitals show that the men were placed on trial without warning, without a chance to choose counsel or to prepare a defense or to understand the charges. The trial is shown to have been replete not only with violations of international law but with violations of clear provisions of Hungarian domestic law and procedure. The note characterizes as false, and as known by the Hungarian Government to be false, various statements which the Hungarian Government has made with respect to the trial, including those made in the Hungarian Government's most recent notes to the United States on this subject, the latest being February 9, 1953.

The note to the Hungarian Government further points out that the judgment of the military court fining the airmen 360,000 forints (over \$30,000) each was without any justification even by any provision of Hungarian law. As further evidence of the true motives of the two Governments, the note discloses the violation by the Hungarian Government of three existing written agreements between the United States and Hungary by which the U.S. Government had the right to call on the Hungarian Government to provide local currency to the United States for expenditures in Hungary out of a large dollar balance then due to the U.S. Government from the Hungarian Government. The Hungarian Government arbitrarily demanded that the United States pay U.S. dollars from sources outside of Hungary on account of the fine, although the fine was levied in local cur-

rency. The note charges that nevertheless the United States paid the dollars demanded, under protest, and points out that if the United States had not paid, the two accused Governments planned to turn the men over for trials in Rumania and perhaps other Soviet-controlled areas.

The motives of the accused Governments are related to a Soviet propaganda campaign in the General Assembly of the United Nations meeting in Paris, and to a purpose of extorting dollars from the United States and of converting to their own use the American airplane and its contents. The notes say:

The actions of the Soviet and Hungarian Governments with reference to this matter coincided in time with the meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations in Paris. The Soviet Government, in prearranged concert with its allies (including the Hungarian Government), in and out of the United Nations, were engaged in a campaign of propaganda and vilification against the United States, seeking to make it appear that the United States Government had embarked on a program of subversion of the Soviet and allied governments under the authority of the Mutual Security Act enacted by the United States Congress. The United States Government believes, and asserts, that this campaign was intended by the Soviet Government to divert the minds of the international public and the member governments of the United Nations, then meeting in Paris, from the systematic operations of international subversion of established governments and social institutions throughout the world, and other misconduct, carried on by the Soviet Government and its allies, overtly and secretly.

Largely unsuccessful in this campaign, the Soviet and Hungarian Governments in concert seized upon the fortuitous and wholly innocent presence, within their physical power, of four American airmen whom they had caused to come down in Hungary and be detained there, in order to provide so-called evidence to prove the Soviet and Soviet-allied propaganda charges against the United States. Knowing at all times that the charges against the airmen, as against the United States, were false and unfounded and that a free and open hearing or investigation according to the practice of civilized and honorable governments would demonstrate the falsity of these charges the Soviet and Hungarian Governments in concert deliberately denied the airmen access to American consular or diplomatic authorities, denied the airmen representation by independent legal counsel, subjected the airmen to a trial by a military court whose judgment was predetermined, held the trial *in camera* where no member of the public was present, kept the airmen continuously incommunicado, denied them and the United States Government access to judicial records and dossiers in the case, and in other ways attempted to conceal from the airmen, the United States Government, and the international public the manifest injustices deliberately perpetrated by the Soviet and Hungarian Governments upon these American nationals as upon the United States Government.

The statements issued by the Soviet and Hungarian authorities in concert with respect to this matter were deliberately and wilfully broadcast to the world by these governments, or were uttered so as to be so broadcast in the usual dissemination of news of international interest, with the purpose and intention of causing damage to the United States and to the airmen themselves. . . .

The United States Government is compelled to conclude, and it charges, that the foregoing actions, whether committed separately by the Soviet Government or in conjunction or in concert with the Hungarian Government, were deliberately and unlawfully committed with ulterior intent to serve a propaganda purpose of the Soviet Gov-

ernment, to cause unlawful damage to the four American airmen above named, and to the United States Government, to convert unlawfully to the use and profit of the Soviet Government and the Hungarian Government the United States Air Force plane 6026, its equipment and its cargo, and to obtain unlawfully from the United States the sum of \$123,605.15.

## Mr. Douglas Heads Trade Survey

At his press conference on March 19 the President announced that Lewis W. Douglas, former Ambassador to the United Kingdom and former Director of the Budget, had been named head of a committee to study U.S. trade relations. The group will make a broad survey which will cover money problems, commodities, raw materials, markets, and surpluses.

## Expansion of Point Four Program in Egypt

Press release 145 dated March 19

A large-scale program in which the United States will assist the Government of Egypt in reclaiming wastelands and resettling landless farmers was announced on March 19 by the Technical Cooperation Administration, Department of State.

An agreement covering the cooperative program, which involves a considerable expansion of Point Four activities in Egypt, was signed at Cairo on that date by representatives of the Government of the United States and the Government of Egypt.

The United States will contribute \$10,000,000 to a joint fund, to which the Government of Egypt will contribute a sum amounting to approximately the equivalent of \$15,700,000 in Egyptian pounds. An Egyptian-American Rural Improvement Service is being established to administer the fund, which will be jointly controlled by the president of the Egyptian National Resources Development Board and John R. Nichols, director of the Point Four Program in Egypt.

Present plans call for carrying out the development work in two project areas, one in the Delta province of Baheira and the other in the province of Fayoum, south of Cairo. Some 20,000 acres in the Baheira area and 60,000 acres in the Fayoum will be reclaimed by drainage and other measures and a total of about 16,000 families of landless peasants will be resettled, according to preliminary estimates.

The present Government of Egypt has undertaken a vigorous program of reform and national development, aimed primarily at improving the lot of Egypt's 20 million people, most of whom are dependent upon agriculture for a living. The typical peasant is extremely poor and agricultural land is scarce. Less than 4 percent of Egypt's

area is habitable, and the population density averages about 1,600 persons to the square mile of cultivated area.

Secretary Dulles recently expressed the interest of the United States and its sympathy for the progressive attitude and energetic efforts of the Government of General Naguib to meet and overcome the internal problems that face the Egyptian people, and wished the Government every success in its efforts.<sup>1</sup>

The land-development and resettlement program represents a major expansion of American assistance to Egypt in its economic development. Cooperative Point Four activities in Egypt at the present time involve expenditures of about \$3,000,000 by the Technical Cooperation Administration in the fiscal year ending June 30, 1953.

These activities, carried out under the general Point Four agreement between the United States and Egypt, signed May 5, 1951,<sup>2</sup> consist of technical advice and demonstration supplies and equipment in various fields including agriculture, health, education, rural improvement, industrial development, natural resources, and public administration. A demonstration of range improvement is under way in the western desert which it is hoped will result in the eventual development of 2 or 3 million acres for livestock production. A team of American industrial specialists is helping the Egyptian Government locate and promote opportunities for industrial expansion with the aid of private capital. Improved building materials from inexpensive local sources are being perfected. American technicians are assisting their Egyptian colleagues in rural-improvement activities through village centers, helping improve health and sanitation conditions, aiding in improving educational facilities and methods, and helping train Egyptian technicians in many kinds of specialized work.

The resettlement projects to be undertaken as a result of the new agreement will be developed around villages, the accepted pattern of rural life in Egypt. These villages will be planned and built with fullest use of local labor and materials. Improved housing, community facilities, vocational schools, public-health services, sanitation works, small-scale marketing and processing facilities for farm crops, and farm-to-market roads must be provided in the project areas. They will employ the services of the villagers to the greatest possible extent. The project also includes assistance in the organization and operation of cooperatives, demonstrations of improved water conservation and management practices, training of agricultural extension and other rural-service workers, and advice to the farmers in farm management and improved methods.

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Feb. 23, 1953, p. 306.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, May 21, 1951, p. 823.

## MSA Defense Support Funds for Turkey

The Mutual Security Agency announced on March 17 that Turkey will receive \$54 million in MSA defense support funds during the present fiscal year.

These funds, MSA said, will permit Turkey to purchase essential capital equipment and other commodities which are important to Turkey's expanding defense effort. Turkey also is receiving substantial amounts of American assistance through participation in MSA's productivity and technical assistance program and the military end-item program of the Department of Defense. MSA may make available a further \$1 million for Turkey if agreement is reached on the use of special funds for the promotion of free enterprise.

To date MSA has made allotments totaling \$45 million to Turkey for the current fiscal year.

Reporting on the Turkish defense effort, MSA said that Turkey is devoting approximately 40 percent of its national budget, including counter-part funds, for defense and that its military force, in relation to population, is one of the highest of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members. Next to South Korea, the United States, and the British Commonwealth, Turkey is making the largest contribution to the U.N. forces in Korea.

Defense support funds are designed to permit the European NATO members to make greater contributions to the common defense effort than would be possible with their own resources. Turkey's position as a growing producer of such highly important strategic materials as copper, magnesium, and chrome, as well as other commodities such as wheat and coal is an important factor, MSA points out, in developing a stronger Turkish economy and in meeting the raw materials deficiencies of Western Europe and the United States.

In addition to support in these fields, MSA through its technical assistance program is helping Turkey to develop such vital activities as its telecommunications network, its transportation system, and its airfields. All of these are important, MSA said, to the defense of Western Europe's southern flank.

The growth of Turkish economy in terms of gross national product has been rapid, expanding more than a third since the start of the Marshall Plan in 1948. Chromite production has increased 75 percent; copper, 118 percent; cereals, 37 percent; cotton, 175 percent, and sugar beets, 85 percent over this period. New power facilities have been constructed and the number of tractors on farms has grown from 3,000 to approximately 35,000.

Aid extended to Turkey during the Marshall Plan by the Economic Cooperation Administration, MSA's predecessor agency, was designed to

strengthen the economic base upon which Turkey is building its defense program. This aid, through June 30, 1952, amounted to \$222.5 million, of which \$84 million was in loans. This does not include drawing rights under the intra-European payments agreements and credits accorded Turkey under the European Payments Union (EPU).

Counterpart funds generated as a result of ECA-MSA dollar grants to Turkey (Turkey deposits an equivalent amount of Turkish lira in the counterpart fund to match MSA grants) is also being used to support the Turkish defense program. Approximately \$87 million in Turkish lira, more than half the total available counterpart, has been used to develop armament production, provide additional troop training, and build air bases.

## **Canadian Prime Minister to Visit Washington**

White House press release dated March 13

The White House announced on March 13 that the Prime Minister of Canada, Louis S. St. Laurent, will be in Washington as the guest of the President on May 7 and May 8. The President's invitation to the Prime Minister was conveyed to Mr. St. Laurent by Don C. Bliss, Chargé d'Affaires of the United States Embassy in Ottawa.

In addition to seeing the President, the Prime Minister will meet with Secretary Dulles and other Government officials. No agenda for the conversations has as yet been determined but it is expected that matters of general interest to the United States and Canada will be considered at that time.

## **Guaranty Issued for Private Investment in France**

International Water Corporation of Pittsburgh has obtained a U.S. Government guaranty of currency convertibility to protect an investment in France of water-well-drilling equipment and the licensing of techniques and processes, the Mutual Security Administration announced on March 17.

This business venture by International Water Corporation is intended to promote the development of large-scale water supplies for municipali-

ties and industries in France, thus contributing to essential needs of the country. The equipment and methods also may be used in other countries of Western Europe.

The U.S. guaranty, issued by the Mutual Security Agency under its Investment Guaranties Program, insures the American corporation of being able to convert into dollars up to \$51,000 in French franc receipts from these new investments.

The well-drilling equipment, valued at \$12,000 will be invested by International in Société Française de Forages Layne France, in which International has held 51 percent stock ownership or control. The remainder of the common stock is owned or controlled by a French company, the Société Lyonnaise des Eaux et de l'Éclairage.

This investment, equivalent to 4,178,000 francs, will be part of a 24-million franc increase in the capital of Layne France, from the present 16 million francs to 40 million. The French interests represented by the Société Lyonnaise will contribute 19,822,000 francs of the new capital. The result will be to reduce International's holding to 31 percent of the stock of Layne France.

The MSA guaranty insures the convertibility of up to \$21,000 in receipts from the equipment investment, the remaining \$30,000 of the guaranty covering royalty receipts from the licensing of processes to the French company, estimated at a maximum of \$3,000 a year for 10 years. The processes to be licensed are a development of Layne & Bowler, Inc. of Memphis, an affiliate of International Water.

The guaranty is the 13th granted by MSA under its Investment Guaranties Program to cover an American investment in France. The International Water Corporation investment was approved for a guaranty by the French Government, and by the Director for Mutual Security as required by legislation authorizing the MSA guaranty program.

MSA offers guaranties against loss from expropriation, as well as currency convertibility protection, for new American investments in those countries participating in the mutual security program which have agreements with the United States covering such guaranties. A fee is charged, based on the amount covered by a guaranty. The guaranty contracts are executed by the Export-Import Bank of Washington.



## INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

### Calendar of Meetings<sup>1</sup>

#### Adjourned during March 1953

ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization):		
Council: 18th Session . . . . .	Montreal . . . . .	Jan. 13-Mar. 27
First Air Navigation Conference . . . . .	Montreal . . . . .	Feb. 24-Mar. 24
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization):		
Meeting of Group of Experts on Emergency Food Reserve . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	Feb. 23-Mar. 7*
Coordinating Committee: 3d Session . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	Mar. 16-28
Commonwealth Advisory Committee on Defense Science . . . . .	New Delhi . . . . .	Feb. 25-Mar. 14
ILO (International Labor Organization):		
Governing Body: 121st Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Mar. 3-6
Committee on Work on Plantations: 2d Session . . . . .	Habana . . . . .	Mar. 16-28
Meeting of Governments who are Beneficiaries of Article 16 of Treaty of Peace with Japan—Working Group . . . . .	London . . . . .	Mar. 4-25
WMO (World Meteorological Organization):		
Commission for Climatology: 1st Session . . . . .	Washington . . . . .	Mar. 12-25
World Symposium on Sferics . . . . .	Zürich . . . . .	Mar. 17-20*
U.N. (United Nations):		
International Children's Emergency Fund:		
Executive Board . . . . .	New York . . . . .	Mar. 19-25
Program Committee . . . . .	New York . . . . .	Mar. 19-25
International Tin Study Group: 7th Meeting . . . . .	London . . . . .	Mar. 23-30*

#### In Session as of March 31, 1953

International Wheat Council: 11th Session . . . . .	Washington . . . . .	Jan. 30-
International Wheat Council: 8th Session (Reconvening of) . . . . .	Washington . . . . .	Feb. 2-
U.N. (United Nations):		
General Assembly: 7th Session (Reconvening of) . . . . .	New York . . . . .	Feb. 24-
Commission on the Status of Women: 7th Session . . . . .	New York . . . . .	Mar. 16-
Commission on Narcotic Drugs: 8th Session . . . . .	New York . . . . .	Mar. 30-
Economic and Social Council: 15th Session . . . . .	New York . . . . .	Mar. 31-
Indian Railway Centenary Exhibition . . . . .	New Delhi . . . . .	Mar. 4-
OEEC (Office of European Economic Cooperation): European Inland Transport Conference . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	Mar. 18-
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization): Council Committee on Relations with International Organizations . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	Mar. 30-

#### Scheduled April 1-June 30, 1953

WMO (World Meteorological Organization): Commission for Synoptic Meteorology: 1st Session . . . . .	Washington . . . . .	Apr. 2-
U.N. (United Nations):		
Economic Commission for Latin America: 5th Session of the Commission . . . . .	Rio de Janeiro . . . . .	Apr. 6-
Seminar on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders in Latin American Countries . . . . .	Rio de Janeiro . . . . .	Apr. 6-
Human Rights Commission: 9th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 7-
Ad Hoc Committee on Forced Labor: 4th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 17-
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East: Regional Conference on Mineral Resources Development . . . . .	Tokyo . . . . .	Apr. 20-
Fiscal Commission: 4th Session . . . . .	New York . . . . .	Apr. 27-
High Commissioner's Advisory Committee on Refugees: 3d Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 27-
Social Commission: 9th Session . . . . .	New York . . . . .	May 4-
International Conference to Adopt a Protocol on Limitation of the Production of Opium . . . . .	New York . . . . .	May 11-

<sup>1</sup> Prepared in the Division of International Conferences, Department of State, Mar. 27, 1953. Asterisks indicate tentative dates.

*Calendar of Meetings—Continued*

**Scheduled April 1–June 30, 1953—Continued**

United Nations—*Continued*

<i>Ad Hoc</i> Commission on Prisoners of War: 4th Session . . . . .	New York . . . . .	May 11–
Special Committee to Consider Measures to Limit the Duration of Regular Sessions of the General Assembly.	New York . . . . .	May 25–
International Law Commission: 5th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	June 1–
Trusteeship Council: 12th Session . . . . .	New York . . . . .	June 16–
Economic and Social Council: 16th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	June 30–
Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	June–
International Sugar Conference . . . . .	London* . . . . .	June or July
Technical Assistance Committee . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	June–
Interparliamentary Union: Meeting of the Council . . . . .	Monaco . . . . .	Apr. 8–
Caribbean Timbers, Their Utilization and Trade within the Area, Con- ference on (Caribbean Commission).	Trinidad . . . . .	Apr. 13–
ICEM (Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration):		
Finance Subcommittee . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 13–
Fifth Session of Committee . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 16–
Inter-American Seminar on Adult Education . . . . .	Ciudad Trujillo . . . . .	Apr. 14–
Rice Consultative Committee: 6th Session . . . . .	Singapore . . . . .	Apr. 15–
South Pacific Conference: 2d Session . . . . .	Nouméa . . . . .	Apr. 16–
Inter-American Council of Jurists: 2d Meeting . . . . .	Buenos Aires . . . . .	Apr. 20–
PASO (Pan American Sanitary Organization): Executive Committee: 19th Meeting.	Washington . . . . .	Apr. 20–
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization):		
Technical Advisory Committee on Desert Locust Control: 3d Meeting . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	Apr. 21–
International Poplar Commission . . . . .	Munster-Munich . . . . .	Apr. 29–
Latin American Seminar on Land Problems . . . . .	São Paulo . . . . .	May 25–
International Chestnut Commission . . . . .	Spain-Portugal . . . . .	May–
Committee on Commodity Problems: 21st Session . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	June 3–
Meeting of the Council: 17th Session . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	June 15–
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization): Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council.	Paris . . . . .	Apr. 23–
South Pacific Commission: 11th Session . . . . .	Nouméa . . . . .	Apr. 25–
Icsu (International Council of Scientific Unions):		
Joint Commission on Physiological Optics . . . . .	Madrid . . . . .	Apr.–
Committee on the International Geophysical Year 1957–1958 . . . . .	Brussels . . . . .	June 30–
Sudan Elections: Mixed Electoral Commission . . . . .	Khartoum . . . . .	Apr.–
ITU (International Telecommunication Union):		
Administrative Council: 8th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	May 2–
International Telegraph Consultative Committee: 8th Plenary Assembly . . . . .	Arnheim . . . . .	May 26–
International Cotton Advisory Committee: 12th Plenary Meeting . . . . .	Washington . . . . .	May 4–
UPU (Universal Postal Union): Meeting of the Executive and Liaison Committee.	Bern . . . . .	May 4–
WHO (World Health Organization):		
Sixth World Health Assembly . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	May 5–
Executive Board: 12th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	May 26–
ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization):		
Standing Committee on Aircraft Performance: 4th Session . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	May 6–
Assembly: 7th Session . . . . .	Brighton (England) . . . . .	June 16–
Caribbean Commission: 16th Meeting . . . . .	Surinam . . . . .	May 11–
International Rubber Study Group: 10th Meeting . . . . .	Copenhagen . . . . .	May 11–
UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organiza- tion):		
Executive Board: 34th Session . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	May 15–
General Conference: 2d Extraordinary Session . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	May 18–
International Center for Workers Education . . . . .	Compiègne . . . . .	May 30–
International Conference on the Role and Place of Music in Education . . . . .	Brussels . . . . .	June 29–
Tribunales de Cuentas (Tribunals of Accounts): 1st International Congress of.	Habana . . . . .	May 20–
International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries: 3d Annual Meeting.	New Haven . . . . .	May 25–
Tenth Congress of the International Seed Testing Association . . . . .	Dublin . . . . .	May 25–
Horticultural Congress and Exposition . . . . .	Hamburg . . . . .	May–
ILO (International Labor Organization):		
Permanent Agricultural Committee: 4th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	May–
36th International Labor Conference . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	June 4–
Traffic and Safety Exhibition, International . . . . .	Milan . . . . .	May–
American International Institute for the Protection of Childhood: Annual Meeting of Directing Council.	Montevideo . . . . .	June 2–
Eighth Pan American Railway Congress . . . . .	Washington and At- lantic City . . . . .	June 12–
Acoustical Congress . . . . .	Netherlands . . . . .	June 16–
Thirteenth International Dairy Congress and Exposition . . . . .	The Hague . . . . .	June 22–
International Commission for the Regulation of Whaling: 5th Meeting . . . . .	London . . . . .	June 22–
<i>Ad Hoc</i> Committee on Quarantine Regulation (South Pacific Commission).	Nouméa . . . . .	June–

## The Soviet Attitude Toward the Disarmament Problem

by Ernest A. Gross  
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly<sup>1</sup>

U.S./U.N. press release dated March 21

We have come a full circle, I think, since 3 days ago when the debate on this subject opened in this Committee. At that time, on behalf of the U.S. Government, I asked what we thought were two reasonable questions, addressing them to the representative of the Soviet Government sitting here, and I do not believe that we have had an affirmative response.<sup>2</sup>

The U.S. Government asked two questions: Whether this was the time when the Soviet Government was prepared to discuss constructively the problem of disarmament, and whether this, the United Nations, is the place in which the Soviet Government is prepared to negotiate honestly?

I do not think I need to assure the members of this Committee that these questions were not intended merely as rhetorical exercises, but were a sincere effort to find out whether the new Soviet leadership is really interested in talking seriously about disarmament. They are not difficult questions to answer affirmatively, if the Soviet Government is sincere and interested. We did not request and did not expect a quick debater's answer, and we much prefer, even at this stage, a considered judgment of the Soviet Government, which we do not feel we have yet obtained.

I have said that our purpose in putting the questions to the Soviet representative were sincere, and we cannot conceal some disappointment at the way in which the questions have been treated—that the only reference made to them was on a previous occasion when the Soviet representative branded them as artificial.

We began our work here on this subject in the knowledge that the change in the Soviet Govern-

ment had produced words of peace from the Kremlin, and in this forum which we feel is the appropriate place to do so, my delegation seeks to learn what substance lies behind those words. If we were to be lightly discouraged, the response of the Soviet delegate might lead us to believe that there is no substance there, that the Soviet Government is not prepared to negotiate genuinely and honestly for a disarmament plan at this time. However, we must place our hope for peace above the disappointments which met us here. We must say to the Soviet delegate: "Surely this is not your last word on the subject; surely you would not have us believe that the words of Premier Malenkov were empty words and that the Soviet Union is determined to use the United Nations merely to gain a tactical military or strategic advantage through trick schemes which are labeled disarmament, but which are really designed to strip free nations of their defenses."

If the Soviet Government truly desires peace, will it not in the name of humanity and in the interest of its own people seek the authority through the delegate here to work side by side with us toward a program to effect disarmament which we can all accept, a program which can provide security for us all and a new hope for mankind?

I have felt constrained to make these remarks at the opening of my brief statement because I think that without exception, and I have listened very carefully to two statements by the Soviet representative, no new suggestion has been put forward; there is no real indication in anything which he has said or which the Soviet bloc representatives have said which reveal any true purpose toward reaching a solution on this problem.

We have felt and continue to feel that this is an important and the right time in which to discuss this subject. The balanced reduction of armed forces and of armaments would have incalculable advantages to the Russian people and to other peoples living under Soviet rule, as well

<sup>1</sup> Statement made in Committee I (Political and Security) on Mar. 21. At the same meeting the Committee approved the resolution as amended (A/C. 1/L. 33) by a vote of 50-5-5.

<sup>2</sup> For Ambassador Gross' statement of Mar. 18, see BULLETIN of Mar. 30, 1953, p. 476.

as to people everywhere else in the world. I am sure that these people deeply desire just a little butter instead of so many guns and that they yearn for a decent standard of living; disarmament can yield this to the people of the Soviet Union and to the areas presently under their control. Disarmament can yield this result to these people without in anyway jeopardizing or undermining the security of the Soviet state.

Real disarmament would lift the fear of aggression from all peoples by reducing the capacity, the ability of states to wage aggressive war. This way we can be sure—all peoples including the Russian people—that there would be tangible guarantees of security.

My Government, within a year after the momentous discovery in our country of the war potential of the atom, proposed that the United Nations undertake an effective plan for the international control of atomic energy. Within the same year, we took the initiative in placing before the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission the basic principles of a constructive plan to bring that about. We are confident—we were then and we still are—that this plan could do the job of controlling effectively the atomic weapon and other related weapons as well, since its procedures would actually encompass the entire field of atomic energy.

The world has not forgotten how after the war the United States along with other states in the free world demobilized their forces and disarmed and dismantled a mighty military establishment. We have never since changed our opinion about the method by which the world's resources and energies should be devoted to peace and to improvement of the standard of living. We have always supported the U.N. plans and principles which are designed to lift the crushing burden of armament, but to do so in an effective, a practical, and an honest manner.

The distinguished representative of the Netherlands in his statement in the Committee yesterday pointed out the vital importance of avoiding the illusion of security. He said, "We must shun sham solutions and there is no such thing as a short cut to peace and security." It does not come so much as a matter of surprise as a matter of disappointment that the Soviet representative should repeat today again the old outworn and utterly impractical suggestion that somehow, as he says, a decision should precede a practical plan for accomplishing the very result which the decision is aimed to accomplish.

The Soviet representative in his two statements here has failed to refer to the simple fact that the United Nations itself by overwhelming majorities has stated its position and has made its objectives and general procedures clear. The resolution of January 11, 1952,<sup>3</sup> establishing the Disarmament

Commission, omits no major aspect of the disarmament problem. The Soviet representative referred to proposals placed before the Disarmament Commission, speaking as if a proposal for ceilings upon armed forces was made without reference to other aspects of the disarmament program, including the effective measures for eliminating the atomic weapon and other methods of mass destruction. The U.N. General Assembly has spoken its mind on these subjects. The General Assembly has called for the regulation, the limitation, and the balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments. It has called for the elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction. It has called for the effective international control of atomic energy to insure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only. And in this connection, it has provided that the Disarmament Commission should use the present U.N. plan as the basis for the Commission's consideration until a better or no less effective plan is devised.

#### **U.N. Disarmament Aims Made Clear**

Then the General Assembly in 1952 called for a progressive and continuing disclosure and verification of all armed forces and all armaments, including atomic, and recognized that the carrying out of such a program for disclosure and verification is the first and indispensable step in achieving a disarmament program.

We fail to understand how it can be seriously advanced as an apparently honest argument that before disclosure and verification is carried out, before states tell the truth and assure that what they tell is the truth, that some magic purpose is to be served by some decision which assumes the result and which is based upon ignorance of the facts.

Mr. Chairman, in his statement 2 days ago, the Soviet representative made some remarks which were out of context, which did not accurately reflect the positions taken in the Disarmament Commission and which I believe it is fair to say distorted the objectives and efforts on the part of my Government in the Disarmament Commission. I do not intend to go extensively into these distortions, nor these misquotations, but I should like to cite two for illustrative purposes.

I said in this Committee on Wednesday that in the Disarmament Commission the Soviet representative had consistently declined to explain the meaning of vague and ambiguous proposals which he had put forward and that he had characterized our efforts to secure explanations and clarifications of these points as, to use his words, "playing with questions and answers."

The Soviet representative in this Committee has replied that there is no word of truth in this contention. The Soviet representative then went on

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Mar. 31, 1952, p. 507.

at length to quote from Soviet proposals made to the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission on June 19, 1947, in order to establish that the Soviet Government had in fact introduced very detailed proposals for the establishment of international control of atomic energy.

It is, of course, entirely true that the Soviet Government in 1947 did introduce proposals into the Atomic Energy Commission and that these proposals were considerably more detailed than the Soviet Government has put forward since that time. In fact, the Soviet proposals of 1947 were sufficiently detailed to permit the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission to study them and to determine soberly that they were wholly inadequate.

To quote from the third report of the Atomic Energy Commission, "They"—that is, the Soviet proposals made at that time in 1947—"ignore the existing technical knowledge of the problem of atomic energy control, do not provide an adequate basis for the effective international control of atomic energy and the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons, and, therefore, do not conform to the terms of reference of the Atomic Energy Commission."

So spoke the Commission with regard to these 1947 proposals, and the General Assembly of the United Nations confirmed this decision of the Atomic Energy Commission in November of 1948, through adopting the third report of the Atomic Energy Commission and through rejecting the Soviet resolution which called upon the Assembly to approve its proposals.

Now, the purpose of the questions which we and other members of the Disarmament Commission addressed to the Soviet representative there and which he declined to answer was to determine whether the Soviet proposals which the Soviet Government was then making in the Disarmament Commission were new proposals or whether they were the same old proposals which had been advanced and rejected. Members of the Committee will recall that in the General Assembly on January 11, 1952, Mr. Vyshinsky stated that the Soviet Government would make new proposals in the Disarmament Commission. As I explained in my statement the other day, despite our persistent efforts in the Disarmament Commission to find out whether the broad, general, vague, and ambiguous proposals of the Soviet Government in the Disarmament Commission were new proposals of a sort which Mr. Vyshinsky had promised or whether they were the same old proposals, our attempt to find out the answer to that question elicited no reply. It may be that Mr. Zorin has given us the answer to this question through quoting the 1947 proposals. In other words, despite the statement of Mr. Vyshinsky on January 11, 1952, that he had new proposals, it now appears that all we had were the same old proposals which the General Assembly had found to be inadequate.

I do not make this as a statement. It is a question. It is a question which we feel can only be answered in the Disarmament Commission itself.

It seems clear to my delegation, Mr. Chairman, that it will not be possible to obtain anything but debaters' answers in the Committee. As I said before, it was not my purpose in asking the two questions I addressed to the Soviet representative the other day to elicit a quick debater's answer. We ourselves look to the future. We hope that the past will bury the stale propaganda, the monstrous lies, the evasions, the hate campaigns, which have in the past characterized the Soviet Government conduct in international community.

In looking back over the work of the Commission, it has not been our purpose to reawaken the memory of old evils. If we look back over our shoulder at the frustrated work of the Disarmament Commission, it is not to score a debating point but to see more clearly the direction in which we must go.

For us, peace is not merely an objective. It is a way of living and it is a method of negotiating and settling disputes honestly, including disputes regarding disarmament. I do not think, Mr. Chairman, that this debate in the Committee regarding disarmament has by any means been wasted effort or lost motion. We have, for our part, reaffirmed our intention to proceed in the Disarmament Commission to a full exploration of all practical and honest proposals which may be put forward.

#### **Soviet Draft Resolution**

I conclude by referring to the Soviet draft resolution which is before us.<sup>4</sup> This resolution does not give much room for optimism or for confidence. The preamble to the resolution is purely propaganda. The General Assembly and the members of the United Nations, in particular those who are represented in the Disarmament Commission, are fully aware of the true reasons for lack of progress in the Disarmament Commission. They, I think, are fully aware that 11 states on the Disarmament Commission made or supported constructive proposals and that one state alone wished to use the discussions solely for propaganda purposes. The resolution proposed by the Soviet representative would undo a great deal of the progress which was made in Paris at the Sixth General Assembly of the United Nations, and which resulted in the resolution of January 11, 1952, to which I have referred.

Among other things, that resolution directed the Disarmament Commission to prepare proposals "for the regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments." The Soviet draft resolution proposes armaments

<sup>4</sup>U.N. doc. A/C. 1/L 31.

reduction without any reference to armed forces whatever. The General Assembly resolution of January 11, 1952, provided that the Disarmament Commission should be ready to consider any proposals or plans for control that may be put forward involving either conventional armaments or atomic energy. Unless a better or no less effective system is devised, the U. N. plan for the international control of atomic energy and the prohibition of atomic weapons should continue to serve as the basis for the international control of atomic energy to insure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only.

The Soviet resolution throws all this progress out the window. In effect, it abandons or seeks to abandon the U.N. atomic energy plan and only calls upon the Disarmament Commission to proceed with the question of the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons, bacterial weapons, and other types of mass destruction, and of the establishment of strict international control over compliance with these decisions.

The General Assembly resolution of January 11, 1952, directs the Commission to formulate plans for the establishment within the framework of the Security Council or an international control organ or organs to assure the implementation of the treaty or treaties which the resolution contemplates. In other words, the entire disarmament program is to be subject to safeguards.

The Soviet draft resolution limits the safeguards, so-called safeguards, to international control merely over compliance with decisions regarding the prohibition of atomic weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. There is no provision for control over other portions of the program such as the reduction of weapons other than those adaptable to mass destruction or the reduction in armed forces.

We recognize that in this resolution for the first time the Soviet Government has admitted by implication the possibility of reduction of nonatomic armaments on a basis other than a flat percentage cut. If I am not mistaken, to my knowledge, this is the first resolution proposed by the Soviet Government which does not call for a flat one-third percentage cut. I sincerely hope that this is an indication of greater flexibility and a desire for a genuine negotiation on this all-important problem. When the Disarmament Commission reconvenes, we shall have a clear test of Soviet intentions. Under the General Assembly resolution of January 11, 1952, and the draft resolution which has now been submitted by 14 cosponsors before the Committee<sup>5</sup>—under these resolutions, the Soviet Government will be in a position to make new disarmament proposals of any nature, and I assure you that my Government will give the most careful and sympathetic consideration to any pro-

posal which has any possibility of achieving a genuinely safeguarded system of disarmament.

For these reasons, my Government will vote against the Soviet draft resolution which we believe the Committee should reject decisively and will, of course, vote in favor of the 14-power resolution.

## Senate Resolution on Minorities Transmitted to U.N.

U.S./U.N. press release dated March 13

*The following letter and its enclosure were transmitted on March 13 by Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., to U.N. Secretary-General Trygve Lie:*

EXCELLENCY: Enclosed are copies of a resolution (S. Res. 84, 83rd Congress, 1st Session) adopted on February 27, 1953, by the Senate of the United States, expressing the sense of the Senate that the inhuman campaigns conducted by the Soviet Government and its puppet governments in satellite states in Europe and Asia against religious and ethnic minority groups deserve the strongest condemnation.

I request that you transmit copies of the resolution and of this communication to the Representative of each Member of the United Nations.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

HENRY CABOT LODGE, JR.  
*Ambassador*

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE SENATE OF THE  
UNITED STATES

*February 27, 1953*

*S. Res. 84, 83rd Congress, 1st Session*

*Resolved*, That it is the sense of the Senate of the United States that the vicious and inhuman campaigns conducted by the Soviet Government and its puppet governments in satellite states in Europe and Asia against minority groups such as the persecution of Greek orthodox congregations, the imprisonment of Roman Catholic prelates, the harassment of Protestant denominations, the suppression of Moslem communities, the persecution and scattering of ethnic groups in Poland, in the Ukraine, in the Baltic and Balkan States and in many other areas under Soviet domination, and most recently the increasing persecution of the people of the Jewish faith, deserve the strongest condemnation by all peoples who believe that spiritual values are the bases of human progress and freedom.

*Resolved further*, That the President of the United States is hereby urged to take appropriate action to protest, particularly in the General Assembly of the United Nations, against these outrages, in order that the United Nations shall take such action in opposition to them as may be suitable under its Charter.

<sup>5</sup> U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.30.

## International Aspects of the Status of Women

*Statements by Mrs. Lorena B. Hahn*

*U.S. Representative on the Commission on the Status of Women*<sup>1</sup>

### NATIONALITY OF MARRIED WOMEN

U.S./U.N. press release dated March 16

The United States has repeatedly voiced its interest in equality for women in the field of nationality and in the development of a convention incorporating the principles adopted by this Commission in 1950. The report of the International Law Commission indicates that it is making progress in reviewing the whole problem of nationality. We are glad that the International Law Commission has been able to initiate this study. The material gathered at the request of the Commission on the Status of Women on conflicts of law relating to the nationality of married women should be useful. I hope the valuable supplement (doc. E/Cn.6/206) prepared for our use this year will also be brought to the attention of the International Law Commission.

Some criticism has been voiced because the principles adopted here 3 years ago have not yet been made into a special convention on the nationality of married women. For the time being our nationality item must be regarded as "unfinished business," and everyone likes to see "unfinished business" completed and off the agenda. However, the United States does not regard this delay as lost time. On the contrary, the supplementary report provided this year shows that a number of countries are revising their nationality laws in the direction of the principles adopted by the Commission and already in force in many countries.

U.S. law already conforms with these principles, and the United States is a party to the Inter-American Convention signed at Montevideo in 1933 which contains the same basic provisions. It seems probable that our recommendations of this Commission have had a considerable influence on legislation enacted since 1950, and will make it

possible for a larger number of countries to support and become parties to a convention along the lines we recommend. I want to talk further about this report a little later on. In the meantime, it is enough to note that only 17 countries are listed as requiring an alien wife to accept her husband's nationality, and over 40 as permitting choice under varying conditions. At least 10 countries have improved their laws since our 1950 report. This is a good omen for a convention of the type we recommend; indeed, without the 10, acceptance of these principles might not be certain.

Another question that has been raised in regard to the study of the International Law Commission is whether the nationality of married women should be dealt with in a separate convention or in one that may cover a wider range of nationality questions. This question was never fully dealt with in the Commission on the Status of Women because it was evident that we were dealing with only a part of a large field, and though the confusions arising for families of mixed nationality are very great, we could not be sure in this one Commission that we could make wise judgments on U.N. action as a whole. It is on this question, on the scope of a new convention in the nationality field, that the United Nations especially needs the advice of the experts on the International Law Commission. The United States hopes that the 1953 session of this Commission can give specific guidance on this matter. The situation of women who marry aliens is an international question that can be dealt with separately and should be dealt with promptly. It is not, however, a problem which exists in a vacuum, apart from other aspects of nationality.

### Interrelationships of Nationality Procedures

Perhaps I can illustrate the interrelationships of nationality procedures best by citing two problems—the situation of children born to couples of differing nationality and the multiple nationality

<sup>1</sup> Made before the Commission on the Status of Women at U. N. Headquarters on Mar. 16, 17, and 25, respectively. Mrs. Hahn was confirmed by the Senate on Mar. 11 to be U.S. representative on the Commission.

enjoyed, or should I say suffered, by individuals who can claim citizenship in several countries by reason of birth, residence, parentage, naturalization, and other grounds.

The situation of children born to parents of differing nationality is one in which women naturally feel an interest, and most of us probably know of one or more young people facing complications on property settlements or conscription requirements because they have more than one nationality. Most countries recognize persons born on their soil as nationals. In addition, it is usual to allow a child to derive nationality from his father, and, in some countries also from his mother. This may mean that a child born in one country to parents having nationality in two other countries can claim citizenship in three countries. Generally it is provided that on maturity a child must choose one of these nationalities for his own, thereby renouncing others, but provisions of this sort vary and few of them come into effect early enough to prevent conflicting claims from countries which require young men to go into military training at 18.

Consideration of the nationality of children is not the function of this Commission, for the welfare of the child should be the determining factor, and on this the Social Commission and various others are the appropriate bodies to take the lead. However, there is no doubt that governments are harassed by conflicting claims to the allegiance of persons who have multiple nationality, and that a clarification of procedures would be welcomed. In our debate in 1950 the United States tried to work out one principle that might be applicable, the principle that if a child receives nationality through parentage, rather than through place of birth or some other source, then the mother should have the same right to transmit nationality as the father. It will allow the child the benefit of choice, which may be greatly to his advantage, particularly if the nationality of his father is unknown. This was not included in the principles we adopted but was recommended for consideration by appropriate bodies. The International Law Commission is such a body, and it is the hope of my Government that when it studies this problem, it will recognize the right of the mother to transmit nationality as equal to that of the father.

Women may also have problems of nationality which do not arise from marriage. Such problems are usually the same for men and women, and arise through parentage, changes of frontiers, and other factors. It is problems of this sort to which the International Law Commission will undoubtedly be giving attention in its study of nationality, and women stand to gain by any clarifications that can be agreed upon. I am sure these problems have been present in the thinking of some of our consultant organizations who have queried whether we have given adequate thought to the

entire subject of nationality of women, including problems of single women. It is therefore to the advantage of both men and women that the field of nationality be properly studied and a careful decision made as to what questions can usefully be clarified at the present time through a nationality convention.

Certainly it will help when there is general agreement among governments that neither marriage nor its dissolution shall affect the nationality of either spouse. These principles are in effect in U.S. law, and it will be easier for our Government, and our citizens, when they are stated as the uniform procedure of as many countries as possible. If, however, there are other nationality questions on which wide-scale agreement is becoming possible, governments should have an opportunity to deal with them promptly, and we will all profit by the result. A separate instrument devoted only to the nationality of married women might delay such overall consideration and discourage progress on other problems.

#### **Changing Circumstances Necessitate Convention**

There may be some who interpret the action of the International Law Commission last summer as unsympathetic, or even a repudiation of the recommendations adopted by this Commission. The United States notes with satisfaction that no such conclusion should be drawn from the record. On the contrary, we can feel satisfaction that while the International Law Commission did not accept the draft convention proposed by Prof. Manley Hudson, it did not reject either the draft or the principles contained therein. The decision of the International Law Commission last July was merely one of procedure to permit study of the full implications of nationality in relation to the many new developments of modern life. After all, a good deal has happened since the Hague convention in 1930 and the Montevideo conference in 1933 to which we trace back present-day proposals on the nationality of women. The General Assembly last December adopted a convention on statelessness which cuts into some of our problem. Today there are matters of property rights and taxation, and of business management which may be considerably affected by an individual's nationality, particularly in other countries than the United States. There are U.S. women in international business today to whom these are important issues, and I am sure others around this table know women in their countries with similar interests. I am not suggesting that these or any other aspects of nationality need to be treated in a convention, but I am sure we will agree that our problems should be solved in relation to the vast sweep of modern interchange, and that the International Law Commission should be encouraged to do a thorough job.

Now I want to talk about the future of this item



on nationality, over and beyond the completion of a convention. What we want, I am sure, is the assurance that men and women who marry across frontiers can do so without fear as to their nationality or the nationality of their children. A convention will help greatly in defining a standard around which equitable procedures can be established between governments. But the completion of a draft convention in the International Law Commission, and its approval by the General Assembly, will be only the beginning of this process. We hope, of course, that many governments will ratify such a convention promptly, and that the remainder will do so before many years pass. In the meantime, there will be great differences between countries as there are now. Even among the parties to the convention there will be a great deal of difference in the way its principles are spelled out, and probably in the procedures by which they become effective between the parties.

The changes reported in the Secretary General's memorandum on nationality of married women this year illustrate the progress that is being made and what will happen in the transition years and beyond. As I said earlier, the laws in many countries, including the United States, permit a married woman to keep her own nationality. Most countries also make special provision for the naturalization of foreigners who marry their citizens. As I recall it, these principles had been adopted in about half the countries of the world. Today, thanks to recent changes, the proportion is considerably greater. Most of the new laws show a realistic appreciation of problems in the transition period. For instance, in Belgium a wife who has acquired Belgian nationality by marriage, and has or can recover another nationality, may renounce Belgian nationality by making a declaration within 6 months. This provision insures against statelessness and at the same time provides freedom of choice. In Egypt an alien woman marrying an Egyptian may retain her nationality unless she desires to acquire her husband's, a provision in the direction of equality with freedom of choice and protection against double nationality. In Norway, where a foreign woman automatically acquires the nationality of a Norwegian husband, she may under certain circumstances be released provided she possesses another nationality or intends to acquire it. Switzerland has recently adopted legislation permitting an alien wife to regain her own nationality through a declaration at the time of marriage.

These are only a few of the possible variations; if we review laws in effect in other countries we would find still more. One of the elements of great value in these changes is concern to prevent a woman becoming stateless. This is apparent also in various provisions I have not quoted to permit a woman whose marriage has been dissolved to recover her original nationality. Some

of these provisions do not accord in principle with the recommendation of this Commission that marriage should not affect the nationality of either spouse, but in actuality they give general effect to this principle through practical safeguards needed in a transition period.

### **Progress Anticipated on Women's Status**

The Secretary General's memorandum is of a type which will be helpful to my Government and to every other government. It summarizes the latest information from all countries and brings up to date the 1950 pamphlet which is already a recognized reference document. There are many governments which collect such data through their embassies and maintain their own files. But there are occasional omissions even in the best reporting systems and an authoritative collection of nationality laws affecting women is a valuable check on what is known from other sources. This information is needed not only as a basis for official decisions but more frequently, and perhaps equally important, to answer the questions of young people or older people who are about to marry and want to know what problems they will face. A document like this would be even more useful if it could be brought out at regular intervals, preferably once a year. The United States would like to ask whether the Secretary General believes it would be practicable to place this memorandum on an annual basis similar to the procedure for the memorandum on political rights. This would also mean keeping nationality as a routine item on our agenda so that we can review the report and also determine how long it should be continued.

The Secretary General may have suggestions on the form of an annual memorandum on nationality, particularly as to additional categories of information. The tables at the end of this document cover the effect of marriage on acquisition of nationality by the alien spouse, but do not show clearly whether a woman marrying an alien may retain her own nationality if she so desires. The questions usually asked by women considering marriage to a foreigner are (1) Can I retain my own nationality; (2) Must I acquire my husband's nationality, temporarily or permanently; (3) Will I be in danger of becoming stateless; (4) Are there special provisions for naturalization of alien spouses. Tables setting up warning signals as to retention of nationality and statelessness would be especially helpful. It seems a little easier to find particular countries, also, when they are listed alphabetically with the pertinent information laid out in columns beside them.

In closing, I would like to say a little in appreciation of the interest our consultant organizations have maintained in this project. For some of them the problems of nationality have been the subject of discussion for two generations, back

into the time of our mothers and perhaps our grandmothers. There have been great gains in this period. In the Americas the Montevideo Convention on the Nationality of Women is a milestone. Eleven of our American Republics are parties to this convention, which provides that neither marriage nor its dissolution shall affect a woman's nationality. The adoption of equality principles by the Commission on the Status of Women in 1950 is another milestone. A milestone has been set by each country which has revised its nationality laws to provide free and equal choice by each of the marriage partners.

As in all matters involving international procedure, the first milestones are the hardest to achieve; as the new way becomes the usual way it is easier to conform than to differ. At the same time, we need not think of our objectives as uniformity. If we work intelligently the chances are we will constantly be finding ways to improve legislation; that is evident already in some of the new provisions to prevent statelessness and clarify choices for both men and women. The report before us today promises a time when international conferences of women may be able to do without the familiar speech on "Problems of Nationality." Instead of problems, however, I would like to see us look forward to a series of progress reports. The observations of our consultant organizations will be important in helping this Commission evaluate progress and to point out the areas where more can be done.

## **WOMEN'S STATUS IN THE FAMILY**

U.S./U.N. press release dated March 17

As a new member of the Commission it is therefore very gratifying to me that the subject of women's status in the family will be under discussion for the first time at this session and that it has been given highest priority.

As we begin our discussion it is my privilege to express the appreciation of my Government for the extensive work of the Secretary General's staff in compiling the reports from official sources on women's status under family law and property law and also in making available the independent reports and comments of the nongovernmental organizations. The detailed information contained in these documents will be invaluable as a basis for consideration of women's needs and problems. I feel sure that all of you will have studied the documents with great interest and care and a sense of the enormous responsibilities before us. As our discussions proceed, I know there will be additional information which you will probably want from me and which I in turn will want to know from other countries.

I regard our work on the family status of woman as one of the most important aspects of woman's position with which this Commission will be called upon to deal. Family law—the set

of legal principles which govern marriage, the relationship of husband to wife, and of parents to children—touches every aspect of human life. Women's status in the family directly affects the contribution which women are able to make to the economic, social, and cultural life of their country, and thereby to the whole progress of civilization. In seeking to understand each other's needs and problems in this area we have an opportunity to formulate principles as to the equitable treatment of women in marriage which will be of potential benefit not only to women themselves but to the whole fabric of our society.

The age in which we are living has seen numerous and far-reaching changes in the status of women. Women everywhere are striving to realize their full potentialities as individuals and to make their maximum contribution to the society in which they live. It was my privilege to have a part in shaping or directing the postwar development of this movement in one of the war-torn countries when I had charge in the late 40's of organizing the Women's Affairs Branch for the U. S. Army in Germany. Guarantees made to women in the Bonn Constitution, which had just been adopted at that time, are now receiving consideration as to legal implementation. Our discussions here will be of vital interest to women working for legislative action to implement that Constitution and to women in other countries where to a constantly increasing extent the reciprocal rights and obligations of women are receiving recognition in terms of the greater contribution to human welfare which such recognition would make possible.

## **Legal Complications in Various Countries**

In reading the extensive documentation on family law supplied us by the Secretary General, I was impressed by the scope and variety of legal principles which we are called upon to consider in the various countries. I note, for example, that in some countries only the father has the right to exercise authority over the care, custody, and education of the children. This situation was reported from Greece, Argentina, Chile, and Brazil. In some countries, such power belongs jointly to the father and mother, including Japan, Norway, Turkey, and Denmark. In still other countries, such as England and France, parental authority is vested jointly in the father and mother, but the father alone has the right to exercise it during marriage. Still another variation is Lebanon, where so far as concerns the care and custody, general and religious education, and the right of punishment, the report shows that the mother has authority over children up to the age of 7 in the case of boys, and 9 in the case of girls. After those ages, these rights pass to the father. In Pakistan, also, the mother has custody of the son until he is 7, and of the daughter until she reaches puberty.

An additional complication of which I was aware but which the reports have brought more vividly to my attention is that in countries established on the Federal-State basis, legal principles may, and often do, vary within the same country. In my own country, for example, laws relating to the family and to property rights are the exclusive jurisdiction of the States, not of the Federal Government. Because of historical factors and original differences in customs and backgrounds, there is considerable variation in the statute laws of the 48 States. Each State differs in some respect from all the others.

In the area that I have just been discussing—that of the right of control over the child—over half of the States (26 States) recognize both parents as joint natural guardians and as such jointly entitled to the child's custody, services, and earnings. However, about a third of our States (15 States) give the father the first right to a child's custody, services, and earnings, permitting the mother to succeed only after the father's death, mental incapacity or desertion. Eight States that have the community-property system of law consider the child's earnings as joint property but generally under control of the father.

In the field of property law, such documentation as has been made available to date from the various countries shows that here also the legal principles with which we will be called upon to deal are of great variety and complexity. I was interested, in the recent report (E/CN.6/208), to note that the laws in the countries reporting establish three main types of property arrangements between husband and wife: the regime of community property, dowry, and separate property. In addition, a system of "union" property regime prevails in China; and a system of the "family estate" exists only in the Italian Civil Code. Moreover, the report shows that in India and Pakistan property rights are based on religious law and that such rights differ in accordance with the religious community to which the woman belongs. Thus a Hindu woman may have absolute ownership only to property acquired before marriage and to earnings acquired during marriage. Even this property may be taken and used by the husband in certain contingencies. In contrast under Mohammedan law, in both those countries and also in Lebanon, a Moslem woman may hold property separately and have full power to dispose of it.

To illustrate the variety and complexity of the subject of property relations between husband and wife, I need go no further than the laws of my own country. Two systems of property rights prevail in the United States: one, the system derived from the English common law in which the husband and wife hold separate and distinct property; the other, the community-property system derived from the Spanish civil law, in which a marriage partnership of property is recognized, husband and wife being partners and equal owners

of the community estate. In the two systems the rules of acquisition of property, its management and control, and its disposition differ today as they differed in the original systems in which the rules had their source.

### **Equitable Treatment of Family Status**

In every common law State married woman's property acts have been enacted during the last 100 years, which have radically changed the husband's common law rights in his wife's real and personal property and have also generally altered the rule as to his ownership of his wife's earnings from work outside of her home and for persons other than her husband. Property acquired during the marriage is regarded as the property of the husband subject to certain safeguards which the law attaches in the interest of the wife and family. The proceeds of the wife's work in her home are still very generally regarded as belonging to her husband and he is under no legal obligations to pay her for such services.

In the eight States with a community-property system, with fundamental rules derived from the law of Spain directly, or indirectly by way of Mexico (or in the case of Louisiana by way of France), the property rights of husband and wife differ markedly from those in our common law States. Under this system all property which the husband and wife acquire belongs equally to both of them, except that which is proved to belong to either of them separately. The proceeds of the labor of each becomes a part of the common or community property, in which the wife has the same extent of ownership as the husband. The marriage is a partnership; and its property like that in any other partnership is primarily liable for the payment of its debts. The husband, however, usually has the sole management of the community property during marriage.

In view of these divergencies in laws and customs, I have come to realize that for me at least it would be most helpful if at this session, if in place of addressing ourselves to specific statutory discriminations, we would undertake to reach agreement on objectives or standards designed to bring equity to women. The broader area of objectives and standards offer us a common meeting ground, so that if we direct our discussions to this area, I believe we would have some expectation of reaching agreement as to the basic principles designed to bring equitable treatment to women under law.

In order to lay a solid basis on which to arrive at constructive suggestions, I would personally find it most helpful if we might center the discussion this year around normal family relationships as distinguished from special problems. Although the reports show a great deal that is outside of U. S. law and experience, it would be most helpful to discuss normal family relationships in terms of the religious, economic, and social back-

## EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR WOMEN

U.S./U.N. press release dated March 25

ground and customs of the various countries. In this way, all of us would gain an insight into the needs of women in other countries and learn to understand their problems. What we might expect to come out of such a program would be a set of principles on family law and property relations which women themselves would accept as equitable and which could be expected to add to the dignity of the family relationship and to strengthen, not weaken, the fabric of our society.

As a start, we have the basic standards set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The preamble of the Declaration states that:

... the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women and have determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,

In arriving at a set of principles consistent with the spirit and purpose of these accepted human values there are several major areas of family law to which I believe we might well give priority. One of the areas that suggests itself as appropriate for early discussion is the institution of marriage. What is the purpose and what are the sanctities of marriage in our differing legal and religious systems? Viewed against the economic and social background of the individual country concerned, what should be the rights and obligations of woman with respect to entrance into marriage, choice of a partner, age of consent? Once a marriage is consummated, what constitutes a mutually satisfactory relationship between husband and wife during marriage? What should be their reciprocal rights and obligations with respect to responsibility for family support, control of children, choice of domicile? What principles governing the control of property acquired after marriage would both insure justice to the parties concerned and promote the welfare of the family? What standards should be applied in dealing with (a) the separate property of the wife, and (b) the property acquired through the joint efforts of both partners?

Our discussions of this topic will give us an opportunity to examine the laws that govern the position of women in the family and to determine what should be the reciprocal rights and obligations of women in the light of existing conditions in the various countries. On the basis of this discussion we may hope to arrive at an understanding as to the underlying principles which will insure the equitable treatment of women in marriage, safeguard the rights and obligations of motherhood, and promote the welfare of the family as the basic institution of our society. The approach I am suggesting may prove to be a long, hard road and it may not easily be finished in one or even two annual sessions. However, since it affords the possibility of constructive help in promoting the family status of women in all our countries, I believe it would be well worth the effort.

We endorse wholeheartedly the principle of the fullest educational opportunities for women. We wish to re-emphasize our belief that education should always be considered in terms of the individual without any discrimination on the basis of sex. This is the philosophy prevailing throughout the United States, embodied in the educational pattern in each one of the 48 States and the various territories under our jurisdiction.

In the United States, education is regarded as a right, available to all children, girls or boys, regardless of the economic or social status of the family. We are fully in accord with the statement of the Fifteenth International Conference on Public Education at Geneva in 1952, "that every person, man or woman, should be able to receive an education enabling him to develop his aptitudes as fully as possible, plan an effective part as a member or citizen of his community, his nation, and the world, and meet the demands of his special tasks in life."

As was indicated in this country's report to that conference, the constitutions of all our states make it obligatory to organize free public-school facilities for all children, and provide either explicitly or implicitly for equal educational opportunities regardless of sex. The duration and the age limits of compulsory education are the same for girls as for boys; all public elementary schools and the great majority of the public high schools are coeducational, there is equal access to all types of vocational and technical training and to higher education, the great majority of all post-secondary institutions being coeducational.

Even the economic and social factors which sometimes affect the opportunity of women for higher education are becoming less and less significant as earlier prejudices are outgrown and employment opportunities open in a wider and wider range of professions and occupations. Today it would be practically impossible to cite any kind of job for which a qualified woman could not obtain appropriate educational training in the United States. As early as 1930 women were employed in all but 30 of the 534 occupations in the census list of that year. By 1940 there were only 9 in which no woman was employed and by 1943 the admission of women to the various military services left only 3, now there is virtually no occupation in which there are not a few women successfully performing a job.

### Promoting Ideals of Democracy

Furthermore, we have discovered and proved again and again the validity of the truism, "educate a woman and you have educated a family—and a community." Every woman is to some extent an educator, whether or not she is a member

of the teaching profession. In the home she helps her children put into practice the learning experiences acquired in the schools, trains them in good health and living habits, and takes a leading role in developing family attitudes and in transmitting the ideals of democracy. In the community, she carries her housekeeping ability and her desire for clean and safe surroundings for her family into the organizing of health and welfare services and of public-service organizations of many kinds for bettering her neighborhood. She has been concerned to see that the water and food supply are kept clean and pure, and that effective sanitation facilities and safe streets are provided.

It may be reassuring to some countries where there is still latent opposition to higher education for women to discover that educated women in this country have a real interest in being wives and mothers—in recent years three-fourths of our women college graduates marry, and current statistics show an upward trend in the number of their children. A recent questionnaire to college graduates showed that many feel they are better mothers because of their education, better in understanding, training and rearing their children, and more able to help and guide them.

Recent trends in American education have tended to focus the whole school curriculum in the direction of education for family and community living. Experience indicates that both men and women can profit by broad instruction in relation to family life, including the joint responsibilities and privileges undertaken in marriage and parenthood. Life adjustment courses in secondary schools and for adults are growing in American schools and communities. Through experiments in both rural and urban areas, schools at the elementary as well as the more advanced level are orienting their teaching toward the raising of living standards in the whole community, by making scientific knowledge available in a form which can be used by young children and their parents, and by developing in applying such knowledge to the raising of living standards.

The concept of the school as a community center rather than merely a place of instruction for children has grown markedly in recent years. School buildings are used for adult education and other community purposes outside the formal school hours. Such school activities as the school-lunch program, greatly influence the life of the community. The growth of informal educational programs, such as agricultural extension, labor education, and educational activities of libraries further reflects the trend toward relating education directly to problems of democratic living.

Responsibility of the community for its schools also reflects the processes of democratic participation—processes in which women as citizens play an important part. It has always been the principle of the American public-school system that

policy making and ultimate control of the schools shall lie in the hands of citizens of each locality rather than in the hands of the government or of professional educators. School boards elected by the citizenry, on which women and men both serve, are the governing bodies of American public schools. The Parent Teacher Association, which brings together parents and teachers to consider needs of children and school, provides a further channel for participation by women of the community in planning for and promoting the education of their children.

Education for responsible citizenship and democratic participation has always been a major objective of American education. Such education first took the form of school courses in civics. In most schools, these courses, limited to the structure and processes of government, have been replaced by courses which integrate the study of history, civics, and other social sciences, and address themselves to "Problems of Democracy." Student organizations within the school are patterned on national, state, or local government and provide boys and girls with direct experience in the responsible use of democratic procedures. Within the classroom, democratic processes are used as a consciously developed teaching method, and emphasis is placed on developing the ability to evaluate facts and to engage in public discussion which is basic to democracy.

#### **Interest in Public Affairs**

These educational developments have been reflected in the role played by American women in their participation in State and Federal activities for the general welfare and for international peace and security. Citizenship training is reflected especially in improved standards of local government for which women have worked vigorously as part of their responsibility for the family. It is reflected also in the activity of women's organizations to improve laws and their administration through honest government, sound judicial procedures, and positive public programs relating to health, education, and welfare. Possibly its strongest reflection is in the contributions of women's organizations to education. The experience in parliamentary law and effective conduct of discussion which women have obtained in their organizations, in trade unions, and also in formal classes in schools has proved of great value for women in their political life.

The interaction between the fact that women are increasingly well educated and increasingly concerned with public affairs is reflected in the development of women's magazines. The interaction between women's magazines and their readers has steadily raised the level of public discussion in those magazines until they have become principal forums for the discussion of important issues, read by men as well as by women. Women

and women's organizations have been in the lead in developing and supporting voluntary welfare services, in the study of social problems, and in support of local and national legislation to deal with these problems. They have frequently paved the way for men and women to work together on these matters through labor unions and other citizen groups.

A comprehensive study of the education of women in the United States will be carried on by a newly established commission on women's education of the American Council on Education. It will explore the current and long-range needs resulting from the impact of changing social conditions upon women as individuals, members of families, career women, citizens, and as creators and perpetuators of values. It will include a con-

sideration of women in faculty and administrative positions in higher education, the opportunities for women students in colleges and universities, and the development of plans for continuing the education of women at the adult level.

The woman who plays a significant and constructive role in the world today will be the woman whose clarity of thinking, whose experience, standards, and judgments can raise the cultural sights of her family and contribute to their psychological and emotional well-being. She is the woman who brings to her profession or business a wider range of vision, who is conscious of her responsibilities as a citizen in a democracy and does something about it. In other words, her education has trained her to be a good member of society.

## The United States in the United Nations

[March 19-25]

### General Assembly

*Committee I (Political and Security)*—The U.S.S.R. on March 19 submitted a resolution determining that the Disarmament Commission, especially the United States, France, and the United Kingdom, had repeatedly attempted to substitute for the question of armaments reduction "that of illegally obtaining intelligence reports on the armaments of individual states." The Soviet draft would direct the Disarmament Commission to proceed forthwith with the study of practical measures to achieve armaments reduction, particularly among the five Great Powers, and with the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons, bacteriological, and other weapons of mass destruction, and the establishment of strict international control. The Disarmament Commission would be asked to report back to the Security Council and the General Assembly not later than July 1.

Before introducing his resolution, Valerian Zorin (U.S.S.R.) brushed aside the questions put to him March 18 by Ambassador Ernest A. Gross, as to whether the Soviets were willing to discuss disarmament constructively in the United Nations. He declared that the U.S.S.R. had consistently advocated armaments reduction and prohibition of atomic energy as the greatest guaranties of peace.

Speaking in support of the 14-power resolution, D. J. von Balluseck (Netherlands) noted the fundamental difference in approach as between the West and the U.S.S.R. It was essential, he said,

to begin with the question of disclosure and verification. The U.S.S.R., however, wanted to start at the "far end" with reduction of armaments and prohibition of atomic weapons. There would be no value in such premature decisions, which might only continue the imbalance of power. A system of checks and balances was needed.

Leslie K. Munro (New Zealand) pointed out that clear and explicit answers to Ambassador Gross' questions of March 18 would "help us to assess" the prospects of making progress in disarmament. Recalling Premier Malenkov's recent "peace policy" statements, he noted that press reports of a *Pravda* article advocating an all-out drive to strengthen Soviet power were a "depressing sequel."

Speaking for the United Kingdom, Sir Gladwyn Jebb also referred to Premier Malenkov's talk of peace and proposed that if he really wanted to settle all outstanding problems peaceably, he would do well to start in the Disarmament Commission. Even if the new Soviet Government could just take a new look at the whole disarmament problem and try to get away from stale slogans, some progress would be achieved.

At the March 20 meeting of the Committee, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen jointly introduced amendments to the 14-power draft which, among other things, would add a reference to hopes that "all members of the Commission will cooperate in efforts to produce constructive proposals likely to facilitate its task."

On March 21, Mr. Zorin made an unusually

moderate statement in which he said that the Soviet Union deemed it essential that the Disarmament Commission continue its work and endeavor to find common ground. His Government could not agree with the Western Powers' insistence that disclosure of information must precede reduction of armaments; in the absence of agreement to reduce armaments, countries could not be expected to disclose information on their armaments for this might result in some states claiming that they were obliged to rearm further.

Ambassador Gross expressed disappointment at the way in which his questions of March 18 had been treated. If the United States were easily discouraged, he said, the response of the Soviet delegation might lead it to believe there was no substance in the words of peace from the Kremlin. However, "we must say to the Soviet delegate: Surely this is not your last word on the subject; surely you would not have us believe the words of Premier Malenkov were empty words."

The U.S. delegate pointed to the incalculable advantages which balanced reduction of armed forces would have for the Russian people and other peoples living under Soviet rule. He was sure they yearned for a decent standard of living, and disarmament could yield this without in any way jeopardizing the security of the Soviet state.

The Soviet resolution, Ambassador Gross felt, would undo a great deal of the progress made at the last General Assembly. It proposed armaments reduction without any reference to armed forces. It sought to abandon the U.N.'s atomic energy plan. On the other hand, the United States recognized that in this resolution for the first time the Soviet Government had admitted by implication the possibility of reduction of non-atomic armaments on a basis other than a flat percentage cut. He sincerely hoped this was an indication of greater flexibility and a desire for genuine negotiation on this important problem. When the Disarmament Commission reconvened, there would be a clear test of Soviet intentions. He concluded by assuring that the United States would give the most careful and sympathetic consideration to any Soviet proposals which might lead to a genuinely safeguarded system of disarmament. (For text, see p. 503.)

In the voting, the 14-power draft as amended was approved 50-5 (Soviet bloc)-5 (Saudi Arabia, Burma, India, Indonesia, Argentina). (During the paragraph-by-paragraph voting, the Soviet bloc had cast affirmative votes on the preamble and on the portion of operative paragraph 2 requesting continuation of the Disarmament Commission's work; it had abstained on paragraph 3, requesting the Commission to report by September 1, 1953, and expressing hope for cooperation within the Commission.)

The Soviet draft resolution was rejected by a vote of 5-41-13 (Bolivia, Afghanistan, Argentina,

Egypt, Ethiopia, Burma, Iraq, Iran, Indonesia, India, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen).

On March 23 Czechoslovakia opened debate on its resolution calling upon the General Assembly to condemn the U.S. Mutual Security Act and to recommend abrogation of the section which appropriates 100 million dollars for alleged espionage and subversive activities behind the Iron Curtain. Both Vaclav David, Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, and Andrei Gromyko quoted liberally from statements of congressional and other U.S. leaders and from evidence given at spy trials in satellite countries in order to back up their contentions regarding interference by the United States aimed at overthrowing governments.

Replying to their charges, Ambassador Lodge declared that no valid indictment of the United States could be based on newspaper clippings and remarks of individual legislators since people in this country were free to speak and write as they chose. As for the question of subversion, Czechoslovakia itself was a flagrant case in point. Ambassador Lodge described the Communist subversion of the Czechoslovak state at the time of the *coup d'état* in February 1948.

With this record, Ambassador Lodge pointed out, the present rulers of Czechoslovakia, who introduced this resolution criticizing the United States, do not come into court with clean hands.

Turning to the question of escapees, Ambassador Lodge pointed out that if the Kremlin leaders are really looking for the people who are subverting life behind the Iron Curtain, they should look at themselves—at their laws, their decrees, their practices of oppression. Ambassador Lodge showed how in order to escape these practices of oppression and to seek freedom to speak, write, vote, and worship, men and women made heroic efforts to escape through the Iron Curtain despite armed guards watching from observation towers and vicious dogs patrolling the frontiers. He showed how the money expended under the Kersten amendment had been used to provide reception and living quarters, food, clothing, medical care; help in their search for visas; vocational training; and employment and emigration advice to assist in the permanent resettlement of these escapees.

Ambassador Lodge went on to show how the funds appropriated under the Kersten amendment were part of the larger sums the United States is now spending under the Mutual Security Act and has previously spent under the Marshall plan to help the free nations to stay free—to stop future Koreans and future Czechoslovakias before they start. As for U.S. intentions toward other countries, he cited U.S. technical-assistance programs and by contrast the recent Technical Assistance Conference where Soviet representatives were conspicuously absent. In conclusion he called for an emphatic rejection of the Czech resolution.

During the debate on March 25, Mr. von Baluseck said that the Czechoslovak Government and its "political friends" were really complaining that citizens of the Iron Curtain countries preferred liberty to serfdom and were leaving the "peace camp" in ever-increasing numbers for the freedom of the West. The escapees were branded as agents of the ruling circles, and those who received them and treated them as human beings were condemned by the Communist world as aggressors and subversionists. The Netherlands delegation would vote against the Czechoslovak resolution, in the belief that giving aid to destitute political refugees was no crime.

Selim Sarper (Turkey) stated that Ambassador Lodge had given convincing answers to the Soviet charges. ECA and MSA had accomplished much in Turkey, he added; there were 2,500 tractors in his country in 1948 and 35,000 in 1952, and the cereal crop had been increased by 4,500,000 tons in the same period.

There was nothing sinister about MSA aid to Free China, Chun-Ming Chang declared. Describing the constructive objectives of the U.S. program, he contrasted it with the Soviet Union's 30-year record of promoting subversive activities in foreign countries. The Chinese people were opposed to the Communist regime, the most brutal form of domination ever known in the world.

Ambassador Lodge on March 25 asked the Soviet delegation two additional questions, as to what future plans "the Kremlin's Czechoslovak puppet" has for William Oatis and what fate the Peiping regime has in store for the 100-odd Americans in Communist China. Summarizing his delegation's attitude toward the Czechoslovak attack on the Mutual Security Act, he concluded:

... the only aspect of the escapee program which merits condemnation is the fact that the world is today so organized that there are escapees. The free peoples of the world can hardly do too much for these victims of Soviet tyranny.

Our aid to escapees can only stop when escapees stop coming—when millions of men and women now trapped behind the Iron Curtain, need no longer look elsewhere for freedom. A problem like this is not solved by tightening border controls and intensifying purges. When national aspirations are subverted, when human rights are suppressed, pressure builds up to the boiling point. One outcome of this pressure is a flow of escapees. And this flow will not stop until the Soviet leaders permit peoples under their sway to live their own lives in their own way.

So long as escapees continue to come, the duty to assist them is a matter of common humanity for the United States and the rest of the free world. It is also a duty imposed on us by the Charter. For, in essence, the United Nations Charter is a Charter of hope and freedom. It is a Charter of emancipation from religious and civil persecution, from poverty and disease, and from the even more hideous scourges of conquest and despotism.

It is a magnet drawing vast populations who see in it the expression of their hope to live their own lives in well-being and freedom.

Mr. Chairman, we want to make this magnet irresistible, strongly charging it with our support and strength.

Our Mutual Security Program will stop when the threat of aggression—not only for us, but for all the free world—is lifted. The United States, like all the free world, prefers peaceful settlements to a dangerous and burdensome armaments race. We do not enjoy that. We long for the day of honest negotiations which my Government asked for in this committee last week. We will meet the Soviet Union half-way at any time.

### **Economic and Social Council**

*Commission on the Status of Women*—The Commission on March 19 approved 12-0-5 (U.S.) a French-Lebanese-Pakistani text requesting inclusion of article 1 of the Human Rights Declaration in the Civil and Political Rights Covenant.

At the following day's meeting, a compromise resolution on the nationality of married women, formulated by the resolutions committee, was approved by a vote of 12-3 (Soviet bloc)-2 (China, U.K.). The resolution recommends that the Economic and Social Council request the Secretary General to circulate to members the draft convention on nationality of married persons proposed by Cuba, with the request that members send in their comments by January 1954, in time for consideration at the Commission's eighth session.

During the same meeting, unanimous approval was given to a resolution on the status of women in private law, recommending that the Economic and Social Council call on governments to take all possible measures to insure equality of rights and duties of husband and wife in family matters, and to the wife full legal capacity and the right to engage in work outside the home and the right to acquire, administer, enjoy, and dispose of property on equal terms with her husband.

Discussion of political rights opened on March 23. Mrs. Lorena B. Hahn (U.S.) urged that attention now be focused on methods of helping governments to provide equal suffrage. As women lacked the vote in more than 15 nations, almost all of which are U.N. members, she believed that helpful recommendations could be made.

On March 24 the Commission adopted a resolution urging signature of the Convention on Political Rights. The vote was 10-0-7 (U.S., U.K., Soviet bloc, Chile). Action on the political rights item was completed on March 25, with the nearly unanimous adoption of three resolutions on submission of information drawn from annual reports on trust territories, on suggestions for future reports by the Secretary General, and on development of the political rights of women in trust and non-self-governing territories.

Debate then opened on educational opportunities for women. Describing the situation in the United States, Mrs. Hahn reported that equal educational opportunities for women were guaranteed in all States. There was practically no job for which a qualified woman could not obtain appropriate educational training. (See p. 512.)



## Communiqués Regarding Korea to the Security Council

The Headquarters of the U.N. Command has transmitted communiqués regarding Korea to the Secretary General of the United Nations under the following U.N. document numbers: S/2904, Jan. 14; S/2921, Feb. 2; S/2923, Feb. 4; S/2924, Feb. 3; S/2925, Feb. 9; S/2926, Feb. 10; S/2931, Feb. 13; S/2932, Jan. 28; S/2933, Feb. 18; S/2935, Feb. 24; S/2937, Feb. 25; S/2938, Feb. 25; S/2940, Feb. 26; S/2941, Feb. 27; S/2943, Mar. 2; S/2944, Mar. 4.

## U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

### Commission on the Status of Women (ECOSOC)

The Department of State announced on March 16 (press release 137) that Mrs. Lorena B. Hahn, U.S. representative on the Commission on the Status of Women of the U.N. Economic and Social Council (Ecosoc), will attend the seventh session of the Commission, which opened at New York on March 16. Mrs. Hahn will be assisted by the following advisers:

Mrs. Alice Angus Morrison, Women's Bureau, Department of Labor  
Mrs. Rachel C. Nason, Office of U.N. Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State  
Mrs. Harriet G. Filler, Division of Research for U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe, Department of State

The agenda for this session provides for the consideration of reports concerning (1) the status of women in the family, including the property rights of married women; (2) equal suffrage for women, with special attention being given to the action which has been taken to bring into force the Convention on the Political Rights of Women which was adopted by the General Assembly last December; (3) civil rights of women, including access to Government service; (4) economic opportunities; (5) equal pay for equal work for men and women workers; (6) educational opportunities; (7) the extent to which women are serving in delegations of their governments to the United Nations and the specialized agencies; and (8) progress on the convention on the nationality of married women. A report on the work of the Commission will be prepared for submission to Ecosoc.

The Commission on the Status of Women, which was established in 1946, is one of the permanent functional commissions of Ecosoc. It is responsible for the preparation of recommendations and reports to the Council on the promotion of women's rights in political, economic, social, educational, and civil fields. Eighteen Governments, elected by the Council, comprise the membership of the Commission. Its last (sixth) session was held at Geneva, March 24-April 5, 1952.

### Technical Assistance Committee (ECOSOC)

The Department of State announced on March 20 (press release 147) that Isador Lubin, the U.S. representative on the Technical Assistance Committee of the U.N. Economic and Social Council (Ecosoc), will attend the meeting of the Committee which is scheduled to open at New York on March 23.

The following advisers will assist the U.S. representative: Philip M. Burnett, acting officer in charge of the technical assistance unit, Office of U.N. Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State; Eleanor Dennison, adviser on multilateral affairs, Technical Cooperation Administration, Department of State; and Johanna von Goeckingk, Division of International Administration, Department of State.

The responsibility for review of the programs and the administrative problems of the U.N. expanded program of technical assistance is carried primarily by two bodies. The Technical Assistance Board, composed of the heads of the participating organizations, undertakes the detailed review, coordination, and integration of the programs or projects submitted by the various agencies and makes reports and recommendations thereon to the Technical Assistance Committee. The Technical Assistance Committee, on which the 18-member governments of the Ecosoc are represented, reviews the reports and recommendations made by the Board; reviews the administrative problems common to all organizations participating in the operation of the program; gives general policy guidance; evaluates the effectiveness of the total program; and makes recommendations to the Ecosoc.

The last meeting of the Technical Assistance Committee was held at New York in July 1952.

### Work Plantation Committee (ILO)

The Department of State announced on March 16 (press release 138) that on that date the Committee on Work on Plantations of the International Labor Organization would begin its second session at Habana, Cuba. The U.S. delegation is as follows:

REPRESENTING THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES:

#### *Delegates*

Clara M. Beyer, Associate Director, Bureau of Labor Standards, Department of Labor, Washington, D. C.  
Fernando Sierra Berdecia, Secretary of Labor of Puerto Rico, San Juan, Puerto Rico

#### *Adviser*

Irving Lippe, Labor Attaché, U.S. Embassy, Habana, Cuba

REPRESENTING THE EMPLOYERS OF THE UNITED STATES:

#### *Delegates*

W. B. Hellis, General Manager, Irvine Company, Tustin, Calif.

Franklin J. Farrington, Assistant Director, Plantations Division, U. S. Rubber Company, New York, N. Y.

*Adviser*

Ross Armsby, Secretary, Manufacturing Commission, Rubber Manufacturers Association, New York, N. Y.

This committee, which held its first session at Bandung, Indonesia, December 4-16, 1950, was established by the Governing Body of the International Labor Office to examine problems common to plantation workers in all areas of the world and to devise methods for dealing with those problems within the framework of the International Labor Organization. In November 1951 the Governing Body decided that the agenda for the second session should include (1) a general report covering actions taken on the basis of the conclusions of the first session and recent events and developments affecting work on plantations; (2) definition of the term "plantations"; (3) regulation of wages on plantations; and (4) health and social services on plantations.

The Committee is composed of representatives from 18 countries: Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Ceylon, Cuba, Dominican Republic, France, India, Indonesia, Liberia, the Netherlands, Pakistan, the Philippines, Portugal, Thailand, United Kingdom, the United States, and Vietnam.

### **World Symposium on Sferics (WMO)**

The Department of State announced on March 17 (press release 141) that a World Symposium on Sferics would convene on that date at Zurich under the auspices of a Working Group on Radio-Electric Meteorology of the Commission for Aerology of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO). The U.S. Government will be represented at the Symposium by observers.

Arthur W. Johnson, Meteorological Attaché American Legation, Bern, will be principal observer. Clayton H. Jensen, Major, U.S.A.F., Chief, Evaluation and Development Division, Directorate of Scientific Services, Air Weather Service, Department of the Air Force, and Lawrence A. Pick, Chief, Meteorological Branch, Sferics Section, Evans Signal Corps Laboratory, Department of the Army, also will be observers.

The purpose of the Symposium is to bring together comprehensive information on sferics (radio-electric storm detection), particularly with respect to the latest techniques in observing, recording, and transmitting data; new developments in equipment; and lists of existing sferics networks.

Worldwide inquiries on the subject have been initiated because of the value of sferics in synoptic meteorology, especially in areas with widely scattered stations and over the ocean. Sferics is a new field of weather research which has practical significance in relation to many human activities, including the protection of lives and property from severe storms and the navigation of aircraft and surface vessels.

## **THE DEPARTMENT**

### **Termination of VOA Contracts**

Press release 152 dated March 20

Contracts for construction at the Voice of America's two high-powered radio stations, Baker East near Wilmington, N.C., and Baker West at Port Angeles, Wash., were terminated on March 20 by Robert L. Johnson, Administrator of the International Information Administration.

The construction contracts for these two transmitting plants were suspended on February 17 by Mr. Johnson's predecessor and substantial maintenance costs were still being incurred.

Since taking office on March 3, Mr. Johnson has met with members of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information, members of the Radio Advisory Committee, and obtained technical advice from experts in and outside the Government.

As a result of this series of studies, Mr. Johnson said he has not attempted to make a final decision as to whether or not these stations should be constructed at some future date but he has concluded that it would not be justifiable to proceed under present contracts for construction at Baker East or Baker West and that these contracts should not be continued in suspension.

### **Department's Security Processes**

*Press Conference Statement by Secretary Dulles*

Press releases 149, 151, dated March 20

I thought it might be useful if I first made a little educational statement (at least I hope it will be educational), about the FBI reports and the way that they are handled.

We are trying here to get FBI checkups as rapidly as we can on all of the key people and important officials in the different departments of the Government. That includes, of course, the State Department. In the beginning we can only cover the top people, because there are so many people in this Department and in the other Departments that if we tried to do everything at one time the FBI facilities would be completely swamped.

The ordinary FBI field checkup takes from 4 to 5 weeks, depending on how diverse have been the activities of the subject of the investigation. If he's lived all his life in one spot it's fairly easy; if he's been in different parts of the country and in different businesses it takes much longer.

When the FBI field report comes in, it's a mass of interviews with persons of all sorts and varieties and of undetermined reliability. The investigators' job is to find information that is adverse, if there is any, because their business is to try to detect anything which is suspicious. Then,

when the field reports are concluded, the FBI makes summaries and these summaries deal primarily with the derogatory material because what we are looking for is danger signals. It summarizes that derogatory material but does not attempt to evaluate it. FBI reports are summaries. For example, they never say that on the basis of our investigation we conclude that "Mr. X" is or is not a good security or a good loyalty risk. That job of evaluating the report is left to the responsible officers of the Departments concerned.

Now, here in the Department of State these FBI summaries in the case of important persons are often sent to me directly and personally by Mr. J. Edgar Hoover. I then ask our security officer, now Mr. McLeod, to handle the matter himself or to speak to me about it. Either I, or one of the Under Secretaries acting for me, have the responsibility of making the final evaluation as far as the State Department is concerned.

Then, in the case of Presidential nominations, we report to the President and he sends the nomination to the Senate. Sometimes where the nomination is deemed to be urgent, the Department and the President act in the first instance, on the basis of quick FBI checks which are designed merely to show whether there is already in the files of the FBI any derogatory material. In that case the matter is supplemented by subsequent field investigations.

Sometimes the Foreign Relations Committee, as is its right, wants to question the Secretary of State with reference to evaluations that are put on FBI reports. It is not, however, customary to make generally available the FBI reports themselves or the summaries because this would disclose and dry up for the future sources of information of great value to the Government. The President and the Attorney General, under whom the FBI operates, closely restrict access to these records. It is, however, permissible for the Secretary of State to tell the Foreign Relations Committee in executive session about the contents of reports without actually disclosing names and sources.

In recent cases the Foreign Relations Committee has accepted the round evaluations given them by the Secretary of State. He cannot, of course, guarantee that there is no possible loyalty or security risk; the most that he can do is to say that the records of the FBI disclose no evidence of such a risk.

Where there are anonymous or unsubstantiated allegations, the Department would normally ask the FBI to continue to seek the facts and to intensify its investigation. We are doing all that is humanly possible to eliminate loyalty and security risks and in this respect we are getting splendid cooperation from the Foreign Relations Committee and from the FBI.

*In reply to a question concerning Charles E. Bohlen, whom the President nominated on Febru-*

*ary 27 to be Ambassador to the U.S.S.R., Secretary Dulles said further:*

I did not find in the FBI reports in summary, any facts indicating that Mr. Bohlen might be a security or a loyalty risk. Now, it's been said that this Bohlen case is an acid test. I think it's an acid test of the orderly processes of our Government. There was a thorough investigation, the reports were brought before the Foreign Relations Committee, they were discussed there with me for a period of nearly 3 hours, and then, as I say, the Committee voted unanimously to report the nomination out to the floor of the Senate. If matters can't be dealt with and disposed of in that orderly way, it will very much disorganize the conduct of public affairs and foreign affairs at a very critical moment in history.

### Confirmations

*Livingston T. Merchant*

The Senate on March 11 confirmed Livingston T. Merchant as Assistant Secretary for European Affairs.

*Robert D. Murphy*

The Senate on March 20 confirmed Robert D. Murphy as Assistant Secretary for United Nations Affairs.

*Walter S. Robertson*

The Senate on March 27 confirmed Walter S. Robertson as Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs.

*Douglas MacArthur, 2d*

The Senate on March 11 confirmed Douglas MacArthur, 2d, as Counselor of the Department.

## THE FOREIGN SERVICE

### Confirmations

The Senate on March 27 confirmed Charles E. Bohlen as Ambassador to the U.S.S.R.

### Check List of Department of State Press Releases: Mar. 23-28, 1953

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## The Pattern of U.S.-Indian Relations

by *George V. Allen*  
*Ambassador to India*<sup>1</sup>

I am deeply sensible of the friendly spirit which has motivated the India League of America in inviting me to be with you here today. It is a source of considerable satisfaction to us who work in the official or governmental sphere of U.S.-India relations to know that there is a group of men and women, distinguished in the professions, the arts, and business, who at the same time are actively engaged in a private effort to increase understanding between the United States and India and further to strengthen relations between the two.

I believe the key to sound and enduring relations between nations lies in private effort in whatever sphere—cultural relations, education, economic assistance, or trade and finance—by organizations such as yours. Official or government action is of course necessary, but it has substance only insofar as the atmosphere of friendship has been created between the peoples of the countries concerned.

I am aware that the India League of America has been active for many years. Before India's independence it was effective in mobilizing opinion in this country on behalf of India's freedom. Since then it has been in the forefront as a private agency for the dissemination of information about India and U.S.-Indian affairs and for the development of closer understanding between our two peoples.

Only a few days ago land was allotted in Washington, D. C., for the site of a Gandhi memorial—a project which was conceived and is being carried out by the League. In activity of this sort, in which private citizens show by action their interest in India and in the development of better understanding, there is, in my opinion, far more value than any number of speeches by government officers or diplomats which proclaim friendship and understanding which may or may not exist. And as these private and spontaneous actions continue, official declarations of friendship will inevitably carry more weight and conviction.

<sup>1</sup> Remarks made before the India League of America at New York City on Apr. 1.

I am very glad to find myself once again professionally concerned with U.S.-Indian relations after a lapse of 7 years in somewhat different work. Prior to my assignment in 1946 as Ambassador to Iran, I shared in the work of that part of the Department of State which dealt with Indian affairs. This was before Indian independence, and, of course, there have been great changes since then. Then, India was the greatest jewel in the crown of empire. Now it is the largest democratic republic in the world. Then, Indian leaders were revolutionaries; today, many of these revolutionaries hold the responsibilities of government and grapple with different but perhaps no less difficult problems.

No man could approach the assignment I have been given but with humility and a full awareness of the challenge the assignment offers. Yet I have every confidence that my work will be easier because, I believe, the broad pattern of U. S.-Indian relations has already been well-established. That pattern involves growing understanding and friendship between the two countries and closer, more fruitful cooperation in international affairs. It is based on scrupulous care that the sovereignty and national aspirations of each not be offended.

We attach the greatest importance to the efforts which India is making to develop its economy and improve the lot of its people. If those efforts succeed, it will encourage peoples throughout Asia and fortify faith in democratic methods everywhere. If they do not succeed, the very foundations of the Indian Republic and of the Orient may be shaken. America's interest, in one sentence, is that India, which has achieved full sovereign status, shall retain that status completely, and that the faith which the vast majority of the Indian people have in democracy's ability to give them a better and fuller life be sustained and fortified.

India's problems are in a very real sense the world's problems, and many nations, recognizing this, are offering whatever help they can. The United States is in the forefront as regards mate-

rial help and moral encouragement to India. We do not give our help as charity; on the contrary, our help has been in the nature of an investment in India's sovereignty and independence. We, and the rest of the free world, stand to receive rich dividends in strengthened democracy and in developing a strong spiritual bastion against the heartless and dangerous forces of materialism.

I am confident that we will continue to offer our help and encouragement.

There is in the United States today an ever-growing understanding of India's problems and sympathy for India's courageous efforts, and in India's position, in the world or its great potential.

I am unaware of any proposals under consideration which would reverse or cancel the policies which the United States has been following for some time and which have received the support of Republicans and Democrats alike. Rather, I think you may find a quickened interest in India, and an even stronger determination, on our part, to clear up any misunderstanding and to reaffirm by word and deed our abiding friendship for India. To this end I have dedicated myself and ask your continued help and support.

## Assessment of Soviet Gestures

### *Remarks by Secretary Dulles*

Press release 173 dated April 3

*In response to various questions concerning the assessment placed by the United States on recent Soviet moves and their possible outcome, Secretary Dulles made the following extemporaneous remarks at his news conference on April 3:*

Nothing that has happened, or which seems to me likely to happen, has changed the basic situation of danger in which we stand. There are three basic facts which, I think, we should always have in mind as long as they are the facts.

The first is this: The Soviet Union is a heavily armed totalitarian state, subject to the dictates of a small group, whose total control extends to one-third of the people, and the natural resources of the world.

The second fact is that the leaders of the Soviet Union are basically and deeply hostile to any other state which does not accept Soviet Communist control. That is part of their fanatically held creed.

The third fact is that the Soviet Communist leaders do not recognize any moral inhibitions against the use of violence. In fact, they do not admit the existence of such a thing as the moral law.

Now those facts combine to create a grave danger, and as I said, nothing that has happened or seems likely to happen in the near future ends that danger, or our need, or the need of the free

world generally, to take precautions against it. That, however, does not prevent accommodations from time to time which may be useful—useful if, but only if, they do not blind us to the persistence of the danger.

At the moment I see nothing which ends that danger or would justify us in changing any of our basic defensive policies, either alone or in conjunction with our allies. Now, there are, as I have said, possibilities of useful accommodation that could relate to such matters as the exchange of wounded and sick prisoners of war in Korea, and if good faith is shown in relation to that, then there may be the possibility of an armistice in Korea.

There is a question of an Austrian treaty which could also be a matter of accommodation.

There are a whole series of outstanding questions which can be a matter of accommodation.

The point I want to make is that so long as these three conditions persist, to which I referred, we must not, in my opinion, assume that the danger is over and that we are living in a peaceful world which requires neither armament nor our allies.

I see nothing which should delay or hamper the European Defense Community and the other basic policy measures that we are trying to take.

*Asked whether there was any inconsistency between this view and that expressed by President Eisenhower the day before,<sup>1</sup> Mr. Dulles replied:*

I am confident that the general philosophy which I have expressed is the philosophy of the administration. The President said, I think—I haven't actually seen the transcript of his statement—that we are prepared to take up concrete matters, such as peace in Asia, where it is to our advantage to do so, and test out the Communist words, in practical operation.

I think that the events that are happening are, to a very large extent, due to the vigorous position which the Eisenhower administration has taken since it has been in office.

We have had indications from so-called neutral sources in contact with the Soviet Union that the leaders there were waiting to see what the policies of the new administration would be, whether they would be weak or strong policies.

Now, in fact, we have taken some fairly strong policies, both in Asia and in Europe.

In Asia we have ended the orders of the Seventh Fleet which protected the Chinese Communist Mainland. We have intensified the build-up of indigenous forces, South Korean forces, in the Republic of Korea. We indicated to the French our disposition to increase help to them there. We pointed out that an armistice in Korea could not be used as a basis for enabling the Chinese

<sup>1</sup>At his press conference on Apr. 2, the President said that the United States should take at face value every offer that was made until it was proved not to be worthy of being so taken.



Communists to shift their forces and to commit aggression elsewhere, or at least if they attempted that it would have serious consequences.

In Europe, we have actively revived the program for a European Defense Community, and increased unity—military, in the first instance; ultimately, political, and economic.

In all those respects we have had vigorous, positive policies. In my opinion they are beginning to bear some fruit, although how much that fruit will turn out to be still remains to be tested. It is still in words primarily rather than in actual deeds.

## Fourth Anniversary of NATO

### STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

White House press release dated April 4

Just 4 years ago today the representatives of 12 free nations met in Washington to sign their names to a document which free men will long remember. That document was the North Atlantic Treaty.

In the years since that date other nations have signed their names and pledged their strength—to make NATO the central source of strength for defense of the western world.

This year it happens that we commemorate the anniversary of NATO at Easter time. To peoples of all faiths the spiritual idea of the Prince of Peace carries meaning. And NATO is an instrument of peace. It endangers none who will respect freedom. It serves all who love freedom—and wish to enjoy it in peace.

We have learned from bitter and conclusive experience that peace cannot be defended by the weak. It demands strength—strength of our armies, strength of our economies, and, above all, strength of our spirit.

This strength can be born only of unity. NATO signifies the resolve of the free nations of the North Atlantic community to be united against any aggression. The North Atlantic Treaty served notice that an attack upon any of the NATO countries would be resisted by all. It did yet more: It called upon all participating nations to develop that strength which could not only win war but more importantly could prevent war.

The two hundred million people of the NATO nations of Europe are in the deepest sense bound

together by a unity more profound than any pact. They are skilled in work, courageous in spirit, and tenacious in their love of freedom. They—their spirit and strength and resources—are indispensable to the defense of freedom everywhere. If they and their resources ever were captured and exploited by an aggressor, there would be no corner of safety anywhere in the world. But so long as these people and these resources are joined with those of the United States in our common cause, no aggressor can be blind to the folly of attack.

The work of NATO is far from complete. This anniversary, then, should be the signal for all NATO nations to dedicate themselves with renewed vigor to the work that remains to be done. So doing, each and all must know that they are serving—not the wishes or needs of some big alien power, nor even a lofty abstract ideal—but simply their own salvation and survival in freedom.

Each and all must remind themselves that the faint of heart and the slow of deed are the first and the surest to invite the torment of aggression.

Each and all of us must summon to mind the words of Him whom we honor this Easter time: “When a strong man, armed, keepeth his palace, his goods are in peace.”

#### Secretary Dulles' Message to Lord Ismay<sup>1</sup>

On this fourth anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty I want to extend to you, and through you to the chairman of the North Atlantic Council and the representatives of other NATO Governments, the greetings of the Government of the United States. Let me also express appreciation of the imaginative and devoted leadership you have demonstrated during the past year. It has been a year of substantial progress, and with continued unity of effort there is reason to hope that even greater progress can be achieved during the coming year. I can assure you of the continued interest and cooperation of the U.S. Government, because we are convinced that a strong and enduring Atlantic partnership is vitally important to the security and peace of the entire world.

<sup>1</sup> Sent on Apr. 3. Lord Ismay is Secretary-General of NATO.

## Proposal for Settlement of Korean Prisoner-of-War Question

*Premier Chou En-lai of Communist China on March 30 proposed that negotiations should begin at once on the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war in Korea, and that, after the cessation of hostilities, all prisoners who do not wish to be repatriated should be turned over to a neutral country "so as to insure a just solution to the question of their repatriation." Following is the text of his statement, which was broadcast by the New China News Agency (Radio Peiping), together with a statement by Lincoln White, Deputy Special Assistant for Press Relations, a letter from Gen. Mark Clark to the Communist Commanders, and a statement by Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav M. Molotov.*

### CHOU EN-LAI'S STATEMENT OF MARCH 30<sup>1</sup>

U.N. doc. A/2378  
Dated March 31, 1953

Enclosed herewith the full text of my statement on the question of the Korean armistice negotiations issued on 30 March 1953. Please distribute the full text of this statement to all the delegations of the member states of the United Nations, except the so-called "delegation" of the remnant Chinese Kuomintang clique.

[Enclosure]

The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, having jointly studied the proposal put forward by Gen. Mark W. Clark, Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command, on Feb. 22, 1953, concerning the exchange of sick and injured prisoners of war of both sides during the period of hostilities, are of the common opinion that it is entirely possible to achieve a reasonable settlement of this question in accordance with the provision of Article 109 of the Geneva Convention of 1949.

A reasonable settlement of the question of exchanging sick and injured prisoners of war clearly has a very significant bearing upon the smooth settlement of the entire question of prisoners of war. It is, therefore, our view that the time should be considered ripe for settling the entire question of prisoners of war in order to insure the cessation of hostilities in Korea and to conclude the armistice agreement.

The Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of

Korea hold in common that the delegates of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers to the armistice negotiations and the delegates of the United Nations Command to the armistice negotiations should immediately start negotiations on the question of exchanging sick and injured prisoners of war during the period of hostilities, and should proceed to seek an over-all settlement of the question of prisoners of war.

The Korean armistice negotiations in the past one year and more have already laid the foundation for the realization of an armistice in Korea. In the course of the negotiations at Kaesong and Panmunjom, the delegates of both sides have reached agreement on all questions except that of prisoners of war.

In the first place, on the question of a ceasefire in Korea, about which the whole world is concerned, both sides have already agreed that "the Commanders of the opposing sides shall order and enforce a complete cessation of all hostilities in Korea by all armed forces under their control, including all units and personnel of the ground, naval, and air forces, effective twelve hours after this Armistice Agreement is signed" (Paragraph 12 of the draft Korean armistice agreement).<sup>2</sup>

Secondly, both sides have further reached agreement on the various important conditions for an armistice. On the question of fixing a military demarcation line and establishing a demilitarized zone, both sides have already agreed that the actual line of contact between both sides at the time when the armistice agreement becomes effective shall be made the military demarcation line and that "both sides shall withdraw two kilometers from this line so as to establish a demilitarized zone between the opposing forces . . . as a buffer zone to prevent the occurrence of incidents which might lead to a resumption of hostilities" (Paragraph 1 of the draft armistice agreement).

On the question of supervising the implementation of the armistice agreement and settling violations of the armistice agreement, both sides have already agreed that a military armistice commission, composed of five senior officers appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, and five senior officers appointed by the Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command, shall be set up to be responsible for the supervision of the implementation of the armistice agreement, including the supervision and direction of the committee for repatriation of prisoners of war, and for settling through negotiations any violations of the armistice agreement (Paragraphs 19, 20, 24, 25 and 56 of the draft armistice agreement); both sides have also agreed that a neutral nation's supervisory commission shall be set up, composed of two senior officers appointed as representatives by Poland and Czechoslovakia, neutral nations nominated jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, and two senior officers appointed as representatives by Sweden and Switzerland, neutral nations nominated by the Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command, and that under this commission there shall be provided neutral nations inspection

<sup>1</sup> Cablegram sent to President Lester B. Pearson of the U.N. General Assembly by the Communist Chinese Premier.

<sup>2</sup> U. N. doc. A/2228, Annex A.

teams composed of officers appointed as members to the teams by the aforementioned nations.

These inspection teams shall be stationed at the following ports of entry in North Korea: Sinuiju, Chongjin, Hungnam, Manpo, Sinanju, and at the following ports of entry in South Korea: Incheon, Taegu, Pusan, Kangnung and Kunsan, to supervise and inspect the implementation of the provisions that both sides cease the introduction into Korea of reinforcing military personnel and combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons and ammunition (except for rotation and replacement as permitted by these provisions), and may conduct special observations and inspections at those places outside the demilitarized zone where violations of the armistice agreement have been reported to have occurred, so as to ensure the stability of the military armistice (Paragraphs 36, 37, 40, 41, 42 and 43 of the draft armistice agreement).

In addition, both sides have reached agreement that "the military commanders of both sides hereby recommend to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides that, within three months after the armistice agreement is signed and becomes effective, a political conference of a higher level of both sides be held by representatives appointed respectively to settle through negotiations the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc." (Paragraph 60 of the draft armistice agreement).

As stated above, in the course of the Korean armistice negotiations one question alone—the question of prisoners of war—blocks the realization of an armistice in Korea. And even with respect to the question of prisoners of war, both sides have reached agreement on all the provisions in the draft armistice agreement on the arrangements relating to prisoners of war, except on the question of the repatriation of prisoners of war. Had the Korean armistice negotiations not been interrupted for more than five months, a solution might long since have been found to this issue of the repatriation of prisoners of war.

Now inasmuch as the United Nations Command has proposed to settle, in accordance with Article 109 of the Geneva Convention, the question of exchanging sick and injured prisoners of war during the period of hostilities, we consider that subsequent upon the reasonable settlement of the question of sick and injured prisoners of war, it is entirely a matter of course that a smooth solution to the whole question of prisoners of war should be achieved, provided that both sides are prompted by real sincerity to bring about an armistice in Korea in the spirit of mutual compromise.

Regarding the question of prisoners of war, the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea have always held and continue to hold that a reasonable solution can only lie in the release and repatriation of war prisoners without delay after the cessation of hostilities in accordance with the stipulations of the 1949 Geneva Convention, particularly those of Article 118 of the convention.<sup>3</sup>

However, in view of the fact that the differences between the two sides on this question now constitute the

<sup>3</sup> Article 118 of the Geneva Convention reads:

"Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities.

"In the absence of stipulations to the above effect in any agreement concluded between the Parties to the conflict with a view to the cessation of hostilities, or failing any such agreement, each of the Detaining Powers shall itself establish and execute without delay a plan of repatriation in conformity with the principle laid down in the foregoing paragraph.

"In either case, the measures adopted shall be brought to the knowledge of the prisoners of war.

"The costs of repatriation of prisoners of war shall in all cases be equitably apportioned between the Detaining Power and the Power on which the prisoners depend.

only obstacle to the realization of an armistice in Korea, and in order to satisfy the desire of the people of the world for peace, the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, in pursuance of their consistently maintained peace policy and their position of consistently working for the speedy realization of an armistice in Korea and striving for a peaceful settlement of the Korean question, thus to preserve and consolidate world peace, are prepared to take steps to eliminate the differences on this question so as to bring about an armistice in Korea.

To this end, the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea propose that both parties to the negotiations should undertake to repatriate immediately after the cessation of hostilities all those prisoners of war in their custody who insist upon repatriation and to hand over the remaining prisoners of war to a neutral state so as to insure a just solution to the question of their repatriation.

It must be pointed out that, in advancing this proposal, we by no means relinquish the principle of release and repatriation of war prisoners without delay after the cessation of hostilities set forth in Article 118 of the Geneva Convention, nor do we acknowledge the assertion of the United Nations Command that there are among the prisoners of war individuals who allegedly refuse repatriation.

It is only because the termination of the bloody war in Korea and the peaceful settlement of the Korean question is bound up with the question of the peace and security of the people of the Far East and the world that we take this new step and propose that, after the cessation of hostilities, those captured personnel of our side who, under the intimidation and oppression of the opposite side, are filled with apprehensions and are afraid to return home, be handed over to a neutral state and that explanations be given them by the side concerned, thus insuring that the question of their repatriation will be justly settled and will not obstruct the realization of an armistice in Korea.

We are convinced that this new step taken by the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for terminating the hostilities in Korea is in complete accord with the vital interests of the peoples whose sons are fighting on both sides in Korea and is also in complete accord with the fundamental interests of the people of the whole world. If the United Nations Command has the good faith to seek peace, this proposal of our side ought to be accepted by it.

#### STATEMENT BY PRESS OFFICER WHITE

*At a news conference on March 30, Lincoln White made the following statement in reply to questions concerning proposals for the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war:*

After more than 10 months, beginning in December 1951, of fruitless efforts by the U.N. Command

This apportionment shall be carried out on the following basis:

"(a) If the two Powers are contiguous, the Power on which the prisoners of war depend shall bear the costs of repatriation from the frontiers of the Detaining Power.

"(b) If the two Powers are not contiguous, the Detaining Power shall bear the costs of transport of prisoners of war over its own territory as far as its frontier or its port of embarkation nearest to the territory of the Power on which the prisoners of war depend. The Parties concerned shall agree between themselves as to the equitable apportionment of the remaining costs of the repatriation. The conclusion of this agreement shall in no circumstances justify any delay in the repatriation of the prisoners of war."

negotiators to reach agreement with the Communists on the question of the repatriation of prisoners of war on a humanitarian basis, negotiations were suspended at Panmunjom on October 8, 1952. At that time the U.N. Command made clear that it had exhausted every effort to find a formula to this end, only to have every proposal it put forward summarily rejected by the Communists.<sup>4</sup>

Accordingly, it stated that its proposals stood and it was prepared to resume negotiations if the Communists desired to accept any of those proposals or would make a constructive proposal of their own.

In the absence of any proposals from the Communist side, General Clark, on February 22, renewed the oft-repeated U.N. proposal that, in accordance with the Geneva Convention, an exchange of seriously sick and wounded prisoners of war not await conclusion of an armistice but be carried out immediately.

Somewhat over a month later, the Communists replied in what appeared to be an acceptance of General Clark's proposal. As the Secretary stated Saturday,<sup>5</sup> it is our hope that arrangements for this exchange can promptly be completed and carried out.

Meanwhile, as stated last October, U.N. Command liaison officers remain available at Panmunjom to receive any constructive proposals or further communications with regard to the armistice negotiations which the Communists wish to bring to our attention. As far as we know here, they have received nothing further since the Communists' letter of March 28. We, of course, welcome any indications that the Communists are now interested in resolving the entire prisoner-of-war question on a humanitarian basis.

#### **LETTER FROM GENERAL CLARK TO THE COMMUNIST COMMANDERS**

Press release 163 dated March 31

*On March 31 Gen. Mark W. Clark sent to General Kim Il Sung, Commander of the Korean People's Army, and Gen. Peng Teh-Huai, Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, the following reply to their letter of March 28<sup>6</sup> concerning the repatriation of seriously sick and wounded prisoners of war in Korea:*

1. I hereby acknowledge with pleasure the receipt of your letter of 28 March, 1953, in reply to my letter of 22 February,<sup>6</sup> and understand that you are fully prepared in accordance with our proposal to proceed immediately with the re-

<sup>4</sup> For texts of statements by General Clark and Lt. Gen. William K. Harrison, Jr., on the suspension of truce talks, see BULLETIN of Oct. 20, 1952, pp. 600, 601.

<sup>5</sup> For Secretary Dulles' statement of Mar. 28, see *ibid.*, Apr. 6, 1953, p. 495.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, Apr. 6, 1953, p. 494.

patriation of all seriously sick and wounded captured personnel during the period of hostilities. Accordingly, I propose that a meeting of the liaison groups headed by a General or Flag Officer representative from each side be held at Pan Mun Jom, at your earliest convenience, to make necessary detailed arrangements for the exchange of these captured persons.

2. I share the hope you expressed that a conclusion of the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war during the period of hostilities would make more likely a smooth settlement of the entire prisoner of war question. Accordingly I will be prepared to instruct my liaison group as a second order of business to meet with your liaison group to arrange for a resumption of armistice negotiations by our respective delegations. We take it as implicit in your suggestion in this respect that you would be prepared to accept U.N. Command proposals or make some comparable constructive proposal of your own which would constitute a valid basis for resumption of Delegation meetings.

3. I request that you advise me as soon as possible of your decision on my proposal with regard to the time of meeting between the liaison groups of both sides to arrange for the repatriation of all seriously sick and wounded captured persons.

#### **STATEMENT BY SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER MOLOTOV**

*Following is the text of a statement by Vyacheslav M. Molotov, Soviet Foreign Minister, as broadcast by the Moscow radio on April 1:*

On the 28th of March, a letter of reply was published from Kim Il Sung, Commander in Chief of the Korean People's Army and Peng Teh-huai, Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers addressed to General Clark, Commander in Chief of the United Nations forces in Korea regarding the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war.

The letter voices agreement with the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war of both sides and indicates that in this question virtual agreement was reached during the course of the Korean truce talks and that only the interruption of the Panmunjom truce talks prevented this exchange from taking place earlier.

Agreement has also been expressed to exchange sick and wounded prisoners of war in accordance with clauses of Article 109 of the Geneva Convention referring to the period of military operations. At the same time, the letter stresses that such an exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war must lead to the unhindered settlement of the entire prisoner-of-war question and thereby to the achievements of an armistice in Korea.

With this aim in view it is proposed immediately to resume talks in Panmunjom. Following this, a statement was made in Peiping by the Premier of the State Administrative Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Chinese People's Republic, Chou En-lai, and in Pyongyang by the Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Korean People's Democratic Republic, Kim Il Sung.

Both the Governments of the Chinese People's Republic and the Government of the Korean People's Democratic Republic have stated that they agree to the proposal for the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war and,

as before, express readiness to reach agreement on the immediate settlement of the entire prisoner-of-war question and thereby of ending the war in Korea.

I am authorized to state that the Soviet Government expresses its full solidarity with this noble act of the Government of the Chinese People's Republic and the Government of the Korean People's Democratic Republic and has no doubt that this act will find ardent support among peoples throughout the world.

The Soviet Government also expresses confidence that this proposal will be correctly understood by the Government of the United States of America.

The Soviet Government has unswervingly supported all steps directed toward the reaching of a just armistice and the ending of the war in Korea. The beginning for this was laid in the reply of the head of the Soviet Government, J. V. Stalin, to the request of the Premier of India, Mr. Nehru, as far back as July, 1950.

As is known, the radio broadcast in New York in June, 1951, by the U.S.S.R. representative in the Security Council<sup>7</sup> served as a basis for beginning truce talks in Korea. These truce talks, which first took place in Kaesong and subsequently in Panmunjom, led to agreement on all conditions of the armistice excepting the question of the repatriation of prisoners of war but the truce talks were interrupted by General Clark in October last year, which delayed the conclusion of an armistice.

The Chinese and Korean side have accepted General Clark's proposal that an exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war should be made in conformity with Article 109 of the Geneva Convention of 1949 concerning treatment of prisoners of war.

This Article states: . . .<sup>8</sup>

This Article of the Geneva Convention refers to the period prior to the armistice, when military operations have not yet been suspended. Since the agreement on the application of this Article has been reached by now and may be signed in the next few days by both sides, no obstacles will be left in the way of the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war beginning without further delay.

The aforementioned letter of the Commauder in Chief of the Korean People's Army, Kim Il Sung, and the Commauder of the Chinese People's Volunteers, Gen. Peng Teh-huai, not only expresses consent to General Clark's proposal of Feb. 22 on the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war, but also proposes resumption of the armistice talks in order to put an end to the war in Korea.

Particular attention must be paid to the fact that the statement of Foreign Minister Chou En-lai on March 30, worked out jointly by the Governments of the Chinese People's Republic and the Korean People's Democratic Republic, proposes not only to exchange the sick and wounded prisoners of war, but also to decide the question on repatriation of prisoners of war as a whole, leading to the conclusion of an agreement on an armistice and the cessation of the war in Korea.

The Government of the Chinese People's Republic and the Government of the Korean People's Republic on their side propose: Following the sensible settlement of the question concerning the sick and wounded prisoners of war, to solve the whole question of prisoners of war in order that both sides be guided by the sincere desire to reach an armistice in Korea in the spirit of a mutual compromise.

The question of the repatriation of prisoners of war must, of course, be decided in conformity with the principles of the Geneva Convention on which, naturally, the Soviet Government insisted, as did the Governments of the Chinese People's Republic and the Korean People's Democratic Republic. As is known neither the prolonged talks in Panmunjom, however, nor the repeated discus-

sions of this question at the General Assembly of United Nations, produced any positive results.

Inasmuch as this question remained the only difference between the belligerent sides in Korea presenting an obstacle to an agreement on an armistice, the Governments of the Chinese People's Republic and the Korean People's Democratic Republic, guided by the desire to achieve peace and an end of the war in Korea, took a step toward a final solution of this question.

They proposed that both sides resume talks on the armistice, committing themselves to repatriate, immediately after the cessation of military operations, all prisoners of war in their hands insisting on repatriation, while handing over the rest of the prisoners of war to a neutral state with the object of ensuring a fair solution of the question of their repatriation.

This proposal allows for a fair solution of the question of the repatriation of prisoners of war and for an elimination of the remaining obstacles for the realization of an armistice in Korea.

There can be no doubt that the peoples of the whole world, desiring to put an end to the war in Korea and to promote the strengthening of peace and the security of the peoples in the Far East and all the world, will welcome this proposal with warm sympathy and offer it full support.

The Soviet Government recognizes the entire fairness of this proposal of the Government of the Chinese People's Republic and the Government of the Korean People's Democratic Republic, and is prepared to cooperate fully in its realization.

Naturally, the United Nations could do more as regards an armistice in Korea if it were to include legal representatives of China and Korea.

The fact that the Chinese people and the Korean people are deprived of their lawful representation in the United Nations, firstly, undermines the prestige of this organization, and secondly, deprives it of the possibility of assisting as it should in the strengthening of international security and universal peace.

The Soviet Government considers it its duty to recall that the question of the restitution of the rights of the Chinese and Korean peoples in the United Nations is one of the most urgent questions, and that the restitution of the rights of China and Korea in the United Nations, particularly under present conditions, is in the interests of the raising of the prestige and international importance of the United Nations and will promote the strengthening of peace throughout the world.

## Visit of Chancellor Adenauer

On April 1 the Department of State announced that the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Konrad Adenauer, and his party will arrive at Washington on April 7. The Chancellor's party will be met at Washington National Airport by Vice President Nixon, Secretary Dulles, and other officials of the Government, including George M. Humphrey, Secretary of the Treasury; Charles E. Wilson, Secretary of Defense; and Harold M. Stassen, Director for Mutual Security. At 12 noon the Chancellor will meet with President Eisenhower at the White House and at 3 p.m. he will call on Secretary Dulles.

On April 8 the National Press Club will give a luncheon in honor of the Chancellor at the National Press Building; an afternoon meeting with Secretary Dulles will follow. On that evening, Secretary Dulles will give a dinner in honor of the Chancellor.

<sup>7</sup> For an excerpt from the statement made by Jacob A. Malik on June 23, 1951, see *ibid.*, July 9, 1951, p. 45.

<sup>8</sup> For text of the article quoted by Mr. Molotov, see *ibid.*, Apr. 6, 1953, p. 495.

On April 9, following a meeting with Chancellor Adenauer, the President will give a luncheon in his honor.

On April 10 the Chancellor and his party will depart for San Francisco.

From April 11 to April 18, the Chancellor and party will visit Carmel, Calif., Chicago, New York, Boston, and Ottawa.

Included in Chancellor Adenauer's party are the following persons: Miss Lotte Adenauer, daughter of the Chancellor; Dr. Walter Halstein, State Secretary of Foreign Affairs; Dr. Vollrath Freiherr von Maltzan, Chief, Office of Foreign Trade; Hans Heinrich von Herwarth, Chief of Protocol; Felix von Eckardt, Chief, Press and Information Office; and Dr. Alexander Böker of the Foreign Office.

## Planning Board To Assist National Security Council

White House press release dated March 23

The President has been giving attention to strengthening and improving the operations of the National Security Council (Nsc). On several occasions he has stressed the importance which he places upon the effective functioning of the Council. He feels that in these critical times the Council can afford the greatest possible assistance to the President in deciding policy issues affecting the national security.

The President has decided that he expects to have in regular attendance at Council meetings, in addition to himself and the Vice President, the following: the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director for Mutual Security, and (when appointed) the Director of Defense Mobilization.

Beside the above Council members, those regularly attending Council meetings as advisers will be the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Special Assistant to the President for Cold War Planning (C. D. Jackson). For executive and staff functions at Council meetings, there will be in attendance Robert Cutler, administrative assistant to the President, and the Council's executive secretary and deputy executive secretary.

The President has named Mr. Cutler as special assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Mr. Cutler will be the principal executive officer of the National Security Council and serve as chairman of its newly established Planning Board.

To bring to Council deliberations a fresh point of view, not burdened with departmental responsibilities, the President plans from time to time to call upon qualified civilians to act as informal consultants to the Council. At present, seven prominent citizens are spending a good part of

the month of March in Washington as civilian consultants. The President believes that this procedure will prove useful to him and to the other Council members.

In order to provide continuous assistance to the Council in its planning operations, the President has established an Nsc Planning Board to take the place of the former Nsc Senior Staff. This Board will be composed of qualified members and advisers from the departments and agencies represented at the Council table. Each person selected for the Planning Board is appointed by the President, on nomination of the chief of the department or agency concerned, and for this purpose will become a special assistant for National Security Affairs. To date the President has appointed the following:

Chairman: Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Treasury Member: Andrew N. Overby, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury  
Defense Member: Frank C. Nash, Assistant Secretary of Defense  
Mutual Security Member: Frank N. Roberts, Military Adviser, Director for Mutual Security  
Odm Member: William Y. Elliott, Office of Director of Defense Mobilization  
Joint Chiefs of Staff Adviser: Maj. Gen. John K. Gerhart, Office, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
Central Intelligence Agency Adviser: Robert Amory, Jr., Assistant Deputy Director for Intelligence  
Psychological Strategy Board Adviser: George A. Morgan, Acting Director, Psychological Strategy Board

A member from the Department of State will be named during the next few days.

The President has authorized additional technical staff assistance for the Council. He also has reappointed James S. Lay, Jr., and S. Everett Gleason as executive secretary and deputy executive secretary, respectively. They will continue to head the permanent staff of the Council.

## Burma Asks Discontinuance of U. S. Aid Program

*The Foreign Minister of Burma, Sao Hkun Hkio, on March 17 sent the following letter to William Sebald, U.S. Ambassador at Rangoon:*

MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR, I am to request under Article V of the Economic Cooperation Agreement between our two governments that the Government of the United States of America will accept notice that we do not desire the aid program to continue beyond June 30, 1953.

The Government of the Union of Burma, however, wish to put on record their appreciation and gratitude for the materials and services received under the Economic Cooperation Agreement which are of great help to them in implementing their rehabilitation programs.

Believe me, etc.,

SAO HKUN HKIO.

# Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation With Japan

Press release 170 dated April 2

A treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation between the United States and Japan was signed on April 2 at Tokyo. Ambassador Robert D. Murphy signed for the United States and Foreign Minister Katsuo Okazaki signed for Japan. The treaty must be ratified by both Governments before it will become effective. It is expected that the treaty will shortly be submitted to the U.S. Senate with a view to obtaining its advice and consent to ratification of the treaty by this Government.

In article 12 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan, signed at San Francisco on September 8, 1951, Japan declared its readiness to enter into negotiations with each of the Allied Powers of treaties "to place their trading, maritime and other commercial relations on a stable and friendly basis." As Secretary Dulles observed in his statement at the opening of the San Francisco conference, the Treaty of Peace by itself could do little more in the field of general economic relations than "point the way to a healthy trade relationship and create the opportunity to go in that way." The treaty signed April 2 marks a significant advance in relations between the United States and Japan, for by this treaty the two Governments record their agreement, in completely mutual terms, upon advanced and enlightened principles to govern on an enduring basis the conduct of general economic relations between the two countries.

In common with other treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation entered into by the United States in recent years, the new treaty deals in considerable detail with a wide range of subject matter. In general, each of the two Governments (1) agrees to accord, within its territories, to citizens and corporations of the other, treatment no less favorable than it accords to its own citizens and corporations with respect to the normal run of commercial and industrial pursuits; (2) affirms its adherence to the principles of nondiscriminatory treatment of trade and shipping; (3) formally endorses standards regarding the protection of persons, their property, and interests that reflect the most enlightened constitutional principles; and (4) recognizes the need for special attention to the problems of stimulating the flow of private capital investment.

Specifically, the provisions of the treaty fall into eight broad categories: (1) entry, travel, and residence; (2) basic personal freedoms; (3) guarantees for property rights; (4) the conduct and control of business enterprises; (5) taxation; (6) exchange restrictions; (7) the exchange of goods; and (8) navigation. While the new treaty adheres closely to the substantive pattern of other recent treaties, it contains several provisions

that are new to U.S. commercial treaties. Notable among these is the provision establishing, pursuant to authorization given in the new Immigration and Nationality Act, a special category of treaty aliens, who are permitted entry for the purpose of developing the operations of business enterprises in which they have a substantial investment. Another noteworthy new provision is one designed to assure the maintenance of a free market in the field of marine insurance.

Pending the entry into force of the new treaty, general economic relations between the United States and Japan will continue to be governed by article 12 of the Treaty of Peace, which sets forth certain broad rules for the conduct of such relations between the Allied Powers and Japan during an interim period of 4 years. When the new treaty comes into effect, it will supersede these provisions of article 12 as between the two countries.

## Technical Cooperation Agreement With Pakistan

Press release 172 dated April 3

The Technical Cooperation Administration of the Department of State has been informed that a supplementary program agreement for fiscal year 1953 was signed at Karachi April 1 for technical cooperation between the United States and Pakistan. It provides for an American allotment up to \$12,254,000. The Government of Pakistan will bear all rupee costs of joint projects which will at least equal the American costs. The agreement is supplementary to the Point Four Program agreement signed between the two Governments February 2, 1952.<sup>1</sup>

At the same time Country Director Ralph Will, and Said Hassam, representing the Government of Pakistan, signed project agreements for the utilization of \$8,437,500 of these funds on specific activities.

The specific agreements are

1. The United States will make available \$437,000 for the continuation of the Village Agricultural and Industrial Development Program toward which it gave \$2,300,000 of fiscal year 1952 funds. This program is designed to increase the efficiency of agricultural production, improve health and sanitary conditions, expand the production of goods and services at the village level to meet local needs, and to introduce cottage industries to provide off-season employment to raise the level of real income and expand total net gross income.

2. The United States will make available \$3,700,000 for the importation of fertilizer. Increased food production is one of Pakistan's prime

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Feb. 25, 1952, p. 296.

requirements and its major source is agriculture. Last fiscal year the United States provided \$900,000 towards the purchase of 10,000 tons of fertilizer. The new program will provide the fertilizer to Pakistani farmers to enable them to step up the production of wheat and other essential grains to meet a situation which is causing deep concern to the Pakistan Government.

3. \$100,000 will be furnished by the United States toward the construction of a Water Development Laboratory at Karachi to provide water research services for the entire nation.

4. The United States will supply \$3 million to assist in the construction of a fertilizer factory at Karachi. The entire cost of the factory is estimated at \$13,307,000, exclusive of consultants' fees and ocean freight on materials purchased outside of Pakistan. When completed the factory will produce approximately 50,000 tons of ammonium sulphate annually.

5. \$450,000 will be furnished by the United States, principally in engineering services, toward the construction of a dam across the Bolan River at Sibi in Baluchistan and for the irrigation and reclamation of land in that area. This project also is being assisted by the Colombo plan. The dam will be constructed by Pakistan and will be finished within one year. It will be earth-filled and will have a height of 70 feet and be 600 yards long. It should provide irrigation for about 35,000 acres and the resettlement of 2,500 refugee families.

6. Assistance to the amount of \$750,000 will be provided by the United States for the development of modern fishing facilities in Karachi. The tremendous increase in the population of Karachi, from about 400,000 before partition to the present 1,500,000 has posed an urgent problem of increased food production. The construction of modern facilities for handling fish, motorizing the fishing fleet, and other improvements in the service should result in important increases in the volume of fish and insure safe supplies of this important food item.

In addition to the above project agreements, consultations are under way in Karachi for the formulation of others to round out the entire program as outlined in the general agreement signed April 1.

## **Control of Shipments to Communist China, North Korea**

### **Discussion With Senator McCarthy**

Press release 168 dated April 1

Secretary Dulles and Senator McCarthy had lunch on April 1 at Senator McCarthy's suggestion. They discussed measures for the control of trade with countries of the Communist bloc.

Senator McCarthy told of the informal understanding which certain Greek shipowners had

communicated to the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations in which they undertook to abstain from certain areas of trade with the Soviet bloc.

The Secretary reviewed the progress recently made by the Department of State in securing the cooperation of foreign nations in accomplishing the policy declared by Congress in the Battle Act "to apply an embargo on the shipment of strategic materials to the countries of the Soviet Bloc." It was noted that cooperation and advice from members of Congress is helpful in the administration of the act. However, that act places on the Administrator of the act (Mr. Stassen) the responsibility for coordinating the activities of the agencies concerned with security controls over exports from other countries. It was pointed out the dangers that would result if congressional committees entered into the field of foreign relations, which is in the exclusive jurisdiction of the Chief Executive.

Senator McCarthy stated that he was aware of these considerations and had no desire or intention to act contrary to them. He said that in the conduct of his committee's investigation facts had been developed which would be useful and for the benefit of the country.

Senator McCarthy further pointed out that neither he nor his committee had made or contemplated making any agreement with any foreign governments or foreign shipping groups, but that as a by-product of the committee's investigation, certain foreign shipping groups had voluntarily agreed among themselves to abstain from participation in the Communist China trade and inter-Soviet bloc trade, a result which both Secretary Dulles and Senator McCarthy felt was in the national interest.

The Secretary thanked the Senator for the information tendered and said that it would be helpful in further negotiations with foreign countries. Senator McCarthy further advised that if in the future similar information would be developed it would be promptly communicated to the proper authorities to the end that the most advantageous use of it would be made.

### **Department Statement**

*The following statement was issued by the Department on March 30 in response to queries concerning the action taken by the Greek Government to prevent the shipment of strategic materials to Communist China and North Korea:*

On March 23 the Council of Ministers of the Greek Government reached a decision to prohibit all Greek flag vessels from calling at any port in Communist China or North Korea. This decision had the effect of law immediately, although it is subject to ratification by the Greek Parliament. Its effect is binding on all ships of Greek registry.

Other countries which have taken similar action



in compliance with the U.N. General Assembly resolution of May 18, 1951<sup>1</sup> are:

Honduras—December 22, 1950

Liberia—July 23, 1951

Panama—August 18, 1951

Costa Rica—January 26, 1952.

The United Kingdom on March 7, 1953, decided, in addition to the system of controls already in force to prevent the shipment of strategic materials to Communist China and North Korea, to introduce a system of voyage licensing for vessels registered in the United Kingdom and the colonies so that strategic materials from non-British sources could not be carried to China in British ships and to prevent the bunkering in British ports of ships of Soviet bloc or other nationality carrying strategic cargoes to Communist China.

On March 28 the French Government agreed to take the necessary measures to prevent the bunkering in French ports of ships carrying to Communist China cargoes of strategic materials and the transportation by French ships of cargoes of strategic character to ports of Communist China.<sup>2</sup>

For a considerable period Canada has maintained a strict embargo over shipments of strategic materials to Communist China, and since August 1951 no ships of Canadian registry have been engaged in trade with Communist China.

For its part, the United States on December 3, 1950, brought all shipments to Communist China and North Korea under licensing control.<sup>3</sup> On December 8, 1950, an order was issued prohibiting ships of U.S. registry from carrying without prior approval controlled commodities to any Soviet bloc ports, including Communist China and North Korea.<sup>4</sup> On December 16, 1950, the United States placed under control all Chinese Communist assets within U.S. jurisdiction and also issued an order prohibiting U.S. ships and aircraft from touching at mainland China and North Korean ports and from carrying anywhere in the world goods destined for Communist China.<sup>5</sup>

In all, some 45 countries have indicated, in response to the U.N. China Embargo Resolution, that they are preventing the shipment of strategic commodities to Communist China and North Korea or that they do not produce or trade in the items concerned.

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of May 28, 1951, p. 849.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, Apr. 6, 1953, p. 491.

<sup>3</sup> For a complete report on U.S. action, see *ibid.*, July 9, 1951, p. 54.

<sup>4</sup> Transportation Order T-1, *ibid.*, p. 59.

<sup>5</sup> Transportation Order T-2, *ibid.*, p. 60. For Department statement on this order and on the blocking of Chinese Communist assets, see *ibid.*, Dec. 25, 1950, p. 1004.

## Current Legislation on Foreign Policy

Providing For An Under Secretary of State (For Administration). Report (To accompany S. 243). H. Rept. 5, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 pp.

Thirteenth Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission. S. Doc. 3, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 210 pp.

Nomination of Charles E. Bohlen. Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eighty-Third Congress, First Session on the Nomination of Charles E. Bohlen to be United States Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. March 2 and 18, 1953. 128 pp.

German Consulate-America House Program. First Intermediate Report of the Committee on Government Operations. H. Rept. 168, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 pp.

German Consulate-America House Program. Hearing Before a Special Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives, Eighty-Third Congress, First Session. February 17, 1953. 86 pp.

Inquiring Into Certain Operations and Conditions in Korea. Adverse Report (To accompany H. Res. 171). H. Rept. 164, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 pp.

World War II International Agreements and Understandings Entered Into During Secret Conferences Concerning Other Peoples. March 12, 1953. Committee Print. 83d Congress, 1st Session. 138 pp.

Organization of Federal Executive Departments and Agencies. Report of the Committee on Government Operations. S. Rept. 80, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 32 pp.

Proceedings at the Enshrining of The Declaration of Independence, The Constitution of the United States and The Bill of Rights in the Exhibition Hall of the National Archives Building December Fifteenth, Nineteen Hundred and Fifty-two. S. Doc. 13, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 22 pp.

War Claims Arising Out of World War II. Letter From the War Claims Commission Transmitting the Supplementary Report of the War Claims Commission on War Claims Arising Out of World War II, Pursuant to Section 8 of the War Claims Act of 1948, As Amended, and the Letter of the President, Dated January 16, 1953. H. Doc. 67, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 247 pp.

Joining With the President of the United States in a Declaration Regarding the Subjugation of Free Peoples by the Soviet Union. Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Eighty-Third Congress, First Session on H. J. Res. 200, Joining With the President of the United States in a Declaration Regarding the Subjugation of Free Peoples by the Soviet Union (and Similar Pending Measures). February 26, 1953. 61 pp.

Studying the Palestinian Arab Refugee Situation. Report (to accompany S. Res. 81). S. Rept. 52, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 pp.

Second Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1953. Report (To accompany H. R. 3053). S. Rept. 48, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 23 pp.

Status of International Military Headquarters Set Up Pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty. Message From the President of the United States Transmitting A Protocol on the Status of International Military Headquarters Set Up Pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty, Signed at Paris, on August 28, 1952. S. Exec. B, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 pp.

## Review of the ECE Economic Survey of Europe

*Statement by Miriam Camp*<sup>1</sup>

Before I begin my comments, I should like to refer to the Executive Secretary's opening remarks concerning the late date of publication of the survey.<sup>2</sup> As he recognized, it has been impossible in view of the short time the survey has been available to have had it thoroughly considered by the interested branches of my Government, and therefore my comments can only be of a very preliminary character. It may well be that the U.S. representative at Ecosoc will wish to comment further.

This year the Secretariat [of the Economic Commission for Europe] has produced for us, once again, a survey of the economic problems and prospects of Europe which embodies that imaginative approach and statistical energy which we have come almost to take for granted, but for which we must nonetheless remain continually grateful and impressed. The fact that the survey this year presents a broad analysis of developments since the war and outlines comprehensively an independent view of the directions which European policy should take in the future greatly enhances its value.

I should like to say at once that in the very broadest terms, both the diagnosis of the economic problems of Western Europe and the prescriptions offered seem to us to look in the right directions and are presented in ways, and with a wealth of factual information, which, at least for me, have shed new light on the problems with which we are all so concerned. Like its predecessor, but like too few other economic studies, it is lucidly and skillfully written. Having said this and having done so from real conviction and not from mere inaugural politeness, I feel more at liberty to proceed to a few less favorable reactions.

<sup>1</sup>Made on Mar. 16 before the U.N. Economic Commission for Europe at Geneva. Miss Camp, who served as acting head of the U.S. delegation to the ECE meeting, is Officer in Charge of Economic Organization Affairs, Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State.

<sup>2</sup>*The Economic Survey of Europe Since the War: A Re-appraisal of Problems and Prospects* (U.N. doc. E/ECE/157).

I am sure that the Secretariat is by now inured—indeed, perhaps completely numb—to the comment that it sometimes appears to be aspiring to the position of the economic Cassandra of Europe. Nonetheless, I feel that there is a point of real substance in this general comment, and I feel bound to say, once again, a few words on the subject.

A careful review of the facts and figures to be found in the survey indicates that a rather remarkable amount of progress has been made by the free world in the past 5 years—in increasing production, in bringing inflation under control, in expanding trade, in maintaining a high level of investment, in avoiding any major recession, in achieving a more equitable distribution of income, in mounting a necessary and substantial defense effort, and in developing units of and institutions for international economic cooperation. In short, an impressive groundwork for continued progress and for an expanding world economy has been established. Yet this is not the impression one receives from the survey, particularly not from a quick reading of the survey.

The economist is, of course, always free to take a broad historical approach to the problems with which he is dealing. Given our limited understanding of economic processes, and given the harsh character of the economic history of recent decades, such an approach must, almost inevitably, highlight the past failures of government policy and emphasize the possibility that such failures will recur.

### **Different Approach Needed**

It seems to me, however, that economists who are closely concerned with analyzing problems of government policy from month to month and year to year, and with appraising the practical alternatives of policy for the future, would do us a greater service if they were to take a somewhat different approach. Past disasters and failures of policy should serve primarily to illuminate decisions

which must be taken in the present. The future might be viewed against less perfectionist standards and with less apparent certainty that the errors of the past will be repeated.

Another general comment which I should like to make concerns the treatment accorded to the Eastern European countries in comparison with that given to the West. The survey's approach to the Eastern European countries is reflected in the statement that "the cloud of difficulties which has arisen in particular industries at various times should not be allowed to obscure the picture of achievement of the Eastern European governments." For the Western European countries, the approach appears to be that the massive achievements since the war should not be allowed to obscure the inadequacies of policy in the past and the major difficulties with which the governments of Western Europe are still faced.

There sometimes seems to be a lack of parallelism in the methods of economic analysis that are applied to the two areas and to the standards against which achievements are treated. Results that are wide of the target tend to be "failures" in Western Europe but only "shortfalls" in Eastern Europe. Social costs, political factors, alternative lines of policy all come in for more scrutiny and comment in those sections of the report that deal with Western Europe, as indeed they do in Western Europe itself. The very availability of an abundance of public discussion and analysis in one area, and its absence in the other, undoubtedly tends to this result.

The Polish delegate<sup>3</sup> in his remarks on Saturday made a considerable point of the fact that he felt the Eastern European countries could not and should not be judged by the same standards as are used in judging the countries of the West, and he strongly felt the Secretariat had been wrong to try to do so.

I feel, on the contrary, that they should be commended for trying and encouraged to try even harder in the future. For unless achievements can be tested against the same standards and unless the methods of analysis and the degree of critical judgment applied are the same for all areas dealt with by the survey, the usefulness of any attempt at an all-European economic analysis will be seriously undermined.

#### **Difficulties of Obtaining Data**

The chapters on the Soviet Union and the other countries of Eastern Europe inevitably reflect the familiar inability of even the most energetic and persistent research worker to secure adequate information on developments in this area. The best that it appears to be possible to do, so far as the U.S.S.R. is concerned, is to present an exposition of plans of varying duration, largely accepting at

<sup>3</sup> Eugeniusz Jan Milnikiel, Polish Minister to Sweden, who spoke on Mar. 14.

face value data whose significance cannot really be tested. In fact, in the case of the U.S.S.R., it seems to be impossible even to avoid presenting statistical series which are clearly not comparable.

There can, of course, be little doubt that production and investment have risen substantially in the Eastern countries. There can equally be no doubt that we shall never really know the true magnitude of these increases, and that any discrepancies between planned and actual increases will be concealed in those countries, to the best of governmental ability.

From the standpoint of trying to compare economic trends in the East and the West, perhaps the most interesting sections are those concerning living standards and the distribution of incomes in the Eastern countries. It is made quite clear that an increase in living standards plays no part in the immediate policy objectives of the Eastern European governments; and, even though reliable information in this field is as meager as in others, it is equally clear that the Eastern governments have been successful in directing productive resources to industrial and military production at the expense of improved living standards.

One of the most interesting problems with which the Eastern governments appear to be faced is that of preventing increases in workers' productivity from being translated into increases either in money wages or in real wages. This current policy of the Eastern countries might be compared with the contrasting one of wage increases in accord with productivity increases which is being embodied more and more in major American wage contracts.

#### **Reasons for Decline in East-West Trade**

The survey also throws light on some of the fundamental reasons for the great decline in trade between Eastern and Western Europe; reasons which were omitted from most of the statements made in the course of the trade discussion the other day. The tables presented show that the volume of exports from Eastern to Western Europe in 1951 was little more than one-fourth as great as in 1938, whereas exports from the West to the East were about one-half as large in volume. Price changes were of course an important factor in the relatively larger decline in exports from the East.

The survey points out one reason for hesitation on the part of the West to increase trade with the East—the fact that useless credits have been accumulated by the West in several Eastern countries because of failure by the latter to provide the volume of exports foreseen in the trade agreements which they negotiated and signed.

However, an analysis of the data presented in the survey indicates a more basic cause for this shrinkage in the exports from Eastern to Western European countries. The most fundamental

cause of the continuing decline of East-West trade is, I believe, to be found in the fact that each of the Eastern European countries is pursuing a policy of autarchy, of economic self-sufficiency to the maximum extent of its ability, and that, where such a policy of individual autarchy is not feasible, every effort is made to buy goods from, and to sell them to, other countries in Eastern Europe rather than the West. Trade among the Eastern countries had increased tenfold since before the war, in contrast with the steep decline in their exports to the West. Each country in Eastern Europe is seeking to develop not only basic industries, but also engineering, transportation equipment, and other such industries, and the area as a whole is pursuing policies clearly designed to insure that, at the earliest possible time, the Soviet world can achieve economic isolation.

Not only is this objective implicit in the material presented in the survey but it is an objective which has been publicly expressed many times by the highest officials of the U.S.S.R. and of the other countries of Eastern Europe. From such statements of policy as the well-known *Bolshevik* article of February 1, 1952, published this last autumn, one cannot escape the conclusion that trade with the West is looked upon as a transitional measure, as a means to end such trade.

#### Western European Policies

Turning now to those much more informative and critical sections of the survey which deal with the countries of Western Europe, I have already commented on the survey's tendency to concentrate on the inadequacies of Western policies at the expense of giving due weight to the truly major achievements since the war in the expansion of production and trade. This approach is perhaps least happily exemplified in the remark about "the much-advertised conditions in some highly industrialized countries, which by skillful policy or good luck have escaped mass unemployment."

It seems to me wrong to belittle in this way a reduction of unemployment in Northwestern Europe which, according to the survey table, fell from 3.1 million in 1938 to only 800,000 in 1951, or by nearly three-fourths. To allow this achievement to be obscured by the peculiar difficulties of assimilating refugees in Western Germany and by the structural problems of the South, seems to me an unfortunate distortion. It was hardly to be expected that the millions of refugees who came from the East just before the war—or, indeed, the thousands now pouring in from the East—could be easily or quickly absorbed.

These comments are not, of course, intended in any way to question the seriousness of the unemployment problem in Southern Europe and in Western Germany, or the need for remedies on which the survey rightly places so much emphasis.

The gains of Western European countries in expanding production and trade since the war have been as impressive as their success in maintaining high levels of employment. The survey, however, is unquestionably correct in pointing out that a few years ago too much hope was held out that a simple expansion of production and trade would bring a solution to Europe's problems; and that there was too little recognition of the very major changes that were needed in the pattern of production, prices, and trade, and in the efficiency and flexibility of European production. The survey is undoubtedly right also in emphasizing that the countries of Western Europe have been perhaps too generous in their judgments of what they could afford to send without return to associated countries overseas, and too lenient in their views of the increases in living standards at home which were compatible with economic strength over the long term. These were undoubtedly "inadequacies" of policy. They cannot, however, it seems to me, justly be called "failures." And, at least in the West, we may see some merit in the fact that these inadequacies were ones of generosity and of humanity.

Broadly speaking, the survey's conclusions concerning the needed directions of Western European policy point the right way. The judgment that Western European countries must increase production in directions which will expand their dollar earnings in relation to their dollar expenditures is hardly open to debate. Equally unarguable is the need for a more effective allocation and use of the supplies of goods and capital which Western European countries have been sending abroad; and, indeed, in the allocation of investment in Western European countries themselves.

These objectives can certainly be achieved only by some *relative* displacement of American production, whether that production is exported or used at home. If there is any quarrel with the general lines of the survey's analysis and recommendations in this field, it would be that they appear to imply a static level of world trade for some years into the future—a constant amount from which the countries of Western Europe must carve an increased share at the expense of U.S. exports or domestic production rather than an expanding level in which Western Europe gains an increasing share. In the chapter on integration, the survey very rightly stresses that progress toward greater European unification can be expected to be reasonably rapid only in the context of expanding economies. The same consideration surely applies to the problem of finding a lasting solution to Europe's trade difficulties.

I would not wish these comments to be interpreted as an indication that the United States would not welcome more effective European competition in world trade. Indeed, the United States, both through substantial *economic aid* and

through many other programs, has emphasized the need for, and has sought to make a direct contribution to, increased European efficiency and competitiveness.

### U.S. Economic Policies

In this general connection, the survey, and a number of speakers, have emphasized the need for action by the U.S. Government on tariffs and related measures which might make it easier for foreign goods to be sold in the American market. This whole problem is, as you know, one that is now receiving the close attention of our new administration. In his first State of the Union message to the Congress,<sup>4</sup> President Eisenhower called particular attention to the need for a revision in our customs regulations and for an immediate study of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act. These questions have also been the subject of increased attention by public groups in the United States. Just recently the Public Advisory Board, composed of distinguished private citizens representing business, agriculture, and labor, and the Council of Economic Development, a prominent business group, have both issued reports advocating sweeping changes in our tariff laws and regulations.<sup>5</sup>

As a final comment on the survey's approach to the achievements of Western Europe in expanding production and trade, I should like to question the appropriateness of the frequency with which the term "stagnation" is used to describe economic developments over the past 18 months. It was, of course, inevitable that the survey's analysis should be based on data extending only through the third quarter of last year. The fact that this third quarter usually shows a sharp seasonal decline, however, together with the marked divergency in trends among the various industries, might, in my opinion, have led the Secretariat to use some more cautious word than "stagnation"—perhaps "leveling off."

The information now available for the fourth quarter, although it presents a somewhat mixed picture, on balance, shows signs of a marked upturn. The index of industrial production for the OEEC countries which stood at 129 in the third quarter of 1952 rose to 145 in the fourth. This, of course, is also a normal seasonal development. Intra-Western European trade rose to a new high and deficits with the United States and Canada were reduced.

The survey's last chapter, that on "Problems of Economic Integration," opens with the gloomy statement that:

The process of international economic disintegration in Europe has been going on, more or less continuously, during the last four decades.

<sup>4</sup> BULLETIN of Feb. 9, 1953, p. 207.

<sup>5</sup> For a summary of the former report, see *ibid.*, Mar. 23, 1953, p. 436.

It goes on to say that:

So far there have been no clear signs of a reversal of these trends. Quite apart from the effects of the East-West split, the main tendency in Western Europe has been one towards continued disintegration of the international economy.

The first statement, of course, has very substantial truth in it. The automatic gold standard has, indeed, disappeared, and the universal acceptance by Western governments of the need to maintain high levels of employment and rising living standards has certainly increased the practical difficulties with which governments are faced both in meeting their domestic aims and in seeking an expanding and freer world trade.

The question may be asked, however, whether it would really be better if these new aims of government were to be abandoned. And if the answer to this question is "no," as the survey itself implies, the further question may be asked whether it is not somewhat beside the point to characterize a period in which major new aims and policies have been assumed as one of "continuing disintegration."

As for the statement that "the main tendency in Western Europe has been one toward *continued* disintegration of the international economy," the evidence to the contrary seems to me to deserve rather more attention than it receives. Surely the OEEC, embracing as it does the European Payments Union with its concomitant program of trade liberalization, has been a major factor in arresting the threatened disintegration of the immediate postwar years and in promoting increasing integration of the Western European economy. The establishment of the Coal and Steel Community was a tremendously bold step forward. Indeed, it does seem to me that examination of the evidence in this survey—although it reveals very great difficulties which have made progress less rapid than had been hoped and which will undoubtedly continue to be a brake on as rapid future progress as might be hoped for—leads to the conclusion that the trend in Western Europe over the past 5 years has been toward increasing rather than decreasing economic integration.

The survey's emphasis on the need for developing the underdeveloped areas in Southern Europe is greatly to be welcomed; although the survey perhaps goes a little far in interrelating as closely as it does the problem of further Western European integration in Western Europe and the solution of the problems of the underdeveloped countries in the South.

Particularly questionable is the suggestion that substantial tariff protection is essential to aid these underdeveloped areas of Southern Europe. Surely there are many alternative possibilities which would be considered before embarking on a major new system of tariff protection, which could have so many damaging repercussions in other areas of policy. A full historical appraisal

of the causes of continued poverty in Southern Italy would reveal many causes in addition to, and of more fundamental importance than, lack of tariff protection.

In summing up this section, the survey rightly concludes that "experience suggests the need to realize that the institutional setting in Western Europe necessitates a very empirical approach to the practical problems of international integration." This endorsement of the practical approach is to be welcomed and can well be underlined as a guide to the governments which are striving to make further progress in this field, although with the Dutch delegate, I feel that if real progress is to be made, the empirical approach has to be combined with goals that fire the imagination.

In coming to the end of my statement, I am very aware that the balance has been more on the side of criticism than on praise. Indeed, I am afraid I have yielded to that weakness which seemed to me to have characterized too much of the survey's approach to the problems of Western Europe—the weakness of picking out what seem to me to be the flaws instead of concentrating on the very real and great merits of the survey. As I indicated at the beginning these seem to me to be so great as to command the admiration of all of us. And I should like to close by paying tribute to all those who have worked so hard in producing what is, despite such faults as various of us may choose to mention, a constructive and imaginative analysis of Europe's problems.

Mr. Chairman, I should now like to make one additional remark. During the course of this debate and our earlier debates, numerous charges have been made by the delegates from Eastern Europe concerning U.S. intentions and actions in Western Europe, in Korea, and in other parts of the world.

I have not repeatedly intervened to set the record straight, for two reasons: First, because I did not wish to contribute to the tendency to discuss questions which are not germane to the problems under discussion, and second, because the statements made are believed by no one here except those who deliberately choose to do so in blind disregard for the facts.

The United States is not perfect, nor does it pretend to be. We welcome constructive criticism of our actions and policies such as those made during this debate by the delegates from France, the Netherlands, and Denmark.

However, we totally reject malicious falsehoods and attempts to distort the facts of our support for the United Nations in Korea or of the purposes of our assistance to Western Europe, which have been and continue to be to promote economic well-being and the conditions for peace.

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### General Assembly

- Complaint of Non-Compliance of States Still Detaining Members of the Greek Armed Forces With the Provisions of Resolution 382 A (V), Adopted by the General Assembly on 1 December 1950, Recommending "The Repatriation of All Those Among Them Who Express the Wish to be Repatriated." Note by the Secretary-General. A/2365, Feb. 17, 1953. 8 pp. mimeo.
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<sup>1</sup> Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

The United Nations Secretariat has established an *Official Records* series for the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and the Atomic Energy Commission which includes summaries of proceedings, resolutions, and reports of the various commissions and committees. Publications in the *Official Records* series will not be listed in this department as heretofore, but information on securing subscriptions to the series may be obtained from the International Documents Service.

## Czechoslovak Subversion Charges Against U.S. Refuted

*Statements by Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.  
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly*<sup>1</sup>

### THE FACTS ON MSA AID

U.S./U.N. press release dated March 23

Once again, let me say to the representatives of the Communist bloc—I have said it many times before and I guess I will go on saying it quite a few times again—that no valid indictment against the United States can ever be based on newspaper clippings and remarks of individual legislators. I realize that if this truth were taken to heart, it would eliminate 90 percent of the Communist attacks.

But it is a truth just the same. We have a free press in America; newspapers, magazines say what they want to say, and disagree with each other. The writer disagrees with the editor and the editor disagrees with the owner. We have free speech in America. We have free speech in the House of Representatives. We have free speech in the U.S. Senate, and it is seldom, if ever, that statements are made there that are made with official authority. It is always easy to know what the U.S. Government thinks by what its officials say on their official authority.

The Czech representative [Vaclav David, Czechoslovak Foreign Minister] says that the U.S. is engaged in subversion, which of course is completely untrue. His speech reminds me a little bit of the statement that used to be made by a cynical political boss who existed for a while here and who said this: "Blame everything, concede nothing, and if defeated, allege fraud." Well, he didn't last very long either.

There were many surprising statements in the speech of the Czech representative. One of them

was that the American soldiers wanted to stay in Czechoslovakia. Mr. Chairman, there is one thing that all American soldiers have in common—it is a burning desire to get home. I have never yet met one who did not want to come home as soon as he could. The Czech representative spoke about the U.S. abusing its forces on the border of Czechoslovakia. And yet the world remembers well because it happened on the 10th of March, when two Mig planes of the Czechoslovak air force shot down an American plane.<sup>2</sup> The weather was good that day and he knew exactly where he was and he was directly over the American Zone of Germany. Two days later, a British bomber was shot down and six British airmen were killed, for which we express our heartfelt sympathy.

### The Coup d'État in Czechoslovakia

Mr. Chairman, if we consider the question of subversion, the case of Czechoslovakia itself is a most flagrant case in point.

Remember that on February 19, 1948, the small free state of Czechoslovakia was having a Cabinet crisis which, had it been settled legally, would have reduced Communist strength in the Government. Suddenly, there appeared a series of reports carefully planted by Soviet agents that the Red army was about to invade Czechoslovakia. Tension was further increased by the sudden arrival in Prague of Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Zorin, accompanied by six Soviet generals, the same Mr. Zorin who is our colleague here today representing the Soviet Union at the United Nations. If I make any mistake in describing what happened next I hope he will correct me.

Mr. Zorin's arrival in Prague was accompanied by the appearance of many heavily armed Communist police who, under the Communist Minister of the Interior, began to patrol the streets and

<sup>1</sup> Made in Committee I (Political and Security) on Mar. 23 and Mar. 25 during debate on the Czechoslovak item entitled: "Interference of the United States of America in the Internal Affairs of Other States as Manifested by the Organization on the Part of the Government of the United States of America of Subversive and Espionage Activities Against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the People's Republic of China, the Czechoslovak Republic, and Other People's Democracies."

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Mar. 30, 1953, p. 474.

search the headquarters of all opposition political parties. They were soon joined by regiments of Communist militia who marched in military formations led by Soviet-trained leaders and carrying Soviet flags.

The next day, February 20, the country was shaken by more rumors of imminent Soviet invasion. Mr. Zorin and his generals were still in Prague and the Communist police militia had proclaimed virtual martial law.

The Kremlin took the next step in converting Czechoslovakia into a puppet state by calling to arms all members of its so-called Czechoslovak "action committees." Planted in every walk of life, they constituted a fifth column in every business organization, factory, and public service—even in the opposition political parties.

On February 21 members of this Communist fifth column seized control of the police, civil service, trade unions, business firms, factories, public utilities, and banks. Following a preconceived, well organized plan, they then dismissed chairmen, directors, and other key figures and put in their own men. By the end of the day all the features of a Soviet police state had appeared in what had been a democratic country; control of broadcasting facilities, elimination of all non-Communist newspaper editors, suppression of non-Communist periodicals and complete censorship. All non-Communist political parties had been eliminated and many of their officials had been arrested.

Thus, in 3 days the country had been taken over. Four days later, on February 25, aged President Benes was forced to sign a Cabinet list which set up a government consisting entirely of Communists and Communist dupes.

What happened after that?

Jan Masaryk was inexplicably driven to his death. Clementis was hanged. Mr. Slansky is dead. But, both Mr. Slansky and Mr. Gottwald left us a testament on subversion when they boasted that they had gone to Moscow to learn "how to wring the neck of the bourgeoisie" in their native country.

This Czechoslovak coup d'état is certainly one of the most glaring examples of subversion in modern times. With this record hung around their necks, the present rulers of Czechoslovakia, who introduced this resolution criticizing the United States, do not come into court with clean hands. Their charges, therefore, are not to be believed.

They charge that in 1951 and again in 1952 the United States appropriated \$100,000,000 for alleged espionage, terrorism, and recruitment of refugees into military formations—all of this, according to the charge, for the purpose of subverting the U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, and other so-called "Peoples Democracies" in Eastern Europe and the Far East.

## Aid to Escapees

The nations of the world are entitled to the facts and here they are:

In 1951, \$100,000,000 was authorized under section 101 of the Mutual Security Act. No further sums were authorized under this section in 1952.

The \$100,000,000 is being spent as follows: \$95,700,000 is going for regular military and economic aid—a part of the larger sums the United States is now spending under the Mutual Security Act and has previously spent under the Marshall plan to help the free nations to stay free. Before the subversion of the free State of Czechoslovakia, she, too, wanted to get this aid. But the Kremlin said "no," because it knew this assistance was designed to strengthen collective security against aggression—to stop future Koreans and future Czechoslovakias before they start.

The remaining \$4,300,000 is being spent to help escapees from Iron Curtain countries. The Czech delegate is evidently baffled because there are no escapees going *into* the Iron Curtain countries. All the escapees are coming *out*. I wonder why?

An escapee is a person who has escaped from the Soviet-dominated world during the last 5 years, and has not been granted citizenship in his country of refuge. He thus differs from the millions of Germans and the hundreds of thousands of Turks and Greeks who fled Soviet-dominated areas in recent years and who have since been granted citizenship in Western Germany, Turkey, and Greece. Unlike them, the person we are helping has literally no place in this world.

But he yearns for a freedom which has been denied him—freedom to speak, to write, to vote, to worship as he pleases and build his life in his own way. He also yearns for freedom from speed-ups, labor disciplines, the internal passports which make Soviet life a hell for the ordinary person, and freedom from the threat of the secret police, the mass deportation, and the forced labor camp.

This person—this stateless man—has given up his home, his possessions, his friends, and often his family. Heroically, he has cracked the Iron Curtain, even though that curtain is constantly being strengthened. Because, as life becomes harder and harder behind the Iron Curtain, more and more people want to escape. More armed guards may be watching from observation towers, vicious dogs may be patrolling the frontiers. Yet people continually get through.

## Flights to Freedom

For example:

Here are three Czechs who climbed a 200-meter airshaft to escape from a coal mine near Kladno, Czechoslovakia, and fled to West Germany on June 21, 1950. They escaped because they were condemned to forced labor for anti-Communist activities before the Czech coup d'état.



Here is Vladimir Drazen, another Czech escapee, who was wounded by an exploding mine while climbing barbed wire entanglements, and who swam the Morava River under fire from Communist guards and arrived safely on the Austrian side on December 14, 1952. He escaped because of depressed living conditions in Communist Czechoslovakia.

Here are Mr. and Mrs. Steven Kantor, a Hungarian couple who hid for 4 days in an empty wine vat in a boxcar on a sealed train from Budapest to Switzerland. They broke out in Linz, Austria, on March 19, 1952. They escaped because their repair shop was nationalized without compensation and they were denied employment because of their anti-Communist record.

Here are a Hungarian farmer, wife, and three small children who reached the Western Zone of Austria on October 29, 1952, after swimming a river and fleeing clear across Hungary from the Rumanian border. They escaped because it was impossible to fulfill unreasonable crop quotas and they were forced to sell livestock to pay confiscatory taxes.

Here is a Charles University student from Prague accompanied by his fiancée, who took poison when apprehended by East German police at the West Berlin border. He was rescued by the West German border patrol and was cured in a West Berlin hospital in August 1952. He escaped because he was accused of "cosmopolitanism"—isn't that a terrible crime?—and unable to continue his studies.

Here is a young foundry worker with his wife and small child who crossed the Hungarian-Austrian border on February 8, 1953, after evading man-and-dog patrols, passing over mined areas, and cutting through barbed-wire barriers. This family escaped because it was impossible to live in Hungary and bring up their child in a democratic manner.

These are a few examples.

### Escapee Program Set Up

There are more than 15,000 such escapees in West Germany, Austria, Italy, Trieste, Greece and Turkey, and they continue to come in at the rate of several hundred a month. All of them are not young men—there are wives, small children, unmarried girls, and elderly people.

When they arrive, they are destitute—unlike the millions of refugees from East Germany who have gone to West Germany and who are fleeing from tyranny to freedom at the rate of 30,000 a month. These stateless persons are entirely without citizenship rights, and their very presence adds to the great burdens of the countries of free Europe.

To help these people, to keep hope in the hearts of others, the United States authorized the sum of \$4,300,000 to be used to set up an escapee pro-

gram in March 1952.<sup>3</sup> It is a pretty inhuman heart that is not touched by the need and by the courage—which makes \$4,300,000 appear small enough.

I think, Mr. Chairman, that Congressman Kersten is to be commended for having done a good deed.<sup>4</sup>

The money is used to help the host countries provide reception and living quarters, food, clothing, medical care, help in their search for visas, vocational training, and employment and emigration advice for emigration is strongly encouraged.

The program which began last March had by August helped 122 escapees to leave Europe. By the end of August, almost 700 were on their way overseas. As of March 1, 1953, a total of 2,483 escapees had been settled in 21 non-European countries. More than another thousand had been accepted by other nations.

News of this program has spread behind the Iron Curtain. More and more people are escaping from tyranny. Those who choose freedom in the future may even include some of the highest officials.

Mr. Chairman, if there is one trait which sets man above the animals, it is spiritual courage. These people show a tough, unbeatable type of courage which deserves our commendation and our help.

This Czech resolution should be emphatically rejected.

### SOVIET POLICY OF AGGRESSIVE INTERVENTION

U.S./U.N. press release dated March 23

I would just like for a few minutes to point out a few of the inaccuracies and lacunae in the statement of the representative of the Soviet Union [Andrei Gromyko].

He spoke of the Roosevelt-Litvinov agreement concerning nonintervention in the affairs of one state by another. I would like to point out that for all practical purposes the Soviet Government made a dead letter of the Roosevelt-Litvinov agreement shortly after it was signed. Shortly after the establishment of diplomatic relations, President Roosevelt instructed our Ambassador in Moscow to make all protests against the violations of the Roosevelt-Litvinov agreement by the Soviet Union. When in 1935, the Comintern met in Moscow and instructed the American Communist Party to use Trojan horse tactics against the American Government, the President sent a strong protest to the Soviet Government. He said

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Apr. 14, 1952, p. 602.

<sup>4</sup> Rep. Charles J. Kersten is the author of the amendment to the Mutual Security Act of 1951 that authorizes expenditure of \$100,000,000 to assist "selected persons who are residing in or escapees from" the Soviet dominated areas. He was one of several U.S. leaders attacked by the Czechoslovak representative in his statement of Mar. 23.

the United States anticipated the most serious consequences if the Soviet Government refused to prevent further acts in disregard of the solemn pledge given by it to the United States.

Hardly a month after the Soviet regime seized power in 1917, all allied and neutral missions in Petrograd received this circular note from the Soviet leaders: ". . . the Soviet Government considers necessary diplomatic relations not only with governments but also with the revolutionary socialist parties which are striving for the overthrow of existing governments." . . .<sup>5</sup>

Since the end of the war, the Soviet Government has persistently followed a policy of aggressive intervention in the domestic affairs of other nations and peoples. Upon the very countries listed in the complaint before this Committee, the Soviet Union has imposed dictatorial Communist regimes. The profoundest feelings for family and country of peoples of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, and Hungary have been deliberately trampled upon.

Only a short time ago, the Yugoslav delegation presented to the Assembly a case history of Soviet intervention in the domestic affairs of a foreign nation—in this instance, Yugoslavia. When the Yugoslav Communist Party was expelled from the Cominform, the highest leaders of the Soviet State then demanded that the Yugoslav people overthrow the Yugoslav Government.

Nor will the world ever forget the most outstanding case of intervention of all—the Communist attack upon the Republic of Korea supported by Soviet equipment, training, and propaganda. I do not think that ought to be left out.

Now, Mr. Chairman, a sarcastic reference was made by the representative of the Soviet Union to the Statue of Liberty, saying that the quotation which is written on it should be changed so that instead of being words of welcome as they now are, there be some expression to the effect that all those within the United States should abandon hope. Well, I think the best answer to that is to see how many people who are now in the United States want to leave. Actions, you know, speak a good deal louder than words in these cases. And I repeat my observation of this morning that a lot of people want to come out all the time from behind the Iron Curtain, but no people from outside want to go in.

The representative of the Soviet Union asked us to demonstrate a talent for peaceful occupations. Well, only a few weeks ago, Mr. Chairman, I was sitting right over at a meeting of the Technical Assistance Conference and I pledged my Government, I think the sum was \$14 million,<sup>6</sup> and

<sup>5</sup> See *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, Vol. I, p. 303* for the full text of this communication, which was sent on Dec. 14, 1917, by the National Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to the U.S. Ambassador at Petrograd.

<sup>6</sup> BULLETIN of Mar. 9, 1953, p. 384.

other nations pledged other sums to drain the swamps, to irrigate the deserts, to wipe out disease, to increase the food supply, to make life worth living for people, to make peace worth struggling for, to bind up the wounds of the world. And as I looked around, to my amazement there was no one in the seat of the Soviet Union, there was no one in the seat of the Ukrainian S.S.R., there was no one in the seat of the Byelorussian S.S.R., there was no one in the seat allocated to Poland, and no one in the seat allocated to Czechoslovakia. Now, there is a case of deeds, of doing something to help people.

Now, the representative of the Soviet Union made a number of quotations from various prominent Americans and he rested a good part of his case on that. With all due respect, that part of his case was rested on sand. One of the Congressmen to whom he referred as one who had violently opposed the Soviet Union during the war was, to the best of my knowledge, not in Congress during the war. He was elected in 1946. Mr. Stassen, whom he quoted, was not in public office at all at the time the quotation was made. I think he was President of the University of Pennsylvania. Mr. Dewey is a Governor, and he was speaking as a private citizen. The State of New York, great as it is, has no foreign relations, as I am sure its able and distinguished Governor would be the first to admit. Mr. Dulles, who was quoted, was not in public office at the time that statement was made. Senator Wiley, Senator Mundt, and Senator Taft, who are all distinguished men, were not speaking officially when they made the utterances quoted by the representative of the Soviet Union, and they have no claim to be doing so. In fact, when you analyze the list of American political figures who were quoted by the representative of the Soviet Union, not one was speaking for the U.S. Government.

Now, that is a fact worth noting as indicating the authority underlying those quotations. I will try once again to explain to the representative of the Soviet Union that we have 435 representatives in the House of Representatives; we have 96 Senators. They are all individuals, every one of them. They often disagree with each other. We have free speech and free press in America, and free speech means much speech, and we have much speech here in this country in case nobody knew it. And the practitioners of free speech often try to get into the free press. That may happen in other countries where we have both free speech and free press. Specific propositions may at any given moment be debatable but they spring from a belief in man being superior to the state and they spring from a hatred of aggression.

Under our system of government, the Executive speaks for the United States in foreign affairs. Now, let that be understood. Congress represents the outside check, the independent audit, the capacity of the free people to judge its own govern-

ment—an institution, by the way, which is a great source of national strength and an unknown feature of life, I gather, in the Soviet Union.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, the representative of the Soviet Union referred to a bill which I sponsored when I was a Senator, and which provided for the enlistment of stateless young anti-Communist Slavs in the U.S. Army. Well, now, I see no reason at all for me to apologize for having sponsored that legislation. It provided that these young men would come into the American Army at American wages and under American living conditions with American citizenship to follow; to be mixed right in with American soldiers and have an equal chance to go to officer candidate school and to be promoted. Contrast that with the action of the Soviet Union in flagrantly impelling others to fight its battles for it—the North Koreans and the Chinese. Now, these people who are fighting the battles for the Soviet Union have been treated as second-rate satellites. We, on the other hand, have invited others to help us resist aggression on an equal basis and as volunteers. There is all the difference in the world between master and slave on the one hand and mutual comradeship on the other.

### THE SUPERSENSITIVE OUTLOOK OF SOVIET LEADERS

U.S./U.N. press release dated March 25

We face the charges of the Czech delegation that the U.S. program of assistance to escapees, initiated under section 101 (a) of the Mutual Security Act, is an act of aggression.

We contend that far from there being anything illegal about our helping these homeless people, this is a project which is humane and, being illuminated by the spirit of the Charter, deserves general commendation. The program of helping escapees is part of an entire program of helping to keep the free world free. We are forced to adopt these programs because of the actions of the Soviet Union. If people were not made unhappy by the Soviet Union, they would not feel the desperate urge to escape and there would therefore be no need to help them.

If small states like Czechoslovakia were not subverted by the Soviet Union there would be no need to have a program of protection against further subversion. And if shooting wars were not aided and abetted by the Soviet Union, as in Korea, there would be no need for a program of military action.

It is the Soviets—and not we in the United States, or we in the United Nations—who started these things.

We aren't the ones who force people to leave the Iron Curtain; they want to leave. We aren't the ones who are subverting countries and sponsoring aggressive war.

We in the United States actually embarked on a headlong disarmament at the end of World War II, but the confidence which American authorities had at that time in our recent ally now appears to have been a major miscalculation because, while we disarmed, the Soviet Union remained armed to the teeth.

We asked nothing more than to live in peace, but the Soviets have forced us to take these necessary actions to prevent all human rights from being wiped out and to frustrate the establishment of an iron dictatorship throughout the world.

If the Kremlin leaders are really looking for the people who are subverting life behind the Iron Curtain, they should look at themselves—at their laws, their decrees, their practices of oppression. They should look at the Lenin-Stalinist doctrine on which they have impaled nearly half the world. That doctrine is the centrifugal force which drives people out through the Iron Curtain to freedom. It is also the force which sends others out beyond the curtain—aggressive armies, reaching out in Korea, in southeast Asia, threatening central and western Europe in an imperialistic design to enfold still more millions into the Soviet prison.

The Mutual Security Act does two things: It gives asylum to the one group—the escapees; and it is designed to halt the other group—the armies of Soviet aggression.

Ninety-five percent of the \$100 million authorized under the Kersten amendment is going to nations of the free world as an integral part of the larger sum which helps these people build their ramparts against aggression. The other five percent goes to assist those who escape from behind the Iron Curtain. The hypersensitive Soviet leaders regard both parts of this program as aggressive. Well, they have no aggressive potentiality at all.

Mr. Chairman, they do so because of the supersensitive outlook which leads them to imagine threats to their position. And that is why they consider it necessary and are willing to shoot down an unarmed foreign aircraft, or lash their people with forced collectivization, or sign a pact with Hitler—regardless of the unfavorable repercussions. To be sure, they are sensitive to these repercussions for such actions weaken the hoped-for attraction of their claims to be the champions of peace and humanity. But they are willing to expose this vulnerability in the struggle of ideas in order to protect what they consider to be their power interests. "Let the enemy consider us nasty people," says a *Pravda* article. "From the mouths of the enemy this is praise."

### How Tyrannical Power is Protected

The Soviets go about protecting the sources of this tyrannical power by, first, preventing Soviet citizens from communicating with the outside world except through controlled means. The Soviet Government prohibits them from traveling

abroad except on official missions; contains them within the Soviet Union by the most elaborate border controls of any state in the world; provides in the criminal code that their families be punished if they should flee; prohibits uncensored communications to other countries; bars Soviet citizens married to foreigners from leaving the U.S.S.R.; discourages communication with foreigners in the U.S.S.R. by the State Secrets Act that encompasses wide areas of normally public information and by decrees that prohibit Soviet officials from talking with foreigners unless specifically authorized. It also quarantines Soviet occupation troops in foreign areas and prohibits fraternization with the local population.

Next, the Soviet Government prevents foreigners from viewing the Soviet Union freely. Only four types of non-Communist foreigners are permitted to enter: diplomats, newspapermen, fur buyers, and similar businessmen, and members of specially invited delegations. Each group is closely restricted. More than 80 percent of Soviet territory is closed to foreign diplomats. Their movements within Moscow are subjected to various harassments, and their work is publicly described as "espionage." The artificially high exchange rate for the ruble discourages some countries from keeping diplomatic missions in the U.S.S.R. Newspapermen are confined largely to the city of Moscow, restricted mainly to reporting what appears in the Soviet press, subjected to censorship, and constantly faced with the threat of expulsion. They no longer are given re-entry permits before departing from the U.S.S.R. At present, there are only six non-Communist correspondents and applications of other newspapermen for entry have been ignored. Businessmen are largely confined to the Leningrad fur auctions. Selected foreign delegations are carefully shepherded on prearranged tours. Meanwhile, the Soviet Government reveals only the barest information about itself. It refuses to publish statistics on almost all aspects of Soviet life; what it does reveal is vague and often meaningless.

These various measures are designed to block the world from seeing Soviet life as it really is. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union through its own propaganda activities and those of its foreign Communist and fellow-traveling supporters seeks, in an unending campaign, to portray Soviet reality in glowing terms and at the same time to keep up a constant and vigorous exposure of unsatisfactory conditions in non-Communist countries.

The immense scope of Moscow's preventive measures and the intensity of its propaganda efforts provide striking evidence of how touchy the Soviet leaders are where foreign scrutiny is concerned. One of the few times that the worth of an individual is recognized by the Soviet Government is when he flees the country, as has been demonstrated by Soviet willingness to accept the risks involved in murdering or kidnaping es-

capees. The Soviet Consul General in New York, for example, attempted in 1948 the kidnaping of a Soviet school teacher unwilling to return to the U.S.S.R. The brutal abduction in Berlin last summer of Dr. Walter Linse by East German authorities<sup>7</sup> was a sharp reminder that kidnapings have become an almost routine Communist practice along the Soviet frontiers of Germany and Austria. By their repeated evasion of requests for help in recovering this eminent member of the Committee of Free Jurists, the Soviet authorities only show their fear of permitting free men to stay free. Such incidents as the Linse case throw light on Communist unwillingness to allow prisoners of war a freedom of choice with regard to repatriation.

From the Kremlin's point of view, Communist troops captured in the course of their imperialist adventures cannot be permitted to choose whether to return home or to stay outside the Iron Curtain, for some of them might choose freedom. But the same Communist logic requires the Kremlin to deny to foreign soldiers and civilians alike held captive in the Soviet Empire the right to go home. Among these, as we have heard, are 3,000 Greek soldiers and many thousand Greek children, together with many thousands of Austrians, and even thousands of satellite nationals. In addition, we have reports of 63,000 Italians and over 300,000 Japanese. There are well substantiated reports of at least 98,000 German soldiers and 750,000 German civilians in the Soviet Union; 8,243 German civilians held captive in Czechoslovakia; and 11,550 German civilians in Poland, 3,240 of whom are children far from home and family. All of these people, except for those mercifully dead, are regarded by the Kremlin as a permanent increment to the imprisoned millions of the Soviet Empire. These are facts, gentlemen.

The Kremlin cannot admit that any person, native or foreign, would, if given the choice, select freedom as against Soviet tyranny. Thus it is that the Kremlin charges "aggression" when aid is given to Soviet and satellite citizens who have chosen freedom and pierced the Iron Curtain. Thus it is that the Kremlin must launch purges, must fabricate tales of subversion, and must stage "show" trials about "defectors" and "traitors" in order to account for those who choose freedom, or merely in order to liquidate those pitiful servants of tyranny, like Slansky, who have fallen into disfavor.

Mr. Chairman, I do not for the time being propose to dwell on that special feature of Soviet tyranny—the persecution of Christians, Moslems, and Jews—which adds further impetus to the flow of escapees from the Soviet orbit.

Nor, Mr. Chairman, do I propose to speak in detail about Soviet persecution of non-Russian

<sup>7</sup> For an account of Dr. Linse's kidnaping, see *ibid.*, Nov. 24, 1952, p. 823.

ethnic groups. There are, however, two aspects of Soviet ethnic persecution that I think it appropriate to refer to at the present time.

### Soviet Ethnic Persecution

The full facts about the first of these were documented only within the past year although the event took place in Poland at the outset of World War II. This event was the Katyn massacre in which more than 4,000 Polish army officers—the flower of the Polish nation—were ruthlessly slaughtered.

These gallant Polish officers had committed two offenses which led to their death: The first was the defense of their homeland against the Soviet invasion of Poland in 1939; the second was falling captive to the advancing Red army. Within a few months after their capture sudden silence fell and their fate was unknown until, in 1943, Nazi Germany proclaimed to the world the discovery of the bodies of thousands of Poles—lying in mass graves and shot through the back of the head—in Katyn Forest near Smolensk in the Soviet Union.

To a world familiar with Nazi atrocities and with the Nazi technique of attacking others for their own crimes, credence was not easily put in Nazi charges that the Katyn massacre was the handiwork of Soviet agents. The crime was typical of the Hitlerite pattern, so that at first it was uncertain whether those who died at Katyn were not but added names on the endless roster of the victims of Nazi tyranny.

But the lingering doubts as to the real facts provoked demands for fresh inquiry. This was particularly true here in the United States where many millions of citizens of Polish ancestry felt a deep sense of personal identification with those killed at Katyn. And so it was that in 1951 the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress provided for the establishment of a select committee to conduct an investigation and study of the facts, evidence, and circumstances of the Katyn massacre.

I will not attempt to detail here the gruesome facts disclosed by the select committee. These facts are now known to each government represented here, since the findings of the select committee were circulated to each permanent representative.<sup>5</sup> Suffice it to say that the select committee's investigation disclosed that responsibility for the massacre lay with the Soviet Government's infamous NKVD. The committee's findings are of direct and deep concern to all states pledged to the furtherance of Charter principles. The people of the United Nations will measure these facts against their determination, expressed in the Preamble of the Charter, "to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person."

Mr. Chairman, another aspect of Soviet tyranny

over non-Russian groups is illustrated by Soviet colonial practices in Soviet Central Asia. Moscow's haste to exploit as well as consolidate its grip on the vast wealth of this region has meant the influx of thousands of Slav colonists to a point where, in some areas, they outnumber the local population. And while an apparent effort has been made to give prestige positions to selected local representatives, the ruling managers and the white collar class remain predominantly Slav. For example, the percentage of natives employed in some eight local ministries of food and industry in Kazakhstan in 1948 varied from 2 to a maximum of 14 percent. In Kirghistan, Uzbekistan, and Tadzhikistan a loss of interest in industrial positions has been reported by the Soviet press due to the lack of opportunity for advancement.

Only recently, I read an article by Dr. Riaz Ali Shah entitled "Islam is Dying in the Soviet Union." Dr. Riaz is the distinguished Pakistani tuberculosis specialist and head of the Punjab Medical Association who visited South Central Asia last spring on the invitation of the Soviet Government. In Tashkent, he reports "the better dressed men, women and children were usually Western Russians. Although there were a number of Uzbeks in the governmental posts, the Russians outnumbered them by a wide margin." Regarding medical training in Tashkent, Riaz said: "In the morning I visited the medical college and hospital. Sixty percent of the students and the majority of the staff were Western Russians." In Alma Ata, the capital of Kazakhstan, S.S.R., he found that 60 percent of the students and 60 percent of the persons in responsible jobs were Western Russians who had settled there. And here again he observed that the better dressed and fed children and adults were, as a rule, Western Russians.

When we hear reports about the immense Russian mission in Peiping and the way in which subjects of the Soviet Union are infiltrating in all the Chinese Communist bureaus, we wonder how long it will be before there, too, all the best jobs are taken by the foreign Russian invader, leaving the Chinese to a fate which can only equal that of the earliest days of colonialism.

Mr. Chairman, within this brief space I have tried to outline the skeleton of Soviet tyranny in order that we may best comprehend the forces which impel thousands of escapees to leave their homes and risk their lives in order to reach freedom beyond the Iron Curtain.

We may well ask how long the men in the Kremlin propose to perpetuate this vast and systematized oppression. We seek no hasty answer, for the question is momentous. But the world deserves a reply. Perhaps Mr. Vyshinsky, when he returns to our midst, can bring new word from the Kremlin.

In addition, Mr. Chairman, let me, on behalf of my fellow countrymen, ask the Soviet delegation

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, Feb. 23, 1953, p. 322.

certain specific questions: What plans does the Kremlin's Czechoslovak puppet have for William Oatis, a courageous American newspaperman who still languishes in prison?

Further, Mr. Chairman, on behalf of my fellow-countrymen, let me ask the Soviet delegation whether it knows what fate the Peiping regime has in store for the hundred-odd Americans in Communist China? This too is a solemn question, for the U.S. Government is informed that 5 of these Americans have already died as the result of mistreatment by the Peiping regime. At least 28 of the Americans in Communist China are imprisoned, 4 more are under house arrest, and on March 21 of this year, 3 more Americans were abducted by Chinese Communists from a yacht off Hongkong.

Mr. Chairman, these matters are of profound and tragic importance to the people of the United States. We would like answers to these questions.

Mr. Chairman, I now wish to direct my attention to the draft resolution which is before us.

For the question before this Assembly is not the catalog of gossip and libel presented by Mr. David, Mr. Gromyko, and their friends. The parliamentary question, and the essential question, which this Assembly must decide is whether the United States, by assisting escapees from the "people's democracies" is, and I quote from paragraph one of the draft resolution, engaging in "acts of aggression" and "interference in the internal affairs of other states."

### **Aid Can Stop When Escapees Stop Coming**

I submit, Mr. Chairman, that the only aspect of the escapee program which merits condemnation is the fact that the world is today so organized that there are escapees. The free peoples of the world can hardly do too much for these victims of Soviet tyranny.

Our aid to escapees can only stop when escapees stop coming—when millions of men and women, now trapped behind the Iron Curtain, need no longer look elsewhere for freedom. A problem like this is not solved by tightening border controls and intensifying purges. When national aspirations are subverted, when human rights are suppressed, pressure builds up to the boiling point. One outcome of this pressure is a flow of escapees. And this flow will not stop until the Soviet leaders permit peoples under their sway to live their own lives in their own way.

So long as escapees continue to come, the duty to assist them is a matter of common humanity for the United States and the rest of the free world. It is also a duty imposed on us by the Charter. For, in essence, the U.N. Charter is a Charter of hope and freedom. It is a Charter of emancipation from religious and civil persecution, from poverty and disease, and from the even more hideous scourges of conquest and despotism.

It is a magnet drawing vast populations who see in it the expression of their hope to live their own lives in well-being and freedom.

Mr. Chairman, we want to make this magnet irresistible, strongly charging it with our support and strength.

Our mutual security program will stop when the threat of aggression—not only for us, but for all the free world—is lifted. The United States, like all the free world, prefers peaceful settlements to a dangerous and burdensome armaments race. We do not enjoy that. We long for the day of honest negotiations, which my Government asked for in this Committee last week. We will meet the Soviet Union half-way at any time.

### **Progress Toward Universal Equal Suffrage**

*Statement by Mrs. Lorena B. Hahn  
U.S. Representative on the Commission  
on the Status of Women<sup>1</sup>*

U.S./U.N. press release dated March 23

We meet this year with a great sense of achievement because the General Assembly has opened for signature the Convention on the Political Rights of Women recommended by this body over the last 3 years. The action clauses of this convention, which provide that women shall vote and hold public office on equal terms with men, without any discrimination, set a standard for legislation in every country in the world. During discussion of the need for this convention, the point was made that in some countries proposals to grant suffrage to women had been confused by party antagonism. It was felt that a convention proposed by the United Nations could be considered in any country on its merits. The convention can therefore open the way to progress in countries which have not yet granted women the right to vote.

Each year shows progress. Since we last met, Lebanon, Bolivia, Greece, Pakistan, and Mexico have made important extensions of suffrage to women. The grant in Lebanon is equal and complete, and I hope the representative of Lebanon in this Commission will tell us about it. Since Mrs. Ledon of Mexico is also here, as the representative of the Inter-American Commission of Women, perhaps she will tell us of the new grant there. The women in Bolivia and Greece had previously been granted the right to vote in local elections, and the new grants expand their rights to cover all elections.

The Secretary-General's memorandum, document A/2145, is especially impressive this year because it includes the date on which women were originally granted suffrage in each country. This

<sup>1</sup> Made before the U.N. Commission on the Status of Women on Mar. 23.

addition has involved much research, evidenced by the detail in the footnotes. The fine quality of this work deserves commendation. The dates of suffrage grants will help governments, for they show how long women have exercised the franchise in each country and where experience has been gained which may be applicable to their own situation.

I have only one suggestion of importance in regard to this memorandum. Insofar as possible, the United States would like to see the various lists as complete as possible. For some reason Spain has been omitted, and also Laos and Cambodia.

It might help if some standard list were used in this document, possibly the members of the United Nations and the specialized agencies. Information on the laws of all countries can usually be obtained from authoritative sources, so that it should not be necessary to send out special inquiries to governments on this matter.

#### **How the U.N. Can Help**

Because one of our objectives has been achieved—namely a convention on political rights—this is a good time to take stock of our situation and consider what we need to do in the year or two ahead. There are today still more than 15 countries in which women lack the vote, and almost all of them are members of the United Nations. The provision of equal suffrage in some of these countries will involve real problems, problems of education and customs as well as leadership. There are various ways in which the United Nations may be able to help these governments, and it is our responsibility to think through their particular needs and make recommendations on how to meet them.

One possibility of aid will be some evaluation of the effect of progressive grants. The Secretary-General's memorandum provides some interesting history on this point. In some of the countries where women voted early, such as New Zealand, Australia, and the United States, gains were made piecemeal—first in certain states and provinces, and then pushed on from these geographical subdivisions toward national suffrage. Some suffrage grants have been made on a nationwide basis, but have been limited at the beginning to local elections. In some countries women have been subject to certain educational or other qualifications not required of men. My immediate observation is that where suffrage grants were made first in certain sections of a country, women have eventually achieved rights throughout the nation. It also seems to be true that where women have first been granted the right to vote in local elections, there is a tendency to extend this right to include all elections. I am not so clear of the effect of distinctions based on educational achievements. An analysis by the Secretary-General of these

variations in procedure might help women and their governments decide whether limited grants are useful, and if so on what basis. We would like to see such an analysis prepared by the Secretary-General for our study next year.

There is another aspect of suffrage which does not show in these memorandums but on which we should have information, especially if the grants of suffrage are on a restricted basis. That is whether elections have been held in which women have actually voted. In some countries no elections may have been held since the grant was made, so that in actual fact women may never have gone to the polls. If possible, I hope the Secretary-General next year can give us some reassurance along this line.

Another way in which the United Nations may be helpful to governments is in developing leadership. We speak often of the right of suffrage being granted to women, but there would be little value in such a grant unless the women of that country are interested in public questions.

The U.N. fellowship program has included a number of women, and I believe some of them have worked in the field of public administration. There may be other programs in the United Nations or in the specialized agencies which can be used to help the leaders in a country where women lack suffrage or have just achieved it. We have not been well informed in this Commission as to what possibilities there are. A statement from the Secretary-General next year would help us evaluate opportunities and also help governments take advantage of them. Such opportunities may be useful to women in trust and non-self-governing territories as well as to women in other countries. Regional conferences similar to the seminar on the status of women conducted recently by UNESCO in India may also be a source of leadership training.

Now I want to talk about what we should be doing with our good ideas. This Commission has had a great many good ideas, especially in regard to political rights for women, and we have done a great many different things with them. We now have the convention, and can center our thinking on how governments can implement the standards set forth in the convention as rapidly as possible and with the greatest possible effect. There is considerable danger, it seems to us, that if we scatter our recommendations too widely, or put them forward in unrelated documents, governments will not find it easy to locate the suggestions they need and will feel confused as to what we have recommended.

Two years ago when the ILO adopted the convention on equal remuneration for men and women workers for work of equal value—known as the equal pay convention—it also adopted a formal recommendation to governments on how to promote the principle of equal pay. This contained a series of specific suggestions as to de-

veloping legislation and standards and also on evaluating results. We believe that something of the same sort would be useful in regard to the Convention on Political Rights of Women, and that we might ask the Secretary-General to gather together during the coming year the various suggestions that might go into it. These suggestions might come from different sources, and be directed, at least at the start, to governments where equal suffrage has not yet been attained. Each of us can probably contribute some ideas for a recommendation of this sort, and our non-governmental organization consultants will also have a great deal to offer. The Secretary-General can also draw on earlier actions in this Commission, such as the pamphlet on *Political Education of Women* which has proved useful in a number of countries. The recommendation should be very simple and practical, and realistic, a how-to-do-it plan to supplement the statement of principles in the convention.

### **"Ground Floor" Approach Urged**

For instance, some governments may feel that they cannot yet win parliamentary approval of votes for women, but believe that in a few years the parliament will be ready to give its assent. We might recommend that in such countries any new laws or constitutions adopted avoid limiting suffrage specifically to male citizens, and instead provide that Parliaments have the power to define the qualifications for voters. This would make it unnecessary to go through the long process of constitutional revision when the country is ready to extend the vote to women. The new constitution of Libya follows this plan. A recommendation along this line might have been helpful during the drafting of the new constitution of Eritrea. The Eritrean constitution provides suffrage rights only for men, so that will have to be amended when Eritrean women gain the franchise.

Another recommendation that might help a great deal in countries where the institutions of self-government are just beginning to take shape, is to take women in at the beginning and avoid any tradition of segregation of women and their interests. This recommendation may be especially useful in the trust and non-self-governing territories, but it applies to new activities in all governments, developed as well as less developed.

If there is any one lesson we can draw from experience, I suppose it is that it is never too early to begin. Once an organization is set up with the women on the outside, even a department of government, it is difficult for women to be accepted as full participants. Much trouble can be avoided if, as each institution of government is developed, schools, health services, local police, political parties, town or tribal councils, or whatever it may be, women are brought in on the administration of such projects from the start,

as members of school boards, public-health directors, policewomen, party workers and committee chairmen, and also in professional and staff positions. If it is found women have not had a chance to train for such jobs, they can be given special opportunities to catch up on essentials.

## **International Materials Conference**

### **Distribution of Molybdenum**

The Tungsten-Molybdenum Committee of the International Materials Conference announced on March 23 its recommended distribution of molybdenum for the second calendar quarter of 1953.<sup>1</sup> The Governments of all 13 countries represented on the Committee have accepted the recommendations. These countries are Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Molybdenum and nickel remain now the only commodities subject to distribution by the International Materials Conference.

In accepting the recommendations, the Government of the United States restated the condition that domestic users of molybdenum in the United States should be authorized to purchase the quantity of such material allocated to other countries participating in the International Materials Conference and not used by any such participating country. In view of this, the Committee agreed to continue the arrangements made whereby such domestic users in the United States or other countries would have the opportunity to purchase molybdenum allocated to other countries participating in the International Materials Conference but not used by any such participating country.

The total free world production of molybdenum in the first quarter of 1953 is estimated by the Committee at 6,448.25 metric tons metal content. Total availabilities exceed this amount by a carry-over of 30 tons from 1952 availabilities. The estimated production for the second quarter is at about the same level as that for the first quarter of 1953, which was over 75 percent above the rate of production in 1950. On the other hand, the defense and stockpiling requirements of the free world are still in excess of the estimated production.

The plan recommended provides for the distribution of the whole free world production of molybdenum, both in the form of ores and concentrates and primary products. Primary products are defined, as in the case of previous distributions by the Committee, as ferro-molybdenum, molybdic acid and molybdenum salts, including calcium-molybdate and molybdic oxide. Roasted

<sup>1</sup> For distribution plan, see IMC press release of Mar. 23.



molybdenum concentrates are regarded by the Committee as being included in ores and concentrates, as in the case of previous distribution plans.

In framing the recommended plan of distribution, the needs of all countries, whether members of the Committee or not, were carefully considered. The distribution plan is now transmitted to all governments, including those not represented on the Committee, wherever the countries concerned are interested in the export or import of molybdenum in the form of ores and concentrates or primary products. All Governments are being requested to carry out the plan of distribution recommended.

### **Copper-Zinc-Lead Committee To Be Terminated**

The Copper-Zinc-Lead Committee of the International Materials Conference announced on March 20 that its members have agreed to the dissolution of the Committee on March 31, 1953. This announcement follows the Committee's recent decision to discontinue international allocation of primary copper on February 15,<sup>2</sup> and reflects the continuing improvement in the supply/demand position of copper in the free world.

The Copper-Zinc-Lead Committee, which was the first of the commodity groups to be established within the framework of the I.M.C., met for the first time on February 26, 1951. The Committee's recommendations for the first international allocations of copper and zinc were accepted by its member governments for the fourth quarter of 1951 and continued, for zinc, until the end of May 1952, and for copper, until the middle of February 1953. Although the supply/demand position of lead was kept under review the Committee did not, at any time, find it necessary to recommend international allocation of that metal.

The following countries were represented on the Committee: Australia, Belgium (representing Benelux), Canada, Chile, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Mexico, Norway, Peru, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

### **Distribution of Primary Nickel**

The Manganese-Nickel-Cobalt Committee of the International Materials Conference on March 26 announced acceptance by 13 of its 14 member governments of a second quarter 1953 plan of distribution<sup>3</sup> for primary nickel and oxides. The reply of the Government of Belgium is still awaited. The recommended plan has been forwarded to all interested governments for implementation.

In this plan, as in those for the last two quarters of 1952 and the first quarter of 1953, provision has been made whereby any nickel allocated to countries participating in the distribution, but not used by them, will become available for pur-

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Feb. 23, 1953, p. 303.

<sup>3</sup> For distribution plan, see I.M.C. press release of Mar. 26.

chase by consumers in the United States and in other countries.

The total production estimate of primary nickel and oxides for the second quarter of 1953, excluding Japanese production, shows an increase of about 200 metric tons nickel content over the figure for the first quarter, or less than one-half of one percent. About 500 tons of nickel oxides (in nickel content), produced in the U.S. Nicaro plant in Cuba during the second half of 1952 in excess of the original estimate for that period, has been included in the second quarter distribution. The total quantity distributed in the recommended plan amounts to 37,800 metric tons nickel content.

An amount of approximately 500 metric tons of Japanese nickel available for export is not included in the plan of distribution because the Committee so far has not been able to determine to what extent importing countries would purchase this high-priced nickel.

The countries represented on the Manganese-Nickel-Cobalt Committee are Belgium (for Benelux), Brazil, Canada, Cuba, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Norway, Sweden, the Union of South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

## **U.S. Delegations to International Conferences**

### **Commission on Human Rights**

The Department of State announced on March 31 (press release 165) that Mrs. Oswald B. Lord, U.S. representative on the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, will attend the ninth session of the Commission, scheduled to be held at Geneva, April 6-June 1, 1953. In addition to Mrs. Lord, the U.S. delegation to this meeting will be as follows:

#### *Principal Adviser*

Philip Halpern, Associate Justice of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York State, Third Department

#### *Advisers*

James F. Green, Deputy Director, Office of U.N. Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State

Warren E. Hewitt, Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for U.N. Affairs, Department of State

The Commission on Human Rights, which is one of the permanent functional commissions of the U.N. Economic and Social Council, was established in 1946 to advise and assist the Council on all matters relating to the obligation assumed by the members of the United Nations to cooperate with the United Nations toward the achievement of universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.

Eighteen governments, elected by the Council, comprise the membership of the Commission. Its eighth session was held at New York, April 14-June 6, 1952.

### **Economic and Social Council**

The Department of State announced on March 31 (press release 164) that at the fifteenth session of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, which opened at New York on that date, the U.S. Government would be represented by the following delegation:

#### *U.S. representative*

James J. Wadsworth, Jr., Deputy U.S. Representative to the United Nations

#### *Deputy U.S. representative*

Walter M. Kotschnig, Director, Office of United Nations Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State

#### *Advisers*

Philip Arnow, Associate Director, Office of International Labor Affairs, Department of Labor

Kathleen Bell, Office of United Nations Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State

Isaiah Frank, Office of Economic Defense and Trade Policy, Department of State

Katherine G. Heath, Office of International Relations, Federal Security Agency

Forrest Murden, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, New York, N. Y.

Robert B. Schwenger, Chief, Regional Investigations Branch, Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, Department of Agriculture

William J. Stibravy, Special Assistant to the Director, Office of Financial and Development Policy, Department of State

William H. Wynne, Office of International Finance, Department of the Treasury

Recent developments in the world economic situation will be discussed at the forthcoming session in the light of comprehensive reports which have been prepared by the U.N. Secretariat, as well as by the Secretariats of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, Economic Commission for Europe, and Economic Commission for Latin America. The Council will also review (1) the annual report by the International Monetary Fund concerning its activities since the previous session; (2) the annual report of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development on its financial activities and resources; (3) a report by the Council's Technical Assistance Committee on the program of technical assistance; and (4) reports by several of its functional commissions, including the Transport and Communications Commission, Statistical Commission, and Population Commission.

Provision is also made in the 29-item agenda of the session for the consideration of several topics which have been the subject of special study pursuant to resolutions adopted by the Council

or the General Assembly of the United Nations. Among those topics are measures for the economic development of underdeveloped countries; the international action that may be taken to promote an integrated approach to and a systematic analysis of the problems of conservation and use of nonagricultural resources; the steps which may be taken by the United Nations and its specialized agencies to develop international respect for the right of peoples to self-determination; measures that can be taken by the United Nations to help governments eliminate slavery, the slave trade, and servitude similar to slavery; and allegations regarding infringements of trade-union rights.

The fourteenth session of the Council was held at New York May 20-August 1, 1952. Its 18 members are Argentina, Australia, Belgium, China, Cuba, Egypt, France, India, the Philippines, Poland, Sweden, Turkey, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, the United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia.

### **U.N. Commission on Narcotic Drugs**

The Department of State announced on March 30 (press release 162) that Harry J. Anslinger, Commissioner of Narcotics, Department of the Treasury, and U.S. representative on the U.N. Commission on Narcotic Drugs, will attend the eighth session of that Commission which will convene at New York on March 30.

George A. Morlock, Office of U.N. Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State, and Alfred L. Tennyson, Chief Counsel, Bureau of Narcotics, Department of the Treasury, will serve as advisers to the U.S. representative.

The Commission on Narcotic Drugs was formally established on a permanent basis in 1946. It assists the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations in exercising supervision over the application of international conventions and agreements dealing with narcotic drugs; carries out such of the functions of the League of Nations Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs as the Economic and Social Council has assumed and continued; advises the Council on all questions concerning the control of narcotic drugs, and prepares draft international conventions on the subject; and considers changes required in the existing machinery for the international control of narcotics.

The provisional agenda of the eighth session contains 29 items for consideration by the Commission. The items relate to such matters as (1) the proposed single convention on narcotic drugs; (2) cooperation between the United Nations and the Universal Postal Union in respect to the control of narcotic drugs; (3) the abolition of opium smoking in the Far East; (4) annual reports made by governments pursuant to article 21 of the convention of July 13, 1931, for limiting the manufacture and regulating the distribution of narcotic

drugs, as amended by a protocol signed at Lake Success December 11, 1946; (5) illicit traffic, in which connection the Commission is to consider both summaries of reports on illicit transactions and seizures made pursuant to article 23 of the 1931 convention, as amended by the 1946 protocol, and a proposal by Burma relating to the coordination of the efforts of certain Far Eastern Governments to suppress poppy cultivation and the smuggling of opium; (6) the problem of synthetic

drugs; (7) the problem of Indian hemp; (8) scientific research on narcotics; and (9) the list of narcotic drugs under international control.

The seventh session of the Commission was held at New York April 15-May 9, 1952. The 15 members of the Commission at the present time are Canada, China, Egypt, France, India, Iran, Mexico, the Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Turkey, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, the United States, and Yugoslavia.

## The United States in the United Nations

[March 26-April 11]

### Security Council

At a closed meeting on March 31, the Security Council by a vote of 10-0-1 adopted a proposal by the French representative recommending to the General Assembly that Dag Hammarskjold, Swedish Minister of State, be appointed U.N. Secretary-General. This recommendation was transmitted to the President of the General Assembly, and Ahmed Bokhari (Pakistan), President of the Security Council, sent Mr. Hammarskjold a cable informing him of the recommendation. The message concluded:

In view of the immense importance of this post, more especially at the present time, members of the Security Council express the earnest hope that you will agree to accept the appointment if, as they hope and believe, it is shortly made by the General Assembly.

In a statement issued later that day, Trygve Lie, retiring Secretary-General, said of the recommendation:

. . . If the General Assembly approves the nomination, which the Assembly certainly will do, I shall be able to lay down the heavy burdens of my office with a clear conscience, knowing that a very able man with sound political, diplomatic, and administrative experience will take over and carry on. . . .

On April 1 Mr. Hammarskjold announced at Stockholm that he had sent the following message to Mr. Bokhari:

With a strong feeling of personal insufficiency, I hesitate to accept candidature but I do not feel that I could refuse to assume the task imposed on me should the Assembly follow the recommendation of the Security Council by which I feel deeply honoured.

### General Assembly

General debate on the personnel policy item opened in plenary on March 28. Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. (U.S.) underlined the necessity of having the full support of world public opinion in order to have the United Nations as an effective force. He also pointed out that public opinion in the United States was concerned lest the United Nations effectiveness be impaired because of the existence of a serious personnel problem. Mr. Lodge indicated that:

The U.S. Government does not believe that persons engaged or who, based on their past and present record, seem likely to engage in subversive activities against any member state should be employed in an international organization. We will do all in our power to provide the Secretary-General with the information necessary to enable him to make a determination on this matter. This does not constitute nor is it intended to constitute dictation to the Secretary-General or other member Governments. It is a service to the United Nations in the interest of maintaining a Secretariat which measures up to standards established in the Charter for international civil servants.

It seemed clear from his report that the standards the Secretary-General proposed to apply would protect staff members against inadequately supported or unreliable representations from member governments; consequently, there should be no doubt as to the continued independence of the Secretariat or as to the safeguarding of individual rights.

Ambassador Lodge stated that the U.S. delegation believed the Assembly should take no action which would hinder the Secretary-General in dealing with the existing situation. However, a

further discussion of this question might be undertaken at the next session, when developments of the intervening period could be reviewed. For these reasons the United States would vote against any text which postponed further action on personnel questions pending the proposed study by a committee.

The resolution introduced jointly by the United States, United Kingdom, and France which had the effect of simply taking note of the report was amended to request a progress report on the development of personnel policy, and the number of its sponsors was increased to 13.

Action on the personnel policy item was completed April 1 with the adoption of the 13-power resolution by a vote of 41-13 (Soviet bloc, India, Indonesia, Burma, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Syria)-4. Under the approved resolution, the Secretary-General will be permitted to continue to conduct and develop his policies along the lines contained in his report and will be asked to submit a further report to the Eighth General Assembly. The 12-power text calling for the creation of a 15-member commission was rejected by a vote of 21-29-8.

The Assembly then recessed until April 7.

*Committee I (Political and Security)*—The Committee on March 26 rejected the Czechoslovak resolution charging U.S. interference in the affairs of other states. The vote was 5 (Soviet bloc)-41-14 (Afghanistan, Argentina, Burma, Egypt, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen). In statements made before the voting, the Soviet and Czechoslovak representatives contended that the U.S. statements on the item had contained slanderous charges intended to divert the Committee's attention from the substance of the matter. After the balloting, several Arab States explained that their abstentions were based in part on the fact that the issue of Zionism had been raised.

At the next day's meeting debate began on the U.S. request for an impartial investigation of charges that U.N. forces used bacteriological warfare. Ambassador Ernest A. Gross (U.S.) introduced a 16-power resolution under which a five-state commission would be set up to carry out an inquiry after the President of the General Assembly had received indications that the parties concerned had accepted the proposed investigation.

As the debate opened, Valerian A. Zorin (U.S.S.R.), proposed that the Committee invite representatives of Communist China and the North Korean authorities to participate. An impartial investigation of the bacteriological warfare question would be possible only with the participation of the states directly concerned with and affected by the use of bacterial weapons. The motion was rejected by a vote of 15 (Soviet bloc, Egypt, Iraq, India, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Burma, Syria)-40-5 (Argentina, Lebanon, Yugoslavia).

Representatives of South Africa, Australia, the Netherlands, and New Zealand, speaking as co-sponsors of the resolution, pointed out the necessity of exposing the hollowness of the charges. If those making the charges did not accept the resolution, the obvious conclusion would be that the charges were baseless and the world would treat any further allegations or protestations with the contempt they deserved.

The Netherlands welcomed the U.S. request to place the item on the agenda, D. J. von Balluseck said. The full membership of the United Nations should express itself when some governments leveled accusations against others, yet persistently refused to permit an impartial investigation of the charges. The investigation should be undertaken as soon as possible, in his view, and should include an examination of the so-called confessions of the prisoners of war.

### **Economic and Social Council**

At the opening meeting of its 15th session, the Council on April 1 adopted by a vote of 14-0-4 a resolution transmitting to the Human Rights Commission the General Assembly's request for continued preparation of recommendations concerning international respect for the right of peoples to self-determination. Also approved, by a vote of 15-2 (Poland, U.S.S.R.)-1 (Sweden), was a Latin American draft modifying the rules of procedure to include Spanish as a working language of the Council and its functional organs. A Soviet motion requesting favorable consideration by the General Assembly of a similar status for the Russian language failed, 4 (U.S.S.R., Poland, India, Egypt)-10-4 (France, Yugoslavia, Uruguay, Philippines).

As its third item, the Council debated the U.S. request that Libya, Nepal, Spain, and the Republic of Korea be invited to the Conference on the Limitation of the Production of Opium, scheduled to begin May 11. Recalling that the inscription of the last two countries had not been unanimous, James J. Wadsworth (U.S.) held that the United Nations was interested in Spanish participation since Spain was an important manufacturing and consuming country which had in the past shown willingness to agree to controls on narcotics. As to the Republic of Korea, he pointed out that the General Assembly had recognized it as the lawful Korean Government and that it was a large opium producer.

G. F. Saksin (U.S.S.R.) said that since he had learned that the countries in question had not asked to be invited to the conference, the action proposed by the United States was contrary to self-determination and infringed on national sovereignty. He now could not even vote for invitations to Libya and Nepal, which his Government had originally favored.

*Commission on the Status of Women*—Mrs. Lorena B. Hahn (U.S.) on March 26 introduced a United States-Haitian resolution urging that regulations regarding distribution of scholarships provide equal opportunities for girls and women, requesting that the Secretary-General continue to cooperate with UNESCO to advance opportunities for education for women, and expressing hope that in programs of fundamental education attention would be given to the importance of providing equal opportunities for women to acquire a language “which will permit them access to the resources of knowledge in the general culture of the country.”

It was later agreed to refer to the resolutions committee this proposal and a French draft relating to the number of study fellowships and scholarships granted to men and women students in primary, secondary, higher, and technical education in the member countries.

Representatives of several nongovernment organizations made statements on women's education. Groups represented included the World Federation of Trade Unions, the International Federation of Women Lawyers, the International Council of Women, the World Union of Catholic Women's organizations, and the International Federation of Business and Professional Women.

On March 27 the Commission adopted a revised Polish resolution which regretted that the Women's International Democratic Federation representative “has not been granted an entry-visa” to permit her to attend the Commission's session, called the attention of the Economic and Social Council to that “abnormal situation,” and requested that the Council examine the question at its 15th session in order to take appropriate measures. The vote was 13-1 (U.S.)-2 (China, U.K.).

Members then approved by a vote of 14-0-3 (U. S.) a Cuban-French proposal recommending that Ecosoc draw the attention of Governments and specialized agencies to the need of ensuring identical basic school curricula for pupils of both sexes. Action on the educational item was completed with the unanimous approval of the resolu-

tions committee's version of the U. S.-Haitian and French drafts on granting scholarships to women and on allowing women opportunities to acquire a second language in countries where native and official languages exist.

At the same meeting, Mrs. Hahn submitted, with Cuba, a resolution on the equal-pay-for-equal-work item. The proposal noted that the principle was sound business practice, urged increased efforts toward widespread implementation in all states, and asked the International Labor Organization to furnish periodic progress reports. It was agreed that this text would be combined with another equal-pay draft sponsored by France, the Netherlands, and Pakistan.

On March 30 the Commission approved a Netherlands-Pakistan proposal relating to the work of women in cottage industries and handicrafts and in seasonal agricultural work in underdeveloped countries. The vote was 12-3 (Soviet bloc)-1 (France).

The combined Cuba-France-Netherlands-Pakistan-U.S. text on equal pay, as slightly modified by the resolutions committee, was adopted on March 31 by a vote of 14-0-3 (Soviet bloc). Also adopted was an amended version of a Dominican Republic-Venezuelan resolution on participation of women in the work of the United Nations; the vote was 15-0-2 (U. K., New Zealand). A Pakistani draft recommending the appointment of qualified women to technical-assistance posts was adopted unanimously.

The Commission completed its substantive work on April 1 after unanimously approving a priorities program for 1953-54 as proposed by the United States. Consideration of the item on women in public law was deferred to the Commission's next session.

## THE FOREIGN SERVICE

### Correction

BULLETIN of March 30, 1953, p. 480: Mrs. Lord's title should be, “U. S. Representative on the U.N. Commission on Human Rights.”

### Confirmations

*John M. Allison*

The Senate on April 2 confirmed John M. Allison as Ambassador to Japan.

*William Howard Taft, III*

The Senate on April 2 confirmed William Howard Taft, III, as Ambassador to Ireland.

## Department Opposes Continuation of Extraordinary Restrictions on Certain Imports

*Statement by Harold F. Linder*

*Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

Press release 166 dated April 1

I wish to thank the committee for the opportunity of testifying with respect to this bill. The Department is interested mainly in two problems related to the bill, namely, the need for continuing powers to insure that adequate supplies of materials are available for the free-world defense effort and the deletion of section 104 from the bill.<sup>2</sup>

The Department agrees with the premise that direct economic controls, while basically incompatible with the American system, may be needed in certain circumstances. Experience has shown that the benefits of such controls in an emergency period extend not only to the United States but to allied and other friendly nations throughout the world. A significant contribution to world economic stability was made when the United States instituted comprehensive economic controls after the invasion of Korea. In another comparable emergency, the interests of the whole free world might again rest on prompt action by the U.S. Government to hold inflationary forces in check and channel resources to essential needs.

Whether it is necessary to enact standby authority for the several types of direct economic controls, as they are no longer currently needed, is a question which the Department considers to be outside its competence. It defers in this to the agencies responsible for those controls.

The Department does, however, have specific comments on certain other aspects of S. 753. This bill would place in standby condition title I of the present Defense Production Act. The authority to establish priorities and to allocate materials and facilities, conveyed by section 101, like that to stimulate expansion of productive capacity (title III), is still needed to assure adequate materials

<sup>1</sup> Made before the Senate Banking and Currency Committee with respect to S. 753, "Emergency Stabilization Act of 1953," on Apr. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Text of section 104 of S. 753 is identical to section 104 of the present Defense Production Act. Except for certain discretions given the Secretary of Agriculture in the administration of the import restrictions, section 104 is that printed in the BULLETIN of Mar. 31, 1952, p. 518.

for the free-world defense effort. Section 101 should be retained on an active, unconditional basis so that there can be a prompt and orderly transition to the modified system of materials control needed to safeguard defense production after June 30.

It is not only U.S. defense programs that might be impaired by lapse of this section. The progress of military programs of other free nations now depends in part upon U.S. supplies. The law presently permits us to assure supplies for these programs as well as for our own. It is in the interest of our total defensive strength that this continues to be possible.

As I said at the outset, this Department attaches great importance to the deletion from the new legislation of section 104, which restricts imports of certain agricultural commodities including dairy products. This section would not appear to be germane, to the general purposes of S. 753, to provide standby authority for emergency economic controls. Rather, it deals with current problems affecting our international trade relations and domestic agricultural programs.

Apart from the question of appropriateness in this context, the Department of State has given careful thought to the need for continuation of section 104, and we can only conclude that this provision has been so harmful to our international trade relations that to continue it, whether on an active or a standby basis, would be unwise. In saying this, I want to make it perfectly clear to the committee that the Department of State is keenly aware of the difficulties with which we are now faced in connection with our domestic dairy products program. However, there are other remedies in our laws which can be used to deal with situations in which imports might impair agricultural programs for dairy products or cause serious injury to the dairy industry. Such remedies exist in section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1934 as amended and in the "escape clause" of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951.

The extension of section 104 by the United States would do considerable damage to our efforts to achieve economic strength and solvency among friendly foreign countries. The President emphasized in his State of the Union message to the Congress that, "Our foreign policy will recognize the importance of profitable and equitable world trade."<sup>3</sup> By introducing trade barriers which are not essential to the protection of American agriculture, the restrictions imposed under section 104 defeat this objective.

The extension of section 104 controls would compel the United States to continue to act inconsistently with agreements previously undertaken with friendly countries. The continued disregard of these commitments in the face of well-founded and repeated protests from 10 countries is seriously undermining efforts to build confidence in our leadership along the whole front of our foreign policy as may be observed from the notes we have received,<sup>4</sup> copies of which I should like to submit for the record.

It is difficult to overemphasize the significance which foreign countries attribute to section 104 and our action under it. In part, the reason for their concern lies in the injurious effect of our section 104 restrictions on their trade; it hampers their efforts to overcome balance-of-payments difficulties and makes it more difficult to reduce their need for extraordinary assistance from the United States. But it is to a perhaps even greater degree the symbolic significance of section 104, as to the direction of U.S. trade policy, which arouses concern. The fact is that, for them, the bill carries the implication that the United States is moving away from a policy of cooperation with its allies toward a restrictionism which disregards both our obligations and their needs. Even our friends in other countries are hard put to defend us. Our enemies seize upon each such example to make the claim that the United States wants not free partners in a mutual exchange of goods, but only dependencies where American surpluses can be conveniently dumped.

It has to be borne in mind that one of the express purposes of the international agreements which section 104 compels the United States to violate is to further the interests of American agriculture. The prosperity of American agriculture depends, in the first instance, on domestic prosperity. But, as the President pointed out in his message on the state of the Union, it depends also "upon the opportunity to ship abroad large surpluses of particular commodities, and, therefore, upon sound economic relationships between the United States

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Feb. 9, 1953, p. 208.

<sup>4</sup> Texts of eight notes submitted since June 1, 1952, are printed as an annex to Mr. Linder's statement. For texts of earlier notes, see part 4 of the Hearings on Defense Production Act Amendments of 1951 before Committee on Banking and Currency, U.S. Senate, 82d Cong., 1st sess., pp. 2951-2958.

and many foreign countries." By denying friendly foreign countries an opportunity to engage in profitable and equitable trade with the United States, this law limits their purchases of American agricultural commodities as well as a wide range of products from other American industries and enterprises. The close tie between our imports and our export sales is illustrated by the fact that one government, the Netherlands, has curtailed its imports of wheat flour from the United States specifically because of section 104 restrictions, and several other governments are considering similar action. At a time when American agricultural exports are already falling off, we can ill afford any further decline in such sales.

For these reasons, this Department is of the view that section 104 should be permitted to expire and that there should be no extension of this provision beyond June 30, 1953, either in the legislation under consideration or other acts of Congress.

## ANNEX

### Canadian Note of February 10, 1953

The Canadian Ambassador presents his compliments to the Secretary of State and has the honour to refer to the Canadian Embassy's Notes of August 28, 1951 (No. 496) and January 17, 1952, regarding the restrictions imposed upon imports of fats, oils and dairy products under Section 104 of the Defense Production Act of 1951.

The Secretary of State will be aware that these import restrictions were considered at the sixth and seventh sessions of the contracting parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and that resolutions were adopted recognizing these measures to be contrary to the provisions of the Agreement.

On the occasion of the announcement on December 30, 1952 of further import restrictions, relating to dried milk products, the Canadian Government re-examined the situation resulting from these restrictions. On the basis of this review the Canadian Government would again express its serious concern at this infringement of international agreements to which the Governments of the United States and of Canada are parties. The Government of Canada wishes to call the attention of the Government of the United States to the effects of these measures not only on trade between the United States and Canada but also on the broad commercial policy interests of the two Governments.

The Government of Canada considers that such departures from accepted principles of commercial policy by the leading trading nation can hardly fail to weaken the force of those principles and to damage seriously the development of world trade on a constructive basis.

Both Canada and the United States, recognizing the weakening effect of continued reliance on import restrictions on economies of friendly countries, have frequently encouraged them to seek solutions to their balance of payment difficulties through increasing exports rather than curtailing imports. Actions by the United States Government such as that represented by these import restrictions tend to undermine the confidence of overseas deficit countries in their ability to approach a balance by increasing their dollar earnings. These measures may in consequence have the effect of discouraging attempts which might be made by such countries, in the face of great difficulties, to change the general direction of na-

tional policies away from reliance on discriminatory import restrictions as methods of achieving international balance.

The Government of Canada, accordingly, takes this opportunity to urge once more that the import restrictions imposed under Section 104 of the Defense Production Act of 1951 be removed as soon as possible.

### **New Zealand Note of March 31, 1953<sup>5</sup>**

The Ambassador of New Zealand presents his compliments to the Secretary of State and has the honour to refer to the recent decision of the United States Government to place an embargo on imports of dried wholemilk, dried buttermilk and dried cream, effective from 1 April 1953. It may be recollected that the importance of this trade to New Zealand was discussed by the Ambassador with the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs on 9 March, and that a note was addressed to the Secretary of State at that time, explaining the effect on New Zealand's economy of all United States restrictions against imports of dairy products.

In view of the full information already supplied to the United States Government in this connection, it is felt unnecessary at this time to enter into a detailed statement of the difficulties created in New Zealand by the decision to place an embargo on imports of dried milk products. The New Zealand Government has asked, however, that the United States Government should be informed of the surprise and disappointment with which the recent decision has been received in New Zealand. The immediate loss of potential dollar-earnings is one that New Zealand can ill afford. The new embargo has the effect of seriously restricting New Zealand's dollar earning capacity which has already been weakened by the actions of the United States in placing embargoes on butter and non-fat dried milk solids and in permitting imports of cheddar cheese only under a quota system. The range of the United States restrictions on imports of dairy products, which accounts for one-third of all New Zealand's export earnings, is now so broad that New Zealand's capacity to secure dollar exchange from exports is gravely reduced.

The New Zealand Government has drawn the attention of the United States Government on other occasions to the fact that restrictions of the kind adopted by the United States in respect of dairy products have been recognised as a clear breach of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Although the countries affected have been given rights of retaliation under the Agreement, the New Zealand Government still does not consider such action to be a satisfactory answer to the problem. The New Zealand Government is, however, concerned over the apparent lack of harmony between the actions of the United States in respect of dairy products, and the spirit of understanding that prevails in other relations between the two countries.

The hope is earnestly expressed that the United States Government will, upon reflection, recognise the broad economic implications of trade restrictions of this kind and the difficulties they create in a country like New Zealand which is so heavily reliant upon free access to world markets for its limited range of export products. The New Zealand Government sincerely trusts that the United States Government may find it possible to permit a resumption of New Zealand's export trade with the United States in dried milk and other dairy products thus bringing its practice in this field into accord with the letter and the spirit of the mutual obligations undertaken by the two countries through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

<sup>5</sup> Three previous notes dated Sept. 17, 1952, Jan. 15, 1953, and Mar. 9, 1953, have been sent by the Government of New Zealand.

### **Australian Note of March 30, 1953<sup>6</sup>**

The Australian Ambassador presents his compliments to the Honourable the Secretary of State and upon instructions from the Australian Government, has the honour to make the following communication.

On January 23, 1953, the Australian Government drew the attention of the Government of the United States to the situation created by the continued operation of restrictions on the importation of dairy products into the United States under Section 104 of the Defence Production Act. At the same time the Australian Government referred to the recent application of import quotas to dried whole milk and dried buttermilk and requested the United States Government to amend the Australian quota which had been based on a period unfavourable to Australian exports of these items. On September 11, 1951, representations were also made by the Australian Government in regard to import restrictions on dairy products authorised by the Defence Production Act and notes were presented concerning the prohibition on imports of butter on June 6, 1950, October 7, 1949 and September 23, 1949.

The Australian Government regrets that it must now once more draw the attention of the United States Government to the recently announced prohibition on imports of dried whole milk, dried buttermilk and dried cream as from April 1, 1953.

The Australian Government has previously pointed out that restrictions and prohibitions on the importation of dairy products into the United States not only accentuate the difficulties of re-establishing world trade equilibrium and nullify attempts made in Australia to adapt the Australian dairying industry to the requirements of a major potential market but have been determined by the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to impair concessions negotiated under that agreement and infringe Article XI of the Agreement.

For a number of years the Australian Government has supported trade policies advocated by the United States which found expression in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. However, it has become increasingly difficult to find justification for the restrictions that the Agreement imposes on the methods which Australia may adopt to foster its own developing industries. It is only by the promotion of exports through a free access to markets for its major industries such as the dairying industry that the Australian economy can support some restriction on its freedom to protect domestic production.

The Australian Government therefore trusts that the United States Government will, at an early date, see its way to remove the recently imposed prohibitions on imports of dried whole milk and buttermilk and its long standing prohibition on imports of butter and other restrictions imposed on the importation of dairy products under the Defence-Production Act.

### **Danish Note of March 17, 1953<sup>7</sup>**

The Danish Ambassador presents his compliments to the Honorable the Secretary of State and has the honor once more to draw the attention of the United States Government to the serious concern of his Government at the restrictions imposed under Section 104 in the Defense Production Act on imports into the United States of Dairy Products.

Under the above provisions the import of one of the principal Danish export commodities, Butter, is subject to a complete embargo nullifying tariff concessions obtained from the United States Government by Denmark and other countries on a *quid pro quo* basis under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

Imports of another product, which would otherwise

<sup>6</sup> A previous note dated Jan. 23, 1953 was also sent by the Australian Government.

<sup>7</sup> A previous note was sent by the Danish Government on Sept. 9, 1952.



have been a particularly suitable object of endeavors to increase Danish dollar earnings, Blue Mold Cheese, have been kept at an artificially low level.

In addition hereto quota limitations have recently been applied to the import of Dry Whole Milk, at a time when Danish exporters had succeeded in establishing a competitive market here for this product trying, in this way, to make up for lost markets here for other milk products such as butter and cheese.

The nature of the provisions of Section 104 is well illustrated by the fact that while *falling* domestic production would invoke action through imposition of quotas under sub-paragraph *a*, an *increasing* domestic production may establish a case for import restrictions under *c*.

Both at the 6th and 7th sessions of the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade a resolution was passed to the effect that the United States import restrictions under Section 104 constitute an infringement of Article XI of the General Agreement, and that the circumstances were serious enough to justify recourse to Article XXIII, par. 2 (withdrawal of concessions) by the contracting parties affected. It was recommended (in the words of the resolution of the 7th session) "that the United States Government have regard to the effects of its continued application of these restrictive measures in breach of the General Agreement and continue its efforts to secure the repeal of Section 104 of the Defense Production Act as the only satisfactory solution of this problem." The United States Government was requested "to report to the Contracting Parties at as early a date as possible and, in any case, not later than the opening of the 8th session of the Contracting Parties on the action which it has taken."

It is the earnest hope of the Danish Government that the United States Government will continue to use its best endeavors to secure the abolishment of the provisions in Section 104 at the expiry of the Defense Production Act on June 30, this year, and to use its influence to prevent actions to establish a substitute legislation based on similar principles.

It would seem to be a matter of particular concern that the United States Government should not let itself be distracted from this aim—or Congress be unduly influenced—by the existence of temporary Government surplus stocks of butter. As repeatedly pointed out by the Administration, and also by a leading Farmers' Organization, during discussions in Congress on Section 104, other provisions, such as Section 22 in the Agricultural Adjustment Act as amended, establish authority and procedure for limitation of imports of any products for which there is an agricultural program (including price support), whenever it is found that imports interfere, or are practically certain to interfere, materially with such a program.

The Danish Government, of course, does not view with favor any such provisions. However, the application of Section 22, as it now stands, and similar provisions would not, as seems to be the case of Section 104, mean the establishment once and for all of what in practical terms amounts to a complete embargo on the importation of butter.

The Danish Government has noted with great interest the very specific recommendations on the question of dairy imports, including butter, made in the recent report to the President by the National Advisory Board of the Mutual Security Agency and trusts that eventually action will be taken along the lines suggested. It has also noted that several important trade organizations, including some representing agriculture, have recommended the abolishment of the provisions of Section 104. The same recommendation was contained in the so-called "Sawyer-Report" of December last year. The provisions are condemned as incompatible with the traditional policy of the United States Government to establish a more liberal international trade and payments system, the progress of which has been frustrated by the difficulties of overseas countries

to earn a sufficient amount of dollars to pay for imports from the United States of agricultural and other products.

It is noted that certain modifications of the cheese import restrictions have been made lately. These modifications, however, apply principally to types of cheese imported from countries other than Denmark, which means that a *de facto* discriminatory element has been established in the administration of Section 104. As already pointed out in Monsieur de Kauffmann's note of September 9, 1952, it is a matter of special regret to the Danish Government that full restrictions are maintained on imports of Blue Mold Cheese at a time when another type of cheese, which from a practical point of view must be considered quite similar in respect of appearance, quality, taste and consumption purposes, has been wholly exempted from control.

In a press release of December 30, 1952, Mr. Brannan, then Secretary of Agriculture, announced an increase of 500,000 lbs. in the basic annual quota for Blue Mold Cheese. It is interesting to note that the communique stated that the quota increase was made in recognition of the strong demand for this type of cheese. Further it stated that "although domestic production of Blue Mold Cheese has recovered substantially in the past years, prices of both the domestic and the imported product have remained firm". In the opinion of the Danish Government it might not have been unreasonable to expect that, under the circumstances referred to, the Department of Agriculture would have found occasion to include Blue Mold Cheese among the several other types of cheese released from import control, thereby removing a cause of friction. On a *prima facie* basis it would seem that removal of the import restrictions on Blue Mold Cheese, under the circumstances, in no way would be contrary to the provisions of Section 104. In this connection it is well worth observing that, to the knowledge of the Danish Government, none of the modifications of restrictions on dairy imports, granted so far, have met with public criticism in the press or otherwise.

The Danish Government would, therefore, ask that the United States Government once more consider the matter with a view to exempting Blue Mold Cheese from the quota restrictions.

As pointed out by the Cheese Importers Association of America, during hearings on the 13th instant in the Senate Banking and Currency Committee to terminate restrictions on cheese imports, these imports do not, under the present circumstances anyway, threaten domestic manufacture. Prices of imported types of cheese, possibly with the exception of Cheddar, are higher than prices of domestic cheeses. The retail price of Danablue is at present 87-89 cents per lb. or 14-21 cents per lb. more than the price of domestic Blue Cheese.

While there seems to be a very firm demand for this type of cheese, as also pointed out in the announcement by the Department of Agriculture on the 30th of December, domestic production has increased by 5,000,000 lbs. from 1951 to 1952, and imports were *cut* about 2,000,000 lbs. by the import restrictions.

If, in spite of this situation and against the sincere hopes of the Danish Government, the Department of Agriculture does not consider it possible to remove Blue Mold Cheese from the list of cheeses still subject to quota restrictions, it is very much hoped that it will be possible, at the very least, to increase the present quota which permits an import during the first half of 1953 of only 1,575,000 lbs. as compared with 2,450,000 lbs. during the second half of 1952.

If the quota is not increased this will not only affect Danish dollar earnings, but may also create serious difficulties in the long run for the sale of Danablue in the American market. Danablue is distributed by the importers mainly to a number of large retail stores. These stores insist on being able to rely on regular deliveries of certain minimum quantities and, due to the shortage, a few have already discontinued handling Danablue.

## Swedish Note of March 30, 1953

The Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of Sweden presents his compliments to the Honorable the Secretary of State and has the honor to bring the following to his attention.

On December 30, 1952, the Department of Agriculture announced import quotas for dried whole milk, dried buttermilk and dried cream, which products had until then been imported without restrictions.

On March 24, 1953, the Department of Agriculture placed the import of the said products under embargo, starting April 1. Of the quotas granted for the first quarter of 1953 only such quantities will be allowed to enter, which are shipped through March 31.

The Swedish Government has instructed me to express its grave concern about these import restrictions, which have been imposed pursuant to Section 104 of the Defense Production Act, as amended. In doing so, I wish to call attention especially to the following facts and circumstances.

Already before World War II Sweden was a better customer of goods produced in the United States than were the United States of goods produced in Sweden. After World War II there has been a great export surplus from the United States to Sweden. For each of the years 1951 and 1952 this surplus amounted to more than 70,000,000 dollars.

A considerable export surplus on the side of the United States has existed also with regard to agricultural products. In 1951 Sweden imported from the United States food products to an amount of about 10,000,000 dollars but exported to the United States such products to an amount of only about 1,500,000 dollars. Furthermore, in the same year Sweden imported from the United States large amounts of other agricultural products than food, i.e. cotton and tobacco. The same trend seems to have been prevailing during 1952.

However, the quantity of agricultural products imported to Sweden from the United States during the last years has been smaller than the quantity, which used to be imported before World War II. Scarcity of dollars has made it impossible for Sweden to buy such products in the United States to the same extent as earlier.

From what now has been said it will be clear that obstacles to Swedish exports to the United States must lead to a decrease in the United States exports to Sweden, including decreased outlets for the agricultural production of the United States.

The Swedish Government has on many occasions shown its willingness to cooperate fully in the efforts to expand world trade, in which the United States has taken a leading part. The Swedish Government for its part has proved this readiness as one of the Contracting Parties of the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade. The United States restrictions on the imports of dairy products have been generally recognized as contrary to this Agreement.

The Swedish Government has with great satisfaction noticed the interest in developing free trade, expressed by the President of the United States. It has also noticed the strong support, which the leaders of the three great American Farm Organizations have given to a liberalization of American trade policy, also with regard to agricultural products. There seems, however, to be an apparent lack of harmony between on one hand the expressed policy of the United States and the views of the great majority of American farmers as stated by their leaders and on the other hand the restrictions on the imports of dairy products.

The Swedish Government, therefore, sees with greatest concern the imposition at this time of a further import restriction on a Swedish agricultural product, which during recent months has been able to find an expanding market in the United States and thus would in the future contribute substantially to the Swedish dollar earning.

With reference to the above the Swedish Government expresses its sincere hope that the Government of the United States will find it possible to reconsider the re-

strictions imposed under the Section 104 of the Defense Production Act.

## Netherlands Note of March 31, 1953<sup>8</sup>

The Netherlands Ambassador presents his compliments to the Honorable the Secretary of State and has the honor to refer to a press release of the United States Department of Agriculture, Production and Marketing Administration, dated March 24, 1953, in which an embargo on imports of dried whole milk, dried butter milk, and dried cream, effective April 1, 1953 is announced.

The absolute character of this measure, coming in addition to continuing restrictions on the import of Netherlands Edam and Gouda cheeses, will undoubtedly have a severely adverse effect upon Netherlands public opinion in general and that of the export community in particular. In this connection Dr. Van Roijen refers to his note of March 2, 1953, in which he transmitted the great concern of the Netherlands Government about the import restrictions on dried milk products which had been imposed on December 30, 1952, under Section 104 of the Defense Production Act. It was hoped that the United States Government would see its way to reconsider the import limitations on Netherlands dairy products.

While not yet having received instructions from his Government, the Netherlands Ambassador would like to express his keen disappointment at the present action which appears to scatter the hope he expressed in his previous note.

## Italian Note of June 30, 1952<sup>9</sup>

The Italian Embassy presents its compliments to the Department of State and has the honor to inform of the following:

The Congressional Record of June 28, 1952, page S585, has published the report of the Senate-House Conference on Section 104 of the Defense Production Act, concerning imports of oils and fats, and informs that the Secretary of Agriculture will be authorized to increase by 15% the limitations on imports of foreign cheeses "for each type or variety which he might deem necessary, taking into consideration the broad effects on international relationship and trade."

The Committee of conference has moreover stated in its report that the control on cheese imports *will not be exercised with respect to types of cheeses, such as Roquefort and Switzerland Swiss, which, because of their U.S. selling price, are clearly not competitive with domestically produced cheeses.*

The Italian Embassy wishes to call attention to the fact that Italian cheeses, although not specifically mentioned in the congressional records, *are not competitive with the domestic production* and therefore should be exempted from import control.

As pointed out in previous notes of this Embassy, Italian cheeses exported to the United States consist largely of sheep's milk cheeses such as Pecorino and Provolone (not produced in this country), or, as in the case of Parmigiano, Reggiano and other Italian grating cheeses, they are subject to particularly lengthy processes of production and seasoning, which causes their selling price in the United States to be 50% higher than the American product.

The differentials in current retail prices of these Italian cheeses and American type are as high or higher than those of Roquefort and Switzerland Swiss cheese. For this reason the Italian Embassy insists that Italian cheeses be exempted from import control as they are not competitive with domestically produced cheeses.

The difference in prices between Italian type and other

<sup>8</sup> Two previous notes dated July 7, 1952 and Mar. 2, 1953 have been sent by the Government of the Netherlands.

<sup>9</sup> For text of a *note verbale* from the Italian Government dated Jan. 15, 1952, together with the U.S. reply of Apr. 15, see BULLETIN of Apr. 28, 1952, pp. 660-661.

foreign and domestic cheeses has been reported in the Congressional Record of June 19 (page 7781). The prices of typical Italian cheese and domestic production are as follows:

<i>Cheese type</i>	<i>Retail price</i>
Italian Parmigiano (imported)-----	\$1. 29-1. 80
American Parmesan-----	0. 75-0. 85
Italian Reggiano (imported)-----	1. 15-2. 25
American type-----	0. 89
Italian Pecorino Romano (imported)---	0. 95-1. 19
American type-----	0. 69
Italian Provolone (imported)-----	1. 19-1. 30
American Provolone-----	0. 65-0. 69

The Italian Embassy asks the Department of State to kindly bring these facts to the attention of the Department of Agriculture, so that Italian typical cheeses may be exempted from import controls, on the same basis as Roquefort and Switzerland Swiss, which in the report of the conference have been mentioned as an example (i. e., "such as").

In the event that the Department of Agriculture should exempt only these two types of cheeses mentioned in the report, the Italian Embassy wishes to point out that such treatment would constitute a discrimination against Italian cheeses, particularly in view of the even more striking characteristics and price differentials of the Italian cheese with the American domestic product, and in view also of the serious damage that is being caused to the Italian economy by recent import restrictions.

The cheese quotas have deprived Italy of the possibility to earn an estimated \$2,000,000 which would have been used to buy United States products (especially agricultural products).

Restrictions against cheese exports to the United States bear chiefly on Sardinia and other regions of Southern Italy for which the manufacture of cheese has been for centuries the main source of livelihood. As it is known, the communist agitators have seized upon the economic distress in these regions resulting from United States import restrictions, to foment trouble and disorder.

For the above reasons, the Embassy urges the suspension of any restrictions on typical Italian cheeses, in harmony with the recent decisions of Congress to exempt from import control foreign cheeses which are not competitive with American products.

The Italian Embassy expresses its thanks to the Department of State for its consideration and assistance.

### **Argentine Note of March 5, 1953**

MR. SECRETARY:

I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that, with the return of climatic conditions to normalcy, the production of cheese has increased in Argentina, and this has made it possible again to build up considerable exportable stocks.

Argentina has traditionally been a large exporter of cheeses to the United States, especially cheeses of the Italian type, so sought after by consumers in this country. As a result of the extraordinary drought which occurred in my country in recent years, Argentine exports of cheese to the United States have declined greatly, particularly since 1951.

Our Government had the opportunity on previous occasions to express its opinion regarding the harm done to the trade between our two countries by the provisions of Section 104 of the Defense Production Act of 1950, and the subsequent amendment thereof permitting one-third of the quotas fixed for each date to be transferred to another country, according to supply needs. The amendment has meant a considerable cut in Argentina's quota in favor of Italy. These provisions are making their nega-

tive effects especially felt at a time when the recovery of Argentine production permits considerably increasing the shipments to the United States. Argentina is at present in a position to fill the entire quota fixed in the said legal provision, including the one-third transferred to Italy, and we therefore respectfully request that this situation be given consideration in the amounts to be imported to the end of the present period, i. e., June 30 of this year. We likewise request that, should new quotas be established for the year 1953-54, full consideration be given to the Argentine situation. In such an event, we also request modification of the present basis for the assignment of quotas, which took the average for the years 1948-50 as a period showing the proportions for each country and each importer. We affirm that the adoption of that period was not really fair, for during those years imports from Argentina declined in comparison with previous years, as a result of the drought.

As a matter of fact, Argentina had exported substantial quantities from 1940 on. In some of those years, the figure of 10,000 tons per year was exceeded. Thus the ratios between Argentine cheese imports and total cheese imports into the United States were very high during those years, in several instances exceeding 80 percent. Those quantities and especially the ratios decreased appreciably from 1947, so that in the three-year period adopted as a base (1948-50), Argentine imports were reduced to an average of 3,500 tons and represented only 20.6 percent of the total imports of the United States, whereas adopting a longer period and therefore one more representative of the situation of international trade, for example, the period 1938-1950, leads to the conclusion that Argentine exports to the United States averaged 4,500 tons, or nearly 35 percent of the total imports.

Now, if reference is made only to cheeses subject to quota, which comprise most of the cheeses that Argentina exports to the United States, the proportions for the periods 1948-50 and 1938-50 are 32 percent and 51 percent, respectively. We therefore maintain that the absolute quantities and the proportions adopted for Argentina according to the regulations do not represent the true share that has traditionally fallen to our country in the total imports.

It behooves us to mention the circumstances that cheese imports are proportionately very small in the United States domestic market and are steadily decreasing. From somewhat more than 10 percent at the beginning of the thirties, these imports have declined appreciably and are now oscillating around 3 percent, so that they cannot cause serious disturbances in the domestic market or in production, nor can they be reflected in increased expenses resulting from the Government price-support policy.

Furthermore, the maintenance of quotas does not seem to be in accord with the new trends of the Government's economic policy or with the necessary expansion of regional economies, a basic factor in the general advancement of well-being in the world.

For these reasons and in compliance with express instructions from my Government, I request Your Excellency to be so good as to see that the proper authorities of the United States Government consider the elimination of the quota system affecting Argentine cheese imports or, failing that, to have a new analysis made of the present system of distribution of quotas of the said product, so that it may be fairer and may definitively permit a substantial increase in Argentine cheese exports to the United States, which my country will be in a position to satisfy to the extent required.

I avail myself of the opportunity to express to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest and most distinguished consideration.

[Signed] HIPÓLITO J. PAZ  
Ambassador

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## The Pan American Union: A True Community of Equal Nations

*Address by the President*<sup>1</sup>

My pride and pleasure in participating in the ceremonies today have a simple source. They spring from the pride which the whole citizenry of the United States feels in the Pan American Union and the ideals for which it stands.

The code that governs our union is founded upon the most deeply held moral convictions. And this fact makes especially appropriate our meeting on this, our Sabbath Day.

Ours is an historic and meaningful unity. It has been, for our whole continent, an honest and productive unity. It can be, for other areas of the world, a prophetic and inspiring unity. For it is triumphant testimony before all the world that peace and trust and fellowship can rule the conduct of all nations, large and small, who will respect the life and dignity of each other.

In this deepest sense, then, we nations of America do more than enjoy a political system constructed for ourselves. We are custodians of a way of life that can be instructive for all mankind.

The history of the Americas over the span of the 63 years since the founding of our regional organization has not been spotlessly perfect. Like all peoples, our nations—every one of them, the United States included—have at times been guilty of selfish and thoughtless actions. In all dealings with our neighbors we have not always bravely resisted the temptations of expediency.

But the special merit of the Pan American achievement is to have triumphed as well as we have over the temptations of heedless nationalism. We have seen and we have acted on the need to work cooperatively together to achieve common purposes. So doing, we have forged a true community of equal nations. I am profoundly dedicated to doing all that I can to perfect the understanding and trust upon which this community must rest.

The vitality of this unity springs, first of all, from our common acceptance of basic moral and juridical principles. But it is inspired no less by our recognition of the rights of each of our nations, under these principles, to perfect its own individual life and culture. Ours is no compulsory unity of institutions. Ours is a unity that welcomes the diversity, the initiative, and the imagination that make our common association progressive and alive. This is the American way—the free way—by which people are bound together for the common good.

I know that these facts, these simple ideals, are not new. But they are given a new, a sharp meaning, by the nature of the tension tormenting our whole world. For it is not possible for this hemisphere to seek security or salvation in any kind of splendid isolation.

The forces threatening this continent strike at the very ideals by which our peoples live. These forces seek to bind nations not by trust but by fear. They seek to promote, among those of us who remain free and unafraid, the deadliest divisions—class against class, people against people, nation against nation. They seek not to eradicate poverty and its causes, but to exploit it and those who suffer it. Against these forces the widest oceans offer no sure defense. The seeds of hate and of distrust can be borne on winds that heed no frontier or shore.

Our defense, our only defense, is in our own spirit and our own will. We who are all young nations, in whom the pioneering spirit is still vitally alive, need neither to fear the future nor be satisfied with the present. In our spiritual, cultural, and material life, in all that concerns our daily bread and our daily learning, we do and should seek an ever better world.

We know that this economic and social betterment will not be achieved by engaging in experiments alien to our very souls, or listening to prophets seeking to destroy our very lives.

We know that it can come to pass only by faithfully applying the rules of national conduct we

<sup>1</sup> Made at the Pan American Union, Washington, D.C., on Apr. 12 and released to the press by the White House on the same date.

know to have been tested and proved wise: A mutual trust that makes us honorable and understanding neighbors, and a self-reliance that summons each nation to work to the full for its own welfare.

I do not think it unjust to claim for the Government and the people of the United States a readiness, rarely matched in history, to help other nations improve their living standards and guard their security. Despite unprecedented burdens of national debt and worldwide responsibility, our people have continued to demonstrate this readiness.

Private investment has been the major stimulus for economic development throughout the hemisphere. Beyond this, the U.S. Government is today engaged with our sister Republics in important efforts to increase agricultural productivity, improve health conditions, encourage new industries, extend transportation facilities, and develop new sources of power.

The pursuit of each of these goals in any one nation of the Americas serves the good of all the Americas. Knowing this, I am anxious that the Government of the United States take careful stock of the economic and social conditions now prevailing throughout our continent and of all the efforts being pressed to bring a better life to all our peoples. Such an assessment can properly be made only through direct personal understanding of the facts. Because my current duties make impossible my making personal visits of courtesy to the countries of Latin America, as I wish I could do, I have asked my brother, Milton Eisenhower, president of Pennsylvania State College, to visit shortly a number of these great Republics. He will carry to each of the governments he visits the most sincere and warm greetings of this administration. He will report to me, to Secretary of State Dulles, and to Assistant Secretary Cabot on ways to be recommended for strengthening the bonds between us and all our neighbors in this Pan American Union.

Today, Mr. Chairman, I think it appropriate to conclude with one thought: However real and just be our concern with constructive material development, we must never forget that the strength of America continues ever to be the spirit of America.

We are Christian nations, deeply conscious that the foundation of all liberty is religious faith.

Upon all our peoples and nations there rests, with equal weight, a responsibility to serve worthily the faith we hold and the freedom we cherish, to combat demagoguery with truth, to destroy prejudice with understanding and, above all, to thwart our common enemies by our fervent dedication to our common cause.

So dedicated, our Republics, united in spirit, can look forward to a future of happy and productive peace.

## Observance of Pan American Day

### A PROCLAMATION<sup>1</sup>

WHEREAS, the Governing Board of the Pan American Union recommended in 1930 that April 14 be officially observed each year by every member country as Pan American Day; and

WHEREAS the people of the United States of America customarily have joined with their friends and neighbors in the other American republics in observing Pan American Day; and

WHEREAS April 14, 1953, will mark the sixty-third anniversary of the founding of the organization long known as the Pan American Union, which now serves as the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States; and

WHEREAS the forthcoming Tenth Inter-American Conference of the Organization of American States, to be held at Caracas, Venezuela, will demonstrate anew to peoples throughout the world the cooperation and good-will among the neighbors of the Americas which have contributed so much to their spiritual, as well as material, development and strength; and


WHEREAS it is the firm resolve of the Government and the people of the United States of America that the ties binding the twenty-one sovereign and equal American republics shall be maintained and strengthened:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Dwight D. Eisenhower, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim Tuesday, April 14, 1953, as Pan American Day, and I direct the appropriate officials of the Government to arrange for the display of the flag of the United States on all public buildings on that day.

I also invite the Governors of the States, Territories, and possessions of the United States to issue similar proclamations for the observance of Pan American Day. And I urge all interested organizations, and the people generally, to unite in suitable ceremonies commemorative of the founding of the Pan American Union, thereby testifying to the close bonds of friendship existing between the people of the United States and those of the other American republics.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this sixth day of April in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and (SEAL) fifty-three, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and seventy-seventh.



By the President:

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

Secretary of State

<sup>1</sup> 18 Fed. Reg., 1953.



## **U.S. and Germany Discuss Economic, Political, and Cultural Relations**

### **COMMUNIQUE ON ECONOMIC, POLITICAL TALKS**

Press release 183 dated April 9

The President of the United States, the Secretary of State, and other members of the Cabinet have met during the past 3 days with the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and had a full and frank exchange of views on the world situation in general and on American-German relations in particular. The conversations took place in a spirit of friendship and cooperation and revealed a far-reaching identity of views and objectives.

The President and the Chancellor discussed the effects which recent developments in the Soviet orbit might have on the East-West conflict. They were fully agreed that, while no opportunity should be missed to bring about a general relaxation of tension, the free nations of the West must not relax their vigilance nor diminish their efforts to increase their unity and common strength. They were further agreed that if the Soviet rulers are genuinely desirous of peace and cooperation among all nations, they could furnish no better proof of their good will than by permitting genuinely free elections in the Soviet occupied Zone of Germany and by releasing the hundreds of thousands of German civilian deportees and war prisoners still in Soviet hands. They further stated their joint conviction that there can be no lasting solution of the German problem short of a reunification of Germany by peaceful means and on a free and democratic basis. The achievement of this purpose calls for sustained common efforts of the signatory powers to the contractual agreements signed at Bonn last year.

There was unanimity of conviction that all concerned should press forward unwaveringly toward European unity through early ratification of the treaty establishing a European Defense Community. Achievement of this goal will be accompanied by the establishment of German independence and sovereignty under the contractual agreements. The Chancellor declared that the Federal Republic of Germany is ready and willing to cooperate on a basis of equality and partnership with all the free nations of the West in strengthen-

ing the defenses of the free world. The Chancellor was given assurance that the United States would supply military equipment to the European Defense Community to assist in equipping the German contingents, once the treaty has been ratified.

The problem of the Saar was discussed and it was agreed that an early agreement should be sought in the common interest.

Consideration was given to the special situation of Berlin and admiration expressed for the political firmness and courage of its inhabitants. It was agreed that the moral and material support needed to keep the city strong is a matter of primary importance. The Chancellor indicated that he had in mind further measures to increase production and reduce unemployment. The Secretary stated that consideration was now being given to assistance by the U.S. Government to investment and other programs to improve economic conditions in Berlin.

The Chancellor indicated the great difficulties facing the Federal Republic because of the necessity to assimilate not only the millions of expellees who came earlier from eastern areas but the renewed stream of refugees from the Soviet Zone and beyond. The President and Secretary of State recognized the great efforts undertaken by the Federal Republic to care for these homeless persons and to preserve economic and social stability. The discussion took account of the possibility that the Federal Republic and Berlin might be unable to bear this burden alone. The Director for Mutual Security stated that careful consideration of this matter would be given in the course of the preparation of the Mutual Security Program for the year beginning July 1, 1953.

The Chancellor raised the problem of war criminals. The future of the war criminals now in U.S. custody was discussed. The U.S. representative stated that his Government would re-examine the status of these prisoners and would also look forward to the possible adoption of new review procedures with German participation, as soon as German ratification of the treaties was completed.

The representatives of both Governments exchanged views concerning progress toward the freeing and expansion of world trade and the

achievement of currency convertibility. The German representatives expressed particular interest in the reduction of tariffs and customs administrative barriers. For their part, the U.S. representatives noted President Eisenhower's statement of April 7 that "the world must achieve an expanding trade, balanced at high levels which will permit each nation to make its full contribution to the progress of the free world's economy and to share fully the benefits of this progress."

Representatives of the two Governments discussed a number of specific problems connected with the normalization of commercial relations between the United States and Germany, including the prospects for increased use by German exporters of the trademarks owned by German nationals prior to World War II. It was noted that considerable progress had already been achieved in making such trademarks available to former German owners and that future progress in that direction was being sympathetically studied by the United States.

The Chancellor and the Secretary of State agreed that the conclusion of a new treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation between the United States and the Federal Republic would be of benefit to both countries and that negotiations for such a treaty should begin at a very early date. Meanwhile, as an interim measure, the two Governments are negotiating an agreement to restore to force the 1923 treaty of friendship, commerce, and consular rights as it stood prior to the war, taking into account the requirements of the present situation. This interim agreement, when ratified in both countries, would, among other things, re-establish a basis on which businessmen of each country would be able to reside and carry on business in the other.

The German representatives indicated their interest in the placing of off-shore procurement contracts in Germany. They were informed that as soon as the contractual and European Defense Community treaties have entered into force, the same criteria will be applied in the placing of such contracts in Germany, within the framework of the European Defense Community, as are applied with respect to the placing of contracts in other European countries.

In order to foster closer cultural cooperation between Germany and the United States and promote mutual understanding between their two peoples, an exchange of notes is taking place.

The two Governments reaffirmed their common interest in controlling, together with other nations of the free world, the movement of strategic materials to nations whose policies jeopardize the peace and security of the free world. Both Governments undertook to continue action to that end, and, in particular, to keep under constant review the list of items which from time to time may be subject to embargo to Communist China. The representatives of the Federal Republic also

expressed their Government's intention, in cooperation with other trading and maritime nations, to apply supplementary measures, such as transshipment controls, against violations or evasions of existing strategic controls.

Announcement is being made simultaneously in the two capitals of the return to the Federal Republic of approximately 350 vessels formerly of German ownership. Arrangements for their transfer to German authorities will be completed by the U.S. High Commissioner in Germany.

The President and the Chancellor are convinced that the conversations just concluded have made a solid contribution to the achievement of common goals of the two countries, in strengthening the ties of friendship now happily re-established and in consolidating the aims and strength of the free world.

## **TRANSFER OF SHIPS TO GERMANY**

Press release 183-A dated April 9

The following are the details of the transfer to the German Federal Republic by the United States of former German vessels noted in the joint communique issued on April 9 at the conclusion of talks in Washington between Chancellor Adenauer and U.S. officials.

The decision to return these vessels to German ownership is based upon the essential function they can perform in Germany, and the desire of the United States to relinquish responsibility for their ownership before the contractual agreements between the German Federal Republic and the United States, the United Kingdom, and France come into effect.

The United States is returning to the German Federal Republic 350 of the vessels which the Tripartite Naval Commission (TNC) allocated to the United States in 1946. The vessels are presently on charter to the German economy.

In June of 1947 the Department of the Navy transferred to the Department of the Army (OMGUS) these vessels. OMGUS (U.S. Military Governor in Germany) in turn made the vessels available to the German economy on a charter basis. This was done to assist the German economy to meet inland waterway and coastal shipping requirements: to increase food production through the availability of 124 trawlers, cutters, and luggers for fishing; and to make possible employment in German shipyards by making available 20 floating docks and four pontoons.

The original fleet was reduced in size through marine casualties, scrapping of overage vessels, transfer of certain vessels to the control of the U.S. Army and Navy, and the sale of vessels surplus to the German economy, and U.S. needs by the Office of the Foreign Liquidation Commission.

The present charterers of the TNC vessels in the service of the German economy have spent considerable funds to rehabilitate and convert these

ex-German naval vessels to make them suitable and economical to operate in the German commercial service. These capital improvements to the vessels were amortized by the operators by deducting an agreed amount from the charter fees due OMGUS/HICOG.

The 1950 appraised value of the vessels being returned to the Federal Republic is approximately Deutschemarks 30 million or \$7.1 million.

The following types of vessels will be included in the transfer to the Federal Republic:

- Inland waterway vessels—dumb and self-propelled, tank and dry cargo
- Coastal tankers and dry cargo vessels
- Tug boats—harbor, river, and deep sea
- Small passenger boats and ferries
- Fire, pilot, and police boats
- Research vessels
- Hotel ships
- Salvage and diving vessels
- Dredgers—suction and bucket
- Floating docks and pontoons
- Fishing trawlers, cutters, luggers
- Workshop and miscellaneous vessels

The cargo-carrying type vessels being returned under this agreement have a maximum deadweight of 3,000 tons. The largest floating dock has a lifting capacity of 16,000 tons.

Final arrangements for the return of these vessels, the time and date of transfer, and other details will be worked out between the competent authorities of HICOG and the Federal Republic.

## **U.S.—GERMAN UNDERSTANDINGS ON CULTURAL EXCHANGE**

*On April 9 Secretary Dulles and Chancellor Adenauer exchanged notes concerning cultural exchange between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany. Following are the texts of the notes, together with the texts of remarks made by Secretary Dulles and Chancellor Adenauer at the time of the exchange of notes.*

### **Texts of Notes**

Press release 184 dated April 9

**EXCELLENCY:** I have the honor to refer to conversations which have recently taken place between representatives of our two Governments concerning the cultural relations between the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany. I understand that it will be the intent of each Government:

1. To encourage the coming together of the peoples of the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany in cultural cooperation and to foster mutual understanding of the intellectual, artistic, scientific, and social lives of the peoples of the two countries.

2. Recognizing that the understanding between its peoples will be promoted by better knowledge

of the history, civilization, institutions, literature, and other cultural accomplishments of the people of the other Government, to encourage the extension of such knowledge within its own territory.

3. To use its best efforts to extend to citizens of the other Government engaged in activities pursuant to this agreement such favorable treatment with respect to entry, travel, residence, and exit as is consistent with its national laws.

4. To promote and facilitate the interchange between the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany of prominent citizens, specialists, professors, teachers, students and other youths, and qualified individuals from all walks of life.

5. As facilitating the interchange of persons referred to, to look with favor on establishment of scholarships, travel grants, and other forms of assistance in the academic and cultural institutions within its territory. Each Government will also endeavor to make available to the other information requested by the other with regard to facilities, courses of instruction or other opportunities which may be of interest to nationals of the other Government.

6. To endeavor, whenever it appears desirable, to establish or to recommend to appropriate agencies the establishment of committees, composed of representatives of the two countries, to further the purpose of this agreement.

The responsibilities assumed by each Government under this agreement will be executed within the framework of domestic policy and legislation, procedures and practices defining internal jurisdiction of governmental and other agencies within their respective territories.

This understanding shall be applicable also in the territory of Berlin as soon as the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany makes a conforming declaration to the Government of the United States of America.

I have the honor to propose that, if these understandings meet with the approval of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, the present note and your note concurring therein will be considered as confirming those understandings, effective on the date of your note.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of highest consideration.

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

**MR. SECRETARY OF STATE:** I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's note of April 9, 1953, concerning the cultural relations between the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany. I understand that it will be the intent of each government:

[Points 1 through 6 of the U.S. note are repeated here.]

I have the honor to concur in the proposal made

in Your Excellency's note and to inform you that the understandings set forth therein meet with the approval of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. That note and the present note, accordingly, are considered as confirming those understandings, which become effective on this date.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest and most distinguished consideration.

KONRAD ADENAUER

#### **Remarks by Secretary Dulles and Chancellor Adenauer**

Press release 185 dated April 9

##### *Secretary Dulles*

*Mr. Chancellor:* The notes which we are about to exchange manifest the desire of my Government to re-establish friendly relations with the people of the German Federal Republic. Cultural exchange between the United States and Germany has in the past contributed substantially to better mutual understanding. In giving formal recognition to this exchange, we wish to emphasize a reciprocal character; beyond that, we wish to encourage private citizens and organizations of both countries to contribute in ever-increasing measure to this cultural exchange.

*Chancellor Adenauer*  
[Translation]

*Mr. Secretary:* I am glad that during my visit to Washington we could have this exchange of notes. I agree with you that the establishment of such cultural relations is the best way of giving expression to a common sentiment and the best means to bring our two peoples together to serve peace and freedom.

#### **ARRIVAL OF CHANCELLOR ADENAUER**

Press release 176 dated April 7

*Following are the texts of statements of welcome made by Vice President Nixon and Secretary Dulles to Chancellor Konrad Adenauer of the Federal Republic of Germany on his arrival at the Washington National Airport on April 7, together with the reply of Chancellor Adenauer:*

##### **The Vice President**

Mr. Chancellor, your visit marks a historic occasion in the relationships between the people of Germany and the United States. There are very few American schoolchildren who do not recall the dramatic period in the American War for Independence when Baron von Steuben helped to train the disorganized and ragged Continental soldiers at Valley Forge and develop the forces which went on to win the victory at Yorktown which resulted in the independence of this country.

As a matter of fact, in a park only a stone's throw away from the house in which you will stay, a statue has been erected which expresses the gratitude of the American people for what he did for us during that period. And all of you, of course, are aware of the tremendous contribution which has been made by the millions of Germans who have become American citizens—a contribution to our culture, to our strength, and to our progress.

It seems to us that one of the great tragedies of our generation has been that twice within almost a generation our two peoples have been torn asunder by conflict. We are confident that we are now entering a new era—a new era of peace and friendship between our two peoples and we are confident—we hope and pray that under your leadership and the leadership of those in your Government in the new Germany, and with your leadership, that together we can re-establish the old bonds of friendship which for so long represented the relationships between the German and the American people.

I recall when I visited Germany in 1947 the terrible destruction that we saw then. Like many who visited Germany at that time, I wondered if the German people and the German economy could ever recover. But under your leadership and the people of your Government with new leaders and a new Germany, a remarkable recovery has taken place, and Germany is fast again assuming its rightful place in the family of nations.

We hope that progress can continue, and I am speaking for all the American people when I say that we are hoping and praying that in your visit here, working with our leaders, that you will be able to make a contribution to the peace and friendship which should exist between our two countries.

And so, therefore, it gives me a great deal of pleasure to extend on behalf of the President of the United States and on behalf of the American people our heartfelt welcome to you and to the other members of your party. And we are hopeful as you sit down with our leaders that you will be able to develop a program which will be of great assistance in meeting our mutual problems and will make a remarkable contribution to the peace and friendship which will mean so much to the people of the world.

##### **Secretary Dulles**

Mr. Adenauer, a few weeks ago you did me the honor of greeting me when I arrived at your capital at Bonn. And it is a very great pleasure and an honor to me now to reciprocate by meeting you here in Washington. That honor is greater because you are, I think, the first German Chancellor in office to ever visit the United States. You can be sure you will receive here a very hearty welcome, indeed.

In Europe great events are in the making.

There is a growing sense of unity and strength which has long been desired, needed, but never yet realized. We have great hopes now that they will be realized. Those hopes are based largely upon the fact that there is in Germany the struggle for liberty and statesmanship which is represented by yourself. The whole world can, indeed, be grateful that at this critical time Germany through you and your leadership is making a constructive contribution to the creation of this unity and strength and freedom in Europe which is indispensable.

I am glad, Mr. Chancellor, that you will not only be in Washington where I am sure we will have constructive talks with our government leaders and officials, but you are going to do something more than be in Washington. You are going to travel a little around our country and I am glad you are going to do that. This will give you a sense of the welcome not only here but a welcome that comes out of the hearts of the American people. We are very glad, indeed, that you are here.

### **The Chancellor**

[Translation]

Mr. Vice President, Mr. Secretary: I am deeply moved as I step on this soil of your Capital by the words you have addressed to myself and to the German people. They were so warm and so full of deep meaning that I find it hard to reply in a very good manner.

You, Mr. Vice President, have spoken of General von Steuben. I thank you for the chivalrous manner in which you referred to the long period of common work between the Germans and the Americans in the past without putting too much emphasis on the last two decades.

You, Mr. Secretary, spoke, like the Vice President, of new tasks, of the work which will have to be done, of the sacrifices which will have to be made by all men of good will, by all men who regard freedom, right, and justice as the highest goods of mankind; and they are ready to defend these bridges and goods with all their strength. Please accept from me in this memorable moment, this solemn declaration.

The German people are on the side of freedom. The German people are on the side of right and justice for all nations. To your President, whom I hold in the very highest esteem, I am most sincerely grateful, and so are the German people, for the opportunity of having at this eventful time the frank and free exchange of views on all questions of mutual concern.

As the representative of the German people I would, above all, like to thank your President and the American people for all the help that they have rendered to the people of Germany in a spirit of true human sympathy. This we shall never forget. We shall be the loyal and helpful partner on the grave and difficult road on which the United States is leading mankind to freedom.

Let me add another word, Mr. Secretary. I well remember the talks we had in Bonn, the free and frank discussions, and I am looking forward to continuing these discussions with you now. I am particularly looking forward to seeing again your President, whom I once met in Bonn when he was the Supreme Commander of NATO. I have a very high respect for your President, and I am looking forward to meeting him again.

### **Validation of German Dollar Bonds**

Press release 171 dated April 2

The Governments of the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany signed a further agreement on April 1 at Bonn concerning validation of German dollar bonds. The agreement is related both to the Agreement on German External Debts signed at London last February 27<sup>1</sup> and to the agreement establishing procedures for validation which was signed at Bonn on the same day.<sup>2</sup> It will be submitted to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification, together with the Agreement on German External Debts and the related agreements.

The purpose of validation is to separate valid bonds from those which were looted in Germany during World War II. Under the terms of the Agreement on German External Debts, only obligations which have been validated will be eligible for payment. The procedures to be established in accordance with the agreement of February 27 will provide the mechanism for meeting the requirement of validation.

The agreement signed April 1 provides that German dollar bonds will not be enforceable unless they have been validated in accordance with the terms of the earlier agreement, or by the competent German authorities. This will serve the interests of the holders of validated bonds, for it will prevent the holders of looted bonds from enforcing payment of them and thus reducing the funds available for the payment of validated bonds.

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Mar. 9, 1953, p. 373.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 376.

## Talks on Repatriation of Sick and Wounded Prisoners

### LETTER FROM THE COMMUNIST COMMANDERS TO GEN. MARK W. CLARK, APRIL 2

We received your letter dated March 31, 1953.<sup>1</sup>

We agree to the proposal advanced in your letter and hereby inform you that the liaison group of our side will be prepared to hold meeting with the liaison group of your side at Panmunjom, on April 6, 1953, to arrange preliminarily the matter of exchange by both sides of injured and sick prisoners of war and to discuss and decide on the date for resuming the armistice negotiations.

Enclosed please find a copy each of each of the statements of the Government of the People's Republic of China<sup>2</sup> and the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea<sup>3</sup> concerning a proposal on the question of repatriation of prisoners of war.

KIM IL SUNG,  
*Supreme Commander of the Korean  
People's Army*

PENG TEH-HUAL,  
*Commander of the Chinese  
People's Volunteers*

### LIAISON OFFICERS' MEETINGS

*Following are statements issued by the U.N. Command at Tokyo summarizing the meetings held at Panmunjom by liaison officers appointed to discuss the repatriation of sick and wounded prisoners of war. The U.N. liaison group was headed by Rear Adm. John C. Daniel; the chief Communist liaison officer was Maj. Gen. Lee Sang Jo.*

#### Meeting of April 6

1. Senior liaison group met at 1000, this date. Substance of record follows:

2. UNC: "I have been appointed as senior member of the United Nations Command liaison group for the purpose of discussing arrangements for the repatriation of sick and wounded captured personnel. Here are my credentials." (Hands credentials to Maj. Gen. Lee Sang Jo.)

3. Communists: "I will show you my credentials in which the commander of our side appointed me responsible

man of the liaison group of our side." (Hands credentials to Rear Adm. Daniel.)

4. UNC: "The United Nations Command is pleased that your side has finally accepted our proposal, as first advanced by us on 22 December 1951, for the repatriation of sick and wounded captured personnel under Article 109 of the Geneva Convention.<sup>4</sup> Accordingly, we are ready to begin immediately the implementation of plans for this repatriation.

"The United Nations Command is prepared to conduct the repatriation operations at Panmunjom in order to take advantage of the neutral area already established. For its part, the United Nations Command is prepared to begin immediately the construction of necessary facilities for the delivery of sick and wounded captured personnel held in its custody, and the receipt of sick and wounded United Nations Command captured personnel held by your side.

"The United Nations Command is prepared to commence delivery of sick and wounded captured personnel in its custody to the control of representatives of your side at Panmunjom not later than 7 days after final agreement on repatriation procedures is made by the liaison groups of both sides.

"The United Nations Command proposes to deliver sick and wounded captured personnel at the rate of approximately 500 captured personnel per day until delivery of all sick and wounded captured personnel in United Nations Command is completed.

"The United Nations Command will continue to treat sick and wounded captured personnel in strict accordance with the humanitarian provisions of the Geneva Convention as long as they remain under our control.

"In order to insure that the sick and wounded captured personnel of both sides are given maximum protection during the full period of this repatriation, our side is prepared to agree with you on procedures to guarantee immunity from aerial attacks to all rail and motor movements carrying sick and wounded captured personnel in Kaesong and Munsan-Ni respectively, and thence through the presently established immunity routes to Panmunjom.

"During the period while sick and wounded personnel are being repatriated through Panmunjom, the 22 October 1951 agreement<sup>5</sup> between our officers will of course remain in effect. The liaison groups of both sides and their parties should have free access to, and free movement within, the Panmunjom conference site area. The composition of each liaison group and its parties should be as determined by the senior member, but to avoid congestion, each side should agree to limit the total number of personnel under its control, including captured personnel, which will be allowed at any one time in the conference site area.

"In order to expedite the final arrangements for the repatriation of sick and wounded captured personnel, our side has prepared a draft of a proposed agreement in-

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of April, 13, 1953, p. 528.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 526.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

<sup>4</sup> BULLETIN of Apr. 6, 1953, p. 495.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, Feb. 18, 1952, p. 270.

corporating the foregoing provisions. I now present you a copy of this proposed draft<sup>6</sup> for your study and any recommendations you may have. I propose that we appoint officers to discuss immediately the administrative details involved in this repatriation.

"I propose that we simultaneously exchange the estimated figures by nationality of sick and wounded captured personnel under each side's control who will be repatriated under the provisions of Article 109 of the Geneva Convention. I propose that we exchange these figures now."

5. *Communists*: "I have taken notice of your proposal concerning the specific arrangement of both sides to exchange sick and injured prisoners of war. As for your proposal, we will seriously study it and will present, as soon as possible, our complete views.

"As it was pointed out by the commanders of our side in their letter of 28 March to your commander,<sup>7</sup> the delegates of both sides to the negotiations have long since reached agreement in accordance with the humanitarian principles on the question of sick and injured prisoners of war in the custody of both sides; to repatriate them with priority. It was solely because the Korean armistice negotiations were suspended that there was no way to implement this agreement. In consequence it has not been possible up to the present to repatriate the sick and injured prisoners of both sides. Now that the commanders of the two sides have agreed to repatriate sick and injured prisoners of war in accordance with Article 109 of the Geneva Convention relating to prisoners of war, our side is prepared to repatriate all the sick and injured prisoners of war held in our custody for the purpose of speedily and thoroughly settling this question. That is to say, our side is prepared to repatriate all the sick and injured prisoners of war entitled to be directly repatriated and accommodated in a neutral country according to the provisions of Articles 109 and 110 of the 1949 Geneva Convention relative to the prisoners of war."

6. *UNC*: "I have a statement to make. In order to proceed without delay in plans for the repatriation of sick and wounded captured personnel I propose that we exchange numbers of sick and wounded captured personnel by nationality now."

7. *Communists*: "Our side also considers that both sides should exchange as quickly as possible the estimated figures of sick and injured prisoners of war. But, in order to determine the estimated figures of sick and injured prisoners of war, the categories of sick and injured prisoners of war to be repatriated should be determined first. Therefore, our side is willing to exchange views with your side on this question first."

8. *UNC*: "What are your views as to the categories of sick and wounded personnel to be exchanged?"

9. *Communists*: "Our side is prepared to repatriate all the sick and injured prisoners of war held in our custody for the purpose of speedily and thoroughly settling this question. That is to say, our side is prepared to repatriate all the sick and injured prisoners of war entitled to be directly repatriated or accommodated in a neutral country according to the provisions of Article 109 and 110 of the 1949 Geneva Convention relative to prisoners of war."

10. *UNC*: "We propose that we recess until 1100 hours to consider your statement."

11. *Communists*: "We agree to your proposal." (Recessed at 1036 hours.)

12. *UNC*: "I have a statement to make. We are prepared to repatriate directly through Panmunjom all sick and wounded captured personnel specified in Article 109 of the Geneva Convention. We have not divided them into categories. We have total figures by nationality which we are prepared to exchange."

13. *Communists*: "I have stated that our side is prepared to repatriate all sick and injured prisoners of war in our custody. I wish to know whether your side is also

prepared to repatriate sick and injured prisoners of war who are entitled to be accommodated in a neutral country according to the provisions of Articles 109 and 110 of the Geneva Convention."

14. *UNC*: "I have a statement to make. We will carefully consider your proposals. I suggest that you carefully consider ours.

"I have another matter. In reference to the proposal which the commanders of your side made to General Clark on 2 April relating to the question of repatriation of prisoners of war, the United Nations Command would be pleased to receive at as early a date as possible a detailed statement of suggestions on the implementation of the proposal in order that it can be studied while the arrangements for the repatriation of sick and wounded captured personnel are being completed.

"We suggest that we recess until eleven o'clock tomorrow."

15. *Communists*: "I have noted your statement. I will report it to my superiors. I agree to your proposal to recess."

16. Meeting adjourned at 1128 hours.

### Meeting of April 7

1. Meeting of senior liaison groups convened at 1100 hours this date. Substance of record follows:

2. *UNC*: "I have a statement to make. Yesterday I proposed that our two sides exchange simultaneously the estimated figures by nationality of sick and wounded captured personnel under each side's control who will be repatriated under the provisions of Article 109 of the Geneva Convention. You agreed that the estimated figures should be exchanged as quickly as possible, but you indicated that the categories of personnel to be repatriated should be determined first. You further indicated that your side was prepared to repatriate all the sick and wounded prisoners of war in your custody who are entitled 'to be directly repatriated or accommodated in a neutral country according to the provisions of Article 109 and 110 of the 1949 Geneva Convention, relative to prisoners of war.'

"I interpret your remarks to indicate that you are willing to repatriate directly through Panmunjom, not only those persons provided for in the first paragraph of Article 109, but also those sick and wounded personnel who might normally be accommodated in neutral countries as provided by the second paragraph of Article 110. The United Nations Command is in agreement with this interpretation subject to the provision that no individual shall be eligible for repatriation except in accordance with Paragraph 3 of Article 109.

"The United Nations Command does not consider it necessary or desirable to break down the over-all figures of sick and wounded to be repatriated under the foregoing understanding, but takes the position that, for humanitarian reasons, the broadest possible scope should be given to the interpretation of 'sick and wounded' in determining the captured personnel to be repatriated; and further takes the position that such repatriation should be started without delay.

"If you are in agreement with the foregoing definition of categories, I propose that we exchange the estimated totals by nationalities of sick and wounded captured personnel—all of whom will be repatriated directly through Panmunjom—so that we can proceed with the detailed arrangement of repatriation."

3. *Communists*: "I have noted your statement. I propose to recess for 20 minutes."

4. *UNC*: "We agree." (Recessed at 1114 hours for 20 minutes.) (Meeting reconvened at 1153 hours.)

5. *Communists*: "I have a statement to make. I have noted the statement you made today. I understand that your side agrees to include in the scope of sick and injured prisoners of war to be directly repatriated this time those sick and injured prisoners of war who may be accommodated in neutral countries according to the provisions of

<sup>6</sup> Not printed.

<sup>7</sup> BULLETIN of Apr. 6, 1953, p. 494.

Article 109 of the Geneva Convention relative to prisoners of war.

"Regarding the question of Paragraph 3 of Article 109 which you mentioned, I wish to point out that this provision must not be used as a pretext for obstructing the repatriation of sick and injured prisoners of war who are willing to be repatriated during hostilities.

"As I have expressed yesterday and now repeat once more, our side is still prepared immediately to repatriate directly to your side all the sick and injured prisoners of war who, according to Article 109 of the Geneva Convention relating to prisoners of war, are entitled to be directly repatriated or accommodated in a neutral country.

"Our side wants to make clear that we reserve the right to ask for the accommodation in a neutral country of those prisoners of war in the custody of your side who will not be directly repatriated.

"Now in this meeting of the Liaison Group, I would like to proceed to the discussion of the specific arrangements for the sick and injured prisoners of war whom both sides are prepared immediately to repatriate directly."

6. UNC: "We suggest that we recess until 1330 hours in order to have lunch and study your proposal."

7. *Communists*: "I agree to the proposal for recess."

8. Meeting recessed at 1200 hours.

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1. Meeting of Senior Liaison Groups reconvened at 1330 hours this date. Substance of record follows:

2. UNC: "I have a statement to make. I note that you are ready to proceed with the discussion of the specific arrangements for the direct repatriation through Panmunjom of sick and wounded captured personnel. Before we proceed further, I propose that we exchange estimated totals by nationality of personnel to be repatriated."

3. *Communists*: "I have noted your statement. Our side agrees that both sides should exchange as quickly as possible the estimated figures of sick and injured prisoners of war to be repatriated. But our side considers that the estimated figures furnished by both sides should conform to the actual situation as much as possible so that they may really facilitate the preparatory work of repatriating sick and injured prisoners of war. Our side is actively checking the number of all sick and injured prisoners of war held in our custody. Your side will be informed by our side as soon as a result comes out. We estimate that this can be done within one or two days.

"With regard to the contents of the proposed agreement relating to the repatriation of sick and wounded captured personnel which your side presented to our side on 6 April, our side has already made a preliminary study of it and is of the opinion that this proposed agreement can be a basis for discussion between the two sides. To some of the articles in this proposed agreement, our side can readily agree now. Our side agrees completely to the first article of the proposed agreement of your side which sets Panmunjom as a place for the exchange of sick and injured captured personnel. Our side can also agree to the Fourth Article on the delivery of sick and injured captured personnel in groups as well as the times included in the roster of each group and the Fifth Article relating to the procedure for delivery and receipt of sick and injured personnel. Our side agrees in principle to the Sixth Article on the protection of sick and injured captured personnel, but the various paragraphs of this article have to be studied in connection with the actual conditions. As for the rest of the articles, our side will present our specific views after giving them further study. Furthermore, our side will also recommend additions to the contents of this agreement if necessary."

4. UNC: "I have a statement. I am pleased that you are ready to get down to the business of settling the question of the repatriation of the sick and wounded.

"It appears that the settlement of the various issues relating to the agreement will be time consuming. I propose that we confine ourselves to the major issues in our discussions between the senior members of the respective

liaison groups, and that we appoint officers to work out simultaneously the administrative details for the repatriation. If you agree with this proposal, I am prepared to appoint now the staff officers who will represent our side."

5. *Communists*: "I have noted the proposal of your side. I will give you our answer to the question tomorrow. "I suggest we recess until eleven o'clock tomorrow.

6. UNC: "We agree to recess until eleven o'clock tomorrow."

## Meeting of April 8

1. Meeting of Senior Liaison Group convened at 1100 hours this date. Substance of record follows:

2. *Communists*: a. "I now inform your side that the estimated figure of sick and injured prisoners of war in our custody, whom our side will directly repatriate to your side, is around 600, of which around 450 are sick and injured Korean prisoners of war and around 150 are sick and injured non-Korean prisoners of war. Our side is further checking the classified figures, by nationality, of the sick and injured non-Korean prisoners of war. I will inform your side as soon as a result comes out."

b. "In order that the problems relating to the specific arrangements for repatriating sick and injured prisoners of war may be studied and the actual preparations may be undertaken, I would like to know the estimated figures of sick and injured prisoners whom your side is prepared to repatriate to our side."

3. UNC: "I acknowledge receipt of the total numbers of sick and wounded of our captured personnel that you are prepared to repatriate. The figures of sick and wounded captured personnel that you say you will repatriate seem incredibly small in view of the total number of captured personnel you have previously indicated you have in your custody. Accordingly, I request that you have these figures reviewed, and a more liberal interpretation made of your definition of 'sick and wounded captured personnel.' I reserve the right to make further comments on these figures at a later date. At this time, I give you the total number of sick and injured personnel of your side which the United Nations is prepared to repatriate, which is 700 Chinese and 5100 Koreans. When do you expect to have the complete breakdown by nationality of sick and wounded personnel to be repatriated?"

4. *Communists*: "We have offered the figures of sick and injured prisoners of war only after we have checked the matter in detail. Accordingly, I can't find any reason why the figures are incredibly small. As I have pointed out in my statement of today, after I have checked the complete figures, I will inform you of the figures of the sick and injured prisoners of war."

5. UNC: "We are now ready to receive your comments on our proposal of yesterday."

6. *Communists*: "I will give you the answer to that question. I would like to express agreement to the proposal submitted by your side yesterday for confining the discussion between the senior members of the respective liaison groups to the major issues and for appointing officers to settle the administrative details for repatriation. I now designate Colonel Lao Pyong Il and Colonel Wang Chien as the officers representing our side."

7. UNC: "I appoint Colonel Willard B. Carlock, Colonel Douglas M. Cairns, and Colonel Soo Young Lee as my representatives, with such assistants as they may require. I propose that they meet one hour after this meeting is adjourned."

8. *Communists*: "In order to conclude speedily an agreement for the repatriation of sick and injured prisoners of war and to commence with the repatriation of sick and injured prisoners of war as early as actual conditions permit, I agree to the proposal of your side for convening the officers' meeting of both sides after the meeting of liaison groups. Our officers will be pleased to hear any suggestions of your side concerning the administrative details for the repatriation of sick and injured prisoners of war."



9. UNC: "Now I ask if you are ready to present your proposed amendments to the draft agreement which we presented to you."

10. *Communists: a.* "With regard to the 'proposed agreement relating to the repatriation of sick and wounded captured personnel,' presented by you on 6 April, I would like to take up now 2 questions for discussion by the liaison groups of both sides."

*b.* "For the purpose of maintaining order in the Panmunjom conference site area, our side proposes to increase the military police of each side who undertake to maintain order within the conference site area from the present maximum number of 15 to 30, during the period when sick and injured captured personnel are being repatriated through the conference site area."

*c.* "Regarding this question, I would like to know your opinion."

11. UNC: "Please go on and give me your other comments on the rest of the proposed agreement. After I have heard them all, we can then discuss them more easily."

12. *Communists: a.* "With regard to Article 6 of the proposed agreement of your side, I have already pointed out in the 7 April meeting that our side agreed to the principle of insuring that the sick and injured captured personnel of both sides are given maximum protection during the full period of his repatriation. However, some of the specific conditions set forth in this article by your side are difficult to be effected because of actual conditions. Your side proposed that movement of motor convoys to Kaesong and Munsan-Ni respectively should consist of not less than 10 vehicles per convoy, moving in close formation; but this provision is not practicable due to the scattered locations of prisoner of war camps of our side. Moreover, this provision is not necessary since the motor convoys will have clear markings and the time and the routes of their movements and their bivouac areas and night stop-over locations for motor convoys will have been informed, in advance, by both sides to each other."

*b.* "Therefore, I propose to cancel this provision in the first paragraph of Article 6 of your proposed agreement."

*c.* "As to the arrangements for mutually informing the time and route of each movement and the bivouac areas and the night stop-over locations as provided in paragraph D and E of Article 6, our side will present a revised text based on actual conditions."

13. UNC: "Do you have any more views or material to present now in relation to other paragraphs of the agreement?"

14. *Communists:* "As to the other paragraphs of the proposed agreement, we are now studying them, so after having finished our study, I will answer to you."

15. UNC: "I propose that we recess now to give us a chance to review your statements, and that we meet here again at 1330."

16. *Communists:* "I agree to your proposal to recess, and my opinion is that the officers' meeting of both sides will be convened at two o'clock PM. If the time is inconvenient for you, we can arrange to convene the officers' meeting after this meeting has finished."

17. UNC: "As I understand it, the full liaison group, including you and I, will meet here at 1330, and then we will arrange later for the meeting of the officers designated by us."

18. *Communists:* "That is correct."

19. UNC: "I propose that we recess now until 1330."

20. *Communists:* "I agree."

21. Meeting recessed at 1142.

1. Meeting of Senior Liaison Group reconvened at 1330 hours this date. Substance of record follows:

2. UNC: *a.* "I have studied your comments with respect to Article 6 and 7 of the draft agreement which we handed you on 6 April."

*b.* "With regard to your proposal to increase from 15 to 30 the maximum number of security personnel of each side who can be in the conference site area at any

one time during the period when sick and injured captured personnel are being repatriated through the conference site, I agree. I assume the reference was only to armed security personnel."

*c.* "I desire to withhold comment on Article 6 until you have presented us with your revised text."

*d.* "I feel that it would expedite the conclusion of the agreement if you would present us with a complete revised text of the whole agreement incorporating such articles of our text to which you can agree and setting forth reasons for your proposed changes. I will then be able to consider the matter in one package and arrive speedily to the items which are controversial. I propose that we recess until such time as you can present your text of the whole agreement. Meanwhile, the officers designated by us this morning can meet and be working on the administrative details."

3. *Communists:* "I propose to recess for 15 minutes."

4. UNC: "I agree."

(Meeting recessed at 1338 hours. Meeting reconvened at 1353 hours.)

5. *Communists:* "Our side proposes to recess until 11 o'clock tomorrow morning, and our side is ready to convene the officers' meeting of both sides as soon as this meeting recesses if it is convenient for your side."

6. UNC: "I agree to your proposal."

7. Meeting recessed at 1354 hours.

### Meeting of April 9

1. Meeting of Senior Liaison Group convened at 1100 hours, this date. Substance of record follows.

2. *Communists: a.* "Now I would like to present to you our revised text<sup>8</sup> of the 'proposed agreement relating to the repatriation of sick and wounded captured personnel,' which your side presented on 6 April."

*b.* "In our revised text, some amendments have already been agreed to by your side. Some amendments our side has explained and some amendments are self-evident without explanation."

*c.* "As to Paragraph E of Article 6 of proposed agreement of your side—that is, Paragraph D of Article 6 in the revised text of our side—I would like to make the following explanation:"

*d.* "According to actual conditions, we consider that bivouac areas and night stop-over locations are necessary for motor convoys carrying sick and injured prisoners of war for repatriation. In order to insure the security of the facilities in these bivouac areas and night stop-over locations, we propose that both sides inform each other beforehand of their locations and markings."

*e.* "As to the mutual informing by the most expeditious means of communication of emergency stop-overs, it is difficult to carry out in practice; therefore our side proposes to cancel this provision."

"What I have now delivered to you is the draft agreement of our side." (Hands proposed revision to Rear Admiral Daniel.)

3. UNC: "We propose to recess until 1145 to consider your changes."

4. *Communists:* "I agree to your proposal to recess." (Meeting recessed at 1108 hours. Meeting reconvened at 1200 hours.)

5. UNC: *a.* "From preliminary study of your proposed changes, it appears that there are no controversial issues between us. We will give it further study and give you our full comments tomorrow. In the meantime I have a few questions."

"(1) How soon after the agreement is signed do you expect to be able to start actual repatriation at Panmunjom?"

"(2) To insure the safety of the personnel being repatriated, we would like to have your convoys south of Pyongyang to have at least 5 vehicles. Will this be possible?"

<sup>8</sup> Not printed.

"(3) We would like the provision for emergency stop-over left in some form, even though it is difficult to effect, so as to afford maximum protection to captured personnel being repatriated.

"(4) We feel that the termination date of the agreement should be twenty days after the commencement of the initial repatriation. Do you have any ideas on this?"

b. "We also have a few minor ideas on wording, which we will give you in detail tomorrow."

c. "That is all the questions regarding the agreement."

6. *Communists: a.* "According to the proposed agreement submitted by your side, the date for commencing the repatriation and the date for signing the agreement are related to each other. If this agreement can be signed on 10 April, then according to the actual conditions of our side, repatriation may be commenced at Panmunjom not later than ten days after the signing of the agreement."

b. "As to the other questions submitted by your side, after my study I will answer to your side."

c. "If you have no other questions, I propose to recess until 1100 hours tomorrow."

7. *UNC: a.* "It would expedite the signing of the agreement if we could have your answers forwarded to us today through a liaison or security officer."

b. "I have another matter. In regard to the figures that you gave us yesterday of the estimated numbers of sick and wounded captured personnel which you are willing to repatriate, it is my hope that you will give the broadest possible scope to the definition of 'sick and wounded' when you make your final determination."

c. "I agree to recess until 11 AM tomorrow, and I propose that the officers whom we designated to work on details meet here at 1330 to continue their work."

8. *Communists: a.* "The figures which our side gave you yesterday are the result of serious checking on the part of our side; and as to the question of scope, we have already presented our ideas to you."

b. "Therefore, I think we have no argument about the definition of scope of the sick and injured prisoners of war, and I agree to your proposal to the meeting of staff officers."

9. *UNC:* "May we expect to receive the information on the question this afternoon?"

10. *Communists:* "As to the question, I will answer you tomorrow."

11. *UNC:* "It would hasten matters if we could obtain the answer today, if possible."

12. *Communists:* "I have taken notice of your statement."

13. *UNC:* "That is all I have."

14. Meeting recessed 1221 hours.

## STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR LODGE

*Following is the text of a statement which Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., U.S. representative to the United Nations, made in the General Assembly on April 7:*

U.S./U.N. press release dated April 7

I am authorized by my Government, which bears responsibility for the Unified Command, to make a brief report to the General Assembly regarding the recent developments which have encouraged all of us who seek peace in Korea.

On February 22 General Clark sent to the Communist commanders a letter stating that the U.N. Command remained prepared, in accordance with the Geneva Convention, to repatriate immediately those sick and wounded captured personnel who were fit to travel and inquiring whether the Com-

munist were prepared to proceed immediately with their repatriation. General Clark's letter simply repeated a long standing proposal that had been made initially by the U.N. Command negotiators at Panmunjom.

We were encouraged when on March 28 General Clark received a favorable response to his letter. The Communist commanders indicated agreement with the proposal to exchange sick and wounded persons and stated that they considered the "reasonable settlement of the question of exchanged sick and wounded prisoners of war of both sides during the period of hostilities should be made to lead to the smooth settlement of the entire question of prisoners of war."

The Communists' letter of March 28 was followed on March 30 by a statement of the Chinese Communist Foreign Minister, Chou En-lai, subsequently endorsed by the Prime Minister of the North Korean regime.

On March 31 General Clark, in a letter to the commander of the Korean People's Army and the commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, proposed that a meeting of the liaison groups from each side be held at Panmunjom to make the necessary detailed arrangements for the exchange of the sick and wounded personnel. In response to General Clark's proposal the Communist commanders suggested that the liaison groups meet at Panmunjom on the 6th of April "to arrange preliminarily the matter of exchange by both sides of injured and sick prisoners of war and to discuss and decide on the date for resuming the armistice negotiations."

The U.N. Command sent its next response on April 5.<sup>9</sup> In this letter the U. N. Command agreed to send its liaison group to meet with the Communist liaison group on April 6. The U.N. Command also invited the Communists to make detailed suggestions for settling the entire question of repatriating prisoners of war. I should like to read one paragraph from General Clark's letter of April 5:

At as early a date as possible, I request that your liaison group furnish our liaison group with a detailed statement of suggestions on the implementation of the proposal for settling the entire question of repatriating prisoners of war as set forth in the statement of Foreign Minister Chou En-lai, and endorsed by Marshal Kim Ki Sung, in order that it may be studied while reasonable settlement of the repatriation of sick and wounded is being effected.

The first meeting of the liaison groups took place on April 6 at Panmunjom. The U.N. Command representative stated that it is prepared to exchange all sick and wounded prisoners of war as expeditiously as possible in accordance with article 109 of the Geneva Convention. The Communist delegate made a statement to the same effect. The U.N. Command representative asked both sides to exchange simultaneously estimated

<sup>9</sup> Not printed.

figures by nationality of the sick and wounded prisoners of war to be repatriated. The Communists agreed, but said that in order to determine the numbers of sick and wounded prisoners of war to be repatriated, the category of sick and wounded prisoners of war should be first determined as provided by article 110 of the Geneva Convention.

At this same meeting the U.N. Command delegation repeated orally the request previously made in General Clark's letter of April 5 that the U.N. Command would be pleased to receive at an early date a detailed statement of suggestions from the Communist commander in implementation of the proposal contained in the Chou En-lai statement regarding the repatriation of all prisoners of war.

At the April 7 meeting some further progress was made. The Communists would require some time before furnishing the number of sick and wounded prisoners to be exchanged and they accept the nine-point proposal of the Unified Command for arrangements for the exchange of sick and wounded as a basis for discussion.

Let me promise you, Mr. Chairman and delegates, that the U.S. Government, which bears responsibility for the Unified Command, will report from time to time to you on the progress at Panmunjom. It is apparent from the report I have made to you that progress is being made. We hope that the progress will continue and will lead to the conclusion of an honorable armistice and a peace in Korea consistent with U.N. objectives.

#### **LETTER FROM THE COMMUNIST COMMANDERS TO GENERAL HARRISON, APRIL 9**

General William K. Harrison, Senior Delegate,  
United Nations Command Delegation.

We have received the letter dated April 5, 1953, from General Mark W. Clark, Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command, in reply to Marshal Kim Il Sung, Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and General Peng Teh-Huai, Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers.

On March 30 and 31, 1953, respectively, Chou En-lai, Premier of the Government Administration Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, and Marshal Kim Il Sung, Premier of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea issued statements, proclaiming the common proposal of the governments of China and Korea for settling the entire question of prisoners of war, that is, "both parties to the negotiations should undertake to repatriate immediately after the cessation of hostilities all those prisoners of war in their custody who insist upon repatriation and to hand over the remaining prisoners of war to a neutral state so as to ensure a just solution to the question of their repatriation." The two afore-

mentioned statements, enclosed in the letter of April 1, 1953, from Marshal Kim Il Sung and General Peng Teh-Huai to General Mark W. Clark, have already been delivered to your side. I am now instructed to present to you the following statement on this proposal:

(1) Article 118 of The Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war, of August 12, 1949, well-established principles and practice in international law, and paragraph 51 of the draft Korean armistice agreement have all established the principle that all prisoners of war on both sides should be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities. It is, therefore, our view that the principle of repatriation of all prisoners of war of both sides after the armistice so that they can return home to lead a peaceful life is unshakable.

(2) However, in view of the fact that the differences between the two sides on the question of repatriation of prisoners of war have now constituted the only obstacle of the realization of an armistice in Korea, and in order to eliminate the differences so as to bring about an armistice in Korea, the Korean and Chinese side, in this new proposal, makes the following obvious concession as to the steps, time, and procedure of the repatriation of prisoners of war. The Korean and Chinese side holds that the repatriation of prisoners of war should be carried out in two steps, that is, both parties to the negotiations should undertake to repatriate immediately after the cessation of hostilities all those prisoners of war in their custody who insist upon repatriation and to hand over the remaining prisoners of war to a neutral state so as to insure a just solution to the question of their repatriation.

(3) In making this concession the Korean and Chinese side by no means relinquishes the principle as embodied in Article 118 of the Geneva Convention in international practice and in paragraph 51 of the draft armistice agreement, which our side has firmly maintained. It is precisely on the basis of this principle of repatriation of all prisoners of war that our side firmly maintains that the detaining side should insure that no coercive means whatsoever be employed against all the prisoners of war in its custody to obstruct their returning home to effect forcible retention, and, at the same time, should insure that the remaining prisoners of war who are not directly repatriated after the armistice be released and handed over to a neutral state so as to secure a just solution to the question of their repatriation.

(4) The Korean and Chinese side does not acknowledge that there are prisoners of war who are allegedly unwilling to be repatriated. Therefore, the question of the so-called forced repatriation or repatriation by force does not exist at all, and we have always opposed this assertion. Based on this stand of ours, our side maintains that those captured personnel of our side who are filled with ap-

prehensions and are afraid to return home as a result of having been subjected to intimidation and oppression should be handed over to a neutral state and through explanations given by our side, gradually freed from apprehensions, thereby attaining a just solution to the question of repatriation.

(5) The foregoing is a full explanation of the new proposal of our side. As to the concrete measures for implementing this proposal, they can only be discussed and decided upon at the meetings of negotiations between the delegates on both sides. And, in negotiations with both sides on an equal footing, only consultation and discussion at the conference are the proper way of settling questions. General Nam Il, Senior Delegate, Delegation of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers.

## TEXT OF AGREEMENT SIGNED APRIL 11

[Unofficial]

The senior member of the United Nations Command liaison group and the senior member of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers liaison group, in order to effect the repatriation of sick and injured captured personnel in accordance with provisions of article 109 of the 1949 Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war, agree to the following:

Repatriation shall be accomplished at Panmunjom.

Repatriation shall commence at Panmunjom not later than 10 days after the signing of this agreement.

a. The Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers shall deliver sick and injured captured personnel at the rate of approximately 100 per day until delivery of all sick and injured captured personnel to be repatriated by the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers is completed. The number of persons actually delivered each day shall be contingent upon the ability of the United Nations Command to receive them, but delivery shall in any case be completed prior to the termination date of this agreement.

b. The United Nations Command shall deliver sick and injured captured personnel at the rate of approximately 500 per day until delivery of all sick and injured captured personnel to be repatriated by the United Nations Command is completed.

The number of persons actually delivered each day shall be contingent upon the ability of the Korean People's Army and Chinese People's Volunteers to receive them, but delivery shall in any case be completed prior to the termination of this agreement.

The United Nations Command shall deliver sick and injured captured personnel in groups of approximately twenty-five. Each group shall be accompanied by rosters, prepared by nationality, to include: (a) Name, (b) rank, (c) internment or military serial number.

After each group of sick and injured captured personnel is delivered and received, a representative of the receiving side shall sign the roster of the captured personnel delivered as a receipt and shall return this to the delivering side.

In order to insure that the sick and injured captured personnel of both sides are given maximum protection during the full period of repatriation, both sides agree to guarantee immunity from all attacks to all rail and motor movements carrying sick and injured captured personnel to Kaesong and Munsan-Ni, respectively, and thence through presently established immunity routes to Panmunjom, subject to the following conditions:

a. Movement of motor convoys to Kaesong and Munsan-Ni, respectively, shall be restricted to daylight hours, and each convoy shall consist of not less than five vehicles in close formation: except that north of Panmunjom, be-

cause of actual conditions, the latter provisions shall apply only to the route from Pyongyang to Kaesong.

b. Each car in rail movements and each vehicle in motor convoys shall display clearly visible identification markings.

c. Each side, prior to the initial movement, shall provide the liaison group of the other side with a detailed description of the markings utilized to identify motor convoys and rail movements. This shall include color, size, and manner in which the markings will be displayed.

Each side, prior to the initial movement, shall provide the liaison group of the other side with the sites and markings of the bivouac areas and night stop-over locations for motor convoys.

Each side shall inform the liaison group of the other side, twenty-four hours in advance of each movement, of the selected route, number of cars in rail movement or number of vehicles in motor movement, and the estimated time of arrival at Kaesong or Munsan-Ni.

Each side shall notify the liaison group of the other side, by the most expeditious means of communication available, of the location of emergency stop-overs.

During the period while sick and injured captured personnel are being repatriated through the Panmunjom conference site area, the Oct. 22, 1951, agreement between liaison officers, with the exception of the part therein provided for in Paragraph 8 of this agreement, shall continue in effect. Liaison groups of both sides and their parties shall have free access to, and free movement within, the Panmunjom conference site area. The composition of each liaison group and its party shall be as determined by the senior member thereof: however, in order to avoid congestion in the conference site area, the number of personnel of each side in the area, including captured personnel under its control, shall not exceed 300 persons at any one time. Each side shall transfer repatriated personnel out of the Panmunjom conference site area as expeditiously as possible.

During the period while sick and injured captured personnel are being repatriated through the Panmunjom conference site area, the armed military police of each side, who undertake to maintain order within the conference site area, shall be increased from the maximum number of fifteen, as provided in the Oct. 22, 1951, agreement between liaison officers, to thirty.

Other administrative details shall be mutually arranged by officers designated by the senior member of the liaison group of each side.

This agreement is effective when signed and will terminate twenty days after the commencement of repatriation of sick and injured captured personnel at Panmunjom.

Done at Panmunjom, Korea, this eleventh day of April, 1953, in the English, Korean and Chinese languages, all texts being equally authentic.

LEE SANG CHO, *Major General, Korean People's Army, senior member Korean People's Army and Chinese People's Volunteers liaison group.*

J. C. DANIEL, *Rear Admiral, United States Navy, senior member United Nations Command liaison group.*

## Special Representative for Korean Economic Affairs

The White House on April 9 announced that the President had appointed Henry J. Tasca as his special representative for Korean Economic Affairs.

Mr. Tasca will investigate ways and means of strengthening the Korean economy in the light of

U.S. security interests. He will report his recommendations to the President through the Commander-in-Chief, U.N. Command, at the earliest practicable date. Mr. Tasca will leave immediately for Korea.

Mr. Tasca is presently Deputy for Economic Affairs to Ambassador William H. Draper, Jr., the U.S. special representative in Europe. In this post Mr. Tasca serves as adviser to the special representative on economic matters, serving as alternate to the special representative in Ministerial Council meetings of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, as well as directing the Office of Economic Affairs.

Mr. Tasca was previously Director of the Plans and Policy Staff in the Office of the Special Representative and was associated for nearly 4 years with the Mutual Security Agency and its predecessor, the Economic Cooperation Administration, at the Paris regional headquarters. He participated in the negotiations which led to the creation of the European Payments Union in 1950.

Last year Mr. Tasca headed the special task group which assisted W. Averell Harriman, then Director for Mutual Security, and Mr. Draper in the Temporary Council Committee preparations for the Lisbon Conference of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

## **Soviet Attack on U.S. Plane in North Pacific Ocean**

### **Department Statements**

Press release 144 dated March 18

The American Embassy at Moscow on March 18, on instructions from the Department of State, lodged a vigorous protest with the Soviet Foreign Office against the attack by MiG fighters upon a U. S. Air Force RB-50 in the North Pacific Ocean on March 15.

The note sets forth the position of the U.S. plane when attacked (about 100 miles northeast of Petropavlovsk and at least 25 miles from the nearest Soviet territory), vigorously protests the action of the Soviet aircraft, states that the Government of the United States expects to be informed at an early date of the disciplinary action taken with regard to the Soviet personnel responsible for the attack, and asks for information concerning measures adopted by Soviet authorities to prevent a recurrence of incidents of this kind.

Press release 156 dated March 24

The Department has studied the text of a note received from the Soviet Government on March 22 in response to our note of March 18. We find the allegations made by the Soviets completely at variance with the facts as established by a careful investigation.

As we pointed out in our note the U.S. RB-50

aircraft involved was at all times over international waters and at the time of the incident was at least 25 miles from the nearest Soviet territory. Without any reason whatever the Soviet aircraft opened fire on our plane, which was obliged to return the fire in self-defense.

The present Soviet note is a typical attempt by the Soviet Government to avoid responsibility for an unwarranted action of its military personnel through the device of fabricating an unfounded version of the affair. We stand on our note of March 18 and continue to expect that the Soviet Government will take measures to discipline the Soviet personnel responsible and to prevent recurrence of such incidents.

### **U.S. Note of March 18**

No. 683

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and has the honor to bring the following matter to the attention of the Ministry.

On March 15, 1953, a United States Air Force plane of the RB-50 type was attacked by Soviet fighter aircraft over the open seas at Latitude 54:02 North and Longitude 161:04 East. After one of the Soviet planes of the MiG type opened fire on the RB-50 the latter was forced to return the fire.

It is reported that no damage occurred to the American plane, and none was observed with regard to the Soviet plane.

The Embassy has been instructed to protest vigorously this action on the part of the Soviet aircraft. The United States Government expects to be informed at an early date concerning the disciplinary action taken with regard to the Soviet personnel responsible and also concerning the measures adopted to prevent a recurrence of incidents of this kind.

### **Soviet Note of March 22**

[Unofficial translation]

The Foreign Ministry of the U.S.S.R., referring to a note of the United States of America, Number 683 of 18th March, 1953, deems it necessary to state the following:

In accordance with verified data, it has been established that an American bomber of the B-29 type violated on 15th March at 11:57 time in the district of Cape Krestovoi the state frontier of the U.S.S.R., and flew over the territory of Kamchatka up to seventy kilometers over a distance of fifteen to seventeen kilometers from the edge of the shore only a short distance from Mutnovskaya Height and turned in the direction of the sea.

At 12:26 the American aircraft B-29 type appeared again and violated the state frontier of the U.S.S.R. northeast of the town of Petropavlovsk in Kamchatka in the area of the village of Zhupanovo.

Good weather, which in both cases enabled the crew of the aircraft to carry out visual reconnaissance on a large scale, excluded the possibility of loss of orientation

and confirmed that the above two cases of violation of the state frontier of the U.S.S.R. were of a clearly pre-meditated character.

When the two Soviet fighter aircraft, which had taken off, approached the American bomber aircraft, which was in the process of a second violation of the Soviet state frontier, the American aircraft opened fire against the Soviet fighter aircraft.

For the purpose of self-defense, one of the Soviet aircraft had to open fire, after which the infringing aircraft turned round, left the Soviet coast and disappeared in an eastern direction.

The above facts show that the protest made by the Government of the U.S.A. in a note of 18th March is without foundation and therefore the Soviet Government rejects that protest.

In view of the fact that the above-quoted data confirm the fact of violation of the state frontier of the U.S.S.R. by an American military aircraft, the Soviet Government sends a protest to the Government of the U.S.A. against the above-mentioned infringement and expects that the Government of the U.S.A. will take due measures to prevent in the future violation of the state frontier of the U.S.S.R. by American aircraft.

## Polish Embassy Asked To Cease Distributing Anti-U.S. Book

### U.S. Note of March 28

Press release 161 dated March 30

*The Department of State on March 28 sent to the Polish Embassy at Washington a note requesting that distribution of a publication by the Embassy making false charges against the United States be stopped immediately and that any further distribution of similar material be discontinued.*

*The text of the U.S. note follows:*

The Secretary of State wishes to inform His Excellency the Ambassador of Poland that it has come to the attention of the Department of State that the Embassy has sent to various recipients in this country copies of a publication entitled "Documents on the Hostile Policy of the United States Government Towards People's Poland". This book contains numerous false charges of aggressive and subversive activities on the part of the United States against Poland. In this connection reference is made to the United States Government's note dated February 9, 1953<sup>1</sup> and earlier communications to the Polish Government.

The dissemination by the Embassy of this collection of propaganda is not consistent with the views expressed by the United States Government contained in its note to the Embassy of March 21, 1952<sup>2</sup> regarding the issuance of publications and press releases by the Embassy. The Department of State consequently requests the Embassy immediately to cease distribution of this publication and to refrain from any further distribution of publications of a similar character.

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Feb. 23, 1953, p. 304.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, Mar. 31, 1952, p. 498.

## PUBLICATIONS

### Recent Releases

*For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.*

**Agriculture, Cooperative Program in Costa Rica.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2511. Pub. 4720. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Costa Rica—Signed at San José Jan. 10 and 25, 1952; entered into force Jan. 25, 1952.

**Health and Sanitation, Cooperative Program in Costa Rica.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2512. Pub. 4721. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Costa Rica—Signed at San José Jan. 10 and 24, 1952; entered into force Jan. 24, 1952.

**Consular Officers.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2494. Pub. 4729. 25 pp. 10¢.

Convention, with protocol of signature, between the United States and the United Kingdom—Signed at Washington June 6, 1951; entered into force Sept. 7, 1952.

**Health and Sanitation, Cooperative Program in Uruguay.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2453. Pub. 4745. 10 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Uruguay—Signed at Montevideo Oct. 4, 1950 and Mar. 7, 1951; entered into force Mar. 8, 1951; agreement between the Government of Uruguay and The Institute of Inter-American Affairs—Signed at Montevideo Mar. 8, 1951.

**Settlement of Disputes Arising Under Article 15 (a) of the Treaty of Peace With Japan.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2550. Pub. 4756. 33 pp. 15¢.

Agreement between the United States and Other Governments and Japan—Opened for signature at Washington June 12, 1952; Signed for the United States June 19, 1952; Signed for Japan June 12, 1952; entered into force between the United States and Japan June 19, 1952.

**Educational Exchange Grants.** International Information and Cultural Series 27. Pub. 4792. 28 pp. 10¢.

Explains International Educational Exchange Program, with information for applicants on grants, and summaries of basic laws concerned.

**United States Educational Commission in the Federal Republic of Germany.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2553. Pub. 4809. 21 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany—Signed at Bonn July 13, 1952; entered into force July 18, 1952.

**United States Educational Foundation in the Union of South Africa.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2554. Pub. 4810. 12 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and the Union of South Africa—Signed at Cape Town, Mar. 26, 1952; entered into force Mar. 26, 1952.

## U.S. Policy on Human Rights

*Printed below are the texts of: 1) a message sent by President Eisenhower on April 7 to members of the U. N. Commission on Human Rights, which convened at Geneva on that date; 2) a letter dated April 3 from Secretary Dulles to Mrs. Oswald B. Lord, U.S. representative on the Commission; and 3) a statement made by Mrs. Lord before the Commission on April 8:*

U.S./U.N. press release dated April 9

### LETTER FROM SECRETARY DULLES TO MRS. LORD

MY DEAR MRS. LORD:

As you leave for Geneva to represent the United States at the Ninth Session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, the best wishes of our Government and of the American people go with you. The President and I are anxious that you carry a personal message to the Commission.

We believe that the American people are determined to do all within their power to make the United Nations an increasingly vigorous instrument of international order and justice. It is our earnest wish that the United Nations become an ever more effective agency for promoting, in the words of the Charter, "respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion."

The United States stands for full and complete enjoyment of these fundamental rights. The whole American philosophy of government is based on the conviction that man was endowed with these rights by his Creator and that they are inalienable. This conviction is expressed at many points in the legal structure of our national and state governments and is most clearly set forth in the Declaration of Independence and in the Bill of Rights in the Constitution of the United States.

Our history demonstrates that nationwide observance of fundamental human rights did not spring into being upon the enactment of statutes. In the years that have intervened between the ratification of the Bill of Rights and the present, we in the United States have made important advances. Through education and publicity, we have developed a human rights conscience which

is perhaps the strongest factor in the progress we have made. In its most recent report to the United Nations for publication in the agency's *Yearbook on Human Rights*, the Government of this country has submitted detailed evidence of the progress recorded in a single year.<sup>1</sup> We intend that these advances shall continue.

Moreover, our Government has noted with satisfaction the improvements in the observance of human rights which have taken place in other countries; but it has noted as well that much remains to be done. We recognize that injustices occur to a greater or lesser degree in all countries, including our own. They cannot be overcome in a day. We must work to eliminate them.

### Background for the U.S. Decision

In the light of our national, and recently, international experience in the matter of human rights, the opening of a new session of the Commission on Human Rights appears an appropriate occasion for a fresh appraisal of methods through which we may realize the human rights goals of the United Nations. These goals have a high place in the Charter as drafted at San Francisco and were articulated in greater detail in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at Paris in 1948.

Since the establishment of these goals, much time and effort has been expended on the drafting of treaties, that is, Covenants on Human Rights, in which it was sought to frame, in mutually acceptable legal form, the obligations to be assumed by national states in regard to human rights. We have found that such drafts of Covenants as had a reasonable chance of acceptance in some respects established standards lower than those now observed in a number of countries.

While the adoption of the Covenants would not compromise higher standards already in force, it seems wiser to press ahead in the United Nations for the achievement of the standards set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights through ways other than the proposed Cov-

<sup>1</sup> For text of the U.S. report, see BULLETIN of Feb. 2, 1953, p. 178.

enants on Human Rights. This is particularly important in view of the likelihood that the Covenants will not be as widely accepted by United Nations members as initially anticipated. Nor can we overlook the fact that the areas where human rights are being persistently and flagrantly violated are those where the Covenants would most likely be ignored.

In these circumstances, there is a grave question whether the completion, signing and ratification of the Covenants at this time is the most desirable method of contributing to human betterment particularly in areas of greatest need. Furthermore, experience to date strongly suggests that even if it be assumed that this is a proper area for treaty action, a wider general acceptance of human rights goals must be attained before it seems useful to codify standards of human rights as binding international legal obligations in the Covenants.

### Re-examining the Covenants' Method

With all these considerations in mind, the United States Government asks you to present to the Commission on Human Rights at its forthcoming session a statement of American goals and policies in this field; to point out the need for re-examining the approach of the Human Rights Covenants as the method for furthering at this time the objectives of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; and to put forward other suggestions of method, based on American experience, for developing throughout the world a human rights conscience which will bring nearer the goals stated in the Charter. In making such suggestions, I am sure you will want to give special weight to the value of bringing the facts to the light of day, to the value of common discussion of problems in the international forum of the Commission on Human Rights, and to the value of each country drawing on the experience of other countries for inspiration and practical guidance in solving its own problems.

We recognize that in presenting to the Commission a change in approach, extended discussion will be required in the Commission and later in the Economic and Social Council and General Assembly as well. By reason of the considerations referred to above, the United States Government has reached the conclusion that we should not at this time become a party to any multilateral treaty such as those contemplated in the draft Covenants on Human Rights, and that we should now work toward the objectives of the Declaration by other means. While the Commission continues, under the General Assembly's instructions, with the drafting of the Covenants, you are, of course, expected to participate. This would be incumbent on the United States as a loyal Member of the United Nations.

Through the agency of the United Nations and

## Importance of U.N. Human Rights Goals

White House press release dated April 7

*The President on April 7 sent the following message to the members of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights at Geneva:*

I am asking Mrs. Oswald B. Lord, the new representative of the United States on the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, to express to the Commission my deep personal interest in its work. In these days of international tension and strain, it is encouraging to know that the members of the Commission on Human Rights are working to develop effective programs to promote human rights and fundamental freedoms for all people and all nations throughout the world.

The U.N. Charter states the human-rights goals which the United States and the other members of the United Nations have pledged themselves to achieve in cooperation with the United Nations—the promotion of universal respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.

For the people of the United States, as well as for people everywhere, the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a significant beacon in the steady march toward achieving human rights and fundamental freedoms for all.

People everywhere are seeking freedom—freedom to live, freedom from arbitrary restraint, freedom to think and speak as they wish, freedom to seek and find the truth. We must press ahead to broaden the areas of freedom. The United States is convinced that freedom is an indispensable condition to the achievement of a stable peace.

Unfortunately, in too many areas of the world today there is subjugation of peoples by totalitarian governments which have no respect for the dignity of the human person. This denial of the freedom of peoples, the continued disregard of human rights, is a basic cause of instability and discontent in the world today.

For these reasons, the work of the Commission on Human Rights assumes greater importance and meaning. For these reasons also, there is need for a new approach to the development of a human-rights conscience in all areas of the world. I have accordingly asked Mrs. Lord to present positive U.N. action programs to the Commission which we feel will contribute to that recognition of human rights and fundamental freedoms which people are seeking throughout the world.

its powerful moral influence, much has been and can be accomplished. Example and education can exert powerful influence. The United Nations can also play an important part, through health, welfare, and other technical assistance programs, in raising standards of living throughout the world and bringing a full life to millions of persons who struggle merely to exist. The removal of restraints on the rights of expression and association can release the creative energies of the human spirit.

Firm in our belief that the United Nations is the most hopeful and effective means of bringing about world peace and of promoting the welfare of mankind throughout the earth, the United



States Government will support your every effort to these ends.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

#### STATEMENT BY MRS. LORD

As this is the first occasion in which I have had the privilege of serving in the Commission on Human Rights, I hope you will permit me to make a few general remarks about the agenda. I am happy to be a member of this Commission and to join with you in the vital task of helping to advance the cause of freedom. I accepted this appointment from the President of the United States because I personally am convinced of the importance of promoting respect for human rights through international cooperation.

At the very outset of our work, I wish to assure you that the U.S. Government continues to support wholeheartedly the promotion of respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Both President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles have spoken to me personally about their deep concern that the United Nations move steadily forward toward the goals laid down in the Charter.

In order to assure steady progress toward those goals, the Government of the United States is suggesting a new and urgent approach to the promotion of human rights, to take account of changed conditions in the world. Today, disregard of the basic principles of human rights is widespread and fundamental freedoms are denied peoples in many areas.

#### Need for Human Rights Action Programs

Under these circumstances, the world does not yet appear ready for a treaty of such comprehensive scope as the proposed covenants on human rights. We need to work together immediately to develop a higher moral sense of human-rights values in all areas of the world. For that reason, the United States is urging that this Commission give immediate consideration to the development of human-rights action programs.

The Commission on Human Rights already has made an outstanding contribution to the constructive achievements of the United Nations. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights stands as a major landmark of progress in this difficult field. It is with understandable pride that I participate in this Commission, where our two past chairmen, Mrs. Roosevelt and Mr. Malik, and their colleagues have brought intelligence and skill to bear upon some of the most challenging problems of our times.

The agenda of the Commission clearly falls into two distinct parts: the completion of the draft

covenants and the consideration of a wide range of other matters.

The General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council have asked that the Commission complete the drafting of the covenants. This task will necessarily occupy a considerable portion of our time; but perhaps, if we could set May 1 as a target date for completing the remaining portions of the two covenants, we need not devote more than half of our session to this task.

Since the completion of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, the Commission has been entirely engrossed in the drafting of the proposed covenants on human rights. As discussions have proceeded on the covenants, it begins to appear that they are not receiving the acceptance which had been initially anticipated and that they will not be ratified as widely as had been hoped. The climate of world opinion does not yet seem favorable to the conclusion of the covenants in the United Nations. The covenants will not have the expected effectiveness in the field of human rights. For these reasons, my Government has concluded that in the present stage of international relations it would not ratify the covenants.

Inasmuch as the United States is a loyal member of the United Nations, its delegation will continue to collaborate in the drafting of these covenants and to make suggestions for improving them. The covenants will be looked upon as a more precise and definitive statement of the principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, irrespective of their ratification or nonratification. My Government hopes that there will be a time when human rights will be sufficiently respected in fact and when a human-rights conscience will be sufficiently developed throughout the world so that a codification of the then prevailing principles will be worthwhile. When and if such a time comes the United States may give consideration to the ratification of a covenant on human rights, and for that reason we are concerned with the drafting of the covenants now so that they will be in the most acceptable form and will require the least possible change if they are used as a model for future treaties.

It seems increasingly important, therefore, that alternative and more effective and acceptable ways be devised by the Commission to achieve the goals of the Charter for the promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

#### Initiating Programs of Practical Action

The remaining part of our agenda contains a large number of items not related to the draft covenants. The U.S. delegation endorses the listing on the provisional agenda and the order of that listing. At the appropriate time, however, I shall suggest that some of these items be given priority. A number of these items are of the ut-

most significance and deserve our most earnest consideration. It is for this reason that I hope that perhaps the last half of our session might be devoted to programs of practical action.

It is the view of the U.S. Government that the guiding principle for the work of the Commission should be to find the surest and speediest methods of raising the level of practice around the world in the observance of human rights. This would require that we initiate a number of action programs. I shall be prepared to make detailed proposals about such action programs in connection with specific agenda items. For the present I should like merely to outline the three principal proposals which my Government wishes me to submit to the Commission.

*First*, we will propose that the Commission institute a study of various aspects of human rights throughout the world. The Commission could undertake this with the assistance of a rapporteur. The rapporteur would consult with nongovernmental organizations as well as governments and the specialized agencies for relevant data to submit to the Commission. The report of the rapporteur would be considered in the Commission, which might then make general recommendations concerning the subject under discussion. Two subjects that might well be considered first are freedom of religion and the right to a fair trial.

*Second*, we will propose that annual reports on developments in the field of human rights be prepared by each member government with the assistance of a national advisory committee. These reports would be considered in the Commission at the same time as the study of the proposed rapporteur would be submitted.

*Third*, we will propose that the United Nations establish advisory services on specific aspects of human rights along the lines of the advisory services now being provided in the economic, social, and public-administration fields. These services would be in the form of experts going to countries requesting the services, scholarships and fellowships being provided for training abroad, and arrangements for seminars.

These are action programs that the Commission can undertake now. There is no need for the Commission to limit itself to the drafting of covenants on human rights, which in any event will have limited applicability. The Commission should give more of its attention to constructive programs which can be initiated without delay in the United Nations for the promotion of the human-rights principles of the charter. Indeed, it will be greatly to the advantage of the Commission itself if it can at this session begin work on some of these affirmative tasks even before the covenants are considered by the General Assembly. In this way the Commission could mark out the basic lines of its future action programs and establish firmly its position in this field.

With all these potential programs for immediate

action at this session of the Commission, I think that you can appreciate my view that we should reserve adequate time for the consideration of these later items.

It is my earnest hope that the work of this session will be successful, especially in the launching of new programs that will contribute effectively to the safeguarding of human liberty.

## Revised Disarmament Resolution Adopted

*The plenary session of the U.N. General Assembly on April 8 voted to ask the Disarmament Commission to continue developing plans for the regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments; the elimination and prohibition of weapons of mass destruction; and international control of atomic energy. One of two Soviet amendments to the text approved by Committee I was adopted; a second amendment, which would have deleted reference to the 1952 resolution establishing the Commission, was rejected. The vote on the resolution as a whole was 52-5 (Soviet bloc)-3.*

*Following is the text of a statement by Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., U.S. representative to the General Assembly, together with the text of the resolution.*

### Ambassador Lodge's Statement of April 8

U.S./U.N. press release dated April 8

My delegation has carefully studied the proposed Soviet amendments to the resolution on disarmament adopted by the Political Committee. Our test, and we feel it would be the test of the members of the General Assembly as well, is whether the adoption of these proposed amendments would strengthen or weaken genuine disarmament efforts. We for our part have reluctantly concluded that their adoption would in fact weaken these efforts, and I regret to add that the statement made this morning by the Soviet delegate merely serves to confirm this conclusion. I should like to explain why I say that.

With regard to the first Soviet amendment which has just been referred to by Sir Gladwyn Jebb, the proposal to delete the commendation of the Disarmament Commission for its efforts since the Sixth General Assembly, is a matter of language rather than a matter of substance. It is in that respect very different from the second Soviet amendment. With regard to the first amendment which would delete the commendation of the Disarmament Commission, and those members who loyally attempted to carry out the mandate and principles established by the General Assembly, we think it wholly appropriate, as the Political Committee itself did, to express the satisfaction of the General Assembly for the work of the Commission. But we do not consider that

this is a matter of sufficient importance to warrant drawing an issue. We, of course, would not consider that the adoption of the first Soviet amendment would in any way support the previously expressed Soviet view that it was the United States, the United Kingdom, or France which obstructed the Commission's work. Of course, we do not think that any such inference could be drawn from the first Soviet amendment.

However, with regard to the second Soviet amendment, we shall vote against that amendment. This proposes the deletion from the second paragraph of the resolution adopted by the Committee the reaffirmation of the General Assembly resolution of January 11, 1952.<sup>1</sup> This resolution, which is basic to the disarmament efforts of the United Nations itself, established the Disarmament Commission and defined its terms of reference. It was adopted in January of 1952 after thorough discussion and was reaffirmed by the Political Committee this year on March 23, by a vote of 49 to 5.

The Soviet amendment would, in our view, simply turn back the clock. It would scuttle or threaten to scuttle the important accomplishments in the disarmament field of the Sixth General Assembly, the Disarmament Commission, and of the present Assembly. The Soviet representative in the Political Committee made clear his intention, and in this respect I feel my statement is justified that Mr. Vyshinsky's remarks this morning reaffirmed the position taken by the representative of the Soviet Union in the Political Committee.

In the Political Committee on March 19, the Soviet representative there attacked the 1952 Assembly resolution. He did so in somewhat more blunt and pointed terms than was done this morning, but the effect was precisely the same, and the meaning and intention is not changed. The Soviet representative in the Political Committee argued that the Disarmament Commission should have confined itself to considering the proposals which the Soviet Union had presented to the Sixth Assembly. That was the argument made and that was the intention underlying the Soviet amendments as they were explained to the Political Committee.

Mr. President, the 1952 General Assembly resolution constitutes the U.N. mandate and guidance to the Disarmament Commission. It is, therefore, a basic document. We are dealing not simply with a title, a mere name, or style of a General Assembly resolution, but with the very terms of reference of the Disarmament Commission itself. This is not a mere matter of words and phrases. It is the question whether we should carry forward on a solid basis of the accumulated wisdom and experience slowly and painfully built up in the United Nations over the past 6 years on this matter—or whether, as the Soviet Government

now suggests, we should in effect wipe the slate clean and start all over again. This is, indeed, a high price to pay for an unknown destination.

May I call to the attention of the General Assembly some of the more important guiding principles established by the 1952 General Assembly resolution, which were opposed by the Soviet delegation in that Assembly and which, as was indicated again this morning by Mr. Vyshinsky, still are opposed by the Soviet delegation. For that indeed is the only reason advanced for the adoption of the second Soviet amendment.

First, the 1952 resolution on disarmament, the basic mandate and guiding principle in this field, laid down the policy that there must be progressive disclosure and verification on a continuing basis of all armed forces and all armaments. Second, that such verification must be based on effective international inspection to insure the adequacy and accuracy of the information disclosed. Both these points have been repeatedly attacked by the Soviet delegation as unwarranted and not permissible. Third, that unless a better or no less effective system is devised, the U.N. plan for the international control of atomic energy and the prohibition of atomic weapons should continue to serve as the basis for the international control of atomic energy. And fourth, that there must be an adequate system of safeguards to insure observance of the disarmament program. These are some of the basic and indispensable elements which form part of the fiber and core of the U.N. program and policy.

If the Soviet amendment were accepted, the Soviet Union, as we believe is its intention, would be in a position at the very least to cast doubt upon the General Assembly's support of these principles which have been repeatedly endorsed by the majority of U. N. members. The Soviet amendment would raise the question whether the General Assembly continues to support the U.N. plan for control of atomic energy. It would lead to doubt whether the General Assembly continues to support its 1952 decision that the progressive and continuing disclosure and verification of all armed forces and armaments is a first and indispensable step in carrying out an agreed disarmament program.

Mr. President, I would conclude by saying that the U.S. Government welcomes any signs that the new Soviet leadership is interested in negotiating constructively for solutions to the many problems which confront us, including disarmament. However, we seek the substance, not the shadow of an agreement. It is, of course, too early to tell whether we are going to be able to make significant progress in the disarmament field. Certainly, the Soviet amendment, which I have been discussing, does not promise to contribute to such progress. Yet, my Government remains deeply interested in the considered judgment of the Soviet Government on the possibilities of honest

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Mar. 31, 1952, p. 507.

and constructive disarmament negotiations. We hope for positive and tangible response from the Soviet Government when the Disarmament Commission resumes its work.

The resolution as adopted by the Political Committee does not in any way preclude the submission by the Soviet Government in the Disarmament Commission of any proposals the Soviet Government, or any other member for that matter, desires to put forward. For our part, we pledge ourselves to continue to work constructively for a genuinely safeguarded system of disarmament and at the same time to give sympathetic and honest consideration to any concrete and practical proposals which the Soviet Government may make toward this end.

### Text of Resolution

U.N. doc. A/L. 149  
Adopted April 8, 1953

The General Assembly,  
RECOGNIZING that

Under the Charter of the United Nations all States are bound to settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use

of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

The aim of a system of world-wide disarmament is to prevent war and release the world's human and economic resources for the purposes of peace,

1. *Takes note* of the report of the Disarmament Commission [and commends the Commission for its efforts to carry out the instructions laid down by the General Assembly at its sixth regular session];<sup>2</sup>

2. *Reaffirms* General Assembly resolution 502 (VI) and requests the Disarmament Commission to continue its work for the development by the United Nations of comprehensive and co-ordinated plans providing for:

(a) the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and armaments;

(b) the elimination and prohibition of all major weapons, including bacteriological, adaptable to mass destruction;

(c) the effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only.

The whole programme to be carried out under effective international control in such a way that no State would have cause to fear that its security was endangered;

3. *Requests* the Commission to report to the General Assembly and to the Security Council no later than 1 September 1953, and hopes that all the members of the Commission will co-operate in efforts to produce constructive proposals likely to facilitate its task.

<sup>2</sup>The clause in brackets was deleted from the Committee I text of the resolution, on a Soviet motion.

## Puerto Rico's New Self-governing Status

U.S./U.N. press release dated March 21

*Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., U.S. representative to the United Nations, announced on March 23 the transmittal to Secretary-General Trygve Lie of the new Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and other documents pertaining to the Commonwealth's new self-governing status. Following is the transmittal letter:*

I have the honor to refer to the U.S. representative's note UN-1727/89 dated January 19, 1953,<sup>1</sup> notifying you that as a result of the entry into force on July 25, 1952, of the new Constitution establishing the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the U.S. Government has decided to cease to transmit information on Puerto Rico under article 73 (e) of the Charter.

The attainment by the people of Puerto Rico of their new Commonwealth status is a most significant step. This is the kind of progress to self-government contemplated by the U.N. Charter. This is the democratic pattern of the free world—of goals set and hopes realized. The people of

Puerto Rico expressed their view by resolution at their Constitutional Convention in the following words:

Thus we attain the goal of complete self-government, the last vestiges of colonialism having disappeared in the principle of Compact, and we enter into an era of new developments in democratic civilization.

I invite your attention in particular to the enclosed letter of Governor Muñoz Marin of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in which, after requesting the termination of the transmittal of information under article 73 (e) with respect to Puerto Rico, and after recounting the development of the Island's political progress, he says:

The people of Puerto Rico are firm supporters of the United Nations and this great organization may confidently rely upon us for a continuation of that good will.

Let me add that the people of Puerto Rico at this moment are proudly cooperating to the utmost in the U.N. effort to repel aggression in Korea. The men of Puerto Rico who are bearing the hardships of battle with other U.N. troops have, by their courage and determination, demonstrated their strong love for freedom.

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Feb. 9, 1953, p. 229.

There are enclosed for the information of the members of the United Nations the following documents in compliance with the terms of Resolution 222 (III) of the General Assembly:

(1) Text of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.<sup>2</sup>

(2) *Memorandum by the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Cessation of Transmission of Information Under Article 73 (e) of the Charter With Regard to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,*

(3) Copy of the letter dated January 17, 1953, from the Governor of Puerto Rico to the President of the United States.

## **MEMORANDUM BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CONCERNING THE CESSATION OF TRANSMISSION OF INFORMATION UNDER ARTICLE 73 (e) OF THE CHARTER WITH REGARD TO THE COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO**

### **Introduction**

1. The United States Government, in pursuance of Article 73 (e) of the Charter of the United Nations, has, in accordance with Resolution 66 (I) adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 14, 1946, transmitted annually to the Secretary General since 1946 information on Puerto Rico. During this period successive advances have been made in the growth and development of self-governing institutions in Puerto Rico and in the vesting of powers of government in the Puerto Rican people and their elected representatives. This process has reached its culmination with the establishment of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the promulgation of the Constitution of this Commonwealth on July 25, 1952.

2. With the establishment of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the people of Puerto Rico have attained a full measure of self-government. Accordingly, the Government of the United States has decided that it is no longer appropriate for it to submit information on Puerto Rico pursuant to Article 73 (e) of the Charter.

3. Resolution 222 (III), adopted by the General Assembly on November 3, 1948, states that, having regard to the provisions of Chapter XI of the Charter, it is essential that the United Nations be informed of any change in the constitutional position and status of any non-self-governing territory as a result of which the responsible government concerned thinks it unnecessary to transmit information in respect of that territory under Article 73 (e) of the Charter. The Members of the United Nations concerned are requested by this resolution to communicate to the Secretary General, within a maximum period of six months, such information as may be appropriate, including the constitution, legislative act or executive order providing for the government of the territory and the constitutional relationship of the territory to the government of the metropolitan country.

4. As a result of the change in the constitutional position and status of Puerto Rico as described in this memorandum, the Government of the United States considers it unnecessary to transmit further information under Article 73 (e) of the Charter concerning the Common-

wealth of Puerto Rico. The United States Government desires that the United Nations be fully informed of the background of this decision. Accordingly, and in pursuance of Resolution 222 (III), this memorandum has been prepared and, together with a copy of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and a letter from the Governor of Puerto Rico is transmitted to the Secretary General for circulation to the Members of the United Nations for their information.

### **Constitutional Development of Puerto Rico Under United States Administration**

5. Puerto Rico has been administered by the United States since 1898 when Spain ceded its sovereignty to the island under terms of the Treaty of Paris. Puerto Rico had a military government until 1900 when the United States Congress enacted the first organic law providing for a civil form of government. The establishment of the Commonwealth in July 1952 marks the culmination of a steady progression in the exercise of self-government initiated by the first organic law.

6. The first organic law, known as the Foraker Act, provided for a Governor appointed by the President of the United States, with the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States, a legislative assembly in which the lower house was elected but the upper house was composed of the heads of executive departments of the government and five other persons, all appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate; and a supreme court, the members of which were also appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, justices of the lower courts being appointed by the Governor with advice and consent of the upper house of the legislature. The act provided for Puerto Rico's representation before all departments of the Federal Government by a popularly elected Resident Commissioner. The Resident Commissioner has a seat in the House of Representatives of the Congress of the United States.

7. In 1917, the scope of self-government was increased with enactment by the Congress of a second organic law known as the Jones Act. Under it, the people of Puerto Rico elected both houses of their legislature, and the popularly elected upper house advised and consented to the Governor's appointment of justices of the lower courts. The President retained authority to appoint the Governor, the justices of the supreme court, the heads of the departments of justice and education, and the auditor, but all other heads of executive departments were appointed by the Governor. The people of Puerto Rico became citizens of the United States. The protection of a bill of rights patterned on the bill of rights of the United States Constitution was extended to Puerto Rico. Provision for representation before the various departments of the Federal Government remained. The legislature could repass a bill over the Governor's veto, but if the Governor did not then approve it, it did not become law unless it received the approval of the President.

8. In 1946, the President appointed as Governor, with the advice and consent of the Senate, a Puerto Rican who had formerly been Resident Commissioner from Puerto Rico. This was the first time that a Puerto Rican had been appointed Governor.

9. In 1947, the Congress authorized the people of Puerto Rico to elect their Governor, beginning with the general election in 1948, and provided a line of succession in the event of a vacancy in the position of Governor or of the Governor's temporary absence or disability. The elected Governor was authorized to appoint all the members of his cabinet, the heads of the executive departments, including the attorney general and commissioner of education. No change was made at that time in the provisions respecting appointment of the auditor and justices of the supreme court.

<sup>2</sup> H. doc. 435, 82d Cong., 2d sess.

## Development and Adoption of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico

10. In 1948, the candidates for Governor and Resident Commissioner from Puerto Rico, who were elected by very substantial majorities, ran on a platform calling for the adoption by the people of Puerto Rico of a constitution of their own drafting, within the framework of a continuing relationship with the United States to which the people of Puerto Rico would consent. In that election, the candidates who advocated statehood for Puerto Rico and independence for Puerto Rico were defeated. An overwhelming number of candidates for the legislature who ran on the same program as the successful candidates for Governor and Resident Commissioner were also elected. In accordance with the expressed wishes of the people of Puerto Rico, there was introduced in the Congress a bill to provide for the organization of a constitutional government by the people of Puerto Rico. It was enacted on July 3, 1950 as Public Law 600, 81st Cong. (64 Stat-319).

11. That law expressly recognized the principle of government by consent, and declaring that it was "adopted in the nature of a compact", required that it be submitted to the voters of Puerto Rico in an island-wide referendum for acceptance or rejection. If the act were approved by a majority of participating voters, the Legislature of Puerto Rico was authorized to call a constitutional convention to formulate a constitution, which would become effective upon its adoption by the people if approved by the Congress after a finding by the President that it conformed with the applicable provisions of the act and of the Constitution of the United States. Those provisions of the Organic Act which related to matters of local government would thereupon be repealed, while the remaining provisions of the Organic Act, relating to such matters as Puerto Rico's economic relationship to the United States, the force and effect of applicable Federal laws, and continued representation in Washington, would thenceforth be known as the Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act. The Congress made only two stipulations with respect to the content of the constitution to be adopted; that it provide a republican form of government and that it include a bill of rights.

12. Four political parties participated in the campaign preceding the referendum: two advocated approval of Public Law 600, 81st Congress, one opposed it, and one was divided in its position. On June 4, 1951, 506,185 persons, 65.08 percent of the 777,675 qualified voters of Puerto Rico, participated in the referendum, and 76.5 percent of those voting approved the act. On August 27, 1951, ninety-two delegates were elected to a constitutional convention, representing the Popular Democratic, the Statehood and the Socialist parties. The convention met in September 1951, and concluded its painstaking work in February 1952. An official English and an official Spanish version of the constitution were adopted, and the text was published in the four daily newspapers of Puerto Rico in both languages. Copies of the document were distributed throughout the Island.

13. On March 3, 1952, the constitution was submitted for adoption or rejection. Of the 783,610 qualified voters, 456,471 participated in the referendum. Of these, 373,594 or 81.84 percent of those voting supported adoption of the constitution; only 82,877 or 18.16 percent of those voting disapproved it. All of the elections and referenda held in Puerto Rico in connection with the development of the constitution were on the basis of universal adult suffrage without property or literacy requirements. Puerto Rico has had universal adult suffrage since 1929. There have been no property requirements since 1906 and the last literacy requirements were removed in 1935.

14. On April 22, 1952, the President transmitted the Constitution to the Congress with his recommendation for approval, and by Public Law 447, 82nd Cong. (66 Stat. 327), signed by the President on July 3, 1952, the Congress approved the Constitution subject to certain

conditions which were to be submitted for approval to the Puerto Rican Constitutional Convention. Public Law 447, in its preambular provisions, recalled that the Act of July 3, 1950 "was adopted by the Congress as a compact with the people of Puerto Rico, to become operative upon its approval by the people of Puerto Rico"; that the people of Puerto Rico had overwhelmingly approved this Act and that the Constitution of Puerto Rico had been drafted by a Constitutional Convention; that the Constitution was adopted by the people of Puerto Rico in a referendum; that the President of the United States had declared that the Constitution conformed fully with the applicable provisions of the Act of July 3, 1950 and the Constitution of the United States, that it contained a Bill of Rights, and provided for a republican form of government; and that the Congress of the United States had considered the Constitution and found that it conformed with the stipulated requirements. The operative part of Public Law 447 recorded the approval by the Congress of the United States of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico subject to certain conditions, among which was that the following new sentence be added to Article VII: "Any amendment or revision of this Constitution shall be consistent with the resolution enacted by the Congress of the United States approving this Constitution, with the applicable provisions of the Constitution of the United States, with the Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act, and with Public Law 600, 81st Cong., adopted in the nature of a compact." The Puerto Rican Constitutional Convention considered and approved these conditions. On July 25, 1952, the Governor of Puerto Rico proclaimed the establishment of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico under its Constitution.

## Principal Features of the Constitution of the Commonwealth

15. The Constitution of the Commonwealth, as it became effective with the approval of the Congress, provides that "Its political power emanates from the people and shall be exercised in accordance with their will, within the terms of the compact agreed upon between the people of Puerto Rico and the United States of America" (Art. I, Section 1). The Constitution of the Commonwealth is similar to that of a State of the Federal Union. It establishes a tri-partite form of government, with a popularly elected Governor, a popularly elected bi-cameral legislature and a judicial branch. The heads of all executive departments are appointed by the Governor, with the advice and consent of the Puerto Rican Senate; appointment of the Secretary of State also requires the consent of the House of Representatives. It should be noted that with the establishment of the Commonwealth neither the President nor the United States Senate participates in any way in the appointment of any official of the government of the Commonwealth.

16. The Legislative Assembly, which is elected by free, universal and secret suffrage of the people of Puerto Rico, has full legislative authority in respect to local matters. The Commonwealth has the power to impose and collect taxes, and to contract debts. Acts of the Legislative Assembly become law upon approval of the Governor, or, in the event that an act is vetoed by the Governor, upon its reenactment by two-thirds of the total number of members of which each house is composed. The President may no longer prevent a bill re-passed over the Governor's veto from becoming law by disapproving it. The protection of a bill of rights is extended to persons in Puerto Rico. All public officials must take an oath to support the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution and laws of the Commonwealth. Amendments to the Constitution may be proposed by the Legislative Assembly, and will be voted on at a referendum, becoming effective if ratified by a majority of the electors voting thereon. The Constitution does not restrict the substance of future amendments, except to provide that

they shall be consistent with the act approving the Constitution, with the applicable provisions of the Federal Constitution, with the Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act, and with the act of Congress authorizing the drafting and adoption of a constitution.

17. The judiciary of the Commonwealth is independent under the Constitution. The justices of the Supreme Court are no longer appointed by the President but are appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate of Puerto Rico. Justices hold office during good behavior and may be removed, after impeachment, for causes specified in the Constitution. The number of justices may be increased only by law at the request of the court itself. No judge may make a direct or indirect financial contribution to any political organization or party, or hold any elective office therein, or participate in any political campaign or be a candidate for elective office unless he has resigned his judicial office at least six months prior to his nomination. Although judgments of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico may be appealed to the United States Court of Appeals, decisions of the United States Supreme Court have established that the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico is the final authority on the meaning of a Puerto Rican law and that its decision interpreting such a law may not be reversed unless the interpretation is "inescapably wrong" and the decision "patently erroneous"; it is not sufficient to justify reversal that the Federal Court merely disagree with the Puerto Rican Supreme Court's interpretation. There continues to be a Federal District Court in Puerto Rico, but its jurisdiction does not differ from the jurisdiction of Federal District Courts functioning within the boundaries of States.

18. Under the Constitution, there is full and effective participation of the population of Puerto Rico in the Government of Puerto Rico. Article II, section 1, provides that no discrimination shall be made on account of race, color, sex, birth, social origin or condition, or political or religious ideas and requires the laws to embody these principles. Puerto Rico is divided by the Constitution into senatorial and representative districts for purposes of electing members of the Legislative Assembly, and provision is also made for election of senators and representatives elected at large. By a special procedure established by Article III of the Constitution, minority parties are assured of representation which recognizes their island-wide voting strength. Elections will be held every four years.

19. Article II, section 2, requires that the laws shall guarantee the expression of the will of the people by means of equal, direct, and secret universal suffrage and shall protect the citizen against any coercion in the exercise of the electoral franchise. Article VI, section 4, provides that every person over twenty-one years of age shall be entitled to vote if he fulfills the other conditions determined by law and prohibits depriving a person of the right to vote because he does not know how to read or write or does not own property.

### **Present Status of Puerto Rico**

20. The people of Puerto Rico continue to be citizens of the United States as well as of Puerto Rico and the fundamental provisions of the Constitution of the United States continue to be applicable to Puerto Rico. Puerto Rico will continue to be represented in Washington by a Resident Commissioner whose functions are not altered by the establishment of the Commonwealth. Matters of foreign relations and national defence will continue to be conducted by the United States, as is the case with the States of the Union.

21. At the request of the people of Puerto Rico and with the approval of the Government of the United States, Puerto Rico has voluntarily entered into the relationship with the United States which it has chosen to describe as a "commonwealth" relationship. The term "common-

wealth" was adopted by Puerto Rico as the official English designation of the body politic created by the Constitution (the official Spanish title is "estado libre asociado"), to define the status of that body as "a state which is free of superior authority in the management of its own local affairs but which is linked to the United States of America and hence is a part of its political system in a manner compatible with its Federal structure", and which "does not have an independent and separate existence" (Resolution No. 22 of the Constitutional Convention). By the various actions taken by the Congress and the people of Puerto Rico, Congress has agreed that Puerto Rico shall have, under that Constitution, freedom from control or interference by the Congress in respect of internal government and administration, subject only to compliance with applicable provisions of the Federal Constitution, the Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act and the acts of Congress authorizing and approving the Constitution, as may be interpreted by judicial decision. Those laws which directed or authorized interference with matters of local government by the Federal Government have been repealed.

22. In Hawaii, Alaska, Guam and the Virgin Islands of the United States the chief executive is appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, not popularly elected by the people; the executive officer immediately subordinate to the Governor is appointed by the President, either alone or with the advice and consent of the Senate, but not by the Governor; and judges of the highest courts exercising local jurisdiction are appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, not by the Governor. This is so provided by their respective organic acts as enacted by the Congress. This is not the case with respect to Puerto Rico. The people of Puerto Rico will participate effectively in their government through universal, secret and equal suffrage, in free and periodic elections in which differing political parties offer candidates, and which are assured freedom from undemocratic practices by the Constitution itself. These elections will be conducted in the future, as they have been in the past, without interference by the United States. The people of Puerto Rico have complete autonomy in internal economic matters and in cultural and social affairs under a Constitution adopted by them and approved by the Congress.

23. Under the Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act, there will still be free trade with the United States, only United States coins and currency will be legal tender in Puerto Rico, and the statutory laws of the United States not locally inapplicable will, with some exceptions, have the same force and effect in Puerto Rico as in the United States. United States internal revenue laws do not apply in Puerto Rico, and the people of Puerto Rico will continue to be exempt from Federal income taxes on the income they derive from sources within Puerto Rico. The proceeds of United States excise taxes collected on articles produced in Puerto Rico and shipped to the United States and the proceeds of customs collected on foreign merchandise entering Puerto Rico are covered into the Treasury of Puerto Rico for appropriation and expenditure as the legislature of the Commonwealth may decide.

24. The final declaration of the Constitutional Convention of Puerto Rico (Resolution No. 23), expresses the views of the people of Puerto Rico as to the status they have now achieved.

"When this Constitution takes effect, the people of Puerto Rico shall thereupon be organized into a commonwealth established within the terms of the compact entered into by mutual consent, which is the basis of our union with the United States of America.

"Thus we attain the goal of complete self-government, the last vestiges of colonialism having disappeared in the principle of Compact, and we enter into an era of new developments in democratic civilization."

## Conclusion

25. The United States Government, therefore, has decided that, with the entry into force on July 25, 1952, of the new constitutional arrangements establishing the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, it is no longer appropriate for the United States to continue to transmit information to the United Nations on Puerto Rico under Article 73 (e) of the Charter. This conclusion constitutes a recognition of the full measure of self-government which has been achieved by the people of Puerto Rico.

## THE GOVERNOR OF PUERTO RICO TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

JANUARY 17, 1953

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

On July 25, 1952, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico was formally installed in response to the wish of an overwhelming majority of the people of Puerto Rico pursuant to a compact between them and the Government of the United States. Puerto Rico became a Commonwealth in free and voluntary association with the United States, and its people have now attained a full measure of self-government. Accordingly, I respectfully suggest on behalf of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico that the Government of the United States take steps to notify the United Nations of the status of Puerto Rico, that it is no longer a non-self-governing area, and that reports concerning it are no longer appropriate under Article 73 (e) of the Charter.

This development has climaxed fifty-four years of growth in mutual understanding and mutual good will. Democratic rights in Puerto Rico have been progressively recognized as self-government has increased. Since 1917, the people of Puerto Rico elected all members of their legislature which had comprehensive powers to enact laws for Puerto Rico. Since 1948, the people of Puerto Rico also elected their own governor, and all other officials of Puerto Rico were locally elected or appointed by elected officials except the Auditor of Puerto Rico and the Justices of the Supreme Court. Until the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico began to function, the latter officials were appointed by the President of the United States with the advice and consent of the United States Senate. The Congress of the United States, however, retained full jurisdiction to legislate with respect to Puerto Rico without the consent of its people, to override its laws, to change its form of government and to alter its relations to the United States.

These reservations have been to a large extent formal. In the entire fifty-four years history of United States administration of Puerto Rico, Congress did not in any instance exercise its power to annul or amend an Act of the Puerto Rico legislature, nor did it modify the relations of Puerto Rico to the United States except progressively to extend self-government to its people in response to their wishes. Even before 1948, the appointed Governor of Puerto Rico was a Puerto Rican whose selection was recommended by the majority political party of the island. After 1948, the appointed Auditor and Justices of the Supreme Court were Puerto Ricans, also appointed with the recommendation and approval of the majority party.

This political history has been accompanied by a mutually beneficial economic relationship. The people of Puerto Rico have received many services from the Government of the United States and have benefited by grants-in-aid. Puerto Ricans have not been subject to the payment of taxes and have been entirely free of imposts, duties or any form of exactions for the support of the Federal Government. At all times since the turn of the century we have enjoyed free trade with the United

States, and since 1917 we have had the benefit of common citizenship. Despite the fact that our population has grown from 953,000 inhabitants in 1900 to 2,219,000 in 1950, our standard of living has substantially increased. For example, the average per capita income in 1930 was \$122.00 as compared with \$319.00 in 1950.

The people of Puerto Rico have been keenly aware of our basic economic problems due to the density of population and the poverty of natural resources. We are proud of the progress that we have made and are continuing to make by the utilization of our own talents and our democratic institutions. This progress would have been impossible, however, if it had not been for the sympathetic cooperation of the United States, manifested in a wide variety of ways, material and political. We have been helped in building sounder social and educational bases for the exercise of our political rights and for our own economic advancement. Our joint efforts in combatting illiteracy and improving health conditions have produced remarkable results. In 1900 the literacy rate in Puerto Rico was 20 percent as compared to 78 percent in 1950; and in the same period the death rate has dropped from 25.3 per thousand to 10 per thousand.

Although the relationship was one of freedom and justice in practice, the people of Puerto Rico were not satisfied to remain in a status which appeared to reflect the imposition upon a people of the will of another community. We are proud of our culture and background, and we cherish our individual dignity and our common heritage. We profoundly believe that our government should be solidly based upon our own will and our own free choice. Accordingly, for some years, as our democratic institutions developed and became firmly established, the people considered and debated the matter of their status.

Specifically, the people of Puerto Rico discussed three choices: independence, statehood within the Federal Union, or association with the United States as a free Commonwealth. At no time did we consider that our choice was restricted, or that any alternative was foreclosed to us or could not be achieved by peaceful means; and it should be said that at no time did the United States attempt, directly or indirectly, to interfere with our choice. On the contrary, President Truman said in a message to the Congress as long ago as October 1945:

"It is the settled policy of this Government to promote the political, social, and economic development of people who have not yet attained full self-government and eventually to make it possible for them to determine their own form of government \* \* \*. It is now time, in my opinion, to ascertain from the people of Puerto Rico their wishes as to the ultimate status which they prefer, and, within such limits as may be determined by the Congress, to grant to them the kind of government which they desire."

And in his message to the Congress in January 1946, he said,

"This Government is committed to the democratic principle that it is for the dependent peoples themselves to decide what their status shall be."

Each of the alternatives of independence, statehood, and association has been represented in Puerto Rico by a political party which favored it, and which actively campaigned for the support of the electorate and nominated candidates for the legislature and the governorship. In the 1948 elections the three alternatives were fully presented to the electorate by the three main political parties. The preference of the people, expressed in an election which was as democratic as any in the world, was unmistakably expressed in favor of the third alternative: a free Commonwealth associated with the United States on the basis of mutual consent. Their choice is aptly summed up in the Spanish name of the new body politic, "Estado Libre Asociado."

It was at the request of the officials of the Puerto Rican



government acting pursuant to the mandate of the people that the Congress of the United States initiated the series of actions which resulted in the creation of the Commonwealth. On July 3, 1950, the 81st Congress enacted Public Law 600. This was, in effect, an offer by the Congress to the people of Puerto Rico, which we might accept or reject, to enter into a compact defining the status of Puerto Rico and the relationships between the respective communities. The compact offered the people of Puerto Rico an opportunity to establish our own government and to remain in association with the United States on defined terms. It was the precise formula that the people, through their elected representatives, had requested.

According to its terms, Public Law 600 was submitted to the qualified voters of Puerto Rico in a referendum held on June 4, 1951 after months of intensive debate. The Law was accepted by the people of Puerto Rico by a vote of 387,016 to 119,169. Sixty-five percent of the eligible voters participated in the referendum. In this as in all elections in Puerto Rico, all citizens of at least 21 years of age, male or female, without property or literacy requirements, were entitled to vote.

After acceptance of Law 600, a Constitutional Convention was elected on August 27, 1951 in an election where all the qualified voters had the right to participate. The Convention met at San Juan on September 17, 1951 and proceeded to draft a Constitution. On February 6, 1952 it approved the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico which it had drafted, by a vote of 88 to 3. On March 3, 1952 the qualified voters of Puerto Rico again went to the polls to express approval or disapproval of the Constitution drafted by the Convention. The Constitution was ratified in this referendum by a vote of 373,594 in favor of approval and 82,877 against approval.

Pursuant to the provisions of the Compact, the Congress of the United States on July 3, 1952, approved the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.<sup>3</sup> On July 11, 1952, the Constitutional Convention of Puerto Rico by resolution accepted amendments proposed by the Congress and took the final step in ratifying the Constitution of the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth was duly installed on July 25, 1952, and the flag of Puerto Rico was raised beside the flag of the United States.

The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, therefore, represents the government that the people of Puerto Rico have freely adopted. It reflects our own decision as to the type of institutions and the kind of relationship to the United States which we desire. There can be no doubt that in the full sense of the term, in form as well as in fact, the people of Puerto Rico are now self-governing. We have chosen our institutions and relationship with the United States. We have determined the nature and distribution of the powers of government. We have created our own Constitution under which we established our own government, the nature of which is described in Article 1, Section 2 of the Constitution as follows:

"The government of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico shall be republican in form and its legislative, judicial and executive branches as established by this Constitution shall be equally subordinate to the sovereignty of the people of Puerto Rico."

Under this Constitution, of course, all of our officials are either elected by the people or are appointed by officials whom we elect. The legislative power of the Commonwealth under the compact and the Constitution essentially parallels that of the state governments. The laws enacted by the Government of the Commonwealth pursuant to the compact cannot be repealed or modified by external authority, and their effect and validity are subject to adjudication by the courts. Our status and the

<sup>3</sup> For President Truman's message to the Congress requesting approval of the Constitution, see BULLETIN of May 5, 1952, p. 721. For his statement on signing the joint resolution of approval, see *ibid.*, July 21, 1952, p. 91.

terms of our association with the United States cannot be changed without our full consent.

The people of Puerto Rico are firm supporters of the United Nations, and this great organization may confidently rely upon us for a continuation of that good will. The Government of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico will be ready at all times to cooperate with the United States in seeking to advance the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Sincerely yours,

LUIS MUÑOZ MARIN  
Governor  
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico

## U. S. Delegations to International Conferences

### U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America

The Department of State announced on April 9 (press release 179), that Merwin L. Bohan, U.S. representative on the Inter-American Economic and Social Council, had been designated acting U.S. representative for the fifth session of the U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America, which is to open on that date at the Hotel Quitandinha in Petropolis, Brazil.

The acting U.S. representative will be assisted by the following advisers:

- Robert E. Asher, Office of Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, Department of State
- James C. Carliss, Office of Regional Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
- Edmund H. Kellogg, Office of U.N. Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State
- Fred Burton Smith, Office of the General Counsel, Department of the Treasury
- Mrs. Kathryn H. Wylie, agricultural economist, Latin American Division, Department of Agriculture
- George Wythe, Office of International Trade, Department of Commerce

At its forthcoming session, the Commission will make an extensive survey of the current economic situation in Latin America. Among the subjects which will be considered in this connection are: trends in production and the rate of development; inflationary tendencies; trends in exports and imports; price movements of export commodities; payments problems—in particular, changes in the pattern of payments with reference to Europe; and problems of intra-regional trade. Of the several important background documents which will be used by the Commission in its consideration of these subjects, one relates to the possibility of effecting multilateral compensation agreements between Latin American and European countries through the facilities of the European Payments Union; another is the Resolution of the U.N. General Assembly on "Financing of Economic Development through the establishment of fair and equitable international prices for primary commodities and through the execution of national programmes of integrated economic development."

## Inter-American Council of Jurists

The Department of State announced on April 9 (press release 181) that the United States would be represented by the following delegation at the Second Meeting of the Inter-American Council of Jurists, which is scheduled to convene at Buenos Aires on April 20, 1953:

### *U.S. representative*

William Sanders, Special Assistant and Planning Adviser,  
Bureau of United Nations Affairs

### *Alternate U.S. representative*

George H. Owen, U.S. Member, Inter-American Juridical  
Committee, American Embassy, Rio de Janeiro

### *Advisers*

Edward A. Jamison, Deputy Director, Office of Regional  
American Affairs, Department of State

Marjorie M. Whiteman, Assistant Legal Adviser for  
Inter-American Affairs, Department of State

The agenda for the forthcoming meeting, as approved by the Council of the OAS on January 26, 1953, contains 13 topics for consideration by the Inter-American Council of Jurists. Those topics relate to politico-juridical matters, codification and uniformity of legislation matters, and organizational matters.

## Sixth International Film Festival

The Department of State announced on April 9 (press release 182) that the U.S. would be represented at the Sixth International Film Festival, to be held at Cannes, France, April 15-29, 1953, by the following delegation:

### *Delegate*

Robert A. Kissack, Jr., Visual Aids Specialist, Office of  
the Chief of Army Field Forces, Department of the  
Army, Fort Monroe, Va.

### *Alternate Delegate*

Stephen J. Campbell, Attaché, American Embassy, Paris

### *Advisers*

Joseph D. Ravotto, Films Officer, American Embassy,  
Paris

Patricia Sussman, Film Distribution Chief, Office of the  
Special Representative in Europe, Mutual Security  
Agency, Paris

The purpose of this series of international film festivals is to promote cooperation among the producers and directors of motion pictures in all countries and to stimulate the development of the art of cinematography and the progress of the film industry in the world. Among the awards which will be made during the 1953 festival are grand prizes for the best long film and the best short film, special prizes for the best national selection in each category, and eight other prizes, the character of which will be determined by the juries. The juries will be selected from among the best qualified persons in France and the cre-

ators of prize-winning films of previous festivals, except that no persons who have participated in the production or presentation of a film entered this year may be a jury member.

The U.S. Government will show the film "And Now, Miguel," produced for the Overseas Information Service of the Department of State. The Mutual Security Agency will be represented by several films attributed to the countries of origin. The American motion picture industry is tentatively planning to show "Lili" (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer), "Call Me Madam" (Twentieth Century-Fox), Walt Disney's "Peter Pan" (RKO), "I Confess" (Warner Brothers), "Come Back, Little Sheba" (Paramount), and two short films, "La Gloire de Renoir" ("The Art of Renoir") (Twentieth Century-Fox) and Walt Disney's "Sea Birds" (RKO).

## THE DEPARTMENT

## Nonrenewal of VOA Contracts

Press release 169 dated April 1

Notices of the nonrenewal of contracts for the Voice of America's use of facilities at five radio transmitting plants, effective June 30, were sent out by Robert L. Johnson, Administrator of the International Information Administration, on March 31.

The decision to discontinue the use of facilities of two private companies in California, two in Massachusetts, and one in Ohio was made as a necessary economy move to comply with the Bureau of the Budget's directive of February 3 and will effect an annual savings in excess of half a million dollars, Mr. Johnson said. The Administrator explained that the Voice of America's reduction of more than 15 percent in radio program hours within the current fiscal year has left an excess of transmitting capacity.

As a result of a series of studies made by experts in and outside the Government, Mr. Johnson said, "I believe it is mandatory upon me to take promptly whatever steps are necessary to prevent the Government from being obligated for facilities or services which I believe will not be needed."

The companies receiving notices to terminate their contracts are Associated Broadcasters of San Francisco, Calif.; Crosley at Mason, Ohio; General Electric at Belmont, Calif.; Westinghouse at Hull, Mass.; and World Wide Broadcasting Corporation at Scituate, Mass. In his letter to the firms affected, Mr. Johnson said, "This action is taken with genuine regret particularly because you and your Company have rendered in many ways services of great value to the United States."

# The Making of Treaties and Executive Agreements

*Statement by Secretary Dulles*<sup>1</sup>

Press release 174 of April 6

S.J. Res. 1 and S.J. Res. 43 involve proposals of the utmost importance. They would basically change the Constitution of the United States relative to the making of treaties and executive agreements.

Each of the resolutions would deprive the nation of treaty-making power in large areas. They would deny to all treaties the force of law, making their enforcement depend on subsequent action of the Congress and, in the case of S.J. Res. 43, also of the 48 States. They would subject the current, day-by-day conduct of foreign affairs to impediments which might be stifling.

Obviously, these far-reaching proposals should not be enacted without careful study and nationwide awareness of their implications.

## The Historical Background

Our present constitutional system was framed in the light of the external dangers which had resulted from the feeble power of the Confederation to deal with foreign affairs.

Perhaps the most urgent reason for calling of the Convention which framed our Constitution was the fact that treaties made under the Articles of Confederation were not enforceable because they operated upon the States and not upon individuals. There was no federal judiciary with authority to enforce treaties as part of the internal law.

Out of this grew the treaty provisions of our Constitution. The debates of the Convention and of the Federalist papers show the extreme care that was taken in their formulation. They reveal too that some of the proposals contained in the resolutions now being considered were advanced and rejected. For instance, Gouverneur Morris made a motion that no treaty should be binding

<sup>1</sup> Made on Apr. 6 before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary in regard to S.J. Res. 1, "proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States relative to the making of treaties and executive agreements," and S.J. Res. 43, "Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, relating to the legal effect of certain treaties."

"which is not ratified as a law." This was voted down 8 to 1 (2 Farrand 392).

The treaty-making power, as it was written into our Constitution, is, to be sure, a large power. Treaties made by the President and concurred in by a two-thirds vote of the Senate become "law of the land." No limitation upon the treaty-making powers are explicitly defined in the Constitution or decisions of the Supreme Court. But the treaty-making power is *not* an unlimited power. All of the Supreme Court cases which deal with the subject are uniform to that effect.

Furthermore, while the Constitution provides that treaties made under the authority of the United States shall be the supreme law of the land, they only rank on an equality with congressional enactments.

The effect of any treaty as internal law can be overcome by a simple act of Congress.

That is a Constitutional fact which must be, and is, accepted by all other nations which make treaties with us.

The present system has worked well for 160 years. The Supreme Court has never had occasion to hold a treaty to be unconstitutional. On the other hand, no treaty has ever yet been made which can be cited as an example of the abuse of the treaty-making power. These two circumstances are persuasive evidence of the care with which treaty power has been exercised during the entire existence of our Republic.

## Origin of Proponents' Fears

During recent years there developed a tendency to consider treaty making as a way to effectuate reforms, particularly in relation to social matters, and to impose upon our Republic conceptions regarding human rights which many felt were alien to our traditional concepts. This tendency caused widespread concern, a concern which is reflected in the proposed resolutions before you, resolutions which first took form in a prior Congress.

I believe that that concern was then a legitimate one. Those who shared it were alert citizens. I believe they have performed a patriotic service in bringing their fears to the attention of the

American public. But I point out that the arousing of that concern was a correction of the evil.

There has been a reversal of the trend toward trying to use the treaty-making power to effect internal social changes. This administration is committed to the exercise of the treaty-making power only within traditional limits. By "traditional" I do not mean that to imply that the boundary between domestic and international concerns is rigid and fixed for all time. I do mean that treaties are contracts with foreign governments designed to promote the interests of our nation by securing action by others in a way deemed advantageous to us. I do not believe that treaties should, or lawfully can, be used as a device to circumvent the constitutional procedures established in relation to what are essentially matters of domestic concern.

### **The Present Trend**

To illustrate my point about the change of trend, I am authorized to say:

1. The present administration intends to encourage the promotion everywhere of human rights and individual freedoms, but to favor methods of persuasion, education, and example rather than formal undertakings which commit one part of the world to impose its particular social and moral standards upon another part of the world community, which has different standards. That is the point of view I expressed in 1951 in relation to the Japanese peace treaty. Therefore, while we shall not withhold our counsel from those who seek to draft a treaty or covenant on human rights, we do not ourselves look upon a treaty as the means which we would now select as the proper and most effective way to spread throughout the world the goals of human liberty to which this nation has been dedicated since its inception. We therefore do not intend to become a party to any such covenant or present it as a treaty for consideration by the Senate.

2. This administration does not intend to sign the Convention on Political Rights of Women. This is not because we do not believe in the equal political status of men and women or because we shall not seek to promote that equality. Rather it is because we do not believe that this goal can be achieved by treaty coercion or that it constitutes a proper field for exercise of the treaty-making power. We do not now see any clear or necessary relation between the interest and welfare of the United States and the eligibility of women to political office in other nations.

These same principles will guide our action in other fields which have been suggested by some as fields for multilateral treaties.

3. The Constitution provides that the President shall have power to make treaties by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. This ad-

ministration recognizes the significance of the word "advice." It will be our effort to see that the Senate gets its opportunity to "advise and consent" in time so that it does not have to choose between adopting treaties it does not like or embarrassing our international position by rejecting what has already been negotiated out with foreign governments.

### **Prevention of Abuses of Power**

Recent developments illustrate the ways by which abuses of the treaty-making power can be avoided. In one way or another, abuses *have* been avoided throughout the life of our Republic. The question thus is whether, in the face of 160 years of nonabuse of the treaty-making power, it is desirable to amend our Constitution as now proposed.

I have been sympathetic to the point of view reflected in S.J. Resolution 1, and I have so expressed myself. I have, however, now come to the conclusion that this whole matter requires further study, because analysis of the pending resolutions shows that they may seriously weaken our Government in the field of foreign relations in ways which, I know, the proponents of the resolutions do not intend or desire. The two different proposals before you, and independent drafting efforts of my own, convince me that it is difficult, if not impossible, to amend the Constitution so as to exclude possible abuses, without incurring risks that are far greater than the risk that the present powers will be abused.

### **Present Importance of Treaty Power**

At this time, perhaps more than ever before in history, the United States should be able to make effective contracts with other nations.

We need national power to achieve free-world unity of purpose and performance.

Today about 50 free countries, representing approximately two-thirds of the peoples and natural resources of the world, face a grave threat. That threat comes from a single totalitarian dictatorship which rules one-third of the peoples and natural resources of the world. This single despotic power has enormous advantages unless the free nations can work together. This cooperation of the free cannot be achieved by imposed unity. It must be achieved largely through treaties and executive agreements which will coordinate the military and economic strength of the free world, and promote friendly cooperation and understanding. The ability of the United States to use treaties and agreements to effect this result can become a matter of national survival.

We need national power to make treaties with our potential enemies, in order to mitigate our dangers and to ease our burdens through measures which would effectively control armaments. Such

treaties do not now seem likely but their possibility should not be excluded.

If we should be attacked, and, unhappily, there should be war, the President as Commander-in-Chief would need the power through executive agreements to achieve unity of purpose and of action with our allies. And when victory was won, we would need national power to make treaties of peace which would heal the wounds of war.

It is against this background that the pending resolutions must be judged.

### Discussion of Resolution

I could discourse about the resolutions at length. It may, however, be enough, if, at this time, I illustrate, principally in terms of S.J. Res. 1, why in my opinion the pending resolutions, despite the good intentions which prompt them, actually could be dangerous to our peace and security.

*Section 1* of S.J. Res. 1 provides that no treaty shall abridge any right enumerated in the Constitution. The Constitution specifies the power of Congress to declare war. Does Section 1 of the proposed Constitutional amendment mean that the United States can never make a treaty which would outlaw war? Can we never agree, with other nations, to abridge the present unqualified right of Congress in relation to war? Surely this is no time for the United States to make itself unable to enter into treaties which would effectively ban the terrible spectre of a war.

*Section 2* of the proposed resolution says that no international organization may supervise or control the rights of citizens of the United States within the United States if those rights are enumerated in the Constitution or are "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States." This could mean that the United States could not make effective treaty arrangements for the international control of atomic energy and mass destruction weapons. The United States has always insisted in negotiations and debates with the Soviet Union that no limitation or control of armaments would be acceptable unless enforced by strict international supervision. This was the so-called Baruch plan. The Soviet Union has so far refused to accede to such international control. But surely this is no time for the United States to make itself unable to participate in the effective international control of armaments.

And how about international supervision of aviation, radio, narcotics, and quarantine requirements? Mere assertion that these are international and not domestic matters will not settle the question. We can but speculate as to what decisions the Supreme Court may reach as to the meaning and application of the proposed amendment to our Constitution.

*Section 3* of the proposed resolution says that no treaty shall become "law of the land" except

through legislation by the Congress. This would make it much more difficult to consummate effective treaties. Our nation's ability to deal with other nations would be gravely impaired. For all treaties which operate within the United States would, in the first instance, have to be consented to by the Senate by the traditional two-thirds majority and then also, at a later date, be put into force by laws requiring the concurrence not only of the Senate but also of the House.

In the past it has often been charged that our present Constitutional treaty-making process is too difficult, being subject to block by  $\frac{1}{3}$  plus 1 of the Senators present. This has been criticized as "government by minority." It has also been suggested that the  $\frac{2}{3}$  Senate requirement be abandoned in favor of a majority of both the Houses. But now it is suggested that a  $\frac{2}{3}$  vote of the Senate is not enough—that there must also be a majority vote of the House of Representatives if a treaty is to be effective within our country.

In many countries, the Senate or Upper House has become relegated to an unimportant role. In this country, the Senate has proudly exercised a unique role of participating with the President in the making of treaties. It would occasion surprise and misgivings in many quarters if the Senate should now feel so unsure of itself that it sought to subject its  $\frac{2}{3}$  approval to veto by a majority of the House.

*Section 4* of the proposed resolution deals with executive agreements. It provides that the President cannot make any agreement of any sort with any foreign government or official except as the Congress may prescribe. This section would gravely embarrass the President in dealing currently with foreign affairs. Today he is one of the coordinate branches of government with exclusive jurisdiction in relation to the current conduct of foreign affairs. The proposed amendment would drastically alter the President's position in that respect and change the present Constitutional concept of balance of power.

Executive agreements of major importance are now customarily made pursuant to congressional or treaty authorization, or depend on congressional action for their implementation.

But every day the President, directly or through his agents, makes minor agreements of some kind or description with other governments or officials. There are masses of agreements made and changed almost daily with relation to the development of foreign bases and disposition of our troops abroad. There are many agreements with other governments to impose restrictions upon trade with areas unfriendly to us. There are daily agreements regarding a host of matters. This proposed resolution would subject this entire process to congressional prescription.

I know full well that the proponents of this resolution are not activated by a purpose to embarrass the President in such matters. But that

## S.J. Res. 1

### JOINT RESOLUTION

Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States relative to the making of treaties and executive agreements.

*Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of each House concurring therein),* That the following article is proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States:

#### "ARTICLE —

"SECTION 1. A provision of a treaty which denies or abridges any right enumerated in this Constitution shall not be of any force or effect.

"SEC. 2. No treaty shall authorize or permit any foreign power or any international organization to supervise, control, or adjudicate rights of citizens of the United States within the United States enumerated in this Constitution or any other matter essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States.

"SEC. 3. A treaty shall become effective as internal law in the United States only through the enactment of appropriate legislation by the Congress.

"SEC. 4. All executive or other agreements between the President and any international organization, foreign power, or official thereof shall be made only in the manner and to the extent to be prescribed by law. Such agreements shall be subject to the limitations imposed on treaties, or the making of treaties, by this article.

"SEC. 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

"SEC. 6. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the date of its submission."

is what the amendment would do. It would so detract from the authority of the office of the President of the United States that his capacity to deal currently with international affairs would be gravely impaired.

### Executive Agreements

It has long been recognized that there is an undefined, and probably undefinable, borderline between executive agreements which may be made by the President alone and those that require validation by the Senate as treaties, or the Congress as laws. This has occasionally caused controversy between the executive and legislative branches of government.

There is a similar undefined, and probably undefinable, borderline between international agreements which require two-thirds Senate concurrence, but no House concurrence, as in the case of treaties and agreements which should have the majority concurrence of both Chambers of Congress. This has occasionally caused controversy between the Senate and the House.

The danger to the nation, however, from agreements not submitted to the Senate as treaties, or to the Congress for legislative validation, cannot be great because, without either Senate or congressional action, these agreements cannot constitutionally become "law of the land."

This is an area to be dealt with by friendly cooperation between the three Departments of Government which are involved, rather than by attempts at constitutional definition, which are futile, or by the absorption by one branch of government of responsibilities which are presently and properly shared.

In order to promote that friendly cooperation, I am authorized by the President to advise this Committee, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the House Foreign Affairs Committee as follows:

It has long been recognized that difficulties exist in the determination as to which international agreements should be submitted to the Senate as treaties, which ones should be submitted to both Houses of the Congress, and which ones do not require any congressional approval.

Differences of opinion resulting from these difficulties have given rise in the past to disputes between the executive branch and the Congress concerning the handling of international agreements. It must be recognized that it would be extremely difficult if not impossible to fit all agreements into set categories. At times there

## S.J. Res. 43

### JOINT RESOLUTION

Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, relating to the legal effect of certain treaties.

*Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of each House concurring therein),* That the following article is proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States:

#### "ARTICLE —

"SECTION 1. A provision of a treaty which conflicts with any provision of this Constitution shall not be of any force or effect. A treaty shall become effective as internal law in the United States only through legislation which would be valid in the absence of treaty. Executive agreements shall be subject to regulation by the Congress and to the limitations imposed on treaties by this article.

"SEC. 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

"SEC. 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the date of its submission."

may be disagreement as to the manner in which agreements are to be dealt with. While recognizing this, the Executive cannot surrender the freedom of action which is necessary for its operations in the foreign affairs field. In the interest of orderly procedure, however, I feel that the Congress is entitled to know the considerations that enter into the determinations as to which procedures are sought to be followed. To that end, when there is any serious question of this nature and the circumstances permit, the executive branch will consult with appropriate congressional leaders and committees in determining the most suitable way of handling international agreements as they arise.

#### S.J. Res. 43

S.J. Res. 43, which follows the language proposed by a Committee of the American Bar Association, contains a further provision. This would require that no treaty shall be effective in any field in which Congress in the absence of a treaty cannot legislate. This would create a no-man's land in foreign affairs. It would require the concurrence of all 48 States to make effective such common treaties as treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation; extradition; reciprocal inheritance taxation; migratory birds; collection of foreign debts; and status of foreign troops. In this field of foreign affairs our country would not speak with one voice but with 49. The primary objective of the framers of our Constitution in this respect would be defeated.

#### A Balancing of Risks

I feel sure that the proponents of the resolutions do not intend to do other than to eliminate the risk of abuses. Their motives are, I know, of the highest. The trouble is that, when it comes to putting their desire into legal form, the result is greatly reduced capacity for national action in an area where it is of the utmost importance that our nation should have power.

Of course, there can never be power without risk of its abuse. But our present Constitutional processes have worked successfully for 160 years. Never during this period has any actual treaty produced the results which the proponents of the resolution fear. Whenever there has seemed to be danger of that, the people of the United States, the Judiciary of the United States, the Senate of the United States, and the Executive Branch of the United States have, in their respective spheres, moved to repel that danger. What has happened in recent months, including the exertions of the proponents of the resolution, demonstrates that the resolution is unnecessary. The trend they feared has been checked.

In this connection, a special tribute is due to Senator Bricker. His exertions to alert our na-

tion to possible danger will long be remembered. It can, however, be judged that the proponents of these resolutions have themselves shown that amendment of the Constitution is unnecessary.

The test of any Constitution is not the way it reads but the way it works. George Washington in his Farewell Address pointed out that "experience is the surest standard by which to test the real tendency of the existing constitution of a country." He went on to warn against "changes, upon the credit of mere hypothesis and opinion." That, he said, "exposes to perpetual change from the endless variety of hypothesis and opinion."

Our Constitution, as it is, has served us well in the field of foreign relations. There is no actual experience to demonstrate the need of the far-reaching changes here proposed. The fears are hypothetical. Therefore, I suggest that this constitutional area is one which deserves to be kept under constant observation and study, but that there is no present need for constitutional change.

The Department of State has prepared a more detailed memorandum dealing with the legal questions raised by these resolutions. I submit this for the information of the Committee and ask that it be included, with its annexes, in the record of this hearing.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Copies of this material may be obtained by writing to the Division of Publications, Department of State.

#### Check List of Department of State Press Releases: Apr. 6-11, 1953

Releases may be obtained from the Office of the Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

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# The Chance for Peace

*Address by the President*<sup>1</sup>

White House press release dated April 16

In this spring of 1953 the free world weighs one question above all others: the chance for a just peace for all peoples.

To weigh this chance is to summon instantly to mind another recent moment of great decision. It came with that yet more hopeful spring of 1945, bright with the promise of victory and of freedom. The hope of all just men in that moment too was a just and lasting peace.

The 8 years that have passed have seen that hope waver, grow dim, and almost die. And the shadow of fear again has darkly lengthened across the world.

Today the hope of free men remains stubborn and brave, but it is sternly disciplined by experience. It shuns not only all crude counsel of despair but also the self-deceit of easy illusion. It weighs the chance for peace with sure, clear knowledge of what happened to the vain hope of 1945.

In that spring of victory the soldiers of the Western Allies met the soldiers of Russia in the center of Europe. They were triumphant comrades in arms. Their peoples shared the joyous prospect of building, in honor of their dead, the only fitting monument—an age of just peace. All these war-weary peoples shared too this concrete, decent purpose: to guard vigilantly against the domination ever again of any part of the world by a single, unbridled aggressive power.

This common purpose lasted an instant and

<sup>1</sup> Made before the American Society of Newspaper Editors and broadcast to the Nation over radio and television networks on Apr. 16. Also printed as Department of State publication 5042.

perished. The nations of the world divided to follow two distinct roads.

The United States and our valued friends, the other free nations, chose one road.

The leaders of the Soviet Union chose another.

## The Road Followed by the United States

The way chosen by the United States was plainly marked by a few clear precepts, which govern its conduct in world affairs.

First: No people on earth can be held, as a people, to be an enemy, for all humanity shares the common hunger for peace and fellowship and justice.

Second: No nation's security and well-being can be lastingly achieved in isolation but only in effective cooperation with fellow nations.

Third: Any nation's right to a form of government and an economic system of its own choosing is *inalienable*.

Fourth: Any nation's attempt to dictate to other nations their form of government is *indefensible*.

And fifth: A nation's hope of lasting peace cannot be firmly based upon any race in armaments but rather upon just relations and honest understanding with all other nations.

In the light of these principles the citizens of the United States defined the way they proposed to follow, through the aftermath of war, toward true peace.

This way was faithful to the spirit that inspired the United Nations: to prohibit strife, to relieve tensions, to banish fears. This way was to control and to reduce armaments. This way was to allow all nations to devote their energies and resources to the great and good tasks of heal-

ing the war's wounds, of clothing and feeding and housing the needy, of perfecting a just political life, of enjoying the fruits of their own free toil.

### **The Road Followed by the Soviet Union**

The Soviet government held a vastly different vision of the future.

In the world of its design, security was to be found, not in mutual trust and mutual aid but in *force*: huge armies, subversion, rule of neighbor nations. The goal was power superiority at all cost. Security was to be sought by denying it to all others.

The result has been tragic for the world and, for the Soviet Union, it has also been ironic.

The amassing of Soviet power alerted free nations to a new danger of aggression. It compelled them in self-defense to spend unprecedented money and energy for armaments. It forced them to develop weapons of war now capable of inflicting instant and terrible punishment upon any aggressor.

It instilled in the free nations—and let none doubt this—the unshakable conviction that, as long as there persists a threat to freedom, they must, at any cost, remain armed, strong, and ready for any risk of war.

It inspired them—and let none doubt this—to attain a unity of purpose and will beyond the power of propaganda or pressure to break, now or ever.

There remained, however, one thing essentially unchanged and unaffected by Soviet conduct: the readiness of the free nations to welcome sincerely any genuine evidence of peaceful purpose enabling all peoples again to resume their common quest of just peace.

The free nations, most solemnly and repeatedly, have assured the Soviet Union that their firm association has never had any aggressive purpose whatsoever. Soviet leaders, however, have seemed to persuade themselves, or tried to persuade their people, otherwise.

And so it has come to pass that the Soviet Union itself has shared and suffered the very fears it has fostered in the rest of the world.

This has been the way of life forged by 8 years of fear and force.

What can the world, or any nation in it, hope for if no turning is found on this dread road?

### **A Life of Fear**

The worst to be feared and the best to be expected can be simply stated.

The *worst* is atomic war.

The *best* would be this: a life of perpetual fear and tension; a burden of arms draining the wealth and the labor of all peoples; a wasting of strength that defies the American system or the Soviet system or any system to achieve true abundance and happiness for the peoples of this earth.

Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed.

### **The Costs of a World in Arms**

This world in arms is not spending money alone.

It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children.

The cost of one modern heavy bomber is this: a modern brick school in more than 30 cities.

It is two electric power plants, each serving a town of 60,000 population.

It is two fine, fully equipped hospitals.

It is some 50 miles of concrete highway.

We pay for a single fighter plane with a half million bushels of wheat.

We pay for a single destroyer with new homes that could have housed more than 8,000 people.

This, I repeat, is the best way of life to be found on the road the world has been taking.

This is not a way of life at all, in any true sense. Under the cloud of threatening war, it is humanity hanging from a cross of iron.

These plain and cruel truths define the peril and point the hope that come with this spring of 1953.

This is one of those times in the affairs of nations when the gravest choices must be made, if there is to be a turning toward a just and lasting peace.

It is a moment that calls upon the governments of the world to speak their intentions with simplicity and with honesty.

It calls upon them to answer the question that stirs the hearts of all sane men: *is there no other way the world may live?*

### **Beginning of a New Era**

The world knows that an era ended with the death of Joseph Stalin. The extraordinary 30-year span of his rule saw the Soviet Empire

expand to reach from the Baltic Sea to the Sea of Japan, finally to dominate 800 million souls.

The Soviet system shaped by Stalin and his predecessors was born of one World War. It survived with stubborn and often amazing courage a second World War. It has lived to threaten a third.

Now a new leadership has assumed power in the Soviet Union. Its links to the past, however strong, cannot bind it completely. Its future is, in great part, its own to make.

This new leadership confronts a free world aroused, as rarely in its history, by the will to stay free.

This free world knows, out of the bitter wisdom of experience, that vigilance and sacrifice are the price of liberty.

It knows that the defense of Western Europe imperatively demands the unity of purpose and action made possible by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, embracing a European Defense Community.

It knows that Western Germany deserves to be a free and equal partner in this community and that this, for Germany, is the only safe way to full, final unity.

It knows that aggression in Korea and in south-east Asia are threats to the whole free community to be met by united action.

This is the kind of free world which the new Soviet leadership confronts. It is a world that demands and expects the fullest respect of its rights and interests. It is a world that will always accord the same respect to all others.

So the new Soviet leadership now has a precious opportunity to awaken, with the rest of the world, to the point of peril reached and to help turn the tide of history.

Will it do this?

We do not yet know. Recent statements and gestures of Soviet leaders give some evidence that they may recognize this critical moment.

We welcome every honest act of peace.

We care nothing for mere rhetoric.

We care only for sincerity of peaceful purpose attested by deeds. The opportunities for such deeds are many. The performance of a great number of them waits upon no complex protocol but upon the simple will to do them. Even a few such clear and specific acts, such as the Soviet Union's signature upon an Austrian treaty or its release of thousands of prisoners still held from World

War II, would be impressive signs of sincere intent. They would carry a power of persuasion not to be matched by any amount of oratory.

This we do know: a world that begins to witness the rebirth of trust among nations *can* find its way to a peace that is neither partial nor punitive.

With all who will work in good faith toward such a peace, we are ready, with renewed resolve, to strive to redeem the near-lost hopes of our day.

The first great step along this way must be the conclusion of an honorable armistice in Korea.

This means the immediate cessation of hostilities and the prompt initiation of political discussions leading to the holding of free elections in a united Korea.

It should mean, no less importantly, an end to the direct and indirect attacks upon the security of Indochina and Malaya. For any armistice in Korea that merely released aggressive armies to attack elsewhere would be a fraud.

We seek, throughout Asia as throughout the world, a peace that is true and total.

Out of this can grow a still wider task—the achieving of just political settlements for the other serious and specific issues between the free world and the Soviet Union.

None of these issues, great or small, is insoluble—given only the will to respect the rights of all nations.

Again we say: the United States is ready to assume its just part.

We have already done all within our power to speed conclusion of a treaty with Austria, which will free that country from economic exploitation and from occupation by foreign troops.

We are ready not only to press forward with the present plans for closer unity of the nations of Western Europe but also, upon that foundation, to strive to foster a broader European community, conducive to the free movement of persons, of trade, and of ideas.

This community would include a free and united Germany, with a government based upon free and secret elections.

This free community and the full independence of the East European nations could mean the end of the present unnatural division of Europe.

### **Reduction of Armaments**

As progress in all these areas strengthens world trust, we could proceed concurrently with the next great work—the reduction of the burden of

armaments now weighing upon the world. To this end we would welcome and enter into the most solemn agreements. These could properly include:

1. The limitation, by absolute numbers or by an agreed international ratio, of the sizes of the military and security forces of all nations.

2. A commitment by all nations to set an agreed limit upon that proportion of total production of certain strategic materials to be devoted to military purposes.

3. International control of atomic energy to promote its use for peaceful purposes only and to insure the prohibition of atomic weapons.

4. A limitation or prohibition of other categories of weapons of great destructiveness.

5. The enforcement of all these agreed limitations and prohibitions by adequate safeguards, including a practical system of inspection under the United Nations.

The details of such disarmament programs are manifestly critical and complex. Neither the United States nor any other nation can properly claim to possess a perfect, immutable formula. But the formula matters less than the faith—the good faith without which no formula can work justly and effectively.

### **A New Kind of War**

The fruit of success in all these tasks would present the world with the greatest task, and the greatest opportunity, of all. It is this: the dedication of the energies, the resources, and the imaginations of all peaceful nations to a new kind of war. This would be a declared total war, not upon any human enemy but upon the brute forces of poverty and need.

The peace we seek, founded upon decent trust and cooperative effort among nations, can be fortified, not by weapons of war but by wheat and by cotton, by milk and by wool, by meat and by timber and by rice. These are words that translate into every language on earth. These are needs that challenge this world in arms.

This idea of a just and peaceful world is not new or strange to us. It inspired the people of the United States to initiate the European Recovery Program in 1947. That program was prepared to treat, with like and equal concern, the needs of Eastern and Western Europe.

We are prepared to reaffirm, with the most concrete evidence, our readiness to help build a world in which all peoples can be productive and prosperous.

This Government is ready to ask its people to join with all nations in devoting a substantial percentage of the savings achieved by disarmament to a fund for world aid and reconstruction. The purposes of this great work would be to help other peoples to develop the undeveloped areas of the world, to stimulate profitable and fair world trade, to assist all peoples to know the blessings of productive freedom.

The monuments to this new kind of war would be these: roads and schools, hospitals and homes, food and health.

We are ready, in short, to dedicate our strength to serving the *needs*, rather than the *fears*, of the world.

We are ready, by these and all such actions, to make of the United Nations an institution that can effectively guard the peace and security of all peoples.

I know of nothing I can add to make plainer the sincere purpose of the United States.

I know of no course, other than that marked by these and similar actions, that can be called the highway of peace.

I know of only one question upon which progress waits. It is this:

*What Is the Soviet Union Ready To Do?*

Whatever the answer be, let it be plainly spoken.

Again we say: the hunger for peace is too great, the hour in history too late, for any government to mock men's hopes with mere words and promises and gestures.

The test of truth is simple. There can be no persuasion but by deeds.

Is the new leadership of the Soviet Union prepared to use its decisive influence in the Communist world, including control of the flow of arms, to bring not merely an expedient truce in Korea but genuine peace in Asia?

Is it prepared to allow other nations, including those of Eastern Europe, the free choice of their own forms of government?

Is it prepared to act in concert with others upon serious disarmament proposals to be made firmly effective by stringent U. N. control and inspection?

If not, where then is the concrete evidence of the Soviet Union's concern for peace?

The test is clear.

There is, before all peoples, a precious chance to turn the black tide of events. If we failed to strive to seize this chance, the judgment of future ages would be harsh and just.

If we strive but fail and the world remains armed against itself, it at least need be divided no longer in its clear knowledge of who has condemned humankind to this fate.

The purpose of the United States, in stating these proposals, is simple and clear.

These proposals spring, without ulterior pur-

pose or political passion, from our calm conviction that the hunger for just peace is in the hearts of all peoples—those of Russia and of China no less than of our own country.

They conform to our firm faith that God created men to enjoy, not destroy, the fruits of the earth and of their own toil.

They aspire to this: the lifting, from the backs and from the hearts of men, of their burden of arms and of fears, so that they may find before them a golden age of freedom and of peace.

## The First 90 Days

*Address by Secretary Dulles*<sup>1</sup>

Press release 200 dated April 18

President Eisenhower, speaking here last Thursday,<sup>2</sup> opened the door to the mansion of peace. He invited the Soviet Union to come in. That invitation was not mere rhetoric. Its timing was not chosen at hazard. It marked a planned stage in the evolution of Eisenhower foreign policy. The speech really had its beginning when President Eisenhower took office, which was 90 days ago tomorrow.

The words which President Eisenhower uttered might have been uttered at any time during these past 90 days. But these words gained immensely in significance because they came against a background of cohesive, positive action.

When President Eisenhower first took office, a plea for peace such as he made this week might have been interpreted as a sign of weakness or a mere gesture of sentimentality. In order that such a plea should carry maximum impact, it was first

<sup>1</sup> Made before the American Society of Newspaper Editors and broadcast to the Nation over radio and television networks on Apr. 18. Also printed as Department of State publication 5044.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*.

necessary to demonstrate to the world, and to Soviet leaders in particular, President Eisenhower's will and capacity to develop foreign policies so firm, so fair, so just that the Soviet leaders might find it expedient to live with these policies rather than to live against them.

I should like briefly to review this 90-day period, which had as its climax the President's historical address.

### The European Defense Community

One of the worries of the free world, and one of the hopes of the Soviet world, has been disunity in Western Europe. For example, it would be particularly disastrous for the West if Franco-German antagonism were revived. That would indeed afford Soviet intrigue a fertile field of operation.

The continental European countries themselves, including France and Germany, had seen the danger and had devised a program to meet it. They had proposed to create a European Defense Community, the members of which would merge their military power into a single force. A treaty

to this effect was signed nearly a year ago. It was contemplated by the treaty that it would be ratified and come into force within 6 months. But, following the signature of the treaty, nothing happened. Last January it seemed that the project was dying.

The President, out of his own intimate knowledge of European conditions, felt that our Government should indicate its deep concern and point out that failure to realize the European Defense Community could mean collapse of the hopes and efforts that inspired the Marshall plan, the North Atlantic Treaty, and the mutual security program. Therefore, on January 30, just 10 days after the President's inaugural, Mr. Stassen and I, at the President's request, visited the six European Defense Community countries and also Great Britain. As a result of our visit and the return visits to Washington of several European leaders, this project has now been revived. It cannot yet be confidently predicted that it will be realized. But it is today the liveliest single topic before the six parliaments of continental Europe.

The Soviet Union now faces the likelihood that Western Europe will produce a unified military force, including French and Germans. Thus would come to a final end one of the hopes from which Soviet imperialism has taken comfort.

## NATO

It was never expected that the European Defense Community, when created, would alone carry the burdens of making Western Europe secure. *EDC*, a community of 6, would stand within the framework of *NATO*, a partnership of 14. This partnership, however, also presented us with urgent problems. For most of the members had come to feel that the program for *NATO* represented a type of effort which they could not continue indefinitely to bear.

The United States and its *NATO* partners had been operating on the assumption that the moment of greatest danger was some early, predictable date. Therefore, it had been reasoned, emergency efforts should be made to meet that date, leaving subsequent years for stabilization and recuperation.

But the Soviet Union did not conveniently relax its threat in order to meet the preconceived timetable of the *NATO* countries. Accordingly it was found necessary each year to prolong the extraor-

dinary exertion and to defer the period of stabilization. This spasmodic approach was exhaustive to all concerned. Several of our allies told us that they could not hold to the present pace without greatly increased help from the United States.

The situation obviously called for a fresh approach.

Because we did not believe that any specific date of peak danger could be reliably forecast; because Soviet communism itself professes to operate in terms of "an entire historical era"; because new weapons inevitably change the aspect of the military task; because a vigorous and happy society is itself an important ingredient of freedom—for these reasons we decided to find programs which, on the one hand, will provide Europe with substantial insurance against being overrun by Soviet attack and which, on the other hand, can, if necessary, be sustained for an indefinite period with growing reliance on Western Europe's own strength.

Next week the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Humphrey, the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Wilson, the Director for Mutual Security, Mr. Stassen, and I will go to Paris to meet with the other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Council. There we shall listen sympathetically to the point of view of our partners and together with them concert military programs designed to deter attack from without, without undermining inner strength.

All will know, and I am confident that the Soviet leaders know best of all, that what we plan is not greater weakness but greater strength. The productivity of the free world is so prodigious, its inventiveness so phenomenal, that any military aggressor that attacked our free-world partnership would be doomed to sure defeat.

What we plan is to dissipate another Soviet hope, the hope expressed by Stalin when he said that "the moment for the decisive blow" would come when the opponents of communism "have sufficiently weakened themselves in a struggle which is beyond their strength . . . have sufficiently disgraced themselves through their practical bankruptcy so that our victory is assured." We do not intend that that moment of bankruptcy shall come.

Let me add that the policy here expressed was determined upon without regard to any of the recent Soviet moves. We are not dancing to any Russian tune. Nothing that has happened has in-



duced in us a mood of relaxation or any desire to weaken NATO. The purpose and the result will be a NATO more sure to live and to perform its appointed tasks.

### **The Far East**

In the Far East vigorous policy decisions were also taken since the 90 days began. In Korea we embarked upon a program to change the complexion of that struggle. As President Eisenhower told you, we still welcome an armistice, not merely to end the fighting but on the assumption that it will lead to a peace which accords with the principles of the United Nations—and that means a free and united Korea. Of course we want peace in Korea. But we do not play the role of supplicants.

We have vastly improved our relations with the National Government of China. We now have an Ambassador at Taipei, Formosa, the provisional capital. We are speeding the delivery of military assistance, which was woefully in arrears. President Eisenhower has changed the instructions to the Seventh Fleet so that, while it is still instructed to protect Formosa, it is no longer instructed to protect the Chinese Communists on the mainland.

In relation to Indochina, the French Government and the Associated States have been told that we would be favorably disposed to giving increased military and financial assistance to plans realistically designed to suppress the Communist-inspired civil war, which for 6 years has wracked the area and seriously drained the metropolitan resources of France.

We recently announced, in conjunction with the French Government,<sup>3</sup> that should the Chinese Communist regime take advantage of a Korean armistice to pursue aggressive war elsewhere in the Far East, such action would have the most serious consequences and would conflict directly with the understanding on which any armistice in Korea was reached. That decision was taken prior to the recent revival of prospects for a Korean armistice. It was part of our effort to anticipate what may happen rather than to catch up with what has happened.

We negotiated with the Governments of Britain, France, and other maritime powers for a tightening of the blockade of Communist China. They are taking important practical measures to restrict

the voyages of their own ships to China and to withhold fuel from ships of other nations which are carrying strategic goods to China.

You can see, as others have seen, that a new order of priority and urgency has been given to the Far East. Further, it has been made clear that we consider that our Eastern friends, from Japan, Korea, and Formosa to Indochina and Malaya, face a single hostile front, to be met with a common purpose and growing cooperation as between the component parts of freedom.

This means that the Communists in the Far East can no longer count on winning by shifting their strength and by focusing attack on one or another free-world position that is isolated from the others. The Communist strategy, based on a contiguous land mass, is now confronted by a growing free-world unity based upon the peninsular positions and offshore island chain now controlled by the free peoples of Asia.

### **The Middle East and Latin America**

The Middle East and Latin America, two areas far apart, have both been the subject of Communist attempts at infiltration. The ground was fertile because these areas have somewhat lacked our attention; and, in the case of the Middle East, there has developed a spirit of nationalism, which has at times grown fanatical in its opposition to the Western Powers.

As was announced some weeks ago, Mr. Stassen and I have been invited by the governments of more than a dozen countries of the Middle East and South Asia to visit them. We have accepted and plan to go next month. That is significant, for no United States Secretary of State has ever visited any of these countries. It will afford us an opportunity to meet at firsthand many of the leaders and, I hope, to dissipate the false impressions which Communist propaganda has fomented.

As President Eisenhower announced last Sunday,<sup>4</sup> the State Department is organizing a goodwill mission to South America, which will be headed by the President's brother, Dr. Milton Eisenhower. He will personally carry the President's sentiments of good will toward the Republics and peoples to the south of us. Our new Assistant Secretary for this area is already in Central America.

I have had the pleasure of two meetings, one at

<sup>3</sup> BULLETIN of Apr. 6, 1953, p. 491.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, Apr. 20, 1953, p. 563.

the United Nations and the other at Washington, with the representatives of all 20 of the American Republics.

What we have done, and what we already plan, mark a determination to develop better understanding and more fellowship with peoples whom we know and respect but whose friendship we have taken too much for granted. Thereby we may close another possible avenue of Soviet Communist aggression.

### **Captive Peoples**

The free peoples are susceptible to Soviet guile because they so passionately want peace that they can readily be attracted by illusions of peace. One such illusion is a settlement based on the *status quo*. This present status involves the captivity of hundreds of millions of persons of distinctive nationality, race, religion, and culture. The hardest task of the Soviet rulers is to beat this disunity into Communist conformity. If that can be done, then the menace of Soviet communism will be immeasurably increased.

It was of the utmost importance that we should make clear to the captive peoples that we do not accept their captivity as a permanent fact of history. If they thought otherwise and became hopeless, we would unwittingly have become partners to the forging of a hostile power so vast that it could encompass our destruction.

President Eisenhower, anticipating some of the events that have since occurred, acted immediately after his inauguration to propose that our national position should be made clear through a solemn resolution concurred in by Congress and the President. The Congress has yet to act. However, I am persuaded, and I trust that the captive peoples are persuaded, that Congress in fact fully shares the point of view that President Eisenhower expressed. In any event the Chief Executive has formulated his position on this important matter and by doing so has foreclosed another of the hopes which Soviet rulers had optimistically entertained.

### **State Department Organization**

While we have been making these policy decisions, we have at the same time been acting to assure that the State Department would be able to make new policies wherever these would seem better than the old and to assure a steadily rising level of performance.

In addition to the new Secretary of State, there are two new Under Secretaries, one of whom specializes in administration and security matters. There are six new Assistant Secretaries. There is a new Legal Adviser, a new Counselor, a new Director of International Information Administration, who has responsibility for the Voice of America. The whole Policy Planning Staff is to go under new direction and be coordinated closely with the revitalized National Security Council.

We are also bringing fresh vision and new vigor into our United Nations Mission and into our Embassies abroad. The Chief of the Permanent Mission to the United Nations, former Senator Austin, retired last January after many years of distinguished service. He has been succeeded by former Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, who now heads the Permanent Mission. His vigor and parliamentary skill already demonstrate that the Soviet leaders cannot look forward to using the United Nations as a sounding board for propaganda but that they will have to deal in the United Nations with a mobilized body of world opinion which is determined that the United Nations shall, in fact, serve its avowed purpose to maintain international peace and security in conformity with the principles of justice.

New Ambassadors are installed or being installed in Great Britain, Ireland, France, Italy, Germany, Russia, Spain, Mexico, Brazil, Japan, Free China, India, and Pakistan. Other appointments are in contemplation.

For the first time in State Department history, all of our major appointments are subject to FBI field checks so as to eliminate security risks and possibility of hostile infiltration into high places. So far as is humanly practical, we are seeing to it that Communist agents shall not have access to the State Department.

We are fortunate in having a body of Foreign Service career men and women who can be the main reliance of the President and myself. They are a permanent and nonpolitical part of Government. They became such under the Rogers Act, enacted by a Republican Congress during the administration of President Coolidge and Secretary Hughes.

There is a tendency in some quarters to feel that confidence cannot be placed in these career officials because in the past, as was their duty, they served under Democrat Presidents and Democrat Secretaries of State. It is, however, easier than most think for our career Foreign Service men and

women to adapt themselves to new Republican leadership. Like career soldiers, Foreign Service officers respect and welcome high-level policy direction such as they are getting under President Eisenhower. They are, with rare exceptions, a splendid and patriotic group of men and women, with a fine tradition. They are experts, trained to analyze and interpret foreign conditions and to carry out designated missions, usually of delicacy, sometimes of danger. Just as the Nation depends for defense purposes on the graduates of our Military and Naval academies, so the Nation for foreign services depends on our career diplomats.

Our people here at home, our friends abroad, and our enemies abroad can know that we have not only strong foreign policies but that we are rapidly molding an organization which will be secure and which will be efficient in action.

I might add, as of particular interest to this distinguished group of American editors, that these foreign policies of which I speak are no longer looked upon as state secrets. We are determined that the public shall be as fully informed as possible, and in the clearest and simplest language possible, about what we are doing in the State Department and what our foreign policy is.

I have long felt that, under our form of government, the effectiveness of foreign policy depends in large measure upon public understanding and support of it.

### **The Soviet Peace Defensive**

Our conduct has been calmly strong, never truculent nor blustering. In the face of it Soviet leaders gave evidence that they were changing their policies. They initiated what presents to you and to me one of the most perplexing problems of our time. It is a problem that I think is largely due to a misnomer. The Kremlin launched what is commonly called a "peace offensive." Whatever it is that the Kremlin has launched—and no one can be sure just yet what it is—it is not a peace *offensive*. It is a peace *defensive*.

It is gratifying that Soviet leaders appear now to have shifted from an offensive to a defensive mood. But we cannot yet tell whether this represents a basic change or merely a tactical shift. It is prudent, for the present, to assume that we are witnessing a tactical move of the kind which Soviet communism has often practiced.

Stalin, in his classic treatise on "Strategy and

Tactics," taught that, from time to time, "concessions" may have to be made "in order to buy off a powerful enemy and gain a respite." He went on to explain the necessity of maneuvering with a "view to effecting a proper retreat when the enemy is strong. . . . The object of this strategy is to gain time and to accumulate forces in order later to assume the offensive."

Is the successor—or should I say, are the successors—following this strategy of the dead Stalin?

Whatever the reason and purpose of present Soviet moves, the fact is that the Communist leaders seem now disposed to grant some things which they formerly denied.

Last February 22, in an effort to probe the mood of the enemy in Korea, we quietly proposed an exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war.<sup>5</sup> Such proposals had frequently been made before, without results. This time a result seems to be in the making.

I should perhaps explain, to end some misunderstanding, that while under the agreement made we will return many more sick and wounded prisoners than we will receive, that is because the total number of prisoners which we hold is many times the number held by the Communists. The ratio of returning sick and wounded to the total prisoners of war held is approximately the same for both sides, with a slight advantage in our favor.

It also now appears that the enemy may now want an armistice in Korea, after having evaded it for nearly 2 years.

In other respects and in other quarters Communist leadership is making concessions. These are all still minor but not without significance. They suggested to us that the time had come to launch a true peace offensive. That President Eisenhower has done. Soviet leadership is now confronted by the Eisenhower tests. Will it meet, one by one, the issues with which President Eisenhower has challenged it? If so, will it abolish and abandon, in fact as well as in name, the Cominform through which it endlessly conspires to overthrow, from within, every genuinely free government in the world? We await the deeds which will give answer to these questions. We profoundly hope that these deeds will, in fact, end a black chapter of distrust and open a bright new chapter of peace and good will.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, Apr. 6, 1953, p. 494.

## The New Era

Some weeks ago when I was at the United Nations, I said that the Stalin era had ended and that the Eisenhower era had begun, bringing with it new hope for all mankind.<sup>6</sup> Already that prediction is in process of confirmation. President Eisenhower's address is a fact which will inevitably influence the course of history. Around the world peoples and governments have universally welcomed that address. In all the capitals of the free world, press and radio have demonstrated an unprecedented spontaneous support for the Presi-

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, Mar. 23, 1953, p. 430.

## Full Truce Talks To Reopen at Panmunjom

### LETTER FROM GENERAL HARRISON TO GENERAL NAM II, APRIL 17<sup>1</sup>

*To General Nam II, Senior Delegate, Delegation of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers.*

1. The Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command has authorized me to instruct the United Nations Command Liaison Group to meet with the Liaison Group of your side on April 18 or as soon thereafter as is agreeable to your side, to discuss matters incidental to reopening plenary sessions of the Armistice Delegations as requested by your Liaison Group on 11 April, 1953.

2. The United Nations Command has studied the statement of the official position of your side which you presented,<sup>2</sup> but does not find the amplification of details regarding the statements of Foreign Minister Chou En-lai and Marshall Kim Il Sung, which was requested in General Clark's letter of 5 April, 1953. However, in view of the agreement by your commanders in their letter of 1 April to the proposal advanced in General Clark's letter of 31 March, it is assumed that you are prepared to accept UNC proposals or make a comparable constructive proposal of your own

<sup>1</sup> On Apr. 18 the Communists replied to General Harrison's letter, and liaison officers met on Apr. 19. They agreed to reopen plenary sessions on Apr. 25.

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Apr. 20, 1953, p. 575.

dent's call for a world-wide peace offensive and his challenge to the new Soviet leadership to back up their words with deeds. That response is not merely because of the words the President used but because what he said had its setting in a 90-day framework.

I do not attempt to read the future. That must always remain obscure so long as vast power is possessed by men who accept no guidance from the moral law. But surely our duty is clear. Those who represent a Nation with the tradition and power of the United States must act boldly and strongly for what they believe to be right. The future is for a higher verdict.

which would constitute a valid basis for resumption of the meetings.

3. With reference to the statements of Foreign Minister Chou En-lai and Marshall Kim Il Sung, the UNC would consider that an arrangement such as the following would be reasonable and constructive and could lead to a prompt resolution of the problem of prisoners of war:

(1) That the neutral state be a nation such as Switzerland, traditionally recognized as appropriate in matters of this kind;

(2) That in the interest of practicality, prisoners of war who are not directly repatriated be released to the custody in Korea of the neutral state;

(3) That after allowing a reasonable time such as 60 days during which opportunity has been afforded by the neutral state to the parties concerned to determine the attitudes of individuals in its custody with respect to their status, the neutral state will make arrangements for the peaceable disposition of those remaining in its custody.

4. The United Nations Command is of the opinion that unless the meetings of the full delegations indicate that an acceptable agreement will be reached in a reasonable time, it will be advisable to recess the meetings again.

WILLIAM K. HARRISON, JR., Lt. Gen. USA  
*Senior Delegate, UNC Delegation.*

*Department of State Bulletin*

## SUMMARY OF LIAISON MEETING OF APRIL 11

1. Meeting of Senior Liaison Group convened at 1100 hours this date. Substance of record follows:

2. UNC: "I have a statement to make. Yesterday you said you had around 15 prisoners of war of other nationalities, including those of Turkey, Canada, Greece, the Netherlands, etc. You also said you were checking the figure to determine the breakdown by nationality. Do you have this breakdown today?"

3. *Communists*: "As I pointed out yesterday to your side, I will give you the figures as soon as our checking is finished. I propose that prior to signing the agreement the interpreters of both sides check the drafts we are to sign."

4. UNC: a. "I have been studying the figures you have furnished which indicate the approximate number of sick and injured captured personnel you intend to repatriate. I believe that you will agree that medicine is not an exact science; accordingly, for humanitarian reasons, I again request that you use the broadest interpretation of the degree of sickness in determining the final number of captured personnel who will be repatriated. We will do the same.

b. "We have prepared our copies of the agreement for repatriation of sick and injured captured personnel for signature. If your side has prepared your copies of the agreement, I agree that the interpreters check the various versions and that we recess for this purpose for 10 minutes."

5. *Communists*: a. "As I have pointed out before, the estimated figures of sick and injured prisoners of war furnished by our side are the result of serious checking in accordance with the principle which our side has consistently maintained, that is, the principle of repatriating all sick and injured prisoners of war. Our side considers that there should be no further dispute about this question.

b. "In order to check the versions of the agreement, Captain Munchae Su, NKA, and Tuan Lien Chung, Ccr, will participate in this work."

6. UNC: "I appoint Lt. Underwood, Captain Lum, and Lt. Wu for our side."

7. *Communists*: "I agree to your proposal to recess for 10 minutes."

(Meeting recessed at 1110 hours. Meeting reconvened at 1205 hours.)

8. *Communists*: "Prior to signing of both sides, I want to make a statement as follows:

a. "Both sides have reached agreement on the exchange of sick and injured prisoners of war during the period of hostilities in accordance with the principles of Article 10 of the Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war. Our side has consistently stood for and will immediately carry out the repatriation in toto of sick and injured prisoners of war held in our custody. Your side has stated that you will invoke the provisions of paragraph 3 of Article 109 of the Geneva Convention and repatriate only a part of the sick and injured prisoners of war held in your custody.

b. "In this connection our side has pointed out that the provisions of paragraph 3 of Article 109 of the Geneva Convention can by no means be used as a pretext for employing coercive means to obstruct the repatriation of sick and injured prisoners of war who are willing to return to our side during the period of hostilities.

c. "Now our side must state again that our side reserves the right to request that the sick and injured captured personnel of our side not repatriated this time be handed over to a neutral state so as to secure a just solution to the question of their repatriation after an armistice.

d. "Furthermore, our side proposes that the liaison group meetings shall be continued after the signing. We have other matters to bring up at the meeting.

e. "Then, I propose to begin to sign."

9. UNC: "I agree." (Actual signing begins at 1208 and is completed at 1210 and one half hours.)<sup>3</sup>

10. UNC: "I have a statement to make.

a. "We are ready to start the actual repatriation at Panmunjom of the sick and wounded captured personnel held in our custody on 72 hours notice. Can you tell me when you will be able to start repatriating our captured personnel?"

b. "I agree to the continuation of the liaison group officers' meeting. I recommend that we recess now. I will be ready to meet with you again at any time you desire."

11. *Communists*: a. "As to the question raised by your side, I will answer tomorrow.

b. "Now I would like to raise a question concerning the resumption of the plenary session of the delegations of both sides. In the letter of March 28 addressed to your commander<sup>4</sup> our commanders have already pointed out that the reasonable settlement of the question of exchanging sick and injured prisoners of war of both sides during the period of hostilities should be made to lead to the smooth settlement of the entire question of prisoners of war. Such a view has already been agreed to by your commander. Now, inasmuch as both sides have signed the agreement for the repatriation of sick and injured captured personnel and our side has in addition put forth a new proposal for settling the entire question of repatriation of prisoners of war, and has given a full explanation of this proposal, our side considers that the plenary session of the delegations of both sides should be resumed immediately to discuss and settle the entire question of prisoners of war so as to realize an armistice in Korea. I would like to know the views of your side on the date of resuming the plenary session."

12. UNC: "I have noted your statement and will inform my superiors.

<sup>3</sup> For text of the agreement, see *ibid.*, p. 576.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, Apr. 6, 1953, p. 494.



a. "I propose that we recess now and I will notify you through liaison officers when we are ready to meet again to give you our answer.

b. "I suggest that the staff officers meet at 1345 to continue their work."

13. *Communists:* a. "Our side holds that both sides should immediately discuss and decide on the date for resuming the plenary sessions of the delegations. Since your side has proposed a recess to consider it we would not insist, but our side still hopes that the liaison groups' meeting should be resumed within one (1) or two (2) days to discuss and decide on the date for resuming the plenary sessions.

b. "I agree to your proposal that the staff officers' meeting be resumed."

14. UNC: "We have noted your statement. We agree to recess."

15. Meeting adjourned at 1222 hours.

## Technical Assistance to Iraq For Land Development Program

Press release 187 dated April 10

Under an agreement signed at Baghdad on April 7, the U.S. Technical Cooperation Mission in Iraq will provide technical assistance to the Government of Iraq in carrying out its vast "Miri Sif" land development and resettlement program.

The Miri Sif (state-owned lands) of Iraq involve about 19 million acres, about two-thirds of which are considered to be capable of agricultural use with some degree of development. There are more than 2 million landless farmers in Iraq, tenants and peasants of large landholders, presently averaging \$200 or less per family per year in income.

About 3 years ago, the Government of Iraq enacted legislation providing for the division of state-owned lands into family-size farms, providing for irrigation water and other types of assistance needed to develop the lands for agriculture, and for opening them up for settlement by peasant families.

At present there are three projects in operation, involving some 200,000 acres and 1,600 families. Other projects in various stages of development involve well over a million acres and are planned to accommodate about 10,000 families. The annual income of farmers already settled averages two to three times their former incomes, mainly as a result of being able to retain the proceeds of their labor.

The Miri Sif program holds great significance, as one of the most important and largest-scale efforts by a Near Eastern government to encourage and assist peasants to become owner-operators of family-sized farms. A considerable amount of Iraq's oil revenues are being devoted to the development of the lands, providing community facilities, building roads, giving financial assistance and guidance to the farmers, providing health services, schools, water supplies, and the like. The program is considered by the Govern-

ment of Iraq to be of great significance in its social and economic development and in improving the living conditions of its people.

A major difficulty in carrying out this vast program has been the general scarcity of technicians in Iraq. The project involves enormous problems—lands must be surveyed and classified according to their agricultural capabilities; soil surveys must be made; irrigation works must be planned and constructed; peasant farmers must be given assistance in farm planning and management through the first critical years of independent operation; credit facilities must be offered with some supervision of loans; schools must be set up and provided with teachers; health clinics must be established and manned; guidance must be given in the formation and operation of cooperatives; instruction in improved methods of farming is needed by most of the settlers; malaria control is necessary in many sections; and so on. The small staff of specialists in the Ministry of Agriculture, which administers the program, and the Ministries of Education and Health which are assisting with it, are spread thinly over the huge program, which will reach into almost every part of Iraq.

Under the new agreement, the Technical Cooperation Administration (which administers the technical cooperation program) will assist in planning the program, will help provide technical advice, will help train Iraqi technicians, will assist with some of the research and survey work, and will provide some demonstrational equipment and supplies as needed to teach improved methods.

The agreement does not provide for any additional allocation of funds or additional American personnel, although future project agreements may provide for supplies, equipment, and possibly additional personnel.

The technical cooperation program in Iraq is carried out under a general agreement for technical cooperation between the Government of Iraq and the United States, which was signed on April 10, 1951.<sup>1</sup> Cooperative activities are now under way in the fields of agriculture, water resources, education, industrial development, highway transportation, health and sanitation, and social affairs.

## MSA Grant to Yugoslavia

The Mutual Security Agency (MSA) on April 6 announced a special grant of \$11 million to Yugoslavia for the current fiscal year.

This sum, like a similar grant of \$20 million announced in January,<sup>2</sup> has been made to offset the results of last year's disastrous drought by pro-

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Apr. 23, 1951, p. 653.

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Jan. 26, 1953, p. 135.

viding funds for the purchase of foodstuffs—principally, corn, wheat, lard, and sugar.

The new grant brings to \$109,000,000 the total of U.S. aid in defense-support funds to Yugoslavia during the current fiscal year. In addition to the \$31 million for drought relief, Yugoslavia is receiving \$78 million from MSA as part of a \$99 million tripartite-aid program to which the United Kingdom and France are also contributing. The tripartite program is designed to assist Yugoslavia in maintaining its defense effort.

## Libby Dam and Reservoir

Press release 190 dated April 11

The following letter was sent by Secretary Dulles to the International Joint Commission—United States and Canada, regarding the application by the Government of the United States for the construction and operation of Libby Dam and Reservoir, filed with the Commission on January 12, 1951:

APRIL 8, 1953

*The International Joint Commission,  
Washington, D. C., United States of America; and  
Ottawa, Ontario, Dominion of Canada.*

SIRS:

Reference is made to the Application dated January 12, 1951 filed by the Government of the United States with the International Joint Commission for approval of the construction and operation of a dam and reservoir referred to as "Libby Dam" on the Kootenai River near Libby, Montana.

Consideration has been given by the Chief of Engineers of the Department of the Army to the advisability of the withdrawal of the Application in order that examination might be made with respect to certain domestic questions as selection of the axis for the dam, relocations and related matters that could be dealt with in accordance with regularly established procedures, rather than intermingled with investigation of the international aspects of the case.

In view of these developments you are advised that the Government of the United States, in accordance with a request of the Secretary of the Army, hereby withdraws the Application for the approval of the Libby Dam project effective as of this date.

Very truly yours,

JOHN FOSTER DULLES  
*Secretary of State*

Upon receipt of the letter the Commission has taken action in accordance therewith.

## Specified Exemption Laws for Escapee Program

### EXECUTIVE ORDER<sup>1</sup>

By virtue of the authority vested in me by section 532 of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as added by section 7 (m) of the Mutual Security Act of 1952 (Public Law 400, approved June 20, 1952, 66 Stat. 146), it is hereby determined that the performance of functions with respect to the escapee program, authorized by the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended, and administered by the Department of State, without regard to the three following-designated provisions of law will further the purposes of the said Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended:

1. Section 3648 of the Revised Statutes, as amended, 60 Stat. 809 (31 U. S. C. 529).

2. Section 305 of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, approved June 30, 1949, ch. 288, 63 Stat. 396 (41 U. S. C. 255).

3. Section 3709 of the Revised Statutes, as amended (41 U. S. C. 5).

This order supersedes Executive Order No. 10410 of November 14, 1952,<sup>2</sup> entitled "Specification of Laws from which the Escapee Program Administered by the Department of State Shall be Exempt."

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

THE WHITE HOUSE,  
April 17, 1953.

## U. S. Interest in Stability of Japan's Economy

*The following statement was made on April 15 by Michael J. McDermott, Special Assistant for Press Relations:*

The future stability of the Japanese economy is, of course, of great concern to the United States, which is giving a great deal of thought to this question. In recent years Japan's balance-of-payments position has been largely supported by U.S. expenditures arising from hostilities in Korea, the maintenance of U.S. forces in Japan, and various U.S. mutual-assistance programs for the Far East. The Department believes that total U.S. expenditures in Japan will not be sharply reduced but will remain at a relatively high level for at least the next 2 years. However, if a serious situation were ever to develop in the Japanese economy, the Department is sure that the U.S. officials would want to sit down together with Japanese representatives to consider ways in which this Government could help.

<sup>1</sup> 10446, 18 *Fed. Reg.* 2209.

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Dec. 8, 1952, p. 909.

## The Soviet Germ Warfare Campaign: A Case History

*Statements by Ernest A. Gross*

*U. S. Representative to the General Assembly*<sup>1</sup>

U.S./U.N. press release dated March 27

I should like to explain why the United States requested the General Assembly to consider as part of its agenda the item which has now been reached: "The Question of an Impartial Investigation of the Charge of Use by the United Nations Forces of Bacteriological Warfare." My Government is asking the General Assembly to create and to supervise an impartial investigation of these charges which the Soviet representative in the Security Council has called "a serious international accusation against the United States Government." In fact, the target of these charges is no less a body than the United Nations itself. If this Organization is worthy of our support and of our confidence, then it must see these charges for what they are and see that they are weighed and set at rest. What could be a more fundamental revolt against the purpose of the Charter to develop friendly relations among nations than the repeated charge of germ warfare?

In attacking the United Nations itself, they seek to undermine the collective effort of the U.N. forces in meeting aggression in Korea. We cannot ignore an attack of this nature upon the character of the men who are giving their lives for the free world in this collective effort.

While the Chinese and North Korean people fight and die in their aggressive war in Korea, the Soviet Union furnishes supplies and lies.

This false and malicious campaign, this "serious international accusation," is designed and intended to spread hatred, division, and suspicion in the minds of men. It is designed to increase the tensions in the world. This being the inevitable result of the Soviet campaign of lies and hatred, the question arises whether it is the considered purpose of the Soviet Government thus to under-

mine and destroy the very foundation of international good will and cooperation. If this indeed is the considered purpose of the new Soviet leadership, how are we to appraise their professions of peace? How can we achieve a peaceful settlement of outstanding issues when one side continues to spread charges that are false, known to be false, and which it has never been willing to put to the proof?

This campaign of international communism must not be ignored. Its venom is intended to make each man fear his neighbor just as international communism would have each nation of the free world suspect its neighbor and so foster the tension upon which Soviet imperialism thrives.

Quite clearly, one specific objective is to isolate the free world from the United States by attempting to single out my Government for special condemnation. That is why the people of the free world should for the sake of their own security look long and hard at the facts.

### How the Charges Have Survived

But how, one may ask, can these vicious charges live—how can they be repeated when in the United Nations, and in the free world at least, the truth is there for any man to see and to hear if he will seek it out? We must first of all look at just how these charges have been able to survive.

Since March of 1952 until today, an impartial investigation of the charge of bacteriological warfare has been offered over and over again by the United Nations, by the World Health Organization, and by the International Committee of Red Cross Societies. It has been offered also by my own Government within and without the United Nations just as it is put forward by my own Government here today.

There has been no response from the Soviet Union, the Chinese Communist regime, and the North Korean authorities except on one occasion.

<sup>1</sup> Made on Mar. 27 and Apr. 8 in Committee I (Political and Security).



It is not part of their plan to respond. It is their plan to lie and then hide from an impartial investigation. Their tactic of "lie and hide" is cowardly—but it is a calculated cowardice.

The one response from the Soviet Union to the decision of the Security Council to investigate what the Soviet representative himself called "a serious international accusation" was a Soviet veto. That is not a response which is open to the Soviet representative in this forum.

We must see this campaign for what it is. It is the technique of the big lie. Let me briefly trace its history. No one describes it better than Hitler when, writing in *Mein Kampf*, he said:

In the size of the lie, there is always contained a certain factor of credibility . . . [The masses] will more easily fall victims to a great lie than to a small one, since they themselves perhaps also lie sometimes in little things but would be too much ashamed of too great lies. Thus, such an untruth will not enter their heads and therefore they will be unable to believe in the possibility of the enormous impudence, of the most infamous distortions, in others.

But it was Stalin himself who invented the bacteriological warfare lie. Back on January 7, 1933, in a statement to the Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, he attacked certain resistance elements of the Soviet population which, he said:

Organize wrecking activities in the collective and state farms, and some of them, including certain professors, go to such lengths in their zeal for wrecking as to inject the germs of plague and anthrax into cattle on the collective farms, help spread meningitis among horses, etc.

In the Purge Trials of 1937 and 1938, with which Mr. Vyshinsky is not unfamiliar, again we find the bacteriological warfare lie. One defendant "confessed" to manufacturing virulent bacteria in three separate factories in order to destroy herds of Soviet swine. Another defendant "confessed" that he had connived with Japanese intelligence to infect the Red army with "highly virulent bacilli" in the event of war.

### Global Organization of the Campaign

I come now to the second stage of the case history of the lie. The campaign charging germ warfare in Korea was launched on February 21, 1952. It has been with us ever since. It is a long-term affair and fully organized on a global basis. From Moscow the campaign is directed. From Peiping and other Communist capitals it is coordinated. By all the Communist and fellow-traveler communication media and apparatus it is disseminated. The division of labor is clear-cut. Raw material flows from Moscow and Peiping. By that, I mean the so-called documentation, announcements of raids, protests, etc. The "eyewitness evidence" is provided by the Chinese Communists and the North Koreans. It is they who

issue the initial protests. The Soviet Government, in addition to exercising primary responsibility for coordination of the worldwide big lie efforts, bolsters the so-called "evidence" with its own peculiar interpretations of evidence and statements, arranges for satellite and international front organization protests, and conducts the big lie campaign in the United Nations.

The Communist-front World Peace Council leads most of the protest movements and is the focal point for various groups who call themselves investigatory commissions and make reports on the charges.

You will undoubtedly soon hear from the lips of the Soviet representative the latest product of this campaign. It has been continued regularly in the columns of the Soviet Government press. For example, as recently as March 16 a headline appeared in *Pravda*: "American Aggressors Continue Bacteriological Warfare in Korea." The story goes on to charge that American planes have recently dropped 16 types of insects in various villages in Korea.

Let me now turn to certain devices used by the Communists in building up and spreading the lie. The Communists have repeatedly employed Communist-controlled "investigations," and they have resorted to extorted confessions. They have done this in an attempt to provide an ostensibly scientific and legal basis for their false charges.

The Communists have staged three so-called investigations:

1. On March 13, 1952, Peiping announced the formation of a so-called "Investigation Commission." This was carefully selected from among Chinese Communists to insure its partiality. Before it began its work, its chairman announced that its purpose was "to gather the various criminal facts on bacteriological warfare waged by the American imperialists."

2. Another so-called investigation was staged by a committee of the Communist front—International Association of Democratic Lawyers. According to *Pravda*, on March 4, 1952, this group was sent out "in order to investigate and establish the crimes committed by the interventionists in Korea, in violation of all international agreements." The Commission was made up of currently faithful followers of the party line. Its chairman, Brandweiner, was also a former Nazi.

3. Last September, the Chinese Communists published a lengthy report of the Communist-sponsored "International Scientific Commission for the Investigation of Facts Concerning Bacteriological Warfare in Korea and China." This group of so-called investigators was organized by a member of the Chinese Communists' Peace Committee. It was composed of Communists or Communist sympathizers. The only member professionally qualified as a scientist for the subject supposedly under investigation was a Soviet epidemiologist, Dr. M. M. Zhukov-Verezhnikov

(U.S.S.R.), Vice-President of the Soviet Academy of Medicine. In a speech carried by Soviet newspapers on March 14, 1952 (months before the investigation), he had already announced his judgment:

The American imperialists have perpetrated a new crime. They have carried out a bacteriological attack on the Korean Peoples Democratic Republic and on the Chinese Peoples Republic.

This supposedly scientific body was not only composed of members who had formed their judgments before going to China, but the Commission itself did not even bother to examine the so-called evidence of bacteriological warfare on the spot. For example, Dr. Andrea Andreen stated upon her return to Sweden in September 1952:

We felt so sure of the integrity of our Chinese hosts that we entirely trusted statements which they made regarding American use of germ warfare. The scientific foundation of the Commission's work consisted of the fact that the delegates implicitly believed the Chinese and North Korean accusations and evidence.

### "Confessions" in Communist Statecraft

We all know that confessions play an important part in the statecraft of Communist countries. From the earliest purge trials to the present day, the Communists have developed methods for breaking the strongest human spirit and compelling innocent people to confess to any tale which the state authorities may require.

The techniques consist primarily of prolonged deprivation of sleep which in time exerts a toxic effect similar to drugs, spinal injection of truth serum, and enforced maintenance of rigid postures for long periods. Psychological methods are also used: subjecting the prisoner to terrifying mass denunciations; the creation of a sense of isolation and the futility of resistance in the mind of the prisoner; use of fellow prisoners as stool pigeons; alternation of severe and lenient treatment; compelling the prisoner to write hundreds of pages of self-disclosure; and, finally, deceit and trickery. The more orthodox method of beating is also frequently used.

I have looked at the facts of the specific cases which are here generalized, and I admit that these facts shocked me so that I have not felt free to put them before this Committee in detail. I will cite, however, one of the least shocking examples: A Belgian priest, Father Schijns, who was kept in solitary confinement for 6 months by the Chinese Communists in 1951, says:

The sleeplessness, the pain, the total abandonment and isolation, and the headaches brought me gradually to a state of complete hallucination. I began, entirely awake and not dreaming, to see spots and shadows on the walls of my room transformed into wild beasts and war scenes. At times, I found myself weeping aimlessly and senselessly. The psychological effect of such a rigid isolation was that I, just as all the others in our house, finally sat down in front of a typewriter and began to write down confessions hundreds of pages in length. I took the hint to recite the facts about everything that I knew and did,

our work, our cares, our activity. Anyone might read it. It was all patent and well-known. I had only to leave it to my Communist masters to construe misdeeds from these facts.

I turn now to a consideration of the so-called confessions extorted by their Communist captors of American prisoners of war in their hands. It is difficult to approach this question without a feeling of strong emotion and resentment. There of course can be no doubt that a captor, hardened to use of methods such as I have described, would not hesitate to turn these helpless men into tools for their propaganda machine.

Mr. Vyshinsky has recently circulated to the members of this Committee two recent alleged confessions of American military personnel. He is the same Mr. Vyshinsky who stated on November 10, 1952, in this same Committee:

Under conditions of war imprisonment, there is not and cannot be the most minimum conditions for the free expression of the will of any war prisoner.

These so-called confessions are false in their general assertions and in their specific allegations. They are of course in no event entitled to credence. They should be presumed to be false against the background of the circumstances in which they are extorted. However, we need not rely upon a mere presumption of their falsity. We have specific refutation.

These military officers have allegedly identified a certain directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States which is supposed to have instituted a plan for bacteriological warfare in Korea. They have allegedly identified certain military personnel who are said to have participated in meetings for carrying this plan into operation.

There was no such directive, and there were no such meetings.

### Statements by American Military Officers

Mr. Chairman, I read to this Committee a statement by Gen. Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States. The statement was written on March 25. I quote:

(1) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have never made a plan for bacteriological warfare in Korea.

(2) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have never sent a directive to the Commanding General, Far East Command, or any other individual in the Far East, by any means directing the initiation of bacteriological warfare in Korea.

(3) The Joint Chiefs of Staff categorically deny that any military forces of the United States have engaged in bacteriological warfare in that area including contiguous Chinese territory.

Next, Mr. Chairman, I read this Committee a statement by Maj. Gen. C. F. Schilt, who was Commanding General of the First Marine Aircraft Wing in Korea from July 1951 to April 1952. This is the responsible officer who commanded the organization which has been alleged, by these latest confessions, to have dropped germ bombs in Korea:

I categorically affirm that the account of bacteriological warfare activity on the part of United Nations and/or United States forces contained therein are complete fabrications. In particular the activities of the First Marine Aircraft Wing which were a matter of intimate knowledge to me in my official capacity at no time participated in bacteriological warfare. None of the statements on the subject attributed to me are true. At no time did I receive or issue any instruction concerning bacteriological warfare nor did I ever attend any conferences or engage in any other planning activities connected with this subject. No special security measures were ever imposed upon the wing or any of its units and during all my service in Korea I never heard of the alleged code word super propaganda (SUPROP).

Next, Mr. Chairman, I read this Committee a statement by Maj. Gen. Clayton C. Jerome who replaced Major General Schilt as Commanding General of the First Marine Aircraft Wing and served in that capacity to January 8, 1953:

It's all a damn lie, and I would like to go up to the U.N. and tell them so under oath.

I categorically deny the truthfulness of the accusations contained in the alleged confessions of Col. Schwable and Major Bley that United Nations and/or U. S. Forces planned or participated in bacteriological warfare. As Commanding General of the First Marine Aircraft Wing during the period 11 April 1952 to 8 January 1953, I positively state that no orders were received by the First Marine Aircraft Wing or issued to subordinate units of the Wing which related to bacteriological warfare. There were no plans for bacteriological warfare prepared by the First Marine Aircraft Wing. The allegations that I discussed such matters with the 5th Air Force and conducted conferences within the First Marine Aircraft Wing relating to bacteriological warfare are completely false.

Other statements in the two alleged confessions are equally false. I will not burden the Committee by reading the sworn statements of the persons mentioned in these two alleged confessions. I have these statements here, and I now request the Secretary-General to circulate them to the members of the United Nations for their inspection.<sup>2</sup> In the greatest detail, persons, places, meetings, and activities referred to in the so-called confessions are denied and refuted. The "confessions" emerge as cleverly forged and contrived documents with no substance whatever.

I have described the nature and origins of this Soviet plot. The whole apparatus of a police-state system, centering in the Kremlin, is being used to manufacture and distribute a total lie—false in all its parts, both general and particular.

How should the General Assembly meet this assault upon the United Nations and upon the effort of the United Nations to resist aggression in Korea?

Repeated offers of an impartial investigation of the charges have been made by the United States, by the International Committee of the Red Cross, and by the U.N. Security Council itself. These offers have been ignored, rejected, or vetoed.

Despite this fact—or indeed, *because* of it—it seemed to us fitting to submit this question to the General Assembly. It is the U.N. Charter itself which is being subverted by Soviet actions, and we are assembled here as custodians and trustees of the Charter.

I have introduced a resolution on this matter, so that the moral weight and dignity of the General Assembly may be brought to bear. This does, after all, embody the collective judgment of the world community.

We propose, along with all the other nations whose forces are engaged in repelling aggression in Korea, that the General Assembly do now formally take note of the accusations which have been made and repeatedly denied by the Unified Command. We think the Assembly should record the fact that offers of impartial investigation have been rejected by the very persons who originate and disseminate the false charges.

We propose that the General Assembly should now call upon the Governments and authorities concerned to cooperate with a Commission established by the Assembly itself to conduct an impartial investigation of the charges that have been made. The Commission should be allowed to travel freely throughout such areas of North and South Korea, the Chinese mainland, and Japan, as the Commission may think necessary in the performance of its task. It should have freedom of access to such persons, places, and documents as it considers necessary. And it should be free to examine any witness, including prisoners of war.

A special problem is presented by reason of the base Communist practice, which I have described, of using the device of extorted confessions. We feel there is a right way to deal with this matter.

The General Assembly should ask the Communists whether they will submit the so-called confessions to impartial investigations.

We challenge the Communist authorities concerned to permit all United States military personnel, whose so-called confessions have been published, to be brought to a neutral area. There they should be given a fair chance to tell the truth to an impartial U.N. Commission. I ask that they be brought to an area in some country which is neither a participant in the U.N. Command in Korea nor whose Government has supported or approved the action of the aggressors in Korea. There they would remain under the responsibility and custody of the Commission and would be interned until the conclusion of hostilities in order to preclude fear of later reprisals by their Communist captors. After an adequate period of rest and recuperation, they would be informed of the propaganda use which has been made of their alleged "confessions" and asked by the Commission to verify or deny the facts contained therein.

<sup>2</sup> U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.37, dated Mar. 27.

It is for the Soviet delegate to accept this offer, in the name of truth.

We await his reply.

## CHARGES BY THE PEIPING RADIO

U.S./U.N. press release dated April 8

Several days ago, in introducing the subject of this debate, the U.S. delegation made clear what our objective was and what it has been from the moment when these false charges became a part of the established Communist propaganda policy. We have since then heard statements by the Soviet representative and by several of the members of the Soviet bloc.

One of the points which has been stressed in all the statements made by the Soviet group, although with varying degrees of emphasis, has been the alleged fault of this Committee in failing to invite the Chinese Communist regime and the North Korean authorities to attend our meetings for the purpose, as it has been put again this afternoon by the Polish representative, of participating in our discussions.

Mr. Chairman, the question has been asked by other speakers before me and I think it only appropriate to ask again what purpose would be served by inviting the Chinese and the North Korean authorities to come here to propagate a lie? There are not two sides to a lie. A lie is an empty thing. It has only one side, an outside. This lie, as we have demonstrated by our highest authorities, by the most responsible officials of the U.S. Government speaking for themselves within their responsibility as representatives of the U.N. Command in Korea, is false in all its generalities and in every particular.

The Chinese Communists and the North Korean authorities have never at any time requested or suggested that an impartial investigation be conducted into the grave charges which they have persisted in leveling against the United States and the United Nations. I do not think it is necessary to speculate concerning the nature of the propaganda and lying testimony which these authorities would engage in if invited to attend our discussions.

On March 30, and I must note as a matter of tragic irony and coincidence, on the same day when Chou En-lai issued a statement regarding the prisoners of war in Korea, on that same day when the hopes of the world were raised, the Peiping Radio commented upon the proposal which I laid before this Committee on behalf of the 16 cosponsors. I should like to explain to the Committee in the words of the Peiping broadcast the attitude which the Chinese Communist authorities take in what I think may fairly be characterized as a desperate attempt to evade an impartial investigation.

Speaking before the Political Committee had before it the proposed composition of the committee of investigation, before any names had been suggested for inclusion in the draft resolution, Peiping Radio characterized the proposal that the General Assembly set up a commission to conduct what it called a so-called impartial investigation and a commission which would have free access to areas necessary to its investigation, and said such a so-called commission—and I point out that the membership of the Commission had not then yet been suggested—that such a so-called commission could more suitably be termed a special detachment of the United States intelligence to collect information about germ warfare waged by the American Forces. And the Peiping Radio went on to say that it is quite obvious that the U.S. Government, which is still continuing bacteriological warfare, is in urgent need of first-hand information concerning the results of this warfare.

This is the manner in which the Peiping Radio characterized a solemn and dignified proposal for the creation of an impartial commission and attacked and undermined a commission whose composition had not even at that point been suggested.

With regard to our proposal, which is contained in this draft resolution, to turn over to the commission the prisoners of war who are alleged to have made confessions, the Peiping Radio on that same day characterized this proposal as a desperate attempt—to use their language—to get these prisoners of war handed over to a commission which is in the exclusive service of the U.S. Government. Again I remind the Committee the members of the commission had not even then been named or proposed.

The Peiping Radio went on to say that the “United States Gestapo”—to use their language—could then employ threat and persuasion for the so-called repudiation of these prisoners of war. In other words, it is a move directed toward coercing them to repudiate their own depositions. By this attempt to use such a shameful dodge, Peiping Radio said, to get a repudiation of the confessions made by the captured U.S. Air Force officers the U.S. Government fools nobody. On the contrary, it only proves that the U.S. Government is at its wits end and can find no way of evading the grave responsibility for using bacterial weapons.

This is the language of the Chinese Communist authorities on March 30. Do we need to speculate further concerning the nature of the statements which would be made if their representatives were invited to participate in our deliberations?

Mr. Chairman, what the U.S. Government has proposed from the beginning and what we now urgently continue to maintain is not a discussion, not a debate, but an investigation. Impartial experts who would be selected by the commission proposed in this resolution would work with mi-

croscopes, not with microphones. This is not a propaganda maneuver. This is an honest and practical device to expose charges which I think all the world knows to be false.

Reference has been made to what I think has been called the moderate tone of the Soviet representative in dealing with this subject yesterday. Mr. Chairman, it is somewhat startling that when the Soviet representative whispers, to hear the echoes shout back. The tone which we have heard from other spokesmen has not been as moderate and restrained as the whispers of the Soviet representative. However, we feel that a lie is just as false whether it is whispered or shouted.

In an attempt to evade the investigation—and this repeats a performance with which we have become familiar and which we saw last summer in the Security Council—the Soviet representative and his louder echoes have referred to the Geneva Protocol and to the desirability of ratifying the Geneva Protocol.

Mr. Chairman, whose good faith is on trial here? We are urging an impartial investigation and an honest method which we know—and say with a sense of responsibility—will expose a lie. Now, why does the Soviet representative intro-

duce the subject of the Geneva Protocol? It has nothing to do with the truth or the falsity of the charges of germ warfare. It is, therefore, an evasion of the point at issue here, a pretext for evading our suggestion for an investigation. The question of the ratification of the Geneva Protocol relates to a quite different, although a very important matter; that is, what is the most practical, effective, and honest method of eliminating bacteriological weapons and other weapons of mass destruction from national arsenals.

The Geneva Protocol does not meet the need of the present difficult world for security against the use of bacteriological weapons. The protocol merely collects promises not to use poison gas and bacteriological weapons *first*. If every member of the United Nations were to sign the Geneva Protocol and ratify it today, the Soviet Government having already hurled the lie about the United Nations use of germ warfare in Korea would be free under its own reservations to the Geneva Protocol to use germ warfare against any U.N. member. There is no security in such an arrangement.

The Geneva Protocol permits the continued manufacture and stockpiling of bacteriological

#### **Draft Resolution on Impartial Investigation of Germ Warfare Charges\***

U.N. doc. A/C. 1/L. 36/Rev. 2  
Adopted April 8, 1953

##### *The General Assembly,*

*Noting* that accusations have been made by certain governments and authorities charging the use of bacteriological warfare by United Nations forces, and that the Unified Command for Korea has repeatedly denied such charges,

*Recalling* that when the charges were first made the Unified Command for Korea requested that an impartial investigation be made of them.

*Noting* that the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and the North Korean authorities have so far refused to accept an offer by the International Committee of the Red Cross to carry out an investigation,

*Noting* that the draft resolution submitted in the Security Council by the Government of the United States proposing an investigation of these charges by the International Committee of the Red Cross failed to carry because of the negative vote of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

*Desiring* to serve the interests of truth,

1. *Resolves* that, after the President of the General Assembly has received an indication from all the governments and authorities concerned of their acceptance of the investigation proposed in this resolution, a Commission composed of Brazil, Egypt, Pakistan, Sweden, and Uruguay shall be set up and shall carry out immediately an investigation of the charges that have been made;

2. *Calls upon* the governments and authorities concerned to enable the Commission to travel freely throughout such areas of North and South Korea, the Chinese mainland, and Japan as the Commission may deem necessary in the performance of its task

and to allow the Commission freedom of access to such persons, places and relevant documents as it considers necessary for the fulfillment of its task and to allow it to examine any witness including prisoners of war under such safeguards and conditions as the Commission shall determine; all prisoners of war who are alleged to have made confessions regarding the use of bacteriological warfare shall, prior to examination by the Commission, be taken to a neutral area and remain under the responsibility and custody of the Commission until the end of the Korean hostilities;

3. *Requests* the President of the General Assembly to transmit this resolution immediately to the governments and authorities concerned requesting them to indicate their acceptance of the investigation proposed in this resolution;

4. *Requests* the President of the General Assembly to report to the General Assembly at the earliest practicable date on the results of his efforts;

5. *Directs* the Commission, when set up, to enlist the aid of such scientists of international reputation, especially epidemiologists, and such other experts as it may select;

6. *Directs* the Commission, after acceptance of the investigation proposed in this resolution by all the governments and authorities concerned, to report to the Members of the General Assembly through the Secretary-General as soon as possible and no later than 1 September 1953;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to furnish the Commission with the necessary staff and facilities.

*\*Sponsored by Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom, and the United States; adopted by Committee I on April 8 by a vote of 52-5-3.*

weapons. It does not provide for international control to prevent facilities for waging mass germ warfare from becoming a part of the armaments of nations.

### U.S. Proposal on Disarmament

We think, and we have advised the Disarmament Commission of our view in this regard and this view has been supported, that the Disarmament Commission should continue its work for the development by the United Nations of comprehensive and coordinated plans providing for the elimination and prohibition of all major weapons, including bacteriological, adaptable to mass destruction.<sup>3</sup> That is what the General Assembly resolution provides, which we voted on this very morning.<sup>4</sup> Within the Disarmament Commission we have repeatedly stated our desire to provide for effective, honest international control of bacteriological weapons. We have pointed out that safeguards must be devised to insure the elimination of bacteriological weapons, their facilities and appliances for their production and their use. We regard it essential that there be an effective and continuous system of disclosure and verification of all armed forces and armaments, including the weapons of mass destruction.

This is our program laid before the Disarmament Commission, a program to which my Government is pledged and dedicated to further and to develop, we hope, to a successful conclusion.

It, therefore, seems clear to my Government as we come close to a vote on the draft resolution before us that the procedure we suggest is honest, that the commission we propose is fair, and that there is no logical or sensible reason to be found in evasions.

I challenge the Soviet representative, reminding him that these charges have been made in Moscow, have been disseminated by Moscow, to state whether his Government is prepared to support an impartial investigation of the charges which the Moscow Radio and the Communist newspapers of the Soviet Union have propagated and disseminated. And I ask him whether the countries proposed for the commission to conduct this impartial investigation—Brazil, Egypt, Pakistan, Sweden, and Uruguay—can be stigmatized and slandered?

I believe, Mr. Chairman, that we should proceed with the resolution. I am confident that the overwhelming majority of the members of this Committee will support a procedure which we know will result in an exposure of an infamous lie.

## Trygve Lie's Work Praised; Welcome Extended to his Successor

*Statements by Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.  
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly*

### Tribute to Trygve Lie

U.S./U.N. press release dated April 7

On behalf of the Government of the United States, I wish to express appreciation for the work of the retiring Secretary-General, Trygve Lie.<sup>1</sup> During his more than 7 years of service to the United Nations he has given of himself unreservedly to promote the ideals of the Charter. His difficult task he has carried out with courage, with energy, and with devotion.

Mr. Lie has generally been regarded as a symbol of the United Nations. The Preparatory Commission in London in 1945 prophesied that the United Nations could not prosper nor its aims be realized without the active and steadfast support of the peoples of the world, and that the Secretary-General more than anyone else would stand for the United Nations as a whole in the eyes of the world. Mr. Lie has recognized the responsibility that this concept placed upon his shoulders and he said, himself, some years later: "The office I happen to hold—the office of Secretary-General—stands for the hopes for peace and civilization that are bound up in the United Nations."

It was Mr. Lie's task to set up the organization at the very start and to make it a going concern. His was the task of establishing the precedents which might guide his successors. He has done this in a manner which has enhanced the dignity of his office. He has not failed to look beyond the immediate problem to the future and he has taken the initiative in presenting his views on long-range planning for the United Nations.

The great test of the United Nations itself came when the organization was faced with the attack in Korea. The issue was whether the organization itself should survive or should perish. Within 15 hours after the Secretary-General was informed that a conflict appeared to have broken out in Korea, he courageously stated his views to the Security Council. Having asked for a report from the U.N. Commission in Korea, he told the Security Council on June 25, 1950, that the situation was in his view a serious one and a threat to international peace, and he said: "The Security Council is, in my opinion, competent to deal with it. I consider it is the clear duty of the Security Council to take steps necessary to re-establish peace in that area."

The 7 years of Mr. Lie's Secretary-Generalship have presented him with the problems of moving

<sup>3</sup> For a résumé of U.S. proposals on disarmament, see *ibid.*, Mar. 30, 1953, p. 477.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, Apr. 20, 1953, p. 584.

<sup>1</sup> Dag Hammarskjöld of Sweden was elected by the General Assembly on Apr. 7 to succeed Mr. Lie as Secretary-General.

the headquarters of the organization from one temporary location to another—from the Henry Hudson Hotel to Hunter College, then to Lake Success, and finally to the new Headquarters building in which we sit. It was a long way from Church House in London, where the Preparatory Commission met, to this Headquarters building. It could be said that in a way this headquarters is a monument to Mr. Lie, because under his guidance it came into being.

However, I suggest that a monument to his work lies not in stone and glass and mortar. The United Nations is neither one building nor another. It is the peoples of the world here meeting through their representatives on the basis of Charter principles. From his first report to the General Assembly to his last, Mr. Lie has seen what the United Nations really is. He said in June of 1946<sup>2</sup> that it is a machinery through which nations can cooperate; that it can be used and developed in the light of its activities and experience to the untold benefit of humanity or it can be discarded and broken. And in his last report to us in September of 1952 he stated that so long as the United Nations exists and functions we can keep alive the hope and continue the effort for peaceful adjustments, for workable bases of coexistence, and even ultimately for the reconciliation of what today may seem unreconcilable.

I suggest that the true monument to Mr. Lie is his stated conviction and belief in the principles of the U.N. Charter.

It could not be an easy task for a man of principle and integrity to attempt to administer an organization composed as it is today of 60 members. Differences of opinion are bound to arise and are to be expected. Mr. Lie's position reminds me of the two lines in John Gilpin's ride:

And those behind cried "Forward,"  
And those in front cried "Back."

As he takes leave of us, Mr. Lie should have the satisfaction of knowing that his is a job well-done. He has not only the grateful thanks of the U.S. Government—the best wishes of the American people go with him also.

### **Welcome to Dag Hammarskjöld**

U.S./U.N. press release dated April 10

It is a pleasure to welcome on behalf of the United States, Dag Hammarskjöld as Secretary-General. He is, of course, no stranger to the United Nations, having represented his Government here at this very session.

As Secretary-General he will hold a key position in an organization to which my Government attaches the greatest importance. The Secretary-General, together with his staff, comprises what the charter calls a principal organ of the United Nations.

<sup>2</sup> U.N. doc. A/2141.

Sweden has a great tradition of service by her citizens in international affairs. Mr. Hammarskjöld's father, in addition to serving his country as its Prime Minister and as a judge, has worked, written, and taught in the field of international law and international organization. His father is also the President of the Nobel Foundation, that body which carries on the aspirations of another great Swede, Alfred Nobel. We all cherish the memory of Count Folke Bernadotte who, as a U.N. Mediator, laid down his life in the service of the United Nations.

In keeping with this tradition, it is most appropriate that Mr. Hammarskjöld, himself a most distinguished citizen of Sweden, should be Secretary-General of the United Nations.

The role of the United Nations and therefore the role of the Secretary-General is as broad as the entire field of human endeavor. We are fortunate that Mr. Hammarskjöld brings to it not only his skill as a diplomat and as a minister, but also his broad experience in economic and financial matters. All these talents directly relate to important fields of U.N. work.

As Mr. Hammarskjöld takes up his duties he becomes part of a living organization which has gone further toward organizing peace and organizing security than any other body in modern history, and this result has occurred at a time of great threats to the peace and the security of the international community.

Today no state can be an island. A web of interrelations must exist between it and other states.

Today an international organization must represent different cultures and different races, although a little over 100 years ago the Council of Europe was conceived as a group of sovereigns, products of the same civilization and background, maintaining the stability of Europe.

Today, as then, we must expect conflict among people and among states. But that does not mean that this conflict need be physical. Shifting tides of power among men and among nations can be tested by quick access to world public opinion. That is what the United Nations provides.

From his post the Secretary-General will be able to see whether the technical advances of pure science can be balanced through corresponding advances in the means by which men and nations can live in peace with their neighbors. To this quest he can contribute.

No one would tell Mr. Hammarskjöld that his work will be easy. His problems will be even more numerous than the 60 members of the United Nations, and as one problem is resolved, others will appear to take its place. . . .

Mr. Secretary-General . . . my Government is happy to have cast its vote in favor of placing this organization—this instrumentality for peace and security—in your custody.

## Maintaining Charter Standards for International Civil Servants

*Statement by Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.*

*U.S. Representative to the General Assembly*<sup>1</sup>

U.S./U.N. press release dated March 28

Let us begin by paying tribute to Secretary-General Lie and to the important and efficient work done by the staff members of the Secretariat in this, as well as in past, Assemblies. In 1950, and again in this General Assembly, I have observed the fine efforts of the men and women who selflessly and anonymously serve us in our search for peace.

It is sometimes forgotten that the task undertaken by Mr. Lie in the organizational period of the United Nations was nothing short of monumental. That he brought together a staff which met the needs of governments, which were holding hundreds of meetings, stands to his everlasting credit. I have every confidence that the U.N. Secretariat will continue to provide for the needs of this international organization with increasing efficiency.

Mr. Lie, in his statement before this Assembly,<sup>2</sup> gave a full report on the problems he has had to face in a period of world trouble. He dealt in some detail with his relationships with some of the member governments. My own remarks will deal less with the past than with the present and future.

The position of the U.S. Government on this question is determined by the importance of the United Nations in American foreign policy. President Eisenhower in his inaugural speech described the United Nations as "the living sign of all peoples' hopes for peace . . . . We shall strive to make it not merely an eloquent symbol but an effective force." This is the basic instruction of the U.S. delegation.

If the United Nations is to be an effective force, it must have the full support of world public

opinion. Public opinion and moral force are the strength of the Organization. We have seen, in the past, the weight of public opinion in bringing questions to issue and settlement in the United Nations.

World public opinion is, in large part, the combined public opinion in the several member states. Public opinion in the United States is concerned that the effectiveness of the United Nations may be impaired because of the existence of a serious personnel problem. Senator Wiley, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, summed up the general view in the United States when he said, "There is absolutely no place in the international secretariat for a single American Communist or any American of doubtful loyalty." And later on, "the United Nations should not become a haven for disloyal Americans or for espionage."

As I said upon presenting my credentials to the Secretary-General, this essentially administrative problem has been one of the principal obstacles in the United States to increased confidence in the United Nations.

The Secretary-General has demonstrated that he, also, is fully cognizant of the fact that the United Nations effectiveness is profoundly influenced by the extent of public faith and confidence in the Secretariat.

It is because of the fundamental importance of this problem that the following steps have been taken:

*First:* The Secretary-General has dismissed the individuals whose actions he regarded as a failure to meet the fundamental obligations of international civil servants.

*Second:* He asked the U.S. Government to furnish him with full information concerning both present and prospective U.S. members of his staff so that he can insure that the Charter standards are met.

<sup>1</sup> Made on Mar. 28 in plenary session on the Report of the Secretary-General on Personnel Policy.

<sup>2</sup> For a summary of Trygve Lie's statement of Mar. 10, see BULLETIN of Mar. 23, 1953, p. 452.



*Third:* The U.S. Government has agreed to undertake investigations necessary to supply the needed information.

*Fourth:* These investigations are now in process.

You have before you in the Report of the Secretary-General<sup>3</sup> the procedures which are being followed by the U.S. Government in conducting these investigations. Although some modification may be necessary from time to time to assure that U.S. employees or applicants for the United Nations are accorded the same protection as employees of or applicants for the U.S. federal service, the primary concern here is that the advice provided to the Secretary-General by the U.S. Government will be based on a thorough inquiry into the facts and that the U.S. Government regards the information provided *only* as advice. While we hope that the information so provided will prove adequate to permit the Secretary-General responsibly to reach conclusions similar to those reached by the U.S. Government, we recognize that the responsibility for final judgment in the matter rests solely with the Secretary-General.

The investigations are proceeding rapidly. Nearly 1,800 investigation forms have been filed, and investigators are currently working on most of these cases. I am confident that most of these investigations will have been completed in the next few months and that the Secretary-General will have been furnished the information he has asked of the U.S. Government by the next regular session of the General Assembly.

The U.S. Government considers that the issues raised in the last few months can be satisfactorily met within the spirit of the Charter by the procedures which the Secretary-General indicates in his report he will follow in reviewing the information to be supplied and by the action he proposes to take on cases where the information discloses the individual is engaging in or is likely to engage in subversive activities.

### **Protecting Individual Employees**

These procedures do not lose sight of the necessity of protecting the individual employee from unjust accusation and arbitrary action. We fully share the concern that many of you have expressed both privately and publicly that the independence of the Secretariat must be maintained. We recognize that, in order to do so, employees cannot be penalized simply because they do not personally agree with the policies of the particular regime in power in their country of citizenship. We have no interest in knowing whether any American in the Secretariat is Republican or Democrat or Independent, so long as he meets the Charter standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity. However, we do have an interest in knowing

<sup>3</sup> U.N. doc. A/2364 dated Jan. 30.

whether he is a member of a conspiracy dedicated to the forcible overthrow of our democratic form of government—and undoubtedly most of you have a similar interest.

Since the power of selection resides solely in the Secretary-General and since it seems clear to us from the Secretary-General's Report that the standards he proposes to apply will protect staff members against inadequately supported or unreliable representations from member governments, there should be no doubt as to the continued independence of the Secretariat or the safeguarding of individual rights.

Consequently, the U.S. delegation believes the Secretary-General should continue to apply the policies outlined in his report.

Of course, it is probable that all delegations find certain points of emphasis or detail in the Report of the Secretary-General with which they may disagree. There are a number of aspects which the United States believes could be improved by amendments. But we consider the Report as a whole to be acceptable.

Further, some delegations have expressed the view that there should be a full discussion of the possibility of a fundamental revision of the Charter provisions relating to the Secretariat. We certainly are not opposed to such a discussion. But such a discussion has no direct bearing on the practical situation we face, which is that the Secretary-General is meeting the problem before him in an effective and forthright manner and should not be prevented from working out a full solution.

The U.S. delegation believes this Assembly should take no action which will hinder the Secretary-General in taking whatever action may be necessary to deal with the existing situation. But, of course, the United States has no objection—in fact we welcome it—a further discussion of this question at the Eighth Session of the General Assembly, such discussion to take fully into account the developments during the intervening period.

In order to accomplish these two purposes, the U.S. delegation has joined with other delegations in sponsoring a draft resolution which is before you for consideration.<sup>4</sup> The U.S. delegation for the same reasons will vote against the resolution proposed by several other delegations, which proposes to suspend any further action on personnel questions while a detailed study is made by a committee of 15 members. We consider that such action by the General Assembly would make it impossible for the Secretary-General to deal adequately with the personnel problems confronting the Organization.

Reverting to the Secretary-General's Report for a moment, there are two questions which have been

<sup>4</sup> U.N. doc. A/L. 146, dated Mar. 28. The resolution is sponsored, in addition to the United States, by France and the United Kingdom.

directed to me in private discussion on which comment might be appropriate.

A question has been raised about the conclusion of the Secretary-General's Report that a refusal, on the ground of possible self-incrimination, to testify before public investigatory bodies may be held to be inconsistent with the obligations of staff members. Let me, therefore, speak briefly about the privilege against self-incrimination.

### Resolution on Personnel Policy\*

U.N. doc. A/Resolution 95  
Adopted April 1, 1953

*The General Assembly,*  
Recalling the following provisions of Articles 100 and 101 of the Charter:

#### Article 100

"1. In the performance of their duties the Secretary-General and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any government or from any other authority external to the Organization. They shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as international officials responsible only to the Organization.

"2. Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the staff and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities.

#### Article 101

"1. The staff shall be appointed by the Secretary-General under regulations established by the General Assembly.

"3. The paramount consideration in the employment of the staff and in the determination of the conditions of service shall be the necessity of securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity. Due regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible",  
and

*Having reviewed and considered* the report of the Secretary-General on personnel policy (A/2364),

1. *Expresses its confidence* that the Secretary-General will conduct personnel policy with these considerations in mind;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the General-Assembly at its eighth session a report on the progress made in the conduct and development of personnel policy, together with the comments of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions thereon;

3. *Invites* the Secretary-General and the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions to submit, after appropriate consultations with the administrative heads of the specialized agencies, their recommendations as to any further action that may be required of the General Assembly;

4. *Calls upon* all Members of the United Nations to assist the Secretary-General in the discharge of his responsibilities as chief administrative officer of the United Nations.

\*Adopted by the General Assembly on Apr. 1 by a vote of 41-13-4.

### The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination

Many of the nations represented here share with my country a common tradition of the rule of law and of jealous concern for the protection of the rights of individuals against invasion by arbitrary governmental power. But the conditions and the manner in which this protection is provided often vary.

The privilege of witnesses to refuse testimony to legislative bodies is a case in point. In many, perhaps in a number of countries legislative bodies are not generally granted the power to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of records and to compel testimony under oath in aid of independent investigations. Where such powers are rare, or unknown, the refusal of a citizen to cooperate in an investigation may well be regarded as an assertion of a simple right. In such a situation, to draw inference from the refusal to testify may appear questionable.

In the United States, however, the position of an uncooperative witness is quite different. The power of the legislature and its committees to make independent investigations and to exercise the ancillary powers necessary thereto is well established and fully recognized both in the written Constitution and by custom. This power is a necessary consequence of our constitutional system with its strict separation of executive, legislative, and judicial powers. To exercise its responsibilities, the legislature must be able to assure itself of access to the information it needs directly from the community. Lacking the power of parliamentary legislatures where executive and legislative functions coexist in the same people, it need not rely merely on information made available to it by the Cabinet. This independent power of the legislature to ascertain facts has been recognized to be not an invasion of liberty, but an essential guaranty of that liberty and of democracy. It is in fact broader and less limited than the corresponding powers vested in the executive. It springs from our system of separation of powers which, I believe, exists in no other nation to the extent that it exists here.

Accordingly, the obligation to cooperate with legislative investigations and to make available the information required by legislative bodies is recognized as a fundamental obligation of American citizenship.

The privilege against self-incrimination is directed primarily at court proceedings and does not excuse the citizen from his obligation to disclose information to a legislative committee. The main purpose of the privilege is the protection of the individual against being compelled to disclose facts which may put him in jeopardy of criminal prosecution. But it may not be invoked as a means of giving effect to a general objection to any given investigation, its subject matter, its methods, or the persons conducting it.

Thus it is no violation of any "right" of Americans in the Secretariat if the Secretary-General takes a grave view of failure to respond to legitimate questions by U.S. legislative bodies, particularly if the inquiry is concerned with possible subversive activities affecting the very safety of the United States. We do not think any citizen has a "right" to hold public office; we consider such tenure to be a privilege.

In his Report, the Secretary-General does not propose to ignore the nature of the questions asked or to disregard the other information concerning the individual which may have been made available to him in determining the consequences of a refusal to testify. I hope that what I have said about the obligation of Americans to cooperate with public investigations may have helped to demonstrate that the Secretary-General's position is not only consistent with law but is a policy which fairly takes into account these considerations about Americans who fear self-incrimination when asked about subversion in the United States.

### **Estimating Personnel Performance**

The second question relates to paragraphs 97, 98, and 99 which state in part: "The Secretary-General should not retain a staff member in the employment of the United Nations if he has reasonable grounds for believing that that staff member is engaging or is likely to engage in subversive activities against the government of any member state." While this statement and the accompanying text seem to me to be clear and unequivocal, I have heard reservations about the policy of refusing employment to individuals on grounds of "the likelihood of engaging in subversive activities." This is because it is held to be almost impossible to make such a determination with any degree of accuracy. The U. S. Government believes that, as in the case of judging any other factor of probable personnel performance, one must look at the individual's past record. Admittedly it is a difficult decision but no more difficult than an attempt to appraise the courage and leadership qualities of a soldier or the ability of a diplomat to respect confidences. All human actions which include an appraisal of the future are estimates of likelihood. No one is ever hired for any job without an estimate of his probable future performance. There are no absolutes of judgment, but, if the guide is past performance, the prediction is likely to be accurate. The procedures established by the U. S. Government and by the Secretary-General assure objectivity and fairness in reaching these decisions. It is for this purpose that the U. S. Government is investigating the background, employment history, and character of present and prospective U. S. citizen staff members not only as regards loyalty but also the probability of competent performance. We

wish to provide the Secretary-General with information on the basis of which he can make as informed a judgment as possible on this point.

In summary, Mr. President, the position of the United States is: The U. S. Government does not believe that persons engaged or who, based on their past and present record, seem likely to engage in subversive activities against any member state should be employed in an international organization. We will do all in our power to provide the Secretary-General with the information necessary to enable him to make a determination on this matter. This does not constitute, nor is it intended to constitute, dictation to the Secretary-General or other member governments. It is a service to the United Nations in the interest of maintaining a Secretariat which measures up to standards established in the Charter for international civil servants.

We, therefore, commend the policies adopted by the Secretary-General as measures designed to strengthen the Secretariat and the United Nations itself to meet the challenges which face us in the unknown future. In our view, these policies deserve a fair trial. The Secretary-General and the U. S. Government will require time and support to make them effective. The General Assembly will be able to judge the value of the policy by their results. World public opinion as well as U. S. public opinion will have an opportunity to judge the results. I am confident that these policies will prove themselves in the main test. They will serve to make the United Nations an effective force.

Accordingly, I urge you to approve the draft resolution of which my delegation is a co-sponsor.

### **Greece Unifies Exchange System**

The Government of Greece has consulted the International Monetary Fund on unification of its exchange system.

Effective April 9, Greece eliminated all multiple currency practices and adjusted the official exchange rate from 15,000 drachmas per U.S. dollar to 30,000 drachmas per U.S. dollar.

The Fund welcomes and concurs in the action proposed by the Greek Government to unify its exchange system by the elimination of its multiple currency practices and adjustment of the Greek official exchange rate.

The Fund notes that this unification of the exchange system has been made possible by the determination of the Greek Government to achieve monetary stability through the pursuance of an internal stabilization program. The Fund considers that these policies should contribute to the further development of the Greek economy, but wishes to emphasize the importance of continuing firm anti-inflationary measures.

## The United States in the United Nations

[April 2-15]

### General Assembly

By a secret vote of 57-1-1, the General Assembly on April 7 confirmed the Security Council's recommendation for the appointment of Dag Hammarskjöld of Sweden as the new U.N. Secretary-General. He was sworn in on April 10.

At the April 7 meeting, V. K. Krishna Menon of India referred to the developments in Korea and expressed the hope that the U.N. Command would keep the United Nations informed of the status of negotiations. At the request of President Pearson, Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., reported briefly on behalf of the Unified Command on the recent events that had encouraged "all of us who seek peace in Korea." (For text, see BULLETIN of Apr. 20, 1953, p. 574.)

On April 8 the Assembly voted 52-5 (Soviets)-3 to continue the Disarmament Commission, after accepting a Soviet amendment deleting from the text a commendation of the Commission's work. Another Soviet proposal to omit a reference to the General Assembly resolution establishing the Commission was rejected by a vote of 10-33 (U.S.)-13.

The Czechoslovak resolution condemning alleged U.S. interference in the internal affairs of certain states was rejected, 5-41-14.

*Committee I (Political and Security)*—By a vote of 52-5 (Soviet bloc)-3 (Burma, India, Indonesia), the Committee on April 8 adopted the joint resolution establishing a commission composed of Brazil, Egypt, Pakistan, Sweden, and Uruguay to make an impartial inquiry into charges of the use of germ warfare. (For text, see p. 617.)

General debate on the Polish omnibus item opened on April 9, with Stanislaw Skrzesewski (Poland) as first speaker. He explained that the recent Communist Chinese and North Korean proposals offered a basis for the solution of the Korean and related problems, and he therefore introduced a revised text of the original Polish draft to take into account the changed state of affairs. The revised version recommended "the immediate resumption of truce negotiations . . . it being understood that . . . the parties will

exert every effort to reach agreement on the question of the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war and . . . of prisoners of war as a whole, endeavoring thereby to remove the obstacles preventing the termination of the war in Korea."

Andrei Vyshinsky (U.S.S.R.) then made a lengthy speech during which he declared that the Soviet Union still adhered to the principle that all prisoners must be repatriated, regardless of their desires. He further stated that the U.S.S.R. recognized the fairness and justice of Chou En-lai's proposal that prisoners resisting repatriation should be sent to a neutral country (BULLETIN of Apr. 13, 1953, p. 526). He emphasized his country's desire for peace and the incompatibility of NATO with this objective, as had the Polish representative. Mr. Vyshinsky also endorsed the remaining part of the Polish resolution, which called for a one-third reduction of all armed forces and unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons; called upon states which had not done so to accede to or ratify the Geneva Protocol of 1925; asked the General Assembly to declare participation in NATO incompatible with U.N. membership; and called for a five-power "peace" pact.

Commenting briefly, Ernest A. Gross (U.S.) said the Vyshinsky speech was reminiscent of a past which the new Soviet leaders profess was a bygone past. The Soviet intervention seemed to him stale, dull, and regressive. As for the Polish text, it contained only all the old slogans which the Soviet Union had offered at previous sessions—no more and no less.

Speaking again on April 10, Ambassador Gross told the Committee that U.N. debate on a Korean armistice at the present time would not facilitate the Panmunjom negotiations. He attributed the current conciliatory Soviet gestures to the West's policy of strength and unity and declared the Polish proposals would contribute nothing to the quest for agreement.

On April 14, the Brazilian delegation circulated a draft resolution noting with satisfaction that agreement had been reached on the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war in Korea, expressing hope that the exchange would promptly be effected and that further negotiations at Pan-

munjom would result in an early armistice, and proposing to recess the present session after completion of current agenda items until the signing of an armistice or other developments in Korea require Assembly consideration.

Henrique de Souza Gomes (Brazil) on April 15 offered a clarification of the motives behind his delegation's proposal. In view of the recent change in the international atmosphere, it seemed necessary to reevaluate the situation and to explore every possible means likely to alleviate present world tensions. He cautioned, however, that it would be futile to ignore the very serious divergencies still prevalent.

The Brazilian draft singled out the problem of the Korean armistice because the delegation thought this was the most "burning" question, which at the same time held the highest hopes of settlement, he explained. He added that this settlement was an essential step in preventing a new world war or the extension of present conflicts. A "modest" approach between despair and unwarranted optimism guided the delegation in its desire to enunciate certain points which had found unanimous support.

Mr. Vyshinsky, after renewing his delegation's attack on NATO and on Western disarmament proposals and noting that the U.N. commander in Korea had not yet replied to the Communists' request for the resumption of peace talks, said that the Brazilian draft was worthy of the most careful study and attention.

Ambassador Gross (U.S.) refuted the familiar charges as to NATO and disarmament; he then welcomed Mr. Vyshinsky's apparent intention to support the Brazilian proposal, which the United States also endorsed.

### **Economic and Social Council**

The Council on April 2 adopted in four separate votes the U.S. resolution requesting the Secretary-General to invite Libya, Spain, Nepal, and the Republic of Korea to attend the Conference on the Limitation of the Production of Opium scheduled to begin May 11. The invitations to Libya and Nepal were approved unanimously; that to Spain by a vote of 13-4 (U.S.S.R., Poland, Uruguay, Yugoslavia)-1 (India); and that to the Republic of Korea by a vote of 14-2 (U.S.S.R., Poland)-2 (India, Yugoslavia).

Walter Kotschnig (U.S.) on April 6 introduced a resolution on international cooperation on cartography, noting the Secretary-General's report and the efforts made by governments to stimulate accurate surveying and mapping of their territories. The draft requested continuance of the Secretary-General's consultations regarding the holding of regional cartographic conferences and also the submission in due course of a report to

the Council on such consultations. Mr. Kotschnig explained that the United States felt that priority should be given to poorly mapped areas, especially Asia, the Far East, and the Middle East. Work already under way by a Pan American body met the needs of Latin America, he added, indicating that this region would not require U.N. interest.

India suggested an amendment to the U.S. text which would provide for the Secretary-General's consultations to cover also the adoption of a standard method of writing geographic names on maps. Following U.S. acceptance of the Indian amendment, the draft was approved by a vote of 15-2 (U.S.S.R., Poland)-1 (Belgium).

Other resolutions adopted on April 6 included a U.K. draft asking further work on the International Map of the World on the Millionth Scale and a proposal that Ecosoc should grant the freedom-of-information rapporteur's request for access to communications dealing with freedom of information.

On April 9 the Council completed action on the trade-union-rights item by approving a five-part U.K.-Swedish proposal providing, among other things, for automatic referral of complaints concerning ILO members to the ILO Governing Body for consideration, noting the U.S.S.R. failure to cooperate in answering allegations, reiterating a request to Spain and Rumania to cooperate, dismissing the allegation concerning Trieste as not meriting further examination, and inviting the competent authorities of the Saar to submit observations on a new allegation.

At the same session, Mr. Wadsworth announced that the United States was unable to grant permission to representatives of the Women's International Democratic Federation and the World Federation of Trade Unions to enter the United States for the purpose of attending U.N. sessions. Following is the text of his statement:

I am instructed by my Government to state that it has found it impossible to grant the recent application of Mrs. Margarette Luckock, a representative of the Women's International Democratic Federation, and Mr. Jan Dessau, a representative of the World Federation of Trade Unions, for admission to the United States to attend sessions of United Nations bodies, including the Economic and Social Council, at United Nations Headquarters in New York. In denying these applications, my Government has found it necessary to invoke the right to safeguard its security which it reserved to itself in Section 6 of the Joint Resolution (Public Law 357) of the 80th Congress, which authorized the United States to enter into the Headquarters Agreement, and in the note of its Representative, dated November 21, 1947, bringing the Headquarters Agreement into effect. My Government is communicating with the Secretary-General of the United Nations in reply to his inquiry dated March 19, 1953 concerning the application of Mrs. Luckock.

I wish to assure you that, in denying these visa applications, my Government has acted only after the most careful consideration and in full recognition of the responsibilities which it has assumed towards the United Nations.

A U.S. draft resolution deferring decision on a U.N. narcotics laboratory pending study before Ecosoc's 18th session by an expert committee and the Narcotics Commission was approved on April 10. At the same meeting, the Commission confirmed members of functional commissions and agreed unanimously to invite Italy to accede to the Convention on the Death of Missing Persons.

Eugene Black, president of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, presented the bank's annual report on April 14, and five resolutions relating to the Population Commission's work were approved. At the next day's meeting, the Council considered two reports of the Technical Assistance Committee and approved the resolution deciding that the new method of obtaining payment toward the living costs of experts recommended by the Tac should be substituted for the existing one not later than January 1954.

## Proposals for Agreement on Cartel Practices

Press release 175 dated April 6

The *Ad Hoc* Committee on Restrictive Business Practices of the U.N. Economic and Social Council (Ecosoc) has released its report containing the Committee's proposals for an international agreement to prevent harmful cartel practices.<sup>1</sup> The report, which has been under preparation for over a year, will provide the basis for further discussions by the Council at its 16th session this summer.

The Committee proposes that countries agree to take action and cooperate with each other to prevent restrictive business practices affecting international trade having demonstrably harmful effects. These practices would be subject to inquiry upon complaint to determine whether such harmful effects were present. Practices involved would, for example, include agreements among competing business firms to abide by certain prices, not to make or sell more than specified amounts, or not to sell in specified geographic areas.

The Committee, operating as a group of experts, has had the assignment of preparing these proposals for the consideration of governments. The Ecosoc discussions should reveal whether these proposals form the basis for the negotiation of an international agreement acceptable to governments. Governments will use the interval between now and the summer session of Ecosoc to review the report. This interval will provide an opportunity for discussion of its contents with interested U.S. groups.

The Committee was established by resolution of Ecosoc in the summer of 1951.<sup>2</sup> This resolution,

which was introduced by the United States, recommended to members of the United Nations that

they take appropriate measures and cooperate with each other, to prevent . . . business practices affecting international trade which restrain competition, limit access to markets, or foster monopolistic control, whenever such practices have harmful effects on the expansion of production or trade, on the economic development of underdeveloped areas, or on standards of living.

The Committee, consisting of representatives of Belgium, Canada, France, India, Mexico, Pakistan, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Uruguay, was established to develop proposals as to methods to be adopted by international agreement to implement this recommendation.

The U.S. position has been that this sort of trade restriction should be eliminated. Healthy and active competition provides a spur for lower costs, lower prices, and higher productivity, which in turn lead to greater trade and increasing standards of living. In this Government's view, restrictive business practices can have harmful effects on international trade similar to those of governmental barriers such as quotas and excessive tariffs. In proposing to Ecosoc that this action be taken, the United States had in mind that such practices often cannot be dealt with effectively by one nation alone under its own domestic laws, and that therefore supplementary international action is needed to cope with the portions of the problem which lie beyond a single country's jurisdiction.

The Committee held sessions in January, April, and September of last year. Its final session started on January 12 of this year and continued through February 21. In summary, the plan which the Committee has developed provides that, on the complaint of any country, a practice alleged to have harmful effects would be subject to inquiry in order to determine whether such effects actually exist. This determination would be made in the light of facts submitted by governments. These facts would be obtained by each government in accordance with its own procedures and would be assembled for analysis. Representatives of governments participating in the agreement would determine on the basis of this analysis whether the practice complained of had a harmful effect in the light of the objectives of the agreement. If they so found, the governments concerned would be requested to take remedial action.

The governments participating in the agreement would undertake to adopt measures by legislation or otherwise to carry out the purposes of the agreement. Each government would further agree to take full account of the findings and recommendations transmitted to it concerning specific business practices, to take the action it considered appropriate, having regard to its obligations under the agreement, and, if in any instance it did not act, to state the grounds for its inaction.

The agreement would apply to the business practices of commercial enterprises whether publicly

<sup>1</sup> U.N. doc. E/2380, E/AC. 37/3.

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Oct. 8, 1951, p. 595.

or privately owned. It would not apply to business practices specifically required by governments, but, where some governments impose such a requirement and others do not the agreement might be applied at the discretion of the participating countries. Moreover, the effects of such governmentally imposed restrictive practices might be brought to the attention of countries that had imposed the requirement.

Copies of the Committee's report may be obtained from U.N. Headquarters. The Government will be glad to receive the views of those interested in the report and to answer inquiries directed to it. Any interested groups which desire to discuss the proposals of the Committee with the Government will be given an opportunity to do so. Requests may be addressed to the Secretary of the Interdepartmental U.N. Economic Committee, Department of State. Views which are received will be taken fully into account when a position is formulated for the Council discussions.

## **Adult Education Seminar To Convene at Ciudad Trujillo**

Press release 188 dated April 10

The U.S. Government has accepted the invitation of the Government of the Dominican Republic to send a representative to a Seminar on Adult Education which will be convened at Ciudad Trujillo on April 14, 1953. Dr. Bess Goodykoontz, who is the Director of Comparative Education, Division of International Education, Office of Education, Federal Security Agency, has been designated U.S. representative at the seminar.

The purpose of the seminar is to provide an opportunity for specialists from the American Republics to review recent progress and consider specific aspects in the education of adults. The participants will discuss the fundamental education of the adult, including techniques for teaching adults how to read and write, and national literacy campaigns; the primary school and its role in the prevention of adult illiteracy; expanding cultural opportunities for adults, by such means as night schools, educational motion pictures and radio and television broadcasts, and public libraries; programs and means for improving adult life in industry and agriculture as well as in the home and the community; and the relation of adult education to international peace.

The seminar is being convened on the initiative of the Government of the Dominican Republic, pursuant to a 1952 resolution of the U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization which recommended that member governments develop activities in adult education in their respective countries and that they hold regional and national meetings on the subject.

April 27, 1953

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- Korea. (a) Reports of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea. (b) Reports of the United Nations Agent General for Korean Reconstruction. Supplementary report of the First Committee. A/2368, Mar. 9, 1953. 6 pp. mimeo.
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- Letter Dated 28 February 1953 From the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Syria Addressed to the Secretary-General Concerning the Report Dated 30 October 1952 of the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization (S/2833). S/2956, Mar. 12, 1953. 10 pp. mimeo.
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- United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in West Africa, 1952. Report on Procedures of Visiting Missions. T/1044, Mar. 16, 1953. 9 pp. mimeo.
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- Report of the International Monetary Fund. E/2351/Add.1, Mar. 5, 1953. 7 pp. mimeo.

<sup>1</sup> Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

The United Nations Secretariat has established an Official Records series for the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and the Atomic Energy Commission, which includes summaries of proceedings, resolutions, and reports of the various commissions and committees. Information on securing subscriptions to the series may be obtained from the International Documents Service.

## Senate Begins Consideration of NATO Treaties

*On April 7 the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations began its consideration of three NATO treaties: The Status of Forces Agreement, the Protocol thereto on International Military Headquarters, and the Agreement on the Status of NATO Forces.*

*Expressions of support for the treaties came in the form of a statement made before the Committee by Under Secretary Smith and in a letter addressed by Ambassador William H. Draper, Jr., U.S. special representative in Europe, to Senator Alexander Wiley, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations.*

*Following are the texts of Under Secretary Smith's statement; President Eisenhower's message transmitting to the Senate the Protocol on Military Headquarters, together with Secretary Dulles' letter forwarding the Protocol to the President; and Ambassador Draper's letter to Senator Wiley.*

### UNDER SECRETARY SMITH'S STATEMENT OF APRIL 7

Press release 177 dated April 7

I am here to support three documents which you are now considering: The NATO Status of Forces Agreement,<sup>1</sup> the Protocol thereto on Military Headquarters,<sup>2</sup> and the Agreement on the Status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.<sup>3</sup>

Secretary Dulles has asked me to express his regrets that, because of the arrival of Chancellor Adenauer today, he cannot appear before you. I know that he would have liked to have personally expressed his strong support for the early ratification of these three treaties.

We have here three treaties designed to translate policy into action. These are multilateral treaties, consonant with our obligations under the U.N. Charter and under the North Atlantic Treaty. They were negotiated within the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization in order to establish a uniform basis for dealing with a large number of the legal and administrative problems which have naturally arisen in connection with operations of the Organization. The United States was one of the leaders in developing the text of these treaties. I hope that the United States will, by adopting these treaties, continue to evidence its support of this vital collective-security effort and its leadership in seeking practical solutions for practical problems.

The treaties under consideration provide for the operations of NATO forces, NATO headquarters, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization itself.

First, there is the Agreement on the Status of Forces, signed at London on June 19, 1951. This agreement is intended to establish a uniform basis of responsibilities, rights, and privileges applicable to the forces of the respective NATO countries and related civilians while in the territory of other NATO countries.

The second agreement is a protocol to the Status of Forces Agreement. It establishes the entity of the integrated military headquarters of NATO and creates certain responsibilities, rights, and privileges necessary for their operations within the territory covered by the North Atlantic Treaty.

The third agreement deals with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization itself, its international staff and national representatives thereto and establishes the responsibilities, rights, and privileges that will govern them. I should like to speak briefly about the major aspects of each of these documents in turn.

#### Status of Forces Agreement

Turning first to the Agreement on the Status of NATO Forces, it is noteworthy that this agreement, like the North Atlantic Treaty effort itself, is precedent-making. Never before have peace-loving nations dedicated themselves to a peacetime effort which would integrate their defense preparations. This concept of integrated defense planning gives greater defensive strength for the same amount of expenditure in manpower, material, and money. Naturally, it involves the poten-

<sup>1</sup> S. Exec. T, 82d Cong., 2d sess.

<sup>2</sup> S. Exec. B, 83d Cong., 1st sess.

<sup>3</sup> S. Exec. U, 82d Cong., 2d sess.



tial stationing and movement of forces of each of the North Atlantic Treaty nations in the territory of any one of them, as NATO plans are directed toward the defense of the whole North Atlantic Treaty area.

The administrative problems connected with the stationing of foreign forces in the territory of any member NATO state are manifold. An orderly basic system of rights, responsibilities, and procedures must be established for the following reasons: (1) to reduce the administrative burden on the troop commanders; (2) to reduce to a minimum the area of possible dispute between countries who send troops and countries who receive them; (3) to insure that the people of the countries who receive troops are protected as to life, limb, property, and security from acts of foreign troops or civilians.

We have had arrangements concluded in wartime on these legal and administrative subjects governing our troops abroad both in World War I and World War II. Such arrangements are quite different from the treaties before you, which are intended to govern deployments for the indefinite period of the cold war. Provisions that were proper for agreements negotiated in wartime obviously could not be expected to be applied to this different operation. We have secured the best possible terms for these circumstances. They are very good terms. They will provide a firm and uniform base in lieu of the varied informal, interim, and *ad hoc* arrangements which have governed our present deployments abroad pending action on this treaty.

Each country, of course, has had to reconcile its desires to have maximum rights for its troops abroad with its natural inclination to grant minimum privileges to other troops coming to its territory. The controlling idea has been to provide a reasonable and just basis that would serve the purposes I have just outlined.

The resulting agreement therefore represents, as do all three agreements, a giving and a taking on the part of all. Insofar as it affects the United States, I believe that it both protects our interests as a nation sending troops abroad and as a nation receiving foreign troops here.

This agreement covers all members of the armed forces of any NATO nation, civilians employed by those armed forces and serving with them, and their immediate dependents, while in other NATO nations under orders. It establishes very clearly that these persons must respect the law of the foreign country in which they may be stationed.

It then deals with a number of aspects of rights, responsibilities, and privileges, and with your permission I should like to refer to certain of the most important aspects which are covered.

We had to develop arrangements that would permit ready movement of military forces in peacetime across international borders. At the same time, those procedures could not overlook

the security interests of the nations receiving forces. Although the result has been to exempt military personnel from passport and visa regulations and immigration inspection as well as from alien registration control laws, this does not mean that security will be neglected. Military personnel must be appropriately identified, of course. I can assure the Committee that screening procedures are being established and that an interim procedure has been adopted for immediate application which all interested agencies of the executive branch are agreed on as appropriate and adequate for that purpose. If the circumstances require, any state may arrange the removal of any individual from its territory.

The problem of jurisdiction in cases of criminal offenses had to be settled. Even as this country did not wish to surrender all of its rights with respect to criminal jurisdiction for offenses committed by foreign forces here, other countries were reluctant to totally surrender their rights. At the same time, it was fully appreciated that the government which sends persons abroad would wish to insure that any trials of its personnel were appropriately conducted.

The result was the creation of a system of jurisdiction that provides that offenses committed in performance of duty, or treason, or espionage against his own country, will subject a person to trial by his own authorities. Other offenses against the law of the foreign country where a man is stationed will be subject to trial in the foreign courts, but the foreign government must give sympathetic consideration to requests for waiver of that right. The normal safeguards of fair trial—the right of counsel, the right to a fair and speedy trial, the right to procure witnesses, and protection against double jeopardy—are expressly covered.

The Committee is aware that under the administrative agreement with Japan we agreed to immediately conclude with Japan, at its option, once we have ratified this Status of Forces Agreement, an agreement on criminal jurisdiction similar to the provisions of this agreement.

The subject of claims is a complex and technical one. Again, we had to resolve these problems on a basis of practicality and equity. The provisions on claims had to be clearly established in order that the rights of the citizenry as well as the states covered by the agreement would be protected. The procedures adopted result in the sharing of liability in cases of normal military operations and the appropriate determination of responsibility on an equitable basis in other cases.

The treaty sets forth a number of procedures designed to safeguard the economy of the country receiving foreign forces from the impact of uncontrolled local purchasing and similar operations. Reasonable and practical channels of dealing with the civilian community are established.

I know that the Congress has been interested

in the subject of tax relief. The treaty neither provides nor precludes general tax relief on expenditures for the common defense. The executive branch has concluded a series of arrangements with pertinent NATO countries, parties to this agreement, which provide for relief from taxes upon such U.S. expenditures. Copies of these arrangements are available.

The treaty provides for the contingency that operations in time of hostilities may require different arrangements. Provision is made for necessary modifications.

The grant and receipt of certain customs exemptions and of freedom from certain customs procedures are covered, and other administrative privileges and immunities are set forth in the agreements.

In summation of this agreement then, we find that procedures are established which will reduce possible areas of frictions and eliminate the worries of governments and populations as to the conduct of foreign troops upon their soil. Some such procedures are essential. These procedures appear reasonable, equitable, and just. In considering them from a practical point of view, the Senate will also wish to recall that the stationing of large numbers of foreign forces in the United States is probably not indicated, whereas we have many people abroad.

#### **Protocol on Military Headquarters**

I should like to turn now to the Protocol on Military Headquarters. This protocol is necessary because of the international character which necessarily attaches to the military headquarters of an integrated force.

This protocol will apply to the respective headquarters of the Supreme Allied Commanders of NATO. These will include General Ridgway's Headquarters in Paris, Admiral McCormick's Headquarters at Norfolk, Va., and the Headquarters of the Commanders-in-Chief of the Channel Command in England. It will also cover headquarters immediately under them and such other subordinate headquarters as the North Atlantic Council determines.

Because it is desirable to consider these headquarters as separate entities, they are given the right to acquire property, make contracts and the capacity to sue and be sued.

In general, persons attached to these headquarters by the respective NATO nations and their civilian components and employees are given rights and responsibilities parallel with those created in favor of individuals and forces covered by the NATO Status of Forces Agreement.

A few points of difference are noteworthy. The International Headquarters are given no jurisdiction to handle criminal cases, certain claims matters, and certain other administrative matters in their own right—these remain the responsi-

bility of the state attaching the individual to the headquarters. For obvious reasons of military security, the records of the headquarters are declared to be immune from process.

And, as in the case of the Status of Forces Agreement, provision is made for change in the protocol in case of actual hostilities.

Again, and before leaving our consideration of the protocol, we should note that this action is precedent-making. We know of no peacetime situation where integrated international headquarters of a military nature have been established. Friction between headquarters and the countries where they are situated, over administrative matters, would deter sorely the NATO defense effort. The procedures established in this agreement present a sound basis to eliminate that difficulty.

#### **Agreement on NATO**

The third agreement is the one dealing with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization itself. The provisions of the agreement give to the Organization legal stature with powers and obligations consistent with its functions. In many respects it assimilates the Organization to a diplomatic mission and provides appropriate status for the international staff and members of delegations to the Organization.

The agreement is necessary if the respective delegations and representatives to the NATO and their staffs, together with the international secretariat and subordinate bodies of the Organization, are to perform their functions.

The Council and the subsidiary bodies concerned are the entities covered by the treaty. Most of these are situated at Paris. A few others are situated elsewhere in Europe. At the present time the only entities covered by this treaty and situated in the United States are the Standing Group of the Military Committee and the Military Representatives Committee which are located in Washington. The Military Headquarters, as we have already noted, are covered by the special protocol dealing with them.

The agreement includes safeguards to assure cooperation and respect for local laws. Provision is made for waiver of immunity from process, and each nation retains an unbridged right to require any person who abuses any privilege to leave its territory.

There are provisions in this agreement, as in the case of the Protocol on Military Headquarters, which authorize the United States to enter into an arrangement with the Organization providing that the United States may employ and tax its own citizens. The United States has entered into such arrangements.

I have mentioned the most important parts of these agreements. They deal with matters of interest to various government agencies and have

been negotiated in consultation with the Departments of Justice, Defense, and Treasury, whose representatives are also present here.

A bill to implement the claims provisions of the treaties has been transmitted to the Congress.<sup>4</sup> The interested agencies are agreed that they do not require, and do not plan to submit, further legislation to implement any of the proposed treaties.

I would like to refer to the respective messages of the President transmitting these agreements to the Senate, as well as to the letters of the Secretary of State forwarding them to the President, and to say that I support the statements contained therein.

In conclusion I want to express my appreciation for this opportunity to appear before this Committee, to assure you of the desire of the Department of State to be as helpful as possible in explaining any matters connected with these proposals, and to submit to this Committee my personal belief that the early ratification of these agreements will be a step forward in the integration of the North Atlantic Treaty area.

The NATO nations are agreed that the early ratification of these agreements is desirable. Already there are three ratifications of the Status of Forces and Civilian Agreements, and one of the protocol.

In the interest of setting up fair and equitable ground rules under which nationals of one country can be stationed in and work in the territory of other countries, in furtherance of the vital NATO defense effort, I consider these agreements desirable and in the best interests of the vital foreign policy of the United States.

#### MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT EISENHOWER TO THE SENATE<sup>5</sup>

THE WHITE HOUSE,  
*February 27, 1953.*

With a view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, I transmit herewith a certified copy of a protocol on the status of International Military Headquarters set up pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at Paris on August 28, 1952. This document is a protocol to the agreement regarding status of forces of parties of the North Atlantic Treaty, and is related to the agreement on the status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, both previously transmitted

<sup>4</sup>Reference here is to draft legislation transmitted by the Department of Defense on Jan. 19 entitled "A Bill To Provide for the Orderly Settlement of Certain Claims Arising Out of Acts or Omissions of Civilian Employees and Military Personnel of the United States in Foreign Countries and of Civilian Employees and Military Personnel of Foreign Countries in the United States, and for other purposes."

<sup>5</sup>S. Exec. B, 83d Cong., 1st sess. President Truman's Messages to the Senate and forwarding letters sent to him by Secretary Acheson are contained in S. Exec. T, 82d Cong., 2d sess., and S. Exec. U, 82d Cong., 2d sess.

to the Senate in the second session of the 82d Congress.

The Status of Forces Agreement of 1951 and the present protocol, as well as the companion agreement relating to the status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization itself, are necessary parts of the new machinery we need to carry forward the vital program for the integrated defense forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. These are multilateral agreements and thus provide that basis of uniformity in these fields which is essential for NATO and its integrated operations. While these agreements do not in every respect reflect the maximum desires of each country, and to that extent represent certain compromises on the part of all, it is my considered belief that they provide a workable, equitable, and desirable framework for NATO activities and peacetime NATO military operations. The early acceptance of these agreements by the NATO nations is very important to the furtherance of the NATO collective-defense effort.

I also transmit, for the information of the Senate, the report made to me by the Secretary of State regarding this protocol.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

#### SECRETARY DULLES' FORWARDING LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT<sup>6</sup>

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,  
*February 25, 1953.*

I have the honor to submit to you a certified copy of a protocol on the status of International Military Headquarters set up pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at Paris on August 28, 1952, with the recommendation that it be transmitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.

The protocol has as its purpose the definition of the status of any Supreme Headquarters or Allied Headquarters, and members of their staffs, which may be established in the territory of any of the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty. Supreme Headquarters is defined in the protocol to mean Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe, Headquarters of the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, and any equivalent international military headquarters set up pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty. Allied Headquarters is defined to mean any Supreme Headquarters and any international military headquarters which is immediately subordinate to a Supreme Headquarters.

The status of an Allied Headquarters and its personnel is determined primarily by setting forth in the protocol the principles which shall govern the application thereto of the agreement between the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the status of their forces, signed at London June 19, 1951 (S. Ex. T, 82d Cong., 2d sess.). Sub-

<sup>6</sup>S. Exec. B, 83d Cong., 1st sess.

ject to the provisions of the protocol, the agreement is to apply to Allied Headquarters in the territory of a party to the protocol in the North Atlantic Treaty area, and to the military and civilian personnel of such Headquarters and their dependents. The basic points covered with respect to applying the status of forces agreement of 1951 may be summarized as follows:

1. The rights and obligations which the agreement gives to or imposes upon the sending state or its authorities in respect of its forces or their civilian components shall, in respect of an Allied Headquarters and its personnel, be vested in or attached to the appropriate Supreme Headquarters and the authorities responsible under it, subject to certain exceptions enumerated in article 4 of the protocol.

2. The obligations to waive claims imposed on the contracting parties by article VIII of the agreement shall be attached both to Allied Headquarters and to any party to the protocol concerned. The claims to which paragraph 5 of article VIII of the agreement applies shall include claims arising out of acts or omissions of any of the employees of an Allied Headquarters, or out of any other act, omission, or occurrence for which an Allied Headquarters is legally responsible, and causing damage in the territory of a receiving state to third parties other than to any of the parties to the protocol.

3. The exemption from taxation accorded under article X of the agreement to members of a force or civilian component in respect of their salaries and emoluments shall apply, as regards personnel of an Allied Headquarters, to salaries and emoluments paid to them as such personnel by the armed service to which they belong or by which they are employed, except that they shall not be exempt from taxation imposed by a state of which they are a national.

4. An Allied Headquarters shall have, subject to the same conditions, the rights granted to a force under article XI of the agreement with respect to customs laws and regulations of a receiving state.

In addition to prescribing how the status of forces agreement of 1951 shall apply, the protocol accords to an Allied Headquarters special privileges and benefits. These include:

1. For the purpose of facilitating the establishment, construction, maintenance, and operation of Allied Headquarters, such Headquarters are to be relieved so far as practicable from duties and taxes affecting expenditures by them in the interest of common defense and for their official and exclusive benefit, and each party to the protocol is to enter into negotiations with any Allied Headquarters operating in its territory for the purpose of concluding an agreement to give effect to this provision.

2. No measure of execution or measure directed to the seizure or attachment of its property or funds shall be taken against any Allied Headquarters, except for the purpose of paragraph 6 (a) of article VII and article XIII of the agreement.

3. To enable it to operate its international budget, an Allied Headquarters may hold currency of any kind and operate accounts in any currency.

4. The archives and official documents of an Allied Headquarters kept in premises used by those Headquarters or in the possession of any properly authorized member of the Headquarters shall be inviolable, unless the Headquarters has waived this immunity. Allied Headquarters shall, however, at the request of the receiving state and in the presence of a representative of that state, verify the nature of any of such documents to confirm they are entitled to such immunity.

The protocol further provides that each Supreme Headquarters shall possess juridical personality and recognizes the capability of a Supreme Headquarters, under certain conditions, to conclude contracts and to acquire or dispose of property. A Supreme Headquarters may also, subject to the provisions of article VIII of the agreement, engage in legal proceedings as claimant or defendant.

Under the protocol, any assets acquired from the international funds of an Allied Headquarters under its capital budget and no longer required by the Headquarters are to be disposed of under arrangements approved by the North Atlantic Council and the proceeds distributed among or credited to the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty in the proportions in which they have contributed to the capital costs of the Headquarters. Any land, buildings, or fixed installations provided for the use of an Allied Headquarters by the receiving state without charge to the Headquarters are to be handed back when no longer needed to the receiving state, and any increase or loss in the value of such property resulting from its use by the Headquarters shall be determined by the North Atlantic Council and distributed among or credited or debited to the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty in the proportions in which they have contributed to the capital costs of the Headquarters.

With respect to taxation of employees of an Allied Headquarters of categories agreed by the North Atlantic Council, a formula has been provided in the protocol that is similar to the one evolved in the agreement on the status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, signed at Ottawa on September 20, 1951 (S. Ex. U, 82d Cong., 2d sess.), concerning taxation on the salaries and emoluments paid by the Organization to its officials. This formula provides exemption for employees who are paid directly by Allied Headquarters, but enables those states which desire to conclude an arrangement with Allied Headquar-

Press release 178 dated April 7

PARIS, FRANCE,  
March 6, 1953.

MY DEAR SENATOR WILEY: I understand that your committee is presently considering the Status of Forces Agreement, the protocol on the status of International Military Headquarters, and the agreement on the status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization itself.

As United States special representative in Europe, and as the United States permanent representative to the North Atlantic Council, I urge prompt approval of these agreements by your committee and by the Senate of the United States. During the past two years the fourteen nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, in view of the existing threat of armed aggression and in the interest of their own individual and collective security have placed large forces under International Command, many of them outside their own country. Common military headquarters have been created and are now functioning in several NATO countries. It is obvious, in these circumstances, that solutions on some permanent and mutually acceptable basis had to be found for a whole series of problems concerning the relationship of the forces and the international military headquarters to the countries in which they are stationed.

These day-to-day problems concerning customs, jurisdiction, claims, and many other similar matters can only be solved in a spirit of mutual good will. NATO military cooperation in peacetime cannot be effective unless these many troublesome questions are the subject of common agreement.

It is a tribute to the spirit of intimate cooperation which now prevails among the members of the alliance that all of them have been able to reach common agreement on the principles which should control the relationship of armed forces and of international military headquarters to the countries in which they are located.

The Status of Forces Agreement now before the Senate is the result of patient and friendly negotiations over a period of months. It provides for uniform treatment of all NATO forces and makes possible equal treatment for United States forces regardless of the country in which they may be stationed. It appropriately safeguards the interests of the United States and of each of our other NATO partners. I recommend its approval without reservation or amendment. It will, when ratified, make possible satisfactory solution of the problems raised by the presence of national forces in countries outside their own.

Approval by the Senate will be further evidence of the continued support of the American people for the principle of collective security and their confidence in friendly peacetime collaboration with our treaty partners. Without such an agree-

ters to employ and assign all of its nationals who are to serve on the staff of Allied Headquarters, to pay the salaries and emoluments of such persons from its own funds at a scale fixed by it, and to charge income tax on the salaries and emoluments so paid. In accordance with this provision, the United States is about to sign an agreement with the North Atlantic Council, acting on behalf of International Military Headquarters, whereby this Government will employ and assign to such Headquarters all United States nationals who are to serve on the staff thereof and pay the salaries and emoluments of such persons from its own funds at a scale fixed by it. This arrangement will be similar to the one transmitted to the Senate for its information in connection with the agreement on the status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and printed in Senate Executive U, 82d Congress, 2d session.

This protocol is related to the agreement regarding the status of forces of parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, and the agreement relating to the status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, transmitted to the Senate in the second session of the 82d Congress. The former agreement also relates to the administrative agreement with Japan, insofar as that agreement provides that upon the coming into force with respect to the United States of the "Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of Their Forces," signed at London June 19, 1951, the United States will immediately conclude with Japan, at the option of Japan, an agreement on criminal jurisdiction similar to the corresponding provisions of that agreement.

These agreements provide for the basic uniformity in these fields which is required in the interest of integrated operations. They represent a successful reconciliation of the views of the various countries concerned and establish basic rights and responsibilities which, though not fully satisfying the views of all countries in every respect, nevertheless represent a reasonable, practical, and realistic formula for these areas from the point of view of the United States, both as a nation sending troops abroad under these agreements and as a nation which may be receiving foreign troops here under their terms.

It is considered important, from the point of view of furthering the NATO collective defense effort, that these agreements be accepted by the NATO nations at the earliest possible date.

It is hoped that the Senate will give favorable consideration to the protocol at the same time that it considers the agreement on the status of forces of 1951.

I am authorized to state that the Secretary of Defense concurs in the necessity for the early ratification of these agreements.

Respectfully submitted.

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

ment the task of the NATO military commanders would be infinitely more difficult and the steady development of common training and planning of the NATO armed forces would be seriously impaired.

The agreement on the status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization itself giving appropriate status to its staff and to the fourteen national delegations accredited to it, is indispensable for the proper operation of the organization. It deals appropriately with the variety of problems which emerge whenever an international organization is created. It gives the organization a legal standing, defines its privileges and immunities, and the status of the staff of the organization and that of the national delegations to NATO. This charter for the organization follows closely similar agreements relating to international organizations.

The military headquarters protocol adapts the appropriate provisions of the Status of Forces Agreement to the personnel assigned to international headquarters and gives the necessary legal status to the headquarters themselves.

Approval of these documents by the United States Senate and by the other NATO governments will, in my opinion, mark a milestone in the field of international cooperation and the continued progress of NATO. The fact that these agreements are necessary is eloquent testimony to the fact that NATO has progressed from an organization which existed only on paper a few years ago to a functioning peacetime political and military organization in which fourteen nations are actually pooling their strength in the interest of their own security.

Respectfully yours,

WILLIAM H. DRAPER, JR.,

*U.S. Special Representative in Europe.*

## **Recommendation for Extension of Trade Agreements Act**

*Message of the President to the Congress*<sup>1</sup>

In my State of the Union message I recommended that "the Congress take the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act under immediate study and extend it by appropriate legislation."

I now recommend that the present act be renewed for the period of 1 year. I propose this action as an interim measure. As such, it will allow for the temporary continuation of our present trade program pending completion of a thorough and comprehensive re-examination of the economic-foreign policy of the United States.

I believe that such a re-examination is imperative in order to develop more effective solutions to the international economic problems today con-

fronting the United States and its partners in the community of free nations. It is my intention that the executive branch shall consult with the Congress in developing recommendations based upon the studies that will be made.

Our trade policy is only one part, although a vital part, of a larger problem. This problem embraces the need to develop, through cooperative action among the free nations, a strong and self-supporting economic system capable of providing both the military strength to deter aggression and the rising productivity that can improve living standards.

No feature of American policy is more important in this respect than the course which we set in our economic relations with other nations. The long-term economic stability of the whole free world and the overriding question of world peace will be heavily influenced by the wisdom of our decisions. As for the United States itself, its security is fully as dependent upon the economic health and stability of the other free nations as upon their adequate military strength.

The problem is far from simple. It is a complex of many features of our foreign and domestic programs. Our domestic economic policies cast their shadows upon nations far beyond our borders. Conversely, our foreign-economic policy has a direct impact upon our domestic economy. We must make a careful study of these intricate relationships in order that we may chart a sound course for the nation.

The building of a productive and strong economic system within the free world, one in which each country may better sustain itself through its own efforts, will require action by other governments, as well as by the United States, over a wide range of economic activities. These must include adoption of sound internal policies, creation of conditions fostering international investment, assistance to underdeveloped areas, progress toward freedom of international payments and convertibility of currencies, and trade arrangements aimed at the widest possible multilateral trade.

In working toward these goals, our own trade policy as well as that of other countries should contribute to the highest possible level of trade on a basis that is profitable and equitable for all. The world must achieve an expanding trade, balanced at high levels, which will permit each nation to make its full contribution to the progress of the free world's economy and to share fully the benefits of this progress.

The solution of the free world's economic problems is a cooperative task. It is not one which the United States, however strong its leadership and however firm its dedication to these objectives, can effectively attack alone. But two truths are clear: the United States' share in this undertaking is so large as to be crucially important to its success—and its success is crucially important to the United

<sup>1</sup> S. doc. 38, 83d Cong., 1st sess.

States. This last truth applies with particular force to many of our domestic industries and especially to agriculture with its great and expanding output.

I am confident that the governments of other countries are prepared to do their part in working with us toward these common goals, and we shall from time to time be consulting with them. The extension for one year of the present Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act will provide us the time necessary to study and define a foreign economic policy which will be comprehensive, constructive, and consistent with the needs both of the American economy and of American foreign policy.

## Mr. DeMille To Confer With Mr. Johnson

Press release 198 dated April 18

Robert L. Johnson, Administrator of the International Information Administration, has asked Cecil B. DeMille, outstanding leader in the film industry, to come to Washington to confer with him on the use of motion pictures in the overseas information program.

Motion pictures are one of five means of communication used by our overseas information program which also includes the worldwide use of press, radio, USIS libraries, and the Educational Exchange Program. This conference with Mr. DeMille, starting April 20, is part of Mr. Johnson's overall plan to invite leading experts in various fields to give him the benefit of their advice and thinking.

## Alfred H. Morton To Become Consultant on Telecommunications

Press release 197 dated April 17

Robert L. Johnson, Administrator of the International Information Administration, has asked Alfred H. Morton, Deputy Administrator and head of the Voice of America in New York, to come to Washington to serve as his chief consultant in "the all-important field of telecommunications."

Mr. Johnson said he is determined to create a stronger, more effective, and more efficient International Information and Educational Exchange Program because "this activity is vitally important to the United States Government."

Mr. Johnson, President Eisenhower's choice to revitalize U.S. overseas information activities, said "the program which the new administration envisages requires careful thought, study, and long-range planning."

The Administrator pointed out that Mr. Morton's 30 years' experience in radio and active interest in television since its inception would be invaluable to him at this time, and added, "I am

asking him to make that experience more readily available to me by serving as my chief consultant on those matters here in Washington."

Mr. Morton, well-known leader in the radio industry who has directed the Voice of America since October 1, 1952, stated that he agreed to assume these new responsibilities at Mr. Johnson's request and plans to take over his duties in Washington on Monday, April 20.

Robert J. Francis will be Acting Deputy Administrator of the Voice of America in New York until such time as a new director is appointed.

## PUBLICATIONS

### Recent Releases

*For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.*

**Telecommunications.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2489. Pub. 4685. 113 pp. 30¢.

Agreement between the United States and American Republics replacing Inter-American radio agreement of Jan. 26, 1940.

**Safety at Sea, North Atlantic Ice Patrol.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2507. Pub. 4719. 16 pp. 10¢.

Interim arrangement between the United States and Other Governments revising the scale of contributions under article 37 of the International Convention on Safety of Life at Sea—Signed at London May 31, 1929.

**Regulation of Production and Marketing of Sugar.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2526. Pub. 4725. 7 pp. 10¢.

Protocol between the United States and Other Governments (prolonging the international agreement of May 6, 1937)—Signed at London Aug. 31, 1951.

**Consular Officers.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2494. Pub. 4729. 25 pp. 10¢.

Convention with protocol of signature between the United States and the United Kingdom—Signed at Washington June 6, 1951.

**Mutual Defense Treaty.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2529. Pub. 4733. 8 pp. 10¢.

Treaty between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines—Signed at Washington Aug. 30, 1951.

**Eradication of Foot-and-Mouth Disease in Mexico.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2404. Pub. 4736. 47 pp. 20¢.

Exchange of notes between the United States and Mexico—Signed at Washington Mar. 17 and 18, 1947; Feb. 9 and Mar. 28, 1949; and at Mexico City Sept. 26 and Oct. 3, 1947; Nov. 24 and 26, 1947; and Dec. 15, 1947; agreement dated at Mexico City Feb. 3 and 12, 1949.

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200	4/18	Dulles: The first 90 days

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

\*Not printed.



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*The Department of State*

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May 4, 1953

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## President Favors Increased Aid to Migrants From Europe

*Following are the texts of an identical letter which the President sent on April 22 to Vice President Nixon, President of the Senate, and Joseph W. Martin, Jr., Speaker of the House of Representatives, recommending the enactment of emergency immigration legislation for the special admission of European immigrants; a letter dated March 18 from Queen Juliana of the Netherlands to the President and his reply, dated April 4, regarding the problem of aid to refugees; and a letter from the President dated April 11 to Hugh Gibson, Director of the Intergovernmental Committee for Migration from Europe, regarding an international program to aid migrants.*

### LETTER TO CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS

White House press release dated April 22

We are all aware of the tragic developments of the past several years which have left countless thousands of individuals homeless refugees in the heart of Europe. In recent months, the number of refugees has been increased by the steady flow of escapees who have braved death to escape from behind the Iron Curtain. These refugees and escapees searching desperately for freedom look to the free world for haven.

In addition, the problem of population pressures continues to be a source of urgent concern in several friendly countries in Europe.

It is imperative that we join with the other nations in helping to find a solution to these grave questions. These refugees, escapees, and distressed peoples now constitute an economic and political threat of constantly growing magnitude. They look to traditional American humanitarian concern for the oppressed. International political considerations are also factors which are involved. We should take reasonable steps to help these people to the extent that we share the obligation of the free world.

Therefore, after consideration of all the points of view which have been presented, I recommend, within the framework of the immigration laws, the enactment of emergency immigration legisla-

tion for the special admission of 120,000 immigrants per year for the next two years.

In order to help resolve this current immigration and refugee problem in the tradition of our American policy, I urge that the Congress give this recommendation its earliest consideration.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

### EXCHANGE OF LETTERS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND QUEEN JULIANA

White House press release dated April 23

APRIL 4, 1953

MY DEAR QUEEN JULIANA:

Prince Bernhard has given me your letter of March 18, 1953 and an accompanying memorandum<sup>1</sup> concerning the plight of refugees throughout the world. Your preoccupation with the challenge which refugees present to the free world at a time when your own country and people are facing so nobly the burdens of over-crowding and the disastrous effects of the recent floods, demonstrates again the compassion which Your Majesty has always shown for those in distress beyond her own borders. I share this concern with you. The United States Government stands ready at any time to consider constructive international measures to alleviate the problems presented so sympathetically in your letter and memorandum.

The refugees in Germany constitute a substantial proportion of the German population. The United States Government, in planning economic measures of assistance with the authorities of the German Federal Republic, has always taken the refugees into account. Along with the indigenous population, they have in large part contributed to and benefited from the rising level of the German economy. The achievement of economic balance and the expansion of employment opportunities in Germany have been primary objectives of United States measures of assistance to the German economy. The United States Government will persist in these efforts in collaboration with

<sup>1</sup> The memorandum is not printed here.

the German Federal authorities. This collaboration has been particularly close and continuous in recent months since the flow of refugees into Berlin has increased.

Your letter points out that emigration may also play a role in relieving population pressures in Germany and other countries whose governments also provide asylum for refugees. To provide opportunities for decent livelihood in countries of immigration for migrants and refugees, the United States Government has given active support to the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration. At its forthcoming session in Geneva, the Migration Committee will give further attention to ways and means of expanding opportunities for emigration overseas.

The United States Government, under its Escapee Program, is also providing assistance in assimilation and resettlement for those who are currently fleeing from Eastern European countries into Germany, Trieste, Austria, Turkey, Italy and Greece. This assistance is supplementary to that provided by these countries of first asylum and the voluntary agencies which provide the essential human touch in their services to refugees.

Present efforts to re-establish refugees either through integration in their present countries of residence or emigration, should be intensified. I am confident that the free world will respond to meet the challenge which the refugees present not only because they are human beings whose dignity and self-respect are at stake, but because they desire with us to play their part in achieving peace and order in the world.

With expressions of great respect and warm personal esteem,

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

MARCH 18, 1953

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,

The people of the United States have magnificently shown their warmhearted sympathy for those in our country who through the flood lost their homes and are in great distress. American help came pouring into our stricken land. Help came indeed, from all over the world, to relieve us in our dire need. With profound gratitude in our hearts we see the problem of our homeless solved on a world basis by one spontaneous move of generosity from peoples and governments alike. This generous support has been of great material, and also of immeasurable moral help to us.

Sympathy for the victims of distress is well known to be a great American tradition. I feel justified, therefore, to ask for your warm attention to the problem of those who became homeless by persecution: the refugees of the entire world.

I appeal to you for personally taking the lead in solving this ever increasing world problem on a

world basis. I strongly feel that this problem is one of the most dangerous and tragic elements in an uncertain future.

I am aware that in the past year, through international effort generously supported by the United States Government, a great many refugees have found a new home, but the problem is still far from solved. Thousands of new refugees, mostly in circumstances of great distress and often in a state of mental despair, are in need of our help.

There are still over 400,000 refugees living in camps in Europe. Tens of thousands of refugees are fleeing from the Eastern Zone of Germany into West Berlin. There are still many thousands of refugees elsewhere in the world. A concerted international action is therefore indicated.

The problem of the refugees can only be solved if they are given opportunities to resettle in new countries, or if they are assimilated in their countries of present residence.

Mass resettlement schemes, however, are seriously hampered at the present time, because in various countries of immigration refugees are not given enough economic opportunities. Moreover, in certain European countries, like my own, the pressure of surplus population leaves little room for absorbing them.

Unless legislation in the countries of immigration specifically permits the entry of refugees and their families, including those in destitute circumstances, it is to be feared only very small numbers of refugees will get a chance to emigrate.

A new approach is necessary, therefore, which opens large opportunities for immigration and also creates the necessary economic conditions permitting the assimilation of refugees in the countries of their present residence.

Efforts to stimulate this assimilation are at the present time being made in several countries, in particular through the operation of an important grant from an American foundation, in close cooperation between the Governments concerned and the Voluntary Agencies working on behalf of the refugees. However, private agencies do not dispose of the necessary resources. Governmental action will be necessary to open credit facilities for all those refugees who are only too willing to support and house themselves if they are given the initial opportunity to regain their independence.

These aspects should receive due attention whenever plans are made to promote the economic development and stability of the world. Neglecting them means that tens of thousands of refugees are condemned to live in camps without any hope for the future for many more years. Such a tragedy, if it were to occur, would destroy the faith in the privileges of freedom not only of the refugees themselves, but also of their kinsmen whom they have left behind.

Discontentment, frustration and even despair is felt by millions of uprooted people, dislocated all

over the world. The free world cannot tolerate so much suffering in its midst without having to suffer itself.

To preserve their human dignity and restore their self-respect, the right psychological and spiritual approach is of overriding importance. How could refugees ever trust free society if it shows interest only for trained muscles or brains, but lacks respect for the higher values of life; if it looks at refugees only as labor potential, and refuses those who cannot work; if it separates them from their families?

It is my conviction that the refugee problem should be tackled in the shortest possible time in its entirety.

The Netherlands will be glad to cooperate in any planning and, within the practical limits of its capacities, in any constructive effort to arrive at results.

Although I fully understand the multitude and magnitude of the problems confronting you, I had to lay this matter of ever-growing importance before you, conscious of the responsibility of all for all, a responsibility which in the plight of the Netherlands the entire world has accepted and lived up to in such an impressive way. In all humility we saw the lesson of loving one's neighbor being observed in a world otherwise so deeply disturbed by international strife.

I am confident you will find the right approach to this problem. May it be given you to solve it. Thus world peace will gain.

Yours sincerely,

JULIANA

## LETTER TO MIGRATION COMMITTEE

APRIL 11, 1953

DEAR MR. GIBSON:

Recalling your recent conference with me at the White House at which you so ably set forth the gravity and extent of population pressures in certain countries in Europe and the additional burdens assumed by many of these countries in the reception of new refugees from Eastern Europe, I welcome the opportunity afforded by the Fifth Session of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration to respond to your presentation on behalf of the Committee.

I am fully aware of the need for international action and collaboration in developing opportunities in many countries of the world for those in Europe who desire to emigrate. By emigration they may achieve self-dependence through useful employment and live with their families in dignity and self-respect doing their part to contribute to peace and order in the world. The Migration Committee, organized in Brussels in 1951, has taken important initial steps to facilitate the movement of migrants and refugees from Europe. The United States Government notes with satis-

faction not only the financial support which the member governments have given to the Committee, but the manner in which these governments have assisted by receiving migrants and refugees.

You stated that the results to date have been modest. I believe that greater achievement is possible and will depend upon sound and modest beginnings. The task before the Committee calls for intensive effort and resourcefulness in finding step-by-step the best ways and means of developing and applying available international resources in assistance to the emigration and immigration countries in resolving their mutual problems. The United States Government fully supports the efforts which the Committee is making to assist those in Europe seeking opportunities for a livelihood in other countries which are in a position to receive them. The problems which face the Committee are under constant examination by the competent agencies of the United States Government and, as the work of the Committee develops, consideration will be given to the manner in which the United States, in concert with other governments, can most helpfully assist the Committee in its further efforts.

I wish the Committee every success in its deliberations at the Fifth Session.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

The Honorable HUGH GIBSON

*Director, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration*

63 rue des Paquis

Geneva, Switzerland

## U.S. Expresses Sympathy for People of Laos

*At a news conference on April 17 Michael J. McDermott, Special Assistant for Press Relations, made the following statement:*

The Royal Government of Laos has issued a statement drawing attention to the attack upon the territory of the Kingdom by Viet Minh troops and stating the determination of the Government, the army, and the people of Laos with the aid of French Union troops to resist this aggression.

The Government of the United States is following developments with the closest attention. It expresses its sympathy with the people of Laos in their present emergency and its fervent wishes to them, to their troops, and to those of the French Union in their efforts to resist and turn back the invaders. The United States will continue to provide and will study ways and means of making more effective its assistance to the Associated States of Indochina and to France in the struggle to destroy Communist aggression in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam.

## The Visa Function Under the Immigration and Nationality Act

by Frank L. Auerbach<sup>1</sup>

Press release 193 dated April 15

I am glad to be here today and to review with you some of the more important changes the Immigration and Nationality Act has brought about in relation to the visa function of the Department of State.

The new law, commonly referred to as the McCarran-Walter Act, became effective on December 24, 1952, and thus has been in operation for less than 4 months, a rather brief period to assess its effect in any thorough fashion. But compared with the old law, the new act has brought about certain changes in our immigration laws and consequently in implementing regulations, the effect of which can already clearly be recognized in the day-by-day operations. I should like to discuss with you some of these changes.

One of the most important changes, if not the most important change brought about by the new law, is that it eliminates racial discrimination from naturalization and makes aliens of all races eligible for immigration into the United States.

Before the new act became operative on December 24, 1952, the Immigration Act of February 5, 1917, provided for the so-called Asiatic barred zone, natives of which, with few exceptions, could not come to the United States as immigrants. In addition the Immigration Act of 1924 made ineligible for immigration all persons who under our nationality laws were barred from naturalization. These provisions of the 1924 act made ineligible for immigration, among others, natives of Korea and Japan. In recent years this resulted in many unfortunate situations, particularly in the case of American servicemen who married

<sup>1</sup> Address made at New York City before the Federal Bar Association of New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut on Apr. 16. Mr. Auerbach is a foreign affairs officer in the Visa Office. For an article entitled "Visa Work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service," see BULLETIN of Feb. 2, 1953, p. 195, and Feb. 9, 1953, p. 232 (also available as Department of State publication 4980).

Japanese or Korean girls only to discover that under the then applicable immigration laws they could not bring their wives into the United States.

In providing for the immigration of persons of Asian ancestry the Immigration and Nationality Act follows, generally speaking, the pattern set up in 1943 when the Congress upon the urging of President Roosevelt repealed the Chinese Exclusion Act and set up a quota for Chinese persons. Different from the case of other immigrants whose quota is determined by place of birth, the law provided in the case of Chinese persons that ancestry rather than place of birth was to be the determining factor in establishing an alien's quota. A similar formula was followed in 1946 when Congress set up a quota for East Indians.

As stated already, the new law follows in general the formula of the 1943 act as to the determination of quota chargeability of Asian peoples with some very significant liberalizing exceptions. Under the old law the East Indian husband, wife, or child and the Chinese husband and child of an American citizen could enter the United States only as quota immigrants, which mostly meant many years of waiting due to the smallness of and the heavy demand on these quotas. The new law accords nonquota status to any child, wife, and husband of an American citizen, regardless of their ancestry or race.

The salutary effect of this liberalization can be observed in the day-by-day work in the Visa Office of the Department of State.

### Quota Chargeability of Asian Immigrants

The quota chargeability of an Asian immigrant who is not entitled to nonquota status is determined by his place of birth if he is born within the so-called Asia-Pacific Triangle, covering roughly all Asian countries from India to Japan and all Pacific Islands north of Australia and New Zealand. In other words, a Japanese person born in Korea is chargeable to the Korean quota while

an East Indian born in Japan is chargeable to the Japanese quota. If an immigrant who is attributable by as much as one-half of his ancestry to a people or peoples indigenous to the Asia-Pacific Triangle is born outside of the Triangle his quota is determined by his ancestry rather than by his place of birth. Due to specific statutory provisions Chinese persons who are quota immigrants are always chargeable to the Chinese quota regardless of whether they are born within or without the Asia-Pacific Triangle.

Apart from the provisions relating to the immigration of Asian peoples the national origins system in allocating immigration quotas has by and large been continued in the new act from the Immigration Act of 1924.

A new provision in the Immigration and Nationality Act places a ceiling of 100 on the number of quota visas which may be issued to natives of colonies and dependencies who are chargeable to the quota of the governing country. For example, natives of Malta, Hong Kong, Bermuda, or Trinidad who are chargeable to the quota of Great Britain may not be issued in any one year more than 100 visas each of the total quota of Great Britain. This new provision has particular significance in the Portuguese and Spanish quotas where the colonies may absorb all of the mother country's quota.

In order to facilitate the administration of this provision of the law the Department of State has established by regulation so-called subquotas of 100 each. The term subquota designates that portion of the quota of a governing country which may be made available, subject to a limitation of 100 annually, to quota immigrants born in any colony or other component or dependent areas overseas from the governing country. Chargeable to such subquotas is, as a rule, any quota immigrant born in a colony, component, or dependent area. The Department has determined that there are at present a total of 78 subquotas of 8 countries: the quota for Great Britain and Northern Ireland has 44 subquotas; France 16 subquotas; Portugal 8 subquotas; Spain and the Netherlands 3 subquotas each; India 2 subquotas; and Belgium and Denmark 1 subquota each. Nine of the 44 subquotas of Great Britain are allocated to British colonies and dependent areas in the Western Hemisphere. They are the Bahamas, Barbados, Bermuda, British Guiana, British Honduras, Jamaica, Leeward Islands, Trinidad, and Windward Islands.

#### **Change in Preference Quotas**

Another significant change brought about by the new law is the system of preferences within quotas. Under the old law the first 50 percent of a quota was available to parents, and to husbands by marriage since January 1, 1948, of American citizens and, in the case of quotas over 300, to

so-called skilled agriculturists. The next 50 percent of the quota was available to the wives and children of permanent resident aliens. Those portions of a quota not used by either preference group were available to all other immigrants sometimes referred to as new seed immigrants because they had no close ties in the United States.

Under the new law relative preferences have been expanded and in addition a system of selective immigration has been introduced. The first 50 percent of each quota is first available to so-called skilled aliens whose services are needed urgently in the United States because of their high education, technical training, specialized experience, or exceptional ability. The next 30 percent of each quota is available to parents of American citizens and the remaining 20 percent to spouses and children of aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence.

Any portion not used by any of these three preference groups is first available to aliens in any of the other preference groups and if not required by them becomes available to nonpreference quota immigrants. Twenty-five percent of this portion of the quota not used by the first three preference groups, however, is made available to a so-called fourth preference quota group consisting of brothers and sisters of American citizens, and to the sons and daughters of American citizens who do not qualify for nonquota status because they are married or over 21 years of age.

Up to this time the number of aliens who have been found qualified for the so-called first preference quota has been rather small, probably due to the fact that this new preference for skilled aliens, which it is expected will eventually benefit American economy and industry, has not yet become well-known. There has been a considerable demand for fourth preference quota visas particularly by brothers and sisters of American citizens who through this new preference find their cases considered ahead of those aliens without such close family ties in the United States.

#### **Protection of American Labor**

The introduction of the system of selective immigration was accompanied by another significant change in our immigration law. The new law did not re-enact the so-called contract labor provisions but has substituted provisions designed to safeguard American labor more effectively and more flexibly. The contract labor provisions of the old law, with few exceptions, excluded from admission into the United States aliens who were promised or had a contract for labor in the United States which was predominantly manual in character. The purpose of this provision was to protect American labor from competition of immigrant labor. The new law approaches this problem differently. Immigrants who seek to enter the United States to perform skilled or unskilled labor

are barred from admission only if the Secretary of Labor certifies to the Secretary of State and the Attorney General a sufficiency of workers in the United States who are able, willing, and qualified to perform at the place to which the alien is destined such skilled or unskilled labor as the alien is seeking to perform, or that the employment of certain immigrants will adversely affect the wages and working conditions of the workers in the United States similarly employed. In the absence of such certification by the Secretary of Labor this provision is inoperative. So far, the Secretary of Labor has not made a certification as contemplated by the law. The scope of this potential ground for exclusion is limited. Even after the Secretary of Labor has made a certification as to the sufficiency of labor in a given locality the resulting excluding provision applies only to nonpreference quota immigrants and immigrants entitled to nonquota status as natives of the Western Hemisphere or as former American citizens. It does not apply to any of the other nonquota immigrant categories or to preference quota immigrants.

The abolition of the contract labor provisions of the old law has a significance which affects another important requirement of the law. Both under the old and new law an immigrant may be issued a visa only if he can show that he will not become a public charge in the United States. Unless the alien had at his disposal in this country funds of his own, proof that he was not likely to become a public charge under the old law usually was presented by the submission of a so-called affidavit of support from a relative or close friend in the United States who expressed his willingness and showed his ability to take care of the alien in such way that he would not become a public charge. The presentation of a work contract in this connection was unacceptable unless the alien's vocation was predominantly mental. The presentation of a work contract for manual employment not only did not overcome the likelihood of becoming a public charge but led mandatorily to the denial of a visa under the contract labor provisions. Under the new law the presentation of a work contract may in some cases very well be the sole proof required by the consul to satisfy the requirement of the law that the alien is not likely to become a public charge.

The law contains another new provision which permits an immigrant in certain cases to overcome a likelihood of becoming a public charge. In the case of an alien ineligible to receive a visa because he is likely to become a public charge a bond may be posted with the Attorney General. Under the Department of State visa regulations the posting of such bond with the Attorney General will be accepted by the consular officer as satisfactory proof that the alien is not likely to become a public charge in the United States.

At this point I should like to comment briefly

on the public charge provision of the statute as it is implemented by the regulations of the Department of State. In the language of the statute an alien is ineligible to receive a visa if in the opinion of the consular officer at the time of application for a visa, the alien is likely at any time to become a public charge. Under the Department's regulations any conclusion that an alien, eligible to receive a visa, is likely to become a public charge must "be predicated upon the existence of facts or circumstances which indicate a reasonable probability that the immigrant will become a charge upon the public after entry into the United States."

Another provision of the new law relating to the issuance of visas to immigrants is of considerable significance. Since the Alien Registration Act became law in 1940 and until the new law took effect, not only present but also former members of proscribed organizations were excluded from admission into the United States. In other words, under the old law an alien who was a member of the Communist Party some 20 years ago but had long since terminated his membership could not be issued an immigration visa even if he had become one of the most outspoken and effective fighters against communism.

For the first time an escape clause for former voluntary members of proscribed organizations is provided by the new act. It contains a defector clause which permits the issuance of an immigrant visa to former voluntary members of proscribed organizations if the alien since the termination of his membership, and for at least 5 years before the date of his visa application, has been actively opposed to the doctrine, program, principles, and ideology of the proscribed organization to which he belonged. The issuance of a visa to such an alien is conditioned on a finding that his admission into the United States would be in the public interest. Visa regulations of the Department of State provide that in the interest of a coordinated and uniform interpretation of what constitutes the public interest in issuing or refusing visas to political defectors, all such cases will be referred by the field to the Secretary of State for possible consultation with the Attorney General.

#### **Elimination of Sex Discrimination**

Another change in our immigration laws which affects the visa function of the Department of State should be mentioned. The new law eliminates the discrimination between sexes which could be found both in the Immigration Act of February 7, 1917, and in the act of 1924. Under the old law an American citizen could bring to this country his alien wife as a nonquota immigrant; but an American woman could bring her alien husband by marriage since January 1, 1948, only as a preference quota immigrant. An alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence could



bring his wife to this country as a preference quota immigrant while an alien woman lawfully admitted to this country could bring her alien husband only as a nonpreference quota immigrant which in the case of smaller quotas meant considerable and often indefinite delay. If an immigrant husband and wife were born in two different countries and the wife was chargeable to an oversubscribed quota while the husband was chargeable to an open quota, under the old law the wife could be charged to her husband's quota. But the reverse did not apply. In other words, a husband chargeable to an oversubscribed quota could not be charged to the open quota of his accompanying wife. These and many other provisions of the old law which discriminated against women have all been eliminated under the Immigration and Nationality Act. Wives have been given the same status in all respects as are granted to husbands. In other words, an alien husband of an American woman may be issued a nonquota visa as can the alien wife of an American citizen; and an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence may bring his spouse as preference quota immigrant regardless of whether the preceding spouse is the husband or the wife.

One new feature of the Immigration and Nationality Act which refers both to immigrants and nonimmigrants is the requirement that visa petitions be filed with the Immigration and Naturalization Service in the case of aliens coming temporarily to the United States for employment or training and in the case of all preference quota and nonquota immigrants except those who are nonquota immigrants due to their birth in the Western Hemisphere.

The petition procedure in these cases rests exclusively with the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Upon the approval of a petition by the Immigration and Naturalization Service the Department of State is notified and in turn forwards to the consular offices abroad the Attorney General's classification of the alien.

#### **Visas for Business Visitors**

Some questions have arisen as to whether certain nonimmigrant aliens coming to the United States temporarily are to be considered temporary workers requiring petitions, or visitors for business in whose case a nonimmigrant visa may be issued without the prior approval of a petition. Since it was obviously the intent of the law to protect by the petition requirement American labor, the Department of State and the Immigration and Naturalization Service have agreed that certain classes of nonimmigrant aliens who are coming to the United States temporarily for noncompensatory and noncompetitive employment or instruction may properly be classified as visitors for business. For example, various American firms who have purchased abroad machinery or

other equipment and have arranged for expert personnel to install in this country such machinery and to instruct the American personnel in its operation. These aliens, it has been agreed, will be considered visitors for business and may, therefore, be issued visitors' visas without a prior petition if they continue to draw their pay from their foreign employer and receive from the American firm not more than a subsistence allowance and reimbursement for other expenses incidental to their temporary stay in this country.

Another example is that of a group of ministers of religion who for years have been coming from England in exchange with American ministers going to England during the summer months. These ministers coming from England continue to draw their salary in England and are the guests in this country of the American church at which they serve, or of its members. Here again it has been held that a visitor-for-business visa may properly be issued rather than a visa requiring a visa petition.

A third group of aliens is considered qualified for classification as visitors for business rather than as temporary workers. These are aliens brought to the United States temporarily by American exporters who are selling American goods abroad and who bring these aliens to this country in order to familiarize them with the manufacture, service or sales methods of the American product. The Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Department of State have agreed that these aliens may be classified visitors for business if the nature of their instruction is predominantly mental; if securing this instruction benefits the American national interest; and if these aliens continue to draw their pay from their foreign employer who may be a foreign branch of an American firm, and receive from the American firm not more than a subsistence allowance and reimbursement for other expenses incidental to their temporary stay.

In view of the concern sometimes expressed about the allegedly unlimited power of consular officers in refusing visas, as a final point, I should like to discuss the administrative procedures surrounding the refusal and revocation of immigrant visas.

When an immigrant visa is refused by a consular officer a memorandum of refusal is prepared and retained in the consular file. The action of refusing an immigrant visa by a consular officer has to be reviewed by the consular officer in charge of visa work at the foreign post. If this superior officer concurs in the refusal he has to countersign the memorandum of refusal. If he does not concur in the refusal the case is referred to the Department for an advisory opinion.

Once an immigrant visa is issued it may be revoked only under the following circumstances: (1) The consular officer knows, or after investigation is satisfied, that the visa was procured by

fraud, willingly false or misleading representation, the willful concealment of a material fact, or other unlawful means; or (2) the consular officer obtains information establishing the alien was otherwise ineligible to receive the particular visa at the time it was issued.

Notice of revocation, if practicable, is to be given to the alien at his last known address before his departure for the United States. Whenever circumstances permit the alien will also be given opportunity to show why he believes revocation to be, or to have been, unwarranted.

Once an immigrant visa has been revoked a full report concerning the revocation has to be submitted to the Department of State for transmission to the Attorney General. If it was not practicable to give the alien notice of revocation before his departure for the United States, the report submitted to the Department of State has to explain all the pertinent circumstances in the case.

In addition to this procedure prescribed by regulations it has long been the administrative practice of the Visa Office to entertain inquiries by attorneys and other interested persons in the United States concerning the disposition of visa cases. If there is no case record in the Department on the case in which an inquiry is received a request for a report on the case will be directed to the field. If on the basis of the facts available in the Department or upon the report received from the field it is found that the handling of the case by the consular officer is not consistent with the Department's interpretation of law and regulations an appropriate advisory opinion will be despatched to the consular officer having jurisdiction in the case.

In this connection, I should like to refer to the provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act which establishes that determination and ruling by the Attorney General with respect to all questions of law are controlling for all agencies entrusted with the administration of this law. Therefore, the interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act by the Department of State is not only guided by pertinent court decisions but also by rulings and requested opinions of the Attorney General.

These are some of the provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act which have been given little if any publicity, but which are of considerable importance to those administering the law and particularly to those who are affected by the law, the immigrant, the nonimmigrant, and their sponsors and representatives in this country.

Of course, it is unavoidable that a new law dealing with a subject matter as complicated as that of immigration will raise problems, many of which cannot be recognized until the law has been in operation for some time. As far as the first 4 months of the law's operations are concerned, it has not presented any serious operational diffi-

culties in the visa field which could not be resolved by reasonable interpretation or adjustment of administrative procedures.

The Visa Office of the Department of State, by the issuance of instructions and advisory opinions, is doing all in its power to assist consular officers throughout the world to achieve as uniform an interpretation of the law as is possible. . . .

## Secretary Dulles Departs For NAC Ministerial Meeting

*Statement by the Secretary*<sup>1</sup>

Press release 206 dated April 21

I believe the forthcoming meeting of the NATO ministers will be a very important one. This will be the first time that representatives of the Eisenhower administration have participated directly in NATO ministerial meetings. There are a number of matters which we will wish to discuss with allied governments, and there are several important decisions to be taken.

Our principal immediate objective will be to reach agreement on broad NATO defense programs for 1953. I believe such an agreement will be attained and will provide for a substantial increase in NATO's defensive strength. In addition, we will wish to examine the current world situation, especially in the light of the proposals of President Eisenhower in his speech of April 16 before the American Society of Newspaper Editors.<sup>2</sup> We also wish to lay the groundwork for the development of plans for future years—long-range plans which will enable us to deter military attack from without while maintaining our inner economic and political strength.

In our discussions in Paris, we will naturally wish to consider recent statements and actions by the Soviet Government, in which all NATO peoples have a common interest. However, I do not believe that our present security planning can be modified by recent Soviet moves. As I said in my address to the editors last Saturday,<sup>3</sup> nothing that has happened so far justifies any relaxation of effort nor any weakening of NATO defenses. Instead, there is good reason to believe that the growing strength of the free world may influence the Soviet Union decisively in the direction of peace. The commonsense course for nations of the Atlantic community is to move forward steadily toward greater strength and unity, maintaining always an appropriate balance between our military defenses and the basic economic stability upon which both our defenses and our entire social order depend.

<sup>1</sup> Made at the Washington National Airport on Apr. 21.

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Apr. 27, 1953, p. 599.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 603.

## At the Crossroads in U.S. Trade Policy

by Thruston B. Morton

Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations<sup>1</sup>

Since this city, the State of Louisiana, and as a matter of fact the entire Mississippi Valley, has such an important stake in international trade, I am sure that you would like to know how the administration feels about your theme, "Balance Trade, Reduce Aid."

I can assure you that the President and the executive branch of the Government agree that it is in our national interest and in the interest of the entire free world that we increase trade and thus reduce the need for aid. But we are, in 1953, at the crossroads in U.S. trade policy.

This administration is going to be assailed with two lines of argument. On the one hand, important groups will be saying: "We must keep the American market for American products. Why should we want to engage in foreign trade and thus make ourselves dependent upon other nations over whom we have no possible means of control? Why should we share our incomparably rich and extensive markets with other nations and allow foreign goods to compete with the products of American workers?"

They will also argue that we must keep out the goods of foreign countries produced by "cheap" labor in order to avoid lowering our standard of living. They will claim that if we permit imports from abroad we will be faced with unemployment in our industries and the closing down of productive facilities.

Then as a final argument, the opponents of any measures to lower barriers to trade will note that our tariffs are the lowest they have ever been in our history, lower than many other nations of the free world. Why, they conclude, should we lower them any further?

On the other side we have those groups which will contend that without a solid economic foundation the mutual-defense effort in the free world

is built on quicksand. They will point out that we cannot have international political cooperation and economic isolation. They will say that with our storehouses piling up with butter, cheese, dried milk, cotton, grains, and other products, it does not take much imagination to realize how dependent we are on export markets. If we try to keep the American market for our products, foreigners are going to keep theirs for their products.

This side also will point out that it makes no sense to say that low labor costs abroad can cut our standard of living if we import.

They will note that American automobile factory workers get higher wages than those of any other country and better pay than most workers in other American nonexport industries. But American cars are cheaper than foreign cars and can undersell them in open competition. The important factor in trade isn't the wage per day; it's the wage per unit of product. Our workers, with the mechanized means of production and highly developed technology, are able to produce a greater number of products per hour, thus resulting in lower costs per unit even though their wages per hour are high.

Furthermore, they will note, the U.S. economy has developed on the basis of the theory that competition is what keeps our system dynamic and progressive. Give in to the protection sentiment, they say, and you destroy the ingredient in American society that makes it grow.

And lastly, they will reply that our tariffs may be the lowest in our history, but that there are still many, many rates ranging from 50 to 400 percent *ad valorem*.

And so the battle rages. Although the arguments of those who recognize the need for lowering barriers to trade may be more persuasive in the abstract, the troops with special interests are infinitely more effective in getting their views presented where it counts the most—before our legis-

<sup>1</sup> Address made before the 8th Mississippi Valley World Trade Conference at New Orleans, La., on Apr. 17 (press release 194 dated Apr. 16).

lators. If we are ever to get a foreign-trade policy capable of serving as the foundation for a strong free world defense effort, it is incumbent upon groups such as yours to stimulate a broader understanding of the issues involved.

I'd like to take myself out of this crossfire and give you some of the facts which reveal the dangers to the United States of pulling back from our policy of international cooperation in the field of trade.

Gone are the days when diplomacy was a matter of ambassadors influencing individuals in power in foreign countries and dealing solely in the political plane. Economic and trade policy are very much a part of our diplomacy and our defense effort. President Eisenhower put it very well in his inaugural address:<sup>2</sup>

... we are linked to all free peoples not merely by a noble idea but by a simple need. No free people can for long cling to any privilege or enjoy any safety in economic solitude. For all our own material might, even we need markets in the world for the surpluses of our farms and our factories. Equally, we need for these same farms and factories vital materials and products of distant lands. This basic law of interdependence, so manifest in the commerce of peace, applies with thousand-fold intensity in the event of war.

#### **Trade Restrictions: An Aid to the Kremlin**

A most important part of our leadership is how to provide an economic foundation for a healthy free world—how to build strength and security to counter both the Communist threats of aggression and the Communist efforts to divide the free world. This problem is just as real today as it was 3 weeks or a month ago, when the Communists launched on the newest zig of their zigzag policy. If we don't come up with the right answers it isn't going to matter to any of us how much cheese, glassware, silk scarves, tuna fish, and shrimp enter the United States in 1953, 1954, or any other year.

The Kremlin's policy is to create weakness and disunity in the free world. Those who tend to pass off lightly the part that U.S. trade policy plays in our over-all foreign policy should read the article that Stalin wrote before his death in the Russian magazine *Bolshevik* for October 1952:

The most important result of the Second World War in its economic consequences must be considered the disintegration of a united, all-embracing world market. This circumstance determined further the deepening of the general crisis of the capitalist system . . .

. . . idleness of enterprises in these countries will increase. In this, properly speaking, there consists a deepening of the general crisis of the world capitalist system in connection with the disintegration of the world market.

Stalin saw that crisis in terms of an "inevitable" trade conflict between the nations of the free world. He assured his readers that this conflict meant the certain disintegration of free world

unity and the ultimate world triumph of communism.

"We need not worry," was the essence of his remarks. "The free nations will destroy themselves. They haven't got what it takes to work and prosper together."

And those who thought that perhaps with Stalin's death we might get a different Communist line should read the speech delivered on March 14 by the Polish representative to the Economic Commission for Europe.

E. Milnikiel, Polish Minister to Sweden, told the Western European countries at a meeting of the U.N. unit not to expect any help from the United States in solving its economic problems by "trade, not aid."

Milnikiel's speech would not have been remarkable had it not revealed the complete coverage that Communist information services are currently giving to every evidence of what we may broadly call "protectionism" in the West—everything from "Buy American" to the escape-clause actions which are invoked in an attempt to keep out imports from the United States.

Those who are anxious to avoid providing the Communists with a weapon to beat us over the head are concerned by the introduction of many restrictionist bills in this session of Congress.

At least 38 bills have already been introduced this session to cut imports from our friends and allies.

At least 22 bills have been presented in the House and 2 in the Senate to cut imports of fuel oil. Two bills would put a 35 percent *ad valorem* duty on imported shrimp. Three bills would double the duty on Swiss watches. One bill to put a 5-cents-per-pound duty on fresh or frozen tuna would really hit Japan hard.

And one bill would give to a Cabinet officer the power to shut off imports when he considered them "excessive."

#### **Communist Use of the Trade Issue**

To cite an example of how the Communists use the trade issue, I would like to tell you about the time our restrictions on cheese imports were imposed, when a tariff quota was imposed on almonds, when minor escape-clause actions were taken which affected Italy.

The Communists in Southern Italy and Sicily went into action. Hardly had our restrictions gone into effect than a Soviet ship appeared in southern Italian ports accompanied by widespread publicity that the Soviet Union intended to buy Italian products. It was a very effective gesture, especially when they bought some boatloads of lemons and almonds.

One American official who traveled in Southern Italy at this time reported that the Communists were also using our trade actions to attack the NATO defense effort. The Communists plastered

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Feb. 2, 1953, p. 168.

wallposters far and wide and repeated by word of mouth, "The United States is ready to take our sons, but she won't take our goods."

Clearly, if we want our allies to throw their economic lot in with us and abandon their historic markets to the East, we must assure them that we will be a responsible and reliable leader. Not just now and then, but consistently.

Of course, we'll need cooperation from the other countries of the free world if we are to build a strong economic foundation.

Countries of the free world must take measures to control inflation; restrictive business and labor practices must be curbed; competition in industry encouraged; productivity increased; and a better climate provided for foreign investment. All these measures would strengthen the economies of the free world.

Another danger which would result from our failure to encourage the free world to reduce barriers to trade is that the Soviet bloc could make big gains in the battle of production.

The Kremlin can, by decrees, eliminate the national economies of the satellites and merge them all into a Soviet economy covering the entire heartland of Europe and Asia.

If we look at a map and trace the outlines of the Soviet bloc, we can see that the major part of Europe and Asia is combined under the iron control of the Soviet Union. The Soviet bloc, with its potential resources and a potentially huge internal market, can maximize its production without much international trade. Conceivably, by dictation from the Kremlin, every part of the Soviet bloc could be directed to produce the things it is best suited to produce. It could thus assure that the best possible use of its resources, plants, and manpower is being made.

The remainder of Europe, Asia, and the Western Hemisphere, on the other hand, is fragmented into over 50 individual countries, each with its own economic structure, each lacking raw materials, resources, plants, and key skills found only in other countries. Each is separated from the others by numerous currency and trade barriers that impede the flow of trade among these various free countries.

To compensate, the free world needs to lower barriers to trade among its member countries.

Not only does the lowering of barriers to trade strengthen the free world by permitting each country to obtain needed materials at the lowest cost, by permitting each to achieve top efficiency from large-scale production, but it also raises the standard of living of all countries of the free world.

The world took a big step forward when mankind decided that division of labor enabled all the villagers to live better. When the shoemaker stopped making his own clothes and concentrated on making shoes, when the farmer concentrated on raising crops instead of trying to build his own

equipment, the whole community benefited. That same principle holds for the nations of the free world.

### **The Tariff Curtain and the Iron Curtain**

Today one of Western Europe's most pressing problems is that of trade. Figuratively speaking, her shoemakers can't sell their shoes to pay for the agricultural and other products they need from us.

This problem has intensified since the historic trade between Eastern and Western Europe has been cut down. Formerly, up until World War II, nearly one-third of Western Europe's commerce was conducted with Russia, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia. Broadly, the countries behind the Iron Curtain supplied Western Europe with cereals, metals, timber, hides, and other raw materials in exchange for textiles, hardware, machinery, electrical equipment, chemicals, and other manufactured goods. The cutback of East-West trade to prevent strategic materials from going to the Soviet bloc has sharply cut down a key source of raw materials for Western Europe and has shrunk drastically a major market for its manufactured goods. Moreover, Western Europe's whole trading pattern with Asia and other less developed areas was disrupted during World War II and has not been altogether restored since.

This situation spotlights another danger which a restrictionist U.S. trade policy would create. Western Europe must find new markets. A restrictive trade policy by us would crush our allies between the tariff curtain and the Iron Curtain.

We seem to our friends to be very inconsistent when we ask the countries of Western Europe to refrain from East-West trade and then shut the door to trade with the United States by our own restrictions on the importation of foreign goods.

Furthermore, such restrictions are not in our own self-interest. If we do not give the people of Western Europe the opportunity to earn dollars, how can we expect them to buy our goods? Restrictions on imports that deny the right to our customers to earn dollars mean lost markets for American business.

We should permit access to our markets from abroad, or else that segment of business and agriculture which sells abroad must become accustomed to diminishing markets. You are undoubtedly familiar with the restrictions imposed by Congress on the importation of cheese which has cut the sale of foreign cheese in the United States. This has resulted, specifically in the case of France, in the cancellation of contracts for the purchase of citrus fruit, because the dollars were not available due to French inability to earn dollars in the American market. We must recognize that for every dollar of sale prevented in the United States there is a dollar of American exports lost abroad.

We are really in a very peculiar situation. After having helped to build up the production of our allies and our former enemies so that the countries of the free world can stand on their own feet in competitive world trade, we have not at the same time been able to lower our trade barriers to make it possible for them to sell to us.

Take the case of Japan—a bulwark against communism in the Far East. The 80 million people crowded into the island of Japan, an area smaller than California, must trade in order to live. We have spent hundreds of millions of dollars a year to keep Japan alive and to rebuild her economic strength. Japan in return has cut off most of her once rich trade with China, although this has meant paying higher prices for raw materials and losing an important market.

If we are going to keep Japan on the free world's side, she must expand her trade with the free world or go on being subsidized by the American taxpayer. There is, of course, one other possibility. She could tie her economy in with the Soviet bloc, but that isn't the solution that we would like to see.

Stalin, before his death, predicted that the free world could not absorb the export capacities of Germany and Japan. It is incumbent upon the free world to prove him wrong in this, as in his other predictions.

There is still another danger if we withdraw from international cooperation in the trade field. This is a danger to our economy.

In the postwar period from 1946 to 1952, the cumulative dollar deficit of the United States with the rest of the world amounted to approximately \$34 billion. It was covered by aid from the United States and the use of gold and dollar reserves. With the reduction of foreign aid, which has made possible a large part of U.S. shipments abroad of agricultural and manufactured products, exports will drop sharply, unless we increase our imports and permit other countries to earn the dollars needed to maintain their purchases of American products.

In this dilemma the United States faces three choices in its trade policy:

1. We can cut exports and accept defaults on payments of loans;
2. We can meet the trade deficit with money from the public treasury—the taxpayer's pocket; or
3. We can face the economic facts of life and recognize that the only way we can receive payment for goods is in the form of imports of goods and services.

President Eisenhower, recognizing the dangers and aware of the need for trade to strengthen the economic foundations of the free world, has recommended to Congress the extension for 1 year of the present Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act as

an interim measure.<sup>3</sup> He also recommended that we revise our customs regulations to remove administrative barriers to trade; encourage the flow of private American investment abroad; utilize facilities overseas for the production of articles which are needed for mutual defense; and import greater amounts of important raw materials which we do not ourselves possess.

The right answers in the field of foreign economic policy are not easy to come by, and there is one thing of which we can be certain—none of them are easy to adopt.

You are probably all aware that hearings will begin on April 22 before the House Ways and Means Committee to decide which of the crossroads the United States shall take in its trade policy. The hearings will be held on a bill which would tear the vitals out of the present Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act. Adoption of such a bill would create consternation among countries of the free world and would lend credence to the Communist theme that the United States wants to sell but it does not want to buy.

#### **The Need for a Customs Simplification Bill**

Hearings will also be held in the near future on a customs simplification bill. Such a bill is long overdue. We haven't had any real changes since 1930, despite the rapid strides we have made in technology. This has led to some strange developments in the Customs Houses around the country. I'd just like to cite a few strange situations which arise from our present law.

Take paragraph 1559 for example. It provides for the classification of those imported articles not specifically provided for in the Tariff Act of 1930. It's called the "general basket clause." It specifies that each and every article not named in the tariff shall be assessed the duty charged for the product it most resembles. Where an article that isn't listed by its own name resembles two other named articles, on which different rates apply, it is assessed at the rate for the article paying the highest duty. This rule has caused some fantastic results.

For example, staple fiber nylon yarn is classified under the wool schedule if the yarn has a crimp or crinkle in it. Exactly the same yarn is classified under the silk schedule and charged a different rate if there is no crimp in it.

Since the enactment of the 1930 tariff, many new products have been developed, and when any of these products are imported the question of tariff classification arises at once. That's when the customs collectors run into the "rule of similitude." Collectors of customs are given no latitude by paragraph 1559 to use their good judgment, experience, or common sense. This paragraph says if they find that an imported article resembles

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Apr. 27, 1953, p. 634.

more than one enumerated article, the classification must blindly follow the rule of highest rate.

Under this rule, radar equipment was classified as clocks until the Customs Court reversed the decision many months later. The Court held that the clock paragraph was intended by Congress to apply to instruments designed to provide a more accurate measurement of time than a radar device does.

I have also heard, but I can't vouch for it, that interpretations under our complicated customs rules brought a young collector widespread renown in the Customs Service. He had to figure out how to rule on a body in a coffin. The body was that of an American being shipped home for burial. This bright collector's solution was to classify the body as "an American product, not advanced in value or improved in condition." Under that legitimate customs-law classification it could come in duty free. The collector also admitted the coffin without charge, on the theory that it was the "usual container" for such goods.

Unfortunately I didn't bring along my crystal ball, so I am not going to try to predict what course of action Congress is going to take with regard to trade policy and how it will affect the theme of this conference, "Balance Trade, Reduce Aid." However, I do know that our Senators and Representatives try to reflect the views of their constituents. We can, therefore, expect no prog-

ress in legislation to help balance trade unless there is general public understanding and support throughout the country for such a move.

For that reason, as well as to develop a forward-looking foreign economic policy which will be in the best interest of the entire country, President Eisenhower has announced that he plans to appoint a commission to undertake a fundamental study of U.S. foreign economic policy.

I am certain that the study will consider realistic measures which are required to face up to present-day problems. And I am sure that the realism of this commission will not fit the description which Disraeli, the great British Prime Minister of the last century, gave of a realist. He said, "A realist is a man who insists on making the same mistakes his grandfather made."

Up to the present time the United States has failed to adopt a policy adequate to the needs of a creditor nation—a creditor nation which wants to be paid for its exports. The renewal of the present Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act and the passage of a customs simplification act, as requested by the President, are not the final measures which need to be taken to meet the demands of these perilous times, but they are what is needed to keep the situation from deteriorating until we can have a thorough study which will result in recommendations which the American people and the Congress will support.

## Problems of American Agriculture and Foreign Trade

*Statement by Harold F. Linder*

*Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

Press releases 186, 189 dated April 10

I was very glad to receive the Committee's invitation to comment, on behalf of the Department of State, on the relation of our agricultural imports and exports to our domestic agricultural programs.

This is a subject which, all too frequently, is dealt with in bits and pieces as emergency situations arise. It is timely, it seems to me, for these problems to be reviewed in some systematic way, so that we can find the course most in harmony with our national objectives. I think that such a course can be found and that reviews of the sort your Committee is conducting are needed to help find it.

On the surface, it might appear that there was no need for Americans to worry very much either

about exports or imports. Superficially, we seem to have a fairly self-sufficient economy. When we look at the figures in the aggregate neither our imports nor our exports seem to bulk very large compared to what we produce at home. For every dollar of domestic production, we import only 3 cents worth and we export only 4 cents worth of goods. Except for the Soviet Union, these figures are lower than those of any major country in the world.

Yet, like so many figures of this kind, the impression they give is deceptive. The fact is that critical parts of our economy are geared to doing a substantial amount of business with foreign countries. This is especially true, as you know, in the field of agriculture. We sell a great deal of our cotton, wheat, tobacco, and rice overseas; last year, for example, just under 40 percent of each of these crops was marketed abroad. To a lesser extent, we market a good many of our specialty

<sup>1</sup> Made before the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry on Apr. 10.

crops abroad as well. Our apple, orange, raisin, and prune producers have always relied on foreign markets to provide the extra margin of profit that makes the difference between a lean year and a prosperous one. Taken all together, these exports require the use of about 60 million acres of American farmland, an area larger than the cultivated areas of all our Southeastern States.

The importance to the farmer of his export markets is something of which he himself is not always aware. As far as the farmer is concerned his contact is with domestic merchants, not with foreign users. What he is not in a position to see is that these crops are resold by these merchants for export abroad. Once these foreign markets dry up, the pipeline is clogged and the domestic buyers disappear.

### **Effects of a Reduction in Foreign Markets**

Another point that needs to be stressed is the fact that when foreign markets for our export crops are reduced, it is not the cotton or wheat or tobacco farmer alone who is affected. Our whole agricultural economy feels the effect, through a number of different channels. Perhaps the most important result is that farmers tend to turn over some of their land from export crops to domestic crops, from cotton to cattle grazing, from tobacco to truck farming, from wheat to dairying, and so on. And the resultant pressures are felt throughout the whole range of agricultural production.

Prosperity for our export-crop producers, therefore, is inseparably tied in with prosperity for the farmer producing for the home market.

This brings me to the next stage of our problem. How can we maintain a situation in which our overseas markets remain willing and able to buy American agricultural products? The Marshall plan answered this problem to some extent. Of course, the Marshall plan was conceived for a much larger purpose and accomplished a great deal more than simply providing an overseas market for American farmers. But it did serve the incidental purpose of providing foreign countries with dollars, some of which were used to buy our American export crops.

This means of disposing of American farm products, however, is one which none of us wants to continue for any longer than necessary, neither the American taxpayer nor the American farmer, nor even the foreign governments who receive our aid. Foreign buying must be placed on a basis on which it pays its own way. The only practical way of achieving this is to make sure that the foreign countries have every reasonable opportunity to earn the dollars that they need to buy our American products. This means that foreign countries should have every reasonable chance to sell their goods in our markets.

It is at this point that American agriculture is faced with a dilemma. Some of the products

which other countries have been selling to us and want to keep on selling to us are items which we can produce for ourselves, provided domestic prices are high enough. And one way of helping to keep these prices high, in addition to government buying, is to reduce or eliminate the imports we have been receiving from foreign producers.

A reduction of imports is often an attractive and seemingly painless solution, when one segment or another of American agriculture is demanding some action. Yet when we apply restrictions to keep out the normal imports of foreign producers, we clearly are running serious risks. Foreigners, finding that their American market is gone, will be forced to cut back on their purchases of our export crops as a result. And some of the farmers who previously raised export crops will turn to production for the home market, thereby adding to home competition and adding to the pressure on our support programs. Everybody may lose; our cotton farmers may lose their markets overseas, and foreign producers may lose their domestic markets in the United States. We balance our trade with the rest of the world in the worst possible way, by restricting it both ways.

I do not pretend to have any easy answers for this dilemma which American agriculture faces. As long as we recognize the equity of support prices for the American farmer, we shall always be faced with the problem of reconciling the farmer's interest in maintaining these programs and his interest in maintaining his overseas markets. We may never be able to achieve a perfect balance between these two interests. But I feel sure that we can achieve a better balance than our present policies now provide.

I have had occasion to make these points to a good many groups in the recent past and from time to time I have been told: "This is all very well, but isn't it true that countries abroad are imposing more and more restrictions on American products and that their current dependence on our cotton, wheat, tobacco, and so forth, is no more than a flash in the pan?"

### **Foreign Demand and the Scarcity of Dollars**

To begin with, I want to point out that the reasons that countries maintain their present restrictions on some American products is precisely because they are buying other American products so heavily. In other words, the demand of foreigners for American exports has grown much faster than the dollars that they have been able to earn; as a result, foreign governments have had to ration their supply of scarce dollars for the various competing demands which have been made upon them. And in rationing their scarce dollars, many of these countries have tried to reduce their purchases of apples, peaches, and other less basic products as a way of meeting part of the cost of their increased purchases of cotton, wheat,



and tobacco. Far from reducing their overall purchases of American agricultural products they have greatly increased these purchases.

The figures present a striking story. The rest of the world, which bought about 700 million dollars of our agricultural products annually in the years just before the war, has been buying from us at an annual rate of about 3,500 million dollars since the end of the war. This increase in our exports is much greater than the rise in our imports of agricultural products; before the war we imported about 600 million dollars annually of the kinds of products American agriculture can produce, whereas since the war the figure has risen to only 1,600 million dollars annually. It should be pointed out that the world's increased purchases of American agricultural products have been reflected in a relatively large number of the individual commodities involved. For some crops, both quantities and prices of exports have gone up; for others, the increase has been principally in the price. The only quantity decreases in exports of important crops have been in fruits.

There has been considerable speculation on how long the increased dependence of the rest of the world on American agriculture is likely to last. No one, of course, can speak with certainty about the long-run prospects. But as nearly as can be judged from the facts, there is every reason to suppose that the demand by foreign countries for American export crops will remain high over the years, provided foreign countries have the dollars to buy these crops.

### **The Increased Emphasis on Industrialization**

There are a number of reasons why this is to be expected. In the period immediately following the war, it was generally thought that our abnormal exports of agricultural products simply reflected the effects of overseas war destruction. But as time went on and our agricultural exports were maintained and expanded we began to see other causes for this extraordinary development. One major cause was the increased emphasis of a great many countries on industrialization. Argentina, for example, followed a deliberate policy of attracting workers from the farms to the cities. As a result, wheat acreage in Argentina has dropped to about 20 percent below its prewar level, and wheat production in Argentina has been equally depressed. Countries which previously relied upon Argentine wheat exports have had to turn to other sources. In addition to the loss of Argentine wheat, other normal prewar sources of wheat, such as Eastern Germany, the Balkan countries and the Soviet Union, also have shrunk. The loss of these sources, like the loss of Argentine wheat, has largely been due to the policy of forced industrialization, which has sharply reduced the amounts of agricultural products available for

foreign buyers. The forces that have tended to diminish prewar sources of wheat have also reduced the supplies of other agricultural products. The result has been that many countries have had to turn to the United States and Canada to fill the gap created by the loss of supplies from other areas.

The emphasis on continued industrialization around the world gives American farmers every right to anticipate that the rest of the world is going to remain a good customer for American products in the years ahead, always provided these countries are allowed to earn the dollars that are needed for that purpose. America's best customers are the countries with expanding production and expanding incomes. These are the countries which develop the internal needs for American essentials and the desires for American luxuries. As long as incomes in any country are on the increase, demands for one or another of America's diverse export crops are bound to increase as well; if not for wheat, then for cotton; and if not for cotton, then for peaches. But in order to translate this growing demand into actual purchases, we must be willing to give these countries the chance to earn dollars; we must be willing, in short, to have trade run on a 2-way street.

These are some of the facts which it seems to me this Committee will have to take into account in considering the problems of American agriculture and foreign trade. I am sure that similar considerations will be elaborated and analyzed in the study which the President has initiated of our overall foreign economic policy.<sup>2</sup> Only if such facts are fully appraised can we move ahead with a mutually consistent agricultural policy and trade policy which will advance our total national interests.

*At the close of his main statement, Mr. Linder made the following additional remarks:*

### **Section 22 of the Agricultural Act**

It is our understanding that, at yesterday's hearing, suggestions were made for amending section 22 of the Agricultural Act so that restrictions could be imposed on agricultural imports before the Tariff Commission had come to a conclusion as to whether or not such imports were interfering with domestic agricultural programs. I believe that this proposed amendment came up in connection with the proposal supported by the administration for the removal of section 104 of the Defense Production Act, which now imposes severe restrictions on imports of dairy products as well as certain other products.<sup>3</sup> Some fear was ex-

<sup>2</sup> For text of the President's message announcing this study and requesting the Congress to extend the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act for 1 year pending its completion, see BULLETIN of Apr. 27, 1953, p. 634.

<sup>3</sup> For text of a statement made by Mr. Linder relating to section 104, see *ibid.*, Apr. 13, 1953, p. 554.

pressed that in view of the prospective expiration of section 104 on June 30 of this year the Tariff Commission might not act promptly enough in deciding upon such restrictions as might prove to be necessary to prevent imports from interfering with the domestic dairy products program.

The Department of State has not had an opportunity to consider all the implications of the proposed amendment to section 22. Our preliminary view, however, is that such an amendment would fundamentally alter the present procedures by placing restrictions on imports before a considered judgment had been reached as to whether or not such restrictions were in fact necessary to prevent impairment of domestic programs. I am not at all sure that restrictions imposed in this way would not create for us many of the international difficulties which we have had in connection with section 104. It may be that some change in section 22 will prove to be necessary. It is our view, however, that any substantial changes in our foreign-trade policy should be undertaken only after the careful and comprehensive study contemplated in the President's recent message to Congress on the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act. As you know, the President in his message asked that the Trade Agreements Act be extended, in its present form, for a period of one year pending a complete and comprehensive review of our foreign-economic policy. Such a review would include a study of the relationship between our foreign-trade policy and our domestic agricultural programs with the idea of finding more effective solutions to the problems which confront us. Basic changes in the operation of section 22 at this time would, in our judgment, tend to prejudice the outcome of this study.

The proposed amendment under section 22 would not appear to be necessary in connection with the removal of 104 restrictions. Since yesterday's hearing, the President has requested the Tariff Commission to institute immediately an investigation under section 22 with respect to commodities now subject to restriction under 104. In his letter to the Tariff Commission he has asked that the Tariff Commission report back to him not later than June 1, that is to say a full 30 days before the scheduled expiration of section 104.

## **Submission of U.S. Claims on German Property**

Press release 192 dated April 15

The Department of State has been informed that the agreement between Switzerland and the Federal Republic of Germany concerning German assets in Switzerland became effective March 20, 1953.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See BULLETIN of Sept. 8, 1952, p. 363 for (1) Synopsis of the Swiss-German Agreement of Aug. 26; (2) Text of the related Swiss-Allied agreement of Aug. 28 and summary of letters annexed thereto.

Under article 5 of the Swiss-German agreement, protection is afforded to persons having interests in German assets in Switzerland, in general, as follows:

1. Persons having assets of a total value of less than 10,000 Swiss francs.
2. Persons who, on February 16, 1945, were dual U.S.-German nationals, provided that the United States supports their claim.
3. Persons deprived of life or substantially of liberty or of full citizenship rights under Nazi discriminatory laws.
4. Persons who can prove by certain certified statements that their property in Switzerland was returned to them pursuant to the laws in Germany on restitution.
5. Non-German persons having a 25 percent or more interest in firms organized under German law, which firms have assets in Switzerland.
6. Non-German beneficiaries of a family foundation.

Under article 18 and the related letter, protection is afforded American interests of 25 percent or more in firms organized outside of Germany and Switzerland, in which Germans participate to the extent of 50 percent or more and which have assets in Switzerland.

Under article 7 of the Swiss-German agreement the Swiss Compensation Office, an agency of the Swiss Government, is required to "despatch requests in an appropriate manner to all owners of property in Switzerland asking them to apply, personally or through agents, within 2 months from publication of such request for the unblocking of their property according to Article 5." By article 13 the Swiss Compensation Office is to unblock the properties specified in article 5 if a request by the owner has been filed within 2 months of the announcement referred to in article 7.

It is suggested that claimants in the United States not await receipt of notice from the Swiss Compensation Office but instead communicate immediately with the Swiss Compensation Office requesting the unblocking of their property. The address of the Swiss Compensation Office is Talstrasse 62, Zürich, Switzerland.

In a letter of August 26, 1952, the Federal Republic of Germany advised the United States that it would afford protection to U.S. nationals (and certain other non-German nationals) who had funds in Switzerland deposited through a German bank, if the German bank had advised the U.S. national that the funds received were deposited with a specified Swiss bank in a specified account and if the account exists today. Any U.S. national having funds in this category should communicate with the Department of State regarding the procedure to obtain protection.

## Questions Relating to Korean Settlement

### Press Conference Remarks by Secretary Dulles

Press release 203 dated April 20

*When asked at a press conference on April 20 whether there had been discussion within the administration of a possible political frontier being established at the waist of Korea, the Secretary made the following response:*

No. The waistline has always been one of the lines which has been given important consideration in terms of the military position in Korea. That line is a fairly short line of about 100 miles, I think, as against the present line of about 120, and as against the northern line which would be about 600 miles. So the waistline has for a long time been one of the lines which has been considered from a military standpoint.

From a political standpoint there has been no renunciation of the goal of a United Korea, which was the goal which was laid down by the United Nations. It was first laid down in 1947 when I handled the matter as a member of the U.S. delegation. It was reaffirmed in 1948 in Paris when I was also on the U.S. delegation handling the matter. It was again reaffirmed in 1950 when I was a delegate to the United Nations. That position was expressed by the President last Thursday and so expressed by me on Saturday.<sup>1</sup>

*Secretary Dulles replied as follows when asked about proposals that a political solution be made a condition to a military truce in Korea:*

I believe that we should try as far as is practicable to assure that a political discussion shall as nearly as possible coincide with the military armistice discussions, and that we should not face a long period of debate about an armistice which would postpone indefinitely political discussions. We have been through nearly 2 years of that, and I hope that if, and as, armistice negotiations are renewed, as they probably will be next Friday, that they will be quick and to the point, and not for long postpone political discussions.

Of course, the armistice agreement,<sup>2</sup> which is not just a U.S. document but a U.N. document, has already been formulated in the sense that it provides by article IV, section 60, that it will be recommended that within 3 months after the armistice agreement is signed a political conference be held. So to that extent, the order of events has already been fixed by a document which the United States alone is not at liberty to change.

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Apr. 27, 1953, pp. 599 and 603.

<sup>2</sup> UN doc. A/2228, dated Oct. 18, 1952.

But I believe that we can expedite the armistice negotiations and, if they are successful, bring about a prompt political discussion.

*Asked whether he would favor going ahead with the armistice first and then go into political discussions, the Secretary replied:*

Yes, I think we are committed to that by the agreement as drawn and, which, I say, is not just a U.S. document, but a U.N. document. It was reported to the United Nations on October 18, 1952.

*Asked whether the United States at the truce negotiations intended to sound out the Communists as to their views on a political settlement, the Secretary replied:*

I doubt that that would be an appropriate forum for such a sounding, because that is a military discussion by military leaders and the armistice is a military document. It could be done through some other means but that doesn't mean to say it will be. I just say it could be.

*Asked whether he thought the Communists would permit free elections and how the country could be unified without free elections throughout Korea, Secretary Dulles replied:*

I mean the kind of thing which was envisaged by the U.N. resolutions of '47 and '48 which did contemplate elections under neutral auspices. There was a commission, you know, sent out there. The United States was not represented on the commission. It was largely a commission of so-called neutrals. And they did supervise elections in part of the area but they were not allowed to proceed into the northern part of Korea. But refusals are not always permanent. We have been hoping for changes, and sometimes they come unexpectedly.

You take what is happening today, the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war, that is something which the Government had sought a good many times over the past couple of years. It has always been rejected. When under President Eisenhower's and my suggestion the proposal was renewed again last February 22, it was accepted. There are oftentimes unpredictable changes in the point of view and attitude of the Soviet Communist regime, and it is never wise to abandon hope permanently.

#### Correction

BULLETIN of April 20, 1953, page 575, first column: The heading should read: Letter from General Nam Il to General Harrison, April 9.

## INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

### Calendar of Meetings<sup>1</sup>

#### Adjourned During April 1953

International Wheat Council: 11th Session . . . . .	Washington . . . . .	Jan. 30-Apr. 2
International Wheat Council: Reconvening of 8th Session . . . . .	Washington . . . . .	Feb. 2-Apr. 13
Indian Railways Exhibition . . . . .	New Delhi . . . . .	Mar. 4-Apr. 17
U. N. (United Nations):		
Commission on Status of Women: 7th Session . . . . .	New York . . . . .	Mar. 16-Apr. 3
Commission on Narcotic Drugs: 8th Session . . . . .	New York . . . . .	Mar. 30-Apr. 24
Consultative Group in the Field of Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders—Latin American Regional.	Rio de Janeiro. . . . .	Apr. 6-19
Economic Commission for Latin America: 5th Session. . . . .	Rio de Janeiro. . . . .	Apr. 9-17
Economic Commission for Europe: East-West Trade Conference . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 13-18*
General Assembly: Reconvening of 7th Session. . . . .	New York. . . . .	Feb. 24-Apr. 23 (recessed)
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization):		
Committee on Relations with International Organizations: 14th Session.	Rome. . . . .	Mar. 30-Apr. 2
Technical Advisory Committee on Desert Locust Control . . . . .	Rome. . . . .	Apr. 21-24
WMO (World Meteorological Organization): Commission for Synoptic Meteorology: 1st Session.	Washington . . . . .	Apr. 2-29*
UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization): Executive Board: 33d Session.	Paris . . . . .	Apr. 8-20
Milan International Trade Fair.	Milan . . . . .	Apr. 12-29
Conference on Caribbean Timbers, Their Utilization and Trade Within the Area.	Trinidad . . . . .	Apr. 13-18
ICEM (Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration):		
Finance Committee . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 13-15
5th Session of Committee . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 16-25
6th International Film Festival. . . . .	Cannes . . . . .	Apr. 15-29
Rice Consultative Committee: 6th Meeting . . . . .	Singapore . . . . .	Apr. 15-16
South Pacific Conference: 2d Session . . . . .	Nouméa . . . . .	Apr. 16-28
PASO (Pan American Sanitary Organization): Executive Committee: 19th Meeting.	Washington . . . . .	Apr. 20-30
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization): Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council.	Paris . . . . .	Apr. 23-25

#### In Session as of April 30, 1953

International Materials Conference . . . . .	Washington . . . . .	Feb. 26, 1951-
OEEC (Office of European Economic Cooperation): European Inland Transport Conference.	Paris . . . . .	Mar. 18-
U.N. (United Nations):		
Economic and Social Council:		
15th Session of the Council . . . . .	New York . . . . .	Mar. 31-
Commission on Human Rights: 9th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 7-
Fiscal Commission: 4th Session . . . . .	New York . . . . .	Apr. 27-
<i>Ad Hoc</i> Committee on Forced Labor: 4th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 17-
High Commissioner's Advisory Committee on Refugees . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 27-
Inter-American Council of Jurists: 2d Meeting . . . . .	Buenos Aires . . . . .	Apr. 20-
South Pacific Commission: 11th Session . . . . .	Nouméa . . . . .	Apr. 25-

#### Scheduled May 1-July 31, 1953

ITU (International Telecommunication Union):		
Administrative Council: 8th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	May 2-
International Telegraph Consultative Committee: 8th Plenary Assembly.	Arnheim . . . . .	May 26-
International Cotton Advisory Committee: 12th Plenary Meeting . . . . .	Washington . . . . .	May 4-

<sup>1</sup> Prepared in the Division of International Conferences, Department of State, Apr. 23, 1953. Asterisks indicate tentative dates.

UPU (Universal Postal Union): Meeting of the Executive and Liaison Committee.	Bern . . . . .	May 4-
U.N. (United Nations):		
Social Commission: 9th Session . . . . .	New York . . . . .	May 4-
<i>Ad Hoc</i> Commission on Prisoners of War: 4th Session . . . . .	New York . . . . .	May 11-
International Conference to Adopt Protocol on Limitation of the Production of Opium.	New York . . . . .	May 11-
International Law Commission: 5th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	June 1-
Economic Commission for Europe: 3d Regional Meeting of European Statisticians.	Geneva . . . . .	June 15-
Trusteeship Council: 12th Session. . . . .	New York . . . . .	June 16-
Economic and Social Council: 16th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	June 30-
<i>Ad Hoc</i> Committee on Administrative Unions . . . . .	New York . . . . .	June
Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	June
Technical Assistance Committee . . . . .	New York . . . . .	June
<i>Ad Hoc</i> Committee on Factors (Non-Self-Governing Territories)	New York . . . . .	July 21-
International Sugar Conference . . . . .	London* . . . . .	June or July*
WHO (World Health Organization):		
6th World Health Assembly . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	May 5-
Executive Board: 12th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	May 25-
ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization):		
Standing Committee on Aircraft Performance: 4th Session . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	May 6-
Assembly: 7th Session . . . . .	Brighton, England . . . . .	June 16-
North Atlantic Ocean Weather Stations . . . . .	Brighton, England . . . . .	July 8-
ILO (International Labor Organization):		
Permanent Agricultural Committee: 4th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	May 6-
Governing Body (and Committees) . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	May 26-
Annual Conference of the ILO: 36th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	June 3-
Meeting of Experts on Systems of Payment by Results in Construction Industry.	Geneva . . . . .	July 21-
Caribbean Commission: 16th Meeting . . . . .	Paramaribo, Surinam . . . . .	May 11-
International Rubber Study Group: 10th Meeting . . . . .	Copenhagen . . . . .	May 11-
International Symposium on Neurosecretion . . . . .	Naples . . . . .	May 18-
International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries: 3d Meeting.	New Haven . . . . .	May 25-
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization):		
Latin American Seminar on Land Problems . . . . .	São Paulo . . . . .	May 25-
Committee on Commodity Problems: 21st Session . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	June 3-
Council: 17th Session . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	June 15-
International Seed Testing Association: 10th Congress	Dublin . . . . .	May 25-
UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization):		
International Center for Workers Education . . . . .	Compiègne, France . . . . .	May 30-
Executive Board: 34th Session . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	June 8-
International Conference on the Role and Place of Music in Education.	Brussels . . . . .	June 29-
2d Extraordinary Session . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	July 1-
International Chestnut Commission. . . . .	Spain-Portugal . . . . .	May-
Horticultural Congress and Exposition . . . . .	Hamburg . . . . .	May-
International Traffic and Safety Exhibition . . . . .	Milan . . . . .	May-
Pan American Highway Congress, Provisional Committee . . . . .	Washington . . . . .	June 1-
Meeting of Directing Council of the American International Institute for the Protection of Childhood.	Montevideo . . . . .	June 2-
8th Pan American Railway Congress . . . . .	Washington and Atlantic City . . . . .	June 12-
13th International Dairy Congress and Exposition . . . . .	The Hague . . . . .	June 22-
International Whaling Commission, 5th Meeting . . . . .	London . . . . .	June 22-
International Commission for Criminal Investigation: 22d General Assembly.	Oslo . . . . .	June 24-
20th International Aeronautical Exposition . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	June 26-
ICSU (International Council of Scientific Unions):		
Committee on the International Geophysical Year 1957-58 . . . . .	Brussels . . . . .	June 30-
Executive Board: 5th Meeting . . . . .	Strasbourg . . . . .	July 6-
<i>Ad Hoc</i> Committee on Quarantine Regulations (South Pacific Commission).	Nouméa . . . . .	June-
Commission of International Union of Pure and Applied Physics on Cosmic Rays.	Bagnères-de-Bigorre . . . . .	July 5-
16th International Conference on Public Education . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	July 6-
International Film Festival . . . . .	Rio de Janeiro . . . . .	July-
WMO (World Meteorological Organization): Regional Association for South America.	Rio de Janeiro . . . . .	July-
9th General Assembly of the Inter-American Commission of Women . . . . .	Washington* . . . . .	July-

## The United Nations: A Place To Promote Peace

*by Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.*

*U.S. Representative to the United Nations*<sup>1</sup>

U.S./U.N. press release dated April 15

I come to you tonight from that interesting, novel, hopeful, primitive, sometimes exasperating but always essential contrivance known as the United Nations. Calvin Coolidge once said that politicians are men who are twice spoiled—by extravagant praise on the one hand and extravagant abuse on the other. I do not think the United Nations is spoiled but it certainly suffers from extravagant hopes which have inevitably led to extravagant disappointments.

I personally approached the United Nations convinced of its essentiality but with some exasperation and without great expectations. I recognized that most Americans were troubled about it for two principal reasons: First, because of the reports of American employees of the United Nations who were subversive, and second, because of the impression that the Soviet Union was using the United Nations as a device to help it win the cold war.

Let me assure you tonight that the personnel problem in the United Nations is in process of being solved. On the day that I presented my credentials I told the Secretary-General of the importance of this problem to American public opinion. The next day I called again with 2,000 forms, each of 6 pages in length—to be filled out by each employee, and that very afternoon, at the suggestion of the Secretary-General, the American employees had lined themselves up in the corridors for fingerprinting. All forms have been filled out and are being processed by the FBI and the Civil Service Commission. The Secretary-General has cooperated. I think this problem is well on its way to satisfactory solution and should be cleaned up in a matter of months.

As far as the cold war is concerned, we can set

down the following thoughts about the United Nations:

It is a place where we can see what the Communists are doing in the war of ideas and sometimes in other ways. Without it we could not see nearly as much.

It is a place where Americans can see how their American public servants are conducting the American side in the cold war, and it therefore enables us to correct our mistakes. If it were not for the United Nations I do not know how we would ever become speedily aware of whether our conduct of the cold war was adequate or not.

It is a place—and we as newspapermen will particularly appreciate this—where you can get authoritative reactions quickly on the state of opinion in almost any part of the world, which it would take you days if not weeks, to get otherwise. For example, a few weeks ago Mr. Vyshinsky turned to me and with upraised hand shouted: "You Americans have lost Asia anyway." My answer, of course, was that we Americans were not trying to get Asia, that we did not think of Asia as some prize inhabited by slaves but as a place inhabited by human beings who wanted to live their own lives, and that the way to regard Asia was as a place to be helped rather than as a pawn in the game of power politics.<sup>2</sup>

Within 5 minutes after I said this there were representatives from Far Eastern nations who, knowing the public opinion in their own countries, said that my statement would be of such interest that it should be translated into many oriental languages and broadcast on the Voice of America. This, of course, was immediately done. It is useful for the United States to have a place where that kind of quick reaction can be obtained.

It is a place where is located the greatest sound-

<sup>1</sup> Address made at the Women's National Press Club dinner honoring the American Society of Newspaper Editors at Washington on Apr. 15.

<sup>2</sup> For text of Ambassador Lodge's General Assembly statement of Mar. 11, see BULLETIN of Mar. 23, 1953, p. 446.

ing board in the world—where public opinion is developed for the world—and never forget that public opinion is basic in the modern world today in spite of iron curtains.

It is a place where the free world gets consolidated. Being free, the non-Communist nations naturally tend to go their own way and to drift apart. But sooner or later some Communist spokesman will make some statement that is so monstrous and so outlandish and so offensive that you can almost see the free nations getting together before your very eyes. This more than counterbalances whatever advantages the Communists may get out of their propaganda.

It is a place where representatives of nations can meet informally without raising considerations of prestige and thus settle disputes. The Berlin airlift, for example, was brought to an end as the result of an American and a Soviet representative more or less “bumping into each other” in the corridors of the United Nations. It is the best place in the world for this kind of contact—which can prevent such enormous quantities of human bloodshed.

It is a place where we have developed allies—certainly not as many as we should have liked. But, equally certain, whatever allies we have are welcome and are that much clear gain.

#### **U.N. Divisions on the Korean Battleline**

One gets a sense of how utterly real the value of the United Nations is when it is recalled that in Korea, only 5 of 15 divisions in the line are American. Of a 155-mile-long battlefront, 60 percent is held by Rok (Republic of Korea) troops, 15 percent by units from other U.N. countries, and 25 percent by Americans. And the Republic of Korea, over and above its own divisions, is giving us still more fighting help in the form of KATUSA's (Korean Augmentation to U.S. Army). Of the American divisions in the line, roughly one-fourth of the men consist of such Koreans.

All of this, added to the fact that the American percentage is undoubtedly decreasing, gives the United Nations some very poignant value in actual terms of flesh and blood. Sixteen nations, in addition to Korea, have proved by actually sending their manhood that they believe in the principle of collective security. To me, these nations—Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Luxembourg, New Zealand, the Netherlands, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, the Union of South Africa, and the United Kingdom—should have a special place in the affections of the American people. If we did not have their help and that of the Koreans, we would need 10 more U.S. divisions in the line.

It is a place in which hypocrisy can be exposed. Whoever has ever served in Congress knows that there is nothing like face-to-face debate to reveal a stuffed shirt to public gaze. The United Na-

tions fills a similar place in revealing hypocrisy among nations.

It is a place where the threat of war in Iran in 1946 was moderated and gradually extinguished; it is a place from which the initiative was taken, with substantial American backing, to prevent Communist encroachment on Greece in 1947; it is a place which enormously facilitated the advent of Israel into the family of nations and prevented that advent from causing extensive hostilities; it is a place which, working with the Netherlands and the Indonesians, found the way to give full independence to the 76 million people inhabiting Indonesia; it is a place which means much to the independence of Libya and will undoubtedly mean much to the independence of Somaliland.

It is a place in which the age-old American belief that a meeting of minds produces more wisdom than the single opinion of even a brilliant mind is often demonstrated. The United States frequently brings proposals before the United Nations which have been extensively studied and prepared. Yet on many occasions these proposals have been altered and improved as a result of the debate.

It is a place in which six of the member nations consist of peoples who were under alien control when the Charter was signed. Of the 800 million people in the free world who were dependent 10 years ago, some 600 million, or three-fourths, have won full independence since 1945, and many more have been placed under U.N. trusteeship. The newly independent countries include the U.N. member states of India, Pakistan, Burma, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Israel. They also include such nonmember states as Ceylon, Jordan, the Associated States of Indochina, and Libya.

It is a place which at this moment is exerting a strong influence to prevent the dispute over Kashmir between India and Pakistan from breaking out into open war.

It is a place in which a veto-proof method has at last been evolved for bringing a real collective-defense program into being. When, as, and if aggression occurs in the future we will no longer be paralyzed by the Communist abuse of the veto.

#### **A Glass House Without Secrets**

It is a place which makes it hard for those who want to divide and rule. The strategy of Genghis Khan and, after him, Tamerlane, was to cajole one nation with false favors while attacking a neighbor nation. Sometimes I think that this is one of the more striking instances in modern times of inherited characteristics. But certainly it is true that it is much harder to play this kind of a game when the entire free world is looking in on the glass house on the East River, where there are no secrets and everyone can see what you're doing.

It is a place which, from the point of view of the

Kremlin, must be a real headache. They cannot control it; they cannot break it up; they do not dare leave it.

All this is not to blind our eyes to the failures; the United Nations has appeared at times to be engaged in a stodgy routine instead of being the arena where the world struggle is dealt with most boldly; and the United Nations has not prevented the Communist victory in China—a victory which achieved what imperialist Japan was seeking and which we risked war in order to avert. Although Soviet communism has suffered one serious setback in Yugoslavia and has been held back in Western Europe at the cost of great exertions, there have been Communist successes in other places which we would be foolish not to admit.

There are a few other things which the United Nations is not. The United Nations is not a place which in any way destroys U.S. sovereignty. The charter specifically prohibits its intervention in domestic matters. Your representative at the United Nations is not called Congressman or Senator but Ambassador, and for the simple reason that he represents a sovereign state.

It is not a place which threatens the destruction of our Constitution. The Supreme Court in the case of *Asakura vs. The City of Seattle* has said that the treaty-making "power does not extend as far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids." Any treaty, whether drafted in the United Nations or not—and I am one who thinks that too many treaties have originated there—needs a two-thirds vote of the Senate as well as the signature of the President, and almost all treaties need congressional legislation later.

It is not a nest of Communist spies, for the simple reason that there is nothing to spy on in the United Nations. The Russians haven't even filled their quota of employees at the United Nations. No U.S. citizen employed by the United Nations has ever been prosecuted for espionage.

It is not a place which is controlled by Soviet Russia and the Communists. It is a rare day when the Soviets can count on more than 5 votes out of the 60.

It is not a snare which dragged the United States into the Korean war. The United States asked the United Nations to take action after the Korean war had broken out.

It is, of course, not a place which can send American boys to fight anywhere. This power is a wholly American power. Moreover, the United States has the right to veto any action of the Security Council of the United Nations dealing with armed force.

The United Nations is, of course, not a place which can prevent great powers from fighting if they want to fight. But, as Secretary Dulles has said,

It can help them to avoid fighting when they really do not want to fight but feel that, unless there is some face-saving device, use of force may be the only alterna-

tive to a disastrous loss of prestige. World organization provides a lap into which even the great powers may choose to drop their disputes. It provides a better way as against the alternatives of humiliating surrender and violent defiance.

In the words of the charter, it is a "center for harmonizing."

None of the 60 Nations comprising the United Nations, except for the Soviet Union, is able to maintain its economic and strategic existence alone—and the Soviet Union can only do it by requiring the harshest kind of slave labor. It is particularly true that the United States cannot stand alone. Our country cannot maintain itself without supplies far in excess of what we produce here—metals, tin, copper, nickel, chrome, manganese, cobalt, etc., and ultimately oil. If we were denied as few as 20 essential materials we would be completely crippled.

The only answer to this dilemma is to strengthen the bonds of enlightened self-interest and of mutual self-respect with other nations.

To conclude, the United Nations is a place where world communism can see us at close range and that suggests this observation:

#### **Recent Changed Appearance of Soviet Policy**

There are probably several reasons for the recent changed appearance of Soviet policy. For one thing, it is the kind of change of pace which a nation can use when it has the initiative. Having the initiative enables a nation on one day to anger and alert its rival and cause him to "tool up"—and then, just as he is beginning to get strong, to use honeyed words on some other day and cause the rival to "tool down." One reason for the changed appearance of Soviet policy is the strength of America under the leadership of President Eisenhower as this has been reflected at the United Nations where the Soviets have had a good chance to observe it. I think we are giving the impression of a people united as they have not been in a long time behind a leader who has at his command many, many strong tools which he can use to regain the initiative and to build a peaceful world.

For the future, therefore, we should look at deeds and not at words. Words have become so debased by communism that they are inaccurate guides to the truth of world strategy. We should watch for results and, when one action has been completed, then watch for the next. We will meet the Soviets halfway at any time, in the realm of deeds, and it is only deeds which can bind up the wounds of the world.

The United Nations is not in any sense a finality. It is in a primitive stage, but, primitive though it is, we know that if it disappeared, war would seem inevitable.

With all its faults, the United Nations is a living organization which has gone further toward



organizing peace and organizing security than any other body in modern history—and this result has occurred at a time of great threats to the peace and the security of the international community.

I have said that war would seem inevitable if the United Nations disappeared. If, on the other hand, the United Nations continues and we do have armed aggression, then it would be the indispensable vehicle for repelling that aggression. This is undoubtedly one reason why the Communists don't leave it.

We can also be sure that if the United Nations did not exist, even in its present imperfect form, men of good will throughout the world would be straining every nerve to create what we have now. It was possible to get along without a place like the United Nations in the days when the 4½-day boat to Europe was the quickest way to travel across the seas. But now a place like the United Nations is just as necessary in international politics as an airport is in international travel and for many of the same reasons.

You ladies and gentlemen who play such a decisive role in molding the opinions of your fellow citizens have a great responsibility in this field. The issue of war and peace depends on the existence of a consensus of moral judgment as to what is right and just. You play a decisive part in developing that consensus. But this is not all. Remember that when the Wright brothers invented the first airplane and caused it to fly a few hundred yards at Kitty Hawk, N.C., they did not immediately chop it to pieces with hatchets and burn it up with a blow torch because it had not flown further. They set about to improve it and so we have the wonderful airplanes of today. Let us work together to improve what we have, and in this work no single group can play as decisive a part as can this gathering of American newspaper editors.

## Adoption of Resolution on Korean Question

*Statement by Ernest A. Gross  
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly*<sup>1</sup>

U.S./U.N. press release dated April 18

We have just repeated in the Assembly an unprecedented step which was taken earlier this week in the Political and Security Committee. We have adopted unanimously a resolution on the Korean question. The resolution expresses the hope that the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war will be speedily completed and that the further negotiations at Panmunjom will result in achieving an early armistice in Korea consistent with U.N. principles and objectives.

<sup>1</sup> Made on Apr. 18 in plenary session.

## Text of General Assembly's Resolution on Korea

U.N. doc. A/Resolution 99  
Adopted April 18, 1953

The General Assembly,

REAFFIRMING its unswerving determination to spare no efforts likely to create conditions favourable to the attainment of the purposes of peace and conciliation embodied in the Charter of the United Nations,

NOTING, following the United Nations Command initiative for the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war, the communication by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China dated 31 March 1953 to the President of the General Assembly, and the exchange of communications between the United Nations Command and the Commanders of the Chinese People's Volunteers and the Korean People's Army in regard thereto,

CONFIDENT that a just and honourable armistice in Korea will powerfully contribute to alleviate the present international tension,

1. *Notes* with deep satisfaction that an agreement has been signed in Korea on the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war;

2. *Expresses* the hope that the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war will be speedily completed and that the further negotiations at Panmunjom will result in achieving an early armistice in Korea, consistent with the United Nations principles and objectives;

3. *Decides* to recess the present session upon completion of the current agenda items, and requests the President of the General Assembly to reconvene the present session to resume consideration of the Korean question (a) upon notification by the United Nations Command to the Security Council of the signing of an armistice agreement in Korea; or (b) when in the view of a majority of Members other developments in Korea require consideration of this question.

This is an impressive development. It expresses a real striving for peace. It is a response to the desire of the peoples of the world for a lessening of tensions.

We are pleased to see that the Soviet Government, and those who vote with it, for the first time have voted today with the overwhelming majority of the United Nations in the General Assembly on a resolution dealing with Korea. It remains to be seen whether this action warrants the hope and optimism that has been engendered by this vote and by some recent Communist statements. It is easy enough for the Soviets to talk for peace. They have done that only too frequently before. It remains to be seen whether they really want peace and whether this promise will be reflected in constructive performance around the conference table at Panmunjom.

This strikes us as a solemn moment of hope rather than of gratitude. While these developments are encouraging, this is not in our judgment a moment for elation. It is a time for sober reflection, for further practical action at Panmunjom which can result in an armistice.

Let there be no misunderstanding. Progress has been made. We realize it and we are glad. The U.N. Command negotiators and the Communist commanders have agreed to exchange sick and wounded prisoners of war, a humanitarian task which is scheduled to begin on April 20. I am sure that all of us will be watching carefully in the hope that this important agreement will be carried out expeditiously.

On April 7 last, the chairman of the U.S. delegation, Ambassador Lodge, gave a report to this Assembly regarding developments which had taken place in Panmunjom up to that time.<sup>2</sup> A supplementary report of the communications exchanged since April 7 is being transmitted to the President of the General Assembly for the information of the members of the United Nations.

We are hopeful that the exchange of sick and wounded will be completed shortly. We are hopeful also that the letter of April 16 [17] of the U.N. Command<sup>3</sup> will lead to a resumption of negotiations on the overall question of prisoners of war.

My Government, which bears the responsibility for the Unified Command, will continue to seek peace by every honorable and decent means. The true initiative for peace has been with the United States and other loyal supporters of the United Nations. As President Eisenhower said on April 16, the first great step toward peace must be the conclusion of an honorable armistice in Korea.

## U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

### Ministerial Meeting of NAC

The Department of State announced on April 18 (press release 199) that a Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council will be held at Paris beginning April 23, 1953. The U.S. delegation to the meeting will be as follows:

#### *U.S. Representatives*

John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State  
George M. Humphrey, Secretary of the Treasury  
Charles E. Wilson, Secretary of Defense  
Harold E. Stassen, Director for Mutual Security

#### *U.S. Permanent Representative*

William H. Draper, Jr.

#### *Advisers*

C. Douglas Dillon, American Ambassador to France  
W. Randolph Burgess, Consultant and Deputy to the Secretary of the Treasury  
Omar N. Bradley, General of the Army, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
Carl W. McCardie, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs  
Livingston T. Merchant, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs

Douglas MacArthur, 2d, Counselor, Department of State  
Andrew N. Overby, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury  
Frank C. Nash, Assistant Secretary of Defense  
Frederick L. Anderson, Deputy U.S. Special Representative in Europe  
David K. E. Bruce, U.S. Observer to the Interim Committee of the European Defense Community and U.S. Representative to the European Coal and Steel Community  
John Ohly, Deputy to the Director for Mutual Security

#### *Members*

Charles W. Adair, Jr., William Batt, Royden E. Beebe, Jr., Brig. Gen. USAF, Henry E. Billingsley, James S. Billups, Lt. Col., USA, Arthur C. Davis, Vice Adm., USN, C. Burke Elbrick, Roger Ernst, Russel Fessenden, Luke W. Finlay, Richard B. Freund, William Galloy, Harrison A. Gerhardt, Col., USA, C. Dillon Glendinning, Lincoln Gordon, John C. Hughes, Fred W. Jandrey, Helen P. Kirkpatrick, Jeffrey C. Kitchen, Willis S. Mathews, Brig. Gen., USA, Ben T. Moore, Roderic O'Connor, William N. Tomlinson, George H. Willis, Robert J. Wood, Brig. Gen., USA, James K. Woolnough, Jr., Col., USA

#### *Executive Secretary*

Millard L. Kenestrick

#### *Assistant Executive Secretaries*

John E. Fobes, Joseph Slater

## Mineral Resources Development (ECAFE)

The Department of State announced on April 20 (press release 205) that the U.S. Government had accepted the invitation of the U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) to participate in a Regional Conference on Mineral Resources Development which will be held at Tokyo from April 20 to 30, 1953. The U.S. delegation to this conference is as follows:

#### *Chairman*

Peyton Kerr, Economic Officer, American Embassy, Tokyo

#### *Members*

David A. Andrews, Assistant Chief, Foreign Geology Branch, Geological Survey, Department of the Interior  
Wesley Clifford Haraldson, Economic Officer, American Embassy, Tokyo  
Earl Irving, Senior Mining Consultant, Special Technical Economic Mission, Manila  
K. P. Wang, Chief, Far East Branch, Foreign Minerals Division, Bureau of Mines, Department of the Interior

The conference at Tokyo has been called by ECAFE to provide an opportunity for experts on mineral resources to exchange views on and discuss techniques for the development of the mineral resources of the countries of the Far East. In addition to discussions concerning mineral resources exploration and exploitation in connection with the overall economic development of the region, the conference will be concerned with status reports by country experts regarding specific minerals. Activities undertaken under the technical cooperation program, the United Nations Expanded Technical Assistance Program, and other programs of technical assistance in the field of mineral resources development will also be considered.

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Apr. 20, 1953, p. 574.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Apr. 27, 1953, p. 608.

## The United States in the United Nations

[April 16-23]

### General Assembly

The Assembly on April 18 unanimously adopted Committee I's resolution noting with satisfaction the agreement on the exchange of sick and wounded, expressing hope for an early Korean armistice, and providing for recessing the present session after completion of the current agenda items. In an explanation of vote, Ernest A. Gross (U.S.) expressed his Government's pleasure at seeing the U.S.S.R. and those who voted with it join the overwhelming majority for the first time on a General Assembly resolution dealing with Korea. It remained to be seen, he went on, whether this action warranted the hope and optimism that had been engendered by this vote and by some recent Communist statements. It was easy enough for the Soviets to talk of peace; whether they really wanted peace, and whether this promise would be reflected around the Panmunjom conference table, was another matter.

The United States, Ambassador Gross continued, was hopeful that the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war would be completed shortly and that negotiations on the overall prisoner question would be resumed. The true initiative for peace, he went on, was with the United States and the other loyal supporters of the United Nations.

Earlier in the meeting, President Lester Pearson explained that since Committee V (Administrative and Budgetary) was not meeting during the second half of the session, the Secretary-General had prepared a report on the fiscal implications of Committee I's report on the bacteriological-warfare item. He requested unanimous consent for a proposal that the Assembly examine the estimates itself, without reference to Committee V. Andrei Vyshinsky (U.S.S.R.) objected to the proposal on the grounds that it was contrary to the rule requiring study of all financial implications by Committee V and that, in any event, the investigatory body was unnecessary inasmuch as the germ-warfare charges already had been investigated by what he called impartial groups.

Because of this objection, President Pearson

said Committee V would be called into session and that its report would be taken up at the next plenary meeting.<sup>1</sup>

The Assembly completed its agenda on April 23, by adopting Committee I's resolutions on the bacteriological-warfare item and on the Burmese complaint, and went into recess. Under the terms of the resolution on Korea adopted on April 18, it will reconvene to resume consideration of the Korean question after conclusion of an armistice in Korea or if other Korean developments require it to do so.

The vote on the resolution calling for an impartial investigation of germ-warfare charges was 51-5 (Soviet bloc)-4 (Burma, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia). The Saudi Arabian delegate explained his abstention on the ground that prior agreement had not been reached by the parties directly concerned.

On the Burmese complaint, the vote was 59-0-1 (China). The representative of Burma, who had abstained from voting on the resolution in Committee I, this time cast an affirmative vote on instructions from Rangoon; his Government, he said, had been impressed by the efforts made toward reaching general agreement on the question.

*Committee I (Political and Security)*—The revised Brazilian resolution on Korea was adopted unanimously on April 16. The Committee voted after the Polish delegate, Stanislaw Skrzyszewski, announced that he would withdraw the Korean section of his resolution, in view of the "new initiative" by the Chinese Communists and North Koreans; his delegation would vote for the Brazilian proposal. On instructions from his Government, he also would not insist on a vote on the remaining sections of his resolution, dealing with disarmament and NATO, since the debate indicated that those two problems needed further discussion. He reserved the right to raise them at the next regular session of the Assembly.

At the next day's meeting, debate began on the Burmese complaint of aggression by the National Government of China, a new item which the Gen-

<sup>1</sup> On April 21 Committee V voted 32-5 (Soviet bloc)-4 to inform the Assembly that the adoption and implementation of the Committee I resolution would involve about \$65,000, to be financed out of the Working Capital Fund.

eral Committee on March 31 had recommended for inclusion on the Assembly's agenda.

U Myint Thein (Burma) charged that Chinese Nationalist forces which had retreated into Burma in 1950 were committing aggression against his country. Dr. Tingfu Tsiang (China) denied that his Government had any control over the Chinese troops in Burma. However, if Burma wanted the National Government to further Burmese wishes on the matter, the National Government stood ready to cooperate; but the resolution was neither just nor helpful.

Following is the text of a statement which Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. (U.S.) made during the debate on April 21:

The problem before the Committee is essentially one of achieving a peaceful settlement of Burma's complaint concerning the presence of Chinese irregular troops in Burma contrary to the wishes of the Burmese Government. Some of these troops settled in the Kengtung area at the end of World War II, and others have drifted into Burma since then. Some 1,700 troops under General Li Mi retreated into Burma in 1950 and have since then been joined by stragglers from neighboring regions. The total number of Chinese irregular troops presently on Burmese soil is estimated by the Burmese Government at 12,000.

The United States believes that Burma is entirely justified in its desire to eliminate from its territories these troops in view of the fact that they do not submit to its authority and that elements of them have been engaged in depredations against peaceful Burmese villages. It is in the common interest of Burma and China, and of the United Nations, that effective steps be taken to remove through pacific means this challenge to Burma's sovereignty.

Since Burma and the Republic of China do not maintain diplomatic relations, some intermediary which has relations with both has been needed. At the request of Burma, the United States has acted as this intermediary. Within the last few months, my government has been engaged in a vigorous effort to bring the parties to agreement on a method of meeting the situation.

We believe that the fundamental basis for any negotiations is an agreement in principle by the Chinese Government to cooperate to the best of its ability in effecting a withdrawal of Li Mi's troops from Burma. After this there should be a cessation of hostile activities and an examination of feasible methods of withdrawing the troops. This in turn should be followed by a laying down of arms and departure of the troops from Burma. It is toward this type of solution that the United States is working.

We consider that progress has been made in these efforts and we have ground for belief that with cooperation along these lines tangible results will be forthcoming. In his statement the Representative of China gave certain assurances concerning the cessation of support and supply of the troops. And we noted with special interest the statement of the Delegate of Thailand that his government stands ready to facilitate the evacuation of the Chinese irregular troops through his country, if agreement is reached on this course. It is only through such helpful moves as this that a solution can be found. We are in constant contact with both parties; and our efforts are continuing and will continue as long as they are desired and there is a prospect of useful results.

The problem is not an easy one. It appears doubtful to us that a full solution—that is, the departure of all these irregular troops—will be feasible. Many of the troops seem to be common bandits posing as Chinese Nationalists. Numerous others are not under the control

of anyone and have long looked upon certain parts of the Kengtung area as their home. We hope, however, that, if the present negotiations are successful, a substantial number can be induced to leave Burma, thus reducing the problem to manageable proportions for the Government of Burma.

The United States Delegation does not believe that the draft resolution proposed by Burma, in its present form, is the best approach to this problem. Adoption of such condemnatory language by the Assembly would be likely to retard rather than promote the agreement which is clearly needed. Moreover, we do not believe that the procedure established in the Burmese draft resolution—action in the General Assembly calling for subsequent and essentially duplicate consideration in the Security Council—would be desirable as a general practice or helpful in this case. We think that, instead, the Assembly should address itself to the promotion of efforts for a peaceful and practical settlement. . . .

Two additional resolutions were introduced April 21. A proposal by Argentina requested Burma, China, and others directly concerned to enter into negotiations, especially to bring about the "immediate withdrawal" of the troops. A Mexican draft provided that the General Assembly should call upon the foreign troops, whose presence, hostile activities, and depredations it considered a violation of Burmese sovereignty, to submit to disarmament and agree to internment or to leave Burma at once. The text also condemned the hostile acts of the forces and affirmed that assistance to them was contrary to the charter. It invited Burma to report on the situation to the next Assembly.

By a proposal introduced by Argentina and Chile, the Mexican draft was amended to recommend that the negotiations in progress through the good offices of other states be continued. The Mexican draft was further amended by Lebanon and was adopted on April 22 by a vote of 58-0-2. Because the Committee, on a motion by Iran, decided to give the Mexican draft priority in the voting, the Burmese text did not come up for a vote. The Burmese delegate, explaining his abstention, expressed regret that the Committee had not seen eye to eye with it on the dispute.

As the Committee ended its work, Chairman João Carlos Muniz (Brazil) said that in his view the meetings had been marked by a high level of debate. After several speakers had paid warm tributes to the chairman, Andrei Vyshinsky, speaking for the "so-called Soviet bloc—which was a figment of the imagination," remarked that Chairman Muniz had done a good job on the whole.

#### Economic and Social Council

Discussion of the world economic situation began on April 16. In general, the speakers agreed that current prospects for peace did not threaten the international economy. Delegates from Belgium, India, and Sweden, however, urged that studies be made of the problems involved in reconversion and possible economic recession. Sir Gladwyn Jebb (U.K.) expressed apprehension

over the continued imbalance of payments and warned that any increase in obstacles to U.S. imports would have "very serious" consequences. Speaking for the United States, James J. Wadsworth stressed the importance of encouraging individual incentive and said his Government would have a "cooperative approach" to the problem of building a productive, strong economic system within the free world.

On April 17 the Council adopted unanimously an Argentine-Australian-French draft recommending continuance of international action for conservation and utilization of nonagricultural and water resources under previous Council resolutions.

Action on the world economic situation was completed on April 23 with the adoption of a request that the Secretary-General include index numbers for marine freight rates in future reports. At the same meeting, the Council approved unanimously a revised six-state resolution on rapid industrialization of underdeveloped countries, thus concluding its consideration of integrated economic development. The revised draft authorized the Secretary-General to consult experts (rather than to convene an expert group, as in the original text) in continuing his studies on the process and problems of industrialization, and requested that a report be submitted before the Council's eighteenth session opened. A U.S.-French amendment suggesting that such studies be carried out by subsidiary Council bodies was rejected, 5-11-2.

## THE CONGRESS

### German Debt Settlement Agreements Transmitted to the Senate

#### Message of the President to the Senate

White House press release dated April 10

I transmit herewith for the consideration of the Senate a copy of each of the following agreements:

1. Agreement on German External Debts signed at London on February 27, 1953, by the Federal Republic of Germany and by the United States and 17 other creditor countries.<sup>1</sup>

2. Agreement between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany regarding the Settlement of the Claims of the United States for Postwar Economic Assistance (other than surplus property) to Germany signed at London on February 27, 1953.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> S. Exec. D, 83d Cong., 1st sess.

<sup>2</sup> S. Exec. E, 83d Cong., 1st sess.

3. Agreement between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany relating to the Indebtedness of Germany for Awards made by the Mixed Claims Commission, United States and Germany, signed at London on February 27, 1953.<sup>3</sup>

4. Agreement between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany concerning the Validation of German Dollar Bonds signed at Bonn on April 1, 1953.<sup>4</sup>

I request the advice and consent of the Senate to the ratification of these four agreements.

In addition, I transmit for the information of the Senate two related agreements between the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States and a report made to me by the Secretary of State covering all six of these agreements. One of the agreements is concerned with the settlement of the obligation of the Federal Republic of Germany to the United States for surplus property furnished to Germany. This agreement was signed at London on February 27, 1953, and was concluded under the authority of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (P. L. 152, 81st Cong.). The other agreement signed at Bonn on February 27, 1953, is an executive agreement relating to the establishment of procedures for the validation of dollar bonds of German issue.<sup>5</sup>

The arrangements set forth in these several agreements provide for the orderly settlement of German external debts, including the prewar debts due mainly to private persons and the claims of the U.S. Government arising from postwar economic assistance to Germany. On the former of these categories, the effect will be to end the state of default which has existed for about 20 years. The consideration of reparation and other governmental claims arising from World Wars I and II is deferred under the terms of the agreement.

The complex documents transmitted herewith are the result of negotiations, extending over more than 2 years, in which all of the interests concerned have been represented. In particular, it is to be noted that the settlement terms and procedures for debts due to private creditors were worked out by negotiations between representatives of private creditor interests and of the debtors. In the light of all of the circumstances, it is the view of the Executive Branch of the U.S. Government that the settlement arrangements embodied in the Agreement on German External Debts and in the various bilateral agreements are reasonable, satisfactory, and equitable to the interests concerned.

With regard to debts due to private creditors, maturity dates have been extended and the creditors are called upon to accept a reduction in in-

<sup>3</sup> S. Exec. F, 83d Cong., 1st sess.

<sup>4</sup> S. Exec. G, 83d Cong., 1st sess. For text, see below.

<sup>5</sup> For text see BULLETIN of Mar. 9, 1953, p. 376.

terest arrears and interest rates, but the principal of the debts is unchanged. With regard to the claims for economic assistance given to Germany in the postwar period, for which the U.S. Government is by far the largest claimant, the settlement is comparable to the terms which other countries have received for similar assistance. On both categories of debt, the German Federal Republic has undertaken to make very considerable payments, but these payments may reasonably be considered within the Federal Republic's capacity to pay. Should the German Federal Republic, however, get into payment difficulties, consultative machinery to deal with the situation is provided for.

The elimination of the German state of default will contribute substantially and directly to the development of normal commercial relationships between the German Federal Republic and the rest of the free world. It will open up the possibilities of new credit, for both short-term trade financing and long-term investment.

These agreements should be considered by the Senate not only in the light of the direct financial benefits to the United States but also in relation to the contribution they will make to the achievement of the principal objective of U.S. policy toward Germany, that of restoring Germany to the position of a responsible nation in the community of free nations.

I recommend, therefore, that the Senate give early and favorable consideration to the Agreement on German External Debts and to the three bilateral agreements between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany relating, respectively, to the settlement of claims for postwar economic assistance to Germany, to the indebtedness of Germany for the Mixed Claims Commission awards, and to the validation of German dollar bonds, and give its advice and consent to their ratification, in order that the debt settlement arrangements may be made effective as promptly as possible.

### **Text of U. S.-German Dollar Bond Agreement**

Press release 196 dated April 16

*The Department of State made public on April 11 the final text of the agreement between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany regarding certain matters arising from the validation of German dollar bonds. The agreement was signed at Bonn on April 1, 1953.<sup>6</sup>*

*The final text of the agreement is as follows:*

#### **AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY REGARDING CERTAIN MATTERS ARISING FROM THE VALIDATION OF GERMAN DOLLAR BONDS**

WHEREAS the United States of America (hereinafter referred to as "the United States") and the Federal

Republic of Germany (hereinafter referred to as "the Federal Republic") have agreed that it is in their common interest to provide for the determination of the validity of German dollar bonds in view of the possibility that a large number of such bonds may have been unlawfully acquired during hostilities in Germany or soon thereafter;

WHEREAS they have agreed on procedures for accomplishing this purpose in the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany Regarding the Validation of Dollar Bonds of German Issue (hereinafter referred to as "the Agreement on Validation Procedures") signed at Bonn on February 27, 1953;

WHEREAS the Federal Republic on the one hand and the United States and other countries on the other signed the Agreement on German External Debts at London on February 27, 1953, for the settlement of Germany's external obligations, including German dollar bonds, the benefits of which will apply only to bonds which have been duly validated; and

WHEREAS the United States and the Federal Republic agree that further measures are required to permit debtors and creditors to proceed to the orderly settlement of the obligations arising from German dollar bonds with confidence in the stability of the procedures regarding validation and with assurance that claims prejudicial to such settlement will not be asserted on the basis of bonds which were unlawfully acquired:

THEREFORE, the United States and the Federal Republic have agreed as follows:

#### *Article I*

Except as may be agreed between the Federal Republic and the United States, the Federal Republic will not amend, modify, or repeal its Law for the Validation of German Foreign Currency Bonds of August 25, 1952 (Bundesgesetzblatt 1952, Part I, page 553) (hereinafter referred to as "the Validation Law") or the Schedule thereto insofar as they relate to bonds, debentures, or other obligations (hereinafter referred to as bonds) listed in the said Schedule or in the First Implementing Ordinance under the said Law of February 21, 1953 (Bundesgesetzblatt 1953, Part I, page 31) and in respect of which the Schedule or the said Ordinance describes the United States as the Country of Offering, or to coupons, dividend warrants, renewal certificates, subscription warrants or other secondary instruments issued in connection with such bonds. Except as may be so agreed, the Federal Republic will not extend the provisions of the said Law to bonds offered in the United States and not listed in the said Schedule or the said Ordinance.

#### *Article II*

No bond, coupon, dividend warrant, renewal certificate, subscription warrant or other secondary instrument referred to in the first sentence of Article I above shall be enforceable unless and until it shall be validated either by the Board for the Validation of German Bonds in the United States established by the Agreement on Validation Procedures, or by the authorities competent for that purpose in the Federal Republic.

#### *Article III*

The members of the Board for the Validation of German Bonds in the United States are authorized and bound to waive all immunity from service of process issuing from courts in the United States in proceedings brought to determine whether the requirements for validation of bonds under the Validation Law have been met. Such proceedings must be brought within three months from receipt of the decision of the Board by the party seeking validation of the bond. It is agreed that such members will comply with any judgments, orders or decrees that such courts may issue in such proceedings. The term "members" as used in this Article includes the chairman and the deputies of the members when acting as members.

<sup>6</sup> For text of the Department's announcement of the signing, see *ibid.*, Apr. 20, 1953, p. 569.

#### Article IV

For the purpose of all proceedings in the United States, the English texts of the Validation Law and of the Second Implementing Ordinance thereunder of March 7, 1953 (Bundesanzeiger Nr. 50 of March 13, 1953) which are annexed to the Agreement on Validation Procedures shall be authentic.

#### Article V

This Agreement shall be ratified by the United States and the Federal Republic in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures. The Agreement shall enter into force upon (a) the exchange of instruments of ratification at Washington, and (b) the entry into force of the Agreement on German External Debts between the Federal Republic on the one hand, and France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States and other countries on the other hand.

DONE in duplicate, in the English and German languages, both authentic, at Bonn, this 1st day of April, 1953.

*For the United States of America:*

JAMES B. CONANT

*For the Federal Republic of Germany:*

SCHAEFFER

### PUBLICATIONS

#### Recent Releases

*For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.*

**United States Educational Foundation in Finland.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2555. Pub. 4811. 13 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Finland—Signed at Helsinki July 2, 1952; entered into force July 2, 1952.

**Progress in the War of Ideas.** International Information and Cultural Series 30. Pub. 4858. 6 pp. Free.

Address by Wilson Compton, broadcast Dec. 23, 1952.

**Ninth Semiannual Report of the Secretary of State to Congress on the International Information and Educational Exchange Program.** International Information and Cultural Series 31. Pub. 4867. 42 pp. 25¢.

Reviews the activities carried on, the effectiveness achieved, and the expenditures incurred by IIA during the period Jan. 1-June 30, 1952.

**Health and Sanitation, Cooperative Program in Uruguay.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2453. Pub. 4745. 10 pp. 10¢.

Exchange of notes between the United States and Uruguay—Signed at Montevideo Oct. 4, 1950, and Mar. 7, 1951; agreement between Government of Uruguay and the Institute of Inter-American Affairs—Signed at Montevideo Mar. 8, 1951.

**Technical Cooperation, Supplementing Agreement of Feb. 9, 1951.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2506. Pub. 4766. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Pakistan—Signed at Karachi Feb. 2, 1952.

**Vocational Education Mission to El Salvador, Modifying and Extending Agreement of Jan. 27 and Feb. 12, 1951.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2523. Pub. 4767. 4 pp. 5¢.

Exchange of notes between the United States and El Salvador—Signed at San Salvador Feb. 19 and 28, 1952.

**Relief Supplies and Packages for the United Kingdom, Payment of Transportation Charges, Amending Agreement of Dec. 1, 1948.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2473. Pub. 4829. 3 pp. 5¢.

Exchange of notes between the United States and the United Kingdom—Signed at London Feb. 23, and Apr. 7, 1951.

**Economic Cooperation, Guaranties Under Public Law 472, 80th Congress, as Amended.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2500. Pub. 4832. 4 pp. 5¢.

Exchange of notes between the United States and Turkey—Signed at Ankara Nov. 15, 1951.

**Economic Cooperation, Relief Supplies and Packages for the United Kingdom, Terminating Agreement of Dec. 1, 1948, as Amended.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2474. Pub. 4855. 2 pp. 5¢.

Exchange of notes between the United States and the United Kingdom—Signed at London June 1, 1951.

**Point 4—What It Is and How It Works.** Economic Cooperation Series 39. Pub. 4868. 12 pp. 5¢.

This booklet deals with our Government's program of assistance to other countries in developing resources and in giving technical training.

**Double Taxation, Taxes on Estates of Deceased Persons.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2595. Pub. 4897. 23 pp. 10¢.

Convention between the United States and Finland—Signed at Washington Mar. 3, 1952.

#### Check List of Department of State Press Releases: Apr. 20-24, 1953

Releases may be obtained from the Office of the Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Press releases issued prior to Apr. 20 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 186 of Apr. 10, 189 of Apr. 10, 192 of Apr. 15, 193 of Apr. 15, 194 of Apr. 16, 196 of Apr. 16, and 199 of Apr. 18.

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†202	4/20	Cale: Latin American trade
203	4/20	Dulles: Possible Korean settlement
†204	4/20	Dulles: Private organizations & Pt. 4
205	4/20	Mineral resources (ECAFE)
206	4/21	Dulles: 11th meeting of NAC
*207	4/21	Kimball, Carolan appointed to IIA
*208	4/22	FBI graduates Pt. 4 technicians
†209	4/22	Curtailment of IIA staff
*210	4/23	de Mille to assist IIA
†211	4/24	Prewar treaties with Japan
†212	4/24	Fiscal Commission (Ecosoc)
*213	4/24	Smith: Advance text of address in N. H.

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*The Department of State* bulletin

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## Results of North Atlantic Council's Eleventh Meeting

### ADDRESS BY SECRETARY DULLES<sup>1</sup>

Last Monday [April 27] I returned from 5 working days in Europe with Secretary Humphrey, Secretary Wilson, and Governor Stassen. We went to attend the meeting of the Council of NATO. We have reported to the President and to the Congress and now I report to you.

First let me, for background, recall what NATO is. NATO is the grand alliance of 14 nations that was created under the North Atlantic Treaty. That treaty was adopted 4 years ago as a bipartisan act to prevent a third world war coming out of Europe. The administration was then Democratic, but Republicans in the Senate, of which I was then one, took an active part in bringing about Senate consent to ratification. Then, in 1950, General Eisenhower was called to be the first Supreme Commander of the NATO forces in Europe. So he knows a great deal about it. It was indeed his vision, energy, and inspiration which largely converted this organization from a paper blueprint into a solid bulwark which already has tremendous protective value to the United States.

Let me recall what this value is. Suppose, for example, that Western Europe were overrun by the Red armies so that the Soviet world included all of Europe. That would so shift the balance of industrial power that we would be in great peril. Take steel production as an example, because steel is a basic commodity. Today we and our allies have an advantage of about three to one over the Communist world. But if Western Europe were shifted from the free world side to the Red side of the ledger, then the steel ratio would be about 50-50. Under those circumstances the Soviet leaders would be much more likely to attack us than is the case today.

Of course, our concern is much more than material. Europe is the cradle of our civilization and dear to many of us as the home of our ancestors. It would be a terrible blow, spiritually and morally, if Europe's religion and culture were to be stamped out by ruthless atheism.

We could not and would not sit idly by in the face of such an attack on Europe. So it is a case

where we should seek prevention which is cheaper than cure, as two world wars have taught us. NATO is prevention, we hope, against a repetition of 1914 and 1939.

NATO now has approximately 50 divisions in Western Europe and there are more than 25 divisions in the southern flank of Greece and Turkey. Some of these units are not fully trained and equipped and there is still much to be done to get maximum combat effectiveness. Nevertheless the existing forces have great value as a deterrent to aggression. Europe is not yet fully secure, but it is no longer a "pushover," so weak that it is a temptation to others to seize it by an act of war.

At last week's NATO meeting we tried to find practical ways of making NATO even stronger. We went at this with some new ideas, largely drawn from President Eisenhower's own personal experience and judgment.

### Combat Effectiveness To Be Increased

1. We sought military strength which would be borne out of economic health, not economic sickness. The European members have been straining toward a theoretical goal and now they are beginning to get out of breath. Since we cannot foresee the year of greatest danger, President Eisenhower believes that it is safest to adopt a pace which can be maintained with growing strength, rather than run the risk of dropping exhausted by the wayside before the haven is reached. Therefore, at this NATO meeting we put our emphasis on getting greater strength by less costly methods. This can be done by improving quality, rather than by seeking an immediate large increase in quantity. In a world of toughness, it is better to be compact and hard rather than to be big and soft. There will be a steady NATO build-up, but in the main this year's and next year's added strength will come through improved quality. That will tend to relieve the excessive strain which has been placed upon the budgets and currencies of some of the countries, including our own. At the same time there will be a big lift in NATO's combat effectiveness. You can figure this to be as much as 30 percent this year.

<sup>1</sup> Made over radio and television networks on Apr. 29 (press release 225).

2. We sought to fill the big gap in European defense which is the present lack of German forces. This gap in the center cannot be made good by any effort, however great, put forward by the other countries. Further, I do not believe that Americans, or British, or French want to anticipate fighting to defend Germany while the Germans look on as spectators. At present Germans are only spectators because the surrender terms do not authorize Germany to have any armed forces.

The continental European countries themselves thought out a solution which was to make agreements largely restoring West Germany's sovereignty and permitting Germans to rearm not just as German national forces, which might serve national ambitions, but as part of a single European Defense Community. This in turn would fit into NATO's defense plans.

These agreements were signed almost a year ago, but still they have not yet been brought into force. At this NATO Council meeting I introduced a resolution calling for the prompt creation of the European Defense Community (Edc). This was unanimously adopted.

All of the Edc governments are fully aware of the importance of early action. But in each of the countries there are parliamentary delays. This strains our patience. But it should not break it. There is no other good solution of the problem of establishing adequate strength and peace in Europe, as the cabinets realize and I trust that the parliaments too will accept that same view during the coming months.

3. We put great emphasis on what is called "infrastructure." That is a strange new word, which has come to have great importance. It means the network of facilities in one country available for NATO forces drawn from different countries. This requires that airfields, pipelines, supply depots, radio communication, radar and the like, in each country, be made available to many national forces on a common basis. In past years, there has been long haggling about working this out. This time we found agreement on a 3-year program for developing this "infrastructure." At moderate cost, it will add enormously to the efficiency of the existing forces. For example, it will create 50 new airfields in a year for common use in Europe. There can be a dispersion and deployment of aircraft on the ground, so that all will not be the concentrated target of a few bombs. And if some airfields are bombed out, there will be alternate fields, well equipped, on which planes aloft can land and take off. This will make NATO forces much more effective and secure.

4. We gave much thought to new tactical weapons, and to the increased power which they can give to the defense of Europe. We are starting some NATO training in these matters with due regard to security.

## Talks With Military Leaders

Just before leaving Paris, I talked at length with two of the top military leaders of NATO, General Ridgway and his Chief of Staff, General Gruenther. Naturally, they would like more land and air strength and they are particularly anxious to see the defense forces rounded out with German contingents. However, they believe that today there is enough strength so that if the Soviets planned to overrun Europe, it would be necessary for them first largely to re-enforce the Red armies now in or near Eastern Germany. This, they could not do without our knowledge. This fact alone is of great importance. It means that we would probably get the opportunity to bring into final readiness counter measures both in Europe and elsewhere, which might in fact deter the actual assault and preserve the peace.

What I have said gives you a good idea of what went on at our formal NATO meetings. Outside of these meetings, we talked informally and directly with most of the members. We did not talk to them as though NATO were just our responsibility and not theirs. After all, NATO is a joint enterprise, and it has its primary location in Europe.

Also we discussed with the British and the French, among others, the matter of general economic aid from the United States. Some call it a "hand-out." That is hardly fair, because the United States has gained intangible, if not specific, benefits.

Americans have always generously responded to emergency needs. But outright grants ought to be reserved only for real emergencies. They are a kind of crutch which may be needed from time to time. But as soon as there is economic health and the opportunity for a people to earn their way by their own efforts, then the crutch ought to be thrown away. We believe that this is becoming increasingly possible.

We talked over that viewpoint with our friends in Europe. We found that they welcomed a relationship which would be dignified and self-respecting for all concerned. There are plenty of ways whereby the British and French and others can contribute in Europe or Asia to special efforts which are in the common interest. Then they will be more and more earning their way.

We shall still be spending substantial sums, and these friendly countries do not need to anticipate too great reduction in their dollar income. But our Government will be specifically getting, for the dollars it spends abroad, what may enable it to save in other security measures and thus, on balance, get more security for less money.

At this last week's NATO Council meeting, in the ways I indicated, there came into NATO a transforming spirit. The full effect will only be apparent in later years as we look back. But as we look forward, we can anticipate that NATO will

never grow into an organization which sucks the life blood out of the member countries, but rather be the shield behind which confidence will grow to invigorate all of the protected nations.

It has been said that the proper role of military strength is to give time for moral ideas to take root. The role of NATO is to enable the great moral and spiritual principles of Western civilization to take root and blossom again after the ravages of two world wars. That was the conception of those Americans who, without regard to party, joined with the other free peoples to create the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. That is the conception for which so many Americans, without regard to party, have given their dedicated efforts. That is the conception which we believe is now nearing realization.

President Eisenhower, in the message which he sent through us to the NATO Council, said, "NATO has become a mighty force for peace and an instrument of enduring cooperation among the Atlantic peoples." As such it greatly increases what the President, in his challenging address, called "the chance for peace."<sup>2</sup>

#### TEXT OF FINAL COMMUNIQUE ISSUED APRIL 25

1. The North Atlantic Council, meeting in Paris in Ministerial Session with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Economics and Finance present, and under the chairmanship of Lord Ismay, completed their work today.

2. The Council agreed on short and long-term programmes for NATO. They established a firm military programme for 1953 and a provisional programme for 1954. In addition to the forces which Greece and Turkey are contributing, there will be a notable increase in the size of the forces assigned to NATO Supreme Commanders and a considerable improvement in their effectiveness. Training is being greatly improved at all levels. The series of large-scale manoeuvres held during the last year has appreciably raised the standard of co-operation of the forces of the member countries; units are being better equipped and the organization of support forces is developing. The NATO military authorities consider that the attainment of the force goals in 1953, and the combined influence of these various factors, will add materially to the defensive strength of NATO during 1953.

3. Agreement was reached not only on the common financing of the second part (£67,000,000) to the Fourth Slice of the Infrastructure Programme (the first part to the amount of about £80,000,000 having been settled at a Ministerial Meeting in December), but also on a cost-sharing formula which would cover future programmes to be submitted by the Supreme Commanders for the three-year period beginning in 1954, involving expendi-

#### "A Mighty Force for Peace"

*Following is the text of a message from President Eisenhower which Secretary Dulles read to the members of the North Atlantic Council at the opening of their eleventh meeting on April 23:*

On the occasion of this important meeting I send my personal greetings to the North Atlantic Council. As you know, I have long held the deep conviction that the success of NATO's program was essential to world peace and to the security and well-being of all Atlantic nations. My subsequent experience has reinforced and strengthened this belief. NATO has become a mighty force for peace and an instrument of enduring cooperation among the Atlantic peoples.

We deplore the fact that civilized nations are compelled at this stage of human history to devote so large a portion of their energies and resources to the purpose of military defense. I have already expressed my hope that it will be possible in the foreseeable future to devote part of these resources and energies to more constructive purposes. I know that this can be accomplished if all nations will cooperate sincerely in creating the necessary conditions for lasting peace. But until the conditions for genuine peace have been firmly established it would be foolhardy for us to delude ourselves about the dangers confronting us. It is still the foremost task of free governments to develop sufficient economic, defensive, and moral strength to make certain that our civilization is spared the horror and devastation of another world war.

All honest men know that NATO has no intention of aggression and that we seek only enough strength to deter aggression by others. We cannot afford to seek less.

As this meeting opens there is an opportunity for mankind to move forward toward a new era of peace and progress. The realization of this opportunity will depend primarily upon the deeds of others. But our own task is clear. While we carry the hope of peace in our hearts unblemished by self-delusion or wishful thinking, we will also employ the skill of our minds and hands to make this hope a living reality. Throughout the changing and unpredictable events of future months and years we will remain steadfast in purpose and united in action.

A quotation from Lincoln seems to have particular significance for our situation of today. We have malice toward none. We have charity for all peoples. But we will remain firmly determined to do the right as God gives us to see the right and will strive on to finish the work we have begun.

ture of up to £250,000,000, subject to the approval of Parliaments. These programmes will include a wide range of projects such as airfields, telecommunications, naval bases and port facilities, pipelines and radar installations. The military authorities of NATO now have a financial planning figure to which they can work for over three years. In addition, an improved system is ready to be put into operation to ensure closer financial supervision over the expenditure of common infrastructure funds.

4. The Council gave close attention to various economic and financial factors affecting the rate of expansion of the defence efforts. It was agreed that the development of sound national economies

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Apr. 27, 1953, p. 599.

and the increase of military forces should be pursued concurrently; in certain fields the establishment of long-term joint military production programmes appeared to be the least costly and the most efficient solution.

5. It was on these lines that the Member Governments and the International Staff developed a method for preparing correlated production programmes. The object of this is both to ensure that the defence production undertaken by European countries within their own budgets is on the most economic lines and to make defence production in Europe more effective. The participation of the United States, through off-shore procurement, adds to the contribution of the European countries and plays a very important part in these achievements. The additional fighter aircraft production programme, which has recently been announced is a first important result of this. It will facilitate the expansion of the aircraft industries in five European countries while at the same time strengthening the air defence capacity of the Alliance. Other programmes are being considered. NATO is also studying the means of developing production in Europe of spare parts for the maintenance of equipment of American and Canadian origin.

6. The Secretary General's Progress Report to the Council stressed the close collaboration between the civilian and military agencies of NATO, and outlined the current work of the International Staff. It emphasised the importance of developing a better public understanding of the aims and achievements of NATO, a matter to which Governments should give their constant attention. The Report described the progress made in the many and varied technical studies by Committees of the Council in a number of widely different fields, such as civil defence and other aspects of civil organization in time of war.

In the course of discussion on the Report, the Council re-emphasised their interest in the NATO countries' co-operation in the economic, cultural and social fields. They noted with satisfaction the initiative taken by the President of the United States of America, recently announced, with a view to fostering the solution of over-population problems in certain countries.<sup>3</sup>

7. The Council continued their regular practice of exchanging views on political matters of common concern. In reviewing the international situation they were in full agreement. This agreement included their estimate of the recent Soviet moves and gestures. To the extent that these moves and gestures are proved by events to be genuine efforts to reduce international tension, they will be welcomed by Member Governments, whose policy has always been to seek every opportunity for world peace.

8. Nevertheless, the Council found that there had not yet in fact been any change in the funda-

mental threat to the security of free peoples. The most striking evidence of this continuing threat is the huge and constantly strengthened military force maintained by those nations whose policies have been responsible for the present tension, and who are still promoting aggressive war in several parts of the world. The most recent example is the extension of hostilities in Laos. This serious development has increased the burden of France in the struggle against aggression and has given rise to deep concern on the part of other Member Governments.

9. The Council, therefore, reaffirmed the policy of collective defence which has proved fully justified, and which has been responsible for the growing confidence of the free world in the future. The Council felt that there was every prospect that this policy, continued with firmness and patience, will create a basis for a just settlement of unresolved international problems.

10. The Council considered it essential that Member Governments should continue to develop the free Atlantic Community which should include a European Defence Community to be established as soon as possible in an ever more closely united Europe.

11. The Council reaffirmed their fundamental desire to build for peace. They looked forward to the day when a greater share of the resources of their countries would be devoted to national and international reconstruction and development. Convinced that in unity lies their greatest strength, they are resolved to broaden co-operation in every field, economic, political and social, as well as military, and so to make the Atlantic Community a lasting reality.

#### **TEXT OF RESOLUTION ON EDC ADOPTED APRIL 24**

THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL,

RECALLING its previous resolutions of May 26th and December 17th, 1952, concerning the Treaty establishing the European Defence Community and the Additional Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on guarantees to members of the European Defence Community;<sup>4</sup>

TAKING NOTE of the progress which has been made since the previous session, including submission of the Treaty to the parliaments of all signatory countries and the fact that five signatories have now completed parliamentary action on the Additional Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the guarantees given by the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty to members of the European Defence Community;

TAKING NOTE of the progress of the Interim Committee, created by the governments signatory to the Treaty establishing the European Defence

<sup>4</sup> For text of the additional protocol, see *ibid.*, June 9, 1952, p. 896; for text of the NAC resolution of Dec. 17, 1952, see *ibid.*, Jan. 5, 1953, p. 4.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, May 4, 1953, p. 639.

Community, in connection with the technical planning and other steps necessary to the Treaty's coming into force, including the completion of the Additional Protocols and agreements proposed by the Interim Committee and designed to facilitate the carrying out of certain important provisions of the Treaty;

*Stresses* that the Atlantic Community continues to attach paramount importance to the rapid entry into force of the Treaty establishing the European Defence Community, and, consequently, to its ratification by all signatories, as well as to the ratification of the Additional Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty.

## Practicalities of Power

*by Under Secretary Smith*<sup>1</sup>

The Chinese philosopher who lived and wrote about 3,000 years ago said once, "It is not only that at times certain men are dangerous to society, but that at times certain societies are dangerous to all honest and decent men." We still confront the most dangerous of those societies as we have in the past confronted a series of them. Those which are dangerous today are represented by Soviet Russia and Communist China.

Now this morning at about one o'clock I was awakened by the news yesterday that *Pravda* had published in full the text of President Eisenhower's recent speech on foreign relations. The fact that any other newspaper in the world published the full text of President Eisenhower's speech would arouse no comment at all. The fact that *Pravda*, in a totalitarian state, publishes such a speech approaches a major stature of a miracle, and you see in that one little vignette the difference between our free society and that which exists in the Soviet Union.<sup>2</sup>

I recall about 8 years ago the Manchester *Guardian*, I think it was, published a cartoon which impressed me enormously. The ordinarily four-by-four cartoon square was divided into 16 little one-inch squares and in the first of those squares the world, depicted as a cringing little dog, was getting a pat on the back from a benign, pipe-smoking Stalin and the little animal was wriggling all over with pleasure. In the next square the same little animal was getting a kick from Molotov, the stars were flying in all directions and, of course, it was

yowling with anguish. The third square was a repetition of the first, the fourth of the second, and so on over the whole 16 squares—alternate pats and kicks—alternate wriggles of pleasure and yowls of anguish, but a constant repetition of the same thing.

Under these circumstances I think it will help us remain oriented if we can keep constantly in mind the real fundamentals of present world conditions. One such real fundamental is power, and I mean by power, military power, regrettably. With a full understanding of the place of power in world relationships, we can better adjust ourselves to the requirements which have been imposed upon us and we can resolve satisfactorily in our own minds what might appear to be contradictions in American foreign policy.

For instance, there seems to be a contradiction when in all sincerity we advocate disarmament while we're spending billions of dollars to rearm ourselves and to rearm our allies. There seems to be a basic conflict in our unremitting efforts for peace while we go ahead with the development of more effective and destructive weapons. But actually, there isn't any contradiction at all. The necessity for this derives from the place of power in the world situation. We didn't inject this factor into it—it was and it has been there for many centuries. But the fact that we're not responsible for its presence does not permit us to ignore it. To do so would be the height of folly, and that is my theme today.

Since we cannot ignore the power factor, then obviously we have to deal with it, and if we're to deal with it successfully it must be understood both in its origin and in its evolution. The lessons of

<sup>1</sup> Address made at the University of New Hampshire, Durham, N. H., on Apr. 25 (press release 213).

<sup>2</sup> For a White House statement on this subject, see p. 678.

history are too well known on this campus for me to repeat them. It is sufficient for me to remind you that within the memory of a good many of you here, there were some governments that were inclined to look on an expeditionary force or on a cruiser as a convenient instrument for the conduct of international negotiations.

Today most members of the world community have abandoned some earlier, essentially primitive patterns of international behavior—and since World War II we and like-minded nations have joined in an effort to replace force as the decisive factor in the relationship between states with a more civilized mechanism. The cause of this evolution and our ideas regarding the application of military strength in world affairs are very simple. We realize that man's capacity to destroy himself and his works have increased almost beyond the scope of imagination. The thoughtful man of today lives with the sobering knowledge that weapons exist which could bring modern civilization to an explosive end. Consequently the United States and like-minded nations have broken with the historic and primitive pattern of power politics. We're trying to resolve international differences and tensions by economic, political, and diplomatic negotiation.

Possibly the tragedy enacted in Geneva in the 1920's was a necessary, if painful, lesson to the people of the world, but the failure of the League of Nations hasn't deterred us from making a new and much more promising effort. We now have an international organization to which disputes can be brought for discussion and arbitration, and there isn't one of you here that would dispute the fact that this procedure is the right and possibly the only road to a just and peaceful world order. We know very well the futility of seeking solutions through violence. We would discard force in favor of the peaceful methods of negotiation and compromise. Now if this fact were universally accepted, our worries and our present danger would be reduced to zero. Unfortunately it is not universally accepted. A very large segment of the peoples of the world are under the complete control of leaders who prefer to rely on military power as the definitive factor in their relationship with other nations.

Now in this tragically simple fact are the implications of immense consequences. Every time I think of it I think of an aphorism, attributed, I believe, to Chesterton, who said, "Christianity is mankind's greatest and finest thought—the only trouble is it has never really been tried." We have a situation, many of the aspects of which are those of peace, and yet we really have no peace. We want to be rid of the burden of armaments, yet we have to spend billions for arms and are likely to have to continue to spend billions for arms. We and our allies yearn for peace and we're fighting in Korea and we're fighting in Indochina and we're fighting in Malaya.

## The Soviet Obsession

The root of the paradox lies in the Soviet obsession with the power factor, which I don't think any of you should ever forget. Because of this obsession we're compelled to create strength of our own as a counterweight to the strength of the Soviet Union. Even though we reject force as an instrument in our relationship with other nations, we've learned through bitter experience that Soviet intransigence reaches a peak when the negotiator across the table lacks power. If the Kremlin should as a temporary expedient make commitments, we can look forward to the likelihood that they may be violated before the ink is dry on the document if the commitments are made to an associate or another nation which lacks power. On the other hand, we've learned that it's possible to negotiate with the Soviet Union if our negotiating position has solid strength behind it.

Nothing that has happened in the past weeks can be construed as evidence of lessening the Soviet preoccupation with the power factor. Since 1919 there have been a great many twists and turns in Soviet policy, but as far as we know and as far as we can tell today, the fundamentals on which Russian policy is based have really not altered in any significant way. To understand this we should recognize that those fundamentals have existed for a long time and they were really not changed by the Bolshevik Revolution.

I have often quoted Lord Palmerston, a British statesman of the last century, a man who was extremely well-informed and a perceptive observer of Russia. Palmerston said:

It has always been the policy and the practice of the Russian government to expand its frontiers as rapidly as the apathy or the timidity of its neighbors would permit, but usually to halt and often to recoil when confronted by determined opposition, then to await the next favorable opportunity to spring upon its intended victim.

Now that analysis fits the postwar action of the Soviet Union very well indeed.

The Kremlin tried to keep troops in Northern Iran, then withdrew them in the face of determined opposition. The legitimate Greek Government after the war looked ripe for overthrow. The Kremlin instigated revolt and later abandoned the rebels when they were met with determined opposition. Berlin had all the earmarks of a soft touch. I was in Moscow at that time. I had very little hope for the situation. Soviet military forces blockaded the city and then when they encountered really determined opposition—and it wasn't military opposition either; it was moral and economic opposition backed up by an airlift—they lifted the blockade. Now each of these withdrawals was effected when determined opposition was met and not before.

Stalin spelled the thing out in a speech which I have read many times. It is included also in his famous work, *Problems of Leninism*. He was



describing the mishaps of the Czarists' government and he said:

The history of Russia of the olden days was that she was always getting defeated for her backwardness. Such is the law of the exploiters to beat those who are backward and weak. If you are backward, if you are weak, that means you are wrong. That means that you can be defeated and enslaved.

Now he was using that argument as a spur to the 5-year plan and for increasing enormously the heavy industry of Russia to support a military potential, but quite obviously those were his thoughts and he applied those ideas equally to other and to weaker nations than the Soviet Union.

We know very well that the Kremlin has never visualized a world of coequals. Lenin himself said:

We great Russians have never been able to make anything but slaves of captive peoples. We have visualized a dominant Russia among a galaxy of satellites and armed might is the first requisite for attaining such a globe-girdling objective.

In addition to the means of reducing the strength of the intended victim, military force and subversive tactics are also a necessity to weaken that strength before brute force is applied.

Now our own aspirations, as all of you know, are very different, but different though they are, we cannot disregard for a moment the Soviet reliance on force as a main means to get what it wants. Fortunately there have been several factors which have exerted a restraining influence on Russia's aggressive tendencies. One was the apparent belief that the mere existence of great strength can exert pressure enough so that the victim may give way without war, as in the case of Czechoslovakia. The second is related to the Soviet theory that capitalism bears the seeds of its own destruction. They think that time is on their side. I think that time is on ours.

### Reasons for Conciliatory Moves

From their point of view, if they were convinced that a major move would be confronted by determined opposition, it's reasonable to assume they would switch to a more conciliatory line. On the other hand, of course, as you have seen, that doesn't mean that a small war which possibly doesn't involve the risk of global conflict may not, from the Soviet point of view, be entirely logical and extremely profitable. That's one of the reasons why we're fighting in Korea and one of the reasons why our allies are fighting in Indochina and Malaya.

In recent weeks we've witnessed what appears to be a reversal of the Soviet line. Naturally there has been great speculation as to the reasons for this change. I have given you one. Another is that the new Soviet directorate recognizes the necessity of time for consolidating its position. It may be that the Kremlin realizes that it is over-extended and requires a breathing spell. The

men in the Politburo are thoroughly aware of the facts of history and they know that several times in the past Russia has swallowed more than she could digest and has had to disgorge in a welter of bloodshed and confusion. And it cannot be said that the satellite states are yet digested.

But, as I have said, it seems more probable that the new regime is reacting to the effectiveness of Western methods in the face of danger; in other words, that there is a realization that they will be confronted by determined opposition and if a new policy is really developing we cannot of course afford to lose sight of the fact that it may be designed to split our developing coalition and weaken our capability for providing determined opposition.

We certainly won't reject the fact that the Kremlin may be willing to negotiate East-West differences in at least temporary good faith. As President Eisenhower said:

We're waiting for deeds—we care nothing for mere rhetoric. We care only for sincerity of peaceful purpose attested by acts.

I wonder if you are aware of the real importance of the President's speech in Washington on April 16?<sup>3</sup> Not only at home here, but throughout the world? It brought about what is really a dramatic change in the political climate almost everywhere. Within hours of its delivery we began to receive cables from all parts of the world reflecting the approbation of chiefs of state and diplomatic chanceries. In Western Europe it was greeted as marking the beginning of a new initiative—in the Near and Middle East it has been warmly welcomed—in the Far East and particularly in Japan it has been widely praised.

We don't know exactly how it has affected the people who live behind the Iron Curtain. We do know that it was taken very seriously in many places. In the satellite countries where it was heard over the Voice of America, it was received with great emotion—in some cases, by tears.

As a whole, then, at this moment, the peoples of the world seem to me to be more united in a desire for the settlement of differences and difficulties than they have been for a long time indeed. But this climate will not endure indefinitely. So we watch and wait for signs that the Soviet Union will respond in good faith, and while waiting for deeds not words, we must indeed follow a policy which might be described as the "open hand and the closed fist." The open hand of course is always extended as a sincere gesture for peace—the fist must be clenched in readiness because we're dealing with a regime which we know is still wedded in an archaic concept of power. The choice rests with the leaders of the Soviet Union. It's up to them to choose which hand.

Now during this 3-day convocation of yours, you have heard a great many wise words and much

<sup>3</sup> BULLETIN of Apr. 27, 1953, p. 599.

about the full and thoughtful life on a college campus where the ideas and policies of the growing generation which will control this country during the years to come are being molded. Perhaps what I have just said may be a rather drab climax, but you people of New Hampshire have a reputation for facing facts and I have given some of them quite simply to you as I see them.

One of these facts is that the world has so shrunk in terms of life and space that we are in a way living under conditions such as the countries of Central Europe lived under for a great many centuries. That is, the oceans which protected our eastern and western coasts are no longer formidable or impassable obstacles. In terms of time and space they can be passed now in a matter of hours and thus they are like the geographic frontiers of the countries of Central Europe—a river, or a mountain range—which might be crossed in a day or in a matter of hours. Those nations for centuries faced across those frontiers a potential enemy, as today we face a potential enemy across ours, and we may live under that state of tension for a long time to come.

If you on this campus live up to the traditions of your school and of your State and of your ancestors, there is no reason why, if we have to do it, we should not face such a condition with calm confidence in our country and in its future and I have complete confidence that you will.

## **U.S. To Assist Victims of Viet Minh Aggression**

*Statement by Secretary Dulles*

Press release 238 dated May 2

Ever since the invasion of Laos began, we have been following developments there with the closest attention and grave concern. Here is another case of ruthless and unprovoked attack upon a country peacefully ruled by a duly constituted government recognized by 35 other nations. When the Communist talk of a Laotian "liberation army" and of "Vietnamese volunteers," they are using the classic Communist phrases which were invented to cloak aggression and which now identify aggression.

We have encouraging reports that the people of Laos are rallying around their King and are co-

operating with the forces of the French Union in the defense of their capital. Their efforts are an integral part of the struggle of the entire free world against enslavement and are recognized as such here.

We are maintaining close contact with the Governments of Laos and of France regarding the special requirements of the situation. We have already taken steps to expedite the delivery of critically needed military items to the forces defending Laos.

We are especially concerned at the plight of the Laotian people who have been driven from their homes by the invaders. The MSA Mission in Laos is arranging to be of help to the Laotian Government in the furnishing of the funds and supplies needed to care for these victims of Viet Minh aggression.

## **Soviet Reaction to President's Speech**

*On April 25 Pravda devoted its front page to a reprint of the President's April 16 address on world peace (BULLETIN of April 27, 1953, p. 599) and to an editorial stating that the Soviet Union was ready to enter into "businesslike" discussions with the West to end outstanding controversies. James Hagerty, the President's press secretary, on April 25 made the following statement on the Soviet reaction to the President's speech:*

White House press release dated April 25

I have talked with the President about the *Pravda* editorial. Its milder tone is a welcome change from the usual vituperation against the United States and the free world. It is also significant that the worldwide interest in the President's peace speech caused the Soviet leaders to reprint it in full for the Russian people.

Of course, the *Pravda* editorial cannot be considered a substitute for an official action by the Soviet leaders.

Maybe this editorial is a first step toward something concrete. If so, the free world will continue to wait for the definite steps that must be made if the Soviet leaders are sincerely interested in a cooperative solution to world problems.

If the Soviet leaders take such steps they will find the United States and the other free nations, as always, ready to work unceasingly for peace.

## The Foreign Service as an Arm of U. S. Policy

by *Clare Boothe Luce*  
*Ambassador to Italy*<sup>1</sup>

The Foreign Service is the overseas arm of our President and Secretary of State. Our Government, in the carrying out of its foreign policy, can be no stronger than the strength of that arm.

As you know, to do the tremendous job of keeping Americans and American interests safe at home and abroad, there are now about 10,000 Americans in the Foreign Service—from ambassadors and ministers to clerks and stenographers.

At the present time there are slightly less than 1,500 Foreign Service officers, all commissioned by the President, like Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps officers. Like their Service colleagues, these Foreign Service officers look to a career dedicated in the same way to the service of their country.

Too often, when people think of the work of the American Foreign Service, they think of assignments to big, glamorous Embassies such as Paris, Rome, London, or Rio. They forget that our country has about 300 diplomatic and consular posts in 75 countries throughout the world. Most of these posts are small and many extremely unpleasant. Tihwa, for example, which was closed when the Communists seized Northern China, was 1,500 miles from the nearest contact with civilization. There was only one bathtub in the entire city.

Or take Jidda, in Arabia, where the year-round temperature is as hot or hotter than our hottest day here in New York, where there are frequent sandstorms, where there are no organized public facilities for sports or other entertainment, where all drinking water must be boiled, and where such things as telephone service and public transportation services are virtually nonexistent. Or again, take Accra on the West Coast of Africa, where nearly all food must be imported, where sewage is carried beside the streets in open ditches, where the average humidity at dawn is 93 percent, and

where it is often necessary to wear mosquito boots whenever one leaves the house for a visit to friends.

Finally, let's look at one of our consulates at a remote outpost in South America. In this town the temperature is from 80 to 90 degrees all year round. No water, milk, or fresh vegetables may be consumed without boiling. There are no suitable hospital or first aid facilities, and it is often impossible to find a doctor of any kind. Two-thirds of the population have no sewers or running water, and nearly 90 percent of the population are infected by some form of internal parasite. Malaria, syphilis, yaws, pinta, and tetanus are prevalent. These are only a few examples of the many posts where thousands of men and women of the Foreign Service surrender the privileges and comforts of American life in order to help maintain that way of life for the rest of us.

Not the least of the hardships suffered by American Foreign Service personnel is that of being compelled to become, to a great extent, strangers to their own country. It is not pleasant to serve one's country by accepting exile from it. But the love of America remains. It should be remembered that the song "Home, Sweet Home" was not written by a man sitting safely at his fireside, but by an American Foreign Service officer stationed in Tunis.

### Undercover Work in World War II

There are many dramatic pages in the history of the Foreign Service. Consider the part played by about a dozen officers in helping to pave the way for the American landings in North Africa in 1942. These Foreign Service officers not only provided a vast amount of military information about fortifications and other defense arrangements in North Africa but also worked quietly to organize anti-Nazi resistance groups among the French. Discovery of some of their activities would have meant imprisonment or death, and they were in peril day and night. However, their undercover operations were performed so effectively that German agents were almost completely

<sup>1</sup> Excerpts from an address made before the America Italy Society at New York on Apr. 8.

fooled. Captured Nazi files later revealed that some of the most effective American Foreign Service officers had been lightly dismissed by the Nazis as "draft dodgers" and "playboys."

It would be impossible to review all the exciting and dangerous adventures which befell these Foreign Service officers, but a few may be illustrative. There was one night when one officer smuggled into a hotel, in full sight of Nazi officers, a radio beacon wrapped in a gunny sack for use in guiding American transports carrying parachutists. There was the evening, shortly before the North African landings, when two American Foreign Service officers pretended to conduct a drunken card game with a French friend while Gen. Mark Clark, who had landed secretly from an Allied submarine, hid in the cellar and while the house was being raided by Vichy French police. Then, there was the officer who was seized and held incommunicado for 5 days after the Allied landings but who escaped and made his way through German lines to Algiers, where he was able to furnish Allied Military Headquarters much valuable information.

The Foreign Service officers in North Africa had advance information as to the time of the invasion but could not leave their offices and hotels without attracting attention. Therefore, they deliberately exposed themselves to bombing, artillery fire, and machinegun fire in order to avoid any tipoff to the enemy.

It is difficult to estimate the number of American lives saved by the work done by these Foreign Service officers in "softening" North Africa for the invasion. For example, resistance groups with whom these officers worked virtually paralyzed Algiers during the first 6 hours of the Allied landings. Another prize example was the commander of a defending French regiment who issued only three rounds of ammunition to his men and ordered them to surrender when the ammunition was exhausted. All told, French resistance to the Allied invasion was greatly reduced by the courage and ingenuity shown by these Foreign Service officers during the long months of preparation.

The skills and capabilities of American Foreign Service officers are nowhere more widely recognized than among our senior military commanders. Top commanders such as General Eisenhower, General Ridgway, General Clark, Admiral McCormick, Admiral Carney, etc., have repeatedly sought the services of experienced American diplomats for their personal staffs. Recognizing the need for such services, the Department of State has assigned some of its best Foreign Service officers to these jobs. Their advice and assistance has proved itself of value on many occasions and has helped to assure the closest coordination of our diplomatic policy with our military strategy.

During these last minutes in Washington I've had the very illuminating and thrilling experience

of encountering, for the first time, a number of the members of this Foreign Service on duty in Washington. . . . I have been greatly impressed by the experienced, intelligent, and dedicated civil servants with whom I have been brought into touch as a result of my new job.

I am convinced that our Foreign Service should be staffed with Americans who, in terms of character and intelligence, are typical of the best of the various sections of the United States and who are highly qualified specialists, professionally trained in all aspects of relations between nations. I am convinced that this is the kind of staff we have if the Foreign Service people I have met in the Department are typical examples of the Foreign Service.

I think, my friends, it is high time the American people began to realize that they have been, may I say frankly, very unappreciative, very grudging in their recognition and applause of this tremendous corps of loyal and dedicated men.

Why? Well, somehow the false idea has got about that our Foreign Service men are political jobholders; that they, let me put it bluntly, ought to be politicians, and as politicians, they ought to be fired for following the orders and directives given to them by previous presidents and secretaries.

Now it is true that when an administration's foreign and domestic policies no longer reflect the will of the people, the people change their administration in their national election. But let us also remember, by and large what we intend to change is the policy and the policymakers. The great body of our administration civil servants remain. If they did not government itself would collapse, because the new administration would not have the political troops with which to govern.

Again, in the army, in war or in peace, when a general is replaced we do not demand the demobilization of his troops. Even in the event he were court-martialed for losing a battle, we certainly would not expect the general who took his place to shoot all his junior officers. Nevertheless, many people talk today as though a change of the Secretary and Under Secretaries—and the policymakers—should be followed by a wholesale change of our Foreign Service officers.

Well, let us imagine that all our Foreign Service officers overseas were ordered to pack their bags and come home within a few weeks after the election of a new President, simply because they had done what their oath of office requires of them—obeyed the directives and orders of the previous Secretary and his President. Can you possibly imagine the effect such a procedure would have on America's interests abroad and on our diplomatic relations? It would be catastrophic.

I hope I am not being too subtle, my friends. I am just trying to say that because there have been in the State Department and the Foreign Service a fraction of men who have been unworthy of our trust is no reason for us to withhold from

the loyal and dedicated many in our Foreign Service the great confidence and the praise the vast majority of them so richly deserve.

And now in closing, I address myself to the real ambassadors, who are you the people. Sound diplomacy, it has been said, is simply Christian charity and prudence operating in international affairs.

But we live in a world—at least on our side of the Iron Curtain—where neither presidents, nor secretaries, nor cabinet members, nor generals, nor ambassadors can accomplish much without the vigorous support of the people and informed public opinion. . . .

## Role of Private Organizations in Technical Assistance Programs

Press release 204 dated April 20

*Secretary Dulles, at his press conference on April 20, made the following reply to questions concerning whether his testimony before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on March 18<sup>1</sup> indicated that private organizations would be expected to conduct programs of assistance to underdeveloped countries should the goal of President Eisenhower, to bring about a general reduction in armaments, be accomplished.<sup>2</sup>*

No, I would not think so. In the first place, there has grown up a slight misapprehension as to what I said about private organizations handling the Point Four Program. I did say that the type of activity which is represented by the Point Four Program is one which has in the past been to a very considerable extent carried on by private corporations, foundations, and the like. I felt that it would be healthy if they felt a greater responsibility in those respects and did not feel that the U.S. Government was pre-empting the field and that, therefore, they did not need to exert themselves to carry on activities relating to the development abroad of greater technical information.

I believe that in all of these matters it is healthier that the activities, if feasible, should be conducted by private organizations rather than by government. Of course, under present conditions it cannot be totally conducted by private operations, and if there was an operation of the magnitude which is contemplated by the President in his address, that would obviously go far beyond the capability of any private organizations.

<sup>1</sup> "Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 83d Cong., 1st sess., Department of State," p. 5.

<sup>2</sup> President Eisenhower outlined his views on disarmament in his address before the American Society of Newspaper Editors on Apr. 16. For text of the address, see BULLETIN of Apr. 27, 1953, p. 599.

## Export-Import Bank Credits to Spain, Japan

The Export-Import Bank announced on April 13 that it has authorized the establishment of a short-term credit of \$12 million to assist in financing Spain's imports of U.S. raw cotton and spinnable waste. The credit is to be extended to the following Spanish commercial banks with the guarantee of the Bank of Spain:

Banco Hispano Americano  
Banco Exterior de Espana  
Banco Espanol de Credito  
Banco de Vizcaya  
Banco Central  
Banco de Bilbao

Cotton purchased under contracts entered into subsequent to April 9, 1953, and shipped subsequent to the date of the contract will be eligible for financing under the line of credit. At current market prices approximately 55,000 bales of cotton can be financed by the credit. Financing will be done through letters of credit under which 18-month drafts bearing an interest rate of 3½ percent per annum will be drawn on the Bank of Spain as agent for the Spanish commercial banks. The credit will be available through September 30, 1953.

Final details with respect to the operation of the credit are yet to be negotiated and a further announcement will be made when arrangements have been completed.

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The Export-Import Bank on April 14 announced that it has authorized a short-term credit of \$40 million to assist in financing Japan's imports of U.S. raw cotton from the 1952 crop. The credit will be in favor of the Bank of Japan and it will operate through U.S. and Japanese commercial banks and cotton marketing channels which customarily finance and handle cotton trade between the United States and Japan. At current market prices, approximately 200,000 bales of cotton can be financed by this credit.

The credit will bear interest at 3½ percent per annum and will be repayable within 15 months.

Final details with respect to the operation of the credit are yet to be negotiated and a further announcement will be made when arrangements have been completed. At that time, all inquiries relating to details of its operation should be addressed by the American cotton shipper to his bank or banks in the United States, or to his agents or customers in Japan.

The Bank pointed out that facilitation of the cotton trade, which is the purpose of the credit, is one of the most important factors in U.S.-Japanese economic relations. In recent years Japan has been the largest export market for U.S. cotton, and hence is of great significance

to our cotton economy, the prosperity of which is highly dependent on exports. On the other hand, the Japanese cotton-textile industry is of central and basic importance to the economy of that country. Japan is dependent upon foreign trade for maintenance of its economy and living standards. The Japanese textile industry contributes about half the value of all Japanese exports but it must import all its requirements of raw cotton.

## **Guaranty Issued for Private Investment in Haiti**

Harold E. Stassen, Director for Mutual Security, on April 15 announced the signing of the first U.S. Government investment-guaranty agreement with an American Republic.

The agreement with the Republic of Haiti makes possible Mutual Security Agency (MSA) guaranties protecting new American investors in that country against currency inconvertibility and loss by expropriation. The agreement was concluded in an exchange of notes between John M. Cabot, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, and Jacques Leger, Haitian Ambassador to the United States.

"Private investment in a friendly country can be a major economic benefit to that country and an important step in President Eisenhower's program of gaining peace and progress with prosperity for the free world," Mr. Stassen said. "I am delighted that the MSA investment-guaranty program can now encourage United States firms and individuals to invest capital in another country of the Western Hemisphere."

MSA has authority to extend guaranties to U.S. investors in any of the 57 mutual-security-program countries after the conclusion of guaranty agreements between the U.S. Government and the country involved. The program originally was limited to Western European countries participating in the Marshall plan and their dependent territories.

Pointing out that Haiti is the 16th nation to enter into such an agreement, Stassen said that he hoped the other American Republics would follow the lead of the Caribbean country. Invitations to discuss the program have been extended to other countries in the Western Hemisphere, Mr. Stassen said.

"The investment of United States capital can help to promote industrial diversification, provide new employment, and stimulate other industries which may produce raw materials or other products used by the newly created enterprise," Mr.

Stassen said. "These investments often provide more consumer goods at lower cost, effect a saving in foreign exchange and make possible new earnings for the country through increasing its export potential," he added.

A currency convertibility guaranty would provide that, if the investor should be unable to convert local currency receipts from the investment into dollars through regular banking channels, the U. S. Government would provide the dollar exchange.

A guaranty against loss by expropriation would provide for reimbursement of the investor by the U.S. Government for loss of investment property due to expropriatory action.

Haiti has taken other steps during the past few years to encourage new industries. For instance, legislation has been passed exempting from import duties machinery, equipment, and raw materials necessary for new industries. A similar exemption has been extended recently to raw materials necessary for the production of handicrafts to be exported.

Another important step encouraging new investment in Haiti was a reduction of the national income tax by 50 percent during the first year of an enterprise and 20 percent during the next four.

A recent partial listing by the Government of Haiti showed 23 industries for which raw materials are available in Haiti, including leather and shoes, glass, salt, tropical-fruit processing, dairy products, paper, fish, cotton textiles, rubber products, metals, transport, soap, chemicals, limestone, grain, chocolate, fiber products, vegetable oils, talc, lumber, and beverages.

The agreement between the United States and Haiti defines the treatment to be accorded by the Government of Haiti to currency or claims which the U.S. Government might acquire if any MSA guaranties should be invoked by an investor in Haiti.

If a convertibility guaranty should be invoked and the U.S. Government thus acquired local currency, Haiti would recognize the transfer of ownership of the currency, under the intergovernment agreement. Such currency would then be available for administrative expenses of U.S. Government representatives in Haiti.

Under other terms of the agreement, any claims to ownership of property acquired by the U.S. Government by paying off an investor's expropriation loss would also be recognized. Such claims would be negotiated on the diplomatic level rather than through the local courts. If no settlement were reached through diplomatic channels, the next step under the agreement would be arbitration of the claims by a person selected by mutual agreement, or by an arbitrator selected by the president of the International Court of Justice.

## The World Economic Situation

*Statement by James J. Wadsworth*

*U.S. Representative in the U.N. Economic and Social Council<sup>1</sup>*

U.S./U.N. press release dated April 16

To begin with I want to express my pleasure at being able to join in this discussion of the world economic situation. Many of you have participated before. For me, this is the first time.

I need not emphasize the importance of this annual debate. This Council is the only worldwide forum on economic matters where the views of the world, on the problems of the world, can be thoroughly aired.

The studies of world economic conditions submitted to us each year in connection with this debate are among the less spectacular but most constructive achievements of the United Nations. The three regional reports of the Economic Commission for Latin America, the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, and the Economic Commission for Europe,<sup>2</sup> combined with the annual World Economic Report and its supplements on Africa and the Middle East, provide unique sources of information on economic developments in various parts of the world.

The most comprehensive of these studies is, of course, the World Economic Report.<sup>3</sup> It is also the most difficult to prepare. The more it aims at universality of coverage, the more it runs into the great differences in the availability of data from country to country. In the absence of adequate official data for such countries as Communist China, there is great temptation to use unverified data obtained from questionable sources.

I am not suggesting that the authors of the World Economic Report should simply omit any reference to countries whose governments consistently refuse to let their own people, or the world, know about the true economic conditions in their territories. I do suggest, however, that the report

should make it clear, much clearer than is the case at present, that they are obliged to operate with altogether inadequate data and that any conclusions drawn from them can at best be only tentative.

Notwithstanding these shortcomings, I consider the report, taken as a whole, a well-written, illuminating survey. It offers an excellent basis for a discussion of world economic conditions.

### **Economic Effects of Armament Programs**

It is now nearly 3 years since the outbreak of hostilities in Korea imposed upon us the cruel necessity of a sharp acceleration of our defense efforts. During that period defense programs have been a major force in shaping trends in the free world's economies. I propose later to consider these trends in relation to my own country. For the moment, however, I should like to confine myself, drawing largely on the World Economic Report, to a brief review of the main course of the economy of the free world under the impact of rearmament needs. The report gives virtually no consideration to the impact of armament production in the Soviet Union and the so-called people's democracies. Accordingly, it does not permit of a similar review of the effect of their armament programs on their economies. It is a well known fact, however, that the levels of production cited in the report for these countries include continuous and heavy armament expenditures maintained at the expense of the standards of living of their people.

For nearly a year and a half the armament effort which came with the Korean war engendered an economic upswing. The demand for many basic materials soared. Fears of impending shortages in consumer goods led to scare-buying. Prices, particularly of primary products, rose sharply. Inflationary pressures were intensified. Governments endeavored, with varying degrees of success, to restrain these pressures. Taxes were

<sup>1</sup> Made in the Economic and Social Council on Apr. 16.

<sup>2</sup> For a review of the ECE report, see BULLETIN of Apr. 13, 1953, p. 534.

<sup>3</sup> Preliminary World Economic Report for 1951-52, U.N. doc. E/2353.

increased and credit tightened. In some instances more direct measures were taken, such as price controls, allocations, and limitations upon raw material end uses. Meanwhile, there was a sharp upsurge in production, accompanied by a rapid accumulation of inventories.

By the closing months of 1951 the economic pattern was different. Inflation was under control. Anticipatory and speculative buying virtually ended. As the abnormal commodity demands declined, the prices of primary commodities receded. Inventory accumulations slowed down. Industrial production for a time ceased to expand but during the last third of 1952 again turned upward.

The result, as the World Economic Report indicates, was that 1952 was a year of relative economic stability, with a satisfactory normal growth in world industrial production. The increase in 1952 over the 1951 level was about 2 percent, in contrast to the abnormal rise in 1951 of close to 14 percent. The fact that such a great increase was followed by a year which was on the whole one of relative stability and further growth in world production is ground for satisfaction.

The defense effort has imposed heavy burdens on the free world. It has entailed great increases in public expenditure with considerable additions to the tax load. It has absorbed, and continues to absorb, a large volume of resources. Generally speaking, however, the free world has shouldered these burdens with less difficulty than was anticipated. Extraordinary resilience and powers of expansion have been demonstrated in the economies of those countries carrying the major burden of the rearmament effort. As a result of these qualities the arms needed for defense have been forthcoming. At the same time, the supply of goods available for civilian consumption has been increased, and large amounts of equipment essential for economic development have been made available for export.

Since 1937, industrial production has risen by 75 percent. By contrast, the growth of food output by only 10 percent is disturbing. When viewed against the 15 percent increase in world population it means that we are still losing ground in the fight against hunger.

The lag in food production is one of the crucial economic and social problems of our time. Vast numbers of people are still inadequately fed. An expansion of world food supplies is a vital necessity. It must be a basic element in all plans for raising standards of living in the underdeveloped parts of the world.

#### **Economic Developments in the U.S.**

I should like to turn now to developments in my own country since the beginning of the Korean trouble.

Economic events in the United States have paralleled to a high degree those described for the

world as a whole by the Secretary-General. There was in this country, too, a post-Korean wave-like motion of inventories and prices, with an upward trend of both industrial and agricultural output.

The output of our farms, factories, mines, and service industries continued to increase in 1952, although not at the high over-all rates as in 1951. Moreover, the past 6 months have shown a greater rate of growth than the first 9 months of 1952, the period covered by the Secretary-General's report. For 1952 as a whole, the gross national product was close to \$350 billion. In the fourth quarter of that year it exceeded an annual rate of \$360 billion. In real terms, 1952 gross output was almost 2½ percent above 1951 and almost 25 percent above 1946.

This expansion in output was accompanied by an expansion in employment. Unemployment fell in 1952 to only 2.7 percent of the total civilian labor force.

Agricultural production in 1952 was the largest in my country's history. It permitted us to export to the rest of the world 564 million bushels of wheat and immense quantities of other foodstuffs vital to the survival of millions of people abroad.

Since farming is something I happen to know a little about from personal experience, I should like to take this occasion to say a word about the American farmer. The extensive program of our Federal and State Governments to develop efficient land-use techniques, to extend the use of fertilizers and other soil chemicals, to improve the quality of seeds and livestock, to control pests and plant diseases, and in general to make scientific practices known to farmers has, of course, been a most important factor in increasing our farm output. But it takes more than education and know-how to keep the farm economy expanding. I am confident that we could not have achieved these production records had not our farmers had the initiative and the ingenuity to make full use of these scientific developments and improved technology.

The year 1952 was a period of balanced growth in contrast to the more uneven expansion of the previous year. An upturn occurred in a wide variety of soft goods industries which had experienced a decline in 1951—apparel, leather, and especially textiles. This expansion has continued into 1953. Production of consumer durables—from automobiles to television sets—followed a similar course. Total retail sales in January and February of 1953 were 9 percent above the corresponding months of 1952. In the civilian economy this general expansion extended also into consumer services, capital goods, industrial capacity, public works, and the construction of houses.

As output increased, the inflationary pressures of the previous 2 years abated in the United States as they did elsewhere. Prices in primary markets declined, while prices at retail leveled off. Wages



have been rising and, by and large, real incomes of the American worker have increased.

### **Emergency Controls Eliminated**

The abundance of goods made possible the elimination, in the past 6 months, of most of the emergency economic controls previously imposed. It is testimony to the great underlying potential for expanding production that the need for controls created by the Korean war was so short-lived. Three years after Korea, our economy is once more free from controls and is producing more civilian and defense goods combined than ever before.

While domestic activity in the United States increased during 1952, our exports of merchandise, exclusive of military-aid shipments, showed a decline. Nevertheless we continued to increase our shipments of capital goods to all parts of the world. Our exports of electrical and industrial machinery amounted to \$2.2 billion, an increase of 15 percent over the previous year. All of the underdeveloped areas of the free world shared in this increase. Our machinery shipments to the Far East were 33 percent higher than in 1951.

At the same time, the value, though not the volume, of merchandise imports fell slightly from the alltime peak of 1951. Taking into account all current items—remittances, tourist expenditures, shipping and other services, as well as merchandise—the export surplus fell from \$3.2 billion in 1951 to \$1.8 billion in 1952. This represented, of course, a reduction of the dollar deficit of the rest of the world and to that extent an advance toward a better balance-of-payments position. The reduced deficit was more than made up by the outflow of private capital and United States grants and loans. As a result, the rest of the world increased its gold and dollar holdings during 1952 by \$1.2 billion.

Let me turn now to a point which may be bothering many of you—the fact that world industrial production in 1952 did not continue to increase as fast as in 1951. Some may interpret this as a cause for concern. An analysis will show I think, that concern is not warranted.

From 1946 to 1948 there was an increase of 25 percent in world production. This phenomenal increase was largely a result of the reactivation of idle capital and labor as part of the process of recovery from war. In the face of destruction, dislocation, and rampant inflation which the war brought, the recovery was extraordinary. Demobilized soldiers, refugees, damaged factories, dislocated businesses, long-unused avenues of trade—all these were reassembled and put back to work with a speed which was nothing less than spectacular. Then, in 1950-51, many countries were forced to turn their efforts to the production

of war materials. Total world output again spurted upward.

Once this process was well along, however, it was hardly reasonable to look for a continued increase in production of such dramatic proportions. A rate of between 2 and 5 percent a year for the world as a whole, looked at in historical perspective, is in fact a rate which the world can view with satisfaction in normal times.

As far as the U.S. economy is concerned, every indication leads me to believe that investment will continue to expand in 1953, giving strength to the U.S. economy and more than counterbalancing any letup in defense expenditures. In each of the past 2 years plant and equipment expenditures by business firms have approximated \$26 billion, much of which was devoted to civilian production. The total plant and equipment now planned for the year 1953 as a whole should result in equally high investment.

Beyond these private investments lies an area of potential public construction whose dimensions at this point are not fully known. We need many more schools, and state and local governments are actively planning for them. We appear to be on the verge of a new era in highway construction brought on by an extraordinary growth in automobile ownership since the end of World War II. If there is concern lest these expansive forces be dissipated, I would agree with Secretary of Commerce Sinclair Weeks who recently called attention to the fact that:

The American system today has many floors underneath to check an old-fashioned slump—high savings, social security, pensions, emergency laws and other props . . . The new administration would not hesitate to use such strong measures as might be required in an emergency.

### **Factors in Economic Progress**

Developments in relation to production, employment, trade, and prices, with which I have so far been mainly concerned, are the concrete measures of economic progress. I should like now to turn from facts and figures to consider briefly some of the factors on which that progress mainly depends.

The possession of abundant natural resources is obviously a major advantage to any area. I need not dwell on such matters as this. What I wish to emphasize is the great importance also of an economic and political environment which encourages its people to put forward their best efforts to improve their economic situation.

The economic development of the United States has been achieved under what we call the system of free enterprise. This is a system which we believe encourages individual initiative, leaves men free to try out new ways of doing things, and promotes the most efficient and productive combination of labor and management. The maintenance of this system has, I am convinced, been

a dynamic force in promoting our economic welfare.

I recognize that this free enterprise system is pursued also in varying degrees by many other nations. I do not say that it would necessarily fit all countries as well as it does the United States. But one thing I do assert with some confidence. That is, that healthy incentives to individual effort are of vital importance for economic progress.

Accordingly one of the most important things a government can do to promote economic well-being is to develop and maintain policies which contribute to this individual dynamic incentive.

First and foremost among such policies is the maintenance of internal financial stability. All of you know the effects of uncontrolled inflation. It hampers the domestic production of goods required for economic development. The easy increase in money incomes weakens incentives to sustained work; the rise in prices discourages savings; new investment tends to take the form of speculative ventures rather than real capital formation. The balance-of-payments position deteriorates, making it more difficult to import capital goods needed to improve productivity. Sound tax policies, credit policies, trade policies, are among the checkreins on those evils.

Land reform is another area of government policy where much can be done to establish conditions favorable to production. Give the farmer a real stake in his work and his future and he will exercise his best ingenuity to improve his land and to increase his output. But the job of instituting such policies is primarily the responsibility of the underdeveloped countries themselves, as is stated so well in the World Economic Report.

Economic growth can also be stimulated through government policies aimed at encouraging private investment, both domestic and foreign. Domestically, this means stimulating savings, mobilizing capital, and inducing it to enter lines of production which will contribute most to development. Since domestic sources of capital are typically insufficient in underdeveloped countries to support an adequate level of investment, vigorous efforts must also be made to establish an environment congenial to the international flow of private capital. In the last analysis, only the local governments can establish a climate in which the foreign investor feels welcome and is convinced that he will get an even break.

The most fundamental problem still facing the world is the creation of conditions which will permit a steady, worldwide improvement in standards of living. Basic to such improvement is increased production. President Eisenhower expressed the issue this way in his message to Congress last week:<sup>4</sup>

The building of a productive and strong economic system within the free world, one in which each country may

better sustain itself through its own efforts, will require action by other governments, as well as by the United States, over a wide range of economic activities. These must include adoption of sound internal policies, creation of conditions fostering international investment, assistance to underdeveloped areas, progress toward freedom of international payments and convertibility of currencies, and trade arrangements aimed at the widest possible multilateral trade.

This means that the approach of the U.S. Government to these problems will be the cooperative approach—working hand in hand with those countries who wish to join in the common endeavor. The President has expressed our determination that these efforts must succeed. In the same message from which I just read, he stated our deep realization that the contribution of the United States to the solution of the free world's economic problems "is so large as to be crucially important to its success," and that its success "is crucially important to the United States."

## Documents on Korean Armistice Negotiations

### Summary of Liaison Meeting of April 19

1. Meeting of Senior Liaison Groups convened at 1100 hours. Substance of record follows:

2. UNC: "I have a statement to make. The position of the United Nations Command with respect to resuming plenary sessions of the Korean Armistice negotiations was stated to you in General Harrison's letter to General Nam Il, dated 16 April, 1953.<sup>1</sup> I reiterate the position of the United Nations Command, that it will resume plenary sessions in the expectation that the detailed arrangements for the implementation of the new proposal of your side will be along the reasonable and practical lines set forth in General Harrison's letter. Based on the foregoing, I am authorized to announce to you that the United Nations Command Delegation will be prepared to meet with your delegation at 1100 on 23 April, 1953, for the purpose of seeking an overall settlement of the question of prisoners of war along constructive and reasonable lines."

3. *Communists*: a. "I am instructed by the Senior Delegate of our side to make the following statement before the Liaison Group meeting enters into discussion on the date for the resumption of plenary sessions. We have studied the letter of April 16 from the Senior Delegate of your side and consider it necessary to point out that, as the Senior Delegate of our side has stated in his letter of April 9<sup>2</sup> to the Senior Delegate of your side, the new proposal of our side for settling the entire question of prisoners of war is a highly constructive proposal. In order to eliminate the differences between the two sides on the question of repatriation of prisoners of war and to bring about an armistice in Korea for which the whole world has been longing, our side has made an obvious concession as to the steps, time, and procedure of the repatriation of prisoners of war. Our side proposes that the repatriation of prisoners of war be carried out in two steps; that is, both parties to the negotiations should undertake to repatriate immediately after the cessation of hostilities all those prisoners of war in their custody who insist upon repatriation, and to hand over the remaining prisoners of war to a neutral State so as to insure a just solution to the question of their repatriation.

b. "The high constructiveness of this proposal has al-

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Apr. 27, 1953, p. 608.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, Apr. 20, 1953, p. 515.

readily been recognized by the whole world. As to the concrete measures for implementing this proposal, it is very obvious that the meeting of negotiations between the delegates of both sides.

c. "The agreements of both sides on various other major problems with regard to an armistice in Korea were all reached in this way. As a matter of fact in negotiations with both sides on an equal footing, only consultation and discussion at the conference are the proper way of settling questions. The Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers consider that the concrete suggestions of either side should all be put forth at the meetings of negotiations between the delegates of both sides.

d. "The progress of the negotiations depends on the effort of both sides. The task which lies before both sides before the resumption of the meetings of negotiations should not be to visualize a recess after the resumption of the plenary sessions, but rather should be to speedily discuss and decide upon the date of reopening the plenary sessions in order to resume the negotiations and realize an armistice in Korea by common efforts.

e. "With regard to the time and date for the resumption of the plenary sessions of the delegations to the armistice negotiations, our delegation is prepared to hold a meeting with your delegation at 1100 hours on 25 April."

4. *Unc*: "We agree that our delegation will meet with your delegation on 25 April, 1953 at 1100 hours."

5. *Communists*: a. "Now both sides have come to a common view regarding the date for resuming the plenary sessions of the delegations of both sides.

b. "I propose that the meetings of the Liaison Groups of both sides recess till either side considers it is necessary to hold a meeting to discuss the question of repatriating sick and injured prisoners of war."

6. *Unc*: "We agree with your proposal to adjourn the Liaison Groups meeting until either side requests a meeting."

7. Meeting adjourned at 1120 hours.

### Summaries of Plenary Talks <sup>3</sup>

#### APRIL 26 SESSION

The first plenary session of the re-opening of the Armistice negotiations at Panmunjom convened today at 2 p. m. This was the first plenary meeting since the recess called by Lt. Gen. William K. Harrison, Jr., Chief *Unc* delegate, on October 8, 1952. General Harrison headed the *Unc* delegation and the Communist delegation was headed by General Nam Il.

General Nam Il presented a six-point proposal as the basis on which the Communists felt the Armistice negotiations should be conducted.

[Following is the text of the Communist proposal:

"First, within 2 months after the armistice agreement becomes effective, both sides shall, without offering any hindrance, repatriate and hand over in groups all these prisoners of war who insist upon repatriation to the side to which the prisoner of war belongs in accordance with the related provisions of paragraph 51, article 111, of the armistice agreement and in conformity with the final name lists exchanged and checked by both sides.

"Second, within the time limit of 1 month after the completion of the direct repatriation of all those prisoners of war who insist upon repatriation, the detaining side shall be responsible for sending to a neutral state, agreed upon through consultation of both sides, the remaining prisoners of war who are not directly repatriated and then release them from its military control. Such prisoners of war shall be received and taken into custody by the authorities of the neutral state concerned in an area desig-

<sup>3</sup> Released to the press at Munsan.

nated by such authorities. The authorities of the neutral state concerned shall have the authority to exercise their legitimate functions and responsibilities for the control of the prisoners of war under their temporary jurisdiction.

"Third, within 6 months after the date of arrival of such prisoners of war in the neutral state, the nations to which they belong shall have the freedom and facilities to send personnel to that neutral state to explain to all the prisoners of war depending on these nations so as to eliminate their apprehensions and to inform them of all matters related to their return to their homelands, particularly of their full right to return home to lead a peaceful life.

"Fourth, within 1 month after the arrival of the prisoners of war in the neutral state, and after the explanations made by the nations to which they belong, the speedy return to their fatherlands of all those prisoners of war who request repatriation shall be facilitated by the authorities of the neutral state concerned, and there should be no obstruction. The administrative details of the repatriation of such prisoners of war shall be settled through consultation between the authorities of the neutral state concerned and the authorities of the nations to which the prisoners of war belong.

"Fifth, if, at the expiration of the time limit of 6 months stipulated in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the present proposal, there are still prisoners of war in the custody of the neutral state, their disposition shall be submitted, for settlement through consultation, to the political conference provided in paragraph 60, article IV of the armistice agreement.

"Sixth, all the expenditures of the prisoners of war during their stay in the neutral state, including their traveling expenses in returning to their fatherlands, shall be borne by the nations to which they belong."

Following the presentation of the Communist proposal, General Harrison pointed out that certain arrangements were outlined in his letter to the Communists of April 16. These were:

1. The neutral state of a nation such as Switzerland, traditionally recognized as appropriate in matters of this kind.

2. That in the interest of practicality, prisoners of war who are not directly repatriated be released in custody in Korea of the neutral state.

3. That after a reasonable time, such as 60 days, during which opportunity has been afforded by the neutral state to parties concerned for determining the attitudes of the individuals in its custody, the neutral state will make arrangements for peaceable disposition of those remaining in its custody.

General Harrison then pointed out that the *Unc* does not consider that the physical removal of prisoners to points outside of Korea is justified in any sense. He added that such a move would afford no material advantage and would entail undesirable delays and many practical difficulties, such as time consumed in transportation, housing and administrative accommodations. This, the General said, would delay the release of prisoners by months, and is a very undesirable solution. He emphasized that the neutral state could exercise adequate custody at suitable locations in Korea, and that 6 months was an "utterly exorbitant" time and that prisoners should not be held in custody for that period. "It is our firm opinion," the General said, "that 60 days will be ample for this purpose."

General Harrison summed up for the *Unc* by stating that the Communists failed to accord acceptable recognition to the arrangements outlined in the letter of April 16. He then proposed a recess until 11 a. m., tomorrow but General Nam Il requested a short recess until 4 p. m., which was agreed to by General Harrison.

Following the recess, General Nam Il said that the time limit of 6 months was "both necessary and reasonable" and Switzerland was unsuitable as the neutral state.

General Harrison, before recessing, again pointed out that there should be no objections on the part of the Com-

munists to Switzerland as the neutral state. Switzerland has for many years been recognized as neutral among the nations of the world and it fulfills all the requirements of a neutral nation.

General Harrison, in his final statement, said, "You have said nothing which would indicate that your proposal is one that we can consider as constituting a reasonable and constructive basis for negotiating an armistice."

#### APRIL 27 SESSION

The second plenary session of the reopened Armistice talks between the UNC and the Communists went into session at 11 a. m. today at Panmunjom.

Lt. Gen. William K. Harrison, Jr., Senior UNC Delegate, told the Communists that their proposals submitted yesterday would force a prisoner to choose between return to the Communists or face detention without a foreseeable end.

The UNC Chief Delegate opened the session by pointing out that their six point proposal "does not form the basis for an acceptable solution to the prisoner of war question." The General added, "it is obvious that your side failed to consider seriously our letter of 16 April in which we outlined the nature of a solution that is reasonable and constructive and one which would lead to a prompt resolution of the problem of prisoners of war."

The Communists were told by General Harrison that their argument regarding Switzerland as not being suitable as a neutral nation is groundless and a strange one indeed. He added that the Communists' proposal to detain prisoners of war up to 9 months after an armistice is signed, and then even longer while a political conference settles their disposition is neither reasonable nor constructive. "It is unreasonable and obstructive," the General said.

The General again told General Nam Il, senior Communist Delegate that the Communists have proposed nothing that can be considered as a reasonable or constructive basis for an armistice agreement.

The Communists asked for an adjournment at 11:52 a. m. until 11 a. m. tomorrow. The UNC agreed to the request.

#### APRIL 28 SESSION

Lt. Gen. William K. Harrison, Jr., UNC Senior Delegate, today informed the Communists that it was the hope of the UNC that both sides would be able to agree on a reasonable and honorable armistice which would protect the human rights of the prisoners of war. He went on to say that if the Communists desired an armistice on this basis, they had failed thus far to give any indication of such an objective.

The UNC Chief Delegate stressed that, "We do not intend to become involved in protracted and useless arguments," and that "from your [the Communists'] experience in previous negotiations with us, you should be well aware that we mean what we say."

On the Communists' rejection of Switzerland as the neutral state, General Harrison said, "You have cast doubt on your own intentions to bring about a speedy and honorable truce."

When the Communists were asked if they were prepared to suggest the name of a neutral state, the Communists replied that they had "noted the question" and then immediately proposed a recess until 11 a.m. tomorrow.

#### APRIL 29 SESSION

An unnamed Asiatic country was proposed today by the Communists as a substitute for the UNC choice of Switzerland as the neutral nation to take custody of prisoners of war who do not wish to be repatriated.

The proposal was made to Lt. Gen. William K. Harrison,

Jr., Senior Delegate for the UNC, by General Nam Il during the fourth session of the reopened plenary talks at Panmunjom.

General Harrison, in his opening statement today, again stressed the selection of Switzerland as the neutral nation in handling prisoners of war and pointed out that "no other nation has comparable experience in this field." He added, "The argument that it is disqualified to serve in this capacity by the fact that it is a member of the neutral nations' supervisory commission is quite groundless.

General Nam Il, on the subject of time required for "explanations" to prisoners who do not wish to be repatriated, said the "specific length of time could be a subject of discussion."

General Harrison pointed out that the transportation of many thousands of prisoners overseas to a neutral nation would, for the great majority of them, constitute deportation and expatriation. "Our side," General Harrison said, "cannot apply force to transport prisoners to a neutral country any more than we can apply force to repatriate them to your side."

The Communists proposed a recess at 12:04 p. m. until 11:00 a. m. tomorrow, which was agreed to by the UNC.

#### APRIL 30 SESSION

Lt. Gen. William K. Harrison, Jr., Senior UNC Delegate, told the Communists today at the fifth meeting of the reopened armistice discussions at Panmunjom that until the Communists come to an understanding on a neutral nation, "we see no advantage in discussing seriously the other elements of your proposal."

General Harrison further stated, "Not knowing the name of the country of your selection, we, of course, are not able to consider the matter of its neutrality. We do think it worth while, however, to point out that an Asian country is necessarily located very close to countries dominated by Communists and might therefore be subjected to Communist military, economic, or political influence."

On the question of prisoner repatriation, the Senior Delegate of the UNC reminded the Communists that only 12,000 of the 65,000 personnel captured during the first year of hostilities have been listed as POW's in December 1951 and that a majority of the missing had been incorporated illegally into the People's Army.

This practice violates the Geneva Convention which requires that POW's be protected from the effects of military operations and that they not be employed in labor contributing directly to military operations. The General said:

"It would seem appropriate that these Koreans whom we are still holding as prisoners and who want to live in South Korea should be released without further delay to enter into civilian life of their fellow Koreans rather than be retained indefinitely as they might under your proposal. It has always seemed strange to us that the representatives of Communist China should insist that native Koreans who refuse to return to North Korea and seek to live in South Korea should be forced to return to

### The United States in the United Nations

"The United States in the United Nations," which has been a regular feature of the BULLETIN, is being discontinued with this issue because of space limitations. The BULLETIN will continue to print texts of major U.S. statements made at U.N. meetings, texts of important U.N. resolutions and other documents, Current United Nations Documents: A Selected Bibliography, and material relating to the U.N. Command operations in Korea.

North Korea. The obviously humane thing would be to release the Korean prisoners who are now in our hands. Such release would also greatly simplify the whole problem of repatriation and the work of the custodial state.

"In view of the advantages to all concerned, a proposal by your side at this time to release in South Korea all Korean prisoners who have refused to return to Communist Korea would greatly facilitate agreement on an armistice and would be received with acclaim by all decent and humane people throughout the entire world."

The meeting adjourned until 11 a. m. tomorrow morning.

## Ambassador Murphy To Assist in Armistice Negotiations

Press release 221 dated April 28

The Department of State announced on April 28 that Ambassador Robert D. Murphy is terminating his duties as Ambassador to Japan on April 29, but his departure from Japan has been temporarily postponed to permit him to continue in Tokyo to assist CRCTCNC [Commander in Chief of the U.N. Command, Gen. Mark W. Clark] in his conduct of the armistice negotiations. President Eisenhower has accorded Mr. Murphy the personal rank of Ambassador in connection with his temporary assignment.

Ambassador Murphy's duties in this connection do not imply any change in the military character of the armistice negotiations nor in General Clark's responsibilities with regard thereto.

As soon as conditions permit, Mr. Murphy will return to the United States to take up his new post as Assistant Secretary of State for U.N. Affairs.

## Termination of Sulphur Committee

The Sulphur Committee of the International Materials Conference (Imc) announced on April 13 that its members have agreed to the dissolution of the Committee on April 30, 1953. This announcement follows the Committee's recent decision to discontinue international allocation of crude sulfur as from March 1, and reflects the continuing improvement in the supply and demand position of sulfur in the free world.

The Sulphur Committee, which was the second of the commodity groups to be established within the framework of the Imc, met for the first time on March 1, 1951. The Committee's recommendations for the first international allocations of crude sulfur were accepted by its member governments for the third quarter of 1951 and allocations were continued on a quarterly or half-yearly basis until March 1, 1953.

The following countries were represented on the Committee: Australia, Belgium (representing Benelux), Brazil, Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the Union of South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

## Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography<sup>1</sup>

### Economic and Social Council

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- Inter-Governmental Organizations. Relations With Inter-Governmental Organizations. Report by the Secretary-General. E/2366, Feb. 17, 1953. 21 pp. mimeo.
- International Action for Conservation and Utilization of Non-Agricultural Resources. Report by the Secretary-General on activities under Council resolution 345 (XII). E/2367, Feb. 23, 1953. 8 pp. mimeo.
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- Allegations Regarding Infringements of Trade Union Rights Received Under Council Resolution 277 (X). Observations of the Permanent Representative of Greece to the United Nations on the communication from the Federation of Greek Maritime Unions, Cardiff, England (Document E/2333/Add.21). E/2371, Feb. 27, 1953. 5 pp. mimeo.
- United Nations Narcotics Laboratory. Note by the Secretary-General. E/2372, Feb. 27, 1953. 9 pp. mimeo.
- Technical Assistance for Economic Development Provided Under General Assembly Resolution 200 (III). Note by the Secretary-General. E/2375, Feb. 27, 1953. 8 pp. mimeo.
- Inter-Governmental Organizations. Means for Furthering the Completion of the International One-Millionth Map of the World. Report by the Secretary-General. E/2376, Mar. 5, 1953. 36 pp. mimeo.
- Flight of Survivors of Nazi Concentration Camps. Fourth Progress Report by the Secretary-General. E/2378, Mar. 10, 1953. 6 pp. mimeo.
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- Notes on the Draft Annual Report of ECAFE to ECOSOC. Statement submitted by IERTU Delegation in connection with the Annual Report of the Commission to the Economic and Social Council. E/CN.11/NGO/6, Feb. 12, 1953. 4 pp. mimeo.
- United Nations Opium Conference. Illicit Traffic in Opium. Note by the Secretary-General. E/CONF. 14/9, Mar. 19, 1953. 19 pp. mimeo.
- Additional Note to the Reports of the Committees [Economic Commission for Europe] by the Executive Secretary. E/ECE/153-H, Rev. 1, Feb. 12, 1953. 28 pp. mimeo.
- Report of the International Children's Centre on the Work of Its Services for the Year 1952. E/ICEF/216, Jan. 30, 1953. 190 pp. mimeo.

<sup>1</sup> Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

The United Nations Secretariat has established an Official Records series for the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and the Atomic Energy Commission, which includes summaries of proceedings, resolutions, and reports of the various commissions and committees. Information on securing subscriptions to the series may be obtained from the International Documents Service.

## Reports of U.N. Command Operations in Korea<sup>1</sup>

### **FIFTY-SEVENTH REPORT: FOR THE PERIOD NOVEMBER 1-15, 1952**

U.N. doc. S/2970  
Dated March 31, 1953

[Excerpts]

I herewith submit report number 57 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 1-15 November 1952, inclusive. United Nations Command communiques numbers 1420-1437 provide detailed accounts of these operations.

The Armistice negotiations continued in recess.

In early November two significant incidents occurred which provided additional factual evidence that intelligence activities within pro-Communist Prisoner of War camps were continuing with strong efforts being made to maintain contact with outside agencies. In the pre-dawn hours of 5 November, two North Korean Communist Prisoners of War were apprehended while attempting to escape from United Nations Prisoner of War Camp Number One, Koje-Do. Carefully sewed into the clothing of one prisoner were six petitions addressed to North Korean and Chinese officials; a hand-drawn map of Korea; a map of Koje-Do indicating troop disposition of United Nations Command security forces, as seen from their enclosure; a partial list of military units on Koje-Do; a diary of a Communist party member; two homemade flags, and a crude compass. The petitions followed same type of Communist propaganda line which appeared on flags and banners prior to decentralization of Prisoner of War population, which occurred at Koje-Do in June 1952. Fantastic accusations and threats against United Nations Command were followed by appeals for help and promises of continued harassing measures.

During an interrogation of a Prisoner of War at Koje-Do who had escaped 17 October and was recaptured 19 November, the prisoner admitted he had delivered a package containing coded documents and petitions of type similar to that mentioned above to a pre-determined individual at the Pusan railroad station. He was able to identify his contact by a peculiar manner of dress and three code words.

<sup>1</sup> Transmitted to the Security Council by the U.S. representative to the U.N. on Mar. 30. Text of the 50th report appears in the BULLETIN of Dec. 15, 1952, p. 958; the 51st and 52d reports, Dec. 29, 1952, p. 1034; the 53d report, Jan. 26, 1953, p. 155; the 54th report, Feb. 9, 1953, p. 224; the 55th report, Feb. 16, 1953, p. 276; and the 56th report, Mar. 2, 1953, p. 348.

These efforts were obviously part of the overall network which had been covertly built up by Communist agencies in North Korea to utilize captured personnel in the United Nations Command's custody as a part of their military objectives. A study prepared by the United Nations Command and due for public release in January discusses the background of this subversive movement and clearly establishes the control which Communist negotiators exercised over a series of riots and incidents of violence which have occurred in the United Nations Command camps during the past year. Many of these incidents have been of a nature or on a scale requiring suppression by force with resultant deaths and injuries. The Communists have used every opportunity to propagandize such outbreaks. The connection between incidents and their propaganda exploitation is by no means accidental. While details of this phase of war which the Communists wage in United Nations Command camps will shortly be known, the conclusions, arrived at after exhaustive research, are of particular interest.

From the Koje-Do outbreak came the confirmation that the Communist high command, undeterred by provisions of the Geneva Convention or any other humane considerations, would use every means, including murder, to maintain its hold on those of its personnel captured by the other side and to expend them in whatever actions would hurt or weaken the enemy. A Communist Prisoner of War therefore, had to be regarded by the Communist not as a passive human being in need of care and protection until he could be returned to his home but as still an active soldier determined to fight on in whatever way his leaders dictated.

This warfare through prisoners did not require that they possess arms in enough strength to overwhelm their guards and enter into large scale military operations. They were to break out if they could and join the nearest irregulars, but they were told this in an attempt to fire their imaginations, rather than in expectation of accomplishment. Military objectives would be served no less, the Communist high command thought, if they created incidents which would make it necessary for their guards to use force against Prisoners of War, resulting in deaths and injuries which could be represented to peoples in both Communist and free countries as convincing evidence of the "brutality" and "inhumanity" of the United Nations Command and especially of the United States. The loss of Communist lives—as many hundreds or even

thousands of them as might be necessary—was a small price to pay for gaining propaganda material to accomplish two purposes; first, to turn free world opinion against the United States and thereby to weaken U.S. leadership in the resistance to Communism; and, second, to unify public opinion in Communist lands against the United Nations cause.

Over the years, the Communists had become very familiar with the effect on public opinion of reports, whether true or false, of inhumane treatment of human beings. Though by no means moved, except to be even more secretive about it, by disclosures of their own widespread and flagrant disregard for the dignity of the human individual and sanctity of his life, they had seen time and again the horrified reaction of even many of their own friends in non-Communist countries. The leveling of similar charges against opponents became a standard practice in their own propaganda. When they had nothing concrete on which to base such propaganda, they manufactured something, such as the germ-warfare hoax against the United Nations Command in Korea. The mission required of the Communist prisoners on Koje-Do was to provide a better propaganda base of this kind and such importance was attached to it that no efforts were spared to build up a fantastically elaborate organization in the Prisoner of War compounds.

Enlightened by this knowledge, the United Nations Command moved swiftly to block Communist warfare through the Koje-Do prisoners. Prisoners who were confirmed Communists, as indicated by their readiness to return to Communist territory, were dispersed into smaller and more easily handled groups on Koje-Do and nearby islands. Compound were built for an average of 500 to 600 men. A much stricter regime was instituted. Compound inspections by camp authorities were more frequent, including thorough searches for contraband. Security forces were strengthened. In some places, to reduce the opportunity for clandestine activities, a curfew was enforced from 1900 to 0500 hours. Intelligence systems were expanded to gain fuller information as to what was going on in the compounds and especially to identify subversive leaders.

To make it more difficult for the Communist prisoners to receive and send messages from and to the high command in North Korea a native village and isolated civilian homes which formerly sheltered agents, were moved out of the camp area on Koje-Do. Steps were taken to prevent the carrying of oral instructions by agents disguised as soldiers who surrendered at the front. Use of Prisoner of War hospitals as the internal communications center for transmission of messages between compounds and enclosures was broken up, and the establishment of a substitute center was made next to impossible.

Despite these measures and others permissible under the Geneva Convention, it was apparent that Communist Prisoner of War leaders were still organized, and were capable of continuing their warfare against the United Nations Command. The timing of outbreaks to synchronize with developments in the armistice negotiations or elsewhere would be handicapped by the loss of communications, but the leaders among the prisoners were

well enough acquainted with the purposes and methods of the party and the army command to know without further instructions, that incidents at any time could be exploited. Constant and close surveillance might deprive prisoners of the advantage of surprise, but there can be no guarantee that control measures now in force will prevent the fanatical Communist leaders from throwing away the lives of those they dominate.

Throughout the remainder of the Prisoner of War Command scattered incidents occurred in pro-Communist camps similar to those which have been experienced during the past several months. There were no such incidents in the anti-Communist camps.

Except for a few hundred individuals still hospitalized and undergoing medical treatment at the United Nations Command Hospital, Pusan, all of the 11,000 civilian internees included in Operation THANKSGIVING were released from custody, and were being resettled in the civilian economy of the Republic of Korea.

Through the medium of radio and leaflets, detailed information on developments in the United Nations General Assembly was made available to peoples living under Communist tyranny in North Korea. In these radio broadcasts and leaflets the United Nations endeavor to achieve an armistice in Korea and lasting peace throughout the world was kept in the foreground. United Nations Command proposals at Panmunjom and United Nations Command readiness to discuss constructive Communist proposals were reiterated in daily informational output. Meanwhile, the Communist leaders have attempted to instill in the peoples under their control the belief that the recess in negotiations constitutes a final break-off.

Rear Admiral B. Hall Hanlon, United States Navy, on 10 November was announced as Assistant Chief of Staff, J-5 (Civil Affairs), United Nations Command, effective with the establishment of the Joint Staff. Admiral Hanlon has served in Korea as the Deputy Commander for Civil Affairs, Korean Communications Zone, and as the Commander in Chief's United Nations Command representative on the Combined Economic Board in Korea. Admiral Hanlon will continue as the Commander in Chief's United Nations Command representative on the Combined Economic Board in addition to his function as Assistant Chief of Staff, J-5 for Civil Affairs.

Under the terms of the Economic Coordination Agreement of May 24, 1952, the United States Government on 7 November paid \$17,987,671.43 to the Republic of Korea. This amount represented a \$4,000,000 monthly payment on account for won expended for bonafide military uses, June through September inclusive, together with payment for won sold to troops during period May through August inclusive. To date three such payments have been made to the Republic of Korea, totaling \$65,638,209.07.

Preliminary results of the crop survey conducted to estimate the Republic of Korea rice crop for the current food year indicate that approximately thirteen million suk of brown rice will be produced (1 suk=5.12 bushels). This figure is reported by the United Nations Command members of the crop survey team; Republic of Korea members have not as yet released their estimates. Dur-

ing the period 1940-44 the annual average rice production was 13,718,516 suk, and during the period 1946-50 the annual average was 14,145,444 suk. By comparison with these figures for previous years, the estimate for this year's crop shows that the Republic of Korea rice production will be approximately normal.

The first class of Republic of Korea merchant seamen will arrive on 17 November at Yokosuka, Japan, for merchant marine training to be conducted by the United Nations Command. The students will be housed and subsisted on a cargo barge converted at a cost of \$48,000 for the purpose. The program provides for training of 480 Republic of Korea seamen during the next twelve months. Classes will consist of forty students and will be of thirty days duration.

## **FIFTY-EIGHTH REPORT: FOR THE PERIOD NOVEMBER 16-30, 1952**

U.N. doc. S/2971  
Dated March 31, 1953

[Excerpts]

I herewith submit report number 58 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 16-30 November 1952, inclusive. United Nations Command communiques numbers 1438-1449 provide detailed accounts of these operations.

Armistice negotiations continued in recess. On the 20th of November 1952 the Senior United Nations Command delegate again requested the Communists to permit captured personnel in their custody to receive individual parcels through the mail exchange which is now in operation. The letter which the Communists have ignored is quoted:

On 6 October 1952 I addressed a letter to you requesting that your side permit our captured personnel in your custody to receive individual parcels through the mail exchange which is now in operation. The United Nations Command further offered the same facilities for the captured personnel of your side whom we hold in custody.

In an effort to simplify the administrative handling by your side and to expedite delivery of these parcels, I further offered for your consideration an easy and workable plan which would not impose any exceptional burden on your logistic capabilities. Although our proposal was fully bilateral and based solely on the humanitarian motive of bringing some measure of comfort to the captured personnel of both sides, you have to date failed even to acknowledge receipt of my communication.

As I have previously pointed out, the approach of winter and the hardships imposed by cold weather make it particularly desirable to take all possible steps at this time to enable the captured personnel of both sides to receive relief parcels. Further, the nearness of the holiday and New Year seasons, which many of the captured personnel of both sides customarily observe as a period of special spiritual and familiar significance, makes it especially appropriate that these deliveries should be undertaken with minimum delay. Since it is clearly the right of prisoners of war under the Geneva Convention to receive individual parcels, it is inconceivable that you should continue to deny the prisoners of both sides the simple and harmless benefits of the exchange of parcels which I again propose.

I reiterate that the United Nations Command is prepared to implement our part of this proposal without delay. Again I express my sincere hope for your early and favorable reply.

There were no other developments in the armistice negotiations during the period.

In the few scattered incidents which occurred in pro-Communist Prisoner of War camps no particular trend could be discerned other than that of pure harassment. At Koje-do, on 25 November, three prisoners of war of one inclosure assaulted without provocation an unarmed United States aid man at the inclosure aid station and then fled to their compound. Orders which were issued immediately by camp authorities for the three prisoners responsible to report to the inclosure command post were refused and two platoons of trained Republic of Korea Army Infantry entered the compound and removed the three offenders. During the forcible segregation of these individuals, twenty-nine prisoners were slightly injured. About fifteen minutes after this first incident a similar one occurred in another inclosure when three prisoners of a group of thirty-five who were on a work detail assaulted, again without provocation, a United States work supervisor. After the work detail returned to their inclosure a United States Infantry platoon entered the inclosure service yard and dispersed the work detail which was then displaying an obviously defiant attitude. The three prisoners of war who had committed the assault were removed.

The camp authorities at Koje-do reported that incidents of this type would probably continue for a period of several days as part of carefully planned violence. Information, as yet incomplete, had been uncovered which indicated that prisoner groups had been ordered by subversive elements to create incidents while International Committee of the Red Cross delegates were at Koje-do on a routine inspection and visit.

Repeated radio and leaflet warnings were employed to inform North Korea civilians of impending United Nations Command air attacks on military targets and to urge them to evacuate their families to safety. The effects of the campaign are considerable in spite of Communist efforts to prevent these humanitarian warnings from reaching the people.

United Nations devotion to peace in a world threatened by Communist aggression was reiterated. Maximum dissemination was given to information concerning United Nations functions and development, stressing the identification of the United Nations with peace and human rights. Reports indicate that the people of North Korea receive only a distorted picture of the United Nations through the enemy's controlled propaganda channels.

The estimated dollar value of civil assistance to Korea for the period 1 July 1950 to 31 October 1952, totals \$577,926,319. Approximately 96 per cent of this amount has been contributed by the United States, including \$328,136,088 for supplies and equipment and an estimated \$225,000,000 in services. United Nations members and other free nations contributed \$11,628,831, United States voluntary agencies \$10,797,874 and United Nations voluntary agencies \$2,363,526. A total of thirty-four countries, four United Nations voluntary agencies and twenty-six United States voluntary agencies are now participating in the Korean Aid Program. As contributing countries, Thailand led with an estimated dollar value



of \$4,368,000 in rice. The Philippines were second with \$1,875,468 in rice, and Nationalist China third with \$617,130 in relief supplies. The American Relief for Korea, Inc., gave the largest non-governmental contribution, totaling \$3,871,145. The War Relief Service of the National Catholic Welfare Conference was second with \$3,623,492.

At the 19 November meeting of the Combined Economic Board, a joint proposal was made for the free allocation of veterinary drugs and supplies to establish and maintain 200 veterinary clinics in Korea for six months. These clinics will be established at the National Veterinary Institute, two Veterinary Colleges, one High School, several livestock Breeding Stations, and in each major city area throughout the Republic of Korea, to treat animal disease and conserve livestock. It is estimated that in six months' time the clinics will be able to begin paying an increasing percentage of the cost of supplies.

A Seminar-workshop program currently is being held in Pusan for 180 educators from all Republic of Korea provinces. Conducted by members of the American Education Mission, the seminars cover five major areas of education, including teaching and learning; fundamental philosophy of education; administration, and child development and guidance. The six members of the American Education Mission, who were recruited for the Unitarian Services Committee, will spend nine months in Korea on a technical assistance program.

An appropriation of \$1,845,000 has been made by United Nations Korea Reconstruction Agency for the orphan's program. Projects to be financed by this appropriation have been prepared by the Joint United Nations Civil Assistance Command Korea-United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency-Republic of Korea Child Welfare Committee, which was established on 6 October for the purpose of studying, analyzing and coordinating child welfare plans and activities. Three projects have been proposed, which include the establishment of a child welfare center and a rational model and training institution in each province; extension and improvement of the best existing educational institutions, and the establishment of three vocational training institutions.

## **FIFTY-NINTH REPORT: FOR THE PERIOD DECEMBER 1-15, 1952**

U.N. doc. S/2972  
Dated March 31, 1953

[Excerpts]

I herewith submit report number 59 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 1-15 December 1952, inclusive. United Nations Command communiques numbers 1450-1464 provide detailed accounts of these operations.

There were no meetings of the Armistice Delegations as the negotiations continued in recess. Developments in the United Nations General Assembly were followed closely as possibly leading to the resumption of the negotiations. The rejection of the Indian resolution by the Chinese Communist and North Korean authorities made it appear that the Communists will continue to insist on an

Armistice on their own terms, and that they will continue to demand the repatriation of all prisoners of war.

The number of incidents in the pro-communist prisoner of war camps which occurred during the preceding several weeks continued to increase. On 6 December 1952, the prisoner of war command reported indications that plans were being formulated for a mass outbreak within the United Nations Command prisoner of war and internee camps. Coded documents had been intercepted in several of the compounds. The code was broken by the authorities and the documents disclosed plans for mass break. The code appeared to be common throughout the main camp and the branch camp areas, indicating that the plan was centrally directed. The date and the time that these plans were to be operative was not known.

An investigation was initiated at once. All camp commanders were acquainted with the situation and were directed to take every precaution to negate any attempt by the internees to put such plans into effect. Eight days after the first reports became available, the plot matured into violence. At noon on December 14, reports came to the commander of the camp that internees in two of the camp compounds were massing. It was evident that immediate action was necessary to prevent the rioters from breaking out of their compounds and inciting their fellows in the six other compounds to attempt similar action. The compound commander, with a small detachment of United States and Republic of Korea guards, had to act at once to prevent many hundreds of internees from breaking out of their compounds and inviting pitched battles.

The necessity for using force to repress inspired and centrally directed outbursts of fanatical violence by prisoners is, at times, unavoidable. That such unavoidable use of force should result in casualties is no evidence that force was not required. The communist authorities have no regard for human life. This is evidenced by their frequent exploitation of their own prisoners of war by inspiring them to a state of fanatical disregard of their own lives. The prisoner of war disturbances caused by the Communists are directed towards embarrassing the United Nations Command and aimed at reaping propaganda benefits, particularly if the United Nations Command can be forced into a situation where force must be used to control the prisoners of war. On the military side, the prisoner of war disturbances are designed to divert United Nations Command Forces from front-line duty.

In all of the camps housing anti-Communist prisoners of war there were no incidents during this period, and interior administration and gradual improvement of facilities continued at a satisfactory rate.

Developments in the United Nations General Assembly relating to the Indian proposal for resolving the prisoner repatriation issue were reported extensively in informational media directed to enemy troops and to North Korean civilians. In connection with the Indian proposal, United Nations Command efforts to achieve peace in Korea and United Nations Command determination to adhere to the humanitarian principle of non-forcible repatriation were reiterated.

# Demilitarization of Jammu and Kashmir

## FIFTH REPORT BY THE U. N. REPRESENTATIVE FOR INDIA AND PAKISTAN

On March 27 Frank P. Graham, U. N. representative for India and Pakistan, transmitted to the Secretary-General his fifth report to the Security Council (U. N. doc. S/2967).<sup>1</sup> In the report, Mr. Graham reviewed the suggestions made by him in his efforts to assist the two Governments to reach an agreement on the demilitarization of Jammu and Kashmir, including the latest exploratory suggestions made at Geneva.

Part I of the report reviews suggestions regarding proposal 7 of the 12 proposals for an agreement on demilitarization; Part II (not printed here) points out the values of inducting the Plebiscite Administrator into office at an early fixed time; Part III (not printed here) refers to assurances regarding the August 13, 1948, and January 5, 1949 resolutions; Part IV (a portion of which is printed here) summarizes the negotiations since the meeting of the Security Council on December 23, 1952; Part V emphasizes the importance to the people of the State, the two nations, and the world of an agreement on the Kashmir dispute. Five annexes (not printed here) are attached to the report.

U.N. doc. S 2967  
Dated March 27, 1953 [Excerpts]

### Number and Character of Forces

#### A. The Suggestions on Proposal Seven Regarding The Number and Character of Forces

Early in his consultations with the two Governments on the sub-continent in July and August 1951, the United Nations Representative found (1) that the Government of India maintained that there should remain in the territory to be evacuated by the Pakistan army a civil force; and (2) that the Government of Pakistan maintained that after withdrawals and reductions there should, in general, be a military balance on the respective sides. In

<sup>1</sup> For excerpts from the 1st report, see BULLETIN of Nov. 5, 1951, p. 738; from the 2d, *ibid.*, Jan. 14, 1952, p. 52; from the 3d, *ibid.*, May 5, 1952, p. 712; and from the 4th, *ibid.*, Oct. 20, 1952, p. 626.

an effort to discover whether there were circumstances under which one or the other of these positions could become the basis of an agreement, the United Nations Representative made certain suggestions to the two Governments as a basis for their negotiation.

The first proposals were made on 7 September 1951.<sup>2</sup>

Proposal seven read as follows:

"7. Agree that the demilitarization shall be carried out in such a way that at the end of the period referred to in paragraph 6 above the situation will be:

#### A. On the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line:

(i) the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally resident therein who had entered the State for the purpose of fighting will have been withdrawn;

(ii) The Pakistan troops will have been withdrawn from the State, and

(iii) large-scale disbandment and disarmament of the Azad Kashmir forces will have taken place.

#### B. On the Indian side of the cease-fire line:

(i) the bulk of the Indian forces in the State will have been withdrawn;

(ii) further withdrawals or reductions, as the case may be, of the Indian and State Armed forces remaining in the State after the completion of the operation referred to in B (i) above will have been carried out;

so that at the end of the period referred to in paragraph 6 above there will remain on the present Pakistan side of the cease-fire line a force of \_\_\_\_\_ Civil Armed Forces, and on the Indian side of the cease-fire line a force of \_\_\_\_\_."

In response to this proposal, the Prime Minister of India, on 11 September 1951, stated *inter alia*:

"... the Government of India will retain on their side of the cease-fire line in Jammu and Kashmir, One Line of Communication Area Headquarters and One Infantry Division (normal) but of four brigades of four battalions each,<sup>3</sup> at the end of the period agreed upon in terms of paragraphs 6 and 9 of the proposals, provided that the operations described in paragraph 7.A (i) (ii) and (iii) of the proposals have been completed by the end of that period. Thus much more than the 'bulk of Indian forces in the State' will have been withdrawn and I wish to emphasize that the forces left behind will be wholly inadequate to resist any large-scale aggression. Effective measures to prevent such aggression will, it is presumed, be taken by Pakistan."

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, Nov. 5, 1951, p. 740.

<sup>3</sup> Interpreted by India to be in the order of 28,000 men.

The Prime Minister of India in the same letter further stated:

"As regards the Civil Armed Forces to be maintained on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period agreed upon in terms of paragraph 6 and paragraph 9, the Government of India would agree to a force of 4,000, organized, equipped and composed as recommended to UNCIV in C of the memorandum transmitted to Dr. Lozano under cover of letter No. 248-PASG/49 dated 13 April 1949, by their Secretary-General in the Ministry of External Affairs."<sup>4</sup>

The Prime Minister of Pakistan on 12 September 1951 stated, *inter alia*, that his Government

"... consider that a force of not more than four infantry battalions (with the necessary administrative units)<sup>5</sup> should remain on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the demilitarization programme envisaged in paragraph 7. These figures are based on a careful consideration of all relevant factors such as, area, terrain, size and distribution of population on the two sides of the cease-fire line.

"The Pakistan Government are, however, of the view that so long as the forces on each side of the cease-fire line are of the order indicated above, some slight difference in the strength or description of the two forces should not stand in the way of an agreement being reached."

In his statement to the Security Council on 17 January 1952, the United Nations Representative summarized the positions of the two Governments as follows:

"... it should be noted that, as a result of three informal exploratory discussions at military level, India agreed to withdraw an additional 7,000 of its armed forces. This would bring the Indian and State armed forces down to 21,000, exclusive of the State Militia of 6,000, which it seems would be a proportion of perhaps over 75 per cent of the Indian and State armed forces present in the State at the time of the cease-fire on 1 January 1949.

"The Representative of Pakistan indicated that any proportionate reduction, however heavy, would be matched on the Pakistan-Azad Kashmir side of the cease-fire line as an inter-dependent part of a continuous process in the proposed programme of demilitarization.

"The official replies of India and Pakistan to the basic questions asked by the United Nations Representative made formal the wide differences between the two Governments on the most basic questions.

"With the additional reduction of 7,000 armed forces, India held the position that at the end of the period of demilitarization there should be on the Indian side of the line 21,000 Indian and State armed forces, exclusive of the State Militia of 6,000, and there should be on the other side of the line a civil armed force of 2,000 and an unarmed civil force of 2,000, half of whom were to be followers of Azad Kashmir and half of whom were not to be followers of Azad Kashmir, as specified above.

"Pakistan maintained that at the end of the period of demilitarization there should be approximately 4,000 armed forces on each side of the cease-fire line, but for the sake of an agreement would accept a slight disparity in favour of India.

"The wide difference in the number of armed forces proposed by the two Governments to be left on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization made it clear that no agreement could be reached on Proposal 7 at this time."

In his Second Report the United Nations Representative suggested for the consideration of the parties that pro-

<sup>4</sup> This memorandum states that half of this force should be armed and half unarmed; half should be followers of Azad Kashmir and half not followers of Azad Kashmir.

<sup>5</sup> In the order of 4,000 men.

posal seven should be revised to provide that at the end of the demilitarization period:<sup>6</sup>

"... there will remain on each side of the cease-fire line the lowest possible number of armed forces based in proportion on the number of armed forces existing on each side of the cease-fire line on 1 January 1949".

Following this proposal a wide difference in the positions of the two Governments on proposal seven still persisted regarding the number and character of forces to be left at the end of the period of demilitarization.

In view of the continuing differences between the two Governments, the United Nations Representative believed it might be useful if he made suggestions on numbers for the consideration of the parties in their negotiations.

In July 1952 the United Nations Representative suggested for the consideration of the two Governments that they attempt to agree on figures within the brackets of 3,000 to 6,000 armed forces on the territory to be evacuated by the Pakistan Army, and Indian army forces of 12,000 to 18,000 on the Indian side. These figures did not include either the 3,500 Gilgit and Northern Scouts in the evacuated territory or the 6,000 State Militia on the Indian side.

In the Geneva Conference in September 1952 the United Nations Representative suggested the definite figures of 6,000 and 18,000 for the respective sides, exclusive of the Scouts and the State Militia. This suggestion was followed by the suggestion that criteria be established by which definite figures might be agreed upon at a military conference to be held after the signing of a truce agreement.

No agreement having been reached between the two Governments at the Geneva Conference or during the meetings of the Security Council held in October, November and December 1952, the United Nations Representative, in the Conference held in Geneva in February 1953, referred to in Part IV below, suggested that the Governments consider for discussion the proposal mentioned therein.

While during the negotiations on paragraph seven there has been some narrowing of the gap between the positions of the two Governments on the question of the number and character of the forces to remain on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization, a substantial difference in position still remains.

*B. The United Nations Representative, as a Mediator, has made a Series of Suggestions in an Attempt to Determine whether a Basis can be found for an Agreement between the two Governments on the Character and Number of Forces*

The United Nations Representative makes no preferential brief for the lower figures of 3,000 to 12,000 or the higher figures of 6,000 to 21,000. As a mediator whose responsibility has been to keep striving for an agreement he has hoped that a basis for the negotiation of an agreement might be found. He hoped, for example, that the figures 6,000 and 18,000 with the accompanying provisions would be found adequate for fulfilling the respective functions: in the evacuated territory, of preserving law and order and the cease-fire line from violations; and on the Indian side of the line, of preserving law and order and the cease-fire line from violations, including meeting the needs in relation to defence.

In the belief that there will be no deliberate and responsible violation of the cease-fire line from either side, it is nevertheless important that there be alertness on both sides of the line against the possibility of attempted violation by any possible irresponsible elements.

It appears obvious that India under the two resolutions has some larger responsibilities on her side of the cease-fire line than the local authorities have in the evacuated territory on the other side of the cease-fire line.

<sup>6</sup> BULLETIN of Jan. 14, 1952, p. 54.

## "Part II

## "Truce agreement

. . .

## A.

"1. As the presence of troops of Pakistan in the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir constitutes a material change in the situation since it was represented by the Government of Pakistan before the Security Council, the Government of Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops from that State.

"2. The Government of Pakistan will use its best endeavour to secure the withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen and Pakistani nationals not normally resident therein who have entered the State for the purpose of fighting." . . .

## B.

"1. When the Commission shall have notified the Government of India that the tribesmen and Pakistani nationals referred to in part II, A, 2 hereof have withdrawn, thereby terminating the situation which was represented by the Government of India to the Security Council as having occasioned the presence of Indian forces in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and further, that the Pakistani forces are being withdrawn from the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Government of India agrees to begin to withdraw the bulk of its forces from that State in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission.

"2. Pending the acceptance of the conditions for a final settlement of the situation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Indian Government will maintain within the lines existing at the moment of the cease-fire the minimum strength of its forces which in agreement with the Commission are considered necessary to assist the local authorities in the observance of law and order. The Commission will have observers stationed where it deems necessary."

The positions of India and Pakistan in regard to the implementation of this part of the resolution were summarized by the two representatives as follows:

*India*

"As regards the implementation of B. 1 and 2 of Part II of the Resolution of the 13th August, 1948, India's position is that the Azad Kashmir forces cannot be differentiated from the Pakistan Army of which they are, for all practical purposes, an integral part, and that their numbers, equipment and efficiency constitute a threat to the security of the State. The implementation, therefore, by Pakistan of A. 1 and 2 of Part II of the resolution will not materially diminish this threat which is aggravated by the ease with which, owing to the proximity of Pakistan's military cantonments, these forces could be quickly reinforced by the Pakistan army. So long as agreement regarding the complete disbanding and disarming of the Azad Kashmir forces is not reached, a truce agreement cannot create 'the conditions for a final settlement of the situation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.' India is, therefore, unable to accept any reduction of its present forces except as part of an overall arrangement which includes not only the withdrawal of Pakistan troops, tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally resident in the State who have entered for the purpose of fighting but also agreement on the measures to be adopted for the complete disbanding and disarming of the Azad Kashmir forces."

*Pakistan*

"It will be seen that under the Resolution the withdrawal of Pakistan troops is contingent upon the withdrawal of the 'bulk' of the Indian Army (Clause B (1)). The UNCIp had explained that 'synchronization of the withdrawal of the armed forces of the two Governments will be arranged between the respective High Commands and the Commission.' (*Vide* paragraph 10 of Appendix I

Without recognition of the Azad Kashmir Government and without prejudice to the sovereignty of the State, it also appears obvious, by the nature of the cease-fire line and the temporary exercise of the necessary and useful functions of the local authorities, that (with the withdrawal of the tribesmen and of the Pakistani nationals not normally resident therein who entered the State for the purpose of fighting, and with the withdrawal of the Pakistan army and authority and the large scale disarming and disbanding of the Azad Kashmir forces) there should be in the evacuated territory effective local authorities and effective armed forces. In the "Azad Kashmir" territory these armed forces would be organized out of the remainder of the Azad Kashmir forces without armour or artillery, and thereafter would be commanded by local officers under the local authorities, under the surveillance of the United Nations.

Proposal seven takes on much added significance because agreement on it would prepare the way for the induction of the Plebiscite Administrator into office at a definite time as provided in proposal ten of the twelve proposals.

**Conference in Geneva from 4 to 19 February 1953<sup>7</sup>**

The Conference in Geneva may be divided into two different stages as follows:

**(1) Consideration of UNCIP resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949**

The first meeting of the Conference took place on 4 February 1953 and was confined to discussion of the procedure to be followed. The United Nations Representative made a statement in which he stated, *inter alia*,

"I should like to propose that we start with the examination of the resolution of 13 August 1948, Part by Part. In this way we may determine to what extent the resolution has already been implemented, and define, as completely as possible, the obstacles which have until now impeded the implementation of those parts which have not yet been carried into effect. I hope that with regard to each of such obstacles it will be possible for the Governments concerned to indicate the conditions under which the obstacles might be removed."

It was agreed that,

(a) the discussion would start with the consideration of Part I (Cease-fire Order) of the resolution of the UNCIP of 13 August 1948, followed by Part II (Truce Agreement) of that resolution, and

(b) the discussion of Part II would be initiated with consideration of paragraph A, sub-paragraphs 1 and 2, and paragraph B, sub-paragraphs 1 and 2, and then, if agreement were reached on those points, examination of paragraph A, sub-paragraph 3, and B, sub-paragraph 3, would take place.

The representatives of India and Pakistan, assuming that Part I (Cease-fire Order) of the UNCIP's 13 August 1948 resolution had been implemented, began discussion of Part II. After the two representatives had expressed their points of view, it was agreed that the discussion would be confined at least in the initial stages to the implementation of Part II (Truce Agreement) of the UNCIP resolution of 13 August 1948. The discussion was confined to paragraph A, sub-paragraphs 1 and 2 and paragraph B, sub-paragraphs 1 and 2, which read as follows:

<sup>7</sup> Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai headed the Indian delegation at Geneva; Sir Zafrullah Khan, Foreign Minister of Pakistan, headed his country's delegation.

to the Commission's letter dated 27th August 1948 to the Foreign Minister of Pakistan).

"It was reaffirmed by the Pakistan Delegation on 5 February 1953 that once a satisfactory truce agreement based on the above principles was arrived at, the Government of Pakistan would proceed to fulfill all the obligations that devolved on it.

"The problem thus resolved itself into one of securing India's agreement to withdraw the 'bulk' of its forces from the State of Jammu and Kashmir as provided for in Part II of the 13th August 1948 resolution."

The results of the meetings and conversations with the representatives separately on this approach led the United Nations Representative to the conclusion that agreement was not possible at that time between the two Governments on a truce agreement based solely on Part II of the 13 August 1948 resolution and it appeared to him that the same difficulties that existed as early as 1949 were still the main obstacles in the way of carrying out the commitments embodied in Part II.

The United Nations Representative did not feel he could continue this approach as the figures of troops proposed by the Government of India for the withdrawal of the bulk of their Army were not such as he could sponsor with Pakistan; nor were the figures suggested by Pakistan negotiable with India.

It was clear to the United Nations Representative, that this approach would not lead to any fruitful result and, in accordance with the terms of reference agreed upon between the two Governments for the Conference, further consideration of the twelve proposals ensued.

#### (2) Further consideration of the 12 proposals

As the United Nations Representative has pointed out and as it was borne out in the last discussions in the Security Council, the main problem under the programme of demilitarization was the question dealt with under paragraph 7 of his 12 proposals, that is to say, the number and character of forces to remain on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of a period of demilitarization.

The United Nations Representative, having met separately with the representatives of India and Pakistan to discuss with each their positions on this important matter, presented on 14 February 1953 to the two representatives for discussion, proposals which contained, *inter alia*, in paragraph 7 specific figures for the forces on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization. The revised text of paragraph 7 read as follows:

"Agree that the demilitarization shall be carried out in such a way that at the end of the period referred to in paragraph 6 above the situation will be:

##### A. On the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line:

(i) the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally resident therein who had entered the State for the purpose of fighting will have been withdrawn;

(ii) the Pakistan troops will have been withdrawn from the State;

(iii) large-scale disbanding and disarming of the Azad Kashmir forces will have taken place; so that at the end of the period of demilitarization there shall remain an armed force of 6,000. This force will have been separated from the administrative and operational command of the Pakistan High Command in accordance with paragraph 9. It will have no armour or artillery.

##### B. On the Indian side of the cease-fire line:

(i) the bulk of the Indian forces in the State will have been withdrawn;

(ii) further withdrawals or reductions, as the case may be, of the Indian and State armed forces remaining in the State after the completion of the operation referred to in B (i) above will have been carried out; so that at the end of the period of demilitarization there shall be an Indian

army force of 21,000 including State armed forces. This force will be without armour or artillery."

The positions of the representatives of India and Pakistan on these proposals were set forth in their communications of 17 February 1953 and, in substance, stated the following:

##### India

(1) The Government of India had no comments on paragraphs 1 to 6, 8 and the provisional clause.

(2) As regards paragraph 7 the Government of India had no comments on A (i) and (ii) and B (i) and (ii). On the question of Azad Kashmir forces referred to in paragraph A (iii) the Government of India was unable to agree to the retention of any military forces in the so-called Azad Kashmir territory.

(3) In the opinion of the Government of India the function of preventing violations of the cease-fire line on the Azad Kashmir side could be effectively performed by a civil armed force to the formation of which they had already agreed (2,000 armed, 2,000 unarmed). However, in order to meet the United Nations Representative's point regarding the necessity of an adequate force to prevent infringement of the cease-fire line from the Azad Kashmir side, the Government of India was willing to agree to some increase in the numbers of the proposed Civil Armed force and also to the equipment of the armed section of this force with such weapons as may be considered suitable to assure the satisfactory discharge of this function.

(4) As regarded paragraph 9, the Government of India pointed out:

(i) that the so-called Azad Kashmir Government should not be allowed to function in this area either collectively or individually through its ministers.

(ii) that all officials appointed by the Pakistan Government should cease to function.

(iii) that no connexion should be maintained between the local authority and the Pakistan Government.

(iv) that the administration should be conducted under the surveillance of the United Nations Representative by local officials who could be relied upon to discharge their duties effectively and impartially with strict regard to the needs and conditions of a fair and impartial plebiscite.

(5) As regarded paragraph 10, the Government of India reaffirmed the views stated in paragraph 2 of the memorandum annexed as Appendix V to the fourth report of the United Nations Representative, that was:

"The Government of India's view is that the Plebiscite Administrator could properly function only after (i) the process of demilitarization is completed and the United Nations Representative is satisfied that peaceful conditions have been restored and (ii) the local authorities are recognized and are functioning on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line under the surveillance of the United Nations Representative. In the interests of agreement, however, the Government of India would be prepared to agree to his induction on the last day of the period of demilitarization provided that it was completed according to plan and was exhaustive so that the Plebiscite Administrator would, as regarded the forces remaining in the State after demilitarization was fully implemented, be concerned only with their disposition."

(6) In regard to paragraph 11 the Government of India made clear that it always had understood the term "disposal" in paragraph 4 (a) of the UNCIP resolution of 5 January 1949 to mean "disposition" and not reduction or withdrawal.

##### Pakistan

(1) Paragraph 7 of the proposals contravened the Security Council's resolution of 23 December 1952.

(2) In the debate that preceded the adoption by the Security Council of its resolution of 23 December 1952

the members of the Council were at pains to affirm and explain that the bracket of figures of troops proposed in the Anglo-US draft resolution on Kashmir had been arrived at after taking into account the military needs of both the Indian occupied areas of the State and Azad Kashmir. No reasons had been advanced by the United Nations Representative to justify any change. The figures of troops for the Indian side of the cease-fire line have been arbitrarily raised, without any justification, to 21,000. The Pakistan delegation was convinced that if 21,000 Indian and State Armed forces were allowed to remain on the Indian side of the cease-fire line as against only 6,000 Azad Kashmir forces, the security of the Azad Kashmir area would be put in serious jeopardy.

(3) The figures now suggested by the United Nations Representative would destroy the safeguard contained in paragraph (8) of the twelve proposals (and already accepted by both sides) that "the demilitarization shall be carried out in such a way as to involve no threat to the cease-fire agreement either during or after the period" of demilitarization.

(4) The figures now proposed have avowedly no other object than to meet India's wishes with regard to the number of forces to be retained on its side of the cease-fire line. This fails to take into account the corresponding needs of security on the Azad Kashmir side of the cease-fire line. This process of continuous yielding ground in face of Indian intransigence amounts in effect to an endorsement and abetment of the Indian attitude. It was a clear indication to India that its sustained attitude of intransigence would ultimately procure the formulation of a Truce Agreement on its own terms.

After thorough consideration of these communications and further conversations with the representatives of India and Pakistan, the United Nations Representative felt that there was no ground left at that stage on which to continue the Conference and therefore, in agreement with the two representatives, he decided to conclude it.

## The Value of an Agreement

### A. Values to the People of the State

The people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir have waited over four years for the fulfilment of the promise of a plebiscite under the two agreed UNCRP resolutions. The people in the East and the West look for an example from the top of the subcontinent in Jammu and Kashmir, that an agreement for a plebiscite will soon be fulfilled for and by the people of this most ancient, beautiful and historic state. Renewed physical and spiritual energies would be released by an agreed settlement of this dispute.

The meaning of this new freedom would shine across the earth from the top-most roof of the world, brightening the lives of the people in the hills and valleys, fields and forests, the homes and schools, mosques and temples, the shops and workplaces, beckoning near and far to all people struggling to be free.

### B. Values to the People of the Two Nations

An agreement would have many positive values to India and Pakistan:

(1) The two Governments, without prejudice to their conceptions and claims, would by the reconciliation of their long maintained differences over Kashmir, take a decisive and co-operative step forward, rather than continuing to the point of possible catastrophe, a disagreement over the ways for the carrying out of these four-year-old agreements which provide for the determination by the people of Jammu and Kashmir of their relation to India and Pakistan.

(2) The dispute over Kashmir would be settled by a constructive peace and not by force of arms or the attrition of years, with their attendant international bitterness and their running sores drawing off the higher interests and energies of two peoples.

(3) Settlement of the Kashmir dispute might contribute to the settlement of the disputes over evacuee property and waterways, with all the meaning of these steps to the morale, and the productive programmes of these historic peoples, most ancient on the earth, yet youngest in the hopes and dreams of their new liberation, and most resolute in the faith and courage of their dedicated leadership.

### C. Values to the People of the World

The universal yearning of the people for peace is today confronted with the high potentials of the world for war. The peoples of the sub-continent have an unprecedented opportunity for providing the leadership, setting the example and mayhap turning the direction of human affairs, away from the tendencies to self-destruction, to the ways of self-determination, peace and co-operation. The settlement of the Kashmir dispute, with its implications for the 400,000,000 people of the sub-continent, might set in motion the beginnings of a counter chain reaction of peace, production and hope. The warmth of human brotherhood may yet melt away the hard divisions between the peoples in their hopes for freedom and peace in the world.

Instead of the United Nations Representative continuing to report differences to the Security Council, may the leadership of over 400,000,000 people, with the good will and assistance of the United Nations, join in negotiating and reporting an agreement on Kashmir and thereby light a torch along the difficult path of the people's pilgrimage toward peace.

Out of the East, the cradle of civilizations and the home of great spiritual faiths, would come again the example to the nations and the call to all peoples for demilitarization, self-determination, and co-operation in great programmes for education, health, production, and peace on all the earth.

## National Security Interests In St. Lawrence Seaway

White House press release dated April 24

*President Eisenhower on April 24 sent the following letters to Senator Alexander Wiley, Chairman, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and Thomas C. Buchanan, Chairman, Federal Power Commission:*

DEAR SENATOR WILEY:

At my request, the National Security Council has considered the national security interests in the Saint Lawrence-Great Lakes Seaway Project. The Council has advised me:

1. Early initiation and completion of the Saint Lawrence-Great Lakes Seaway is in the interest of national security.

2. The United States should promptly take whatever action may be appropriate to clear the way for commencement of the project, whether by Canada alone, or, now or as may be later developed, by Canada and the United States jointly.

3. It is desirable that the United States participate in the construction of the Seaway; the extent of and limitations upon such participation to be the subject of separate determination by authority other than the Council.

The Council's findings and recommendations

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have my approval; and I propose now to discuss with the Cabinet the extent of and limitations upon United States participation in the project.

I am forwarding a copy of this letter to the Chairman of the Federal Power Commission for his information and such action as he may deem appropriate.

DEAR MR. BUCHANAN:

Enclosed for your information and such action as you may deem appropriate is a copy of a letter which I have sent today to Senator Alexander Wiley, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. The letter contains a statement of the views and recommendations of the National Security Council on the Saint Lawrence-Great Lakes Seaway Project.

## Current Legislation on Foreign Policy

Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 83d Cong., 1st sess., informal meeting of the Committee with Chancellor Konrad Adenauer of the Federal Republic of Germany. April 9, 1953. 8 pp.

Foreign Policy Address of the President of the United States delivered before the American Society of Newspaper Editors, April 16, 1953. S. Doc. 39, 83d Cong., 1st sess. 6 pp.

Agreements Relating to the Status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Armed Forces, and Military Headquarters. Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 83d Cong., 1st sess., on Status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Armed Forces, and Military Headquarters. April 7 and 8, 1953. 117 pp.

Eighth Report Concerning the Yugoslav Emergency Relief Assistance Program. Letter From Secretary of State Transmitting the Eighth Report Concerning the Yugoslav Emergency Relief Assistance Program, covering the period September 16, 1952, through December 15, 1952, pursuant to Section 6 of Public Law 897, 81st Cong. (The Yugoslav Emergency Relief Assistance Act of 1950). H. Doc. 128, 83d Cong., 1st sess. 2 pp.

## THE DEPARTMENT

### Resignation

Reed Harris as Deputy Administrator of International Information Administration, effective April 24, 1953.

### Curtailment of IIA Staff

Press release 209 dated April 22

Robert L. Johnson, Administrator of the International Information Administration (IIA), said on April 22 that approximately 830 people both here and abroad will be dropped from the payroll of the overseas information and educational exchange program, and around 160 unfilled positions will be abolished. Mr. Johnson said he was taking this action to comply with the economy directive issued by the Bureau of the Budget.

Of the total number of IIA employees to receive termi-

nation notices, approximately 60 hold positions in Washington, 399 are working in the Voice of America and supporting services in New York, and the others, which include local nationals, are employed by press, motion pictures, U.S. Libraries, and the exchange-of-persons program located in Europe, the Near East, the Far East, and Latin America.

Because of this economy move, the IIA Administrator said, the Voice of America will reduce the number of broadcasts to the free world by eliminating the following language broadcasts: French, Portuguese, Spanish to Latin America, Hebrew, Malayan, and Thai. In addition, the English broadcast service will be reduced from a worldwide total of 5 hours and 45 minutes daily to 30 minutes a day.

Broadcasts to the Iron Curtain countries will be maintained and relay facilities now nearing completion overseas will strengthen the signal in certain critical areas. The number of language broadcasts originating from the Munich Program Center, which now include Russian, Polish, Lithuanian, Estonian, Bulgarian, and Hungarian, will be increased.

In Latin America as well as Portugal, France, and Israel, local broadcasting stations will continue to receive some VOA features and commentaries by means of discs, tapes, and scripts.

Since program services to the free world will be reduced, the bimonthly world program schedule, with a million and a half circulation, which has been published in English and 10 other languages, will be discontinued.

This move, according to Mr. Johnson, is a contraction to establish the essentials of a revitalized, flexible, and hard-hitting program designed to achieve maximum effectiveness.

## Check List of Department of State Press Releases: Apr. 27-May 2, 1953

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*216	4/27	Taft: Irish-American relations
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†218	4/27	Signatories of wheat agreement
†219	4/27	Reed Mission to Pakistan
†220	4/28	Dulles: Japanese treaty anniversary
221	4/28	Murphy: Assignment to UNC
†222	4/28	Further wheat agreement signatories
†223	4/29	New <i>Foreign Relations</i> volume
†224	4/29	Tax negotiations with Australia
225	4/29	Dulles: Results of NATO meeting
†226	5/1	Administrative Council (TRU)
†227	5/1	Dulles: Polish constitution
*228	5/1	Vice Admiral Wright visits Jordan
*229	5/1	Dulles: Trip to Near East
†230	5/1	Return of German art libraries
†231	5/1	Cotton Advisory Committee
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†234	5/4	Leddy: Senate investigations comm.
†235	5/4	Letter of credence: Rumania
†236	5/4	Letter of credence: Egypt
†237	5/4	Letter of credence: Lebanon
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## A New Look at Our Foreign Policy

by Under Secretary Smith<sup>1</sup>

The administration in Washington realizes that our international policies must reflect the attitudes and interests of the American people themselves, and if they are to be successful, must have public support. If they are to have this support, it is essential that the American people be currently advised on policy developments. This is one reason why we attach so much importance to the work of your World Affairs Council and to gatherings like this in which our foreign policies are discussed. You are key representatives from various groups in this great community. You will carry back to many others the substance of the discussions here. Similarly, those of us who are your spokesmen and servants can carry back with us a firsthand impression of your thinking about our policies and about what they should be. By thus working together we can better serve the interests of our nation.

You are fortunate to have Mr. Sevareid<sup>2</sup> with you this morning and to have the benefit of his experienced analysis of the international picture. You are fortunate also to have the benefit of Senator Duff's<sup>3</sup> broad and mature judgment; he not only looks at State Department policies from the standpoint of the national good and the welfare of the people, but also he can interpret those policies especially well for the people of his own State.

In the short time available this morning, I can touch only on a few of the major aspects of our foreign policy, but I will attempt to give you at least the outline of the new administration's look at some of our international problems.

Before doing so I want to emphasize the strong support which our Government gives to the United Nations. I can best state our goal for the United Nations in the words of President Eisenhower. He said, "We shall strive to make it not merely an eloquent symbol but an effective force."

<sup>1</sup>Address made before the World Affairs Council at Philadelphia on May 8 (press release 249).

<sup>2</sup>Eric Sevareid, radio commentator.

<sup>3</sup>Senator James H. Duff of Pennsylvania.

We are actively working toward that goal. I believe that the closing weeks of the General Assembly session which ended just a few days ago demonstrate some of that effectiveness.

It is within the framework of the United Nations that we are working with other free nations in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is a regional arrangement to protect its members from the threat of aggression.

Member nations of NATO represent an important area in our overall foreign policy. They constitute the strongest segment in the fighting power of the free world. Not only in a military sense but also economically and industrially they contribute great strength.

Aside from their role in self-defense, some NATO nations are playing active and vital roles in the defense of other free areas of the world. Consider the heavy burden that France is carrying in Indochina and what Britain is doing in Malaya.

We can justly call NATO a successful alliance. President Eisenhower was one of the guiding spirits in building this organization. It has accomplished much in a comparatively short time. It has produced a sizable degree of fighting strength, and its united efforts have notably increased the morale of the peoples of Europe.

### A New Approach to the NATO Alliance

All of you here are familiar with the broad concepts stated by the President at his press conference last week [April 30]. He brought the military and economic factors into focus with a view to creating "a situation of maximum military strength within economic capacities."

In constructing the free world's defenses, we must break neither our own back nor the backs of our allies by overloading ourselves to reach a peak goal by a given date. It is much wiser to build steadily at a pace our respective economies can bear over a period of years. The NATO nations

at their recent meeting agreed in principle to a long-range program of increasing strength.<sup>4</sup>

It is imperative that we keep defense efforts of the free world balanced properly with economic capabilities. Without economic vitality, military defense becomes impossible.

At the same time, I want to make it very clear that this new approach is not a leveling off of the defense program but a continued buildup on a longer, steadier, and less costly but more efficient basis. Actually, it represents more security for less money. Emphasis will be placed on quality rather than on quantity in NATO forces. One first-class, battleworthy division, you can readily understand, is better than two or three with low battle efficiency. We are less interested in numbers than in true combat effectiveness.

Along with the improved quality of existing divisions will come the addition of new divisions both this year and next. This is not a backward movement. It is an adjustment of defense plans to economic capabilities. We estimate, in fact, that there probably will be an increase of about 30 percent in the military strength of the NATO countries in 1953.

The free European nations have undertaken to develop a greater unity and strength through the establishment of a European Defense Community (Edc). This plan, which they initiated themselves, would give Western Germany a place in the defense of Germany and Western Europe. It was designed to combine the military forces of six countries into an effective organization. German forces would serve not as a separate German national army, but as an integrated component of the armed strength of the European Defense Community.

The European Governments concerned are aware of the importance of Edc to their own defenses. But until the President sent Secretary Dulles and Governor Stassen to Europe recently the project was lagging. Interest has now been revived and at the recent NATO Council meeting the members unanimously called for prompt action. We are, of course, anxious for an effective response to this call.

The problem is up to the European parliaments. Cabinets favor Edc and are pushing for it in good faith. But the parliamentary or rather the political difficulties are great. Acceptance of the treaty means giving up control of national armies to Edc—giving up a degree of national sovereignty. We can appreciate the difficulty if we ask ourselves whether the United States would be willing to give up a major part of the control of its armed forces.

There are historic differences between the peoples of this vast area. If you will remember the difficulties of the American Colonies after the Rev-

olutionary War, in getting agreement on our present Constitution, you will have some idea of the problems in Europe where nations have a much more diverse background and infinitely greater prejudices to overcome.

There are also a number of very complex legal and budgetary problems which arise with the creation of an integrated defense force. These are purely practical and have nothing to do with national traditions or prejudices. However, the need for Edc is so great that all those concerned with the security of Europe hope for favorable parliamentary action at the earliest possible date.

In the meantime, there is continual effort by the European nations to work out their defense problems. At the recent NATO Council session agreement was reached on a 3-year program for developing networks of facilities in the different countries, which will be needed by the added NATO forces. This agreement involves such important installations as airfields and supply depots, pipelines, and radio communication. It will increase efficiency and make the combined forces more effective.

NATO stands today as one of the most important barriers to Communist expansion and one of the most important instruments for world peace. The Mutual Security Program, which has just been presented to Congress, demonstrates America's continued interest in maintaining and strengthening the North Atlantic alliance.

The need for strengthening its defenses was forcibly brought home to the free world by the Communist aggression in Korea. It then became very clear, if proof were needed, that the Communists would resort to armed force in their drive toward world domination.

#### **New Emphasis on the Far Eastern Area**

President Eisenhower has placed new emphasis on the whole Far Eastern area. Prior to his inauguration, he visited Korea to become familiar with the situation there at first hand. He has continued to focus attention on that area in his efforts to bring about peace in the world.

In Korea we have been striving to obtain an honorable armistice which could stop the fighting, permit repairing the ravages of war, and allow discussion of a peaceful settlement.

I am sure you all appreciate that this issue concerning prisoners of war is not simply a technicality, but a dramatic focus of the essential difference between the Communists and free-world philosophies on the rights of the individual man, whoever he may be, and his relationship to the State. Communist rulers view the human being as a mere chattel in which the Communist State has a complete property right that must be recognized. This is a principle to which the free world cannot and will not admit.

<sup>4</sup> For information relative to this meeting, see BULLETIN of May 11, 1953, p. 673.

In his recent address on the chances for peace<sup>5</sup> the President referred to "an honorable armistice in Korea" as the first great step toward peace. In further discussing peace in the Far East he said very pointedly:

It should mean, no less importantly, an end to the direct and indirect attacks upon the security of Indochina and Malaya. For any armistice in Korea that merely released aggressive armies to attack elsewhere would be a fraud.

We seek, throughout Asia as throughout the world, a peace that is true and total.

To me, and I think to you, this means quite clearly what it says, that a truce in Korea which simply gave the aggressors freedom of maneuver would be a delusion and a sham truce. That is why we are especially concerned now with the Communist attack on Laos, in Indochina. It seems to me that Korea and Indochina can be regarded as the flanks of our defense against Communist expansion in Asia. We are in close contact with the Governments of Laos and of France and are determined to do all in our means under present circumstances to help them meet the situation.

We consider aggression not a national or a racial problem, but a global problem. Under the United Nations we join our efforts with other countries to prevent aggression, as we have done in Korea.

Our interest in the independence of free countries naturally includes Japan. The progress that Japan has made in its first year since the peace treaty went into effect is impressive. We are especially interested in the future of the Japanese economy and in its role in the economic development of the Far East, because, as I said before, economic stability is an essential prerequisite to self-defense.

It is unnecessary for me to enlarge on the reasons why the center of the world's problems lies in the Soviet Union, or to remind you of the rapidity with which the Kremlin has expanded its control, by overt or covert means, into all parts of the globe.

Since the death of Stalin the new leadership in the Kremlin has shown some indication of a change in tone toward the free world. This may be due to their belief that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has overextended itself and needs time to consolidate its expansion. It may be that they need time to tighten their own grasp on their absolute dictatorship. Almost certainly they are reacting to the position of strength which we are creating in the NATO area.

Possibly some of this reaction is in good faith. But the countries represented at the recent NATO Council meeting were united in the conviction that the Soviet peace offensive has not yet produced anything to cause us to relax our efforts toward strengthening our defenses. On the contrary, a fresh aggression is taking place in Southeast Asia.

Three weeks ago President Eisenhower put the issue of peace directly to the new Soviet leadership. He expressed the readiness of the United States to play its part. He asked the new leaders to show their peaceful intentions by deeds, to bring their influence to bear for genuine peace in Asia, for the free choice by nations of their own forms of government, for action on disarmament proposals.

The President's speech made such an impact on world opinion that the Soviet leaders took the unprecedented step of publishing his address in *Pravda*. True, they spread across the front page a labored exposition of the familiar Moscow line and relegated the speech to an inside page. But their defensive editorial lacked the usual acid tone.

The reply made no concrete suggestions as to how to solve the issues set forth by President Eisenhower. On the other hand, it did not resort to the usual vituperative name-calling. To see whether it actually means anything in the direction of peace we must keep our eyes on developments where events are taking place; the negotiations at Panmunjom, the Communist attacks in Indochina, and the disarmament discussions in the United Nations. We must base our judgment on actions toward the peaceful settlement of outstanding issues.

The key to the intentions of the Soviets lies in their deeds. Will they sign an Austrian treaty? Will they release the thousands of war prisoners they have held since the fighting stopped in World War II? Will they seek an honest settlement of other issues?

We can rely on deeds alone. In no event can we afford to lower our guard or to negotiate from a weakened position. The Soviet leaders respect power, and they recognize no moral inhibitions in international relations.

#### **Near Eastern and Latin American Problems**

Secretary Dulles leaves tomorrow on a trip which will take him to a number of countries of the Near East and South Asia. This is the first time that a Secretary of State has visited this area during his term of office.

Interest in the area he will visit is especially keen because 9 of the 12 countries involved have achieved their independence in the last generation. These new nations are struggling with internal and external problems. We want to see them maintain their independence. We are seeking through technical assistance and mutual-security aid to help them better the living standards of their people and to strengthen their economies and national defenses.

We hope to pattern our future policies on what we learn on the ground from the countries themselves. We want to make a full re-examination and reappraisal and shape our actions in accord with the needs of these free nations. Mr. Dulles

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, Apr. 27, 1953, p. 599.

is making his visit with no preconceived plan or program for the area. His object is to learn their problems from the people themselves.

We are also giving close attention to our relations with our neighbors in the Western Hemisphere. Our Mr. Cabot, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, has just returned from Latin America, and in June Milton Eisenhower, the President's brother, will visit a number of the great Republics to the south.

The President is anxious, and here I quote his words,

that the Government of the United States take careful stock of the economic and social conditions now prevailing throughout our continent and of all the efforts being pressed to bring a better life to all our peoples. Such an assessment can properly be made only through direct personal understanding of the facts.<sup>6</sup>

Upon his return Mr. Eisenhower will report to the President and Secretary Dulles on ways to strengthen the bonds among the Republics of the Western Hemisphere.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, Apr. 20, 1953, p. 564.

## Areas for Deeds, Not Words

*Remarks by Secretary Dulles<sup>1</sup>*

Press release 247 dated May 7

You no doubt expect me to say a few words about the international situation. Our nation's position was put forward on April 16 by President Eisenhower. That speech had a profound influence throughout the entire world. It was so newsworthy that it was printed in full in the leading newspapers of Moscow. Any speech that can thus put Soviet censorship to rout is, by that act alone, a speech of historic import.

The President put it squarely up to the Soviet leaders to show whether they were willing to put peaceful deeds behind their peaceful words. As progress in these matters strengthens world trust, then there could come a reduction of the armaments which everywhere are burdening the people. The President specified certain areas for deeds.

He first specified Korea. The Communist leaders used words that indicated that they were prepared to make possible an honorable armistice. Words are still being exchanged. But the U.N. Command is not prepared indefinitely to continue bandying words about matters which have already been talked about for nearly 2 years.

<sup>1</sup> Made before the New York State Republican dinner at New York on May 7.

The nations of Latin America and the United States have long worked cooperatively together to achieve common purposes. We hope to work together in still greater strength in the days which lie ahead.

This development of facts at firsthand by representatives of our Government is important to our future policies. At least equally important is the serious effort to develop and understand the spiritual and moral values involved. Spiritual strength is basic to our whole way of life.

Our own spiritual strength is so deep and so basic that we sometimes fail to remember it is there; yet it is our fundamental beliefs that have led us to a great role of leadership among nations.

We hold that leadership at a time when powerful and, I must say, evil forces seek to dominate the earth. We work with other free nations to restrain and drive back those forces. In this task the maintenance of our spiritual strength is vital. Without it we would be lost—with it, we can face the future with calm and confidence.

We earnestly desire and seek an honorable peace in Korea. But we shall not allow our enemies there to use peace talk as a stratagem for gaining military advantages in their war of aggression.

The President then specified Indochina. Since he spoke, there has occurred a new aggression. The peaceful state of Laos has been invaded by Communist forces from Vietnam, many of whom had first been trained and equipped in Communist China. These armed aggressors now also threaten peaceful Thailand (Siam). Thailand is one of the nations which, showing its faith in collective security, has gallantly and substantially contributed to the U.N. effort in Korea. By performing this act for others, it has won the right to help from others.

The third area mentioned by the President was Austria. It is a shocking thing that this small nation, the first victim of Hitlerite aggression, should now for so long have been denied unity and independence. Red armies in the Soviet Zone absorb the economic wealth as would a horde of locusts. For nearly 7 years now the Western Powers have been negotiating with the Soviet Union for an Austrian treaty of liberation. Time after time it has seemed that such a treaty was on the point of consummation. Each time the

Soviet Government has drawn back. So Austria remains an area where the Soviet leaders, if they wish, can produce deeds that will be meaningful.

Let no one underestimate our desire for peace and our willingness to contribute to an easing of the present tension. We are not afraid of peace. On the contrary, this administration is dedicated to seek peace and pursue it. President Eisenhower understands, better than most, the horrors of war and he has demonstrated, as have few, the capacity to turn war into victory and to build on the foundation of victory a defensive posture calculated to assure peace.

It is the purpose of President Eisenhower and those who serve him to develop policies so firm, so just, so appealing to all humanity that the Soviet leaders will elect to live with these policies rather than futilely to combat them.

That is our great purpose. We must, however, be constantly vigilant lest we fall into a trap. The longing of our people for peace is so intense that there is danger of accepting illusion for reality. This danger is the greater because Soviet Communists have constantly taught and practiced the art of deception, of making concessions merely in order to lure others into a false sense of security, which makes them the easier victims of ultimate aggression.

You can be confident that your Republican administration has goals which correspond to the lofty idealism of the American people. In pursuit of these goals, we shall not become weary or grow faint, and also we shall pursue these goals in ways which are circumspect and which place trust in others only after it has demonstrably been earned.

Guided by these principles, our administration, under our great President, will justify the leadership which last November was demanded of it.

## Secretary's Visit to Near East and South Asia

### Background Information

Press release 250 dated May 8

Secretary Dulles plans to leave by plane from Washington on May 9. Accompanying him on the trip will be Harold E. Stassen, Director for Mutual Security; Henry A. Byroade, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs; Douglas MacArthur, 2d, Counselor of the Department of State; Robert E. Matteson, Assistant Director of the Mutual Security Agency for Research, Statistics, and Reports; Roderic L. O'Connor, Special Assistant to the Secretary; Fred L. Hadsel, Special Assistant to Mr. Byroade; and Col. Stephen J. Meade, military aide and consultant. Mrs. Dulles and Mrs. Stassen will go with the party as far as Cairo. They will

then travel independently in the Near East, re-joining the Secretary's group for the return flight across the Atlantic.

The Secretary will fly by a special Air Force Constellation as far as Cairo and Tel Aviv, by car and C-47 in the Levant, and by Constellation again for the rest of the trip.

The party will arrive at Cairo on May 11. On May 13 they will fly to Tel Aviv; on May 14 they will drive by automobile to Jerusalem en route to Amman, where they will spend the night; on May 15 they will fly to Damascus; on May 16 they will drive over the mountains to Beirut; on May 17 they will fly to Baghdad; on May 18 they will fly to Riyadh, the capital of Saudi Arabia. On the afternoon of May 19 they will stop briefly at the oil center of Dhahran on the Persian Gulf, and that night will fly to New Delhi. After 2 days there, they will go by plane to Karachi for the 22d and 23d. The night of the 24th will be spent in the plane en route to Istanbul where they will spend the 25th, flying to Ankara the 26th. May 27 they will be in Athens and May 28 in Tripoli, Libya, returning to Washington the afternoon of May 29.

The Secretary and Mr. Stassen regret that shortness of time and the extent of the area make necessary such relatively short stays in many important countries and even have required the omission of some states from the itinerary.

As has been brought out before, the purpose of the trip is for the Secretary and Mr. Stassen to gain firsthand impressions, to listen to the views of the leaders in the area, and to develop even closer relations with the countries which they will visit.

In many cases the Secretary and Mr. Stassen will be guests of the Governments and in all cases they will confer with the heads of state, prime ministers, foreign ministers, and other leading economic and financial figures.

### Departure Statement <sup>1</sup>

Press release 252 dated May 9

Mr. Stassen and I are very glad to have this opportunity to visit many states of the Near East and South Asia. On this, the first visit to the area by an American Secretary of State while in office, we plan to stop in Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, India, Pakistan, Turkey, Greece, and Libya. We are making the trip at the request of President Eisenhower on whose behalf we shall express the friendship of the American people for the Governments and peoples of the countries we visit, and to whom we shall report observations and findings.

The period since World War I, and particularly the last 10 years, has seen a tremendous change in this part of the world. Of the 12 states which we shall be visiting, all but 3 have obtained their in-

<sup>1</sup> Made at the Washington National Airport.

dependence in the last generation. Great progress is being made in such fields as government, education, economic development, and expansion of local culture. But many problems remain to be solved, which are all the more pressing because of the strategic location of these lands. Whereas many of the problems are internal, others affect all of the states of the area, and still others affect the freedom and security of the entire free world.

As I have already said, I shall not bring with me specific plans or programs, nor do I intend to ask the Governments I visit for any decisions. I shall listen intently to what I am told and consider the problems brought to my attention with the utmost interest and sympathy. I am pleased at the thought that this trip will give me a chance to renew old friendships, and, I am sure, make many new and lasting ones. In addition, the trip will be an opportunity to dispel such misunderstandings of the American position as may exist, and develop still closer relations between the United States and the countries I visit on my itinerary. Under these circumstances, both Mr. Stassen and I are looking forward to the trip with keen anticipation.

## Developments in Laos, Thailand, and Korea

*Press Conference Statement by Secretary Dulles*

Press release 253 dated May 9

In view of the recent, rapid sequence of events in the Far East, I believe it would be appropriate to summarize for you our actions concerning developments in Laos and Thailand.

Communist Viet Minh forces began their movement toward the Royal Capital City of Luang Prabang in Laos on April 12.

Following an appeal from the Government of Laos on April 13 to the free world to condemn the aggression, the United States issued a statement of support and sympathy.<sup>1</sup>

The urgent need for cargo aircraft to aid French and Lao forces in meeting this aggression was discussed by me with French officials during our stay in Paris for the recent NATO meeting.

Within 24 hours it was agreed at the highest level that such aircraft, if available, should be dispatched to Indochina. Within another 24 hours the aircraft were located with the Far East Command. Within another 24 hours civilian operators were located to fly the planes, because the French did not have crews accustomed to handle these planes and we did not desire that our military personnel should fly into the combat zone. The plan was actually put into operation within a few hours after our return from Paris, and the

aircraft arrived at Hanoi on May 5 and were made operational immediately.

Three days prior to the arrival of the aircraft in Hanoi, we announced on May 2<sup>2</sup> that we were maintaining close contact with the Governments of Laos and of France regarding the special requirements of the situation and that the Mutual Security Administration Mission in Laos had made arrangements to help ease the refugee problem by making available certain funds and supplies.

The Ambassador from Thailand, Pote Sarasin, came to my office at 3:30 p.m. on Tuesday of this week, May 5, to discuss the problems confronting his country as a result of the Viet Minh invasion of Laos.<sup>3</sup>

The Ambassador expressed his country's urgent need for small arms ammunition and for various military items urgently required by the Thai Navy, Army, and Air Force, which requests had simultaneously been made through the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group and our Embassy at Bangkok. Within 24 hours of the Ambassador's request certain amounts of such ammunition were in the air on their way to Bangkok from the Pacific area, and action was taken to expedite delivery of the other military items.

These two instances illustrate a capacity for decision and performance and of cooperative teamwork between the Departments of State and Defense, which should, I believe, be gratifying to the American people. Also, they should be impressive to others, whether they be friends or aggressors.

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*Following his press conference, the Secretary repeated his remarks concerning Laos and Thailand for the benefit of radio, newsreel, and television services. In addition to these remarks, he made the following statement (press release 254 dated May 9) concerning the Korean truce negotiations:*

As I have said many times, we want peace in Korea if it is a peace with honor. Whether or not the armistice terms will mean that kind of a peace is still under discussion between the representatives of the two sides in Korea, under guidance, of course, as far as we are concerned, from Washington. The Communists made proposals day before yesterday<sup>4</sup> which we are carefully studying. It is obvious that they will require elucidation and perhaps modification before they will be acceptable to us as compatible with peace with honor, but that is a matter which we are going into and which will be developed in further discussions which will be taking place in Korea over the coming days.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, May 11, 1953, p. 678.

<sup>3</sup> For information concerning the Ambassador's visit, see p. 709.

<sup>4</sup> P. 727.

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of May 4, 1953, p. 641.



## **"Free Lao Movement" Leader**

Press release 242 dated May 5

*The Government of Laos on May 4 delivered a formal note to the United States which contains certain information pertaining to the present situation in Laos. Following is a condensed translation of the note:*

The absence of Laotians among the invading troops can be verified by any impartial observer.

With reference to the so-called government "free Lao State or Lao Fatherland" under Prince Souphanouvong, the following should be noted:

(1) Souphanouvong, who has not lived in Laos for 20 years, joined Lao Issara or the free Lao movement, in 1946.

(2) He was expelled from the movement on May 16, 1949, because of his Communist tendencies and total subservience to the Viet Minh, and specifically for agreeing to the penetration of Lao territory by armed bands from across the frontier.

(3) The Lao Issara movement, which was created in October 1946, was formally dissolved in October 1949, after signature of the Franco-Lao accords, with all members rallying to the Royal Government. Of seven members of the present Royal Government, four, including the Prime Minister, were members of the Lao Issara movement.

(4) Since his expulsion from Lao Issara, Souphanouvong has been the personal vassal of the Viet Minh, who sent him to Communist China to receive indoctrination for the role destined for him.

(5) Souphanouvong, therefore, cannot claim association with the "Free Laos." Nor can he claim any popular mandate, tacit or explicit, to represent the aspirations of the Lao people, to whom he is unknown.

## **Thailand Takes Measures To Maintain Security**

Press release 245 dated May 6

The Thai Ambassador described to Secretary Dulles on May 5 the implications for his Government and the Thai Nation of the dangerous situation created in neighboring Laos by aggressive Viet Minh Communist forces and outlined various measures of a military and police nature which his Government is taking to maintain the security of Thailand's borders.

He indicated that the present level of preparedness was due in part to existing training programs and military assistance carried out by the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group in Thailand under existing agreements and in part due to the battle experience of Thai troops fighting with the U.N. forces in Korea. He further stated that his Government had listed specific military items which were urgently needed and which had already been programed under current military aid plans and asked that, if possible, immediate delivery be made.

The Ambassador was assured that the Secretary was aware of the threat to Thailand which the Ambassador had outlined, that he was fully sympathetic with the Thai Government's desire to receive urgently needed military items, and that prompt consideration would be given to providing the necessary items in the light of availabilities and U.S. world commitments. He added that he had been most favorably impressed at reports he had received of the many evidences of the determination of the Thai Government and people to withstand Communist aggression.

## **Letters of Credence**

### *Egypt*

The newly appointed Ambassador of Egypt, Ahmed Hussein, presented his credentials to the President on May 4, 1953. For the text of the Ambassador's remarks and for the text of the President's reply, see Department of State press release 236 of May 4.

### *Lebanon*

The newly appointed Ambassador of Lebanon, Charles Malik, presented his credentials to the President on May 4, 1953. For the text of the Ambassador's remarks and for the text of the President's reply, see Department of State press release 237 of May 4.

### *Rumania*

The newly appointed Ambassador of Rumania, Marin Florea Ionescu, presented his credentials to the President on May 4, 1953. For the text of the Ambassador's remarks and for the text of the President's reply, see Department of State press release 235 of May 4.

## Europe Strives for Unity

by Henry B. Cox

*Deputy Public Affairs Adviser, Bureau of European Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

The field of international relations has not had a dull winter. Since I visited with many of you in Philadelphia last December, the world has experienced important changes of leadership in two of its most powerful nations. One such change would have been enough to keep any student of international affairs on his toes, but history was not content with one. Today the foreign-policy observer must scan the news from Washington and Moscow with equal vigor and discernment if he seeks to anticipate the trend of world events.

Those who were watching news from Washington in January—most of the diplomatic world was doing little else—received an early insight into the temper of the new administration. Ten days after the inauguration of President Eisenhower, the new Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, and the new chief of Mutual Security, Harold E. Stassen, flew to Europe on a special mission which gave a clear indication of the tremendous importance which this Government attaches to European unity. The urgency of that trip to Europe revealed the feeling that the drive for European unity was seriously lagging.

It was just a year ago this month that France, Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the Benelux (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg) signed a treaty creating the European Defense Community, commonly referred to as the EDC. When Secretary Dulles and Mr. Stassen took office the EDC treaty had been ratified by none of the parliaments of the participating countries. In both France and Germany there were serious psychological and political obstacles in the way of parliamentary action. Consideration of the EDC treaty by the Italian parliament was being held up by the prolonged debate on a new Italian electoral law. The Benelux countries, for their

part, were awaiting the lead of their colleagues.

The Dulles-Stassen mission represented another effort on the part of the United States to give needed impetus and support to the growing European unity movement. Coming as it did at one of the most crucial stages in that development, it served to bolster the resolve of Europe's statesmen to press forward to their ancient goal of a European community.

Europe is one of the most critical areas with which we have to deal in the conduct of foreign relations. It is important to us for many reasons. Culturally it is the cradle of our civilization. Then, too, the European members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization with a total population of roughly 200,000,000 represents the greatest reservoir of skilled manpower in the world. In the major indices of industrial production—coal, crude steel, and electric power—its output substantially exceeds that of the Soviet bloc. It is not difficult to imagine what a dramatic change would occur in the balance of power in the cold war struggle should the manpower resources and industrial capacity of Western Europe become available to the Soviet Union.

Following World War II and even before it, U.S. leaders recognized that continued disunity in Europe would constitute one of the greatest hazards to the security of the free world. Speaking before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1947, Mr. Dulles urged that in granting Marshall plan aid to Europe, "the basic idea should be not the rebuilding of the pre-war Europe but the building of a new Europe, which, more unified, [would] be a better Europe." This idea was accepted and has been the underlying principle of our entire economic and military assistance program.

The concept of a united Europe is an old one dating back to the early history of that continent. Throughout the 19th century, European alliances and conflicts clearly demonstrated the inability

<sup>1</sup>Address made before an interscholastic high-school group from the Philadelphia area, under sponsorship of the Philadelphia World Affairs Council, at Philadelphia on May 5.

of any European nation to stand alone. Individual national security went out with the advent of the industrial revolution. At various times Europe was partially but only temporarily integrated through conquest. But political integration within a democratic framework was never achieved.

Plans to unify Europe prior to World War I were completely fruitless, since they did not take into account the political and economic prerequisites for an effective union and were often devices designed to benefit one nation. Moreover, in many instances they were put forward by individuals whose influence on their governments was insignificant. In addition to these factors it is probable that the Europeans were simply not ready for such a radical development.

The economic and social problems resulting from the First World War caused many enlightened European leaders to give serious thought again to the question of European unity. The primary motivation was the desire to avert further wars and to promote economic well-being. But again the dream was not realized. Sufficient impetus was lacking to preserve a League of Nations, much less to create a European political community.

But the historic trend persisted. Milestones came faster in the wake of the economic, social, and political chaos created by World War II. Even while the war was still in progress and its ultimate outcome in doubt, Europe's statesmen revived the unity concept as the only satisfactory and enduring solution to Europe's many problems. In 1944 the Governments-in-exile of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg signed a treaty providing for collective defense and cooperation in the economic, social, and cultural fields. Thus began the so-called European movement, supported by such leaders as Spaak, Churchill, Sforza, and Bidault.

The Benelux Union became a reality in 1947 and the first steps were taken to remove the customs barriers between the three countries. The following year British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin, in a major foreign policy address to the House of Commons, called for a consolidation of Western Europe. This initiative resulted in the formation of the so-called Western Union when France, the United Kingdom, and the Benelux countries signed the Brussels Pact in March 1948. The pact called for closer collaboration of the five members in economic, social, and cultural matters and for collective self-defense.

Through the Marshall plan the United States made its greatest contribution to European rehabilitation and indirectly gave an important assist to European integration in the economic field. One month following the signing of the Brussels Pact the countries participating in the Marshall plan formed the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), which has actively

promoted recovery and economic cooperation since its inception.

As cooperation among the European nations increased there was popular and parliamentary pressure for the creation of an organization which would represent not only the governments, but also the peoples and parliaments of member countries. In May 1949 the Council of Europe came into being in response to this need.

Meanwhile, faced with the growing threat of Soviet aggression the nations of Western Europe, together with the United States and Canada, joined in the establishment of an organization designed primarily to further their collective security. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, more commonly known as NATO, was formed in November 1949.

In May 1950 European unity in the economic sphere made another significant advance when French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman made a bold proposal for the pooling of the coal and steel resources of France and Germany under a supranational authority. Schuman invited other countries to join and in April 1951 France, Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg signed a treaty establishing the so-called European Coal and Steel Community. Today the Community is a going concern. Its executive branch and assembly are already in operation and it has established a single market for coal and steel embracing its six member nations.

In the meantime, in spite of its slow start, the Council of Europe has made considerable progress. Not just "a government in search of a job," as a European leader once characterized it, it has provided Europe with a comprehensive blueprint for political union which must now be passed upon by the parliaments of member nations. Within the Council a working group has recently completed a draft European constitution calling for a federal legislature of two houses, a federal executive, and a federal court.

As you can see, tremendous progress has been made toward the goal of a united Europe. But European unity may suffer a serious setback if the six Schuman plan countries cannot successfully clear what is currently their most difficult hurdle—the ratification of the European Defense Community or EDC treaty. Conceived by former French Premier René Pleven, the EDC was designed to fill the recognized need for a German military contribution to the defense of Western Europe in a form most acceptable to all parties concerned.

Since the signature of the EDC treaty in May 1952 only one nation has started the ratification process. In West Germany the lower house of Parliament, the Bundestag, has given its approval to ratification. The upper house or Bundesrat has just voted to postpone action pending a ruling of the Constitutional Court on the constitutionality

of German participation in the EDC. Opposition to the treaty in Germany stems primarily from the major opposition party, the Social Democrats, but also includes some extreme rightist elements. The Social Democrats have maintained that the EDC in its present form does not provide for German participation on the basis of complete equality. Moreover, they do not consider the European defense force envisaged by the treaty as an effective means of defending Western Europe against possible Soviet aggression.

In Paris, ratification has been hindered by an understandable reluctance on the part of some Frenchmen to see Germany rearm at a time when French military resources are being seriously drained by the war in Indochina. Under present circumstances some French circles feel that German domination of the EDC, which they desire to prevent, would only be a matter of time. Add to these major political and psychological obstacles Europe's traditional nationalist feelings of pride

in national armies and reluctance to accept the control of a supranational authority, and you have a fair idea of the problem of EDC ratification.

While clearly recognizing the obstacles to be overcome before ratification can be achieved, it is our hope and that of Europe's statesmen that eventually logic will win out over traditional emotional factors and that relatively less important national interests may yield to more compelling international realities. We remain convinced that the EDC is the soundest possible approach to European defense, and we will continue to give it our maximum support.

It has always seemed to us that EDC was essential to the concept of European unity. As long as Soviet strategic goals appear unchanged, Europe cannot hope for unified security without unified strength. In the final analysis, however, European unity, whether it be economic, political, or military is something which can be made a reality only by the Europeans themselves.

## Registering Public Opinion

*by H. Schuyler Foster*  
*Chief, Division of Public Studies*<sup>1</sup>

The Department of State carries on a systematic effort to keep itself informed about public opinion, so that policy decisions can be taken with full consideration of the views of the American people. The Department's officers realize the vital connection between public opinion and U.S. foreign policy. They know that, as Secretary George Catlett Marshall put it, "no policy—foreign or domestic—can succeed without public support."

Under our democratic government, sustained and intelligent support of foreign policy must come from public understanding, from the views about foreign policy held by each individual. Citizens' views are especially important today, since much of the execution of this foreign policy requires active citizen participation. As Secretary of State John Foster Dulles has said in a recent radio-TV address to the American people:

Foreign policy isn't just something that's conducted by secretaries of state and by ambassadors in different parts

<sup>1</sup> Address made at the Department of State on Apr. 22 before a group of Rhode Island high school students visiting Washington under the sponsorship of the World Affairs Council of Rhode Island.

of the world; every one of you has got a part in making a successful foreign policy for the United States.<sup>2</sup>

You don't need to be 21 years old to participate in U.S. foreign policy. As a taxpayer, even on lipstick or movies, you are contributing a share of the large sums needed to carry out our foreign policy. Those young Americans now serving in the armed forces are called upon to make a much greater contribution for the success of our foreign policy, whether they are serving in the United States or in Korea. These are contributions which Americans were not normally called upon to make prior to World War II. In earlier years, Congress did not appropriate billions of dollars for a mutual security program; yet the American public of today has agreed to tax itself heavily to carry out this vital part of our foreign policy.

Each person in the country contributes to American public opinion, whether by favoring our foreign policies, by opposing them, or by ignoring them. Even when a person has no opinion, that fact has an impact on the total opinion picture. All one has to do to realize the cumulative result

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Feb. 9, p. 216.

of individual opinions is to suppose that everybody else shared your opinion, or lack of one.

The systematic analysis of opinion carried out within the Department of State makes it possible for every officer considering a foreign-policy problem to be familiar with public opinion on that problem. American opinion is not, of course, the only factor entering into policy decisions. Many other considerations are involved in deciding what action would best promote world peace and the welfare of the American nation. Sometimes expert judgment is required on such technical questions as: How much aid from the United States do European countries need this year to carry out the joint defense program without harming their economies? How much aid can the United States afford to send without harming its own economy? Or, how far could increased trade with European countries reduce their need for United States aid? Or, again, how feasible is it to set up a comprehensive defense organization for the Pacific area? How far are other countries willing to go in joining a defense organization? Along with the expert judgments on such knotty questions, the Department of State policy officer receives analyses of what the American public is thinking about such questions.

Every day, top officers of the Department get a summary of opinion developments of the last 24 hours on all major aspects of our foreign policy. In addition, policy officers receive from time to time detailed analyses covering, for instance, current opinion about the Far East or Germany. Or perhaps a longer-range study of public attitudes over the last year or two toward the United Nations. Opinion studies are frequently requested by Department officers who want an analysis geared directly to the specific problem which confronts them.

Just how does the Department go about this job of registering public opinion? How can your opinion be registered without any consultation with you? It is clearly impossible to collect each month the opinions of millions of Americans on the leading foreign affairs topics of that month, but it is possible to construct a reasonably accurate picture of American public opinion on the basis of opinion expressions which are more readily accessible.

### **Sources of Opinions Studied**

The Department's analyses of opinion are broadly based upon all available types of publicly expressed opinion. These include, first of all, the materials available from the daily press. Newspaper editorials; "columns" by individual writers, some of which appear in papers across the country; and news stories which report the views of outstanding leaders of opinion, whether Congressmen, other political leaders, spokesmen of the major national organizations, or other newsworthy figures. These press materials are available

promptly and reflect a number of different points of view. So do the broadcasts of the radio commentators.

A little later the weekly magazines are available, and radio discussion programs. Then there are the formal resolutions of major groups, such as business, labor, or agricultural associations, church groups, patriotic organizations, women's clubs. A wide variety of organizations show an active interest in international problems and take public stands on our foreign policy.

The nationwide polling organizations, those of Gallup and Roper and some of our universities, often include foreign-affairs topics in their samplings of public opinion. Individual citizens write to the Secretary of State or to the White House, giving direct expression to their views on foreign affairs. Moreover, Department officers often report on those questions and attitudes which they have found to be most prominent at meetings they have attended in various parts of the country. All of these varied types of opinion expression are carefully watched, from day to day and week to week, by those who are responsible for registering public opinion on foreign affairs.

On many questions all of these opinion indicators point in the same direction; showing, for example, the overwhelming support for continued U.S. participation in the United Nations. Indeed, on the broad question of America's role, ever since Pearl Harbor public opinion has strongly and consistently favored an "active part" in world affairs for the United States with only a minority desiring us to "stay out" of world affairs as much as we can. This positive attitude is evident in the press and radio comment, in the results of public opinion polls, in the declarations by national organizations, and by the great majority of other leaders and spokesmen.

Moreover, belief in an active role in world affairs is dominant in all geographical sections of the country. Public opinion polls show virtually the same support for this attitude in the Midwest as in the East, in the North as in the South. It is also true that the "stay out" attitude is evenly held by a minority of Americans throughout the nation, and in both of our major political parties. As students, however, you will be interested in knowing that the amount of education a person has does make a difference in foreign-policy outlook. Generally speaking, the more education a person has, the more likely he is to favor a positive role for America.

### **Divergent Views Analyzed**

On some issues, support for the main idea is clear but there is sharp difference of opinion as to the degree to which or the way in which the principle should be carried out at a particular time. For instance, there is strong support for a large-scale program of aid to our allies; but there

is difference of opinion about the exact amount and character of that aid and about the desirability of making the aid conditional on specific acts. In such cases, the registration of public opinion requires a description of just how opinion is divided: which groups within the population take which sides and for what reasons, which schools of thought are gaining and which declining.

This method of registering public opinion does far more justice to the richness and diversity of American thought than would a simple conclusion, such as: The public says yes, or the public says no.

Special mention must be made, in any discussion of how the Department registers public opinion, of the opportunities open to organizations and their spokesmen. Periodically, those organizations which have educational programs on foreign affairs are invited to send representatives to meetings with Department of State officers in Washington. Some of these conferences are comprehensive in their coverage and include talks by the Secretary and other top officials of the Department; others deal with particular problems which are of special interest to some of the organizations at a particular time. All of these meetings, to which the organizations send their spokesmen and pay their own expenses, offer an opportunity for the group representatives to present their views, their opinions, to responsible policy officers of the Department. A diversity of views is often evident on these occasions, since these organizations represent many different aspects of American life.

Between such meetings, too, organization spokesmen send statements of their views to the Department; or they may secure interviews in order to lay their opinions directly before officers dealing with the problem in question. In connection with article 71 of the U.N. Charter, which relates to the U.N.'s Economic and Social Council, the Department of State specifically undertakes "consultation with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with matters within [the Council's] competence."

From this summary description of the numerous and representative sources from which the Department collects American opinion, it is clear that the Department ascribes importance to what the public is thinking. The sample of newspapers, magazines, and radio commentators is designed to include every outlook, every shade of thought on these major foreign-policy questions. Public opinion, as registered through these various channels, is considered by desk officers confronted with day-to-day problems and by top officials who must make major decisions. Public opinion is often an important factor in preparing the Department's recommendations to the President for his final action on foreign-policy questions.

The job of the American citizen in the second half of the 20th century is very challenging, perhaps more difficult than ever before. There are

not only foreign-policy problems but domestic problems which must be faced on the national, state, and local levels. It's a big job; but the magnitude of the citizen's job does not diminish the importance of his role in foreign affairs. It was never more important than today.

## **Soviet Proposal for 5-Power Peace Pact**

*In response to questions concerning Soviet Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov's proposal for a five-power peace pact contained in a message to the Congress of the Peoples in Defense of Peace, Michael J. McDermott, Special Assistant for Press Relations, made the following statement on April 28:*

The Department would regret if the discussion of outstanding issues now disturbing the peace of the world were to degenerate into a mere propaganda battle. Mr. Molotov has seen fit to address his proposal for a five-power pact, which, incidentally, has been a standard Stalinist-Communist proposal for many years, to an unofficial body which has served for a long time as a front for the international Communist movement.

The Department still awaits official action on the part of the Soviet Union to promote the cause of peace, not mere words. In any event, a pact of this sort appears to be unnecessary in view of the Charter of the United Nations, which is a peace instrument binding on all nations.

## **International Wheat Agreement Signed at Washington**

Negotiations which had begun at the end of January culminated in the signing at Washington on April 13 of a new International Wheat Agreement.<sup>1</sup> Signature was made by 17 countries.

The new agreement is the result of the International Wheat Council's decision to recommend to member governments that the present Wheat Agreement, which is due to expire on July 31 of this year, be extended for a further 3-year period. This 3-year period will encompass a new price range of \$2.05 maximum and \$1.55 minimum as a replacement for the present range of \$1.80 maximum and \$1.20 minimum. (The new maximum price of \$2.05 was found unacceptable by the United Kingdom delegate, who informed the Council that while his Government desired a renewal of the agreement, it was not prepared to accept a maximum price above \$2.)

During the course of negotiations the Council also agreed to recommend to governments a num-

<sup>1</sup> Copies of the renewed agreement may be obtained by writing to the Division of International Conferences, Department of State.

ber of textual amendments to be incorporated in the new agreement. These were introduced largely on the basis of the experience gained in the operation of the Wheat Agreement since 1949 and are intended to clarify certain parts of the agreement and to improve its operation. None of these recommended changes, however, alters the basic principles on which the agreement was originally established.

A provision of the new agreement will permit the Council, under certain conditions, to select an expert advisory panel to give the Council an advisory opinion before taking a decision on any dispute arising on the application or interpretation of the agreement. The present position under which the Council is the final arbiter on all disputes is unaffected.

The following tables set forth the guaranteed imports and exports of wheat and their distribution, by countries which have been recommended to governments by the International Wheat Council, and will apply under the renewed International Wheat Agreement.

The Department of State on April 27 announced (press release 218) that the agreement had been signed on behalf of 39 countries up to and including April 24, 1953.

Those signatories include the 4 exporting countries now members of the International Wheat Council, namely, Australia, Canada, France, and the United States of America, and 35 of the importing countries now members of the Council, namely, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Ceylon, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Lebanon,

Liberia, Mexico, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, the Philippines, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the Union of South Africa.

The Department further announced on April 28 (press release 222) that the agreement had been signed by El Salvador, Iceland, Indonesia, New Zealand, Peru, and Venezuela on April 27, which was the final date for signature.

Forty-five of the forty-six countries, members of the International Wheat Council, have now signed the agreement. The United Kingdom did not become a signatory.

#### Guaranteed Purchases

Crop year August 1 to July 31	1953-	1954-	1955-	Equivalent in bushels for each crop year
	54	55	56	
	thousands of metric tons			
Austria . . . . .	250	250	250	9, 185, 927
Belgium . . . . .	615	615	615	22, 597, 382
Bolivia . . . . .	95	95	95	3, 490, 652
Brazil . . . . .	360	360	360	13, 227, 736
Ceylon . . . . .	255	255	255	9, 369, 646
Costa Rica . . . . .	35	35	35	1, 286, 030
Cuba . . . . .	202	202	202	7, 422, 229
Denmark . . . . .	50	50	50	1, 837, 185
Dominican Republic . . . . .	26	26	26	955, 336
Ecuador . . . . .	35	35	35	1, 286, 030
Egypt . . . . .	400	400	400	14, 697, 484
El Salvador . . . . .	20	20	20	734, 874
Germany . . . . .	1, 500	1, 500	1, 500	55, 115, 565
Greece . . . . .	350	350	350	12, 860, 299
Guatemala . . . . .	25	25	25	918, 593
Haiti . . . . .	45	45	45	1, 653, 467
Honduras . . . . .	15	15	15	551, 156
Iceland . . . . .	11	11	11	404, 181
India . . . . .	1, 500	1, 500	1, 500	55, 115, 565
Indonesia . . . . .	142	142	142	5, 217, 607
Ireland . . . . .	275	275	275	10, 104, 520
Israel . . . . .	215	215	215	7, 899, 898
Italy . . . . .	850	850	850	31, 232, 154
Japan . . . . .	1, 000	1, 000	1, 000	36, 743, 710
Lebanon . . . . .	75	75	75	2, 755, 778
Liberia . . . . .	2	2	2	73, 487
Mexico . . . . .	415	415	415	15, 248, 640
Netherlands . . . . .	675	675	675	24, 802, 004
New Zealand . . . . .	160	160	160	5, 878, 994
Nicaragua . . . . .	10	10	10	367, 437
Norway . . . . .	230	230	230	8, 451, 053
Panama . . . . .	20	20	20	734, 874
Peru . . . . .	185	185	185	6, 797, 586
Philippines . . . . .	236	236	236	8, 671, 515
Portugal . . . . .	175	175	175	6, 430, 149
Saudi Arabia . . . . .	60	60	60	2, 204, 623
Spain . . . . .	145	145	145	5, 327, 838
Sweden . . . . .	25	25	25	918, 593
Switzerland . . . . .	215	215	215	7, 899, 898
Union of South Africa . . . . .	320	320	320	11, 757, 987
United Kingdom . . . . .	4, 819	4, 819	4, 819	177, 067, 939
Venezuela . . . . .	170	170	170	6, 246, 431
Total (42 countries) . . . . .	16, 208	16, 208	16, 208	595, 542, 052

#### Guaranteed Sales

Crop year August 1 to July 31	1953-	1954-	1955-	Equivalent in bushels for each crop year
	54	55	56	
	thousands of metric tons			
Australia <sup>1</sup> . . . . .	2, 041	2, 041	2, 041	75, 000, 000
Canada . . . . .	6, 804	6, 804	6, 804	250, 000, 000
France . . . . .	10	10	10	367, 437
United States of America . . . . .	7, 353	7, 353	7, 353	270, 174, 615
Total . . . . .	16, 208	16, 208	16, 208	595, 542, 052

<sup>1</sup> In the event of the provisions of article X being invoked by Australia by reason of a short crop, it will be recognized that certain markets, by virtue of their geographical position, are traditionally dependent upon Australia for the supply of their requirements of wheat grain and wheat flour. The necessity of meeting these requirements will be one of the factors to be taken into account by the Council in determining the ability of Australia to deliver its guaranteed sales under this agreement in any crop year.

# World Trade Week, 1953

## PROCLAMATION<sup>1</sup>

WHEREAS it is the policy of this Government to foster mutual understanding and friendship among nations; and

WHEREAS world trade, freely conducted by private enterprise, increases material well-being and develops friendly intercourse among free peoples; and

WHEREAS international trade among the nations of the free world adds to the economic strength upon which their common defense is based; and

WHEREAS increased international exchange of goods, services, and capital promotes better economic utilization of the world's resources and higher standards of living; and

WHEREAS expanded world trade advances the ideal of unity among all mankind and strengthens the foundation for lasting peace and prosperity:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Dwight D. Eisenhower, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim the week beginning May 17, 1953, as World Trade Week; and I request the appropriate officials of the Federal Government and of the several States, Territories, possessions, and

municipalities of the United States to cooperate in the observance of that week.

I also urge business, labor, agricultural, educational, and civic groups, as well as the people of the United States generally, to observe World Trade Week with gatherings, discussions, exhibits, ceremonies, and other appropriate activities.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this twenty-third day of April in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and fifty-three, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and seventy-seventh.



By the President:

WALTER B. SMITH,  
*Acting Secretary of State*

## Maintaining Mutually Advantageous Trade With Latin America

*by Edward G. Cale*

*Director of the Office of Regional American Affairs<sup>2</sup>*

Public attention in the United States in the foreign relations field has for some time naturally been concentrated largely on developments in Korea and in the war torn areas surrounding the Soviet Union. I am glad to have the opportunity, however, to call your attention to the continued significance to the United States of our neighbors south of the Rio Grande.

The United States and the countries of Latin America are closely bound together by ties of geography, history, and economics. We share common ideals. Our interests and those of the Latin American countries are such that we have customarily found ourselves holding essentially the same views on important political issues.

Our commercial interdependence with the Latin American countries is very close. From the standpoint of military defense they are a great asset to us and we to them.

Geographically, except for Canada, Latin America is our closest neighbor. It has a population that is slightly larger than our own. It contains regions of great strategic importance from

the viewpoint of U.S. and Western Hemisphere defense.

Our direct private investments in the area are large, amounting to approximately 5 billion dollars. In fact, if investments in Canada are excluded, United States direct private investments in Latin America exceed those in all the other countries of the world combined.

Our trade with the area is also very large. In 1952 Latin America exported to the United States about 3.4 billion dollars worth of goods or approximately 32 percent of total U.S. imports from all sources. In addition to basic foodstuffs such as coffee and sugar, we imported from Latin America many of the raw materials which we must have either to live comfortably in peace or to fight effectively in war. Included in this group of imports are many strategic and critical materials. Indeed, Latin America is the major single source of some 20 materials on the U.S. stockpile list. Latin America is also an important market for U.S. exports and is heavily dependent on the supplies which it receives from the United States. Latin America's imports from the United States in 1952 amounted to approximately 3.5 billion dollars or about half of its imports from all sources.

The security and well-being of the United States require a close and cooperative relationship with Latin America. Geographic proximity alone

<sup>1</sup> No. 3012, 18 *Fed. Reg.* 2469.

<sup>2</sup> Excerpts from an address made before the Export-Import Club at Richmond, Va., on Apr. 22 (press release 202 dated Apr. 20).



would necessitate such a relationship, if only to secure the southern approaches to the United States and our communications between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Geographic proximity also enhances the value to the United States, particularly in time of war, of the wide variety and large volume of strategic and other raw materials upon which our industries are becoming increasingly dependent.

The Latin American countries also have a vital stake in the maintenance of close and cooperative relations with the United States. Their security as well as ours is involved in the maintenance of a strong Western Hemisphere. Their dependence upon their trade with us is especially great. Among the important consumer goods which Latin America purchased in the United States in 1952 were 227 million dollars of wheat and flour, 82 million dollars of other grains and preparations, 72 million dollars of fruits and vegetables, 25 million dollars of tobacco and manufactures, 217 million dollars of textile manufactures, and 431 million dollars of automobiles, parts, and accessories. Among capital goods and industrial raw materials which they purchased from us during the same year were 220 million dollars of iron and steel mill products, 308 million dollars of chemicals and related products, and 727 million dollars of electrical and industrial machinery.

### **The Question Asked by Our Neighbors**

These are dull figures, but they translate into such basic things as the sulfur needed to keep Cuba's rayon plants in operation, steel towers to carry transmission lines from newly developed hydroelectric plants in Brazil, and equipment for expanding Chile's steel mill capacity. In the period of stringency following the Korean crisis the United States kept these essential commodities moving out to satisfy civilian requirements in Latin America on the same priority schedule that it used for civilian requirements here in this country. We were a reliable supplier. Whether we will prove an equally reliable purchaser now that the pendulum is swinging in the opposite direction is a big question for the future and one which our neighbors are asking with some apprehension. How much they can continue to buy here depends, in a very direct way, on how much they can sell here, for under present conditions there is no layer of accumulated capital for these countries to draw upon.

Latin American exports to the United States represent much more than the flow of a given amount of goods. They represent employment for a large segment of their population. They represent the means of obtaining the goods which they need to improve their health and comfort. More importantly, perhaps, they supply the dollar exchange for the purchase of the capital equipment and for the servicing of the dollar indebted-

ness and equity investment which are required for their economic development.

The need for such development is evident. Latin America has the natural resources both to build home industry and agriculture and to expand foreign trade. However, while conditions vary widely from country to country, average per capita income in Latin America as a whole is about one-eighth of the per capita income in the United States. How urgent it is, from the viewpoint of future inter-American cooperation, that the United States facilitate the further development of their resources becomes more evident from day to day. The people of Latin America are today deeply conscious of the disparity between the living standards of all but the more wealthy among them and the living standards of the average citizen in countries like ours. They believe that this disparity can and should be overcome. They are resolved to improve upon life as they have known and lived it in the past. A foundation for general economic development in Latin America, is, in fact, being established. The governments, and private citizens as well, are investing greater funds than ever before in agriculture, power, and industrial facilities. The governments are increasing their budgets for education, health and social security, public works, and agricultural development. Progress is slow, however, in terms of need for it.

We in this country, in appraising the situation, must realize that Latin America is actually in the midst of a social revolution. We must understand that our Latin American neighbors are deeply conscious of the need for social reform to correct age-old abuses. In many areas of activity there is little that we can or should do, for the Latin American countries must work out their own destinies. We should be fully aware, however, that old institutions and old concepts—including the concept of cooperation with the United States—are being critically examined everywhere. We must, to the extent that we are able, help our Latin American neighbors understand that our attitude is one of cooperation but not of interference in their problems and must endeavor to remove the basis for any justifiable complaint they may have against us. We, of course, have the right to expect them to show a corresponding comprehension of the problems facing us and to take similar action regarding our grievances.

It is my opinion that nothing in our relations with the Latin American countries will be of greater importance in the immediate future than the trade policy which we adopt. No subject is receiving more critical inquiry on their part at the present time. They are asking such questions as these:

Are the prices they receive for the products they sell to the United States fair?

Are the prices which they pay for the products they buy from us reasonable?

Does the United States recognize any responsibility for helping to afford a continuing market for their products after they have expanded their production in order to meet our temporary war production needs?

Does the United States expect them to remain producers of foodstuffs and raw materials only, and not to diversify their economies?

I understand, of course, that some of these questions fail to give sufficient recognition to the interests which the Latin American countries have had in the worldwide struggles that have raged throughout the life of this generation; that they show insufficient understanding of the fact that those struggles were the struggles of the Latin American countries as well as ours and that the rights and interests which we have fought to protect are not only our own rights and interests but those of free men everywhere. I believe that it is essential that we also understand, however, that a large part of the people in Latin America are so much concerned with the day-to-day problem of procuring the means of subsistence that they have not realized, and do not now realize, that they have any real stake in the outcome of those struggles. It is also necessary that we understand, especially in view of the social changes that are now occurring in Latin America, that it is highly important that not only government officials but the people of Latin America know and understand just what the attitude of the United States is toward Latin America's problems.

#### **The U.N. Resolution on Terms of Trade**

I can illustrate the importance which our Latin American neighbors attach to their trade with us and some of the current problems involved in that trade, I believe, by indicating the role which the Latin American Republics played in the adoption by the General Assembly of the United Nations late last fall of a resolution dealing with the terms of trade.<sup>3</sup> By "terms of trade," I mean the ratio between the prices of the goods a country sells and the prices of the goods it buys. When a fixed quantity of a country's exports will exchange for more of the goods the country must import, the terms of trade are moving in its favor; if the quantity of goods it receives for its imports declines, the terms of trade are becoming less favorable. This resolution recommended that governments which adopt measures affecting the prices of raw materials entering into international trade should consider the effect of such measures on the terms of trade of underdeveloped countries in order to insure that the prices of these primary commodities are kept in an adequate, just, and equitable relation to the prices of capital goods and other manufactured articles. The intent of the resolution, as explained by its pro-

ponents, was to facilitate the establishment of fair wage levels in the less developed countries and to permit a more rapid growth of domestic savings.

The United States was not opposed to the concept of fair and equitable prices. We believed, however, that the relationship between the prices of raw materials and the prices of manufactured goods, especially during recent years, has been favorable to the producers of the former. We also were of the opinion that there is no effective way, internationally, of maintaining any fixed relationship between the prices of large numbers of commodities and that there is no criterion other than the free play of market forces by which to determine what is a just price.

The resolution was, nevertheless, adopted by an overwhelming vote. It had been introduced by a representative of one of the Latin American countries. Nineteen Latin American delegations joined with the delegations of 16 other countries to give a total vote of 35 for the resolution. Fifteen countries, including the United States, opposed it. The resolution was carried by more than a two-thirds majority, and there is no doubt in my mind that it had the approval of the overwhelming majority of the Latin American people who had given any consideration to it.

Undoubtedly one of the principal forces motivating the supporters of the resolution was the fear that the favorable price relationship that has existed during the last several years might not continue. Raw material prices have generally fluctuated much more widely in the past than have the prices of industrial goods. Furthermore, as you know, there has been a tendency for the prices of many foodstuffs and raw materials to move downward in recent months and there is, I am sure, apprehension on the part of producers of these products in other countries just as there is among producers of such products in the United States.

You will appreciate the fact that at a time when the Latin American countries fear that they may face a period of declining prices for their exports, when they desire so much to improve their material lot, and when they recognize that one of the principal means of realizing this objective is through the maintenance of a high volume of mutually advantageous trade with us, our trade relations with them are of very great importance. Whatever we do to reduce their exports to us will not only reduce our exports to them, in virtually the same proportion, but will be reflected in their political orientation and in the ability of the free world to defend itself.

President Eisenhower in his recent statement to Congress concerning renewal of the Trade Agreements Act<sup>4</sup> placed our trade policy in the context of our total foreign policy. What he said in that connection is entirely applicable to our relations with Latin America and may be taken

<sup>3</sup> U.N. doc. A/resolution 86.

<sup>4</sup> BULLETIN of Apr. 27, 1953, p. 634.

as a summary of what I have been trying to say to you this evening. In that statement President Eisenhower said:

Our trade policy is only one part, although a vital part, of a larger problem. This problem embraces the need to develop through cooperative action among the free nations a strong and self-supporting economic system capable of providing both the military strength to deter aggression and the rising productivity that can improve living standards.

No feature of American policy is more important in this respect than the course which we set in our economic relations with other nations. The long term economic stability of the whole free world and the overriding question of world peace will be heavily influenced by the wisdom of our decisions. As for the United States itself, its security is fully as dependent upon the economic health and stability of the other free nations as upon their adequate military strength.

After calling attention to the complexity of this problem and to the fact that building a productive and strong economic system within the free world will require action by other governments, as well as the United States, over a wide range of economic activities, President Eisenhower continued:

In working toward these goals, our own trade policy as well as that of other countries should contribute to the highest possible level of trade on a basis that is profitable and equitable for all. The world must achieve an expanding trade, balanced at high levels, which will permit each nation to make its full contribution to the progress of the free world's economy and to share fully the benefits of this progress.

## **OEEC Group, U.S. Officials Discuss Economic Problems**

### **Summary of Discussions**

Major economic problems of mutual concern to the United States and Western Europe were discussed during a week of conferences, which opened on April 10, between a delegation of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) and U.S. Government officials.

The conferences opened with a meeting at the Department of State of the OEEC group, Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith, Secretary of the Treasury George M. Humphrey, and Director for Mutual Security Harold E. Stassen.

The European delegation was headed by Sir Hugh Ellis-Rees, chairman of the Council of the OEEC and chief of the U.K. delegation to OEEC. Other members of the delegation were Ambassador Attilio Cattani, chairman of the OEEC executive committee and head of the Italian delegation to OEEC; Baron Snoy, chairman of the OEEC steering board for trade and secretary general of the Belgian ministry of economic affairs; and Hans Karl von Mangoldt, chairman, European Payments Union managing board, and member of the German delegation to OEEC. Robert Marjolin, OEEC secretary general, also participated in the talks.

The OEEC is composed of 17 European countries including virtually all of the nations of free Europe. The United States and Canada are associated in the organization and participate in its work. The OEEC was created in 1948 in recognition of the fact that American assistance to Europe under the Marshall plan could be effective only with maximum self-help and mutual cooperation among the European nations themselves.

Since 1948 the OEEC has provided machinery through which the member countries have worked together to reduce trade barriers, increase production, stabilize finances, balance their accounts with one another and with the outside world, and solve other economic problems.

### **Text of Joint Communique**

1. Representatives of the United States and the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) have today (April 16) concluded a week of intensive exploratory discussions on the common economic and financial problems of the North Atlantic area. The discussions were concerned primarily with the problems raised last December in the Fourth Report of the OEEC and in last month's US-UK talks, and in the OEEC Ministerial Council Meeting. As foreseen in the communique issued following the US-UK talks in March,<sup>1</sup> the United Kingdom suggestions were discussed with the Organization in the course of the March 23-24 OEEC Ministerial Council Meeting. The present talks provided an opportunity for further consultations between representatives of the OEEC and the United States.

2. The discussions were informal in character, directed to obtain a frank exchange of views on a wide range of economic problems of common interest. The OEEC delegates reviewed developments leading up to the Organization's Fourth Report, issued last December under the title, *Europe—The Way Ahead*. In this connection, they presented an analysis of European economic problems and prospects. They also explained certain suggestions for meeting those problems which would involve measures to be taken by European countries and by the United States.

3. The OEEC Delegation exchanged views with senior officials of the United States administration, including the Secretaries of State, Treasury and Commerce, and the Director for Mutual Security. During the course of the meetings, U.S. officials and the visiting delegation discussed European economic policies of common concern, and United States economic policies which have a significant impact on Europe. The exchange led to a better understanding of the economic problems common to the United States and Europe.

4. The discussions revealed complete under-

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Mar. 16, 1953, p. 395.

standing and agreement on the vital necessity for pursuing sound economic policies. Representatives for both sides stated it to be their objective to seek (i) stable and growing economies which would permit rising living standards, necessary investments and adequate collective or individual defense efforts, (ii) sound internal economic policies directed at maintaining financial stability, and (iii) freer and expanded world trade and an improved system of international payments. There was general agreement that these purposes would be furthered by continuing efforts and close cooperation on both sides of the Atlantic.

5. In presenting their analysis, the OEEC delegates stated that, despite the great progress made during the past five years, they regarded the present economic situation in Europe as far from satisfactory, and they stressed the urgency of the need for action. The OEEC views were along the following lines:

(a) The task facing Europe was to continue the cooperative efforts which had already produced important results. Although the total volume of European exports to the rest of the world was today about two-thirds higher than pre-war levels, dollar earning from exports had to be increased. To that end, and in order to meet other vital needs, especially in the field of defense, it was necessary to increase European production and productivity and make European exports more competitive. Further efforts should be made to reduce trade restrictions, among the European countries themselves and with the rest of the world:

(b) The United States could play a role in restoring conditions for expansion of world trade and payments by measures in the fields of commercial policy, foreign investment and raw materials. U.S. policies with regard to tariffs, shipping and customs procedures were of considerable importance to OEEC countries, which require dollars to buy agricultural products, raw materials and manufactured goods in the United States. The European countries had great interest in increasing exports to the United States, so as to reduce the imbalance between them and the United States. U.S. investment abroad could assist in making possible a freer international trade and payments system. As regards raw materials, it would be useful if ways could be found to moderate the widespread disturbances caused by violent fluctuations in their prices. Problems relating to freer movement of persons were also mentioned.

6. Points raised by United States representatives involved an exploration of various individual or concerted measures by which European countries might improve the competitiveness of their exports in third areas, as well as in the United States market, with a view to improving both their immediate balance of payments situations and

their consequent opportunities for obtaining the real economic benefits of freer trade and payments on a broader basis. With respect to possible measures to be taken by the United States, the representatives of the United States pointed out that reviews of U.S. foreign economic policy were being undertaken. In this connection, attention was drawn to the appointment of Mr. Lewis Douglas, and members of Mr. Douglas' staff participated in the discussions.

7. The representatives of the Government of the United States also related their support of these objectives to the continuing interest of the United States in further progress toward European integration, through such arrangements and institutions as the European Defense Community, the European Political Community, the Coal and Steel Community, and the Organization for European Economic Cooperation.

## **U.S. Terminates Further Vesting of German Property**

### **White House Announcement of April 17<sup>1</sup>**

The White House on April 17 announced the termination of the program for vesting German-owned properties located in the United States. This action constitutes a further step in the orderly conclusion of a wartime measure inaugurated by the U.S. Government shortly after the outbreak of World War II.

Attorney General Brownell stated that after April 17, 1953, the Department of Justice will not issue any orders vesting new or additional German properties. Secretary of State Dulles stated that the decision taken represents one of a series of progressive steps looking toward the development of normal relations between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany.

Under the provisions of the Trading with the Enemy Act, enemy-owned properties in the United States at the outbreak of World War II were immediately immobilized and later vested. Immobilization prevented the enemy from using these assets to further its war effort, and by vesting these assets the U.S. Government obtained reparation for the payment-of-war claims.

### **Text of Statement by Chancellor Adenauer<sup>2</sup>**

[Translation]

The termination of the confiscation of German prewar assets announced on April 17 by the White House signifies a further important step on the path to a complete normalization of German-American economic relations. The American

<sup>1</sup> Released to the press at Augusta, Ga.

<sup>2</sup> Made at Boston on Apr. 17.

Government has thus generously and speedily complied with a wish which the Federal Chancellor had presented during his conferences in Washington.<sup>3</sup>

In accordance with American legislation, German assets in the United States were frozen at the outbreak of the war, and later were for the most part confiscated in favor of the American Government. Such confiscation of German prewar assets continued until very recently. Today's statement terminates the era of confiscations which constituted a burden on German-American postwar relations. A new important stage has been entered.

The Federal Government welcomes this statement by which the American Government demonstrates again that it is working in an exemplary manner to restore normal economic relations in the interest of all the countries of the free world. The Federal Government is convinced that this step by the leading economic nation of the world will have favorable repercussions on the treatment of German prewar assets in other countries, too.

## Anniversary of Polish Constitution

*Statement by Secretary Dulles*

Press release 227 dated May 1

Today [May 3] is the 162d anniversary of the adoption of the Polish Third of May Constitution, a step of worldwide significance on the road toward modern, Western democracy. In the days of its independence the Polish Nation celebrated this anniversary freely and with patriotic devotion as the national holiday. In their present unhappy bondage the Polish people commemorate the occasion no less solemnly, although those in Poland, as we all know, may do so only in their hearts and thoughts.

The Polish Nation is rightly proud of its splendid history which illustrates, as does all history, that no tyranny can suppress permanently the freedom of a nation which truly desires freedom. Freedom—the freedom of nations as well as freedom of the individual—is at the heart of American policy. It is the same principle which the Poles inscribed on their banners—“for our freedom and for yours.”

On this occasion I send to the Polish people an expression of the warm, friendly sympathy of the American people and of their Government. We salute true Poles wherever they may be. We join with them in the hope and faith that the Polish desire for freedom and independence will find the fullest realization.

<sup>3</sup> For information relating to the Chancellor's visit to Washington, see BULLETIN of Apr. 20, p. 568.

## Anniversary Message on Japanese Peace Treaty

Press release 220 dated April 28

*Secretary Dulles has sent the following message to the Japanese people on the occasion of the first anniversary of the Japanese peace treaty:*

I am happy, indeed, to send my greetings to the people of Japan on the first anniversary of the Treaty of Peace. A year ago, Japan became a sovereign and independent nation and a member of the international society. I know that the Japanese people are proud of their independence and sovereignty and will guard them carefully.

While the restoration of Japan's independence under the peace treaty is indispensable for Japan's future, Japan's active interest and participation in a growing number of international organizations is an impressive fulfillment of one of the objectives underlying the Treaty of Peace. I hope that Japan can become a full member of the United Nations, as such a large majority of its members have already favored.

During the past year, our two peoples have faced many complex and difficult problems together. We each have come to a greater understanding of the other's problems. I am sure that this understanding will continue to increase as time goes by. This anniversary is an occasion for the Japanese and American people to reaffirm their determination to work together with other friendly peoples for peace and security.

## Notification Regarding Prewar Agreements With Japan

Press release 211 dated April 24

*The Department of State announced on April 24 that on April 22, 1953, the Japanese Government was given official notification, in accordance with the terms of the Treaty of Peace with Japan signed at San Francisco September 8, 1951, regarding the prewar bilateral treaties and other international agreements with Japan which the U.S. Government desires to keep in force or revive. The notification, which was handed by U.S. Ambassador John M. Allison to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, is as follows:*

I have the honor to refer to the Treaty of Peace with Japan, signed at San Francisco September 8, 1951, which came into force, in accordance with the provisions of article 23 thereof, on April 28, 1952, upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by Japan, the United States of America, Australia, Canada, France, New Zealand, Pakistan and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Article 7(a) of the Treaty of Peace reads as follows:

Each of the Allied Powers, within one year after the present Treaty has come into force between it and Japan, will notify Japan which of its prewar bilateral treaties or conventions with Japan it wishes to continue in force or revive, and any treaties or conventions so notified shall continue in force or be revived subject only to such amendments as may be necessary to ensure conformity with the present Treaty. The treaties and conventions so notified shall be considered as having been continued in force or revived three months after the date of notification and shall be registered with the Secretariat of the United Nations. All such treaties and conventions as to which Japan is not so notified shall be regarded as abrogated.

I have the honor, by direction of the Government of the United States of America and on its behalf, to notify the Japanese Government, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Peace quoted above, that the Government of the United States of America desires to keep in force or revive the following prewar bilateral treaties and other international agreements with Japan:

#### *Extradition*

1. Treaty relating to the extradition of criminals. Signed at Tokyo April 29, 1886. Entered into force November 26, 1886.

2. Supplementary convention relating to the extradition of criminals. Signed at Tokyo May 17, 1906. Entered into force October 5, 1906.

#### *Narcotic Drugs*

3. Arrangement for the direct exchange of certain information regarding the traffic in narcotic drugs. Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo February 16 and July 6, 1928. Entered into force July 6, 1928.

4. Arrangement for the exchange of information relating to the seizure of illicit narcotic drugs and to persons engaged in the illicit traffic. Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo April 23 and September 6, 1929.

#### *Postal*

5. Convention for the exchange of money orders. Signed at Washington April 18, and at Tokyo May 23, 1885. Entered into force October 1, 1885.

6. Additional convention to the convention for the exchange of money orders. Signed at Tokyo May 25 and at Washington June 22, 1888. Entered into force October 1, 1888.

7. Additional articles to the convention for the exchange of money orders. Signed at Tokyo April 5 and at Washington May 4, 1889. Entered into force June 24, 1889.

8. Additional convention for the exchange of postal money orders. Signed at Tokyo May 7 and at Washington June 1, 1904. Entered into force July 1, 1904.

9. Parcel post agreement, with detailed regulations. Signed at Tokyo June 1, 1938 and at Washington June 20, 1938. Entered into force July 1, 1938.

#### *Property—Leaseholds*

10. Arrangement relating to perpetual leaseholds. Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo March 25, 1937. Entered into force March 25, 1937.

#### *Smuggling—Liquor*

11. Convention for the prevention of the smuggling of intoxicating liquors. Signed at Washington May 31, 1928. Entered into force January 16, 1930.

#### *Taxation*

12. Arrangement relating to reciprocal exemption from taxation of income from the operation of merchant vessels. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington March 31 and June 8, 1926. Entered into force June 8, 1926; operative retroactively from July 18, 1924.

The treaties and other international agreements listed above shall be considered as having been

continued in force or revived 3 months after the date of this note, i. e., July 22, 1953.

It is understood, of course, that either of the two Governments may propose revisions in any of the treaties or other agreements mentioned in the above list.

Further, it shall be understood that any of the provisions in the treaties and other agreements listed in this notification which may be found in particular circumstances to be not in conformity with the Treaty of Peace shall be considered to have been deleted so far as the application of the Treaty of Peace is involved, but shall be regarded as being in full force and effect with respect to matters not covered by the latter treaty.

In compliance with article 7 (a) of the Treaty of Peace, quoted above, the U.S. Government will register with the Secretariat of the United Nations the treaties and other agreements which are by this notification kept in force or revived.

Accept [etc.]

## **U.S. Properties on Chinese Mainland**

Press release 217 dated April 27

The Department has noted an apparent misunderstanding contained in a syndicated article written by Robert S. Allen, which was published in the *New York Post* on April 16. The effect of the misunderstanding is to do an injustice to the Chinese Nationalist Government.

Possibly on the basis of the recent hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, the erroneous inference was drawn that the Chinese Nationalist Government unjustifiably endeavored to collect \$2,600,000 from the U.S. Government for properties on the mainland of China sold to the U.S. Government, but allegedly not delivered as a result of the withdrawal of the Chinese Nationalist Government to Formosa in late 1949.

A condensed description of the transaction by Leland W. King, Jr., Director of Foreign Buildings Operations for the Department, made on March 25 before the subcommittee on the Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce is found on page 196 of the hearings. The fact is that the properties in question were actually bought by the Chinese Nationalist Government from private owners, paid for in Chinese currency, and delivered according to agreement to the U.S. Government in 1948 and early 1949. The properties were occupied and used by the U.S. Government for some time, both before and after the withdrawal of the Chinese Nationalist Government from the mainland. The U.S. Government arranged to pay for these properties by crediting their cost against the Chinese indebtedness to the United States under the surplus property disposal agreement. The Chinese Nationalist Government never demanded payment in cash for these properties.

The properties were not vacated by the U.S. Government until its Foreign Service establishments in Communist China were closed and all Foreign Service personnel withdrawn from mainland China early in 1950. The properties were then left in the care of the British Government, which represents American interests in Communist China. Most of the properties were seized by the Chinese Communists late in 1950.

The Chinese Nationalist Government at the request of the U.S. Government agreed in September 1952 to take back title to certain of these properties, thus releasing for use elsewhere the allotment earmarked by the Department of State for the purchase of these properties. Throughout these negotiations the cooperative action of the Chinese Nationalist Government has been evident.

## The Reed Mission to Pakistan

Press release 219 dated April 27

The Secretary of State and the Director for Mutual Security are sending Harry Reed of Purdue University to Pakistan for an on-the-spot survey of the wheat situation. Pakistan has requested U.S. assistance in meeting a deficit this year estimated by Pakistan at 1.5 million tons. A forecasted food crisis in this drought-stricken country is of deep concern to the United States. A firsthand report by Mr. Reed's 3-man survey team will greatly assist in reaching a decision on Pakistan's request for aid.

Mr. Reed is dean of the College of Agriculture and director of the Agriculture Extension Service of Purdue University. He has devoted his life to agriculture, working in the extension field, and serving as a professor and as director of experiment stations. His associates on the mission include Norman J. Volk, associate director of the Agriculture Experiment Station at Purdue University, and Peter H. Delaney of the Office of South Asian Affairs, Department of State. The date of departure for Pakistan is not definitely determined, but it is hoped that Mr. Reed will have a report ready in May.

Under an emergency U.S. loan of \$15 million provided in September 1952,<sup>1</sup> Pakistan has purchased and shipped some 160,000 tons of American wheat as a part of its heavy wheat imports arranged since the beginning of its current food year (May 1952-April 1953). These 1952-53 imports and the anticipated sharp deficit for the 1953-54 food year are due to severe curtailment of wheat yields in two successive years, resulting from drought and insufficient water for irrigation.

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Sept. 29, 1952, p. 490.

## Current Legislation on Foreign Policy

Protocol to Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Consular Rights With Finland. Message From the President of the United States Transmitting Protocol, Signed at Washington on December 4, 1952, modifying the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Consular Rights Between the United States and Finland, signed at Washington on February 13, 1934. S. Exec. C, 83d Cong., 1st sess. 4 pp.

Seventh General Assembly of the United Nations. Report of Senator Alexander Wiley as a delegate to the Seventh General Assembly of the United Nations, October 17 to December 21, 1952, together with certain speeches made in the United Nations. S. Doc. 25, 83d Cong., 1st sess. 68 pp.

Importation of Foreign Agricultural Workers. Report (To accompany H. R. 3480). H. Rept. 229, 83d Cong., 1st sess. 5 pp.

Rubber Act of 1948. Message from the President of the United States transmitting recommendations relative to the Rubber Act of 1948, as amended, relating to the Synthetic-Rubber Program. H. Doc. 123, 83d Cong., 1st sess. 2 pp.

Submerged Lands Act. Report from the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Senate of the United States, to accompany S. J. Res. 13. March 27, 1953. S. Rept. 133, 83d Cong., 1st sess. 81 pp.

Personnel Investigations of Employees and Applicants For Employment in the Executive Branch of the Government for Loyalty, Suitability, and Security. A Report With Conclusions and Recommendations Made as a Result of the Investigation Into the Personnel Needs and Practices of the Various Governmental Agencies. S. Doc. 29, 83d Cong., 1st sess. 20 pp.

Agreements With the Federal Republic of Germany. Message From the President of the United States transmitting an agreement on German external debts, an agreement regarding the settlement of the claims of the United States for postwar economic assistance (other than surplus property), an agreement relating to the indebtedness of Germany for awards made by the Mixed Claims Commission, an agreement concerning the Validation of German Dollar Bonds. S. Execs. D, E, F, and G, 83d Cong., 1st sess. 243 pp.

## Tax Treaty Negotiations With Australia

Press release 224 dated April 29

U.S. and Australian tax officials have completed draft agreements of conventions between the two countries. These conventions are concerned with the avoidance of double taxation with respect to taxes on income, gifts, and estates of deceased persons. In due course, they will be submitted to the respective Governments for consideration. The discussions, which were held at Washington from April 13 to April 25, were a continuation of those successfully initiated at Canberra in March of 1952.

Head of the U.S. delegation was Eldon P. King, head of Office of International Tax Relations, Bureau of Internal Revenue. P. S. McGovern, Commissioner of Taxation of Australia, headed the Australian delegation.

## The Working Party of the International Tin Study Group

by Clarence W. Nichols

The International Tin Study Group<sup>1</sup> has appointed a Working Party to consider proposals for intergovernmental action regarding tin. The Working Party will report to the chairman of the Steering Committee of the U.N. Conference on Tin as to whether conditions exist for the resumption of that conference at a suitable date.

The action appointing the Working Party was taken by the seventh meeting of the Study Group held at London from March 23-27, 1953. The Working Party, which is open to all members of the Study Group, is scheduled to meet at Brussels on June 15, 1953.

The U.N. Conference on Tin, which met at Geneva from October 25 to November 21, 1950, adjourned subject to the possibility of being reconvened on the initiative of its chairman. The chairman submitted to the seventh meeting of the Study Group a request for advice concerning the question of reconvening the Geneva conference. The Study Group concluded that it would not be advisable for the conference to be reconvened until additional preparatory work had been completed.

The Study Group considered, however, that further informal consultation among the governments which are principally interested in tin should be arranged as promptly as possible. This view was based particularly on the present statistical position of tin on a world basis and the prospect that strategic stockpiles will not continue to absorb a

<sup>1</sup> The International Tin Study Group was formed pursuant to a recommendation of the International Tin Conference, held at London in October 1946. The basic purpose of the group is to maintain a continuous intergovernmental review of the world supply and demand situation, both present and prospective, with respect to tin in all its forms.

Membership in the Group is open to all governments which have a substantial interest in the international trade of tin. The 13 countries which are members accounted for over 90 percent of world production and about 80 percent of world consumption of tin, exclusive of the U.S.S.R., in 1952. The member countries are Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, British Colonial and Dependent Territories, Canada, France, India, Indonesia, Italy, the Netherlands, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

tonnage equal to the difference between production and consumption of tin at the present time.

The Study Group calculated world-mine production of tin in 1952 at 165,000 long tons. World consumption in 1952 was estimated at 126,000 long tons. These figures are exclusive of tin production and consumption in China, Eastern Germany, and the U.S.S.R.

In estimating production for 1953 and 1954, the Study Group took account only of production from plant and equipment already in operation, under rehabilitation, or under commitment, and assumed the existence in the principal producing countries of political and social stability and other factors permitting continuity of current operations.

As a basis for its estimates concerning future consumption, the Study Group assumed that current levels of industrial production will be maintained in all tin-consuming countries, that foreign exchange will be available for the purchase of full requirements of tin, and that the use of tin will not be restricted by official limitations. On the basis of those assumptions, the Study Group estimated that the excess of production over consumption in 1953 and in 1954 would be approximately as great as it was in 1952.

Tin had ceased to present a problem of acute shortage in the United States during 1952. Supplies and requirements came into approximate balance. Private importation of tin was resumed by the United States in the summer of 1952. Early in 1953 the United States discontinued the domestic allocation of tin and removed all of its remaining limitations upon use or inventories of tin.

The U.S. Government had indicated in a series of statements made during 1952 and 1953 by the Defense Production Administration, the National Production Authority, the Munitions Board, and U.S. representatives in the International Tin Study Group that the strategic stockpiling program of the United States will soon have acquired the full amount of tin called for by the present goal of the stockpile.

Unless unforeseen changes occur in the produc-



tion or consumption of tin, it appears that a substantial readjustment might result from the completion of stockpile procurement. Such an adjustment could involve an extended period of instability in the price of tin, with adverse effects upon the economic and political interests of consuming countries as well as producing countries.

Production of tin is the principal source of employment, foreign exchange, and governmental revenue in Bolivia. The tin industry is also important in other producing areas, especially in Malaya, Indonesia, Thailand, Belgian Congo, and Nigeria. Adjustments of production in the tin industry are characteristically slow; one difficulty is that alternative employment is limited in the tin-producing areas.

If commercial stocks of tin were to accumulate to a burdensome extent, the capacity for production might eventually contract to a level even below the rate of continuing commercial demand. A period of unduly depressed prices might then be followed by a period of shortage and excessively high prices. This would be a repetition of an extreme cycle to which tin has been subject in the past.

The possibility that notably unstable conditions might develop in the world tin situation was the principal concern of the International Tin Study Group in March 1950, when the Group requested that the United Nations sponsor an intergovernmental conference on tin. This conference, which opened at Geneva 6 months later, had available as a basis for its discussions the draft of an intergovernmental agreement prepared by the Study Group. This draft agreement contemplated an intergovernmental program through which the tin-producing countries and the tin-consuming countries could act together to reduce the degree of instability which confronts the procurement and marketing of the metal internationally. The draft program included provisions concerning the regulation of supplies and prices through the operation of an international buffer stock and the application of export quotas by the producing countries.

The situation and outlook for tin at the time of the Geneva conference were dominated by the sharp increases in demand which were then affecting practically all raw materials during the months immediately following the invasion of Korea. The type of imbalance which the Study Group had principally in view as of March 1950 did not appear to be imminent at the time of the Geneva conference. The draft agreement which had been submitted by the Study Group and the various international measures proposed during the conference differed so widely in their methods of operation that the conference concluded that a further and separate examination by governments of these various alternatives was needed.

The discussion during the Geneva conference focused attention on several key problems upon

which agreement would be needed in specific terms to provide a basis for intergovernmental action. These key questions included: The circumstances under which a limitation of exports might become effective; the precise means by which such a limitation could be applied; and the manner in which an international buffer stock would be organized and administered. An international commodity agreement for tin would of course also have to specify its objectives in terms of a price range considered reasonable. In addition, such an agreement might provide for international allocation in time of general shortage.

The resolution of adjournment of the U.N. conference instructed the chairman of the conference, with the assistance of the executive secretary:

(a) to keep under review the further discussions and conclusions of the International Tin Study Group,

(b) to consult, on the basis thereof, with the members of the Steering Committee, with a view to deciding upon a suitable date for a resumption of the conference,

(c) to consult the Secretary-General of the United Nations upon the further provision of the services and facilities of the conference; and, being satisfied that the conditions for a resumption exist, to request the Secretary-General to invite those governments which were invited to the present meetings to come together again.

The Steering Committee of the U.N. Conference on Tin included the chairman of that conference, Georges Peter of France, and representatives of four tin-producing countries (Belgian Congo, Bolivia, British Colonial and Dependent Territories, and Indonesia) and four tin-consuming countries (Canada, India, United Kingdom, and United States), all of which are also represented in the International Tin Study Group.

• *Mr. Nichols, author of the above article, is a special assistant in the Office of International Materials Policy and is U.S. representative in the Management Committee of the International Tin Study Group. He has been the U.S. delegate to meetings of the International Tin Study Group since 1949 and was chairman of the U.S. delegation to the 1950 U.N. Conference on Tin at Geneva.*

## Communiqués Regarding Korea to the Security Council

The Headquarters of the U. N. Command has transmitted communiqués regarding Korea to the Security-General of the United Nations under the following U. N. document numbers: S/2945, Mar. 4; S/2945, Mar. 6; S/2946, Mar. 6; S/2950, Mar. 9; S/2951/Corr. 1, Mar. 10; S/2952, Mar. 11; S/2953, Mar. 12; S/2955, Mar. 12; S/2958, Mar. 16; S/2959, Mar. 16; S/2960, Mar. 18; S/2961, Mar. 19; S/2962, Mar. 23; S/2964, Mar. 23; S/2966, Mar. 26; S/2969, Mar. 31; S/2973, Mar. 31; S/2976, Apr. 1; S/2977, Apr. 2; S/2984, Apr. 8.

## Documents on Korean Armistice Negotiations

### Summary of May 2 Plenary Meeting

1. Delegations reconvened 1100 hours this date. Substance of record follows:

2. *Communists*: "I have a statement to make. In your statement of yesterday you mentioned the procedure of the current negotiations. According to the nature of the questions, our side considers that the procedure of the negotiations should be to decide upon first the principle of sending to a neutral nation those prisoners of war not directly repatriated and then the nomination of the specific neutral nations.

"Your side has already been informed that with the prerequisite of sending to the neutral nation those prisoners of war not directly repatriated, our side is prepared to nominate an Asian neutral nation.

"Your side indicated yesterday that aside from Switzerland you would also consider Sweden. With regard to this I would like to point out again that our side fully agrees that the neutral nations constituting the neutral nations' supervisory commission agreed upon by both sides are all neutral nations. But the essence of the question is that under the principle of sending to a neutral nation those prisoners of war not directly repatriated, it is obviously impractical to send them to Europe which is far, far away. The reasons should be very clear.

"Among those neutral nations agreed upon by both sides for constituting the neutral nations' supervisory commission there are Poland and Czechoslovakia in addition to Switzerland and Sweden. Would your side agree to sending to Switzerland, Sweden, Poland, and Czechoslovakia those prisoners of war not directly repatriated?

"With the prerequisite of sending to a neutral nation those prisoners of war not directly repatriated, our side holds that both sides should consult with each other and decide upon an Asian neutral nation.

"Your side said that an Asian neutral nation was not suitable. Our side does not agree to such an assertion. There are many neutral nations in Asia, such as India, Burma, Indonesia, and Pakistan. Can you possibly say that these neutral nations are not suitable?

"Your side has requested our side to nominate a specific neutral nation. Our side is not unwilling to do so, but our side considers it inappropriate to proceed with the specific nomination before the principle of sending to a neutral nation those prisoners of war not directly repatriated is decided upon.

"If our side nominates a neutral nation where those prisoners of war not directly repatriated will be sent for accommodation while your side refused to decide upon the principle of sending them to a neutral nation, would this not put the neutral nation which has been nominated in an embarrassing position?

"Therefore, our side holds that both sides should first decide upon the principle of sending to the neutral nations those prisoners of war not directly repatriated. As to your objection to sending those prisoners of war not directly repatriated to a neutral nation, your side has failed to give any tenable reason.

"In the interest of the progress of the negotiations we hold that the principle of sending to a neutral nation those prisoners of war not directly repatriated should immediately be decided upon.

"I would like to hear any constructive views of your side."

3. *UNC*: "Your statement this morning indicates a return to your negotiating methods of our earlier sessions which terminated in futility last October. For example, you have just asserted that we said that we rejected an Asian state as the neutral. That, of course, is not a true statement. Since we said no such thing and did so in 3 languages, English, Korean, and Chinese, we cannot see how you could make, other than deliberately, the untrue statement we have just heard from you.

"You should know that such misstatements cannot in any way help in the reconciliation of our different positions in these negotiations.

"I note also a second point in your statement which appears to be illogical. If I understood you accurately, it was to the effect that it might be embarrassing to the neutral selected if we do not agree as a prerequisite to transportation of the prisoners to the territory of that country. We cannot understand why this should be unless you have already a prearranged understanding to that effect with the country you propose to nominate."

4. *Communists*: "Please repeat that again."

(Last paragraph above repeated.)

5. *UNC*: "In that case we can well understand that you, rather than the neutral, would be embarrassed if we do not agree to send the prisoners to that country. Further, we cannot see why a true neutral could not perform its functions in Korea as well as elsewhere.

"In this connection, you have stated that the essence of the problem is that it is 'impractical to send the prisoners to Europe which is far, far away.' With this sentiment I can well agree. It is in fact impractical to transport the prisoners overseas. The only practical solution is for the neutral nation to take custody in Korea.

"Resuming these talks on the basis of your suggestion that the prisoners who are the subject of this discussion be turned over to a neutral power for disposition, our side sought agreement initially on Switzerland as the custodial neutral and later on Sweden. Both are prominent neutrals.

"In its external relations Switzerland has maintained an absolute neutrality for 150 years. It has no alliances with other powers; has not even joined the United Nations. Internally, it is unified and tranquil. Thus, its government is not subject to pressure from without or from within. Its government is long established and has developed a high level of competence in its administrative officials. Its economic, political, and social welfare situation has been such that it could participate in benevolent activities in all parts of the world without unfavorable results to its own people through the diversion of effort and resources from its domestic problems.

"For these reasons, Switzerland has frequently been requested to serve in the role of an impartial third party in disputes between nations. It has responded to such

requests on numerous occasions, and it has always given in exact performance of the duties so undertaken. As a byproduct, it has built up a fund of experience in such matters. Perhaps the major portion of such disputes have involved the treatment of war prisoners. As a result, Switzerland has personnel who are better qualified to deal with this problem than could be found elsewhere.

"In respect to the current problem, Switzerland is geographically far removed from the area of conflict, which further insures the objectivity of its approach to problems that may have been engendered by that war.

"In brief, no one could possibly name a country better qualified to serve in the role of custodial neutral in the current situation than Switzerland. If another country could be named, it would be Sweden, whose qualifications for handling this problem differ only slightly from those of Switzerland in that it is a member of the United Nations. In all other aspects, both internal and external, Sweden and Switzerland are equally qualified to serve in the role of custodial neutral. Both are preeminently qualified. Either is acceptable to our side.

"Neither would it be necessary to transport the pris-

oners to either of these countries. With you, we consider it undesirable and the reason applies to all overseas movement of the prisoners. In any such case the prisoners would require movement to a port, loading on ships, overseas movement, unloading at the port of the neutral state, transportation to the actual site of custody. In essence the only difference between the movement you say is impracticable and the one you demand is a short period of actual travel on the sea. Yet you would make these few days a vital matter. The only reasonable solution is to keep the prisoners in Korea during the period of custody.

"To facilitate progress in these negotiations, you will recognize the validity of these arguments and join us in a request to one of these two nations to serve as the custodian of those prisoners who, while in the custody of the detaining power, fail to avail themselves of their right to be repatriated.

"We are prepared to hear the name of your candidate for the neutral state. If you are not yet ready to give us that name we see no value in further discussion today."

6. *Communists*: "Today also your side has not shown any effort for expediting the progress of the negotiations.

### **Text of Communists' Proposal for Settling Prisoner Question**

*Following is the text of the proposal presented by the chief Communist delegate, General Nam Il, at Panmunjom on May 7:*

(1) Within 2 months after the armistice agreement becomes effective, both sides shall, without offering any hindrance, repatriate and hand over in groups all those prisoners of war who insist upon repatriation to the side to which the prisoners of war belong, in accordance with the related provisions of paragraph 51, Article 3 of the armistice agreement and in conformity with the final names lists exchanged and checked by both sides.

(2) In order to facilitate the return to their homelands of the remaining prisoners of war who are not directly repatriated, both sides agree that a neutral nations repatriation commission shall be established, to be composed of an equal number of representatives appointed respectively by 5 nations, namely, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Switzerland and Sweden, the 4 nations provided for in paragraph 37, Article 2 of the armistice agreement, and India as agreed upon by both sides.

(3) All prisoners of war of both sides, with the exception of those prisoners of war who shall be directly repatriated as provided for in paragraph 1 of this proposal, shall be released from the military control and custody of the detaining side at the original places of detention and be handed over to the neutral nations repatriation commission, provided for in paragraph 2 of this proposal, which shall receive them and take them into custody. The neutral nations repatriation commission shall have the authority to exercise its legitimate functions and responsibilities for the control of the prisoners of war under its temporary jurisdiction. In order to ensure the effective execution of this authority, the member nations of the neutral nations repatriation commission shall each provide an equal number of armed forces.

(4) The neutral nations repatriation commission, after having received and taken into custody those prisoners of war who are not directly repatriated, shall immediately make

arrangements so that within the time limit of 4 months after the neutral nations repatriation commission takes over the custody, the nations to which the prisoners of war belong shall have freedom and facilities to send personnel to the original places of detention of these prisoners of war to explain to all the prisoners of war depending upon these nations so as to eliminate their apprehensions and to inform them of all matters relating to their return to their homelands, particularly of their full right to return home to lead a peaceful life.

(5) Within 4 months after the neutral nations repatriation commission receives and takes into custody the prisoners of war, and after the explanations made by the nations to which they belong, the speedy return to their fatherlands of all those prisoners of war who request repatriation shall be facilitated by the neutral nations repatriation commission, and the detaining side shall not offer any obstruction. The administrative details for the repatriation of such prisoners of war shall be settled through consultation between the neutral nations repatriation commission and the sides.

(6) If, at the expiration of the time limit of 4 months as provided in paragraph 4 and 5 of this proposal, there are still prisoners of war in the custody of the neutral nations repatriation commission, their disposition shall be submitted for settlement through consultation to the political conference as provided in paragraph 60, Article 4 of the armistice agreement.

(7) All the expenditures of the prisoner of war during the period in the custody of the neutral nations repatriation commission, including their traveling expenses in returning to their fatherlands, shall be borne by the nations to which they belong.

(8) The terms of this proposal and the arrangements arising therefrom shall be made known to all prisoners of war.

I hope your side will make such efforts. Our side has clearly shown its stand. I propose to recess until 1100 hours, May 4."

7. UNC: "If agreeable to you, Admiral Daniel requests your liaison group to remain for scheduled meeting. We agree to recess until 1100 hours, 4 May."

8. *Communists*: "In order to hold the liaison group's meeting, Major General Lee Sang Jo will remain."

9. Meeting adjourned at 1205 hours.

### Summary of May 4 Plenary Meeting

1. Delegations reconvened at 1100 hours this date. Substance of record follows.

2. UNC: "I have a statement to make.

"We are obliged to tell you once again that we will not engage in protracted and fruitless discussion during the current negotiations.

"Since our return here 8 days ago we have heard you submerge, under a variety of obstructive provisions, the essentially simple and constructive principle under which we agreed to resume these talks—that those prisoners who refused to be repatriated be turned over to a neutral power for disposition.

"It is obvious that the first matter to be explored, in connection with a principle such as this, is the matter of the custodial neutral. Consequently, our side, in a forthright manner, proposed that Switzerland be requested to serve in this capacity. We cited its qualifications which cannot be equalled. When your side refused to agree to Switzerland, we proposed Sweden, and we cited its outstanding qualifications for the custodial role. By contrast, your side has refused even to name a neutral. You have indicated only a geographical area from which a neutral might be selected. What can be your motive for conducting these negotiations in this obscure manner?

"You have said that the neutral must be an Asian nation. Since the essential qualifications of the country to take custody of the prisoners are its neutrality and competence, we fail to see that its geographical location is relevant. Nevertheless you insist on that requirement, you appear to have even further limited the field for selection. In our meeting of Saturday, 2 May, you asked us a question. It was, 'There are many neutral nations in Asia, such as India, Burma, Indonesia, and Pakistan. Can you possibly say that these neutral nations are not suitable?'

"Unless your question was intended to serve nothing more than purposes of propaganda, we must assume that you consider each of the 4 countries which you named to be both neutral and competent and, therefore, suitable. It is possible, of course, that you may have a particular one of them in mind for your candidate, but since you have been either unprepared or unwilling to name it, we have had to take the initiative in this matter in the furtherance of an armistice. In our sincere effort to achieve an agreement which will insure a just disposition of the prisoners, we are prepared to meet you half way in the matter of the neutral nation. Although we have previously nominated Switzerland and Sweden, we are now prepared to nominate one of the four countries which you have named. Based on your statements, we expect that our nomination will be quite acceptable to you and will result in quick agreement on this issue. If so, then this will have been the first indication since these talks began that there may be some justification in our agreement to meet with you again. We hope that this indication may not be nullified by subsequent negotiations.

"We now nominate Pakistan, an Asian nation both neutral and competent, and one of the four whose suitability you obviously implied in your question to us. Now we expect you to demonstrate your sincerity by agreeing to have this power serve as custodial neutral."

3. *Communists*: "I have a statement to make.

"Our side holds that those prisoners of war not directly repatriated should be sent to a neutral nation so that

they can be completely freed from the influence of the detaining side. With this as a prerequisite, our side has already indicated that our side is prepared to nominate an Asian neutral nation.

"It must be pointed out that there is a vast difference between the situation of sending these prisoners of war to a neutral nation and that of keeping them in Korea. Our concrete proposal for sending to a neutral nation those prisoners of war not directly repatriated is reasonable, practical, and concrete.

"Our proposal provides that the detaining side should be responsible for sending those prisoners of war not directly repatriated to a neutral nation concerned agreed upon by both sides and release them from its military control. The authorities of the neutral nations shall then receive them and take them into custody in an area designated by such authorities. Our proposal also provides that the authorities of the neutral nation concerned should have the authority to exercise their legitimate functions and responsibilities for control of the prisoners of war under their temporary jurisdiction.

"When the prisoners of war not directly repatriated are sent to a neutral nation agreed upon by both sides and released from the military control of the detaining side to the custody of that neutral nation, then the question of forcible retention by the detaining side when its military control [is removed] will not arise. Therefore, our proposal is reasonable.

"On the other hand, the authorities of the neutral nation shall have the authority to exercise their legitimate functions and responsibilities for the control of the prisoners of war under their temporary jurisdiction. For instance, they shall place necessary armed forces to keep guard on such prisoners of war. A practical question which must be settled is thus settled. Therefore, our proposal is practical. Your side has never given any tenable reason for opposing the reasonable and practical proposal of our side.

"Your side objects to sending to a neutral nation those prisoners of war not directly repatriated and proposes to keep such prisoners of war in their original places within the detaining side, using the existing installations which would be demilitarized. But if such prisoners of war were not sent to a neutral nation, how could the military control of the detaining side concretely be thoroughly removed so as to free the prisoners of war completely from the influence of the detaining side? And how could it be possible at the same time to enable the neutral nation to effectively take charge of such prisoners of war and maintain order at the locations where they are to be accommodated?

"Our proposal provides that after the arrival in a neutral nation of those prisoners of war not directly repatriated, the nations to which they belong shall send personnel to make explanations to all the prisoners of war depending upon them, and that the authorities of the neutral nation concerned shall be responsible for facilitating the speedy return to their fatherland of all those prisoners of war who request to be repatriated home.

"The provisions of our proposal are so reasonable and explicit that your side has failed to give any reasons for objecting to it. The contradiction between the 2 statements made by your side on this question at the plenary session of 26 April only confirms us in this impression of ours.

"It is the concrete proposal for effecting a settlement of the entire question of the prisoners of war that our 2 sides are discussing now."

4. UNC: "You have again failed to name your candidate for the neutral nation. After all the effort our side has made to reach an equitable compromise on this issue, even nominating one of the Asian states indicated by you as suitable, the continued evasion by your side can only be considered as inspired by motives other than those of reaching an equitable agreement.

"Time in these discussions is fast running out. Are you prepared to accept Pakistan as the neutral nation? If not, we have no other issue to discuss with you."

5. *Communists*: "Our side holds that those prisoners of war not directly repatriated should be sent to a neutral nation agreed upon by both sides. Our side has indicated clearly many times that with this prerequisite our side is prepared to nominate an Asian neutral nation. Our side still considers that both sides should first decide upon the principle of sending those prisoners of war not directly repatriated to a neutral nation, then proceed with the nomination of a specific neutral nation.

"On this question, our side has repeatedly made clear the position of our side. I consider it unnecessary to reiterate it.

"I hope that your side will carefully study my statement. I propose that we recess until 11 o'clock tomorrow morning."

6. *Unc*: "We agree."

7. Meeting recessed at 1140 hours.

## Summary of May 5 Plenary Meeting

1. Delegations reconvened at 1100 hours this date. Substance of meeting follows.

2. *Communists*: "I have a statement to make.

"Our side has noted that your side has nominated Pakistan to serve as the neutral nation. Our side has consistently held that with the prerequisite of sending to a neutral nation those prisoners of war not directly repatriated, both sides decide upon an Asian neutral nation.

"Your side agreed yesterday that an Asian nation be named to serve as the neutral nation and specifically nominated Pakistan. This action is worth welcoming.

"I would like to know whether your side has agreed to transport to that neutral nation the remaining prisoners of war not directly repatriated so as to implement the six-point proposal put forward by our side. We hope that your side will clarify this question."

3. *Unc*: "We consider that the designation of the custodian is a primary element of the principle of custodianship by a neutral power. Our side has tried diligently to reach agreement on this matter and we have at various times nominated three neutral states, one of which you previously indicated would be acceptable to you. Are you willing to solve this problem or not?"

"If I have understood your question correctly, you have just asked if we agree that the prisoners of war not directly repatriated shall be physically transported to the territory of the neutral country where that country will exercise its custodial functions. If this is your question, the answer is 'no.'

"As to the place of custody, there can be no real problem. The neutral state must take custody, within demilitarized areas of Korea, of those prisoners who have not been directly repatriated. To transport these many thousands of prisoners overseas is entirely unnecessary to the purpose of the custody. It would be time consuming and would needlessly delay the final solution of the problem. Moreover, the prisoners could not be moved prior to the resolution of their status without force, and many would destroy themselves rather than submit to removal from Korea. In the face of these facts and your own recognition that transportation of the prisoners to a distant land is impractical, your side might well spare itself the effort of continuing to advocate that unacceptable course of action."

4. *Communists*: "The important question which confronts the delegations of both sides at present is whether those prisoners of war not directly repatriated shall be sent to a neutral nation or be kept in Korea to be taken into custody there by a neutral nation. These are 2 fundamentally different situations, and they require entirely different concrete arrangements.

"Our side has consistently held that those prisoners of war not directly repatriated shall be sent to a neutral nation and has objected to keeping them in Korea. We consider it the most reasonable and practical measure to send them to a neutral nation. Your side has held

that they should be taken into custody in Korea by a neutral nation and has specifically nominated Pakistan to take them into custody in Korea. We should like to know what steps your side would take to remove the military control of the detaining side so as to free the prisoners of war from its influence? How would your side at the same time enable the neutral nation which your side has nominated to effectively take charge of the prisoners of war whose number according to your side runs into tens of thousands? How would your side maintain order and tranquility in the prisoner of war camps? I hope that your side will clarify these questions?"

5. *Unc*: "We have noted your questions.

"We consider that such matters can be readily and effectively solved in such manner that custody can be exercised efficiently and with due fairness to the individual prisoners concerned and to our 2 sides.

"We have asked for your nomination of a neutral. It is obvious that since the details about which you have asked can be solved without serious difficulty, it should be no real problem to you to nominate a neutral to perform the custodial functions. We therefore ask you again the name of your nominee.

"In order to reach accord quickly, we ask your side to agree to one of our nominees if you are not prepared to make a nomination."

6. *Communists*: "Our side considers that to send prisoners of war to a neutral nation and to keep them in Korea to be taken into custody there by a neutral nation are 2 fundamentally different situations which require entirely different concrete arrangements. Since your side has nominated Pakistan to take the prisoners of war into its temporary custody in Korea, your side must already have your idea of how Pakistan shall perform its functions.

"I cannot understand what necessity there is for your side not to answer the simple question of our side. What concrete steps would your side take to remove the military control of the detaining side so as to free the prisoners of war from the influence of the detaining side? How does your side propose to enable the neutral nation which your side has nominated to effectively take charge of such prisoners of war?"

"Specifically, does your side intend to invite the neutral nation to send its armed forces to Korea for taking the prisoners of war into its custody? I hope that your side will clarify these questions."

7. *Unc*: "Regardless of subsequent negotiations as to the details of the arrangements for exercise of custody, that custody must be exercised by a neutral nation. Unless we reach agreement on all elements of the matter of custody and final disposition of the prisoners, there will not be an armistice. Therefore, there is no need to discuss these details prior to agreement on the neutral state. On the other hand, the qualifications of the state selected is a primary consideration which affects all of the other details. Your evasion of the matter of agreeing on the neutral merely causes suspicion as to your motives in view of our efforts to meet you half-way. This evasion has the effect of making us recognize more than ever the importance of designating the custodial state before discussing other details of arrangement.

"Unless you are prepared to accept one of our nominees or nominate a different one, we have nothing further to say."

8. *Communists*: "Since your side has nominated Pakistan to serve as a neutral nation, we consider that your side has the obligation to make it clear just how to request Pakistan to accomplish its functions. Our side considers that while nominating Pakistan to serve as a neutral nation your side cannot refuse to make it clear where and what functions you want this country to perform.

"Just as in the past meetings, when either side puts forward a proposal, it has the obligation to clarify it. We consider that it is an important question of principle to release the prisoners of war not directly repatriated from the control of the detaining side so that they can be freed from the influence of the detaining side and

also at the same time to enable the neutral nation to effectively take charge of the prisoners of war and maintain order in the prisoner of war camps.

"We would still like to know the concrete views of your side on the questions I have put forward."

9. Unc: "I have nothing further to say."

10. *Communists*: "I hope you will give an answer to my questions tomorrow morning. I suggest that we recess until 11 o'clock tomorrow morning."

11. Unc: "We agree."

12. Meeting recessed at 1159 hours.

### Summary of May 7 Plenary Meeting

1. Delegations reconvened at 1100 hours this date. Substance of record follows.

2. *Communists*: "I have an important statement to make.

"In the concrete proposal for implementation which our side put forward on April 26, the disposition of the remaining prisoners of war who are not directly repatriated is based upon the prerequisite of sending them to a neutral nation. But discussion in the armistice negotiations of the past 10 days has proved that your side has been trying to obscure this prerequisite of our side by the settlement first of the question of the nomination of the neutral nation, thereby attempting to realize the other prerequisite which your side has put forward, namely, the prerequisite of keeping in Korea the remaining prisoners of war who are not directly repatriated with the neutral nation coming to Korea to take them into custody.

We consider that the 2 prerequisites mentioned above are entirely different. Under different prerequisites, there should be different proposals for disposition. The proposal of our side provides that the Korean and Chinese prisoners of war who are not directly repatriated be sent to a neutral nation, released from the original control of your side, and received and taken into custody by that neutral nation; that thereafter, through the explanations made to them by the personnel sent to that neutral nation by our side, they be freed from their apprehensions so that it will be possible for them to express their will; and that thereafter, the authorities of the neutral nation concerned ensure that all those prisoners of war who request repatriation be repatriated to their fatherlands.

"However, the proposal of your side provides that the remaining prisoners of war who are not directly repatriated still be kept in the area controlled by the detaining side. This would obviously make it impossible for such prisoners of war to be completely freed from the control of the detaining side. Moreover, the neutral nation would meet great difficulties in the area controlled by the detaining side in receiving and taking into custody the prisoners of war, who according to the assertion of your side are in great numbers. At the same time, such a situation would not afford due freedom and facilities to the side concerned for its explanation work. Between these 2 proposals, the proposal of our side best embodies the principles of the Geneva Convention of 1949 and international practice, and can thus settle the question of the repatriation of prisoners of war justly and reasonably.

"But in the discussions of the past 10 days, your side has obstinately insisted upon the prerequisite of your side that the remaining prisoners of war not directly repatriated should still be kept in Korea, and that a neutral nation should come to Korea to receive them and take them into custody. Such an obstinate action of your side will again hinder the realization of an armistice in Korea because of a question of steps and procedure. As a result, the ardent desire for an armistice in Korea of the people of both sides whose sons are fighting in Korea and of the peace-loving people of the whole world, will again receive a blow. In view of this fact, I now declare that we will continue to reserve the proposal put forward by our side on April 26.<sup>1</sup> But on condition that your side accepts the

following new proposal which our side puts forward now, we are prepared to try to adopt the prerequisite of your side that the remaining prisoners of war not directly repatriated be kept in their original places of detention and be handed over to a neutral nation which shall arrange for their repatriation. I must point out that the proposal put forward on April 26 by our side is more reasonable as compared to the new one which is based upon the prerequisite of your side.

"The contents of our new proposal are as follows:

[For text, see p. 727.]

3. Unc: "We have noted your proposal. We suggest a recess until 11 o'clock 9 May."

4. *Communists*: "We agree."

5. Meeting recessed at 1126 hours.

## U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

### Fiscal Commission (ECOSOC)

The Fiscal Commission of the U.N. Economic and Social Council (Ecosoc) is scheduled to hold its fourth session at New York, beginning on April 27, 1953.

The Department of State announced on April 24 (press release 212) that Edward F. Bartelt, Fiscal Assistant Secretary, Department of the Treasury, who is the U.S. representative on the Fiscal Commission, will be assisted by Dan Throop Smith, Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury, who will serve as principal adviser, and the following other advisers: Eldon King, Head, Office of International Tax Relations, Bureau of Internal Revenue, Department of the Treasury; Frederick Livesey, Adviser, Office of Financial Development Policy, Department of State; Raphael Sherfy, Legal Advisory Staff, Department of the Treasury.

Because the economic development of many areas of the world is dependent upon the flow of private investment capital from highly developed to underdeveloped countries, the Commission will devote considerable attention to problems relating to the taxation of foreign investment, of corporate profits and dividends, and of foreign nationals, assets, and transactions. . . .

Among other items on the agenda for the fourth session are (1) world tax service; (2) taxation of agriculture; (3) government finance and economic development; (4) government financial reporting; (5) public finance information service; and (6) problems of municipal finance.

## President Suggests Study of Immigration and Nationality Act

*Following is the text of a letter dated April 6 from the President to Senator Arthur V. Watkins, chairman of the Joint Committee on Immigration and Nationality Policy:*

DEAR SENATOR WATKINS:

Thank you for your letter of March 20 informing me of the plan of your subcommittee to hold hearings on several immigration bills now pending before it. I am particularly grateful to have your assurance that you are prepared to cooperate in the formulation and implementation of an immigration program, insofar as you can consistently do so.

It is only proper to point out to you that I have received a great many complaints that the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 does

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of May 11, 1953, p. 687.

embody many serious and inequitable restrictions.

While I recognize that the act contains some provisions which represent a liberalizing influence in the field of immigration law and that a fundamental revision of a statute cannot be approached without searching analysis, I suggest that a study of the operation of many of the administrative provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 should be immediately undertaken, with an invitation to all concerned to testify regarding the provisions of which they complain.

In the State of the Union Message I pointed out that "existing legislation contains injustices."<sup>1</sup> Among the administrative provisions of the law which it is claimed may operate with unwarranted harshness are the following:

## 1

The provisions which make inadmissible any alien who, in the opinion of the consul, is likely to become a public charge at any time in the future. This places upon the consul the burden of forecasting events which cannot be predicted and, it is claimed, would permit abuse of discretionary judgment.

## 2

The provisions which make ineligible for a visa any alien with respect to whom the consular officer knows or has reasonable grounds to believe probably would, after entry, engage in espionage, sabotage or "subversive" activities. It is asserted that this provision vests in the consul the authority, without restraint, to determine by his own mental processes the probability of future proscribed conduct, thus permitting a possible abuse of discretionary judgment.

## 3

The provision which permits an immigration official to interrogate without warrant "any alien or person believed to be an alien as to his right to be or to remain in the United States." It is said that unless the word "believed" is clarified so as specifically to require "probable cause," an abuse of this authority could possibly subject any citizen to improper interrogation.

## 4

The provisions under which, it is asserted, naturalized citizens have only "second class" citizenship because they, as distinguished from native-born citizens, can be expatriated because of residence abroad for certain periods of time, without reference to any other conduct on their part.

## 5

New restriction upon granting leave to seamen while ships are in United States ports.

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Feb. 9, 1953, p. 211.

The provision which exempts from the criminal grounds of exclusion those aliens who have been convicted abroad of purely political offenses fails to define the term "political." It is asserted that it is therefore difficult for administrative officers to determine whether the "criminal" offenses for which individuals have been convicted are indeed of a criminal, as distinguished from a political, nature.

## 7

The provisions permitting aliens who were and are believers in nazism and fascism to enter the United States unless it can be affirmatively shown that they advocated the establishment of those ideologies in the United States.

## 8

Deportation provisions that permit an alien to be deported at any time after entry, irrespective of how long ago he was involved, after entry, is an activity or affiliation designated as "subversive." Such alien is now subject to deportation even if his prior affiliation was terminated many years ago and he has since conducted himself as a model American.

## 9

The provision which authorizes the Attorney General to suspend deportation of certain deportable aliens if "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" is demonstrated. It is asserted, however, that these restrictive terms are not explained in the law, thus leaving the interpretation of the phrase open to administrative determination, subject to Congressional approval or "veto." It is argued that the law should more clearly state the standards upon which this discretionary relief may be granted by the Attorney General.

## 10

The provisions which permit the continuation of up to a 50 percent mortgage extending far into the future on the quotas of many countries. Under these provisions it is charged that Estonia has its quotas partially mortgaged until the year 2146; 2014 for Greece; Poland, the year 2000, and Turkey, 1964.

It would seem desirable for the Committee on the Judiciary to investigate these complaints and the other critical comments which have developed as a result of the operation of the Immigration and Naturalization Law of 1952 with a view to achieving legislation which would be fair and just to all. I shall appreciate it if you will present these comments to the members of the committee and to the chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER.

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254	5/9	Dulles: Laos, Thailand, Korean truce
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\*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.



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The Department of State

# bulletin

Vol. XXVIII, No. 726

May 25, 1953



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## Mutual Security Program for 1954 Presented to Congress

### MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT TO THE CONGRESS<sup>1</sup>

I recommend to the Congress the passage of legislation extending the Mutual Security Program in order to enable the United States to carry out its responsibilities of leadership in building up the security of the free world and the prospects for peace both for ourselves and our allies.

The basic purpose of this program is simply the long-term security of the United States living in the shadow of the Soviet threat.

The program being submitted to you includes approximately \$5,250 million for military weapons and support directly to the defense efforts of our friends and allies. It also includes approximately \$550 million for technical, economic, and developmental purposes designed to promote more effective use of the resources of the free nations and thus to further the freedom and security of all of us. This total represents a reduction of about \$1.8 billion from the previous administration's 1954 budget.

The devotion of so large a portion of this request to military purposes is a measure of the peril in which free nations continue to live. The blunt, sober truth is that we cannot afford to relax our defenses until we have seen clear, unmistakable evidence of genuinely peaceful purpose on the part of the Soviet Union. As I strived to make clear to all peoples in my recent appeal for real peace and trust among nations,<sup>2</sup> we continue earnestly to hope for such evidence, so that the world may turn its energies and resources to serving the needs, rather than the fears, of mankind.

Until Soviet good faith is proven by deeds, the free nations must rely on their own strength for the preservation of peace. To fail to continue vigorously to strengthen our military forces would be to risk wasting all our efforts for the past five years in defense of our liberties.

Since the initiation of our major bipartisan foreign aid program in 1947, the accomplishments

of the free world have been very great. In Greece, the onrush of communist imperialism has been halted and forced to recede. Out of the ruins left by that aggression, a proud, self-reliant nation has re-established itself. Threatened economic and political collapse in Western Europe was averted through the intensive efforts of the great peoples of that continent aided by American resources. Revitalized economies in Europe today are producing more than ever before and are in a far better position to defend themselves from external or internal aggression. In the Near East and Far East, American aid is helping many new nations on their way to a better life for their citizens. And the free nations everywhere—realistically facing the threat of Soviet aggression—have in addition sought to create, with American assistance, the military strength essential to guard their security.

The Mutual Security Program for 1954 has been developed by the new administration after the most careful study and deliberation. All elements of the program have been reviewed in great detail, all proposals subjected to thorough scrutiny.

From this study I have come to certain clear conclusions.

*First:* The United States and our partners throughout the world must stand ready, for many years if necessary, to build and maintain adequate defenses.

*Second:* To accomplish this objective we must avoid so rapid a military buildup that we seriously dislocate our economies. Military strength is most effective—indeed it can be maintained—only if it rests on a solid economic base.

*Third:* We must help the free nations to help themselves in eradicating conditions which corrode and destroy the will for freedom and democracy from within.

*Fourth:* It is necessary to do more in the Far East. We are proposing to make substantial additional resources available to assist the French

<sup>1</sup> H. doc. 140; transmitted May 5.

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Apr. 27, 1953, p. 599.

and the Associated States in their military efforts to defeat the Communist Viet Minh aggression.

*Fifth:* Since it is impossible to forecast precisely the year and moment when the point of maximum military danger may occur, the only prudent course calls for a steady military buildup, with our partners throughout the world, sustained and planned so as to use our joint capabilities with maximum efficiency and minimum strain.

We must and shall keep steadfastly on the course we have set. We must—so long as the present peril lasts—keep constantly growing in a military strength which we can support indefinitely. These basic principles were agreed upon and applied in the successful meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Council just concluded in Paris.<sup>3</sup>

While the amounts requested for technical, economic and developmental purposes are small as compared with the military support, these programs are nonetheless of the most vital importance. They will be applied chiefly in South and Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa. Through these programs, the United States is proving its interest in helping the peoples of these areas to work toward better and more hopeful conditions of life, to strengthen the foundations of opportunity and freedom. To guard against the external military threat is not enough: we must also move against those conditions exploited by subversive forces from within.

I present this whole program to you with confidence and conviction. It has been carefully developed by the responsible members of this administration in order to achieve—at least possible cost—the maximum results in terms of our security and the security of our friends and allies. In my judgment, it represents a careful determination of our essential needs in pursuing the policy of collective security in a world not yet freed of the threat of totalitarian conquest.

Unequivocally I can state that this amount of money judiciously spent abroad will add much more to our Nation's ultimate security in the world than would an even greater amount spent merely to increase the size of our own military forces in being.

Were the United States to fail to carry out these purposes, the free world could become disunited at a moment of great peril when peace and war hang precariously in balance.

This is the way best to defend successfully ourselves and the cause of freedom.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

THE WHITE HOUSE,  
May 5, 1953.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, May 11, 1953, p. 673.

## STATEMENT BY SECRETARY DULLES<sup>4</sup>

Press release 241 dated May 5

I am pleased to have this opportunity to appear before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee in support of President Eisenhower's Mutual Security Program for fiscal year 1954. Mr. Stassen, Mr. Wilson, and Mr. Humphrey will join in describing this program. Therefore, my discussion will deal primarily with the foreign-policy aspects of the program.

A main objective of the program is to get the most security for the least cost. The way to do that is to cooperate with others. The mutual program will produce more real security for the people of the United States than we could get by spending the same amount of money on a purely national program.

I want to make it clear at the beginning that this program has nothing to do with charity. It is based on solid considerations of self-interest. It is, in fact, an inseparable part of our own national security program.

Let me describe briefly some of the basic principles which underlie the program as a whole.

*First*, our country is confronted by a very grave threat. There is not yet any evidence that this threat has diminished or will diminish within the foreseeable future. We stand ready to seize every honorable and practical opportunity for a peaceful settlement of international differences. But, as President Eisenhower said in his recent message to the North Atlantic Council, "until the conditions for genuine peace have been firmly established it would be foolhardy for us to delude ourselves about the dangers confronting us."<sup>5</sup> We have no aggressive purpose ourselves. But we want to increase the likelihood that any aggressive intent of others will be curbed by the knowledge that the cost of aggression will be greater than any possible gain. That is not yet the case everywhere. But where it is the case there is more security.

*Second*, we recognize that the safety of the United States cannot be assured by the strength of the United States alone, indispensable as that is. When any nation falls victim to Soviet aggression, whether internal or external, the Soviet Union becomes stronger and U. S. safety is lessened. It is as simple as A, B, C. Aside from the tragedy to the people conquered, Soviet domination means that these people and their resources will be harnessed to the Soviet war machine and may be turned against us. If Soviet communism is permitted to gobble up other parts of the world one by one, the day will come

<sup>4</sup> Made before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee on May 5.

<sup>5</sup> BULLETIN of May 11, 1953, p. 673.

when the Soviet world will be so powerful that no corner of the world will be safe. On the other hand, if the free nations retain their freedom and develop their strength and unity, they can continue to make a vital, positive contribution to peace and security. Their soldiers will continue to stand beside our own, and their factories will continue to work with our own, in deterring and resisting aggression.

*Third*, other free nations will only continue to develop their strength and unity effectively if the U.S. is prepared to provide positive leadership. We cannot, of course, assume exclusive responsibility for the security of the whole world, and there are areas where those directly concerned should exercise greater responsibility. But unless the strongest nation in the free world takes an initiative, others can scarcely be expected to do so.

*Fourth*, this program of mutual security has been planned on a global basis. We cannot safely see only one area and be blind to others. All parts of the world are interdependent.

*Fifth*, our mutual-security planning must be and is long range. We cannot afford to exhaust ourselves by spasmodic programs designed to meet ever-recurring emergencies. We cannot operate on a day-to-day, hand-to-mouth basis. Instead, we must think in terms of the policies and programs that we can afford to live with for what may be a long period of years.

*Sixth*, this program is based on the principle that we and our allies alike must maintain an essential balance between our economic health and our military effort. The American economy is the very heart of the strength of the free world, but our resources are not unlimited and we dare not endanger our fundamental economic stability. The same is true of our allies. If economic stability goes down the drain, everything goes down the drain.

*Seventh*, this program is designed to get maximum value for all the money spent. The burden of this program is too great for us to finance "boondoggles." This program represents prudent investments in concrete projects which benefit the United States as well as other nations.

Finally, this program is aimed at retaining the initiative for peace which was seized in President Eisenhower's great address of April 16. We do not dance to any Russian tune; we take the lead in the search for peace. There are some indications that the Soviet leaders have already begun to react to the growing strength of the free world. It is imperative that we continue to increase this strength and thereby increase the chances for the success of our policies.

The principles I have stated relate to the Mutual Security Program as a whole. I would

now like to discuss briefly the program proposed for various parts of the world.

### Importance of NATO Area

A large part of the total amount is being requested for the European area. Most of this assistance is for purposes of military defense within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Let us consider why this area is so important.

As I mentioned in my recent report to the American people on NATO,<sup>6</sup> the United States and its NATO allies now have a three-to-one lead over the Soviet bloc in the production of steel. If Russia takes all of Europe, the ratio would be about 50-50. Today, the NATO countries as a whole have a five-to-two lead over the Soviet bloc in the production of coal. If Russia took all of Europe, the Soviet empire would have a three-to-two advantage in this vital fuel. It is clear that American security would be gravely imperiled by a Soviet conquest of Europe.

Now let's look at the other side of the coin. While our European allies remain free and strong they can make a substantial positive contribution to the defense of the free world, including the United States. Since the beginning of NATO, we have delivered to our European allies over \$10 billion in economic and military aid combined. But during this same period, they have spent about \$30 billion from their own budgets for defense purposes. The principle is the same which we apply at home to get protection against fire. We all contribute to the fire department and get better protection more cheaply than any one could get by himself.

Today there are approximately 75 NATO divisions in existence across the Atlantic, plus sizable air and naval forces. It is true that many of these troops need more training and equipment before they can be fully effective. However, let us not underestimate their value. The NATO forces already represent a significant deterrent to Soviet aggression and a real contribution to the protection of all NATO peoples, including the people of the United States. If these forces did not exist, we would need a much larger security establishment in the United States with an immense increase in cost, and hundreds of thousands more Americans in uniform.

As you know, the NATO Council met a few days ago in Paris. All agreed that it was vital not only to maintain NATO's strength, but to build it up. We faced a problem, however, because the NATO members have about reached the limit of their present ability to improve quality and at the same time to maintain the past rate of buildup in size of NATO forces. The situation obviously demanded a shift of emphasis. Rather than continuing to

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 671.

exhaust our resources in a precipitate military buildup, we have agreed to undertake a more gradual and more steady buildup which is consistent with U.S. and European economic capabilities. Greater emphasis will at this time be placed on the improved quality of NATO forces rather than upon immediate quantitative increases.

I do not want anyone to receive the impression that NATO is cutting back its program. Our plans call for NATO to move forward realistically toward a greater defense capacity. The program upon which we agreed for the calendar year 1953 provides for a moderate increase in the size of NATO forces as well as a very substantial improvement of their quality. If these plans are carried out, it is the judgment of our military experts that the NATO forces in Europe, by the end of this year, will be nearly 30 percent stronger than they are now.

Another major problem in Europe today is the attainment of European unity, and particularly the integration of Germany into the free European community. Without a German military contribution, there will be a most serious gap in the NATO defense system.

The plan which Europeans have devised for integrating their defense efforts and achieving a German contribution, as you know, is to create a common army under a European Defense Community (Edc). The French Premier, René Mayer, Italian Prime Minister de Gasperi, German Chancellor Adenauer, and the leaders of the Benelux countries are all solidly behind Edc. They have told me that they see no good alternative. They are doing their best to secure its approval by their respective national parliaments. It is inevitable that legislative bodies should want to give careful consideration to any step as far-reaching as Edc. But the reasons for Edc are so compelling that we must hope these parliaments will not long delay its establishment. I believe our own plans can be based on the present assumption that the nations of continental Europe will continue to do their share of the job of creating adequate defenses, and will be able to overcome the political obstacles that now stand in the way of a unified effort.

Turning from Europe to the opposite side of the world, the Far East, we find severe Soviet military pressures combined with extreme economic difficulties. The problems of this area are closely linked with those of Europe and are of great consequence to American security.

### **Communist Threat to Far East**

Communist aggression in Indochina represents one of the most serious present threats to the free world. The present aggression against Laos is an extremely disturbing development. The primary responsibility for conduct of military operations rests upon France and the Associated States. Their manpower must do the fighting and they

are bearing a large part of the costs of the military effort. But they are clearly incapable of bearing the entire cost. Our mutual-security program provides \$400 million and some military end items for the purpose of helping the French and Indo-chinese peoples reduce this Communist pressure to manageable proportions. There may be some modest increase in aid of new and more vigorous plans.

We must materially strengthen the effectiveness of Chinese forces on Formosa. Defense measures in Formosa are closely dependent on economic stability, and it is also important that we assist directly in improving economic conditions. If Formosa can be made militarily strong and economically healthy, it may exercise a powerful attraction upon the enslaved people of Asia.

Japan is one of the prime targets of Communist expansion in the Far East. Under the Security Treaty with Japan, it is expected that Japan will increasingly assume responsibility, within its economic capabilities, for its own defense against direct or indirect aggression. This Mutual Security Program provides funds for weapons for Japanese internal security and home defense.

We are also requesting moderate funds which can be used for Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia, each of which faces grave problems of Communist origin.

Let us now look at the Near East and South Asia. The Near East is one of the main crossroads of the world and has great strategic importance. It has a large and growing population and important resources. This area is subject to Soviet pressures, attempting to take advantage of political unrest and economic distress. Western, and even American, prestige in this area has been deteriorating steadily, and the situation requires urgent and decisive remedial measures. Some of us are leaving Saturday to visit this area to get a firsthand impression of the problem.

Our program for this area provides for a continuance of technical-assistance projects at approximately current rates, maintenance of programs of relief and rehabilitation of refugees, and a limited program of economic aid for capital development. We also seek authority to undertake limited military-aid programs to the countries of the Near East, which will contribute to their internal security and will assist in promoting plans for peace between Israel and the Arab Nations, and in establishing a regional defense organization. While the total assistance sought for this area is not great, it can be vitally important.

In South Asia, which includes both India and Pakistan, we find a population as large as that of China. This population is still free from Communist control. However, present economic conditions in this area provide a happy hunting ground for the Communists.

It is vitally important in South Asia to move toward a solution of the twin problems of food and health. Both India and Pakistan have well thought out plans for economic development and have shown great initiative in going forward with these plans despite very limited resources. I believe that we are justified in some continuance of aid, though at a rate below what had been previously planned.

The programs of special economic aid planned for these areas are small in terms of total need, but can be of immense value, especially if they can be continued for several years.

#### **Increase in Aid to Latin America**

Moving finally to Latin America, I want to state my belief that the United States in the past has too often failed to give proper attention to our good friends with whom we have had beneficial political and economic relations for so many years, and who have assumed with us collective responsibility for the defense of this hemisphere. At present American private investment provides large amounts of capital which contribute to the improvement of economic conditions and living standards in Latin America, and we believe that private enterprise should continue to take the lead wherever it can. However, there are certain important needs which cannot be met by private capital. In view of the importance of this area, the program being presented to you proposes a moderate increase in our assistance to Latin America. This aid takes the form of technical assistance designed to improve living standards through diversification and increased productivity. It also includes limited military assistance to help the Latin American countries to place their military forces in a better state of readiness, so as to be able to cooperate more effectively in the defense of this hemisphere.

The total requested is \$1,772,000,000 less than was requested by the so-called "Truman" budget for the fiscal year 1954. The reduction is not as great as many of us would like to see, having regard to the need to balance the budget, to restabilize our currency, and, eventually, to reduce taxes. The reduction is, however, as great as, in our judgment, can be reconciled with the essential security of the United States.

It may be that developments, good or bad, may make it unnecessary or imprudent actually to spend all the sums here requested. You can be confident that the money not needed will not be spent. We do, however, say to you that we consider it would be imprudent and dangerous not to have available at least the sums we have requested. Indeed, it may well prove to be the case that we have not asked for enough.

In these matters, it is impossible to avoid taking risks. I believe that if we have erred, we have

erred on the side of asking for too little rather than for too much.

We should not disguise from ourselves the fact that the international situation is critical. For example, all of Southeast Asia is today in great peril, and if Indochina should be lost, there would be a chain reaction throughout the Far East and South Asia. Many countries which have always looked to the Western World and particularly the United States as the source of greatest power, both moral and material, are beginning to wonder whether the center of power has not shifted from Washington to Moscow. Even in the Western World there are non-Communist elements ready and eager to take power upon a platform of appeasement of Soviet communism, or at least benevolent neutrality toward Soviet communism.

At this juncture there are many forces at work within the United States which would result in a further abdication of leadership. There are those who would sharply raise our tariff. There are those who would sharply cut foreign aid. There are those who would seek to impose upon our friends and allies additional restrictions upon their trade with the Communist world even in terms of nonstrategic articles. There are those who would sharply cut the military contributions of the United States to NATO and other alliances.

If these things happen, then the United States will be isolated and in the greatest danger of its entire history.

In testifying yesterday before the Ways and Means Committee,<sup>7</sup> I referred to the fact that the present foreign-aid program will reduce budgetary and unallocated economic aid to our principal allies. They accept this in good spirit as a necessary part of a common program whereby we all try to bring our extraordinary security commitments into line with economic health. But if we do not do all that is possible within the limits of our economic health, then our purposes will be misinterpreted, and they will feel that their fragile economies are being subjected to multiple blows which are more than they can sustain.

It is the judgment of the President and his Cabinet and of the National Security Council, after the most intensive investigation, that the program here presented is, on the one hand, within the capabilities of the United States and consistent with moving as rapidly as possible toward a balanced budget, and, on the other hand, that anything appreciably less would be dangerous to our peace and security.

There is no "water" in this program to be squeezed out without taking greater risks than we believe are acceptable at the present time. I believe that this will be made apparent to you as you hear the further development of the facts through the statements to be made by Mr. Stassen, Mr. Wilson, and Mr. Humphrey.

<sup>7</sup> See p. 743.

**STATEMENT BY HAROLD E. STASSEN  
DIRECTOR FOR MUTUAL SECURITY\***

Following upon the clear and cogent policy statement by the Secretary of State, may I at the opening of my comments express my appreciation to the chairmen and members of the two Committees for the invitation to meet with you.

It is my responsibility and my privilege to present for your consideration the broad outlines, the important details, the concepts, the methods, and the objectives of President Eisenhower's new Mutual Security Program.

This program is a reflection of the philosophy and the principles of the President so often and so eloquently expressed. Its objective is peace—peace with justice—peace with freedom—peace with progress. It seeks to bring about among the free nations mutual strength, mutual confidence, mutual understanding, and mutual progress.

Its twin consequences will be a rapid buildup of effective defensive strength in the free world and a steady advance in the standards of living of the free peoples. It means increased security for the United States.

The program will be carried out under the direction of the President in a manner closely integrated with the total program of the Government, taking guidance on foreign policy from the Secretary of State, on defense policy from the Secretary of Defense and, through him, from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on financial policy from the Secretary of the Treasury, and with respect to budgetary practices from the Director of the Bureau of the Budget. It will utilize, whenever appropriate, the services and counsel of the other departments and agencies of the Government, such as the Departments of Commerce, Agriculture, Interior, and Health, Education, and Welfare.

In its administration, we will faithfully reflect the decisions of the Congress and will ever endeavor to serve the people of the United States.

**Details of the Program**

With this broad outline, may I turn to specific important details of the proposed Mutual Security Program.

As the President and the Secretary of State have indicated, the total of new obligational authority requested in the Mutual Security Program has been reduced from the previous 1954 budget by \$1.8 billion—from \$7.6 billion to \$5.8 billion.

Before discussing the several components of this total, several general statements concerning this figure seem appropriate. In the first place, it is the result both of an exhaustive review of our national security policies and of a detailed evalua-

\* Made before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House Foreign Affairs Committee on May 5.

tion of the operation and effectiveness of past and present mutual-security programs.

It represents the product of months of work by the National Security Council, where each of our security objectives was carefully studied, and its importance weighed in relation to the fiscal considerations that the Secretary of the Treasury will discuss with you. It reflects the findings which resulted from the careful, local studies which were recently made by special evaluation teams, comprised of nearly 60 outstanding leaders of American industry and finance, in 12 countries now participating in the program.<sup>9</sup> It mirrors the experience and knowledge which were gained by the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury, and myself during our several trips to Europe and particularly in the course of the recent meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Paris.

In the second place, as the President has already indicated, we are hopeful, as a result of our present close and careful scrutiny of the present Mutual Security Program, of discovering certain savings in currently appropriated funds which can be applied to reduce somewhat the presently requested authorization for new obligational authority. The exact amount of any real savings can only be determined as we approach the close of the fiscal year. They depend upon the extent to which any of the specific requirements on which present programs were based have been eliminated and not replaced by new, comparable requirements, the extent to which reductions in the originally estimated prices of military equipment have occurred, and other similar factors.

In the third place, I should note in passing that the foregoing aggregate figure does not include something under \$100 million in local currencies which are already, or will become, available to the United States in the form of counterpart or as contributions by other governments and which are required to carry out the program presented. Finally, I should caution the Committees that this is a tight program in which no provision has been made for a number of contingent requirements which, because they are contingent, we felt should not be included. I refer particularly to possible requirements for additional economic assistance in Korea, especially if further increases are to be made in Rox forces, and to the possible need for aid in averting famine in Pakistan. I mention these because I think it is important for you to know precisely what is, and precisely what is not, included in the request for authorization which is now before you.

Within this \$5.8 billion total, slightly over \$4 billion is requested for mutual-defense material and training.

Of this amount approximately \$2.53 billion is

<sup>9</sup> For Mr. Stassen's announcement of the appointment of these teams, see BULLETIN of Mar. 2, 1953, p. 337; for a summary of the teams' reports, see MSA press release dated May 8.



requested for the European area, about \$1 billion for the Far East, slightly under \$475 million for the Near East, and \$20 million for Latin America.

Within the \$5.8 billion, \$995 million is requested for mutual-defense financing. This portion of the program is designed to assist certain countries in Europe and the Far East in carrying out important defense objectives in a manner which will prevent their own budgets from remaining in disastrous imbalance.

Of this amount, \$400 million would be utilized for the procurement of equipment, materials, and services which are required by, or are necessary for the support of, forces of France which are located in Indochina and forces of the Associated States of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam.

Of the total amount of \$995 million for mutual-defense financing, \$100 million is intended for the manufacture in France of artillery, ammunition, and semiautomatic weapons which are required by, and are to be delivered to, French forces assigned to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and another \$100 million is designed for the manufacture in the United Kingdom of military aircraft required by United Kingdom forces for the defense of the North Atlantic area.

The provision of these amounts in the manner indicated, together with \$100 million which is requested to finance United States exports to the United Kingdom of wheat, cotton, and lard would have these effects:

Direct defense-financing assistance to the United Kingdom would be cut in half from 1953 to 1954. There would be a further reduction the following year, and early termination of all such assistance is contemplated. The resulting loss in dollars for balance of payments would be partially cushioned by increased earnings on jet aircraft and other military materiel contracts with the United States.

For France approximately 40 percent of the cost of the Indochina war would be covered by contributions in various forms from the United States.

In both of these situations, if the average taxpayers of the United Kingdom and of France continue, as they do today, to pay slightly more taxes proportionately than the average taxpayer in the United States, then each country can, with able management, adjust to the new program reasonably well and effectively carry out their extensive commitments for mutual defense and national security. I am convinced, however, that the amounts recommended are the very minimum which the United States should provide, and these amounts are directly related to the essential objectives of our country as well as theirs.

Two hundred and fifty million dollars is requested for Mutual Special Weapons Planning. This does not affect atomic weapons, which are controlled, as you know, by other legislation. It will include only such special weapons as the

President may determine, after the study of new weapons now under way by SHAPE is completed. Double safeguards should be included to insure that the security interests of the United States are served. Specifically, it is proposed that the President be responsible for determining, first, the wisdom of initiating the production of specified weapons of this type, and second, for any physical transfer of equipment or to provide training. With such safeguards, I am convinced that this \$250 million will, in the course of the next 4 or 5 years, prove to be the most important \$250 million in the defense portion of the Mutual Security Act.

One of our greatest assets in defense is the productive and scientific genius of the free peoples. The objective of NATO defense planning, as of American defense planning, has not been one of matching man for man a potential army of aggression, but rather of making our forces as effective as possible through a combination of training and modern weapons. The special new weapons that are now beginning to enter production or are nearing the completion of development must be a part of that planning if we are to create, with a minimum cost, the most effective defensive shield. We are thus proposing to take at this time those steps that are appropriate that will make possible the sharing with our allies of the industrial and scientific advances that can make our people more safe from attack and our collective armed forces more secure and effective in combat.

Smaller amounts are involved in the mutual development and technical-progress programs, approximately \$315 million for economic aid directed toward development and about \$140 million for technical cooperation. Of the \$315 million, \$30 million represents a request for an authorization, but not at this time for an appropriation, to cover anticipated future contributions to UNRWA (the United Nations Agency for the Relief and Resettlement of Arab Refugees). These amounts are predominantly for India and Pakistan, for Southeast Asia, for the Near East, and for Latin America and Africa. These amounts are much less than the direct defense portions but the programs which they cover may well prove to be the most important of all in their ultimate effect.

India has a well conceived plan for long-term development now under way. Moderate assistance for 3 years should be anticipated, but only one year is included in the 1954 fiscal year program.

The multilateral organizations whose work advances the broad security and humanitarian objectives of the Mutual Security Program together require a little more than \$100 million. This amount includes funds for our proposed contributions to the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Technical Assistance (UNTA), the Organization of the American States, the United Nations Korean

Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA), and the Inter-Governmental Committee for European Migration. Our support of these programs is in furtherance of President Eisenhower's inaugural statement that "respecting the United Nations as the living sign of all people's hope for peace, we shall strive to make it not merely an eloquent symbol but an effective force." Because of the great humanitarian and economic importance of these international programs to the free world, we must continue to assume leadership in making them succeed.

Of these five multilateral undertakings, three are integral parts of the U.N. system, one is solely inter-American, and one is organizationally outside of the U.N. framework. The total effort and accomplishments of all of these, however, have come to be regarded by less fortunate people everywhere as concrete evidence that the leading free nations are willing to back expressions of concern and interest with tangible deeds.

### **Vital MSP Objectives Can Be Attained**

I realize that some will sincerely feel that this proposed program cuts too deeply and too sharply into the amount of the previously planned program. I realize that others will sincerely feel that even more drastic reductions should now be made.

It is our considered conclusion after careful study that the vital objectives of our country in the Mutual Security Program can be attained through this reduced amount if wisely used in the new program.

It is also our considered conclusion that these recommended amounts are urgently needed in the interests of the safety and security of our country.

It is our pledge that these funds will be administered with extreme care and that throughout the year every opportunity will be seized for further savings when they can be made without prejudice to our country's objectives. As I have also stated we expect to make moderate but important savings in the 1953 program which will be reported to the committees later and can be credited against the amount now requested for the new program.

This new Mutual Security Program in President Eisenhower's administration will have these characteristics:

1. Longer-range planning and programing with open discussion of future requirements, subject always to the annual decisions and reviews of Congress.

2. Earlier attainment of strong defense capabilities through more rapid deliveries of critical items and more thorough training of forces in being.

3. Constant insistence on the importance of economic stability and an expanding gross national product among the free nations as the essential foundation for sound defense.

4. Accelerated planning for the use of new weapons for the defense of the free nations against threatening totalitarian thrusts.

5. Full enlistment of the cooperating defensive strength of all nations who oppose the Soviet Communist power.

6. Expanded use of the production capacity of Europe through a combination of U.S. and multi-national orders which will permit efficient mass production of NATO arms and the consequent establishment of a better production base in Europe.

7. Steady development of the natural resources and the people's capabilities in the less advanced areas of the free nations.

8. Gradual expansion of fair and profitable trade between the free countries.

9. Broader cooperation with voluntary organizations engaged in similar activities with emphasis on the "people-to-people" relationship.

10. Increased reliance upon private capital for all phases of economic accomplishment.

11. Alertness and willingness to adjust to any new conditions, in accordance with the President's April 16 address.

In other words, we seek a rapid, sure-footed climb with our partners to a high plateau of secure preparedness, and then, shoulder to shoulder, an advance along that plateau toward peace and better living for ourselves and for others.

Without minimizing the difficulties and obstacles we face, I do have confidence that this Mutual Security Program can be carried through successfully. This confidence is rooted in my deep and abiding faith in the freedom and the inherent dignity of men.

It is strengthened by my regard and appreciation for the superb abilities and excellent teamwork of the officials of the administration upon whom so much of this program depends, the Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles; the Secretary of Defense, Charles Wilson; the Secretary of the Treasury, George Humphrey; and the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, Joseph Dodge.

It is fortified by my knowledge of the high caliber and the devotion to duty of the members of the uniformed services of our country, the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines, upon whom so much of our work depends.

It is fed by my conviction of the truly great qualities of the peoples, and of the leadership of the other countries with whom we work in the Mutual Security Program.

Regardless of the cynics, the defeatists, the timid souls, and the shortsighted ones, let us move forward with faith and determination, with realism and sound planning. Thus will we, in the United States of America, be worthy of our national power and responsibility, and of our opportunity in 1953, under the leadership of President Eisenhower.

## Support for Extension of Trade Agreements Act

*Following are texts of statements made by Secretary Dulles and the Director for Mutual Security, Harold E. Stassen, before the Ways and Means Committee of the House of Representatives on May 4 and May 5 respectively.*

### STATEMENT BY SECRETARY DULLES

Press release 233 dated May 4

The President has recommended that the Congress extend the present Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act for a further period of one year.<sup>1</sup> I wish to speak in support of that recommendation.

The President has a simple purpose. It is to avoid a committal, or appearance of committal, to a changed tariff policy before that policy can be coordinated with other new and related policies. We want all of the parts to add up to a coherent whole and not cancel each other out. Only thus will they truly serve the welfare of our people.

The President proposes to use this year, or as much of it as is required, for study which will have the full participation of the public and the Congress. He has recommended that for this purpose a Commission be established consisting of five members appointed by him, three by the Speaker of the House, and three by the president of the Senate.<sup>2</sup> Extension of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, in its present form, for an interim period of one year will give the time needed to make a fresh appraisal of what should be done.

There are a number of bills which have been introduced and referred to this Committee which would serve this purpose. I believe, however, that H. R. 4294 is not in accord with our present needs. It would not only enact special regulations on imports of petroleum, lead, and zinc but it would basically alter the operation of our present trade program. That would be to commit ourselves to future policy before we can be sure that such policy is that which, added up with others, will produce the best results.

As we begin the task of reassessing our foreign economic policy, we are confronted with a number

of basic facts. This nation has become the center of the economic system of the free world. We in this country account for 50 percent of the total production of non-Communist countries. We are the world's largest exporter and the world's largest importer. We are the greatest creditor nation in the world and the most important single source of the free world's capital needs. We lead in the development of new inventions and new skills.

This strength of ours is something for which we are all devoutly thankful. In part it comes from the good fortune which spared us the physical destruction of two world wars. In part it comes from an abundance of natural resources. Even more, it comes from our own efforts and from the national policies which have guided these efforts—policies which on the whole have, for 164 years, served our nation well.

We shall not continue to have strength and to enjoy national health except as we continue to follow wise policies. Those policies will not be wise unless they recognize the basic truth that no nation can long survive as a citadel of self-indulging privilege surrounded by massed human misery and despair. The United States is today a paradise compared to most of the world. But it could be a fool's paradise if we thought we could, with impunity, so act as to impede the honest substantial efforts of others to improve their lot.

It is enlightened self-interest for the strong to be considerate of the weak.

This timeless truth always operates. Sometimes it operates slowly. But today it operates quickly. There exists in the world a vast and powerful conspiracy directed against the United States. It seeks to prevail by bringing under its control those peoples who feel hopeless and who are despairing, and who thus readily lend themselves to a violent program of world revolution. Already one-third of all the people of the world have been made first the victims and then the tools of that conspiracy. A further reduction of the free world and an increase of the captive world cannot but have ominous consequences for the United States.

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Apr. 27, 1953, p. 634.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 747.

## Soviet Concept of Western Economy

The leaders of Soviet communism have consistently proceeded on the theory that economics was the Achilles heel of the West. They have argued that the industrialized West depended upon raw materials and markets of the underdeveloped areas, and that if these areas could be subtracted from the economic domain of the West and brought under Communist control, the Western nations would not have left sufficient scope for the employment of their industrial machine. Then, it was reasoned, the Western nations would engage in violent competition among themselves which would put them at loggerheads so that they would readily fall victims, one by one, to Communist conquest.

That thesis was announced by Stalin in 1924, and his last political publication, that of October 1952, asserted that so much of the world had now been alienated from the West that Britain, France, and the United States could not make place for the postwar commercial activities of Germany and Japan. Stalin concluded that the Soviet leaders could now reliably assume that Britain and France would gradually "break from the embrace of the United States," and that Western Germany and Japan could be counted on to "try to smash United States domination." Then would come what Stalin foresaw in 1924 as the "moment" for the "decisive blow."

Stalin reasoned that these developments were, as he put it, "inevitable." In that he was surely wrong. But we too would be wrong if we were blind to the fact that the Communist thesis includes some valid elements. We could by our own mistakes make Stalin's predictions come true.

Our political, our security, and our economic interests mesh. The fact is that the ability of other free countries to resist Communist aggression and their willingness to unite with us on certain common-security policies depend largely upon their economic well-being. That in turn is influenced by our own economic policies, including our tariff policy.

The present administration is attempting to shape U.S. policies to what it believes are the overall needs of our nation. That involves consideration of our own budgetary, monetary, and tax problems. It involves reviewing our policies of military and economic aid to other friendly countries. It involves reconsideration of our defense program. It involves study of measures, such as the Battle Act, designed to restrict trade between the free nations and the captive world, which while commercially useful to the free world might be militarily useful to the Soviet world. It will also involve consideration of our trade and economic problems in relation to the welfare of other free nations—a welfare to which we cannot be indifferent, save at our peril.

The variety and difficulty of the problems we face emerge sharply as we consider specific areas

of the world. Western Europe, through its own efforts and with our help, has made large gains since 1946. Production of these countries has increased by 40 percent and exports have risen by 60 percent over the prewar period. Yet the Western European countries are unable to pay for all of the U.S. goods which they need, even though they are severely denying themselves many of the American goods their citizens want. Their gold and monetary reserves are very low in relation to current needs and the contingencies they face. They feel that their margin of safety is so slight that they dare not be venturesome.

We have helped these countries fill their current requirements for American products, including military defense items, by extraordinary aid. But this situation is unhealthy. It is not a basis on which a lasting alliance of mutually self-respecting nations can long continue. It can be corrected partly by measures taken by the countries of Western Europe themselves and partly by action by the United States.

The countries of Western Europe can do much for themselves by increasing their economic unity so that they more freely exchange their goods as between themselves. They need more and more to back their currencies with sound budgetary measures and productive efforts, so that their currencies will be a medium for expanding trade above the low level which always prevails when currencies fail to lift trade above what is virtually a barter basis. Sound U.S. foreign policies can do much to promote the unity and strength in Europe which are desired and sought by the peoples themselves.

## Japan's Need for Markets

If we turn to Japan, we find again a nation which buys much more American goods than it can pay for by sales to our country. Japan's problems are the more acute, because she has concerted her policies with those of the United States, which call for a very sharp curtailment of trade with Communist China. Thus Japan has been forced to turn elsewhere, and largely to the United States, for the food and raw materials which her population requires. But also Japan needs markets which provide the funds to pay for its imports.

In this connection, again, our foreign policies can help by promoting the development of the underdeveloped areas of South and Southeast Asia, where there could be a mutually beneficial trade with Japan. Here, again, however, the situation is complicated by Communist aggression in Indochina, which seeks to bring the "rice bowl" area of Southeast Asia under Communist rule.

There are underdeveloped areas of Asia and Africa and of this American Hemisphere which can find ways of better utilizing their own resources to promote their development. Here, too,

we have a part to play. By encouraging a climate which will attract American private capital to such areas, by extending public or private technical assistance where it will help, and by following trade policies which take sympathetic account of the problem of nations which depend on the production of one or two products, we can play a part in developing an amount of economic health and good will.

Also, we must remember that the internal strength of this nation depends upon wise foreign-economic policies. Imports are occasionally disturbing. But a check on exports would be equally disturbing. Vast segments of American agriculture, industry, and labor rely on large export markets for their prosperity. Our cotton, wheat, and tobacco growers depend largely on export, as does the machinery industry. The entire industrial activity of the United States is heavily dependent upon imported raw materials and will grow more dependent on those materials as time goes on. Moreover, our American taxpayers should not be expected indefinitely to shoulder the large grants-in-aid that have recently been supplied by the United States to bolster foreign economies. Finally, hundreds of thousands of private Americans, as well as the Government itself, have large investments throughout the world, and their value is seriously affected by the amount of dollars foreign countries have to pay for interest and to repay principal.

Accordingly, our own national self-interest will be advanced by balanced measures which take into account the varied interests of the different segments of our national life. Sporadic acts, designed to help particular interests, without regard to the whole, will not in the long run be beneficial.

I certainly would not suggest that the answer to all our problems is to be found in a new U.S. tariff act which would further reduce our customs duties which in many sectors are already low. I do not think that domestic industry and agriculture should be sacrificed in the interest of exporters or that local business should alone pay the price of foreign policies designed to promote international unity and economic health.

What I do feel strongly is that every segment of our nation will eventually suffer if our economic and foreign policies are a maze of contradictions. This would happen if new tariff policies were adopted before policies in other areas and the policies of other countries are more fully developed. If the Congress now took measures which foreshadowed a sharp increase in tariff protection, that would have very disturbing repercussions not only upon other national policies which are being formulated but also upon the policies which we hope other governments will adopt as a contribution to a total free world which will be more vigorous, more healthy, more unified, and more secure.

As the President said in his letter of May 2, this question of trade needs to be thoroughly studied

by a representative commission which will assume its responsibilities without any prior commitments or prejudices whatever.

### **“Standstill” Urged for Study Purposes**

I want to say to you that as Secretary of State I have no preconceived ideas and no policies to which I feel committed. I have a completely open mind. That is why I can conscientiously urge that there be in effect a “standstill” until this problem can be studied under fresh auspices in its relation to the complex problems into which tariff policy must be fitted. That is why I urge that H.R. 4294 should not now be adopted. Its present adoption would have serious international repercussions injurious to the best interests and welfare of the United States. It would be taken, throughout the free world, to forecast U.S. trade policies which would make it impossible for them to live without increasing association with and dependence on the Communist world.

In Paris last week, Secretary Humphrey, Secretary Wilson, Mr. Stassen, and I had talks with representatives of various foreign governments and we forecast a coming reduction in economic and budgetary aid from the United States.<sup>3</sup> This was accepted in good spirit by our friends. But their economies are still too fragile to absorb multiple shocks. Therefore, we strongly believe that the United States should not take tariff-lifting action at this time, before such action can be appraised in the light of our other governmental policies designed to permit balancing of the budget, stabilizing our currency, and, we hope, eventually cutting taxes, and doing all of this without jeopardizing the international relationships upon which our security largely depends.

Our nation has lived for 2 years under the present Trade Agreements Act. We have not only lived but lived well, and are today enjoying a high level of productivity and employment. The present act contains provisions which enable special measures to be taken to protect special situations such as may exist, for example, in relation to the lead and zinc industries. Surely it is the course of wisdom not to depart from legislation which has served us well until we are quite sure that the legislation to replace it can better, or at least equally, serve our national welfare. That we cannot know until the entire field has been studied by such a commission as the President proposes. Therefore Mr. Chairman, in closing, I again urge that no change be made in the existing Trade Agreements Act; that it be retained unimpaired in its present form in the interim period of study which lies ahead; and that the commission asked for by the President be promptly established and put to work.

<sup>3</sup> For material on the North Atlantic Council Meeting, Apr. 22-25, see BULLETIN of May 11, 1953, p. 671.

I wish to thank you for this opportunity to appear before you to express the views of the Mutual Security Administration on the question of the extension of reciprocal trade. As you may know, for many years—since the days of my governorship in Minnesota, through the War, the San Francisco conference, my trips through Europe, Asia, and Africa, and more particularly now as Director for Mutual Security—I have been following closely the interrelationship of U.S. and world economic trends and conditions. It is with knowledge and conviction born of these years of study and observation that I wish to speak forthrightly with you on the question before your Committee.

Under President Eisenhower's inspiring leadership, the United States today is bringing new hope to the people of the free world—hope for lasting peace and for rising standards of living. You recall that on February 2 President Eisenhower in his State of the Union message to Congress set down certain fundamental points that form the basis of the foreign policy of an administration which received a powerful mandate from the people at the polls last November. Among these policy points, and these form the context within which this Government approaches the question of reciprocal trade, President Eisenhower said:

1. That no single country can stand alone against Communist aggression, as he said, "mutual security means effective mutual cooperation."
2. That our foreign policy recognizes the importance of profitable and equitable world trade.
3. That we aim to receive from the rest of the world in equitable exchange greater amounts of important raw materials which we do not now possess in sufficient quantity.
4. That the study of, and extension of, the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act be carried out.

Then on April 7, President Eisenhower followed up his State of the Union address by sending to the Congress a special message formally recommending, first, that the present Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act be extended for one year and, second, that a thorough and comprehensive re-examination be made of the economic-foreign policy of the United States. (He has now recommended to Congress that a Commission of 11 members be established to carry out this study.)

Finally, in his great address of April 16 to the Newspaper Editors of America, President Eisenhower proclaimed that "We are prepared to re-examine with the most concrete evidence our readiness to help build a world in which all peoples can be productive and prosperous."

<sup>1</sup> Released to the press on May 5 by the Office of the Director for Mutual Security.

We are today at a crossroads in our foreign-economic policy. No aspect of American policy is more important than the course this Congress chooses to adopt in our economic relations with other nations. The economic stability and, therefore, the political stability of the free world will be influenced by the wisdom of your decision.

As I see it, the one guiding principle in setting our course of action should be: Does it help the U.S. and the free world to grow in strength and unity or does it help the Soviet in its program to divide and conquer the free world. To this end we should have as our objectives maintaining a high level of production and employment in a sound, dynamic, expanding American economy and, second, the positive strengthening and unification of our free world allies in rolling back and defeating Communist aggression. Stalin in his article in the Communist publication *Bolshevik* released last October at the 19th Party Congress regarded as inevitable, because he hoped and wanted it to happen, a trade war between the nations of the free world. Malenkov in his October 5 report to the 19th Party Congress was even more explicit:

American imperialism is acting today not only as an international exploiter and enslaver of nations but also as a force that is disrupting the economies of the other capitalist countries. . . . It is wrecking the historically established multilateral economic ties between the capitalist countries and replacing them by unilateral ties between these countries and the United States. Boosting their exports through the most unscrupulous dumping while at the same time closing their home market to foreign goods . . . the economic policy pursued by American imperialists is bound to aggravate the antagonisms between the United States and other capitalist countries.

If we wish to prevent the realization of Stalin's and Malenkov's predictions and hopes, if we wish to thwart the Communist policy objective of dividing the free world, then can there be any question at all that we do not want to reverse the trend of the past two decades and raise again trade barriers to the goods and services of our friends?

In terms of our foreign-policy objectives set down by the President and in terms of the objectives of the Mutual Security Act which require me as Administrator to "strengthen the mutual security of the Free World" and "to develop their resources in the interest of their security and independence and the national interests of the United States," let me cite a few facts:

#### Results of Reducing Exports

1. If we reduce our exports what happens? We hurt America and we hurt our friends abroad. In 1952 we exported roughly 10 percent of the total movable goods (agricultural products, manufactures, etc.) that we produced. Our wheat farmers exported 48 percent of their total production in 1952, our cotton farmers 37 percent, our tobacco farmers 25 percent. Our machine tool manufacturers 11 percent of their production in 1952, our

tractor manufacturers 23 percent of their production. These are but a few examples of the extent to which American farmers, laborers, and businessmen depend on exports for their own livelihood. With large surpluses of butter, cheese, dried milk, and cotton in our storage warehouses, it is emphatically important that we must export more not less or our American taxpayer will be paying more in terms of price supports. If we reduce our exports we hurt our own people but we also hurt our friends abroad and allies who are dependent on these imports which are vital to their own economies and to the free-world defense. For example, the United Kingdom in 1952 imported from the United States about 10 percent of its total imports and its total imports were about a fourth of the U.K. total consumption. Japan, to take a country on the other side of the world, imported from the United States about 30 percent of its total imports which too represented a considerable portion of its total consumption.

2. If we try and balance payments by continuing large-scale aid indefinitely we either increase our taxes or our debt—perhaps both. We weaken the basic morale and initiative of our friends. We play into the hands of the Soviet propagandists.

Any industrial country such as the United States which depends on the outside world 100 percent for its tin, 100 percent for its mica, 100 percent for its asbestos, 100 percent for its chrome, 99 percent for its nickel, 93 percent for its cobalt, 95 percent for its manganese, 67 percent for its wool, 65 percent for its bauxite, 55 percent for its lead, 42 percent for its copper is unwise in terms of its own self-interest to raise new trade barriers.

I submit to you that at this juncture in the development of unity and strength among the free nations the present Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act should be extended and, as the President has recommended, a thorough study and re-examination of the facts should be carried on to allow us to set the best forward course.

## **President Recommends Commission To Review Commercial Policy**

White House press release dated May 2

*The President on May 2 sent the following letter to Vice President Nixon and Speaker of the House Joseph W. Martin, Jr.:*

In the Message which I sent to the Congress on April seventh requesting a one-year extension of the present Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act,<sup>1</sup> I referred to the need for a thorough reexamination of our whole foreign economic policy.

I now recommend that a commission be estab-

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Apr. 27, 1953, p. 634.

lished to make this review. The review should provide the basis for action during the next session of the Congress.

It is my belief that the proposed commission should be made up of members of the Congress appointed by the Vice President and the Speaker of the House, and members appointed by myself from outside the Congress. It should be representative of both major parties. This is appropriate since commercial policy is an integral part of our total foreign policy for which broad national support is vital.

This commission naturally should work within the framework of our foreign policy and our global defense plans. Close liaison should be maintained with the group set up under the auspices of the State Department to follow up the economic and financial talks held earlier this spring between the United States and various European countries.

The commission should study all existing legislation and the regulations and administrative procedures stemming from it which bear directly on our foreign economic relations. This review should seek to determine how these laws can be modified or improved so as to achieve the highest possible levels of international trade without subjecting parts of our economy to sudden or serious strains.

An inquiry of this nature is imperative. The economic policy of this nation exercises such a profound influence on the entire free world that we must consider carefully each step we take. Changes in foreign economic policy—even those which at first have relatively slight consequences within this country—may either strengthen our allies or plunge them into a downward spiral of trade and payment restrictions, lower production, and declining living standards.

Our foreign economic policy also has important implications here at home. Declining imports will necessarily mean falling exports, resulting in a serious loss of markets for our agriculture and other industries. Expanded imports may require some adjustments in our country. We must make sure that changes in foreign economic policy consonant with our position as the world's greatest creditor nation do not benefit particular groups at the expense of the national welfare, but we must also make sure that such changes do not place unequal burdens on particular groups.

As I indicated in my previous Message, the achievement of a strong and self-supporting economic system in the free world, capable of providing adequate defense against aggression and of achieving rising standards of living, must be a cooperative effort. Through increasing two-way international trade and stimulating in every practical way the flow of private investment abroad we can strengthen the free world, including ourselves, in natural and healthy ways. By so doing, we can lessen and ultimately eliminate the heavy burden of foreign aid which we now bear. Both

we and our friends abroad earnestly desire to see regular trade and investment replace grant assistance.

In launching a broad-gauge study into the question of what our foreign economic policy should be, I think we can prepare the way for a fuller utilization of the economic strength of the free world in the cause of peace and prosperity.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

## World Trade Week

*Statement by Secretary Dulles*

Press release 267 dated May 15

The special significance of World Trade Week at this critical time in international affairs is emphasized by President Eisenhower in proclaiming the national observance of this week.<sup>1</sup> He stated: ". . . international trade among the nations of the free world adds to the economic strength upon which their common defense is based."

Our defenses are involved. As the free world seeks to build its defensive strength it is essential that we establish a solid economic foundation. Without such a foundation our cooperative political and military structure is built on quicksand. International trade plays a key role in this program.

The Soviet leaders, past and present, are aware of the close relationship between our trade policy and the West's defense effort. They have consistently proceeded on the theory that economics is the free world's Achilles heel. Stalin and his successors have predicted an inevitable trade conflict between the nations of the free world which will bring in its wake the certain disintegration of free world unity and the ultimate world triumph of communism. More than that, the Soviet Union is working constantly to encourage such a split in the free world.

The free world must prove these predictions wrong. But we cannot do so if we are blind to the fact that the Communist thesis includes some valid elements. We could by our own mistakes make the Soviet predictions come true.

We must recognize that our political, security, and economic interests cannot be divorced. As a matter of fact, the ability of the free nations to resist Communist aggression and their willingness to cooperate with us on common-security policies depends upon their economic well-being. That is, in turn, influenced by what our economic policies, including our tariff policy, will be.

President Eisenhower has recommended the establishment of a bipartisan commission to develop recommendations for a foreign-economic

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of May 18, 1953, p. 716.

policy adequate to the needs of these critical times. Public discussion during this World Trade Week and understanding of the issues involved will help this Government meet the responsibilities in the free world which fate has thrust upon us.

## Proposed High-Level Conference With the Soviets

*Following is the text of a statement made on May 13 by Michael J. McDermott, Special Assistant for Press Relations, regarding a high-level conference with the Soviets, which Sir Winston Churchill proposed in the House of Commons on May 11:*

Prime Minister Churchill's statement concerning a high-level conference with the Soviets is a further manifestation of his own high purpose and of the fervent desire of all the peoples of the free world to achieve a just and lasting peace. Such a peace is a goal toward which we and our free world Allies are devoting our constant effort so that we may help all peoples toward better standards of living. Recently President Eisenhower stressed his willingness to do all within his power to ameliorate existing international tensions and to meet the other side halfway when and if there is concrete evidence that such a meeting would produce positive results. The President indicated in his speech of April 16<sup>1</sup> those places in Asia and Europe toward which we should look for such evidence. Indeed, at the present time, negotiations at Panmunjom and pending negotiations with respect to Austria afford opportunity for the Soviets to demonstrate the sincerity of their avowals about the peaceful settlement of major international issues. Such a demonstration would help to pave the way toward a high-level conference.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Apr. 27, 1953, p. 599.

<sup>2</sup> At his press conference on May 14 the President said in answer to a question about Sir Winston's proposal that the State Department had released a statement with his approval. All these things, he said, were manifestations of the free world's great longing for some kind of peaceful composition of our difficulties in the world. The question was when the heads of state, who were very busy men, could meet and discuss these things with some promise of progress.

He personally was ready to do anything, the President continued; the only thing he believed the dignity and self-respect of the United States demanded was that we had some reasonable indication that progress could be made. He did not insist that complete progress be achieved or that any great blueprint for the peace of the world come out of such a conference; just that something that could be called progress be made.

He had no objection to Sir Winston's proposal, he concluded, but he would like, before he committed this Government to participate, something that would be evidence of good faith all around.



## German Libraries in Italy Restored to Former Ownership

Following is the text of a Department announcement (press release 230 dated May 1, annotated by Ardelia R. Hall, Arts and Monuments Adviser, Division of Overseas Information Centers), together with the text of an agreement signed at Rome on April 30.

### DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT OF MAY 1

Clare Boothe Luce, on behalf of the U.S. Government, and the Ambassadors of the British and French Governments, the Italian Premier, and the Ambassador of the German Federal Republic on April 30, 1953 signed an agreement at Rome transferring four German institutes in Italy and their libraries, collections, and property to the Federal Republic of Germany for restoration to former legal ownership and administration.

A cultural accord was signed at Rome on February 27, 1953, by Konrad Adenauer, Chancellor of Germany, and Alcide de Gasperi, the Italian Premier, in accordance with the prior decision of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France to restore the institutes to the Federal Republic. The signing of the five-power agreement marks the conclusion of the negotiations.

The libraries since their return to Italy have been under the joint control of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. They were stored during the war in the salt mines of Austria and in a monastery in Germany. They were returned in 1946 from the American Occupied Zones by Gen. E. E. Hume and Gen. Lucius D. Clay and placed under the control of the Allied Commission for Italy.

The restitution of the institutes is in conformity with established Allied policies of respect for German cultural institutions, observed throughout the American, British, and French Zones of Germany. The reopening of museums, libraries, and universities was among the earliest acts of the Allied Control Council in Berlin. The American policy specifically stated that its objectives were to protect and preserve German-owned cultural materials and works of art and the contents of museums, libraries, and archives, and to complete

the transfer of administration to the responsible German agencies.<sup>1</sup>

The history of the four institutes in Italy under the direction of learned societies in Germany has been fully published. They include the German Archaeological Institute of Rome,<sup>2</sup> the German Historical Institute,<sup>3</sup> the Hertziana Library,<sup>4</sup> and the German Institute of the History of Art of Florence.<sup>5</sup> They were established in 1829, 1881, 1911, and 1897 respectively, for the advancement of research in Italy in the fields of

<sup>1</sup> Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.), *Military Government Regulations, Title 18: Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives* (Change No. 1, 12 February 1947, Berlin), par. 18-111 and 18-113; *Germany 1947-1949—The Story in Documents*, Department of State publication 3556, p. 619.

<sup>2</sup> The German Archaeological Institute, Rome Branch (Deutsches Archäologische Institut, Römische Zweiganstalt) was administered by the German Archaeological Institute, with headquarters in Berlin. The foundation of the Institute and its early history are set forth in the following references: *Bullettino degli Annali dell' Istituto di corrispondenza archeologica per l'anno 1829* (Salvineci, Rome, 1829), pp. iii-viii, "Manifesto di associazione," and pp. 66-70; *Annali dell' Istituto di corrispondenza archeologica*, vol. 1 (1829); Gerhart Rodenwaldt, *Archäologisches Institut des Deutschen Reiches 1829-1929* (Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 1929).

<sup>3</sup> The German Historical Institute (Deutsches Historisches Institut) was founded under the name of the German Historical Station of the Royal Academy of Sciences, following the opening of the Papal secret archives. The early history of the Institute is given in the following volume: Walter Friedensburg, *Das Königlich Preussische Historische Institut in Rom in den dreizehn ersten Jahren seines Bestehens 1888-1901* (Verlag der Königl. Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin, 1903.)

<sup>4</sup> The Hertziana Library (Bibliotheca Hertziana) was bequeathed to and administered by the Kaiser Wilhelm Gesellschaft für Kunstwissenschaft, now the Max-Planck Gesellschaft. An account of the Hertziana Library and of the Palace Zuccari and its frescoes is found in the following references: Jean Paul Richter, *La collezione Hertz e gli affreschi di Giulio Romano nel Palazzo Zuccari*. Con una prefazione di Robert Mond. (*Römische Forschungen der Bibliotheca Hertziana V*, 1928. Privately printed. Leipzig); Werner Korte, *Der Palazzo Zuccari in Rom. Sein Freskenschmuck und seine Geschichte* (Verlag Heinrich Keller, Leipzig, 1935), also contains a bibliography on the Bibliotheca Hertziana, pp. 88, 89.

<sup>5</sup> The German Institute of the History of Art in Florence (Kunsthistorisches Institut in Florenz) was founded and

classical archeology, Italian painting, and Papal history. They were permanently located in Rome and Florence, cities which are vast repositories of the cultural heritage of Western Europe. They were ably administered for over a half a century in the service of generations of scholars. As such they come under the protective articles of international law in The Hague conventions of 1899 and 1907,<sup>6</sup> which proclaim the inviolability of all institutions dedicated to religion, charity, education, and the arts and sciences. The American position, that "the libraries are regarded by this Government as cultural property to be excluded from German external assets and to be returned to their rightful owners," was published in 1951.<sup>7</sup>

The magnificent libraries of these institutes, among the finest specialized libraries in the world, are their chief scholarly asset. Valued in the millions of dollars, they have been increased over the years by many private donors. The international group of scholars and patrons which founded the Archaeological Institute in 1829 generously supported it. Among the founders was the distinguished French archaeologist, Quatremère de Quincy, and the Institute exemplifies his famous analogy of "the universal republic of arts and sciences," as a spiritual republic in which peoples of all countries are members and share its lofty concerns.<sup>8</sup> The Institute grew with the acquisition of the von Bunsen collection in 1838, the Parthey Library, and the library of Baron Platner in 1878, and in recent years was deeded the estate of one of its directors. The Historical Institute began its library with a collection from the Royal Library of Berlin. The Florence Institute was developed by the members of an international society of friends of the Institute.

The Hertziana Library is a unique memorial to international good will. It was created by Henrietta Hertz and her British friends, Mr. and Mrs. Ludwig Mond, with her library and that of Mrs. Mond as a nucleus. Mr. Mond was a distinguished scientist and philanthropist. The Mond family and Miss Hertz are famous for their patronage of the arts, and they will always be remembered for

their farsighted beneficence in the foundation of the Bibliotheca Hertziana, for their enrichment of the museums of London and Rome, and for their generosity to the academies of the United Kingdom<sup>9</sup> and Germany.

Miss Hertz acquired a 16th century palace on the Piazza Trinità de' Monti from Mr. Mond and bequeathed it to the Kaiser Wilhelm Gesellschaft (now the Max-Planck Gesellschaft). In her unpublished will, Miss Hertz has clearly and beautifully expressed her intent that "the Palazzo Zuccari and its annexes, true to their tradition, may for all time serve the cultivation of art and science. With this in mind there has been established in the lower rooms, painted by Frederico Zuccaro (1542-1609) himself, a library of the history of art which is to be located there permanently under the name of the Bibliotheca Hertziana . . ." so as "to establish in Rome a permanent seat of art rich in accomplishments." With the same objective, Miss Hertz also bequeathed her collection of paintings to the Italian State, "as a token of my affection for the country that I hold in such esteem as the seat of art in the past and, I hope, also in the years to come."

It is to honor the generous spirit of such benefactors who have dedicated their gifts to the public good that the four nations, Italy, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, have restored the institutes and all their resources to the German learned societies in order that they may maintain the trust, which they have received from past generations, unaltered and undiminished.

#### TEXT OF AGREEMENT

WHEREAS the Governments of the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, have in accordance with the right to dispose of German assets in Italy conferred upon them by article 77, paragraph 5, of the Treaty of Peace with Italy, decided to release from custody to the former German owners certain libraries and collections in Italy, namely

- (a) The Hertziana Library, Rome;
- (b) The German Archeological Institute Library, Rome;
- (c) The Library of the German Institute of Art History, Florence;
- (d) The Library of the German Historical Institute, Rome (hereinafter referred to as "the Libraries"), as well as certain properties, namely
  - (e) The Villino Amelung, Rome;
  - (f) The Palazzo Zuccari, Rome (hereinafter referred to as "the Properties").

AND WHEREAS the Governments of the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America have agreed in the case of the Libraries and the Properties to release the Government of the Italian Republic (hereinafter referred to as "the Italian Government") from their obligation under Paragraph 3 of the Memorandum of Understanding regarding German assets in Italy signed in Washington on 14th August 1947.

The Governments of the French Republic, the United

<sup>9</sup> *Proceedings of the British Academy, 1913-1914*, pp. 10, 11.

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administered by the Society for the Maintenance of the Institute of Art History in Florence (Der Verein zur Erhaltung des Kunsthistorischen Institutes in Florenz). The history of the Florence Institute is given in the following pamphlet and annual reports: *Kunsthistorisches Institut in Florenz 1897-1925* (pamphlet published on the 80th birthday of Wilhelm Bode); *Jahresberichte, Verein zur Erhaltung des Kunsthistorischen Institutes in Florenz*.

<sup>6</sup> *Convention (II) with respect to the laws and customs of war on land*, signed at The Hague, July 29, 1899, annex to the convention, article 56 (U.S. Treaty Series No. 403); *Convention (IV) respecting the laws and customs of war on land*, signed at The Hague, Oct. 18, 1907, annex to the convention, article 56 (U.S. Treaty Series No. 539).

<sup>7</sup> BULLETIN of Aug. 27, 1951, p. 345.

<sup>8</sup> Charles De Visscher, "International Protection of Works of Art and Historic Monuments," *Documents and State Papers*, June 1949, p. 824; reprinted as Department of State publication 3590.

Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, the Italian Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany have agreed as follows:

## I

The Libraries and the Properties will be released from custody to their former owners, or to their successors in right, title or interest; or, in the event of there being any doubt or dispute in respect to any such right, title or interest, to the custody of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany for eventual release to their lawful owners. All of such disposition shall be subject to the following terms:

(a) The Libraries shall remain in Italy.

(b) The Libraries shall be maintained by the owners as international centres of scholarship and research open to all nationals, and shall be administered in such a manner as to serve impartially and without discrimination the interests of scholars of all nations.

(c) The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany waive on their own behalf and on behalf of the former owners or their successors all claims whatsoever against the Governments of the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, the Italian Republic and all the agents and representatives of the said Governments in respect of the aforesaid Libraries and Properties, from the time of their removal from the control of the owners until their release as provided in this Article.

## II

The Italian Government, in consideration of the guarantees exchanged between themselves and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany in the Exchange of Letters signed in Rome on 27th February 1953 and of their desire to emphasize the universal cultural interest of the Libraries, are prepared to assist in finding suitable premises for housing the Libraries of the German Archaeological Institute and of the German Historical Institute, and to grant to the Libraries, within the limits of the law, the same facilities which they enjoyed in the past.

## III

This Agreement shall enter into force upon 1st May 1953. In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorised thereto by their respective governments, have signed the present agreement.

DONE at Rome in quintuplicate this 30th day of April 1953.

*For the Government of the French Republic*  
JACQUES FOUQUES DUPARC

*For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland*  
VICTOR MALLET

*For the Government of the United States of America*  
CLARE BOOTHE LUCE

*For the Government of the Italian Republic*  
DE GASPERI

*For the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany*  
CLEMENS VON BRENTANO

## Unification of Austrian Exchange System

An initial par value for the Austrian schilling, at 26 schillings per U.S. dollar, has been established by agreement between the Government of Austria and the International Monetary Fund, the Fund announced on April 30.

The Austrian Government has informed the Fund that it is discontinuing all multiple currency practices and intends to pursue fiscal and credit policies designed to maintain the effectiveness of the par value. The new measures represent the latest in a series of steps, taken in consultation with the Fund, to achieve domestic monetary stability and make possible the unification of Austria's exchange rates.

The par value for Austria is as follows, effective May 4, 1953:

0.0341796	grams of fine gold per schilling;
910.000	schillings per troy ounce of fine gold;
26.0000	schillings per U.S. dollar;
3.84615	U.S. cents per schilling.

## New Meeting of Austrian Treaty Deputies

Press release 256 dated May 11

The President, in his speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors on April 16,<sup>1</sup> called upon the Soviets to prove the sincerity of their peaceful words by performing those deeds which are now unquestionably within their power and which would materially enhance the prospects for peace. The President and Secretary Dulles have both pointed out that the Austrian question is one of several the resolution of which would demonstrate the good faith and peaceful intentions of the Soviets.

The United States, in concert with the United Kingdom and France, has had the question of an Austrian settlement under constant consideration since 1946 with a view to re-establishing the freedom and independence of Austria as promised in the Moscow Declaration of 1943, to which the United States, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union are committed.<sup>2</sup>

By the end of 1952 a total of 258 meetings of the deputies of these four powers had been held without producing final agreement on a treaty. On December 20, 1952, the U.N. General Assembly requested the four powers to do everything possible to arrive at a speedy settlement of the Austrian question. Two meetings of the Austrian treaty deputies were then held in London in February 1953, but no substantial progress was made.

The Secretary General of the treaty deputies has now called for a meeting to be held at London on May 27. The U.S. deputy, Walter C. Dowling, will be present at the meeting under instructions to do everything in his power to conclude an equitable Austrian settlement.

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Apr. 27, 1953, p. 599.

<sup>2</sup> For a chronology of events relating to the Austrian treaty question, see *ibid.*, Aug. 11, 1952, p. 222.

## Visit of Indian Vice President

Press release 263 dated May 14

Upon the invitation of this Government, S. Radhakrishnan, Vice President of India, will come to Washington on May 20.

Mr. Radhakrishnan will stay at Blair-Lee House. During his visit the Vice President will call on the President and visit Mount Vernon and the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier at Arlington. On May 21 a dinner will be given in his honor by the Acting Secretary of State. On May 22 the Vice President of the United States will give a luncheon in his honor at the Capitol, and on the same day the Ambassador of India will give a reception at the Embassy. Mr. Radhakrishnan will leave by train for Canada on May 24.

## Laos Constitution Day

Press release 257 dated May 11

*Secretary Dulles transmitted the following message to the Prime Minister of Laos, Souvanna-Phouma, on the occasion of Laos Constitution Day, May 11 (May 10, U. S. time):*

On occasion Laos Constitution Day, I am glad to express sympathy and admiration with which the United States Government and people have followed the valiant resistance of Laos to Communist aggression. This aggression was a particularly shocking act against a free constitutional government which has shown that it enjoys full support of its citizens in time of grave crisis. Your armed forces and those from other parts of the French Union are giving to the Free World a heartening demonstration of a brave and resourceful fight against aggression; a fight which I am confident will be successful.

## Greek Problems Discussed

Press release 255 dated May 9

Spyros Markezinis, Minister of Coordination of the Government of Greece, held discussions this week with the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Director for Mutual Security concerning Greek defense and economic conditions.

The Government of the United States is fully aware of the severe difficulties which have continuously confronted the Greek people during the postwar years in suppressing armed Communist subversions, achieving the physical rehabilitation of Greece, and securing the internal stability of the country. It stresses once again its admiration for the progress achieved by the efforts and sacrifices of the Greek people and its wholehearted and continuing interest in the future of Greece.

This Government views with deep satisfaction the state of readiness of the Greek Armed Forces and the progress made by Greece with her friendly neighbors for defense against aggression. It recognizes that the considerable strides of Greece toward economic stability, attained by the vigorous action of the Greek Government, provide a sound basis for future economic development and represent a most encouraging achievement.

The Government of the United States welcomes the intention of the Greek Government to develop a long-term investment program. We hope that such a program will command support in Greece and abroad from those who would normally finance such a program. The U.S. Government insofar as it is concerned expects to continue, subject to congressional authorization, economic and military assistance to Greece, and the executive branch has asked Congress for mutual-security funds for this purpose for the next fiscal year. Such funds as well as funds previously appropriated for the current fiscal year will, we expect, help in the implementation of the long-term program referred to.

## U. S., Canada Discuss Mutual Problems

### Text of Joint Communiqué

White House press release dated May 8

The President of the United States, the Secretary of State, and other members of the Cabinet have held discussions during the last two days with the Canadian Prime Minister, Mr. Louis St. Laurent, and the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson. The meeting continued a long standing practice of visits exchanged across the border between Prime Ministers of Canada and Presidents of the United States. The conversations consisted of a full and frank exchange of views on the world situation in general and on United States-Canadian relations in particular. They were conducted in that spirit of friendship and cooperation which has long been characteristic of official discussions between the two Governments and they revealed a far-reaching identity of objectives.

In a survey of the world situation today, the President and the Prime Minister gave particular emphasis to recent developments in the U.S.S.R. and the Soviet orbit and their effects upon the free nations of the world. It was agreed that while every effort should be made to bring about a relaxation of current tensions, the free nations could not afford to diminish their efforts toward the achievement of united strength and ability to meet aggression. Acts, not words, would be proof of Communist intentions. Though recent developments in Korea where Canadian and United States troops are fighting side by side have seemed

more hopeful, nevertheless, in Laos a new act of aggression has been committed which might have serious consequences for Thailand and the whole of Southeast Asia. These developments in Southeast Asia must cast doubt on Communist intentions.

In the discussions on the European area, emphasis was placed on the necessity of maintaining the momentum of vigorous support for NATO. The achievements of the recent NATO Ministerial meeting were noted with satisfaction. It was agreed that both countries must continue to do their full share to further NATO objectives.

Views were exchanged concerning progress made toward the expansion of world trade. It was recalled that trade between the United States and Canada is greater than that between any other two countries. The Prime Minister stressed the great importance attached by Canada to the liberation and expansion of world trade and expressed the hope that the United States would play a role of leadership in this field. The President stated that, as an interim step, the Administration has recommended to the Congress the one-year renewal of the Reciprocal Trade Act and intends to submit to the Congress shortly its proposals regarding Customs Simplification. The President also pointed out that he has recommended to the Congress the establishment of a Commission to study all aspects of United States economic foreign policy so that future policies will be comprehensive, constructive and consistent.

The Prime Minister emphasized the importance to Canada of an early start on the St. Lawrence project and the especial urgency to Canada of the power development. The President assured the Prime Minister that the United States is fully aware of Canada's urgent need for St. Lawrence power. He said that he favored the development of the United States share of St. Lawrence power under the authority of New York State and that he hoped for an early favorable decision by the Federal Power Commission in this matter. The President in this connection referred to the decision of the Cabinet on this subject announced today.<sup>1</sup> The Prime Minister said that the Canadian Government was still prepared to discuss United States participation in the international section, provided that arrangements for power construction are completed and provided the whole seaway would not be delayed. He stressed again Canada's readiness to proceed at once with the work under the Canadian St. Lawrence legislation of 1951.

Recognizing the importance to the free world of the adequate defense of the North American continent, the President and the Prime Minister emphasized the desirability and effectiveness of cooperation on the basis of the Ogdensburg Declaration of 1940, which established the Permanent Joint Board on Defense between Canada and the

United States. Post-war arrangements for continental defense have continued in this framework. It was recognized by the Prime Minister and the President that joint defense facilities erected in Canada under these arrangements strengthen the defense and the security of both Canada and the United States. The President assured the Prime Minister that the United States, for its part, in such joint actions will continue scrupulously to respect Canadian sovereignty.

The Prime Minister and the President reaffirmed the importance of continuing the wholehearted cooperation between the two countries in the field of continental defense, and in the wider field of international action designed to preserve and strengthen peace.

## Special Committee's Report on St. Lawrence Seaway Project

White House press release dated May 8

The Cabinet on May 8 unanimously approved a report by a special Cabinet Committee, appointed by the President to study the St. Lawrence-Great Lakes Seaway project. The Committee consisted of representatives of the Departments of State, Defense, Commerce, and the Interior.

The Committee proposed, and the Cabinet agreed, that participation by the United States in the seaway project is highly desirable, provided such participation is limited to the international section of the St. Lawrence between Lake Erie and Montreal.

The recommendation is consistent with the administration's policy of considering each major construction project on its merits and in terms of whether it should be a Federal, local, or private project or a combination of any two or all.

The recommendations of the Committee, as approved by the Cabinet, follow:

1. The interests of the United States, taken as a whole, make desirable participation in the St. Lawrence-Great Lakes Seaway project, limited to the international section of the St. Lawrence between Lake Erie and Montreal.

2. Participation by the United States should, however, be expressly conditioned on: (a) Satisfactory assurance that the underlying power project will go ahead, pursuant to appropriate authorization; (b) satisfactory assurance that Canada will go ahead with its part of the navigation project, in cooperation with the United States; and (c) predication of the project on a self-liquidating basis. The Committee is of the opinion that these conditions are reasonable and consistent with national policy.

3. Participation by the United States now in the construction and operation of a St. Lawrence River Seaway would increase its defense advan-

<sup>1</sup> *Infra.*

tages to this country, and would in time of emergency assure it of full benefits of joint participation.

4. Participation by the United States now in the project would strengthen our strategic position at all times respecting use of the seaway for transportation of basic materials.

5. Construction of the international rapids section canals on the U. S. side would be more economical than construction on the Canadian side and would result in lower tolls, and, because of its design, the American project would constitute in certain aspects a superior navigation facility.

6. The Committee is of the opinion that the St. Lawrence Seaway, Lake Erie to Montreal, so constructed and operated, would be self-liquidating over a projected period of 50 years.

7. The Committee feels that the early initiation and completion of the St. Lawrence-Great Lakes Seaway project in accordance with the recommendations contained in this report is in the national interest.

## Visit of Jean Monnet

Press release 259 dated May 12

Jean Monnet, Chairman of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community, will pay a visit to the United States during the early part of June at the invitation of the U.S. Government. He will spend several days in Washington where he will call on President Eisenhower and other high officials to discuss the affairs of the European Coal and Steel Community and other matters relating to European unity.

Mr. Monnet will also visit New York where he will receive an honorary degree from Columbia University on June 2.

Since the establishment of the Coal and Steel Community on July 25, 1952, Mr. Monnet has visited the six countries which are members of this Community—France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. He has also visited certain countries which are closely associated with the Community, including the United Kingdom and Sweden. During his visit to the United States, Mr. Monnet will be accompanied by a small group of other members of the High Authority.

Mr. Monnet is regarded as one of the outstanding leaders of the movement toward unity in Europe. He has had a distinguished career in business and public service dating back to World War I.

From 1919 to 1923 he served as first Assistant Secretary General of the League of Nations, after which he devoted himself primarily to business affairs until World War II. During the war he carried out a number of important assignments, first as a member of the French Purchasing Mission in Washington, later as a member of the British Purchasing Commission, and still later as chairman of the Anglo-American War Production Board. In 1944 he became head of the French Economic Mission in Washington and negotiated the lend-lease agreement with the U.S. Government. He was a member of the French delegation to the UNRRA conference in Montreal in 1944, and to the U.N. conference in San Francisco in 1945. Mr. Monnet continued to serve the French Government in various capacities in the years following the war and attained international recognition as a leading proponent of the "unified market" in Western Europe. Together with his fellow-countryman, Mr. Schuman, he was one of the driving spirits in the development of the European Coal and Steel Community and was appointed Chairman of the High Authority of the Coal and Steel Community when it came into existence in July 1952. While directing Europe's first great experiment in a merger of sovereignty, Jean Monnet has continued to urge further steps toward the more complete political, economic, and military unification of Europe.<sup>1</sup>

## Brazilian Loan Agreement

The credit of \$300,000,000 authorized by the Export-Import Bank on February 21<sup>2</sup> to assist Brazil in liquidating its past due U.S. dollar accounts was formalized on April 30 with the signing of the loan agreement at the offices of the Export-Import Bank.

Glen E. Edgerton, Chairman of the Board of Directors, signed for the Export-Import Bank with Mario Leopoldo Pereira da Camara, Financial Counselor of the Brazilian Embassy, signing for the Banco do Brasil. Walther Moreira Salles, Ambassador of Brazil, and Ernani do Amaral Peixoto, Governor of the State of Rio de Janeiro, witnessed the signing.

The credit will be administered by the Banco do Brasil. All exporters entitled to payment should seek repayment through usual commercial channels from the Banco do Brasil and not through the Export-Import Bank.

<sup>1</sup> For an article on Mr. Monnet, see *Field Reporter*, January-February 1953, Department of State publication 4874, p. 27.

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Mar. 23, 1953, p. 442.

# Repatriation of Korean Prisoners of War

## BASIC U. S. POSITION ON PRISONER QUESTION RESTATED

Press release 269 dated May 15

There have been many questions, and some misunderstanding, about the present status of the armistice negotiations at Panmunjom. It is appropriate, therefore, to restate our basic position and to make clear where we stand.

The Government of the United States, like the Governments of the other U.N. members participating in Korea, has always wanted peace in Korea. We did not start the war in Korea, but we have always been ready to end it on an honorable basis. For almost 2 years we have patiently and persistently sought to bring an end to the war. Our efforts to bring peace to Korea were ignored by the Communists for the first year of the fighting. When armistice negotiations finally began in July 1951, the U.N. Command made every effort to reach an honorable armistice. We have negotiated in good faith and with great patience. We are continuing to negotiate in that way.

The negotiations have been deadlocked for more than a year on the question of prisoners of war. Members of the free world have affirmed that there can be no force used to compel the unwilling prisoners to return to the Communists. That is the fundamental issue between us and the Communists and the one on which we stand.

Some weeks ago the Communists for the first time gave some basis for hoping that they may be prepared to meet the moral judgment of the nations of the world on the prisoner question. After several false starts they finally came forward with a proposal which, with necessary modifications and clarifications, could form a basis for an honorable agreement.<sup>1</sup> On May 13 the U.N. Command accepted many points of this latest Communist proposal as a basis for negotiation and proposed some modifications to make the plan workable. These suggestions are designed to make the plan for taking custody of the prisoners of war who resist repatriation practicable and fair, to protect the prisoners in question, while at the same time satisfying the Communists and the peoples of the world that the decision of these

persons to go home or not to go home is entirely their own. The U.N. Command has sought to reduce the scope of the problem to give maximum protection to all the prisoners, as well as to make the task of the custodial commission manageable.

On one point there can be no question. The principle that force shall not be used to compel resisting prisoners to go home excludes every form of coercion. We cannot, consistently with that principle, create a situation where such persons are offered no alternative to repatriation other than indefinite captivity or custody. The principles for which we have been striving for many months and which have been approved by the United Nations require that the prisoner question should be finally settled, that persons who wish to go home should be allowed to do so and that those who do not shall be released within a reasonable time after the end of hostilities.

The prisoner-of-war question is no technicality but a fundamental point of free world philosophy on the integrity and rights of the individual. Free men cannot and will not agree to regard human beings as mere chattels to be held and used as such. The U.N. Command will continue to explore every possibility for an honorable and reasonable solution in Korea but it will not surrender a fundamental humanitarian principle vital to the whole free world.

## NEW U.N. PROPOSAL FOR SETTLING PRISONER QUESTION

*Following is the text of a proposal submitted on May 13 by the U.N. Command to the Communist negotiators in Korea.*

1. Within 2 months after the Armistice Agreement becomes effective, both sides will, without offering any hindrance, repatriate and hand over in groups all those Prisoners of War in its custody who insist on repatriation to the side to which they belonged at the time of capture. Repatriation shall be accomplished in accordance with the related provisions of Article III of the Draft Armistice Agreement. In order to expedite the processing of such personnel, each side shall, prior to the signing of the Armistice Agreement, exchange the total numbers, by nationalities of personnel to be repatriated direct. Each group delivered to the other side shall be accompanied by rosters, prepared by nationality, to include name, rank (if any) and internment or military Serial Number.

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of May 18, 1953, p. 727.

2. A. On the date the armistice becomes effective, all Prisoners of War of Korean nationality who, while in the custody of the detaining powers, have elected not to avail themselves of their right to be repatriated, shall be released to civilian status. Those who may subsequently desire to return to the area under the military control of the side to which they formerly belonged shall be permitted and assisted to do so under the provisions of Article 59 of the Draft Armistice Agreement.

B. Terms of reference for Prisoners of War Custodial Commission.

#### I. General.

1. In order to insure that all Prisoners of War have the opportunity to exercise their right to be repatriated following an armistice, Sweden, Switzerland, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and India shall each be requested by both sides to appoint a member to a Prisoner of War Custodial Commission which shall be established to take custody in Korea of those Prisoners of War who, while in the custody of the detaining powers, have elected not to avail themselves of their right to be repatriated, and who are not released to civilian status on the date the armistice becomes effective. The Prisoner of War Custodial Commission shall establish its headquarters within the demilitarized zone in the vicinity of Panmunjom. Subordinate bodies of the same composition as the Prisoner of War Custodial Commission shall be stationed at those locations at which the Custodial Commission assumes custody of Prisoners of War.

2. The Armed Forces and any other operating personnel required to assist the Custodial Commission in carrying out its functions and responsibilities shall be provided exclusively by India, whose representative shall also be Chairman and Executive Agent of the Custodial Commission. Representatives from each of the other 4 powers shall be allowed staff assistants in equal number not to exceed 10 each. The arms of all personnel provided for in this paragraph shall be limited to Military Police type small arms.

3. No force or threat of force shall be used against the Prisoners of War specified in paragraph 1 above to prevent or effect their repatriation, and no violence to their persons or affront to their dignity or self-respect shall be permitted in any manner for any purpose whatsoever (but see paragraph 7 below). This duty is enjoined on and entrusted to the Prisoner of War Custodial Commission and each of its representatives. Both sides shall have representatives with appropriate representatives of the Prisoner of War Custodial Commission to determine that any personnel who request return to the other side have not been coerced into making this decision. Prisoners of War shall at all times be treated humanely in accordance with the specific provisions of the Geneva Convention, and with the general spirit of that convention.

#### II. Custody of Prisoners of War.

4. All Prisoners of War who do not avail themselves of the right of repatriation following the effective date of the Armistice Agreement, or who are not released to civilian status on that date, shall be released from the military control and from the custody of the detaining side as soon as practicable, and, in all cases, within 60 days subsequent to the effective date of the Armistice Agreement to the Custodial Commission at locations in Korea to be designated by the detaining side.

5. The locations specified in the preceding paragraph shall be demilitarized by the withdrawal of the military forces of the detaining side to a distance of at least 2 kilometers from the perimeter of the Prisoners of War installation at the time the Custodial Commission assumes control thereof.

6. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 5 above, the Indian representative is entitled to call upon the detaining side in the area under whose military control Prisoners of War installations are physically located, to provide such administrative and security forces as may be needed to augment the forces provided by India.

Forces so provided shall be under the operational control of the Senior Officer of the Indian Security Forces.

7. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 3 above, nothing in this agreement shall be construed as derogating from the authority of the Custodial Commission to exercise its legitimate functions and responsibilities for the control of the prisoners under this temporary jurisdiction.

#### III. Verification.

8. Each side shall be afforded an opportunity to verify or ascertain the attitude towards repatriation of its captured personnel while they are in the custody of the Custodial Commission. To this end, its representatives shall be afforded access to its captured personnel to explain to them their rights, and inform them on any matters relating to their return to their homelands, under the following provisions:

A. The number of such verifying representatives shall not exceed 1 per thousand Prisoners of War held in custody by the Custodial Commission, but the minimum shall not be less than 5;

B. The hours during which the verifying representatives shall have access to the prisoners shall be as determined by the Custodial Commission, and generally in accord with Article 53 of the Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of Prisoners of War;

C. All verifications and interviews shall be conducted in the presence of a representative of each member nation of the Custodial Commission;

D. Additional provisions governing verifications shall be prescribed by the Custodial Commission, and will be designed to employ the principles outlined in paragraph 3 above.

9. Prisoners of War in its custody shall have freedom and facilities to make representations and communications to the Custodial Commission and to representatives and agencies of the Custodial Commission and to inform them of their desires on any matter concerning themselves, in accordance with arrangements made for the purpose by the Custodial Commission.

#### IV. Disposition of Prisoners of War.

10. Any Prisoner of War who, while in the custody of the Custodial Commission, decides to avail himself of the right of repatriation, shall so certify to a body consisting of a representative of each member nation of the Custodial Commission. Upon execution of such certificate, he shall, while still in the custody of the Custodial Commission, be delivered forthwith to the Prisoner of War exchange point at Panmunjom for repatriation under the procedure prescribed in the Armistice Agreement.

11. Sixty days after transfer of custody of the Prisoners of War to the Custodial Commission is completed, Prisoners of War who have not availed themselves of the right to be repatriated shall be released to civilian status, the Custodial Commission ceasing its function and being dissolved.

#### V. Red Cross Visitation.

12. Essential Red Cross service for Prisoners of War in custody of the Custodial Commission shall be provided by India in accordance with regulations issued by the Custodial Commission.

#### VI. Press Coverage.

13. The Custodial Commission shall insure freedom of the press by:

A. Providing for observance of the entire operation in South Korea by representatives of the press accredited to the United Nations Command.

B. Providing for observance of the entire operation in North Korea by representatives of the press accredited to the Korean People's Army or the Chinese People's Volunteers.

#### VII. Logistical Support for Prisoners of War.

14. Each side shall provide logistical support for the Prisoners of War in the area under its military control, delivering required support to the Custodial Commission at an agreed delivery point in the vicinity of each Prisoner of War installation.



15. The cost of repatriating Prisoners of War from the exchange point at Panmunjon shall be borne by the side on which said prisoners depend in accordance with Article 18 of the Geneva Convention.

16. The Custodial Commission is entitled to call upon the detaining side to provide specified unarmed personnel for the operation of facilities or the provision of services within the Prisoner of War installations within the area under its military control.

17. The Custodial Commission shall provide medical support for the Prisoners of War as may be practicable. The detaining side shall provide medical support as practicable upon the request of the Custodial Commission and specifically for those cases requiring extensive treatment or hospitalization. The Custodial Commission shall maintain custody of Prisoners of War during such hospitalization. The detaining side shall facilitate such custody. Upon completion of treatment, Prisoners of War shall be returned to a Prisoner of War installation as specified in paragraph 4 above.

18. The Custodial Commission is entitled to obtain from both sides such legitimate assistance as it may require in carrying out its duties and tasks.

VIII. Logistical Support for the Custodial Commission.

19. Each side shall be responsible for providing logistical support for the personnel of the Custodial Commission stationed in the area under its military control, and both sides shall contribute on an equal basis to such support within the demilitarized zone. The precise arrangements shall be subject to determination between the Custodial Commission and the detaining side in each case.

20. Each of the detaining sides shall be responsible for protecting the verifying representatives from the other side while in transit over lines of communication within its area, as set forth in paragraph 23 for the Prisoners of War Custodial Commission, to a place of residence and while in residence in the vicinity of but not within each Prisoner of War installation. The Custodial Commission shall be responsible for the security of such representatives within the actual limits of Prisoners of War installations.

21. Each of the detaining sides shall provide transportation, housing, communication, and other agreed logistical support to the verifying representatives of the other side while they are in the area under its military control. Such services shall be provided on a reimbursable basis.

IX. Publication.

22. The terms of this agreement shall be made known to all Prisoners of War who, while in the custody of the detaining power, have failed to avail themselves of their right of repatriation.

X. Movement.

23. The movement of the Custodial Commission, its personnel, and repatriated Prisoners of War shall be over lines of communication as determined by the command(s) of the opposing side and the Custodial Commission. A map showing these lines of communication shall be furnished the command of the opposing side and the Custodial Commission. Movement of such personnel, except in the demilitarized areas established in paragraph 5 above, around locations as designated in paragraph 4 above, shall be under the control of, and escorted by, personnel of the side in whose area the travel is being undertaken.

XI. Procedural Matters.

24. The interpretation of this agreement shall rest with the Custodial Commission. The Custodial Commission, and/or any subordinate bodies to which functions are delegated or assigned by the Custodial Commission, shall operate on the basis of unanimity, except with respect to procedural matters; on procedural matters decision shall be by majority vote.

25. The Custodial Commission shall make reports to the opposing commanders once each week concerning the status of Prisoners of War in its custody and any other important matters relating to its functions and responsibilities.

26. When this agreement has been acceded to by both sides and by the 5 powers named herein, it shall become effective upon the date the armistice becomes effective.

## CORRESPONDENCE WITH SENATOR KNOWLAND

*Following is the text of a letter addressed to Secretary Dulles by Senator William F. Knowland of California and of the reply from Thruston B. Morton, Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations:*<sup>1</sup>

APRIL 6, 1953.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Enclosed is some information<sup>2</sup> relative to the prisoner-of-war situation which was forwarded to me by Mr. Christopher Emmet. I believe that he also sent the same material to you, but knowing how busy you are I am not sure whether you have had a chance to examine the same or not. I believe that it is extremely important in light of the discussions which are now going on and may be contemplated in the future.

I have recently received some figures that disturbed me and for which there appears to be no satisfactory explanation at the present. On May 9, 1952, the following situation prevailed among the prisoners-of-war in Korea relative to their desire to be returned to Communist hands or their determination to resist being returned to Communist hands. Frankly, I have never been satisfied that we had made the fullest use of the opportunity of exploiting the adverse effect upon the Communist world of this situation. I am satisfied from reports reaching me that the questions were all loaded against the person who had the desire to remain outside of the Iron Curtain and in favor of his returning. It was only those who felt so strongly that they said they would resist return by force that were included in the "no" column. The figures are as follows:

	No (would not return)	Yes (would return)	Total
1952, May 9:			
Chinese.....	15, 600	5, 100	20, 700
North Koreans.....	42, 100	53, 900	96, 000
South Korean Com- munists.....	12, 200	3, 800	16, 000
Total.....	69, 900	62, 800	132, 700
1953, Feb. 3 (no breakdown by nationality):			
Chinese.....			21, 106
North Koreans.....			101, 620
South Korean Com- munists.....			
Total.....	39, 726	83, 000	122, 726

<sup>1</sup> Reprinted from *Cong. Rec.* of May 1, 1953, p. 4427.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed here.

Just what does this mean? Have we permitted further Communist propaganda urging the return of unwilling prisoners of war or has the moral effect of words spreading in the prisoner-of-war camps that while the Communists can return to their homeland, the best that the prisoners who want no part of the Iron Curtain again can look forward to is more or less permanent retention by so-called neutrals who at almost any time may finally agree to surrender them to the tender mercies of the Communists?

With best personal regards, I remain

Sincerely yours,

WILLIAM F. KNOWLAND.

APRIL 22, 1953.

MY DEAR SENATOR KNOWLAND: I have received your letter of April 6, 1953, acknowledged by telephone on April 10, concerning prisoners of war held by the U.N. command in Korea, and enclosing a study about the Indian cease-fire plan, which I am returning. Thank you for your courtesy in making this material available to the Department.

The officers concerned with Korean affairs have made a careful study of your letter and have given me the following information: During the course of the hostilities in Korea, the U.N. command, as required by the Geneva Convention, notified the international committee of the Red Cross of the names of some 175,000 captured personnel and the ICRC transmitted this information to the Communists. On December 18, 1951, when the U.N. command and the Communists were first discussing the Pow exchange at Panmunjom, the U.N. command gave to the Communists a list of approximately 132,500 Pow's, consisting of approximately 21,000 Chinese and more than 111,000 Koreans.

The difference between the figure of 175,000 given to the ICRC and the 132,500 subsequently given to the Communists is accounted for by the fact that the U.N. command had reclassified as civilian internees almost 38,000 persons of South Korean origin who had been swept into U.N. compounds during the rapid northward advance of U.N. forces in the fall of 1950; there were also approximately 5,000 duplicated names. Of the nearly 38,000 civilian internees, approximately 28,000 expressed the desire to remain in South Korea and were subsequently released. The remaining 9,500 indicated their desire to return to North Korea and continue to be in the custody of

the U.N. command for ultimate repatriation to Communist areas.

Included in the list of 132,500 were approximately 16,000 former residents of South Korea who were still classified as Pow's. Of these, some 11,000 expressed the desire to remain in South Korea and were later reclassified and released by the U.N. command. The remaining 5,000 expressed the desire to return to North Korea and continue to remain in the custody of the U.N. command for ultimate repatriation to Communist areas.

Of the other 116,500 Pow's not included in the foregoing category, approximately 34,000 North Koreans and 14,000 Chinese indicated that they would resist repatriation; more than 62,000 North Koreans and more than 6,500 Chinese were found to be available for repatriation to Communist areas.

Following is a breakdown of persons who are presently remaining in the custody of the U.N. command:

<i>Classification</i>	<i>Approximate number</i>
Available for repatriation:	
Korean POW's-----	68,000
Korean civilian internees-----	9,500
Chinese-----	6,500
Total-----	84,000
Persons resisting repatriation:	
Koreans-----	34,000
Chinese-----	14,500
Total-----	48,500

There has been no significant change in figures of persons desiring to return to Communist areas in the period from late June 1952, when the screening was completed, to the present time. It should be noted that on May 9, 1952, the date on which your first tabulation is based, the screening had not as yet been completed and the release of persons in the civilian internee and South Korean Pow categories had not yet taken place.

The Department is, of course, aware of the effect on prisoners of war inherent in a possible solution which would only provide the alternatives of return to Communist persecution, or more or less indefinite detention by "neutrals." You may be sure that if the armistice negotiations are resumed at Panmunjom, General Clark will have this problem very much in mind.

Sincerely yours,

THRUSTON B. MORTON

*Assistant Secretary*

(For the Secretary of State).

## Conference on U.S.-Ecuadoran Fishery Relations

*A conference on fishery relations between the Governments of the United States and Ecuador was held at Quito, Ecuador, from March 25 to April 14, 1953. Following are the declarations, agreements, resolutions, and recommendations approved by the conference:*

### I

The Conference on United States-Ecuadoran Fishery Relations, with reference to Agenda Point 1,<sup>1</sup>

RECORDS: That it has received information from and views of the Delegations on the questions which have arisen as a result of the seizures of the United States fishing vessels *Notre Dame*, *Sun Pacific*, *Equator*, and *Venus*.

### II

The Conference on United States-Ecuadoran Fishery Relations, with reference to Agenda Point 2,<sup>2</sup>

AGREES: That the principal causes of the difficulties which have characterized United States-Ecuadoran fishery relations include:

1. The difference in views of the Governments of the United States and Ecuador with respect to the principles of international law applicable to the extent of territorial waters and the measurement thereof.<sup>3</sup>

2. The difference in views of the Governments of the United States and Ecuador with respect to the principles of international law applicable to innocent passage of fishing vessels.

3. The withdrawal of the privilege of obtaining licenses valid for fishing in Ecuadoran territorial waters on the continental coast.

<sup>1</sup> "Questions which have arisen as a result of the seizures of fishing vessels of the United States of America."

<sup>2</sup> "Examination *in toto* of the acts which caused the difficulties which have characterized United States-Ecuadoran fishery relations."

<sup>3</sup> For an article on U.S. policy on fisheries and territorial waters by William C. Herrington, who was chairman of the U.S. delegation to this conference, see BULLETIN of June 30, 1952, p. 1021.

4. The withdrawal of the privilege of obtaining licenses by radio to fish in Ecuadoran waters.

5. The current United States Government system of issuing clearances bearing the destination "high seas" and the use of these clearances and of "via la pesca" by United States fishing vessels.

### III

The Conference on United States-Ecuadoran Fishery Relations, with reference to Agenda Point 3,<sup>4</sup>

CONSIDERING: That the Conference in analyzing the causes of difficulties in the fishery relations between the United States and Ecuador, in connection with the seizures of the fishing vessels *Notre Dame*, *Sun Pacific*, *Equator* and *Venus*, studied the points of view of the two countries with respect to territorial waters and innocent passage;

That the Conference heard the statements of the United States and Ecuadoran Delegations with respect to the legislation and jurisprudence of their respective countries relating to territorial waters and innocent passage;

That the Conference noted the substantial differences in the positions of the two countries; and

That the powers of the Delegations do not extend so far as reconciling these differences or recommending measures in the international field which would affect world interests;

AGREES: That it is not within its competence to resolve differences in legal dispositions and juridical concepts of the United States and Ecuador regarding territorial waters and innocent passage, the principles of which in any event are not susceptible of bilateral determination since these principles are matters for determination only by the general agreement of maritime States.

<sup>4</sup> "Ways and means of bringing about greater cooperation in fishery matters of mutual interest and to the benefit of the two countries."

#### IV

The Conference on United States-Ecuadoran Fishery Relations, with reference to Agenda Point 3,

**RESOLVES:** To take note that natural and juridical persons and other organizations of foreign nationality which conduct fishery operations on land or sea areas under Ecuadoran jurisdiction, are required, in their relations with Ecuador, to subject themselves to Ecuadoran fishing laws, decrees, and regulations.

#### V

The Conference on United States-Ecuadoran Fishery Relations, with reference to Agenda Point 3,

**RECOMMENDS:**

1) That as an interim measure and as soon as may be convenient the validity of fishing licenses issued to United States vessels by the Government of Ecuador be extended to include the territorial waters of her continental coast.

2) That as an interim measure and as soon as may be convenient fishing licenses be granted by radio by Ecuador, subject to adequate controls.

3) That the United States Government review as soon as may be convenient its current law and practice with respect to

*a)* Clearances for United States fishing vessels with destination "the high seas", including "via la pesca", and "touch and trade", and

*b)* Professional qualifications of officers and condition of navigability, supplies, and so forth, of fishing vessels with such destination, in order to determine what modifications may be needed to obviate or minimize problems in the territorial waters of Ecuador.

4) That, being convinced that there are other measures to be considered which will promote the solution of problems and development of activities beneficial to both the United States and Ecuador, a second conference on fishery relations be held as soon as practicable, preferably by the end of May, 1953 in the United States, to deal with the following agenda:

*a)* The advantages and disadvantages to be achieved by making permanent the measures recommended under 1) and 2) above, relating to licenses to fish including Ecuadoran continental waters, and to the issuance by radio of licenses to fish, to determine what modifications might be needed.

*b)* Consideration of possible changes in law and practice in the United States concerning the issuance of clearances to United States fishing vessels bearing destination "the high seas", "via la pesca", and "touch and trade".

*c)* The granting to fishing vessels holding fishing permits for Ecuadoran territorial waters the same port privileges granted to merchant vessels.

*d)* The granting to fishing vessels not holding such fishing permits, of port privileges under circumstances of necessity, and a point by point clarification of the privileges and responsibilities of vessels permitted such entry.

*e)* The possibility of the Governments or private interests of the United States or Ecuador establishing a fueling station in Ecuadoran territory on the Island of San Cristobal of the Colon Archipelago, or on whatever other island is more suitable, to take care of fueling requirements of the merchant and fishing fleets of the United States and Ecuador in accordance with existing regulations.

*f)* The development of measures for effective interchange of information concerning fishery laws, decrees, and regulations of the two countries affecting foreign fishing vessels.

*g)* Consideration of the objectives and research program of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission and the advantages which might accrue to Ecuador through adherence to the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Convention.

*h)* Consideration of other problems and activities, the inclusion of which shall be agreed upon by the Governments of both countries.

5) That the Governments of the United States and Ecuador study the possibility of periodic meetings for the analysis of their fishery problems and for the consideration of recommendations derived therefrom.

5) That the Governments of the United States and Ecuador investigate means to embody in a fishery convention the results achieved at this Conference together with other ways and means of bringing about greater cooperation in fishery matters of mutual interest and benefit to the two countries.

#### VI

The Conference on United States-Ecuadoran Fishery Relations

**RESOLVES:** To express its profound thanks to His Excellency Dr. José María Velasco Ibarra, President of the Republic of Ecuador, for the propitious and hospitable atmosphere which he provided for the Conference and which led to the successful outcome of its deliberations.

#### VII

The Conference on United States-Ecuadoran Fishery Relations

**RESOLVES:** To extend to their Excellencies, Minister of Economy Mr. Jaime Nebot Velasco, Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr. Teodoro Alvarado Caraioca, Minister of Defense Dr. Carlos Julio Arosemena Monroy and Minister of the Treas-

ury Dr. Wilson Vela, and to His Excellency, Paul C. Daniels, Ambassador of the United States of America to Ecuador, its sincere thanks for their wise counsel and generous cooperation in meeting all material requirements for the full success of the Conference.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the respective Delegates sign this Final Act this Pan American Day, April fourteenth, nineteen hundred and fifty three, in duplicate in the English and Spanish languages, both texts being equally authentic, depositing one set in the two languages in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ecuador and the other set in the two languages in the Department of State of the United States of America.

For the United States of America:	For the Republic of Ecuador:
WILLIAM C. HERRINGTON	RENÉ ESPÍNDOLA
WARREN FRANCIS LOONEY	CORONEL OCTAVIO DONOSO VELASCO
THOMAS J. MALEADY	GUSTAVO SALGADO
HAROLD F. CARY	ALBERTO BARRIGA LEDESMA
DONALD P. LOKER	MILTON MONTALVO
	MARCO VAREA DONOSO
	CÉSAR RAZA

## U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

### U.N. Opium Conference

The Department of State announced on May 11 (press release 258) that Harry J. Anslinger, Commissioner of Narcotics, Department of the Treasury, and U.S. representative on the U.N. Commission on Narcotic Drugs, has been designated U.S. delegate to a U.N. International Opium Conference which is to open at New York on May 11.

Alfred L. Tennyson, Bureau of Narcotics, Department of the Treasury, has been designated alternate U.S. representative; and George A. Morlock, Office of U.N. Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State, has been designated adviser.

The purpose of the conference will be to complete the drafting of and to adopt a protocol for the limitation of the production of opium.

Invitations to the forthcoming conference were issued in March 1953 to all States members of the United Nations, as well as to those nonmember States which are parties to one or more of the existing international narcotic treaties.

### International Dairy Congress

The Department of State announced on May 14 (press release 264) that the U.S. delegation to the 13th International Dairy Congress, to be held at The Hague, Netherlands, June 22-26, 1953, will include:

### Chairman

Ralph E. Hodgson, Assistant Chief, Bureau of Dairy Industry, Agricultural Research Administration, Department of Agriculture

### Delegates

Benjamin F. Castle, Executive Director, Milk Industry Foundation  
Charles W. England, Director of Research, C. Y. Stephens Dairy Industries, Washington, D.C.  
B. S. Graham, Executive Secretary, Central Oklahoma Milk Producers Association  
T. Kline Hamilton, Past President, Milk Industry Foundation, Columbus, Ohio  
Milton Hult, President, National Dairy Council  
Otto F. Hunziker, La Grange, Ill.  
Eugene L. Jack, Division of Dairy Industry, University of California  
James C. Norgaard, General Manager, Farmers Union Co-operative Creamery Company, Superior, Nebr.  
Lester S. Olsen, President, Olsen Publishing Company, Milwaukee, Wis.  
Arthur C. Ragsdale, Chairman, Department of Dairy Husbandry, College of Agriculture, University of Missouri  
Frank E. Rice, Executive Secretary, Evaporated Milk Association, Chicago, Ill.  
Harry C. Trelogan, Dairy Economist, Assistant Administrator for Marketing, Agricultural Research Administration, Department of Agriculture  
George M. Trout, Professor of Dairy Husbandry, Michigan State College  
Herman D. Weihe, Bureau of Dairy Industry, Agricultural Research Administration, Department of Agriculture

### Secretary

Robert A. Brand, Second Secretary of Embassy, American Embassy, The Hague

The scientific program of the forthcoming Congress consists of subjects on which there can be a profitable exchange of information by members of the dairy industries of the United States and of European countries.

The meetings of one section of the Congress, concerned with "milk as a raw material," will study such topics as the influence of feeding upon the quality of milk, the production of bacteriologically good milk, the avoidance of deterioration in the quality of milk during transportation, and procedures for grading milk.

A section concerned with the "processing and utilization of milk" will deal with topics relating to the concentration (evaporation, freezing, drying) of milk, the ripening of cheese, changes in the quality of butter during storage, and the use of milk in the form of other products, including yogurt, ice cream, and chocolate milk.

Other sections of the Congress will deal with specialized topics of concern to the dairy industry in respect to "equipment and buildings," "fundamental research," and "economics."

### Rubber Study Group

The Department of State announced on May 8 (press release 251) that the U.S. delegation to the tenth meeting of the Rubber Study Group, scheduled to open at Copenhagen on May 11 will be as follows:

### Delegate

Willis C. Armstrong, Deputy Director, Office of International Materials Policy, Department of State

### Alternate Delegate

George H. Alexander, Chief, Rubber, Fibers and Hides Branch, Agricultural Products Staff, Department of State

### *Congressional Adviser*

Paul Shafer, House of Representatives

### *Government Advisers*

John R. Blandford, Counsel of the Armed Services Committee, House of Representatives  
George K. Casto, Chief, Rubber Division, General Services Administration  
Edelen Fogarty, Assistant Attaché, American Embassy, Copenhagen  
Everett G. Holt, Assistant Chief, Rubber Division, National Production Authority, Department of Commerce  
Morton Yohalem, Special Deputy, Rubber Facilities Disposal, Reconstruction Finance Corporation

### *Industry Advisers*

John L. Collyer, President, B. F. Goodrich Company  
Harvey S. Firestone, Jr., Chairman, Firestone Tire and Rubber Company  
Frederick T. Koyle, Partner, Carl M. Loeb, Rhoades and Company  
William F. O'Neil, President, General Tire and Rubber Company  
David A. Paterson, Chairman, H. A. Astlett and Company  
Thomas Robins, Jr., President, Hewitt-Robins, Inc.  
George M. Tisdale, Vice President, U.S. Rubber Company  
Gilbert K. Trimble, Executive Vice President, Midwest Rubber Reclaiming Company  
A. L. Viles, President, Rubber Manufacturers Association  
Robert S. Wilson, Vice President, Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company  
R. D. Young, President, Rubber Trade Association of New York, Inc.

Following exploratory talks concerning rubber which were held at London in August 1944 by representatives of the Governments of the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States, the Rubber Study Group was organized to serve as an advisory body for the study of the world rubber position, of measures designed to expand the world consumption of rubber, and of means of dealing with any problems which might arise concerning international trade in rubber.

The Study Group will review a report from its Statistical Committee on the production and consumption of rubber throughout the world and will receive and discuss statements by the participating delegations concerning developments within their respective countries having an effect on the production and consumption of rubber. In addition, the Study Group will receive a report from a working party which was established by the Group at its ninth meeting (Ottawa, May 5-9, 1952) "to consider whether measures designed to prevent burdensome surpluses or serious shortages of rubber are necessary and practicable."

### **Standing Committee on Performance (ICAO)**

The Department of State announced on May 6 (press release 246) that the U.S. delegation to a meeting of the International Civil Aviation Organization's Standing Committee on Performance which opened on May 6 at Paris, France, will include:

#### *U.S. Member*

Raymond B. Maloy, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Washington, D. C.

#### *Alternate U.S. Member*

Hugh B. Freeman, Civil Aeronautics Board, Department of Commerce

### *Advisers*

P. Stanley Nowlan, Jr., United Airlines, San Francisco, Calif.  
John A. Carran, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Washington, D.C.  
W. E. Koneczny, Civil Aeronautics Board, Department of Commerce

### **World Health Assembly (WHO)**

The Department of State announced on May 5 (press release 243) that the U.S. delegation to the Sixth World Health Assembly which convened at Geneva on May 5 includes the following:

#### *Chairman (Chief Delegate)*

Leonard A. Scheele, M. D., Surgeon General, Public Health Service, Department of Health, Education and Welfare

#### *Delegates*

Leonard W. Larson, M. D., Member, Board of Trustees, American Medical Association, Bismarck, N. Dak.  
Franklin D. Murphy, M. D., Chancellor, University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kans.

#### *Alternate Delegates*

Frederick J. Brady, M. D., Division of International Health, Public Health Service, Department of Health, Education and Welfare  
H. van Zile Hyde, M. D., Chief, Division of International Health, Public Health Service, Department of Health, Education and Welfare  
Howard B. Calderwood, Office of United Nations Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State

#### *Congressional Advisers*

Homer D. Angell, House of Representatives  
Wayne L. Hays, House of Representatives

#### *Advisers*

Carol C. Laise, Division of International Administration, Department of State  
Carl N. Neupert, M. D., State Health Officer, Wisconsin State Board of Health, Madison, Wis.  
Ruth Sleeper, Director, School of Nursing and Nursing Services, Massachusetts General Hospital, Boston, Mass.  
Robert T. Stormont, Secretary, Council on Pharmacy and Chemistry, American Medical Association, 535 North Dearborn St., Chicago, Ill.  
Knud Stowman, International Health Representative, Division of International Health, Public Health Service, Department of Health, Education and Welfare  
Thomas F. Wayne, Colonel, (M. C.), U.S.A., Chief of Preventative Medicine, Department of the Army

#### *Secretary of Delegation*

Henry F. Nichol, Conference Attaché, Resident U.S. Delegation for International Organization Affairs at Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland

#### *Administrative Officer*

Mason A. LaSelle, Assistant Conference Attaché, Resident U.S. Delegation for International Organization Affairs at Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland

Besides reviewing the work and program of the WHO, the participants in the Sixth World Health Assembly will deal with such questions as the coordination of the activities of the WHO with those of the United Nations and other specialized agencies, the rights and obligations of associate members, the frequency of sessions of the As-

embly, the decentralization of the work of the organization through the assignment of greater responsibilities to regional committees, and the budget of the Who for 1954. The delegates to the Assembly will also have an opportunity to participate in technical discussions on the control of tuberculosis, syphilis, and typhoid, and on the different methods of applying health techniques.

#### **Cotton Advisory Committee**

The Department of State announced on May 1 (press release 231) that the International Cotton Advisory Committee will hold its Twelfth Plenary Meeting at Washington, D.C., beginning on May 4, 1953.

The U.S. Government will be represented at that meeting by the following delegation:

##### *Delegate*

Romco E. Short, Director of the Foreign Agricultural Service, Department of Agriculture

##### *Associate Delegate*

E. D. White, Deputy Director, Food and Agriculture Division, Mutual Security Agency

##### *Alternate Delegates*

F. Marion Rhodes, Director, Cotton Branch, Production and Marketing Administration, Department of Agriculture

Willard O. Brown, Chief, Agricultural Products Staff, Office of International Materials Policy, Department of State

##### *Advisers*

Arthur W. Palmer, Head, Cotton Division, Foreign Agricultural Service, Department of Agriculture

Oscar Zaglits, Head, Foreign Agricultural Trade and Policies Division, Foreign Agricultural Service, Department of Agriculture

Rene Lutz, Deputy Assistant Director for Foreign Requirements and Claimancy, Office of International Trade, Department of Commerce

Read P. Dunn, Jr., Foreign Trade Director, National Cotton Council, Washington, D.C.

##### *Adviser and Secretary*

Eulalia L. Wall, International Economist, Agricultural Products Staff, Office of International Materials Policy, Department of State

It is expected that the Committee will be chiefly concerned at its forthcoming meeting with reports by the participating delegations on the cotton situation in their respective countries and its program of work and budget.

#### **Administrative Council (ITU)**

The Department of State announced on May 1 (press release 226) that Francis Colt de Wolf, Chief, Telecommunications Policy Staff, Department of State, and U.S. representative on the Administrative Council of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) will attend the session of the Council which is to open at Geneva May 2, 1953.

Mr. de Wolf will be assisted at the forthcoming Council session by the following advisers: Helen G. Kelly, Telecommunications Policy Staff, Department of State, and Wayne Mason, Telecommunications Attaché of the American Legation at Bern, who is resident at Geneva.

The United States was re-elected to membership in the Administrative Council, the governing body of the ITU, at the Plenipotentiary Conference of the ITU which was held at Buenos Aires October 3-December 22, 1952. The other countries elected to membership at that conference are, as follows: Argentina, Brazil, Canada, China, Czecho-

slovakia, Egypt, France, India, Italy, Mexico, Pakistan, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, and Yugoslavia.

Resolutions adopted at the Buenos Aires conference had the effect of increasing the powers and responsibilities of the Administrative Council. It was directed, among other things, to reclassify the personnel of the permanent organs of the ITU and to determine the salaries of officials in accordance with a scale adopted by the conference; to study questions relating to revision of the existing pension system; and to arrive at a decision regarding the provision of larger headquarters premises for the Union. At a special organizational meeting at Buenos Aires of the newly elected Council, it was also agreed that one of the most important matters to be dealt with by the Council at its 1953 spring session would be the election of a new Secretary General of the ITU.

### **THE FOREIGN SERVICE**

#### **William H. Draper, Jr., Resigns as U.S. Special Representative**

On May 11, 1953, President Eisenhower accepted the resignation of William H. Draper, Jr., as U.S. special representative in Europe, effective June 30. For text of Mr. Draper's letter of resignation and the President's reply, see White House press release of May 11.

#### **Confirmation**

The Senate on May 13 confirmed Horace A. Hildreth as Ambassador to Pakistan.

#### **Check List of Department of State Press Releases: May 11-16, 1953**

Releases may be obtained from the Office of the Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.

Press releases issued prior to May 11 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 226 of May 1, 230 of May 1, 231 of May 1, 233 of May 4, 241 of May 5, 243 of May 5, 246 of May 6, 251 of May 8, and 255 of May 9.

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\*Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

**Correction**

BULLETIN of May 18, 1953 (No. 725)—Date in upper left-hand corner of back cover, "May 11, 1953," should be corrected to read, "May 18, 1953."

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The Department of State

# Bulletin

XXVIII, No. 727

June 1, 1953



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## The Continuing Need for Vigilance Against Soviet Aggression

by James B. Conant

U. S. High Commissioner for Germany<sup>1</sup>

I appreciate very much this invitation to speak to the Foreign Press Association here in Bonn. I had hoped to get together with you and your German colleagues before this in a press conference and to report on my trip to the United States, when I had the privilege of being there at the time of Chancellor Adenauer's visit. But on my return to Germany I found myself with a scheduled series of travels which have kept me away from Bonn for most of the last 10 days.

Now, assuredly, it is much too late for me to make such a report, or to tell you about the response which the Chancellor received in the United States, except to underline the enthusiastic reception he was accorded wherever he went. I was particularly pleased, of course, that he saw fit to come to Harvard University. And I was greatly impressed and gratified at the spontaneous ovations he received from the students whenever he came out of the various buildings he was visiting. I am familiar enough with the student body at Cambridge to know that they represented real enthusiasm for the Chancellor and for the German Republic he represents. This and similar experiences point up the fact that Dr. Adenauer's visit was a significant contribution to the furtherance of lasting friendship between the German and American people.

While I was in the United States, President Eisenhower made his historic appeal for world peace. May I remind you that it is nearly a month since he said:<sup>2</sup>

... Recent statements and gestures of Soviet leaders give some evidence that they may recognize this critical moment. We welcome every honest act of peace. We care nothing for mere rhetoric. We care only for sincerity of peaceful purpose attested by deeds. The opportunities for such deeds are many. The performance of a great number of them waits upon no complex protocol

but upon the simple will to do them. Even a few such clear and specific acts, such as the Soviet Union's signature upon an Austrian treaty or its release of thousands of prisoners still held from World War II, would be impressive signs of sincere intent. They would carry a power of persuasion not to be matched by any amount of oratory. . . .

What have the Soviets done in the meantime to show their willingness to join in a genuine effort to eliminate the tensions which wrack the world and which have created the atmosphere of nervous foreboding in which we live today? A few naive people may have grasped at the straw offered by the recent editorial in *Pravda*, or even considered it a great concession that *Pravda* printed the full text of President Eisenhower's speech. I think we are all agreed that any opening of the Iron Curtain that shuts off the Soviet people from the news of the outside world—however small the crack may be—is a good thing. But such an act of grace by Soviet censors cannot be considered a serious reply to the President's proposals for world peace. It is deeds and not merely words that the world requires if we are to begin to witness the rebirth of trust among nations which President Eisenhower has called for.

### Continued Abuses in Soviet Zone

As far as Europe is concerned, no basic change has occurred in the past weeks as far as I can see—no basic change to alter the familiar pattern of Soviet action. You correspondents know better than anyone else the deeds by which we can judge the new Soviet leadership. Certainly here in Germany the gap between words and deeds is obvious to all of us. We find no indication in the Soviet Zone of any relaxation of the pressures to which 18 million Germans are being constantly subjected.

Let me remind you of a few facts that are surely pertinent:

<sup>1</sup> Address made before the Foreign Press Association at Bonn, Germany, on May 7.

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Apr. 27, 1953, p. 601.

1. The Communist Government of the Soviet Zone in recent weeks has stepped up its campaign of attack and persecution of the church. Church liaison officers with the Government have been whisked away by the security police. Dozens of church officials, ministers, and priests have been arrested and some sentenced in show trials to long terms of imprisonment for alleged sabotage of democratic institutions. Church youth organizations have been dissolved or their members expelled from the schools of the Soviet Zone.

In order to restrict the activities of the church in public life, time-honored payments of church taxes required for pastors' salaries and church expenses have been reduced or withheld by the Government, theological training has been restricted, and church publications interfered with. A horde of police spies have been assigned to attend church services and report on "deviations" from the official Communist ideology. And in some places youthful Communist rowdies have even been given the task of breaking up religious services.

Protest against these measures by responsible church bodies and German religious leaders remain unanswered or are attacked as lies and malicious propaganda. Things have gone so far that the Protestant synod of Germany, including the Protestant bishops of the Soviet Zone, felt constrained to send a letter of protest to General Chuikov in which they appealed to the General to stop the antichurch measures of Soviet Zone authorities. And only a few days ago Bishop Dibelius, in a courageous attempt to prevent further Communist attacks against the Protestant youth organization of the Soviet Zone, filed suit against the official publication of the Communist controlled FDJ.

This *Kirchenkampf* taking place in the Soviet Zone hardly needs further comment. At the very least, it is "inhuman," as the recent general synod of the United Evangelical-Lutheran Church described it. But this effort to reduce the church in the Soviet Zone to a ghetto-like existence is not an encouraging sign to those looking for evidence of Communist acts of conciliation.

2. The "Sovietization" of agriculture and industry in the East Zone is continuing—is even being accelerated. Farms are being collectivized on a grand scale, private enterprise is being eliminated in large sectors of Soviet Zone economy, ration cards are being withdrawn from categories of workers and white-collar employees which do not fit in with the Government's plans for collectivization of the economy. Unless these measures are soon reversed, all this may well mean slow death for millions of Germans. Even now, according to a report prepared by the Bundestag Committee for All-German Affairs, 13 million inhabitants of the Soviet Zone are living on a starvation diet.

3. The terror and persecution which have driven thousands of Germans to leave their homes in the Soviet Zone and to seek refuge in the West continues unabated. The flow of these unfortunate people into Berlin has only slightly diminished in recent weeks, and the pattern of their stories remains the same—moral and material pressures applied with all the brutality and efficiency of a monolithic police state.

4. The picture remains unchanged in all other significant areas of life in the Soviet Zone. Schools, universities, theaters—all aspects of cultural life feel the blighting hand of the censor and the political commissar. German youth are being beguiled or dragooned into the Soviet Zone armed forces, which now have adopted a Soviet-style uniform, and have been enlarged to include air units as well as land and sea forces. The sealing off of the zonal border continues. In the scar of plowed land which the Soviets have torn up across Germany to mark their zonal border, the final stretches of barbed wire are now being planted.

The picture, then, has not changed. Does this continued "Sovietization" of Eastern Germany mean that the recent Soviet overtures are not genuine? Does it mean that the directives from Moscow have not yet seeped down through the rigid Soviet Zone bureaucracy? Or does it mean that the Communists are simply consolidating their position in the Soviet Zone? I do not pretend to know. But I do know that we would be very foolish indeed if we allowed rumors or speculations about Soviet intentions to bring about a relaxation of our vigilance in the defense of the free world against military aggression. Let me repeat, President Eisenhower has said: "We welcome every act of peace," but as you all know, American rearmament, NATO, and the plans for the EDC are the result of disappointments in the past. They are the fruits of the bitter experience of the last 8 years.

In this connection it seems to me that Secretary Dulles' report to the American people on the NATO Council meeting<sup>3</sup> needs to be considered carefully by all concerned with the European situation. Speaking of the necessity for the prompt creation of the European Defense Community, he said: "There is no other good solution of the problem of establishing adequate strength and peace in Europe," and, speaking of the need for the creation of a German force, he remarked, you will recall, "I do not believe that Americans, or British, or French want to anticipate fighting to defend Germany while the Germans look on as spectators." I venture the opinion that the Germans themselves will not long remain content to have their country defended by the presence of American, British, and French troops.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, May 11, 1953, p. 671.

## The Ultimate Goals

Coming as I have to Germany so recently, and having had a chance to talk with so many leaders of different political parties as well as leaders of industry, labor, and of your profession, I have been impressed by the unanimity of feeling here in the *Bundesrepublik* in regard to the ultimate goals. I take it that almost without exception thoughtful Germans would agree that Germany should, as quickly as possible, make its contribution to the common defense of Europe; that Germany should have a closer association with the other nations of Europe; and that the goal must be the reunification of Germany under conditions of peace and freedom.

The differences of opinion arise when it comes to discussing methods of reaching these important goals. About these differences of opinion within the *Bundesrepublik*, I do not propose to speak here this afternoon. The Germans must settle the debate themselves. I can only suggest a parallel. If a sea has broken through a dike and flooded great areas of fruitful land, isolating countrymen from one another, and if new storms threaten further disasters, it is reasonable to suppose that those

beyond the reach of the flood would want to get ahead as rapidly as possible in building a new dike. But if the people concerned continued to debate as to how the dike should be constructed—or even if it should be built at all—and how the flooded area should be reclaimed, then the danger of a new catastrophe, of total destruction, would be very great indeed. In such a situation, surely no one can deny that the important thing is to get on with the job and get it done. Whether there be any merit in the parallel I have drawn, time alone will tell.

Now one final word. President Eisenhower, in his appeal for world peace to which I have referred, spoke of the “serious and specific issues between the free world and the Soviet Union.” He went on to say, “None of these issues, great or small, is insoluble—given only the will to respect the rights of all nations. Again we say: The United States is ready to assume its just part. . . . With all who will work in good faith toward such a peace, we are ready, with renewed resolve, to strive to redeem the near-lost hopes of our day.”

This is the policy of our country.

## The Costs of Survival in a Dangerous World

*by Thruston B. Morton*

*Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations<sup>1</sup>*

As we in Washington see it, there are two basic developments which, taken together, have made this the sort of world it is.

The first development might best be termed the rise of Soviet power and of that power's insistence on expansion at the free nations' expense. We are not threatened by a theory or a conspiracy alone—we are also menaced by a material force which to date has dedicated itself to global domination and to destruction of our way of life.

This force must be understood and clearly understood.

What is the nature of the Communist menace?

It is a total menace. It seeks domination through the use of every conceivable weapon; it operates in global terms with global objectives.

<sup>1</sup>Excerpts from an address made before the New Hampshire Taxpayers' Association, at Concord, N.H., on May 20 (press release 273 dated May 19).

It uses every conceivable weapon—propaganda, subversion, economic pressure, outright aggression; further, it uses these weapons singly or in various combinations. The postwar years are replete with examples of this dangerous Communist flexibility. Let me cite just a few.

There was the drive to subvert the legitimate Greek Government in 1946–47. Greek strength, supported by American aid and technical advice, drove the Communists into retreat.

There was the economic pressure of the blockade applied to Berlin in an effort to drive the West out. Free world strength, brought to bear by the fabulous airlift, forced the jaws of that blockade open and kept the free world in west Berlin.

And there was the callous, unprovoked, naked aggression in Korea—an aggression that was halted and driven back by the strength of U.N. forces. For the first time in modern history, collective security has operated effectively on the battlefield.

We have yet to achieve peace in Korea—that is true. The American mother or father, the wife or the sister with a loved one in Korea will find little comfort in the fact that aggression has been checked there as long as the battle continues.

I am well aware of this. But the Communists have been forced to negotiate for a truce. We are negotiating, and we are doing everything possible to achieve a peace with honor. There is hope.

Now, it is true that the pattern of Communist imperialism of the past half-dozen years has taken on some new wrinkles. But—as I want to stress a little later—it would be folly to take these new wrinkles for a change in the pattern.

The global impact of a Communist conspiracy, whose heart lies in Soviet power, remains the first of two basic developments which condition the nature of the unstable world we live in.

What is the second?

You might call it the technological miracle which has turned a large world into a small one. You might call it the scientific age.

A shot fired at another Concord not far from here some 175 years ago was said to have been heard around the world. Today, a shot fired anywhere sets phones to jangling, pulses to pounding, and nerves on edge everywhere. And it does so in a good deal less time.

An election in Italy or Indonesia is carefully analyzed the day after it is held by experts in Washington, London, Paris, and Moscow. Today, a jet bomber can fly halfway around the globe in less than 24 hours.

Today, “it’s a small world” is something more than a casual greeting. There is no such thing as an isolated nation. Isolationism is as out-of-date as last year’s Paris gowns—even more so.

In a small world beset by the Soviet menace, we Americans have had no choice but to look at our situation realistically. We have had to recognize that our national security is dependent upon our assuming certain global responsibilities which your fathers and mine would not have thought of assuming.

Edmund Burke, British statesman and orator, once said—and I quote: “When bad men combine, the good must associate, else they will fall, one by one.”

That statement, made almost 2 centuries ago, is as valid today as it ever was.

America cannot stand alone in this kind of world. The security of our nation and of all free nations depends upon our ability to maintain and strengthen our united defenses.

It depends upon our willingness and our ability to meet the Communist menace anywhere and everywhere. It depends upon our willingness to assume and wear the mantle of free world leadership with dignity, firmness, and tact.

We Americans have not sought the role of leadership. In fact, we have never sought it. Look back at our history. What do you see?

You see a nation primarily concerned with its internal development. You see a lusty youth coming of age. You see many peoples of diverse backgrounds and national origins creating a great country in which freedom and liberty are more than mere words.

For a brief period in the closing years of the 19th century, the cry of “manifest destiny” rang through the land. Some Americans felt that their new proud nation was entitled to flex its political and commercial muscles abroad. But the America of the current century gave short shrift to this attitude.

No, we Americans have not sought world leadership. But today we have had it imposed upon us by circumstances for the most part beyond our control.

We have no alternative but to meet the tests that leadership implies. These tests are both moral and material. They demand both physical power and adherence to principle.

### **Right to Differ Inherent in Democratic Unity**

Let me say a word about principle.

Insofar as our leadership is concerned, we are wise not to forget that it is based upon democratic thought and democratic practice.

We have the right to ask that our friends in Europe and elsewhere carry their share of the mutual defense burden—and we have done so. We do not have the right to dictate to them—and we should not seek to do so even if we could.

The free peoples are working together in common cause because they realize that unity is the only sound road to security and peace. They are bound together by common principle, common purpose, and common need—not by force imposed from Washington.

Recently, there has been a good deal in the press about differences of opinion as between some of our European allies and ourselves. I am not going to comment on these alleged differences in any detail.

I would only point out that the right of Americans to hold different opinions is bedrock to our society. Should we seek to deny to other peoples the very right we ourselves cherish?

The right to differ is one of the crucial strengths not only of our own democracy, but of democratic unity in a difficult world. It is one of many important things that distinguishes us from the totalitarian tyranny which threatens us.

The fact that the free nations may differ on specific policies is much less important than the fact that they continue to agree on basic principle and to work together toward a common objective.

So much for the moral principle involved in American leadership. What about material strength?

I have spoken of the Communist menace as a global one. This means that our foreign policies

have had to be thought out in world terms. It also means that we require the material strength to support such policies.

The Soviets have made it clear that they understand only one language—that of power. We and our free world friends have had to speak that language. And we've had to speak it on a global basis.

The conflict in Korea is not an isolated one. It is related to what is happening in Malaya and in Indochina. Furthermore, what is happening in Asia is related to the situation in Europe.

It is all part of the same worldwide Communist pattern for conquest.

In considering that pattern, it is well to recognize that Communist words are related to Communist deeds, even if the words and deeds do not square with each other.

The Communists continually talk of "peace." At the same time, they carry on aggression in Korea and in Southeast Asia, and apply pressure to Western Europe.

What lies behind this seeming contradiction?

Shortly before his death, Stalin wrote an article for a leading Soviet publication. That article may well have been Stalin's last political will and testament. In it, the Soviet dictator stated that the free nations were bound to split. Communist victory, he said, would be assured when this occurred.

Stalin was not only reiterating a basic Marxist prediction. He was also setting down a line which Communists everywhere were expected to follow. And they indeed appear to be following it.

By talking "peace" while they practice aggression, the Communists hope to confuse and to divide the free world. Their current propaganda offensive is clearly directed at exploiting any differences that might exist between ourselves and our allies. It is further designed to play upon the deep-rooted hopes and fears of a humanity which earnestly desires a *true* peace.

In carrying through the obligations of leadership, we Americans would do well to bear in mind the deadly and devious aims of Soviet propaganda as well as of the various other methods the Communists employ to achieve their objectives.

We can hope for the best, but we must be prepared for the worst.

President Eisenhower put it very well when he said<sup>2</sup>—and I quote:

Until Soviet good faith is proven by deeds, the free nations must rely on their own strength for the preservation of peace. To fail to continue vigorously to strengthen our military forces would be to risk wasting all our efforts for the past five years in defense of our liberties.

These problems are obviously complex ones. They can be met only through a well-rounded, positive foreign policy. They are being met by just such a policy.

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of May 25, 1953, p. 735.

American foreign policy today is not a hit-and-miss operation. Nor is it designed to bow out of the picture at the end of a given calendar year.

American foreign policy today is based on the assumption that the Communist challenge will be with us for many years, regardless of any immediate relaxation of international tensions that may develop. The costs of that policy have been calculated with an eye to spending the minimum consistent with our long-run security.

The gradual buildup of NATO forces in Europe, the development of strong measures to cope with the Communist military threat in Southeast Asia, the encouragement of a unified Western European economy, the search for a moderate trade policy which will give other nations a reasonable chance to sell in the American market—all of these things are part of a positive foreign policy.

What is this positive policy costing us? What does it mean to you—the taxpayers—in dollars and cents?

What is the new team in Washington doing to minimize the costs of national survival?

In answering these vital questions, it is well for us to understand that Washington bureaucrats do not necessarily differ from other taxpayers when it comes to spending the tax dollar.

The new team in Washington is not interested in squeezing or misleading the taxpayer. In fact, the Eisenhower administration sees taxes pretty much as you in Concord see them. We are taxpayers too. And we are concerned with reducing the average man's tax burden to the lowest practicable level. But—as the President has pointed out time and again—it is not sound policy to reduce taxes before making reasonable progress toward balancing the budget.

The new administration has already taken a number of important steps toward a balanced budget. But the balancing cannot be done overnight.

Now, I make no pretense of being a fiscal expert. But I do believe that your Government has begun to move toward creation of a sounder dollar and a sounder credit structure.

As for specific economies, I might point out these:

The foreign-aid budget—and that includes both our military defense and economic expenditures abroad—was submitted to Congress only after 1.8 billion dollars was trimmed from the estimates made by the preceding administration; several major Government departments have submitted budgets which are well below last year's ceilings; the national defense budget, the biggest single item of Federal expenditure, has been trimmed by some 5 billion dollars.

These are important economies, and undoubt-

edly others are being made and will be made. But I think we need to be thoroughly realistic about this matter of Government economy. The cost of national security is high. It is going to continue to be high for some time to come. The cost of running the Federal Government as a whole is high, and the demands of national security are not the only reasons for this.

### Facing the Fiscal Facts

Congressmen would receive fewer letters of complaint and people generally would be somewhat less impatient for a drastic tax cut if more of us stopped to consider the fiscal facts.

What are the facts?

In the first place, inflation does not play favorites. Your Government is required to pay just as much for the things it needs as are you or your next-door neighbor.

Things have changed in the last decade or so. Prices have skyrocketed. For example, a chair costing the Government 9 dollars in 1940 today costs 32 dollars. File cabinets have gone from \$24.75 to \$61 in the same period. Desks which went for \$27.75 in 1940 now cost more than three times as much.

Government employees—and they have to eat just like other people—have had their wages raised considerably, even as have those who are privately employed.

The great majority of Americans are living better today than ever before, but we have had to pay for it.

Another factor in the governmental situation, which those who are impatient for drastic tax action might well keep in mind, has to do with the Government's complexity.

A generation ago the executive branch of the Government was composed of the White House, the Cabinet departments, and a handful of specialized agencies. When Franklin Roosevelt came to power, there were only about 500,000 Federal employees. The Government's responsibilities were considerably fewer and it played a considerably lesser role in the economic sphere.

Today, the number of executive agencies has more than quadrupled. There are five times as many Government employees, and the Government's obligations, both at home and abroad, would have staggered the imagination of even the most radical of thinkers back in 1930.

There are several important conclusions that can be drawn from observing this Government of ours in operation and from an understanding of its responsibilities. These conclusions, I might say, are my own.

The first is that you just cannot take a complex organization of two and a half million people and slice off a quarter or a half.

To use the meat-ax approach on the Federal budget—as some people advocate—might well

imperil our existence. With government functions being as complex and interrelated as they are, there is always the danger of cutting through a bone when aiming at a piece of fat.

No, the meat-ax approach is definitely not recommended. The scalpel would be more to the point. We must probe for waste carefully. And the administration has been doing just that.

A second important conclusion is that the new administration in Washington is not in position to turn back the clock. No man—no matter how clever—can recapture time. And I strongly doubt that it would be wise to do so if it were possible.

The administration has dedicated itself to certain specific objectives. It is seeking to maintain economic stability and a reasonable level of defense within the framework of a genuinely democratic economy. It is striving to protect and strengthen private enterprise.

The President has made it clear that Government activity in the economic sphere will be kept to that minimum consistent with the public interest.

This—it seems to me—does not imply a return to the situation which existed in 1920 or even in 1940. The Government's relationships with the domestic economy are highly complex and our obligations abroad are neither short-term nor minor.

For these and other reasons, we are compelled to gear any economic steps we take to the needs of 1953—not those of a generation or even a decade ago.

A third conclusion that I believe we must draw is that democratic government cannot function in a straitjacket. Nor does it.

Ours is not a monolithic state like the Soviet Union. Here, governmental decisions are the product of the interplay of many different forces and many different influences. Such is the essence of democracy.

There are those who seem to think that the President can issue an order and get any desired result. It is true that Mr. Eisenhower can issue instructions to the executive branch of which he is the head. But—as many chief executives have learned through sad experience—he can neither coerce the Congress nor stampede the Supreme Court.

The President does have power—much power. But he has been given that power by the American people, who have trusted him to use it wisely.

Wisdom demands that the President lead more by persuasion and reason than by directive. And that is exactly what the President is doing.

The final point I would make here is that the President cannot be expected to solve every problem we face in a matter of hours, days, or even months. Further, there are basic problems that cannot be solved on short notice even if he were to have the powers of a dictator, and I know that



you will agree that we have no use for a dictator in this country.

I also know that one of the best ways to assure our strength and our security as a democratic nation is to recognize that democracy imposes responsibilities, even as it guarantees rights and privileges.

Democracy cannot be taken for granted—particularly in this day and age. It must be worked at.

Every individual American and every American group with a specific interest is, I believe, obligated to accept the fact that there is such a thing as the national interest and the general welfare.

Every such group or individual must also appreciate that his particular objective is subordinate to the national interest. In short, the national well-being demands compromise from each of us—a certain willingness to sacrifice our maximum demands for something more moderate.

In this willingness and ability to sacrifice special interests to the general welfare lies one of the major keys to the American democracy's staying power.

I'm not a betting man. But if I had to bet I would stake everything I had on the common sense of the average American and on the future of America.

## U.S. Objectives in Western Europe

*by Ridgway B. Knight*

*Deputy Director, Office of Western European Affairs<sup>1</sup>*

I believe it is unnecessary, with a group such as this, to describe in any great detail the vital importance of Western Europe to American security. The hard, cold facts of modern life prove that we can no longer think of American defense solely in terms of our own manpower, our own weapons, our own natural resources, and our own factories and farms. Instead, we must appraise our security situation in terms of the combined strength of the United States and its allies. We must think not only of how much we would lose if the nations of Western Europe should fall under Soviet domination but also how much they would gain thereby. We must think of how much we gain if these nations remain on our side and develop their strength. Finally, we must think of the significant contributions which certain of these nations are making to the security of other parts of the free world, in Korea, Malaya, and Indochina.

I cannot, in this short period of time, catalog all the problems we face in Western Europe. It is better, I believe, to try to visualize our main objectives in Europe and to try to consider the major developments which affect us at the present time.

Our main objective in 1953, as it has been ever since the war, remains the development and consolidation of U.S. security in the face of the most

direct and the most dangerous threat which has ever been directly leveled at our country. There is no evidence whatever that this threat has lessened, despite the much talked of "Soviet peace offensive."

The history of the Soviet dictatorship and more particularly its action since the end of the war constitute positive facts which speak for themselves.

In fact, the last Communist official pronouncement which has the force of dogma specifically indicates that one major aim of Soviet policy is to dissolve Western unity. Stalin's pronouncement on the eve of the 19th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party last October re-emphasized "the need to promote conflict and exploitable weaknesses in the non-Communist world."

On the other side of the ledger we have as facts only a very limited exchange of wounded prisoners of war and some visas granted to a few distinguished American travelers. Otherwise this much publicized "peace offensive," which Secretary Dulles has aptly described as a "peace offensive," has ironically enough received its impetus from such minor causes as a few smiles on the faces of Soviet diplomats and a welcome to these same American visitors in Moscow—a welcome which in every other country in the world would be considered as merely normal.

Considering this situation it is essential to strive for a judicious balance. On the one hand we must

<sup>1</sup> Address made before the World Affairs Forum of the Foreign Policy Association of Pittsburgh, Pa., on May 7.

obviously refrain from being so frozen in our mental attitudes that we would not be willing to avail ourselves of changed conditions in Moscow which may result from the death of Stalin. On the other hand we must realize that the probability of a basic change in attitude of the Soviet oligarchy is slim indeed and that we must diligently preserve those policies of calm and strength until we have received positive proof that the leopard has changed his spots. By lowering our guard we could well fall into a trap set for us.

In the meanwhile, however, we should seek to avail ourselves of any opportunity offered to us by the other side with a view to redressing little by little the still unfavorable balance. In each case we should do it for a specific objective, and we should carefully refrain from accepting any one of these single objectives as a final test of a change in Soviet policy as a whole. This can only come from overall performance along the lines set down by the President.

It remains that the basic problem which faces not only our country but also our NATO partners is how to develop and maintain a position of real strength over an unpredictable number of years. We have no evidence that the threat to our security will diminish on any predictable date, nor do we have evidence that would permit us to assume an attack on any particular date. In this situation, as Secretary Dulles recently said, it would be a mistake "to exhaust ourselves by spasmodic programs designed to meet ever-recurring emergencies."

It is obvious that one of the most important problems connected with a long-term security program is the economic problem. This is true for two reasons. In the first place, military strength alone is not sufficient for our security, because the Communists have proved their ability to take over countries which are weak economically and spiritually without the use of military force. There can be no stable society without the prospect of an acceptable standard of living for the people who must defend that society. In the second place, it is equally clear that military strength itself cannot be developed or maintained without a sound economic base. It is therefore our purpose to keep our military efforts in balance with U.S. and European economic capabilities.

If we are to increase our mutual strength in the face of present economic and political limitations, there are two things we must do. First, we must try to obtain more real defense from the present resources devoted to defense. Second, we must seek to utilize other resources not yet tapped.

Our ability to achieve a better use of present resources requires constant striving within NATO to eliminate unnecessary duplication and waste. It requires us to press forward with the principle of balanced collective forces adopted by NATO in May 1951. Under this principle, we seek to attain balance among the various elements of the military

forces of the NATO countries as a whole rather than balance within individual national forces. Finally, it is evident that the achievement of greater unity among the nations of continental Europe will, in the long run, greatly facilitate the effective use of available resources.

### **Collective Security Needs France and Germany**

In seeking to tap new reservoirs of strength, one prospect stands out at this time above all others. I refer, of course, to Germany. The manpower, industrial plant, and technical skill of Western Germany can add substantially to the total strength available for the defense of the Atlantic community, and it is exceedingly important to us that this strength be utilized.

Both our desire to encourage European unity and our interest in a German military contribution focus, at the present time, on the European Defense Community. This is a plan, designed by European statesmen, to permit Germany to contribute military forces to Western defense, not as independent national forces but as part of a combined European army. Thus, EDC would not only make possible a German military contribution but would also represent an important step toward closer continental unity, which should have substantial political and economic benefits as well as political and military advantages.

American policy has firmly supported this European plan. In fact, the U.S. Government has sometimes been criticized on the grounds that it has set forth no alternative policy in the event EDC should fail of ratification. However, the point of the matter is very simple. Theoretical alternatives to EDC exist. Practical alternatives, given the political facts of life facing us today, have not yet come to light.

As we are in search of a net addition of strength, the German contribution is required over and above the existing elements of strength in the free world. Were it only possible to obtain Germany's contribution at the expense of defections in other quarters, our interests would not be served. To put it bluntly, our collective security requires the full participation of both France and Germany—not of Germany or France.

As matters now stand the only political framework within which the French people may accept the military collaboration of their enemy of yesterday is the EDC.

As long as this remains a political fact, it is quite sterile to talk of alternatives.

### **Fate of EDC Largely Dependent on France**

As we all know, the fate of the EDC is in suspense at this time. The final outcome will depend largely upon the eventual decision reached by the French parliament. I will not seek to express a judgment as to whether French hesitations are justified or not. Passing judgment on others is

seldom profitable. In the field of foreign relations it usually complicates rather than helps a solution.

In my opinion, and I would like to make it quite clear that I am only expressing a personal view, the process which the French people have gone through is a simple one. In connection with the Epc, the French people went through a first phase which can be called intellectual and logical. As a German contribution appeared to be necessary, and was being insisted upon by the United States, the European army seemed to be the safest framework therefore, limiting the potential future threat of a dynamic Germany which exists. However, to view the situation as it was, it should also be recognized that during this first phase the European army seemed so distant that the general public hardly gave it serious thought.

The second phase can be termed affective and sentimental. Reason had no part therein. The thousand and one traditional and historical fears and suspicions about Germany commanded and determined this reaction when the Epc evolved from a dream into a real possibility. This reaction was not confined to extreme nationalists. It stemmed from the heart of the vast majority of French people who instinctively revolted against the thought of any kind of union with the traditional enemy of yesterday, and against the thought of the disappearance of the French Army of which the most outspoken antimilitaristic Frenchman remains proud deep down in his own heart.

Illogical as it may seem, this state of mind is very human and very common. Haven't all of us, when faced with personal situations in which our reason has told us to do one thing, done quite the contrary? This sentimental reaction was unavoidable and was foreseen by many.

Our hope, and I believe it is a sound one, is that this second and sentimental phase will gradually give way to a third phase in which reason and logic will again come to the surface and gain the day. In the last 2 months French leaders from the Prime Minister down have spoken to the French people more frankly than ever before. They have shown why there is no alternative for France and that there is no turning back in this great forward movement, which in addition to harnessing the strength of a vital Germany to the common cause should usher in an entirely new historical period of material, spiritual, and intellectual development in a gradually uniting Europe.

We have read much in the newspapers about protocols to the Epc treaty and other conditions stipulated by the French Government for ratification of the treaty. While politically important because of the ever complex parliamentary situation in the French National Assembly, these conditions in my opinion represent the manifestations of the underlying state of mind of France as a whole, rather than absolute requirements in them-

selves. Given an instinctive refusal to move forward, new conditions could be expected ever to crop up so as to justify logically the sentimental unwillingness to move ahead. However, given a modification in this underlying state of mind, these specific conditions can and will be met. The mere fact that a month ago the protocols to the treaty were agreed, while until shortly before then they seemed insurmountable obstacles, is one of the best indications of improvement.

As you know, while there are a number of issues which have a bearing on French ratification, the Saar is the major one. Here again, given the desire on both sides to proceed, an acceptable solution to both will be found, notwithstanding the fact that in many ways the Saar issue provides a synthesis of the differences in many fields which have pitted France against the forces of a national Germany since Frederick the Great was King of Prussia.

Quite aside from substance, one of the most urgent considerations at this moment is speed. Barely 4 months remain before the national elections in Germany when Adenauer, a truly great European statesman, and his coalition Government will face the voters. In all likelihood his chances at the polls will, as in every democracy, be conditioned by his record. If the Epc has not been ratified by September and if, therefore, the contractual relationship with Germany has not come into force, and Germany remains under the statute of occupation, the opposition will see to it that the tremendous improvement in everyday life of the average German which has occurred under Chancellor Adenauer's tenure will be minimized. The *de facto* status achieved by the Bonn government will tend to be forgotten and the charge will be made that Adenauer has not been able adequately to promote and defend the interests of Germany. As a result, it is well within the realm of possibility that the German Government might be taken over by elements which now oppose plans for a European Defense Community. Whether these elements would eventually modify their attitudes is uncertain, but one thing seems quite certain. There would not only be further delay in obtaining a German defense contribution, but there would also be a severe loss of momentum in the movement toward European unity. In fact, it is possible that the European idea would have lost so much ground that it would be unattainable in this generation.

Let us now return to France.

### **Present French Situation**

While France's reactions are largely sentimental and historical, they are also materially conditioned by her present situation. At this point it might be useful briefly to review her basic position.

France's essential trouble is that she is over-extended populationwise, economically, and finan-

cially. Perhaps the greatest problem at this time is related to her budget, of which the three main components are her NATO effort in Europe, the Indochina war, and, lastly, reconstruction and development. The latter, while largely forgotten in 1953, remains a very heavy one.

In seeking to face this three-fold task during the past few years, France has been running a budget deficit which has exceeded 20 percent of the total in 1951 and 1952 and is accruing in 1953 at a rate of approximately 30 percent.

As in every country there are three ways of balancing a budget: by increasing taxes, by deficit financing, or by cutting expenditures.

If we look at the first possibility, that of increasing taxes, one is usually met by the argument that if only the French paid their taxes their budget would be balanced. What is thus overlooked is that tax evasion is an ancient custom in France and that the State takes this into consideration when establishing tax rates. As a result, certain tax rates are abnormally high. Even with considerable tax evasion, the French people actually pay—in taxes collected—at least as great if not a higher percentage of their national income than the percentage paid by American taxpayers to Federal, State, and local governments combined. In other words, with an average income of about one-third the average American income, the French taxpayer must turn a larger proportion of his income over to the tax collector than the average American does.

If we look at the second possibility, deficit financing, we find little reason for hope, as ever since 1914 the French people have had a virtually continuous inflation experience, with the result that the franc today is worth about one-half of one percent of what it was worth before the First World War. With this kind of personal knowledge of what extreme inflation can mean, the average Frenchman is most reluctant to invest in any kind of bond, be it a state obligation or a private one. Therefore, before the French will be willing to invest in government bonds a good many years of financial and currency stability will be required before sufficient confidence can be established.

In view of what we have said about the first two possibilities, it is obvious that as time passes the pressure on the French Government to resort to the third method, namely reducing expenditures, is becoming heavier and heavier. As France's main hope of eventually being able to support herself resides in expanding her basic economy through completion of her reconstruction and development program, the pressure is therefore increasingly concentrated on the reduction of her military expenditures. Here the choice is between reducing in Indochina or in Europe.

As the average Frenchman places the security of the mother country first, all these pressures are

gradually being concentrated on the Indochina part of the budget, and in this connection I might briefly mention that, notwithstanding the very large amount of aid which we gave to France last year, this did not amount to half of her total budgetary outlays for the Indochina war.

I mentioned earlier that France was also overextended demographically and will only mention one example. At the present time about 30 percent of her officers are in Indochina or on rotation to and from there, as are 40 percent of her career noncommissioned officers.

As a result of what I have outlined above, an inferiority complex definitely exists in France with respect to Germany. Germany, in addition to being the hard-working dynamic and demographically powerful country that she is, has no extra European commitments. Consequently in regard to ratification of the European Defense Community the French fear that with France's energies divided between Europe and the Far East, Germany will inevitably rise to the dominating position in the EDC.

### Italy and National Elections

In a summary, however brief, dealing with Western Europe, it is impossible to overlook the Italian national elections. These are the first to be held in a country with a large Communist party since the death of Stalin and since the stepped-up divisive efforts of the new Soviet Government.

The problem is not whether the Italian Communist Party and the Nenni Socialists will obtain a majority. That fortunately can be excluded. The problem is different. The Italian parliament has adopted a law giving 65 percent of the seats to the party or to the several parties linked together—that is presenting a joint common ticket—obtaining 50.1 percent of the total votes cast.

So that the Italian democracy can continue to function in an orderly fashion, the four parties of the center coalition—Christian Democrats, Republicans, Liberals, and Independent Socialists—must achieve the fateful percentage of 50.1.

The danger is that they may not for the following reasons:

1. The Communist Party, and especially the Nenni Socialists, which pretend to be independent, may well increase their voting strength.

2. The MSI, or Neo-Fascists, may gain somewhat.

3. But more dangerous than the above, many Italians with sentimental attachment to the House of Savoy who voted Christian Democratic in a reflex of self-preservation in 1948, when Italy seemed to be on the verge of going Communist, may give in to their sentimental impulse and vote Monarchist now that the Communist danger seems to be receding.

What will happen if the center list does not obtain 50.1 percent of the total?

At best a situation in which government coalitions will have to depend on the alliance of parties which are basically antagonistic. Governments would be short-lived, of the French variety, but more brittle and ineffective as the additional increment needed to make up a majority will be even more foreign and more basically opposed than is the case in France. Thus a weakened Italy would be a basic source of weakness for the entire Mediterranean flank of the Western alliance. Indeed much has been said recently about the increasing cooperation between Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia. Little, however, has been said about Italy, which backs up this line. If the worst ever came to the worst and war should break out, Italy would be not only the base for logistic support of a large part of the Balkan area, but would also be the base for air support. Just as Germany could not hold back a Communist attack without the backstopping support of France and other Western European nations, the defense of South-eastern Europe would be virtually impossible without maximum Italian cooperation and strength.

. . . I will be brief in my conclusion. Let me stress that this conclusion is also quite personal.

#### **Danger Inherent in Present Situation**

I am concerned about the coincidental and cumulative effects of certain developments at this particular moment. I refer to the fact that at the very time when the impact of the notorious Soviet "peace offensive" is beginning to be felt on the Continent, the British Government has announced its new budget with tax decreases, and we are publicly stressing the stretched-out character of our own defense effort.

Now the U.K. budget is based on a fine plan: one which by offering more initiative to the average Britisher should quickly result in a larger economic base to be taxed and, therefore, produce a larger tax yield.

Likewise in our case it is essential, in view of the nature of the threat which we face, that we so adjust our affairs that our house will be in good order, in an order acceptable to the great majority of the American people, to enable us to maintain our effort over perhaps many years.

However the fact remains that these simultaneous developments could quite erroneously be interpreted on the Continent of Europe as proof positive that the United States and the United Kingdom, regardless of their public pronouncements to the contrary, consider that the Soviet threat has appreciably lessened. This could set in motion a train of events which could well disarm the Continent spiritually as well as materially.

I believe Secretary Dulles stated this problem exceedingly well when he presented the Mutual

Security Program to the Congress and urged that the Congress make no reductions in foreign aid beyond those already made by the administration.<sup>2</sup> He pointed out that our allies have accepted our reduction in foreign aid in good spirit, as a necessary part of a common program whereby we will all try to bring our security commitments into line with economic health. But he went on to say this:

If we do not do all that is possible within the limits of our economic health, then our purposes will be misinterpreted and our allies will feel that their fragile economies are being subjected to multiple blows which are more than they can sustain.

He added that a further reduction in our commitments might involve risks greater than are acceptable at the present time.

Please do not think that I consider war unavoidable. I do not now and never have.

But I do consider that our security is based on a strength of the free world adequate to make the other side think twice before committing an act of aggression which might be a *casus belli*.

Therefore I am convinced that we must seek to maintain that most difficult balance and equilibrium between defense and well-being—in a sense we should strive to give concurrent priorities to these naturally contradictory facts. We must preserve solvency and standards of living in the free world which will protect that which we are determined to defend. Also we must accept the heavy burden to maintain the military strength needed to protect from aggression this free way of life of ours which we enjoy today and which is the birthright of our children.

#### **MSA Allotment to Netherlands for Productivity Agreement**

The Netherlands has become the third European country to launch a stepped-up productivity drive under the terms of the "free-enterprise" amendments to the Mutual Security Act, the Mutual Security Agency (MSA) announced on May 7 in making the first allotment of funds under its new agreement with the Dutch.

It is planned that the present allotment of \$1,500,000 is to be followed before July 1 by another \$1,500,000 allotment of defense-support funds, which will be used to provide commodities needed by the Netherlands in its defense buildup.

The Dutch Government is depositing an equivalent amount of guilders in a special counterpart fund to finance the new drive.

Similar agreements have been concluded by MSA with the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany under terms of the "free-enterprise" legislation, and others are being nego-

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of May 25, 1953, p. 736.

tiated. These amendments to the Mutual Security Act direct MSA to negotiate productivity agreements for the purpose of "stimulating free enterprise and the expansion of the economies of those countries."

To enable MSA to carry on these programs, Congress stipulated that \$100,000,000 of MSA funds should be used to develop an equivalent amount of European currencies to finance a European-wide productivity program.

Negotiations for the Dutch program, which will expand and strengthen the effort already being made under the MSA technical-assistance program to increase productivity, have been under way since July 1952. When the Dutch announced last January that they would not require MSA defense-support assistance during the 1953 fiscal year,<sup>1</sup> they indicated their continued interest in participating in technical-assistance programs, and it was agreed that the productivity program would not be affected as a result of the action.

The Dutch program proposes to seek immediate increases in productivity in the metal, building trade, and clothing industries and the introduction of new techniques of distributing consumer goods.

Guilder grants are to be made to the metal industry, including foundries, to remedy low productivity in small firms. This assistance is designed to enable these firms to qualify for sub-contracts from larger companies and permit an increase in the production capacity of the industry. The metal industry figures largely in the defense-production program of the Netherlands.

An expanded building program to replace war-destroyed factory facilities and housing for workers is also important to the Dutch economy and defense effort. Grants to the building trade will be specifically designed to help it incorporate new techniques in its activities and speed the country's construction program.

Previous studies that have been made under the MSA technical-assistance program have pointed to substantial gains that can be made in meeting consumer demand for clothing provided standardization of current output can be achieved. To accomplish this, substantial grants are planned for the clothing industry.

To assist in the effective distribution and sale of the expanded production, grants will be utilized in improving retail marketing practices.

In addition to the grant program, productivity funds will also be used as loans to medium and small firms in these three vital areas to assist them in modernization of plant design and equipment layout.

Paralleling this program, which has been developed jointly by MSA and appropriate ministries of the Netherlands Government, is a similar productivity program of the Dutch themselves. This will be carried on entirely by Dutch resources and will seek similar aims through the intensive use

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Feb. 9, 1953, p. 217.

of technical-assistance projects, including technical-information programs, and a Dutch loan fund to be used for the benefit of small and medium private industries. Both programs have been developed with the full participation and concurrence of Dutch private industries, labor, and consumers groups.

## Suspension of MSA Aid to Iceland

The Mutual Security Agency announced on May 16 that at the proposal of the Icelandic Government, American defense support aid to Iceland is being suspended. A similar announcement is being made in Reykjavik by Icelandic Minister of Commerce Bjorn Olafsson.

This suspension of aid follows a final allotment to Iceland of \$3,250,000, which will be used to help Iceland settle its intra-European payments position through the operations of the European Payments Union (EPU). The final allotment, made May 13, makes a total of \$5,450,000 in defense support funds for that country in the 1953 fiscal year and a total of a little more than \$37,000,000 in defense support and economic aid for Iceland since the initiation of the Marshall plan, MSA's predecessor, in April 1948.

In proposing that MSA defense support aid be suspended, Icelandic Government officials pointed out that the American aid in the past 2 years has been entirely related in one form or another to the carrying out of three projects basic to the Icelandic economy. These are construction of two hydroelectric plants and one fertilizer plant. All three are scheduled to be completed this summer.

MSA said that the suspension of defense support aid does not affect Iceland's participation in the MSA productivity and technical assistance program. It also does not affect Iceland's membership in NATO, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), and the Council of Europe.

Since Iceland has no military establishment, it has not received any direct military aid under the Mutual Security Program. It is, however, the site of a U. S. air base.

## Three-Power Meeting To Be Held

### *Statement by the President*

White House press release dated May 21

The Governments of the United States, Great Britain, and France have been in consultation with the view of holding an informal high-level meeting. We have agreed that such a meeting is desirable at a date convenient to all of us. A primary purpose will be further to develop common viewpoints with these friends on the many problems that must be solved cooperatively so that the cause of world peace may be advanced.

## An Expression of Friendship for the People of India

*Remarks by Secretary Dulles<sup>1</sup>*

Press release 282 dated May 22

I greatly appreciate the courtesy of the Government of India in giving me this opportunity to speak directly to those people of India who are listening to this broadcast. I speak to you as the Cabinet Minister who, under President Eisenhower, is responsible for foreign policy. It has fallen to my lot to be the first Secretary of State of the United States ever to come to India during the 160 years of our national existence. That is something of which I am proud.

The President has asked me to come here with Mr. Stassen, Director of our Mutual Security Agency, in order to carry his greetings to you, to express the friendship and interest which we feel for the people of India, and to learn from you. Our conference with Prime Minister Nehru, with your planning commission, and with other officials, and our visits to some of your national monuments, all help us to better understand the spirit of India. This knowledge will in turn help the United States to make a better foreign policy. . . .

The United States feels that it carries a very heavy burden and responsibility in world affairs. We did not seek that responsibility and indeed many Americans regret we have it. But since we do have it, we want to act wisely. That means we should sit down with our friends and discuss common problems and interests so that we may know at firsthand the views of other countries with whom we share the common objective of assuring peace and striving constantly for improvement in the welfare of all mankind.

Our own Declaration of Independence declared that we owe decent respect for the opinion of mankind. We have sought and will continue to seek opinions of other nations, and we will take these opinions into account in making our own policies.

May I remind you that when the U.N. Assembly was discussing Korea last year, the United States voted for the Indian resolution although this required us to change our own original position. It was other countries, not the United States, which rejected that resolution and thereby created a new situation.

We are eager for peace. It is true that the United States has fought three times in this century. We fought in World War I, we fought in World War II, and we are fighting today in Korea alongside South Korean and other U.N. forces. But we can hardly be accused of starting either the First World War or the Second World War, for both these wars began over 2 years before we came in. When we did come in, we were almost

wholly unarmed and it took another year for us to be ready to fight effectively. We came into those wars only because it seemed that if we did not, militaristic dictators would crush free peoples.

We fight in Korea in response to a June 25, 1950 decision by the U.N. Security Council—a decision in which India joined. That decision was based upon a report by the U.N. Commission in Korea, of which India was a member, to the effect that there was military aggression against the Republic of Korea which might endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

After the end of the Second World War, the United States quickly disarmed itself. After the Korean aggression we rearmed, but although we are fortunate to be endowed with great material strength our military establishment today by no means is the largest in the world. I can say to you that the American people are passionately devoted in seeking a just peace.

Some think that we are materialists. It is true that our people produce a high standard of living and that it is talked about all through the world. But the Americans are basically idealists. We are not ashamed of our material well-being, but we admire and respect things of the spirit. We are constantly seeking to enrich our culture by drawing on the culture of others. That is natural, perhaps, because we ourselves are a nation of immigrants made up of many races, colors, and creeds.

We read literature of other countries, enjoy their art, and listen to their music. Our people travel throughout the world and enjoy works of beauty which other peoples have created. Many millions of Americans have visited your wonderful Taj Mahal and those who cannot get here at least are familiar with it through photographs.

Finally, I would like to remind you that those who founded our Nation nearly two centuries ago did it in the hope that a United States would by its conduct and example promote freedom everywhere. President Lincoln who liberated slaves declared that our Declaration of Independence meant liberty not only for the people in our country but "hope for the world and for all future time." "It gave promise," he said, "that in due course weights should be lifted from the shoulders of all men." That, in a few words, has been and is the ideal of the American people.

President Eisenhower expressed the same ideal a few weeks ago. He made a moving appeal to all peoples of the world urging concrete steps to restore peace and justice in the world and to relieve mankind from the terrible burden of armament. He pledged that if there were deeds to restore international trust, that the United States would join with others to help all peoples of the world to live a better life. That appeal has received tremendous response throughout the world. That is because it was based on principles close to the hearts of all free men. . . .

<sup>1</sup> Made over the All-India Radio at New Delhi on May 22.

## The Value of Technical Cooperation in Latin America

by *John M. Cabot*

*Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

There is today before Congress a series of bills designed to grant increased protection for American producers of oil, lead, zinc, fish, and other products which Latin America exports to us. No one wants to see legitimate American industries prejudiced and workmen thrown out of work. From a narrow viewpoint we must remember that the question is not whether we can or cannot prevent depression in the oil, lead, zinc, and fishing industries. Clearly we can. The question is how can we cause the least possible unemployment and injury to our production as a whole. To save the employment of tens by special favors, at the expense of throwing hundreds out of work—to protect millions of invested capital at the expense of tens of millions—is not wisdom. It is the road to universal misery—closed factories, breadlines, despair the world over. Let us not choose that road.

Let us not indeed be so selfish as to think of the effects of exaggerated protection from the domestic viewpoint only. Our Latin friends produce many items which we buy from them in enormous quantities—coffee, sugar, copper, tin, lead, zinc, oil, bananas, wool, hides, etc. Their very subsistence depends on their exports of those commodities. If we do not buy what they are accustomed to produce, they will certainly have to give up much of what they now have. Not only will our normal exports to them be choked off, we shall substitute for them liberal exports of resentment and despair. That is not the road to cooperation, friendship, pan-Americanism. Even those who care nothing for the unfriendliness they will create in our sister Republics by choking off imports from those countries might do well to think of the help that would thereby be given to communism in neighboring lands. How unctuously the Communists would roll over their tongues this further

evidence of the inevitable contradictions of capitalism; and how easily the Latin American worker, who has lost his job when Uncle Sam slammed shut the door of international commerce, would accept this slick argument. Most of us will want, however, to think of good relations with our sister Republics as well as our national security.

There will be times when we shall have to protect domestic industries against unfair competition. We have recently been compelled, for example, to our great regret to levy a countervailing duty on Uruguayan wool tops. Recognizing the resentment that such decisions will inevitably cause, I nevertheless hope that our friends will appreciate that we did only what our law with good reason required.

On the other hand, I think it is vital for us in the United States to realize that we should not interfere with legitimate imports from other countries which have built up their trade over the years, merely because conditions in the domestic industry are not quite as good as they have been. In particular, I trust we are not prepared to repudiate binding trade agreements concluded under the authority of a law passed by Congress in order to curtail oil, lead, and zinc exports from our sister Republics. Surely that is not the proper course to follow.

Our economic well-being, the rising standards of living in our sister Republics which will contribute to that well-being, the supply of materials vital to us in an emergency, and above all that continental solidarity which contributes so vitally to our national security, all depend upon the development of normal trade with our sister Republics. Let us not permit any individual interest to rise above our clear national interests.

To this may I add a word for our Latin friends. Our economic measures are not always wise and farseeing, nor are all of our fellow citizens angels with golden harps and wings. I earnestly hope, nevertheless, that our friends to the south will not blame us for the results of their own economic

<sup>1</sup> Excerpts from an address made before the Board of Directors of the National Foreign Trade Council, Inc., at New York on May 15 (press release 260 dated May 14).



mistakes. There has been too strong a tendency among them to try to raise living standards by an assortment of panaceas, such as currency and credit inflation, heavy export taxes, multiple exchange rates, subsidies, nationalizations, controls, etc. Basically speaking, there is only one way that the living standard can be raised and that is to produce more. It is impossible to divide among consumers what is not produced. It is indeed important that what is produced should be divided fairly, but it has to be produced first. Prosperity depends not upon high prices, which choke off demand, but rather upon a high volume of production in proportion to the human labor involved.

Production can be increased in many ways—in agriculture, for example, by better seed, plowing, fertilizers, techniques in general. But in this modern world the greatest aid to increased production is increased capital. The worker in the United States is intelligent and hardworking, but so are many others in this world; the reason that our worker enjoys the highest living standards in the world is quite simply because he has vastly the greatest store of capital tools to help him produce. That is why he produces more and has more.

### **Need for Foreign Capital**

I earnestly hope that our sister Republics will transform their great natural resources, as we have, into the capital equipment which will mean for them progressively higher standards of living. We look forward with them to the day when their domestic capital can cover domestic needs. But as we did, they will need foreign capital to cooperate in their development. In this connection, it is vital to remember that we did not permit foreign capital to plunder our national resources but we also treated foreign capital fairly. We did not kill the goose that laid the golden eggs.

It is rather discouraging to receive letters reading like this:

Certain foreign capital acts as a retarding force in these countries. It has established such heartless and absolute monopolies that it has replaced the son of the country in every activity—agricultural, commercial, industrial. It has oppressed him, denying him the means of satisfying his necessities, and using its influence to have the State do the same. It intervenes in the internal politics of the country. It secures unwarranted concessions and tax exemptions, bribes officials, etc.

These things are said of companies which have poured millions of capital into the jungle and the desert and made them into great producers of wealth; that pay their workers higher wages and provide better housing, working conditions, hospitals, schools, etc., than can be found anywhere else in the respective countries; that have made vital contributions, without thought of reward, to various phases of the national life; and that in several instances have regularly furnished a very substantial part of the exports of the countries,

without which the economies of these countries would be gravely affected.

We can only deplore the fact that so many sincere people should have swallowed such false and misguided propaganda. That the Communists are pressing it is only to be expected; that people who love their countries should espouse views which can only injure their countries is difficult to understand. If foreign capital is guilty of abuses, and there are undeniably cases where it has been, measures can be taken to correct them which will not ruin legitimate foreign investors and paralyze development. But today the picture is all too often one of foreign capital which is being unreasonably harassed. That is tough on the foreign capital involved. It is much tougher on the country where it is invested, for that country is thereby injuring the well-being of its people and its national development while the Kremlin laughs.

American capital has a great responsibility to demonstrate to the people of the country in which it is invested the tangible benefits it is bringing to them. The governments and the thinking people in those countries have an equal responsibility to their own countries to convince their countrymen of the advantages which accrue to the national development through fair treatment of foreign capital.

Amid all these difficulties and perplexities, I have nevertheless a heartening message for you. I have just returned from visits to 11 of our sister Republics in the Caribbean area. I went doubting that the tide had turned in the battle against hunger, disease, and consequent communism in that area. I return convinced that it has. There are some bad spots in the generally bright picture; the battle is far from over and I must solemnly warn you that complacency on our part might easily be fatal. But the trend in this area is generally in the right direction and with steadfastness and wisdom it will continue so.

### **Results of U. S. Technical Cooperation**

I wish in particular that you might have been with me to see and hear as I did what our technical cooperation is meaning to them in improved living standards. When this work was originally started during the war by Nelson Rockefeller and his organization, I must confess to misgivings; our Latin friends are very sensitive and it seemed to me that they might resent our offers of cooperation in such fields as education and public health. In self-defense be it said that from time to time there has been enough of that to show that misgivings were not altogether unfounded; but they have been swept away by the striking successes achieved by the cooperative services we have backed. I am not telling you what our people told me; I am telling you what the officials of the countries I visited said. The closer they were

to the work the more appreciative they tended to be.

The usual pattern is for the two governments to set up a cooperative service, say in health or agriculture. At the beginning the United States furnished the bulk of the project funds to pay the needed American technicians, materials, and training grants; the other government furnished the money needed for local expenses, trainees, facilities, etc. The purpose is for the U.S. technicians to work themselves gradually out of their job as the other government develops know-how, organization, trained personnel, facilities, etc. Today on an average the other government furnishes almost  $\frac{2}{3}$  of the technical-assistance funds and the vast bulk of the personnel. Let me say that this is by no means a one-way street; some of our technicians working in the various countries with their local colleagues have fathered developments of value to all of us. Interestingly, one of the perpetual troubles of the cooperative projects is the way in which their trained personnel get swiped, particularly by other agencies of the local government. Not that we really object to this; on the contrary, we are glad to see the training they have been given put to good use by the other country.

The two fields in which our technical cooperation has been particularly effective are those of health and agriculture. In the former, great progress has been made in eliminating yaws and malaria, in providing pure water and in setting up clinics and public nursing. Scarcely a house you pass in Central America does not have the DDT sign on it to show when it was last sprayed. In these countries it is an old story for the Stars and Stripes to fly beside the national flag as pure water systems are inaugurated in town after town and the women find that they no longer have to carry jugs of contaminated water for long distances. Today the people know that their governments are doing something for them and they know that Uncle Sam is helping.

The story in the agricultural field is much the same. The agricultural services have introduced better seed, plowing, terracing, erosion control (vital in Central America), and irrigation, better fertilizers, better methods generally. At first I listened to these stories skeptically; they were all very fine, but were these services really getting to the small farmer, were they being reflected in the national economy? My skepticism was unwarranted. In El Salvador, for example, the old native rice has been largely supplanted by a new rice developed by the cooperative service which gives an enormously increased yield. In a country as crowded as El Salvador this is vital. In Costa Rica instead of importing corn, sugar, beans, and rice as they used to they now export them—rice to Japan, they proudly told me.

Some of you will doubtless think, well, that is

all very lovely but it must cost us a pretty penny and what do we get out of it?

The total cost to us of all our technical cooperation with 19 American Republics, which includes 650 training grants, will amount this fiscal year to \$22,300,000. If we must regard this from a dollars and cents point of view, I understand that it has been a good investment simply from the increased sales of American tractors, farm machinery, fertilizers, medicines, sanitary supplies, etc., it has stimulated, quite apart from any indirect commercial effects.

But personally I deplore any such argument. It was not the reason we undertook the program and it is to my mind but a minor part of the case for continuing it. The major advantages of the program from our viewpoint are not material. This is pan-Americanism in action. This is a demonstration that we do care for their well-being, that we do value their friendship, that we want them to rise in splendor in the constellation of nations. It shows the ignorant peon that Communist propaganda is clap-trap and that democracy is the path of progress for the great masses of humanity.

At this point let me reiterate my introductory warning: a splendid start has been made in wiping out miseries and raising living standards through our technical cooperation, but it is only a start. An enormous task still lies before us. As we turn over some services to other governments, there are important new fields which can and must be opened. I am not pleading for large increases in appropriations; the very men working in the field say that a large sudden increase in available funds would be disastrous, because the success of their operations has depended on their being small and compact. To my mind the important thing is to give our technical-cooperation program continuity. If we want the friendship of our sister Republics, we must loyally cooperate with them in their development on a continuing basis.

And another point. We are often criticized for recognizing governments that have come to power by violence and remain in power by oppression. I shall not at this time refute these arguments at length; suffice it to say that democracy cannot be imposed by force, but must be built painfully from the ground up; that we have solemnly pledged ourselves not to intervene in the internal affairs of any other American Republic; and that we have found that interventions of one sort and another, however well intentioned, have never produced democracy.

I think that if there is anything we can do to help democratic forces in our sister Republics, our technical cooperation is it. By combating illiteracy, by improving health, by giving even the poorest something more than the bare means of subsistence, by interesting everyone in civic affairs, by awakening pride in national progress, I profoundly believe that it is laying solidly a few

foundation blocks upon which a sound structure of democracy can in due course be built. And we, as eldest sister in the American family of nations, will rejoice if our cooperation helps our sister Republics to attain the brilliant destiny which must surely be theirs.

## Monetary Fund Announcements

The International Monetary Fund announced on May 11 the establishment of the initial par value for the Japanese Yen at 360 Yen per U.S. dollar.

The parities for the Yen in terms of gold and in terms of the U.S. dollar of the weight and fineness in effect on July 1, 1944, are as follows:

0.00246853	grams of fine gold per Yen;
12,600.0	Yen per troy ounce of fine gold;
360.000	Yen per U.S. dollar;
0.277778	U.S. cents per Yen.

The International Monetary Fund has concurred in a proposal by the Government of Bolivia to establish a new par value for the boliviano and simplify the Bolivian exchange system. The Fund also announces a purchase of U.S. \$2,500,000 by the Bolivian Government.

The new foreign-exchange measures, which become effective on May 14, were proposed as part of a program directed toward stabilization of the Bolivian economy. The country previously had developed a complicated restrictive system based on simultaneous use of quantitative restrictions on imports and payments, and multiple currency practices. Through this system different treatment was given to various mining and agricultural exports. Essential food imports were maintained at a preferential rate.

The new par value established for Bolivia's currency, previously 60 bolivianos per U.S. dollar, is 190 bolivianos per U.S. dollar. In terms of gold and in terms of the U.S. dollar of the weight and fineness in effect on July 1, 1944, the parities for the boliviano are as follows:

0.00467722	grams of fine gold per boliviano;
6,650.00	bolivianos per troy ounce of fine gold;
190.00	bolivianos per U.S. dollar;
0.526316	U.S. cents per boliviano.

The exchange system will consist of an official and a free market. The official market will be for all trade transactions, government payments, registered capital, and certain specified invisibles. All present exchange taxes, multiple import and export rates, retention quotas, compensation, and divisas propias arrangements are eliminated. An export tax equivalent to 35 bolivianos per dollar will be levied on the exports of the government-owned mining corporation. Ad valorem taxes of 50 and 100 percent will be levied on less and non-

essential imports. A legal free market for all remaining items will be established, where rates will fluctuate.

The Fund welcomes the substantial simplification of the exchange rate structure and approves the new multiple currency practices proposed by Bolivia. The Fund notes that quantitative restrictions will still be maintained on international payments. It welcomes the efforts being made to move toward monetary stabilization and wishes to emphasize the importance of firm anti-inflationary measures as a basis for further progress towards the achievement of Bolivia's international equilibrium. The Fund will follow developments in the new exchange system and related matters.

## Remedial Works for Niagara Falls

Press release 265 dated May 15

The International Joint Commission submitted on May 12, 1953, to the Governments of the United States and Canada its report and recommendations concerning remedial works to preserve and enhance the scenic beauty of Niagara Falls and Niagara River. The report and recommendations were submitted in response to a reference to the Commission by the two Governments on October 10, 1950, in accordance with article II of the treaty with Canada concerning uses of the waters of the Niagara River signed on February 27, 1950 (TIAS 2130; 1 U.S.T. 694).<sup>1</sup>

Article II of this treaty provides that the Governments agree to:

... complete in accordance with the objectives envisaged in the final report submitted to the United States and Canada on December 11, 1929, by the special International Niagara Board (S. Doc. 128, 71st Cong., 2d sess.) the remedial works which are necessary to enhance the beauty of the Falls by distributing the waters so as to produce an unbroken crestline on the Falls.

In order to accomplish this result this article of the treaty further provides that the Governments:

... shall request the International Joint Commission to make recommendations as to the nature and design of such remedial works and the allocation of the task of construction as between the United States of America and Canada.

Accordingly on October 10, 1950, a reference was sent by the two Governments to the International Joint Commission requesting it to conduct investigations and make a report containing:

(1) recommendations concerning the nature and design of the works necessary to enhance the beauty of the Falls by distributing the waters so as to produce an unbroken crestline on the Falls in accordance with the report of the special International Niagara Board;

<sup>1</sup> For the Department's announcement of the signing of the treaty, see BULLETIN of Mar. 20, 1950, p. 448.

(2) recommendations concerning the allocation of the task of construction of remedial works as between Canada and the United States, having regard to the recommendations made under paragraph (1);

(3) an estimate of the cost of such remedial works.

The treaty provided also that upon approval by the United States and Canada of such recommendations, the construction of the remedial works should be undertaken under the supervision of the International Joint Commission and completed within 4 years after the date on which the two Governments approved the Commission's recommendations. The total cost of the works is to be divided equally between the two Governments.

Upon receipt of the reference of October 10, 1950, the International Joint Commission established the International Niagara Falls Engineering Board which has conducted extensive studies and has constructed models for testing plans intended to carry out the objectives set forth in the treaty. A comprehensive joint report of the results of these studies and tests was submitted to the Commission at its semiannual meeting in Washington beginning April 7, 1953.

After study of the Board's report the International Joint Commission has submitted its report dated May 5, 1953, reviewing the results of the investigations and making the following recommendations:

*1. Recommendations concerning the nature and design of the remedial works necessary to preserve and enhance the scenic beauty of the Niagara Falls and River.*

The Commission recommends the construction of the remedial works described in this report and in the Board's report which is attached hereto and made a part hereof, with such minor modifications as the Commission may deem advisable at the time of construction, the works to include:

(a) A Chippawa-Grass Island Pool control structure, extending out from the Canadian shore approximately 1550 feet into the Niagara River, parallel to the existing submerged weir and about 225 feet downstream therefrom;

(b) An excavation in the Horseshoe Cascades lying immediately upstream from the Canadian flank of the Horseshoe Falls and a crest fill on that flank about 100 feet long; and,

(c) An excavation in the Horseshoe Cascades lying immediately upstream from the Goat Island flank of the Horseshoe Falls and a crest fill on that flank about 300 feet long.

*2. Recommendations concerning the allocation of the task of construction of the remedial works as between Canada and the United States of America.*

The Commission recommends that the task of construction be divided between the two countries in such manner that each country would construct, generally, those portions of the works which lie within its national boundaries. On this basis, Canada would construct the Chippawa-Grass Island Pool control structure and the excavation and crest fill on the Canadian flank of the Horseshoe Falls; and, the United States would construct the excavation and crest fill on the Goat Island flank of the Horseshoe Falls, including the small amount of excavation on the Canadian side of the Boundary.

3. The Commission further recommends that the construction of the proposed remedial works be initiated at the earliest possible moment and be pressed to completion as rapidly as possible. It is especially important that construction of the Chippawa-Grass Island Pool control structure be commenced immediately and that it be constructed to its ultimate length of approximately 1,550 feet unless during the course of construction the status of prospective additional power diversion should permit consideration of a shorter structure initially. The excavation and fill on either flank of the Horseshoe Falls should be started as soon as possible and substantially completed before work is begun on the excavation and fill on the other flank in order to minimize temporary adverse effects on the scenic spectacle during the construction period.

4. The Commission also recommends that the two Governments authorize it to establish a Control Board to supervise the operation of the proposed control structure to insure accomplishment of its intended purposes and to insure that the levels of the Niagara River and Lake Erie will not be adversely affected. These functions, deemed properly within the purview of the Commission, are closely related to the function of determining the amount of water available for the purposes of the Treaty of February 27, 1950. Accordingly, it would seem desirable and in the public interest that the representatives of the United States and Canada to be designated pursuant to Article VII of the Treaty be appointed by the Commission to serve also as members of the Control Board which the Commission desires to establish and hold responsible for the operation of the Chippawa-Grass Island Pool control structure.

With respect to the estimate of the costs of such remedial works, the Commission reported as follows:

#### *Cost Estimates*

The construction cost of the remedial works (not including the comparatively small amount of pre-construction costs) is estimated to total \$17,536,000 at July 1952 construction-cost levels.

A breakdown of this estimate is shown below:

Chippawa-Grass Island Pool Control Structure, 1,550 feet long-----	\$14,594,000
Excavation and Fill in the Cascades on the Canadian Flank of the Horseshoe Falls--	1,582,000
Excavation and Fill in the Cascades on the Goat Island Flank of the Horseshoe Falls-----	1,360,000
Total -----	\$17,536,000

Estimated Annual Cost of Operation and Maintenance of the Remedial Works----- \$100,000

The report and recommendations will be considered by the interested agencies of the two Governments and a decision will be reached regarding the Commission's recommendations.

## **German Ratification of EDC Treaty, Contractual Conventions**

*Statement by Acting Secretary Smith*

Press release 266 dated May 15

It is heartening to hear from Bonn that the German parliament has completed ratification of the European Defense Treaty and Contractual Conventions. These agreements will permit the

Federal Republic to play an honorable and important role in the family of free nations, including their common defense against aggression. This action by the Bundesrat also constitutes one more basic step toward European integration through the establishment of a European army.

I realize that the constitutionality of these treaties may still be tested before the German Constitutional Court. Nonetheless, I am convinced that the action just completed in Bonn will greatly encourage those forces and individuals throughout free Europe which are devoting themselves to increasing the strength and unity of the free world. We hope most sincerely that the other Parliaments of the developing six-nation community may follow suit and approve the treaties concerned in the near future.

## **Military Assistance to Ethiopia**

Press release 279 dated May 22

Acting Secretary Smith and the Foreign Minister of Ethiopia, Ato Aklilou Abte Wold, on May 22 signed a mutual-defense assistance agreement under the provisions of which the Government of the United States will provide military equipment and training assistance to the Ethiopian Armed Forces. The agreement follows a determination made recently by the President that Ethiopia is eligible for grant aid according to the provisions of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended. In reaching this determination the President took into consideration Ethiopia's strategic location within the general Near East area and the importance of Ethiopia's defensive strength to security in that area and to U.S. security. The federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia last September has given Ethiopia a shoreline on the Red Sea which emphasizes its strategic identification with the Near East area.

This agreement is similar to other agreements concluded with countries already receiving U.S. military aid and provides generally for the terms and conditions under which such aid will be made available. The agreement contains the customary provision for a U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group, which will be sent to Ethiopia to observe the use made of the aid and perform such other functions, including training, as are required in the assistance program. This program is designed to facilitate, to the extent permitted by its

manpower, resources, facilities, and general economic condition, the full contribution by Ethiopia to the development of its own defensive strength and the defensive strength of the free world.

Ethiopia's resolve to play its part in the collective defense of the free world has been clearly demonstrated by its contribution of combat forces to the U.N. Command in Korea, and the outstanding fighting record of those troops has provided an impressive measure of Ethiopia's military capacity, provided it has modern military equipment.

## **Release of William N. Oatis From Czechoslovak Prison**

*At a news conference on May 16 Lincoln White, Deputy Special Assistant for Press Relations, made the following statement on the release of William N. Oatis, Associated Press correspondent in Prague, after 2 years of imprisonment in Czechoslovakia.*

Following continuous representations to the Czechoslovak Government since the imprisonment of William Oatis on April 23, 1951, Ambassador George Wadsworth saw Prime Minister Viliam Siroky and Foreign Minister Vaclav David at 6 p. m. at Prague on May 15. The Ambassador was informed by the Prime Minister that in accordance with the Czechoslovak Constitution, the President of Czechoslovakia, Antonin Zapotocky, was pardoning William Oatis on the basis of a petition received from Mrs. Oatis in November 1952. Arrangements for his release and departure from Czechoslovakia were made at this meeting. The release of William Oatis removes one of the obstacles which have so far stood in the way of any improvement in the relations between the United States and Czechoslovakia.

The Department, of course, is greatly pleased by the release of Mr. Oatis from an incarceration which this Government felt from the outset was a gross injustice.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>For an account of the Oatis trial, including (1) a condensed version of the indictment; (2) text of Czechoslovak espionage laws; and (3) excerpts from the proceedings, based on notes made by the American Embassy observers, see BULLETIN of Aug. 20, 1951, p. 283. Also available as Department of State publication 4357. For Department statements concerning this case, see BULLETIN of July 16, 1951, p. 92; Sept. 10, 1951, p. 416; Sept. 24, 1951, p. 489; and Oct. 20, 1952, p. 625.

## INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

### Calendar of Meetings <sup>1</sup>

#### Adjourned During May 1953

Inter-American Council of Jurists: 2d Meeting . . . . .	Buenos Aires . . . . .	Apr. 20-May 9
Fourth Commonwealth Conference on Development of Design & Inspection of Military Clothing and General Stores.	London . . . . .	Apr. 20-May 9
U.N. (United Nations):		
<i>Ad Hoc</i> Committee on Forced Labor: 4th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 23-May 22
Fiscal Commission: 4th Session . . . . .	New York . . . . .	Apr. 27-May 8
High Commissioner's Advisory Committee on Refugees: 3d Session .	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 27-May 2
Social Commission: 9th Session . . . . .	New York . . . . .	May 4-20
<i>Ad Hoc</i> Commission on Prisoners of War: 4th Session . . . . .	New York . . . . .	May 11-29
South Pacific Commission: 11th Session . . . . .	Nouméa . . . . .	Apr. 25-May 1
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization):		
Poplar Congress: 5th International and Poplar Commission: 7th Session.	Munster-Munich . . . . .	Apr. 29-May 8
International Cotton Advisory Committee: 12th Plenary Meeting . .	Washington . . . . .	May 4-5
UPU (Universal Postal Union): Meeting of Executive & Liaison Committee.	Bern . . . . .	May 4-15
WHO (World Health Organization): 6th Assembly . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	May 5-22
ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization): Standing Committee on Aircraft Performance: 4th Session.	Paris . . . . .	May 6-30*
ILO (International Labor Organization): Permanent Agricultural Committee: 4th Session.	Geneva . . . . .	May 6-16
Caribbean Commission: 16th Meeting . . . . .	Paramaribo . . . . .	May 11-16
International Symposium on Neurosecretion . . . . .	Naples . . . . .	May 11-23
International Rubber Study Group: 10th Meeting . . . . .	Copenhagen . . . . .	May 11-15
International Cotton Standards Conference . . . . .	Washington . . . . .	May 13-15
International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries: 3d Meeting.	New Haven . . . . .	May 25-30
International Seed Testing Association: 10th Congress . . . . .	Dublin . . . . .	May 25-30

#### In Session as of May 31, 1953

International Materials Conference . . . . .	Washington . . . . .	Feb. 26 1951-
OEEC (Organization for European Economic Cooperation): Conference on European Inland Transport.	Paris . . . . .	Mar. 18-
ITU (International Telecommunication Union):		
Administrative Council: 8th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	May 2-*
International Telegraph Consultative Committee: 8th Plenary Assembly.	Arnheim . . . . .	May 26-
U. N. (United Nations): International Conference to Adopt a Protocol on Limitation of the Production of Opium.	New York . . . . .	May 11-
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization): Latin American Seminar on Land Problems.	São Paulo . . . . .	May 25-
WHO (World Health Organization): Executive Board: 12th Session . .	Geneva . . . . .	May 26-
ILO (International Labor Organization): Governing Body: 122d Session .	Geneva . . . . .	May 26-
CFM (Council of Foreign Ministers): Deputies for Austria . . . . .	London . . . . .	May 27-
UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization): International Center for Workers Education.	Compiègne . . . . .	May 30-
Horticultural Congress and Exposition . . . . .	Hamburg . . . . .	May-

#### Scheduled June 1-August 31, 1953

U. N. (United Nations):		
International Law Commission: 5th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	June 1-
3d Regional Meeting of European Statisticians . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	June 15-
Trusteeship Council: 12th Session . . . . .	New York . . . . .	June 16-
Economic and Social Council: 16th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	June 30-
Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	June-
International Sugar Conference . . . . .	London . . . . .	July 13-
Technical Assistance Committee, Working Party . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	July 15-
<i>Ad Hoc</i> Committee on Factors . . . . .	New York . . . . .	July 21-
Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction . . . . .	New York . . . . .	July 27-
ECAFE Subcommittee on Iron and Steel . . . . .	Bangkok . . . . .	Aug. 31-

<sup>1</sup> Prepared in the Division of International Conferences, Department of State, May 22, 1953. Asterisks indicate tentative dates.

Meeting of Directing Council of the American International Institute for the Protection of Childhood.	Montevideo . . . . .	June 2-
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization):		
Committee on Commodity Problems: 21st Session . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	June 3-
17th Session of the Council . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	June 15-
ILO (International Labor Organization):		
Annual Conference: 36th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	June 4-
Meeting of Experts on Systems of Payment by Results in the Construction Industry.	Geneva . . . . .	July 21-
<i>Ad Hoc</i> Committee on Quarantine Regulations (South Pacific Commission).	Nouméa . . . . .	June 8-
UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization):		
Executive Board: 34th Session . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	June 8-
International Conference on the Role and Place of Music in Education.	Brussels . . . . .	June 29-
Second Extraordinary Session . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	July 1-
Eighth Pan American Railway Congress . . . . .	Washington & Atlantic City.	June 12-
ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization):		
Assembly: 7th Session . . . . .	Brighton (England) . . . . .	June 16-
North Atlantic Ocean Weather Stations . . . . .	Brighton . . . . .	July 8-
Eighth International Dairy Congress and International Dairy Exposition.	The Hague . . . . .	June 22-
International Whaling Commission: 5th Annual Meeting . . . . .	London . . . . .	June 22-
International Commission for Criminal Investigation: 22d General Assembly.	Oslo . . . . .	June 24-
20th International Aeronautical Exposition . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	June 26-
Icsu (International Council of Scientific Unions):		
Committee on the International Geophysical Year 1957-58 . . . . .	Brussels . . . . .	June 30-
Executive Board: 5th Meeting . . . . .	Strasbourg . . . . .	July 6-
Joint Commission on High Altitude Research Stations . . . . .	Denver . . . . .	Aug. 22-
IUPAP (International Union of Pure and Applied Physics): Commission on Cosmic Rays.	Bagnères-de-Bigorre . . . . .	July 5-
16th International Conference on Public Education . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	July 6-
International Wheat Council: 12th Session . . . . .	London . . . . .	July 16-
Second International Congress on Rheology . . . . .	Oxford . . . . .	July 26-
13th International Congress of Pure and Applied Chemistry . . . . .	Stockholm . . . . .	July 29-
17th Conference of the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry.	Stockholm . . . . .	July 29-
WMO (World Meteorological Organization):		
Regional Association for South America . . . . .	Rio de Janeiro . . . . .	July-
1st Session of the Regional Association for North and Central America.	Toronto . . . . .	Aug. 3-
Commission for Aerology: 1st Session . . . . .	Toronto . . . . .	Aug. 10-
Commission for Instruments and Methods of Observation: 1st Session.	Toronto . . . . .	Aug. 10-
Ninth General Assembly of the Inter-American Commission of Women.	Asunción . . . . .	Aug.-
Fourth International Astronautical Congress . . . . .	Zürich . . . . .	Aug. 3-
15th International Veterinary Congress . . . . .	Stockholm . . . . .	Aug. 9-
14th International Exhibition of Cinematographic Art . . . . .	Venice . . . . .	Aug. 11-
Eighth International Congress on Home Economics . . . . .	Edinburgh . . . . .	Aug. 12-
Silent Games (Deaf Mutes), 7th International . . . . .	Brussels . . . . .	Aug. 15-
Third International Conference on Soil Mechanics and Foundation Engineering.	Zürich . . . . .	Aug. 16-
12th Congress of the International Association of Limnology . . . . .	Cambridge & Windemere . . . . .	Aug. 20-
Ninth International Congress of Genetics . . . . .	Bellagio . . . . .	Aug. 24-
Eighth International Congress on Rheumatic Diseases . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Aug. 24-
Fifth International Congress on Tropical Medicine and Malaria . . . . .	Istanbul . . . . .	Aug. 28-
International Association for Hydraulic Research . . . . .	Minneapolis . . . . .	Aug. 30-
Fourth International Congress of the International Association on Quaternary Research.	Rome & Pisa . . . . .	Aug. 30-

## **Eighth Pan American Railway Congress**

*by William T. Faricy*

A noteworthy event in the broadening relationship among American Republics in the industrial and technical field will occur in the United States this June when the Eighth Pan American Railway Congress will be held at Washington, D.C., and Atlantic City, N.J. It will be the first meeting the Pan American Railway Congress Association has held in this country. Previous con-

gresses have been held at Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro, Santiago, Bogotá, Montevideo, Habana, and Mexico City.

The objectives of the Association, which was established as a permanent international organization in 1910, include the improvement of railroad facilities and services in the American Republics, reduction of frontier barriers, standardization of equipment, interchange of technical data, and coordination of transport. All 21 American Republics are members of the Association, the headquarters of which is at Buenos Aires; many railroads, institutions, and private individuals

take part in the activities of the organization. U.S. participation was authorized by legislative enactment in 1948 (Public Law 794, 80th Cong.).

It is expected that the Eighth Congress, which is being sponsored by the Government of the United States and the U.S. National Commission in the Pan American Railway Congress Association (PARCA) in collaboration with the Permanent Commission of PARCA, will reflect and emphasize the heightened interest of all the countries of the Americas in applying the most advanced scientific and technical developments to the improvement of transportation by rail.

While members of the Congress are in Atlantic City, the Railway Supply Manufacturers' Association will sponsor an exhibit consisting of more than 20 million dollars' worth of railroad supplies and equipment, the largest show of its kind ever held. Participants in the Congress will be invited to visit these exhibits in Convention Hall and on nearby railroad tracks and see the latest developments that have contributed to the great advances U.S. railroads have made in recent years in the efficiency, economy, safety, and dependability of their operations.

Such improvements include the "push-button" yard, which provides remote control of switches and car speeds for smoother and faster classification of trains in yards; the use of radio, radar, television, and other electronic marvels; centralized traffic control, interlocking automatic block signals and other traffic-expediting systems, and new and improved types of motive power, including the diesel-electric, gas and steam turbine-electric, and the Ignitron, which converts alternating current to direct through the use of rectifier tubes.

Technical papers to be presented at the Congress are expected to cover such facilities and equipment as the foregoing, as well as new operating methods, all designed to increase railroad efficiency in all areas of the Western Hemisphere.

Arrangements for the Congress are being made by an Organizing Committee established in March 1952. This committee, headed by James G. Lyne, president of the Simmons-Boardman Publishing Corporation and editor of *Railway Age*, consists of members of the U.S. National Commission in the PARCA; the presidents of a number of U.S. railroads; officials of several U.S. companies producing railroad equipment and supplies, and government officials concerned with improvement of international transportation facilities.

The Congress will open at Washington on June 12 with the presentation of credentials and registration of the participants. Present estimates are that attendance from the Latin American Republics will exceed 150 delegates and members and that the enrollment from the United States will be about 200.

The Washington portion of the Congress will begin June 13 and end June 20. This period will

consist primarily of meetings of technical sections and plenary sessions for the presentation and discussion of papers on problems of railway construction, rolling stock, operation, administration and public policy. A total of 147 subjects have been suggested for possible treatment, in line with which an estimated 200 papers will be presented. In accordance with past practice, honorary diplomas and monetary prizes will be awarded for the best papers.

In addition to the meetings of technical sections and plenary sessions, roundtable discussions will be held on two subjects of current interest: How the U.S. technical-cooperation program can aid the development of Latin American railroads and international traffic problems.

On June 21, the participants will be taken by special train to Atlantic City. There they will attend the annual meetings of several divisions of the Association of American Railroads. A presentation of awards will be made at the closing session on June 25.

Detailed information on the Congress may be obtained from Loyd J. Kiernan, Executive Secretary, Organizing Committee, Eighth Pan American Railway Congress, Division of International Conferences, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

• *Mr. Faricy is chairman of the U.S. National Commission in the Pan American Railway Congress Association.*

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<sup>1</sup> Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

The United Nations Secretariat has established an Official Records series for the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and the Atomic Energy Commission which includes summaries of proceedings, resolutions, and reports of the various commissions and committees. Information on securing subscriptions to the series may be obtained from the International Documents Service.



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## THE DEPARTMENT

### Department To Sponsor Conference on U.S. Foreign Policy

Press release 281 dated May 22

Representatives of approximately 200 national organizations have been invited by Secretary Dulles to attend a conference on U.S. foreign policy at the Department on June 4 and 5, 1953.

The meetings will be informal in character and are designed to give leaders of national nongovernmental organizations an opportunity to exchange views with top officials of the Department.

The conference program includes informal statements by Secretary Dulles; Carl W. McCandle, Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs; Livingston Merchant, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs; Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs; Henry A. Byroade, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs; Robert L. Johnson, Administrator, International Information Administration; Stanley Andrews, Administrator, Technical Cooperation Administration; John M. Cabot, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs; Harold E. Stassen, Director for Mutual Security; and Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., U.S. Representative to the United Nations. Joseph B. Phillips, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, will deliver the closing address June 5. Names of other speakers representing major areas of the Department will be announced later.

Other Department officials will participate in a series of panel discussions with organization representatives on the morning of June 5.

A luncheon meeting will be held in the National Press Club ballroom on June 4, at which time the

speaker will be Senator Alexander Wiley, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Those attending the conference represent organizations and associations from various sections of the country which have a continuing interest in international affairs. Among the groups which have designated representatives for the meeting are farm, labor, business, women's, religious, veterans', men's service and educational and professional organizations.

## Resignation

Harold F. Linder as Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, effective May 15, 1953.

## Designations

John C. Dreier, U.S. representative on the Council of the Organization of American States, has been designated as coordinator of preparations for the Tenth Inter-American Conference, which is scheduled to take place at Caracas in March 1954. In this capacity he will be directly responsible to the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs.

The acting U.S. representative on the Inter-American Economic and Social Council, Julian C. Greenup, will serve as deputy coordinator, with responsibility for coordinating the preparations in the economic field.

Richard S. Wheeler, Associate Chief of the Division of International Conferences, will serve as deputy coordinator, with responsibility for coordinating the organizational and administrative aspects of this Government's participation in the Conference.

The coordinator and the deputy coordinators will serve in this capacity in addition to their regular duties.

## Information Relating to the IIA

### Press Reports Denied

In reference to press reports concerning his resignation, Robert L. Johnson, Administrator of the International Information Administration, said on May 19 (press release 274) that the stories concerning his resignation are completely erroneous, and added that he has high hopes of shaping the overseas information program into an effective weapon to win the cold war.

Mr. Johnson said there is no basis for the press reports that he is disgusted over the extent to which operations of the Voice of America's radio programs were being cut back. The Administrator pointed out that he took the initiative and directed a series of cutbacks to comply with the Bureau of the Budget's economy directive, of which he approves. He added:

"The actions I have taken within the last 6 weeks will reduce costs and increase the efficiency of our operation. The moves I have made are a contraction to establish the essentials of a revitalized, flexible, and hard-hitting program designed to achieve maximum effectiveness."

He added that he is considering other consolidation moves which will reduce operating costs without jeopardizing the effectiveness of the program.

### Closing of New York IPS Office

Robert L. Johnson, Administrator of the International Information Administration, announced on May 18 (press release 272) the closing of the New York Office of the International Press Service, effective June 30, as a means of reducing operating expenses.

The International Press Service is one of five media services, and operates the press, publications, and photographic programs of the State Department's International Information Administration. In addition to photo and news coverage, the 15 persons working in the New York Office of IPS, 250 West 57th Street, provide photo and article research and procurement and printing coordination, as well as assistance to foreign journalists in the United States.

As a result of this move, Mr. Johnson said, the domestic functions of the International Press Service will be centralized in Washington. The Administrator added that New York coverage of important events such as U.N. meetings will not be eliminated. Such assignments, as required, will be accomplished by Washington personnel.

## Administrative Operations Consolidated

Robert L. Johnson, Administrator of the International Information Administration, announced on May 18 (press release 270) that the functions of the New York Administrative Office (NAO) of the IIA will be combined with the Office of Comptroller of the International Broadcasting Service as a means of lowering costs and improving efficiency.

Frank L. Seymour who since November 1952 has been chief of the New York Administrative Office handling auditing, procurement, contracting, warehousing, and general services for all of IIA in New York, will take over on May 18 as acting comptroller of the International Broadcasting Service and will direct the consolidation of these two administrative operations. The position of comptroller of the International Broadcasting Service had previously been held by Robert J. Francis, who is at present serving as acting director of the Voice of America.

## Denial of Press Statement on Film Directors

The Department of State on May 13 (press release 262) denied statements appearing in that day's press that any film directors had been chosen by the Department to work on film projects for the International Information Administration (IIA). There is no foundation to press statements that 28 Hollywood directors had been drafted into service to guide the making of a series of 2-, 3-, and 4-reel films on behalf of IIA.

Robert L. Johnson, Administrator, International Information Administration, in referring to the misstatements appearing in the press, called attention to the fact that last month he had announced that Cecil B. DeMille had consented to serve as chief consultant on matters relating to IIA Motion Picture Service.<sup>1</sup> With the assistance of Mr. DeMille, it is expected that the active cooperation of the entire motion-picture industry will be enlisted in behalf of the State Department's program.

## Nomination of Michael J. McDermott

Press release 278 dated May 21

The President on May 21 sent to the Senate the nomination of Michael J. McDermott of Massachusetts to be Ambassador to El Salvador.

Mr. McDermott will bring to his new assignment a rich experience of 36 years in international affairs. He has served continuously as chief press officer of the Department of State since 1927, has served on various policy committees within the Department of State and has attended virtually every major international conference in which the

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Apr. 27, 1953, p. 635.

United States has participated since entering the Department in 1920.

His service in the best interests of his country was made "Mike" McDermott known to and respected by correspondent and diplomat alike throughout the world. In recognition of this service Mr. McDermott was awarded the Superior Service Award by the Department of State in 1950.

In 1917 Mr. McDermott came to Washington to the Office of the Provost Marshal General, where he assisted in the preparations for the conduct of the first draft. He was then assigned to the White House in September 1917. He joined the Army in December 1917, and was commissioned a warrant officer by the Secretary of War. He was then immediately assigned to overseas duty as confidential clerk to Gen. Tasker Bliss in the American Section of the Supreme War Council at Versailles and on the American Commission to Negotiate Peace. He served under General Bliss until May 1920 when he was honorably discharged.

Mr. McDermott then accompanied Elihu Root to The Hague. Mr. Root was then a member of the Commission of Jurists to formulate the project for an International Court of Justice. He remained with Mr. Root until August 1920 when he came to the Department of State at Washington.

Mr. McDermott's first assignment in the Department of State was that of special assistant. In June 1923 he was assigned as private secretary to Under Secretary of State William Phillips.

In 1923 Mr. McDermott was loaned by Secretary Charles Evans Hughes to the White House to accompany President Warren G. Harding on his trip to Alaska as a combination secretary and press officer. It fell to his lot to announce the tragic news of the President's death August 2, 1923, at the Palace Hotel in San Francisco. . . .

In April 1924 Mr. McDermott became Assistant Chief of the Division of Current Information. Three years later he became Chief of the Division. In January 1944 he became special assistant to the Secretary of State for Press Relations and has served in that capacity under six Secretaries of State.

While serving with Mr. Root and during his early days in the Department, Mr. McDermott was attracted to law. He attended night school at the National University, receiving his LL.B. in 1926 and his LL.M. and M.P.L. in 1927.

Mr. McDermott has been a member of the Department of State Publications Committee since 1929. He was the representative of Secretaries Hull and Stettinius on the Committee on War Information Policies from 1942 to 1946. He was a member of the Committee on Political Planning in 1942 and 1943. During 1944 he also served as member on the Department of State Policy Committee and the Committee on Postwar Programs.

Mr. McDermott has been assigned to eight Latin

American conferences: as special assistant on the U.S. delegation to the 6th International Conference of American States at Habana in 1928; as press officer for the American delegations to the 8th International Conference of the American States at Lima, in 1938; at the Second Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics at Habana in 1940; at the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace at Mexico City in 1945; at the Rio conference in 1947; and at the Bogotá conference in 1948. He also served as press relations officer at the Conference of American States on Conciliation and Arbitration in Washington in 1928-29, and public relations director for the 8th American Scientific Conference at Washington in 1940.

Mr. McDermott participated in the early efforts to avert World War II, serving on the Mission for Signature of a Pact for the Renunciation of War at Paris in 1928, and as press officer for the American delegation at the London Naval Conference of 1930.

During World War II he also served in international efforts to lay a foundation for lasting peace once the horrors of that war were ended. He served as chief press relations officer at the three major conferences looking to that end: the U.N. Conference on Food and Agriculture at Hot Springs, Va., in 1943; at the U.N. Monetary and Financial Conference at Bretton Woods, N. H., in 1944; and at the U.N. Conference on International Organization which wrote the Charter of the United Nations at San Francisco in 1945. He also served as press officer for the U.S. group at the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations on International Organization held in Washington in 1944. . . . He served as press officer for the U.S. delegation to the First Session of the General Assembly at London in 1946.

Mr. McDermott accompanied Secretary of State Cordell Hull to Moscow in 1943 at a conference which pledged the restoration of Austrian independence. He also witnessed the early hopes for and later disillusionment of the Council of Foreign Ministers, acting as press officer for the U.S. delegations to the Paris (1946), New York (1946), Moscow (1947), London (1947), and Paris (1949) Council of Foreign Ministers Meetings. He also served as press officer for the U.S. delegation to the Paris Peace Conference of 1946 which wrote the treaties of peace with Finland, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Italy.

Mr. McDermott saw the dream of the North Atlantic community grow to reality and has participated in most of its subsequent meetings. He acted as chief press relations officer for the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization at Washington in 1949. He has served as press officer for the U.S. delegations to the New York (1950), Rome (1951), and Paris (1952) meetings of the Council of NATO.

## THE FOREIGN SERVICE

### Consular Offices

The consulate at Bergen, Norway, is being closed on May 31. The Bergen consular district will be absorbed into the Oslo district.

The consulate at Adelaide, South Australia, is being closed to the public as of May 30 and will officially close on June 15, 1953. The Adelaide consular district is being incorporated into the Melbourne district.

### Frederick L. Anderson Resigns as U.S. Deputy Special Representative

On May 22, 1953, President Eisenhower accepted the resignation of Frederick L. Anderson as U.S. deputy special representative in Europe, effective September 1. For text of Mr. Anderson's letter of resignation and the President's reply, see White House press release of May 22.

## PUBLICATIONS

### 1935 Documents on U.S. Policy in Near East, Africa Released

Press release 223 dated April 29

*Foreign Relations of the United States, 1935, Volume I, General; The Near East and Africa*, released on May 9 by the Department of State, presents extensive documentation on the diplomacy of a year marked by deteriorating international relations and futile efforts to check the drift toward World War II. The record explains the increasing threat of a rapidly rearming Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy's aggression against Ethiopia, and the confusion and lack of cooperation among other European powers. Meantime, the United States sought to avoid involvement in European or Near East problems, adopted new principles of strict neutrality designed to keep the United States out of any war, and endeavored, by use of its moral influence, to preserve peace and uphold international obligations. Unfortunately, the dictatorships were not sufficiently responsive to moral influence.

The records of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments and the London Naval Conference reveal frustration and futility. Reasons for this appear in the reports on these conferences and in analyses by American diplomatic missions of political events in Europe. Encouraged by her victory in regaining the Saar, Nazi Germany repudiated the restrictive provisions of the Treaty of Versailles and began openly to rearm. Reports from American missions make

clear the seriousness with which the danger was viewed in diplomatic circles and also indicate the lack of any effective policies to meet the situation.

The desire of the United States to remain aloof from involvement in war is well set forth in a reply to a dispatch of March 28, 1935, from Ambassador Robert P. Skinner at Ankara (pp. 209-211), describing the danger of war and urging that the President appeal to all European powers to renounce for 25 years any possible claim to additional territories. Under Secretary of State William Phillips wrote on May 9, 1935 (pp. 272-273), that this Government had consistently refused to take part in the controversy between the "status quo States" and the "revisionist States," that sponsoring such a proposal would give rise to a claim that the United States had impliedly promised assistance in case of its violation. Further, it was doubted that the revisionist States would adhere to a 25-year guarantee and it was felt that therefore the proposal would be doomed to failure and might aggravate still further the situation.

A somewhat more positive policy was followed with respect to the Far East. At a White House conference on November 19, 1935, regarding naval discussions (pp. 144-149), President Roosevelt approved a Department of State draft formula on political cooperation with Great Britain. It declared that any agreement on cooperation was out of the question, but that the delegation to the London Naval Conference might "emphasize the inevitable and growing community of interests of the British Empire and the United States throughout the world, and particularly the Far East," and that the United States and the British Empire were "likely, in their own interests and in the interests of the community of nations, to follow, in general a parallel, though independent policy, notably in the Far East." (p. 146.)

Documents on the activities of the Nye Committee investigating the munitions industry and on the rejection by the Senate of a resolution for the adherence by the United States to the Permanent Court of International Justice help explain the caution of the administration in its international relations.

A good deal of interest centers on the Ethiopian-Italian conflict—the efforts by the League of Nations and by France and the United Kingdom to bring about a peaceful settlement; the invasion; and efforts to end hostilities; and American actions in the interest of peace and for the protection of American life and property.

As in regard to European problems, the United States pursued an independent policy. It did not take part in League of Nations efforts, but made separate appeals for a peaceful settlement. When the invasion came the U.S. Government took no part directly in the application of sanctions against Italy, though it adopted neutrality measures which redounded to the benefit of Ethiopia.

Other sections on the Near East and Africa in-

volve relations with Afghanistan, Egypt, Iran, Liberia, Morocco, and Turkey. Some concern was expressed regarding Soviet ambitions as to the Straits. Turkey desired modification of agreements in order to make possible better defense.

Volume II of the *Foreign Relations* series for 1935, dealing with the British Commonwealth and Europe has been published.<sup>1</sup> The remaining two volumes for the year, Volume III, *The Far East*, and Volume IV, *The American Republics*, will be published at an early date.

This volume was compiled in the Division of Historical Policy Research. Statements in the preface give the rules under which *Foreign Relations* is compiled and a list of the staff which compiled the 1935 volumes. Copies (xcv, 1,074 pp.) may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C., for \$4.25 each.

## Documents on German Foreign Policy

Press release 240 dated May 4

The contemporary tragedy of the smaller states of Eastern Europe which began with their subjection to Nazi domination, is the main theme of the volume of captured German diplomatic documents released on May 16 by the Department of State. The new volume, the fifth in the series of *Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945*, Series D (1937-45), Vol. V, being published cooperatively by the American, British, and French Governments, bears the subtitle: *Poland, the Balkans, Latin America, the Smaller Powers*, and gives an account of the growing Nazi political and economic pressure on these states from 1937 until March 1939.

The largest single group of documents in the volume deals with Polish-German relations and with the futile attempt of the Poles to play a lone hand between Germany on the one side and Russia on the other.

Although Hitler pretended for a long time to honor the Polish-German Non-Aggression Pact of 1934, and even signed a new declaration on mutual respect for the rights of minorities in November 1937, these attitudes were revealed to have been designed to lull the Poles while he pursued German designs upon Austria and Czechoslovakia.

Within a few weeks after the surrender of Czechoslovakia at Munich on September 29, 1938, the Poles were presented with the German demands for the return of Danzig and the Polish Corridor. The full record on the continuing German demands is now published for the first time.

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of July 28, 1952, p. 162.

There are also revealing documents on the full control of the Free City of Danzig exercised from Berlin despite the city's nominal independence and the presence of the League of Nations Commissioner there.

A somewhat parallel situation is uncovered in the Memel Territory, held by Lithuania under the Versailles treaty, and the documents now published show the way in which pressure was brought to bear on the Lithuanians in March 1939 to compel them to cede the territory back to Germany.

In Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia it was the weakness of their economies and their dependence on favorable trade agreements which the Germans, with their politically directed and totalitarian economy, exploited to bring these states into the German orbit. The threat which the active German minorities controlled from Berlin constituted to the internal security of these states was also effectively employed.

In the Scandinavian states and in the smaller states of Western Europe the principal concern of German policy is shown to have been to cut these states away from their ties to the League of Nations collective-security system, and to insure that in the event of war they would stand in isolated neutrality.

At the other end of Europe the Germans were engaged in an attempt to revive their relations with Turkey, which had been their ally in World War I. They pressed for a revision in their favor of the Montreux Convention which governed the status of the Dardanelles and made every effort to promote economic relations. The hardheaded Turkish diplomacy, while recognizing the value of German trade, followed a cautious course politically and irritated German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop by its concern not to antagonize either Russia or the Western Powers.

At the same time the Germans were busy with efforts to undermine the British position in the Near East where they sought to combine diplomatic intrigue with trade in arms. In this area the problem of Jewish Palestine brought a serious split within the German Government between the Nazi Party fanatics who wished to oppose at all costs the growth of a Jewish state and those who saw economic advantages in encouraging Jewish emigration there.

In this period the Germans established closer contacts with Arab nationalism, and the Grand Mufti entered into Germany's political calculations.

The extent of German interests in the Middle East is also illustrated by negotiations with Ibn Saud resulting in the establishment of a German mission in Saudi Arabia.

The repeated and futile efforts of the Western Powers to get Germany to cooperate in international plans to assist refugees, promoted especially by President Roosevelt and the American-led Rublee committee, are also detailed.

Documents are published on the operations of German policy in Latin America where the somewhat crude attempts to make use of the local German communities led to sharp conflicts with several governments. A striking episode is that centering on the alleged Nazi complicity in the revolt against the Vargas Government in May 1938, and the Brazilian decision that the German Ambassador, Karl Ritter, must leave the country.

The Nazis once enjoyed a reputation for being masters of psychological and political warfare, and the captured documents provide a unique opportunity for the examination of the inner machinery of a system profoundly antagonistic to our own and operating all over the world.

The research on this volume has been directed by the following editors-in-chief: For the United States, Bernadotte E. Schmitt; for the United Kingdom, Margaret Lambert; for France, Maurice Baumont. Copies may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C., for \$3.25.

## Recent Releases

**Double Taxation, Taxes on Income.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2596. Pub. 4898. 30 pp. 10¢.

Convention between the United States and Finland—Signed at Washington Mar. 3, 1952.

**Letter From a Woman of East Germany.** European and British Commonwealth Series 40. Pub. 4918. 4 pp. 5¢.

This letter tells what our efforts to penetrate the Iron Curtain by radio have come to mean to hundreds of thousands living under Soviet domination.

**Naval Mission to Peru, Renewing Agreement of July 31, 1940, as Extended.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2504. Pub. 4772. 2 pp. 5¢.

Exchange of notes between the United States and Peru—Signed at Washington Jan. 18 and Mar. 24, 1952.

**Economic Assistance, Relief and Resettlement of Refugees, Extension of Projects.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2497. Pub. 4774. 3 pp. 5¢.

Exchange of notes between the United States and Israel—Signed at Tel Aviv Feb. 27, 1952.

**Mutual Defense Assistance, Transfer of United States Naval Vessels to Argentina.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2442. Pub. 4784. 4 pp. 5¢.

Exchange of notes between the United States and Argentina—Signed at Washington Jan. 4 and 8, 1951.

**Mutual Defense Assistance, Transfer of United States Naval Vessels to Brazil.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2443. Pub. 4785. 3 pp. 5¢.

Exchange of notes between the United States and Brazil—Signed at Washington Jan. 4, 1951.

**Mutual Defense Assistance, Transfer of United States Naval Vessels to Chile.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2444. Pub. 4786. 4 pp. 5¢.

Exchange of notes between the United States and Chile—Signed at Washington Jan. 4, 1951.

**United States Educational Commission in the Federal Republic of Germany.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2553. Pub. 4809. 21 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany—Signed at Bonn July 18 1952.

**United States Educational Foundation in the Union of South Africa.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2554. Pub. 4810. 12 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and the Union of South Africa—Signed at Cape Town Mar. 26, 1952.

**United States Educational Foundation in Finland.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2555. Pub. 4811 13 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Finland—Signed at Helsinki July 2, 1952.

**Air Transport Services—Kimpo Airport.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2432. Pub. 4827. 20 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Korea—Signed at Seoul Jan. 14, 1950 and letter signed at Seoul Apr. 3, 1950.

**Radio Communications Between Amateur Stations on Behalf of Third Parties.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2433. Pub. 4828. 3 pp. 5¢.

Exchange of notes between the United States and Ecuador—Signed at Quito Mar. 16 and 17, 1950.

**Point 4 Profiles.** Economic Cooperation Series 38. Pub. 4859. 38pp. 15¢.

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## Launching the European Coal and Steel Community

*by Raymond Vernon*

Americans are prone to draw a parallel between the problems of merging the nations of Western Europe into a federation and the problems which the 13 American States faced in forming a Federal Government. Among Europeans, this analogy never fails to evoke automatic dissent. Apart from pointing out how heterogeneous Western Europe is in culture, language, and outlook, Europeans argue that the difficulties of merging a collection of mature, industrialized states into a common entity in the 20th century are far more complex than were those of merging the underdeveloped agricultural-mercantile economies in America nearly two centuries ago.

The issue now is being put to the test—not a full-scale test, perhaps, but one which should provide glimmerings, at least, of the problems with which a full-scale federation would have to deal. For the ratification of the Treaty Constituting the European Coal and Steel Community, the nations of France, Italy, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg stand committed to try to merge their coal and steel industries into a common market. The implications of this commitment need some elaboration.

We begin with six sovereign nations. Each has its own tariff system under which goods coming into the country are taxed. Each regulates the amount of goods which comes in and flows out of the country, using a variety of devices for the purpose. Some subsidize certain groups of industries and certain types of consumers in accordance with their own conception of national equity and national interest. Each has its own currency and each regulates the uses that its nationals can make of the currencies of other countries. Each taxes its enterprises and their sales in accordance with its own national system. Each has a state-owned or state-regulated transport system, carefully developed in response to the political pressures and economic requirements of its own national economy. Each has its own social-security systems and its own limitations on the movement of foreign labor into the country.

What must emerge after a 5-year period of transition and adjustment is an economy for coal, steel, iron ore, and scrap which operates without national distinctions. Products moving within the common market are not to be subject to tariffs. Products are to be priced without regard to the nationality of the buyer and without other forms of discrimination. Nationals of one country buying these products in another need have no worries about obtaining the necessary currencies. When the products are shipped on a railroad or barge line, the fact that they are destined for another country in the common market is to have no effect upon the freight rate which the carrier charges. When the products are scarce and some system of allocation is called for, the available supplies are to be shared among countries in the common market without regard to nationality. Skilled coal or steel workers are to move freely across the national boundaries of the six countries.

### **The Approach to the Problem**

The gap to be spanned in moving from the pre-treaty situation of six national markets to the eventual system of one common market is sobering in its magnitude. First of all, there are the differences in national practices and national laws to be eradicated. Controls exist in some countries but not in others. Competition exists in some areas but not in others. Habits of work, conditions of investment, availability of materials all vary greatly in the six countries.

But perhaps the more important problem is one which would have existed even if conditions in the national markets of each of the six countries had been the same. This is the possibility that the elimination of national barriers—tariffs, quantitative restrictions, labor restrictions, and the like—might confront protected national industries with such new competitive conditions that great shifts would have to take place in the location and activities of the affected industries.

Faced with these difficulties, the planners of the Community had to decide whether to take a

great step into the unknown—to establish such uniform rules for the common market as circumstances seemed to require, to abolish all national barriers and discriminations, and then to let the chips fall, without making any efforts to smooth the transition. This approach would have avoided the possibility that devices initially applied to deal with transitional difficulties—compromises with the common market concept—might become a permanent part of the common market. “*Rien est plus permanent,*” say the wise cynics, “*que la provisoire.*”

There was a great deal to be said, however, against such a leap into the dark. Suppose, as some technicians dourly predicted, this simple course led to a great upheaval in the coal and steel markets of the six countries. Suppose that here and there prices were to rise sharply, or to drop suddenly; suppose scarcities were to develop or unemployment were to result. However salutary, or indeed essential, these shocks might be to the ultimate creation of a common market, their immediate effect might be to create an extreme distaste for the common market concept among the nationals of the six countries. This, in turn, could adversely affect the larger projects of six-country integration still in various stages of creation, such as the European Defense Community, the European Political Community, and the Dutch project for a full customs union. A choice had to be made between these two sets of considerations.

The choice was foreshadowed by the provisions of the treaty itself, and, particularly, of the related Convention Containing the Transitional Provisions. “The purpose of the present Convention,” according to section 1 of the convention, “is to set forth the measures necessary for the creation of the common market and the *progressive adaptation* of production to the new conditions in which it will take place. . . .” [Italics supplied.] Section 24 of the convention is much more pointed. It states with regard to coal production:

It is recognized that precautionary mechanisms are necessary during the transition period to avoid sudden and harmful shifts in production. These precautionary mechanisms should take into account the situations existing at the time the common market is created.

Furthermore, if it should appear that harmful and abrupt price increases might occur in one or more regions, precautions should be taken to avoid such effects.

Section 29 contains equally cautionary observations as regards steel.

In keeping with this approach, the convention allows for the use of various devices and the maintenance of various situations, during part or all of an initial transitional period of 5 years, which would represent aberrations from the common market. The approach is that of feeling one’s way gingerly down a long, dark corridor, while impelled to reach its end within a given period of time. It may be useful to see specifically how this approach has been applied.

## Coal and Steel Community: First Important Step Toward United Europe

By the setting up and actual working of this new institution a first important step toward the creation of a United Europe has materialized. There, in the framework of democratic institutions of a Federal character with a Parliamentary Assembly and a Court of Justice, Belgians, Dutchmen, Frenchmen, Germans, Italians and Luxembourgers are as Europeans, not as citizens of their respective countries, taking decisions which are directly applicable in the territories of these six nations. In the field of coal and steel the barriers, which have so long divided Europe, have been removed, so that those basic materials enjoy a single market of 155 million consumers like that of the United States.

At the request of the six Governments, members of the Parliamentary Assembly of the coal and steel community have worked out the project of a constitution which will create a European Parliament elected by the people and an Executive responsible to it. This is the political authority under which the European Army would also be placed.

President Eisenhower, while in Europe, watched with keen interest the efforts to work out the first steps toward European federation. His experience there convinces him that the uniting of Europe is an historic necessity for the peace and prosperity of Europeans and of the world.

The United States is following these vitally important undertakings, of which the coal and steel community is actually proving the practicability, with great interest.

—Statement issued on June 3 by the White House during a visit to Washington by Jean Monnet and Franz Etzel, President and Vice President, respectively, of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community, and Dirk Spiereburg, one of its members.

## The Common Coal Market

On February 10, 1953, exactly on schedule, tariffs and quantitative limitations on the movement of coal among the six countries were removed. As a corollary, coal ceased to figure on that date as an item in the carefully balanced bilateral trade agreements which ordinarily condition the movement of goods between the countries in the Community; previously, coal had figured as a major lever in such bargains and as a major element in political maneuvering among the six countries.

As foreseen in the convention, a few exceptions to the general pattern of the common market were permitted. Belgium, for example, was allowed to retain the quantitative restrictions necessary to prevent the more efficient mines in other countries from reducing Belgium’s output too rapidly. In addition, a transitional system was set up under which the more efficient mines of Germany and the Netherlands are taxed in order to subsidize the less efficient mines of Belgium and Italy. Production in the former two countries is now taxed at the rate of 1.1 percent of its gross value in order to raise half of the 33 million dollars annually which

the High Authority estimates is needed to ease the shock for Belgian and Italian mines; the other half of the subsidy, in accordance with the convention's provisions, will be supplied by the Belgian and Italian Governments.

This is only one of several transitional pain-easing systems of subsidy which have been authorized. The French Government has been allowed for the time being to continue an internal system of levies and subsidies which had previously existed among the various coal basins throughout France. The general purpose of these levies and subsidies is to keep in business for the present some of the basins of France which otherwise might have been shut down by the competition of the more efficient basins in other parts of France. This system is to be supplemented for the time being, as it has in the past, by a system of subsidies on coking coal and coke brought into France from other parts of the common market, in order to bring the price of these supplies down to the French price.

The drift of the High Authority's thinking in authorizing the limited continuation of some of these subsidies is illustrated by its letter to the French Government, on the continuation of subsidies on imported coking coal. France imports most of her coking coal from Germany; at the time of the establishment of the common market, its sale was being subsidized by about \$4 a ton. In 3 or 4 years, the High Authority pointed out to the French Government, the price of coking coal in France is bound to be appreciably lower than it is today. This will occur, according to the High Authority, because of (1) an eventual lowering of German national transport rates for coal, which is to take place in the next 2 years, and (2) gradual expansion in the use of coal from the Lorraine and Saar areas which is in process. In these circumstances, the High Authority thought it advisable to avoid the sharp rise in French prices of coking coal which would follow on discontinuation of the import subsidy, if the rise is eventually to be followed by a decline of even greater magnitude. Accordingly, the import subsidy is continued under certain specified limitations.

Still another type of subsidy appears in the interim mechanisms of the common market. These are the subsidies maintained by various national governments in favor of one group or another of coal consumers. The German system illustrates this sort of arrangement, and the High Authority's response thereto is typical of its reaction to such arrangements.

One of the rules of the single market, it will be recalled, is that any seller of coal must charge the same price of all buyers within the common market, whatever the nationality of the buyers. For Germany this meant the end of a system of "double-pricing," that is, charging German buyers one price and buyers of other nationalities a

higher price for coal in periods of shortage. These double prices were eliminated largely by increasing prices to German buyers, thereby putting them on a par with prices to French and other buyers in the common market. However, this decision, standing by itself, would have meant price rises for many German consumers which "for economic and social reasons" the German Government felt ought not to be borne by all classes of consumers alike. Accordingly, the German Government proposed that some coal users, including shippers, deep-sea fishermen, householders, and gas and electric power stations, should be exempted from the price rise for the time being; the loss in revenue resulting from the exemption would be borne by the German mines.

The High Authority accepted this system for domestic consumers and deep-sea fishermen, but not for other consumers. And the High Authority imposed one major reservation: These reduced prices must be made available by the German mines to consumers in these privileged classes in any part of the common market, whatever their nationality might be.

Tied in closely with the question whether to maintain subsidies for various producer and consumer groups was the question whether to continue to set price ceilings on sales of coal. The High Authority was faced with the fact that ceilings were in effect in all the member states but could not be sure whether such ceilings were actually preventing substantial rises in prices or whether they were only a means by which sellers were able to avoid competition in the fixing of prices. In any event, the prevailing philosophy of the convention was controlling, and the High Authority decided that price ceilings on coal must continue for the time being.

The High Authority, in determining its new price ceilings, acted on the theory that the new ceilings should serve as a transition between the national price ceilings which heretofore had existed and a system of prices in the common market which made sense in terms of the common-market concept. At the same time, the High Authority was also anxious to avoid too explicit a system of price fixing, that is to say, a system so detailed as to specify the price for each of the many types and grades of coal and coke produced in the common market. Accordingly, the prices enumerated for many of the basins are stated in terms of average prices for major classes of coal such as anthracite, coke, briquettes, and so forth; prices for specific types are enumerated only with respect to categories for which there is believed to be a real shortage, such as coking fines.

Taken as a whole, the system which the High Authority has set up for the sale of coal in the common market does not permit unregulated competition to operate, nor does it allow the principle of nondiscriminatory treatment to have full sway.

Yet it represents movement, substantial movement, away from the regime of national markets which preceded it. Discrimination based on nationality is gone, for all practical purposes, both in coal sales and in coal haulage. The subsidization of relatively inefficient producers is still widely prevalent, though perhaps a little less so than before February 10. The subsidization of privileged classes of consumers continues to be pervasive, although again the total subsidization is probably less than it was before.

But there has been movement in the direction which most observers would agree is needed to increase the efficiency and productivity of the coal industry of the six countries. The critical question is not so much what the state of the common market is today but the speed and direction in which the common market is moving. The direction, at least, is reasonably clear; the speed has yet to be determined.

### **The Common Steel Market**

The approach of the European Coal and Steel Community toward the common steel market is rather different in some important respects from its approach with respect to the coal market. Coal is a mineral; it is mined where it is found. The locus of steel production, on the other hand, depends much more on manmade decisions. As a result, the Community's approach to the organization of the steel market has been a great deal closer to the concept of a simple, competitive enterprise system and has not reflected the same tendencies toward the regulatory administration of a natural resource as have been manifested with respect to the coal market.

The common steel market came into being on May 1, 1953, 3 weeks later than the earliest date on which the market could have opened under the terms of the convention. On that date, tariffs, quantitative restrictions, and discriminatory pricing with respect to steel were abolished within the single market. As in the case of coal, steel ceased to figure in bilateral trade bargains between any of the six countries.

The Community permitted two aberrations from the concept of the common market, however, both of which had been recognized in the convention. The first of these arises from the fact that the six countries do not impose exactly the same tariffs on steel imported from countries outside the common market. The Benelux steel tariffs, by and large, are very much lower than those of France, and French steel tariffs are somewhat lower than those of Germany and Italy. As a result, until the process of "harmonization" of these tariffs has been completed, there is a risk that persons in the common market who want to buy British steel, for example, would import the steel through the Belgian customs even though the eventual destination of the steel might be Germany or Italy.

To deal with this problem, the Benelux countries will apply the Benelux rate only to a limited amount of steel imports, representing the total which Benelux could have been expected to import in satisfaction of its domestic demand; the excess over that amount will be subject to higher duty, representing the French tariff rate applicable to the same product.

The second aberration has to do with the steel industry of Italy. This is a relatively small industry, handicapped by high costs of raw materials and modest size. This industry is to have the benefit of a gradual, rather than an abrupt, immersion in the cold waters of competition. The tariffs now protecting that industry are to be eliminated by stages over the 5-year period, instead of all at once.

Apart from these special provisions, the High Authority possesses during the transitional period some rather extraordinary powers by which it could intervene in the functioning of the common market through the application of internal restrictions. So far, at any rate, there is no indication that the High Authority proposes to do so.

Perhaps the most difficult problem which arose in connection with the opening of the steel market is one which illustrates a fundamental difficulty governing all the operations of the European Coal and Steel Community—the difficulty of attempting partially to integrate the economies of a group of modern states while trying to maintain six distinct national economies in the unintegrated area.

The problem stems from the fact that firms in the common market are required to charge non-discriminatory prices to buyers in the common market, irrespective of the buyers' nationality. While simple in concept, the application of the principle presents knotty problems, particularly because of the impact of national tax systems. Take the case of a German firm selling to a French buyer: Should the German firm quote a price which includes German sales taxes, even though such taxes are refunded by the German Government on export sales?

After much soul-searching, the answer which the High Authority provided was "no." The reasoning behind this conclusion was that a buyer located in France, in choosing as between a French and a German seller, ought to be choosing between sellers who were carrying the same sales tax burden; the German seller in the French market, therefore, ought to be subject to the French sales tax, not the German sales tax.

But this conclusion, self-evident as it may seem, was not an easy one to reach. The fact is that the Germans have a fairly low sales tax, whereas the French have a much larger sales tax. The French, on the other hand, have a fairly low tax on corporate profits, whereas the Germans have relatively high taxes on the profits and property of

corporations. French firms selling in Germany, therefore, bear only the low corporate taxes of France and the low sales taxes of Germany, while German firms in the French market bear high corporate sales taxes and high French sales taxes. The High Authority's decision therefore presented obvious problems of equity, as the High Authority itself explicitly recognized; yet it seemed to be the only answer compatible with nondiscriminatory nonnational pricing.

Here we have in concrete form an illustration of the pervasive difficulties of projects of partial integration. Problems of this sort will never really be answered satisfactorily, nor will any answer really be a final solution, as long as national governments are free by fiscal and other means substantially to influence the operations of enterprises in the common market.

Each product in the common market has presented some unique problem for the High Authority and has tested its philosophy and approach in one way or another. In the case of iron ore, the High Authority felt that the slight disturbance that might result from the institution of the common market was worth risking. Accordingly, the free market for iron ore went into effect without any transitional arrangements to ease the shock, and without any limitation upon the movement of iron ore within the common market. One of the more obvious effects of this arrangement was the elimination of the discriminatory pricing for iron ore which had favored French steel firms over foreign firms. The High Authority's official report on this step observes that "the effect of the rise in prices to French clients has only been a limited one, because of the cordial relations existing between the mines and the consumers in general," presumably a diplomatic way of acknowledging the existence of some corporate ties between the French steel plants and the sources of their ore.

The market for steel scrap also presented some difficult decisions for the High Authority. Steel scrap, unlike coal, steel, and iron ore, is a business with a great many more sellers than buyers. In some of the national markets comprising the Community, notably those of Germany and Italy, scrap dealers had joined together in cartel-like organizations, the function of which was to fix the price and amount of scrap coming on the market. As the date of the opening of the common market approached, the French considered setting up an organization of this sort to parallel the existing organizations in Germany and Italy. They apparently abandoned this idea, however, when the High Authority decided that the German and Italian organizations were inconsistent with the treaty and must be dissolved.

Having dissolved these cartel-like organizations—a step with few precedents on the European scene—the High Authority then authorized the operation until the end of the current year

of a new scrap organization covering all six countries. This organization, which is conceived of as a transitional arrangement, is to confine its actual operations to the import of steel scrap and is not to be involved in scrap transactions originating within the common market. The general theory is that the operation of this organization, aided by an equalization fund, will prevent the price of the imported scrap, which is the highest-priced scrap used in the common market, from setting the price for all scrap in the common market.

Whether this will prove to be the case remains to be seen. But the more important test which this experiment represents is whether it is possible for an organization to confine itself to the essentially benign function for which the organization was conceived without eventually engaging also in the fixing of prices, the allocation of supply, the suppression of new participants in the scrap business, and other undesirable practices. This is a problem of which the High Authority is clearly acutely conscious.

### Future Prospects

Although the common market has hardly begun to function, it is not too early to draw a few tentative conclusions regarding the market and its institutions. First of all, the European Coal and Steel Community seems to be acting as its creators conceived it should act, not as a captive creature of six national governments behaving in accordance with the negotiated settlements of the six, but rather as a distinct government operating under the constitution which created it—responsive to the governments of the six member countries but distinguishable from them. A shift in this attitude on the part of the Community could alter basically the nature of its decisions. More important, such a shift could reduce the attractive force of the Community as a nucleus of further European integration.

Second, it is apparent that the kind of market that is coming into being under the Community's aegis is a peculiarly European institution, reflecting ideas and habits of administration somewhat different from our own. So far, it represents a mixture of competition, state intervention in favor of certain groups, state acceptance of the responsibility of easing transitional shocks, and participation by nongovernmental groups in the apparatus of administration.

Finally, there are signs of real movement in the organization of the common market away from some of the restricting practices and habits which dominated national markets toward a freer and more vigorous regime. For example, the strength of the cartels within the common market can be assumed to be much lower, for the present, than the strength they possessed when operating in six national markets, and there are adequate powers

within the Community to keep such cartels weak, if the Community determines to exercise such powers. Moreover, so far as one can judge, the regulations imposed by the Community on the common market seem on the whole to be less pervasive than the national regulations they replaced, leaving more room for the play of market forces. But perhaps the most important result of all has been the elimination of coal and steel as weapons of economic diplomacy which the six national governments used to extract concessions and strike bargains that did little to advance the general welfare of Western Europe. On the whole, these first few months of performance have justified the expectations of the founders of the Community.

• *Mr. Vernon, author of the above article, is Acting Director of the Office of Economic Defense and Trade Policy.*

#### Related Materials

*Regional Organizations: Europe and the North Atlantic Area*, Department of State publication 4944, April 1953. Contains a brief account of the development and functions of eight European regional organizations including the Coal and Steel Community, a chart showing their interrelationship, and a bibliography.

*The Schuman Plan Constituting a European Coal and Steel Community*. Draft treaty and draft convention containing the transitional provisions. Department of State publication 4173. 1951.

*An analysis of the Schuman Plan*. Department of State publication 4176. 1951.

*Understanding the Schuman Plan*. Department of State publication 4281. 1951. A background summary.

Raymond Vernon, "The Schuman Plan: Sovereign Powers of the European Coal and Steel Community," *The American Journal of International Law*, April 1953, p. 183. The legal significance of the Schuman Plan.

## Secretary Dulles, Mr. Stassen Return from Near Eastern Visit

### *Statement by the Secretary*

White House press release dated May 29

Three weeks ago, Mr. Stassen and I and our associates left Washington to visit a part of the world with which we seek new ties of friendship. It is an important part of the world. It gave us our religion and it contains the holy places. The Near East is the junction of three continents—Europe, Asia, and Africa. South Asia and the Near East together contain one-half of the people of the world not already under Communist domination.

These people we visited have been our friends.

Most of them were long under the political domination of other powers. As colonial peoples they looked up to the United States with respect and admiration. We had gained freedom and strength for ourselves and we sought those qualities for others.

Now, the peoples we visited have won political freedom. Seven of them have become independent nations within 10 years. But they do not yet have strength and well-being. They are preoccupied by quarrels and fears which deny them tranquillity and endanger their national existence. They want and need the friendly inspiration and guidance we once provided. But they feel that in our maturity, we have grown materialistic at the expense of idealism and justice, and that our friendship has grown cold.

The Suez Base dispute between Egypt and Britain, the uneasy armistice and economic warfare between Israel and the Arab States, the problem of Arab refugees, the India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir, the prevalence of poverty, are typical of conditions which create fear, bitterness, and weakness. Only communism can profit from these conditions. It strives frantically to do so at our expense. Wherever we went, the Communists sought to disrupt our mission and prevent it from achieving its intended purposes. Everywhere they failed. Hostile demonstrations were kept at a distance, and were well-controlled. The aspect of the people was cordial and welcoming. The leaders were abundantly hospitable, and they talked with us as with those who could be trusted.

We return with refreshed ties with our valiant allies, Greece and Turkey, and with information as to other areas and their problems which can be of great importance to the United States. We of the State Department will be better qualified to advise President Eisenhower in relation to foreign policy, and Mr. Stassen, Director of Mutual Security, will be better able to help that program implement our foreign policy.

Above all, we laid a new foundation for friendship. That is because we gave new hope that the United States, while standing firmly against any breach in the ranks of the Western Powers, and without in anywise undermining the State of Israel, is determined to find a way toward a broader unity. This would be to the advantage of all concerned. We could then, in desired ways, help the nations of the Near East and South Asia to live together in amity and peace and allay their initial pains. Thus, they may move on to a healthy national life which will accept the responsibilities, and add to the strength, of the free-world community.

Mr. Stassen and I have at once made a preliminary report to the President and we shall report more fully to him and the Congress with reference to our conclusions, particularly those which may affect our foreign policy. Then I shall have more to say to the American people.



## Review of the Austrian Treaty Question

By a vote of 48 to 0 the Seventh Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 20, 1952, adopted a resolution urging the early conclusion of a treaty for Austria.<sup>1</sup> The five states of the Soviet bloc did not participate, and Pakistan and Afghanistan abstained.

The resolution, sponsored by Brazil, Lebanon, Mexico, and the Netherlands, had the full support of the United States. Earlier, Benjamin V. Cohen, alternate delegate for the United States, speaking before the Political and Security Committee, declared:<sup>2</sup>

The United States welcomes the resolution . . . calling upon the governments concerned to reach agreement on an Austrian treaty to terminate the occupation of Austria and to restore to Austria its rights to sovereign statehood.

Back of the action taken by the General Assembly lies the story of a major postwar tragedy. It is a story of broken pledges on one hand and frustrated hopes on the other. It is an illustration of the methods employed by the Soviet Union in exploiting other peoples and other nations, regardless of pledges solemnly given and repeatedly reaffirmed.

Here, in capsule, is an illuminating picture of Soviet techniques in handling nations and peoples who refuse to knuckle under. The Austrian treaty negotiations are a case study for the free world. They can be a lesson for those who still trust the Soviet word. There could be no clearer picture of the difficulties of dealing with the men of the Kremlin.

Since 1945 Austria has been occupied by troops of the four major Allied Powers of World War II—the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union. The Three Western Powers are, and have been, eager to withdraw their troops and restore Austrian independence. They went into Austria only to liberate that country and its people from the Nazis. There was no thought of a prolonged stay.

EDITOR'S NOTE. This study is also available as Department of State publication 5012.

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Jan. 12, 1953, p. 68.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 67.

### The Moscow Pledge

In the Moscow Declaration of November 1, 1943, the Four Powers pledged themselves to regard, and so treat, Austria as a liberated, not an enemy, country:

The Declaration stated:

The Governments of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States of America are agreed that Austria, the first free country to fall a victim to Hitlerite aggression, shall be liberated from German domination.

They regard the annexation imposed upon Austria by Germany on March 15th, 1938, as null and void. They consider themselves as in no way bound by any changes effected in Austria since that date. They declare that they wish to see reestablished a free and independent Austria, and thereby to open the way for the Austrian people themselves, as well as those neighboring states which will be faced with similar problems, to find that political and economic security which is the only basis for lasting peace.

Austria is reminded, however, that she has a responsibility which she cannot evade for participation in the war on the side of Hitlerite Germany, and that in the final settlement account will inevitably be taken of her own contribution to her liberation.

The Declaration was signed by Foreign Minister Molotov for the Soviet Union, Secretary of State Hull for the United States, and Foreign Secretary Eden for the United Kingdom. Two weeks later the French Committee for National Liberation signed for France.

There can be no doubt that the Soviets fully understood that the Declaration was a pledge and a commitment. In a proclamation to the citizens of Vienna, March 1945, the late Marshal Tolbukhin, commanding the Russian forces in Austria, said:

The Red Army has set foot on the soil of Austria not to conquer Austrian territory. Its aim is exclusively the defeat of the enemy German-Fascist troops and the liberation of Austria.

The Red Army backs the Moscow Declaration of the Allied Powers on the independence of Austria.

The Moscow Declaration is a pledge unredeemed, but it is still binding, morally and legally, on those who made it. To the Western Powers, who wish to redeem it, it must be the basis of whatever treaty is finally concluded with Austria. Less would be a betrayal of faith.

Even prior to the Moscow Declaration, the Allied position on Austria had been clearly stated. British Prime Minister Churchill, for example, said on November 9, 1940:

Great Britain defends the cause of all nations for whom she has drawn the sword, namely, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Norway, Holland, Belgium, France, and Greece. Great Britain will fight until final victory and with it liberation for all these countries is achieved.

When the United States entered the war, President Roosevelt, December 9, 1941, named the countries which had been invaded by the Axis Powers and which must be liberated. Austria was included.

Again on February 18, 1942, Mr. Churchill said:

With the victory of the Allies, liberated Austria will again take up her place of honor.

### **Declaration on Liberated Europe**

Austria was not specifically discussed at the Three Power conference at Yalta in February 1945, but Austria, as a victim of Nazi aggression, was among the countries affected by the Declaration on Liberated Europe, approved at Yalta. Marshal Stalin, Prime Minister Churchill, and President Roosevelt were all three present and assented.

This Declaration pledged the Three Powers to "assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite state in Europe" (1) to establish conditions of internal peace, (2) to carry out emergency relief measures, (3) to form "interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people," and (4) to facilitate, where necessary, the holding of free elections.

This, again, was a promise and a pledge. At the invitation of the Three Powers present, the provisional French Government subsequently endorsed the Declaration and joined in the pledges given.

Later, August 1945, the Potsdam Agreement provided that "reparations should not be exacted from Austria." According to the terms of the agreement the reparation claims of the Allied Powers (the Soviet Union was mentioned specifically) were to be met, in part, from "appropriate German external assets." This provision has caused difficulties in the negotiations on the treaty, but its intent was, and is, perfectly clear.

### **Role of the Soviet Union**

There has been no disagreement among the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France as to their responsibility and duty in meeting these pledges to Austria, specifically stated and implied.

The single stumbling block has been, and is, the Soviet Union.

The Soviet determination to stymie an Austrian treaty has become increasingly apparent.

In the Seventh Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations they made every attempt to block consideration of the Brazilian resolution or any action pertaining to Austria. When the agenda for the Assembly was under consideration in October 1952, the Soviets objected to the Assembly's giving any kind of consideration to the Austrian treaty. They based their objections on article 107 of the Charter of the United Nations. Article 107, they said, placed the Austrian treaty outside the limits of U.N. "competence." In other words, the United Nations had no right to consider it.

Article 107 of the U.N. Charter reads:

Nothing in the present Charter shall invalidate or preclude action, in relation to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory to the present Charter, taken or authorized as a result of the war by Governments having responsibility for such action.

The committee on the Assembly agenda rejected this position. It was pointed out to the Soviets that Austria had never been considered as an enemy state, that Austria had never declared war against any member of the United Nations, that no U.N. nation had ever declared war against Austria, and that the position of Austria, both during the war and later, had been explicitly defined in the Moscow Declaration as that of a liberated country. Clearly, article 107 did not pertain to Austria.

Later, both in the Political and Security Committee and before the Assembly itself, the Soviets, or one of their puppets, continued to bring up article 107 as a bar to consideration of the Austrian treaty. The Polish delegate, Mr. Skrzyszewski, actually used the term "enemy" in speaking of Austria. The Brazilian resolution, he said, was a violation of the Charter "as article 107 made clear, beyond any doubt, that the organization [the United Nations] could not intervene with regard to any action taken in relation to any state involved in the Second World War as an enemy of any signatory of the Charter."

Defending the right of the United Nations to speak, delegate after delegate pointed out to the Soviets that Austria was not an enemy country. It was brought to their attention, furthermore, that the resolution in no way questioned, much less sought to invalidate, any action in relation to Austria taken or authorized as a result of World War II. It concerned solely the desirability of speedily concluding a treaty for Austria.

The vote of the General Assembly soundly repudiated the position of the Soviets.

The delegate of Brazil, Henrique de Souza Gomes, introducing the resolution, did not propose a review of the actions taken by the occupying powers, nor did he suggest the substantive pro-

visions which should go into the treaty. As he explained, all the resolution did was to urge the occupying powers to agree promptly upon a treaty which would carry out the pledges they themselves had previously made and which they had never publicly renounced.

Representatives of the Soviet Union and of the Soviet-dominated States, however, refused to agree to even the mild provisions of the resolution. In the committee, and later in the General Assembly, they signified their disagreement by refusing to participate in the voting. Their strategy was not to oppose openly but to obstruct.

To the Western Powers, this strategy of obstruction on the part of the Soviets had become all too familiar. The Soviet Union, to be sure, had never officially renounced the Moscow Declaration. In preventing the conclusion of a treaty for Austria, Soviet tactics had been to quibble, to delay, to introduce extraneous issues.

The efforts of the three Western Powers to conclude a treaty and to bring about the evacuation of Austria had been continuous, persistent, and sincere. They had been willing to compromise with the Soviets on detail and had asked only that the principle of independence for Austria be observed.

They had, themselves, submitted proposal after proposal. They had sat patiently through literally hundreds of meetings. Between 1945 and the time of the Seventh Session of the General Assembly, there had been, in fact, 33 sessions of the Council of Foreign Ministers at which the Austrian treaty had been discussed, 258 meetings of the Austrian treaty deputies, and 85 meetings of the Austrian Treaty Commission.

At each of these sessions the Western Powers had met the representatives of the Soviet Union in a spirit of conciliation. They had been unyielding only on the basic proposition that Austria must be free and independent, as the Moscow Declaration had promised. They had insisted only that Austria be restored to sovereign statehood.

The resolution adopted at the Seventh Session of the General Assembly had the full support of all three of the Western Powers involved in the Austrian question. It had, in fact, overwhelming support in the Assembly. No less than 30 representatives of member nations spoke in its favor.

The resolution put the moral weight of free world opinion behind the efforts of the Western Powers to reach an agreement with the Soviets on the Austrian treaty. It did, and could do, nothing more. But as Ambassador Cohen said:

We [the Western Powers] are entirely willing to meet with representatives of the Soviet Union to discuss and conclude such a treaty. We will meet again and again and again. But our experience of these past 7 years leaves little hope for arriving shortly at a satisfactory conclusion unless something more is added.

Perhaps this resolution is that something more.

## Eight Years of Negotiations

As a study of Soviet tactics, the details of the negotiations on the Austrian treaty are worth scrutiny. For convenience' sake, the story can be divided into six fairly distinct periods.

The first, principally introductory, includes the Moscow Declaration itself and the events preceding.

The immediate postwar period includes roughly 2 years. As far as progress toward a treaty is concerned, it was almost a total blank.

In the third period—1947 to the middle of 1949—negotiations actually got under way.

The fourth period opened on a note of hope. The Soviets appeared, briefly, to be willing to leave Austria—but at a price. Abruptly, however, their attitude changed. A disturbing picture of their intent began to take shape. The hope faded.

The fifth period, continuing down to the end of 1950, is a story of open and constant Soviet obstruction against persistent efforts on the part of the Western Powers to conclude a treaty. At last the Soviets had abandoned any pretense of concealing their purpose.

Finally there is a sixth period, beginning with the spring of 1952 and continuing up to the failure of the meeting called at London by the Western Powers pursuant to the General Assembly resolution.

There will be further chapters in the Austrian treaty story. They may be highly significant in their bearing on the world strategy of the Soviet Union. Their full significance, however, may be illuminated by consideration of what already has taken place.

During the years immediately following the end of hostilities in World War II, the problems in Austria, as in many European countries occupied by the Nazis, concerned mainly food, shelter, transportation, and the establishment of a stable government. For Austria the latter was, of course, complicated by problems arising from the Anschluss, problems of disentangling the country's entire political and economic life from that of Germany.

These were serious problems, and the treaty seemed of minor importance. The Austrian people had the promise of the Moscow Declaration. Neither they nor the Western Powers were aware of the real plans of the Soviets.

Pending the first Austrian election, the four occupying Powers recognized a provisional Austrian government. Through the European Advisory Commission they agreed on zones of occupation and set up an Allied Council through which to work.

The avowed purpose of the occupation was, first, to divorce Austria completely from German control—to undo the Anschluss of 1938. It was, second, to root out Austrian nazism and to punish

war criminals. Lastly, it was to aid in the restoration of a free Austria in the spirit of the Moscow Declaration.

After the elections of November 1945 the Four Powers recognized the new Government, and by an agreement reached in 1946 they extended considerably the powers of that Government. This agreement, still in force, provided for the progressive relaxation of Four Power control. As the freely elected Austrian Government grew in will and strength to maintain a democratic regime, it was to be given more and more authority in managing the affairs of the country. The Allied Council consisting of four High Commissioners, one appointed by each of the occupying powers, remained to aid and advise the new Government.

The question of a treaty, however, was not forgotten. In April 1946 the Council of Foreign Ministers met at Paris. The U.S. Secretary of State, Mr. Byrnes, proposed that the Austrian treaty be included on the agenda. He stated that his Government felt that a treaty for Austria, a liberated country, should be given consideration at least equal to that planned for Germany's former satellites.

The British and French Foreign Ministers agreed. The Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Molotov, dissented. He said that the Soviet delegation was not prepared. He pointed out that the Council's agenda was crowded. He said that Austria was not sufficiently denazified to be trusted.

Pinned down to a possible date, Mr. Molotov said:

It might be necessary to leave troops in Austria for another year; that is, two years in all from the end of the war.

In the middle of May it was proposed that the Council recess for a month. Secretary Byrnes took this opportunity to make another effort in behalf of Austria. He suggested that during the recess the deputies of the Foreign Ministers could start preliminary work on a draft treaty.

The British and French Foreign Ministers again agreed.

Once again Mr. Molotov objected. He told Secretary Byrnes curtly, "When we are ready, we will inform the other delegates."

Despite this rebuff the United States went ahead and prepared a draft treaty. So did the British.

When the Council reconvened in June, Secretary Byrnes again urged that the Austrian treaty be scheduled for discussion. After much hesitation Mr. Molotov agreed but insisted that it be the Austrian "question" rather than the Austrian treaty and that it be the last item on the agenda.

When the Council finally reached the Austrian "question," Secretary Byrnes said he felt that prompt action should be taken because it was inconceivable to him that treaties with Italy and the

Balkan States should be concluded and nothing done about Austria.

The Soviets, however, announced three new conditions which, they declared, must be met before the Soviet Union would agree to consider an Austrian treaty. These were (1) more progress in eliminating alleged Austrian nazism, (2) the forcible repatriation of displaced persons in Austria, and (3) the completion of the Italian and Balkan treaties.

Obviously there could be no action on the treaty at that time. None was taken.

### **Treaty Deputies Appointed**

The Council of Foreign Ministers met again, this time at New York, in the late fall of 1946. The Italian and satellite treaties were completed.

Secretary Byrnes then proposed that special Austrian treaty deputies be appointed. The Soviet Union objected but finally agreed. The deputies were named and instructed to set to work immediately. They were to begin consideration of the drafts, agree on as many articles as possible, and report to the Council at its next session, scheduled for the following March at Moscow.

The story of this first postwar year, 1946, is important insofar as it provides background for what was to follow. It was a curtain raiser for the years ahead.

The activities of the Soviets in Austria during 1946 are significant.

The Potsdam Agreement asserted that reparations would be permitted from "appropriate German external assets." The United States, the United Kingdom, and France interpreted this to mean properties in Austria owned legitimately by Germany and German nationals as of May 8, 1945. They did not include (1) property seized after the Anschluss through force or duress, (2) property owned by the Austrian Government, or (3) property in Austria owned by nationals of the U.N. nations.

However, from the first the Soviets placed a far different interpretation upon the term. Immediately after the liberation of Austria they began to dismantle factories and plants in their zone and ship the equipment to the Soviet Union. Estimates for that first year on equipment taken from Austrian metal-working, machinery, and locomotive industries alone run to 63,778 pieces. The total of the Soviet "take" probably never will be known.

When the special treaty deputies met at London early in 1947, new Soviet delaying tactics emerged. Whereas the other deputies submitted concrete outlines of all treaty articles, the Soviet deputy offered only incomplete proposals. He spent most of his time criticizing the proposals of the other powers. He found little, if anything, worth while to say for them.

Nevertheless, the deputies did manage to accomplish some work. They disposed of all but 20 articles, which were referred to the Moscow session of the Council of Foreign Ministers.

### **The Council in Moscow**

When the Council met at Moscow in March, with so much of the spadework done, the Western Powers had high hopes for an early agreement.

In his book *My Three Years in Moscow*, Ambassador Walter Bedell Smith (now Under Secretary of State) reported:

The Western representatives were not entirely surprised over the difficulties they encountered in attempting to reach an agreement on Germany but they expected progress in formulating a treaty for Austria. Here, at first, things went well and agreement was reached on all but a few points. But these were basic and of fundamental importance.

"German assets" overshadowed all other issues. By this time the Soviets had seized in Austria more than 300 enterprises, valued at roughly 700 million dollars. They demanded that the treaty give them permanent possession.

What they wanted meant:

1. Two-thirds of Austria's entire oil production, all of its oil reserves, and about three-fourths of its refining capacity.

2. The extensive assets of the Danube Shipping Company in Austria, Hungary, and the lower reaches of the river.

3. Three hundred industrial plants, including those in iron and metal work, machinery, electrical equipment, heavy chemicals, textiles, glass, steel construction, and optical and precision instruments.

4. Forty-one percent of the largest bank in Austria and complete control of four other large Austrian banks.

5. A large proportion of the insurance companies in Austria.

As a second issue the Soviet Union threw into the pot certain claims of Yugoslavia against Austria for reparations and for the cession of a large part of the Austrian Province of Carinthia and small portions of Styria and Burgenland.

The Four Powers had agreed at Potsdam that there should be no question of reparations so far as Austria was concerned. Premier Stalin himself was a party to that agreement. Moreover, the claims of Yugoslavia were based on damages caused by Hitler's armies. Their claims to reparations were against Germany, not Austria.

As for Carinthia, the Western Powers recalled that, in 1920, there had been a plebiscite in that area under the auspices of the League of Nations, and the majority of the people had voted to remain Austrian. The rights of the Slovene minority were protected under the new Austrian

constitution. Nevertheless, the Soviets supported both Yugoslav claims.

The Western Powers were not unaware, of course, that Soviet championship of the Yugoslavs was motivated by something more than sympathy for their cause. Ambassador Smith wrote:

. . . from remarks made by members of the Soviet delegation and finally from covert proposals made by Molotov during the final stages of the conference, it was clear that the Soviet Union would abandon its advocacy of Yugoslavia's claims at once if the Kremlin's definition of what constituted "German assets" in Austria . . . was accepted by the Western powers.

A few years later Ambassador Smith's interpretation of the Soviet position was confirmed in the subsequently published exchange of notes between Tito of Yugoslavia and the Kremlin. From these notes we learn that Molotov and Vyshinsky both told Yugoslavia shortly after the Moscow Conference opened that there was no hope that the Council would accept their claims. To quote from one of these notes:

Foreign Minister Molotov declared to Yugoslav Foreign Minister Kardelj that, despite such hopeless proposals, the Soviet delegation would continue to keep the question of Slovene Carinthia on the agenda but only to facilitate a positive solution regarding German property in Austria on behalf of the Soviet Union.

Toward the end of the Moscow session the U.S. Secretary of State, General Marshall, proposed that the discussion of the Austrian treaty be continued by the deputies, with a cutoff date set for September. If no agreement had been reached by that time, the Four Powers should submit all unsettled questions to the General Assembly of the United Nations. The British and French agreed. The Soviets refused.

However, a proposal was accepted by the Four Powers to set up a special Austrian Treaty Commission to consider all disputed articles.

With this slight gain the Moscow Conference ended.

### **The Austrian Treaty Commission**

The new Austrian Treaty Commission met at Vienna May 12, 1947. The Commission held 85 meetings. There was, however, no agreement. If anything, the Soviet position became more arbitrary. For example, the Soviet member repudiated an earlier commitment to claim Austrian property only if it had been purchased by the Germans at a fair price. The Soviets asserted claim to all such property, even if it had been purchased under duress and regardless of price. The Commission adjourned October 11.

There had been one development. In the fall the French Government had submitted a proposal under which certain specified "German assets" in Austria were to be assigned to the Soviet Union. Others were to be returned to Austria for a lump-sum payment of 100 million dollars. In the hope

of breaking the deadlock, arriving at a treaty, and ending the occupation, the United States and Britain supported this proposal.

The French proposal was introduced in the Council of Foreign Ministers at London in November 1947. The Soviets would have none of it. The Conference ended with no progress on a treaty.

During 1948 the question of the Austrian treaty did not come before the Council of Foreign Ministers. The deputies met repeatedly, disagreed, and adjourned.

At one time it did appear, briefly, that the Soviets were ready to come to some kind of understanding. Early in 1948 they submitted their own specific demands. Adapting the French proposal to their own figures, they asked for a cash settlement of 200 million dollars, two-thirds of all oil production for 50 years, all the assets of the Danube Shipping Company in eastern Austria, and other properties. And they continued to demand that Yugoslavia's claims be met.

The Soviet proposal was unacceptable to Austria and was rejected by the Western Powers.

At the suggestion of the United States the deputies met at London February 9, 1949. By mid-April it had become obvious that the Soviet deputy, acting on orders from Moscow, was pursuing deliberate delaying tactics. It was useless to continue until after the meeting of the Foreign Ministers scheduled for May at Paris.

At Paris the Western Powers made their position clear. When Austria came up on the agenda, they jointly declared:

Austria is a liberated country. It is extremely difficult to justify continued military occupation four years after Allied troops liberated Austrian territory from Nazi domination. The Austrian people and the Austrian government have repeatedly called upon us to fulfill our responsibilities and to complete the task we assumed. Surely the time is long overdue for the execution of these commitments.

In the meanwhile there had been one development. Relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union had cooled. The open break was yet to come, but notes had begun to fly back and forth between Tito and the Kremlin.

Approached now on Yugoslavia's claims, the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Molotov, made a gesture of defending his one-time friends and then abandoned them. Their claims would be dropped.

With that obstacle removed, the Western Powers, with Austria's approval, made an offer. They agreed that the U.S.S.R. should receive 60 percent of Austrian oil production, shares in the Danube Shipping Company, and a 150-million-dollar cash settlement. It was a high price, but putting an end to the occupation and restoring Austrian sovereignty were thought to be worth it. The concessions were made on the understanding that they would be incorporated in a final treaty to be completed by September 1, 1949. With the Soviets apparently agreeing, the deputies were

instructed to set to work and be ready with the treaty by that date.

Austrian hopes rose with the news of the Paris "settlement." "Now we shall be masters in our own house," commented the Austrian Foreign Minister, Karl Gruber. He was given a triumphant reception when he returned to Vienna.

And so the deputies met July 1, 1949, at London to finish up the business—or so the Austrians and the Western Powers thought.

They were soon disillusioned. It was the old question of "German assets." The Soviets had been perfectly willing to make big concessions at the expense of Yugoslavia, but when it came to their own interests even slight compromises were out of the question.

For example, there was a large amount of railroad rolling stock which the Soviets had seized as "war booty." At Paris the Foreign Ministers had agreed that war booty was to be returned to Austria. The deputies were to define the exact meaning of the term. The Soviet deputy now refused to agree that these railroad items, vitally important to Austrian economy, came under the heading of "war booty."

Under the Paris agreement the Soviets were to receive 60 percent of the oil exploration lands in Austria. In London the Soviet deputy interpreted this clause in such a way as to assure a monopoly for the Soviet Union on virtually all future Austrian oil production.

The Paris agreement would have allotted the Soviets oil refineries in Austria with an annual refining capacity of 420,000 tons. In London the Soviet deputy handed the other deputies a long list of refineries to which the Soviets laid claim under this provision. By manipulating production figures, they had enlarged the agreed Paris total to include all major Austrian refineries.

They demanded full title to the sole pipeline running from the producing area to the refineries. They insisted upon rights to Danube shipping properties, even in excess of those formerly possessed by the Danube Shipping Company.

Thus there was no treaty ready for the Foreign Ministers on the scheduled date, September 1, 1949.

The deputies met again in New York during the last week in September. At that time the Foreign Ministers of the Four Powers were at Lake Success attending a session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

The first few meetings of the deputies produced no results. An appeal was made to the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Vyshinsky, and on October 6 Mr. Vyshinsky made public a statement to the effect that the unagreed articles presented no problem if "German assets" could be settled to Soviet satisfaction.

Briefly there was hope. The Soviet deputy, however, announced that the Soviet Union would make no concessions. He concluded his statement with an abrupt "That is all, gentlemen."

Finally, on November 11, the U.S. deputy announced that the United States would be willing to accept the wording of the Soviet draft on "German assets." It was clear, however, that the United States was not taking this position because it agreed in principle but only because of the wishes of Austria to be free, even at this price.

Word went out from Lake Success that chances for completion of the treaty draft by the end of the month were very good.

### The "Dried Peas Debt"

The hopes thus raised were soon dashed. The Soviet deputy announced that he could not agree until he knew the outcome of Soviet-Austrian negotiations on Soviet claims for compensation for postwar relief supplies allegedly given Austria. He said he would not continue the discussion until this matter had been settled.

This was, of course, a completely extraneous issue. It had nothing to do with the treaty.

The Austrians contended that the supplies involved were largely dried peas taken from Wehrmacht stores in Vienna by the Soviets at the time of "liberation" and distributed to the hungry population in the days immediately following.

The Austrians had made every effort to settle the business with the Soviets, but the Soviets had refused to set a figure. They had ignored Austrian notes on the subject.

News of the introduction of the issue as a bar to the treaty was received in Vienna with shock and bewilderment.

The deputies adjourned to reconvene at London January 9, 1950, when, presumably, the issue of the dried peas would have been settled. The Austrians resumed their efforts to close the "dried peas debt" but were unsuccessful.

The issue was still unresolved when the deputies met at London.

The meeting dragged on through April. With the excuse of the "dried peas debt" wearing thin, the Soviet deputy came up with an entirely new issue. He charged the Austrian Government and the Western Powers with encouraging a revival of nazism and remilitarization in Austria. Almost identical charges had been examined repeatedly by the Allied Council in Vienna, where the Western High Commissioners had found them unconvincing, vague, and unsupported by the evidence.

Not content with this, the Soviet deputy asked the other deputies to attend a special meeting on May 4, 1950, where he said he would have "something important" to say.

That "something important" was a denunciation of the United States and Great Britain for their presence in Trieste.

Despite the obvious fact that the Austrian treaty had no direct relationship with the Trieste question, the Soviet deputy stated on May 22 that

"before signing the treaty with Austria, it is necessary that the Governments of the U.S.A., Great Britain and France should reply to the note of the Soviet Government of April 20 on the question of Trieste."

Austria, apparently, was to serve as a hostage to force compliance on the part of the Western Powers on this entirely irrelevant issue. If this linking of two unrelated matters prevented the conclusion of a treaty, the Soviet exploitation of Austria could continue.

In terms of progress toward a treaty, the year 1951 was practically a blank. At a meeting at Paris the Western deputies made a strenuous effort to agree upon a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers and to have the Austrian question included on the agenda but failed.

In September U.S. Secretary of State Acheson, Foreign Minister Schuman of France, and Foreign Secretary Morrison of the United Kingdom met in Washington. They discussed the Austrian treaty and on September 14 issued a tripartite declaration, which, in part, stated:

... there is no justification for any further delay in the conclusion of a treaty for the re-establishment of a free and independent Austria. This has been a constant aim since the conclusion of hostilities. They [the three Western Powers] will not desist in their efforts to bring the Soviet Government to the same view and to that end they have decided to make a new and resolute effort in the meetings of the Austrian Treaty Deputies to fulfill the long over-due pledge to the Austrian people.

Speaking before the Sixth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations in Paris, November 13, 1951, Secretary Acheson called upon the Soviet Union for action. He said:

For more than five years now the United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union, and the United States have been discussing the conclusion of a treaty for Austria. The four powers have promised the Austrian people independence. The Austrians have long ago fulfilled all the conditions for the restoration of their complete sovereignty. But the country is still under occupation . . . the Soviet leaders can speak the word which will fulfill their promise to Austria.

A new meeting of the deputies was called for January 29 at London.

The Soviet deputy refused to attend. No meeting, therefore, could be held.

### The "Short Treaty" Is Drawn

In the spring of 1952 the Western Powers took an important step in an effort to break the deadlock in the negotiations.

The 1949 agreement on the basic treaty provisions had included a provision that the final treaty should be ready by September 1 of that year. That deadline, however, had not been met.

In the meantime Austria had moved ahead. The situation had changed. Many of the provisions of the draft treaty were no longer applicable. Others were too punitive for a country whose de-

votion to democratic principles and whose ability to put them into effect had been demonstrated.

Austria was no longer on trial. She had proved herself.

Accordingly, the Western Powers set to work to prepare a new draft. The result of their labors was a short treaty of just eight articles.<sup>3</sup> Of these, seven were agreed articles from the old draft and were, as the Western Powers saw them, all that was needed to assure Austria her freedom and independence.

One article was new. It read:

Each of the Allied and Associated Powers shall . . . relinquish to Austria all property, real and personal, of whatever description, held or claimed by them as German Assets or war booty in Austria.

The matter of Soviet rights to compensation was not disputed. The new article, however, took into consideration the 7 years of exploitation of the Austrian economy by the Soviets.

The new draft proposed to put an end to that exploitation. It proposed to restore to Austria not only her political independence but the wherewithal to make that independence meaningful.

The new draft was submitted to Moscow March 13, 1952. With it went notes from the Western Powers explaining the proposal and urging the Soviet Government to cooperate in this latest effort to fulfill the pledges of the Moscow Declaration.

The U. S. note said:<sup>4</sup>

The Government of the United States considers that failure to reach an Austrian settlement has placed a heavy and unnecessary burden on the Austrian people and has contributed materially to the maintenance of the dangerous tensions which unhappily exist in international relations. It is the most earnest desire of the Government of the United States to do everything within its power to remove these tensions. The conclusion of an Austrian treaty would constitute an important step toward the consolidation of peace.

Weeks and months slipped by without a reply from the Soviets. The Western Powers forwarded "reminders" to Moscow from time to time and still received no reply.

In July the Austrian Government itself took action. A memorandum was circulated among the members of the United Nations calling attention to the situation and presenting the Austrian case.<sup>5</sup>

The memorandum said, in part:

The protracted occupation of Austria, the duration of which can now not even be estimated, affects Austrian political and economic interests in the most serious manner.

There was a brief survey of Austrian properties now in the hands of the Soviets. (For text, see Annex.)

The preference of the Austrian Government for the short draft treaty was stated:

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Mar. 24, 1952, p. 449.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 448.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, Aug. 11, 1952, p. 221.

. . . negotiations cannot be resumed on the basis of the old treaty draft which . . . contains a number of financial and economic provisions no longer bearable . . . and hardly ever acceptable to the Austrian Parliament . . .

Reaction among U. N. members to the Austrian memorandum was definitely favorable. It was hard for anyone to see why Austria should not be restored to freedom and independence. Sentiment for its admission to the United Nations itself was strong.

On August 14, 5 months almost to a day after the short treaty draft had been forwarded to Moscow, the Soviets replied.<sup>6</sup>

The tone of the reply was not encouraging. The Soviets demanded, first of all, the withdrawal of the new draft. Trieste was again mentioned, and there were references to demilitarization and denazification. The Austrian memorandum was condemned as "notorious."

Specific criticisms of the new draft, however, were limited to charges that the text omitted certain agreed articles in the old draft guaranteeing democratic rights to the Austrian people and granting the Austrian Government the right to maintain its own national armed forces. The last objection was curiously inconsistent in light of the references to "demilitarization." Actually, of course, Austria has no national armed forces. It owns not a single military plane or planes of any description. It has no guns, no tanks, no ammunition, no troops.

The Western Powers lost no time in replying to the Soviet note. They sent a note to Moscow in which they agreed to the inclusion in the new draft of the articles from the old draft covering the points raised by the Soviets.<sup>7</sup>

The Soviets were reminded, however, that the present Austrian Constitution and Austrian legislation actually in force provided full democratic rights to the Austrian people. Three free elections since 1945 had been held, with a resulting Government holding the full confidence of the Austrian people.

Said the U.S. note:

Nonetheless, appreciating the careful consideration given by the U.S.S.R. during the past five months to the proposal of March 13, 1952, and anxious, as it has been since the Moscow Declaration of 1943, to restore to Austria full independence, the Government of the United States therefore proposes that there be added to its proposal of March 13, 1952 articles 7, 8, and 9 of the long draft as previously agreed upon by the four powers.

These were the articles of the old draft referring to the democratic rights of the Austrian people.

The Western Powers agreed also to the inclusion in the new draft of the old article on armed forces for Austria.

Of this the U.S. note said:

With reference to the Soviet Government's objections to the proposal of March 13, 1952 in that it passes over the right of Austria to have its own national armed forces

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, Sept. 1, 1952, p. 322.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, Sept. 15, 1952, p. 404.



necessary for the defense of the country, the Government of the United States considers that the right to maintain armed forces belongs inherently to a free and independent nation and should not have to be specifically granted to a nation never considered to have been an enemy. The Soviet Government, however, implies by its reference to the long draft of the State Treaty that it wishes to place limitations upon Austria's right to have national armed forces for its self-defense. While seeing no necessity thus to limit Austrian sovereign rights the United States Government, in order to reach early agreement and to terminate the occupation, would accept, although reluctantly, the addition of Article 17 of the long draft to its proposal of March 13, 1952.

The specific objections of the Soviets having been met, the Western Powers then proposed that a meeting of the deputies be scheduled for September 29 in London to initial the new draft as amended to meet the Soviet objections.

Said the United States:

The Government of the United States . . . believes that the way is now clear for the conclusion of an Austrian settlement . . .

But the meeting called for September 29 was destined never to take place. On September 27 the Western Powers received identical notes from the Soviet Government reiterating its demand that the short draft be withdrawn before any further discussion of the Austrian treaty.

The emphasis in their objections to the new draft, however, had shifted. The block was again "German assets."

This time the mask was off. The Soviets made little attempt to conceal their determination not to discuss any treaty which would require them to disgorge their loot. They wanted that thoroughly understood before even consenting to meet with the Western Powers.

There was no meeting in London on the date set.

The next development was the effort by the Soviets to prevent the inclusion of the Austrian question on the agenda of the General Assembly. Then came the fight in the General Assembly to prevent consideration, and later approval, of the Brazilian resolution. On both points the Soviets were unsuccessful. The resolution was adopted.

On January 12, 1953, the Western Powers, in identical notes<sup>8</sup> to the Soviet Government, called to the attention of Moscow the wishes of the U.N. members, clearly expressed in the vote on the Brazilian resolution.

Said the notes:

It is proposed, therefore, rather than to continue the sterile exchange of notes . . . that a meeting of the Austrian Treaty Deputies be held at an early date for the purpose of concluding an Austrian Treaty.

The meeting was set for January 30, 1953, at London.

At first it appeared unlikely that the Soviet deputy would attend. In another note Moscow demanded the withdrawal of the short treaty before any meeting was scheduled.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, Jan. 26, 1953, p. 135.

The Western Powers stood firm. The meeting was postponed a week. February 6 was the new date.

This time the Soviet deputy, Andrei Gromyko, put in his appearance. He came armed with his Government's instructions to prevent the conclusion of an Austrian treaty.

He declared that only after withdrawal of the new draft could "other matters relating to the Austrian question be discussed."

The Western Powers were conciliatory. They stated that the meeting had been called simply to discuss an Austrian treaty. The French deputy suggested that anything could be discussed that could lead to the desired end.

The U.S. deputy proposed, in light of the Soviets' objections to the short draft, that it be laid aside and work be resumed on the old long draft. He said that he would be ready to withdraw the abbreviated treaty if they could conclude a just and equitable treaty on any other basis, including the long draft, without further delay. As the Soviet Government had expressed readiness to conclude a treaty on the basis of the long draft, he formally proposed that discussion begin by going through the long draft.

Mr. Gromyko, however, again insisted that no discussion could take place until the new draft was withdrawn. He refused to enter into any discussion, even after the Western deputies agreed that the short draft would be withdrawn if a just and equitable treaty could be concluded on any other basis without delay.

The Western deputies repeated their willingness to begin the discussion by a review of the long draft. To this the Soviet deputy replied, "I have nothing to add to my previous position."

Considering that the Western Powers had agreed to resume business on the basis of the old draft, Mr. Gromyko's "position" seemed highly indefinite. Since he refused to go further into the subject, it became more than apparent that attempts to continue the discussion would be futile. The meeting was suspended.

And so, in the spring of 1953, the question of freedom and independence for Austria was still unresolved. The attitude of the Soviet Union leaves little hope for a satisfactory conclusion of a treaty in the immediate future.

Austria is still occupied. In June 1947, the United States waived payment from Austria for occupation costs, but Austria still foots the bill for the upkeep of the troops of the other occupying powers. Speaking of the total economic burden borne by Austria, Foreign Minister Gruber has said:

Had it not been for the generous aid of friendly nations, and in particular the United States of America, Austria would be an economic wreck today.

In light of the pledges of the Moscow Declaration, the Austrian people resent the fact that their country has been singled out for such treatment.

Occupation forces have been withdrawn from Italy and Japan, admittedly "enemy" nations. Treaties have been signed with Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Italy, Japan, and Rumania.

Austria, by solemn agreement a "liberated" country and never an enemy, now asks to be liberated from her "liberators." She asks that the pledges of the Moscow Declaration be fulfilled.

The United States backs that plea. In his concluding remarks before the Political and Security Committee, Ambassador Cohen said:

Austria seeks only justice. And it is justice long delayed. My Government believes that Austria is entitled to its freedom and independence . . .

## ANNEX

### Losses Incurred by Austria Through the Occupation<sup>o</sup>

A complete enumeration of all losses suffered by Austria through the occupation which has now lasted for more than seven years, and a detailed description required in this connection of its indirect effects on Austria's economy, which can only be fully ascertained after the withdrawal of the troops of occupation, would go far beyond the limit of this short information. Therefore, only a few particularly important facts and figures indicating the extent and diversity of the losses incurred will be presented in the following paragraphs.

#### 1. Direct costs of occupation:

From 1945 to 1951 Austria has paid more than 6400 million Austrian Shillings in occupation costs, A. S. 5200 mill. of which were paid directly to the powers of occupation, while the remaining A. S. 1200 mill. were used for the exchange, at a rate of 1:1, of the military shilling notes issued by the occupying powers in 1945. (It should be noted here that the American occupation authorities, in recognition of the fact that there was no reason to continue the occupation of a liberated Austria waived their claim to occupation costs.)

To this day, direct occupation costs, converted into Dollars at the present rate of exchange, amount to approximately \$300 mill.

If the rate of exchange of 1:10 in force from 1945 to November 1949 is applied to the occupation costs paid during this period, the sum spent on occupation costs from 1945 to this day amounts to \$530 mill.

#### 2. Indirect losses suffered by the state:

All goods shipped to the occupation powers are exempt from any taxes, dues and customs formalities. The enterprises seized by Soviet Authorities (USIA-enterprises) do not pay the prescribed taxes; similarly, no tax is paid from the illegal sale of foreign tobacco products, made possible solely by the fact of the occupation.

The losses in taxes and dues thus incurred by the Austrian state up to the end of 1951 can be estimated as follows:

	million Shillings
Custom duties-----	1, 160
Direct taxes-----	540
Excise taxes-----	123
Tobacco-tax-----	1, 520
<hr/>	
Total-----	3, 343

<sup>o</sup> Annex 5 of memorandum presented to the Department of State July 31, 1952, by the Austrian chargé d'affaires, announcing his Government's intention of taking to the United Nations its plea for the conclusion of a State treaty to end the occupation of Austria and restore its national sovereignty.

This sum, calculated at the present rate of exchange of A.S. 21.36 to U.S. \$1 (disregarding the rate of A.S. 10 to \$1 valid until 1949) corresponds to appr. \$150 mill.

#### 3. Seizures and dismantlements:

Following the liberation of Austria a series of seizures, dismantlements and removals of all kind were carried out. The losses incurred through the dismantlement and removal of machinery, semi-finished products, raw materials and equipment amount to appr. \$500 mill.

#### 4. Tourist traffic in Austria:

The losses suffered by the Austrian tourist industry through the seizure of tourist establishments thus diverted from their original use amount to \$24.5 mill. The sums necessary for the restoration of these tourist establishments, which have suffered severest damage by such seizure and diversion are estimated at \$29 mill.

Moreover, the exploitation by a power of occupation of the oil deposits in Austria signifies for the Austrian economy a yearly loss of many millions of Dollars, as illustrated by the following figures:

1. Production in 1951 . . . . .	2, 236. 000 tons
Value based on the price of crude oil only of \$17 per ton . . . . .	appr. \$38, 000. 000
Considering the Austrian refining capacity of 1,300,000 tons, and assuming an average price for refined oil products of \$30, the above figure is increased to -----appr.	\$55, 000. 000
Deliveries to Austrian consumers (finished products) . . . . .	813. 000 tons
Remaining production, exported after deduction of the quantities used by the oil plants and the USIA-enterprises . . . . .	1, 180. 000 tons (53%)

Thus, the losses suffered by Austria in convertible currency in 1951 amounted to . . . . . \$23, 000. 000

On the other hand, in spite of her own oil production, 53% of which is being exported, Austria had to import, in 1951, mineral oil products of a value of . . . . \$4, 349. 000

2. An area of 109.452 hectares (appr. 270.300 acres) of arable soil has been seized and removed from Austria control.
3. One half of Austria's Danubian river fleet, including practically all riparian installation, warehouses etc. was also seized.
4. Nearly 600 railway engines and thousands of railway coaches were removed as war booty.
5. In addition, 9 telephone exchanges, sixty thousand switchboard connections and 30.000 telephones were dismantled.

## U.S.S.R. Declines Participation in Austrian Treaty Meeting

Press release 291 dated May 26

*On May 25 Soviet Ambassador Malik at London addressed a letter to the Secretary General of the Austrian treaty deputies declining the latter's invitation for participation of the Soviet Government in a meeting of the treaty deputies, which was to have been held at London beginning on May 27. On May 26 Ambassador Malik received a reply to his communication in the form*

of a joint note delivered by treaty deputies of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France.

Following are the texts of Ambassador Malik's letter and of the reply of the treaty deputies:

#### **Soviet Communication of May 25**

In confirming receipt of your letter of the 11 May in which it is proposed to call in London on the 27 May a meeting of the deputies for the preparation of a draft state treaty for Austria I consider it necessary to call your attention to the following:

First of all it should be recalled that the Council of Deputy Foreign Ministers for the Austrian Treaty is not in any way a permanent quadripartite organ and the summoning of such meetings lies within the competence of the Council of Foreign Ministers, the setting up of which was decided at the Potsdam Conference of 1945.

Starting from the year 1947, the question of an Austrian treaty was submitted on a number of occasions to sessions of the deputies but, in spite of the efforts made from the Soviet side, agreement was not reached. In the years 1947-49, appropriate meetings of the deputies were held, but they did not lead to the results which they should have. The meetings of the deputies which took place in the year 1950 also did not lead to a solution of the question of an Austrian treaty. Likewise in view of the position taken up by the representatives of the three powers, the meetings of the deputies held in February 1953 did not alter the position.

In view of the foregoing circumstances, there are no grounds to suppose that the meeting of the deputies which is now proposed would give any more successful results than the preceding meetings.

In connection with the foregoing, I propose that, at the present time, it would be more expedient to consider this question through diplomatic channels by means of an appropriate exchange of opinions.

#### **Treaty Deputies' Joint Note of May 26**

In his letter of the 25 May to the Secretary General of the Deputies for the Austrian Treaty, the Soviet Deputy alleged that a meeting of the Treaty Deputies could be called only at the request of the Council of Foreign Ministers, and asserted that there were no grounds for believing that the meeting called for the 27 May would be successful. The Deputies of France, the United Kingdom and the United States fail to understand the Soviet Deputy's position. It is the assigned task of the Deputies to draft an Austrian Treaty. All but a few of their 260 previous meetings were called without specific instructions from the Council of

Foreign Ministers. Moreover, at the last meeting of the Deputies on February 9, 1953, the Soviet Deputy agreed to an adjournment with the understanding that the next meeting would be called by the United Kingdom Chairman at an early date.

The three Deputies consider unwarranted the assumption by the Soviet Deputy that the meeting proposed would not lead to the conclusion of an Austrian Treaty. At the last meeting they made it perfectly clear they were prepared to accept any treaty in terms which would ensure Austria's political and economic independence. They are convinced that, given goodwill on the Soviet side, it would still be possible to conclude such a treaty.

The three Deputies deeply regret the refusal of the Soviet Deputy to meet and are reporting the position to their respective governments.

#### **Rumanian Diplomat Declared Persona Non Grata**

Press release 289 dated May 26

The Department of State on May 26 notified the Legation of the Rumanian People's Republic that Christache Zambeti, First Secretary of the Legation, is *persona non grata* for activities incompatible with Mr. Zambeti's status as a diplomat accredited to this Government. The Department ordered Mr. Zambeti's immediate departure from the United States.

The action taken was based on carefully verified information which revealed that Mr. Zambeti on May 20 called at the home of V. C. Georgescu, a naturalized American citizen of Rumanian descent residing in New York City, and attempted to subvert Mr. Georgescu to collaborate politically with the Communist regime of Rumania to the detriment of the U. S. Government. The price offered for this collaboration was to be the welfare of Mr. Georgescu's minor sons and their possible restoration to their parents. Mr. Georgescu's sons, Costantin and Peter, ages 19 and 14 respectively, were born in Rumania and have been refused permission by the Rumanian authorities to come to this country to rejoin their parents. Mr. Georgescu rejected the proposal of Mr. Zambeti and reported the matter to the proper authorities.

Following is the text of the Department's note to the Legation of the Rumanian People's Republic regarding the status of Mr. Zambeti:

The Acting Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Minister of the Rumanian People's Republic and invites his attention to the following:

The Government of the United States has ascertained that Christache Zambeti, First Secretary of Legation, has engaged in activities incompatible with his status as an accredited diplomatic official.

Therefore, this Government is impelled to declare Mr. Zambeti *persona non grata*. The Legation is requested to make arrangements for his immediate departure from the United States.

## Reiteration of Principles of UNC Position on POW Issue

### *Statement by the President*

White House press release dated May 26

The attention of the free world is focused upon the armistice negotiations at Panmunjom. There, on May 25, the U.N. Command renewed its efforts to bring an honorable peace to Korea and a fair and humane settlement of the POW issue. To speed these negotiations the U.N. Command requested executive, in other words confidential, sessions. We are continuing to observe the executive nature of those sessions.

There are, however, certain principles inherent in the U.N. Command position which are basic and not subject to change. No prisoners will be repatriated by force. No prisoners will be coerced or intimidated in any way. And there must be a definite limit to the period of their captivity. The procedures used in handling the prisoners must reflect these principles.

In all this, our allies are in full accord. These principles accord also with the prevailing view of a representative bipartisan group of Senators and Congressmen who have been consulted.

Finally: These principles on which we stand are the same as those which were formally approved by 54 members of the United Nations.

## The Faith of Free Men

*by Robert L. Johnson*

*Administrator, International Information Administration*<sup>1</sup>

Some time between now and sunrise tomorrow morning, hundreds of people who are waiting—hiding out in the forests, along the river banks, and in the fields—will risk their lives to escape to freedom. How many of them have come over from the Iron Curtain? The answer is nearly 2 million persons, more than 150,000 of whom have crossed this great divide in 1953. These are the people the Soviet party members and their satellite henchmen have instructed, indoctrinated, and intimidated. Yet still they come.

The real story of the people behind the Iron Curtain is told also in the recent demonstrations in Czechoslovakia—the demonstrations which began when the Communists tore down the statue of Tomas Masaryk, the beloved first President of the Czech Republic. In the city of Brno, school children formed into a procession and marched to the site. When the police tried to interfere, the

women of Brno were at the children's side, and they were followed by the workers. Surely, as the Voice of America pointed out in a broadcast to the people of Czechoslovakia, those Communist policemen must have sensed their ultimate fate.

Most of us, of course, know why these people have revolted from communism. They seek only what a former citizen of the Soviet Ukraine found here in the United States. How surprised she was to discover that here no identification papers are required. She did not have to register at a police station. She could live where she chose, travel freely from place to place, with no forbidden zones. As she tells it: "Everything here depends on one's own initiative, ability, and will to organize one's own life. Such is life in America."

How well this woman's expression of appreciation points up the difference between the free world and the slave world. The fabric of the free world is a deep and abiding faith in our freedoms. The fabric of international communism is fear—fear of oppression, and tyranny, and inhumanity. The true source of the bonds between free nations, as President Eisenhower has said, is the fundamental faiths we share together.

Consider, for a moment, the rich heritage passed on to us by our brave ancestors. They left their homes, renounced security, and with their families entered the wilderness and endured incredible hardships. They came in quest of spiritual goals. They embedded in the virgin soil of a new continent the principles and convictions which have distinguished our Nation from all the empires of totalitarianism, past and present. For theirs was the true revolution, one dedicated to making a reality of individual freedom—the finest ideal that the mind can conceive.

### What Free People Really Believe

What do free people really believe? It comes down, I think, to certain simple and yet all-powerful convictions:

—That a man can better himself by his own efforts and be respected for what he does, regardless of color, creed, or racial origin;

—That wealth is something to be created by mutual effort, not something to be taken away from somebody else;

—That the privilege of citizenship carries with it personal responsibilities for the improvement of the community;

—That the "other fellow" has his side of the story and a right to be heard;

—That government is the servant, not the master of the people, and it can never confiscate property, minds, or souls;

—Above all, free people believe that men live for a higher purpose than their own small aims under the laws of a power beyond that of any man in any state.

<sup>1</sup> Address made before the All-American Conference To Combat Communism at Washington on May 23 (press release 280 dated May 22).

These convictions are intertwined in the fabric of our faith. They give us, in fact, the brawn, the nerve, and the mind which are our strength in meeting with the primary task that faces the United States and the free world today.

That task is well-known to you. It is to counter the evils let loose in the world by a system of government whose basic tenets are the opposite of our own, and whose final aim is to enslave the world. This system is now developing every technique of propaganda and subversion, in a campaign menacing to our way of life. Since World War II it has spread into a major effort to divide the free world. Its primary effort is to isolate the United States and to undermine confidence in our strength, the sincerity of our stated purposes, and our leadership.

In short, this is the "campaign of hate," and its proportions are staggering. The Soviet Union and its satellites are now spending about \$1.5 billion each year on direct propaganda alone. And Red China has budgeted almost an equal amount for propaganda. These expenditures do not include the vast sums also being spent in support of the Communist government regimes by the Communist parties, nor by the organizations which are curry-combed by the followers and the travelers to serve the ends of communism.

But they do not rely solely on direct propaganda. They inspire riots, as in Paris, Tokyo, and Essen in 1952. They create the threat of war in Asia and in Eastern Germany. They infiltrate underground, and they stir up conflicts between groups and between nations.

To meet this challenge in the "war of ideas," the U.S. Government, through the International Information Administration (IIA), is conducting a program of information and educational exchange. The purpose is twofold: to combat communism and to inspire hope and confidence in the unity and strength of free men. Both aims are basic.

In my opinion, we should bring about two things. First, we must use all of our power to remove the misconceptions about the United States and to answer the lies the Communists tell about us. For example, the Soviets charge that we are the aggressor in Korea. However amazing that charge is to us, unless it is answered with the truth, unless we bring the facts in the case to the attention of millions of people, the charge will, to say the least, influence their thinking and their actions.

Second, we must inform the world by the examples of what we do and what we have done that we are not an aggressive or an imperialistic nation. We must tell other peoples not only of what we do each day but of our historical actions in fostering and granting independence to the Philippines and to Puerto Rico; and of our non-aggressive aims in the two great wars of the

century. Such truths as these will carry the conviction to other peoples that our purposes are just what we say they are.

As I see it, the IIA has two definite assets. On the one hand, we have a number of devoted men and women working at the task. On the other, we have "all the arguments" on our side.

We do not have to engage in deception or subterfuge; we do not have to twist the truth. We do not have the problem of the Soviets, who are trying to make the people of Poland favor a system under which they are paying higher and higher prices for bread, meat, housing, and other bare necessities while the Soviets are boasting to the world about lower prices in the U.S.S.R. No one in Poland needs to be an economist to realize that his personal privations and denials, the draining of his country, are what make the lower prices possible in the Soviet Union.

In the last several years, the U.S. information and exchange program has developed in a more or less topsy fashion. It is a new arm of our Government. It must strengthen the other means—diplomatic, military, and economic—by which we pursue our objectives abroad.

#### **Effectiveness of IIA**

Has this new arm of government done its job? Is it effective now? Should the citizen continue to pay his taxes in part to support such an undertaking?

Most people who know something about this program, I believe, have no hesitation in answering these questions affirmatively. They know, moreover, that it is not the kind of program, like making bullets or tanks or ships, where you can apply the slide rules, the statistics, and the cost factors, and then come up with a measured answer.

More and more people have realized that showering a thousand leaflets is worth while if only one person picks up a copy and acts on it; that broadcasting is worth while so long as there is one radio receiver in operation; that the visit of one person may have a profound effect on our relations with another country; that a single film can revolutionize the thinking of an entire village; and that a book vitalized with the ideals of a Lincoln will open the minds of all those who read it.

This new program is effective, perhaps, only when it reaches into the minds of other people and presents the truth day in and day out. We are doing just that in many ways, but the American people know very little or nothing at all about it.

For example:

—When the Soviets must use almost 1,000 transmitters to hold out the Voice of America (VOA) at a cost which may exceed the entire budget of our radio program; and when the VOA receives four times as much audience mail as the BBC.

—When two priests, one in Italy and one in the Philippines, can say, respectively:

One motion picture is worth a hundred sermons.

The thing I like [about IIA's films] . . . is that they make people think. Thinking people make poor Communists.

—When the Secretary of the Belgian American Educational Foundation can report that of about 650 Belgians who had been to the United States under the auspices of the foundation, 11 have since become Ministers of State (3 have been Prime Ministers), 5 have been Senators, 5 have been members of the Chamber of Representatives, 14 have held positions in international organizations, and nearly 300 were, or now are, faculty members of the four Belgian universities or other institutions of higher learning.

—When the distribution of press material in several European countries, used by free trade unionists, is credited with the failure of Communist-attempted general strikes; and when the only course of retaliation by the Communists must take the form of bombing and burning our field posts, as they have done in Damascus, Baghdad, and Beirut.

—When the proposed elimination of information centers—our libraries—in Schweinfurt, Germany, and Hakodate, Japan, saw civic groups, churches, and labor unions successfully petitioning to retain these centers. In the Japanese city, 40,000 persons signed such a petition.

—And when, in an activity begun with one man in 1948, nearly 800 projects have been developed with organizations and individuals in the United States so they could participate directly in this overseas program.

When facts like this become known, when the reasons for spreading the truth about ourselves are fully understood, I am sure no sane person would ask: "Can we afford the IIA program?" He would say instead, "Can we afford to be without it?"

But the most conclusive measure of the worth of the program may be this: Suppose that the U.S. Government had no overseas program of this nature, no radio, no publications, no information centers, no exchange of persons, no motion pictures. In short, no explanation to the great masses of people in the world of U.S. policy, U.S. deeds, and what Americans stand for.

Quite obviously, few among us would favor such a negative course in the world of today.

To do the positive job of spreading the truth, and to do it most efficiently, we must eliminate from the program any person who is not in complete sympathy with the aims and purposes of our Government. We must bring in the most brilliant men and women available in the United States. Every individual in the IIA, and every new employee, must be what I would call a genuine American.

For mark you well: This program is important. It is an undertaking which the President and other leaders regard as of the highest importance. For they realize this: If our job of carrying America's message of truth and hope to the world is well done, there is a good chance that it will be the weapon with which free men will finally overcome the modern day challenge to freedom. It is our best hope for enduring peace—backed by the faith of free men.

## **Reed Mission Reports on Pakistan Survey**

Press release 287 dated May 25

The food survey mission to Pakistan under Harry Reed, dean of the Agriculture Extension Service of Purdue University, has returned and made its report to the Department of State and the Mutual Security Agency.

The purpose of the mission was to make an intensive survey of Pakistan's food needs for the coming year in the light of that country's request for U. S. assistance in supplying a quantity of wheat. This objective was accomplished with the excellent cooperation of Pakistan officials both in Karachi and the provinces.

The mission reported that Pakistan is approaching a very critical period for its national economy. The most urgent problem is the assurance of a food supply for the next 12 months. Mr. Reed emphasized that the people of Pakistan are fully aware of this problem and have taken a number of steps toward its solution. However, if a drastic food shortage is to be averted, the efforts of the Pakistan people will have to be supplemented with substantial outside assistance for the procurement of wheat.

Mr. Reed's associates on the mission were Norman J. Volk, associate director of the Agriculture Extension Service of Purdue, and Peter H. Delaney, Office of South Asian Affairs, Department of State.

## **King and Queen of Greece Invited To Visit U.S.**

White House press release dated May 28

During his present visit to Greece, the Secretary of State extended on behalf of the President an invitation to Their Majesties the King and Queen of the Hellenes to visit the United States in autumn of this year.

It will be a pleasure for the Government of the United States to welcome for the first time to this country the rulers of a nation which contributed so much of its classical heritage of ideas to the concepts which animated the founders of our democracy. The United States and Greece

have maintained the most cordial relations since the emergence of Greece as a modern State more than a century ago. The visit of Their Majesties King Paul and Queen Frederika will provide the American people an opportunity to manifest the warm friendship they have long felt for a gallant ally whose record against armed aggression both during and after World War II has been an inspiration to all of the free world.

## **Signing of Tax Conventions With Australia**

Press release 261 dated May 14

On May 14, 1953, Walter Bedell Smith, Acting Secretary of State, and Sir Percy C. Spender, Australian Ambassador, signed three conventions (treaties) between the United States and Australia for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion, one relating to taxes on income, one relating to taxes on the estates of deceased persons, and one relating to taxes on gifts.

The substantive provisions of the income-tax and estate-tax conventions follow, in general, the pattern of such conventions which have been entered into by the United States with numerous other countries. The gift-tax convention with Australia is the first convention of this kind which the United States has concluded with any country. It also follows the general pattern of tax conventions, the objective of which is to eliminate double taxation as far as practicable.

The three conventions with Australia are subject to ratification and will be submitted to the President for transmission to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification. Upon the exchange of instruments of ratification by the United States and Australia, each of the conventions will enter into force according to a formula set forth in the particular convention.

## **Royal Treasures Returned to Ryukyu Islands**

Press release 296 dated May 28

Treasures of the former Royal Household of the Ryukyu Islands were returned to the Ryukyuan Government on Okinawa by Maj. Gen. David A. D. Ogden, the Deputy Governor of the Ryukyu Islands, on "Friendship Day," May 26, 1953, which terminated a week's celebration in the Ryukyus of the 100th anniversary of the visit of Commodore Perry to the Ryukyu Islands in 1853.

These treasures were recovered early this month in the United States by the Bureau of Customs, with the assistance of an Army sergeant, William T. Davis, who was assigned to Okinawa in 1949. At that time he learned of the tragic loss of the special collections and archives of the old royal

court which had been preserved in the Shuri Castle for over 400 years. These irreplaceable documents and royal regalia were believed to have been destroyed in 1945 when the cities of Naha and Shuri, the ancient capital of the islands, became a battlefield. In April 1952 fewer than 100 works concerning Ryukyu history remained in the library at Shuri.

A gilded headpiece of the Sho Royal House is among the items being restored to Okinawa under U.S. Government policies.

The return of the *Omoro Soshi*, the original 22 manuscript volumes of ancient Ryukyuan poems and chants dating from the Ming dynasty, is of unique importance. Volume I dates back from the eleventh year of Chia-ch'ing (1532) and the other volumes date from the third year of Tien-chi (1623). This rare manuscript from the Shuri Castle is the earliest extant copy of ancient songs of great historic and religious significance for the Ryukyuan people. Twenty-six volumes of the annals of the Royal Household and genealogical records of the princely families dating from 1702 and 1711 and other miscellaneous works are also being returned. A complete record on microfilm of these rare volumes has been made by the Department of State.

## **MSA and Danish Government Initiate Productivity Program**

The Danish Government and the Mutual Security Agency on May 15 put into motion a broad program to increase Danish production and productivity during the next 2 years. Announcement of the undertaking was made on May 15 at Washington. Simultaneously, MSA allotted \$1,500,000 in defense support funds to Denmark under terms of a new agreement, and said another \$1,500,000 allotment was planned before July 1. These dollars will be used for the procurement of commodities needed in Denmark's defense buildup. Danish currency generated by the dollars will be used to finance the new productivity campaign.

Under terms of the Danish Government-MSA agreement, Denmark is earmarking 31,720,000 kroner (equal to \$4,597,102) for the productivity programs of which about two-thirds is to be generated by MSA's new \$3 million allocations and the remainder taken from Danish Government counterpart funds previously generated by MSA dollar aid.

Denmark is the fourth country to enter into such an agreement with MSA. The others are the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the Netherlands. Negotiations are in progress with other countries.

MSA is directed to work with countries participating in the Mutual Security Program to develop intensive productivity programs under the terms of the "free enterprise" amendments to Mutual

Security legislation. These amendments provide that Msa use up to \$100,000,000 this year to generate foreign currency counterpart funds for productivity programs in Western European countries which enter into agreements with Msa "with a view to stimulating free enterprise and the expansion of the economies of those countries."

The Danish fund will provide 10,565,000 kroner (equal to \$1,531,160) for loans and grants to private enterprises in industry and commerce; 4,500,000 kroner (equal to \$652,174) to support a building construction program; 15,000,000 kroner (equal to \$2,173,913) to increase agricultural production; and 1,655,000 kroner (equal to \$239,855) as Denmark's contribution to the European productivity agency established May 1 under the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC).

The agreement specifies that commercial enterprises benefiting from the program are to share their increased profits with labor and consumers.

A key part of the program is the development of a corps of Danish consultants who will be available to aid industry, labor, and the distributing and building trades. Intensive training for this personnel will be provided through studies in Denmark, other parts of Europe and, when necessary, the United States.

On completion of their training, the consultants will be obligated to make their services available to private enterprise or the productivity program for at least 1 year in close cooperation with the Danish Productivity Council. The Council, which includes representatives of labor, employers, Government, and consumers, will supervise the entire productivity program. It was set up in 1949 to work toward higher productivity in Danish industry and agriculture.

The industrial consultants will advise management on the application of scientific principles, and labor consultants will advise the free trade unions regarding their role in the productivity campaign. Similarly, construction and distribution consultants will work closely with appropriate organizations in advising retailers and contractors on special methods to raise the level of productivity and to market the increased production which results.

To spur building construction, five machinery depots will be established in various parts of Denmark which will rent equipment and machinery, such as cranes, hoists, scaffolds, and the like, to contractors who are unable to afford the purchase of such equipment. The machinery available in these warehouses will be sufficient to permit the construction of about 4,200 apartments yearly, or about 20 percent of Denmark's total annual new construction.

Another major part of the program is a 4,000,000 kroner (equal to \$579,710) revolving loan fund to be devoted to the modernization of existing food stores on the pattern of American self-service stores. Low-interest loans not to exceed about

30,000 kroner each (equal to about \$4,350) are to be made to small- and medium-sized stores seeking to convert to self-service type of operation.

Also in keeping with the objectives of the Msa legislation is a project for the protection of consumers' interests in the form of developing and strengthening the existing Danish consumers' organization. This project will permit a substantial expansion of consumer research work such as the testing of products, educational programs, and demonstrations to housewives.

A key segment of the agricultural productivity program will be the establishment of about 90 pilot farms which will demonstrate modern and efficient methods of feeding cattle, pigs, and poultry. An extensive program also is being developed to instruct farmers in the efficient use of machinery, largely necessitated because the number of tractors in use in Denmark has increased from 5,000 in 1945 to nearly 40,000 today.

Another important provision of the agricultural productivity program is the setting up of an Agricultural Information and Technical Service Office, which will correspond to the American Agricultural Extension Service. This office, working with the Productivity Center, will attempt to spread to farmers knowledge of improved agricultural techniques to increase food and fiber production.

## U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

### Telegraph Consultative Committee (ITU)

The Department of State announced on May 25 (press release 285) that the International Telegraph Consultative Committee of the International Telecommunication Union is to hold its Seventh Plenary Assembly at Arnhem, Netherlands, May 26-June 13, 1953.

The United States will be represented at the meeting by the following delegation:

#### *Chairman*

Edward M. Webster, Commissioner, Federal Communications Commission

#### *Vice Chairman*

Richard T. Black, Telecommunications Policy Staff, Department of State

#### *Advisers*

Robert G. Kreer, Assistant Chief for Telegraph, Division of Communications and Records, Department of State

William P. Richmond, Jr., Attaché, American Embassy, Paris

Marion H. Woodward, Chief, International Division, Common Carrier Bureau, Federal Communications Commission

The Committee has no formal agenda for its Seventh Plenary Assembly. Its work will consist of a review of the reports and recommendations prepared by the various study groups on their assigned subjects; the adoption of recommendations; the formulation of new questions for



study; and the taking of decisions, as necessary, on matters connected with the administration of the Committee until its next plenary assembly.

Both the U. S. Government and private American telecommunication companies have a direct interest in all recommendations and decisions of the Committee which may affect message service. Moreover, the United States has made numerous contributions to the work of the various study groups over the past few years.

### Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Commission

The Department of State announced on May 25 (press release 283) that the third meeting of the International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries would convene at New Haven, Conn., on that day. The U.S. Government will be represented at the meeting by the following delegation:

#### *U.S. Commissioner*

John L. Kask, Chief, Office of Foreign Activities, Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior  
Richard Knollenberg, Chester, Conn.  
Francis W. Sargent, Director, Division of Marine Fisheries, Department of Conservation, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Boston, Mass.

#### *Advisers*

Herbert W. Graham, Chief, North Atlantic Fishery Investigations, Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior  
Lionel A. Walford, Chief, Branch of Fishery Biology, Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior

Under the terms of the International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, which entered into force in July 1950, the Commission provides the machinery for international cooperation in the scientific investigation and development of the fishery resources of the waters off the west coast of Greenland and the east coasts of Canada and New England.

While the Commission has no direct regulatory powers, it may recommend to governments the regulatory measures that it considers necessary for maintaining, at a maximum level for sustained production, the stocks of fish which support the international fisheries in the convention area. The members of the Commission are Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

It is expected that the Commission will at its current meeting adopt a comprehensive research program which will constitute, in effect, a master plan for the future research activities to be undertaken in the convention area by the member governments under the auspices of the Commission.

Among the matters of great interest to the United States which the Commission will have before it are recommendations having to do with the New England haddock fisheries.

## THE DEPARTMENT

### Appointment

Robert Richardson Bowie as Director of the Policy Planning Staff and Department representative on the Planning Board of the National Security Council, effective May 28.

## New Series of Broadcasts to Latin America

Press release 297 dated May 28

Robert L. Johnson, Administrator of the International Information Administration, announced on May 28 that Associated Broadcasters, Inc., of San Francisco, has been authorized to use for Latin American broadcasts, until June 30, two shortwave transmitters which they are presently operating under contract with IIA. The new series of Latin American broadcasts will begin May 28 and continue through the month of June.

This shortwave transmitting plant at San Francisco, now to be used for the new series of broadcasts under private auspices, was one of those affected when Dr. Johnson gave notice, on April 1, that IIA contracts for facilities at five shortwave transmitting plants would not be renewed. At that time the Administrator said that in view of his proposed economy cuts in the Voice of America personnel and language broadcasts, IIA would not need these facilities after the present contract expired on June 30.

The daily shortwave programs launched by Wesley I. Dumm, president of Associated Broadcasters, Inc., from 6:30 to 9:30 p. m., e. s. t., fill approximately the same time occupied by the Voice of America's Spanish language broadcasts which terminated May 23.

This new series of programs, broadcast without additional cost to the Government, will consist mainly of music, sports, and news currently used on San Francisco's Station KSFO. Associated Broadcasters, Inc., will prepare the selected music and sports programs for shortwave broadcast with Spanish commentary at their own expense. Spanish-speaking announcers will replace the usual KSFO newscasts with items of particular interest to Latin America.

In addition, Dr. Johnson added that the International Information Administration had contracted with Associated Broadcasters, Inc., to produce and broadcast to Latin America, under the supervision of the Department of State, a series of half-hour dramatic programs in Spanish, designed to cultivate friendships with the people of Latin America. The programs are to be broadcast some time between 6:30 and 9:30 p. m., e. s. t. The dramatic series will be paid from funds appropriated by Congress for radio programming to Latin America and Western Europe by private international broadcasting licensees.

## THE FOREIGN SERVICE

### Praise for the Foreign Service

*by Acting Secretary Smith<sup>1</sup>*

I had not intended to talk shop today, and yet I came here wanting in some way to pay a deserved tribute to a career service and, believe me, it is possible for me to apply a very, very rigid standard of comparison.

I have, in almost 40 years of service as an Army officer, believed that I required a very high standard of performance in my subordinates, that

<sup>1</sup> Transcript of extemporaneous remarks made before the Foreign Service Association at Washington on May 27 (press release 294).

I have demanded more of them and of myself than many of my contemporaries, and indeed my subordinates have felt the same way. I want you to know that during the time I have been associated with the Foreign Service, both abroad and in the Department here, I have, and I say this literally, been astonished—pleased and astonished—by the high qualities of intellectual honesty, integrity, and devotion to duty which I have seen continuously displayed. I don't mean just the long hours of thankless work, away from the observation of a superior, simply of getting a job done, but the real dedication to a task, to a service, to an ideal. It exceeds—it certainly equals if it does not exceed—anything that I have ever seen before, and I wanted to acknowledge that fact.

This service does two things for you. It develops an intellectual honesty which permeates the entire personnel. I will give you an example.

After 40 years of service in various capacities in Government, after being responsible for our war planning on a high level, conducting various large-scale military operations, then attending the course of instruction in atomic energy, becoming Director of Central Intelligence, and occupying other positions of more or less sensitivity, I joined the State Department and was, of course, subjected to a full field investigation.

During the course of that investigation, one of the officers charged with conducting it wanted to find out something about my service in Moscow. The only man who was immediately available who had served with me was a friend and a son of a friend, a young officer whom I had actually fired out of Moscow because, while I think he is a very good man, he was misplaced and was doing a remarkably poor job. I am afraid I didn't handle him very well on his report. I think he has recovered from that. In any event, it was to him that the FBI went to find out about my service and, as he told an associate that had reached me about third hand, the first thought was, "Well, the mills of the gods grind slowly." Then he said, "I thought it over and I could not in honesty think of anything very bad to say about the old goat." Well, there is the opportunity for levity, but it means what it says, and he said what he believed and not possibly what he would like to have said—a good standard for relatively junior officers in the service, one that I applaud and one that I admire.

Now, with regard to work and its effectiveness, there are various standards, of course. While in Moscow, I believe it was in company with your distinguished President that I visited a collective farm. On the way in, our interpreter, who was with us, stopped to speak a few words to a very old Russian woman who was with a sickle cutting brush alongside the road. He said to her among other things, "Mother, how are things on the farm?" She said, "Ah, they are terrible. On this farm nothing works. The tractors don't work;

the plows don't work; the trucks don't work. The only thing on this farm that works has just been made a heroine of Soviet motherhood."

There have been times, along about half past 7 or 8 or 9 o'clock in the evening, when I have thought that our mechanical processes of getting things done and coordinated in the Department were about like that. But usually in the morning when I get to my desk and see the results of some clearheaded, coordinated thinking in the field of foreign relations and realize how wrong I myself would have been had it not been for that level-headed staff advice, I reconcile myself to any loose motion that we may have in the field of technical-staff operations. Those are easily correctable. What cannot be supplied on short notice is the character, the quality, the integrity, and the intellectual honesty of the personnel. That we have in full measure. For that our country has reason to be grateful. I have reason to be grateful. I congratulate you for it.

### Confirmations

The Senate on May 28 confirmed Arthur Gardner as Ambassador to Cuba.

The Senate on May 28 confirmed R. Douglas Stuart as Ambassador to Canada.

The Senate on May 28 confirmed William T. Pfeiffer as Ambassador to the Dominican Republic.

The Senate on May 28 confirmed Michael J. McDermott as Ambassador to El Salvador.

## THE CONGRESS

### Request for Extension of UNRWA Program for Palestine Refugees

*Statement by Acting Secretary Smith<sup>1</sup>*

As this is a public hearing, it is necessary to review certain matters already well known to this Committee.

I shall not document our interest in the Near Eastern region, which is fully understood in responsible circles within the executive and legislative branches of Government.

It is my purpose to outline the nature of the refugee problem and the efforts of the U.N. Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) to rehabilitate the unhappy Palestinians who lost their homes and property in what is now Israel.

Our conclusions are that this is a world problem which it is proper for the United Nations to deal with; that we should continue to support the U.N. Relief and Works Agency in its efforts. We

<sup>1</sup>Made before the Near Eastern and African Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on May 20 (press release 276).

think that the United Nations has done a good job under difficult conditions. We appreciate the full support that Congress has given in the past to this effort. We hope that we can look to Congress for continuing support. Past concern for this unfortunate group is justified on grounds of our national interest and on grounds of common humanity.

Difficult conditions have hindered progress, stemming from the background of hostilities in Palestine. Furthermore, large-scale projects require detailed planning, and there are inevitable delays in putting major reclamation and irrigation plans in hand.

This in brief is the situation :

As a result of hostilities, upwards of 750,000 Arabs, living in the British mandate of Palestine, in 1948 left their homes and possessions. The vast majority of these people have received no compensation for their property, and many express the desire to be repatriated.

While 100,000 or more of these people have been able to find means of self-support in Arab communities, the registry rolls of the United Nations now list about 865,000 needy refugees, to whom 810,000 "rations"—the equivalent of 1,600 calories daily, are being distributed.

This problem is not static, as our best evidence indicates that the refugee population is growing at the rate of 25,000 annually, as births exceed deaths.

Present projects for the refugee population, which Mr. Gardiner<sup>2</sup> can describe in greater detail later and which will take some years to implement fully, hold out hopes for a living for only about 400,000 souls.

The simple fact is that the agricultural, industrial, and financial resources of the Arab nations concerned cannot cope with this problem unaided.

As you know, Israel occupied territory during the conflict considerably beyond the boundaries allotted to it by the U.N. partition plan of 1947. From the lands so occupied many thousands became refugees.

The refugee problem is the principal unresolved issue between Israel and the Arabs; outstanding issues are generally listed as compensation to the refugees, repatriation of the refugees, adjustment of boundaries, and the status of Jerusalem and the Holy Places. None of these issues can be separated from the refugee problem.

Against a background of frustration and hostility, the U.N. Relief and Works Agency has done two things: Maintained a program of relief—food, shelter, medical care—and developed in the Arab countries programs of self-support for the refugees.

The Department of State considers that this U.N. agency is the correct instrument for these

purposes. Through the establishment of such an organization by the General Assembly, widespread support of the program has been secured from many nations. At the same time, the direct relationship between the agency and the principal contributing governments, through the Agency's Advisory Commission, has enabled us to keep in close contact with its operations and to have a direct voice in its policies.

As for the general policies of the agency, its standards for relief must be conditioned by the fact that poverty prevails among nonrefugees. There must be left incentives for those who choose to work rather than to receive a dole. This makes for hardship in a population which had achieved, during the past 30 years, higher material standards than those of its former neighbors and its present hosts. We cannot in any case right the wrongs of the Arab refugee by relief payments, but if the United Nations can help maintain adequate levels of health and nutrition we shall have some cause for satisfaction.

On the side of rehabilitation, we have witnessed slow but steady progress in attitudes among the Arab governments enabling the development of specific plans to permit substantial numbers of the refugees to improve their lot.

The U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees has conducted its operations in a framework of humanitarian and economic considerations and has attempted to avoid any direct connection with outstanding political issues. Within these limits, and without prejudice to final solutions of political issues, it has negotiated agreements to benefit the refugees by substituting employment for relief.

In 1952 the General Assembly of the United Nations, with Arab support, voted a 3-year program estimated to cost \$250,000,000, divided as to \$50,000,000 for relief and \$200,000,000 for projects.<sup>3</sup> Funds to start this program have been available since late in 1951.

The agency has earmarked funds for the irrigation of the Jordan Valley. A project is now under close study by the U.S. engineers attached to the Government of Jordan. Intensive irrigation of the valley might provide for 200,000 people not now living there. This is a bold and imaginative proposal. In Jordan, whose resources of water and arable land are limited, it is the main hope. Technical problems both of water utilization and of land settlement lie ahead. More than any other nation, Jordan has been the sufferer of the Palestine hostilities. Jordan nevertheless represents a stabilizing influence in the Near East and needs and welcomes outside aid.

The Egyptian Government has made a proposal for aiding refugees now concentrated in Gaza, through developments in the Sinai Penin-

<sup>2</sup> Arthur Z. Gardiner, Politico-Economic Adviser, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs.

<sup>3</sup> For text of resolution, see BULLETIN of Feb. 11, 1952, p. 226.

sula. Preliminary engineering advice is favorable to such a proposal, involving use of water from the Nile.

In Syria, work is under way on land reclamation carried out by refugees on lands made available by the Government. Proposals for rehabilitation of the urban refugees are under study.

The record of the UNRWA has until recently consisted chiefly of prospects. It is now possible to report that projects are the subject of continuing collaboration and concrete planning between UNRWA and governments. This marks a great step forward. You may recall that 3 years ago when the problem was first studied by Gordon Clapp, on behalf of the Palestine Conciliation Commission, it was impossible for him to find responsible Arabs willing to discuss more than a program of work relief. We now are in the phase of economic development from which refugees and host countries can secure permanent benefits.

It is unreasonable to expect Arab countries to accept refugees as workers unless means are found to improve conditions of their own citizens at the same time. The refugees cannot be the sole beneficiaries of new opportunities, nor can they hope to elbow settled people aside. Here lies the case for general economic development of the host countries, which deserves to be considered on its own merits as well as in the context of providing opportunities for the refugees. From the conclusion of hostilities in Palestine until today, little tangible progress has been made in such development in Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Egypt. The interest and plans of these countries hold out hope for the future, but they will need help from the banks and from our own Government, as well as from the UNRWA, if their plans are to mature.

It is clearly not in our national interest to accept responsibility for the welfare of the refugees, for either a long or a short period of time. It seems equally clear that to abandon this program of relief and rehabilitation now would have serious repercussions on our national interests. Such action would involve profound unsettlement in the Near East, prejudicial to the well-being of all our friends there. It is equally clear that the goals of the present program cannot be achieved by its present terminal date of June 30, 1954. It is our view that the date for termination of the program should be extended for a further 2 years, until June 30, 1956; that we should endeavor to maintain the target of \$200,000,000 for work projects and, as circumstances dictate, continue relief expenditures for at least a further 2 years. This will necessitate an increase of the relief fund originally projected at \$50,000,000.

The success of other programs included in current MSA legislation for the area will have a great effect on the progress of this agency, as would a settlement of other issues in the Near East.

## Support for U.S. Participation in St. Lawrence Seaway Project

*Statement by Livingston T. Merchant*

*Assistant Secretary for European Affairs<sup>1</sup>*

I am appearing before you today to support U.S. participation in the St. Lawrence Seaway project. As Under Secretary of Commerce Williams has testified, the Cabinet and the National Security Council have both seriously studied the question of U.S. participation.<sup>2</sup> Both have come to the conclusion that this participation is desirable, provided that it is limited to the international section of the St. Lawrence River, substantially as proposed in S. 589.

The decision was not made lightly. It was based on the administration's policy of considering each major construction project on its own merits and on the basis of the national interest.

The conclusions reached by the administration are predicated on several conditions. First, satisfactory assurance must be received that the underlying power project will go ahead. In this connection I have been gratified to learn that the examiner for the Federal Power Commission has issued his report and has recommended the issuance of a license to the Power Authority of the State of New York. Second, satisfactory assurance is required that Canada will go ahead with its part of the navigation project in cooperation with the United States. I believe that we have the basis for this assurance in the communique issued after the recent meeting of the President and the Prime Minister of Canada,<sup>3</sup> which I will refer to later. Third, the project must be self-liquidating.

Testimony on the third condition will be given by other witnesses who will appear before you. I do not intend to go into detail on the many aspects of the legislation which you are considering. I do want, however, to set the record straight as to just what the present arrangements are in so far as the international aspects are concerned.

Previous administrations consistently supported measures for the development by the United States and Canada of the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence basin. These measures envisaged, for the part of the United States, development of power and navigation jointly with Canada along lines laid down in the 1941 agreement between the two countries. Congressional approval of these measures was never secured.

In the past 18 months, however, the situation changed. Under a different basis, we have reached

<sup>1</sup> Made before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on S. 589, providing for the creation of the St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation, on May 20 (press release 275).

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of May 25, 1953, p. 753.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 752.

the point where we can see that both the navigation and the power phases of the St. Lawrence project will go forward. The power potential of the International Rapids section of the St. Lawrence is to be developed by entities of the United States and Canada. A deep sea waterway into the Great Lakes is to be provided concurrently by Canada.

Before us we have a simple question. Will the United States join with Canada in constructing the St. Lawrence Seaway, as proposed in S. 589, or will it abandon by default any control over this great natural waterway so important to North America's security and economic progress?

The recent developments which have led to the present situation can briefly be summarized. In 1951, when it appeared that congressional approval of the 1941 agreement would not be obtained, the Canadian Government suggested that, under the appropriate provisions of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, application be made by the United States and Canada to the International Joint Commission for approval of certain works for the development of power in the International Rapids section of the St. Lawrence.<sup>4</sup> The Canadian Government gave assurances that, should the power plans be approved, additional works would concurrently be provided to insure deepwater navigation into the Great Lakes. The Canadian Government obtained Parliamentary assent to the necessary domestic legislation for construction of the seaway on the Canadian side of the St. Lawrence. It also negotiated an agreement with the Province of Ontario whereby the Ontario Hydro-Electric Power Commission would develop the Canadian share of the power.

The Department of State, working with other interested executive agencies, cooperated with the Canadian Government in the preparation and the submission of the applications of the two Governments for power development to the International Joint Commission. After some months of hearings, the International Joint Commission issued its Order of Approval on October 29, 1952.<sup>5</sup> Shortly thereafter, on November 4, 1952, the Canadian Government informed the United States that it considered the agreement of 1941 to have been superseded by the action of the International Joint Commission. It was further stated that the Canadian Government would not therefore seek Parliamentary ratification of that agreement.

These developments left the situation as follows: (1) the power would be developed by the Province of Ontario and an entity in the United States, and (2) the seaway would be constructed by Canada alone, provided no action is taken by the Congress

<sup>4</sup> For an announcement of the meeting on Sept. 8, 1951 between President Truman and Canadian Prime Minister Louis S. St. Laurent, when the latter indicated his Government's willingness to construct the seaway as a Canadian project, see *ibid.*, Oct. 8, 1951, p. 581.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, Dec. 29, 1952, p. 1019.

to authorize U.S. participation in the navigational phase. Once plans for power development have been completed, the Canadian Government has expressed its willingness to discuss U.S. participation in the seaway.

#### Canadian Position Indicated

That Canadian willingness is expressed in a memorandum given to the American Ambassador in Ottawa on January 9, 1953, by the Canadian Government. I would like to quote from that memorandum since it expresses not only the Canadian Government's attitude toward possible U.S. participation in the seaway but because it also emphasizes the importance which Canada attaches to power development.

While the Canadian Government is of course prepared to discuss, in appropriate circumstances, joint participation in the Seaway, the demand for power in the area to be served by the International Rapids power development is so urgent that the Canadian Government is most reluctant to engage in any discussion which might delay the progress of the plan now under way for the development of power in the International Rapids Section of the St. Lawrence River at the earliest possible moment.

Once an entity is designated and authorized to proceed with construction of the United States share of the power works, if the U.S. Government wishes to put forward a specific proposal differing from that put forward by the Canadian Government for the construction of the seaway in the international section which proposal would not delay the development of power under arrangements agreed upon in the exchange of notes of June 30th, 1952<sup>6</sup> and approved on October 29th, 1952 by the International Joint Commission, the Canadian Government will be prepared to discuss such a proposal.

The Canadian Government would naturally expect the discussion to be such as not to cause any serious delay in the completion of the whole seaway.

The most recent indication of the position of the Canadian Government is to be found in the communique issued at the conclusion of the talks between the President and the Prime Minister of Canada on May 8. I will not attempt to read into the record the whole of that communique which reveals the identity of view and the close cooperation in many fields of the two Governments, but I would like to quote that portion relating to the St. Lawrence.

The Prime Minister emphasized the importance to Canada of an early start on the St. Lawrence project and the especial urgency to Canada of the power development. The President assured the Prime Minister that the United States is fully aware of Canada's urgent need for St. Lawrence power. He said that he favored the development of the United States share of St. Lawrence power under the authority of New York State and that he hoped for an early favorable decision by the Federal Power Commission in this matter. The President in this connection referred to the decision of the Cabinet on this subject announced today. The Prime Minister said that the Canadian Government was still prepared to discuss United States participation in the international section, provided that arrangements for power are completed and provided the whole seaway would not be delayed. He

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, July 14, 1952, p. 65.

stressed again Canada's readiness to proceed at once with the work under the Canadian St. Lawrence legislation of 1951.

These statements are illustrative of the Canadian Government's position. They show Canada's cooperative attitude as well as Canada's desire to get on with the job.

### Aspects of U.S., Canadian Relations

We see that, provided a Federal Power Commission license is granted, then power and navigation can go forward. As satisfactory as those arrangements are, I should like to emphasize that they are not as advantageous to the United States as would be the case if the United States were a participant in the navigational development. Without that participation the United States will have no clear right to a voice in the construction, control, operation, tolls, and amortization of this waterway which should play so great a part in the economic development of both our country and Canada. According to Corps of Engineers' testimony, construction of the seaway on the U.S. side of the boundary would cost less. Since most of the traffic using the canal will be of U.S. source or destination, the costs of amortization will largely be borne by U.S. shipping and shipments for U.S. account. Construction costs and amortization proposals are, therefore, matters in which the United States should have a voice. Joint U.S.-Canadian operation of the St. Lawrence waterway should lessen the chances for friction between the two countries. For the above-mentioned reasons, I believe that U.S. participation is highly desirable in order to insure adequate protection to legitimate U.S. interests.

In this matter of St. Lawrence development, the State Department is naturally concerned, especially with aspects affecting or potentially affecting our relations with Canada. These relations have historically been close and harmonious and it is important that they remain so. Most Canadians, and certainly the Federal Government in Ottawa, now regard the carrying out of St. Lawrence development as the single most important aspect of U.S.-Canadian relations. In this connection, St. Lawrence power for the industrial centers of Ontario is regarded by Canadian authorities as urgent because all other major sources of hydroelectric power available in the area to be served by St. Lawrence power have been or are being developed. A serious shortage of low-cost power is already apparent in Ontario and is expected to become acute by 1957. Even if construction were to start today, power would barely be available in time. For this reason, the Canadian Government is most anxious that no action be taken which would delay a start on the power project.

Meeting Canadian power needs is in our interest. About one-half of Canada's total manufacturing

capacity is located in the area to be served by St. Lawrence power. That growing industrial plant is producing goods essential to our defense, to Canada's defense, and to the needs of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Critical materials also come from that area. About 90 percent of the free world's nickel, for example, comes from Ontario.

You can readily see that the development of St. Lawrence power is essential to Canada and will add to our strength. Similarly, the seaway is viewed in Canada as a major contribution to the economy.

I have indicated that any action by the United States which would delay Canada's plans to proceed with power and navigational development would be harmful to our relations with Canada. It is urgent, therefore, that legislation of the nature of S. 589 be enacted during this session of the Congress, if the United States is to join in this project of great importance to our national security and our future economy.

## PUBLICATIONS

### Recent Releases

*For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.*

**Disposal of Surplus Military Equipment and Materials.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2537. Pub. 4789. 5pp. 5¢.

Exchange of notes between the United States and Greece—Dated at Athens Dec. 21, 1951, and Jan. 7, 1952.

**Relief From Taxation on Defense Expenditures.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2538. Pub. 4787. 7pp. 10¢.

Exchange of notes between the United States and Luxembourg—Signed at Luxembourg Mar. 10 and 13, 1952.

**Relief From Taxation on Defense Expenditures.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2546. Pub. 4803. 2pp. 5¢.

Exchange of notes between the United States and Denmark—Signed at Copenhagen Apr. 7 and 9, 1952.

**Education, Cooperative Program in Honduras, Additional Financial Contributions.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2549. Pub. 4806. 4pp. 5¢.

Exchange of notes between the United States and Honduras—Signed at Tegucigalpa Jan. 9 and Apr. 7, 1952.

**Relief From Taxation on Defense Expenditures.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2557. Pub. 4817. 3pp. 5¢.

Exchange of notes between the United States and Iceland—Signed at Reykjavik Mar. 5 and 18, 1952.

## Foreign Relations Volume Dealing with American Republics

Press release 271 dated May 18

Efforts for the establishment and maintenance of peace in the Western Hemisphere, negotiations for reciprocal trade agreements, and representations to secure proper treatment for American business interests are the chief subjects of diplomacy dealt with in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1935, Volume IV, The American Republics*, released on May 23 by the Department of State.

The long-continued Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay overshadowed other problems in inter-American relations in 1935. Hostilities were finally brought to an end on June 12 by an armistice agreement secured through the mediation of a group of neutrals consisting of the United States, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Uruguay. The armistice was followed by a peace conference in which the belligerents joined with the mediators.

The correspondence now published shows that one of the difficulties was to secure a proper arrangement for the exchange of prisoners of war. It is of interest to note that a draft peace plan presented included a provision for "Return of prisoners of war on signature of treaty of peace except those who make written application to remain." (p. 152.) The year ended with no final agreements having been reached. (Repatriation of prisoners was carried out in 1936 through a neutral country, Argentina, where the prisoners were given the opportunity either to return to the country by which they had been captured, or continue the journey to their own country.)

Other peace efforts recorded in this volume include the final ending of the dispute between Colombia and Peru over Leticia and the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between Costa Rica and Guatemala.

In the field of commercial relations, the year was marked by the signing of reciprocal trade agreements by the United States with Brazil, Colombia, Haiti, and Honduras. Negotiations for these agreements are here published together with preliminary discussions or negotiations for similar agreements with eight other countries. Exchange restrictions adversely affecting American business were also the subject of diplomacy with several countries.

Relations with Mexico receive considerable attention in this volume. Questions at issue chiefly concerned agrarian and oil interests of American citizens. The religious situation in Mexico also was a source of concern, but the Government of the United States regarded it as a domestic issue in which it should not intervene.

Political unrest continued in Nicaragua and the habit of various factions looking to the United States for support had not disappeared. The American Minister, however, met such advances with the definite statement that "intervention is a thing of the past." (pp. 843, 873.) The Minister was authorized to express the earnest hope of the Government of the United States that nothing would occur to disturb the peace of Nicaragua. (p. 874.)

There is little indication in the documents here printed that the threat of coming world war received much attention in the relations of the United States with its neighbors of the Western Hemisphere, but it is recorded that the Brazilian Government received from its Ambassador in Tokyo "a rather alarming picture of Japanese preparation for eventual hostilities with the United States." In such an emergency the United States was assured of "whole-hearted Brazilian support and cooperation." (p. 387.)

*Foreign Relations of the United States, 1935, Volume IV, The American Republics* (lxxxix, 988 pp.) was compiled in the Division of Historical Policy Research by Victor J. Farrar and Henry P. Beers, under the direction of E. R. Perkins, editor of *Foreign Relations*. Copies may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C., for \$4.00 each.

### Check List of Department of State Press Releases: May 25-29, 1953

Releases may be obtained from the Office of the Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.

Press releases issued prior to May 25 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 261 of May 14, 271 of May 18, 275 of May 20, 276 of May 20, 280 of May 22, 283 of May 25, 285 of May 25, 287 of May 25, and 289 of May 26.

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289	5/26	Zambeti, <i>persona non grata</i>
†290	5/26	Air transport pact with Cuba
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*292	5/27	F.S. Point 4 graduates
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The Department of State

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## Report on the Near East

*Address by Secretary Dulles*<sup>1</sup>

About 3 weeks ago, the Director for Mutual Security, Mr. Harold Stassen, and I and our associates set out, at President Eisenhower's request, on a trip to 12 countries which lie in between the Mediterranean in Europe and China in Asia. I shall give you our country-by-country impressions and then our general conclusions.

First, let me say that everywhere we were well received. This was encouraging, for several of the countries feel that the United States policies have, in recent years, been harmful and even antagonistic to them. The Communists have vigorously exploited this feeling. They staged some hostile demonstrations. But these were inconsequential. The governments received us with warm hospitality, and as we drove through the streets, the people usually greeted us with friendly smiles and applause. The political leaders talked intimately with us, and we gained new friendships and new understanding which will stand us in good stead for the future. Also in each capital I spoke to all of the United States Foreign Service personnel. They are a fine body of men and women of whom we can be proud.

It is high time that the United States Government paid more attention to the Near East and South Asia, which, until our trip, no United States Secretary of State has ever visited. Our postwar attention has been primarily given to Western Europe. That area was and is very important, but not all-important.

It came as a surprising shock when the 450 million Chinese people, whom we had counted as friends, fell under Communist domination. There could be equally dangerous developments in the Near East and South Asia. The situation calls for urgent concern.

The area we visited contains about one-fourth

of the world's population. It represents about one-half of the people of the world who are still free of Communist domination.

The Near East possesses great strategic importance as the bridge between Europe, Asia, and Africa. The present masters of the Kremlin, following the lead of past military conquerors, covet this position. In 1940 Soviet leaders specified, in secret negotiations with the Nazis, that Soviet "territorial aspirations center . . . in the direction of the Indian Ocean and . . . the Persian Gulf."

This area contains important resources vital to our welfare—oil, manganese, chrome, mica, and other minerals. About 60 percent of the proven oil reserves of the world are in the Near East.

Most important of all, the Near East is the source of three great religions—the Jewish, the Christian, and the Moslem—which have for centuries exerted an immense influence throughout the world. Surely we cannot ignore the fate of the peoples who have first perceived and then passed on to us the great spiritual truths from which our own society derives its inner strength.

### **Egypt and the Suez Base**

Our first stop was in Egypt. There we had 3 days in which to get acquainted with General Naguib, who heads the Government. He is a popular hero, and I could readily see why. He and his associates are determined to provide Egypt with a vigorous government which will truly serve the people. Also, they seek to end the stationing of British troops and exercise of British authority at the Suez base.

Before we arrived in Egypt, a very tense situation had developed between the British and the Egyptian Governments. Conversations looking to an orderly withdrawal of British troops had been suspended, and there was danger that hostilities would break out.

We discussed the situation with General Naguib. The heart of the trouble is not so much the pres-

<sup>1</sup> Delivered to the Nation over radio and television networks on June 1 and released to the press (no. 299) on the same date. Also printed as Department of State publication 5088.

ence of British troops, for both sides agreed that they should be withdrawn, but the subsequent authority over and management of this gigantic base, its airstrips, and its depots of supplies. Experienced administrative and technical personnel is needed to keep the base in operating efficiency and the provision of this personnel causes difficulty. The matter has an importance which goes beyond Egypt, for the base serves all Near Eastern and indeed Western security.

I am convinced that there is nothing irreconcilable between this international concern and Egyptian sovereignty. We asked, with some success, that there be further time to find a peaceful solution. The United States is prepared to assist in any desired way.

Egypt stands at the threshold of what can be a great new future. If this Suez problem can be satisfactorily solved, I am confident that Egypt can find the means to develop its land and lift up its people and add a new bright chapter to a glorious past.

### **Israel, Jerusalem, and Refugees**

Next we went to Israel. We were impressed by the vision and supporting energy with which the people are building their new nation. Inspired by a great faith, they are now doing an impressive work of creation. They face hard internal problems, which I believe they can solve. Furthermore, the Prime Minister, Ben Gurion, and other Israeli officials asserted convincingly their desire to live at peace with their Arab neighbors.

Jerusalem is divided into armed camps split between Israel and the Arab nation of Jordan. The atmosphere is heavy with hate. As I gazed on the Mount of Olives, I felt anew that Jerusalem is, above all, the holy place of the Christian, Moslem, and Jewish faiths. This has been repeatedly emphasized by the United Nations. This does not necessarily exclude some political status in Jerusalem for Israel and Jordan. But the world religious community has claims in Jerusalem which take precedence over the political claims of any particular nation.

Closely huddled around Israel are most of the over 800,000 Arab refugees, who fled from Palestine as the Israeli took over. They mostly exist in makeshift camps, with few facilities either for health, work, or recreation. Within these camps the inmates rot away, spiritually and physically. Even the Grim Reaper offers no solution, for as the older die, infants are born to inherit their parents' bitter fate.

Some of these refugees could be settled in the area presently controlled by Israel. Most, however, could more readily be integrated into the lives of the neighboring Arab countries. This, however, awaits on irrigation projects, which will permit more soil to be cultivated.

Throughout the area the cry is for water for irrigation. United Nations contributions and other funds are available to help refugees, and Mr. Stassen and I came back with the impression that they can well be spent in large part on a coordinated use of the rivers which run through the Arab countries and Israel.

### **Jordan**

Irrigation needs became most vivid as we motored from Jerusalem to Amman, the capital of Jordan. The road goes through the Dead Sea area, a scene of desolation with no sign of life other than the tens of thousands of refugees who survive precariously on the parched land largely by aid of United Nations doles. Later on, as we flew north, we observed the waters of the Yarmak River, which could perhaps be diverted so as to return some of this vast desert valley into fertile land.

At Amman we dined with the charming and able new King Husein and his Government. They are preoccupied with the problem of refugees and of relations with Israel. The inflow of refugees has almost doubled the population, and the long armistice line with Israel gives rise to frequent and dangerous shooting episodes.

### **Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia**

From Jordan we went to Syria. There we were impressed by General Shishakli. He is eager to develop the resources of his country, which are substantial. Thus, the living standards of the Syrian people could be raised. This would, in turn, enable them to receive more refugees into a land which relatively is sparsely populated.

From Damascus, the capital of Syria, we motored to Beirut, the capital of Lebanon. The road took us over a mountain range, with refreshing snow in sharp contrast to the heat of the desert plains.

You will recall that Beirut is the home of the American University, which has educated many of the Arab leaders of today. President Chamoun of Lebanon talked to us of his high hopes for his country and pointed to the role it might play, representing uniquely a meeting of East and West.

Leaving Lebanon for Iraq, we flew over the Tigris and Euphrates Valleys. This was the site of the Garden of Eden. Under its new ruler, King Faisal—who visited the United States last summer—the Government of Iraq is beginning to develop these valleys and restore their former productivity. The revenues from the oil production are being largely directed to this and other construction purposes. Iraq can be, and desires to be, the granary for much of this part of the world.

In Saudi Arabia we were received by King Ibn Saud, one of the great Near Eastern figures of this century, conspicuous in his dignity and single-mindedness of purpose. He is a good friend of the United

States, as he has shown by deeds. Our policy will be to reciprocate this friendship. In Saudi Arabia Americans and Arabs are working together in good fellowship in the vast oil fields of the country. It is a good relationship.

### **India and Pakistan**

We left the Arab area to go first to India and then to Pakistan. These two nations, although independent for less than 6 years, already play an influential part in world affairs.

In India I met again with Mr. Nehru, one of the great leaders of our time. We had long conversations together in the intimacy of his home. His calm demeanor and lofty idealism impressed me. We reviewed together the international problems which concern both our countries, including the problem of a Korean armistice and the threat to Southeast Asia. We did not always agree, but we did clear up some misunderstandings and, I felt, gained respect for the integrity of our respective purposes. India is now supporting the armistice position of the United Nations Command in Korea.

Mr. Stassen and I also obtained a clearer view of the Government of India's 5-year program to improve the welfare of the Indian people.

India is the world's largest self-governing nation. It has about 2,000 miles of common boundary with Communist China. There is occurring between these two countries a competition as to whether ways of freedom or police-state methods can achieve better social progress. This competition affects directly 800 million people in these 2 countries. In the long run, the outcome will affect all of humanity, including ourselves. Our interest fully justifies continuing, on a modest scale, some technical assistance and external resources to permit India to go on with its 5-year plan.

Pakistan is the largest of the Moslem nations and occupies a high position in the Moslem world. The strong spiritual faith and martial spirit of the people make them a dependable bulwark against communism.

The new Prime Minister, Mohammed Ali, whom we recently knew as Ambassador to Washington, energetically leads the new Government. We met with a feeling of warm friendship on the part of the people of Pakistan toward the United States.

A grave and immediate problem is the shortage of wheat. Without large imports, widespread famine conditions will ensue. Last year we helped India in a similar emergency. I believe that prompt United States wheat assistance to Pakistan is essential.

It is not possible to think about United States aid without also thinking that these countries cannot afford to waste their efforts in quarreling with each other and diverting their strength for possible use against each other.

That thought applies to the dispute between India and Pakistan about Kashmir. It is my impression from my conversations with the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan that this controversy can be settled. Surely it needs to be settled. We tried, tactfully but firmly, to make clear that the United States, as a friend of both countries, hopes for an accord which would make more fruitful such economic aid as we render.

### **Iran**

It was not practical to include Iran in our schedule. However, we arranged that our Ambassador to Iran should meet us in Pakistan. Iran is now preoccupied with its oil dispute with Great Britain. But still the people and the Government do not want this quarrel to expose them to Communist subversion. They have not forgotten the Soviet occupation of 1941-1946.

The United States will avoid any unwanted interference in the oil dispute. But we can usefully continue technical aid and assistance to this agricultural nation of Iran and in that way perhaps help prevent an economic collapse which would play into the hands of predatory forces.

### **Turkey, Greece, and Libya**

After Pakistan, we went to Turkey and Greece. These two countries have clearly demonstrated their intent to stand steadfast against Communist aggression and subversion. Despite their heavy commitments to NATO, both countries have contributed valiantly to the United Nations efforts in Korea.

We, in turn, plan to continue to help Greece and Turkey to grow stronger. They are valiant in spirit and hold a strategic position in Europe and Asia which enables them to help us. While in Greece I dined with the King and Queen and passed on to this charming couple President Eisenhower's invitation that they visit us this fall.

Our last stop before returning to the United States was Libya, the newest member of the family of nations. This country is located at a key spot on the North African coast on the Mediterranean. It has recently become an independent nation by action of the United Nations. Libya is cooperating with the United States and the United Kingdom in strengthening its own defenses and those of the Mediterranean area.

Let me turn now to conclusions.

1. *Colonialism.* Most of the peoples of the Near East and South Asia are deeply concerned about political independence for themselves and others. They are suspicious of the colonial powers. The United States too is suspect because, it is reasoned, our NATO alliance with France and Britain requires us to try to preserve or restore the old colonial interests of our allies.

I am convinced that United States policy has

become unnecessarily ambiguous in this matter. The leaders of the countries I visited fully recognize that it would be a disaster if there were any break between the United States and Great Britain and France. They don't want this to happen. However, without breaking from the framework of Western unity, we can pursue our traditional dedication to political liberty. In reality, the Western powers can gain, rather than lose, from an orderly development of self-government.

I emphasize, however, the word "orderly." Let none forget that the Kremlin uses extreme nationalism to bait the trap by which it seeks to capture the dependent peoples.

2. *Living Standards.* The peoples of the Near East and Asia demand better standards of living, and the day is past when their aspirations can be ignored. The task is one primarily for the governments and the peoples themselves. In some cases they can use their available resources, such as oil revenues, to better advantage. There are, however, ways in which the United States can usefully help, not with masses of money but by contributing advanced technical knowledge about transport, communication, fertilization, and use of water for irrigation. Mr. Stassen and I feel that money wisely spent for this area under the mutual security program will give the American people a good return in terms of better understanding and cooperation.

3. *Arab Good Will.* The United States should seek to allay the deep resentment against it that has resulted from the creation of Israel. In the past we had good relations with the Arab peoples. American educational institutions had built up a feeling of good will, and also American businessmen had won a good reputation in this area. There was mutual confidence to mutual advantage.

Today the Arab peoples are afraid that the United States will back the new State of Israel in aggressive expansion. They are more fearful of Zionism than of communism, and they fear lest the United States become the backer of expansionist Zionism.

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<sup>2</sup> Full text of the Declaration is as follows:

"The Governments of the United Kingdom, France, and the United States, having had occasion during the recent Foreign Ministers meeting in London to review certain questions affecting the peace and stability of the Arab states and of Israel, and particularly that of the supply of arms and war material to these states, have resolved to make the following statements:

1. The three Governments recognize that the Arab states and Israel all need to maintain a certain level of armed forces for the purposes of assuring their internal security and their legitimate self-defense and to permit them to play their part in the defense of the area as a whole. All applications for arms or war material for these countries will be considered in the light of these principles. In this connection the three Governments wish to recall and reaffirm the terms of the statements made by their representatives on the Security Council on August 4, 1949, in which they declared their opposition to the development of an arms race between the Arab states and Israel.

On the other hand, the Israeli fear that ultimately the Arabs may try to push them into the sea.

In an effort to calm these contradictory fears the United States joined with Britain and France in a Declaration of May 25, 1950, which stated that "the three Governments, should they find that any of these states (of the Near East) was preparing to violate frontiers or armistice lines, would, consistently with their obligations as members of the United Nations, immediately take action, both within and outside the United Nations, to prevent such violation."<sup>2</sup> That Declaration when made did not reassure the Arabs. It must be made clear that the present U.S. administration stands fully behind that Declaration. We cannot afford to be distrusted by millions who could be sturdy friends of freedom. They must not further swell the ranks of Communist dictators.

The leaders in Israel themselves agreed with us that United States policies should be impartial so as to win not only the respect and regard of the Israeli but also of the Arab peoples. We shall seek such policies.

4. *Peace Between Israel and the Arab Nations.* There is need for peace in the Near East. Today there is an uneasy military armistice between Israel and the Arab States, while economic warfare is being conducted by the Arab States, in retaliation for alleged Israeli encroachments. The area is enfeebled by fear and by wasteful measures which are inspired by fear and hate.

Israel should become part of the Near East community and cease to look upon itself, or be looked upon by others, as alien to this community. This is possible. To achieve it will require concessions on the part of both sides. But the gains to both will far outweigh the concessions required to win those gains.

The parties concerned have the primary responsibility of bringing peace to the area. But the United States will not hesitate by every appropriate means to use its influence to promote a step-by-step reduction of tension in the area and the conclusion of ultimate peace.

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2. The three Governments declare that assurances have been received from all the states in question, to which they permit arms to be supplied from their countries, that the purchasing state does not intend to undertake any act of aggression against any other state. Similar assurances will be requested from any other state in the area to which they permit arms to be supplied in the future.

3. The three Governments take this opportunity of declaring their deep interest in and their desire to promote the establishment and maintenance of peace and stability in the area and their unalterable opposition to the use of force or threat of force between any of the states in that area. The three Governments, should they find that any of these states was preparing to violate frontiers or armistice lines, would, consistently with their obligations as members of the United Nations, immediately take action, both within and outside the United Nations, to prevent such violation."

The above Declaration was first printed in the BULLETIN of June 5, 1950, p. 886.

5. *Middle East Defense Organization.* A Middle East Defense Organization is a future rather than an immediate possibility. Many of the Arab League countries are so engrossed with their quarrels with Israel or with Great Britain or France that they pay little heed to the menace of Soviet communism. However, there is more concern where the Soviet Union is near. In general, the northern tier of nations shows awareness of the danger.

There is a vague desire to have a collective security system. But no such system can be imposed from without. It should be designed and grow from within out of a sense of common destiny and common danger.

While awaiting the formal creation of a security association, the United States can usefully help strengthen the interrelated defense of those countries which want strength, not as against each other or the West, but to resist the common threat to all free peoples.

6. *Friendly Understanding.* In conclusion, let me recall that the primary purpose of our trip was

to show friendliness and to develop understanding. These peoples we visited are proud peoples who have a great tradition and, I believe, a great future. We in the United States are better off if we respect and honor them, and learn the thoughts and aspirations which move them. It profits nothing merely to be critical of others.

President Eisenhower's administration plans to make friendship—not faultfinding—the basis of its foreign policy. President Eisenhower brought with him from Europe an unprecedented measure of understanding and personal friendships. Before he was inaugurated, he went to Korea. Twice since inauguration, Mr. Stassen and I have been to Europe. Now we have been to the Near East and South Asia. Later this month, the President's brother, Dr. Milton Eisenhower, and Assistant Secretary of State Cabot will go to South America.

Thus your Government is establishing the worldwide relationships and gathering the information which will enable us better to serve you, the American people.

## President's Letter to Syngman Rhee on Proposed Korean Armistice

*Following is the text of a letter dated June 6 from the President to Syngman Rhee, President of the Republic of Korea:*

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

I received on June 2 the cabled text of your communication dated May 30.<sup>1</sup> I have given it the careful and sympathetic consideration it deserves.

The Republic of Korea has engaged all of its resources, human and material, in a struggle which will go down in history as one of the epic struggles of all time. You have dedicated your all without reservation to the principle that human liberty and national liberty must survive against Communist aggression, which tramples upon human dignity and which replaces national sovereignty with a humiliating satellite status. The principles for which your nation has fought and for which so many of your youth have died are principles

which defend free men and free nations everywhere.

The United States has stood with you, and with you we have fought for those principles, as part of the United Nations Command. The blood of your youth and our youth has been poured out on the altar of common sacrifice. Thereby we have demonstrated not only our dedication to the cause of human freedom and political liberty, but also our dedication to an equally important principle which is that there cannot be independence without interdependence, and there cannot be human liberty except as men recognize that they are bound together by ties of common destiny.

The moment has now come when we must decide whether to carry on by warfare a struggle for the unification of Korea or whether to pursue this goal by political and other methods.

The enemy has proposed an armistice which involves a clear abandonment of the fruits of aggression. The armistice would leave the Republic of Korea in undisputed possession of

<sup>1</sup> Not printed here.

substantially the territory which the Republic administered prior to the aggression, indeed this territory will be somewhat enlarged.

The proposed armistice, true to the principle of political asylum, assures that the thousands of North Koreans and Communist Chinese prisoners in our hands, who have seen liberty and who wish to share it, will have the opportunity to do so and will not be forcibly sent back into Communist areas. The principle of political asylum is one which we could not honorably surrender even though we thereby put an earlier end to our own human and material losses. We have suffered together many thousands of casualties in support of this principle.

It is my profound conviction that under these circumstances acceptance of the armistice is required of the United Nations and the Republic of Korea. We would not be justified in prolonging the war with all the misery that it involves in the hope of achieving, by force, the unification of Korea.

The unification of Korea is an end to which the United States is committed, not once but many times, through its World War II declarations and through its acceptance of the principles enunciated in reference to Korea by the United Nations. Korea is unhappily not the only country which remains divided after World War II. We remain determined to play our part in achieving the political union of all countries so divided. But we do not intend to employ war as an instrument to accomplish the world-wide political settlements to which we are dedicated and which we believe to be just. It was indeed a crime that those who attacked from the North invoked violence to unite Korea under their rule. Not only as your official friend but as a personal friend I urge that your country not embark upon a similar course.

There are three major points I would like to make to you:

1. The United States will not renounce its efforts by all peaceful means to effect the unification of Korea. Also as a member of the United Nations we shall seek to assure that the United Nations continues steadfast in its determination in this respect. In the political conference which will follow an armistice that will be our central objective. The United States intends to consult with your Government both before and during such a conference and expects the full participation of your Government in that conference.

2. You speak of a mutual defense pact. I am prepared promptly after the conclusion and acceptance of an armistice to negotiate with you a mutual defense treaty along the lines of the treaties heretofore made between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines, and the United States and Australia and New Zealand. You may recall that both of these treaties speak

of "the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific area." A security pact between the United States and the Republic of Korea would be a further step in that direction. It would cover the territory now or hereafter brought peacefully under the administration of the ROK. Of course you realize that under our constitutional system, any such treaty would be made only with the advice and consent of the Senate. However, the action which the United States has heretofore taken, and the great investment of blood and treasure which has already been made for the independence of Korea are certainly clear indications of American temper and intentions not to tolerate a repetition of unprovoked aggression.

3. The United States Government, subject to requisite Congressional appropriations, will be prepared to continue economic aid to the Republic of Korea which will permit in peace a restoration of its devastated land. Homes must be rebuilt. Industries must be reestablished. Agriculture must be made vigorously productive.

The preamble of the Constitution of the United States states the goals of our people, which I believe are equally the goals of the brave people of Korea, namely "to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty." Manifestly, not all of these conditions now prevail in Korea. Moreover, in existing circumstances they cannot be achieved either by prolongation of the present conflict or by reckless adventure with a new one. Only by peaceful means can these things be achieved.

With the conclusion of an armistice the United States is prepared to join with the Republic of Korea to seek for Korea these ends. We believe that in Korea there should be a more perfect union and, as I say, we shall seek to achieve that union by all peaceful methods. We believe that there should be domestic tranquillity and that can come from the end of fighting. There should be provision for the defense of Korea. That will come from the mutual security treaty which we are prepared to make. The general welfare should be advanced and that will come from your own peacetime efforts and from economic assistance to your war-torn land. Finally, a peaceful settlement will afford the best opportunity to bring to your people the blessings of liberty.

I assure you, Mr. President, that so far as the United States is concerned, it is our desire to go forward in fellowship with the Republic of Korea. Even the thought of a separation at this critical hour would be a tragedy. We must remain united.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER.



## New Escapee Program in Austria

by Llewellyn E. Thompson  
Ambassador to Austria<sup>1</sup>

The concept of the fundamental dignity of the individual is basic in our Western culture—it is indeed one of the firm foundations upon which our society rests. When governments, usurping and maintaining power in defiance of the will of the people they rule, infringe upon or deny the basic human rights of the individual, we find the victims seeking in increasing numbers to escape from conditions they can no longer abide.

In the free world, where political opposition to government is accepted and expected, the political refugee is granted shelter and asylum as a matter of course.

But more than asylum is needed—we must give adequate and sympathetic support, moral and physical, to those who have come to us as refugees. And that is the purpose and goal of the program being initiated here today.

This center constitutes a shelter and a way station on the road to a new life. Under this roof, men and women and even children, who just a short time ago knew the terror of a godless system and the constant fear of political arrest, are preparing to enter a new life of dignity and peaceful endeavor. In this place they can pursue their religious faiths, continue their education, and prepare themselves for useful occupations of their own choice.

We are not alone in this work. Responding to the initiative of the U.S. Government, the Government of Austria has been very active in establishing this reception center. It has staffed the camp with experienced personnel and provided the basic food, fuel, and equipment. Let me add that this is but a small portion of the generous contribution which the Austrian people have made toward easing the burdens of refugees. It gives me great pleasure to commend the sympathetic and efficient manner in which this problem has been met and the spirit of cooperation which has been so consistently translated into fruitful deeds.

We recognize that Austria is burdened with the problem of providing asylum for thousands of other refugees, including those of German ethnic origin. The establishment and financing by the American Government of a special program will relieve this problem by supporting the resettlement and re-establishment of escapees overseas. In the few short weeks that this center has been occupied, over 50 escapees have traveled from Wels to countries in the Western Hemisphere. Programs are under way to improve the health, morale, and technical knowledge of those who re-

<sup>1</sup> Remarks made on May 26 at the opening at Wels, Austria, of a new reception center jointly established by the Governments of the United States and Austria for escapees from Soviet-dominated countries.

main to be settled elsewhere so that they may soon follow to new homes of their own choosing abroad. The introduction and implementation of these programs are only possible through the skillful participation on the part of the voluntary agencies.

Here then, in these modest surroundings, it can truly be said a new life begins.

The presence here today of so many of the persons engaged in this humanitarian effort is proof to escapees that they are not a forgotten people. It is proof that the victims of tyranny are the abiding concern of all who respect human liberty anywhere.

## U.S. Representative on Board for Validation of German Bonds

The Department of State announced on May 29 (press release 298) the appointment of Douglas William Hartman to be the U.S. representative on the Board for the Validation of German Dollar Bonds. The German Government has selected Walter Reusch as the German representative on the Board. The chairman, who will be a U.S. citizen, has not yet been selected.

The Validation Board was created by an agreement between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany signed February 27, 1953,<sup>1</sup> which established the procedures to be followed in the United States for validating German dollar bonds. The Board will sit in New York City and is expected to begin its operations, involving approximately one million bonds of an estimated value of \$700 million, in the near future. At the present time it is engaged in making necessary administrative arrangements preparatory to entering upon the discharge of its duties.

Pending the commencement of validation, bondholders are being urged to hold their securities until the Board issues appropriate public announcements in newspapers and periodicals of general circulation, informing bondholders of the steps to be taken to have their bonds validated.

The Validation Board will carry out an operation believed to be unique in the field of international finance. Under the procedure provided for in the agreement of February 27, 1953, the Board is authorized to validate German dollar bonds which were outside Germany on January 1, 1945. This twofold criterion of time and place is the sole test which the Board will apply in determining whether the bonds submitted to it shall be validated. This does not mean that this is the only way U.S. bondholders can obtain validation. Holders of lawfully acquired securities who cannot establish that they were outside Germany on the required date may apply for validation under the procedures established in the Federal Republic of Germany.

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Mar. 9, 1953, p. 376.

The objectives of the program are to render invalid an estimated \$350 million of German dollar bonds retired for cancellation by the German Government and seized by the Soviet armed forces when they captured Berlin at the end of World War II, and to validate the remainder of such bonds. The valid securities will thus be able to be restored to the U.S. markets and the holders will become eligible for the benefits provided under the German debt settlement. The Board will coordinate its activities closely with the depositaries, trustees and paying agents, the stock exchanges, the Securities and Exchange Commission in this country, and with the issuers and the German validation agencies in the Federal Republic.

The Board will take its decisions by joint action if the U.S. and German members are in agreement. Where they are not in agreement the chairman will decide, and his decision will constitute the decision of the Board. The Board is already at work planning the preliminary phases of the validation program. During this initial stage the Board will be occupied with such tasks as the staffing of its office, the selection of depositaries for the safe-keeping and processing of bonds, the preparation of registration forms for bondholders to fill out in applying for validation, the distribution of these forms to banks throughout the United States, and the issuance of public announcements which, in addition to appearing in newspapers and periodicals of general circulation, will also be distributed to all banks, brokers, and securities dealers, advising bondholders of the procedure they should follow in applying for validation. The Board is making every effort to complete these and similar administrative details as soon as possible so that the commencement of the validation program may be announced at an early date.

## U.S. Claimants to German Assets in Switzerland

Press release 303 dated June 3

The Department of State has been informed through the American Legation at Bern that claimants under Article 7 of the Swiss-German Agreement, which became effective March 20, 1953, must file their claims by June 29, 1953, unless they have been notified otherwise personally by the Swiss Compensation Office.<sup>1</sup>

Article 7 of the Swiss-German Agreement provides that the Swiss Compensation Office, an agency of the Swiss Government, is required to "despatch requests in an appropriate manner to all owners of property in Switzerland asking them to apply, personally or through agents, within two months from publication of such requests for the

<sup>1</sup>For previous information, see BULLETIN of Sept. 8, 1952, pp. 364 and 363; *ibid* May 4, 1953, p. 654.

unblocking of their property according to Article 5."

Under Article 5 of the Swiss-German Agreement protection is afforded to persons having interests in German assets in Switzerland, in general, as follows:

1. Persons having assets of a total value of less than 10,000 Swiss francs.

2. Persons who on February 16, 1945, were dual U.S.-German nationals, provided that the United States supports their claim.

3. Persons deprived of life, or substantially of liberty, or of full citizenship rights under Nazi discriminatory laws.

4. Persons who can prove by certain certified statements that their property in Switzerland was returned to them pursuant to the laws in Germany on restitution.

5. Non-German persons having a 25 percent or more interest in firms organized under German law, which firms have assets in Switzerland.

6. Non-German beneficiaries of a family foundation.

## MSA Productivity Allotment to Italy

The allotment of \$22 million to Italy to make possible an expansion of the drive to increase productivity and production in Italian industry and agriculture was announced on May 26 by the Mutual Security Agency in Washington and Rome.

Major provisions of the new program, developed by MSA and the Italian Government, provide for the establishment of a revolving fund for loans to small- and medium-size industrial and distributive firms cooperating in the productivity program, and a special fund to stimulate construction of workers' homes by housing cooperatives organized by free-trade unions. The workers' housing program is intended to provide demonstration projects of modern quality construction at the lowest possible unit-cost.

The new aid-grant also will make possible broadened activities of the Italian national productivity committee, continued support for the technical-assistance program, establishment of a research and education fund to assist productivity projects in these fields, and necessary funds for Italian participation in the European Productivity Agency established May 1 by the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC).

To finance these segments of the expanded productivity program, the Italian Government is setting aside the equivalent of \$22 million in lire counterpart funds.

Italy is the fifth Western European country to conclude a special productivity agreement with MSA as provided for by amendments to the Agency's legislation. Others are the United Kingdom, Western Germany, the Netherlands, and Denmark.

# Air Transport Agreement With Cuba

Press release 290 dated May 26

*The Department of State on May 26 announced the signing at Habana, Cuba, by Dr. Miguel Angel de la Campa, Minister of State, Dr. Pablo Carrera Justiz, Minister of Communications and Transport of the Cuban Government, and U.S. Ambassador Willard L. Beaulac of a bilateral air-transport agreement between the United States and the Republic of Cuba. This agreement is substantially the same as that negotiated by the United States with more than 40 other countries.*

*The text of the agreement follows:*

## AIR TRANSPORT AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Cuba

Desiring to conclude an Agreement for the purpose of promoting direct air communications between their respective territories,

Have accordingly appointed authorized representatives for this purpose, who agreed as follows:

### ARTICLE 1

For the purposes of the present Agreement, and its Annex, except where the text provides otherwise:

(a) The term "aeronautical authorities" shall mean in the case of the United States of America, the Civil Aeronautics Board and any person or agency authorized to perform the functions exercised at the present time by the Civil Aeronautics Board, and, in the case of the Republic of Cuba, the Junta de Aeronautica Civil and any person or agency authorized to perform the functions exercised at present by the said Organization.

(b) The term "designated airlines" shall mean those airlines that the aeronautical authorities of one of the contracting parties have communicated in writing to the aeronautical authorities of the other contracting party that they are the airlines that it has designated in conformity with Article 3 of the present Agreement for the routes specified in such designation.

(c) The term "territory" shall have the meaning given to it by Article 2 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation, signed at Chicago on December 7, 1944.

(d) The definitions contained in paragraphs a, b, and d of Article 96 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation signed at Chicago on December 7, 1944 shall be applied to the present Agreement.

### ARTICLE 2

Each contracting party grants to the other contracting party the rights specified in the Annex hereto necessary for establishing the international civil air routes and services therein described, whether such services be inaugurated immediately or at a later date at the option of the contracting party to whom the rights are granted.

### ARTICLE 3

Each of the air services so described may be placed in operation as soon as the contracting party to whom the rights have been granted by Article 2 to designate an airline or airlines for the route concerned has authorized an airline for such route, and the contracting party granting the rights shall, subject to Article 7 hereof, be bound to give the appropriate operating permission to the airline or airlines concerned; provided that the airlines so designated may be required to qualify before the competent aeronautical authorities of the contracting party granting

the rights under the laws and regulations normally applied by these authorities before being permitted to engage in the operations contemplated by this agreement; and provided that in areas of hostilities or of military occupation, or in areas affected thereby such operations shall be subject to the approval of the competent military authorities.

### ARTICLE 4

In order to prevent discriminatory practices and to assure equality of treatment, both contracting parties agree that:

(a) Each of the contracting parties may impose or permit to be imposed just and reasonable charges for the use of public airports and other facilities under its control. Each of the contracting parties agrees, however, that these charges shall not be higher than would be paid for the use of such airports and facilities by its national aircraft engaged in similar international services.

(b) Fuel, lubricating oils and spare parts introduced into the territory of one contracting party by the other contracting party or its nationals, and intended solely for use by aircraft of the airline of such contracting party shall, with respect to the imposition of customs duties, inspection fees or other national duties or charges by the contracting party whose territory is entered, be accorded the same treatment as that applying to national airlines and to airlines of the most-favored-nation.

(c) The fuel, lubricating oils, spare parts, regular equipment and aircraft stores retained on board civil aircraft of the airlines of one contracting party authorized to operate the routes and services described in the Annex shall, upon arriving in or leaving the territory of the other contracting party, be exempt from customs, inspection fees or similar duties or charges, even though such supplies be used or consumed by such aircraft on flights in that territory.

### ARTICLE 5

Certificates of airworthiness, certificates of competency and licenses issued or rendered valid by one contracting party, and still in force, shall be recognized as valid by the other contracting party for the purpose of operating the routes and services described in the Annex, provided that the requirements under which such certificates or licenses were issued or rendered valid are equal to or above the minimum standards which may be established pursuant to the Convention on International Civil Aviation. Each contracting party reserves the right, however, to refuse to recognize, for the purpose of flight above its own territory, certificates of competency and licenses granted to its own nationals by another State.

### ARTICLE 6

(a) The laws and regulations of one contracting party relating to the admission to or departure from its territory of aircraft engaged in international air navigation, or to the operations and navigation of such aircraft while within its territory, shall be applied to the aircraft of the airlines designated by the other contracting party, and shall be complied with by such aircraft upon entering or departing from or while within the territory of the first party.

(b) The laws and regulations of one contracting party as to the admission to or departure from its territory of passengers, crew, or cargo of aircraft, such as regulations relating to entry, clearance, immigration, passports, customs, and quarantine shall be complied with by or on behalf of such passengers, crew or cargo of the other contracting party upon entrance into or departure from, or while within the territory of the first party.

### ARTICLE 7

Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 10 hereof, each contracting party reserves the right to withhold or revoke, after thirty (30) days prior notice to the other contracting party, the exercise of the rights specified in

the Annex to this Agreement by an airline designated by the other contracting party in the event that it is not satisfied that substantial ownership and effective control of such airlines are vested in nationals of the other contracting party, or in case of failure by such airline, or the Government designating such airlines, to comply with the laws and regulations referred to in Article 6 hereof, or otherwise to perform its obligations hereunder, or to fulfill the conditions under which the rights are granted in accordance with this Agreement and its Annex. In the event of action by one contracting party under this Article, the right of the other contracting party to request consultation pursuant to Article 11 shall not be prejudiced.

#### ARTICLE 8

This Agreement and all contracts connected therewith shall be registered with the International Civil Aviation Organization.

#### ARTICLE 9

Existing rights and privileges relating to air transport services which may have been granted previously by either of the contracting parties to an airline of the other contracting party shall continue in force according to their terms.

#### ARTICLE 10

Either of the contracting parties may at any time notify the other of its intention to terminate the present Agreement. Such a notice shall be sent simultaneously to the International Civil Aviation Organization. In the event such communication is made this Agreement shall terminate one year after the date of receipt of the notice to terminate, unless by agreement between the contracting parties the communication under reference is withdrawn before the expiration of that time. If the other contracting party fails to acknowledge receipt, notice shall be deemed as having been received 14 days after its receipt by the International Civil Aviation Organization.

#### ARTICLE 11

In the event either of the contracting parties considers it desirable to modify the routes or conditions set forth in the Agreement and attached Annex, it may request consultation between the competent authorities of both contracting parties, such consultation to begin within a period of sixty days from the date of the request. When these authorities mutually agree on new or revised conditions affecting the Annex, their recommendations on the matter will come into effect after they have been confirmed by an exchange of diplomatic notes.

#### ARTICLE 12

If a general multilateral air transport Convention accepted by both contracting parties enters into force, the present Agreement shall be amended so as to conform with the provisions of such Convention.

#### ARTICLE 13

Except as otherwise provided in this Agreement or its Annex, any dispute between the contracting parties relative to the interpretation or application of this Agreement or its Annex, which cannot be settled through consultation, shall be submitted for an advisory report to a tribunal of three arbitrators, one to be named by each contracting party, and the third to be agreed upon by the two arbitrators so chosen, provided that such third arbitrator shall not be a national of either contracting party. Each of the contracting parties shall designate an arbitrator within two months of the date of delivery by either party to the other party of a diplomatic note requesting arbitration of a dispute; and the third arbitrator shall be agreed upon within one month after such period of two months.

If either of the contracting parties fails to designate its own arbitrator within two months, or if the third

arbitrator is not agreed upon within the time limit indicated, either party may request the President of the International Civil Aviation Organization to make the necessary appointment or appointments by choosing the arbitrator or arbitrators.

The contracting parties will use their best efforts under the powers available to them to put into effect the opinion expressed in any such advisory report. A moiety of the expenses of the arbitral tribunal shall be borne by each party.

#### ARTICLE 14

Changes made by either contracting party in the routes described in the schedules attached except those which change the points served by these airlines in the territory of the other contracting party shall not be considered as modifications of the Annex. The aeronautical authorities of either contracting party may therefore proceed unilaterally to make such changes, provided, however, that notice of any change is given without delay to the aeronautical authorities of the other contracting party.

If such other aeronautical authorities find that, having regard to the principles set forth in Section VII of the Annex to the present Agreement, interests of their airline or airlines are prejudiced by the carriage by the airline or airlines of the first contracting party of traffic between the territory of the second contracting party and the new point in the territory of the third country, the authorities of the two contracting parties shall consult with a view to arriving at a satisfactory agreement.

#### ARTICLE 15

This Agreement, including the provisions of the Annex thereto, shall come into force on the day on which notice of its ratification by the Government of the Republic of Cuba is given to the Government of the United States of America.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed the present agreement.

Done at the city of Havana in duplicate, in the English and Spanish texts, both equally authentic, this twenty-sixth day of May 1953.

For the Government of the United States of America:

WILLARD L. BEAULAC

For the Government of the Republic of Cuba:

MIGUEL ANGEL DE LA CAMPA

PABLO CARRERA JUSTIZ

#### ANNEX

##### SECTION I

The Government of the Republic of Cuba grants to the Government of the United States of America the right to conduct air transport services by one or more airlines of United States nationality designated by the latter country on the routes, specified in Schedule One attached, which transit or serve commercially the territory of the Republic of Cuba.

##### SECTION II

The Government of the United States of America grants to the Government of the Republic of Cuba the right to conduct air transport services by one or more airlines of Cuban nationality designated by the latter country on the routes, specified in Schedule Two attached, which transit or serve commercially the territory of the United States of America.

##### SECTION III

One or more airlines designated by each of the contracting parties under the conditions provided in this Agreement will enjoy, in the territory of the other contracting party, rights of transit and of stops for non-traffic purposes, as well as the right of commercial entry and departure for international traffic in passengers, cargo and mail at the points enumerated on each of the routes specified in the Schedules attached.

#### SECTION IV

The air transport facilities available hereunder to the traveling public shall bear a close relationship to the requirements of the public for such transport.

#### SECTION V

There shall be a fair and equal opportunity for the airlines of the contracting parties to operate on any route between their respective territories (as defined in the Agreement) covered by this Agreement and Annex.

#### SECTION VI

In the operation by the airlines of either contracting party of the trunk services described in the present Annex, the interest of the airlines of the other contracting party shall be taken into consideration so as not to affect unduly the services which the latter provides on all or part of the same routes.

#### SECTION VII

It is the understanding of both contracting parties that services provided by a designated airline under the present Agreement and Annex shall retain as their primary objective the provision of capacity adequate to the traffic demands between the country of which such airline is a national and the country of ultimate destination of the traffic. The right to embark or disembark on such services international traffic destined for and coming from third countries at a point or points on the routes specified in the present Annex shall be applied in accordance with the general principles of orderly development to which both contracting parties subscribe and shall be subject to the general principle that capacity should be related:

- (a) to traffic requirements between the country of origin and the countries of destination;
- (b) to the requirements of through airline operation; and
- (c) to the traffic requirements of the area through which the airline passes after taking account of local and regional services.

#### SECTION VIII

It is the intention of both contracting parties that there should be regular and frequent consultation between their respective aeronautical authorities (as defined in the Agreement) and that there should thereby be close collaboration in the observance of the principles and the implementation of the provisions outlined in the present Agreement and Annex.

#### SECTION IX

(a) The determination of rates in accordance with the following paragraphs shall be made at reasonable levels, due regard being paid to all relevant factors, such as cost of operation, reasonable profit, and the rates charged by any other airlines, as well as the characteristics of each service.

(b) The rates to be charged by the airlines of either contracting party between points in the territory of the United States and points in Cuban territory referred to in the attached Schedules shall, consistent with the provisions of the present Agreement and its Annex, be subject to the approval of the aeronautical authorities of the contracting parties, who shall act in accordance with their obligations under the present Annex, within the limits of their legal powers.

(c) Any rate proposed by the airline or airlines of either contracting party shall be filed with the aeronautical authorities of both contracting parties at least thirty (30) days before the proposed date of introduction; provided that this period of thirty (30) days may be reduced in particular cases if so agreed by the aeronautical authorities of both contracting parties.

(d) The Civil Aeronautics Board of the United States having approved the traffic conference machinery of the International Air Transport Association (hereinafter

called IATA), for a period of three years beginning June 30, 1952, any rate agreements concluded through this machinery during this period and involving United States airlines will be subject to approval of the Board. Rate agreements concluded through this machinery may also be required to be subject to the approval of the aeronautical authorities of the Government of Cuba pursuant to the principles enunciated in paragraph (b) above.

(e) The contracting parties agree that the procedure described in paragraphs (f), (g) and (h) of the Section shall apply.

1. If, during the period of the Civil Aeronautics Board's approval of the IATA traffic conference machinery, either any specific rate agreement is not approved within a reasonable time by either contracting party, or a conference of IATA is unable to agree on a rate, or

2. At any time no IATA machinery is applicable, or

3. If either contracting party at any time withdraws or fails to renew its approval of that part of the IATA traffic conference machinery relevant to this Section.

(f) In the event that power is conferred by law upon the aeronautical authorities of the United States to fix fair and economic rates for the transport of persons and property by air on international services and to suspend proposed rates in a manner comparable to that in which the Civil Aeronautics Board at present is empowered to act with respect to such rates for the transport of persons and property by air within the United States, each of the contracting parties shall thereafter exercise its authority in such manner as to prevent any rate or rates proposed by one of its airlines for services from the territory of one contracting party to a point or points in the territory of the other contracting party from becoming effective, if in the judgment of the aeronautical authorities of the contracting party whose airline or airlines is or are proposing such rate, that rate is unfair or uneconomic. If one of the contracting parties on receipt of the notification referred to in paragraph (c) above is dissatisfied with the rate proposed by the airline or airlines of the other contracting party, it shall so notify the other contracting party prior to the expiry of the first fifteen of the thirty (30) days referred to, and the contracting parties shall endeavor to reach agreement on the appropriate rate.

In the event that such agreement is reached, each contracting party will exercise its best efforts to put such rate into effect as regards its airline or airlines.

If agreement has not been reached at the end of the thirty (30) day period referred to in paragraph (c) above, the proposed rate may, unless the aeronautical authorities of the country of the air carrier concerned see fit to suspend its application, go into effect provisionally pending the settlement of any dispute in accordance with the procedure outlined in paragraph (h) below.

(g) Prior to the time when such power may be conferred by law upon the aeronautical authorities of the United States, if one of the contracting parties is dissatisfied with any rate proposed by the airline or airlines of either contracting party for services from the territory of one contracting party to a point or points in the territory of the other contracting party, it shall so notify the other prior to the expiry of the first fifteen (15) of the thirty (30) day period referred to in paragraph (c) above, and the contracting parties shall endeavor to reach agreement on the appropriate rate.

In the event that such agreement is reached, each contracting party will use its best efforts to cause such agreed rate to be put into effect by its airline or airlines.

It is recognized that if no such agreement can be reached prior to the expiry of such thirty (30) days, the contracting party raising the objection to the rate may take such steps as it may consider necessary to prevent the inauguration or continuation of the service in question at the rate complained of.

(h) When in any case under paragraphs (f) and (g) above the aeronautical authorities of the two contracting parties cannot agree within a reasonable time upon the ap-

propriate rate after consultation initiated by the complaint of one contracting party concerning the proposed rate or an existing rate of the airline or airlines of the ether contracting party, upon the request of either, both contracting parties shall submit the question to the International Civil Aviation Organization for an advisory report, and each party will use its best efforts under the powers available to it to put into effect the opinion expressed in such report.

#### *List of Scheduled Landings*

1. An airline or airlines designated by the Government of the United States shall be entitled to operate air services on each of the air routes specified via intermediate points, in both directions, and to make scheduled landings in Cuba at the points specified in this paragraph:

1. From Miami, Florida, to Camaguey, Cuba, and beyond.
2. From Miami, Florida, to Habana, Cuba, and beyond.
3. From New York and/or Washington, D.C., to Habana, Cuba, and beyond.

4. From Tampa, Florida/St. Petersburg, Florida, to Habana, Cuba, and beyond.

5. From Houston, Texas, and/or New Orleans, Louisiana, to Habana, Cuba, and beyond.

2. An airline or airlines designated by the Government of the Republic of Cuba shall be entitled to operate air services on each of the air routes specified via intermediate points, in both directions, and to make scheduled landings in the United States at the points specified in this paragraph:

1. From Habana, Cuba, to Miami, Florida.
2. From Varadero, Cuba, to Miami, Florida.
3. From Habana, Cuba, to New York.
4. From Habana, Cuba, to Key West, Florida.
5. From Habana, Cuba, to West Palm Beach, Florida.
6. From Habana, Cuba, to St. Petersburg, Florida.

3. Points on any of the specified routes may at the option of the designated airline be omitted on any or all flights.

## **A New Human Rights Action Program**

*A new U.S. policy stand on human rights was first outlined on April 3 by Secretary Dulles in a letter addressed to Mrs. Oswald B. Lord, U.S. representative on the U.N. Commission on Human Rights. On April 7, the date on which the U.N. Commission convened at Geneva, President Eisenhower noted, in a message sent to members of the Commission, that the United States wished to take a new approach toward the creation of an effective worldwide human-rights policy. In a statement made on April 8, Mrs. Lord formally presented the U.S. position to the Commission. (For texts of the above messages and statement, see BULLETIN of Apr. 20, 1953, pp. 579-582.)*

*Following is the text of a further statement by Mrs. Lord, made before the Commission on May 19, which discusses three U.S. draft resolutions for the development of a new human-rights action program.*

### **MRS. LORD'S STATEMENT OF MAY 19**

At the second meeting of this session of the Commission I indicated that at a later stage of this session I would put forward proposals which my Government feels are best suited to furthering the Commission's task of promoting human rights. I want to tell you today, at the outset, that these proposals are the product of earnest and careful

consideration, and they have been framed in the sincere belief that their adoption will make more significant and meaningful the work of the United Nations in the field of human rights. They stand upon the charter and upon the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; upon that foundation we hope to build a program which will continuously advance the cause of human rights—slowly perhaps but nevertheless effectively. My country has since its inception been dedicated to the advancement of human rights, and we continue, in accordance with our tradition, to support their advancement throughout the world. We recognize the fundamental and intrinsic importance of human rights; we have learned through bitter experience that systematic and deliberate denials of human rights have a direct relationship to the preservation of world peace. Peace and security cannot be assured in a world in which peoples who are denied their individual rights are pressed to resort to measures of violence against their oppressors. And the governments which violate the fundamental human rights of those whom they control cannot be expected to respect the rights of other members of the international community.

I recall, as I am sure all of my colleagues here do, the hope for a better, peaceful world which inspired the efforts of those who, at San Francisco, drafted the Charter of the U.N. Organization. My Government realized then, as it realizes now,

the necessity of a world organization which would deal with fundamental, long-range problems in addition to those problems immediately related to the settling of disputes as they arise among nations. It was the intention of my Government then, as it continues to be, that the peoples of the world, wearied by war and fear of war, must be assisted by the world organization in their long struggle to achieve a better life wherein the individual person and the rights which he possessed would secure full recognition everywhere. It was for these reasons that express provision was made in the charter, in articles 55 and 56, for a statement of the obligation of all members with respect to human rights, and in article 68, for the establishment of a commission for the promotion of human rights. And it should be the constant purpose of the members of this Commission, I believe, to seek those ways which will be most effective in bringing about the attainment of the charter goal of increased respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.

In the Charter of the United Nations there are no words more inspiring than those of the Preamble which express the determination of the peoples of the United Nations "to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small." These words reflect the age-old desire of men to be free, to think and worship as they please, and to speak and write as they choose. These words reflect man's desire to escape from the tyranny of other men, to live without fear of the secret police, without fear of the unjust trial—without fear of the arbitrary death sentence or the concentration camp. These words are but the latest rendering of the historic yearnings that have made men work, and fight, and die that they and their fellow men might know freedom and justice.

Much has been done since the San Francisco conference 8 years ago to translate these words of the Preamble and the later provisions of the charter into action. The General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, and the Commission on Human Rights have all sought to define general principles, to establish criteria of conduct, and to expose wholesale violations of the rights of man. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is the greatest single achievement of the United Nations in the promotion of human freedom. President Eisenhower said in the message to the Commission which I read at the beginning of this session:

For the people of the United States, as well as for people everywhere, the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a significant beacon in the steady march toward achieving human rights and fundamental freedoms for all.

It is the earnest hope of the U.S. Government

that the Commission on Human Rights will continue to move steadily forward toward finding ways to give practical expression to the goals and standards set forth in the Universal Declaration. For the past several years, the Commission has been preoccupied in the drafting of covenants on Human Rights. This arduous effort to translate the moral precepts of the Universal Declaration into the legal prescripts of the covenants is nearing completion, thanks to the devotion and perseverance of the members of this Commission. Henceforth the Commission will be freer than in the past to devise other methods for insuring the enjoyment of human rights and human freedoms.

I do not for one moment wish to question the Commission's preoccupation with the responsibility of drafting the covenants or to belittle in any way the work that has been accomplished in this field. I merely wish to point out that, of all the functional and regional commissions established by the Economic and Social Council, this Commission is the only one that has been limited almost entirely to the drafting of international instruments. The time has come, I believe, for this Commission, now that the completion of the covenants is in sight, to turn its attention, like the Social Commission and other Commissions, to the practical problems of helping all governments and peoples to move ahead in the advancement of their well-being.

The task of devising new methods in the field of human rights is not an easy one. There are many possible methods, some of which might be practicable and some of which might prove to be fruitless. It is with a view to helping the Commission to develop some new action programs that the U.S. delegation is introducing today these three draft resolutions concerning the future work of the Commission.

### **A New Approach**

Before explaining each of the three draft resolutions, I should like to make a few general observations about the nature of the new action program proposed by the U.S. delegation.

First, I must admit that these three proposals are not entirely new in concept. The Commission has had similar items on its agenda, but it has never had time to consider them thoroughly. The former Secretary-General, in his Twenty-Year Program, proposed many similar ideas; but, again, the Commission lacked the time to explore them. Both governments and nongovernmental organizations have from time to time suggested plans for action in the field of human rights. The major purpose of the U.S. proposal is to assemble the most practical of all these many ideas and plans, together with several new procedural devices, into a single unified program—a program that offers the best hope of early results.

Second, these draft resolutions are merely an outline of an action program—skeletons on which flesh and blood are still to be added. There are still many technical problems yet to be clarified. It is our hope that the Commission at this session will bring these skeleton outlines to life.

Third, this action program—an action program in three parts—is, quite frankly, experimental in character. This program would take the Commission into new fields of activity and would present it with new problems, and perhaps even with new difficulties. For this reason our delegation has tried to limit this experiment to a few simple and relatively modest proposals that show real promise of success.

Fourth, these three proposals do not by any means exhaust the possibilities for action by the Commission. There may well be many other programs which could be used to supplement the initial proposals submitted by our delegations.

Fifth, the initiation of this action program would help return the Commission to the broad and constructive work for which it was originally intended. Because the Commission has been preoccupied with the drafting of the covenants, many of the activities with which it could otherwise have been concerned—such as freedom of information, forced labor, slavery, and prisoners of war—have had to be performed by other, *ad hoc* bodies.

The three proposals which are before the Commission are thus a distillation of ideas and proposals from many different sources. They are an outline of a new approach to human rights. They are an experiment in new ways to secure and safeguard liberty, and a mere beginning in a new and broad field of activity. In preparing these three draft resolutions, the U.S. delegation has consulted privately with other delegations, with the Secretariat, with several of the specialized agencies, and with the nongovernmental organizations. These preliminary conversations have been most helpful in clarifying and amplifying the general proposals which I outlined briefly in my opening statement at this session. The draft resolutions before you incorporate many of the comments and suggestions we have received, but they do not include many of the minor details that may be required as the program develops. I invite whatever further suggestions you may have.

#### Preparation of Annual Reports

The first of the draft resolutions (doc. E/CN.4/L.266) proposes a new program for annual reports on developments in the field of human rights. It is the view of our delegation that, if the Commission is to undertake any important activities in addition to the drafting of the covenants, it must have adequate information on which to base its consideration of the problems of human rights. Much of that information is now available in one

form or another, especially in the *Yearbook on Human Rights*. What is now required is an annual review of the major developments, the principal achievements, and the general progress which is being made toward attaining the goals set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. What is needed is an examination by each member government of its own shortcomings and, more important, its progress toward remedying them. Periodic self-examination is good for an individual; it is equally good for a government. The annual reports which we are proposing would be an experiment in national self-examination.

Some representatives have pointed out to our delegation that this request for yet another report might place an excessive burden upon governments that are already overburdened with preparing reports to the United Nations and the specialized agencies. But what we envisage is not another long detailed report containing masses of statistics that would tax the resources of our governments and the patience of our civil servants. No, what we envisage is a relatively brief summary of developments and accomplishments, highlighting those events of the year that warrant the attention of the Commission. The Commission would be interested, I believe, in information concerning the enactment of a new bill of rights, the repeal of a repressive law, the elimination of some form of discrimination, or the development of new measures or agencies for protecting the civil rights of the citizen. A short but precise summary of developments of this kind would be preferable to two or three hundred pages of statistics and footnotes. Such a report could summarize or refer to more detailed reports on special subjects that had been transmitted to other organs of the United Nations or to the specialized agencies. The report would give primary attention to the specific aspect of human rights selected for study in accordance with the second proposal I shall place before you.

Our draft resolution proposes that each member government establish a national advisory committee, composed of experienced and competent persons, to assist the Government in the preparation of the annual report. The purpose of this provision is to enable a government to supplement the data and to check the judgment of its own officials with the independent data and judgment of responsible private citizens. These citizens might be representatives of, or be in close touch with, national nongovernmental organizations.

So far as the United States is concerned, we would envisage a small advisory committee, perhaps of 8 or 10 outstanding citizens, who would be appointed by the Secretary of State. This advisory committee would assist the Department of State and other Departments and Agencies of our Government in the preparation and review of the



report. The Secretary of State would be responsible for the final text of the annual report, but he would have had the benefit of the advice of a number of experienced and responsible American citizens.

The use by our Government of advisory committees of this nature has been highly successful in many different fields of activity. In our preliminary conversations, our delegation has received one or two suggestions that this technique may perhaps not be suitable to other governments and might not be productive of good results. This is one of the many points on which I solicit the comments of other Commission members.

The objective of this first proposal is not to create a system of reporting merely for the sake of reporting or for the sake of filing the reports away in some inaccessible file cabinet. The objective is to enable the Commission each year to review the state of observance of human rights in the world. Each year the Economic and Social Council reviews the economic state of the world; each year the Social Commission reviews the social state of the world. Our proposal would enable this Commission to make an annual review of human rights with special emphasis on some specific aspects of human rights, as we propose in our second draft resolution.

#### **Specific Studies Proposed**

The second draft resolution before the Commission today (doc. E/CN.4/L.268) proposes that the Commission initiate a series of studies of specific aspects of human rights on a worldwide basis. We consider that it would not be sufficient for the Commission merely to undertake each year a general debate on the whole field of human rights, valuable and novel though this would be. We consider that each year the Commission ought, in addition, to pay special attention to one specific subject and endeavor to discover just how well the world is observing and respecting that particular right.

The particular right which the Commission might study next year is of less importance to our delegation than the establishment of the program itself. The Commission might decide to take up each article of the Universal Declaration, one after another, and thus embark upon a 25-year plan. It might be more useful, in our opinion, for the Commission to begin, on an experimental basis, with some specific civil or political right that is fairly widely observed and is not involved in political controversy. The studies should not include topics which already are under consideration by some other organ of the United Nations or by one of the specialized agencies. For example, as its first subject, the Commission might select freedom of conscience and religion, the right to a fair trial, or freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention, or some other civil and polit-

ical right which has not been, or is not being, considered elsewhere. These are merely suggestions, and other representatives may wish to suggest other subjects.

It is our thought that the Commission would require special assistance to do this kind of job well. In my opening statement, I had suggested that the Commission might appoint a rapporteur for this purpose. This was based on the long experience of the League of Nations and the more recent experiment of the Economic and Social Council in appointing a rapporteur to study the subject of freedom of information. After further consideration, and after consultation with other representatives of governments and organizations, our delegation concluded that it might be preferable to describe the person who would conduct this study in a somewhat different way and to provide for the appointment by the Secretary-General of an expert adviser for each study selected by the Commission. This expert adviser would be a person of high moral standing and of recognized competence in the particular subject selected—a person whose professional ability and whose objectivity would be beyond question. These are necessarily high qualifications but I feel confident that in every region of the world there are persons—scholars, jurists, statesmen—who could prepare a report such as we envisage on some particular subject and later assist the Commission in its consideration of the report.

The U.S. delegation proposes that the expert adviser on each subject should have access to a wide variety of information. This information would include information transmitted to the United Nations by member states, information published by the specialized agencies, information made available by nongovernmental organizations, and all other information in the possession of the Secretary-General, including communications received by the United Nations concerning human rights.

The U.S. delegation recognizes that it is making a novel and significant proposal in suggesting that the expert adviser should have access to communications received by the United Nations. Our delegation suggests that the expert adviser should use these communications only as part of the mass of raw material which will be available for his study. Using the techniques of the scholar, he would appraise the communications received on a particular subject against all the other information at his disposal. He would not, of course, undertake to review any particular case or report on it to the Commission. He would take account of only the communications of a responsible character, disregarding those which were obviously of purely propaganda nature, or which were written to serve some unique personal interest of its author. It is our thought that the expert adviser, after studying all this wide variety of material, starting with the vast collection already available in

the *Yearbook on Human Rights* and working his way through official reports and private communications, would present the Commission with a digest of his findings. This would be a personal report made on his own responsibility, as a specialist, for which neither the United Nations nor any member government would have official responsibility. The Commission would then discuss the report and perhaps formulate some general conclusions upon it.

In our view, neither the expert adviser nor the Commission would try to find fault with individual countries nor try to condemn individual countries for their shortcomings. We hope that the discussion of the reports will not degenerate into mutual recriminations. Their purpose, rather, will be—through the influence of publicity and public opinion—to stimulate and induce improvement by each country. The emphasis should be on progress and on measures needed to advance progress, not on errors of omission and commission.

#### **Establishment of Advisory Services**

The third draft resolution (doc. E/CN.4/L.267/Rev. 1) proposes advisory services in the field of human rights. This draft resolution requires less explanation on my part, because it proposes the kind of technical assistance and advisory services that are already familiar to all the members of this Commission. In our view, the regular technical-assistance program of the United Nations in the field of public administration and the social-welfare advisory services should be used as models for this new and closely related program of advisory services in the field of human rights. This program would build upon those already suggested by the General Assembly in the field of freedom of information, by our Sub-Commission in the field of discrimination, and more recently by the Commission on the Status of Women.

Advisory services can take several forms. A country needing help can ask for the services of an expert or team of experts for a specific job. The job might be to draft laws to assure a free press, or to protect the interests of minority groups. Or the job might be to outline ways to bring newly enfranchised women to take a more active part in national and community affairs.

Some countries will need help in training young people seeking careers in the human-rights field. If the professional training is not available in their own country, the United Nations can help provide for study abroad through scholarships and fellowships.

Still another useful advisory service is the international seminar. Under U.N. auspices, experts of a region can be brought together to exchange ideas, report on progress, and help each other in dealing with common problems.

The U.S. Government considers that respect for

and observance of human rights can best be advanced through the processes of discussion, persuasion, education, and exchange of information. The progress already made by the United Nations and the specialized agencies in the use of technical assistance and advisory services in promoting economic and social development gives vitality to these international organizations and hope to millions of persons throughout the world. Our proposal would merely extend these techniques to the whole field of human rights. It would merely apply these proven techniques to a wider variety of subjects.

These activities could not and should not be carried on solely by the United Nations. They should be supplemented by similar activities by non-governmental agencies. For this reason, our draft resolution concludes by urging international and national nongovernmental organizations, universities, philanthropic organizations, and other private groups to supplement this U.N. program with similar programs designed to further the exchange of information and assistance in the field of human rights.

There is one problem, common to all three of our draft resolutions, that deserves careful consideration by the Commission—that is, the relation of these three proposals and, indeed, of any similar programs initiated by the Commission, to the work already being undertaken by other organs of the United Nations and by the specialized agencies. It is essential, of course, that there be a minimum of duplication of effort by these various bodies. Our delegation has tried to avoid any such duplication. It may well be, however, that we have not yet been entirely successful in this regard and we should welcome the suggestions of other representatives, the Secretariat, and the specialized agencies on this important and difficult point.

Mr. Chairman, I should like to conclude with the general observation that these draft resolutions are submitted by our delegation as the basis for a constructive program for the future of this Commission. These draft resolutions are necessarily tentative and incomplete in scope. They are designed to serve as a basis of discussion and as an outline of what, in our judgment, the Commission should do in the future to advance the cause of liberty to which its members are devoted. Our delegation now places these draft resolutions before the Commission for its consideration. I welcome the observations of other representatives, of the Secretariat, of the specialized agencies, and of the nongovernmental organizations; and I shall gladly attempt to revise these draft resolutions to accommodate the views or suggestions here expressed, so far as this can be done consistent with the underlying purposes of these resolutions.

These proposals have been drawn up in recognition of the values to which the Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, referred in the letter which

He wrote to me before I left the United States to attend this session of the Commission: "The value of bringing the facts to the light of day, . . . the value of common discussion of problems in the international forum of the Commission on Human Rights, and . . . the value of each country drawing on the experience of other countries for inspiration and practical guidance in solving its own problems." It is our profound hope that these draft resolutions will help to enable the Commission—and the world—to move forward toward the goals laid down in the charter and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We believe that this three-point program can be effective in advancing human rights in our time.

## TEXTS OF U. S. DRAFT RESOLUTIONS<sup>1</sup>

### Draft Resolution on Annual Reports

U.N. doc. E/CN.4/L.266  
Dated May 7, 1953

The Commission on Human Rights

*Recommends* that the Economic and Social Council request the General Assembly to adopt the following resolution:

"The General Assembly

*Considering* that by Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter the Members of the United Nations have pledged to take joint and separate action to promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion;

*Considering* that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights sets forth the goals toward which all Members of the United Nations should strive in the promotion of human rights and that the Declaration has inspired governments and peoples in the writing of their constitutions and laws;

*Desiring* to advance as rapidly as possible respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms and to stimulate Member Governments to press forward toward attaining the goals set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;

*Desiring* to obtain from each Member of the United Nations information about developments and achievements in the field of human rights in its country and measures taken to safeguard human liberty; and

*Bearing in mind* the special responsibilities of other organs of the United Nations and of the Specialized Agencies in the promotion of human rights,

1. *Recommends* that each Member transmit each year to the Secretary-General a report on developments and achievements in the field of human rights in its country for consideration by the Commission on Human Rights, such report

(a) to summarize, or make reference to, any relevant portions of reports already submitted to another organ of the United Nations or to a Specialized Agency; and

(b) to give primary attention to the specific aspect of human rights currently selected for study by the Commission in accordance with Resolution —;

2. *Recommends* that each Member establish a national advisory committee, composed of experienced and compe-

tent persons, to assist its Government in the preparation of its annual report;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to prepare a brief summary and analysis of the annual reports upon a topical basis;

4. *Recommends* that the Economic and Social Council request the Commission on Human Rights to consider these annual reports and the Secretary-General's summary and analysis at the same time that it considers the studies submitted by the Expert Adviser appointed in accordance with Resolution —, and to transmit to the Economic and Social Council such comments and conclusions thereon as it deems appropriate; and

5. *Recommends* that the Economic and Social Council make suitable arrangements with the Specialized Agencies to co-operate in carrying out this resolution and to avoid duplication of effort."

### Draft Resolution on Specific Aspects of Human Rights

U.N. doc. E/CN.4/L.268  
Dated May 7, 1953

The Commission on Human Rights

*Desiring* to strengthen the work of the United Nations for wider observance of, and respect for, human rights and fundamental freedoms on a world-wide basis;

*Desiring* to give special attention in future sessions to studies of specific aspects of human rights; and

*Desiring* to obtain for its consideration, a summary and analysis of the information available from Member States, the Specialized Agencies, Non-Government Organizations, and other sources on specific aspects of human rights;

*Bearing in mind* the special responsibilities of the Specialized Agencies as regards certain human rights;

1. *Decides* to initiate a series of studies of specific aspects of human rights on a world-wide basis;

2. *Decides* that at each session the Commission shall select a specific subject or specific subjects for study, provided that no subject shall be selected which is under consideration by another organ of the United Nations or by the Specialized Agencies.

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to appoint as an Expert Adviser, for each subject selected by the Commission for study, a person of high moral standing and of recognized competence in the particular subject, who shall

(a) prepare the study in his own name and under his own responsibility, with such assistance from the Secretariat as he may require, and

(b) assist the Commission in its consideration of the study;

4. *Authorizes* the Expert Advisers, in the preparation of their studies, to have access to the following sources of information:

(a) information transmitted to the United Nations by Member States;

(b) information published by the Specialized Agencies;

(c) information made available by Non-Governmental Organizations having consultative status with the Economic and Social Council; and

(d) all other information in the possession of the Secretary-General, including communications received by the United Nations concerning human rights, subject to paragraphs (a) and (b) of Resolution 75 (V) of the Economic and Social Council, as amended, concerning the identity of communications; and

5. *Recommends* that the Economic and Social Council

(a) make suitable arrangements with the Specialized Agencies to cooperate in carrying out this resolution and to avoid duplication of effort; and

<sup>1</sup> These resolutions have been forwarded by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights to the Economic and Social Council for circulation to U.N. member governments and specialized agencies. This group has been requested to make comment on the resolutions by Oct. 1, 1953.

(b) adopt the following draft resolution:

"The Economic and Social Council

1. Approves the decisions of the Commission on Human Rights concerning the initiation of studies of specific aspects of human rights; and

2. Amends Resolution 75 (V), as amended, to authorize the Expert Advisers to have access to the communications in the possession of the Secretary-General for the purpose of taking them into account in preparing these studies."

### Draft Resolution on Advisory Services

U.N. doc. E/CN.4/L.267/Rev. 1  
Dated May 7, 1953

The Commission on Human Rights

Considering that by Articles 55 and 56 of the United Nations Charter the Members of the United Nations have pledged themselves to promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion;

Recognizing that advisory services, by the international interchange of technical knowledge through international co-operation among countries, represents an effective means for the promotion of the human rights objectives of the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;

Taking note of Resolution 633 (VII) of the General Assembly which requests the Secretary-General to elaborate a programme of action for the development of domestic information in under-developed countries;

Taking note of the proposals on technical assistance made by the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities (E/CN.4/670, Annex I, Resolution K) and the Commission on the Status of Women (E/CN.6/L.106/Rev.1); and

Taking account of the arrangements previously established by the General Assembly concerning the regular technical assistance programme and the advisory services of the United Nations (Resolutions 200 (III), 305 (IV), and 418 (V));

Considering that the Specialized Agencies, within their competence and by virtue of their regular programmes and their special programmes of technical assistance, are already rendering important services to their Members with a view to ensuring the effective observance of human rights;

Recommends that the Economic and Social Council request the General Assembly to adopt the following resolutions:

"The General Assembly

A. Authorizes the Secretary-General:

1. Subject to the directions of the Economic and Social Council, to make provision for the following services, with the co-operation of the Specialized Agencies where appropriate and without duplication of their existing services, and in consultation with non-governmental organizations having consultative status, the subjects listed in paragraph E below:

(a) To appoint experts to provide advisory services at the request of Governments which show the need for them;

(b) To enable suitably qualified persons to observe, and familiarize themselves with, the experience and practice of other countries;

(c) To enable suitably qualified persons who cannot receive professional training in their country to receive appropriate training in foreign countries having the necessary facilities for such training; and

(d) To plan and conduct seminars; and

2. To include in his budgetary estimates of the United Nations the sums necessary for carrying out an effective operational programme based on the provision of the above services;

B. Requests the Secretary-General to undertake the performance of the services as provided in A.1 above, in agreement with the Governments concerned, on the basis of requests received from Governments and in accordance with the following policies:

1. The kind of service to be rendered to each country under A.1 (a) shall be acceptable to the Government concerned and shall be determined in consultation with that Government;

2. The selection of the persons under A.1 (b) and (c) shall be made by the Secretary-General on the basis of proposals received from Governments, which shall indicate their preferences with regard to host countries, and shall be acceptable to the host countries; and

3. The amount of services and the conditions under which they are to be rendered shall be decided by the Secretary-General with due regard to the greater needs of the under-developed areas and in conformity with the principle that each requesting Government shall be expected to assume responsibility, as far as possible, for all or a considerable part of the expenses connected with the services furnished to it, either by making a contribution in cash, or in the form of services for the purposes of the programme being carried out;

C. Requests the Secretary-General to report regularly to the Commission on Human Rights and as appropriate to the Commission on the Status of Women on the measures which he takes in compliance with the terms of this resolution, and to request these Commissions to formulate recommendations from time to time concerning the continued action required to carry on these advisory services;

D. Recommends that the Specialized Agencies continue to develop their technical assistance services with a view to aiding Members to assure the effective observance of human rights;

E. Selects the following as subjects to which the above advisory services would be applicable:

(a) Improvement of administrative and judicial procedures;

(b) Establishment and improvement of techniques of mass information media, including such facilities as news agencies;

(c) Prerequisites for increased participation in government, including voting and public office;

(d) Increased participation in national and community civic affairs, especially for women recently granted the vote;

(e) Abolishing slavery and institutions and practices akin thereto;

(f) Legislative and other measures for the prevention of discrimination and the protection of minorities; and

(g) Establishment of non-governmental and governmental bodies for the protection of civil rights;

F. Invites the Specialized Agencies to communicate to the Economic and Social Council, for transmission to the Commission on Human Rights, any observations which they might find appropriate on the above services and on any new measures of assistance which they may deem necessary with a view to assisting Members in ensuring the effective observance of human rights; and

G. Urges international and national non-governmental organizations, universities, philanthropic foundations, and other private groups to supplement this United Nations programme with similar programmes designed to further research and studies, the exchange of information, and assistance in the field of human rights."

## Reorganization of Foreign Aid and Information Programs

*The President on June 1 submitted to the Congress plans for the reorganization of various foreign-aid functions and agencies and of foreign-information functions. Under the Reorganization Act of 1949, these plans will go into effect automatically after 60 days, unless the Congress meanwhile takes action to reject them. The Congress could put the plans into effect earlier by passing a resolution of approval.*

*On June 1 the President also issued an Executive order providing for the immediate transfer to the Director for Mutual Security of the Technical Cooperation Administration and certain other functions relating to foreign aid.*

*Following are the texts of the President's message stating his reasons for proposing the two reorganization plans, the messages transmitting the plans, the Executive order providing for the transfer of the Technical Cooperation Administration, and a letter from the President to department and agency heads.*

### MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS<sup>1</sup>

The history of recent decades has brought a profound and irrevocable change in the role of our Nation in world affairs. We have assumed a position of leadership among the free nations of the world in our united quest of a just and lasting peace. No national ambition, no selfish desire, but the sheer force of circumstance—the compelling need of freedom's cause—has brought us to this position and this responsibility.

To meet this responsibility, our Nation today is dedicated to international action in concert with other nations—through the United Nations and in regional arrangements with other nations for collective security, for economic and social cooperation, designed to foster a community of world law. We have come to know that national security entails mutual security with other free nations. And we have come to know that their freedom, in turn, depends heavily upon our strength and the wisdom with which we use it.

To meet the challenge of this responsibility effectively—to convert earnest intent into construc-

tive fact—we must achieve the most efficient and cohesive possible organization for the conduct of our foreign affairs. Slackness, confusion, blurred authority and clouded responsibility—any of these can defeat the noblest purposes of any foreign policy.

Our organization for the conduct of foreign affairs has been built upon a patchwork of statutes which needs careful restudy as a basis for new legislation. The development of new legislation will take time. By early next year we will be prepared, with appropriate consultation with the Congress, to recommend such legislation. In the meantime we must improve the present arrangements within the framework of existing legislation.

To date, the organization of the executive branch for foreign affairs has been deficient in two major respects. First: there has been no clear assignment of central responsibility for foreign policy below the President. Second: a number of programs which implement our foreign policy have been scattered within the executive branch rather than being grouped together for the most efficient and economical administration.

We must correct these deficiencies. The measures proposed are directed toward that objective. The consideration of new legislation will open up further reorganization possibilities.

*First.* We are taking the necessary steps to confirm the historic responsibility of the Department of State as the agency responsible under the President for the development and control of foreign policy and all relations with foreign governments. Not only must the Department of State be given clear authority to provide guidance on our foreign policies to all other agencies of the Federal Government; it is equally important that each Chief of Diplomatic Mission in each foreign country provide effective coordination of, and foreign policy direction with respect to, all United States Government activities in the country.

*Second.* We must bring together in a single organization foreign assistance and related economic operations now dispersed among several agencies of the executive branch.

*Third.* We must provide a new, separate organization for the international information pro-

<sup>1</sup> H. doc. 156.

grams now administered by the Department of State and the Mutual Security Agency.

To achieve the organization I have outlined requires a series of related actions. Accordingly, I am transmitting to the Congress today, by the required statutory message in each instance, Reorganization Plans Nos. 7 and 8 of 1953, under the Reorganization Act of 1949, as amended. Those plans take many of the necessary steps. I am making other changes by executive order. I am, in addition, setting forth in a letter addressed to department and agency heads, the arrangements which will govern relationships among executive branch officials in the conduct of our international responsibilities.

Reorganization Plan No. 7 has as its major purpose the realignment of our foreign assistance and related economic operations. It establishes a new Foreign Operations Administration and abolishes the present Mutual Security Agency and certain offices. It centers in the head of the new Administration the functions vested in the Mutual Security Agency and the Director for Mutual Security, including the Director's functions under the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act.

To centralize further the foreign assistance and related economic responsibilities in the head of the new Foreign Operations Administration, I am taking certain administrative actions. These include the transfer from the Secretary of State to the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration four responsibilities: the administration of the Act for International Development; assistance to private foreign relief organizations; programs for aiding persons who have escaped from Communist areas; and operating functions with respect to United States participation in the United Nations Technical Assistance Program, the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund, the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency, and the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration. These administrative actions also include the delegation by the President to the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration of appropriate responsibilities respecting the Palestine refugee program.

The new Foreign Operations Administration will have as its direct responsibility two major related assistance programs which previously have been separately administered. Both the Technical Cooperation Administration in the Department of State and the Mutual Security Agency have administered technical assistance programs. At the very least, this has meant some duplication in the performance of certain common functions, including the recruitment of technicians and the formulation of general policies. It has made difficult the achievement of a balanced programing of technical assistance on a world-wide basis.

The transfer of the Technical Cooperation Administration is not intended to modify the character of the United States technical cooperation

## Department of State Announcement <sup>1</sup>

SUBJECT: President's Reorganization Actions

### 1. General:

1.1 The President on June 1 announced reorganization plans for foreign aid and information operations as a part of the Administration's program for improving the conduct of our foreign relations. Executive Order 10458 of June 1, 1953, transfers to the Director for Mutual Security responsibility for the direction and supervision of the Technical Cooperation Administration. Also delegated to the Director for Mutual Security are certain of the responsibilities for several multi-lateral programs in which the United States participates, including: the United Nations and Organization of American States technical assistance programs, the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund, the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency, and the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migrants. Also transferred to the Director for Mutual Security are the program to assist Iron Curtain country escapees and the activities of the Voluntary Foreign Aid Staff.

1.2 Under Reorganization Plan No. 7 submitted June 1 to the Congress, the functions of the Office of the Director for Mutual Security, the Technical Cooperation Administration, and the Mutual Security Agency, will be consolidated in a new Foreign Operations Administration. The Institute of Inter-American Affairs, together with its functions, will also be transferred to the Foreign Operations Administration under this plan. All functions vested in the Secretary of State by the United Nations Palestine Refugee Aid Act of 1950 will be transferred to the President.

1.3 Under Reorganization Plan No. 8 submitted June 1 to the Congress, foreign information operations would be consolidated in a new agency. The Department will retain responsibility for controlling a program under which official statements of the United States position on major issues, specifically identified as such, will be disseminated on a world-wide basis. The educational exchange of persons programs will also be retained in the Department.

1.5 These plans have been developed by the President on the basis of intensive study by committees advising him and with full participation by the departments and agencies concerned. One of the main results is to relieve the Secretary of State of supervising operating programs, freeing his time to concentrate on the important problems of foreign policy. The reorganization will relieve the Department of State of many duties extraneous to the main foreign policy problems. The administrative burdens falling upon the Secretary under the present arrangement where he is ultimately held responsible for personnel, budget, regulations, and security of operating programs, such as the information program, cannot help but divert him and his principal assistants from concentrating on the primary role of the Department.

<sup>1</sup> Excerpts from Department Circular No. 30 dated June 4. Portions not printed consist of a quotation from the President's message stating the purposes of the reorganization and details relating to the transfer of personnel.

program as a long-range effort to cooperate with the governments and peoples of other countries in developing their economies and raising their standards of living. The technical cooperation program will be carried out solely in furtherance of the purposes of the Act for International Development. The transfer of the functions vested in the President by the Act for International Development includes the programs under that act administered by the Institute of Inter-American Affairs.

The new Director of the Foreign Operations Administration will have the same responsibilities as his predecessor for continuous supervision, general direction and coordination of all foreign assistance programs, including the military assistance responsibilities vested in the Secretary of Defense.

Reorganization Plan No. 7 of 1953 provides for abolishing the offices of Special Representative in Europe and Deputy Special Representative in Europe, as authorized by section 504 of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended. I am establishing a new United States mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European regional organizations. The chief of the mission will report to and receive instructions from the Secretary of State. The mission will include representatives of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration.

Reorganization Plan No. 8 establishes a new agency—the United States Information Agency—for the conduct of our information programs. These include, with certain limited exceptions, four programs: the information activities now administered by the International Information Administration of the Department of State; the information programs financed in connection with government in occupied areas; the information program of the Mutual Security Agency; and the Technical Cooperation Administration information program. The first three of these programs would be shifted by Reorganization Plan No. 8, while the last would be reassigned by executive order.

Various arrangements have been provided in the past for the coordination of these programs, but the placing of them in a single agency seems the one sound way to provide real unity and greater efficiency. This action, moreover, brings under single management all the funds to be expended on these foreign information activities.

These information activities must, of course, be subject to special guidance and control in view of their direct relation to the conduct of foreign affairs and national security policy. Therefore, Reorganization Plan No. 8 specifies that the Secretary of State shall provide to the Director of the new agency on a current basis full guidance concerning the foreign policy of the United States. The plan also specifies, and I have amplified this

in my letter to the department and agency heads, that the Secretary of State shall control the content of a program setting forth official United States' positions for use abroad. The program will be clearly identified as such by an exclusive descriptive label. I have likewise instructed that the new United States Information Agency shall report to the President through the National Security Council or as the President may otherwise direct.

In administering the information program in the Department of State, the Secretary of State has relied on various general statutes authorizing and controlling administrative matters. To insure that adequate authority may be vested in the new Director, Reorganization Plan No. 8 provides that he may, in carrying out his functions, exercise such administrative authorities of the Secretary of State and of certain other officers as the President may specify.

This is necessary because the legislation dealing with the information programs does not contain administrative provisions. For example: the Director of the new United States Information Agency will need personnel authority. I, therefore, plan to authorize an independent personnel system for this agency's foreign operations under authority of the last subsection of section 2 of Plan No. 8. This system will be based on the provisions of the Foreign Service Act of 1946. It will give authority to the Director to appoint personnel and take such other personnel actions as are necessary, thereby relieving the Secretary of State of responsibility with respect to personnel actions. Such personnel would receive compensation, allowances, and other benefits applicable to Foreign Service Reserve, Staff, and alien personnel. It is not planned to extend to the new agency any authority with respect to the appointment of Foreign Service Officers.

While these arrangements will enable the new agency to function with reasonable effectiveness from the outset, I do not consider them permanently suitable. There is need for a critical analysis of the various systems of employment and compensation for United States Government overseas civilian personnel. I am directing that this entire matter be studied with a view toward recommending appropriate legislation.

While divesting the Department of State of the foreign information programs, the reorganization plan does not transfer the responsibility of that Department for the educational exchange programs authorized by various acts of the Congress. Close coordination of our information and educational exchange programs will, of course, be effected by the Secretary of State and the Director of the United States Information Agency.

The Constitution of the United States places the duty upon the President for the conduct of our foreign affairs. Reorganization Plans Nos. 7 and 8 and the related Presidential actions are designed

to protect and strengthen the role of the Secretary of State as the principal officer, under the President, in the field of foreign affairs. In the last analysis, however, the ability of the Secretary of State to discharge his responsibilities depends upon the backing accorded to him by the President, including consultation with the Secretary on the appointment and maintenance in office of the directors created by these reorganization plans. I shall continue to exercise my powers of appointment so that these offices are occupied only by men who support and enjoy the full confidence of the Secretary of State.

I urge the Congress to give its full support to these reorganizations.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

THE WHITE HOUSE,  
June 1, 1953.

### MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS TRANSMITTING FOREIGN AID REORGANIZATION PLAN<sup>2</sup>

I transmit herewith Reorganization Plan No. 7 of 1953, prepared in accordance with the Reorganization Act of 1949, as amended, and providing for the reorganization of various foreign aid functions and agencies. My reasons for proposing the plan are stated in another message transmitted to the Congress today.

After investigation, I have found and hereby declare that each reorganization included in Reorganization Plan No. 7 of 1953 is necessary to accomplish one or more of the purposes set forth in section 2 (a) of the Reorganization Act of 1949, as amended. I have also found and hereby declare that it is necessary to include in the accompanying reorganization plan, by reason of reorganizations made thereby, provisions for the appointment and compensation of officers specified in section 1 of the plan. The rates of compensation fixed for these officers are, respectively, those which I have found to prevail in respect of comparable officers in the executive branch of the Government.

The statutory authority for the exercise of the functions abolished by section 8 (a) (5) of the reorganization plan is section 413 (a) of the Act for International Development, as amended. The vesting of the functions of planning, implementing, and managing the programs authorized by that Act, as amended, in an officer other than the President is incongruous with the pattern of the Act as a whole, whereby other functions are vested in the President, with power of delegation. In the interest of having the most flexible arrangements for the administration of the Act, the functions in question could be either abolished or transferred to the President. I have concluded that they overlap the authority of the President under the Act generally, are thus dispensable, and should be abolished.

<sup>2</sup> H. doc. 157.

I expect that the improved organizational arrangement provided for in Reorganization Plan No. 7 of 1953 will lead to substantial economies and significantly improved effectiveness of administration. It is not practicable, however, to itemize at this time the reductions in expenditures which will probably be brought about by the taking effect of the reorganizations included in the reorganization plan.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

THE WHITE HOUSE,  
June 1, 1953.

### REORGANIZATION PLAN NO. 7 OF 1953

Prepared by the President and transmitted to the Senate and the House of Representatives in Congress assembled, June 1, 1953, pursuant to the provisions of the Reorganization Act of 1949, approved June 20, 1949, as amended.

#### FOREIGN OPERATIONS ADMINISTRATION

Section 1. *Establishment of Foreign Operations Administration.*—(a) There is hereby established a new agency which shall be known as the Foreign Operations Administration, hereinafter referred to as the "Administration".

(b) There shall be at the head of the Administration a Director of the Foreign Operations Administration, hereinafter referred to as the "Director." The Director shall be appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and shall receive compensation at the rate of \$22,500 a year. The Secretary of State shall advise with the President concerning the appointment and tenure of the Director.

(c) There shall be in the Administration a Deputy Director of the Foreign Operations Administration, who shall be appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and who shall receive compensation at the rate of \$17,500 a year. The Deputy Director shall perform such functions as the Director shall from time to time designate, and shall act as Director during the absence or disability of the Director or in the event of a vacancy in the office of Director.

(d) There are hereby established in the Administration six new offices with such title or titles as the Director shall from time to time determine. Appointment thereto shall be by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The compensation for each of two of the said offices shall be at the rate of \$16,000 a year and the compensation for each of the other four offices shall be at the rate of \$15,000 a year. The persons appointed to the said new offices shall perform such functions as the Director shall from time to time designate, and are authorized to act as Director, as the Director may designate, during the absence or disability of the Director and the Deputy Director or in the event of vacancies in the offices of Director and Deputy Director.

Sec. 2. Transfer of functions to the Director.—There are hereby transferred to the Director:

(a) All functions vested by the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended, or by any other statute in the Director for Mutual Security provided for in section 501 of that Act, or in the Mutual Security Agency created by that Act, or in any official or office of that Agency, including the functions of the Director for Mutual Security as a member of the National Security Council.

(b) All functions vested by the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 in the Administrator created by that Act.

(c) The function vested by section 6 of the Yugoslav Emergency Relief Assistance Act of 1950 in the Secretary of State.

Sec. 3. *Institute of Inter-American Affairs.*—The Institute of Inter-American Affairs, together with its functions,



is hereby transferred to the Administration. All functions vested by the Institute of Inter-American Affairs Act in the Secretary of State are hereby transferred to the Director. Functions with respect to serving as employees of the said Institute or as members of the board of directors thereof, including eligibility, as the case may be, to be detailed as such employees or to serve as such members, are hereby transferred from the officials and employees of the Department of State to the officials and employees of the Administration. The Institute shall be administered subject to the direction and control of the Director.

**Sec. 4. National Advisory Council.**—The Director shall be a member of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems (22 U. S. C. 286b).

**Sec. 5. Performance of functions transferred to the Director.**—The Director may from time to time make such provisions as he shall deem appropriate authorizing the performance by any other officer, or by any employee or organizational entity, of the Administration, of any function of the Director, except the function of being a member of the National Security Council and the function of being a member of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems.

**Sec. 6. Transfer of functions to the President.**—All functions vested in the Secretary of State by the United Nations Palestine Refugee Aid Act of 1950 are hereby transferred to the President.

**Sec. 7. Incidental transfers.**—(a) Personnel, property, records, and unexpended balances of appropriations, allocations, and other funds, employed, used, held, available, or to be made available in connection with functions transferred or vested by this reorganization plan shall be transferred, at such time or times as the Director of the Bureau of the Budget shall direct, as follows:

(1) So much of those relating to functions transferred to or vested in the Director or the Administration as the Director of the Bureau of the Budget shall determine shall be transferred to the Administration.

(2) Those of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs shall be transferred along with the Institute.

(3) So much of those relating to the functions transferred by section 6 hereof as the Director of the Bureau of the Budget shall determine shall be transferred to the agency or agencies of the Government to which the President delegates the said functions.

(b) Such further measures and dispositions as the Director of the Bureau of the Budget shall deem to be necessary in order to effectuate the transfers provided for in subsection (a) of this section shall be carried out in such manner as he shall direct and by such agencies as he shall designate.

**Sec. 8. Abolitions.**—(a) There are hereby abolished:

(1) The offices of Director for Mutual Security and Deputy Director for Mutual Security, provided for in sections 501 and 504, respectively, of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended (including the organization in the Executive Office of the President known as the Office of the Director for Mutual Security).

(2) The Mutual Security Agency.

(3) The title of Administrator provided for in the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act.

(4) The four positions provided for in section 406 (e) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended.

(5) The offices of Administrator and Deputy Administrator for Technical Cooperation, provided for in section 413 (a) of the Act for International Development, as amended, together with the functions vested in the Administrator by the said section 413 (a), as amended.

(6) The offices of the Special Representative in Europe and Deputy Special Representative in Europe, provided for in section 504 (a) of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended. The abolition of the said offices of Representative and Deputy Representative shall become effective

on September 1, 1953 (unless a later date is required by the provisions of section 6 (a) of the Reorganization Act of 1949, as amended).

(b) The Director shall wind up any outstanding affairs of the aforesaid abolished agencies and offices not otherwise provided for in this reorganization plan.

**Sec. 9. Interim provisions.**—The President may authorize the persons who, immediately prior to the effective date of this reorganization plan, hold offices or occupy positions abolished by section 8 hereof to hold offices and occupy positions under section 1 hereof until the latter offices and positions are filled pursuant to the provisions of the said section 1 or by recess appointment, as the case may be, but in no event for any period extending more than 60 days after the said effective date, as follows:

(a) The Director and Deputy Director for Mutual Security as the Director and Deputy Director of the Foreign Operations Administration, respectively.

(b) The Administrator for Technical Cooperation and the person occupying the senior position provided for in section 406 (e) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended, to serve in the two senior positions created by section 1 (d) hereof.

(c) The Deputy Administrator for Technical Cooperation and the persons occupying the three positions provided for in section 406 (e) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended, to serve in the four positions created by section 1 (d) hereof which have compensation at the rate of \$15,000 a year.

### MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS TRANSMITTING PLAN FOR U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY<sup>3</sup>

I transmit herewith Reorganization Plan No. 8 of 1953, prepared in accordance with the Reorganization Act of 1949, as amended, and providing for the reorganization of foreign information functions. My reasons for proposing this plan are stated in another message transmitted to the Congress today.

After investigation, I have found and hereby declare that each reorganization included in Reorganization Plan No. 8 of 1953 is necessary to accomplish one or more of the purposes set forth in section 2 (a) of the Reorganization Act of 1949, as amended. I have also found and hereby declare that it is necessary to include in the accompanying reorganization plan, by reason of reorganizations made thereby, provisions for the appointment and compensation of officers specified in section 1 of the plan. The rates of compensation fixed for these officers are, respectively, those which I have found to prevail in respect of comparable officers in the executive branch of the Government.

I expect that the improved organizational arrangement provided for in Reorganization Plan No. 8 of 1953 will lead to substantial economies and significantly improved effectiveness of administration. It is not practicable, however, to itemize at this time the reductions in expenditures which will probably be brought about by the taking effect of the reorganizations included in the reorganization plan.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

THE WHITE HOUSE,  
June 1, 1953.

<sup>3</sup> H. doc. 158.

Prepared by the President and transmitted to the Senate and the House of Representatives in Congress assembled, June 1, 1953, pursuant to the provisions of the Reorganization Act of 1949, approved June 20, 1949, as amended.

### UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

Section 1. *Establishment of agency.*—(a) There is hereby established a new agency which shall be known as the United States Information Agency, hereinafter referred to as the Agency.

(b) There shall be at the head of the Agency a Director of the United States Information Agency, hereinafter referred to as the Director. The Director shall be appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and shall receive compensation at the rate of \$17,500 a year. The Secretary of State shall advise with the President concerning the appointment and tenure of the Director.

(c) There shall be in the Agency a Deputy Director of the United States Information Agency, who shall be appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and who shall receive compensation at the rate of \$16,000 a year. The Deputy Director shall perform such functions as the Director shall from time to time designate, and shall act as Director during the absence or disability of the Director or in the event of a vacancy in the office of the Director.

(d) There are hereby established in the Agency so many new offices, not in excess of fifteen existing at any one time, and with such title or titles, as the Director shall from time to time determine. Appointment thereto shall be under the classified civil service and the compensation thereof shall be fixed from time to time pursuant to the classification laws, as now or hereafter amended, except that the compensation may be fixed without regard to the numerical limitations on positions set forth in section 505 of the Classification Act of 1949, as amended (5 U. S. C. 1105).

Sec. 2. *Transfer of functions.*—(a) Subject to subsection (c) of this section, there are hereby transferred to the Director, (1) the functions vested in the Secretary of State by Title V of the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948, as amended, and so much of functions with respect to the interchange of books and periodicals and aid to libraries and community centers under sections 202 and 203 of the said Act as is an integral part of information programs under that Act, together with so much of the functions vested in the Secretary of State by other provisions of the said Act as is incidental to or is necessary for the performance of the functions under Title V and sections 202 and 203 transferred by this section, and (2) functions of the Secretary of State with respect to information programs relating to Germany and Austria.

(b) Exclusive of so much thereof as is an integral part of economic or technical assistance programs, without regard to any inconsistent provision of Reorganization Plan No. 7 of 1953, and subject to subsection (c) of this section, functions with respect to foreign information programs vested by the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended, in the Director for Mutual Security provided for in section 501 of the said Act are hereby transferred to the Director.

(c) (1) The Secretary of State shall direct the policy and control the content of a program, for use abroad, on official United States positions, including interpretations of current events, identified as official positions by an exclusive descriptive label.

(2) The Secretary of State shall continue to provide to the Director on a current basis full guidance concerning the foreign policy of the United States.

(3) Nothing herein shall affect the functions of the Secretary of State with respect to conducting negotiations with other governments.

(d) To the extent the President deems it necessary in

order to carry out the functions transferred by the foregoing provisions of this section, he may authorize the Director to exercise, in relation to the respective functions so transferred, any authority or part thereof available by law, including appropriation acts, to the Secretary of State, the Director for Mutual Security, or the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration, in respect of the said transferred functions.

Sec. 3. *Performance of transferred functions.*—(a) The Director may from time to time make such provisions as he shall deem appropriate authorizing the performance of any function of the Director by any other officer, or by any employee or organizational entity, of the Agency.

(b) Representatives of the United States carrying out the functions transferred by section 2 hereof in each foreign country shall be subject to such procedures as the President may prescribe to assure coordination among such representatives in each country under the leadership of the Chief of the United States Diplomatic Mission.

Sec. 4. *Incidental transfers.*—(a) So much of the personnel, property, records, and unexpended balances of appropriations, allocations, and other funds, employed, used, held, available, or to be made available in connection with the functions transferred or vested by this reorganization plan as the Director of the Bureau of the Budget shall determine shall be transferred to the Agency at such time or times as he shall direct.

(b) Such further measures and dispositions as the Director of the Bureau of the Budget shall deem to be necessary in order to effectuate the transfers provided for in subsection (a) of this section shall be carried out in such manner as he shall direct and by such agencies as he shall designate.

Sec. 5. *Interim provisions.*—Pending the initial appointment under section 1 of this reorganization plan of the Director and Deputy Director, respectively, therein provided for, their functions shall be performed temporarily, but not for a period in excess of 60 days, by such officers of the Department of State or the Mutual Security Agency as the President shall designate.

### EXECUTIVE ORDER 10458<sup>4</sup>

#### PROVIDING FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF CERTAIN FOREIGN AID PROGRAMS AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended, the Act for International Development, as amended, and sections 301 to 303, inclusive, of title 3 of the United States Code, and as President of the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. *International development.* (a) The functions conferred upon the Secretary of State by Executive Order No. 10159 of September 8, 1950,<sup>5</sup> 15 F. R. 6103, are hereby transferred to the Director for Mutual Security; and, accordingly, the said Executive order is amended by striking therefrom, wherever they appear, the words "Secretary of State" and inserting in lieu thereof, in each instance, the words "Director for Mutual Security."

(b) The Technical Cooperation Administration is hereby transferred from the Department of State to the jurisdiction of the Director for Mutual Security and shall be administered under his direction and supervision.

Sec. 2. *Participation in certain international organizations.* There are hereby delegated to the Director for Mutual Security the functions conferred upon the President by section 534 of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended, section 12 of the Mutual Security Act of 1952, and section 303 of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended, with respect to the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (as the successor of the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Move-

<sup>4</sup> 18 Fed. Reg. 3159.

<sup>5</sup> BULLETIN of Sept. 25, 1950, p. 499.

ment of Migrants from Europe), the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund, and the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency, respectively.

Sec. 3. *Ocean freight charges on relief supplies, etc.* The Mutual Security Agency is hereby designated as the agency of the Government which shall hereafter exercise the authority to pay ocean freight charges on shipments of relief supplies and packages under section 117 (c) of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as amended, and section 535 of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended.

Sec. 4. *Functions of Secretary of State and Department of State.* (a) Nothing in this order shall be deemed to modify the functions of the Secretary of State with respect to conducting negotiations with other governments.

(b) The Secretary of State and the Director for Mutual Security shall establish and maintain arrangements which will insure that the functions of the said Director under this order shall be carried out in conformity with the established foreign policy of the United States.

(c) The Secretary of State shall be responsible for making the United States contributions, under subsections (a) and (b) of section 404 of the Act for International Development, to the United Nations for technical cooperation programs carried on by it and its related organizations, and to the Organization of American States, its related organizations, and other international organizations for technical cooperation programs carried on by them, and for making United States contributions to the international organizations referred to in section 2 hereof. The Secretary of State shall also be responsible for formulating and presenting, with the assistance of the Director for Mutual Security, the policy of the United States with respect to the assistance programs of the international organizations referred to in this subsection and in section 2 hereof and for representing the United States in those organizations. Sections 1 (a) and 2 hereof shall be subject to this subsection.

(d) The Director for Mutual Security shall allocate to the Department of State funds which have been or may be appropriated or otherwise made available for contributions of the United States to the international organizations referred to in section 2 hereof or to those receiving contributions under subsections (a) and (b) of section 404 of the Act for International Development.

Sec. 5. *Miscellaneous provisions.* (a) Subsection (a) of section 2 and sections 3 and 4 of Executive Order No. 10300 of November 1, 1951,<sup>a</sup> as amended by Executive Order No. 10368 of June 30, 1952, are hereby revoked.

(b) There shall be transferred to the jurisdiction of the Director for Mutual Security, consonant with law, so much as the Director of the Bureau of the Budget shall determine of the personnel, property, records, and unexpended balances of appropriations, allocations, and other funds, employed, held, used, available, or to be made available in connection with the functions transferred, delegated, or assigned to the Director for Mutual Security or the Mutual Security Agency by this order. Such further measures and dispositions as the Director of the Bureau of the Budget shall deem to be necessary in order to effectuate the transfers provided for in this section shall be carried out in such manner as he shall direct and by such agencies as he shall designate.

(c) To the extent that any provision of any prior Executive order is inconsistent with the provisions of this order, the latter shall control and such prior provision is amended accordingly.

(d) All orders, regulations, rulings, certificates, directives, agreements, contracts, delegations, determinations, and other actions of any officer or agency of the Government relating to any function affected by this order shall remain in effect except as they are inconsistent herewith or are hereafter amended or revoked under proper authority.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

THE WHITE HOUSE  
June 1, 1953

<sup>a</sup> *Ibid.*, Nov. 19, 1951, p. 826.

## LETTER TO HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES

White House press release dated June 1

JUNE 1, 1953

To: The Heads of All Executive Departments  
The Director for Mutual Security

I have today transmitted two reorganization plans to the Congress and taken other actions by Executive order providing for a significant reorganization of the executive branch for the conduct of foreign affairs. This letter further defines relationships which will govern executive branch officials in the conduct of our international responsibilities.

The over-all foreign affairs reorganization which I desire to achieve is designed to emphasize the primary position of the Secretary of State within the executive branch in matters of foreign policy. I personally wish to emphasize that I shall regard the Secretary of State as the Cabinet officer responsible for advising and assisting me in the formulation and control of foreign policy. It will be my practice to employ the Secretary of State as my channel of authority within the executive branch on foreign policy. Other officials of the executive branch will work with and through the Secretary of State on matters of foreign policy. I shall also look to the Secretary of Defense as the Cabinet officer responsible, within the framework of foreign policy, for advising and assisting me in the formulation and control of military policy. Similarly, the Secretary of the Treasury, within the framework of foreign policy, shall continue to be the Cabinet officer responsible for advising and assisting me in the formulation and control of monetary and financial policy.

The Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of the Treasury, as appropriate, shall review plans and policies relative to military and economic assistance programs, foreign information programs, and legislative proposals of the Foreign Operations Administration and the United States Information Agency, to assure that in their conception and execution, such plans, policies and proposals are consistent with and further the attainment of foreign policy, military policy and financial and monetary policy objectives. The Director of the Foreign Operations Administration and the Director of the United States Information Agency will assure the concurrence or participation of the appropriate Secretary before taking up with me any policy matters of concern to that Secretary.

The heads of these new agencies should furnish information to the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury in such manner and form as may be agreed between the head of the agency and the Secretary concerned to insure that the program of the agencies and the implementation of such programs conform with foreign policy, military pol-

icy, and financial and monetary policy objectives.

To the maximum feasible extent consistent with efficiency and economy, the internal organization of the new agencies should be designed to permit ready coordination with subordinate levels of the Department of State. This would suggest parallel areas of responsibility for constituent units of the State Department and of the two new operating agencies wherever feasible. The two operating agencies should also enter into appropriate arrangements to insure the necessary coordination with each other. Overseas regional staffs should ordinarily be established for the operating agencies only where there is a regional organization or multilateral activity of sufficient importance to warrant the establishment of a diplomatic mission. The Chief of the United States diplomatic mission in each foreign country must provide effective coordination of, and foreign policy direction with respect to, all United States Government activities in the country. To the maximum practicable extent, there should be integrated supervision of personnel performing related economic or information activities in each foreign country. Appointments of all chief representatives abroad of the two new agencies, and of the chiefs of military assistance advisory groups abroad, should be cleared with the Secretary of State.

The Director of the Foreign Operations Administration should take full advantage of the advice and assistance available in other agencies. He should coordinate his operations with related operations in other agencies. At the same time, I expect the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration to maintain full control and direction over all foreign economic and technical assistance programs rather than turn this responsibility over to other agencies. We must have an integrated direction of technical assistance and other foreign assistance activities.

Since I am assigning to the Mutual Security Agency responsibility for paying ocean freight on voluntary relief shipments, I wish to make a corresponding change respecting the Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid. This Committee, which was created pursuant to the President's letter to the Secretary of State, dated May 14, 1946, operates under the guidance of the Department of State, and coordinates public and private programs for foreign relief. The Committee should hereafter operate under the guidance of the Director for Mutual Security or the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration, as the case may be, and the State Department staff now assisting the Committee should be transferred to the Mutual Security Agency and thereafter to the Foreign Operations Administration.

The reorganization plan which creates the United States Information Agency also assigns exclusive responsibility to the Secretary of State for the control of the content of a program designed to assure accurate statements of United States official positions on important issues and current developments. It is my desire that this program be so administered as to keep these official United States positions before the governments and peoples of other countries. No material which is not a statement of official United States views, regardless of its nature, or origin or the medium used for its dissemination, should be identified by the exclusive label which is provided.

The United States Information Agency will be the normal outlet for this program, but the Secretary of State may use other channels for disseminating this program abroad when in his judgment the use of such channels is required. The Director of the United States Information Agency should give full cooperation in providing the services and facilities necessary for the preparation, translation, transmission, and distribution of materials for this program.

The Director of the United States Information Agency shall report to and receive instructions from me through the National Security Council, or as I may otherwise direct. I am directing that the necessary changes be made in existing arrangements for Government-wide coordination of foreign information activities to enable the Director of the United States Information Agency to serve as Chairman of the Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee.

The Secretary of State has an obligation to develop means of providing foreign policy guidance fully and promptly. The Foreign Operations Administration and the United States Information Agency must seek such guidance and establish appropriate means of assuring that its programs at all times conform to such foreign policy guidance.

The instructions in this letter supplement the actions which I have taken by Executive order and the reorganization plans. They will in turn be supplemented as necessary by other orders and by interagency arrangements. I am confident that the members of the executive branch, under the clear assignments of responsibility which I have provided, will continue to work together even more effectively as a team. Such teamwork is essential to our success in the conduct of foreign affairs and to the achievement thereby of a greater measure of peace, well-being, and freedom throughout the world.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

## President's Proposal for Admission of European Migrants

*Statement by Acting Secretary Smith*<sup>1</sup>

In his letter of April 22, 1953<sup>2</sup> to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, President Eisenhower pointed to the tragic developments which left countless thousands of homeless refugees in Europe, and referred to the steady flow of persons escaping from Communist oppression to seek asylum in the free world. The President also pointed to the problem of population pressures as a source of urgent concern in several friendly countries in Europe. As a contribution to the solution of these problems, the President urged earliest consideration for his recommendations for emergency immigration legislation.

After careful study, the Department of State believes that the bill introduced by you, Mr. Chairman,<sup>3</sup> and 17 of your colleagues (S. 1917) will go a long way toward meeting the needs outlined by the President.

The Department of State is interested in the proposed legislation primarily because of its foreign-policy implications. The humanitarian aspects of the program are obvious. Its effect upon our relations with our European allies will be most favorable. It will assist in relieving situations which, under certain circumstances, would adversely affect the national security of the United States by undermining the economic and political stability of our allies.

We are faced with a number of serious problems having an important impact on the political, economic, and social life of friendly countries in Europe. Some of these problems are a direct outgrowth of World War II; others trace their origin

to totalitarianism. They are problems of population pressures and of escape from persecution, and they are creating situations in certain European areas which constitute a grave threat to important objectives of American foreign policy. During and after World War II the pressures from basic overpopulation increased tremendously. This is attributable in part to the virtual cessation of migration during the war years. Millions of people became refugees; other millions, because they were Germans, were expelled from their homes in Eastern Europe. There has also been a steady stream of persons fleeing to freedom from Communist terror in Eastern Europe.

Most of the nations of the free world have made a considerable effort to alleviate this situation. Through our own Displaced Persons Act of 1948, this Government admitted some 350,000 refugees from Germany, Austria, and Italy. Through the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration, the United States and 21 other governments, including Australia, Canada, Israel, 12 Western European, and 6 Latin American countries, have worked conscientiously to help in the solution of this problem. This Committee, with U.S. assistance and leadership, hopes to move 120,000 from Europe in 1953 and 140,000 in 1954.

Various countries have participated substantially in receiving migrants from Europe. It is estimated that some 350,000 migrants are moving annually to overseas countries. Since 1945, Canada has admitted approximately 775,000 immigrants from Europe; Australia 720,000; Latin American countries approximately 125,000 annually. It is hoped that under U.S. leadership other nations will further increase their level of immigration from Europe.

The problem to which S. 1917 is addressed is one of great concern both to this Government and to our North Atlantic Treaty allies. It is imperative to reduce the population backlog created during the war and postwar years and recently aggravated by the flow of escapees from countries

<sup>1</sup> Made on May 26 (press release 238) before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on the President's proposal for the admission of 240,000 escapees, expellees, and persons from overpopulated areas in Europe. Acting Secretary Smith testified on May 21 before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization of the House Committee on the same proposal (press release 277; not printed).

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of May 4, 1953, p. 639.

<sup>3</sup> Sen. Arthur V. Watkins.

under Communist control. Serious economic and social problems have been created in areas of overpopulation and where refugees and escapees have concentrated. And not the least serious is that these problems become a factor in the growth of communism. The result is a drain on the economies of our Western European partners. Despite outside assistance, they have had to bear the principal burden themselves. West Germany and other countries have absorbed a large proportion of the backlog into their own economies, but they cannot handle this problem alone. Only through adequate emigration opportunities can the population pressures be reduced to manageable proportions.

S. 1917 seeks to contribute to a solution of two problems. One relates to overpopulation; the other to refugees—German expellees and escapees from communism. I believe it important to emphasize that S. 1917 seeks to meet these problems within the framework of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. The security provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act will be fully complied with. The screening of candidates for admission will be fully as rigorous as that provided under normal immigration. To protect the American labor market from undue overcrowding, S. 1917 contains provisions going beyond those set forth in the Immigration and Nationality Act. The Labor and Agriculture Departments will describe the process by which migrants under this program will have been assured of suitable employment prior to the issuance of a visa and will testify on the impact of the program on the domestic economy.

S. 1917 is a temporary measure which does not alter or amend the Immigration and Nationality Act. It is designed to meet an emergency situation through the issuance of 240,000 special-quota visas over a 2-year period.

I agree completely with you, Mr. Chairman, when you said at the time you introduced S. 1917, "All the necessary protections with respect to security are provided for in this bill. In no manner do the requirements differ from those of the Internal Security Act or the security provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act." You pointed to another basic fact, which I should like to emphasize, when you said, "The selection of immigrants . . . is to be carried out exclusively by officials of the U.S. Government. Without exception, all determinations of eligibility and admissibility will be made by officials of this Government."

#### **Provision for Special-Quota Visas**

The program proposed by the bill would enable us, over a 2-year period, to admit 110,000 escapees and expellees now crowded into the Western Zones of Berlin, West Germany, and Austria. S. 1917 defines an "escapee" as anyone who has left the

Soviet Union or other Communist, Communist-dominated, or Communist-occupied area of Europe, and has refused to return to these areas. Persecution or fear of persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinions is the established yardstick. An "expellee" is any person of German ethnic origin, expelled from Eastern Europe, who is now residing in Berlin, Western Germany, or Austria. Both in the case of the escapee and in the case of the expellee, only those who are not firmly resettled are eligible.

Well over 8,000,000 people—expellees and escapees from communism—have already been absorbed by the Federal Republic of Germany. Large numbers cannot be absorbed, and the problem has been aggravated by a steady influx of those fleeing west from the oppressive heel of totalitarianism. Similarly a flow of East European escapees has added to the problem in Austria. It is toward these problems that the admission of 110,000 escapees and expellees now in West Berlin, Western Germany, and Austria is directed.

S. 1917 provides for the admission of another 15,000 escapees from communism now in the European territories of our NATO partners, including Turkey, and in Trieste. Here again, we would be offering hope to those who have left their homes and braved the terrors of Communist frontiers in a perilous quest for freedom.

The great contributions which these escapees have made here and in other Western nations are well known to this Committee.

The remaining special-quota numbers are made available to qualified persons from the territories of our NATO partners, Italy, the Netherlands, and Greece.

Italy's struggle to meet her overpopulation problem is well known. The President's letter of April 22 was received enthusiastically by the Foreign Ministers at the April meeting of the North Atlantic Council, offering as it did hope that help might be in sight for our common allies. All members of the North Atlantic Council have been deeply concerned with this problem, and various plans for increasing mobility of labor in Europe are being explored.

In Italy, the population problem is not a permanent and insoluble one. It results largely from the policy of the Mussolini regime of discouraging normal emigration; the high birthrate of the 1930's; the cessation of emigration during the war; and the influx of approximately one-half million people from the former Italian colonies and from Istria and Venezia Giulia. In the post-war period Italy's birthrate has been below that of most other West European countries. The current birthrate is 17.6 per 1,000 population, compared, for example, with 19.4 for France and 24.6 for the United States. The Italian problem is primarily one of handling the accumulated backlog which that country, despite its consistent efforts, cannot manage by itself.

## Other Countries Help

Over a period of time we have urged other friendly countries to help in this situation. From 1946 to 1951 approximately 750,000 Italians have been received by these countries. Approximately one-half million have gone overseas, while the remainder have been resettled in other European countries. The adoption of S. 1917 would provide further encouragement for others to increase their efforts. Our direct contribution under this program would be to admit 75,000 Italians from Italy and Trieste over a 2-year period.

The bill under discussion would also provide for the admittance, during the next 2 years, of 20,000 from the Netherlands. The desirable level of emigration from that country would be about 60,000 annually. Indonesian independence closed a traditional outlet for Dutch migration. Many Dutch families, settled in that area for generations, were repatriated to the Netherlands, a country badly devastated by the war and already seriously overcrowded. Last winter's flood disaster dramatized the pressing overpopulation problem. Last year about 50,000 emigrated, primarily to Canada and to Australia. The openings provided in the United States for 20,000 immigrants from the Netherlands in the next 2 years would not only be regarded as a most friendly gesture but would do much to strengthen the economy of one of our staunchest allies.

Greek efforts to contribute effectively to our Western defense against communism and to maintain decent living standards could be defeated by the crushing weight of surplus population. Each year Greece has six times as many new workers entering the labor market as Belgium and Sweden, which have populations of comparable size. Lack of resources and of arable land, war devastation, and Communist guerrilla activity, have gravely heightened the population problem. Emigration to Canada and Australia is beginning to help. The admission into the United States of an additional 20,000 Greeks would considerably ease the burden on the local economy and strengthen the bonds between this country and Greece which stands so courageously on the easternmost flank of our defenses.

Mr. Chairman, I thoroughly agree with the statement you made when you introduced S. 1917. You said, "the bill now being introduced is a good, honest piece of proposed legislation, carefully drawn to protect the United States, and it is drawn in such a way as to make clear what it is intended to be."

In summary, may I say again that the problems dealt with in the President's letter and in the proposed legislation are most critical. They concern friendly countries confronted by acute population pressures and burdened with an increasing

influx of escapees from communism. These countries have made magnificent efforts to absorb as many people as possible. The United States and other countries of the free world have supplemented these efforts by taking steps to assist in alleviating the problems. The program provided by S. 1917 would be our most effective contribution. Moreover, our example in adopting this legislation would encourage other countries to increase their efforts and enlarge their programs. Altogether we would be strengthening the internal soundness of our NATO allies and our friends in Europe as we continue in our common efforts to create effective defenses against threats of external military aggression. And, finally, gentlemen, the adoption of this legislation would offer hope of a life in freedom to many who risked their lives to flee from Communist tyranny in search of liberty.

## THE DEPARTMENT

### Confirmation

The Senate on June 4 confirmed Samuel C. Waugh as Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs.

## THE FOREIGN SERVICE

### Consular Offices

The consulates at Hamilton, Ontario, and Victoria, British Columbia, are being closed to the public as of May 29. Hamilton will officially close by June 30, while Victoria will be officially closed by June 12, 1953.

The consular functions of Victoria are being transferred to the consulate general at Vancouver. Those of Hamilton are to be divided between the consulate at Niagara Falls and the consulate general at Toronto as follows:

Niagara Falls—Applications for visas from residents of Hamilton and the area between Hamilton and Niagara Falls.

Toronto—All consular functions, except visa work originating in and near Hamilton, as stated above.

### Chiefs of Mission To Remain at Their Posts

The President announced on June 1 that the following chiefs of mission are to remain at their posts:

Angus Ward, Ambassador to Afghanistan  
Paul C. Daniels, Ambassador to Ecuador  
Edward B. Lawson, Minister to Iceland  
Monnett B. Davis, Ambassador to Israel  
Joseph Flack, Ambassador to Poland

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*The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication compiled and edited in the Division of Publications, Office of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.*

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## National Security and the Defense of Freedom

*Address by the President<sup>1</sup>*

I thank you sincerely for the honor of your invitation to be with you today.

Yours is one of our Nation's most distinguished and enterprising organizations. You are young and responsible people with impressive careers and achievements already recorded to your credit. My own life has been spent with America's young people. The grave decisions that I have been compelled to make have been vindicated by their skill, their sense of responsibility, and their sacrifice. My faith in them is my unbounded faith in America itself.

Because you are both young and responsible, you know what is your greatest responsibility of all—tomorrow—the whole future of freedom.

In the minds of all of you—as in my own mind—is a long list of critical subjects confronting our people today. I wish I could discuss all of them with you—the problems of healthy foreign trade; the regulation of Government expenditures; the achieving of a more just tax structure; the development of sound agricultural programs; the great work to be done in the fields of education, health, and welfare.

There is, however, one matter that overshadows all of these. It is the constant, controlling consideration in our national life today. It is—our Nation's security.

Quickly we can see how this one issue effectively rules all others. It alone comes close to fixing the level of Government budgets—when two of every three dollars spent by our Federal Government go to defense purposes. It thereby almost automatically sets the requirements for Federal taxes. It directly affects the welfare of our farms, so dependent upon wide opportunities for export. And it is intimately bound up with foreign trade—for our own imports of such critical products as

nickel, and cobalt, and mica are essential to our national security.

It is no wonder that our national security is so vast a matter—for the struggle in which freedom today is engaged is quite literally a total and universal struggle. It engages every aspect of our lives. It is waged in every arena in which a challenged civilization must fight to live.

It is a military struggle—on the battlefields of Korea, of Indochina, of Malaya.

It is an economic struggle—in which the equivalent of a lost battle can be suffered in a ruined rice crop in Asia, or in the lagging of a critical production line in America.

It is a political struggle—speaking at the conference tables of the United Nations, in the daily diplomatic exchanges that flood the cable wires and telephone lines of the world.

It is a scientific struggle—in which atomic-energy plants and colossal research projects can produce terrible wonders matching in fateful effect the inventions of the wheel or of gunpowder.

It is an intellectual struggle—for the press and the radio, every spoken and printed word, can either inspire or weaken men's faith in freedom.

It is a spiritual struggle—for one of communism's basic assumptions about the nature of men is that they are incapable of ruling themselves, incapable of attaining the spiritual standards and strength to solve national problems when these require voluntary personal sacrifice for the common good. This is the Communist's justification for regimentation. All this we deny. And we must seek in our churches, our schools, our homes, and our daily lives the clearness of mind and strongness of heart to guard the chance to live in freedom.

For this whole struggle, in the deepest sense, is waged neither for land, nor for food, nor for power—but for the soul of man himself.

These are real, tough facts—not mere poetic fancies. They are facts as true and as compelling as any airplane production schedules, or the fire-

<sup>1</sup> Made at the annual convention of the National Junior Chamber of Commerce, Minneapolis, Minn., on June 10 and released to the press by the White House on the same date.

power of our guns, or the armor of our tanks, or the speed of our jets.

I cannot presume today to speak of all aspects of so vast, so all-embracing, so total a struggle—nor of all the truths that must, I believe, guide us steadfastly. I wish to speak simply of two of these truths.

The first is this: Our military strength and our economic strength are truly one—and neither can sensibly be purchased at the price of destroying the other.

The second is this: This Nation and all nations defending freedom everywhere in the world are one in their common need and their common cause—and none can sanely seek security alone.

The first of these truths concerns our military posture of defense. The second concerns our whole concept and conduct of world affairs. Let us consider each of them briefly, for the mere assertion of a general truth proves nothing and convinces no one.

### **An Age of Peril**

The central problem of our military defense is not merely to become strong—but to stay strong. The reason is obvious; we cannot count upon any enemy striking us at a given, ascertainable moment. We live, as I have said before, not in an instant of peril but in an age of peril—a time of tension and watchfulness.

The defense against this peril, then, must be carefully planned and steadfastly maintained. It cannot be a mere repetition of today's reflex to yesterday's crisis. It cannot be a thing of frenzies and alarms. It must be a thing of thought and order and efficiency.

Precisely such a defense is now being built for our country. I personally believe it does several things. It soberly promises more efficient military production. It realistically assesses our long-term economic capacity. It demands the elimination of luxury, waste, and duplication in all military activity. And it allocates funds as justly and wisely as possible among the three armed services.

Concretely: these defense plans allocate 60 cents out of every defense dollar to air power. With the enactment of pending legislation our Air Force will have available for its expenditure more than 40 billion dollars. By mid-1954 its strength will total 114 wings. At the same time the air arm of the Navy will command a full half of all the funds available to the entire naval establishment. The Navy and Marine air arms will alone total almost 10,000 planes. All this, I believe, promises both powerful air defense and a no less powerful deterrent to any would-be aggressor.

Greater efficiency in production will give us less costly production schedules—and something even more vital: fewer planes "on order," more planes in the air. Today, typical production schedules require 26 months for a B-47, 34 months for a

B-52. We believe that such schedules can be reduced to something like 18 months. I repeat: that will mean fewer planes in theory, more planes in fact—more swiftly and less expensively.

How many planes—how many divisions—how great a Navy—should we have? Such questions are, these days, earnestly and fervently debated by advocates of different theories, as well as a fair number of self-appointed experts. All this is healthy and proper enough—provided we do not lose sight of certain elemental facts.

First: We must remember always that reasonable defense posture is not won by juggling magic numbers—even with an air of great authority. There is no wonderfully sure number of planes or ships or divisions—or billions of dollars—that can automatically guarantee security. The most uncompromising advocates of such magic numbers have themselves changed their calculations almost from year to year. Such changes are reasonable, as technological advance requires. But the insistence that the latest change is final, definitive, and unchallengeable—that is not reasonable.

Second: We must remember that all our plans must realistically take account—not just this year but every year—of colossal and continuing technological change. We are living in a time of revolution in military science. Today 25 aircraft equipped with modern weapons can, in a single attack, visit upon an enemy as much explosive violence as was hurled at Germany by our entire air effort throughout 4 years of World War II.

And a third serious truth about our military defense is this: there is no such thing as maximum security short of total mobilization. This would mean regimentation of the worker, the farmer, the businessman—allocation of materials—control of wages and prices—drafting of every able-bodied citizen. It would mean, in short, all the grim paraphernalia of the garrison state.

This would do more damage than merely to strain the economic fabric of America. It would—if long sustained—imperil the very liberties we are striving to defend. And it would ignore that most elemental truth—the fact that this total struggle cannot be won by guns alone.

I do not believe—in a word—that we can wisely subscribe to what I would call the "all-out" military theory of defense—ignoring the other defenses we must build and hold.

### **The "Fortress" Theory**

There is another theory of defense—another oversimplified concept—which I believe equally misleading and dangerous. It is what we might call the "fortress" theory of defense.

Advocates of this theory ask: Why cannot the strongest nation in the world—our country—stand by itself? What does the United Nations matter? And particularly in Asia, where so many of our sons have died in freedom's name, why cannot we

make our own decisions, fight and stand as only we ourselves may choose?

There are many answers. I shall give but a few.

A total struggle—let us never forget it—calls for a total defense. As there is no weapon too small—no arena too remote—to be ignored, so there is no free nation too humble to be forgotten. All of us have learned—first from the onslaught of Nazi aggression, then from Communist aggression—that all free nations must stand together, or they shall fall separately. Again and again we must remind ourselves that this is a matter not only of political principle but of economic necessity. It involves our need for markets for our agricultural and industrial products, our need to receive in return from the rest of the world such essentials as manganese and cobalt, tin, and tungsten.

This essential, indispensable unity means compromise—always within a clearly defined, clearly understood framework of principle. We know the need of compromise, in harmony with basic principles, within our own Nation. It is the essence of the democratic process. We should not be surprised that it applies just as vitally among nations—in the wide community of the world's free peoples.

How—where—can there be retreat from this unity? Surrender Asia? That would mean leaving a vast portion of the population of the entire world to be mobilized by the forces of aggression. Surrender Europe? That would mean more than doubling the industrial power of those same forces.

Who is there who thinks that the strength of America is so great—its burdens so easy, its future so secure—that it could make so generous a gift to those challenging our very lives?

There is no such thing as partial unity. That is a contradiction in terms.

We cannot select those areas of the globe in which our policies or wishes may differ from our allies—build political fences around these areas—and say to our allies: "We shall do what we want here—and where you do what we want, there and only there shall we favor unity." That is not unity. It is dictation. And it is not the way free men associate.

We all hear—in this connection—a good deal of unhappy murmuring about the United Nations. It is easy to understand the dismay of many. None of us is above irritation and frustration over

the seemingly vain and tedious processes of political discourse in times of great crisis.

But none of us can rightly forget that neither the world—nor the United Nations—is or can be made in a single image of one nation's will or idea. The fact is that from its foundation the United Nations has seemed to be two distinct things to the two worlds divided by the Iron Curtain. To the Communist world it has seemed a convenient sounding board for their propaganda, a weapon to be exploited in spreading disunity and confusion. To the free world it has seemed that it should be a constructive forum for free discussion of the world's problems, an effective agency for helping to solve those problems peacefully.

The truth is that even if the United Nations were to conform to the concept held by the free nations, it would still be bound to show infinite variety of opinion, sharp clashes of debate, slow movement to decision. For all this is little more than a reflection of the state of the world itself. An image of perfect symmetry would be a distorted image—the false creation of some nation's or some bloc's power-politics. And perhaps the greatest worth of the United Nations is precisely this: It holds up a mirror in which the world can see its true self. And what should we want to see in such a mirror but the whole truth—at such a time of total struggle?

There are—as you see—certain common denominators to all that I have said, certain constant thoughts I believe to be consistently relevant in facing our tomorrow. We must see clearly that all the problems before us—from farm exports to balanced budgets, from taxes to the vital resources for our industry—all are dependent on our Nation's security. And in this real way freedom's great struggle touches all of us alike—farmer and businessman, worker and student, pastor and teacher.

We know this to be true because we know that there is but one struggle for freedom—in the market place and in the university, on the battlefield and beside the assembly line.

We know that strength means being strong in all these ways and places.

We know that unity means comradeship, patience, and compromise among all free nations.

And we know that only with strength and with unity—is the future of freedom assured. And freedom, now and for the future, is our goal!

## Text of Agreement on Prisoners of War

*Following is the text of the agreement on prisoners of war which was signed at Panmunjom on June 8 by Lt. Gen. William K. Harrison, Jr., senior delegate of the U. N. Command delegation, and General Nam Il, senior Communist delegate:*

Within two months after the armistice agreement becomes effective both sides shall, without offering any hindrance, directly repatriate and hand over in groups all those prisoners of war in its custody who insist on repatriation to the side to which they belonged at the time of capture. Repatriation shall be accomplished in accordance with the related provisions of Article III of the draft armistice agreement. In order to expedite the repatriation process of such personnel, each side shall, prior to the signing of the armistice agreement, exchange the total numbers, by nationalities, of personnel to be repatriated direct. Each group delivered to the other side shall be accompanied by rosters, prepared by nationality, to include name, rank (if any) and internment or military serial number.

Both sides agree to hand over all those remaining prisoners of war who are not directly repatriated to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission for disposition in accordance with the following provisions:

### TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR NEUTRAL NATIONS REPATRIATION COMMISSION

#### *I, General*

1. In order to ensure that all prisoners of war have the opportunity to exercise their right to be repatriated following an armistice, Sweden, Switzerland, Poland, Czechoslovakia and India shall each be requested by both sides to appoint a member to a neutral nations repatriation commission which shall be established to take custody in Korea of those prisoners of war who, while in the custody of the detaining powers, have not exercised their right to be repatriated. The neutral nations repatriation commission shall establish its headquarters within the demilitarized zone in the vicinity of Panmunjom, and shall station subordinate bodies of the same composition as the neutral nations repatriation commission at those locations at which the repatriation commission assumes custody of prisoners of war. Representatives of both sides shall be permitted to observe the operations of the repatriation commission and its subordinate bodies to include explanations and interviews.

2. Sufficient armed forces and any other operating personnel required to assist the neutral nations repatriation commission in carrying out its functions and responsibilities shall be provided exclusively by India, whose representative shall be the umpire in accordance with the provisions of Article 132 of the Geneva Convention, and shall also be chairman and executive agent of the neutral nations repatriation commission. Representatives from each of the other 4 powers shall be allowed staff assistants in equal number not to exceed fifty (50) each. When any of the representatives of the neutral nations is absent for some reason, that representative shall designate an alternate representative of his own nationality to exercise his functions and authority. The arms of all personnel provided for in this paragraph shall be limited to military police type small arms.

3. No force or threat of force shall be used against the prisoners of war specified in paragraph 1 above to prevent or effect their repatriation, and no violence to their persons or affront to their dignity or self-respect shall be permitted in any manner for any purpose whatsoever (but see paragraph 7 below). This duty is enjoined on and entrusted to the neutral nations repatriation commission. This commission shall ensure that prisoners of war shall at all times be treated humanely in accordance with the specific provisions of the Geneva Convention, and with the general spirit of that convention.

#### *II, Custody of prisoners of war*

4. All prisoners of war who have not exercised their right of repatriation following the effective date of the armistice agreement shall be released from the military control and from the custody of the detaining side as soon as practicable and, in all cases, within sixty (60) days subsequent to the effective date of the armistice agreement to the neutral nations repatriation commission at locations in Korea to be designated by the detaining side.

5. At the time the neutral nations repatriation commission assumes control of the prisoner of war installations, the military forces of the detaining side shall be withdrawn therefrom, so that the locations specified in the preceding paragraph shall be taken over completely by the armed forces of India.

6. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 5 above, the detaining side shall have the responsibility for maintaining and ensuring security and order in the areas around the locations where the prisoners of war are in custody and for preventing and restraining any armed forces (including irregular armed forces) in the area under its control from any acts of disturbance and intrusion against the locations where the prisoners of war are in custody.

7. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 3 above, nothing in this agreement shall be construed as derogating from the authority of the neutral nations repatriation commission to exercise its legitimate functions and responsibilities for the control of the prisoners of war under its temporary jurisdiction.

#### *III, Explanation*

8. The neutral nations repatriation commission, after having received and taken into custody all those prisoners of war who have not exercised their right to be repatriated, shall immediately make arrangements so that within ninety (90) days after the neutral nations repatriation commission takes over the custody, the nations to which the prisoners of war belong shall have freedom and facilities to send representatives to the locations where such prisoners of war are in custody to explain to all the prisoners of war depending upon these nations their rights and to inform them of any matters relating to their return to their homelands, particularly of their full freedom to return home to lead a peaceful life, under the following provisions:

A. The number of such explaining representatives shall not exceed seven (7) per thousand prisoners of war held in custody by the neutral nations repatriation commission; and the minimum authorized shall not be less than a total of five (5).

B. The hours during which the explaining repre-

sentatives shall have access to the prisoners shall be as determined by the neutral nations repatriation commission, and generally in accord with Article 53 of the Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war.

C. All explanations and interviews shall be conducted in the presence of a representative of each member nation of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and a representative from the detaining side;

D. Additional provisions governing the explanation work shall be prescribed by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, and will be designed to employ the principles enumerated in paragraph 3 above and in this paragraph;

E. The explaining representatives, while engaging in their work, shall be allowed to bring with them necessary facilities and personnel for wireless communications. The number of communications personnel shall be limited to one team per location at which explaining representatives are in residence, except in the event that all prisoners of war are concentrated in one location, in which case, two (2) teams shall be permitted. Each team shall consist of not more than six (6) communications personnel.

9. Prisoners of war in its custody shall have freedom and facilities to make representations and communications to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and to representatives and subordinate bodies of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and to inform them of their desires on any matter concerning the prisoners of war themselves, in accordance with arrangements made for the purpose by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.

#### *IV, Disposition of prisoners of war*

10. Any prisoner of war who, while in the custody of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, decides to exercise the right of repatriation, shall make an application requesting repatriation to a body consisting of a representative of each member nation of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. Once such an application is made, it shall be considered immediately by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission or one of its subordinate bodies so as to determine immediately by majority vote the validity of such application. Once such an application is made to and validated by the Commission or one of its subordinate bodies, the prisoner of war concerned shall immediately be transferred to and accommodated in the tents set up for those who are ready to be repatriated. Thereafter, he shall, while still in the custody of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, be delivered forthwith to the prisoner of war exchange point at Panmunjom for repatriation under the procedure prescribed in the armistice agreement.

11. At the expiration of ninety (90) days after the transfer of custody of the prisoners of war to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, access of representatives to captured personnel as provided for in paragraph 8 above, shall terminate, and the question of disposition of the prisoners of war who have not exercised their right to be repatriated shall be submitted to the political conference recommended to be convened in paragraph 60, draft armistice agreement, which shall endeavor to settle this question within thirty (30) days, during which period the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall continue to retain custody of those prisoners of war. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall declare the relief from the prisoner of war status to civilian status of any prisoners of war who have not exercised their right to be repatriated and for whom no other disposition has been agreed to by the political conference within one hundred and twenty (120) days after the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission has assumed their custody. Thereafter, according to the application of each individual, those who choose to go to Neutral Nations shall be assisted by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the Red Cross Society of India.

## **Prime Minister Nehru Congratulates President on Prisoner Agreement**

*The summer White House at Custer State Park, S. Dak., on June 12 received an exchange of messages between the President and Prime Minister Nehru of India. The latter's message had been transmitted to Secretary Dulles on June 9 by the Indian Ambassador, Gaganrihari Mehta, who then transmitted the President's reply to Prime Minister Nehru in London.*

### **Prime Minister Nehru's Message**

Please convey to President Eisenhower my congratulations on the signing of the P. O. W. Agreement at Panmunjom. The United States under the leadership of the President has played a wise and generous part in these negotiations which have resulted in an Agreement and I should like to offer my respectful congratulations to President Eisenhower for his leadership at this critical moment. I earnestly trust that this Agreement will lead to peace not only in the Far East but elsewhere.

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

### **President's Reply of June 12**

MY DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

I thank you for your message received June 9 regarding the prisoner of war agreement reached at Panmunjom. I greatly appreciate your words regarding the part which the United States has played in this matter. It is my earnest hope that this agreement will speedily lead to an armistice and just peace in Korea, and to a relaxing of world tensions. India's participation in the work of the Repatriation Commission will mark a further significant contribution toward these ends.

Sincerely yours,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

This operation shall be completed within thirty (30) days, and upon its completion, the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall immediately cease its functions and declare its dissolution. After the dissolution of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, whenever and wherever any of those above-mentioned civilians who have been relieved from the prisoner of war status desire to return to their fatherlands, the authorities of the localities where they are shall be responsible for assisting them in returning to their fatherlands.

#### *V, Red Cross visitation*

12. Essential Red Cross service for prisoners of war in custody of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall be provided by India in accordance with regulations issued by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.

#### *VI, Press coverage*

13. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall insure freedom of the press and other news media in observing the entire operation as enumerated herein, in accordance with procedures to be established by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.

#### *VII, Logistical support for prisoners of war*

14. Each side shall provide logistical support for the prisoners of war in the area under its military control, delivering required support to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission at an agreed delivery point in the vicinity of each prisoner of war installation.

15. The cost of repatriating prisoners of war to the exchange point at Panmunjom shall be borne by the detaining side and the cost from the exchange point by the side on which said prisoners depend, in accordance with Article 118 of the Geneva Convention.

16. The Red Cross Society of India shall be responsi-

## The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission

Press release 311 dated June 10

*In compliance with the terms of the Prisoner-of-War Agreement reached at Panmunjom on June 8 the United States, acting in behalf of the U.N. Command, on June 9 transmitted to the Governments of Sweden, Switzerland, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and India, through their Missions in Washington, an Aide-Mémoire asking if they were prepared to serve on the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission envisioned by that Agreement.*

*The text of the Aide-Mémoire follows:*

The Department of State calls the attention of the Government of \_\_\_\_\_ to an agreement in regard to prisoners of war signed at Panmunjom in Korea on June 8, 1953 between the United Nations Command and the Communist delegations.

This agreement establishes a Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and sets forth the terms of reference of this Commission. The introductory sentence of the terms of reference provides:

"In order to ensure that all prisoners of war have the opportunity to exercise their right to be repatriated following an armistice, Sweden, Switzerland, Poland, Czechoslovakia and India shall each be requested by both sides to appoint a member to a Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission which shall be established to take custody in Korea of those prisoners of war who, while in the custody of the detaining powers, have not exercised their right to be repatriated."

Paragraph 26 of the terms of reference provides:

"When this agreement has been acceded to by both sides and by the five powers named herein, it shall become effective upon the date the armistice becomes effective."

The Department of State would appreciate an expression by the Government of \_\_\_\_\_ that it is prepared to serve on the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in accordance with the terms of the above prisoner of war agreement.

Enclosure:

Text of Agreement on Repatriation of Prisoners of War

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,  
Washington

but both sides shall not under any name and in any form interfere or exert influence.

### VIII, Logistical support for the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission

19. Each side shall be responsible for providing logistical support for the personnel of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission stationed in the area under its military control, and both sides shall contribute on an equal basis to such support within the demilitarized zone. The precise arrangements shall be subject to determination between the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the detaining side in each case.

20. Each of the detaining sides shall be responsible for protecting the explaining representatives from the other side while in transit over lines of communication within its area, as set forth in paragraph 23 for the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, to a place of residence and while in residence in the vicinity of but not within each of the locations where the prisoners of war are in custody. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall be responsible for the security of such representatives within the actual limits of the locations where the prisoners of war are in custody.

21. Each of the detaining sides shall provide transportation, housing, communication, and other agreed logistical support to the explaining representatives of the other side while they are in the area under its military control. Such services shall be provided on a reimbursable basis.

### IX, Publication

22. After the armistice agreement becomes effective, the terms of this agreement shall be made known to all prisoners of war who, while in the custody of the detaining side, have not exercised their right to be repatriated.

### X, Movement

23. The movement of the personnel of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and repatriated prisoners of war shall be over lines of communication as determined by the command(s) of the opposing side and the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. A map showing these lines of communication shall be furnished the command of the opposing side and the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. Movement of such personnel, except within locations as designated in paragraph 4 above, shall be under the control of, and escorted by, personnel of the side in whose area the travel is being undertaken; however, such movement shall not be subject to obstruction and coercion.

### XI, Procedural matters

24. The interpretation of this agreement shall rest with the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, and/or any subordinate bodies to which functions are delegated or assigned by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, shall operate on the basis of majority vote.

25. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall submit a weekly report to the opposing commanders on the status of prisoners of war in its custody, indicating the numbers repatriated and remaining at the end of each week.

26. When this agreement has been acceded to by both sides and by the 5 powers herein, it shall become effective upon the date the armistice becomes effective.

27. DONE at Panmunjom, Korea, at 1400 hours on the 8th day of June 1953, in English, Korean, and Chinese, all texts being equally authentic.

Signed NAM IL, *General, Korean People's Army senior delegate, delegation of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers.*

Signed WILLIAM K. HARRISON, Jr., *Lieutenant General, United States Army senior delegate, United Nations Command Delegation.*

ble for providing such general service personnel in the prisoner of war installations as required by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.

17. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall provide medical support for the prisoners of war as may be practicable. The detaining side shall provide medical support as practicable upon the request of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and specifically for those cases requiring extensive treatment or hospitalization.

The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall maintain custody of prisoners of war during such hospitalization. The detaining side shall facilitate such custody. Upon completion of treatment, prisoners of war shall be returned to a prisoner of war installation as specified in paragraph 4 above.

18. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission is entitled to obtain from both sides such legitimate assistance as it may require in carrying out its duties and tasks,



## Sustaining NATO's Objectives

by General Matthew B. Ridgway  
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe<sup>1</sup>

I consider it particularly appropriate to join with members of the American Council on NATO in discussing the role of this international organization and of one of its military agencies, Supreme Allied Command, Europe, in world affairs. I appreciate greatly your invitation to address you.

It is of major importance that the peoples of the United States and all other NATO countries receive as full and factual information concerning the common problems we face together and what we are doing to solve them as is possible within the bounds of military security.

Free peoples only give their wholehearted support and accept heavy financial burdens when they know the facts and find these facts justify the costs.

You are doing our country and the free world a great service by assuming the task of assisting in furnishing Americans the facts concerning the purposes, objectives, and status of NATO and of its military commands.

What is the Supreme Allied Command, Europe? What is its job?

Where is its place in NATO—the North Atlantic Treaty Organization?

Have the North Atlantic Treaty nations changed their declared purpose of uniting their efforts for their collective self-defense, and for the preservation of peace and security?

Has the threat which twice already in this century has brought them untold loss of life and destruction of property, and which but 3 short years ago revealed the possibility of enormously greater catastrophe for them and for all of the Western World now abated?

Can they now safely relax their efforts and relegate military security to a secondary place?

All these questions occur and recur in the daily consideration of the major problems now facing NATO. All require reasoned answers. The answers, which the NATO governments are now

pondering, and the actions which these governments take will be fateful for the future of our people and for all those who, in NATO and elsewhere throughout the world, share with them the ideals of human dignity, human decency, and liberty under Almighty God.

As the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, I want to outline the scope of our job.

I want to outline this job as I see it today, dependent on the answers given by the governments concerned to the questions I have propounded.

In that which follows, I speak as an international military commander, deriving my responsibilities and authority from an international political body, the North Atlantic Council, on which the United States Government is one of fourteen members.

In this role, while I express my personal views, I do so from an international, not solely an American military viewpoint. I speak to nationals of all 14 NATO nations, not just to Americans. I speak from within my sphere as a professional military man, not as a trespasser into the political sphere, whose limits I well recognize and scrupulously respect.

Yet there will be found, I think, in what I say, something particularly pertinent to America's consideration of its NATO obligations. It could hardly be otherwise. The capabilities of the American people to influence the course of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization are so great, their role of leadership so vitally significant for themselves and the world, that America does carry a heavy share of responsibility for finding solutions to NATO's problems. . . .

We must, in any analysis of a problem so huge, commence with a firm foundation on which to build.

I take, as my foundation, the purpose and objectives of the parent organization, NATO.

The purpose is to preserve the peace and our freedom, and this statement is simple, clear, all-inclusive, and unchallengeable. It is the truth.

<sup>1</sup> Address made before the American Council on NATO at New York on May 21. Reprinted from *Cong. Rec.*, June 8, 1953, p. A3458.

The objectives of this organization are clearly set forth in the preamble to the treaty:

To safeguard the freedom, common heritage, and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law; to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area; to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security.

The entire history of the North Atlantic Treaty negotiations, and of NATO itself, including all that has been done from its inception to date, is completely devoid of any threat to any nation. Any allegation of aggressive intent constitutes a deliberate and malicious fraud against humanity.

Now from this foundation of fact I derive two premises. *First*, it was the threat of armed aggression by Soviet Russia and Soviet-controlled military power which brought NATO into being. *Second*, the primary objective of NATO is the preservation of peace and of the security of the peoples and territory of the North Atlantic area.

On this foundation and from these premises, the Governments, acting through the Permanent Council on which all are represented, assigned certain missions or jobs to be done. Among them were the military missions. If not the most important at the time, certainly they were then the most urgent. If Western Europe had been attacked in 1950 as the Republic of Korea was criminally attacked in June of that year, there would have been no doubt of its fate.

#### **NATO's Wartime Mission**

The urgent job at the time of foundation was to create, at the earliest possible date, the military strength which would deter aggression against Western Europe with its inevitable expansion into a worldwide conflict. This can be termed the "peacetime objective" of NATO.

The wartime mission stems directly from this. If an attack should be made upon us, either through miscalculation or the deliberate design to precipitate war, then NATO's military forces must be capable of repelling and defeating the aggression with the least cost to the member nations in terms of manpower, money, and those values dear to us all.

This then is the problem. It is the No. 1 problem of NATO. It is, in my opinion, of no less urgency today than when the Council, in December 1950, acknowledged it as such by asking the Government of the United States to make available to help solve this problem my predecessor, now the President of the United States.

Now we consider the military problem given my command.

The mission of my command is naturally intertwined with that of the overall NATO organization. It is the top headquarters in Europe which controls and guides the NATO armed forces to the accomplishment of their objective. This objective is twofold in nature.

*First*, to deter aggression by building up our military forces to such a degree that potential breakers of the peace will consider their chance of successful attack doubtful.

*Second*, to insure, insofar as possible, that in the event we are attacked, we defend the peoples and the lands of the NATO nations. I would like to emphasize, with regard to the latter objective, that there are no qualifications in time. The responsibility for this defense is not to be deferred to some future day when adequate forces to insure success might be available. This responsibility exists today, if the dread volcano of war should again erupt.

This is the first of two fundamental factors affecting the urgency of our job.

The NATO nations, as we have seen, formed their association under the grave peril of a great and menacing threat. They evaluated that threat. They analyzed painstakingly and objectively its nature, its magnitude, its potentialities in time and space. They drew certain conclusions. Their highest military authorities put their official stamp of approval on these conclusions, and furnished them authoritatively to their Supreme Commanders—Admiral McCormick in the Atlantic and I in Europe.

These conclusions included, in terms no one could misconstrue, estimates of the size and composition of the forces the potential aggressors could launch against us—in which directions, for what objectives, when and in what sequence.

They included a statement that the military forces of the potential aggressor were in an advanced stage of readiness for war. They stated, and recent history gives this statement an ominous note, that there might be only relatively brief warning, or none, prior to the outbreak of hostilities.

This is the second of the two fundamental factors affecting the urgency with which SHAPE's [Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe] commander views the need for getting on with his job. The other factor, as already stated, is that he has the responsibility for defense in Western Europe right now.

We have, I think, shown in fairly definite outline the form of my job, what it is, and how it came into being. The next step should show the situation affecting this job, as that situation exists today.

The defense of Western Europe embraces a multitude of elements. They concern the political, economic, financial, and social problems of the member states. They relate to the stability of governments, stability of currencies, balance of trade, industrial potential, budget structures and cycles, standards of living, as well as all the innumerable military problems of armies, navies, and air forces—both intra and interservice—in personnel, equipment, training, and leadership. These various elements must all be accorded due

consideration if NATO is to be a sound and effective organization.

It is well to mention now those elements which affect the situation in which I and my headquarters must function.

The North Atlantic Council is the top body—the political authority—charged with the responsibility of considering all matters concerning the implementation of the provisions of the treaty. The Council, which formerly met only periodically when the several national Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Finance attended, is now in permanent session in Paris, with permanent representatives, each with rank of Ambassador, in attendance.

Several times a year these sessions become ministerial meetings of the Council by reason of the attendance of the Ministers mentioned. The most recent of these was held in Paris last month.<sup>2</sup>

The Council is served by an international staff, headed by a Secretary-General, Lord Ismay, and certain committees of which, from the standpoint of my headquarters, the military committee is the most important. That committee is composed of one of the Chiefs of Staff of each of the member nations. It serves as a military advisory body to the Council, to which it is responsible.

It also provides general policy guidance to its executive body, the standing group. This latter body is composed of three senior officers, one each representing the Chiefs of Staff of France, the United Kingdom, and of the United States. This body issues instructions and guidance on military matters to the various NATO commands, including, of course, the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.

A further important element in the situation affecting the job of my command is the relative military weakness of the Western nations. It is important to emphasize that this relative weakness was brought about largely because of the deliberate and precipitate demobilization of our military forces following the close of World War II. Thus, until the advent of NATO, we remained critically weak to oppose actual Communist expansion. In fact, we were then, except for our atomic capability, almost completely lacking in the principal deterrent to aggression that Communists recognize—military force. In some areas we had to start practically from scratch.

### Potential Enemy Capabilities

We cannot afford to guess whether a potential enemy—whose long-range objectives remain unchanged and whose past and present actions speak for themselves—will or will not attack us. We cannot afford to wait unprepared. To do either would invite disaster.

The difference between intentions and capabilities

<sup>2</sup> For information regarding this meeting, see BULLETIN of May 11, 1953, p. 671.

ties is of the utmost importance. The civilian authorities may, in fact *must*, estimate and evaluate the intentions of those who threaten our security.

The military leaders must deal with the capabilities of the potential enemy—not seek to fathom his mind for his intentions.

At my headquarters we must—and do—make our estimates and plans based on potential enemy capabilities and the minimum forces and strength we must have to meet that threat.

We know that the capabilities of Soviet Russia, as shown in its air, land, and sea power, constitute an ever-present threat to Western Europe. We know that the Soviet Communist forces could with relatively little warning strike at any point of their choice along the 4,000-mile line stretching from Norway to Turkey.

We know that we must also face the threat of the Soviet's atomic capabilities, and we are taking full cognizance of the possibilities of these new, unconventional weapons.

Just when such new weapons will be in adequate supply for military use is a question I shall not discuss. We cannot, however, delay production of those arms and equipment, or delay training the men on whom we know—atom bomb or no atom bomb—we must still rely.

During the past 3 days I have presented our situation in detail to the committees of the Congress which consider the Soviet threat and the problems it creates. In general, the factual situation is that while we have made steady progress during the past year, we still have major deficiencies in manpower, support units, arms and equipment, logistical establishments, stockades of ammunition, and, above all, in planes.

If we are to reach the threshold of real security, our full effort is required. The momentum of steady progress must be maintained, even accelerated.

The effort and sacrifice to create the required forces fall upon the people of the several NATO nations. This fact requires in them a determination to be secure in their capability of remaining free—a determination strong enough to sustain their support for the financial burdens, for the national military service, and for the many other measures that are essential to the building of an effective force.

In the fight NATO is making for peace by peaceful means, it is of vital importance that our political authorities shall have their voices in negotiations between East and West backed up by the force which potential aggressors recognize. We must have a covering force in being—land, sea, and air—fully manned, fully and adequately armed and equipped, properly trained and, above all, properly led.

It falls upon the highest civilian authorities of the NATO nations to make their separate and collective decisions as to the time when their require-

ments of security will be met; hence the rate of building toward those requirements.

In this, they look to their military advisers for honest and objective estimates of requirements, for advice as to the military consequences of failure to meet those requirements, and for advice as to the most efficient and effective methods of building toward them.

In making their decisions they must assess many factors and many demands, knowing, as we all do, that military strength cannot long endure on a foundation of economic weakness. Their judgment must be the balanced judgment which does not attempt so much in so short a time as to impair the very foundations on which future military strength depends, nor produce so little as to prolong unnecessarily the grave threat to security in which the free nations still stand. The military authorities ask only that these decisions be made with full cognizance of the military factors.

Economic and other factors may, and doubtless will, profoundly influence the capabilities of governments to provide these requirements.

Such action is the constitutional prerogative and responsibility of the civil authorities. It is for them to decide what should or should not be provided, and for any reason which they may deem proper.

The military commanders will accept those decisions with complete loyalty. They will continue, as they have in the past, to do the utmost within their power with the means provided. They will also continue, as they have in the past, loyally yet fearlessly, to point out the military consequences, as in the light of military reasons they see such consequences, of any failures to provide the requirements they consider essential.

### **Peril Continues Great**

I believe we stand in just as great peril as ever we stood before. While our strength has increased, so too has that of our potential adversary, and the discrepancy remains greater than could be overcome within the immediate future unless we continue to make great efforts.

On the basis of the known effort the Kremlin is making to increase its offensive capability in conventional fields, its assumed effort to increase its offensive capability in unconventional fields, including the atomic, its demonstrated ruthlessness, and its implacable hostility toward us, I see no valid grounds for complacency or relaxation.

If and when we acquire the minimum defensive strength which we all agree we must have, or if and when there is reliable evidence, in actions not words, of a major abatement of Soviet Russian hostility toward the West, with a concurrent and corresponding reorientation of its policy of seeking to subvert other governments, then and only then might a resurvey of our position perhaps justify a lesser effort.

This time is not yet. We are today far from that minimum defensive strength.

All earthly values are relative. Costs of armed forces and equipment, of training establishments and maintenance, of salaries and all the multitudinous things that go into the creation and maintenance of military establishments are higher—very much higher today than ever before. But spiritual values remain fixed, and it is those which determine the relative values of lesser things.

They are at stake now as in few other historical epochs. If they should be destroyed, nothing else would have value. If we are determined, as we say we are, to maintain them within a proper margin of safety, then costs of material things assume quite different values.

We may be gambling today with all that is precious—with human lives and spiritual principles as well as with earthly treasures.

If we slow down and are not assailed, we shall have saved some money. We shall have attained an easier living. If we slow down and *are* assailed, and lose, we shall have seen our liberties perish, our institutions destroyed, ourselves enslaved, and our God derided.

These are the reasons which I think give urgency to the task we have undertaken. These are the reasons which should, I think, impel us to quicken, not slacken, our pace, to lengthen our patience, to freshen our courage, and to renew our faith in the rightness of the course we have freely chosen to follow.

The military commanders would, I think, be derelict in duty if they did not point out what history has so often recorded, and governments so often forgotten. No amount of postwar explanation can explain, no postwar excuses can excuse the needless loss of lives sacrificed through compromise of principle and lack of sustained resolution—through lack of timely, adequate preparation to meet recognized perils.

War tomorrow would make infinitely greater demands on human bodies and human spirits than ever before. Only through training, intelligently planned and persistently pursued, of adequately armed and equipped forces, can these demands be mitigated.

Only through high training requirements, rigidly enforced, can low casualty rates be possible. Only well-armed and equipped, adequately trained, and efficiently led forces can expect victory in future combat.

Only nations which are willing to provide these things—and all of them take much time and money—have a right to expect victory. The nations of Western Europe, and their allies beyond the Atlantic, cannot expect this unless they truly unite their efforts for their collective security and their common defense, and do it in time.

Let me now answer, in the way I personally think they should be answered, the questions yet unanswered with which I began this discussion.

—I believe the NATO nations are agreed on what their purpose is. I believe their purpose has not changed. I believe it still is to unite their efforts for their collective self-defense and for the preservation of peace and security.

—I believe the NATO nations, collectively, must take new and more forceful decisions as to how to achieve this purpose and must implement these decisions with new, positive, and sustained action.

—I believe that NATO leadership must impart new impetus to NATO efforts and implant new faith in NATO capabilities; I believe this NATO leadership must be provided and exercised without procrastinating delay.

—I believe that the present ratio of NATO defensive capability to the offensive capability of the Soviets and their captive peoples emphatically does not justify relaxation of efforts to achieve reasonable military security.

—I believe, on the contrary, that the scale and tempo of these efforts should be increased, even though costs are high and burdens heavy, until we have achieved a reasonable chance of successfully defending ourselves if we should be attacked.

Our defensive strength has grown greatly since the North Korean plunge across the 38th parallel in brutal and unprovoked aggression. Greece and Turkey, with their valiant fighting forces, have since then joined our NATO alliance, and, since that fateful day in June of 1950, we and our NATO partners have tripled our defense expenditures, a measure of our great collective effort. We are moving forward, but our momentum must be maintained.

With the unity in Western Europe for which we hope—including ratification of the European Defense Community Treaty and Western Germany's contribution to the common defense—and with continued American support commensurate with America's responsibilities, I believe all these things can be done.

—I believe the needed NATO leadership can be found, the NATO purpose carried to fulfillment, if this leadership in free governments has the support of their peoples. I believe free peoples will support this leadership if it will, by its own chosen methods in each particular country, furnish the people the facts.

Finally, I believe—I have faith—that out of the spiritual reservoirs of the Western World will come leadership with the vision to see, the integrity to choose, and the courage to carry us together along the only road which can lead us to our objectives. To follow this road, we shall perhaps have to place our need for security ahead of our desire for more of many things until, through strength, we shall have largely lessened the threat to our political and territorial integrity and our spiritual heritage, or shall have acquired the means for successful self-defense if an attack should be loosed against us.

## **Suspension of MSA Defense Support Aid to Denmark**

Harold E. Stassen, Director for Mutual Security, announced on June 11 that, by agreement between the United States and Danish Governments, American defense-support aid to Denmark is being suspended.

The Danish Government, Mr. Stassen said, proposed the suspension of aid since its dollar gap has been closed and its gold and dollar reserves are increasing.

Commenting on the suspension of defense-support aid to Denmark, Mr. Stassen said:

The fact that Denmark has been able to close its dollar gap is another example of the fundamental soundness of the Mutual Security Program. As a nation which was occupied by the Nazis during World War II, Denmark faced difficult problems in rebuilding its economic strength and attaining economic stability in the postwar period. With, first, Marshall Plan dollar help and, subsequently, MSA dollar aid, that economic recovery has been achieved. This is further evidence that as partners, nations of the free world can effectively become stronger together.

Denmark's MSA defense-support funds in the current fiscal year total \$7.5 million of which \$3 million was specifically earmarked to help Denmark expand its productivity program. The first \$1.5 million of the \$3 million was allotted on May 15, and the second half of the total is expected to be allotted later this week.

The 1953 fiscal year allotments make a total of \$278.9 million in defense support and economic aid for Denmark since the initiation of the Marshall plan, MSA's predecessor, in April 1948.

## **U.S.S.R. Queried as to Text of Austrian Treaty It Would Favor**

Press release 314 dated June 12

*The following note was delivered on June 11 to the Soviet Government by U.S. Ambassador Charles E. Bohlen at Moscow. Similar notes were delivered to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the British and French Embassies.*

The Ambassador of the United States presents his compliments to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and, under instructions from his Government, has the honor to communicate the following:

The United States Government has learned with regret of the refusal of the Soviet Deputy to attend the meeting of Deputies for the Austrian Treaty called for the 27th of May by the United Kingdom Chairman.<sup>1</sup> The United States Government is seriously concerned that it is now nearly ten years since the Austrian people were promised the restoration of their freedom and independence

<sup>1</sup> For text of the Soviet note of refusal, see BULLETIN of June 8, 1953, p. 815.

in the Moscow Declaration. It is more than eight years since the end of hostilities in Europe made possible the fulfillment of that pledge. The United States Government cannot accept as justification for this further delay in the conclusion of an Austrian Treaty the pretext on which the Soviet Deputy has based his refusal to attend the meeting.

In 1949 the United States Government, together with the French and United Kingdom Governments, agreed to meet the Soviet position on major outstanding issues of the treaty provided early agreement could be reached on it as a whole.

Since that time, the Soviet Government has persisted in raising obstacles which have prevented substantive negotiations, although the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States and France have repeatedly made it clear that they were prepared to accept any treaty

which would ensure Austria's political and economic independence.

It was in that spirit that the representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States and France were ready in London on the 27th of May to attend the meeting called in the customary manner as agreed at the previous meeting. The Soviet Deputy, however, did not attend and proposed instead that consideration of the Austrian Treaty be continued through diplomatic channels.

The conclusion of an Austrian Treaty is not a question of procedure but rather of good will. To avoid further unnecessary delays and to enable the Deputies to complete the work already done, the United States Government requests the Soviet Government to inform it of the exact text of the treaty which the Soviet Government is prepared to conclude in order to ensure the political and economic independence of Austria.

## The Pivotal Conflict Dominating the World

*by Under Secretary Smith*<sup>1</sup>

In years gone by, if inspiration failed him, a commencement speaker could fall back on a pattern that was safe and sure. He could open with some time-tested bromides about the youthful and shining faces in the audience and the challenge of the future. Then he could embark on one of several themes which came under the vague heading of "inspirational." In my generation, I recall that philosophic discourses on the meaning of commencement enjoyed a great vogue.

In their way, these talks had their uses. In listening to them, the more inquiring and perceptive minds in the audience could pursue their private thoughts without interruption. And the more worldly listeners could employ the time to plan the evening's festivities or catch up on their sleep. There was no harm done and the amenities of the situation were satisfied.

Fortunately or unfortunately, times have changed. It is no longer feasible or desirable for the speaker who is up against it to withdraw to previously prepared positions—if I may employ a military term. The waste of time is a luxury we cannot afford. Bluntly, we live in a world rent by tension. We have been forced to assume the lead-

ership of that segment of the world community which is resolved to deal with present problems and work out its future in the manner of free men. In that role, we confront a ruthless, barbaric, and power-hungry clique who seek to subject the world to their tyranny. And I speak as one who spent 3 years in Moscow.

In essence, the struggle is between free and independent societies and a terror-ridden dictatorship. It is a struggle which all of you—like it or not—will be forced to join. It is, furthermore, a struggle which is certain to have a marked impact on your future.

It seemed to me, therefore, that a member of your Government who had been given the high honor of an invitation to speak to you was under an obligation of no mean proportions. It appeared that, if my remarks failed to take into full account this pivotal struggle, I would be falling short of what was expected of me. Moreover, I believed that if I did not make what contribution I could to your understanding of this struggle, I would be wasting an opportunity.

It is a privilege to be here. I feel that the theme of these graduation exercises appropriately highlights the significance of the independent college in this modern democracy of ours. A society that

<sup>1</sup> Address made at Washington and Jefferson College, Washington, Pa., on June 8 (press release 307).

would achieve and retain freedom must be an informed society. The institutions that provide this education can acknowledge no master save the principle of responsible and independent scholarship. Our universities must be citadels where the individual student is at liberty to pursue his studies free from external pressures and secure against governmental dictation.

That principle has been an integral part of the long and distinguished tradition of this college. This is hardly surprising for an institution which takes its name from two leading American disciples of liberty. You will recall that it was Jefferson who declared that "The God who gave us life gave us liberty at the same time." I am sure that Jefferson would be the first to agree that these Divine gifts must be guarded if they are to be retained. It has long been a firm American conviction that our God-given liberty can only be preserved by the continuing and determined efforts of those who possess it.

We need only inspect the condition of education, for example, in the Soviet Union, where freedom is denied. Do you suppose that the scholastic organizations of the Communists are places where, in the words of the poet John Milton, one "may utter and argue freely"?

Quite to the contrary. The tyranny of the Soviet state demands of students and teachers, as well as of the rest of their subjects, an absolute conformity. Those who deviate are severely dealt with. This is certainly one of the gravest weaknesses in the Soviet structure—a weakness which we in this country shall do everything in our power to avoid.

At this particular moment, the principle of academic freedom may be of secondary interest to you. It is natural that your interest should be focused on a matter of more immediate and more personal concern—that is, your future. It may not be immediately clear to you, but the relationship between the two is less distant than it appears. The concept of freedom is the root-issue between the Communist and the non-Communist spheres.

Your future is completely wrapped up in the way this issue will be resolved. Some among you may take a very pessimistic view of the prospect. This is an easy attitude to adopt. You may have listened too attentively to the voices of doom which are coming from some quarters. You may have believed their cry that the world is in a mess; that war is inevitable; or that our prosperity is a war-born phenomenon and that peace—if we achieve it—will plunge us into a severe economic depression.

If you believe this, you have swallowed a quantity of balderdash which no human system could possibly assimilate. It is quite probable that your queasy feelings about the future stem from indigestion.

I am an old soldier, turned diplomat. I have

seen the problems, about which these voices cry disaster, from both the inside and the outside. They are grave problems, sure. But the gravest of them is no worse than many of the difficulties with which we have successfully dealt in the past. And some of the lesser are already well advanced toward a solution.

Let us examine this talk about peace bringing on an economic depression. This is strikingly parallel to some of the wishful thinking advanced by Soviet economists. Happily, the facts point quite in the other direction. The American economy is operating on a solid base of peacetime production. Our economists recognize that cutting off military buying would probably result in a period of readjustment, but they believe that business activity would bounce back stronger than ever after a period of transition. You will recall that this administration has promised to maintain and increase prosperity at home and to provide greater opportunities for individual initiative. I rely on that promise—and I think you can.

Very well, then, what about the inevitability of war and the "mess" the world is in? These are far larger matters more difficult of solution than the question of depression.

I do not believe war is inevitable. To the contrary, I think that a general war is avoidable. But I am sure that if we meekly accept the inevitability of war—if we fail to marshal our tremendous energies and resources into the cause of peace—we will one day find ourselves at war!

Many of you in this graduating class will probably take up the sword for several years, either voluntarily or at the invitation of the President of the United States. As a professional soldier, my views on this experience probably differ somewhat from yours. I will grant that many who enter the service might otherwise have found a more beneficial and certainly a more lucrative activity for the next 2 years. But I assure you that 2 years of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, or the Marines will not blight your careers. Moreover, the experience will be good for many of you.

### **The Two Courses Open to Us**

Certainly, no one of you who has given the matter any thought will argue with the thesis that bearing arms is a part of your responsibility as citizens. Nor do I think you will deny the necessity of building up American military strength in these times. You further realize, I am sure, that a buildup of the strength of our allies along with our own is a key factor in preventing war. To a degree unmatched anywhere in the world, the men of the Kremlin are highly sensitive to the power factor as it enters world relations. It is basic to their calculations—their own power and the strength of their adversaries as well. When we talk in terms of heavy-bomber squadrons, tank corps, and infantry divisions, we

are speaking a language, perhaps the only language, that the Soviet leaders never misunderstand. As far as they are concerned, military force in being commands their respect. If we are realistic, we must give such a force a high place on the list of deterrents to Soviet aggression.

Actually, of the two courses open to us as set down by President Eisenhower in his April 16 speech, the buildup of military power for an indefinite period is by far the less desirable from our point of view. It is the hard course—the expensive course. But if the existence of this strength contributes to the achievement of real peace, the sacrifice and cost involved in creating it will be trivial indeed.

The second course cited by the President is far more to be preferred and holds a promise of easing world tension. It is that of genuine negotiations with the Soviet Union. At this moment we do not see sufficient indications that the U.S.S.R. is ready to negotiate a genuine settlement. From our sour experience in diplomatic dealings with Stalin and his successors we have learned to watch for meaningful and concrete evidences of Soviet good faith.

In the hope of speeding the presentation of the necessary evidence we have publicly asked Soviet Russia to back up her talk of peace with deeds of peace. And we have further made clear that token gestures will carry little weight. We have made no secret of what we would regard as evidence. We have suggested that an early and reasonable Korean truce would be so viewed.

We have also mentioned the conclusion of a treaty of peace with Austria as evidence of good faith. On this last matter, the Soviet Union has argued, obstructed, backed and filled—and otherwise stalled for nearly 8 years. It has been a negotiating marathon during which the Western Powers gave every consideration to the Soviet position. We are reasonable people. From this experience we can only conclude that the Soviets do not want a free Austria.

But the Soviets say they want peace. To this I say that, if they want peace one-tenth as ardently as they say they want peace, we could have peace tomorrow.

We cannot predict, at this point, whether or not the Soviet Union will decide to negotiate genuinely. Until the decision they reach becomes apparent, we shall be called upon for patience, prudence, and firmness. But whatever course the Soviet Union elects, there is much that is fruitful that we may undertake.

We can, for example, continue to work with our European partners to advance European integration. We can strengthen the links between Western Germany and the rest of Western Europe through economic, political, and defense measures. There are present in this area many of the ingredients of a solid international community—with or

without Soviet cooperation. We must work for its fuller development.

In the Middle East, which certainly qualifies as a problem area, the recent trip made by Mr. Dulles gives us reason to think that there is a chance to make important progress toward easing the dangerous tensions that plague the region. A beginning has been made toward lessening the friction between Israel and neighboring Arab States. We have reason to hope that the British and the Egyptians will renew their efforts to arrive at an amicable solution of their differences on the maintenance and use of the extensive military installations in the Nile region.

#### **Where Communist Imperialism Is Most Pressing**

Without question, Europe and the Middle East are key areas. But the region where the menace of Communist imperialism is most pressing is the Far East. Can we reach a solution there short of a major war? I believe such a solution is possible. I make this statement with a full realization of the obstacles to a solution.

For example, after protracted and tortuous negotiations, we are hopeful that an honorable conclusion of the Korean fighting is in sight. During the last months, the main issue of difference between the U.N. and the Communists centered on the prisoner-of-war question. This question has been little understood here in this country. It is no minor matter but involves a fundamental principle.

Western democracy regards the rights and privileges of the individual as paramount. Consequently, we have insisted that there can be no forcible repatriation of such prisoners as are held by the U.N. command. We could not agree on any other basis, and we are hopeful that an agreement consistent with this principle might soon be reached.

If an armistice is signed, it would signalize the achievement of the purpose for which the U.N. forces entered Korea. You will recall we intervened in Korea to halt an unprovoked Communist aggression. That we will have done. We will, further, have taken a long stride toward the restoration of peace in the area—and in the world as well.

A Korean armistice certainly would be cause for rejoicing. American prisoners of war would be brought home. They would be returned without our paying a blood price in lives of prisoners held by us who would resist repatriation by force. American and other U.N. casualties would cease.

For the Republic of Korea in particular, the heavy loss of life suffered by their troops would be ended. The suffering and sacrifice of the people of that courageous nation would be over. We could then set about the urgent task of rehabilitation.

We are hopeful that the leaders of the Republic



of Korea will recognize the merits of the armistice terms and the benefits which would accrue to them from a cease-fire.

But, and I must emphasize this, we must not forget that the problem of Korea would still be short of final settlement. It will probably be necessary for us to keep forces in Korea for some period in the interests of security. Moreover, should an armistice be signed, there are political questions to be resolved leading toward the unification of Korea. Without attempting to forecast the course of these talks, they will not be quickly or easily concluded.

At this point I should like to sound a note of caution. If we gain an armistice, we should beware of letting down our guard. We cannot relax. Korea is but one flank of a conflict which girdles the world. Danger spots are many. We must remain alert and ready.

Should a settlement in Korea be achieved, there are still other major problems in the Far East. In our concern over Korea, we tend to overlook the guerrilla war which is going on in Malaya and the fighting between the French Union forces and the Communist insurgents in Laos and Vietnam. These are dangerous situations. Nevertheless, if we recall the conditions that prevailed several years ago in these areas, the improvement in the free-world position is marked.

I am far from being the incurable optimist. I do not hope for one grand and sweeping settlement which will forever ease international differences or relax world tension. Appealing as such a development would be, the present situation is too diverse and too complex to allow it. A surer approach is to solve what we can when we can.

Make no mistake. I propose a tedious and a taxing procedure. It will call for determination on our part, maturity, and stamina. We shall have to maintain a discipline in our thinking which will rule out ill-considered or emotional moves.

As new members of the society of educated men, you have a responsibility to make a maximum contribution to this struggle for peace. You cannot do so unless you have an abiding faith in your own future and in the future of this and other free

nations. Faith of this nature generates the confidence we need—the courage to discharge with purpose and with resolution the tremendous responsibilities that have devolved upon us. From that faith we can draw the strength necessary to meet any crisis that may confront us.

If you require evidence to persuade you of the necessity of faith and courage, look at what the antithesis has produced in the Soviet Union. There is a regime that employs fear as an instrument of power and shapes its policy out of hatred. Can there be any doubt in your minds as to which is the stronger? As to which will endure?

In the last analysis, our strength is the strength of the free which develops out of a passionate individual devotion to liberty.

We would do well to adopt the sentiments expressed by an early patriot, Josiah Quincy, in 1774, which he incorporated in his "Observations of the Boston Port Bill." His, I believe, was a declaration of a fundamental. He wrote:

Blandishments will not fascinate us, nor will threats of a "halter" intimidate. For, under God, we are determined that wheresoever . . . whensoever . . . or howsoever we shall be called to make our exit, we will die free men.

## Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights with Germany

Press release 302 dated June 3

An agreement concerning the application of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights of 1923, as amended, between the United States and Germany, to the Federal Republic of Germany and Western Berlin was signed on June 3 at Bonn. The agreement represents another important step toward normalization of relations between the two countries.

James B. Conant, U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, signed the agreement on behalf of the United States and Konrad Adenauer, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, signed on behalf of the Federal Republic.

The negotiations leading up to signature of the agreement were mentioned in the communique of April 9, 1953,<sup>1</sup> concerning the U.S.-German talks during the Chancellor's visit to this country.

The agreement will in due course be submitted to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification. The text of the agreement is as follows:

### AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND GERMANY ON FRIENDSHIP, COMMERCE AND CONSULAR RIGHTS OF DECEMBER 8, 1923, AS AMENDED

The United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany, desirous of strengthening the bonds of friendship existing between them and of placing their relations on a normal and stable basis as soon as possible, have

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Apr. 20, 1953, p. 565.

### Corrections

In the BULLETIN of June 8, 1953, p. 799, first column, the second sentence of the second paragraph should read: "For with the ratification of the Treaty constituting the European Coal and Steel Community, the nations of France, Italy, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg stand committed to try to merge their coal and steel industries into a common market."

In the same issue of the BULLETIN, p. 800, first column, the 11th and 12th lines should read: "*Rien n'est plus permanent,*" say the wise cynics, "*que le provisoire.*"

resolved as a step toward that end to restore to full force and effect, except as otherwise provided in the following Articles, the provisions of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights between the United States of America and Germany signed at Washington December 8, 1923, as amended, as a provisional measure pending the conclusion of a more comprehensive, modern treaty or treaties for such purposes, and have, through their duly authorized representatives, agreed as follows:

#### Article I

The provisions of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights between the United States of America and Germany signed at Washington December 8, 1923, as amended by an exchange of notes dated March 19 and May 21, 1925, and the agreement signed at Washington June 3, 1935, shall be applied and be considered fully operative between the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany on and after the effective date of the present agreement insofar as either High Contracting Party may not have heretofore notified the other Party in accordance with Article XXXI of the aforesaid Treaty an intention to modify or omit any of its Articles, and except as otherwise provided in the following Articles, without prejudice to the previous status of any provisions of the aforesaid Treaty which may have remained operative or may have again become operative at any time since the outbreak of hostilities between the United States of America and Germany.

#### Article II

In accordance with the intent of Article XIX of the aforesaid Treaty, that Article is hereby amended by adding the following:

The Government of either Party may, in the territory of the other, acquire, own, lease for any period of time, or otherwise hold and occupy, such lands, buildings, and appurtenances as may be necessary and appropriate for governmental, other than military, purposes. If under the local law the permission of the local authorities must be obtained as a prerequisite to any such acquiring or holding, such permission shall be given on request.

#### Article III

None of the provisions of the present agreement or of the aforesaid Treaty shall be considered as affecting in any way (1) the rights or obligations of either Party in respect of measures to safeguard essential security interests or (2) the status of the United States of America and its personnel in Germany. Until the effective date of the Conventions signed at Bonn on May 26, 1952<sup>2</sup> the provisions of legislation, regulations or directives which may be in effect by virtue of the status in Germany of the United States of America shall prevail over any inconsistent provisions of the present agreement or of the aforesaid Treaty; and thereafter the provisions of the said Conventions, and of any other related agreements that have been or may be entered into, shall so prevail in case of any such inconsistency.

#### Article IV

Pending the peaceful reunification of Germany, the German territory to which the aforesaid Treaty shall be applied and considered fully operative shall be understood to comprise all areas of land, water and air over which the Federal Republic of Germany exercises jurisdiction. The present agreement shall also enter into force, and the aforesaid Treaty shall be applied and considered fully operative, in the area of Berlin (West) when the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany furnishes the Government of the United States of America

a notification that all legal procedures in Berlin necessary therefor have been complied with.

#### Article V

It is agreed that negotiations for a new treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation shall be entered into without delay.

#### Article VI

1. The present agreement shall be ratified, and the ratifications thereof shall be exchanged at Washington as soon as possible.

2. The present agreement shall enter into force on the day of exchange of ratifications.

3. Either Party may terminate the present agreement by giving six months' written notice to the other Party. IN WITNESS WHEREOF the respective duly authorized representatives have signed the present agreement.

Done in duplicate, in the English and German languages, both equally authentic, at Bonn, this third day of June, one thousand nine hundred fifty-three.

For the United States of America:

JAMES B. CONANT

For the Federal Republic of Germany:

ADENAUER

## International Bank and Japan Discuss Financing Power Projects

The Government of Japan and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development announced on June 3 that they are opening discussions on the general approach of the Bank toward the financing of Japan's economic development. These discussions follow the visit to Japan of a Bank mission in the closing months of last year,<sup>1</sup> which examined the general economic situation and prospects as well as the investment requirements of Japan. Three thermal power projects, one for a 66,000 KW unit for the Chubu Electric Power Company, another for a 75,000 KW unit for the Kyushu Electric Power Company, and the third for two 75,000 KW units for the Kansai Electric Power Company, have been mentioned as a possible basis for the Bank's initial investment in Japan.

## Registration Period for Holders of Mexican Securities

Press release 304 dated June 3

The Department of State calls attention to a recent announcement of the Minister of Finance and Public Credit of the Government of Mexico, which is of interest to certain holders of Mexican Government Direct Debt Obligations and Mexican Railways Obligations.

The announcement refers to a Presidential decree signed May 19, 1953, pursuant to which the Mexican Government has granted a 3-month period, from August 19 to November 19, 1953, dur-

<sup>2</sup> For a summary of the conventions, see *ibid.*, June 9, 1952, p. 888.

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Oct. 27, 1953, p. 672.

ing which holders of those securities who have not registered them to indicate nonenemy ownership, in accordance with a decree dated August 4, 1942, as amended and extended, may apply for permission to register them. The announcement states that the 3-month period during which applications for registration may be made will be the final opportunity for such registration, and that the period will not be extended. A translation of the decree may be obtained at any field office of the U.S. Department of Commerce.

A Registration Commission has been established which will pass upon all applications for permission to register, and it is announced that the decision of the commission will be final and non-

appealable. The announcement states that security holders, whose applications for registration are already on file with the Ministry of Finance or with the Banco de Mexico, need not reapply for permission to register. The Registration Commission will review such applications and notify the security holders at the earliest moment.

Application forms may be obtained from the Banco de Mexico, S. A., México, D. F. and, in the United States, from the American Trust Co., 70 Wall St., New York 5, N.Y. Further information about applying for permission to register may be obtained from these organizations or from the office of Hardin, Hess & Eder, attorneys for the Government of Mexico, 74 Trinity Place, New York.

## Progress Toward Migration Committee's Goals

### FIFTH SESSION OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE FOR EUROPEAN MIGRATION<sup>1</sup>

by George L. Warren

The fifth session of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration was held at Geneva from April 16 through April 24, 1953. The Subcommittee on Finance met from April 13 to April 15, 1953. Twenty-one of the twenty-two member governments were represented at the session; Luxembourg was the only member not in attendance. The Argentine, Costa Rica, and Norway had joined the Committee since the previous session. Colombia, Spain, the United Kingdom, the Holy See, Allied Military Government, Trieste, and government and nongovernmental organizations were represented by observers.

The Migration Committee was established provisionally for 1 year at Brussels in December 1951 and was continued in operation during 1953 by decision of the Committee at its fourth session at Geneva in October 1952. The purpose of the Committee is to secure the movement out of Europe of over 100,000 migrants and refugees annually who would not otherwise be moved. The 21 member governments participating in the fifth session were Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bel-

gium, Brazil, Canada, Costa Rica, Chile, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Paraguay, Sweden, Switzerland, the United States, and Venezuela.

The following were elected to serve as officers at the fifth session: Sir Douglas Berry Copland (Australia), chairman; H. von Trutzschler (Germany), first vice-chairman; Fernando Garcia-Oldini (Chile), second vice-chairman; Tyge Haarløv (Denmark), *rapporteur*.

Dr. von Trutzschler was elected chairman of the Subcommittee on Finance which met for 2 days preceding the fifth session. The Subcommittee was composed of Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United States. The Subcommittee considered the financial statements covering the period from February 1, 1952, through December 31, 1952, and the status reports on the budgets and plans of expenditure for 1952 and 1953.

With respect to the financial statements for 1952, the Subcommittee noted that the gross income of the organization to December 31, 1952, was \$26,114,357 and gross expenditure, \$19,446,549. The Committee carried over on January 1, 1953, \$6,667,808, of which \$2,490,624 had been committed before December 31, 1952 for 1953 operations.

<sup>1</sup>For articles by Mr. Warren on earlier sessions of the Migration Committee, see BULLETIN of Feb. 4, 1952, p. 169; Apr. 21, 1952, p. 638; July 21, 1952, p. 107; and Jan. 12, 1953, p. 64.

The Subcommittee found that between February 1, 1952, and December 31, 1952, the Committee had moved 77,626 persons out of Europe including 31,226 refugees. The sources and destinations of the emigrants were as follows:

<i>Countries of Emigration</i>	
Austria -----	11, 012
Germany -----	38, 276
Greece -----	495
Italy and Trieste -----	12, 278
Netherlands -----	10, 052
Others -----	5, 513
<i>Countries of Immigration</i>	
Australia and -----	15, 486
New Zealand -----	397
Canada -----	8, 853
Argentina -----	
Brazil -----	9, 797
Other Latin American -----	2, 812
United States -----	38, 102
Others -----	2, 179

During the session the Director reported that the number of persons moved by the Committee from February 1, 1952, through February 28, 1953, had been 84,492.

The Subcommittee noted with satisfaction that all government members, with the exception of one, had paid their contributions totaling \$2,283,168 to the administrative expenditures for 1952. Additional contributions to operational income amounted to \$23,831,189. Financial reimbursements to the Committee for movements completed during 1952 were most satisfying, but it was not expected that the rate of reimbursement achieved during 1952 would be maintained in 1953. Additional funds would therefore be required to subsidize certain movements which would not produce reimbursement of the costs involved.

In considering the status report on the budget and plan of expenditure for 1953, which had been adopted at the fourth session in October 1952, the Subcommittee found that there had been delays in the payment of contributions to all categories of expenditure during the first quarter of 1953 and recommended to the full Committee that all government members be urgently requested to speed up payments. This action was later taken by the full Committee. The U.S. representative, supported by the Director, made a special plea to the Governments to secure more members for the Committee and to make more and larger contributions to the Committee's funds in order that an adequate reserve for operating expenditures of at least \$3,000,000 might be built up and additional funds made available to cover the cost of nonreimbursable movements.

The Director, Hugh Gibson, in making his report on progress to date and prospects for 1953, cited the fact that worldwide economic and political conditions had affected the operations of the Committee during 1952, a period during which emigration movements in general had been at a lower level than in the period from 1947 through

1950. He expressed confidence, however, that the volume of movement out of Europe would increase during 1953 because of the many signs in this direction that were already apparent, such as the adherence of Argentina, prospects of larger movement to Canada, improving economic conditions in Australia, and increasing interest in immigration in the Latin American countries.

Mr. Gibson made particular reference in his report to the invaluable assistance of the voluntary agencies which participated in one way or another in the movement of more than half of the persons assisted by the organization during 1952 and accounted particularly for the movement of 11,560 refugees. The movements fostered by the voluntary agencies had shown a substantial increase during the second half of 1952 and an even larger gain in the final quarter. The Committee found no difficulties in securing adequate commercial transport from Mediterranean ports, but found it necessary to arrange additional shipping for traffic from Northern Europe to Australia and to the United States and Canada.

#### **Expansion of Services Begun**

A definite start had been made in expanding the migration services of the Committee through the provision, in collaboration with the Brazilian and Italian Governments and the International Labor Organization (ILO), of training for building laborers in Italy destined for Brazil; of language training in Greece, in collaboration with UNESCO, for preselected migrants for Australia; in the distribution of information to potential migrants; and in projects of preselection in Italy in which, again, the Brazilian and Italian Governments, ILO, and the World Health Organization are collaborating. New services for placement of migrants have been organized in collaboration with the Government of Brazil, and other projects of a technical nature are under immediate study. In the area of land settlement, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Venezuela are making definite progress, with the assistance of staff members of the Committee, in preparing projects for the placement of migrants.

The response to the Director's report was in general commendatory and optimistic. Statements by the representatives of individual governments tended to confirm the Director's appraisal of the prospects of movement for 1953. The Australian representative stated that it remained the policy of his Government to absorb the maximum number of immigrants within the limitations of available capital for general economic development. The representative of Chile stated that his Government was examining a series of projects, particularly one for the settlement of 1,000 Dutch families.

The representative of Canada reaffirmed earlier statements that it was Canada's policy to

admit the largest number of immigrants who could be integrated into the economic life of the country each year. He also reported that the Canadian Government had reached a decision to participate as a member of the Committee during 1953 and 1954 and that Canada would need further assistance in shipping during 1953. The representative of Brazil spoke of the development of plans presently in prospect in his country under which larger numbers of Italian, German, and Dutch migrants might be received. This general optimism was heightened by the letter received by the Director from President Eisenhower, early in the session, in which the President expressed the continuing support of the United States in the Committee's efforts.<sup>2</sup> News was received later in the session of the President's letter to the Congress urging the adoption of legislation to admit 240,000 migrants and refugees into the United States over a period of 2 years.<sup>3</sup>

The representative of Colombia, reporting as an observer, gave a brief description of land-development projects in Colombia which are well beyond the blueprint stage and for which the required financing is now being planned. The Argentine delegate reported that his Government was presently engaged in the building of roads and of irrigation in the development of over 600,000 acres of land which would be opened for the settlement of immigrant and native farmers. The representative of Italy, in commenting on the migration services initiated by the Committee, expressed the hope that studies could be made of the possibility of grouping certain processing services in four cities in Italy under the auspices of the Committee; thus standards of selection and of examination might be so developed under international auspices as to win the confidence of all recruiting governments which might come to use such services in common as an assistance to recruitment.

The representative of Germany confirmed the Director's statement that it is the policy of the German Federal Republic to facilitate emigration from West Germany in accordance with the following priorities: (a) dependents of persons who have already emigrated; (b) alien refugees; (c) farmers and farm workers; (d) single women (domestics and nurses); (e) unskilled labor; and (f) skilled workers. The representative of the Netherlands referred to the requirements of his Government for the assistance of the Committee in shipping and to the need for more opportunities for Dutch emigrants.

The Committee readily adopted the proposal to make Spanish an additional official language. This action was received with enthusiasm by the Latin American government members and was considered by all present to increase the likeli-

hood of the early adherence of the Governments of Colombia and Spain to the Committee.

### Draft Constitution Studied

The Committee devoted the remainder of the session to the consideration of the preliminary draft constitution which had been prepared by the Director at the request of the Committee at its fourth session. After a general discussion on the draft constitution in the full Committee, a drafting subcommittee, composed of representatives of Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, the United States, and Venezuela, prepared a revised draft which the Committee, at the final meeting, decided to refer to the Governments for comment, with the request that all comments be forwarded to the Director at least 2 months in advance of the next session.

The general discussion developed the fact that some of the government members would be able to accept the constitution by administrative action, whereas others, including the United States, would find it necessary to submit the text of the proposed constitution for legislative action and approval. Eventual acceptance of the constitution by the government members will give the Committee more stability and an anticipated life span of from 3 to 5 years.

Article 1 of the proposed constitution reads in part as follows:

1. The purpose and functions of the Committee shall be:
  - (a) to make arrangements for the transport of migrants, for whom existing facilities are inadequate and who could not otherwise be moved, from European countries having surplus population to countries overseas which offer opportunities for orderly immigration;
  - (b) to promote the increase of the volume of migration from Europe by providing, at the request of and in agreement with the Governments concerned, services in the processing, reception and first placement of migrants which other international organizations are not in a position to supply, and such other assistance to this purpose and in the settlement of migrants as falls within the capacity of the Committee.

The discussions at the fifth session reflected optimism that the Committee's goal of movement for 1953 of 120,000 migrants and refugees out of Europe can be achieved during the year. A considerable number of wives and dependents, particularly in Germany and Italy, await the opportunity to join husbands and fathers who have preceded them to overseas countries of immigration. The techniques of selecting and processing migrants for travel are being constantly improved, and better placement services in the countries of immigration are beginning to show results in the opening up of further opportunities for additional migrants. The sessions of the Committee have provided new opportunities for the conclusion of

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of May 4, 1953, p. 641.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 639.

agreements between emigration and immigration countries with respect to migration.

The United States was represented at the fifth session by George L. Warren. The advisers were Dorothy D. Houghton, Assistant Director for Refugees and Migration, Mutual Security Agency; Guy J. Swope, Chief, Displaced Populations Division, Office of the U. S. High Commissioner for Germany; Richard R. Brown, Director, Office of Field Coordination, Escapee Program, Frankfurt on the Main; David E. Christian, Chief, Manpower and Labor Economics Section, European Labor Division, Office of the Special Representative in Europe, Paris; and William Kurylehek, American Embassy, Vienna.

The Committee decided to convene its sixth session in October 1953.

• *Mr. Warren, author of the above article, is Adviser on Refugees and Displaced Persons, Department of State.*

## Investigation of U.S. Citizens on U.N. Secretariat

EXECUTIVE ORDER 10459<sup>1</sup>

*Amendment of Executive Order No. 10422 of January 9, 1953,<sup>2</sup> Prescribing Procedures for Making Available to the Secretary General of the United Nations Certain Information Concerning United States Citizens Employed or Being Considered for Employment on the Secretariat of the United Nations*

WHEREAS Executive Order No. 10422 of January 9, 1953, prescribes procedures for making available to the Secretary General of the United Nations and the executive heads of other public international organizations certain information concerning United States citizens employed or being considered for employment by the United Nations or other public international organizations of which the United States is a member; and

WHEREAS the said Executive Order No. 10422 incorporates by reference certain of the procedures provided or authorized by Executive Order No. 9835 of March 21, 1947, as amended; and

WHEREAS Executive Order No. 9835, as amended, has been revoked by section 12 of Executive Order No. 10450 of April 27, 1953, effective thirty days from that date:

Now, therefore, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution, statutes, and treaties of the United States, including the Charter of the United Nations, and as President of the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:

1. Paragraphs 3, 4, 5, and 6 of Part I of Executive Order No. 10422 are amended to read as follows:

"3. The preliminary investigation conducted by the Civil Service Commission shall be a full background investigation conforming to the investigative standards of the Civil Service Commission, and shall include reference to the following:

- (a) Federal Bureau of Investigation files.
- (b) Civil Service Commission files.

- (c) Military and naval intelligence files as appropriate.
- (d) The files of any other appropriate Government investigative or intelligence agency.
- (e) The files of appropriate committees of the Congress.
- (f) Local law-enforcement files at the place of residence and employment of the person, including municipal, county, and State law-enforcement files.
- (g) Schools and colleges attended by the person.
- (h) Former employers of the person.
- (i) References given by the person.
- (j) Any other appropriate source.

However, in the case of short-term employees whose employment does not exceed ninety days, such investigation need not include reference to subparagraphs (f) through (j) of this paragraph.

"4. Whenever information disclosed with respect to any person being investigated is derogatory, within the standard set forth in Part II of this order, the United States Civil Service Commission shall forward such information to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Bureau shall conduct a full field investigation of such person: *Provided*, that in all cases involving a United States citizen employed or being considered for employment on the internationally recruited staff of the United Nations for a period exceeding 90 days, the investigation required by this Part shall be a full field investigation conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

"5. Reports of full field investigations shall be forwarded through the United States Civil Service Commission to the International Organizations Employees Loyalty Board, established by Part IV of this order and hereinafter referred to as the Board. Whenever such a report contains derogatory information, under the standard set forth in Part II of this order, there shall be made available to the person in question the procedures of the Board provided or authorized by Part IV of this order (including the opportunity of a hearing) for inquiring into the loyalty of the person as a United States citizen in accordance with the standard set forth in Part II of this order. The Board shall transmit its determinations, as advisory opinions, together with the reasons therefor stated in as much detail as the Board determines that security considerations permit, to the Secretary of State for transmission to the Secretary General of the United Nations for his use in exercising his rights and duties with respect to the personnel of the United Nations as set out in the Charter and in regulations and decisions of the competent organs of the United Nations.

"6. At any stage during the investigation or Board proceeding, the Board may transmit to the Secretary of State, for forwarding to the Secretary General, in as much detail as the Board determines that security considerations permit, the derogatory information disclosed by investigation. This shall be for the purpose of assisting the Secretary General in determining whether or not he should take action with respect to the employee, or the person being considered for employment, prior to the completion of the procedures outlined in this order. The making available of any such information shall be without prejudice to the right of full hearing as provided for herein."

2. Paragraph 1 of Part II of Executive Order No. 10422 is amended to read as follows:

"1. The standard to be used by the Board in making an advisory determination as provided for in paragraph 5 of Part I of this order with respect to a United States citizen who is an employee of, or is being considered for employment by, the United Nations, shall be whether or not on all the evidence there is a reasonable doubt as to the loyalty of the person involved to the Government of the United States."

3. Executive Order No. 10422 is further amended by adding the following new part at the end thereof:

<sup>1</sup> 18 Fed. Reg. 3183.

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Jan. 12, 1953, p. 62.

"1. There is hereby established in the Civil Service Commission an International Organizations Employees Loyalty Board of not less than three impartial persons, the members of which shall be officers or employees of the Commission.

"2. The Board shall have authority in cases referred to it under this order to inquire into the loyalty to the Government of the United States of United States citizens employed, or considered for employment, by international organizations of which the United States is a member, and to make advisory determinations in such cases, under the standard set forth in Part II of this order, for transmission by the Secretary of State to the executive heads of the international organizations coming under the arrangements made pursuant to Parts I and III of this order.

"3. The Board shall make necessary rules and regulations, not inconsistent with the provisions of this order, for the execution of its functions. There shall be included in such rules and regulations provisions for furnishing each person whose case is considered by the Board:

(a) A written statement of the alleged derogatory information, in as much detail as security considerations permit.

(b) An opportunity to answer or comment upon the statement of alleged derogatory information, in writing, and to submit affidavits.

(c) An opportunity for hearing before the Board, or a panel thereof of at least three members, including the right of the person to be represented by counsel, to present witnesses and other evidence in his behalf, and to cross-examine witnesses offered in support of the derogatory information: *Provided*, that the Board shall conduct its hearings in such manner as to protect from disclosure information affecting the national security.

"4. Based upon all the evidence before it, including such confidential information as it may have in its possession, the Board shall make its determinations in writing, and shall send to each person who is the subject thereof a copy. In cases in which hearing or other action is by a panel of three members, the action or determination of the panel shall constitute the action or determination of the Board, except that rules and regulations pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Part shall be adopted by action of the Board as a whole.

"5. Except as otherwise specified in this order, the Civil Service Commission shall provide the necessary investigative and other services required by the Board. All agencies of the executive branch of the Government are authorized and directed to cooperate with the Board, and, to the extent permitted by law, to furnish the Board such information and assistance as it may require in the performance of its functions.

"6. All cases arising under this order which are pending before the Regional Loyalty Boards and the Loyalty Review Board of the Commission on the effective date of Executive Order No. 10450 of April 27, 1953, shall on that date be transferred to the Board."

This order shall become effective on May 27, 1953.



THE WHITE HOUSE,  
June 2, 1953.

## Confirmation of Trusteeship Council Representative

On June 11 the Senate confirmed the nomination of Mason Sears as U.S. representative on the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations.

June 22, 1953

## IMC Adopts System of Guiding Quotas for Molybdenum

The Tungsten-Molybdenum Committee of the International Materials Conference announced on June 10 that it has decided not to recommend a formal allocation for molybdenum for the third calendar quarter of 1953. Instead, it has worked out guiding quotas for the use of countries concerned which reflect only what is regarded as a normal pattern of distribution at this stage.

The Governments of all 13 countries represented on the Committee have accepted this recommendation. These countries are Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

The Committee, after careful examination, noted a distinct improvement in the molybdenum supply situation, which is now considered satisfactory for essential needs. Therefore, a firm plan of allocation for ores and concentrates and primary products is no longer deemed necessary.

The plan of guiding quotas should insure that the present pattern of trade will be maintained both as regards the exports and imports of ores and concentrates and primary products. Member governments have agreed that if the arrangements are found to be working satisfactorily, the Committee will be dissolved on July 31, 1953.

## Appointments to Pan American Railway Congress Association

Press release 301 dated June 2

The White House announced on June 2 that the President had appointed Sinclair Weeks, Secretary of Commerce, and John M. Cabot, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, to the U.S. National Commission of the Pan American Railway Congress Association.

The other members of the U.S. National Commission are as follows: William T. Faricy, President, Association of American Railroads, Chairman; George P. Baker, Professor of Transportation, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University; J. M. Hood, President, the American Short Line Railroad Association; James G. Lyne, President, Simmons-Boardman Publishing Corporation, and Editor of *Railway Age*; Arlon E. Lyon, Executive Secretary, Railway Labor Executives Association; and Charles D. Mahaffie, Commissioner, Interstate Commerce Commission.

The aims of the Pan American Railway Congress Association, which was established as a permanent international organization in 1910, are to contribute to the progress of railways in the Americas through the study and possible solution of the problems inherent in the development of

railway systems and through the making of arrangements to facilitate international railway traffic. All 21 American Republics are members of the Association, the headquarters of which is at Buenos Aires, and many railroads, institutions, and private individuals are also members. U.S. membership in the Association and the establishment of a U.S. National Commission were authorized in Public Law 794 of the 80th Congress (approved June 28, 1948).

The functions of the U.S. National Commission, under the terms of the charter of the Association, include the provision of assistance in the preparation of special studies of railway questions and in the organization of the periodic congresses of the Association. The members of the Commission have played leading roles in making preparations for the Eighth Pan American Railway Congress, which is to meet first at Washington and then at Atlantic City during the period between June 12 and 25 of this year.<sup>1</sup>

## U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

### Pan American Railway Congress

The Department of State on June 8 announced (press release 308) that the Eighth Pan American Railway Congress is to be held first at Washington, D.C., and then at Atlantic City, N.J., during the period June 12-25, 1953. The Congress is being sponsored by the Government of the United States and the U.S. National Commission of the Pan American Railway Congress Association (PARCA) in collaboration with the Permanent Commission of the PARCA.

The members of the U. S. delegation to the Congress are listed below. Asterisks indicate members of the U.S. National Commission, Pan American Railway Congress Association.

#### Chairman

\*William T. Faricy, president, Association of American Railroads; Chairman, U.S. National Commission

#### Vice Chairman

\*James G. Lyne, president, Simons-Boardman Publishing Corp., New York, N.Y.

#### Delegates

\*George P. Baker, professor of transportation, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.

\*John M. Cabot, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Department of State  
C. W. Floyd Coffin, president, Railway Supply Manufacturers' Association, New York, N. Y.

Richard M. Connell, U.S. resident member, Permanent Commission, Pan American Railway Congress Association, American Embassy, Buenos Aires

\*James M. Hood, president, American Short Line Railroad Association, Washington, D.C.

\*Arlon E. Lyon, executive secretary, Railway Labor Executives' Association, Washington, D.C.

\*Charles D. Mahaffie, commissioner, Interstate Commerce Commission

Chauncey O. Rowe, acting president, Institute of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State

\*Sinclair Weeks, Secretary of Commerce

#### Advisers

Herbert Ashton, director, Transportation, Communications and Utilities Division, Office of International Trade, Department of Commerce

Kenneth N. Hynes, American Republics Division, Office of International Trade, Department of Commerce

Henry H. Kelly, chief, Inland Transport Policy Staff, Office of Transport and Communications Policy, Department of State

Charles P. Nolan, officer in charge, Transportation and Communications, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State

#### Secretary

\*Walter S. Abernathy, transportation economist, Office of International Trade, Department of Commerce; executive secretary, U.S. National Commission

This will be the first meeting held in the United States by the Pan American Railway Congress Association, an organization which has been devoted since its formation in 1910 to the improvement of railroad facilities and services in the American Republics. Previous Congresses have been held at Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro, Santiago, Bogotá, Montevideo, Habana, and Mexico City.

The Washington portion of the Congress, which will last from June 12 through June 20, will consist primarily of plenary sessions and meetings of technical sections for the presentation and discussion of papers on problems of railway construction, rolling stock, operation, administration, and public policy. During the Atlantic City portion of the Congress, lasting from June 21 through June 25, the participants will have an opportunity to view a major railway exhibit being sponsored by the Railway Supply Manufacturers' Association, and to attend the annual meetings of several divisions of the Association of American Railroads. On June 25 awards and prizes will be presented to the authors of the best papers presented to the Congress.

### International Labor Conference

The Department of State announced on June 2 (press release 300) that the U.S. delegation to the thirty-sixth session of the International Labor Conference, opening at Geneva on June 4, 1953, includes:

#### REPRESENTING THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES:

##### Delegates

Irving McNeil Ives, U.S. Senate

Philip M. Kaiser, Assistant Secretary of Labor

##### Alternate Delegate

James E. Murray, U.S. Senate

##### Advisers

B. Harper Barnes, Assistant Solicitor for International Labor Affairs, Department of Labor

Clara M. Beyer, Associate Director, Bureau of Labor Standards, Department of Labor

William B. Groat, Judge, Queens County Court, Long Island City, N. Y.

Joseph L. Harmon, Assistant Chief, ILO Division, Office of International Labor Affairs, Department of Labor

William M. Leiserson, Industrial Relations Consultant and Arbitrator, Washington, D.C.

Richard F. Pedersen, Office of U.N. Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State

Fernando Sierra Berdecia, Secretary of Labor of Puerto Rico, San Juan, P.R.

<sup>1</sup> For an article by Mr. Faricy on the Eighth Pan American Railway Congress, see BULLETIN of June 1, 1953, p. 787.



David M. Walker, Secretary, Department of Labor and Industry, Harrisburg, Pa.

Arnold L. Zempel, Executive Director, Office of International Labor Affairs, Department of Labor

REPRESENTING THE EMPLOYERS OF THE UNITED STATES:

*Delegate*

Charles E. Shaw, Standard Oil Company of N.J.

*Advisers*

William B. Barton, Chamber of Commerce of the United States

Robert C. Bassett, Hearst Newspapers

Richard P. Doherty, National Association of Radio and Television Broadcasters

James W. Haley, Jewell Ridge Coal Corp.

Hoey A. Hennessy, National Association of Manufacturers

Milton M. Olander, Owens-Illinois Glass Company, Toledo, Ohio

Herbert M. Ramel, Moog Industries, St. Louis, Mo.

Charles H. Smith, Jr., Steel Improvement and Forge Company, Cleveland, Ohio

William G. Van Meter, Chamber of Commerce of the United States

REPRESENTING THE WORKERS OF THE UNITED STATES:

*Delegate*

George Philip Delaney, American Federation of Labor

*Advisers*

Alexander J. Cleland, Bricklayers, Masons and Plasterers' International Union of America

John J. Duffy, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers

A. D. Lewis, United Mine Workers of America

Lee W. Minton, Glass Bottle Blowers' Association of the United States and Canada

Michael Ross, Congress of Industrial Organizations

Harry Sayre, United Paperworkers of America

Elwood Swisher, United Gas, Coke and Chemical Workers of America

Members of the resident U.S. delegation for International Organization affairs in Geneva who will take part are Henry F. Nichol, serving as secretary of delegation; Mason A. LaSelle, as administrative officer; and John F. Jason, as documents officer.

The International Labor Conference is the legislative body of the International Labor Organization (ILO), a specialized agency of the U.N. system which seeks through international action to improve labor conditions, raise living standards, and promote economic and social stability.

The items on the agenda for the thirty-sixth session of the Conference are as follows: (1) report of the Director General, (2) financial and budget questions, (3) application of conventions and recommendations, (4) holidays with pay, (5) protection of the health of workers, (6) minimum age for underground work in coal mines, (7) organization and working of national labor departments, and (8) constitutional amendment.

## Eight Years of UNESCO Progress

*Following is the text of a letter which Walter H. C. Laves, Chairman of the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO, sent to Senator Karl E. Mundt, reporting on UNESCO's progress.<sup>1</sup>*

MAY 11, 1953

MY DEAR SENATOR MUNDT:

On behalf of the United States National Commission for UNESCO, it is my pleasant privilege to recall to your mind an historic event which took place 8 years ago and in which you played a major part. At that time steps were taken to assure international action in support of principles basically identical with those found in the United States Constitution and the Bill of Rights.

On May 22, 1945, the House of Representatives adopted House Resolution 215, which you had introduced, in which the House urged "... the participation by the Government of the United States in the creation of an international educational and cultural organization. . . ." Two days later the Senate adopted a similar resolution introduced by Senator J. William Fulbright and Senator Robert A. Taft. Pursuant to these resolu-

tions, the United States helped to establish the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. Two Members of Congress, Senator James E. Murray and Representative Chester E. Merrow, were members of the United States delegation to the Conference at which the constitution of UNESCO was drawn up. Subsequently Congress authorized the acceptance of membership in UNESCO by the United States and the establishment of a National Commission to advise the Government, and to serve as an agency of liaison on UNESCO matters.

In view of the personal initiative and interest which you thus showed in the establishment of UNESCO, together with these colleagues in Congress, I should like to take this occasion to give each of you a brief report—a progress report—about the Organization and the National Commission.

UNESCO is rendering to its member states the services which you envisaged for the organization in H. R. 215: "... for the purpose of advising together and to consider problems of international education and cultural relations throughout the world and more particularly to organize a perma-

<sup>1</sup> Reprinted from *Cong. Rec.* of May 19, 1953, p. 5285.

ment international agency to promote educational and cultural relations, the exchange of students, scholars, and other educational and cultural leaders and materials, and the encouragement with each country of friendly relations among nations, peoples, and cultural groups."

You will be pleased to know how far UNESCO has gone in living up to these expectations.

### **UNESCO Services**

UNESCO has responded to the urgent requests of more than 20 of the less developed nations for help in raising their levels of education.

It has pioneered a system of fundamental education which helps improve health, nutrition, and literacy, and thus promises to raise the standard of living of the more than half of the world's population which can neither read nor write.

It has brought together teachers from many countries and in many separate conferences for the study of common educational problems.

It has demonstrated to countries without public libraries how they can establish these and use them for democratic educational purposes.

It is helping member states undertake scientific research to improve living conditions. Notably it promotes study of ways in which semidesert regions can be brought into cultivation.

It has made possible the renewal of contacts between scientists, educators, and creative artists in the postwar world, thus upholding the free exchange of knowledge and ideas.

Schools and libraries in soft currency countries have found a way to obtain books, laboratory equipment and other necessary supplies from hard currency countries through the UNESCO coupon plans. In 1952 this made possible purchases from the United States to an amount of over half a million dollars.

Fellowships and travel grants awarded by UNESCO have helped educators, scientists, youth leaders, and trade union members from over 40 countries to study in other countries.

The international interchange of students and teachers is greatly helped, too, by UNESCO's publications. Study Abroad and Teaching Abroad which list annually the fellowships and teaching opportunities in many countries that are open to candidates from other lands.

UNESCO has helped people in the free world understand the principle of collective security, as defended by the United Nations in Korea.

Most important of all, UNESCO is demonstrating to the people of the free world how they can secure social and economic advancement through free institutions and through peaceful international cooperation.

May I mention a few typical pieces of UNESCO work that have come to my personal attention recently.

### **Raising Educational Levels**

In 1952 alone, UNESCO was asked by member governments to send out 22 educational missions. The purpose of these was to provide expert help in planning public educational reforms, to recommend methods of financing such reforms, and to propose ways of improving school administration. These teams of international composition and character would have been impossible without UNESCO.

This large number of advisory services was requested because previous missions sent out under UNESCO auspices had been singularly successful. I talked about this at the Paris General Conference of UNESCO last November with an official of the Ministry of Education of Thailand. He told me about the changes that have been undertaken in the Siamese educational system as the result of the educational mission which his government had requested UNESCO to send 2 years ago. A 10-year plan for educational development has been approved and a supplemental scheme is already in operation in one area where all types and grades of educational activities are being reorganized.

The delegate from Burma told me that his government had doubled its budget for public education and was in the midst of building 1,000 new primary schools, 240 secondary schools, and a teacher training center. This was the direct result of the recommendations of a UNESCO educational mission which had been adopted by the Burmese Government. Important progress has been made in Afghanistan and many other countries.

A few months ago I was in Cairo when the final plans were made for the establishment of a fundamental education center for the Arab states. Illiteracy rates in this region range from 50 to 70 percent. This center has now opened and the first class has teams of 5 trainees from each of the 6 cooperating countries. Within a year there should be 200 trainees enrolled. The center is modeled on the Fundamental Education Center in Mexico, which is supported by UNESCO, the Mexican Government, and the Organization of the American States. Fifty teachers were graduated this year from the Mexican center. They have returned to their countries in Latin America to establish similar national schools run by their own governments.

### **Methods by Which UNESCO Has Worked**

These services, like all else that is done by the organizations, are undertaken by UNESCO only on the request of the member states. I can assure you, from personal experience as Deputy Director General of UNESCO for nearly 4 years, and from subsequent observation, that UNESCO carries out in the letter and the spirit the provision of its constitution that, "with a view to preserving the independence, integrity, and fruitful diversity of the states members of this organization, the or-

### Fourth Conference of U. S. National Commission for UNESCO To Be Held

The U.S. National Commission for UNESCO has announced that its Fourth National Conference will be held in Minneapolis at the University of Minnesota September 15-17, 1953. The conference is authorized by Public Law 565 (79th Cong., 2d Sess.), and this year will have as its theme "America's Stake in International Cooperation." Seven hundred delegates representing organizations, institutions, and individuals will attend. The 12th annual meeting of the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO will precede the conference.

ganization is prohibited from intervening in matters which are essentially within their jurisdiction."

UNESCO's work throughout its program rests on and supports and promotes the free exchange of knowledge and ideas. It is a continuous attack, by practical action, against the Iron Curtain philosophy. Fellowships for study abroad, international seminars for scientists, scholars, and teachers, expert advice given on request, publications bringing the concentrate of free scholarly inquiry or divergent opinions—these are its chief methods of action.

### Increasing UNESCO Membership

As you know, this agency unites the American people in the cause of freedom, understanding, and friendship with the people of over 60 other countries.

Six years ago, when UNESCO's first conference was held, there were 34 member states. The number has increased steadily each year. At its last meeting, UNESCO accepted the application of Spain, Libya, and Nepal. Countries which have gained their independence have at once applied for membership in UNESCO—countries such as Indonesia, Cambodia, Viet Nam, Burma, Ceylon, and Pakistan. Germany and Japan have sought and received admission; thus UNESCO brings former enemy peoples back into the family of nations.

I am sure that you will regret with me that the peoples of some countries are kept outside UNESCO by the will of their governments, but it is easy to understand why Soviet Russia has refused to subscribe to the principles of UNESCO, and why the Governments of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary have withdrawn from UNESCO, since they have become satellites of the U.S.S.R., and since UNESCO has begun to be effective.

The Polish Government, in its letter of withdrawal, last December, alleged that UNESCO is turning itself into an obedient instrument of the cold war launched by American imperialism; that UNESCO has supported Anglo-American aggression in Korea.

These distortions and falsehoods were rejected by the General Conference of UNESCO, which de-

clared "that the allegations contained in the aforesaid communication are completely unfounded."

### Some United States Misunderstandings

I should like to remark briefly on two points about which some misunderstanding exists in the United States.

First, all who sincerely wish that international cooperation through organization may succeed are concerned lest Americans who are disloyal or are engaged in subversive activities should find employment in international agencies. The Executive Committee of the United States National Commission at one of its first meetings in 1947 declared that persons employed by UNESCO should be truly and fully representative of their countries, and the National Commission assisted UNESCO to find Americans who meet this standard. About 60 Americans are employed by UNESCO headquarters in Paris, which has a total staff of about 800, and some 50 other Americans are employed by UNESCO in other parts of the world. I am confident that the great majority of these Americans employed by UNESCO are completely loyal citizens, and I believe that measures now being taken will assure that no American will be employed by UNESCO except those known to be loyal.

I wish also to touch on another point which may have come to your notice—the allegation that UNESCO is trying to impose some doctrine on our schools, designated as one-world government. This false charge was first aired in a newsletter issued by a certain organization and has been widely repeated, although frequently refuted. The truth is that in several pamphlets for teachers (not for pupils) some opinions expressed in international conferences of teachers invited from various countries are reported, and that an occasional sentence among these opinions indicates a belief that a world organization should have stronger powers than those given to the United Nations. UNESCO has never advocated any policy with respect to world government. The Director General of UNESCO has spoken explicitly on this point. "It has never been the purpose of UNESCO to turn citizens from their national loyalties . . . whoever, out of alleged devotion to some international order, repudiates his loyalty to his own country, does not really love his own country nor the international order he claims to admire."

### United States National Commission Active

I should like to take this opportunity, too, of reporting to you that the United States National Commission has carried out in the past 6 years many of the functions assigned to it by Congress. You were one of those who labored to insure that the Commission should be a body widely representative of the voluntary citizen groups of this country. It consists of 100 American citizens, of whom 60 are selected and nominated by national

organizations. These voluntary organizations comprise millions of members, and are widely representative of the educational, cultural, social, economic, and religious life of this country. Through active membership in the National Commission they have linked their members in UNESCO's work for international friendship.

The Commission has been continuously consulted by the Department of State on many matters relating to United States participation in UNESCO. It has been represented on delegations to all sessions of the General Conference of UNESCO, at which the program and budget of this organization are approved.

Through several committees and panels of experts, parts of UNESCO's program are submitted to citizen groups and competent specialists for consideration and advice. More than this, hundreds of American citizens have volunteered to assist in the task of carrying out within the United States those portions of the UNESCO program that can be carried out in this country, such as contributing to the educational needs of the less developed countries and the study of the United Nations.

A special feature of the National Commission's program has been the organization every 2 years of a national conference for the purpose of considering ways to improve our understanding of and participation in world affairs, particularly through the kinds of international cooperation represented by UNESCO. Provision for such conferences was wisely made by Congress when it authorized the establishment of the National Commission. All interested organizations are invited to send representatives.

You will recall the First National Conference held in Philadelphia in 1947 at which you gave a keynote address. Subsequent conferences were held in April 1949 and January 1952. We are now making plans for the Fourth National Conference to be held in Minneapolis in September at which the main theme will be "America's Stake in International Cooperation."

This letter [is] already too long by ordinary standards—yet it barely touches upon the wide variety of important activities made possible through the existence of UNESCO.

I want to close by extending you the thanks, appreciation, and congratulations of the United States National Commission for UNESCO for the great public service you performed in helping assure the establishment of UNESCO which has been so essential to the achievement of an understanding among peoples and of peace itself. Even at this early date the wisdom of that decision has been demonstrated by the enthusiastic support given UNESCO throughout the peace-loving world. The record of this phase of postwar cooperation has already shown its practicability and necessity.

Sincerely,

WALTER H. C. LAVES

## Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography<sup>1</sup>

### Economic and Social Council

- Full Employment. Implementation of Full Employment Policies. Replies of governments to the full employment questionnaire covering the period 1951-52, submitted under resolutions 221 E (IX), 290 (XI) and 371 B (XIII) of the Economic and Social Council. Contents: India. E/2232/Add. 10, Apr. 13, 1953. 29 pp. mimeo.
- Economic Commission for Europe. Annual Report to the Economic and Social Council covering the period from 19 March 1952 to 18 March 1953. E/2382, E/ECE/162, Mar. 28, 1953. 100 pp. mimeo.
- Financial Implications of Actions of the Council. Work Programmes and Costs of the Economic and Social Activities of the United Nations. E/2389/Add. 2. 5 pp. mimeo.
- United Nations Programme of Technical Assistance. Under General Assembly resolutions 200 (III), 246 (III), 418 (V) and Economic and Social Council resolution 222 A (IX). Report by the Secretary-General. E/2414, Apr. 30, 1953. 139 pp. mimeo.
- Freedom of Information. Comments and suggestions of governments transmitted for information and assistance of Rapporteur on Freedom of Information. E/2427. 47 pp. mimeo.
- Report of the World Meteorological Organization. E/2428, May 12, 1953. 72 pp. mimeo.
- Report of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. E/2432, May 14, 1953. 27 pp. mimeo.
- Economic Development of Under-Developed Countries. Question of Methods To Increase World Productivity (Council Resolution 416 E (XIV)). Working Paper by the Food and Agriculture Organization on the problems of productivity in agriculture, fisheries, and forestry. E/2435, May 18, 1953. 13 pp. mimeo.
- Calendar of Conferences for 1954. Memorandum by the Secretary-General. E/2436, May 19, 1953. 12 pp. mimeo.
- Commission on Human Rights, Ninth Session. Measures of Implementation. Statement submitted by the International League for the Rights of Man, a non-governmental organization in Category B status. E/CN.4/NGO.45, Apr. 10, 1953. 3 pp. mimeo.
- United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund, Executive Board. Report of the Executive Board on Its 103rd to 110th Meetings Held 19-26 March 1953. E/ICEF/227, May 8, 1953. 240 pp. mimeo.
- UNICEF-Who Joint Committee on Health Policy Report of the Sixth Session Held at the Headquarters of the World Health Organization, Geneva, 1 and 2 May 1953. E/ICEF/228, May 12, 1953. 12 pp. mimeo.
- Consideration of the Provisional Agenda for the Sixteenth Session of the Council. Preliminary annotations to the draft provisional agenda for the sixteenth session contained in E/2352/Rev. I. Note by the Secretary-General. E/L.498, Apr. 23, 1953. 8 pp. mimeo.

<sup>1</sup> Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

The U.N. Secretariat has established an Official Records series for the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and the Atomic Energy Commission, which includes summaries of proceedings, resolutions, and reports of the various commissions and committees. Information on securing subscriptions to the series may be obtained from the International Documents Service.

## Congress Urged To Make Grant of U. S. Wheat to Pakistan

### MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT TO THE CONGRESS<sup>1</sup>

The people of Pakistan are faced with famine, and they have asked our help in meeting disaster.

We are fortunate to be in a position to offer help at this time, for we have an abundance of wheat. I strongly believe that we should do so. Accordingly I urge the Congress to make possible the shipment to Pakistan of up to 1 million long tons of United States wheat.

The specter of famine confronts the people of Pakistan at a crucial time in their growth as a young free nation. Unchecked, it could undermine the very democratic principles and institutions to which Pakistan is dedicated.

The crisis is largely a result of a calamity of nature. Pakistan was self-sufficient in food until severe drought, in 2 successive years, struck the wheat-producing area of west Pakistan.

The wheat consumption of the people of west Pakistan averages less than 12 ounces per day in a diet consisting very largely of this grain. Today Government wheat reserves have fallen to the vanishing point.

The immediate need of Pakistan is to obtain abroad up to 1.5 million long tons of wheat both for consumption and for a small working reserve during the next 11 months. Of this total, the Government of Pakistan expects to be able to obtain about 400,000 tons of wheat with its own and other aid resources. Canada and Australia have both made generous grants for wheat to Pakistan. There is no important source in the free world other than the United States able to furnish additional help.

Pakistan has, therefore, appealed to the United States for 1 million tons of wheat. Its approach has been one of dignity, as one sovereign democracy to another, stating a real and urgent need. Between the people of Pakistan and the people of the United States there exists a strong bond of friendship. I am sure that the people of the United States desire their Government to respond rapidly and effectively to Pakistan's request.

Pakistan has endeavored to keep its request for

United States aid to a minimum. The Secretary of State and the Director for Mutual Security sent a special mission, headed by Dr. Harry Reed, dean of the College of Agriculture of Purdue University, to study at first hand the food situation in Pakistan. Mr. Dulles and Governor Stassen have also visited Pakistan within the last 2 weeks. With the help of their observations, careful consideration has been given the Reed mission's recommendations.

One critical fact is that the Government of Pakistan is suffering grave financial difficulties. It has already taken rigorous steps to remedy both the food outlook and its general economic disabilities, and these efforts give some hope for future self-sufficiency. But Pakistan's gold and foreign exchange holdings are barely enough to meet its legal requirements for currency backing and essential working capital. Moreover, Pakistan has little prospect of an exportable wheat surplus which would permit repayment of a loan in kind. Its export earnings and all its prospective financial resources are needed to meet the demand of economic development essential to prevent future food and financial crises. A dollar loan would make it impossible for Pakistan to obtain further necessary development loans from international lending institutions.

These considerations make certain conclusions evident. Pakistan needs a grant of up to 700,000 tons of United States wheat for relief purposes according to the best available estimates. The urgency of the need is underscored by the Reed mission's recommendation for delivery of 100,000 tons of United States aid wheat in Karachi by August 15 of this year.

This grant would serve a double purpose. It would meet Pakistan's immediate and pressing need for food and at the same time provide local currency for economic development programs. The rupee receipts from the sale of wheat would be placed in a counterpart fund under joint Pakistan-United States administration. This fund will be used for development purposes with emphasis placed on increased food production in

<sup>1</sup>H. doc. 171.

Pakistan to lessen the danger of future shortages.

In addition to the 700,000 tons, Pakistan may also need up to 300,000 tons as a necessary working reserve of wheat. The exact amount needed for this purpose can only be determined later; and only then can we determine whether the remainder of our aid should be supplied as a grant or a loan.

Fortunately, we do have the capacity to help at the present time. Our large wheat reserves have created a grave storage problem, demanding unusual and sometimes costly storage measures.

I propose, therefore, that the Congress authorize me to make available to Pakistan up to 1 million tons of wheat out of stocks held by the Commodity Credit Corporation.<sup>2</sup> This wheat already is owned by the Commodity Credit Corporation, having been obtained under the price-support program. To make it available to Pakistan will create no additional Government expenditure at this time other than the cost of transportation. In order that the operations of the Commodity Credit Corporation will not be impaired, I am recommending that the legislation include authority for the Commodity Credit Corporation to recover its costs, including interest, through an appropriation when the costs of the programs have been ascertained.

The United States Government proposes to designate, with the concurrence of the Government of Pakistan, a group to observe the receipt and distribution of wheat in Pakistan. The group's reports will be available to the Congress.

To provide sufficient United States aid in time, it is imperative that the grain begin to move from United States ports by the end of this month.

I strongly urge that the Congress make such prompt action possible.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER.

THE WHITE HOUSE, June 10, 1953.

#### STATEMENT BY SECRETARY DULLES<sup>1</sup>

Press release 313 dated June 12

The people of Pakistan are facing a food shortage of dangerous proportions. For the second successive year, there has been a drought in the wheat-producing area of West Pakistan. Wheat is the major food in the area. When the crop fails, starvation ensues unless sufficient wheat is brought into the country. The Government of Pakistan, faced with the heart-rending prospect of starvation in its country, is exerting every effort to solve this critical problem. It has become clear that Pakistan's own efforts and the help it is able to get from other countries will fall far short of

<sup>2</sup> A bill embodying this proposal (S. 2112) was passed by the Senate on June 16; for text, see *Cong. Rec.* of June 16, p. 6831.

<sup>1</sup> Made before the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry on June 12. The Secretary on June 15 testified before the House Committee on Agriculture and Forestry (press release 316; not printed).

bringing enough wheat into Pakistan, and the Government has turned to the United States for assistance.

On April 22 the Government of Pakistan requested the United States for a grant of one million tons of wheat as a part of its total import needs, which it estimated at one-and-one-half million tons. The request was made reluctantly and with dignity, but with an anxiety which we can easily appreciate.

President Eisenhower has recognized the gravity and immediacy of Pakistan's food situation and the help needed from the United States if it is to prevent disaster. The President has recommended that we give Pakistan 700,000 tons of U.S. wheat from stocks held by the Commodity Credit Corporation and that this grant be made immediately, as the situation in Pakistan demands. He has further recommended that Pakistan receive up to an additional 300,000 tons of U.S. wheat if it is determined later to be needed. This action will meet the Government of Pakistan's needs. It is in line with the recommendations of the special mission, headed by Harry J. Reed, Dean of the College of Agriculture of Purdue University, which Mr. Stassen and I sent to Pakistan in May to make an on-the-spot survey of Pakistan's food situation.

I am gratified with the recommendations of the President and urge that the Congress enable us to translate them into action at the earliest possible moment. That will be concrete evidence to our friends that the United States acts promptly and effectively to alleviate human suffering and the threat of disaster when it strikes them. It will be in the humane tradition of the American people.

In order to lay all of the facts concerning this matter before you, several of us have come here to talk to you. I want to give you my thoughts on the foreign-policy aspects of Pakistan's request, and the action which the President has recommended. Mr. Stassen, who was with me in Pakistan on our recent trip, will discuss Pakistan's economic and financial position and his plans for administration of the wheat grant if it is authorized. Under Secretary True D. Morse of the Department of Agriculture is here and will explain our own wheat situation. Dr. Reed and his colleague, Dr. Norman J. Volk of the special mission which made the survey of Pakistan's actual need, are here to report to you on their findings.

As you know, I have just returned from my trip to the Middle East and South Asia. I spent 3 days in Pakistan and talked at length with Prime Minister Mohammed Ali, who formerly was Pakistan's Ambassador to the United States and is a good friend of our country, as well as with Pakistan's Governor General, Mr. Ghulam Mohammed, and Foreign Minister Sir Zafrulla Khan, whom I have known for many years and who was extremely helpful at the San Francisco Japanese peace treaty conference. I met and talked with

other high officials of the Pakistan Government.

One of my clearest impressions was that of the outstanding and sincere friendliness which the leaders of Pakistan feel for the United States. I was greatly impressed with their understanding of world problems. I am convinced that they will resist the menace of communism as their strength permits. You know that Pakistan and the United States have commonly supported the same views in the United Nations and that Pakistan was a tower of strength on the Japanese treaty.

Pakistan occupies a strategic location. Communist China borders northern territories held by Pakistan and from Pakistan's northern border one can see the Soviet Union. Pakistan flanks Iran and the Middle East and guards the Khyber Pass, the historic invasion route from the north into the subcontinent. With their religious convictions and courageous spirit, the people of Pakistan and their leaders make their country a real bulwark. That bulwark deserves strengthening and our grant of wheat will do this. No country or government can remain strong if its people are starving, and I am convinced that Pakistan's need for wheat to avert starvation is great and urgent. Failure on our part to help Pakistan promptly and in the measure needed would permit disaster.

President Eisenhower has recommended that our immediate assistance be a grant. I fully support this recommendation. My review of the situation has convinced me that this is the only way which makes sense. A loan to be repaid in the future by Pakistan would only weaken Pakistan's economy, while the interest of the United States lies in helping to strengthen Pakistan. That consideration applies to repayment in kind as well as in dollars. We join the Pakistan Government in its hopes to build up Pakistan's wheat production so that it can avert future dangers of food shortage, but the prospects of Pakistan's having enough wheat to permit repayment in kind are not such as to justify that requirement. Repayment in dollars would seriously impair Pakistan's ability to continue its necessary development and probably prevent further loans for development purposes.

The wheat grant which has been recommended is required to meet an emergency situation in Pakistan. While serving a genuine economic purpose, it does not meet Pakistan's needs for economic development nor take the place of technical assistance and economic development measures. However, the Pakistan rupee counterpart of the grant would be of substantial help to Pakistan's efforts to strengthen its economy and would further our own ability to assist Pakistan in this regard.

The President has referred to the urgency of Pakistan's need for wheat arrivals to meet its situation. Dr. Reed has highlighted that in his report, recommending that the United States extend aid to permit the arrival of wheat shipments from

the United States by July 15 to August 1 and that 100,000 tons of our wheat arrive in Pakistan by August 15.

We are fortunate in having more than enough wheat for requirements and to meet this emergency. I know that the Congress has many important matters before it, but humanity and our national interest will be served by prompt and generous action on our part. I add my personal plea for such a response to President Eisenhower's proposals.

## PUBLICATIONS

### Recent Releases

*For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.*

**Technical Cooperation, Economic Assistance. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2561. Pub. 4834. 6pp. 5¢.**

Agreement between the United States and Israel—Signed at Tel Aviv May 9, 1952.

**Relief From Taxation on Defense Expenditures. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2563. Pub. 4836. 6pp. 5¢.**

Exchange of notes between the United States and the Netherlands—Signed at The Hague Mar. 7, 1952.

**Administration in Zone A of Free Territory of Trieste. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2564. Pub. 4837. 6pp. 5¢.**

Understanding between the United States, Italy, and the United Kingdom—Dated at London May 9, 1952.

### Check List of Department of State

#### Press Releases: June 8-15, 1953

Releases may be obtained from the Office of the Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Press releases issued prior to June 8 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 300 of June 2, 301 of June 2, 302 of June 3, and 304 of June 3.

No.	Date	Subject
307	6/8	Smith: The pivotal conflict
308	6/8	Pan American Railway Congress
*309	6/8	Johnson: Foundations of freedom
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The Department of State

# Bulletin

XXVIII, No. 731

June 29, 1953



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## Morals and Power

*Address by Secretary Dulles*<sup>1</sup>

Since I have been Secretary of State, I have been to Europe, the Near East, and South Asia. Before that, in connection with negotiating the Japanese peace treaty, I had an excellent chance to get a firsthand look at our foreign representatives in Japan, Korea, and other parts of the Far East.

One of the things that most impressed me in these areas was the down-to-earth cooperation which existed between our civilian and military officials. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is an outstanding example of large-scale military-civilian cooperative effort.

The current negotiations in embattled Korea are being carried on by General Harrison. And, to my way of thinking, he is doing an excellent job under very exacting conditions.

But behind General Harrison stands a team of Defense and State Department officials which, once again, testifies to the effectiveness of military and civilian cooperation.

I might mention that one of my first acts as Secretary of State was to invite the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their chairman to lunch with me at the State Department. They kindly responded and the five of us had an intimate exchange of views about the world situation and U. S. security. Ever since, we have cooperated with no single trace of friction. That, I am glad to say, is typical. Of course, there are often initial differences of opinion. But, by and large, our military and civilian officers both here in the United States and on duty overseas rise above differences when the chips are down. In today's world, the chips are down almost everywhere.

It is teamwork between the military and civilian which has given us the necessary strength whenever and wherever we have needed it.

I should like to talk for a few minutes about power in a material sense, such as is represented by our splendid military establishment. What is the purpose of this power? Admiral Mahan is

credited with one of the best answers to this question. It is that the role of power is to give moral ideas the time to take root. Where moral ideas already are well-rooted, there is little occasion for much military or police force. We see that illustrated in our own communities. Where the people accept the moral law and its great commandments, where they exercise self-control and self-discipline, then there is very little need for police power. Under these circumstances, it is sufficient to have a very modest force to take care of the small minority always found in every community which disregards the precepts of the moral law.

Where, however, there are many who do not accept moral principles, then that creates the need of force to protect those who do. That, unfortunately, is the case in the world community of today.

At the present time, there is no moral code which has worldwide acceptance. The principles upon which our society is based—the principles which we believe to be both humanitarian and just—are not accepted by governments which dominate more than one-third of mankind.

The result is that we have a world which is, for the most part, split between two huge combinations. On the one hand, there is the United States and its free-world associates. This is a voluntary alliance of free peoples working together in the recognition that without unity there could be catastrophe.

On the other hand, there is the totalitarian bloc led by the Soviet Union—an artificial, imposed unity which cannot be called an alliance in the sense that we use the word.

These huge concentrations are in conflict because each reflects differing aims, aspirations, and social, political, and economic philosophies. We must assume that they will continue to remain in basic conflict, in one way or another, until such time as the Communists so change their nature as to admit that those who wish to live by the moral law are free to do so without coercion by those who believe in enforced conformity to a materialistic standard.

<sup>1</sup> Made before the National War College at Washington on June 16 (press release 321).

This is one of the hard facts of international existence which we must accept. We cannot close our eyes to it. It will not go away simply because we hope that it will do so.

We must plan accordingly.

### **“Know Your Enemy”**

There is a sound military principle which we must take into consideration in our planning. It is “know your enemy.”

What makes the Soviet Union—the fountain-head of world communism—act as it does? Why do the Soviets seek power and more power?

These complex questions are not simply answered. There are many forces which motivate the Soviet drive for power. Among these forces are these which I should like to mention: ideology, the historic imperialistic urge, and the chronic insecurity complex which besets those who rule by force.

Take first the question of Communist ideology. Soviet theorists, as you know, refer to their ideology as Marxian-Leninist-Stalinism. Whose name will next be added remains to be seen.

Through the years, Communist ideology has taken a number of twists, turns, and shifts in emphasis. Upon occasion, it has almost seemed as if the ideology has been stood on its head to justify a policy which Soviet leaders have had to adopt to meet a given international or domestic crisis. Thus, in October 1939, the Soviet leaders proclaimed that Hitler was the peace lover and the British and French the aggressors.

There can be no question but that Soviet leaders use shifty tactics.

But the Soviet leaders have never departed from a certain basic thesis laid down by Marx. It is called “dialectical materialism.”

It is important for us to remember that this Marxist principle continues to be basic to the Soviet credo despite any changes that have been made by Lenin and Stalin. Stalin’s last published article, written shortly before his death, was based upon original Marxist assumptions when he predicted that the United States and its allies inevitably would split because of inner, economic contradictions.

The entire creed of Soviet communism is based upon this “dialectical materialism,” the theory that there is no such thing as a moral law or spiritual truth; that all things are predetermined by the contradictory movements of matter; that so-called capitalism is historically fated to collapse; and that communism is the movement predestined to effect that collapse.

Now, let us look briefly at another of the springs of Soviet action, that of historical imperialism. This urge to expand is not something patented by the Communists of Soviet Russia. This urge has long been found with the “Great Russians” in the Eurasian heartland. It is a national urge,

though it is clear that today communism has greatly intensified it.

The present Soviet Communist exertions in the Near East, Far East, and East Europe are a duplication of many past performances. Early in the 19th century Tsar Alexander, the most powerful ruler of his time, organized the so-called “Holy Alliance” in an effort to dominate the world.

Has the historic imperialist urge played a role in the Soviet drive for power? I think it is clear that it has.

The third and last influence which I will men-

### **Soviet Moves To Prevent Western European Unification**

Press release 319 dated June 15

*Asked for an evaluation of recent Soviet moves in Europe, Secretary Dulles made the following remarks at his press conference on June 15:*

I believe that one of the primary purposes of Soviet foreign policy for some time has been to prevent, if possible, a unification of Europe, Western Europe, which would create a strong unified community in that area. Measures looking toward that result are pretty well under way. You have in actual operation at the present time the Coal and Steel Community which represents a considerable measure of economic unity of 6 nations with reference to two key commodities—coal and steel—and that has created a single market and is a beginning of economic unity in Western Europe.

There is the treaty for the creation of a European Defense Community which, as you know, has been signed by 6 nations and is before the parliaments of the 6, having been ratified by both houses in Germany.

There is also a project which is being worked out by the European countries who are participating in the Coal and Steel Community for the creation of a political unity, and a proposed constitution is pretty far advanced. I would guess, and it can be no more than a guess, that the present Soviet moves are designed to eliminate the fears of the Soviet Union in Western Europe, fears which are one of the contributing forces toward the creation of this unity.

Now, I believe that unity is going to prevail, irrespective of Soviet tactics, because it is important not merely as a measure against the threat of Soviet communism; it is a measure to create unity in a part of the world where disunity has been a cause of wars, notably the disunity between France and Germany.

I believe the statesmanlike leaders in Europe realize that unity is essential not merely to meet a peril of attack from the Soviet Union, but the peril which comes to all of them from their own disunity and from the wars that have arisen in the past because of that disunity. Therefore, I believe that unity will prevail, but I think the Soviet tactics are designed, if possible, to frustrate that movement.

I see no reason as yet to attribute these Soviet moves to a change of basic approach rather than a change of tactics. Now, I don’t exclude that as a possibility. All I say is that as yet the evidence is not adequate to justify, in my opinion, the assumption that it represents more than a change in tactics.

tion is that chronic sense of insecurity which pervades police-state rulers. Those who rule by force inevitably fear force. In a police state the rulers have a monopoly or near monopoly of weapons. But it is never possible to arm enough policemen to rule an unruly mass without in the process arming some who themselves may prove unruly. Also, the rulers of a police state greatly fear any weapons which they do not control, and they seek to extend their power to bring these weapons under control. They cannot imagine that armaments in the hands of others may be designed purely for internal security and self-defense. That is why the Soviet leaders have so consistently and so violently expressed their opposition to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and fought the creation of a European Defense Community. To us their fears seem mere pretense. But perhaps they do have fear, because they do not understand that if force is in the hands of those who are governed by moral law, it will not be used as a means of aggression or to violate the principles of the moral law.

This picture which I have given of the international situation is not a pleasing one. It does not hold out the prospect of any quick change for the better or any early elimination of our need for power in order to permit moral principles to take root rather than be uprooted.

However, if we do maintain power, and if we do subject it to moral law and use it truly to enable moral principles to survive, and thrive, and spread in the world, we can have hope in the future. For we know that in the long run the fruits of a spiritual faith prevail over the fruits of materialism.

The great weakness of Soviet Communist doctrine is that it denies morality. That is its Achilles heel, of which we must take advantage. We can take advantage of it if—but only if—we ourselves accept the supremacy of moral law.

### **Recapturing the Mood of Our Forebears**

Our nation was founded by the men who believed that there was a Divine Creator who endowed men with unalienable rights. They believed, as George Washington put it in his farewell address, that religion and morality are the great pillars of human happiness and that morality cannot prevail in exclusion of religious principles.

Our Federal and State Constitutions, our laws and practices, reflect the belief that there is a Being superior to ourselves who has established His own laws which can be comprehended by all human beings and that human practices should seek conformity with those laws.

Seeking first the Kingdom of God and His righteousness, many material things were added to us. We developed here an area of spiritual, intellectual, and material richness, the like of which

the world has never seen. What we did caught the imagination of men everywhere and became known everywhere as "the Great American experiment." Our free society became a menace to every despot because we showed how to meet the hunger of the people for greater opportunity and for greater dignity. The tide of despotism, which at that time ran high, was rolled back and we ourselves enjoyed security.

We need to recapture that mood.

Today some seem to feel that Americanism means being tough and "hard-boiled," doing nothing unless we are quite sure that it is to our immediate short-term advantage; boasting of our own merit and seeing in others only demerit.

That is a caricature of America. Our people have always been generous to help, out of their abundance, those who are the victims of misfortune. Our forebears have traditionally had what the Declaration of Independence refers to as a decent respect for the opinion of mankind. They sought to practice the Golden Rule by doing to others as they would have others do unto them. Their conduct and example made our nation one that was respected and admired throughout the world.

So, in conclusion, I say to you who graduate from the National War College: Be proud of your association with U.S. power, which is indispensable in the world today; but remember that that power is worthy only as it is the shield behind which moral values are invigorated and spread their influence; and accept, as citizens, the obligation to preserve and enhance those moral values. They are the rich heritage that has been bequeathed us. It must be our ambition that future generations shall look back upon us, as we look back upon those who preceded us, with gratitude for the gift to our Republic of the qualities that make it noble, so that men call it blessed.

### **Repressive Soviet Measures Taken in East Berlin**

Press release 328 dated June 19

*Following is the text of a joint message sent on June 18 by the United States, United Kingdom, and French Commandants in Berlin to the representative of the Soviet Control Commission concerning repressive measures taken by Soviet authorities in East Berlin:*

As Commandants of the French, British and U.S. sectors of Berlin and in the name of the Allied High Commission we desire to express our grave concern over events which have taken place in Berlin in the past few days.

We condemn the irresponsible recourse to military force which had as its result the killing or serious wounding of a considerable number of citizens of Berlin including some from our own sectors.

We protest the arbitrary measures taken by the Soviet authorities which have resulted in the interruption of traffic between the sectors and free circulation throughout Berlin.

We formally deny that Willi Coettling, executed after a travesty of justice, was an agent provocateur under the orders of the intelligence service of a foreign power. His condemnation to death and his execution on an empty pretext appear to us as acts of brutality which will shock the conscience of the world.

As the highest Soviet authority in the Soviet sector of Berlin you share with us the responsibility of guaranteeing the well-being and the freedom of the people of Berlin. We therefore demand in the interest of Berlin as a whole that the harsh restrictions imposed on the population be lifted immediately and that free circulation within Berlin be reestablished.

## \$50 Million Aid for Berlin

### *Statement by the President*

White House press release dated June 18

It gives me particular satisfaction at this time to announce that following discussions with the authorities of West Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany, the United States is granting an additional \$50 million aid for West Berlin. This grant of Mutual Security Program funds will be used further to strengthen West Berlin's economy and enable the people to withstand the great pressures to which they are constantly exposed.

About one-third of this sum will be used in the city's industrial investment program. This aid will help provide jobs for Berlin's unemployed and will assist the city in paying its own way.

The balance will contribute to the fulfillment of the "stockpiling" program bolstering the West Berliners' security by providing stores of food, fuel, raw materials, and other essentials.

No material contribution such as this, however, can adequately express the admiration of the American people for the courageous stand of the people of Berlin in the face of existing hazards and economic difficulties.

## Current Legislation on Foreign Policy

State Department Information Program—Voice of America. Hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate, Eighty-Third Congress, First Session, Pursuant to S. Res. 40, A Resolution Authorizing the Committee on Government Operations To Employ Temporary Additional Personnel and Increasing the Limit of Expenditures. Part 1, February 16 and 17, 1953. 77 pp.; Part 2, February 18 and 19, 1953. 71 pp.; Part 3, February 20 and 28, 1953. 74 pp.; and Part 4, March 2, 1953. 104 pp.

Legislation To Extend the Mutual Security Program. Message From the President of the United States Transmitting Recommendations for Legislation To Extend the Mutual Security Program. H. Doc. 140, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 pp.

Extension of Export Control Act of 1949. Hearing Before the Committee on Banking and Currency, House of Representatives, Eighty-Third Congress, First Session, on H. R. 4882, April 29, 1953. 27 pp.

Study of the Escapee and Refugee Situation in Western Europe. S. Rept. 158, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 pp.

Commission on Foreign Economic Policy. Report (To accompany S. J. Res. 78). S. Rept. 292, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 pp.

Report of Special Study Mission to Pakistan, India, Thailand, and Indochina. Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives. May 6, 1953. Committee print. 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 104 pp.

Report on the Operations of the Department of State (Under Public Law 584). Message From the President of the United States Transmitting a Report by the Secretary of State on the Operations of the Department of State Under Section 2 of Public Law 584, Seventy-Ninth Congress, As Required by That Law. H. Doc. 115, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 97 pp.

Amendment to the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945. Hearings Before the Committee on Banking and Currency, House of Representatives, Eighty-Third Congress, First Session, on H. R. 4465, A Bill To Amend the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, As Amended. April 20 and 21, 1953. 59 pp.

Amendment to Export-Import Bank Act of 1945. Report (To accompany H. R. 4465). H. Rept. 320, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 pp.

The Mutual Security Program for Fiscal Year 1954. Basic Data Supplied by the Executive Branch. Committee print. 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 109 pp.

Investigating Means of Expanding Foreign Investments. Report (To accompany S. Res. 25). S. Rept. 208, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 pp.

Reorganization Plan No. 5 of 1953. Message From the President of the United States Transmitting Reorganization Plan No. 5 of 1953, Relating to the Export-Import Bank of Washington. H. Doc. 135, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 pp.

State, Justice, and Commerce Appropriation Bill, Fiscal Year 1954. Report (To accompany H. R. 4974). H. Rept. 341, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 29 pp.

Agreements Relating to the Status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Armed Forces, and Military Headquarters. Report (To accompany Executives T and U, 82d Congress, 2d session, and Executive B, 83d Congress, 1st session). S. Exec. Rept. 1, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 19 pp.

Testimony of General Alfred M. Gruenther. Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eighty-Third Congress, First Session, on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. April 1, 1953. 28 pp.

Soviet Schedule for War, 1955. Executive Hearings Before the Committee on Un-American Activities, House of Representatives, Eighty-Third Congress, First Session. May 13 and 14, 1953. 32 pp.

Treaties and Executive Agreements. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Eighty-Third Congress, First Session on S. J. Res. 1, Proposing an Amendment to the Constitution of the United States Relative to the Making of Treaties and Executive Agreements, and S. J. Res. 43, Proposing an Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, Relating to the Legal Effect of Certain Treaties. February 18, 19, 25, March 4, 10, 16, 27, 31, April 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11, 1953. 1267 pp.

## Second Anniversary of SHAPE as an Operational Headquarters

*Report of Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway  
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe<sup>1</sup>*

[Excerpts]

This report concerns Allied Command Europe from 30 May 1952, when I became Supreme Allied Commander Europe, to date.

The purpose of this report, the second emanating from Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe [SHAPE], is to provide an assessment of the current and prospective capability for discharging assigned defense responsibilities. It includes a brief summary of the situation 1 year ago; an examination of the changes which have since occurred; an appraisal of their effects upon the capability of this command for carrying out its assigned defense mission; a resurvey of its military requirements; and an indication of the areas of existing major deficiencies. The report is purposely couched in somewhat general terms for security reasons. Precise figures on present stocks of ammunition, on fuel for aircraft, tanks, and trucks, and on the effectiveness of our radar to give us timely warning of surprise enemy air attack obviously should not be made public. All matters of substance in this report have been included in classified reports previously made to proper authority. They have been covered in adequate detail and supported by appropriate recommendations.

Notwithstanding this unquestioned need for withholding certain information from publication, I wish to emphasize at the outset of this report the importance, in fact I believe the crucial importance, of making known to our NATO peoples the main facts of the military situation in which they are so deeply concerned. In no other way can they be convinced of the need for the heavy burdens they are asked to carry. If unconvinced, they cannot be expected to support NATO pro-

grams, even on the minimum scale essential to collective security. With an unshakeable belief in our concept of democracy, I concur wholeheartedly with my predecessor, General Eisenhower, who a year ago questioned why there should be "confusion in the minds of millions of our own peoples as to the basic aims of our defense program, the necessity for it, and the urgent demand for their own individual efforts." "Once the truth is understood," he stated, "once the critical dangers present in the world situation are really known, there will be less complacency concerning our present military situation and the harmful effects of delay will be clearly seen."

It has been my constant conviction since I assumed command that public understanding is indispensable to progress toward the minimum military security for which NATO has been established. To create this understanding, NATO and the national authorities must present the facts of our security situation through a coordinated and sustained information program. I have previously submitted recommendations concerning such action.

The search for solutions to the many major problems encountered in the effort to become secure gives rise to serious political, economic, financial, and social difficulties to which I am acutely alive. Yet early solutions must be found if the basic objectives which brought NATO into being are to be reasonably attainable within the near future.

The assessments which follow constitute a military estimate. In preparing it, I have drawn heavily upon the advice and assistance of the officers assigned to this command. Of all services, and from all the countries represented in this command, they are men of high-principled integrity and demonstrated professional competence, in whom their countries may have real pride and confidence. This report is based on their honest and objective analysis and reflects the rigid standards of austere economy consistent with minimum

<sup>1</sup> Released to the press by SHAPE, Public Information Division, Paris, on May 30. The report is made to the chairman of the Standing Group, North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

For text of the first report on SHAPE, submitted by General Eisenhower, see BULLETIN of Apr. 14, 1952, p. 572.

acceptable efficiency which are our common aim. These men are deeply aware of the waste of human life, of spiritual values, and of material treasures which past wars have entailed; they are dedicated to the effort to forestall the catastrophic destruction which future wars could bring.

### THE SITUATION ONE YEAR AGO

I turn now to the situation of a year ago, the time at which the first Annual Report of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe was issued. The military mission entrusted to the European Allied Command then as now was:

*a.* In war to defend NATO's European territories.

*b.* In peacetime to develop an integrated, effective force capable of accomplishing the war-time mission if required.

The next basic consideration, giving concrete dimensions to the tasks involved in accomplishing the assigned mission, was the Soviet threat—its nature and magnitude. There were two particular points to be stressed in this connection. *First*, our task as military men was to concern ourselves with Soviet capabilities. Military planning and recommendations could not be based upon speculative estimates of a potential aggressor's intentions. If the mission assigned to this Command was to be discharged, our forces had to be prepared to meet an aggressor's forces as they actually existed and could be brought into battle. We had to reckon with military realities. We could not rely on attempts to fathom the minds of the men in the Kremlin nor to follow their frequent reversals of tactics. *Second*, it was necessary to react effectively to Soviet actions within whatever period of warning might be provided. Of all the basic principles of war, none could have more devastating effect in this area than that of surprise. The importance of Soviet capability and of time as two factors of fundamental significance could scarcely be exaggerated.

The Soviet bloc had over 51½ million men under arms, roughly 41½ million belonging to the Soviet Union itself. The U.S.S.R. mounted 175 line divisions. Satellite strength was growing. The Soviet air force totaled just over 20,000 frontline aircraft, with a large aircraft reserve. The Navy had more than 300 submarines, including a number of the latest type. The Soviet forces were capable of rapid expansion in case of war. Trained-reserve manpower and reserves of equipment were immediately available. Some 30 divisions were located in occupied Europe, of which the 22 in East Germany constituted an ever present threat to our forces. The combat effectiveness of the ground forces was rated high and their equipment good—in some types superior. The

combat efficiency of the air force, while rated below NATO standards, was improving, particularly with the replacement of piston-type with modern jet aircraft. The Soviets' well-known disregard for their own casualties further increased their offensive capability.

The balance sheet of NATO security in Western Europe, as I evaluated it in May 1952, showed major assets and major liabilities. The military assets, such as the multiple elements of command structure and leadership, plans and directives, organized combat units and provision for their support, had already begun to give the basis for hope of future security.

Against these assets were ranged grave liabilities. In May 1952, security in Western Europe was still heavily overshadowed by the enormous preponderance of combat-ready Soviet military power poised behind the Iron Curtain. Furthermore, there were grave deficiencies in Allied preparedness to meet a Soviet attack had it come. The total fighting strength of the Allies formed but a small fraction of the Soviet forces deployed in forward areas. Land forces and naval strength assigned to Allied Command Europe were entirely insufficient.

The inadequacy of the Air Forces was particularly acute. Many units were deployed in exposed areas east of the Rhine, with no prepared redeployment sites. Command, control, and warning arrangements were fragmentary in the extreme. A large number of our aircraft were of obsolescent piston-engine type.

The principal subordinate commands were still in a formative state. The headquarters would not have been equal to the demands of active operations. Signal communications were seriously inadequate for continued effective control of the fighting elements.

Particularly in the status of supporting elements, the deficiencies would have weighed heavily against effectiveness in combat. Stocks of ammunition were extremely low, logistical and maintenance systems inadequate, and resupply plans and assignments of responsibilities were still under discussion and proving extremely difficult. Supply lines ran parallel to the front and were operationally unbalanced.

Shortages of specialists, career personnel, and experienced leaders were severe in many units and would have had a substantial adverse effect on combat operations. Many reserve elements lacked the degree of organization and training required for combat. Finally, although expansion goals and commitments for 1952 had been undertaken at Lisbon, it was increasingly apparent that the requisite steps in manning, training, and equipping were not being taken in full and on time.



## CHANGES OCCURRING IN THE PAST YEAR

During the past year much has been done to increase our defense forces and to make them more effective. Measured against the Soviet capability, our progress is insufficient to give us acceptable prospect of success if attacked. We are still far short of the minimum requirements. We lack essential supply and support. But a series of actions have been taken which have strengthened our command structure, augmented our operational plans and directives, and materially increased our land, air, and naval forces. Examination in more detail of major changes follows.

### Development of Command Structure

By August 1952 arrangements for coordinating the operations of the forces of Greece and Turkey with those of the remainder of my command had been established. Headquarters Allied Land Forces Southeastern Europe, with Lt. Gen. Willard G. Wyman, U.S. Army, in command, were established in Izmir directly subordinate to Admiral Carney, Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe. In December 1952 Admiral the Earl Mountbatten of Burma, Royal Navy, was appointed Commander in Chief Allied Forces Mediterranean. In March 1953 he took over his Allied (NATO) Command, which in wartime would include units of the British Mediterranean Fleet plus naval forces from other NATO nations. The U.S. Sixth Fleet, with a striking force mission, remains assigned to the Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe. Thus there now exists a command structure to control our united forces along a 4,000-mile front extending from northern Norway to the Caucasus.

### Buildup of Forces

At Lisbon in February 1952 the nations had set for themselves, for the first time, firm goals for the buildup of their forces in 1952, and tentative goals for 1953 and 1954. As 1952 ended, the goals were in large part met numerically for air forces, naval forces, and for active army divisions, although there was a substantial shortfall in planned combat effectiveness. During the last 12 months' progress in the buildup of forces has been steady. Throughout the command the strength of units has increased, additional major items of equipment have been provided, and training advanced. In addition, a substantial number of new units have been organized. Nevertheless, for all services there are still major deficiencies in support units, in logistical establishments, and in stocks of ammunition and other supplies. I would add parenthetically at this point that our reporting and evaluating system has been considerably

strengthened throughout this period. We can provide more definitive information of actual conditions than formerly was possible. Thus it is now possible to evaluate combat-effective units with much greater confidence. We now have a much more reliable knowledge of just where we stand.

A year ago the outstanding deficiency was in the tactical air forces. There was a shortage of aircraft, of crews, of supply and support. A considerable increase during the year in the number of combat aircraft, mainly from deliveries under the U.S. mutual defense assistance program, has since bettered our position. Not only have the numbers of combat aircraft increased, but their combat capability has improved. The increase in the number of pilots and technicians for these aircraft, together with some small improvement in aircraft control, warning and reporting systems, has been encouraging. Our network of airfields has been enlarged and made more efficient. Our various exercises, which posed difficult problems in coordination and communications, demonstrated the ability of national forces assigned to SHAPE to work together as a team. In supply, and in the development of the system for distributing fuel, we have improved our status over the past year. Nevertheless, our air power is still today the weakest link in our defense. In spite of our progress, our air forces could not adequately carry out their tasks. The increase of air power must receive far greater attention by the NATO nations.

During the past year, great efforts have been made to improve training of regular forces and at the same time to achieve better training and mobilization procedures for reserve forces, on whom so much of our defensive strength depends. Lack of proper training facilities and areas has hampered this effort, but good leadership can do much to offset the deficiency. Accordingly, SHAPE has strongly emphasized the need for leadership at all echelons. Various national forces have organized additional schools for junior and noncommissioned officers, and study periods for senior officers. Mobilization and training exercises have been conducted with encouraging results. Problems in training both active and reserve forces, like most of our large problems, are now becoming more clearly defined, and some NATO nations are requesting and using training and advisory missions organized by SHAPE. Such missions are now operating in the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Portugal. Another important development has been the recent establishment of atomic indoctrination courses for key NATO commanders and staff officers. The courses, which are designed to acquaint officers with the use of atomic weapons in tactical situations, will enable NATO military staffs to consider the implications of atomic warfare in the defense of Western Europe. With all this, there is still an urgent need for all countries to reexamine critically their mobilization

systems and to insure that they are adequate to provide, in the time required, forces sufficiently well trained to perform their duties.

### **Support of Armed Forces**

The growth of land forces during the past year, while not satisfactory, has been encouraging. This situation, however, is not true of the arrangements for the supply and support of those forces. The initial emphasis which had been given to the creation of frontline troops resulted in a grave shortage of the operational reserves, of certain critical supplies, and of service troops, without which a modern army cannot maintain itself effectively in the field.

In an international command, the problem of providing the overall logistic support is unusually complicated, because each nation is responsible for the support of its own forces. This arrangement results in a lack of flexibility in the supply system. In an attempt to make the system less rigid, SHAPE, in October 1952, after discussion with the nations concerned, submitted to the Standing Group specific proposals which, if adopted, should in time remedy the main faults in the organization of our supply. But merely improving our supply organization does not make good the present lack of operational reserve stocks. The nations are all agreed that they should hold stocks sufficient for several months, a period based on an estimate of the time to begin the replenishment of stocks in Europe after the outbreak of war. Mainly for financial reasons, however, their stocks have not been built up to the needed level.

On the other hand, progress has been good on the third part of the program of infrastructure, that is, of fixed military installations including airfields, signal communications, and command headquarters. More than half of the 125 airfields approved have been completed to the point where they could be used in an emergency, and construction is proceeding well on all but a few of the remainder. Our fixed communications net is beginning to take form.

The fourth part of the infrastructure program was approved by the Council in December 1952, but only about one-half of it was financed at that time. Additional airfields, headquarters, signals communications, jet-fuel storage tanks, and distribution pipelines to airfields were among that portion of the program which was agreed on. The remainder, financed in April 1953, included additional airfields and items such as naval bases, radar installations, radio-navigational aids, and training installations. In April 1953, the Council also approved the financing of a long-range infrastructure program for 1954, 1955, and 1956, covering the additional NATO military installations required to be built during this 3-year period. This farsighted departure from previous year-by-year

financial approval represents a long step forward. It will enable us to improve greatly the planning for construction by placing it on a firm long-range basis.

The organization of the civilian bodies of NATO has been progressively strengthened during the past year as a result of the creation of the position of Secretary General as a focal point of civilian leadership. Under Lord Ismay, the work of building a more cohesive structure has gone forward. The North Atlantic Council, since the decision in early 1952 that it function in permanent session through the appointment of permanent representatives, has provided increasingly firm top-level direction to NATO, on a continuous basis. Under Lord Ismay, the International Staff has been developed to assist and advise in the discharge of complex civilian responsibilities. The result has been to delineate both those and the military responsibilities more clearly, to facilitate policy decisions, to strengthen defense production, and to provide more effective review of performance in meeting accepted goals. The military echelon of NATO now has authoritative civilian guidance and direction available on a permanent basis. The political aspects of NATO military exercises, the assessments of the security threat, the administrative and budgetary supervision of NATO airfield and other infrastructure programs, and the complex tasks of setting annual goals for the buildup of military forces are matters on which this type of guidance has been received.

### **The European Defense Community**

During my year of command I have followed closely the plans for the European Defense Community. The benefits which the early ratification of the treaty would have brought to our efforts and to European unity included the contribution of West Germany, which I consider indispensable to our defense system. SHAPE has maintained constant liaison with the Interim Committee of the European Defense Community and has observed and assisted in its planning. Its plans are workable and sufficiently advanced to avoid delay in developing a German contribution.

### **Shift of National Emphasis**

Throughout many of the NATO nations the growth of defensive power has reduced the sense of fear and urgency under which they lived in the preceding 12 months. Nations are beginning to change their planned military programs from rapid rearmament to a longer-term policy. Although this change may be dictated by the economic situation, we must not forget that any real slackening of the defense effort may itself open the way to aggression.

During the past 12 months, the U.S.S.R. has systematically strengthened its armed forces and those of its European satellites. The highly mechanized group of Soviet armies stationed in East Germany has been kept at a high level of training; its equipment has been increased and its vehicles modernized. Many Russian air squadrons have been reequipped with jet aircraft. A huge program of airfield construction has been nearly completed throughout Eastern Europe. The Soviet naval shipbuilding program is continuing steadily and now includes construction of new improved ocean patrol submarines. The military strength of the satellite countries has been increased considerably. Since January 1952, when these forces numbered approximately 1,000,000 men organized into 65 divisions, they have increased to more than 1,300,000 men organized into 70-odd divisions. This total does not count East Germany, where various units of the police have been converted into the nucleus of a German army which now numbers about 100,000. East Germany is also forming an air force and a naval force. The foregoing summary relates to the strengthening of Soviet conventional forces. It must not be forgotten, however, that Soviet effort in the atomic field has also continued.

These are the facts about the increasing strength of the Soviet bloc. Since Stalin's death, there has been much conjecture about possible changes of policy by the rulers of the Soviet Union. These are matters beyond my purview. Moreover, as a soldier I cannot afford to deal with conjecture. I feel it my duty to state that I know of no facts which would lead me to conclude that the military danger from the East has lessened. This view coincides with the official communique issued by the North Atlantic Council at the conclusion of its Ministerial session, 25 April 1953.<sup>2</sup>

An appraisal of the present power ratio goes far beyond the military field. It embraces every aspect of our political, economic, financial, and social systems. All but the military aspects are beyond both my competence and responsibility. Yet within the strictly military field, I find the disparity between our available forces and those which the Soviet rulers could bring against us so great as to warrant no other conclusion than that a full-scale Soviet attack within the near future would find Allied Command Europe critically weak to accomplish its present mission. The potential aggressor retains the initiative. He can exercise his offensive capability at will and choose the time, place, weight, and direction of attack. To allow the NATO nations to maintain their status as free nations, we should have the means which can be committed to action within a short time and

which can give us the capability of withstanding an initial attack and gaining time to gather our strength. To do otherwise, we would risk needlessly heavy sacrifice of life and great loss of critical equipment. We need not only the physical means but the driving force of dynamic leadership sustained by a high morale throughout the civilian population as well as among our fighting forces.

### **THE TASKS AHEAD**

Now, in May 1953, the NATO nations, which were almost defenseless in 1950, can be justifiably proud in looking at their increased strength. They can be buoyed up by their accomplishments, not weighed down by their fears. The result should be an improvement in the morale of their peoples. Their seriousness of purpose and their strength of will should have been made clear to the world.

Yet pride in achievement must not blind us to the magnitude of the tasks ahead, nor hide our true military position today. The achievements during the past year have been considerable. They reflect great credit on the 14 NATO nations, but the efforts of the last 2 years could all be wasted were we to relax now. There are still many gaps in our defense system which must be filled without delay if our homelands are to have that reasonable minimum of security which it has been NATO's primary purpose to achieve.

My predecessor reported in May 1952: "There is no real security yet achieved in Europe; there is only a beginning." Knowledge of the military situation today gives no grounds for believing that this security has been achieved, that the beginning, made a year ago, has now come so near to a successful ending that our efforts can be relaxed.

Northern Europe still lacks within its own resources the minimum forces required to give adequate chances of success against a major attack. The nations in that area will have to receive external assistance, and this is contemplated in our plans. The continuing magnitude of Soviet offensive capabilities in Northern Europe, and the special requirements for coordinating the military measures taken by the nations of that area with the contributions of other NATO partners to defense, create a problem of unusual complexity and difficulty. The pattern of solution through collective action is being gradually clarified. Further efforts by all concerned are, however, required.

In Central Europe we have made material progress. It is clear that the basic elements of strength to attain a capability for defense of that area can be found. What is required is the continued will and effort to convert this potential into reality. If such effort is forthcoming, and especially if an

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, May 11, 1953, p. 673.

early German contribution is provided, we can look forward to the day in the near future, when if attacked, we could conduct a successful defense in that area.

Likewise in Southern Europe the land forces are steadily improving and a successful defense appears attainable in the foreseeable future. There continues to exist a serious lack of support troops. This weakness must be remedied. Powerful naval forces could make a contribution of the greatest value but the air forces here, as in other areas, are still dangerously short.

There are many measures that apply generally throughout the whole Western European area. Active land forces must be further increased. Those already in being must be better trained and backed by proper support troops—at present lacking. The system of training and mobilizing our reserve forces must insure that they are ready to face a professional enemy on equal terms. The naval forces must receive the escort vessels and minesweepers which will be vital for defense against a potential enemy strong in submarines and minelaying capability.

Our greatest weakness, however, is in the air. For the next year, at least, higher priority should be given to the air forces. Not only do we lack the number of modern aircraft indispensable for our defensive tasks, but in some countries the development of an effective air warning and control system is only just beginning.

To establish a workable supply system, the nations should plan to meet the requirements for their forces both from home production and through negotiation with other governments. National stocks, particularly of ammunition, should be increased from their present low level.

The deficiencies I have noted are correctible, provided that timely action is taken and sustained. If this is done, this command could be capable, within the near future, of effectively defending Western Europe against full-scale Soviet aggression. If these deficiencies remain substantially uncorrected, these requirements substantially unfulfilled, then Allied Command Europe will continue to be critically weak in its capability of accomplishing its present mission; the NATO nations of Europe will remain exposed to the peril of decisive military defeat with all its catastrophic consequences to them and to Western civilization.

Our present difficulties would be lessened through greater unity of effort. In the economic field, this would help solve the problems of military supply and equipment. In the political field, it would facilitate our efforts to mobilize all our available military resources.

In 4 years the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has demonstrated that free nations, working earnestly together, can achieve collective security. We have become seriously aware of the heavy

sacrifices demanded to arm nations for defense. Today we are far from the plateau of security. We have merely gained the foothills leading to that plateau. A leveling off now, when we are far below minimum force requirements, may return our European peoples to that grim feeling of military weakness and futility of effort only recently left behind.

During the last 2 years we have overcome the natural inertia which besets all human endeavors. We have imparted to the huge and complicated machinery of defense a momentum of incalculable power—the results of faith and growing strength. We must not lose that momentum. To do so would be to nullify all our labor and sacrifices, to repudiate our principles, and to perpetuate our peril. Were the momentum once lost, the efforts to restore it would be many times those we have so far made.

The most precious assets of our nations are their spiritual values and their youth. The most sacred obligations of governments are to nurture and preserve those values, and to assure that those lives shall not be hazarded through failure to recognize the depth of the threat ranged against us.

Joined in devotion to the cause of peace and security of all we prize, convinced of the aim and the urgency of our individual efforts, we have now to sustain the momentum that has brought us thus far and to maintain our faith in the values we strive to defend.

30 MAY 1952

MATTHEW B. RIDGWAY

## **U.S. Restricts Fueling of Ships Bound for Communist China**

Samuel W. Anderson, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for International Affairs, announced on June 8 a move by the Commerce Department to prevent any foreign ship or aircraft scheduled to call at Communist Chinese ports from fueling at U.S. ports without prior approval by the Department. Applications for such approval will not generally be granted, Mr. Anderson stated.

A new export control regulation of the Office of International Trade, effective July 6, will require an individual validated license from OIT for export of petroleum products, including fuel, for use on board foreign carriers leaving the United States or its territories if any one of the following conditions exists:

1. The foreign carrier requiring the petroleum products has called at Macao or any point under far eastern Communist control since January 1, 1953;
2. The carrier is bound for any such point within a period of 120 days in the case of a vessel

or 30 days in the case of an aircraft from the date of departure from the last U.S. point of exit;

3. The carrier will carry any commodities of any origin within these same periods known by the owner, master, commander, charterer, or agent to be destined directly or indirectly to these points unless the commodities are covered by an export license from OIR; or

4. The carrier is registered in, or under charter to a Soviet-bloc country or is under charter to a national of any Soviet-bloc country.

Under general licenses "ship stores" and "plane stores," OIR permits exportation, without an individual validated export license, of usual and reasonable quantities of fuel, food stores, etc., for use or consumption on board the vessel or plane during the voyage which are not intended for unloading in a foreign country. Under the new regulations, however, an individual validated export license will be required if any of the four conditions specified above exists.<sup>1</sup>

## Release of Anti-Communist Prisoners From U.N. Camps in South Korea

*Following are texts of statements and correspondence relating to the release of anti-Communist prisoners of war in South Korea.*

### U.N. Command Statement of June 18

Between midnight and dawn today, approximately 25,000 militantly anti-Communist North Korean prisoners of war broke out of United Nations Command prisoner of war camps at Pusan, Masan, Nonsan and Sang Mu Dai, Korea.

Statements attributed to high officials of the Republic of Korea now make it clear that the action had been secretly planned and carefully coordinated at top levels in the Korean Government and that outside assistance was furnished the P. O. W.'s in their mass breakout. R. O. K. security units assigned as guards at the P. O. W. camps did little to prevent the breakouts and there is every evidence of actual collusion between the R. O. K. guards and the prisoners.

During the past year, these R. O. K. security guard units have been especially trained for their duties at P. O. W. camps, in order that more than 13,000 United States and R. O. K. Army combat troops, which would otherwise be required as security personnel, might be made available for front-line duty. The R. O. K. security guards were considered especially suitable for the camps containing anti-Communist Korean prisoners in view of the previous cooperative attitude of these P. O. W.'s.

United States personnel at these non-repatriate camps, limited in each case to the camp commander and a few administrative personnel, exerted every effort to prevent today's mass breakouts, but in the face of collusion between the R. O. K. guards and the prisoners, their efforts were largely unavailing. The large quantities of non-toxic irritants (tear gas and other non-poisonous gases) employed proved ineffective because of the great number of prisoners involved in the night-time breakouts. Nine prisoners were killed and sixteen injured by rifle fire. There were no casualties among United States personnel.

As of 1 o'clock this afternoon, 971 escaped P. O. W.'s had been recovered.

R. O. K. security guard units which have left their posts and non-repatriate camps are being replaced by United States troops.

### ROK Action a Violation of U.N. Command's Authority

*Statement by Secretary Dulles*

White House press release dated June 18

I have been in conference with the President regarding the unilateral action taken by the Republic of Korea to release prematurely North Korean prisoners of war. This action was in violation of the authority of the U.N. Command to which the Republic of Korea had agreed. On behalf of the United Nations we have conducted our negotiations for an armistice in good faith and we have acted and are acting in good faith. President Eisenhower is communicating with President Rhee in this sense.

### Lt. Gen. Harrison to Gen. Nam IL, June 18

Gen. NAM IL,

*Senior Delegate, Delegation of the Korean People's Army, and the Chinese People's Volunteers:*

Between midnight and dawn today, approximately 25,000 North Korean prisoners of war, who have refused to be repatriated following an armistice, broke out of United Nations Command prisoner of war camps Nos. 5, 6, 7 and 9.

<sup>1</sup>The list of commodities subject to the new procedure and further information on this change in regulations are published in OIR's Current Export Bulletin 705, dated June 4, 1953. It may be obtained at the U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington 25, D.C., or any Field Office of the Department.

Statements attributed to high officials of the Republic of Korea indicate that the action had been secretly planned and carefully coordinated at top levels in the Korean Government and that outside assistance was furnished the prisoners of war in their mass breakout. Republic of Korea Army security units assigned as guards at the prisoner of war camps did little to prevent the breakout, and there is every evidence of actual collusion between the Republic of Korea Army guards and the prisoners.

The Republic of Korea Army security guard units used at the camps containing anti-Communist prisoners of war had been considered especially suitable in view of the previous cooperative attitude of these prisoners while in custody.

These Republic of Korea Army security guard units which have left their posts at nonrepatriate camps are being replaced by United States troops.

Efforts are being made to recover the prisoners now at liberty and as of 1 o'clock this afternoon, 971 escaped prisoners of war had been recovered.

WILLIAM K. HARRISON, JR.,  
*Lieutenant General, U.S.A., Senior Delegate*  
*United Nations Command Delegation.*

**Pyun Yun Tae, Acting South Korean Premier,  
To Gen. Clark, U. N. Commander, June 18**

DEAR GENERAL CLARK: As regards the question of releasing the anti-Communist Korean prisoners of war, instead of handing them over to the five-nation custodial committee, the position of this Government has long been made clear through frequent representations, oral and written, from its spokesmen. This position is, it should be noted, also what the United Nations cease-fire delegation itself once took as its own, when Lieut. Gen. William K. Harrison, its senior delegate, in the course of enunciating the then new United Nations three-point proposal on May 13, 1953,<sup>1</sup> said, "Prisoners of war of Korean nationality who have elected not to avail themselves of the right to be repatriated should be released to civilian status on the date the armistice becomes effective."

The complete reversal of this United Nations stand does not so much reflect, we sincerely believe, a change in criteria of human judgment as a freakish turn in international fortuity favoring the ascendancy of appeasers, to whom these 34,000 kin of ours, all loyal to us, just look as many unfeeling wooden pawns to be whisked about in their grand game of "peace," alias surrender. We, in the name of human decency and dignity, revolt at this sickening order of things, whatever may ensue.

I need not reiterate now why we cannot let our own citizens liberated from Communist domination, internationally miscalled prisoners of war, be taken away to any neutral area to be placed under the jurisdiction of an alien body and brainwashed for several long months by trained Communist tormentors supported by pro-Communist alien armed forces. We declare time and again that this nation cannot suffer this to happen within its own domain.

We need not point out the fact that many of those prisoners are bona fide R. O. K.'s captured by the enemy but forced to fight on his side, contrary to all known human practices, to say nothing of the Geneva Convention. Where is the justice, if the United Nations, who let the Communists' liquidating or forcing more than 50,000 R. O. K. prisoners of war into their military service go unchallenged, now insists on even these bona fide R. O. K. troops being pressured to go to the Communists and succeeds? The public sentiments are so strong against it that, even if this Government wished to acquiesce in the tragic international development, it could not have done so without completely forfeiting the confidence and the

respect of the Korean people, which this Government cannot be justly expected to risk.

Recognizing, however, the international complications involved in the prisoners of war question and implicitly trusting that the United Nations Command would do right by the said prisoners by somehow restoring them to free ways of life in the end, this Government has been patiently waiting for the United Nations Command to take adequate measures to set them free from the prolonged, unjustifiable incarceration. You know, General, what we would have done with them, if they were in our custody. We would have liberated these hapless fellow-countrymen of ours long ago. If we had entertained, even for a single moment, any idea of bartering the innocent lives of these poor fellow-citizens for the transitory ease of a shameful peace we would have deserved nothing but the curse of these intended victims as well as the damnation of a Righteous Deity.

With the prisoners of war agreement reached between the United Nations Command and the Communists, however, the last ray of hope is gone of seeing them ever freed, for that agreement, its terms being what they are, will end up in forcibly repatriating all of them against their original wishes, sending them to execution or concentration camp. Whoever, Archbishop or layman, has been submitted to the ordeals of Communist inquisition has never survived as what he was.

Foreseeing this tragic eventuality, this Government could not have done otherwise than it has done today. It has tried every means to avoid causing inconvenience to the United Nations Command. It had been patient to the very last moment, until it was compelled to do the duty the whole nation was expecting it to discharge.

Today our President instructed the Korean authorities connected with the guarding of these prisoners to release them. As he said in a statement released today, a copy of which is herewith enclosed<sup>2</sup> for your reference, the reason why he took this action without consulting you in advance is too obvious to need any explanation. Whatever interpretation others may put on this, his sole motive of having done so was to cause as little embarrassment as possible to the United Nations Command. It is clear to him that no matter how you feel about the stand this Government has been taking on the P. O. W. question, you are duty-bound to abide by the agreement terms, which we do not regard as equally binding on us. Even to be consulted, however slightly, about our contemplated action would have been unbearably embarrassing to you. I hope you will take this well-meant silence not too badly.

We feel relieved to know that no violence occurred between the R.O.K. and United Nations P.O.W. camp personnel, though we regret very much that several scores of prisoners were killed and injured by United Nations guards. In this connection, I should like to call your attention to the mutual need of refraining from saying or doing anything that might likely provoke passions of the masses, which, once let loose, may easily get out of control. If there is any talk to be done, it had better be managed quietly, we believe.

As regards the 971 prisoners said to have been retaken and re-detained, and several thousands still being kept in stockades, I ask you to turn them over to us to be released by our own hands. We must liberate them all, preferably, if possible, in a manner least likely to cause trouble. For your concurrence, I should like to suggest that this note will be released with a view to publicly clarifying the situation and thus forestalling pernicious doubts that might otherwise multiply.

**Communist Commanders to Gen. Clark, June 19**

We have received the letter of June 18, 1953, from General Harrison of your side to Gen. Nam Il of our side.

In the letter your side stated that 25,000 captured personnel of the Korean People's Army, detained in P. O. W.

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of May 25, 1953, p. 755.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

camps Nos. 5, 6, 7, and 9 of your side "broke out" of and "escaped" from the P. O. W. camps on June 18 under the secret planning in advance and careful coordination at top levels in the South Korean Government and with the aid of the South Korean security units and outside assistance. Yet, Syngman Rhee of South Korea formally admitted that these P. O. W.'s were "released" on his order by the South Korean security units.

Only ten days ago, both sides had just signed an agreement on the question of repatriation of prisoners of war; yet, the South Korean Government and Army directly controlled by your side already flagrantly and openly violated this agreement in coercing the 25,000 prisoners of war who constitute more than half the total number of prisoners of war not for direct repatriation, into leaving a prisoner of war camp under the so-called order of "release" and through the actions of the secret agents and security units from inside coordinated with the outside and indicating openly that they were prepared to press-gang the prisoners of war into the South Korean Army so as to achieve the aim of forcibly retaining prisoners of war.

Moreover, this situation further developed. On June 19, another 1,813 prisoners of war were forced to leave the P. O. W. camp. Therefore, we cannot but consider the nature of this incident as extremely serious.

For some time the Syngman Rhee clique of South Korea has been clamoring for "opposing an armistice in Korea," "advancing to the north and unifying the whole nation" and "releasing all the Korean prisoners of war" who "refuse" repatriation. Your side is not unaware of such a question, yet your side did not adopt any actual measures to prevent and stop the occurrence of the Syngman Rhee clique in carrying out its long-premeditated scheme of violating the agreement of P. O. W.'s and obstructing the realization of an armistice. We consider that your side must bear the serious responsibility for this incident.

Our side has long ago and repeatedly called the attention of your side to the fact that so-called "preventing the forced repatriation" of P. O. W.'s which your side has propagandized all along is completely fabricated and does not occur at all; on the contrary, the possibility of forcible retention of prisoners does exist and is increasing all the time, which is what our side shall resolutely oppose. This incident of "releasing" and coercing P. O. W.'s by Syngman Rhee, which has now occurred, proves that the forcible retention of P. O. W.'s, which our side is against, has further become an unquestionable fact. The wrong stand and attitude of conniving which your side has taken all along on this question could not but have directly caused the occurrence of the incident and affected the implementation of the armistice agreement ready to be signed.

In view of the extremely serious consequences of this incident, we cannot but put the following questions to your side:

Is the United Nations Command able to control the South Korean Government and Army?

If not, does the armistice in Korea include the Syngman Rhee clique?

If it is not included, what assurance is there for the implementation of the armistice agreement on the part of South Korea?

If it is included, then your side must be responsible for recovering immediately all the 25,952 prisoners of war who are at liberty, that is, those who were released and retained under coercion and to be press-ganged into the South Korean Army, and your side must give assurance that similar incidents absolutely will not recur in the future. We are awaiting the reply of your side.

*Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army*  
KIM IL SUNG

*Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers*  
PENG TEH-HUAI

## Gen. Clark to President Syngman Rhee, June 20

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In the summer of 1950, when the United States and other nations responded to your appeal to the United Nations to repel the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea, the United Nations received from you a message assigning command authority over all land, sea and air forces of the Republic of Korea to the commander, United Nations Command, for the duration of hostilities.<sup>3</sup>

The United Nations Command did not seek, and indeed, did not consider necessary any further or more formal commitments from your Government regarding the participation of Republic of Korea armed forces in the United Nations Command. I therefore have considered and do now consider that I have full command authority over all land, sea and air forces of the Republic of Korea. Nothing in our long association during our mutual prosecution of our common cause has prepared me to believe that I should consider otherwise.

This notwithstanding, and in clear violation of my authority, certain officers and men of the Republic of Korea Army willfully permitted the escape of many thousands of lawfully detained prisoners of war from various prisoner of war installations during the early morning hours of 18 June 1953, such officers and men having been officially enjoined with responsibility for the security of said installations and for the detention of said prisoners. Further, I have received information through the public press that this action was initiated on your orders and issued through an official who is not within the forces under my command.

I must inform you with all the sincerity which I possess that I am profoundly shocked by this unilateral abrogation of your personal commitment, which was so freely and voluntarily given at the time. As a matter of fact on several occasions in recent weeks you have personally assured both Ambassador Briggs<sup>4</sup> and me that you would not take unilateral action with reference to R. O. K. forces under my control until after full and frank discussion with me.

Your actions today have clearly abrogated these assurances.

I cannot at this time estimate the ultimate consequences of this precipitous and shocking action on your part, nor can its effect on the common cause for which we have sacrificed so much during these past several years be forecast at this time.

Sincerely,

MARK W. CLARK,  
*General, U.S. Army*

## Statement by General Clark, June 21

The actions of the Government of the Republic of Korea in connection with the recent mass outbreaks of Korean anti-Communist prisoners of war were clearly a direct violation of the authority vested in me as Commander in Chief, United Nations Command. The Republic of Korea has acknowledged this authority since the summer of 1950, when it freely and voluntarily assigned command of all land, sea and air forces of the Republic of Korea to the Commander, United Nations Command, for the duration of hostilities—authority which, prior to the events of June 18, 1953, it has never questioned.

President Eisenhower has forcefully called this matter to the attention of President Rhee, and I have made urgent representations to President Rhee on the same subject. The actions of the Government of Korea on

<sup>3</sup> For text of President Rhee's letter of July 15, 1950, see BULLETIN of Aug. 7, 1950, p. 206.

<sup>4</sup> Ellis O. Briggs, U.S. Ambassador to Korea.

June 18 also directly violated solemn assurances repeatedly given to me in person by President Rhee over the past several weeks that no overt and unilateral action would be taken by his Government in connection with the removal of, or interference with, Republic of Korea forces under the United Nations Command without prior consultation with me.

These assurances from the responsible head of a sovereign state I accepted in good faith. It is now tragically clear, however, that President Rhee has unilaterally abrogated his previous assurances and that the mass outbreaks of Korean anti-Communist prisoners of war were not only aided but actually engineered by officials and troops of the Republic of Korea Government.

It was realized, of course, that the Republic of Korea Government had the capability of taking unilateral action with regard to the release of prisoners of war. It was also known that certain elements in the Republic of Korea Government had advocated privately and publicly that such action be taken. The personal assurances of President Rhee, however, were considered sufficient guarantee that no such action would be taken without prior consultation with me. I cannot emphasize too strongly my surprise and disappointment that this very serious step was taken.

In the light of developments over the past few weeks, during which the intransigent attitude of certain Republic of Korea officials toward an armistice became increasingly apparent, I gave careful consideration to the advisability of replacing the Republic of Korea security force units at Korean anti-Communist P.O.W. camps with other United Nations units. With the full knowledge of my Government, decision was made not to do so for several reasons:

*First:* The specially trained Republic of Korean Army security forces which had performed their duties in a commendable manner had given no evidence of disaffection. Because they are of the same race and speak the same language as the prisoners they were guarding, they filled the need which could not be fully met from any other sources within my command.

*Second:* In the delicate situation which prevailed, any move to replace Republic of Korea units would have reflected on the trustworthiness of those units and on the Republic of Korea, and might have precipitated the very kind of situation in the camps with the Republic of Korea which the United Nations Command has been very anxious to avoid.

*Third:* United Nations combat units were critically needed at the front, particularly in view of the desperate attacks launched by the enemy during the past few weeks; to have withdrawn the several thousand men necessary to replace the Republic of Korea Army security forces units would have constituted a serious drain on our front line forces.

At the same time, I directed that the normal information program in each of the camps concerned be expanded to insure a full understanding on the part of the anti-Communist prisoners of the position which the United Nations Command had taken in armistice negotiations on the matters pertaining to prisoners of war. The fact that neither force nor coercion would be permitted in repatriating prisoners of war was reiterated day after day in the hope that it would allay their very natural fears and apprehensions as to their future disposition.

In addition, I directed those of my commanders concerned with the security of these prisoners of war to devise control measures, to include riot control tactics. All my directives on these subjects had the full concurrence of my superiors in Washington.

Because the Republic of Korea Government has unilaterally and without previous notice abrogated its promises voluntarily given and because of the collusion, defection, and desertion of some Republic of Korea Army security force units, large numbers of anti-Communist prisoners of war have broken out of their camps and are now dispersed throughout South Korea, with apparent

support and assistance from the Republic of Korea Government. Such measures as are practicable are being taken to effect their return.

The action taken by President Rhee and the officials of his Government in making possible the mass breakout of these many thousands of prisoners has been a deep and personal disappointment to me and to my entire command. It has given rise to wholly unfounded suspicions of collusion on the part of the Republic of Korea Government and the United Nations Command to circumvent or abrogate the prisoner-of-war agreement recently reached at Panmunjom. There has been no such collusion, nor has the United Nations Command in any way been a party to this completely unauthorized action. The entire responsibility rests squarely upon President Rhee and the Government of Korea.

## Political Conference on Korea

*Press Conference Remarks by Secretary Dulles*

Press release 318 dated June 15

*In response to questions concerning the likely time, place, date, and agenda of the political conference following an armistice in Korea, Secretary Dulles made the following remarks at his press conference on June 15:*

Under the provisions of the armistice, there would be a political conference to be held within 90 days of the conclusion of the armistice. The General Assembly of the United Nations has recessed with the understanding that they would be called back into session promptly upon the conclusion of an armistice. At that time they would presumably designate a committee of its members, a delegation of U.N. members, to take part in the conference. In addition, the Republic of Korea will certainly take part in the conference. Who will take part on the other side, we do not know.

Now, as to the agenda of the conference. The purpose from our standpoint will be to endeavor to assure the unification of Korea. That has been our objective for a long time. It was expressed during the war and at postwar conferences. It was expressed at the United Nations on several occasions. I myself was a member of the U.S. delegation which, in 1947 and again in 1948, put through the resolutions which called for the unification of Korea. I myself am a great believer in that unification, just as I believe in the unification of Germany and the unification of Austria. I believe all three of these unifications will come about, and I believe that we can expedite their coming about by appropriate political methods and by handling our case properly at this conference and at other opportunities that may be offered.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Asked whether in the view of the United States the agenda of the political conference should be confined to Korean questions or include other Far Eastern problems such as Indochina, the Secretary replied that no conclusions on this had yet been reached.



## U.S. Military Mission To Visit Indochina

Press release 329 dated June 20

In response to an invitation from the French Prime Minister when he visited Washington last March, a U.S. military mission headed by Lt. Gen. John W. O'Daniel, presently commander, U.S. Army Pacific, will arrive at Saïgon on June 20. Its purpose will be to pursue discussions with Gen. Henri Navarre, Commander in Chief, Indochina, on the manner in which U.S. material and financial support of the effort of the French and Associated States armed forces in Indochina may best

contribute to the advancement of the objective of defeating the Communist forces there and of bringing peace and security to Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. It is believed essential to insure an increasingly close integration of U.S. assistance with the plans developed by the authorities of France and of the Associated States.

Arrangements are being made for the military leaders of the Associated States to participate in these discussions. The vital role of the national armies of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos and the increasingly important assumption of high military responsibilities by the Associated States will make these discussions of particular interest.

## Some Aspects of American Foreign Policy

*by Livingston T. Merchant*

*Assistant Secretary for European Affairs<sup>1</sup>*

I have frequently been impressed by the difficulty of discussing foreign policy without at the same time discussing a lot of other matters. Foreign policy today involves tax policy, budget policy, tariff policy, immigration policy, military policy, and dozens of other things.

We cannot make major decisions in international affairs without affecting to some degree the domestic scene. Nor can we safely make decisions on matters that used to be considered purely domestic without taking into account possible effects upon our international relations. We're in the position of a baseball pitcher who has to keep one eye on the batter, one eye on the base runner, and needs still another eye to watch the manager's signals.

What I'm trying to say is already fairly obvious to most of you. In this century, the business we call foreign affairs has become extremely complicated. I'm sure there are many career officers in the American diplomatic service who have a certain nostalgia for the "good old days" when life was simpler, when American security was not seriously threatened. In those days, our work was important, of course, but the consequences of a mistake were not quite so dangerous as they are today.

Our foreign relations have become all-important to our national security, our domestic prosperity, and even our survival, and we have to use

every practical technique available to protect American interests. We're playing for keeps.

I think some Americans have been perplexed and even shocked by the course of events which have converted the United States from a relatively secure nation at the turn of this century to a nation whose security is gravely imperiled today. Scholars and philosophers have devoted much thought to this subject, and many explanations have been offered. If we were able to live the last half-century over again perhaps many things would be done differently. The world looks simpler in hindsight.

But for myself, I am convinced that even the most enlightened policies on the part of national governments could not have reversed the tide of insecurity which has swept the earth in this century. Our greatest problem has been the onrush of modern technology. Perhaps if we had begun in the latter decades in the 19th century to jail all young men who were playing around with gasoline motors, trying to invent flying machines, investigating electrodynamics, and studying what was then considered the pure and harmless science of nuclear physics, we could have avoided many of our present difficulties. Then perhaps there would have been no planes to fly the oceans and attack our shores, no atom bombs to blast our cities, no great concentrations of economic and political strength to destroy the balance-of-power system which protected us for so many years. But such a course of action, we realize, would have been absurd. We cannot and do not wish to stop the march of science and technology. Our only al-

<sup>1</sup>Address made before the Machinery and Allied Products Institute at Washington, D.C., on June 11 (press release 312).

ternative is to try to develop the kind of national and international relationships among human beings which will permit these advances of science to be used for our benefit rather than our destruction.

I believe we must accept the probability that we face a long period of insecurity, that we may not achieve complete security in this generation or the next. Perhaps we can find some satisfaction in the thought I recently heard expressed by the great British historian, Toynbee, that nations gain certain advantages from insecurity. While I think Mr. Toynbee has a good point, I also feel that we could get along with a little less insecurity than we have at this moment.

While our foreign policies today, as in the past, must be designed to serve a variety of American interests, our cardinal purpose is to preserve the security of the people of the United States. We must keep constantly in mind the very grave dangers confronting us, and seek in every possible way to reduce and eliminate these dangers. The decisions of the Department of State, and of many other agencies of the Government, must be made with the problem of national security uppermost in our thoughts.

I suspect that some Americans are convinced that there is something mysterious and esoteric about the process of formulating foreign policy. While the process is often intricate, it is by no means mysterious. Our nation has certain broad objectives which are easily understood by most Americans. We are also confronted with certain inescapable facts which exist in the world. In essence, our job is to find methods of dealing with these facts which will permit us to reach our objectives.

I think it may be useful at this point for me to discuss briefly a few of the most important facts which we must recognize and take into account in developing American foreign policy at this stage of our history.

### **Soviet Power**

First, our nation's safety is threatened by an adversary whose power is virtually unmatched in the records of human civilization. The Soviet Union controls one-third of the world's population. It dominates a large part of the world's land area. It possesses enormous natural resources, many of which are not yet fully exploited. Its present rate of industrial growth is greater than our own and considerably greater than that of Western Europe. It has the largest standing army and air force in history. Its policies and actions are not inhibited by the moral and humanitarian considerations which have traditionally restrained other governments and peoples from crimes against their neighbors. In addition, the Soviet empire has achieved a tight internal discipline maintained by military force, by the

secret police, and by a philosophy which makes every individual a creature of the state.

The Soviet empire also has unprecedented advantages in the field of political warfare. The Communists have already seized several countries without use of the Soviet armies. They also have strong support in many other countries that are still free. All disasters, weaknesses, and problems in the free world benefit the Communists and increase their opportunities of expanding their power. Our own security and national interests can only be served if conditions in other free countries improve, but the Communists' purposes are served if conditions in these countries become worse. And I think you will agree that it is easier to disrupt than to build.

Because of the Soviet Union's ability to combine a military threat with a continuing ideological campaign, the Soviet leaders are able to exercise a perpetual squeeze play against the free world. On one hand, if free nations fail to build their military defenses, they risk being overpowered by the Soviet military machine. On the other hand, if they concentrate an excessive portion of their energies and resources on military defense, they risk an economic and political collapse which would permit the Communists to seize power internally. Thus, the Soviet empire is constantly attacking the free world on two flanks at the same time, in the hope of taking nations one by one, exploiting their resources, gaining additional strength, and eventually becoming so powerful that the remainder of the free world can no longer resist Communist domination of the planet. The power of the Soviet empire and the nature of Communist tactics combine to present a threat far greater than has ever been presented by any other aggressor.

A second fact we must recognize was recently stated very simply by President Eisenhower when he said that the United States needs friends. In fact, the friendship and assistance of other free nations is absolutely vital to our national security.

I am convinced that a great deal of the controversy which arises from time to time over particular proposals and actions in the field of international affairs would disappear if the American people as a whole fully appreciated the limitations upon our national power. We are a strong country, but one of the most foolish things we could do would be to exaggerate our strength. We have only 6 percent of the world's population and a small part of its land area. We have tremendous and valuable natural resources but only a minor part of the total resources of the world. We are noted for our enormous industrial power, and yet the Soviet conquest of Western Europe alone would enable the Soviet empire to achieve industrial superiority. Moreover, we could not maintain our industrial production and our standard of living without raw materials which we import from other free nations.

## U.S. Needs Strong Friends

Third, I want to stress the fact that we not only need friends but also need friends who are strong. In the overall world struggle that has been forced upon us, we cannot judge our capacity for resistance in terms of our own national army, navy, and air force, or in terms of our own economic and industrial production, without reference to the economic, military, and political capabilities of other free nations. It would be just as foolish for us to do this as it would be for Florida, California, or Connecticut to assess their respective abilities to withstand communism without reference to the power of the United States as a whole. If we view the world picture clearly and soberly, we will not limit ourselves to asking whether a division encamped along the shores of the Potomac has enough guns and tanks. We will also concern ourselves about the strength of a French division in Indochina, the strength of a British division in Western Germany, and the strength of a Chinese division on Formosa. We will ask whether the economic systems of Italy, and Iran, and India, and other countries are strong enough to permit the people of these countries to resist the appeals of communism and to make a positive contribution to the security of the free world.

Once we begin to think in these terms, we can appreciate more fully another important fact which we have learned in recent years. We have learned that a dollar spent in creating strength in other countries often buys a great deal more total strength than it will buy in this country. In our vast economy a few million dollars may add little or nothing to our ability to resist Soviet aggression. But these same dollars spent in technical assistance may provide the decisive margin by which countries in the Middle East and South Asia can reverse a downward economic trend and change it into an upward economic trend. And in Europe we have seen that our military and economic assistance exercises a similar multiplier effect in the development of defensive strength. Because the Europeans themselves pay most of the cost of their defenses, with the United States supplying only the critical margin which the Europeans cannot provide, the military forces made possible by American assistance are far more powerful than the United States could build for the same amount of money in this country, where we would have to pay the total cost.

A final fact I want to stress today is the important relation between economic health in other free countries and our efforts to achieve world peace and security. We can neither keep the friendship of other peoples nor hope to see them become strong unless they are able to establish conditions of economic stability and growth. Without economic health, the military defense we are helping to build will be limited in size and effectiveness. Without economic health, free and

orderly political institutions will tend to disintegrate. If economic conditions remain stagnant or deteriorate, the Communists will have an opportunity to seize new territories without firing a shot. Most of us are well aware that economic collapse in other countries would have the most serious effects upon our exports and imports and upon our domestic prosperity. It is equally important to understand that economic conditions abroad vitally affect our national security.

In this connection, I would like to draw particular attention to Europe, the area for which I have special responsibility in the Department of State. Secretary Dulles has already told the Congress and the general public about the substantial progress which Europe is making in the development of military defenses. We have also witnessed, since the early postwar years, a steady decline in the political power of the Communists in free Europe. Today, however, there are ominous clouds on the economic horizon which threaten to undo much of the good work which has been done.

### Europe's Economic Problems

During the last year, the steady rise in overall European production which began with the Marshall plan has leveled off. Intra-European trade has declined. Since mid-1950, living standards in Europe as a whole have not risen significantly. Inflation in several countries has continued to undermine economic stability; since the Korean war prices in France have risen more than 40 percent. Taxes are severe; it may astonish many Americans to realize that the percentage of national and individual income taken by taxes in the European NATO countries, as a whole, is slightly higher than the percentage taken by all Federal, State, and local taxes in the United States. Finally, Europe's balance of payments with other parts of the world, especially the dollar area, remains unfavorable.

All these facts were recognized by the NATO ministers who met in Paris last April to develop NATO defense plans for 1953. It was obvious that the defense efforts of most European governments had closely approached the limits of their economic capabilities. Rather than waste their resources in a precipitate buildup to a defense level that could not thereafter be sustained, NATO has abandoned any fixed-date target and is seeking a more gradual and more realistic continuing buildup.

But the acceptance of a more realistic defense program has not by any means solved Europe's basic economic problems. Some of these problems are very deep-rooted and can only be solved over a long period of years. Despite the outstanding achievements made possible by the Marshall plan, it is evident that there were several European economic problems which it did not and could not solve. Let me give a few examples.

Before the war, Europe earned a substantial portion of its income from capital investments, services, and other so-called "invisible transactions." These earnings helped to compensate for Europe's recurring import surplus. On the average, prewar Europe received a net income from invisibles amounting to approximately 1½ billion dollars per year. During the war, much of Europe's capital was destroyed, stolen, or liquidated to support the military effort. As a result, invisibles ceased to provide Europe a net income and in 1947 represented a net deficit of approximately 500 million dollars. While Europe's economic position has greatly improved since that time, there has been no opportunity for the Europeans to re-accumulate the capital needed for domestic and overseas investment.

Next, let us remember that several European nations during and after the war lost large portions of their overseas empires which had formerly provided markets for European products as well as sources of raw materials. While the independence of these colonial areas will probably contribute, in the long run, to the strength of the free world, one immediate effect was to disrupt traditional patterns of trade and create additional economic problems in Europe.

Normal trading patterns were further disrupted by the Soviet seizure of Eastern Europe which formerly exchanged large quantities of coal, grains, timber, and other raw materials for Western Europe's industrial products. All told, trade between Eastern and Western Europe is now only about one-third the prewar level. As a result, Western Europe must import many important raw materials from areas where higher prices prevail and pay the large transportation costs of carrying these goods across oceans. Some trade between Eastern and Western Europe continues, and we recognize that the products received from the East contribute significantly to Western Europe's economic stability. Without this trade the strain on free Europe's economy would be seriously aggravated. Despite the importance of this trade, our allies are cooperating with us to deny strategic materials to the Soviet bloc, and we must recognize that these measures limit still further the possibility of acquiring needed imports from that area.

Another obstacle to full economic recovery in free Europe has been the drastic shift in what we call the "terms of trade." Since the war, the prices of the goods which Europe must buy from other areas have substantially outdistanced the prices of the goods which Europe is able to sell. The effect upon Europe is very similar to the effect upon an American manufacturer who finds that the cost of raw materials and labor have pyramided while the market for his own product remains the same.

Finally, we must remember that while the Marshall plan helped Europe to increase its industrial

production by about 50 percent, it did not automatically provide new markets for these products. Today, Europe still must import goods from many parts of the world but has not been able to find adequate export markets with which to pay for these imports.

This problem has great significance for American businessmen, including those in this audience. Many of you have goods which you would like to sell to Europe. Europe would like to buy these goods and will probably need imports of this kind for many years to come. There's just one obstacle to what would otherwise be a very satisfactory business relationship. Unfortunately, you gentlemen prefer to be paid for what you sell. And the Europeans have great difficulty in getting their hands on the dollars needed to pay you. As a result, you lose business, the European consumer goes without, the European economy suffers, the European defense system is limited, and American security is endangered.

As I have said, Europe's economic problems are not simple. They can only be solved over a long period of years, and the fundamental solutions must be found by the Europeans themselves. However, Europe's economic health is so important to us that we have a vital interest in contributing to a positive solution. Let me outline some of the policies which President Eisenhower's administration is pursuing.

#### **U.S. Foreign Economic Policies**

First, the United States is encouraging European unity by every reasonable and practical means. At the moment, our interest is focused primarily on the treaty creating a European Defense Community (Edc) because this plan offers a practical method of achieving a vitally important military contribution from Western Germany within the framework of an integrated European defense system. But the ultimate values of unity go far beyond military defense. It is hoped that the Edc, taken together with the existing Coal and Steel Community, and other efforts toward integration, will provide a basis for the eventual political and economic federation of Europe, thereby giving Europe the advantages of a broad common market, investment area, and productive system similar to what we have in the United States.

Second, the Government is continuing direct assistance to certain countries in Europe, though at a reduced level. We believe that economic aid must be held to a minimum, both because it is uneconomical and also because economic aid has many unpleasant psychological and political consequences. Nearly all of the aid President Eisenhower has requested for Europe is to be used for the purpose of building Europe's military defenses. However, certain parts of this assistance will have the secondary value of enabling Europe

to earn U. S. dollars. I refer primarily to the off-shore procurement program, which will be discussed in greater detail by another speaker.

Third, we hope to encourage greater private investment in Europe. The role of the Government in stimulating investment is of course limited, but we are carefully exploring prospects for making Europe more attractive to American private investors.

Fourth, we believe that our technical assistance and capital-development programs in the underdeveloped areas of Asia, Africa, and South America, in addition to helping strengthen these areas, will indirectly benefit free Europe by expanding supplies of raw materials available from non-dollar sources.

These measures I have mentioned, if accompanied by European efforts to attain fiscal stability, to achieve freer convertibility of currencies, and to expand productivity, may be expected to exercise a favorable effect upon the overall European economy. However, it is unlikely that any of these measures can provide a complete and permanent solution to one of Europe's most acute and most difficult problems—the dollar shortage. If we want the European people to continue to maintain vigorous free institutions, if we want Europe to be a strong shield against Soviet aggression, if we want to sell goods to Europe, if we want Europe to continue its vital contribution to the security of Asia and the Near East—we must accept one hard, inescapable fact—Europe must have dollars. Whether the Europeans sell us goods for these dollars, earn dollars in third countries, or receive dollars as gifts, they must obtain dollars in some way if they are to cooperate with us effectively in the struggle for freedom.

I am not a trade expert, and I cannot honestly tell you that our international security requires that this or another American tariff rate or other trade restriction should be modified in a particular way. As you know, President Eisenhower recently called for a comprehensive study of American economic foreign policies including tariff and trade policies. This study will take account of domestic considerations as well as the problem of international security. Pending the completion of this study, it would be inappropriate for me to attempt to make any proposals concerning the methods by which the nations of Europe can increase their supply of dollars by selling goods in the U. S. market. However, I believe all of us realize that we are faced with a limited number of alternatives. And I think we all agree that if we can find ways to help the Europeans market their products in the United States without serious damage to American producers, we will be able to establish a much more satisfactory economic relationship with Europe than can ever be established on the basis of economic grants.

In speaking to you today, I recognize that I have raised a great many more questions than I have answered. Perhaps this is typical. Someone, I've forgotten who, once defined a diplomat as "a man who can find a problem for every solution." However, I am quite serious when I say that I believe our first task is to identify and recognize our problems as they really exist, to know the facts we face, and to understand the alternatives that we possess.

A great American once said that "the frontiers are neither east nor west, north or south, but wherever a man faces a fact."

Today, I believe that the frontiers of human freedom do not follow the long, barricaded line called the Iron Curtain, but rather are to be found in our own minds—in our own willingness to recognize facts and our determination to take whatever action may be required to insure the survival of the things we believe in. This is our challenge and our strength. I shall always believe that the intellectual and spiritual powers which grow in the environment of freedom will prove stronger than the power of any tyranny that man can devise.

## Building Closer U.S.-Spanish Relations

by James Clement Dunn  
Ambassador to Spain<sup>1</sup>

The reputation of the Spanish people for hard work and perseverance in the face of difficulties is well known. Since my return to Spain I have been impressed greatly by the visible signs of reconstruction and economic progress which have been achieved in the face of a series of adverse developments, including civil strife followed by the disruption of the Second World War and a decade of recurrent droughts with their terrible impact on agriculture and electric power availabilities. Spain's economic achievements under such difficult circumstances are a tribute to the tenacity of purpose and to the industriousness of the Spanish people.

The short time I have been in Spain has not allowed me to gain an intimate knowledge of specific problems of Spanish-American trade. But I am aware that such problems exist—as in fact they do everywhere—and that you gentlemen have to deal with them every day of your lives. I realize that what you can accomplish by your individual efforts often depends on factors not entirely within your control. Of these, possibly the most important single factor is the relationship between the Government of Spain and the Government of the United States.

All of you are aware that for more than a year

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<sup>1</sup> Translation of an address made in Spanish before the annual meeting of the American Chamber of Commerce at Barcelona, Spain, on June 16.

negotiations have been proceeding between our two governments looking toward a much closer and more intimate relationship than has ever before existed between our two countries. You will understand that while these negotiations are in progress, it is not proper for me to discuss them in detail. But it is entirely proper for me to say that they have been conducted in the most frank and friendly atmosphere, in a spirit of mutual respect and comprehension, and with a sincere desire on both sides to understand the motives and ideals which guide us and to reach agreements which will contribute not only to the best interests of both countries but to the common defense of Western Europe as well.

Although these negotiations are primarily for the building of greater facilities for mutual defense, their successful conclusion will, I am convinced, provide a firm foundation for the development of future trade, for enlarged private investment, and for the drawing together of our two peoples in an increasing measure of cultural, scientific, and commercial interchange to the benefit of both. Spain and the United States already have a cultural, historical, and traditional background of mutual interest which inevitably draws them together.

In the world today there is one issue which transcends all others. Our heritage of culture and civilization faces the most dangerous spiritual and material threat which history has recorded. We all realize that to resist this threat successfully, each nation must make the full contribution which its strength and resources permit. The foremost responsibility of all of us, therefore, is to insure the survival of our liberty and independence.

#### **U. S. Expenditures for Defense**

The recognition by the American people of this peril is manifest in the rapid expansion of their own military forces, in the large sums being devoted to military research and production, and in the large amounts of military assistance going to like-minded nations in many parts of the world. The financial sacrifices which the American people have placed upon themselves to meet the danger and to achieve this program are reflected in the fact that almost 73 percent of all U.S. budgetary expenditures are for security purposes. The strengthening of the free world's military defenses has gone far beyond financial aspects, as evidenced by the casualties of 136,000 of America's sons in holding the line against aggression in Korea.

The situation I have set forth explains why a larger proportion of U.S. foreign-aid funds are now devoted to military assistance and why the remainder is for economic purposes which directly support the defense effort. The actual administration of these funds is a matter of cooperation between friendly governments, of mutual accom-

modation and decision based on the exchange of ideas concerning the common objective of defense of our liberties. Once these mutual decisions of a basic character are made, it is the responsibility of each government within the area of its sovereignty to direct and control their implementation.

Although, as I have said, U.S. economic-aid funds are oriented toward the defense effort, it is apparent that their use will contribute to strengthening the economy of the nations receiving them. We recognize that a strong economy is an integral part of the free world's effort to combat the threat of aggression. Specifically in the case of the Spanish economy, the United States has demonstrated its interest during the past year in the completion of allocations of the \$62.5 million credit for economic development projects and in the allocation of two credits of \$12 million each for the shipment of cotton to keep Spain's spinning and weaving mills operating at reasonable levels.

#### **Buildup of Moral Strength Vital**

Considerations of a military and economic character are of great importance, but above all we must build the moral strength which stems from high ideals and the traditions of honesty and clear purpose.

When governments assume the responsibilities that are inherent in the concept of mutual trust, mutual aid, mutual defense—then the peoples of such nations assume like responsibilities. It becomes the duty of all of us to direct our energies to the mutual objective; to guard ourselves against the kind of pettiness that separates one ally from another—one good friend from another good friend. Our Western culture is a synthesis of various national elements which contribute, like those of Spain, to its greatness. Our immediate objective in this difficult time is to preserve this Western culture and the principles upon which it is based. Our enemies are constantly attempting to divide and destroy the nations of the West by exploiting the minor differences which arise when independent, sovereign nations work together. We must not allow them to succeed. The survival of the free nations depends upon their ability to compose their differences and to work together.

Personally, I believe that we can look forward with confidence to the future. The free nations possess not only the material resources but the spiritual and moral values essential to defend themselves should the necessity arise. Americans, like Spaniards, believe that man is a creature of God and that his destiny can only be realized through moral law. I am convinced that this idealism, this devotion to God and country provides a sound basis for a mutual collaboration between our two countries which will express our common determination to resist the forces of evil and lead us to a common destiny of peace, progress, and prosperity.

## Achieving a Healthy World Economy

*by Winthrop W. Aldrich*

*Ambassador to Great Britain<sup>1</sup>*

We stand today at a crossroads in the development of the world economy. In the closing years of the last war, efforts were made to create the elements of a global economic system which would provide the much needed increased production and improved standards of living for peoples throughout the world. Attainment of these objectives was seen to be dependent on encouragement of the international flow of goods and services, capital, and money. There was to be a code of international rules and a new worldwide institution in each of three fields: The International Bank to foster investment and development; the International Monetary Fund to foster orderly foreign-exchange patterns and to help finance short-term fluctuations, and the International Trade Organization to foster an expanding world trade without discrimination. The latter institution did not come into being, but substantial progress toward some of its objectives was made through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

These concepts and institutions have been of some value. The World Bank in particular, under prudent and imaginative management has come to play an increasingly constructive role. But the dislocations in the world economy, some of long standing, all vastly intensified by the war itself and further aggravated by the cleavage of East and West and the needs of Western rearmament, proved too severe to be dealt with by the concepts of Bretton Woods alone.

Over the last 8 years, the foundations of the free-world's economy have been maintained with the help of a series of temporary measures, including UNRRA, the Marshall plan, the Mutual Security Program, the European Payments Union, and others. There has been an amazing recovery in production in war-torn Europe and Japan. In

most of Europe, internal finances have achieved at least a semblance of order. The free world has survived the shock of the post-Korean inflation and some subsequent downturn. The immense dollar chasm of the immediate postwar years has been greatly narrowed.

Nonetheless, the problem of dollar shortages throughout the free world, and especially in Europe, remains a critical one. It is made manageable today only by crude and wasteful devices: severe restrictions abroad against dollar imports, complex and cumbersome exchange controls, and the abnormal contributions of American aid and foreign military expenditures. While such devices have kept crises within bounds and prevented utter collapse, they cannot be reconciled with the healthy and durable foundation for an expanding world economy which both we and our friends abroad require for our mutual security and prosperity.

### **U.S.-U.K. Washington Talks**

This fact is recognized by thoughtful and far-seeing men of affairs in both public and private life the world over. It was this fact which led to the Commonwealth Conference in London of last December. Early last March, shortly after I took office as American Ambassador, I returned to Washington to attend the meetings at which British Foreign Secretary Eden and Chancellor of the Exchequer Butler presented to our new administration the results of the Commonwealth Conference and besought our cooperation in working out jointly policies and measures which would provide a sounder foundation for international trade, finance, and economic development.<sup>2</sup> The Washington talks would have been noteworthy alone for the personal contacts then established between the responsible leaders of our two Governments, for the pound sterling and the American

<sup>1</sup> Excerpts from an address made at the Harvard University Graduate School of Business Administration, Cambridge, Mass., on June 12.

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Mar. 16, 1953, p. 395.

dollar are the two great trading currencies of the free world. But the talks produced more than these indispensable personal contacts: they elicited a free and genuine meeting of minds on "the essential elements of a workable and productive economic system within the free world." These elements were defined as (a) sound internal economic policies by debtor and creditor countries alike; (b) freer trade and currencies; (c) creation of conditions for the sound development of free-world resources; (d) constructive use of international institutions.

Under the heading "freer trade and currencies" it was agreed that:

On the financial side the objective should be the eventual convertibility of sterling and other currencies and the gradual removal of restrictions on payments. On the trade side the objective should be to bring about the relaxation of trade restrictions and discriminations in a way which, in the words of President Eisenhower's State of the Union Message, "will recognize the importance of profitable and equitable world trade." It is in the interest of the United States to take such measures as are exemplified in the President's message in order that the members of the free world may the better pay their way by their own efforts.

Our Government stated its intention to undertake over the ensuing months an intensive review of these subjects, to arrive at a sound judgment on specific courses of action. Since that time, President Eisenhower has initiated a series of steps to move forward on this front. He has assigned responsibility within the administration to follow up the economic and financial talks held with the United Kingdom, with the Organization for European Economic Cooperation in Paris, and with the representatives of other European governments. He has requested the extension without change for a year of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, pending the thorough reexamination of our whole foreign economic policy. He has requested the passage during the current session of Congress of a measure to simplify customs administration. He has supported a change in the drastic method of controlling imports of dairy products and other agricultural commodities now required by section 104 of the Defense Production Act. Most important, he has recommended the establishment by the Congress of a Commission, to include members of both Houses of Congress and members appointed by the President, to make a review of our whole foreign economic policy as the basis for action during the 1954 congressional session.

This series of steps reflects the considered determination of the administration to develop a foreign economic policy which is, in the President's words "consonant with our position as the world's greatest creditor nation." This is a complex area which touches directly the interests of many and varied segments of our economic life. Awareness of this closeness of interest is reflected in discussion

and debate in business, farm, and labor circles over the entire nation. I am greatly encouraged to see a growing number of key organizations in the country's economic life emerging from this process of debate with a recognition of the changed position of the United States in the world and strong endorsement of trade and investment policies appropriate to our creditor status. The views of these organizations will greatly assist the new Commission in its work.

In developing its recommendations on specific measures, the Commission will have to find ways and means of advancing the basic national interest by striving for a healthy world economy with due consideration for the needs of our domestic economy. I cannot anticipate what detailed proposals will be evolved, but I do know what their fundamental direction must be. That is an increased readiness to admit imports in open competition in our own markets so that our friends abroad can earn the means to buy what they want and desperately need from us and what it is in our interest to sell them. To achieve this is essential to our own economic interest; it is also vital to our political and security interests in the free world.

It is essential that our policy of accepting increasing imports be a steady and a continuing policy, and that we make this clear to producers and suppliers in other countries. In a recent broadcast to the nation, President Eisenhower stressed the need for a "healthy two-way trade." A healthy trade cannot be built in an atmosphere of uncertainty. One of the things which gives businessmen abroad the most concern is the fear that if they are successful in building up a good business in our country, it will suddenly be limited or cut off by governmental action. We must find ways of removing the grounds for this fear.

#### **"Buy American" Policy Archaic**

In my opinion there is one element in our policy that is clearly archaic. I am sure that it adds to the cost of our Government. It certainly decreases the opportunities for other countries to earn their way. It obviously runs counter to the principle of fair business competition. It is regularly cited abroad as one more indication that the United States is not prepared to act as a good creditor. I am convinced that it is totally unnecessary as a support to American industry.

This is the "Buy American" legislation, under which, as a Government, we buy goods from abroad in only the most exceptional cases. Why should we not be sensible and abandon this obsolete policy? Unless there is bona fide necessity or other clearly demonstrable national interest considerations to the contrary, let us make our public purchases wherever goods of comparable quality can be found on competitive and advantageous terms. This would both save money for our taxpayers and promote world balance by re-



moving one more obstacle to competitive business opportunities for our friends.

I stress American trade policy not as the sole, but as one indispensable element in a constructive total foreign economic policy. There are other essential elements: the promotion of private investment, expanded tourism, a sound strategic stockpiling policy, and the like. Nor can a healthy world economy be built by the United States alone. We can only remove obstacles to the efforts of others to earn their way in the world; they must produce the right goods and services at the right prices and at the right time, and they must find the energy and drive to sell them. International financial arrangements must be designed to facilitate the flow of goods and services, but no financial arrangements can substitute for a pattern of balanced physical trade. It will take unremitting effort and close cooperation throughout the free world to create such a pattern.

I think it is right that time should be taken for the most thoroughgoing canvass of all aspects of these policies and their implications. But the world does not stand still. Failure to move resolutely forward can easily result in slipping backward. The President's target for decisive forward action is the congressional session which begins next January. In my judgment, that is none too soon.

To achieve a healthy world economy will require some adjustments at home, as well as abroad. But the stakes are very high. Failure to find durable solutions would mean at the best a continued patchwork of unpalatable stopgap remedies and, at the worst, and far more likely, a shrinkage of world trade which would undermine our own prosperity and threaten disaster to our allies abroad. The United States has learned by painful experience that it cannot afford political or military isolation; we are also learning that we cannot afford economic isolation.

## **Liberia Withdraws From GATT**

Press release 310 dated June 9

The U.S. Government has been informed by the United Nations at New York that the Government of Liberia has notified the Secretary-General of the United Nations of its intention to withdraw from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), effective June 13, 1953. Under the terms of the Protocol of Provisional Application of the General Agreement, any contracting party may withdraw on 60 days' written notice to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

The withdrawal of Liberia from the General Agreement will not result in any alteration in U.S. duties. The only concessions which the United States made to Liberia in the General Agreement were bindings of the duty-free status of latex or crude India rubber (not including jelutong or

pontianak) (par. 1697); palm oil (par. 1732); and palmyra, piassava, and palm-leaf fibers, not elsewhere specified (par. 1684). All these items were also bound duty-free in GATT to the United Kingdom, and this status continues.

## **Import Quota Imposed on Shelled Filberts**

### **Background Information**

White House press release dated June 10

The President on June 10 issued a proclamation placing a limitation on the importation of shelled filberts during the 1952-53 crop year.

The proclamation, which puts into effect the findings and recommendations of the U.S. Tariff Commission, was found necessary under section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act in order to keep the level of imports consistent with the Department of Agriculture's filbert marketing agreement and order.

The proclamation will limit to 4,500,000 pounds the total quantity of shelled filberts that may be imported for consumption or withdrawn from warehouses where stored as a result of importation, during the period October 1, 1952 to September 30, 1953.

The U.S. filbert industry had accumulated excessive inventories during the 2 previous marketing years, while a record filbert crop was harvested by growers last fall. Under provisions of the filbert marketing agreement and order, a substantial portion of the crop had to be shelled. As a result, U.S. production of filbert kernels during the 1952-53 season reached an alltime high of 3,300,000 pounds. This production has been in competition with lower-priced imports, resulting in a return to U.S. filbert growers of only 55 percent of parity for the 1952 crop. The President felt, therefore, that the quota restriction was necessary to fulfill the objectives of the filbert marketing agreement and order under section 22.

The Tariff Commission, which instituted its investigation of the filbert marketing situation on April 13, 1952, will continue its studies and will report its findings from time to time to the President.

### **Proclamation 3020<sup>1</sup>**

1. WHEREAS, pursuant to section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as added by section 31 of the act of August 24, 1935, 49 Stat. 773, reenacted by section 1 of the act of June 3, 1937, 50 Stat. 246, and amended by section 3 of the act of July 3, 1948, 62 Stat. 1248, and section 3 of the act of June 28, 1950, 64 Stat. 261 (7 U. S. C. 624), the President caused the United States Tariff Commission to make an investigation to determine whether almonds, filberts, walnuts, Brazil nuts, or cashews are being or are practically certain to be imported into the United States under such conditions and in such quantities as to render

<sup>1</sup> 18 Fed. Reg. 3453.

or tend to render ineffective, or materially interfere with, certain programs or operations undertaken by the Department of Agriculture with respect to almonds, pecans, filberts, or walnuts, or to reduce substantially the amount of any product processed in the United States from almonds, pecans, filberts, or walnuts with respect to which any such program or operation is being undertaken; and

2. WHEREAS the said Commission instituted such investigation on April 13, 1950, and in the course of such investigation has from time to time reported to the President regarding the need for the imposition of restrictions under the said section 22 in order to prevent imports of tree nuts from rendering ineffective, or materially interfering with, tree-nut programs of the Department of Agriculture; and

3. WHEREAS the said Commission reported to the President on September 25, 1952, regarding the need for action under the said section 22 in order to protect tree-nut programs of the Department of Agriculture for the 1952-53 crop year, and the President, on the basis of such report and recommendations made by the said Commission in connection therewith, issued a proclamation on September 27, 1952 (Proclamation 2991; 17 F. R. 8645), carrying out in part the said recommendations; and

4. WHEREAS, on the basis of the said report of September 25, 1952, and the investigation covered thereby, I find that shelled filberts (whether or not blanched) are practically certain to be imported during the remainder of the 12-month period ending September 30, 1953, in such quantity and under such conditions as to render or tend to render ineffective, or materially interfere with, the program undertaken by the Department of Agriculture with respect to filberts pursuant to the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, as amended; and

5. WHEREAS I find and declare that the imposition of the quantitative limitation hereinafter proclaimed is shown by the investigation of the said Commission to be necessary in order that the entry of imported shelled filberts (whether or not blanched) will not render or tend to render ineffective, or materially interfere with, the said program undertaken by the Department of Agriculture with respect to filberts;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by the said section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended, do hereby proclaim that no shelled filberts (whether or not blanched) shall be permitted to be entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption hereafter and prior to October 1, 1953, which would permit the total quantity of such filberts entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption during the period October 1, 1952 to September 30, 1953, both dates inclusive, to exceed 4,500,000 pounds, which permissible total quantity I hereby find and declare to be proportionately not less than 50 per centum of the average annual total quantity of shelled filberts which were entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption during the representative period hereinafter mentioned.

I hereby determine that the period October 1, 1949 through September 30, 1951 is a representative period for the purpose of the first proviso to section 22 (b) of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the city of Washington this 10th day of June in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and fifty-three, and of the independence of the United States of America the one hundred and seventy-seventh.



By the President:  
JOHN FOSTER DULLES,  
*Secretary of State.*

## New Import Quotas Placed on Certain Dairy Products and Oils

### Background Information

White House press release dated June 8

The President on June 8 issued a proclamation putting into effect the findings and recommendations of the U.S. Tariff Commission under section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act as amended, with respect to certain dairy products, flaxseed and linseed oil, and peanuts and peanut oil.

In the past, regulation of imports of these certain dairy and other farm products by the Department of Agriculture has been specified under section 104 of the Defense Production Act, which expires on June 30 unless further extended by legislation.

The President's action places the Department of Agriculture's crop-control and price-support programs for these products in the same status as the Department's crop-control and price-support programs for other agricultural products.

These limitations on imports are found to be necessary to protect the U.S. Department of Agriculture's crop-control and domestic price-support programs for these products from being materially interfered with by excessive imports from foreign countries.

Under this new arrangement the Department's crop-control programs for these products are placed on a more consistent basis and they can be patterned to meet the new crop conditions as they arise. Also under section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, the Government, when necessary, can adjust the quotas or fees on imports to be no greater than are required to protect adequately the Department's domestic crop-control and price-support programs from being materially interfered with by excessive imports. This new arrangement is less arbitrary and makes these Government programs conform more with the requirements of the Government's foreign trade and economic policy and with the reciprocal trade agreements to which the United States is a party.

If in the future these restrictions should prove to be either excessive or inadequate, the fees and quotas on imports may be adjusted under section 22 to meet the situation by action of the President upon recommendation of the Tariff Commission.

The new quotas and fees will become effective July 1, 1953, when section 104 of the Defense Production Act expires, unless it is renewed by further legislation.

In addition to the commodities listed in the President's Proclamation, the Tariff Commission's investigation covered imports of tung nuts and tung oil. Imports of these products are currently restricted by direction of the Secretary of Agriculture under section 104 of the Defense Production Act. The Tariff Commission, however, re-

Article	LIST I	Quantity
Butter . . . . .		707,000 pounds
Dried whole milk. . . . .		7,000 pounds
Dried buttermilk. . . . .		496,000 pounds
Dried cream. . . . .		500 pounds
Dried skimmed milk . . . . .		1,807,000 pounds
Malted milk, and compounds or mixtures of or substitutes for milk or cream. . . . .		6,000 pounds (aggregate quantity)

Article	LIST II	Quantity
Cheddar cheese, and cheese and substitutes for cheese containing, or processed from, Cheddar cheese.		2,780,100 pounds (aggregate quantity)
Edam and Gouda cheese . . . . .		4,600,200 pounds (aggregate quantity)
Bluemold (except Stilton) cheese, and cheese and substitutes for cheese containing, or processed from, bluemold cheese.		4,167,000 pounds (aggregate quantity)
Italian-type cheeses, made from cow's milk, in original loaves (Romano made from cow's milk, Reggiano, Parmesano, Provoloni, Provolette, and Sbrinz).		9,200,100 pounds (aggregate quantity)
Peanuts, whether shelled, not shelled, blanched, salted, prepared, or preserved (including roasted peanuts, but not including peanut butter).		1,709,000 pounds (aggregate quantity): <i>Provided</i> , That peanuts in the shell shall be charged against this quota on the basis of 75 pounds for each 100 pounds of peanuts in the shell

Article	LIST III	Fee
Peanut oil. . . . .		25% <i>ad valorem</i> on peanut oil entered or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption during any 12-month period beginning July 1 in excess of 80,000,000 pounds
Flaxseed (except flaxseed approved for planting pursuant to the Federal Seed Act)		50% <i>ad valorem</i>
Linseed oil, and combinations and mixtures in chief value of such oil. . . . .		50% <i>ad valorem</i>

ported that it did not find that imports of tung nuts and tung oil would, if unrestricted by measures taken under section 104 or section 22, be practically certain to interfere with the program of the Department of Agriculture with respect to the domestic production of tung nuts. The Commission therefore did not recommend that any restriction be imposed on imports of these products.

The President has authorized the Tariff Commission to release the report made to him on the investigation of imports subject to restriction under section 104 of the Defense Production Act.<sup>1</sup>

**Proclamation 3019<sup>2</sup>**

WHEREAS, pursuant to section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as added by section 31 of the act of August 24, 1935, 49 Stat. 773, reenacted by section 1 of the act of June 3, 1937, 50 Stat. 246, and as amended by section 3 of the act of July 3, 1948, 62 Stat. 1248, section 3 of the act of June 28, 1950, 64 Stat. 261, and section 8 (b) of the act of June 16, 1951, Public Law 50, 82d Congress (7 U. S. C. 624), the Secretary of Agriculture advised me that he had reason to believe that upon the expiration of section 104 of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended, the products included in the lists appended to and made a part of this proclamation are practically certain to be imported into the United States under such conditions and in such quantities as to render or tend to render ineffective, or materially interfere with, programs undertaken by the Department of Agriculture with respect to certain of such articles or with respect to products from which certain of such articles are processed, or to reduce substantially the amount of one or more of

such articles processed in the United States from agricultural commodities with respect to which a program of the Department of Agriculture is being undertaken;

WHEREAS, having agreed with the Secretary of Agriculture's reason for such belief, I caused the United States Tariff Commission to make an investigation under the said section 22 with respect to the said articles;

WHEREAS, the said Tariff Commission has made such an investigation and has reported to me its findings and recommendations made in connection therewith;

WHEREAS, on the basis of the said investigation and report of the Tariff Commission, I find that in the event section 104 of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended, expires under its present terms, the articles included in the lists appended to and made a part of this proclamation are practically certain to be imported into the United States under such conditions and in such quantities as to render or tend to render ineffective, or materially interfere with, programs or operations undertaken by the Department of Agriculture or agencies operating under its direction, pursuant to sections 101, 201, 301, and 401 of the Agricultural Act of 1949, as amended, and Part VI of Title III of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, as amended, with respect to certain of such articles or with respect to products from which certain of such articles are processed, or to reduce substantially the amount of certain of such articles processed in the United States from agricultural commodities with respect to which the said programs or operations of the United States Department of Agriculture are being undertaken; and

WHEREAS I find and declare that in the event section 104 of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended, expires under its present terms, the imposition of the fees and quantitative limitations hereinafter proclaimed is shown by such investigation of the Tariff Commission to be necessary in order that the entry, or withdrawal from warehouse, for consumption of such articles will not render or tend to render ineffective, or materially interfere with, the said programs or operations, or reduce substantially the amount of products processed in the United States from agricultural commodities with respect to which certain of the said programs or operations are being undertaken:

<sup>1</sup> Copies of the Commission's report may be obtained by addressing requests to the U.S. Tariff Commission, 5th and E Sts., N.W., Washington 25, D. C.

<sup>2</sup> 18 Fed. Reg. 3361.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by the said section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended, do hereby proclaim that on and after July 1, 1953, articles included in the lists appended to and hereby made a part of this proclamation shall be subject to quantitative limitations and fees, as follows:

1. Articles included in Lists I and II (except peanuts) shall be permitted to be entered only by or for the account of a person or firm to whom a license has been issued by or under the authority of the Secretary of Agriculture, and only in accordance with the terms of such license. Such licenses shall be issued under regulations of the Secretary of Agriculture which he determines will, to the fullest extent practicable, result in (1) the equitable distribution of the respective quotas for such articles among importers or users and (2) the allocation of shares of the respective quotas for such articles among supplying countries, based upon the proportion supplied by such countries during previous representative periods, taking due account of any special factors which may have affected or may be affecting the trade in the articles concerned. No licenses shall be issued which will permit any such articles to be entered during any 12-month period beginning July 1 in excess of the respective quantities specified for such articles in Lists I and II and, in the case of articles included in List II, during the first 4 months and the first 8 months of any such 12-month period in excess of one-third and two-thirds, respectively, of such specified quantities.

2. No peanuts included in List II shall be entered during any 12-month period beginning July 1 in excess of the quantity specified for such peanuts in the said List II.

3. Articles included in List III shall, when entered, be subject to the fees respectively specified therefor in the said List III.

I hereby determine that the periods specified in the said report of the Tariff Commission for the purpose of the first proviso to section 22 (b) of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended, are representative periods for such purpose.

The provisions of this proclamation shall not apply to articles imported by or for the account of any department or agency of the Government of the United States.

As used in this proclamation, the word "entered" means "entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption".

This proclamation shall be without force and effect if section 104 of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended, is extended beyond June 30, 1953.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this eighth day of June in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and

[SEAL] fifty-three, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and seventy-seventh.



By the President:  
JOHN FOSTER DULLES,  
*Secretary of State.*

## MSA Makes Additional Grant of \$15 Million to Yugoslavia

The Mutual Security Agency on June 15 announced a special grant of \$15 million to help Yugoslavia build up reserve stores of raw materials and food which were depleted as a result of last year's disastrous drought.

Previously this fiscal year, \$106,750,000 had been allotted to Yugoslavia. This amount included \$31,000,000 as emergency drought aid to finance purchases of such items as corn and wheat to stop an immediate threat of famine in Yugoslavia, as well as some essential raw materials.

The new grant of \$15 million will help restock Yugoslavia's depleted food and raw material larders. This will help avoid another emergency before new harvests are in and raw material supplies are replenished.

The balance of \$75,750,000 was allotted by MSA under the \$99,000,000 tripartite-aid program of the United States, United Kingdom, and France for Yugoslavia. The U.S. share of the tripartite program is \$78,000,000, including \$2,250,000 which was made available to Yugoslavia as an advance from 1952 fiscal year funds.

## Appointment of Chairman of U.S. Committee for U.N. Day

Secretary Dulles announced on June 15 (press release 317) the appointment of Thomas J. Watson, Jr., as 1953 chairman of the U.S. Committee for U.N. Day. At the same time, he announced that Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt and Warren R. Austin had accepted his invitation to serve as honorary chairmen of the committee.

In a telegram to Mr. Watson, Mr. Dulles declared that the U.N. Day program, spearheaded by the U.S. Committee for U.N. Day, "is important to administration support of the United Nations." In accepting the Secretary's invitation, Mr. Watson said, "I will be delighted to serve as chairman of the U.S. Committee for U.N. Day and will bend every effort to carry out the job in the way you and your associates desire." In a later statement, Mr. Watson said, "I have accepted the appointment to be 1953 chairman of the U.S. Committee for U.N. Day because I believe that the best hope for peace in the world lies in the work of the United Nations."

Warren Austin served as chief of the U.S. delegation to the U.N. until this year. Mrs. Roosevelt was a member of the U.S. delegation to the General Assembly for a number of years.

The U.S. Committee for U.N. Day (formerly called National Citizens' Committee for U.N. Day) was established by the U.S. Government in 1948 in response to a U.N. General Assembly resolution that October 24 be observed annually as U.N. Day. October 24 is the day that the U.N. Charter came into force. Each year the Secretary of State, with the approval of the President, appoints a chairman for the U.S. Committee for U.N. Day which organizes the observance of U.N. Day in this country. The committee is composed of more than 100 national organizations representing civic, business, labor, agriculture, veterans, religion, education, welfare, youth, women, trade, and service associations.

## U.S.-U.N. Cooperation in U.N. Postal Activities

*by John D. Tomlinson*

A postage stamp, small as it is, has a significance far beyond its worth either in cash or as a prepayment for postal service. The postage stamps of all nations frequently symbolize their ideals and traditions, their leaders, or great events in their history. Because of their material and symbolic values, millions of people throughout the world save and collect them as a hobby, for historical study, for personal prestige, or occasionally for investment. But the postage stamps of each nation would have little worldwide interest if they were not universally recognized as valid for mailing purposes to all parts of the world through the chain of national postal establishments which form, under the Universal Postal Union, a single postal territory for the reciprocal exchange of correspondence.

Very early in the development of U.N. headquarters arrangements, the question was raised of the possible establishment of a U.N. postal administration and the issuance of U.N. stamps. The unique position of the United Nations and its impact upon all peoples prompted a considerable amount of interest in this subject on the part of some delegations to the General Assembly. Although the first formal proposal on the matter was made by the Argentine delegation to the second session of the General Assembly in the fall of 1947,<sup>1</sup> the possibility of such a development had been anticipated in the negotiations between the United States and the United Nations in the headquarters agreement. This agreement, which was approved by Congress, August 4, 1947,<sup>2</sup> provided that:

In the event that the United Nations should propose to organize its own postal service, the conditions under which such service will be set up shall be the subject of a supplemental agreement.

The Argentine proposal envisaged a U.N. postal administration which would issue U.N. stamps

and provide its own postal facilities for official U.N. mail. These facilities would be provided at headquarters and at such other U.N. offices as might be established. One of the motives underlying the Argentine proposal was to apply revenues toward the amortization of the cost of the U.N. headquarters building. The Secretary-General, in a report to the General Assembly,<sup>3</sup> suggested the exploration of another type of arrangement under which U.N. postal activities would be restricted to the issuance and use of U.N. stamps for its official mail, leaving all other operations to the national postal administrations concerned, under agreements to be concluded with them. The General Assembly, however, was not prepared to embark on either course without considerably more study of the many problems involved, and accepted the proposal of the Secretary-General that inquiries be made into the administrative, technical, and financial implications of a U.N. postal service and that recommendations thereon be submitted to the next session.<sup>4</sup>

Pursuant to this resolution, U.N. officials sought the advice and assistance of the U.S. Post Office Department with regard to the two principal alternative proposals. After extended examination of each, the Secretary-General, in his report to the third session of the General Assembly in 1948<sup>5</sup> concluded that in view of the limited financial prospects, complicated technical and administrative operations, and limited usefulness to overseas offices and specialized agencies, "it would appear that there would be no financial advantage in pursuing this project further at the present time."

In the discussions on this report in the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly, it was pointed out that the advantages in terms of publicity likely to result from the issue of special U.N. stamps if a U.N. postal administration were

<sup>1</sup> U.N. doc. A/367 dated Aug. 28, 1947.

<sup>2</sup> P. L. 357, 80th Cong.

<sup>3</sup> U.N. doc. A/C.5/191 dated Oct. 31, 1947.

<sup>4</sup> G.A. Resolution 159 (II) dated Nov. 20, 1947.

<sup>5</sup> U.N. doc. A/655 dated Sept. 28, 1948.

created made it desirable for the United Nations to pursue the inquiries and negotiations already initiated. Alternately, it was proposed that further studies and negotiations be pursued concerning the issue of national stamps designed for U.N. purposes.<sup>6</sup> The resolution adopted by the General Assembly on October 8, 1948, approved in principle the idea of establishing a United Nations Postal Administration, authorized the Secretary-General to conclude arrangements with various governments for the issue of special or overprinted postage stamps, and requested him to pursue the inquiries and negotiations already initiated.<sup>7</sup>

Pursuant to this resolution, the Secretary-General approached the U.S. Government to ascertain whether it would be possible for the United States to issue a commemorative or special U.N. stamp or an overprinted stamp. Extensive consideration was given to this matter by officials of the Post Office Department and the Department of State. After considering various alternatives, they concluded that legislative restrictions and other serious difficulties made it impossible at that time for the United States to issue stamps with a U.N. overprint or a special issue of a distinctive U.N. stamp for exclusive sale at U.N. headquarters.

The Secretary-General continued active study of the problem of establishing an autonomous postal administration. The former Director of the Netherlands Postal Service, W. R. Van Goor, was called in to survey various aspects of it, and further consultations were held with U.S. postal officials. Considerable attention was given to estimating the cost of operations and estimated revenues. Although the experts differed in their estimates, the Secretary-General, in his report to the fourth session of the General Assembly,<sup>8</sup> estimated that the United Nations might effect a saving of \$21,000 (based on 1948 costs) if it were to operate its own postal service. This estimate did not include any revenues which might be derived from the sale of stamps for philatelic purposes.

The discussion in the General Assembly of this report, which was presented without recommendations, revealed a cleavage between those who wished to proceed immediately with the establishment of an autonomous postal administration and those who felt further study was necessary. Others felt it was a burdensome task for the United Nations to undertake such an operation in view of the excellent services being rendered by the U.S. Post Office Department. Before a final decision was taken, various delegations desired more clarification on such matters as the nature of the necessary agreement with the United States, further study of costs, and the relationship with the Universal Postal Union. The U.S. delegation took a

neutral position, but expressed the willingness of the United States to continue its cooperation with the United Nations in postal matters whatever decision might be taken with regard to the establishment of a U.N. Postal Administration.

A compromise resolution was adopted requesting the Secretary-General "to continue the preparation of necessary arrangements for the establishment of a United Nations postal administration" and to submit a new report at the beginning of the next session.<sup>9</sup> The term "arrangements" was interpreted as authorizing the Secretary-General not only to continue his study of the matter with the assistance of expert advice and to proceed with essential preparatory work incidental to the organization of a postal service, but also to enter into negotiations with the appropriate U.S. authorities. It was understood that such negotiations and other preparatory arrangements undertaken would be the subject of a full report to the General Assembly for its final approval.<sup>10</sup>

#### **Draft U.S.-U.N. Postal Agreement**

Following the adoption of this resolution, U.S. officials in the Post Office Department and in the Department of State collaborated fully with U.N. officials in attempting to find a satisfactory solution to give effect to the wishes of the General Assembly. In February 1950 conversations were held at Washington between U.S. and U.N. officials resulting in a first draft of a U.S.-U.N. postal agreement patterned along the lines of the Italian-Vatican City agreement. This draft agreement envisaged the establishment, operation, and maintenance of a U.N. Postal Administration within the headquarters district of the United Nations in New York and included arrangements between the U.N. Postal Administration and the U.S. Post Office Department on various matters including the local transport of mail and the schedule of charges.

The principal problem which emerged for the United Nations in these discussions was with regard to the scope of service to be offered by the U.N. Postal Administration. The United Nations proposed a limited postal service including ordinary letter mail, ordinary printed matter, and parcel post and took the position that the agreement should indicate the limited nature of the service to be offered because of its direct bearing on any postal charges or rates to be worked out between the United Nations and the United States. U.S. representatives, however, took the position that such a matter was not a proper subject for inclusion in the U.S.-U.N. agreement since the U.N. Postal Administration was presumably free to offer whatever services it saw fit. In the course of these discussions it became more and more ap-

<sup>6</sup> U.N. doc. A/671 Rev. I dated Oct. 7, 1948.

<sup>7</sup> G.A. Resolution 232 (IV) dated Oct. 8, 1948.

<sup>8</sup> U.N. doc. A/988 dated Sept. 21, 1949.

<sup>9</sup> G.A. Resolution 342 (iv) dated Oct. 20, 1949.

<sup>10</sup> Report of the Fifth Committee to the General Assembly, U.N. doc. A/1015 dated Oct. 13, 1949.

parent to U.N. representatives as well as U.S. representatives that there were serious disadvantages in operating a U.N. Postal Administration offering only limited services.

During these discussions reference was made to an agreement between Switzerland and Liechtenstein under which Switzerland handles all Liechtenstein postal operations, and Liechtenstein issues and sells a Liechtenstein stamp which is recognized by the Swiss postal authorities. Liechtenstein retains the proceeds from sales of the Liechtenstein stamps for philatelic purposes.

Further conversations were held in April 1950 to examine the possibilities of an arrangement between the United States and the United Nations along the lines of the Swiss-Liechtenstein agreement. As a result of these conversations, a second tentative draft agreement was drawn up under which a U.N. post office station would be established at U.N. headquarters and operated by the U.S. Post Office Department, using stamps provided by the United Nations. This U.N. station would supply all the services offered by any U.S. post office having comparable operations, except that the U.N. Post Office Station would sell and use only U.N. postage stamps. It was provided that all revenue derived from the sale of U.N. postage stamps by the U.N. Post Office Station would be retained by the U.S. Post Office Department as full and complete compensation for its services. The United Nations would provide the U.S. Post Office Department with quarters, custodial services, and utilities for the operation of the U.N. Post Office Station. The United Nations, on the other hand, would maintain a separate agency for the sale of U.N. postage stamps for philatelic purposes and retain all revenue from such sales.

The advantages of an agreement along the foregoing lines were quite obvious. In the first place, the United Nations would not be involved in any operations other than the handling of philatelic sales. The Post Office Department on the other hand would operate the U.N. Post Office Station in the same manner as it had operated a U.S. branch post office at U.N. headquarters, first at Lake Success and subsequently in the headquarters district in New York. The principal remaining barrier to full agreement was the possibility that U.N. stamps might be purchased from the philatelic agency of the U.N. Postal Administration and used for mailing purposes at the U.N. Post Office Station, thereby involving the handling of mail by the U.S. Post Office Department without reimbursement. With U.N. headquarters in a city such as New York, this possibility appeared quite a serious obstacle to the satisfactory implementation of the proposed agreement. Subsequent conversations were held to iron out this difficulty, and a provision was inserted in the draft agreement that the United Nations should limit its sale of stamps for philatelic purposes only to

those made in response to requests sent by mail. Since it was realized that various difficulties might arise in the application of an arrangement of this nature, provision was included in the agreement permitting its amendment 1 year after its entry into force.

The draft agreement as finally negotiated was submitted by the Secretary-General in his report to the fifth session of the General Assembly in 1950.<sup>11</sup> On November 16 the proposed plan was accepted without dissent by the General Assembly,<sup>12</sup> which noted the draft agreement between the United Nations and the United States and requested the Secretary-General to proceed with the conclusion of the agreement and with the necessary arrangements for the establishment of a U.N. Postal Administration at the earliest possible date. In a formal ceremony at U.N. headquarters the agreement was signed March 28, 1951, by Secretary-General Trygve Lie, on behalf of the United Nations, and by Ambassador Warren R. Austin, U.S. representative to the United Nations, and Jesse M. Donaldson, Postmaster General, on behalf of the United States.

Meanwhile, preparations were being made by the United Nations for the design and printing of U.N. postage stamps and postmarks. Under the General Assembly resolution provision had been made for the appointment by the Secretary-General of an Advisory Committee on Stamp Design. With the advice of this committee, it was decided to issue 15 denominations ranging from 1¢ to \$1.

#### U. N. Stamps Issued

On October 24, 1951, the date of entry into force of the agreement, 6 of the 15 denominations of the regular series were issued—1¢, 1½¢, 3¢, 5¢, 25¢, and \$1. On November 16, 1951, 5 more denominations in the regular series were issued—2¢, 10¢, 15¢, 20¢, and 50¢. On December 14, 1951, four airmail stamps were issued in denominations of 6¢, 10¢, 15¢, and 25¢. Following the announcement of the issuance of U.N. stamps, and particularly during the period October 15 to December 24, 1951, orders and inquiries from the public and from philatelists averaged 1,200 pieces per working day, and during the peak rose to 1,800 pieces per day. During the first 3 days of issue approximately 1,100,000 first-day covers were processed.<sup>13</sup>

During 1952 a 2¢ postcard was issued on July 18, an air-letter sheet on August 29, a U.N. Day commemorative stamp in a 5¢ denomination celebrating the signing, in 1945, of the charter at San Francisco, and on December 10, two stamps in 3¢ and 5¢ denominations commemorating the

<sup>11</sup> U.N. doc. A/1934 dated Sept. 26, 1950.

<sup>12</sup> G. A. Resolution 454 (V) dated Nov. 16, 1950.

<sup>13</sup> See *Report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly on the United Nations Postal Administration*, U.N. doc. A/2191 dated Sept. 19, 1952.

adoption in 1948 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Eight stamps in five new issues and a stamped envelope in two sizes are being issued in 1953: "Refugee" stamp, 3¢ and 5¢ denominations, April 24; "Universal Postal Union" stamp, 3¢ and 5¢ denominations, June 12; embossed envelope, 3¢ denomination, in two sizes, in September; "United Nations Day" stamp, 3¢ and

## Stamp Sales to Public

Another question was that of public access to the U.N. Post Office Station, which was located in a restricted area of the headquarters building. Consequently the general public did not have the same opportunity to purchase stamps or post mail matter at the U.N. Post Office Station as at a U.S. Post Office. It was impractical for the United Nations to make more satisfactory arrangements for the public before the completion of the General Assembly building. On the other hand, both the United Nations and the United States wished to serve the general public at U.N. Headquarters and to find a means for allocating proceeds from the sale of stamps as between the U.N. and the U.S. Post Office Department. The U.N. Post Office Station sold U.N. stamps without regard to purpose, and the revenues from all such sales were retained by the U.S. Post Office Department under the terms of the agreement. But its only customers, except on days when stamps were issued, were U.N. officials and others on official business who had ready access to the building. The United Nations under the agreement could not sell stamps to visitors.

In anticipation of the completion of the General Assembly building and the provision of a reception area for the general public, further conversations on these interrelated problems were held in September 1952 between U.N. and U.S. officials. Agreement was reached on a plan under which the U.N. Postal Administration would sell stamps in the public reception center in the new General Assembly building for both philatelic and mailing purposes. Mail matter bearing U.N. postage deposited in the reception center was to be forwarded to the U.N. Post Office Station in another part of the building, with the United Nations reimbursing the U.S. Post Office Department for the face value of postage on all mail matter so forwarded.

In order to effect this arrangement it was necessary to modify the agreement of 1951 by deleting the clause which restricted the sale of U.N. stamps for philatelic purposes to orders received by mail. Subsequently the United States officially notified the Secretary-General that it was prepared to modify the agreement by deleting this clause, and the Secretary-General so recommended to the seventh session of the General Assembly. The General Assembly in its resolution of November 6, 1952, authorized the Secretary-General to "conclude the instrument necessary to revise the postal agreement with the United States of America" by deleting the words in par. (ii) of section 3 reading, "in response to orders received by mail." In an exchange of notes between the Secretary-General and Ambassador Ernest A. Gross of November 7, 1952, and November 17, 1952, respectively, the formal amendment of the agreement was completed. This amendment became effective on

### U.S. Postal Authorities Thanked for Cooperation With United Nations

*On the occasion of the issuance on June 12 of U.N. stamps commemorating the Universal Postal Union (Upu), the Director of the U.N. Information Center in Washington, Paul V. Johansen, presented to Postmaster General Arthur E. Summerfield the first issues of these stamps. In making the presentation, Mr. Johansen paid tribute to the cooperation of the U.S. Post Office Department in the following terms:*

In behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations I have great pleasure in presenting to you the first issues of a stamp, produced by the United Nations Postal Administration in honor of the Universal Postal Union—established in 1874 and in membership the largest of the specialized agencies of the United Nations.

In making this presentation I am asked to convey to you our very best thanks for your cooperation in concluding a postal agreement with the United Nations and also for your kindness in facilitating our philatelic operations.

5¢ denominations, October 24; "Human Rights Day" stamp, 3¢ and 5¢ denominations, December 10.

As an indication of the interest in the purchase of stamps for philatelic purposes, by April 30, 1953, the United Nations had received gross revenues from such sales totaling \$1,031,031. Total expenses to the United Nations in this activity from January 1, 1951, when the U.N. Postal Administration was established by the Secretary-General, through April 30, 1953, amounted to \$320,023, resulting in a net revenue of \$711,008 to the United Nations for that period. These revenues are counted as miscellaneous receipts in the U.N. budget and, as such, help reduce the contributions of member governments to the United Nations.

During the first year of operations several problems arose in connection with the interpretation and application of the U.S.-U.N. Postal Agreement. One of these related to bulk mailings from the U.N. Post Office Station. A number of requests were made for bulk commercial mailings using the U.N. stamp. In view of difficulties in connection with facilities for handling such mailings, as well as the policy questions involved, it was agreed that for the time being bulk mailings of over 1,000 pieces would not be accepted.



November 17, 1952. (For text of the agreement, incorporating the amendment, see Annex.)

During the first few months after the opening of the new General Assembly building in September 1952, an average of 4 to 5 thousand visitors a week were received at the reception center in that building. When U.N. stamps were placed on sale and mailing facilities provided in that area, following the entry into force of the amended agreement, total stamp sales averaged \$3,300 a week. About 85 percent of these stamps were for philatelic purposes; the remainder were used for mail matter for which the Post Office Department was reimbursed.

Although U.N. stamps have been widely publicized, as manifested by the volume of philatelic sales, the arrangements between the United Nations and the United States have not been too well understood. Many have the mistaken impression that the U.S. Post Office Department is footing the bill for handling U.N. mail. Actually the U.S. Post Office Department is fully reimbursed at current U.S. postage rates for all mail matter, official and unofficial, deposited at the U.N. Post Office Station, which is the only station where U.N. stamps may be used for mailing. If any article of mail matter bearing a U.N. stamp were deposited in a U.S. Post Office or mail box it would be considered as unpaid and would be handled accordingly under U.S. Postal Regulations; that is, it would be returned to the sender or sent to the Dead Letter Office.

U.S. postal officials consider the operation of the U.N. Post Office Station quite satisfactory from the standpoint of the Post Office Department, although working out mutually agreeable arrangements in this unique situation has involved a few headaches. It is generally considered that the cost of operations of this station and the revenues received compare favorably with those of U.S. Post Offices offering similar services.

The Universal Postal Congress which opened at Brussels in May 1952 adopted a resolution recognizing, from a postal point of view, the establishment of the U.N. Postal Administration in accordance with the U.N. General Assembly resolution of November 16, 1950, and the Postal Agreement between the United States and the United Nations. As a result of this action, U.N. stamps have been given worldwide recognition by the postal administrations of 93 countries members of the Universal Postal Union.

As the largest contributor to the United Nations (35.12 percent for 1953), the United States benefits more than any other member of the United Nations from this arrangement, inasmuch as the revenue derived from U.N. philatelic sales reduces the amount of its contributions to the annual expenses of the United Nations.

The interests of the United Nations under the arrangement have been well served. U.N. stamps have helped to broaden public acquaintance with

and interest in the United Nations as an institution as well as to provide the United Nations with its own distinctive stamp for its official mail. These benefits, in addition to the substantial proceeds from philatelic sales, have been realized without involving the United Nations in the complexities of international postal operations.

## ANNEX

POSTAL AGREEMENT  
BETWEEN  
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
AND  
THE UNITED NATIONS  
AS AMENDED NOVEMBER 17, 1952

WHEREAS, a certain Agreement between the United States of America and the United Nations, dated the 26th day of June, 1947, regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations (said Agreement being hereinafter referred to as the "Headquarters Agreement") provides that in the event that the United Nations should propose to organize its own postal service, the conditions under which such service shall be set up shall be the subject of a Supplemental Agreement; and

WHEREAS, the United Nations desires to establish a postal service in conformity with the Headquarters Agreement,

NOW THEREFORE, the Parties hereto agree as follows:

### Section 1

#### *Scope of Agreement*

(i) Subject to the provisions of this Agreement, there shall be established a United Nations Post Office Station in the Headquarters District of the United Nations, as defined in the Headquarters Agreement, which shall be operated by the United States Post Office Department.

(ii) The United Nations Post Office Station shall provide at the prevailing rates all the services offered by any United States Post Office having comparable operations except that the United Nations Post Office Station shall use only United Nations postage stamps.

### Section 2

#### *Supply of United Nations Postage Stamps and Stamped Paper*

(i) The United Nations shall at its own expense furnish all United Nations postage stamps required under the terms of this Agreement.

(ii) In the event that the United Nations shall produce or authorize production of stamped envelopes and post-cards, such envelopes or post-cards shall conform to the specifications of the United States Post Office Department as to size and as to quality of paper used.

(iii) No United Nations postage stamps shall be distributed except in accordance with the terms of this Agreement.

### Section 3

#### *Sale of United Nations Postage Stamps*

(i) The United Nations Post Office Station shall sell only United Nations postage stamps which shall be provided by the United Nations free of charge in such quantities as may be necessary to fulfill all reasonable needs of the United Nations Post Office Station. All revenue derived from such sales of United Nations postage stamps and from other services rendered by the United Nations Post Office Station shall be retained by the United States Post Office Department as full and complete compensation for performance of its obligations under the terms of this Agreement, except, however, that the United States Post Office Department shall be reimbursed for performance of any postal services resulting from use of United Nations postage stamps sold for philatelic

purposes under the provisions of paragraph (ii) of this section which are used as postage on mail matter posted at the United Nations Post Office Station by being paid an amount equal to the face value of any such stamps so used as postage.

(ii) The United Nations may maintain a separate agency for the sale of United Nations postage stamps for philatelic purposes. Subject to the provisions of paragraph (i) of this section all revenue derived from such philatelic sales of United Nations postage stamps shall be retained by the United Nations for its own use.

#### Section 4

##### *United Nations Postmarks*

The United Nations shall furnish all postmarking stamps to be applied to mail posted for mailing in the Headquarters District and shall furnish all such postmarking stamps to the United Nations Post Office Station free of charge. All postmarks shall be designated as United Nations postmarks.

#### Section 5

##### *United Nations Post Office Station Premises*

The United Nations shall provide the United States Post Office Department at the expense of the United Nations with the quarters, custodial services and utilities necessary to enable the United States Post Office Department to operate the United Nations Post Office Station in the Headquarters District.

#### Section 6

##### *Staff and Equipment*

Except as otherwise provided in this Agreement the United States Post Office Department will provide at its own expense all staff, equipment and other services and facilities necessary to enable the United States Post Office Department to operate the United Nations Post Office Station under the terms of this Agreement.

#### Section 7

##### *Postal Address of the United Nations*

The postal address of the Headquarters District of the United Nations shall be "United Nations, New York".

#### Section 8

##### *Duration of the Agreement*

(i) This Agreement shall take effect on a date to be agreed upon between the United Nations and the United States Post Office Department.

(ii) This Agreement shall be subject to revision, on the written proposal of either contracting party, after one year from the date of commencement of operations.

(iii) This Agreement may be terminated by either party giving the other written notice of its intention to terminate such Agreement at least twelve (12) months in advance of the termination date fixed in such notice.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the respective representatives have signed this Agreement and have affixed their seals hereto.

DONE in duplicate this twenty-eighth day of March 1951.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

WARREN R. AUSTIN (Seal)  
JESSE M. DONALDSON (Seal)

FOR THE UNITED NATIONS:

TRYOVE LIE

• *Mr. Tomlinson, author of the above article, is an adviser in the Office of U.N. Economic and Social Affairs.*

## U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

### Council of Food and Agriculture Organization

The Department of State on June 16 announced (press release 320) that the Council of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) had convened for its seventeenth session at Rome on June 15.

President Eisenhower appointed Knowles A. Ryerson, dean of the College of Agriculture, University of California, Berkeley, Calif., as U.S. member on the Council for this session. John W. Evans, director of the Office of International Materials Policy, Department of State, and Robert B. Schwenger, chief of the Regional Investigations Branch, Foreign Agricultural Service, Department of Agriculture, have been designated associate U.S. members for this session.

Other members of the U.S. delegation are:

#### *Advisers*

Ursula H. Duffus, Office of U.N. Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State  
L. Wendell Hayes, Attaché for FAO Liaison, American Embassy, Rome  
Robert C. Tetro, Agricultural Attaché, American Embassy, Rome

#### *Adviser and Secretary*

Thomas E. Street, Foreign Agricultural Service, Department of Agriculture

The Council, which is the executive body of the FAO, will be primarily concerned at its forthcoming session with preparations for the seventh session of the Conference of the FAO. Among the items to be considered in this connection are (1) the preparation of a provisional agenda for the Conference; (2) the program of work and budgets for the Organization for 1954 and 1955; and (3) reports on the establishment of an emergency famine reserve, methods of financing agricultural development, and the relationship of the FAO with organized representation of producer and consumer interests. The Council will also consider reports on the work of the Organization and administrative and financial questions.

### THE DEPARTMENT

## Locally Produced Broadcasts in Latin America

Press release 315 dated June 12

Reports from our Embassies in Latin America indicate that much of the local-broadcasting time previously occupied by the relay of the Voice of America's shortwave programs is now being used by public affairs officers of the International Information Administration (IIA) for locally produced shows.

Some 212 broadcasting stations located in 13 Latin American countries gave a total of about 1,028 free hours every 3 months to the local rebroadcast of VOA programs transmitted shortwave from the United States. When economy measures caused IIA's Voice of America to stop beaming Spanish and Portuguese language broadcasts south of the border on May 23, public affairs officers in Mexico City, Panamá, San Salvador, Habana, and nine South American countries were asked to "hold that relay time."

Reports to date show that the speedy offer of interesting, locally produced programs has held much of this

very desirable free air time for U.S. information programs and indicate that Usis missions probably will have the opportunity of broadcasting more than 4,000 additional hours this coming year.

These additional broadcasts can be handled, for the most part, with existing staff and funds. Material for the locally produced shows is drawn from several sources including news and commentary from the Wireless File received daily from IIA's International Press Service in Washington, features and dramatizations adapted from U.S. newspapers, books, and magazines, as well as tape and disc recordings prepared by the IIA's International Broadcasting Service in New York.

The production of local radio programs designed to develop greater understanding between Latin America and the United States has been a regular part of the IIA's program for some time. The local Usis employees and other Latin American talent used on these broadcasts have helped the shows to achieve wide popularity. During the past year, 42 such programs have been broadcast regularly by 14 Usis field posts in Latin America. Almost 500 radio stations gave these locally produced programs free time totaling over 4,500 hours during a 3-months' period.

In addition to the radio programs and occasional television shows produced by Usis missions, Latin America receives the Voice of America's 30-minute worldwide program, broadcast shortwave in English.

### **Mr. McIlvaine To Be Special Assistant to Assistant Secretary McCardle**

The Department of State announced on June 19 (press release 330) that on that day Robinson McIlvaine was sworn in as Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, Carl W. McCardle. The oath was administered by Chief of Protocol, John F. Simmons.

Mr. McIlvaine will deal primarily with the domestic public affairs and information program of the Department. With the reorganization of the Department, this phase of its activities is being given increased attention in view of the desire of Secretary Dulles to provide the American people with a fuller picture of our foreign policy. In this capacity Mr. McIlvaine will assume, in addition to his other duties, those of the Director of the Office of Public Affairs. This position has been abolished by Mr. McCardle.

### **THE FOREIGN SERVICE**

### **Diplomatic Relations Resumed With Colombia**

Press release 326 dated June 18

The Ambassador of the United States at Bogotá, Capus M. Waynick, has been instructed to resume diplomatic relations with Colombia on June 18.

This action is being taken in conformity with the desire of the United States to carry on normal diplomatic relations with the Colombian Government, and in accordance with our information that the new Government in that country has established effective control over Colombian territory and has given assurances of its intention to fulfill the international obligations of Colombia.

### **Confirmations**

On June 11 the Senate confirmed the nomination of John C. Hughes as U.S. permanent representative on the North Atlantic Council with the rank and status of Ambassador.

The Senate on June 15 confirmed Amos J. Peaslee as Ambassador to Australia.

### **Theodore C. Streibert To Be Consultant to Mr. Conant**

Press release 323 dated June 17

At the request of James B. Conant, U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, Theodore C. Streibert of New York City will go to Germany for several months as consultant on the public affairs program. His chief function will be to assist Mr. Conant and his staff in the recently announced reorganization.

Formerly president of radio station WOR, New York, and chairman of the board of the Mutual Broadcasting System, Mr. Streibert has been serving as consultant to Robert L. Johnson, Administrator of IIA, who has approved the new assignment in Germany. After working on special projects for Mr. Johnson, Mr. Streibert recently returned from abroad where he made a field study of radio programming centers and organizational problems under a separate information agency.

### **THE CONGRESS**

### **President Urges U.S. Loan To Coal and Steel Community**

White House press release dated June 17

*On June 17, President Eisenhower made public the following exchange of letters with Sen. Alexander Wiley, chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, and Robert B. Chipperfield, chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives:*

#### **Text of the President's Letter**

JUNE 15, 1953

MY DEAR SENATOR WILEY: (MY DEAR MR. CHIPPERFIELD): While in Europe, I watched with keen interest the efforts to work out the first steps toward European federation. My experience there convinced me that the uniting of Europe is a necessity for the peace and prosperity of Europeans and of the world.

The recent visit to Washington by the members of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community has given me the opportunity to review with them the work and plans of the Community.<sup>1</sup> This Community seems to me to be the most hopeful and constructive development so far toward the economic and political integration of

<sup>1</sup> For text of a White House statement issued on June 3 during this visit, and for an article on the Coal and Steel Community, see BULLETIN of June 8, 1953, p. 800, p. 799.

Europe. As such, this European initiative meets the often expressed hopes of the Congress of the United States.

M. Monnet, President of the High Authority, has described the general program of the Community for the development of its coal and steel resources which will require extensive investment for increasing production and improving productivity. The new Community does not wish to obtain grants for these purposes, but requires loan capital. The proceeds from the taxes now being levied and collected by the Community would appear to provide security for substantial borrowing.

In due time the Community will probably seek loans for these purposes from United States and European sources public and private. It appears to me that a portion of the financing of this development program by the United States Government or one of its agencies, out of moneys available for such purposes and under conditions insuring proper use and ultimate repayment, would foster European integration in a tangible and useful way.

Today the Common Assembly of the Community convenes to receive the first Annual Report from the High Authority regarding the activities of the Community. Your Committee might consider this an appropriate occasion to express its approval of the progress to date and its keen interest in the success of this and future steps toward European integration.

Sincerely yours,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

#### Senator Wiley's Reply

JUNE 16, 1953

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Thank you for your letter of June 15, 1953, regarding the recent visit to the United States of M. Monnet, President of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community. You point out that the creation of this Community is one of the most hopeful and constructive developments so far toward the economic and political integration of Europe. I have noted also that the Common Assembly of the Community convened yesterday to receive the first Annual Report from the High Authority regarding the activities of the Community.

As you know, M. Monnet and his colleagues had two informal sessions with members of the Committee on Foreign Relations while they were in the United States. We discussed the operations of the High Authority and were much impressed by the vision of these men and at the same time their realistic approach to the problem of the integration of Europe.

As you stated in your letter, European initiative in creating the Community meets the often expressed hopes of the Congress. It was in 1949 that the Economic Cooperation Act was amended

to state that it was the policy of the "people of the United States to encourage the unification of Europe . . . ." In 1950, the Act was again amended to emphasize the policy of the United States "to encourage the further unification of Europe . . . ."

The members of the Foreign Relations Committee have asked that you convey to the Community our best wishes for its success.

It is my deep hope that the European Coal and Steel Community will be able to weld together the European economy so that the combined strength of free Europe will enable that continent to maintain its freedom and develop its resources to the fullest in order that the people of Europe may prosper.

Sincerely yours,

ALEXANDER WILEY

#### Representative Chipfield's Reply

JUNE 16, 1953

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Your letter of June 15, 1953, referring to the European Coal and Steel Community, was read to the Committee on Foreign Affairs. The Committee was greatly interested in the information it contained.

The Committee and its members have followed the progress of the Community with great interest, and a number of its members have been encouraged by their meetings with the president, M. Monnet, and other members of the High Authority. The Committee had contemplated reference to the real progress of this most significant step toward European integration in the legislation now pending before it. In view of the convening of the Common Assembly of the Community on June 15th, and in view of the fact that the Community is not an applicant for funds authorized in the pending legislation, the Committee adopted the enclosed resolution which I have the honor to transmit to you. It is our hope that you will see fit to transmit it with the personal good wishes and congratulations of the Committee to the Community and its High Authority.

We hope that this is a symbol of prompt action on the part of the European Defense Community and the European Political Community because we believe that the nations of Europe must pull together to achieve not only military integration but political federation.

Respectfully,

ROBERT B. CHIPFIELD

[Enclosure]

JUNE 11, 1953

#### RESOLUTION

WHEREAS the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives has followed the development and progress of the European Coal and Steel Community from its inception with great interest, through hearings,

reports and unofficial discussions with its officials; and WHEREAS this is the most significant step toward European integration to date; and

WHEREAS the Congress has repeatedly expressed its belief in the paramount importance of such integration, having stated in the Mutual Security Act of 1952 "The Congress welcomes the recent progress in political federation, military integration, and economic unification in Europe and reaffirms its belief in the necessity of further vigorous efforts toward these ends as a means of building strength, establishing security, and preserving peace in the North Atlantic area;" and

WHEREAS the Committee has learned that the first annual report from the High Authority will be made to the Common Assembly of the Community on June 15th;

NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED

1. The Committee congratulates the Community and its High Authority under the leadership of its president, M. Monnet, upon the substantial progress already made, not only because of the tangible benefits that are already apparent, but because of the significance of the Community in the building of a united Europe.

2. The Committee notes with satisfaction that the Community is in a position to seek capital loans for improving productivity on a sound credit basis. Subject to proper qualification, it is the hope of the Committee that the Community may be able to obtain a portion of such loans from United States sources.

3. The Committee, reiterating the view repeatedly and officially stated by the Congress of the importance of European unity to Europe and to the free world, expresses its hope that the European Defense Community and the European Political Community which constitute the necessary further steps, of which the Coal and Steel Community is the first, may be speedily developed, ratified and put into force.

## President Rejects Increased Duty on Screen-Printed Silk Scarves

White House press release dated June 10

*The President on June 10 sent identical letters to Eugene D. Millikin, Chairman, Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate, and Daniel A. Reed, Chairman, Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives. A similar letter was sent on the same date to Edgar B. Brassard, Chairman of the U.S. Tariff Commission. Text of the President's letter to Chairmen Millikin and Reed follows:*

I have carefully reviewed the report of the Tariff Commission of April 13, 1953, made under Section 7 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, on screen-printed silk scarves, in which the Commission reported that screen-printed silk scarves provided for in paragraph 1210 of the Tariff Act of 1930 and included in item 1210 of Part I of the Torquay Schedule XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade are being imported into the United States in such increased quantities, both actual and relative, as to cause serious injury to the domestic industry producing like or directly competitive products, and as to threaten continuance of such injury.

The Commission recommended the application, for an indefinite period, of an increase in the rate of duty from 32½ per centum to 65 per centum *ad valorem* on imported screen-printed silk

scarves to prevent the continuance of such serious injury to such domestic industry.

Because of international conditions which demand our most earnest efforts to maintain friendly cooperation with other countries of the free world, I feel keenly the necessity of acting on these escape-clause cases with great care and I feel that I should act only after all the facts involved have been clearly established and well authenticated. And in considering such cases, they must be carefully reviewed together with all the possible international implications of such action.

One of the central points in the case under consideration is: What is the industry for which serious injury is claimed? The Commission itself apparently had to resolve this question somewhat arbitrarily. It appears that there are United States entrepreneurs who buy the raw silk in Japan, pay there for the labor at piece rates for printing and finishing which is all done under their supervision and continued ownership. They then export the finished products to the United States and merchandise them here. Such American entrepreneurs claim to be the domestic industry. There are other firms who do the piece-rate work on the raw material by screen-printing and finishing the silk into scarves in this country, but who never own or control the scarves, nor have any direction of the industry, except as it pertains to the piece-rate jobs they are hired to do and which they do in their shops in this country.

To complicate matters further, most of these latter firms were not engaged in the processing of scarves alone but rather in providing certain services in the manufacture of scarves and of other products as well. Moreover, these firms are only a fraction of all the domestic firms which offer the same or similar services.

It is also questionable whether the effective increase of some 9 or 10 cents in the tariff on lower-priced scarves would not simply increase the cost to the consumer without actual benefit to the segment of the apparel industry producing the lower-priced competitive article. It is not convincingly shown that the higher-priced scarves, costing in excess of \$4.50 per dozen abroad, should be subjected to a doubling of our tariff. The problem is, of course, inextricably bound up with the vagaries of style considerations affecting the apparel industry, with its attendant competitive conditions and speculative risks, and in many cases to the handling or processing of items other than scarves in the several processing steps.

Another aspect which bears on the case, and concerning which I feel further information is required, relates to the returns from other products which the industry, as it may be defined by the Commission, may be enjoying. Question has also been raised as to whether the imported silk scarves do not, because of the great disparity in quality and price, reach an additional market beyond that tapped by domestic silk scarves. If this is true,

it would have an important bearing on whether escape-clause action could help in any significant way in relieving the difficulties of the domestic firms which have applied to the Commission.

Because of these questions and doubts, I am returning the report to the Commission with the request that it make a further careful examination of this case in the light of the more recent and current facts and conditions in the industry producing silk scarves and report its findings to me.

As you know, I have recommended to the Congress that a Commission be set up to study our over-all foreign economic policy, including our tariff structure and trade program. Until such a study is concluded and our future international trade policy is determined, I am reluctant to modify the concessions granted in our trade agreements unless the evidence clearly demonstrates that such modifications are necessary.

I am sending this report to you in compliance with the provision of section 7 (c) of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, which provides that should the President not take the action recommended by the Tariff Commission within sixty days, he shall submit a report to the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives and to the Committee on Finance of the Senate, stating why he has not made such adjustment or modification, or imposed such quotas.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

## PUBLICATIONS

### Recent Releases

*For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.*

**Vocational and Industrial Education, Extension of Cooperative Program in Brazil.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2475. Pub. 4913. 5 pp. 5¢.

Exchange of notes between the United States and Brazil—Signed at Rio de Janeiro Oct. 14, 1950.

**Economic Cooperation, Guaranties under Public Law 472, 80th Congress, As Amended.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2517. Pub. 4749. 4 pp. 5¢.

Exchange of notes between the United States and the Philippines—Signed at Washington Feb. 18 and 19, 1952.

**Safety of Life at Sea.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2495. Pub. 4728. 241 pp. 55¢.

Convention, with regulations, between the United States and Other Governments—Signed at London June 10, 1948.

**Education, Cooperative Program in Nicaragua, Addi-**

**tional Financial Contributions.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2530. Pub. 4739. 5 pp. 5¢.

Exchange of notes between the United States and Nicaragua—Signed at Managua Mar. 27 and Apr. 25, 1952.

**General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, First Protocol of Supplementary Concessions.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2532. Pub. 4769. 11 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Other Governments—Dated at Geneva Oct. 27, 1951.

**Health and Sanitation, Cooperative Program in Haiti, Additional Financial Contributions, Supplementing Agreement of Sept. 18 and 27, 1950.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2536. Pub. 4780. 4 pp. 5¢.

Exchange of notes between the United States and Haiti—Signed at Port-au-Prince Oct. 17, 1951 and Mar. 31, 1952.

**Education, Cooperative Program in Ecuador, Additional Financial Contributions.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2539. Pub. 4790. 5 pp. 5¢.

Exchange of notes between the United States and Ecuador—Signed at Quito Mar. 18 and 31, 1952.

**Health and Sanitation, Cooperative Program in Uruguay, Additional Financial Contributions.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2540. Pub. 4791. 4 pp. 5¢.

Exchange of notes between the United States and Uruguay—Signed at Montevideo Jan. 16 and Mar. 26, 1952.

**Education, Cooperative Program in Paraguay, Additional Financial Contributions.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2541. Pub. 4796. 6 pp. 5¢.

Exchange of notes between the United States and Paraguay—Signed at Asunción Jan. 31 and Mar. 25, 1952.

**Health and Sanitation, Cooperative Program in Ecuador Additional Financial Contributions.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2542. Pub. 4797. 5 pp. 5¢.

Exchange of notes between the United States and Ecuador—signed at Quito Mar. 18 and 31, 1952.

**Agriculture, Cooperative Program in Paraguay, Additional Financial Contributions.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2543. Pub. 4799. 6 pp. 5¢.

Exchange of notes between the United States and Paraguay—Signed at Asunción Jan. 31 and Mar. 31, 1952.

**Education, Cooperative Program in the Dominican Republic, Additional Financial Contributions.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2544. 4 pp. 5¢.

Exchange of notes between the United States and the Dominican Republic—Signed at Ciudad Trujillo Feb. 12 and Apr. 4, 1952.

**Customs Concessions on Automobiles, Provisional Agreement.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2545. Pub. 4801. 2 pp. 5¢.

Exchange of notes between the United States and Chile—Signed at Santiago Apr. 8, 1952.

**Health and Sanitation, Cooperative Program in Haiti, Additional Financial Contributions.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2547. Pub. 4804. 4 pp. 5¢.

Exchange of notes between the United States and Haiti—Signed at Port-au-Prince Mar. 3 and Apr. 9, 1952.

**Telecommunications, Registration of Frequencies Used in Greenland by United States Authorities.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2548. Pub. 4805. 3 pp. 5¢.

Exchange of notes between the United States and Den-

mark—Dated at Washington Mar. 25 and Apr. 4, 1952.

**Air Transport Services, Amending Agreement of Mar. 31, 1949.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2551. Pub. 4773. 3 pp. 5¢.

Exchange of notes between the United States and Panama—Signed at Washington May 29 and June 3, 1952.

**Health and Sanitation, Cooperative Program in Brazil, Additional Financial Contributions.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2552. Pub. 4808. 5 pp. 5¢.

Exchange of notes between the United States and Brazil—Signed at Rio de Janeiro Feb. 28 and Apr. 18, 1952.

**Relief From Taxation on Defense Expenditures.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2556. Pub. 4812. 12 pp. 10¢.

Exchange of notes between the United States and France—Signed at Paris Mar. 13, 1952.

**Agriculture, Cooperative Program in Haiti, Additional Financial Contributions.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2558. Pub. 4818. 5 pp. 5¢.

Exchange of notes between the United States and Haiti—Signed at Port-au-Prince Jan. 29 and Apr. 9, 1952.

**Relief from Taxation on Defense Expenditures.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2559. Pub. 4821. 4 pp. 5¢.

Exchange of notes between the United States and the United Kingdom—Signed at London Mar. 17 and 18, 1952.

**Mutual Defense Assistance.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2560. Pub. 4833. 12 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Ecuador—Signed at Quito Feb. 20, 1952.

**Reciprocal Trade, Supplementing Agreement of November 6, 1939.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2565. Pub. 4753. 39 pp. 15¢.

Agreement between the United States and Venezuela—Signed at Caracas Aug. 28, 1952; exchange of notes signed Aug. 28, 1952.

**Economic Cooperation, Guaranties under Public Law 472, 80th Congress, As Amended.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2567. Pub. 4839. 4 pp. 5¢.

Exchange of notes between the United States and Norway—Signed at Washington Mar. 28 and Apr. 1, 1952.

**Economic Cooperation, Guaranties under Public Law 472, 80th Congress, As Amended.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2568. Pub. 4840. 4 pp. 5¢.

Exchange of notes between the United States and Greece—Signed at Washington Apr. 21 and 23, 1952.

**Technical Cooperation, Joint Fund Program.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2570. Pub. 4842. 8 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Israel—Signed at Tel Aviv May 9, 1952.

**Emergency Economic Assistance.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2571. Pub. 4849. 5 pp. 5¢.

Exchange of notes between the United States and Israel—Dated at Washington May 1, 1952.

**Leased Bases in Newfoundland, Modifying Agreement of Mar. 27, 1941.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2572. Pub. 4850. 5 pp. 5¢.

Exchange of notes between the United States and the United Kingdom—Signed at Washington Feb. 13 and Mar. 19, 1952.

**Consular Officers, Exemption from Customs Duties and Related Taxes.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2577. Pub. 4863. 4 pp. 5¢.

Exchange of notes between the United States and Chile—Signed at Washington Mar. 12, Apr. 16, and May 12, 1952.

**Technical Cooperation, Education Program.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2583. Pub. 4880. 3 pp. 5¢.

Exchange of notes between the United States and Libya—Dated at Tripoli Apr. 30 and May 20, 1952.

**Technical Cooperation, Assurances under Mutual Security Act of 1951.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2624. Pub. 4847. 4 pp. 5¢.

Exchange of notes between the United States and Afghanistan—Dated at Kabul Jan. 2 and 24, 1952.

**United States Educational Commission in Sweden.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2653. Pub. 4925. 11 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Sweden—Signed at Stockholm Nov. 20, 1952.

**Mexican Agricultural Workers, Amending and Extending Agreement of Aug. 11, 1951.** Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2531. Pub. 4921. 6 pp. 5¢.

Exchange of notes between the United States and Mexico—Signed at México Jan. 10 and 31, Feb. 8, Mar. 31, and Apr. 9, 1952.

**Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of American States.** International Organization and Conference Series 11, American Republics 10. Pub. 4928. 88 pp. 25¢.

A brief summary of the activities of the Fourth Meeting, held at Washington Mar. 26 to Apr. 7, 1951.

### Check List of Department of State Press Releases: June 15-19, 1953

Releases may be obtained from the Office of the Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Press releases issued prior to June 15 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 310 of June 9, 312 of June 11 and 315 of June 12.

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